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Consumers' Correspondence Inference on Celebrity Endorsers: The Role of Correspondence Bias and Suspicion

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I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Taewoo Kim entitled "Consumers' Correspondence Inference on Celebrity Endorsers: The Role of Correspondence Bias and Suspicion." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Communication and Information.

Sally J. McMillan, Major Professor

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(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

**Consumers' Correspondence Inference on Celebrity Endorsers:
The Role of Correspondence Bias and Suspicion**

A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Taewoo Kim
December 2012

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Acknowledgements

I whole-heartedly dedicate my dissertation to my wife, Priscilla Lee, and parents, Kwanhoi Kim and Sunja Mang. Also, my three sons, Ethan Kim, Nathan Kim, and Brendon Kim always let me keep on reasons why I should finish the entire work. Without their support and patience, I could not have made it.

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Abstract

The main purpose of this study is to find out whether celebrity endorsers' behaviors, such as large endorsement contract and multiple product endorsement, will influence consumers' correspondence inferences on those celebrities' genuine attitudes towards the endorsed products in print advertisements and how such attributional inferences will differ according to the perceived level of product congruence with the endorser. For meaningful analysis and interpretation, the differential effects were examined in terms of correspondence bias and suspicion of ulterior motives. The bias refers to people's attributional inference tendency to relying on other persons' dispositions; whereas, the suspicion of ulterior motives accounts for people's suspending such inferential tendency to the bias. The moderating roles of individual need for cognition and implicit theory of personality were also scrutinized along with the inferential process. Lastly, the mediating role of correspondence inference to attitudinal and behavioral measures of advertising effectiveness was tested.

Results support the differential effects of suspicion by perceived product congruence on persuasiveness of celebrity endorsement advertising. Consumers did bias their correspondence inferences when the product was not perceived to be highly congruent with the image of the celebrity endorser; however, consumers did not bias their correspondence inferences when they were highly suspicious of the endorser's ulterior motives whether the product is perceived to be highly matched with the image of the endorser or not. Those effects were also found to be moderated by consumers' level of need for cognition, but not the implicit theory of personality. Irrespective of their suspicion levels, low need for cognition consumers did bias their correspondence inferences whether the product was perceived to be highly matched with the image of the endorser or not. An additional investigation on the mediating role of

correspondence inference confirmed its positive effects on consumers' attitudes toward the ad and the brand, and behavioral intentions. Based upon the empirical findings from the experiment, theoretical and managerial implications as well as limitations and suggestions for future research are discussed.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The use of endorsers for products is prevalent in advertising and leading advertisers spend millions of dollars in paying famous people to endorse their products. Endorsers can be of many different types, from typical consumer or peer endorsers, to experts, created product characters, CEOs and company presidents, and of course celebrities (Friedman & Friedman, 1979). Celebrities have always been among the favored choices for advertisers in order to guarantee their promotional success, perhaps due to the images and status they project as well as their ability to grab the audience's attention by a famous name paired with a product (Shimp, 2000; Till & Ship, 1998).

Practitioners' intuitive arguments and academic researchers' empirical evidence clearly supported that utilizing a celebrity endorser is effective (Agrawal & Kamankura, 1995; Atkin & Block, 1983; Erdogan, 1999; Friedman & Friedman, 1979; Gabor, Jeannye, & Wiener, 1987; Kahle & Homer, 1985; Kamins & Gupta, 1994; Miciak & Shanklin, 1994; Misra & Beatty, 1990). Advertisers tend to rely on several persuasive attributes when determining the appropriateness of a celebrity endorser such as popularity, attractiveness, expertise, likeability, and familiarity (Friedman & Friedman, 1979). Since the late 1970s, researchers developed and tested theories based on source credibility, source attractiveness, match-up hypotheses, and the meaning transfer model in order to uncover the mechanism at work. As a consequence, corporations have invested significant marketing dollars in celebrity endorsements that have eaten up larger and larger percentages of advertising budgets in each passing year (Erdogan, Baker & Tagg, 2001; Sports Business Journal, 2002; CNN Money, 2003; Clark & Horstmann,

2005; White, Goddard, & Wilbur, 2009). Top-earning celebrities now boast multi-million dollar sponsorship and endorsement contracts (e.g., \$57 million for Taylor Swift and \$52 million for Lady Gaga in 2011). Employing a celebrity for the brand endorsement has also become a lucrative and sought-after part of show business (Pomerantz, 2012).

The usefulness of celebrity endorsers, however, appears to be limited by certain constraints. The previous research on consumers' attribution of celebrity endorsers suggested that if consumers suspiciously perceive situational factors surrounding the endorsement, they tend to correspondently attribute the endorser's endorsement motives to money, self-publicity, or image enhancement, thereby lessening the persuasiveness of celebrities' supportive claims (Cronley, Kardes, Goddard, & Houghton, 1999; Moor, Mowen, & Reardon, 1994; Silvera, & Austad, 2004; Sørsum, Grape, & Silvera, 2003; Sparkman, 1982). That is, such unexpected perceptions from situational information could lead consumers to think more carefully about their correspondence inferences rather than mindlessly assuming the celebrity endorser have genuine preferences on the endorsed product.

If this is the case, what could be the situational cues around celebrity advertising that generate suspicion on the minds of consumers? One previous study from Tripp, Jensen, and Carlson, (1994) gives some clues for that inquiry. In the qualitative interviews with study subjects, they found that:

All informants stated that celebrities endorse products because they are paid for those endorsements. ... While informants thought that "more" money caused celebrities to endorse more than one product, this motive did not necessarily reflect negatively on the endorser (e.g., no statements of greed, etc.). ... However, when prompted via open-ended questions (salient), all informants offered that the endorsement of more than one product by the same celebrity could diminish the effectiveness of the ads either through product comparisons, ad comparisons, or questions concerning the endorser. These informants questioned the sincerity of the endorser's relationship with the products. Some questioned the endorser's trustworthiness relative to the product endorsement while other informants

stated that they thought the endorser should be loyal to one product. (Tripp et al., 1994, p. 543)

Taken as a whole, the interviews revealed that consumers tend to attribute the celebrity's motives for the endorsement to money, but this money motive does not necessarily induce their negative correspondence inferences to the endorser; however, consumers probably question the celebrity's sincerity or trustworthiness, either directly or indirectly if they recognize that the celebrity is endorsing multiple products. It should be also noted that both of situational constraints (i.e., the large endorsement fee and multiple product endorsements) are analogous to attribution issues, people's tendency on correspondence bias and suspicion of ulterior motives, which have been concretely examined in the social psychological literature (Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990; Fein, 1996; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Silvera & Laufer, 2005).

With those phenomenological facts and theoretical orientations in mind, this study tries to explain why consumers differ in their correspondence inferences on the celebrity endorser in multiple situations, how those differences can be empirically examined by advertising and social psychological theories, and what persuasive effects will be generated from those attributional inferences. In order to achieve those purposes, this study developed a set of hypotheses from several theoretical perspectives in literature. Based on theoretical perspectives from correspondence bias and suspicion of ulterior motives, this study posited that consumers, depending on their degrees of suspicion on endorsers' motives and perceived product congruence with endorsers, would generate predictable patterns of attributional responses to the celebrity advertising, which subsequently influences their attitudes toward the ad and the brand, and behavioral intentions. Additionally, personal differences in need for cognition and implicit theory of personality were hypothesized to test their moderating roles in the relationships among suspicion, perceived product congruence, and correspondence inference. Lastly, the mediating

roles of correspondence inference were also proposed to assess the causal links from suspicion and perceived product congruence to advertising effectiveness measures.

A quasi-experimental design was administered by employing online consumer panelists from a private research party. The final sample composed of 289 respondents from stratified samples of 3,000 panelists. In order to ensure the internal validity of the study, three pretests were conducted and the developed test advertisements were checked on their manipulated levels of suspicion and perceived product congruence in the main experiment. All of scale items were adapted and contextually adjusted from previous relevant studies for the measures' internal reliability. A series of univariate analyses were employed to test the causal relationships from treatment conditions to correspondence inferences and the moderating roles of personality differences. The occurrence of correspondence bias and high suspicion of ulterior motives was examined by the probability test of planned contrasts, which compared each pair of means of correspondence inferences. The mediating roles of correspondence inference were analyzed using the hierarchical regression and Sobel test.

The present study extends the celebrity endorsement research in two important ways. Although the theoretical perspectives of attribution have been applied in the several studies of celebrity endorsement advertising (e.g., Cronley et al., 1999; Moor et al., 1994; Hunt, Kernan & Mizerski, 1983; Karmins, 1989; Silvera, & Austad, 2004; Sørsum et al., 2003; Sparkman, 1982; Tripp et al., 1994), they have usually centered on addressing direct relationships between consumers' attributional inferences and their ad/product evaluations. On the other hand, this study not only delves into the mediating role of consumers' attributional inferences (i.e., correspondence inferences on the celebrity) in the whole process of attribution, but also tries to assess the moderating effects of individuals' personality difference on attributional inferences. In

addition, the theoretical perspective, suspicion of ulterior motives, is firstly applied to the study of celebrity endorsements. Such attempts enable strong theoretical implications because consumers' evaluative responses to celebrity-endorsed products seem to be thoroughly articulated by a more complex perceptual mechanism rather than the simple path from attributions to attitude changes.

In practical terms, the present study will also be informative to advertising practitioners. Above all, the findings of consumers' correspondence bias on the celebrity endorser will provide advertisers strong justifications for their choice of a celebrity in their promotional campaigns; whereas, consumers' reaction due to their high suspicion on multiple celebrity endorsements will provide insights into why advertising creators and planners should guarantee the originality of the advertisement when a highly profiled celebrity is employed. The meaningful relationships between consumers' correspondence inferences and the effectiveness of celebrity advertising will put forward the need to refine celebrity endorsement strategies particularly to enhance consumers' beliefs that the celebrity is sponsoring the brand based on his/her true attitude and experience with the product.

The remainder of this dissertation is organized as the following order. Chapter 2 provides the comprehensive review of literature, proposes a theoretical framework, and sets forth the hypotheses based on the theoretical relationships among variables. Chapter 3 discusses the study design along with the experiment procedure. Chapter 4 presents the results of statistical tests. Lastly, in chapter 5, interpretations, implications, limitations, and suggestions for the future study are provided.

Chapter 2

Literature Review and Hypotheses

This chapter reviews four domains of the literature in association with celebrity endorsement advertising and attribution theory. In the first section, the celebrity endorsement in advertising will be defined with details of its historical advance, and the advantages of this advertising strategy will be pinpointed by comparison to its disadvantages. The second section will appraise the main theoretical models previously applied to the study of celebrity endorsement advertising, along with their theoretical limitations. The third section will review the previous studies on attribution theory and the phenomenon of correspondence bias in order to find out their theoretical applicability on celebrity endorsements. The fourth section of this literature review will inspect the theoretical perspective on the suspicion of ulterior motives and its implications in the study of celebrity endorsements. In addition, based on the theoretical tenets of correspondence bias and suspicion of ulterior motives, the fifth section will propose a guiding theoretical framework for generating hypotheses. In the final section, multiple relationships reflecting on this study's points of interest will be hypothesized

Celebrity Endorsement in Advertising

This section mainly discusses both advantages and disadvantages of using a celebrity in advertising. Before presenting the pros and cons on the subject, the history and definition are set forth in order to show how the celebrity endorsement has been developed and conceptualized as an important advertising strategy in the U.S. society.

History of Celebrity Endorsement. The idea of using celebrities in advertising is not a recent phenomenon. It dates back to the 1760s. Josiah Wedgwood, the founder of the Wedgwood

brand of pottery and chinaware, also called the father of the modern brand, creatively employed marketing devices, especially royal endorsements, to create an aura around the name of his company in order to give the brand a value far beyond the attributes of the product itself (Pringle, 2004). Between 1875 and 1900, the trade card, either handed along with the product to the customer or inserted in the packaging itself, popularized the use of celebrity endorsements. The card had a picture of a celebrity along with product descriptions which featured actresses like Lily Langtry and Sarah Bernhardt, and baseball players like Cy Young and Ty Cobb (Tuner, 2004). It was at those times that author Mark Twain appeared on three brands, Great Mark Cigars, Mark Twain Cigars and Mark Twain flour (Ketcham, 2001). In 1890, a soap manufacturer, Pears, hired a famous and beautiful actress, Lily Langtry, to do a testimonial, 'Since using Pears Soap, I have discarded all others.' This testimonial advertising is believed to be the first celebrity endorsement on a large scale (Sternheimer, 2011).

By the early twentieth century, the cigarette industry began including baseball cards in their packs of cigars. These baseball cards were intended to be given away as gifts to loyal customers and people soon started buying the cigarettes for the cards and endorsements caught on fast with marketers (Tuner, 2004). Though no evidence exists to show whether these brands had the direct permission of the celebrities, it was known that Honus Wagner, a baseball player, stopped a tobacco company that was using his name in the baseball cards to sell its products (Ketcham, 2001). It became so popular that later T206 Wagner card in a near mint condition was sold in 2007 for \$2.8 million, which is the highest price ever for a baseball card (Davis, 2007). In addition, Wheaties, one of the oldest brands of breakfast cereals in the U.S., so aggressively adopted celebrity endorsements for the product that, at the 1939 major league all star baseball

game, forty-six players among the total of fifty-one endorsed Wheaties at the time (Ketcham, 2001).

Till the early 1930s, the major endorsers were athletes, but by 1945, movie stars like Charlie Chaplin became more sought-after (Pringle, 2004). With the rising popularity of commercial radios in the 1930s and color TVs in the 1960s, TV personalities and entertainers also became popular (Erdogan, 1999; Swerdlow & Swerdlow, 2003). During the 1970s, one in eight TV commercials and one in every six advertisements featured a celebrity (Thompson, 1978; Howard, 1979). Clark and Horstmann (2005), from their analysis on the collection of 1000 endorsement advertisements from the year of 1920 to 1970, found that celebrities were predominantly used by cigarettes, beauty products, beverages and audio equipment. Since then, the use of a celebrity has evolved from simple soap or cigarette ads to multi-million dollar campaigns for tantalizing the consumer (Agrawal & Kamakura, 1995).

By 1980, however, Athlete endorsements picked up again when Nike discovered a young and extremely talented basketball player, Michael Jordan. Nike relied heavily on Jordan's image to make itself a global mega-brand. As such, over the period from the year of 1980 to 1992, 60% of the endorsement deals involved soft-drink companies and athletic shoe manufacturers, and almost 75% of all sports-related products like clothes and shoes used athletes to endorse their brands (Agrawal & Kamakura, 1995). Athletes like Jordan, Bo Jackson, Chris Evert, and Bill Cosby dominated the late 1980s (Ketcham, 2001).

In the late 1990s, companies took the celebrity endorsement to a new level by holding press conferences to announce deals with celebrities. Celebrities were no longer just endorsers. They had become spokespersons for the endorsed brand (Sternheimer, 2011). Also, with the popularity of sit-coms (e.g., *Friends*) and movies, advertisers paid much attention to the PPL (i.e.,

product placement), where celebrities' made-up characters promoted the sponsored brands in more contextual or effective ways.

The popularity of using a celebrity to endorse products and services as an effective advertising strategy was not exceptional in recent decades. Recent estimates indicate that almost 25% of the U. S. companies use celebrities in their advertising campaigns (Shimp, 2000) and as much as 25% of all television commercials involve celebrity endorsements (Erdogan, Baker & Tagg, 2001). Accordingly, advertisers' spending also increases such that around 10% of advertiser's budgets reportedly involve celebrity endorsements (Agrawal and Kamakura, 1995). In 1998, it was estimated that companies in the U. S. spent \$800 million on acquiring celebrities for advertisements, promotions, and PR campaigns (Clark & Horstmann, 2005). In 2001, the U. S. companies paid \$897 million to athletes, coaches, and sports personalities (Sports Business Journal, 2002). In 2003, Nike spent \$1.44 billion on celebrity endorsements (CNN Money, 2003). Between two and three billion dollars were spent on celebrity advertising in 2006 in the U. S. alone (White, Goddard, & Wilbur, 2009).

Definition of Celebrity Endorsement. In general, endorsers can be of many different types, from typical consumer or peer endorsers, to experts, created product characters, CEOs and company presidents, and celebrities (Friedman & Friedman, 1979). Among those types, celebrities have been regarded as the most selectable candidate for the endorsement advertising (Shimp, 2000), perhaps because of their highly dynamic, attractive, and engaging personal qualities as well as the attention-drawing appeal of a famous name paired with a product (Atkin & Block, 1983). The term celebrity refers to “an individual who is known to public (e.g., actor, sports figure, entertainer, etc) for his or her achievements in areas other than that of the product class endorsed” (Friedman & Friedman, 1979, p. 63). According to McCracken (1989), the

celebrity endorser can be defined as “any individual who enjoys public recognition and who uses this recognition on behalf of a consumer good by appearing with it in an advertisement” (p. 310).

The celebrity endorsement could encompass a variety of activities. Erdogan (1999) and Pringle (2005) illustrated six major ways a celebrity can get involved to promote a brand: celebrity customer (e.g., Puff Daddy and Courvoisier), celebrity sponsorship (e.g., Wayne Rooney and Ford), celebrity testimonial (e.g., Geoffrey Palmer and Audi), celebrity employee (e.g., Stella McCartney and Stella), celebrity owner (e.g., Michael Jordan and Air Jordan), and celebrity’s product placement (e.g., Will Smith and Ray Ban in the movie ‘Man in Black’). In a modal way, McCracken (1989) identified four types of endorsements: explicit (i.e., I endorse this brand), implicit (i.e., I use this brand), imperative (i.e., you should use this brand), and co-present (i.e., mere association with the brand). If one more type is added to the roles of celebrity endorsers listed by Erdogan (1999) and Pringle (2005), that must be the celebrity entrepreneur, a celebrity endorser who is involved in the management or creation of the brand he or she promotes (i.e., Boxer George Foreman and his counter-top meat grill machine).

Advantages of Celebrity Endorsement. In a world where media messages abound, advertisers need to have potent and effective messages to reach the consumer. Many previous studies have shown the potential benefits of celebrity endorsements for advertisers. For example, Agrawal and Kamakura (1995) found that customers are more likely to choose goods and services endorsed by celebrities than those without such endorsements. Miciak and Shanklin (1994) compiled a list of 1,500 US celebrities by way of appealing qualities to consumers and found that consumers rated most of those celebrities as familiar and reliable.

Among the main justifications for the use of celebrity endorsements are that celebrities lead to higher advertisement recall and increased brand-name recognition (Friedman & Friedman

1979; Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983) and create the preferred image for a product through the meaning transfer (Debevec & Iyer, 1986; McCracken, 1989; Goldsmith, 2000; Lafferty, 2002). In a study for exploring the moderating role of individuals' situational involvement between central and peripheral routes to the advertising effectiveness, Petty, Cacioppo, and Schumann (1983) identified that people are more likely to favor products endorsed by celebrities than by non-celebrities, and participants' exposure to a famous endorser increases their recall of the product category under low-involvement conditions. Besides higher recall and brand recognition, celebrities can also transfer their positive qualities and meanings to the brand. According to McCracken (1989), celebrities are the most useful in transferring meanings from culture to products because anonymous models could not offer configurations of meanings that celebrities can possess, such as projected demographic match, favorable personality, and preferred lifestyle. In practice, companies can hire celebrities who have proper meanings to establish new positioning for existing products. Pizza Hut International, for instance, increased its global market share by utilizing global celebrities such as the supermodel, Cindy Crawford, and the Baywatch star, Pamela Anderson (Erdogan, 1999).

Some researchers explained the merits of celebrity endorsements in terms of social power. Both increasing competition for grabbing consumer consciousness and new product proliferation in the market have encouraged advertisers to use attention-creating techniques to promote their products successfully. Also, the recent technological advance from old to new media, which serves to increase consumers' control over programmed advertisements, have made advertisers more responsive to consumers' demands (Lurie, 2004). The use of celebrity endorsements in such complex and interactive environments may ease those threats because of celebrities' reference power (e.g., celebrity as a role model) and expert power (e.g., celebrity as an expert

within his/her fields) (Raven, Schwarzwald, & Koslowsky, 1998). For example, a female movie star, if he/she is attractive enough to create strong attention, might reasonably be expected to stand out from surrounding clutter with a great deal of knowledge related to beauty care/cosmetics or health-promoting foods/drinks (Sørum, 2003). Celebrities also help the process of self-invention with which they make up clear, coherent, and powerful selves that everyone seeks (McCracken, 1989).

In addition to tactical and psychological benefits, the economic worth of celebrity endorsers has been studied with emphasis on the expected profitability of a company. Dickenson (1996) suggested that celebrity endorsers help boost sales tremendously. She took as an example the soft drink brand, Oasis, which used a TV personality as a voiceover in its TV commercial for launching the brand. As a result, Oasis was chosen as the most successful soft drink launch of 1995 by Super Marketing and Asian Trader. Gabor, Thornton, and Wiener (1987) exemplified that Michael Jackson carried Pepsi sales up 8% in 1984, the first year of its contract with Jackson. In addition, the Advertising Age International reported that, in 1997, Pepsi's 2% global market share increase was attributable to using the British pop group the Spice Girls as a spokesperson (Erdogan, Baker, & Tagg, 2001).

Lastly, both the usability of a celebrity endorser in inter-cultural advertising campaigns and the positive relationships between celebrity endorsement advertising and consumers' ad/brand evaluations have been frequently mentioned in the literature (Atkin & Block, 1983; Freiden, 1984; Kaikati, 1987; Kamins, 1989; Petty et al., 1983). Celebrities with worldwide recognition (e.g., Tom Cruise) have been said to help reduce unexpected difficulties coming from cultural differences in global marketing communications (Kaikati, 1987). Atkin and Block (1983) found that celebrity endorsers were viewed as significantly more trustworthy and

competent, and slightly more attractive than non-celebrity endorsers. Their findings also indicated that purchase intentions as well as brand evaluations were greater on advertisements featuring celebrity endorsers than on advertisements featuring non-celebrity endorsers.

Disadvantages of Celebrity Endorsement. Despite the preceding potential benefits of using celebrity endorsers in advertising campaigns, the disadvantages of using them deserve serious consideration. Both advertisers and academics have shown a greater interest in the potential hazards of celebrity endorsements. Consumers no longer necessarily accept the sales pitch at face value. In fact, Cashmore (2006) reported that “20% of shoppers were actually ‘celebrity resistant,’ 60% were ‘bored with celebrities,’ and only 8% indicated that they would buy a celebrity endorsed product, and even then only if the celebrity was someone they admired or trusted” (p. 166). According to researchers, those unfavorable responses might be influenced or caused by negative publicity associated with certain celebrities (Klebbba & Unger, 1982; Till & Shimp, 1998; Bailey, 2007), deviating consumer attention by overshadowing endorsed products (Cooper, 1984; Rossiter & Percy, 1987), as well as credibility loss by celebrity overexposure (Kaikati, 1987; Tripp et al., 1994)

Of the various risks celebrity endorsers might pose to their endorsed brands, negative celebrity information has been considered the most important one because most of celebrity endorsements are vulnerable to the celebrity scandal. Therefore, when advertisers employ celebrities as their product endorser, they also take a risk of their brand being tarnished by negatively published celebrity information (Erdogan & Baker, 2000). Amos, Holmes, and Strutton (2008) speculated that the high risk associated with using celebrity endorsers as well as the substantial impact negative information about those celebrities can have on consumers’ perceptions would exercise the largest impact on the effectiveness of celebrity endorsements in

advertising. That is, when negative information about a celebrity endorser emerges, the accompanying unfavorable perceptions consumers develop can dilute the brand equity of the celebrity associated product. Till and Shimp (1998) also found that a strong associative link between celebrity and product must be lessened if negative celebrity information happen to lower consumers' brand evaluations. However, regardless of consumers' perceptual strength on associations between the celebrity endorser and the product, negative information about celebrity endorsers appears to put a company's products and built-in images at risk. For example, the fact that the famous pop star Michael Jackson was indicted for reported child molestation produced such negative connotations that the negatively transformed image resultantly attenuated the celebrity's endorsement power for Pepsi.

The overshadowing by celebrities on their endorsed products puts forth another negative aspect on using celebrity endorsements. That is, consumers would focus their attention on the celebrity and fail to notice the brand being promoted. According to Petty et al. (1983), due to the enhanced attention drawn to celebrities in many types of advertisements, a general lack of people's interest in assessing merits of the product may occur, which can result in reductions in their brand recognition (Petty et al., 1983). Rossiter and Percy (1987) also suggested that this phenomenon, the celebrity overshadowing effect, is likely to occur when the ads featuring celebrity endorsers focus on the celebrity rather than on the products endorsed. For this negative effect, Cooper (1984) cautioned advertising practitioners that the product, not the celebrity, must be the star.

