Chapter 2: Usurpers in Gaul

The Gallic provinces faced their own challenges in the first decade of the fifth century. Severe threats to Italy under Stilicho’s regime, specifically the invasions of Alaric (401-402) and of an otherwise unknown Gothic leader named Radagaisus (405-406), forced the MVM to take a series of ad hoc decisions favoring the central provinces over the other regions of the western empire. Stilicho severely reduced the military forces of Gaul in order to supply men for the defense of the Italian peninsula.¹ He also allowed the traditional conduct of Roman foreign policy with the barbarians beyond the Rhine/Danube limes to lapse, leading to confusion and tension on the frontiers.²

While Stilicho’s actions were arguably necessary responses to the threats of the period, they nevertheless amounted to a fundamental neglect of imperial management of the Gallic provinces. Under the circumstances, it is perhaps inevitable that such neglect would result in problems for the Honorian regime. The usurpations of Maximus and Eugenius remained a part of living memory and the extension of the control of the Theodosian dynasty into the western empire was a relatively new development.³ The potential for the abuse or rejection of Italian authority was therefore quite real, though it was perhaps an unavoidable risk given the circumstances prevailing in Italy during the first half of the decade.


² Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 195-200, 206-208.

Stilicho’s policies, however, did have one unforeseeable consequence that served to aggravate the apparently tenuous hold of the Honorian regime over this region. In late 406, groups of Alans, Vandals, and Suebi crossed the Rhine frontier and caused widespread panic in the northern Gallic provinces. Contrary to many modern perceptions, there is nothing to suggest that this crossing was somehow a consequence of problems elsewhere in the Roman Empire or beyond the Roman *limes*. Occasional barbarian raids were part and parcel of frontier life in the Roman Empire, especially when the imperial government was otherwise distracted with internal concerns or problems elsewhere. On normal occasions, the imperial administration would eventually deal with the barbarian raiders as soon as time and resources permitted. Unfortunately, the barbarian incursions of 406 coincided with both a new series of Gallic usurpations and with the divided priorities of the central administration at Ravenna in the final phase of Stilicho’s regime. Collectively, these issues set the stage for the tumultuous events that would characterize Honorius’ regime and have a lasting impact on the Western Roman Empire throughout the fifth century.

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According to the chronicle of Prosper of Aquitaine, on December 31, 406, groups of Vandals and Alans crossed the Rhine and entered Gaul. The fragments of the fifth-century historian Renatus Profuturus Frigeridus, preserved in Gregory of Tours’ *Historia*, provide narrative glimpses of this crossing, showing the political complexity and confusion hidden behind Prosper’s simple notice. Civil discord seems to have fractured the Alan contingent on the Rhine frontier. Frigeridus tells us that the Alans were forced to divide their forces between their king, Respendial, and another commander, Goar, when the latter decided to enter Roman service. The division seems to have been significant enough to cause Respendial to change his plans and withdraw from the Rhine for a time. Meanwhile, some group of Franks inflicted a great slaughter on the Vandal contingent, even killing their king, Godigisel. Only the arrival of the Alans (presumably those under Respendial) saved the Vandals from being wiped out completely.

Frigeridus’ account is as tantalizing as it is brief. Though Goar is frequently designated a king of the Alans in secondary literature, Frigeridus does not suggest that this was the case during the Rhine crossing. His specificity concerning Respendial’s rank as king may suggest that Goar was simply an influential commander in Respendial’s barbarian host. In 414, an unnamed Alan king, possibly Goar, aided Paulinus of Pela against other barbarians at Bordeaux. Nevertheless, the

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6 Prosper of Aquitaine *Chronicon* s.a. 406.

7 Courtois, *Vandales*, 41-42 suggests that Godigisel was the king of the Hasding Vandals. In his opinion, their defeat at the hands of the Franks led to their later weakness, as evidenced in their sharing the single province of Gallaecia with the Suebi after the partition of Spain in 413. Unfortunately, Frigeridus does not differentiate between the Vandal groups, making it virtually impossible to discuss the political organization of the barbarian invaders of 406.


9 Paulinus of Pella *Eucharisticus* 372-405. Wilhelm Levison was the first to identify Paulinus’ unnamed Alan king in 414 as Goar. See Wilhelm Levison, “Bischof Germanus von Auxerre und die Quellen zu seiner Geschichte”, *Neues Archiv* 29 (1904) 95-175. The identification is often accepted in older historiography. See, for instance, Bury, *Later Roman Empire*, 198; Jones, *Later Roman Empire*, 188; Herwig Wolfram, *History of the Goths* (Berkeley, Los
only source which specifically cites Goar as a king of the Alans is Constantius of Lyons’ *Vita Sancti Germani* written sometime around 480 C. E.\(^\text{10}\) This may suggest that like Alaric, Goar’s kingship was a development that occurred over time, a testimony to the changing nature of barbarian political structures during this period.\(^\text{11}\)

Goar’s decision to join the Romans suggests that contrary to much primary and secondary literature, there still remained a Roman presence on the Rhine frontier at this period. After securing Goar’s aid, this Roman opposition apparently became sizable enough to deter Respendial from crossing the Rhine in the spot he had initially chosen. Meanwhile, the Vandals had apparently attempted to cross at a different point, one which brought them up against some group of Franks. Scholars have almost universally accepted that these Franks were acting as allies or federates of the Romans.\(^\text{12}\) However, Frigeridus and the Spanish historian Orosius, both of whom mention this episode with the Franks, are not specific on that point.\(^\text{13}\) Regardless, it is evident that the Alans and the Vandals were acting independently at least initially, attacking frontier defenses at different points. It seems that Respendial only came to aid the Vandals when he realized that he could not stand against the Roman forces in his area alone. Presumably the two groups then crossed the Rhine together.

\(^{10}\) Constantius of Lyons *Vita Sancti Germani* 28. For text and commentary, see the Constatius and René Borius, *Vie de Saint Germain d’Auxerre. Sources Chrétiennes* no. 112 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1965). Though his theses regarding the redating of Germanus’ career to the 430s and the British rebellion as a social revolution have not found favor with later scholars, E. A. Thompson’s *St. Germanus of Auxerre and the End of Roman Britain* (Suffolk: Boydell Press, 1984) also offers a useful commentary on the saint’s *vita*.

\(^{11}\) For an excellent discussion of the development of Alaric’s title of “king”, see Halsall, *Barbarian Migrations*, 202-206.


\(^{13}\) Gregory of Tours *Historia* II. 9; Orosius *Historiae* VII. 40. 3.
Though the Suebi go unmentioned in the work of Prosper and Frigeridus, other authors suggest that they formed a third major division among the barbarians who entered Gaul in the winter of 406. The Suebi are traditionally listed as one of the groups making up the Alamannic confederation. In his letter 123 to the Gallic noblewoman Ageruchia, dated to around 409, Jerome mentions the Alamanni as one of the tribes who crossed the Rhine. Unfortunately, Jerome’s letter is an artful display of his own literary education, and his ethnographic list of barbarian groups includes many unmentioned in any other contemporary source, such as the Quadi, Sarmatians, Gepids, Herules, Saxones, and even the Pannonians. The Alamanni reference may therefore owe more to his desire to pad an apocalyptic description with antagonists than to provide accurate information on the perpetrators of the Rhine crossing.

Hydatius alone records another change in the political structure of the barbarian groups after their entry into Spain in 409. In his entry concerning the division of Spanish provinces among the barbarian in 411, he specifies that the Vandals were composed of at least two groups. The dominant Vandal group was the Siling Vandals who received the province of Baetica for settlement. The second group was apparently of lesser number if the size of their settlement allotment is any indication. These Vandals shared the small province of Gallaecia with the Suebi. In Frigeridus’ description of the Rhine crossing, however, he mentions only one Vandal

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14 Orosius Historiae VII. 38. 3 & 40. 3; Gallic Chronicle of 452 s. a. 410; Hydatius Chronicon 34 [42] and 41 [49]; Zosimus VI. 3. 1; Sozomen IX. 12. 3.

