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# The Relation between Globalization and Personal Values across 53 Countries and 28 Years

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I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Irina Florentina Cozma entitled "The Relation between Globalization and Personal Values across 53 Countries and 28 Years." I have examined the final electronic copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Industrial and Organizational Psychology.

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Anne Smith, Franz Kellermanns, Don Clark

Accepted for the Council:

Carolyn R. Hodges

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The Relation between Globalization and Personal Values across 53 Countries and 28 Years

A Dissertation Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Irina Florentina Cozma  
December 2011

## **Abstract**

The aim of this research is to examine the relation between the change in globalization and change in personal values (work and general life values). An analysis across 28 years and 53 countries suggests that changes in different personal values have different relations with the change in globalization. Moreover, this relation is influenced by the demographic characteristics of the sample. The present research contributes to the literature in the following ways: 1) linking globalization (an economic concept) and personal values (a psychological concept), 2) providing an analysis of the relation between the change in personal values and the change in globalization across 28 years and 53 countries, 3) using an objective measure of globalization to examine the globalization phenomenon, and 4) including a large number of personal values (12 values) which provides a rich source of information.

**Key words:** change, globalization, personal values, work values.

## Table of Contents

<b>CHAPTER I .....</b>	<b>1</b>
INTRODUCTION .....	1
LITERATURE REVIEW .....	4
<i>Globalization</i> .....	4
<i>Globalization and change</i> .....	7
<i>Values</i> .....	9
<i>Values and Change</i> .....	12
<i>Globalization and Values</i> .....	15
<b>CHAPTER II.....</b>	<b>25</b>
METHODS .....	25
<i>Data sources</i> .....	25
<i>Variables of interest</i> .....	27
<i>Data Analysis</i> .....	27
<b>CHAPTER III .....</b>	<b>31</b>
RESULTS .....	31
<i>A. Preliminary analysis</i> .....	31
<i>B. Primary analysis</i> .....	32
<i>B.1. Change in values</i> .....	32
<i>B.2. Change in globalization</i> .....	37
<i>B.3. Correlation between change in values and change in globalization</i> .....	37
<b>CHAPTER IV.....</b>	<b>42</b>
DISCUSSION .....	42
<i>Research contribution</i> .....	44
<i>Practical contribution</i> .....	46
<i>Data analysis contribution</i> .....	47
<i>Further research</i> .....	48
<i>Conclusion</i> .....	51
<b>REFERENCES.....</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>APPENDIX.....</b>	<b>69</b>
<b>VITA.....</b>	<b>123</b>

## List of tables

<i>Table 1 KOF Index of Globalization: Indices and Variables Weights (Dreher, 2006)</i> .....	71
<i>Table 2 Countries included</i> .....	72
<i>Table 3 Summary of the variables</i> .....	74
<i>Table 4 Subject matter experts' agreement on intrinsic and extrinsic work values (%)</i> .....	75
<i>Table 5 Reliability and percent of variance for the work related values</i> .....	76
<i>Table 6 Test-retest reliabilities (Pearson's r coefficients)</i> .....	82
<i>Table 7 Change in extrinsic work values and globalization</i> .....	83
<i>Table 8 Change in personal values from the first to the last year</i> .....	88
<i>Table 9 Correlation between the absolute sum of change in values and absolute sum of change in globalization</i> .....	89
<i>Table 10 Correlation between change in values and change in globalization by intervals</i> .....	89
<i>Table 11 Correlation between change in values and change in globalization from the first to the last year</i> .....	90
<i>Table 12 Correlation between the sum of change in values and sum of change in globalization</i>	90
<i>Table 13 Correlation between the absolute sum of change in values and absolute sum of change in globalization (younger people, &lt; 30 years old)</i> .....	91
<i>Table 14 Correlation between change in values and change in globalization by intervals (younger people, &lt; 30 years old)</i> .....	91
<i>Table 15 Correlation between change in values and change in globalization from the first to the last year (younger people, &lt; 30 years old)</i> .....	92
<i>Table 16 Correlation between the sum of change in values and sum of change in globalization (younger people, &lt; 30 years old)</i> .....	92
<i>Table 17 Correlation between the absolute sum of change in values and absolute sum of change in globalization (higher SES)</i> .....	93
<i>Table 18 Correlation between change in values and change in globalization by intervals (higher SES)</i> .....	93
<i>Table 19 Correlation between change in values and change in globalization from the first to the last year (higher SES)</i> .....	94
<i>Table 20 Correlation between the sum of change in values and sum of change in globalization (higher SES)</i> .....	94
<i>Table 21 Correlation between the absolute sum of change in values and absolute sum of change in globalization (bigger cities &gt; 100,000 people)</i> .....	95
<i>Table 22 Correlation between change in values and change in globalization by intervals (bigger cities &gt; 100,000 people)</i> .....	95
<i>Table 23 Correlation between change in values and change in globalization from the first to the last year (bigger cities &gt; 100,000 people)</i> .....	96
<i>Table 24 Correlation between the sum of change in values and sum of change in globalization (bigger cities &gt; 100,000 people)</i> .....	96
<i>Table 25 Correlation between the absolute sum of change in values and absolute sum of change in globalization (more educated, university and higher)</i> .....	97
<i>Table 26 Correlation between change in values and change in globalization by intervals (more educated, university and higher)</i> .....	97

<i>Table 27 Correlation between change in values and change in globalization from the first to the last year (more educated, university and higher)</i> .....	98
<i>Table 28 Correlation between the sum of change in values and sum of change in globalization (more educated, university and higher)</i> .....	98
<i>Table 29 Typology of values</i> .....	99
<i>Table 30 Summary of hypotheses and research questions' results</i> .....	100
<i>Table 31 Key findings</i> .....	102

## List of figures

<i>Figure 1 Globalization Index for US (1982 - 2007)</i> .....	104
<i>Figure 2 Economic Globalization for US (1982 - 2007)</i> .....	104
<i>Figure 3 Social Globalization for US (1982 - 2007)</i> .....	105
<i>Figure 4 Political Globalization for US (1982 - 2007)</i> .....	105
<i>Figure 5 Globalization Index for Romania (1982 - 2007)</i> .....	106
<i>Figure 6 Economic Globalization for Romania (1982 - 2007)</i> .....	106
<i>Figure 7 Social Globalization for Romania (1982 - 2007)</i> .....	107
<i>Figure 8 Political Globalization for Romania (1982 - 2007)</i> .....	107
<i>Figure 9 Top 10 countries with most GI change</i> .....	108
<i>Figure 10 Top 10 countries with less GI change</i> .....	108
<i>Figure 11 Change in Life Satisfaction for Top 10 countries with most GI change</i> .....	109
<i>Figure 12 Change in Life Satisfaction for Top 10 countries with less GI change</i> .....	109
<i>Figure 13 Change in Trust for Top 10 countries with most GI change</i> .....	110
<i>Figure 14 Change in Trust for Top 10 countries with less GI change</i> .....	110
<i>Figure 15 Change in Happiness for Top 10 countries with most GI change</i> .....	111
<i>Figure 16 Change in Happiness for Top 10 countries with less GI change</i> .....	111
<i>Figure 17 Change in Importance of Work for Top 10 countries with most GI change</i> .....	112
<i>Figure 18 Change in Importance of Work for Top 10 countries with less GI change</i> .....	112
<i>Figure 19 Change in Importance of Family for Top 10 countries with most GI change</i> .....	113
<i>Figure 20 Change in Importance of Family for Top 10 countries with less GI change</i> .....	113
<i>Figure 21 Change in Importance of Friends for Top 10 countries with most GI change</i> .....	114
<i>Figure 22 Change in Importance of Friends for Top 10 countries with less GI change</i> .....	114
<i>Figure 23 Change in Importance of Leisure for Top 10 countries with most GI change</i> .....	115
<i>Figure 24 Change in Importance of Leisure for Top 10 countries with less GI change</i> .....	115
<i>Figure 25 Change in Importance of Politics for Top 10 countries with most GI change</i> .....	116
<i>Figure 26 Change in Importance of Politics for Top 10 countries with less GI change</i> .....	116
<i>Figure 27 Change in Importance of Religion for Top 10 countries with most GI change</i> .....	117
<i>Figure 28 Change in Importance of Religion for Top 10 countries with less GI change</i> .....	117
<i>Figure 29 Change in Intrinsic Work values for Top 10 countries with most GI change</i> .....	118
<i>Figure 30 Change in Intrinsic Work values for Top 10 countries with less GI change</i> .....	118
<i>Figure 31 Change in Extrinsic Work values for Top 10 countries with most GI change</i> .....	119
<i>Figure 32 Change in Extrinsic Work values for Top 10 countries with less GI change</i> .....	119
<i>Figure 33 Change in Job Satisfaction for Top 10 countries with most GI change</i> .....	120
<i>Figure 34 Change in Job Satisfaction for Top 10 countries with most GI change</i> .....	120
<i>Figure 35 Change in personal values for China</i> .....	121
<i>Figure 36 Change in globalization for China</i> .....	121
<i>Figure 37 Change in personal values for India</i> .....	122
<i>Figure 38 Change in globalization for India</i> .....	122



## **CHAPTER I**

### **Introduction**

Far more people have an opinion about globalization than a deep understanding of the concept (Martens & Zywiec, 2006). This might be because parallel discussions are conducted about this topic in different disciplines (economics, sociology, political science, anthropology, and marketing) without much contact between them. Axford's (1995) observation that, while there has been much intellectual excitement about the concept of globalization, there has been little reliable or systematic empirical research on its core components and consequences, remains valid to this day. We hear all the time that the world is changing and becoming globalized (Freidman, 2005) or semi-globalized (Ghemawat, 2007) or glocalized (Robertson, 1995), but actually what, where and how much is it getting globalized? The present research addresses these questions from the perspective of personal values and contributes to the literature in the following ways: 1) linking globalization (an economic concept) and personal values (a psychological concept), 2) by providing an analysis of the relation between the change in personal values (work and general life values) and the change in globalization across 25 years and 50 countries, 3) by using an objective measure of globalization to examine the globalization phenomenon, and 4) by including a large number of personal values (12 values) which provides a rich source of information.

First, the focus of this research is to examine if there is a similar relation between change in personal values and change in globalization. Do work and general life values change in the same way as globalization? And if so, changes in which values have a more similar relation with the change in globalization? Empirical and theoretical research on personal (general life and

work) values has demonstrated that values change over time, with the rate of change varying based on what values are being examined (Zander & Kogut, 1992; Topalova, 1994; Triandis, 1995; Ralston et al., 2006; Calman, 2004; Sorge, 2005; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Li & Bond, 2010; Twenge et al., 2010). But little research has looked at the long term changes in values, mainly due to the limited and fragmentary nature of the available data. More research is needed to test whether any general patterns in value shifts can be detected (Li & Bond, 2010). Taking advantage of the recent release of the European Values Survey (EVS) and World Values Surveys (WVS) (2010), the present research would examine change in personal values across 25 years.

Second, rarely in the literature are personal values and globalization studied together. On the one hand, the few articles which did this are in the economics literature and looked at a measure of globalization in relation with just one value (Koster, 2007, 2009). On the other hand, the psychology literature typically looks at a purely economic dimension as proxy for globalization (e.g., GDP, economic growth, etc.) in relation to a specific personal value. The present research will use a multidimensional globalization measure and a set of work and general life values, thereby attempting to provide a more accurate picture of the relation between these two constructs. The results of this research will help us understand if (and which) personal values change in the same way as globalization.

Third, in the social sciences, researchers often use globalization as an argument for their research or as explanation for their results (e.g., Flynn, 2010; Ma & Allen, 2009; Lacassagne, Castel, & Fu, 2004; Keating et al, 2002; Calhoun, Teng & Cheon, 2002; Suh & Kwon, 2002; Aaker, Benet-Martínez, & Garolera, 2001; Vertinsky et al., 1990), proclaiming that globalization increases at a rapid pace (e.g., Bradford & Burke, 2004; Zekos, 2004; Ide, 2003; Koslowsky et al., 2002) or stating that their findings contribute to the knowledge of how globalization impacts

individuals and organizations (e.g., Baughn et al., 2010; Lien et al., 2009; Parboteeah et al., 2009 ; Carr & Harris, 2004; Suutari & Taka, 2004; Russ-Eft & Hatcher, 2003; Luke, 2002; Roman, 2001; Singhapakdi, 1999). However, they neither measure globalization nor back up their statements with data reflecting the degree of globalization. Plus what aspects of globalization are they talking about? Globalization is a highly general and internally heterogeneous construct (Sorge, 2005). Basically it is a long-term, multidimensional process that encompasses internationalization (increasing cross-border relations, international exchange, and interdependence), liberalization (of restrictions on movements), universalization (disseminating objects and experiences across the world), modernization (spreading the social structures of modernity), and deterritorialization (the increasing separation of social spaces from territorial places, distances, and borders) (Scholte, 2005). Moreover, globalization represents not just an idea, but also a tangible and measurable empirical phenomenon which can be assessed using a Globalization Index (GI). While it is doubtful that a phenomenon as vast as globalization can be fully captured by just one statistic, having a comprehensive measure of globalization is an important first step in landing the globalization debate on a more solid scientific ground. But this highly complex phenomenon is not easily quantifiable. Globalization occurs at levels that make measurement difficult (e.g., trans-border environmental issues, cultural transformations and a so-called “global consciousness”). Those features of globalization are obviously interesting and novel, which is one of the reasons why they are so difficult to capture. One possible solution is to assess globalization by thematic order (Dreher, 2008). The present research looks at the relation between changes in personal values and globalization using the Index of Globalization offered by KOF Swiss Economic Institute (Dreher, 2007; 2008).

Fourth, the previous research looked to just one value in relation with a proxy of globalization. The present research includes 12 personal values having the opportunity to provide a richer source of information. Moreover, the scarcity of the literature regarding the relation between globalization and personal values make from this research a pioneer. The results will offer a global picture of the relation between change in globalization and change in a broad set of personal values (e.g., extrinsic and intrinsic work values, job satisfaction, importance of work, life satisfaction, trust, happiness, importance of family, importance of friends, importance of leisure, importance of politics and importance of religion).

The present inter-disciplinary research reviews the following literatures: 1) globalization and globalization change, 2) personal values and personal value change, and 3) the relation between values and globalization.

## **Literature Review**

### **Globalization**

Globalization involves an intensification of cross-national cultural, economic, political, social and technological interactions that lead to the establishment of transnational structures and the global integration of cultural, economic, environmental, political and social processes on global, supranational, national, regional and local levels (Rennen & Martens, 2003). While globalization is perceived as one general idea, it actually includes multiple facets which are not necessarily interrelated. As stated by Held et al. (1999, p. 27), “Few areas of social life escape the reach of processes of globalization. These processes are reflected in all social domains from the cultural through the economic, the political, the legal, the military and the environmental.”

Furthermore, we should not view globalization as a recent phenomenon since successive waves of globalization have occurred throughout history. What we witness today is merely the

most recent iteration of the phenomenon. In fact, from 1870 to 2000 four distinct phases have been identified: the first wave of globalization 1870–1913, the deglobalization period of 1913–1950, the golden age of 1950–1973 and the second wave of globalization of 1973 onward (O’Rourke & Williamson, 1999; O’Rourke, 2001; Williamson, 2002). Moreover, Stearns (2010) suggests that the globalization might have been actually started with the creation of the Silk Road (206 BCE – 220 CE) which increased long distance travel and trade across societies. Naghshpour (2008) argue that until the time that all the nations are able to abolish borders and other barriers to trade, the world will witness trade cycles and, hence, globalization cycles. Each cycle will have its own forces that determine its starting point, the rate of expansion, the point of decline, the rate of decline, the end of the cycle, and the birth of a new cycle.

Globalization represents not just an idea, but also a tangible and measurable empirical phenomenon. Kearney (2002, 2003) was the first to attempt to compute a composite globalization index (GI). Nowadays GI is calculated yearly by different organizations, therefore providing a constantly updated picture for organizations operating in different countries (A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index, 2005, 2008; Ernst & Young, 2009; KOF Swiss Economic Institute Index of Globalization, Dreher, 2006). The rankings are not identical (due to the different factors that each take into account) but they are similar. Martens and Zywiets (2006) assessed the robustness of three commonly computed GIs and found that all of the correlation coefficients were significant ( $>.90, p<.001$ ). Nonetheless, there is not one best GI as each one has its limitations. Furthermore, some have proposed using a different GI for developing countries (Ebenthal, 2007).

Measurement of globalization should not be limited to only economic variables, as a whole range of other issues are also important in assessing the phenomenon (Martens & Zywiets,

2006), including cultural and historical aspects of human living (Lim, 2007). Additionally, Brady et al. (2007) noticed that many aspects of social life have been neglected by recent research on globalization that overstates its economic nature. In response to these critics, recent globalization indexes have incorporated other types of dimensions, such as political globalization (KOF Swiss Economic Institute Index of Globalization, Dreher, 2006; A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index, 2005, 2008), technological globalization (A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalization Index, 2005, 2008; Ernst & Young, 2009), cultural globalization (Ernst & Young, 2009). Also there are talks about the globalization of crime (Winslow & Zhang, 2008), and the globalization of health and illness (Turner, 2010). In this context, it is worth mentioning alterglobalization, which is a large spectrum of global social movements that present themselves as supporting new forms of globalization, urging that values of democracy, justice, environmental protection, and human rights be put ahead of purely economic concerns (Hinkelammert & Ulrich, 2004).

However, the present components of GI are not without problems (Martens & Zywiets, 2006; Naghshpour & Sergi, 2009). For example, they are sensitive to: a) foreign direct investment (FDI; e.g., ranking small countries at the top because they are more dependent on investment and trade for survival), b) the population size (e.g., after controlling for GDP, the population increase affects trade negatively), c) the service versus manufacturing focus of a country (e.g., more advanced service-oriented countries do not have as much to trade so they will experience a decrease in GI), or d) the conjunctural factors (e.g., due to the SARS epidemic in Asia, the tourism dropped 50% in 2003 which affected the GI). FDI and capital flows are particularly problematic since they can be very volatile (with variations of up to 200% from one year to the next).

