IS ECONOMICS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?
REMAKING ECONOMICS AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE

Introduction
The Inspiration and Need for this Piece

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Abstract

This piece is in four parts following this abstract, the Table of Contents and a Short Introduction.

Part I: Is Economics in Violation of International Law?  Part I applies a set of systematic international legal principles found in international law to the doctrines of “neo-classical” mainstream economics to test whether the discipline is consistent with those legal principles or would be held to be in violation if brought to trial in an international court of law.  The conclusion of this legal analysis is that the discipline is in violation.

Part II: Is there a Current Social Science of Economics in Economics or Elsewhere that Meets the Requirements of Social Science?  If Not, Why Not?  Part II then holds the discipline of economics to scrutiny as to whether it meets the test of being a “social science” and also applies a similar test to the sub-discipline of “economic anthropology” that has been a response to the ideologies in the discipline of economics.  Although both claim to be social sciences, the conclusion is that both have largely become ideological rather than scientific, serving to promote political views (in the case of neo-classical economics, a technical field of national production engineering combined with an ideology to promote it).

Part III: The Rebuilding Process for the Discipline: Where Economics Fits and What is Missing. Part III goes back to the goals of the social sciences and humanities in terms of their areas of analysis and questions for individual disciplines and then offers a new framework for a scientific discipline of economics and a new humanities of economics linked with it.  This new economics as an empirical social science for prediction links measures of consumption, production and distribution to biological and ecological principles and replaces the current starting assumptions that are culturally biased “moral precepts.”  It moves the discipline forward, beyond its position within industrial market systems where it serves as an ideological and technical tool to promote economic interests of elites in those systems.

Part IV: The Challenge of Institutional and Cultural Change in Academia The piece ends with a discussion pointing to the areas of society that would need to change in order for a scientific and international law compliant discipline to emerge.

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Preface

Several years ago while teaching development studies in Washington, D.C., in the United States, I introduced what was considered then to be a controversial exercise testing the “development” approach of international banks and the international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) that partner with them on “income generation” and “poverty alleviation” projects. I asked students to test whether Germany’s government policy in the 1940s would be approved under contemporary “development” investment criteria and economic theory as taught in the university. The specific policy I asked them to test was that of the “public and private partnership” of government cooperating with industry to “relocate” Jews and Roma from their homes to labor camps and for human laboratory medical experiments and then to process the bodies for soap, wigs, and gold from their teeth while confiscating and selling their possessions. I pointed to the specific measures used to value and screen such projects today, noting how they met government objectives and provided for the greater good while increasing the gross domestic product (GDP) and promoting public health in accordance with government plans in a policy of “national sacrifice” to benefit the nation.

Most of the students, trained in economics, seemed to think that such form of economic development would be approved today unless the affected minority somehow had political leverage in the donor countries. They justified their decision on the following criteria that came out of doctrines in basic economics texts:

- The investment would increase productivity as measured by GDP, the standard measure of value, and possibly also promote export industries and trade balances, while also increasing per capita GDP;
- Unemployment figures in the country would drop and the project would “create jobs,” thus demonstrating positive achievements on the economic indicators that are routinely used show improvement;
- Eliminating minorities would reduce “political risk” to investors of internal instability and could also improve “sanitation” and value of the inner cities and former slum areas where minorities had lived, thus also bringing an economic boost to the country. This could also be considered a valuable increase in the value of the country’s “social capital” as would the increased solidarity and efficiency it would bring in other areas.
- The consumption and population balance would also fit new “sustainable development” criteria even though the initial productivity growth would not be sustained.
- The approach fit the contemporary development goals of promoting “business-government” (“public-private”) partnerships, having no negative impact on gender (the standard rights and screening criteria that is prioritized over other rights categories, including that of cultural protections), and would also meet environmental screening conditions.
- “Participatory rural appraisals” that include discussions with local groups would demonstrate that the majority highly favored the approach, thus validating the current criterion that INGOs use for political acceptability, “participation,” “democracy,” and “fit” with “local communities” and “cultures.”
- Though good arguments could be made about the long-term impact of this policy on productivity or on the country’s overall value and assets, the students noted that government and foreign decisions as well as those of the United Nations “Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)” (now the “Sustainable Development Goals (MDGs”) are based on short-term visible benefit in incomes and in “poverty reduction,” with the question of “majority benefit” and short term measures overriding, with any long-term measures considered “speculative” or “political.” Moreover, the short term results would enable the country to quickly reach and receive praise for achieving the MDGs.
- Population movements, land use, and sales of products for export would fit contemporary international development goals for promoting international trade and globalization by relying on the “comparative advantage” of a country (in this case the ability to exploit a minority group), while promoting free mobility of labor and resources.
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Population relocations, confiscation of land and other property, forced labor, child labor, human experimentation, and all other activities short of genocide would be treated as issues of “national sovereignty” of the country seeking the loan, with all of these actions simply viewed as “political decisions” even if they would be found to be in violation of international treaties signed by the country government (such as the most basic international conventions on child rights or rights of the person). The standard argument justifying activities with similar harmful impacts today is that international actors are showing “respect for local traditions,” “respect for national sovereignty,” and are agreeing to “non-interference with the internal politics” of “sovereign nations.” Moreover, international consultants working on such projects would be forced to sign “confidentiality” agreements to prevent them from raising issues of “politics,” including human rights questions or violations of even national government or donor country laws, during their work on these projects. Even if the loan projects were written by foreigners and endorsed by country governments as a part of various illegal incentive schemes of donor countries to promote approval (military, economic and political pressure or “soft tools” like opportunities for project kickbacks (usually 10 – 20% that occurs after the audit trails of the international lenders hand off control to governments) or disguised payments (“study tours,” “capacity building” and other salary increments to government officials, subsidized taxes to avoid taxation of country elites, equipment, etc.), the decisions would still be protected by a façade of “national sovereignty” and given an unchallenged status on the basis of this “sovereignty.”

Given the “war-time” conditions of Germany, so long as trade was still occurring with the lender nations the unresolved determination of who was the “aggressor” would likely enable Germany to declare the sacrifices of these populations as subjects of human medical experiments or as contributors of slave labor, as “voluntary” under national laws and part of the “national defense” with their deaths described as part of these “sacrifices” and “risks”.

Though genocide is a clear violation of international law, no independent mechanism would allow for the liquidated minorities to initiate direct lawsuits against their own governments or international organizations in international courts or to take the matter successfully to any international bodies unless those governments met the rare criteria of having signed international protocols to be bound by such court jurisdictions. In civil suits, the victimized groups would likely not receive standing in the courts of the donor countries and could not initiate processes against the international lending organizations given their immunity from prosecution, or from the donor governments. Once the donors approved the loans, the presumption would be in the donors’ favor. Only if international bodies were eager to punish the leadership of the country for some other reason (such as nationalization of any foreign investment in concentration camps) would they likely take action. However, since the donor country governments would then also be implicated, the cases would likely be dropped and actions would likely be taken to secure the investments rather than abandon them.

The discussion also elicited comments that decisions of “fairness” or “equity” or “rights” are “political” determinations that have been removed from the study and practice of economics and that were to be considered “elsewhere” (likely nowhere) given that they were “outside of the scope of the work”. Students stressed their “professionalism” and “duty” to avoid making political determinations since these were political and cultural judgments on which the required ethic for economists was to remain “neutral”.

I was reminded of this again recently several months ago in an e-mail I received from Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel Prize winning economist in 2001. Over the past few years, I have completed a series of indicators to be used to screen whether or not international development projects meet international professional and legal criteria, including respect for sovereignty, gender equality and mainstreaming, sustainable development, democracy and other areas affirmed in international treaties as universally binding principles. This series of some 20 published open-access articles now constitutes the first treatise or codification of international development law (Lempert, 2018). Since scoring criteria for
accountability to international law did not previously exist and there is as yet no real infrastructure at all to hold international organizations or governments accountable to international laws and principles in development projects, the call to place existing law in an enforceable codification was long overdue. While I was engaged in the process of sending each of the articles to journals in specialized fields for peer review, I sent one of these that seemed to be the least controversial and most easily based on fundamental international laws for rights protections, to a journal edited by Dr. Stiglitz; the Journal of Globalization and Development.

Though Dr. Stiglitz is a minority (Jewish) and should be aware of the events of World War II and the basis of the international legal order that followed, including the United Nations Treaty that criminalizes genocide and establishes protected group rights (U.N., 1948), he is also an economist. In nearly one year from the time I sent my piece for review and made several queries, Stiglitz and his colleagues at the journal were unable to find a single colleague versed in international law and the principles of democracy in globalization and development who could review the article I had sent him. Ultimately, they found only a single reviewer whose central comment, affirmed in later correspondence from Dr. Stiglitz, was both a denial and ignorance of the criminalization of genocide and of the basis of federal and international bodies including the United Nations itself. The reviewer noted, astonishingly, “It is not clear to me that group rights are essential.” The note added that rights recognized by the Genocide Convention “might be … a worthy goal” but that the balancing of power (i.e., processes of minority rights protection and equity) was not “an end in itself” despite it being defined that way under international law. In the views of the journal, these established legal protections were now seen simply as a means to another ends and that could easily disregarded by a group of economists. Stiglitz did not state what these other ends were that would justify the disregard for the international law outlawing genocide.

Despise contrary views of some economic thinkers, minority and group rights are the basis of international law and the post-World War II international legal consensus. They are, in fact, the founding principle of the U.N. Charter in its affirmation of “self-determination of peoples” and the most basic principle of the international legal system and of rights (U.N. Charter, 1945; Lempert, 2010b). Moreover, the principles of democracy, using process to balance power and establish equity, are straightforward in international rights documents and in most basic textbooks on law and political rights, including those on the basic principles of the U.S. political system.

Professionals in other disciplines to which I sent the same article were in sharp disagreement with Stiglitz and the economists who edit the journal with him. That article has since been peer reviewed by international legal scholars and published (Lempert, 2011a).

Recently, similar lines of questions have arisen that touch on the moral and legal blinders of professional economists. With the global financial crisis, increasing attention to climate change and global overuse of resources, and the dislocations and suffering that are resultant, public accusations have been launched against economists not only for not predicting or preventing these harms but for causing them through their cheerleading of unrestrained consumption, deregulation, and globalization in ways that appear to destabilize economies and favor corporate interests (Fullbrook, 2009).

As both a social scientist and an international lawyer, I began to raise a single fundamental question and wondered why it had not been examined before.

*If leading economists do not even recognize the fundamental principles of global and national citizenship, have they abandoned basic respect for law to the point where they could (and should) be held accountable for criminal intent and action? Are the discipline of economics and its leading practitioners in violation of international law?*

For years, the “discipline” of economics has come under a variety of attacks from outside and within the profession, on the basis that it might not only be of questionable value, but few have offered a fundamental challenge to the discipline to suggest that it might actually be in criminal violation of the fundamental principles of international law and humanity. *Could it be that the economics profession...*
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Itself is in violation of international law and in need of sanction or restructuring at the hands of courts and the public, rather than left to its own hands?

Moreover, if it is, how could it have happened that an academic profession that is, itself, considered fundamental to the international order could be directly responsible for undermining it? Could a self proclaimed “science” actually be an organized attempt to design and promote a set of criminal activities? If it were, that would also suggest that economics isn’t a science at all, but something else: an ideology or a religion promoted as a science and offering certain technical tools for criminal acts. Is it? If so, is that why the questions of legality have yet to be raised?

To take the conjecture further, if economics were guilty as charged, what would be the responsibility of a court to rebuild it so that it were actually a neutral and law-abiding social science? If economics today is a criminal enterprise, what would a social science of economics actually look like?

Furthermore, if economists were found guilty of violating international law, who, specifically, would be at fault, and could the discipline even be changed, given the implications of its influence and embeddedness in the culture? Moreover, if there is a problem in the discipline, is it caused by fundamental tenets embedded in the discipline itself, by a select group of economics who have misused neutral principles, or by a socialization process that occurs as one rises up higher in the profession and is taught a hidden curriculum of values? How could they be held accountable?

As a lawyer and anthropologist, originally trained as a “political economist,” I apply a set of systematic international legal principles to the doctrines of “neo-classical” economics as presented by mainstream scholars in the discipline, to test first whether the discipline is consistent with those legal principles and then, whether the discipline meets the standards of objectivity that would classify it as a science.

This introductory section starts with a review of some of the previous approaches, to date, by which economists have been criticized and by which they have or could have or should have been held accountable. Before applying a more extreme form of correction – criminal prosecution as a way to impose public standards on actors that violate them – I review, below, how the preliminary corrective mechanisms that have partly worked in other disciplines to insert public standards and oversight, through self-regulation within disciplines and within the university, have failed in the discipline of economics. The examination of these failures helps to make the case for why prosecution may be the only and best form of imposing standards, and also helps to lay the groundwork for an understanding of what has gone wrong and why the failures may be so hard to fix.

Where a group is resistant to any form of public criticism and oversight and develops its own morality that it seeks to place above public morality, it is likely acting more a religion, ideology or cult than as a science or scholarly discipline. That seems to be what has happened in economics and that is also a topic to be examined here in this piece, following the legal analysis. Moreover, in the case of economics, the connections with authority and finance that this group wields may have served to insulate it from public standards including those of law and morality.

This piece is in four parts, starting with analysis and then moving to solutions.

- Part I: Is Economics in Violation of International Law? The first part of this piece applies a legal test, defining the international laws under which the discipline of economics could be held accountable, identifying the elements of the crimes under which a theory of accountability could be constructed, and testing a number of mainstream principles from mainstream economics today and considering how a court could rule. Given the findings of multiple violations, the article moves to a second part, seeking to explain what went wrong in economics as a social science.

- Part II: Is There a Current Social Science of Economics in Economics or Elsewhere that Meets the Requirements of Social Science? If Not, Why Not? The second part of the piece seeks to identify how a discipline that is classified as a “science” could violate international law. It puts the discipline of economics to the test to see if it can classify as a scientific discipline or whether it is a set of technical skills combined with ideological or religious beliefs, noting the different possible functions that a
It notes how economics has become an ideology promoting specific interests. The piece applies a similar test to the sub-discipline of “economic anthropology” that has been a response to the ideologies in the discipline of economics; finding that both have largely become ideological rather than scientific.

- Part III: The Rebuilding Process for the Discipline: Where Economics Fits and What is Missing. The piece then offers a new framework for a scientific discipline of economics and a new humanities of economics to replace the current discipline, that can best be described as a technical field of national production engineering combined with an ideology to promote economic interests of elites in industrial market systems. The new approach that this piece offers – of economics as an empirical social science for prediction and as a humanities to consider the range of human needs and possibilities -- links measures of consumption, production and distribution to biological and ecological principles and replaces the current starting assumptions that are culturally biased “moral precepts.”

- Part IV: The Challenge of Institutional and Cultural Change in Academia Presenting a solution and a set of measures, in the third part of this piece, offers a vision and a model but that needs to be accompanied by a strategy for institutional and cultural change in order to become a reality. This section discusses what changes beyond just the law are required to reform the discipline of economics, including a cultural assessment of how and why ideological and religious pressures that have protected the current form of the discipline make its transition to a social science so difficult. The piece ends with a short conclusion pointing to the areas of society that would need to change in order for a scientific and international law-compliant discipline of economics to emerge.
Previous Approaches: Critiques of Economics and Failed Oversight of the Discipline

The “test” and critique that I have offered above, in opening this article, highlights an egregious example of where and how professional economists today appear to be blind to international law and to the suffering of those whom such laws exist to protect by criminalizing various forms of genocide and of exploitation of communities and individuals, their resources, lands, and livelihoods. Though critiques like these of the economics profession are not new, such critiques have more often been framed as political attacks on hard to define ideologies like “capitalism” or on specific institutions managed by economists, such as the World Bank Group (including the International Finance Corporation) and other multinational banks also managed by economists, or on individual economists who have served in major political positions and those who follow their particular “school” or approach, on leaders of the financial community (private banks and investment banks), as well as on multi-national corporations who are less directly controlled or run by economists (and Masters of Business Administration) but who are reliant or allied with them. Such critiques usually place blame on specific individuals and institutions or on the countries where they have power and the ideologies they espouse (certain aspects of either “State capitalism” or “military capitalism” or “corporatist capitalism” or “free market capitalism”) rather than on their shared training or teaching in the discipline of economics. If specific behaviors following specific teachings are at fault, then it would seem that the place to focus attention is on specific, illegal, teachings that violate well-established laws and that directly promote shared interests through an advancement hierarchy of influence.

Though there have been some attacks on specific “schools” of thought like those of Milton Friedman and the “Chicago School” (Klein, 2007) and of those who promoted certain economic “theories” associated with economic failures of political actors, like “Reagonomics”, or on other economists and their allies such as the “Keynesians”, these have all been attempts to critique specific political factions rather than examining the mainstream beliefs of the discipline. Contemporary attacks on specific “schools” or on “isms” (like “capitalism”) have diverted attention as to whether any specific mainstream “bi-partisan” doctrines of the discipline are deserving of criticism. Critiques of the economics profession have only very recently begun to draw the link between the overall teachings and political influence and actions of the discipline itself, that have caused harms through direct advancement hierarchies or by creating an enabling environment.

The three short sections that follow offer:

1) a short history of the critiques,
2) a comparison between the response to these critiques within the discipline of economics and that to critiques of other disciplines, offering some hypotheses as to why economists in the past and now have subjected themselves to little self-scrutiny or regulation while some (but not all) other disciplines that are classified as “social sciences do,” followed by
3) a discussion of the existing regulatory approaches for use by universities and general public that have also failed, with some hypotheses as to why they have failed.
The Critiques of Economics

It would be wrong to say that economics as a discipline has been free of criticism or that it has faced less criticism than other disciplines. Indeed, its characterization as the “dismal science,” as useless for prediction, and out of touch with empirical reality are well known, as is the nearly 150 year old criticism by Karl Marx that this “moral science” began with a determination of “value” that was itself inequitable and immoral. Yet, despite the fundamental critique of economics that began at least with Marx on both scientific and moral grounds, these critiques and later ones, in the 1960s, they have led to the formation of other fields or sub-fields rather than fundamental changes in the discipline that address the source of the critique. Challenges of mainstream economics have largely moved outside of the discipline to other fields (environmentalism/ecology, economic anthropology) or have offered limited patchwork remedies within the discipline that add reality in the form of additional variables (culture and community) or inclusiveness of particular interest groups (women and minorities). Only recently have some of the fundamental challenges to the discipline as irrelevant and in abuse of its doctrines in ways that are morally or legally questionable, begun to reappear inside the discipline itself.

Overview of the Critiques: How to Classify and Interpret them, Historically

In preface to introducing the critiques of economics over time, I try here briefly to place the critiques within a cultural context as a way of interpreting them and the response to them. The historical pattern of critiques of economics and how both the moral and scientific critiques were lodged or ignored, may say as much about the societies in which economics was funded as about the “discipline” itself. There are very different implications in launching critiques against philosophers or mathematical theoreticians with no followers as there are in critiquing leaders of a group that directly advises or acts among those who hold economic and political power in an empire, which is how, in colonial Europe and the expanding United States, the discipline of economics arose. Critiques do not exist independently of this context; they arise from individuals and groups within certain socio-economic contexts. Critiques against economics need to be understood not only for their content but how they are also addressed against a social institution that represents individual power and influence.

Critiques and the response to them need to be examined to establish who launched the critiques, the interests they sought to protect and challenge. No matter how valid critiques may be, they can largely disappear in much the same way as claims of rights or interests if they do not have “standing,” an opportunity to be recorded, heard, and considered along with a process that will offer a remedy. To interpret why economics was a target of attack and whether these critiques were important or meaningful, one has to also interpret the societal role of economics and the status of the profession and its members. If and when economists are part of the structure of power, critiques do not only challenge them on intellectual grounds but also challenge their role as political actors to be held accountable on moral and legal grounds.

Countries with successful economic systems have historically come under criticism for the negative impacts they have had on indigenous peoples and other minority cultures, on the environment, on established mainstream cultural practices, on equity, on opportunity, on choice, and other measures that are among the values that the international system has defined as universal human goals. Criticisms of powerful economic systems for their shortcomings and contradictions generally place the blame on specific nations, institutions, or individuals rather than on economic doctrines but these criticisms do also fall on doctrines and ideologies behind them and vice versa. If specific doctrines promoting specific acts are to blame for specific harms, including violations of international law, the places and disciplines those ideologies are taught might be appropriate places to seek accountability in attempts to punish and prevent harm and should be seen as emerging within that context.

One can characterize the claims against economics back in the 19th century as coming first from educated European minorities in countries that were industrializing and in which there were visible harms. Marx was Jewish. Vladimir (Ulyanov) Lenin and the different political economic philosophers
and activists in late 19th and early 20th century Europe came from a mix of nationalities and from dislocated minority groups. Later challenges to economics, in the 1960s, were often from disappearing small farm communities where lands and environments were being destroyed, from minorities and women seeking employment and economic advantage. Today, disappearing minority cultures and small countries have emerging standing. They bring claims in a context in which economics as a discipline has risen in status with its leading practitioners also becoming closely linked with holders or economic and political power, moving between academia, the financial sector, and the executive branch of domestic and international political institutions.

19th Century Critiques of Economics

In the 19th century, Karl Marx implicitly attacked economics (along with the system of “capitalism” – the corporate interests and inequalities – that they represented) by challenging the discipline’s very measure of “value” as one that reinforced inequity (and implicitly destruction of culture and community). His attacks weren’t directly on the economics profession but on the political economies the discipline supported and he offered them as a sociologist and historian as well as someone looking at economic processes through a different lens. Marx likely saw 19th century economists as ignorant promoters of those with economic and political power, with “false consciousness” about economic realities and economic actors, rather than as direct and knowing enablers of harms. As a social scientist, he suggested that economists’ starting point for analysis – the measures of market prices – would have no predictive value for historical events. He challenged economists to start their analyses elsewhere and to continue to look at politics and economics as related social wholes rather than to narrow the focus of the discipline to variables he viewed as immoral if not irrelevant (Marx 1970 (1867)). Though he didn’t call for specific sanctions or removal of economists, others who acted in his name in Russia (and the Soviet Union) did.

In their classic works criticizing Western European countries and the U.S. for the harms done to minority cultures and to non-elite families, both Marx and Lenin sought to blame the ideology or “system” of “capitalism” (the term they used to label those industrializing countries) as the cause of the harms, including those related to “imperialism” (Marx, 1970 (1867); Lenin, 1926) Marx never defined individuals who had successfully introduced this new doctrine of economics as subversive or devious or criminal, nor did he seek to criminalize particular approaches. He isolated the factor of corporate economic organization (of “capital”) and partly determined, without clear causal data that this factor, independently, rather than another ideology or cultural process in the overall context of the societies he blamed, and rather than any other independent choice that he could identify in social science variables, was the driving force of militarism and harm. He saw the harms of the then existing economic systems as part of a natural process that he could scientifically observe in societies that were industrializing. The implication of his work was either that no one was responsible for harms other than specific “classes” that emerged, or everyone was responsible.

Following Marx’s introduction of a new approach to measuring and predicting economic phenomena over time, arguments over the starting point of “value” have long characterized critiques of economics and focus of critiques seems to have been on identifying starting points of study while losing the idea of predicting larger economic processes and seeking to find key variables. This discussion over “value” in industrial economies has remained a major line of study in disciplines that seek to counter economics, like “Economic Anthropology.” It seems to have rooted the critique in economics over whether the discipline should take the side of “workers” or “owners” rather than on the predictive questions and scientific methods of the discipline. The critique of mainstream economists characterizes them and critiques them for basing their concept of value on “cost of production” and “market price” of purchase; a basis of analysis that takes existing political inequalities, based on who has the ability to pay, which is based on a pre-existing unequal distribution of political power (starting allocations of arms, networks, information, education, biological advantage, and cultural ideologies of coercion). Marx’s moral critique of economics implicitly suggests that “value” be based on a concept of natural rights, stemming from Locke (1689),
Rousseau (1762), and other 18th century political philosophies, that assume and promote political equality as the basic desired value of society. Those who continue to maintain this critique suggest that societies seek to conform their economic systems with these political philosophies rather than detach the discipline of economics from political philosophy.

What is fascinating about this debate and the amount of energy devoted to it is that neither of these starting points of “value,” which are both political and ideological determinations, have anything to do with science or measures of actual observed social and cultural relationships in production, consumption and exchange. Neither the mainstream economists nor the “Marxists” start by drawing models of reality from observation and offering hypotheses to then test reality through comparisons and experimentation. Neither practice “science.” Neither has sought to turn economics into a “science.”

As economics separated itself, in name, as a recognized discipline from the discipline of political philosophy, other scholars have offered critiques of economics that have had implications for how other “social science” “disciplines” have emerged, and perhaps also politicizing different disciplines. Max Weber, a German scholar, considered one of the founders of what became sociology, offered a view, that “capitalism” was linked to the Protestant religious ethic. His work implied that economics in the West was really a part of Protestant religious theology rather than a science (1904) in a way that seemed to affirm that it should be. Weber, looking at context and seeking to offer predictions for historical changes that were occurring with new (industrial) technologies suggested that economic practice was culturally determined, not by technology but by religious beliefs, with religious cultures rather than individual action as the cause. Although Weber praised the Protestants and the military power he judged that their economic system promoted, he also implied that perhaps a religion or ethnic group could be blamed for the harms (slavery, genocide, and other inequities) that these systems created. In focusing on religion, Weber also seems to have opened the door for economists to separate economic activity from its harms by treating the benefits of a specific religious doctrine (productivity) that combined economics and religious ideologies, as potentially separate from harms that were somehow separate or political even though he implied that they were part of the same cultural and social system.

Given that most of the harms of imperial, industrial, colonial powers have also occurred in cultures that are not “Protestant” (or “capitalist”) but that do similar things under other names (such as “state” “socialist” systems), those who continue to use Marx or Weber’s theories to attack entire cultural or religious systems seem to have lost a way to focus or measure responsibility or to pinpoint areas for change. Marx’s critique has long been painted as an attempt (by a German Jewish scholar) to criminalize particular behaviors of a culture or religion in which these harms occur and then to try to eliminate cultures rather than to understand their processes and to try to change what is wrong while also determining what kinds of changes are and are not possible. While economic teaching may be an ideology or religion today, one needs to look specifically at specific actions and specific doctrines by specific individuals with specific harms in order to target what needs to be changed. To do that, one needs to follow a logical and scientific critique rather than to be misled into critiquing entire societies or peoples.

Other Late 19th Century and Early 20th Century Critiques

Economics did undergo some technical changes in the early 20th century, in response to need for application to address specific problems. For many economic historians, this seems to be a time in which economics and other social science disciplines were moving towards more “realism”, with critiques leading to internal changes that began to open up economics to become a social science. Many critiques of economics that have followed in the past 50 years may be a reaction to the turning away from this early 20th century era in which economics was becoming more of an empirically based, applied social science.

Some economists view this period as having introduced a behaviorist approach into economics along with some predictive models of economic cycles and failures in macro-economic regulation (Fullbrook, 2005). As economics began to emerge as a discipline, the focus seemed to be on measuring factors of
“productivity” in industrial systems, the “evolution” of economies to industrial systems, and the individual psychology of choices of consumption items in industrial systems. Most of this seemed to be a kind of “production engineering” rather than a science of economies or economic institutions and functions and the criticisms largely seemed to be designed to improve this industrial engineering to expand it and move it towards an empirical foundation.

Thorstein Veblen, for example, introduced the sociological concept of “institutional analysis” to supplement the study of economics that started with individuals. This approach became a part of economics, along with new policy tools for responding to the global economic depression of the 1930s, promoted by economists like John Maynard Keynes. Economic historians generally see this as an opening of the field to more empirical and practical approaches and a move away from an abstract modeling system based on mathematics and physics (establishing concepts like “force” and “acceleration” and “gravity” to model interactions).

One view is that it was the U.S. Department of Defense’s funding of game theory and other mathematical models for military use in the Cold War – the work of Morganstern and von Neumann (1947) and Nash (1951) – that returned economics back to abstraction, secrecy and methods of exploitation and control that have led to critiques starting in the mid and late 20th century. It may have been this funding that also worked to centralize the discipline under seven key U.S. universities who were recipients of military funding (Fullbrook, 2005).

The critique offered in this piece in Part I (legal analysis) and Part II (social science analysis) is largely grounded in the standards for international law and for social science that developed both in law and in disciplines at that time.

Mid to Late 20th Century Critiques

Starting in the 1960s, the critiques of economics seemed to increasingly take on a dimension of practical concern. Environmentalists offered a fundamental critique of the basic “productivity” doctrines of the discipline while political interest groups questioned the sensitivity of the discipline to minorities in industrial society and to women (a critique that also continues today). These critiques implied the discipline’s lack of coverage of real variables and also suggested moral blinders to human concerns including equity. The critique that the discipline failed as a science also continued, though more as a target of ridicule than anything else.

Whether or not economists were themselves relevant, environmentalists began to recognize the need for planning to assure more careful use of global resources. Environmentalists challenged economists to offer real world models of real world scarcity problems rather than to continue to assume unlimited resources, unlimited wants, and the ability of the “invisible hand” of “the market” to create the balance (Carson, 1962; Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1968; Hardin, 1993; Brown, 1981, 1984-2001; Schumacher, 1973). These critiques continue today with increasing salience with competition over finite resources as populations increase, consumption demands rise, and social and environmental costs increase (Korten, 2007; Sen, 1997). These critiques are, however, largely from within the frameworks of new disciplines because they have failed to change the core doctrines, principles and measures used in economics. They are essentially a competing ideology, exposing economics as an ideology or religion of productivity, consumption and measures of prices rather than one measuring resource, production and consumption balances and the consequences of the imbalances. Economists have simply added new tools to their “neo-classical” economic models, to seek to measure the environment (“resource capital”) and political economic systems and their shaping of preferences as commodities (“social capital”) but without focusing on the structure of the discipline as an empirical and legally accountable social science.

Critiques during the 1960s and 1970s of industrial society and its militarism and violence began to focus on the “military industrial complex” and on approaches to production and consumption that destroyed cultures and had no intrinsic moral or social value, relevance to human development or democratic aspirations (Melman, 1974; Goodman, 1956; Whyte, 1956). These largely focused on
economic policies, on corporations, and on Western consumer culture and technology, in general. While economics was included in the critique as part of the “Establishment,” it wasn’t singled out in itself for criticism.

Critiques of economics as silly and self-contradictory seemed to suggest a view of economics at least through the 1970s as a discipline that was mostly benign and ineffective rather than criminal. Jokes about economists as offering nothing practical and able only to “assume” and fantasize, suggests that it was more the domain of bumbling fools than of greedy strategists offering technologies and indoctrination that would loot and poison the planet, extinguish cultures, and enslave the masses. Economists were largely criticized as bubble headed intellectuals mouthing slogans and closing their eyes to harms created by elites in major political and economic institutions who had little need for these academics.

Recent Critiques:

Contemporary critiques of economics have returned to moral challenges (now with legal implications) along with the previous unsystematic skepticism about the validity of the discipline as a “discipline” or science, though without any real guidelines for its fundamental transformation. Critiques of economics have also begun to suggest that this technical subject that should have been designed to sustain the society was actually designed to undermine it; to promote the interests of a given class to exploit rather than to maintain it.

In the late 20th century, economists justified their discipline as having the potential to predict avert the harms of economic depression through the study of business cycles and policy tools and the offering of remedies for government action to regulate economic activity and promote well-being. Now, only a generation later, there is a question of whether economists and their basic doctrines are in fact responsible not only for not predicting but for causing and worsening economic depression, theft of public resources by banks and corporations, environmental destruction, growing inequities and the social and political harms they elicit (Fullbrook, 2009). Rather than being viewed as buffoons, economists today are among the best paid academics and find themselves moving into positions in government and major financial institutions, often shuttling between Wall Street and the financial investment banks, international multi-lateral government institutions, high political position, and Chief Financial or Executive officers of universities. With economists claiming that their doctrines avoid “political” and distribution decisions on the one hand, while beating the drums to eliminate public regulations that promote their own self-interest, on the other, current critiques of economics suggest that the “dismal science” may in fact be a deadly religion.

Recent failures in Western economies have now started (finally) to highlight the faults of economics, demonstrating that this seemingly useless science is really an ideology promoting real world actions with real world harms. The idea of criminalizing specialized mathematicians (with economists largely using mathematics to express concepts, rather than empirical models) arguing over paradoxes on interest rates might have seemed ridiculous in the past, but not today. Attacks on economics today is often in political movements (like the “Occupy Wall Street” protests starting in 2011, or the “99%” movement in the United States) that target economic actors and institutions like “Wall Street” and link them to specific economic doctrines and their academic policy advocates who move back and forth between seats of political and institutional power and their teaching positions.

While it isn’t the purpose of this article to document the social changes that occurred in industrial societies in the 1970s, many works of that time suggest why economists have now become important actors and why the doctrines they teach may now be directly related to specific harms caused by leaders of institutions. While economists may have been irrelevant in societies run in the early period of the industrial revolution, in the late 19th century, by industrialist robber barons or military cabals, modern industrial systems may have routinized their functions such that the professional technocrats who are trained to manage institutions now do have moral and legal responsibility. Chief among them today are the economists who are interlinked today with institutional and political power.
In the 1960s, it was easy for sociologists to identify specific ethnic elites and leaders and to attribute decisions to those of a specific class or ethnic group and to particular male leaders (Mills, 1956). Industrial engineers and psychologists served that system by offering better ways to control workers and stimulate their productivity (through “time and motion” studies of labor and “industrial psychology”) but economists had little real role other than to offer applause. That seems to have changed.

Emile Durkheim had predicted more than a century ago that industrial society would “rationalize” and replicate itself such that it operated as a kind of machine for the benefit of institutions and with institutions shaping people to fit particular roles (Durkheim, 1893). Sociologists, like Daniel Bell, began to observe that the leaders in institutions were increasingly a meritocratic, technocratic class, chosen for their specific technical abilities and allegiance to certain organizational ideologies rather than on their ethnicity, gender or class (Bell, 1972). In this transition, the leaders of society were no longer the representatives of a specific ethnicity or “class” but were the adherents of skills and ideology. Without blaming any specific profession or discipline, like economics and economists, sociologists did suggest that institutional ideologies would run amok, the “professionals” would follow them blindly, almost robotically and pathologically causing harm, and that the only solution would be to criminally sanction these professions to assure that individuals “following orders” were applying moral tests to their actions (Arendt, 1963; Yablonsky, 1972). With the rise of minorities and women to positions of apparent power in the urban, industrial society of today, it may be that we are observing the fulfillment of that prediction. The lawyers, economists, M.B.A.s, computer scientists/ information technocrats and engineers who have risen to head institutions are there for technical skills and adhere to the ideologies that come with those skills, rather than rising primarily on the basis of their ethnicity, class, or scientific acumen.

A number of critiques of economics as a discipline have focused on its lack of attention to “community” and how the discipline works to undermine cooperation, to unravel public control and regulation of institutions, and to promote greed and self-interest; a corollary to the claim of environmentalists in the 1960s. These and other critiques today seem to focus on the need to add specific moral dimensions or questions but without identifying the source of an underlying problem or approach to restructuring. Nisbet’s “Quest for Community,” for example, alerted economists to the reality that humans are social beings (something taught as a fundamental in the natural sciences and anthropology for nearly two centuries but denied in economics) and instinctively prefer community to imagined constructs like “markets” (1990). Yet, he did not seem to recognize that economies are also dependent on genetics, environment and culture and that these aspects were also missing from the discipline’s study. His critique did not call for a restructuring of the discipline to start with the full context of known human realities rather than with some posited beliefs. Like other moral critiques, rather than seek to move the discipline away from a debate over “values” and to start it as a science of observation to which moral values could be applied, this one remained at the surface. This has been followed by similar critiques asking whether “economists make bad citizens” (Gilovich and Regan, 1996) as well as direct charges that “thinking like an economist undermines community” (Marglin, 2008) among other moral failures (Mayhew, 2004; Hodgson, 2004).

Typical of these critiques is that the solution they seek reinforces the anti-science approach of economics and its inability to measure and predict social phenomenon. In place of study of the “profit maximizing man,” for example, one economist called on his fellow economists to start their study not with the community itself, and not with real variables of climate and genetics, but with the behaviors of an imagined “political economic person” in a new imagined model of choices, alongside or in replacement of the current modeling (Söderbaum, 2004).³

Critiques of the profession’s textbooks from within the “discipline” have focused mostly on representation issues (the interest politics of the university) rather than on validity, social benefit or intellectual or scientific merit. A study in 1993 focused on the “economic status of women and minorities” (Feiner, 1993) while a later study looked at the “quantity of race and gender related material” (Robson, 2001).
The most recent critiques combine previous criticisms, arguing that economics is an “acceptance of fantasy rather than reality” largely because it neglects issues of sustainability (Fullbrook, 2004 and 2009). A movement of young economists starting in 2009, calling themselves “Post Autistic Economics”, combines the concerns for the environment/green environment (“thermodynamics”) with feminist critiques (e.g., recalculating women’s labor in Gross National Product) with calls for considering other national measures such as Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness. These approaches aim to “pluralize” and politicize economics like other disciplines but not really to replace it, though some adherents may hope the freedoms they seek from current doctrines and enforced conformity may create the space (absent today within the discipline) that promotes competition and change.

My own critique in the 1990s, partly touched on the problems specific to economics but did not focus on a condemnation or rebuilding of individual disciplines. My focus was on dealing with higher education and its anarchonistic methods as a whole as destructive of community and democracy (Lempert, et. al., 1996). I included economics and business school education among other social sciences and professions as training robotic, amoral technocrats, removed from social reality and from human empathy, and I viewed economics as only one of several disciplines following similar, top-down, doctrinal, undemocratic, non-empirical methods based on both a factory and “Church” model. My critique suggested that all of the disciplines, including economics, could be reformed through laboratory work and through restructuring of teaching methods and university administration to create direct responsiveness to community needs and student desire for skills, useful models, awareness, and human connection. I noted the modern university as an example of “market failure” in failing to incorporate social benefits and costs and to respond to students as consumers. Though I proposed different economics laboratory courses and tested a national development planning project, with Harvard and Brown University students as a direct challenge to international approaches to promote globalization and destroy indigenous communities, I did not introduce or test a full democratic-experiential economics curriculum to challenge and replace its doctrines (Lempert, McCarty, and Mitchell, 1995, 1998).

**The Response: Surprising Absence of Self-Scrutiny and Transformation of Economics: Comparisons to Anthropology and Psychology**

Despite the fundamental criticisms of economics on both intellectual grounds and moral (public benefit) concerns, economics has yet to be subject to any internal or external ethics reviews or codes, to any real public oversight. Nor has it held itself to scientific principles of empirical observation and hypothesis testing to replace its creative, imagined (fantasy) models. This is in sharp contrast to other social sciences like psychology, that has become largely empirical and imposed ethical research guidelines (though some would say are currently lacking in any real effectiveness or enforceability and have also been corrupted by profit motives and political power), or anthropology, that has reshaped itself as a “moral” “discipline” and placed historic critiques directly in its curriculum.

The evolution of critiques of economics may suggest why the discipline has only until recently been charged with creating legal and moral harm and also why there has been so little response within the profession to outside critiques. If the discipline was so dismal, so poor at prediction and so out of touch with reality – more the characterization of an ideology or religion than a science – its lack of relevance and prominence until recently, with economists rising to power and applying its doctrines, may have made it seem mostly benign. Even if one agreed that economics’ basic assumptions denied Western political ideals of political equality for individuals and communities/cultures, it may have seemed pointless to focus on economists as a direct source of harms and to demand any reforms. In the early 20th century and then during the Cold War in the 1950s, political elites may have actually acted to shield economics from the earlier moral and intellectual criticisms that were launched against it by replacing social science approaches with mathematics and by working to purge the university of progressive scholars by creating fear among progressive university intellectuals and minorities. More recently,
opposite forces may be at work. While criticisms of economics today may be sharp precisely because economists have been part of the powers-that-be causing harms, economists’ current alliance with power may further insulate them from the need to reform. Indeed, if economists are to be blamed for dismantling regulations on financial and economic power and undermining systems of public regulation and rule of law, one would expect them to demonstrate the same contempt and to show the same disregard for legal and moral standards and accountability over their own work. Some economists studying the history of the discipline suggest that it is not merely economic power behind the discipline’s rise but also U.S. military funding of mathematical economics and game theory for use in strategies of the Cold War at home and abroad, in competition with other powers and in seeking control over resources and citizens (Fullbrook, 2005).

The histories of anthropology and psychology have been in reverse of economics and this seems to explain why economics seems to have almost entirely deflected criticisms without a response while other disciplines have established some internal procedures and have also reformed the disciplines. A century ago when the work of economists was viewed as irrelevant and economics was moving towards realism, these other disciplines that, at that time, were empirical, were directly linked to activities of imperial conquest over native peoples (anthropology) or psychological manipulation of citizens in their roles as economic and political actors (psychology). The direct moral implications focused scrutiny on these disciplines and created some sense of responsibility among practitioners for which they may have been forced to respond, at least for a time. Anthropologists clearly did serve empire in an intermediary role throughout much of the early history of the discipline until quite recently. Anthropologists were providing information to religious missions, to slave traders and to militaries seeking to run arms for guerrilla wars. The discipline was seen as a way to control and exploit native peoples coming under domination of Western colonials empires as part of the exploited “resources” of those empires. The moral and legal responsibility was clear. Similarly, psychologists have long been the arm of police interrogators and torture, propaganda campaigns, and social control. Today, calls for more regulation of these disciplines have mostly dissipated and it is likely because the disciplines are now seen as completely irrelevant to prediction and policy (anthropology) as it moves towards philosophy and away from social science, or the harms they do is mostly directed by others with real power (including economists) such that these disciplines merely serve as technical tools or information collection (in “area studies”).

This isn’t to say that internal responses of anthropology and psychology to legal, moral and scientific challenges have been any better than those of economists. In anthropology, the response to moral challenges may have eviscerated the discipline rather than reformed it (Duncan, 1995; 2012; Lempert, 2011b) by turning it from a social science into something closer to political advocacy or journalism that offers no tools for social engineering for good or bad (Andrade, 1995). One can question whether anthropology has become any more neutral or moral given that it no longer seeks to develop tools for social betterment and rarely challenges the powers that be with empirical data or predictions. At least introductory courses review the history of the discipline and note the relationship between British, U.S., and other major power colonialism and the development of the discipline in ways that furthered colonial objectives. There has been a recognition of the potential harms to peoples for which that discipline could be held accountable, resulting in changes in the discipline as well as protocols and disciplinary codes (Hymes, 1982) and calls for symmetrical treatment of peoples with and without power (Nader, 1982) though some suggest that anthropologists today actually reinforce powerlessness and colonial ideologies (Duncan, 2011b, 2012). Though anthropologists in the U.S., in the American Anthropological Association, do have an ethics code and ethics committee, for all practical purposes these codes are meaningless since there is no licensing of members, and no enforcement through an adjudicatory body in which members have standing and there are any sanctions. As in other fields that have codes, even where there are licenses, this one seems to exist largely to advertise to outsiders rather than to effectively regulate behaviors. Moreover, there is no way to separate the association and the profession’s own conflicts of interest from its own ethical standards.
Why was economics able to so effectively deflect calls for self-regulation and reform in the 1960s and 1970s? Indeed, if anthropologists were studying native peoples and recognized legal and ethical obligations for their protection, one would expect at least calls for similar scrutiny of the social scientists studying and working with (and for) the financial interests and governments that were directly causing the harms being documented by anthropologists. If anthropologists felt the need to side with weaker and vulnerable parties rather than to blindly side with interests funding their research, one would expect there would be legal and ethical calls to shield economists from siding with parties responsible for the same harms.

There have been some changes in economics. In the related “discipline” (or program) of business management, where economists often teach and where economics courses are integrated into the curriculum, there were attempts to create courses on ethical and legal responsibilities of business, dating back to the 1970s. By the early 1980s, however, some of these courses that remained had already been co-opted such that they were transformed into their very opposite. Instead of bringing ethical and legal responsibility into business and economics to ensure a respect for the very assumptions that economists claimed were essential to fair competition and sustainable economies, the courses were transformed to teach business elites how to manipulate the media and the public in order to undermine public regulations. In 1986, in an article in the San Francisco Chronicle, I noted how the “ethics” course at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business had been transformed into a course called “Business and the Changing Environment,” to teach managers how to alter the political environment for corporate benefit and how to deceive the public over legal violations. The teacher Stanford selected for that course had worked to keep public information on US. military failures in Indochina from the public, rather than any of the whistleblowers who had protected public interest.

Today, the American Economic Association (AEA) has an “Ad Hoc Committee on Ethical Standards of Economists” but no code of enforceable standards. Apparently for the first time, at the beginning of 2011, some 300 economists signed a petition urging the AEA to establish a code requiring economics professors to disclose their non-university sources of income to partially reveal what they perceived as widespread conflict of interest and sale of economics doctrines directly to corporate interests (beyond the more subtle methods of university and institute financing and career paths for economists).

Within economics as a discipline, unlike established professions (law, medicine, accounting) and unlike other social sciences (human subject protocols of psychology and anthropology), none of the very forms of political regulation that economists say a democratic political system can be trusted to apply to regulate markets and protect the public, exist to protect the public from any of the externalities, direct harms, and/or legal violations of the economics profession and its practitioners, themselves. There is no public screening of doctrines and methods for compliance with law, with social protections, or with scientific method. There are no professional ethics codes or protocols for economic teachings, work or advice. There is no licensing.

Ironically, while economics historically started in the church as a “moral” discipline, and began connected with law and politics, it is now viewed by many as a “church” of its own where work is subject to peer review but where neither public moral standards nor the public itself are part of the review and accountability process (Alvey, 1999; Young, 1997). That specific critique will be examined in Part II of this piece in an effort to understand the source of the failures of economics as a social science and where specific disciplinary standards and protocols could be part of a solution.

While the author of this article has published ethics codes for practitioners in a number of fields, including one published in one of the major journals in the U.S. for professionals in public administration, that could be used by economists in their work for domestic and foreign governments, this code has never been adopted by or published in any professional journals in economics (Lempert, 1997). The author’s personal experience in trying to use this code in international development work where teams and oversight administration largely include economists, is that the very mention of professional and ethical standards is often enough to immediately end contract negotiations and to lead to the choice of “professionals” with no standards or scruples, who will freely break the law when prompted to do so, or...
without prompting at all. Without any unionization of social scientists and other professionals working on government projects in development – the reason for drafting and publishing these codes in the first place – violations run rampant.

Some public concerns have partly been incorporated into the discipline in the form of peripheral subjects such as environmental accounting or sociological topics in the study of labor markets (the value of household labor, gender gaps, additional costs of minorities and women) and this is a sign of change and adaptation of economics, but if the basics of neo-classical economics that threaten environments and peoples continue to be taught as the bedrock of the discipline, then these are little more than ineffective, patchwork remedies.

As noted above, the debate over starting assumptions over “value” has never really had any effect in transitioning the discipline to an actual social science, following the principles of observation, modeling, comparison and hypothesis testing. In a way, that is astonishing because the critiques that have been persistent, beyond those moral critiques started by Marx, are those that the discipline fails today to offer any predictive value or effective technical (engineering, policy) tools, particularly since many of the practical tools like those of Keynesian economics, seem to be treated as “political assumptions” or are just discarded as not “rigorous” and integral parts of the discipline. If the discipline hasn’t been or no longer seeks to be predictive or effective in application, it would need to be empirical in its measures and scientific in its methods (i.e., hypothesis testing) in order to create the basis to be able to do so. Ironically, the faith that economists teach in “consumer sovereignty” and responsiveness of markets seems to be proven nonsense when applied to the discipline of economics, itself, that should be taken as the first sign of a fraudulent endeavor. Public demand for a discipline offering tools has been subverted by the control exerted over the discipline by its practitioners who have restricted internal and external competition and publicly accountable regulation that would have made it responsive. Political power and positioning of economics as a doctrinal discipline to be accepted with a religious faith has been able to deflect calls for response.

Regulatory Approaches of the Universities, Applying Public Law and Morality that Have Been Short-Circuited

In principle, through public control over the universities as public institutions, the public should have been able to exert pressure on the academic discipline of economics for reform and should have been able to generate competing alternatives through internal regulatory mechanisms within the universities where economists work. Yet, these mechanisms have also failed. Existing regulatory approaches for use by the university and general public for applying public law and morality have also been short-circuited with regard to oversight of economics. Perhaps this is both a result of the ability of economists to achieve political influence over these institutions and of ways the discipline has managed to characterize and shield its activities and impact.

In theory, in democratic societies, universities are organizations held to public scrutiny and public law as are the professions. As a response to regulations, universities have created their own internal monitoring systems as have various professions. In reality, and particularly with regard to economics, this system of public accountability and oversight through democratic participation and public legal challenge and oversight has been co-opted, leaving only the press and alternative academic journals as the place where calls have arisen for change. Moreover, many of these forums for speech are also subject to the very same controls they may seek to criticize, such as politicized peer review processes that act to protect the profession.

In principle, universities are publicly chartered organizations that can be dissolved or restructured at any time if they do not serve the public purpose. When private for profit and non-profit corporations came into legal existence in the early 19th century, laws clearly recognized that these were human creations subject to direct public oversight. In the U.S., publicly chartered organizations like universities are established under specific requirements that they further specific public purposes. It is theoretically
possible to force accountability on university disciplines by seeking to dissolve universities or disciplinary associations like the AEA and economics journals. Of course, the “transactions costs” of doing this are high. One needs to rely on prosecutors to do it or embark on a political campaign or a lawsuit against government prosecutors to compel them to do so. Public pressures through these mechanisms or threat of their use were used in the 1950s in the U.S. to purge universities of progressive scholars and those whose doctrines challenged the elites (Barrow, 1990; Schrecker, 1986; Lewis, 1988; Lempert et. al., 1996; Duncan, 1995) just as they were used in the Soviet Union starting in the 1930s (Lempert, 1995). In universities in the U.S. and Western Europe, mechanisms like these were used to eliminate the very moral and intellectual challenges posed by 19th century scholars like Karl Marx, in ways that shielded economics from scrutiny, enabled it to strengthen its position, and also sent political signals to scholars as to what they needed to do to increase their power and protect their positions. No one seems to have tried such legal challenges recently to reform a discipline, though there are attempts now to hold universities accountable and faculty accountable for specific actions that they take in fundraising and in government that cause harm and that could apply to economists in extending their activities and influence to communities outside of the university. Yet, it is the potential threat of this form of public sanction that compels universities themselves to step in, absent any actual legal attempts to dissolve them or to hold their officials accountable, in order to hold disciplines accountable to legal and moral codes and to fulfill a public purpose.

Within universities, public standards are imposed over both faculty members and students through the various employment and disciplinary contracts that exist within the university. If one takes Stanford University as an example, its Faculty Handbook, section 4.4.B(1), sub-section (4.3) on Faculty Discipline defines misconduct as “dishonest or unethical behavior in the faculty member’s own teaching or research.” Faculty can also be dismissed, according to sub-section (4.4) on findings of “substantial and manifest incompetence.”

The next section of this article, that reviews specific legal charges against economics and economists for specific doctrines that they teach, clearly alleges dishonest and unethical behavior by economists. Economics can be challenged for its doctrines that defraud peoples of their cultures and their resources and undermine their long term interests while promoting the self-interest of economists proselytizing those ideas. Yet, none of these issues have ever been raised in any university department for any kind of legal or moral disciplinary review. Similarly, many of the doctrines of economics that have no basis in observation and reality and that economists themselves characterize as “fantasy rather than reality” (Fullbrook, 2004 and 2009), would seemingly meet the threshold test of review for “substantial and manifest incompetence.” Nevertheless, economics has evaded any such review process by other social science professionals who do measure observed reality and who do have ethical codes.

The Fundamental Standard for Students of Stanford University’s Office of Judicial Affairs is similar and would seemingly apply similar standards to students who study economics and who are required to write papers, take exams and (at the graduate level) teach the doctrines of the discipline. Where students would recognize certain of the doctrines of the discipline as immoral, fraudulent or incompetent, they would also be required to oppose and correct those doctrines, with the expectation of support from the university in doing so. According to the standard, “Students at Stanford are expected to show both within and without the University such respect for order, morality, personal honor and the rights of others as is demanded of good citizens. Failure to do this will be sufficient cause for removal from the University.” Yet, no students at Stanford or elsewhere other than perhaps in the Soviet Union or countries formerly under its hegemony, where there were requirements to parrot a parallel set of dogmas that could be considered equally un-scientific and religious and promoting similar harm, have been removed for parroting of doctrines that are allegedly false, fraudulent, and the cause of harm (Lempert, 1995).

The problem with these processes and the reason they are so unlikely to be used to challenge doctrines and their resultant harms, is that there is a reluctance to use them even for their appropriate purposes. Mechanisms like these that should protect public and individual rights as well as free speech have become politicized and subject to abuse, both during the Cold War in the U.S. and more recently
where professors in the U.S. have reported fears over the past many years for removal or retaliation for the expression of political views, including those views that they believe are grounded in objective scientific and legal standards. When laws and processes are subject to abuse, there is a reluctance to use them at all lest they be used to retaliate against those who seek to use them for their appropriate purpose. Intellectuals and ordinary citizens in Europe and the U.S. no longer seem to see institutional processes as protecting their interests or operating fairly. Such fears are not to be taken lightly. Even in the disciplines that have ethics codes and claim to protect their professionals and the public, these processes create opportunities to purge colleagues who take the idea of public protections seriously. When one fears the powers-that-be, one no longer turns to mechanisms to hold those in power accountable, even if it is rule of law, standards, and democratic participation that are in fact the source of protections to abuse of authority and politicization.