15 Jerome Epistula 123. 16.

16 While generally maintaining this thesis, Goffart suggests that there may be some elements of fact behind Jerome’s scholarly list of barbarian groups. See Goffart, Barbarian Tides, 80-81. We are on slightly better ground in Jerome’s list of Gallic cities sacked by the barbarians. Nevertheless, Kulikowski has shown that we must also approach this information with caution. See Kulikowski, “Barbarians in Gaul”, 331-332.

17 Hydatius Chronicon 41 [49]. This lesser group of the Vandals are often referred to as “Hasding” Vandals. The name goes unrecorded in fifth-century sources, only appearing among writers of the sixth century. See, for example, Jordanes Getica 113. Courtois, Vandales, 25 n. 1 suggests that the name was a term derived from the ruling dynasty,
king, Godigisel, who died in battle with the Franks. As with the Alan civil discord under Goar, the division (and reunion after 416) of the Vandals provide a testimony to the fluidity of barbarian political and cultural identity across time and distance.

Zosimus tells us in VI. 3. 1 of his *Historia Nova* that the barbarian depredations in the Gallic provinces roused the fear of the soldiers stationed in Britain. The British army now turned to self-help, preferring to support the usurpation of imperial power rather than risk a barbarian invasion from across the channel.\(^{18}\) In an earlier section of his history (VI. 2. 1-2), Zosimus details the sequence of these usurpers. The army first raised a man named Marcus to the purple. When he failed to meet their needs, they chose a man named Gratian. After four months, he too fell from favor. Finally, in early 407, they chose a man with the propitious name Constantine, believing that he would conquer the empire just as his namesake had one hundred years before.\(^{19}\)

Zosimus’ information on the sequence of British usurpers in VI. 2. 1-2 finds confirmation in the work of the ecclesiastical historian Sozomen, as well as in a surviving fragment of both authors’ collective source for this event, the lost history of Olympiodorus.\(^{20}\) Unfortunately for our understanding of the British usurpations, however, Zosimus’ attribution of a cause-effect relationship between the Rhine crossing of the Vandals, Alans, and Suebi, and the rise of the usurpers comes from a different section of his history (VI. 3. 1) and has no parallel in the

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\(^{18}\) Zosimus VI. 3. 1.  

\(^{19}\) Zosimus VI. 2. 1-2. Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 13. 1 = Müller-Dindorf 1. 12.  

\(^{20}\) Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 13. 1 = Müller-Dindorf 1. 12; Sozomen IX. 11. 1-2. Our earliest source for the usurpations, however, is Orosius *Historiae* VII. 40. 4. In his discussion of the British usurpers, Orosius mentions Gratian and Constantine, but not Marcus.
surviving source tradition. Furthermore, his testimony to this connection is, in fact, chronologically at odds with what we know of these events from other authors.

In his chronicle, Prosper of Aquitaine states specifically that in the sixth consulship of Arcadius and the first of Probus, *Wandali et Halani Gallias traiecto Rheno ingressi II k. Ian*. In modern dating, this translates to December 31, 406. In the surviving fragment of Olympiodorus which Zosimus used as a source for the sequence of British usurpers in VI. 2. 1-2, however, Olympiodorus tells us that the British usurpations began before the seventh consulship of Honorius, or January 1, 407. As we know that Constantine was proclaimed and crossed from Britain to the continent in early 407, Olympiodorus’ account would suggest that Gratian was raised to the purple sometime in autumn, 406, and Marcus a short time earlier. Therefore, the Rhine crossing of the Vandals, Alans, and Suebi could not have caused the sequence of British usurpations. According to the testimonies of Prosper and Olympiodorus, the British rebellion had to have been already well underway before the barbarians broke through the Roman *limes*.

Over the years, scholars have offered a variety of more or less plausible solutions for navigating the contradiction between Prosper’s date for the Rhine crossing and Zosimus’ claims in VI. 3. 1 concerning the cause/effect relationship of the Gallic invasion and the British usurpations. In the commentary to his critical edition of Zosimus, François Paschoud argues that the commonly accepted source for this section of Zosimus’ history, the now lost work of Olympiodorus, originally detailed two barbarian invasions of the Gallic provinces in 406. The first invasion caused the British usurpations, while the second was the more famous Rhine

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21 Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 13.1 = Müller-Dindorf fragment 12.

22 Prosper dates the rise of Constantine to 407 and this is also the date of his earliest coins. Paschoud argues for a probable date of early February, 407, based on Zosimus’ narrative and Honorius’ itinerary derived from the *Codex Theodosianus* VII. 13. 18 and VII. 20. 13. Paschoud, *Zosime*, III. 1, 205-206; III. 2, 20-21.
crossing of Alans, Vandals, and Sueves on December 31, 406. Michael Kulikowski, on the other hand, has offered a different approach. Kulikowski, following an earlier theory put forth by Norman Baynes and drawing on recent work on the chronicle tradition, argues that Prosper’s date for the Rhine crossing should be read as referring to the last day of 405 rather than 406. The theories of Paschoud and Kulikowski both have their merits and as such, have each gained supporters in the scholarly community.

The key to the problem, however, seems to lie in the commonly accepted notion that Zosimus’ narrative for the events after 404 more or less faithfully follows the lost work of Olympiodorus, a historian of proven reliability. Unfortunately, there is good evidence to think that Zosimus was using another, less precise historian for Book VI, Chapter 3, precisely the point in which he makes his controversial claims. A variety of evidence supports this view. Chapters

23 Paschoud, Zosime, III. 2, 19-21, 28-31. Paschoud also provides an emendation to Zosimus’ text, which he feels better represents the “original” text of Olympiodorus. Paschoud’s hypothesis derives from his belief that Zosimus’ passage presents a garbled account of the entry of a fragment of Radagaisus’ army into Gaul after their defeat at Faesulae in the summer of 406. This hypothesis, however, is untenable. All of our sources tell us that Stilicho’s defeat of Radagaisus’ forces at Faesulae was a complete victory. More importantly, even those sources which are actively hostile to Stilicho are forced to acknowledge this victory. They therefore employ various means in an attempt to distance the hated general from the event, attributing the victory to Stilicho’s subordinates or to the mercy of God. See, for example, Orosius Historiarum VII. 37; Augustine De Civitate Dei V. 23; Marcellinus Comes Chronicon s.a.406. 2-3. These writers would not have needed to use such literary ploys, if a contingent of Radagaisus’ forces escaped to wreck further havoc in Gaul. Such an action would have provided these the very element they needed to further vilify Stilicho. We can therefore be relatively sure that to all intents and purposes, Radagaisus’ army was annihilated at Faesulae. Stilicho’s enemies had every reason to tell us if it had been otherwise.


25 Drinkwater, “Usurpers” 273 and Birley, Roman Government of Britain, 457-460 both follow Paschoud’s thesis. Kulikowski’s thesis is accepted in Goffart, Barbarian Tides, 74 n. 3 and Halsall, Barbarian Migrations, 211.