Factors included in the GI are interconnected and interrelated, affecting each other in various ways. However, despite the fact that this introduces difficulties in measuring globalization, acknowledging the pluralistic character of the forces that drive globalization and its consequences seems to be an essential step in describing this phenomenon (Martens & Zywiets, 2006).

### **Globalization and change**

The discussion about globalization and change can be divided in two sections: 1) advocates of fast globalization, and 2) advocates of slow globalization, semi-globalization or glocalization.

Advocates of fast globalization tend to emphasize the convergence at different levels among countries. For example, Friedman (2005) advocated in his book, *“The world is Flat,”* that globalization is here, and proposed a “triple convergence model”: 1) flattening influences: fall of the Berlin Wall, Netscape, open source, outsourcing, off-shoring, Google, cell phones, etc.; 2) convergence of the business practices and skills that would get the most out of the flat world – meaning that a new business model is required in order to succeed (from vertical to horizontal); 3) the inclusion of three billion people (China and India) who had previously been left out of the business climate. Rosling (2006, 2009) and Sapkota (2010) support the idea that the economic, health, and educational development gap between Western countries and the rest of the world is closing rapidly. Rosling (2009) actually predicts that the income per person (GDP per capita) gap between the U.S., India and China will be closed in 2048.

Due to the boost of globalization, people increasingly experience the same material goods and living styles across countries, such as eating fast food at McDonalds, drinking a latte at

Starbucks, having similar banking services provided by HSBC, and so forth (Li & Bond, 2010). Taking into account the increase in communication due to the increased number of cell phones and the use of the Internet, Stiglitz (2002) claims that globalization has reached people in the developing countries, effectively reducing the “sense of isolation” they feel and giving them opportunities to explore the global world.

However, whether globalization is actually occurring has been a source of great debate, and many skeptics contend that globalization’s existence is overblown (Bairoch, 2000; Campbell 2004, Fligstein 2001; Gilpin 2001, Held et al. 1999; Therborn, 2000). The takeaway point from Ghemawat’s (2007) book, “*Redefining Global Strategy*,” is that globalization is a myth and semi-globalization will last for decades. Globalization advocates evoke the disappearance of borders and the integration of markets and assume or predict internationalization levels close to 100%. Conversely, Ghemawat (2007) argued that most types of economic activities that might cross borders are still largely concentrated domestically. Levels of internationalization of phone calls, management research, charitable giving, investment, and even trade (as a fraction of economic activity) cluster much closer to 10% than to 100%. These and other key measures of internationalization suggest that the world is not flat. It is 90% round, like a rugby ball (Ghemawat, 2007).

People’s response to globalization might be more complex than is commonly assumed. Existing research tends to view people’s responses to globalization as a static trait (Alden et al., 2006; Strizhakova et al., 2008). In a consumer-oriented article, Van Ittersum and Wong (2010) propose that consumers actively tradeoff between globalized and localized product offerings, sometimes favoring the global, at other times the local, making the case for a dispositional approach to globalization. Some researchers think that the pervasive influence of countercurrents



from the local reaction to Western cultures is overlooked (Berger & Huntington, 2002; Hermans & Kempen, 1998). They suggest that local traditions would be resistant to the press of globalization. Traditions and local cultural practices would be shored up in the face of the intense and continuous “invasion” of foreign products, services, information, and implicit values. Therefore local and global cultures would interact, leading to cultural transformation and a sense of high connectedness among cultures called glocalization (Hermans & Kempen, 1998). As a result *some* values across *some* countries might be similar, but there are still *some* values across *some* countries which are still different.

## **Values**

The literature provides a number of definitions of values. Much cited is Rokeach (1973, p.5), who defines a value as “an enduring belief that a special mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence.” Hofstede (1984, p.18) defines values as “a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others.” A more elaborate definition is given by Schwartz (1992, p.2), who defines values as “desirable states, objects, goals, or behaviors, transcending special situations and applied as normative standards to judge and to choose among alternative modes of behavior.” An important merit of this latter definition is that it distinguishes values from attitudes by pointing at their generalized nature. Attitudes are people’s beliefs about specific objects or situations (Hollander, 1971), whereas values are generalizable across situations. Another difference is that attitudes can be positive or negative, whereas values are always positive, i.e. in favor of something (Roe & Ester, 1999).

Values can provide predictive and explanatory power in the analysis of attitudes, opinions and actions, and can reflect major social change in societies and across nations (Schwartz, 1992), therefore being directly related with the globalization phenomenon.

### *Personal values*

Personal values estimate the level of importance of a goal or behavior according to a certain criterion (Levy, 1990; Guttman, 1982). Elizur and Sagie (1999) used a multifaceted definition of personal values, which incorporates life and work values independently. Analyzing personal values in the frameworks of both the broader (more general) life area and the narrower (more specific) work area together can help to clarify their importance.

Elizur and Sagie (1999) presented an integrative definitional framework of personal values that incorporates both life values and work values, pointing that work values are a subset of the personal life value system. Their framework has three facets that define personal values: value modality, focus, and life area. First, value modality is the dominate type of value that an individual holds, and could be: a) material values (placing importance on tangible or physical things), b) affective values (placing importance on interpersonal relationships), and c) cognitive values (placing importance on personal internal thoughts, opinions, beliefs, and considerations). Second, personal values will either be focused or diffused. Focused values are those that lead to a tangible and clear outcome, whereas diffused values are broader in nature and have abstract outcomes that are harder to measure. Last, life area is the location of the value in the life sphere. Elizur and Sagie (1999) listed two types of life areas: work and life in general.

General life values are the beliefs or standards that individuals use to guide their attitudes, behaviors, or personal goals throughout life (Perrewe & Hochwarter, 2001). They include smaller, individual subdomains (Elizur & Sagie, 1999), or different life spheres, which

represent the different areas of life that an individual has a role in and places value upon, such as family life, work life, religion, or self. Traditionally, researchers have studied value systems and their effect on various domains separately from one another (Elizur & Sagie, 1999; Perrewé & Hochwarter, 2001). However, analyzing them together will help clarify which personal life values relate more to certain domains (with globalization in this case).

Work values have been defined as the outcomes people desire and feel they should attain through work (Brief, 1998; Frieze, Olson, & Murrell, 2006). Work values shape employees' perceptions of preferences in the workplace, exerting a direct influence on employee attitudes and behaviors (Dose, 1997), job decisions (Judge & Bretz, 1992), and perceptions and problem solving (Ravlin & Meglino, 1987). Congruence between employee values and organizational values lead to greater satisfaction (Meglino, Ravlin, & Atkins, 1989) and less turnover (Sheridan, 1992).

The literature differentiates between extrinsic and intrinsic work values (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2001). Extrinsic work values focus on attaining instrumental resources separable from the meaning of the work activities themselves, as for example, income, security, and prestige (Lindsay & Knox, 1979; Ryan & Deci, 2001). In contrast, intrinsic work values focus the intangible rewards associated with the process of work that reflect the inherent interest in the work, the learning potential, and the opportunity to be creative (Ryan & Deci, 2001). The intrinsic work value involves valuing work that is inherently interesting and important and provides autonomy (Lindsay & Knox, 1979), and basically valuing work for its own sake.

The relation between work and family has long been of interest to researchers (Hardesty & Betz, 1980; Watanabe et al., 1997). The literature in this domain can be characterized by four major competing models: spillover model (satisfaction at work is associated with satisfaction at

home), compensation model (being dissatisfied at work trigger seeking more pleasurable experiences at home and vice versa), opposition model (work and family activities conflict with each other and you should sacrifice one or the other), and segmentation model (work and family are independent domains and there is no meaningful association between them) (Voydanoff, 1989; Zedeck, 1992; Watanabe et al., 1997).

However, values are not context-free. They depend on the environment in which they are set and on the influences from outside domains (Hyde & Heathington, 2006). The present research is based on the premise that it is important to understand values' dynamic from a globalization perspective. This research takes into account 12 personal values (extrinsic and intrinsic work values, job satisfaction, life satisfaction, trust, happiness, importance of work, importance of family, importance of friends, importance of leisure, importance of politics, importance of religion). More details about each of them can be found below, in the section that highlights the hypotheses and research questions.

## **Values and Change**

The discussion about values and change can be divided into three sections: 1) advocates for and against values change, 2) how fast the values change, and 3) exactly what values are changing.

Regarding the change or lack thereof in values, the convergence and divergence viewpoints were developed decades ago as contrasting explanations of values' evolution (Webber, 1969). Those who believe that economic ideology drives values follow the convergence theory perspective. They argue that managers in industrialized nations will embrace common values with regard to economic activity and work-related behavior (England & Lee,

1974). Convergence implies that as nations become industrialized, there will be a significant change in values towards behavior that embraces free-market capitalism (Eisenstadt, 1973; Pascale & Maguire, 1980). Conversely, proponents of the divergence approach argue that national culture, not economic ideology, drives values and that even if a country adopts capitalism, the value systems of those in the workforce will remain largely unchanged (Lincoln, Olson, & Hanada, 1978; Ricks et al., 1990). Thus, divergence proposes that individuals will retain their diverse, culturally determined values regardless of economic ideology (Cole, 1973; Evans, 1970). The crossvergence perspective (Ralston et al., 2006) attempts to bridge these views by accepting that both alternatives are viable, and that they are inherently interactive.

Regarding how fast the values change happens, Hofstede (1980) emphasized that this change, if it is happening, is a very slow one. However other researchers believe that the change is more rapid and therefore the research on values must be periodically updated (Triandis, 1984). The crossvergence approach acknowledges that some aspects of a values system may change over a period of years (fast change) while other aspects of a values system may take generations or centuries to change (slow change). Inglehart (1990) identified an overall shift in values among successive generations in Western countries, which he has labeled as a transition from materialist to post-materialist values.

The speed of change in values depends on what values we are talking about. Rokeach (1973) and Schwartz (1992) identified a contrast between terminal and instrumental values that are theoretically consistent with the crossvergence perspective. Socio-culturally ingrained values are deeply rooted in the core social fabric of the society. Therefore, these terminal values are less likely to change in response to business ideology influences (i.e., economic, political, and technological changes). Values that are more peripheral, on the other hand, are more susceptible

to change when there are economic, political and/or technological changes. Thus, change to any of these aspects of business ideology influence can have a substantial impact upon these instrumental values. Making an argument for this idea, Calman (2004) analyzed the change in ethical values and suggested that there are a series of core values which are unlikely to change over long time periods, and there are then a series of secondary or derived values around which there is much more controversy and within which differences of view occur. Such changes need to be documented and understood.

Zanders' research (1992, 1993) on work values, has demonstrated partial changes over time, such as an increase in the value of personal development in certain countries (e.g. Sweden and the Netherlands). Values related to comfort and material conditions failed to show significant change. A decrease in work centrality has been reported by Quintanilla and Wilpert (1991) in a German sample over a six-year period. While the value of the work role decreased, the value of leisure increased. A similar study using an American sample (England, 1991) showed a different type of change: work centrality also decreased, but economic work goals rather than expressive work goals were rated higher. Topalova (1994) compared Bulgarian samples from 1977, 1984, and 1990. She found that work centrality did not change, but the importance attributed to various work facets did. A growing weight was assigned to the instrumental facet of work, especially to job security. Inglehart and Baker (2000) argued that societal development would shift people's attention from physical and economic concerns to more personal interests, such as self-expression and subjective well-being.

A longitudinal study across nine years (Lindsay & Knox, 1979) shows a stronger correlation across years between extrinsic work values (.63) than between intrinsic work values (.27), suggesting that extrinsic work values change less compared to the intrinsic work values

which change faster. On the other hand, recent cross-generational research found that both extrinsic and intrinsic work values changed, and offered information on the direction of this change (Twenge et al., 2010). Twenge et al. (2010) suggested that the importance of some work values did increase (leisure, extrinsic work values), some decrease (intrinsic values, work centrality, social values), and that the importance of other values did not change (altruistic work values).

To summarize, some values do change over time but others remain relatively stable. To fully understand the overall change in value system, it is important to establish which specific values are changing and the magnitude of this change. The present research seeks to analyze these changes in relation to changes in globalization.

### **Globalization and Values**

Usually research on globalization is carried out by economists and research on values is carried out by psychologists, with very few attempts being made to integrate the two fields. Furthermore, even when both variables are taken into account, 1) only economic variables (e.g., GDP, economic growth, etc.) are used as a proxy for globalization (Inglehart, 1990; Shat, 2008; Li & Bond, 2010), 2) the discussion is focused on just one country (Shah, 2008), or just one variable (Koster, 2007, 2009; Bjørnskov, Dreher & Fischer, 2008; Layard, Mayraz & Nickell, 2010), 3) the research is cross-sectional (Koster, 2007, 2009; Shat, 2008) due to limited and fragmentary nature of the available data, and 4) the research typically investigates the relation between economic development and *cultural* values, which are not the topic of this research (Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Shah, 2008; Li & Bond, 2010). The present research

will take into account both the overall GI and its dimensions, over 53 countries in relation with several personal values (work and general life values) across a 25 years period.

Few studies have included a full globalization measure and at least one personal value (Koster, 2007, 2009). In a first study, Koster (2007) examined the relation between the KOF Index of Globalization and willingness to help others (e.g., sick, disabled, or immigrants). His results showed that economic and social dimensions of GI are positively related with the intention to help immigrants, but not related to the intention to help the sick and disabled. In a second study, Koster (2009) built a new construct (“organization of solidarity”) from the willingness to help variable used in the previous study and a second variable measuring whether the respondents think individuals or governments should take more responsibility. He found support for social globalization as being related with solidarity, and partial support for the economic and political dimensions (they were related to solidarity only in the case of immigrants). Nevertheless, these studies are cross-sectional.

The goal of the present research is to see if and how the changes in personal values relate with the changes in globalization, measured by the GI. Due to the lack of literature in this area, I will formulate both hypothesis and research questions for the relation between the change in personal values and change in GI. However, the purpose of this research is to take a general look at the relation between change in personal values and globalization and to provide some broad answers about it. The first set of hypothesis and research questions take in refers to the whole population from the dataset.

The literature on **extrinsic** and **intrinsic work values** indicates that intrinsic work values might be increasing as globalization increases. Inglehart and Baker (2000) argued that societal development would shift people’s attention from physical and economic concerns to more



personal interests, such as self-expression and subjective well-being. Van de Vliert et al. (2009) found that working for money was strongest drive for the people's motivation to work in the poorest countries, whereas working for fun was strongest in the richest countries. Also, the principle of prepotency argues that once a need is satisfied, it declines in importance and the next higher need is activated (Maslow, 1943).

*H<sub>1</sub>: There is a similar relation (positive correlation) between change in intrinsic work values and change in GI.*

*H<sub>2</sub>: There is a similar relation (negative correlation) between change in extrinsic work values and change in GI.*

With the advent of globalization, increased job flux, and at-will employment policies, feelings of insecurity are becoming more prevalent, contributing to work-related stress (Blustein, 2006), which in turn is associated with lowered **job satisfaction**, and elevated turnover intentions (Spielberger, Vagg & Wasala, 2003).

*H<sub>3</sub>: There is a similar relation (negative correlation) between change in job satisfaction and change in GI.*

Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008) distinguished four groups of aggregate variables as potential determinants of **life satisfaction**: political, economic, institutional, and human development and culture. Some of this determinants (openness to trade, relative investment price levels, infant mortality, the number of years a country has been independent, having a bicameral political system and communist past) were robustly related to life satisfaction, but others did not (national income, welfare state characteristics, democracy, unemployment rates, and higher

education). A cross-sectional study which included both *developing* and *developed* countries found a strong relation between life satisfaction and income (Deaton, 2008). But other research (Easterlin & Sawangfa, 2010), who treated life satisfactions and financial satisfaction as one dimension (as subjective well being; SWB), failed to show any consistent relation between economic growth (GDP per capita) and SWB across 13 *developing* countries. These contradictory results stress the need for further analysis of the relation between life satisfaction and GI.

*RQ<sub>1</sub>: Is there a similar relation between the change in life satisfaction and change in GI?*

As societies develop, the **importance of leisure** activities seems to increase, and the **importance of work** activities to decrease. A decrease in work centrality has been reported by Quintanilla-Ruiz and Wilpert (1991) in a German sample over a six-year period. While the value of the work role decreased, the value of leisure increased. Similar results were obtained using an American sample (England, 1991). Nevertheless, the role of work remains important in the development and maintenance of a person's identity, but the role of leisure is apparently assuming significantly greater importance in developed countries (Offe, 1984; Quintanilla-Ruiz & Wilpert, 1991; Harpez, 1999).

*H<sub>4</sub>: There is a similar relation (positive correlation) between the change in importance of leisure and change in GI.*

*H<sub>5</sub>: There is a similar relation (negative correlation) between the change in importance of work and change in GI.*

The **importance of family** in relation with globalization was hardly studied. Georgas et al. (2009) analyzed family relations across 27 countries, and his findings indicate a combination of cross-cultural differences and similarities in family characteristics across cultures. The socioeconomic index of countries was the most powerful source of variation of the variables, followed by the dominant religion of countries. The largest differences between countries were, in descending order, the hierarchical values of mother and father, relationships with family and Kin values, expressive roles of mothers and fathers, and family networks. Universals among countries were also found: emotional bonds with the nuclear family did not differ across countries, nor the degree of bonds with its members, financial roles of fathers were higher than mothers', child care roles of mothers were higher than fathers', and expressive roles of mothers were higher than the child care roles of fathers.

*RQ<sub>2</sub>: Is there a similar relation between the change in importance of family and the change in GI?*

Even if I did not identify any research looking at the relation between friendship and globalization, in line with the increase importance of trust and leisure, the importance of **friendship** is expected to increase too.

*H<sub>6</sub>: There is a similar relation (positive correlation) between the change in importance of friends and change in GI.*

The relation between the **importance of politics** and globalization is a paradoxical one. As pressures from the international economy intrude on domestic societies, citizens turn even more urgently to their own governments for help. In their view, domestic problems (e.g.,

unemployment, delocalization of industries, immigrants, etc.) are carried into the community by the unregulated flows of capital, labour and information from outside national territory (Berger, 2000). Because the problems appear to have political origins, they appear reversible by government actions. Thus, one paradoxical outcome of globalization may be to refocus political attention on the role of the state on the boundaries of national territory (Berger, 1995; Della Porta, 1995).