The third important issue is that benefits of using celebrities can reverse markedly if they become an endorser for many diverse products. Celebrity greed and the frequent appearance of a particular celebrity in TV commercials or in print ads are likely to undermine the effects of

his/her endorsement. As Mowen and Brown (1981) suggested, if a celebrity's image is associated with many brands in the consumer mind, the celebrity and the particular brand would not be distinctive. If then, consumers tend to attribute the true nature of the celebrity's endorsement to generous compensation, leading consumers to overt cynicism about the celebrity's motives (Tripp et al., 1994). Previous studies (Mowen & Brown, 1981; Moore, Mowen, & Reardon, 1994; Tripp et al., 1994) have suggested that use of multiple product endorsements negatively affects consumers' perceptions of endorser trustworthiness, as well as their brand evaluations. Mowen and Brown (1981) discovered that the product and ad evaluation were higher and product purchase intention was greater when a celebrity endorsed only one product. Using multiple print ads as the stimuli, Tripp et al. (1994) also found that as the number of products endorsed increased, consumers' perceptions of celebrity credibility, celebrity likability, and their attitude toward the ad become less favorable.

Theoretical Models on Persuasiveness of Celebrity Endorsement

This section discusses theoretical models which scholars have constructed to aid in selecting celebrity endorsers. First, two of source models including source credibility and attractiveness are reviewed in their theoretical developments and applications in celebrity endorsement advertising. Second, this is followed by the match-up hypothesis and meaning transfer models. The former models inform this study of various characteristics of a perceived communication source, the latter two models reflect the importance of congruence and symbolic meaning transfer between communicators and products. Lastly, some theoretical limitations of those four models are addressed.

The Source Credibility Model. Celebrities have been viewed by consumers as credible sources of information about the product or company they endorse (Goldsmith, Lafferty, &

Newell, 2000). Therefore, when researchers reflect on the topic of celebrity endorsement, they have generally employed the source credibility model as one of two foundational source models; the other model was alleged to be the source attractiveness model. Likewise, advertising practitioners have utilized the source credibility model as a basis for evaluating consumer perceptions of a celebrity endorser (Amos, Holmes, & Strutton, 2008). Ohanian (1990) defined source credibility as “a communicator’s positive characteristics that affect the receiver’s acceptance of a message” (p. 41). Indeed, the source-credibility model was originated from the results of a landmark study by Hovland, Janis, and Kelly (1953). From their analysis on factors leading to the perceived credibility of the communicator, they found that sources’ exhibiting expertise and trustworthiness are credible and persuasive in some extent. In that study, Hovland, and his associates (1953) defined expertise as "the extent to which a communicator is perceived to be a source of valid assertions," and trustworthiness as "the degree of confidence in the communicator's intent to communicate the assertions he considers most valid" (p. 59).

As the first dimension of the source credibility model, expertise generally refers to the knowledge, experience, or skills possessed by an endorser. This dimension also includes diverse meanings of authoritativeness (McCroskey, 1966), competence (Whitehead, 1968), expertness (Appelbaum & Anatol, 1972), or qualification (Berlo, Lemert, & Mertz, 1969). Also, adjectives such as "trained-untrained," "informed-uninformed," and "educated-uneducated" commonly have been used to measure this dimension (Ohanian, 1990, p. 41). However, some researchers strongly asserted that what does really matter is not whether an endorser is actually an expert but how the endorser is perceived by the target consumer (Hovland, et al., 1953; Ohanian, 1991).

Previous research on the source credibility in the context of persuasive communications generally indicates that consumers’ reactions in response to the source’s recommendations seem

to be varied directly according to their perceived level of source expertise, which in turn positively influences source effectiveness (Ohanian 1991). By experimentally manipulating the dimensions of expertise, Crano (1970) found that subjects exposed to a high expert source exhibited more favorable agreement with the advocated position than did those exposed to a low expertise source. Similarly, Biswas, Biswas, and Das (2006) compared general experts to celebrity endorsers, and found that expert endorsers are more effective in increasing brand evaluations than celebrities when their endorsements pertain to higher risk products such as new technology gadgets. They also mentioned that the finding was especially the case among consumers with more knowledge about the product category.

Trustworthiness, the second dimension of source credibility model, has been regarded as another important predictor for effectiveness of celebrity endorsement advertising.

Trustworthiness was referred to as the integrity, honesty, or believability of an endorser (McGinnies & Ward, 1980). As with expertise, it depends on target audience perceptions. Adjectives such as "dependable-undependable," "honest-dishonesty," "reliable-unreliable," and "sincere-insincere" commonly have been used to measure this dimension (Ohanian, 1990, p. 50). Giffin (1967) suggested that the positive consequences of trustworthiness would be consumers' favorable disposition, acceptance, psychological safety, and perceived supportive climate in association with the sponsored product.

The effect of trustworthiness on attitude change has been studied increasingly. Miller and Basehart (1969) stated, "a highly opinionated message from a highly trustworthy communicator produces an effective attitude change, while non-trusted communicators' impact proved immaterial" (p. 4). For their reasoning that trustworthiness is the major determinant of source credibility, Friedman and Friedman (1976) and Friedman, Santeramo, and Traina (1979) claimed

that celebrities who are liked will also be trusted and celebrity trustworthiness was highly correlated with a respondent's perceived similarity to the source, the level of source's expertise, and the source's attractiveness. However, some researchers caution as our naïve interpretation of those effects. Perceived communicator trustworthiness appears to produce a greater attitude change than perceived expertise (McGinnies & Ward, 1980); whereas, trustworthiness of a celebrity was not significantly related to customers' intentions to buy an endorsed brand (Ohanian, 1991). Desphande and Douglas (1994) insisted that an endorser's ethnic status would affect endorser trustworthiness and as a result brand attitudes and these interactions occur because people trust individuals who are similar to them. So, it was claimed that ethnic background should be carefully evaluated when targeting particular ethnic groups (e.g., Africans, Europeans, and Asians).

The Source Attractiveness Model. Researchers in social psychology have frequently mentioned that physical attractiveness is an important indicator for an individual's initial judgment of another person (Baker & Churchill, 1977; Chaiken, 1979; McGuire, 1985). Admitting such source effects from his/her attractiveness, advertising practitioners have chosen celebrity endorsers on the basis of their attractiveness, which gave them dual effects of celebrity status and physical appeal (Singer, 1983). However, source attractiveness as a construct appears to be multi-dimensional in nature. As a construct, attractiveness comprehends not only physical attractiveness but also other potent characteristics that consumers might perceive as attributes of a given celebrity endorser (e.g., intellectual skills, personality properties, lifestyles, or athletic strength) (Erdogan, 1999). Also, the attractiveness of any source is moderated or determined by consumers' perceptions of the source's similarity, familiarity, and likeability, where Similarity was defined as a "supposed resemblance between the source and the receiver of the message",

familiarity as “knowledge of the source through exposure”, and likability as “affection for the source as a result of the source's physical appearance and behavior” (McGuire, 1985; McCracken, 1989, p. 316). According to Amos et al. (2008), both familiarity and likeability, when it is used in the context of celebrity endorsements, would make a substantial additive influence to the predictive ability of the source credibility model.

As detailed in the previous research, physically attractive communicators seem to be more successful than their unattractive counterparts at changing consumers' beliefs (Baker & Churchill, 1977; Debevec & Keman, 1984) and thereby generating their purchase intentions (Petroshius & Crocker, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1980; Patzer, 1983). This reasoning was originally based on two theoretical perspectives: the theory of ‘halo effect,’ which occurs when people who rank high on one dimension are assumed to excel on other dimensions as well, and ‘consistency theory,’ which states that people are more comfortable when all of their judgments about a person go together (Solomon, 1996). Cohen and Golden (1972) suggested that physical attractiveness of a communicator determines the effectiveness of persuasive communication through a process called “identification” which is assumed to occur when information from an attractive source is accepted as a result of desire to identify with such endorsers (Kelman, 1961, p. 59).

The significant effects of Endorsers' attractiveness on persuasive outcomes were broadly examined in the literature. Early, Joseph (1982) summarized his experimental evidences concerning physically attractive communicators' impact on opinion change, product evaluation, and other dependent measures. In particular, he mentioned that attractive endorsers have a more positive impact on the products they endorse than less attractive endorsers. Joseph's findings are clearly consistent with Patzer's (1983) study. As an opponent for the attractiveness model, Patzer

(1983; 1985) claimed that physically attractive endorsers used in advertising lead consumers have more favorable attitudes toward the advertisement and stronger purchase intentions across culture because a definite pattern of verifiable cultural differences would be transcended by attractive endorsers' subtle, pervasive, and inescapable informational cues. Kahle and Homer (1985) also suggested that increasing the communicator's attractiveness enhances positive attitude change. In specifics, these researchers manipulated celebrity physical attractiveness, and likability, and then measured attitude and purchase intentions on the product (i.e., Edge razors). Their findings showed that participants exposed to an attractive celebrity liked the product more than participants exposed to an unattractive celebrity. Although the same interaction was not statistically significant for likeable endorsers, recall for the brand was greater both in attractive and likeable celebrity conditions. Surprisingly, unlikable celebrities performed better on recognition measures than likeable and attractive celebrities. Also, one interesting finding indicated that an attractive celebrity created more purchase intentions than an unattractive celebrity; whereas, controversially an unlikeable celebrity produced consumers' more intentions to buy the product than a likeable celebrity.

The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) has been applied for comprehending such complicated relationships between the attractiveness of endorsers and the effectiveness of advertising message types. The ELM perspective, which argues that persuasion under high and low involvement conditions varies. For instance, the quality of arguments contained in a message has a greater impact on persuasion under high involvement conditions, whereas under low involvement conditions peripheral cues, such as source attractiveness and credibility, have greater impact on persuasion (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981). Contrary to expectations of Petty and Cacioppo (1980), endorser attractiveness was equally important under both high and

low involvement conditions. The authors argued that in addition to serving as a peripheral cue, the physical appearance of endorsers might have served as a persuasive visual testimony for product effectiveness under low involvement conditions. Under high involvement conditions, the physical attractiveness of endorsers may have served as a persuasive product related cue. In 1983, Petty et al. replicated the earlier study of 1980, but they employed a peripheral cue that was not be perceived as being relevant with the product. Findings revealed an interaction between involvement levels and endorser types. Under low involvement conditions, the endorser type had a significant impact on attitudes towards the product though no impact was found on behavioral intentions. Regarding recall and recognition measures, their findings indicated that exposure to celebrity endorsers increased recall of the product category under low involvement conditions, but it did not affect recall measures under high involvement conditions. In addition, the results by manipulating the endorser type revealed that celebrities had marginally significant impact on brand name recall over typical citizens. Interestingly, the use of celebrity endorsers was found to reduce the brand name recognition under low involvement conditions but not under high involvement conditions. Petty, et al. (1983) reasoned that this rather awkward finding occurred because people were more interested in the product category under high involvement situations and might be more motivated to assess what the brand, rather than the personalities, is offering.

As detailed in aforementioned models, advertising professionals have relied on the assumption that using a celebrity to endorse a brand will result in an increase in consumers' recall and attitude change of the brand. However, increasingly, researchers question empirical evidences, which resulted from a direct link between using a celebrity endorsement to achieve higher brand recall. For instance, McCracken (1989) cautioned practitioners' inappropriate choice of celebrity endorsers such as Bill Cosby for endorsing E.F. Hutton and Ringo Star for

Sun Country Classic wine coolers. Soon, advertising researchers and practitioners accepted that effective celebrity advertising should foster, in the mind of the consumer, a match or connection between the endorser and the endorsed brand (Keller, 1993).

The Match-up Hypothesis Model. The match-up hypothesis model generally refers to the balance of matching between the celebrity endorser and the endorsed product (Till & Busler, 2000). The model predicts that messages conveyed by the celebrity image and the product should be congruent for effective advertising (Kahle & Homer, 1985; Kamins, 1990) and the determinant of the congruence between the celebrity and the product depends on the degree of perceived fit between the celebrity's projected image and the product's attributes (Misra & Beatty, 1990; Lynch & Schuler, 1994). In one of early research studies, Kanungo and Pang (1973) found that the effect of the models varied depending on the product with which the models were paired. They explained those findings in terms of the "fittingness" of the model for the product (Kanungo & Pang, 1973, p. 177). Friedman and Friedman (1979) and Atkin and Block (1983) also explored that the type of a endorser may interact with the type of a product endorsed and concluded that the better celebrity endorsers are appropriate where product purchases involve highly social and psychological risk, the higher the level of endorsement effectiveness will be.

Among the diverse dimensions of match-up factors, sources' physical attractiveness has been frequently tested on its matching effects between a celebrity and a product (Kahle & Homer 1985; Kamins 1990). Kahle and Homer (1985), referring to the social adaptation theory, showed that respondents have more favorable brand evaluation when the product (i.e., razor blades) was paired with an attractive, rather than an unattractive, celebrity endorser. Kamins (1990) also tested the match-up hypothesis by pairing either an attractive (i.e., Tom Selleck) or unattractive

(i.e., Telly Savalas) celebrity with either a product intended for enhancing one's attractiveness (i.e., luxury car) or a product not intended for enhancing one's attractiveness (i.e., home computer). Similarly, Kamins (1990) argued that including an attractive models in an advertisement may in some consumers' minds intrinsically prompt the idea that use of a brand endorsed by those models will enhance their appearance as it did for the celebrity. Also, Kamins and Gupta (1994) found that the match-up between a celebrity endorser and the endorsed brand enhanced the celebrity endorser's believability and attractiveness. Those researchers reasoned that the match-up effect occurred because of the celebrity endorser's familiarity and consumers' identification and initialization processes of social influence from celebrity endorsers.

However, it was frequently found that consumers often do not connect the celebrity to the product. That is, matching salient traits from the specific celebrity to the specific product's attributes does not necessarily improve the persuasiveness of celebrity endorsement advertising. Shani and Sandler (1991) found that although consumers could correctly identify the endorsers, they were less accurate in matching the endorsed brands. Wells, Burnett, and Moriarty (2000) speculated that consumers often remember a commercial but forget the product. In addition, Callcoat and Phillips (1996) reported that consumers are generally influenced by spokespersons if products are inexpensive and low involving, and if few differences are perceived among available brands. For the match up factor as a moderator to the measures of advertising effectiveness, Mehta (1994) found no significant differences between celebrity and non-celebrity endorsers on persuasion variables such as brand attitudes, ad attitudes, and intentions to buy. Mehta further found that there were no differences in the performance of the celebrity and non-celebrity commercials. In other studies, the fit between a celebrity and a product was found to be only effective for certain effectiveness measures like brand attitudes, but not for other measures

such as purchase intentions. These seemingly paradoxical findings lead to the conclusion that some complex mechanisms of meaning transfer resides in the celebrity endorsement advertising such that virtually any endorsed product can be made to take any meaning (McCracken, 1987).

The Meaning Transfer Model. The importance of using celebrity endorsers does lie in how these celebrities add great values to companies, products, and eventually consumers. J. G. Frazer (1992), Scottish anthropologist, speculated that an object can become imbued with the meaning of those connected to the object and, once touched by a respected person in a tribe or society, the object carries that person's essence. In McCracken's (1989) conception, modern celebrity endorsers lend their essence to the products they support, thereby rendering the objects more valuable through the process of meaning transfer. According to McCracken (1989), Celebrity endorsements are special examples of a more general process of meaning transfer. In his conceptual model, marketplace exchange is envisioned as the site of meaning exchange. Fowles (1996) stated that advertisers' rationale for hiring celebrities to endorse products is that people consume images of celebrities and advertisers hope that people will also consume products associated with celebrities. As a featured example, Michael Jordan was selected by many advertising practitioners as an ideal combination of success and charisma, which has made him one of the most well managed celebrity endorsers. That is, his success as a basketball athlete is well transferred to the products he endorsed, leading to impressive business success.

McCracken (1989) proposed the three staged model of meaning transfer, which at first seems a merely theoretical concept from empirical points of views, but its applicability to real life was demonstrated by researchers. According to McCracken (1989), in the first stage, celebrities develop their images through the role types they develop in society as well as how they are depicted in the media. In other words, the "culturally constituted society" assigns

meaning to celebrities (McCracken, 1989, p. 315). But, it should be noted that the number and variety of meanings contained in celebrities are extensive. Celebrities represent distinctive portraits of status, class, gender and age as well as personality and lifestyle and such varied and subtly constructed meanings are well presented by way of the marketing system (Erdogan, 1999). As Atkin and Block (1983) have shown, consumers have a pre-conceived image of a celebrity endorser and the meaning transfer seems to hinge on audience perceptions and the associations an endorser has already cultivated. St. James (2003) investigated image transfer on evaluations of highly technological products. He found that the strongest evaluations of a digital cable recorder emerged when the product was paired with the endorsement from a science fiction actor in television shows, not endorsements from a situational comedy actor or a pop singer. St. James (2003) stated that entertainers did not in reality have expertise in relation to new technology products; whereas, the image of a science fiction starship captain lent the actor who portrayed him a stronger association with technology and thus gave more credibility for endorsing the technology product.

The second stage is about the process from the celebrity to the product. When celebrities endorse a product, the cultural meanings residing in a celebrity, going beyond the person, are transferred on to the products. According to McCracken (1989), the brand personalities are shaped in this stage. McCracken (1989) described that the meaning of celebrity endorser's images tends to be dynamic and could be rendered malleable in the hands of designers, advertisers, producers, and consumers. For meaning to adhere to a product, McCracken (1989) indicated that the matching must synchronize the celebrity image and endorsed product. Merely employing a familiar face might not achieve that synergy. For instance, Langmeyer and Walker (1991) explored meanings communicated by celebrity endorsers (i.e., Madonna and Christie

Brinkley) by different types of products (i.e., bath towels as an unendorsed commodity product; VCR as an unendorsed technical product with high information needs, and blue jeans as an endorsed high-image product). Their study found that, before being endorsed by celebrities, products had original images for each product category, but when endorsed by celebrities, they took on the images of each celebrity. This finding supports McCracken (1989) suggestion that advertisers should explore the symbolism that encompasses a celebrity to determine whether these meanings are desirable for brands since the effectiveness of the endorser depends, in a large part, on the meanings he/she brings to the endorsement process.

Lastly, the process of meaning transfer could be accomplished when consumers' meaningful identification with a celebrity lead them to purchase the endorsed product "in the hope of claiming some of these transferred meanings for their own lives" (McCracken, 1989, p. 317). That is, "meaning movement from goods to consumer is achieved through rituals" (McCracken, 1989, p. 317). According to McCracken (1989), ritual is a kind of social action devoted to manipulating cultural meaning for purposes of collective and individual communication and categorization. So, ritual is an opportunity to affirm, evoke, assign, or revise conventional symbols of cultural order (Mick, 1986). McCracken (1986) also added that four types of ritual are used to move cultural meaning from goods to consumers; exchange rituals, possession rituals, grooming rituals, and divestment rituals. In conjunction with McCracken's (1989) argument, the role of advertising is to support those rituals by shaping products to take on any relevant meaning. Domzal and Keman (1992) claimed that advertising is an integral part of social systems, whose function is to communicate the culturally constructed meaning of products to consumers. According to these authors, consumers learn meanings by interpreting product definitions, which usually are implicit in promotional contents.

Limitations of Theoretical Models on Celebrity Endorsement. As identified in aforementioned research results for each model, advertising researchers and practitioners tend to believe that using expert, credible, and attractive celebrity endorsers is effective. However, extent research also shows theoretical and practical limitations on each model. Intuitively, most of those limitations appear to be centered on two source models. Erdogan (1999) stated that the source credibility research regards the celebrity endorsement process as one dimensional, so it is impossible to provide a well grounded explanation of what factors construct source credibility and what factors are more important than others in certain situations. For instance, McCracken (1989) criticized that the source model can tell us only that a celebrity is attractive, not what attractive is, and prevent us from identifying the matches and mismatches with endorsed entities. In short, the source models tell us only about degrees of credibility and attractiveness even when what we need to know about is special kinds of credibility and attractiveness (1989, McCracken). The evidence for this criticism is prevalent.

A possible exception to the belief that the more credible a source is, the more persuasive the source is likely to be, has been pointed out by Karlins and Abelson (1970) in terms of the cognitive response theory. According to the theory, a message recipient's initial opinion is an important determinant of influence. This theory advocates that if individuals have a positive predisposition toward the message issue, a source who lacks credibility can be more persuasive than a high credibility source, since those individuals favoring the advocacy will feel a greater need to ensure, or control, that a position with which they agree is being adequately represented (Aaker & Myers, 1987). On the other hand, if individuals have a negative disposition, a high credibility source is more persuasive than a less credible source since the highly credible source

is thought to inhibit individuals' own thought activation and facilitate their acceptance of message thoughts (Stemthal, Dholakia, & Leavitt, 1978; Harmon & Coney, 1982).

Expertise and physical attractiveness have generally been identified and studied as very important dimensions (Homer & Kahle, 1990) in source models, but the other dimensions, such as trustworthiness and familiarity, have not been sufficiently investigated. Amos et al. (2008) stated that, next to source's expertise, trustworthiness is the second most important predictive construct for explaining the source effect. They claimed that the trustworthiness should proxy the confidence consumers have in the integrity and reliability of a given source. In other studies, celebrities' familiarity and likeability were treated as if each were analogous to attractiveness and each celebrity attribute was regarded as being subsumed within the attractiveness construct (Kahle & Homer, 1985). In contrast, some studies approached to the familiarity and likeability separately, investigating each construct's effectiveness as if each were distinct from endorsers' attractiveness (O'Mahoney & Meenaghan 1998). In sum, endorsers' attractiveness is certain to be a relevant construct both with familiarity and likeability within the broader context of celebrity endorsements; however, the scope and nature of the attractiveness construct remains totally unidentified, and therefore appears worthy of additional attention (Kahle & Homer, 1985).

Additionally, research in the marketing and advertising literature has been still equivocal about the impact that credible endorsers have on individuals' evaluation on the advertisement and brand. Many researchers confirmed that physically attractive models used in endorsement advertising led to more favorable attitudes toward the advertisement and stronger purchase intentions (Baker & Churchill, 1977; Petroschius & Crocker, 1989; Patzer, 1983). Inconsistently, the effect of model attractiveness was not found in two previous studies. Studies from Caballero, Lumpkin, and Madden (1989) and Till and Busler's (1998) presented evidence that celebrity

inspiring positive feelings toward the exposed advertisement and the product do not necessarily translate into actual behavior or purchase intention. A possible explanation for the lack of celebrity endorsers' effect on purchase intention would be that celebrity endorsements "seem to work on the cognitive and affective components of attitudes rather than the conative components" (Baker & Churchill, 1977, p. 550).

Academic findings regarding gender or cross gender interactions between endorsers and target audiences are also inconsistent and unable to provide any theoretical or practical direction. In researching gender interactions between endorsers and target audiences, Debevec and Kernan (1984) found that attractive female models generated more enhanced attitudes than attractive male models across both genders, but particularly among males. Inversely, Caballero et al. (1989) found that males showed greater intentions to buy from male endorsers and females hold greater intentions to purchase from female endorsers. Baker and Churchill (1977) found a rather unexpected interaction amongst female models, product types, and intentions to purchase products among male subjects. When the endorsed product was coffee, an unattractive female model created more intentions to buy the product than her attractive counterpart among male subjects; whereas, when it was perfume/aftershave, male subjects reacted more positively to an attractive female model. On the other hand, Petroschius and Crocker (1989) found that endorsers' gender had no impact on consumers' attitudes toward the advertisement and no major impact on their intentions to buy products.

Lastly, for the match-up hypothesis model, DeSarbo and Harshman (1985) argued that although the theory on match-up hypothesis recovers some of the pitfalls of source models, the real world applicability is also limited since it is almost impossible to develop all of the needed matchup between a product and a celebrity. Amos et al. (2008) also stated that due to the variety

of source effects identified when examining the fit between a celebrity and a product, it is almost impossible to make any generalization. Methodologically, respondents' perceptions on the fit between a celebrity and a product could also be distorted because when consumers are asked to perceive the level of congruence, they are consciously attempting to match the celebrity with the product. As a matter of fact, no consensus was reached regarding what source effects should be matched with a product.

To summarize, previous studies on celebrity endorsement advertising found that; 1) the source credibility, typically viewed as a function of expertise and trustworthiness, has been spotlighted as a main factor for determining how influential the endorser would be (Ohanian, 1991); 2) Sources' attractiveness, whether it is psychological or physical, has been emphasized when determining liking for the endorser and thereby increasing endorsement effectiveness in general (Friedman & Friedman, 1979); 3) the match-up hypothesis model has been admitted for its usefulness for identifying the fit of celebrity endorsers and their endorsed products, especially in situations where expertise or attractiveness is relevant to the product domain (Kamins, 1990); 4) The meaning transfer model tells us more a broad concept that celebrity endorsement advertising is not a one dimensional process but a symbolic meaning transfer from culture to endorsement to product to consumers. It also suggests an exact assessment of those transferred meanings in the empirical study together with the theoretical development (McCracken, 1989).