27 To my knowledge, Demougeot is the only scholar who has rejected the Olympiodoran attribution of this chapter of Zosimus. See Émilienne Demougeot, “Constantine III, L’Empereur D’Arles” in L’Empire Romain et Les Barbares d’Occident (IVe-VIIe siècle), Scripta Varia (Paris: Sorbonne, 1988; originally published in Hommage à
2 and 4 of Zosimus’ sixth book of the *Historia Nova* form a continuous narrative of the rise and progress of Constantine III’s rebellion, beginning with an account of the British usurpers (VI. 2) and continuing to detail the expansion of Constantine’s power into Spain (VI. 4). Both chapters also contain detailed information that can be corroborated from parallel passages in the earlier *Ecclesiastical History* of Sozomen, who also used the lost work of Olympiodorus as a source.\(^{28}\)

Zosimus VI. 3, however, represents a visible narrative and chronological break in the author’s main account, in which he drops back in time to describe the British usurpations once again and tie these to the entry of the Vandals, Alans, and Suebi into the Gallic provinces.

In addition to the narrative break, Book VI, Chapter 3 of Zosimus contains a variety of vague and obviously incorrect statements that are unlikely to have derived from Olympiodorus. In terms of narrative, the chapter details the reasons for the usurper Constantine III’s decision to garrison the Alpine passes. In order to explain this, Zosimus drops back in time from the main narrative to discuss the entry of the Alans, Vandals, and Suebi into Gaul in 406. Unfortunately, Zosimus claims that these barbarian groups entered Gaul through the Alpine passes, a contention that stands at odds with every other source we possess, which all testify to a Rhine crossing.\(^{29}\)

VI. 3. 2 contains vague description of a battle between Roman and barbarian troops which lacks

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\(^{28}\) The information contained in Sozomen IX. 11 parallels Zosimus’ account at VI. 2. 1-2 and VI. 4. 1.

\(^{29}\) Zosimus VI. 3. 1. For the Rhine crossing, see Orosius *Historiae* VII. 40; Prosper of Aquitaine *Chronicon* s. a. 406; Gregory of Tours *Historia* II. 9. The barbarian groups that each author lists tend to vary. Prosper and Frigeridus only cite the Vandals and the Alans. Orosius cites the Vandals, Alans, and Suebi, as well as the Burgundians.
all of the detail, including location, date, and Roman leaders, which a similar passage from Olympiodorus would usually include. Finally, VI. 3. 3 mentions that Constantine III also restored the Rhine limes, which Zosimus incorrectly claims had been ignored since the reign of the Emperor Julian. Zosimus then returns to the main narrative derived from Olympiodorus with Chapter 4.

All of the textual evidence would therefore suggest that Zosimus broke from his Olympiodorian source material with Chapter 3, and chose to include material from the work of a far less reliable historian, whose account possessed patently vague and incorrect information. While the identity of this historian must remain speculative, there is textual evidence that would suggest that Chapter 3 represents a previously unidentified fragment of the historian Eunapius. Eunapius’ history, like that of Olympiodorus, only survives through fragments contained in the work of later authors. The ninth-century Byzantine scholar and patriarch Photius claims that Eunapius’ history begins after the reign of the Emperor Claudius II (d. 270) and ended with the death of the Eudoxia, the wife of the Emperor Arcadius, and the rise of the Bishop Acacius to the episcopal seat at Constantinople.30 As both of these events occurred in 404, scholars have generally accepted this year as the end date for Eunapius’ work.31 As a historian, however, Eunapius was averse to chronology, as he himself tells us in a surviving fragment, preferring to arrange his history according to the reigns of emperors and discuss events as didactic and moral lessons.32 It is therefore entirely possible that Eunapius’ history referred to events later than the

30 Photius Bibliotheca, Codex 77, I. 158-60. See Blockley, Fragmentary Classicizing Historians, II. 3-5.

31 For Eunapius’ life and work, see Blockley, Fragmentary Classicising Historians, I. 1-26.

32 Eunapius, Blockley fragment 1 = Müller-Dindorf 1.
year 404. Furthermore, though we can date the last events in Eunapius’ history (according to Photius) to this year, we should note that these are both events are associated with the eastern empire. It is therefore possible that his coverage of western events extended slightly beyond the year 404.

Zosimus’ debt to Eunapius for the years 270-404 is a long established truism of scholarship. Photius himself claims that Zosimus merely copied and condensed Eunapius’ history for use in his own work. With the year 407, Zosimus turned to Olympiodorus’ history as his main source, resulting in the loss of most narrative content for 405/406. As we have seen, however, the evident peculiarities of Zosimus VI. 3 would suggest that the author deviated from Olympiodorus in this chapter, and it is possible that he went back to his Eunapian source material to provide information. In addition to the vague description of events and the overt, though factually incorrect, praise of the Emperor Julian, the best evidence for this thesis is a telltale verbal parallel between the description of the mysterious battle between Romans and barbarians that appears in VI. 3. 2 and two previous battle descriptions in Zosimus’ history, one of which definitely derives from Eunapius’s account of the Battle of Adrianople. While not

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33 Barnes has shown that the first edition of Eunapius’ history, which he argues ended with the Battle of Adrianople in 378, contained references to events from the later reign of Theodosius. These references had previously led scholars to assume that this first edition extended through 404, the probable end date for the second edition. See T. D. Barnes, *The Sources of the Historia Augusta* (Bruxelles: Latomus, 1978) 114-123.


35 The words in question (ἀπαντὰς πανολεθρίᾳ διέφθειραν) are used to describe the complete destruction of an army in battle and appear in the present passage under discussion, Zosimus VI. 3. 2 (ὁ γὰρ ἄν ἀπαντὰς πανολεθρίᾳ διέφθειραν) as well as Zosimus’ description of the battle of Adrianople derived from Eunapius (IV. 24. 2: Ὅλῳ ἀπαντήσαντες ἀπροφασίστως οἱ βάρβαροι, καὶ παρὰ πολύ τῇ μάχῃ κρατήσαντες, μικροῦ μὲν ἄν ἀπαντὰς πανολεθρίᾳ διέφθειραν) and Zosimus’ erroneous account of Stilicho’s battle with Radagaisus (V. 26. 5: Καὶ τοῖς βαρβάροις ἀπροσδοκήτοις ἐπιπεσὼν ἄπαν τὸ πολέμιον πανολεθρίᾳ διέφθειρεν…). At least one scholar has argued that Zosimus’ account of Radagaisus’ defeat in 406 does not derive from Olympiodorus. See J. Rosenstein, “Kritische Untersuchungen über das Verhältnis zwischen Olympiodor, Zosimus und Sozomenus”, *Forschungen zur Deutschen Geschichte* 1 (1862) 165-204. Given the verbal parallel, Zosimus’ Radagaisus account may also derive from Eunapius.
conclusive evidence, this verbal parallel would suggest that Eunapius’ history of western events extended beyond the end date of 404 for eastern events, and that Zosimus decided to incorporate some of this information into an overarching narrative concerning Constantine III that ultimately derived from Olympiodorus.

Zosimus’ use of Eunapius or another, unknown source for his information in Chapter 3 does not automatically negate his assertion of a cause/effect relationship between the Rhine crossing of 406 and the rise of the usurpers in Britain. It does, however, remove the presumptive authority of an Olympiodororan source from the information. Without this support, the purported relationship between these events appears suspect, especially alongside the obviously incorrect statements also contained in Chapter 3. It therefore seems best to favor the dates of Prosper for the Rhine crossing and the authentic fragments of Olympiodorus for the British usurpations, rather than accept the spurious testimony of Zosimus in this section. The British usurpations were probably already in motion when the Alans, Vandals, and Suebi breached the Rhine frontier on December 31, 406.