*H<sub>7</sub>: There is a similar relation (positive correlation) between the change in importance of politics and change in GI.*

High level of economic welfare and high levels of secular education with its emphasis on the scientific method will determine a noticeable decrease in the **importance of religion** (Esmer, 2007). Some exceptions are the persistent high level of religiosity in the U.S., and the increased level of religiosity in the Islamic world (Esmer, 2007). But overall there is good reason to think that we have been heading towards a more secularized world on the whole despite strong resistance and sporadic reversals (Noris & Inglehart, 2004).

*H<sub>8</sub>: There is a similar relation (negative correlation) between the change in importance of religion and change in GI.*

From the personal values included in this paper, the most popular and researched one is **happiness**. It seems that higher income raises happiness in *developing* countries, while the effect is only small, if it exists at all, in *developed* countries (Frey & Stutzer, 2002). This phenomenon is known as the “*Easterlin hypothesis*” which states that once a society’s basic needs – food, shelter, employment – are satisfied, the accumulation of greater and greater wealth does not

generate greater collective or personal happiness over the long run. Unfulfilled aspirations (new needs) increase over time with income, negating any possible increase in happiness due to increased income (Easterlin, 1995, 2001). Supporting this hypothesis is Layard et al.'s (2010) research which looked at the relation between income growth and GDP per capita with happiness across time in *developed* countries. Their findings indicate that change in happiness has a different relation depending on the growing national and personal incomes.

*RQ<sub>3</sub>: Is there a similar relation between change in happiness and change in GI?*

**Trust** has been shown to be an important factor in the success of inter-organizational systems and transnational supply chain collaboration (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Ibbott & O'Keefe, 2004). Also at the country level, due to increase interconnectivity across countries, trusting behavior becomes a necessity for economic survival and competitive advantage (Mahapatra & Kumar, 2009). Relations based on trust will make the trade and international strategic alliances between countries easier, and will accelerate the gains for all parts involved (Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995; Gulati, 1995). Interpersonal trust, an important component of social capital, is closely related both to economic development and democratization (Esmer, 2007).

*H<sub>9</sub>: There is a similar relation (positive correlation) between the change in trust and change in GI.*

After analyzing the relations between the change in all these personal values and change in GI, the **overarching question** is to find the change in what value has the most similar relation with the change in globalization.

*RQ<sub>4</sub>: Change in what value has the most similar relation with the change in overall GI?*

The hypothesis and research questions stated above take in account the GI as a whole. But different dimensions of GI capture different aspects of globalization (Dreher, 2006; Koster, 2007, 2009; Charron, 2008), therefore I will also analyze the relation between change in personal values and change in **GI's dimensions** separately. Apparently the strongest driver of global integration, and the main reason why the globalization juggernaut will keep moving forward, is the spread of technology (included in the social dimension in this research) (Ernst & Young, 2010). Also, economic and cultural globalizations seem to not to be very popular (due to fear of increasing inequality or loss of identity), while political globalization wins majority support probably in a hope of more efficient political agreement, which will help keep the other aspects of globalization under control (Stearns, 2010).

*RQ<sub>5</sub>: What is the relation between change in each of the personal values and change in each dimensions of GI (economic, social and political)?*

The hypothesis and research questions stated above take into account the whole population. The following sets of hypothesis focus on sub-samples from this population, because there is a large heterogeneity in the degree of globalization over time and across countries, as well as within countries (Bhandari & Heshmati, 2005). An in-country analysis between globalization and the different groups in a particular country might show different results. There is no doubt that globalization is discriminatory in its effects on the populations of nations. There are winners and losers. The winners of globalization benefit greatly, while the losers are left out or can even experience the adverse effects. In particular, educated, middle and upper class individuals living in globalized cities are exposed to the constructive facets of globalization and benefit a great deal from its economic vitality, while uneducated or less educated lower classes in

less globalized cities do not benefit at all (Naghshpour, 2008a, 2008b; Shah, 2009). Davidson et al. (2009) found that the upper strata in more developed economies are more globalized. De Pelsmacker et al. (2002) claimed that due to the existence of some common values, some products can be sold to similar target groups across countries (such as young people or people with a higher education) and argue that these groups, in general, are more open-minded, less culturally bound, more receptive to and make more use of international media, have more international contacts and travel more. There are even talks about “a global elite” (Davidson et al., 2009; Pakulski, 2010). Therefore, globalization might happen just for some people inside a particular country.

Because globalization impact different people in different ways, it is possible that when the sample is composed only by individuals with higher **socio-economic status** (SES), or from **large towns**, or **more educated**, or **younger**, the relation between change in personal values and GI (and its dimensions) to be more similar.

*H<sub>10</sub>: There is a stronger relation (higher correlation) between the change in personal values and change in GI for higher SES individuals across countries compared with the whole population.*

*H<sub>11</sub>: There is a stronger relation (higher correlation) between the change in personal values and change in GI for people living in bigger cities across countries compared with the whole population.*

*H<sub>12</sub>: There is a stronger relation (higher correlation) between the change in personal values and change in GI for people who are more educated across countries compared with the whole population*

*H<sub>13</sub>: There is a stronger relation (higher correlation) between the change in personal values and change in GI for younger people across countries compared with the whole population.*

The studies mentioned above evaluate globalization (or proxies for globalization) in relation with different personal values. The results, even if sometimes contradictory, lean toward the idea that the change in values over time is somehow related with an economic or political proxy as a measure of globalization. The present research takes a more comprehensive view of how the evolving environment can shift personal values by using the GI and its dimensions as a measure of globalization. The variables analyzed here are general life values (life satisfaction, happiness, trust, importance leisure, friends, family, politics, and religion) and work related values (extrinsic and intrinsic work values, importance of work, and job satisfaction). The first set of hypotheses look at relation between the change in personal values and change in the globalization as a whole (GI) and each of GI's dimensions (Economic Globalization – EG; Political Globalization – PG; Social Globalization - SG). The second, third, fourth and fifth sets of analyses involve the relation between the change in GI, EG, PG, and SG and the change in personal values for some sub-samples of the whole population (high SES, large towns, more educated or younger).



## CHAPTER II

### Methods

#### Data sources

##### *Globalization Index - KOF Swiss Economic Institute*

This is a database that provides yearly measurement of political, economic, social, and overall globalization (Dreher, 2006). The KOF index of globalization is created by the Konjunkturforschungsstelle (KOF – Economic Research Center) of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Zürich, Switzerland, and is the result of the call for an all-encompassing measurement tool. Also this measure has become the most widely used measure of globalization by academic researchers (Dreher et al., 2008). This GI takes in account three dimensions: 1) Economic Globalization – trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), stocks and flows, portfolio investment, income payments to foreign nationals, hidden import barriers, the average tariff, the trade tax share of revenue, and capital account restrictions; 2) Social Globalization – data on personal contact (outgoing telephone traffic, transfers, tourism, the share of foreign population, international letters), data on information flows (internet hosts and users, cable television, trade in newspapers, radios), data on cultural proximity (numbers of McDonalds and IKEA outlets, and trade in books); and 3) Political Globalization – embassies in the country, membership in international organizations, participation in U.N. Security Council missions, and international treaties (Dreher, 2006). These three dimensions are based on 23 variables, which finally are aggregated into one single index of globalization (Table 1).

All information about definitions, calculations of rankings and papers on which the index is based, and papers that use the index (around 100) can be found on their website (<http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/>).

### *The World and European Values Survey (EVS/WVS)*

The World Values Survey (WVS) is a worldwide network of social scientists studying changing values and their impact on social and political life. The WVS in collaboration with EVS (European Values Study) carried out representative national surveys in 97 societies. Representative national samples of each society's public are interviewed, using a standardized questionnaire that measures values concerning religion, gender roles, work motivations, democracy, good governance, social capital, political participation, tolerance of other groups, environmental protection and subjective wellbeing. Details on questionnaire wording, fieldwork organizations and data access can be obtained at [www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org) and [www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu](http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu). A rich academic literature has been created around the original and consecutive surveys and numerous other researchers have made use of the findings. The repository found in the EVS website contains almost 900 publications that used EVS data.

For the present research the four waves of the European Values Study (EVS), conducted in 1981, 1990 and 1999, and 2008 have been integrated with the five waves of the World Values Surveys (WVS), carried out in 1981-1984, 1989-1993, 1994-1999, 1999-2004, and 2005-2009. Consequently this data covered 28 years (1981 - 2009). In order to analyze change in values, the research focused on the countries that had three or more years of data collection. From the total of 103 unique countries and regions included in EVS and WVS, 53 countries (303,987 people) fulfilled this criterion (Table 2).

## **Variables of interest**

One year of EVS/WVS data has around 400 questions depending on the year and country. From the surveys collected in the 53 countries included in this research (countries that had three or more years of data collection) I chose the variables which: 1) were reflecting personal values (work and general life values), and 2) were asked consistently across three or more years. This selection resulted in 24 variables: work related values (16 items) and general life values (8 items) (Table 3). Also, a number of demographic variables were included. These demographic variables were used to test the additional sets of hypotheses mentioned in the previous chapter.

- Set 1: whole sample;
- Set 2: younger → 30 years old or less;
- Set 3: higher social-economic status → above 7<sup>th</sup> step of income (e.g., for U.S. equivalent of \$50,000 per year);
- Set 4: bigger cities → population of 100,000 or more;
- Set 5: education level → college and higher.

## **Data Analysis**

### *A. Preliminary analysis.*

The first step is to look at the factor structure. The analysis was performed for each country by year. Some dimensions were expected to emerge (e.g. intrinsic and extrinsic work values). Furthermore the reliability should support the dimensions found. Both Cronbach's alpha reliability (for the dimensions) and test-retest reliability (for individual items) were checked.

## B. Primary analysis

The hypotheses were tested by correlating the effect size change of personal values with the change in globalization (GI). A significant correlation indicates that the change in that value has a similar relation with the change in GI. The higher correlation highlights the value which changes the most in a similar way as globalization change.

### B. 1. Change in values

The change in values was calculated by using the effect size change (Cohen's  $d$ ) between data collection years for each dimension (or item) for each country. The formula used is:

$$\text{Cohen's } d = M_{T2} - M_{T1} / \sigma_{\text{pooled}} \text{ where } \sigma_{\text{pooled}} = (\sigma_2 + \sigma_1) / 2$$

where  $M_{T1}$  and  $M_{T2}$  are the means for two years of data collection, and  $\sigma$  is standard deviation. A positive score is interpreted as the mean of the value in year 2 is higher than the mean of that value in year 1. Cohen (1988) defined effect sizes as small when  $d = .2$ , medium when  $d = .5$ , and large when  $d = .8$ .

For the present data four ways to calculate the change in values were identified. Each type of effect size change computation has the potential to capture different information about the change in values:

- a) the effect size change between each interval of data collection  $\rightarrow d = M_{T2} - M_{T1} / \sigma_{\text{pooled}}$
- b) the effect size change between the first and last year of data collection  $\rightarrow d_{TnT1} = M_{Tn} - M_{T1} / \sigma_{\text{pooled}}$ ;
- c) the sum of the effect size change  $\rightarrow \sum d = d_{T1} + d_{T2} + \dots + d_{Tn}$ ;
- d) the sum of the absolute effect size change  $\rightarrow \sum |d| = |d_{T1}| + |d_{T2}| + \dots + |d_{Tn}|$ .

## B. 2. Change in globalization

The change in globalization was calculated by the difference in GI between the same intervals used to calculate the values' change (which correspond with the data collection years for values). Similar with the way change in values were calculated, there are four ways to calculate the change in globalization:

- a) the difference between each interval of data collection:  $\rightarrow x_{n+1} - x_n$
- b) the difference between the first and the last year of data collection  $\rightarrow x_n - x_1$
- c) the sum of each interval of data collection's distances  $\rightarrow \sum (x_{n+1}-x_n) = [(x_2-x_1) + \dots + (x_{n+1}-x_n)]$
- d) the sum of each interval of data collection's the absolute distances  $\rightarrow \sum |x_{n+1}-x_n| = [|x_2-x_1| + \dots + |x_{n+1}-x_n|]$

## B. 3. Correlate the change in values with the change in globalization

To see if the change in personal values has a similar relation with change in globalization, the change in each personal value for all the countries was correlated with the change in globalization for all respective countries. The following correlations were performed:

1. the change in values for each interval with the change in GI for the similar interval  $\rightarrow d$  with  $x_n - x_1$  for each interval by country.
2. the change between the first and the last year of data collection for values and for GI  $\rightarrow d_{TnT1}$  with  $y_n - x_1$ .
3. the sum of the effect size change of values with the sum of the GI distances differences  $\rightarrow \sum d$  with  $\sum (x_{n+1}-x_n)$ .
4. the sum of the absolute effect size change of values with the sum of the absolute GI distances differences  $\rightarrow \sum |d|$  with  $\sum |x_{n+1}-x_n|$ .

In concordance with the hypotheses and research questions, each of these correlations will be performed for five different samples. The first set of hypotheses looks at relation between the change in personal values and the change in the globalization as a whole (GI) and each of GI's dimensions (Economic Globalization – EG; Political Globalization – PG; Social Globalization - SG). The second, third, fourth and fifth sets of analysis involve the relation between the change in GI, EG, PG, and SG and the change in personal values for people with a high SES, from large towns, more educated or younger.

## CHAPTER III

### Results

#### A. Preliminary analysis

##### A.1. Factor analysis

Consistent with previous research on extrinsic work values (Ros et al., 1999; Van Vianen et al., 2007), the factor analysis of the some items measuring work values revealed two factors reflecting intrinsic and extrinsic work values. From the total of 24 items, 14 items were grouped in intrinsic and extrinsic work related values. However, for some years the items loaded on both factors. In order to achieve more clarity regarding the grouping of these items, a panel of 12 subject mater experts (SEM) grouped these 14 items as intrinsic or extrinsic work values (Table 4).

Even if the item “Not too much pressure” received 58% endorsement as being an intrinsic work value, finally this item was integrated to the extrinsic work values dimension because: 1) according to the definition of the intrinsic and extrinsic work values, this items seems not to be related with self-actualization aspect of the work (intrinsic work values) but with a more pragmatic and utilitarian one (like extrinsic work values are), 2) the reliability of the extrinsic work values dimension increased when the item was added, and 3) SME agreement was highly divided regarding this item (42% of SEM saw this item as representing an extrinsic work value).

The percent of variance accounted by the first factor is reported in Table 5.

##### A.2. Reliability

Internal consistency reliability ( $\alpha$ ) was calculated for the work related values (14 items) for each country by dimension by year. All internal consistency reliabilities ( $\alpha$ ) for the extrinsic

work values (9 or 6 items) and intrinsic work values (5 items) were in the acceptable range. In some years and countries only some of the items were asked, therefore the composite of intrinsic and extrinsic work values did not always integrate the same all 14 items (Table 5).

Test-retest reliability was calculated for the remaining 10 items (Table 6). Due to data limitations, there are only three years with enough data across countries that allowed this analysis (1990, 1000, and 2008). Again the values were in the acceptable range.

For some items the reliability was not as good as desired (Nunnally, 1978). Beside issues as item translation and/or survey administration, one important aspect to take in account is that the majority of the items had a low number of response categories (two or four), and previous research (Weng, 2004) indicated that the scales with few response categories tend to result in lower reliabilities, especially test-retest reliability.

## **B. Primary analysis**

### *B.1. Change in values*

The effect size (Cohen's  $d$ ) has been calculated for each country taking into account the data collection years for each dimension (or item). Also all four computation types capturing change in values were calculated. The following paragraphs offer a description of the net change of values for the present dataset (effect size change between the first and last year of data collection – see also Table 8), and also of the total magnitude of change (absolute sum).

In the case of extrinsic work values, from the total of 47 countries, 27 (57%) registered a negative effect size change from the first to the last year of data collection (20 significant – seven small, five medium, eight large), and 20 a positive effect size change (16 significant – 8 small, three medium, five large). Hence overall there are more countries for which the importance of



extrinsic work values decreased than increased. The countries with the highest effect size change are Turkey (-.2.91), Moldova (-.2.13), France (1.83), Macedonia (-1.49). On the other side, countries which registered the highest magnitude of extrinsic work values change (absolute sum) are Malta (2.59), Sweden (2.48), Moldova (2.40), Latvia (2.15) and Slovenia (1.93).

In the case of intrinsic work values, from the total of 47 countries, 30 (64%) registered a negative effect size change from the first year of data collection to the last (19 significant – 11 small, four medium, four large), and 17 a positive effect size change (nine significant – three small, two medium, four large). Hence overall there are more countries for which the importance of intrinsic work values decreased than increased. The countries with the highest effect size change are Turkey (-1.98), Moldova (-1.45), Spain (1.25), and Macedonia (-1.07). On the other side, countries which registered the highest magnitude of intrinsic work values change (absolute sum) are Turkey (3.14), Malta (2.50), Slovenia (2.40), Moldova (2.23), and Latvia (2.12).

In the case of job satisfaction, from the total of 28 countries, 12 registered a negative effect size change from the first year of data collection to the last (three significant – all small), and 16 (57%) a positive effect size change (10 significant – all small). Hence overall there are more countries for which job satisfaction increased than decreased. The countries with the highest effect size change are Bulgaria (.49), Poland (-.39), and Slovakia (.34). On the other side, countries which registered the highest magnitude of job satisfaction change (absolute sum) are Poland (1.13), Slovakia (.97), and Malta (.71).

For life satisfaction, from the total of 53 countries, 15 countries registered a negative effect size change from the first to the last year of data collection (seven significant – all small), and 38 (72%) had a positive effect size change (23 significant – 15 small, six medium, two large). Hence overall there are more countries in which life satisfaction increased than decreased.

