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Introduction

During the Cold War children across the United States hid under tables and desks at the sound of the school alarm. Families built shelters under their houses. Movies were produced revealing the destruction of "the bomb." Americans were faced with the threatening force of nuclear war. However, times have changed. With scientific advancements and a change in geopolitical structure, Americans no longer practice bomb drills, hide in shelters, or perceive the threat splashed throughout the media. The U.S.S.R. collapsed, and a wave of optimism swept across America. Even though children today are not hiding under desks, the threat of nuclear proliferation still exists. Further, it is unclear just how increasingly prevalent proliferation and nuclear war will be in the future.

Since the development of the nuclear bomb, presidents and their administrations have maintained nuclear policies appropriate for the time, trying to remain current in an ever changing political world. The end of the Cold War eliminated a long period of the bi-polar nuclear balance. The fracture of the Soviet Union, along with the rise in Third World nuclear powers and terrorism, has caused administrations to respond in policy. Since the Clinton administration, U.S. nuclear policy has sought to maintain deterrence, but with an increasing emphasis on counterproliferation instead of nonproliferation. The current Bush administration has continued this policy by emphasizing counterproliferation. However, the administration has not achieved its goals. It has created an environment that fosters proliferation and heightens risk. This paper will examine U.S. nuclear policy since the end of the Cold War. Specifically, I will examine the decline of nonproliferation, the rise of counterproliferation, and George W. Bush's
nuclear policies. I will also reexamine the Bush administration’s choices and provide recommendations on which U.S. nuclear policy approach is best—nonproliferation or counterproliferation.

**U.S. Nuclear Policy 1945-1990s: Nonproliferation**

Nonproliferation is defined in the *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* as,

> Those actions (e.g., diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, threat reduction assistance, and export controls) taken to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by dissuading or impeding access to, or distribution of, sensitive technologies, material, and expertise.¹

Nonproliferation comprises efforts set forth by an administration to take a diplomatic role in reducing the proliferation of nuclear arms. This approach is based around agreements that are typically multilateral and foster an integration of countries and policies. Nonproliferation developed primarily under the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. However, nonproliferation has not always worked as many had hoped. In the U.N., fissures between nuclear countries and non-nuclear countries appear along voting lines. “There are still 25,000 nuclear weapons on earth, more than 90% in possession of Russia and the US.”² Multilateral agreements have done little substantially to reduce the size of nuclear arsenals or ensure the safety of decomposing unused weapons.

During the Cold War the two traditional nuclear powers were the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Both states engaged in a military buildup, especially in their respective nuclear weapons capabilities. In the 1960s U.S. nuclear capabilities hit their highest

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mark; the U.S. possessed almost 32,200 nuclear warheads.³ "Between 1965-1970, Soviet military spending rose by 40 percent."⁴ The policy approach of both countries during the Cold War comprised deterrence, mutually assured destruction (MAD), and second strike capabilities. Deterrence is "a process of weighing the benefits of a contemplated action against assessed risks or losses."⁵ In other words, deterrence is the capability to avoid an attack through fear of retribution of greater force. The idea of MAD developed from the punishment or retaliation portion of deterrence. "Under the strategy of mutual assured destruction, or MAD, the two adversaries would refrain from attacking each other because doing so would be tantamount to nuclear suicide."⁶ The threat of MAD provided a balance. The increased Soviet military spending, "...gave the Soviet Union the virtually certain capability to inflict heavy damage on the United States in a retaliatory strike."⁷ Recognizing this, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 1972 which prevented both countries from creating defensive missile systems.⁸ (Later, I will discuss Bush’s withdrawal from this treaty.)

MAD flows from the belief that no entity can wipe out the other’s nuclear capabilities completely. This idea is connected to second strike capabilities (such as nuclear submarines) which ensure that even after an attack a counter-attack can occur.

These policies since the 1940s not only shaped much of what nuclear policy is today but

⁴ Painter, ibid., P. 60.
⁷ Painter, op cit., P. 60.
also played a role in driving the advancement of nuclear technology and accumulation of huge arsenals by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

The Rise of Nonproliferation

In the Cold War years of détente, nuclear policy did not drastically change. Détente was a policy implemented by Richard Nixon from 1969-1974. Nixon and détente "...attempted to halt the decline in US power through... arms control, an opening of China, and a reliance on regional allies in the Third World."\(^9\) Treaties such as SALT and START worked to reduce huge nuclear arsenals. These treaties relaxed tensions, but also reflected how drastic proliferation of nuclear weapons in these countries had become. Eventually the nuclear club totaled five countries. In 1968 the following countries signed the NPT: the U.S., China, Russia, the U.K., and France. The NPT, which went into effect in 1970, was designed to exert nuclear control. Signatories of the NPT were not to develop nuclear technology except for peaceful purposes. This treaty established a framework to control the number of possible states that would seek weapon proliferation. Designed to give incentives to both the nuclear empowered and those without nuclear arms, the NPT provides a structure for nuclear arms control. One scholar has stated:

The NPT is commonly regarded as an arrangement between the nuclear weapons states, which agree to transfer technology and materials to non-nuclear weapons states for peaceful purposes, which in return commit themselves not to divert this material to developing nuclear weapons.\(^{10}\)

Those countries without nuclear technology signed the treaty promising that they would not develop nuclear weapons. Despite this, the NPT provided incentives to join the treaty.