However, measuring comprehensive celebrity attributes like expertise and attractiveness are likely to be an uneasy task because the effectiveness of a celebrity endorser varies as a function of the product type, the present popularity of the celebrity, and perhaps even situational conditions at the time and place where the advertisement is shown. Especially, the informational value of an endorser's communicated affection for a product seems to be valid only to the extent

that consumers believe the endorser's motive to be genuine. Furthermore, it could be meaningful to directly measure how much consumers evaluate the celebrity's genuine affection for the endorsed product in advertising. In order to do that, two steps of application are needed; first, finding psychological explanations that can enlighten such an inferential process, and next applying the theory to the phenomenon of interest. One possible explanation is a psychological process originating in attribution theory: correspondence bias.

Attribution Theory and Celebrity Endorsement

Attribution theory may be helpful in forming the theoretical framework for the present study because attribution theory can explain whether consumers attribute celebrities' endorsement to their affection to products they endorse or their personal motives reflected in situational cues. Especially, the correspondence bias rooted in attribution theory can explain both how consumers generate correspondence inference from celebrity endorsers' disposition on products within clear situational constraint information and why they underestimate such constraints.

Attribution Theory. Attribution theory explains the processes by which people come to understand their own behavior and that of others. Causal attribution process is not only means of providing the individual with perceptions of reality about the world, but also of maintaining effective control in that world (Kelley, 1972; Stryker & Gottlieb, 1981). According to Jones (1990), attribution theory rests on three assumptions that; 1) individuals attempt to determine the causes of their own and others' behavior, 2) individuals do not assign causes of behavior randomly but rather employ rules, and 3) the causes attributed to behavior will influence subsequent behavior.

The ‘naïve psychology’ proposed by Heider (1958) is widely viewed as a starting point for contemporary research on attribution theory. His two contributions that continue to influence the attribution research appear worth noting. First, Heider distinguished personal or dispositional causation in which the behavior of some individuals is the primary cause of an outcome from environmental or situational causation in which some type of external influence is the primary cause of an outcome. Heider’s second contribution is his proposition that behavior “has such salient properties it tends to engulf the total field rather than be confined to its proper position as a local stimulus whose interpretation requires the additional data of a surrounding field - the situation in social perception” (1958, p. 54). With this proposition, Heider correctly predicted that observers would tend to prefer dispositional over situational causal explanations, although the claim that salience would be the cause of this effect has been the subject of theoretical debate (Gilbert & Malone, 1995).

Although Heider’s (1958) work provides some core ideas that have played a central role in subsequent attribution studies, two later theories clarified those ideas both to render them more easily tested empirically and to enable the development of attribution theory as a mainstream topic in social psychology. The first of two is Kelley’s (1967) ‘co-variation theory,’ which describes the three types of information that attributors use to verify whether they have correctly linked causes and effects. The direction of individuals’ causal inferences differs depending on the basis of the three types of information: distinctiveness, consistency (i.e., both temporal and modal), and social consensus. For example, if information about a person P’s recommendations on a brand B are perceived to be high consensus, high distinctiveness, and high consistency, it implies that P’s recommendation is caused by the fact that B is a good

product. According to this principle, people associate a particular reason with a particular outcome if the outcome exists when the reason exists, and is absent when the reason is absent.

In the context of celebrity endorsement advertising, previous researchers adopted attribution theory to identify consumers' perception of multiple product endorsements. Attribution theory (Kelley, 1972) suggests that, since multiple product endorsements do not imply the distinctive action, consumers' trait inferences may result in less favorable evaluations on multiple product endorsers than on single product endorsers. Some early studies confirmed that a celebrity endorses multiple products is sufficient to erode consumers' perceptions of endorser trustworthiness, as well as their ad and brand evaluations. Mowen, Brown, and Schulman (1979) manipulated knowledge of the number of products endorsed by a celebrity via a paragraph that listed four additional products the celebrity had agreed to endorse. The dependent measure was the combined likability and familiarity of the celebrity endorser. The findings revealed that the celebrity was perceived more negatively when subjects were told that multiple products were endorsed by the celebrity. Using written instructions, Mowen and Brown (1981) also manipulated knowledge of the number of products endorsed by a celebrity. Other manipulated factors were the prestige of the product endorsed, type of endorser, and number of additional endorsers. Dependent measures included trustworthiness, likability, ad evaluations, brand evaluations, and purchase intentions. Knowledge of the number of products endorsed produced no differences in participants' perceptions on the spokesperson's likability and trustworthiness. However, individuals informed of multiple product endorsements viewed the advertisement and the product less favorably and indicated less interest in buying the product. In a recent study, Trip et al. (1994) also applied three types of information to measure the effectiveness of multiple product endorsements and found that the number of products a celebrity

endorses negatively influences consumers' perceptions of endorser credibility and likability, as well as attitudes toward the advertisement.

However, it should be noted that Kelley's (1967) co-variation theory is rather classical in that it mainly focused on causality. For example, the co-variation theory only tells what the causes are for consumers' negative responses to multiple celebrity endorsements. As the second major derivative from Heider's (1958) attribution theory, the correspondent inference theory was proposed to deal with perceiver's process of attribution (Jones & Davis, 1965). The goal of correspondent inference theory is to use an observed behavior to identify the characteristics of person or actor performing that behavior. Specifically, the objective of correspondent inference theory is to identify circumstances under which it is justifiable to make correspondent inferences about the actor, where a correspondent inference is described as "a straightforward extrapolation from the behavior observed" (Jones, 1990, p. 47). Correspondent inference theory regards three pieces of information as being particularly important for observers to make causal inferences to the actor. First, correspondent inferences are most proper when the actor has his/her own volition for free choice as to whether he/she performs the observed behavior. Second, the actor's behaviors are sufficiently diagnostic to the extent that they are unexpected. When an individual behaves in a way that is completely understandable, the behavior does not necessarily reveal anything about the individual's personal characteristics (Jones & Harris, 1967). Third, behaviors that have a single and clear result are more diagnostic of the actor's motives in performing that behavior, thereby serving as a stronger basis for correspondent inferences (Jones & Davis, 1965). Even though the correspondence inference theory was widely applied and tested in social psychology contexts, its use in advertising, especially in the study of celebrity endorsements, has been limited. However, our knowledge of how celebrity endorsements work must be enlightened

by a famous sub-theory derived from the theory of correspondence inference: correspondence bias.

The Correspondence Bias. A variety of attribution theories have generally conceptualized human beings as rational and logical creatures. In addition, early theories analyzing causes of attributions were normative in nature in that they offered prescriptions regarding how and what information should be used in order to arrive at a accurate and valid attribution (Silvera & Laufer, 2005). Nevertheless, people tend to deviate from the normative prescriptions of early attribution theories in several ways. Perhaps the most notable of those deviations is perceivers' tendency to ascribe people' behavior to personality based factors when the observed data are more consistent with situational explanations. One of the earliest explanations for why people consistently make this perceptual error is the argument, drawing on principles from Gestalt psychology, that behavior engulfs the field (Heider, 1958). This tendency, referred to as the 'correspondence bias' (Gilbert & Jones, 1986), or 'fundamental attribution error' (Ross, 1977), has proven to be an extremely robust phenomenon (Quattrone, 1982). Moreover, the inability of the research community to agree upon the explanation of correspondence bias (Gilbert & Malone, 1995) has stimulated a substantial amount of research on the topic. The perspective on 'process' concerning attributions seem to be relevant to the topic of celebrity endorsements. That is to examine the cognitive steps involved in the process of attribution for the purpose of identifying potential sources of error in each step

Before looking to the detailed attribution process, one influential study about correspondence bias is worth recognizing. In the study from Jones and Harris (1967), participants were asked to read an essay that either supported or opposed Fidel Castro's regime in Cuba. In half of the cases, they were told that the writers were given free choice with regard to

the attitudes they expressed in the essay. The other half were told that the writers were forced to express a particular opinion. The participants were then asked to speculate on what the writers' actual opinions concerning the Castro regime were. This task should have been very simple when the writers were free to express their own opinion. When the writers were forced to present a specific opinion, however, the participants did not have any clue regarding their real standpoint. Surprisingly, the participants in both conditions believed that the attitude expressed in the essay represented the writers' actual position. The participants ascribed the writers' behavior to inner factors, despite the existence of a clear situational constraint.

Since the study of Jones and Harris (1967), researchers have tried to identify causes of the correspondence bias and to discover contexts in which interesting applications of this bias could be found. A common explanation for the correspondence bias involves selective attention, by which observers tend to focus on the actor, who is more prominent and accessible than the background of the situation (Taylor & Fiske, 1975). Other researchers have claimed that this bias occurs particularly when the observers are unable or unmotivated to correct their perception by taking the situation into account (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). In fact, most of explanations on the causes of correspondence bias have been explained in reference to the attributional process.

The Attributional Process. Many researchers have tried to break the attributional process into a number of stages or sub-processes in order to know the detailed mechanism of attribution. The first of those process models was proposed by Quattrone (1982). According to the researcher, observers use an “anchoring and adjustment heuristic” when they make attributions (Quattrone, 1982, p. 595). That is, they use the observed behavior to establish an anchor, or starting point, for their assessment of the actor's disposition, and then adjust this anchor of information about

external or situational constraints that might have influenced the behavior (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). So, people's anchoring and adjustment heuristic indicates that insufficient adjustment would induce the correspondence bias. After that, several models concerning the attributional process have been developed (Gilbert et al., 1988; Trope, 1986) and probably the most complete model that is worth articulating further was proposed by Gilbert and Malone (1995). Their attributional process model depicts attributions as involving four stages: 1) situation perception, 2) behavioral expectation, 3) behavior perception, and 4) attribution (See Figure 1).




Figure 1. Attributional Process Model: Gilbert & Malone (1995)

According to Gilbert and Malone (1995), people's tendency to the correspondence bias comes from their information processing difficulties in the first three stages of attributional process. In the first stage of situational perception, the observer must first recognize the situation in which the actor is behaving in order to make an proper attribution; however, situations are not always easy to be recognizable because they are not often specified physically (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). In the second stage of behavioral expectation, audience pressure, peer expectations, and sometimes fear of terrorists might all influence the actor's behavior in various ways, but none of these contextual forces are readily available to an external observer. In the third stage of behavior perception, when the causal influence of the situation is ignored or overlooked, observers tend to make biased dispositional attributions. For example, in the study from Ross, Amabile, and Steinmetz (1977), participants evaluated two people who were playing

a general knowledge quiz game. The participants were informed that one of these people was assigned the role of composing and asking difficult questions and the other one had to answer those questions. The participants tended to ignore the situational constraints that benefited the questioners and perceived them as more knowledgeable than the answerers.

Besides the above inducers to inferential bias, incorrect causal inference also increases observers' correspondence bias. If observers are accurate in their cognitive activity, they must not only recognize what the situation is but also understand how that situation is likely to influence behavior. However, observers who often lack such accurate understanding are likely to have erroneous expectations for how a person would normally behave, thereby misjudging the attributional inferences of how the actor actually does behave. For instance, in Milgram's (1963) classic obedience paradigm, observers appear to underestimate the percentage of participants who will deliver the maximum shock level. Those who were familiar with Milgram's research, where more than half of participants administered the maximum shock, thought those participants who administer high levels of shock behaved normally; whereas, participants who refused to administer shocks were disobedient. In contrast, people who had inaccurate expectations about what was typical behavior in that situation reacted quite reversely. Participants who administered high levels of shock was seen as sadistic and cruel; whereas, participants who refused to give high levels of shock were viewed as typical. That Milgram research highlights that accurate identification of what behaviors should normally be expected in a given situation is crucial to making a valid and correct attribution.

From the speculation that the first two stages of the attributional process might result in errors when observers are unaware of situational constraint information, one can predict that a realistic understanding of the situation protects observers against the correspondence bias.

Paradoxically, however, it is exactly such a prediction that can cause some errors when an observer tries to interpret the behavior (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). Observers' knowledge of the situation can result in correspondent expectations for behavior in that situation, which can in turn bias interpretations of the actor's actual behavior through a process called "perceptual assimilation" (Trope, 1986; Trope & Alfieri, 1997, p. 663). For example, knowledge that a situational force (e.g., a hostile audience) is likely to induce a particular behavior (e.g., a nervous speech) induces an observer to expect that behavior. The observer's expectations are then likely to influence his interpretation of the behavior, frequently resulting in perceptions that the behavior corresponds more closely with his expectations or with the situational constraints than it actually does (Trope, Cohen, & Maoz, 1988). In this example, this perceptual assimilation process would result in a perception that the speech was more nervous than it actually was, and subsequently in an unduly dispositional inference that the speaker was more nervous than he actually was. Trope, Cohen, and Maoz (1988) concluded that when observers expect a particular type of behavior, and when the behavior is sufficiently ambiguous to permit perceptual assimilation effects, people are more likely to perceive the behavior as corresponding with the situation and thus to make stronger dispositional attributions about the actor.

Lastly, even when observers accurately identify both the behavior and the situation, if they do not properly integrate those pieces of information it is still possible for them to exhibit the correspondence bias. The effect of improper information integration on the correspondence bias is more clarified in the 'sequential operations model of attribution' developed by Gilbert et al (1988). According to Gilbert et al. (1988), the sequential operations model of attribution process involves three stages (See Figure 2). First, people identify an actor's behavior (i.e., categorization). Second, they attribute the actor's behavior to his/ her correspondent dispositional

inference (i.e. characterization). In the last stage, people take the situation into account and adjust their attribution accordingly (i.e., correction). However, although the first two stages are relatively automatic and demand low levels of attention, the third stage occurs only if the person is paying enough attention (Gilbert et al., 1988).




Figure 2. Sequential Operations Model of Attribution: Gilbert et al. (1988)

Gilbert and Malone (1995) also suggested that the three stages of the attribution process in the model differ in terms of the cognitive demands they place on observers. That is, the first two stages are relatively automatic and effortless; whereas, the correction stage is substantially more cognitively demanding. Thus, when observers lack motivation, mental energy, or cognitive skills, they are able to categorize the behavior and characterize the individual as having traits corresponding to that behavior, but they are often unable to correct for situational factors and thus exhibit correspondence bias.

The Correspondence Bias on Celebrity Endorsement. Since Jones and Harris (1967), researchers have tried to identify causes of correspondence bias (Gilbert & Malone, 1995) and discover contexts in which interesting applications of this bias could be found. Celebrity endorsement advertising has been suggested as one study area the theory of correspondence bias potentially relates to (Sørum, 2003). In particular, relevancy is in the question of whether and when consumers infer that celebrity endorsers have genuine attitudes toward the products they

endorse. Despite the high relevance of attribution theory to the study of celebrity endorsement advertising, previous research on celebrity endorsements has seldom adopted this perspective. Silver (2005) strongly suggested that measures of global celebrity characteristics like credibility and trustworthiness are likely to be problematic to the extent that the effectiveness of a celebrity endorser varies as a function of the product type, the current popularity of the celebrity, and perhaps even societal conditions at the time and place where the advertisement is shown.

Kardes (1993) has argued that correspondence bias makes us disregard the situational constraints and thus contributes to the effectiveness of celebrity endorsement advertising. Most consumers know that people advertising something are likely to be well paid to express their affection for that product. This is especially true for celebrity endorsers. According to Tripp et al. (1994), observers of a celebrity spokesperson who endorses only a product may or may not attribute the endorsement to the product itself. Other potential causes for the endorsement exist in popularity of the endorser, endorser's ties to the product, company, or advertising agency and money paid to the endorser. Among those causes, celebrity monetary benefits and accompanying endorsement script in ads have been regarded as the main situational constraints in previous studies.

As the first study of its kinds, Cronley et al., (1999) carried out an exploratory study with the following hypothesis: correspondence bias will occur, even though the participants know that the endorser is under very constraining situational circumstances. These researchers showed participants an advertisement in which Cindy Crawford endorsed a popular brand of orange juice. They had two experimental conditions. In one condition, participants were informed that Cindy Crawford did the commercial for free as part of a charity campaign. In the other condition, participants were told that she received an advertisement fee. In addition, there were two

versions of the advertisement, an extreme and a moderate endorsement. In the extreme version, five advantages of the product and three times of Cindy Crawford's name were presented. In the moderate version, no product advantages were mentioned and Cindy Crawford's name was mentioned only once. Cronley et al. (1999) found support for their hypothesis. Participants assumed that the endorser actually liked the particular brand of orange juice. This was especially true when they were told that she had volunteered, but also when they knew that she was well paid. Thus, Cronley et al. (1999) concluded that they had demonstrated correspondence bias. They also found that the degree to which participants made dispositional attributions was correlated with participants' attitudes toward the advertisement, the product, and the endorser. Accordingly, they concluded that correspondence bias is a possible reason why endorsement advertisements are effective.

Unlike the study from Cronley et al. (1999), Silvera and his colleagues (Sørum et al., 2003; Silvera et al., 2004) found no evidence for correspondence bias from their experiment using similar advertisements including several different endorsers and product types. Unexpectedly, these researchers found the reversal of correspondence bias in that endorsers were viewed as have genuine attitudes toward the endorsed product less than the typical individual. Only similar finding with the study of Cronley et al. (1999) was that correspondent inferences on the celebrity endorser are positively related to purchase intentions for the advertised product. A number of differences with regard to methodology and participant populations can potentially explain the different results from those lines of research and these differences in turn testify to the complexity of the process of correspondent inference in relation to celebrity endorsement advertising.

In summary, the findings from previous studies on attribution theory and correspondence bias found that; 1) correspondence bias is exhibited when people are unable to correct for situational factors in a three stages of attributional process (i.e., categorization, characterization, and correction) and the correction also depends on individual differences (e.g., need for cognition and implicit theory of personality); 2) consumers tend to exhibit their tendency to the correspondence bias when they evaluate an celebrity's true motives for the endorsement (Cronley et al., 1999); 3) correspondent inferences about an endorser were positively associated with participants' attitudes toward the advertisement, the product, and even purchase intentions for the endorsed product (Silvera et al., 2004).

However, it might be that consumers, as Jones and Harris (1967) pointed out, make dispositional attributions to a larger extent than is logically justified. Thus, they might disregard the facts that the endorser is well paid and instructed to say by the advertiser. In contrast, several studies have shown that correspondence bias occurs even when situational constraints are obvious to the observer, although the attributions made are somewhat less dispositional (Gilbert & Jones, 1986; Gilbert & Malone, 1995). It is also reasonable to expect that when consumers observe a celebrity endorsement advertisement, they are not sufficiently sensitive to the situational constraints on the endorser's behavior. This can cause them to conclude that the endorser actually has positive attitudes concerning the product, and that the act of endorsing is an expression of genuine affection for the product. However, what if situational constraints are too obvious for observers to ignore a celebrity endorser's ulterior motives (i.e., recognizable from the celebrity's multiple product endorsement) (Tripp et al., 1994)?

Research on suspicion of ulterior motives has given clues to the anti-correspondence bias, because when an observer has reasons to suspect that an actor is motivated by external factors, the observer is less apt to make dispositional attributions (Fein, Hilton & Miller, 1990).

Suspicion of Ulterior Motives about Celebrity Endorsers

This section deals with previous research on suspicion of ulterior motives and how situational information about the ulterior motives of celebrity endorsers is processed differently in the mind of suspicious consumers. In addition, with recognition that there was no theoretical examination on the suspicion for celebrity endorsement study, this section provides an overall review of previous studies on suspicion in marketing literature and their applicable points in celebrity endorsement contexts such as multiple product endorsements.

Perceivers' Suspicion Mechanism. Suspicion of ulterior motives was defined as questioning the motives that underlie another person's behavior or questioning the authenticity of that behavior (Hilton, Fein, & Miller, 1993). According to Fein (1996), suspicion is "a dynamic state in which the individual actively entertains multiple, plausibly rival hypotheses about the motives or genuineness of a person's behavior" (p. 1165). However, suspicion is more than simply entertaining multiple hypotheses about the motives underlying a behavior. Suspicion is a frequently experienced mental state (Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990). For instance, perceivers are likely to experience suspicion when they observe employees ingratiating with their boss or a child suddenly offering loving sentiments just before asking for something he/she wants. Hilton et al. (1993) also stated that suspicion can be triggered by a variety of circumstances, such as when perceivers are warned about the insincerity or untrustworthiness of an individual or group, when perceivers' expectations have been violated strongly, and when perceivers recognize

situational cues in the contextual information surrounding an actor's behavior that suggest ulterior motives.

A unique mechanism of suspicion is that suspicious perceivers have a tendency to generate alternative causal explanations for a target person's behavior (Fein, 1996; Fein & Hilton, 1994; Fein et al, 1990; Vonk, 1998). In contrast, unsuspicious perceivers tend to be predisposed to take a person's behavior at face value and infer that it reflects the person's true personality or attitude, even when the situation provides an adequate explanation for the behavior (Jones & Davis, 1965). A suspicious person, however, engages in a relatively sophisticated attributional thought process in which he/she actively entertains multiple, plausibly rival hypotheses about the motives of another's behavior. As a result, suspicious perceivers tend to refrain from taking behavior at face value and be in a state of suspended judgment, at least until their suspicions have been resolved (Fein, 1996).

Another important mechanism of being suspicious is that a target person's behavior and contextual information, or both, subsequent to suspicion arousal can significantly influence a perceiver's attributional processing (Fein et al., 1990; Hilton et al., 1993). In the Fein et al. (1989) study, for example, participants read about the activities of a man with modest means courting an older and very wealthy widow. The man wrote poems, sent flowers and candy often, and told her that he wanted to marry her. Despite all of these loving behaviors, participants were unwilling to infer whether the man was truly in love with the woman or was simply after her money. They were only able to disambiguate the suitor's behavior and generate negative or positive attributions about his true intent after reading unrelated information about the man's behavior that inferred greed or altruism.

Lastly, it should be distinguished that the influence of suspicion on willingness to invest cognitive effort in the scrutiny of persuasive messages is twofold, depending on how suspicion is approached. Suspicion can be regarded as the response aroused by a specific persuasive source or a dispositional characteristic of the receptor. First, starting from the source perspective, a highly suspicious source might arouse reactance (Worchel & Brehm, 1971). In other words, this suspicion can arouse feelings of threats against the customer's sense of freedom, provoking reactance, which will inhibit any willingness to invest cognitive effort in the scrutiny of the message (Fitzsimons & Lehman, 2004). This effect has been identified to be strong enough to overwhelm receptors' inter-individual differences (Echebarria-Echabe, 2010). Another perspective involves regarding suspicion as a dispositional characteristic of the receiver. Here, suspicion is regarded as a dispositional characteristic that affects receivers' attitudes towards persuasive attempts in general. So, highly suspicious subjects will show a preventive attitude towards persuasive messages. In the social perception domain, Fein and Hilton (1994) found that observers who are in general suspicious of the motives underlying actors' behavior engage in relatively sophisticated styles of attribution processing.

Suspicion and Correspondence Bias. Extant research suggests that people are not good at detecting insincerity due to the correspondence bias (O'Sullivan, 2003). As mentioned in the previous section on correspondence bias, perceivers tend to take actors' behavior at face value rather automatically, and they rarely devote the cognitive resources necessary to successfully complete the more cognitively effortful task of correcting their initial correspondence inferences in light of contextual information. Interestingly, studies on suspicion have showed conditions similar to those used in the research of correspondence bias, in which the identification of the actor's behavior was clear and the situational constraint was obvious. In the context of this

similarity, how does suspicion cause perceivers to avoid this bias? Is it an antidote to the correspondence bias? The studies on the suspicion of ulterior motive have made positive answers.

According to Fein (1996), ulterior motives trigger a very different mindset than is typical, causing perceivers to process information in a relatively unique way. That is, suspicious perceivers show a particular attribution style which explains why salient ulterior motive information leads to suspension of judgment, whereas other information that is at least as salient does not. More specifically, this suspicious mindset can be characterized as a state of “attributional conservatism” in which suspicious perceivers raise substantially their thresholds for accepting behavioral information at face value (Fein et al., 1990, p. 1165; Hilton et al., 1993). That is, once they have become suspicious, perceivers are more likely to perceive a wide range of behavior as attributionally ambiguous. This mindset may stem in part from the desire not to be duped by another individual. Therefore, the suspicious perceiver may focus to an unusually large degree on the potential hidden agendas of all actors, not only the actor in question. When, in this frame of mind, perceivers may begin to question the motives even if any contextual information that suggests any particular ulterior motives is not available for the actors.