While the reasons for the British usurpations remain speculative, recent scholarship has shed much light on the progress of Constantine’s revolt in Gaul. After claiming the purple, Constantine crossed to the continent at Bononia (Boulogne) in early 407 and quickly received the allegiance of most of the Gallic army as well as many prominent Gallic senators. He seems to have contained the Alans, Vandals, and Suebi in the two Belgicas in the north of Gaul for three years using both military and diplomatic means, possibly combined with some military

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36Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 13. 1 = Müller-Dindorf 12. 1; Sozomen IX. 11. 2; Zosimus V. 27. 2.
recruitment. He also refortified the Rhine frontier, and gained easy recognition as emperor in southeastern Gaul as well as Spain. His first coins were minted at Lyons, suggesting that this city may have been the goal of the first phase of his invasion. Following his usurpation, Constantine’s correspondence with the imperial court contained the traditional claim of innocence and request for recognition. Unlike previous usurpers, however, Constantine did not rule out the prospect of conciliation and alliance upon an initial rebuff. Instead, it became a permanent (though at times, poorly managed) feature of his public policy. These first coins from Lyons as well as later issues from Trier and Arles each bear inscriptions that place Constantine within the legitimate imperial college, clearly displaying his political aspirations towards compromise.

37 For Constantine’s success in containing the 406 barbarians, see Kulikowski, “Barbarians in Gaul”, 331-338. In the previously discussed problematic passage of the Historia Nova (VI. 3. 2), Zosimus mentions a battle between Romans and barbarians in which the Romans emerge victorious, but allow the barbarians to escape and regroup, becoming dangerous once again. As this vague battle scene comes during a discussion of Constantine and the Vandals, Alans, and Suebi, Zosimus apparently intends his readers to see these groups as the belligerents. Orosius also mentions that Constantine made ill-advised treaties with barbarians, though it is true that he does not specify the 406 invaders. In the same chapter, he mentions a newly recruited force of barbarians given the name Honoriaci.

38 See Drinkwater, “Usurpers” 269-298; Kulikowski, “Barbarians in Gaul”, 333; Late Roman Spain, 157.

39 Drinkwater makes a compelling case for Lyons serving as a mid-point in the transfer of the Gallic Praetorian Prefecture capital from Trier to Arles, established in the early years of the fifth century. Drinkwater, “Usurpers”, 275-279.

40 In the sources, the first mention of Constantine’s correspondence and protests of innocence occurs in early 409, when Honorius is forced to temporarily acknowledge the usurper. Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 13. 1 = Müller-Dindorf 12. 1; Zosimus V. 43. 1. If this were correct, it would mean that Constantine controlled Gaul for almost two years before he made any overtures to the imperial court. On the basis of the reconstructed progress of Constantine’s climb to power, the propaganda of his coinage, as well as the evidence of earlier usurpation attempts, it is far more reasonable to conclude that Constantine’s first appeals to the imperial court came shortly after his assumption of the purple, probably while he was still stationed in Bononia.

41 Demougeot, “Constantine III”, 101-104; Drinkwater, “Usurpers”, 276-279; Kulikowski, “Barbarians in Gaul”, 333. Coins from Lyons, Arles, and Trier bearing the legend Victoria Augggg (Constantine, Honorius, Arcadius, Theodosius), and later Auggg (Constantine, Honorius, Theodosius) show that Constantine was promoting himself as a member of the imperial college. RIC 10.123-149.
This policy may also have slowed the progress of his invasion. Constantine paused in the winter of 407/408 before taking Arles. If the city was not yet the capital of the Gallic Prefecture, it may have served as a temporary capital for the remnants of the Honorian regime. As the sources suggest that Constantine was recognized in northern and southeastern Gaul soon after his arrival, this pause may have served as a further peace overture to the imperial court. Regardless, this decision almost ended his revolt in the first year. Through military tenacity and intrigue, Stilicho’s general Sarus managed to attack and besiege the usurper in the city of Valence for seven days. Only the arrival of a substantial relief force under the generals Edobich and Gerontius forced Sarus to withdraw from the siege and retreat into Italy. In the spring of 408, Constantine corrected his earlier mistake and took Arles, forcing the Honorian loyalists to flee to Ravenna.

In Spain, Didymus and Verinianus, relatives of the Theodosian house, organized a make-shift army of slaves and dependents and launched a revolt in the province of Lusitania. Constantine raised his eldest son, Constans, to the rank of Caesar and sent him to deal with the threat along with the MVM Gerontius, the newly appointed PPO Galliarum, Apollinaris. According to Honorius, a troop of newly recruited barbarians, the Honoriaci, were also in their number.

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42 Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 13. 1 = Müller-Dindorf 12. 1; Sozomen IX. 11. 3; Zosimus VI. 2. 2. All of our sources tell us that Constantine quickly received recognition from the Gallic troops. For Constantine’s progress through Gaul and his possible overtures to Ravenna, see Drinkwater, “Usurpers”, 276-279.

43 Zosimus VI. 1. 3-4.

44 Sozomen IX. 4. 4-8; Zosimus V. 31. 4. In the narratives derived from Olympiodorus, Stilicho uses the fact of Constantine’s presence in Arles to argue against Honorius’ journey to the eastern capital.

45 Zosimus VI. 4. 1-4. Gerontius is almost certainly the name Zosimus intended in his single mention of a general named “Terentius” who accompanied Constans and Apollinaris to Spain. See PLRE II: Terentius.

46 Orosius Historiae VII. 40. 5-7. Demougeot offers the tentative suggestion that Constantine may have named these barbarian troops Honoriaci in an effort to show unity with the legitimate regime at Ravenna. She adds, however, that they also have been regular troops. See Demougeot, “Constantine III”, 106-107. Kulikowski decisively rejects Orosius’ testimony and argues that they were a regular unit of the Gallic army, not recruited barbarians. See
After an initial defeat, the forces of the usurper crushed the rebellion. Constans then allowed Honoriaci to pillage the wealthy region known as the _campi Pallentini_.\(^{47}\) In the late summer or autumn of 408, Constans delivered Didymus and Verinianus, along with their wives, to his father at Arles. Rather than keeping the men as valuable bargaining chips, Constantine chose to put them to death, an action he would later come to regret.\(^{48}\)

At the beginning of the year 409, Constantine therefore controlled all of Gaul and Spain and had no viable enemies of which to speak. The death of Stilicho in the summer of 408 had left an imperial administration in Italy crippled by court intrigue, and thoroughly unable to deal with events in Gaul. Furthermore, Ravenna’s consistent indecisiveness over the correct approach to the problem of Alaric had left the Gothic general and his army free to apply pressure directly to the city of Rome. Under these conditions, Constantine could simply wait for Honorius to compromise.

According to Zosimus, Constantine sent an embassy of eunuchs to Ravenna in late 408/early 409 seeking recognition. Honorius knew that the usurper had captured his relatives, but did not yet know that Constantine had already executed Didymus and Verinianus. According to Zosimus, fear for the safety of his relatives as well as the current threat of Alaric, led Honorius to recognize the usurper. He agreed to share power and sent an imperial robe to Constantine as a token of acceptance.\(^ {49}\) Honorius may also have granted Constantine an honorary consulship at

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\(^{48}\) Orosius _Historiae_ VII. 40. 5-7; Zosimus VI. 4. 3 – VI. 5. 2; Sozomen IX. 11. 4 – IX. 12. 1. For discussion, see Drinkwater, “Usurpers”, 281-282.