Economists appear not only to have risen in power in government and economic institutions but in universities, as well, and academics may not have any confidence that they can use university procedures to hold economics or economists accountable. Or, they may reasonably fear that their own disciplines are now unable to stand up to the same kinds of honest intellectual, moral and legal critiques. Would political scientists, historians, and even new disciplines like Women’s Studies, be able to defend their disciplines today as promoting scientific principles and adhering to codes of fairness, law, and ethics? Or have they also become politicized, ideological and subservient to certain powerful economic interests in Western societies that fund the university and the exploitation of other cultures, resources, and labor, rather than protecting long-term human interests that are the subjects of international law? Do these disciplines really act to protect human cultural diversity, biodiversity, sustainability of human systems, individual equality and potential, and empirical observation and modeling, over benefits to certain powerful interests in the urban sectors of societies where they teach?

Within universities, it seems clear why economists are not held to scrutiny. Economists are among those faculty members most likely to rise to the positions of Chief Financial OfficeProvost and University President because of their alliance with the interests of the wealthy and powerful in government and the private sector who fund the universities. In the early 1980s, when I introduced field social science courses at Stanford University, to create social science laboratory work and modeling based on empirical observations and sensitivity to local communities, the university provost at the time, an economist, described actual social science as not part of the “educational mission” of the university (Lempert, Briggs, et. al., 1995).

When a discipline in a university like economics has no ethical codes or standards in the discipline, describes political regulation and issues of morality and equity as something “outside” of its concerns, and has a central tenet that the measure of value and of human existence is not long-term survival or intellectual or civilization’s advance but satisfaction of greed and aggrandizement of wealth – principles that one would think are antithetical to the idea of civilization and to the role of the university in promoting it – it should be of no surprise that this discipline practices what it preaches in ways that allow it to benefit readily from amorality; selling itself to power for its own short term benefit with no remorse.

Economists have directly benefitted within the university and without from the politicization and undermining of public processes of legal accountability and morality as well as their willingness to work with militaries without full public and legal control and scrutiny of their actions and impacts. By changing the standard of legal protections from one of long-term interests to one of short-term economic and financial gain, they have created a situation within the university where they can assure they will be free of scrutiny and where they can continue to aggrandize wealth and power and further undermine the processes and disciplines that would challenge them. In work with the militaries and their think tanks, it is possible that they have already received blanket protections from scrutiny and have incorporated a military ethic that overrode the usual transparency and public accountability that one would expect of the social sciences, as has also occurred in international finance and “development” organizations.

When questioned about the need for accountability, economists have a ready answer to shield themselves. They do not experiment on “human subjects” because their discipline is not empirical or
experimental (other than in social experiments they conduct on the peoples and resources of countries over whom they exert power in political and economic positions outside the university). They respond that they are simply “mathematicians” doing pure research and they ask to be treated to the same ethical standards as mathematicians. Unlike anthropologists, they note that they do not collect information on foreign cultures that are used to subvert those cultures. What they do is not direct. They can claim that they simply espouse doctrines that are used by others to take resources, sell products and impose ideologies on the peoples whose environments, cultures and systems they destabilize. They can claim that their real subject is industrial society and that they teach and operate in industrial societies and that they are simply exercising speech within those societies freely. They do claim ignorance of any outside impact and the measures the discipline offers diverts attention from those harms/externalities they do not measure.

The public purpose that economics and the university are filling today are not to find and respond to long term social needs or to create the tools for a sustainable society and harmonious human future. They appear to be responding only to short-term economic pressures of powerful groups that have purchased disciplines for private purposes. When short-term interests corrupt institutions (and disciplines) and short-circuit their social missions, it becomes the responsibility of the public to step in through use of legal accountability mechanisms of criminal and civil law.

At the national level, if universities are now serving to promote short term national interests rather than public interests, and if domestic legal mechanisms are insufficient to represent foreign interests that are being harmed by universities and their doctrines, it becomes incumbent on international legal mechanisms to fill that gap.

While various critics of economic doctrines suggest that various of these doctrines have caused harm to several different groups (native peoples, cultural sustainability, environment, future rights holders among them) and others have criticized the doctrines as ideology, self-interest, and fallacy, few have combined the two critiques to form the basis for criminal prosecution and restructuring of the institutions and profession offering these doctrines. Yet, it is precisely such elements – the knowledge of fallacy of doctrine, the self interest in promoting those doctrines, and specific resultant harm as a result of promoting those doctrines – that constitute criminal behavior that could be adjudicated by courts. Moreover, it is the professional responsibility to social science and the failure to fulfill this mission that should also subject the discipline to restructuring.

Doing that in a way that follows consensus principles and that can be depoliticized, for the overall benefit of humanity and for the expansion of human knowledge and intellectual discipline, is the goal of this piece.

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1 E-mail to author from Joseph Stiglitz and the Journal of Globalization and Development, Friday September 3, 2010, reaffirmed in a second letter from Tom Polds on September 9, 2010, noting that “we place absolute trust in our [‘highly esteemed editorial board.’]”

2 Editor’s Note: The article is published in Global Jurist, edited by Ugo Mattei, who has contributed a response to this piece, in this issue.

3 Editor’s Note: See Dr. Soderbaum’s response to this piece, in this issue.

4 Editor’s Note: See Dr. Kathleen Levinstein’s article in this issue.

5 Editor’s Note: Dr. Duncan offers insight into these phenomenon today in pieces in this issue.


7 I have sought to do so in the U.S. and State of California, to create accountability at the university where I earned my law degree and Master of Business Administration degree and to protect the professional standards I was taught. There is a direct
link between Stanford University’s rise in its endowment (currently the highest in the U.S.), the military contractors who donate to the university, and the role of Condoleezza Rice, a Political Science professor, who moved from a position as Stanford’s Chief Financial Officer (Provost) to the post of U.S. National Security Advisor where she approved (what were apparently illegal under both U.S. and international law) military operations in Iraq. Rice directly steered billions of dollars to these same contractors who fund the university and was then invited back to teach at Stanford and to continue to raise funds for the university for the same groups (in apparent clear violation of university policy). The deaths of many California citizens in the U.S. military who were endangered by this profiteering scheme appear to clearly fit criminal laws of murder in the state of California. These activities also seem to meet all of the elements of criminal racketeering under California and U.S. laws in which not only Rice but university officials who are aware of her role and have kept silent or promoted it for reasons of financial benefit, would also be held criminally liable under conspiracy laws. This is sufficient evidence for dissolution of the university charter as well as individual prosecutions. Though I have sent such evidence to the California Attorney General and U.S. Attorney General, as have others including former Los Angeles District Attorney Vincent Bugliosi whose published book and article detail similar charges, prosecutors have yet to act. Grounds for prosecution may be clear, but actual decisions to prosecute require political will and pressure more than hard evidence. (Legal briefs are on file with author.)

8 One case recently came to the author’s attention in which a practicing anthropologist sought to publish a theoretical article on “bureaucracy” and used personal examples of legal violations and whistle-blowing in domestic and international public organizations in a piece that sought to model how this behavior worked. Though anthropology’s Code of Ethics required the journal to protect his/her identity as an informant who could be subject to retaliation and whose family and close associates could be harmed, the entire Board of the Journal sought, instead, to twist the ethics code in ways that would cause harm to the colleague for seeking to introduce controversial public issues into the discipline. They argued that the colleague’s use of data from public organizations would violate the ethics of the public organizations whose corruption the author was exposing because he/she did not tell them in advance that he might at some later date exercise his political free speech rights and fulfill his/her duty by reporting on violations that he might find in those organizations! The journal sought to expose the author and jeopardize his/her career and livelihood on grounds that protecting corruption of powerful organizations from scrutiny by the discipline was more ethical than protecting a colleague! There are similar cases in political science, a discipline that also has a code, in law, and in other disciplines. Whatever they may claim, professional associations of scholars have conflicts of interests and are likely to protect those powerful interests before adhering to the principles of their ethics codes.
Introduction to Part I

Holding an industry or profession legally or ethically accountable is not something new in industrial societies nor should it be surprising or shocking that one would seek to do so. Though the exercise should be something as routine as any kind of screening for any private or public intervention, the discipline of economics has long escaped – and perhaps found a way to hold itself exempt – from this scrutiny that is routine for many professions. The way to remedy that, to see if this failure is a simple and harmless error or something else, is to actually apply such a test, starting with its strict forms.

In this section, I assess the basis for criminal prosecution of the discipline of economics, testing whether economists as a group promote specific, self-serving, false or fraudulent doctrine with the intent to induce specific actions resulting in known and measurable harms that the international system has identified as criminal.

In examining the process of imposing a legal sanction, I outline the methodology by which one might consider prosecution of the economics profession on the basis of the doctrines it promotes and walk through the steps required to do so. In brief,

- **Step 1** identifies the source of shared doctrines among economists (analogous to finding shared practices in an industry),
- **Step 2** identifies the sources of universal law that could be used for prosecution as well as the laws that should not be used due to some of the paradoxes of politicization of international law and the relations of international law itself to economic ideology,
- **Step 3** describes the elements of the crime to be prosecuted for the specific laws tested,
- **Step 4** evaluates the possible verdicts for each doctrine and law to be applied, and then
- **Step 5** discusses the implications of this outcome for specific individuals, institutions and society.

In the section below on Method, I outline this process in more detail, including discussion of legal safeguards. I then move directly to analysis, using this five step process.
Method: Holding Economics to Legal Scrutiny

In international law, there are clear methods for examining violations by any actors, including a discipline like economics, to assure that its appropriate activities and rights are protected and supported and to assure that its activities that are in violation of law and misuse public assets and public trust can be identified, sanctioned and stopped. Focusing on speech raises concerns but there are also safeguards. There is a history of law and legal principles guiding the protection of speech, cultural and individual diversity and expression, and long-term sustainability of planetary resources and human potential against short-term greed and fears, through criminal prosecutions of the individuals, ideologies and activities that destroy these. These are human processes and are imperfect, but such processes have guidelines for protections and fairness.

In both national and international laws, there are already relatively clear lines that can protect disciplinary inquiry that reflects principles of science and that would allow for scrutiny of a discipline like economics in ways that should be supported by public consensus. Law in industrial societies protects scientific activity, speech, and belief and there are several distinguishing factors that sanction activities that do not but that are exercised as pseudo-science and fraud.

Law and reason provide fundamental principles for differentiating between those intellectual and speech activities that affirm humanity and those that do harm.

- Laws currently differentiate between advocacy action speech linked to incitement of violence of harm through advocacy of private doctrines (which is not protected, while almost all other private advocacy is protected) and university freedom of supposition, experiment, hypothesis and with individual expression of belief (all of which are to be protected). There are legal distinctions determining where private doctrines are appropriate (religious institutions that are non-state actors) and where they are not (state action), with some determinants on “religious doctrine”.

- Laws currently differentiate between scientific activities (employing methodologies of observation, experimentation, and hypothesis testing of beliefs) and religion or proselytization for benefit of specific groups through self-interest. In the case of educational and research, there is a relatively clear line on what is “science” versus “religion” and “interest advocacy”, as well as between scientific experimentation meeting protocols of human rights protections and those that are not. Science is distinguished by law from interest advocacy and religious worship as a human activity that is open freely to internal challenges through empirical testing.

- Laws currently differentiate between promotional advocacy for an interest and advocacy that is fraud. Promotional advocacy is protected political speech. Fraud is a form of speech used to deceive and harm, with specific intent and with statements known to be false.

- Laws distinguish levels of scrutiny for doctrines taught in private organizations from those to be taught in public organizations or in those publicly chartered with specific public purposes. In public organizations, laws differentiate between the teaching of doctrines and the rewarding of students for public purposes and those that violate these purposes through adherence to private doctrines, discriminatory grading and reward systems, and the promotion of doctrines that endanger the weak against the strong.

Applying law to challenge a scholarly discipline understandably raises justifiable fears that the powerful or and/or the uneducated will work together to target unpopular ideas or ethnic groups under the cloak of law. It is all too easy to abuse legal mechanisms and to enact totalitarian purges in the name of law or public interest. Those fears are perfectly understandable and reasonable given recent history and given contemporary circumstances. The author shares these fears and has been disheartened, both as a lawyer and as a legal plaintiff, at the erosion of rule of law, mishandling of law, and the barriers that exist to fairness and justice, even where laws on their face are clear.

Governments too often seek to criminalize religious beliefs and cultural autonomy. They have tendencies to de-legitimize political opposition and to stigmatize defenders of rights. They are prone to finding new ways to suppress speech and public information, thwart accountability and to use the tools of propaganda to undermine reality and reason. Even amongst educated publics, it is common to use high
position and media to generate fears and target small groups of thinkers and minority cultures. To those who seek to secure power, ideas are disdained and intellectuals are often vilified. It may very well be that the lack of faith in legal institutions today to actually carry out law and justice are fully justified. Nevertheless, it is the principle of law and justice and the mechanisms of participatory, transparent, open access, non-discriminatory justice systems that are the path towards protection of rights and the planet.

The case outlined in this chapter proceeds on the assumption of reason and fairness in the application of existing written consensus principles of international law, even though that may not be the reality. In the view of this author, the only way to move civilization forward, assuming that is possible (something that is also subject to scientific testing) is to build procedures, institutions, and systems that codify principles and establish real safeguards for long-term human interests. The human systems with the responsibility to do that are systems of rule of law and of public civics education to build the full array of citizen skills for understanding and participation in those systems.

The international legal community used a set of mechanisms at the end of World War II in occupied West Germany to establish democratic and legal processes with the goal of assuring protections of minorities and communities by restructuring university disciplines and rebuilding public education⁹. Those are among international precedents for examining disciplines and stripping them of harmful ideological doctrines so that they can return to intellectual missions free of interest group politics and focus on discipline and actual science, free from racist prejudices that distort scientific teaching and from experimentation on humans that endangers human dignity.

The method of applying law to the discipline of economics consists of the following five steps:

1) Identify the source of shared doctrines among economists (analogous to finding shared practices in an industry).

2) Identify the sources of universal law that could be used for prosecution of the use of specific illegal doctrines while identifying those internally contradictory laws that should not be used today because of dangers of political tainting of universal law (noting paradoxes of some politicization of international law as well as internal conflicts of interest in law given the relations of specific international law documents to economic ideology).

3) Describe the elements of potential crimes to be prosecuted and the defenses to them for the specific laws identified in Step 2.

4) Evaluate the possible verdicts for each doctrine and law that is considered in Step 3 and applied to the identified doctrines in Step 1.

5) Discuss the implications of this outcome for specific individuals, institutions and society in order to determine the appropriate remedy for society.

**Step 1: Identifying the Potential Criminal Acts: The Shared Doctrines**

Holding “economics” to legal standards can be a bit tricky because it requires identifying what “economics” is and who it is. Economics isn’t a licensed profession and not every university economics department is exactly the same. For the purpose of this analysis, the goal is to identify economics as a profession of academics using a common label and teaching a set of shared doctrines that they identify by name; generally what they call “neo-classical Economics”. These doctrines and their teaching are the alleged harmful acts that can be tested as criminal for their violations of international law. Since there are also different “doctrines” or “schools” in economics, identifying the commonly shared doctrines is not a perfect process, but it is possible to determine what these doctrines are since there are associations of economists and universities that hire Ph.D. economists from this shared group, and textbooks that are taught commonly by the members of that group.

The goal of this article is not to identify every specific court in which one might bring a case or every defendant “Economist” or “Economics Department” that might be held accountable. There will be variations in applications of the law and different defendants would, assuming the findings of legal violations, have different culpability given their different roles in the profession¹⁰. Those are tactical issues. This article focuses, instead, on the general argument; the fundamental doctrines that are the norm among a collective and identifiable group that self-identifies as economists and that also recognizes a
group of shared doctrines. The task here is to identify those doctrines so that they can be held to legal scrutiny.

The first sub-step is to define the “defendant” “economist”/ “economics department”/ “economics discipline” – the alleged perpetrator of the violations; i.e., the discipline and its boundaries. The second sub-step is to pick a strategy for identifying the shared doctrines of this defendant/ these defendants. A third sub=step is to check to assure that the doctrines are, in fact, shared, and can be stated clearly with agreement.

The Defendants

The group of defendants that identifies themselves as economists includes: the group of individuals receiving university degrees in “economics,” those teaching “economics,” those publishing textbooks in “economics” for “economics departments,” and those identifying themselves by profession as “economists.” This is a collective enterprise. Economics establishes itself as in industry by setting its own standards for publication, for hiring and advancement. As in civil lawsuits and prosecutions of the tobacco industry for their distortion, misuse of data and profit, working tacitly as a collective with common ends, economists can be viewed as a profession or industry that can potentially be held accountable for research and public statements where there is promotion of self-interest in ways that are fraudulent, deceptive and result in harm.

This approach for identifying a group is consistent with the goals of international law enforcement. Rather than blame entire cultures or religions for specific actions or extreme doctrines that are combined with harmful actions, the international legal system seeks to identify the individuals and institutions that turn larger public systems towards criminality to help societies to rebalance themselves in ways that are consistent with international universal principles. The approaches of the Nuremberg courts following World War II were not to criminalize Germans or Japanese as an ethnic group, though they recognized collective responsibility, but to criminalize individuals promoting certain ideologies in exercise of authority and in compelling others to take actions, in violation of international law, as they sought to restore Germany and Japan to stability. The goal of those courts was to hold individuals or groups of individuals accountable for the choices they made, including the doctrines they promoted, in their own self-interest that harmed the acknowledged rights of others. It was to criminalize independent policy decisions that were not essential to the survival of the economic system or the culture practicing that system, such as how they choose to treat native peoples, land rights, future rights to a clean environment, and other rights that international law affirmatively recognizes.

Even though some might say that economists are not the most responsible for certain harms occurring today that reflect their doctrines that does not mean they should not be held accountable or that they cannot be held accountable. The economics profession is not completely responsible but it is also not completely independent of existing distribution and abuses of wealth and power and its ideologies. Yet, the idea that it is completely neutral and unaccountable is easy to prove false. This kind of thinking is one of the blinders within economics itself; assuming free, independent and sovereign choice. The test of that is to look at the sources of funding of Economics departments as well as the places academic economists work and how their own funding and prestige and position are reinforced. Economists teach what corporations promote and not what the “market” of student “consumers” choose. The very profession they work in is also an “imperfect market” that restricts choice. Law assumes and evaluates choices by individuals and economists themselves and it is economists who themselves teach that individuals make their own choices and understand the risks and values, including those of choosing harm to others and criminality. In essence, economic teachings already accept the accountability of economists for the implications of what they teach and the interests they promote. One can choose not to be an economist. One can choose to challenge its teachings in another field. The law does hold collectives accountable. The “rule of nobody” is not a defense (Arendt, 1963). Collective responsibility also recognizes individual responsibility, particularly at high levels. If a doctrine is behind certain policies, whether that of a political party, a corporate advertiser, or a social institution, individuals who promote the doctrines are responsible for them and their effects.
Note that one overriding purpose of law and the spirit of the legal analysis offered in this piece is not to punish specific individuals as much as to hold behaviors to standards and to regulate human activity and move it forward with long-term interests of humanity. Punishment is a means to the end of changing behaviors, not the end in itself. The goal of this piece is to first identify the doctrines and the actions and impacts that are linked to those doctrines and to try to criminalize and change them if they are indeed in violation of international law. The goal at the same time is to improve and replace these doctrines if they are scientifically and methodologically suspect and weak, to improve their intellectual merit and public value.

There are different alternatives for approaching doctrines. One can look at specific “schools” within a discipline that rigidly adhere to particular doctrines on the assumption that it is these schools that have somehow perverted and distorted a discipline. One can look for a specific group that uses the discipline in a way that distorts its meaning for criminal intent and assume that the discipline itself may simply be subject to abuse by rogue elements. Or one can start directly with the discipline itself on the belief that the entire “discipline” is itself promoting doctrines with fraudulent, self-interested intent resulting in criminal harms.

There is already public discussion as to where to look for harmful doctrines and how to measure the harm. Here, it makes most sense to start with the economics profession itself, leaving open the possibility for looking at specific sub-groups if the discipline itself is benign.

While Naomi Klein identifies what she loosely terms the “shock doctrine” of specific economists like Milton Friedman and the “Chicago School” and seeks to hold them and the politicians who apply their approach accountable for theft of the commons and destabilization of weak countries and their cultures (Klein, 2007). However, since not even Milton Friedman identifies himself as the proponent of the “shock doctrine,” with a clear identifiable school of followers, organized into a discrete political party or organization that promotes a specific ideology, determining the specific defendants and specific components of this doctrine would be difficult.

Since others suggest that the current approach to “globalization” is itself a criminal doctrine and that the harms it has caused, that might also amount to international and domestic crimes, are not merely limited to a specific school but are supported by specific professions including the economics profession, it would be easier to start the analysis with the profession itself to see if it has such doctrines and if they can be linked to harms.

Seeking Shared Beliefs: Separating Doctrine from Scientific Beliefs

Most economists today recognize a body of doctrine in their field that they refer to as “neo-classic economics” but unlike certain professions with established determination of physical laws (like the “four laws of thermodynamics”) that are known to all physicists in a specific order, this is not a list of enumerated tested laws and it is also not a clear list of doctrine.

If economics were a real social science, there would be a set of such laws as in natural science; these would be taught along with the experiments that reveal and replicate them in a hierarchy building the discipline as a discipline. There would be nothing to test for legality other than the experimental protocols and the applications of results. Yet, even though economics is being expressed in mathematics, many of its principles are not scientific laws.

Instead, in the discipline of economics, there are topics and precepts. Unlike reading religious texts of parables and invocations from a higher power, economists do state doctrines in their basic texts. In one way, it is actually easier to find the doctrines of economics than trying to determine the basic tenets of a religion from a single, long religious text that may have multiple authors, may be written in an ancient language, and may contain contradictory or ambiguous passages. Every economics Ph.D. will agree to a certain set of principles and textbooks will repeat them.

The question is how exactly to find them and then how to examine them. Here is the standard of what to search for. There are certain crimes where speech is clearly a criminal act. Among them are fraud (knowing deception for personal gain), incitement, reckless endangerment, and, more recently, hate speech. These crimes are prosecuted by identifying specific statements that have these impacts. In the
case of economics, these will be shared beliefs that are repeated in highlighted contexts such that they achieve the recognition of a doctrine that scholars know or should know to be false with the intent of promoting personal gain at the expense of others. One quick way to separate out the ordinary statements of scholarship from those that could fit the category of criminal speech is to look at how these statements are made and how individuals in the discipline are rewarded and punished for their challenges to those statements. In a “discipline” it is relatively easy to find the shared beliefs since individuals are rewarded and punished on the basis of whether they agree to them and these are used in the basic teaching and then testing and rewarding of those who repeat them and then teach them and use them in their own written publications.

Doctrines are clearly distinguishable from the ordinary work of science and scholarship for the very reason that they are not subject to testing and replacement but are accepted on faith. Assumptions that are promoted without any test of their validity, without any attempt to test that validity – including penalties against who seek to make those challenges, and without any opportunity to throw out the assumption if it fails the test meet the definition of doctrine. A widely shared political or ideological belief like a religious belief that is not subject to testing, is not an empirical observation, and is not a rebuttable hypothesis, is probably a doctrine.

Economics also offers some doctrines of “omission” in which certain fundamental questions (that would promote protections) are eliminated from the agenda even though there is a natural tendency to want to raise them. Where the discipline determines that certain public protections are not to be taught, without a rational basis, these can also be examined as doctrine. Of course, the prohibitions against certain discussions are usually more subtly stated and can be a bit harder to find. In my critique of Stanford’s “hidden curriculum” in teaching business courses, for example, I gave the example of the case study of the failing community bank in which the objective of the class was to teach students to erase their empathy for the community and to shut down a bank on purely business profit grounds with no attention to social costs and benefits. There is a classic American film, shown usually around the Christian holiday of Christmas, It’s a Wonderful Life, directed by Frank Capra and starring the well-known actor, James Stewart. In the film, Stewart’s character saves the community bank and his soul with it by incorporating community values in his choice. The Stanford case took the same story but deliberately excluded discussion of the public values in order to promote a doctrine and to reverse students’ moral, intellectual and legal inclinations.

Assuring that the Doctrines are Fundamental, Shared Tenets of the Discipline

Previous studies of economics as a discipline confirm not only that there is a basic set of beliefs but that they are almost universally enforced in the discipline; thus meeting the status of doctrine. The profession has been found to show a high level of conformity and this is visible not only in its internal hierarchy but in its basic textbooks, even though in a “market economy” economists would describe publishers as free to offer a diversity of approaches where a discipline had yet to find objective, scientific laws and required competitive approaches in order to do so. In looking at this conformity, many authors immediately point out where to look for the doctrines.

In a study in 2006, “Economics Confronts the Economy,” Philip Klein described the discipline as controlled by a comparatively small group of economists located in what are considered the U.S.’s top departments (University of Chicago, MIT, Stanford, Harvard) who edit the leading journals and act as a barrier to the emergence of new ideas. He described this control as the source of stagnation of the discipline around doctrines, including the central view that economic power should be free to exert political power without public or legal oversight (the “laissez-faire” ideology).

Though no one directly points to the Nobel Prize Committee as accountable (the more likely targets are economists, themselves, and the institutions they work for), the Nobel Prize in Economics (that is actually the “Bank of Sweden’s Prize in Economic Science in Memory of Alfred Nobel”) may be the professional seal that anoints economists and their doctrines and that could be viewed today as one of the most important centralizing agents for the doctrines of the discipline. Indeed, this award, given since 1968, and nearly one quarter of the time to economics professors at a single university known for its
narrow and doctrinal view of the discipline (the University of Chicago) plays a very different role for this discipline than it does for natural sciences and medicine. In natural sciences, the Nobel Prize largely rewards scientists for the human benefits of work, adding a new criterion to work that largely remains unchanged in its recognition and use in those disciplines following the award. By contrast, the Nobel Prize in Economics is the only social science award, in a discipline that itself recognizes that it is largely based on doctrine rather than scientific verification of its validity or application. The award’s impact is powerful on the individuals who win the award through what is also admittedly a “politicized” and non-transparent process that places a value judgment on the work. In economics, unlike natural sciences where work has already adhered to the scientific method and its referee process, the award is bestowed on individuals whose work has never undergone empirical testing and verification. Though the award committees are run by a national Swedish academy, political judgments (and funding) without any rigorous criteria make the award vulnerable to capture by subjective interests. The funds empower the Prize Committee as a group that itself standardizes the discipline of economics on its own set of values. It is this that also potentially makes it liable for the harms economics may cause. Moreover, the large financial awards to economists are made out of the endowed funds of a central bank in a country that is now largely dependent on arms manufacturing. The award is given in the name of Alfred Nobel, a businessman who was also an arms merchant and inventor of destructive materials who some referred to as the “merchant of death.” Thus, the award itself potentially reinforces the conflicts of interest on this discipline.

The same Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel Prize winner in Economics who unintentionally inspired this article, confirmed this uniformity in 1988 in a study of the discipline’s textbooks. He described most of them as “clones of Samuelson” (a basic economic text since 1948) and explained that they represented a uniformity of thinking due to monopolistic competition (control of competition by the concentrated buying power of the discipline) (1988).

A 1998 study reconfirmed Stiglitz’s observation, finding a “surprising degree of consensus” (Walstad, Watts and Bosshardt, 1998, reported in Lopus and Paringer, 2011). The number of textbooks and publishers has increased but the outlook was found to be similarly narrow.

A more recent study, in 2011, finds that the modern economics textbooks now include “feminist, radical, and religious” views but that there is still uniformity in the discipline’s doctrines, even when there are varying amounts of interest group representation politics (Lopus and Paringer, 2011, p. 5). Today there are only four major publishers, down from 10, twenty years ago. Two of these texts (those of McConnell/Brue/Flynn and Mankiw) represent 40% of sales with several others probably at about a 5% market share. The differences between them are not the doctrines but the topical emphasis on issues like: consumer and producer surplus; what is called behavioral economics (game theory and strategic decision-making; NOT cultural or biological models to explain economies); along with descriptions of the workings of financial markets and banking system in newer works to reflect the recent global financial crisis (but apparently without the legal and political issues of control of the political system and law/regulation by financial interests). International content is not changed but it is moved to the beginning of various books.

The history of textbooks in the field also reflects this lack of diversity. The initial textbook, by Alfred Marshall in 1890, was replaced by Paul Samuelson’s text in 1948. Campbell R. McConnell’s first text, in 1960 began to outsell Samuelson’s in 1975 and remains one of the top two texts alongside that of N. Gregory Mankiw, Chair of George W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors from 2003-5.

The current batch is what Edward Fullbrook refers to as “toxic textbooks” that are directly linked to self-interest through authors like Mankiw (2009). Though Fullbrook calls these books “toxic” rather than “fraudulent” or “criminal” for their failure to see the global financial crisis and for the cause of globalization; he identifies some of the principles that can be tested for criminality.

For the purpose of this article, I tested a sampling of the introductory textbooks from various publishing years to see if, indeed, the introductory textbooks laid out a series of doctrines that could be immediately tested against international law. They do offer some basic doctrines but unfortunately are not the best source of doctrines to use for this study. One must go to the specific areas of the discipline
that build upon the basic introduction – such as international trade and development economics – for the specific doctrines they introduce.

I took the list of the “most popular texts” as of 2011, as described by Lopus and Paringer, including the two by Mankiw and McConnell (and Brue) that comprise the 40% market share, and four others that together constitute the majority share. These are (from Lopus and Paringer):

- *Principles of Modern Economics*, Nicholas Gregory Mankiw;
- *Economics*, Paul Samuelson (and William Nordhaus);
- *Economics*, David Colander;
- *Macro Economic Essentials: Understanding of economics in the News*, Peter Kennedy;
- *Principles of Economics*, Karl E. Case, Sharon Oster, Roy Fair;
- *Principles of Economics*, Timothy Taylor

I relied on the National Library of a “developing country” where I was then based, the People’s Democratic Republic of Lao, and found eight texts, published over a forty year period. These included the texts of two of the top selling authors and several others (McConnell and Brue, 2002; Samuelson, 1961; Clayton, 1983; Clayton, 2001, Wonnocott, 1986, Smith, 1991; Baumol and Blande, 1991; McCarty, 1988).

All of these texts start with the same basic, unproven, unempirical dogmatic assumption on “wants” and “scarcity”. The use of these terms as a starting assumption for economics is not an empirical observation or a tested theory and that is why it can easily be identified as a doctrine. It is an untested belief that is not true across cultures and that is not subject to challenge. Some critics describe this doctrine as the “assumption of greed” and the promotion of production, consumption, destruction, homogenization, and unsustainability. Among its various statements in its simplest form are these:

- “Scarcity” is the fundamental issue of economics; assuming “rational behavior” (interesting in that “scarcity” is linked with a subjective doctrinal view of it as “rational”) (McConnell and Brue, p. 33);
- “Economics is the study of how men and society choose with or without the use of money to employ scarce productive resources” (Samuelson, 1961, p. 6). Here, there is the added psychological, non-scientific assumption that “men” and “society” have full power of free choice which is in direct contrast to the scientific assumption that decisions are determined or linked to outside variables and/or as the result of certain principles that can be discovered by hypothesis testing. This is an assumption about causality that opposes the basic premise of scientific testing of relationships; and
- “No nation in the world has sufficient resources to satisfy the wants of all of its people. . . Economists study the ways in which individuals and society choose to use limited resources . . . to satisfy unlimited wants” (Smith, 1991, p. 3 and 11)

One of the books also makes it clear that the discipline is U.S. centric and does not allow for comparisons and testing on all forms of economies. “The economist describes how our economic system works” (McCarty, p.4.). This admission suggests that the discipline itself is established on doctrines for a specific technical purpose and is not a science, though it doesn’t elaborate the rest of those doctrines. One would not find a chemistry textbook, for example, just describing “the workings of our products.” The texts also suggest that the system of doctrines they commonly promote is the key to bringing the greatest wealth, prosperity, innovation and happiness and that this is a desirable choice for all. That, itself, is also a doctrine. One would not find a parallel to this in a physics textbook describing physics as the key to wealth and happiness but merely a description of natural laws that could be understood and applied to human problems for human benefit.

The absence of certain teachings in the introductory texts also suggests another doctrine, though it is only implied. Most textbooks mention that economic actors are constrained by government. Some do posit that political regulation develops to ensure respect for rights and individual sovereignty but the subject of rights and protections as an integral part of applications of economics or of economic predictions and measures is dropped. It never enters again into economic discussion and there are no
attests to measure the value of rights (though it enters into “Law and Economics”) and fundamental long-term concerns of human survival and sustainability. The role of government is given only lip service in these texts. It is mentioned only in upper level economics texts where the role of government and the concepts of international law and legal protections are noted (and, as analyzed below, undermined) in specific ways.

While introductory “Principles of Economics” texts actually fail to identify a common enumerated set of “principles” and doctrines, the teaching of doctrine is instilled in the discipline in these texts in place of scientific enquiry and that, itself, opens the discipline up to legal challenge. Introductory textbooks teach economics as a guide to enrichment and protection of interest through specific action. This confirms that economists are doing something other than offering ideas about how the world might work as a basis for scientific testing. It is clear from the texts that economists are starting with a basis of valuation on which they claim they will advance student “wealth” and “happiness” depending on whether students agree to accept these principles and valuations. The discipline is also linked directly to policy without an established basis of scientific measurement and observation. This means that the doctrines are already linked to invocations for both government and private action. This is a form of action, not the generation of hypotheses for scientific testing of observations, which would immediately offer protection as protected scientific pursuit.

Picking the Doctrines to Test

Since the basic economics texts do not outline the discipline’s essential doctrines at its various levels, one needs to look further into the discipline to identify them. One can find them through research and I do so, below. The list of topics in economics that are required for one to earn a degree in the field are also fairly constant throughout universities and comprise the study of economics at different levels, starting from individuals and firms to national government to international economic relations. Almost all university departments start with what they call “Micro-Economics” (consumer and producer behavior), “Macro-Economics” (national production, consumption and price regulation), International Trade, and “Development Economics” (the transformation of economies into trade blocs with industrial countries). Though one can find other courses in economics departments including agricultural, labor or resource economics, public/government accounting, accounting, and methods, these are topic areas rather than the established sequence of levels. Each of these four levels promotes doctrines but they are not listed as formal numbered “laws” or “assumptions.” One has to use other social science methods to find them.

As an anthropologist, I applied the methodology of participant observation used by anthropologists to try to specify belief systems. I combined this with the evidentiary search and deductive logical reasoning approaches used by lawyers to list actionable charges that define behaviors. Both approaches have built-in degrees of subjectivity but should not elicit major disagreement from economists.

The “test” I applied, as someone who has studied economics\textsuperscript{11} is to try to identify those textbook principles statements that nearly all economists would agree belong in a text and would be taught as a basic list of doctrines in the four different levels described above.

To decide which of these should be put to the legal test, I applied a second form of screening. As a Ph.D. social anthropologist who has also had extensive study (and teaching experience) in other “social science” fields, I sought to generate a list of those economics doctrines that are in direct violation of basic principles taught in other disciplines. I looked for those specific doctrines that students in another discipline could say compete with the principles found in another discipline and that they would not teach because it contradicts, without complementing, the teachings that can be found in those other disciplines.

One could present all of economics’ basic tenets and doctrines and then explain which of these do not need to be tested for legality, though that would make the process and presentation here much longer. Other scholars may wish to do that as part of the process of rigorously holding the discipline to the test and restructuring it. For example, many authors critique the tenet or precept of economics (and the word “tenet” or “precept” here is chosen as distinct from “doctrine”) that “competition” is fundamental to economics and that “self-interest” is fundamental to economic study. They claim that this promotes the
concept of “greed” in ways that undermine society and that this approach denies human cooperation. In fact, this part of economic precepts does not in itself create a contradiction with other disciplines or with the approach of science. The existence of such doctrines in economics that are viewed contradictorily by different social sciences is very special and unusual. A chemist, for example, would not read a physics textbook and say that the principles in the physics book were contradictory and not complementary to those of chemistry (or vice-versa) and promoted a different set of values and assumptions! They would say only that certain ideas are theories for which the approaches of their discipline might result in better models but neither discipline would make a claim to truth. By contrast, this does happen in the social “sciences” and “humanities” including economics, which identifies the principles as unscientific doctrines that can be examined.

Note that this identification of economic doctrines on the basis of competition with principles in other fields does not mean that the economic doctrines are right or wrong, since it may be the other disciplines that are wrong. At this stage, the test doesn’t determine the validity or legality of the doctrines. It just determines that these assumptions are doctrinal to economics because they are not shared by (or disproven by empirical data in) other social sciences. The purpose here is to simply generate a list of the doctrines for examination.

Note, also, that what I did not do in this study, unlike others using anthropological methods for similar ends, is to look at the “hidden curriculum;” the teaching of doctrines and values that are embedded both in the teaching methodologies of economics and the structure of power and choices within the university systems where economists teach and are trained. The hidden curriculum of contemporary universities certainly reinforces the doctrines that economists teach (Lempert et. al., 1995). Teaching economics as mathematics and book learning without laboratory field work to meet the peoples who are harmed and cultures destroyed by economic teachings certainly reinforces the attempt to devalue communities and to hide and desensitize individuals to results. Business school use of the case method to reinforce the idea of closed “board room” decision-making with paper statistics and with the public excluded, also works to instill a specific ideology and to exclude public values. Changing the hidden curriculum is an essential part of the solution for reforms but is not essential to judging the illegality of the discipline.

Overall, I identified some 15 doctrines among these four different levels that seemed fundamental to the study of economics at these four levels. Some of the doctrines could be classified as subsets or corollaries. Below is a quick summary. The specific doctrines are input in the table that tests their legality, in Step 4, below (“Tests of the Legality of Economic Doctrines”).
Summary of Legal Doctrines Testable Under International Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Four Sub-Areas of Economics</th>
<th>Number of Key Doctrines Identified for Testing in Each Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Micro-Economics</td>
<td>Six doctrines, four of them fundamental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro-Economics</td>
<td>Three fundamental doctrines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development</td>
<td>Four fundamental doctrines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade</td>
<td>Two fundamental doctrines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that in creating these four building blocks of levels of analysis in economics, the discipline has also made specific choices that deny other social sciences. The economy of the industrial State and its production are considered a worthy level of economic study, but economic behaviors and structures at the level of human culture, of family, of group, and community are not. Nor is the eco-system and its relations considered as a level of economic analysis, even in the new sub-area of Environmental Economics (which measures the “value” of “economic services” rather than start with the eco-system and its costs relative to humans). Nor are animals considered a level of economic study even though they do exhibit economic behavior and could be said to have economies. Similarly, the cross-species interactions of economic exchanges are not considered as a level. This also helps to point to some of the doctrines and biases in the discipline that have both scientific and moral/legal implications.

Other readers could probably add to the list I have generated and that you may wish to scan now in the left hand column of that table below, in Step 4. For example, some might wonder why the list includes 15 doctrines while the doctrines of monetarism are not included on the list. The idea that banks can generate money supply in order to promote “growth” is viewed by some major critics as being the key culprit of the recent financial crisis and depression (Daly, 2011). Others question the idea of individual paper currencies as global reserve currencies and note the inequities and harms that result.

Readers could also try to offer more precise agreed wording and specify the exact percentages of texts or surveyed economic professors or journal articles that conform with these specific principles. They may wish to amend or present this list in another way that could reflect a more “scientific” approach to specifying the norm (perhaps a statistical bell curve) and the systematic list of beliefs. Others are welcome to do that if they believe such refinement would advance the approach here or provide a model for application to challenges to other disciplines. The goal here is just to try to generate a basic set of doctrines that can be tested for legality and to tie them to central pillars of the study of the discipline.

Step 2: Identifying the Source of the Legal Standards to Use:

Identifying international laws to apply is harder than it may seem, though I will do so in this section after applying a process that looks to legal bedrock, consistency and universality of law within a multitude of international documents including international laws (which are clear and partly enforceable) and declarations, conventions, and treaties (that seek to clarify the meaning of basic laws but often create conclusion).

The set of international treaties is, unfortunately, full of contradictions, which has led to a misleading view that all law is subjective, culturally based, and impossible or undesirable to enforce, without any common and universal consensus. Though there are two very clear areas of “universal” criminal laws
(outlawing the crimes of genocide and crimes “against humanity” that both essentially act to protect cultural/group rights, referenced below), these international “laws” are not uniformly enforced though they are legally clear and their full meaning and enforcement are continually subject to international politics. Several other treaties establish individual “rights” or legal violations (such as trade agreements) that in themselves may contradict or undermine other established principles.

To appropriately apply these “laws,” one has to separate out the political influences on the body of international law. Doing so reveals part of the paradox of how economic doctrines and politics themselves already influence international agreements and laws and makes enforcement of laws against economics as a discipline almost paradoxical. After explaining why all of the treaties other than those of the two “universal” criminal laws, may themselves have been short-circuited by economic doctrines and their associated politics, I move to examine and clarify the standards of the “universal” criminal laws, recognizing that the interpretation of how those laws are enforced must also be stripped of the political influences that seek to redefine what these laws mean.

A Paradox of Law and Economics

The development of international “rights” treaties has reached such a stage where it is almost possible today to speak of generating a treaty “guaranteeing” the “right” to “pickled herring” or “gefilte fish” and as a practitioner in this field I have published criticisms of my fellow international human rights lawyers and human rights educators for the way that recent rights declarations and international conventions have begun to stray from bedrock law towards self-interested promotion by every interest group that seeks recognition in a treaty. In my view, little more is required for an international declaration today than backing by the producers of pickled herring and gefilte fish coupled with the belief of organizations and bureaucrats working with the United Nations system that they will be funded to generate such treaties and then to administer projects that “fulfill” these rights of everyone to enjoy pickled herring and gefilte fish (Lempert, 2010a). Similarly, the emergence of international organizations and trade agreements that promote ideologies of globalization and that include sanctions and other pressures on countries or groups for non-compliance, also continue to multiply. In ignoring actual international laws like the U.N. Genocide Convention’s protections of cultural rights, many organizations and interests in the international community today seek to use these agreements to replace international law.

The paradox is that both the universal international laws, that are designed to protect the most fundamental, long-term interests of humanity, and those “rights” treaties, trade agreements and “development” standards that contradict or undermine them in ways that are largely designed to promote short-term economic interests of businesses, countries, and government bureaucracies, can all ultimately be defended on the basis of economic measurements or described as being politically motivated. If the ultimate standard of measurement is an economic one (or a political one) and if economics itself has become politicized, how is it possible to identify a neutral standard for the accountability of those who design the standards? Is there a paradox of using morality, or “science” or even economics’ own principles (as a “moral science”) to “prove” the objectivity of law and then to compare economics against this objectivity?

Like economics, the discipline of “law” or “jurisprudence” was also originally considered a “moral science.” Legal scholars looking for the source of moral law have used many of the same methods and arguments as economists in seeking to justify that the doctrines that emerged were “positivist,” “neutral,” or “natural law.”

What, then, makes “law” more trustworthy than economics? How is it possible to know that the “law” that defines “universal” value and long-term benefit isn’t subject to the same (or other) subjectivity and self-interest? What makes its judgments any better as a standard of value than those of the “science” of economics, as economists would claim? Are both systems really parallel and coming out of a common origin, making them both equally valid as religious or “legal” standards of measurement? Is this article able to do more than hold two moral, relativistic approaches against each other? What makes the economists wrong and allows their defiance of international law to be judged itself as a criminal act?
The solution is to emphasize the disappearing bright line distinction between “law” and “economics.” One of my goals in this article is to make it clear that the two belief systems have come into conflict. By simple definition, law should take precedence over economics since law is the system to be used as the highest standard for judging other acts. The reason for using law in this way is not simply an arbitrary choice justified only on calls of “morality” or “faith.” It is because law itself is the area of human activity in which societies seek to protect “long-term human survival interests.” Cultures use law to protect their survival. International legal systems have now developed for the stated legal purpose, in the United Nations founding documents and in key criminal laws, not of protecting one individual culture but of protecting long-term human survival and multiple cultures. Even if economics has gained a leading position in the most powerful societies (urban, technological cultures) on the planet, today and are the equivalent of the religious doctrines of those cultures, they still take second place to the international goal of protecting the overall survival of humanity. That survival may include defending humanity against the doctrines of those powerful cultures if it finds them a threat to long-term human survival.

Even economic theories and measures are used to give greater legitimacy to the basis of international law, those measures are based on the long-term value of human survival, not simply on one culture’s moral beliefs for protecting its own survival. Economics cannot be placed on the same level as law precisely because it does not consider the totality of human interests. It only considers those within its current measures.

In the statements that I presented in the introductory section of this article from Professor Stiglitz and his economics colleagues, it is clear that they do not simply ignore the two basic international criminal laws. They go beyond that. They are attacking the very legitimacy of those laws, claiming that they are no more valid than the trade agreements for globalization that they are using to replace them. They are claiming that their work in economics is superior to that of law because it lacks their determination of what economic doctrines imply constitutes a pure “science.” They argue that law’s moral authority as a system is based on even less faith than their “rigorous” and “mathematical” system of economics. They claim that the international community has politically defined its principles as sacred in a way that essentially makes it no different from economics as a system and simply an arbitrary set of doctrines that may be no different from religious dogma.

The view of the international community, written into law following World War II, and held as a fundamental basis of rule of law is that the economists are wrong. International law, itself is not just a theology or moral set of goals. Societies recognize certain principles in law as meeting the test of being universal (culturally neutral), moral in all cultural moral precept systems, AND as natural law. International laws are testable propositions for long-term survival and benefit. Trade agreements and the belief in short-term economic measures and gains cannot meet that standard that would enable specific interests to compete against law.

Holding economics up to international legal standards does not challenge the right to make economic measurements or observations or even to apply those measures to law. What legal analysis of economics doctrines tests is whether or not the current doctrines that have been chosen for teaching by economists are those that reflect long-term human interests or scientific observation and that would readily be approved by a consensus of humanity. Finding economic doctrines in violation of these laws would say that the current economic doctrines actually violate the basic principle that economists say they agree to, but have abandoned; that “value” must reflect actual long-term human survival benefits and universal value to humanity as tested by human history and experience, and NOT simply doctrine or ideology that is promoted for the self-interest of a small group today in ways that cause harm and that do not stand up to scientific testing. The promotion of short-term economic interests and policies appears to have become the current (unlawful) approach of economics and the law can hold these economic doctrines to a long-term test, including a test of long-term economic benefits to humanity; the test that economists are expected to uphold as their first principle but that they appear to have abandoned.

Indeed, it is possible to take certain of the measures and precepts of economics as a discipline and to use them to prove that the current form of the discipline is knowingly based on internal contradictions that deny certain of its own teachings for reasons of conflicts of interest that can be tested for their legality.
The very doctrines that economists espouse today that appear to undermine group rights and cultural diversity (in promotion of genocide) directly contradict the basic tenet of economics that diversity and competition are, themselves, actually more “robust” systems for protecting long-term adaptability and needs. This biological idea of competition, adaptation, radiation and diversity of human groups that allow for competing ideas of value, consumption and production, could easily fit with understandings of ecology and environmentalism but contemporary economic doctrines override this basic belief (Lempert, 2010b). Similarly, the idea of political equity that modern economic doctrines undermine can be determined to also best reflect the basic economic doctrine of fair and stable competition and can be easily applied to 18th century ideals of political equality and social contract (Lempert, 1996b). Modern economic doctrines knowingly choose not to do this. This opens up economics to legal scrutiny.

The other contradiction within economic doctrine today with the principles of law is that the “market”, as promoted today by economic doctrines, is a system for expression of short-term majority preferences but not for the long-run, which is the basis for law. Economists say that “in the long run we’re all dead” because they reinforce short-term decisions and internalized perceptions. Law says that we need to assure that in the long run we are still alive and that natural assets, social systems, cultural diversity, historical learning is still protected. This means that economics fundamentally recognizes that it requires law to supervise it since law acts as the very correction of market imperfections. It is designed to establish social goods and social choices alongside or in place of free market choices. In other words, law and economics are not “equivalent” “preference systems” of moral or political choice. Law is the one that trumps and establishes the “level playing field.”

International law is designed as a way to introduce long-term measures into human decision-making, by establishing “rights” for cultural and individual diversity that have long-term benefits as well as rights for environment, children and heritage that are also likely to be undervalued in short-term investment calculations. The challenge for economists today, in the face of law, is to explain their abandonment of such fundamental “universal” standards; their arbitrary determination that such fundamentals can and should be redefined in typical actions by economists, such as in approving international development loans and grants, with international law seen only as “exogenous” or “external” variables or constraints that are deemed irrelevant to economic decision-making or impediments to be removed. They must explain why equity, cultural or human diversity, and long-term human or environmental investments are not systematically protected in their decision-making.

Historians of economics note that these internal (and moral) contradictions within economics began to multiply even before the system of international law was established after World War II. “The drift of economics away from a moral science was evident, and condemned, yet the impact of these attacks was minimal.” (Alvey, 1999, p. 24). The question is, was this drift away from a moral science also a drift away from legality; i.e., adherence to accepted principles of international law, with a claim that they were “non-scientific” and unnecessary and interfered with economic “positivism”? If “greed” and “conquest” were established as the basic “positivist” principles and part of economic science, the harms they created can be held against international law to determine if they are illegal.

Once economics begins to take certain human motivations and utilize them for short-term interests that also promote their own self-interests, they are no longer acting neutrally or acceptably. Once doctrines prioritize short-term benefits such as “productivity” in a way that favors a small group (producers) with unexamined long-term negative consequences for the survival of cultures and of groups (people whose lands or livelihoods are threatened and who do not fund university chairs, unlike the corporate heads who are creating the harms), then economics is in violation of its role as a discipline. The conflict of principles is not simply whether a doctrine like greed can be taught as an assumption but whether the encouragement of greed teaches and promotes theft, short-term over long-term interests, and de-valueation of the interests of others as legitimate and symmetric as recognized and established under law.

The reason there is only a very limited set of international laws that can be used for this test is because the process of determining what is “universal” and in humanity’s long-term interest is difficult, vulnerable to politicization, and because “social sciences” like economics also appear (for political and
ideological reasons) to have forbidden study of the very types of questions that might help provide more answers on what kinds of systems are possible and how we best promote survival.

The proliferation of “rights” treaties (as if the U.N. system has become a business for generating and selling declarations) and of trade agreements has far outstripped the actual testing of which of these approaches are really “universal” and in humanity’s long-term interests and which are just part of an international political process in which interests compete (unequally) for advantage. In recent years, treaties have largely generated a list of individual rights that not only compete with each other but that often work to undermine cultural/group rights that are protected by international criminal law.

Economics has contributed to this blurring of law not only through the offering of international agreements that promote existing economic and political power but also by promoting an idea of individuals shaping laws and processes for individual situations rather than for promoting principles to protect weak interests under specific conditions. Economic doctrines today works on the assumption of individual rights and individual units as factors of labor and consumption independent of culture in ways that detach individuals and resources from their cultural systems and make them available for exploitation in the global economy. These individual rights – for women’s industrial labor, for individual mobility (in line with foreign capital investments), for (industrial system) education – largely serve economic interests and globalization and are promoted selectively by industrial countries seeking to employ foreign labor and extract foreign resources. In international organization agendas, these various economic, social and political rights are promoted in ways that seek to enforce government spending choices that follow political preferences established by the international community for the global economic niche of each country. Rather than reflect “law,” these rights create a mechanism that can undermine cultures and diversity in favor of a uniform mono-culture. Many of these, analogous to the “right to pickled herring”, now find themselves in international documents.

The two existing bedrock international laws have common elements that distinguish them from the large proliferation of international documents that have followed. What makes the international criminal laws on genocide and crimes against humanity enforceable is that there are identifiable perpetrators who create harm. Exercise of the “right” of a culture to exist, free of actors seeking to undermine its workings in order exploit its resources and its people (as workers or consumers), has a remedy. One can hold those who undermine these cultures accountable. Most of these other rights are policy statements defined as “rights.” Who denies nomadic desert peoples their supply of fresh water where there is no outside intervention polluting or depleting the water? On what basis can outsiders then come in, move the nomads to a sedentary area and force them into agricultural production for the global market on the basis of “enforcing their water rights?” If economists promote these moves on the basis of promoting “rights” and “choice” and “productivity” while destroying the culture of the nomads to do it, the “rights” treaties do not override the international law that protects the inviolability of the culture.

For this analysis, the place to start is with the bedrock international criminal laws.

The Wording of the International Laws that Can be used as a Test

Even though there are really only two international criminal laws (genocide and crimes against humanity) that can be used to test (and ultimately prosecute) the legality/illegality of economics, these laws, themselves, are “evolving.” The “problem” in identifying the specific applicable standard for these laws is that enforcement is also subject to politicization in both interpretation and application. There is a disparity between the historic enforcement of international laws and the laws themselves, such that the laws may actually criminalize many more activities than international prosecutors currently consider for bringing to trial.