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\(^9\) Painter, op cit., P. 56.
Nuclear armed countries would give non-weapons information to other countries for peaceful purposes. Further, those with nuclear weapons promised eventually to disarm them.

The NPT framework establishes reciprocal diplomatic benefits to achieve its goals of stopping a nuclear arms race between smaller countries and preventing further proliferation of nuclear arms. This pact appears to foster international trust. Under Article VI of the NPT signatory countries are to:

...pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.\(^\text{11}\)

It is my interpretation that this article announces the efforts of nuclear countries to pursue total nuclear disarmament. Because the language is vague, however, the eventual disarmament of the permanent five countries seems highly unlikely four decades after the treaty was signed. Further, non-treaty members have developed nuclear weapons. These include India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. While some countries such as South Africa, Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine have given up nuclear weapons and signed on to the NPT, other countries, most namely Iran have resisted international pressures and begun nuclear programs under the treaty’s provision for peaceful nuclear programs monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

In sum, the NPT has not achieved all its goals. Not only have new countries joined the nuclear club since the NPT was adopted, but the original signatories still have huge stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

U.S. Nuclear Policy 1990s-Present: Counterproliferation

After 9/11, the Bush administration worked to change U.S. foreign policy with regard to nuclear defense. Specifically, the Bush administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which had been a stabilizing part of the Cold War. The treaty was adopted to keep the global powers from developing missile defense systems when nuclear parity was reached. According to President Bush in a speech made in 2001 at the National Defense University,

Security of both the United States and the Soviet Union was based on a grim premise: that neither side would fire nuclear weapons at each other, because doing so would mean the end of both nations. We even went so far as to codify this relationship in a 1972 ABM Treaty, based on the doctrine that our very survival would best be insured by leaving both sides completely open and vulnerable to nuclear attack.12

Later in the speech, Bush emphasized how the world had changed since the Cold War. “Yet, this is still a dangerous world,” he said, “a less certain, a less predictable one.”13 Bush laid out a new approach to nuclear policy. This approach is still based on deterrence and the proliferation of weapons. But it has a broader goal than the grim premise of retaliation. Bush noted: “Today's world requires a new policy, a broad strategy of active nonproliferation, counterproliferation and defenses.”14 Counterproliferation became a new term in U.S. nuclear policy.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff define counterproliferation as follows:

Those actions (e.g., detect and monitor, prepare to conduct counterproliferation operations, offensive operations, weapons of mass

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13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
destruction, active defense, and passive defense) taken to defeat the threat and/or use of weapons of mass destruction against the United States, our military forces, friends, and allies.\textsuperscript{15}

The key term here is that U.S. policy will go beyond active defense and encompass "offensive operations." Thus, the new second prong of U.S. nuclear defense policy entails pre-emptive measures to ensure U.S. protection against those suspected of nuclear proliferation. George Bunn, a negotiator for the NPT as well a former U.S. ambassador to the Geneva Convention, gives two examples of counterproliferation actions during the Bush administration. The first, the invasion of Iraq in 2003, was justified by the need to prevent the nation from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The second occurred in 2004, when the U.S. intercepted enriched-uranium aboard a German ship headed for Libya.\textsuperscript{16} These examples demonstrate the difference between nonproliferation and counterproliferation. While nonproliferation relies on diplomacy and multilateral agreements to dissuade proliferation, counterproliferation relies on an active offense to keep materials from being acquired.

\textit{The Rise of Counterproliferation, 1988-1992}

While critics attacked the NPT and questioned its effectiveness, counterproliferation began to rise as a new offensive approach to blocking nuclear proliferation. The end of the Cold War raised new questions about the future of nuclear arms. A new restructuring of military actions and nonproliferation began. "Classical


strategic policy and nonproliferation began to merge. This restructuring began in the early 1990s and led to the pillar of counterproliferation.

Dick Cheney, who at the time was secretary of defense under George W. H. Bush, pushed for a plan to use nuclear weapons against proliferators. The plan, entitled "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy," took shape among middle level bureaucrats in the Pentagon. As physical targets in Russia dwindled, targets outside Russia proliferated. One scholar points out that there is little evidence that President Clinton was aware of the strategy being designed in the Pentagon during his first term. Nonetheless, the ground had been laid for a new strategic policy.

*The Rise of Counterproliferation, 1992-2000*

The elevation of this policy continued throughout the Clinton administration and then accelerated under George W. Bush. In the early 1990s the term "rogue nations" became widely accepted in referring the Third World nations that ignored the NPT. Under Clinton, a crisis with North Korea arose when the country left the NPT and began to build nuclear reactors. The Osirak Option was one of the first buildups that insinuated counterproliferation. Although the information on the Option is still classified, it is known that the Clinton administration was considering military action against North Korea. However, negotiations took place and the Agreed Framework stopped North Korea from plutonium production while providing them with light-water reactors and foreign aid. Although this incident did not end in an offensive counterproliferation action,

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18 Ibid., P. 93.
19 Ibid., P. 95.
20 Ibid., P. 97.
it shows the rise of using offensive means to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It marks the first time that the counterproliferation policy was fed to an even administration.

