Unconventional Warfare in East Tennessee, 1861-1865

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I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Paul A. Whelan entitled "Unconventional Warfare in East Tennessee, 1861-1865." I have examined the final electronic copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in History.

LeRoy P. Graf, Major Professor

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S. J. Folmsbee, Ralph W. Haskins

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(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
March 6, 1963

To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Paul A. Whelan entitled "Unconventional Warfare in East Tennessee, 1861-1865." I recommend that it be accepted for nine quarter hours of credit in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in History.

Le Roy P. Shuf
Major Professor

We have read this thesis and recommend its acceptance:

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Accepted for the Council:

[Signature]
Dean of the Graduate School
UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN EAST TENNESSEE,
1861-1865

A Thesis
Presented to
the Graduate Council of
The University of Tennessee

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by:
Paul A. Whelan
March, 1963
PREFACE

President John F. Kennedy, in a speech to the 1962 graduating class at West Point, mentioned a type of warfare which has become particularly important today. He observed:

This is another type of warfare—new in its intensity, ancient in its origin—war by guerillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins—war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression—seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.¹

This study proposes to examine the Civil War in East Tennessee in the light of what we know about unconventional warfare today. As the name unconventional would imply, the records of such activities are scarce. As a result, many of the facts have had to be pieced together from local histories, memoirs, letters, newspaper accounts, and stories told by the descendants of a number of the participants. Most of their stories have lost nothing in the retelling over the several generations which have elapsed since the Civil War; verification is impossible. Use of such stories has been limited to assisting the author in attempting to get a feeling for the times.

This study will employ some terms and ideas which are specifically the tools of the military historian. These are likely to be unfamiliar to the reader not intimately associated with them. Hence it seems advisable to have available definitions of some of the more important terms.

Appendix I contains a glossary of these terms which are especially related to unconventional warfare and which will be used in this study.

There is still a controversy among historians as to the type of conflict that was fought between 1861 and 1865. But there is no doubt about the fact that it was a war, and, for the purpose of this study, war may be defined as "... a violent interaction between two organized political groups (governments or otherwise)." Warfare is a particular variety of military activity involving specific forces, weapons, or tactics. It need not employ all of a participant's capability, nor is it necessary for that part which is employed to conform to any specific proportion or to be used according to any set pattern. Any war may be fought by using any form of warfare to the degree which each antagonist assumes will result in victory for his particular cause. Unconventional warfare may be defined as that method of warfare used by the indigenous people of an area in opposition to an enemy occupying force. The effort is usually supported and directed from outside the zone of conflict by a government friendly to those who are resisting. In unconventional warfare there are three major components: guerrilla activities, evasion and escape, and subversion. The technical requirements of all three have a


common basis, and in Appendix II are discussed in detail from the point of view of guerrilla operations.

This study is divided into six chapters. In the first, unconventional warfare is related to the Civil War background with attention to the problem of its legitimacy as a method of warfare. In the succeeding three chapters, unconventional warfare, as it unfolded in East Tennessee between 1861 and 1865, is presented in some detail. Chapter two sets the background and ends with Colonel S. P. Carter's raid in early 1861. Chapter three continues the narrative through General Ambrose Burnside's successful occupation of Knoxville in late 1863. The fourth chapter considers the remaining years of the war. Chapter five is devoted to escapes involving East Tennessee throughout the war. The concluding chapter summarizes the war in East Tennessee from the viewpoint of unconventional warfare.

I wish to express my sincere thanks to all of those who have helped and encouraged me in this undertaking. My special thanks to Professor LeRoy P. Graf who directed this study and to Professors Stanley J. Folmsbee and Ralph W. Haskins who patiently gave their time and valuable suggestions. However, for the final product I must assume full responsibility.
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CHAPTER I

A CONSIDERATION OF UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE

The twentieth century, marked by the Communist Revolution, by two world wars, and by the advent of nuclear power, has produced a renewed interest in all aspects of unconventional warfare. In fact, the interest has been so universal among military forces that perhaps it is losing the distinction of being considered unconventional.\(^1\) Widespread consideration of this type of warfare really began with the World War II resistance movements.\(^2\) The Russian peasants resisting Hitler's drive to the heart of Russia gained international acclaim. As fascinating and courageous as their efforts were, it was left to a little-known Chinese Communist leader, Mao Tse-Tung, who stunned the Western world with a strategic guerrilla victory over the Nationalist government in 1948, to focus attention upon the importance of irregular forces in warfare.\(^3\)

I.

Unconventional warfare is no substitute for the orthodox

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\(^1\)John Forth Amory, *Around the Edge of War, A New Approach To the Problems of American Foreign Policy* (Clarkson N. Potter, New York, 1961), 7-8. The same notion is held by C. M. Woodhouse in his foreward to Otto Heilbrunn's *Partisan Warfare* (Frederick A. Praeger, New York, 1962).

\(^2\)Most useful studies of unconventional doctrine, strategy, and tactics have appeared after this period. The studies of T. E. Lawrence and Francis Lieber are notable exceptions to which later reference will be made.

considerations of position and mass movement. Yet, the conventional methods of warfare cannot be fully understood unless the unconventional is considered as an adjunct to it. In it is found the expression of the people in relation to the political connotations involved. With the advent of total war, everything "enemy" becomes a target. The battles between armies in the field are no longer the whole story. Ideologies, resources, and non-combatants become targets. In defense, the people respond with a harassing offensive against the enemy, waged on their own terms. This response of an attacked people is older than formal war or its study.

The Spaniards provided the name by which such a response of a people to invasion is most commonly known. During Napoleon's victorious march through Spain in 1808, the Spanish army disintegrated in the face of the onslaught. It reorganized itself into small independent units which were self-sustaining in limited actions. To identify this force, the Spanish attached the suffix for small (illa) to their word for war, guerra. Thus the new term guerrilla, "small war," was coined.

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Western military thought was slow to recognize the significance of the guerrilla war. Perhaps it was for this reason that Colonel Nemo (a nom de plume in the Revue Militaire Generale of France) claimed: "Regular armies have almost never succeeded in gaining the ascendancy over guerrilla operations of any importance. Perhaps it is because of a subconscious desire to hide this impotence that the great commanders have minimized the role of guerrilla operations."

The traditional military policy of the United States followed the standard European pattern, even though its early experiences indicated a preference for the unorthodox and irregular. A tradition of irregular warfare has existed in this country since its early Colonial days. The Jamestown Colony under Captain John Smith neutralized a vastly superior Indian threat by using accepted guerrilla tactics. The French and Indian Wars provided further training in guerrilla tactics for both

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6 "The Place of Guerrilla Action in War," translated and digested from a copyrighted article by Colonel Nemo in Revue Militaire Generale (France, January, 1957), Military Review, United States Command and General Staff School, XXXVII (November, 1957), 99. (Hereafter Mil. Rev., U.S.) Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, 14, credits the guerrilla as being "... almost invested with the nimbus of invincibility." Virgil Ney remarks, "Guerrilla warfare ... mocks the formality which is the hallmark of the traditional military profession." Guerrilla Warfare, 5.


Colonial and British troops. The lessons of fire and maneuver, cover and concealment were well known by the English-speaking forces on the continent long before the American Revolution. Volunteer bands of patriots under Marion, Sumter, Pickens, and others virtually won the South for the revolutionary government. All of these actions offered valuable lessons in the art of unconventional warfare, but none paralleled the modern military technique quite so closely as those which developed during the American Civil War. Individual irregulars, particularly of the Confederacy, have had their apologists. The names of Forrest, Mosby, Morgan, Quantrill, and scores of local personalities are well known. Some are excellent studies, but other more panegyric works seem to have had little influence on the traditional military interpretations of the war. Perhaps it is because preoccupation with mass movements and technological advances has until very recent times not demanded a study of any other threat than maximum military force.


11Jac Weller, "The Irregular War In the South," Military Affairs, XXIV (Fall, 1960), 135.

12As of this writing, a close check of the many new studies of the Civil War, as well as Thomas J. Pressly's very fine Americans Interpret Their Civil War (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1954), has failed to reveal any concerted effort to explain the significance of guerrilla fighting in the war. The above is also available in paperback (Collier Books, New York, 1962).
The peculiarities associated with guerrilla warfare need some clarification before applying them to the situation in East Tennessee. In the larger sense, unconventional warfare is a politico-military struggle having as its target the total war-making capability of an enemy. The key elements are the population and their reaction to the conflict. Men schooled in the art of warfare are not impressed with what they consider an improper, if not ungentlemanly, way to fight. As time has passed it has become increasingly clear that there are rules in unconventional warfare every bit as demanding as those on the conventional battlefield, rules which must be mastered if victory is to be won.

Guerillas and partisans are the practitioners of this art and it is well to understand how they fight. Generally, an undesirable political situation prompts a response of opposition from some of the more politically active of the population. Armed with a cause, employing propaganda and direct action, a nucleus of irregulars seeks to draw others into the movement. If the occupying government fails to stifle the activity at the outset, the irregulars will attract more adherents until they are strong enough to pose a threat to the formal authority. As they expand their organization and activities, their very presence poses a strategic threat to their opponents.

The tactics used range from simple sabotage to attacking supply depots, from assassinations to raids, and from aiding enemy deserters to helping friendly escapees rejoin their army. The emphasis is on

\[13\] For a more detailed study of Unconventional Warfare Operations, Doctrine, and Tactics, see Appendix II.
inventiveness, ingenuity, and simplicity in all things. The rule for
attack is never openly to engage the enemy. If there is time for the
enemy to react defensively, the action must cease. The pattern is to
strike, retreat and strike again, keeping the enemy continually off
balance and allowing him no rest.

The missions undertaken by irregular units, either singularly or
in groups, must impair the enemy's combat effectiveness, reduce his war
potential, attack his morale, or subvert his will to fight; failing in
any of these, the action should be avoided. In unconventional warfare,
success or failure has only two measurements—the disruption caused the
enemy and the loyalty of the population to the irregulars. Both must be
obtained to win.

At the heart of any resistance movement are dedicated men with
 stamina and knowledge of the area in which they fight. Their life is
unnatural, brutal, and severe. The unconventional warfare they embrace
comes very close to demanding of them a primitive state of life in which
the jungle law of the survival of the fittest prevails. In this fight,
stealth, surprise, cunning, and deceit are the irregular's constant com-
panions. These traits are as ready to destroy him as he hopes they will
his enemy. When he uses them in concert with others, he embraces a
clandestine way of life and hopes for a better future. For the individ-
ual, there is little that is real except his goal, and with time even
this becomes obscure. T. E. Lawrence emphasized this point when he said
that underground movements are more in the nature of "... an influence,
an idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back,
drifting about like a gas."  

Irregular warfare has often been dismissed by historians as either an unfit or unimportant subject. Changing conditions, however, have prompted modern scholars to revise this approach and to attempt to weave such combat into the historical pattern. A new importance is seen in the response of a people to the turmoil and disruption caused by unconventional warfare. A whole society may be radically changed or permanently disfigured as the people react to the resulting abnormal pressures of direct participation.

The people of East Tennessee were confronted with just such a situation in 1861. Against the backdrop of a conventional war and the peculiar political situation of the time, their reaction seems particularly significant today because some of the problems they faced a century ago now challenge the world. But of more intrinsic value to the student of history is the opportunity to view a well-known situation from a slightly different perspective, thereby providing one more opportunity to try to understand the past as it really was.

II.

The struggle to establish the legitimacy of unconventional warfare

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was a problem at the outset of the Civil War even as it has been in modern times. Both the Union and Confederate governments found it necessary to cope with the questions concerning the employment and treatment of irregular forces. Confederate thinking was far in advance of that of the Union leaders in this sphere. Even before a shot was fired, private citizens were advocating the formation of irregulars to hamper a Federal invasion.\textsuperscript{17} The Confederate authorities, however, were reluctant to sanction irregular forces. In June, 1861, General Robert E. Lee advised a Virginia regimental commander against equipping such a unit. On the 27th of March, 1862, the Virginia General Assembly did authorize such a force of from 10 to 20 companies of 100 men each to be organized in the same manner and paid as the Confederate Army. President Davis expanded the idea to include all of the Confederacy, and on April 21, 1862, he authorized partisan bands and granted them governmental recognition. Almost immediately pressure was brought to bear to curtail the formation of these irregular forces. The adventure and lack of formality which they offered seriously hampered normal recruiting. Despite official pressures, by mid-September, 1862, eight southern states possessed irregular units. But the concept was still unacceptable to professional military men. General Henry Heth, commanding the District of Lewisburg, viewed such groups as:

\begin{quote}
.. organized bands of robbers and murderers. .. They do as they please—go where they please. The effects of this organization upon
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{17} Carl E. Grant, "Partisan Warfare, Model 1861-1865," \textit{Mil. Rev.}, \textit{U. S.}, XXXVIII (November, 1958), 42.
the volunteering has been very injurious. Many, especially the worthless, like the privilege of fighting, as they say, on their own responsibility, which interpreted means roaming over the country, taking what they want and doing nothing.\(^{18}\)

Other reports from field officers told the same story, but even as late as February, 1863, units were still being activated, though official policy stated the contrary.\(^{19}\)

Meanwhile, Union forces were being instructed to deal with anyone engaging in guerrilla warfare "... according to the severest rules of military law."\(^{20}\) On the 22nd of December, 1861, General Henry W. Halleck decreed the death penalty for irregulars in the Department of the Missouri.\(^{21}\) He included anyone who aided "insurgent rebels," holding them pecuniarily liable for United States property destroyed. On the 7th of April, 1862, General John C. Fremont issued orders to annihilate the guerrillas in the Mountain District.\(^{22}\) By July, Generals Ulysses Grant


\(^{19}\)On the 3rd of January, 1863, James A. Seddon, who succeeded George W. Randolph as Confederate Secretary of War, reported that though reluctant to disband existing units, no more would be formed. Special Order Number 13, Adjutant and Inspector General's Office, issued three weeks later, authorized Major Wicks to form a partisan unit. Grant, "Partisan Warfare," 45; \textit{O.R.}, Ser. IV, Vol. 2, pp. 4-5, 31, 71-72.

\(^{20}\)Cited in Grant, "Partisan Warfare," 47.


\(^{22}\)General Orders No. 11, Headquarters Mountain Department, April 7, 1862, \textit{ibid.}, Ser. I, Vol. 51, Pt. 1, p. 568.
and Grenville M. Dodge were doing the same in Tennessee. The war behind the war was becoming intensely bitter and confused.

A status needed to be established for guerrilla forces with respect to the laws and customs of war. In the North, during the summer of 1862, General Halleck initiated a study of the problem. He wrote Doctor Francis Lieber, professor of history and political economy at Columbia College, a recognized authority on the usages and customs of war, asking him to make public his views on guerrilla warfare. Lieber's reply was brief but lucid, and was in the form of an article entitled "Guerilla Parties Considered with Reference To the Laws and Usages of War. . . ." The professor noted that writers of the laws of war had neglected the irregulars, and as a result the term guerrilla was often misused, which resulted in confusion. He sought to distinguish among the various types of irregular activities, to define them, and to accord to each certain specific rights according to category. Guerrillas, he felt, were armed men, not an integral part of an organized army, who raided, destroyed, massacred, and who characteristically gave no quarter. This

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24 In August, Lincoln recalled Halleck from the field to assume the duties and title of General in Chief of the Army. No field commander, the general was an apt military theorist and the year before had published his International Law or Rules Regulating the Intercourse of States in Peace and War, which was highly regarded in military circles. Frank Freidel, Francis Lieber, Nineteenth Century Liberal (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1947), 324.

placed them outside the rules of war. Partisans he regarded as detached parts of the army. If they did not pillage or refuse to give quarter, they were to be treated as any other regular soldier. A uniform was no requirement. Any clothes were acceptable so long as disguise or concealment was not the intent. Brigands, detached soldiers who robbed or attacked the enemy without or against authority, were to be put to death. Spies, war rebels who renewed war in an occupied territory, and conspirators planning to renew war, were also subject to the extreme penalty.

Lieber viewed bushwhackers, whom the Confederates tried to justify as "citizens of this Confederacy who have taken up arms to defend their homes and families," as not legally falling into a status which would warrant their being considered as prisoners of war merely because they had taken up arms in summons to a Confederate proclamation. 26

Lieber tried to formulate a rule of reason for the treatment of guerrillas and bushwhackers. If they were captured in fair fight and open warfare, they should be prisoners of war until definite crimes or killing of captives was proved against them. 27 If they were captured in a district fairly occupied by military force or in the rear of the army, they were clearly brigands and not prisoners of war. Lieber was not certain how his theories would apply in a civil war inasmuch as municipal

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26 Cited in Grant, "Partisan Warfare," 47. See also the exchange of letters between George W. Randolph and John B. Clark which explains the Confederate position in this matter. Frank Moore, The Rebellion Record, A Diary of American Events (11 vols., plus supplement, New York, 1861-1868), Supplement (Doc. No. 66), 362.

27 Freidel, Lieber, 330.
law would have to be considered. However, he admonished in closing: "So much is certain, that no army, no society, engaged in war, any more than a society at peace, can allow unpunished assassination, robbery, and devastation, without the deepest injury to itself and disastrous consequences which might change the very issue of the war."28 Field commanders were quick to see the significance of Lieber's definitions and, choosing to ignore this technicality, issued them as general orders in all departments.

The first occasion to apply Lieber's concepts arose in the prisoner of war exchange issue. Although there had been a number of prisoners released early in the war on parole, there were no formal discussions on exchange until February 23, 1862. The primary reason for this delay was that the United States did not consider the Confederacy as a nation; therefore any negotiations would be tantamount to official recognition. Meetings had taken place only between military representatives. In July, an agreement as to terms and points of exchange was finally reached by the two governments. And it was not until October of 1862 that representatives for each side were selected and the armies got down to the serious business of putting the cartel of July 22 into effect. The status of partisans had been an issue from the start. Mr. Robert Ould, the Confederate representative, insisted that they be treated as any other soldier and included in the exchange. Lieutenant

Colonel W. H. Ludlow, the Union agent, did not agree with the southern viewpoint, and the negotiations reached a deadlock. By coincidence, General Robert E. Lee had just written to George W. Randolph, the Confederate Secretary of War, informing him of the capture of a number of Union prisoners by Colonel John D. Imboden's partisans. These captives were being retained until some of Imboden's men who were Union prisoners were included on the list of those eligible for exchange. The Secretary passed this information on to Mr. Ould with the instructions to "... inform the agent of the United States that prisoners taken by our partisan corps will not be exchanged until the enemy consents to exchange such of the partisans as fall into their hands." Ludlow took the problem to the Union authorities. Finally, on November 20, he was allowed to inform Mr. Ould that prisoners from irregular units would be exchanged as any other soldier. The same day all units under the Department of Virginia received a circular in which Ludlow announced that "... the body of Confederate troops known by the designation of partisan rangers and whose officers are commissioned by the Confederate government and who are regularly in the service of the Confederate States are to be exchanged when captured."  

The bickering over the status of those involved in unconventional warfare did not stop here despite the simple and straightforward language Ludlow used in the circular. Official correspondence continued to be exchanged which clearly emphasized the basic point of contention and

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30 _Ibid.,_ 739.
disagreement between the two sides. The line of demarcation between partisan operations and guerrilla warfare was not distinct. Attempts to codify the rules of war continued in the North, and finally reached fruition with the publication of War Department General Orders 100 on April 24, 1863, under the title "Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field." 31

These directions constitute the first comprehensive codification of the laws of war. 32 Essentially, it was a handbook on how American soldiers would conduct themselves in war. It laid down rules concerning the protection of civilians, their rights, and their property. It provided commanders with specific guides as to who fell under military jurisdiction and under what circumstances. Military authorities and experts on international law alike lauded it. Chief Justice Chase of the United States Supreme Court found that it warranted high praise. After the war it was used as the basis of an international code of war which in turn led to the Hague Convention of 1899 and 1907. "The historical importance of the code of instruction is evidenced by the fact that it

31 Ibid., Ser. II, Vol. 5, pp. 671-682. This order remained in effect until the eve of World War I when it was replaced by Field Manual 27-10, Rules of Land Warfare. For a discussion of this order and its effects to the modern day see Freidel, Lieber, 334-41. General Halleck had prematurely issued the parts concerning parole and exchange under General Orders 49, O.R., Ser. II, Vol. 5, pp. 306-07. For Lieber's code see Congressional Globe, 37 Cong., 3 Sess., 1179, 1323; 38 Cong., 1 Sess., 262. The revised articles of war failed to pass Congress; so this is the only record available. The military version of the rules of land warfare is printed in full in O.R., Ser. III, Vol. 3, pp. 148-64.

32 Freidel, Lieber, 339-40; Frank Freidel, "General Order 100 and Military Government," MVHR, XXXII (March, 1946), 555-56.
remained in force until the eve of World War I when it was superseded in 1914 by the Rules of Land Warfare.\textsuperscript{33}

Almost immediately after the order was published, Mr. Ould wanted a clarification as to when it applied to each side.\textsuperscript{34} He wished to use certain acceptable portions of it against the Federal Government to gain an advantage for the Confederacy from the exchange program. The Confederate Government initially tried to make propaganda use of the order, but this soon stopped as they became occupied with the more pressing problem of defending Vicksburg. Three important accomplishments may be attributed to the order. It met the need for some kind of guidance which heretofore had been lacking. It resulted in a limited Union gain insofar as it reduced certain abuses in exchange and parole which had benefited the Confederacy.\textsuperscript{35} Finally, it served as a face-saving device for the Union in that prisoners could be exchanged without according formal recognition to the Confederate Government.\textsuperscript{36}

The Confederate Government meanwhile was having a difficult time maintaining the status of their partisan units. All through 1863, continual criticism was levied against them. In January, 1864, new charges of terror tactics and plunder again brought these units under official

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{33}Grant, "Partisan Warfare," 52.
\item \textsuperscript{34}William Best Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, A Study in War Psychology (Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1930), 95; O.R., Ser. II, Vol. 6, p. 744.
\item \textsuperscript{35}Ibid., Ser. II, Vol. 4, p. 946; Vol. 6, pp. 32-33.
\item \textsuperscript{36}Freidel, Lieber, 337.
\end{itemize}
Their activities had become too open and were too often criticized to be allowed to enjoy further official recognition. On February 17, 1864, the Confederate Congress repealed the Act of April, 1862, which had authorized the forming of partisan units.

Meanwhile, unconventional activities continued throughout the battle zones. Commanders on both sides still took the pragmatic view of destroying guerrillas, partisans, and irregulars who, for their part, continued to wreak havoc upon the enemy whenever and wherever possible. Officials on both sides seemed keenly aware of the dangers inherent in unconventional warfare, and they made herculean efforts to legislate it into containment. But, from an overall standpoint, resistance was still in the hands of the people and they decreed that it would continue. Under these conditions, a "protracted conflict" was a natural resultant.

Somehow the fact had been overlooked that "... the deciding factor in war—the power to sue for peace—was [in the Civil War] transferred [sic] from government to people and that peace-making was a product of revolution." By their individual and collective acts on

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both sides, irregular forces demonstrated that this war was more than army confronting army; it was also people against people, idea against idea. It was a totality of commitment from which one side would emerge as the victor, having completely crushed the will of the other. By tacit approval, no quarter was to be given. The idea was old, but the application was modern in every sense.

In East Tennessee, unconventional warfare was a choice made by those most directly affected--those confronted with a force which to their way of thinking intended to deprive them of their place in the Union. The threat to them was real. So was their resistance. Resorting to force seemed to be the sure way to hold out against the enemy until outside aid could reach them and with overpowering force drive the enemy out and preserve their ideology. The feeling of oppression was spontaneous and it involved a high degree of emotionalism. Many lessons had to be learned by trial and error, and the years between 1861 and 1865 were to be trying ones for this isolated region.

41Ibid., 99.
Three quarters of the way through the eighteenth century, the New England colonies embarked upon the uncertain venture of establishing a nation. By 1789, its predicted failure no longer seemed certain, yet the European nations were still unwilling to concede that its avowed republican principles could endure. If by some quirk of fate the stated aims of the United States did succeed, then this new nation would serve as a threat to the social structure upon which the European empires were founded. The differences in political systems openly conflicted upon the high seas, and the result was the War of 1812. By no stretch of the imagination could a great military victory be claimed by the United States. Far more precious though was the tacit recognition that the United States was actually a sovereign nation fully recognized as such among the European powers of the day. "It marked the beginning of America as a truly independent power... Now Americans looked westward... State after state was added to the Union."\(^1\) New political alliances were formed. The Federalist Party was eclipsed by a rising flood of nationalism. The nation became aware of itself, and sections soon found grounds to differ as deeply among themselves as the country

had with foreign powers. No longer was the question one of whether we should be free, but rather of whether we should be free together or as separate entities. The controversy became more bitter by the mid-nineteenth century. Violent demonstration replaced compromise. National interests degenerated into provincial sectionalism; unyielding and bitterly absolute. Unity dissolved as the nation's president-elect clandestinely entered Washington on the night of February 22, 1861.²

Embarrassment and derision though were not Mr. Lincoln's main problem. He faced a Confederate government representative of a new South which viewed the abolition of slavery as a direct threat to its economic survival.³ On March 4, 1861, Jefferson Davis, recently elected president of the Confederacy, raised a new flag over the capitol building in Montgomery, Alabama.⁴ Lincoln refused to recognize the existence of a new nation. "He considered the Union unbroken, no matter what had been said and done at Charleston, at Montgomery, or elsewhere, and he would act on the assumption that the states that said they were out of the Union were eternally in it."⁵ Peace was impossible, and the focal point became Fort


³Ibid., 235.


Sumter. When General P. G. T. Beauregard's artillery batteries shelled the fort on the morning of April 12, 1861, the Civil War began. Before it was over, many old ideas about warfare would be discarded and many new ones tried. During the next four years war would change and become modern.

The Confederate strategy was to defend the South rather than to attack the North, whereas Federal forces were obliged to attack the South in order to preserve the Union. Thus the Federal Army had to fight the enemy on his terms and in his territory. The deeper the Federal forces penetrated into the Confederacy, the more vulnerable their supply lines became. Partisan bands of hostile Southerners harassed the Federal rear, disrupting communications and destroying supplies. Federal military commanders were not prepared for such warfare. They would discover that:

Nothing is more terrible than partisan warfare, and every partisan war has been a long war in spite of the superiority in regular formation of the invading side. In short, the problem of partisan warfare is very similar to the maintenance of law and order during peace time—it normally takes ten or more policemen to catch an armed criminal, but seldom more than one armed criminal to do down a policeman.

Thus, as the Union Army advanced, its strength diminished. Half the army was noncombative—guarding lines of communication, on leave, sick, or on special detail. The South, on the other hand, could contest every foot of territory at full strength as they had no rear to defend.

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7Ibid., 47.
Mass was clearly on their side. Under these circumstances, the task of Federal authorities was to create a Southern rear. The National Army moved down the Mississippi, eastward through Chattanooga and Atlanta to Savannah, and then north to Richmond. In effect, a huge right flank wheel extending over a thousand miles and taking three years to accomplish created a rear and was decisive. Sherman held George D. Johnston in North Carolina while Grant's pressure pounded Lee's army to defeat.

While this grand strategy was evolving and the nation reluctantly came to accept a long conflict as inevitable, Tennessee faced a problem that a hundred years later would plague many of the world's smaller nations—unconventional warfare.