The most fundamental effect that suspicion has on perceivers is that it causes them to hesitate to take behavior at face value, do the work of correction, and even evoke a mindset that facilitates this process (Fein, 1996). This assertion was proved by Fein et al. (1990) in the essay paradigm study similar to ones used in studies on the correspondence bias. Fein et al. (1990) compared the inferences made by participants who learned that an author's choice of positions advocated in his essay was constrained by the demands of his job (i.e., no choice condition) with those made by participants who learned that the author was not under strong constraint but that his choice of positions may have been influenced by a motive to ingratiate himself to a superior

or to avoid an unwanted job (i.e., ulterior motives condition). The findings indicated that the participants in the no choice condition exhibited the typical correspondence bias in their inferences. That is, participants' inferences on the author's true attitude did not differ significantly as a function of the attitude expressed in the author's speech. The participants who had reason to be suspicious, on the other hand, did not fall prey to this bias.

As a matter of fact, one previous study showed that a suspicious mindset is a quite effective antidote to the correspondence bias (Fein, 1996). Marchand and Vonk (2005) tried to identify the process of becoming suspicious and discovering ulterior motives. Participants read about a likable behavior, and then sequentially received ten cues about potential ulterior motives of the actor. Participants were asked to think aloud while they were reading and their thoughts were coded. They found that participants evaluate the actor less positively as more information is presented. In addition, they also showed the expected quadratic effect for suspicion. Perceivers who were initially certain of their evaluation soon began to doubt the actor's motives as suspicious. As more information was presented, they became progressively more certain that the actor indeed had ulterior motives, until finally they were certain. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that suspicion is a dynamic process that unfolds over time as people grapple with the possibility that an actor has ulterior motives, and then become convinced.

Suspicion on Communicators' True Motives. Recent research in social psychology and related disciplines has identified conditions under which persuasion attempts backfire because of recipients' suspicious minds on the communicator's true motives (e.g., Campbell & Kirmani, 2000; DeCarlo, 2005; Friestad & Wright, 1994; Main, Dahl, & Darke, 2007). In cases when persuasion motives (e.g., to get someone to change his or her opinions) are salient by a number of factors, such as their explicit behaviors (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000) or the belief that the

agent will personally benefit commissions from their supporting behaviors (Friestad & Wright, 1994), recipients are likely to distrust the communicator's recommendations and will adjust their attributions for plausible situational constraints (Fein, 1996; Fein et al., 1990). Despite this advance, little is known about the effects that consumers' suspicion of ulterior motives is likely to exert on their acceptance of a celebrity endorsement in advertising contexts. Notably some studies of suspicion on sales agents' motives help us understand how consumers cope with a celebrity endorsement when they feel suspicious on the celebrity's true motives.

Even though not focused on celebrity advertisements per se, Campbell and Kirmani (2000) found that two factors, accessibility of persuasion motives and consumers' cognitive capacity, have an interactive effect on inferences of persuasion motive and salesperson perceptions. An interesting finding from Campbell and Kirmani's research suggests that when perceivers were suspicious of a salesperson's ulterior motives, more negative persuasion inferences were generated that, in turn, negatively influenced perceptions of the salesperson. To these researchers, suspicion was regarded as one of coping mechanisms in consumers' 'persuasion knowledge model' (Friestad & Wright, 1994). A basic idea of persuasion knowledge model is that a consumer is able to use her persuasion knowledge to identify that an agent is attempting to influence her and to try to manage the persuasion episode to achieve her own goals. In a similar vein, Campbell and Kirmani (2000) proposed that when the situation makes ulterior motives accessible, persuasion knowledge will be used to infer an underlying persuasion motive and will thus influence the evaluation of the salesperson. In contrast, when ulterior motives are less accessible and consumers are cognitively constrained, persuasion knowledge will not be used in evaluating the salesperson. This finding implies that when recipients are come to believe

that the motive behind a sales person is insincere or manipulative (i.e., suspicious) by some situational constraints, they will likely resist their compliance with sales person's tactics.

It is also worth noting that situational constraints, whether it comes from a sales person's message tactics, diversely relevant information about the person, or other perceived behaviors, eventually induce negative impressions from consumers when they are enough to be suspicious. This fact hints that the tactical advantages of celebrity endorsers also appear to be limited by certain situational constraints. For example, endorser effectiveness is reduced when perceivers feel suspicious on the celebrity's ulterior motive by the fact that he/she endorses several products (Tripp et al., 1994). The semi-structured interview conducted by Tripp et al. (1994) revealed consumers' strong reactions to celebrities' multiple product endorsements. In their study, all interviewees mentioned that celebrities endorse products because they are paid for those endorsements. All of interviewees, to some extent, questioned whether the endorser used or even liked his/her endorsed products. Also, those researchers found that some interviewees felt consumers would react negatively due to the endorser appearing in ads for more than one product. These interviewees questioned the sincerity of the endorser relative to the product endorsement while other interviewees stated that they thought the endorser should be loyal to one product. Taken as a whole, the interviews suggest that consumers do not actively process information regarding how many products a celebrity endorses. However, when the number of products endorsed does become salient, consumers doubt whether the endorser actually likes, uses, or purchases the products endorsed. In this regard, consumers question the endorser's trustworthiness, either directly or indirectly. Silvera (2005) also proposed that endorsing several products may create the likelihood that the celebrity has an ulterior motive to cash in the value of

their name recognition, and such ulterior motives will reduce an observer's tendency to make correspondent inferences.

To summarize, the findings of previous studies on suspicion of ulterior motive suggested that; 1) suspicious perceivers have a tendency to generate alternative causal explanations for a target person's behavior and cognitively engage in relatively sophisticated styles of attribution processing (Hilton et al., 1993); 2) the most fundamental effect that suspicion has on perceivers is that it causes them to hesitate to take behavior at face value, do the work of correction, and even evoke a mindset that facilitates this process (Fein, 1996); 3) suspicion study indirectly suggested that endorsing several products creates the likelihood that the celebrity has an ulterior motive to cash in the value of their name recognition and such ulterior motives must play an important role preventing correspondent inferences to the behavior of endorser (Silvera & Laufer, 2005).

Proposed Theoretical Framework

Before proceeding to the development of specific research hypotheses, in order to clarify main concepts of correspondence bias and suspicion of ulterior motives, a guiding theoretical framework was developed with reference to Gilbert et al.'s (1988) model of sequential operations of attribution.

Figure 3 shows the proposed theoretical framework that was applied in this study. The framework proposes that people draw correspondence bias or suspicion outcomes based on the results of a three-staged process: categorization (i.e., identifying action), characterization (i.e., drawing dispositional inferences about the actor), and correction (i.e., adjusting those inferences with information about situational constraints). In particular, in a no-suspicion condition, people will not do the work of correction because they make dispositional inferences on the behavior of

an actor as it is. In a low-suspicion condition (i.e., low constraint condition), people also will not do the work of correction because they tend to underestimate situational constraints and overestimate actor's dispositions. That is, they will show correspondence bias. However, in a high-suspicion condition, people will do the work of correction because suspicion causes them to hesitate to take the behavior of an actor at face value and arise more sophisticated thinking. Accordingly, they will not show correspondence bias and even produce less correspondence inference to the actor.

Based on literature of celebrity endorsements, it should be also noted that some factors regarding perceived product congruence with a celebrity endorser and individual difference in personality will moderate the sequential operation between characterization and correction. The different roles of those moderators are discussed in the next chapter.




Figure 3. A Proposed Theoretical Framework

Research Hypotheses

The primary goal of this section is to generate multiple research hypotheses on the basis of theoretical relationships between suspicion and its persuasive effects within the context of celebrity endorsement advertising. Since both conceptual and theoretical foundations were already discussed at length in the preceding literature review, this section is devoted to investigate points of interest including; 1) the antecedent role of suspicion, with the explanatory support of correspondence bias and suspicion of ulterior motives, on consumers' correspondence inference on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity, 2) the differential role of consumers' perceived product congruence with a celebrity endorser on their correspondence inference on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity, 3) the moderating roles of personality constructs, need for cognition and implicit theory of personality, in correspondent inferential processes, and 4) the mediating role of correspondence inference from both suspicion and perceived product congruence to attitudinal and behavioral consequences.

Antecedents of Correspondence Inference on celebrity endorsement. The first set of hypotheses regards antecedent conditions that might cause the evocation of correspondence inference with differing degrees of impact. Based on previous literature review, this study speculates that receivers' suspicion on celebrity endorsers' genuine motives, aroused from their situational information and their perception on product congruence with the chosen celebrity, would be an influential factor on consumers' endorser-relating attributions.

Low Suspicion and Correspondence Bias. It is generally expected that consumers' suspicion on celebrity endorsers' genuine motives will negatively affect their correspondence inference on the celebrity's endorsement behavior in advertising. Many researchers confirmed that individuals' correspondence inference that celebrity endorsements reflect true affection for

endorsed products on the part of endorsers should be doubted because a large amount of endorsement fee given to celebrities should be viewed as a strong incentive toward the endorsement behavior (Atkin & Block, 1983; Kamin, 1989; Tripp et al., 1994).

Although relationships between suspicion and correspondence inference are negatively associated, the negative strength of correspondence inference depends on the degrees of suspicion; that is, how much people take actors' situational information as being suspicious (Gilbert & Malone, 1995). In particular, previous research concerning correspondence inference on celebrity endorsements suggested that certain situational information such as a large amount of endorsement fee, could be a low-suspicion inducer affecting consumers' correspondence inference because money compensation for endorsement has been commonly accepted to the public and celebrities are favored as product endorsers due to their reference and expert power (as reviewed in Chapter 2). However, this study claims that low-suspicion situation could be better explained by a theoretical phenomenon called 'correspondence bias.' By definition, correspondence bias is a tendency "to assume that a person's behavior is a true reflection of their beliefs or opinions and thus their underlying dispositions when in fact their behavior could be explained entirely by situational factors" (Gilbert & Malone, 1995, pp. 22). Theory of correspondence bias suggests that people tend to make strong correspondence inferences (i.e., liking for the product) from behavior and fail to adjust sufficiently for situational factors (i.e., endorsement fees) (Frieden, 1984; Gilbert & Johns, 1986). In other words, correspondence bias is exhibited when people are unable to correct for situational factors in the sequential operations of attribution: categorization, characterization, and correction (Gilbert et al., 1988). In addition, O'Sullivan (2003) found evidence that correspondence bias significantly undermined the ability to detect honesty and deception accurately when observers thought positively about someone.

In the context of celebrity endorsements, several studies have assessed correspondence bias by manipulating subjects' awareness of situational factors that were linked to the actor's behavior and found that correspondence bias always occurs in association with situational information on a monetary incentive for the endorsement (e.g., Cronley et al., 1999; Sorum et al., 2003). Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed;

H1: Consumers' correspondence inference on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity in an advertisement will not be significantly lower under a low-suspicion condition than under a no-suspicion condition because of their tendency to correspondence bias.

Suspicion of ulterior motives. In a nonverbal communication literature, there is ample evidence that most people cannot distinguish honest from deceptive behavior of others (Anderson, DePaulo, Ansfield, Tickle, & Green, 1999; Ekman & O'Sullivan, 1991; Malone & DePaulo, 2001). One of the reasons why people are so poor at detecting deception is a perceiver's "truthfulness bias" (Marchand et al., 2005, p. 243) That is, people tend to accept everything they see at face value and cannot comprehend something without accepting it as true. Gilbert (1991) proposed that people do have the power to assent, reject, and suspend their judgment, but only after they have initially believed the information to which they have been exposed. The interesting speculation from studies on the truthfulness bias is that it keeps its pace through correspondence bias even when the situation surrounding the behavior of an actor provides alternative explanations (Vonk, 1999).

However, there is one particular circumstance in which correspondence bias can be overcome, namely, when a perceiver becomes suspicious about a person's ulterior motives (Fein, 1996). Fein (1996) described suspicion of ulterior motives as a state in which perceivers hold multiple and rival hypotheses about the motives or sincerity of the actor's behavior. The most

fundamental effect that suspicion of ulterior motives has on perceivers is that it causes them to hesitate to take behavior at face value, do the work of correction, and even evoke a mindset that facilitates this process (Fein, 1996). As a consequence, suspicion of the underlying ulterior motives of an actor can result in less favorable perceptions of the actor (Fein et al., 1990; Vonk, 1998). Conditions under which the endorsement behavior of a celebrity is suspicious to consumers have not been empirically studied in the literature. However, qualitative interviews conducted by Trip et al. (1994) revealed that when consumers recognize multiple product endorsements from a celebrity endorser, they show strong suspicion on his/her genuine liking of the endorsed product. Silvera and Laufer (2005) also indirectly suggested that endorsing several products creates the likelihood that the celebrity has an ulterior motive to cash in the value of his/her name recognition and such ulterior motives must play an important role preventing overestimating consumers' correspondence inference to the behavior of the endorser. Thus, the following hypothesis is drawn with respect to the persuasive effects of high suspicion;

H2: Consumers' correspondence inferences on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity in an advertisement will be significantly lower under a high-suspicion condition than under no- or low-suspicion conditions because of their tendency to high suspicion of ulterior motives.

Perceived Product Congruence. Consistent with foregoing arguments, correspondence bias may have played a significant role in the way consumers evaluate the endorsement behavior of a celebrity. However, another possible explanation for keeping consumers on the high level of correspondence inference could be found when endorsed products are highly matched with celebrities. The high matching factor could make consumers think that celebrities do not actually take part in an advertisement because of money but out of genuine affection for the

product. This may explain why study participants in Cronley et al.'s (1999) study did not question Cindy Crawford's true motives, therefore showing correspondence bias. In a similar vein, a high-suspicion condition may not necessarily induce less correspondence inferences to celebrities' affection for their endorsed products. For instance, consumers, even if they are exposed to the information of multiple celebrity endorsements, could think that the celebrity really like the endorsed product in a specific advertisement because of highly perceptual matches between them.

In this study, consumers' perceived product congruence with a celebrity is also presumed as a potential determinant of the direction of correspondence inferences. The basis of this assumption was derived from the theory of schema congruity, which predicts that the extent to which new information conforms to consumer expectations is based on previously defined category schemas in memory (Mandler, 1982). Prior research in category-based processing also indicates whether new information is congruent or incongruent with the existing schemas can influence an individual's inferential judgment of the information (Sujan, Bettman, & Sujan, 1986). When an object is perceived as fitting into previously defined category schema, it is favorably evaluated on the basis of affect transfer (Wansink & Ray, 1996). Within the context of celebrity endorsements, schema congruity occurs when the image of an endorser (e.g., Cindy Crawford as a supermodel) and the image of a product (e.g. healthy drinks) are relevant such that the relationship between them can be readily addressed within the existing celebrity and/or product category schemas. Such schema congruity generally produces more favorable responses to advertisements than schema incongruity because congruent advertisements conform to consumers' expectations and allow predictability (Meyers-Levy & Tybout, 1989).

In McCracken's (1989) conception of celebrity's meaning transfer model, celebrities serve as the site for social meanings to converge. Endorsers become carriers of those meanings into whatever social space that uses their name, face, or image. For meaning to adhere to a product, McCracken (1989) indicated that the match must synchronize the celebrity image and endorsed product. However, meaning transfer seems to hinge on audience perceptions based on their schema congruity an endorser has already cultivated. For instance, previous studies found that celebrity endorsers are appropriate where product purchase involves high social and psychological risks (Friedman & Friedman, 1979; Atkin & Block, 1983). Misra & Beatty (1990) also found that a given level of expected congruency promotes recall and liking of the brand in such cases when actor Clint Eastwood promoted rugged blue jeans (vs. board games) and Olympic gymnast Mary Lou Retton promoted an energy drink instead of a pricey wine. In a recent study, St. James (2003) investigated the image transfer on evaluations of high-technology products and concluded that despite the fact that entertainers do not in reality necessarily have expertise in relation to new technology products, the image of a science-fiction starship captain lent the actor who portrayed him a stronger association with technology and thus more credibility for endorsing the technology product.

In fact, researchers on correspondence bias have admitted that attribution requires observers to perform something of a matching test in which they compare the actor's behavior with their expectations for that behavior and determine whether the behavior meets these expectations (Gilbert et al. 1995). Even though not studied yet in the previous literature, aforementioned theoretical tenets suggested that the correspondence bias and suspicion outcomes could be differentiated by perceivers' product congruence or incongruence between the celebrity endorser and the endorsed products. In line with the discussion, the following set of research

hypotheses can be put forth to determine whether correspondence inference varies with product types a certain celebrity endorses and whether these relationships differ in consumers' correspondence bias and suspicion of ulterior motives.

H3a: Consumers' correspondence inferences on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity in an advertisement will be significantly greater for a high congruent product than for a low congruent product.

H3b: Consumers' tendency to correspondence bias becomes stronger for a high congruent product than for a low congruent product; whereas, consumers' tendency to suspicion of ulterior motives becomes stronger for a low congruent product than for a high congruent product.

Need for Cognition as a Moderator. Contrary to general assumptions on the correspondence bias, some people failed to show correspondence bias when they are cognitively busy (Gilbert et al., 1988). In other cases, researchers found no evidence for correspondence bias and even a reversal of it (Sørum et al., 2003; Silvera & Austad, 2004). This suggests that certain individuals might be less prone to correspondence bias and, in other words, individual differences might play an important role in the process of attribution. The fourth set of research hypotheses is concerned with whether and how individual differences in need for cognition could influence the effects of suspicion on correspondent inference in the attribution process of celebrity endorsements.

Need for cognition has been shown to affect various stages of attribution process, where limited cognitive resources, such as low need for cognition, prevent adequate correction of the initial categorization of the actor in the sequential operations of attribution, so resulting in correspondence bias (D'Agostino & Fincher-Kiefer, 1992; Webster, 1993; Silvera, 2005; Tal-Or

& Papirman, 2007). Petty & Cacioppo (1986) defined need for cognition as an individual's tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors and showed that high and low need for cognition subjects differ in the information processing strategies used in social judgment tasks. When instructed to form an impression of a target person, high need for cognition subjects expend more effort in the processing and integration of inconsistent information and are less prone to the primacy effect than low need for cognition subjects (Ahlering & Parker, 1989; Srull, Lichtenstein, & Rothbart, 1989). Therefore, high need for cognition subjects are more likely to carefully process and elaborate the arguments of persuasive messages and less likely than low need for cognition subjects to rely on heuristics and other peripheral cues to assess the validity of these messages (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Those findings indicate that perceivers with high need for cognition should not be subject to the bias because sufficient cognitive resources are devoted to their correction process. More recently, D'Agostino & Fincher (1992) found that individuals with high need for cognition, who are more motivated to process information, are less prone to make the correspondence bias.

Irrespective of individuals' cognitive capacity, when perceivers are highly suspicious of an actor, they find themselves actively trying to determine which dispositions are implicated in a behavior early in the process (Hilton et al., 1993). Also, high level of suspicion can arouse feelings of threats against people's sense of freedom, provoking reactance (Fitzsimons & Lehman, 2004). Reactance will inhibit any willingness to invest cognitive efforts in the scrutiny of the message. This effect will be strong enough to overwhelm receptors' inter-individual differences. For instance, although it has been demonstrated that subjects with high need for cognition relative to subjects with low need for cognition are more disposed to engage in more

systematic information processing (Petty, Tormala, Hawkins, & Wegener, 2001), this difference can fade away in the face of a persuasive source that arouses high suspicion. Therefore, the differences between high and low need for cognition subjects are expected to disappear in the high-suspicion condition. Thus, the following hypotheses are established;

H4a: Consumers' tendency to correspondence bias will not appear for people with high need for cognition but people with low need for cognition; whereas, consumers' tendency to suspicion of ulterior motives will appear for people with both low and high for cognition.

In association with the hypothesis 4b, one would expect that relationships between correspondence bias and need for cognition could not be all same for both high and low congruent products in advertisements. For example, perceivers with high need for cognition, even though their level of suspicion is low, make more efforts in attribution processing on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity when the celebrity and product are clearly low matched; therefore, they will generate more negative correspondence inferences enough to overcome their correspondence bias. In contrast, even if people with low need for cognition perceive low product congruence in an advertisement, they still show the correspondence bias because of their limited cognitive thinking. In order to find out the relationship among three constructs, correspondence inference, product congruence, and need for cognition, the following hypothesis is proposed;

H4b: In a condition of high product congruence, consumers' tendency to correspondence bias does not become stronger for people with low need for cognition than people with high need for cognition. In comparisons, in a condition of low product

congruence, consumers' tendency to correspondence bias becomes stronger for people with low need for cognition than people with high need for cognition.

H4c: In both levels of high and low product congruence, consumers' tendency to suspicion of ulterior motives becomes stronger for people with high need for cognition than people with low need for cognition.

Implicit Theory of Personality as a Possible Moderator. In addition to the difference in individuals' need for cognition, social psychologists have provided a substantial amount of research examining the impact of other individual factors on the attribution process such as attribution complexity (Newman, 1996; Bloomberg & Silvera, 1998), cognitive development (Piaget, 1952; Newman, 1991), ideocentrism (Newman, 1993), and implicit theory of personality (Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995). Differential aspects of those factors from the need for cognition is that they primarily have moderating effects on the final two stages of the attribution process when observers interpret or perceive the behavior and integrate situational and behavioral information. Among those individual factors, this study will test the role of implicit theory of personality as a possible moderator on consumers' inferential process of attribution in the context of celebrity endorsements.

According to Dweck and her colleagues (Dweck, Hong, & Chiu, 1993; Dweck, Chiu, & Hong, 1995), two types of implicit theory of personality have been identified within individuals. One type is entity theorists who view personality as being permanent. The other type is incremental theorists who regard personality as being dynamic with greater potential for change and development. A person's 'implicit theory of personality' has been shown to relate to attributions in general and to the correspondence bias in particular. Hong (1994) suggested that entity theorists are more likely to demonstrate correspondence bias than incremental theorists

because entity theorists are more prone to make spontaneous trait inferences than incremental theorists. That means entity theorists make significantly stronger correspondence inferences about the celebrity endorser than others because they believe someone's personality (e.g., celebrities themselves) is hard to be changed. In addition, this study also postulates that if the implicit theory of personality as a factor of psychological difference moderates the process of correspondence bias, it also should affect the process of high suspicion on celebrity endorsers' motives. For example, it could be possible that even under a high suspicious condition, entity theorists are less expected to show a correction process on their correspondence inferences than incremental theorists. Based on this line of reasoning, the following hypotheses are generated;

H5: Consumers' tendency to correspondence bias becomes stronger for entity theorists than incremental theorists; whereas, consumers' tendency to suspicion of ulterior becomes stronger for incremental theorists than entity theorists.

Correspondence Inference as a Mediator. The final concern of this study is the persuasive consequences of correspondence inference that probably occurs when consumers are exposed to celebrity endorsement advertising. This study limits the outcomes of correspondence inferences to the primary indicators for advertising effectiveness, which include attitudes toward the ad and brand and behavioral intention. Although these attitude measures are unable to provide a full assessment of possible causal attribution effects, they are deemed to be appropriate outcome variables in this study because all three factors explicitly reflect the receiver's evaluations as the major dimensions of attributional consequences (Kelly & Michela, 1980; Decarlo & Leigh, 1996).

Consumers' correspondence inferences on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity are likely to have directional effects on ad/brand evaluations. Previous research findings indicates

that significant relationships exist not only between correspondence inferences and attitudes toward the ad and brand, but also among three outcome measures including behavioral intention (MacKenzie, Lutz, & Belch, 1986; Cronley et al.; 1994; Lord, Lee & Sauer, 1995). In particular, correspondence attributors will positively evaluate the ad and brand, and even have positive behavioral purchase intention, based on congruent associations between the celebrity and what the product is supposed to be (e.g., the endorser must reflect his/her real experience with the product). On the other hand, Correspondence attributors will negatively evaluate the ad and brand, and even have negative behavioral purchase intention when they perceive a certain level of suspicion from the endorser's situational information. As such, as outcomes for suspicion and product congruence, correspondence inferences also can influence consumers' ad or brand attitudes and behavioral intentions. In light of these assumptions, the following hypotheses are proposed;

H6a: Consumers' correspondence inferences will be significantly associated with their attitudes toward the advertisement, the product, and behavioral intention.

Besides the relationships between correspondence inference and attribution consequence, this study is also concerned with whether and how correspondence inferences could influence the effects of suspicion and perceived product congruence on attitudinal and behavioral responses to celebrity advertisements. That is, the issue here is focused on the mediating role of correspondence inferences between their antecedents (suspicion and perceived product congruence) and consequences (ad attitude, brand attitude, and behavioral intention). With references to the mediating effect of causal inferences that already been suggested by attribution researchers (e.g., Kelley & Michela, 1980; Decarlo & Leigh, 1996), the hypothesis on the mediating role of correspondence inference is posited as below;

H6b: Consumers' correspondence inferences will mediate the effect of suspicion attitudes toward the advertisement, the product, and behavioral intention.