*The Rise of Counterproliferation, 2000- Present*

As Clinton left office after two terms, the stage was set for a rise of the Third World's role in international nuclear policy. The threats of terrorism, Al Qaeda, and rogue nations had risen to the top of the political agenda. When Bush took office he filled his cabinet with members from cabinets of the early 1990s. Dick Cheney became Vice President, and it appears in retrospect that the rise of counterproliferation was inevitable.

Under the Bush administration nonproliferation took on a military tone that had been unprecedented in previous U.S. policies. As he assumed office, he withdrew from multiple treaties, refused to ratify others, and stated that America's superior military was the best way to combat proliferation. These actions rested upon multiple assumptions. Among them is the idea that the U.S. and its superior capabilities can and should decide who should and should not have nuclear weapons. Counterproliferation turned into a policy that stretches American resources thin and demotes America's good will in the international arena. America is striking others that are deemed to be proliferating weapons. While under the ruse that they are reducing America's stockpile, the administration has made efforts to increase America's nuclear superiority. Without this superiority America would not retain an unchallenged military capable of preemptive strikes.

*What Does Counterproliferation Mean for Nonproliferation Efforts?*
Critics claim that counterproliferation has not only failed but has also undermined decades of nonproliferation efforts. Are they correct? It is my position that they are. To support this opinion, I will focus on four things in particular. First, I will focus on the undermining of international treaties that has damaged the diplomatic use of nonproliferation efforts since the 1970s. Second, I will discuss how counterproliferation has further encouraged nations to move away from a no-first-use policy that has traditionally maintained balance in a looming nuclear disaster. Third, I will examine how these efforts have contributed to the destabilization of power structures in volatile regions and what this means for the proliferation of nuclear arms. Finally, I will examine the international problems associated with counterproliferation citing how holding nuclear weapons in high esteem in foreign policy causes further proliferation.

Undermining International Treaties

The Bush administration opposes heavily-structured international treaties. For example, the administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol, or uphold the International Criminal Court. The administration has concerned itself with fewer multi-national agreements and focused on strategic bilateral arrangements. Here, I will discuss the implications of withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and the administration’s decision to sell nuclear technology and materials to India.

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty was signed in 1972. The treaty maintained a balance of MAD by ensuring that one country did not possess the technology to defend
itself against incoming attacks. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and Bush’s change in foreign policy, the administration began to view the treaty as antiquated. Bush said in August of 2001:

I've asked Congress to provide the largest increase in military spending since Ronald Reagan was the president and commander-in-chief of the United States... And to meet any dangers, our administration will begin building the military of the future. We must and we will make major investments in research and development. And we are committed to defending America and our allies against ballistic-missile attacks, against weapons of mass destruction held by rogue leaders in rogue nations that hate America, hate our values and hate what we stand for.\(^\text{21}\)

Thus, before withdrawing from the treaty Bush set in motion actions to design a national defense missile system, which critics viewed as too costly and in violation of the treaty. Later that year he met with Putin, then President of Russia, to discuss the future of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. A month after the meeting, Bush withdrew from the treaty. “President Putin — who has long opposed scrapping the treaty — expressed regret at Bush’s decision but did not condemn it strongly.”\(^\text{22}\)

At the time of the withdrawal U.S.-Russian relations appeared to be improving. Recently, however, Russia has been making international headlines for its regression towards an oppressive Soviet state. This mainly holds true in regards to Russia’s media censorship.

The withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty threatens a structure that has kept peace and stopped proliferation of nuclear arms for decades. Bush’s actions might lead to a new arms race for national defense missile systems. This would produce weapons in space, but it would also produce a heightened risk of insecurity. If national


defense technology can work defensively, there appears little evidence to counter its use offensively.

Although few effects have been felt since the U.S. withdrew from the treaty, the future promises great insecurity. Sentiments since U.S. withdrawal have changed. One scholar has noted:

The mood in late 2007 could scarcely be more different. Russia and the United States are at odds over missile defense (which President Putin compared in Lisbon to the Cuban missile crisis – the most threatening moment of the Cold War).\(^\text{23}\)

Further, Russia has also threatened to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). The INF was signed in 1987 by the U.S. and the Soviet Union which would eliminate intermediate and short-range stockpiles as well as allow inspections by the other participating party. However, Putin labeled this treaty as antiquated. In my opinion, as well as other critics, Putin's push to withdraw is a reaction to Bush’s policies.

"In the name of the Russian national security interests, it has to go. This is, verbatim, the Bush administration’s rationale for withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Like the United States, Russia now prefers to have a free hand."\(^\text{24}\)

Putin views that the U.S. has overstepped its limits concerning foreign policy. Although I view Putin, now Prime Minister of Russia, hesitantly, I find truth in his claim that the U.S. “inevitably encourages a number of countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction.”\(^\text{25}\)


Treaty with India.

The Bush administration withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and refused to sign Kyoto and other agreements. But, that does not mean it has not entered into bilateral arrangements. In 2005 Bush began to work with India, a non-signatory to the NPT, on a deal to promote trade of nuclear materials for peaceful energy purposes. This arrangement, however, is in direct violation to the NPT which prevents nuclear companies from selling or trading nuclear technology with non-signatory countries.