During the turbulent period before the April 15th call for troops, Tennessee, being a border state like Kentucky, tended to favor the preservation of the Union. Within the state, however, there were pressures at work to influence the state to follow the Confederacy. Isham G. Harris, who had come to the governorship in 1857, proved to be the leader of this movement. His pro-southern sympathies were well known, but, in view of the state's position in the 1860 presidential election, there seemed little to fear from his influence. The vote recorded an

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9 Fuller, Grant, 48.
10 Mary Emily Robertson Campbell, The Attitude of Tennesseans Toward the Union, 1847-1861 (Vantage Press, New York, 1961), 199.
apparent anti-secession majority of 16,000.\textsuperscript{12} When Governor Harris attempted to call a convention to settle the relationship between state and Federal governments, his effort was defeated. Undaunted, Harris continued to ally with the Confederate cause and sought to put the power of the state into that camp. There seemed little hope that the state might be successfully maneuvered away from the Union until the President's call for volunteers gave Harris the opportunity to defy openly the call, replying that: "Tennessee will not furnish a single man for the purpose of coercion, but 50,000 if necessary, for the defense of our rights and those of our Southern brethren."\textsuperscript{13} He called a special legislative session which, at his bidding, entered into a military league with the Confederacy. By this act the political structure of the state remained associated with the Union, but its entire military capability was placed in the hands of Jefferson Davis.\textsuperscript{14} Earlier, the governor had authorized the raising of a provisional force for the protection of the state, and had with foresight stationed 15 companies of the force in Knoxville to

\textsuperscript{12}The vote was Breckinridge (Southern Democrat), 64,809; Bell (Constitutional Unionist), 69,176; Douglas (Northern Democrat), 11,330. Weston Arthur Goodspeed, History of Tennessee From the Earliest Time To the Present (The Goodspeed Publishing Co., Nashville, 1886), 777. No one candidate ran on a policy of disunity, but, of the three, Breckinridge was the only advocate of Southern rights, which were to be defended at any cost. John D. Hicks, The Federal Union (third edition; Houghton Mifflin Co., New York, 1953), 547-48.

\textsuperscript{13}O.R., Ser. III, Vol. 1, p. 81. The original document is in the Tennessee State Archives, Nashville, Tennessee. Governor Harris appears to have changed his mind several times concerning the figure 50,000. 75,000 has been marked out and the above figure substituted. There are several other illegible changes.

\textsuperscript{14}William R. Garrett and Albert V. Goodpasture, History of Tennessee, Its People and Its Institutions From Its Earliest Times To the Year 1903 (The Brandon Co., Nashville, 1903), 536.
preclude any trouble from this section of the state. The majority of voters in West and Middle Tennessee favored the Confederacy two to one, while the reverse was true in East Tennessee. The only thing remaining to take Tennessee out of the Union was the technicality of the popular vote which was arranged for the eighth of June. For all intents and purposes, Tennessee was Confederate.

Most Tennesseans refused to go along with the governor or the majority popular vote. To the Southerner, such a refusal was treasonable, and to the Unionist heroic. Those espousing the Southern cause thought East Tennessee Unionists inconsistent in advocating that secession was illegal and then advocating the secession of East Tennessee from the rest of the state. On the other hand, East Tennesseans felt that it was Middle and West Tennessee who were at fault while they sought only to maintain the status quo. Sectionalism had long been a problem in the state, and many argued that the eastern section of the state merely used the war as a pretext to carry out a policy of separate statehood which had been advocated by Andrew Johnson twenty years earlier. Moreover, slavery was of little interest to East Tennesseans. Their lack of wealth made them feel no sympathy toward a slaveholding aristocracy. Many

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18 Verton M. Queener, "East Tennessee Sentiment and the Secession
also felt a deep dislike of the Democratic Party, which in East Tennessee was associated with secession.

While the governor was busy taking the state out of the Union, East Tennesseans were feverishly trying to prevent it. In February, 1861, when the plan of the governor became evident, T. A. R. Nelson, Horace Maynard, John Baxter, Andrew Johnson, and others began a stump campaign to preserve the Union. 19 By the end of May, a convention in Knoxville indicated that the citizens of East Tennessee wanted no part of secession, and that they fully intended to organize forces to foster the Union. 20 Quietly they went about marshalling their strength in the various counties. By August, Joseph A. Cooper of Carter County had organized and, to some extent, trained 500 men. 21 Soon there were an


19. P. Temple, East Tennessee and the Civil War (Robert Clarke Co., Cincinnati, 1899), 179-223; N. G. Taylor wrote: "Tennessee is for the Union as long as it can be honorably maintained, in other words as long as it lasts." N. G. Taylor to T. A. R. Nelson, Jan. 3, 1861, Nelson Papers (McClung Collection, Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville, Tennessee). See also Merritt, History of Carter County, 165-67; The Express, Jonesboro, Tennessee, July 5, 1861, clipping in Nelson's Scrapbook (McClung Collection, Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville).


estimated 10,000 men ready to resist Confederate encroachment. Their preparedness was doubtful, but their resolute intention to preserve the Union was clear to all. East Tennessee Unionists had no intention of leaving the Union, an idea they expressed at a Convention held in Greeneville on the 17th of June. Unlike the earlier protest meeting at Knoxville, this was an ultimatum. For those who could read the signs, it was the beginning of an open revolt. Six months earlier, Dan Worley had written his daughter from Bull's Gap that in Knoxville there was constant dread of insurrection over the secession issue.

On the opening day of the Greeneville Convention, T. A. R. Nelson presented to the 296 delegates a paper entitled "A Declaration of Grievances." East Tennesseans, it declared, would not join the Confederacy. If left alone, no violence would result; if not left alone, the Federal Government would be asked to send military aid immediately. If any delegate was threatened or any East Tennessean jeopardized in any way, retaliation by force would be swift. The final provision authorized the raising of forces to back the stand taken by the Convention delegates.

These were impossible conditions for a secession-minded government

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23Dan Worley to his daughter (unnamed), 14 Dec. 1860, Kingsley Roswell Letters, 1850-1885 (Special Collections, University of Tennessee Library, Knoxville).


to meet. If their cause was to succeed, they needed absolute support from all of the people to justify their position. Resistance in any form would be a sign of Confederate weakness; a display of a fatal flaw in the fabric of the Confederate argument.

That the Greeneville Convention was allowed to meet, it has been said, reflected the Confederates' desire to maintain peace and order in East Tennessee and to be as benevolent as possible in carrying out their policies.26 Actually, there was nothing else they could do. Humanitarianism was hardly their motivating factor; the decisive motivation was military expediency. The Unionists of East Tennessee felt themselves on firm ground for several reasons. First, technically Governor Harris had separated Tennessee from the United States following a "Declaration of Independence" rather than by secession. Under the circumstances, he could not reasonably deny a section of the state a similar right. In addition, the Confederates championed States' rights. To deny either principle to part of the state was to deny the validity of their whole cause and they would not dare to do this, particularly since they would


The author argues that Union resistance forced the Confederates to abandon their benevolent policy toward East Tennessee. This fails to take into account the principle of occupation as being untenable to the people regardless of the means employed to carry it out. A people were having an unwanted political structure imposed upon them when by vote they had indicated it as undesirable. Legal means of being heard had been thwarted; so to them active resistance seemed to be the only answer. Confederate occupation, regardless of its application, they felt, was unwarranted, and they moved to thwart it. The Confederates, on the other hand, felt they could do nothing else. They could not permit an area of enemy strength to exist within their very heartland; so they sought to remove it, if for no other reason than survival. Thus was laid the political foundation for an unconventional war to develop.
have to depend heavily upon the righteous image they created. They could ill afford to create a hypocritical picture to the world, especially since they sought aid for their cause from other countries. It would not look good to suppress internally the very thing they sought to gain.

Secondly, applying force upon East Tennessee would be duly noted in other uncommitted border states and sections at a time when the Confederate Government desperately sought to recruit these states into their fold. A precedent of forceful compliance was hardly the thing to use to win sympathy from the unaligned. Third, the use of force to combat resistance now would be ill timed. The Confederate Government desperately needed time to organize and solidify its policy. Its troops lacked training and skill, being at this time little more than a mob with a common cause. To provoke armed resistance would be virtual suicide and could fracture irreparably the image of unity they sought to present.

Fourth, in the early days of the war, military position was of paramount importance. East Tennessee was a strategic bottleneck, a fact which had not escaped the notice of either side. From the Southern point of view, the railroad which passed through the valley was a vital lifeline of communication joining the distant parts of the Confederacy.

The link between Richmond and Montgomery had to be kept open at all cost to preserve the territorial integrity of the new government. Its loss would

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mean that troops and equipment from the Gulf states would have to detour hundreds of miles around the mountains by way of Atlanta and Charlotte before they could be moved north. The Union forces, and in particular President Lincoln, saw the area as one which, if completely controlled, could effectively divide the rebellious states into two separate groups and destroy any hope of presenting a formidable, unified force against the country. Each little pocket could be quickly put down before the whole insurrection reached a state of warfare. The strategy then of both sides became one of denying the use of East Tennessee to the other. The Union would have to supply outside aid quickly to the men of the area before the Southern occupation became too strongly entrenched. Since the Confederates could ill afford to provoke the inhabitants, they had little choice but to move cautiously, hoping to gain support by diplomacy rather than force.

By April, 1861, it seemed certain to the East Tennesseans that help in the form of General Buell's forces was on the way. Both General McClellan and Lincoln himself were anxious to come to the aid of the beleaguered mountain people. Both believed that an early show of force would guarantee control of this strategic area and deprive the Confederates of a necessary communication link. This view seemed reasonable inasmuch as Lincoln still viewed the issue as one of a rebellion to be


contained rather than as a full-scale war to be won. Buell in the field faced an entirely different issue, that of overextending his supply lines in an area vulnerable to enemy interdiction. Realizing that at best his move would be but a gesture inviting expulsion at the enemy's whim, he did nothing, which in the end analysis was probably worse than a gesture.

It soon became evident that resistance was to be determined not by Confederate occupation policy but by the basic ideology of the area--the desire to remain in the Union. To many, state Confederate troops in the Knoxville area since April were a constant source of irritation.\(^\text{30}\) Ostensibly, these were provisional troops for state protection. But, to the East Tennessee Unionists, they were the enemy. Probably no matter what policy the Confederates had pursued, it would have been ineffectual in stemming the overall attitude favoring resistance. The concept of national loyalty was too deeply ingrained in the minds and hearts of these mountain people to be neutralized by a few conciliatory gestures.\(^\text{1}\)

At the Greeneville Convention, secret agreements had been made with Robert K. Byrd (Roane County), Joseph A. Cooper (Campbell County), R. E. Edwards (Bradley County), S. C. Langeley (Morgan County), and others secretly to train and organize a force of 500 men.\(^\text{31}\) By July 1, the Adjutant-General in Washington had detailed Lieutenant William Nelson to recruiting duty in East Tennessee. Not only was he to raise a force, but he was to deliver 10,000 arms to be used in the area.\(^\text{32}\) General


\(^{31}\) O. P. Temple, Notable Men of Tennessee, 104.

McClellan, with his army in Virginia, felt that if these arms were delivered, he could break through into East Tennessee and "...break the backbone of secession." That the Confederates were aware that arms and men were ready to be sent into East Tennessee is evidenced in the following letter:

I came through East Tennessee today. There is truly [sic] great disaffection with these people. It is currently reported and believed that Johnson has made an arrangement at Cincinnati to send 10,000 guns into East Tennessee and that they have actually been shipped through Kentucky to Nicholasville, and are to be handed over there to near the Kentucky line and placed in the hands of Union men in Kentucky on the line to be conveyed to Union men in East Tennessee. They openly proclaim that if the Legislature refuses to let them secede they will resist to the death and call upon Lincoln for aid. Nelson, Brownlow, and Maynard are the leaders. If they were out of the way we would be rid of all the trouble. That they will give us trouble I doubt not unless they are promptly delt [sic] with. They rely on aid from Southern Kentucky and Lincoln. You must see Davis and get him to order Floyd down to about Cumberland Gap to intercept these arms if they attempt to cross into Virginia. Governor Harris has ordered one regiment to the various passes on our northern border, but the people here say they are not sufficient. A number of Union Companies are forming and drilling daily in the disaffected districts for the avowed purpose of resistance. Let the Government look closely to this movement. Unless nipped in the bud, it may become very troublesome.

In Haste, yours truly,
Sam. Tate.

The arms for which Johnson and Maynard had so urgently pleaded began arriving in Kentucky about mid-July, and according to plan began


filtering into East Tennessee.\textsuperscript{35} Between 5,000 and 10,000 stands of arms were believed to have been distributed.\textsuperscript{36}

Exaggerations by both sides have made it impossible to determine the exact strength of the resistance movement at this time, and in a sense the question is unimportant. What is important is that the situation seemed serious enough for the Confederates to appoint General Felix K. Zollicoffer commander of the newly formed command in East Tennessee.\textsuperscript{37} Assuming command on July 26, he immediately sent the standard warning of threatened invasion and uprising to Richmond, probably to justify additional manpower.\textsuperscript{38} His warning was heeded, and by mid-September he had a force of 11,457 men.\textsuperscript{39}

Warnings of impending disaster to the Confederate cause continued to reach the Southern capital.\textsuperscript{40} Just as regularly, Unionists in East Tennessee continued to plan a resistance program while they waited for Federal aid from the Union. The continual movement of troops into the area confirmed their worst suspicion that intimidation was the policy of

\textsuperscript{35}James T. Carter to Andrew Johnson, July 15, 1861, Andrew Johnson Papers, University of Tennessee, Knoxville. These papers, currently being edited by Professors LeRoy Graf and Ralph Haskins of the History Department, are being catalogued according to date for easy access.

\textsuperscript{36}Anderson, \textit{Southern Federals}, 30.


\textsuperscript{38}Ibid., 377-78.

\textsuperscript{39}Ibid., 409.

the Southern government. The Athens [Tennessee] Post denied this suspicion, stating on July 26: "We speak by authority in declaring that they [Confederate troops] are not here to intimidate our people . . . they will protect and defend each and every citizen in his rights." Force would only be used in self-defense or if absolutely necessary. 41 This guarantee was of as little significance as was the policy of conciliation which Zollicoffer was directed to pursue. 42 At this juncture, the will to resist was strong among some of the more politically attentive, while the vast majority of the people were apparently indifferent, as is usually the case. Indications were that Union support was on the way. Armies could not be far behind the arms that were coming across the Kentucky border. To the more aggressive East Tennesseans, it seemed only a matter of defying the Confederates for a short while, long enough to reach the area. Morale among the resisters was high, and the whole situation had the aura of an adventurous game of hide and seek. This is not to say the matter was not serious, but merely that the gravity of the situation was not fully realized. There seemed little cause for worry as East Tennesseans demonstrated against Confederate troops and tried to outwit the soldiers' efforts to discover their hidden guns. At Tuckaleechee Cove about 18 miles south of Knoxville, Frederick Emert, who had buried his gun, swore to searching soldiers that he had no gun on this

41 Athens [Tennessee] Post, July 26, 1861.

At various rallying points, Union men began to gather to formulate resistance plans. During one such gathering, near Walland Gap in Blount County, some fifteen hundred people raised the United States flag on a large pole to symbolize their faith in the Union. The Confederates, though, intent upon gaining control of this trouble spot within their lines, had dispatched a cavalry unit under a Lieutenant John White to disarm the mountain men. Upon reaching Maryville, Lieutenant White spent the night in the home of Judge Jesse Wallace, who warned him about the flag and advised him to leave it alone. The next morning, Lieutenant White and his troops moved out in the direction of Tuckaleechee Cove and through the narrow pass paralleling Little River. After marching for several hours, they came to the clearing in the center of which flew the national flag. Some of White's men were about to cut it down when he stopped them. Then, prudently, he formed his troop, saluted the colors, and continued into the mountains. Everywhere they went, the soldiers were cordially received, but they were unable to find any weapons and

43Will A. McTeer, "Among Loyal Mountaineers," Miscellaneous Pamphlets on the Civil War (Special Collections, University of Tennessee Library, Knoxville), 1-4.

44Inez E. Burns, History of Blount County, Tennessee, From War Trail to Landing Strip, 1795-1955 (The Tennessee Historical Commission, Nashville, 1957), 59-60. The same story was reprinted in the Knoxville News-Sentinel, July 18, 1962, written by Hal Boyle, entitled "They Saluted--and Survived." Both accounts probably used the McTeer pamphlet previously cited. The story was verified in its essential details by 97-year-old Robert Weare, who lives near the area and heard the story from his father who participated in the incident. Personal interview with the author, August 19, 1962.
returned empty handed some weeks later to Maryville.

What they did not know at the time they entered Walland Gap was that they were completely surrounded by mountaineers with more than a hundred and fifty rifle sights zeroed in upon them. Had they made one move to desecrate the flag, they would never have left the gap alive. As it was, they were watched, not molested, and allowed to return alive because of the honor they showed the flag.

Similar acts of defiance, preliminaries to irregular warfare, were being carried out over all of East Tennessee. Militarily, such acts were ineffective, but they did serve to crystallize the determination to thwart the Confederate forces.

East Tennessee proved to be an ideal location in which to fight an irregular war, as may be seen by an examination of some of the economic and geographic factors involved.

Guerilla [sic] warfare was nothing new to the people of the Cumberland mountains. Their forebears had been trained to such fighting by Indian warfare and had continued the custom in their personal feuds. It was only natural that this would be the accepted method of battle in this region.45

In these uplands, "... the Union men were usually the mountain men par excellence, the mountaineers among mountaineers, owners of small farms, advocates of strong central government. ..."46 It was they who formed the backbone of resistance. Perhaps they were ignorant, ill-informed, and altogether too simple and naive, viewing things in singularly black

45Thurman Sensing, Champ Ferguson, Confederate Guerilla (Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, 1942), x.

46Dykeman, French Broad, 80.
and white terms. They may have been truculent, haters of change, proud
and overly concerned with the simple life, but they could fight and would
when provoked. Characteristically, these men were "... independent,
passionately devoted to liberty, hardy, brave and so attached to their
mountains that they would rather live in poverty there than in wealth in
cities or even in the plains." They were a people with a cause, able
and willing to fight, providing one of the essential elements of an
unconventional war.

"Parson" Brownlow, a circuit rider preacher now turned political-
editor, was the self-appointed spokesman of these Unionists. He added
the following comment to an already volatile situation: "We can never
live in a Southern Confederacy and be made hewers of wood and drawers of
water for a set of aristocrats and overbearing tyrants. ... We have
no interest in common with the Cotton States. We are a grain-growing and
stock raising people, and we can conduct a cheap government, inhabiting
the Switzerland of America."48

It became clear, as the opposing armies moved into position, that
there was no longer a possibility of compromise; only one side could
emerge as the absolute victor. The war had been preceded by years of
antagonism and propaganda. All sense of moderation had been lost in the
political sphere and so it would be in the coming conflict, evoking in

47 Temple, East Tennessee and the Civil War, 76.

48 Knoxville Whig, January 26, 1861. The same attitude of deter-
mined resistance was reported in Harper's Weekly, XXIII (August, 1861),
405, and in the New York Times, urging help be given to East Tennessee,
on July 6, 1861 and October 16, 1861.
soldier and civilian alike a primitive spirit of tribal fanaticism. Thus, inexorably, events in East Tennessee moved toward unconventional warfare.

East Tennessee differed markedly from the rest of the state in its geographical formations. It was generally composed of a series of high parallel ridges running northeast and southwest, with a series of smaller jagged ridges crossing valleys and breaking the landscape to such a degree that a labyrinth was formed by the position of these crests. The result of this formation was isolated valleys, coves, and hidden passes which favored a defender who knew the country. Forces moving through the area would be further limited from straying from well-used paths by the dense forest and undergrowth characteristic of these low, mature mountains. It might take hours to hack through the vegetation across a valley no wider than a quarter of a mile and with only a five hundred-foot variance in altitude. Movement was further hampered by the lack of roads through the area, the result of two factors. First, the main roads followed closely the paths of the rivers flowing through the valleys; hence they tended to parallel the ridges, avoiding the higher elevations. Most routes crossing the ridges were hardly more than footpaths or animal trails. Second, the funds available for public improvements in the 1830's had been prematurely exhausted on railroad construction; hence there were no turnpikes worthy of the name in the whole section.\(^\text{49}\) The

movement of armies through this country could hardly be made en masse. Travel was possible only in small self-sufficient groups confined to well-defined trails. As a result, an invader could come only with difficulty into the area.

While East Tennessee was remote, ringed by mountain barriers, it enclosed fertile productive fields, a potential granary for the government which controlled it. Comprising all of the territory from the North Carolina boundary to the center of the Cumberland Plateau, it contained 13,112 square miles of territory divided into thirty-four counties.

The scene was set; the battle lines drawn; the forces ready. The native East Tennesseans realized that they held the advantage of mobility and surprise over the regular forces of the Confederacy. They could not be brought to battle unless they desired it. Their knowledge of the countryside, together with their impregnable mountains, provided them both with hiding places and with bases from which to strike. The fact that the population favored resistance erected still another barrier against successful Confederate occupation. The Confederates attempting to win support were forced to continue their policy of restraint. General Zollicoffer repeatedly issued proclamations stating that his aim was but to preserve order and not alienate the people, but all to no avail.


In Carter and Johnson counties, training camps were so obvious that Colonel W. E. Baldwin was sent to disperse them, arrest those who resisted, and, if necessary, kill their leaders. General Zollicoffer ordered Captain McClellan's cavalry detached to help Baldwin. Meanwhile, Captain James Fry was ordered into Greene County to neutralize a Unionist force being trained by a Captain David Fry. These displays of force seemed to quell the spirit of the Unionists in the separate areas, but as quickly as they were quieted in one place, trouble erupted in another.

An indication of these activities may be seen in the work of William Clift of Hamilton County who had taken over a Cumberland Presbyterian meeting ground and was using it as a way station for refugees escaping to the north. Many of the men arriving were being organized into companies and were being armed with the weapons smuggled in from Kentucky. When the state adjutant general, James W. Gillespie, and some 400 men were sent to stop Clift's work, no shots were fired. The "Cross Roads Treaty" between Colonel Clift and General Gillespie was

stated his intention to carry out a policy of conciliation. On the surface, it probably did some good in that it delayed open resistance until late fall, thus giving the Confederates more time to solidify their control over key areas. It did little to stem the tide of resistance.

53 Zollicoffer to W. E. Baldwin, September 1, 1861, ibid., 833.
54 Athens [Tennessee] Post, September 13, 1861.
signed on the 19th of September. Clift promised to stop resistance and to remain loyal and peaceful, while Gillespie promised that there would be no Confederate military intervention into the lives of the inhabitants. 56

Anger was provoked in East Tennessee when the property of those who had fled north was ordered sequestered and Landon C. Haynes was appointed to sell the property. 57 The Enemy Alien Act of August 8, 1861, was also applied by Jefferson Davis to East Tennessee. Its effect was to declare every Unionist an enemy and to label those who had been in Federal territory and returned to East Tennessee as spies or combatants regardless of their status if they were over fourteen years of age. 58 A wave of arrests on any pretext made matters worse. Professing sympathy for the Union was cause enough to be taken into custody. 59 True, many of the cases were thrown out of the civil courts, but the damage had been done; the people had been alienated.

The Confederate forces in the area were reduced after mid-September when Zollicoffer was ordered north toward Kentucky to intercept the Federal force under Buell moving toward Tennessee. 60 Union irregulars


harassed Knoxville and engaged Colonel W. B. Wood's men there. These raids continued with increasing boldness until suddenly, on September 29, they stopped. Guerrillas were demonstrating their power to move and attack at will, a clear indication of their strength. The Confederates were now edgy, and even Zollicoffer was having second thoughts about his soft policy. It was obvious that the Union men sought to drive a wedge more deeply between the Confederate military and the inhabitants. If the military was forced to get tough, the people would resent them more, and those who until this time had been indifferent would by default side with the growing band of Union guerrillas.

Through October and into early November, apprehension continued to mount as the Confederate authorities became increasingly aware of the extent of the discontent in East Tennessee. Conciliation, many felt, had failed. The railroad was in danger of being destroyed, and events proved so critical that General A. S. Johnston ordered two infantry regiments and seven cavalry companies to join Zollicoffer's command. General W. B. Wood expected his two hundred men holding Knoxville to be overwhelmed in a general Unionist uprising and rebellion. "Unionists are talking exultingly of the approach of the Lincoln Army . . . and their intention to join it." Wood needed troops immediately; otherwise the railroad,

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61 W. B. Wood to Zollicoffer, October 28, 1861, ibid., 482.
62 Zollicoffer to W. B. Wood, October 30, 1861, ibid., 490.
63 Ibid., 509-10.
stores, and his commissary might fall into enemy hands. Landon C. Haynes lent his voice of concern by warning Jefferson Davis: "... the railroads will be destroyed, the bridges burned, and other calamities not necessary to mention will follow." Strangely enough, this was the very night chosen by the Unionists to carry out a coordinated attack against all the railroad bridges in East Tennessee in their first organized guerrilla attack.

Planning for the bridge-burning operation and the subsequent link up with regular Federal forces moving into East Tennessee from Kentucky began as early as July, 1861. W. B. Carter of Carter County, a preacher and Union sympathizer, went to Washington with the plan. In conference with President Lincoln, General McClellan, and Secretary of War Stanton, he outlined the two-part program. The nine railroad bridges in East Tennessee along the East Tennessee and Virginia and the East Tennessee and Georgia railroads were to be simultaneously destroyed by indigenous partisan bands. With communications blocked, a strong strike force of Federal regulars would move into the area and take the key military positions from the Confederates. With Federal aid, Unionists in the area would come out of hiding and, once armed, would help with the occupation and en masse join the regular army. The force thus confronting the

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65 Landon C. Haynes to Jefferson Davis, Nov. 8, 1861, ibid., 837-38.
67 Temple, East Tennessee and the Civil War, 370-72, 375-77. The whole incident is described in Chapter XVII, 366-87. See also, Temple, Notable Men of Tennessee, 310.
Confederacy would be formidable; forage was available locally from the abundance of the valley and from captured military stores. In effect, a Union spear would be poised at the heart of the Confederacy ready to strike down the valley toward Montgomery. The Confederacy would be bisected, and they would be deprived not only of the railroad but of the manpower and food available in East Tennessee.