Identifying the laws to use is actually a partly interactive process that requires not only looking at the law but also in generating a list of specific harms that do or might fit under those laws. In order to determine which acts of economics (which doctrines) might be prosecuted as crimes, the existing and potential harms of the doctrines also need to be enumerated (and they are in Step 4, below) and then matched with the existing laws that seek to assign criminal responsibility for specific harms. To find out
if the harms of economic doctrines fit existing laws, the laws must be stated in terms of the full potential list of harms that are clearly or could be covered by the laws.

Since the laws on genocide and crimes against humanity have only been applied in very narrow ways, to clarify that the laws can apply to specific harms, an understanding of how these laws are to be applied against new kinds of harms requires applying standard statutory analysis techniques to the laws. This is the legal technique of examining the “plain meaning” of the laws, then the historic intent and legislative history, to offer a basis for reconstructing the existing statutes given other documents or legal understandings if the specific plain meaning and intent are not clear in the law itself. Finally, though less objective, to find the full extent by which the laws might be applied, requires understanding the public policy goal of the laws and trying to reconstruct them to coincide with those policies.

Both of the existing international criminal laws come out of the basic goals of humanity that are enshrined in the United Nations Charter (1948):

1. To maintain international peace and security … in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.
2. …Respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

Considering each of these laws in turn and their fullest interpretations, it is possible to determine how the harms that economists are believed to have caused could fit prosecution under one or both of these international laws.

- The Genocide Convention: The plain meaning of the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (U.N. General Assembly, December 9, 1948) is summarized relatively quickly in one sentence, in Article II, of the law with other articles describing where the law applies and to whom it applies. It is a crime of “destruction” “in whole or in part” of a group. It is a crime of intent. “Incitement” which is a crime of speech is also punishable as is “complicity.”

\[
\text{Article I.} \quad \text{The contracting parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or war is a crime under international law.}
\]

\[
\text{Article II.} \quad \text{In the present convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:}
\]

\[
(c) \ \text{Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part …}
\]

\[
\text{Article III.} \quad \text{The following acts shall be punishable:}
\]

\[
(c) \ \text{Direct and public incitement to commit genocide.}
\]

\[
(e) \ \text{Complicity in genocide.}
\]

\[
\text{Article IV.} \quad \text{[punishment includes] public officials or private individuals.}
\]

What has never been absolutely clear here is the definition of partial destruction of a group. Thus far, only actual killings have been prosecuted as genocide. Yet it is very clear from the law that there is no use of the word “death,” “homicide,” “killing” or “murder” that would limit genocide to only these things. By the principles of statutory analysis, had these limitations been intended, they would have been included.

Historical analysis of the law confirms that it was also intended to criminalize a much broader set of harms than those resulting in “death.” Raphael Lemkin, who coined the word “genocide” and authored the law, hoped that it would be used to criminalize much more than murder and that it would protect the integrity of cultures in all of its dimensions. He wrote,

Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is
directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group.14

Lemkin doesn’t clearly establish that the law was designed to protect the economic choices of groups since he used the term “economic existence” and “security.” Nor does he use the term “economic institutions” alongside “political and social institutions.” Clearly, he saw the exploitation and abuse of resources that undermined livelihoods as genocide.

Anthropologists looking at this explanation, today, using accepted definitions of culture would quickly add “economic choices” and “economic institutions” into this list to assure its appropriate meaning (Lempert, 2010b). That is exactly what the international community has done in recent documents that essentially define the genocide law. These two documents are the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2007), applied to peoples who sit on land and resources that have been the most vulnerable to economic doctrines including those promoting globalization, and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992 (Rio Declaration, 1992). These documents do not have the full force of law, but they are not creating new “rights.” They are interpreting existing law. Almost all countries have signed the UNDRIP and the Rio Declaration. Even where a few industrial countries like the United States, where the economics profession is concentrated, have not signed on, that does not make these clarifications irrelevant or even unenforceable through the Genocide Convention. The actions of the economics profession are clearly global and are exerted in some 141 countries that have signed the UNDRIP and that can also bring prosecutions of genocide against foreign nationals whose actions have effect in their countries.

Below are some of the key provisions of the UNDRIP that give meaning to the Genocide Convention.

\textit{Article 5.}
Indigenous Peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions.

\textit{Article 7.}
Indigenous Peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide.

\textit{Article 8.}
1. Indigenous Peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.
2. Redress for ....
a) any action which has the aim of depriving them of their integrity as a distinct people or of their cultural values or ethnic identities.
d) any form of forced assimilation or integration.

\textit{Article 9.}
Indigenous Peoples .... Traditions and customs of their community or nation.

\textit{Article 11.}
1. Indigenous Peoples have the right to practice and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain and protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures.

\textit{Article 12.}
1. Indigenous Peoples have the right to use and control of their ceremonial objects.

\textit{Article 13.}
Indigenous Peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future generations ....

\textit{Article 20.}
1. Indigenous Peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and social systems and institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities.
2. Indigenous Peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development are entitled to just and fair redress.

\textit{Article 23.}
Indigenous Peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for exercising their right to be developed.

\textit{Article 32.}
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain the free and informed consent prior to approval of any project affecting their lands or territories or other resources.

The provisions that would strengthen the use of the genocide treaty and provide opportunities for charges against economics would be Articles 7, 8, 23 and 32. Article 7, for example, would appear to protect Indigenous Peoples against globalization or marketization of their culture by outsiders and doctrines that advocate for it. Article 8 would also potentially criminalize certain economic doctrines for globalization that seek to assimilate Native Peoples in any way (in their consumption and production activities). Article 23 could directly speak to doctrines of economists that are offered in ways that undermine full and objective judgments by Native peoples and act to convince them, on biased and incomplete information and doctrinal falsehoods, to give up aspects of their cultures or to sell their resources at market values rather to recognize what is needed to protect the sustainability of their systems. Article 32 would potentially criminalize economic doctrines that push governments to make decisions based on Gross Domestic Product and other aggregate benefits without considering the particularized harms to individual cultures in their geographic niches.

The importance of the Rio Declaration in combination with the Genocide Convention is that it introduces the scientific formula that defines what keeps a culture sustainable: the “IPAT” equation (environmental impact as a factor of population, affluence and technology) that requires a balance of population (demographic policies), consumption and production/technology on a specific asset base. The Declaration encapsulates this idea in two principles:

Principle 3. ... to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.
Principle 8. To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for all people, States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies.

In specific contrast to economics doctrine, the Declaration assumes that consumption and production are free choices that are integral to each culture and that they can be kept in balance. In contrast to economic doctrines, it assumes that happiness (“utility”) is determined and measured differently by each culture and that these differences should be preserved as fundamental protected rights (ostensibly by the Genocide Convention). Efficiency is measured differently by each culture because all activities can have a culturally maintaining value about from that measured by individuals. There is no such thing as a universal standard and there is not even an assumption that wants are unlimited or that societies or cultures have to deal with scarcity. What they have to deal with is balance that reflects their cultural choice. Cultures are rooted to land and specific (holy) resource assets that are of special value, that are sui generic, non-fungible goods.

The Rio Declaration essentially puts economists on notice that their doctrines are not universally accepted and that their doctrines could result in genocide by undermining cultural sustainability. Moreover, they put economists on notice that this balance is also a scientific concept of which they are expected to recognize.

- The Rome Statute on Crimes Against Humanity: The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is stated more recently than the Genocide Convention but its principles were already put to practice in the Nuremberg Trials of Nazi war criminals immediately after World War II.

The statute defines crimes against humanity as acts which:

... are positively odious offences in that they constitute a serious attack on human dignity or grave humiliation or degradation of one or more human beings. They are not isolated or sporadic events but are ... part of widespread or systematic practices. (Rome Statute, ICC, 1998)

The Statute does not clearly define what these harms might be other than that they be systematic and serious. But this statute does seem to be directed against the activities of a group promoting a specific
ideology that leads to specific harms. The doctrines of economics are certainly “widespread” and “systematic” in their practice rather than “isolated or sporadic.” If economic doctrines are linked to destruction of global heritage – destabilization of the global economy in ways that create conditions for war and any other harms that would seem to harm humanity in general – or create severe conditions for a specific group (farmers or laborers could certainly constitute “one or more human beings”) it would seem that this law could apply.

Harms that Economists are Believed to have Caused and International Laws that Deal with those Harms

Given the above laws that define certain harms that match those harms caused by economic doctrines, the answer to whether economics fits the areas of existing international crimes for testing is yes. There is an easily identifiable list of harms that are directly linked to economic doctrines.

Forced resettlement, urbanization, destruction of heritage sites, foreign investment in new forms of production, environmental transformation, national schooling policy that assimilates and replaces cultural difference, promotion of foreign trade in communities that could otherwise be sustainable, advertising of products that knowingly change established consumption patterns, openness to foreign investment that will change established labor and family patterns, and urbanization choices that are promoted by international development banks, international NGOs, and foreign donors routinely destroy cultures and result in disproportionate harms and deaths to minority cultures in violation of those international laws that have been established to protect the long-term survival of humanity.

The chart below lists these general types of harms that have been attributed to economic doctrines (left-hand column) and then asks whether those harms are covered by the international laws against humanity (central column) and genocide (right hand column). At least one of the two laws seems to cover all of these harms and some of the harms can be covered by both. This quick analysis does not examine the elements of the commission of the crime or even which type of crime (such as incitement of the crime, actual commission of the direct act, and/or participation in a conspiracy to commit the crime). It does not link specific doctrines with the listed harms. This chart simply leads to the next step; taking the identified doctrines of economics and testing to see whether those that can be linked to these specific harms in ways that meet the specific elements that are determined to be criminal acts. That is the subject of Steps 3 and 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Harm</th>
<th>International Laws that Cover the Listed Harm</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undermining of regulation to crash economic systems</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion or reinforcement of inequalities</td>
<td>Possibly if the resultant inequalities make a group worse off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation into a national culture or global economy</td>
<td>No (unless it comes with specific harms – see below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of cultural diversity through urbanization, forced resettlement, vulnerability of land and livelihoods</td>
<td>Yes if the resultant vulnerability makes a group worse off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undermining of family and social institutions</td>
<td>Yes if there is resultant poverty to an identifiable group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Specific Harms to be Tested and Coverage Under International Law
Step 3: The Judgment Process: Identifying the Elements of the Crimes:

The legal determination for prosecutors and courts is whether economic doctrines, themselves, promoted by the discipline of economics, meet the specific elements of the crimes (causality and intent) in ways that are sufficient to determine guilt. Step 2, above, confirms that economic doctrines can be linked to specific areas of harm that are criminalized by the international laws sanctioning genocide and crimes against humanity. In linking economic doctrines to those harms, however, the additional step to establish guilt is to demonstrate that a specific act meets the additional elements of crime beyond the harms; that of intent. The crimes in international law for genocide and against humanity are not “strict liability” crimes that would punish perpetrators simply by showing that their acts are causally linked to the harms (that “but for” the acts of the discipline of economics, the harms would not have occurred). They also require proof of “intent,” the mental state to have generated the specific acts that led to the harms. The laws, themselves, are not that clear on how “intent” is to be determined and proven, or whether any defenses can negate that intent, but there are procedures establishing intent in similar crimes. There is also a bit of a distinction necessary here as to whether the discipline of economics and its actors could be held directly responsible for specific acts alone (promoting a harmful doctrine), or whether guilt arises as part of a conspiracy, or both, though this distinction is really more relevant to punishments and to overall solutions (whether other parties also need to be held guilty and reformed at the same time) rather than to specific guilt.

Here, I discuss these different theories and how an international lawyer would instruct a judge to apply them to economics, as a basis for considering liability of the economics profession in Step 4. I examine here the tests that courts use for establishing causality and intent under the specific types of speech crimes for which economics could be prosecuted (either directly or conspiratorially) that are part of the causal chain of speech leading to harm (fraud, incitement) as well as the defenses to these acts and then discuss how I would apply these theories as an international lawyer/prosecutor and/or judge.

Causality: The “But For” Test

Are the doctrines of economics that are plausibly linked to the harms of genocide and crimes against humanity, in fact responsible in any way for those harms, including the speed and intensity with which they occurred? Or would they occur in exactly the same way without the existence of the discipline of economics? In the Soviet Union, one could argue that the teachings of Western economics were essentially eliminated and replaced by subjects like “Scientific Communism” and “Marxist-Leninist Doctrine.” Yet, the same kinds of harms that occurred in the areas of Western imperial influence occurred under the Soviet regime. Minorities lost their lands and languages in the name of “development.” Eco-systems were destroyed, regions were polluted, minority regions were destroyed, and communities lost their sustainable economic bases. Can economic doctrines really be held liable or are other institutions, actors, and processes entirely at work? Can economics escape liability for the actions of political and economic institutions that have destroyed cultures, eco-systems and communities by using the “ADDI” defense; pointing the finger and saying “Another Dude Did It, not me”?

It is easy to point to individuals with economics degrees in international and domestic governmental institutions and in businesses, and often in leading positions, who have direct responsibility for the harms attributed to economic doctrines. Almost certainly they would not be in these positions without their educational certification as economists (particularly those in international banks and in government policy positions). Almost certainly, the credibility given to their advice to foreign governments and domestically is based on their economics degrees and ability to claim support from the economics profession. Moreover, they implicitly measure their success by their ability to shift resources to the policies they support. While it is difficulty to directly calculate the specific amount by which their economics credentials are responsible for their authority and their specific percentage role in harms, there is sufficient evidence of this link and economists themselves acknowledge it, though they deny that the results of the actions are “harms”. Economists with political and economic power not only take responsibility for the discipline’s doctrines; they boat of the impacts they have had on global policies.
Probably the quickest way to recognize the direct responsibility of economics for the results of their doctrines is to ask what the difference would be in recent global history if economists had been held to the standards of oversight described in the Introduction to this article, in terms of university codes of ethics and professional responsibility and licensing. The law establishes that educators and disciplines have an affirmative “duty” to protect the public and the integrity of their profession. What would have happened had they actually exercised this duty and recognized the results of their profession as “harms” to be avoided under law and ethics codes, to which they would be held accountable?

If the economics associations were to publicly sanction members who caused harmful results and were to teach students to ostracize those individual economists and to change their institutions they led in order to uphold legal principles and public concerns, it is certain that those organizations would have been hindered in their impact. The discipline of economics’ own doctrines prevent economists from saying that they oppose their own doctrines and the results of them. Any kind of legal review or ethical enforcement would, as one of the non-arguable (and trivial) tenets of economic doctrine notes, “increases costs” of action and, therefore “reduces the supply” of that action where the action is freely chosen (in the language of economists, “demand for such action is variable rather than fixed”).

Consider, for example, the impact on policy if economics as a profession exercised the kind of legal and ethical responsibility that current regulations of universities require, as described above using the example of Stanford’s Fundamental Standard for its faculty members and the chartering laws of universities as non-profits that require them to meet their public purpose. Many economists who work for national and international public organizations move back and forth between public position and the university, including Larry Summers, the former President of Harvard and U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, and Joseph Stiglitz, the Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank. Others like N. Gregory Mankiw, Chair of George W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors from 2003-5, publish textbooks. If universities held them fully accountable for their activities in public life and their doctrines and found those doctrines to promote violations of international laws, they would be unable to resume their university teaching or administration. Their texts would not meet review standards and would not be published or used in the classroom. They would be free to speak at universities in accordance with free speech laws, but not to receive honorary degrees or honorarium payments. Like the “disbarment” of a lawyer, stripping an individual of a professional license, they would be stripped of the ability to earn a living in the field. Certainly, economists would recognize that this form of negative economic incentive would regulate their behavior in ways that would assure compliance with legal and moral standards. Indeed, it is the very lack of enforcement today that turns a blind eye to any financial conflicts of interest within the profession that could contribute to the harms examined in this article.

Although it is used relatively weakly, the American Bar Association and various other professional lawyers’ groups act to rate U.S. Supreme Court nominees on their suitability for the court as well as comment on government legal decisions. Economic associations that upheld legal and moral responsibilities could be expected to do the same.

Unless economists would argue that there is a fixed preference for genocide and crimes against humanity by the businesses and governments of the societies in which they work, that are not subject to any public legal or moral pressures, or any reasoning of long-term self-interest, (which some say they do now argue in claiming that “globalization is inevitable” and that “there are no alternatives” and therefore that they have no moral responsibility in furthering its harms) there is no way they can claim they are free of responsibility. In short, the economics profession’s own doctrines are an admission of responsibility for the results and harms of the doctrines they promote.

Even if economists were to claim that they were only minor actors and that they were simply responding to economic and political incentives set by other individuals, institutions or cultural dispositions, they would have a difficult burden of identifying those others and of transferring responsibility given their own visibility and the expectation of a higher standard of responsibility of those with Ph.D.’s and in teaching positions. Moreover, international legal principles established by the Nuremberg Trials after World War II would prevent them from acknowledging individual responsibility given that there is no indication of coercion on economists or on the profession. The choice of profession
and doctrine is one that economists themselves also define by their own doctrines as “free choices,” given that the discipline discounts study of underlying power and social forces and claims that individuals have “sovereignty.” Again, in terms of potential legal liability, economists here are hoisted by their own petard.

Assuming they were to be subject to prosecution and sanctions, economists might be able to lessen potential penalties placed on them and the profession if they could identify those other actors or if they could show that the destruction of cultures that they promoted “in part” (according to the genocide law) was a lesser part than the harm caused by others, even though harms “in part” also destroy cultural integrity and sustainability and are criminalized. Yet this would not free them of guilt.

Claiming that the (Russian) Soviet Empire caused almost all of the same harms for which economists today might be held accountable, even without the economics profession and its doctrines would also not serve as an effective defense. Indeed, if the same harms are the result of similar doctrines in other countries, a universal application of law should also require holding disciplines in other countries responsible. The goal of this article in raising issues about economic doctrines is not to create an attack on a profession in one country or system (“market” economies of Europe and the U.S.). In the Soviet Union, and certainly in China, the ideologies of production and industrialization with no regard to ecosystems, cultural diversity, or community and group rights, were just as essential to teachings (often promoted by governments in conjunction today with foreign economists working for the World Bank, regional development Banks and international businesses that work in these countries). Similar doctrines may not have been taught in “economics” departments, but they were (and may still be) taught in other disciplines. One can easily take the list of doctrines identified for testing in this article and find analogues to them in disciplines that were taught in the Soviet Union (Lempert, 1995). Equity was taught as a basic value and there was more equitable distribution, but productivity “growth” (according to “plan” and “targets”) was and is promoted in ways that undermine cultural and community protections. Although the discipline of economics and others have been politicized and have sought to deny the similarities between empires in their basic doctrines as a way to highlight differences with “enemies,” there are direct similarities in doctrines. The fact that the same doctrines may exist elsewhere is not a defense. “Two wrongs do not make a right.” This underlies the principle of international law; to apply principles equally everywhere to protect long-term human interests and to look for ways to reform acts and doctrines everywhere that threaten humanity.

Conspiracy and Direct Violations

Where a concert of actions would be necessary to create harm and the appeal of a doctrine, itself, is not enough to find individual liability, a court could find conspiracy to commit genocide or conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity, alone. Although academic doctrines are not direct physical acts like forced resettlements of peoples or the theft of resources that undermine cultures and communities, doctrines operate in concert with actors who perform these acts and they work, independently, to deceive groups about the real impacts of policies and this creates the basis for legal liability under laws of conspiracies that are central themes of the international laws against genocide and crimes against humanity. Since economists earn their living from teaching doctrines and advising rather than through any other form of direct production, the compensation that they receive from those who benefit from their doctrines and use them to cause any harm (the corporations that fund universities and political campaigns, the bank loan payments that fund international banks, and the public moneys of countries that benefit from their position in the global economy and in military and trade hierarchies) is itself an act of enrichment as a result of such harm to others. This is what makes it possible to consider economic doctrines as illegal acts in themselves (largely for the crime of fraud, that directly undermines cultures and communities) and as part of a conspiracy with other actors (governments and their militaries, international business, and domestic elites and majority cultures).

Since economics as a profession consists of promoting doctrines, the criminalization of doctrine requires that these doctrines, in themselves, be viewed as harmful acts. In law, the “speech-action doctrine” is used to distinguish ordinary free speech from speech that is action. The easiest one to apply
here to economics is the crime of “fraud”, but the crime of “incitement” may also apply, though there is a fine line between “incitement” and “conspiracy,” itself, in the case of doctrine.

The legal definition of “fraud” is clear and consists of specific elements. By law, it is an act, with knowledge of the falsity of a statement or the harm that will occur to another, made with intent to cause harm, where another party relies on the statements to their detriment, and where harm occurs. Where a doctrine is a direct appeal to cultures that destabilizes them, a court could find direct guilt of genocide on the basis of this act. The teaching itself changes the peoples of the culture directly through a form of cultural imperialism without the need for additional actions by others.

“Incitement” is a bit fuzzier in its legal doctrine and merges into conspiracy when applied to a profession. Under English common law, incitement was defined as: persuading, encouraging, instigating, pressuring or threatening others in ways that created harms. Now, however, the United Kingdom has codified the law such that the standard of incitement is now “encouraging or assisting crime.” England also had a law for “conspiracy to corrupt public morals” or to “outrage public decency” that can be an incitement crime/speech act. Academic doctrines seem to fit with this legal definition.

With “conspiracy” usually defined as an agreement between two or more persons to break the law with at least one overt act in furtherance of the agreement or completing an incomplete act, the only way to distinguish incitement is to suggest that there was an actual spoken agreement by economists who promoted a doctrine, with governments, international banks and businesses. In the law of conspiracy, however, the proof is made easier because those agreements can be inferred. In the case of economic doctrines that are targeted at multiple activities throughout the world (“global development” and the “international economy” and “globalization”) these agreements could be seen as already implicit in the daily functioning of the economics profession through the linkages of its practitioners and scholars.

Genocide law has criminalized the Nazis on the basis of a “common plan.” In demonstrating the existence of a “common plan”, it is not necessary for the conspirators to be involved in all stages of the planning or to be aware of all of the details to be held guilty of conspiracy. Moreover, a conspiracy may also exist where legal means are used to accomplish illegal results. An agreement between economists and policy makers or between economists and businesses or development organizations could, therefore, be considered to exist given the relationships of the professions in jobs and funding as well as mutual recognition.

For several years, the United States has prosecuted conspiracy under a statute known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act (18 U.S.C. 1961). This act loosely and widely defines conspiracies as activities that collectively support an “enterprise” or organization and that include criminal acts by one or more members resulting in economic benefits for members of the group. Though the statute was originally intended for use in prosecuting organized crime groups, the economics profession could certainly fit its intent in ways that facilitate prosecution for conspiracy on the basis of common doctrine, common financial gain, and specific actions by high status members of the group promoted to positions in government or economic institutions with the direct or implied consent of the members of the profession. This existing theory is also easy to fit with the context of both the international laws of genocide and crimes against humanity.

For the purposes of this article, the legal determinations that I test and make here, below, in Step 4, distinguish between the direct acts (that directly promote genocide or crimes against humanity through specific policies that directly undermine a culture with the knowledge of the economics profession that this will be the result) and conspiracy, but without reviewing the crime of “incitement” that is a gray area in between. I test the liability of economics using the standard for conspiracy where an economics doctrine in itself does not advocate for a specific policy that results in genocide but where it could be seen to influence others in a way that would result in such acts, with those acts as immediately foreseeable consequences of promoting the doctrine. For example, advocating for sales of resources that are essential to the survival of a culture in a specific environmental context is a direct act. Advocating for increased sales in general is not a genocidal act but when the person receiving the message will foreseeably commit an act, it could then be considered to be part of a conspiracy. There is a difference between bringing a
gun to the furtherance of an assassination plot (in which case the conspirators are guilty of the act) and selling a gun to a mental patient who says he wants to kill someone. The intent is different and the amount of culpability is different. The distinction between direct crime and conspiracy, thus also partly depends on an analysis of intent.

Intent

Genocide is an “intent” crime. The international statute requires the act to be “deliberately” perpetrated. Deliberation requires thought rather than an automatic, primal, instinctive reaction. Similarly, proof of crimes against humanity requires that the acts be “systematic,” not “sporadic,” which also implies deliberation. The harms that are caused cannot simply be random, accidental or unintended. To be held guilty, economists pushing the doctrines that were harmful need to have known that the doctrines were harmful or need to have acted with disregard for the harms in order to be held accountable. In fact, by analogy to several criminal laws, it is easy to prove the intent of economists that would link the promotion of doctrines to specific harms.

Indeed, under international law, there may not even be a need to “prove” the intent of economic doctrines to demonstrate intent to cause harms that result from them since the intent is often evident in the very wording of the doctrines. Here are some examples of intent to eliminate culture, which is a harm recognized under international law as a violation.

- The idea that cultures should become part of the global economy and industrialize, for example, is already a clear doctrinal intent in economics to eliminate cultural differences.
- Promotion of a cash crop for export by a group that has previously been sustainable within its resource based is a direct intent to make the culture dependent on trade and part of the global economy in ways that destroy that culture forever.
- Making nomads sedentary is a destruction of their culture. Industrializing rural peoples is destruction of their culture.
- Calling on nations to act in terms of “gross” or “aggregate” benefit even if it means harms to specific groups is also intentional.

It is hard to claim that the intent is otherwise than this. Economists are clear. They may even actually believe that other people are better off giving up their culture in the same way that colonial missionaries may have believed that destroying culture was part of a “civilizing” mission and that enslaving peoples was part of the “white man’s burden.” They may believe that “domesticating” peoples whom they view as “primitive” or “undeveloped” is noble because it potentially offers higher “living standards” according to the measures that economists use. Whatever the belief, belief does not negate the intent. The intent is to change cultures in ways that “destroy” “in part” or in whole, those cultures. The reasons why beliefs, no matter how sincere, do not negate intent, are discussed below in a section on possible defenses.

The question of intent in a legal prosecution for specific harms is not whether economists have thought through the implication of their doctrines for cultures and for communities. An educated person able to write an economics exam or paper to earn a college degree or doctorate can be judged to have the reasoning ability, state of mind, and intelligence to know whether an assumption is questionable or false. An educated person has the affirmative duty to be aware of critiques and falsity of doctrines that they teach or promote as policy. Under the law, they are expected to be aware of the existence of international treaties that are readily available and that contradict economic doctrines, and basic knowledge of other disciplines that contradict economic doctrines, as well as internal contradictions within economics itself.

The only real question that is relevant on beliefs and intent relates to punishment. How much personal gain is connected to how much known harm? If economic doctrines are criminally accountable as fraud, perpetrated on domestic publics, on foreign governments, and on foreign peoples in a direct attempt to take resources, sell people products they do not need, and disrupt their systems for economic and political advantage, the amount of criminal culpability is usually proportionate to the size of the gain and the amount of harm done to achieve that gain.
Part of the determination here in looking at the amount of harm that is done to native peoples or communities rests on the standards used in tort law where harm is measured in terms of whether it is “reasonably foreseeable” by the person committing the act that causes the harm.

In looking for analogies here, specifically for “genocide,” laws on “homicide” can serve as a guide since the crime of genocide, the destruction of a genetic or ethnic group, was invented as an analog to homicide, the destruction of a person. In criminalizing different levels of homicide, courts seek to distinguish different mental states of intent. “Homicide,” the killing of another human being that may be justified, accidental (two defenses that can be considered for genocide, below), or illegal, is criminalized in two different categories based on intent: manslaughter and murder. Manslaughter and murder are distinguished by the existence of “malice or intent,” with murder sometimes classified as of the “first degree” or “second degree” by the degree of intent. The key here as analogized to genocide and crimes against humanity would appear to be the amount of “malice aforethought,” as to how deliberate and “premeditated” or calculated an act was. Note, however, that this standard is, itself, self-referential. Finding one implies the other. The distinction really seems to be whether behavior that is reckless can be considered to be deliberate and courts currently hold that recklessness itself implies “malice” in cases of homicide. In other words, rather than suggest that there are two different levels of intent, the suggestion is that there are two ways or more of determining intent. One is a conscious decision to “inflict grievous bodily harm” or to commit a dangerous felony or use of a deadly weapon to intentionally harm. A second is to show reckless indifference to an intentionally high risk to human life.

The implication for doctrines of economists and genocide or crimes against humanity is that not only a calculated, pre-mediated exploitation of peoples but also the reckless disregard for the impact of economic doctrines on others (the unwillingness to take responsibility to investigate the impacts of doctrines or to challenge or replace doctrines), combined with self-interest, could itself be determined to constitute “malice” and to ratchet up the severity of punishment and reform that is necessary.

Defenses: Negating the Element of “Intent”

The only real defenses that economics could offer in a court if their doctrines are directly linked with harms, is to suggest that the promotion of these doctrines is either justified or accidental. In courts that are untainted by economic ideologies and in which legal standards can be objectively enforced, it is difficult to imagine that such defenses would have any merit.

Probably the only occasion in which genocide might be considered justifiable is the necessity of wartime where saving certain cultures might result in harm to cultures in border areas or who are in areas where the extraction of certain resources is essential. Such defense might be applied by defenders against aggression who felt threatened. In the case of Cambodia, the fear of Vietnamese in Phnom Penh has apparently not been allowed as a defense by the Khmer seeking to protect Khmer culture, but that does not mean that such a defense could not be applied elsewhere. Yet, this is not the case for economists, today, whose doctrines are those of the most powerful countries whose goal is economic benefit, not protection of a culture at risk. Perhaps during the “Cold War” it might have been possible to make such an argument, but the fact that both sides would have been making the same argument (with the Soviet ideology almost parallel to those of U.S. and Western European economists, as described above) would render it absurd. It would more likely appear that groups on both sides were using the threat of war as an excuse to justify genocide, when there were more economically productive alternatives on both sides to war. Assuming it were legal and also not just an attempt to raise fear in order to promote interventions in countries with oil and other resources, the “War” on “Terror” could also be potentially used as a justification for globalization that has resulted in interference today in almost every country on the globe. Yet, to make this argument, the courts would need to be convinced that the “War on Terror” is a “necessity” for defending the planet. In fact, since even economists like Joseph Stiglitz have begun to recognize the economic absurdity of the “War on Terror,” there is little likelihood that an independent global court would be convinced that it was a “necessity” to protect the survival of white Europeans and the U.S. or all humanity. More likely, this claim itself and the actions taken in support of it have raised
the level of anger, violence and instability and postponement of sustainable development and protection alternatives in ways that make humanity more vulnerable (Lempert and Nguyen, 2011).

Some economists might also try to make a similar argument about actions after the Cold War in the countries of the former Soviet Union where they offered economic advice of “privatization” (often referred to by the victimized populations as “piratization”) and dismantling of government welfare and regulatory functions that they euphemized as “structural readjustment.” No matter what they may have actually believed they were doing, the results have been reported as the looting and brain-draining of these economies and the placement of economic ownership into the hands of foreigners and oligarchies. The underlying goal actually appeared to be to weaken the former “enemy” countries and to impose control over their economies. A possible defense here is that these activities were militarily justifiable. In response to arguments that the Marshall Plan after World War II worked to rebuild Germany as an economic and democratic power, economists would claim that elites in the former Soviet Union retained power and nuclear weapons and this form of weakening was justifiable. If economists were on trial simply for application of their doctrines in enemy countries, part of the argument might be plausible. Nevertheless, a rational prosecutor and judge would recognize that reducing threats of rivals could better be achieved by trying to really transform them as was promised rather than seeking to loot and control them under a pretext of helping. Economists have not offered this defense in an attempt to distinguish this as a special case. Their doctrines have been applied uniformly to all (Lempert, 1996b).

Were I to be acting as the defense lawyer, or were defense lawyers aware of my previous writings, there is another creative and unusual argument that could be offered as a similar “self-preservation” defense for at least one ethnic group of economists, though there would be risks to making the argument (Lempert, 1998). This article began asking how Joseph Stiglitz, a Jewish economist, could be in denial of international law regarding protection of minorities, given that the law itself was inspired by a Jewish lawyer to protect all groups from the kinds of victimization that remain fresh in the minds of Jews. Indeed, the ranks of famous economists include many Jews, as do the ranks of international rights lawyers. The explanation of their denial is that self-defense of Jews within European empires in which the discipline of economics is prominent have required Jews to support the harmful acts against others as a means of self-protection. Jewish economists, if able and willing to express their underlying fears and motivations, could rationally argue that their denial of law is a result of their own fear and desire to protect Jews; that they have made an alliance with power and have agreed to support what the know are harmful, irrational, unscientific and illegal doctrines in order to gain influence to achieve larger benefits. They could argue that they have made a “Devil’s Bargain” for justifiable reasons. While I do believe that many Jews who have risen in economics and in other academic professions where legitimacy is compromised (such as the study of the Soviet Union where ideological explanations of “capitalism versus communism” were offered in place of serious scientific comparison, for psychological motives), I believe these motives are at such a deep subconscious level, given the amount of fear behind them, that they would not be rationally articulated and weighed. It is more likely that the minority international lawyers who uphold the law ad who rationally reflect on these fears in their own career choices, have chosen to uphold the law rather than to try to justify its violation. So, while this defense would not absolve ethnic minority economists, and while the very fear that underlies this defense would probably prevent it from even being made, it does at least help to offer a psychological explanation of what seems paradoxical about the violations for ethnic minority economists. It also helps to show why the solution for transforming economics will not only need to deal with ideological and religious beliefs but also with deep seated fears of ethnic minorities who are economists.

Certainly, beyond “self-defense,” economists would argue in their defense that in most cases “living standards” have increased in destroyed cultures and that the populations survive, or that even if those populations are smaller, the overall aggregate benefit justifies the sacrifices. Life expectancy and consumption would be shown to have increased. Domestication and contemporary forms of enslavement would be described as beneficial for “primitive” peoples living in “poverty”. This defense would fail for the same reason that the defense to battery crimes – that claim that the victim “wanted” to bit hit or that the beating was in the “best interests” of the victim, or that the majority benefits – also fails. Belief by a
perpetrator that he/she is fulfilling the will of “God” or even of the majority also does not mitigate the intent to cause the harm or change that is criminalized. It is the action and the intent to perform that action that is criminalized, not the belief about the intent. Germany may have been cleaner and more prosperous after committing genocide but that is not a valid defense for it. It is not the prerogative of the perpetrator or the perpetrator in collaboration with certain representatives of a victimized group that has the authority to judge itself for acts that are defined as criminal. The belief that the cultural changes or dislocations that economics doctrines have promoted are in the “best interests” of the cultures being changed or that those cultures desire those changes (without direct cultural measures that the cultures are independently evolving to the new beliefs, freely choosing them, and are not under any pressures or being misled to do so) or that the economists are simply acting in accordance with established directives or agreements of major international organizations like the U.N. system or multi-lateral banks, also fails as a defense.

The only form of belief that may constitute a defense in criminal law is the incapacity of the defendant; the inability to form a normal mental state (i.e., insanity). Nevertheless, even if economic doctrines are “insane” and represent a kind of mental “incapacity” such as the inability to form reasoned judgment based on reality, the irrational belief in certain ideas contrary to normal perception, or other delusional behavior, that would not appear to be a defense here. Even if they completely disparage the rights of others and the value of the choices of others, economists still have the ability to understand ideas of rights, right and wrong, and symmetry. As mathematicians studying market behavior, the idea of symmetry and negotiation over value is fundamental to economics. The fact that economists apply the principle selectively to benefit their own interests over others does not indicate that they are insane but suggests the opposite; a calculating self-interest. Even if economists would claim that they are entirely amoral beings who exist without any emotional attachment or understanding of humans or nature as a result of (or as the attraction to) their discipline, and that the discipline has created mechanisms to specifically choose people for it who are unable to have any empathy with others and/or who delight in use of power, manipulation and harm to others (some of the basis of psychopathic behaviors) this form of pathological belief and incapacity would not be sufficient as a defense. Economists would be seen by courts as choosing a selective application of these beliefs in their own interests which is the standard of criminal behavior. Rather than speak to criminal liability, this defense might instead speak to the types of necessary remedies. If economists think only in financial, cost-benefit terms for people like themselves, with no attachment to the environment, to future humans, or to the planet, this is certainly a pathological behavior and would likely be classified as a type of mental illness if the classification were made not on the basis of ability to function in society but in terms of mental state. This kind of picture of economists would suggest that economists would be unable to reform the discipline themselves or to teach a reformed discipline and would need to be given other work; perhaps as mathematicians or engineers, in ways that would be useful for society without resulting in harms.

The argument that the choice of economic doctrines is somehow “accidental” and not a deliberate attempt to promote certain interests over others would also be viewed in the courts as without merit. Here, the “reasonable person” standard that courts use in judging behaviors and intent, would be applied to economists in a way that held them to the standard of behaviors expected for the “reasonable professor with a higher education degree”. Under that standard, economists would not be able to argue that the fundamental doctrines of the subject in which they had spent a lifetime training and as experts were the products of an “accident.” What economists might claim is that their doctrines were largely intended for use in certain, specific contexts with which they are familiar; with technological societies like the United States and its already developed trading partners. Although academics currently might claim effectively that they and the society in which they live trains and requires them to be insular and unaware of the events of their government’s activities overseas, with little foreign language skill or awareness of their own communities or neighbors, and with little knowledge of anything real and outside of presentations on electronic media, and could seek to claim that this ignorance is part of their upbringing (Lempert, et. al, 1995), that should not be an excuse because they would be considered to have a “duty” under the law to study the implications of their teachings. Claiming that they are ignorant of non-technological societies...
and lacked the intent to cause harm is a claim of “ignorance” that is not something a Ph.D. academic can claim. Ignorance of an academic would not be a defense. Even if one might accept this profession of ignorance on its face, given the reality of modern society and of even its leading academics to accept this defense if not to reinforce it through their teachings, methods, and university policies, one would also have to accept that economists have absolutely no knowledge of history, no knowledge of even place names around them, and no understanding of their own family histories or even of the genetic and class differences directly visible around them. All societies in which economics is taught have a known history of minority interactions and destruction of cultures. Many of them have place names that bear the names of exterminated or assimilated peoples. It would be impossible to claim that economists do not know the potential effects of their doctrines on minority cultures and on communities given the historical evidence directly around them even if what may describe as the “dumbing down” of societies in order to create this ignorance has become the reality.

Even if economists were raised as children to be ignorant and were selected at universities for their ignorance and/or certain perceptual disabilities that prevented them from forming any clear judgments of much of the historical or social reality around them including hypnotic or other susceptibility to suggestions or delusions, the mathematical logic by which they are selected and advanced would still enable them to perform the simple logical tasks required to test the consistency, veracity and consequences of doctrines they were told to repeat. The lack of effort to use this logical capacity to determine the truthfulness of economic doctrines is itself a form of “gross negligence” and absence of a “duty of due care,” for which the defense would be negated and they would be held legally liable.

A colleague and I have published some tests of this defense. We have logically applied some of the most fundamental economic doctrines and have published them in academic literature where they are easily available on-line. Simple applications of economic doctrines generates results that prove the underlying model on which economists base their work to be essentially suicidal for even the societies in which economists work (Lempert and Nguyen, 2011). My colleague, Hue Nguyen, researching whether modern industrial societies can move towards sustainability based on the current ways in which material incentives are used to reward workers for their behavior, shows that all industrial societies are fundamentally unsustainable and can only exist by exploiting other cultures. Technological growth is unable to fuel enough consumables to support sufficient reinvestments for continued growth in technology and productivity. The economics profession appears to know and disregard this fundamental truth that even the profession’s own existence may be dependent on violation of international law (Nguyen, 2008)

One well-known economist, Herman Daly, charges that the doctrine of unlimited “growth” is actually designed by economists to divert attention to calls for redistribution and concern for other ethnic or kinship (family) groups and that it serves to substitute a regressive “trickle-down” form of aid to others for actual sharing or concern (Daly, 2011). In his view, it is designed to cover up harm and to rationalize irresponsibility without any logical thought to whether or how much growth is really possible or of benefit. In short, that does not make predatory behavior a defense. It is the predator that would have the responsibility to change or be caged.
Applying the Law in Two Steps

Step 4: Evaluating the Possible Verdicts:

Given a set of doctrines to test, the specific laws by which the doctrines could be held liable, and the elements of the crime, it is a relatively simple process to evaluate potential verdicts against the economics profession under international laws. These tables suggest several likely guilty verdicts and a number of potential verdicts. I summarize this process in the four tables below; each table examining one of the four sub-areas of economics and the various doctrines in each sub-area (the 15 doctrines identified for testing). In Step 5, I present a summary of these results and discuss their implications.

There are four columns in each table.

- The first column, on the left simply states the economic doctrine being tested against the law, sometimes with a short explanation or interpretation;

- The second column denotes which of the two international criminal laws is being applied to test the legality of the doctrine. Note that some of the doctrines can be tested for violations of both laws. In such cases, there are two rows of analysis for each doctrine; one for each of the two laws.

- The third column asks and answers the question, “Does the Doctrine Reflect Self-Interest (Motive) and is it in Violation of an Empirically Tested Observation/Fact?” This column helps to explain the selection of the doctrine for testing. It offers information to confirm that the economic doctrine being challenged for a violation of law indeed meets the test for a “doctrine” or a form of actionable-speech, as distinguished from an empirical observation or scientific theory that would be fully protected free speech of a discipline. It offers evidence that this particular doctrinal statement is contradicted by proof in other disciplines or is internally contradictory within the discipline of economics, itself, and that it is really ideological dogma. It offers an explanation for why economists know or should know that this doctrine is false or should be subject to testing and challenge rather than accepted on (religious) faith. This column seeks to assure that the doctrines being tested for legal sanctions are value judgments promoting others to act in ways that create harm to others (while bringing self-interested benefits to those promoting them). A suggestion is also offered for why promotion of this belief may be in the financial self-interest of economists and of economics as a profession. This evidence together establishes the “intent” if a crime has been committed. It shows that there is a self-interested reason for promoting a false belief that economists know or should know to be untrue or untested.

- The final column is labeled, “Potential Verdict Against Economists on the Basis of Promotion of this Doctrine (if Law were Enforced): Meeting the Elements of a Causal Act, Harm and Motive.” This column tests whether the doctrine can indeed be linked with the type of harm that the law requires for prosecution; either genocide or crimes against humanity. It briefly explains how the doctrine causes the harm – whether it is by defrauding a group to accept harm in the belief that they are being helped or whether a group is being encouraged to commit harm against others, or other act. It differentiates the direct acts that cause harm from indirect acts that can be seen as part of a conspiracy to commit the harm. It links the doctrine, motive, elements, and the specific crime and then offers a judgment on a likely verdict. Some of the verdicts are clear. Others depend on the actual type of harm and context in which the harm occurs from a specific doctrine since a doctrine can potentially be used in various ways by different actors in different contexts.
Is Economics in Violation of International Law?: Part I

Test of the Legality of Specific Economic Doctrines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Doctrine</th>
<th>Law That Applies (Whether there is a Judicable Violation)</th>
<th>Does the Doctrine Reflect Self-Interest (Motive) and is it in Violation of an Empirically Tested Observation/ Fact? (i.e., Is there “intent” that could constitute a potential legal cause of action?)</th>
<th>Potential Verdict Against Economists on the Basis of Promotion of this Doctrine (if Law were Enforced): Meeting the Elements of a Causal Act, Harm and Motive</th>
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<tr>
<td>Micro-Economics:</td>
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<tr>
<td>1. All societies and</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</td>
<td>Yes. Human populations tend toward stability and formation of norms and regularity to adapt to their environments. Destabilizing this is part of a goal to promote sales of technology and of products to exploit and profit by destabilizing others.</td>
<td>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of society by fraudulently changing adaptive production and consumption patterns (knowledge of the falsity of the measure, reliance by weaker country/culture on the advice of the economist, with detriment to the weaker country/culture) in ways that cause cultural destruction with malice implied by blatant disregard for protected rights.</td>
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<td>individuals wish higher</td>
<td>Rome Statute, Crimes Against Humanity</td>
<td>Similar to above.</td>
<td>Possible future conviction for crimes against humanity as the harms of over-consumption become increasingly evident in climate change, overpopulation and the resulting famines, civil strife and wars that are easily predictable using existing social science and that economists choose to disregard for benefit of a few and for personal self-interest.</td>
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<tr>
<td>consumption (“homo economicus”). Zero growth and such balance with nature are not even options. This is sometimes called the “Scarcity assumption”</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
2. Preferences exist as free and individual choice, even if corporate power and cultural or cultural hegemony shape them, with the basic unit of analysis of the discipline (the actors exercising these choices) being a sovereign individual consumer and producer.

<p>| Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP | Hard to say. There is still a debate as to the extent of free choice versus cultural and biological determinism as well as the influences of unequal power on choice. The failure seems to be in not adding in those extra dimensions, not in the choice of starting with one or another. This may just be an assumption for a starting point for unit of analysis that needs to be placed within clear cultural context and looked under clear conditions to offer useful information. IF this doctrine is used in international development in combination with other beliefs (“mobility of capital and labor”) to promote sale of community assets in ways that disrupt the balance of societies, then it is a self-interested doctrine that could promote a legal cause of action (see the analysis below of doctrines of International Trade) | Possibly guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide IF the proselytization of this belief is done in a way that hides inequalities and exploitation and furthers them in ways that promote the self-interest of economists, particularly if it is used to justify inaction and promotion of international trade and development schemes that change preferences within cultures or make assets and resources vulnerable in ways that undermine the culture. It is when this belief is restated as part of International Development and International Trade doctrines that it then becomes actionable. (See below.) |</p>
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<tr>
<td><strong>3.</strong> Goods and resources are fungible/substitutable and can be replaced once they are exhausted, by “the market” (demand and supply).</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes, certain objects are sacred and certain institutions are irreplaceable if cultures are to be sustainable and to have the opportunity to adapt in ways that do not destroy their integrity. This belief works to accelerate changes without responsibility for the consequences on human systems and the violent dislocations that are caused by abrupt losses due to over-use of resources as a result of deliberate lack of planning and under-valuation of cost of transition by vulnerable cultures. The conflict of interest is that economists work for the powerful countries and interests that benefit from the rapid exploitation of these resources.</td>
<td><strong>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy</strong> (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of minority cultures with intent to destroy those minority cultures in whole or in part by promoting pressures that undervalue their resources and preferences and make them vulnerable to disappearance. Malice can be implied from disregard of the known and inherent dangers of the inequities and destruction that the doctrines reinforce. Assuming that all goods and people are fungible also suggests that all cultures are fungible, that all changes are acceptable and that accelerated destruction of human diversity even in violation of international legal requirements for protection is something acceptable because all substitutions will be of equivalent value.</td>
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<td><strong>4.</strong> All objects and values can be reduced to a single economic denominator as measures of value and exchange.</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Yes, economists know that preferences are contingent and inter-related (Arrow’s paradox). This is because a functioning culture requires an interactive set of activities acting in balance and balances cannot be forced specified on the same single dimension. Dominant social groups in specific roles that rig a system in favor of measures in their interests, undermine that system. Economists join that self-interested rigging by promoting this principle.</td>
<td><strong>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy</strong> (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of minority cultures with intent to destroy those minority cultures in whole or in part and with malice implied from disregard of the inconsistencies of known economic doctrines.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rome Statute, Crimes Against Humanity</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Economic benefits are to be calculated by producers as aggregates independent of cultural values (e.g., profits, productivity) or impacts on cultural values for the purposes of efficiency, to promote the “maximization of income”. Catering to minorities is “inefficient” because of higher costs of reaching “small market niches.” Minority preferences are valid only when it is efficient for markets to cater to their needs. Meeting these unmet preferences is a social and political choice not a market failure that requires replacing the approach.</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP; Other international rights treaties are relevant but they are not actionable</td>
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<tr>
<td>IF economists deliberately exclude the implications of this doctrine and do not teach it as an example of a place where there is a need for government action (such as in the case of regulating monopolies, where most economists at least give lip service to conditions necessary for regulating a free market), then it would be possible to reach a determine of guilt of genocide and conspiracy (public incitement and complicity through silence and distortion when there is a duty of care to act) to commit genocide through undermining of minority cultures and their ability to maintain existing systems of trade or consumption that support those systems. Malice can be implied from violation of duty of care given knowledge of the consequences. If the profession itself could be said to be promoting one ideology, the profession could be found guilty as a whole. Otherwise, guilt might be a judgment here of individual actions given some existing dissent from a unified view.</td>
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<td>Preferences (calculated in standard units of the basic “utility” or “util”) can be expressed in currencies (e.g. U.S. dollars) as part of valuation model, though these units have built-in characteristics of political inequality and social context.</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</td>
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<tr>
<td>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of minority cultures with intent to destroy those minority cultures in whole or in part by promoting pressures that undervalue their resources and preferences and make them vulnerable to disappearance. Malice can be implied from disregard of the known and inherent dangers of the inequities that the doctrines reinforce.</td>
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### Macro-Economics:

| 1. Equity is not a rational choice preference and can be violated in the quest for “efficiency,” leaving inequities for the political process to correct. In “developing” societies, “equity” that promotes the same consumption patterns among individuals and across cultural and ethnic lines can be important as a way to promote productivity. | Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP; Other international rights treaties are relevant but they are not actionable unless they can be linked to the Rome Statute | Yes, not only is the belief culture specific since studies show that some societies prefer equity and community to individual aggrandizement and hierarchy, but the proselytization of this belief by countries, organizations or elites works to create the very inequalities that enable them to accumulate wealth by creating conditions leading to pressures for destruction on minorities not engaged in the wealth and production systems that this doctrine promotes. Moreover, there is a clear and known contradiction in the belief since economic inequality translates into political inequality and short-circuits political action and regulation of competitive markets and of rights protections, including those of minority cultures. | *Guilty of genocide and conspiracy* (public incitement and complicity when there is a duty of care to act) to commit genocide as a result of deliberate exclusion of the implications of this doctrine on distinct minority cultures and the false implication that equity principles should be used to change the consumption and production patterns of all cultures in ways that would create equality through cultural assimilation and destruction. Malice can be implied from disregard of the known and inherent dangers of the inequities and destruction that the doctrines reinforce. The Genocide Convention assumes equity of political power of cultures to protect sovereignty and also assumes that any increase in aggregate wealth will not be an excuse for generating inequities that threaten the survival of minority cultures. |
| Rome Statute, Crimes Against Humanity | Similar to above | Possible guilt of crimes against humanity if harms from financial disruption (such as the 2008 financial crisis that resulted from known promotion of financial regulations to eliminate public safeguards) and other such, promoting the financial class for no justifiable reason other than aggrandizement at the expense of others, can be characterized to include degradation or humiliation of one or more human beings and attacks on human dignity. Economic, social and political rights promoted in the various U.N. declarations are not yet actionable and are really competing policy choices, but in the case of reckless theft that also has consequences for the future of the planet (not only immediate harms of poverty but resultant political instability and war), these could be seen as degradation. It should be easy to prove intent (or reckless disregard for known consequences), motive and knowledge in changing regulatory laws and weakening enforcement that directly led to the financial crisis and enrichment of a small group in ways that destroys families and leaves people homeless. |
2. Externalities (including economic and social justice issues and destruction of cultures), are the role of the political process to correct and economists can ignore them (similar to above but applied to other distributional effects and costs)  

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<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of minority cultures and their environments, weakening their ability to protect themselves and arguing against any responsibility to assure such protections. Same reasoning as above as a corollary:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP; Other international rights treaties (e.g., political, social and economic) are relevant but they are not actionable</td>
<td>Yes. Economics is a policy discipline designed specifically to advise policy makers and economists are often appointed to political positions where they offer advice on increasing productivity that has a clear benefit for the economic elites who appoint them. To claim that one sort of policies that are in their self-interest belong in the discipline and another set, that does not promote their interests, should not be in the discipline, is an abuse of power and hypocritical.</td>
<td>Possible guilt of crimes against humanity for the same reason as in 1, above.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rome Statute, Crimes Against Humanity</td>
<td>Similar to above</td>
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3. The law is part of the enabling environment and corporations can assert political power over individuals to change laws in their favor. Corporate personhood legitimizes corporations as political actors and elites can also use capital holdings to change the rules of the game. (Taught in the author’s MBA program at Stanford in what was originally an “ethics” course.) Rather than strengthen citizens to control corporations, corporations can be trusted to develop an ethic of “corporate social responsibility.”

| Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP | Yes, this is a hypocritical argument that economists know to be false. The assumption of free markets promoting efficiency and aggregate benefits depends on a regulatory system that creates a level playing field that cannot be politically short-circuited. Economists promote a logical contradiction out of self-interest. The argument here is similar to the above: economic inequality translates into political inequality and short-circuits political action and regulation of competitive markets and of rights protections. Corporations and wealth are established as part of the enabling environment for productivity and incentives, but any activity that allows for these forms to have political influence is a distortion. The idea that businesses can be trusted to be “socially responsible” or can be trained to do so is a fraudulent doctrine promoted to weaken efforts at citizen and government regulation. The legal economic doctrine that reveals the duplicity is that corporations exist only to pursue shareholder profit. Suggestion that corporations can self-regulate is self-interested propaganda to promote corporate interests tied to those of economists. |

| Guilty of genocide and conspiracy (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of minority cultures with intent to destroy those minority cultures in whole or in part by promoting pressures that undervalue their resources and preferences and make them vulnerable to disappearance. Malice can be implied from disregard of the known and inherent dangers of the inequities and destruction that the doctrines reinforce. Corporations and elites amassing capital are known to use this power time and again historically to dislodge cultures from their resources and to weaken cultural bounds in order to free labor for exploit. |
| Rome Statute, Crimes Against Humanity | Similar to above | Possible guilt of crimes against humanity if the harms (e.g., the 2008 financial crisis as an example of the impact of economic doctrine on financial markets) in this category can be characterized to include degradation or humiliation of one or more human beings and attacks on human dignity. It should be easy to prove intent (or reckless disregard for known consequences), motive and knowledge in changing regulatory laws weakening enforcement that directly led to the financial crisis and enrichment of a small group of people in ways that destroyed families, left people homeless. |
### International Development:

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<tr>
<td>1. Use of GDP as measure instead of per capita assets, thus convincing non-economists to measure progress and value on that basis, and promoting sales in dollar measures rather than locally converted measures of long-term asset wealth and value/utility.</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, III. (c), with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</td>
<td>Yes. Standard business practice measures wealth by assets, not by income, and this is a basic tenet of business that is deliberately overridden in economic doctrine to promote sales that benefit the country, organization (bank or investor) or class proselytizing use of this measure, with dollar income also directly benefiting those whose value system is reflected by monetized assets. <strong>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide</strong> (public incitement and complicity) through depletion of a cultural group’s asset base through fraudulently (knowledge of the falsity of the measure, reliance by weaker country/culture on the advice of the economist, with detriment to the weaker country/culture) convincing owners to trade resource wealth for short-term income, resulting in loss of sustainable assets and subsequent cultural disintegration and impoverishment, with the malice implied by blatant disregard for consequences in light of international treaties.</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. All societies desire industrialization, urbanization and technology (domestication of humans).</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</td>
<td>Yes, same as above as a corollary. <strong>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy</strong> (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of minority cultures and their environments. Same reasoning as above as a corollary:</td>
</tr>
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| Rome Statute, Crimes Against Humanity | Same as above | **Possible similar guilt of crimes against humanity**
if urbanization can be directly linked to deals between governments that fuel land grabs and displacement of family farms in the name of “economic efficiency” and possibly of other policies that create dependency and put pressures on resources in ways that lock countries into unsustainable development. The global phenomenon of landlessness that is fueled by foreign capital or urban capital pushing peoples off of their lands and has led to the same kinds of harms that are the result of war and natural disaster but are caused by human action, including increased malnutrition and deaths among children and social harms to displaced adults. A court could find guilt if the land invasions and “resettlements” are for no justifiable reason other than aggrandizement at the expense of others and if the harms are characterized to include degradation or humiliation of one or more human beings and attacks on human dignity. Economic, social and political rights promoted in the various U.N. declarations are not yet actionable and are really competing policy choices, but in the case of reckless theft that causes death and dislocation in ways that cannot be defended simply as a “policy choice,” these could be seen as degradation. It should be easy to prove intent (or reckless disregard for known consequences), motive and knowledge in land and resource thefts. |
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<tr>
<th>3. Traditional culture is a form of “negative social capital” that impedes development</th>
<th>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</th>
<th>Yes, similar to above. Human cultural diversity is part of human adaptability to different environments for human survival. This economic doctrine reflects is a self-interested and hypocritical use of a linked economic doctrine that favors “competition” and individual preferences (“sovereignty”) for utility maximization and that calls for political neutrality. Devaluing different adaptation patterns and choices is an attempt to destabilize other cultures for profit.</th>
<th><strong>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy</strong> (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide with direct evidence of intent to destroy minority cultures in whole or in part and with malice implied from disregard of empirical fact in ways that also directly contradict other economic doctrines. Same reasoning as above:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. International measures of “human development” that measure current per capita health and consumption standards do not need to incorporate measures of cultural adaptability/ sustainability/ survival since these consumption preferences reflect universal choice</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</td>
<td>Yes, this approach suppresses historical measures of human life expectancies through history (finding it was historically longer in “primitive” cultures, for those who survive childbirth at various times), and conflicts with the discipline’s claim that economics maximizes choice and fulfillment of preferences by promoting human diversity, the true expression of “competition.” The goal of promoting a single, high level of consumption favors societies in which economists work, where economic benefits arise from the sales of consumer goods to poorer and less powerful societies in exchange for their resources and the ability to cheaply exploit their labor.</td>
<td><strong>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy</strong> (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide with direct evidence of intent to destroy minority cultures in whole or in part through promotion of consumption and production patterns that assimilate and destroy those cultures while creating direct benefits for the more powerful societies and classes which economists serve, with malice implied from disregard of empirical fact in ways that also directly contradict other economic doctrines. Same reasoning as above:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade:</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP; Rome Statute for Crimes Against Humanity</td>
<td>Yes, when trade is extended into economies that are not already trading cultures or that are induced to trade beyond their ability to remain sustainable within their own environments, the idea of comparative advantage is violated and systems become dependent on the country, organization or class promoting the trade and then acting to manipulate the dependency and terms of trade.</td>
<td>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of society with direct evidence of intent to destroy a culture in whole or in part so that there is a reliance on trade and a detachment from sustainability within an ecological niche and with malice implied from the blatant disregard for consequences in light of international treaties. The doctrine of comparative advantage implies dependency on products or labor from outside an eco-system and turns cultural systems that are stable in their environments into those no longer in homeostasis, with dependency on outside products.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rome Statute, Crimes Against Humanity</td>
<td>Similar to above.</td>
<td>Possible future conviction for crimes against humanity as the harms of over-consumption become increasingly evident in climate change, overpopulation and the resulting famines, civil strife and wars that are easily predictable using existing social science and that economists choose to disregard for benefit of a few and for personal self-interest.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Consider capital and labor as mobile and interchangeable, free-flowing “factors of production” rather than integral cultural assets.

| Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP | Yes, when a country’s resources and its key people are viewed as objects for purchase with no attempt to provide protections that maintain their balance and basic functions and when it is assumed that weak groups are freely approving these sales and able to maintain themselves when there is clear and repeated evidence to the contrary, over generations, cultural sovereignty and sustainability is being sacrificed in the interests of powerful countries and interests for whom economists work that are able to make the deals that promote sales of these assets. | Guilty of genocide and conspiracy (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of society with direct evidence of intent to destroy a culture in whole or in part so that there is a reliance on trade, an absorption into an international system where certain cultural groups will be destroyed, and a detachment from sustainability within an ecological niche and with malice clear from the blatant disregard for consequences of uprooting clear components of a sustainable culture for sale and economic exploitation in light of international treaties and the attempts to justify this cultural disintegration as free and informed choice. |
**Possible similar guilt of crimes against humanity** if this ideology of mobility of capital can be directly linked to deals between governments that fuel land grabs and displacement of family farms in the name of “economic efficiency” and possibly other policies that create dependency and put pressures on resources in ways that lock countries into unsustainable development. The global phenomenon of landlessness that is fueled by foreign capital or urban capital pushing peoples off of their lands and has led to the same kinds of harms that are the result of war and natural disaster but are caused by human action, including increased malnutrition and deaths among children and social harms to displaced adults. A court could find guilt if the land invasions and “resettlements” are for no justifiable reason other than aggrandizement at the expense of others and if the harms are characterized to include degradation or humiliation of one or more human beings and attacks on human dignity. Economic, social and political rights promoted in the various U.N. declarations are not yet actionable and are really competing policy choices, but in the case of reckless theft that causes death and dislocation in ways that cannot be defended simply as a “policy choice,” these could be seen as degradation. It should be easy to prove intent (or reckless disregard for known consequences), motive and knowledge in land and resource thefts.
Step 5: The Verdict and its Implications:

The verdicts resulting in Step 4 are clear. Economics is guilty as charged in promoting a series of doctrines that it knows or should know result in harms and that are in violation of international laws, and doing so in ways that promote their personal gain. Given the number of doctrines at fault and their interrelationship in causing similar kinds of harms, the implication is that economics as a discipline has not only been acting systematically with other large and powerful interests to promote those harms, but that it may serve as the ideological doctrinal system (or “church”) that specifically acts to try to legitimize and inculcate those harms into the major industrial societies where economists work.

Here is a quick summary, shown also in the table below. Of the 15 economic doctrines tested, each one independently sufficient to be raised as evidence of legal violations of international law in international courts if standing were granted for raising them, 13 of them would likely be found in violation of the law outlawing genocide, both as direct causes of genocide and part of a conspiracy with the remaining two in possible violation, and 8 of them would possibly be found guilty of crimes against humanity. In each of the four sub-areas of economics held to scrutiny -- micro-economics, macro-economics, international development and international trade -- the fundamental doctrines are in violation of international law. The only hedging on these verdicts is on the specific harms to specific populations under the crimes against humanity and the lack of “ripeness” of cases for the harms of “unsustainability.” It is likely that economic doctrines are creating the context now for global economic depression and World War, with the collapse of a number of industrial economies. However, since the full extent of these harms has yet to occur and is still considered “speculative,” the current crime against humanity may only be at the “attempt” stage. It is not yet fully “ripe” for adjudication until the harms occur or until it is clear that the crime could be prosecuted for the attempted harm (reckless disregard for foreseeable harms). The verdicts are summarized in the table below.

Summary Table: Legal Verdicts on Economic Doctrines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub Area of Economics</th>
<th>Key Doctrines Tested</th>
<th>Likely Verdicts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Micro-Economics</td>
<td>Six doctrines, four of them fundamental</td>
<td>Four of these, including three of the four key beliefs can be held to violate the Genocide Convention (both genocide and conspiracy) while the other two are possible violations, and two of the four key beliefs are possible crimes against humanity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro-Economics</td>
<td>Three fundamental doctrines</td>
<td>All three can be found to violate the Genocide Convention (genocide and conspiracy) and to be possible crimes against humanity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development</td>
<td>Four fundamental doctrines</td>
<td>All four can be found to violate the Genocide Convention (genocide and conspiracy) with one to be a possible crime against humanity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade</td>
<td>Two fundamental doctrines</td>
<td>Both can be found to violate the Genocide Convention (genocide and conspiracy) are possible crimes against humanity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the extent of these violations, the relative silence of international law and the relative lack of attention by the enlightened public, one might reasonably wonder how this could be. How is it that such an honorable and respected group of some of the most highly educated people in the most advanced technological societies could be judged guilty of so many violations and with so little outcry? This is not
the first time the author has sought to provide answers to these questions, but this piece attempts a systematic look at the situation and its causes (Lempert and Nguyen, 2011; Lempert, 2015).

Further, if economics has gone rogue, how many other disciplines and institutions have also run amok? Where are the mechanisms in advanced society to self-correct and to measure “progress” and human long-term interests? Why are they failing?

When systems turn out, under examination, to be something so opposed to what they claim to be and to what people assume them to be, that means that the claims and the assumptions are likely wrong and that systems need to be called what they are and replaced. What, then, exactly is the profession of economics?

According to this legal analysis, above, economics is a group of people promoting a series of doctrines that cause harm and receiving a great deal of money and status out of the profits of those harms. What, then, is that?

- If economics were a science, it would be neutral, defining real variables and relationships between them, offering predictions and theories, not doctrines. It would predict behaviors and model reality according to identifiable laws. That is not what this legal test reveals it is.

- If economics were a limited management tool for an agreed ends, acting like an engineering discipline, it would be within the law. It would use simple variables unique to industrial societies, looking at policy mechanisms and impacts, with variables such as taxes and other fiscal tools and monetary tools, with no need for so much energy on mathematical systems and for doctrines that do not demonstrate the workings of these tools. It is not that either, according to this test. In large part, economics is doing something else.

The identification of so many doctrines, with so many of them in violation of the law suggests that economics is an ideological or indoctrination system, but what kind?

- Is economics a management or political control system for protecting an elite “class” and their assets and power, using technical tools?

- Is economics a religious ideology promoting certain beliefs on faith to maintain a natural order, shaping public behaviors to conform to these, without testing of truth or alternatives?

The legal test, above, suggests that economics is both of these. In technological society, where religious beliefs can challenge power and technology, economics may serve as a religious and ideological system to protect powerful interests and to legitimize their violations of legal and moral principles. Where religion in traditional societies and in early empires largely merged with political power to serve its interests, it appears that economics serves in this role. It may have evolved as a “moral philosophy” and “moral science” affiliated with the church to become a religious and control system affiliated with the modern, industrial, or corporatist State, dependent on one’s descriptive word of choice.

Part II of this article analyzes how economics may have evolved to fill this combined religious and political role and how it used the outward symbols of science and mathematics to gain legitimacy and to insulate its exercise of this role. That also helps explain why it has been so difficult to hold accountable and why it will be so difficult to reform. Religious belief systems, ideologies, and power are resistant to legal, moral and political challenge because they become the central underpinnings of the social order. Such analysis can serve as the basis for understanding where economics went wrong, where it could fit, and how it could be restructured, which is what international legal oversight would need to recommend.

The 15 doctrines examined above, viewed together, as a system, rather than as a list of separate violations, do work together as a coherent ideology. These doctrines are not “economics.” Much as the doctrines of industrialization, production, collectivization, homogenization, and militarism were really political doctrines within the Russian (Soviet) Empire (and similarly in other empires), promoted by the State outside of “economics,” they seem to work the same way in the U.S., in Europe, and even, ironically, now in China. Economics is an ideological system promoting power and neo-colonialism. The essential ideology of this system, based on “scarcity” (unlimited wants), and growth, reflects a consistent ideology that devalues groups that do not have the same military and economic coercive power. It knowingly seeks to undermine their cultures and to replace them, with deliberate unapologetic intent. It
Is Economics in Violation of International Law?: Part I

posits that all peoples desire this change and control and that higher consumption and newer technologies are universally desired; overriding the reality that the system creates the very instability, uncertainty, violence and pressure that forces adaptation, trade, and militarism. While cultures seek stability and balance and while humans seek security and habit, this ideological system is based on the premise of created instability, vulnerability, and insecurity, in contrast to the goals of international law. None of the doctrines are presented with caveats for protecting certain groups or allowing them to opt out of this system. The assumption is that certain standards of living and consumption achievable with trade and technological and cultural change are the only desirable alternative, that choice is linear, and that there is “no alternative.” That is an ideology of power and control, with the sanctity of a religious belief.

Today, with the ascendancy of economics, the definition of “practical” has come to mean “what people in power will pay for and support” rather than “those simple steps that can actually be taken to best meet human needs.”

Those who have been indoctrinated by the thinking of economics certainly recognize that legal institutions today are not separable from political realities today where economics as a discipline represents power and those with power will not hold themselves liable for its criminal violations. Their “practical” view of the world is that the criminalization of economics and its replacement is “not practical” because power does not allow for rule of law. Those with this “practical” view will wait for the current system with its economic doctrines to collapse before thinking that any prosecution and change can really occur. These “practical” thinkers would say that solutions and alternatives are unrealistic or idealistic. They may even seek to protect and prop up that system, hoping only for minor changes, believing that it is “too big to fail” and must be bribed to change, much like the failing international and financial and banking system. They may believe it is “practical” to bribe those in power in the hope they will change, allowing them to continue to extort governments and legal systems, despite published findings even of economics itself (in risk and reward curves as a function of income) that shows that the wealthy really aren’t motivated to change by additional financial incentives and are unlikely to take additional risks for more benefits. Those with wealth and power are likely to simply pocket the extra wealth and see it as reinforcing their power.

If, on the other hand, there are other, like the author of this piece, who take a different view on what is “practical”, viewing what is “practical” as looking for mechanisms for human survival that can actually be adopted, and seeing existing human inventions like law and their application as one of those “practical” mechanisms for practical people for practical survival needs. If you are a “practical” thinker like the author of this piece, who looks for solutions rather than just seeks to spin fantasy theories, you might recognize that being ready for change also means having a “practical” workable, real, and clear alternative that meets standards of legality and social science and that puts together a set of building blocks of work that already exists, into a logical framework, rather than just advocates and hope for “change”. You would recognize that it is important to have some simple tools for understanding why things went wrong and what kinds of patterns of thinking can, practically, be changed, to overcome these mistakes. I invite you then, to read Part II of this piece, with that analysis.
The actual extent, impact, and underlying goals of cultural changes as a result of post-war occupation and through international aid, including through organizations like the United Nations still raises questions and I do not wish to imply that these are appropriate models of applying international law to education, simply to note that these actions have occurred. The author is currently engaged in research in Germany to examine these changes and the actual impact.

One might perceive of defendants as in different “classes” as well as in specific organizations. Economic professors, economists who are members of associations such as the American Economic Association, particular economics faculties at leading universities, editorial boards of leading professional journals or the journals themselves, or even all economics degree holders who work in positions where they are hired as or identify themselves as economics could be among the classes. The majority of these leading the profession are in the U.S. and Europe but of course there are now economists in almost every country. One particularly intriguing defendant is the Nobel Prize Committee in Stockholm that both identifies and awards money and prestige to leading economists every year. They could certainly be seen as a major certifying organization of the discipline and they may be more directly vulnerable to prosecution than economics journals in the U.S.

This study was both as an undergraduate major and as a “Master of Business Administration” (M.B.A.,) and was reconfirmed consistently in practice in work with economists in government, international financial institutions, in private industry, and in international development for nearly 30 years.

Competition can certainly be described as a motivating factor that leads to innovation and efficiency. Scientific observations of human (and animal) behavior confirm this observation not only in economics but also in biology. Competition is not the ONLY motivation, however, and the lack of recognizing other kinds of motivation using empirical study is a doctrine of economics that competes with scientific observation.

Humans (and animals) also cooperate. The conditions under which competition and cooperation occur could both be described as “self-interest” using observable data. In genetics, it appears that cooperation may have evolved to promote survival of individual genes, making cooperation a form of enlightened self-interest. In this case, such precepts or tenets are perfectly legitimate approaches to study. What makes them “doctrines” is their combination with assumptions that turn their teaching into ideological appeals to shape behaviors and to restrict certain study. The idea that human desires are unlimited and must always generate “scarcity” takes the motivation of self-interest, that can be studied along with other motivations, and transforms it into a political doctrine that can undermine fundamental human interests. Similarly, teaching that cultural mechanisms that regulate self-interest in order to promote cooperation and equity and reduce conflict, are obstacles to development, transforms the tenet of self-interest into a doctrine. Political theorists studying the idea of social contract and governance, such as James Madison, also start with the basic premise of individual self-interest as human motivation (Madison et al, 1788). They use that belief to structure political and legal systems to best manage this competition and to demonstrate that these approaches improve human welfare. It is by undermining such approaches (especially undermining the essence of law) that economics offers doctrines that can be examined for their legality.

The irresponsiveness of universities to community and student needs, and resistance to competition and to democratic values, all violate the principles advocated and purported by economists with little effort to fix these market failures. Indeed, it is economists whose doctrines largely seek to reinforce these failures through voucher systems and privatization schemes to promote subsidization of education for and ideology of the rich. This reflects and reinforces the existence of those economic doctrines. Yet, there is no reason to include the problems of the hidden curriculum here. This hidden curriculum is not unique to economics. The economic doctrines speak for themselves in terms of content without the need to examine the form in which they are taught.

Though similar sanctions have yet to be enforced, they have been raised by several human rights lawyers in regard to public figures moving back and forth between universities and political office. Among them recently in the public eye are Law Professor and White House Lawyer John Yoo, hired by the University of California, Berkeley and strongly criticized by human rights lawyers who believe he sought to legitimize violation of the Geneva Convention in the use of torture while working in the White House. Similar charges are made against, Condoleezza Rice, the Stanford Political Science professor who many believe approved of violation of the Geneva Convention in the use of torture as well as alleged murder and other crimes relating to promoting U.S. attacks on Iraq and its civilian population. There are similar charges made against former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who was awarded a fellowship at Stanford’s Hoover Institute. This is not simply a charge directed at one political party. Many human rights lawyers and activists question whether President Barack Obama could return to law school without challenge, given reported violations of international law with his direct approval, including targeting international assassinations and attacks on civilian population.

As of 2008, the cost to the U.S. alone in direct costs (not in future social and economic consequences) was estimated at well over $1 trillion U.S. (at least $3,000, on average, from the pockets of every U.S. citizen) and perhaps several trillion with little compensatory benefit. David Herszenhorn, “Estimates of Iraq War Cost were not Close to Ballpark,” The New York Times, March 19, 2008.
IS ECONOMICS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?
REMAKING ECONOMICS AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE

Part II
Is There a Current Social Science of Economics in Economics or Elsewhere that Meets the Requirements of “Social Science”? If Not, Why Not?

DAVID LEMPERT, PH.D., J.D., M.B.A., E.D. (HON.)

Introduction to Part II

How is it that a discipline that is classified as a “science” can act so long as primarily an ideology or religion, in ways that violate international law, as demonstrated in Part I of this piece? What is the fundamental problem in economics? Assuming there is a political will and opportunity to improve the discipline (or a requirement to do so after a legal challenge), how can the discipline be restructured to set it on an appropriate course?

Part II begins by seeking to clarify what has gone wrong in the discipline of economics by distinguishing the various potential and actual roles and functions of the discipline, seeking to separate the various activities and methods of four different intellectual endeavors -- science, applied technical skills, creation of an overall belief system that is religion or science (what some have called the symbolic “superstructure” of human activities) and the political mechanisms, stories or ideology to reinforce that order and system of beliefs -- that have come to fuse together within the discipline. Like other disciplines that began or largely developed within religious institutions (in the “Church” in European cultures) as moral philosophy and then later separated into science and philosophy, the roles of economics now remain blurred as both “science” and “humanities” in ways that have actually substituted religion (and pseudo-science) along with political ideology for the clear roles that the discipline could actually serve in a scientific culture. To see this, Part II examines the history of the discipline of economics, starting with its roots in the “Church”, along with other university studies that were cloistered examinations of religious texts rather than scientific empirical study. In following that history to the present, it becomes clear that economics remains intertwined with basic religious assumptions. These beliefs in the discipline of economics and in other social sciences today work to prevent development of human sciences in ways that would view humans as parts of the natural world, evolving from other animals and amenable to study and comparison in the same ways as animals and the natural world. These assumptions restrict comparisons and tests and begin with specific theological and ideological views in their place, preventing the discipline of economics from serving predictive theories and effective technical applications for human advancement.

The problem facing economics as a discipline is not limited to economics but also infuses political science, anthropology and other “disciplines” as some other examples in this section suggest.18 Given that cultures tend to avoid or restrict changes, perhaps it isn’t surprising that since the “social sciences” have long been rooted in religion that they would still have a tendency to fill the social function of religion, even in “modern” society. The distinction between “science,” “ideology” and “religion” is easily blurred today and it would not only be surprising for religious doctrines to find themselves entering into assumptions, causal models and doctrines in what are viewed as the natural and social sciences, but it would be hard to separate them. The process of “de-criminalizing” economics is, therefore, not just one
of removing or replacing doctrines but requires solutions that recognize the different social roles played by the discipline in society as rooted in the institutional development and needs of society and that offer clear ways of distinguishing these roles.

In examining what has happened to economics and in looking for alternatives and means of restructuring, Part II examines the sub-discipline of “economic anthropology” to see whether academic responses to failures in economics are able to free themselves of the same cultural biases. What the test shows is that, for similar reasons, economic anthropology fails today as a potential “social scientific” and “applied social science” replacement for economics. Economic anthropology has itself moved from potentially a science into a “moral” response to economics. Rather than offering a solution and implanting itself in primate evolution and human history for a scientific study of human economic behavior rooted in culture, genetics, and environment, the discipline of anthropology in which economic anthropology is a subfield has also become entwined is now, today, also an anti-science, anti-Darwinian, set of doctrines. These doctrines have entered economic anthropology and other anthropology subfields that parallel other social science disciplines, like political science in ways that undermine a real challenge to these other disciplines that have also strayed from science and/or from legality. Economic anthropology has created itself as a parallel opposite to economics, seeking to take over the moral ground but not the scientific one. That role has been left to other disciplines like Human Geography and Human Ecology that are also examined here in Part II, finding that their narrowness has rendered them inadequate to offer a real challenge.

Overview: What Has Gone Wrong?

Is Current Economics a Social Science, Technique, Mathematics, or Theology?

The title of a recent book on economics, Puzzle of Modern Economics: Science or Ideology, suggests that economists are puzzled as to the social role that economics does or should play (Backhouse, 2010). Like other “modern” disciplines, economics should potentially be playing four different functional roles and the question is whether they are all consistent or appropriate. The analysis below suggests that economics appears to currently offer only a bit of science (and more the appearance or illusion of science), some engineering (mostly for national production and the consumption that goes with it), while acting largely as a religion (reinforcing certain beliefs on the social order and fitting in with established Christian beliefs that seek to detach humans and causality from the animal world and environment) and serving as political ideology (for industrialization, empire, and an elite class). Each of these four different kinds of functions may be needed in modern society but not in the ways that economics currently partially or distortedly or illegally fills them. The puzzle is to clarify these different functions of economic study and to see that they are all appropriately labeled and filled, rather than distorted and confused.

This section seeks to distinguish the various roles and functions of the discipline of economics. It starts by defining what these different functional roles are that a discipline might play and by describing what their key elements should be, as well as how to test that these needs are being met. What follows is an analysis of how the discipline of economics fails to fill these roles, with an explanation of why and where, historically, it went off track. The concepts may seem to be a bit abstract, theoretical, and new to the thinking of those not used to them, but I try to present them clearly and succinctly here.

The Different Ideal Roles that Economics Could Play as a Discipline in a Sustainable Society

Although anthropologists have recently shied away from trying to define structures and functions in societies because of the difficulties of finding all of these functions and structures across all societies, there is still agreement on some of the basic categories found in almost every society and particularly in technological societies. These include structures and functions of: science itself, in practice (for understanding and adapting to the surrounding environment, particularly for dealing with change), engineering, the technical application of predictive science (applications of knowledge to recurring
needs), religion or other kinds of belief systems like science (on questions of values and existence) and rituals including story-telling and promotion of political ideology to reinforce the beliefs and maintain the social order, sometimes a part of the education or socialization function for the young, as well as protecting against deviance and maintaining solidarity and collective beliefs).

In fact, the four of these fit together in a logical way.

- Science and engineering work together, with basic science revealing the laws that can then be used in application. In the social sciences, the science develops the laws used in policy (“social engineering”) and in technical, professional application.

- Religion or other belief systems like the belief in science and reinforcing rituals or political ideology can also be viewed together and in different parts. Religion (creation of doctrine) defines social and cultural systems while ritual (political) ideology work to reinforce existing political and economic systems. Sometimes the stated religious beliefs and the rituals to reinforce the beliefs, through ideology, seem to be different, which is what helps them to be seen as different functions. Part of the difference is that the stated religious belief may be different from a hidden belief that is really being promoted by the ideology (such as the teaching of “peace” and “love” by religion but the actual ideology of militarism and competition in societies). This is not to say that the functions do not exist but that they are easy to mis-identify because of conflicting statements. (It is part of the role of good social science to identify the actual, underlying beliefs and ideologies.) Belief systems and the ritual ideology to promote them can also be tested and shaped as part of the adaptation of societies to change.

- These two couplets of science-engineering (social science-policy/technology) and religion/belief systems-reinforcing ideology (doctrine-philosophy/humanities) can also work in parallel. Ideally, for instance, the humanities disciplines or the parts of social science disciplines that include humanities would also include study of philosophy and literature (the humanities) relating to specific scientific disciplines and technologies, as a way of imagining new alternatives and legitimizing transition. In this way, humanities work to develop the new belief systems and reinforcing rituals for long-term sustainability and this is the ideal role in relation to sciences in an adaptive society that values science. Reinforcing ideology-philosophy can serve to imagine new possibilities and direct scientific inquiry or can reinforce and legitimize certain scientific approaches. In other words, the study of humanities can be directly complementary to individual sciences or social sciences. (The practicality of how this could work in a remade discipline of economics is described in Part III.)

For economics and other social sciences, each of these four roles can work in parallel and can either mutually reinforce each other in a way that promotes change and innovation (in a “Stable Adaptable Scientific Society”) or can mutually influence each other to prevent it (in an “Unstable, Mal-adaptive Scientific Industry Society”), or both, at different times and in different ways.

To make these functions easier to see, and to help understand how they work in different societies, I have put them in a short table, below. The first row describes a successful, model “Stable, Adaptable Scientific Society” in which social sciences, including economics, fulfill appropriate functional roles, as opposed to the current situation, of the second row, where they are failing to work together in a consistent way. The third row presents the case of non-scientific, non-technological “Stable Traditional Societies and Cultures” that do not have developed science or social science. This table also helps show that in an industrial society where social sciences like economics are failing, the society is not only unsustainable but is returning to the form of a traditional, non-industrial society.
Analyzing Disciplines by their Roles in Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Society with Different Roles of Academic Disciplines</th>
<th>Functions that Academic Disciplines Play or Can Play in Different Societies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Science and Adaption to the Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Science (How the World Works)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable, Adaptable, Scientific Society</td>
<td>Social Science as Predictive Human Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstable Mal-adaptive Scientific Society [Current Situation of Economics]</td>
<td>Social Science as Pretense (Literature and Play), with No Real Predictive Social Science for Major Questions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Traditional Culture</td>
<td>No Science or Social Science in Reality or Pretense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The suggestion of this chart in the second of the three rows is that the idea today within the social sciences and of economics, that they can be both predictive science and a “humanities”, has actually failed to protect the appropriate four functions as distinct but working together. Instead, it has blurred them to politicize the science and to transform it into something that is no longer science. In other words, it has changed the objectives of sustainability for a scientific society into one that simply maintains inequalities and stagnation, and promotes a political ideology that opposes the systems of international law and universal aspirations that would keep modern industrial systems adaptive and sustainable. In much the same way, the 16th to 19th century European idea of the social science as branches of “moral philosophy” and then as a “moral science” also blurred the functions and promoted a colonial system that led to the calamities of World War and the potential for human annihilation in the 20th century. What exists today may be a continuity from the past without the changes that are needed for a sustainable industrial society.

The way to see this is to look closely at the four different functions and the role that an appropriate social scientific discipline of economics, meeting the standards of international law and of science, would ideally play in a sustainable, adaptable technological society and comparing it to the role it actually does play today.
What one would expect to see for economics in an ideal “modern,” sustainable (“progressive” in the sense of meeting human aspirations and assuring flexibility and adaptability), scientific, law abiding, human society is as follows.

Economics as Science

As a science in a sustainable technological society, economics would offer predictions on the global questions about economies: how they rise and fall in particular environments, what one would expect to see with certain populations and climates and resources, what kinds of satisfaction, growth, scientific achievement, division of labor, and equality would exist in those conditions and what is possible. Behaviors in reaction to different incentives and controls, revealing mechanisms and pathways, would be modeled with the causality also tested. One test of whether an intellectual activity is a science that can be applied to economics as a basis for distinguishing whether the discipline is actually pursuing scientific questions or just humanistic questions is to see whether the measures used to answer the question are rooted in the natural world: if animals have similar activities that can be studied and if there are parallel principles to understand similar phenomena in animals, the study can be presumed as a science. For example, animals have societies and they have politics. They also have economic organization. Real economic science would therefore start with what is observable in nature, then specifically in primates with biological/genetic influences mapped out, then with historical archaeological explanations of various pathways. Rather than start just with industrial societies, industrial society models would need to be shown in relation to other societies but with additional variables. One further way to distinguish science from humanities is to test the variables measured to see if they relate to the tangible natural world or if they are just creations of the human mind. For a humanities, unlike science, one studies symbols and ideas that only humans have and do – literature, history, art. Similarly, symbols of money and prices can also be seen as partly symbolic and part of humanities study rather than science unless fully grounded in measurable quantitative real variables. The absence of use of natural variables and natural comparisons in economics today (and evaluated further below) would suggest that it is not really science. Similarly, if much of what is simply story and art form in economics today or “religion” or “ideology” of certain economic ideas and doctrine would really be studied only as literature, myth and religion and no longer propagated in the scientific discipline, then it would not meet the definition of science. Furthermore, if it were a science, economics today would not only have an agenda of global questions that included the full range of human cultures and societies and natural interactions as well as biological and chemical processes. It would also follow the scientific method of deductive reasoning following observations and comparisons through hypothesis testing, controlled experiments, and comparisons. Variables would be subject to challenge for their objectivity and rootedness in the measurable world. Causal assumptions would also be subject to testing to determine the actual relationship between physical and material conditions and biology and economic choices, rather than assuming full human choice as an independent variable.

Economic Engineering of Sustainable Societies:

The technology of economics is inextricably linked to the science of economics (the full range of technologies that are possible to apply scientific knowledge) as well as the moral and religious questions (for whom, to do what). A fully applied social science is linked with a fully expressed scientific social science discipline. If there is little predictive social science in economics today, then what would exist in the form of applications could at best only be something narrow. Properly structured, economics would serve as a technology and policy instrument to promote sustainable diverse cultures of all types, to seek to promote science and advance in technological societies, to promote equity and fulfill humanitarian political goals, to promote peace and eliminate wasteful spending on violence, status displays, and rigid social controls. Today, with little development of economics based on measurements and comparisons drawn from reality, with predictive value, and serving the spectrum of human needs throughout different
societies and throughout each society, all that would be left within applied economics would be a form of
production engineering and profit maximization for business.

Economics as a Religion or Belief System (of Science, Law, Universal Human Values, and Requirements
of Sustainability)

Teaching and disciplines can all be viewed as promoting some kind of belief system by definition of
their being “disciplines”. Science is one such belief system, but not a “religious” or “political” one. Science it is a belief system that does not require faith or rigidity, only constant empirical testing of its beliefs in ways that allow them to be replaced in the face of empirical fact. In a law-abiding scientific
culture, social science disciplines, including that of economics, reflect and promote belief in science
(merit, mind, and knowledge) and the ideals of science for technological and related social progress (to
meet university human values and aspirations and to protect long-term human survival and sustainability). By contrast, the test in Part I suggests that economics today seems to promote only the interests of
specific cultures and their consumption patterns, in defiance of the consensus principles of humanity
established in international law and promoted through scientific enquiry.

Economics as a Form of Reinforcing Ritual as an Internally Law Abiding, Moral “Ideology” to Protect
Sustainability through Universal Concepts of Social Progress in an Industrial Society

In a culture that follows rule of law and in which science is a key to prolonging and improving the
human future and as stewardship over universal resources, it is linked to reinforcing rituals. These rituals
could be called an “ideology”, but they are not for promotion of any specific individual or group interest,
which is the usual definition of an ideology. They are only promoting human survival in general by
reinforcing a belief system of empiricism. In a scientific and law abiding culture, these rituals promote
rights to culture, diversity, and protective co-existence and interaction with nature as these are recognized
as human “universals”. The test of “doctrines” and of systems in economics as appropriate or “political”
and “ideological” is whether they reflect these fundamental beliefs of science and beliefs of political
equality that are parts of rights culture and “social progress” (improving human systems to better meet the
objective goals of human survival and sustainability in ways that meet universal human aspirations). Inappropriate parts of this belief system are those views that are specific to individual cultures or groups
in those cultures to promote specific interests (political ideology). In holding up the doctrines of “neo-
classical” economics to international law in Part I, it would seem clear that the opposition of the discipline
to established principles of cultural rights and sustainability works to promote a single ideology of a
single culture and the interests of specific institutions and leaders of those institutions within that culture.

Contemporary industrial societies looking towards long-term sustainability seek to answer questions of
values based on reasoned answers to ways of promoting long-term human survival as well as promoting
scientific inquiry and exploration into all of the unanswered questions of our universe and of our
existence. In small societies with limited science and technology, religion provides doctrinal answers on
value that are designed to protect the survival of those cultures and the environments in which they exist.
In our contemporary society, with advanced technology that allows us to shape our environments and to
control our consumption within our environments, the moral role of economics is to think about the actual
goals of consumption and production; not just to advocate for increase. It is to consider how we measure
human progress, how we define real value of what is difficult to measure – scientific and intellectual
advance, human satisfaction and well-being, human nature, security versus risk, the environment, and
how we measure what is possible in terms of distribution and equity. The moral philosophical role of
contemporary economics is not to assume only one possible system and to advocate for it as doctrine but
to continue where thinkers like Marx, the guild socialists like Cole, Buckminster Fuller, and others
imagined utopian communities and the paths to reach them (Cole, 1920).

Though there is now a cynicism towards communitarian or planned models of production, the
technological reality of space travel means that planning of new economic forms will not only be a moral
question but also a relevant technical engineering one. Similar moral questions that are of relevance to economics are whether economic growth and peace are compatible or whether war, military competition and violence are necessary incentives for economic growth, how drives and incentives for competition and cooperation and diversity versus conformity can be balanced. It is moral questioning that serves to inform and direct scientific inquiry by freeing the human imagination. In the way that science fiction helps lead, regulate, and integrate scientific research and application, moral philosophy, utopian fiction, and science fiction on economic trends, possibilities and the dilemmas they create are the role of morality in economics. In addition to science fiction, it is partly the role of social science (including economic anthropology as a facet of anthropology and an approach to an alternative discipline of economics) to serve as culture critique to show these alternatives but not simply to start with and argue for a different standard of value.

**How Economics Now Ineffectively Fills these Functional Roles and Threatens Social Unsustainability and Instability**

While contemporary economics contains some elements of science and engineering, the part that is heralded as science is largely pseudo-science using trivial variables and hiding behind the language of mathematics, while its role in engineering is strictly limited to promoting production and consumption in technological societies (within the limitations of relatively fixed technologies and social systems) and to profit maximization for enterprises. In its religious and moral roles, economics serves to undermine science, law and humanistic, moral concerns in ways that by definition (since law and morality are, by definition, designed to assure long-term adaptability and stability) threaten humanity.

Historians question when economics broke away from its church doctrine origins as a “moral science.” Indeed, it may never have broken away and these definitions may be misleading. While it may still be theological and ideological, the contemporary discipline of economics does not meet the definition of a science as being an empirical, hypothesis testing exercise leading to the creation of predictive models that are invariant across cultural context. One might think of its activities, given the legal determination of Part I, as more of an “immoral” “pseudo-science.” Starting from an abstract model (the principles of “neo-classical economics) that does not derive from experimental data and then searching for ways to justify the model is the antithesis of science. It falls into the realm of religion, propaganda, and ideology.

**Economics as a Pseudo-Science**

Ironically, the economic theory of “Gresham’s Law”, that weak forms of currency will drive out stronger formal ones, one of the narrow arbitrary “laws” of individual psychological behavior, that have crept into economics as “economic theory”, has an analogue in what has happened in the discipline of economics, itself. In its central teachings, arbitrary untested assumptions paraded as universal laws of behavior, dressed up in mathematics and jargon, have replaced the actual scientific method of observation and hypothesis testing of economic systems using real variables. What has resulted is either pseudo-science or a capture of another discipline (like the study of individual human behaviors that falls within the discipline of psychology) that is rebranded as “economics” (e.g. parts of psychology rebranded as “behavioral economics”).

Economists make their claim as scientists by relying on the approach of positivism and basic definitions that came out of physics. “Force” and “mass” are not immediately visible but are concepts that are established as the basis for describing interactions, abstracted from observation. Economists make the parallel but false claim that the “rational economic person” and their assumptions of scarcity are abstracted from reality in similar ways and that a series of interactions and relationships can be explained and derived as laws which follow. What makes economics a pseudo-science is that these abstractions and the interactions that follow are not subject to the same tests as in natural science where certain mathematical terms like “mass” or “force” can be described by observations of nature. Physicists test concepts of mass and force to derive measures of gravity and velocities. Their descriptions of matter are
subject to tests and description in its various forms and universal constants like the speed of light and gravity. Economists, by contrast, stop with assumptions that are contradicted by observable data in other disciplines that explore human behaviors and cognition (psychology) and that show how preferences are actually derived, such as from culture (anthropology) or genetics (biology). The charts in Part I listed the various assumptions of “neo-classical” economics and the observations of other disciplines that revealed them as fantasy, while noting that economists have nevertheless held onto them in defiance of objective reality and without any attempt to replace them following the established practice of science. To make the comparison clearer and to help reveal the failure of economics, consider the following as a kind of “thought experiment”. Imagine if physics started with the assumptions that are the basis of economics; of maximization of matter as a goal, or of scarcity or “limited resources”, or even of rational behavior of matter. None of these basic assumptions are units of measurement chosen as building blocks that allow for testing, the way that definitions of “matter” and “mass” and “force” do, as the basic assumptions of observations that physics set out to test. Were physics to have started using the same assumption approach of economics, what would be the result on modern physics and the study of the nature of matter or measures of the universe? The answer is that it would not and could not exist, because economics starts with a conclusion of a belief system rather than an attempt to study a phenomenon (like how different “masses” fall or attract each other, or how different “forces” act on each other). There would be no study of light as a wave and particle, as matter an energy inter-convertible, or the irrational behavior of matter, of anti-matter or principles of uncertainty because economic assumptions do not define things to measure and compare. Instead, they work to prevent actual measurements and comparisons. The result in economics is not only that there no testing, but that there is no attempt at neutral observations that are independent of the observer (in the case of economics, cultural and political biases.) The basic premise of science is that it must be replicable and culturally neutral, independent of time and place. Economics already defines itself as measuring and representing phenomena in the industrial environments where economists live, work, isolate themselves and their research and claim as the highest form of civilization. A physics similarly limited to only the elements found in a laboratory would not be physics.

It would be wrong to grossly overgeneralize to say that economics never contained elements of social science or that one cannot find social science in economics today. There is some science in economics as a social science. However, to be considered a social scientific “discipline”, its recognized work must follow the standards, methods and goals of science. Malthus’ Law on Population and consumption that was one of the discipline’s initial doctrines dating to the early 19th century is testable science with clear measurable variables even though mainstream economic doctrines today deny it and do not teach it. Game theory models of competitive behavior that have been widely propagated since the 1950s are drawn from observation and can be tested along with other psychological attitudes towards risk, reward (including gambling behaviors and impacts of taxes), and cooperation. Though some observers like Backhouse believe that game theory, itself, is the essential scientific model that is most widely accepted in the discipline, this scientific component of the discipline is still more likely to be found in international relations departments or in specific applications in business schools rather than in mainstream economics. That means that economists can recognize what science is and that they can employ it but if the discipline is “scientific” it must also distinguish the science from the non-science. It may be that all economists today use “data” and can be considered “empirical,” (Backhouse, 2010), but that does not mean that they employ the scientific method or that the data they use answers fundamental comparative questions. The problem with those major scientific approaches that have developed within economics is that they have not been formalized into the building blocks of the discipline in the way that Newton’s laws, for example, are basic building blocks in the discipline of physics. Nor have they swept away the doctrines that are still presented in introductory courses, are basic parts of the discipline’s training, and that are not taught with laboratory methods and subject to the challenge of the scientific method. They have largely been shunted aside as “political economy” and other marginal subareas. Further, much of the contemporary work today in economics that uses empirical methods and hypothesis testing is limited to industrial societies and certain production and consumption variables in ways that do not replace or challenge the
discipline’s basic non-scientific doctrines or that apply behavioral psychology to production and consumption decisions and then label it as “economics”. Where economists apply the scientific method and test hypotheses with data, today, it is largely through limited observations of some micro-behaviors (particularly psychological dimensions of risk and reward) with attempts to link minor variables to output and to look at industry behaviors such as learning and costs of scale curves, to conduct (with few ethical protocols) national experiments on investment strategies public and private, to examine national budgets, or to measure links between research and development and productivity. These are largely technical results to confirm what is often intuitive advice for profit maximization by firms or for national spending that is otherwise obstructed by the strength of political and economic ideologies. In that sense, it is also a form of pseudo-science that just confirms definitional relationships that are common sense. Often, the variables used are not hard, natural measures but are collinear variables of socially constructed objects like money and prices. Though these are not widespread in the discipline and do not lead to its classification as a science, they are at least a core of a future potential for recreating the discipline as a science. Even where these may be culturally circumscribed studies offering results applicable within a specific cultural context, they can show interesting relationships while confirming and measuring obvious impacts of law and regulation or on public human investments over military and social control expenditures on efficiency and productivity.

Although not widespread in economics, itself, scattered scientific studies of economic phenomenon can be found throughout other disciplines which also suggests that economics as a social science could exist. There are socio-biological studies of several economic phenomena among primates and other species – production, technology, distribution; hierarchies. Archaeology and economic anthropology have conducted comparisons of economic phenomena across societies. Sociology has looked at transition of economic systems in human history/ development of technologies; environment and technology; environment and consumption; economic relations across species. Ecologists now continue where Malthus left off with predictions of eco-system collapse; engineering technology studies and predictions of resource limitations and impacts. These are some of the scientific approaches that need to be pulled together with the existing science within the disciplines margins in order to build a discipline of economics as a legitimate social science.

Economic Engineering of Production and Domination

Although economics rarely describes itself as a technical field apart from its applications like “business school,” standard textbooks are offering policy tools and practical advice, specifically within a limited range of industrial societies and those subject to their political influence rather than to the wide range of questions that could compromise the applied social science of economics. A typical economics text today opens by appealing to students on the basis that, “Your understanding of economics will help you to make decisions about earning money and about saving, investing, or spending your money;” instructing readers on how to be good workers and consumers (Smith, 1991, p. xxiii). Another simply notes that, “The economist describes how our economic system works” (the italics added for emphasis) (McCarty, 1988, p. 4). Robert Solow, a Nobel Prize winning economist (in 1987), noted for his work on economic growth, notes matter-of-factly that “between 1940 and 1990 … economics became a self-consciously technical subject” (Solow, 1997, p.42) like that of engineering. The very basics of the discipline, of “supply and demand”, are really business concepts rather than economic categories of consumption and production that one would expect as the basis of a science. In my view, existing sub-fields of economics could actually be renamed to correspond with actual technical functions as follows:
Current (Euphemistic) Name of Sub-field of Neo-Classical Economics | Actual Technical/Engineering Role (Renamed in Plain English)  
--- | ---  
Micro-Economics | Corporate Market and Profit Engineering  
Macro-Economics | National Production Engineering for Corporations  
International Development/Trade Economics | Economic Globalization, Colonialism and Assimilation  
General Business Administration (Already Applied) and Industrial Engineering Subjects | Supplier, Worker, Consumer, and Government Regulator Manipulation and Control  

- Micro economics is a euphemism for corporate market concepts and profit engineering. Though the subject covers consumer demand, it certainly does not teach consumer organizing for market power or consumer and community protection skills, culture protections or economic rights and regulation.  
- Macro-economics is a euphemism for the corporate national production engineering.  
- Development economics and trade economics social engineering for globalization and urbanization of rural and minority cultures and for control over independent economies.  
- Business education and Industrial engineering are technical fields for worker, consumer and supplier control.

**Economics as Religious Faith, Acceptance of Rigidity, Inequality and Control**

More often than is consciously acknowledged, the teaching of economics introduces symbols and appeals based on “faith” that are most similar to those used in primitive magic, appealing to authority or acceptance of divine guidance in place of scientific testing and fact. The constant reference to the metaphorical “amazing invisible hand” described by Adam Smith in the 18th century when the discipline was rooted in religious teachings and taught by members of the clergy established a doctrinal tone in the discipline that remains today without a direct attempt to eliminate it. Economic doctrines, cloaked today in mathematics and jargon and inaccessible to the naked eye and testing of the layman are also to be accepted on faith as a form of acceptance of existing hierarchies of power and invocations to divine right that bestow legitimacy on market system empires and on economists. The common reference in economics to the “market” and its “invisible hand” invokes the Christian belief in an invisible “God” blessing Christian countries and assuring happy endings (Smith, 1776). This “invisible” hand is an extension of the benign “God” of the Christian New Testament that asks blind faith in its teachings, rather than in the constant challenges against the irascible “God” of the Old Testament whose power was continually subject to human reason. In writing about “capitalism” in describing the economics of Western Christian industrial societies, Max Weber even gave a religious benediction to economics in 1904, linking it to the “Protestant ethic” (Weber). The situation of the discipline in England and the U.S. with its restrictive focus on European industrial societies and societies copying or forced to follow the model, reinforces the doctrine as part of a socially specific religious ethic. Some economics historians note how even the language of the discipline has lost any universal objective quality as this recent quote suggests. “The term ‘economy’ is as specific to the English language as solidarité is to the French. If the various meanings of the word are obscure in English, their translation into most other languages is even more problematic. . . . Britain and America have dominated global capitalism in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries respectively and so, gradually, the peoples of the world have come to absorb something of their economic terminology as common usage” (Hart and Hann, 2007).

While any discipline can express certain amount of wonder at the construction of the universe that suggests some kind of divine choice – the properties of the carbon atom as seen by chemists and some of the paradoxes seen by physicists – the characteristic of a religion is that it creates wonder out of what can be studied and it substitutes faith for experimentation and explanations. The typical economics textbook begins by establishing this religious sense of wonder and magic about ordinary events, with statements like this one. “You can be almost certain that if you go to the nearest supermarket, both the corn flakes and bananas [you wish for breakfast] will be there waiting for you” (Smith, 1991, p. 17). In fact, there are complex set of explainable interactions at work here – hegemony, corporate power, government coordination, control over consumer choices, controls over the labor force. Much of it is environmentally and culturally determined. But that is not how these texts present it. Science, by contrast, allows for experimentation and rational explanation of all of these, but economics assumes away biological, cultural and political explanations, avoids experimental observation, and ascribes events to divine intervention and blessing of the producers. Everything is assumed to follow the motivations and activities found in the industrial cultures with the set of values where economists work. The discipline acts to confirm and praise that culture’s values, psychology, and interactions.

The divine faith propagated in the discipline is that the “market” finds a solution to all problems through its divine laws of supply and demand and that these create a divine form of autonomous regulation. Though some of these doctrines are discarded when events reveal their absurdity, the discipline of economics seems to immediately replace them with other beliefs to be taken on faith as one of the major political economists of the late 20th century, John Kenneth Galbraith, satirized. Galbraith’s history of economics notes how one of the long held religious beliefs that was sanctified as “law” in economics has now reappeared. The early doctrine was “Say’s Law”. Say’s Law postulated on faith that supply of products in an economy would always equal demand and lead to full employment (Galbraith, 1987) as part of the magic and miracle of the market. That “law” ultimately came face to face with a bit of reality … the Great Depression of the 1930s. Though Say’s Law was discarded after the Great Depression, it has since been replaced by new doctrines of economic faith such as the “Kuznets curve” and other fantasies to sustain the theology of globalization, of industrialization and of laissez faire economics. These new laws again ask for faith in the “market” and “growth” as forever sustainable, with productivity always rising to meet consumption demands, with new resources always replacing those that are exhausted and with the poisoning of the planet always being reversed by a newly appearing technology to be produced by the “wealth” that resulted… at least in the long run. Realists note that “in the long run, we are all dead” and that once humans die out from the exhaustion of resources, the failure of science to meet the needs “on demand” and the catastrophic impacts of pollution and war, there certainly will be a balance at “zero” but economic dogmas are continually generated to deny the reality by averting attention to the history of collapse of past economies and cultures. One scholar putting these contemporary economic dogmas to empirical test, but outside the discipline of economics, refers to them as “toxic omissions” and promotion of “cancerous growth” (Nguyen, 2008).

The reliance on mathematics as the language of economics also fills a religious function that is seen in religious activity in other human societies. In many cultures, magic and the power of those wielding it are reinforced through the use of special language known only to a few, revealed in incantations and “spells”. In physics, mathematics serves to measure and explain through formulas so it is used as a way of demonstrating relationships between physically measurable substances. In economics, however, it serves to hide the lack of empirical content and to create exclusivity among its practitioners through a common use of obscure symbols. Like the use of Latin by the Church and in legalese among lawyers, and the length of time studying it, mathematical equations have become the abracadabra of economics in a way that gives it a religious character.

In addition to the discipline of economics using the techniques of religious institutions, it also maintains some of the dogmas and assumptions of the Christian Church, itself, out of which it arose. One
way to make the distinction between economics as a science and economics as a continuation of the
principles of the Christian Church is to look at how the discipline treats the evolutionary principles
of Charles Darwin to see if the discipline ever really broke with the church and accepts the idea of humans
as part of nature and of evolution of social systems following natural processes. The key difference
between the Church’s view of humans and that of human sciences is the break imposed between the
natural/animal world and humans. Sciences assume a continuity of forms that allows for comparison
along with causality that explains human systems as a product of natural, environmental factors. The
Church assumes not only that humans as a species are not comparable to other primates or animals and
lack shared characteristics of other species on earth, but that human decisions are independent of nature
and that “God” or humans cause events, thus reversing the logic of science. The discipline of economics
not only starts off with assumptions of completely independent human choices, not only free from nature
and any kind of genetic or other determination but free from society and culture as well, but the focus on
modern industrial society also seeks to detach societies today from human history and from cross-cultural
comparisons. In this way, the discipline of economics reflects both the Church’s assumption of causality
and its separation of study of economic behavior of humans in “civilized” societies from similar
economic behaviors of animals, primates, or non-industrial human societies. It postulates the idea of a
linear, teleological evolution in which societies all move towards a single industrial form that is at a
“higher” level than other cultures, such that its assumptions do not have to be tested on less complex
societies and that study of political science, psychology and anthropology can also be de-linked from it.
In fact, economics is not alone among the “social sciences” in discarding basic scientific assumptions of
causality that are consistent with Darwin’s theory of evolution. Other social science fields today are
discarding science and choosing “moral models: in the “humanities”; substituting the assumptions and
teachings of the Church in order to avoid any form of deterministic, predictive and scientific explanations
relying on nature and comparisons (Andrade, 1995).