According to the joint statement press release:

The President would also seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies, and the United States will work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India....

Critics worry that this arrangement undermines the NPT and the efforts of the nonproliferation regime. Although, the President views these arrangements as promoting economic, technological, and political relationships between the two countries, the result of undermining international treaties could be devastating. Other countries, non-signatory or signatory, could follow India's lead and seek nuclear technology. This demonstrates the hypocrisy of the U.S. and other nuclear club members in allowing selective proliferation. (This will be discussed in the last section of this paper.) This arrangement also poses a threat to nonproliferation because it increases the risk of an arms race between Pakistan and India.

The threat of first-use.

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The no-first-use of nuclear weapons is a generally accepted guideline.\textsuperscript{27} In order to attract non-weapon states to extend the NPT, the nuclear club promised not to use nuclear weapons on NPT signatory countries unless first attacked. This is different than the no-first-use policy that entails a country not using nuclear weapons preemptively. In other words, the only thing warranting a nuclear attack would be another nuclear attack. However, this is not in line with the Bush administration’s preemptive policies. In the Nuclear Posture review in 2001, Bush states that the U.S. may use nuclear weapons in response to biological and chemical attack.\textsuperscript{28} Further, Bush also emphasizes that preemptive nuclear strikes could be used to keep states from retaining large stores of underground biological and chemical weapon stockpiles.\textsuperscript{29} The groundwork is laid. In short, the U.S. has disavowed a strict no first-use policy.

\textit{Destabilization of Regions.}

In my opinion there is an international emphasis on developed countries that have nuclear weapons and underdeveloped countries that do not. I believe that nuclear arms races could likely arise in these underdeveloped regions. With the U.S. trading nuclear information with India, the reactions of Pakistan could be dangerous. Further, India and China also have a tense relationship. If the U.S. is securing India as an ally against China, China could perceive a nuclear trade agreement as a severe threat. Moreover, build-up in the Asian subcontinent could lead to build-up in North East Asia. Increased nuclear emphasis and development in mainland China would lead to many concerns over Taiwan’s security. Is an Asian domino effect of nuclear buildups possible? I believe it is.

\textsuperscript{27} Bunn, op cit., P. 106.
\textsuperscript{28} Bunn, op cit., P. 106.
\textsuperscript{29} Bunn, op cit., P. 106.
The U.S. fought wars for the prevention of a domino effect against communism. But, really, who is fighting against the proliferation of nuclear technology and arms?

*International Problems Associated with Counterproliferation*

International problems are often complex. It is my opinion, however, that nuclear weapons in high esteem in foreign policy causes further proliferation. By weapons in high esteem I mean countries whose plans and actions have a heightening use of nuclear weapons offensively and defensively. With the 2001 release of the Nuclear Posture Review, the U.S. is putting nuclear weapons into the foreign policy. In this posture the U.S. maps out the new offensive uses of counterproliferation and places an emphasis on new development. Reflecting this posture, “The George W. Bush administration also earmarked millions of dollars for research and development of new types of nuclear weapons....”\(^{30}\) According to the NPT, nuclear weapons countries are supposed to be eliminating their stockpiles and moving away from nuclear arsenals. Instead, countries hear about new improvements and the potential for increased use. This sends a mixed message to non-nuclear countries.

NATO for many years during the Cold War held that the first-use of nuclear weapons could be acceptable in some cases. But, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and a diaspora of nuclear technology critics think that NATO’s emphasis on nuclear weapons causes other nations to seek them for their own protection and deterrence. Some countries have urged NATO to deemphasize nuclear weapons. For example, Canada and Germany:

\(^{30}\) Sauer, op cit., P. 1.
...believe that nuclear first use is unnecessary, counterproductive and unbefitting of a prosperous, democratic and strong Europe. Instead, they argue, NATO should promote nonproliferation by showing the world that nuclear weapons will not be an instrument of international power and status in the 21st century. At the very least, they argue, NATO must openly debate its nuclear doctrine in the light of the Cold War's end.  

Reviewing Counterproliferation

Before I will begin my evaluation of counterproliferation, I will put it into the larger context of U.S. foreign policy—a policy that traditionally has embraced deterrence and nonproliferation. Problems with nonproliferation began to arise in the early 1990s. The permanent five nuclear powers expanded to include others that have nuclear capabilities. This showed that nonproliferation was not working. Instances such as Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan providing nuclear information to less than desirable countries demonstrated gaps in diplomatic efforts between controlling state actions and not individual actions. Further, the attacks of 9/11 pushed critics to question the effectiveness of nonproliferation efforts. Because of all this counterproliferation became popular among U.S. policymakers. Counterproliferation maintains that dissuasion can be accomplished by not only an active defense but an active offense (which can include pre-emptive military force). Counterproliferation is seen by the Bush administration as providing more protection against irrational rogue nations and terrorists. Although it does not assume that rogue nation states are completely "irrational," it does assume that they are unpredictable.