The whole operation was heartily endorsed by the Union authorities, particularly President Lincoln.68 Carter returned south with two regular officers, Captains William Cross and Daniel Fry, to begin preparations. Meanwhile, the army relief force under the command of General George H. Thomas began to move into position in Kentucky.69 Actually, his force was never adequate to accomplish its assigned task, and reflected more a case of political wishful thinking than military realism. Still, Thomas deployed to make as adequate a display as was possible. He intended to take Cumberland Gap, strike Knoxville, and then send troops in both directions along the railroad and hold it against possible counterattack.70 He moved out toward his objective earlier than he had anticipated in late October, an action necessitated by the reported movement of a strong Confederate force under Zollicoffer which had already begun a movement into

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69 Temple, East Tennessee and the Civil War, 371.
Kentucky. The actual size of the force was never fully agreed upon, but it was large enough to force Thomas to dispose of it before he carried out his primary mission. He met little determined resistance, and moved on to Lebanon, Kentucky, ready to advance into East Tennessee in early November. At this point, General Sherman decided that the whole plan was tactically unsound, and he ordered Thomas back. There was really little else that could have been done as Thomas' supply lines would have been confined to a single pass—Cumberland Gap. His reserves were too weak to exploit the gains of his strike element even if it had achieved surprise. In addition, the enemy had forces far superior to those of Thomas on three sides, and could have concentrated an attack at any place along his thinly dispersed force almost at will. The Confederate forces, by retaking Cumberland Gap, could easily have sealed him tightly into the valley and annihilated him. In effect, to have proceeded into East Tennessee would have been tantamount to military suicide no matter what limited success might have been achieved. Sherman rightly decided that the price was prohibitive in view of what could be accomplished. From this point until the end of the war, East Tennessee was relegated to a strategically insignificant area from a military point of
view. Strategic planning now called for bypassing the area, striking south along the Mississippi and Tennessee rivers, and then swinging toward the coast south of the mountains in order to strangle the Confederacy. The military commanders seemed to realize what Lincoln was slowly learning; this was full-scale war, not a political revolt which would be quickly subdued.

In the meantime, the partisan bands in East Tennessee went about their preparations, confident that soon the gray-clad soldiers would be overrun by a tide of blue-uniformed soldiers rushing to their rescue, quite unaware that Thomas had been recalled. The date of the uprising was set for the night of November 8. Carter had been given $2,500 to carry out this part of the operation, and, considering the rather small sum, he did remarkably well. 73

On October 27, Carter informed General Thomas that things in East Tennessee looked very bad. But he assured the general that if he could get enough men, he would defeat the Confederates and save the railroad; otherwise the bridges would be destroyed. 74 Thomas received the note on November 4, and the very next day he sent Carter's letter to Brigadier General W. T. Sherman together with a plea for enough troops so that he might resume his mission. 75

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73 Temple, East Tennessee and the Civil War, 371; McKinney, Education in Violence, 117; Scott and Angel, Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry, 59-61.
75 Thomas to Sherman, November 5, 1861, ibid., 891.
Johnson in London, Kentucky, that all attempts to continue into East Tennessee had failed and that the mission was to be aborted.  

In addition to Sherman's reluctance, General McClellan had not sent any troops, probably expecting Brigadier General D. C. Buell to follow orders and support the uprising by occupying the area south of Cumberland Gap, seizing the railroad, and severing communications between Virginia and the Mississippi River. Buell's over-cautious reluctance to comply with directives seems somewhat characteristic of the general. However, in this case as in Sherman's withdrawal of Thomas, it would have been militarily unsound to carry out the move. As it turned out, the failure to get troops into Tennessee did not hinder Carter's final plan of action, since he had in the meantime decided to destroy the bridges and wait for Federal help before attacking the Confederates.

Parties had been selected to attack and destroy each of the target bridges, and on the night of November 8 each group moved into position. The chief agent responsible for the bridges in lower East Tennessee, from the Hiwassee River to Bridgeport, was A. M. Cate, who quietly and effectively destroyed his targets and disappeared. It would be thirty-five years before anything at all was learned about the participants in this

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76 Thomas to Johnson, November 7, 1861, ibid.  
77 McClellan to Buell, November 7, 1861, ibid.  
action. This was indeed an outstanding performance from the standpoint of guerrilla warfare. There was neither loss of life nor equipment in accomplishing the assigned mission.

But, if effectiveness characterized the handling of the four southern bridges, debacle describes the attack upon the others. Of the remaining five, only one, the Lick Creek bridge, was successfully destroyed. Two attempts were completely aborted, and at Strawberry Plains faulty intelligence caused W. C. Pickens and his party to blunder into a single guard, James Keelan. A fierce struggle and wild shooting ensued, and when everything ended a few moments later, Keelan had fled badly wounded, Pickens had been shot in the thigh, and several others suffered superficial wounds. Only then was it discovered that no one had any matches, they having either been forgotten or lost. Expecting Confederate reinforcements to arrive at any moment, the attackers fled. Thus ended the bridge-burning mission. The final result was: five bridges destroyed with only one man badly wounded; four bridges untouched. But the Confederate reaction was one of panic and apprehension. Communication lines along the railway had been cut. There was no way of telling if this was the signal for a full-scale Federal attack or not, but rumors were spreading wildly and the defenders prepared for the worst.

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79 Temple, Notable Men of Tennessee, 85-86.

80 Knoxville Register, November 13, 1861, in Mrs. W. T. Wood's unpublished manuscript, Strawberry Plains, Tennessee; Temple, East Tennessee and the Civil War, 382.

Transportation was disrupted; the movement of army supplies was rendered impossible.\textsuperscript{82} The telegraph between Chattanooga and Richmond had been knocked out along with the railroad bridges.\textsuperscript{83} Troops were rushed to East Tennessee, though the Confederate commanders had little or no idea of what they faced in the area.\textsuperscript{84} Colonel Daniel Leadbetter was placed in charge of the East Tennessee railroads and of reestablishing telegraph communications.\textsuperscript{85}

Union men, according to the initial plan, began to gather on the 8th of November at pre-selected sites to await the arrival of the regular forces. As many as 1,000 men began to assemble in the Strawberry Plains area, and on the banks of the French Broad River near Underdowns Ferry a large force held off a Confederate attack for several hours before dispersing. Some 300 men were gathered in Sevier County.\textsuperscript{86}

Colonel Daniel Stover (a son-in-law of Andrew Johnson) mustered the Union men in Carter County and proceeded to Carter's Depot (Zollicoffer), intending to destroy the railroad bridge over the Watauga River. Instead, they merely captured it from its two guards and waited for the main body

\textsuperscript{82} Branner to Benjamin, November 9, 1861, \textit{ibid.}, Ser. I, Vol. 4, p. 231.

\textsuperscript{83} W. H. Mackall to General Polk, November 9, 1861, \textit{ibid.}, 531-32.


\textsuperscript{85} Cooper to Leadbetter, November 10, 1861, \textit{ibid.}, 234.

\textsuperscript{86} W. B. Wood to Cooper, November 11, 1861, \textit{ibid.}, Ser. II, Vol. 1, p. 840; R. Branner to Sec. of War Benjamin, \textit{ibid.}, 843; Temple, \textit{Notable Men of Tennessee}, 386-87.
of Carter County volunteer irregulars to join them. The next day, 1,000 men, variously armed, joined Stover's band and all gathered at Elizabethton. Stragglers from nearby Johnson, Washington, and Greene counties soon joined the unit, and they all moved out to attack a nearby Confederate detachment commanded by Captain McClellan. However, when they encountered his pickets they withdrew, elected a leader, and went into camp. During the night a few shots were exchanged, but nothing was decided. By the next day, it became apparent that something had gone wrong. The irregular force which had gathered found that it did not receive the expected Federal leadership. Lacking direction and with no idea of what was happening, the men disbanded.

In Hamilton County, William Clift was active again. After the bridge burnings he had abrogated the treaty with Colonel James W. Gillespie, the Tennessee state adjutant general. Men were gathering once more on his farm for what history has called the "Second Clift War." On November 12, Colonel W. B. Wood was sent from Athens, Tennessee, to meet an Alabama unit and together with them converge on Clift and wipe out his force. In the subsequent encounter, shots were exchanged in a confused and poorly coordinated engagement which resulted in no loss of life.


Clift's force dispersed, and General Wood reported to Confederate Secretary of War Benjamin that "the rebellion in East Tennessee has been put down in some of the counties and will be effectively suppressed in less than two weeks in all the counties." 89

The story was the same all over East Tennessee. What had begun as an operative plan to remove the Confederates soon floundered. A dispirited mob slowly dispersed, still not knowing what had happened. Resistance seemed to have crumbled. Evidently the Confederates had but to continue their present policy to be assured of a docile and yielding people in East Tennessee. The hoped for Union attack into East Tennessee had been called off. There was nothing that indigenous partisan groups could contribute unless they were organized, and it was now obvious that they were not. Their morale was shattered; their will to resist destroyed. They had also disobeyed the cardinal rule of guerrilla warfare by attempting to engage in regular army activities without either the training or the equipment.

At this juncture, the Confederate authorities made a key blunder, a blunder which would drastically revise the situation in East Tennessee. Reasoning that their policy of conciliation had failed, from the highest authority down to the field commanders, the unanimous decision was to employ terror tactics. 90 Secretary of War Benjamin's instructions for dealing with the East Tennessee Unionists were quite plain:

89 Ibid., 250.
1st All such as can be identified as having been engaged in bridge burning are to be tried summarily by drum-head court-martial and if found guilty, executed on the spot by hanging. It would be well to leave their bodies hanging in the vicinity of the burned bridges.

2nd All such as have not been so engaged are to be treated as prisoners of war and sent with an armed guard to Tuscaloosa Alabama, there to be kept in prison at the depot selected by the government for prisoners of war. Whenever you can discover that arms are concealed by these traitors, you will send out detachments, search for, and seize the arms. In no case is one of them known to have been up in arms against the government to be released on any pledge or oath of allegiance. The time for such measures is past . . . . Such as voluntarily take the oath of allegiance, and surrender their arms, are alone to be treated with leniency.

P.S. Judge Patterson [a son-in-law of Andrew Johnson], Colonel Pickens, and other ring-leaders of the same class must be sent at once to Tuscaloosa jail as prisoners of war. 91

The Confederate area commander informed General Cooper that "... a mild or conciliating policy will do no good; they [the Unionists] must be punished; and some of the leaders ought to be punished to the extent of the law. Nothing short of this will give quiet to the country." 92 To emphasize that he meant what he said, he again placed Knoxville under strict martial law. General Zollicoffer also changed his views. "Their [the Unionists] leaders should be seized and held as prisoners. The leniency shown them has been unavailing. They have acted with base duplicity and should no longer be trusted." 93 Governor Harris felt that "this rebellion must be crushed out instantly, the leaders arrested, and .

92 W. B. Wood to Cooper, November 11, 1861, ibid., Vol. 4, p. 236.
summarily punished." 94 A. G. Graham proposed that all Unionists in East Tennessee be stripped of their lands and possessions and together with their families be forced to leave the country. 95

The wholesale roundup began immediately. In Greeneville, at a court-martial ordered by Colonel Leadbetter on November 30, four men were ordered executed. 96 Jails and prisons all over East Tennessee were being filled to capacity with known or suspected Unionists. "Parson" Brownlow was captured and held until March, 1862, when he was sent north mainly because he was too important to be executed and too dangerous to be allowed to remain in the South. 97

Judge Samuel Milligan recalled the force and brutality of the trials of two bridge burners, Fry and Hinchie (also reported as Hensie). 98 They were brought to Greeneville, and within two hours their bodies were hanging on a large oak tree behind the railway station. "Their bodies

94 Harris to Davis, November 12, 1861, ibid., Ser. I, Vol. 4, p. 240.
95 A. G. Graham to Davis, November 12, 1861, ibid., p. 239.
96 Temple, East Tennessee and the Civil War, 393-97; Thomas W. Humes, Loyal Mountaineers of Tennessee (Ogden Bros. & Co., Knoxville, 1888), 135-47. Those executed included David Fry. It was later discovered that he was the wrong man, not the Captain Fry who had been sent to East Tennessee to help Carter organize the uprising.
were left swinging in the air all that afternoon, and through the night, and until 4 oclock p.m. the next day. . . . Other union men under guard were forced to cut them down, dig their graves and bury them."99 Jacob Harman and his son were taken to Knoxville, convicted of participation in the bridge burnings, and sentenced to be hung. The son was hung first and the father forced to watch and then was hung himself. 100

Leadbetter was not so sure that this was the end of the matter. He wrote from Greeneville: "I think that we have effected something—done some good; but whenever a foreign force enters this country be it soon or late three-fourths of these people will rise in arms to join them."101 Accordingly, he issued a proclamation which in essence warned all East Tennesseans that as long as they supported the Union cause in this fight, they could expect no mercy. On the other hand, those who took the oath to support the Confederacy would be pardoned. 102

In late November, Brigadier-General W. H. Carroll replaced Wood at Knoxville. Keeping the city under strict military rule, he went on the assumption that resistance was best contained by a tough policy.103 But his success could only be temporary. H. C. Young realized quite well the

99 Milligan, "Memoir," 94.
100 Ibid., 97-99; Dykeman, French Broad, 89.
103 Carroll to Benjamin, December 11, 1861, ibid., 759-60.
flaw in such a policy. He and other leading citizens protested the heavy-handedness of the military authorities. His argument was voiced in Richmond by Colonel H. R. Austin and Landon C. Haynes. To all of them, as well-informed citizens of East Tennessee, it seemed best to end the reprisals in the hope that it would put an end to disloyalty. 104

However, these voices of moderation were ineffective. Leadbetter, who was placed in command of Knoxville on January 7, 1862, was no follower of a policy of conciliation. Overawing the Unionists by force was to him the only answer. 105 The inhabitants of the region could not be trusted, and an underground resistance, though outwardly quiet, was still very much a reality. 106 Legal manipulations were being carried out behind the scenes to rectify some of the unjust arrests, but it was already too late as much of the damage had been done. 107 Moreover, the hierarchy gave no indication of reversing its strongly militant stand; the tense situation could not possibly be eased. The Confederates realized that at least two-thirds of the people, if not openly hostile, were at least opposed to their policies. 108 The bridges were still in danger,

104 H. R. Austin to Davis (rec.) December, 1861, ibid., 869.
105 Leadbetter to Cooper, December 24, 1861, ibid., 859.
106 Leadbetter to Cooper, January 21, 1862, ibid., 877.
and open aggression was still very much a reality.\textsuperscript{109}

The Confederates had two tasks: to keep civil order and to stop partisan activities. Both could have been done by conciliation, but the Confederates elected to adopt the repressive program. The choice proved to be self-defeating because under a collective punishment system, the innocent suffer and tend to become alienated, thereby increasing the problem of control. But, if severity against the guerrillas and the population was not the answer, would not leniency create its own dangers? Admittedly it would up to a point. Obviously, the population would be subject to the pressures of the partisans, but, even so, restraint on the part of government would have alienated the resistors, eventually isolating them as criminals. The Confederate policies forced many into the ranks of the partisans, thereby actually rejuvenating the unconventional warfare these policies were designed to forestall.

It is an over-simplification to argue that the bridge burnings were militarily insignificant, ending in failure, and therefore caused the Confederates no harm. Similarly, it is a mistake to conclude that East Tennesseans were worse off after the act than they were or would have been had it not been carried out.\textsuperscript{109} It is true that had the Union forces and the guerrillas carried out the plan as originally conceived, the damage caused the Confederacy might have been devastating. Even so, the Confederates were temporarily deprived of a supply route and of

\textsuperscript{109}This argument is advanced both in Miss Garrett's thesis, 64, and by Temple, \textit{East Tennessee in the Civil War}, 387.
telegraphic communication at a time when they greatly needed them to thwart the expected Federal attack. Both were vital to military maneuver, and both were unavailable. While the bridges were repaired by December,\(^\text{110}\) a significant psychological impediment endured. The realization of the vulnerability of the area to unconventional attack forced the Confederates to keep as many as 10,000 men constantly in the area, an area within their own lines.\(^\text{111}\) This interior policing deprived combat commanders of the military use of these soldiers. In addition, the numbers of East Tennesseans available as effective replacements for depleted combat ranks were greatly reduced. More important, even though men of this area were distrusted as soldiers, they might have been forced to produce vitally needed food. Now, both men to fight and men to grow food were lost, a factor which would later contribute heavily to the decisive defeat of the Confederates. This kind of contribution made by unconventional warfare is often ignored in assessing the military significance of particular operations because its effectiveness is usually impossible to measure in conventional military terms. Perhaps it may be more easily appreciated if viewed in terms of how much more successful an enemy might have been had it not existed to hamper his war effort. There is no doubt that the resistance movement at this time was poorly organized, but to dismiss it as harmless is to dismiss the psychological, economic, social, and even military factors bearing upon a region

\(^{110}\)New York Times, December 31, 1862.

\(^{111}\)Dykeman, French Broad, 80-86.
subjected to total war.

The reaction of the Confederate officials was probably natural; but it was disastrous. Actually, they were at least equally as responsible for the perpetuation of resistance as were the Unionists. Instead of weakening the partisans, Confederate policy guaranteed them a source of manpower, a base of operation, and the support of the local population, while simultaneously depriving the Confederacy of the same advantage.

Oliver Temple has held that the suffering of the people of East Tennessee was magnified by the incidents of resistance and that they would have been better off had they not become so engaged. This would prompt the rhetorical question, by whose terms would they have been better off? Certainly not in relation to their political tradition or ideological desire to remain associated with the Union. There is nothing in the events of the war up to this point which indicates that their position would have done other than deteriorate as the war progressed. Voicing opposition as they had and demanding separate statehood when they did placed East Tennessee in a position of mistrust in the Confederacy. Certainly the area would not have been left alone in terms of manpower and economic considerations to decide its own future distinct from that of the whole Confederacy. Either voluntarily or by force, these people would have had to contribute to the war no matter which side they supported, and in this sense they would not have been better off.

If they had persisted in their Union sympathies, yet had not performed some overt act, perhaps a few hangings might have been avoided,
but other kinds of mistreatment would have occurred. In any case, the politically active Unionists had no intention of accepting disunion, and they intended to do something about it. They certainly did not believe that they would have been better off not voicing their discontent. They realized, it seems, that sacrifices would be required if they were to have the government they wanted. They also wanted their fellow East Tennesseans, men normally apathetic, to feel a similar indignation. The bridge burnings and the subsequent aid from Federal forces were the planned incidents to unify the resistance effort. When the failure of the whole plan became evident and the Confederate authorities resorted to terror to control the area, the partisan leaders saw their chance to fan the spark of resistance. Here was an opportunity to rebuild morale and make a determined stand against an enemy who had now openly declared its hostility to the people of the area. The hardships of war could be offset if there was a reason and purpose for resisting. It was to be a fight to remain one with the Union. The unity of purpose achieved by the events of November, 1861, seems far more important than the failure to burn the bridges and cannot be dismissed on the basis of individual well-being. There was now a reason to resist, a goal to achieve, and an enemy to be driven out—a fact far more important to a people than the personal discomfort or suffering they might have to endure to achieve it. Unconventional warfare had been declared by an act of the will of the East Tennesseans.

By this act, an underground was created which would harass the Confederacy within its very heart and which ran deeper than mere
political feeling. Now the wrongs that had been endured were worn as personal scars etched deeply on the hearts of the people and burned into their minds.\textsuperscript{112} They were embarking upon the life of citizens at war—a war which had only just begun.

\textsuperscript{112}Ibid., 91-95; Sheeler, "Unionism in East Tennessee," 201-03.
CHAPTER III

THE APEX--OPEN WARFARE BY INDIGENOUS PERSONNEL

Through the length and breadth of what had been a united country, it was plain to all in 1862 that it would be a long war. In East Tennessee it seemed that no outside help would soon reach the Unionists and that Confederate forces were outwardly in firm control of the region.\(^1\)

Since the abortive bridge-burning attempt and its aftermath, Union sympathizers who had not escaped were forming into bands in the inaccessible mountains and clandestinely beginning to fight their own unconventional warfare. Some would be fighting to preserve the Union, some for their land, and others merely for themselves. Some would be well led and others would become mere bands of cutthroats masquerading behind a noble purpose.

Through the winter of 1861-62, these bands conducted raids against the Confederate troops, firing upon their pickets, burning their buildings, harassing their ranks, and keeping them constantly on edge. Whenever Federal raiders ventured into the area, Union guerrillas were always there to guide them, to block roads, and to cut telegraph wires. Few of these actions were of any official military significance and rarely appeared in the reports. The stories of these exploits have endured.

mainly as family lore among the residents of the mountains.\footnote{The historical collection of John W. Baker, Huntsville, Tennessee, contains numerous such accounts which he has gathered.} Probably many of these stories are true, but certainly an equal number are not. While verification is impossible, enough evidence exists to conclude that skirmishes were regular, disruptive, and costly to the Confederates both in men and equipment.

The Confederate force was incapable of coping with the constant attacks and was unable to revitalize itself by recruiting. Consequently, morale in the ranks was low, and the confidence of Southern sympathizers was badly shaken.\footnote{Joseph H. Parks, General Edmund Kirby Smith, C.S.A. (Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, second printing, 1962), 156.} Confederate authorities had pleaded with Jefferson Davis for months to send into East Tennessee an aggressive commander who could stem the tide of the Unionist revolt.\footnote{Landon C. Haynes to Jefferson Davis, January 27, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. 7, p. 849.} To meet this need, Davis ordered Major General E. Kirby Smith, called from winter quarters at Manassas, to report immediately to Richmond. After being briefed on the precarious situation in East Tennessee, he was sent immediately to Knoxville to assume command of the Department of East Tennessee. Arriving on March 8, 1862, he formally assumed his duties the following day. Kirby Smith's biographer has described the conditions which he found in his new assignment:

Affairs in East Tennessee were even worse than the new commander had expected. The people were disloyal; the troops "a disorganized mob
without head or discipline." The only bright ray of hope was the reasonable assurance that the enemy, by directing all its available power toward West Tennessee, would give an opportunity for reorganization in the eastern section.\(^5\)

Kirby Smith began rapidly to put his command in fighting order. He had 8,000 men spread over East Tennessee, guarding key points, the railroads, and Cumberland Gap. To the north, poised to strike, was a Federal Army vastly superior to his own. To the west, with Nashville in Federal hands, he would have to deal with an old foe of the Confederacy, Andrew Johnson, as Military Governor of Tennessee.

From the beginning, Andrew Johnson had been a rallying point of the resistance movement.\(^6\) He had been one of those responsible for the firm stand taken by the mountaineers favoring the Union. A self-made man of the people, he had their complete confidence. Now once again he was in a position to assist the Federal cause. It is impossible to say that he in any way directed the unconventional warfare activities, but, considering his unquestioned patriotism and the fact that Dan Ellis and other pilots made continual trips from East Tennessee to Nashville and back again, it is probable that he played a significant part in obstructing Confederate aims.\(^7\) Even if he had taken no active part, his very

\(^5\)Parks, Kirby Smith, 157.


\(^7\)Scott and Angel, Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry, 136, 141.
presence was enough to inspire the irregulars and hamper Kirby Smith.

Within his command, Kirby Smith's position was untenable. As in the time of Zollicoffer, wherever troops were not physically present, there was to be found open defiance, attack, and harassment. To his wife, the disgruntled Kirby Smith confided: "I am overwhelmed with cares & troubles, no one can conceive the actual conditions of East Tenn. disloyal to the core, it is more dangerous and difficult to operate in, than the country of an acknowledged enemy." 8

East Tennessee was enemy territory. The population opposed Kirby Smith, but then, so did large numbers of his own soldiers. Those who came from the local area were completely undependable. 9 They had joined the Confederate Army usually to avoid suspicion, and whenever they could, either deserted or gave the enemy information and aid. 10 The general reported, for example, that without firing a shot, Union raiders had captured two of his local companies near the town of Jacksborough. Kirby Smith insisted that both officers and men of such units be shifted to a less sensitive area, since they were not trustworthy. 11

The activity of the partisan was also seen in the trouble Kirby

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8Cited in Parks, Kirby Smith, 158.


10Georgia Lee Tatum, Disloyalty In the Confederacy (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1934), 151.

Smith was having with the militia, or home guard, as it was commonly called. These, too, he considered totally unreliable due to the infiltration into their ranks of Unionists. Assessing the reliability of the inhabitants in terms of counties, he observed that only six of the thirty-two counties of East Tennessee could be considered friendly. He estimated that this state of affairs gave the Union a potential of some 20,000 recruits should they need them.\textsuperscript{12} To counteract this resistance, he proposed to arrest all the leaders and draft all the eligible men, sending them to a more southern area for indoctrination and training.\textsuperscript{13} All partisans, he instructed Leadbetter, should be summarily dealt with, all arms seized, and all equipment and supplies destroyed.\textsuperscript{14} Further, Kirby Smith decided that all East Tennesseans should take the Confederate oath of allegiance. Secretly, he deployed selected officers and men to designated locations to administer the oath. Those who refused to take it were to be sent as prisoners to Knoxville.\textsuperscript{15}

General R. E. Lee was worried that Kirby Smith's force of 8,000 effective soldiers was insufficient to cope with the partisans. Therefore, he ordered reinforcements to the area, and at Kirby Smith's request recommended that martial law be imposed and the East Tennessee

\textsuperscript{12} Smith to Cooper, March 23, 1862, \textit{ibid.}, Pt. 2, p. 355; Smith to T. A. Washington, April 3, 1862, \textit{ibid.}, Pt. 2, pp. 389-90.
\textsuperscript{13} Smith to Cooper, April 2, 1862, \textit{ibid.}, 385-86.
\textsuperscript{14} Smith to Leadbetter, March 27, 1862, \textit{ibid.}, 369.
\textsuperscript{15} Circular by Smith, April 2, 1862, \textit{ibid.}, 386.
Confederates be ordered out of the region.\textsuperscript{16} On April 8, 1862, Jefferson
Davis formally made the region of East Tennessee enemy territory. He
suspended civil jurisdiction except in civil litigations, suspended the
writ of \textit{habeas corpus}, and ordered Kirby Smith to establish an effective
military occupation.\textsuperscript{17}

To add to his troubles, Kirby Smith was now instructed to enforce
the first of three conscription laws passed on April 16, 1862. This act
required that all men between eighteen and thirty-five serve in the
Confederate Army. Partisan leaders made certain that all East Tennessee
knew of this latest order, and suddenly there was a conspicuous absence
of men in this category throughout the territory.\textsuperscript{18} Kirby Smith was
furious and ordered a crackdown upon these propagandists.\textsuperscript{19} He did
everything in his power to stop the partisan-inspired flow of men toward
Kentucky, but to little avail. Thousands escaped.\textsuperscript{20} Psychologically,
the conscription act guaranteed the fidelity of East Tennesseans to the
cause of the Union. Actually, the traditionally independent mountain men
on both sides found this piece of legislation a bitter pill.\textsuperscript{21} For those

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Indorsement by R. E. Lee, March 21, 1862, \textit{ibid.}, 320-21; Lee to
Smith, April 7, 1862, \textit{ibid.}, 397-98.
\item \textsuperscript{17} General Orders No. 21, April 8, 1862, \textit{ibid.}, 402.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Tatum, \textit{Disloyalty}, 150; Parks, \textit{Kirby Smith}, 171.
10, Pt. 2, pp. 429-30; H. L. Clay to J. C. Vaughn, April 19, 1862, \textit{ibid.},
429; H. L. Clay to J. M. Rhett, April 23, 1862, \textit{ibid.}, Pt. 1, p. 649.
\item \textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.}, Pt. 2, p. 114.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Dykeman, \textit{French Broad}, 91.
\end{itemize}
about to join the Confederate Army, it was an insult. To the Unionist, it hurried him out of the area into a blue uniform. To those who had no desire to fight from the beginning, there was now no choice but open resistance to what they deemed an unjust law. While the conscription net trapped many who were forced to take the oath against their will, they served with reluctance, only until they could either desert or serve the underground.