Economics as a Reinforcing Political Ideology of Imperialism, Inequality, Dislocation and
Disempowerment

One of the easiest ways to distinguish social sciences from ideology is to use a method suggested by a
linguist, Noam Chomsky. By definition, ideologies are taught as “isms” while science is simply presented
as law. Physicists don’t teach “Newton-ism” or “Einstein-ism” or “mechanics-ism.” They teach
Newton’s laws and Einstein’s theories that are testable as law. Economists teach labels of “isms”:
capitalism and socialism, monetarism, free market liberalism, and, in critique, Marxism. In doing so,
they are teaching ideologies.

The doctrines taught in economics and the conflicts of interest they represent are described in Part I of
this article. The analysis of “neo-classical” economics as in violation of the consensus on international
law and substituting self-interest of the profession, linked to the wealth of specific elite groups in specific
societies, is the very definition of promoting an ideology rather than a science.

A more common critique is that the values promoted by economists are not simply economic
exploitation and genocide but themselves reflect the “system” of “capitalism” as a specific ideology.
Despite social science debunking the idea of economic “isms” as distinct choices and as recognizing
significant differences in the workings of mass industrial societies, the idea of the existence of such
“isms”, that they differ, and that systems can freely “choose” all aspects of their economies without any
form of determinism, economics (and many other disciplines today) hold onto this belief as part of its
ideology. In Part I, I offered comparisons of teachings in past and contemporary empires to demonstrate
that the doctrines of economics today are really those of economic self-interest and imperialism that can
be found in almost all other industrial empires, but economists and political theorists readily describe their
teachings as fitting into a coherent set of beliefs that they in fact admit are ideological. These ideological
beliefs are largely imaginary constructions that describe competing trading blocs without clear definition
or scientific basis as to their applicability or origin. They reinforce the idea that economics is motivated
by a desire to offer and “compare” ideologies even where they are illusory, fantasy beliefs that may not even reflect real or actual choices. Most introductory economics textbooks offer comparisons between the U.S., described as a form of “capitalism” with the Soviet Union and China, as well as Japan, and sometimes Sweden, representing some kind of “mix” of public oversight, consolidation and coordination, public benefit and political power, without reference to particular political relationships or environments. All of these books seem wedded to an ideological supposition that these economic systems are easily distinguishable by their “choice” of economic ideologies from among these limited models of industrial societies in very different geographies and with different resources and niches. Without explaining the nature or causality of these choices or the contexts in which they arise, economists appear to make value judgments and labeling of these systems based on their own interests in rising in the systems where they work. In teaching these “isms,” economists make no attempt to reveal the material conditions in which they arose, the deep structures of the societies where they exist, and how these ideologies fill a social function to reinforce the social order. They make no attempts at actual observations of empirical reality of humans in individuals and groups/cultures. Nor do they examine their own role in how these teachings work to distract attention from the impacts of these ideologies on human cultural survival and diversity, on sustainability, on social and intellectual progress or on adherence to international law. Indeed, in his work seeking to predict the evolution of industrial economies, Karl Marx found very little difference between the two stages that he described as “monopoly capitalism” and “state socialism” and one wonders if he even could have found a meaningful difference between the economies of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States, would he have lived to apply these terms (Baran and Sweezy, 1968). The creation and manipulation of this false debate in place of science and actual moral choice and creative thinking is itself part of the political ideology of the discipline.

Summary: What has happened in economics to result in this failure of the discipline to fill its appropriate functions?

At the root of the failure of economics to promote science, rule of law and sustainability is a tension between the different approaches to social functions in industrial and traditional systems and the rooting of industrial cultures in non-industrial traditions that kept cultures stable without long-term planning. Today, this need for industrial social systems to have the science and technology to adapt to changes that could threaten survival along with the religion and ideology to define what long-term survival, (and progress), mean on the one hand, and the need for maintaining social order and stability continue to compete with each other.

In the area of religion, ideology, and morality, the search for long-term values to protect humanity has been blurred with the rituals and teachings of faith in preserving the existing society and power structure, even where that structure may be immoral and in violation of human goals (sometimes because of it). In allaying with power, religion becomes a promotion of blind beliefs in an existing order rather than a set of principles for long term identification and protection of human moral values like universal law that protect human survival beyond simply the short term survival of a particular society.

In the area of science and engineering, the goal of societies for balance and harmony sometimes restricts science in order to prevent its findings from leading to rapid changes in the social order and in beliefs. In those cases, technology begins to serve an established order or a particular social group for particular ends (military, control, or simply pleasure consumption). Where science becomes suppressed, it can itself begin to adopt the attributes of religion or pseudo-science, with mathematics and jargon taking the place of real experimentation and model building.

In modern society, where science serves to explain and control the laws of nature for human enlightenment and adaptation, the role of humanities is to apply the moral beliefs of universal law and progress to the use of science (technology) to assure that it serves humanitarian ends. In such a society, ideology serves not to promote a certain class or self-interest but to reinforce rule of law, universal law and human moral principles as well as adherence to the scientific method.
In trying to understand the factors at the basis of this tension in order to seek means of reconciling it and restructuring disciplines and the institutions that pressure and influence them, it is important to look at some of the history and institutional workings of economics as a discipline.

The History and Evolution of the Discipline of Economics as a “Moral” Discipline Self-Described as a “Science”

In creating their own shared version of the history of economics, economists have invested in telling a story that focuses attention on the narrow aspects of the discipline as applied only to modern societies and certain contemporary institutions. In doing so, they have promoted ideological goals in the place of science that did exist in the discipline’s history but that was and continues to be marginalized. Though scientific approaches have occasionally entered economics, as have concepts of science, alongside different moral and political principles of various times, economics has moved to maintain itself as the immoral dismal non-science. Given the success of industrialization in increasing the power of modern empires, the role of economics has largely been one of maintaining the social order of these successful empires through ideology and religion, rather than preparing societies with the science and technology for the economic failures that were predictably bound to occur.

The focus of the following interpretation of the history of economics is on the myths that economists have created about their own discipline. Their own story-telling is in parallel to the discipline’s actual activities – avoidance of empirical study and use of available methodologies to do such study. Focusing on what is missing reveals what economists have feared and how their discipline’s ideology and religious precepts have worked, while helping to better understand how to challenge and replace them. This focus challenges whether economics was ever a “moral” discipline (intent on principles of law for long term human adaptation and survival) and whether it was ever a science and helps to reveal where it failed and why.

Overview: Examining the History of Economics as a Discipline and Measuring its “Progress” and Change

Given that much of the history that economists tell today of their discipline focuses on its “moral” aspects, though it fails to meet the international consensus of morality that is enshrined in international law (the subject of Part I), it is fitting to ask where this idea of “morality” comes from and how it is to be measured as well as where the story told about the discipline’s history comes from and what measures and definitions are used to establish what is included and excluded.

Today, in a time of rapid technological transformation where technological progress is often viewed as modern religion and where technology has brought longer lifespans and political power to those who embraced it, there is a tendency to believe that industrial societies are achieving social progress on a similar linear trajectory, and that technological process implies social progress. At the heart of economists’ telling of their history is this hidden assumption that the promotion of “productivity” and “technology” is also the measure of success of the discipline in its “moral” goals. In fact, technological progress and social progress are quite different and often at odds given the potential abuses of technology (Lempert, 2016). Technology can also progress even in a culture with limitations or restrictions on science. While social science would seem to be necessary for social progress and for human adaptation and sustainability, the development of social sciences does not seem to be linear, either.

What is presented as the history of economics today, by economists, is not really the history of all economic studies. It is, instead, the “lineage” or “ancestral history” of the discipline of economics as self-defined and subjectively selected by those who are anointed in that discipline, today. It is the “official” “corporate” history. It largely excludes everything that isn’t part of a written lineage of teachers and pupils starting with some upper class British authors, slowly widened to include a number of mostly
American males, though occasionally challenged by other Europeans, from the start of and following the industrial revolution.

Trying to examine the history of “economics” is problematic. Today, it is possible to measure and analyze the activities and doctrines of those who call themselves economists. At the same time, it is possible to list all of the appropriate functions (presented above in this chapter) that the discipline should include, and to look for them elsewhere, even if the might go under other names like “ecology” or “ethology” or “environmental policy.” Doing it for the past, however, is difficult.

As an ideology and “religion,” economics has invested its effort in diverting attention from the economic activities of the real world in order to shape a particular dogma and doctrinal vision of the world with hidden assumptions about social progress. In the official history of the discipline, economists do the same thing in creating unverified assumptions about what constitutes “progress” in the discipline itself, by detaching measures of the success from the discipline in answering fundamental human questions about economics and society and substituting measures of prestige, influence, and narrowness. Examining the history of economics requires establishing baselines of what the discipline sets out to do in answering scientific questions to meet human needs and in focusing on where there were real advances. In looking at their created version of their history or “lineage,” it is important to focus not on what economists themselves include but on the significant economic studies and social science tools they leave out.

The Creation Myth of Economics: When Does Economic Study Really Begin?

The histories of “economics” as told by “economists” often start with the word that names the discipline, “economics.” The assumption is that none of the activities of the discipline existed before the creation of the word, nor for some 2,000 years after! The very naming of the word “economics” establishes part of the mythology of the origin of the discipline that rewrites the history in a way that establishes it as something European.

The word that became “economics” in English and is similar in other European languages, comes from the ancient Greek, “oikonomia” meaning ‘household management’ (“oikos for house; nomos for law/custom/rules). It implied “the imposition of order on the practical affairs of a house, usually a large manor house in the countryside with its slaves, animals, fields and orchards” (Hart and Hann, 2007). But this was only one word in one language. It is one that itself limits the study of economic activity to the later pattern of the discipline that focuses on specific units of economic activity and their management.

Though modern economists do not recognize it, there certainly was a science (and a technology) of economics before England’s industrial revolution. There probably were several. In the same way that there was medical science, chemistry, architecture and engineering in early civilizations, proven by the archaeological record even without formal writings, there also had to be a science of economics and probably were more than one. In the same way that it is clear that there was a subject of architecture in early civilizations even without the texts of architects, because of the existence of infrastructure and monuments with engineering complexity that required the existence of a profession with teachings, the same is true if economics. Societies that had industry, division of labor and public works had to have economists to coordinate these activities.

Kings have always had had economic advisors. They systematized all kinds of public contributions and tax systems of different peoples in their empires, taught the princes who later became kings, and based their reputations on the effectiveness of their advice. That means their teachings had to be systematized, recorded, measured and tested in some way. There would have been parables and parallels based on observations of nature, on animals, and competing groups. That is economics as a science. There may already be efforts to compile and contrast the early teachings of these economists from the archaeological record and from ancient texts. If there aren’t, there should be as a way to partly re-establish the track of the discipline and to partly help systematize economic data from other civilizations. Perhaps the 17th and 18th century British scholars writing on economics started to analyze the history and
it has now been purged. Or, perhaps they began the purge in an effort to eliminate or discount approaches before theirs that may have been empirical and that may have invited direct, detailed comparisons between the British Empire and imperial economic systems of the past.

The British scholars who are viewed as the first economists had classical and religious education, likely reading the Bible and texts in ancient Greek and Latin, and they would have recognized their profession in biblical historical accounts if they had wished to do so. At least one economist is fairly clearly described in the Bible as an economic advisor along with some of his advice in ancient Egypt, more than 3,000 years ago. Joseph, one of the early “Hebrews” was an economist who went to ancient Egypt to work as an economist. He advised the Pharaoh on stockpiling surplus for distribution to offset regular flooding of the Nile as part of a national insurance system funded by public taxation. It isn’t known how sophisticated a mathematical system he used for insurance calculations, how he apportioned the tax, how he compensated the collectors and the overseers of the warehouses, how he viewed convertibility of different goods based on nutritional value and likelihood of waste, how he stored and apportioned seeds for replanting and so in, but certainly he had to calculate and recalculate these based on experience. When faced with requests for monumental public spending, military spending, religious functions, and research and development, he almost certainly faced the same questions that public economists face today. Certainly, there would have been comparisons with other Middle Eastern peoples that could even be seen as experimental knowledge as the “science” of economics.

In the same way that the Romans learned from the Greeks, Egyptians and Babylonian Empires, and probably from the Chinese and Indian civilizations, and in the way that Renaissance Europe resurrected the scientific teachings of the Romans and Greeks, there probably would have been an attempt to transfer and build on earlier knowledge of economic science. Almost certainly, there were economic principles of public administration that had direct benefit to rulers and their societies, making it rational to invest in this area of knowledge and to protect it like other areas of administrative planning, such as military strategy. While modern economics has largely served as an ideology to promote elite interests and the social order, its sub areas of business administration and public economics are developed because of the direct benefit they offer and this would have been the incentive for the historic development of public economics. There were certainly scientific principles of taxation, labor and land use in early civilizations. The Bible also records early land laws and environment rituals, taboos, and sacrifices and of bride prices and security systems like the levirate and sororite. In the Biblical texts, the Sabbath is described as a day of rest from work and its functions. Though they might have been called by other names and had other tasks, “economists” and others practicing “economics” were essential to the development of these systems.

The real question is, what happened to these branches of economics such that they were not recognized as such by the early self-recognized British “economists” and such that these areas of inquiry were not directly merged with the scientific method to form a real social science of economics at the time of the industrial revolution? Why were questions about incentive systems, hierarchies, distribution, investment, social security and risk not at the basis of what became economics? Why were questions about labor shuttled off into sociology, questions of sustainable adaptation placed in biology, and those of equality and distribution isolated in political science, with economics becoming abstractions about the “economic man” and “scarcity”? Did the idea of comparative science just not fit the Church ideology of supremacy of modern industrial Christian society and did the Church act to make it a rarefied isolated subject? Did the idea of labor rights and spiritual intellectual values other than wealth maximization and greed not fit the political ideology of slavery and worker exploitation that the Church wanted to promote as part of what Weber called the “Protestant Ethic”?

Was there an idea or predisposition, from the start of “modern” economics and social sciences to split social science disciplines in ways that reflected ethnicity, religion, social class and gender? In the U.S. and elsewhere, disciplines are themselves stratified. In both the Soviet Union and the U.S., for example, Jews are highly over-represented as human rights lawyers and business lawyers while the dominant ethnicities in those societies (Russians in the Soviet Union, Europeans in the U.S.) are prosecutors.
Sociology, addressing issues of labor market opportunities and deviance, largely attracts educated minorities and women; the same groups seeking to rise in multi-cultural societies (empires). Anthropology has become a discipline of minorities and women, promoting issues of identity of these groups. Did this kind of ethnic and gender coding of disciplines that is visible today also work to direct economics at its origin, and did it become an embedded underlying part of the “deep structure” of the discipline, beneath its real content?

In the histories presented by economists themselves, of their own field, including those that study the history of the discipline from the perspective of “morality” or study it as a “moral science” one would expect to find similar clarity as to the definitions of “morality” and “science” and analysis of the role of the discipline (e.g., Alvey, 1999). In presentations of the history of economics by anthropologists in the sub-field of economic anthropology, one would expect to find a contextual analysis of economics, looking at its social role throughout history in terms of structures and functions (e.g., Hart and Hann, 2007). But most of the histories, even by critical thinkers like John Kenneth Galbraith, seem to be recitations of the “Great Works” of the field in histories that are really an ancestral lineage of high priests who define what they do as economics (Galbraith, 1987).

The “Year Zero” and Mythical History of Economics from the 18th Century

Most of the histories of economics as told by contemporary Western economists start with Adam Smith and the idea of economics as a moral philosophy in the 18th century, rather than a science. Yet, they seem blind to the very moral (political) philosophies of the 18th century as much as to the scientific advances and approaches that characterized the era at the start of the industrial revolution. These histories don’t mention any great scientific discoveries or theories other than those of (ironically, the Reverend) Thomas Malthus. Malthus appears early on the list, usually just after Adam Smith, who is often viewed as the founder. Malthus’ scientific approach and then its disappearance are usually an unexplained anomaly.

Adam Smith’s work appeared at the time of the emergence of the political philosophies of social contract, political equality, and group rights (in the U.S., the “anti-Federalists”) and of the American and French revolutions that apparently inspired Karl Marx in his economic analyses but these questions are surprisingly absent for almost a century in the earlier lineage. These public rights and law movements were the real moral philosophy of the day and directly linked with ideas of economics—land rights, taxation, accountability of economic actors. Yet, these public concerns do not appear in economics, as if the discipline resisted these secular trends and remained isolated, somewhere else, perhaps in the church. It is as if the emergence of economics or at least the historical rewrite of the discipline is part of a determination to detach these concepts of equity, community, and accountability from those of economic control and to establish a competing ideology that perhaps can be used to protect upper classes and new emerging economic institutions like corporations. Perhaps economics emerged precisely to counter political philosophy, to oppose scientific movements of the time and to promote an ideology that fit the religion of upper class Americans and Europeans. One could speculate that there were religious and class variables at work, with the ancestral economists representing wealthy Anglo families affiliated with the Church, while Marx, in sociology and outside of formal economics, was from a family of middle class Jews.

Adam Smith’s “moral philosophy” of economics was apparently the ideology of the aristocracy of the British Empire and is reflected in his statement of the discipline’s goals: “the great objects of the political economy of every country, is to increase the riches and power of that country” (Smith, 1976b, p. 372). If the contemporary approach of “deconstructing” is used to try to explain what are viewed as the founding goals of the discipline of economics, what one finds is neither value-free science nor direct religious morality. It is the ideology of empire. It is this ideology that appears to have remained central and continually reaffirmed in the doctrines of the discipline. Smith viewed the British empire, despite its enslavement and genocidal economic doctrines, as among the “civilized and thriving nations” where
“even of the lowest and poorest order … may enjoy a greater share of the necessaries and conveniences of life than it is possible for any savage to acquire” (Smith, 1976b, p. 10). This went hand in hand with the civilizing mission of the British Empire to covert the remaining subjugated peoples and slaves. The goal of economics was “growth”. It was not legality, equity, increased choice, sustainability, science, spirituality, or happiness. Even today, Western economists writing about Smith describe these views of empire as a “value-free science,” based on the “fact” that humans behave in a rationally self-interested manner (Alvey, 1999).

For the next century following Smith, little of the work in the discipline of economics is viewed as having lasting influence. Malthus, who was prominent in the early 19th century at the start of the industrial revolution, the rise of corporations and urbanization, became the first professor of what was then called “political economy” in England. Unlike other economists who followed him, it is not only his science that makes him anathema to the economists who followed him, but probably also his humanism. Like the anti-federalists in the U.S. (agrarian farmers like Thomas Jefferson, promoting community rights), Malthus’ moral values as a reverend were to protect communities and lower classes.

Histories of the discipline do not mention any predictive models that can be seem as essential building blocks for the discipline nor do they list disciplinary questions and their relevance to all societies. Histories of economics largely avoid study of the specific role and impact of the discipline in terms of the policy advice offered and at what level, at who studied and funded the discipline, on who it served and how. They do not discuss the growth of business school education and other technical fields of the corporate state or of other social sciences and how different questions were distributed among these disciplines, with the relationships changing. Also left out of these histories are explanations of how labor and class issues ended up in sociology and how ethnic groups entered that field. Similarly absent is discussion of the growth of legal and jurisprudence movements (including “legal realism”) of the 1930s, and various studies outside the discipline of corporations, concentrations of wealth, and organized crime (Berle and Means, 1933; Mills, 1956; etc.) along with the responses to them. Attempts to rebuild a joint discipline of political-economy and to raise larger questions of regulation and equity are also apart from the discipline’s history (Lindblom, 1977). In a sense, these histories like the discipline, itself, appear in an isolated bubble without minimal reference to social and historical context, its relevance or application, or its actual social functions. They create an isolated pristine model that exists in a vacuum, making value choices as to what gets included without setting a standard of what constitutes the boundaries of the study and where and how it is found. The general impression is that economics remained a toy of the upper classes for their amusement and justification of the existing order. That, itself, is a religious function.

The Shift of Economics Away from Malthus and Science and the Development of Its ideology: The Political Realities of Concentration of Economic Power with the Industrial Revolution that are Missing from the History of the Discipline

What might explain the anti-science turn in the discipline after Malthus, roughly fifty years later in the 1870s, is contact with political reality and the attempts of economists to serve emerging economic power. Economic historians note two major “political economists” after Malthus and before economics separated itself from “political” (and legal) concerns of equity and protectionism; David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. While both are described today by disciplinary historians as “influential” thinkers, the reality may be the opposite and a purposeful attempt to justify the alliance of the discipline with wealth and power. Malthus invented a theory that created the scientific subfield of economic demography and it was shunted aside. Ricardo and Mill, like many other similarly praised “influential thinkers” of the past and today, offered no new science but may have simply risen to fame by writing the justifying ideology of the elites of the time or promoting that ideology through their actions. In the renamed United States (previously, “these united States”) the 1860s marked the de facto end of community rights (federalism) with the victory of northern industrialists in the civil war. In Europe, industrialists similarly triumphed against the workers of the Paris Commune in 1848 and against other uprisings against the concentration
of State power under industry. Among the legitimating rhetoric of this new political reality is the work of John Stuart Mill in which the tyranny of the urban majority and their industrial culture is euphemistically termed “utilitarianism.” It is this philosophy and its terminology – the promotion of this abstract “utility” over rights, freedoms, sustainability, and happiness – that has ultimately merged into the basis of economic doctrine and goaded its illegality ever since. As with Smith’s work that was nuanced and not so easily subject to characterization in its own time, parts of Mill’s work seem to have been taken out of their overall context in order to serve the ideological function of the discipline.

In contrast to Malthus’ thinking that seems to have represented the Enlightenment ideals of the 18th century, this new ideology attributed to Mill and of economists is stark. Human fulfillment and happiness in all of its forms – scientific discovery, art, invention, passion and health – are reduced in this new economic philosophy to the lowest common denominator; the “util,” the unit of usefulness in this new theory of “utilitarianism.” Mill, himself, was not the originator of the philosophy of utilitarianism. It dates back at least to Jeremy Bentham, a political philosopher writing at the time of the French revolution (Bentham, 1789) Like Bentham, Mills believed in individual rights and other political ideals of the late 18th century (though not in the idea of “natural rights.”) But, as a political economist, he brought the essential idea of “utilitarianism” – the majoritarian principle of gross or aggregate benefit, “the greatest good for the greatest number” – into economics where, along with individual (economic) rights, it has merged into contemporary “neo-classical” economic doctrine.

Mill introduced the concept of the “economic man” as a wealth maximizing machine along with the concept of “utility” that ultimately brings everyone and everything to the lowest common denominator. Despite all of his caveats, Mill offered this ideology that has been at the base of immorality and greed in economics and that makes it appear acceptable. The idea of “greatest good for the greatest number” has been heralded as a democratic approach for urbanizing society despite its violations of contemporary international law. It perfectly fit the ideology of the northern merchant class in the U.S. civil war and fits, today, the destruction of native peoples, their communities and cultures, as well as rural life. Though Bentham and Mills might have been shocked to see how their idea could have been twisted, in reality utilitarianism is an easy ideological cover for majority tyranny and the ideologies of “Red” and “White” fascism. The imperial ethic common to Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia and to the U.S. empire has been promotion of “gross national product” for “national benefit” to meet the “democratic” goals of the majority (and now the urban global majority). There are other more generous interpretations of John Stewart Mill but whatever Mill’s actual intent it seems that economists were intent on using his ideas for these political purposes. Some critical economists today believe that Mill’s actual writings, partly like those of Adam Smith, are selectively quoted and twisted well beyond their actual intent in order to serve business interests, today. Herman Daly actually lauds Mill for supporting the idea of a “stationary state,” non-growth (sustainable) economy, that was replaced by a corporate ideology and fantasy of unlimited “growth” as the key to the greatest good for the greatest number in distortion and suppression of Mill’s actual belief (Daly, 2011).

Even at the time Bentham was writing, when the U.S. threw out its Articles of Confederation, that protected community rights, and established its more centralized Constitution, the federalists and the country’s mercantile imperial agenda were already victorious over the anti-federalist, agrarian farmers and individual political and social rights advocates. The 19th century began to mark the capture of government power in the U.S. and Europe by industrialists. In the U.S. civil war, the industrialists of the north took control. As one of the later European countries to industrialize, in the Russian Empire/Soviet Union, the Stalinists ultimately declared a “war” on the peasants (including the “holodymir,” the imposed famine and starvation of millions of Ukrainians) in establishing their control.

What is interesting about the establishment of utilitarianism as a basic doctrine of economics is how barren and minimalistic the concept is. As much as economists point to the diversity of products and desires they claim can be expressed in the market to be purchased with money and generated through productivity, the real essence of their vision of humanity is summarized by their real measure of value in
life. It is the “util.” They live in a uni-dimensional world where the richness of human existence is reduced and valued in common units.

**Economics as a Religious and Political Ideological Movement During the Era of Western Industrialization and Colonialism**

Given the missing history is the presentation by economists, one can understand the actual history by looking at the religious, economic and political currents in Europe and the U.S. over the past two centuries. The gaps in the history of economics as a discipline can be understood by examining the religious and political ideologies that shaped economics and other social sciences from the beginning of the mid-19th century in which economics is described as being born in Western countries, with economic largely paralleling and reinforcing existing beliefs and powers.

**The Church’s Ideological Challenge to Economics and Its Suppression of Science and Social Science that Continue, Subconsciously, Today**

In trying to fully understand why Malthus’ scientific approach disappeared from economics, specifically during the era of modern industrialization and science, perhaps the answer also lies in looking at the scientific developments of the 19th century. One of the major scientific advances of the 19th century is easily linked to Malthus’s work and could have promoted continued development of economics as a social science, but that have been written out of economics and out of the discipline’s history. But it was also anathema to the Church.

In 1851, Charles Darwin published “The Origin of the Species” (Darwin, 1851). Biological adaptation is, in fact, a perfect segue from Malthus and demographic economics; Evolution adds a missing element into Malthus’ equation where population and production grow at different rates. If societies can’t increase production, they need to change consumption in order to re-establish a balance. Darwin observed how other species dealt with the same problem. Species adapt to change their ecological niche. In addition to regulating population and seeking ways to change production, humans can also change their ecological niche. This is the history of human evolution and Darwin wrote on it later (Darwin, 1871; 1872). It is also the history of cultural change that is central to the study of real world economics and economic history. With Darwin, like Malthus, natural science merges with social science to address the issues of environment and adaptation; human economic successes and failures. Theories and data appear for examining how economic systems have worked throughout human history and pre-history. The power of Darwin’s work in biology and in extension to human biology and human individual and group behaviors (i.e., the basis of social science) is that it offered a theory to look at group adaptations of humans as well as individual adaptations within human groups, including relationships with real variables of climate, geography, and with other species. Given this breakthrough in biology and the opening of the door to the social sciences, the question to ask is, “Where is this work found economics and in the history of economics”? Shockingly, the mention of Darwin is actually used to reverse his scientific findings of multiple and diverse adaptations (adaptive radiation) rather than to incorporate it into a social science. Darwin’s work in economics, rather than being welcomed to propel it forward, becomes transformed into a false, anti-scientific legitimating rhetoric of industrial societies as part of a linear evolution that makes them unique and not subject to study or comparisons (Morgan, 1877). In other words, Darwin’s work was and is today used to justify the already existing theology of the Church, of humans as unique and of urban (white) societies as unique in themselves, detached from nature, not subject to comparison, shaping environment rather than being part of it or evolving within it.

The scientific approaches of Malthus and Darwin were and are not only a challenge to Church doctrine, but also to the elites in industrial society who are essentially aligned with the Church. Empirical study and scientific theory were and are a potential threat to power because they reveal it and because they challenge the blind faith in its legitimacy. If human societies simply evolve to fill niches, the power of Christian industrial societies is not a divinely bestowed choice. It is random. That means that the
societies being enslaved and whose resources are exploited are not “inferior” but have just adapted to
different niches. It means they have equal claims to humanity and rights.

If there were any 19th century economists at all who were trying to continue the scientific traditions
and infuse concepts of rights as well as to try to look at evolutionary processes and predict them, the most
well-known was probably Karl Marx, whom economists do not recognize. Marx, himself, should not
have been seen as an outside threat to the discipline, but he is seen as outside of their history. In fact, was
not really promoting the idea of ethnic identity and rights, even though he was a minority. He probably
sought to repress identities and to promote industrialization as a way to end the pain of ethnic
discrimination (Lempert, 1998). It is his representation of an empirical tradition, his studies of political
power and that his raising political rights questions in the discipline that probably made it essential for
economics to try to eliminate all of these approaches in one sweep.

The pseudo-scientists representing power, and the Church, propping up that power and benefitting
from it, had to react to Malthus, Darwin, and Marx’s scientific approaches to economic issues, and had to
eliminate them or face social change that would have made them irrelevant. So, it is in the 1870s that the
major reorientation of the discipline of economics occurred that broke it away from politics and from
science and establishes the doctrines and approaches that dominated throughout the industrial era. It was
at this time that economics was repackaged in form and content, as were other social sciences.

The Distortion of Science in the Name of Science: The Modern Packaging of Economics Supporting the
Supremacy of European and American Industrial Imperialism

A number of different political and religious beliefs seemed to merge in creating the core doctrines of
the discipline of economics in the late 19th century in ways that reinforced the American and European
empires as higher stages of “development” and “evolution” and promoted the institutional power of the
emerging industrial administrative corporatist state. The approach restricted comparisons, accepted the
Church’s approach to causality (detached from natural variables and deterministic processes), and split
the discipline off from political science as part of a “specialization” that also eliminated political and
distribution questions and study of the links between economic and political power. While it is difficult
to separate out the different institutions and ideologies that were at work in the 19th century as Western
empires industrialized, taking an outsider’s perspective on ideologies and institutions and the purposes
they may have served, allows for the generation of some hypotheses as to what was really going on in
economics at the time. Rather than take philosophies and ideologies as given and look at their internal
logics, a political and sociological look at different institutions and the roles they served for different
professional and social groups points to what may have been going on in the discipline. This perspective
helps to place the change in economics as a discipline within the context of the politics of the time (real
power that economics would have served), suggesting that the transformation of economics into a
(pseudo) science was a way to free it from moral and political challenges (particularly of those believing
in natural rights). This perspective also suggests how this new (pseudo) science also protected the Church
and elites from challenges brought by real science, including Darwin and biologists who would have
supported minorities and the environment against the damage wrought by industry and empire. It
suggests how economics also fit itself into the same kind of doctrinal order based on faith and divine
legitimacy as the Church.

The Real Politics of Industry and Empire Driving the Transformation of the Discipline of Economics
since the Late 19th Century

Rather than face new competition, the empires of Europe increased their global dominance with the
rise of industry. The position of different empires changed in relation to each other, but the idea of
empire and the economic power they represented continue to grow. At the same time, it is in the 19th
century that corporations began to assert themselves as legal persons with the rights of persons in direct
challenge to the laws of Adam Smith’s time that saw corporations as government chartered institutions to
be subject to direct public oversight. When corporations took over production and the State regulated it, the discipline became a study of the regulation of corporate productivity and the technology of doing so in the interests of the owner class of this larger “household.”

Following the civil war in the U.S. and the triumph of the industrial northern states, the new individual rights laws that gave equality to African-Americans (the 14th Amendment to the U.S. constitution) also gave birth to the idea of rights of the illusionary “corporate person.” With the conquest of community rights in the U.S. came a strengthened ideology in economics of individual rights that began to see individuals and corporations as the basic economic productive units and not families (family farms and businesses) or communities. This new idea of individual rights was reinforced and neutered in the discipline by the economic doctrine of the rational economic actor and it fit the needs of an urban, industrial economy.

**How the Transformation of Economics into a “Science” Detached it from Legal and Moral Challenges**

William Jevons in Manchester, Carl Menger in Vienna and Léon Walras in Lausanne, writing in the early 1870s, became the new voices and faces of what became modern economics. Their names are little known today outside of economics, probably because they invented little of permanence. They worked to package the discipline as a pseudo-science by introducing mathematics as its form. At the same time they reduced its content to minimize the scope of study and to eliminate most empirical study. The paradox of the discipline is that while it began to incorporate mathematics and statistics, it moved farther away from real world measurements and economic concerns that might have challenged its doctrinaire beliefs. First, it anointed itself as a “science” without any moral oversight. Then, it manipulated actual science to fit its doctrines. Then, it used certain doctrines of the Church to give it a religious legitimacy, to create itself as an order of faith and to prevent scientific challenge.

Jevons’ goal was to incorporate “a perfect system of statistics” to make the discipline “an exact science” and a “mathematical science” with more and more precision about less and less (Jevons, 1970, pp. 84). Maybe this is a partly a misreading of Jevons and he did hope for an actual science but even giving him the benefit of the doubt, he was still unable to articulate the proper variables and problems of study that would have met the requirements for economics to be a “social science” “discipline”. Assuming Jevons’ intentions actually were to turn the discipline into more of a science, the problem with his approach was that he began by making suppositions about human nature without measurements and by offering philosophical essays rather than testing hypotheses. In other words, he was introducing the language of science but without the scientific method that was essential for actually doing science. Jevons and his contemporaries began to reinforce the ideological doctrine of contemporary economics that started by identifying “economic value” and looking to “maximize utility” rather than studying actual economic variables about how economic systems and individuals placed in different hierarchical, functional, gender, age, and other roles within them actually behaved under different conditions.

Economic historians describe the emerging methodology of the discipline at this time as one of “positivism” which implies use of the scientific method (Alvey, 1999). But “positivism” is a slippery concept since it incorporates many aspects of the scientific method and it hides what these economists actually did. In their use of “positivism,” economists essentially distorted scientific objectivity into something closer to religious subjectivity and then claimed that they were meeting the requirements of science when they weren’t. Buddhists also claim that they follow the scientific principles of viewing reality and then meditating on it so that the basic principles underlying it emerge in their sense of universal truth. But they do no hypothesis testing and no controlled experiments or even thought-experiments using data. They view their extraction of principles as akin to science but it is not. Buddhists say this is similar to what physicists do in imagining basic concepts that can be used in their equations and it may be, but that is not enough to qualify it as science (Capra, 1975; Pirsig, 1974). Economists say they are doing the same; that they are using this introspective method and then building equations in a field in which controlled experimentation and hypothesis testing are (in their view)
impossible. But that does not make it science. In critiquing science and social science today and throwing it out, anthropologists use this comparison and say that science is fundamentally no different from religion since it is based on a subjective abstracting from reality that is not really objectively verifiable. The fallacy is that real science does have a standard for objective validity and testing. It establishes common, universal measures and applies comparisons and tests to yield repeatable results. It distinguishes between ordinary observations and measured observations and between arbitrarily extracted principles and those that can be used for comparisons. Where controlled experiments are impossible, it finds ways of using data for simulated experimental comparisons that allow for the extrapolation of results. In eliminating experimentation, empirical measurements and comparisons, and hypothesis testing, economists were left with what they viewed as “neutrality” and “agreement” but that they also distorted to mean agreement by those within their doctrinal order.

What seems to actually have been going on in economics is that the idea of “science” was really being used to eliminate moral and humanistic concepts from the discipline so that it was free to represent particular ideological interests. As one historian explains, “a mathematical science of economics came to be seen as the logical alternative to a moral science of economics” (Alvey, 1999, p. 26). The real goal of promoting “positivism” seems to have been not to promote science but to eliminate the idea of “natural law.” Here is where the legal concepts introduced in Part I help to interpret what this debate might really have about.

When “natural law” was first posited as something universal, it really was offered subjectively. Ironically, in the same way economists say they extracted certain scientific principles from nature, legal scholars say they extracted certain principles from nature about law in the form of “rights.” The two systems were apparently derived in the same way but each was claiming superiority. Eventually, they split apart from each other as political economy eliminated ideas about rights and equity from its study. Which side was right and what was really going on?

Today, there is little talk about “natural law.” Instead, certain ideas of “rights” are described as “universal law.” In fact, some of the “universal law” of today is really the “natural law” from the 18th and 19th century, with a significant difference. Many ideas about rights were originally posited as natural or “God given” and offered on faith. But, in fact, today, these principles can be tested against standards of human survival. That is how, in Part I, the validity of “universal law” in areas like cultural diversity and cultural rights were easy to distinguish from attempts by economists to deny them. Rather than being simply subjective beliefs, some rights concepts actually fulfill long-term human survival goals. That allows them to be commonly recognized as universal principles. Rather than being “natural”, they are in fact recognizable as “universal.” If these universally help principles meet the logical test of promoting long-term human survival in ways understood by all cultures, then they are in fact “natural” and “moral.” In some societies, the same tests can be applied to equality and individual rights, using the mathematical idea of symmetry and suggesting that those societies also best survive when they support egalitarian principles that promote equal opportunity and diversity. In those societies, such a principle (e.g., the “Golden Rule” of symmetry) would be “moral” and even seem “natural.” In the 19th century, the “natural law” scholars weren’t able to use such scientific justification to defend the legitimacy of those natural laws that represent “universal” principles and those that are moral guides to science and other disciplines in the context of industrial societies. Lacking that armor, they were unable to force economics to incorporate their principles in order to meet universal law and the moral principles of activity in industrial societies. So, economists were able to claim their assumptions as “natural”, though they are not.

Economics’ opposition to “natural law” and the ability to undermine its legitimacy, actually meant that the concepts of “rights,” “equality” and protection of diversity could be driven out of the discipline as “unscientific” even though they were fundamental goals and needs for the survival of humanity, while other precepts that undermine human survival were incorporated as the basis of the discipline.

The legacy of this split not only had ramifications for economics. If economics was able to claim itself as a science and to denounce the application of moral and legal standards as something “unscientific,” then the natural sciences and other disciplines could do the same. In fact, even though the
concept of rights has more of a scientific basis than the approach taken in economics, the disengagement of morals and rights standards from science meant that any kind of abuses were now possible in the name of “objectivity” and “reason.” If it was legitimate to strip humans of all of their actual biological drives and behaviors, including those of community and relation to nature, and to redefine the moral study of humans as limited to selfish economic motives that could be viewed as “rational,” then it could be considered equally moral and acceptable to treat humans as fungible chemical compositions that could be turned into soap with little remorse.

In splitting off political science (political economy) from economics, not only were questions about natural rights eliminated but so were questions about the political impacts of accumulation of economic power and the controls needed to put it in check. Questions of ownership, of externalities, of community values, and many others were simply eliminated from the scope of the discipline in one fell swoop.

Though these questions seemed to have continued independently in political science and government administration for some time, as well as in some remaining combined departments of political economy, political science ultimately seems to have copied the approach of economics for similar self-interested purposes and these questions have also largely disappeared. The recent transformation of political “science” into a mathematically based discipline that also avoids empirical study and comparisons the natural world, human genetics and evolution, and questions of community, equity, and law, seems to be in an exact parallel. The two cases appear to represent the same adaptation to similar phenomena. Splitting political economy into two disciplines appears to have ultimately trivialized both in the name of “dividing up variables for study.” One can analogize what has happened to splitting the periodic table in half and claiming that chemistry was becoming more scientific and specialized. Political science variables, like those of economics, that are not placed in holistic context and are not measures of relations between biological, environmental and other real variables and behaviors, ultimately lead to trivial or preposterous results. Such results serve only to distract from reality and real prediction and adaptation, and to legitimizing and supporting power within a specific existing system.

The kinds of debates that raged in the 1960s and affect social science today – of science being fundamentally anti-human because of the ability to reduce humans to an inventory of chemicals that can easily be turned into soap in the name of “objectivity” and “neutrality” – were resolved in economics in a way that gave a moral stamp of legitimacy on a pseudo-science rather than allow for a humanistic, morally accountable social science. That opened the door to attack on social sciences that actually were doing social science, unlike economics.

It is ironic that what has happened in anthropology and other social sciences is how their reaction to this choice in economics has resulted in a failure at the opposite extreme. They have now rejected social science today (and science). They have turned to what they call a “moral model” of humanities that has no fundamental grounding because it has also become detached from the ideas of universal and natural law and accountability to the goals of human survival and progress subject to measurable standards. Like economics, without any scientific standard, they have drifted to a version of pseudo-science that exists for specific methodologies rather than the scientific method. These failures exist side by side using “moral” rationale in different ways to render an amoral result.

How the “Science” of Economics Denigrated and Distorted Existing Scientific Approaches and Deflected Scientific Challenges, Fitting with the Ideology of the Church and Opposing Political Challenge

In responding to scientific challenges posed by Darwin and the social, cultural and political interests that this science in fact represented, economics also delegitimized cultural rights and individual rights and diversity in a way that supported genocide and inequality. The approach was to delegitimize population-demography studies like that of Malthus, and other related fields, to prevent any comparative study of cultures (existing and historic) and their economic adaptations as well to prevent any comparative study of early humans, or primates, and other species and their economies, as well as their relations to each other and to their environments. Creating the study of industrial societies as unique in themselves and not
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comparable, with no testable hypotheses about alternatives and no empirical study of the reality of how they worked to shift attention from the legitimacy of other societies as well as connections to and value of nature.

Darwin used study of biology to suggest that humans and human societies could also be compared to animals as a way to understand basic underlying processes. Darwin’s theories posed challenges to the existing economic and political order by reinforcing the idea of “natural rights” that economics wished to evade. The idea of life as simply “process” meant that hierarchies had no independent “divine” legitimacy. The evolution and adaptation of individuals and species represented a fundamental equality of all things that reinforced the idea of natural rights. Indeed, the very concept of cultural rights that has become part of international law as a universal principle, comes directly out of Darwin’s science. In the theory of evolution, the rise of primates and humans was a random event that is one of several responses to cataclysmic changes on earth in which complex forms of life disappeared when confronted with abrupt changes. Human survival, like the survival of other species, requires constant adaptation to change, and that adaptation is best served by evolution and diversity. Cultures have equal rights to survival on the basis of their “natural right” to be part of the natural process of evolution and adaptation that Darwin documented.

What economics did in the 19th century was to substitute a new view of Darwin. This new view justified empire and inequality while limiting study to an abstract concept of humans as something entirely separate from biology and environment with the ability to entirely shape the aspects of economy in ways that were completely removed from nature and actual consumption or biological needs. In the place of nature was the creation of an abstract, non-existent “rational man” in an economic system of paper money, products, wages, and factors of production, in an industrial system representing the “highest stage” of social evolution and the only one of any value and worth considering.

Lewis Henry Morgan’s view of “social Darwinism” (1877) came from outside of the discipline of economics and never directly become part of its teachings, but it entered the discipline in other central works such as Rostow’s “stages of growth” (1960) and the “Kuznets Curve” (1955) that remain part of the doctrine today. Darwin’s description of evolution as an adaptive and “radiative” process with evolution following no specific teleology of increasing complexity, was replaced by a model of evolution as linear and progressive, with a moral implication that equated complexity and technological superiority with moral superiority and “progress.” Rather than classifying economic systems by their adaptability and comparing processes, economists accepted this linear view that corresponded with the ideas of the Church; that humans are superior to and separate from animals, that industry and urbanization is superior to agriculture, that technology is superior to simplicity, and that “development” is a linear evolutionary process measured by technological complexity and military superiority rather than by these and/or social, legal, and political changes. This reshaping of the concept of humans and of nature eliminates the historical evidence of advanced technological societies continually collapsing and disappearing due to their unsuitability to their environments and their inability to adapt to change or to damages that they caused. It replaces it with the false belief that technological empires are a continuous stream of successes that have conquered nature (and human nature) and are invulnerable.

The linear evolution model not only serves to create hegemony and reinforce an ideology of superiority (and uniqueness) of current industrial powers, but it also helps cover up the missing science. If economics were a science, it would need to look at animals, primates, history and change to understand the commonalities and differentiation processes as well as vulnerability. The idea of linear evolution is a way to quickly dismiss this gap and cover it over while promoting the supremacy of European (“Western”) industrial empire over “primitive” societies and vulnerable minorities who needed to be “cleansed” out of Europe for reasons of “hygiene” and “purity.”

In the 1930s and 1940s when the global depression and World War among countries that had traded with each other gave impetus to a return to science to understand economics, the arguments defending the myopic approach of economics were very similar to those of the Church. One of the defenders of economics, Frank Knight, argued that comparisons between large and small societies (let alone with the
human historical record and with primates and the animal kingdom) had no validity because of the specific nature of industrial societies as an advanced form unto its own (1941). It is this argument of “modernization” and incomparability that has also invaded other social sciences today in ways that also prevent such comparisons. In the same way that the Church stopped Galileo and the advance of medicine by preventing dissections and comparison with animals, economics trumped science and defended doctrine. The natural sciences ultimately gave way, recognizing that there could be no space program without the chance to first send animals into space, and there could be no medical advance without first testing on animals. Economics stopped these challenges by upholding a doctrine that opposed evolutionary principles, reversed causality, and prevented the entrance of real science.

How Economics Institutionally Established itself as a Religious Order of Faith, Similar to and Aligned with the Church

In preventing scientific challenges to economics, the keepers of the doctrines of the discipline had to find a way to assure uniformity and to punish deviance and challenge within not just its doctrine but its institutions. What they did was to redefine “discipline” to mean obedience to doctrine and replacement of the scientific ideal of continually challenging doctrine with facts. To do that, it had to adopt the methods of advancement that were already part of the legacy of the university system that came out of the Church; a system of sacred texts, hierarchy, “peer review” with no outside accountability or challenge, and a blind worship and faith in the sanctity and divinity of the doctrine.

In the ancestral lineage history of economics, the reason for starting with Adam Smith and the “invisible hand” may be precisely because of the alliance of economics with the Christian Church and with the mythology that echoes the Church belief in “God” and the “Holy Ghost.” Even though they come out of the Bible, if economics were to start with Joseph and the Egyptians from the Jewish Old Testament, Malthus’s scientific approach to population and famine and Marx’s combination of science and moral questions would immediately have legitimacy. Starting with Adam Smith changes the lineage, creates a link to the Christian New Testament, and establish the discipline as one based on “God given” doctrines based on faith. In order to understand economics, one cannot do empirical testing of one’s own. One needs to be led by the priests of the discipline who have employed a special process of thinking that only those advancing in the order can appreciate and employ. This system produces certain ordained truths that are then tested through rigorous “mathematics” that also requires special study. Rising in economics (and thus in affiliated political power) is tied to the blind faith in certain assumptions and methods. It is a system based on hierarchy and faith.

Those who “have faith” (i.e., believe in something contrary to normal human experience) and substitute it for reason and empiricism, will accept any dogma given by a hierarchy. The Church understood this when it established the rituals of allegiance to invisible spirits and belief in the “virgin birth.” Those who are willing to accept a belief like a “virgin birth,” and of “Heaven,,” are then likely to accept other beliefs from similar authorities that require dying for country rather than for morality and lie, and protecting superiors/elites. It means agreeing to kill eco-systems that are the basis of life, destroying human diversity, and inflicting pain. In economics, for adherents, it thus becomes easy to deny and override the basic principles of international law and civilization as well as to accepted the discipline’s myths of sustainability and “progress” in the face of contradictory evidence and theory. Indeed, some of the more basic doctrines of economics that have no relation to reality, such as that of endless “growth,” can be directly analogized to the Christian belief in Heaven. Rather than offer redistribution and opportunity that was an original belief of “Christianity” (the Jewish teachings of Jesus), the Church aligned with the State and offered the poor an ideology of benefits in the “afterlife” in “Heaven” as a reward for obedience, sacrifice, submission and support of inequity and power of colonialism and empire in Christianized countries. Today, the poor are offered the ideology of “growth” and “trickle down” benefits as a similar belief for their compliance. If they agree to support the demands of producers and the wealthy and accept indebtedness and sacrifice, they are told that unlimited “growth” will bring them a
share of future wealth, without any equivalent sacrifices from those with wealth and power. This future “growth” that they can expect (with its current and future social and personal costs that likely negate the benefits) are the mythical “Heaven” and “afterlife” (Daly, 2011).

Economic historians do not include the contemporary “hidden curriculum” of universities and other schools (the replacement of trade education of direct practical application and experiment with factory models (lectures and regurgitation of doctrine in closed settings) merging with the methods of the Church (the sermon and mass)) but the teaching of economics as a doctrine rather than as a laboratory, field social science taught using democratic, market mechanisms also reinforces the connection between economics and religion. With the emergence of economics as a “science,” the broad, interdisciplinary education of economists disappeared, putting blinders on those entering the order in both content and method (Lempert, Briggs et. al., 1995).

If economics is a religion following the model of Christian Church beliefs and if pressures for conformity to the doctrine are so intense, one might ask how it is that so many Jews are major economists and why, for example, someone like Joseph Stiglitz would also so blindly support principles that would oppose what one would think it central to Jews. The answer to that question is likely that minorities look to the discipline to rise and to demonstrate their loyalty. This is how minority groups in empires secure themselves. Though there is a seeming contradiction here, the logic of what has happened follows clear social science principles. Readers can consider the conclusions of my other pieces on this phenomenon in Cold War social science (Lempert, 1998; Lempert, 2015).

Economic Anthropology: Solution or Ideological Response?

One of the obvious places for a social science of economics and a moral philosophy of economics (consistent with international law and as a key to progress and meeting human needs) to develop would have been in anthropology, the most holistic of the social science disciplines. Though economics moved away from science and became increasingly narrow and doctrinal, there was an opportunity for the appropriate functions of the discipline to appear elsewhere such as in a science in anthropology or in any one of the other emerging social sciences in the 19th and 20th centuries. In the 1940’s, when anthropologists began to offer comparisons of different types of economies that could have addressed the predictive failings of economics and then again, since the 1960s, when anthropologists began offering a moral challenge to many disciplines and to ideologies of imperialism, there was an opportunity for anthropology to become the discipline that filled these gaps. But even with every opportunity to do this – in methodology, data, and self-definition of its mission of “culture critique” through comparison and imagination – the discipline of anthropology and its subfield of economic anthropology failed to do this. Somehow, economic anthropology turned away from the potential it had to replace economics and retreated to becoming simply a theoretical response that itself became characterized by the same shortcomings of the discipline of economics. One explanation is that anthropologists simply turned away from social science believing that any predictive work would be co-opted and used immorally and illegally against Native peoples and humanistic concerns (Duncan, 1995). Another is that the same social forces that co-opted economics also co-opted anthropology but in a different way. Instead of turning it into an ideology of power and a technical tool of elites, it was neutralized and transformed into a place where critics of power simply became marginalized storytellers.

To see what happened and why anthropology still has the opportunity to fill these gaps if it chooses, as well as the pressures and legacies it will have to now overcome, this section examines the state of “Economic Anthropology” today and why its current approach is surprisingly different from its promise. It reviews the history of how it got that way, and then speculate on how (and why) it failed in order to understand what difficulties also exist in transforming this sub-discipline to fill the appropriate roles that economics and economic anthropology have both abandoned.
What Economic Anthropology Is Now and Why it is Surprising

In turning to some of the basic texts that define the sub-discipline of economic anthropology, one finds initial basic statements, like these of the discipline’s mission, that sound very much like the role that the discipline of economics has failed to play. In the *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, for example, the definition on economic anthropology starts out this way: “Economic anthropology studies how human societies provide the material goods and services that make life possible.” (Narotzsky, 2001). Yet, as with economics, once the methods, assumptions of study, and the research questions are defined, what appears is something far from what one would expect to find in meeting the potential of the discipline as a social science and as a subject of the humanities. To see this, one need only start with the expectation for the sub-discipline and compare it to how the self-defined economic anthropologists, writing and teaching in this sub-field and as members of the Society of Economic Anthropology, today, actually describe what they do.

In its role as a social science, there was good reason to expect that anthropology would have filled the role described above for economics as a social science. Anthropology’s branches offered the data and the scientific methods and theories that could have built an economic social science, including human evolution and adaptation (physical anthropology), archaeology (the historical record of human economies), and social and cultural anthropology (comparative study of the roughly 6,000 existing cultures on the planet, today). Economic anthropology could have grounded the study of economics in material variables, links to the animal kingdom, to primate evolution and to human history. Anthropologist’s principle of cultural relativism, following Darwin’s idea of adaptive radiation of human societies in ways that see them all as equal rather than on a chain of linear evolution, could have continued where Malthus and Darwin left off and where economics went off track. Moreover, economic anthropology could have replaced the influence of the Church on economics that turned it away from science and reversed scientific principles of causality that explained human adaptation to the environment. Indeed, there were signs that anthropology started to do that in the 1940s and 1950s, but suddenly that ended. Yet, today, anthropology has also become entwined in an anti-science, anti-Darwinian, set of doctrines that have undermined any real challenge. The sub-discipline of economic anthropology has in fact, created itself as a parallel opposite to the discipline of economics, seeking to take over the moral ground but not the scientific one. That role has been left to other disciplines like Human Geography and Human Ecology, though their narrowness (described below) has rendered them inadequate to offer a real challenge.