The countries with the highest effect size change are Moldova (1.12), Ukraine (.86), Albania (.76), Bosnia & Herzegovina (.71), and Serbia & Montenegro (.64). ). On the other side, countries which registered the highest magnitude of life satisfaction change (absolute sum) are Russia (1.32), Turkey (1.41), Moldova (1.19), Estonia (1.19), and Slovakia (1.08).

In the case of trust, from the total of 53 countries, 24 countries registered a negative effect size change from the first to last year of data collection (nine significant – eight small, one medium), and 29 (55%) had a positive effect size change (12 significant – all small). Hence overall there are more countries in which trust increased than decreased. The countries with the highest effect size change are Denmark (-.50), Albania (.44), Mexico (.43), Belarus (-.41), and Macedonia (-.35). On the other side, countries which registered the highest magnitude of change in trust (absolute sum) are Turkey (1.15), Spain (1.05), Netherlands (.98), Romania (.67), and Poland (.62).

In the case of happiness, from the total of 52 countries, seven countries registered a negative effect size change from the first to the last year of data collection (one significant - small), and 45 (87%) had a positive effect size change (31 significant – 24 small, seven medium). Hence overall there are more countries in which happiness increased than decreased. The countries with the highest effect size change are Mexico (.74), Albania (.73), Belarus (.73), Nigeria (.73), and Slovenia (.59). On the other side, countries which registered the highest magnitude of change in happiness (absolute sum) are Poland (1.88), Turkey (1.56), Canada (.93), Latvia (.90), and Romania (.90).

In the case of importance of work, from the total of 51 countries, 37 (73%) countries registered a negative effect size change from the first to the last year of data collection (17 significant – 15 small, two medium), and 14 had a positive effect size change (six significant –

four small, two medium). Hence overall there are more countries in which importance of work decreased than increased. The countries with the highest effect size change are Sweden (.59), Bosnia & Herzegovina (-.55), Turkey (.52), Finland (-.51), and India (-.45). On the other side, countries which registered the highest magnitude of change in importance of work (absolute sum) are Turkey (1.43), Sweden (1.16), Czech Republic (1.09), Slovenia (1.05), and Latvia (.94).

In the case of importance of family, from the total of 51 countries, 16 countries registered a negative effect size change from the first to the last year of data collection (three significant – one small, two medium), and 35 (67%) had a positive effect size change (ten significant – all small). Hence overall there are more countries in which importance of family increased than decreased. The countries with the highest effect size change are Bosnia & Herzegovina (-.63), Sweden (-.61), Japan (.38), Turkey (.34), and Bulgaria (.30). On the other side, countries which registered the highest magnitude of change in importance of family (absolute sum) are Sweden (1.09), Mexico (1.08), Bosnia & Herzegovina (.94), Russia (.85), and Portugal (.74).

In the case of importance of friends, from the total of 51 countries, 11 countries registered a negative effect size change from the first to the last year of data collection (four significant – three small, one medium), and 40 (78%) had a positive effect size change (24 significant – 23 small, one medium). Hence overall there are more countries in which importance of friends increased than decreased. The countries with the highest effect size change are Bosnia & Herzegovina (-.59), Hungary (.51), Austria (.48), Poland (.46), and Macedonia (.46). On the other side, countries which registered the highest magnitude of change in importance of friends (absolute sum) are Czech Republic (.97), Finland (.96), Turkey (.84), Moldova (.72), and China (.63).

In the case of importance of leisure, from the total of 51 countries, eight countries registered a negative effect size change from the first to the last year of data collection (three significant – two small, one large), and 43 (84%) had a positive effect size change (15 significant – 13 small, two medium). Hence overall there are more countries in which importance of leisure increased than decreased. The countries with the highest effect size change are Sweden (-1.55), Turkey (.73), Ireland (.52), Mexico (.47), and Chile (.46). On the other side, countries which registered the highest magnitude of change in importance of leisure (absolute sum) are Sweden (1.66), India (1.05), Turkey (.77), Bulgaria (.73), and Peru (.73).

In the case of importance of politics, from the total of 51 countries, 22 countries registered a negative effect size change from the first to the last year of data collection (13 significant – 11 small, two medium), and 29 (57%) had a positive effect size change (12 significant – 10 small, one medium, one large). Hence overall there are more countries in which importance of politics increased than decreased. The countries with the highest effect size change are Sweden (1.02), Lithuania (-.71), Iceland (.59), Latvia (-.54), and South Korea (-.48). On the other side, countries which registered the highest magnitude of change in importance of politics (absolute sum) are Lithuania (1.55), Bulgaria (1.41), Sweden (1.05), Turkey (1.03), and Czech Republic (.95).

In the case of importance of religion, from the total of 51 countries, 25 countries registered a negative effect size change from the first to the last year of data collection (nine significant – all small), and 26 (51%) had a positive effect size change (15 significant – 13 small, two medium). Hence overall there are slightly more countries in which importance of religion increased than decreased. The countries with the highest effect size change are China (.72), Bulgaria (.62), Turkey (.49), Mexico (.48), and Poland (-.47). On the other side, countries which

registered the highest magnitude of change in importance of religion (absolute sum) are China (1.30), Spain (1.09), Belarus (.89), Finland (.80), and Mexico (.75).

As an example, Table 7 summarizes the effect size change in extrinsic work values for 47 countries which provided enough data for this value.

### *B.2. Change in globalization*

The change in globalization was calculated as the difference in GI between the same intervals used to calculate the values' change (which correspond with the data collection years for values). Also all four ways of estimating change in globalization were calculated.

The GI index is provided on a 1 to 100 points scale. The mean change for the 53 countries included in this analysis across 25 years is 21.29 points (min = 7.15, max = 37.76, SD = 8.50). The countries which experienced more change in globalization are: Lithuania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Estonia, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Latvia and Portugal. The countries which experimented less change in globalization are: Colombia, Switzerland, Nigeria, Mexico, Australia, Netherlands, Norway, Brazil, Ireland and Sweden.

As an example, Table 7 summarizes the change in globalization in relation with change in extrinsic work values for 47 countries that provided enough data for this value. See also Figure 1 – 8.

### *B.3. Correlation between change in values and change in globalization*

As a general note, the correlations between two of the four types of computations of change resulted to be identical: the change between the first and the last year of data collection ( $d_{TnT1}$  with  $y_n - x_1$  by country) and the sum of the effect size change of values with the sum of the

GI distances differences ( $\sum d$  with  $\sum (x_{n+1}-x_n)$  by country). Also in these cases the correlations between change in values and change in globalizations were less significant and lower comparing with the other two ways of looking at change (by intervals and absolute sum).

The correlations between the sum of the absolute effect size change of values with the sum of the absolute differences of GI distances ( $\sum |d|$  with  $\sum |x_{n+1}-x_n|$  by country) capture the total magnitude of change.

The correlations between the change in values for each interval with the change in GI for the similar interval ( $d$  with  $x_n - x_1$  by country) capture most of the variations and noise in change. Therefore the below results are based on this analysis (See Table 9 – 28 for the all four analysis).

#### *Set 1 – All sample* (Tables 9 – 12)

The correlations between the change by intervals in overall globalization index (GI) and change in values are significant for seven values: intrinsic work values (+), trust (+), happiness (+), importance of family (+), importance of friends (+), life satisfaction (-), and importance of politics (-). From these correlations, three were in the hypothesized direction (intrinsic work values, trust, and importance of friends). Importance of friends and job satisfaction were in the hypnotized direction but not significant.

#### *Set 2 – Younger people* (< 30 years old) (Tables 13 – 16)

The correlations between the change by intervals in GI and change in values are significant for three values: happiness (+), importance of family (+), importance of friends (+),

and importance of politics (-). All these three significant correlations were stronger comparing with the overall sample.

*Set 3 – **Higher SES** (above 7<sup>th</sup> step of income<sup>1</sup>) (Tables 17 – 20)*

The correlations between the change by intervals in GI and change in values are significant for six values: intrinsic work values (+), trust (+), happiness (+), importance of family (+), importance of religion (+), and importance of politics (-). From these six significant correlations, three were stronger comparing with the overall sample (intrinsic work values, happiness, and importance of religion).

*Set 4 – **Bigger cities** (population 100,000 or more) (Tables 21 - 24)*

The correlations between the change by intervals in GI and change in values are significant for four values: happiness (+), importance of happiness (+), importance of religion (+), and importance of work (-). All these four correlations were stronger comparing with the overall sample.

*Set 5 – **More educated** people (university or higher) (Tables 25 - 28)*

The correlations between the change by intervals in GI and change in values are significant for five values: life satisfaction (+), importance of friends (+), extrinsic work values (-), importance of work (-), and importance of politics (-). From these five correlations, four were stronger comparing with the overall sample (life satisfaction, importance of friends, extrinsic work values, and importance of work).

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<sup>1</sup> For U.S., equivalent of \$50,000 or more per year.

## Post hoc analysis

The analyses performed above take in account the whole set of countries. For a more in depth look at the relation between change in globalization and change in values a subset of countries were extracted. Basically one additional question is to see if countries which experienced more change in globalization also have more change in values (and countries with less change in globalization have less change in values). In order to answer this question countries with the highest change in GI and countries with the lowest change in GI (approximate  $\pm 2SD$ ) were identified, based on the total change in GI as calculated by the absolute sum method. Figures 9 to 34 indicate that there are several typologies (see also Table 29):

1. High (low) values change – High (low) globalization change. Countries with higher change in globalization have more change in values and countries with less change in globalization have less change in values  $\rightarrow$  *life satisfaction, trust, importance of work, and importance of family*. Also in general the countries which experienced more change in globalization and values had more different values among them, and countries which experienced less change in globalization and values had more similar values among them.
2. Moderate values change – High / low globalization change. Both set of countries, with high and low change in globalization, experienced a moderate change in values  $\rightarrow$  *intrinsic work values, extrinsic work values, and importance of politics*. Also regardless of the change in globalization, countries were similar with respect to these values.
3. No values change – High / low globalization change. Both set of countries, with high and low change in globalization, did not change their values  $\rightarrow$  *job satisfaction, happiness, importance of friends, importance of leisure, and importance of religion*. Also regardless of the change in globalization, countries were similar with respect to these values. One



exception is the importance of religion which did not change for both countries with high or low level of change in globalization, but had different values across countries.

## CHAPTER IV

### Discussion

This research proposed a set of hypothesis and research questions. Due to the scarcity of information regarding the relation between personal values and globalization, the assumptions made about how this relation might be were rather tentative than solid grounded in theory and past research. Overall the final goal of this research was to look at the general picture at this relation and to provide some broad answers about it (For key findings see Table 31).

From the total of nine hypotheses, three were supported – significant and positive correlations (H<sub>1</sub>- intrinsic work values, H<sub>6</sub>- importance of friends, H<sub>9</sub> - trust). Two other relations were positive correlated (RQ<sub>2</sub> - importance of family, RQ<sub>3</sub> - happiness). Two relations were negative correlated (RQ<sub>1</sub> – life satisfaction, and H<sub>7</sub> – importance of politics). Five relations were not significant: two were in the (H<sub>3</sub> - job satisfaction which was in hypothesized direction but not significant, H<sub>5</sub>- importance of work which was in the hypothesized direction but not significant, H<sub>2</sub> – extrinsic work values, H<sub>4</sub> – importance of leisure, H<sub>8</sub> - importance of religion).

The change in importance of politics has the stronger correlation with the change in globalization (RQ<sub>4</sub>). Moreover the change in Social Globalization had the closest relation with the change in the set of personal values analyzed in this research (RQ<sub>5</sub>). The change in SG constantly had a higher number of significant correlations with the change in values comparing with GI, EG, or PG. This might be explained by the nature of the values analyzed here: personal values are definitely more related with social aspects of the life than with the economic or political ones.

In addition, the relation between the change in personal values and globalization is influenced by the demographic characteristics of the population. First, the relation between the change in values and change in globalization tell a different story in the case of the sub-samples (younger people, people with a high social economic status, from bigger cities, or more educated) comparing with the overall population. For example, the relation between change in globalization and change in importance of religion becomes significant in the case of people with higher SES and from bigger cities. Also importance of friends becomes non-significant in the case of people with higher SES. In the case of younger people life satisfaction becomes positive significant and importance of work and extrinsic work values significant and negative. Second, in the case of all four types of sub-samples analyzed, all significant correlations were stronger comparing with the correlations for the overall sample ( $H_{10}$  to  $H_{13}$ ). This results support the previous research which argued that the “global elite” (Davidson et al., 2009; Pakulski, 2010), which most benefit from the globalization, is composed by people from this categories. These are the categories which have more access to the global products and are more receptive to them. To exemplify take the case of Americans. As Zogby (2011) states in a BBC article, the under-30s are the Americas first global citizens. They have passports and have travelled abroad. They are the least likely to say that American culture is superior to other cultures of the world, and they are by far the most likely of any age cohort to call themselves "citizens of the planet Earth". They are multi-cultural and 40% say they expect (not hope or wish, but expect) to live and work in a foreign capital in their lives (Zogby, BBC, March 29, 2011).

Even if the purpose of this research is to look at the *relation* between change in personal values and change in globalization, the change in personal values represents in itself a fascinating topic. From the present research, the most interesting finding is that the variables

which decreased in the majority of the countries were work related variables (intrinsic and extrinsic work values, and importance of work). In addition, importance of leisure and friends, happiness, and life satisfaction increased in the majority of the countries included in this research. All societies have had work at their center (de Botton, 2009). But it seems that the value of work is losing from importance making place for other aspects of one's life like friends, family and leisure.

Regarding the countries which change the most, Eastern Europe countries registered the biggest changes (Turkey, Moldova, Bulgaria, Latvia, Czech Republic, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Slovenia, Slovakia, etc.). From South American just Mexico experienced comparable amounts of change. Two anomalies deserve to be mention: 1) Sweden, which traditionally is seen as a stable and mature country, registered an unusual high amount of change, and 2) China and India (Figure 37 & 38), which lately experienced a high economic development, registered just an average change in values comparing with the other countries. On possible explanation of why, even if both East European countries and India and China experienced major political and economic change in the last years, they changed their values differently might be related with the size of these countries. In comparison, East European countries are smaller therefore people are more interconnected and change can spread easily. India and China have a much larger population, with the majority of them living in rural areas, therefore people are not so much interrelated and change is happening in an isolated manner.

### *Research contribution*

Various disciplines (economics, sociology, political science, anthropology, and marketing) study globalization from different perspectives with distinct premises and employ

unique methods. From a scientific perspective, given that multiple disciplines have contributed to the understanding of the effects of globalization, I see value in further dialogue and closer collaboration across these fields. Psychologists have not paid much attention to this phenomenon, despite the fact that they have invoked it as cause or explanations for their results. Because each discipline has different comparative advantages in the field of globalization research, cooperation among social scientists would provide a more comprehensive and clearer picture of globalization. Due to the limited literature linking globalization with psychology, psychologists can make significant contributions by investigating how globalization is related with a wide variety of aspects of human nature, including the general life and work related values.

The main finding of this research is that different personal values change in a different ways in relation with the change in globalization. This indicates that globalization is not an “all or nothing” phenomena, on the contrary it is allowing multiple variations and each personal value should be treated as a one by one case.

Furthermore demographics play a role in the relation between change in globalization and change in personal values. Results revealed different stories when the sample taken into account was composed by younger people, more educated, from bigger cities or with a higher SES.

In addition, this research shows the importance of seeing globalization not just as a one dimension phenomenon. In general the correlations between change in personal values and change in globalization had different results depending on what aspects of globalization was taken into account (GI, EG, SG or PG). In very few instances all four indices correlate with a certain personal values. More often just one or two dimensions of globalization had a significant correlation with a given value, which means that each dimension of globalization is adding

different information. Moreover by using a quantitative measure of globalization, the present research brought the conversation about globalization on a more solid ground.

### *Practical contribution*

From a practitioners' perspective, this research is meant to help companies understand the changes that shape our world, and to show how connected (or not) the world has become. The trend for people, firms and governments to become increasingly interdependent and integrated with one another, through the exchange of goods, capital, labor, technology and culture, shows little sign of slowing (Ernst & Young, 2010). No one really argues that globalization of one kind or another is taking place, but less agreement is found regarding the existence of a global individual with universal homogenized values. Globalization obviously affects and limits diversity but it does not erase it. Therefore companies will have to think in terms of balance between the economic benefits of promoting global convergence and the cultural benefits of preserving local divergence (O'Hara & Biesecker, 2003; Witkowski, 2005). Values are considered to be motivating and thus to contribute to positive work outcomes. Value congruence is supposed to reduce conflict and improve cooperation (Roe & Ester, 1999). Multinational organizations should find people with the appropriate values to do a certain job, choose the proper job for people with given values, and bring together people with similar values. Managers can no take for granted that recruitment policies, work motives, leadership ideals, and organizational structures and strategies are equally malleable in any direction, anywhere (Van de Vliert et al., 2009). Cross-cultural research argues that national cultures should be considered in the global economic context and shows that management practices are embedded in national cultures (Chevrier, 2009).

Having an understanding of how the general life values and work values within countries have changed both over time and in correspondence to globalization, will aid companies to understand better their worldwide market base and to tailor their global and local strategies. The business domain is filled with celebrations of the new globalized world in which borders, distances and cultures supposedly do not matter. However we may be on a slower path toward a worldwide managerial culture than globaphobes fear and globaphiles hope (Van de Vliert et al., 2009). The idea is to help businesses cross borders profitably by seeing the world as it really is, rather than in idealized terms.

#### *Data analysis contribution*

In this research there were four types of computations used to look at the relation between change in personal values and change in globalization. Each of this analysis revealed different results and in consequence different stories that could be said. For example, there is a difference between the longer and shorter term relationship between personal values and globalization. There is evidence that short-term fluctuations in some personal values (e.g., life satisfaction, subjective well-being) are positive correlated with GDP (Easterlin & Sawangfa, 2010), which is a component of globalization. This shorter-term positive associations should not be mistaken with the longer-term relationship. Easterlin and Sawangfa (2010) offer the following example. Imagine two series: one of subjective well-being (SWB) and one of GDP per capita exhibiting synchronous sawtooth movements, but those in SWB are around a horizontal trend line, while those in GDP per capita are about a positive trend. The short-term relationship between the growth rate of GDP and SWB is positive, but the longer them is not.