Force was not succeeding. General Kirby Smith changed his tactics and tried persuasion in a proclamation issued on April 18. He took the position that many of the people were resisting Confederate martial law because they had been misled and as a result were ignorant of their duties and obligations to the State of Tennessee. To those who were misled, he offered forgiveness if, during the next thirty days, they would admit their error and take an oath to support the Confederacy. Even those who had already fled the state or were hiding in the mountains were included in this offer. The property and rights of those who returned would be protected, the writ of habeas corpus would be reinstated, and militia draft would be suspended.

The Provost Marshal, William Churchwell, in his letter "To the disaffected people of East Tennessee," added further inducement to return by reminding those affected that their wives and children were involved. If the men returned in 30 days on Kirby Smith's terms, they could care

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for their families at home, on their own land, without fear of being molested. If they refused, their families would be sent to Kentucky at their own expense.

Kirby Smith pleaded with President Davis to suspend the Confederate conscription law. He estimated that this act had caused over 7,000 men to flee north and join the Federal Army. Realizing how precarious the situation was in East Tennessee, Davis relented and agreed to suspend temporarily the act in that region. Confederate Secretary of War G. W. Randolph was willing to go further and exempt the area permanently as a gesture of conciliation. Manipulating the conscription act was a propaganda venture which Kirby Smith intended to exploit to the maximum. Here was an opportunity to win those who had not fled and to encourage many who had already gone to return home. On August 13, he issued the following proclamation:

To the East Tennesseans in the U.S. Army:

You must all now be convinced that you have been grossly deceived by the misrepresentations of those under whom you are serving. I therefore announce to you that a final opportunity is offered you to return to your homes and your allegiance. I offer you a general amnesty for all past offenses, the only condition being that you take the oath of allegiance to the Government and that you conduct yourselves as becomes good citizens. You will receive a fair price for any arms, ammunition and equipment you may bring with you.

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24 Ibid., 453-54.
25 Ibid., 521; Vol. 16, Pt. 2, pp. 695-96.
26 Ibid., 703.
27 Ibid., 756.
Three days later, Kirby Smith advanced into Kentucky and Major General J. P. McCown took command of the District of East Tennessee. McCown, a native of Carter County, Tennessee, was a West Point graduate who had had considerable military experience on the frontier in the Mexican War, fighting Indians in the Seminole War, and in putting down rebellion in the Utah Expedition. In short, he came to his command with experience; moreover, as he wrote to Confederate Secretary of War Randolph: "I am one of these people and think I know them." He was told upon his assumption of command that there were some 5,000 arms and large quantities of ammunition in the Knoxville-Clinton area and that he was to find and confiscate the lot. There is no record to indicate that he succeeded. If the Union General G. W. Morgan could be forced back from the Cumberland Gap and Kentucky border region, McCown was to attempt to enforce conscription which had been waived earlier. The whole area was to be purged of Unionists.

When McCown attempted to enforce conscription on September 3, East Tennesseans responded by joining partisan bands and causing such destruction that he requested additional troops to control them. He tried to


30 Ibid., 797.

31 Ibid., 776.

32 Ibid., 794-95.
round them up and send them north after stripping them of their property. In both cases he was ineffective, and once again, as had Kirby Smith before him, he suspended conscription.

Meanwhile, General Braxton Bragg ordered conscription for all able-bodied men in Tennessee, thereby forcing McCown to reverse his position. Once again, the male population sought refuge in the mountains and in Kentucky. The situation was more than McCown could cope with, and Brigadier General Samuel Jones was ordered into the area to enforce conscription. Adopting a firm but fair policy from the start, he actively attacked partisan bands while carefully avoiding depredations against innocent citizens. 33 He meant to "... suppress everything like open hostility or secret treachery," and intended to do it by driving a wedge between the partisans and the population which supported them. 34 Diplomatically, he contacted the prominent local leaders, hoping through them to influence the people to stop their resistance. He induced T. A. R. Nelson to make a statement which was published in the Knoxville Register on October 4. 35 Attacking Lincoln, he pointed out that the Union was

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33 General Order 2, September 27, 1862, *ibid.*, 884-85; General Order 6, September 29, 1862, 890, 858, 893, 894.

34 *ibid.*, 908-09.

35 Copy in Nelson Papers, McClung Collection, Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville, Tennessee. Nelson had been a firm Unionist up to the time of his capture and subsequent parole from Richmond. He was released on condition that he support the Confederate government, which he did. In fairness, it must be pointed out that though he was criticized as a traitor, he acted in the best interest of law and order as he saw it, once he was convinced that the Union cause was lost. Thomas B. Alexander, Thomas A. R. Nelson of East Tennessee (Tennessee Historical Commission, Nashville, 1956), 95-97.
broken and the Federal Army had abandoned the area. He therefore urged all East Tennesseans to join the Confederate Army. General Jones had this piece of propaganda printed into handbills and distributed throughout East Tennessee. Newspapers were urged to reprint it and other leaders were asked to follow Nelson's lead. Editors were requested to forget their old party differences and join together in striving for peace. 36 Jones had high hopes of success on October 4 when he reported to Randolph that there was now in East Tennessee "... a better state of feeling toward the Government." 37 Union men, however, failed to share Jones' enthusiasm or his political convictions. They accepted Nelson's statement and public position as obtained by coercion or as the price paid for the release of his son. 38 Jones denied this, but it did him little good. His whole propaganda effort failed to move the Unionists to cooperation. This attempt, as had the others, neglected to take into consideration that these men believed in the Union cause and that they adamantly opposed conscription.

Trying a different approach, Jones wrote to Davis pointing out that to force these men to serve would only perpetuate a bad situation already experienced by previous commanders. Though they were undependable as soldiers, they could still be useful to the cause by harvesting the corn crop before it was lost and working in the mines to produce

37S. Jones to G. W. Randolph, October 14, 1862, ibid., 945-47.
38Ibid., 957-58; Letters and clippings in the Nelson Papers.
vital minerals to sustain the war effort. To this suggestion, Governor Harris objected on the basis that it was bad politics. Randolph went even further when he held that suspending conscription under Kirby Smith and McCown had done no good; why would it succeed now? Furthermore, it would be a bad precedent; no one would volunteer. Randolph insisted that the issue should be faced squarely. Either East Tennesseans must obey the law or be prepared to accept the consequences of their refusal to do so. Davis agreed. Jones asked again for a temporary suspension, but by this time Davis was hard pressed for manpower. He realized the dilemma he faced: exempting the unwilling placed a premium on disaffection, while not exempting the East Tennesseans guaranteed their continued resistance. Davis made his choice and again refused to suspend the conscription act. In October, when General E. Kirby Smith returned to command in East Tennessee, he was ready to use troops to enforce conscription, and he was given full authority to make the act work.

So far, the cost to the Confederacy had been high. Over 10,000 men had been needed to keep order, desertion losses were prohibitive, and, on the average, two soldiers were required to conscript one. In addition, over 10,000 Unionists had already crossed into Kentucky to join the Federal Army, crops were rotting in the fields, and the women and


41 Ibid., 973; Vol. 20, Pt. 2, pp. 405-06; Ser. IV, Vol. 2, p. 246. A full account of the Unionists' rebellion and the Confederate efforts to suppress it is in ibid., Ser. II, Vol. 1, pp. 829-912.
children left to produce the food were daily becoming public charges.\(^42\)

Raids upon military stores continued, and military movement was being hampered continually by small groups of guerrillas who would fire on patrols and then melt into the mountains.

As the year ended, another aspect of unconventional warfare further limited the Confederate control of the area. Partisans were now cooperating full time in paramilitary activities. Some had made the transition into regular units; others remained in the area to ferret out information, act as guides, and harass the enemy; working together, they cooperated to perfect the raiding technique exemplified by Carter’s Raid.

Brigadier General Samuel P. Carter and his fellow East Tennesseans who had escaped to Camp Dick Robinson had long been raiding along the Confederate line.\(^43\) With the cooperation of those who remained hidden in the country, their attacks were carried out swiftly and effectively and always in areas where the enemy least expected them. Now it was time to try a deeper penetration in an attempt to destroy the railroad bridges just south of Bristol, Tennessee.


\(^{43}\)Carter, a Princeton and Naval Academy graduate, was put on detached duty with the army specifically to train volunteers and conduct partisan activities in East Tennessee. Being a native, he was well known to the men there. He had led the first important Union cavalry raid of the war at Holston, Carter's Station, and Jonesville to take pressure off Rosecrans at Murfreesboro. Boatner, Dictionary, 130; Parks, Kirby Smith, 162, 174, et passim; Scott and Angel, Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry, 66 et passim; William R. Carter, History of the First Tennessee Cavalry (U.S.A.) (Gaut Ogden Co., Knoxville, 1902), 62 et seq.; Humes, Loyal Mountaineers, 194-95.
Carter departed from Lexington, Kentucky, on Friday, the 19th of December, 1862, intending to divide his force and strike the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad at two separate locations a hundred miles apart.\(^{44}\) Then, working toward a junction of his troops near the center, he would withdraw, leaving the enemy disrupted and with a huge repair problem. He gathered his force as he moved eastward, but unhappily he discovered at the final rendezvous point that he had only 980 men. Keeping to the dense forest and rugged terrain, by the 28th he reached the foot of the Cumberland Mountains undetected. He moved into the mountains and here changed his plans, deciding not to divide his forces in view of the strength of the enemy, which was superior to his by at least three to one. Moving into Virginia, then past Bristol and Kingsport, Tennessee, he maneuvered against light resistance through Moccasin Gap and by the 30th of December reached Blountville.

Six miles south of Blountville, at Union, his men destroyed the railroad bridge across the Holston River. The town of Union was quickly captured and the 150-man garrison surrendered without resistance. All useful military equipment was destroyed and the prisoners paroled, many of them promptly heading for home in North Carolina.\(^{45}\)

Colonel James P. T. Carter then moved with 181 men toward Carter’s Depot, ten miles west of Union. En route, they captured Colonel J. M. Love, commander of the 62nd North Carolina, the unit which had just been


\(^{45}\) Scott and Angel, Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry, 107-10.
Love was racing to his men in a locomotive which was now reversed and added to Carter's strike force. About 200 of Love's men mustered to defend against the hard-charging Union forces. Capitalizing upon surprise, Federal forces quickly routed the defenders.

Carter's men then fired the bridge across the Watauga River and drove their newly acquired engine onto it, causing the whole structure, engine and all, to collapse and fall into the river. All enemy equipment was destroyed. The raiders and their mounts were now extremely fatigued, but they were obliged to move toward Kingsport to avoid contact with any enemy forces. Passing Kingsport after sunset on the 31st, they reached Clinch Mountain and stopped for their first night's rest since the 27th of December.

Meanwhile, their presence had been detected on the 29th while still 45 miles from Bristol. General Humphrey Marshall, the Confederate commander, was unable to bring an effective force to bear against Carter at any time. He never had an accurate picture of Carter's strength. The Federals were said to have had as many as 4,000 men, armed with weapons superior in firepower to anything Marshall possessed. From the beginning, Marshall felt himself outnumbered. In addition, his communications were hampered by J. C. Duncan, a telegrapher and Unionist, who refused to let Captain T. W. W. Davis notify General Kirby Smith at Knoxville of Carter's presence. This delay was sufficient to allow

47 Ibid., 95-103.
Carter's men time to cut the wires. The bridges were burned, and Carter's force had begun its withdrawal before the Confederates could fully mobilize their defenses. They were also hampered by the question of who, soldiers or civilians, had jurisdiction over railroad dispatching. The end result was that nothing moved until it was too late.

Marshall, newly assigned and well aware that he was in unfriendly country, needed local help effectively to place his forces in order to seal Carter's exit. He was able to find only four men who would help him.48

To compound Marshall's problem, the inhabitants were felling trees and blocking roads over which his men were vainly trying to make contact with Carter's force.49 The defense was operating in a vacuum. Lt. Colonel E. F. Clay confirmed the maddening frustration in his official report. He spoke for all, saying: "I must say, in conclusion, that it is strange, but nevertheless true, that I did not receive any information whatever from citizens except from the two alluded to in the first part of my report."50

The only effective Confederate resistance was mounted by Captain William W. Baldwin's partisan rangers, who alone seemed to understand the method of warfare being fought. He led the only Confederate force that

48 Their information was contradictory and of limited value. Marshall's dependence upon these men caused him to discount the reports from his officers in the field, which added to the confusion and further hampered the defensive effort., ibid., 112.

49 Ibid., 116.

50 Ibid., 122.
made contact with Carter, and kept Marshall well advised of the enemy's movements. Marshall, misled by his four local helpers, discounted Baldwin's reports. Baldwin's harassing bothered Carter sufficiently for him to call attention to it on two occasions in his final report. He noted on December 31 that: "The Command has been annoyed during the day and night by bushwhackers." And again on the 2nd of January, he stated: "Our march was much impeded during the day by bushwhackers who constantly annoyed our front and rear."

That Baldwin realized the effectiveness of his tactics is evidenced by his tenacity of attack, which never let up until Carter had withdrawn well into Virginia. More important, he realized the effect upon the inhabitants when he reported that: "Besides the great public damage done us by this raid, an almost irreparable damage is done to private circles...; almost every servicable [sic] horse on the road has been taken off..., so that there are not horses left on this route to cultivate the fields." That the effect of the raid was disastrous was further substantiated by Isaac B. Dunn, one of the Confederate sympathizers, who saw a more profound significance in Carter's successful paramilitary attack. Dunn observed that "the greatest injury is the confidence afforded to the Union sentiment in East Tennessee, for already they have commenced

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51 Ibid., 123.
52 Ibid., 91.
53 Ibid., 124.
bushwhacking in Carter County and several persons have been killed. 54

Significantly, the Union command seemed to have no real appreciation of what Carter had accomplished; his force was ordered disbanded when it returned to Kentucky on the 5th of January, 1863. 55

Another successful raid was conducted in June when William P. Sanders led another group into East Tennessee, and on the twentieth struck Knoxville, killing one officer, and then moved east and destroyed the railroad bridges at Strawberry Plains and Mossy Creek. His men took with them a large amount of Confederate stores as they escaped, unmo­

56 These were the only full­scale Federal raids into East Tennessee until Burnside's forces invaded in September, 1863. The partisan forces were now strong enough to carry on alone, controlling, as they did, practically the whole region. 57

J. A. Campbell, the Confederate Assistant Secretary of War,

54 Isaac B. Dunn to J. R. Tucker, January 5, 1863, ibid., 130.

55 Ibid., 92.

56 Humes, Loyal Mountaineers, 201-07.

57 Southern newspapers conceded East Tennessee to Unionist control as early as February, 1862. New York Times, February, 1862, cited a report from the Richmond Dispatch of February 13, 1862, in which partisans were reported to be moving unhampered over the whole region. Additional verification places the time of partisan control in early 1863. T. C. De Leon, Four Years in Rebel Capitals: An Inside View of Life in the Southern Confederacy, From Birth to Death (Gossip Printing Co., Mobile, Ala., 1890), 182-83; Mary Boykin Chesnut, A Diary from Dixie, edited by Ben Ames Williams (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, 1949), 185, 252. Another author is even more specific, conceding control to the secret organization, The Heroes of America, but it is impossible to verify the Official Record of the Rebellion reference he lists. Frank Owsley, "Defeatism in the Confederacy," North Carolina Historical Review, IV (July, 1926), 455.
observed that opposition in the mountains was a menace as great to the Confederacy as that of either of the Union armies in the field, and day by day it was getting worse. \(^{58}\) "Repeated attempts were made to put down these bands but they met with indifferent success. The Confederacy could not spare enough troops for the task and the local home guards were absolutely unreliable."\(^{59}\)

The spring of 1863 was tense and violent. There was a growing defiance of the conscription laws. Desertions continued unchecked. General S. B. Buckner in Knoxville noted the futility of trying to prevent them because "of the difficult country to which they can retreat."\(^{60}\) He had 24,000 East Tennesseans and western North Carolinians, but asserted that he would have traded the lot for a thousand from any other state. Those who had not fled north to join the Federal Army remained hidden in the mountains, woods, and coves. From these secluded secret bases, they would strike, stealing, destroying stores, and waylaying conscript officers. "The civil arm is paralyzed; the bitterness of faction is intense," Buckner lamented.\(^{61}\) The uprising, which many Confederates believed had been suppressed, suddenly became a reality once more. Now, in late summer, order and discipline had broken down completely. The authorities

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had technical occupation, but control belonged to the partisans. In August, 1863, there were 106 men absent without leave from the 64th North Carolina Regiment. The commander refused to pursue them. He reasoned that he would probably lose more men as the citizens openly encouraged and aided Confederate deserters to leave their units.

To add further to the problem of civil control, the citizens were engaged in a psychological warfare which struck at the heart of the army. Letters, notes, and word of mouth messages all spoke of the comforts of home, of food, and of unfulfilled needs. This worked havoc on the morale of the conscripted common soldier. Many more quit and went back to their mountains. Each deserter, each troubled soldier decreased the will to fight of those who remained; the Armies of the Confederacy were being destroyed from within even as they confronted a growing enemy superiority. Unconventional warfare was taking its toll.62

Buckner was no more successful in handling East Tennessee than his predecessors. He was unable to obtain any manpower from the region at all. But in the Confederacy there were more pressing problems in the

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62 Dykeman, French Broad, 100-02; Owsley, "Defeatism," 446, 451.

Many of the pleas received by Confederate soldiers were as simple and as dramatic as the following letter from Martha Revis to her husband:

"You said you hadn't anything to eat. I wish you was here to get some beans for dinner. I have plenty to eat as yet. I haven't saw any of your pap's folks since you left home. The people is generally well hereat. The people is all turning Union here since the Yankees has got Vicksburg. I want you to come home as soon as you get this letter. . . . The folks is leaving here and going North as fast as they can. . . ."

Quoted in Andrew Lytle, Bedford Forrest and His Critter Company (revised edition; McDowell, Oblensky, New York, 1960), 189.
southwest. Buckner and what men he had were sent west in late August. Federal forces had already advanced far into Middle Tennessee. Rosecrans was moving into position once again to face Bragg; this time at Chattanooga. In early September, Burnside moved into East Tennessee. The long-awaited relief had finally come. Burnside's reception on September 3 was overwhelming. People from miles around flocked to Knoxville to welcome the Union forces. A Baptist minister even led a parade into town; crowds lined the streets waving flags they had carefully hidden away for such an occasion. Burnside was instructed to secure East Tennessee and then consolidate his forces with Rosecrans in Chattanooga. Instead, he dispersed his troops throughout East Tennessee, attacking small groups of isolated Confederate soldiers. He was now determined to clear East Tennessee and, instead of rushing to Rosecrans' aid, he started his own campaign in the opposite direction. His Confederate counterpart was General W. E. "Grumble" Jones, who fought a brilliant delaying action,

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63Report To the Contributors To the Pennsylvania Relief Association for East Tennessee by a Commission Sent by the Executive Committee To Visit That Region and Forward Supplies To the Loyal and Suffering Inhabitants (n.pub., Philadelphia, 1864), 16.

64Knoxville Whig and Rebel Ventilator, January 30, 1864; Temple, East Tennessee and the Civil War, 475; Samuel Mayes Arnell, "The Southern Unionist" (n.pub., n.p., n.d., typed manuscript, Special Collections, University of Tennessee Library, Knoxville), 223.


denying Burnside access to the salt mines in southwestern Virginia.

Southern power gave way to Union domination. In a week Burnside cleared the route to Cumberland Gap, over which the Unionist mountaineers could now pass safely to the training camps in Kentucky.

The decisive blow which the Confederate authorities had feared for years had finally been struck. A Union counterinsurgency force, loyally supported by irregulars and the rest of the civilian population, now had control of upper East Tennessee, and as one modern historian has said: "These bands did all they could as guerillas [sic] to harass the Confederacy. They attacked and plundered loyal towns, drove out or killed Confederate officers, ran off livestock and slaves of loyal citizens, and generally terrorized the countryside. They were so powerful that practically the whole mountain country was lost to the Confederacy." 67

Meanwhile, in July, the Army of the Cumberland under Rosecrans moved to the neighborhood of Chattanooga. It was essential that the Confederates be expelled from here if the Federal Army hoped to penetrate into the lower South. To possess Chattanooga was to assure a point from which the Federal Army might swing around the Great Smoky Mountains and attack Atlanta, Savannah, Charleston, and even Richmond. Rosecrans avoided contact with Bragg and, by out-maneuvering the Confederate general, occupied Chattanooga on September 9, 1863. Longstreet brought 10,000 men up from Atlanta to reinforce Bragg, who in turn attacked Rosecrans at Chickamauga on September 18. A two-day battle ensued, after

which the Federal commander retreated and was shut up in Chattanooga by Bragg. 68

Bragg became distracted with Burnside at Knoxville and the hostile population to his rear and sent Longstreet to crush him. 69 Douglas Southall Freeman observed that "Longstreet was as anxious to leave Bragg as the Commanding General was to be rid of him..." 70 Even so, Longstreet was furious at Bragg and disappointed in the number of men he was given and the limited supplies he was issued to carry out this task. Moreover, he felt that Bragg was persecuting him. 71 To make matters worse, guerrillas continually harassed him, and his every move was known clearly by the Union forces in the field. 72 In hostile country he penned a letter to General Buckner expressing his resentment of Bragg. He concluded: "Have you any maps that you can give or lend me? I shall need everything of the kind. Do you know any reliable people, living near and east of Knoxville, from whom I might get information of the condition, strength, etc. of the enemy?" 73 His inaccurate maps were to cause him to make two serious mistakes, either of which could have cost him the

71 Ibid., 286-88.
72 Dykeman, French Broad, 104-05.
73 Quoted in ibid.
battle, both of which guaranteed his defeat.

Meanwhile, General U. S. Grant assumed command of the Union forces in the Chattanooga area. Realizing that Burnside would be of little use to him except to keep Longstreet from rejoining Bragg, he instructed Burnside to move south from Knoxville in force and make contact with Longstreet.\textsuperscript{74} Once contact was established, he was to draw Longstreet deeper into East Tennessee by successive retrograde movements and thus deprive Bragg of Longstreet's force.\textsuperscript{75}

To the rear of Longstreet's army, guerrillas were keeping his rear guard up close to the main body and severing his lines of communication with Bragg. In effect, there were, then, two separate battles shaping up in East Tennessee, and only the Federal commander and his forces knew what was happening in both at once.\textsuperscript{76}

Burnside met Longstreet and a series of skirmishes persuaded the Confederate leader to press his attack. Burnside eventually withdrew to Knoxville to defend a strongly fortified position.\textsuperscript{77} Longstreet advanced, certain that he had Burnside contained within the Knoxville complex. He began his siege using one of the oldest potent weapons with which to reduce a fortified enemy--starvation. Union rations were short, but


\textsuperscript{75}Fuller, \textit{Generalship of Grant}, 242; Benjamin P. Thomas and Harold M. Hyman, \textit{Stanton, The Life and Times of Lincoln's Secretary of War} (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1962), 292.

\textsuperscript{76}Dupuy and Dupuy, \textit{Civil War}, 257-59.

Longstreet, mistakenly relying upon what proved to be an inaccurate chart, left the French Broad River route open to the besieged Federals. Recent study has tended to discount the significance of the inaccurate map, seeking explanation in either inadequate scouting by Wheeler's cavalry or Longstreet's confidence that not enough food could possibly get through to feed 20,000 men. Yet, even so, the map story still persists. Regardless of explanation, Longstreet very nearly succeeded in starving Burnside's army. The four days before his attack on Fort Sanders, the Union forces were short of rations, and it was not until after this fight that the guerrilla forces succeeded in getting enough food down-river to meet all the needs of the Union troops.

From the moment that Burnside occupied the city, and especially during the siege, the Unionists had been pressing anything floatable into service to rush food to Knoxville. There had been an exceptional harvest that year and food moved in in quantity. Confederate sympathizers saw the nightly train of boats and warned Longstreet, but unaccountably he took no action. Realization that supplies were getting in prompted the Confederates to move upstream to Boyd's Ferry and there

78 The map he used showed the French Broad joining with the Holston (now Tennessee) River below Knoxville, rather than above. Little River was probably mistaken for the French Broad. With control of the north side of the Holston from Cherokee Heights, Longstreet thought he controlled the water entrance to Knoxville, but the whole French Broad was left open to navigation.


80 Dykeman, French Broad, 106.
construct a heavy raft designed to cut the pontoon bridge linking Burnside's forces, which bridge also served as a gill net to trap food-laden rafts from the up-river suppliers.

The guerrillas were not inactive; an unidentified woman crossed the Confederate lines and warned Burnside.81 Hastily, a large boom was constructed and the huge raft was checked short of its objective and the supplies continued to get through.82

On November 27th, Federal authorities took steps to see to it that Longstreet would learn of Grant's defeat of Bragg at Chattanooga.83 Dispatching five separate messengers by five separate routes to reach Burnside with the news, Grant was certain that at least one would be intercepted. Longstreet was trapped between Knoxville and Sherman's forces which had been moving up from Chattanooga to relieve Burnside.84 The idea was to convince Longstreet that his situation was so desperate that he would not attempt to rejoin Bragg but would continue to attack Burnside and attempt a breakout into Virginia.

81 Knoxville Whig, January 30, 1864. In December, 1962, a dredging crew accidentally discovered an old hand-forged chain in the river in Knoxville. It was in the position where Burnside's bridge was believed to have been located. It is believed that this chain was part of the boom designed to prevent the destruction of the bridge. Knoxville News-Sentinel, December 21, 1962.

82 Orlando M. Poe, "The Defense of Knoxville," Battles and Leaders, III, 739.


84 Grant to Sherman, November 29, 1863, ibid., Pt. 2, p. 49; Dupuy and Dupuy, Civil War, 262.
Occasionally heroic efforts were made by the partisans to aid Burnside. When one of Grant's dispatch riders, attempting to reach Knoxville with the news of Grant's victory, was unable to go any farther than Kingston, Mary Love volunteered to carry it on. Exhausted after travelling 35 miles on horseback, she went to the home of a friend, Mrs. Elizabeth Brown, in Louisville, Tennessee. Mrs. Brown sent her son John T. Brown, age thirteen, to get the message through to Knoxville. John reached General Burnside and delivered the message after a determined ride under extremely difficult circumstances. Another instance of civilian assistance took place in Maryville, Tennessee, where six girls had organized themselves into the Loyal Ladies Home Guard under Captain Cynthia Dunn. They had long operated as spies and were the first to make contact with Sherman when he was moving north to relieve Burnside. It was they who first informed him of Longstreet's defeat and withdrawal from Knoxville.

Longstreet's attack on Fort Sanders was repulsed with heavy losses on the morning of November 29. While recovering from this blow, he received word of Bragg's defeat at Chattanooga. He saw the hopelessness


87Fink, "Battle of Knoxville," 104-07.
of his chances of joining Bragg because of the reported strength of Union regular and partisan forces along the line of march he would have to take.\textsuperscript{88} Grant's captured courier had confirmed this. In addition, reports of three Union columns converging upon him convinced Longstreet to disengage and move up the Holston River into the comparative safety of the mountains.\textsuperscript{89}

Grant had sent Sherman rushing north partly because of constant pressure from Washington to relieve the loyalists of East Tennessee by driving Longstreet from the region and partly to keep the Confederate general from trying to relieve Bragg.