H6c: Consumers' correspondence inferences will mediate the effect of perceived product congruence on attitudes toward the advertisement, the product, and behavioral intention.

Figure 4 illustrates the mediating role of correspondence inference in celebrity endorsement advertisements, which integrates the first five sets of hypotheses proposed in the present study. The model presupposes multiple dependent relations and mediating links: that is, 1) the main effect of suspicion in hypotheses 1 and 2; 2) the interaction effect of suspicion and perceived product congruence in hypotheses 3a-b; 3) the moderating effects of need for cognition and implicit theory of personality in hypotheses 4a-c and 5a-b; 4) the mediating effects of correspondence inference on the causal relationships between main factors (suspicion and perceived product congruence) and ad attitude, brand attitude, and behavioral intention in hypotheses 6a-c.

All suggested hypotheses require rigorous investigations based on the proposed mediating model in order to provide theoretical and managerial implications with respect to the applicability of the correspondence bias and suspicion perspectives to consumer processing of celebrity advertising and the differential effects of individual factors on that process. Those proposed hypotheses will be tested by the methodological process described in the next chapter.




Figure 4. A Proposed Mediation model of Celebrity Correspondence Inference

Chapter 3

Methodology

The current study employed a series of pilot studies and a main study to test the proposed hypotheses. This chapter gives an overview about the study design including pretests for stimuli advertisements, sampling, data collection procedure, and measured variables. Before specifying each experimental step, main constructs were first conceptualized to clarify particular characteristics of this study.

Conceptualization of Main Constructs

It was necessary for this study to conceptually redefine some important concepts or constructs in order to appropriately operationalize them and thereby help achieve an acceptable level of construct validity before performing experiments. Based on conceptualizations in the relevant literature, key constructs in this research were redefined as follows:

- *Attribution*: The perception a receiver generates to infer the cause of an actor's behavior. In this study, it specifically refers to an individual's cognitive activity of ascribing the celebrity's motivation for product endorsement in the advertisement to one or more causes.
- *Correspondence (Dispositional) inference*: The perception a receiver generates to infer that a celebrity's motive for supporting the product in the advertisement is attributed to the endorser's underlying true personality and disposition(s), such as the celebrity endorser's honest feeling or belief about the advertised product.

- *Correspondence bias*: The tendency for a perceiver to draw dispositional inferences from the endorsement even though he or she has recognized the situational constraint(s) that might actually cause the endorsement.
- *Suspicion*: The state in which a perceiver hold multiple and rival inferential hypotheses about the celebrity endorser's dispositional behavior in the advertisement when, from certain situational forces, he/she perceives the endorser's ulterior motive(s), such as the endorsers' self-interest, making money or enhancing personal goals.
- *Product Congruence (Schema Congruity)*: The extent to which new information (e.g., new product) conforms to consumer expectations based on previously defined category schemas in memory: Within the context of celebrity endorsement, schema congruity exists when the image of an celebrity endorser and the image of a product are relevant such that the relationship between them can be readily addressed within the existing celebrity and product category schemas.
- *Need for Cognition*: An individual's tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful cognitive endeavors: Individuals with higher need for cognition tend to invest and enjoy cognitive efforts more than lower need for cognition individuals.
- *Implicit theory of personality*: Assumptions that lay people hold about the nature of the self and particular objects or social worlds: Individuals with entity theories made more extreme trait judgments about the behavior of a celebrity endorser as compared to individuals with incremental theories.

Study Design

The experimental method of research was used for establishing the evidence of causality between constructs. The primary objectives of experiments were to test; 1) the main effects of suspicious condition on the evocation of correspondence bias or suspicion outcome regarding the behavior of a celebrity endorser in the exposed advertisement (i.e., Hypotheses 1 & 2), 2) the interaction effects of product congruence on the causal relationships between suspicions conditions and correspondence bias or suspicion outcome (i.e., Hypotheses 3a-b), 3) the moderating effects of personality constructs, need for cognition and implicit theory of personality, between suspicions conditions and correspondence bias or suspicion outcome in each product congruence condition (i.e., Hypotheses 4a-c & 5), and 4) lastly, the relationships between correspondence inference and attitudinal or behavioral measures in each suspicious condition (Hypotheses 6a-c).

To test proposed hypotheses 1, 2, and 3a-b, a 3x2 between-subjects factorial design was employed with no- versus low- versus high- suspicion conditions and high versus low product congruence conditions. To test proposed hypotheses 4a-c and 5, a 3x2 x2 between-subjects factorial design was employed with adding two factors of personality constructs, need for cognition (low versus high) and implicit theory of personality (entity versus incremental theorist), to the previous 3x2 between-subjects factorial design (See Figure 5). In addition, a no-suspicion condition, as a role of control group, was contrived as a part of the design in order to compare its correspondence inference as a baseline rate with correspondence inferences from low- or high-suspicion conditions. In this study, the types of suspicious conditions and perceived product congruence are manipulated variables, while the rest of constructs are measured variables. The

dependant variables are correspondence inference, attitude toward the advertisement, attitude toward the brand, and behavioral intention for the endorsed brand.




Figure 5. Factorial Design for Experiment

Pretests and Test advertisement

This study requires three pretests for developing test advertisements. Three pretests were conducted to; 1) select a appropriate sports celebrity whom subjects both have no name recognition of and understand his/her popularity of, 2) identify brands that are congruent and not congruent with the chosen celebrity and that subjects are not familiar with, and 3) create three levels of suspicious conditions based on situational information cues.

Celebrity Selection. The first pretest was designed to determine an appropriate sports celebrity endorser in test advertisements. To overcome potential problems with using a familiar celebrity with participants, this study chose a European sports celebrity not known to Americans. Though celebrities are by definition known to the public and generally famous, people's minds are varied considerably on their familiarity, likability, trustworthiness, and identification with a

celebrity. Such high variation in participants' evaluation of a celebrity, even though randomly distributed across experimental conditions, could generate an error variation that even ruins treatment effects.

Thirty-five participants were recruited in online pretests. Participants' recognition on the name of a sport celebrity was tested among European sports celebrities within a cycling sports category (See Appendix A). Among 4 athletes, Samuel Sánchez (2008 Beijing gold medalist in the road race), Chris Hoy (2008 Beijing gold medalist in the track and sprint), Julien Absalon (2004 Athens and 2008 Beijing gold medalist in the cross-country mountain bike), and Māris Štrombergs (2008 Beijing gold medalist in the BMX), French Olympic mountain bike cyclist Julien Absalon was selected as a sports celebrity endorser in the test advertisements due to participants' responses to zero recognition. It might be noted that one fictitious sports figure specialized in racing bicycles has been chosen for experimental manipulations of a celebrity endorser in a previous study in the literature (Till & Shimp, 1998). To minimize the confounding effect of endorser gender, it was determined to consistently use a male endorser for every stimulus advertisement.

Product Selection. The second pretest was to determine a product type and distinguished levels of celebrity and product congruence within the selected product type. As with celebrity selection, it was also very important to create and use made-up or unknown brands for this study's experiment in order to eliminate the possible effects of brand familiarity and perceived brand quality that might have existed and varied in the potential participants' minds. In addition, as Tripp et al. mentioned (1994), when subjects are exposed to unknown brands, multiple product endorsement effects, such as suspicion aroused, should be observed and possibly be

stronger than when exposed to familiar brands since subjects could rely only on peripheral cues in order to report their attitude toward the brand and purchase intention.

For the second pretest, the beverage product category was chosen as a product type. In the content analysis of Advertising Age's top 300 U.S. magazines in the time period from September 2002 to February 2005, Grau, Roselli, and Taylor (2007) found that food and beverages ranked as one of the most frequent product type sports celebrities endorsed: sporting goods (28%), clothing/shoes/apparel (22%), entertainment (9%), electronic appliance (7%), cosmetic/personal care (6%) and food/beverages (6%). Among six product types, the beverage category has been generally identified as one of low involvement products in the well-known framework for advertising planning, Foote, Cone & Belding (FCB) matrix (Vaughn, 1986). In addition to the high frequency in associations with sports celebrity endorsement, the beverage product was considered to be familiar and available to the subject population. Although it was expected that the individual variance on this factor would be considerable when participants are drawn from the consumer panelists whose age and lifestyle are likely to vary to a greater extent than those of homogeneous samples such as students, the choice of low involvement product category would prevent the affect of subjects' own unknown confounding factors on the study's experimental conditions.

Sixty-four participants were recruited in the online pretest to select a high congruent product and a low congruent product with the chosen sports celebrity in the stimulus advertisement (See Appendix A). With respect to product relevancy, studies on involvement have shown potential differences in the processing of advertisements from different product categories (Johar & Sirgy 1991; Petty et al., 1983). Therefore, this study would choose two different products within the same beverage products: coffee, milk, soft drink, sports/energy

drink, fruit juice, and tea. Among those beverage products, it took for granted that the sports/energy drink as a sports related product is highly congruent with the chosen sports celebrity; therefore, remains what to choose the other that meet the same level of personal involvement with the sports/energy drink and the low level of congruence with the chosen sports celebrity.

As demonstrated by the celebrity endorsement literature (Misra & Beatty, 1990; Till & Busler, 2000), the degree of product congruence with a sports celebrity was operationalized in terms of perceived match between the image of a sports celebrity and the image of an endorsed product based on a match-up factor. In order to select two products with different levels of congruence with the chosen sports celebrity, participants was asked to rate each beverage product on six seven-point semantic differential scales including very inappropriate/very appropriate, inconsistent/consistent, very unlikely/very likely, very irrelevant/very relevant, does not match/matches very well, and does not go together/ goes together ($\alpha = .86$). These scales were adapted from several studies on match-up hypothesis (Kamins & Gupta, 1994; Misra & Beatty, 1990; Till & Busler, 2000) and the mean score of six items were calculated to represent each participant's overall involvement with each beverage. The results of the pretest indicated that soft drink is the most incongruent and sports/energy drink is the most congruent with the chosen sports celebrity among five beverage products: coffee ($M: 2.82, SD: 1.66$), milk ($M: 3.86, SD: 1.87$), soft drink ($M: 2.75, SD: 1.67$), sports/energy drink ($M: 5.92, SD: 1.44$), fruit juice ($M: 4.37, SD: 1.87$), and tea ($M: 3.03, SD: 1.57$). The paired t-test reveals that the difference of congruence between soft and sports/energy drink is statistically significant ($t = -3.09, p < .001$). For these selected products, fictitious brand names, 'ENERGY' for the sports/energy drink and 'ORANGINA' for the soft drink were developed and used to eliminate the possible effects of

brand familiarity and perceived brand quality that might have existed and varied in the minds of potential participants.

Design of Test Advertisements and Suspicious Information. This study created six different types of stimuli in associations with two levels of celebrity-product perceived congruence and three levels of suspicious condition. Firstly, for the chosen sports celebrity, Julien Absalon, two full-page color print advertisements were designed to represent two levels of celebrity-product congruence with the help of an advertising professional to make the advertisement more realistic (see Appendix B). Each set of two advertisements was constructed to be equivalent, except for the product type advertised. In order to minimize variances in their message and creative components, two advertisements had identical layouts and spacing with a photo of the endorser appearing on the middle of the page. Each advertisement contained a brief line of copy for the endorsed brand (e.g., ‘ENERGY, My first choice of sports drink’) as a personal statement made by the celebrity, which appeared in the bottom side of the page. A picture of each brand appeared in the lower left-hand side of the advertisement. In order to minimize the effect of prior knowledge with the brand, the made-up brand named ENERGY for the high congruence product and ORANGINA for the low congruence product were used for all treatment conditions. A pretest revealed that none of eighty-four participants had heard of those brand names.

Besides two levels of product congruence with the sports celebrity, this study requires the observation of consumer responses to the advertisements with three levels of suspicion aroused from situational information. A link between Julien Absalon and each suspicious condition was established by having each participant read informational contents about his profile and contract status as a celebrity endorser after being exposed to test advertisements. According to Fein

(1996), suspicion is “a dynamic state in which the individual actively entertains multiple, plausible rival hypotheses about the motives or genuineness of a person’s behavior” (pp. 1165). In the psychology literature, this definition has been used widely in guiding the experimental conditions by differentiating information about actor-target relationships such as a student vs. a professor and a man vs. a very wealthy widow (Fein et al., 1989; Fein, 1996; Marchand & Vonk, 2005). Those studies also found that the largest changes in participants’ suspicious evaluation emerged on the basis of target information. Such information about actor-target relationships could not be found in the celebrity advertising people usually watched on television or magazine. Also, consumers saw many advertisements without any given contextual information on the endorsing behaviors of a celebrity. However, in the advertising and marketing literature, it has been found that consumers’ suspicion of ulterior motives on the endorsing behavior of a celebrity could be triggered by such cues as his large amount of money contract revealed to the public (Cronley et al., 1999; Moore et al., 1994; Silvera et al., 2004) or his presence on multiple product advertisements (Mowen & Beatty, 1990; Mowen et al., 1979; Tripp et al., 1994).

Based on aforementioned literatures on suspicion of ulterior motives, this study operationalized consumers’ suspicion of the ulterior motives on certain celebrity endorsers as the state that is evoked by the increase in cues that are specifically related to the ulterior motives of a celebrity endorser such as large amounts of money and multiple product endorsements. No suspicious condition on celebrity’s ulterior motives was presented within the context of a nonpaid celebrity endorsement. In particular, in order to make it sure that participants did not perceive the celebrity’s ulterior motives, his endorsement motivation as supporting for the underprivileged was specified in the situational information. For no suspicious condition, following two of information items were presented after the stimulus advertisement.

- Julien Absalon is a French cross-country mountain biker. He won gold medals at the 2004 Summer Olympics and at the 2008 Summer Olympics. He rides for the Spanish mountain bike team Orbea. Absalon has 17 World Cup wins.
- Among some of possible non-alcoholic beverages on the French market, Julien Absalon decided to endorse the brand, ENERGY (or ORANGINA) as part of his support for children and young people in South Africa.

The low suspicious condition was manipulated with disclosing the contact fee of 8 million dollars to emphasize that Julien Absalon was extremely well compensated for his appearance. This endorsement amount for a famous sports celebrity refers to the informal investigation from celebrity management organizations' fee schedule. Though a large amount contract fee could be viewed by subjects as a strong ulterior motive toward the endorsing behavior of a sports celebrity, this study contends that only this information could not evoke high suspicion from subjects' minds because the practice of fee compensation becomes general knowledge to consumers and they tend to believe celebrities like the endorsed product regardless of endorsement fees (Cronley et al., 1999; Moore et al., 1994; Silvera et al., 2004). The following two information items were used in the low suspicious condition.

- Julien Absalon is a French cross-country mountain biker. He won gold medals at the 2004 Summer Olympics and at the 2008 Summer Olympics. He rides for the Spanish mountain bike team Orbea. Absalon has 17 World Cup wins.
- Julien Absalon contracts 8 million dollars per year for endorsing the brand, ENERGY (or ORANGINA).

Studies on multiple product endorsements provided evidence that multiple product endorsements not only resulted in detrimental effects on consumers' trustworthiness on the celebrity endorsers but induced more negative evaluations of the advertisement and the brand (Mowen & Beatty, 1990; Mowen et al., 1979). According to Tripp et al. (1994), this negative effect is distinct from any effects that occur due to increased exposure to the celebrity endorser.

Those researchers also confirmed that individuals reacted less favorably to the advertisement itself as knowledge of number of products endorsed increased to four. This study regards the informational cue of multiple product endorsements as an inducer enough to create the high suspicion that the celebrity has ulterior motives to cash in the value of their name recognition or to build his/her personal image. As shown in the following three information items, information cues about the increased amount of endorsement fees and other five endorsement brands were revealed in the high suspicion condition.

- Julien Absalon is a French cross-country mountain biker. He won gold medals at the 2004 Summer Olympics and at the 2008 Summer Olympics. He rides for the Spanish mountain bike team Orbea. Absalon has 17 World Cup wins.
- Julien Absalon contracts 8 million dollars per year for endorsing the brand, ENERGY (or ORANGINA).
- Besides ENERGY (or ORANGINA), Julien Absalon now endorses 5 different brands in Europe. He earns more than 30 million dollars from those endorsement deals.
 - Numericable (cable television operator)
 - Pearl iZUMi (mountain Biking Shoes)
 - NICKEL (cosmetics)
 - Archos (MP3 player)
 - Celio (men's clothing)

In Fein and his colleagues' studies (1989; 1990; 1996), suspicion of ulterior motives was experimentally induced. Participants received a description of a situation that put them in a state of suspicion. Subsequently, additional information was provided that could change participants' judgments in one direction or the other. It is important to note that in those studies, researchers did not check manipulated suspicious conditions because they knew participants were already suspicious of the actor's behavior from the contextual information. Like previous studies on suspicion in the psychology literature, this study's three levels of suspicion were also induced by manipulated situational information cues. However, in order to clarify the manipulation, difference between high and low suspiciousness to the sports celebrity was pretested (See

Appendix A). In the third pretest, participants received constant profile information about the sports celebrity, Julien Absalon; however, different types of situational information about Julien Absalon were presented depending on suspicious conditions. Eighty four participants were asked to indicate which informational cue aroused more suspicion on the ulterior motives behind the endorsed behavior of Julien Absalon. With eight no responses, sixty four subjects chose the sports celebrity with multiple product endorsements as being more suspicious: whereas, twelve people chose the sports celebrity with only the endorsement fee as being more suspicious ($\chi^2 = 18.47, p < .001$).

Sampling Method

A random sample of 3,000 potential participants was selected from the computer database of consumer panels provided by SurveyMonkey. The company has approximately more than 30 million registered adult members of a nationwide consumer panel in the United States and all of them are selected by the criteria of SurveyMonkey's qualifying points. The stratified sampling method was used to guarantee that a specific of subsample of the population is adequately represented. Initial subsample is representative of the U.S. population in terms of gender (1500 males - 50% and 1500 females - 50%) and age (330 panelists aged between 19 and 29 years - 11%, 480 panelists aged between 30 and 44 years - 16%, 1700 panelists aged between 45 and 60 years - 57%, and 490 panelists aged over 60 years - 16%). These ratios are compatible with those reported in the U.S. Census Bureau regarding to the intercensal estimates of the resident population by sex and age for the United States as of July 1, 2010. Those initial mail recipients were also randomly distributed according to their race, occupation, educational level, household income, and state in which they currently reside. With an effort to make such demographic characteristics equivalent over the six groups (four treatment groups and two

control group), each potential participant was randomly assigned to one of the six experimental conditions with 500 initial panelists per group. The online survey continued until at least 60 responses were collected in each cell group. All participants were more than 18 years old. About 20-25 minutes were required for participants to complete a questionnaire. There were no anticipated risks and all responses were strictly anonymous. Before the progress onto data collection, all of research protocols involving the use of human subjects were approved by IRB at the University of Tennessee Knoxville.

Experimental Procedure for Main Study

Because this study employs a field experiment method using an online consumer panel, the data-gathering procedure is different from that used in laboratory settings. First, three electronic files were created with reference to the results of pretests. The first file includes instructions on the research objective and rights on the human subjects. The second file contains 6 different contents of stimulus advertisements according to the treatment/control of three suspicion levels and two celebrity-product congruence levels. The third customized file for each treatment/control condition is made up of questions on dependant variables, manipulation check, and demographics. After fixing technical problems associated with the flow of online survey and readability, an invitation e-mail containing a link to one of these files is sent out to the randomly selected consumer panelists. Those subjects are people who opted in to an online survey sample list provided by SurveyMonkey's authorized research.

Second, those who wanted to participate in the current experiment were guided to access the assigned experimental content by clicking a link in the invitation e-mail at their convenience. At the beginning of the online survey, participants were asked to consent to their rights human subjects and participation via a checkbox query. If the subject consented, he or she was then

asked to proceed to the stimulus ad and information, and then fill out post-exposure questionnaire on his or her own pace. Once participants accessed the experimental content, they were instructed to: (1) look at a given advertisement for 20-30 seconds or longer if they wished; (2) assume that they find the advertisement while reading a magazine; and (3) carefully read and follow the directions in each section when filling out the post-exposure questionnaire. During filling out questionnaire, referring back to the advertisement is allowed because there are many memory-based questions spanning the whole questionnaire. Also, to control for potential order effects, the logically ordered question were altered for a new order. The data resulted from this study were used only for study analysis. The online survey questionnaire was deleted after gathering all data; instead, the printed version of questionnaire remains in a locked file cabinet in the researcher' office for one years, upon which time they will be destroyed. A copy of the survey questionnaire and experiment materials are attached (See Appendix B).

Measures

The experimental research requires that a researcher operationally define abstract concepts in concrete forms and the variables under consideration be measured (Wimmer & Dominick, 2000). In this study, the post-exposure questionnaires contained measures tapping correspondence inference, attitude toward the ad, attitude toward the brand, and purchase intention as dependent variables. In addition, two personality measures, need for cognition and implicit of personality, were adopted from previous literatures to identify their moderating roles on the dependent variable, correspondence inference.

Dependent Variables. A crucial step in this study was to measure how patterns of correspondence inference differ across suspicious conditions. In this study, correspondence inference is operationalized as the extent to which participants, with reference to situational

constraints, made dispositional attributions regarding the endorser's attitude toward the brand. It should be noted that correspondence inference was measured in a forced condition: that is, participants were asked to rate how much they agree or disagree with each of the listed causes of the endorsing behavior of the sports celebrity. Although people make causal inferences naively by natural activation of attributional thinking (Heider, 1958), the forced method of measuring attributions was necessary to evoke the participants' dormant inferential activity and thereby to ensure a sufficient number of attributional responses for statistical analyses.

Correspondence inference was measured with a composite scale adopted from Pilkonis (1977), Cronley et al. (1999), and Sorum et al. (2003). Participants were asked to indicate their level of likeliness ranging from 1(not at all likely) to 9 (extremely likely) on the following six statements. A total of six items for this measure were found to be internally consistent ($\alpha = .86$) and for the statistical use, the mean score of six items were calculated to represent each participant's index of correspondence inference.

- Julien Absalon endorses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] to convey his belief in the brand.
- Julien Absalon frequently uses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)].
- Julien Absalon doesn't like the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)].
- Julien Absalon endorses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] to express her feeling about the brand based on her actual experience.
- Julien Absalon views the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] as a good brand.
- Julien Absalon endorses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] to talk about the brand based on his actual experience and knowledge with the brand.

According to Mitchell and Olson (1981), attitude is defined as “an individual's internal evaluation of an object such as a branded product” (pp. 318). Mitchell and Olson (1981) also suggested that attitudes are considered relatively stable and enduring predispositions to behave in a certain way. Thus, attitude measures have been considered useful predictors of consumer behavior toward a product or service by advertising scholars and practitioners (MacKenzie, Lutz, & Belch, 1986; Mitchell, 1986; Mitchell & Olson, 1981; Spears & Singh, 2004). In this study, attitude toward the ad, attitude toward the brand, and purchase intention were measured as dependent variables in order to find out the relationships of participants' correspondence inference with those attitude measures.

Attitude toward the ad, defined as a person's favorable or unfavorable evaluation to a particular advertising stimulus during a particular exposure occasion, were assessed with a seven-point, semantic differential scale anchored by pleasant/ unpleasant, likable/unlikable, desirable/undesirable, appealing/unappealing and good/bad. Those five items were adapted and slightly modified from the attitude studies of these items were found to be internally consistent ($\alpha = .92$). The mean score of five items were calculated to represent each participant's index of attitude toward the advertisement.

Spears and Singh (2004) defined attitude toward the brand as “relatively enduring, one dimensional summary evaluation of the brand that presumably energizes behavior” (pp. 55). After a series of factor analyses, those researchers developed a comprehensive scale for attitude toward the brand. Their scale was deemed appropriate for the present study because their five items seem to encompass most sub-dimensions of brand attitude definitions. Therefore, to measure attitude toward the brand, this study used a seven-point, semantic differential scale anchored by appealing/unappealing, bad/good, unpleasant/pleasant, favorable/favorable, and

likable/unlikable. These items were found to be internally consistent ($\alpha = .89$). The mean score of five items were calculated to represent each participant's index for attitude toward the brand.

