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FOREWORD:
THE DEATH OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
IN AN ERA OF MULTICULTURAL CORPORATISM (“NEO-LIBERALISM”):
WITH EFFORTS AT RESUSCITATION

DAVID LEMPERT, PH.D., J.D., M.B.A., E.D. (HON.)
Special Issue Editor

Abstract:

This foreword is in four separate parts:
Part I: Inspiration for the Special Issue: A Personal Story: This section describes the inspiration for this issue, in a tale of the author’s experience with social science over the past 40 years. It offers some general observations and theories about what has happened to the social sciences from a personal perspective over time. (pages 2 to 19)
Part II: The Concept for this Special Issue of Catalyst and the Reality of Critiquing and Restoring Social Science: This section is what one generally finds in an introduction to a special issue, describing the specific concept and contents, with some additional information that itself is informative about social science today. It presents the goals for the issue and the process of putting this issue together. Most journal special issues offer an easy vehicle for an existing group of scholars to publish their work. In contrast, this issue, starting with a critical approach to social science, faced many of the challenges that exist today to those who seek to challenge the existing consensus in social science that is anti-science and that has politicized social science. This section provides a case study that offers insight into the controls and ideologies that restrict discussion of social sciences today. (pages 20 to 38)
Part III: Introducing the Contents of the Special Issue: This section introduces the pieces in this issue and how they fit together. (pages 39 to 46)
Part IV: A Vision for Revitalizing Social Science and Inviting Continued Debates and Solutions: This final section offers a short general “vision” for a revitalized social science, describing the kinds of actions that this issue of Catalyst seeks to catalyze, in revitalizing social science disciplines. (pages 47 to 52)

The typical introduction to a special issue focuses on the pieces that appear and describes how they fit together with each other. What makes Catalyst a special journal is that in addition to linking articles on themes, it seeks to serve in the role of catalyzing deep reflection and social change. With those goals in mind, this foreword consists of four parts as described in the abstract above: a personal story of this editor’s experience (hopes and despair) with academic social sciences; the goals of this special issue and the process of bringing it to fruition; introduction to the pieces in the issue; and comments on the tasks ahead given the findings and proposals presented in this issue to re-catalyze social sciences.
Part I:

Inspiration for this Special Issue:

A Personal Story on the Promise of the Social Sciences for Human Betterment and the Breaking of that Promise

I Am a Social Scientist

I am a social scientist. I am proud of it. What I do is considered to be impossible but I do it anyway. I search for “natural laws” of behavior across societies that I use to predict future events. My guiding principle is a humanitarian one, to follow human goals and international law and to promote human survival and well-being. I generate hypotheses on major questions of human behavior like war, revolution, cultural survival, sustainability, social progress and human rights. I use comparative data. I am not bound by any specific methods or ideologies.

I follow in a proud tradition of scholars like Thomas Malthus, who offered one of the first laws of social science using natural variables of population and environment. I also follow in the proud tradition of creating technologies to try to build a better world, like ideal laws and political, economic and social institutions that are responsive to human needs.

We live in an age of science and technology where we make constant predictions and develop technologies regarding both the physical and natural world including every other species and including ours when it comes to human biology and health. But, somehow, humans are treated in a different category where the same rules are not recognized, even though they also exist.

People like me are not supposed to exist. The mythology of our time is that there are no natural laws applying to human behavior, or that if there are, it is inappropriate to look for them. Since people like me are not supposed to be doing what we are doing, given the challenge to these beliefs, we are barely allowed to survive. Our works are not published because the questions we ask and the methods we used are simply not supposed to exist.

Of course this is not to say that there are no social scientists today. There are social scientists doing such work but many of them work on the dark side without the same standard that those of us in the light apply on satisfying international law, on working for the interests of humanity, and on making our work public. Those others work for militaries and police and security states and corporations on predicting and controlling human behaviors.

Here’s how this all happened and how we can try to return to civilization.

The Promise of Social Science: Growing Up in an Industrial Society

Like many others growing up in the “space age” and the “nuclear age”, that was back before the age of “full spectrum dominance” and drones, I came of age with a fascination of science and technology. I felt both the excitement of scientific discovery and expansion of human potential, combined with a nightmarish fear of its destructive power. Despite the haunting fears of those terrors introduced by technology in its destructive and invasive powers, I shared the belief that I lived in an era of human “progress” that was not only technological but that was also social and that would put technologies under human control for the fulfillment of human aspirations. If we could “put a (hu)man on the moon” and incinerate a city in a flash, then of course we could have the technology to put an end to poverty and to war and inequality and injustice. It seemed that achieving social progress was a simple application of social science to policy and just a matter of the will to “change our way of thinking”. The solutions seemed obvious and easy.

I believed that social science was just slower to develop but was in parallel to natural science, and would be the key to that better future. I saw the success of civil rights and women’s rights and peace
movements and the emergence of think tanks for “planning” and believed we were ready to advance to a new era. Devoting one’s life to this seemed to be the most noble of causes. Convincing people to follow long term human interests seemed like it would be harder than achieving some short-term technological and policy goals, but it seemed that there would be social science applications that would solve this dilemma, as well, so that we would be able to focus on our long-term survival.

Social sciences appeared to have the answers. They appeared to herald a scientific approach to social progress. Social science studies demonstrated the advantages of education over incarceration, for example. They measured the benefits of peace and tolerance. They pointed out new methods of education that engaged a wider range of human attributes. They showed how human fears and fallacies could be overcome with methods of child raising and parenting that taught logic and tolerance and respect. They showed how survival of different cultures, rather than homogenization into a single urban culture, offered the source of innovation and adaptation for long-term human survival and fulfillment.

Natural science was exploring space and the oceans as well as modeling the environment and health. Along with this came a belief that social science would be linked with it in the design of model communities in space as well as on earth. I saw social scientists focusing on human potential and how it could be freed and expanded. I saw them using principles and measures in seeking to predict and secure law as an instrument of justice and rights. What I saw in the 1960s and 1970s when I was growing up was a flurry of experimentation, of new think tanks, and of funding for research. There seemed to be a belief that continued scientific progress would provide the funds for an endless continuation of such funding and experimentation. With each new improvement would come the demand and the available funds for more, in a virtuous upward cycle of progress.

I had faith in this cycle of betterment. I was convinced that progress would feed on itself in this upward spiral and that all of this benefit would be shared. When I grew up, as a member of the growing “middle class” with that economic stability and educational opportunity, there was no reason to suspect that this basis of security and hope would disappear. Why would anyone want to give that away? Indeed, the logic of a long-term future was one in which we had the economic stability and confidence to focus our actions on the long-term, on working together for common ends as the only way to avoid going back to the horrors of World War II that were fresh in the minds of my parents and my teachers and some of our leaders.

Those who grew up in major cities and suburbs in the years before, during or after those when I was raised in the 1960s and 1970s, and had the advantage of a well-funded public high school education, would have also been exposed to the classics of social science that reinforced this belief in social science, among them:

- Malthus in economics, showing the mathematics of social stability;
- Madison, Hamilton, Jefferson and the Anti-Federalists, in studies of American history, the Magna Charta and its system of rights in studies of British history, and Rousseau and the idea of social contract in studies of French history. These classics of political science taught the axioms of political representation and balancing of power;
- Darwin’s theory of evolution, human adaptation, and the interactions with and balance with environment and nature that were the basis of a pluralistic model (rather than a single linear model) to explain differentiation and change.

Those who read science fiction literature for fun would have also read many of the many works describing the building of different kinds of utopias and the logics and lessons of trying to do so, with authors like H.G. Wells, himself, merging science and social science to lead the way.

In my college days in the late 1970s, the social sciences continued to advertise themselves as offering the keys to the betterment of society through predictions and application. The idea that attracted me was based on the notion that if we could understand human nature and behaviors at all levels, we could plan the perfect society. Along with the idea of science fiction was the belief that we could create human utopias through social scientific engineering to build progress.
In college, in the late 1970s, I found my calling in social science. My faith in social science, that I developed then and was able to follow in my first initial social science work (earning and award from my department and then published), remains to this day. In the nearly forty years since then, however, I have watched social science shattered, abandoned, maligned, distorted and all but abandoned today and replaced with something far from the methods and approaches that drew me to it.

What fascinated me as I began my own career as a social scientist, in prediction and applications were natural cycles and patterns in history and in individual human behavior that also had a relation to the environment which meant that there were things to measure and use in tests of measurable human behaviors. I was also drawn to the scientific basis of human behavior that could be studied in primates and in evolution. Some of this, I had to find on my own at that time, since much of social science in the areas that I was studying (political behaviors of collapse and violence and inequality) was still using fuzzy political terms of the Cold War or fleeing from reality to create mathematical models that had symbols but no basis in actual observations and measurements. In looking to build areas of the social sciences, there was not a lot of existing foundation but there was opportunity to bridge with some existing fields to conduct and read about experiments in behavioral sciences and biology. There were classic works to build on, even if I had to go outside of my classes to do it. There were social science questions and approaches to be found through a broad liberal arts education in natural science, theory of history, as well as literature. For example, I read

- the works on cycles of civilization, of Oswald Spengler and Pitirim Sorokin, in history and sociology;
- early social scientists like Tocqueville, to examine their field methods and approaches comparisons of societies. I liked how Tocqueville compared societies of similar origins but different environments (the U.S. and European countries) and made attempts to explain the differences using those kinds of variables;
- the early political economy like works of Karl Marx, and his study of cycles and development over time;
- Darwin and emerging sociobiology, including studies of animal and primate behaviors, to understand innate behaviors and adaptation and evolution;
- Tolstoy and his theories of historical change and movements. In reading classic authors like Tolstoy (and Orwell and Capek and Wells and Kafka), beyond the artistry I saw how these authors used the humanities to essentially pose thought experiments and to try to answer social science questions historical examples and close studies of human behaviors. I saw how the work fit together into a larger enterprise of predictions and applications and considered issues like determinism and feedback. In this way, I came to appreciate the humanities not as a competition with or replacement for science, but as a partner in scientific thinking that expanded the pathways of science. That also led me to start writing fiction alongside social science.
- books about science along with continuing studies of natural science, mostly to understand the methods and ways of thinking and measuring and analyzing, as a guide to also understanding human phenomena at various levels of study.
- the Bible and other classic religious texts as social data rather than as dogma, offering comparative guidelines on law and human action and social change and measures; and
- the philosophy of Ancient Greeks, to see how they began from scratch to create early science and social science by defining systems and parts of systems and ways of thinking, to establish the building blocks for measurements and comparisons.

In this way, I also realized that the modern segmentation of social sciences and placement of different methodologies in different fields was somewhat artificial. A real social scientist followed questions and drew on any methodology that could answer those questions, without the myopia of specific methods or boundaries. That was also something intellectually exciting and important for meeting the needs of others; minorities, children, the poor, and those who faced barriers.
I knew this wasn’t just me, alone, running to the library and playing at social science so I felt that I was part of a community of people working together and across boundaries to build knowledge for human betterment. That was very different from just reporting on individual narrow interests and trying to secure or repeat dogmas, which was the critique of those who were afraid of experimentation and challenges and science. Things were also happening around me in a number of fields. Even though what I learned in many classes seemed just processed and dry, there also seemed to be new openings.

- New subfields were developing like ecology and sustainable development by scholars like Paul Ehrlich and Garret Hardin and Lester Brown. This was the time of some of the early literature on sustainability, following Rachel Carson’s scientific ode to the natural world. At the time, of course I believed that these ecological works of the 1960s and 1970s would quickly be applied, in long term planning of consumption and the environment that would protect sustainability and natural beauty.

- In the 1960s, there were scholars in government who also looked at practical concerns and offered long term historical predictions and utopian suggestions. People like John Kenneth Galbraith were offering visions on the future of industrial societies and on moral choices. American Presidents had hired some of the best academic minds to work in government on building a “Great Society” including sociologists and psychologists and anthropologists who seemed free to ask large questions and to offer opinions based on professional judgment that would be backed by professional organizations and codes. Scholars seemed to be working in government for human betterment and not just for stable employment or for access to money and power. There was also space for the public intellectual, offering cross disciplinary essay and commentary. People like Stanley Milgram and Philip Zimbardo and Irv Janus were asking basic questions about how to protect democratic decisions and to protect rational judgments. Think tanks and research institutes were developing alongside universities and they seemed to be motivated by social scientific questions in ways that represented independent thinking rather than funded research to promote self-interest.

- There were new techniques in mathematics and social science, like “Game Theory” and the prisoners’ dilemma that seemed to offer ways for promoting peace and cooperation in ways that recognized diversity and listening and negotiating.

- Keynesian economics was demonstrating that the most productive society was one that had the greatest equality and that invested in people, in education, social welfare, rights protections, a diversity of ideas, and a strong infrastructure, and that worked to develop human capacity rather than to invest in prisons and war.

- Studies of political theory seemed to show that public participation, citizen oversight, and social contract democracy was the most stable and the most productive system and that there was no alternative to understanding all of its mechanisms and to making sure that they would work.

- Psychology seemed to focus on all of the aspects of human development and how human misperceptions could be overcome and how individualism could be promoted through new forms of education and awareness. This “new age” psychology was introducing a scientifically based understanding of human variety and needs that could then be linked to new approaches to education and to new legal protections.

At that time, it was unthinkable to me how these understandings for peace, for economic stability, for equity, for democracy, for sustainability, for more diversity in human development, that were, then, confirmed in social science, would not be treasured and fully applied. I believed that such information, once in human minds, would never disappear or be replaced by ideologies that would destroy this basis in reason. That such thing would happen (and it did, and continues today, often in ways that have been subtle and hidden under the banner of promoting diversity and research) seemed to me to be unthinkable. I thought that such a reversal would have required something monstrous and dislocating. How could human logic and betterment be overcome and subverted, replaced by ideas that were anti-science and
anti-reason, that would say that social science was “impossible” or that large questions and predictions and applications should be abandoned and replaced with only small, single issue reporting and advocacy and representation and endless philosophical questioning that would attack the basis of “discipline” and “applications”, themselves? It seemed unthinkable.

**Rethinking my Faith in Society and Academic Institutions Regarding Social Science and Progress**

In looking back at why I feel such disillusionment about what has happened (or how I view what has happened) in social sciences in the past forty years, I wonder if I was wrong to believe the things that I did. Some historians of social science argue that it always served elite interests and ideologies and was never really on the path to becoming a science (Price, 2003; Schrecker, 1986). In some ways, my faith in the idea of “progress” and in the U.S. may have itself been a fantasy that blinded me to some social science principles that I better understand now. It isn’t that I give up on social science. I believe in it more than ever. My experience with it, however, may have been the result of my own illusions. Part of the attack on social science today that I find being conducted by many people whose stated goals I share (for gender and racial and ethnic equality in industrial societies, for more economic equality, for tolerance, for democracy and rights and oversight, for environmental protection and survival) may be a result of their fears about science (that I also share) and about the reality of our institutions and system. I think that others made short-term compromises based on realities that I did not want to accept then and, in my belief that we must find a way to avoid social and environmental collapse and world war and totalitarianism, we cannot accept now.

I admit that I found much of formal schooling in the 1960s and 1970s confining and stultifying and wondered if it would or could change. I recognized it as being relatively uniform and mechanistic but I didn’t think that just changing the gender or backgrounds of the teachers or changing a few books or adding more mechanization was what was needed. That was just touching on the symptoms and outward view. I felt confined in book learning that seemed like church scholarship. I saw most academics as just bureaucratic clerks. But there were some that linked the classroom to social experiments and applications, including classes that used data collection exercises to model different phenomenon all around us. If they were the ones who would stay in universities and as educators, then things would change, but if people who loved the book learning, bureaucratic approaches and who just wanted to bring their own books and dogma were the ones to enter, the changes would only be skin deep and false. Even though social sciences today have more “representation” on faculties and more “area studies” and books from more countries and cultures, their anger at the previous system seems to be at the people in it but not the real failure in meeting human needs of students and society and of building social science.

The reason I had a hope for empirical social science and laboratory learning (not bureaucratic internships, but real field laboratory study and application) was because that was the way to make it exciting and linked to real and measurable impact on the world. In graduate school, I began inventing field courses that had social science “laboratories” and empowering applied policy work across disciplines.

What I saw was that there were niches to open up the university, to open up social sciences and to create applications. If that meant travelling half way around the world to advise a Prime Minister after analyzing all kinds of data, and then adding field data in-country, it was possible. After all, I just decided to do it. And I did it.

As a college senior, I found that I could model political, economic and social processes in a small country (Mauritius) as the basis for larger countries, and that I could use this as the basis for meetings on policy with the country’s Prime Minister and its newspapers and Ambassadors and that if I looked hard enough I could find the professors who would let me do that. Some of my interdisciplinary social science modeling and applications may have been flawed, but my faith in the results of modeling and in the ability to find a way to do that within existing institutions were not. I was predicting instability and elections and also designing solutions for ethnic co-existence and sustainability. I was 21 years old.
What I didn’t really think about was that the reason they may have been letting me do that was not just to promote social science and human betterment but because it may have been creating a technology with military and control implications. Others in my situation simply decided that they would not engage in prediction and application at all because of their assumption that it would be used against humanitarian ends. They seemed to label anyone who wanted to use social science for prediction and application as someone who accepted militarism and control or were just naïve. Maybe that is the motive today, alongside those others who engage in social science research that is really the kind of reporting and work that does serve the interests of control, in area studies or in “criminology”.

In the 1960s and 1970s, I was against colonial and resource driven wars and a believer in promoting autonomy and sustainability and a system based on rule of law. I believed that battles were worth fighting and that humans were finally starting to get civilization on the right path. Although I saw Cold War policies and its perpetual proxy wars throughout the globe as well as the fears and impact it had on politics in the U.S., I also believed that there was a post-World War II understanding that there was no alternative to an international system of peace and security that recognized differences and tolerance. I believed that the role of social science and intellectuals was to actively engage in building an international system based on law and universal values. In the U.S., we appeared to be advancing towards civil rights and social justice and building the “Great Society” and democracy, even if we couldn’t quite get it right internationally.

Perhaps I was blinded to the parts of human behavior that social science was not yet really studying deeply, though it is there to see today in most post-World War II, “noire” films. The underbelly of fear and hate and self-destruction and violence and denial and self-deception that were also parts of human behavior were largely assumed away in my view of social science and applied policy studies of “solutions”. The solutions avoided questions about the “deep structure” and how we would deal with it and overcome it, or whether that was even possible (Lempert, 2016). In my view, that didn’t mean that social science is a failure here and that there is a reason to abandon it. It means that social science may have been too simplistic or perhaps still diverted from reality.

Today, I find that social science tools allow me to look at the “deep structure” of societies and to predict where we are collapsing and how things may change. But I also recognize that this deep structure is what may be preventing other colleagues from using these tools and engaging in these kinds of debates as well as applying the results of these studies, today.

In many cases, today, I am seeing that social scientists are free to mention and name all of the social problems that are worthy of study and applications, ranging from planetary and cultural survival to issues of equality and social justice. At the same time, they seem to be opposed to any real modeling, comparisons, predictions and technological applications to the root causes of the problems. The labeling and reporting seems to have replaced the actual discipline and work. It seems to be a self-parody and a self-fulfilling prophesy.

Just citing classics of social science or social science principles or seeking to use the scientific method is cause for immediate rejection in major journals today. The essence of science and discipline is building on earlier work and establishing foundations to move forward with better questions. Today, when I mention earlier, classic works, however, I face a wall of anger, throwing it out, as if “change” and reform in the university today means not only hating the prejudices and politics and discrimination of earlier “colonial era” academics, means also throwing out everything that was scientific and attempted to build reason and discipline. It is now throwing out the disabled grandparents with the bathwater. Social science today limits itself to what it calls “engaging in current debates”, which are equally politicized and controlled. The very idea that social science is about “debates” that must be politically “current” is itself a fallacy that represents an underlying destruction of discipline and intellectual life. Social science is about solving fundamental questions and providing solutions to fundamental problems, not about personal academic “debates” narrowed and run by and for the careers of specific academics. The current “debate” in my field, is to critique and destroy social science and to replace it with dogma and psychobabble. That may be part of a process and design that continues what existed before without really changing it.
The vision I had of social science and its excitement and possibilities has seemed to go dark. I still have my hope, but I feel like I am living in darkness. Much of the social science that I studied seems as if it has been made to disappear and replaced with illogic and slogans and anti-science in an attack on reason.

In the late 1980s, after attending professional school and doing some social science teaching as well as creating the very popular field social science course and then NGO, “The Unseen America”, I entered a Ph.D. program and became an holistic social scientist. The story of my specific field and what happened in it over that time is the story of what has been happening in the U.S. and globally in academia and in social science.

The Attraction of My Field, the Holistic Social Science of Anthropology, when I Entered Graduate School

My first introduction to what was called “anthropology” was in high school, in a special course that my school offered. Instead of following a textbook, the course drew on a variety of theories and questions about human evolution and cultures in ways that were broad and exciting. It focused on every important question of the time (war and peace, rights and co-existence) and on questions of human nature, in ways that were rooted in science and in comparisons. It didn’t start with theory or methodology or case studies or jargons or definitions. It started with exciting questions.

In fact, “anthropology” had already been a part of our curriculum all through “social studies” courses in which we saw some of the early ethnographic films on polar peoples (“Nanook of the North”) and Southeast Asians (“Dead Birds”) and were exposed to questions about different environments and contacts between peoples. In fourth grade, I wrote a report about Egyptian hieroglyphics, so it wasn’t as if questions about human difference and relations and human systems was something that had to be narrowly packaged. I was already primed with the questions and the idea of looking comparatively and systematically, using all kinds of methods, to come up with answers.

An holistic like anthropology that combined natural science and social science along with questions from science fiction about the human future, studying human behavior at the level of culture and societies, offered the chance to focus on the most important human questions: cultural survival and culture change, the “perfection” of cultures to goals of social progress, understanding of the causes of wars between cultures and genocides and discrimination inside them. The benefit of a scientific and structured “disciplinary” approach was the systematic opportunity to both predict what would lead to such outcomes and then develop technologies to promote the best outcomes.

The field also had the advantage of examining human group behaviors in multiple time frames: over hundreds of thousands of years in the time of human evolution from other primates and examining processes of human differentiation (physical anthropology); over tens of thousands of years in the formation of different human cultures in the prehistoric and later historic records (archaeology); and in modern time, with contemporary cultures as they interact and change today and as they group into complex societies as well as disintegrate (social and cultural anthropology). There was also the fourth subfield, to study cultural cognition and ordering in the form of language and the changes in communications and explanations of the surrounding environment (linguistics).

In combining these four fields, anthropology was then, at its core, a social science drawing on natural science. It started with evolutionary biology and environmental variables, then added the element of human co-evolution with environments and development of technologies in the formation of cultures. Finally, it allowed for use of contemporary science of cognition, social modeling, comparisons and thought experiments.

What attracted me to anthropology was not just that it was a social science asking key questions. What was different about it was that it seemed to offer the freedom to break away from the ideologies that still directed other social science today and to replace those boundaries with fresh interpretations.
anthropologists suggested that the very same tools used to study “primitive” or traditional societies could be used to study industrial societies and that these societies could be directly compared in order to understand common processes. The discipline suggested that countries like the U.S. could be directly compared to the Soviet Union and that all empires could be compared historically so as to reveal answers to questions of the factors that led them to arise and allowed them to be controlled. The promise of the field was to provide ways for comparisons of the U.S. with other historic empires, including Nazi Germany and the Roman Empire. This offered the freedom from the ideological straight jacket thinking of nonsensical Cold War labels like “capitalism” and “socialism” and from labels like “democracy” and “red” or “white” “fascism” that would allow for straightforward questions about “what is going on here?” It meant that work could cover the most relevant questions of our time and the solutions, rather than narrow and individualistic concerns.

When I read Horace Milner’s “Body Ritual Among the Nacirema” in my high school anthropology course, I saw that one of the core goals of anthropology was to critique American society by comparing its practices directly to those of “primitive” societies in a scientific way. That kind of thinking offered a chance to pierce the mythologies, ideologies, and propagandistic blinders to see truth and to allow for looking for hard variables. It allowed for reversing “the common wisdom” in any and all of its aspects, from educational systems to ideas about politics and economics, by changing and testing all of the assumptions constantly drilled in as what was the “most advanced” or “the best” or “the only” choice. I realized at the time that this was an important and powerful tool for social change and one of the most important tools, along with skills in management and law, for addressing the key problems of our time.

For young people who were idealistic and humanitarian and bright, one of the best things that one could do seemed to be to train for leadership with the essential social science and practical skills and to open oneself to visionary thinking when doing so, in order to be able to create new institutions and to regulate and change those institutions that were failing or leading to failures, rather than simply fitting oneself into narrow slots in those same imperfect or failing or dangerous institutions. Disciplines like anthropology seem to offer the opportunity to be visionary: to see things exactly as they were and to understand what was humanly possible.

It seemed to me at the time that anthropologists were offered the opportunity to serve as visionaries and that in the post-World War II era where the world had seen so many horrors and in the Cold War era where we were in danger of unleashing new planetary horrors, that this was one of the most sensible and logical and “moral” (life preserving and civilization promoting) choice that a young and bright human being could make. I saw that anthropologists could be funded to go overseas, not to report on peoples to control them, which was something of the past colonial eras, but to bring back new ideas to apply as well as a clearer perception of industrial societies. Doing so would make me a part of the science and technology of social change. It was in that spirit and belief that I entered the profession of anthropology.

This was my idealized picture. I still believe in those goals and in the promise and I continue to do as much of it as I can in my own work that follows the calling of that profession. Within the profession, itself, however, I find very few colleagues left who share this vision of social science and the role of the profession. While anthropology still claims to offer “culture critique” it seems mostly in the form of well-worn ideological critiques that repeat the same kinds of slogans over and over to reinforce narrow political beliefs (that I mostly agree with as political beliefs) rather than to discover the mechanisms of how the world works or to offer new solutions to result in change. I find that most of those in the profession today do area studies and case reporting or philosophy (“anthroposophistry”, though my colleagues hate this word because the inventor of the term, Rudolf Steiner, was Austrian and they do not want to be affiliated with his “school”) rather than social science or applications. Their work offers little real clarity about the reality of human systems in general or the mechanisms of change. The science of anthropology, to determine what could be changed and how, and to offer the technologies for real change, appears to have been gutted and reduced to the level of endless philosophical discussions over minutiae. In my view, it has been dismantled and fragmented. The study of current societies has been emptied of all of its sciences. It has returned to reporting promoting rather than challenging ideologies. That seems
to have been by design. When I look back and try to understand how and why this happened, whom it really benefits, and why, the picture that I come up with is not a happy one. My faith in my Ph.D. field of anthropology and in academia has been shattered over the past many years, though my belief in social science and in the disciplinary core of basic social sciences is unwavering. If only, I think to myself, … if only others would return to it and build upon the foundations that great minds had created in the past, without desecrating and demeaning and denying it.

Experiencing the Decline and Dismantling of My Field of Holistic Anthropology over 40 Years

What happened in my field serves partly as a metaphor for what has happened in general. Indeed, the reason I entered the field of anthropology was because of the stagnation and myopia (in terms of questions and variables) that I found in the social sciences that I had focused on in college: economics and political science. I won awards at the university level in economics and political science, but I found these disciplines driven only by concerns of short-term material and political (power) gain relative to others, without a desire to focus on the real humanitarian questions relevant to human survival. Since then, however, I have seen anthropology (and sociology) also narrowed by similar pressures; adding some other competing interests within social science (important interests of minorities and gender) but similarly reducing the focus and methods to extremely narrow, short-term concerns at the expense of disciplinary principles and larger humanitarian questions and applications. I partly understand this because I was also partly shaped by these short-term pressures, though it was actually my attempt to overcome them that led me to become a social scientist, and particularly an anthropologist.

At the university level in the late 1970s, I admit that I avoided anthropology. Even though I saw the history and potential of the discipline, I didn’t see any courses at my university, other than one I audited in archaeology (on the Ancient Near East and the rise of writing and trade and civilization), that were directly addressing the key issues that I knew were central to the discipline. The more “practical” social sciences that claimed to do that were Political Science and Economics, along with the skills in Psychology and some applied courses (like Administrative Science). They offered the prestige and the potential to at least work on important questions, though I actually found in studying them that the labels did not reflect the reality. That’s what led me back to entering the (once, and partly still at that time) holistic discipline of anthropology.

Though I saw the promise of the disciplines of Economics and Political Science, and took several university courses in these departments and did some university teaching in these fields while in professional schools in law and business/management I also felt that something seemed to be starting to hold these disciplines back and distorting them.

- Economics seemed to be focusing on production engineering and cultural extermination and assimilation for the purpose of exploitation and gain rather than promoting happiness, sustainability, quality, and fulfillment. Questions about equity and survival were silenced in favor of starting assumptions that were out of touch with reality and were mathematics rather than empiricism. It seemed that Economists were increasingly working for businesses and finance and mixing their own interests with the success of corporations, with globalization, and related harms, rather than as representatives of the public as they should have been.

- Political science, in whatever country, seemed to be serving mostly to convince people that their system was the “best” and “only” possible one. After studying definitions, the problems of political science seemed to be narrow attempts to win elections and hegemony and to explain away injustice rather than to try to create it. Most of the explanatory variables seemed to be ideological definitions. The more I studied Political Science, the emptier it seemed. Political scientists seemed to be interested in allying with powerful political figures and working to advise them, thus mixing their own careers with the interests of ruling classes, ruling interests, and the existing political system and its inequalities rather than concerned with oversight, law, and protection of rights and humanity.
Sociology also seemed to be narrow, focusing only on urban societies and problems of specific groups as if to advocate their own causes and to offer statistics as to their own inequality, rather than to focus on achieving the overall “good” society, overall opportunity, equity and justice. Sociologists seemed to increasingly define themselves by methodology (survey) and their own group interests, rather than on comparative work and overall problems of social change, social violence, general political and social inequalities and abuses of power and how to predict them and effectively challenge them.

By contrast, Anthropology seemed to be the overarching social science that took broad perspective and used natural variables. While it didn’t seem to be doing much of anything when I entered it as a graduate student, I thought that the energy that I would bring to it would be rewarded and welcomed. I was wrong. I did find a way to do my work on important questions, but I have increasingly had to publish my work in anthropology outside of the field of anthropology, given the disappearance of most of the areas that were part of a widely constituted social science field.

When my field work as a young anthropologist took me to study the urban Russians in the Soviet Union and to offer a comparison of the workings of the university, of law, of political economy, and of empire in Russia with the U.S., I may have been the first U.S. anthropologist in the urban Soviet Union. What I brought back was, indeed, a culture critique of the kind that fit the stated premise of anthropology along with a classic holistic model and several descriptions of general mechanisms of adaptation and control in modern societies that built on some of the classic founding works in the field. I travelled to a foreign, indeed hostile and uncomfortable, place and sought to live among the natives. I used a variety of scientific tools from across the social sciences to model how such systems worked. In writing up my research, then at Harvard, I offered an holistic (i.e., an “ethnographic”, anthropological) model both as a scientific description of how social processes worked, in general, as well as in the form of a vision of how U.S. institutions and the overall culture worked, behind the blinders of the Cold War that presumed incomparable differences. I travelled on government funds and came back with a university institute grant. Unfortunately, when I offered the culture critique, my career suddenly went dead.

I learned that culture critiques of the U.S. were not, in fact, allowed in U.S. social science when it came to comparisons with “enemy” industrial powers. Without using ideological terms like “socialist” to describe other major systems (today, the ideological term is “post-socialist”, whatever that is) in place of the social scientific terms and concepts of my discipline, academics would not even consider my work. Indeed, today, some 25 years after the end of the Cold War, anthropologists themselves are some of the strongest protectors of these ideological and mythological terms used to describe the Russians and the U.S. and to perpetuate blinders about how the U.S. system operates. The tool of ethnographic holism (the modeling of a culture/society to explain how it worked), the idea of comparisons, the making of predictions and the offering of applications using concepts from law and management have all been scrapped.

Since becoming a professional anthropologist, I have watched as my field of Anthropology, which I entered to do holistic social science, has turned to an “humanities” using the language and approaches of literary analysis and philosophy applied to culture itself. In the place of science and prediction, human relations are now turned into “discourses” and “texts”. In doing so, the discipline claims to be open to examination of cultural “deep structure” and to “deconstruction”, but that is only as a literary tool describing “consciousness” rather than either material or institutional realities. “Peer review”, which once existed to assure the professional application of disciplinary standards such as the scientific method, now works as contemporary political censorship to drive out scientific standards and to eliminate the asking of all of those questions that are not found in “current debates”. The claim is that the discipline is now more “inclusive” and pluralistic due to greater gender and ethnic representation. The reality is that one political standard and ideology has been replaced by another. Members of the discipline are now required to parrot the same slogans and ideological terms that are the new political litmus test, like “capitalism” and
“socialism” (and now, “post socialism”). Colleagues who use the scientific method rather than offer a literary critique, or who cite classic social scientists rather than the literary critics who now run the field, simply cannot publish work in the journals in the field or teach in the field. The discipline uses the fiction of “peer review” to promote a consensus that is in the self-interest of whomever sets the rules. Today, the rule they have decided to set is one that eliminates objective rules, all together. The rule today is that work must be only narrow case study reporting using a single method (that of “participant observation”) and must also mimic scholarship of the Middle Ages, with endless citations to the works of everyone else in this shared set of beliefs.

To me, the idea of a “discipline” and of the discipline of “anthropology” is something that is a bedrock foundation that can be built upon but can only by altered by replacement with better, more descriptive, more “valid”, more “predictive” theories. The test is not whether something is politically popular with colleagues but whether it provides answers to disciplinary questions and demonstrates success in solving the problems that are the basic questions in the discipline. By definition, a “discipline” follows rules. It starts with a set of fundamental questions within a sphere. It can add questions. It can add methods. It can replace what exists through demonstration of ability to solve problems. But it cannot simply wipe out questions and wipe out methods and eliminate scholarship simply on the basis of political preferences. The rules can be and are meant to be adapted where they build on past work. In social science, we start with the rule of scientific objectivity and measurement. We start with the definitions of “culture” and of “ethnicity” and of “society”. We ask question, discover certain truths or laws, and then build on this. Anthropology, we start with the assumption of human groups adapting to and shaping environments over time in various time periods. Over the long term, we evolve genetically as a species (over hundreds of thousands of years). Over the shorter term, we evolve “racial” characteristics (tens of thousands of years). Over the even shorter term, we evolve languages (roughly one thousand years). And over shorter terms, we evolve “cultures” (several generations). Anthropology works on the four levels to understand these changes. When we perform “ethnography”, our subject of study is the holistic “ethnic group” or “culture”, in the sub-field of “social and cultural anthropology”. This is what we mean by discipline. It is a shared enterprise with some core principles.

If researchers were to find that this discipline didn’t fit all of the problems they were studying, or if there were smaller units (larger than individuals, the subject of psychology; and larger or smaller than social or economic or political institutions which are the subjects of other social science disciplines), they could invent separate disciplines or sub-disciplines for greater focus. If they wanted to add some new measures and theories and wanted to offer “thought experiments” to enrich what existed, that would be welcome. What would not be welcome is the elimination of existing categories for pure political reasons.

Today, in my field of anthropology, however, the attack, particularly within social and cultural anthropology, has been an attack directly on both the unit of study to eliminate it (“culture”, and the physical anthropological concept of “race”) as well as on the questions of study (cultures and group interaction), as well as its structural goals as a discipline (objectivity, prediction, modeling) and its technical applications (promoting sustainable human cultures). All that is left is use of a methodology (“ethnography”, the “study of ethnic groups”) that is a contradiction in terms because the unit that “ethnography” was invented to study (“ethnic groups” at the holistic level, for modeling and comparisons) is no longer the unit of analysis.

In place of the “study of culture” is now the study of “food” (“food studies”) or of a single variable like gender (“gender studies”) or study of “organizations” (“organizational anthropology”) or “internet culture” or “technology”. The problems under study are no longer those relating to “cultures” and the level of cultures. They are now issues of personal adaptation, like “identity” and “migration”.

Scholars who wish to write about important topics in anthropology, in order to predict and model economic and political power or law at the level of cultures and societies, today, are unable to publish work or teach on the fundamental questions that were the basis for establishing the discipline and the
discipline has now established for two generations that scholars no longer ask these questions let alone have the chance to read or learn about them. Instead, anthropologists are limited to options like these.

- One is the celebrity worship approach. Anthropologists can write about people in power from the perspective of a celebrity magazine, commenting on their clothing selection, their office decorations, their posture and their oratory. One can describe their “rituals” of power and consumption in an innocuous and childlike way that offers no mechanisms for prediction or change, and can claim that this documentation is studying “culture”.

- Another approach is to make up a terminological (and unmeasurable, ideological) “variable” and new jargon to go along with it, that claims to “explain” (but not model) what is already obvious about an existing social problem (discrimination or inequality) in newly invented words, without any scientific predictions or tools for change. Scholars who wish to write about empires, can describe imperialism from the perspective of “debt” or “exchange relations” and invent new “theory” relating ideological jargon on topics like “debt in history”, but they cannot actually model empires and power balances and predict how empires collapse and change and whether and how they can be confronted or offer any applied technology to doing so.

In this way, the discipline creates the illusion of being “moral” and focusing on “contemporary issues” while it actually undermines the very science and technology that would explain and predict the phenomena it claims to study and that would allow for the creation of technologies to promote humanitarian and public interests (d’Andrade, 1982; Hymes, 1995). It also protects itself from criticism because those who promote this destructive anti-social science and anti-disciplinary and anti-applied approaches can claim to be representatives of the groups who were excluded by earlier scholars and victimized by society. They can also claim that any criticism is “racist” or “sexist” and an attempt to “return to the past” rather than be held accountable to demonstrate public benefit and results for the political interests they espouse or for the discipline. As someone who not only agrees with their stated political goals but who has sacrificed to try to achieve them, I find myself being oddly attached by the very people whose long-term interests I am actually sacrificing to protect. What has happened is something that I find both surreal and tragic.

Lest I be accused of making this up, I offer an example of a current advertisement for a teaching position in anthropology at a well-respected university that was placed on the website of the American Anthropological Association.

Open Rank Position on Emerging Worlds in Sociocultural Anthropology
The University of Texas at Austin

The Department of Anthropology at the University of Texas at Austin invites applications for an open rank position to start in fall 2017, with preference for a hire at the Assistant Professor or early Associate Professor level.

We seek scholars whose work addresses emerging worlds and emerging theoretical approaches in sociocultural anthropology. Particular interests include non-representational theory, new materialism, sensory ethnography, multi-species ethnography, new ecologies and infrastructures, affect and performativity, racial assemblages, and circuits of violence. We also welcome methodological innovations and interventions. Geographical and theoretical areas are open.

In my view, most of these “new areas” of study appear to be an attempt to dismantle the discipline and to destroy any attempts to study behaviors at the level of culture/ethnic group or to use any kind of social scientific measurement. Here is why.

- “Multi-species ethnography” and “Sensory ethnography” are contradictions in terms. By definition, “ethnography” was the study of cultures within their environmental context (i.e., relationship to surrounding species, climate and geography) so the idea of “multi-species” here really means: “studies of humans and their pets”.

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“Sensory ethnography”, when translated in plain English, is really “journalism of sound”.

The stated goal of the discipline of anthropology, though it may have not worked effectively to achieve it in its early years, was to model cultures and to describe them in relation to their material environments. “New materialism”, however, is not bringing materialism back in, to assure an anthropology that is protective of Indigenous peoples and all of us in relation to our environments and in opposition to colonialism. In fact, it is doing the opposite. It is defining the “non-material” and intangible as some kind of subject of study and reporting for anthropologists (but not an explanatory variable for predicting and improving processes of human cultures).

“Non-representational theory” is partly the destruction of modeling.

Since scientific concepts like “feedback interactions” have been eliminated from anthropology with science, that concept now apparently re-enters the field as something dumbed down like “circuits of violence”.

I find it hard to believe that some of the other concepts being taught, like “performativity”, will last long in the English language. Much of what I find in my field of anthropology today is not yet in any dictionary and my hope is that its lack of value in predicting or improving anything will assure that it disappears before it actually does enter the dictionary.

I wrote to the chair of the Department offering this ad and to the Dean of Arts and Sciences to ask for comment on what was happening to the discipline of Anthropology at the University of Texas, Austin, for inclusion in this issue. They chose not to respond. I do not believe they can respond in a coherent way, but of course that is only my “opinion”. Certainly everything they are doing can be backed up by “peer review”. Once they educate a group of students to use the new terminology they have created, these then become the “current debates” and questions in place of everything that came before.

This is not the only such ad and it is clear where anthropology is headed (and where it is returning).

Here is another such ad from another well-known school:

*Associate Professor of Anthropology, Mount Holyoke College*

We are looking for an ethnographer who specializes in media and visual anthropology, with attention to the politics of representation regarding cultural forms such as race, class, gender, religion, and ability. We welcome candidates who incorporate video, photography, and/or other innovative techniques into their ethnographic methodology. The successful candidate will have the opportunity to collaborate with colleagues in interdisciplinary fields such as Film Studies, Africana Studies, Latin American and Latinx Studies, and Journalism, as well as with community-based and global education programs.

What is clear from this advertisement is that the department is not even seeking someone who is trained in the discipline and its questions or can even teach the methodologies of the discipline. They are seeking someone to teach “politics of representation”. This is what much of Anthropology has become today; a place in universities for fulfilling the political goal of “representation” and where scholars can replace social science and applications with film journalism. Anthropology at major schools like this one, now sees itself as “cross cultural journalism” of different groups to be represented and reported on. If the natural sciences were to go this route, the approach would be one of cultural perspectives that would destroy natural science (feminist astronomy, Indigenous astronomy, African astronomy, Buddhist astronomy) and that would turn cell biology into animal representation (cat biology, dog biology, hamster biology).

The explanation in anthropology is that this is a “moral” (political) choice. What I fear is that social sciences seem to be taking the university back to the 19th century and earlier, to their roots in the church. In the past, the universities were founded by religious groups and incorporated religious teaching as part of their “ethics” obligations. These religious courses could not be challenged on the basis of whether they taught skills or addressed disciplinary problems. Their goal was to proselytize and they were funded
specifically to do so, with faculty, students and community all believing in the importance of this religious training in place of social science, with constant invocations but little in the way of actual enforcement of many of the ethical principles that they claimed to espouse. That appears to be the approach again, today. In my view, morality also requires principled commitment and courage with the focus on results, with engagement based on the realization of principles.

I am fearful when I see this trend in the discipline that the actual goal is to espouse beliefs as a form of public relations while assuring that none of the goals will actually be achieved. Transforming anthropology into a debating society for moral relativism and only journalistic recording and essay, without the development of science and technology for human betterment, means that those with power will win and that economic inequalities, loss of cultural diversity, environmental damage, and threats to human survival will only increase as they have over the same past forty years. As anthropologists give up science and application, those with power who needed to be educated and held accountable are continuing to use science and technology to increase their power and their unaccountability. Advocacy and self-affirmation have value in combination with science and tools, but alone they are the equivalent of entering into battle without technology, strategy or tactics.

It takes little more than a generation to destroy a discipline by cutting off all attachment to the past and that is what I see happening. My hope is that as long as the libraries are protected, scholars can ultimately find traditional work in their disciplines and articles like this one, though difficult to find, can serve as the threads to reconnect those thinking and rebellious scholars of the future with such work. I try to have faith that scholars will ultimately realize that the current approaches offer nothing of value and that no one is willing to fund this kind of fantasy forever. It will ultimately burn itself out. But, for now, it has emerged and is replicating itself in the selection of faculty members and their selection of students in a continuous process.

The Situation Today: University Social Sciences as Dead Zones and Academia as a Shell

I sympathize with students today who are entering the university with expectations that social science will open their eyes to natural laws of human behavior that they can use to make the world a better place and who then are immediately turned off by curricula that offers them endless definitions, jargon, and discussion that leaves them without anything of real value. I look at university curricula in the social sciences today and wonder what skills and perspectives students are learning and how and where they will apply it. “Where’s the content?” I have no doubt that many students today privately worry to themselves (with no place to express their doubts) that what they are seeing in Anthropology and other social sciences is a fraud, backed up by mystique and slogans about “teaching people to think” without any content, promoted by a power structure designed to bully them into submission and in a way that perpetuates itself. What I see in universities today are dead zones where the skeletons of social science disciplines still exist but where the disciplines themselves are directionless echo chambers.

While teaching in secondary schools today is often sterile and numbing, with few direct visible practical applications in the teaching of social studies and literature, and often snuffing out curiosity, at least secondary school curricula offer some measures of skills that build in a sequence in use of language, mathematics, and natural sciences. Similarly, in the sciences at the university level, laboratory courses may still be cookbook projects, but there is a sequence of problem solving techniques and laboratory skills. Technical school vocations and professional schools at least partly also offer these steps. But following a century of modern social science, there is still very little in the sequential learning and application of theoretical skills other than perhaps in some cognitive psychology courses.

Most social science courses today, and particularly those in anthropology, sociology and political science, focus on definitions (the jargon of the field), on authors and theories (history, or what anthropologists call “ancestor worship”, rather than prediction or models), and on some work with abstractions that claim to offer models of reality but offer compound assumptions. This same process is multiplied across dozens of “subjects” with huge packets of information that is of little real application, in
addition to the definitions, authors and theories and abstractions (such as the study of specific areas or histories or problem concerns). These courses mostly offer the same repetitive package promoting the recitation of facts and theories and the use of jargon but not the ability to predict or model much of anything or to change anything in ways that promote long-term human goals. In these fields, the definition of an expert seems to be someone who knows the history of all of the failures of the subject and pretends to offer value, but who at best knows some case studies that might or might not be analogies to something he or she meets in the real world. It is easy to understand why students today are bored and alienated and cynical and prefer to just memorize these packets of information electronically rather than to have to see other human beings. It is unfortunate that those who actually find this model appealing and who can best pretend that it is somehow dignified, of intellectual value, humane or even human, are the ones who are then selected to perpetuate it. The “seminars” and “discussion” sections in social science courses today seem to be little more than theater, allowing for venting, posturing, and social skills of watching the generation of dogma and figuring out one’s social position and status more than anything having to do with social science.

As one advances to the higher level courses, many of these are “discussion” courses are “response paper” or “review paper” or “research paper” courses where one learns how to cite the different theories. But there are no problem sets teaching methods of solving real problems, no proven laws or theories taught for applications, no laboratory work to demonstrate the theories, and no applied work to put the theories to use, other than the model of “internships” that place students as free labor in existing institutions that are largely failing their social missions and themselves unable to teach social science skills. One could rightly ask how it is that academics have been studying their “areas” and offering theory after theory but have yet to find any validity of any of their theories, or why they should continue to teach theories with the claim that social reality cannot be predicted by theory or natural laws. What is it that they are studying? How is it of any value? Why should time and resources be wasted on what is no different from philosophy, theology and church scholarship?

Not all of social science has been eliminated and this is where there is still hope. There are still methodological courses within and alongside the social sciences, starting with statistics and research methods. These are the remaining skeletons of social science. They do offer the range of potential quantitative and qualitative skills to be used even though each discipline seeks to limit the teaching of methodologies to only one or two techniques that may or may not be useful at all for solving the actual questions that are within the boundaries of that discipline. Students who are clever and who recognize the value of social science need to have the foresight to take as many of the skills courses that are offered, across as many fields as possible, while avoiding the rest beyond the basic vocabulary in each discipline that can be seen as useful simply for communications. These can be studied along with various communications skills and presentation technologies. Together, these are not the makings of a social scientist, but at least they maintain the potential for social science to develop again in the universities by those who can start again with important questions and start applying a variety of techniques to try to answer those questions and to develop applications.

If one were rebuilding social sciences, one would start by clarifying the fundamental questions and boundaries of each discipline (as I try to do in my piece in this issue on Economics), introducing students to the full range of social science methodologies that can be used within the context of the scientific method, and then try to build courses based on what fundamental laws of societies are known to exist. For social science courses to meet the definition of social science, similar to an introductory course in the natural sciences, they would have to link the definitions to specific demonstrated laws and then problem sets, with real data, to show how these the data is used to generate predicted outcomes. These laws would then be demonstrated in laboratory components of the course where students would learn the methodologies for testing and improving these basic building blocks.

Years ago, I tried just to reintroduce the scientific element of the methods, in hope that this would catalyze change. By trying to assure that there were “laboratory” courses in every field, and that students could have some control over them, I believed that this would unleash a series of new empirical models as
well as a questioning of the theologies that were perpetuated in their place (Lempert, 1995). I succeeded in showing that it could be done and in laying out steps to do it, though I was unable to fully establish this model within a singular department or university.