Sherman, it will be remembered, had ordered Thomas back from his relief mission to aid the bridge burners in 1861. He still viewed East Tennessee as virtually a death trap for regular forces, and told Grant as much in his first field communication of December 1: "Recollect that East Tennessee is my horror. That any military man should send a force into East Tennessee puzzles me. I think, of course, its railroads should be absolutely destroyed, its provisions eaten up or carried away, and all troops brought out."\textsuperscript{90} Leaving his main body at Maryville, Sherman went on to inspect Knoxville on December 6, 1862. Finding that all was quiet,

\textsuperscript{88}R.\textsubscript{S.}, Ser. I, Vol. 31, Pt. 1, p. 461.

\textsuperscript{89}James Longstreet, \textit{From Manassas to Appomattox} (J. B. Lipincott Co., Philadelphia, 1896), 510-11.

he detached one corps and returned to Chattanooga.\textsuperscript{91}

General Foster took command of the area on December 11 and fought one battle at Bean's Station against Longstreet. This battle closed the Knoxville campaign. Thereafter, Longstreet went into winter quarters at Greeneville.\textsuperscript{92}

Two years of unconventional warfare had been grim but rewarding for the Unionists. Their strength and power had increased steadily with each act of Confederate mismanagement, with each policy reversal, and with each unjust reprisal. The Confederates controlled little but the actual ground upon which an armed soldier stood guard, and even this right of possession was constantly challenged by incessant guerrilla attacks. By the end of 1863, the Confederate sphere of influence was limited to the extreme northeast counties of East Tennessee, where not even Longstreet's army was master of the land it occupied. Wherever else Confederate fortune might have seemed at its height, in East Tennessee its decline appeared to be almost complete.

Even so, among the Unionists there was an uncertainty about the victory, as though perhaps something was not quite right, or that perhaps the price had been higher than they had expected. But there was no time to worry about such things inasmuch as unattached bands of guerrillas, untended farms, and degenerating family life posed immediately pressing problems. These would all have to be worked out in time; meanwhile, there was a war to be won.


\textsuperscript{92}Smith, "Military History of East Tennessee," 100-02.
Chapter IV

The Climax

Longstreet's army found the abnormally cold winter in East Tennessee no more palatable than the Federal guns they had faced in the siege of Knoxville. After the humiliating defeat he suffered there, Longstreet busied himself in Richmond by charging his senior officers with dereliction of duty.\(^1\) His army busied itself with surviving, and Union guerrillas busied themselves making life as unbearable as possible for all Confederates. E. P. Alexander, one of Longstreet's officers, observed: "We had some of our foraging wagons captured and men killed by the 'bushwhackers.' The latter were supposed to be guerrilla troops in the Federal service recruited among the people of that section whose sympathies were anti-Confederate. They seldom fought, but they cut off small parties and took no prisoners."\(^2\)

General Grant, heeding Sherman's warning against a campaign in this region, decided not to force Longstreet out of East Tennessee but rather to keep him there.\(^3\) Here the Confederate general's army would be no threat, yet it could be constantly harassed by guerrillas and slowly starved. Food was scarce during January and February. In March, some

\(^1\)Freeman, Lee's Lieutenants, III, 284 et passim.


small stores and equipment began to trickle in from Virginia, but hardly enough to sustain an army. In mid-March, when Longstreet returned from Richmond to rejoin his command, he was horrified at the condition of his army. His men were starving and so were his animals, and the guerrillas were pressing him hard. He was desperate. To Lee he wrote: "There is nothing between this [Greeneville] and Knoxville to feed man or horse. Our supplies are getting very short, too. Here nothing but extraordinary exertions will save us, and the sooner we get to work and make them the better it will be for us." Finally, in April, he moved his army north to join Lee. The force he took was only a pale shadow of the army he had brought into East Tennessee. The land they left behind was all but destitute. While the people had suffered, they had in a sense won. Their slim stock of food had been devoured by this 50,000-man force, but their continual harassment had kept Longstreet's men on nerves' edge.

The old voice of Unionism, "Parson" Brownlow, returning to Knoxville with the victorious Federal forces, resumed the publication of his newspaper, the Knoxville Whig. This "Spelling Book and Bible of the East Tennessee Unionists" once again became the primary propaganda organ of the region. But there was now a decided shift in his approach. No longer the underdog, the "Parson" began demanding that Confederate sympathizers be made to suffer retribution for all they had done to Unionists

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5 Quoted in Dykeman, French Broad, 116.
6 Arnell, "Southern Unionist," 63-64.
over the past two years. Politically, there was a complete reversal of authority. Andrew Johnson, the military governor in Nashville, used his authority to seek moderation and keep order. Brownlow's writings encouraged the extremists who would have no part of this, intent as they were upon revenge.

This was by no means the only complication in the area. Since the beginning of the war, deserters, later isolated Confederate cavalry soldiers, and the ever-present independent guerrilla bands had been active in the mountains. Longstreet's wintering army had deprived these marauders of their normal sources of food. Starvation forced them out of the mountains and now, more brazenly than ever, like hungry wolves, they came into the valleys, raiding, pillaging, and stealing. These unaligned bands swarmed over the area. "The pistol in the hand of the guerrellas [sic] was all that represented authority. The very foundations of society were loosed." ⁷ As if the raids of the "Outhers," as they were called, were not enough, the Confederate partisans, operating from secluded bases in the mountains, regularly conducted paramilitary attacks upon isolated Federal outposts in East Tennessee.

One example is sufficient to highlight the problems which were compounding the viciousness of unconventional warfare in the mountains.⁸ General Z. B. Vance of North Carolina had organized a force of Indians and mountainmen to guard against the encroachment of the East Tennessee

⁷Ibid., 241.

⁸Dykeman, French Broad, 113-14.
Unionists into North Carolina. Like most partisan leaders, Vance chose to depend upon the enemy for his supplies and raided regularly across the border into Tennessee. On January 8, 1864, he left his base outside of Asheville to attack in the vicinity of Sevierville, Tennessee. Moving through the mountains undetected, on the 12th of January he struck a Federal supply column near the town and made off with 18 to 24 wagonloads of supplies. Since his attack had met with no opposition, he made a leisurely withdrawal to conserve the strength of his animals for the hard pull over the mountains. He intended to rest his command at Cosby Creek, about twenty-five miles from his point of attack.

Meanwhile, Colonel A. L. Palmer at the Federal post in Dandridge had been alerted shortly after Vance's attack. He mounted an intercept party and moved swiftly toward Cosby Creek, hoping to overtake Vance when he stopped for water. Palmer's counterinsurgency force was in position as Vance approached, and took him completely by surprise. All the stolen equipment was recovered as well as the enemy's horses. Vance and fifty-two of his men were taken prisoner. While this was a major blow to the Confederate effort, it did not stop the raids altogether. Evidence that they were continuing is found in numerous atrocity stories.  

Men were taken from their homes at night and whipped, beaten, and killed. Food was stolen, citizens robbed, barns burned, cattle driven

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10Ibid., 264; John Reynolds to Nelson, May 8, 1864, Nelson Papers.
off, and fields trampled by men on horseback. Mrs. Adeline Deaderick, an East Tennessean with Union sympathies, said that in 1863 and 1864 "... our whole land was filled with bands of mauraders [sic] not belonging to any army: But following in the wake of both; savage men, who preferred to plunder and steal to fighting at all." Mary Catherine Sproul of Overton County recorded the activities of these guerrillas near her home. Her observations of their methods exemplify the terror and uncertainty they spread. In December, 1864, she wrote:

The Guerrillas still bore the Sway in Overton, they were Clad in Yankee-blue and boasted that they were Jeff Davises [sic] Guerrillas--These despicable men went to Charles Hensons a good Union Man took his Salt and other things by violence, Moved two of their wives almost in his yard and told him [that] if he did not Support them they would kill him. They also went to Mr. R. Johnsons a Loyal Citizen and took his horse a quantity of leather Some Salt and many little articles useless to enumerate. These vile beasts in human form went to Mr. Klizings and took Some 12 or fourteen Sides of leather--This gang of Guerrillas usually went by the name of Hammock. ... It is impossible to attribute these activities solely to the Confederates since there were many independent guerrilla bands. Nevertheless, the Confederates were blamed.

The Confederate irregulars in East Tennessee were probably no more ruthless than those espousing the Union cause. Their methods of

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11 Helen B. Bullard and Joseph Marshall Krechniak, Cumberland County's First Hundred Years (Centennial Committee, Crossville, Tennessee, 1956); Hale and Merritt, History of Tennessee, III, 646.


operation paralleled very closely those of the Unionists. Like them, the Confederates concentrated their main effort around the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. Hiding along the right-of-way, they took shots at personnel on passing trains, spiked the tracks, robbed the baggage cars, and tried to burn the bridges.\textsuperscript{14} In an attempt to put a stop to this, the Federal authorities devised a plan which would provide more adequate protection for the trains. The right of way was to be cleared of trees and undergrowth for a half mile on either side. The felled timber would be used to build strong points and for fuel on the trains. In some towns, like New Market, statements signed "Old Soldier" were posted in conspicuous places warning that ". . . all damned rebels are hereby notified to leave at once" or face death.\textsuperscript{15}

Some of the Confederates were partisan raiders who had been sent to remain behind enemy lines for extended periods. They were experienced men, with a degree of reckless daring and dashing bravado that would make them the source of many colorful and romantic legends. There is perhaps no finer description of those operating in East Tennessee than that written by Mary Noailles Murfree, who wrote under the name of Charles Egbert Craddock. In her fictional account of a guerrilla raid, she said this of the Confederate leader:

He seemed endowed with the wings of the wind; today he was tearing up railroad tracks in the lowlands to impede the reinforcements of an

\textsuperscript{14}D. Whipple to W. J. Stephens, A. A. Talmadge to J. H. Magill, February 8, 1865, Nelson Papers.

\textsuperscript{15}Handbill, February 8, 1865, \textit{ibid.}. 
army; to-morrow the force sent with the express intention of placing
a period to those mischievous activities heard of his feats in burn-
ing bridges and cutting trestles in remote sections of the mountains.
The probabilities could keep no terms with him, and he laughed at
prophecy. He had a quick invention—a talent for expedients. He
appeared suddenly when least expected and where his presence seemed
impossible. He had a gift of military intuition. He seemed to know
the enemy's plans before they were matured; and ere a move was made
to put them into execution he was on the ground with troublous
obstacles to forestall the event in its very inception. He main-
tained a discipline to many commanders impossible. His troops had a
unity of spirit that might well animate an individual. They endured
long fasts, made wonderful forced marches on occasion—all day in the
saddle and nodding to the pommel all night; it was even said they
fought to such exhaustion that when dismounted the front rank, lying
in line of battle prone upon the ground, would fall asleep between
volleys, and that the second rank kneeling to fire above them, had
orders to stir them with their carbines to insure regularity of the
musketry. He had the humbler yet even more necessary equipment for
military success. He could forage his troops in barren opportunities;
they somehow kept clothed and armed at the minimum of expense. Did
he lack ammunition—he made shift to capture a supply for his little
Parrott guns that barked like fierce dogs at the rear-guard of an
enemy or protected his own retreat when it jumped with his plans to
compass a speedy withdrawal himself. His horses were well groomed,
well fed, fine travellers, and many showed the brand U.S., for he
could mount his troop when need required from the corrals of an
unsuspecting encampment. He was the ideal guerilla, of infinite
service to his faction in small, significant operations of dispropor-
tioned importance.16

No matter how romantic fiction might paint the guerrilla or the
irregular, "Parson" Brownlow was interested in no distinction beyond the
fact that they were Confederate and therefore the object of his wrath.
Two years in exile had only intensified his hatred and his determination
to seek revenge. He had made his position quite clear earlier when he
said, "So far as I am concerned I have done the infernal Confederacy all

16 Charles Egbert Craddock, pseud. Mary Noailles Murfree, The Raid
of the Guerilla and Other Stories (J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia,
1912), 37-39.
the damage I could and I shall continue to fight it to the bitter end.\textsuperscript{17}

On this basis, he used his almost unlimited power as a Federal Treasury Department special agent and as a newspaper editor to ruin economically anyone who had not remained unconditionally loyal to the Union.\textsuperscript{18}

Accordingly, he demanded that the Confederate guerrillas be made to pay for destroying Union property. If they had no money, then the livestock and property of their relatives should be seized as compensation.\textsuperscript{19} As for the guerrillas themselves, Brownlow would later suggest that they be disposed of quickly and without the expense of imprisonment.\textsuperscript{20}

In the rural areas, such feelings expressed by Brownlow were interpreted as orders to do away with anything and anyone Confederate. Naturally, this was taken in its widest context, and a near state of lawlessness prevailed.

Now the Confederate sympathizers were in jeopardy of being driven from their homes.

All of these problems superimposed one on the other made military control an impossibility. Brigadier General S. P. Carter, provost marshal at Knoxville, made the first move a year earlier to restore order by demanding that the partisans stop punishing Confederates on their own

\textsuperscript{17}Clipping, April 26, 1863, in Hall-Stokely Papers (McClung Room, Lawson McGhee Library, Knoxville, Tennessee).


\textsuperscript{19}Knoxville Whig, September 3, 1864.

\textsuperscript{20}Ibid., September 3, 1865.
authority.\textsuperscript{21} He had made it plain that failure to comply with his directives would result in arrest. Slowly, Carter regained control and began to organize the partisans into home guard units which were to prove fairly effective against the numerous Confederate guerrilla bands.

At the same time, Colonel George Kirk had been working throughout the summer with his partisans, attempting to contain the North Carolina Confederate raiders.\textsuperscript{22} One of the most feared and highly respected of all East Tennessee raiders, he ranged widely from his headquarters at Greeneville, Tennessee, into North Carolina, fighting a continual guerrilla war with the Confederates there. In February, 1864, he organized his units composed of mountaineers, Confederate deserters, and bushwhackers.\textsuperscript{23} By late June he was ready to invade North Carolina and attack Camp Vance, an important Confederate supply base and training center where the Confederates were training their junior reserves: seventeen and eighteen-year olds called to service under the 1864 Conscription Act.

In July, Kirk and 130 of his men surprised the garrison at Camp Vance in a lightning-like raid. He destroyed the base and a large stock

\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Ibid.}, January 16, 1864. The Johnson Papers point out how desperate things were: "... our fields have been desolated, our horses and grain all taken from us, our families insulted and impoverished and a few rebel gourillas [sic] are allowed to occupy our whole country from Strawberry Plains up to the Virginia line. ... Send, and do it without delay, enough force here to relieve us..." J. Netherland to Gov. Johnson, July 8, 1864, Johnson Papers.


\textsuperscript{23}\textit{Ibid.}, Vol. 49, Pt. 1, p. 810.
of supplies, and "... like an eagle snatching its prey... carried its [Camp Vance's] one hundred reserves [away] in its talons."²⁴ Kirk's men were from these mountains and on every raid they meant to make the Confederates pay dearly for every minute the Unionists had suffered over the past three years. In these mountains, irregular tactics were the accepted norm of battle. The objective was to shatter the enemy's will to continue fighting, and the means were brutal, fierce, and uncompromising.

From these combined efforts, some order was restored and the enemy guerrillas, if not yet totally defeated, were at least located and to some degree contained.²⁵ By controlling the Union irregulars and directing their activities, a unity of action was achieved, enabling Federal authorities to concentrate a more highly organized force against the Confederates. The leaders were capable, and were old hands at this type warfare. Because they were natives they knew the land and they knew the people.

Probably one of the most important activities that took place after Longstreet's defeat was the beginning of a civil actions program. These people who had remained faithful to the Union through years of hardships had been left practically destitute by the last months of the


campaign. The important thing now was to get them back on their feet as quickly as possible. The program had a humanitarian aspect, but it was more than that. If Grant intended to keep Longstreet isolated, partisan guerrillas would have to do it. They could only succeed with the support of the population. Such support could only be assured if the people were relieved of some of their hardships or if they had faith that help was coming. It might still be a long war, and the need for food was always an important consideration. The sooner the fields were cultivated the better, because it would guarantee Grant a nearby source. To Grant, and later Sherman, there was always the ever-present danger of an attack from the rear which would be nullified if the rear was solidly Unionist.

The plan of rejuvenation for East Tennessee was a twofold program. First, supplies had to reach the area in sufficient quantity to prevent economic disaster. They were few at first, but, after Thomas took Nashville in December, 1864, enough food, clothing, and equipment arrived to assure a gradual recovery. Quartermaster officers were sent into the area to authorize the use of military equipment and animals for farm work. They issued seeds, tools, guns, and ammunition, helping in any way possible to increase civilian morale. The second aspect of the program was the work of volunteer organizations like the East Tennessee Relief Association, which rushed in supplies and medicine and kept it coming as long as necessary, and the Western Sanitary Commission, which

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26Ibid., Vol. 34, Pt. 2, p. 134.

27Knoxville Whig, April 16 and April 23, 1864; Campbell, "East Tennessee During Federal Occupation," 73-75, 80.
assisted in planting and seed distribution.\textsuperscript{28} It would take several years of this type of relief work before East Tennessee would recover completely, but the timing was perfect.\textsuperscript{29} This activity gave the Federal forces another distinct advantage in that they never lost the support or control of the population.

Thus by blending military force, political power, and an awareness of civilian needs, the Federal authorities were able to make an asset of the region which had been a liability to the Confederates. Moreover, with the cooperation of a friendly population, they were able to blunt the threat of a Confederate counterguerrilla offensive. To be sure, the Confederate raiders and independent guerrillas had a certain nuisance value, but, because these attacks were sporadic and rarely co-ordinated, they were never a real threat to Federal authority.

Confederate raids continued. On August 1, such a raid against Athens, Tennessee, was successfully repelled. Quickly a counterinsurgency team was sent in pursuit, overtaking them at a base near Murphy, North Carolina, where they were surprised and defeated. Here was a guerrilla textbook situation in which counterguerrilla technique demoralized and overwhelmed the enemy. After this victory, and with Kirk securing the line to the left along the border, the southern part of East Tennessee was relatively free of Confederates.

\textsuperscript{28}Pennsylvania Relief Report, 34-36; Knoxville Whig, February 13, 1864; Humes, \textit{Loyal Mountaineers}, 309-10, 316-17, 393.

\textsuperscript{29}Knoxville Whig, May 23, 1866; Campbell, "East Tennessee During Federal Occupation," 75-79.
Meanwhile, General A. C. Gillem, Acting State Adjutant General, was ordered by Governor Andrew Johnson to take the Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry into East Tennessee. The orders directed them to act as a counterinsurgency force to clear the upper part of the region of enemy guerrillas and to restore civil order. Gillem's force left Nashville on August 1, and sixteen days later reached Knoxville, the area behind them clear of the enemy. A day later they moved toward Morristown together with two other units, all under Gillem's command. These state troops were the only Union force in upper East Tennessee, as every other unit had been sent south to join Sherman.

Their first contact with the enemy was near Morristown. Here they captured Confederate Senator Joseph B. Heiskell and a number of Confederate partisans of General John Hunt Morgan's command. Hearing that General Joseph Wheeler's cavalry was in the Maryville vicinity, Gillem turned southwest to meet him. Wheeler was moving north toward Knoxville when partisan scouts of each command met in probing skirmishes, after which contact was lost. For the next six days Gillem marched and counter-marched between Knoxville and Greeneville in an attempt to locate either Wheeler or John Morgan, whom he believed to be somewhere near Greeneville. If the Confederates closed in on him from both directions he would be

30Scott and Angel, Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry, 152-53.
31Ibid., 153-56.
32Ibid., 158. For conditions in the Morristown-Greeneville area, see M. S. Temple to O. P. Temple, August 18, 1864, Oliver P. Temple Papers (Special Collections, University of Tennessee Library, Knoxville); O.R., Ser. I, Vol. 39, Pt. 2, p. 311.
trapped and cut off from Knoxville and his line of supply. Fortunately, Wheeler moved past Strawberry Plains and then turned west and headed into Middle Tennessee. It is doubtful if either he or Morgan knew how close they were to Gillem or how close they were to regaining control of upper East Tennessee.

Gillem took Bull's Gap on August 31, and on September 4, along with a Federal relief column from Knoxville, moved on Greeneville. In the early morning hours of September 4, a town citizen slipped into the Federal lines and informed the commander of the Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry that the Confederate guerrilla John Hunt Morgan was in town. Companies G and I were sent along a back road under cover of a heavy storm to sweep into town and attempt to get Morgan. The raid was a complete surprise, and Morgan was shot by Private Andrew Campbell during the skirmish.


For the remainder of the month and well into October, Gillem's men fought a running guerrilla battle with the Confederates under Vaughn and Basil Duke. Control of the valley entrance into Virginia was at stake, and the fighting ranged from Morristown to Jonesboro with the Union forces finally withdrawing to New Market. Gillem attacked again on the 27th of October near Panther Springs, five miles south of Morristown. The Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry, accompanied by the Eighth Infantry, routed the Confederates with heavy losses and pursued them as far as Russellville before breaking contact.

Now it seemed that a reasonable amount of progress toward a return to normal conditions was being made. There were, however, still isolated bands of guerrillas who had moved deep into the mountains, and it was toward these that Governor Johnson now directed his attention. He felt that he could turn to the people as he had always done in the past. He issued a proclamation on September 8, 1864, in which he said:

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\text{in these last hours of Morgan's life to leave many questions unanswered. However, the most plausible explanation still seems to be that advanced by Scott and Angel in Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry. They hold that Morgan was a "target of opportunity" so to speak. When the Federal forces moved to attack Greeneville, they had no idea Morgan was there. The two companies which stormed the town were dispersed only after they were in attack formation. A guide got them into town unnoticed, and as they charged down the main street to the house where Morgan was supposed to be, fighting broke out. None of the men in either company had ever seen Morgan before. "A man" ran from a house pulling on his pants and firing as he ran. He was shot after a short chase. Later he was identified as General Morgan.}
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Whereas the rebellion has inaugurated a guerrilla mode of warfare throughout the country, degenerating into the Commission of every species of crime known to and punishable by the laws of the land, it is the duty of all good citizens, therefore, to unite in one common effort to sustain the civil authority throughout the state, and the suppression of these marauding bands, which are preying upon the innocent and defenseless [sic] throughout the land. 37

He went on to authorize the calling of all men 18-45 to militia duty. Refusal to serve would mean punishment by law. Here was the test; this was exactly the same procedure the Confederates had attempted early in the war and had failed. Under Johnson, however, there was no exodus to the hills. The population was not hostile but rather rallied to the Governor's call. The temper of the East Tennesseans was such that those who would oppose Johnson's call were in peril of their lives; in fact, the noose was slowly tightening around the necks of the few remaining independent bands, the most notorious of which was led by Champ Ferguson.

Champ Ferguson was probably the most effective independent Confederate guerrilla to operate in Middle and East Tennessee. 38 The reputation of his men and their tactics was almost legendary. Wherever he was active, he terrorized the country and was despised by civilians on both sides with equal intensity. 39 The only Confederate guerrilla who was


38 The most complete work about this famous guerrilla is Thurman Sensing, Champ Ferguson (Vanderbilt University Press, Nashville, 1942).

39 Williamson, "Diary of J. C. Williamson," 63-64.
refused amnesty, he was hung following a sensational trial in Nashville after the war.\textsuperscript{40} He usually operated in Fentress County against his Union counterpart, Tinker Dave Beattie.\textsuperscript{41} He was a brutal, vindictive man with a killer instinct, selfish, cunning, and probably a little mentally unbalanced. Ferguson and his men ventured into East Tennessee only twice on raids. The first of these was of no consequence, but on the second the raiders made off with 500 Federal mounts.\textsuperscript{42} Major Thomas H. Reeves, the Federal commander at Kingston, pursued the raiders, but after several days' chase he gave up, having recovered only 25 horses. Champ escaped, but he never returned to East Tennessee.

By no stretch of the imagination could this type of fighting be considered ended. Men of the same caliber as Ferguson would continue to roam the hills and harass the local population for years to come. In letters, diaries, and memoirs that have survived, the stories of the atrocities and outrages committed by these bands is repeated over and over again.\textsuperscript{43} Long after he succeeded Lincoln as President, Andrew Johnson continued to receive letters concerning the activities of these men. For example, H. T. Cox wrote from Lynchburg, Virginia, in 1865 that

\textsuperscript{40}O.R., Ser. I, Vol. 49, Pt. 2, p. 843. Full details of the trial may be found in the Nashville Dispatch, Daily Union, Daily Press and Times, March-June, 1865).

\textsuperscript{41}Hale and Merritt, History of Tennessee, III, 650-58.


\textsuperscript{43}For example, see Moon, "Adeline Deaderick Memoirs," 52-65; Shrader Webb to Captain George Webb, April 30, 1865, in Ruth Webb O'Dell, Over the Misty Blue Hills, The Story of Cocke County, Tennessee (n.pub., n.p., 1950), 337.
"... a reign of terror still exists in East Tenn.--that persecutions in almost every conceivable manner are prosecuted against men of property..." G. W. Deaderick of Bristol pleaded that something be done to restore quiet in the country, while a group of citizens writing from Washington County pointed the finger of guilt at Federal troops. They said that:

... a system was inaugurated by which the Union soldiers, taking the law in their own hands, avenged the wrongs they had suffered in the rebellion by beating and in some instances killing the men who had wronged them. Like all similar movements, it soon became progressive and in short culminated in Rape, Robbery and Murders, Extending to citizens indiscriminately without regard to party.44

Neither Confederate nor Unionist may be blamed per se for the results of unconventional warfare; both sides must share the guilt which led to its degenerating into common outlawry and banditry. On the other hand, there was probably little that could be done once unconventional warfare became an accepted practice. Unsavory characters always swarm like flies to honey to such activities, and the society which resorts to this method must also accept the people it attracts. But outwardly East Tennessee seemed secure, and the talk that Johnson might be considered for the vice-presidency was buttressed by the good job he had done in bringing Tennessee back into the Union.45

The Confederates, though, considered the story far from finished. In October, 1864, General John C. Breckinridge was placed in command of

44H. T. Cox to Johnson, June 17, 1865; G. W. Deaderick to D. T. Patterson, April 28, 1866; Shelly G. Shipley, et al. to Johnson, April 21, 1866, Johnson Papers.

45Hall, Andrew Johnson, 54.
that part of the Southwest Virginia--East Tennessee territory which remained to the Confederates.\textsuperscript{46} In early November, he launched a counter-attack. His rag-tag partisan fighters blended into a strong fighting unit--a unit strong enough to force Gillem back to Bull's Gap, where he established a strong defensive perimeter on November 11.\textsuperscript{47}

Breckinridge drove hard into Gillem's lines. Gillem fell back and tried to hold Morristown but was routed in disorder. Judge John B. Shields, then a lieutenant in the Confederate 39th Tennessee, describing the rout later in an article in a Jasper, Alabama, paper said: "We pursued the Federals as far as Strawberry Plains, capturing 300 prisoners. We thus cleared upper East Tennessee of all Federal Troops, they going to Knoxville... We did a great deal of scouting as bushwhackers were doing considerable mischief all over East Tennessee."\textsuperscript{48} Breckinridge then spread his forces thinly over the territory he had just taken, concentrating them along the railroad line, burning the bridges, and tearing up the track. Duke covered the Rogersville area, while Vaughn held Greeneville.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., Pt. 1, pp. 889-892; J. B. Camp to J. P. Graves, November 12, 1864, Works Projects Administration, Tennessee Historical Records Survey, History of Morristown, 1787-1936 (typed; Tennessee State Library, Nashville, 1940), 35.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 36. This figure may be about a hundred high, but the fact that Gillem's force retreated in disorder to Knoxville is true. O.R., Ser. I., Vol. 39, Pt. 1, p. 891; Scott and Angel, Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry, 208.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 211; O.R., Ser. I., Vol. 45, Pt. 1, p. 825.
In mid-December the Federal forces, under Stoneman, Gillem, and Burbridge, launched a counteroffensive from Bean's Station. Duke was routed by Gillem in a classical combined frontal assault and flanking attack. Gillem then pressed forward to link up with Burbridge at Bristol. Together they pushed the last Confederate forces from East Tennessee. The few stragglers who remained were cut off and it became the task of Union guerrillas quickly to round them up.