\(^{49}\) Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 13. 1 = Müller-Dindorf 12. 1; Zosimus V. 43. 1-2.
this time. A Greek funerary inscription from Trier, dating the year as the eighth consulship of Honorius and the first of Constantine, suggests either that the usurper simply claimed the consulship in his own domains or that Ravenna awarded him the position. If the latter, then it must have been purely honorary, as all other sources record the year as the eighth consulship of Honorius and the third of Theodosius II, the eastern emperor.50

This agreement with Constantine, regardless of the fact that it was made under duress, may have given Honorius some hope for dealing with Alaric. The Senate of Rome had recently reached an accord with the general, laying the foundations for peace. Attalus had led a senatorial embassy to encourage Honorius to recognize the peace and reopen negotiations with Alaric. If Zosimus accurately records the sequence of events, however, we now find Honorius acting aggressively, or at least presumptuously. Instead of confirming peace, the emperor, under the control of the magister officiorum Olympius, sent soldiers from Dalmatia to guard the city of Rome. This act was a breach of the truce and Alaric responded accordingly. Of the six thousand men sent for this task, only a hundred survived Alaric’s attack.51 Honorius then sent Olympius with a small force of three hundred Hunnic mercenaries to attack the meager troops of Athaulf, who had entered the peninsula at Alaric’s command. The groups met at Pisa, and on this occasion, the Roman forces fared far better. Though commanding a smaller force, the Huns managed to kill eleven hundred of Athaulf’s escort, while losing only seventeen of their own men.52

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50 *Inscriptiones Graecae* XIV Supplement 2559; Drinkwater, “Usurpers”, 281.

51 Zosimus V. 45. 1-2.

52 Zosimus V. 45. 5-6.
Factionalism was always the rule in imperial courts. After the death of Stilicho in 408, Olympius and his faction dominated the Emperor Honorius. Beneath this surface, however, factions favoring Alaric, Constantine, or having altogether other agendas vied for dominance. After the successful attack on Athaulf, court eunuchs launched a coup against Olympius, forcing him to flee to Dalmatia. The praetorian prefect Jovius, orchestrating a military revolt, then succeeded in destroying what was left of Olympius’ administration and assumed control of the feeble emperor. While Olympius’s regime had favored an aggressive approach to the problem of Alaric, Jovius shifted the direction of court politics towards peace with the general. Under his auspices, negotiations between Honorius and Alaric therefore resumed for brief period. Unfortunately for everyone, Jovius may have overestimated his standing at court. A diplomatic misstep brought his loyalty to Honorius into question, forcing him to swear an oath never to make peace with Alaric. With negotiations once again in shambles, Alaric launched the second siege of Rome in the summer of 409.

At this time, Constantine sent a second embassy to Honorius, under the leadership of a Gallic aristocrat named Jovius (not to be confused with Honorius’ homonymous PPO Italiae). This Jovius sought confirmation of the peace that Honorius had previously established with the usurper. He also expressed regret for the deaths of Didymus and Verinianus, claiming that their executions had taken place without the knowledge of Constantine. Once again, Honorius was

53 Zosimus V. 46. 1.

54 Zosimus V. 47. 1 – 49. 2. For discussion, see Werner Lütkenhaus, Constantius III. Studein zu seiner Tätigkeit un Stellung im Westreich 411-421 (Bonn: Habelt, 1998) 24-31.
forced to accede to Constantine’s demands. In return, Honorius received assurances that he would have the full force of Constantine’s Gallic army to help him in his war with Alaric.\textsuperscript{55}

Already in 409, however, Constantine’s fortunes had begun to unravel. After breaking the Spanish rebellion of Didymus and Verinianus, the Caesar Constans had left his court in Caesaraugusta (Zaragoza) under the control of Gerontius and escorted his prisoners to Arles.\textsuperscript{56} Once these had been handed over, he seems to have remained with his father at Arles until spring or summer 409.\textsuperscript{57} Unfortunately, in an obscure sequence of events, the MVM Gerontius, still stationed in Spain, chose this time to revolt. The circumstances surrounding this rebellion are open to debate, though Zosimus clearly ties Gerontius’ actions to the return of Constans to Spain in the company of a new MVM, Iustus.\textsuperscript{58} Gerontius raised a member of his household, an otherwise unknown Maximus, to Augustus, and in an action that was to have longstanding consequences for the western Empire at large, stirred the 406 barbarians, hitherto settled in northern Gaul, into open revolt once again.\textsuperscript{59} Over the course of the next few months, these groups of Alans, Vandals, and Suebi, moved south into the provinces of Aquitania and Narbonensis, terrorizing the populace along the way.\textsuperscript{60} In autumn of 409, they crossed the


\textsuperscript{56} Gregory of Tours \textit{Historia} II. 9.

\textsuperscript{57} Paschoud, \textit{Zosime}, III. 2, 37; Kulikowski, “Barbarians in Gaul”, 337.

\textsuperscript{58} Zosimus VI. 5. 2. Demougeot, “Constantine III”, 203-204 also suggests that Gerontius’ revolt may have occurred due to Gerontius’ anger over Constantine’s failure to provide troops for the defense of Spain. She is almost certainly incorrect, however, in dating Gerontius’ revolt to after the return of Constantine’s troops from the aborted Italian campaign in the summer of 410. See Drinkwater, “Usurpers” 283-284.

\textsuperscript{59} Zosimus VI. 5. 2.

\textsuperscript{60} Demougeot, “Constantine III”, 200; Kulikowski, “Barbarians in Gaul”, 337-339.
Pyrenees and entered Spain, where they would eventually divide the provinces amongst themselves.\textsuperscript{61}

Even beyond the loss of Spain, Gerontius’ revolt and the new devastations of the barbarians seems to have fatally weakened the integrity of Constantine’s Gallic empire. Zosimus connects Constantine’s failure to deal with the renewed threat of the 406 barbarians, as well as new incursions from beyond the Rhine, with the collapse of Roman rule in Britain, Armorica, and other provinces, as each turned to local self-help measures.\textsuperscript{62} Though Zosimus claims that these areas expelled their Roman magistrates and refused to submit any longer to Roman laws, this should not be held to represent a full turn away from Roman administration \textit{per se}. Rather, it seems to have been a rejection of the locus of power and authority, as opposed to its overall form. Thompson notes the vague, fleeting references to Roman office-holders in Britain as recorded in the late fifth-century \textit{vita} of Germanus of Auxerre. Van Dam’s seminal work on the Bagaudae movement that would plague Armorica in the coming decades also encourages a shift away from traditional views of peasant uprisings to center on local rule unrecognized in Italy yet operating on the Roman paradigm.\textsuperscript{63} Finally, in 411, when a new regime emerges in northern Gaul, it is led by a new imperial claimant, the usurper Jovinus. For these reasons, contrary to Zosimus’ depiction of lawlessness, it is best to understand the rejection of Roman control at this time as a rejection of Constantine’s regime and the expelled magistrates as representatives of the usurper’s administration.

\textsuperscript{61} Orosius \textit{Historiae} VII. 40. 10; Hydatius \textit{Chronicon} 41 [49]. Hydatius, entry 34 [42], tells us that the barbarians entered Spain on a Tuesday, either the 28\textsuperscript{th} of September or October 12\textsuperscript{th}, 409. For a discussion of the consequences of this invasion on the administration of the Spanish provinces, see Kulikowski, \textit{Late Roman Spain}, 161-167.

\textsuperscript{62} Zosimus VI. 5. 2-3.

\textsuperscript{63} Thompson, \textit{Saint Germanus of Auxerre}, 11-12; Raymond Van Dam, \textit{Leadership and Community in Late Antique Gaul} (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985) 25-56.
After the revolt of Gerontius in the spring or summer of 409, the sources become even more muddled than usual about the proper sequence of events. The scholarly narrative therefore varies according to which primary source an individual scholar tends to favor. This narrative divide is most evident in the period assigned to Gerontius’ raising a member of his household, the *domesticus* Maximus, to the purple. Paschoud, followed by Drinkwater, would delay this event to the summer of 410, leaving a Gerontius in an ambiguous position for perhaps a full year.\(^6^4\) Matthews and Kulikowski associate this event with the beginning of Gerontius’ revolt in the spring or early summer of 409.\(^6^5\) Likewise, the raising of Constans to Augustus, which is likely to have been either the cause or the effect of the rise of Maximus, is variously dated to 409 or 410. Unfortunately, the sources provide ample evidence for either interpretation, leaving any narrative of these events in the realm of speculation.