What happened to that effort was that it was co-opted. Instead of using the laboratory approach to invigorate social sciences, the universities have created approaches to “field work” that have either exploited students on international tourism (“study abroad”) or funneled them into low-level positions in existing institutions to work as exploited interns (in what is called “service learning”). Rather than allow students to model the world and to build and run solutions in their communities, many social sciences courses have emerged that are subsidized low-level labor for existing institutions that were part of the problem. The “service” in non-governmental organizations or in university created “projects” works to treat symptoms and subsidize breakdown in government functions, rather than to explore how systems work and to create social experiments. Often this “field” approach is used to provide a pittance of services to the poor where government has refused to do so, and to simply train technical skills rather than to introduce new social science modeling in the form of real “laboratory” work.

Establishing measures of value and disciplinary standards would be one way to try to hold social science departments to their missions. I have also tried to do that in a series of articles, including one presented in this issue (for anthropology), but academics today ferociously resist discussion of any kind of measurements and call only for political review by their peers, with no guidelines. While universities claim to be “accountable” to accreditation committees (of like-minded people) and to students who pay tuition, it is hard to see any kind of actual measure of value of the social science disciplines at all of any kind other than peer “ratings” or measures of “starting salaries”.

The idea of “disciplines” is that they started with specific areas of study and with agendas of key problems that they would set out to solve, as the basis then for creating technologies to meet the needs. Social sciences, ideally, exist to answer social questions at different levels of inquiry and then to improve society at different levels, in everything from peace and sustainability to human fulfillment. In studying a social science discipline, one would expect to start with a list of the “problem areas” that the discipline addressed. Physics starts with the “nature of matter” and “energy” and its relationships and then establishes all of the areas and sub-areas where it applies questions (from the formation and future of the universe to the nature of elementary particles and fields). Biology starts with the nature of life, its evolution and function of its components at the level of eco-systems, species, organs, and organelles. The measure of progress is visible at each level of inquiry. The same should be said for the predictions of human systems and institutions and group behaviors. Yet, today, one finds it nearly impossible just to list the problems that individual social sciences claim they are trying to solve, the progress they have made, and the levels and areas of questions they are pursuing. It is as if there are no longer any lists of the mission or goals of social science disciplines, the problems they are trying to solve, the steps that are already solved and the steps ahead. With no purpose and no measure of value, the only measures they seem to offer now are political ones.

My discipline, anthropology, still claims to be unable to define even its essential terms like “culture” or “ethnicity”, let alone answer any questions or find any laws or principles. After trying for years to do it, starting with publishing an ethics code for practitioners, it has become clear to me that academics do not want any kind of standards. Anthropologists do not want to be a “discipline”. They do not want to have any rules or measures. They do not want to have a mission. They do not want to have to meet any standard of “value”. One can see it in the list of subject areas in the University of Texas ad. Anthropologists want to pontificate and “perform”, as if social science now is limited to being a kind of performance art.

Of course, they want the power to grade their students (something that I do not want with students; I want contracts with clear measures of objective learning). They want the power of blind peer review without accountability so that they can censor work they do not like. They want the power to choose colleagues without any transparency or accountability so that they can reinforce their political approaches in the use of university resources. They want the power to produce advertisements like those above, that
enable them to use resources to promote things that they cannot even define, let alone demonstrate has any kind of value to any of their constituencies.

Since what is being taught is a set of names and definitions, but not skills or solutions, the way once advances in these fields is not on the basis of ability to “prove” something true or false and to solve an existing disciplinary problem in a way that advances the discipline up a step. Advancement has returned to the approaches of a church hierarchy. That metaphorical description tells us where we are, today, in the social sciences. We are back in the 19th century, or perhaps in the Middle Ages, in the era of the church. Our social sciences are more like Church theologies in their quests to be “moral” and to focus on human thought rather than on measuring reality. The modern university has its roots in the church, in the pagoda, and in the yeshiva. It comes out of teaching religious doctrines. This is where it seems to have retreated, again, in the area of social sciences.

**Contemporary Social Sciences as Theologies**

The metaphor for describing social science today as a set of Churches may actually, subconsciously be the reality. One of the “laws” of anthropology is that cultures seek to replicate themselves and reassert their underlying structures. If the underlying structure of the university is really that of the church and doctrine, the tendency of the newer fields like the social sciences would be to regress to that of church doctrines unless there were standards and oversight forcing accountability to standards of science and value.

Several years ago, Noam Chomsky, the linguist, described much of contemporary social sciences today as theologies that were little different from their antecedents in the church. As a linguistic, he drew the comparison to sciences. Though there is “Newtonian” physics, where laws operate in a context (motion less than the speed of light), there is no such thing as “Newtonism” or Newtonians” competing with “Einsteinians”. There are natural laws that have been validated and there are recent theories waiting additional testing. But, in “social sciences” by contrast, there is “Marxism-Leninism” and “capitalism” and “socialism” and “totalitarianism”. In anthropology, you may be a “Straussian” or a “structural functionalist” or a “post-modernist”. The reason for these characterizations is because they reflect factions with ideologies and the absence of scientific testing and laws. That means they are resistant to any kind of reform. When people follow and defend a “God”, there is no form of proof to convince them otherwise; other than perhaps defeating them with a bigger “God”.

As in the Church, scholars in social sciences today seem to take on the same role as church clerics. That would explain why courses focus on understanding of all the previous church scholars by naming and discussing them, rather than to problem sets and applications and laboratory field work. One shows obedience to doctrines by promoting and defending them in the church and in social science today by creating new hair splitting theories that maintain the religious doctrines (and “engage in the current debates”) and that do it by creating new jargon. Terminology is continually reinvented. Research may employ new technologies but it does no more than reports on what is already known and obvious.

With no ability to predict social realities and in apparent fear of confronting reality with empirical testing, social science generates into sound-bytes. In fear of new models and challenges to dogma, the way to prevent it is to assure that there is no way to do it. To assure adherence to dogma, they turn thinking into black and white sound-bytes or memes. The length of journal articles becomes shorter and shorter so that there is room only to cite what has already been vetted. Books are turned into shorter and shorter cookie cutter lengths and increasingly just edited volumes of short symposium, sound-byte articles.

The result appears to be disconnected from reality (and often from logic and language in their works). It appears to be a perverse self-destructive spiral to extinction of the disciplines. The work that is funded is either useless or directly serves specific elites interests. As it becomes more useless, the public also joins in on the attack and agrees to cuts in funding. So there is a downward spiral of lack of funding, insularity and self-censorship, and cuts in funding.
The justification that social sciences are “teaching people how to think” or “opening up perspectives on the world” is what churches do. The fear of challenge, change, and empirical study and modeling is characteristic of a church. Much of what is social science today is an exercise in poetry and philosophy in a way that reinforces (and grades) conformity to favored outcomes. Students are taught how to parrot, manipulate, and obfuscate. Unfortunately today, in an industrial society where technology has the power to destroy humanity, the death of social science and replacement with ideological invocation and philosophy can only have the result of undermining civilization and humanity rather than advancing it. This is a dismantling of civilization and an undermining of intellect, done in the name of “progress” and “intellectualism”. It is nearly impossible to challenge a Church because there are no standards other than solidarity of groups that form for self-protection.
Part II:
The Concept for this Special Issue of Catalyst and
The Reality of Critiquing and Restoring Social Science

I originally believed it would be relatively easy, particularly in the contemporary political environment today of dissatisfaction with most major institutions and with attacks on academia, to offer fundamental critiques and solutions. There seem to be plenty of academic journals and new ones, like Catalyst, on the Internet. One hears plenty of “critiques”.

In fact, it took more than two years to produce this issue and much more time than that to find a venue for the central article in this issue, critiquing the legality of Economics as a discipline under recognized international law. All of the authors in this issue seem to have similar stories of difficulty in finding a forum for critiques and solutions. For starters, how do you get a critique and a solution for bringing disciplines back to their original precepts through “peer review” when such processes no longer even recognize the original goals and questions of the disciplines or even the basic procedural principles of objective reviews? The idea of getting through a “peer review” itself becomes paradoxical.

When one has a group of colleagues who fill an already established university niche with positions and funding to produce material, it is relatively easy to establish a journal and to fill it with a continuous stream of material. It is a bit like a continuous factory production. Offering fundamental critique and solutions, by contrast, has no constituency, no institutional structure, and no resources to offer other than ideas. Today, that makes it almost impossible to exist. That means that a critique of social science disciplines on their content and procedures must also include insight into their institutional structures that reinforce the existing mindsets and their failures.

This section in this introduction offers a description of the barriers to critique and describes the very infrastructure that this issue needed to establish simply to exist. It offers ideas for those who wish to continue and expand the critique and solutions offered in this issue. Before introducing the articles that now comprise the issue and how they fit together, below is an introduction to the process of this special issue. I offer data on how controls seem to work in social sciences that make it difficult even to create a debate or a forum that challenges the current dismantling of social science and that offers solutions.

This section is one two parts. The first begins with the advertisement for the special issue and then a discussion of the hypotheses of why the social sciences have been dismantled, that I hoped would be part of the discussion of the issue. The second part discusses the structural barriers to producing an issue like this one and some of the ways of overcoming those challenges for those who seek to do so in the future.

In offering this essay section here, that has also undergone peer review, I present my personal views as conclusive opinions based on more than 40 years of academic life. I have not footnoted or qualified every statement.
The Concept of the Special Issue

This issue came about as a matter of happenstance and then it almost did not happen. The difficulty of finding places to raise questions about social science and to try to improve them is itself evidence of how deeply rooted the problem of the disappearance of social science and its standards within the social sciences seems to be.

If there were channels today for reviewing social science works and for presenting new methodologies, one might expect to easily find the places to introduce critiques and to open discussion along with them. If these places existed, there would be multiple discussions of these issues that could perhaps be brought together. But that is not how the world of academia works and how “peer review” works today.

This author is not aware of any places to raise the issue of rebuilding social sciences. Indeed, the only major criticism of social sciences over the past few years seems to have been the “Sokal Hoax” in which a physicist debunked the failures of social science by publishing a nonsense article and then describing the fraud he perpetrated (Sokal, 1996). That was more than twenty years ago and little seems to have changed.

There are plenty of journals that offer “critiques” and open the door to “critical works”. In anthropology, for example, there is the journal, *Critical Anthropology*, among others. But such journals do not offer their pages for constructive criticism in the form of accountability measures or solutions. They limit the debate to narrow, philosophical criticisms in ways that prevent any attempt to create accountability, standards or objectivity. The spaces they offer are short: long enough to allow for attacks but too short to present solutions. It seems that this is by design.

Assuming that most journals today in the fields that bear the labels of “social sciences” have become self-interested journals to promote work of specific groups in order to reinforce a track to tenure and some institutional power, where would one go to find the place for discussion of the discipline, itself?

Today, occasionally, for a short time, either a group of graduate students or maybe a renegade academic suddenly opens up a window of space. Such opportunities seem to only open for a year or two and then they seem to shut down. In other cases, journals seem to open for a short time for a purpose of a small group to publish a small amount of work. To keep it going, they no longer can find work to keep in their journal and suddenly open up space for outsiders. Finding them is sometimes like going on a treasure hunt.

This was one of those times. I found one of those open windows. I came to this journal, *Catalyst*, with my article that is in this issue, on economics. The piece is too interdisciplinary to fit most journals, since it combines law, economics and anthropology in one place. It is too long for any print journal. It is too short for a book and not fitting for a book since it does not have a ready market (the criteria for even academic publishers, today). It challenges the corporate ideologies of “law and economics” journals. It is too practical and applied for anthropology journals to even look at. The two leading (maybe the two only) practicing anthropology journals, accept only sound-bytes of some 3,000 to 5,000 words.

According to the editor of *Catalyst*, mine was the first article that had ever come to the journal that wasn’t sought by a specific group for a specific purpose. I found the journal on the Internet in a search for an e-journal that might be open to something long and unusual. The editor let it sit for months. Then she agreed to publish it as the center of a “forum”, on condition that I also agree to produce an entire issue around it. That is how this special issue arose.

Putting together this issue met with a number of difficulties that demonstrate the barriers to rebuilding social science. Advertising the issue, receiving articles, and even completing the issue itself, faced all kinds of barriers that seem to work to reinforce what exists. I describe some of these below.
Purpose of issue and call for articles

With Catalyst’s then editor, we agreed on the following call for articles for the special issue that we would start to advertise in early 2016. It appeared on the journal’s webpage, hosted by the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and by those social science newsletters and listserves that agreed (often after considerable prodding) to disseminate the call.

Catalyst: A Social Justice Forum, will turn its attention in a forthcoming special issue to articles that offer critiques of any one of the five core social science disciplines combined with proposals for catalyzing reform of that discipline. The journal seeks articles offering specific measures and proposals for rebuilding each of the five core social science disciplines to focus on discovering the “scientific” theories and “laws” of human group and individual behaviors as a basis for designing technologies for social justice and social betterment.

The journal offers this special issue based on the debatable assumption, to be used as a starting point for argument sake, that the five core social science disciplines studying human behavior at the level of groups (anthropology, and the sub-sectoral disciplines of economics, political science and sociology) and of individuals (psychology) have been diverted from their missions as social science disciplines or have stagnated in paralyzing (co-dependent) critiques. The journal seeks articles on how to hold these specific disciplines accountable to the principles of social science objectivity for long-term, measurable human betterment.

The starting assumption is that three of the pure social sciences of human group behaviors (economics, political science, and, partly, sociology), while claiming to be “scientific” have actually worked as pseudo-sciences to promote political ideologies of industrialization, production, homogenization, and social control, while the fourth has been transformed to offer counter ideologies and “inclusiveness” (e.g., anthropology and many new spinoff “disciplines” associated with it) in ways that turn it into a “humanities” with no scientific method or thinking; as simply critique, philosophy, advocacy or journalism. Psychology may be the closest to a real science, but many of its applications do not meet universally established goals for social justice and have been used, instead, for social control (e.g., criminology, advertising). Several new disciplines have now emerged but without a clear link to a social science core (peace studies, human geography, sustainability studies, legal studies, development). Disciplines today claim to use scientific tools or specific methods, but few really meet the definition of “science” or “discipline” – hypothesis testing, real/non-ideological or culturally biased variables, results applicable outside of specific cases – or focus on larger human concerns – cultural survival, development of the full human potential, political equity, environmental protection, social equity, and peace, among them.

Seeking Hypotheses on How the Dismantling and Destruction of Social Science Happened

My hope for this special issue was that authors, singly, or as a group, would help to offer perspectives on the underlying root causes of the dismantling of the social sciences as part of the context for attempting to rebuild them that would be the “catalysis” process of the issue. My own hypothesis was that, behind the curtain of academia and intellectualism and their claims of promoting progress, there was one key factor influencing academia along with other institutions: money and power. I believed this was a result of the elimination of real public control and feedback with the university, with think tanks and with public debate. While others have written on how private universities have been corrupted by money and how a for-profit mentality has seemed to have taken over universities – some say by political design, both in public and private universities (Giroux, 2007; Ginsberg, 2911; Scott, 2012; Wittner, 2013) – there hasn’t been much study of how (or whether) social sciences have been directly targeted in this way.

It is worth noting that some of the authors cited above, particularly Scott and Giroux, believe that the attack on the university and on the social sciences, was by design of several institutions and elites. They believe that these elites planned a backlash against universities and, one might extend the argument, against the specific disciplines (and perhaps the ethnic groups in them) that were promoting social science, law and some of the policy sciences as tools for democratization and citizen control of corporate and military institutions. They believe that these institutions and the elite families behind them organized to begin to fund think tanks and media to directly attack, disable, dismantle, and co-opt the universities.
The plan included changes in the political control over and the funding of education in ways that would achieve those ends.

Despite my hope that this issue would further examine how and why universities are failing in their social science mission, this special issue does not probe deeper into why industrial societies “allowed” this or other contributing factors to these failures to happen (or whether the process was a natural and predictable, deterministic one). At best, this special issue provides examples to suggest that what happened to social sciences was part of the process that seems to have happened with other institutions over the past 50 years: the dismantling of rule of law in many Western countries, the rise of oligarchy, the disappearance of the middle class, the continued rise of the national security state, and perhaps the attempt to “dumb down” the mass public, in a number of related phenomena.

While it is hard to determine the specific causes and effects of the dismantling of social sciences, the symptoms are certainly linked to a range of visible economic and political changes, even if the actual root causes may lie deeper in our cultures. What is visible today in the social sciences, all at once, seems to be a return to the forms of indoctrination and the methods of religious dogma, the mechanization of the classroom with new technologies that promote mechanical learning rather than empirical social science, and the addition of “field” work that is more like low-wage apprenticeship and technical skills application than it is empirical social science, that I have commented on in the first section of this introduction, above and address briefly and directly here, again, below. Financial and political controls could be the explanations.

What is it, specifically, that this special issue sought to explain, to confront, and to overcome with solutions? While technological advances (“e-learning” or “distance learning”), the introduction of “service learning” (internships), and the advent of “multi-culturalism” in the “social sciences” are all described as educational and human “progress”, I believe that they represent the opposite. In themselves, all of these could potentially be great advances, but the way they are used today seems to work to promote profit while creating the illusion of social benefit. These are the issues that I also hoped this special issue would address, directly or indirectly.

Electronic classrooms and programmed learning may be “efficient” in teaching definitions and dogma, but they do not address the underlying failures of disciplines, and that seems to be the purpose. Teaching and learning social science require laboratory methods working with communities. That takes resources. It has tremendous potential benefits but it also has all of the risks of travel and human interaction and spontaneity. With it come the risks (and long-term benefits for human survival and advancement) of empowerment and social change. The way technology is used today in social sciences, however, it is to dumb down social science to definitions and memorization with the occasional addition of new electronic measurements and presentations. This is not social science. It is university cost savings and social control. Packing people into classrooms and offering robotic electronic learning is an extension of mechanization and robotics to promote profits at the expense of quality. More rote learning, more robotic mass learning, and more packaged learning means that there is no need to invest in real education. It means there is no need for laboratories or equipment, no need for visits to the community to apply social science directly, and no need for two-way engagement with students that would allow students to invent new approaches and challenge existing models.

Multi-culturalism in the university also offered the hope and potential for transforming disciplines like social sciences into empowering community-based action. Instead, all it did was to take the church model for education and to replace the dictatorial role of the professor with a more diverse set of figures, while replacing one set of dogmas with multiple dogmas (Lempert, 1995). The diversification of faculty members has not made economics or political science more empirical or applied. It has not brought more answers and more useful tools to anthropology or sociology. Indeed, it has fragmented them into single variable studies and methodologically driven reporting with no real theory or application. The applications that have arisen are “criminology” and “security studies” that actually reinforce controls and inequalities. The rise of new sub-disciplines has come with lots of labeling but no real challenge to policies of cultural destruction and rise of corporate and financial power (Lempert, 2014). In many
respects, rather than train students to do better social science modeling and application, the effect of multiculturalism and diversity in the social sciences seems to have been to pander to students by offering them narcissism in the way that the mainstream media has become entertainment. Entertainment sells. Learning and standardization and application require work. In seeking to extract profits while diverting attention from skills and change, diversity actually also financially benefits university administration and short-term elite interests.

The choice of promoting “internships” for social science students (i.e., menial work for an established organization followed by writing a research or “response paper”) and “travel abroad” (educational tourism) programs rather than rigorous social science laboratory work and application in the form of community planning or running start-up institutions, fits the same paradigm. The internship and travel abroad programs offer lower level skills and entertainment with few demands, while providing free labor to existing organizations. They lure in students on the pretext of “job connections” and “lines on resumes” while actually disempowering students. The approach earns universities quick profits while exploiting students and making claims of “community relations” (Lempert, 2016).

It appears that universities are profiting from students rather than serving them and the public. They seem to be turning into profit centers on a commercial model rather than meeting students and public needs as public organizations. Indeed, both the current and a recent U.S. President of opposing political parties have made millions of dollars from “for profit” universities while advocating or supporting policies that have actually gutted funding for existing social science research.

While social sciences are rarely funded in developing countries and dictatorships because there is little concern for “solving” the social problems that are the result of inequalities and the corruption and abuses that reinforce them, in developed countries, the increasing concentrations of wealth and political power over the past few decades seem to also be correlated with the dismantling of social sciences or their transformation to serving elite interests even while claiming to represent “diversity”.

An Overview of the Era of Multi-Cultural Corporatism: The Social Context for this Special Issue

Social science is not offering much in the way of predictive models or technologies of change, but it does offer plenty of terms to “describe” it, often euphemistically. The clearest descriptive terms seem to be “multi-cultural” and “corporatism”. In my view as an anthropologist, “multi-culturalism” is also a deceptive term. Positions in universities and societies appear to be more “diverse” as a result of globalization and culture contacts, but cultural differences (as measured by language diversity and cultural integrity) are rapidly being destroyed. We are witnessing a homogenization and assimilation of peoples to fit a structure of corporate interests and economic and political inequalities.

Having a clear term to describe what is happening can help to make the goals of remaking the social sciences and the barriers clearer, but such a term must identify the specific institutions and behaviors that need to be changed since it is impossible just to blame and confront a terminology or an ideology or a set of institutions without understanding the behaviors and choices underlying them. In the United States, the term currently in vogue to describe the openness to visible diversity (what used to be called the “proletarianization” of the labor force or the “commodification” of individuals to serve in generic roles in corporate-institutional structures) is now generally called “neo-liberalism” to describe contemporary politics in the U.S. and Europe. Words like “neo-colonialism” and “globalization” are used to describe similar the impacts elsewhere. Some political scientists are now using terms like “oligarchy” (Gilens and Page, 2016) or “(inverted) totalitarianism” (Wolin, 2003), which are more descriptive.

The closest direct translation of “neo-liberalism” using corresponding terms that are easy to understand is probably “multi-cultural corporatism” or “multi-cultural corporate fascism”. What is “new” about it is its inclusive multi-cultural component, not that it has any impact on opportunity or social welfare. Its “liberalism” is not the “progressive liberalism” of the Welfare State or “democratic socialism”. It is the corporate liberalism of placing institutional power above regulation and allowing
“free” trade, controlled by multi-national corporate power (freeing up resources for exploitation and cultures for assimilation).

The arrangement has transformed the relationship between institutions and the governed and this is also what we are seeing with the dismantling of social sciences and their applications. Before, in my lifetime, corporations and state institutions were nominally subject to public regulation through democratic processes. In most “democracies”, these procedures were still controlled by an economic elite of a specific ethnic group and generally by a patriarchy, though females who enjoy the use of military force and police powers seem to be now joining it. This is what C. Wright Mills called the “power elite” (Mills, 1956).

While many scholars today like to label the system today as “capitalism”, since this also includes the commodification of people and the appearance of “diversity” and the rise of corporatist control, the term capitalism creates the assumption that the agency of this change is an abstract factor called “capital”. Blaming abstractions for human choices and actions covers them up and also pretends that certain political systems (that are “capitalist”) are the problem rather than those that might have different organizational forms (i.e., “socialist”). The problem is the rise (and/or entrenchment) of an economic elite controlling institutions and determining that they do not need to support the very disciplines that might predict their actions or that might generate technologies to challenge their power. Their exercise of power is through institutions, with the military and police also a form of corporate institutional structure.

As power has concentrated in institutions (military, banks, domestic and multi-national corporations), political control seems to have been placed directly in these institutions. Governments serve the institutional powers, directly, and manipulate political structures in ways that work to coordinate the institutions and the elites managing them. Today, in contrast to the past, those running the institutions are not necessarily from single ethnic groups or males. They are “multi-cultural” and “diverse”. Moreover, the institutions are not managed by a single set of families that has held power for several generations. They are a new oligarchy that has risen to fit the needs of the institutions. New families entering the oligarchy based on their ability to serve the interests of the existing corporate entities (rather than public interests) through technology.

How is this connected back to the problems of the universities and of academic disciplines and the goals of this issue for holding them again to their social science missions?

Rather than independently serving the interests of students who pay tuition (what economists would call “consumer sovereignty”) or communities through public regulation and public funding, universities, think tanks, and other places where social scientists work, now seem to serve financial and elite interests directly. Major funding seems to come from private sources and their endowments are then invested back in these enterprises. Both private and public university management appears to be unaccountable to the public, despite public chartering, and seems to serve the interests of a management class running the institutions as businesses interlocking with other institutions.

While think tanks are largely privately founded and serve as mouthpieces for ideological propaganda to serve donors, rather than for development of public social science and application, the universities now appear to be largely corporate institutions serving industry combined with the historic model of the church. If social sciences are dead, it seems to be a result of corporations acting as the tail wagging the dog (the public).

While some authors claim that faculty members and minorities were trying to protect their disciplines (Ginsberg, 2011), I believe that academics were among the first to surrender and to agree to be co-opted, while claiming to be doing the opposite. Rather than argue that here, I direct readers to the two personal essays by Brooks Duncan in this issue that I believe make a more eloquent argument for how this may have happened.

Duncan’s sharpest question that I would echo here is this one: If social sciences today are really more “representative” than before (with more women and more minorities and more courses on Women’s Studies and Ethnic Studies and Area Studies and Gender Studies) and if there are really more “political” and “moral” courses than before, why is it that the net impact of all of these changes on the inequalities in
society is less than zero and why is it that the impact on the structure of the university and on social science is also less than zero? In other words, how is it that with all of this supposed “progress”, we have more prisons (and also more courses on “terrorism” and “criminology”) and greater social inequality and a rise in corporate and military power and the national security state, and a weakening of democracy? Why is it that these “moral” courses are still top-down lectures and book learning and top-down grading without student empowerment, without community empowerment, without empirical learning and social science?

Indeed, all of this looks like co-optation of a small group of supposed “diverse” “representation” rather than real change at all. It looks like a suppression of change through the appearance of change rather than the reality of social progress. It looks like a new form of tokenism with an agreement to dismantle social sciences rather than to promote them as a means for applied social progress.

Some twenty years ago, Brooks Duncan argued that the elimination of science in my field of anthropology was actually a reaction by anthropologists to the attempt by elites to control the social sciences for destructive ends (Duncan, 1995). His argument was that social sciences were not really co-opted and that minorities were not agreeing to an elite agenda or being forced to follow it in fear for their jobs. He gave scholars the benefit of the doubt and said that they were purposefully choosing to destroy social sciences because they could not assure that their work as social scientists would be used for humanitarian purposes. In his view, they were choosing to destroy social sciences in the belief that it was better that no one do sciences at all. In a sense, the argument was that if humans now had the technology to create the atomic bomb, that they would ultimately use it to destroy civilization as we know it and that we would all be better off if we just tried to destroy science first, before we reached that point. He would probably see the movements today towards study of personal “identity” as a kind of “New Age” reaction to science and a turn inward to improve oneself, given the feelings of powerlessness to change society.

My view in this issue is that no matter how sciences are used, the moral choice is not to destroy science but to struggle to make it humanistic and to turn our attention to the study of the social scientific mechanisms to achieve positive social change. While I hoped to inspire more discussion and debate over this within this special issue, and hoped for more of a discussion on it than is presented in this introduction and in Duncan’s essays, this topic may be a kind of taboo. People may be afraid to confront it.

Psychological Symptoms of the Change in Social Science Disciplines that Create Barriers to Discussions like those Envisioned in this Issue

Whatever the causes of the disintegration of social science and whatever the appropriate response, I hoped that this issue would also touch on many of the visible signs of failure of academics and universities to defend social sciences. There seem to be underlying psychological barriers that may stem from political and economic pressures (or fears about them). Some of them deserve mention here along with the impacts on specific social science disciplines and disciplinary approaches.

It is generally considered “politically incorrect” and “reactionary” to critique the loss of standards in universities today. Indeed, many of those elites who seem to have promoted the dismantling of social sciences are also those who critique what has emerged in its place. In my view, both the critics and the defenders are half wrong in that neither support social science and its measures. They either support standards that are designed to dismantle social science or they do not want standards at all.

If one is idealistic and innovative and actually offers new approaches and implement them (Lempert, 1995) and tries to excite students and administrators and university academics to continue this marvelous invigorating mission and tradition of rational, scientific thinking applied to the great problems and questions of our day to open up discovery, the response today is resignation and rejection and scorn; nihilism and cynicism and attack. “Everything is relative”, “science does not have the answers”, “it is immoral to try to use technologies of social science to change anything”, “don’t ask big questions”; “what
you are attempting is impossible so don’t bother trying”. It is perverse and dark and stifling; a bastion of hopelessness and learned helplessness. It seems to be driven by fear, denial and anger.

Open up academic journals and one will find the self-promoting litanies, “No one has thought to test this before” (that in my view are tragic-comic given the usual lack of justification for what is tested as having any connection to any real human benefit or needs), followed by closing paragraphs of, “It needs more research”. Yet most of these research publications no longer apply the methodologies of scientific testing to important comparative questions. Instead, they have retreated to Church scholarship, on the one hand, requiring endless citations, or simple case studies and mathematics to prove the obvious (or irrelevant), on the other.

Along with the dismantling of social science has also come a duality in the idea of “discipline” and “standards”. On the one hand, in the parts of social science that have become rigid political dogma and that prevent any real inquiry or science, the idea of “discipline” and “standards” is used as a sword to drive out any questions, variables, and methods that do not repeat what already exists. On the other hand, among those who claim to be representing the new “morality”, there are no standards and there is no discipline at all other than direct politicization. The real standards that have disappeared are the standards of science, allowing challenges and new variables and hypothesis testing without constraining the questions and variables and conclusions, and the standards of professional ethics. There are no enforceable ethics codes in any of the social sciences that can be used to hold anyone accountable for conflicts of interest or corruption of processes because no one in these “professions” wants any such “discipline” or protection at all. If ethics codes could be enforced, it would be much harder to break them.

Indeed, the ethical obligations of social science disciplines have also now become twisted beyond recognition, apparently allowing for academics to use their authority and to follow any sources of funding as well as to avoid any actual social obligations in their work. What Laura Nader called “studying up” in anthropology – the study of power and how it works in attempts to hold it accountable – has now been defined by many anthropologists as “unethical” because it might lead to accountability and change of those who have power. Written law claims that this is a human right and a basic right in democratic societies, but I have found in my direct experience academics are now defining these basic rights as “unethical”.

In many ways, what exists today in the place of social science is a set of “feel good” courses that do appear to pander to constituencies to reinforce political beliefs and identity (which in themselves are not “bad”). The problem is that in pandering, they offer these perspectives in place of social science rather than in improvements and applications to it. Meanwhile, they are not confronting many of those aspects of social science that they opposed; they are simply disengaging from it. By doing so, much of what continues as social science has gotten worse give the lack of engagement and confrontation.

In universities today there appear to be two parallel extremes within “social science” disciplines. The disciplines are in many ways more authoritarian (and, in my view, racist and genocidal) than they were in the colonial past, which is what my central article in this issue, on economics and its violations of international law, critiques, while trying to protect minority cultures, diversity and rights. Alongside this is a new set of representational “diversity” courses on “identity” that appear in social science in place of social science. In comparing the social sciences that I studied in the university some 20+ years ago with those taught today, I find that both extremes are much more pronounced and anti-science (anti-social science) while the “middle” between the extremes, that allowed me to study and ask social science questions and taught some social science methodologies, has largely disappeared. What we appear to have are more doctrinal and mathematical courses in economics and political science in support of globalization, industrialization, militarism, the national security state (courses in “terrorism and security studies” and “criminology and prison studies) with the destruction of minority cultures and eco-systems that it supports, on the one hand, with courses on “women’s studies” and “ethnic studies” and “globalization” (and the evils of “capitalism”) and “post-socialism” on the other. It is a full politicization in which students are subject to or allowed to choose their form of indoctrination, but without any actual
measurement, modeling, hypothesis testing, or application. The picture is not entirely bleak. Some of the gaps are being filled by departments like Environmental Biology and subjects like environmental economics, but that just reinforces the disarray.

My undergraduate major (at Yale) of “Economics and Political Science” that promised a return to social science questions and modeling has all but disappeared while the leading intellectuals in the field (Charles Lindblom and John Kenneth Galbraith among them) are no longer read and are immediately attacked when they are cited in current work, as part of an effort to make them disappear. That interdisciplinary approach of the past allowed for comparison of political-economic systems and for modeling them as “industrial states” and “mixed systems” while identifying variables to describe how they became what they were. It also allowed for applied courses within them on understanding the variables influencing policy processes (individual and institutional behaviors) as well as on the full array of policy choices and social contract/system design choices. These are now disappeared. Many of the majors that were interdisciplinary and applied social sciences like that one, “Economics and Political Science” (“Political Economy”), as well as the traditional “Legal Studies”/“Law and Society” that taught the building of legal institutions, constitutions, and the writing of progressive legislation and policies, no longer seems to exist or continue as something else (courses in identity for specific groups or dead end repetitions of ideology of “globalization” and “capitalism”). Yale’s “School of Organization and Management” that combined public policy schools, management and behavioral science also no longer exists in that form and has been replaced by a standard Business School.

In Political Science, instead of predictive models and tools for building participatory democracy and for improving society, most departments today list a range of new courses in “Terrorism Studies” and “Security Studies” and “Criminology”. Instead of social justice and social contract modeling, there is now “Criminal Justice”. The modeling has also become mathematical based on the assumption of “rational actors” despite the fact that political behaviors seem to be increasingly irrational (if not socially suicidal, and insane). One cannot model the behaviors of social suicide today in political science and have it reviewed. Neither those assumptions nor entire sets of variables can be studied or reviewed in political science journals. Political Science has also moved towards mathematics and towards area reporting rather than predictive modeling. An article in this issue by Polly Sly describes what is missing today in the discipline of Political Science and how the discipline seems to serve only elite interests.

What seems to have invaded Economics (and detached it from all of the variables of politics and culture) was a reinforcement of ideology and productivity and affirmation of greed in the “new” theories of “Trickle Down Economics” and the “Laffer Curve” that were promoted by corporate elites during the Reagan-Thatcher era of the 1980s. The models of public economics were replaced with “supply side” subsidies of the rich with the myth that it would help the poor. Instead of humanistic models and studies of reality and comparisons and predictions and alternative, utopian economies, economics became both a study of dogmas and a retreat to mathematics and engineering of questions of short-term productivity. “Society” in the study have economics has been reduced to a “constraint” or an abstraction that is commoditized as “social capital”.

In many disciplines, instead of getting better models and tools, what we have developed alongside the mathematics and the theologies and the narcissism is endless critique; first of the existing tools, then of the existence of tools themselves, then attacks on science, attacks on standards, attacks on measurement, attacks on law, attacks on anything constructive. There was “Critical Legal Studies” that attacked the idea of law as a tool for social change (one of the beliefs in the 1960s) and that offered the promise of some real world predictions of legal decisions and legal systems in continuing the social science of law established by the “legal realists” in the 1930s. Instead, however, it degenerated into story-telling and discourse analysis and deconstruction, coming from literary studies and turning the real world of law into literary studies of “narratives”. Similarly, there was “Critical Development Studies” that criticized all of the neo-colonial globalist “development” models and then made sure that there was nothing to replace it other than cynicism and “helping the poor” in ways that essentially colonized them and promoted exactly what was criticized. In offering “critique”, its goal was not to rebuild and offer a “constructive critique”
with predictions and models and understanding of deeper structures, but seems instead to have been to
paralyze everything in endless debate and abstraction. There was “Critical Anthropology” and then
“Critical Medical Anthropology”. The new “tools” were not to reconstruct what might have been wrong
but only to “deconstruct” and destroy and expose and deride. By definition, a “critic” is someone who
does not offer anything constructive. He/she simply acts to destroy others who do. These movements do
not present “alternative theories”. They have been followed by “Feminist Critiques” (and “Feminist
Economics”) and “Queer Studies Critiques” that are an endless stream of single variable, self-promoting
approaches for “inclusion” such as “feminist economics”.

If one asks academics today what it is that they do and how they actually add value to their disciplines
(or how they can even call what they do, “disciplines”) the answer is that they teach “critical thinking”
and offer “explanations”. Social science attempted to explain human phenomenon by showing how
variables could predict outcomes and then how understanding of such “laws” could promote progress and
the human tradition. Today, social scientists no longer believe in natural “laws” of social behavior and
they no longer seek to provide models that can offer predictions for anything beyond what is already
known and common sense. What they do is “explain”, which means creating endless definitions that
explain nothing. They see themselves as poets. They believe there is brilliance in their turning of phrases
and perversion of languages but there is nothing behind it. They build their careers on creating new
words. They are creating protective mystiques and walls to hide the emptiness of their work and their
inability and unwillingness to predict or improve anything.

Theories offered in social science today are no longer hypotheses that can be tested. Instead, they are
descriptive terms that can never be tested or applied (let alone understood), with endless case studies
proving over and over again what is already known.

Rather than look for causes and structures, my colleagues use labels that have no measurable content
and that cannot be used in any way as variables (“capitalism” and “imperialism” and “patriarchy”), on the
one hand, and contemporary establishment political ideologies on the other (“post-socialism”). Rather
than recognize and protect actual cultures and historic cultural identities of language and environments,
they actually work to promote assimilation and the creation of preference identities that promote
rootlessness (e.g., sexual identities, Internet identities, and other social groupings and identifications).

My colleagues’ “theories” are themselves largely attacks on science and reason, reinforcing the idea
of great singularities of today that prevent any kind of scientific comparisons (“modernity” and
“globalization”) that describe all contemporary events as impossible to compare to any other time because
they are so “unique” that social science becomes irrelevant, or how (in citing authors like Foucault),
everything is so interconnected including our consciousness, that no change is possible, and that
everything is in the mind and “socially constructed” and that we can simply will anything we want to
happen, or we can create “social movements” and “new consciousness”, such that social science and
study of actual human behaviors are irrelevant.

My colleagues talk about social change and social movements in the social sciences but actually
trying to apply academic teachings to human social progress, as defined under international law and
agreed to in most countries, is also something that these academics religiously seem to avoid. When I ask
them, why, they say that this is “social engineering” and that is for people (and militaries, and
corporations, and criminal syndicates, and national security organizations, that are mostly beyond public
control and that do such social engineering every day) to do “themselves” without any scientific work
from scholars to use as guidance.

The social science and application that my colleagues now religiously oppose are not only stated
goals of national and international laws. Such work is also part of the publicly chartered legal mission of
universities and often in the stated missions of universities themselves. If social scientists do not seek to
enact these obligations and serve as models of them and teach them and organize them, then who will and
who does? Where is the morality? Where is the commitment to law? Where is the commitment to
science? The answer is that today, all of these, including science, is just one of many “points of view” to
be “critiqued”.

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It seems that academics today, as a group, have built up defensive mechanisms and systems to eliminate discussions of their role and how they act in contradiction of their stated missions and stated political goals. My colleagues point to courses on single issues like “Human Rights” (but generally without teaching social contract drafting and enforcement) and “Peace Studies” (without much in the way of prediction or applications), and “Global Studies” (but not comparative empires and predictions and mechanisms), and all of the representational identity courses as the basis for any questioning of the actual academic quality, disciplinary basis, and real-world impact of these courses, claiming that any questioning of their approach is an assault on “progress” and “turn back the clock” even when the purpose is to actually promote the goals they claim.

The lesson of this special issue is that to stay within an academic environment today and to do any social science, one essentially has to publish it oneself and create the infrastructure for doing it oneself. The mainstream of university disciplines of “social science” today allows only the anti-science “critical debates”, the invention of jargon and case studies of the obvious, joining the circus of endless, useless noise, while producing “empirical work” as a form of journalistic reporting or bean counting using any new media and measurement technology that one chooses.

Mechanisms of Political (Political Economic) Influence over Academia, Impacting the Social Sciences

Although none of the articles in this special issue focuses directly on the mechanisms of the changes that have occurred in society to dismantle social science, there is a good question that needs to be raised in this issue of why even public universities, with both public funding and student tuition payments do not demand social sciences that promote the long-term public good and are content with just symbolism that lacks contact. I raise this question here for a brief discussion since it is this kind of public pressure that is needed to help rebuild social science.

Private universities increasingly rely on corporate donations and alumni donations and they are responsive to businesses and elites so they do not have the necessary incentives to promote public social science that serves long-term public interests, even though they are public chartered. It seems clear that they would favor corporate benefitting scientific research and the arts while stifling those disciplines that might lead to social progress. But what has cut the link within public universities?

The answer may be in the overall corporatization of the political process and the disempowerment of citizens as consumers, but other control mechanisms seem to be at work over faculty advancement and research. Public oversight over most forms of government spending also seems to have been weakened and the university may be just another example.

In the 1960s and 1970s, in the U.S., there was a feedback on private funding between the new middle class minorities who rose on the basis of their own businesses (medical clinics, law firms, small businesses) and whose taxes and contributions also filled government treasuries for building a new and more open society. The Cold War largely channeled funds in the U.S. for military competition and imperialism, but there was also an element of national development through social welfare and solidarity as well as the goal of winning hearts and minds globally with the example of more inclusive and beneficial policies. The better-off the population, the more funds they could offer. This set of incentives, however, seems to now be broken, with the goal of continued transfers to the elite and social control rather than public investment. Without the incentives for public benefit and with the direct linkages, the result is to destroy the institutions that had promoted such benefit. The incentive system in place today seems perverse and self-destructive.

In general, tuition payments are partly a direct market control of consumer sovereignty over the university and what it teaches, but these mechanisms today seem to work only for specific technical skill training (and increasingly in “private business model” colleges and universities), with student demand working only to promote courses as entertainment rather than long-term public benefit. The cost of libraries, laboratories, and quality teaching with close student contact is too high for “the market” to work on its own without public oversight. Education must be public subsidized and overseen as a transfer to
future generations, and this is where the link is broken. Government funding to meet public needs for solutions to social problems and future needs has been cut. Research has been moved to think tanks or it is subservient only to specific state and non-state powers: the military, the national security state, and corporations. Public oversight has become that of corporate boards that eliminate long-term measures and direct public concerns.

If private universities can now be bought by commercial interests and have an incentive to destroy social science and social progress, it may be that public universities are unable to fill the gap. Their mission appears to be increasingly limited to teaching and to government supported research for the benefit of the same corporate industries that influence state governments and the concerns that influence national government (military research, information collection rather than social benefit applications, national security and prisons.)

In the global economy today, tax laws have allowed for accumulation of vast amounts of wealth for specific industries in a concentrated “winner-take-all” economy of large financial institutions, military technology companies, the prison state, non-renewable energy sources that are subsidized by specific policies and military and police spending (on behalf of oil and coal companies), the pharmaceutical industry, and entertainment industry. The funds that are available to go back into universities are largely serving these interests rather than any public interests. Since the funding is largely for short-term destructive or exploitative industries rather than for products of immediate public benefit, and the policies that promote the funding are global rather than community or nationally based, university funding also reflects these priorities. Much of it seems to also promote narcissism of specific groups that have benefitted from entering this elite power structure (co-opted minorities and women) or who can be co-opted into believing that their interests are being met through this “representation” that replaces social science.

Only a few weeks ago, in my field of anthropology, I saw an advertisement for a newly created position in anthropology in a nonsense subfield that undermines the discipline but that was seriously being promoted by the University of Copenhagen. The subfield is called “corporate anthropology”. This is an example of what is happening and how businesses are not only introducing their concerns but how they have fundamentally distorted social science disciplines into nonsense that undermines the very definitions and subject of study of disciplines. Indeed, there is already a field of business management. Anthropology studies culture and human adaptations, not product markets. But anthropologists do study people, so a Danish business has found that it was able to co-opt the discipline and fund a position for someone who would study markets to strengthen Denmark’s corporate business interests. The university agreed. Indeed, “Anthropology of Bureaucracy” and “Corporate Anthropology” is now an emerging field in the corporate dominated university in the corporate state. The discipline of anthropology is stripped of its questions but its methodologies are co-opted for use by elites. This is the new business of social science.

Similarly, it is not unusual today to see advertisements for social scientists that require scholars to bring research projects and funding with them and to see anthropologists working for assimilation of peoples rather than for cultural protection, and for studies of specific needs that should be work done by public agencies outside the university. The result is now replacing science and social science technology development inside the public university.

At the upper levels of the university, the concept of University President as statesman or stateswoman and spokesperson for humanity has similarly been replaced with the concept of University President as fundraiser and business manager and this is what is visible in advertisements for these positions. Although the top research universities opened positions of President and Provost to women, and minorities, the background is increasingly that of economist fundraiser. The role of the President has increasingly been one of sycophant to donors and cost-cutter for the new corporate university.

The university that became the leader in building its endowment in the U.S. was Stanford and the way it did it was in fact by creating a linkage to death, though it is usually not described so openly and directly with those words. The recent history of Stanford is that University Provost and Political Science
Professor Condoleezza Rice solicited funds from military companies and alumni working in war industries. Then, as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under President Bush, her decisions provided those companies with the benefits: tax money for an illegal war in Iraq, money for prisons and new forms of torture, and policies sending Americans to their death to support the interests of oil companies. The U.S. did not prosecute her under international law. Nor did anyone in the state of California seek to use the RICO (the racketeering statute) designed for prosecuting such financial coordination. Nor did the university challenge her return to teach others how to do the same. Though Stanford University is a publicly chartered institution and keeping a professor like Rice on its staff is likely in violation of its charter, there has been no effort to revoke Stanford’s charter (Bugliosi, 2008).

In addition to the direct financial and political influences over the university, the control of research agendas seems to be working through other mechanisms. The corporatization of publishing, including the university presses, has also been part of the use of the “market”, both overtly and covertly, to transform social science into reporting and entertainment. As the major corporate presses began to merge and consolidate the industry and as book sales also became controlled through vertically integrated channels (book store shelf space sold directly to corporate publishers, assuring no space for new entrants), this pressure has fed back directly on academia.

In order to commercially “compete”, university presses have changed their publishing strategy from one of offering new works in small niches that would open the door for progress, to seeking only books that already had a “mass market” appeal. The vetting process on academic books began to include new criteria that were commercial rather than actual quality “peer review”. Presses now ask whether proposed books already have markets of captive students (whether the professor could ensure purchase by extorting students of a large lecture course) or whether there are enough colleagues who would go along with assigning or promoting the book. While, theoretically, the public should be able to influence study of social science through the market (and there are examples of this in studies of sustainability and collapse by authors like the human geographer, Jared Diamond, whom the public, including this author, seems to love but many academics refuse to acknowledge), many of these “market” decisions actually fail to test public interest and value at all. The criteria are generally whether there is a mass market or whether the majority of scholars might use the book as a test, thus shutting out much new work of merit.

The impacts are obvious. More books became group written, as those of multiple authors or textbooks, like those in the Soviet Union were, to ensure a single line and multiple stake in the book. To compete in the “mass market”, more academic books became entertainment. Titles and topics are increasingly sexualized and sensationalized. Without new ideas, the focus on the books became one of presenting “new” facts, to compete against journalistic and area reporting accounts. This has begun to turn books into journalism, entertainment, advocacy and narcissism. Cost cutting measures have also turned books into cookie cutter lengths and formats to assure that they fit a common mold that would “sell” without raising the costs of publication.

The vetting process also appears to work to ensure a prior censorship. Publishers now refuse to ensure authors against the new approach by corporations to censor criticism. In the U.S., the courts are now open to “strike suits” and “SLAPP” suits (strategic lawsuits against prior publication) designed to threaten authors and publishers simply by creating nuisance and costs. The result has been to prevent publishers from critiquing business or government support for an emerging corporate oligarchy.

What happened at the level of book publishing appears to have been pushed down to the level of academic journals, as well. Behind claims of “space limitations”, the length of articles in academic journals has been constantly reduced, with editors always claiming that the fault is with publishers. In applied anthropology, in the two major journals of the field (Practicing Anthropology and Anthropology in Action), the situation has reached such an extreme that articles are in fact no more than sound-bytes of 3,000 words and there is no room for letters to the editor or debates, and little even for book reviews. The standard length in most other journals is now only 8,000 to 10,000 words.

Although some authors in areas of fiction have now used self-publishing and the Internet to promote new works through clever marketing schemes that could occasionally break through the barriers,
academic publishing is limited because academic authors are seeking “legitimacy” for their work and careers through the publishing process, rather than seek a market. This legitimacy has tended to enforce political and ideological controls. Of course, it was possible to try to create an “Authors’ Collective” as a publisher and to open up space on the Internet. (In the 1990s, I tried with some colleagues to start a cooperative academic press.) It would have been easy to undersell the commercial presses. But academics are not entrepreneurial. My experience is that they are afraid to take this risk. The reason may also be the way that career advancement is still controlled.

Most advancement in research universities today is subject to a measurement process that has little or nothing to do with actual contribution to social science or to public value of work. Although there are no standards used today for measuring social science breakthroughs or values to the public, there are measures of prestige that academics establish for themselves. What the social science associations do is arbitrarily establish rankings of certain “prestige” journals. They also establish ranks on the basis of “citations” of work. They call these rankings “impact factors”.