Union forces stationed at Athens, Tennessee, were again attacked by Confederate guerrillas on January 28, 1865. The Confederates lost about fifteen men, but withdrew only after capturing as many prisoners. It now became evident that East Tennessee could never be secured from such attacks unless these Confederates were attacked and their bases destroyed. Without bases they would be at the mercy of the Federal counter-guerrilla forces who could isolate and destroy them. The Confederates

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50 Ibid., 808-10; Scott and Angel, Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry, 219-20.

51 O.R., Ser. I, Vol. 45, Pt. 1, pp. 817-20. This unit moved into Virginia under Gen. G. S. Stoneman's leadership and helped destroy the King's Saltworks, destroy the railroad, and burn the bridges as far north as Wytheville, Va. While in this town, members of the Thirteenth blew up a church full of ammunition as well as a lead mine. Stoneman also captured 560 Confederate soldiers in a clever ruse at Bristol. The Confederate commander telegraphed Bristol for an all clear to send in reinforcements. Stoneman forced the telegrapher to send back an O.K. Two miles east of town, a group of men waited for the train to pass. When it did, they pulled up the track. The same was done just past the Bristol station. As the train pulled in, every Federal gun in the area was trained on it. As the Confederate commander stepped off the train, Stoneman was there to accept his surrender. Scott and Angel, Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry, 220-29. See also Duke, Morgan's Cavalry, 537 et passim.

were well aware of the vulnerability of their bases and took great care to locate them in the mountains of North Carolina as inaccessible as possible.

Raids under the direction of Colonel Kirk had long had these bases as their objective, but no maximum effort to destroy them completely had ever had full Federal sanction. Regular commanders were loath to admit the danger of such forces, and not until this late stage of the war could they be convinced of the necessity of clearing the mountains of this potential danger.\textsuperscript{53} Probably the most convincing argument was the recent experiences in East Tennessee and the knowledge that Lee, facing defeat in Virginia, could march to these mountains and prolong the war indefinitely. To those who understood the full implications of unconventional warfare, it was imperative that this course of action be denied the Confederate commander as quickly as possible.

Accordingly, in March, 1865, a force was gathered in Knoxville composed of the veteran Fifteenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, the Tenth Michigan, the Twelfth Ohio, and three Tennessee regiments: the Eighth, Ninth, and Thirteenth.\textsuperscript{54} All were ordered to prepare to travel light; all were experienced mountain fighters; and all expected to participate in their specialty—unconventional warfare. They were, in the modern use of the term, a Special Forces Group whose training fitted them for paramilitary operations in enemy territory, isolated for long

\textsuperscript{53}Ibid., 232; Van Noppen, "Stoneman's Last Raid," 28.

periods of time with no contact with friendly forces. They represented the ultimate in sophistication of guerrilla-partisan warfare. Combining as they did regular organization and discipline with the tactics and techniques of the partisan, they constituted a formidable weapon directed toward the last stronghold in the Confederacy capable of sustaining a protracted guerrilla war.

They were further armed with a new psychological weapon which gave tacit approval to their type of warfare for the first time. Sherman had clearly defined their mission as one designed to deprive the enemy of his ability to wage war in their zone of responsibility. The general intended that they paralyze the economy, destroy supplies, scatter families, and do anything else that would undermine enemy morale. He further increased their latitude of operation by holding that every man, woman, and child of the South was armed and at war. A definition we would come to call "total war" in the 20th century was thus born. Before such an onslaught, the will to resist would cease in the South from the Mississippi River to the Atlantic Ocean.

General George H. Thomas gave orders for the expedition with instructions "to destroy but not to fight battles." No order could more explicitly suggest unconventional warfare. No campaign could be said to conform more nearly to Francis Lieber's position concerning a rebellion.


Paragraph 156 of General Order 100 admonished the commander to "... throw the burden of the war, as much as lies within his power, on the disloyal citizens of the revolted portion or province...."  

General George Stoneman was placed in command of the newly designated District of East Tennessee in February, 1865, and with his combined command launched the offensive from Knoxville on March 21, 1865. General Alvan Gillem, commanding nine regiments, moved out immediately to seal the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad escape route which Lee might want to use. They reached Morristown on the 23rd amid cheers from the local population. Here they split and moved on, sweeping all before them. Perhaps it could best be described as a mountain version of Sherman's march to the sea. No Confederate soldier was safe; no Confederate sympathizer was shown any quarter if he resisted. The Tennessee regiments were particularly brutal, for they had been at this type of warfare a long time, and old personal memories stirred them to indiscretions they might otherwise not have committed. The destruction and military success of the raid has been admirably reconstructed by Professor Van Noppen, who concluded that:

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This was a splendidly conceived, ably executed attack upon the war potential and the civilian population of the South as well as upon its military resources. It was one of the early examples of total war. Stoneman's raid not only did incalculable military damage, but it destroyed the war making capacity of a whole region. Most significantly as Stoneman and his raiders passed through eastern Tennessee, . . . we obtain revealing glimpses of how the war had been felt and interpreted by the people of these regions who were its innocent victims. 62

It is clear by implication that this raid exemplified the culmination of training, applying fully the methods, means, and policies of unconventional warfare in its most advanced state. The military consequences to the enemy were staggering. Conversely, the completeness of the victory by the Union force was unquestionable.

The best and worst of this method of warfare were readily revealed in its military implications as well as its social impact. Militarily, it broke the will to fight of the Southerners. 63 It completely deprived Lee's armies of their food supply by severing the rail lines through East Tennessee. Morale was shattered as completely as was the war potential. In addition, Stoneman narrowly missed freeing the Union prisoners at Salisbury Prison; they were evacuated prior to his arrival. "The vast quantities of military stores destroyed . . . were sufficient to have enabled the South to continue the war for some time." 64

The social and political devastation was even more complete; the possibility of cooperating to achieve a peaceful post-war settlement was

62 Ibid., 19.
63 Ibid., 525.
64 Ibid.
now impossible. Professor Van Noppen has observed that: "The Pennsylvania troops behaved with discipline and decorum. On the other hand, many of the 'home Yankees' of the Tennessee regiments were undisciplined, were motivated by revenge, and committed many depredations. They robbed, pillaged and wantonly destroyed furniture, clothing, and even food that people needed for subsistence."\(^6\)

Such behavior could not but have its lasting effect. The Tennesseans seem to have been incapable of behaving so as to win over the population. The motive of revenge probably cost them a chance of total victory. Had they acted to convince rather than force, the subsequent story might have been different. With this raid, the military possibilities of unconventional warfare had been clearly indicated. On the other hand, the danger to the social order inherent in such a course of action had quite as vividly been revealed. Though the war officially ended while this raid was in progress, the ill feelings, hatreds, and political differences endured and divided the people.

Stoneman received the news that Grant had accepted Lee's surrender. But the fighting had not ended for his forces. They moved in to occupy Asheville, and there the word reached them that Jeff Davis had escaped from the Confederate capitol. He was making his way toward Georgia with a large cache of gold with which to continue the fight, unaware that his military commanders had already decided against prolonging the war by

\(^6\)Ibid., 526-27.
unconventional means. Though Stoneman and his men combed the mountains for the Confederate President, he was not to be found, having come to the end of the road in Washington, Georgia, where on May 4 he and his associates decided to give up the fight and scattered each to his own hiding place.

The end was inglorious. So was the war in East Tennessee. The combat had been vicious and personal, and in a military sense unconventional. The price of victory was high in terms of loss of life and property, but higher still in terms of the state of mind of the sufferers as they faced the task of reconstructing their society. There was little understanding, less charity, and no mercy as vengefully the social order was rebuilt. Payment is still being made a hundred years later, in no small measure a result of the social degeneration brought on by unconventional warfare.

67 Eliza Frances Andrews recorded this day for history by commenting in her diary:

"... there was a private meeting in his room ..., and again early in the morning there were other confabulations before they all scattered and went their ways--and this, I suppose, is the end of the Confederacy..." Quoted in Katherine M. Jones, Heroines of Dixie, Confederate Women Tell Their Story of the War (Bobbs-Merrill Co., New York, 1955), 409.

68 "It was fought by men in single combat, in squads, in companies, in regiments, in the fields, in fortified towns and in ambush, under the stars and stripes, under the stars and bars and under the black flag. The arch fiend himself seems to have been on the field in person, inspiring, directing, commanding." An excerpt from a speech in New York by Champ Clark of Missouri, April 25, 1892, referring to the war in Missouri, is equally applicable to the one fought in East Tennessee, 1861-1865.
CHAPTER V
ORGANIZED ESCAPE

When the State of Tennessee decided to separate from the Union, the East Tennessee Unionists were confronted with the problem of Confederate vindictiveness. Many Unionists were forced to seek asylum in a more sympathetic region. From this need evolved the final aspect of unconventional warfare—evasion and escape. Confederate authorities opposed the mass exodus of capable manpower. As their opposition intensified, the means used to evade and escape became more sophisticated. As conventional warfare increased in the state, unconventional warfare was expanding to include assisting key people to leave, opening escape routes for Union soldiers returning to their units, and helping Confederates to desert. From a Union point of view, this phase of the unconventional war in East Tennessee was of immeasurable value in that it depleted the manpower available to support the Southern cause.

To understand what took place, it is first necessary to understand more about evasion and escape. As an integral part of unconventional warfare, it is frequently undertaken by the same people who are engaged in guerrilla activities and subversion. It is here being treated

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1The distinction between evadee and escapee is important in the international rules of war but is not essential to this thesis. An evadee is defined as anyone behind enemy lines who succeeds in eluding physical detention by the enemy. An escapee is any person who, having been physically captured, successfully frees himself. Both actions may be accomplished with or without aid. For the purpose of this study, this distinction will not be used.
separately for the purpose of clarity. Evasion and escape techniques represent a more subtle form of resistance than either guerrilla or subversive exploits. Another distinctive characteristic is an indirectness of attack against the enemy's authority. Violence is avoided, the primary objective being to get important people, soldiers, and other selected individuals out of enemy-held territory.

From the viewpoint of an oppressed people or of prisoners in captivity, the most important reason for escape may well be to leave behind the intolerable life which both conditions suggest. But we must not overlook the effect upon morale. The people in an occupied area get a psychological boost by aiding an escapee. Conversely, the enemy is jolted into the realization that his efforts to exercise control over the area are being undermined by successful escapes from his control. Furthermore, escapees serve as an example to others, proving that it is possible and thus reducing the fear usually associated with such situations. In addition, every escapee is a vital source of information, providing friendly commanders with a useful source of intelligence. In an effort to confine this security breech, an enemy is forced to undertake drastic measures. If the methods used are overly severe, their use will encourage additional escapes; if too lenient, they will be interpreted as a sign of weakness and the resistance movement will become bolder in its activities. Regardless of the course pursued, escape practices will force the enemy to use vitally needed combat forces to control unauthorized people and activities behind his lines. Obviously, every man who escapes from enemy control adds to the ranks of the
friendly forces and is one more man whom the enemy may not exploit either to fight for him or to produce needed supplies for his armies.

When Governor Harris took Tennessee out of the Union in 1861, he immediately dispatched loyal Confederate troops to East Tennessee to quell an expected Union uprising there. The Unionists for their part resented this intimidation and were determined to resist despite the conciliatory policy adopted by General Zollicoffer, the Confederate commander. They had demonstrated their resolve in the 1861 elections by voting for representation in the United States Congress rather than in the Confederate. The Confederate authorities had no intention of allowing the elected East Tennesseans to reach Washington, and took steps to prevent their departure by blocking all routes north.

The representatives, though, had plans of their own—to escape. T. A. R. Nelson attempted to reach the North in early August, but he was captured by the Home Guard in Lee County, Virginia, and sent to Richmond as a prisoner. Horace Maynard awaited the election returns in Scott County. When it was clear that he had been elected, he fled into Kentucky, and on December 2, 1861, took his seat in the United States Congress. Andrew J. Clements made good his escape and joined Maynard in

20\textsuperscript{2} \textsuperscript{2} R. \textit{Ser. I}, Vol. 4, pp. 369-70.
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Ibid}, pp. 377-474-75.
\textsuperscript{4} Knoxville \textit{Whig}, August, 1861, clipping in Nelson Scrapbook, XIII, 177.
\textsuperscript{5} \textit{Congressional Globe}, 37 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 2.
Congress on January 13, 1862. George W. Bridges, Union candidate from lower East Tennessee, also got away, but was obliged to return when his family was detained at the Tennessee border by Confederate guards. Receiving word that his wife was ill, he returned to see about her and was arrested and sent to Knoxville as a prisoner. One week before the end of the term, he was released and took his seat in the United States House of Representatives.

The escapes of these prominent men did not go unnoticed either in East Tennessee or in Governor Harris' office. The Governor decided to follow a stricter policy of border security in order to prevent the flight of any additional notable men. Harris asked Richmond for more soldiers to implement this policy. Meanwhile, General Zollicoffer tried to tone down the governor's harsh stand, hoping to avoid antagonizing the population. On August 18, 1861, he promised the people that the men under his command would in no way provoke an incident which would threaten the peace of the communities under his jurisdiction. He even encouraged those who had already fled to return home, promising them that no charges would be brought against them. Political differences were over, he said, and it was time now "... to maintain the independence it

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6Ibid., 297.

7Humes, Loyal Mountaineers, 35; Congressional Globe, 37 Cong., 3 Sess., pp. 1295-96.


[the state and presumably the Confederacy] has asserted by the united feeling and action of all its citizens.\textsuperscript{10} For a time conciliation seemed to be gaining a measure of success. Open defiance of Confederate authority subsided,\textsuperscript{11} but the flight north to Federal training camps continued.\textsuperscript{11} A contemporary historian recorded the fact that:

Gradually the disposition to leave spread through all the counties of East Tennessee. So, there came to be a constant stream of refugees constantly working their way by night, through the wide expanse of mountains separating East Tennessee from the thickly settled parts of Kentucky. . . . They fled from what they regarded as a present and terrible danger. . . . Soon there were thousands of these wanderers in Kentucky.\textsuperscript{12}

During the autumn of 1861, these loyal men were organized into six regiments of the Federal Army. In the meantime, Confederate forces redoubled their efforts to stop the flow by guarding every pass, but still the exodus continued.\textsuperscript{13} Though some still made their way independently across the mountains, more and more refugees became dependent upon local citizens for aid. The refugees knew little about the passes and routes and even less of the tightening security measures being imposed by Confederate authorities.

Their only chance of success depended upon men who knew the country and were apprized of Confederate activities, men like William Clift,

\hspace{1cm}\hspace{1cm}\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{10} General Orders No. 3, August 18, 1861, \textit{ibid.}, Ser. II, Vol. 1, p. 831.

\hspace{1cm}\hspace{1cm}\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{11} Temple, \textit{East Tennessee and the Civil War}, 368.

\hspace{1cm}\hspace{1cm}\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{12} \textit{ibid.}, 369.

\hspace{1cm}\hspace{1cm}\hspace{1cm}\textsuperscript{13} Tatum, \textit{Disloyalty}, 144.
mentioned earlier in connection with the Clift Wars.\textsuperscript{14} This sixty-seven-year old Unionist began his career of Confederate defiance by providing a haven for refugees going to the North. They came from as far away as Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia, and in such numbers that Clift organized them into companies. After Clift signed the Crossroads Treaty in which he agreed to disband his force, his men escaped to Kentucky where they joined the Federal Army.

To make matters worse, the Confederate Congress, on August 30, authorized the sequestration of enemy estates, property, and effects, and Landon C. Haynes was appointed to dispose of all property in this category.\textsuperscript{15} Haynes interpreted this act as pertaining to anyone who had escaped, who might escape in the future, or who aided the United States in any way.\textsuperscript{16} Not only were their possessions in jeopardy, but the Union sympathizers themselves were arrested on one pretext or another.\textsuperscript{17} Life was made miserable for the East Tennessee Unionists, and there was among them an ever-increasing desire to get away.

Almost immediately the Confederate Congress issued another vindictive piece of legislation. This time it was a proclamation made the more objectionable by four amendments which gave those not in sympathy with

\textsuperscript{14} J. S. Hurlburt, \textit{History of the Rebellion in Bradley County} (Indianapolis, 1866), 66-71; Temple, \textit{Notable Men}, 45-46.

\textsuperscript{15} R.\textit{S. Ser. IV}, Vol. 1, pp. 586, 592.

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Knoxville Weekly Register}, October 17, 1861.

\textsuperscript{17} Garrett, "Confederate Government in East Tennessee," 27-29.
the Confederate cause forty days to get out of the South or be held as enemy aliens. All their property was to be forfeited, all rights annulled, and, if they were in the area after the elapsed time, they faced detention as spies or prisoners of war.\textsuperscript{18} Though this was the official policy of Davis' government, Governor Harris, who still had technical control of the Tennessee troops guarding the routes north, continued to arrest anyone trying to cross the border.\textsuperscript{19} This confusing state of affairs continued until September 18 when General Zollicoffer and his men moved into Kentucky, leaving the border unguarded.

All this time Union men were subjected to unlawful search of their homes, seizure of their arms, and violation of their civil rights. Their response to these indignities was exemplified by the November bridge burnings. The Confederates responded by introducing a policy of retaliation which was more coercive than those already imposed. Each time the Confederates stiffened their policy, men went north in droves. By the time they passed a conscription law in April, 1862, the escape routes were already well defined. O. P. Temple has estimated that as many as fifteen or twenty thousand secretly crossed into Kentucky to join the Federal Army during the first two years of the war.\textsuperscript{20}

As escaping Unionists increased in number, the Federal troops stationed in Kentucky came to their assistance. A Federal company based

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., Ser. I, Vol. 52, Pt. 2, 180; Temple, East Tennessee and the Civil War, 369-70.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., 428.
at Albany, Kentucky, commanded by Captain Jim Ferguson, was entrusted with the mission of establishing a "safe line" along the state boundary.\(^{21}\)

The operation was simple. After traveling for days over the rugged mountain terrain, few of those escaping had any idea exactly when they crossed the border. If they relaxed their vigilance too quickly, they ran the risk of being captured by one of the Confederate cavalry patrols. To preclude this chance, all were instructed to continue to evade until they had made definite contact with Ferguson's forces.

Those who for one reason or another could not escape immediately took refuge with the mountaineers, hiding in the inaccessible hills and coves. "Parson" Brownlow, for example, hid out in Tuckaleechee Cove (Townsend) in October, 1861.\(^{22}\) Some, like Robert Johnson, the son of Andrew Johnson, made it out of Tennessee on their own. After hiding for two months in the mountains and walking mostly at night, he crossed into Kentucky in early February, 1862.\(^{23}\) His success was an exception; most of those unfamiliar with the mountains were captured. If escapes were to continue, professionals would be needed. In this situation, the new

A "safe line" is an area near the border which is patrolled by friendly forces and beyond which an escapee may expect to receive aid. When friendly contact is made along a safe line, it may be assumed that in most cases the escapee is safely beyond enemy-held territory.


\(^{23}\)New York Times, March 2, 1862.
heroes of the mountains—the pilots—gained importance. These men, either for pay or out of patriotic dedication, arranged to lead others through the mountains to Federal camps, like Camp Dick Robinson near Lexington, Kentucky.

These pilots were a special breed of men. Their knowledge of the country—its unused passes and back roads, river crossings, and secluded resting spots—equipped them for this task. Expert woodsmen, daring, resourceful, and cool under pressure, these men loom as heroes in the local legends of East Tennessee, and none is more famous than Dan Ellis, the "Old Red Fox." He was a bridge-burner in the early resistance movement. Later, hiding in the mountains, he was almost captured by Confederates. He eventually escaped and from April 1862 to the end of the war was responsible for helping thousands of men into Kentucky to

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24 Temple, East Tennessee and the Civil War, 426-27; Humes, Loyal Mountaineers, 364-66. There were a number of these men other than those who will be discussed in this thesis. Some of the more important were: Spencer Deaton, Seth Lea, and Frank Hodge of Knox County; Isaac Bolinger of Campbell, Washington Van and William B. Reynolds of Anderson County; and James Lane of Greene. Tatum, Disloyalty, 151. Chapter XXIX in Scott and Angel, Thirteenth Tennessee Cavalry, deals primarily with Dan Ellis, but also records the names of many other pilots. Dan Ellis, in his own book, Thrilling Adventures, also lists many of these men throughout his discussion. Others were: Keith Blalock and Harrison Church of North Carolina, and Ruben Rogers, Alexander Heatherly, Joseph Cooper, Daniel A. Carpenter, John Heatherly and his wife Kate Summers, all of Campbell County. William McLain taught Dan Ellis the trade, and Emanuel Headen guided escapees from Georgia into Kentucky.

25 Dykeman, French Broad, 121.

26 A shorter, less scholarly, but useful account of Dan Ellis's exploits than those already mentioned is Emmett Gowen, "Dan Ellis and the Mountain Trail," True Civil War Stories, Joseph Millard, editor (Fawcett Publications, Greenwich, Conn., 1961), 185-200.
join the Federal Army. Not one to waste his talent, he always acted as a courier on his return trip, bringing in the latest news and instructions. Through the efforts of men like Ellis, the lines of communication with the North were kept open to the extent that Union papers were able, throughout the war, to report regularly on the situation in East Tennessee.  

Richard Flynn of Cumberland County was another famous pilot who led parties of escapees from Georgia and Alabama safely into Kentucky. His story is an example of the care and planning that went into establishing an escape route. His route began with an initial contact made in the vicinity of Chattanooga at a "safe house" run by Peter Thundergudgeon on Walden's Ridge. Peter provided guidance, passwords, and food enough to get the travelers to Y. C. Sniprip's house in Sequatchie Valley. After food and rest, Sniprip guided the group to Flynn's pick-up point on Big Laurel Creek. Flynn then guided his charges along a mountain trail to Possum Creek, Kentucky. Flynn is perhaps most famous for his role following the ill-fated attempt of James T. Andrews and his party to capture the Confederate locomotive "The General" in what is commonly called the "Great Locomotive Chase." After Andrews and his raiders failed and were captured, eight of the party were executed, but later eight others escaped from prison in Atlanta. They were quickly shuttled into the

27Temple, East Tennessee and the Civil War, 465, 467.

28Bullard and Krechniak, Cumberland County, 55.

escape net and into the hands of Richard Flynn, who delivered them safely into Kentucky. Like Ellis, on his return trips Flynn was both scout and courier.

Captain R. A. Ragan of Cocke County had experience as escapee, evad ee, and pilot. Soon after the enactment of conscription, Ragan, a school teacher, was picked up and taken to Knoxville. Here he was imprisoned with some 300 other Unionists. Through the influence of Ragan’s father, who was a postmaster, General Leadbetter was instructed to release the young man. No sooner had he arrived home than word came that he was to be arrested again. Seeking refuge in the mountains, for weeks he moved and hid, always just ahead of conscript parties searching for others like himself. He missed several opportunities to rendezvous with groups being led out, first because of an injury and later because the pilot he was to meet was captured. After several months in the mountains, he returned to the vicinity of his home and hid for a while with relatives, which was extremely dangerous as the searches were continual and always unannounced. It was not until July, 1863, that Ragan, hearing that George Kirk was leading a group out in a few days, joined about a hundred other men at the appointed meeting place. Together they crossed Walden Ridge, the Watauga, Cumberland, Holston, and Powell rivers, and finally reached Camp Dick Robinson. Many East Tennesseans were already

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30 Bullard and Krechniak, Cumberland County, 56-57.

there preparing to join Burnside's army in an assault on the Confederates.

But more men were needed. Ragan volunteered to return home, raise a
force, and bring them north before the attack.

He safely recrossed into East Tennessee without incident. Those
wanting to escape were to meet him at a specific time on a remote farm
owned by Benjamin F. Nease. At the appointed time, the men began to
arrive by twos and threes, quietly waiting because of the ever-present
danger of attracting the attention of Confederate scouting parties.
After a hundred or so had arrived, Ragan felt it safe to identify himself
as the pilot. To have done so sooner without adequate precaution could
have meant certain death if the Confederates had infiltrated the net. On
Ragan's signal, they started out in single file, maintaining strict
silence, over the unfamiliar route. They picked up fifteen more men at
the Chucky Knobs "safe area," and by daylight had reached the Holston
River, where they rested. 32

At eight that night they began the river crossing, which took
until midnight; consequently they only made fifteen miles that day. 33

32 A "safe area" is a remote part of the country where the enemy
rarely patrols. Men wanting to escape were sent to these areas to be
contacted by a pilot for evacuation. A pilot usually had several of
these areas established along his route. As he approached them, he would
halt his column some distance away and either he or an assistant would go
forward and contact any men there according to prearranged signals. Such
a technique prevented the compromise of the whole net in the event that
the Confederates had succeeded in compromising or infiltrating it at any
point.

33 An interesting sidelight to this trip at the Holston River
crossing was the prayer offered for the success of the men by an old
Negro preacher called Old Uncle David delivered just before Ragan crossed:
Continuing on, now over two hundred strong, they crossed Bays Mountain and then Clinch Mountain, and finally the dangerous Clinch River. Only then did they dare rest. The next leg took them over Powell's Mountain, Walden Ridge, and Wild Cat Mountain. The nights were dark, the trails narrow and dangerous, and the strain of the trip with little food and inadequate clothing was beginning to tell on the men; still they kept on. Dawn on the fifth day found Ragan's men hidden in the woods beside the Powell River. The most dangerous part of the trip lay just ahead--Powell's Valley. This area was heavily patrolled; from here to the border any slip could mean death or capture. The pressure was intense. An old man named Walker was the "contact" in the area, and by two the next

"O, Lord God Almighty! We is yo' Chil'n and 'pects you to hea' us without delay, ca'ce we all is in a right smart hurry. Dese yer gemmen has run'd away from de Seceshers and dere 'omes and wants to get to de Norf. Dey hasn't got any time to wait. Ef it is 'cordin to de destination of great Hebben to help 'em it'll be 'bout necessary fo de help to come right soon. De hounds and de rebels is on dere track. Take de smell out ov de dog's noses, O Lawd! and let Gypshum darkness come ober de eyesights ob de rebels. Confound 'em O Lawd! De is cruel, and makes haste to shed blood. De long has pressed de black man and groun' him in de dust, and now I reck'n dey spects dat dey am a gwin to serve de loyal men de same way. Hep dese gemmen in time ob trouble and lead 'em through all danger on to de udder side of Jo'dan dry shod! An raise de radiance ob you face on all de loyal men what's shut up in de Souf! Send some Moses, O Lawd to guide 'em fru de Red Sea of Flickshum into de Promis' Land! Send some great Gen'ral ob de Norf wid his comp'ny sweepin' down fru dese parts to scare de rebels till dey flee like Midians and slew dereselves to sabe dere lives! O Lawd, bless de Gen'rais of de Norf! O Lawd, bless de Kunnels, O Lawd, bless de Capt'ins! O Lawd, bless der loyal men makin' dere way to de Promis' Land! O Lawd, Ever-lastin. Amen."