There are two ways to evaluate counterproliferation. First, we can look at the responses and interactions in the international arena. Then, there we can look at the actual

initiatives derived from the policy. Internationally, the Bush administration's emphasis on counterproliferation has been viewed negatively. However, because of U.S. negotiations with Russia and China, the responses to the U.S. withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were less negative than expected. As shown earlier, current relations between the U.S. and Russia have been strained by such “free handed” activity. Some international observers have questioned the balance of power that the U.S. thinks the new policy can achieve. In the conference proceedings co-organized by the Fourth Freedom Forum, the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs entitled ‘NATO Nuclear Non-proliferation Policies in a changing Threat Environment’ the summary concludes:

More should be done by European allies to encourage the USA to take a more active role in nuclear non-proliferation. Otherwise, counterproliferation may take precedence over non-proliferation.32

This is a reemerging idea internationally. The U.S. could in the long term encourage proliferation. The efforts of counterproliferation would disrupt balances of power in regions and actively impede the fight against nuclear proliferation.

Counterproliferation’s effectiveness is yet to be fully seen. Weapons of mass destruction were not found in Iraq, perhaps making future pre-emptive strikes unlikely. However there have been two positive outcomes of counterproliferation policy: (1) the interception of uranium headed for Libya; and (2) the adoption of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). “The PSI can be seen as a loose arrangement of a group of like-minded countries that share similar counterproliferation goals....”33 The PSI was pushed

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33 Bosch and Ham (Eds), op cit., P. 154.
by the Bush administration in 2003 after North Korean nuclear materials headed for the Arabian Sea were intercepted but not confiscated. The goal of the PSI is for like-minded countries to have the freedom, resources, and capabilities to respond to the challenges posed by proliferation. Without a formal charter, the PSI gives Washington the ability to act swiftly and relies on the use of law enforcement, intelligence, and other government officials. In the fight against further proliferation the administration hopes that the PSI will be able to counter this problem—although its legality is unclear.

Which Approach is Best?

Both nonproliferation and counterproliferation have produced mixed outcomes. Deterrence has worked in the past; however, it might not work against rogue nations or terrorists. Nonproliferation has been effective in keeping the majority of countries from proliferating weapons, but it has not been upheld by Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea. The NPT also was unable to protect against A.Q. Khan's network of nuclear information which presented an extreme danger to the U.S. as well as to the nonproliferation regime.

Evaluation of Outcomes and Recommendations

With all of this in mind, the Bush administration has chosen counterproliferation, which entails not only a defensive but an offensive component to fighting proliferation. Some fear that the U.S. hard stance and willingness to use nuclear weapons as retaliation to biological and chemical weapons as retaliation against non-state actors could lead to greater insecurity and encourage nations to proliferate weapons in order to deter the U.S. or others. The U.S. also engages in activities in opposition to its stance on

34 Bosch and Ham (Eds), op cit., P. 154.
nonproliferation. Although the U.S. calls for sanctions against Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, it does not call sanctions for its closer allies of India, Pakistan, or Israel.

These mixed outcomes are complex, much like the nuclear policy issue itself. It is my opinion that the administration should stay the course with some adjustments. Although living in a nuclear-free world would be ideal, the reality is that eradicating nuclear arsenals poses extreme problems not only in disposal but also in cost. Further, eradicating nuclear weapons would still leave behind the knowledge of how to acquire them, which ultimately could lead to another Cold War.

The administration's attempts at counterproliferation are noted. However, the key to U.S. security as well as international peace is to maintain the framework of nonproliferation. The U.S. simply cannot police the entire world and acquire all nuclear paraphernalia. Nonproliferation, on the other hand, sets a world standard. The U.S. and international organizations should work for full compliance to non-proliferation (including those states that the U.S. appears to overlook as non-signatory). Further, for this to work not only the U.S. but also NATO should minimize the role of nuclear weapons in its foreign policy.

Since the U.S. has shifted its nuclear policy towards counterproliferation, it has not been uncommon for other countries to emphasize their capabilities for nuclear weapons. For example, "Putin in 2006 spoke of a 'new spiral' in the arms race and the need for new weapons to maintain the strategic balance." If Putin really pursues this policy and other nations move away from a no-first-use policy, the balance in many regions and security for all will be in great jeopardy. Maintaining the emphasis on nonproliferation and deterrence has not been completely ruled out in dealing with rogue

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35 Bunn, op cit., P. 6.
nations. The U.S. and international organizations should work to strengthen the security of nuclear weapons so that "loose nukes" are less likely to occur. By "loose nukes" I refer to the definition of "weapons and weapons-grade materials inadequately secured against theft [or unregulated sale]." For example,

The majority of Soviet uranium processing plants are in the Asian republics of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, now beyond the control of Moscow, creating the possibility of unregulated hard currency sales to Third World countries, especially nearby Pakistan, India and Iran.

The energy and expense that the U.S. is currently putting into counterproliferation could be used more effectively. Even before 9/11, the Bush administration "...proposed cutting $100 million from the $750 million spent on non-proliferation programs..." from the previous year. In my opinion, it would do more long-term good in implementing these above recommendations, marginalizing the policing attitude and reinforcing instead of undermining the deterrence and nonproliferation regime.

The Breakdown of Nonproliferation?

My answer is that nonproliferation is best and can be restructured. The UN has studied and concluded that educating the potential proliferators on the dangers of nuclear warfare as well as the environmental risks will curb proliferation. I agree with the UN's study in that I think that a more engaged effort at nonproliferation is best. My discussion

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with focus on how I feel that counterproliferation is eroding nonproliferation efforts.