In this moral role, anthropology could have also offered the challenge to economics that would have pushed it to change, but it has failed there as well. Anthropology sees itself today as offering “culture critique” by demonstrating how different societies solve similar problems in ways that moderns societies say are impossible or undesirable. On issues of distribution, opportunity, economic power, regulation, calculation of quality of life, and “progress,” anthropology has in fact offered critiques. But it has failed to go the additional step of imagining how modern society could move to different forms in order to better meet human needs in ways that are sustainable, in promotion of long term human survival, and that meet a larger range of human aspirations. Again, that role has largely been left to other disciplines like Human Ecology, or simply abandoned.

Instead of these goals and approaches, the definitions of economic anthropology offer only discussions of “power and meaning” (continuing the encyclopedia definition above) in place of prediction and offering of visions (Narotzky, 2001). Rather than define how economies work and how they could work, anthropologists look at the “spiritual meaning” as well as the “personal” and “social” implications of exchange relationships. This is not very different from the micro-approach that economists use for “supply and demand” and it has remained the basic approach now in this sub-discipline for almost a century (Mauss, 1925). It appears that economic anthropologists are co-dependent on the discipline of economics and that rather than create something new, they simply offer a theoretical rebuttal to the economists’ abstract definitions, such as those of “value”, by suggesting that material “values” are
insufficient descriptions of the complexity of motivation. Major debates in the sub-discipline are centered not on the new predictive models developed by economic anthropologists as a social science, or on what kinds of societies are possible, desirable and the pathways of achieving them. Instead, the debates are on philosophy, in rebuttal to the religious and ideological assumptions of economists on “value,” and on economic frameworks and their applicability, with attempts to update some of the critiques made by Marx and apply them to current processes of globalization. Most of my colleagues in economic anthropology offer new labels, a new jargon (rather than the mathematics and equations of economics) but little else.


For most of its history, economic anthropologists defined themselves in relation to the other, more influential discipline (Wilk, 1996), either using neoclassical theories and concepts in the study of traditional economies, or arguing that these were inadequate in explaining the economic behavior of people in traditional societies. This was the key issue in the polemic debate between substantivists and formalists that dominated economic anthropology from the late 1950s to the early 1970s.

There is no need here to try to unravel the debate between the “substantivists” and “formalists” other than to note again that it was not in the context of either social science or culture critique, but a diversion from both.

Today, economic anthropology, much like many other disciplines, is defined not by disciplinary question, hypotheses, and human needs, by a specific narrow methodology and an area in which the methodology is used without any mention of objectives or role. In anthropology, the method is “ethnography” or participant observation; qualitative recording of data. It is “empirical” but it is blind and not scientific because it reports and pontificates instead of doing hypothesis testing and comparison. The area of economic anthropology is “economic institutions and behavior” (Platner, 1989). Similarly, while studying urban societies and some economic questions within them, sociology today defines itself in its use of “questionnaires”. By definition, an economic anthropologist seeking to use questionnaires or looking at demographic or environmental data or consumption data to gain a picture of the holistic economic reality of a society, is defined outside of the discipline, while an intern in a soup kitchen writing a diary or an anthropologist recording attitudes about the potato in Russia or sugar cane in the tropics or the tin mines in Bolivia is considered an “economic anthropologist.”

These are no longer scientific approaches and do not apply the scientific method. Much as with economics, a specific methodology in economic anthropology has come to create the impression of a science but without the actual scientific method. Here, the method used by anthropologists – ethnography – is empirical but it lacks the essential elements to distinguish it from journalism (Duncan, 2012). The social science methodology of hypothesis testing, comparison, and experimentation has been stripped away. So has the idea of social modeling that was the basis of ethnography; the idea of writing an “ethnography” that viewed a culture (an “ethnic group”) in its whole and sought to reveal its workings by showing the links between various sub-systems.

Some sciences and social sciences isolate variables and look at causal relations and/or feedback relations. Others analyze systems and show the relationship between different functional components as they model those systems. In the past, ethnography was invented as a way of doing a systems analysis and then using the model of each system to provide data for making comparisons of specific variables (how climate might drive certain cultural choices) and for culture critique (to question whether certain systemic relationships and the conditions driving and allowing them, could be generated in another society and weighing their desirability). Anthropology and economic anthropology have now so circumscribed the methodology and so stripped away the context that it does little more than generate written data in the form of journalism, or even just journals (diaries or blog).
How Economic Anthropology Derailed Itself

Reading the history of economic anthropology is much like reading the history of economics. It appears that similar political pressures and cultural realities are operating in parallel in a kind of mirror imagery. While anthropology as a whole began to question the use of social science for imperialism and established standards and critiques of imperialism that were also reflected in the critiques that economic anthropology made of economics, the discipline also dismantled itself as a social science in ways that defanged any real challenges to the societies in which anthropologists worked. As the discipline of economics became an ideology to serve and legitimize power and to prevent scientific inquiry and challenge, economic anthropology voiced challenges but made itself innocuous and irrelevant by dismantling its own scientific inquiry, development of alternative models, and use of tools to try to achieve real change. By agreeing to be part of a debate, it essentially assured the authority of the (more powerful and well connected) system it claimed to be criticizing. Indeed, the criticism, itself, sent the message that economics and the powers it represented were in control and that little real alternatives existed. A real challenge would have treated the discipline of economics as a charade, replaced it with something of value, and used the tools of a real economic social science and engineering, combined with visions of alternatives, to try to achieve those visions.

Much like the history of economics that reinforces an ancestral lineage of an ideology that starts in the West and in the Church, the histories that have been published of economic anthropology, such as those of Hart and Hann, are written as examples of patronage networking and ancestor worship (2007). They list those who consider themselves part of the club, but avoid starting with the questions for the sub-discipline that need to be explored and the models that need to built and asking who does it, where, and why, and what progress has been made on the discipline’s agenda. In histories and textbooks of natural science, one finds the questions of the discipline and the story of experiments and building blocks in those areas, with some explanations of how failures led to the breakthrough experiments, laws, and theories which followed. In economic anthropology and in economics, much like the history of religious scholarship, one finds simply a linear retelling of arcane debates by those self-selected over time within the disciplinary order. The histories go nowhere other than recounting the agendas created by those with power. Similar to contemporary politics; the debate creates its own false reality and values rather than respond to a scientific agenda to answer fundamental questions about processes and change.

With some exceptions in the 1940s such as Herskovitz’s, Economic Anthropology: The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples (1940) and partly by works that still followed this line for about a generation after like Marshall David Sahlins’ Evolution and Culture (1960) and Stone Age Economics (1974), there was an initial attempt to establish a comparative science of economics that compared and contrasted economies using a number of different variables and structures. These served some of the scientific goals of a science of economics as well as moral comparisons and visions (ideas of leisure, distribution, cooperation and community). But, even by the time of Sahlins, they were already plunging back into theoretical debates over value and meaning in exchange relationships and away from understanding and predicting processes and adaptations.

Even before the contemporary movement to transform anthropology into simply story telling and away from social science, it had already turned to theory and away from science and challenge. One anthropologist has suggested that was an attempt to protect anthropological work from ever being used by empires again, as it already was being used at the time Sahlins wrote, by the post-World War II European empires of the U.S., France, Soviet Russia, and others, to use Native Peoples as Cold War pawns (Duncan, 1992). In Duncan’s view, anthropologists saw themselves as powerless to confront and try to change their own societies and decided it was best to destroy the discipline lest its fruits come into the hands of those with power, as seemed inevitable. Anthropologists could still have tried to create a moral social science that would challenge power in overall long-term human interests. They could have tried to demonstrate the value of an economic social science in improving quality of life and sustainability in much the way sociologists continued to demonstrate the economic futility of investments in prisons, war
and control systems, rather than education and freedom (at least until that discipline was transformed in the 1990s into one serving prosecutors, “criminologists,” wealthy interests manipulating jury systems, advertising, and political processes), but they did not.

Some anthropologists did make major efforts to collect and standardize data in what was the beginning of a major scientific initiative in the profession. Certainly, this data could have been used by economic-anthropologists as the basis for building a predictive social science. Though not complete, Human Relations Area Files still keeps records of kinship systems, geography and land use patterns, distribution, ritual exchanges, and production for a number of cultures, using information collected and standardized by anthropologists. Using such a basis, anthropologists could model how economic systems worked on the basis of environment and production, needs for labor and risks of labor, and on other economic questions. Yet, anthropologists have failed to use them for systematizations that would be used for the modeling of cultural clusters as economic systems and for revealing of mechanisms using the different kinds of models existing in the sciences. Anthropological models rely less on correlations and statistical models and more on what Levi-Strauss called “structural models,” that can partly be analogized to Gregor Mendel’s genetic tables for expression of dominant and recessive genes, and system models of linkages and feedback relations. Indeed, the standard anthropology textbook is still written like an illustrated dictionary that lists examples of various social and cultural forms by category but that makes no attempt at synthesis that would link these forms to specific conditions that would allow for predictions of where they would be found, or that would model how they transform in response to certain changes in conditions.

Without these models, anthropologists also failed in applications to contemporary societies, where the benefits of an economic social science would have been demonstrated and would have reinforced the value of such study. When Frank Knight challenged economic anthropologists who were studying primitive societies, by suggesting that small, non-industrial societies could NOT be compared with industrial societies, he may have triumphed over economic anthropologists for the wrong reasons (1941). Anthropologists studying “primitive societies” did compare them to each other and used their findings as a cultural critique, but they didn’t develop scientific models that would extend their findings to industrial societies for predictive purposes. They certainly could have modeled sustainability, abuses of power, cyclic behavior, hierarchies, and other phenomenon and could have created predictions. But, they did not. In part, they may have lacked the skills to do such study. In part they may have been bullied to avoid or not publish such study. In part, they may have simply faced turf battles with sociology, that defined itself as studying complex societies, and that created a split that worked to prevent real comparisons. Whatever the cause, economic anthropologists stopped dead rather than actually find predictive laws and develop the real skills to explain empires and industrial economies. They did their individual ethnographies and became experts on “their” “tribes,” but stopped short of using the scientific method to generate conclusions and predictive models.

As one recent economic anthropology text describes it, anthropologists distorted their agenda in studying small societies so that they were simply serving ideological goals rather than those of science. Though they were looking to show that other human alternatives existed, they weren’t active in looking at models of how large societies could actually transition but simply assumed the same causality as the Church, that humans could choose systems without exploring the real causal relations between the environment and human systems. As Hart and Hann explain it, “The purpose of economic anthropology, when still known as ‘the economics of primitive man’, was to test the claim that a world economic order must be founded on capitalist principles. The search was on for alternatives that might support a more just economy, whether liberal, socialist, anarchist or communist. Hence the interest in origins and evolution, since society was understood to be in movement and had not yet reached its final form” (2007).

In adopting the Church’s approach to causality, economic anthropology also implicitly accepted the Church and political establishment’s refutation of Darwin that had in fact been the mainstay of physical anthropology! In looking at “primitive societies” and differentiating them from industrial societies by suggesting that there were no laws applying to both, economic anthropology reinforced the idea of linear
evolution that undermines the discipline’s moral premise of cultural relativism and equality due to adaptive radiation. Economic anthropologists began to reinforce the idea of historical progression from hunting and gathering, agriculture and state formation, to “modern” industrial societies, with discontinuities between these.

What partly seems to have happened is that in the interests of criticizing economics, many economic anthropologists began to champion Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels, rather than develop their own economic science. Yet, Engels’ *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884) draws heavily on Lewis Henry Morgan’s *Ancient Society* (1877), and Marx’s work continues the idea of linear evolution of economic and political systems.

Where they now do work that has some attribute of science, economic anthropologists today are continuing to react to the discipline of economics rather than build social science. One widely heralded recent work among economic anthropologists, for example, is the “cross-cultural application of game theory” (Henrich et. al., 2004). What economic anthropologists like Heinrich now do is simply take the assumptions of economics (like rational wealth-maximization) and test them in other cultures to see if they hold. While that might generate the evidence that helps in a trial of economists for adhering to doctrines that violate international law, even when there is proof that they are erroneous, it does little to build economics as a social science. Yet, Hart and Hann herald it as, finally, an attempt to return to a “19th century agenda” and to “build bridges to economists and biological anthropologists.” Indeed, for the first time in more than half a century, it has enabled anthropologists to begin to publish in major economic journals (Hart and Hann, 2007). This explanation of hierarchy (why would anthropologists desire to publish in economic journals, and not vice versa?) may explain the motivating factors behind the failure of economic anthropology to do anything more than this.

Similar cross cultural comparisons beyond “theories of value” and motivation, are whether markets and money are universal, and how “exchanges,” consumption and private property are defined and designed. These have supplanted the search for laws of economic organization that were descriptive and predictive and kept the sub-discipline at a level of religious debate over starting assumptions and definitions. There have been philosophical arguments about “human nature” and its moral basis (Wilk and Cliggett, 2001) with critiques of theories but no synthesis of laws of cultures.

Though they claim to be driven by morality, economic anthropologists have largely failed to extend their critique to action. After almost a century of critique, some economists have now started to recognize the absurdity of their assumptions and to seek to add in “culture” (in what they call “community” or “social capital”) to try to resurrect their models. Anthropologists already had the real variables to describe the failure of economic models. Kinship and male dominance and grouping behaviors can explain corruption, but economic anthropologists did not offer the model. Fear of the “other” and definitions of identity can explain hierarchy and military spending as well as why current aspects of sustainable development and globalization are failing (Lempert and Nguyen, 2011) but such a simple relationship took decades to appear in academic literature. Relations between environment and political and economic choices that show that ideologies are the dependent variable and not the independent, explain the Russian and U.S. economies (Lempert, 1995), but this remains outside of economic anthropology. So do Malthusian and neo-Malthusian models of political economy, and many others.

Much of modern economics is ritual and pseudo-science with mythical beliefs about “free choice” and causality. Economic anthropologists have partly recognized the “primitive magic” at work in modern societies, but their approach has been their own form of doctrine, jargon, and primitive magic in return, in the very same type of university structures that also come out of the Church (Lempert, Briggs, et. al., 1995). Economists work with a limited range of variables – money, government spending, interest rates, taxes, regulation, investments, and simply measure the different impacts on other variables – employment, production, “satisfaction,” wealth, that have largely distracted attention from the reality of the collapse and unsustainability of modern economies. Economic anthropology had the chance to offer the alternatives with clear predictions and solutions. They had the chance to reveal the deep structures of
the failed systems and to begin to experiment and model transformative change. Works that tried, even within anthropology, were largely ignored and that sub-discipline has also failed.

**How and Why Anthropology as a Whole an Economic Anthropology as a Sub-Field, Failed to Fill the Role of Economic Social Science or Moral Ideology**

In a short analysis, it is difficult to distinguish the socio-economic, individual psychological and institutional forces that prevented anthropologists from building an effective social science challenge to economics and to other disciplines that failed to fulfill their roles. It appears, however, that the same social forces that worked to distort economics would have also been at work on other disciplines within the same university system, even if they claimed to hold to different beliefs. One can probably analyze the discipline of anthropology in terms of its funding and political power and conclude that it simply didn’t have the chance to offer a real challenge and that its members chose an opportunistic solution that appeared to offer a challenge while also protecting their careers or that they chose to use the discipline in what they thought (rightly or wrongly) was the “best” way to offer any challenge at all.

In some cases, anthropologists may have chosen to neuter the discipline in the belief that this was the best way to protect peoples who might be harmed by the science and technology they were creating (Duncan, 1992). Some may have believed that direct challenges to authority were futile and that it was still moral and possible to make a difference by confronting ideology and writing stories. That may be a delusion that contradicts some of the very principles of anthropology and social change, but without anthropology as a science teaching those concepts, perhaps the discipline’s practitioners really believed the ideology they substituted. Perhaps the discipline even began to attract those who were running from economics and other disciplines and simply sought a haven to exist.

Today, there are two clear taboos in anthropology that denigrate scientific explanations and also reinforce the Church’s attack on Darwin in doing so. Both are presented as “moral” objections and probably reflect a fear in how science is used that has led to a fear and purge of science altogether. They involve issues of biological differences in gender (the reality of “sexual dimorphism”) that women’s bodies are smaller and that there are also differences in male and female brains, and biological differences in race that mean that different ethnic groups have adapted to different environments. These are obvious results of evolution and they have important implications for economics. Bodies have genetically adapted to different economic functions. Yet, today, in a society that wants to promote equality in competing for all economic positions, there is a political desire to suppress the reality of biological differences and to assert that biological advantages and liabilities do not exist such that anyone can fill any position in modern industrial society. Of course, biological differences do not imply discrimination and harm, but the reality anthropologists see is that favored groups use evidence of difference to reinforce their advantages rather than to compensate for those differences in ways that promote equality and individual (or group) satisfaction. By suppressing the use of science, economic anthropologists and anthropologists suppress research on biological differences and, they believe, thus better protect their political interests. So, paradoxically and ironically, they ally with the Church, the institution that has promoted gender discrimination and racial discrimination, to suppress science in the belief that science, a system based on objective merit, will be used to support subjectivity and inequality. A better explanation for this apparent contradiction may be that despite what they may say about morality, economic anthropologists and anthropologists in general may be in direct alliance with economic power in a way that offers them personal benefit.

Perhaps, the discipline was also co-opted like economics, by political and economic pressures that rewarded members of the discipline for creating the illusion of reform and challenge while actually doing nothing to advance it, while driving out anthropologists who sought to do more. The placement of economic anthropology in anthropology departments today itself suggests that this may be the case.

While study of economics is fundamental to understanding living and extinct cultures and remains central to archaeology and physical anthropology, two of anthropology’s sub-disciplines, that study the material
culture and survival of humans and pre-humans in the past, it is largely peripheral to studies of living cultures. The part of anthropology devoted today to the study of living cultures is called “social and cultural” anthropology and it largely focuses on the social and cultural aspects of cultures that are merchandized as part of globalization rather than those parts that would see cultures as independent, sustainable, integral wholes with rights of existence. The study of dance, food, music, art, religion, folklore and “identity” of assimilating and disappearing cultures is the central part of the discipline while the study of their economies, their political systems (political anthropology), and their legal systems (legal anthropology) are de-emphasized or distorted. This seems to be a deliberate attempt by anthropology, itself, to marginalize resistance to globalization under the New World Order and to promote acceptance of assimilation into it. Culture itself is only identified by its remaining attributes that can be turned into economic products – ethnic restaurants, dance performances, art and music – without any assertion of fundamental rights that would challenge globalization and commodification of peoples. Thus, even the name for the sub-discipline no longer protects the ideas of cultures as functional wholes with their own land, economies, and political and legal systems but merely as high cultural artistic forms and social forms in the system of empires in which economists have high positions.

This may also be the reason why anthropology has failed to “study up” and include comparisons of behaviors of elites and their organizations, as well as of the real functioning of large societies, in direct comparisons with native peoples (Nader, 1982). Even the full editorial board of one of the leading journals in political anthropology recently worked to censor pieces that look at how industrial societies are “converging” in their political practices and denying rights. While laws openly allow for free speech of citizens to write about elites, the journal reversed the discipline’s very protections designed to protect the victims of globalization and elites and sought to use them to target the author of such comparisons. They claimed that writing about elites must include their informed consent (a misstatement of actual public law of free speech of citizens in writing about public officials) and they refused to protect the identities of informants on elite behaviors would not be protected (an attempt to put authors writing about elites and their families in direct risk of retaliation by elites, also in denial of the association’s ethics code).

Today, anthropology has largely become one of the disciplines used by the university for political purposes in hiring; offering an outlet for feminism, minorities, and gays to affirm their identities and for universities to appear to be meeting diversity pressures without any major transformation of disciplines or society. Purged scholars during the Cold War who critiqued economics and other disciplines (including those who taught the works of Marx) may have burrowed into anthropology as a way to hide in the same way that it serves as a collective of feminists, minorities and poets, today.

Whatever their individual reasons, the results in the discipline are also visible in terms of skills and abilities. One reason anthropology today does not accept science and does not offer a vision for industrial economies may simply be because the people now admitted and attracted to the discipline do not have the aptitude and are not encouraged to develop the skills that would enable them to analyze the complexities of modern systems. Though archaeologists and physical anthropologists often come with scientific and technical backgrounds and/or develop them in their training, social and cultural anthropologists who study and teach economic anthropology rarely combine their study of anthropology with any technical training in business, marketing, finance, management, accounting, statistics, engineering, environmental biology, materials sciences, or any other tools that would enable them to effectively analyze the transfer and use of resources that comprise the material and biological basis of economic systems. Nor do they have the training in the modeling of systems or the quantitative methodologies that would enable them to make effective analysis and comparisons of complex economic systems. The “experts” in economic anthropology blindly enter economic institutions and write poetry about their feelings or criticize the obvious without really knowing or understanding what is going on in the systems they are observing. They are left focusing on how workers are treated, on the intimate stories of human relations in organizations that are not really relevant to the deeper structure of the system, or how consumption is
fetishized, in ways that make what they see exotic but that offer no real comparative study of human economic systems. They are left with little other than journalism.

In some ways, the sub-discipline simply abandoned its potential and knowingly chose a political, ideological agenda of opposing the contemporary industrial system without being clear on what could be reformed or how. As one of the recent leading textbooks in economic anthropology describes it,

In *Capital*, Marx (1867) expressed humanity’s estrangement from the modern economy by making abstract value (money) the principle organizing production, with the industrial revolution (machines) as its instrument and people reduced to the passive anonymity of their labour power. Marx’s intellectual effort was aimed at reversing this order and that remains our priority today. (Hart and Hann, 2007)

Meaningless dualistic moral debates drive out any space for real change. They create the illusion of opposition without any real action or content. In many societies, debates are frames in terms of a contrived duality that presents entrance of alternative views and impedes any real action. The “opposition” argument may be a straw man for protecting the system as it is, or it may be used to create fear of change in that it offers something unreasonable or frightening. In some cases, it may simply offer a parallel version of what exists that partly rotates with another alternative to create an illusion of “change” that is really just a rotation of similar alternatives. It appears that economic anthropologists may have agreed to serve in this social role in ways that reinforced economics rather than offered real opposition.

Other New Disciplines, Filling the Gap?:

Human Geography, Human Ecology and Others:

It seems as if new university departments are being created every day in areas like “Peace and Conflict Studies,” “Women’s/Gender Studies,” “Human Ecology,” “Environmental Policy,” “Globalization Studies,” “Politics and Economics of Industrial Societies,” “Ethnic Studies,” “Nationality Studies,” “Colonial Studies,” “Sustainability Studies,” geographic area studies, and many more. None of them really claim to be “social sciences” (or claim really to be anything in the overall scheme of human knowledge and disciplinary approaches) though they do claim to be filling missing gaps or responding to perceived demands or needs. Some do come out of sciences and see themselves as professional or engineering disciplines (such as the energy efficiency components of Sustainability Studies), offering Masters of Science degrees. As new areas, they offer the potential to evolve into competition for failed social sciences elsewhere. Yet, for now, most of these seem to be ad hoc political additions to universities that address disciplinary failures by offering symbolic courses that represent specific ideologies or interest groups rather than seek to fundamentally correct the distortion of the social sciences. Like economic anthropology, they are subject to similar forces that seem to transform any fundamental challenge into just rhetorical responses. Though some do address some of the missing issues and approaches of economics, few seem to really be filling the gap for a social science of economics or a humanistic economics. In some cases, they may actually be making it harder to rebuild social sciences by continuing the fragmentation process that occurred with economics splitting with political science and with sociology splitting off of anthropology. Taking disciplines that started with holistic, systems views of human societies or of individual humans and began to split off and extract the variables, as economics did with political science and demographics and as women’s studies now does with gender and area studies does with ethnicity, makes it more difficult to look at processes and relationships and to build predictive, explanatory models.

Perhaps the closest to the different missions of economics are “Human Geography” and “Human Ecology,” which are bringing issues of sustainable development and relationship between societies and the natural environment to the forefront and that do seem to look at human societies in somewhat of a contextual, systems approach. Rather than split off particular variables for a political emphasis, they seek
to add in basic natural variables (geography and species) and to then examine economic systems. Both of these new departments (or sub-departments) are found in many universities and have their own journals. Part III returns to the larger context of the organization of the social sciences and humanities – or human knowledge into disciplines – to look systematically at what is missing and where rebuilding can occur. Here, Part II concludes by briefly looking at what these two sub-disciplines appear to do and whether they are or can be a place for the rebuilding (or replacement) of economics as a discipline.

The evolution and fit of these two sub-disciplines, “Human Geography” and “Human Ecology” is interesting because they are evidence of a disciplinary branching rather than strict approach to formalizing knowledge and inquiry. Geography fits somewhere among the natural sciences between physics and chemistry as an application of both to this planet, as part of the planetary sciences with planetary Geology. Similarly, Ecology is an extension of the natural science of biology. Both arise in parallel but not together to look at parts of earth; one at the face of the surface and its inorganic base and then the other at the biological systems that emerge on top of that geography. Both then independently add the human dimension on top of the layers they are studying.

Human geography maps humans onto landscapes and human ecology inserts humans as one of the species in a biological system. From there, the aspects of economics that are noted within each of these sub-disciplines are the type of economies on the geography and the impact of the economies on the ecosystems. Both of these kinds of studies are, of course, parts of economics that are missing from economics. They are real world, empirical economics in terms of relations to physical variables and to biological systems.

Yet, because of the way both disciplines phrase questions and work within subsets of larger studies, they are unlikely and unable to reconstruct economics as a predictive social science in all of its various elements, or as a humanities imagining the types of economics and their political and distributional elements that are possible, and how to achieve them. They are unlikely to discuss psychological factors or place economics in the holism of culture.

Human geography seems to be more concerned with demographic mapping that shows where humans live by different classifications on different geographies than looking at predictions of cultural forms that develop and how they change on particular landscapes. Much of the work today focuses on spatial patterns on land rather than the explanations of how and why certain types of human societies can be expected to be found under specific conditions. That kind of “mapping humans onto the terrain” was originally one of the goals of anthropology that could have ended up in economic anthropology but did not. Human geography does not currently fill that gap and is not likely to do more, but it could serve as a place for scholars who are seeking to do this in a way that anthropology currently seems unable or unwilling. One human geographer, for example, Jared Diamond, essentially takes archaeological and anthropological data of human societies in vulnerable geographic environments and tries to determine some of the factors that have led to collapse of their economies and of their cultures (Diamond, 2005). But he may be the exception to the rule and his work also focuses on the geography and human impact on the environment rather than on how cultural practices actually work to collapse or protect economies, or on how results could be predicted.

Human ecology addresses one of the fundamental questions of economics that follows on Malthus – the “carrying capacities” (maximum human populations) in different environmental niches with different technologies, and also includes measures of human energy usage within those environments (Ehrlich, Ehrlich, and Holdren, 1973; Hardin, 1993; Schumacher, 1973). It also moves partly into areas of zoology and genetics to look at some basic concerns of human adaptation and community (Hardin, 1977). Yet, it also appears to appear to avoid the predictive and developmental questions of human cultures that are missing from economics as well as other key economic questions that one would expect to be part of this discipline, such as the co-evolution of humans with different species (e.g., the domestication and co-evolution of humans with wolves/dogs and felines/cats) and the rise of different types of economies, though it may be partly moving in this direction (Brown, 2004). Its focus is largely limited to that of “sustainability” measures of populations as ways to engineer them appropriately to their environment,
which is a technological application of economics that could certainly supplement what is really now a
discipline of “national production engineering” that doesn’t address whether that productivity is in
balance with a particular environment and consumption pattern (cultural choice). But it lacks the social
science questions of prediction and change (Arrow, et. al., 1995).

Human ecology is partly a response to and an extension of economics, complementary to
environmental and social accounting that have been adjustments to economic growth measures (measures
of “externalities”) but that don’t ask the larger questions about sustainability, cultural choice of
consumption and production patterns, and how they develop and change. The result on economics itself
has been to simply adjust current measures with additions like “natural capital” and “social capital"
without changing the ideology or approach. Kenneth Boulding (1970) and Herman Daly and Joshua
Fairly (2003), with their “index of sustainable economic well-being,” following William Nordhaus’
“measured economic welfare index” (2000), have been among the pioneers here in trying to refine
growth accounting to incorporate environmental measures of various types, though the approach is
limited to measurements rather than to changes in approach. Other indicators continue to appear that
more fully incorporate externalities and social costs into measures of economic growth, such as the
“Genuine Progress Indicator” used in the U.S. State of Maryland (2011). Though economists still don’t
accept measurements that would challenge their doctrinal beliefs and accept different cultural preferences
(such as Bhutan’s “Gross National Happiness” indicator), there seems to be an attempt to merge or co-opt
the human ecology approach before it would challenge economics and become an economic social
science and a humanities raising additional moral questions about distribution, choice, hierarchy, and
change among human and other biological populations. Overall, human ecology goes beyond
environmental economics to use a systems dynamics
approach to model economies within environments,
though it stops there.

More recently, some of the frustration with economics has led scholars to try to create new names for
human ecology approaches that would encourage economics to start with these perspectives and perhaps
to rebuild economics. There is a movement called “economology” (and other attempts at “econology”) to
try to create an economics of ecology, starting in the other direction from economics. Thus far, these
seem to be human ecology by a different name, under economists, rather than a coherent attempt to
rebuild economics from first principles of social science and humanities.

It seems clear that a more systematic approach to recreating the discipline of economics. These
approaches thus far are offering important work that is missing. One can’t really expect existing scholars
to start from first principles and recreate something outside of their knowledge and comfort zones based
on a template and a schedule. To do that, someone needs to offer first principles, establish categories,
outline the kinds of questions and problems that can be addressed in those categories, and attract the next
generation of scholars by demonstrating the importance and logic of particular work and by inspiring
and encouraging it among those entering a discipline in transition, with the excitement, opportunity, challenge
and risk that it brings.

In fact, in starting from first principles, it becomes clear that that there actually is quite a bit of
material already that has been produced that could fit into a new discipline of economics, but it is not easy
to find. Some of it is indeed in Human Geography, in Human Ecology, in Economic Anthropology, and
on the margins of economics, itself. Other work is in demographics, in biology (animal behavior and
particularly primate study, and genetics), architecture and design, energy studies, urban planning, political
science, sociology, history, and area studies. The moral approach of economics, that is not social science
but that can work with it, can be found in the humanities like philosophy and fiction (particularly science
fiction of imagined worlds and their economic and political-economic systems). The problem is that it
has not been collected into any discipline and where it appears it bears the stamp of the discipline
promoting it rather than a link to economics. There is certainly much more than any one scholar,
certainly including the author of this piece, can possibly be aware of and have the chance to collect, given
the need to be versed in so many disciplines and to have the time and inclination to follow the literature.

Trying to establish this framework is the task of Part III.
18 [Editor’s note. See some of the other articles in this issue for specifics.]
19 In applying to various programs in law, business, and anthropology in the 1980s and 1990s and then teaching in these fields and in other social sciences, it was clear that the disciplines offering the highest salaries (the professions) attracted students with the highest aptitudes for quantitative analysis, logic and systems thinking. They also attracted more highly motivated and competitive students. Students studying in anthropology are not chosen for analytical or mathematical or scientific abilities or aptitude, nor do they express any interest in such critical thinking. They are largely attracted by the chance to write or film, and particularly to think about and proclaim their own identities.
Is Economics in Violation of International Law?
Remaking Economics as a Social Science

Part III
The Rebuilding Process for the Discipline:
Where Economics Fits and What is Missing

David Lempert, Ph.D., J.D., M.B.A., E.D. (Hon.)

Introduction to Part III

Perhaps one might ask whether the world is better off without economics at all and should just dismantle it, put its high priests behind bars or at least retrain them for something useful for which they may be suited like mathematics, though some critics of the discipline even disparage its mathematics. Given that the discipline has caused so much harm, maybe should transform itself into something innocuous like the poetry and story-telling that has now become the mainstay of anthropology (Duncan, 2012). Or perhaps, they should be left to their own prescriptions, to find non-existent work in the global economy while relying on the miracle of “the market”.

Economists have claimed they could make work life easier, increase human health and happiness, promote peace and higher pursuits (paradoxically, science and morality), safeguard and increase wealth and harmony with existing resources. They claimed they could predict business cycles, smooth depressions and disruptions, stimulate innovation, adaptation, and diversity. Even though they may have lost sight of all of these and replaced them with benefits for a few, all of these questions remain, along with many others about the kinds of economic distribution and security that are possible, the process of transferring resources away from war and to peace, and of balancing human needs with nature, and others. Simply because a discipline has turned to criminality does not mean that it cannot be rebuilt to answer those fundamental questions and to develop those technologies that it originally claimed it would offer and that fill an important social role in building a better world.

The U.S. has been the center of the discipline of economics for most of the past century, following leadership in the field from Britain. It has been a field that developed and served two empires, the second of which is now collapsing. It appears that the global system that economists promoted may also be collapsing. Now is the time to create a new, rebuilt economic discipline that is not U.S. centric or culture bound and that will not similarly become a tool of the next rising economic and military super power looking to justify the harms it creates by claiming them as promoting human well-being. For a sustainable human future it is important to create an economic discipline that is an empirical and predictive social science applicable for a wide variety of circumstances where humans live and adapt together. It is important to create an economics that predicts global economic crises and offers theories of real social change that can help transform societies to deal with crises rather than one that creates crises and refuses to predict them out of self-interest of its members.

Part III offers a new framework for a scientific discipline of economics to replace the current discipline’s roles of “national production engineering,” religious belief and political ideology to promote economic interests of elites in industrial market systems. This part discusses the roles that economics can play as a technology for sustainable development in protection of human diversity, the place that it can address political concerns like equity, and the area in which it can support universal legal principles and raise other humanistic questions without serving as doctrine or dogma. Alongside it, Part III offers a
suggestion for rebuilding a complementary “humanities” of economics that acts to invigorate and hold the social science accountable to moral concerns.

The process for rebuilding economics is one that must also go beyond this single discipline given that other social sciences have developed in reaction to economics and in response to similar influences and pressures. To do so, Part III maps the social sciences, the technical training of social engineering, and the “moral” social philosophic/ “humanities” roles of these disciplines to see where economics really fits and what is missing. It returns to the goals of the social sciences and humanities in terms of their areas of analysis and questions for individual disciplines and then offers a new framework for a scientific discipline of economics and a new humanities of economics linked with it. The approach that this piece offers – of economics as an empirical social science for prediction -- links measures of consumption, production and distribution to biological and ecological principles. In doing so, it replaces the current starting assumptions that are culturally biased “moral precepts.” It moves the discipline forward, beyond its position within industrial market systems where it serves as an ideological and technical tool to promote economic interests of elites in those systems.

**Overview of the Rebuilding Process:**

**Mapping the Social Sciences, Social Engineering and Social Philosophy Disciplines**

In rebuilding economics in its various appropriate roles as outlined in Part II, it is wise to start by thinking about categories of academic disciplines in general, how they relate to each other and what they are designed to do. Though the word “economics” dates back to the ancient Greeks, the modern history of social science disciplines is so relatively new and with so many redefinitions and re-establishment of boundaries and methodologies that it makes sense to start afresh and to re-imagine the very enterprise of establishing these disciplines in a process of rebuilding. Using logic and imagining all of the different social sciences together can create that fresh start by inductively and deductively “mapping” out the social science disciplines within the context of natural sciences and humanities.

Why start with this kind of classification approach, with the assumption that continues to be under attack that human knowledge can be extracted from nature in an orderly way? The answer is that, despite the difficulties of organizing knowledge and setting boundaries, the very idea of “disciplines” and collecting and advancing human knowledge relies on some kind of framework. Rather than avoid such discussion and to do the ordering subconsciously and then examine the results, it is worth stepping back and thinking about the tasks and boundaries. Scholars currently rely on language and historical traditions to establish categories and the result has been disciplines like economics and other social sciences going off track with little understanding of their purpose, their scope or their boundaries. While others call for creative and “pluralistic” challenges to economics that will redesign it, or offer “transition” models (Daly and Farly, 2003) branching in different directions, existing linguistic categories, institutional and bureaucratic customs, and limitations are likely to lead to approaches that again fail to fully meet the needs.

Science and “discipline” require putting information and experience into categories, asking clear questions in broad categories, specifying variables and building models that reveal relationships and build understanding within the scope of the enterprise of the discipline. This is “positivism” in its basic sense. Currently, disciplines are failing. Their results are trivial. The questions are small and of limited use. The variables are meaningless. The models are simplistic. The concept terms including the names used for the discipline and sub-disciplines are themselves filled with connotations and ideological meaning that trip up any real analysis. To progress, it is important to strip away what exists and go back to first principles and basic steps. It is important to return to studying small systems that are easy to test and where results are easy to collect and then rebuild from there.

Graduate student dissertations and professional research in social sciences and humanities today seem to be largely directed by research funds, much by narrow questions and low expectations of professions and journals, and often simply be random selection without any direction towards significant questions...
that fit into larger scientific agendas or human needs. Unlike the natural sciences and mathematics that lay out specific agendas and not important unsolved problems waiting to be attempted, (Kuhn, 1970), it is rare to find research agendas in social sciences that list the theories waiting to be empirically tested and the specific problems that remain to be solved. Too often, research topics are selected as forms of journalism, with researchers picking a place or a topic or simply turning their existing employment into a case study for publication. Too rarely is there any attempt to start with an important, scientific research question and hypothesis, first, with wide applicability to different systems and contexts, followed by the selection of methodologies and search for appropriate data.

Economics needs to start with a wide scope of everything that may fit and also look at what has been fit elsewhere an why. The rebuilding of economics is not a process that can be limited to the discipline of economics, for a number of reasons. Not only have other social sciences developed in reaction to economics (and failed in similar ways in response to similar influences and pressures). Economics has itself split off some of its variables into other disciplines when it narrowed from political economy and philosophy. At the same time, much of what is economics appears in other disciplines, from ecology/biology and geography to demographics and sociology, though it is not recognized as “economics” to psychology and incentives (what today is called “behavioral economics”). In order to rebuild economics in its four potential social roles (the important roles of carrying out social science, applying it through technical training/social engineering, conceptualizing science, and promoting the “moral” social philosophic/”humanities” role of science), what follows below is the exercise of mapping economics and related disciplines to see which disciplines are doing what and what is missing. This is a first step to repackaging and rethinking the disciplines.

There are two approaches to such mapping, combining inductive and deductive reasoning. The inductive approach starts with the global view of human knowledge and study to suggest how knowledge in the social sciences might ideally be organized and where economics fits. The social science disciplines can be mapped to see what is currently happening in the different functional roles. Indeed, such maps should ideally present a full spectrum of predictive research questions and applied and parallel technology-policy as well as parallel humanities discipline to drive the science and technology and to consider both its potential and dangers.

1. Inductive Structuring of Scientific Knowledge, from a Global Perspective, Following Comte

One of the first attempts to try to systematize scientific knowledge, including both the natural and social sciences, dates back to the early and mid-19th century. This is about the time that Darwin was conducting his research and economics and other social sciences in Europe and the U.S. were defining themselves and often transitioning, radically. Auguste Comte, considered by some to have been the “father” of social science and first establishing sociology (in 1838), offered the first “hierarchy” of natural and social sciences. It offers a way to rethink what happened with economics and other social sciences before they emerged in their contemporary forms. With few contemporary attempts to explain the relationships of modern disciplines, including economics, in any real logic, it may be that Comte was the last scholar to really think through the appropriate ordering and relationship of the social sciences (Comte, 1853, 1865). Today, with boundaries largely defined by methodologies and subjects of study rather than level of analysis and research questions, perhaps it is no wonder that the challenges to economics are appearing in a confusing array of new disciplines and interdisciplinary study that seem to follow little logic. Perhaps Comte’s logic holds the key again to the basic building block in establishing and teaching all of the social sciences.

Comte’s hierarchy of natural sciences and social sciences is presented schematically in the table below with Comte’s original scheme in boldface and my elaborations included alongside it. It is relatively easy to follow simply by applying the “levels of analysis” approach to the different fields.

- Physics, the most basic level, studies the essence of matter and energy.
- Chemistry studies matter at the level of the elements and their combinations.
Biology studies the units of life at the cellular level, level of the organism, at the level of species and of eco-systems, though Comte doesn’t really differentiate this level. Note that astronomy and geology, the planetary and earth sciences, don’t appear on this table, though they are mostly levels of inorganic chemistry, also following physical principles. Nor do any technical or engineering fields appear here, since they are offshoots of basic sciences.

The jump from the basic sciences to the human sciences is not that clear since biology itself studies at different levels. Humans are a species and also a part of eco-systems and aren’t necessarily a linear level above all biology. Comte recognizes the jump and then essentially divides the study into two categories: study of the individual (psychology) and study of humans in natural groups of cultures and mass societies.

At the lowest level is psychology, the study of the individual human. Though there are now behavioral sciences for study of other species, Comte is recognizing the complex brain functions of humans and determining that it merits a separate study and that the study of the individual as a unit is a level of complexity different from just biology.

In moving to the next level and inventing “sociology,” Comte was essentially saying that all of the studies of humans at the level of society (and culture/community as the basic human group) could be grouped into a general level of analysis. Comte sought to unify history, economics and, from below, psychology into a single social science given the belief that the key for study was the level of analysis and not the specific “functions” or roles within that level, like politics and economics. So, before economic or social or political variables were split off in ways that prevented holistic study of humans in individuals or groups, Comte affirmed the value of holism.

It is probably here where most contemporary scholars give up on Comte, finding his classifications lacking clear enough boundaries and indisputable logic. Yet, the distinctions and levels of the natural sciences has been a relatively useful construct for thinking about scientific problems, even though there is a blurring at several levels (physical chemistry, bio-chemistry, and biophysics are examples, though they don’t negate the individual disciplines as cores for study). Psychology as a discipline has also become increasingly biological, chemical and physical in the study of brain functions and nerves, but in ways that also seem to draw on principles from the core disciplines in application at a different level, rather than denying the construct of the disciplines.

To try to fit modern concepts into Comte’s view of study by levels of analysis, I have made some additions to Comte’s table. My goal is to try to suggest those disciplines that still exist and that offer a transition between that natural sciences and Comte’s idea of a unified social science. Darwin had already published his major work in the 1850s, when Comte was also producing his major works. Though slightly later, Darwin’s work on the Descent of Man, 1871 and the Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals in 1872 were attempts to start moving biology into social science. The discipline that now examines the link between animals and humans, individually and in groups, is “physical anthropology”, the biological (and cultural) evolution of primates to humans. So, for argument’s sake, it can be added as the most basic step of Comte’s table between psychology and the unified social science.

Since Comte also believed in unifying history with the social sciences, I also add the “scientific discipline of history” into this table. That discipline is “archaeology”, the study of the physical record of humans that establishes the history in the way that “physical anthropology” seeks to establish the earlier, pre-human history. Archaeology can be seen as the study of human social and cultural evolution and as the science of human history and social evolution. This differs from the literature or philosophy of that record which is much of the current discipline of history as “story” and ideology rather than testable science in a framework used for prediction. This study of human history (and prehistory) is also found today with “physical anthropology” in anthropology departments as part of attempts to study human societies holistically.

Probably the closest discipline to Comte’s idea of a unified social science that would serve as scientific modeling of cultural and social systems, was anthropology of the early and mid-20th century, that saw itself as an holistic discipline for the comparative and scientific study of all human groups and
their adaptation and evolution. It no longer does that today, for reasons described in Part II, but it was defined to originally serve that holistic role.

In order to make all of this easier to see in a picture of where several disciplines and sub-disciplines do fit together and in a hierarchy, it makes sense to just call things by what they are so that the relationships are clearer. “Physical anthropology” is really “Pre-Human Biology and Society;” the study of human evolution with both successes and failures. It examines of the evolutionary linkages between biology and modern humans. “Archaeology” is really the study of “Extinct Cultures and Physical Record of History of Living Cultures” as well as the study of their evolution. What today is called “social and cultural” anthropology and that was the science of anthropology just a few decades ago, was really once the study of “Living Cultures” in all of their dimensions and in their evolution; not just social and cultural but also economic, political, legal, and other systems. By using these terms, it is possible to see the steps of science of cultures from the holistic study of pre-humans to the holistic study of extinct cultures to the holistic study of living cultures.

What Comte’s analysis suggests is that the remaining social science disciplines, other than psychology and “the unified social science for groups” that I have likened to mid-20th century anthropology, should be seen only as offshoots of a unified holistic social science and should be also approached in an holistic way. The branches of this unified social science that have today broken off into individual disciplines on their own – sociology, political science, and economics – could study the social, political, and economic institutions and functions of society/culture as part of the whole, and should not do so in isolation with just a division of variables that fragments them into individual isolated disciplines and then further fragments them even more with study of isolated variables (like “gender” or “area” or activities like “migration” that also break off today as individual disciplines). Before they are broken off with the focus on narrower and narrower questions or reporting, these disciplines (and then any sub-disciplines) need to start as subsystems that are part of the larger system, following the same levels of study as that of holism, starting with their places (e.g., the place of economics, politics and social institutions and questions) within physical anthropology, archaeology, and comparisons of different types of societies in the ways that anthropology originally set out to compare societies. That is quite a different approach to the current one that moves immediately to fragmentation, breaks up the whole, and creates entirely new hierarchies with detached and narrow sets of problems and information collection.

In looking at rebuilding all of the social sciences, together, in their appropriate sub-categories, it is also important to note what happened to sociology, itself, after the era of Comte, and how it actually broke off a chunk of economics. Several decades after Comte lived, at the end of the 19th century and early 20th century, the two scholars who are considered the “founders” of modern sociology erased Comte’s approach and brought key economic variables under the umbrella of sociology, where they have remained, in studies that may have started out as holistic but that led to fragmentation and allocation of questions in a way that was unsystematic. Durkheim’s classic work in “sociology” on “The Division of Labor in Society,” (1893), was essentially a look at the social aspects of economic production and its systematization, which began as holism but then seems to have led to the transformation of much of sociology to that of issues of economic inequality and segmentation in the labor force. Meanwhile, Weber’s “Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,” (1904), linked religion and culture to a form of economic productivity in a way that also began holistically but that also paved the way for sociology to focus on economic relations. In defining itself as a discipline, sociology largely began to focus on production and later on incomes and social class (Mills, 1956) rather than on the actual holistic goal of how societies emerge to integrate or absorb human cultural groups into a larger whole and then to explore how societies then relate to each other. At the same time, sociology also began to add narrow studies of “social institutions” and questions that detached social relations from the whole, with concentration on deviance, socialization/education and age stratification, inter-ethnic relations (focusing mostly on status of individuals) in complex societies, and gender/family that are really the social institutions and aspects of society.
Both economics and sociology have also not only taken a set of variables onto themselves and a particular methodology in a retreat from the holism envisioned by Comte, but both have also sought to break themselves off from other disciplines in a way that would establish another level of analysis that runs counter to Comte’s logic. Comte did not differentiate between small human societies and complex or between agricultural and industrial. He did not suggest that they required a different level of analysis. But it is by this principle that sociology might appropriately split itself off from anthropology, that of collections of cultures at a more complex level. Instead, sociology has taken that study and has also taken the study of social institutions within the lower level of cultures/ethnic groups (!), thus confusing itself as a sub-discipline studying social institutions AND one studying only complex societies. Similarly, it is by this false division that economics has defined itself as dealing only with industrial societies rather than with all human cultures and their economies. By Comte’s principles, these disciplines need to be reorganized to end the confusion and gaps they have created.

Of course, there are still questions about how other subjects can fit into this table. How are mathematics, music, and human languages related to the sciences? Is linguistics as a cognitive science, an offshoot of psychology, with all of these then individual representations of brain functions that can be seen as offshoot disciplines in the same way that astronomy and geology are offshoots of sciences? Probably some kind of classification logic of that sort could fit into Comte’s table in that way. Assuming that those disciplines can logically fit into an expanded table and that such work can be left to others, I will move on, below, to try to complete a logic of social sciences that includes all of the appropriate roles for economics and for other social science disciplines.

Comte’s Hierarchy (in bold) with Additions (non bold):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anthropology as a Social Science</th>
<th>[Living Cultures and Scientific Modeling of their Systems]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>with Social Science Branches of Economic Social Science, Political Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archaeology</td>
<td>[Extinct Cultures and their Human Social and Cultural Evolution]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Anthropology</td>
<td>[Pre-Humans and their Human Biological Evolution]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemistry</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Structural Functional Analysis, with Interpretation

By taking Comte’s approach further and adding in the functions that specific disciplines like economics could serve as sub-disciplines under the holistic study of human cultures and societies, it is possible to reveal where there are gaps in economics and the other disciplines and to point out ways to fill those gaps in social science as a predictive science, applied social science/technology/social engineering, and humanities. This starting point for analysis is quite revealing. It isn’t perfect, since it rests on the assumption (subject to challenge) that societies (and cultures) can actually be viewed in terms of their social, political, and economic institutions and functions of such institutions. Since the named disciplines of sociology, political science, and economics that suggest the existence of these separate types of institutions and functions in cultures and societies, it is possible to use this as a starting point for examining these disciplines. This may not ultimately be the best way to start reorganizing all disciplines, but it offers an interesting perspective now on what has happened with economics as a discipline in ways that point to some logical alternatives for restructuring.

I start with Comte’s model of disciplines and expand his table to view the social sciences at the holistic level he envisioned and then assume that the “functions” of cultures and societies fit into at least three basic overall types that would fit specific disciplines (social, political and economic). I map out a table of social sciences to include these three sub-levels of:

- sociology (social institutions across all cultures and societies),
- political science/“politology” (political institutions across all societies), and
- economics/“oikonomology”/“econonomicology” (economic institutions across all cultures and societies).

Although no one today in anthropology or sociology is clarifying the different “functions” that exist in society and the kinds of structures or systems that they might represent, viewing this to be outdated along with Comte, in fact the social sciences (and humanities) implicitly rely on this kind of thinking about human groups (cultures and societies) even though they deny it. In the same way that biologists studying the cells of plants and animals and the bodies of humans and animals define their study into categories based on the different structures and functions they see repeatedly, across species, so does the same type of categorical thinking of structures and functions categorize the disciplines that focus on human individual and group behaviors. The discipline of biology offers an analogy to help think about these disciplines of human behavioral study. In biology, in looking at the body, different systems are studied that co-exist: the circulatory system of the heart, lungs and blood, the nervous system of the brain and nerves, the lymphatic system for fighting disease, the skeletal and muscular system, co-exist. The study of human groups has implicitly worked in the same way and this is what has led to distinctions of economic, political and social and the disciplines that follow them. I will look for the places of these to put in a table, below.

In setting up the table, I use three columns using three parallel branches of learning next to each other:

- predictive (social) science (experimentation and modeling using the scientific method and comparisons where direct experimentation isn’t possible) filling the central column of the table,
- applied (social) science/engineering (application of scientific knowledge within specific contexts) on one side, and
- humanities/philosophy (value questions and epistemological questions relating to science and offering creative ideas and critiques) on another side.

Now that I have columns, I want to use the rows as places for different disciplines. The question is how to set up the rows given the difference between the ideal of different disciplines and the existing disciplines today. I want the table to show what should be ideally and then demonstrate where the disciplines are today and what is missing.

Above, I noted that anthropology and sociology are both potentially holistic disciplines studying human groups at the levels of culture/ethnic group (anthropology) and society/collections of cultures and
between cultures (sociology) and that there are also the three structures and functions within the whole: social structures, political structures and economic structures. So the table needs to be split into a set of rows for holism and then a set of rows for the structures and functions. So, how should I fill in the table?

Already, the definitions of the basic disciplines are problematic for the basic, central column of social science as well as for the humanistic study and for engineering/social engineering as well. For example,

- Is “Sociology” really the “scientific study of social institutions across all societies” or the “study of societies (complex groups of human cultures as a unified entity), as noted above?
- Is “Political science” really the right word for scientific study of all political institutions or just for the Greek concept of “polities” such as “city states”? Maybe that word also needs to be changed and split into several areas to fit.
- What word fits the scientific study of “Economics” and is the Greek idea of “oikos” and “nomos,” the study of “household” “laws/customs/management” of any relation to what the discipline is about given that it is really about production and consumption and that this is a “household” function only in some cultures?

It is easy to poke a bit of fun at the expense of anthropologists and the way they have already both criticized and reinforced the use of “structural functionalism” sub-disciplines and have done so in a way that creates a kind of mess. The confusion about where “economic anthropology” (as described in Part II) fits this table and what it is today, represents a contradiction (or hypocrisy) in the discipline, today, that itself would lead to calls for expansion of this table beyond economic, political and social systems if their current approach in the sub-discipline would need to be fit into this table. In my view it does not fit, as noted in Part II, because it does no predictive science, it does no applied social science and it offers no “thought experiments” with potential scientific questions that fit the appropriate role of a humanities discipline linked to social science and applied social science. Here is an explanation of this mess, to clear away this potential confusion before returning to a clear approach to filling in the table. Even though anthropologists today have thrown out the idea of “structural functionalism” (Malinowski, 1944) as a way to compare and study different cultures, as part of a contemporary bias against “science” and systematization, the reality is that they already do it themselves and know that maintaining a “discipline” demands it. This is how “economic anthropology” as well as “social anthropology” and “political anthropology” appeared. The confusion is that even in denying structural functionalism, anthropologists offer plenty of other subjects that also follow the same kind of functional logic and structures that they say don’t exist, well beyond these three. Among them, for example are “cultural anthropology” and “medical anthropology” that cover health systems and functions and cultural (i.e., “high cultural” functions and structures). But these do not fit together into a cohesive logic since, as described above, economic anthropology itself is mostly a reaction to what is going on in economics rather than an attempt to structure a comparative study of economies in different human groups. Moreover, rather than say they are studying “Living Cultures” with all of their functions as sub-topics, anthropologists studying living cultures say that they are doing “social and cultural anthropology”22. But, how can they be really doing holistic study if they have renamed holism in terms of only two of its functions, social and cultural, and then classify economic and political functions somewhere below, along with “legal anthropology” and, somewhere off to the side, medical anthropology (the functions and institutions of health and body grooming)? This is a microcosm of the confusion that now exists for putting disciplines back together.