Ragan commented: "This prayer, offered in a full and fervent voice, seemed to cover our case exactly and we could join in the 'Amen.' We then crossed the Holston River, but not dry shod." Quoted in O'Dell, Misty Blue Hills, 335.
afternoon he had the men fed and in position to cross the "dead line" that night. Everyone tried to get some rest except two who were detailed to keep the others from snoring or talking in their sleep. It took until three in the morning for everyone to get across the open valley. It was slow and nerve-racking work avoiding the constant patrols and moving in small groups, sometimes only a few yards at a time. This four-hundred-yard crossing was, as the participants put it, like crossing the valley of death.

The "dead line" behind them, Ragan's men crossed Cumberland Mountain and into another "safe area" known as Bailes Meadow. All the men were hungry and many were almost naked, most were without shoes after the rugged night marches, but all were free and all were bitter, ready to fight. This particular group became Company K of the Eighth Tennessee Infantry Regiment under Colonel Felix A. Reeve.

34 This term originated from the line or fence beyond which prisoners of war were not allowed to cross in the compound. Anyone crossing would be shot. The same term endures today and carries with it the same connotation. William Best Hesseltine, Civil War Prisons, A Study in War Psychology (Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1930), 57, 61, 143 et passim. The "dead line" in this case was the narrow stretch through Powell's Valley which the Confederates patrolled very heavily. G. W. Morgan to O. D. Green, April 19, 1862, O.R., Ser. I, Vol. 10, Pt. 2, p. 114. This area proved to be an ideal spot to trap escape parties. Many successful apprehensions were made here. Only ten days before Ragan's party arrived, another group had been captured in the exact location where they were making their crossing attempt. The usual procedure on such occasions was to hang the pilot on the spot. This point where success was so close was usually the most dangerous because of the natural tendency of the escapees to relax their vigilance and become noisy and careless. Pilots were always most apprehensive at these points. Escape from this position, once the crossing had begun, was impossible. The risk to the escapees was only capture, but to the pilot it was instant death. Ibid., 336. W. W. Glazier, The Capture, the Prison Pen and the Escape (R. H. Ferguson and Co., New York, 1870), 358-59.
The pilots developed a criss-cross network of escape routes all across East Tennessee, and, wherever they were established, the loyal population showed its approval in whatever way it could. Farmers, for example, began to leave caches of food at fence corners every few miles along the routes where men would be moving swiftly and silently to the North. Ever conscious of the increasing nocturnal traffic, residents along the way undertook to act as sentinels, protecting and warning. Through this cooperative effort, the number of successful escapes multiplied. Still, the nagging problem of a lack of organization pointed up many remaining dangers. Escape parties were often forced to spend as much time hiding from each other as from the Confederates. Incompetent or careless guides, attracted by what seemed to them to be easy money, blundered their way across the hills, exposing themselves and their charges to certain capture. Sometimes Confederates, posing as Union guides, succeeded in gaining the confidence of a group seeking to escape, whereupon they led their unsuspecting companions into the waiting arms of Confederate patrols.  

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35 Bullard and Krechniak, Cumberland County, 55. The techniques of cooperation were as varied as were the routes and were as modern as if they were those of World War II or the Korean War. Probably the two most significant points revealed by these stories of escapes were, first, that the cooperation of the population and their subsequent organizing made the internal escape net a success and, second, research to this writing has not uncovered a single case of a net's being compromised from within. This is a record of which the participants could be justly proud. It is reflective of their dedication to the Union, and as yet it has not been excelled in modern times.

36 Dan Ellis, Thrilling Adventures, 99 et passim, 133.
The need for organization became increasingly obvious as Confederate security tightened. There is evidence that groups for this purpose had been forming from the very beginning under the name of the Heroes of America.\textsuperscript{37} Like all such clandestine organizations, its origin is unknown as was its connection with similar structures elsewhere in the Confederacy.\textsuperscript{38} Operating in North Carolina, southwestern Virginia, and eastern Tennessee, the Heroes of America was Union inspired, and its headquarters was somewhere within Federal lines.\textsuperscript{39} Confederate authorities in East Tennessee had long suspected the existence of such a movement but had been unable to destroy it.\textsuperscript{40} Union officers, if not directly involved in its operations, were certainly well aware of its activities and allowed its operators to pass freely through Federal lines.\textsuperscript{41} Participation among the mountaineers was encouraged by granting them exemption from conscription.\textsuperscript{42} Weight was added to the importance of this work by the testimony of Daniel R. Goodloe to the Senate that both Grant and Lincoln were members of the Heroes of America.\textsuperscript{43} Each

\textsuperscript{37}Owsley, "Defeatism," 452-56.

\textsuperscript{38}Tatum, Disloyalty, 32.


\textsuperscript{41}Tatum, Disloyalty, 33.


\textsuperscript{43}Daniel R. Goodloe was a former U.S. Marshal from Warren County. His statement is in the Senate Report, 42 Cong., 1 Sess., Ser. 1468,
local segment had its own grips, passwords, signs, oaths, and obligations to bind the members.\textsuperscript{44} The following observation by one historian is an example of the degree of commitment to the Union cause expected of members:

The duties required were to encourage and facilitate desertion from the Confederate army, to protect and pass all deserters, escaped prisoners, or spies; to report the positions, movements, numbers, and condition of the Confederate troops; in short, to contribute in every way possible to the success of the Federals and the defeat of the Confederacy.\textsuperscript{45}

For protection, members held no meetings, kept no records, and often, through a system of "cut-outs" and safe houses or areas, knew only a few other members of the organization. Their operations were conducted more as a loose confederation than as a highly centralized and directed unit. Each group acted "... as an independent, dismembered link in a perfect chain."\textsuperscript{46} Probably there was a close association between key leaders and the United States Secret Service, though there is insufficient evidence to prove such an association ever existed. The movement of escapees from

\begin{itemize}
\item p. 227. Membership in such a society seems incongruous to the characters of Lincoln and Grant. In his overzealously, it is possible that Goodloe overstated the participation of both these leaders. Maybe he meant that they were heroes in America only in the broadest sense, though his statement explicitly implicates both men in the organization. It is quite possible also that their names were used for their propaganda value. Even though there might be reservations in accepting this testimony at face value, the effect desired was attained. Loyal Unionists of the area formed into an organization.

\item \textsuperscript{44}O.R., Ser. IV, Vol. 3, pp. 806, 809, 811; Tatum, Disloyalty, 33-34; Dykeman, French Broad, 121.

\item \textsuperscript{45}Tatum, Disloyalty, 34; O.R., Ser. IV, Vol. 3, pp. 803, 807, 814.

\item \textsuperscript{46}Dykeman, French Broad, 121.
\end{itemize}
one group to another was done so well and with such apparent professionalism that it is safe to speculate that sufficient cooperation existed to classify the effort as an organization.

Membership in the Heroes of America was not limited to avowed Unionists, as evidence of their activity was found within the Confederate Army itself. Kirby Smith was aware of this even to the extent that he suspected individual soldiers, officers, and in some cases entire units of disloyalty. His suspicions were not without foundation, for later it was discovered that Confederate Captain Robert W. Boone, a great-grandson of Daniel Boone, was a secret Union agent, spy, pilot, and scout who used the name Charlie Davis. Under this name he led hundreds of men safely through Confederate lines. The problem was so acute that Confederate officials began reporting to Richmond the existence of such secret organizations, particularly the fact that their soldiers were members. As Confederate losses increased in 1863, the societies gained strength until, as General Gideon J. Pillow reported to General Samuel Cooper, their influence was so widespread that it was impossible to


49 ibid., 152.

obtain men in Tennessee. 51

He might have added that it was almost impossible to keep the men he had. By the fall of 1863 the desertion programs of Union secret societies were in full operation. General Rosecrans reported in September that he was able to fill his ranks by enlisting many of these men who had left Confederate ranks. 52 It was from the ranks of the deserters that Colonel George Kirk also recruited many of his irregulars. Moreover, there was great dissatisfaction among the Confederates in Tennessee units. It was so easy to contact someone who could help them get away that it is not surprising to find that when the men received letters from home begging them to return, many could not resist the temptation to desert.

By 1864 the secret societies expanded their escape nets into the newly constructed prisons in the Carolinas. They modified and enlarged the underground railroad system used earlier to smuggle slaves out of the South. 53 During the long political struggle that preceded the war, the Negroes had perfected a relay system of passing runaway slaves from one point to another until they could reach the safety of the North. The effectiveness of this system has long been a matter of debate, but there is little doubt that the slaves south of the mountains were well

acquainted with isolated routes in sparsely settled areas which they used constantly in communicating with each other. When the war came, they placed themselves at the disposal of the Union. Spies, prisoners, and deserting Confederates, all were accepted, aided, and moved on into the mountains. The Negroes' knowledge of the movements of southern patrols, roadblocks, and army dispositions was uncanny. They handled their charges until they reached the base of the mountains, an area relatively safe from Confederate patrols. From this point on was the province of the mountain men. The link from prison escape to sanctuary was complete. "Here for the first time all the elements necessary for a successful escape were present: the guard-force was inadequate, the prison walls were non-existent, and on the outside there was a large portion of the population ready and willing to render assistance." 54

Many of the Confederate prison camps, such as the one at Camp Sorghum near Columbia, South Carolina, had been hastily constructed and were little more than cleared areas surrounded by guards. Some had fences, but these were easily breached by slipping an unauthorized man

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54 Hesseltime, "Underground Railroad," 60. "The Union Army had been making good use of the little known mountain passes where only experienced guides could find their way. These mountains sheltered fugitives from the Confederate Army who hid by day and foraged by night, often moving in bands of as many as twenty men for protection. Through both northern and southern portions of the North Carolina mountains were paths followed by those who had escaped from Confederate prisons in making their way to Union lines in Tennessee. Those fleeing from Salisbury followed the Yadkin River to Wilkes County, said to be probably the strongest Union County in North Carolina; . . . . The Unionists fed and sheltered escapees and guided them across the Blue Ridge to Banner Elk, where the second relay of guides helped them to Tennessee." Van Noppen, "Stoneman's Last Raid," 33.
or so into a work party as it departed. Quite often the assistance of a
guard who was a member of a secret Union organization could be obtained.
At this particular camp, holding twelve hundred officers, three hundred
and seventy-three are known to have successfully escaped. The pattern
seemed to be to get beyond the wire by stealth or with assistance and
into the hands of nearby Negro or white Union sympathizers. "Union
soldiers escaping from prisons at Columbia usually made their way across
South Carolina and through Saluda Gap to Hendersonville, North Carolina,
where they were relayed to Asheville." From this point, pilots guided
the escaped prisoners through East Tennessee safely into Federal lines.

Lieutenant Charles G. Davis followed a different route after his
escape from Camp Sorghum on Friday, November 4, 1864. Two days later

55 O.R., Ser. II, Vol. 7, pp. 1196, 930, 975. This prison was so
named because of the vast quantity of sorghum molasses issued as rations
to the prisoners.

56 Albert D. Richardson, The Secret Service, the Field, the Dungeon
and the Escape (American Publishing Co., Hartford, 1865), 428; Hessel-
tine, Civil War Prisons, 249; Hesseltime, "Underground Railroad," 62;
Glazier, Capture, Pen, and Escape, 192.

57 Dugger, War Trails, 111-33.

58 Charles G. Davis, a lieutenant in the First Mass. Cavalry, was
wounded and captured at Aldie, Virginia, June 7, 1863, and taken to Libby
Prison at Richmond. From there he was at Camp Oglethorpe, Georgia, and
then sent to Charleston, South Carolina, with other officer prisoners to
be kept in the city while it was under fire from the Union siege guns,
especially the "Swamp Angel" on Morris Island. In September of 1864
yellow fever broke out, and the local home guard was so depleted that
there were not enough men to guard the prisoners. Lt. Davis was sent to
Camp Sorghum at Columbia, South Carolina, from which place he escaped on
November 4, 1864, reaching Knoxville by way of the Smokies and Cades Cove
on December 5, 1864. In the Official Records, Davis is listed as an aide
to General Hooker, but this is an error as there were two Davises in the
he and three companions made contact with an elderly Negro who directed them to the route north. Monday morning, two Negroes found them and from this point on they were in the hands of the underground, which moved them steadily north until on November 30th they found themselves in the care of Henry B. Grant. In an excerpt from his diary, Davis relates his subsequent trip to Knoxville:

November 30. We went into bush, Mr. Grant going with us. We had a good night's rest. We travelled about 5 miles to the Tuckasuge [sic] River which we had to wade. The water was very cold, deep and rapid. It was also very wide, having three channels, there being two islands at the ford, giving us 3 streams to cross before we reached the opposite bank. Capt. Hart had a mishap in the trip across this river. He tripped his toe against a rock and down he fell, thoroughly wetting his clothes. He reached the shore all right, but had the pleasure of putting on his clothes wet. We traveled about half a mile and reached the home of A. B. Welch, he being the next gentleman to whom we had been referred. It was now about 11 o'clock at night. We awakened Mr. Welch. He got up and built a large fire and we soon got warm and had our clothes dried. Mrs. Welch arose and cooked us some supper, which pleased us very much. We remained by the fire until after 2 o'clock and went to the bushes to rest. We had intended to travel the balance of the night. Mr. Welch told us it was not safe for us to continue on the road we were traveling any further on account of Bushwackers who had recently passed. He told us of a trail over the mountains which he would take us over early in the morning that would be perfectly safe, and we could travel by daylight and reach a Union settlement within 25 miles. So we concluded to remain until morning.

1st Mass. Cav. and the names became confused. The correction was not allowed to be made under the rules of publication of the Official Records. Davis went on to become a Major, and after the war was president of the Union Prisoners of War Association. Eliot Davis (grandson) to author, July 31, 1962. Excerpt from typed manuscript of Major Charles G. Davis. The original is the property of his grandson, Mr. Eliot Davis, Grand Marais, Minnesota. With his permission, a copy has been made and is in the Special Collections of the University of Tennessee Library, Knoxville, Tennessee. The route followed by the Davis party is a particularly rugged trail which is today part of the Smoky Mountain National Park. The old trail from Welches Ridge to the Spencer cabin and into Cades Cove is a hard two-day hike.
December 1st: We had a good night’s rest. Mr. Welch awoke us directly after daylight, bringing out a good breakfast. We were soon on our way again. Mr. Welch piloted us over the mountains for about 10 miles and then directed us so we could not lose our way. We ate a lunch of cornbread and molasses. Mr. Welch gave us a good drink of apple brandy before eating. We traveled about 3 miles after bidding Mr. Welch good-bye and camped on the top of Smoky Mountain in a cabin [Spencer]. We had a hard day’s march. Some of the mountains we had to climb were very steep, being a mile high from base to top.

December 2nd: We arose about daybreak and again started on our trip. We had some hard climbing for an hour or so, but the descent soon commenced and continued until we reached Cades Cove. We entered the Cove about 3 p.m. and very unexpectedly caused quite an alarm. A girl was on duty as a sentinel. She gave the alarm with a horn. When she blew the horn we were looking down the Cove. In an instant it was alive. The men were driving their cattle before them, and every man had a gun over his shoulder. We asked the girl to point out the home of Mr. Rowan (after telling her who we were), assuring her that we were friends. We marched in and went to Mrs. Rowan’s home. She was very much frightened when she saw us, but we soon satisfied her that we were friends. She informed us that they were looking for the Rebels every moment. Rather pleasant news for us. We had not more than got seated when a woman came running up the road to Mrs. R., and informed her that the Rebs were coming. We jumped up ready to run, but we soon found out that the woman had taken us for the Rebels, and that it was a false alarm. Mrs. Rowan said she could not keep all of us, so five of us started over to the home of Mr. Sparks to whom she directed us. We soon found out that our entrance had alarmed all of the inhabitants of the Cove. The men left the fields and fled to the mountains. It soon became known who we were. They commenced to collect around us. We were resting very comfortably at Mr. Spark’s telling our story when a horseman came riding up from the lower end of the Cove and said “the Rebels are coming sure,” that one of the citizens had seen them. It was confusion for some moments. The men picked up their guns and we our blankets and started for the mountains. We reached a safe place. After waiting for an hour, we found out that it was another false alarm. The report had gone down one side of the Cove and up the other. We all returned to Mr. Spark’s house and ate a hearty supper. We found all good Union men here. They all have to sleep in the bushes every night, and have for the past two years. They live in continued terror of being killed. At dark we went to the bushes for our night’s rest.

December 3, 1864: Breakfasted with Mr. Haslet. Raining by spells all day. Citizens are trying to get horses to carry us to Knoxville tomorrow. Four of our party not being very foot sore, took the road for Tuckaige [sic] Cove, the balance went in search of horses. When
we reached the top of the mountain, we sat down to wait for the rest of the party. While waiting we had a lunch of bear meat and corn bread. Getting wet and cold, concluded not to wait any longer. Left word on a tree that we had gone on to Tuckasuge [sic] Cove, where we arrived at 4 o'clock. We stopped at the house of a good Union man, Mr. McCampbell, the balance of the party arriving about dark without horses. Three of the party went to the home of Mr. Snyder and stopped for the night. Mr. Welch and Mr. Gregory are out this evening after our horses. This Cove is "a true blue settlement." It gave 146 votes for Lincoln [in 1864]. McLellan [sic] did not receive a vote. We had a very fine supper, plenty of good apples, spent a pleasant evening with old Grandfather McCampbell, 74 years of age, who kept us talking all the time. He was full of old Revolutionary stories. We are beginning to feel as if we were getting near home. Cleared up about sunset. Had a beautiful night, moon as bright as a new dollar. Slept in a corn crib and were very comfortable.

December 4: Our friends woke us at daybreak with the salutation "Breakfast is ready." We soon got ready and sat down to a well filled table and ate to our heart's content. Messrs. Grant and Welch were unable to get horses for the whole trip, but got horses to carry us across the Little River, which we had to cross three times, got started about 10 a.m., forming quite a cavalcade. Messrs. Welch and Gregory are going to Knoxville with us to get ammunition for the citizens of Cades Cove. About one o'clock we reached the Alleganney [sic] River [Little River]. After crossing we sat down and had a lunch, sweet bread, pies and apples. Marched over thirty miles today. The road is in good condition. Passed an Indian settlement on the banks of Little River. Four of our party stopped at the house of Mr. John Brown (3 1/2 miles to Knoxville), the balance of the party continued on to find another house to stop in for the night. After a great deal of trouble found one, the residence of Mr. Harmon who lived within 1 1/2 miles of our picket lines. We had a beautiful day. The whole party is feeling very gay.

December 5: Happy Day. Moved into the City of Knoxville... Capt. Willard W. Glazier escaped from Camp Sorghum on the 26th of November and related much the same kind of experience. Once in the mountains of North Carolina, the Union guides, members of the Heroes of America, guided him safely to Federal lines. Albert D. Richardson with

59Glazier, Capture, Pen., and Escape, 204 et passim.
Junius Henni Browne, New York Tribune reporters, immortalized the work of these escape organizations in the narration of their escape from Salisbury Prison in North Carolina. On December 18, 1864, officers on duty as guards there helped them escape. Richardson and Browne were always expected at their next stop, as the "grapevine" communications system spread the word of their coming long before they arrived. Once into the mountains, they were met by Dan Ellis who, six days later, on January 13, brought them safely into Knoxville.

W. H. Shelton and two others escaped from Camp Sorghum in November of 1863 and by mid-December had reached the mountains where they met a Baptist minister who brought them to the home of a colleague, Quince Edmonston. From here Shelton's party was led from the home of one layman to another, living off the fat of the land. On March 4 he was picked up by a Federal patrol near Loudon, Tennessee.

Everyone traveling the net was a potential source of military intelligence in his own right. As he passed from one point to another he obtained more data which could be passed on to the authorities for evaluation. Couriers or pilots returning along the line brought back

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60 Heseltine, "Underground Railroad," 63.

61 The officer of the guard was a member of the Heroes of America. Shortly after he helped Richardson escape, he personally led thirty prisoners safely to Knoxville. Richardson, The Secret Service, 438, 447, 449-50.

62 Ellis, Thrilling Adventures, 38-41.

63 W. H. Shelton, "A Hard Road To Travel Out of Dixie," Century, XVIII (October, 1890), 931-49.
instructions for the whole underground. Thus, the Union was provided with an organized means of getting information out of and into East Tennessee on a regular basis.

Many different methods were used. In some places there were regular message drops such as the one run by Mrs. Jeannette L. Mabry, the wife of George W. Mabry, a Confederate colonel.64 No guide considered his mission complete unless he stopped going and coming to trade intelligence with Mrs. Mabry. Many a Federal soldier was astounded at the amount of information she gave them to relay to the first headquarters they reached in free territory.

Judge Samuel Milligan managed to get information from Greeneville to Knoxville, even though he was under close house arrest by Longstreet's staff quartered in his home.65 A trusted man would be sent to see the judge, ostensibly on private business. As they shook hands upon parting, the judge pressed a note, with vital information on it, into his visitor's hand. The contact passed the information to an escaping prisoner who took it to Knoxville.

Sometimes the escape net was used in reverse.66 General Grenville M. Dodge, who in 1862 headed all Federal clandestine activities in Tennessee, used it to get his operators into East Tennessee. Pauline

64Temple, East Tennessee and the Civil War, 427-28; Tatum, Disloyalty, 151.

65Milligan, "Memoir," 103.

66Harnett Kane, Spies For the Blue and Gray (Doubleday and Co., New York, 1954), 127-38.
Cushman, his famous and provocative Creole spy, was quite familiar with the underground route into Confederate lines. In 1863, working under Colonel William Truesdail, she was assigned the task of infiltrating enemy lines and visiting as many of Bragg's camps as possible. She entered the net at Columbia and was piloted to a location which would match her cover story. From there she worked alone, employing the "direct contact" methods to which she owed her fame. The job of the underground pilots was simply to be near enough to receive her messages and get them to Colonel Truesdail.

No one will ever know how many escapes can be attributed to the organized secret societies commonly designated as the Heroes of America. Nor will an absolute figure of the per cent of Confederate deserters who were aided by them ever be fully ascertained. It seems certain that in the 90,000 to 136,000 Confederate desertions during the last two years of the war, the underground groups figured importantly.

The very fact that such groups existed in East Tennessee was a major contribution of unconventional warfare in the region. Confederate authorities were unable to stem the tide of escapes through East Tennessee. As the war progressed and until it ended, the work of the pilots and the secret organizations combined to make East Tennessee an important link in the escape to freedom. The men who escaped and those who helped them went to great lengths to obtain liberty even to the extent of risking their lives. The human ingenuity, daring, patience, and endurance displayed was a tribute to the independent spirit of these people and their determination to escape and fight.
Escape and evasion may have been the most useful, the most enduring, and perhaps the most popularly acceptable aspect of unconventional warfare. There seems little doubt that the organized escape effort proved to be a formidable weapon in depriving the Confederacy of manpower in East Tennessee. As the system became more highly organized, it reached far out of the local region to provide a haven for prisoners, Confederate deserters, and others disillusioned with the Confederacy. As the organization became more sophisticated and techniques became perfected, more were able to escape. Everyone—men, women, and children—were found working in this struggle, yet aside from pilots, who were hung immediately when caught, little punishment was meted out to others escaping or aiding escapes except to jail them. There was a tacit acceptance of the fact that it was the duty of a soldier to escape and of his counterpart to detain him. As there is no evidence that abnormal brutality was practiced upon captured escapees, it would appear that this phase of warfare remained on a fairly high plane of human interaction. Since the advent of modern warfare, this phase of activity, even before the Civil War, was a formal part of every soldier's training. There is something about spirit, determination, will power, and dedication which is universally attractive to all people. Perhaps this accounts for the willingness to participate in evasion and escape activities. Certainly a contributing factor was the fact that the evadee intended merely to get away and not to fight in or destroy the area he passed through. There is little here which is disruptive to society because when the war is ended there is no further need for an escape net. The charitable and
humanitarian traits which prompted a person to aid an escaping prisoner were easily redirected into worthy community pursuits in rebuilding after the fight. Of all the facets of unconventional warfare, that involving escapes from enemy territory was the most productive, in terms of investment, cost, return, and long-range results. No greater contribution was made during the war toward laying the foundation for reunion.
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The irregular raids conducted both by partisans and by elements of the regular army, together with the work of clandestine organizations, constituted unconventional warfare in East Tennessee. In the early days of the Civil War, effective armed resistance was sporadic, poorly led, and in the main futile. Little was gained by the Greeneville Convention in 1861 except to express the position of the Unionist leaders in opposing the actions of a Confederate majority in the state. When President Lincoln called for troops to put down the rebellion, the position which East Tennessee would take was still questionable. Confederate propaganda was adroitly directed at exploiting this indecision, just as Union propaganda was intent upon establishing an island of Unionism within the heart of the Confederacy.

Union sympathy, or at least indifference to the Southern cause, was well known. Efforts of Union zealots to arm the East Tennesseans prompted the Confederates to take the initiative and occupy the uncertain and unreliable uplands of East Tennessee. The Confederate purpose was twofold: to prevent an uprising in this critical bottleneck, an uprising which would hamper their war effort, and to win the sympathy of the people for the Confederate cause, thereby assuring a solid wall of resistance against the invasion of Unionists into Confederate territory. Initially, the plan showed signs of success. By all accounts, aside from formal occupation, during the first few months of the war these troops
did little which might be called offensive. Quite the contrary, they were admonished time and again not to antagonize the people but to treat them fairly and with extreme care. Any act which might be considered offensive to human dignity was scrupulously avoided. In fact, the occupying forces seem to have gone out of their way to avoid trouble. They seem to have been so convinced of the righteousness of their cause that they apparently believed their mere presence would rally the recalcitrant Tennesseans to the Confederate banner. Consequently, little of a positive nature was done to assure the uncompromising support of the people. Confederate authorities misjudged the population with whom they were dealing, and herein lay the fatal flaw in their planning.

These East Tennesseans were unsuited both by tradition and desire to have someone else determine how they were to act in this national crisis. Their traditional independence and dedication to the Union resulted in resistance. Assured of Federal help (which failed to materialize), the leaders undertook the bridge-burning mission which was only partly successful. In the end it was little more than a gesture, but an important one in that it deprived the Confederates of a vital transportation system at a critical time, and it was a psychological blow which prompted the Confederates to adopt an unsound policy in dealing with the Unionists. The Confederate authorities answered defiance with a reign of terror designed to force the Unionists into subjugation, but instead the partisans gained more followers and solidified the determination of the people to resist the Confederacy and to adhere to the Union.

The terrain both physically and politically was conducive to
unconventional warfare. The Confederates controlled the cities and key points, but the Unionists won the minds of the mountain men through successful political indoctrination and thus controlled the key element—the people, who remained pro-Union. Principle became the rallying point and the cause the only thing worthwhile because these people had become convinced that their future well-being was dependent upon a Union victory.