Journals that have “high impact” values are those that are run by corporate publishers, sold at high prices, and unavailable to those without major resources. Internet journals, even at universities, like this one, that are open access and available to practitioners and readers throughout the world, for free, have zero impact. Journals that have space constraints, favor short articles, have academics at the corporate funded private universities and that offer little diversity or application, have high value in these ratings. Journals that are open to new ideas and applications and that have no restrictions, and where you can potentially do actual social science have no value in these ratings.

Many universities internationally now openly use these ranking systems in hiring (particularly the United Kingdom but some other countries that seek scholars and wish to rise in the “rankings”). Most others seem to do so on an informal basis. This is how they exert social control over scholars and the disciplines. In order to remain in the field, academics must publish in certain identified journals and in order to publish in those journals academics must agree to their ideologies, their decisions on methodologies, on variables, and on length. In my field of anthropology, it may be impossible today to publish social science in any of these major journals. The length requirements alone make it impossible to establish and test an hypothesis and offer comparative data. The requirements for citations to the literature also make it impossible to offer anything new since all of the space is taken up simply discussing theory and defending the right to simply offer a new idea, let alone present it.

Almost certainly, this special issue was unable to attract the articles it sought because academics knew that by publishing in Catalyst, they would not get the “credit” needed to advance their careers, let alone jeopardize them by offering a constructive critique and challenges. The same pressures also made it difficult to find reviewers of pieces to sure academic peer review, as I describe below in the next section.

Prospects for Change and the Role this Issue Can Play as a Catalyst

I have hope that public/market pressures and the new technology of electronic open-access publishing like this journal, will ultimately lead to a return to public benefit social science.

Social science has been in a downward spiral for a long time but I believe that economic and social realities will ultimately force it to wake up. For a long time, students have flocked to courses and work that pander to identities and that offer them something easy and fun. They believed that they could simply enter the job market with a degree but without real skills other than a few journalistic skills, without social science and that companies will invest in training programs while selecting them on their ideologies and contacts, alone. As they find themselves entering the labor market without real skills or perspectives that the social sciences could provide, and as current companies are unable to provide them with work, students will continue to abandon the current approaches and demand more.

The rise of fields like environmental studies and geography is already partly a recognition that social sciences today are bankrupt and that other departments must start to fill the gap. Increasingly, not only students but the public in its funding will start to demand results again from social science on problems of
human concern: accountability of public and private institutions to citizens, social equity, safeguarding of rule of law, demilitarization, planning for sustainability, demilitarization, and other issues of human concern. We will need real social science to achieve it, not just ideologies and definitions and slogans.

It is the goal of this special issue to partly serve as that catalyst.

The Difficulty of Trying to Challenge the System and Rebuild: The Process of Putting Together this Special Issue

Putting together this issue required more work than I had imagined or was led to believe when I agreed to take it on. That also led me to a deeper understanding of how academic publishing and review processes operate today to vet ideas on the basis of ideology in a way that undermines science and scholarship.

In an open and free society and one that claims to follow principles of scientific procedures of open scientific debate, there would not only be open forums for substantive critical work and essays, but disciplines would be open to such constructive criticism and change. They would openly inform colleagues of the existence of such discussions and would assist in welcoming such articles as well as fulfilling the needs of the profession for free. Scholars would feel free to critique their professions as a way to improve them as well as to meet professional and public obligations. Scholars would offer time for reviews and would follow guidelines for review procedures.

In practice, none of that seems to hold true. The pecking order of professional associations in the social sciences and of their journals appears to serve to reinforce common beliefs, to promote conflicts of interest with benefits for the public and students, and to prevent any real discussion and debate. Even where a journal like this one, at a recognized public university, offers the forum for such discussion, there are already numerous obstacles.

Below, I discuss four of the areas in which this special issue faced barriers of:

- Outreach: Informing colleagues that this journal even exists and that submissions and other forms of participation were welcome was itself an obstacle.

- Finding Submissions from Authors able to Offer Critiques and Solutions: Finding colleagues willing and able to offer critiques and solutions seems to go completely against the training and incentives of scholars today whose thinking is within “the box” and engaged in ritual advocacy of “argument” rather than modeling and real solutions. There seems to be plenty of “wash” (“green wash”, “rights wash”) that mentions public problems and measures them, but little of the actual critical thinking and constructive solutions that the disciplines all claim is their reason for being.

- Finding Colleagues Willing to Perform the Expected Professional Service of Peer Review for a Journal that Offers No Pay and No Status to Advance their Personal Interests: In a society where valuation is based on status and wealth, scholars themselves seem to be driven only by those incentives rather than by any sense of duty or mission or love for scholarship and the profession. Finding reviewers who can apply standards rather than use peer review as a political tool against colleagues and who are trained to promote ideas rather than just enforce self-interested consensus, seems almost impossible.

- Protecting Academic Freedom: Difficulties of Outreach

Most journals already have a steady stream of articles from a group of colleagues. Special issues often are the result of publishing conference papers and serving a group of colleagues who promote their work together. That was far from the case for this special issue that started from scratch. To seek authors and reviewers, I personally sent a call for outreach to 15 professional associations including those in the U.S. and Europe, across the five social science disciplines and general social science associations, as well as relevant sub-disciplines. Several of these were eager to publicize the call for articles on their listserves. Others agreed to post on web pages to members. There was no way to check whether all of these actually
All of these were new contacts. *Catalyst* did not have any such existing infrastructure for contact and outreach. I had to construct it. I thought it would be easy and that promoting disciplines and creating opportunities for scholars to publish and debate would be welcome. It partly was, but there was also a strong block of opposition that shocked me and that I view as a professional ethical responsibility to report here.

Overall, only two thirds of the associations agreed to publicize this outreach (10 of 15). The fact that there were refusals at all astonished me. What, after all, is the function of disciplinary membership societies if not to promote academic exchange and inform members of professional opportunities including publication? The answer is that for many of these associations of scholars, the mission appears to be something else: to promote the perspectives of a small group of scholars within each association to set the (religious) canon of the association.

I asked the head of the Association for Psychological Sciences if he could explain his “psychology” in refusing outreach to members of the association and I have his permission to use his response here:

> Dear Dr. Lempert,
>  
> [I]t is settled APS policy. The reasons for it appear to me obvious. Every day, I get calls for submissions, offers to edit special issues, etc, from new journals I never heard of. If APS were to accept calls for papers from non-APS journals, they would likely become very numerous and vetting them very tedious.
>  
> Sincerely,
>  
> Randy Gallistel
>

I offered the following rebuttal to the APS Board and received no response, though I requested one and offered to publish it.

> Dear Dr. Gallistel:
>  
> Your critique of open information and of vetting is, in my view, a condemnation of the scientific method itself which relies at its core on debating new ideas that have "never [been] heard of" and "vetting them" according to some standard other than simply being known to a small group. That "very tedious" process is the essence of science and the core of the idea of discipline and objective review. The idea of a policy being set by administrators and being "settled" without the possibility of review is the very definition of a religious belief that cannot change, rather than science, which is always open to being improved. Certainly you could task your administrators to screen legitimate calls for submissions from journals from those that are not (in our case it is easily done since we are based at the University of Tennessee and are open access without any fees of any kind to authors, unlike many long-standing journals backed by commercial publishers).
>  
> Best,
>  
> David
>

**Difficulties of Appropriate Submissions from Authors Willing to Engage in Debate**

Though I am proud and happy of the articles that are presented in this issue, the small number of submissions, the lack of submissions in certain disciplines, and the lack of topicality of some of the submissions that were received also shocked me. I thought that opening the door to a healthy debate that I know members of the public and undergraduates agree with, would result in a large number of pieces. My conclusion from the response that included some not published pieces (that I found narrow and somewhat narcissistic) is that academics today are simply not rewarded for and not trained for any real critical thinking or for actual solutions. The structure of academia today also seems to create a situation where academics do not have the inclination or time to do any deep thinking and where work is reduced to journalistic blog and repetition that gets dashed off.

*Catalyst* received draft articles from only five authors and discussion of article ideas from three other authors. Aside from articles published here from Brooks Duncan and Polly Sly, that were sent in draft and that covered two of the social sciences beyond my piece on Economics, the other draft articles were mostly evidence of what is wrong in social science.
One of the articles was from an undergraduate, attacking social science rather than supporting it. In other words, the piece was exactly the opposite of the purpose of the special issue. Apparently, the author was in a class where the professor was promoting attacks on social science and encouraging authors to join in the attacks.

Another article was from a graduate student, writing in the area of Queer Studies and calling for a new social science that would serve the agenda of gay rights. We discussed the article and the fit with the theme. The author withdrew the piece in recognition that promoting an interest group agenda was not correcting the problem he identified in social science but was just offering a different way of politicizing disciplines.

A third author, also an early career scholar, sent a paper about two political philosophers in the early 20th century. The piece had no linkages to contemporary issues of social science and no ideas for remaking social science. Three other pieces potentially fit the theme but needed work and only one of the three, the piece on Kathleen Levinstein on applied behavioral analysis, is published here, after joint work to produce it in publishable form. It seemed that this was the first time that the authors were able to freely address such themes.

One piece focused on “Critical Medical Anthropology” as an example of “Critical Studies” approaches that have come to paralyze and politicize social sciences. What happened is described below.

A Political Scientist was eager to write about the detachment of his discipline from environmental variables that led to an inability to predict or offer value in areas of sustainability and environment. After months of waiting and nearly a dozen letters, suggestions and offers of help from my end with promises from the author, the piece simply never materialized.

Dr. Levinstein, a practitioner in social work sought to address the entrance of religious and ideological based treatments for genetic conditions like Autism in ways that abandoned science and caused harm. You can read that piece in this issue.

Writing these pieces did not come naturally to the authors. Even with considerable guidance, the author of the piece on Critical Medical Anthropology (CMA) was unable (or unwilling) to focus on how this approach had been able to enter her discipline, what systems or procedures had failed, and how they could be improved. Rather than follow direction, she produced what was, in my view, a “theoretical critique” of “theoretical critique” (CMA). In my view, as an outsider, she was indoctrinated into approaches of abstract theory without science only felt comfortable producing the very thing she was criticizing. It seemed that the “theology” of disciplines had so penetrated them that perhaps academics could not even realize it. Another potential explanation is that the author did realize the contradiction but did not submit a critique for reasons of professional advancement. If academic advancement today is dependent on publishing (nonsensical) theory in specific journals and the ability of young scholars to keep their jobs depends on doing so, there is reason why scholars would not want to publish “essays” in this journal; particularly ones that criticize people in their field who could influence their ability to earn their livelihoods. In fact, I sought the author’s help in finding graduate students who could take her idea and turn it into a piece that would fit this journal, with whatever credit she would have liked for offering the idea. She declined. I then began a search for graduate students, again through outreach to professional associations, who would be guaranteed publication of an article in this journal that was being “commissioned” to provide material on this topic, with the suggested title, “Social Scientists as Modern Witch Doctors: Fighting ‘Evil Spirits’ of ‘Structural Violence’ and ‘Capitalism’ in Medical Anthropology instead of the Causes of Disease”. In looking for graduate students, the only two potential takers were two students who actually wanted to write on the opposite position, in which they had been trained; attacking social science.

There were no suggestions of any other pieces such as book reviews or essays.
Finding academics who would agree to provide “response articles” to my piece on “Is Economics in Violation of International Law?” also proved to be nearly impossible. This was despite the promise to authors of a light peer review that would mostly be a copy edit, with guaranteed publication and protection of whatever approach the authors wished to take. Two pieces that were offered, by Ugo Mattei and Peter Söderbaum appear in this issue but the process of finding authors took months and left a track of numerous broken promises from scholars.

Overall, I approached more than 20 scholars and practitioners to contribute to this issue, believing that they would welcome the invitation and would all have a professional interest in the topic and conclusions of my article. Of these, six never even responded\textsuperscript{iii}. Two scholars offered what I understood were clear promises to write pieces but then never produced them after months of correspondence\textsuperscript{x}. Two other scholars seemed by their responses to be interested in producing pieces but then simply “disappeared” and did not continue correspondence\textsuperscript{ix}. I received polite refusals from several\textsuperscript{xi}. I also approached a number of faculty members within the University of Tennessee, itself, where this journal is based, but found no one with both expertise and interest in the topic.

Difficulties in Peer Review Processes

Every article in this issue, including this Introduction, has undergone two academic peer reviews in fulfillment of Catalyst’s policies of constructive peer review, and every article has been reworked by its authors following receipt of review comments but finding reviewers for a publication that most never heard of proved to be almost impossible. Catalyst has no current list of reviewers who were able or committed to review the material in this special issue, which meant searching and outreach again through professional associations.

Review processes don’t work easily. Few scholars today feel committed to do them. And when they do, they often seek to push self-interest, rather than to actually review the work. Several academics approached for reviews reported the conflict of interest that they faced in reviewing articles for this issue in a simple omission: “funding for my profession would be endangered”. Few scholars jumped at the chance out of expression of concern was for society and for the advancement of knowledge and that their interest was in doing things better and considering criticisms as the basis for improvement, though a very small number, whom I was thankful to find, did.

As Robert Keohane, a renowned emeritus Political Scientist wrote, candidly, “The scholars I know publish well-known journals and would not see the refereeing task … as priorities for them”\textsuperscript{xii}. Typically, academics responded to my request by noting that there were “working on a book” (what academic isn’t?), and many of these were retirees who were free of teaching responsibilities or, for those better known, “on a book tour”. There is no professional “pro bono” obligation for academics beyond the line that it offers academics on their c.v.

Protecting the Academic Freedom of the Issue against Outside Interference

In establishing the groundwork for this special issue, I took great pains to protect authors and academic freedom, well beyond the usual claimed protections (that I believe do not work today). I went so far as to establish a contract with the editor of Catalyst to ensure that I would be able to protect opinions as I saw fit. The stipulation was that anything the (outgoing) editor of Catalyst disagreed with or others disagreed with, they would have the opportunity to debate in the following issue to this one. The only protection that I sought for this was “discussion” with me and the authors of articles criticized in order to assure fairness (with an implied opportunity to respond) and no personal or libelous attacks.

Unlike almost all professional journals, Catalyst was also particularly well suited for protecting free speech since its host (up to and including this issue) was the University of Tennessee’s “Research and Creative Exchange” unit (TRACE). Rather than being a for-profit commercial publisher or an academic publisher subject to financial concerns and pressures, Catalyst was operating essentially as a library archive, but an electronic one. As an archive, it offered the same kind of free speech as a book-shelf.
Authors are simply placing their books on the shelf. Catalyst acts just to highlight particular works on the shelf by organizing them by themes and offering some kind of “review” to suggest a higher quality. This approach is relatively free of any direct pressures.

The contract that I prepared for this special issue sought to assure these protections would remain for the production of the issue and through any transitions of Catalyst in the future.

The review process that I established for articles was to put them on different tracks with different review obligations. Prior to my doing so, Catalyst had no specific review standards. The editor agreed that my piece on Economics would not undergo a “blind” peer review since it would serve as the basis of the issue’s “forum”. Instead, the editor would offer suggestions for improving it and reviewers, whom I would select, would offer suggestions for improvement while also having the option to present publishable “Commentaries”.

For any pieces that were “scientific”, I would seek an expert review process to assure the accurate use of methodologies and factual accuracy of the piece, including knowledge of the field. There are no such pieces in this issue.

For all other pieces that are “essays”, the process was to fully protect the opinions of the author. Some pieces, like this introduction, would not need to merit review. Others, that are considered thematic essays that offer critiques and proposals, would only be subject to reviews of statements for factual accuracy and accuracy of any use of methodologies. All of the conclusions and proposals would be the free speech of the authors. The only role that I took was that of a copy editor. I made sure that all articles addressed the theme, that they had a context to make them intelligible to readers of several disciplines, and that they offered logical arguments. I offered some troubleshooting and recommendations for improving the presentations and arguments.

Despite this process and the protections, there were still attempts to stop this issue that I mention here only to note this as a factual matter. The result of that was to eliminate a category of essays that I had originally hoped would appear in this issue as simple opinion pieces, written in plain English, without extensive footnotes. As editor, I would have been happy with three of the articles that now appear in this issue, in their original forms in styles that were less academic and shorter. The articles by Kelly Levinstein, by Brooks Duncan (on “The Quiet Purge of Jews in Social Science”) and by Polly Sly, are now longer, heavily footnoted academic essays. In my view, critical essays in academia are subject to a double standard that requires much heavier footnoting than pieces that represent a “common wisdom” and protect existing practices and ideologies. Ultimately, these three articles are now much “stronger” than their original form. The authors and I are happy with the current form that bolsters and solidly grounds their views. On the other hand, it came at the expense of additional uncompensated time and effort.

Of course, all respectful debates and disagreements are welcomed in future issues, with the hope that I and other authors in this issue will also be welcome to respond.

Protecting free speech is costly and rule of law in the United States today is, apparently, not very strong.
Part III:
Introducing the Contents of this Special Issue

The normal role of an introduction is to ground the format of the issue in an overall context and to introduce the history and content of the issue in a way that shows the links between the pieces on a common theme. In doing so here, I offer a slightly annotated version of the Table of Contents that shows where this issue fits in the enterprise of critiquing and rebuilding the social sciences as a whole and individually (the core social sciences) followed by some highlighting of the importance and history of particular articles that I am proud to publish as part of this special issue.

What This Special Issue Does to Advance the Agenda of “Rebuilding Social Science”:

The Table of Contents of this Issue is produced here, for reference, in the body of this article, as a prelude to discussion of the content.

This issue is organized into three different sections.

- The goal of the first section, The General Problems of Social Science Today, is to present some systemic problems in social sciences and the universities today in a general way. The first parts of this introduction partly create that context as do two pieces by Brooks Duncan; one that is a bit of a satirical look on changes in the social sciences and the second that focuses on the transformation of social sciences into repositories for “representation” quota filling in the universities in place of the problem-solving mission of social science. Kathleen Levinstein’s essay offers a case study of the corruption of social science for specific profit ends. In this way, the section highlights some of the influences from outside social science disciplines that have distorted their missions.

- The second section, Failures of the Core Social Sciences, moves to specific critiques of the content and teachings of the main social sciences at different levels: Sociology (at the societal level), Anthropology (at the cultural level), and the three “functional” categories within cultures and societies of Economics, Political Science, and Sociology (at the level of socialization), and then Psychology (individual level). Note that for this issue, there are only critiques of two of the disciplines: Economics (my piece, that also touches on the field of Economic Anthropology, with two response articles) and Political Science, by Polly Sly. The articles here offer critiques as well as alternatives to describe the appropriate questions (content) and methods (scientific method and then specific methodologies) and applications, as well as the appropriate relations of these disciplines to humanities.

- A third section, Structural Solutions to the Rebuilding of Social Sciences, focuses on the kinds of procedural and institutional mechanisms that are needed to rebuild disciplines to hold them to their missions as disciplines. This section offers one of my pieces on safeguarding objectivity in academic review processes. In this section, I also call for the promotion of missing academic debate through the revival of forums like “Letters to the Editor” and offer a sample such letter that currently disappears from debate.
# Foreword

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Introduction to Articles in This issue and History of Each Article:

I take a special pride in this issue for the courage of its authors, for the careful and insightful critiques and for focusing on mechanisms and solutions. In my view, these characteristics are all too rare in academic work today. Were it not for this journal, many of the perspectives presented here on modern societies including the U.S., would simply disappear altogether.

Below are some ideas that I wish to highlight about the different articles that appear in this issue, in their order of appearance.

THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF SOCIAL SCIENCES TODAY

Short Statements of the Problem in the Social Sciences:
1. Professor Rip Van Winklestein Applies for a Teaching Job
   … to Find His Discipline has Disappeared
   Brooks Duncan

Maybe not everyone remembers, or young people no longer read Washington Irving’s story of “Rip Van Winkle” that is part of the early Dutch-American folk lore of “New Amsterdam” (New York) and the Hudson River. Duncan has taken this charming tale and transformed it into modern day, with the difference being that Duncan did not simply take too much to drink and head off to snooze for two decades. In Duncan’s view, it is the opposite. The academics he satirizes apparently went into a snooze, or a long, generational denial for two decades, while Duncan was forced to abandon his professional love and calling and to go into a kind of professional and international exile. He apparently made good use of his twenty years and did not give up.

What Duncan is revealing is not really the bankruptcy of contemporary disciplines, but how they both champion their anti-intellectualism and use it as a means of exploiting the very groups they claim to serve by training generations of students who are sensitive to problems of discrimination and inequality, but who learn little in the way of substantive skills to do anything about them in the courses on these topics. Students and communities are paying for expensive book-learning and are receiving degrees leaving them in debt and unable to make much headway on social problems at all.

In the past, when social science began to focus on solutions to social problems on both a global and local scale, social science disciplines partly demonstrated value to the public as a basis for funding. Social scientists were involved in community affairs and the university was beginning to integrate itself with community needs. Today, with social sciences serving as “representation” and diversion from focusing on social needs and directly addressing them, the funding is in a downward spiral with the only community return being the free labor of students as “interns” and “clinical practitioners” to replace services that are no longer funded at professional levels (legal services, education, and social welfare rather than prisons). Moreover, forces seem to act to ensure that disciplines remain cut off from reality and from the direct constituents of funding: community and students seeking specific skills. Instead, the university is increasingly linked to corporations, government and wealthy private donors who have little interest in either social change or community needs and do not wish for the universities to challenge their structures of authority. Faculty, like Duncan, who try to break this link and re-establish accountability to communities are apparently censured and purged from the ranks.

To keep themselves afloat in this pernicious distortion of funding and incentives, social science disciplines have often turned into pyramid schemes. To justify salaries, they need to attract paying students and graduate students. But since they cannot attract students by demonstrating real benefits in the community or real skills, they need to attract students on another basis. To do that, Duncan suggests that they are pandering to interest groups with courses on identity politics that are forms of narcissism without skills and practical application, and they transform their courses into entertainment in ways that offer public relations and savings to university managers without any quality. In Duncan’s view, they
offer vague promises of future benefits and employment without any real measures and with no accountability. This is a downward spiral as the quality of teaching and research continues to fall to new lows and, in fact, to absurdity that Duncan satirizes.

Dr. Duncan’s bittersweet satire on what has happened had, he reports, no place in any existing academic journals or in political essay publications that have mostly disappeared. I am happy to offer a platform for that voice here in this issue.

2. The Quiet Purge of Jews in Social Science

Brooks Duncan

Duncan’s piece on “The Quiet Purge of Jews” is highly controversial both, he reports, in the Jewish community and among academics. If Duncan is correct, the quota filling goals of universities in some of the social sciences have replaced Jews, this one minority that had a history of working for humanitarian concerns in the social sciences and that fought prejudices with structural solutions to benefit all groups, with academics today who are chosen on the basis of “representation” and simply promote discussions of their own groups at the expense of the disciplines and their ability to have real impact on social issues. These implications of this article are fascinating and terrifying at the same time.

Duncan omits in his article any discussion of a key legal case on discrimination that was raised to the U.S. Supreme Court nearly fifty years ago, that is known by most rights lawyers in the U.S. It is almost as if Duncan is proving predictions made by that case. The case was brought in 1971 to challenge affirmative action policies of admissions at the law school of the University of Washington, in Seattle. Law school applicant Marco De Funis, who was Jewish, sued the University for discrimination and his lawyers warned that the U.S. was entering a new era of discrimination that would work directly against Jews. The case was DeFunis v. Odegaard, that reached the Supreme Court in 1974, around the era of a similar case of Bakke v. University of California. The Supreme Court did not decide it, avoiding the issue on the pretext that DeFunis had used the three years that the courts let go by, to get into another law school. What is important about the DeFunis case is that DeFunis, despite the sound of his name was not a “white” man challenging a “minority” hire. DeFunis was Jewish, but affirmative action meant that Jews were to face a new kind of discrimination that would classify them as “white” or “overrepresented” in much the same way that Eastern Europeans had purged Jews in the 20th century to reduce them in professions like law down to 1 or 2% to reflect their percentage in the population. De Funis’ lawyers said it would only be a matter of time before affirmative action would be used to eliminate Jews from certain professions that they excelled in, on the grounds of “correcting” discrimination. DeFunis is now dead and his case is forgotten. This issue is now swept under the rug. Duncan lifts up that rug.

Duncan’s article is important because it gets beyond knee-jerk “political correctness” in regards to affirmative action and examines the actual social goals of “representation” to try to promote those goals effectively, in solidarity with them, rather than attack. The claim for affirmative action was that the entrance of minorities (and women) into certain professions would not only create greater opportunity overall in society, but that it would also bring new perspectives that would revitalize the professions at all levels. For example, “Eco-feminism” offered a challenge to the patriarchy and the ushering in of a society that would be more peaceful, more equitable, and more in tune with nature. The idea of multiculturalism was that it would foster social science that focused on solutions to public problems, greater accountability, transparency, and experimentation. But what if the opposite occurred? What if the newly entered minorities and women, instead, just copied the abuses of authority that they had criticized and merely became “tokens” or figureheads who were co-opted by that system and were in line with all of its negative features and were simply a new part of authority protecting their own power? What if the goal of allowing greater diversity in those disciplines and professions that could actually change society and change the structures of power was actually to co-opt or neutralize it? What if the process of “inclusion” was also a process of destruction and oppression in which minorities were now part of these goals? These are the questions that Duncan has dared to ask.
Duncan is suggesting that the introduction of “diversity” in hiring in the social sciences has been used to hide and insulate or at least has worked hand-in-hand with an agenda for destroying the social sciences. In overseeing the review process for Duncan’s articles, I was frightened to see Duncan’s attempts to critique changes in social science in an attempt to make them more socially responsible, repelled in ways that attacked Duncan as being racist and sexist and wanting to “return to the past” (!). Duncan’s argument is clearly not that the introduction of women and minorities has dumbed down the university because women and minorities are somehow inferior. It is that in using some of the social sciences as places to achieve diversity AND as places to promote ideologies to protect power, selection processes have worked to eliminate social scientists of all backgrounds, including those males and non-minorities in political science, economics and psychology, and women and minorities in all fields. Duncan’s argument is that the result has been to assure a politicization and a dumbing down in all of these fields (or at least a neutralization at any attempts to improve these fields and to allow them to teach real skills in empowering ways that could lead to real social improvement and social change).

It is important to remember the history of discrimination and purges in social sciences, particularly during the McCarthy era in the U.S., that forced Jews in many disciplines to take ideological positions to fit those of the establishment (Price, 2003; Duncan, 1995) and it is also important to allow for full examination of how processes work today. This is what Duncan tries to do. I am happy to protect the right to do that in this issue.

**Short Essay on Problems in Social Sciences:**

3. *Psychology*: Distorting Psychology and Science at the Expense of Joy
   Human Rights Violations against Human Beings with Autism by Applied Behavioral Analysis
   *Kathleen Levinstein*

Dr. Levinstein’s piece is an important look at how science and social science too easily go awry as the result of economic self-interest and her case study of Applied Behavioral Analysis considers the economic incentives that lead psychology and its applications to go wrong while also detailing the failures of appropriate public oversight. While there are cries today from academia for self-regulation and for increased distance from political oversight, largely due to mistrust in political institutions and political processes without real attempts at seeking to challenge and fix them, the insulation of disciplines from scrutiny, which academics instinctively demand, is not the solution when academics themselves have conflicts of interest. The question is what kind of oversight will best protect the public and how we can achieve it.

Levinstein’s article is courageous because she is both practitioner and potentially a direct beneficiary of science and its applications as the parent of an autistic son and as an autistic. She tells a chilling story of science and application gone wrong in ways that stigmatize, victimize and do harm to individuals and society under the pretext of intellectual advance and “help”.

**FAILURES OF THE CORE SOCIAL SCIENCES**

**Major Articles on the Core Social Sciences:**

In a time in which there do not seem to be any public or internal standards of measure for social science discipline that subjects these activities to measures of progress in answering important human questions for meeting human needs, this section provides two articles that apply such standards. Disciplines today do have review procedures but they are, again, those “peer review” procedures that are too easily political standards of adherence to an internal dogma defining “current debates” and/or use of a specific methodology or to financial controls.
4. Economics: Is Economics in Violation of International Law
   Remaking Economics as a Social Science
   a) Introduction: The Inspiration and Need for this Piece
   b) Part I: Is Economics in Violation of International Law?
   c) Part II: Is there a Current Social Science of Economics in Economics or Elsewhere?
   e) Part IV: The Challenge of Institutional and Cultural Change in Academia.
   
   David Lempert

5. Response: An Ecological Economist’s View: Peter Söderbaum
6. Response: An International Legal Scholar’s View: Ugo Mattei

My long piece is one in which I started, as a lawyer, with the standards of international law for protecting cultures (a human rights measure), for protecting sustainability and the planet/environment, and for human rights and aspirations as expressed in international law. There are plenty of critiques of social sciences (and of science) as representing the interests of colonial powers and ideologies, but we do have measures and tools for assuring that accountability rather than throwing out social science. That measure is international law. I decided to apply it to Economics and then to use international law to offer guide for how to restructure a discipline where it went afoul of international law in a way that would still protect science. In addition to holding Economics to the test, I also decided to hold the sub-discipline in my field, Economic Anthropology, that claims to be the antithesis of (neo-classical) Economics to the test, as well, to see if it actually offered the solution. That made for a long but interesting piece and also provoked an interesting discussion among international legal scholar Ugo Mattei and environmental economist Peter Söderbaum.

The problems inherent in Economics are different from those of other social science disciplines that have become humanities, such as contemporary anthropology as “Anthroposophistry”. Economics claims to be a science, uses mathematics, and teaches skills. The question is whether it is actually a “social science” or just theoretical mathematics and techniques, as well as whether the mathematics and techniques are objective and humanitarian or not. My piece deepens previous critiques using the analysis of law and of requirements of “science”, revealing neo-classical Economics as a pseudo-science of “hard” techniques and soft thinking; using sophisticated technical tools that have replaced the important questions of the discipline as well as its public and legal purpose.

This article presents a detailed analysis of an entire discipline as opposed to what is the typical bounded approach today of either a micro-analysis or an “argument”. Today, that makes it impossible to publish anywhere other than in an e-journal like this that does not have length requirements. The piece is essentially the size of 10 standard articles today but well short of the length of a book (that would be twice that size). That means that today it does not “fit”.

The one economics journal that critiques the profession, the Real World Economic Review, wanted to publish this piece and said it would go “viral” but they required as a condition of publication that it be only a sound-byte summary, 10% of the whole, with no place to post the rest. After I explained how lawyers need to back up claims for credibility, as do scholars, and that I did not just seek to grandstand and invite attacks, I never heard from the editor, Edward Fullbrook, or the assistant editor again.

This is representative of the publications problem in social science. If you have the equivalent of a long mathematical proof or a model, you cannot “summarize” it and that means you cannot publish it. Law reviews accept long pieces but generally only of discourses where the footnotes can be longer than the text, with the standard length of 30,000 words but not more.
7. *Political Science*: The Nonsense and Non-Science of Political Science………
   A Politically Incorrect View of ‘Poly-T(r)icks’
   Polly Sly

Rather than use a legal or public standard, Sly’s piece is straightforward in examining Political Science today. Sly simply holds Political Science to its own standards as a discipline claiming to be a “science” and addressing questions of political systems following the requirements of objectivity and the scientific method. Sly looks at the structure of the discipline and existing work to paint a picture of a discipline manipulated by financial interests and existing political power, distorted by ideology and filled with internal contradictions. Sly offers a vision for the discipline and some solutions for reorienting it to assure a humanitarian and scientific purpose.

**STRUCTURAL SOLUTIONS FOR REBUILDING SOCIAL SCIENCES**

*Tools: Return to Objective Standards in place of Political Ones*

In addition to reorienting social science disciplines on the basis of public purpose/ law and scientific questions and methods, part of the challenge of rebuilding social science is to create the institutional and procedural mechanisms that assure accountability, healthy internal debate, and that oppose financial and political manipulation. Doing this is tricky and it is an area that academics fear for good reason. “Public purpose” and scrutiny have too often been used historically to impose agendas on scholarship that serve elite interests under the cover of promoting public or “majority” goals. Processes and standards can offer protections but they can also be used, as they have often been used, to purge specific approaches.

The goal of this section of the issue is to open the debate on how to establish standards that are fully protective of diversity and humanitarian objectives while also assuring adherence to disciplinary objectives and standards.

8. Returning Discipline to the Discipline
   A Model Procedure for Reviews in Anthropology, Social Sciences, and other Related Disciplines
   David Lempert

I present this piece here for discussion on how to assure the depoliticization of professional review processes, with some very clear guidelines that combine concepts from law (and human rights protection) with concepts of social scientific method and interdisciplinary consensus on answering questions and offering results. The piece I am presenting here is one of three that I have written in this area. What I have found is that there does not seem to be any place in social science where this discussion can be held, since no publications exist to openly present and debate procedural codes and issues in specific disciplines.

The piece that I am presenting here is an excellent one for discussion. It was peer reviewed and readied for publication in the one anthropology e-journal that had the ability to print such a piece; *Anthropology Matters*. Yet, despite fully undergoing a blind peer review at that journal and also undergoing final copy edits as a last step to publication, editors intervened with no explanation to pull the piece from publication. After multiple letters to the editors to find out what the basis was for the decision and what changes they would require, I still have no idea what the basis was. I can only conclude that there was no disciplinary or professional basis at all. The editors are, of course, welcome to participate in that debate openly in future issues of this journal, with my responses, assuming the openness of future editors of issues of *Catalyst* to this debate.
This final piece is a short example of something that is now missing from much of social science today; open, collegial debate. Social science proceeds on the basis of debate. Without debate, disciplines are left with dogma. There are rules of debate, including reference to and grounding in the questions and definitions of a discipline and scientific methods of determining truth. What is also needed for such debate is that it have forum.

Today, there is some debate among colleagues on electronic websites and even on Facebook, but it is becoming unfocused, with quick reactions. In my view, we need to safeguard the space of “Letters to the Editor” to assure for responses and discussions that do not simply promote groups of colleagues (or attack) but that have a disciplinary basis.

Here is an example of such a short letter that I sent to the editor of a journal after reading a book review of a book that in my view had no link at all to social science or to the terms or boundaries of the field. This piece was reviewed by the editor and welcomed for publication. Shortly, thereafter, however, the editor announced that the publication would no longer have “Letters to the Editor” or interactive discussions. In hope of restoring this disappearing institution and procedure while also assuring the existence of a “Letter to the Editor” page in Catalyst, I create that space here.
Part IV:  
A Vision for Revitalizing Social Science  
and Inviting Continued Debates and Solutions:  
Challenging Readers to Promote the Process of Change

No issue of Catalyst could be complete without some challenge to colleagues to the processes for catalyzing change. This section offers a short general “vision” for a revitalized social science, describing the kinds of actions that this issue of Catalyst seeks to catalyze, in revitalizing social science disciplines.

It is one thing to offer articles that critique social science and point to the root causes of the problems as well as to offer specific measurement tools and alternatives. But using these tools and advocating for this kind of vision requires more than blueprints and law. It requires cultural change. How do we do that?

Universities today are filled with people trained not to believe in social science, not to do it and to suppress any attempts to do it. Journals are locked against discussion. The few places on the periphery where these ideas can be presented are never read (and probably very little of what is produced in the major journals is read either). Funding for critique does not exist and only a few authors with missionary zeal who can make great sacrifices can do anything.

I have started to do it with the idea of a legal challenge to Economics, review processes, and introducing laboratory courses (Lempert, 1996). It does not seem to be enough.

In my view there is an opportunity today to do so if colleagues would realize it. Funding in universities today and for research has become a vicious cycle in a competitive downward spiral. I believe that it can be reversed. Doing so requires focusing on positive community benefits for students and community and reaching out to students and community rather than to just politicized funding. The current social science disciplines are unable to make their case for benefit because the lack of science and application undermine the potential for benefit while real science and application lead to real and measurable results.

Where are such changes occurring or could they occur and how can it be accelerated?

A Short Vision for Revitalized Social Sciences

There is a special niche for revitalized social sciences as objective “sciences” discovering “natural laws of human activities” with direct policy applications for specific social benefits in line with global humanitarian goals, particularly in communities that are recognizing that they need to focus on their community needs and on practical tools if they are to survive. A place this transformation could start is in small universities that value scientific principles and seek to serve community needs.

A social science department in a technical university, for example, offers an opportunity for scientific based approaches with applications in a way that differs from the current adaptations of social sciences in non-STEM universities. State universities that are responsive to local needs and recognize the need today for change also offer opportunities for a restart of social sciences.

The components of this idealized vision with a way to promote and sell it, are presented below.

Mission of the Disciplines: Social Science as a Science with Linked Technologies, in Parallel to Natural Sciences

Like the natural sciences, the role of the social sciences is to uncover “objective” natural laws of human behavior using the scientific method. Ideally, in promoting this vision, the purpose of these disciplines is to use data, experiments, and thought experiments to predict human phenomenon in the areas of human behavior, discovering the relations between measurable variables and phenomenon that are not culturally specific but that work across cultures and times. It is not to “explain” (to just offer stories) or to just document or to name and label phenomena but to measure and predict.
A vision for the social sciences as social sciences starts with affirmation of this mission and the idea of discipline in the disciplines: a commitment to discovering laws in ways that are neutral to the observer and that can be repeated in multiple places and times rather than for single events. Each discipline has a series of questions that it seeks to answer in a division of labor, with cross-disciplinary work and theoretical and philosophical questions to follow later but not to replace the concept of discipline in defining an area and set of questions with specific boundaries.

Relation of Social Sciences to Humanities

A vision of social science requires an humanities that is linked to social science in a constructive way that understands science. In coordination with the advance of social science disciplines, humanities, ideally, play an important complementary role. If the goal of academic work is to advance human knowledge for the betterment of humanity, the role of “humanities” in relation to both the natural and social sciences is to provide the imagined thought experiments and provocative questions that can advance the science and imagine new technology, while also raising questions about its ethical implications and the need for public oversight and controls as well as assuring that specific human needs are not overlooked. The role of the humanities is also to raise questions about causality and about what is possible and not possible in predictions about how the universe works. Humanities offer this in the form of fiction and philosophy. Social sciences need to maintain links with these approaches and those disciplines need to also recognize a role in helping to advance the social sciences and to make them responsive and accountable, but not to replace or undermine them.

Institutional Organization of the Social Sciences and Required Breadth in the University

Ideally, in fulfilling the mission of academic research and teaching, university departments will be increasingly held and should be held to offer clear statements of the focus of their departments in the context of the advance of human knowledge. Social science departments in general and specifically, ideally must offer statements of the large intellectual questions that they are pursuing, their fit within the overall search for human knowledge, the relation to question they do not ask and the gaps they leave, in order to demonstrate where they fit with the overall goals and progress of social science. Doing so can increasingly be the path towards support from students and community, including local funding.

In their search for funding, departments will also have an advantage in student and community support if they establish such measures and statements for the specific courses taught and research projects pursued under their aegis. They will be rewarded for clear statements of measures of disciplinary success. Each course should also offer statements on its objectives in teaching skills, problem solving and advance of discipline, and applications, rather than just covering subject areas and theories, and should explain where it fits in specific relation to other offerings and research.

Mission of Teaching of the Disciplines: Steps for Project Based Higher Education: The Teaching of Social Sciences

Today, most of the entrance and exposure to social sciences is through ad hoc appeals to self-interest (identity) or commercial interests (specific careers but not to the ability to solve particular kinds of problems for particular groups at particular levels). Today, the social sciences compete against each other for students, funds and attention, leading to a diversion from their actual mission and potential benefits and an inability to actually train future social scientists or to promote to the public the value of social science in the way that natural sciences sometimes effectively present their work. More practical and accountable introduction to the fields is also a way to promote funding.

Ideally, students entering study of social science should have an introduction to the organization of the social sciences, the division of research questions, and the existing methodologies in order to understand the overall goals of these disciplines, their context and the progress that has been made to date.
in these fields. (It may be that this is currently not being done anywhere and that materials do not even exist for this.)

Ideally, every social scientist should have some basic introduction to each of the six basic social sciences (anthropology, sociology (at its two levels), economics, political science, and psychology) in the same way that scientists have a basis in chemistry, physics and biology, as a basis for cross-disciplinary work, boundaries, and for exposure to a larger set of methodological and analytical approaches. There should also be some exposure to all of the disciplines that seek to fit into social sciences today so that students and the public can understand where they fit (and whether they do).

Training offered in social sciences should have two objectives for providing benefits to students and communities, in parallel to that of the natural sciences.

- Training should provide the methodologies for solving specific problems using understandings of natural laws that have been uncovered, in the form of problem sets.
- Training should also provide the methodologies for laboratory work (in the social sciences, field research and quantitative methods) for problem solving.

The sequence of teaching should be in these building blocks for problem solving along with skills courses. As in the natural sciences, the place for teaching theory is at the high levels where more complex problems call for new models and new methods of data collection and where there are challenges to existing knowledge.

While project oriented (applied) teaching of science and technology is generally taught at the higher levels, the ideal approach to teaching science is not through just textbook problem sets and cookbook laboratory exercises but through integration of these with creative applications where students use problem solving methods and research methods on a variety of local problems. This is the appropriate model for social science as well.

In my book, *Escape from the Ivory Tower: Student Adventures in Democratic Experiential Education* (Jossey Bass, 1996) and in its sequel, *Escape from Professional Schools* (not yet published), I present a set of course curricula at several levels in the social sciences where students learn modeling, research skills, and applications at all levels, in the community and in the university. These courses offer the step-by-step approaches to learning the skills and applications of the social sciences. This is only a first step to restarting social science by promoting doing it. As we return to social science, curricula will then have the basis for problem set courses applying models for results, and for applications.

**Protections: Constituents, Ethics, and Funding Firewalls**

For social science to advance as a social science, its mission and connection to international law, humanitarian values, and advance of the disciplines must not only be clear and transparent, but there must be real accountability and enforcement. This is also in line with public benefit and support, as well as a key to overcoming the political antagonism today among those scholars who could do social science but who fear the abuse of the results.

One of the dangers of social science that is visible today is that research and university funding may not serve the ethical, legal, public and professional interests for advancing disciplines but may distort agendas in order to serve specific economic interests (businesses), political or military interests (government agency funding), or ideological interests (foundations and donors).

Statements of universities and departments cannot be based only on goals of “growth” of funding or sources of funding or prestige. They must be rooted in actual measures of disciplinary advance and measurable public benefit with mechanisms of direct public accountability and legal accountability.

Ideally, departments must have mission statements that start with the research questions they seek to answer and the public benefits and establish processes to assure that they are community and public centered and driven and not opportunistically driven by funding opportunities and specific political pressures. Funding strategies need to follow overall professional strategies and not distort or reorient them. There need to be mechanisms for rejecting funding that does not meet strategic objectives.
The distortion of social science has been partly a direct response to politicized elite funding (in the U.S. it is the “war on terrorism”, the growth of the prison sector and “criminology”, the control of foreign peoples, the manufacturing of political consent, and promoting productivity rather than sustainability, social progress and quality) and partly a reaction against the uses of science and technology (a growth in anti-science attitudes within some social sciences and anti-technology that have led to an overall rejection of social science itself given its recent historic abuses). The way to reform is to break this pernicious source of funding and oversight and to link work directly to the public stakeholders; students and communities.

The teaching mission also includes a mission of civic training for students as active citizens. In my book, *Escape from the Ivory Tower*, I describe a vision of “democratic experiential education” in the social sciences that assures that social sciences are also empowering and protective of individuals and society.

**Beyond this Issue: Invitations to Readers**

While *Catalyst* now reverts back to a new editor, it is my hope in offering this special issue that the debate on social sciences will continue in future issues in ways that catalyze the social science disciplines and apply them in ways that achieve real social justice.

Constructive letters to the editor are welcome and it is my hope that the pages of *Catalyst* will be open to them and to responses.

I hope that the space of *Catalyst* will be open for other special issues editors on these and similar topics and that future issues will also be open to articles on these themes without having to “fit” theme issues.

For readers interested in this special issue, I note that I have already written pieces on similar topics, for which there are no journals where such debate can be held. Perhaps they will appear in future issues of *Catalyst*:

- “What’s Missing in Anthropology and Applied Anthropology?: A Practitioner’s Vision for Applied Anthropology Programs”
- “Where’s the Discipline in the Discipline?: Ethics Principles for Book Reviews and General Standards of Review in Anthropology, Other Social Sciences and Related Disciplines”
- “On Renaming Social and Cultural Anthropology”

Colleagues may also write to me directly with constructive critiques, proposals and invitations.
Selective References


Sokal, Alan. 1996. 'Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity', Social Text (Spring/Summer) 46/47, 217-252.


In this issue, I offer a critique of and proposal for rebuilding “Economics” as a social science, but I don’t call for eliminating the definition of “Economics” or breaking up the field. I call for more empiricism for predictive modeling, to eliminate the assumptions and abstractions of the discipline, today. I also bring in more predictive questions with applications, beyond the current focus on “productivity” and towards issues of consumption and sustainability. A reader of my piece, Peter Söderbaum, also echoes the call for more pluralism in Economics in this issue. What we do not do is call for the replacement of the field with philosophy or political advocacy or area studies.


U.S. President Donald Trump established the Trump University to teach real estate skills and faced civil lawsuits from students who claim they were defrauded. Former President Bill Clinton earned millions of dollars for unclear activities at the international for profit chain, Laureate University.

Those not agreeing were: the American Association of Behavioral and Social Sciences (AABSS), the European Economic Association, the American Psychological Association, and the Association for Psychological Sciences, and the International Political Science Association. These included three of the five social sciences and one general social science.

E-mail communication to author, February 8, 2016, with copies to the APS Board, Nancy Eisenberg, Susan Goldin-Meadow, and Sarah Brookheart.

These include Edward Fullbrook, who originally wanted to publish a very short version of my piece in his own journal, the *Real World Economic Review* (“Post-Autistic Economics”) but then went silent, Ralph Nader, Mark Weisbrot, Law Professor Jonathan Turley.

Economist James Galbraith and Historian Ellen Schrecker.

Harvard Economics Professor Steve Marglin, Economist / Lawyer Bill Black, and Economist Herman Daly.

Among these were Noam Chomsky, Law Professor Marjorie Cohen, Economist Kshama Sawant, Social historians Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz and Angela Davis, Law Professor Robert F. Kennedy Jr., Lawyer and Sociologist William Domhoff, and Sociologist Frances Fox Piven. Former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark’s office would not communicate directly with him. My former professor Charles Lindblom was happy to reconnect (and I followed with birthday greetings for his 100th) but his eyesight prevents him now from scholarly work.

E-mail to author, May 26, 2017.
PROFESSOR RIP VAN WINKLESTEIN
APPLIES FOR A TEACHING JOB …
AND FINDS HIS DISCIPLINES (AND MUCH OF SOCIAL SCIENCE)
HAVE DISAPPEARED

Essay
BROOKS DUNCAN, PH.D.
Independent Scholar

What if you woke up one day and found that your entire discipline, to which you had sacrificed years of your life, had suddenly disappeared ... not because it had become obsolete but because it had been replaced by advocacy and indoctrination, and that nobody seemed to notice or care, as if it had happened by design? It happened to me....

I earned my Ph.D. some 20+ years ago in a field of social science that I thought had prepared me for life; one of the bedrocks of university disciplines. Though my field had largely been founded by people like me – male humanitarians – that was the worst category to be in at the time I earned my Ph.D. because it was the group not fitting the mandate for “diversity” in hiring. If I wanted work in my field, I would either have to take some jobs overseas (which I partly did, on prestigious fellowship) or work as an adjunct “gypsy scholar” (which I also partly did) or just find another temporary career that might apply my skills (which I also did, overseas) and just wait.

I waited a generation and stayed overseas. My female classmates started their families. Others took other careers. I found a wife but we couldn’t yet find the stability in a place to start a family. I grew my beard that mostly went white. I built a track record publishing unusual theoretical works in new journals, mostly outside my field. And then, I decided to apply again for teaching jobs, with full credentials as both a scholar and a practitioner. But something had happened. My field literally disappeared, not entirely in name but in substance.

What was once a science was now reclassified as a humanities. Where it had been defined before by questions, it was now defined only by a methodology, really just a form of journalism and philosophy without any basis in what was possible or why. The actual subject of study that defined the field was no longer there. It was replaced by political advocacy for whatever groups the teachers belonged to.

To understand what happened, just imagine that my field was once a natural science, with a discipline for testing and measuring universal principles and building on them, which is how we advance human knowledge and the mission of the universities. Imagine that my discipline was like physics, studying matter and energy and their dynamics by testing hypotheses and developing laws.