Rather than worry here about the actual final design of a full table of all of the social sciences that accurately divide or assign structures and functions that are found in human cultures, I limit the classification to economics and to the established disciplines that should be at a parallel level; sociology and political science, whatever the eventual names should be for these disciplines. If the table were extended to include other functions found in society beside social, political and economic, there might be a row for cultural studies and the social science of public health systems as well as possibly jurisprudence or legal science (here, on this table, I have included them as sub-sets of political institutions since law can
be seen as a part of governance, social control and politics), but these are just additions that add complication. For now, I leave these complications out of the table.

To make things easy, I use two different tables. The first one is offered as a reference point to show where economics fits. The second one concentrates entirely on the discipline of economics.

In the first table, I take the idea, above, of an overall holistic social science of “Living Cultures” (early 20th century “anthropology”) and then start the analysis of two of the main sub-levels, political science and sociology, in the central columns for social science. In filling in the table, I have decided to use regular print and **bold** where I think the subject of study currently exists and *italics* where I think that the social science that I name does not currently exist (!). Where a subject exists but its current name seems to hide what it actually does today, I have tried to “translate” the current name into an actual description of what I think that discipline or sub-discipline actually does, using **underlining**.

Here is what shows up in the center column of the table, in italics.

- There is no longer an holistic social science of anthropology that studies living cultures anymore, since anthropology has turned away from science in the study of living cultures. The only science now for anthropology is the study of extinct cultures and prehistoric humans, as described above.

- Similarly, there is no real “political science” at the sub-level of studies of politics, for similar reasons that there is no existing real science of economics.

- There is a bit of comparative science of sociology and this is why sociology is in bold and not italicized in the table. But since sociology now only studies urban systems and not the social institutions in all human groups, the table notes that missing area with italics.

From the central column, I move then to the right to see whether there is any technical, policy, or engineering discipline that corresponds to the social science. In fact, several of these technical and professional disciplines exist, even if the science behind them is weak or non-existent.

- There are emerging holistic planning disciplines, some of them including sustainable development planning.

- Anthropology itself has medical anthropology, which isn’t holistic but is one kind of technical application of anthropology that could also be considered part of public health science and applied public health, neither of which are shown on this table. “Applied anthropology” is not included in the table because it is difficult to see it as a specific discipline and is more just a use of anthropology for the ends of specific employers, rather than a profession or separate subject.

- Within political science, four technical applications are noted but only one of them, “public administration”, actually offers basic administrative skills in its teaching. The others are largely offering ideology in their teaching methods and content and the table uses underlining to offer a more direct restatement of what the subject actually teaches, next to the current euphemistic name of the discipline, in bold. For example, law schools today do not teach students how to advocate for justice, protect rights or establish efficient moral and sustainable systems. Instead, they teach application of rules and ideologies that maintain the established order, its ideologies and myths, and is renamed. International relations schools do not teach the skills of protecting peoples and sustainability in ways that reduce long term conflict and create a better world. They teach advocacy for the leaders of the countries in which the courses are offered along with rhetoric and excuses to protect that order. Political science today is largely the teaching of how to manipulate electoral processes, not how to achieve democracy, challenge power, create equity or promote long term rights or human interests, so it is also renamed to reflect its actually ideology and teaching. What is visible on this table is that political science is actually largely a discipline teaching ideology rather than a social science, and thus it is placed in the right column on the table while the central column for political science is filled only in italics with a speculative discipline that does not now exist23.
The left column represents the functions of philosophy, morality, imagination and critique. Contemporary social and cultural anthropology, law, political science, and theology all contain elements of imagination, critique, and ideology. They aren’t really fulfilling the functions of helping to imagine and map out real potential alternatives, which is what I view as the ideal role of humanities in relation to sciences. In my view, many mostly create a sense of fatalism, but the fact that they are filling this role rather than one of social science puts them on this side of the table.

The second table, now presents a picture of what is going on in the discipline of economics and this is the table that can be used as a guide to remaking the discipline. Note that in this table, I use blue shading to highlight what actually does exist within the discipline of economics today and to separate it from what is presented as economics or what actually is economics, that exists outside of the discipline today. Note that since this entire table is devoted to economics, I have just used boxes in the three columns where they belong but without any specific relationship across the rows. Here is what the table shows.

- Economics today does not really exist as a social science, so the central area is, therefore, blank.
- There are actually several branches of applications and technical work that are part of economics including objective skills like accounting, finance, econometrics and calculations of inequalities in labor economics that are being done largely in sociology rather than in economics, itself. What should be part of economics, in planning for sustainable development, is now being done mostly in human ecology and “environmental studies” so I have put these on the table to indicate that. Economics as applied today, in what is called “macro-economics” and “trade economics” is really “National Production Engineering” under a euphemistic name, with the table noting the real name, using underlines. “Development studies”/”development economics” is another misnomer for what is being taught today and that is really the “Globalization and Urbanization” of rural and minority cultures.
- Economics also has a major hole in the area of humanities, since its only real thrust today is in national production engineering and in ideology for the producers, with little thought to equity, sustainability or real human needs. Other than the teaching of critiques like those of Karl Marx and the minor debates on values from economic anthropology, there is no sustained culture critique of modern economies derived from studies of small, historic, or animal cultures. Nor is there much of a utopian vision of preferable economies and how to get there, though some of this is being done by environmental policy and sustainable development planners.
- Some of the actual missing science of economics can be found in the discipline of psychology and some of the applications actually come out of psychology or human ecology.

Given the identification of what is missing and what is far flung outside of economics or misnamed, the next step is to suggest what a rebuilt economics would look like if it filled its roles of social science and humanism.
## Table of Related Disciplines and Sub-Disciplines to Economics, Classified by Actual Activity, with Missing Elements and Suggested Renaming:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophy/ Morality/ Humanities</th>
<th>Science</th>
<th>Engineering/ Technology/ Policy/ Professions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Holistic Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Cultural Anthropology</td>
<td>Anthropology as a Social Science [Living Cultures: Scientific Modeling of Social and Cultural Systems]</td>
<td>Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[“Anthroposophistry”]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Urban Planning]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Demography]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[Medical Anthropology]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights Based Democratic Political Systems</td>
<td>Political Science/ “Politology” as a Science of Political Institutions and Relations</td>
<td>Protection of Power through Legal Institutions (Law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theology, Law</td>
<td>[Jurisprudence/ Legal Science]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Election and Public Opinion Engineering (Political Science)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Maintaining the New World Order and Hegemony (International Relations/ Political Science)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology (as a Science of Social Institutions and Relations) at the level of complex societies and individual cultures</td>
<td>Pedagogy/ Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Criminology and Social Control</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table of Economics and Related Disciplines and Sub-Disciplines Classified by Actual Activity, with Missing Elements and Suggested Renaming:

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<tr>
<th>Philosophy/ Morality/ Humanities</th>
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<td><strong>Sub-Level</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Utopian Economies, and Culture Critique</strong></td>
<td><strong>Economics/ “Econology”/ Economic Social Science (as a Science of Social Institutions and Relations)</strong></td>
<td><strong>National Production Administration/Engineering (currently Macro Economics and Trade)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Marxist Economics/ Economic Anthropology</td>
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<td><strong>Globalizing and Urbanizing the Second and Third World/ Rural and Minority Cultures (currently Development Studies/ Development Economics)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Economic Anthropology</td>
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<td><strong>Finance</strong></td>
<td><strong>Econometrics and Linear Programming</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Accounting</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Advertising/ Marketing (really applications of Psychology)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Advertising/ Marketing (really applications of Psychology)</strong></td>
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Remaking Economics as a Social Science along with a Complementary Economic Humanities

The second table, above, helps now to identify five key steps to remaking the discipline of economics in order that it fulfills its needed functions that are currently missing, consolidates the work within the framework of a discipline and institutionally protects itself from the pressures that have previously and currently undermine it.

1) First, it is important to start with a consistent definition of the areas to be covered by the field (and that have now been scattered) to agree on boundaries that allocate areas with other social sciences disciplines. In other words, it is important to define the discipline’s scope. This step is relatively easy using the functional analysis approach of the three columns of the table. Since the word “economics” can be readily understood back from its Greek roots, there is no need to change the name of the discipline in remaking it, even though the discipline fails to fulfill its promise and narrows its questions and methods.

2) Second, once the scope of the discipline is clear, it is easy to move towards building the field as a science by setting the array of scientific questions to be solved, followed by a compilation of existing “laws” and approaches that begin to answer those questions. The purpose of restructuring economics as a science is to assure that it identifies a broad set of questions of value to a number of different groups whose interests have now been excluded, on the one hand, while assuring that the discipline “builds” on itself as discovers the predictive laws that answer the questions and then goes deeper and deeper in refining explanations as a “discipline”. Disciplinary questions help not only to establish a direction but also create a framework for taking available findings that meet the definition of economic social science but exists now across several disciplines and integrating them into a single restructured discipline with a recognition of the value of those studies and their methodologies.

3) Third, application of the discipline as policy or engineering should also naturally follow from the rebirth of the discipline as science, since application takes the scientific tools and applies them to specific needs.

4) Fourth, clarifying the scientific questions that allow for a broad scope of study and for building predictions, simultaneously gives new voice to some of the humanistic inquiries that can bring the “what if” questions into the discipline.

5) Finally, it is important to assure the institutional processes that protect these disciplinary inquiries against the pressures that have prevented them in the past and today. Economics hasn’t just failed in its content. Economics has failed in its processes as an “institution” to be accountable to society and to professional standards. To set the discipline on a path that will be open to further broad questions, that will generate and test laws, and that will develop the data, methodologies, and continuing research agenda to build on requires larger political structural changes in academic and research institutions as well as larger cultural changes. Even an imposition of a new model on the discipline would do little to set it on course for the long term. Even if international courts criminalized economics and forced it to remodel itself in concert with restructuring of other disciplines, the same political, economic and cultural pressures that degraded the discipline would largely still exist and would continue to interfere in its development. It is important to understand the forces that make change difficult both to try to change thinking and to establish the political mechanisms that can override them. These can be examined in turn. Given that the institutional protection of a restructured discipline of economics is much more difficult than just outlining what the discipline “should” do, and may or may not be possible, I devote that discussion to Part IV.
1. **Defining the Area of Study (Scope) of Economics**

There already is generally agreement on the scope of “economics.” Both within and outside the existing discipline it is recognized as encompassing production and consumption to fill basic human needs (food, clothing, and shelter) as well as other kinds of human aspirations and needs that require the use of resources. This is the social function of and includes the activities and institutions that constitute the “economic” part of cultures and societies. The problem in contemporary economics has actually resulted from the narrowing and politicization of this general area, taking leaps into ideology, doctrine, and faith, after starting off with this overall agreed scope.

Many economics textbooks start out in agreement with this general subject area of the discipline of economics but then fail when they seek to qualify and limit it. It is easy to get a feel for how to protect the overall scope of the discipline and to assure agreement on the overall definition of what it includes by challenging and repairing some of the basic definitions in existing textbooks. Consider the following three examples found in current texts:

a) “Economics is the study of how people make their living, how they acquire the food, shelter, clothing and other material necessities and comforts of this world.” (Wonnocotts, 1986, p.4). This definition is a bit limiting (lowbrow) in the sense that it does not consider the resources needed for meeting other human needs for art, intellectual exploration, expression, community, and spirit, and other needs that perhaps humans don’t want to recognize as “needs” (aggression, sexuality, hierarchy, bonding) and that may not always be “comforts” as also part of an economy, though they are all reflected in economic transactions. Immediately after this start, Wonnocotts’ text, in a way that is typical in the field today, then narrows and redefines the scope as the study of “scarcity” rather than also including the definition and negotiation of needs and wants. In the discipline’s definition of its goals, it is important to assure that the scope remains open to looking at all human needs, defining them, seeing how they relate to each other, and then looking at all of the factors on how they are fulfilled (how consumption and production occur to meet these needs).

b) “Economics is the study of “how human beings satisfy their material needs and wants” offers an even shorter version of the above, but in general agreement (McCarty, 1988, p. 4). Immediately after this start, however, McCarty skips over scientific questions and models and moves immediately to turn the discipline into one for technicians, substituting engineering for science. It is a failure to narrow the discipline’s scope to suggest only that, “Economics seeks to measure the benefits and costs of alternative answers to these questions” as if everything is for sale and calculable within the value system of the authors and their class/culture and that there are no major scientific or philosophical questions to ask about the full range of needs, aspirations, consumption and production and the factors in fulfilling them. This is why it needs to be clear that the scope is the scope of scientific, predictive questions and philosophical questions to ask about this area.

c) Better well known is Samuelson’s text, that is similar to these above but that did in its earlier versions, a half century ago, partly include some scientific and cultural questions (Samuelson, 1961). Samuelson’s text included a discussion of Malthus as well as some, albeit extremely brief, cross cultural comparisons, noting sacred cows in India and the potlatch of the Kwakiutl as culturally defined needs and consumption. But, Samuelson also narrowed the scope of the discipline by taking cultural choices for consumption and production as givens, without seeking any scientific explanation that would allow for comparisons of cultures to understand the nature (causes and explanations) of consumption preferences, one of the most basic questions of economics and the study of “how men (sic) and society choose.”
With an agreed scope, it is possible to start to reintroduce some of the important scientific and then humanistic questions that have been purged out of the discipline and that can be reintroduced along with others that readers, themselves, can introduce.

2. Setting Research Questions of Economic Social Science

Once the topical boundaries of any discipline are clear, that discipline is really defined by the questions it asks and the kinds of problems it seeks to solve. To start this process for economics, it is easy to see what is failing, what is needed to catalyze the process of asking questions, and to then sketch out the categories in which to generate questions, with some of the kinds of questions that the discipline should be addressing.

What makes contemporary economics criminal and largely obsolete is that it avoids answering some of the questions that are key to our time and not just of our time or society but of all time and for all humans—of extinction being faced by half of the cultures on the planet that is driven by economic actors, of collapse of economic systems as a result of actions by economists and people they represent, of lack of sustainability of the current economic systems dominating and changing the planet, of failed responses to and preparations for crises, of needs for the future on and off the planet, of dissatisfaction with current distributions and with the quality of work, of lack of identifying a complete vision of human aspirations and wants that economics can fulfill other than simple animalistic desires for consumption of “more,” and so on.

What one should expect to see in a remade discipline of economics is a list of questions at the beginning of introductory economics texts, in the descriptions of every sub-sector, and for discussion at meetings of economists, with constant additions to the agenda coming from within and without. One can judge the health of the discipline by the breadth and importance of the questions it places at its center and in the openness it offers for adding questions of breadth and depth while systematizing the search for answers without cutting off application of methodologies, models or forms of thinking that could help provide answers.

What one finds today are economics textbooks and courses that avoid questions of survival, of quality of life, of human diversity, and of choice—that are the questions of human existence and life and that all have relations to economics. Instead, economics texts demonstrate their inhumanity, shallowness, and cynicism and that of the discipline with petty questions about “scarcity” and “utility” and assigning price tags. These are questions for the raising of animals, not for the development of human beings. What should appear are questions about human nature and possibilities as humans and the role of economics as part of this nature, rather than something as shallow as “the firm/supply and demand,” “national production,” and “comparative advantage” of “international trade.” A healthy discipline is driven by questions, not by theological assumptions or by a methodology. That is different from what one finds today with a top-down, insulated agenda that assumes a crystallized, static mathematical approach to a single path and solution driven by the “experts” with all of the questions determined in advance. Questions help keep in mind the goals and for whom, as well as what humans are and can be.

What questions should the discipline of economics try to answer, for what reasons, for whom?

What is the full scope of questions? To start to generate the right questions, it is important to start with the right general initial question.

In the area that can be defined as economics, what concerns are of importance to long term interests of all human beings in all cultures and societies (singly and together)?
Another way of thinking about it is this.

*What does economics need to predict and explain to be of value to the long term interests of all human beings in all cultures and societies (singly and together) in all of their various positions and roles as human beings?*

Asking the questions in this way – in terms of universal principles to first test potential standards and then to look at relationships and predictions – is different from the engineering questions that apply the proven scientific prediction to promoting a chosen outcome in a particular social context. Questions that focus on one population or one type of economy and/or that do so looking just at a limited range of variables that will not reveal the workings of a system, are usually engineering questions rather than scientific ones.

In generating questions, one can also think about the process as a fully inclusive one. Currently, the role of economics has been to maintain elites. The discipline works to indoctrinate and maintain an order rather than to solve questions that enable society to adapt. For each group that has been excluded and harmed, and for all of the failures that have occurred, what questions need to be asked, what solutions need to be sought, and what kinds of predictions need to be made and how can these be aggregated into general questions for such groups in general rather than narrowed only the interests of specific and new interest groups posing them?

Given that the distortion of the agenda of economics has largely come as a result of politicization and corruption of the discipline, the source of broad questions must assume an open process. The methods and discipline are the role of experts but the agendas need to come from everywhere in a social science and humanities. Those currently calling (albeit from within the discipline) for a pluralistic economics recognize that valid questions for improving the discipline must come not only from within but from other social scientists frustrated by the failure of economics (such as the author of this piece) and from the overall public that funds universities and research and that seeks to study in the disciplines for answers to public questions. Questions about the goals of economic production, about the full range of human aspirations, of quality and meaning of life, of quality of work distribution that are now pre-defined and proscribed by producers, elites and the academics they pay to represent their interests, would be fully re-opened in a pluralistic economics. So would questions of political power and opportunity that are relevant to minority communities and to those of different age and economic status,

Again, while it is possible to start off the questioning here and try to make sure that the initial broad range of questions remains at the forefront of the discipline without being censored out, until they are fully addressed and answered, institutionalizing an open questioning process requires long-term structural and institutional changes. These assurances are really a part of a political process of flexibility of a discipline, accountable to society and students from bottom up, rather than top down.

Even if the process of asking questions is fully open, it is difficult to generate all of the right questions at once. Questions arise in response to human problems that need to be solved and also depend on the quality of the process for allowing free thought and for allowing different groups to participate in bringing questions. Analysis also leads to new questions. There is also a tension between questions, laws and predictive models that have been identified, and areas/units of study. These develop at different rates and in a relationship with each other.

Some of the questions to be generated are scientific questions (for predictions) and some are humanistic ones about what is desirable and possible (that may be scientific questions once the methodologies for providing scientific answers are better developed or better ways are devised for framing the questions so that they can be answered). These can be divided into questions of science, humanities and engineering (that can overlap), before moving to define all of the units and levels of study that can bring in data to answer those questions, while noting the progress that is already made on defining laws and theories (following in the next sections). Before separating them, however, the questions can be systematized.
There is a way to systematize the questions, but there is no way to come up with all of the potential questions or categories. Way more is possible than can be imagined here. This is just the start of a framework following a logic. It is possible to roughly define the categories as follows, at the “meta” (all encompassing, overall) level, at the categorical level looking at the various parts of economic activities, at the system level looking at how the parts actually fit together, and then within systems. A quick way to assign these categories is as follows:

- Overall (“meta”) level questions about the goal of economics to serve what human needs and to achieve and measure “progress” on what dimensions, in what ways, for what ends, for whom;
- Consumption questions (at the categorical level), defining human “needs,” desires, patterns of consumption, by whom, for whom, and all of the biological, psychological, environmental, and cultural factors that drive them;
- Production questions (at the categorical level) defining how production is organized and all of the dimensions and factors that drive it and relate to it;
- Systems level questions, looking at the relationship between production and consumption, at the overall balance of the two with each other and in an overall eco-system and resource base (sustainability), in the context of social systems, and causes of failures or weaknesses in the overall system, and the implications of this system for other systems on which they depend, the overall change of the system, and the prediction of adaptability and development of different kinds of economic systems in different conditions and contexts; and
- Internal dynamics questions including distribution, equity, hierarchies and human relations.

Some of the kinds of questions can be placed in these categories as a start, as follows. Many of these are already being asked but are not yet inside economics as a discipline or they are not linked to scientific explanatory modeling that gives them a predictive dimension and applications.

For those who fear that the questions below do more than establish what should be in economics but begin to usurp the role of other disciplines like political science (in defining wants and equity as “economic” consumption and production and distribution questions rather than “political ones”) or biology and psychology (defining the source of preferences) or anthropology (defining the sustainability of systems), my answer is that all disciplines need to rethink where they start, need to recognize their dependence on others, and then need to reset boundaries and allocate work on the important questions for humanity that are being mishandled by current disciplines.

- In my view, the boundaries of with political science are those of power and decision-making. These include economics and values but focus on the interactions and balancing, not what is valued and met or how, which are economic questions.
- Similarly, the questions for anthropology are those at the level of overall systems and all of their functions, taken together, at the system level, with economic structures, political structures, social structures and other structures and functions. Cross cultural studies of value or production that exist today in anthropology are not anthropology because they are cross-cultural or because the use of cross cultural study raises the philosophical questions.
* **Overall (“Meta”) Level:** *What is economic progress? What are the real goals of economic activity? To serve what human needs, on what dimensions, in what ways for what ends, for whom?*

How do different economies define progress? How do they compare in how they allocate “surplus”? How do they allocate different amounts for writing systems or not, for research, for military, for art, and what factors are linked to this that predict these differences, with what results? How do different economies define ultimate goals of human survival and of attributes of being human and what factors are linked to these goals? What is the human intellectual potential beyond gluttonous consumption? What is the purpose of technology and science; purpose of art? How do humans assign value? How do humans weigh security and freedom as economic values? Is being domesticated better than being free, with what measurable linkages? Do humans accept gender differences in life expectancy, health, and welfare? What is real per capita “wealth”? What is the real measure of Gross National Happiness?” How do societies define future goods and values?

International law already determines that humans allow for different choices of consumption patterns to reflect different sustainability choices of different cultures and do not apply a single standard. That makes the application of single measures like GDP per capita and “human development” indices as the standard of international policies. But within industrial societies and not forcing those values on others, there are still questions about what the standards are for human well-being.

Much of that is defined in human development indices, for comfort. The real questions are about how to achieve these benefits, for whom, over what long time frames, as well as how to incorporate the different cultural views of benefits.

Unlike contemporary economics, this set of questions does not end with the assumption of the human being as analogous to a common pig, simply rationally seeking “more” and in more dimensions. It assumes that humans are complex and social beings with a variety of aspirations and interrelations (creative, scientific, hierarchical, biological) that define a complex set of interdependent needs and desires within society and with the natural and physical world, that shape economic systems and create a variety of goals and possibilities for economic systems. Economics needs to start with overall questions about what these are and how they work, and looking at the kinds of biological and social systems that give rise to them, without limiting and specifying what has yet to be investigated.

What makes these questions more than just fuzzy philosophical speculation is that many of the answers of human motivation is already answered or partly investigated by studies in anthropology, evolutionary biology, and psychology but the questions have yet to enter economic modeling and to continue as part of full scientific inquiry that establishes their sources or how they can be predicted. Leaving them at the level of speculation and philosophy is not enough. That indicates a disciplinary failure.
* Consumption: (Categorical Level): How do humans define and measure needs?

What part of needs are genetic and biologically determined, what part are cultural, what part are individual, and how are they shaped, expressed, bounded, weighed against each other, interactive, changing over life and time?
What is economic security? How do societies define “enough” rather than “always wanting more” (the ideology of production in Statist corporatist industrial societies and empires)?
What explains non-efficient consumption patterns: status and hierarchy consumption (business suits, potlatch), war (economics of empire and population control mechanisms); social control (know prisons are a much worse investment than schools but humans build them maybe because of kinship/clan/ethnic fears and utilities); male risk behaviors to impress women and the consumption economics of mating choices; importance of nature versus artificial environments and how socialization works in natural versus artificial environments and the costs?
What are the boundaries of choice? What biological factors drive and set them?
Are there biological adaptations to famines (fat) and psychological adaptations?
Is consumption part of genetic hierarchies for order and reproduction? (i.e., high status high consumption females and males)? Is consumption part of the aggrandizement of leaders as ways to secure fear and power? Who in society decides on consumption needs? How can these be predicted?

* Production: (Categorical Level): How is production organized and what are all of the factors driving it and relating to it?

What causes economic depression?
What stimulates productivity in ways that are balanced with consumption demands? What stimulates productivity in ways that are balanced with resources?
What promotes new levels of scientific achievement and of types of technology? Is military competition necessary for innovation? Is high consumption a necessary incentive for innovation in ways that doom some technological societies to unsustainability (Nguyen, 2008)? Must there be population and resource pressures?
Are inequalities necessary as a motivation?
What motivates managers, workers, and “shareholders”/stakeholders? What other values do productivity serve that are part of utility functions (Locke’s view of mixing with soil, Tolstoy’s view of joy of work)?
What “utility” is derived from cooperatives, self ownership, shop, factory work, collectives, cooperation?
What are the social dynamics of production and their inefficiencies?
Overall System Level Questions: What is the relationship between production and consumption, the overall balance of the two with each other and in an overall eco-system and resource base (sustainability), in the context of social systems? What are the causes of failures or weaknesses in the overall system, and the implications of this system for other systems on which they depend? What causes the overall change of the system? How can the adaptability and development of different kinds of economic systems in different conditions and contexts be predicted?

Given geographic, climatic and resource variables and existing levels of technologies and accessibility of populations, what economic systems can be predicted to arise and what can be predicted about their cultural adaptive forms?

What causes system collapses and what behaviors, responses, and forms of collapse can be predicted to see with different conditions?

What factors influence carrying capacities?

What are the energy system dynamics of economies?

What are the likely economic scenarios for natural disasters that are known to occur and what are the investments now to cope with them – meteoric impact; massive volcanic eruptions?

And for human made disasters: climate change; toxins in food chain; nuclear war; genetic modification; etc.?

What can be predicted will happen after imperial collapse? With climate change and environmental collapse? After World War III?

What factors explain in a predictive model the post World War II plastic, conspicuous consumption economy of the U.S.?

How would the U.S. and Soviet economy’s current state (including the U.S. current transformation to a military-prison-hedonism economy) have been predicted using data available back in the 1970s? What political and economic factors interfere with the ability of prediction?

How do different economies interact with each other and establish dependencies, exploitation or synergies? How do these processes work and how are their impacts measured?

How can the convergence of economic systems, the divergence, and diffusion of processes be predicted and measured?

What objective measures are there for categorizing and comparing economic systems by types and what are the specific environmental/ climatic, political hegemonic, and internal choices that actually shape these systems?

Are there natural evolutionary processes of economic systems and if so what are the predictive factors?

How do individual choices affect human biological evolution as beings and what does that mean? How do individual choices effect the co-evolution of other organisms with humans and the eco-system? How do individual choices change the planet and the universe?

How do technology and robotics, as they become part of a new integrated environment, drive the demands and the economy rather than just serve them?

What are the relations between environment and economy, including the new technological environment? Is there a necessary ideology that the created environment that may be one of mechanical artificial space becomes the ends rather than the means for the human future, and where does such an ideology come from? (Lempert, 2011b)

What does it take to establish a fully self-sustained industrial economy on another planet or in a space vehicle? What is the basic sustainable size; what resources are needed and size to assure division of labor, transmission of education and values, genetic diversity? Are any of the contemporary visions of space colonization consistent with economic realities?
* Internal Dynamics Questions (including distribution, equity, hierarchies and human relations):

How much equity and what types are possible with what relations to other variables? How much inequality is needed to allow for certain other benefits? Is relative poverty part of human nature and society and a needed motivating force for industrial production?

How much mixing of cultures and discomfort promotes innovation?

Which kinds of inequality of consumption and working conditions are acceptable and what are the overall costs and benefits? Different cultures allow different choices for family transfers; they allow different consumption equity for sexuality and for children; for kinds of diets

How can economics institutionalize processes to stop the trends that occur towards the monopolization and control of the regulatory system?

Are all political rights driven by climate/environment and economic organization or can they be driven independently (as human choice and independent variables rather than dependent variables)?

How are appropriate bargaining powers set: labor versus producers, public controls over management, control over monopoly and economic power aggregation, intergenerational protection and transfers?

How do systems of intra-gender competition work (between older and younger males, between males in groups and out of groups, between males of different characteristics, between women), choices and relations between males and females of different ages, group behaviors of genders?

What other kinds of personality dynamics are at work in productivity that reinforce groups, competition, bonding, various kinds of production?

What are the underlying dynamics of age and socialization in production?

How do factors of caste/ethnicity/slavery, patriarchy/kinship and the state, drive and influence consumption and production decisions/including mating and reproductive decisions as part of the system economics?

How are demographic/reproductive choices and genetic implications of those choices for the future related to and interact with the economic system?

How are age stratification and other division of labor and discrimination issues handled across societies and what are the factors influencing them?

How is the treatment of the aged related to factors of production, consumption and sustainability?

How do different levels of individual deviance and diversity and the mechanisms for controlling them interact with other economic outcomes and variables?

How can group rights/cultural diversity of small cultures really be protected given the economic propensity to exhaust resources and to view theft as a cost saving alternative?

Note that some of the internal questions are currently being discussed in sociology, as the charts in the previous sections indicated. But sociology does not ask these questions in comparative ways to build an overall science of causes, effects, and predictions of these economic variables that are simply relegated to factors of “labor” (and not also linked to consumption, sustainability, genetics, and other variables and outcomes). Moreover, the basic work that is currently done on labor measures in sociology may actually be better in a unified economics, placing these variables back in a full context.

Overall, what these questions already indicate is that a complete discipline of economics will need to draw on evidence and methodologies that are currently scattered in a number of other disciplines and will have to draw them together to come up with models, “laws,” and tentative answers. The discipline won’t be able to pretend to exist independently and then to slowly add in outside factors as if they are new discoveries worthy of an international prize. The discipline will have to reconstruct itself by drawing from and teaching biology, environment, culture, energy systems, materials science, psychology, law and politics.
In rebuilding the discipline of economics, there is no room for making ideological determinations that such questions or categories are too hard or not really important or relevant. These are among those questions that are structurally central to the discipline. To find answers, it is possible to go right to existing evidence. That evidence is in human history. It is in biological evolutionary record. It is in anthropological data and available through comparative study. It is available through direct observation and testing. It is in all of the very sources and methods that economics currently avoids. Thus, that is where the discipline needs to be re-established as a social science.

Some Basic Foundations of Economic Social Science:

Building the social science of economics is a logical process following from the above. It is well beyond the scope of this section to show how the initial textbook for that field is likely to look in content, but what it is possible to do here is sketch out the method for answering questions, the places to look, and the kinds of existing answers. As in the process of generating the discipline’s basic questions, above, it is important to be open to a wide range. Indeed, answers can be found in what is now a variety of disciplines, and it is important to be open to a variety of methodologies. It is possible to pull together a variety of information and methods to recreate the discipline.

In rewriting the basic textbook of economics as a social science as a guide to the field, it is possible to follow a step-by-step process. It is possible to go down the list of questions above and classify the answers to those questions by what is known (laws that have withstood testing, theories that are being tested and are partially verified or competing, and untested hypotheses) in a body of principles that meet the standards of the scientific process. The work of economists is to continue to test what is unknown as well as to develop the methodologies and organize categories of existing data for use in the process. The key principle is to look for natural laws and for theories that can be tested, offering predictive value, or ways of answering and asking questions that the social science has yet to examine. Everything else is story or fable.

While critics of social science will claim that this will end up with an empty textbook, the reality is that there is plenty to fill such a book. There may not be “experiments” to test every question, but there are plenty of scientific comparative methods that have yielded predictive hypotheses that can be tested on current social systems and behaviors. It is scattered among a number of fields, but it already is science. And there already is a great deal of it. For instance, Malthus explains system collapse and there are plenty of other works that extend on this and also explain what kind of behaviors result when there is competition for resources, including political and economic systems that form to regulate economic behavior (Diamond, 2005). There are equations for measuring carrying capacities for population for different environments and economic systems (Gross, 1976) and for measuring balance and sustainability such as the “IPAT” equation (Ehrlich, Ehlich, and Holdren, 1973). There are theories and tests on the relations between population and innovation (Boserup, 1981). These provide some direct “laws” and theories still being tested in the areas of systems questions shown above. What is missing is to fill in the questions with what known and what isn’t known and how it can be tested.

In other areas, while there may not yet be testing of specific variables, there are some systems models that can be used for thought experiments like those in physics and that can be tested by then sampling human behavior. These “structural models” like those of game theory now in economics and other kinds outside of economics like Mendel’s model for expression of dominant and recessive genes, can be used to provide answers to specific questions and can be integrated into the list of questions (e.g., Lempert and Nguyen, 2011).

Although much of contemporary economics falls into the categories of technical and engineering fields, this does not prevent using existing data for some scientific questions where the variables are not specific to just one culture and type of economy. There has been some advance in valuations over time and in clusters of preferences and in how tradeoffs are made, how risks are assessed, how the future is weighed under different conditions, and how bargaining occurs in different societies. There has been
some look at various forms of distribution and impact of these different distributions. There are some measures of externalities. There have been tests of money as an incentive, tests of some kinds of investments on output, on various taxes and regulations and the incentive effects, on competitive behaviors which can perhaps partly be fit into scientific modeling. These are largely trumped by the doctrine and attempts at control and aggregation of wealth by elite groups, that dominate the basic principles, but these could be integrated into economics as a science, without the current blinders and placed appropriately in the hierarchy of factors describing how economic systems work, collapse and adapt.

What makes this a difficult process and more challenging than writing current textbooks that just take current doctrines, add some new material and change some of the emphasis, is that it requires searching through several disciplines with various kinds of data with fluency in those disciplines and then the ability to aggregate the material such that it not only presents the answers but also presents the models, frameworks and methodologies in a unifying way that promotes a continuing common endeavor with continued linkages.

Building a social science of economics along with rebuilding the social sciences in general is not just a task for economists. For example,

- Anthropologists need to look back again at holistic systems and their ideologies to offer social scientific models in which the workings and factors influencing economic subsystems will be clear.
- Political economists also need to look again at the global questions that link politics and economics.

But, it is possible to start the process within economics, itself, in ways that also show what these other fields have developed that is useful and how they can also offer more data and results that is useful across fields within this rebuilt umbrella of social sciences. The process can be outlined here with a sketch of its key buildings blocks, the places where existing information can be found, and a list of the existing methodologies that can lead to answers and how they can be taught.

Instead of going down the list of questions for economics as a social science and trying to point to answers and methodologies that have already begun the process of answering those questions in a variety of disciplines, it is quicker to start the process here by pointing directly to the disciplines that can be inventoried and invited as participants in this newly rebuilt social science of economics, and that can offer the methodologies.

Finding Answers to the Questions of the Social Science of Economics

The range of disciplines that has already conducted social scientific tests on economic questions but whose work largely remains outside of economics and un-integrated with the other disciplines includes disciplines that have examined human biology and evolution (evolutionary biology/ethology/zoology and physical anthropology), those social sciences that study individuals (psychology), those that study all kinds of societies (archaeology, anthropology, and sociology), interdisciplinary social sciences of humans and nature (human ecology, human geography, demography), those joint social sciences (political economy), and emerging sub-fields. Such works in these disciplines study economic variables and economic systems to determine which aspects are biologically or culturally rooted and how they are influenced. In many cases, studies they have done seek to answer some of the above questions at the same time, rather than separate them. Below, it is possible to list some typical work in a number of these fields that belongs in a social science of economics.

Note that even though these outside disciplines can be ordered with each other (such as human evolution and evolution of human societies), the goal is not to take the different information and put it into a single sequence to describe a single line of evolution of economic systems (Boas, undated). That would replicate the failure of economics in the past. The goal is to “mine” all of these disciplines for the answers they offer about individual humans and about human societies through the various methodologies.
and comparisons that they have conducted, in answer to a full range of questions about how economic processes work. While it is certainly important to ALSO look developmentally, at small systems to large, as well as change processes, that is simply one of many, many questions about economic systems.

The scientific approach is to use smaller systems the same way that Drosophilia (the fruit fly) was used in genetics, amoebas are used in cell biology, and rats are used in cognitive psychology. It is to focus on comparisons, on the one hand, and change processes, on the other, rather than make the mistake of assuming that the levels are part of an evolutionary scheme that can be used to explain transitions and “development.” At each level, it is possible to look at consumption/needs, production, and overall system and internal dynamics questions. It is to look at different systems levels to understand how systems work, succeed and fail. A linear evolution from amoebas and the fruit fly to humans is not assumed, but they are studied on a small scale to reveal common processes. The answers that all these disciplines offer to different questions on economics is much more and much different than a linear teleological explanation of historical development of humans and their economies. Theories of development are important – from genetics to sociology (e.g., Toffler, 1980; Bell, 1972; etc.) but linear explanations are not part of the collection of scientific information that starts to rebuild the discipline of economics.

For these disciplines, it is possible to look briefly at the areas of work that answer economic questions as a guide to integrating that information into a social science of economics. These disciplines do not necessarily have definitive answers (yet) on human economic systems and behaviors, but they have been collecting data in their fields to raise questions and to point to answers. They allow for similar processes that open the way for further examination through experimentation, biologically and culturally.
**Evolutionary Biology:** There are many analogies of animal behavior to human behaviors. Not only do animals also have “economies” with divisions of labor and various innate and culturally developed ways of meeting production and consumption needs in their environments. They also co-evolve with their environments. Since there are many common genes and common adaptive processes, it remains to carry the study further to reveal exactly which attributes are shared and expressed in which ways. (E.O. Wilson, 1978)

Animal economics can be studied from various populations including bees, ants, and other species with their differentiation of labor and consumption and choice patterns. Gender relations are a key part of economics for all species, though economists currently deny the costs and incentives of breeding/sexuality/genetic transfer and of courtship and bonding expectations and costs. The biology of male and female dominance hierarchies, status displays, preening behaviors, and pecking orders (alpha males) are also analogous to human consumption, production and distribution in areas that go beyond current economics study of “rational” and “efficient” “maximization behavior.” Virility symbols and displays are also seen in human consumption and production behavior and explanations for human activities like monument building (and construction of phallic symbols) and violence are partly explainable by observations of animal behavior.

Humans not only co-evolve with the environment (human ecology explanations, below) but also seem to have domesticated both animals and plants in ways that have been part of a co-evolution that has reinforced economic systems. Dogs and cats appear to have been domesticated and co-evolved with humans (some studies suggest the changes in human senses of smell and hearing are due to co-evolution with domesticated wolves/dogs and cats) to fulfill economic roles and to offer economic synergies. Internal parasites (in the digestive tract) and other organizations are believed to have symbiotically co-evolved with humans and may still be co-evolving in ways that have an impact on consumption choices, evolution, and the workings of human economic systems.

Studies of key behaviors for the survival of human economies have also used animal studies including:  
- imprinting of bonding and cognitive behaviors (Lorenz, 1982);  
- the evolution of cooperative behaviors (Axelrod, 1984) and explanations of competition versus competition and the “limits of altruism” (Hardin, 1977);  
- population adaptations and diversity, war, and economic collapse, in demographic and evolutionary studies (Darwin, 1871, 1872; Malthus, 1986)

**Physical Anthropology:** Specific studies of primate groups, their cultures and economic behaviors (including peace and harmony, territoriality, food strategies as carnivores and herbivores, technology, hierarchy, sexuality) now not only focus on study of groups in the wild but comparative cultural studies of different communities reacting in different ways to environmental change or to individual laboratory conditions.

The studies of various chimpanzees and special case of the bonobo chimpanzee, closest genetically to humans but apparently making different cultural choices, offers scientific comparisons of human economic possibilities and of human evolution (Van der Waal, 1982).
**Psychology**: Psychology is already combined with economics in the applied subjects of marketing/advertising, negotiation, and environmental psychology. More basic studies of cognitive psychology, group psychology and of needs, pathologies and choice are offering a fuller picture of human beings alone and in groups that can provide the basis for describing what economies do and what purposes and uses exist for consumption, production and distribution under various “normal” and “abnormal” conditions.

Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs” is among the early studies of human consumption and production needs and how these needs are not linear and fungible as economists have established through ideology, but are hierarchical and interdependent (1943). Pathologies of consumption due to insecurity, such as obesity (preference for fat and sugar as a “comfort food”) explain how consumption decisions and “needs” are also subject to complex relational and environmental factors and not linear and fungible as economic ideology has asserted. “Efficiency” and stability need to add psychological factors to devise full models.

There are also studies of relations between economic organization of society including economic institutions and social institutions, sometimes in replication (father figure and authority from the family to the society), adaptation, and in parallel, including among criminal organization and survival strategies among the poor, even looking at organized crime and ghetto families as economic enterprises that fit and reflect the larger economy (Sharff, 1981).
Archaeology and Anthropology (with a rebuilt economic anthropology that can be absorbed into economics as a social science): The clearest data on human economic systems, on their internal and overall system dynamics, comes from the human record, itself, offering comparisons and the ability to do scientific hypothesis testing by searching for common cases. Moreover, the very concept of economic sustainability for cultures and complex systems originally comes out of anthropology and needs to be at the basis of economic measures and analysis focusing on long-term human outcomes.

The classification of types of economic niches of various cultures is still incomplete as is the classification of economies beyond quick assignations by technology (hunting and gathering; agricultural; industrial) or ideological factors to define current “friends” and “enemies.” One finds not only scientific cultures but “copycat” spinoff or “free rider” cultures (e.g., Ukraine and Belorus next to Russia; Viet Nam next to China), niche cultures (Roma or Jews fulfilling specifically economic roles in a larger society), dependent or subordinate cultures or those playing a neutral role among larger systems (Switzerland and its banking economy; Singapore and Mauritius as trade zones; Laos as a buffer); and former empires pushed into highlands to subsist marginally (about one third or half of the peoples of Asia, including the H’mong, Black Tai, many others) or smaller niches such as lowland or river areas (the Cham). This is a much more complex way to look at human roles and interactions than the simplistic center versus periphery approach of dependency theorists looking at political economy (below). Among some of the classification works are those looking at peasant economies and their organization and risks (James Scott’s classic “moral economy of the peasant”, 1976), studies of nomadic systems and their interrelationships with other economies, (Evans-Pritchard’s classic study of the Nuer, 1940); and the economics of highland tribes including their social structure (Leach’s classic study of highland Burma, 1954).

Some of the classic work in anthropology has looked at the rise of different complex economic systems with specific geographic areas where there is a major resource subject to control like a major river delta or strategic connection area of rivers promoting kingships and empire (Harris, 1977), the integration of different peoples in those empires (Whitten, 1969), and the social and political economy of empires in general (Lempert, 2012; 1995).

Some studies have “mapped” economic systems onto particular territories, noting how geography and climate sustains industrial production in certain areas only with particular types of political systems because of the production risks and the ways in which families and communities are either autonomous or need to be cohesive in order to survive. A study of Russia, for example, reverses current ideological assumptions about economic “choices” and demonstrates how in a society of “industrial igloos,” climate and spacing patterns and risk are determinative of the political economic systems and choices that the Russians have made (Lempert, 1995).

A key concern for anthropology has also been to explain social change and social evolution including economic transitions (Lempert, 1995).

Food taboos and choices are largely related to ecological adaptations, particularly for grazing animals like pigs and cows, where their advantages are weighed against impact on topsoil and the resources they consumer in the Middle East and India, were originally explained by anthropologists doing economic anthropology, though this has recently been driven out of the discipline (Harris, 1977).

What economists have called “corruption,” has also largely been explained by anthropologists in terms of kinship networks and production and distribution systems that maintain cultures within their environments.

Biological and structural functional models that were originally part of anthropology in the past offer models of economic and cultural systems with their attached variables. Though anthropology has discarded much of this as has economics, a return to science would resurrect these approaches (Malinowski, 1944). They would also provide a full picture of motivations and costs to create a complete
economic model of resource use, production, consumption and distribution. These earlier anthropological models looked at individual roles in groups and the social functions of harmony, charity, and other maintenance of an overall system. None of these fit in current economic models of rational, profit maximizing individuals but they do offer a full picture of human needs and resources used to fill them in the context of cultural sustainability.

In contemporary economics, cultural and biological realities are viewed as constraints to be overcome, or they are assumed away, or perhaps grudgingly added as an afterthought into economic models. In fact, they are central attributes of economic activity and motivations and are the starting points of models.

Central to anthropology in the past, and in need of resurrection in ways that would also invigorate economics as a social science, are comparisons of cultures living in similar environments to see the kinds of economies that have independently arisen in those environments and modeling the factors that gave rise to them and promoted their survival. Among some kinds of comparisons are those of:

- Cold climates and urban life: (e.g., St. Petersburg, Stockholm, Anchorage);
- Desert climates: (e.g., Dogon of Mali and the Native American Pueblo cultures and their similarities);
- Mountain peoples: (e.g., peoples of the Andes and the Himalayas).

Though there were originally attempts to systematize information on cultures through data bases like the Human Relations Area Files that would have allowed for modeling of the relationships between environmental variables, economic production and various other cultural factors, that information is still too poorly systematized to do those comparisons other than in a rudimentary and ad hoc way. But, perhaps there will be a way to continue such work within the discipline in the future. For example, it seems clear that dowry and bride prices, choice of matrilineality and matrilocality, and even exchange of nephews in some Pacific island societies are about much more than kinship and exchange ritual, which is mostly how anthropologists describe them today. These are actually economic investments that could be described as forms of “asset/portfolio management” and “risk balancing,” “future valuation of income stream” and social security systems in societies where people and their labor are the major assets. Since few anthropologists have training in accounting and finance and since those economists who do have denigrated study of financial and investment issues in non-industrial cultures, much of this data has yet to be analyzed and placed into predictive models as part of a social science of economics.

Material in applied anthropology (outside interventions in “development”) is also too poorly systematized for comparisons though there are also plenty of reported case studies. Though he is an economist, Amartya Sen’s work on land distribution and famine/productivity (1987) is an example of the kind of economic case study that one finds in the “applied anthropology” or “anthropology of development” literature on the interaction between agricultural and other economic productivity and culture.
**Sociology:** Much of sociology already is a study of labor economics and inequalities (gender, class, race/ethnicity/religion), structural and institutional power, and socialization (age cohort analysis) as well as deviance in urban societies. The discipline already exists as a supplement to and critique of economic policies on behalf of groups that have been excluded from mainstream economics. Much of this can be integrated into economics. Most of these studies and approaches are easy to find and don’t need to be referenced here. But there are other kinds of studies that can remain part of sociology as central to the discipline that also offer answers for economics.

Division of labor in society, the connection of religion to modern economic ideologies, and the nature and form of industrial societies are questions that were at the basis of the foundation of modern sociology and that offer some answers and models for key questions of economics as a social science (Weber, 1904; Durkheim, 1893).

As in anthropology, there have been some attempts to look at “evolution” of economic systems, but in sociology it is in terms of particular technologies with a look at how the technologies, themselves, change the human environment and require different kinds of economic and social organization (Toffler, 1980; Bell, 1972).

Sociologists have also looked at urban areas as micro-cosms of industrial society, studying their class and ethnic/caste structures. Among the classics that look at these urban economic systems in the U.S. are “Yankee City” (Warner, 1947), “Middletown,” and others of the southern U.S., as well as overall (Mills, 1956). Anthropology would add international comparisons following similar models.

Economic histories and profiles of wealth as well as of the workings of economic institutions, like corporations, have also been the purview of sociology (Berle and Means, 1933).

Though in its infancy, the study of human societies and their economies in space as well as the economic interests and ideologies driving it has started to develop within the discipline of sociology as a social science of living in space that some scholars have termed “astro-sociology” (Lempert, 2011b).

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**Ecology and Environment:** The concept of economic sustainability, really a subset of holistic measures of sustainability stripped of its essential cultural component, is currently developed in measures of ecology and the environment. These measures cannot exist alone since cultures cannot survive economically with ONLY their productive functions sustainable and without any consumption directed towards other functions (health care, spiritual needs). But, these are essential to economic study and are only now slowly partly entering the fringes of economics even though they are central to economics as a social science.

Some studies have taken specific kinds of economies – fishing, farming, hunting – and mapped out the particular resources and behaviors necessary to promote sustained production, noting how biology, environment, and human productivity are integrated systems (Brown, 2004).
Demographics/ Population/ Public Health/Human Biology: Some of the basics of the study of human needs and of human populations have found their way into a variety of disciplines ranging from those of public health and human biology (issues of diet/nutrition, sanitation and water, exercise and environments) to overall population dynamics and issues (genetic and economic preparation for biological and natural disasters, reproduction and family issues and needs). Some of this is simply a mathematics of population growth, epidemiology, and predictive modeling of costs, catastrophes and demand. It has also extended into issues of psychological health and costs of social pathologies and “appropriate” environments for meeting mental health “needs.” All of these have economic implications and are central to economic modeling in economics as a social science as well as the engineering of sustainable economies and of defining human “progress” and economic goals.

Basic methodological studies are able to determine human “carrying capacities” for sustainability (populations that can survive in particular environments with given technologies) (Gross, 1976). Similar studies try to determine these limits by looking at human dietary needs, generating equations for long term sustainability (Ehrlich, Ehlich and Holdren, 1973), or defining “basic needs” (Streeten, 1981). Studies of innovation and production (Boserup, 1981) have identified links of technology and militarism New applications of Malthus link issues of sustainability to political violence, collapse or to political transition (Lempert, 1987; Goldstone, 1991).

Political Economy/ Political Science: Somewhere on the fringes of both political science and economics, the combined discipline of political economy has continued in different forms, promoting work that was originally an intrinsic part of economics but that now lacks a clear home. Work at this level looks at political-economic “systems” as well as larger global processes, touching on the political questions of modern economic systems that economists have suppressed in their own studies.

Key works in political economy start where economists leave off in noting the failures of what they call “market economies” and look for examples of systems that have measured and tried to build legal, political and other institutions to resolve these failures though without specifically explaining why some systems choose to resolve these and others don’t (Lindblom, 1977). Some authors challenge the blind ideology of economists, directly, by showing how true solutions that “perfect the market” (for example, through “political markets”) actually resolve the problems that economists hypocritically determine are outside of the scope of the discipline (Lempert, 1996b).

Convergence theory studies (Galbraith, 1967; Dimock, 1951; Kerr, 1983) have sought to determine how much diversity is possible for industrial economies to see if industrial technology requires a certain type of economic, social and political organization that transcends geographic, genetic, and historic-cultural differences.

“Dependency” and “World Systems Theorists” have presented a much more simplistic model than the anthropological approach that should be to look at different clusters of cultures to see how they fill different roles within empires or next to large empires in terms of political and economic power relations (Gunder Frank, 1972; Wallerstein, 1979; Lempert, 2014).

Not included here in this section, but noted above in Part II is the work of scholars in Human Geography and Human Ecology on themes that are those of economics as a social science but that are currently being done outside of the discipline. In its infancy, for example, are predictive economic studies that start with an environment and predict what kind of economy will arise, noting the specific conditions that will lead to different kinds of changes over time.
Teaching the Methodologies for Rebuilding the Social Science of Economics:

Economists today are virtually illiterate in all of the above fields. They likely have never taken a single psychology, sociology, anthropology, human biology, archaeology, or ecology course. They may have taken no physical science laboratory courses to apply scientific methods. Indeed, the discipline of economics today works to purposefully narrow the range of ideas and to prevent knowledge from these other fields or use of their methodologies, other than to usurp outside disciplines by co-opting ideas and imposing new definitions on existing concepts. Therefore, rebuilding the discipline of economics as a social science will also require that trained economists are not only fluent in the range of outside disciplines that do empirical study of economic phenomena, but that they also have the training in the use of some of those methodologies and in the ethical and professional precepts behind their use. Economists need not be archaeologists, primate biologists, or zoologists but they should be able to read primary source studies in those fields to incorporate such findings. They should, however, be fluent in some of the methodologies of other social sciences, particularly those of psychology, ethnography (qualitative methods of anthropology), and sociology, as well as in system modeling.

Note that today, one can look at almost any course list in the world’s major universities in their bachelors, masters, and doctoral programs and equivalents in social sciences and applications and probably find, nowhere, a list of actual skills and methodologies in the social sciences that are important for actual social science research. One will find lists of courses by subjects and by geography, but most of these courses will be lists of readings. One will find one or two methodology courses that currently define specific disciplines and that are the basis of distinguishing those disciplines (sociologists using surveys, anthropologists using “participant observation,” or economists using “econometrics” mostly in computer programs rather than in independent modeling of biofeedback mechanisms for iterative testing). But I have yet to see a list of methodology courses offering essential tool kits for the solving of particular social science problems at different levels of analysis. That is both a comment on and evidence of the failure of social sciences today to actually function as social sciences rather than as doctrine and ideology.