Zosimus tells us that the return of Constans and his new general Iustus to Spain initiated Gerontius’ rebellion.\(^6^6\) This probably occurred in the spring or early summer 409.\(^6^7\) As previously stated, the sources are garbled. Logic, however, would dictate that Gerontius raised Maximus to the purple at this earlier point. Revolting from an entrenched regime, even if it was arguably illegitimate like that of Constantine, would require Gerontius to offer a new imperial focus for his troops. Such had been the case only recently with Constantine’s own rise in Britain, an event in which Gerontius, himself a Briton, had probably played a part. After driving

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\(^6^5\) Matthews, *Western Aristocracies*, 311; Kulikowski, “Barbarians in Gaul”, 337.

\(^6^6\) Zosimus VI. 5. 2.

\(^6^7\) As previously discussed, Demougeot’s date of summer 410 is probably incorrect. Demougeot, “Constantine III”, 203-204. For the 409 date, see Drinkwater, “Usurpers” 283-284, Kulikowski, “Barbarians in Gaul”, 332.
Constans and the Constantinian loyalists from the peninsula, he proceeded to make peace with the barbarians who had crossed the Pyrenees in autumn of 409.68

Late 409 or early 410 found Constans and his administration back with his father at Arles. During the summer of 409, Jovius’ embassy had further secured Constantine’s place alongside Honorius and Theodosius II in the imperial college, in return for aid against Alaric. Constantine himself was therefore in the process of gathering his army for his ill-fated Italian campaign. The reorganization of Gallic administration and the rise of Constans from Caesar to Augustus are therefore best seen as part of this preparation. According to Zosimus, Constantine demoted Apollinaris, the grandfather of the famous poet and epistolographer Sidonius, as praetorian prefect and selected another man to replace him.69 From the evidence of Frigeridus, and later of Sidonius himself, this was Decimius Rusticus, the former magister officiorum.70 As Apollinaris was demoted after the loss of Spain to Gerontius, it is possible that Constantine felt that the praetorian prefect was at least partially responsible for this setback. It is also possible, however,

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68 Frigeridus claims that Maximus’ regime was supported by troops of various barbarian peoples. Gregory of Tours, Historia II. 9 “...atque in se cometatu gentium barbararum accinctum ...”. Photius’ summary of Olympiodorus claims that Gerontius made some type of peace with the barbarians. Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 17. 1 = Müller-Dindorf 16. 1 …τὴν πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀσμενίσας εἰρήνην… Finally, Orosius claims that Maximus is currently in residence among the barbarians after his fail usurpation. Orosius must always be used with caution, but this notice may be evidence of strong ties between his failed regime and the barbarians who entered Spain in 409. See Orosius Historiae VII. 42. 5.

69 Zosimus VI. 13. 1.

70 Gregory of Tours Historia II. 9. This fragment is problematic in many ways. It associates Decimius Rusticus as PPO with the arrival of the first news of Gerontius’ revolt in Spain. In keeping with sequence of events that Zosimus suggests, I would see the rise of Constans to Augustus and the promotion of Rusticus to PPO as events associated with Constantine’s preparations for his Italian campaign. Therefore I agree with Paschoud, Zosime, III. 2, 65-66, that this event took place in early spring of 410. Although Zosimus’ Book VI is notoriously unedited, he is careful to place this brief mention of the reorganization of the Gallic administration firmly between the fall of Attalus and Alaric’s new peace overtures towards Ravenna, combining them in a single section, VI. 13. 1. Further information that Frigeridus provides, particularly that Edobich was sent to the German peoples, while Constans and Rusticius set out for the Gauls, suggests that Frigeridus has here combined Gerontius’ revolt in 409 with Constantine’s preparations for Gerontius’ Gallic invasion which occurred in late 410 or early 411.
that the shift simply represents the normal rotation of offices to accommodate the ambitions, and court the favor, of the Gallic aristocracy.

Regardless, Constantine also seems to have chosen this point to raise his son Constans from Caesar to full Augustus.\textsuperscript{71} Several reasons for this decision can be offered. Up to this point, Constantine was able to sit as Augustus over his Gallic empire while employing his son as Caesar to manage problem areas such as Spain. With Constantine’s planned campaign in Italy, it made sense for him to raise his son to the rank of Augustus and thereby ensure the stability of his regime should his own life be lost to battle or conspiracy in the troubled region of Italy. Likewise, the 409 embassy of Jovius had secured Constantine’s propaganda as an ally of Honorius. This recognition from Ravenna, along with the fact that he was bringing help to Honorius, may have suggested to the usurper that the issue of raising another Augustus was one that Honorius could be forced to accept. Finally, though some scholars have argued for the reverse, it makes far more sense that some consideration of the rise of Maximus in Spain prompted Constantine’s decision to raise Constans to Augustus. Constantine had typically practiced a policy of administrative “overkill” in Spain. Though Orosius tells us that the Spanish provinces had obediently accepted his magistrates, the region remained the homeland of the Theodosian dynasty and the revolt of Didymus and Verinianus had shown the precarious nature of its loyalty to the usurper’s regime. To deal with this threat, Constantine had sought to overshadow his own illegitimacy with prestigious offices, raising Constans to the rank of Caesar and stationing the Gallic praetorian prefect, Apollinaris, in Caesaraugusta (Zaragoza). Now,

\textsuperscript{71} Both Sozomen and Zosimus seem to associate the rise of Constans to Augustus with Constantine’s Italian campaigns. Sozomen does this directly, while Zosimus, whose text ends before the campaign begins, places the rise of Constans just after the fall of Attalus, thus summer 410. While this should probably not be seen as an exact date, it at least suggests the approximate time of somewhere between early spring and summer 410. Sozomen IX. 12; Zosimus VI. 13. 1.
Gerontius had beaten him at his own game, and a new Augustus presided with his court in Tarraco (Tarragona). Though he could claim some shadow of legitimacy thanks to his compromise with Honorius, in the overall circumstances, it makes sense that Constantine would act in keeping with his previous strategy and raise his son to the rank of Augustus. While he could no longer hope to overawe the Spaniards with prestigious office, he could at least ensure that the two sides met under leaders of equal rank on the battlefield.

Whether Constans’ third advance into Spain ever occurred is open to debate.\textsuperscript{72} Sozomen can be read to suggest it, claiming that Constantine, after his abortive Italian campaign in the summer of 410, met his son at Arles, who was fleeing from Spain. Photius, in his summary of Olympiodorus, suggests that Gerontius pursued Constans as he fled Spain. Both accounts are, however, compressions of the years 409-411 taken from the same original source, and both are therefore misleading on several counts. Nevertheless, the sources do at least suggest that Constans set out against Gerontius yet again in the spring of 410.