If what happened to my discipline happens to physics (and the way things are going, who knows), here is what physics would look like today. Instead of a common core of courses, with a progression of theories and laboratory work and testable problems that are common at every university and are the basic building blocks leading to more fundamental questions, all of that would be gone.

In its place, there would be history of philosophies of physics that declared science to be unworkable and that “imagined” physical impossibilities, and individual interpretations of physics, and journalism of physics, and visual photography of physics, but all of this under different names, certified as academic,
with journals and book learning, doctrinal courses but no science. Scientific principles of causality and transitions (like evolution, in biology) would be replaced by religious type theories claiming that the world and its creations were all products of imagination and could be created by human imagination. Courses would have names like “The Forces”, “Waviness”, and “Dimensionality”. There would be “relevant” courses like “The Physics of Capitalism”, “Particle Diaspora Studies”, “Post-Socialist Physics”, “Fast Food Physics and its Acceleration” and “Queer Physics” and “area studies” courses like “The Physics of Islam” and “The Physics of Latin America”. There would be topical courses like “Metaphysics, Astrology, and the History and Theory of Physics,” “Post-Modern Physics and the Deconstruction of Physics”, and “Physics as a Cultural Construction”. There would be new political courses like “Physics and the Physical Attraction of the Sexes”. And there would be fashionable courses like “Black Holes and Other Mass Movements: A Critical Perspective”, “Transnational Physics and Electron Migrations”, . In place of laboratory courses would be film courses like “Visual Physics” and “Qualitative Methods in Physics: Participant Observation Physics through Readings and Discussion”, and “Corporate Internships in Physics”. There would be “applied” courses like “The Physics of Poverty and Inequality”, “The Physics of Power”, and “The Physics of Social Work and Social Forces” and “Immateriality of Physics”.

Comparative studies would also be eliminated since study of principles would no longer be relevant. The goal would be to “report” and to explore “identity” and to offer philosophy. Articles in journals would be shortened to a maximum length of some 8,000 words, to promote “case studies” since there would be no need for inventing and presenting new methodologies or tools or testing theories or even offering proofs and theory and evidence. That would free scholars up to write about “Observations of Big Things” and “Observations of Small Things” and “Feelings on Bigness”. One could become a reporting expert, for example, on “The Rain in Spain”. (Here’s an unscientific hint and the basis for a short article that would be easy to peer review because you can find it in the literature. “The rain in Spain ... falls mainly on the plain!” But of course you should not take my word for it. You should seek grants and conduct field observations on it every summer and write a new article. And you will probably safely earn tenure!)

Physics departments as we know them today would no longer exist. They would be merged with other sciences into departments of “Natural Sciences” or taught alone without other branches like physical chemistry or biophysics.

Of course, government and business might be funding some other new courses that might not sound so unusual. There might be courses like “Physics for Global Weapons and Elite Security,” and “Physics for Counter-terrorism”, and “Physics of Communications for State Security and Control” and “Physics of Network Analysis” and “The Physics of Prison Construction”. Some say we already have these and these are the real applied courses that have gone too far in the opposite direction.

All of this could be described as nonsense (or dangerous), but nonsense attached to self-interest and patronage networks and careers. And it would happen overnight, with new entrants quickly replicating the previous patronage systems to choose disciples to secure their interests.

Probably all of this sounds absurd when applied to physics, but a physicist might be the first to admit that physics also has religious questions and implications that cross borders with the humanities, and that there are plenty of questions on what is measurable and what is knowable. Taken to an extreme, these humanities questions and political issues about the uses of physics and its applications as well as questions about who studies physics could lead to exactly the kind of situation that happened in my discipline. In my discipline, the absurd is now real. The names of courses and the approaches noted above are mostly the reality today in my discipline and in some nearby disciplines.

While my discipline has mostly disappeared in the past 20 years, similar disappearing acts were already occurring in other disciplines much earlier. What led me to my doctoral discipline was my experience with those social science disciplines that had already mostly lost touch with reality and had
substituted mathematics, theology, labeling and reporting for scientific hypothesis testing of important human behaviors that could be measured empirically across cultures and predicted.

My discipline was anthropology, the dynamics of humans in groups (cultures) within environments (habitats) with the sub-discipline of social and cultural anthropology (the dynamics of these contemporary groups) linked to the history of human groups and their transformations (archaeology) and to the evolutionary biology of primates (physical anthropology) and corollary to development and differentiation of language (linguistics).

I entered anthropology to answer some fundamental questions about human societies, how they changed, and what was possible. At the heart of the study of human societies were questions about genocide, war and peace, and internal violence (predicting when it occurred and the factors that led to it); questions about sustainability and survival of cultures and understanding and predicting the factors of how it worked, questions about democracy and rights at the level of cultures and at the level of individuals, rule of law and legal systems and what was possible and what factors and conditions were necessary and whether there was a technology of society to achieve it, definitions of “development” and “progress” and whether there was a universal “good” and what social technologies could be used to achieve it and protect it when it was threatened, and related questions.

It probably also was not accidental that many of the founders of the discipline who had posed these questions and who hoped to find answers in order to create a better world believed in empiricism and human action.

I entered anthropology for the chance to look at real variables that linked human groups and actions to their environment and could be studied to show the link between geography, environment, and climate, and interactions between neighboring areas, on economic systems, political systems, technology, and beliefs. I understood the discipline as the place for doing holistic modeling of societies and then comparing these societies to each other and over time to answer big questions. Holism meant incorporating any and all methodologies from other social science that might help, studying societies at all levels, and collecting real data rather than narrow and trivial information like election results or product purchases.

Almost all of that has now been wiped out. Most of the questions can no longer be asked. The methods can’t be used. The assumption that humans are like other species and can be studied like other species, evolving with their environments, is disfavored. It is as if the Church had stepped back in to declare Darwin’s theory of evolution an invalid starting point, with human action to be considered in isolation and in a way that reversed the causality.

When you commit to a discipline and to teaching it, it is a calling. It is a part of how you see the world, your commitment to the future and to others. I am sure that those who wiped out my discipline see themselves as having a religious and ideological belief in what they do, but I don’t think it is a “calling” for them, based on a love of students and humanity and of nature and intellectual life. I don’t think they make a choice of many possible careers and view it as a sacrifice. I don’t see any real love or commitment in their approaches. What I see is opportunism and little ability and little other choice. That is why as they continually look to generate new courses, the titles seem to come not from research problems but from whatever topic is presented in the newspapers, with little roots to discipline or study. The best minds, with ideals, are not in the field promoting the current absurdities.

Now my task is not just trying to re-enter my field. It is trying to rebuild it, restore it and reverse the damage to bring back sanity and rationality. To do that, I have to get a foothold. I can publish, though finding “peers” and convincing reviewers who no longer read or know the classics but who only recent “Newspeak” is difficult. Most of what I write isn’t read or taught. It has disappeared along with much of the discipline that existed before and that is being wiped out.

How do I find the people who know what has been lost and convince them to keep it alive by giving me a chance to do so?
In applying for teaching positions, I quickly saw that it wasn’t just the discipline that had disappeared but that all of the associated systems for hiring and recruitment had also changed. That made applying for teaching positions an entirely different process, reversing all of the principles of qualifications and standards and merit.

In earning my Ph.D., I went to the most competitive schools, took more courses, advanced more quickly, published earlier, taught my own courses earlier, and won more honors and prestigious awards than my classmates. That is why, while I accepted having to wait 20+ years while positions were being filled on the basis of gender and ethnic quotas, I thought I could simply reapply after the wait and rely on all of these credentials. While waiting, I published more, added professional skills in new areas, won some more awards, and also had a professional applied career.

For teaching positions, being older and experienced actually should also be a major advantage because, by definition, a teacher must be someone who has a greater base of knowledge and experience and skills. Civilized societies view elders as sources of knowledge and wisdom and the image of a professor is someone who is respected for the years of investment in a discipline. But, with the disappearance of my discipline, the existing measures of qualifications have also largely disappeared. Where there are no longer any standards for courses and no hierarchy of knowledge, there are also no real standards for hiring.

Imagine if the advertisements for jobs in your field were filled with categories that were simply new jargon, often invented by each school, and generally with the departments having no real idea what they were seeking to hire. Top universities in the country in my field now advertise for candidates to teach topics that have not only never existed but that they often cannot even define. In the past few months, I have seen job announcements for candidates to “interrogate capitalism” (can one also “interrogate fascism”? is it done with water boarding?), and to teach “environmental anthropology” (a bit paradoxical, since the field was defined as the relation between humans and the environment), to teach “indigeneity” or “migration” or “transnationalism” (but not the processes of cultural adaptation), to teach undefined ideologies like “post-socialism” (as if an ideology was once a culture), and “humanitarianism”, or “inequality”. There have also been advertisements to teach courses in “terrorism” and “victimology”, “environmental justice” and “human rights”, as well as “feminism” and “ethnicity” and other popular labels that people might read in the newspapers or talk about at cocktail parties like “the Internet”. Not a single one of these courses existed before in the top universities where I studied and none of them were advances on the basic building blocks.

For a while, I thought, maybe I should create a few of these labels of my own, of something unique that sounded trendy, that was equally absurd and that no one else would have. In my view, most of the professors in my field today are really functionally illiterate in the basics of the discipline and in anything else outside it. They hardly read. My idea was to suggest that I was an expert in “Distractamology: Theory and Methods” and “Cultural Regressivity: Ideology and Religion”, “Social Parasiticlinivity: History and Applications”, and “Diarrhetical Anthropology: Unstoppable Cultural Creation”. These would perfectly fit the times. It probably wouldn’t be hard to publish pieces on them in some of the “best” journals, either, that are mostly just jargon and sound-bytes. But since most of what exists today is already so absurd, one can hardly improve upon it.

For most of the areas in which they advertise today, departments are not replacing professors already teaching the subjects for which they are seeking to hire. That is why most of the basics and approaches that would build on them have largely disappeared. Today, departments are just picking names of things they thought they should have that they didn’t already have as if they are collecting species for a zoo or foods for a buffet, on the basis of “representation” and popularity, rather than content. I have written to many of these departments and asked them what skills and perspectives they want taught (and I suggested some), what methods they were open to use (and I suggested some) and how they saw these areas fitting with their department and the definition of the discipline (sometimes I offered ideas). The usual response
is, “we are open to different approaches and perspectives” and “we have no fixed idea.” They have no idea what they are seeking or why and no standards to measure it.

Some things have not changed; such as the “area studies” courses that were just reporting specializations designed to serve military and commercial interests. Those courses haven’t changed but the areas of focus have. These “area studies” have always really been “Enemy Studies”, “Business Partner Studies” and “Narcissism Studies”, which means that today there are just new areas like Arab and Islamic studies, Chinese studies, and Diaspora studies as enemies and partners and immigrant identities change.

In a real “discipline” in a real university, knowledge is like a ladder like basic language and mathematics in grade-school education. Each topic advances on a previous one. The more experienced or brilliant one is in a field, the higher one advances on this ladder with advancement presuming mastery of the lower rungs and ability to teach them. In a real discipline, the knowledge and skills are standardized. The better the schools where one studies and the higher one advances and the better one does, the more qualified one is and the higher one’s position should be on the pecking order for seeking positions.

With specialization, there are more tracks, but in real disciplines, those tracks build standards of knowledge of the world. One’s qualifications can also be measured by the number of different tracks where one earns proficiency.

But with the disappearance of my discipline, all of these ladders of knowledge and existing standards and qualifications also disappeared with it.

Almost uniformly, when I look back at the people who were hired for these positions in previous years (and they are rarely announced; there is no concept anymore of transparency or openness; everything is kept hidden and probably understandably), the people selected are inexperienced, unpublished, from mediocre schools, with weak and narrow skills; almost exactly the opposite of what you would expect if there were standards and quality. The schools say they picked the “best” and “most qualified” and “best fit”. How could that be?

Here’s probably what is happening and why.

If universities were businesses and were subject to the requirements of their customers (students) and their beneficiaries (communities), they would have to openly show that they were picking the most qualified candidates and they would be held accountable. But today, all of these processes occur in the dark with no review. Students, communities and job candidates have no idea what really goes on and even with the laws establishing schools as public organizations, real public oversight has disappeared.

Bureaucracies with no oversight act to protect the bureaucrats. Professors today are a special kind of bureaucrat. Their goal seems to be to minimize the demands on their time and to find ways to maximize their reputation, fame and disciples. There’s no reward for advancing the discipline or protecting communities or students. It isn’t how funding works (from donors or high levels of government) and it isn’t how their advancement works. Their incentive now is to hire people who can work under them, to whom they can shift their work, whom they can exploit for credit, and who can build their egos. That is how they view their students and graduate students. And it is apparently now the model of hiring. Pick the weakest person, whom you can exploit.

The quota filling of disciplines didn’t simply add a few new slots and leave others for later, for which qualified scholars might apply. It replaced those slots with a new patronage network. Instead of the “boys’ club” or “old boys’ network” (or, for my benefit, the male progressive empirical scholars who had filled key positions in social sciences), there was now a “young girls’ network” and minority club, generating new positions to create this new hierarchy.

Those systems are very hard to challenge and enter. They can simply sniff under your armpits and figure out whether or not you dose on the same substances and fantasies and lifestyle. Mostly, they seem to do it by focusing on reference letters and networks rather than on skills and publications. Probably
there is nothing new here and the patronage networks that existed before have now been replaced by new ones. While business selections use references to confirm what is in the record, university hiring in my field does not seem to depend at all on one’s actual record as much as on the networks. As before, honest scholars and humanitarians who care about the discipline and about students and the community are easy to spot. And they are easy to derail in hiring processes.

Of course, it wasn’t just my discipline that had disappeared. Many other systems have been dismantled in the U.S., Europe, and elsewhere.

Indeed, some scholars might argue that in the social sciences and humanities there never was any objectivity in hiring and the mechanisms and teaching were always politicized. The difference in the past may have simply been that during the period of industrialization, with the existence of a middle class and demands from minorities as well as international competition, there was a recognized need for and funding social sciences and competition of ideas. At that time, there were calls for accountability and for results.

Today, the only real “accountability” and results seem to be that of “representation”, information collection, and popularity, rather than building effective social sciences and systems. Today, that seems to have been dismantled under the pretense of inclusiveness in place of results.

We aren’t living in the times of 20 and 50 years ago when one could write to a government official and say, “we aren’t investing anymore in civilization and if we don’t we are destroying our future”. To do that, today, you would have to find rational people who cared about the future, who valued science and reason. And where are you going to find that? You can’t go to the courts and show that hiring processes had run amok with discriminatory standards without end, replacing any kind of merit. To do that, you have to find a justice system that understands justice and is more than just in service for elite interests.

Being overseas should be good training for all of that. I spent a lot of time in dictatorships like the Soviet Union and then its “independent” states and in other “post-colonial” countries that were pretty much like they were under colonialism. Although no one says it aloud, the U.S. and many European countries have slowly copied the model of these other countries so that now they are pretty much indistinguishable. In the U.S., for example, they copied the “State Security” apparatus of the Soviet Union and gave it almost the exact same name.

Now we have a global educational system that is sending the products of these disappeared disciplines to the former Soviet Union and to China, where they all too easily fit in, substituting the teaching of one ideology for another.

I can’t just go away for another 20 years this time waiting for this to change and neither can the globe. The results are becoming all too clear.
THE QUIET “PURGE” OF JEWS AND JEWISH THINKING IN AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE

Essay

BROOKS DUNCAN, PH.D.
Independent Scholar

Abstract

This article uses the method of ethnic stratification analysis and participant observation to raise questions about what appears to be one of the hidden ethnic transformations that has occurred in the disciplines of anthropology and sociology in the past two decades; the replacement of Jews. Jews, who were among the founders of and became “over-represented” in these disciplines, have now been replaced with other minorities through a process of selection based on “representation”. Along with the use of these disciplines for overall university quota filling, in order to promote statistics for hiring of under-represented groups, has come the loss of the empirical “scientific” approach of Jewish scholars and the idea of application of “universal” principles for social progress. These two phenomena appear to be related, raising questions about the actual social justice and social progress impacts of what was claimed as “diversity”. Under the veneer of apparent diversity, the costs to social science and actual social justice may outweigh the benefits. In today’s political environment, there seems to be an unwillingness to pursue and raise these questions.

Introduction

In 1938, in Hungary, the Bela Imredy regime began to implement some of the first contemporary “Jewish laws”. These laws imposed quotas to limit Jewish positions in different professions, particularly those of academics and scientists, on a banner of “equality”, “representation” and “democratic” concepts of social justice.

Much more slowly and with limited comment, with the participation of many Jews, themselves, as they retire and as they redefine the goals of the professions to fit with contemporary political correctness, a similar purge may have occurred in American social sciences over the past generation. Measuring it and drawing attention to the questions it raises today are difficult. This is an area where ethnic statistics are not reported. Jews, themselves, (unlike almost every other minority group) seem unwilling to discuss and pursue the issue. This author’s attempts to open up the issue have not been encouraged. Recent events, however, draw direct attention to the issue.

One of the first wake-up calls to Jewish scholars in the U.S. and to those in Israel occurred within the American Anthropological Association within the past few months. In demonstrating outrage at the policies of the Israeli government towards Palestinians, some 1,000 members of the Association signed a petition to ban interactions with Israeli academic institutions. The ban sought to target Jewish anthropologists in Israel for the actions of their government. Though many (perhaps even a majority) of Israeli Jewish anthropologists actually oppose the Israeli government’s racial policies and actively teach...
approaches to tolerance, the ban did not seek to enforce international human rights laws or to target political actors. It was an action by anthropologists to target anthropologists. The American Studies Association endorsed the approach.

Many legal experts say that the resolution, itself, violated the charter of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) and the association’s lawyers should never have allowed it to come to a vote. But it did. If any legal review of the legal implications for the organization, as a publicly chartered non-profit under U.S. laws ever took place, it was never shared with members of the organization as U.S. non-profit laws require. Moreover, the Association offered no prior review of the potential impact of the resolution on its Jewish members. Nor did it review the status of Jews in the organization, though there were calls to do so.

The resolution ultimately failed, but by a razor thin margin of some 39 out of nearly 5,000 votes (some 0.8% of the total) in the spring of 2016. The management of the AAA is now seeking to address the issue in other ways.

The ban was clearly targeted at Jews. Discrimination laws characterize such “selective enforcement” as “de facto” discrimination. One can walk through the logic that courts use to establish discrimination to come to this conclusion. If its approach had been non-discriminatory, he American Anthropological Association would have set a general policy on dealing with human rights violations by its member anthropologists of all ethnicities and across all countries. Here, however, there was no effort to instigate similar bans against other countries with similar policies in violation of human rights of minority populations, nor against those countries who have supported (and/or armed) the Israeli government. Nor was there a call to make any of the ethical procedures or sanctioning powers of the Association enforceable so that reviews of discrimination or violations of the Association’s ethics codes could occur on a regular basis. This was not a “first step” towards such procedures. This was the only step. This was a specifically targeted ban.

- There were no calls for bans against academic institutions in the United States for the U.S. government’s (bi-partisan) support of these policies and other global military actions or violations.
- There have been no calls for bans on Stanford University because of its rehiring of Condoleezza Rice or to condemn that University’s connections to military industries though scholars and students at Stanford have raised such concerns.
- Nor were there calls for bans on the University of California for its employment of former White House lawyer John Woo to teach law, though many have also raised concerns there.
- Nor were there calls for bans against U.S. universities with Reserve Officer Training Corps (“ROTC”) military training programs.
- Nor have there been calls by the Association for bans against universities holding stock in military industries or oil companies or in companies that have been undermining land rights and destroying cultures and habitats in Latin America, Africa and Asia that are widely reported by human rights (and land rights) organizations.
- Nor were there calls for boycotting of anthropologists who work for the World Bank or for other development banks or donors that promote “resettlement” in ways that many anthropologists have long claimed, promote cultural genocide.

Supporters of the AAA’s ban sought to hold Israel’s Jewish anthropologists to a standard of professional responsibility that would require that they take direct action against the policies of their universities that are discriminatory or that undermine the rights of Palestinians. These requirements, according to Israeli academics opposing the ban, could have jeopardized their careers. The ban would have offered no process to evaluate the appropriateness of those actions and their actual impacts.

In short, when examined from the legal standard of discrimination, the boycott was discriminatory in its selectivity and in its impact. The approach singled out Jews in the profession without imposing any similar responsibility on any other group in any other place.
So that there should be no misunderstanding, it is important to offer the following disclosure in this article. The author of this article is not a supporter of the policies of the Israeli government towards Palestinians, nor of the ideology of “Zionism” that would place Israelis or Jews above international law. Nor is the author of this article “nostalgic” for the colonial and imperial uses of social sciences in the past, to destroy the cultures of Native peoples and to discriminate against women and minorities of any descent (not only Jews, but all minorities). The author is a firm supporter of professional ethics codes and international human rights laws to protect cultural survival and individual rights of all peoples.

This article is not about the legitimacy of the boycott approach or about the legal obligations of the Israeli government or of failures of many Jews and prominent Jewish organizations to fulfill moral and international legal obligations of human rights and policies of peace and reconciliation with the Palestinians, the Bedouins and other groups in the Middle East. Many other articles deal with these issues. This article is about the status of Jews in the social sciences today and about the relationship between the position of Jews and the role of the disciplines in promoting high quality scholarship and applications in the area of social justice.

Questions Raised about Jews in Key Social Science Disciplines, Quantitative and Qualitative:

The point raised in this article is that the claimed goals of efforts to promote racial, ethnic, gender, and other forms of diversity in the social sciences have not been met and the means that have been chosen may have created other harms and impediments to achieving these goals. Among the claims of diversity was that it would serve as a key to promoting social progress for the larger society by stimulating social science to address humanistic concerns, to improve their models and methods, and to widen applications. It is now possible to test these claims. In this author’s view, the changes have not in any way followed the expectations. The changes in academic hiring may not have focused at all on hiring faculty to transform the social sciences, to change methods, to apply social science to society and to improve society, at all. Instead, the hiring may have simply been used to hire minorities who would avoid following those goals and would simply divert attention from real social change. The hiring appears to have come at the sacrifice of one minority group for the benefit of others in a way that may be linked with undermining of the very reform of and progress of social science.

This is not a call to turn back the clock. It is a call to examine the real impacts “diversity” may have had on one hidden minority (Jews) and also to question whether academic diversity has promoted its promised mission for improving social sciences and for transforming institutions and society in ways that have achieved measurable and sustainable social progress in all areas, not simply in “representation” in a few positions. This article raises the speculation that the seemingly more “diverse” and “representative” social sciences may actually be continuing the same colonial (or corporatist), assimilationist agenda that adherents of diversity claimed they would challenge while pretending to do otherwise.

Here is the irony. For a small number of university academics who have entered the ranks of academia and come from diverse minority backgrounds, their advance is a sign of social justice. Yet, at the very same time, the society around them, in almost every social justice or progress measure for which their social science fields are supposed to contribute to improvements, situations appear to be much worse.

- Social inequality in the U.S. and Western Europe has worsened since 1970, not improved, in what is a clear sign of social regress and injustice, not progress. Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman calls it “the Great Divergence” (Noah, 2010) and even the International Monetary Fund (IMF) now recognize that “Widening income inequality is the defining challenge of our time. In advanced economies, the gap between rich and poor is at its highest level in decades” (Dabla Norris, et. al, 2015). In 2012, the top 1% of Americans owned 40% of the wealth; nearly double of the share (23%) in 1978. The net worth of the top 400 Americans (the 0.1%) was equal to the bottom 50% of all Americans in 2010, up from only 5% some thirty years before (Sale and Zucman, 2014). The more “diverse” social
science of the past few decades has not only offered no benefit but has appeared impotent as the situation has gotten worse.

- With the increased social inequality has also come a corresponding political inequality, with transfer of power to the economic elites, and with the U.S. increasingly described not as a democracy but as an “oligarchy” (Domhoff, 2013). While the appearance of minorities in the university and in political positions, globally, suggest on its face that there is more democratization, almost every measure shows the opposite, including in participatory procedures in universities and their communities, themselves.

- Though minorities may be more visible in the U.S., the acceleration of globalization and homogenization of peoples into a global industrial economy has promoted cultural genocide in the name of assimilation. Cultural diversity and associated language diversity is disappearing. The rate of language (and affiliated culture) extinction is now estimated at one language every two weeks (Crystal, 2000). The data here suggests that “diversity” in hiring in social sciences may actually have worked to accelerate homogenization and assimilation, at the expense of minority cultures and their protection.

- The promotion of diversity has also not led to greater tolerance or “peace” if measured in terms of global militarization. In adjusted figures, global military spending rose 50% between 2001 and 2010 (Russell, 2011). There are more courses on “peace studies” and more courses on “Women’s Studies” (originally claimed to challenge “male hierarchy”, “patriarchy” and violence) but this “diversity” seems to have no impact on global peace or tolerance or demilitarization.

- While the global data on “poverty” is ambiguous, what is clear is that very few, if any, countries are sustainably integrated with their environments and resources. Social science has not led any path for changing human behaviors that are leading to a planetary crisis due to global climate change and unsustainability. There were certainly warning signs in the 1960s and 1970s when there were calls for a new, more representative social science that would be friendlier to nature and to native cultures. Again, there seems to have been no positive impact at all.

Given this data, what is the real impact of this “diversity” and this “progress” in the disciplines? What is it in thinking and applications that have changed over the past thirty years? Are the changes in hiring policy really a sign of progress or a cover to divert attention from regress, or perhaps to create a form of collusion?

Overall, if measured in terms of citizen rights versus the state and versus corporate power and in terms of economic equality, or even in terms of the accountability of university disciplines and faculty to students and to society and in the democratization of the university and teaching methods which is something that would be directly in the hands of faculty members to change (Lempert, 1995), one might argue that the “99%” of citizens in developed countries are all now worse off today despite greater “diversity” in the social sciences and other professions and that the “diverse” faculty in universities have done little or nothing to promote any kind of measurable change. Diversity policies have brought women and a large spectrum of minority representatives into certain disciplines, but they have not had any noticeable impact on the application of social science for measurable social progress in social equality or rights protections, or in the goals of social science in advancing predictions or promoting applications. Greater diversity in the social sciences has not replaced the agendas of colonialism (now, neo-colonialism) or inequality in government and corporate policies. Nor has the opening up of positions to diversity promoted the quality of social science in answering its core questions and developing tools to promote the interests of social justice. The change has, however, appears to have resulted in purging (and perhaps partly demonizing) the very minority group (Jews) that had, in part, been working to try to build and humanize the social science disciplines. It appears that what has actually occurred in academia has been the dismantling of social science, of standards, and of an overall, implementable, human rights agenda at all levels.

Again, so that there is no misunderstanding among readers, the purpose of this article is not to attack the diversification in university hiring or to suggest that “minorities and women” are somehow to blame for changes in the world over the past thirty years that may be harmful. It is to suggest that the specific people who have been chosen for positions and the way that they have been chosen may indicate an
undermining and reversal of the actual claims that were made for promoting and achieving diversity. It is that the hiring may have been conducted with the purpose of eliminating those minority faculty (many of them Jews) who were promoting a progressive agenda for transforming social science, its methods, its applications and society and replacing them with “representational” faculty who would agree to dismantling and replacement of social sciences and real attempts at social progress.

Is there a connection between these new faculty selection policies, the apparent impact on Jews, the apparent dismantling of the social sciences and social “regress” rather than real progress? Or is it all just coincidental? This essay cannot answer that question. It can only point to some of the changes that have occurred and that few scholars are ready to examine and raise this (largely unwelcome) question in universities and society.

The AAA resolution to punish Israeli (Jewish) anthropologists and only Israeli (Jewish) anthropologists occurred simultaneously with calls for the elimination of implementable ethics standards and alongside a process in the discipline that has eliminated standards for the discipline. In the view of its supporters, the boycott resolution was an example of “progress”. To this author, it appears to be a symbol of the very opposite, despite all of the positive attention to the human rights of Palestinians (that this author and most anthropologists affirm).

Over the past thirty years, there has been a gradual change in American social science that can be highlighted by what has been happening in anthropology (and particularly in social and cultural anthropology). The changes have not been documented and are rarely a subject of discussion. Nevertheless, the changes are immediately visible both in statistics and in the ideological changes in American social science. Not only have Jews (and particularly Jewish men) been disappearing from the social sciences in which they were key founders. The Jewish approach to social science that built these disciplines – empiricism, prediction, and applications for social progress – has been replaced by approaches that mirror the views and methods of the 19th century Catholic Church, now promoted by non-Jewish minorities and women. Perhaps there is some kind of causal relationship. Perhaps this is just a coincidence. These two changes may be independent of each other but reflect the same underlying cause. Either way, they merit examination.

In keeping with anthropological tradition, this article presents a variety of initial data on Jews, on academia, and on social change in the U.S. and Europe over the past thirty years in a way that raises issues for discussion. One way that anthropologists raise issues is to look at phenomena in other societies that are considered “primitive” or, in some cases, societies of “enemies”, and then to note that in “our” society (that of the anthropologists) we do something very similar but call it something else or hide it from view. Anthropologists call this the approach of “culture critique”. This article opens with such a critique. In 20th century Europe in regimes that we consider primitive or barbaric, there were quotas that reduced Jews in some professions in order to assure that the professions reflected the actual population. Today, we refer to the implementation of those quotas as “purges” and discrimination. The end result of those quotas was to promote loyalty to regimes that used ideas of “representation” and “progress” to undermine progress. Certainly the motivation in those countries was not to “assimilate” multiple minority groups but to eliminate them, but it was also to promote policies of “unity” that promoted militarism, corporatism (in different forms), and new forms of inequalities in the name of social progress. The goal also seemed to be to undermine social sciences. It is uncomfortable to ask this question, but in many of these aspects, “Is there really a difference in how the policies of “representation” in certain professions were used then and are being implemented now in the U.S. and Western Europe?” Has part of that approach been copied for similar purposes, either knowingly or subconsciously, without drawing attention?
Some Quantitative Data on Jews in Anthropology and Sociology

While statistics on Jews are hard to come by, few anthropologists deny the qualitative data on Jews in the profession, today. This article is too short to offer “proof” of what has happened to Jews in the profession. But there is available data, both quantitative and qualitative, to perform what sociologists call an “ethnic stratification” analysis.

In a profession that relies on qualitative data, through participant observation, this piece offers the best data available. It is presented from the perspectives of those in the profession, including this author, as well as in the form of some basic quantitative comparative data that can be compiled using a simple technique of assigning ethnicity to different populations and then comparing those groups. Examining “ethnic stratification” data within a profession is a standard part of social stratification that sociologists regularly examine (Shibutani and Kwan, 1965; Noel, 1968) for various minority groups. Though most current studies focus on specific classes of minorities and do not include Jews (who have become an “invisible” minority in many ways), there have been studies of Jews in specific professions such as law, with qualitative data and quantitative analysis that notes the attraction of Jews to professions that deal with issues of rights and social justice (Heinz and Laumann, 1982).

In comparing the lists of Jewish scholars in subjects (once social sciences) like Anthropology and Sociology today, it appears that the Jewish founders and luminaries of those disciplines have disappeared or have been replaced, perhaps as a direct result of the hiring policies of “representation”.

- Most lists of sociology’s founders name Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx (both Jews) alongside Max Weber, and some add George Simmel (also Jewish) among the top four.
- In anthropology, Jerry Moore’s “Visions of Culture”, finds 7 or 21 founders of the discipline as Jews, including the founders of sub-fields (Marcel Mauss and Marshall Sahlins in Economic Anthropology). This is culled from a larger list with similar proportions. Though Jews are only 2% of the overall population in the U.S., and were about the same in pre-World War II Europe, one third of 42 biographical entries in the Dictionary of Anthropology are Jews (Moore, 2012).
- Few lists of the founders of the profession are complete without Franz Boas and Edwin Sapir, Jews founding Columbia’s department, Robert Lowie, one of the founders of the department at the University of California, Berkeley, French Jews like Mauss and Claude Levi Strauss, British Jews like Max Gluckman, and more recently Marvin Harris at Columbia, and Eric Wolf at the City University of New York.

Of course, Jews were historically still the minority among leaders of the field and overall in the field, itself. Among the other two thirds of the famous names in the field were a number of anthropologists who directly supported the colonial and racist agendas of anthropology of that time (Herbert Spencer and Edward Morgan, among them). The question to be raised is whether Jews were part of the “progressive”/humanitarian agendas of social science as a social science in reflection of Jewish culture.

While there are no statistics on Jews today in anthropology and sociology (and the most recent membership survey conducted by the American Anthropological Association (AAA) did not even recognize Jews in its categories of members of 2016), despite the author of the survey apparently being Jewish (!), it is easy to note that the numbers are few. In scanning the lists of social and cultural anthropologists at major institutions in New York City, where Jews were founders of the discipline and where Jews are some 10% of the population and perhaps more of the student population, it is now hard to spot any by looking at family names and given names. There may be 1 of 27 at Columbia today, though 4 of 6 emeritus faculty are presumably Jewish. New York University appears to have 2 out of 30. John Jay’s department, part of the City University of New York, has 1 out of 14; an Israeli teaching area studies courses on the Middle East.

To test the quality of this data, I compared the numbers of academics that I identified as “Jews” in different fields and in different subfields. For example, in some top universities, this method identified Jews as up to 20% or more among the faculties of public policy and law, while only about 2% of sociology and anthropology. Within sociology and anthropology, itself, among young faculty (recent
Ph.D.s), there are more Jews in areas that remain less racially or ethnically diverse and where there is more science (physical anthropology, archaeology, and medical anthropology).

In examining the ethnicity of younger anthropologists, one can also find differences in percentages of Jews among the “four fields” of anthropology where there are different hiring policies and impacts. Traditionally, anthropology has four fields: physical anthropology (evolutionary biology of humans and primates that is mostly natural science), archaeology (science and technical application), linguistics (science) and social and cultural anthropology (originally considered to be “social science and humanities”). If there are Jews left in anthropology departments, they are visible first in physical anthropology and archaeology as well as medical anthropology (an “applied” subfield of cross cultural public health) where faculty appear to be chosen for scientific skills. Among social and cultural anthropologists, where advertisements for faculty are now directly geared towards “representation” (“area studies,” gender, sexuality, and ethnicity), one finds very few Jews. Those who can be identified appear to have been chosen for their gender (as “Women’s Studies” anthropologists) or sexuality (as “Queer Studies” anthropologists) or for a specific area studies (“Jewish Studies” or “Middle Eastern Studies” anthropologists) given how they identify their specialty areas and courses that they teach on their university web pages.

In fact, there also seems to be a link between this de facto outcome (apparent disappearance of Jews) and the methods used in hiring. Anthropological hiring is now clearly, and admittedly, targeted to “representation” rather than to social scientific achievement in solutions to specific problems and applications, or to specific measurable social impact. To examine how this discrimination has worked to eliminate Jews, the author wrote to hiring committees and personnel offices of those universities who use specific language of “representation” in their hiring policies in Anthropology, with specific questions on how these criteria applied to Jews. Among the terms used in university hiring today to promote “diversity” is the term “historically under-represented group”. Before 1973, there were still quotas on Jews in many universities (Oren, 1985) but Jews had, despite quotas, advanced to become overrepresented in Anthropology and Sociology, presumably on the basis of merit. The question this author asked was specifically how two universities that used this specific term as a criterion in hiring would treat Jews and how a Jewish candidate should present himself in applying given the potential for either preference or reverse discrimination. The author asked the schools to specifically define their terms “under-represented” and “historically” to see what time frame they used for history and what criteria they used for representation. Indeed, if the goal were to overcome discrimination and not to discriminate against Jews, the term they would use would be “historically subject to discrimination” rather than “underrepresented” which specifically implies a quota. If they were really promoting diversity and wanted minorities to ensure real intellectual diversity, they would identify the contributions and link them to the discipline’s questions and goals, but they do not do that either. They simply look for representation and ways of triggering it by mentioning “areas” of geography or topics like gender.

The weasel word phrase, “historically underrepresented” seems specifically designed to allow for discrimination against one single minority; Jews. The inability or unwillingness to define what is meant by “historically” and “underrepresented” signal that the targeting, specifically, of Jews, is the intent, since it would be easy to answer questions if this were not the case. If the time period meant a century ago, with the history of universities as founded by churches (including one of the universities queried, where Jews would not have been hired), Jews were underrepresented. Today, again, they may be only “quota represented” (down to 2%) or less. Today, similarly, in many anthropology departments, men, who are technically a minority of the population, are also becoming an “underrepresented” minority given the introduction of “Women’s Studies” into Anthropology. So, the term “historically” and “underrepresented” are highly ambiguous terms without transparency and subject to abuse. If Jews are welcome because of the merit and diversity that they bring to these disciplines, it would be very easy for university hiring groups to simply say that Jews were historically “disproportionally” represented on the basis of merit and that they cannot be considered “historically over-represented”. In fact, the universities that use these terms refused to define these terms or to answer how they fit Jews, as a minority and they
refuse to use the term “disproportionally” represented in order to make it clear that they are not seeking a 2% quota for Jews.

The conclusion that seems easy to reach is that the term “historically underrepresented” is essentially a euphemism for quota filling through “representation”, with departments like Anthropology and Sociology being used specifically for such “representation” rather than for merit based hiring. In fact, the only two groups today that may be the direct victims of the use of this euphemistic term are Jews and (to a small extent) men. Reducing men to some 48% of faculties at most replaces half of the men. Forcing Jews from some 20% of the profession that they achieved on merit and in the face of discrimination, down to 2%, is potentially a purge of some 90% of Jews who would have sought work in the profession.

In other words, it appears that after decades of fighting discrimination and gaining representation on merit, majority groups and other minorities have now worked together to establish a fixed quota for Jews that can no longer be overcome by merit because it is based directly on population statistics.

The result of this for these disciplines is that this “area studies” or single variable approach to hiring works to replace holistic and comparative (social scientific) anthropology, whose mission as a discipline was to test hypothesis and provide solutions and applications to disciplinary questions. The impact of these hiring policies appears to have been to diminish the percentage of Jews in the profession to that similar to their numbers in the population (around 2%) and to replace them with other visible minorities in a form of apparent reverse discrimination. It also appears to have been to eliminate the structure of the discipline around answering questions, following standards, modeling phenomena at the level of societies and cultures, and generating technologies for promoting overall solutions to humanistic concerns. One can speculate on how or whether these two agenda were linked in the hiring and whether the “representational” faculty who were chosen were also selected on specific criteria related to their approaches to science and to real impacts on concerns of social justice.

Similar numbers of Jews in professions in the Soviet Union, starting in the 1950s, were considered evidence of the impact of Russian anti-Semitism, stepped up during the Cold War. There, Jewish entrance into teaching and professional fields dropping to about 2% to reflect their percentage in the national population. For anthropology and a number of current social science fields and spinoffs from Anthropology and Sociology like “Legal Studies” or “Social Justice”, the numbers are now similar, though one does not hear these as calls for sanctions against U.S. universities (as there were calls for sanctions against the Soviet Union) or for migration of intellectuals to “Free World Countries” where they could fulfill their professions (assuming such places exist today or can be identified) or for change. Faced with such barriers in the Soviet Union and other one Party States, Jews and others who were refused entrance to their areas of professional aptitude and choice sought to move to other specialties that are less “political” and that also offered less potential for any kind of transformative social change. Jews are now highly represented in fields of technology (particularly computer science), natural sciences, and administration in the U.S. and Western Europe and perhaps this also represents the same phenomenon. It is not clear whether Jews have left anthropology and sociology because they no longer see it as places where empirical social science is welcome and where they can do real social change. Perhaps they have left as a result of discrimination. Perhaps both factors are at work.

**Some Qualitative and Interpretive Data on the Role of Jews in Anthropology and Sociology**

Interpreting the meaning of the decline of Jews in the key social science disciplines of anthropology and sociology is difficult because “Jewish culture” and “Jewish values” are, themselves, in flux today and are disputed. To really understand how hiring policies have been used and how Jews in and outside of these disciplines see themselves and the pressures on them would also require the kind of detailed investigation that is way beyond the scope of this essay. However, it is possible to use the very types of interpretive methods that alternatives use to generate the kinds of hypotheses that anthropologists raise, to suggest connections between the decline of Jews in these disciplines and the decline of “social science” and of applications to “social justice” and “social progress” in these disciplines.
To analyze what social phenomena mean, anthropologists typically use forms of qualitative analysis. Among the methodologies is “participant observation” by those who directly confront a particular phenomenon and can report and analyze their experience. Other methods include structured and non-structured interviews with “informants” whose identities are protected.

The format of this article is too brief for a full explanation of these methods and for proof of every conclusion (or conclusive observation) offered here. In all qualitative studies, and particularly today in anthropology where authors increasingly study their own ethnic groups, it is impossible (and not always advantageous) to be completely “neutral.”

The value of these methodologies is to allow for reflection, introspection and the raising of hypotheses and interpretations that follow.

The perspective of this author is that the attraction of many of the Jews to the fields of anthropology and sociology in the past, as reflected in the topics and goals of their research, was the ability to advocate for equality and respect for minorities (particularly in sociology that focused on measures of inequality and power). Indeed, elite attacks on these fields from outside the university often focused on the uses of empirical study by anthropologists and sociologists to challenge dogmas of racial and religious superiority. The perspective of Jewish intellectuals was to use empiricism (i.e., social science, itself) as the means of combating racism and its associated policies. This tradition is long rooted in Jewish culture and particularly in the cultures of Jews living in the European and American Jewish “diaspora” (Cahill, 1998; Lempert, 2015).

In their work in the mid-20th century, the belief of many Jewish social scientists was that the “neutrality” and “objectivity” of social science was the most effective means of achieving the goals of social justice and social progress, through legal and political protections. Rather than simply argue for “representation” and attack science and technology, the Jewish empiricist view, particularly in social science in the 1950s to 1970s, was that scientific objectivity offered the keys to legal and political protections. The ethos of Jewish social scientists and affiliated movements in law by Jewish legal scholars, lawyers and judges, was that elimination of scientific objectivity and the standards and laws that derived from them, would lead to a return to discrimination and oppression in another form.

Indeed, if one were trying to undermine the movements towards social progress, through legal enforcement of rights that empirical social science was building, it would appear that the way to do that would be to eliminate Jews from these professions and to try to eviscerate the disciplines. The way that authoritarian governments in Europe suppressed calls for social progress and rights protections was to repress social sciences and to eliminate Jews in them. The Hungarians did this. The Nazis did this. So did the Soviet Russian Empire in its ethnic purges.

If one were seeking to do this in the United States, one could seek to suppress the data and the work of scholars on specific questions of social change, equality and rights or one could replace and co-opt them. Certainly, one question to ask about social sciences over the past thirty years is whether the ethnic policies of “representation” have also somehow co-opted the scholars who have been hired in these professions.

Certainly, the advocacy for rights and social justice has not been suppressed in the writings and speech of anthropologists and sociologists. It is loud and clear, coming from the perspective (and, often, the specific self-interest) of each entrant on behalf of his or her group. On the other hand, it would simply be nothing more than “noise” if it were detached from standards, science, and applications. That may be what has happened.
**An Interpretive Theory about What has Happened and its Impact on Social Science and Social Progress**

There have been two clear changes in universities in the past thirty years, in profile of faculty and in curricula, and they appear to be related. One has been “affirmative action” to create “equity” in the universities on the basis of representation among faculty members; particularly in gender and skin color. The other has been a transformation of social sciences and humanities in ways that have eliminated empirical social science in fields like social and cultural anthropology and that have created a series of new “representational” disciplines that promote “identities” and area studies but without social science or technical applications to institution building and social change. These changes have turned large areas of social sciences into theologies, philosophy, journalistic reporting, and promotion of homogenization/assimilation of cultural and intellectual differences in the global, urban, industrial, New World Order. The early descriptions of these changes claimed that they represented an incorporation of “morality” (D’Andrade, 1995) along with “re-invention” (Hymes, 1982). This author, writing about the changes, has found much of it justified on the basis of reactions against the uses of social sciences by modern governments to cause harm rather than good. The justification seemed to be that the only way to eliminate the immoral use of social science and technologies was to eliminate social science and the technologies, themselves, rather than to confront and change them (Duncan, 1995; 2011; 2013).

The two processes appear to be interconnected though the causality is not clear. Ironically, American Jews have largely facilitated this change even though it has come at the expense of Jews in the social sciences and appears to have undermined the very approaches, social reform goals, and intellectual pursuits promoted by Jews.

In the former Soviet Union and in Western Europe, quotas to replace positions and approaches of Jews were instigated by authoritarian “populist” regimes. In the U.S., the approach appears to have been supported by Jews, with Jewish men retiring and filling their already “minority” slots with other minorities, women.

What probably led Jews to support this transition was the claim that this approach to “representation” would promote equality and “social justice” along with new “advocacy” approaches.

Traditionally, Jewish social scientists had often sought to directly confront the political actors who were using social science for immoral ends and had sought to reform social sciences and their applications. Jewish intellectuals like Noam Chomsky, Howard Zinn, Frances Fox Piven, Marvin Harris, and Jared Diamond have been leaders of a tradition of intellectuals promoting social science for progressive social goals. There seem to have been similar movements among women (“eco-feminism”) and among minorities promoting progressive and applied social sciences (e.g., the tradition of sociologist William DuBois, followed in historically black colleges in the U.S. The idea for promoting diversity and representation throughout academia may have been based on the belief that diversity would magnify this approach rather than replace it.

The result, however, appears to have been the opposite; to undermine real economic and political equality and social justice, either through biases entering into the hiring or through other influences that the new representational diversity was unable or unwilling to check, as individuals pursued the interests of their specific groups and their own careers.

The ethical principle that was emerging in anthropology by the 1960s was to protect minority cultures and difference, not to assimilate minorities (the current approach), while the goal of sociology was to promote economic equality and opportunity, not just homogenization. The “representation” supported by anthropology today, however, is mostly one of promoting assimilation and, unfortunately, what could be viewed as cultural genocide, through support of globalization. Meanwhile, the goals of “equality” have boosted some women and a few minorities into positions of power while overall social inequality in the U.S. and globally are now at their highest levels in decades. One of the impacts of a turn away from social science and application is that these fields no longer teach the science of social transformation and progress; only the rhetoric, metaphor, philosophy and documentation of transition.
When Jews founded key social sciences, it was partly to address “Jewish questions” of cultural survival, tolerance (predicting and averting genocides and war), rule of law and accountability, sustainability, social “progress” including equality, and intellectual freedom. The approach was not advocacy for Jews but the opposite: stress on shared intellectual approaches, commitment to objective principles, reason and empiricism. The goal was to overcome subjectivity and self-interest and to focus on long-term progress and civilization. With the disappearance of Jews in social science, this has been reversed. Rather than build institutions and focus on the long-term, social science today appears to have become a forum for competing self-interests and narcissism.

In the areas of social science today that were once the purview of Jewish scholars, seeking a “neutral”, humanistic, empiricism to promote shared long term human goals and to build technologies for human betterment, what one finds instead are self-interested advocacy, narcissistic philosophizing, and dogma, whether it is in anthropology and sociology or in small pockets in other social science disciplines. Most of the works of Jewish social thinkers and social scientists from the 1960s and earlier have been purged from the curriculum and from journals. A form of Orwellian “Newspeak” now determines that classic theories of social science and their applications are “too old” to be cited, and scholars in these areas report inability to publish as a result of these exclusionary criteria. Questions and comparisons are no longer of interest to the young scholars who are emerging in these fields, and are eliminated. Citations to authors like Daniel Bell, Marvin Harris, Paul Goodman, Noam Chomsky, and those who partly resurrect their approaches today, like Jared Diamond, are reportedly targeted for removal.

Critics say that there are still Jews in social sciences but that they have simply moved. The positions that they take, however, may actually show the larger phenomenon. Among economists and policy makers, prominent Jews like Paul Krugman, Joseph Stiglitz (two Nobel Prize winners), Jeff Sachs, and former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, are often viewed as examples of Jewish “progressives”. Yet they are in fact supporters of globalization and minority assimilation, using empirical critiques to occasionally call for more taxation, redistribution and opportunity. Perhaps they are examples of the pressures for co-optation that may exist throughout the disciplines. They are Jews and still promote certain Jewish views and approaches, but not the full set of human rights and protections that Jews sought to address in anthropology and sociology.

Though there are still many Jews in some other disciplines that were considered parts of the social sciences, the idea of Jewish missions there, including commitment to empiricism, have also disappeared, though Jewish scholars were among those pushing those disciplines in the 1950s through the 1970s to focus on equity, opportunity, and empowerment; modeling strategies of change and teaching applications. Social sciences like economics and political science today appear to have become theologies of “production engineering” and “manufacturing consent”, offering mathematics and support and defense of current systems rather than mechanisms of change. There are still plenty of Jews in these areas as there were throughout the Cold War. In fact, these were easy disciplines in which Jews could fit, but in ways that muted possibility for progress or social change. Jews remain in these fields, with their work appearing to often serve the interests of the upper 1%, promoting American exceptionalism and its economic dogmas. Many of these Jews are the adherents of neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism; the ideologies of militarism, globalism and corporatism.