The Unionists learned quickly the art of insurgency. Tediously and skillfully they prepared their organization and rooted it solidly in the people. They adopted the tactics of strike and flee, wait, watch, then strike again, giving no rest to the enemy. Their intelligence network was superb, their communication lines were effective, their escape system successful. Throughout the first two years of the war they struck at the enemy relentlessly. They depleted his effective force by direct attack, by aiding desertion, discouraging enlistments, resisting arrest, and spreading literature subversive to the Confederacy. Simultaneously they recruited forces for the Union and successfully guided them to training camps in Kentucky, distributed arms and ammunition, and harassed the Confederate rear to such an extent that every stockpile, every ammunition dump, and every skirmish line had to be heavily guarded. The more vulnerable the rear became, the more men the Confederates were forced to detail to police duties. With their extreme shortage of manpower, this ineffective use of soldiers could well have been a decisive factor contributing to defeat. Even more troublesome was the fact that the Unionists had learned the secret of self-perpetuation. In many cases they were totally dependent upon the enemy for all of their supplies.
wherever this source was temporarily denied them, there was always the friendly population ready and willing to assist them. Their organization was flexible, their movements swift, and their activities disheartening to the Confederate authorities who tried in vain to break the back of the Union resistance.

Lincoln had long sought to come to the aid of the East Tennesseans for both personal and political reasons, but militarily it was not feasible until the fall of 1863. Then Rosecrans moved from Murfreesboro into position at Chattanooga while Burnside moved on Knoxville. Burnside was guided into East Tennessee by the very men who had long been the hard core of guerrillas and partisans opposing Confederate authority. From these men he obtained invaluable assistance in determining where the enemy should be attacked, and while he pulled Longstreet further away from Bragg at Chattanooga, these partisans severed the Confederate commander's lines of communication and prevented his return to the south. It was these same men who saw to it that Burnside's soldiers ate while Longstreet laid siege to Knoxville, and it was they who were given the task of harassing the defeated Confederate forces after the battle. Through the long winter of 1863, Longstreet's force wintered in a foodless wasteland, unhelped by the population, and under constant guerrilla attack, while his veteran force turned into ragged, ill fed, morale-shattered bodies of small forage parties. When at last they moved

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1Esther S. Sanderson, County Scott and Its Mountain Folk (Esther S. Sanderson, Huntsville, Tenn., 1958), 194.
through the valley into Virginia to join Lee, the guerrillas, together with the geography of East Tennessee, had exacted their toll upon this once formidable force.

Meanwhile, even before Carter's Raid, the partisan guerrillas had matured into a more sophisticated brand of fighter. Now they openly conducted warfare in cooperation with regular Federal forces against the Confederates. Whole groups of them were integrated into the regular army, and they alternated between conventional assaults and partisan raids, whichever promised to be most effective. This ability to engage in combined action was carried a step further as these units were called upon to rid East Tennessee of the vast number of marauding bands of independent guerrillas and Confederate raiders which remained after the main Confederate armies had evacuated. The Union irregulars had the mission of prevention, suppression, or defeat of these insurgent bands, an action calling for a combination of military and non-military actions. With outside aid from the army and from relief societies who provided food, seeds, and equipment, the social ills of the area and the sufferings of the loyal civilian population were kept to a minimum, thereby depriving the Confederate guerrillas of the necessary local sympathy and support they so desperately needed to survive. The Confederates were slowly forced to move their bases to Alabama, western North Carolina, and Virginia, from which they continued their raids into East Tennessee.

A maximum effort by the Union counterinsurgency forces was launched against these secluded Confederate bases. The purpose was threefold: first, to destroy enemy raiders and their bases of operation;
second, to cripple the war potential of the area by attacking the will of the people to continue to resist—a brutal and destructive work; and finally, to prevent the Confederate forces from retreating to the mountains and turning the war into a protracted conflict. To achieve this last, it was necessary to be there first and in control. All the while that this cycle of unconventional warfare was developing, the less obvious yet vital work of returning men to combat units was quietly being carried on by the secret societies charged with this responsibility.

Thus, as the war progressed, a pattern of development revealed itself. There was no indication that either side officially condoned unconventional warfare. Quite the contrary, notable men on both sides openly manifested their disdain for it. Some tried to limit it, yet all practiced it if it was to their advantage. Conversely, they condemned it if it was not. The people of the mountains of East Tennessee accepted it as their mode of expression of resistance and developed it to a high state of art, yet, like the generals, they neither fully understood it nor were they prepared to face the consequences to their society of overzealousness in its application. The story of Reconstruction in East Tennessee, the enduring hatred it generated and the vengeful practices it gave rise to, is another story, but it stands as mute testimony to the residue of a war waged by unconventional means. It is impossible to gauge to what extent unconventional warfare undermined society, stifled moral values, and fostered the hitherto unacceptable ethical principle that the end justifies the means. But from numerous diaries, papers, and contemporary statements, and from interviews with surviving descendants
of the mountain folk of East Tennessee, this is the picture that emerges. In some families, deeds committed by neighboring families during the Civil War still remain unforgiven and are the source of many enduring regional disputes. The social consequences of unconventional warfare are insidious, persistent, and debilitating.

The damage inflicted upon the Confederacy by Union irregulars in East Tennessee was considerable and important—though often intangible. The results were complex, neither black nor white, and therefore debatable. As to the question, was it worth it? the best answer is no, but then what war is? Could the Unionists have done anything else? Certainly, but perhaps at a cost much greater than they paid. They cunningly employed their most effective weapon to preserve what they believed in. It is appropriate that their story be known and thus their actions be better understood. Without question, unconventional warfare in East Tennessee, 1861-1865, was in every sense modern.

From a military point of view, there were several important results which were even then recognized as advances in the field of unconventional warfare but which were lost to the military generations which followed. It was not until total war became an international concern in the twentieth century that these lessons were revived. In 1865, the New York Times carried an article entitled "Guerilla War, Its History and Principles" which revealed the extent of the knowledge of

2Tatum, Disloyalty, 154.
this type warfare at that time. It is interesting to note how fully the principles of unconventional warfare were understood. The major emphasis was on the requirements for success. Notably, the most important observation was that "to succeed... the hostilities, however partial, must be the expression of the will--not of a mere faction, but of the majority of the population." The moral force to fight must be deeply entrenched in the people. Their fight, the article went on to say:

"... may remain partial in its physical action, but to triumph it must be general in its influences, and national [regional] in its base and support--the good will or approbation of the action at large, particularly in the middle and lower classes. ... Nothing like lukewarmness in guerrilla warfare has a chance. And it is the very fact that the people seem to go mad in a real guerrilla war and become fanatical in their resolutions, that makes it so dangerous to regularly organized powers. It violates the very rules by which regular armies and administrations move and operate."

By all standards, the military situation in East Tennessee complied with the contemporary conditions for success and afforded ample evidence that unconventional warfare had matured, at least to a point of professional consideration, both in organization and operations. By the end of the Civil War it had acquired its own special strategic and tactical significance. As the units participating became more highly organized, they adopted the numbered designations of regular forces, though they continued to employ their irregular methods.

The widespread practice of this type of fighting, its successes and its failures, apparently warranted serious consideration, at least in

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4 Ibid.
some quarters. Even as early as 1863 there were serious editorials written concerning unconventional methods.\(^5\) It was argued by some, for example, that the best way to combat guerrillas was with an anti-guerrilla force. On the other hand, some held that guerrillas were best put down by sound defeats administered by conventional forces. Though the problem was never seriously confronted as to an established policy by either side, one fact was clear. It was no longer valid to view unconventional warfare as a side show in war; modern military men would have to consider it as an integral part of the theory and practice of warfare. Evident also was the fact that discontent and patriotism were two mainsprings of partisan movements which would be of considerable importance in modern war. But with all the experience and all the study, when it became evident that Generals Lee and Johnson did not intend to continue the war in this medium, the lessons learned were promptly ignored by the professional soldier.\(^6\) By default, the field was left completely to the lawless element of society who soon would employ it as a means to obstruct the reconstruction of the social order. Its military importance was thus obscured by the depressing social derangement which resulted. That unconventional warfare was truly a harassing and therefore potentially valuable species of war-making had been proven beyond a doubt in East Tennessee during the Civil War.

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\(^6\)Ibid., May 11, 1865.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX I

GLOSSARY

UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TERMS

Civic Action--The use of military forces on projects useful to the populace at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others helpful to economic and social development.

Clandestine Operations--Activities to accomplish intelligence, counterintelligence, and similar actions in secret. Differs from covert operations in the attempt to conceal the operation rather than the identity of the sponsor.

Covert Operations--Those planned and executed to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial of the sponsor.

Economic Action--Planned use of economic measures to influence the policies or actions of another state, for example, to impair warmaking potential of an enemy or generate economic stability in a friendly power.

Economic Warfare--Aggressive use of economic means to achieve national objectives.

Irregular Forces--Armed individuals or groups who are not members of regular armed forces.

Military Civic Action--Use of largely native forces on projects in education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, etc. to improve economic and social development and improve the standing of the military forces with the population.

Paramilitary Forces--Forces or groups distinct from the regular armed forces of any country but resembling them in organization, equipment, training or mission.

Paramilitary Operation--An operation undertaken by a paramilitary force which either by its tactics or its requirements in military-type personnel, equipment, or training approximates a conventional military operation. It may be undertaken in support of an existing friendly government or in support of a group seeking to overthrow a government. Such an operation may be overt or covert or a combination of both.

Political Warfare--Aggressive use of political means to achieve national objectives.
Propaganda—Any information, ideas, doctrines or special appeals to support national objectives by influencing opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of a specific group. Black propaganda purports to eminate from a source other than the true one. Grey propaganda does not identify any source. White propaganda is acknowledged by the sponsor.

Psychological Activities—Those activities conducted in peacetime, or in areas outside of active military theaters of war, which are planned and conducted to influence the emotions, attitudes, or behavior of foreign groups in ways favorable to the achievement of national objectives.

Psychological Operations—This term includes psychological activities and psychological warfare, and encompasses those political, military, economic, and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in enemy, hostile, neutral, or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior favorable to the achievement of national objectives.

Psychological Warfare—Planned use of propaganda and other actions to influence opinions, emotions, attitudes and behavior of hostile foreign groups.

Subversive Political Action—A planned series of activities designed to accomplish political objectives by influencing, dominating, or displacing individuals or groups who are so placed as to affect the decisions and actions of another government.

Unconventional Warfare—Includes guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, and subversion. Conducted in enemy or enemy controlled territory by predominantly indigenous forces, usually supported and directed by an external source.

Evasion and Escape (E&E)—The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control.

Guerrilla Warfare (GW)—Military and paramilitary operations in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous (native) forces.

Subversion—Action to undermine the military, economic, psychological, moral or political strength of a regime.
Unconventional warfare is a sufficiently specialized means of fighting to warrant more detailed attention than was possible in the body of the preceding study. Within the past decade a whole army of experts have written about the subject, and the armies of many nations have put the principles derived into practice with varying degrees of success. It is true that there is little that is new in the concept that a dissatisfied people will resist even the most powerful army if they are sufficiently provoked. What is relatively new is the fact that a rebellion, or a people's war as we have come to regard such activities, is not guaranteed success merely because it expresses the will of the people but rather because it is a well-planned and well-executed military operation. The following discussion will concentrate only on guerrilla activities, though practically all the concepts discussed could be applied to any aspect of unconventional warfare.

The most fundamental concept to be remembered is that this is not warfare without rules. Its brutality, violence, and totality have created this misconception. To be used successfully, the rules must be more rigidly adhered to than in any other method of warfare.\(^1\) It offers less margin for error than many more conventional methods. The price of a mistake or a slight miscalculation is usually swift annihilation. Yet,

\(^1\)Ney, *Guerrilla War*, vi.
despite its finality, unconventional warfare is not militarily decisive against an enemy, nor is it intended to be.\textsuperscript{2}

Samuel B. Griffith, long a student of unconventional methods, has said that:

It is one aspect of the entire war, which although alone incapable of producing the decision, attacks the enemy in every quarter, diminishes the extent of area under his control, increases our national strength, and assists our regular armies. [Unconventional warfare is] . . . military strength organized by the active people and inseparable from them.\textsuperscript{3}

Distinctively, the unconventional warfare method may begin as a loosely organized group of civilians of from ten to twenty raiders. Other similar units may form, intent upon harassing the enemy in their local area. The key is to have them coordinate their efforts first with each other and then with special conventionally organized forces sent to the area. The capability of these units is limitless. The unit may continue to act on its own or with regular forces, or ultimately be incorporated within the regular force. Among the leaders of such a movement there must be a realization that for such a force to evolve into a strategically useful fighting unit, the indigenous people upon whom success depends must be led gradually to the position to be ready to take up arms and fight. In other words, there must first be a conditioning process through which they pass. They must be convinced of the cause.

\textsuperscript{2}This is commonly accepted by all guerrilla warfare theorists. By its very nature (hit and run), no single guerrilla action against an enemy could result in a strategic victory. On the other hand, numerous actions of this type could materially influence the strategic outcome.

Propaganda is usually the first and most important weapon used. It is used both against the enemy and among friendly forces. Its object is to build the ideological factor into a principle worth protecting, worth fighting for against an enemy who is presented always as desiring to take it away from the people involved. This is the war of words which begins before open conflict, and which continues throughout the war and well into the postwar period until it is no longer of any value.

Unconventional warfare differs profoundly from warfare in which regular armies are openly engaged in combat. The objective of such conventional combat is to win control of a state by defeating the enemy's military forces in the field. In contrast, the strategy of unconventional forces must be to win control of the state by first winning control of the civil population. For without the disciplined support of the civilian population, militarily inferior guerrilla forces can have no hope of success.

Indigenous personnel working within enemy-held territory is the key element of unconventional warfare. They must be supported in varying degrees by external sources. Operations are planned and executed to complement resistance movements against the government in control. Such a movement is an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power. In its early stages, resistance may take the form of subversive political activities to arouse the populace and encourage distrust, hostility, and loss of confidence in the legal government. If the government

4Ney, Guerrilla War, 2 et passim.

fails to react immediately and the movement is not suppressed, insurgency by irregular forces may result. This is a condition of subversive political activity, civil rebellion, revolt or insurrection against the government in power. Irregular forces are formed that are designed to weaken and overthrow constituted authority.⁶

The mission of guerrilla forces is to reduce the combat effectiveness, war potential (industrial, economic, political, and military), and morale of the enemy to such a state that his will to resist is destroyed or seriously impaired.⁷ Paramilitary units, existing alongside the armed forces, are professedly nonmilitary, but they are organized on an underlying military pattern as a potential auxiliary or diversionary military force.

Evasion and escape is a vital aspect of unconventional warfare. It includes the procedures and operations necessary to provide exit routes from enemy-held territory for friendly military forces and other selected individuals to return to friendly control. Escape nets, contacts, safe areas, and guides all come within the scope of their operations.

⁶A question of semantics has been raised concerning the use of the term "insurgency," In some parts of the world it has an honorable connotation of fighting for freedom by abolishing tyranny. To some countries this may be taken to mean that the United States opposes in principle the very rights it tends to uphold. This is an interesting point which should not be ignored, with the result that mere words may stand as a barrier to that freedom we support in practice. J. K. Zawodny, "Guerrilla and Sabotage," The Annals, CCCXLI (May, 1962), 18.

⁷These are irregular forces and in a broad sense refer to all types of insurgents—partisans, subversionists, terrorists, revolutionaries, and guerrillas. U.S. Army, Special Warfare, 8.
Irregular activities include the use of every means at the disposal of the people of an occupied country to hamper, harass, and destroy the enemy's ability to control the area and the people in it. If the enemy is employing irregular forces in an area which he technically occupies but does not completely control, the resisting forces may find it necessary to develop counter forces whose aim it is to neutralize the enemy's irregular forces. The specific rules of unconventional warfare are as broad as the entire study of military strategy and tactics. It comes as no revelation to the reader that the magnitude of the subject is beyond the narrow scope of this study. Yet a basic understanding of these concepts is essential if this mode of warfare is to be understood in relation to the general concept of war and warfare.

Strategically, social and political discontent provides a frustrated population from which an irregular force is recruited. This local population is basic to engaging in or combating unconventional warfare. In it is found the key to success or failure.

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8 Zawodny, "Guerrilla and Sabotage." Kutger terms guerrilla strategy the negative offensive, by which he means that open combat with major enemy forces is always avoided as are decisive battles of any sort. Kutger, "Irregular Warfare," 116.

9 This point is established in virtually every article and manual on irregular and guerrilla activity in print today. It is so basic that it is often overlooked in both study and application of the principles herein being discussed. For a more detailed treatment of this principle see Ney, Guerrilla Warfare, 16, 182; Griffith, Mao Tse-tung On Guerrilla Warfare, I et passim. A summary of the main points made by Mao Tse-tung in this book may also be found in "Mao's Primer On Guerrilla Warfare," The New York Times Magazine, June 4, 1961, pp. 13, 71-73. This article is reprinted in the USAF Counterinsurgency Course Selected Readings, I, 1-7; Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, 32-40.
Following the standard Principles of War are, of course, fundamental.\(^\text{10}\) There are, in addition, specific principles which are particularly applicable to irregular activities. One expert lists them as the principles of: The Environment, Community Security, Community Support, Propaganda, Proximity, Deliberate Delay, Personal Security, Part-time Function, Full-time Function, Modus Operandi, and Organization.\(^\text{11}\) He also points out that: "No other form of warfare demands such a precise assessment of capabilities in strategic planning as does guerrilla activity, and in no other form of warfare is this principle so often broken."\(^\text{12}\)

Guerrilla strategy is concerned with four major objectives: preserving itself, undermining the strength of the enemy, preparing for a general uprising, and gaining control of the territory by force of arms. The tactics employed may be compressed to one sentence: "If, during a guerrilla attack, the enemy has a chance to reload his weapons, the action should be considered unsuccessful and abandoned."\(^\text{13}\)

\(^\text{10}\)The Principles of War as laid down by Von Clausewitz are the Objective, Offensive, Mass of force, Economy of force, Mobility, Surprise, Security, Communications, and Coordination.

\(^\text{11}\)Ney, *Guerrilla Warfare*, 1-2.

\(^\text{12}\)Ibid., 11.

\(^\text{13}\)Ibid., 12-13. Heilbrunn sees a threefold tactical aim: draw enemy forces from the front, weaken his infrastructure, the framework of material things that provide the means of mounting and sustaining an operation or campaign, and win support of the people. Heilbrunn, *Partisan Warfare*, 98. Also see "Guerilla selon l'ecole Communiste," *Bulletin Militaire* (June, August, 1955), n.p. [Etat-Major de la Force Publique, Leopoldville, translating agency]. This is translated from the French and quoted extensively in Heilbrunn, *Partisan Warfare*, 78-106. This work is the Viet-minh Manual on partisan warfare which was translated into English and made public by the organization mentioned above. It was a major contribution to the study of the subject of unconventional warfare.
Successful guerrilla operations inevitably hinge upon simplicity. All operations must be essentially offensive in nature and executed only when a favorable element of surprise can assure success. Mobility is vital and must never be lost. Imaginative thinking, devising new methods of attack and new targets to destroy, should be encouraged among all the fighters. Yet no activity should be undertaken unless it makes a specific contribution to the overall strategy and is coordinated with other plans before it is carried out. All necessary equipment should be stored as near to the enemy as possible and be in position well before any anticipated attack. This serves the double purpose of allowing the attackers to proceed safely to the assembly points without fear, since an unarmed man rarely arouses suspicion. In addition, no energy is lost bringing in needed equipment, and there is less danger that vital equipment will be forgotten at the last moment.

Under all circumstances, the local population must not be antagonized. Similarly, defensive or positional warfare must be avoided. There are many other considerations too obvious to enumerate, such as avoiding valleys as camping locations and exposed areas when marching. These are common knowledge to the soldier.

To accomplish their mission, guerrilla units may undertake varied and diversified assignments. They may, for example, disrupt communications and transportation; gather intelligence; capture, kidnap, or kill key enemy personnel; protect friendly soldiers who either escaped or are temporarily isolated from their units; protect the indigenous population against banditry; guard local industry and natural resources from
exploitation by the enemy; and a score of other activities. Sabotage may rightly be considered within the province of the guerrilla unit, but generally such activity requires specialized training and skilled execution. Usually such activities are left to specific groups who are experts in the particular destruction desired. This is the realm of the specialist, not the general practitioner. 14

From the practical standpoint, all guerrilla units, no matter what their job, need a source of supplies. 15 They have four major sources upon which they depend. The local population is the most readily available. If the population is friendly, there is usually very little problem in obtaining at least meager subsistence-level supplies. If the population is hostile, supplies are difficult to obtain and the unit may be forced to change its base of operations. In either case, popular animosity may develop as food and supplies become increasingly scarce during wartime. At best, this is a very limited source, and for some equipment, as in the case of weapons, hardly dependable. The members of a unit may make or grow many of the necessities required to survive. Total dependence upon such a source becomes increasingly difficult as operations against the enemy are stepped up. The difficulties of making the equipment, avoiding enemy surveillance, and carrying out raids

14 Ibid., 89, 138. In the course of this study, no unified examples of sabotage were noted. Sabotage activities are associated with large industrial urban areas. None were noted in East Tennessee during the Civil War. There is the possibility that such methods were considered beyond the scope of warfare at that time.

15 Ibid., 98; Ney, Guerrilla Warfare, 13.
compound and are usually too much for any unit to live with for extended periods of time. Probably the best source of all supply for a guerrilla is the enemy. By attacking his supply lines, the guerrillas obtain needed food, ammunition, and weapons which the enemy has transported into the area. In this way, guerrillas are relieved of bringing in their own supplies while forcing the enemy to employ a large portion of his force as guards, thus reducing the enemy combat effectiveness. This has an adverse psychological effect upon the morale of his men, who constantly face the threat of an attack at any time. The fourth source of supply is from a sympathetic outside source. All four combined accord to the guerrilla the ability to operate for extended periods without running the risk of exposed and vulnerable supply lines. Of course, he is tied to his base of operations and must confine his activities to a relatively limited area. Within its confines, however, exploiting the enemy is the preferred means of resupply.\(^{16}\) If the basic rule of simplicity in all things is followed, the guerrilla unit can be a strong and effective force.

This effectiveness may usually be measured from two standpoints: the effects upon the enemy and upon the population. Not only is the actual destruction of enemy forces to be considered, but also the number of his forces which can be retained in a non-combat status to act as guards and police behind the actual combat zone. On the other hand, to

the civil population, guerrillas act as a source of morale-building. Through the guerrillas, the people express their antipathy against the enemy, which gives them a cohesiveness and a rallying point under the nose of the enemy. From the standpoint of the guerrilla unit, it is an assurance of survival, for such a unit cannot long endure in a hostile environment. T. E. Lawrence of Arabia made the point when he maintained that about two per cent of the population is enough to organize a revolution if the rest of the population is sympathetic.17

The guerrilla environment is one of harsh discipline and spartan life combined with a dedication and zeal reaching almost missionary proportions. Guerrillas deal in absolutes, in blacks and whites, in ebbs and flows, in feverish actions, and in actionless hidings. Under such circumstances, many burn out quickly. Among those who survive there are often radical changes in value premises, morality, and sensitiveness. It often seems that animal craftiness supplants conscience, and that lofty ideals are reduced to primitive jungle law of the survival of the fittest with the norm of morality being that the end justifies the means.

Morale hinges upon very simple things, such as being dry, a lump of sugar, or a smile from a sympathetic woman. With speed and concealment essential to survival, small comforts assume a disproportionate status. This life is in no sense normal or, for that matter, compatible to the nature of man. "Guerrilla fighting is probably the most vicious

form of human warfare. The intensity of feelings involved and the sacrifices incurred are peculiar to guerrilla fighting.\[18\]

Though credited with near invincibility within their sphere of activities, guerrillas do have definite limitations. At the operational level, there is often a distinct lack of training among commanders.\[19\] Discipline may be hard to enforce, and recruiting replacements may be extremely hard due to the nature of the work as well as conflicting military manpower requirements. Cooperation with similar units may be impossible, rendering any sort of unified effort against an enemy impossible to accomplish. In addition, there may be political limitations and any combination of a variety of events both natural and contrived which may disrupt the effectiveness of the guerrilla unit.

One further element of guerrilla action must be mentioned, that of terror. Terror is the most dangerous and at the same time the most effective weapon available to the guerrilla fighter.\[20\] If the enemy uses terror in any of its graduated forms upon the populace of an area, the guerrilla may hasten to its defense. If the enemy is prone to follow a conciliatory policy toward the inhabitants in an effort to win their support, the guerrilla may use terror to provoke deliberately the enemy into an act of violence against the people. This again offers the guerrilla an opportunity to champion the people. The same methods may be

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\[18\] Zawodny, "Guerrilla and Sabotage," 15.

\[19\] Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, 18-20.

\[20\] Ney, Guerrilla War, 15; Heilbrunn, Partisan Warfare, 145.
employed to influence enemy soldiers to desert, and conversely it may be employed within the unit itself to prevent desertion. If the inhabitants are prone to be uncommitted in the struggle, the threat of terror may be employed to obtain their cooperation or to assure the fact that they will give none to the enemy. On the other hand, if needless terror is employed or if it is used unwisely by the guerrilla, the people may associate themselves with the governmental authority and help to wipe out the guerrilla force. The guerrilla is dependent upon the whim of the people, and he must exploit or cooperate with them as the case may be. In the unconventional war, the outcome is in the hands of the people, and success in obtaining support is hardly possible without their sympathy.

The organizational structure of guerrilla units is such that any group may be easily joined with conventional forces, become conventional forces, or continue to function as an unconventional unit. This flexibility provides them with their best defense against enemy forces desiring to destroy them. Since guerrillas enjoy virtual immunity from destruction by a regular force employed in the conventional manner, the best way to combat them is with the same type of force, confront them in kind.21 Countering the opposing force in the unconventional sense is termed counterinsurgency. It includes all military, political, economic, psychological, and sociological activities directed against such irregular units determined to overthrow a duly established government. The problem is to maintain or restore internal security and create a favorable

21USAF Counterinsurgency Course, Selected Readings, 7.
climate in which psychological activities may be carried out to reaffirm the faith of the people in the established government. Civil action programs are undertaken, designed to improve the relationship between the military forces and the civil population, and are a necessary part of guerrilla operations. The aim of this program is to establish rapport, thus eliminating discontent and with it the support which an irregular force must obtain from the indigenous population to survive.

Thus the component parts of unconventional warfare evolve into a pattern which may be used to study any unconventional warfare activity in which a people are situated to respond to an intolerable situation. Essentially, the reaction is highly personal because:

Behind a guerrilla's gun is a man; that man shoots in the direction from which there is no hope. He shoots because he does not believe that for him justice and satisfaction can be achieved in any other way. In the long run, therefore, he should be met on the level of his expectations and hopes and not with a rifle. For a partisan may be completely wrong on what he is fighting for, but is not likely to be nearly so wrong on what he is fighting against.22

This survey of what the guerrilla does, how he does it, and under what conditions, is by no means complete because such activities are limited only by the human imagination. It is probably this fact which makes the guerrilla such a formidable opponent and a worthy subject of study for the professional military man and civilian alike. It is here that the gap between citizen and soldier is bridged because in unconventional warfare the two meet as equals.

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