Behavioral Intention refers to a person's motivation in the sense of his or her conscious plan to exert effort to carry out a behavior (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). In this sense, intentions are easily differentiated from attitudes. Bagozzi, Tybout, Craig, and Sternthal (1979) defined behavioral intentions as personal action tendencies relating to the brand. Spears and Singh (2004) more specifically defined purchase intention as "an individual's conscious plan to make an effort to purchase a brand" (p. 56). This study used the construct, behavioral intention, as a dependent variable because it is a more inclusive measure than purchase intention and fictitious brands in the stimulus advertisement are not on the market. After the leading statement, "if ENERGY (ORANGIA) is on the US market," participants were asked to indicate their degrees of agreement or disagreement using a 7-point Likert type scale with the following four statements. A total of four items for this scale were found to be internally consistent ($\alpha = .85$) and for the statistical use, the mean score of six items were calculated to represent each participant's overall behavioral intention.

- Next time when I purchase a sports drink (or soft drink), I will buy ENERGY (or ORANGIA).
- I will consider drinking ENERGY (or ORANGIA).
- I would search for more information about ENERGY (or ORANGIA) (e.g., visit Website(s)).
- If special sale is offered, I will buy ENERGY (or ORANGIA).

Moderating Variables. One of purposes of this study is to examine the possibility that individual's information processing difference between high and low need for cognition and implicit theory of personality may influence the correspondence inference. Cacioppo and Petty

(1982) defined need for cognition as “the tendency for an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking” (pp. 116). According to them, need for cognition could moderate the effectiveness of an advertisement through its influence on the preferred style and amount of processing. The need for cognition scale was administered after the subjects had completed the questionnaire containing the dependent measures, a procedure similar to that used by Haugtvedt, Petty, and Cacioppo (1992). The subjects were told that the scale contained statements about situations that require subjects' reactions to demand for cognitive effort. The abbreviated, 18-item need for cognition scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984) was used to assess participants' agreement (1 = complete disagreement and 7 = complete agreement) with 18 phrases designed to detect their disposition to engage in hard and systematic thinking (e.g., “I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours”, or “learning new ways of thinking does not excite me very much”). These items were found to be internally consistent ($\alpha = .88$). Self ratings on those statements were averaged to classify the subjects into two groups by the conventional median split method (*Median* = 4.34). The high need for cognition group had ratings above the median and the low need for cognition group had ratings below the median.

Implicit theory of personality was defined as “the two different assumptions people make about the malleability of personal attitudes” (Dweck et al., 1995, pp. 267) where entity theory refers to a fixed, nonmalleable trait and incremental theory implicates a malleable quality that can be changed over time. Originally, Dweck et al. (1995) developed scales for implicit theory of personality in conceptually specific domains such as intelligence, morality, and world, but they also designed a three-item scale in order to assess the overall entity versus incremental theory of the person in a particular domain. The items in this implicit person theory scale are: 1) "The kind of person someone is something very basic about them and it can't be changed very much," 2)

"People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are can't really be changed," and "Everyone is a certain kind of person and there is not much that can be done to really change that" ($\alpha = .87$). This study adopted this three-item overall scale of implicit theory of personality, each of which was measured on a 6 point Likert scale and averaged to form an overall implicit theory score (ranging from 1 to 6), with a higher score indicating a stronger incremental theory. Also, to ensure that only participants with clear theories are included, this study followed the same format and scoring method of a previous study on implicit theory of personality (Dweck et al., 1993) where participants were classified as entity theorists if their overall implicit theory score is 3.0 or below and classified as incremental theorists if their overall score is 4.0 or above.

Chapter 4

Results

This chapter reports the results of main experiment following the description of sample profile, equivalency checks for sample group, and manipulation checks for test advertisements. The statistic package program, SPSS 20.0, was used to assess the data for descriptive and analytic statistics. Procedures and analyses that were taken in each phase are detailed in the following sections.

Sample Profile

A week after deploying online questionnaires including test advertisements to the selected consumer panelists, a total of 323 responses among selected 3,000 consumer panelists (response rate 10.8%) were collected. However, the final sample for statistical inference included a total of 289 responses after cleaning out responses with too many missing values or contrary to the treatment of experimental conditions. The number of participants in each experimental condition is; 1) 52 for the group of no suspicion and low product congruence, 2) 46 for the group of low suspicion and low product congruence, 3) 42 for the group of high suspicion and low product congruence, 4) 55 for the group of no suspicion and high product congruence, 5) 50 for the group of low suspicion and high product congruence, and 6) 44 for the group of high suspicion and high product congruence.

The composition of final sample was fairly representative of the U. S. population in terms of gender and age. Of the sample of 289 participants, 48.4% ($n = 140$) were male and 51.6% ($n = 149$) were female. The majority of participants are 45-60 ($n = 109$, 37.7%) years old followed by the age group of 30-44 ($n = 76$, 25.6%), over 60 ($n = 70$, 25.0%), and 18-20 ($n = 34$, 11.8%). For

the educational level, participants with a graduate degree made up the majority ($n = 90$, 31.1%); the rest were associate or bachelor degrees ($n = 86$, 29.8%), some college ($n = 78$, 27.0%), a high school degree ($n = 27$, 9.3%), and less than a high school degree ($n = 8$, 2.8%). Table 1 shows these demographic profiles of the experimental participants.

Table 1. Sample Demographic Characteristics

Demographic Characteristics	Category	Frequency (n=289)	Percent (%)
Gender	Male	140	48.4
	Female	149	51.6
Age	18-29	34	11.8
	30-44	76	25.6
	45-60	109	37.7
	Over 60	70	25.0
Education	Less than high school degree	8	2.8
	High school degree	27	9.3
	Some college	78	27.0
	Associate or bachelor degree	86	29.8
	Graduate degree	90	31.1

Sample Group Equivalency Checks

In order to guarantee what an experimental design tries to achieve, it was important to attain an acceptable level of equivalency over six experimental conditions in terms of sample demographic profiles and distributions of scores for possible confounding variables. If the comparison groups are similar to each other on all confounding variables at the beginning of the experiment, the variation of the dependent variable is mainly due to the systematic difference between groups in an experiment, resulting in increasing internal validity of the study (Wimmer & Dominick, 2000). As demonstrated in Table 2, no significant differences among six groups were found in the proportions of gender (suspicion: $\chi^2 = .190$, $p = .910$; product congruence: $\chi^2 = .002$, $p = .966$). Table 3 also shows that the distribution of age was not significantly different over the six groups (suspicion: $\chi^2 = 2.324$, $p = .888$; product congruence: $\chi^2 = 3.030$, $p = .387$).

Table 2. Gender Equivalency Check: Pearson Chi-Squire Test

Conditions	<i>N</i>	Gender (%)		χ^2	<i>Sig.</i>
		Male	Female		
Suspicion					
High	86	40(13.8)	46(15.9)	.190 (<i>df</i> = 2)	.910
Low	96	47(16.3)	19(17.0)		
No	107	53(18.3)	54(18.7)		
Product Congruence					
High	149	72(24.9)	77(26.6)	.002 (<i>df</i> = 1)	.966
Low	140	68(23.5)	72(24.9)		

Table 3. Age Equivalency Check: Pearson Chi-Squire Test

Conditions	N	Age (%)				χ^2	Sig.
		18-29	30-44	45-60	Over 60		
Suspicion							
High	86	8(2.8)	24(8.3)	33(11.4)	21(7.3)	2.324 (df=6)	.888
Low	96	12(4.2)	20(6.9)	39(13.5)	25(8.7)		
No	107	14(4.8)	29(10.0)	37(12.8)	27(9.3)		
Product Congruence							
High	149	22.(7.6)	37(12.8)	52(18.0)	35(12.1)	3.030 (df=3)	.387
Low	140	12(4.2)	36(12.5)	57(19.7)	35(12.1)		

Following the Chi-Squire test on gender and age, series of one-way ANOVAs and t-tests were conducted to test whether the levels of perceived source credibility and product involvement are significantly different among the six groups. As described in the literature, the constructs, source credibility and product involvement, have been widely accepted as affecting consumers' cognitive and attitudinal responses on advertising. The measurement of source credibility, comprising the dimensions of expertise, attractiveness, and trustworthiness, was adopted from Ohanian's (1990) source-credibility scale. All three measures of source credibility were internally consistent (expertise: $\alpha = .94$; attractiveness: $\alpha = .92$; trustworthiness: $\alpha = .89$). Product involvements with sports and soft drinks were tested using Zaichkowsky's (1994) revised personal involvement inventory, which were also internally consistent ($\alpha = .85$). Subscales for each measure were averaged for the analysis. Table 4 indicates that the distribution of each measure of source credibility and product involvement was not significantly different over three suspicion groups (expertise: $F = 2.216, p = .298$; attractiveness: $F = .270, p = .763$; trustworthiness: $F = .948, p = .389$; product involvement with sports drink: $F = .291, p = .748$;

product involvement with soft drink; $F = .625, p = .536$). As shown in Table 5, with the exception of expertise, the proportions of attractiveness, trustworthiness, and product involvement were not significantly different between high and low product congruence groups (expertise: $t = -5.209, p < .01$; attractiveness: $t = -1.752, p = .081$; trustworthiness: $t = .948, p = .389$; product involvement with sports drink: $t = 2.454, p = .085$; product involvement with soft drink: $t = .803, p = .407$). The significant difference of expertise between two levels of product congruence groups are highly acceptable because two groups were conditioned based on products' matching with the source's expertise. In sum, the impact of gender, age, source credibility, and product involvement were successfully controlled in the six experimental conditions.

Table 4. Source Credibility & Product Involvement Equivalency Check on Suspicion:

Equivalency Measures	Suspicion						<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
	No		Low		High			
	<i>Mean</i> (<i>max.=7</i>)	<i>SD</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>		
Source Credibility								
Expert	4.47	2.04	4.02	2.08	4.23	2.14	1.216	.298
Attractiveness	4.51	1.69	4.43	1.51	4.35	1.42	.270	.763
Trustworthy	4.51	1.69	4.25	1.35	4.30	1.22	.948	.389
Product Involvement								
Sports Drink	3.36	1.96	3.41	1.98	3.20	1.86	.291	.748
Soft Drink	3.69	2.06	3.60	2.08	3.94	2.14	.625	.536

Table 5. Source Credibility & Product Involvement Equivalency Check on Product Congruence: Independent T-Test

Equivalency Measures	Product Congruence				<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
	Low		High			
	<i>Mean</i> (<i>max.=7</i>)	<i>SD</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>SD</i>		
Source Credibility						
Expert	3.62	2.05	4.85	1.94	-5.209	.000**
Attractiveness	4.27	1.59	4.59	1.51	-1.752	.081
Trustworthy	4.38	1.38	4.35	1.52	.948	.389
Product Involvement						
Sports Drink	3.41	1.88	3.06	1.95	2.454	.085
Soft Drink	3.84	2.17	3.64	2.03	.803	.407

Note. ** $p < 0.01$.

Manipulation Checks

Six stimuli, including two test advertisements with the variation of perceived product congruence and three situational information cues inducing different levels of suspicion, were created for the main study. Manipulation checks were conducted to ensure that participants in three suspicious conditions perceived the types of situational information cue as intended and to check if there were significant differences in the compatibility between the sports celebrity (Julien Absalon) and his endorsed drink products (ENERGY and ORANGIA). In regard to three types of situational information cues, which were designed to generate different degrees of suspicion (Fein et al., 1989; Echebarria-Echabe, 2010), participants were asked to indicate their levels of agreement ranging from 1 (highly unlikely) to 7 (highly likely) on the following questions.

- Julien Absalon endorsed the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] because of his hidden interests.
- Julien Absalon endorsed the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] because of his certain financial goals.
- Julien Absalon endorsed the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] to present his image to the public.
- The fact that Julien Absalom endorsed the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] makes me suspicious of his ulterior motives.

Perceived product congruence with the chosen celebrity in two conditions was tested with a multiple item measure, adapted contextually from Fleck and Quester's (2007) bi-dimensional congruence scale. Participants were asked to indicate their levels of agreement ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) on the following questions. Reliability tests confirmed a sufficient level of internal consistency for both measures (suspicion: $\alpha = .84$; product congruence: $\alpha = .92$), suggesting no need to remove any item for the manipulation check.

- I am not surprised that this person (Julien Absalon) endorses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)].
- With this endorsement, I can understand the brand (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] better.
- One would expect this person (Julien Absalon) to endorse the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)].
- That this person (Julien Absalon) endorses the brand (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] tells me something about it.

The result of one-way ANOVA in Table 6 revealed that there were significant effects of situational information manipulations on suspicion ($F = 21.549, p < .01$). Furthermore, as shown in Table 7, the results of planned contrasts confirmed that three sets of suspicious condition were perceived as intended. The suspicion mean score for the high suspicious condition ($M = 4.80, SD = .87$) was significantly higher than that for the no suspicious condition ($M = 4.49, SD = .82; t = 4.241, p < .001$). Likewise, the suspicion mean score for the low suspicious condition was significantly higher than that for the no suspicious condition ($M = 3.93, SD = 1.08; t = 2.226, p < .05$). Significant differences between two levels of treatment groups for product congruence were confirmed by the independent t-test (high: $M = 4.32, SD = 1.18$; low: $M = 3.79, SD = 1.22; t = -3.723, p < .001$) which is shown in Table 8. Thus, group differences on the dependent measures could be reasonably ascribed to the treatments.

Table 6. Manipulation Checks on Suspicious Conditions: One-Way ANOVA

Suspicious Conditions	N	Mean (max.=7)	SD	F	Sig.
High	86	4.80	0.87	21.549	.000**
Low	96	4.49	0.82		
No	107	3.93	1.08		

Note. Between groups $df=2$; Within groups $df=286$. ** $p < 0.01$.

Table 7. Manipulation Checks on Suspicious Conditions: Planned Contrasts

Suspicious Conditions	Value of Contrast	SE	<i>t</i>	Sig.
No vs. Low	.561	.132	4.241	.000**
Low vs. High	.311	.140	2.226	.027*

Note. * $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8. Manipulation Checks on Product Congruence: Independent T-Test

Product Congruence	N	Mean (max.=7)	SD	<i>t</i>	Sig.
High	149	4.32	1.18	-3.723	.000**
Low	140	3.79	1.22		

Note. ** $p < 0.01$.

Hypotheses Tests for the Main Experiment

This study delves into consumers' correspondence inference on a celebrity endorser based on his/her suspicious information and perceived product congruence. Primarily, the study examines 1) the main and interaction effects of suspicion and perceived product congruence, 2) the interaction effects of need for cognition and implicit theory of personality with suspicion, and 3) the mediational effects of correspondence inference between two main conditions and advertising related attitudes. In order to find out those relationships empirically, series of factorial ANOVAs with rigorous planned contrasts and regressions with mediation tests were conducted within satisfied assumptions of parametric tests on normal distribution, homogeneity of variance, and independence.

The Results of Multivariate Analysis. For two independent variables, suspicion and perceived product congruence, a series of multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVA) were performed on dependent variables: correspondence inference, attitude toward the advertisement, brand attitude, and behavioral intention. As a preliminary check for MANOVA's assumption of homoscedasticity, Box's M test was conducted for both independent variables. The result of Box's M test was not significant respectively (suspicion: $p = 25.00$; perceived product congruence: $p = 23.59$), which indicates equality of the variance/covariance matrices among treatment groups in each dependent variable (Field, 2005). With the use of Wilks' lambda criterion, the combined dependent variables were significantly affected by the degree of suspicion ($Wilks' \lambda = .791$, $F = 8.78$, $p < .01$) and perceived product congruence ($Wilks' \lambda = .889$, $F = 8.825$, $p < .01$). The MANOVA results also reflected moderate associations for both suspicion ($\eta^2 = .11$) and perceived product congruence ($\eta^2 = .11$) with the combined dependent variables. Because omnibus MANOVAs indicated significant main effects of the degree of suspicion and

perceived product congruence on the combined dependent variables, it was appropriate to further investigate the nature of hypothesized relationships between treatments and individual dependent variables through univariate ANCOVA procedures (Field, 2005).

The Effects of Suspicion. H1 stated that consumers' correspondence inference on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity in an advertisement will not be significantly lower under a low suspicious condition than under no suspicious condition. Furthermore, H2 envisioned that consumers' correspondence inference on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity in an advertisement will be negatively associated with their suspicion aroused from high suspicious condition. The objectives of those two statements are to test whether consumers show correspondence bias in low suspicious condition and overcome the bias in high suspicious condition. A 3 (degree of suspicion) x 2 (degree of perceived product congruence) ANOVA was conducted on consumers' index of correspondence inference. Type III sums of squares were used in the analysis due to the different numbers of participants in each groups. Also, as a preliminary check for ANOVA's assumption of homogeneity of variance between groups, Levene's test was conducted. The result of Levene's test was not significant for the dependent variable, which indicates the high probability value for the data set (Field, 2005).

Table 9. Results of the 3(Suspicion) x 2(Product Congruence): Two-Way ANOVA

Dependent Variable	Independent Variables	<i>df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	η^2
Correspondence Inference (CI)	Suspicion (S)	2	60.57	39.03	.000**	.22
	Product Congruence (PC)	1	23.99	15.46	.000**	.05
	S x PC	2	5.23	3.37	.003**	.02
	Error	283	1.55			

*Note. R Squared = .259 (Adjusted R Squared = .246). ** $p < 0.01$.*

As shown in Table 9, the result of ANOVA analysis revealed that there was a significant main impact of the suspicion treatments on the correspondence inference ($F = 39.03, p < .01, \eta^2 = .22$). In order to examine the occurrence of correspondence bias for participants in low (i.e., multiple product endorsements) or high (i.e., multiple product endorsements) suspicious conditions, mean differences between each suspicious condition were compared and tested with planned contrasts. In this study, the statistical method of planned contrasts is more useful than post hoc tests because specific hypotheses should be tested. The results of planned contrasts (see Table 10) showed that mean difference between the low ($M = 5.64, SD = 1.08$) and no ($M = 5.95, SD = 1.37$) conditions was not significantly different ($t = -1.71, p = .089$). However, the mean value for correspondence inference in the low suspicious condition ($M = 4.42, SD = 1.38$) was significantly lower than that in the low suspicious condition ($t = -6.41, p < .01$). The pattern of mean values among the three suspicious conditions was consistent with the hypothesized downside linear relationship, Based on these results, H1 and H2 were fully supported.

Table 10. Planned Contrasts of CI Regarding Main Effects

Independent Variables	Level (Mean/SD)		Mean Diff.	df	t	Sig.
Suspicion	No (5.95/1.37)	Low (5.64/1.08)	-.31	286	-1.71	.089
	Low (5.64/1.07)	High (4.42/1.38)	-1.22	286	-6.41	.000**
	No (5.95/1.37)	High (4.42/1.38)	-1.53	286	-8.23	.000**
Product Congruence	Low (5.10/1.51)	High (5.66/1.31)	.56	287	3.36	.001**

Note. ** $p < 0.01$.

The Effects of Perceived Product Congruence. H3a predicted that consumers' correspondence inferences on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity in an advertisement will be significantly greater for a high congruent product than for a low congruent product. Also, in associations with suspicion, H3b predicted that consumers' tendency to correspondence bias becomes stronger for a high congruent product than for a low congruent product; whereas, consumers' tendency to suspicion of ulterior motives becomes stronger for a low congruent product than for a high congruent product. The former hypothesis was examined in its main effect from the aforementioned 3 x 2 factorial ANOVA. In order to support the H3b, three criteria were applied; 1) the interaction between suspicion and perceived product congruence, 2) the occurrence of correspondence bias in low suspicious conditions and the overcome of correspondence bias in high suspicions conditions at both levels of product congruent conditions, and 3) the increase of mean differences between each suspicious condition from high to low product congruent conditions. In some senses, the third criterion tests the moderating role of product congruence on suspicion; therefore, it was assessed by means of procedure suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986).

For the main effect, Table 10 indicated that the mean value for the correspondence inference in the high product congruent condition ($M = 5.66$, $SD = 1.31$) was significantly higher than that in the low product congruent condition ($M = 5.10$, $SD = 1.51$; $F = 15.46$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .05$), which was also supported by the planned contrast ($t = 3.36$, $p < .01$) in Table 11. Despite the effect size was small, same ANOVA results also revealed a significant degree of suspicion by product congruence for the correspondence inference ($F = 3.37$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .02$). The second requirement for H3b was tested using the planned contrasts. The results of planned contrasts (see Table 7) showed that, in the high product congruent condition, the mean difference between the

low ($M = 6.08$, $SD = .77$) and no ($M = 5.98$, $SD = 1.41$) conditions was not significantly different ($t = .42$, $p = .675$); however, in the low product congruent condition; the mean value for correspondence inference in the low suspicious condition ($M = 5.17$, $SD = 1.16$) was significantly lower than that in the no suspicious condition ($M = 5.92$, $SD = 1.16$; $t = -2.85$, $p < .01$). The mean differences between low and high suspicious conditions were shown to be all significantly different at both high (low suspicion: same as above; high suspicion; $M = 4.79$, $SD = 1.28$, $t = -5.22$, $p < .01$) and low (low: same as above; high: $M = 4.03$, $SD = 1.51$, $t = -4.12$, $p < .01$) product congruent conditions. Lastly, Figure 6 demonstrates differences in the suspicion treatment effects between low and high product congruent groups for participants' correspondence inferences. While the treatment effects did materialize among low and high product congruent groups, these effects appeared not to be more pronounced among participants with higher suspicion. Therefore, H3a was supported and H3b were partially supported.

Table 11. Planned Contrasts of CI on Perceived Product Congruence by Suspicion

Moderating Variables	Suspicion			Mean Diff.	<i>t</i>	Sig.
	No	Low	High			
High PC	5.98(1.41)	6.08(.77)		.10	.42	.675
		6.08(.77)	4.79(1.28)	-1.29	-5.22	.000**
Low PC	5.92(1.34)	5.17(1.16)		-7.45	-2.85	.005**
		5.17(1.16)	4.03(1.51)	-1.14	-4.12	.000**




Figure 6. Correspondence Inferences for Interaction Effects

The Moderating Roles of Need for Cognition. H4a was employed to test whether the effects of suspicion would be moderated by an individual's own levels of need for cognition. H4a stated that consumers' tendency to correspondence bias will not appear for people with high need for cognition but people with low need for cognition; whereas, consumers' tendency to suspicion of ulterior motives will appear for people with both low and high for cognition. In addition, to better understand the moderating role of need for cognition, H4b and H4c were proposed to look at how the role would be changed according to different levels of product congruence. H4b specified that, in a condition of high product congruence, consumers' tendency to correspondence bias does not become stronger for people with low need for cognition than people with high need for cognition; whereas, in a condition of low product congruence, consumers' tendency to correspondence bias becomes stronger for people with low need for cognition than people with high need for cognition. For the high suspicious condition, H4c envisioned that in both levels of high and low product congruence, consumers' tendency to

suspicion of ulterior motives becomes stronger for people with high need for cognition than people with low need for cognition. The numbers of participants selected by the conventional median split method ($Median = 4.34$) in each sell was ranged from 22 to 31, and Levene's test resulted in the homogeneity of variance between all groups.

First, A 3 (degree of suspicion) x 2 (degree of perceived product congruence) x 2 (degree of need for cognition) ANOVA was conducted on consumers' index of correspondence inference. As shown in the Table 12, significant simple main effect was found for need for cognition ($F = 40.02, p < .01, \eta^2 = .13$), which means that participants with low need for cognition ($M = 5.73, SD = 1.21$) shows more correspondence inferences than participants with high need for cognition ($M = 4.97, SD = 1.43$).

Table 12. Results of the 3(Suspicion) x 2(Product Congruence) x 2(Need for Cognition) Design: Three-Way ANOVA

Dependent Variable	Source of Variation	<i>df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	η^2
Correspondence Inference (CI)	Suspicion (S)	2	66.52	50.74	.000**	.27
	Product Congruence (PC)	1	33.81	25.80	.000**	.09
	Need for Cognition (NFC)	1	52.46	40.02	.000**	.13
	S x PC	2	7.70	5.88	.003**	.04
	S x NFC	2	13.80	10.53	.000**	.07
	PC x NFC	1	2.09	1.59	.208	.01
	S x PC x NFC	2	1.02	.78	.460	.01
	Error	277	1.31			
	Low PC					
	Suspicion (S)	2	52.06	37.59	.000**	.27
	Need for Cognition (NFC)	1	35.87	25.90	.000**	.13
	S x NFC	2	7.76	5.60	.005**	.07
	Error	134	1.39			
	High PC					
	Suspicion (S)	2	20.30	16.35	.000**	.17
	Need for Cognition (NFC)	1	17.73	14.26	.000**	.09
	S x NFC	2	7.08	5.70	.000**	.07
	Error	143	1.24			

Note. ** $p < 0.01$.