Change by interval provides more data points for the correlations (maximum 172 points in the present research), and also captures more variation in change. Taking into account that the hypothesis of this research were looking for a relation across time, it was important to capture as much variation as possible. Therefore for the purpose of this research, this analysis was used to interpret the results.

Two of the analysis used in this research provided almost identical results: change from the first to the last year and sum of changes. The change from the first to the last year offers important information about the overall change, but does not go into details regarding the variation of change across years, plus offers less data points necessary for the correlations (maximum 53 in the present research). On the other hand, the sum of change analysis dims the direction of the change, the amount of change gets attenuated, and therefore less information is given.

The absolute sum of change has the advantage of capturing the change regardless of the direction of change, therefore adding more information about the magnitude of change. But this analysis provides less data points for the correlation (maximum 53 in the present research).

Depending on the questions asked and on the number of data points available, different analysis might be recommended. In the present research the short term changes captured by each interval provided the best estimation of the relation between change in globalization and change in personal values.

### *Further research*

The present research benefits of the new data recently released by the European and World Value Survey (December 2010). The work done by the scholars who contributed to this



data collection deserves our gratitude. But the WVS and EWV are not perfect. Unfortunately the data is collected at unequal time intervals. Also the wording or context of the questions sometimes changes over time, creating primacy bias (Easterlin & Sawangfa, 2010). In addition, the variables included in these surveys are just individual items for which psychometric proprieties were not checked. Of course the work involved in such a process across so many countries and years is immense, and more resources are needed to be able to repeat this effort more regularly. But for sure a more rigorous approach in development of these surveys is needed.

Usually research done across multiple countries integrates a small number of countries (from two – three to a dozen) and rarely sample of tens of countries are analyzed. Even the present study samples just 53 of the nearly 200 current national entities. Europe, North America and the parts of Asia are well represented, but African and Arab countries are clearly unrepresented in all studies.

This research encompasses only two decades and a half, a very narrow window through which to observe cultural change. Longer periods are preferred for studying cultural change (Esmer, 2007). Furthermore the scarcity of longitudinal data across countries makes difficult a more complex analysis of the relation between change in globalization and change in personal values.

The relationship between these constructs requires a deeper analysis. For example, what is the causal relation between change in values and change in globalization? Which one is the antecedent and which one the consequent? Or there is a third variable which causes them both? Furthermore maybe both values and globalization are involved in a spiral of changes being both

antecedents and consequents for each other. Using a lag analysis might provide additional information about the causality of this relation.

One of the purposes of the present research was to look at the relation between change in globalization and change in values differentiating across different types of population (younger, from bigger cities, more educated, with a higher SES). An in-country analysis between globalization and the different groups in a particular country showed different results. But there are more sub-groups inside a country and future research might discover new information by slicing the population by different criteria (e.g., within-country regions, profession, gender, ethnicity, etc.).

This study presented a series of results obtained through quantitative methods. For a deeper understanding of these results qualitative measures should be used. Interviews and focus groups with people from different countries will bring further understanding of why certain values change in a certain way in relation with globalization.

Globalization represents not just an idea, but also a tangible and measurable empirical phenomenon which may be assessed using a Globalization Index. This research used the KOF Index of Globalization which has a certain composition. Other globalization indexes include different dimensions, like technology dimension which is part of the Ernst & Young (2010) and A.T. Kearney/Foreign Policy (2010) globalization indexes. Some authors (Gelernter & Regev, 2010) state that technology is the main factor which drives globalization forward, therefore incorporate other globalization indexes in future analysis might strengthen the results or might reveal different information. Studying the globalization in relation with psychological variables could only provide a more comprehensive and clearer picture of it.

## *Conclusion*

The main objective of this research was to look at the relation between the change in a set of personal values and change in globalization across time. The release of a new set of data by the World Value Survey and European Value Survey made possible the coverage of 53 countries across 28 years in relation with 12 personal values. Results indicate that personal values are changing differently in relation with globalization. Based on this research, changes in globalization are mirrored by just a set of personal values in certain contexts, meanwhile other personal values do not change in the same way or in the same direction with globalization. More research is needed to understand what triggers these changes and if there is a causal relation between change in personal values and change in globalization.

Moreover, the relation between the change in globalization and the change in personal values depends on the demographic characteristics of the population analyzed. People with a higher social-economic status, younger people, more educated and from bigger cities are changing their values in a more similar way with changes in globalization, comparing with overall population. These results support the existence of a “global elite”.

In social sciences, our capacity to explain the world is much greater than is commonly assumed (Sorge, 2005). We have only to make a serious effort to relate complementary bodies of knowledge to one another. In this context, this research aims to make a contribution by linking globalization (an economic concept) and personal values (a psychological concept). The unfolding of globalization over time is a story of changes people encounter in many aspects of their lives, in the way of thinking and behaving. Globalization involves human actors whose ideas, identities and anxieties can facilitate, power, or contain global exchanges (Trentmann, 2010).

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# Appendix

# Tables

Table 1 *KOF Index of Globalization: Indices and Variables Weights (Dreher, 2006)*

<b>A. Economic Globalization</b>	<b>[37%]</b>
i) Actual Flows	(50%)
Trade (percent of GDP)	(19%)
Foreign Direct Investment, flows (percent of GDP)	(20%)
Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent of GDP)	(24%)
Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP)	(17%)
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP)	(20%)
ii) Restrictions	(50%)
Hidden Import Barriers	(22%)
Mean Tariff Rate	(28%)
Taxes on International Trade (percent of current revenue)	(27%)
Capital Account Restrictions	(22%)
<b>B. Social Globalization</b>	<b>[39%]</b>
i) Data on Personal Contact	(33%)
Telephone Traffic	(26%)
Transfers (percent of GDP)	(3%)
International Tourism	(26%)
Foreign Population (percent of total population)	(20%)
International letters (per capita)	(25%)
ii) Data on Information Flows	(36%)
Internet Users (per 1000 people)	(36%)
Television (per 1000 people)	(36%)
Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP)	(28%)
iii) Data on Cultural Proximity	(31%)
Number of McDonald's Restaurants (per capita)	(43%)
Number of Ikea (per capita)	(44%)
Trade in books (percent of GDP)	(12%)
<b>C. Political Globalization</b>	<b>[25%]</b>
Embassies in Country	(25%)
Membership in International Organizations	(28%)
Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions	(22%)
International Treaties	(25%)

Table 2 *Countries included*

No.	Country	Period	Years of data collections	Population
1	Albania	1998-2008	3	3533
2	Argentina	1984-2006	5	5368
3	Australia	1981-2005	3	4697
4	Austria	1990-2008	3	4492
5	Belgium	1981-2009	4	7358
6	Bosnia & Herzegovina	1998-2008	3	3912
7	Brazil	1991-2006	3	4431
8	Bulgaria	1990-1500	5	5607
9	Belarus	1990-2008	4	5607
10	Canada	1982-2006	4	7079
11	Chile	1990-2005	4	4700
12	China	1990-2007	4	5515
13	Colombia	1997-2005	3	9050
14	Croatia	1996-2008	3	3724
15	Czech Republic	1990-2008	5	7909
16	Denmark	1981-2008	4	4742
17	Estonia	1990-2008	4	4552
18	Finland	1990-2009	5	4761
19	France	1981-2008	5	6319
20	Germany	1990-2008	5	11638
21	Hungary	1982-2008	5	5626
22	Iceland	1984-2009	4	3405
23	India	1990-2006	4	8543
24	Ireland	1981-2008	4	4242
25	Italy	1981-2009	5	7897
26	Japan	1981-2005	5	5727
27	South Korea	1982-2005	5	5870
28	Latvia	1990-2008	4	4622
29	Lithuania	1990-2008	4	4527
30	Malta	1983-2008	4	3362
31	Mexico	1990-2005	4	6990
32	Moldova	1996-2008	4	4589
33	Netherlands	1981-2008	5	5845
34	Nigeria	1990-2000	3	5019
35	Norway	1982-2008	4	4442
36	Peru	1996-2008	3	4212
37	Poland	1989-2008	6	6678
38	Portugal	1990-2008	3	3738
39	Romania	1993-2008	5	6753
40	Russia	1990-2008	5	10038



Table 2. *Continued*

No.	Country	Period	Years of data collection	Population
41	Slovakia	1990-2008	5	5537
42	Slovenia	1992-2008	5	5451
43	South Africa	1990-2007	4	11659
44	Spain	1981-2008	7	12770
45	Sweden	1982-2009	6	6215
46	Switzerland	1989-2008	3	3884
47	Turkey	1990-2009	5	11274
48	Ukraine	1996-2008	4	6513
49	Macedonia	1998-2009	3	3550
50	Great Britain	1981-2009	6	7346
51	United States	1982-2006	5	8155
52	Serbia & Montenegro	1996-2008	4	8028
53	Northern Ireland	1981-2008	4	2116
	Total	1981-2009		303987

Table 3 *Summary of the variables*

Variables	Scale
<b>Work Values</b>	
Important in a job	Yes/No
Good pay	
Not too much pressure	
Job security	
A respected job	
Good hours	
Opportunity to use initiative	
Generous holydays	
That you can achieve something	
A responsible job	
A job that is interesting	
A job that meets one's abilities	
Pleasant people to work with	
A useful job for society	
Meeting people	
Job satisfaction	1 to 10
<b>General Life Values</b>	
Life satisfaction	1 to 10
Feeling of happiness	1 to 4
Most people can be trusted	Yes/No
Important in life	1 to 4
Work important in life	
Leisure important in life	
Friends important in life	
Family important in life	
Politics important in life	
Religion important in life	
<b>Globalization Index</b>	
Globalization Index	1 to 100
Economic Globalization	
Social Globalization	
Political Globalization	

Table 4 *Subject matter experts' agreement on intrinsic and extrinsic work values (%)*

Important in a job	Extrinsic	Intrinsic
Good pay	100%	
Good hours	100%	
Job security	100%	
Generous holydays	100%	
A respected job	67%	
Pleasant people to work with	67%	
Meeting people	67%	
A useful job for society	58%	
Not too much pressure	42%	
That you can achieve something		100%
A job that is interesting		100%
A job that meets one's abilities		100%
Opportunity to use initiative		92%
A responsible job		75%

Table 5 *Reliability and percent of variance for the work related values*

Country by year	Extrinsic work values			Intrinsic work values		
	# items	$\alpha$	% variance	# items	$\alpha$	% variance
<b>Albania</b>						
1998 (n = 999)	6	.514	29.90	5	.555	36.13
2002 (n = 1000)	6	.522	30.12	5	.706	46.20
2008 (n = 1534)	8	.701	32.50	5	.665	42.94
<b>Argentina</b>						
1994 (n = 1005)	6	.625	35.10	5	.730	48.26
1991 (n = 1002)	9	.819	40.56	5	.758	50.96
1995 (n = 1079)	6	.533	30.45	5	.513	34.08
1999 (n = 1280)	6	.585	32.17	5	.566	36.64
<b>Austria</b>						
1990 (n = 1460)	9	.644	26.39	5	.639	40.95
1999 (n = 1522)	9	.651	26.77	5	.678	43.77
2008 (n = 1495)	8	.774	39.13	5	.788	54.11
<b>Belgium</b>						
1981 (n = 1145)	9	.761	34.84	5	.798	55.41
1990 (n = 2792)	9	.701	29.95	5	.711	46.55
1999 (n = 1912)	9	.763	35.12	5	.708	46.22
2009 (n = 1502)	8	.549	24.95	5	.617	39.89
<b>Bosnia &amp; Herzegovina</b>						
1998 (n = 1200)	6	.618	34.66	5	.721	47.32
2001 (n = 1200)	6	.703	40.58	5	.728	47.95
2008 (n = 1512)	8	.800	41.70	5	.758	50.82
<b>Bulgaria</b>						
1990 (n = 1034)	9	.799	38.48	5	.691	45.37
1997 (n = 1072)	6	.519	30.46	5	.690	44.81
1999 (n = 1000)	9	.799	38.38	5	.806	56.51
2008 (n = 1330)	8	.734	35.42	5	.780	53.60
<b>Belarus</b>						
1990 (n = 1015)	6	.658	37.83	5	.679	43.89
1996 (n = 2092)	6	.593	33.70	5	.548	36.26
2000 (n = 1000)	9	.742	32.87	5	.720	47.89
2008 (n = 1473)	8	.667	30.09	5	.733	48.35
<b>Canada</b>						
1982 (n = 1254)	9	.748	33.84	5	.707	46.13
1990 (n = 1730)	9	.745	33.30	5	.664	42.80
2000 (n = 1931)	6	.644	36.56	5	.560	36.41
<b>Chile</b>						
1990 (n = 1500)	9	.824	41.80	5	.786	54.00
1996 (n = 1000)	6	.564	32.13	5	.617	39.82
2000 (n = 1200)	6	.667	37.75	5	.712	46.74

Table 5. *Continued*

Country by year	Extrinsic work values			Intrinsic work values		
	# items	$\alpha$	% variance	# items	$\alpha$	% variance
China						
1990 (n = 1000)	9	.667	28.04	5	.646	41.68
1995 (n = 1500)	6	.493	29.14	5	.638	41.44
2001 (n = 1000)	6	.593	33.12	5	.692	45.46
Croatia						
1996 (n = 1196)	6	.555	31.32	5	.635	40.83
1999 (n = 1002)	9	.836	43.41	5	.788	25.21
2008 (n = 1399)	8	.748	36.33	5	.734	48.56
Czech Republic						
1990 (n = 924)	9	.689	22.81	5	.649	45.10
1991 (n = 2109)	9	.723	31.54	5	.693	45.18
1998 (n = 1147)	6	.564	31.82	5	.637	41.64
1999 (n = 1901)	9	.650	26.76	5	.640	41.34
2008 (n = 1746)	8	.768	38.23	5	.794	54.91
Denmark						
1981 (n = 1182)	9	.717	30.99	5	.717	47.09
1990 (n = 1030)	9	.647	26.97	5	.586	38.31
1999 (n = 1018)	9	.610	25.11	5	.590	38.41
2008 (n = 1487)	8	.605	27.83	5	.603	38.79
Estonia						
1990 (n = 1008)	9	.676	28.06	5	.620	40.27
1996 (n = 1021)	6	.445	27.22	5	.573	37.21
1999 (n = 1005)	9	.651	26.65	5	.631	40.93
2008 (n = 1478)	8	.689	31.89	5	.695	45.11
Finland						
1990 (n = 588)	9	.746	33.51	5	.730	48.28
1996 (n = 987)	6	.483	29.02	5	.523	34.89
2000 (n = 1038)	9	.680	28.44	5	.666	42.89
2009 (n = 1134)	8	.619	28.23	5	.686	44.36
France						
1981 (n = 1200)	9	.585	24.15	5	.635	40.83
1990 (n = 1002)	9	.576	24.24	5	.619	39.83
1999 (n = 1615)	9	.645	26.92	5	.670	43.24
2008 (n = 1495)	8	.546	26.41	5	.643	41.74
Germany						
1990 (n = 3437)	9	.660	28.28	5	.686	44.37
1997 (n = 2026)	6	.412	27.40	5	.357	28.68
1999 (n = 1895)	9	.631	26.36	5	.690	44.72
2008 (n = 2061)	8			5	.699	45.44

Table 5. *Continued*

Country by year	Extrinsic work values			Intrinsic work values		
	# items	$\alpha$	% variance	# items	$\alpha$	% variance
<b>Hungary</b>						
1982 (n = 1464)	6	.730	42.80	5	.714	46.70
1991 (n = 999)	9	.771	35.48	5	.728	48.10
1998 (n = 650)	6	.558	31.38	5	.538	35.46
1999 (n = 1000)	9	.874	54.93	5	.852	64.29
2008 (n = 1511)	8	.662	30.44	5	.622	40.44
<b>Iceland</b>						
1984 (n = 927)	9	.716	31.25	5	.605	39.05
1990 (n = 703)	9	.716	30.68	5	.689	45.01
1999 (n = 968)	9	.780	36.44	5	.724	49.50
2009 (n = 807)	8	.645	29.52	5	.636	40.93
<b>India</b>						
1990 (n = 2500)	9	.817	40.83	5	.793	54.81
1995 (n = 2040)	6	.593	33.26	5	.726	47.94
2001 (n = 2002)	6	.712	42.09	5	.865	65.12
<b>Ireland</b>						
1981 (n = 1217)	9	.696	29.87	5	.650	42.10
1990 (n = 1000)	9	.740	33.50	5	.674	43.70
1999 (n = 1011)	9	.820	41.11	5	.770	52.15
2008 (n = 815)	8	.797	41.42	5	.798	55.39
<b>Italy</b>						
1981 (n = 1348)	9	.684	29.05	5	.607	39.10
1990 (n = 2018)	9	.716	31.24	5	.639	41.20
1999 (n = 1999)	9	.776	35.98	5	.755	50.65
2009 (n = 1479)	8	.762	37.70	5	.754	50.43
<b>Japan</b>						
1981 (n = 1204)	6	.666	37.95	5	.559	37.70
1990 (n = 1011)	9	.726	32.15	5	.664	43.14
1995 (n = 1054)	6	.638	37.35	5	.671	43.49
2000 (n = 1362)	6	.613	35.66	5	.695	45.40
<b>South Korea</b>						
1982 (n = 970)	5	.627	40.38	5	.526	34.75
1990 (n = 1251)	9	-.342	14.59	5	-.044	25.96
2001 (n = 1200)	6	.568	33.04	5	.611	40.44
<b>Latvia</b>						
1990 (n = 903)	9	.717	31.18	5	.530	35.90
1996 (n = 1200)	6	.532	30.67	5	.571	37.61
1999 (n = 1013)	9	.646	28.20	5	.534	36.31
2008 (n = 1443)	8	.752	37.01	5	.728	48.31