While a future article (or text) is needed to properly outline the basic methodologies essential for economics as a social science, it is possible to also list some of the already existing methodologies outside of the current discipline that are being used to empirically examine economic phenomena. These are supplementary to some of the methodologies that are already used by public and private managers, if not by economists. Again, this is just a start for the purposes of indicating the need for a broader and more scientific approach. Readers will certainly be able to supplement the list below.

Among the basic training of any social scientist, and particularly those in economics as a social science, from outside of the current field of economics and in the disciplines where they are now found are the following subjects with their methodologies:

- Psychology: group psychology, organizational behavior including leadership/ group think, environmental psychology, risk assessment, cognitive psychology (understanding and preferences). Some of these are already taught to administrators in the form of marketing and advertising and in organizational behavior, though it is largely with the purpose of manipulating the public and controlling workers, rather than in understanding how control systems work and can be understood and made responsive to actual human needs;
- Ethnography: qualitative field methods and ethnographic modeling; kinship systems and how they work for social protection and other sharing of resources (termed “corruption” and “nepotism” when viewed from the outside by economists), and network analysis as well as up to 10 additional specific methodological tools for understanding body language, environment that are rarely taught even within ethnography courses;
- Ecology: footprint analysis, sustainability analysis, time allocation, labor, energy, materials inputs, diet and caloric intake and minimum nutrient analysis;
- Statistics: data analysis and models; and
System dynamics and systems modeling including Bayesian and competitive game simulations and the art of designing and testing models rather than using existing simulations and linear programming models for optimization.

From within economics, itself, there are already some useful methodologies, but they need to be taught in ways that apply to real problems with real variables in comparative settings and general hypothesis testing. Among these are:

- Accounting: financial accounting and asset valuation, cost accounting; managerial accounting; public/national accounts, environmental accounting
- Energy systems accounting and materials and resource values and costs, including externalities and risks;
- Econometric modeling (but these models need to be improved with real, material variables);
- Game theory; and
- Bargaining and negotiation dynamics.

In teaching these methodologies to the next generation of economists, it will be important to turn the teaching of the discipline into one similar to the natural sciences, with laboratory practicum courses comprising as much as half of the curriculum to ensure that methodology is integrated with the teaching of laws and theories. As in sciences, the purposes of laboratories is not only to assure learning of the skills but also to show how existing laws were discovered (and can be retested), how model building is accomplished, and how the social sciences requires ethical protocols and protections as well as standards of benefit to the general public that comprises the subjects, funders, and beneficiaries of humanistic research.

Indeed, both in the former Soviet Union and countries under its influence as well as in the U.S. and Western Europe, there have been a number of changes since the 1990s in curricula and in gender and ethnicity of teachers. Yet many actual changes are illusory because these changes have not included transformation in the teaching methods, accountability, administration, or hierarchy or in the university and in the larger society. In Russia in 1990 and in countries like China and Viet Nam in the following years, the Western economics textbooks and doctrines critiqued in the first part of this essay were translated and adopted to replace State planning doctrines and “Marxist” ideologies in much the same way that these texts had replaced Church teachings and early economics texts some 70 years earlier (Lempert, 1996a). Far from changing economics doctrines in universities in Europe and the U.S., the gender and ethnic “balancing” of teaching staffs and the introduction of new courses to meet the politics of these constituencies has also offered little real challenge to economics to its core principles, questions, or methodologies. There is a need for changed teaching methods and university structure at the same time, to replace the hidden curriculum of obedience to top-down doctrine with community oversight and values, pluralistic competition, and intellectual accountability.

3. Application of the discipline

Application of economics should also naturally follow from the rebirth of the discipline as science, since application takes the scientific tools and applies them to specific needs as defined in the questions above. Here, I note only in brief the need to transform the teaching of economics so that both its scientific courses and its applications include field work and interaction with community.

Sample curricula and methodological advice on how to design laboratory field science courses alongside basic theory courses and in more complex applications such as in national development planning for sustainable development and field study of economic history are already available as well as potential mechanisms for changing structure and funding of universities so that the processes are also democratized as the curriculum itself is more open and empirical (Lempert with Briggs, 1995). Similar materials for graduate level, including for management training, in countries throughout the world have been designed (Lempert, unpublished manuscript). An example of an application of an overseas national development planning project for sustainable development in which students produced an economic
development plan and presented it on national media and to a country President, in person is also accessible (Lempert, 1995 and 1998). For preparation of curricula looking at the social science of empire or for comparative empires such as the U.S. and U.S.S.R., there are also available materials (Lempert, 2012; Lempert, 1997b). An outline of questions and approaches for the economic and social science study of living in space that can be used as the basis of a curriculum has also been published (Lempert, 2011b).

4. Rebuilding Economics as a Humanities: A Necessary Corollary to Social Science:

While most natural scientists and engineers have an affinity for science fiction and the arts because of their ability to stimulate creative thinking, to raise ethical and moral questions, and to spur dreams about what is possible, today’s economists as pseudo-social scientists and their colleagues in many other false social sciences and humanities have acted in ways that have polarized their work and closed doors to questions. With the re-opening of economics as a social science, it will also be possible to re-open the humanities of economics as a place where visions and dreams can be expressed, ethical and moral questions can be raised, comparisons with other cultures can be offered as critiques and questions about what may be possible in our own, and science fiction, itself, of imagined economies on and off of the earth, can seek to answer and to raise new questions about economics that can also feed back into economics as a social science. In what is now viewed as the “dismal science,” this is part of the missing joy that needs to be and can be reintroduced.

Economics today is fiction and fantasy in itself, but it is the wrong kind. Real science fiction and fantasy when linked with the social science of economics is the kind that seeks to imagine and test economic laws and theories in future settings in ways that push science and engineering into new areas. Many of the questions posed above, as the basic questions for the discipline of economics, are questions that also require imagination and creative testing in the form of “thought experiments” about pathways of possible actions and results, before it is possible to experimentally test them in fact.

What makes the reading of alternative works such a threat to economists today and what has stifled such thinking is not that imagined alternative systems might lead to brutal totalitarianism in the march towards goals of equity and community. Current economic doctrines have already marched us off to brutality and uniformity that violate human laws and poison the future in the name of “choice” and “sovereignty.” It is that economic doctrines, themselves, have worked to kill off truth and imagination of alternatives. By focusing on a single set of doctrines and in suppressing empirical study of issues like the spiritual emptiness of work in industrial society and of the traumatic impacts of economic institutions on weak cultures and on the vulnerable, economists distort truth. At the same time, economists also destroy imagination and the search for alternatives. Religious doctrines act to destroy the belief that there are alternatives and to suppress the imagination that would consider what they might be like and how to achieve them. Economic doctrines have worked both to assault the search for truth and the human capacity for imagination and search for a better world. The belief that the existing economic system is inevitable and that no other alternatives exist, exerts a psychological tyranny that crushes hope and the human spirit. Such doctrinal thinking was mirrored on both sides in the Cold War (Lempert, 1995) as it is found in the teaching of economic doctrines in almost every major industrial empire today.

An appropriate humanities of economics will be open to philosophical questions, to utopian visions, to culture critiques (including offering different standards of progress, sustainability, and of values), and to science fiction that imagines various economies. Already, science fiction has offered economic predictions as well as positive and negative utopias. Yet economists do not respond to them now in teaching or testing them through research. For example, one might ask, is the science fiction vision of Soylent Green (an overpopulated planet where humans are recycled as food) one that is an actual possibility according to what we know about economics? Which post-Apocalyptic visions following nuclear war, natural catastrophes, global climate change, and collapse of empire and of globalization, are realistic? Do science fiction space economies make sense? Are they desirable?
An appropriate humanities side of economics will re-open the door for utopian thinking that has been suppressed by power and a sense of fatalism. It will recognize that creative thinking is also essential to human adaptation on a planet that will ultimately die and that in the near future is also facing massive ecological changes that will force economic and political-economic adaptations in consumption, production and lifestyle. Without imagining alternative futures and linking them with the economic realities of economics as a social science, humans are unlikely to succeed in averting the potential failures we are currently causing and also to be prepared for the world that will follow.

Not all imagination about economies fits the standard for what is appropriate in a humanistic economics as an adjunct to an economic social science. The adjunct to social science is not simple dreaming in the belief that passion and hope will quickly replace a failed system with a successful alternative. That belief is also a fiction. It characterizes what is wrong with much of humanities today including much of the criticism of contemporary economics that is found in places like anthropology, where one would hope to find evidentiary based cultural critique and testing of pathways to visionary alternatives, rather than just criticism. Good science stimulates the imagination and generates parallel thinking that demonstrates an understanding of scientific possibilities combined with moral and philosophical questions. Such thinking presents laws that limit certain possibilities but also opens up technologies and cures to solve human problems. Fantasy without science undermines rational belief and the ability to work on real improvements by creating the fiction that improvements can occur without sacrifices/tradeoffs.

While it is beyond the scope of this article to lay out a textbook or a course for the teaching and listing of all work that would fit into an humanities of economics in parallel to a social science of economics, one can start from the list of questions above and start to fill in some of the existing work in economic philosophy that already probes these issues.

While it might be best to list the kinds of philosophical and imaginative thinking that has gone into the questions that comprise the full study of economics, as outlined above, in a parallel to those categories for measuring progress, looking at consumption, at production, at internal issues in economic systems like equity, and at overall questions about economic systems, their sustainability and change, currently existing work that raises these issues often looks at several of these issues at once. In order to “mine” various works to compile a list of works addressing these issues, one might start by looking at the different disciplinary and methodological approaches as a whole. One way to think about where to look, here, is to start with different “genres”: philosophical works that challenge social sciences and that include essay and literature; utopian works of fiction and of visionary planners that seek to test alternative economic forms, as well as some forms of “culture critique” and comparison; and future visions of negative utopias (post-apocalyptic scenarios) as well as speculation of “off-Terra” economies (life off of earth). A short list of existing materials is indicated below in each category, but there is certainly much more that readers could add. This is just a brief start.
**Humanistic Questions about Economic Needs:** Measuring and defining concepts of beauty, progress, happiness, and satisfaction are philosophical and religious questions but they are also economic questions that scholars have raised with economic implications.

Works that raise the central questions about the purpose of economic production ask about the relationship between humans and nature and how humans understand ourselves as a part of nature (Carson, 1962) as well as about how much is enough and whether more or bigger is really better and to what extent (Schumacher, 1973). Others, largely within popular sociology, focus on technology and its implications for the structure of society and the definition of what is human as well as whether it is possible to reorganize society for better lives with technology or are just destined to serve it (Toffler, 1980; Yablonsky, 1972; Goodman, 1956; Bell, 1972).

Almost forgotten today, after some several decades, are questions about the possible forms of the “new industrial state” and whether industrial societies must “converge” to a single form (Galbraith, 1967). The nightmarish visions of bureaucracy and control in industrial societies that were raised in fiction by authors like Kafka and Orwell seem to some to be inevitable, and the lack of scientific attention to the questions seems to reinforce that view (Duncan, unpublished):

Though there is a lot of focus on technological change and on equity issues as well as some questions on health and quality of life, there still isn’t much focus on measuring and defining social “progress” in ways that measure human diversity or creative aspirations to determine whether human societies are ever really “advancing.” Is social “progress” merely an ideology promoted by cultures finding themselves in the minority, for which there is no real human motivation and possibility of achievement (Lempert, 2015)?

**Utopian Economics:** Utopian fiction and models or plans are largely about visions of political and economic systems. Today, it seems almost impossible to publish models unless one is already well known and vetted, and the pressures to suppress teaching of earlier visions or historical experiments have largely driven them out of social science disciplines like economics unless they are packaged as “sustainable development plans” and stripped of political and legal questions of rights, opportunity and equity. But many exist. While utopian fiction is abundant, if it is taught it is usually in literature courses rather than by scholars who can test which models might actually be feasible and how it would be possible to test them, rather than to tar them all with ideological slogans and disregard them in their entirety.

The classic visions of “communism” are still taught (Marx, 1867), but more interesting are later applied visions of guild socialism (Cole, 1920), of the kibbutz model, and of mixed economies and choices (Lindblom, 1977).

There are several tests of planned communities like Arcosanti, of architectural plans and shapes like those of Buckminster Fuller, of “sustainable cities,” of “livable cities,” of communal farms and cooperatives, as well as histories of religious utopian communities and alternative economies (including those of the Amish in the U.S. that are among those that survive despite the pressures and risks that usually lead to failure or directly undermine them). Most of the questions can still be raised and tested. Are the small cities of Eastern Europe, with their mixes of racial and religious groups maintaining their strong identities and filling different economic roles, possible or desirable again as a model? (Lempert, 2008)

More policy oriented proposals calling for large scale economic reforms to deal with issues of equity and sustainability or “steady state” economy, also fit here (Sen, 1987; Daly, 2011; Korten, 2007).
**Visions of the Economic Future: Post apocalypse (Negative Utopias) and Economics of Life in Space:**

The false and singular optimism of contemporary economic ideology has largely banned any realistic discussion of how humans will or could cope with the results of failure or calamities in a practical way, particularly given the way contemporary industrial economies are “high entropy” systems (high complexity and ordering, with each individual specializing in a limited area and unable to recreate most of the basic attributes of economic functioning one ones own).

Predictions of resource exhaustion and collapse or disaster are largely avoided as too “speculative” or “negative,” though disaster planning, particularly as a result of climate change, is now a mainstay of work in the “developing” world. Re-imagination of the “death of the suburbs” (Kunstler, 2005) or “life after …” are critical parts of scientific understanding of risk and human adaptation, as well as part of planning. Is it necessary to redesign education systems and dispersal of information and technology to prepare survivors for calamity?

Living in space questions on what is human and how these space environment economies will be structured are extensions of the earlier utopian community questions but into artificial environments that must be artificially created to carry almost everything they will need. Astro-sociology and critics are starting to map these out (Lempert, 2011b).

In building a new humanities of economics to replace the little that currently exists (mostly in economic anthropology, where large questions have mostly withered away just to questions of “value” that respond to economists), there is also a model of what not to do. For a humanities of economics to have meaning, scholars working in this part of the discipline must be fluent in the genres (the humanistic methodology) of appropriate critique and vision as well as maintain a focus on the key questions for the discipline and on a symbiotic rather than confrontational relationship with the social science and applied parts of the discipline.

Within the “social sciences,” social and cultural anthropology has largely declared itself as a humanities subject in the past two or three decades. It had the potential to develop a critique that would have challenged and invigorated the social science being done in the discipline and in other (conceptually subordinate) social sciences like economics. Yet, anthropology has failed as an humanities because it has sought to destroy and replace rather than refresh its discipline’s own social science. It has offered only political advocacy for interest groups in a fragmentation of the holistic systems approach of the discipline into variables that could align with different constituencies. As an humanities, contemporary social anthropology almost entirely lacks the genres above of utopias and negative utopias and visions of the future. Its cultural critiques have been minimal in recent years, and the humanistic questions it asks about human needs have become increasingly limited and without context. Few, if any, social anthropologists today try to define “progress” or offer visions of achieving it. Without a social science of contemporary cultures existing in parallel to its work as an humanities, it has largely failed in its mission of focusing and supplementing the discipline’s own social science and technical applications on moral questions and on broad humanistic concerns.

At first, there was potential. Though not an anthropologist, Ursula Kroeber Le Guin, the daughter of a leading anthropologist, Alfred Kroeber, introduced questions of gender, sexuality and economic organization into her widely acclaimed alternative science fiction novels. Yet, few if any anthropologists followed. Instead, anthropologists today largely offer journalism, blog, ideological response to ideology, and political advocacy for interest groups they personally represent in the profession on the basis of gender, nationality, ethnicity, and sexuality, or their specific artistic or peculiar interests like film or music or food. One scholar, incensed with what he views as the self-destruction of that discipline, has offered a set of tests of colleagues’ work to separate out journalism and blog from academic approaches, as a kind of guideline that could be useful here to keep economics on track (Duncan, 2012).
This is using the parallel Greek roots for “polis” (polity or political entity) and “logos,” the “study of.”

This is using the parallel Greek roots for “oikonomia” (“economics” the study of “household management”) and “logos.”

Anthropologists recognize “social and cultural” anthropology as two distinct sub-categories, meaning that they already recognize social institutions and functions as not broad enough to cover “Cultural Institutions” and functions. This meaning of “culture” is a different one from the meaning for the classification of peoples by shared strategies of survival that are passed down through generations by a group usually in a specific ecological or geographic or social niche and tied together by shared language and traditions. Here, the meaning of culture is defined as encompassing those functions that are not basic to biological survival but that are characteristic of communities and that include what is sometimes referred to as “high culture.” This meaning of “culture” here includes dance forms, musical forms, clothing and other decorative styles, folklore, and usually religion.

[Editor’s note: See Polly Sly’s article in this issue.]
Introduction to Part IV

Challenging social science by holding it to legal standards and to scientific principles is a relatively straightforward process if legal and academic institutions are functioning properly. In a scientific culture and one with rule of law and procedures, where a discipline fails to predict reality and where applications also fail, scholars offer better theories and science progresses. That, however, is not the world we live in. In practice, the ideal is not the reality in law, science, or in “the marketplace”. Underlying structures of political and economic power along with religious beliefs and ideologies that are linked to each other prevent change of institutions, cultures, and beliefs. Challenging religious beliefs and ideologies is often seen as a challenge to one’s basic sense of identity and security. Law, logic and evidence alone do not suffice to replace theological beliefs. Even when crisis shakes one’s basic belief systems, it is still difficult to replace those systems with something that seems new.

Outlining a new discipline of economics (Part III), presenting a set of measures of roles that a discipline should follow (Part II), and focusing on the law for holding a discipline accountable (Part I) all offer a political and legal vision for change. Actual change, however, is much harder. This section, Part IV, discusses what institutional and cultural/social changes beyond just the law are required to reform the discipline of economics and whether or not they are even possible.

This section analyzes the structural needs in contemporary society that are essential for a real transition in the discipline of economics and how or whether they can be changed, including a cultural analysis of the ideological and religious currents that have been intertwined in economic doctrines in ways that deflect challenges and will make its transition to a social science so difficult. The piece ends with a short conclusion pointing to the areas of society that would need to change in order for a scientific and international law compliant discipline to emerge.
Why the Rebuilding is So Difficult: The Politics and Ideologies that Promote Theologies over Science and that Distort Academia and Research:

It is easy to outline a legal and policy solution but when the wrongdoing is that of an elite group whose institutions and ideology are deeply rooted in society, it is difficult to imagine how things will change. Even if international courts criminalized economics and forced it to remodel itself in concert with restructuring of other disciplines, the same political, economic and cultural pressures that degraded the discipline would largely still exist and would continue to interfere in its development. Economics as a discipline has not just failed in its content. Its institutional structures of departments, think tanks, and universities have also failed to be accountable to society and to stated professional standards. Those academic and political institutions that are responsible for enforcing laws and assuring the value of academic research and teaching to the survival of society and humanity have also failed.

To set the discipline of economics on a path that will be open to further broad questions, that will generate and test social science laws and theories, and that will develop the data, methodologies, and continuing research agenda to build on requires larger political structural changes in academic and research institutions as well as larger cultural changes. The problem here is that very problem that economists themselves recognize in theory but do not confront in reality; the problem of “public goods” and their corruption by market forces, with failure of regulatory institutions, professional codes, and incentives.

Economists speak of “incentives” and “rational behavior” as leading to choice. If these, alone, were enough, those societies today that are facing unsustainability and economic decline, like those where the discipline of economics is prominent, would seek change. But they do not. Instead, these societies are in denial given their global power and the financial and military power of the elites, themselves. They reinforce current behaviors and shield themselves from reality. These behaviors may be “rational” in the short-term but they are not in the long-term and that is the problem. Elite behaviors do not appropriately weigh long-term consequences of behaviors that are self-destructive and retaliatory. Meanwhile, those societies whose economies are currently rising also focus only on the short-term without seeing long-term implications. They see themselves as perfectly successful, with no need for change or attention to the long run. In a sense, the systems that elites build prevent any real re-examination or change. Where disciplines like economics have mis-educated professionals for generations, few have the mindset and the training for the kind of scientific, objective thinking needed to establish reform. As systems collapse, most also find themselves having to deal with the anger, fear, and backlash of those who are suffering the results of failure. This makes it difficult to reform.

The next three sections discuss the realities of confronting:

- current economists as violators of the law,
- institutions that maintain the failing and law breaking economics discipline, and
- overall “social forces” or “deep structures” of beliefs and ideologies that make change difficult, using different strategies of behavioral and social change.
Dealing with the Individuals (Economists and the Financial and Political Interests Behind Them) and their Mental State as the Source of the Problem, through Behavioral Interventions

The simple approach of holding economists accountable to international and criminal law assumes that there is a small group that has violated existing rules and norms and that such a group can be punished, reformed and reintegrated or isolated back in the society. That requires an overall commitment to rule of law and an ability to punish or reform those who are at fault. If the criminality is an indication of a larger failing of the culture (or part of the cause of that failing) and may have also created or is linked to so many institutions that propagate such misdeeds, the process of change may be impossible to conduct from within. The deeper roots of institutional behavior and social processes often make change difficult unless it is directed by a more powerful, outside, authority but if the international system is unable to act legally in a time of relative prosperity, will it act at all in a time of breakdown, chaos and uncertainty?

In an ideal world, following the “rational” behavior that economists say people follow to maximize their (long-term) self-interest, it would be simple to change the failures of economics through legal enforcement and through medical (mental health) interventions. Given that the behaviors of economists seem to be long-term irrational as do the behaviors of other elites required to enforce international law for long-term human interests, what the legal analysis described in Part I as a “legal problem” may actually be an emotional problem and may require behavioral rather than legal solutions.

Criminologists would most likely define the behaviors at the base of the international crimes of economists identified in Part I to be more than simply actions on the basis of rational self-interest. They could easily define them as reaching the level of psychopathic or sociopathic behavior. This is because economists are not simply stealing or causing harm for direct self-interest. They have covered up their behavior with a system of beliefs to rationalize what is multiple, repeated harm that is against their own (and humanity’s) self-interest and delusions as to the nature of reality. Under some definitions, that would classify as a mental disorder. Reforming such behavior even through simple law enforcement and sanction would be difficult because the perpetrators may not even have the rational and logical ability to understand what they have done wrong and why it does not follow the standards of observations, conclusions and logic about real world events.

Economists are perfectly able to act in society and appear normal, but, if the analysis of economics as in violation of international law is correct, then by definition, economists are a threat to themselves or others (the standard for defining mental illness). For psychological and/or chemical reasons, something has apparently failed in economists in their ability to empathize with other human beings unlike themselves and to accept and appreciate those differences and choices. Economists also fail in their ability to perceive their own long-term interests, in their perception of the world around them and its workings, and their ability to reason.

Even if the international legal system could hold economists criminally accountable, there is a good basis for approaching economics colleagues, teachers, and officials with compassion and understanding, despite the lack of apparent sympathy they show for others and despite the harms and probably inability they have to understand or show remorse for the harms they have caused, and seeking behavioral solutions. In both media stereotypes of amoral business executives and in everyday life, those studying economics are largely view as people lacking in the more humane qualities found throughout society. While there are few studies of behavior types of professions and such studies are hard to define as “objective”, I simply open up the issue here for discussion as part of looking at solutions. Personality types fitting into universities today are changing as the roles and professions change, including the movement of economics towards sterile mathematics. That kind of work would attract those lacking real self-confidence, or creativity who are withdrawn and may feel excluded or deprived. They appear to need aggrandizement, affirmation from powerful and wealthy people, to affirm their lack of self. At the opposite end, those who study finance and business and who plan careers in areas like trade and corporate policy, where they can do damage, might fit the profile of a psychopathic personality.
Assuming that economists are in denial about their behaviors, one approach to some of them would be to confront them directly with the reality and results of their behaviors and the victims, surrounding them with truth telling. As of now, that has yet to happen and it is not clear who would do it. Currently educational methods and lack of real historical, comparative, or cross-cultural and field research in economics helps to promote denial by avoiding contact with reality. Empirical social science works well to promote empathy, overcome denial and ignorance, and to promote model building in social sciences like economics but people would have to engage in it and institutions would have to promote it (Lempert with Briggs, 1995). Economists are elites today in society such that even if people can feel compassion for them (something often impossible when one feels relatively powerless and victimized), they are likely to fear confronting them for good reason. There are many ways by which economists can use their current networks to retaliate against those who would see to change them, rather than act to reform and correct the damage they have caused.

It is particularly difficult to confront elites with their behaviors when they have built a strong wall of denial. The myths that economists promote, though they may be harmful and delusion, have permeated society and culture, making it difficult for most people to participate in the confrontation without feeling some shared guilt and denial. That calls for a focus on the other factors that need to change.

**Political, Institutional, Structural Reforms**

Unless there are also larger political, institutional and structural reforms, economics as a discipline and a profession will still be vulnerable to degradation and capture. Like the institutional reforms needed in economics as a discipline, many necessary political reform solutions are also relatively straightforward on paper. Not only are there specific legal mechanisms of institutional oversight but there are structural democratic mechanisms to ensure the protection of an entire system in perpetuity and to protect it from the kinds of corruption (of economic and military power that distort what appear to be effective systems, on paper) that appear to distort almost every existing political system, today. Yet, like the reforms of university disciplines and like enforcement of law, these are also trumped by cultural realities.

The “post autistic economics” group is right in calling for a pluralism in economics, but they are only starting the process as a single interest group within the discipline. For their demands to be met, they have to have the leverage of funding of the university and of legal and political accountability of the university to public needs.

In societies where public democratic oversight of institutions and participation – in the political process, in the courts, in the media – has also been corrupted, the rebuilding needs to focus on oversight of university funding and responsiveness as well as of political institutions to confront the lack of real democracy and accountability in the modern state.

Though the specific mechanisms of political reform to protect minority cultural rights at all levels of political power, as well as individual rights at those levels, are too detailed for this article, there are solutions to address the problems of concentration of economic, military, and political power (Lempert, 1994; 1996b) as well as means of creating a democratic culture and democratizing the university, itself (Lempert with Briggs, 1995).

Seeking institutional changes, however, also requires a focus on the cultural context that prevents it.

**Cultural Obstacles to Change**

What makes economics as a discipline so hard to change is that it has deeply intertwined itself with modern culture in such a way that attacking its doctrines today is, first, a direct attack on religion (Christianity) and, second, a direct confrontation on issues that have become “taboo” that subjects critics to personal attack and ostracism. Third, the processes that economists have set in motion that international law criminalizes – destruction of cultures and threats to the survival of humanity – have been initiated in such a way that short-term attempts to reverse them and undue the harms will cause
considerable immediate hardship. It is almost as if economics has worked to create a self-destructive process that cannot be reversed. These three “mine-fields” to change can be examined in turn.

1. How Economics Forestalls Challenges by Establishing Attack on Economics as an Attack on Religion

As this article demonstrated in Part II, economics historically worked to ally itself with doctrines of the Church in Christian countries, both in the function of the discipline (serving a religious function) and in political alliance and symbolism. While one can rationally confront scientific arguments, by mustering evidence and tests, the acceptance of religious beliefs is not rational and it is difficult or impossible to challenge religious beliefs with rational argument. One cannot confront believers in the idea of “virgin birth” or the “invisible hand” of the market with scientific fact because the beliefs are established on the basis of power, ritual, and manipulation of emotion in ways that generate “faith.” Religious beliefs only falter when the “Gods fail” and the benefits that the faith promises can no longer be provided by society.

In the absence of adherence to scientific standards and democratic approaches, prosecution and court processes are equally or more likely today to target academic innovators rather than those who represent and abuse power. Academics who have written in defense of educational standards in the U.S., for example, have often been those seeking to uphold the values and power of the Christian Church and Western ideologies rather than those of science. William F. Buckley’s “God and Man at Yale,” (1951) and Allan Bloom’s, “Closing of the American Mind,” (1987) were widely heralded as calls to suppress the development of social science rather than to promote it.

Moreover in contemporary industrial culture that is scientific but that has mis-educated people about science, it is difficult to gain consensus on even the most basic knowledge to challenge economics as pseudo-science. In the U.S., for example, half of the country does not accept Darwin’s theory of evolution and many schools are now required to teach it as a “theory” with equal time to “creationism.” With economics allying itself with the anti-Darwinists, how can one challenge economics?

How is it possible to rebuild economics as a science by bringing in comparisons of human societies with the animal kingdom and the economic systems of other species when the Church opposes the teaching of Darwinism and economics allies itself with the Church? The problem in rebuilding economics as a social science is that it immediately positions the changes as coming from “other” religions that do not self-censor such scientific discussions. That turns the challenge to economics into a polarized religious battle between Christians (and those who support them as the dominant power in “Western” societies) and those who would oppose them. The problem is not just that studying ant colonies and their division of labor as a way to understand division of labor in human economies is frightening to those who see human systems as entirely, distinct, separate and “divine.” It is that the very approach and narrow boundaries of economics today reinforces Church beliefs that people learn from birth and that are given a status that amounts to their being “sacred” and unchallengeable. Showing how human pecking orders and consumption displays among males are simple behaviors from the animal kingdom linked with sexuality is frightening to those who adhere to religious Church dogma that seeks to deny human connections to nature and responsibilities to nature. Studying relations among Bonobo chimpanzees and their choice to replace war with sexuality, is also not welcome by the Church nor economics. The modeling of nature and of simple systems as analogues to understand complex systems and relations between population (reproduction), war, and technological advance are questions religion has declared off limits and that contemporary economics reinforces.

The ideology of “growth” without end, a doctrine some believe was specifically created to mask harm to other groups on the pretext of helping them, is also rooted in the idea of missionaries and charity, thus also giving it a kind of “holiness” and false morality that makes it difficult to challenge. Much like the belief in Heaven and an afterlife and other beliefs that have followed Western imperialism and missionary work to undermine foreign cultures and prepare them for exploitative colonial “trade” and production, the “faith” in perpetual “growth” works to prevent calls for redistribution and equity (Daly, 2011). Exposing such underpinnings of commonly held beliefs would be politically explosive.
Transforming economics into a social science also implicitly opens up questions of how different cultures and religions maintain different economic systems. These beliefs include the “Protestant ethic” and family relations (attitudes about abortion) that reinforce warfare to maintain land divisions (European land went entirely to the first born male, the second born male went to the imperial army while the third son went to the church, with this system promoting population and imperial expansion). Similarly, Christian beliefs work to maintain control of labor forces, promising them a better life “after death” in reward for their current obedience.

Economics has so allied itself with religious beliefs such that the attack on the discipline is likely to be directly or subtly described as a religious battle between Christians and non-Christians. That turns a scientific and legal disagreement into the kind of religious war that has characterized much past violence between Europe and other societies (particularly the Middle East).

If both the U.S. Empire and Europe continue to fall and are replaced by China as the major world power, will this then change, or has the economic doctrine already wedded itself to “religious” beliefs in China?

This article, in Part II, offered reasons for why Jews and other non-Christians in the U.S. and Western Europe have already made the religious “conversion” to promote the religious beliefs of economics as part of their need to show their loyalty and to rise in those systems. One might argue that countries like China that have entered the “world system” and are now using it to their economic advantage have also partly converted to this religion, even though they oppose the direct teachings of Christianity. The portions of economics that are aligned with Christianity, in accepting beliefs from authority figures on faith and in opposing the ideas of causality that are based in evolution are quite consistent with various Asian religions. The Buddhist “after-life” (really, the “next” life in the cycle of lives) and its idea of self-denial while elites prosper, with postponed equity until the “next” life, is not unlike the faith that Christianity merges with economic doctrine. While Asian religions of Taoism and Buddhism may have more ties to the natural world and more respect for nature than Christianity, these religions do not prevent the destruction of nature.

Chinese seems to have fully adapted to teaching of economics and one would expect them to continue to reinforce it as part of a state religion. Even without the Church, there will still be reticence among Chinese authorities to fully promote scientific thinking, and the state (one Party) religion of divine right and of faith/trust in hierarchic leadership and nationalism (promoting the advance of the country on the basis of race, rather than for any particular human ideal) will likely trump real science.

In Vietnam, economic beliefs have now merged with the State religion in slogans that define the national essence, such as “Giaó m'nh” (“Rich and Powerful”) and other reinforcing ideologies as to industrialization, commerce and investment comprising attributes of “civilization” with those outside of this system as “outdated” or uncivilized.


Economists in all countries have sought to label those who look at distributional issues, individual rights, and cultural rights as disloyal, opposing national unity, and a threat, rather than long-term thinkers who offer legitimate intellectual challenge in the interests of science and humanity. Thus, beyond finding themselves pulled into a religious confrontation, those who challenge economics will also likely find many of their attempts at reform being turned into attacks on their loyalty. In academic discourse, disciplines representing elites identify their positions with the nation and work to transform professional debates into witch hunts against critics. Scholars raising issues of distribution, political rights, and public oversight have long been smeared as “Marxist” and disloyal. The transformation of economics into a social science must confront these ideologies of elites in opening up debates that have become taboo.

In a social science of economics, choosing to scientifically examine geography and the environment as variables that could be used to understand and predict aspects of the economies and linked political
choices of Russia, China and the U.S. would immediately eliminate the political-ideological stereotyping that current social science disciplines use to define and demonize “enemies” and to distract attention from similar (and failing) choices in society (Lempert, 1996a; 1998). It is to the advantage of elites to continue this demonization of “enemy” economies and their internal collapses (labor camps, wars, and civil wars) and to oppose those social scientists who seek to describe economic phenomenon on the basis of environmental and cultural failure instead of “bad choices” of economic “isms” by an “enemy leadership.”

Re-opening economics to the real-world issues that it avoids today of political control and equity – slavery, class systems, kinship and corruption, feudalism – also opens for scrutiny the processes through which elites maintain power in violation of law and of promises and principles. Comparisons with the animal kingdom and their economies would raise questions about how elites use economic doctrines in ways that are stark and perhaps shocking. Ant societies and bees have production, consumption and division of labor that in many ways are like the inequities that are found in the global economy today. Beyond the questions of whether such hierarchies and divisions are biologically hard wired and inevitable, and how much variation and “choice” is possible for humans, are questions of how different human workers really are from worker ants, and whether economists really think of there being much more to life or humanity. There are reasons why those who try to raise these approaches would face strong opposition as well as ridicule.

The more one examines the possibilities for what a science of economics would study, the more it actually exposes shocking attributes of elites in society and positions of the masses. Take, for example, the case of how several species have integrated with others for different synergistic roles. Humans have “domesticated” dogs, elephants and horses in what are essentially “paid” exchange labor relations with other species. Dogs and cats in a household can also have exchange relationships and division of labor. Were economists to discuss these parallels it would also become all too clear that modern labor forces have been created on the model of humans and animals with human workers filling a role no different from horses, cats or dogs. One can see why economists would go to great lengths to prevent the discipline from raising these comparisons and questioning why their view of human motivation (“maximization behavior”) is also so similar to that of their view of the behavior of domesticated animals.

To take these scientific analogies farther, intestinal bacteria or parasites in humans form a synergistic relationship integrating with human hosts in what is a science of economics would also describe as an economic “system.” Humans with parasites do change their own demand and consumption patterns, so there is another parallel here as well. The adaptations are long term evolutionary, short-term biological as well as psychological. This is not far from what Lester Brown and others suggest about economic systems of humans as really biological environmental production systems (fishing, farming, hunting) that need to be studied exactly in that way (Brown, 2004). To open up these questions for study as an integral part of economics as a social science raises fundamental questions about the human relationship with nature and definitions of being human.

Once these questions are raised, then it is hard to stop questions as to why converting live things into dead things is the aim of a society based on current neo-classical economic teachings and why economists do not measure the full spectrum of consumption desires for achieving quality of life, across dimensions beyond the limited (animalistic) vision of elites and the “modern” societies.

Once these questions are raised and become integral to a new discipline of economics, other questions would certainly follow about how the current economic and political systems were maintained with such limited vision and such primitive views of human beings, for so long. That would open up examination of how preferences and wants are shaped and how socialization and education and control systems actually work today. These are questions that elites have a short-term interest in suppressing and that they would subject to ridicule.

In academia today, even outside of economics, raising biological and environmental questions within social science is also largely a taboo. In anthropology, for example, the very biological and genetic questions about different ethnic groups and about human evolution that stress the very differences and
specialized needs are suppressed today on the pretext that considering differences and needs across ethnicity and gender somehow prevents “equality”. This role of economic anthropologists and new disciplines today in suppressing science because of the discomfort in recognizing biological gender differences (sexual dimorphism) and racial differences, ends up reinforcing the anti-science approach of economics and the suppression of rights rather than their protection. Economics avoids issues of biology, evolution and comparison by arguing that economic preferences are personal choice to meet wants that are adjusted in the marketplace, not that competing genetic populations are in a hegemonic struggle for the resources they need to meet their specific biological needs. This ideology within social science has reached the point of absurdity but it is still not subject to question despite simple reality that most children recognize. Europeans manufacture sun screen for their white skin and also have different dietary needs. The Russians may have a high tolerance for vodka as a processing of sugars in the winter and Russian bodies may have adapted to famine. But, attention to these issues of biology and of the hegemony of certain racial groups in the “market” to meet their genetic needs in ways that limit minorities, is considered to be taboo. The modeling of economics based on competing cultural needs and gender biology is suppressed as a taboo under the ideology of the “rational economic man” and the “free market” because opening up study of biology and genetics that could stereotype groups would also create the need for rights and accommodation for others where businesses and governments have sought to eliminate such debate. Society would have to accept and promote diversity as a way to promote adaptability and not turn all societies into “efficient” “melting pots.” It would have to spend the resources to protect cultures and individuals. These questions would call for significant reorientation of resources from private goods to social goods for future benefit. There would be calls for real measures of long term human survival that meet a protected scientific standard.

The parallels between animal economies and contemporary economies are intuitively understood. In fact, the concepts are already deeply embedded in language. Words like “Queen Bee,” “worker ant,” and the “rat race” are clearly understood in English. In saying they are “working like a dog,” people also recognize the economic relationship between humans and domesticated animals. While some species are viewed differently in different cultures, there are many universals. The very word in Vietnamese for a feudal economy, for example, is “phong kien,” meaning “ant society.” Usually, when something is so easily understood, its suppression requires extreme measures to turn the topic into a “taboo.” That has what has happened, making it difficult to challenge with some of these ideologies rooting themselves so deeply that attempts to change them also result in difficult short-term economic costs.

3. How Economics Culturally Embeds its Principles, Setting in Motion a Downward Vicious Cycle, Offering Short-Term Payoffs, that Cannot be Reversed

A final cultural factor that militates against changing economics as a discipline is that economic doctrines of globalization, consumption and “growth” have created such high short-term costs to reversal and offer such short-term incentives to continue, that they are almost impossible to reverse, even though they may have put society on a downward, self-destructive path.

The doctrines of economics may have created a self-fulfilling prophesy and “vicious cycle” such that once certain processes are started, it may be impossible to reverse them. For example, once cultures that are sustainable in their own environments are forced into globalism, they may no longer have a choice but to face immediate collapse or future collapse with much greater violence and death if they try to opt out. For many cultures, what globalization does is to replace sustainable consumption with dependency on trade while populations grow. This new cycle forces them further into exploitation of their environments that make them further unsustainable and make them further reliant. Their vulnerability also increases from climate change as a result of over-consumption of resources by industrial societies, or by invasions of their resources, or by dependency on resource exploitation or a cash crop for the global market. Once they are “hooked” on outside goods to meet increased demand and to replace local consumption with foreign products that they no longer produce locally, they become vulnerable to the rising price of those
goods, meaning that they must increase the short-term destruction in order to receive them. Since sustainable consumption policies are never a part of the current economic doctrines, once cultures are pushed into globalization (trade), their population usually jumps at first as a result of “donor” “anti-poverty” health improvements and quick incomes. This population increase and the taste of elites for foreign goods as well as their replacement of local production for export production changes their consumption patterns. Fear of invasion and theft of resources also simultaneously pushes increased military consumption that creates a further drain on the economy in what for many countries is a vicious cycle that ratchets up their dependency and the overall unsustainability of the global system (Lempert and Nguyen, 2011).

Economists know that most countries that are being pushed into globalization do not have the infrastructure and understanding to control their consumption and to invest in ways that will lead them to sustainable development. Moreover, the international banks and donors have no interest in sustainable development planning. It is their very weakness that makes their labor and other resources easy to exploit.

In other words, economics doctrines have the impact on many cultures and communities that destroys their cultural homeostasis – sustainable balance with their environment – in such a way that it must continue to depend on imported technologies and imported goods. The culture or community is hooked on a pattern that forces it to more quickly deplete its own resources and to reach the potential limits of technology where it faces collapse and poverty. In doing so, it essentially loses the ability to change because any attempts at reversal (such as that of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge Cambodia in the 1970s) guarantee a short-term crisis. The result is to postpone the decision-making to the future, to a much larger crisis.

This contemporary neo-classical economics ideology of immediate “growth” to combat poverty is more than just an illusion intended to divert focus from equality and sustainable resource management. It is an ideology that establishes continued short-term dependency on outside technology in order to continually resolve, every time in the short-term, the inevitable poverty that results after the benefits of the new technology have been exhausted by increased population and consumption and by increased social costs or declining quality of resources (and ultimately lower returns to the technology or to sale of an export good). Scientists refer to this process as “autocatalysis.” Start of a process becomes almost a chain reaction that accelerates the process in a way that is irreversible. Its long-term prognosis is collapse: resource exhaustion, famine, war, and collapse or extinction (Diamond, 2005, page 186).

Similar processes are underway today in industrial countries to prop up neo-classical economics doctrines; extorting funds to certain economic sectors in ways that also promote this vicious cycle. Rather than invest in public goods to promote sustainability with long term gains, elites seek short-term spending to maintain their current industries and workers in those industries, such as military and social control (prisons and police) and seek to maintain them no matter how productive they will be in the long run.

One could also describe what occurs as similar to an addiction. If “growth” and “trade” are introduced as “solutions,” the destabilization they create in the balance of consumption, production, and resources, ratchets up the need for more growth along the same lines. Currently in the U.S., the addiction to growth and fear of the unemployment that results when resources like oil are over-exhausted and when non-productive or inefficient industries and government spending become “too big to fail,” reinforces the call for the very processes of “growth” that worsen the problem; more subsidies to the failing industries, more exploitation of resources and elimination of regulation, more military spending to take resources. All of this is to “create (short-term) jobs.” In response, the increased militarism drives exploitation of the environment and militarism (and terrorism) in response. Like any addiction, this is just a short-term “fix” that drives the failures. Since the harms create a continuing incentive for the short-term addictive fix, the neo-classical economic doctrine of “growth” is reinforced rather than discarded and those who oppose it are painted as unpatriotic and wanting to cause pain to “workers” or “soldiers” in the non-productive industries, or opponents of “security”.

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Even the small countries most vulnerable to climate change, to militarism, and to changing export demands, are wedded to the short-term fix of environmental projects that “promote livelihoods” and boost consumption rather than protect resources, to more “growth policies,” and to more military spending in the paradoxical desire to be “rich and powerful” at the expense of their current resources and with increasing consumption demands, rather than future investments.

The economists’ focus on the short-term, with the doctrinal assumption that all goods are fungible and that systems are all self-correcting, prevents any long-term sustainability calculations or investments and helps to reinforce such addictive behavior.

In his work, Collapse, Jared Diamond poses the question, “What did the person cutting down the last remaining tree on Easter Island think when doing it?: given that we know in hindsight that the deforestation of the island was its death warrant making it uninhabitable (Diamond, 2005). He wonders how people were unable to think ahead and choose and seems unable to analogize it to contemporary experience where we have reason and science and “choice” to avoid economic disasters. If the Easter Island native were like those today who are raised on economic doctrine, the cutting of the tree may have been part of a system of beliefs driven entirely by fear and short-term needs. If this system of beliefs had been rigged such that neighbors were constantly in fear of violence of all forms (from group and individual “enemies”) the cutting of the tree would be essential to generate the weapons and wealth to protect against those enemies. The system of beliefs is such that the only “patriotic” solution is to consume and generate weapons and “protection,” even at the cost of destroying the future. In promoting the types of crimes for which they could be held liable, economists have rigged the global economy into a downward spiral (Lempert and Nguyen, 2011).
The Challenge: Where Do We Go From Here?

Science has a way of progressing on its own, though often at a slow or uneven pace. Sooner or later a society decides that a forgotten or repressed science and technology are in its interest and they invest in such work, it is recorded, and it becomes part of the body of human knowledge. It is difficult to say if economics and other social sciences will re-emerge as true social sciences in the lifetime of this author, but so much work has been done, fragmented among various disciplines, that it will at least continue underground and in some form, until there is an opportunity to do it systematically and with mainstream recognition.

How can we reverse the corruption of social science disciplines by money and military power and insulate social sciences so they can go forward in the broad, humanistic ways that (perhaps unlike the natural sciences, that often seem to go hand-in-hand with nationalism and empire) these disciplines need to survive?

- Corporations want to prepare employees and policy makers to promote their interests.
- Publishers are corporate and even research journals are now selling their space.
- Think tanks hire scholars to promote their ideologies and corporations endow chairs and hire armies of research assistants and secretarial services to promote their views and to crowd out competitive work.

Academics live with the pretense of objectivity, peer review, but it is permeated with financial influences, power and conflicts of interest that are unchallenged.

Political reality is that empires that are successful continue to promote the ideologies that underlie their success. In the world today, where much thinking among elites is still relatively short-term (despite the rational benefit of long-term thinking) and where technology and the economic doctrines that helped bring resources to major powers have contributed to that success, the only real challenges to economic doctrines will come in the countries that recognize the need to change and to invest in long term strategies. Empires are unsustainable but they accumulate power quickly as they rise. The doctrines of economics today reinforce the weapons spending and violation of rights (genocide, land invasions) that characterize successful empires of the West and East (China, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Japan, etc.) and oil rich autocracies of the Arab world. One can little expect these countries to suddenly change their approaches to that of sustainable development and stewardship for planetary survival when their leaders are oriented towards short-term consumption and when motivation is often anger and avoidance. Empire funds ideology of empire, not sustainable development, diversity, rule of law and diversity.

Within empires, can social sciences re-emerge to offer outlets for groups within those empires to look for solutions to some of their internal problems? One might suggest that some social sciences actually arose in the past to do this. If so, which disciplines could do this?

Disciplines today have become defined narrowly by methodologies rather than by research questions and discoveries. Academics today are promoting self-interest and many social scientists have defined that self-interest as using their fields for political platforms for interest groups or to protect peoples by seeking to destroy science all together, so it is not misused. But, there are also advantages to using social science to create change from within and to protect interests in a rational and scientific way.

No society completely rejects science or technology. Cultures only seek to limit their scope and protect certain beliefs about human power and action. The influence of Christianity (and similarly, Buddhist ideas of fate and some other religions) that limits social science in fear that it undermines what is considered sanctified in human action, is not completely incompatible with science. The idea of determinism is fearful but social science does not imply a lack of any human action. It implies probabilistic predictability, like Mendelian genetics. There are still random processes at work but science can predict the likely probably outcomes based on experience. Certain laws are at work and there is probabilistic evidence. What is not certain and pre-determined is what the specific outcome will be in each particular case.
There are reasons to think that self-interest could lead to a return to social science thinking and solutions, even if it only starts with short-term self-interest. Even if one suggests that the social sciences were only able to partly develop as social sciences in the early 20th century because of the need of Western empires to understand how to better meet the needs of their minorities and better understand how their systems worked so as to avoid instability, that was still enough to open the door to social science.

Psychology made the transition from a philosophical discipline of Freud and Jung to an experimental science looking at brain chemistry, genetics, environmental factors, and evolution. One could say it has also become driven by control objectives of advertising, political merchandising, and social control (as well as profit of drug companies creating needs and diseases in ways that also inject politics, ideology and pseudoscience). Yet, the idea of experimentation and comparison as well as ethical protocol is embedded in the discipline. Some would say it has become too driven by science because of the commercialization of drugs and genetic therapies and that it needs more ethical oversight of experiments and applications, but few would say that it has completely rejected science.

More likely, a “real” economics will go underground, developed by independent scholars, on the funds of the authors, depending on scholars in small countries or minority groups or with special interests in communities on the periphery who see social science and humanitarian work as a calling. This is costly to the human beings who make the sacrifices to do it and it is hard for science to break through the din of ideologies. Real science, however, has an advantage over ideology in that it can stand the test of time and can be verified. Work with little content is easy to clear away. Scientific ideas meet the challenges of proof and can be translated into technologies for human betterment. They ultimately stand out.

In Vietnam, a country with little commitment to sciences or to scientific thinking other than in the field of herbal medicine, I was astonished to hear the following story praising Chinese historians from 2,000 years ago for their willingness to die rather than violate their obligation to faithfully and truthfully record history. The Han Chinese Emperor summoned the chief royal historian to write about historical events that suggested the Emperor had deviated from tradition and to falsify the historic record. The historian noted his requirement to present an honest history. The Emperor had him beheaded and called in the deputy chief. He was told the same. The Emperor had him beheaded and brought in the third historian in line. This continued until every one of the Chinese historians was beheaded. All maintained their oath to the profession over the commitment to the Emperor; something also astonishing in a country where the traditions have largely been to worship the Emperor as a servant of Heaven, except (according to Confucian teachings) in times of crisis where the “contract” between the Emperor and the people is broken and one can challenge the Emperor.

Despite the current traditions in China to obey authority, and even weaker commitment to any kinds of ethics or professional codes in Vietnam, this story continued among the Chinese and into Vietnam with a sense of praise for the martyred historians. Moreover, there were also parallel stories of un-corruptible Chinese judges and Mandarins, respecting seemingly lost traditions.

This ethic survived for centuries and still has resonance as part of popular culture seeking to resurrect ancient traditions even in conflict with modern authority. That suggests that there must be a universal human understanding of scientific inquiry and its protection. While most “scholars” today would seem to fear beheading for upholding professional ethics and fighting for humanistic and scientific scholarship, times like these also call for return to principles, including those of universal law and empirical inquiry. Even in the face of strong religious invocations and ideologies, that basic understanding may also be part of human universal values and part of the full scope of human needs that goes well beyond the short-term self-interest assumed and practiced by contemporary economists and other scholars.
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24 See, for example, California’s Welfare and Institutions Code Sections 5150-5157. These sections offer the immediate justifications for confinement under mental health laws with the determination of medical professionals.

25 See, for example, studies like one done recently in Denmark, reported here, “Did You Study Business or Economics? Then You Might be a Psychopath, Claim Scientists,” by Tim Collins, May 4, 2017, [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4473012/Studied-business-economics-psychopath.html](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4473012/Studied-business-economics-psychopath.html)

26 As I partly explain in *Escape from the Ivory Tower* (Lempert with Briggs, et. al., 1995) my own awakening to the failures of economics doctrines and of the training I received even at top universities in the U.S., came from interactions in the Third World and in poor areas of the U.S. with the very peoples the doctrines I was taught were supposed to be helping. This independent experience and confrontation of my beliefs, at a young age, was a rude wake-up call and forced me to abandon many of the doctrines that I had also been taught to accept. It led me to generate and test a new empirical social science curricula that included teaching of economics through laboratory field work and applied projects. Part of the reason I feel compassion for economists and offer the psychological analysis above is because I am able to reflect on my own reasons for studying economics and on the backgrounds, personalities, and motivations of classmates and teachers, including many of whom were minorities like myself (Jews and others), who felt awkward, and looked for disciplines that would offer recognition, acceptance, and high status. During my college career, I found the cold, unemotional and powerful appeal of economics and related fields to be seductive, including its ideologies of “greatest good for the greatest number” and its measures of industrial, technocratic “progress” that I now recognize as in error. My confrontation with reality occurred in experiences where I was alone and forced to think;
something that does not happen with economics students or professionals at universities or in institutional settings. Not only did my beliefs have to be continually confronted with reality, but I also had to recognize my own fears and needs in order to act rationally to overcome those fears.

27 Though unpublished, I have written a three volume work comprising a coherent system of political oversight that resurrects 18th century political principles that have all been effectively used in the past, and applies them to the institutions of the modern state (in the form of two sets of amendments to the U.S. constitution to restore federalism and individual rights). One of the two sets is presented in a published article, cited above, offering a model constitution for Ukraine, with some of the theory presented in a short published article that is also cited. The idea of the work was to “translate” existing legal and constitutional mechanisms that were already tested and established in the culture prior to the industrial revolution, but that had been lost since, into the contemporary context following the industrial revolution, to deal with the rise of corporations including mass media, and public bureaucracies including professional military and police powers. Although the U.S. and other countries claim their systems today are “democratic” because they use some of the limited mechanisms of 18th century political equality, the discarding of other mechanisms that assured effective balance of powers and managerial oversight have essentially rendered the remaining mechanisms mere ritual. One can go back to the actual principles of balance of powers and managerial oversight and control and reapply them so that they have real meaning. Today, however, curricula of political science, political economy, and law, have also removed such topics, thus creating the view among academic publishers that there is “no demand” to support publication of such work.

28 I lived and conducted research in Vietnam between 1998 and 2006 and completed two yet unpublished ethnographies of Vietnamese culture and history.