Soviet Studies offers an example of the changes that have occurred. In that area field, some Jewish scholars did try to compare empires and understand how they could be humanized, like Alfred Meyer, Harold Berman, Alex Inkeles, Daniel Bell, and David Lempert, with others taking similar approaches in related fields; among them, Immanuel Wallerstein, Seymour Melman and Alvin Toffler. Most, however, worked to demonstrate their support for U.S. elites through their agreement to take Jewish anger out on the Russians and other Slavic peoples in ideological condemnations (Lempert, 1988).

When confronted by the data of declining numbers of Jews in specific disciplines, critiques say that changes that have occurred in the disciplines are not linked to ethnicity. They claim that Jews themselves have abandoned social science and applications and concerns of social progress and social justice. They say that the numbers of Jewish scholars in fields like economics, law, and political science, who serve
establishment agendas, suggest that Jewish intellectual culture has changed and that Jews are not the victims but responsible parties for the problem. They say that Jewish scholars have simply moved out of fields like anthropology and sociology into other areas that are more prestigious and more lucrative and that it is by choice. They say that the lack of minorities promoting social science today and its applications for social progress is not due to selection but also to choice.

This author believes that the data shows otherwise. Progressive Jewish intellectuals have, in fact, some of the largest followings in readership of their works and recent political candidates in similar traditions (like Senator Bernie Sanders) do as well. This author believes that there have been specific ideological and political pressures that have targeted types of research, empirical methods, teaching approaches, research questions and applications. The approach that remains is one that reflects not only a “conservative” agenda but also a set of religious beliefs behind it.

In anthropology, in place of Jewish attempts at a neutral, empirical and objective social science, linking studies of humans to evolution and biology, are now dogmas that were originally those of the Catholic Church. The discipline’s current assumptions sever the link between humans and biology, attacking the idea of cultural and social evolution or comparisons with primate behaviors. They deny any kind of objectivity or neutrality that would allow use of the scientific method. They deny that behaviors are determined or predicted, or that there are technologies that can be used to improve the human condition. What has replaced science is the idea that everything is a subjective individual choice. This is the same ideology as that of the Catholic Church. The battle that is being waged against social sciences today appears to be largely an echo of the battle against “evolution” and Darwinian theory, that has existed for some 150 years and that appears to have emerged in a new form. The replacement of Jews in anthropology and sociology, and the approaches in other sciences largely seem to reflect an emergence of Christian religious beliefs about determinism, free will, and about science itself. The idea that science and empiricism are only “beliefs”, the attack on comparing human groups to those of primates and other species, the attack on beliefs of cultural “evolution”, the attack on predictions of human behavior using nature and science, and the belief that cultures are “socially constructed” rather than subject to natural and environmental determinants, are basic Christian religious beliefs.

Teaching and research in social sciences today have largely returned to the methods and approaches of Church scholarship that predate the opening of the university to social science (and to Jews in the 20th century). There’s little or no laboratory testing, little hypothesis testing, little modeling, little thought experimentation. There is no real empowerment of students through objective skills learning or democratic experiential education (Lempert, 1995). There are few student-designed community protection projects. Instead, students are channeled into existing organizations as low level assistants and trained for obedience to dogma and to narcissistic philosophy. What is taught today is semantics, “deconstruction” and paralysis rather than entrepreneurship for social change. That is akin to Church scholarship. Current scholars are reinventing the wheel and treating symptoms and offering philosophies and definitions rather than addressing any root causes of contemporary problems such as genocides and inequalities.

In economics and political science, while there are dogmas about human nature that are not allowed to be tested or examined (that of “profit maximizing” or “utility maximizing” individuals, putting unlimited greed above community or society), in anthropology, the dogma is that all cultures and societies are “social constructions” created in the mind and imposed by the mind and perception, also apart from biology or environment. The current ideology is that history cannot be used as a comparison with modern conditions in order to model and predict contemporary societies in order to be able to change them, because we are at the highest point of creation, in a “post-modern” age that is distinct and incomparable. In the context of this set of ideological beliefs, most applications and tools that would promote sustainability or co-existence or social progress find themselves labeled as sacrilegious, or “hegemonic”. The only way to examine reality is through “metaphors” of power; to “deconstruct” rather than to reconstruct and create. At the same time, political labels are the norm given that scientific comparisons are forbidden. In American social science, political terms like “socialism” and “post-socialism” are used
in place of scientific concepts in order to use scholars to perpetuate divides with Eastern Europe and prevent comparisons with U.S. This is theology.

What is left in place of social science is journalism and philosophy (Duncan, 2011). Power can be documented but not held accountable. Indeed, anthropologists now view it as “immoral” to write about those who exercise power or to attempt change other than that benefitting one’s own group interests. Area studies is promoted for foreign policy and domestic reporting, not for theory and hypothesis testing.

If there are any Jews among the names of leaders in fields like anthropology, they are no longer empirical social scientists but philosophers. Even in Israel, Jewish social scientists have also abandoned the traditions established by Jews, in an effort to gain recognition from American colleagues in fields now dominated by a very different tradition.

Within social and cultural anthropology today, for example, some of the more recent Jewish icons are Clifford Geertz (half-Jewish), Paul Rabinow and Sherry Ortner. These are Jews whose reputations rose as they offered attacks on the scientific method and turn to anthropology as literature, philosophy, and introspection with little or no practical application or solutions to the intellectual problems posed by the discipline.

Indeed, one of the reasons that the American Anthropological Association is able to cover up what has been happening and to pretend it has not occurred, is to point to the few Jews who were on the side of the Israeli boycott, as “evidence” that there is no anti-Semitism in the profession. Others simply say that Jews “choose” to no longer enter social sciences because of some unexplained lack of interest. Such a view fails to recognize that the destruction of empirical social science and the purging of Jews may itself be the signal to Jews that their views are unwelcome. Jews may view the disciplines not only as unwelcoming but also lacking in prestige and salary, and on the downslide, in comparison to other disciplines in the university where Jews traditionally excel and where they seem to still be “disproportionately” (but not “over”) represented.

**Discussion: Has This Topic Been Suppressed?**

Why is it that Jews are silent about these changes? With calls to ban Israeli institutions for discrimination against Palestinians, how is it that a discriminatory purge against Jews and Jewish approaches in social sciences like anthropology are not even discussed by Jews in a form of solidarity to promote Jews?

Every minority group in the social sciences, with one exception, now advocates for its members to create a promotion network for positions in a patronage system reminiscent of (and perhaps no different from) the “old boys’ network” that they sought to challenge. The exception is Jews. There is no group of Jewish anthropologists or Jewish social scientists protecting or promoting the interests of Jews. Jews seem to be afraid to draw attention to themselves in this way and to protect each other or to advocate for a specific Jewish view of social science and social justice through social science.

Jewish-American academics appear to see no evil, hear no evil and speak of no evil. I know the issue has been raised to many of them, with appeals to Jews to stand up to protect Jews. They appear to recognize the issues presented in this article and do not disagree that Jews are disappearing from these professions. Yet, those asked uniformly respond that they do not wish to even mention the issue of anti-Semitism, let alone work for any solidarity among Jews in the way that other groups support each other.

It may be that Jews are unable to admit that the stated goals of equality have failed to promote social justice and that decisions by Jews have been a part of the problem. Many Jews were the instigators of these changes, in the name of “social progress”. It may be hard to admit that something far different and potentially far more dangerous has occurred and continues to occur. As in Europe in the 1930’s, Jews remain silent, perhaps hoping that problems will just go away and pretending that they do not exist; hoping they will be able to assimilate and not be noticed or targeted.

There is a sympathetic way to look at the bind that Jewish academics may find they are in. The position of Jews is unlike that of other ethnic groups.
First, if Jews still recognize the tradition of science and objectivity as the path towards “perfecting the world” in the Jewish tradition of social justice and progress, the last thing they would want to do is to be part of a system that simply argues for “representation” of ethnic groups as the key to progress in the disciplines. The Jewish approach was to create a non-sectarian social science that would raise everyone together by pursuing “truth” and solutions. A “multi-sectarian”, fragmented social science in multiple directions of advocacy and self-interest represents the very breakdown of this goal. By turning themselves into just another advocacy group, Jews would be recognizing the failure of the Jewish ideal and its replacement with just self-interest advocacy and narcissism. If this is where we are today, and it may be, how could Jewish intellectuals admit it and join it?

Second, Jews may find themselves at greater risks today if they self-identify. If the gutting of the social sciences is an attack on the idea of science itself, and a return to an anti-Darwinian belief that denies a kind of evolutionary “determinism” and replaces it with the view of the Church, Jews may truly be more vulnerable than ever before because they represent challenge to a unifying religious dogma. Calling attention to themselves may be a real danger, for individuals and for Jews as a whole. Faced with such dangers, the approach of Jews is typically to avoid attention and to try to blend in, as the safest strategy for survival.

It may be one thing for blacks or Latinos or Asians to make demands for greater representation. These groups are already large percentages of the populations in the U.S. and Western countries or they have links to large populations, elsewhere. By contrast, Jews are a very small group.

For Jews to make the argument that they are deserving of a return to over-representation because their contribution has been more valuable to the professions, that it represents the heart of progress of the professions, and is also at the basis of social change, in an era where the “powers that be” have turned back the clock to destroy social change, if not the planet with it, may be courting danger. It would be reasonable for Jews to fear that they would be inviting exactly that backlash against Jews that has occurred regularly throughout history in the Western world.

Whatever the reason, Jews remain silent today, offering little challenge to the “politically correct” ideologies of “progress” and “social justice” offered by other groups, though they may be little more than myths.

**Conclusion**

Anthropologists try to step “outside” of their own cultures to take a broader perspective, as if they were seeing their own cultures for the first time, without being fixed in the existing debates and discourse. In the U.S. and Western Europe, the debate over multi-culturalism as it has been applied in universities and in other areas in society has been fixed into a polarized debate. One must either be entirely for it or entirely against it, with the risk that any critics are described as “racist” or “sexist” and wanting to return to “the past” in a reversal of what is assumed without any debate to be a sign of “progress”. There are different forms of multi-culturalism and reform, including the one that minorities and women promised but have apparently not followed, to transform science and technologies so as to achieve humanistic goals of cultural sustainability, economic equality, political reform, and peace. The promise was not to replace social science and its technical applications with only humanities subjects, each promoting study of a different group. But who, today, can or will promote it, particularly after nearly thirty years of attacks.

Criticism of what has happened is so controlling that it has been described in the very terms that everyone understands and that harks back to thinking in totalitarian states: “political correctness”. How is it that such controls on thinking and critique could come to characterize what is supposed to be “progressive” social change towards more openness?

As seen from the outside, viewed as a whole, the answer seems to be that the multi-cultural path that was chosen seems to be one almost entirely in line with the growing wealth, power, and authority of elites that is everything but social progress. The multi-culturalism that we find today in university disciplines like anthropology and sociology appears from the outside to have substituted an ideology of “social
“justice” for real social justice, in a way that covers up a regressive, globalist agenda and suppresses any debate on what has happened by targeting critics as “racist” or “sexist”.

Those who have benefitted from this new form of “multi-culturalism” (that seems to be closer to “assimilation” or perhaps “tokenism” rather than an introduction of multiple cultural approaches to real social transformation) are, of course, the first to attack any critics and to defend the changes. Their arguments are that they have never stopped criticizing globalization and various “isms” that they never really measure or define (primarily “capitalism” and “socialism”). They claim that they have awakened “consciousness” and taught people to “think” and that what they do is on high “moral” ground.

Certainly, this article will face these very attacks.

The challenge to the defenders of this path of multi-culturalism, is to show that after more than a generation, that they have had real, measurable impact on the larger society in ways that are greater than the previous era (post-World War II to the 1970s) in areas of social justice and social progress. Not only can they not show this with any actual data, since all the data shows regress not progress, but they no longer even have the tools to offer measures.

The irony is that this new “morality” has not only come at the expense of the one ethnic group that traditionally fought for and built the infrastructure for social progress, but that its adherents have worked to destroy this infrastructure. They have worked to make the university impotent by attacking science, undermining social science, and eliminating measurement, itself. Given what the measurements now show, they certainly have no incentive now to rebuild a system of measurement.

They will say that what they have done is “moral”, but they have made themselves and their disciplines powerless, if not useless in promoting social progress. They have stripped social science of its science and technology and turned it into something more akin to religion. They can no longer justify what they have done with measures because they no longer believe in measures; viewing measurement (and perhaps civilization, itself) as some form of “oppression” to be eliminated (Strathern, 2000; Engle Merry 2011).

While many of the minorities who have taken positions in academic disciplines may claim to be teaching (or, in politics, representing the interests of) “social justice”, it appears to be empty rhetoric. The larger implications are well reflected in the political acts of members of the AAA against Jewish anthropologists. This is not social change or institution building based on legal or scientific principles. What we are seeing is a destructive political attack without equity and without theoretical basis. We are seeing echoes of the wrongful tactics used by others a century before, but now in the hands of new groups claiming to be more representative but apparently caring only about their own parochial interests; perhaps too co-opted or too cowed to try to look at themselves or to stand up to those powerful actors who are the real source of injustices.

References


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1 The legal review and legal issues raised were discussed with a member of the AAA who is also an attorney and who has asked for confidentiality.

2 The final reported vote was 2,423 against and 2,384 in favor, announced in early June 2016.

3 This standard comes from U.S. law, established by the Supreme Court and defined in the decision, *Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.*, 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The three possible tests of it are: whether the impact is “stark and dramatic”, whether the historical background suggests that discrimination was intended, and whether administrative records demonstrate intent. There are reasons to suggest that each of these three standards are met, independently here, and particularly the first.

4 This is reported by an anonymous member of the AAA.

5 While no better method of ethnic identification is available in the absence of surveys, this method at least has the advantage of consistency in that the same bias (undercounting or over-counting) and is used only for the purpose of historic trends, not to confirm “accuracy”. The author made identification by looking at typical Eastern European Jewish surnames that often use animal totems (“wolf”, “fox”), colors (“white”, “black”, “green”) and link to professions (“stein” for gems work, “sugar”), and common place endings (“stein”) in Germanic, Russian, Hungarian and other Eastern European Slavic forms along with common first names, as well as Israeli names. The most likely bias is to underreport the actual numbers. In an effort to avoid discrimination, Jews in the U.S. and Europe often changed their surnames and adopted common first names as well as
sought to hide their origins through different cosmetic means (e.g., cosmetic surgery, straightening hair). Large numbers of Jews in recent years have also intermarried, though that may only start to affect the data recently given the lag time.

This kind of identification is still sensitive for some Jews since this kind of formal identification of Jews by surnames and physiognomy was used by both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany in carrying out discriminatory (and deadly) policies. It is also likely that the same methods were used up until the early 1970s in college admissions in major universities to enforce what was then an “unofficial” quota (Oren, 1985).

Here, however, there is no attempt to identify and “out” any specific individuals for any discriminatory purpose; in fact the opposite. There is no attempt to invade privacy or to try to force anyone of Jewish ancestry to quantify or define that ancestry. Jews, today, are understandably apprehensive today about identification (e.g., is it best to include Hebrew or Yiddish language skills and Jewish religious education on a list of skills today or is it immediately understood that it is something to be hidden?) and there was no attempt to approach individual to ask them to self-identify.

6 Bucknell University, in Pennsylvania, for example, uses the term “historically underrepresented in higher education” and has a university statement on promoting diversity as well as a special Associate Provost for Diversity. In 2017, the author wrote directly to the Associate Provost for Diversity, the Provost, the Dean of Arts and Sciences, a Programme Chair for an academic hiring slot using this term, and the head of the Human Resources offices as well as a staff member. The Anthropology Department of American University in Washington, D.C., also offered an ad in 2017 noting that “Applications from historically underrepresented minority and identity groups are strongly encouraged to apply”. The author wrote to the Department Chair.
DISTORTING PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENCE
AT THE EXPENSE OF JOY
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST HUMAN BEINGS WITH AUTISM
VIA APPLIED BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS

Essay

KATHLEEN P LEVINSTEIN, PhD, LCSW, LMSW
University of Michigan, Flint

Abstract

Although it is both one of the more “scientific” of the social sciences and also one of the most applied, Psychology has a long history of inventing both “diseases” and “treatments” for them while turning a blind eye to applications that fail to incorporate scientific knowledge and rights-based protections. Despite continued exposure of such practices, they continue to arise, with academics making their careers and practitioners making profits while patients and society suffer some of the consequences. This piece focuses on one of the latest of these modern science fiction horrors in a subfield that has been at continual fault: the mis-definition and treatment of “Autism” in the anti-science practice of “Applied Behavioral Analysis” (“ABA”). While ABA has arisen in the discipline of psychology, it is now authorized by public school educators and provided by unlicensed professionals with the discipline of Psychology failing to establish appropriate review procedures for its practices and educators, service providers (social workers who may or may not be professionals) and government agencies also failing to uphold ethical and legal action. Public and legal oversight have also failed. The author, a Ph.D. social worker, “survivor” of ABA “treatment” and the mother of a child who died from an ABA related injury, addresses the issue directly in this article.
Introduction

Although it is both one of the more “scientific” of the social sciences and also one of the most applied, psychology has a long history of inventing both “diseases” and “treatments” for them while turning a blind eye to applications by “licensed physicians” that fail to incorporate scientific knowledge and rights based protections of those who are unable to give consent or who are intimidated or misled into providing it for their children or others under their care. Among the many recent “diseases” whose objective bases are questioned are: Attention Deficit Disorder; Borderline Personality Disorder or Bipolar disorder, while various “treatments” and “cures” that appear as fads and that are then eliminated because they are found to cause more harms than benefits despite their “scientific” testing include: pre-frontal lobotomies, electric shock, and drug therapies. Indeed, these practices are now outlawed as forms of battery, if not torture. Historically, other “normal” human variations have also been stigmatized as “problems” needing to be "treated" such as left handedness, homo-sexuality, female "hysteria". Despite continued exposure of new practices as harmful without sufficient testing or regulation, they continue to arise, with academics making their careers and practitioners making profits while patients and society suffer some of the consequences.

“Applied Behavioral Analysis” (“ABA”) is one of the relatively recent and ongoing examples. It has arisen within the “social science” of clinical and developmental psychology, yet, most of its practitioners are now unregulated and unlicensed paraprofessionals and care givers, with neither the discipline of psychology nor related fields nor government establishing any real oversight or review procedures. Psychologists have offered plenty of studies of the approaches (failures and advantages) of other alternatives but the discipline has failed to establish any public oversight of treatments like these that it invents and promotes, leaving those decisions to the “market” and to regulations that may or may not exist. Among the practitioners are those in the applied discipline of Social Work that has relatively no information regarding ABA in its curricula but they seem to focus only on dissemination, (i.e., authorizing ABA ) also taking no professional or personal responsibility when the treatments they authorize may be known to be harmful or inferior. Public and legal oversight have also failed.

Despite prestige of being “sciences” and adding intellectual value and professional safeguards, the reality appears to be that there is little accountability and little interest in it, with these professions corrupted by financial incentives and avoiding scrutiny. Although Psychology claims to be a “science” that also has ethical codes for both research and treatments, the discipline appears to this author and presented in evidence below, to be driven not by any effective scientific and ethical oversight but by a desire of practitioners to be free to earn money from new experimental treatments and to then make their careers on measuring the impacts without any personal responsibility for the consequences. My observation and experience, to state it bluntly, is that they have created a science that treats humans as guinea pigs for the self-interest of the “scientists”. It is a definition of “science” that excludes humanistic concerns (Todd, 2013) and is driven by political assumptions about what is “normal” that are filled with conflicts of interest (Dawson, 2004).

The failure reported in this article in the application of ABA to Autistics is one that should not only have been avoided through objective evaluations of the practice, both in ideal form and in actual practice, but in constant reviews and government and legal oversight. Yet, these systems have all failed with harms continuing on a large scale for at least 25 years and perhaps dating back to the inception of the practice some 40 years ago.

What is happening in the “science” of psychology and its applications appears to be that conflicts of interest in funding and lack of any public or internal oversight have led to the science running amok. Such experimentation on human beings and financial influences may be occurring in other disciplines as well, at the level of entire cultures and societies, due to similar incentives and oversight failures.
This piece focuses on one of the latest of these modern science fiction horrors in a subfield that has been at continual fault: the definition and treatment of “autism” in the practice of ABA.

The author, a Ph.D. social worker, an Autistic and “survivor” of ABA “treatment” and the mother of a child who died from an ABA related injury and two other Autistic children, addresses the issue directly in this article using case vignettes and participant observation as a parent of three Autistic children.

The piece will then offer some possible solutions.

**Background**

To understand the failings of Psychology and its applied fields, one needs to understand the role of Psychology, the different applied fields, how they link or do not link with each other, and how they establish standards and oversight or fail to do so. While Psychology started as a social science discipline with scientific-biological approaches, its applications are splintered into different areas: Psychiatry (seen as a medical approach), Social Work (dealing with relationships and social and political context) and Educational approaches such as Applied Behavioral Analysis.

It is within this context that a “treatment” like ABA emerges, with none of these various actors taking actual responsibility while all seek to gain. After briefly reviewing the actors and their lack of accountability, this background section briefly describes how ABA emerged. This provides the setting for presenting the data and analysis that details the failure of this system at all of these levels, using the case of Autism.

**Psychology and its Role in Defining and Reviewing Genetic “Diseases” and Behavioral “Treatments”**

Psychology’s Code of Conduct instructs its practitioners to respect the rights and dignity of all people including those whose vulnerabilities impair autonomous decision making in both research and applications (American Psychological Association 2010).

The Code also advises psychologists to seek the informed consent of patients in practice. Applying this code, however, is problematic in interactions with Autistics, many of whom are unable to provide consent for Applied Behavioral Analysis.

Psychological diagnosis and treatment manuals also advise systematic evaluation of alternative theories, which would promote therapeutic alternatives for Autistic people.

These Codes have failed. While they would require oversight and commitment to procedures, the procedures are voluntary, unenforceable, and unenforced. In fact, there are no incentives to enforce them. The incentives of psychologists are only in introducing and testing treatments. Their financial interest is in obtaining money for this research. They are not trained and take little responsibility for the uses of their work or the economic influences over their research or political interests. They look the other way. It is not their “department” and they do not take responsibility.

This lack of oversight is despite the fact that studies fully recognize that even the process of research and peer review has offered little validity or replicability (Belluz, Plumer, and Resnick, 2016) and particularly in clinical neuroscience where the majority of studies are found to be non-replicable (Rothwell and Martyn, 2000).

The discipline simply opens itself up to financial influences in a direct conflict of interest and undermining of professional review and there is no duty of care to the subjects (or “patients”) they work with. If a client runs out of funds, they can simply terminate the care with no consequence.

**Psychiatry: Licensed Medical Treatment: But for What “Diseases”?:**

Psychiatrists are also involved in the classification of diseases when they fall into categories, like Autism of “neuro-developmental disorders” but they are not involved in any of the care or oversight because “neurological” disorders (or “differences”, which is the term that Autistics prefer) are not “psychiatric” disorders. In other words, where the differences are genetically based without any physical or psychological cause agents, psychiatrists do not take responsibility. It is possible that they could, in the
case of Autism, particularly in defining ABA as a cause of emotional disturbances because of the trauma that it inflicts, but because of the way they define their role, they absolve themselves of responsibility.

In fact, Autistics are routinely mis-diagnosed as having psychiatric disorders that Psychiatrists treat, such as bi-polar disorder, what is called “oppositional defiant disorder”\(^7\), schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, and “mood disorder”, and placed on medications that may result in toxic reactions (including behavioral reactions) that can lead to psychiatric hospitalizations where harmful treatments may be continued or increased. Given the sensitivities that many Autistics have (to light and sound), they may end up in restraints. Yet, there is little accountability.

**Social Work: Unlicensed, Unprofessionalized Free Market “Services”**

In approving therapies that psychologists invent but that are provided by others such as teachers and teachers’ aides, Social Workers, in for-profit organizations, often receiving funding from government agencies (school districts with Autistic children) are subject to certain oversight laws and there are ethics codes for social workers. While there are fewer problems of conflicts of interest, the problem with social worker decisions is that they are often uninformed or without clarity of obligations.

Among recent laws, for example, in the United States, is the Autism CARES Act of 2014 (previously called the “Combating Autism Act” until the terminology was challenged by Autistics) that funds care for Americans ages 2 to 21. This Act, however, is an example of the failures for overseeing therapies. This is a funding bill specific to Autism, not a licensing of all social work treatments. As such, its incentives are financial ones, with service providers seeking to convince school districts to authorize the funds, without direct incentives for protections. The Acts do not require appropriate professional diagnostics consistent with state of the art diagnostics of each Autistic, nor awareness of all of the treatments. There are no provisions assuring that parents are fully informed of all of the diagnoses and treatments and the incentives are for the agencies and service providers to act on behalf of the parents.

Social Workers, if they decide to join an association, may an (unenforceable) code of ethics and they are generally trained to be advocates. However, there is no obligation that they are licensed or continually trained in the services that they authorize or that they oversee. Moreover, Social Workers are not required to belong to any professional licensing organization that regulates them. They often authorize interventions like ABA without ever having seen it or even knowing what it does or what its consequences might be. While the National Association of Social Workers now has an edict, as of 2014, against Social Workers authorizing ABA, not all Social Workers belong to the NASW or that they follow its determinations even if they do. There is also no clarity, in dealing with children, as to whether the Social Workers have a duty of care to the children (and with Autistic children, they are often non-verbal) or to their parents.

**Educational Approaches: Licensed and Unlicensed, Including ABA**

Public schools in the U.S. and elsewhere, in efforts to find solutions to help the disabled, have now also become the decision-makers on the type of “education”, “therapies” and “treatments” that are offered (and administered) to children. In doing so, they respond to administrative and bureaucratic pressures to “provide” services and to contract with providers but have few specific safeguards or oversight assuring that what they offer is state of the art or in the best interests of the children.

As educators, their incentive is not to choose appropriate “care” and “therapy”. It is, instead, to look for work as educators. That means that they have an incentive to promote approaches like ABA that offers them work in providing a “teaching” approach to try to change Autistics so that they can “do more”, rather than to offer them “therapies” that just allow them to feel more comfortable with themselves and their environments. They rely on the Social Workers to authorize their work and then they (teachers and teachers’ aides, often without even high school diplomas) offer “teaching” like ABA.

Anything and everything that changes behaviors may be introduced in schools and in the marketplace in countries like the U.S. and described as behavioral services or treatments or forms of “education”
whether or not they actually meet any of these definitions. These all compete in the “marketplace” for recognition, funding and approval without restriction. Those that are able to be mass produced, offer “efficiency” in application, and can most actively lobby government are those that are the “winners” in being applied, whether or not they meet standards and laws for being “humane” or for actually being the highest quality or cost effective. Moreover, the interests and abilities in this system do not start with those of the child, since they are not the paying clients with political power or effective legal protection.

The Emergence of “Treatments” like ABA in this Setting

Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA), a multi-billion dollar industry in the United States, is based on the work of Dr. O. Ivar Lovaas, a clinical psychologist and graduate of the University of Washington in the 1970s and then professor at the University of California, Los Angeles. It is an example of how “treatments” emerge in psychology and then enter the private sector as well as public funding, without any oversight. Though there have been some spinoffs of ABA, now broadly defined as “Discrete Trial Training”, the basics of ABA continue and this article will focus specifically on this practice.

ABA is essentially a practice of introducing trauma (pain and punishments) in order to change a behavior that society determines (with a claim to a scientific basis) needs to be changed. While such kinds of actions would ordinarily be considered assault, battery and even torture (“The action or practice of inflicting severe pain on someone …in order to force them to do or say something”) when used without consent, these activities are re-classified as “treatments” or “therapies” when psychologists label them as having some kind of social or behavioral benefit. The problem is establishing what the standards are for making this determination, how consent is given, who applies it and with what expertise and under what conditions, how it can be challenged and verified, and how the public and individuals being treated are actually “protected”. That is where major questions are raised.

Before examining what “Autism” is, how it is defined and how one determines whether a “treatment” or “therapy” is even appropriate for this genetic “difference” (or “disorder” or “disability”, which are all parts of the questions of this “scientific process”), it is important just to place in context how an activity like ABA somehow even emerges as a “service” offered freely in the marketplace in a country like the U.S. and how widespread it is.

In fact, no one really knows how many practitioners there are of ABA other than perhaps some people in the industry who study their “competitors” to learn how they can increase their “market share”. It is a “service product” without regulation that is sold to school districts, parents and individuals through a number of providers who may specialize in it and other kinds of “therapies” for behaviors considered abnormal ranging from dyslexia to depression. In the U.S., the American Board of Behavioral Psychology offers certificates to those who wish to enhance their employability but these are not licenses and there is no requirement for practitioners to have them. In 2012, some 1,817 people sought these certificates compared to 3,184 in 2014 and they include people in positions of “counselors, school psychologists, special education teachers and teaching assistants (U.S. Behavior Analyst Workforce, 2014). But no one knows how this translates into practitioners of specific services.

Today, ABA is largely approved by these unlicensed paraprofessionals, many of them only just paraprofessionals (staff persons supervised, in theory, by Masters or Ph.D. level Psychologists) with no advanced or degrees in Education or Psychology, who may be trained by others with a similar lack of professional training and no obligations. They are also not psychotherapists and not providers of any mental health training. These paraprofessionals who then offer the services (teachers and teachers’ aides) are, in turn, supposed to be supervised by Masters-level Board Certified Behavior Analysts (BCBAs) and occasionally at the doctoral level, who are usually only educators and, less often, psychologists; again with the provider organizations having to meet no requirements for whom they hire or whether or how they are licensed. In truth, “supervision” often includes one initial observation of the child by the BCBAs; however, this is often not the case, and often there is no observation of the child by the supervisor.
The fact that ABA trainers are not therapists or Social Workers is key in understanding the fundamental value differences and philosophies between education and social work vis a vis respect for human beings and self-determination that leads to conflicts in determinations with interventions like ABA. Even if one were to argue that ABA paraprofessionals and trainers are helping people with Autism, they are helping them through a form of training or education, not through a therapeutic venue.

Overall, the approach seems to follow that of a business rather than that of a client-focused professional service. In working with the nation’s largest insurer in this area, the author observed ABA practices at work, for a period of some four years, from October 2010 to July 2014. The initial observation, when it does occur, often happens by Skype or by telephone. Increasingly, there are paid reviewers involved who have neither met the child, the ABA trainer, nor the supervisor, and may conduct 50 reviews a day on Autistics, aged 2 to 21 from across the United States, often providing the exact same treatment plan for each client. ABA has clearly become a large-scale, mass-produced assembly line. In the case of offering ABA for Autistics, the BCBA also do not have Autism, but they have decided, in furtherance of their business interests in providing their services, that they know best in terms of what people with Autism need to learn.

In the 1970s, Lovaas began by identifying a behavior that did not fit the definition of “normal” and he picked an approach for human experimentation to see if he could change it. Then he sought government money to run the experiments. The original “abnormal” population he chose was “gay children” and the approach he chose was to use “aversive stimuli” that were painful and unpleasant to see if he could force children to change the behaviors. He then had the chance to move on with the approach to other “abnormal” populations and to seek additional funds.

Dr. Lovaas’s initial work at UCLA in the 1970s “curing” gay children was generously funded by the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). This comprehensive and intensive behavioral intervention used the principles of operant conditioning to displace feminine, homosexual maladaptive behaviors, which were punished and replaced with more masculine, heterosexual behaviors and were then rewarded (Rekers and Lovaas, 1974). Dr. Lovaas and (1987) claimed that these children eventually became “indistinguishable from their peers”. He also presided over gay conversion camps, which are still in existence today in the United States, attempting to make gay and lesbian youth heterosexual.

The approaches that Lovaas originally used included not only hitting gay children (corporal punishment) but also electric shock. At the time in California in the 1970s, homosexuality was still a “crime”, so Lovaas was able to claim that his work was deterring criminal behavior. Indeed, Lovaas later objected (apparently on religious grounds) to homosexuality being removed later from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders since he viewed it as a disease.

Lovaas (1974) lamented that he was unable by law to hit the children harder, particularly one female Autistic child whom he referred to as fat. In that case, the authorities finally intervened and forbade Lovaas from further use of corporal punishment, though his aversive treatments continued to use other unpleasant stimuli beside physical violence on the body.

Ultimately, the gay community, starting with the Gay Activist Alliance (GAA) fought Lovaas and convinced the public that the “abnormal” behavior of being gay was in fact just another aspect of normal human behavior and the “treatment” was in fact a form of abuse. But that did not stop the very same “treatments” from being applied to other populations whose advocates were less politically vocal; non-verbal, Autistic children. Indeed, the only oversight of these experiments and treatment is community political pressure on a case by case basis by the minority population that faces it.

When the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) terminated his funding in 1976 due to complaints of excessive use of corporal punishment against children, Lovaas expanded his techniques to “Autistic” children, using similar characterizations and approaches. This same phrase that Lovaas used in the treatment of homosexuals was also used to describe Autistics who are currently forced to undergo ABA: the goal of making them “indistinguishable from their peers” (Lovaas, 1987). In fact, this is the current stated goal of ABA treatment; the most effective punishments with both populations, per Lovaas, were spanking or hitting the children.
At the Expense of Joy

Although some of these regimes have changed over time, the underlying philosophy of studies that seek to justify the “effectiveness” of punitive techniques on children in creating “desirable behaviors” (as defined by the experimenters) continues. Among them is an often cited study today, from 2005, that stereotyped children as having “serious behavioral problems” that were not investigated, in order to justify the punitive “treatments” (Hanley, Piazza, Fisher and Maglieri, 2005).

Methodology: Examining a Failure of Applied Behavioral Analysis in a Case Study:

This article is written from the perspective of a participant observer who is a practicing social worker observing ABA treatments, an Autistic and “survivor” of ABA “treatment”, and the parent of three Autistic children and the mother of one child who died from an ABA related injury and two other Autistic children. The author does not claim to be “objective” but offers observations from the perspectives of a professional participant, patient and caregiver, reflecting on each of these perspectives with case vignettes and documented studies. Much of what needs to be documented for the “experts” such as the relationship between ABA and deaths is simply not available as “peer reviewed” scholarship because the victims do not have the power and privilege to complete peer reviewed research while their experiences and those of their parents are invalidated because they do not have the same political authority and voice as those controlling the “treatments” and the reviews. In working with the nation’s largest insurer in this area, the author observed ABA practices at work, for a period of some four years, from Oct 2010-July. The author seeks to provide the missing voice from the perspective of an observer.

The piece offers the definition of Autism, provides a short vignette that highlights the problems of how it is “treated” in the U.S. under the rubric of ABA, then examines the reality of “treatments” in practice in the face of research studies that show a disconnect between the studies and the applications. The author then addresses some of the root causes of the problems of scientific and oversight failures at many levels, and offers some solutions.

While the practice of ABA is the specific focus of this essay, ABA is not the “only” “treatment” for Autism. The point of this essay is to challenge the mindset of practitioners that focuses on finding something that “works” that they define for others, but without considering the ethics and human costs and their faulty definitions of “science”. Although ABA continually attempts to rebrand itself as the gentler, kinder ABA (in response to complaints of human and ethical rights violations from both Autistics as well as others), its historical origins and underlying belief system, including its use of authority to design what is “normal” and the freedoms that people have to live with their differences are clearly at odds with the human rights perspective.

What is Autism and Who Defines It?

The lack of agreement among Autistics, themselves, psychologists, educators, ABA practitioners, and society itself itself suggests the inherent politicization of psychology in determinations of what is “normal” and what is “acceptable” and how these terms can be abused.

Autistics have a biological difference that limits their ability to communicate in ways that are normal or “neuro-typical” (i.e., like 80% of the current population, which is simply a statistical measure of human variation and nothing more). In fact, many Autistics see it as a neurological difference that carries with it many strengths including honesty, loyalty the ability to hyper-focus and a higher level morality that does not allow for cheating.

According to the American Psychiatric Association (2013), Autism (or the “autistic spectrum”) is a range of “neuro-developmental disorders” including a difficulty in interpersonal communications and social awareness and repetitive behaviors. Some 1.5% of American children are now considered to exhibit various forms of autism, though the range of difficulties has wide variation given differences in intellectual abilities and specific behaviors (Center for Disease Control, 2014). In viewing Autism as a “disorder”, Autistics note that it is simply a genetic “difference” that makes it difficult to feel comfortable with particular surroundings.
By contrast, the mis-definition used by ABA is one that focuses on undesirable behaviors to be eliminated, rather than on a biological-genetic determination and a diagnostic of some 250 different syndromes. The behaviors that Autistics are supposed to lose include any behaviors which make them visible as being Autistic, including rocking (tremendously self-soothing) and hand flapping. These self-stimulatory behaviors are often referred to as “stimming” in ABA language, and are considered undesirable because they result in pleasure for Autistics and withdrawal from neuro-typical people. Many of these behaviors (e.g., hand flapping or gaze aversion) are simply part of the repertoire of Autistics for maintaining their own sense of balance. When Autistics are stripped of these self-soothing mechanisms that are vital to their sense of well-being, they suffer.

A Vignette: The Human Cost of Applied Behavioral Analysis

“They Murdered My Son”
*A Case Report of How the “Science” of ABA “Treats” Autistic Children*

My son loved watching Willie Nelson music videos and would shriek with joy whenever Willie appeared on the screen. He loved riding in the car with my husband. If he had been permitted to jump on a trampoline, swing on a swing, go in the pool to swim (which he also enjoyed), or listen to music, he would be alive today. Not only would he be alive but he would not have spent his entire life suffering because of people being wedded to an ideology that does not work for a large number of Autistics. All of these activities are those that are now approved as therapies for Autistics like my son. But he did not have the chance to reach adulthood and enjoy his life with these approaches and there are thousands, maybe tens of thousands of children like him who have not and perhaps will not because of the way the “science” of psychology and the decisions of “treatments” of educators and social workers continue to act, for their benefit, but without real oversight or even information. The system we live in today is intent on “curing” them with “treatments” that do not recognize their abilities or differences and that inflict pain that would be considered criminal battery in any other circumstances, in doing so.

My son was diagnosed at age 2 with Autism. Until his death from a fatal head injury sustained during ABA, and possibly several injuries that were never reported and that contributed to harm him over years, he never spoke, never was able to go to the bathroom, feed or dress himself. The “treatments” were all designed to turn him into a “normal” child and to inflict punishments on him in order to induce him to do so. That belief had nothing to do with the reality, but no one in the system of devising and approving and implementing these treatments was ever checked by the reality, and not even in the courts despite several cases my husband and I brought over the 22 years of my son’s life.

My son had an IQ of 10 but no one ever told me that as a parent. All they told me was that he needed “treatments” to become normal. No one (neither the educators who enforced the treatment without any training, nor the social workers who administered it, also without training) ever told me that such “treatments” have no benefit for children with low IQ’s. Nor were they required to have my son’s IQ evaluated as a precondition in determining and authorizing treatment. Nor did the authorities nor the courts enforcing and authorizing funds for ABA ever demand or require such determinations for the benefits of my child or for other parents’ children. In fact, ABA trainers advise that there is no way to determine IQ and that 40 hours a week of ABA for a 2 year old at a minimum are required and are in fact the only hope for a child to develop speech and the ability to go the bathroom unassisted.
Psychologists who conducted studies ultimately understood all of this, years after these ABA treatments were being promoted and funded, but they also had no obligation to use what they knew to protect anyone. Nor did the original “inventors” of the treatment, who made their careers and gained lucrative research contracts. Unlike testing of drugs before they are authorized for sale, there is no government testing of treatments that create emotional distress or fear in unwilling and unsuspecting children, before these treatments are marketed to school districts and forced on already distraught and vulnerable parents.

At age 3, a year after these “treatments” began my son became frustrated at being restrained in a chair. He had no capacity to understand the demands of his ABA trainer, with only a General Equivalency Diploma from High School in his special education classroom. He banged his head out of frustration, which is also a common reaction. In doing so, he split his head open, coming very close to losing his eye. He required numerous stiches to his head, and was unable to swim; something that he loved and then never wanted to do again as he started to recover as his pattern had been interrupted. This was perhaps the largest loss in his life prior to finally murdering him.

Over the next several years, I went to court five times in an attempt to halt the administration of ABA and to protect my son against continued injuries. At one point, rather than examining the impact of the ABA on my son, the school district investigated me, instead, through Child Protective Services, seeking to blame me and my husband for being neglectful parents unwilling to “save” our son.

This situation continued for several years and my son sustained numerous injuries. By the time he reached the age of 21, he was 6’ 6” and 260 pounds. It was only at this point and with videos of his reactions to the ABA treatment that we were allowed to home school him. But by that time, the harms that were to cause his death had already been done. Head injuries suffered as a response to ABA led to a slow, torturous death over a period of 13 months.

How many more unprotected children will die from this treatment or the next one promoted by psychological research and service providers, both of whom have financial interests in promoting the treatments but no liability for the consequences.
"Touch Red"
(An Example of ABA “Treatment” at Work)

“Touch Red” is often a beginning command utilized in ABA, which assumes that the person who is commanded has receptive language skills and is able to distinguish colors and understands the concept of “touch”. Putting these together is, in fact, a complex intellectual process. This command is repeated over and over again by ABA trainers, thousands of times, while the Autistic is restrained.

An even greater assumption is that this is good for the Autistic person, which is an imposition of neuro-typical values and has caused great harm to Autistics. The philosophy behind the restraint and the commands is that the person with Autism will be able to generalize the learning and will then seek to follow the command. With Autistics, both assumptions are false, so the repeated command by the person administering them is often an example of a psychological deficit among the person making the commands (inability to recognize reality and inability to learn from repeated experience). Increasingly, the continuation of this by the person making the commands may reach a level of either exploitation of the child (inflicting the treatment as a way to earn funds) or abuse and enjoyment of inflicting abuse (what psychiatrists might diagnose but do not, as psychopathic behaviors by the “trainer”).

Another example of a beginning command is “Look at me”. This is viscerally painful for many Autistics, yet they comply because it is expected of them, despite the pain. In the Autistic community, such self-protection is referred to as “gaze aversion”, not the “lack of eye contact” as the ABA trainers classify it. Here, again, the ABA trainer assumes that the person has the capacity for receptive language and is being willful and non-compliant if he or she does not look at the ABA trainer. That assumption is false.

A Modern Horror Story: ABA and the “Treatment” of “Autism”

Despite more than 25 years of studies showing not only that the ABA approach to autism is a failure but that it uses techniques that Social Workers deplore and courts and prosecutors would sanction as “battery” and “infliction of emotional distress” if not “fraud”, the process has continued unabated. How is it that years of studies of failure and of the existence of better therapies could fail to result in actual impact on practices? It appears that “research” rewards the researchers for inventing new theories and trying to promote them as well as for then studying their failures, but not one that provides rewards for protecting and promoting benefits to the public.

Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) has always been grounded in human and civil rights violations from the beginning of its practice because the harms that the “treatment” causes were directly hidden by the “scientific” measurement used for success. Here is why. Autistics have an acute sense of hearing, light and touch sensitivity. That means that the use of such stimuli in ways that create aversion to it (e.g., bright light) force reactions that lead to compliance with the goals of the person creating this trauma. While this response is an automatic one and not an example of human interactions, Lovaas’ studies labeled these reactions as a “success” in treatment that was published in the literature without challenge, perhaps given the funding and prestige of the institutions behind it. What Lovaas actually “proved” in his scientific publications was something already very well-known and did need additional validation: it is relatively easy to terrify children. This historical context is crucial to understanding present ABA, as well as the present corporate industry’s attempts to distance themselves from their historical origins.
Only in 1991, some 15 years after the initial studies, did researchers from Rutgers, including the well-known behaviorists Sandra Harris and Jan Handelman, publish a study about the consequences of the use of aversive stimuli (i.e., stimuli with punitive and painful consequences that people normally seek to avoid such as bright lights or loud noises, many of these are described below) in Autism programs, comparing the morale and job satisfaction of more than 100 staff members. In their study, the staff was divided into those who could use only mild aversive stimuli, and those who could use severe aversive stimuli on their Autistic clients. Severe aversive stimuli included, but were not limited to, slapping, pinching, electric shocks, noxious odors, noxious liquids, and hair pulls (Harris, Handelman, Gill, & Fong, 1991). Restraints were removed from the scope of the study when no one involved could decide whether their use on Autistics constituted mild or severe aversive stimuli. The researchers discovered that staff members who applied severe aversive stimuli were happiest and reported less job-related stress and greater personal accomplishment. In fact, the longer the staff members who worked in the programs being studied had been using aversive stimuli on their Autistic clients, the more personally accomplished they reported being. The authors concluded that allowing staff to use a wide range of interventions, including strong aversives, may diminish job stress and enhance one’s sense of personal efficacy, suggesting a certain personality type that is attracted to the control and domination inherent in ABA “therapies”.

Nearly two more decades went by, but the findings of this study seem to have had no impact on any regulation of the practice of ABA or its choice for use in treatment.

City University of New York researcher Brown (2008) observed the very same flaws again and reported them again, nearly two decades later. ABA providers are more likely to be comfortable with the use of aversives, including restraint, seclusion, and food, water, and sensory deprivation, as well as electroshock, particularly against the disabled, who are often seen as, in Lovaas’ (1974) words, less than human. “You see, you start pretty much from scratch when you work with an Autistic child. You have a person on the physical sense, they have hair nose and a mouth but they are not really human in the psychological sense,” Lovaas claimed in an interview. "After you hit a child, you can't just get up and leave him; you are hooked to that kid". (Chance, Psychology Today, 1974)

Despite this evidence, Social Workers at insurance companies have been authorizing hundreds of millions of dollars for ABA treatment without ever having seen the practice in action. They are often surprised when they are informed that ABA requires physical restraint—often of two-year-olds for 40 hours per week and upwards. Indeed, as Autistics begin to self-injure in response to this treatment, I observed that the hours recommended for children of different ages were typically increased rather than decreased. Any child development expert will advise that 40 hours per week of restraint for a typical two-year-old is not advisable, much less a two-year-old with Autism, who has significant sensory issues and a high need for vestibular input. These Social Workers believe that they are helping families, yet they sadly are unaware that they may, in fact, be funding criminal battery or perhaps “torture”.

In the reviews that took place that this author observed in working for a company providing ABA services, all Autistic children were determined to “need” a minimum of 40 hours per week of this treatment, never less. There was never a request by the providers to decrease hours, based on the child’s frustration, regression or injury. All of the ABA practitioners were working with the same goal, and one that studies have determined to be impossible to attain for many Autistics: speech utterance.

As these ABA corporations have continued to grow and to become more “efficient” so have they continued to increase the call for treatments without any review, with practitioners often reviewing some 50 cases a day of Autistics they never see and never meet. Often these treatments plans are exactly the same for all 50 children without any recognition of their variations and appropriateness of ABA. ABA practitioners call for the regime without knowing what the syndromes or even the IQ’s are of individual children; meaning that they have no idea of the potential prognosis and implications of the ABA regime. As a practitioner, I was informed over and over by superiors that it was impossible to obtain IQs as the children were too low functioning to do such diagnosis, though I now know that to be absolutely false.

In luring parents and Social Workers to support these treatments in the U.S., the approaches taken by ABA practitioners may in fact be examples of criminal and civil fraud, using high pressure tactics against
people under stress. Parents who are desperate and devastated by having been given no strength-based perspective of Autism, are often told that their child's Autism is a "death sentence" (Autism Now, 2013), but that a reprieve is possible. These parents are told that their afflicted children may be cured but that time is of the essence, and ABA is their last chance. Thus, they are told to obtain a minimum of 40 hours per week of ABA before the opportunity of the developing brain passes. Tragically, by the time they may find out that their child has a 20 IQ or lower, sometimes many years have passed and many millions of dollars have already been spent.

It is very difficult for some parents to accept that their child will never be typical. Rather than being encouraged, ABA practitioners offer parents false hope and tell them not to mourn the typical child that they will never have, the college graduation and the wedding that they will not attend, and the grandchildren that they will never have. By contrast, Social Workers are uniquely trained and experienced in the mourning process and would be much more effective here.

In discussing the basis for his treatment, Rekers and Lovaas (1974) argued in Human Beings with Autism, that practitioners should start from scratch when they work with an Autistic child. He describes patients as persons in the physical sense—they have hair, a nose and a mouth—but not as people in the psychological sense. They advised that one way to look at the job of helping Autistic kids is to see it as a matter of constructing a person, starting with the raw materials and building a person. Lovaas, in borrowing the principles from his earlier punitive and pain inducing approaches to gay children, began to impose similar strictures on children with Autism, a population that many people would argue have an even greater vulnerability.