Table 5. *Continued*

Country by year	Extrinsic work values			Intrinsic work values		
	# items	$\alpha$	% variance	# items	$\alpha$	% variance
Lithuania						
1990 (n = 1000)	9	.750	33.65	5	.659	42.45
1997 (n = 1009)	6	.608	33.98	5	.669	43.26
1999 (n = 1018)	9	.744	32.95	5	.684	44.67
2008 (n = 1496)	8	.737	35.29	5	.689	44.69
Malta						
1983 (n = 467)	9	.846	45.10	5	.736	48.79
1991 (n = 393)	9	.881	51.58	5	.821	59.24
1999 (n = 1002)	9	.817	41.15	5	.741	49.35
2008 (n = 1408)	8	.789	40.64	5	.818	58.23
Mexico						
1990 (n = 1531)	9	.827	42.09	5	.780	53.17
1996 (n = 2364)	6	.575	31.85	5	.652	41.85
2000 (n = 1535)	6	.606	34.93	5	.649	41.77
Moldova						
1996 (n = 984)	6	.499	29.25	5	.687	44.57
2002 (n = 1008)	6	.629	35.79	5	.756	50.69
2008 (n = 1453)	8	.727	35.24	5	.750	51.66
Netherlands						
1981 (n = 1221)	9	.732	32.31	5	.722	47.42
1990 (n = 1017)	9	.720	31.31	5	.720	47.33
1999 (n = 1003)	9	.665	27.95	5	.672	43.32
2008 (n = 1512)	8	.741	35.76	5	.774	53.08
Nigeria						
1990 (n = 1001)	9	.829	42.90	5	.760	51.29
1995 (n = 1996)	6	.669	37.82	5	.645	41.45
2000 (n = 2022)	8	.610	33.99	4	.598	45.42
Norway						
1982 (n = 1051)	9	.767	35.27	5	.732	48.29
1990 (n = 1239)	9	.674	28.86	5	.684	44.27
1996 (n = 1127)	6	.414	26.93	5	.456	32.56
2008 (n = 1088)	8	.594	27.35	5	.610	39.26
Poland						
1990 (n = 982)	9	.666	27.33	5	.655	42.21
1997 (n = 1153)	6	.626	35.17	4	.588	44.95
1999 (n = 1095)	9	.790	37.38	5	.790	54.37
2008 (n = 1440)	8	.728	34.46	5	.751	50.10
Portugal						
1990 (n = 1185)	9	.825	41.94	5	.793	54.72
1999 (n = 1000)	9	.729	32.29	5	.723	47.73
2008 (n = 1504)	8	.815	43.62	5	.845	61.86

Table 5. *Continued*

Country by year	Extrinsic work values			Intrinsic work values		
	# items	$\alpha$	% variance	# items	$\alpha$	% variance
Romania						
1993 (n = 1103)	9	.733	32.62	5	.701	45.81
1998 (n = 1239)	6	.598	33.40	5	.707	46.17
1999 (n = 1146)	9	.809	39.85	5	.823	58.67
2008 (n = 1259)	8	.745	36.20	5	.765	51.70
Russia						
1990 (n = 1961)	9	.664	27.66	5	.610	39.68
1995 (n = 2040)	6	.473	29.31	5	.533	35.84
1999 (n = 2500)	9	.695	29.24	5	.665	43.06
2008 (n = 1417)	8	.704	32.73	5	.731	48.25
Slovakia						
1990 (n = 466)	9	.702	30.00	5	.684	44.23
1991 (n = 1136)	9	.773	35.88	5	.712	46.76
1998 (n = 1095)	6	.488	28.53	5	.606	39.37
1999 (n = 1331)	9	.518	20.78	5	.551	36.50
2008 (n = 1400)	8	.784	40.30	5	.811	57.02
Slovenia						
1992 (n = 1035)	9	.779	36.32	5	.762	51.37
1995 (n = 1007)	6	.608	34.34	5	.661	43.67
1999 (n = 1003)	9	.751	33.96	5	.698	46.19
2008 (n = 1326)	8	.774	38.90	5	.785	53.82
Spain						
1981 (n = 2303)	9	.795	38.12	5	.765	51.86
1990 (n = 4147)	9	.793	38.15	5	.761	51.37
1995 (n = 1211)	6	.566	32.63	5	.607	39.38
1999 (n = 1200)	9	.809	39.93	5	.813	57.43
2000 (n = 1209)	6	.690	39.76	5	.710	46.67
2008 (n = 1492)	8	.598	27.19	5	.645	41.67
Sweden						
1982 (n = 954)	9	.706	30.56	5	.700	45.75
1990 (n = 1047)	9	.790	37.76	5	.706	46.27
1996 (n = 1009)	6	.451	28.38	5	.375	29.75
1999 (n = 1015)	9	.718	31.52	5	.571	37.08
2009 (n = 1187)	8	.678	31.31	5	.643	41.46
Turkey						
1990 (n = 1030)	6	.592	34.76	5	.707	48.69
1996 (n = 1907)	6	.658	38.61	5	.708	49.86
2001 (n = 1206)	9	.552	25.37	5	.487	36.66
2009 (n = 2291)	8	.774	41.18	5	.796	57.18



Table 5. *Continued*

Country by year	Extrinsic work values			Intrinsic work values		
	# items	$\alpha$	% variance	# items	$\alpha$	% variance
Ukraine						
1996 (n = 2811)	6	.596	33.63	5	.675	43.66
1999 (n = 1195)	9	.808	39.51	5	.792	54.67
2008 (n = 1458)	8	.743	35.86	5	.739	49.00
Macedonia						
1998 (n = 995)	6	.681	38.75	5	.701	45.73
2001 (n = 1055)	6	.533	31.10	5	.716	47.21
2009 (n = 1199)	8	.803	42.61	5	.792	54.92
UK						
1981 (n = 1168)	9	.749	34.35	5	.683	44.12
1990 (n = 1484)	9	.701	30.31	5	.662	42.87
1999 (n = 1000)	9	.706	30.12	5	.685	44.65
2009 (n = 1547)	8	.706	33.32	5	.705	45.91
US						
1982 (n = 2325)	9	.730	31.88	5	.754	50.46
1990 (n = 1839)	9	.744	33.03	5	.729	48.03
1995 (n = 1543)	6	.641	36.53	5	.643	41.27
1999 (n = 1200)	6	.636	36.00	5	.597	38.38
Serbia & Montenegro						
1996 (n = 1520)	6	.660	37.40	5	.683	44.13
2001 (n = 2260)	6	.461	29.41	5	.508	33.97
2008 (n = 3028)	8	.777	39.11	5	.760	51.05
Northern Ireland						
1981 (n = 312)	9	.718	31.14	5	.731	48.64
1990 (n = 304)	9	.688	29.49	5	.608	39.26
1999 (n = 1000)	9	.794	37.85	5	.793	54.87
2008 (n = 429)	8	.739	35.68	5	.769	52.08

Note:  $\alpha$  = internal consistency reliability

Table 6 *Test-retest reliabilities (Pearson's r coefficient)*

Variables	Year		
	1990 -1999	1999- 2008	2008 - 1990
Job satisfaction	.767	.719	.733
Life satisfaction	.943	.868	.911
Happiness	.961	.918	.920
Trust	.897	.928	.862
Importance of work	.502	.826	.541
Importance of family	.855	.794	.696
Importance of friends	.851	.913	.725
Importance of leisure	.904	.909	.924
Importance of politics	.623	.459	.708
Importance of religion	.905	.958	.767

Table 7 *Change in extrinsic work values and globalization*

No	Country	No. of obs.	Change in extrinsic work values				Change in globalization index			
			d	$d_{TnTI}$	$\Sigma d$	$\Sigma  d $	$x_{n+p} - x_n$	$y_n - x_1$	$\Sigma (x_{n+1} - x_n)$	$\Sigma  x_{n+1} - x_n $
1	Albania	3	.08	-1.12	-1.09	1.26	7.93	14.36	14.36	14.36
			-1.17				6.43			
2	Argentina	4	.11				5.57			
			-.34	-.15	-.14	.54	10.23	20.23	20.23	20.23
			.10				4.43			
3	Austria	3	.20	.46	.48	.48	11.81	14.78	14.78	14.78
			.28				2.97			
4	Belgium	4	-.02	.89	.87	.91	8.96	19.19	19.19	19.19
			.18				9.65			
			.71				.58			
5	Bosnia and Herzegovina	3	.08	-.91	-.87	1.02	11.55	20.70	20.70	20.70
			-.94				9.15			
6	Bulgaria	4	.14	-.95	-.97	1.49	21.00	37.05	37.05	37.05
			.12				3.65			
			-1.23				12.40			
7	Belarus	4	-.52	-.48	-.47	.56	6.32	18.22	18.22	18.22
			.04				7.03			
			.01				4.87			
8	Canada	3	-.02	-.09	-.10	.10	.98	11.07	11.07	11.07
			-.07				10.09			
9	Chile	3	.04	.12	.13	.13	9.97	14.63	14.63	14.63
			.09				4.66			
10	China	3	.31	.08	.08	.54	9.13	22.07	22.07	22.07
			-.23				12.94			
11	Croatia	3	.65	-.06	-.01	1.31	13.98	26.57	26.57	26.57
			-.66				12.59			

Table 7. *Continued*

No	Country	No. of obs.	Change in extrinsic work values				Change in globalization index			
			d	$d_{TnT1}$	$\Sigma d$	$\Sigma  d $	$x_{n+p} - x_n$	$y_n - x_1$	$\Sigma (x_{n+1} - x_n)$	$\Sigma  x_{n+1} - x_n $
12	Czech Rep.	5	-0.46	-0.46	-0.52	1.04	0	18.22	18.22	18.22
			.15				9.77			
			-.43				1.81			
			.22				6.64			
13	Denmark	4	-0.22	.88	.99	1.43	.78	14.60	14.60	14.60
			.01				11.79			
			1.20				2.03			
14	Estonia	4	-0.15	-0.53	-0.55	.55	6.11	35.24	35.24	35.24
			-.05				6.19			
			-.35				35.24			
15	Finland	4	.05	.67	.69	.69	15.81	20.37	20.37	22.05
			.31				5.40			
			.32				-.84			
16	France	4	-0.01	1.74	1.75	.62	8.49	19.84	19.84	19.84
			.37				9.17			
			1.38				2.18			
17	Germany	4	-0.70	.26	.29	1.69	15.52	22.73	22.73	22.73
			.43				4.32			
			.56				2.89			
18	Hungary	5	-0.14	-0.05	-0.04	1.89	11.97	35.34	35.34	35.34
			.05				17.79			
			.88				.46			
			-.82				5.12			
19	Iceland	4	.47	.39	.38	.55	-1.32	12.56	12.56	28.38
			-.07				20.47			
			-.01				-6.56			
20	India	3	.17	.50	.55	.55	7.98	16.69	16.69	16.69
			.37				8.71			

Table 7. *Continued*

No	Country	No. of obs.	Change in extrinsic work values				Change in globalization index			
			d	$d_{TnT1}$	$\Sigma d$	$\Sigma  d $	$x_{n+p} - x_n$	$y_n - x_1$	$\Sigma (x_{n+1} - x_n)$	$\Sigma  x_{n+1} - x_n $
21	Ireland	4	.16	-.11	-.06	1.49	-.57	11.95	11.95	13.09
			.56				11.94			
			-.77				.58			
22	Italy	4	.35	.32	.37	1.78	10.68	27.92	27.92	27.92
			.73				14.07			
			-.71				3.17			
23	Japan	4	.39	.96	.98	1.25	4.19	16.64	16.64	16.64
			.72				3.16			
			-.13				9.28			
24	South Korea	3	-1.89	1.22	2.87	6.64	5.74	26.53	26.53	26.53
			4.76				20.79			
25	Latvia	4	.64	.38	.35	2.15	15.80	31.94	31.94	31.94
			-.90				4.94			
			.61				11.20			
26	Lithuania	4	.47	-.37	-.40	1.34	25.23	37.76	37.76	37.76
			-.53				1.75			
			-.34				10.78			
27	Malta	4	-.40	-.81	-.90	2.59	-.40	20.01	20.01	20.81
			.84				12.58			
			-1.34				7.83			
28	Mexico	3	.16	-.33	-.37	.16	7.92	9.25	9.25	9.25
			-.54				1.33			
29	Moldova	3	.19	-2.13	-2.01	2.40	11.93	21.75	21.75	21.75
			-2.21				9.82			
30	Netherland	4	.37	-.30	-.34	1.08	-.48	7.70	7.70	8.66
			-.25				7.99			
			-.46				.19			
31	Norway	4	-.35	.34	.44	1.61	3.48	10.70	10.70	10.70
			-.24				6.37			
			1.03				.85			

Table 7. *Continued*

No	Country	No. of obs.	Change in extrinsic work values				Change in globalization index			
			d	$d_{TnT1}$	$\Sigma d$	$\Sigma  d $	$x_{n+p} - x_n$	$y_n - x_1$	$\Sigma (x_{n+1} - x_n)$	$\Sigma  x_{n+1} - x_n $
32	Poland	4	.36	-.37	-.31	1.53	20.62	31.80	31.80	31.80
			.25				2.95			
			-.92				8.23			
33	Portugal	3	-.33	-1.11	-1.17	1.17	22.62	30.78	30.78	30.78
			-.84				8.16			
34	Romania	4	.99	-.50	-.44	2.42	18.08	31.91	31.91	31.91
			-.27				1.11			
			-1.16				12.72			
35	Russia	4	.20	.03	.03	.53	12.30	29.99	29.99	29.99
			-.25				6.58			
			.07				11.11			
36	Slovakia	5	-.53	-.57	-.68	1.68	.0	31.71	31.71	33.35
			.23				18.72			
			-.65				-.82			
			.27				13.81			
37	Slovenia	4	.67	-.56	-.59	1.93	8.89	33.19	33.19	33.19
			-.20				11.32			
			-1.06				12.98			
38	Spain	6	-.07	.39	.36	.71	9.58	24.87	24.87	24.87
			-.11				7.50			
			.29				6.01			
			.23				1.57			
			.01				.21			
39	Sweden	5	.52	.54	.54	2.48	4.00	12.68	12.68	12.68
			-.97				4.93			
			.41				3.42			
			.58				.33			
40	Turkey	4	-.04	-2.91	-3.73	0.04	14.93	19.91	19.91	19.91
			.72				3.91			
			-4.41				.27			

Table 7. Continued

No	Country	No. of obs.	Change in extrinsic work values				Change in globalization index			
			d	$d_{TnT1}$	$\Sigma d$	$\Sigma  d $	$x_{n+p} - x_n$	$y_n - x_1$	$\Sigma (x_{n+1} - x_n)$	$\Sigma  x_{n+1} - x_n $
41	Ukraine	3	.03	-.25	-.23	.28	11.24	21.92	21.92	21.92
			-.26				10.68			
42	Macedonia	3	-.36	-1.49	-1.59	1.59	8.38	21.93	21.93	21.93
			-1.24				13.55			
43	UK	4	.01	.36	.38	.38	5.31	12.83	12.83	14.25
			.30				8.23			
			.07				-.71			
44	Serbia and Montenegro	3	-.65	-.74	-.80	.80	2.32	16.85	16.85	16.85
			-.15				14.53			
45	Northern Ireland	4	-.10				-.57	11.95	11.95	13.09
				-.08	-.03	1.65				
			.81				11.94			
			-.74				.58			
46	Nigeria	3	-.23	-.18	-.17	.29	5.22	9.76	9.76	9.76
			.06				4.54			
47	US	4	-.11	.09	.08	.44	7.29	13.27	13.27	13.27
			-.07				3.85			
			.26				2.13			

Note:

Cohen's  $d = M_{T1} - M_{T2} / \sigma_{pooled}$ ;

$d_{T1Tn} = d_{T1} - d_{Tn} \rightarrow$  the effect size change between the first and last year of data collection for a given country.

$\Sigma d = d_{T1} + d_{T2} + \dots + d_{Tn} \rightarrow$  the sum of the effect size change.

$\Sigma |d| = |d_{T1}| + |d_{T2}| + \dots + |d_{Tn}| \rightarrow$  the absolute sum of the effect size change.

$x_{n+1} - x_n \rightarrow$  the difference between each interval of data collection.

$x_n - x_1 \rightarrow$  the difference between the first and the last year of data collection.

$\Sigma (x_{n+1} - x_n) = [(x_2 - x_1) + \dots + (x_{n+1} - x_n)] \rightarrow$  the sum of each interval of data collection's distances.

$\Sigma |x_{n+1} - x_n| = [|x_2 - x_1| + \dots + |x_{n+1} - x_n|] \rightarrow$  the sum of each interval of data collection's the absolute distances.

Table 8 *Change in personal values from the first to the last year*

Personal values	No. Countries			% Countries
	Total	Increase	Decrease	
Extrinsic work values	47	20	27	57%↓
Intrinsic work values	47	17	30	64%↓
Job satisfaction	28	16	12	57%↑
Life satisfaction	53	38	15	78%↑
Trust	53	29	24	55%↑
Happiness	52	45	7	87%↑
Importance of work	51	14	37	73%↓
Importance of family	51	35	16	67%↑
Importance of friends	51	40	11	78%↑
Importance of leisure	51	43	8	84%↑
Importance of politics	51	29	22	57%↑
Importance of religion	51	26	25	51%↑



Table 9 *Correlation between the absolute sum of change in values and absolute sum of change in globalization*

	Values	N	Absolute Sum			
			GI	EG	SG	PG
1	Extrinsic work values	47	<b>.281<sup>+</sup></b>	<b>.241<sup>+</sup></b>	.209	.221
2	Intrinsic work values	47	<b>.388<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>.375<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>.255<sup>+</sup></b>	<b>.270<sup>+</sup></b>
3	Job satisfaction	28	.120	.123	.228	-.161
4	Life satisfaction	53	<b>.516<sup>***</sup></b>	<b>.310<sup>*</sup></b>	<b>.288<sup>*</sup></b>	.190
5	Trust	53	-.004	.093	.020	.082
6	Happiness	52	-.004	.004	.111	-.157
7	Importance of work	51	<b>.312<sup>*</sup></b>	<b>.520<sup>***</sup></b>	<b>.460<sup>***</sup></b>	<b>.350<sup>**</sup></b>
8	Importance of family	51	.211	.109	<b>.286<sup>*</sup></b>	.155
9	Importance of friends	51	.155	<b>.400<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>.273<sup>*</sup></b>	.099
10	Importance of leisure	51	-.066	.110	.076	-.056
11	Importance of politics	51	<b>.313<sup>*</sup></b>	<b>.289<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>.262<sup>+</sup></b>	<b>.486<sup>***</sup></b>
12	Importance of religion	51	.155	.112	<b>.278<sup>*</sup></b>	.064
	Mean		.198	.224	.229	.129
	S.D.		.174	.156	.116	.195

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

<sup>+</sup> = p < .10; \* = p < .05; \*\* = p < .01.