Being in an intertwined network would lessen the risk of nuclear warfare.

After World War II, while industrialization and productivity were booming, counterpoised ideologies formed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Spiraling into the Cold War, these forces took advantage of the ever-growing technological advancements in weaponry and military sciences. In particular, the nuclear weapon arsenals of the two-superpower countries grew. The Cold War relied most on one fear: the fear that Nagasaki and Hiroshima had realized, a fear that incinerates, mutually destroys, and leaves years of haunting radiation—the nuclear bomb. The interactions between the Cold War superpowers as well as the Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear war, must be studied to decipher diplomatic mechanisms that can help prevent a possible fatal future nuclear struggle.

Fear is a major component in diplomacy between two countries. Diplomacy insinuates a game of one move or threat by a country and a counter-threat by the other country. With this simple fact in mind, it is easy to understand the massive escalation in nuclear weaponry during the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, the NPT and the establishment of the IAEA have controlled policy and set the boundaries for signatory countries. As critics argue, the end of the Cold War and these organizations, however, has not led to the end of nuclear threat. Loopholes and pre-existing nuclear arsenals of developed countries show that these efforts are not working in the 21st century. But these critics ignore the role that the nuclear armed developed nations play in themselves furthering proliferation. Nuclear non-proliferation is not possible while developed nations
hide behind the hypocrisy of keeping, testing, and improving nuclear weaponry while forbidding others to develop them.

The 21st century nuclear threats are derived from ‘rogue nations’ and potential buyers, such as terrorist groups as well as other impoverished nations. The Third World unity is a very real one. Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea all pose current nuclear threats. As these rogue nations go against NPT and global protocol, the likelihood for other entities such as al-Qaeda, Hezbollah, or Muslims in India to purchase nuclear weaponry increases.

The policies to engage these countries should develop through education and open lines of communication. Just as the U.S. still holds Cold War grudges against Cuba, closed communication isolates a country, which perpetuates disconnected societies that often fear or loathe the ‘culturally imperial’ ones—especially those already in possession of nuclear arsenals. MAD and integration as well as education concerning these issues can deter Third World proliferation and propaganda. Israel has nuclear weapons, but, even though it is in a constant state of conflict, has made no serious move to launch them. First, Israel is very engaged with the developed (or dominant) world powers. Second, MAD or, more likely, nuclear fall out would greatly affect Israel because of its close proximity to its adversaries. Further, MAD is still a policy that affects Washington’s actions towards other countries. However, Third World mentality of MAD can also proliferate the likelihood of Third World nuclear development. If the U.S. or the developed world do not attack countries that have nuclear weaponry for fear of retaliation, the temptation of proliferation for North Korea and other countries that have adverse relations with the U.S. increases exponentially.
The case of North Korea is timely and involves many of the aforementioned concepts. North Korea is a Third World country that refused for many years to sign a peace agreement with its opponents from the Korean War. It has developed weapons, and in 2006 North Korea taunted nuclear power nations with its test launches. Although the nuclear capacity of North Korea is questionable, the implications are grandiose. Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan are all countries that, like Israel, are connected to the developed world. These countries, unlike Israel, do not have nuclear weapons and could be nuclear targets for North Korea. America has promised these allies support and military protection—which deters nuclear proliferation in Asia but solicits the U.S. activity and reinstitutes MAD between North Korea and the U.S. The U.S. has greater nuclear arsenals and higher capacity to make and use them, which provides an incentive for North Korea to proliferate weapons even further.

Besides the fact that nuclear proliferation causes a very detrimental outcome for the whole planet, the fact that Washington's foreign policies and world-dominant countries' hypocrisy undermines the nuclear nonproliferation and causes greater production in unconnected Third World countries. Ultimately, non-proliferation theories of the 1970s are applicable in the 21st century. Uninvolved societies do have a greater inclination to acquire nuclear technology, whether for North Korea's taunting purposes, Iran's proclaimed domestic uses, or Pakistan's defensive purposes against India. The developed nations and those with nuclear capabilities should adopt a multilateral approach to dissuade these activities.

*How to restructure nonproliferation?*
In my opinion, communication, education, outreach, and overall improvement of interconnectivity and alleviation of poverty are the only ways to disenchant 'rogue nations' and deter terrorist entities. Hypocrisy has led to greater proliferation—perhaps not greater in actual number, but greater in actual threat. In 2000 the United Nations (UN) analyzed the reality of the growing threat of nuclear proliferation. The United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education was submitted in October of 2002 to the General Assembly. After this analysis of current non-proliferation, education, and training programs, the UN had a variety of recommendations. The study emphasized that education and different methods should be used to reach the public on all levels. Regardless of age, background, or status, the message of non-proliferation should be conveyed with special attention to cultural and language differences. The study also calls for movements by a number of actors ranging from leaders of state to non-governmental organizations. Other organizations such as grass-root groups also would play a viable role in educating the populace of the dangers of seeking nuclear weapons. Some of these dangers include a misuse of limited resources, environmental damages, and potential threat of disaster.

Jayantha Dhanapala, UN Undersecretary General for Disarmament Affairs, and William C. Potter, Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, wrote in the International Tribune, October of 2003, "Education is peace-building by another name."