Applied Behavioral Analysis is an experiment in punitive or “aversive” stimuli (imposing stimuli that people normally avoid) in order to make their claim claiming that half of all children subjected to its methods could be made to look “indistinguishable from their peers” (Rekers & Lovaas, 1974). The crux of the ABA movement is to render people with Autism invisible as a distinct group void of all remnants and gifts of Autism. Nine out of 19 children in Lovaas’ experimental group underwent ABA for 40 hours a week for two or more years.

Despite the facts, the ABA industry has always downplayed and even denied the importance of aversives in achieving this famous 47%. This dubious oft-cited 47% represents the “best” outcomes of Dr Lovaas’ 1987 study: the 9 out of 19 pre-school Autistic children in his experimental group who underwent 40 hours of ABA per week for two or more years. At the end of therapy they were reported to have "recovered" and become indistinguishable from their typical peers. They maintained this result through a battery of tests at the 1993 follow-up. (Of the 40 children in two different control groups, the first getting 10 hours of ABA per week and the second drawn from existing cases in the community, only one from the second group tested as "recovered" in 1987 (Dawson, 2004).)

Nevertheless, Dr. Lovaas and his colleagues have never acknowledged progress through a course of natural developmental for Autism, and also never discussed the importance of intelligences (such as measured by IQ) or specific syndromes to future prognosis. According to studies by the Mayo Clinic (2016), there are some 250 different types of Autistic syndromes, determining for example whether an Austistic child even has the capacity for speech. This approach was not recognized in the initial studies and it continues to be excluded from ABA approaches to diagnosis and treatment, with the assumption that one approach fits all.

Autism is a lifelong neurological disorder (or difference) that no amount of aversive conditioning, torture, or torment will ever be able to “cure.” The underlying physical or genetic condition (the “organic disease” as opposed to the abnormal behavior, or the psychological disorder) will continue throughout the life cycle; however, what sometimes occurs is that if Autistics are frightened and deprived enough, eventually—like dogs or other caged lab animals—they will succumb to their “trainers” out of frustration and utter helplessness, and, as common with any victims of torture, will give the ABA trainer what the trainer has demanded of them. This stress response, however, is possible only in the event that the Autistic has the capacity to give the ABA trainer what they demand. If their IQ is too low, and the Autistics have no receptive language capacity, they will not make the connection that they are supposed
to provide: eye contact, touch red etc. Thus, they may become increasingly frustrated, and may even engage in self-inflicted injury, often for the first time in their lives. This scenario is most likely to result not only in injury and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), but also in depression and Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) due to the constant replications conducted “over and over, day in and day out” (C. Fleischman, personal communication, day, month, 2013). Seclusion, restraint, and aversive stimuli have been proven to be ineffective in modifying behavior, and in fact, actually increase behavior in many children and have the potential to cause physical and long-lasting trauma to the child (Jones & Timbers, 2002; Magee & Ellis, 2001; Natta, Holmbeck, Kupst, Pines, & Schulam, 1990). Yet, ABA does not recognize it.

The ultimate goal, desired not only by the ABA trainer, but, tragically, also by the parents of the person with Autism (who are often ashamed of their child and who desire that they look typical, regardless of the cost in terms of emotional comfort to their child) is forced “normalcy” rather than acceptance of genetic differences that cannot be changed. As with the “treatment” of homosexuality, the basic ideology underlying ABA is a religious and anti-science approach that biological, genetically rooted differences can be “cured” and “eliminated” through punitive and painful techniques. This scientific fallacy is one that remains unchallenged by insurance companies, government policies, educators and by practitioners.

Studies now at least ten years old suggest that ABA treatment may not only be misdirected, but that results may in fact be fraudulent; having no scientific basis and relying on data that failed to include what would have been found from routine control groups. Gernsbacher (2006) advised that the effectiveness of ABA for Autistics is a myth and misconception, because the gains made during the treatment are actually due to the child’s development, rather than ABA. This raises the question of whether ABA, apart from its great expense (projected at $3,380,000 per child now in the United States) and its historical basis in torture, is also completely ineffective.

As the ABA trainers never obtain the IQ and syndrome prior to training, they have no way of understanding if the person they are seeking to train has a 20 or a 200 IQ, has an innate capacity for speech, or has no such capacity. Human beings with Autism are trapped, often by restraint straps that inhibit their movements until they comply. When there is no ability to comply, the person with Autism will often become self-injurious for the first time in their lives. Subsequently, the ABA trainer then advises family members that more ABA is needed to quell these new behaviors. Ironically, if the person with Autism has no capacity to understand the demands, he or she is at even greater risk, and is described as non-compliant. Most often, ABA trainers are unaware that there are multiple syndromes that underlie Autism, and do not understand the importance of obtaining this information prior to beginning the training. For the person with average or borderline IQs who can obey the commands of the ABA trainers, it is at the expense of joy, as expressed by Child Development expert and advocate Dr. Toni Spiotta from Montclair University Child Development Center (personal communication, July 1998).

From a Human and Civil Rights perspective, there are no successes in ABA; there are only broken and traumatized human beings, who do what they are told at the expense of joy. Of course, by social work standards, this is a very high price to pay.

In fact, there are several other therapeutic options that are preferable and that studies confirm as better options. Yet, there are no oversight mechanisms or incentives that work to assure that these alternatives are considered as treatments by professionals. These alternative therapeutic approaches are in fact more humane and suited to both Autistics with lower IQs as well as those with highly evolved sensory systems. They include “floor time” (getting on the floor with a child and gently and respectfully attempting to form a connection and attachment), music therapy, water therapy, animal assisted therapy (introducing cats, not dogs) and vestibular input (physical movement such as swinging or jumping on a trampoline). These therapies, although preferred by Autistics and effective in creating attachment are almost never offered, largely because they seem to require less therapeutic time, meaning lower billings for the providers.

The failure of ABA can be described simply. Autistics have a biological difference that limits their ability to communicate in ways that are normal. Science and law recognize that the way to deal with this
difference is to accept it and to help Autistics and those around them to be tolerant and to adjust to it in constructive ways. ABA stigmatizes it and disregards science and law. The term “behavior as communication” refers to the child’s effort to communicate dislikes, needs, desires etc., but the Autistic child cannot do so because of a communication deficit (i.e., no speech or limited speech). When an Autistic’s behavior is seen merely as bad behavior and not as an effort to communicate, which is how ABA characterizes it, the Autistic can become even more frustrated, thus causing escalation. People who are not properly trained to distinguish these “behaviors” or to decipher the communication attempts can sometimes escalate the Autistic to a critical point where the use of physical and/or mechanical restraint comes into play.

The Problem

Though ABA has arisen outside of the discipline of psychology and its practitioners are “educators”, the discipline has failed to establish appropriate review procedures for ABA’s practices while the applied discipline of Social Work has also failed to uphold ethical and legal action against such practices. Public and legal oversight have also failed in the U.S., even though other countries in northern Europe seem to have avoided many of these problems. In the U.S., the ethics that appear to drive science and to compete with and undermine it are too often financial (itself a kind of “religion”) and religion, itself. Motives of short-term financial gain seem to overcome concern for children and for tolerance at all levels in professions. Meanwhile, there appears to also be a dark undercurrent that calls for obedience and conformity and control, as well as the power of authorities to seek to achieve it in a vulnerable population through the ability to inflict pain. “Science” and “education” appear to be linked with motives of power and control.

At the level of social science – Psychology and Psychiatry – there is a failure to incorporate human obligations to potential victims of treatments, with researchers insulating themselves by claiming that they are only doing “research” that their universities and government funding agencies support. They take no responsibility to the consequences. Their goal is to promote “normality”. Despite the lessons of German (Nazi era) and Russian (Soviet) era psychology and experimentation, it is hard for this author to see how such lessons have been directly incorporated into either self-regulation or oversight in the U.S.

In my view, the values of these two professions that apply the treatments – Social Work and Board Certified behavioral analysis trainers – are also in conflict regarding Applied Behavioral Analysis in ways that undermine public protections. The supervisors — BCBAs — have chosen education rather than Social Work as a profession and adhere to the values of education. As education enters into the field of treatment, there are problems of structure, form and philosophy. ABA was invented by a Psychologist (who was attempting to cure Autistics through aversives as he previously attempted to do with gay males). Now, the "treatment" (like substance abuse) is completed by paraprofessionals (often without even high school diplomas) and is signed off on by Masters level Educational Psychologists.

Educators have a vastly different philosophy than Social Workers- most notably a demand for work rather than a therapeutic stance to protect the recipients of their services. Instead of meeting the child where she or he is there was a demand to look neuro-typical - no matter the level of agony - and hence a lack of support for dignity both of children and the disabled. This is a disciplinary failure as well as a failure on many other levels.

Transferring some of the diagnosis and treatment to Psychiatrists is also not the answer because that profession is also ill suited to it and has also been part of the problem for Autistics. Psychiatrists are not at well versed in Autism. I saw first-hand the misdiagnosis of Autistics daily (with bi-polar disorder, schizophrenia, “oppositional defiant disorder”, “mood disorder”, schizo-affective disorder and “attention deficit hyperactivity disorder”) - and then the resulting prescription of medications that were toxic to Autistics and resulting in self-injurious behaviors, often for the first time in their lives, and ensuing hospitalizations, 4 point restraint and sadly trauma and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Sadly, the misdiagnosis, once in their files, followed them through the rest of their lives, resulting in continuing
hospitalizations (sometimes after only a few days after discharge) and big admissions monies for hospitals. The financial incentives thus work against accurate diagnosis and treatment.

Part of the underlying problem is also that of financial motivations. A few words must be said about the large, "not-for-profit" Autism organizations that are headed by neuro-typical people who uniformly support ABA. Although these organizations raise hundreds of millions of dollars each year, a miniscule amount is delivered for people with Autism to assist the quality of our lives. According to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Autism Research Coordination, only 2.4% of NIH's research funding goes toward research on services, and only 1.5% is directed toward adults with Autism (Autistic Self Advocacy Network, personal communication, April 15, 2014). The money is spent on either “curing” Autism or, even more depressingly, on the prospect of detecting Autism via amniocentesis to ensure that people with Autism will no longer be born. The vast majority of funding through large Autism organizations is funneled to microbiologists working on prenatal testing, which will result in eugenic extermination of people with neurological differences, referred to by Dr. James Watson as curing stupidity Watson (2007) is also famous for his white supremacist comments as well, including his sentiment that Black people do not have the same intelligence as white people. In 1997, Watson also advised that a woman should have the right to abort her unborn child if the tests could determine that the child would be homosexual.

There is also a religious ethic at work that is part of the ABA approach and that directly contradicts approaches of science and law. ABA largely developed to promote religious motives of stigmatizing homosexuality and defining “normal” in keeping with the values of Christianity. Treatments that are punitive and painful are also a part of this religious ethic with religious doctrinal underpinnings and history in religious education in Christian communities. One of the reasons the ABA approach may have been allowed under law in the U.S. is because of this religious approach.

In plural civil societies, there is an opportunity for pressure groups to arise to bring attention to these issues, but that only happens on an individual basis and the impact depends on the power of the groups. That explains why ABA has been eliminated for homosexuals but not for Autistics. There is now a subject of “Disability Studies” that is slowly bringing in these concerns, but it responds to the same funding incentives that are the source of the overall problem.

**Solutions:**

**Bringing Science and the Public Back in to Oversight of Definition and Treatment of Disease**

The long term solutions for protecting the public from failures in the discipline of Psychology and from various applied disciplines working on “treatments” follow directly from the problems. There are also some short term measures that Social Workers can take now to address the harms from current approaches to Autism. Many of these solutions are legal and they are also culture. They require a cultural change towards standards and responsibility and oversight and a social science and professionalism that is subject to public review rather than financial incentives.

Having traveled to other child centered countries such as Denmark, Norway and Sweden countries where ABA is not a profit making enterprise, the situation there looks very different. Not every child is pushed into regimes of ABA and no child who does is ever subject to 40 hours of it (the standard minimum request that I observed in the U.S.). Thus, the ABA problem is a uniquely U.S. problem, driven by failures in American culture, political economy, and regulation. It may also be difficult to change in current U.S. political institutions and culture, including US courts, due to the wrath, the power and the legitimacy of the ABA institutions in the U.S.

Since many of the solutions are clear and can be seen in other countries, there is no need to lay out the solutions but instead to advocate for professionals and individuals to follow the models that are more effective, professional, humane and rights based, that are found elsewhere.
Long Term Structural Solutions:

The social science, globally tells us that ABA definitely does not work in individuals who are non-verbal and will never be. It tells us that diagnosis is needed prior to assigning treatment. It tells us that legal protections in the interests of the child, not the parents or the society, can protect rights and also protect public funds. But in the U.S., the incentive system does not work. These structures need to be changed.

Paraprofessionals should no longer be performing ABA. Prior to writing an initial behavior plan, the Autistic child should see a geneticist to determine syndrome and accompanying IQ. Children who have exclusionary syndromes (and all children) should be offered alternative therapies that are more therapeutic in nature and more respectful of the child. Schools of Social Work should be training on Autistic life and should be utilizing materials written by Autistics as well as inviting Autistics in to make policy and to complete direct instruction with Social Work students.

BCBAS and BCBADS should also be in direct contact with Autistics so that they can hear Autistic responses to ABA. In addition they should be taught alternative therapies. As we have research that indicates that oftentimes people gravitate to ABA due to internal sadism, psychotherapy should be mandated for all ABA licensed practitioners as a means of institutional and cultural change.

Though the U.S. has signed onto most international law, its view of “American exceptionalism” places it above the law and makes its commitments questionable. I am calling upon social scientists and academics to go against the standing social order that tells us that Autism must be cured and the people with Autism should be stripped of every possible defense they have been able to muster and of all of their joy and to follow these international law and ethics.

Even if Social Workers believed that ABA had the capacity to transform a 20 IQ into a 200 IQ, or that ABA had all of the magical properties that the corporate ABA industry and the large multimillion dollar Autism organizations try to convince Social Workers and educators that it does, I would still ask them to oppose this practice, as a Social Work body, on the grounds that it is a Human and Civil Rights violation, and is, in fact, torture as defined by the Geneva Convention Part 4C(e), which outrages against personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment (1949). Acts defined as torture under the Convention are those “by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as … intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity” (U.N. Convention Against Torture, 1949). In the case of Austistics, the sensitivity to stimuli is greater than that or neuro-typical people and they are a discrete minority being targeted directly as a result of this minority status.

Short Term Treatment Options for Autism:

I am also calling upon Social Workers to reconsider responses to a family where a child has recently been diagnosed with Autism. Rather than assisting them in suing their school districts to obtain more ABA (as the large Autism organizations always recommend them to do) and putting them in touch with attorneys to lead this charge, please recommend that they see a geneticist in order to obtain syndrome and IQ. This will ensure that over 95% of the people currently receiving ABA will be spared, and parents will be spared the prospect of collaborating in the torture of their own children. Utilizing a strength-based model for Autism when working with families can educate them as to the many gifts that Autism brings. However, most importantly, I am asking that they oppose the practice of ABA on Human and Civil Rights grounds.
References


Chance, Paul. (1974) "After you hit a child, you can't just get up and leave him; you are hooked to that kid" Interview with O. Ivar Lovv, Psychology Today, 1974)


Note that while this article uses the term “Autistics” which is the choice of Autistics, themselves (ourselves) as to how they (we) prefer to self-identify, there is an ongoing debate over terminology. Professionals prefer to categorize Autistics in a way that Autistics find demeaning and controlling, “People with Autism” as if they/we are diseased and needing of “treatment” of a “disease”. See as http://www.ageofautism.com/2008/08/olmsted-on-au-1.html and http://ncdj.org/style-guide/

Editor’s Note: See the articles in this Special Issue on the discipline of Economics, where the “experimentation” without consent and with financial motives may be on entire populations if not on humanity, itself, in the form of globalization and cultural homogenization.

Most states, if not all states, require informed consent for psychological treatment; and the American Psychological Association, under Standard 3.10, requires informed consent (http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/). Nevertheless, there is a huge disparity between the requirement of consent and the actual protection of children, parents and other caregivers to ensure that these “requirements” are an enforceable reality.

Although it is not the subject of this article, the psychological “disorders” and “diseases” identified by Psychiatry seem to routinely any kind of deviance as “abnormal” and in need of “cures” (e.g., sedatives and other drugs to pacify specific groups) whether or not there is any actual disease agent. There is always the danger of turning political deviance into a disorder (which typically occurred in the Soviet Union) and genetic deviance as a disorder (which typically occurs in empires with minority populations” such as Jews in the Soviet Union, Native Americans and Blacks in the U.S.). “Mood Disorder” and “Oppositional Defiant” disorder are already suggestive in their naming of attempts to suppress dissent and discontent by classifying it as a “disease”.

This is based on the author’s best estimates having worked in the industry. No actual figures are available.

In the case of psychological treatments, the goal is to force a behavior that the professional determines is necessary. Rather than advocating for the boundless amounts of money to fund ABA, we would be better served in assisting families to mourn these expectations and/or celebrate their child with Autism. We need to ask ourselves as Social Workers, however, if the parents’ need to have an indistinguishable child should outweigh the child’s need for integrity and self-determination.

Note that there is also a potential moral dilemma for families in the area of Autism, as genetic technologies improve. Currently, 92% of families who discover that they are having a child with Down syndrome make a decision to terminate the pregnancy (Massachusetts Down Syndrome Congress, 2013). If Autism is able to be detected via amniocentesis, the expectation is that 92% of pregnancies involving a fetus with Autism will also be terminated. This is an urgent moral crisis that necessitates social workers to evaluate our value systems, both individually and collectively, as this is an issue we MUST reconsider-and urgently. Eugenics is not the topic of this work- but as the time is drawing so near for it to any longer be a choice- I am posing the question at this time for urgent consideration.

Against all statistical odds, they advise that each and every child they treat was making progress toward “utterances”.

Editor’s Note: Anyone familiar with the penal system in the U.S. is also aware that it retains the death penalty and supports a huge prison industry. While most other industrial countries focus on “reform” and reintegration of offenders, there is a much larger element in the U.S. for vindictiveness and punishment. The differences in approaches in the U.S. and Europe make this article, in fact, a case study in how culture and religion seems to drive science in a way that undermines objectivity.

http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html
IS ECONOMICS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?
REMAKING ECONOMICS AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE

Introduction
The Inspiration and Need for this Piece

DAVID LEMPERT, PH.D., J.D., M.B.A., E.D. (HON.)

Abstract

This piece is in four parts following this abstract, the Table of Contents and a Short Introduction.
Part I: Is Economics in Violation of International Law? Part I applies a set of systematic international legal principles found in international law to the doctrines of “neo-classical” mainstream economics to test whether the discipline is consistent with those legal principles or would be held to be in violation if brought to trial in an international court of law. The conclusion of this legal analysis is that the discipline is in violation.
Part II: Is there a Current Social Science of Economics in Economics or Elsewhere that Meets the Requirements of Social Science? If Not, Why Not? Part II then holds the discipline of economics to scrutiny as to whether it meets the test of being a “social science” and also applies a similar test to the sub-discipline of “economic anthropology” that has been a response to the ideologies in the discipline of economics. Although both claim to be social sciences, the conclusion is that both have largely become ideological rather than scientific, serving to promote political views (in the case of neo-classical economics, a technical field of national production engineering combined with an ideology to promote it).
Part III: The Rebuilding Process for the Discipline: Where Economics Fits and What is Missing. Part III goes back to the goals of the social sciences and humanities in terms of their areas of analysis and questions for individual disciplines and then offers a new framework for a scientific discipline of economics and a new humanities of economics linked with it. This new economics as an empirical social science for prediction links measures of consumption, production and distribution to biological and ecological principles and replaces the current starting assumptions that are culturally biased “moral precepts.” It moves the discipline forward, beyond its position within industrial market systems where it serves as an ideological and technical tool to promote economic interests of elites in those systems.
Part IV: The Challenge of Institutional and Cultural Change in Academia The piece ends with a discussion pointing to the areas of society that would need to change in order for a scientific and international law compliant discipline to emerge.

Author: Dr. Lempert is a Ph.D. social anthropologist, lawyer and M.B.A. with undergraduate training in Economics and Political Science who has taught undergraduate courses in the disciplines of international development, anthropology, sociology, law, and political science and has designed professional school curricula on four continents. He has worked as a non-profit executive, business and government management consultant and educator for 30 years in more than 30 countries for the UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCHR, UNHCR, World Bank, IFC, Ernst & Young, USAID, EC, Soros Foundation, and several other development organizations and companies on business and market solutions to development. He is also a strategic planner in the business and non-profit sectors. He has published several books and articles on university education and the disciplines and is the founder of several NGOs in education. Please direct all correspondence to: superlemp@alumni.stanford.org.
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Preface

Several years ago while teaching development studies in Washington, D.C., in the United States, I introduced what was considered then to be a controversial exercise testing the “development” approach of international banks and the international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) that partner with them on “income generation” and “poverty alleviation” projects. I asked students to test whether Germany’s government policy in the 1940s would be approved under contemporary “development” investment criteria and economic theory as taught in the university. The specific policy I asked them to test was that of the “public and private partnership” of government cooperating with industry to “relocate” Jews and Roma from their homes to labor camps and for human laboratory medical experiments and then to process the bodies for soap, wigs, and gold from their teeth while confiscating and selling their possessions. I pointed to the specific measures used to value and screen such projects today, noting how they met government objectives and provided for the greater good while increasing the gross domestic product (GDP) and promoting public health in accordance with government plans in a policy of “national sacrifice” to benefit the nation.

Most of the students, trained in economics, seemed to think that such form of economic development would be approved today unless the affected minority somehow had political leverage in the donor countries. They justified their decision on the following criteria that came out of doctrines in basic economics texts:

- The investment would increase productivity as measured by GDP, the standard measure of value, and possibly also promote export industries and trade balances, while also increasing per capita GDP;
- Unemployment figures in the country would drop and the project would “create jobs,” thus demonstrating positive achievements on the economic indicators that are routinely used show improvement;
- Eliminating minorities would reduce “political risk” to investors of internal instability and could also improve “sanitation” and value of the inner cities and former slum areas where minorities had lived, thus also bringing an economic boost to the country. This could also be considered a valuable increase in the value of the country’s “social capital” as would the increased solidarity and efficiency it would bring in other areas.
- The consumption and population balance would also fit new “sustainable development” criteria even though the initial productivity growth would not be sustained.
- The approach fit the contemporary development goals of promoting “business-government” (“public-private”) partnerships, having no negative impact on gender (the standard rights and screening criteria that is prioritized over other rights categories, including that of cultural protections), and would also meet environmental screening conditions.
- “Participatory rural appraisals” that include discussions with local groups would demonstrate that the majority highly favored the approach, thus validating the current criterion that INGOs use for political acceptability, “participation,” “democracy,” and “fit” with “local communities” and “cultures.”
- Though good arguments could be made about the long-term impact of this policy on productivity or on the country’s overall value and assets, the students noted that government and foreign decisions as well as those of the United Nations “Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)” (now the “Sustainable Development Goals (MDGs)” are based on short-term visible benefit in incomes and in “poverty reduction,” with the question of “majority benefit” and short term measures overriding, with any long-term measures considered “speculative” or “political.” Moreover, the short term results would enable the country to quickly reach and receive praise for achieving the MDGs.
- Population movements, land use, and sales of products for export would fit contemporary international development goals for promoting international trade and globalization by relying on the “comparative advantage” of a country (in this case the ability to exploit a minority group), while promoting free mobility of labor and resources.
Population relocations, confiscation of land and other property, forced labor, child labor human experimentation, and all other activities short of genocide would be treated as issues of “national sovereignty” of the country seeking the loan, with all of these actions simply viewed as “political decisions” even if they would be found to be in violation of international treaties signed by the country government (such as the most basic international conventions on child rights or rights of the person). The standard argument justifying activities with similar harmful impacts today is that international actors are showing “respect for local traditions,” “respect for national sovereignty,” and are agreeing to “non-interference with the internal politics” of “sovereign nations.” Moreover, international consultants working on such projects would be forced to sign “confidentiality” agreements to prevent them from raising issues of “politics”, including human rights questions or violations of even national government or donor country laws, during their work on these projects. Even if the loan projects were written by foreigners and endorsed by country governments as a part of various illegal incentive schemes of donor countries to promote approval (military, economic and political pressure or “soft tools” like opportunities for project kickbacks (usually 10 – 20% that occurs after the audit trails of the international lenders hand off control to governments) or disguised payments (“study tours,” “capacity building” and other salary increments to government officials, subsidized taxes to avoid taxation of country elites, equipment, etc.), the decisions would still be protected by a façade of “national sovereignty” and given an unchallenged status on the basis of this “sovereignty.”

Given the “war-time” conditions of Germany, so long as trade was still occurring with the lender nations the unresolved determination of who was the “aggressor” would likely enable Germany to declare the sacrifices of these populations as subjects of human medical experiments or as contributors of slave labor, as “voluntary” under national laws and part of the “national defense” with their deaths described as part of these “sacrifices” and “risks”.

Though genocide is a clear violation of international law, no independent mechanism would allow for the liquidated minorities to initiate direct lawsuits against their own governments or international organizations in international courts or to take the matter successfully to any international bodies unless those governments met the rare criteria of having signed international protocols to be bound by such court jurisdictions. In civil suits, the victimized groups would likely not receive standing in the courts of the donor countries and could not initiate processes against the international lending organizations given their immunity from prosecution, or from the donor governments. Once the donors approved the loans, the presumption would be in the donors’ favor. Only if international bodies were eager to punish the leadership of the country for some other reason (such as nationalization of any foreign investment in concentration camps) would they likely take action. However, since the donor country governments would then also be implicated, the cases would likely be dropped and actions would likely be taken to secure the investments rather than abandon them.

The discussion also elicited comments that decisions of “fairness” or “equity” or “rights” are “political” determinations that have been removed from the study and practice of economics and that were to be considered “elsewhere” (likely nowhere) given that they were “outside of the scope of the work”. Students stressed their “professionalism” and “duty” to avoid making political determinations since these were political and cultural judgments on which the required ethic for economists was to remain “neutral”.

I was reminded of this again recently several months ago in an e-mail I received from Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel Prize winning economist in 2001. Over the past few years, I have completed a series of indicators to be used to screen whether or not international development projects meet international professional and legal criteria, including respect for sovereignty, gender equality and mainstreaming, sustainable development, democracy and other areas affirmed in international treaties as universally binding principles. This series of some 20 published open-access articles now constitutes the first treatise or codification of international development law (Lempert, 2018). Since scoring criteria for
accountability to international law did not previously exist and there is as yet no real infrastructure at all to hold international organizations or governments accountable to international laws and principles in development projects, the call to place existing law in an enforceable codification was long overdue. While I was engaged in the process of sending each of the articles to journals in specialized fields for peer review, I sent one of these that seemed to be the least controversial and most easily based on fundamental international laws for rights protections, to a journal edited by Dr. Stiglitz; the *Journal of Globalization and Development*.

Though Dr. Stiglitz is a minority (Jewish) and should be aware of the events of World War II and the basis of the international legal order that followed, including the United Nations Treaty that criminalizes genocide and establishes protected group rights (U.N., 1948), he is also an economist. In nearly one year from the time I sent my piece for review and made several queries, Stiglitz and his colleagues at the journal were unable to find a single colleague versed in international law and the principles of democracy in globalization and development who could review the article I had sent him. Ultimately, they found only a single reviewer whose central comment, affirmed in later correspondence from Dr. Stiglitz, was both a denial and ignorance of the criminalization of genocide and of the basis of federal and international bodies including the United Nations itself. The reviewer noted, astonishingly, “It is not clear to me that group rights are essential.” The note added that rights recognized by the Genocide Convention “might be ... a worthy goal” but that the balancing of power (i.e., processes of minority rights protection and equity) was not “an end in itself” despite it being defined that way under international law. In the views of the journal, these established legal protections were now seen simply as a means to another ends and that could easily disregarded by a group of economists. Stiglitz did not state what these other ends were that would justify the disregard for the international law outlawing genocide.

Despite contrary views of some economic thinkers, minority and group rights are the basis of international law and the post-World War II international legal consensus. They are, in fact, the founding principle of the U.N. Charter in its affirmation of “self-determination of peoples” and the most basic principle of the international legal system and of rights (U.N. Charter, 1945; Lempert, 2010b) Moreover, the principles of democracy, using process to balance power and establish equity, are straightforward in international rights documents and in most basic textbooks on law and political rights, including those on the basic principles of the U.S. political system.

Professionals in other disciplines to which I sent the same article were in sharp disagreement with Stiglitz and the economists who edit the journal with him. That article has since been peer reviewed by international legal scholars and published (Lempert, 2011a).2

Recently, similar lines of questions have arisen that touch on the moral and legal blinders of professional economists. With the global financial crisis, increasing attention to climate change and global overuse of resources, and the dislocations and suffering that are resultant, public accusations have been launched against economists not only for not predicting or preventing these harms but for causing them through their cheerleading of unrestrained consumption, deregulation, and globalization in ways that appear to destabilize economies and favor corporate interests (Fullbrook, 2009).

As both a social scientist and an international lawyer, I began to raise a single fundamental question and wondered why it had not been examined before.

*If leading economists do not even recognize the fundamental principles of global and national citizenship, have they abandoned basic respect for law to the point where they could (and should) be held accountable for criminal intent and action? Are the discipline of economics and its leading practitioners in violation of international law?*

For years, the “discipline” of economics has come under a variety of attacks from outside and within the profession, on the basis that it might not only be of questionable value, but few have offered a fundamental challenge to the discipline to suggest that it might actually be in criminal violation of the fundamental principles of international law and humanity. *Could it be that the economics profession*...
Is Economics in Violation of International Law?: Introduction

Itself is in violation of international law and in need of sanction or restructuring at the hands of courts and the public, rather than left to its own hands?

Moreover, if it is, how could it have happened that an academic profession that is, itself, considered fundamental to the international order could be directly responsible for undermining it? Could a self proclaimed “science” actually be an organized attempt to design and promote a set of criminal activities? If it were, that would also suggest that economics isn’t a science at all, but something else: an ideology or a religion promoted as a science and offering certain technical tools for criminal acts. Is it? If so, is that why the questions of legality have yet to be raised?

To take the conjecture further, if economics were guilty as charged, what would be the responsibility of a court to rebuild it so that it were actually a neutral and law-abiding social science? If economics today is a criminal enterprise, what would a social science of economics actually look like?

Furthermore, if economists were found guilty of violating international law, who, specifically, would be at fault, and could the discipline even be changed, given the implications of its influence and embeddedness in the culture? Moreover, if there is a problem in the discipline, is it caused by fundamental tenets embedded in the discipline itself, by a select group of economics who have misused neutral principles, or by a socialization process that occurs as one rises up higher in the profession and is taught a hidden curriculum of values? How could they be held accountable?

As a lawyer and anthropologist, originally trained as a “political economist,” I apply a set of systematic international legal principles to the doctrines of “neo-classical” economics as presented by mainstream scholars in the discipline, to test first whether the discipline is consistent with those legal principles and then, whether the discipline meets the standards of objectivity that would classify it as a science.

This introductory section starts with a review of some of the previous approaches, to date, by which economists have been criticized and by which they have or could have or should have been held accountable. Before applying a more extreme form of correction – criminal prosecution as a way to impose public standards on actors that violate them – I review, below, how the preliminary corrective mechanisms that have partly worked in other disciplines to insert public standards and oversight, through self-regulation within disciplines and within the university, have failed in the discipline of economics. The examination of these failures helps to make the case for why prosecution may be the only and best form of imposing standards, and also helps to lay the groundwork for an understanding of what has gone wrong and why the failures may be so hard to fix.

Where a group is resistant to any form of public criticism and oversight and develops its own morality that it seeks to place above public morality, it is likely acting more a religion, ideology or cult than as a science or scholarly discipline. That seems to be what has happened in economics and that is also a topic to be examined here in this piece, following the legal analysis. Moreover, in the case of economics, the connections with authority and finance that this group wields may have served to insulate it from public standards including those of law and morality.

This piece is in four parts, starting with analysis and then moving to solutions.

Part I: Is Economics in Violation of International Law? The first part of this piece applies a legal test, defining the international laws under which the discipline of economics could be held accountable, identifying the elements of the crimes under which a theory of accountability could be constructed, and testing a number of mainstream principles from mainstream economics today and considering how a court could rule. Given the findings of multiple violations, the article moves to a second part, seeking to explain what went wrong in economics as a social science.

Part II: Is There a Current Social Science of Economics in Economics or Elsewhere that Meets the Requirements of Social Science? If Not, Why Not? The second part of the piece seeks to identify how a discipline that is classified as a “science” could violate international law. It puts the discipline of economics to the test to see if it can classify as a scientific discipline or whether it is a set of technical skills combined with ideological or religious beliefs, noting the different possible functions that a
discipline can serve. It notes how economics has become an ideology promoting specific interests. The piece applies a similar test to the sub-discipline of “economic anthropology” that has been a response to the ideologies in the discipline of economics; finding that both have largely become ideological rather than scientific.

- Part III: The Rebuilding Process for the Discipline: Where Economics Fits and What is Missing. The piece then offers a new framework for a scientific discipline of economics and a new humanities of economics to replace the current discipline, that can best be described as a technical field of national production engineering combined with an ideology to promote economic interests of elites in industrial market systems. The new approach that this piece offers – of economics as an empirical social science for prediction and as a humanities to consider the range of human needs and possibilities -- links measures of consumption, production and distribution to biological and ecological principles and replaces the current starting assumptions that are culturally biased “moral precepts.”

- Part IV: The Challenge of Institutional and Cultural Change in Academia. Presenting a solution and a set of measures, in the third part of this piece, offers a vision and a model but that needs to be accompanied by a strategy for institutional and cultural change in order to become a reality. This section discusses what changes beyond just the law are required to reform the discipline of economics, including a cultural assessment of how and why ideological and religious pressures that have protected the current form of the discipline make its transition to a social science so difficult. The piece ends with a short conclusion pointing to the areas of society that would need to change in order for a scientific and international law-compliant discipline of economics to emerge.
Previous Approaches: Critiques of Economics and Failed Oversight of the Discipline

The “test” and critique that I have offered above, in opening this article, highlights an egregious example of where and how professional economists today appear to be blind to international law and to the suffering of those whom such laws exist to protect by criminalizing various forms of genocide and of exploitation of communities and individuals, their resources, lands, and livelihoods. Though critiques like these of the economics profession are not new, such critiques have more often been framed as political attacks on hard to define ideologies like “capitalism” or on specific institutions managed by economists, such as the World Bank Group (including the International Finance Corporation) and other multinational banks also managed by economists, or on individual economists who have served in major political positions and those who follow their particular “school” or approach, on leaders of the financial community (private banks and investment banks), as well as on multi-national corporations who are less directly controlled or run by economists (and Masters of Business Administration) but who are reliant or allied with them. Such critiques usually place blame on specific individuals and institutions or on the countries where they have power and the ideologies they espouse (certain aspects of either “State capitalism” or “military capitalism” or “corporatist capitalism” or “free market capitalism”) rather than on their shared training or teaching in the discipline of economics. If specific behaviors following specific teachings are at fault, then it would seem that the place to focus attention is on specific, illegal, teachings that violate well-established laws and that directly promote shared interests through an advancement hierarchy of influence.

Though there have been some attacks on specific “schools” of thought like those of Milton Friedman and the “Chicago School” (Klein, 2007) and of those who promoted certain economic “theories” associated with economic failures of political actors, like “Reagonomics”, or on other economists and their allies such as the “Keynesians”, these have all been attempts to critique specific political factions rather than examining the mainstream beliefs of the discipline. Contemporary attacks on specific “schools” or on “isms” (like “capitalism”) have diverted attention as to whether any specific mainstream “bi-partisan” doctrines of the discipline are deserving of criticism. Critiques of the economics profession have only very recently begun to draw the link between the overall teachings and political influence and actions of the discipline itself, that have caused harms through direct advancement hierarchies or by creating an enabling environment.

The three short sections that follow offer:
1) a short history of the critiques,
2) a comparison between the response to these critiques within the discipline of economics and that to critiques of other disciplines, offering some hypotheses as to why economists in the past and now have subjected themselves to little self-scrutiny or regulation while some (but not all) other disciplines that are classified as “social sciences do,” followed by
3) a discussion of the existing regulatory approaches for use by universities and general public that have also failed, with some hypotheses as to why they have failed.
The Critiques of Economics

It would be wrong to say that economics as a discipline has been free of criticism or that it has faced less criticism than other disciplines. Indeed, its characterization as the “dismal science,” as useless for prediction, and out of touch with empirical reality are well known, as is the nearly 150 year old criticism by Karl Marx that this “moral science” began with a determination of “value” that was itself inequitable and immoral. Yet, despite the fundamental critique of economics that began at least with Marx on both scientific and moral grounds, these critiques and later ones, in the 1960s, they have led to the formation of other fields or sub-fields rather than fundamental changes in the discipline that address the source of the critique. Challenges of mainstream economics have largely moved outside of the discipline to other fields (environmentalism/ ecology, economic anthropology) or have offered limited patchwork remedies within the discipline that add reality in the form of additional variables (culture and community) or inclusiveness of particular interest groups (women and minorities). Only recently have some of the fundamental challenges to the discipline as irrelevant and in abuse of its doctrines in ways that are morally or legally questionable, begun to reappear inside the discipline itself.

Overview of the Critiques: How to Classify and Interpret them, Historically

In preface to introducing the critiques of economics over time, I try here briefly to place the critiques within a cultural context as a way of interpreting them and the response to them. The historical pattern of critiques of economics and how both the moral and scientific critiques were lodged or ignored, may say as much about the societies in which economics was funded as about the “discipline” itself. There are very different implications in launching critiques against philosophers or mathematical theoreticians with no followers as there are in critiquing leaders of a group that directly advises or acts among those who hold economic and political power in an empire, which is how, in colonial Europe and the expanding United States, the discipline of economics arose. Critiques do not exist independently of this context; they arise from individuals and groups within certain socio-economic contexts. Critiques against economics need to be understood not only for their content but how they are also addressed against a social institution that represents individual power and influence.

Critiques and the response to them need to be examined to establish who launched the critiques, the interests they sought to protect and challenge. No matter how valid critiques may be, they can largely disappear in much the same way as claims of rights or interests if they do not have “standing,” an opportunity to be recorded, heard, and considered along with a process that will offer a remedy. To interpret why economics was a target of attack and whether these critiques were important or meaningful, one has to also interpret the societal role of economics and the status of the profession and its members. If and when economists are part of the structure of power, critiques do not only challenge them on intellectual grounds but also challenge their role as political actors to be held accountable on moral and legal grounds.

Countries with successful economic systems have historically come under criticism for the negative impacts they have had on indigenous peoples and other minority cultures, on the environment, on established mainstream cultural practices, on equity, on opportunity, on choice, and other measures that are among the values that the international system has defined as universal human goals. Criticisms of powerful economic systems for their shortcomings and contradictions generally place the blame on specific nations, institutions, or individuals rather than on economic doctrines but these criticisms do also fall on doctrines and ideologies behind them and vice versa. If specific doctrines promoting specific acts are to blame for specific harms, including violations of international law, the places and disciplines those ideologies are taught might be appropriate places to seek accountability in attempts to punish and prevent harm and should be seen as emerging within that context.

One can characterize the claims against economics back in the 19th century as coming first from educated European minorities in countries that were industrializing and in which there were visible harms. Marx was Jewish. Vladimir (Ulyanov) Lenin and the different political economic philosophers
and activists in late 19th and early 20th century Europe came from a mix of nationalities and from dislocated minority groups. Later challenges to economics, in the 1960s, were often from disappearing small farm communities where lands and environments were being destroyed, from minorities and women seeking employment and economic advantage. Today, disappearing minority cultures and small countries have emerging standing. They bring claims in a context in which economics as a discipline has risen in status with its leading practitioners also becoming closely linked with holders or economic and political power, moving between academia, the financial sector, and the executive branch of domestic and international political institutions.

19th Century Critiques of Economics

In the 19th century, Karl Marx implicitly attacked economics (along with the system of “capitalism” – the corporate interests and inequalities – that they represented) by challenging the discipline’s very measure of “value” as one that reinforced inequity (and implicitly destruction of culture and community). His attacks weren’t directly on the economics profession but on the political economies the discipline supported and he offered them as a sociologist and historian as well as someone looking at economic processes through a different lens. Marx likely saw 19th century economists as ignorant promoters of those with economic and political power, with “false consciousness” about economic realities and economic actors, rather than as direct and knowing enablers of harms. As a social scientist, he suggested that economists starting point for analysis – the measures of market prices – would have no predictive value for historical events. He challenged economists to start their analyses elsewhere and to continue to look at politics and economics as related social wholes rather than to narrow the focus of the discipline to variables he viewed as immoral if not irrelevant (Marx 1970 (1867)). Though he didn’t call for specific sanctions or removal of economists, others who acted in his name in Russia (and the Soviet Union) did.

In their classic works criticizing Western European countries and the U.S. for the harms done to minority cultures and to non-elite families, both Marx and Lenin sought to blame the ideology or “system” of “capitalism” (the term they used to label those industrializing countries) as the cause of the harms, including those related to “imperialism” (Marx, 1970 (1867); Lenin, 1926) Marx never defined individuals who had successfully introduced this new doctrine of economics as subversive or devious or criminal, nor did he seek to criminalize particular approaches. He isolated the factor of corporate economic organization (of “capital”) and partly determined, without clear causal data that this factor, independently, rather than another ideology or cultural process in the overall context of the societies he blamed, and rather than any other independent choice that he could identify in social science variables, was the driving force of militarism and harm. He saw the harms of the then existing economic systems as part of a natural process that he could scientifically observe in societies that were industrializing. The implication of his work was either that no one was responsible for harms other than specific “classes” that emerged, or everyone was responsible.

Following Marx’s introduction of a new approach to measuring and predicting economic phenomena over time, arguments over the starting point of “value” have long characterized critiques of economics and focus of critiques seems to have been on identifying starting points of study while losing the idea of predicting larger economic processes and seeking to find key variables. This discussion over “value” in industrial economies has remained a major line of study in disciplines that seek to counter economics, like “Economic Anthropology.” It seems to have rooted the critique in economics over whether the discipline should take the side of “workers” or “owners” rather than on the predictive questions and scientific methods of the discipline. The critique of mainstream economists characterizes them and critiques them for basing their concept of value on “cost of production” and “market price” of purchase; a basis of analysis that takes existing political inequalities, based on who has the ability to pay, which is based on a pre-existing unequal distribution of political power (starting allocations of arms, networks, information, education, biological advantage, and cultural ideologies of coercion). Marx’s moral critique of economics implicitly suggests that “value” be based on a concept of natural rights, stemming from Locke (1689),
Rousseau (1762), and other 18th century political philosophies, that assume and promote political equality as the basic desired value of society. Those who continue to maintain this critique suggest that societies seek to conform their economic systems with these political philosophies rather than detach the discipline of economics from political philosophy.

What is fascinating about this debate and the amount of energy devoted to it is that neither of these starting points of “value,” which are both political and ideological determinations, have anything to do with science or measures of actual observed social and cultural relationships in production, consumption and exchange. Neither the mainstream economists nor the “Marxists” start by drawing models of reality from observation and offering hypotheses to then test reality through comparisons and experimentation. Neither practice “science.” Neither has sought to turn economics into a “science.”

As economics separated itself, in name, as a recognized discipline from the discipline of political philosophy, other scholars have offered critiques of economics that have had implications for how other “social science” “disciplines” have emerged, and perhaps also politicizing different disciplines. Max Weber, a German scholar, considered one of the founders of what became sociology, offered a view, that “capitalism” was linked to the Protestant religious ethic. His work implied that economics in the West was really a part of Protestant religious theology rather than a science (1904) in a way that seemed to affirm that it should be. Weber, looking at context and seeking to offer predictions for historical changes that were occurring with new (industrial) technologies suggested that economic practice was culturally determined, not by technology but by religious beliefs, with religious cultures rather than individual action as the cause. Although Weber praised the Protestants and the military power he judged that their economic system promoted, he also implied that perhaps a religion or ethnic group could be blamed for the harms (slavery, genocide, and other inequities) that these systems created. In focusing on religion, Weber also seems to have opened the door for economists to separate economic activity from its harms by treating the benefits of a specific religious doctrine (productivity) that combined economics and religious ideologies, as potentially separate from harms that were somehow separate or political even though he implied that they were part of the same cultural and social system.

Given that most of the harms of imperial, industrial, colonial powers have also occurred in cultures that are not “Protestant” (or “capitalist”) but that do similar things under other names (such as “state” “socialist” systems), those who continue to use Marx or Weber’s theories to attack entire cultural or religious systems seem to have lost a way to focus or measure responsibility or to pinpoint areas for change. Marx’s critique has long been painted as an attempt (by a German Jewish scholar) to criminalize particular behaviors of a culture or religion in which these harms occur and then to try to eliminate cultures rather than to understand their processes and to try to change what is wrong while also determining what kinds of changes are and are not possible. While economic teaching may be an ideology or religion today, one needs to look specifically at specific actions and specific doctrines by specific individuals with specific harms in order to target what needs to be changed. To do that, one needs to follow a logical and scientific critique rather than to be misled into critiquing entire societies or peoples.

Other Late 19th Century and Early 20th Century Critiques

Economics did undergo some technical changes in the early 20th century, in response to need for application to address specific problems. For many economic historians, this seems to be a time in which economics and other social science disciplines were moving towards more “realism”, with critiques leading to internal changes that began to open up economics to become a social science. Many critiques of economics that have followed in the past 50 years may be a reaction to the turning away from this early 20th century era in which economics was becoming more of an empirically based, applied social science.

Some economists view this period as having introduced a behaviorist approach into economics along with some predictive models of economic cycles and failures in macro-economic regulation (Fullbrook, 2005). As economics began to emerge as a discipline, the focus seemed to be on measuring factors of
“productivity” in industrial systems, the “evolution” of economies to industrial systems, and the individual psychology of choices of consumption items in industrial systems. Most of this seemed to be a kind of “production engineering” rather than a science of economies or economic institutions and functions and the criticisms largely seemed to be designed to improve this industrial engineering to expand it and move it towards an empirical foundation.

Thorstein Veblen, for example, introduced the sociological concept of “institutional analysis” to supplement the study of economics that started with individuals. This approach became a part of economics, along with new policy tools for responding to the global economic depression of the 1930s, promoted by economists like John Maynard Keynes. Economic historians generally see this as an opening of the field to more empirical and practical approaches and a move away from an abstract modeling system based on mathematics and physics (establishing concepts like “force” and “acceleration” and “gravity” to model interactions).

One view is that it was the U.S. Department of Defense’s funding of game theory and other mathematical models for military use in the Cold War – the work of Morganstern and von Neumann (1947) and Nash (1951) – that returned economics back to abstraction, secrecy and methods of exploitation and control that have led to critiques starting in the mid and late 20th century. It may have been this funding that also worked to centralize the discipline under seven key U.S. universities who were recipients of military funding (Fullbrook, 2005).

The critique offered in this piece in Part I (legal analysis) and Part II (social science analysis) is largely grounded in the standards for international law and for social science that developed both in law and in disciplines at that time.

Mid to Late 20th Century Critiques

Starting in the 1960s, the critiques of economics seemed to increasingly take on a dimension of practical concern. Environmentalists offered a fundamental critique of the basic “productivity” doctrines of the discipline while political interest groups questioned the sensitivity of the discipline to minorities in industrial society and to women (a critique that also continues today). These critiques implied the discipline’s lack of coverage of real variables and also suggested moral blinders to human concerns including equity. The critique that the discipline failed as a science also continued, though more as a target of ridicule than anything else.

Whether or not economists were themselves relevant, environmentalists began to recognize the need for planning to assure more careful use of global resources. Environmentalists challenged economists to offer real world models of real world scarcity problems rather than to continue to assume unlimited resources, unlimited wants, and the ability of the “invisible hand” of “the market” to create the balance (Carson, 1962; Ehrlich and Ehrlich, 1968; Hardin, 1993; Brown, 1981, 1984-2001; Schumacher, 1973). These critiques continue today with increasing salience with competition over finite resources as populations increase, consumption demands rise, and social and environmental costs increase (Korten, 2007; Sen, 1997). These critiques are, however, largely from within the frameworks of new disciplines because they have failed to change the core doctrines, principles and measures used in economics. They are essentially a competing ideology, exposing economics as an ideology or religion of productivity, consumption and measures of prices rather than one measuring resource, production and consumption balances and the consequences of the imbalances. Economists have simply added new tools to their “neo-classical” economic models, to seek to measure the environment (“resource capital”) and political economic systems and their shaping of preferences as commodities (“social capital”) but without focusing on the structure of the discipline as an empirical and legally accountable social science.