In the meantime, Constantine proceeded to uphold his part of the arrangement with Honorius. With what would we might presume to be great fanfare, Constantine gathered his army in the spring and marched from Arles into northern Italy at some time during the summer of 410. Unfortunately for the usurper, his faction at the court of Honorius suffered a blow from which it could not recover. Honorius’ \textit{magister equitum} Allobich, the apparent leader of a Constantinian

\textsuperscript{72} Paschoud, \textit{Zosime}, III. 2, 37, believes that Constans was raised to Augustus at the beginning of summer, 410, and sent against Gerontius, only to flee back to Gaul upon the rise of Maximus to the purple at the end of the same summer. Drinkwater, “Usurpers”, 283-284, suggests that second attack against Gerontius was planned for the summer of 410, but was abandoned for reason unexplained upon the arrival of news of Maximus assuming the purple. Kulikowski, “Barbarians in Gaul”, 339, sees not two, but a single, year-long battle between Constans and Gerontius, extending from Gerontius’ revolt in the spring/early summer 409 to Constans arrival in Arles in the summer of 410. For the current narrative, I follow Halsall, who depicts a two-pronged offensive in the summer of 410. This offensive saw Constantine march into Italy, while Constans marched once again into Spain against Gerontius. Halsall, \textit{Barbarian Migrations}, 221-222.
faction, had previously murdered Eusebius, the recently appointed *praepositus sacri cubiculi*. While the specific reasons for this crime are now unknown to us, the murder itself reflects the chaotic state of the factional conflict in the imperial court during this period. Allobich apparently considered that the time was ripe for yet another overthrow of the ruling faction, to correspond with the arrival of his master. Unfortunately, he overestimated his strength. Sozomen records that Allobich was assassinated before the very eyes of the emperor while returning from an imperial procession, causing Honorius to dismount and give thanks to God for the murder. With the death of Allobich, Constantine apparently reconsidered his Italian campaign. He halted his progress in Liguria and retraced his steps to his residence at Arles.

Now back in Gaul in late summer or early autumn 410, Constantine met his son, Constans, who was returning from his Spanish defeat at the hands of Gerontius. Whatever peace they enjoyed, however, was short lived, as Constantine’s empire continued to crumble around them. After beating back two failed invasions, Gerontius now went on the offensive, launching a campaign into Gaul against his former patrons. Constantine sent his loyal MVM Edobich beyond the Rhine to raise reinforcements, while tasking Constans with the organization of the Gallic defenses. In these, Constans fared no better against Gerontius than he had on previous occasions. In the civil war that followed, Constans was forced to retreat to his headquarters at

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73 Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 15. 1 = Müller-Dindorf 14. 1.

74 Sozomen IX. 12. 5. Photius gives the more sober notice that Allobich was killed with the emperor’s consent. Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 15. 1 = Müller-Dindorf 14. 1.

75 Sozomen IX. 12. 4.

76 Sozomen IX. 12. 4-6.

77 Sozomen IX. 13; Gregory of Tours *Historia* II. 9.
Vienne. There he was besieged and killed in late 410 or early 411.\footnote{Orosius \textit{Historiae} VII. 42. 4; Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 17.1 = Müller-Dindorf 16; Sozomen IX. 13; Marcellinus Comes \textit{Chronicon} s.a 411. For commentary, see Kulikowski, “Barbarians in Gaul”, 339-340.} Gerontius then turned his army against Constantine, beginning a siege of Arles that would ultimately cost both men their lives.

In the meantime, events in Italy had improved. Since Constantine’s ignominious retreat, Honorius’ meager realm had suffered the shock of Alaric’s sack of Rome in late August. By the autumn of 410, however, a new, aggressive faction had emerged at Ravenna that favored peace with neither the usurpers in Gaul nor Alaric’s marauding army. At the apparent head of this new faction was an Illyrian officer named Constantius. Constantius was originally from the city of Naissus (Niš) in Dacia, a birthplace he shared with the early fourth-century emperor Constantine. According to Olympiodorus, he had joined the army in the reign of Theodosius.\footnote{Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 37 = Müller-Dindorf 39.} This would suggest that he was among the officers who had accompanied the eastern army of Theodosius to the west in the civil war against Eugenius in 395 and had remained there under Stilicho to form the core of Honorius’ regime.

Attempts to deal with Alaric and his motley army had largely dominated the activities of the various court factions since the death of Stilicho. The faction of Constantius, however, saw this pressure relieved. As previously discussed, the sack of Rome in late August 410, marked the failure of Alaric’s negotiations with the imperial court of Honorius. Though the general had tried a variety of tactics, including raising the senator Attalus to the purple, he had always used the threat to the eternal city as the primary bargaining chip in his diplomatic strategy. Once Alaric
allowed his army to sack Rome, he knew that the possibility of negotiation was at an end. Leaving the city on August 27, Alaric marched his army south in an attempt to cross to Sicily. When this too failed, his army began a retreat north. On the march, Alaric fell ill and died near the city of Consentia (Cosenza) sometime in autumn 410. His brother-in-law, Athaulf, now took command of his forces. With Honorius’ sister Galla Placidia as their high-profile hostage, the army now entrenched itself in southern Italy for the whole of the following year, effectively placing itself on the sidelines in contests with the imperial court.

Under Athaulf, Alaric’s army was no longer a direct threat to Ravenna, and so imperial politics returned to its normal footing. That is, dealing first and foremost with challenges to the legitimate imperial dynasty once again became the order of the day. This meant that for the first time in two years, Constantine and his Gallic regime became Ravenna’s priority. In the autumn of 410, the imperial government gathered a small army in Italy. In the following spring, it crossed the Alps and launched an attack on Arles under the command of Constantius as magister peditum and another previously unknown officer, Ulfilas, as magister equitum. In doing so, Constantius was almost certainly aware that they were entering a politically contentious region.

When the Italian army entered Gaul, Gerontius and his Spanish army had already succeeded in destroying Constantine’s defenses in the autumn of 410 and were then in the process of besieging the usurper in his capital city of Arles. News of the unexpected arrival of Constantius

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80 For general commentary on the negotiations of Alaric with Ravenna from 408-410, see Matthews, Western Aristocracies, 284-306, Kulikowski, Rome’s Gothic Wars, 173-177.

81 Philostorgius XII. 3-4; Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 11. 4 & 16 = Müller-Dindorf 10 & 15; Hydatius Chronicon 37 [45]; Jordanes Getica 156-158.

82 Orosius Historiae VII. 42. 1; Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 17. 1 = Müller-Dindorf 16; Sozomen IX. 13 & 14. 1-2. Ulfila’s obviously Gothic name, however, probably indicates that he, like Constantius, was part of the force that Theodosius led west against Eugenius in 395, subsequently finding a place in the reorganized military of Stilicho.
and Ulfilas seems to have caused a major defection of Gerontius’ forces to the army of the legitimate regime. Thus weakened, Gerontius had no choice but to withdraw from the siege and retreat back to his stronghold in Spain. Unfortunately, his remaining troops did not approve of this decision and turned on him. In a scene that Sozomen paints in heroic colors, Gerontius was besieged in his house with his wife and a few loyal retainers. After killing three hundred of his former troops, Gerontius, his wife, and a loyal Alan follower chose suicide over falling into the hands of their enemies.\textsuperscript{83}

Back at Arles, the army of Constantius and Ulfilas took up the siege of Constantine and his forces, but soon experienced a surprise of their own. When Gerontius had first invaded Gaul, Constantine had sent his loyal general Edobich to recruit relief forces among the barbarians beyond the Rhine. Constantius and Ulfilas now learned that this relief army was approaching from the north. Upon receiving this news, the Honorian generals were alarmed and like Gerontius before them, initially decided to retreat rather than face the expected forces. The imminent arrival of Edobich, however, seems to have forced their hand towards combat. Constantius and Ulfilas therefore crossed the Rhone which bordered ancient Arles on the north, and took up positions.\textsuperscript{84}

Sozomen provides an uncharacteristically detailed account of ensuing battle, which almost certainly draws on the lost work of Olympiodorus. Constantius with the infantry awaited Edobich’s relief army, while Ulfilas with the cavalry hid in ambush. Once Edobich’s forces began to engage those of Constantius, Ulfilas fell on the northern army from behind, leading to a thorough rout. The vast majority of Edobich’s army surrendered, while the general himself fled

\textsuperscript{83} Sozomen IX. 13.