These actions would be the most

visible and have the highest world-changing capacity. The UN’s study is a major advancement towards a world of nuclear containment with hope for non-proliferation.

In the past, however, the UN’s policy encouraged proliferation. The UN Charter provides no provisions for disarmament equivalent to the charter for the League of Nations. Despite this flaw, the UN worked towards disarmament during the Cold War. Russia and the United States, however, each worked to make its side appear more in support of complete disarmament. When efforts failed, the other side was blamed. Negotiations in the UN during the Cold War era, like most negotiations, were limited. This led to a new limited vision of what nuclear disarmament could be in the future—that of arms control measures. After the Cold War the UN found strength in the collapse of the bi-polar structure and passed numerous resolutions concerning nuclear disarmament. These resolutions tend to split the UN into developed nations that do not want to relinquish nuclear power versus non-developed nations that realize the hypocrisy of the situation.

The General Assembly in Resolution 60/70 (October 2005) linked nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Notably, the majority of Third World countries, including Iran and North Korea, voted for this resolution. Not surprisingly developed nations with nuclear or potential nuclear capabilities voted against it. Pakistan, one of the nations on the nuclear threat list, abstained from voting. South Korea and Japan, usually voting allies of the United States, also, abstained as well.

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41 Bourantonis, ibid., P. 55.
Iran introduced another resolution, 60/72 (October 2005), encouraging greater transparency among nuclear nations. As with the previous resolutions, Third World countries banded together and voted in favor. Cowering from another vote, Pakistan abstained again. The United States voted against it. In fact, not one developed country voted in favor of the resolution.\(^{43}\) Iran appears to be a very cunning diplomatic force in the UN with regards to nuclear non-proliferation, rallying Third World countries against the increasingly apparent developed country hypocrisy. Iran’s call for transparency is ironic considering the status of Iran on the nuclear threat list, and its lengthy debacle with the IAEA.

Iran has been seeking nuclear power since Shah Pahlevi in the 1970s with foreign assistance from Germany and France, but mostly from the United States.\(^{44}\) After the Iranian revolution, it did not take long for interest in the nuclear program to start again, and the United States is now experiencing a backlash from involvement in Iran’s nuclear program.

Unlike in the 1970s, the United States is now adamant about the cessation of Iranian nuclear development. Iranian diplomats, however, claim that their projects and development fall under Article IV of the NPT that asserts states can develop nuclear energy for peaceful domestic purposes.\(^{45}\) This NPT flaw is allowing Iran to play the “peaceful nuclear energy” card. Nuclear energy is still a form of proliferation and is only causing more work for IAEA personnel and more complications in the political arena.

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\(^{45}\) Kile [Ed.], ibid., P. 3.
To trump the nuclear energy card, especially with Iran, education and engagement are the best routes. Seeking interconnectivity to Iran’s nuclear aspirations could curb the threat of proliferation. Joint ownership of reactors or a trade on nuclear energy would be fruitful yet unlikely. Iran aspires to have complete nuclear independence—that is the ability to produce a complete nuclear cycle from mining to storing waste.⁴⁶ This move towards nuclear isolation is not economically efficient with the surplus of enriched plutonium and nuclear waste already in the world market.⁴⁷ Russia already has protocol in place for reprocessing and receiving some nuclear waste. Even if Iran was not making nuclear weapons, nuclear waste would cause environmental hazards. The *International Herald Tribune* writes on Saudi Arabia’s work against Iran’s influence,

> Saudi Arabia is worried about even a peaceful program because of the possible environmental threat — and fears of the Gulf getting caught in the middle of any fight between Iran and U.S. troops stationed in Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain.⁴⁸

Further, the more nuclear independence Iran attains, the more it is likely to resell nuclear waste to third parties such as Hezbollah—an Islamic fundamentalist group known to have strong ties with Iran.

The West is also confronting the dilemma of North Korea’s nuclear power. Differing from Iran, however, North Korea has a more ruthless dictator and a worse human rights record. Although Iran’s transparency is becoming increasingly less as the

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⁴⁶ Kile [Ed.], ibid., P. 3.
⁴⁷ Kile [Ed.], ibid., P. 3.
country pursues nuclear isolationism, North Korea’s transparency is far less, as the country has been pursuing isolationism since the 1950s.

Since North Korea’s transparency is low, its capabilities are unknown. But, we know the rogue nation has nuclear weapons. However, as seen with its summer of 2006 missile tests, the viability of these weapons is in doubt. The threat is still looming, although curtailed by its recent agreements to dismantle nuclear reactor plants. The Rumsfeld commission concluded, “It is unlikely the countries other than Russia, China and perhaps North Korea, will deploy an ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) capable of reaching any part of the U.S. before 2010.” The report indicates the lack of information and transparency with respect between security and North Korea—“perhaps” is a fairly feeble word when it comes to nuclear threats.

The transparency failure of North Korea was heightened in 1992 when it withdrew from the NPT. To avoid a disaster the U.S. negotiated the “agreed framework” and gave North Korea two light water reactors. Although a potential brinksmanship on the Korean peninsula was derailed, the damage to the non-proliferation regime was done.