Table 10 *Correlation between change in values and change in globalization by intervals*

	Values	N	By intervals			
			GI	EG	SG	PG
1	Extrinsic work values	131	.134	.055	<b>.217<sup>**</sup></b>	.068
2	Intrinsic work values	131	<b>.212<sup>*</sup></b>	.091	<b>.311<sup>***</sup></b>	.136
3	Job satisfaction	71	-.033	.099	<b>-.258<sup>*</sup></b>	.093
4	Life satisfaction	172	<b>-.157<sup>*</sup></b>	-.052	<b>-.250<sup>***</sup></b>	-.034
5	Trust	172	<b>.240<sup>***</sup></b>	.117	<b>.157<sup>*</sup></b>	<b>.270<sup>***</sup></b>
6	Happiness	170	<b>.151<sup>*</sup></b>	<b>.151<sup>*</sup></b>	.112	.080
7	Importance of work	148	-.111	<b>-.285<sup>***</sup></b>	<b>-.216<sup>**</sup></b>	-.129
8	Importance of family	148	<b>.196<sup>*</sup></b>	.039	<b>.193<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>.156<sup>+</sup></b>
9	Importance of friends	148	<b>.161<sup>*</sup></b>	.038	.072	.002
10	Importance of leisure	148	.013	-.009	.009	-.008
11	Importance of politics	148	<b>-.296<sup>***</sup></b>	<b>-.267<sup>***</sup></b>	<b>-.195<sup>*</sup></b>	<b>-.285<sup>***</sup></b>
12	Importance of religion	148	.128	.020	.025	.024
	Mean		.053	.000	.015	.031
	S.D.		.169	.140	.198	.143

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

<sup>+</sup> = p < .10; \* = p < .05; \*\* = p < .01.

Table 11 *Correlation between change in values and change in globalization from the first to the last year*

	Values	N	First to last year			
			GI	EG	SG	PG
1	Extrinsic work values	47	-.174	-.065	.079	<b>-.349*</b>
2	Intrinsic work values	47	.016	-.006	.141	-.082
3	Job satisfaction	28	<b>.371*</b>	<b>.405*</b>	.077	.300
4	Life satisfaction	53	.193	.061	-.012	<b>.352**</b>
5	Trust	53	<b>.234<sup>+</sup></b>	.084	.158	<b>.269*</b>
6	Happiness	52	.159	.185	-.059	.218
7	Importance of work	51	-.018	<b>-.323*</b>	<b>-.252<sup>+</sup></b>	-.192
8	Importance of family	51	.042	-.156	-.005	-.154
9	Importance of friends	51	.171	.064	.020	-.130
10	Importance of leisure	51	.150	-.106	-.106	-.103
11	Importance of politics	51	<b>-.568***</b>	<b>-.443***</b>	<b>-.406***</b>	<b>-.528***</b>
12	Importance of religion	51	<b>.362**</b>	.014	.099	.030
	Mean		.078	-.024	-.022	-.031
	S.D.		.256	.223	.166	.273

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

<sup>+</sup> = p < .10; \* = p < .05; \*\* = p < .01.

Table 12 *Correlation between the sum of change in values and sum of change in globalization*

	Values	N	Sum			
			GI	EG	SG	PG
1	Extrinsic work values	47	-.129	-.072	.099	<b>-.270<sup>+</sup></b>
2	Intrinsic work values	47	.032	.001	.154	-.068
3	Job satisfaction	28	<b>.368*</b>	<b>.397*</b>	.078	<b>.330<sup>+</sup></b>
4	Life satisfaction	53	.199	.065	-.017	<b>.365**</b>
5	Trust	53	<b>.237<sup>+</sup></b>	.088	.161	<b>.271*</b>
6	Happiness	52	.159	.184	-.064	.224
7	Importance of work	51	.017	<b>-.323*</b>	<b>-.252<sup>+</sup></b>	-.178
8	Importance of family	51	.043	-.145	.005	-.149
9	Importance of friends	51	.166	.060	.015	-.139
10	Importance of leisure	51	.163	-.097	-.098	-.101
11	Importance of politics	51	<b>-.567***</b>	<b>-.446***</b>	<b>-.408***</b>	<b>-.524***</b>
12	Importance of religion	51	<b>.356**</b>	.016	.105	.031
	Mean		.087	-.023	-.019	-.017
	S.D.		.250	.222	.170	.270

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

<sup>+</sup> = p < .10; \* = p < .05; \*\* = p < .01.

Table 13 *Correlation between the absolute sum of change in values and absolute sum of change in globalization (younger people, < 30 years old)*

Values	N	Absolute Sum			
		GI	EG	SG	PG
1 Extrinsic work values	46	<b>.270<sup>+</sup></b>	<b>.360<sup>**</sup></b>	.238	.117
2 Intrinsic work values	46	.207	<b>.358<sup>*</sup></b>	.072	.177
3 Job satisfaction	28	<b>.386<sup>*</sup></b>	.283	<b>.348<sup>+</sup></b>	.041
4 Life satisfaction	53	<b>.306<sup>*</sup></b>	.135	.182	<b>.242<sup>+</sup></b>
5 Trust	53	.074	.074	.124	-.112
6 Happiness	52	.265	<b>.384<sup>**</sup></b>	.161	-.011
7 Importance of work	51	<b>.412<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>.507<sup>***</sup></b>	<b>.460<sup>***</sup></b>	<b>.369<sup>***</sup></b>
8 Importance of family	51	<b>.423<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>.288<sup>*</sup></b>	<b>.430<sup>**</sup></b>	.179
9 Importance of friends	51	.335	<b>.471<sup>***</sup></b>	<b>.344<sup>**</sup></b>	.210
10 Importance of leisure	51	-.040	.140	.016	-.057
11 Importance of politics	51	<b>.384<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>.438<sup>***</sup></b>	<b>.314<sup>*</sup></b>	<b>.379<sup>**</sup></b>
12 Importance of religion	51	.142	.214	<b>.272<sup>+</sup></b>	.061
Mean		.264	.304	.247	.133
S.D.		.145	.140	.140	.156

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

<sup>+</sup> = p < .10; \* = p < .05; \*\* = p < .01.

Table 14 *Correlation between change in values and change in globalization by intervals (younger people, < 30 years old)*

Values	N	By intervals			
		GI	EG	SG	PG
1 Extrinsic work values	127	.027	-.038	<b>.242<sup>**</sup></b>	-.088
2 Intrinsic work values	127	.137	.075	<b>.309<sup>**</sup></b>	.618
3 Job satisfaction	71	.192	<b>.256<sup>*</sup></b>	-.047	<b>.271<sup>*</sup></b>
4 Life satisfaction	171	.057	.087	-.036	.083
5 Trust	171	.119	.047	.065	<b>.178<sup>*</sup></b>
6 Happiness	164	<b>.223<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>.198<sup>*</sup></b>	<b>.153<sup>*</sup></b>	<b>.135<sup>+</sup></b>
7 Importance of work	148	.033	<b>-.164<sup>*</sup></b>	-.055	-.017
8 Importance of family	148	<b>.226<sup>**</sup></b>	.065	<b>.220<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>.181<sup>*</sup></b>
9 Importance of friends	148	<b>.279<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>.141<sup>+</sup></b>	.130	.079
10 Importance of leisure	148	.084	.054	.040	-.004
11 Importance of politics	148	<b>-.333<sup>***</sup></b>	<b>-.279<sup>***</sup></b>	<b>-.258<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>-.294<sup>***</sup></b>
12 Importance of religion	148	.126	-.026	.037	.012
Mean		.098	.035	.067	.096
S.D.		.158	.148	.157	.221

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

<sup>+</sup> = p < .10; \* = p < .05; \*\* = p < .01.

Table 15 *Correlation between change in values and change in globalization from the first to the last year (younger people, < 30 years old)*

Values	N	First to last year			
		GI	EG	SG	PG
1 Extrinsic work values	46	-.235	-.088	.050	<b>-.422**</b>
2 Intrinsic work values	46	.033	-.084	.191	-.032
3 Job satisfaction	28	<b>.395*</b>	<b>.335<sup>+</sup></b>	.198	.278
4 Life satisfaction	53	.174	.142	.063	.172
5 Trust	53	.004	-.088	.076	.026
6 Happiness	52	<b>.389**</b>	<b>.276<sup>+</sup></b>	<b>.247<sup>+</sup></b>	<b>.310*</b>
7 Importance of work	51	.201	-.154	.023	-.026
8 Importance of family	51	.157	-.127	.122	-.065
9 Importance of friends	51	.179	.103	.089	-.144
10 Importance of leisure	51	<b>.281*</b>	.000	.009	-.015
11 Importance of politics	51	<b>-.485***</b>	<b>-.398**</b>	<b>-.361**</b>	<b>-.477***</b>
12 Importance of religion	51	.227	-.095	-.014	-.041
Mean		.110	-.015	.058	-.036
S.D.		.254	.201	.155	.238

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

<sup>+</sup> = p < .10; \* = p < .05; \*\* = p < .01.

Table 16 *Correlation between the sum of change in values and sum of change in globalization (younger people, < 30 years old)*

Values	N	Sum			
		GI	EG	SG	PG
1 Extrinsic work values	46	-.229	-.102	.053	<b>-.400**</b>
2 Intrinsic work values	46	.056	-.077	.198	.001
3 Job satisfaction	28	<b>.413*</b>	<b>.347<sup>+</sup></b>	.223	<b>.338<sup>+</sup></b>
4 Life satisfaction	53	.145	.131	.043	.141
5 Trust	53	.006	-.085	.078	.027
6 Happiness	52	<b>.319**</b>	<b>.282*</b>	.222	<b>.327*</b>
7 Importance of work	51	.219	-.150	.023	-.015
8 Importance of family	51	.148	-.114	.130	-.069
9 Importance of friends	51	.179	.103	.080	-.149
10 Importance of leisure	51	<b>.287*</b>	.008	.016	-.013
11 Importance of politics	51	<b>-.484***</b>	<b>-.399**</b>	<b>-.364***</b>	<b>-.474***</b>
12 Importance of religion	51	.223	-.090	-.009	-.035
Mean		.107	-.012	.058	-.027
S.D.		.249	.203	.155	.242

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

<sup>+</sup> = p < .10; \* = p < .05; \*\* = p < .01.

Table 17 *Correlation between the absolute sum of change in values and absolute sum of change in globalization (higher SES)*

Values	N	Absolute Sum			
		GI	EG	SG	PG
1 Extrinsic work values	34	<b>.455**</b>	<b>.529***</b>	<b>.454**</b>	.080
2 Intrinsic work values	34	<b>.584***</b>	<b>.527***</b>	<b>.411*</b>	<b>.527***</b>
3 Job satisfaction	19	.009	-.181	.037	.067
4 Life satisfaction	44	<b>.613***</b>	<b>.461**</b>	<b>.488***</b>	.002
5 Trust	44	.099	.198	.088	.149
6 Happiness	43	<b>.556***</b>	<b>.539***</b>	<b>.448**</b>	.036
7 Importance of work	41	.221	.173	<b>.329*</b>	.049
8 Importance of family	41	.176	.180	<b>.278+</b>	-.056
9 Importance of friends	41	<b>.398**</b>	<b>.482***</b>	<b>.388*</b>	-.038
10 Importance of leisure	41	.104	.211	.074	-.074
11 Importance of politics	41	<b>.467**</b>	<b>.555***</b>	<b>.385**</b>	.141
12 Importance of religion	41	<b>.257+</b>	<b>.278+</b>	<b>.258+</b>	.222
Mean		.328	.329	.303	.092
S.D.		.210	.225	.159	.163

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

+ =  $p < .10$ ; \* =  $p < .05$ ; \*\* =  $p < .01$ .

Table 18 *Correlation between change in values and change in globalization by intervals (higher SES)*

Values	N	By intervals			
		GI	EG	SG	PG
1 Extrinsic work values	88	.025	-.165	.144	.009
2 Intrinsic work values	88	<b>.261*</b>	.031	<b>.428***</b>	.014
3 Job satisfaction	48	-.210	-.054	<b>-.314*</b>	-.063
4 Life satisfaction	133	.072	<b>.144+</b>	.018	.019
5 Trust	133	<b>.206*</b>	.073	.118	<b>.297***</b>
6 Happiness	129	<b>.180*</b>	<b>.197*</b>	<b>.167+</b>	.070
7 Importance of work	111	-.087	-.091	-.067	-.051
8 Importance of family	111	<b>.177+</b>	.088	.154	<b>.164+</b>
9 Importance of friends	111	.107	.085	.103	.063
10 Importance of leisure	111	.103	.064	.076	.095
11 Importance of politics	111	<b>-.192*</b>	<b>-.166+</b>	-.095	<b>-.188*</b>
12 Importance of religion	111	<b>.162+</b>	<b>.173+</b>	.082	.120
Mean		.067	.032	.068	.046
S.D.		.155	.124	.178	.122

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

+ =  $p < .10$ ; \* =  $p < .05$ ; \*\* =  $p < .01$ .

Table 19 *Correlation between change in values and change in globalization from the first to the last year (higher SES)*

	Values	N	First to last year			
			GI	EG	SG	PG
1	Extrinsic work values	34	-.129	.007	.016	-.269
2	Intrinsic work values	34	-.041	-.036	.159	-.193
3	Job satisfaction	19	-.168	-.225	-.156	.051
4	Life satisfaction	44	<b>.246<sup>+</sup></b>	.121	.091	<b>.322<sup>*</sup></b>
5	Trust	44	.218	.003	.110	<b>.362<sup>*</sup></b>
6	Happiness	43	<b>.386<sup>*</sup></b>	.243	<b>.310<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>.326<sup>*</sup></b>
7	Importance of work	41	-.071	-.169	-.029	.088
8	Importance of family	41	<b>.280<sup>+</sup></b>	.148	<b>.269<sup>+</sup></b>	.253
9	Importance of friends	41	-.221	-.277	-.200	.095
10	Importance of leisure	41	<b>.304<sup>*</sup></b>	.179	.209	<b>.335<sup>*</sup></b>
11	Importance of politics	41	<b>-.478<sup>***</sup></b>	<b>-.472<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>-.390<sup>**</sup></b>	-.141
12	Importance of religion	41	<b>.471<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>.371<sup>*</sup></b>	<b>.331<sup>*</sup></b>	<b>.409<sup>**</sup></b>
	Mean		.066	-.009	.060	.137
	S.D.		.290	.242	.222	.236

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

<sup>+</sup> = p < .10; \* = p < .05; \*\* = p < .01.

Table 20 *Correlation between the sum of change in values and sum of change in globalization (higher SES)*

	Values	N	Sum			
			GI	EG	SG	PG
1	Extrinsic work values	34	-.141	-.006	.025	-.288 <sup>+</sup>
2	Intrinsic work values	34	-.044	-.030	.160	-.204
3	Job satisfaction	19	-.179	-.226	-.160	.029
4	Life satisfaction	44	<b>.250<sup>+</sup></b>	.133	.097	<b>.314<sup>*</sup></b>
5	Trust	44	.214	.001	.106	<b>.362<sup>*</sup></b>
6	Happiness	43	<b>.386<sup>*</sup></b>	.247	.295 <sup>+</sup>	<b>.334<sup>*</sup></b>
7	Importance of work	41	-.066	-.162	-.027	.086
8	Importance of family	41	<b>.282<sup>+</sup></b>	.144	<b>.277<sup>+</sup></b>	.256
9	Importance of friends	41	-.232	-.287	-.211	.088
10	Importance of leisure	41	<b>.317<sup>*</sup></b>	.192	.228	<b>.335<sup>*</sup></b>
11	Importance of politics	41	<b>-.474<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>-.468<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>-.391<sup>**</sup></b>	-.135
12	Importance of religion	41	<b>.457<sup>**</sup></b>	<b>.351<sup>*</sup></b>	<b>.323<sup>*</sup></b>	<b>.409<sup>**</sup></b>
	Mean		.064	-.009	.060	.132
	S.D.		.291	.241	.223	.240

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

<sup>+</sup> = p < .10; \* = p < .05; \*\* = p < .01.

Table 21 *Correlation between the absolute sum of change in values and absolute sum of change in globalization (bigger cities > 100,000 people)*

	Values	N	Absolute Sum			
			GI	EG	SG	PG
1	Extrinsic work values	20	.332	.333	.132	<b>.481*</b>
2	Intrinsic work values	20	<b>.633**</b>	<b>.619**</b>	<b>.456*</b>	.309
3	Job satisfaction	12	<b>.501+</b>	<b>.621+</b>	.373	.218
4	Life satisfaction	24	.323	.229	.292	.148
5	Trust	24	.189	.120	.234	.007
6	Happiness	24	<b>.403*</b>	<b>.396+</b>	<b>.469*</b>	-.115
7	Importance of work	24	.252	.305	.322	-.232
8	Importance of family	24	.288	.224	<b>.408*</b>	-.051
9	Importance of friends	24	.334	<b>.349+</b>	.295	-.004
10	Importance of leisure	24	-.199	-.263	-.267	-.114
11	Importance of politics	24	.323	.319	.331	.113
12	Importance of religion	24	.240	.180	.262	-.035
	Mean		.302	.286	.276	.060
	S.D.		.198	.232	.195	.202

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

+ =  $p < .10$ ; \* =  $p < .05$ ; \*\* =  $p < .01$ .