Critiques during the 1960s and 1970s of industrial society and its militarism and violence began to focus on the “military industrial complex” and on approaches to production and consumption that destroyed cultures and had no intrinsic moral or social value, relevance to human development or democratic aspirations (Melman, 1974; Goodman, 1956; Whyte, 1956). These largely focused on
economic policies, on corporations, and on Western consumer culture and technology, in general. While economics was included in the critique as part of the “Establishment,” it wasn’t singled out in itself for criticism.

Critiques of economics as silly and self-contradictory seemed to suggest a view of economics at least through the 1970s as a discipline that was mostly benign and ineffective rather than criminal. Jokes about economists as offering nothing practical and able only to “assume” and fantasize, suggests that it was more the domain of bumbling fools than of greedy strategists offering technologies and indoctrination that would loot and poison the planet, extinguish cultures, and enslave the masses. Economists were largely criticized as bubble headed intellectuals mouthing slogans and closing their eyes to harms created by elites in major political and economic institutions who had little need for these academics.

Recent Critiques:

Contemporary critiques of economics have returned to moral challenges (now with legal implications) along with the previous unsystematic skepticism about the validity of the discipline as a “discipline” or science, though without any real guidelines for its fundamental transformation. Critiques of economics have also begun to suggest that this technical subject that should have been designed to sustain the society was actually designed to undermine it; to promote the interests of a given class to exploit rather than to maintain it.

In the late 20th century, economists justified their discipline as having the potential to predict avert the harms of economic depression through the study of business cycles and policy tools and the offering of remedies for government action to regulate economic activity and promote well-being. Now, only a generation later, there is a question of whether economists and their basic doctrines are in fact responsible not only for not predicting but for causing and worsening economic depression, theft of public resources by banks and corporations, environmental destruction, growing inequities and the social and political harms they elicit (Fullbrook, 2009). Rather than being viewed as buffoons, economists today are among the best paid academics and find themselves moving into positions in government and major financial institutions, often shuttling between Wall Street and the financial investment banks, international multi-lateral government institutions, high political position, and Chief Financial or Executive officers of universities. With economists claiming that their doctrines avoid “political” and distribution decisions on the one hand, while beating the drums to eliminate public regulations that promote their own self-interest, on the other, current critiques of economics suggest that the “dismal science” may in fact be a deadly religion.

Recent failures in Western economies have now started (finally) to highlight the faults of economics, demonstrating that this seemingly useless science is really an ideology promoting real world actions with real world harms. The idea of criminalizing specialized mathematicians (with economists largely using mathematics to express concepts, rather than empirical models) arguing over paradoxes on interest rates might have seemed ridiculous in the past, but not today. Attacks on economics today is often in political movements (like the “Occupy Wall Street” protests starting in 2011, or the “99%” movement in the United States) that target economic actors and institutions like “Wall Street” and link them to specific economic doctrines and their academic policy advocates who move back and forth between seats of political and institutional power and their teaching positions.

While it isn’t the purpose of this article to document the social changes that occurred in industrial societies in the 1970s, many works of that time suggest why economists have now become important actors and why the doctrines they teach may now be directly related to specific harms caused by leaders of institutions. While economists may have been irrelevant in societies run in the early period of the industrial revolution, in the late 19th century, by industrialist robber barons or military cabals, modern industrial systems may have routinized their functions such that the professional technocrats who are trained to manage institutions now do have moral and legal responsibility. Chief among them today are the economists who are interlinked today with institutional and political power.
In the 1960s, it was easy for sociologists to identify specific ethnic elites and leaders and to attribute decisions to those of a specific class or ethnic group and to particular male leaders (Mills, 1956). Industrial engineers and psychologists served that system by offering better ways to control workers and stimulate their productivity (through “time and motion” studies of labor and “industrial psychology”) but economists had little real role other than to offer applause. That seems to have changed.

Émile Durkheim had predicted more than a century ago that industrial society would “rationalize” and replicate itself such that it operated as a kind of machine for the benefit of institutions and with institutions shaping people to fit particular roles (Durkheim, 1893). Sociologists, like Daniel Bell, began to observe that the leaders in institutions were increasingly a meritocratic, technocratic class, chosen for their specific technical abilities and allegiance to certain organizational ideologies rather than on their ethnicity, gender or class (Bell, 1972). In this transition, the leaders of society were no longer the representatives of a specific ethnicity or “class” but were the adherents of skills and ideology. Without blaming any specific profession or discipline, like economics and economists, sociologists did suggest that institutional ideologies would run amok, the “professionals” would follow them blindly, almost robotically and pathologically causing harm, and that the only solution would be to criminally sanction these professions to assure that individuals “following orders” were applying moral tests to their actions (Arendt, 1963; Yablonsky, 1972). With the rise of minorities and women to positions of apparent power in the urban, industrial society of today, it may be that we are observing the fulfillment of that prediction. The lawyers, economists, M.B.A.s, computer scientists/ information technocrats and engineers who have risen to head institutions are there for technical skills and adhere to the ideologies that come with those skills, rather than rising primarily on the basis of their ethnicity, class, or scientific acumen.

A number of critiques of economics as a discipline have focused on its lack of attention to “community” and how the discipline works to undermine cooperation, to unravel public control and regulation of institutions, and to promote greed and self-interest; a corollary to the claim of environmentalists in the 1960s. These and other critiques today seem to focus on the need to add specific moral dimensions or questions but without identifying the source of an underlying problem or approach to restructuring. Nisbet’s “Quest for Community,” for example, alerted economists to the reality that humans are social beings (something taught as a fundamental in the natural sciences and anthropology for nearly two centuries but denied in economics) and instinctively prefer community to imagined constructs like “markets” (1990). Yet, he did not seem to recognize that economies are also dependent on genetics, environment and culture and that these aspects were also missing from the discipline’s study. His critique did not call for a restructuring of the discipline to start with the full context of known human realities rather than with some posited beliefs. Like other moral critiques, rather than seek to move the discipline away from a debate over “values” and to start it as a science of observation to which moral values could be applied, this one remained at the surface. This has been followed by similar critiques asking whether “economists make bad citizens” (Gilovich and Regan, 1996) as well as direct charges that “thinking like an economist undermines community” (Marglin, 2008) among other moral failures (Mayhew, 2004; Hodgson, 2004).

Typical of these critiques is that the solution they seek reinforces the anti-science approach of economics and its inability to measure and predict social phenomenon. In place of study of the “profit maximizing man,” for example, one economist called on his fellow economists to start their study not with the community itself, and not with real variables of climate and genetics, but with the behaviors of an imagined “political economic person” in a new imagined model of choices, alongside or in replacement of the current modeling (Söderbaum, 2004).

Critiques of the profession’s textbooks from within the “discipline” have focused mostly on representation issues (the interest politics of the university) rather than on validity, social benefit or intellectual or scientific merit. A study in 1993 focused on the “economic status of women and minorities” (Feiner, 1993) while a later study looked at the “quantity of race and gender related material” (Robson, 2001).
The most recent critiques combine previous criticisms, arguing that economics is an “acceptance of fantasy rather than reality” largely because it neglects issues of sustainability (Fullbrook, 2004 and 2009). A movement of young economists starting in 2009, calling themselves “Post Autistic Economics”, combines the concerns for the environment/green environment (“thermodynamics”) with feminist critiques (e.g., recalculating women’s labor in Gross National Product) with calls for considering other national measures such as Bhutan’s Gross National Happiness. These approaches aim to “pluralize” and politicize economics like other disciplines but not really to replace it, though some adherents may hope the freedoms they seek from current doctrines and enforced conformity may create the space (absent today within the discipline) that promotes competition and change.

My own critique in the 1990s, partly touched on the problems specific to economics but did not focus on a condemnation or rebuilding of individual disciplines. My focus was on dealing with higher education and its anachronistic methods as a whole as destructive of community and democracy (Lempert, et. al., 1996). I included economics and business school education among other social sciences and professions as training robotic, amoral technocrats, removed from social reality and from human empathy, and I viewed economics as only one of several disciplines following similar, top-down, doctrinal, undemocratic, non-empirical methods based on both a factory and “Church” model. My critique suggested that all of the disciplines, including economics, could be reformed through laboratory work and through restructuring of teaching methods and university administration to create direct responsiveness to community needs and student desire for skills, useful models, awareness, and human connection. I noted the modern university as an example of “market failure” in failing to incorporate social benefits and costs and to respond to students as consumers. Though I proposed different economics laboratory courses and tested a national development planning project, with Harvard and Brown University students as a direct challenge to international approaches to promote globalization and destroy indigenous communities, I did not introduce or test a full democratic-experiential economics curriculum to challenge and replace its doctrines (Lempert, McCarty, and Mitchell, 1995, 1998).

The Response: Surprising Absence of Self-Scrutiny and Transformation of Economics: Comparisons to Anthropology and Psychology

Despite the fundamental criticisms of economics on both intellectual grounds and moral (public benefit) concerns, economics has yet to be subject to any internal or external ethics reviews or codes, to any real public oversight. Nor has it held itself to scientific principles of empirical observation and hypothesis testing to replace its creative, imagined (fantasy) models. This is in sharp contrast to other social sciences like psychology, that has become largely empirical and imposed ethical research guidelines (though some would say are currently lacking in any real effectiveness or enforceability and have also been corrupted by profit motives and political power), or anthropology, that has reshaped itself as a “moral” “discipline” and placed historic critiques directly in its curriculum.

The evolution of critiques of economics may suggest why the discipline has only until recently been charged with creating legal and moral harm and also why there has been so little response within the profession to outside critiques. If the discipline was so dismal, so poor at prediction and so out of touch with reality – more the characterization of an ideology or religion than a science – its lack of relevance and prominence until recently, with economists rising to power and applying its doctrines, may have made it seem mostly benign. Even if one agreed that economics’ basic assumptions denied Western political ideals of political equality for individuals and communities/cultures, it may have seemed pointless to focus on economists as a direct source of harms and to demand any reforms. In the early 20th century and then during the Cold War in the 1950s, political elites may have actually acted to shield economics from the earlier moral and intellectual criticisms that were launched against it by replacing social science approaches with mathematics and by working to purge the university of progressive scholars by creating fear among progressive university intellectuals and minorities. More recently,
opposite forces may be at work. While criticisms of economics today may be sharp precisely because economists have been part of the powers-that-be causing harms, economists’ current alliance with power may further insulate them from the need to reform. Indeed, if economists are to be blamed for dismantling regulations on financial and economic power and undermining systems of public regulation and rule of law, one would expect them to demonstrate the same contempt and to show the same disregard for legal and moral standards and accountability over their own work. Some economists studying the history of the discipline suggest that it is not merely economic power behind the discipline’s rise but also U.S. military funding of mathematical economics and game theory for use in strategies of the Cold War at home and abroad, in competition with other powers and in seeking control over resources and citizens (Fullbrook, 2005).

The histories of anthropology and psychology have been in reverse of economics and this seems to explain why economics seems to have almost entirely deflected criticisms without a response while other disciplines have established some internal procedures and have also reformed the disciplines. A century ago when the work of economists was viewed as irrelevant and economics was moving towards realism, these other disciplines that, at that time, were empirical, were directly linked to activities of imperial conquest over native peoples (anthropology) or psychological manipulation of citizens in their roles as economic and political actors (psychology). The direct moral implications focused scrutiny on these disciplines and created some sense of responsibility among practitioners for which they may have been forced to respond, at least for a time. Anthropologists clearly did serve empire in an intermediary role throughout much of the early history of the discipline until quite recently. Anthropologists were providing information to religious missions, to slave traders and to militaries seeking to run arms for guerrilla wars. The discipline was seen as a way to control and exploit native peoples coming under domination of Western colonials empires as part of the exploited “resources” of those empires. The moral and legal responsibility was clear. Similarly, psychologists have long been the arm of police interrogators and torture, propaganda campaigns, and social control. Today, calls for more regulation of these disciplines have mostly dissipated and it is likely because the disciplines are now seen as completely irrelevant to prediction and policy (anthropology) as it moves towards philosophy and away from social science, or the harms they do is mostly directed by others with real power (including economists) such that these disciplines merely serve as technical tools or information collection (in “area studies”).

This isn’t to say that internal responses of anthropology and psychology to legal, moral and scientific challenges have been any better than those of economists. In anthropology, the response to moral challenges may have eviscerated the discipline rather than reformed it (Duncan, 1995; 2012; Lempert, 2011b) by turning it from a social science into something closer to political advocacy or journalism that offers no tools for social engineering for good or bad (Andrade, 1995). One can question whether anthropology has become any more neutral or moral given that it no longer seeks to develop tools for social betterment and rarely challenges the powers that be with empirical data or predictions. At least introductory courses review the history of the discipline and note the relationship between British, U.S., and other major power colonialism and the development of the discipline in ways that furthered colonial objectives. There has been a recognition of the potential harms to peoples for which that discipline could be held accountable, resulting in changes in the discipline as well as protocols and disciplinary codes (Hymes, 1982) and calls for symmetrical treatment of peoples with and without power (Nader, 1982) though some suggest that anthropologists today actually reinforce powerlessness and colonial ideologies (Duncan, 2011b, 2012). Though anthropologists in the U.S., in the American Anthropological Association, do have an ethics code and ethics committee, for all practical purposes these codes are meaningless since there is no licensing of members, and no enforcement through an adjudicatory body in which members have standing and there are any sanctions. As in other fields that have codes, even where there are licenses, this one seems to exist largely to advertise to outsiders rather than to effectively regulate behaviors. Moreover, there is no way to separate the association and the profession’s own conflicts of interest from its own ethical standards.
Why was economics able to so effectively deflect calls for self-regulation and reform in the 1960s and 1970s? Indeed, if anthropologists were studying native peoples and recognized legal and ethical obligations for their protection, one would expect at least calls for similar scrutiny of the social scientists studying and working with (and for) the financial interests and governments that were directly causing the harms being documented by anthropologists. If anthropologists felt the need to side with weaker and vulnerable parties rather than to blindly side with interests funding their research, one would expect there would be legal and ethical calls to shield economists from siding with parties responsible for the same harms.

There have been some changes in economics. In the related “discipline” (or program) of business management, where economists often teach and where economics courses are integrated into the curriculum, there were attempts to create courses on ethical and legal responsibilities of business, dating back to the 1970s. By the early 1980s, however, some of these courses that remained had already been co-opted such that they were transformed into their very opposite. Instead of bringing ethical and legal responsibility into business and economics to ensure a respect for the very assumptions that economists claimed were essential to fair competition and sustainable economies, the courses were transformed to teach business elites how to manipulate the media and the public in order to undermine public regulations. In 1986, in an article in the San Francisco Chronicle, I noted how the “ethics” course at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business had been transformed into a course called “Business and the Changing Environment,” to teach managers how to alter the political environment for corporate benefit and how to deceive the public over legal violations. The teacher Stanford selected for that course had worked to keep public information on US. military failures in Indochina from the public, rather than any of the whistleblowers who had protected public interest.

Today, the American Economic Association (AEA) has an “Ad Hoc Committee on Ethical Standards of Economists” but no code of enforceable standards. Apparently for the first time, at the beginning of 2011, some 300 economists signed a petition urging the AEA to establish a code requiring economics professors to disclose their non-university sources of income to partially reveal what they perceived as widespread conflict of interest and sale of economics doctrines directly to corporate interests (beyond the more subtle methods of university and institute financing and career paths for economists).

Within economics as a discipline, unlike established professions (law, medicine, accounting) and unlike other social sciences (human subject protocols of psychology and anthropology), none of the very forms of political regulation that economists say a democratic political system can be trusted to apply to regulate markets and protect the public, exist to protect the public from any of the externalities, direct harms, and/or legal violations of the economics profession and its practitioners, themselves. There is no public screening of doctrines and methods for compliance with law, with social protections, or with scientific method. There are no professional ethics codes or protocols for economic teachings, work or advice. There is no licensing.

Ironically, while economics historically started in the church as a “moral” discipline, and began connected with law and politics, it is now viewed by many as a “church” of its own where work is subject to peer review but where neither public moral standards nor the public itself are part of the review and accountability process (Alvey, 1999; Young, 1997). That specific critique will be examined in Part II of this piece in an effort to understand the source of the failures of economics as a social science and where specific disciplinary standards and protocols could be part of a solution.

While the author of this article has published ethics codes for practitioners in a number of fields, including one published in one of the major journals in the U.S. for professionals in public administration, that could be used by economists in their work for domestic and foreign governments, this code has never been adopted by or published in any professional journals in economics (Lempert, 1997). The author’s personal experience in trying to use this code in international development work where teams and oversight administration largely include economists, is that the very mention of professional and ethical standards is often enough to immediately end contract negotiations and to lead to the choice of “professionals” with no standards or scruples, who will freely break the law when prompted to do so, or
without prompting at all. Without any unionization of social scientists and other professionals working on government projects in development – the reason for drafting and publishing these codes in the first place – violations run rampant.

Some public concerns have partly been incorporated into the discipline in the form of peripheral subjects such as environmental accounting or sociological topics in the study of labor markets (the value of household labor, gender gaps, additional costs of minorities and women) and this is a sign of change and adaptation of economics, but if the basics of neo-classical economics that threaten environments and peoples continue to be taught as the bedrock of the discipline, then these are little more than ineffective, patchwork remedies.

As noted above, the debate over starting assumptions over “value” has never really had any effect in transitioning the discipline to an actual social science, following the principles of observation, modeling, comparison and hypothesis testing. In a way, that is astonishing because the critiques that have been persistent, beyond those moral critiques started by Marx, are those that the discipline fails today to offer any predictive value or effective technical (engineering, policy) tools, particularly since many of the practical tools like those of Keynesian economics, seem to be treated as “political assumptions” or are just discarded as not “rigorous” and integral parts of the discipline. If the discipline hasn’t been or no longer seeks to be predictive or effective in application, it would need to be empirical in its measures and scientific in its methods (i.e., hypothesis testing) in order to create the basis to be able to do so. Ironically, the faith that economists teach in “consumer sovereignty” and responsiveness of markets seems to be proven nonsense when applied to the discipline of economics, itself, that should be taken as the first sign of a fraudulent endeavor. Public demand for a discipline offering tools has been subverted by the control exerted over the discipline by its practitioners who have restricted internal and external competition and publicly accountable regulation that would have made it responsive. Political power and positioning of economics as a doctrinal discipline to be accepted with a religious faith has been able to deflect calls for response.

Regulatory Approaches of the Universities, Applying Public Law and Morality that Have Been Short-Circuited

In principle, through public control over the universities as public institutions, the public should have been able to exert pressure on the academic discipline of economics for reform and should have been able to generate competing alternatives through internal regulatory mechanisms within the universities where economists work. Yet, these mechanisms have also failed. Existing regulatory approaches for use by the university and general public for applying public law and morality have also been short-circuited with regard to oversight of economics. Perhaps this is both a result of the ability of economists to achieve political influence over these institutions and of ways the discipline has managed to characterize and shield its activities and impact.

In theory, in democratic societies, universities are organizations held to public scrutiny and public law as are the professions. As a response to regulations, universities have created their own internal monitoring systems as have various professions. In reality, and particularly with regard to economics, this system of public accountability and oversight through democratic participation and public legal challenge and oversight has been co-opted, leaving only the press and alternative academic journals as the place where calls have arisen for change. Moreover, many of these forums for speech are also subject to the very same controls they may seek to criticize, such as politicized peer review processes that act to protect the profession.

In principle, universities are publicly chartered organizations that can be dissolved or restructured at any time if they do not serve the public purpose. When private for profit and non-profit corporations came into legal existence in the early 19th century, laws clearly recognized that these were human creations subject to direct public oversight. In the U.S., publicly chartered organizations like universities are established under specific requirements that they further specific public purposes. It is theoretically
possible to force accountability on university disciplines by seeking to dissolve universities or disciplinary associations like the AEA and economics journals. Of course, the “transactions costs” of doing this are high. One needs to rely on prosecutors to do it or embark on a political campaign or a lawsuit against government prosecutors to compel them to do so. Public pressures through these mechanisms or threat of their use were used in the 1950s in the U.S. to purge universities of progressive scholars and those whose doctrines challenged the elites (Barrow, 1990; Schrecker, 1986; Lewis, 1988; Lempert et. al., 1996; Duncan, 1995) just as they were used in the Soviet Union starting in the 1930s (Lempert, 1995). In universities in the U.S. and Western Europe, mechanisms like these were used to eliminate the very moral and intellectual challenges posed by 19th century scholars like Karl Marx, in ways that shielded economics from scrutiny, enabled it to strengthen its position, and also sent political signals to scholars as to what they needed to do to increase their power and protect their positions. No one seems to have tried such legal challenges recently to reform a discipline, though there are attempts now to hold universities accountable and faculty accountable for specific actions that they take in fundraising and in government that cause harm and that could apply to economists in extending their activities and influence to communities outside of the university. Yet, it is the potential threat of this form of public sanction that compels universities themselves to step in, absent any actual legal attempts to dissolve them or to hold their officials accountable, in order to hold disciplines accountable to legal and moral codes and to fulfill a public purpose.

Within universities, public standards are imposed over both faculty members and students through the various employment and disciplinary contracts that exist within the university. If one takes Stanford University as an example, its Faculty Handbook, section 4.4.B(1), sub-section (4.3) on Faculty Discipline defines misconduct as “dishonest or unethical behavior in the faculty member’s own teaching or research.” Faculty can also be dismissed, according to sub-section (4.4) on findings of “substantial and manifest incompetence.”

The next section of this article, that reviews specific legal charges against economics and economists for specific doctrines that they teach, clearly alleges dishonest and unethical behavior by economists. Economics can be challenged for its doctrines that defraud peoples of their cultures and their resources and undermine their long term interests while promoting the self-interest of economists proselytizing those ideas. Yet, none of these issues have ever been raised in any university department for any kind of legal or moral disciplinary review. Similarly, many of the doctrines of economics that have no basis in observation and reality and that economists themselves characterize as “fantasy rather than reality” (Fullbrook, 2004 and 2009), would seemingly meet the threshold test of review for “substantial and manifest incompetence.” Nevertheless, economics has evaded any such review process by other social science professionals who do measure observed reality and who do have ethical codes.

The Fundamental Standard for Students of Stanford University’s Office of Judicial Affairs is similar and would seemingly apply similar standards to students who study economics and who are required to write papers, take exams and (at the graduate level) teach the doctrines of the discipline. Where students would recognize certain of the doctrines of the discipline as immoral, fraudulent or incompetent, they would also be required to oppose and correct those doctrines, with the expectation of support from the university in doing so. According to the standard, “Students at Stanford are expected to show both within and without the University such respect for order, morality, personal honor and the rights of others as is demanded of good citizens. Failure to do this will be sufficient cause for removal from the University.” Yet, no students at Stanford or elsewhere other than perhaps in the Soviet Union or countries formerly under its hegemony, where there were requirements to parrot a parallel set of dogmas that could be considered equally un-scientific and religious and promoting similar harm, have been removed for parroting of doctrines that are allegedly false, fraudulent, and the cause of harm (Lempert, 1995).

The problem with these processes and the reason they are so unlikely to be used to challenge doctrines and their resultant harms, is that there is a reluctance to use them even for their appropriate purposes. Mechanisms like these that should protect public and individual rights as well as free speech have become politicized and subject to abuse, both during the Cold War in the U.S. and more recently
where professors in the U.S. have reported fears over the past many years for removal or retaliation for the expression of political views, including those views that they believe are grounded in objective scientific and legal standards. When laws and processes are subject to abuse, there is a reluctance to use them at all lest they be used to retaliate against those who seek to use them for their appropriate purpose. Intellectuals and ordinary citizens in Europe and the U.S. no longer seem to see institutional processes as protecting their interests or operating fairly. Such fears are not to be taken lightly. Even in the disciplines that have ethics codes and claim to protect their professionals and the public, these processes create opportunities to purge colleagues who take the idea of public protections seriously. When one fears the powers-that-be, one no longer turns to mechanisms to hold those in power accountable, even if it is rule of law, standards, and democratic participation that are in fact the source of protections to abuse of authority and politicization.

Economists appear not only to have risen in power in government and economic institutions but in universities, as well, and academics may not have any confidence that they can use university procedures to hold economics or economists accountable. Or, they may reasonably fear that their own disciplines are now unable to stand up to the same kinds of honest intellectual, moral and legal critiques. Would political scientists, historians, and even new disciplines like Women’s Studies, be able to defend their disciplines today as promoting scientific principles and adhering to codes of fairness, law, and ethics? Or have they also become politicized, ideological and subservient to certain powerful economic interests in Western societies that fund the university and the exploitation of other cultures, resources, and labor, rather than protecting long-term human interests that are the subjects of international law? Do these disciplines really act to protect human cultural diversity, biodiversity, sustainability of human systems, individual equality and potential, and empirical observation and modeling, over benefits to certain powerful interests in the urban sectors of societies where they teach?

Within universities, it seems clear why economists are not held to scrutiny. Economists are among those faculty members most likely to rise to the positions of Chief Financial Officer/Provost and University President because of their alliance with the interests of the wealthy and powerful in government and the private sector who fund the universities. In the early 1980s, when I introduced field social science courses at Stanford University, to create social science laboratory work and modeling based on empirical observations and sensitivity to local communities, the university provost at the time, an economist, described actual social science as not part of the “educational mission” of the university (Lempert, Briggs, et. al., 1995).

When a discipline in a university like economics has no ethical codes or standards in the discipline, describes political regulation and issues of morality and equity as something “outside” of its concerns, and has a central tenet that the measure of value and of human existence is not long-term survival or intellectual or civilization’s advance but satisfaction of greed and aggrandizement of wealth – principles that one would think are antithetical to the idea of civilization and to the role of the university in promoting it – it should be of no surprise that this discipline practices what it preaches in ways that allow it to benefit readily from amorality; selling itself to power for its own short term benefit with no remorse.

Economists have directly benefitted within the university and without from the politicization and undermining of public processes of legal accountability and morality as well as their willingness to work with militaries without full public and legal control and scrutiny of their actions and impacts. By changing the standard of legal protections from one of long-term interests to one of short-term economic and financial gain, they have created a situation within the university where they can assure they will be free of scrutiny and where they can continue to aggrandize wealth and power and further undermine the processes and disciplines that would challenge them. In work with the militaries and their think tanks, it is possible that they have already received blanket protections from scrutiny and have incorporated a military ethic that overrode the usual transparency and public accountability that one would expect of the social sciences, as has also occurred in international finance and “development” organizations.

When questioned about the need for accountability, economists have a ready answer to shield themselves. They do not experiment on “human subjects” because their discipline is not empirical or
experimental (other than in social experiments they conduct on the peoples and resources of countries over whom they exert power in political and economic positions outside the university). They respond that they are simply “mathematicians” doing pure research and they ask to be treated to the same ethical standards as mathematicians. Unlike anthropologists, they note that they do not collect information on foreign cultures that are used to subvert those cultures. What they do is not direct. They can claim that they simply espouse doctrines that are used by others to take resources, sell products and impose ideologies on the peoples whose environments, cultures and systems they destabilize. They can claim that their real subject is industrial society and that they teach and operate in industrial societies and that they are simply exercising speech within those societies freely. They do claim ignorance of any outside impact and the measures the discipline offers diverts attention from those harms/externalities they do not measure.

The public purpose that economics and the university are filling today are not to find and respond to long term social needs or to create the tools for a sustainable society and harmonious human future. They appear to be responding only to short-term economic pressures of powerful groups that have purchased disciplines for private purposes. When short-term interests corrupt institutions (and disciplines) and short-circuit their social missions, it becomes the responsibility of the public to step in through use of legal accountability mechanisms of criminal and civil law.

At the national level, if universities are now serving to promote short term national interests rather than public interests, and if domestic legal mechanisms are insufficient to represent foreign interests that are being harmed by universities and their doctrines, it becomes incumbent on international legal mechanisms to fill that gap.

While various critics of economic doctrines suggest that various of these doctrines have caused harm to several different groups (native peoples, cultural sustainability, environment, future rights holders among them) and others have criticized the doctrines as ideology, self-interest, and fallacy, few have combined the two critiques to form the basis for criminal prosecution and restructuring of the institutions and profession offering these doctrines. Yet, it is precisely such elements – the knowledge of fallacy of doctrine, the self interest in promoting those doctrines, and specific resultant harm as a result of promoting those doctrines – that constitute criminal behavior that could be adjudicated by courts. Moreover, it is the professional responsibility to social science and the failure to fulfill this mission that should also subject the discipline to restructuring.

Doing that in a way that follows consensus principles and that can be depoliticized, for the overall benefit of humanity and for the expansion of human knowledge and intellectual discipline, is the goal of this piece.

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1 E-mail to author from Joseph Stiglitz and the Journal of Globalization and Development, Friday September 3, 2010, reaffirmed in a second letter from Tom Polds on September 9, 2010, noting that “we place absolute trust in our [‘highly esteemed editorial board.’]

2 Editor’s Note: The article is published in Global Jurist, edited by Ugo Mattei, who has contributed a response to this piece, in this issue.

3 Editor’s Note: See Dr. Soderbaum’s response to this piece, in this issue.

4 Editor’s Note: See Dr. Kathleen Levinstein’s article in this issue.

5 Editor’s Note: Dr. Duncan offers insight into these phenomenon today in pieces in this issue.


7 I have sought to do so in the U.S. and State of California, to create accountability at the university where I earned my law degree and Master of Business Administration degree and to protect the professional standards I was taught. There is a direct
link between Stanford University’s rise in its endowment (currently the highest in the U.S.), the military contractors who donate to the university, and the role of Condoleezza Rice, a Political Science professor, who moved from a position as Stanford’s Chief Financial Officer (Provost) to the post of U.S. National Security Advisor where she approved (what were apparently illegal under both U.S. and international law) military operations in Iraq. Rice directly steered billions of dollars to these same contractors who fund the university and was then invited back to teach at Stanford and to continue to raise funds for the university for the same groups (in apparent clear violation of university policy). The deaths of many California citizens in the U.S. military who were endangered by this profiteering scheme appear to clearly fit criminal laws of murder in the state of California. These activities also seem to meet all of the elements of criminal racketeering under California and U.S. laws in which not only Rice but university officials who are aware of her role and have kept silent or promoted it for reasons of financial benefit, would also be held criminally liable under conspiracy laws. This is sufficient evidence for dissolution of the university charter as well as individual prosecutions. Though I have sent such evidence to the California Attorney General and U.S. Attorney General, as have others including former Los Angeles District Attorney Vincent Bugliosi whose published book and article detail similar charges, prosecutors have yet to act. Grounds for prosecution may be clear, but actual decisions to prosecute require political will and pressure more than hard evidence. (Legal briefs are on file with author.)

8 One case recently came to the author’s attention in which a practicing anthropologist sought to publish a theoretical article on “bureaucracy” and used personal examples of legal violations and whistle-blowing in domestic and international public organizations in a piece that sought to model how this behavior worked. Though anthropology’s Code of Ethics required the journal to protect his/her identity as an informant who could be subject to retaliation and whose family and close associates could be harmed, the entire Board of the Journal sought, instead, to twist the ethics code in ways that would cause harm to the colleague for seeking to introduce controversial public issues into the discipline. They argued that the colleague’s use of data from public organizations would violate the ethics of the public organizations whose corruption the author was exposing because he/she did not tell them in advance that he might at some later date exercise his political free speech rights and fulfill his/her duty by reporting on violations that he might find in those organizations! The journal sought to expose the author and jeopardize his/her career and livelihood on grounds that protecting corruption of powerful organizations from scrutiny by the discipline was more ethical than protecting a colleague! There are similar cases in political science, a discipline that also has a code, in law, and in other disciplines. Whatever they may claim, professional associations of scholars have conflicts of interests and are likely to protect those powerful interests before adhering to the principles of their ethics codes.
IS ECONOMICS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?  
REMAKING ECONOMICS AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE

Part I  
Is Economics in Violation of International Law?  

DAVID LEMPERT, PH.D., J.D., M.B.A., E.D. (HON.)

Introduction to Part I

Holding an industry or profession legally or ethically accountable is not something new in industrial societies nor should it be surprising or shocking that one would seek to do so. Though the exercise should be something as routine as any kind of screening for any private or public intervention, the discipline of economics has long escaped – and perhaps found a way to hold itself exempt – from this scrutiny that is routine for many professions. The way to remedy that, to see if this failure is a simple and harmless error or something else, is to actually apply such a test, starting with its strict forms.

In this section, I assess the basis for criminal prosecution of the discipline of economics, testing whether economists as a group promote specific, self-serving, false or fraudulent doctrine with the intent to induce specific actions resulting in known and measurable harms that the international system has identified as criminal.

In examining the process of imposing a legal sanction, I outline the methodology by which one might consider prosecution of the economics profession on the basis of the doctrines it promotes and walk through the steps required to do so. In brief,

- **Step 1** identifies the source of shared doctrines among economists (analogous to finding shared practices in an industry),
- **Step 2** identifies the sources of universal law that could be used for prosecution as well as the laws that should not be used due to some of the paradoxes of politicization of international law and the relations of international law itself to economic ideology,
- **Step 3** describes the elements of the crime to be prosecuted for the specific laws tested,
- **Step 4** evaluates the possible verdicts for each doctrine and law to be applied, and then
- **Step 5** discusses the implications of this outcome for specific individuals, institutions and society.

In the section below on Method, I outline this process in more detail, including discussion of legal safeguards. I then move directly to analysis, using this five step process.
Method: Holding Economics to Legal Scrutiny

In international law, there are clear methods for examining violations by any actors, including a discipline like economics, to assure that its appropriate activities and rights are protected and supported and to assure that its activities that are in violation of law and misuse public assets and public trust can be identified, sanctioned and stopped. Focusing on speech raises concerns but there are also safeguards. There is a history of law and legal principles guiding the protection of speech, cultural and individual diversity and expression, and long-term sustainability of planetary resources and human potential against short-term greed and fears, through criminal prosecutions of the individuals, ideologies and activities that destroy these. These are human processes and are imperfect, but such processes have guidelines for protections and fairness.

In both national and international laws, there are already relatively clear lines that can protect disciplinary inquiry that reflects principles of science and that would allow for scrutiny of a discipline like economics in ways that should be supported by public consensus. Law in industrial societies protects scientific activity, speech, and belief and there are several distinguishing factors that sanction activities that do not but that are exercised as pseudo-science and fraud.

Law and reason provide fundamental principles for differentiating between those intellectual and speech activities that affirm humanity and those that do harm.

− Laws currently differentiate between advocacy action speech linked to incitement of violence of harm through advocacy of private doctrines (which is not protected, while almost all other private advocacy is protected) and university freedom of supposition, experiment, hypothesis and with individual expression of belief (all of which are to be protected). There are legal distinctions determining where private doctrines are appropriate (religious institutions that are non-state actors) and where they are not (state action), with some determinants on “religious doctrine”.

− Laws currently differentiate between scientific activities (employing methodologies of observation, experimentation, and hypothesis testing of beliefs) and religion or proselytization for benefit of specific groups through self-interest. In the case of educational and research, there is a relatively clear line on what is “science” versus “religion” and “interest advocacy”, as well as between scientific experimentation meeting protocols of human rights protections and those that are not. Science is distinguished by law from interest advocacy and religious worship as a human activity that is open freely to internal challenges through empirical testing.

− Laws currently differentiate between promotional advocacy for an interest and advocacy that is fraud. Promotional advocacy is protected political speech. Fraud is a form of speech used to deceive and harm, with specific intent and with statements known to be false.

− Laws distinguish levels of scrutiny for doctrines taught in private organizations from those to be taught in public organizations or in those publicly chartered with specific public purposes. In public organizations, laws differentiate between the teaching of doctrines and the rewarding of students for public purposes and those that violate these purposes through adherence to private doctrines, discriminatory grading and reward systems, and the promotion of doctrines that endanger the weak against the strong.

Applying law to challenge a scholarly discipline understandably raises justifiable fears that the powerful or and/or the uneducated will work together to target unpopular ideas or ethnic groups under the cloak of law. It is all too easy to abuse legal mechanisms and to enact totalitarian purges in the name of law or public interest. Those fears are perfectly understandable and reasonable given recent history and given contemporary circumstances. The author shares these fears and has been disheartened, both as a lawyer and as a legal plaintiff, at the erosion of rule of law, mishandling of law, and the barriers that exist to fairness and justice, even where laws on their face are clear.

Governments too often seek to criminalize religious beliefs and cultural autonomy. They have tendencies to de-legitimate political opposition and to stigmatize defenders of rights. They are prone to finding new ways to suppress speech and public information, thwart accountability and to use the tools of propaganda to undermine reality and reason. Even amongst educated publics, it is common to use high
position and media to generate fears and target small groups of thinkers and minority cultures. To those who seek to secure power, ideas are disdained and intellectuals are often vilified. It may very well be that the lack of faith in legal institutions today to actually carry out law and justice are fully justified. Nevertheless, it is the principle of law and justice and the mechanisms of participatory, transparent, open access, non-discriminatory justice systems that are the path towards protection of rights and the planet.

The case outlined in this chapter proceeds on the assumption of reason and fairness in the application of existing written consensus principles of international law, even though that may not be the reality. In the view of this author, the only way to move civilization forward, assuming that is possible (something that is also subject to scientific testing) is to build procedures, institutions, and systems that codify principles and establish real safeguards for long-term human interests. The human systems with the responsibility to do that are systems of rule of law and of public civics education to build the full array of citizen skills for understanding and participation in those systems.

The international legal community used a set of mechanisms at the end of World War II in occupied West Germany to establish democratic and legal processes with the goal of assuring protections of minorities and communities by restructuring university disciplines and rebuilding public education. Those are among international precedents for examining disciplines and stripping them of harmful ideological doctrines so that they can return to intellectual missions free of interest group politics and focus on discipline and actual science, free from racist prejudices that distort scientific teaching and from experimentation on humans that endangers human dignity.

The method of applying law to the discipline of economics consists of the following five steps:

1) Identify the source of shared doctrines among economists (analogous to finding shared practices in an industry).

2) Identify the sources of universal law that could be used for prosecution of the use of specific illegal doctrines while identifying those internally contradictory laws that should not be used today because of dangers of political tainting of universal law (noting paradoxes of some politicization of international law as well as internal conflicts of interest in law given the relations of specific international law documents to economic ideology).

3) Describe the elements of potential crimes to be prosecuted and the defenses to them for the specific laws identified in Step 2.

4) Evaluate the possible verdicts for each doctrine and law that is considered in Step 3 and applied to the identified doctrines in Step 1.

5) Discuss the implications of this outcome for specific individuals, institutions and society in order to determine the appropriate remedy for society.

**Step 1: Identifying the Potential Criminal Acts: The Shared Doctrines**

Holding “economics” to legal standards can be a bit tricky because it requires identifying what “economics” is and who it is. Economics isn’t a licensed profession and not every university economics department is exactly the same. For the purpose of this analysis, the goal is to identify economics as a profession of academics using a common label and teaching a set of shared doctrines that they identify by name; generally what they call “neo-classical Economics”. These doctrines and their teaching are the alleged harmful acts that can be tested as criminal for their violations of international law. Since there are also different “doctrines” or “schools” in economics, identifying the commonly shared doctrines is not a perfect process, but it is possible to determine what these doctrines are since there are associations of economists and universities that hire Ph.D. economists from this shared group, and textbooks that are taught commonly by the members of that group.

The goal of this article is not to identify every specific court in which one might bring a case or every defendant “Economist” or “Economics Department” that might be held accountable. There will be variations in applications of the law and different defendants would, assuming the findings of legal violations, have different culpability given their different roles in the profession. Those are tactical issues. This article focuses, instead, on the general argument; the fundamental doctrines that are the norm among a collective and identifiable group that self-identifies as economists and that also recognizes a
group of shared doctrines. The task here is to identify those doctrines so that they can be held to legal scrutiny.

The first sub-step is to define the “defendant” “economist”/ “economics department”/ “economics discipline” – the alleged perpetrator of the violations; i.e., the discipline and its boundaries. The second sub-step is to pick a strategy for identifying the shared doctrines of this defendant/ these defendants. A third sub-step is to check to assure that the doctrines are, in fact, shared, and can be stated clearly with agreement.

The Defendants

The group of defendants that identifies themselves as economists includes: the group of individuals receiving university degrees in “economics,” those teaching “economics,” those publishing textbooks in “economics” for “economics departments,” and those identifying themselves by profession as “economists.” This is a collective enterprise. Economics establishes itself as in industry by setting its own standards for publication, for hiring and advancement. As in civil lawsuits and prosecutions of the tobacco industry for their distortion, misuse of data and profit, working tacitly as a collective with common ends, economists can be viewed as a profession or industry that can potentially be held accountable for research and public statements where there is promotion of self-interest in ways that are fraudulent, deceptive and result in harm.

This approach for identifying a group is consistent with the goals of international law enforcement. Rather than blame entire cultures or religions for specific actions or extreme doctrines that are combined with harmful actions, the international legal system seeks to identify the individuals and institutions that turn larger public systems towards criminality to help societies to rebalance themselves in ways that are consistent with international universal principles. The approaches of the Nuremberg courts following World War II were not to criminalize Germans or Japanese as an ethnic group, though they recognized collective responsibility, but to criminalize individuals promoting certain ideologies in exercise of authority and in compelling others to take actions, in violation of international law, as they sought to restore Germany and Japan to stability. The goal of those courts was to hold individuals or groups of individuals accountable for the choices they made, including the doctrines they promoted, in their own self-interest that harmed the acknowledged rights of others. It was to criminalize independent policy decisions that were not essential to the survival of the economic system or the culture practicing that system, such as how they choose to treat native peoples, land rights, future rights to a clean environment, and other rights that international law affirmatively recognizes.

Even though some might say that economists are not the most responsible for certain harms occurring today that reflect their doctrines that does not mean they should not be held accountable or that they cannot be held accountable. The economics profession is not completely responsible but it is also not completely independent of existing distribution and abuses of wealth and power and its ideologies. Yet, the idea that it is completely neutral and unaccountable is easy to prove false. This kind of thinking is one of the blinders within economics itself; assuming free, independent and sovereign choice. The test of that is to look at the sources of funding of Economics departments as well as the places academic economists work and how their own funding and prestige and position are reinforced. Economists teach what corporations promote and not what the “market” of student “consumers” choose. The very profession they work in is also an “imperfect market” that restricts choice. Law assumes and evaluates choices by individuals and economists themselves and it is economists who themselves teach that individuals make their own choices and understand the risks and values, including those of choosing harm to others and criminality. In essence, economic teachings already accept the accountability of economists for the implications of what they teach and the interests they promote. One can choose not to be an economist. One can choose to challenge its teachings in another field. The law does hold collectives accountable. The “rule of nobody” is not a defense (Arendt, 1963). Collective responsibility also recognizes individual responsibility, particularly at high levels. If a doctrine is behind certain policies, whether that of a political party, a corporate advertiser, or a social institution, individuals who promote the doctrines are responsible for them and their effects.
Note that one overriding purpose of law and the spirit of the legal analysis offered in this piece is not to punish specific individuals as much as to hold behaviors to standards and to regulate human activity and move it forward with long-term interests of humanity. Punishment is a means to the end of changing behaviors, not the end in itself. The goal of this piece is to first identify the doctrines and the actions and impacts that are linked to those doctrines and to try to criminalize and change them if they are indeed in violation of international law. The goal at the same time is to improve and replace these doctrines if they are scientifically and methodologically suspect and weak, to improve their intellectual merit and public value.

There are different alternatives for approaching doctrines. One can look at specific “schools” within a discipline that rigidly adhere to particular doctrines on the assumption that it is these schools that have somehow perverted and distorted a discipline. One can look for a specific group that uses the discipline in a way that distorts its meaning for criminal intent and assume that the discipline itself may simply be subject to abuse by rogue elements. Or one can start directly with the discipline itself on the belief that the entire “discipline” is itself promoting doctrines with fraudulent, self-interested intent resulting in criminal harms.

There is already public discussion as to where to look for harmful doctrines and how to measure the harm. Here, it makes most sense to start with the economics profession itself, leaving open the possibility for looking at specific sub-groups if the discipline itself is benign.

While Naomi Klein identifies what she loosely terms the “shock doctrine” of specific economists like Milton Friedman and the “Chicago School” and seeks to hold them and the politicians who apply their approach accountable for theft of the commons and destabilization of weak countries and their cultures (Klein, 2007). However, since not even Milton Friedman identifies himself as the proponent of the “shock doctrine,” with a clear identifiable school of followers, organized into a discrete political party or organization that promotes a specific ideology, determining the specific defendants and specific components of this doctrine would be difficult.

Since others suggest that the current approach to “globalization” is itself a criminal doctrine and that the harms it has caused, that might also amount to international and domestic crimes, are not merely limited to a specific school but are supported by specific professions including the economics profession, it would be easier to start the analysis with the profession itself to see if it has such doctrines and if they can be linked to harms.

Seeking Shared Beliefs: Separating Doctrine from Scientific Beliefs

Most economists today recognize a body of doctrine in their field that they refer to as “neo-classic economics” but unlike certain professions with established determination of physical laws (like the “four laws of thermodynamics”) that are known to all physicists in a specific order, this is not a list of enumerated tested laws and it is also not a clear list of doctrine.

If economics were a real social science, there would be a set of such laws as in natural science; these would be taught along with the experiments that reveal and replicate them in a hierarchy building the discipline as a discipline. There would be nothing to test for legality other than the experimental protocols and the applications of results. Yet, even though economics is being expressed in mathematics, many of its principles are not scientific laws.

Instead, in the discipline of economics, there are topics and precepts. Unlike reading religious texts of parables and invocations from a higher power, economists do state doctrines in their basic texts. In one way, it is actually easier to find the doctrines of economics than trying to determine the basic tenets of a religion from a single, long religious text that may have multiple authors, may be written in an ancient language, and may contain contradictory or ambiguous passages. Every economics Ph.D. will agree to a certain set of principles and textbooks will repeat them.

The question is how exactly to find them and then how to examine them. Here is the standard of what to search for. There are certain crimes where speech is clearly a criminal act. Among them are fraud (knowing deception for personal gain), incitement, reckless endangerment, and, more recently, hate speech. These crimes are prosecuted by identifying specific statements that have these impacts. In the
case of economics, these will be shared beliefs that are repeated in highlighted contexts such that they achieve the recognition of a doctrine that scholars know or should know to be false with the intent of promoting personal gain at the expense of others. One quick way to separate out the ordinary statements of scholarship from those that could fit the category of criminal speech is to look at how these statements are made and how individuals in the discipline are rewarded and punished for their challenges to those statements. In a “discipline” it is relatively easy to find the shared beliefs since individuals are rewarded and punished on the basis of whether they agree to them and these are used in the basic teaching and then testing and rewarding of those who repeat them and then teach them and use them in their own written publications.

Doctrines are clearly distinguishable from the ordinary work of science and scholarship for the very reason that they are not subject to testing and replacement but are accepted on faith. Assumptions that are promoted without any test of their validity, without any attempt to test that validity – including penalties against who seek to make those challenges, and without any opportunity to throw out the assumption if it fails the test meet the definition of doctrine. A widely shared political or ideological belief like a religious belief that is not subject to testing, is not an empirical observation, and is not a rebuttable hypothesis, is probably a doctrine.

Economics also offers some doctrines of “omission” in which certain fundamental questions (that would promote protections) are eliminated from the agenda even though there is a natural tendency to want to raise them. Where the discipline determines that certain public protections are not to be taught, without a rational basis, these can also be examined as doctrine. Of course, the prohibitions against certain discussions are usually more subtly stated and can be a bit harder to find. In my critique of Stanford’s “hidden curriculum” in teaching business courses, for example, I gave the example of the case study of the failing community bank in which the objective of the class was to teach students to erase their empathy for the community and to shut down a bank on purely business profit grounds with no attention to social costs and benefits. There is a classic American film, shown usually around the Christian holiday of Christmas, *It’s a Wonderful Life*, directed by Frank Capra and starring the well-known actor, James Stewart. In the film, Stewart’s character saves the community bank and his soul with it by incorporating community values in his choice. The Stanford case took the same story but deliberately excluded discussion of the public values in order to promote a doctrine and to reverse students’ moral, intellectual and legal inclinations.

**Assuring that the Doctrines are Fundamental, Shared Tenets of the Discipline**

Previous studies of economics as a discipline confirm not only that there is a basic set of beliefs but that they are almost universally enforced in the discipline; thus meeting the status of doctrine. The profession has been found to show a high level of conformity and this is visible not only in its internal hierarchy but in its basic textbooks, even though in a “market economy” economists would describe publishers as free to offer a diversity of approaches where a discipline had yet to find objective, scientific laws and required competitive approaches in order to do so. In looking at this conformity, many authors immediately point out where to look for the doctrines.