As hypothesized in H4a, significant effects was revealed for the suspicion by need for cognition interaction ($F = 10.53, p < .01, \eta^2 = .07$). The results of planned contrasts in Table 13 showed that the mean differences of correspondence inference between no and low suspicious conditions were not significantly different at both low (no suspicion: $M = 6.05, SD = 1.32$; low suspicion; $M = 5.96, SD = .95, t = -.42, p = .677$) and high (no suspicion: $M = 5.81, SD = 1.45$; low suspicion; $M = 5.31, SD = 1.11, t = -1.83, p = .065$) need for cognition. However, the mean differences between low and high suspicious conditions were shown to be significantly different at both low (low suspicion: same as above; high suspicion; $M = 5.08, SD = 1.21, t = -3.80, p < .01$) and high (low suspicion: same as above; high suspicion; $M = 3.58, SD = 1.311, t = -6.16, p < .01$) need for cognition. Lastly, Figure 6 demonstrates differences in the suspicion treatment effects between low and high need for cognition for participants' correspondence inferences. As with the case of suspicion by product congruence interaction, while the treatment effects did materialize among low and high need for cognition groups, these effects appeared to be more pronounced among participants with higher suspicion. Therefore, H4a was supported.

Table 13. Planned Contrasts of CI on Suspicion by Need for Cognition

Moderating Variables	Suspicion			Mean Diff.	<i>t</i>	Sig.
	No	Low	High			
High NFC	5.81(1.45)	5.31(1.11)		-.50	-1.83	.069
		5.31(1.11)	3.58(1.31)	-1.73	-6.16	.000**
Low NFC	6.05(1.32)	5.96(.95)		-.90	-.42	.677
		5.96(.95)	5.08(1.21)	-.87	-3.80	.000**

Note. ** $p < 0.01$.

As indicated in Table 12, the interaction among three conditions, suspicion, product congruence, and need for cognition, was not found in the analysis of three-way ANOVA. This result of non-interaction was predicted by the researcher because it was expected that, though the strength is moderated by need for cognition, directional relationships between suspicion and need for cognition were expected to be the same in both levels of product congruence. However, in order to explore the effects of need for cognition on correspondence bias and suspicion of ulterior motives in each degree of product congruence, two-way ANOVAs of suspicion by need for cognition were executed in each perceived product congruence condition. Significant effects were found in Table 12 for the suspicion by need for cognition interaction in both conditions of high and low product congruence (high PC: $F = 5.70, p < .01, \eta^2 = .07$; low PC: $F = 5.60, p < .01, \eta^2 = .07$). Figure 7 also showed materialized effects of need for cognition and pronounced directions of effects on suspicion. Unexpectedly, two important findings were emerged in the planned contrast for three treatment groups (see Table 14). The depth analyses revealed that the correspondence bias was not found for participants with high need for cognition in the low product congruent condition. That is, the mean value for the correspondence inference for participants with high need for cognition was significantly lower in low suspicion ($M = 4.69, SD = 1.05$) than that in no suspicion ($M = 5.79, SD = 1.50$) when the product congruence was low ($t = -2.88, p < .01$). In addition, the consequence of high suspicion was not shown for participants with low need for cognition in the high product congruent condition. This result means that the mean difference of correspondence inference among high ($M = 5.67, SD = .87$), low ($M = 6.18, SD = .79$) or no ($M = 6.09, SD = 1.41$) suspicion was not significant for participants with low need for cognition ($t = -1.58, p = .117$; $t = -1.35, p = .182$). Therefore, in spite of expected findings for all other planned contrasts in Table 14, H4b and H4c were partially supported.

Table 14. Planned Contrasts of CI on Suspicion by Need for Cognition in Each Level of Product Congruence

Moderating Variables	Suspicion			Mean Diff.	<i>t</i>	Sig.
	No	Low	High			
High PC						
High NFC	5.83(1.42)	5.96(.75)		.13	.39	.700
		5.96(.75)	4.06(1.10)	-1.89	-5.74	.000**
Low NFC	6.09(1.41)	6.18(.79)		.09	.32	.752
		6.18(.79)	5.67(.87)	-.51	-1.58	.117
	6.09(1.41)		5.67(.87)	-.42	-1,35	.182
Low PC						
High NFC	5.79(1.50)	4.69(1.05)		-1.09	-2.88	.006**
		4.69(1.05)	2.75(1.24)	-1.95	-4.56	.000**
Low NFC	6.01(1.24)	5.69(1.07)		-.32	-1.04	.301
		5.69(1.07)	4.67(.96)	-1.02	-3.23	.002**

Note. ** $p < 0.01$.




Figure 7. Correspondence Inferences for NFC Interaction with Suspicion in Each PC Level

The Moderating Roles of Implicit Theory of Personality. H5a stated that consumers' correspondence inference on the endorsement behavior of a celebrity in an advertisement will be significantly greater for entity theorist than for incremental theorist. Furthermore, H5b proposed that consumers' tendency to correspondence bias becomes stronger for entity theorist than incremental theorists; whereas, consumers' tendency to suspicion of ulterior becomes stronger for incremental theorists than entity theorists. As another personality moderator for suspicion, both main and interaction effects of implicit theory of personality with suspicion was tested using a two-way ANOVA. A preliminary analysis revealed a strong tendency for participants to become entity theorists which includes 69 in no suspicion, 72 in low suspicion, and 62 in high suspicion. Classified incremental theorists consisted of 36 in no suspicion, 23 in low suspicion, and 21 in high suspicion. Among 289 participants in this study, 16 participants (5.5%) were not classified, which is slightly lower when compared with a typical unclassified frequency of 15-20% in the previous studies using the measure of implicit theory of personality (e.g., Dweck et al., 1995). The result of Levene's test meets the assumption on the homogeneity of variance between all treatment groups.

A 3 (degree of suspicion) x 2 (degree of implicit theory of personality) ANOVA was conducted on participants' correspondence inference. Table 15 showed the significant simple main effect of implicit theory of personality ($F = 6.75, p < .01, \eta^2 = .024$), which means that entity theorists ($M = 5.75, SD = 1.32$) shows more correspondence inferences than incremental theorists ($M = 5.25, SD = 1.46$). Contrary to expectations on interaction effects between suspicion and implicit theory of personality ($F = .858, p = .425, \eta^2 = .14$), two types of participants of implicit theory of personality did have similar degree of tendencies on

correspondence bias and high suspicion outcomes. From the results of the test, H5a was supported; whereas, H5b was rejected.

Table 15. Results of the 3(Suspicion) x 2(Implicit Theory of Personality) Design: Three-Way ANOVA

DV	Source	<i>df</i>	<i>Mean Square</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>Sig.</i>	η^2
Correspondence Inference	Suspicion (S)	2	37.75	22.99	.000**	.142
	Implicit Theory of Personality (ITP)	1	11.09	6.75	.010*	.024
	S x ITP	2	1.41	.858	.425	.006
	Error	277	1.64			

*Note. R Squared =.221 (Adjusted R Squared=.206). * $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$.*

Correspondence Inference and Advertising Effective Measures. H6a was proposed to test correlations between consumers' index of correspondence inference and attitudinal and behavioral outcome measures. Table 17 showed Pearson's correlation coefficients among the dependent variables, which indicated all positive and significant relationships. As correspondence inferences about celebrity's true brand attitude and preference increased favorably, participants' attitudes toward the ad, the brand, and behavioral intention also increased in favorability. Thus, H6a was supported. In the same table, it should be also noted that suspicion had no significant relationship with perceived product congruence; whereas, it had significant and negative associations with dependent variables. In contrast, perceived product congruence was shown to have strong correlations with dependent variables.


Table 16. Intercorrelations among Study Variables: Pearson's Correlation

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Suspicion	—	-.056	-.323**	-.209**	-.224**	-.211**
2. Perceived Product Congruence		—	.425**	.367**	.400**	.363**
3. Correspondence Infer.			—	.280**	.286**	.212**
4. Attitude toward the Ad				—	.574**	.521**
5. Attitude toward the Brand					—	.559**
6. Behavioral Intention						—

Note. ** $p < 0.01$.

The hypothesized mediating effect of correspondence inference on the links between suspicion and attitudinal and behavioral outcome measures (H6b) were assessed using three steps of hierarchical regressions plus the Sobel test recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). The same procedure was also employed to analyze the mediation role of correspondence inference between product congruence and attitudinal and behavioral outcome measures (H6c). In order to support each mediation hypothesis, prior to the Sobel mediation test, series of regression analyses were conducted specifically to examine: 1) whether suspicion or product congruence has a direct effect on correspondence inference; 2) whether suspicion or product congruence has a direct effect on ad attitude, brand attitude, or behavioral intention; (3) whether correspondence inferences has a direct effect on ad attitude, brand attitude, or behavioral intention. In the purpose of statistical usability for the categorical measures of suspicion and product congruence into metric traits, interval scales employed in manipulation checks for suspicion and perceived product congruence were used in the regression analysis.

As exhibited in Figure 8, a series of regression analyses revealed six significant causal routes which satisfy the first three conditions for the mediation test. Six paths are: 1) suspicion – correspondence inference (CI) – ad attitude; 2) suspicion – CI – brand attitude; 3) suspicion – CI – behavioral intention; 4) product congruence – correspondence inference – ad attitude; 5) product congruence – CI – brand attitude; and lastly 6) product congruence – CI – behavioral intention.



Note: ** $p < 0.01$.

Figure 8. Standardized Coefficients from Three Steps of Hierarchical Regression Analyses

The final step was conducted using the Sobel test. In order to drive t statistic, the Sobel test uses the magnitude of the indirect effect with comparisons to its estimated standard error (Sobel, 1986). Series of Sobel tests in Table 18 revealed that correspondence inference significantly mediated the relationships between suspicion and ad attitude ($t = -3.19, p < .01$),

brand attitude ($t = -3.30, p < .01$), and behavioral intention ($t = -2.42, p < .05$). For the paths of product congruence, correspondence inference significantly mediated only two processes on ad attitude ($t = 2.41, p < .01$) and brand attitude ($t = 2.29, p < .01$), not behavioral intention ($t = 1.14, p = .254$). Noticeably, the amount of indirect effects of correspondence inference to the direct effects in both suspicion and product congruence paths were found to be ascending orders of ad attitude (suspicion path: $RI = .52$; PC path: $RI = .21$), brand attitude (suspicion path: $RI = .52$; PC path: $RI = .18$), and behavioral intention (suspicion path: $RI = .52$). Based on these results, H6b and H6c were fully supported.

Table 17. Results of Sobel Mediation Tests for Dependent Variables

Variable Relationships						
IV	MV	DV	<i>PM</i>	<i>RI</i>	<i>t</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Suspicion	CI	A _{ad}	36.7	.59	-3.29	.000**
		A _{brand}	34.4	.52	-3.30	.000**
		BI	24.6	.33	-2.42	.017*
Product Congruence	CI	A _{ad}	17.6	.21	2.41	.016*
		A _{brand}	15.0	.18	2.29	.022*
		BI	8.2	.09	1.14	.254

*Note. PM: Percentage of the total effect that is mediated. RI: Ratio of the indirect to the direct effect. * $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$.*

Chapter 5

Discussion

This chapter is devoted to discuss theoretical and managerial implications that emerged from the present study. Beforehand, major findings and interpretations drawn from the experiment are presented. Some limitations on the study with future directions will also be discussed.

Research Findings and Interpretations

In the main experiment, consumers' correspondence inference, as a key index in the process of attribution, was separately assessed in terms of its antecedents (i.e., suspicion and perceived product congruence), moderators (i.e., need for cognition and implicit theory of personality), consequences (i.e., attitudinal and behavioral measures), and lastly moderating effects. Also, correspondence inferences were compared between each level in antecedents by moderators to identify consumers' tendencies on correspondence bias and high suspicion outcomes. Since results of statistical analyses mostly support the hypotheses on causal relationships among variables, it is reasonable to say that consumers' correspondence inference is an important indicator for communication effects in celebrity endorsement advertising.

For the main effects of two antecedents, significant causal relationships between either suspicion or perceived product congruence and correspondence inference were found in the experiment while the directional effects were inversed over the two antecedents. From these results, it was clear that highly suspicious celebrity endorsers are more likely to induce negative correspondence inferences from consumers than low suspicious celebrity endorsers; whereas, highly perceived product congruence is more likely to invoke positive correspondence inferences

from consumers than does low perceived product congruence. However, interpreting such suspicion and perceived product congruence effects on correspondence inference requires additional elucidations derived from interactions between the two antecedents in the experiment.

One of the most important findings from the experiment is that participants' tendencies on correspondence bias are likely to increase when they feel more on high product congruence with the endorser in the advertisement. In fact, participants did not show the correspondence bias when they are in a condition of high product congruence: however, participants did show the correspondence bias when they are in a condition of low product congruence. In other words, a low level of suspicion aroused from the situational information of a large endorsement fee does not necessarily invoke consumers' correspondence bias. For example, consumers may attribute the celebrity endorser's motive to making money when the endorsed product is not highly matched with the image of the endorser. Another important finding from the significant interactions between suspicion and perceived product congruence is that, regardless of their perceptions on the product matching levels, consumers tend to keep a very low level of correspondence inferences when they have a high level of suspicion on the endorsers' true attitudes and preferences for the product. This result indicates that when consumers are previously aware of a celebrity's endorsements on several products, they are strongly likely to attribute the endorser's true motives to earning big money or image making, which results in the negative tendency of their correspondence inferences. As a summary of those results, it is concluded that consumers' correspondence bias are affected by their perceived levels of product congruence with a celebrity endorser; however, consumers do not bias their correspondence inferences when they are highly suspicious of the endorser's ulterior motives whether the product is highly matched with the image of the endorser or not.

As with perceived product congruence, individual inference in need for cognition was also tested as a potential moderator for the attribution process on a celebrity endorser. The ANOVA analysis revealed the main effect of need for cognition on participants' correspondence inference even though it was not predicted in the study. According to the result, it is likely that consumers with low need for cognition are likely to show more positive correspondence inferences on celebrity endorsers' true attitude and preference for the product than consumers with high need for cognition do. However, this main effect could not be interpreted as it was because the construct, need for cognition, is not a causal inducer but just a personality differentiator which moderates the relationships between the inducer and the induced consequences. Therefore, the moderating role of need for cognition should be explained within the interaction terms with suspicious conditions.

The findings from the interaction showed another critical moderator on the tendency of correspondence bias on the celebrity endorser's true motives. The hypotheses on need for cognition stated that consumers' tendency to correspondence bias will not appear for people with high need for cognition but people with low need for cognition; whereas, consumers' tendency to high suspicion of ulterior motives will appear for people with both low and high for cognition. That is, high need for cognition people tend to carefully process and elaborate the arguments of persuasive messages including situational information when they are coded as reference points, thereby adjusting their correspondence inferences on the endorser; however, low need for cognition people are subject to rely on cognitive heuristics and other peripheral cues without considering situational information, so keeping their early made correspondence inferences on the endorser. Nevertheless, the endorser who arouses high suspicion will inhibit people's willingness to invest cognitive efforts in the scrutiny of the arguments, which overwhelms the

influence of need for cognition on the correspondence inference. As a matter of fact, participants with low need for cognition, not high need for cognition, did show the correspondence bias and both need for cognition groups react to the high suspicion of ulterior motives.

Another important issue here is how the level of need for cognition could determine the strength of correspondence bias and the tendency on high suspicion of ulterior motives in different perceived product congruence conditions. One interpretive sign for that query is the interaction effects among three constructs, correspondence inference, product congruence, and need for cognition. From the hypotheses, it was expected that in a condition of low product congruence, consumers with low need for cognition are more likely show the correspondence bias than consumers with high need for cognition; whereas, in a condition of high product congruence, both high and low need for cognition consumers likely show the correspondence bias. Also, it was hypothesized that, in both levels of high and low product congruence, consumers' tendency to high suspicion of ulterior motives becomes stronger for people with high need for cognition than people with low need for cognition. However, the significant three-way interaction was not present in the analysis. This result may be due to the similar patterns of linear graphs between suspicion and need for cognition for each level of perceived product congruence. That is, although its effects were not exactly the same, perceived product congruence was shown to influence the correspondence inference in a similar way across two groups of need for cognition. For instance, if three-way interaction effects were revealed significantly, the difference of correspondence inference for high need for cognition participants between low and high suspicious conditions should be significantly different between low and high perceived product congruence levels. But, it was not. Only the mean scores of correspondence inference

for high need for cognition participants both in low and high suspicious conditions were greater when perceived product congruence was high than when it was low.

In an alternative way, the two-way ANOVAs between suspicion and need for cognition in each level of perceived product congruence were conducted and generated more meaningful implications for this study. According to the results, high need for cognition participants did show the correspondence bias not in a low product congruent condition but in a high congruence condition, but low need for cognition participant showed correspondence bias in both levels of perceived product congruent conditions. In addition, unexpectedly, low need for cognition participants did not respond to the high suspicion of ulterior motives, keeping their high tendency to show the correspondence bias when the endorser and the product were perceived to be highly matched. In sum, it can be interpreted that high need for cognition consumers are less prone to the correspondence bias on the celebrity endorser's true attitude to the endorsed product even when they perceive the endorsed product is not highly matched with the endorser; however, low need for cognition consumers are more likely to show correspondence bias on the celebrity endorser's true attitude to the endorsed product even when they perceive the endorsed product is highly matched with the endorser.

The results of ANOVA tests and planned contrasts also help to identify the relationship that implicit theory of personality, as a possible personality moderator, has on the attributional process. Contrary to the expectation, the influence of consumers' implicit theory of personality on their correspondence bias appears not to be significant. Participants as incremental theorists did show the correspondence bias just as participants as entity theorists. In the contrast, both incremental and entity theorists strongly responded to the high suspicion of ulterior motives. However, even though the interactions between suspicion and implicit theory of personality were

not significant, it should be cautioned not to infer that there are no relationships between the two variables, because, in the experiment, the mean difference between no- and low suspicion for incremental theorists ($MD = -.50$) was found to be marginally significant ($p = .069$). That is, incremental theorists possibly have a less tendency to show correspondence bias on a celebrity endorser's true motives than incremental theorists. Also, expectedly, the mean difference between low and high suspicion for incremental theorists ($MD = -1.73$) was found to almost two times stronger than that for entity theorists ($MD = -.96$), which means that incremental theorists have a tendency to more strongly responds to highly suspicious information than entity theorists. Therefore, the results could be interpreted such that even though the implicit theory of personality would have an impact on consumers' attributional process, its influence as a moderator is tentative.

The next inspection for this study was to find out how consumers' correspondence inferences influence their ad attitudes, brand attitudes, and behavioral intention. The correlation matrix and multiples regression results strongly indicated that participants' correspondence inferences on a celebrity's true attitudes toward the product significantly influence the indicators of advertising effectiveness. As participants' correspondence inferences increase in favorability, their attitudes toward the ad and brand also increase in favorability. This is also true for their behavioral intentions. The high and positive standardized beta coefficient showed that as participants have increasingly stronger favorable correspondence inferences about a celebrity's attitudes and preferences for the product, they are more likely to move into purchasing the endorsed product. In sum, it was clearly found that the level of consumers' correspondence inferences positively affects their attitudes toward the ad and the brand, and even behavioral intentions.

Noticeably, consumers' correspondence inference appears to have a great impact on their ad attitudes, brand attitudes, and behavioral intention. Then, one important question is raised how consumers' correspondence inference, as a consequence of their attributional process, can favorably influence the indicators of advertising effectiveness when the level of suspicion or perceived product congruence on the endorser differs. In this study, possible answers on those inquiries were examined by assessing the mediating role of correspondence inference between suspicion and perceived product congruence, and three effectiveness measures. For instance, if the correspondence inference plays a mediating role between suspicion and ad attitudes, it is implied that the correspondence inference not only becomes a direct predictor of a suspicion but also determines the effect of suspicion on ad attitudes. Findings from the tests suggested that the level of correspondence inference significantly mediated the effects of suspicion and perceived product congruence on all dependent variables, which suspicion was negatively related with and perceived product congruence was positively associated with. Shortly, consumers' correspondence inference apparently played mediating roles in the paths from attributional antecedents to advertising effectiveness factors. However, the mediation by correspondence inference does not preclude the possibility that suspicion or perceived product congruence directly influence ad attitude, brand attitude, and behavioral intention; instead, the ability of those antecedent factors to induce attitudinal and behavioral effectiveness indicates that suspicion or perceived product congruence are more likely to induce receivers' attributional processes themselves, facilitating the formation of negative or positive correspondence inferences, which in turn influence their ad attitudes, brand attitudes, and even behavioral intentions.

Theoretical Implications

The celebrity endorsement in advertising has been regarded by researchers and practitioners as being effective and, therefore, used as one of the main promotional strategies until now. To ensure why using a celebrity in advertisements is persuasive, a number of researchers have used theoretical models that had the most explanatory power. Among them, theories on source credibility and match-up hypothesis presided in the literature as the primary theories determining how influential a celebrity endorser would be. However, those theoretical perspectives mainly dealt with the question for WHY using a celebrity is effective, not the question for HOW consumers are persuaded by the celebrity endorsement. For instance, only a source's positive attributes such as expertise and attractiveness cannot explain how consumers respond to celebrity endorsement advertisements when they are already aware of a large amount of incentives given to the celebrity or when they were previously exposed to multiple products endorsed by the same celebrity. If the celebrity value as a persuasive communicator is valid even in such situational constraints, this study argues that consumers should believe the endorsement to be reflected on the celebrity's genuine affection for the product.

Correspondence inference theory, originally suggested by Jones and Davis (1965), was helpful in forming the theoretical framework for the present study because it explains how consumers process a celebrity's situational information to attribute the genuineness of the endorser to a product. Among attribution theories, one psychological process called 'correspondence bias' or in other words 'fundamental attribution error' was adopted to explain how consumers make correspondence inferences from celebrity endorsers' attitudes or preferences to endorsed products within clearly constrained situational information and why they underestimate such constraints (e.g., a large money incentive). The applicability of the

correspondence bias theory was supported by some studies (Cronley et al., 1999; Sørsum et al., 2003; Silvera et al., 2004) that consumers tend to exhibit correspondence bias in evaluating a celebrity endorser's motives for recommending a product by viewing the endorser as actually liking the endorsed product. However, consumer's correspondence bias is not likely to happen when they clearly perceive the celebrity endorser's ulterior motives, such as his/her multiple product endorsements for making big money or higher publicity. The theoretical perspective on suspicion of ulterior motives gave clues to this study about such correspondence bias disappearing. According to the theory, when an observer has reasons to suspect that an actor is motivated by external factors, the observer is less apt to make dispositional attributions (Fein et al., 1990).

The findings of this study clearly demonstrated the proper theoretical applications of the correspondence bias in the context of celebrity endorsement advertising. As identified from the results of this study, the theory of correspondence bias is capable to better explain how the celebrity advertising reaches persuasion to the perceivers than do mere correspondence inferences on the celebrity. That is, even though correspondence inference, as it is, could indicate the level of favorableness derived from the attributional process, it still cannot explain why the inferential errors do not bring about unfavorable consequences for consumers and rather lead to positive consequences to the advertisers. In spite of its explanatory capability, the correspondence bias to a celebrity endorser was not found to be robust as much as Heider's maxim that behavior "tends to engulf the total field" (1958, pp. 54). In the context of celebrity advertising, perceived product congruence and individual's level of need for cognition were identified to moderate consumers' correspondence bias on the celebrity endorser. As a matter of fact, it was found that the more consumers have high need for cognition and the more they

perceive low level of product congruence with the endorser, the less their correspondence bias will be. Identifying those moderators is truly important from theoretical points of views because they help explain the inconsistent occurrences of correspondence bias emerged from previous studies (e.g. Cronley et al. 1999).

In this study, the theoretical concept, suspicion of ulterior motives, was firstly tested in its applicability to the phenomenon of multiple product endorsements. Whereas prior research has typically examined consumer responses to celebrity's multiple product endorsements in the context of Kelly's (1973) covariation theory (e.g., Tripp et al., 1994), this study employed consumers' suspicion of ulterior motives as a determinant of less correspondence inference on a celebrity's true motives when the celebrity is a multiple product endorser. In some senses, Kelley's (1967) covariation theory is not well fitted to experimentally testing consumer responses to celebrity's multiple product endorsements because it is primarily concerned with causal attributions which are typically slower and more deliberate judgments (Smith & Miller, 1983). In contrast, Jones and Davis' (1965) correspondent inference theory (i.e., suspicion of ulterior motives) focuses on inferences about the characteristics of the actor and this trait inference is often relatively quick and effortless (Uleman, Newman, & Moskowitz, 1996). As expected, the theoretical propositions on suspicion of ulterior motive were proved to successfully explain the affect of a celebrity's multiple product endorsements on consumers' correspondence inference in general and their correspondence bias in specific. That is, when consumers already recognize of a celebrity's presence in multiple product endorsements, unless consumers are situated in the conditions of low need for cognition and high perceived product congruence with a celebrity, consumers are highly likable to generate lower level of correspondence inferences enough to obsolete their correspondence bias on the endorser. Therefore, the high suspicion

consumers generate to the celebrity's genuine motives could be the appropriate answer to Tripp et al. (1994)'s question of why "the number of products a celebrity endorses negatively influence consumers' perceptions of endorser credibility and likability" (pp. 543). In addition, this study expands the theoretical scope of suspicion of ulterior motives in that even high suspicion consumers could do the correspondence bias depending on their level of need for cognition and the perceived relationship of a celebrity and the endorsed product. For low need for cognition consumers who think the endorsed product is high matched with a celebrity, recognizing of the celebrity's multiple product endorsements does not cause them to hesitate to take the behavior at face value.