\textsuperscript{84} Sozomen IX. 14.
the battlefield and sought refuge with Ecdicius, a man whom he considered to be a loyal friend. Rather than provide refuge, however, Ecdicius killed Edobich and delivered his head to Constantius, seeking reward and honors as recompense. Constantius, however, was disgusted with this violation of the guest/host relationship as well as the general betrayal of a friend. Apparently believing that the presence of Ecdicius was a curse upon both himself and the army, Constantius dismissed the man with nothing but the thanks of the state.85

Having defeated Edobich’s army, Constantius and Ulfilas returned to the siege of Arles. Soon, however, they were made aware of a further threat from the north, the rise of a new usurper, the Gallic aristocrat Jovinus.86 Jovinus is an obscure figure in the surviving sources, usually little more than a name. The fragments of the lost histories of Olympiodorus and Frigeridus alone provide any real details concerning the nature and events of his regime. Nevertheless, the duration of his rule from 411 to 413 and the strong support he enjoyed among discontented groups within the fractured empire, including both Gallic aristocrats and barbarian leaders such as Athaulf and Sarus, suggest that his significance far outweighs the scant treatment that he receives in the surviving sources.87

85 Sozomen IX. 14. For an overview of these events, see Drinkwater, “Usurpers”, 287; Kulikowski, “Barbarians in Gaul”, 340-341. Demougeot offers a variety of possible reasons for Constantius treatment of Ecdicius. She suggests that Constantius may have wished to take Edobich alive in order to use him either to obtain the capitulation of Constantine III or to recruit members of his barbarian army. See Demougeot, “Constantine III”, 206. Both suggestions are possible, but probably unnecessary to explain Constantius’ reaction to such evident betrayal. Ecdicius, the trusted friend of Constantine’s general, was almost certainly a former adherent of the usurper’s regime, who now sought to join the winning side with his murder of Edobich. Constantius had little reason to favor such a man or his actions. For similar conclusions, see Ralph W. Mathisen, Ecclesiastical Factionalism and Religious Controversy in Fifth-Century Gaul (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1989) 32.

86 Gregory of Tours Historia II. 9.

Possibly even before Constantius and Ulphilas entered Gaul in the spring of 411, Jovinus gathered some remnants of the collapsed regime of Constantine and launched a new usurpation in northern Gaul. Olympiodorus claims that he was raised to the purple at Mundiacum in Germania Secunda.\(^88\) He also gained with the support of Goar and Guntiarius, leaders of groups of Alans and Burgundians, respectively. While Guntiarius is otherwise unknown, Goar was the leader of that group of Alans that had chosen to ally themselves with the Romans during the fateful Rhine crossing in the winter of 406.\(^89\) It is therefore probably safe to assume that both men were seeking recognition and favorable treatment for their followers within the Roman Empire.\(^90\)

By late spring 411, Jovinus was apparently strong enough to threaten the Italian army besieging Constantine at Arles. In a passage many scholars have considered to be a simple misplaced reference to the arrival of Edobich’s relief army, Frigeridus tells us that news arrived from northern Gaul that Jovinus had been proclaimed and that an army of Burgundians, Franks, Alamanni, and Alans were marching against the besiegers.\(^91\) This information seems to have

\(^{88}\) Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 18 = Müller-Dindorf 17. The obscurity of this city has led many scholars to suggest that an emendation to Mogontiacum (Mainz) is required. See, for instance, Matthews, *Western Aristocracies*, 313 n. 4. The further information, however, that specifies that this city was located in Germania Secunda (τῆς ἑτέρας Γερμανίας) would seem to argue against this identification, as Mainz was located in Germania Prima. With Blockley, I see little reason for the emendation, either textually or logically. Olympiodorus was providing a historical detail concerning the rise of Jovinus that is otherwise unattested. The location in which the usurper was proclaimed is no indication of where he had his court once his regime was established. See Blockley, *Fragmentary Classicising Historians*, 216, n. 46.

\(^{89}\) Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 18 = Müller-Dindorf 17; Gregory of Tours *Historia* II. 9.


\(^{91}\) Gregory of Tours *Historia* II. 9. Drinkwater believes that Jovinus’ usurpation occurred after the death of Constantine III in late 411. He therefore interprets Frigeridus’ notice of the march of Jovinus’ forces on Arles as a garbled account of the earlier arrival of Edobich’s relief army bringing aid to the besieged Constantine. See Drinkwater, “Usurpers”, 289 n. 136. See also Bury, *Later Roman Empire*, 194 and Matthews, *Western Aristocracies*, 313. I, however, see no reason to doubt Frigeridus’ account, especially given the fact that serious problems had plagued Constantine’s regime since 409. Since establishing himself at Arles, Constantine’s focus had been on Gerontius’ revolt in Spain and the imperial center in Italy. This neglect had already caused the regions of Britain and
caused concern for both the Italian army and Constantine himself. Realizing that all was lost, Constantine now renounced his imperial title and had himself ordained as priest, apparently hoping to reinforce the promises of safety that he received from Constantius with clerical membership. After receiving their own assurances, the citizens of Arles opened their gates to the besiegers. Constantine and his surviving son, Julian, whom he had previously named *nobilissimus*, were sent to Honorius in Italy. Unfortunately for him, neither the oaths of the besiegers nor the priesthood was enough to save Constantine’s life. Honorius had both the usurper and his son put to death thirty miles outside Ravenna. The *Consularia Constantinopolitana* records the arrival of Constantine’s head on a spear at Ravenna on September 18, 411.

Sozomen’s narrative suggests that after the capitulation of Arles and the capture of Constantine III, Gaul returned to the control of Ravenna. He ends his account of these events with a brief notice of the deaths of the usurpers Jovinus and Maximus, and other figures who had previously rebelled against the rule of Honorius. He thus maintains his theme of the divine favor accorded to the legitimate emperors of the Theodosian house.

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92 For the ecclesiastical dimension of Constantine’s regime, see Mathisen, *Ecclesiastical Factionalism*, 28-32. Mathisen shows that Heros, the Bishop of Arles at this time, was a partisan of Constantine III and would have performed the ceremony that raised the usurper to the priesthood.

93 Olympiodorus, Blockley fragment 17 = Müller-Dindorf 16; Sozomen IX. 15.

94 *Consularia Constantinopolitana* s. a. 411

95 Sozomen IX. 15. 1-3.
In reality, Gaul still had years of conflict left to endure. Previously, the news of the arrival of Edobich’s relief army had alarmed Constantius and Ulfilas, briefly causing them to consider a withdrawal to Italy.\textsuperscript{96} Apparently, only the proximity of the army caused them to stand their ground, a gamble that had ended in their favor. Now, with the army of Jovinus on the march, Constantius and Ulfilas faced either the uncertainty of a second battle or the prospect of finding themselves besieged within the city of Arles. As they had achieved their immediate objective in the capture of Constantine, they reasonably opted to avoid this trap and withdraw once again to Italy. The fall of a troublesome usurper was more than enough to prove the viability of Constantius’ faction at Ravenna, and there was no need to risk undermining this success.

For the moment, Jovinus was therefore allowed to consolidate his gains and establish his new regime in the Gallic provinces. However, this respite was short lived. As we will see in Chapter 3, the year 412 would mark the entry of Athaulf and his army into the Gallic political sphere. In a manner similar to Alaric’s relationship with the eastern and western empires from 395-408, Athaulf’s forces would prove a vital third party in the contest between the Gallic regime of Jovinus and the central court at Ravenna. Ultimately, Athaulf’s actions would lead to the fall of the usurper’s administration and the rise of something new: the establishment of an alternate Theodosian regime in the western empire.

\textsuperscript{96} Sozomen IX. 14. 1-2.