Table 22 *Correlation between change in values and change in globalization by intervals (bigger cities > 100,000 people)*

	Values	N	By intervals			
			GI	EG	SG	PG
1	Extrinsic work values	47	.080	-.005	.115	.095
2	Intrinsic work values	47	.088	-.191	<b>.264+</b>	.159
3	Job satisfaction	24	.306	.172	<b>.402*</b>	.242
4	Life satisfaction	66	.026	.051	.018	-.029
5	Trust	66	.099	.091	.149	-.036
6	Happiness	66	<b>.298*</b>	<b>.285*</b>	<b>.312*</b>	.067
7	Importance of work	67	<b>-.198+</b>	<b>-.308*</b>	-.145	.013
8	Importance of family	67	.123	-.004	<b>.203+</b>	.108
9	Importance of friends	67	<b>.294*</b>	<b>.247*</b>	.129	<b>.378**</b>
10	Importance of leisure	67	.173	.112	.061	<b>.222+</b>
11	Importance of politics	67	-.104	<b>-.221+</b>	.021	-.023
12	Importance of religion	67	<b>.226+</b>	.142	<b>.225+</b>	.156
	Mean		.118	.031	.146	.113
	S.D.		.158	.187	.148	.127

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

+ =  $p < .10$ ; \* =  $p < .05$ ; \*\* =  $p < .01$ .

Table 23 *Correlation between change in values and change in globalization from the first to the last year (bigger cities > 100,000 people)*

	Values	N	First to last year			
			GI	EG	SG	PG
1	Extrinsic work values	20	-.289	-.178	-.221	-.284
2	Intrinsic work values	20	-.241	-.175	-.071	-.299
3	Job satisfaction	12	<b>.557*</b>	.453	<b>.609*</b>	.300
4	Life satisfaction	24	<b>.389<sup>+</sup></b>	.150	<b>.355<sup>+</sup></b>	<b>.444*</b>
5	Trust	24	.186	.158	.118	.138
6	Happiness	24	.328	.246	<b>.419<sup>+</sup></b>	.144
7	Importance of work	24	-.316	<b>-.367<sup>+</sup></b>	-.260	-.035
8	Importance of family	24	-.028	-.051	.003	.064
9	Importance of friends	24	.271	<b>.367<sup>+</sup></b>	.234	.042
10	Importance of leisure	24	<b>.356<sup>+</sup></b>	.299	<b>.361<sup>+</sup></b>	.247
11	Importance of politics	24	<b>-.609**</b>	<b>-.542**</b>	<b>-.515**</b>	<b>-.417*</b>
12	Importance of religion	24	.318	.192	.261	.302
	Mean		.077	.046	.108	.054
	S.D.		.363	.308	.329	.269

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

<sup>+</sup> = p < .10; \* = p < .05; \*\* = p < .01.

Table 24 *Correlation between the sum of change in values and sum of change in globalization (bigger cities > 100,000 people)*

	Values	N	Sum			
			GI	EG	SG	PG
1	Extrinsic work values	20	-.274	-.156	-.200	-.300
2	Intrinsic work values	20	-.207	-.134	-.029	-.308
3	Job satisfaction	12	<b>.563*</b>	.450	<b>.611*</b>	.339
4	Life satisfaction	24	<b>.406*</b>	.171	<b>.358<sup>+</sup></b>	<b>.462*</b>
5	Trust	24	.189	.159	.122	.139
6	Happiness	24	.326	.256	<b>.417*</b>	.119
7	Importance of work	24	-.308	<b>-.359<sup>+</sup></b>	-.249	-.036
8	Importance of family	24	-.049	-.073	-.014	.056
9	Importance of friends	24	.326	<b>.402<sup>+</sup></b>	.334	.046
10	Importance of leisure	24	<b>.362<sup>+</sup></b>	.308	<b>.367<sup>+</sup></b>	.247
11	Importance of politics	24	<b>-.615***</b>	<b>-.548**</b>	<b>-.520**</b>	<b>-.440*</b>
12	Importance of religion	24	.320	.191	.263	.304
	Mean		.087	.056	.122	.052
	S.D.		.365	.310	.331	.281

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

<sup>+</sup> = p < .10; \* = p < .05; \*\* = p < .01.



Table 25 *Correlation between the absolute sum of change in values and absolute sum of change in globalization (more educated, university and higher)*

	Values	N	Absolute Sum			
			GI	EG	SG	PG
1	Extrinsic work values	23	.133	.117	.109	.098
2	Intrinsic work values	23	.115	.220	.087	.028
3	Job satisfaction	0	x	x	x	x
4	Life satisfaction	37	<b>.785***</b>	<b>.353*</b>	<b>.666***</b>	<b>.403**</b>
5	Trust	38	.060	-.137	-.090	-.030
6	Happiness	38	<b>.297<sup>+</sup></b>	.163	.250	-.059
7	Importance of work	38	.073	.168	.085	-.126
8	Importance of family	38	.187	-.070	.114	-.024
9	Importance of friends	38	.035	.094	-.176	-.029
10	Importance of leisure	38	.069	.032	.052	-.090
11	Importance of politics	38	.151	.114	.079	.024
12	Importance of religion	38	.074	.120	.019	-.070
	Mean		.180	.107	.109	.011
	S.D.		.214	.133	.216	.144

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

<sup>+</sup> = p < .10; \* = p < .05; \*\* = p < .01.

Table 26 *Correlation between change in values and change in globalization by intervals (more educated, university and higher)*

	Values	N	By intervals			
			GI	EG	SG	PG
1	Extrinsic work values	46	<b>-.331*</b>	<b>-.387*</b>	.036	<b>-.298*</b>
2	Intrinsic work values	46	-.238	<b>-.364*</b>	.099	-.210
3	Job satisfaction	0	x	x	x	x
4	Life satisfaction	90	<b>.199<sup>+</sup></b>	<b>.284**</b>	-.041	<b>.247*</b>
5	Trust	93	.090	-.040	.085	.100
6	Happiness	92	.161	.157	.090	.053
7	Importance of work	92	<b>-.278**</b>	<b>-.321*</b>	-.128	<b>-.173<sup>+</sup></b>
8	Importance of family	92	.096	-.104	.116	.026
9	Importance of friends	92	<b>.254*</b>	.065	<b>.261*</b>	.097
10	Importance of leisure	92	.204	.068	<b>.180<sup>+</sup></b>	.111
11	Importance of politics	92	<b>-.282**</b>	<b>-.255*</b>	-.155	<b>-.267*</b>
12	Importance of religion	92	.231	.110	<b>.253*</b>	.054
	Mean		.029	-.082	.109	-.004
	S.D.		.251	.215	.156	.220

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

<sup>+</sup> = p < .10; \* = p < .05; \*\* = p < .01.

Table 27 *Correlation between change in values and change in globalization from the first to the last year (more educated, university and higher)*

	Values	N	First to last year			
			GI	EG	SG	PG
1	Extrinsic work values	23	<b>-.653***</b>	<b>-.693***</b>	-.335	<b>-.516**</b>
2	Intrinsic work values	23	-.182	<b>-.465*</b>	-.016	-.199
3	Job satisfaction	0	x	x	x	x
4	Life satisfaction	37	<b>.502**</b>	<b>.343*</b>	.250	<b>.444**</b>
5	Trust	38	.215	.028	-.059	.182
6	Happiness	38	<b>.310+</b>	.152	.248	<b>.291+</b>
7	Importance of work	38	-.256	-.219	-.132	-.115
8	Importance of family	38	.071	-.151	-.048	-.040
9	Importance of friends	38	.199	.116	.223	.079
10	Importance of leisure	38	.252	.057	.128	.174
11	Importance of politics	38	<b>-.417**</b>	<b>-.305+</b>	-.196	<b>-.349*</b>
12	Importance of religion	38	<b>.536***</b>	<b>.320*</b>	<b>.308+</b>	<b>.423**</b>
	Mean		.055	-.074	.034	.034
	S.D.		.382	.326	.211	.310

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

+ =  $p < .10$ ; \* =  $p < .05$ ; \*\* =  $p < .01$ .

Table 28 *Correlation between the sum of change in values and sum of change in globalization (more educated, university and higher)*

	Values	N	Sum			
			GI	EG	SG	PG
1	Extrinsic work values	23	<b>-.655***</b>	<b>-.682***</b>	-.326	<b>-.532**</b>
2	Intrinsic work values	23	-.223	<b>-.468*</b>	-.038	-.247
3	Job satisfaction	0	x	x	x	x
4	Life satisfaction	37	<b>.496**</b>	<b>.335*</b>	.244	<b>.461**</b>
5	Trust	38	.217	.028	-.059	.183
6	Happiness	38	<b>.299+</b>	.134	.237	<b>.279+</b>
7	Importance of work	38	-.247	-.218	-.136	-.109
8	Importance of family	38	-.065	-.154	-.040	-.037
9	Importance of friends	38	.205	.123	.219	.075
10	Importance of leisure	38	.241	.055	.124	.165
11	Importance of politics	38	-.419**	<b>-.312+</b>	-.210	<b>-.354*</b>
12	Importance of religion	38	<b>.530***</b>	<b>.310+</b>	<b>.307+</b>	<b>.428**</b>
	Mean		.035	-.077	.029	.028
	S.D.		.383	.321	.230	.318

Note: N = number of data points; GI = Globalization Index; EG = Economic Globalization; PG = Political Globalization; SG = Social Globalization.

+ =  $p < .10$ ; \* =  $p < .05$ ; \*\* =  $p < .01$ .

Table 29 *Typology of values*

No.	Typology of values	Values	Relation with globalization	Relation with other countries
1	High (low) values change – High (low) globalization change.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• life satisfaction</li> <li>• trust</li> <li>• importance of work</li> <li>• importance of family</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Countries with higher change in globalization have more change in values.</li> <li>- Countries with less change in globalization have less change in values.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Countries which experienced more change in globalization and values had more different values among them.</li> <li>- Countries which experienced less change in globalization and values had more similar values among them.</li> </ul>
2	Moderate values change – High / low globalization change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• intrinsic work values</li> <li>• extrinsic work values</li> <li>• importance of politics</li> </ul>	Both set of countries, with high and low change in globalization, experienced a moderate change in values.	Regardless of the change in globalization, countries were similar with respect to these values.
3	No values change – High / low globalization change	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• job satisfaction</li> <li>• happiness</li> <li>• importance of friends</li> <li>• importance of leisure</li> <li>• importance of religion</li> </ul>	Both set of countries, with high and low change in globalization, did not change their values.	<p>Regardless of the change in globalization, countries were similar with respect to these values.</p> <p>* Exception: the importance of religion did not change for both countries with high or low level of change in globalization, but had different values across countries.</p>

Table 30 Summary of hypotheses and research questions' results

Hypothesis	Results
<i>H<sub>1</sub>: There is a similar relation (positive correlation) between change in intrinsic work values and change in GI.</i>	<b>Sig. +</b>
<i>H<sub>2</sub>: There is a similar relation (negative correlation) between change in extrinsic work values and change in GI.</i>	Sig. +
<i>H<sub>3</sub>: There is a similar relation (negative correlation) between change in job satisfaction and change in GI.</i>	ns
<i>RQ<sub>1</sub>: Is there a similar relation between the change in life satisfaction and change in GI?</i>	Sig. +
<i>H<sub>4</sub>: There is a similar relation (positive correlation) between the change in importance of leisure and change in GI.</i>	ns
<i>H<sub>5</sub>: There is a similar relation (negative correlation) between the change in importance of work and change in GI.</i>	Sig. +
<i>RQ<sub>2</sub>: Is there a similar relation between the change in importance of family and the change in GI?</i>	ns
<i>H<sub>6</sub>: There is a similar relation (positive correlation) between the change in importance of friends and change in GI.</i>	ns
<i>H<sub>7</sub>: There is a similar relation (positive correlation) between the change in importance of politics and change in GI.</i>	<b>Sig. +</b>
<i>H<sub>8</sub>: There is a similar relation (negative correlation) between the change in importance of religion and change in GI.</i>	ns
<i>RQ<sub>3</sub>: Is there a similar relation between change in happiness and change in GI?</i>	ns
<i>H<sub>9</sub>: There is a similar relation (positive correlation) between the change in trust and change in GI.</i>	ns
<i>RQ<sub>4</sub>: Change in what value has the most similar relation with the change in overall GI?</i>	Life satisfaction
<i>RQ<sub>5</sub>: What is the relation between change in each of the personal values and change in each dimensions of GI (Economic, social and political)?</i>	Stronger for SG
<i>RQ<sub>6</sub>: Change in what value has the most similar relation with change in each of GI's dimensions?</i>	Importance of work

Table 30. *Continued*

Hypothesis	Results
<i>H<sub>10</sub>: There is a stronger relation (higher correlation) between the change in personal values and change in GI for higher SES individuals across countries compared with the whole population.</i>	<b>Yes</b>
<i>H<sub>11</sub>: There is a stronger relation (higher correlation) between the change in personal values and change in GI for people living in bigger cities across countries compared with the whole population.</i>	No
<i>H<sub>12</sub>: There is a stronger relation (higher correlation) between the change in personal values and change in GI for people who are more educated across countries compared with the whole population</i>	No
<i>H<sub>13</sub>: There is a stronger relation (higher correlation) between the change in personal values and change in GI for younger people across countries compared with the whole population.</i>	<b>Yes</b>

Note: H = hypothesis; RQ = research question; Sig. = Significant; ns = non-significant; **Bold** = that the results are as hypothesized.

Table 31 *Key findings*

No.	Key findings
1	Work related values decreased (intrinsic and extrinsic work values and importance of work decreased), and values like life satisfaction, happiness, importance of family, friends and leisure increased.
2	Easter European countries registered the highest increase in globalization and the highest amount of change in values.
3	<p>The relation between change in globalization and change in personal values differed depending on the values.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Changes in Importance of politics and Life satisfaction have a significant and negative relation with the change in globalization.</li> <li>- Changes in Intrinsic work values, Trust, Happiness, Importance of family, and Importance of friends have a significant and positive relation with the change in globalization.</li> <li>- Changes in Extrinsic work values, Job satisfaction, Importance of work, Importance of leisure and Importance of religion have no significant relation with the change in globalization.</li> </ul>
4	<p>The relation between the change in personal values and globalization depends on the demographic characteristics of the population.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- People with a higher SES, younger people, more educated and from bigger cities changed their personal values in a more similar way with the changes in globalization comparing with the overall population.</li> </ul>
5	From all the values, the change in importance of politics was the most similar with the amount of change in overall globalization.
6	From all the dimensions of globalizations, the change in Social Globalization had the most similar relation with the change in the set of personal values used in this research.

# Figures




Figure 1 *Globalization Index for US (1982 - 2007)*




Figure 2 *Economic Globalization for US (1982 - 2007)*






Figure 3 Social Globalization for US (1982 - 2007)




Figure 4 Political Globalization for US (1982 - 2007)




Figure 5 *Globalization Index for Romania (1982 - 2007)*




Figure 6 *Economic Globalization for Romania (1982 - 2007)*




Figure 7 Social Globalization for Romania (1982 - 2007)




Figure 8 Political Globalization for Romania (1982 - 2007)




Figure 9 Top 10 countries with most GI change




Figure 10 Top 10 countries with less GI change




Figure 11 *Change in Life Satisfaction for Top 10 countries with most GI change*




Figure 12 *Change in Life Satisfaction for Top 10 countries with less GI change*




Figure 13 *Change in Trust for Top 10 countries with most GI change*




Figure 14 *Change in Trust for Top 10 countries with less GI change*




Figure 15 Change in Happiness for Top 10 countries with most GI change




Figure 16 Change in Happiness for Top 10 countries with less GI change




Figure 17 Change in Importance of Work for Top 10 countries with most GI change




Figure 18 Change in Importance of Work for Top 10 countries with less GI change






Figure 19 Change in Importance of Family for Top 10 countries with most GI change




Figure 20 Change in Importance of Family for Top 10 countries with less GI change  
 Note: Sweden – last data in 2009; Mexico more change.




Figure 21 *Change in Importance of Friends for Top 10 countries with most GI change*




Figure 22 *Change in Importance of Friends for Top 10 countries with less GI change*




Figure 23 Change in Importance of Leisure for Top 10 countries with most GI change




Figure 24 Change in Importance of Leisure for Top 10 countries with less GI change

Note: Sweden – last year 2009




Figure 25 Change in Importance of Politics for Top 10 countries with most GI change




Figure 26 Change in Importance of Politics for Top 10 countries with less GI change




Figure 27 Change in Importance of Religion for Top 10 countries with most GI change




Figure 28 Change in Importance of Religion for Top 10 countries with less GI change




Figure 29 Change in Intrinsic Work values for Top 10 countries with most GI change




Figure 30 Change in Intrinsic Work values for Top 10 countries with less GI change




Figure 31 Change in Extrinsic Work values for Top 10 countries with most GI change




Figure 32 Change in Extrinsic Work values for Top 10 countries with less GI change




Figure 33 Change in Job Satisfaction for Top 10 countries with most GI change




Figure 34 Change in Job Satisfaction for Top 10 countries with most GI change






Figure 35 Change in personal values for China




Figure 36 Change in globalization for China




Figure 37 Change in personal values for India




Figure 38 Change in globalization for India

## **Vita**

Irina Cozma has received her B.A. in Psychology from the University of Bucharest, Romania (2002). Due to her interest in psychology in the work place, she completed a M.A. in Organizational and Economic Psychology (University of Bucharest, 2004) and a M.A. in Strategic Management of Human Resources (University of Salamanca, 2005). Irina's Doctor in Philosophy degree in Industrial and Organizational Psychology from the University of Tennessee, U.S., was conferred in December 2011. Her exposure to different cultures (Irina lived and worked in Romania, Spain, Moldova, and U.S.) has driven her to research what is unique and what is similar in human beings from different parts of the world and how these differences leave a mark on their work behavior. Irina's main interest is in the field of cross-cultural research, but she has authored articles, as well as several chapters in books, in areas ranging from teamwork and multisource feedback to counseling. Her articles were published in Romania, Spain, Argentina, and the U.S.