Consumers' correspondent inferences about an endorser were found to be positively associated with their attitudes toward the ad, the product, the endorser, and even the purchase intention for the advertised product (Cronley et al. 1999; Silvera et al., 2004). One of the most valuable attempts in this research was to test the mediating role of correspondence inference, as an outcome of attributional process, in multiple causal links between the proposed attributional antecedents and consequences. Until now, despite some researchers (Kelly & Michela, 1980; Decarlo & Leigh, 1996) proposed rather conceptual models concerning the mediating process of causal inferences, such a mediation effect of attributions has not been proved empirically and also gained little attention in the advertising research. Employing multi-step regressions and probability tests on the empirical data, this study clearly supported the mediating roles of endorser-generated correspondence inferences in the context of celebrity advertising. That is, consumers' correspondence inferences mediate all the effects of suspicion and perceived product congruence on their attitudes toward the ad and the brand, and even their behavioral intentions.

Such significant mediation effects of correspondence inference demonstrate its critical roles as being latent but influential determinants of the celebrity endorsement advertising.

Managerial Implications

In addition to theoretical implications, the present study provides many implications for advertising practice on celebrity endorsements. Most of all, this study used grown-up consumer panelists who are varied in age, gender, occupation, and geographic factors. Therefore, findings derived from this study can be properly projected over the consumer population, which provides advertisers practical reference points for testing practitioners' theory in use and establishing effective celebrity endorsement strategies.

Word of mouth communications have been thought to have a more powerful influence on consumers' evaluation on the product than information received through commercial sources such as advertising and neutral evaluation reports (e.g., consumer reports) because it usually occurs through sources that consumers regards as being credible (Richins, 1983; Herr, Kardes, & Kim; 1991). However, it's not always true especially when advertising uses commercial sources that are truly famous for consumers. Good news for advertising practitioners is that consumers have a tendency of correspondence bias when the correspondent sources are namely celebrities. This study found that correspondence bias occurs when consumers evaluate celebrity endorsed advertising. That is, consumers attribute positive attitudes and preferences for the endorsed product to the celebrity even when they know that advertisers pays large amount of endorsement fees to celebrities in exchange for their favorable images. This should provide one possible rationale why the celebrity endorsement is one of the effective advertising strategies.

Even though the phenomenon of consumers' correspondence bias on celebrity endorsers is a meaningful implication for the advertising practice, advertisers should be also aware that it is

quite complex to determine what situations induce consumers' correspondence bias. In fact, according to the findings of this study, consumers' knowledge of multiple product endorsements from a celebrity leads to their less correspondence inferences on the celebrity's genuine motives enough to negate their correspondence bias. Also, when consumers feel that the endorsed product is not highly matched with a celebrity, they are less likely to show the correspondence bias. However, these findings do not mean that two types of advertising practices, multiple product endorsements and product endorsements from unmatched celebrities, should not be executed by advertisers because it is quite understandable that advertisers prefer to use celebrities who prove reference powers in their previous advertising and transfer celebrities' favorable images to their new products. Instead, findings suggest for advertisers how to refine those practices to overcome negative effects. An ideal choice of a celebrity endorser with high credibility in associations with expertise, attractiveness, and trustworthiness will surely contribute to achieving effective endorsement effects. Unless that is easily fulfilled, advertisers should make their every efforts in estimating which celebrity's property will be the most important to overcome the negative sides of multiple endorsements and to be transferred to the endorsed product without inducing consumers' perceived incongruence. In order to do that, they surely need to take into accounts not only checking the prospect celebrity's projected images and occupational backgrounds but also testing perceived fit factors with the chosen product.

One of the most interesting findings in this study is that high need for cognition consumers are less likely to show their correspondence bias when they perceive the endorsed product is not highly matched with a celebrity; whereas, low need for cognition consumers are more likely to keep their level of correspondence inference when they perceive the endorsed product is highly matched with a celebrity even if they are given the high suspicious information

on multiple product endorsements. In other words, the more consumers have high need for cognition and the less they perceive the product congruence, the more they respond to the suspicious information. In order to make managerial implications for these findings, the mechanism between people's level of cognitive loadings and inferential strength on suspicion should be explicated. According to Wiener, LaForge, and Goolsby (1990), cognitive busy consumers are less likely to use persuasion knowledge (e.g., considering situational constraints for the celebrity's behavior) than unbusy consumers, therefore less responding to the suspicious information. They also suggested that low level of accessibility on suspicious motives attenuate the observer (i.e., consumers) difference. So, if consumers' level of need for cognition and their perceived level of product congruence cannot be totally controlled by advertisers, one possible way to influence them is to make them inaccessible to uncontrolled information. To achieve such desired communication effects, advertising creators and planners need to be well prepared for the ways to better present their endorsement advertisements by improving creativity and originality of the advertisements or by establishing an effective media strategy. For instant, consumers' perceptions on the product matching with the endorser could be enhanced by presenting supportive and strong copy messages, and making a new character for a celebrity within the storytelling advertisement could hide consumers' recognition of their multiple roles in other advertisements.

Lastly, the findings of this study showed that as consumers do increasingly stronger correspondent inferences about the celebrity's attitudes and preferences for the product, their own evaluations on the advertisement, the brand, and even their behavioral intention also increase. This has valuable implications for justifying the use of celebrity endorsers in advertisements. Above all, in order to generate positive correspondence inferences from consumers, selecting the

right celebrity for the viewer and the product is necessitated by advertising practitioners. In addition, although this study did not provide comparative data regarding sports celebrities versus non-sports celebrities (e.g., movie stars) on their endorsement effects, advertising practitioners should be aware of their different points of appeals to their promoted products if they hope to generate intended correspondence inferences from target consumers.

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies

Not unlike other empirical research efforts, the results and implications presented in this study are limited by a number of factors, many of which can be addressed in future studies. First, limits come from artificial settings for the online experiment. Only one kind of celebrity endorser, sports celebrity, was used in the experiment although athletes as product endorsers are ubiquitous in celebrity advertising. In particular, this study chose a French cycling athlete, Julien Absalon, who is not familiar to but only makes impressions of being a celebrity to the U.S. consumers, in order to impede the effects of participants' confounding factors (e.g., identification with and likability to the celebrity). Other types of celebrity endorsers, such as movie stars and renowned fashion models, and those type effects were not extensively explored in this study. In the authentic world, celebrities have their own characteristics which are developed by interactions with the public and some celebrities often evoke a much richer set of responses and feelings than other celebrities (McCracken, 1986). For instance, Michael Jordan has unique attributes of expertise and charisma with the endorsed product category, but such characteristics might not be evoked by fashion models in general. In addition, this study consistently used a male celebrity endorser to minimize gender-caused unexpected effects. Even though it is not clear that celebrity's own gender would affect the way how consumers correspondingly infer celebrities' endorsement behaviors from situational information, some previous academic findings suggested that gender

interactions between endorsers and target audiences exist when measuring advertising effectiveness. Debevec and Kerman (1984) found that attractive female models induced more enhanced attitudes than male counterparts across both gender. Caballero et al. (1989) also suggested that males hold greater intentions to purchase from male endorsers and females showed greater intentions to buy from female endorsers. Therefore, in order to guarantee the full scope of understating, thereby strengthening the external validity of the study, all possible contexts of both celebrity type and gender should be examined in the future study.

Another artificial limitation of this study is the use of made-up brands (i.e., ENERGY and ORANGINA) and magazine-style advertisements. Brand names, ENERGY for a high congruent product and ORANGINA for a low congruent product were employed in order to impress the genuineness of products on participants. Although a pretest revealed that none of participants had heard of those brand names, the word in naming as “orange” might cause unexpected impressions to participants. That is, ORANGINA could be perceived by participants as being a high congruent product with Julien Absalon due to his healthy image. For future experiments, it is vital to rigorously pretest created brands in order to minimize the introduction of the effect of prior experience with brands and unintended impression on brand names. In addition, one piece of celebrity endorsed advertisement, which was not situated in a real magazine, was shown to participants in order to single out the intended effects of suspicion and product congruence. Therefore, ecologically, results from the experiment of this study should be cautioned to generalize to any branded products on the market and to other media. In reality, consumers often have a number of experience and cues that help them evaluate the quality and image for each brand, and their evaluations are also affected by the way how the brand is positioned and portrayed in the media.

Third, consumers' correspondence inferences about the celebrity endorsement were measured in forced conditional settings and compressed time limits. That is, participants were forced to evaluate their degrees on attributional statements regarding the presented endorser's informational cues on suspicious motives within a processing time of 20-25 minutes. The possible problem for the forced condition in such a short period is that participants may not activate their attributional thinking on the celebrity endorser, if they are not forced to do that in real life. Also, although the basic mechanisms must be the same, the process of becoming suspicious may take more time outside of the laboratory. However, such a forced measure of correspondence inference was necessitated in the experiment for the statistical purposes of attaining an acceptable range of responses and inducing participants to bring out their latent thoughts. Nonetheless, future research should examine a variety of protocols designed to mirror consumers' inferential processing on suspicion under more natural conditions.

Fourth, it is recommended that the hypotheses proposed and tested in this study be reassessed with more refined measurement scales and treatments. For the purpose of achieving an acceptable level of measurement reliability, this study relied on existing scales and, in fact, most of reliable tests verified that measures in use were internally reliable and valid by the originators of scales. However, indexes of correspondence inference and suspiciousness were created by adopting and contextually redesigning from relevant scales of previous studies because measurement scales for those variables have not been developed robustly yet. Therefore, in the future study, researchers should establish more reliable and valid scales for measuring variables of attributional inferences so as to apply those scales to evaluating the test-retest reliability of many findings in this study.

Fifth, the treatment of individual difference variables needs to be refined. This study converted the continuous variables, need for cognition and implicit theory of personality, into dichotomous variables by splitting the scales at some point in order to analyze moderating effects on correspondence inference using ANOVAs. However, the primary argument against this practice has been that it generates loss of information about individual differences, spurious statistical significance, and overestimation of effect size (MacCallum, Zhang, Preacher, & Rucker, 2002). Furthermore, using the short version of implicit theory of personality scale that did not include reversed items in this study was found to increase the skewness of data to the right. This skewness of data probably resulted in insignificant moderating roles of implicit theory of personality between suspicion and correspondence inference. Silvera et al. (2000) also found that many of participants were extremely reluctant to be on the low labels of implicit theory of personality, being inclined to be entity theorists. In order to avoid those negative consequences, future studies should carefully design personality measurement items and adopt the application of standard methods of regression and correlational analysis to undichotomized measures in the analysis.

Sixth, some people would argue that advertising currently is not viewed or read by consumers with the cognitive elaboration process such as making causal inferences about any observed agent. Others also dispute that findings from experimental designs produce higher results than exists in the real world. Actually, advertising can be effective in persuasion by making the brand salient in consumers' minds by way of repeated exposure, slogan, or emotional appeal; in contrast, the effectiveness of celebrity endorsements is subject to reduction by selective attention, advertising clutter, and the time available to identify and evaluate the advertisement (Wells et al., 2008; Amos et al., 2008). So, consumers' inferential processing of

attribution on the celebrity's attitudes to the endorsed product could not be required for the persuasiveness of celebrity endorsement advertising. However, a considerable amount of advertisements are still created with the hope that consumers actively read and think about the central message therein. Indeed, empirical findings from this study suggest that consumers' attributional thinking in associations with correspondence bias and suspicion can significantly influence the persuasive effects of advertisements using a celebrity endorser. Therefore, consumers' inferential activity must not be ignored in the future advertising research.

Lastly, it should be admitted that the explanatory ability of this study be within the proposed model. That is, findings of this study should be explained in the contextual relationships of antecedents (i.e., suspicion and perceived product congruence), moderators (need for cognition and implicit theory of personality), correspondence inferences, and consequences of inferential process (i.e., attitudinal and behavioral measures). However, there are many important issues that require further investigations regarding antecedents and moderators on the proposed model. For instance, how robust is the proposed model to repeated experiments? How do consumers' correspondence inferences differ in accordance with the sources' different attributes of credibility? How do consumers' correspondence inferences differ in different groups of age and gender? How do consumers' correspondence inferences differ when their mood states changes? How do consumers' correspondence inferences differ according to their individual differences on personality (e.g., need for control, temporary causal uncertainty, idiocentrism, and self construal)? Among those unexplored issues of potential importance, especially the cultural difference has gained researcher's attention for its proven influence on attribution. According to researchers (Menon, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 1999; Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999; Chiu, Morris, Hong, & Menon, 2000), the attribution theory cannot be applied to its domain of study

universally because cultural differences may exist such that people' attributional processes are influenced by diversity in language and associated cultural meaning systems. Accordingly, future studies on these relevant issues are encouraged to better understand how the attribution truly works in the celebrity advertising.

This study was carefully designed and effort fully processed to expand the theoretical and practical knowledge scope regarding celebrity endorsement advertising. For this purpose, this study not only proposed a theoretical framework in references to consumers' attribution phenomena of correspondence bias and suspicion but also identified the framework' applicability into the context of celebrity advertising. Even though many meaningful results were found from the rigorous assessments on the hypotheses, their contributions to theory and practice, especially the attribution perspective this study offer of our current understanding of celebrity endorsements, should be continuously refined and interpreted by future advances in the related knowledge domain.

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Appendices

A: Questionnaire for Pretests

Pretest 1: Celebrity endorser selection

Have you ever heard of the following European sports celebrities? Yes _____ No _____

1. Samuel Sánchez (2008 Beijing gold medalist in the road race)
2. Chris Hoy (2008 Beijing gold medalist in the track and sprint)
3. Julien Absalon (2004 Athens and 2008 Beijing gold medalist in the cross-country mountain bike)
4. Māris Štrombergs (2008 Beijing gold medalist in the BMX)

Pretest 3: Suspicious Information checking

From the following two different information, A or B, which do you think make you more suspicious when you evaluate the following celebrity's true motives for sponsoring a certain brand?

A _____ B _____



***Julien Absalon** is a French cross-country mountain biker. He won gold medals at the 2004 Summer Olympics and at the 2008 Summer Olympics. He rides for the Spanish mountain bike team Orbea. Absalon has 17 World Cup wins.*

A: Julien Absalon earned 8 million dollars this year for endorsing a certain brand.

B: Julien Absalon earned 8 million dollars this year for endorsing a certain brand. Besides a certain brand, Julien Absalon earned more than 30 million dollars this year for endorsing 5 different brands.

B: Questionnaire for Main Experiment

Informed Consent

You are invited to participate in a survey as part of a doctoral dissertation project. It will take about 20 minutes of your time to complete. This study is being conducted by Taewoo Kim, a doctoral candidate, in the department of Communication and Information Science at the University of Tennessee–Knoxville.

The purpose of this study is to seek opinions and feedback among consumers to understand how YOU perceive the role of celebrities in magazine advertisements. You will be asked to indicate your perceptions about the behavior of a celebrity spokesperson and the endorsed product(s), attitude toward product(s)/ advertisement, personality of yourself, and lastly some of your demographics.

There are no anticipated risks for study participants. Your participation in this survey is voluntary and the information you provide will be confidential. You may decline to answer any question. None of the information you supply will be any way associated with your identity at any stage of study.

This study has been reviewed and approved by The University of Tennessee at Knoxville Institutional Review Board. If you have questions about the research or the procedures, please contact Taewoo Kim at 1 (national code) – 865 (local code) – 622 – 0922 or send an email to tkim7@utk.edu . If you have questions about your rights as a research participant please contact Brenda Lawson in the Office of Research, University of Tennessee-Knoxville, at 1 (national code) – 865 (local code) – 974 – 7697 or send an email to blawson@utk.edu.


If you are age 18 or older, please check here. ☐

By checking the box and completing the survey, you provide your informed consent to participate.

Test (Stimulus) advertisements

Please take at least 30 seconds to read the following advertisement.

[High Congruent Ad)]



[Low Congruent Ad]



"ORANGINA®"
My first choice of orange soda !!

PSCHITT Co., Ltd.

Stimulus information for each suspicion case

Please take at least 30 seconds to read the following information.

[No Suspicion Case]

- **Julien Absalon** is a French cross-country mountain biker. He won gold medals at the 2004 Summer Olympics and at the 2008 Summer Olympics. He rides for the Spanish mountain bike team Orbea. Absalon has 17 World Cup wins.
- Among some of possible non-alcoholic beverages on the French market, Julien Absalon decided to endorse the brand, ENERGY (or ORANGINA) as part of his support for children and young people in South Africa.

[Low Suspicion Case]

- **Julien Absalon** is a French cross-country mountain biker. He won gold medals at the 2004 Summer Olympics and at the 2008 Summer Olympics. He rides for the Spanish mountain bike team Orbea. Absalon has 17 World Cup wins.
- Julien Absalon contracts 8 million dollars per year for endorsing the brand, ENERGY (or ORANGINA).

[High Suspicion Case]

- **Julien Absalon** is a French cross-country mountain biker. He won gold medals at the 2004 Summer Olympics and at the 2008 Summer Olympics. He rides for the Spanish mountain bike team Orbea. Absalon has 17 World Cup wins.
- Julien Absalon contracts 8 million dollars per year for endorsing the brand, ENERGY (or ORANGINA).
- Besides ENERGY (or ORANGINA), Julien Absalon now endorses 5 different brands in Europe. He earns more than 30 million dollars from those endorsement deals.
 - Numericable (cable television operator)
 - Pearl iZUMi (mountain Biking Shoes)
 - NICKEL (cosmetics)
 - Archos (MP3 player)
 - Celio (men's clothing)

The following questions will ask you about your perception on the behavior of the endorser (Julien Absalon) with the endorsed brand, your attitude toward the endorsed brand, your attitude toward the advertisement, and your behavioral intention.

Acquaintance with the endorser and the brand (Screening)

Have you ever heard of the sports celebrity, Julien Absalon? Yes _____ No _____

Have you ever heard of the brand ENERGY (or ORANGIA)?

Yes _____ No _____

Measure 1: Source Credibility [15 items & 7-point bipolar type scale]

Please mark in the space closest to the adjectives that best reflect your perception of the endorser (Julien Absalon) in the advertisement you've just seen.

Not an expert	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Expert
Untrustworthy	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Trustworthy
Attractive	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Unattractive *
Dishonesty	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Honesty
Inexperienced	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Experienced
Undependable	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Dependable
Not Classy	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Classy
Knowledgeable	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Unknowledgeable *
Unreliable	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Reliable
Ugly	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Handsome
Unqualified	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Qualified
Sincere	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Insincere *
Plain	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Elegant
Unskilled	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Skilled
Unsexy	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Sexy

* Reversely coded

Measure 2: Product Involvement [10 items & 7-point bipolar type scale]

Please mark in the space closest to the adjective that best reflects your personal perception or relevance of the sports drink (or the soft drink).

Unimportant	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Important
Interesting	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Boring
Irrelevant	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Relevant
Unexciting	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Exciting
Means a lot	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Means nothing *
Unappealing	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Appealing
Mundane	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Fascinating
Valuable	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Worthless *
Uninvolving	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Involving
Not needed	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Needed

Measure 3: Congruence between the endorser's chosen profession and the endorsed product [4 items & 7-point Likert type scale]

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

1. I am not surprised that this person (Julien Absalon) endorses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)].
2. With this endorsement, I can understand the brand (ENERGY) [or (ORANGINA)] better.
3. One would expect this person (Julien Absalon) to endorse the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)].
4. That this person (Julien Absalon) endorses the brand (ENERGY) [or (ORANGINA)] tells me something about it.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

Measure 4: Correspondence Inference [5 items & 9-point Likert type scale]

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

1. Julien Absalon endorses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] to convey his belief in the brand.
2. Julien Absalon frequently uses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)].
3. Julien Absalon doesn't like the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)].
*
4. Julien Absalon endorses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] to express her feeling about the brand based on her actual experience
5. Julien Absalon views the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] as a good brand.
6. Julien Absalon endorses the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] to talk about the brand based on his actual experience and knowledge with the brand.

Strongly Disagree Neutral Strongly Agree

Measure 5: Attitude toward the ad [5 items & 7-point bipolar type scale]

Please mark in the space closest to the adjectives that best reflect your attitude toward the ad (ENERGY) [or (ORANGINA)] in the advertisement you've just seen.

Unpleasant	—	—	—	—	—	—	Pleasant
Unlikable	—	—	—	—	—	—	Likable
Good	—	—	—	—	—	—	Bad *
Undesirable	—	—	—	—	—	—	Desirable
Unappealing	—	—	—	—	—	—	Appealing

Measure 6: Attitude toward the brand [5 items & 7-point bipolar type scale]

Please mark in the space closest to the adjectives that best reflect your attitude toward the brand (ENERGY) [or (ORANGINA)] in the advertisement you've just seen.

Unpleasant	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Pleasant
Unlikable	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Likable
Good	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Bad *
Unfavorable	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Favorable
Unappealing	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	Appealing

Measure 7: Behavioral intention [4 items & 7-point Likert type scale]

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?

If ENERGY (or ORANGINA) is on the US market ...

1. Next time when I purchase a sports drink (or soft drink), I will buy ENERGY (or ORANGIA).
2. I will consider drinking ENERGY (or ORANGIA).
3. I would search for more information about ENERGY (or ORANGIA). (e.g., visit Web site(s))
4. If special sale is offered, I will buy ENERGY (or ORANGIA)

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Strongly Disagree			Neutral			Strongly Agree

Measure 8: Suspicion [4 items & 7-point Likert type scale]

How much likely do you agree with the following statements?

1. Julien Absalon endorsed the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] because of his hidden interests.
2. Julien Absalon endorsed the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] because of his certain monetary or financial goals.
3. Julien Absalon endorsed the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] to present his image to the public.
4. The fact that Julien Absalom endorsed the sports drink (ENERGY) [or the soft drink (ORANGINA)] makes me suspicious of his ulterior motives.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Highly Unlikely			Neutral			Highly Likely

The following questions will ask you about your personality.

Measure 9: Need for Cognition [18 items & 7-point Likert type scale]

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

1. I usually end up deliberating about issues even they do not affect me personally.
2. I would prefer complex to simple problems.
3. It's enough for me that something gets the job done: I don't care how or why it works.*
4. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
5. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental effort. *
6. Thinking is not my idea of fun.*
7. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat important but does not require much thought.*
8. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities.*
9. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
10. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely chance I will have to think in depth about something.*
11. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
12. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
13. Learning new ways to think doesn't excite me very much.*
14. I only think as hard as I have to.*
15. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
16. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.
17. I like tasks that require little thought once I've learned them.*
18. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.

Measure 10: Implicit Theory of Personality [3 items & 6-point Likert type scale]

How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements.

1. The kind of person someone is something very basic about them and it can't be changed very much.
2. People can do things differently, but the important parts of who they are can't really be changed.
3. Everyone is a certain kind of person and there is not much that can be done to really change that.

_____	_____	_____	_____	_____	_____
Completely	Disagree	Mostly	Mostly	Agree	Completely
Disagree		Disagree	Agree		Agree

The following questions will ask you about your information.

Measure 10 - 12: Gender, age, & education [Nominal Scale]

1. Gender: Male _____ Female _____
2. Age: 18-19 _____ 30-44 _____ 45-60 _____ Over 60 _____
3. Education: Less than high school degree _____
 High School degree _____
 Some college _____
 Associate or bachelor degree _____
 Graduate degree _____

Vita

Taewoo Kim was born June 28, 1971 in Seoul, South Korea. He did his undergraduate work, political science, at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul. He received his Master of Arts in Journalism from the University of Missouri Columbia in 2001. After graduating, he moved back to Korea and began working as a professional marketer for multi-companies such as LG, Hyundai, and Intel. After 5 years of field works, he worked on his doctor of philosophy in advertising as a major and statistics as a minor at the University of Tennessee Knoxville in 2006, with the purpose of combining his interests in marketing communications, branding, and consumer psychology.