North Korea is not only a nuclear threat because of its domestic program. North Korea also exports nuclear information. Iran’s Shahab-3 (1300-1500 km range) missile is based on technology from North Korea’s No Dong missile. Since there is very little transparency, the likelihood of North Korea selling or trading information increases drastically.

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51 Kile [Ed.], op cit., P. 50.
Another state, not in George W. Bush's 'Axis of Evil' but still a volatile nuclear power is Pakistan. It has a great propensity to sell nuclear technology. Some scholars believe Pakistan to be on the "bottom of the nuclear hierarchy." Its nuclear development is "driven solely by the desire to counter India."52 There is evidence that Pakistan's nuclear development stems from a hostile relationship with India, as well as a fear of India's nuclear might. However, other mitigating domestic issues with Pakistan should not be disregarded; Pakistan is a strong nuclear threat. The threat is not necessarily to American security vis-à-vis direct aggression but through third parties and a breakdown in non-proliferation measures.

Pakistan has a brittle government, a bond of Islamic unity, and a willingness for nuclear exportation. Pakistan views its nuclear arsenal as a deterrent policy against India; India views the proliferation in the same regards. The situation is reminiscent of a Cold War structure leading to volatility. The ineffectiveness of nuclear deterrence was displayed in May 1999 and the heightened tension almost led to war over the Kargil heights.53 The United States, although sometimes promoting positive relations to Pakistan, such as during the Cold War and post-9/11 operations, actually chose sides with India—perhaps indicating its recognition of the aforementioned mitigating circumstances.

The Bush administration's "Indo-U.S. agreement on Nuclear Cooperation" has led to a surge in military support for India instead of Pakistan. The price of F-16's sold to

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India is one-third the price of the same military equipment sold to Pakistan.\footnote{Khan, Ayaz Ahmed. "Weaponising India." The Nation 25 Sept 2006: Lexis Nexus.} Instead of encouraging a steaming pit of military proliferation, the U.S. and the west need to stimulate an open line of communication and education as a justification for supporting India’s nuclear aspirations. The increase of proliferation in India will only lead to an increase in nuclear weapons in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s view of nuclear deterrence is uneconomic and a danger to nuclear proliferation. The money that is wasted on nuclear weapons steals funds from a budget that could go to support development in human capital. Further, the drain on the economy provides incentive for the serious potential threat of nuclear proliferating Pakistan—the reselling of nuclear weapons or waste to third parties. The strong connection between Pakistan and Islamists cannot be ignored. The state is by no means a radical fundamentalist propagating unit. A country, however, with Islam as it’s only unifying factor and a brittle government should not be seen as a benign nuclear power. In 2003, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program admitted to selling nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea.\footnote{Schwartz, Milton [Ed.]. \textit{Iran: Political Issues, Nuclear Capabilities, and Missile Range}. Nova Science: New York. P. 15.} The selling of nuclear technology and design as well as nuclear waste is a hazardous by-product of increasing proliferation.

\textit{What is left to do?}

The study of these three states all show the implications of Third World countries developing nuclear technology. Acquisition should not be viewed as a deterrent, a protector, or an agent of revenue. Instead, open lines of communication, education, and outreach among the developed world and the Third World should be pursued in the area
of nuclear non-proliferation. The difficulties arise in the resistance of nuclear empowered countries to disarm. This further emboldens those that see the hypocrisy.

The options for the world to take are at a crossroads. Incentive-based diplomacy could be applied to those nations that the developed world thinks should dismantle their nuclear programs. Incentive-based diplomacy has two prongs: negative sanctions and positive incentives. Sanctions, however, reveal more hypocrisy and have only brazened such ‘champions of the Third World’ as Iran. For example, sanctions against Iran have limited school supplies and fed a grass roots movement against the West. Further, positive incentives are highly incalculable with the low degree of transparency in these countries. North Korea could filter money back into the central bank and ultimately back into military endeavors. Although the European Union usually advocates a positive incentive approach, a brassy America can claim the absurdity of rewarding a nation for something it never should have attained in the first place. This schism proves to be a standstill in the UN and Security Council.

The other path is world non-proliferation in its purest form. The pure non-proliferation would also include pure disarmament because partial armament breeds proliferation. This route, however, is highly unlikely considering the unwillingness of the major powers to relinquish nuclear control. Moreover, the flow of information and technology research cannot be halted completely. The transfer of materials can be guarded under sanctions, but the flow of professors, doctors, and researchers is more difficult. All it would take for the pure non-proliferation regime to collapse would be one country hoarding one weapon or nuclear apparatus, and news to spread. Surely a new nuclear arms race would be a potential outcome, if not nuclear attack.
A third way, on the other hand, should be pursued—an outreach of information, education, and support of nuclear non-proliferation. The Third World needs to be connected to the developed countries such as Israel, discouraging nuclear development. Options can include multi-national ownership of nuclear reactors or relinquishing rights to the UN. Under these circumstances, Third World countries would get a voice and education, as well as the appeasement of the big nuclear powers through the oversight of operations by the UN Security Council. Only after affirmative steps can be taken to pull the rug from underneath these nuclear countries that are finding loopholes around the NPT ideas of the 1970s will future security of the world from nuclear holocaust augment the vast threat of nuclear weapons and waste.
Bibliography