In a study in 2006, “Economics Confronts the Economy,” Philip Klein described the discipline as controlled by a comparatively small group of economists located in what are considered the U.S.’s top departments (University of Chicago, MIT, Stanford, Harvard) who edit the leading journals and act as a barrier to the emergence of new ideas. He described this control as the source of stagnation of the discipline around doctrines, including the central view that economic power should be free to exert political power without public or legal oversight (the “laissez-faire” ideology).

Though no one directly points to the Nobel Prize Committee as accountable (the more likely targets are economists, themselves, and the institutions they work for), the Nobel Prize in Economics (that is actually the “Bank of Sweden’s Prize in Economic Science in Memory of Alfred Nobel”) may be the professional seal that anoints economists and their doctrines and that could be viewed today as one of the most important centralizing agents for the doctrines of the discipline. Indeed, this award, given since 1968, and nearly one quarter of the time to economics professors at a single university known for its
narrow and doctrinal view of the discipline (the University of Chicago) plays a very different role for this discipline than it does for natural sciences and medicine. In natural sciences, the Nobel Prize largely rewards scientists for the human benefits of work, adding a new criterion to work that largely remains unchanged in its recognition and use in those disciplines following the award. By contrast, the Nobel Prize in Economics is the only social science award, in a discipline that itself recognizes that it is largely based on doctrine rather than scientific verification of its validity or application. The award’s impact is powerful on the individuals who win the award through what is also admittedly a “politicized” and non-transparent process that places a value judgment on the work. In economics, unlike natural sciences where work has already adhered to the scientific method and its referee process, the award is bestowed on individuals whose work has never undergone empirical testing and verification. Though the award committees are run by a national Swedish academy, political judgments (and funding) without any rigorous criteria make the award vulnerable to capture by subjective interests. The funds empower the Prize Committee as a group that itself standardizes the discipline of economics on its own set of values. It is this that also potentially makes it liable for the harms economics may cause. Moreover, the large financial awards to economists are made out of the endowed funds of a central bank in a country that is now largely dependent on arms manufacturing. The award is given in the name of Alfred Nobel, a businessman who was also an arms merchant and inventor of destructive materials who some referred to as the “merchant of death.” Thus, the award itself potentially reinforces the conflicts of interest on this discipline.

The same Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel Prize winner in Economics who unintentionally inspired this article, confirmed this uniformity in 1988 in a study of the discipline’s textbooks. He described most of them as “clones of Samuelson” (a basic economic text since 1948) and explained that they represented a uniformity of thinking due to monopolistic competition (control of competition by the concentrated buying power of the discipline) (1988).

A 1998 study reconfirmed Stiglitz’s observation, finding a “surprising degree of consensus” (Walstad, Watts and Bosshardt, 1998, reported in Lopus and Paringer, 2011). The number of textbooks and publishers has increased but the outlook was found to be similarly narrow.

A more recent study, in 2011, finds that the modern economics textbooks now include “feminist, radical, and religious” views but that there is still uniformity in the discipline’s doctrines, even when there are varying amounts of interest group representation politics (Lopus and Paringer, 2011, p. 5). Today there are only four major publishers, down from 10, twenty years ago. Two of these texts (those of McConnell/Brue/Flynn and Mankiw) represent 40% of sales with several others probably at about a 5% market share. The differences between them are not the doctrines but the topical emphasis on issues like: consumer and producer surplus; what is called behavioral economics (game theory and strategic decision-making; NOT cultural or biological models to explain economies); along with descriptions of the workings of financial markets and banking system in newer works to reflect the recent global financial crisis (but apparently without the legal and political issues of control of the political system and law/regulation by financial interests). International content is not changed but it is moved to the beginning of various books.

The history of textbooks in the field also reflects this lack of diversity. The initial textbook, by Alfred Marshall in 1890, was replaced by Paul Samuelson’s text in 1948. Campbell R. McConnell’s first text, in 1960 began to outsell Samuelson’s in 1975 and remains one of the top two texts alongside that of N. Gregory Mankiw, Chair of George W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors from 2003-5.

The current batch is what Edward Fullbrook refers to as “toxic textbooks” that are directly linked to self-interest through authors like Mankiw (2009). Though Fullbrook calls these books “toxic” rather than “fraudulent” or “criminal” for their failure to see the global financial crisis and for the cause of globalization; he identifies some of the principles that can be tested for criminality.

For the purpose of this article, I tested a sampling of the introductory textbooks from various publishing years to see if, indeed, the introductory textbooks laid out a series of doctrines that could be immediately tested against international law. They do offer some basic doctrines but unfortunately are not the best source of doctrines to use for this study. One must go to the specific areas of the discipline
that build upon the basic introduction — such as international trade and development economics — for the specific doctrines they introduce.

I took the list of the “most popular texts” as of 2011, as described by Lopus and Paringer, including the two by Mankiw and McConnell (and Brue) that comprise the 40% market share, and four others that together constitute the majority share. These are (from Lopus and Paringer):

- **Principles of Modern Economics**, Nicholas Gregory Mankiw;
- **Economics**, Paul Samuelson (and William Nordhaus);
- **Economics**, David Colander;
- **Macro Economic Essentials: Understanding of economics in the News**, Peter Kennedy;
- **Principles of Economics**, Karl E. Case, Sharon Oster, Roy Fair;
- **Principles of Economics**, Timothy Taylor

I relied on the National Library of a “developing country” where I was then based, the People’s Democratic Republic of Lao, and found eight texts, published over a forty year period. These included the texts of two of the top selling authors and several others (McConnell and Brue, 2002; Samuelson, 1961; Clayton, 1983; Clayton, 2001, Wonnocott, 1986, Smith, 1991; Baumol and Blande, 1991; McCarty, 1988).

All of these texts start with the some basic, unproven, unempirical dogmatic assumption on “wants” and “scarcity”. The use of these terms as a starting assumption for economics is not an empirical observation or a tested theory and that is why it can easily be identified as a doctrine. It is an untested belief that is not true across cultures and that is not subject to challenge. Some critics describe this doctrine as the “assumption of greed” and the promotion of production, consumption, destruction, homogenization, and unsustainability. Among its various statements in its simplest form are these:

- “Scarcity” is the fundamental issue of economics; assuming “rational behavior” (interesting in that “scarcity” is linked with a subjective doctrinal view of it as “rational”) (McConnell and Brue, p. 33);
- "Economics is the study of how men and society choose with or without the use of money to employ scarce productive resources" (Samuelson, 1961, p. 6). Here, there is the added psychological, non-scientific assumption that “men” and “society” have full power of free choice which is in direct contrast to the scientific assumption that decisions are determined or linked to outside variables and/or as the result of certain principles that can be discovered by hypothesis testing. This is an assumption about causality that opposes the basic premise of scientific testing of relationships; and
- “No nation in the world has sufficient resources to satisfy the wants of all of its people. . . Economists study the ways in which individuals and society choose to use limited resources … to satisfy unlimited wants” (Smith, 1991, p. 3 and 11)

One of the books also makes it clear that the discipline is U.S. centric and does not allow for comparisons and testing on all forms of economies. “The economist describes how our economic system works” (McCarty, p.4.). This admission suggests that the discipline itself is established on doctrines for a specific technical purpose and is not a science, though it doesn’t elaborate the rest of those doctrines. One would not find a chemistry textbook, for example, just describing “the workings of our products.” The texts also suggest that the system of doctrines they commonly promote is the key to bringing the greatest wealth, prosperity, innovation and happiness and that this is a desirable choice for all. That, itself, is also a doctrine. One would not find a parallel to this in a physics textbook describing physics as the key to wealth and happiness but merely a description of natural laws that could be understood and applied to human problems for human benefit.

The absence of certain teachings in the introductory texts also suggests another doctrine, though it is only implied. Most textbooks mention that economic actors are constrained by government. Some do posit that political regulation develops to ensure respect for rights and individual sovereignty but the subject of rights and protections as an integral part of applications of economics or of economic predictions and measures is dropped. It never enters again into economic discussion and there are no
attempts to measure the value of rights (though it enters into “Law and Economics”) and fundamental long-term concerns of human survival and sustainability. The role of government is given only lip service in these texts. It is mentioned only in upper level economics texts where the role of government and the concepts of international law and legal protections are noted (and, as analyzed below, undermined) in specific ways.

While introductory “Principles of Economics” texts actually fail to identify a common enumerated set of “principles” and doctrines, the teaching of doctrine is instilled in the discipline in these texts in place of scientific enquiry and that, itself, opens the discipline up to legal challenge. Introductory textbooks teach economics as a guide to enrichment and protection of interest through specific action. This confirms that economists are doing something other than offering ideas about how the world might work as a basis for scientific testing. It is clear from the texts that economists are starting with a basis of valuation on which they claim they will advance student “wealth” and “happiness” depending on whether students agree to accept these principles and valuations. The discipline is also linked directly to policy without an established basis of scientific measurement and observation. This means that the doctrines are already linked to invocations for both government and private action. This is a form of action, not the generation of hypotheses for scientific testing of observations, which would immediately offer protection as protected scientific pursuit.

**Picking the Doctrines to Test**

Since the basic economics texts do not outline the discipline’s essential doctrines at its various levels, one needs to look further into the discipline to identify them. One can find them through research and I do so, below. The list of topics in economics that are required for one to earn a degree in the field are also fairly constant throughout universities and comprise the study of economics at different levels, starting from individuals and firms to national government to international economic relations. Almost all university departments start with what they call “Micro-Economics” (consumer and producer behavior), “Macro-Economics” (national production, consumption and price regulation), International Trade, and “Development Economics” (the transformation of economics into trade blocs with industrial countries). Though one can find other courses in economics departments including agricultural, labor or resource economics, public/government accounting, accounting, and methods, these are topic areas rather than the established sequence of levels. Each of these four levels promotes doctrines but they are not listed as formal numbered “laws” or “assumptions.” One has to use other social science methods to find them.

As an anthropologist, I applied the methodology of participant observation used by anthropologists to try to specify belief systems. I combined this with the evidentiary search and deductive logical reasoning approaches used by lawyers to list actionable charges that define behaviors. Both approaches have built-in degrees of subjectivity but should not elicit major disagreement from economists.

The “test” I applied, as someone who has studied economics, is to try to identify those textbook principles statements that nearly all economists would agree belong in a text and would be taught as a basic list of doctrines in the four different levels described above.

To decide which of these should be put to the legal test, I applied a second form of screening. As a Ph.D. social anthropologist who has also had extensive study (and teaching experience) in other “social science” fields, I sought to generate a list of those economics doctrines that are in direct violation of basic principles taught in other disciplines. I looked for those specific doctrines that students in another discipline could say compete with the principles found in another discipline and that they would not teach because it contradicts, without complementing, the teachings that can be found in those other disciplines.

One could present all of economics’ basic tenets and doctrines and then explain which of these do not need to be tested for legality, though that would make the process and presentation here much longer. Other scholars may wish to do that as part of the process of rigorously holding the discipline to the test and restructuring it. For example, many authors critique the tenet or precept of economics (and the word “tenet” or “precept” here is chosen as distinct from “doctrine”) that “competition” is fundamental to economics and that “self-interest” is fundamental to economic study. They claim that this promotes the
concept of “greed” in ways that undermine society and that this approach denies human cooperation. In fact, this part of economic precepts does not in itself create a contradiction with other disciplines or with the approach of science. The existence of such doctrines in economics that are viewed contradictorily by different social sciences is very special and unusual. A chemist, for example, would not read a physics textbook and say that the principles in the physics book were contradictory and not complementary to those of chemistry (or vice-versa) and promoted a different set of values and assumptions! They would say only that certain ideas are theories for which the approaches of their discipline might result in better models but neither discipline would make a claim to truth. By contrast, this does happen in the social “sciences” and “humanities” including economics, which identifies the principles as unscientific doctrines that can be examined.

Note that this identification of economic doctrines on the basis of competition with principles in other fields does not mean that the economic doctrines are right or wrong, since it may be the other disciplines that are wrong. At this stage, the test doesn’t determine the validity or legality of the doctrines. It just determines that these assumptions are doctrinal to economics because they are not shared by (or disproven by empirical data in) other social sciences. The purpose here is to simply generate a list of the doctrines for examination.

Note, also, that what I did not do in this study, unlike others using anthropological methods for similar ends, is to look at the “hidden curriculum;” the teaching of doctrines and values that are embedded both in the teaching methodologies of economics and the structure of power and choices within the university systems where economists teach and are trained. The hidden curriculum of contemporary universities certainly reinforces the doctrines that economists teach (Lempert et. al., 1995). Teaching economics as mathematics and book learning without laboratory field work to meet the peoples who are harmed and cultures destroyed by economic teachings certainly reinforces the attempt to devalue communities and to hide and desensitize individuals to results. Business school use of the case method to reinforce the idea of closed “board room” decision-making with paper statistics and with the public excluded, also works to instill a specific ideology and to exclude public values. Changing the hidden curriculum is an essential part of the solution for reforms but is not essential to judging the illegality of the discipline.

Overall, I identified some 15 doctrines among these four different levels that seemed fundamental to the study of economics at these four levels. Some of the doctrines could be classified as subsets or corollaries. Below is a quick summary. The specific doctrines are input in the table that tests their legality, in Step 4, below (“Tests of the Legality of Economic Doctrines”).

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Summary of Legal Doctrines Testable Under International Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Four Sub-Areas of Economics</th>
<th>Number of Key Doctrines Identified for Testing in Each Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Micro-Economics</td>
<td>Six doctrines, four of them fundamental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro-Economics</td>
<td>Three fundamental doctrines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development</td>
<td>Four fundamental doctrines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade</td>
<td>Two fundamental doctrines</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note that in creating these four building blocks of levels of analysis in economics, the discipline has also made specific choices that deny other social sciences. The economy of the industrial State and its production are considered a worthy level of economic study, but economic behaviors and structures at the level of human culture, of family, of group, and community are not. Nor is the eco-system and its relations considered as a level of economic analysis, even in the new sub-area of Environmental Economics (which measures the “value” of “economic services” rather than start with the eco-system and its costs relative to humans). Nor are animals considered a level of economic study even though they do exhibit economic behavior and could be said to have economies. Similarly, the cross-species interactions of economic exchanges are not considered as a level. This also helps to point to some of the doctrines and biases in the discipline that have both scientific and moral/legal implications.

Other readers could probably add to the list I have generated and that you may wish to scan now in the left hand column of that table below, in Step 4. For example, some might wonder why the list includes 15 doctrines while the doctrines of monetarism are not included on the list. The idea that banks can generate money supply in order to promote “growth” is viewed by some major critics as being the key culprit of the recent financial crisis and depression (Daly, 2011). Others question the idea of individual paper currencies as global reserve currencies and note the inequities and harms that result.

Readers could also try to offer more precise agreed wording and specify the exact percentages of texts or surveyed economic professors or journal articles that conform with these specific principles. They may wish to amend or present this list in another way that could reflect a more “scientific” approach to specifying the norm (perhaps a statistical bell curve) and the systematic list of beliefs. Others are welcome to do that if they believe such refinement would advance the approach here or provide a model for application to challenges to other disciplines. The goal here is just to try to generate a basic set of doctrines that can be tested for legality and to tie them to central pillars of the study of the discipline.

Step 2: Identifying the Source of the Legal Standards to Use:

Identifying international laws to apply is harder than it may seem, though I will do so in this section after applying a process that looks to legal bedrock, consistency and universality of law within a multitude of international documents including international laws (which are clear and partly enforceable) and declarations, conventions, and treaties (that seek to clarify the meaning of basic laws but often create conclusion).

The set of international treaties is, unfortunately, full of contradictions, which has led to a misleading view that all law is subjective, culturally based, and impossible or undesirable to enforce, without any common and universal consensus. Though there are two very clear areas of “universal” criminal laws
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(outlawing the crimes of genocide and crimes “against humanity” that both essentially act to protect cultural/group rights, referenced below), these international “laws” are not uniformly enforced though they are legally clear and their full meaning and enforcement are continually subject to international politics. Several other treaties establish individual “rights” or legal violations (such as trade agreements) that in themselves may contradict or undermine other established principles.

To appropriately apply these “laws,” one has to separate out the political influences on the body of international law. Doing so reveals part of the paradox of how economic doctrines and politics themselves already influence international agreements and laws and makes enforcement of laws against economics as a discipline almost paradoxical. After explaining why all of the treaties other than those of the two “universal” criminal laws, may themselves have been short-circuited by economic doctrines and their associated politics, I move to examine and clarify the standards of the “universal” criminal laws, recognizing that the interpretation of how those laws are enforced must also be stripped of the political influences that seek to redefine what these laws mean.

A Paradox of Law and Economics

The development of international “rights” treaties has reached such a stage where it is almost possible today to speak of generating a treaty “guaranteeing” the “right” to “pickled herring” or “gefilte fish” and as a practitioner in this field I have published criticisms of my fellow international human rights lawyers and human rights educators for the way that recent rights declarations and international conventions have begun to stray from bedrock law towards self-interested promotion by every interest group that seeks recognition in a treaty. In my view, little more is required for an international declaration today than backing by the producers of pickled herring and gefilte fish coupled with the belief of organizations and bureaucrats working with the United Nations system that they will be funded to generate such treaties and then to administer projects that “fulfill” these rights of everyone to enjoy pickled herring and gefilte fish (Lempert, 2010a). Similarly, the emergence of international organizations and trade agreements that promote ideologies of globalization and that include sanctions and other pressures on countries or groups for non-compliance, also continue to multiply. In ignoring actual international laws like the U.N. Genocide Convention’s protections of cultural rights, many organizations and interests in the international community today seek to use these agreements to replace international law.

The paradox is that both the universal international laws, that are designed to protect the most fundamental, long-term interests of humanity, and those “rights” treaties, trade agreements and “development” standards that contradict or undermine them in ways that are largely designed to promote short-term economic interests of businesses, countries, and government bureaucracies, can all ultimately be defended on the basis of economic measurements or described as being politically motivated. If the ultimate standard of measurement is an economic one (or a political one) and if economics itself has become politicized, how is it possible to identify a neutral standard for the accountability of those who design the standards? Is there a paradox of using morality, or “science” or even economics’ own principles (as a “moral science”) to “prove” the objectivity of law and then to compare economics against this objectivity?

Like economics, the discipline of “law” or “jurisprudence” was also originally considered a “moral science.” Legal scholars looking for the source of moral law have used many of the same methods and arguments as economists in seeking to justify that the doctrines that emerged were “positivist,” “neutral,” or “natural law.”

What, then, makes “law” more trustworthy than economics? How is it possible to know that the “law” that defines “universal” value and long-term benefit isn’t subject to the same (or other) subjectivity and self-interest? What makes its judgments any better as a standard of value than those of the “science” of economics, as economists would claim? Are both systems really parallel and coming out of a common origin, making them both equally valid as religious or “legal” standards of measurement? Is this article able to do more than hold two moral, relativistic approaches against each other? What makes the economists wrong and allows their defiance of international law to be judged itself as a criminal act?
The solution is to emphasize the disappearing bright line distinction between “law” and “economics.” One of my goals in this article is to make it clear that the two belief systems have come into conflict. By simple definition, law should take precedence over economics since law is the system to be used as the highest standard for judging other acts. The reason for using law in this way is not simply an arbitrary choice justified only on calls of “morality” or “faith.” It is because law itself is the area of human activity in which societies seek to protect “long-term human survival interests.” Cultures use law to protect their survival. International legal systems have now developed for the stated legal purpose, in the United Nations founding documents and in key criminal laws, not of protecting one individual culture but of protecting long-term human survival and multiple cultures. Even if economics has gained a leading position in the most powerful societies (urban, technological cultures) on the planet, today and are the equivalent of the religious doctrines of those cultures, they still take second place to the international goal of protecting the overall survival of humanity. That survival may include defending humanity against the doctrines of those powerful cultures if it finds them a threat to long-term human survival.

Even economic theories and measures are used to give greater legitimacy to the basis of international law, those measures are based on the long-term value of human survival, not simply on one culture’s moral beliefs for protecting its own survival. Economics cannot be placed on the same level as law precisely because it does not consider the totality of human interests. It only considers those within its current measures.

In the statements that I presented in the introductory section of this article from Professor Stiglitz and his economics colleagues, it is clear that they do not simply ignore the two basic international criminal laws. They go beyond that. They are attacking the very legitimacy of those laws, claiming that they are no more valid than the trade agreements for globalization that they are using to replace them. They are claiming that their work in economics is superior to that of law because it lacks their determination of what economic doctrines imply constitutes a pure “science.” They argue that law’s moral authority as a system is based on even less faith than their “rigorous” and “mathematical” system of economics. They claim that the international community has politically defined its principles as sacred in a way that essentially makes it no different from economics as a system and simply an arbitrary set of doctrines that may be no different from religious dogma.

The view of the international community, written into law following World War II, and held as a fundamental basis of rule of law is that the economists are wrong. International law, itself is not just a theology or moral set of goals. Societies recognize certain principles in law as meeting the test of being universal (culturally neutral), moral in all cultural moral precept systems, AND as natural law. International laws are testable propositions for long-term survival and benefit. Trade agreements and the belief in short-term economic measures and gains cannot meet that standard that would enable specific interests to compete against law.

Holding economics up to international legal standards does not challenge the right to make economic measurements or observations or even to apply those measures to law. What legal analysis of economics doctrines tests is whether or not the current doctrines that have been chosen for teaching by economists are those that reflect long-term human interests or scientific observation and that would readily be approved by a consensus of humanity. Finding economic doctrines in violation of these laws would say that the current economic doctrines actually violate the basic principle that economists say they agree to, but have abandoned; that “value” must reflect actual long-term human survival benefits and universal value to humanity as tested by human history and experience, and NOT simply doctrine or ideology that is promoted for the self-interest of a small group today in ways that cause harm and that do not stand up to scientific testing. The promotion of short-term economic interests and policies appears to have become the current (unlawful) approach of economics and the law can hold these economic doctrines to a long-term test, including a test of long-term economic benefits to humanity; the test that economists are expected to uphold as their first principle but that they appear to have abandoned.

Indeed, it is possible to take certain of the measures and precepts of economics as a discipline and to use them to prove that the current form of the discipline is knowingly based on internal contradictions that deny certain of its own teachings for reasons of conflicts of interest that can be tested for their legality.
The very doctrines that economists espouse today that appear to undermine group rights and cultural diversity (in promotion of genocide) directly contradict the basic tenet of economics that diversity and competition are, themselves, actually more “robust” systems for protecting long-term adaptability and needs. This biological idea of competition, adaptation radiation and diversity of human groups that allow for competing ideas of value, consumption and production, could easily fit with understandings of ecology and environmentalism but contemporary economic doctrines override this basic belief (Lempert, 2010b). Similarly, the idea of political equity that modern economic doctrines undermine can be determined to also best reflect the basic economic doctrine of fair and stable competition and can be easily applied to 18th century ideals of political equality and social contract (Lempert, 1996b). Modern economic doctrines knowingly choose not to do this. This opens up economics to legal scrutiny.

The other contradiction within economic doctrine today with the principles of law is that the “market”, as promoted today by economic doctrines, is a system for expression of short-term majority preferences but not for the long-run, which is the basis for law. Economists say that “in the long run we’re all dead” because they reinforce short-term decisions and internalized perceptions. Law says that we need to assure that in the long run we are still alive and that natural assets, social systems, cultural diversity, historical learning is still protected. This means that economics fundamentally recognizes that it requires law to supervise it since law acts as the very correction of market imperfections. It is designed to establish social goods and social choices alongside or in place of free market choices. In other words, law and economics are not “equivalent” “preference systems” of moral or political choice. Law is the one that trumps and establishes the “level playing field.”

International law is designed as a way to introduce long-term measures into human decision-making, by establishing “rights” for cultural and individual diversity that have long-term benefits as well as rights for environment, children and heritage that are also likely to be undervalued in short-term investment calculations. The challenge for economists today, in the face of law, is to explain their abandonment of such fundamental “universal” standards; their arbitrary determination that such fundamentals can and should be redefined in typical actions by economists, such as in approving international development loans and grants, with international law seen only as “exogenous” or “external” variables or constraints that are deemed irrelevant to economic decision-making or impediments to be removed. They must explain why equity, cultural or human diversity, and long-term human or environmental investments are not systematically protected in their decision-making.

Historians of economics note that these internal (and moral) contradictions within economics began to multiply even before the system of international law was established after World War II. “The drift of economics away from a moral science was evident, and condemned, yet the impact of these attacks was minimal.” (Alvey, 1999, p. 24). The question is, was this drift away from a moral science” also a drift away from legality; i.e., adherence to accepted principles of international law, with a claim that they were “non-scientific” and unnecessary and interfered with economic “positivism”? If “greed” and “conquest” were established as the basic “positivist” principles and part of economic science, the harms they created can be held against international law to determine if they are illegal.

Once economics begins to take certain human motivations and utilize them for short-term interests that also promote their own self-interests, they are no longer acting neutrally or acceptably. Once doctrines prioritize short-term benefits such as “productivity” in a way that favors a small group (producers) with unexamined long-term negative consequences for the survival of cultures and of groups (people whose lands or livelihoods are threatened and who do not fund university chairs, unlike the corporate heads who are creating the harms), then economics is in violation of its role as a discipline. The conflict of principles is not simply whether a doctrine like greed can be taught as an assumption but whether the encouragement of greed teaches and promotes theft, short-term over long-term interests, and de-valuation of the interests of others as legitimate and symmetric as recognized and established under law.

The reason there is only a very limited set of international laws that can be used for this test is because the process of determining what is “universal” and in humanity’s long-term interest is difficult, vulnerable to politicization, and because “social sciences” like economics also appear (for political and
ideological reasons) to have forbidden study of the very types of questions that might help provide more answers on what kinds of systems are possible and how we best promote survival.

The proliferation of “rights” treaties (as if the U.N. system has become a business for generating and selling declarations) and of trade agreements has far outstripped the actual testing of which of these approaches are really “universal” and in humanity’s long-term interests and which are just part of an international political process in which interests compete (unequally) for advantage. In recent years, treaties have largely generated a list of individual rights that not only compete with each other but that often work to undermine cultural/group rights that are protected by international criminal law.

Economics has contributed to this blurring of law not only through the offering of international agreements that promote existing economic and political power but also by promoting an idea of individuals shaping laws and processes for individual situations rather than for promoting principles to protect weak interests under specific conditions. Economic doctrines today works on the assumption of individual rights and individual units as factors of labor and consumption independent of culture in ways that detach individuals and resources from their cultural systems and make them available for exploitation in the global economy. These individual rights – for women’s industrial labor, for individual mobility (in line with foreign capital investments), for (industrial system) education – largely serve economic interests and globalization and are promoted selectively by industrial countries seeking to employ foreign labor and extract foreign resources. In international organization agendas, these various economic, social and political rights are promoted in ways that seek to enforce government spending choices that follow political preferences established by the international community for the global economic niche of each country. Rather than reflect “law,” these rights create a mechanism that can undermine cultures and diversity in favor of a uniform mono-culture. Many of these, analogous to the “right to pickled herring”, now find themselves in international documents.

The two existing bedrock international laws have common elements that distinguish them from the large proliferation of international documents that have followed. What makes the international criminal laws on genocide and crimes against humanity enforceable is that there are identifiable perpetrators who create harm. Exercise of the “right” of a culture to exist, free of actors seeking to undermine its workings in order exploit its resources and its people (as workers or consumers), has a remedy. One can hold those who undermine these cultures accountable. Most of these other rights are policy statements defined as “rights.” Who denies nomadic desert peoples their supply of fresh water where there is no outside intervention polluting or depleting the water? On what basis can outsiders then come in, move the nomads to a sedentary area and force them into agricultural production for the global market on the basis of “enforcing their water rights?” If economists promote these moves on the basis of promoting “rights” and “choice” and “productivity” while destroying the culture of the nomads to do it, the “rights” treaties do not override the international law that protects the inviolability of the culture.

For this analysis, the place to start is with the bedrock international criminal laws.

The Wording of the International Laws that Can be used as a Test

Even though there are really only two international criminal laws (genocide and crimes against humanity) that can be used to test (and ultimately prosecute) the legality/illegality of economics, these laws, themselves, are “evolving.” The “problem” in identifying the specific applicable standard for these laws is that enforcement is also subject to politicization in both interpretation and application. There is a disparity between the historic enforcement of international laws and the laws themselves, such that the laws may actually criminalize many more activities than international prosecutors currently consider for bringing to trial.

Identifying the laws to use is actually a partly interactive process that requires not only looking at the law but also in generating a list of specific harms that do or might fit under those laws. In order to determine which acts of economics (which doctrines) might be prosecuted as crimes, the existing and potential harms of the doctrines also need to be enumerated (and they are in Step 4, below) and then matched with the existing laws that seek to assign criminal responsibility for specific harms. To find out
if the harms of economic doctrines fit existing laws, the laws must be stated in terms of the full potential list of harms that are clearly or could be covered by the laws.

Since the laws on genocide and crimes against humanity have only been applied in very narrow ways, to clarify that the laws can apply to specific harms, an understanding of how these laws are to be applied against new kinds of harms requires applying standard statutory analysis techniques to the laws. This is the legal technique of examining the “plain meaning” of the laws, then the historic intent and legislative history, to offer a basis for reconstructing the existing statutes given other documents or legal understandings if the specific plain meaning and intent are not clear in the law itself. Finally, though less objective, to find the full extent by which the laws might be applied, requires understanding the public policy goal of the laws and trying to reconstruct them to coincide with those policies.

Both of the existing international criminal laws come out of the basic goals of humanity that are enshrined in the United Nations Charter (1948):

1. To maintain international peace and security … in conformity with the principles of justice and international law.
2. …Respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.

Considering each of these laws in turn and their fullest interpretations, it is possible to determine how the harms that economists are believed to have caused could fit prosecution under one or both of these international laws.

- The Genocide Convention: The plain meaning of the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (U.N. General Assembly, December 9, 1948) is summarized relatively quickly in one sentence, in Article II, of the law with other articles describing where the law applies and to whom it applies. It is a crime of “destruction” “in whole or in part” of a group. It is a crime of intent. “Incitement” which is a crime of speech is also punishable as is “complicity.”

*Article I*. The contracting parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or war is a crime under international law.
*Article II*. In the present convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part …

*Article III.* The following acts shall be punishable: (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide. (e) Complicity in genocide.

*Article IV.* [punishment includes] public officials or private individuals.

What has never been absolutely clear here is the definition of partial destruction of a group. Thus far, only actual killings have been prosecuted as genocide. Yet it is very clear from the law that there is no use of the word “death,” “homicide,” “killing” or “murder” that would limit genocide to only these things. By the principles of statutory analysis, had these limitations been intended, they would have been included.

Historical analysis of the law confirms that it was also intended to criminalize a much broader set of harms than those resulting in “death.” Raphael Lemkin, who coined the word “genocide” and authored the law, hoped that it would be used to criminalize much more than murder and that it would protect the integrity of cultures in all of its dimensions. He wrote,

Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is
directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against
individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group. 14

Lemkin doesn’t clearly establish that the law was designed to protect the economic choices of groups
since he used the term “economic existence” and “security.” Nor does he use the term “economic
institutions” alongside “political and social institutions.” Clearly, he saw the exploitation and abuse of
resources that undermined livelihoods as genocide.

Anthropologists looking at this explanation, today, using accepted definitions of culture would
quickly add “economic choices” and “economic institutions” into this list to assure its appropriate
meaning (Lempert, 2010b). That is exactly what the international community has done in recent
documents that essentially define the genocide law. These two documents are the United Nations
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2007), applied to peoples who sit on land and
resources that have been the most vulnerable to economic doctrines including those promoting
globalization, and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992 (Rio Declaration,
1992). These documents do not have the full force of law, but they are not creating new “rights.” They
are interpreting existing law. Almost all countries have signed the UNDRIP and the Rio Declaration.
Even where a few industrial countries like the United States, where the economics profession is
concentrated, have not signed on, that does not make these clarifications irrelevant or even unenforceable
through the Genocide Convention. The actions of the economics profession are clearly global and are
exerted in some 141 countries that have signed the UNDRIP and that can also bring prosecutions of
genocide against foreign nationals whose actions have effect in their countries.

Below are some of the key provisions of the UNDRIP that give meaning to the Genocide Convention.

Article 5.
Indigenous Peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic,
social and cultural institutions.

Article 7.
Indigenous Peoples have the collective right to live in freedom, peace and security as distinct peoples
and shall not be subjected to any act of genocide.

Article 8.
1. Indigenous Peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or
destruction of their culture.
2. Redress for ....
a) any action which has the aim of depriving them of their integrity as a distinct people or of their
cultural values or ethnic identities.
d) any form of forced assimilation or integration.

Article 9.
Indigenous Peoples .... Traditions and customs of their community or nation.

Article 11.
1. Indigenous Peoples have the right to practice and revitalize their cultural traditions and customs.
This includes the right to maintain and protect and develop the past, present and future manifestations
of their cultures.

Article 12.
1. Indigenous Peoples have the right to use and control of their ceremonial objects.

Article 13.
Indigenous Peoples have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future generations ....

Article 20.
1. Indigenous Peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and social
systems and institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and
development and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities.
2. Indigenous Peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development are entitled to just and
fair redress.

Article 23.
Indigenous Peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for exercising
their right to be developed.

Article 32.
2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative institutions in order to obtain the free and informed consent prior to approval of any project affecting their lands or territories or other resources.

The provisions that would strengthen the use of the genocide treaty and provide opportunities for charges against economics would be Articles 7, 8, 23 and 32. Article 7, for example, would appear to protect Indigenous Peoples against globalization or marketization of their culture by outsiders and doctrines that advocate for it. Article 8 would also potentially criminalize certain economic doctrines for globalization that seek to assimilate Native Peoples in any way (in their consumption and production activities). Article 23 could directly speak to doctrines of economists that are offered in ways that undermine full and objective judgments by Native peoples and act to convince them, on biased and incomplete information and doctrinal falsehoods, to give up aspects of their cultures or to sell their resources at market values rather to recognize what is needed to protect the sustainability of their systems. Article 32 would potentially criminalize economic doctrines that push governments to make decisions based on Gross Domestic Product and other aggregate benefits without considering the particularized harms to individual cultures in their geographic niches.

The importance of the Rio Declaration in combination with the Genocide Convention is that it introduces the scientific formula that defines what keeps a culture sustainable: the “IPAT” equation (environmental impact as a factor of population, affluence and technology) that requires a balance of population (demographic policies), consumption and production/technology on a specific asset base. The Declaration encapsulates this idea in two principles:

Principle 3. … to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.

Principle 8. To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for all people, States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies.

In specific contrast to economics doctrine, the Declaration assumes that consumption and production are free choices that are integral to each culture and that they can be kept in balance. In contrast to economic doctrines, it assumes that happiness (“utility”) is determined and measured differently by each culture and that these differences should be preserved as fundamental protected rights (ostensibly by the Genocide Convention). Efficiency is measured differently by each culture because all activities can have a culturally maintaining value about from that measured by individuals. There is no such thing as a universal standard and there is not even an assumption that wants are unlimited or that societies or cultures have to deal with scarcity. What they have to deal with is balance that reflects their cultural choice. Cultures are rooted to land and specific (holy) resource assets that are of special value, that are sui generic, non-fungible goods.

The Rio Declaration essentially puts economists on notice that their doctrines are not universally accepted and that their doctrines could result in genocide by undermining cultural sustainability. Moreover, they put economists on notice that this balance is also a scientific concept of which they are expected to recognize.

- The Rome Statute on Crimes Against Humanity: The Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court is stated more recently than the Genocide Convention but its principles were already put to practice in the Nuremberg Trials of Nazi war criminals immediately after World War II.

The statute defines crimes against humanity as acts which:

... are positively odious offences in that they constitute a serious attack on human dignity or grave humiliation or degradation of one or more human beings. They are not isolated or sporadic events but are … part of widespread or systematic practices. (Rome Statute, ICC, 1998)

The Statute does not clearly define what these harms might be other than that they be systematic and serious. But this statute does seem to be directed against the activities of a group promoting a specific
ideology that leads to specific harms. The doctrines of economics are certainly “widespread” and “systematic” in their practice rather than “isolated or sporadic.” If economic doctrines are linked to destruction of global heritage – destabilization of the global economy in ways that create conditions for war and any other harms that would seem to harm humanity in general – or create severe conditions for a specific group (farmers or laborers could certainly constitute “one or more human beings”) it would seem that this law could apply.

**Harms that Economists are Believed to have Caused and International Laws that Deal with those Harms**

Given the above laws that define certain harms that match those harms caused by economic doctrines, the answer to whether economics fits the areas of existing international crimes for testing is yes. There is an easily identifiable list of harms that are directly linked to economic doctrines.

Forced resettlement, urbanization, destruction of heritage sites, foreign investment in new forms of production, environmental transformation, national schooling policy that assimilates and replaces cultural difference, promotion of foreign trade in communities that could otherwise be sustainable, advertising of products that knowingly change established consumption patterns, openness to foreign investment that will change established labor and family patterns, and urbanization choices that are promoted by international development banks, international NGOs, and foreign donors routinely destroy cultures and result in disproportionate harms and deaths to minority cultures in violation of those international laws that have been established to protect the long-term survival of humanity.

The chart below lists these general types of harms that have been attributed to economic doctrines (left-hand column) and then asks whether those harms are covered by the international laws against humanity (central column) and genocide (right hand column). At least one of the two laws seems to cover all of these harms and some of the harms can be covered by both. This quick analysis does not examine the elements of the commission of the crime or even which type of crime (such as incitement of the crime, actual commission of the direct act, and/or participation in a conspiracy to commit the crime). It does not link specific doctrines with the listed harms. This chart simply leads to the next step; taking the identified doctrines of economics and testing to see whether those that can be linked to these specific harms in ways that meet the specific elements that are determined to be criminal acts. That is the subject of Steps 3 and 4.

### Specific Harms to be Tested and Coverage Under International Law

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Harm</th>
<th>International Laws that Cover the Listed Harm</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undermining of regulation to crash economic systems</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promotion or reinforcement of inequalities</td>
<td>Possibly if the resultant inequalities make a group worse off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pillaging of the natural environment</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assimilation into a national culture or global economy</td>
<td>No (unless it comes with specific harms – see below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of cultural diversity through urbanization, forced resettlement, vulnerability of land and livelihoods</td>
<td>Yes if the resultant vulnerability makes a group worse off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undermining of family and social institutions</td>
<td>Yes if there is resultant poverty to an identifiable group</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Step 3: The Judgment Process: Identifying the Elements of the Crimes:

The legal determination for prosecutors and courts is whether economic doctrines, themselves, promoted by the discipline of economics, meet the specific elements of the crimes (causality and intent) in ways that are sufficient to determine guilt. Step 2, above, confirms that economic doctrines can be linked to specific areas of harm that are criminalized by the international laws sanctioning genocide and crimes against humanity. In linking economic doctrines to those harms, however, the additional step to establish guilt is to demonstrate that a specific act meets the additional elements of crime beyond the harms; that of intent. The crimes in international law for genocide and against humanity are not “strict liability” crimes that would punish perpetrators simply by showing that their acts are causally linked to the harms (that “but for” the acts of the discipline of economics, the harms would not have occurred). They also require proof of “intent,” the mental state to have generated the specific acts that led to the harms. The laws, themselves, are not that clear on how “intent” is to be determined and proven, or whether any defenses can negate that intent, but there are procedures establishing intent in similar crimes. There is also a bit of a distinction necessary here as to whether the discipline of economics and its actors could be held directly responsible for specific acts alone (promoting a harmful doctrine), or whether guilt arises as part of a conspiracy, or both, though this distinction is really more relevant to punishments and to overall solutions (whether other parties also need to be held guilty and reformed at the same time) rather than to specific guilt.

Here, I discuss these different theories and how an international lawyer would instruct a judge to apply them to economics, as a basis for considering liability of the economics profession in Step 4. I examine here the tests that courts use for establishing causality and intent under the specific types of speech crimes for which economics could be prosecuted (either directly or conspiratorially) that are part of the causal chain of speech leading to harm (fraud, incitement) as well as the defenses to these acts and then discuss how I would apply these theories as an international lawyer/prosecutor and/or judge.

Causality: The “But For” Test

Are the doctrines of economics that are plausibly linked to the harms of genocide and crimes against humanity, in fact responsible in any way for those harms, including the speed and intensity with which they occurred? Or would they occur in exactly the same way without the existence of the discipline of economics? In the Soviet Union, one could argue that the teachings of Western economics were essentially eliminated and replaced by subjects like “Scientific Communism” and “Marxist-Leninist Doctrine.” Yet, the same kinds of harms that occurred in the areas of Western imperial influence occurred under the Soviet regime. Minorities lost their lands and languages in the name of “development.” Eco-systems were destroyed, regions were polluted, minority regions were destroyed, and communities lost their sustainable economic bases. Can economic doctrines really be held liable or are other institutions, actors, and processes entirely at work? Can economics escape liability for the actions of political and economic institutions that have destroyed cultures, eco-systems and communities by using the “ADDI” defense; pointing the finger and saying “Another Dude Did It, not me”?

It is easy to point to individuals with economics degrees in international and domestic governmental institutions and in businesses, and often in leading positions, who have direct responsibility for the harms attributed to economic doctrines. Almost certainly they would not be in these positions without their educational certification as economists (particularly those in international banks and in government policy positions). Almost certainly, the credibility given to their advice to foreign governments and domestically is based on their economics degrees and ability to claim support from the economics profession. Moreover, they implicitly measure their success by their ability to shift resources to the policies they support. While it is difficulty to directly calculate the specific amount by which their economics credentials are responsible for their authority and their specific percentage role in harms, there is sufficient evidence of this link and economists themselves acknowledge it, though they deny that the results of the actions are “harms”. Economists with political and economic power not only take responsibility for the discipline’s doctrines; they boast of the impacts they have had on global policies.
Probably the quickest way to recognize the direct responsibility of economics for the results of their doctrines is to ask what the difference would be in recent global history if economists had been held to the standards of oversight described in the Introduction to this article, in terms of university codes of ethics and professional responsibility and licensing. The law establishes that educators and disciplines have an affirmative “duty” to protect the public and the integrity of their profession. What would have happened had they actually exercised this duty and recognized the results of their profession as “harms” to be avoided under law and ethics codes, to which they would be held accountable?

If the economics associations were to publicly sanction members who caused harmful results and were to teach students to ostracize those individual economists and to change the institutions they led in order to uphold legal principles and public concerns, it is certain that those organizations would have been hindered in their impact. The discipline of economics’ own doctrines prevent economists from saying that they oppose their own doctrines and the results of them. Any kind of legal review or ethical enforcement would, as one of the non-arguable (and trivial) tenets of economic doctrine notes, “increases costs” of action and, therefore “reduces the supply” of that action where the action is freely chosen (in the language of economists, “demand for such action is variable rather than fixed”).

Consider, for example, the impact on policy if economics as a profession exercised the kind of legal and ethical responsibility that current regulations of universities require, as described above using the example of Stanford’s Fundamental Standard for its faculty members and the chartering laws of universities as non-profits that require them to meet their public purpose. Many economists who work for national and international public organizations move back and forth between public position and the university, including Larry Summers, the former President of Harvard and U.S. Secretary of the Treasury, and Joseph Stiglitz, the Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of the World Bank. Others like N. Gregory Mankiw, Chair of George W. Bush’s Council of Economic Advisors from 2003-5, publish textbooks. If universities held them fully accountable for their activities in public life and their doctrines and found those doctrines to promote violations of international laws, they would be unable to resume their university teaching or administration. Their texts would not meet review standards and would not be published or used in the classroom. They would be free to speak at universities in accordance with free speech laws, but not to receive honorary degrees or honorarium payments. Like the “disbarment” of a lawyer, stripping an individual of a professional license, they would be stripped of the ability to earn a living in the field. Certainly, economists would recognize that this form of negative economic incentive would regulate their behavior in ways that would assure compliance with legal and moral standards. Indeed, it is the very lack of enforcement today that turns a blind eye to any financial conflicts of interest within the profession that could contribute to the harms examined in this article.

Although it is used relatively weakly, the American Bar Association and various other professional lawyers’ groups act to rate U.S. Supreme Court nominees on their suitability for the court as well as comment on government legal decisions. Economic associations that upheld legal and moral responsibilities could be expected to do the same.

Unless economists would argue that there is a fixed preference for genocide and crimes against humanity by the businesses and governments of the societies in which they work, that are not subject to any public legal or moral pressures, or any reasoning of long-term self-interest, (which some say they do now argue in claiming that “globalization is inevitable” and that “there are no alternatives” and therefore that they have no moral responsibility in furthering its harms) there is no way they can claim they are free of responsibility. In short, the economics profession’s own doctrines are an admission of responsibility for the results and harms of the doctrines they promote.

Even if economists were to claim that they were only minor actors and that they were simply responding to economic and political incentives set by other individuals, institutions or cultural dispositions, they would have a difficult burden of identifying those others and of transferring responsibility given their own visibility and the expectation of a higher standard of responsibility of those with Ph.D.’s and in teaching positions. Moreover, international legal principles established by the Nuremberg Trials after World War II would prevent them from acknowledging individual responsibility given that there is no indication of coercion on economists or on the profession. The choice of profession
and doctrine is one that economists themselves also define by their own doctrines as “free choices,” given that the discipline discounts study of underlying power and social forces and claims that individuals have “sovereignty.” Again, in terms of potential legal liability, economists here are hoisted by their own petard.

Assuming they were to be subject to prosecution and sanctions, economists might be able to lessen potential penalties placed on them and the profession if they could identify those other actors or if they could show that the destruction of cultures that they promoted “in part” (according to the genocide law) was a lesser part than the harm caused by others, even though harms “in part” also destroy cultural integrity and sustainability and are criminalized. Yet this would not free them of guilt.

Claiming that the (Russian) Soviet Empire caused almost all of the same harms for which economists today might be held accountable, even without the economics profession and its doctrines would also not serve as an effective defense. Indeed, if the same harms are the result of similar doctrines in other countries, a universal application of law should also require holding disciplines in other countries responsible. The goal of this article in raising issues about economic doctrines is not to create an attack on a profession in one country or system (“market” economies of Europe and the U.S.). In the Soviet Union, and certainly in China, the ideologies of production and industrialization with no regard to ecosystems, cultural diversity, or community and group rights, were just as essential to teachings (often promoted by governments in conjunction today with foreign economists working for the World Bank, regional development Banks and international businesses that work in these countries). Similar doctrines may not have been taught in “economics” departments, but they were (and may still be) taught in other disciplines. One can easily take the list of doctrines identified for testing in this article and find analogues to them in disciplines that were taught in the Soviet Union (Lempert, 1995). Equity was taught as a basic value and there was more equitable distribution, but productivity “growth” (according to “plan” and “targets”) was and is promoted in ways that undermine cultural and community protections. Although the discipline of economics and others have been politicized and have sought to deny the similarities between empires in their basic doctrines as a way to highlight differences with “enemies,” there are direct similarities in doctrines. The fact that the same doctrines may exist elsewhere is not a defense. “Two wrongs do not make a right.” This underlies the principle of international law; to apply principles equally everywhere to protect long-term human interests and to look for ways to reform acts and doctrines everywhere that threaten humanity.

**Conspiracy and Direct Violations**

Where a concert of actions would be necessary to create harm and the appeal of a doctrine, itself, is not enough to find individual liability, a court could find conspiracy to commit genocide or conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity, alone. Although academic doctrines are not direct physical acts like forced resettlements of peoples or the theft of resources that undermine cultures and communities, doctrines operate in concert with actors who perform these acts and they work, independently, to deceive groups about the real impacts of policies and this creates the basis for legal liability under laws of conspiracies that are central themes of the international laws against genocide and crimes against humanity. Since economists earn their living from teaching doctrines and advising rather than through any other form of direct production, the compensation that they receive from those who benefit from their doctrines and use them to cause any harm (the corporations that fund universities and political campaigns, the bank loan payments that fund international banks, and the public moneys of countries that benefit from their position in the global economy and in military and trade hierarchies) is itself an act of enrichment as a result of such harm to others. This is what makes it possible to consider economic doctrines as illegal acts in themselves (largely for the crime of fraud, that directly undermines cultures and communities) and as part of a conspiracy with other actors (governments and their militaries, international business, and domestic elites and majority cultures).

Since economics as a profession consists of promoting doctrines, the criminalization of doctrine requires that these doctrines, in themselves, be viewed as harmful acts. In law, the “speech-action doctrine” is used to distinguish ordinary free speech from speech that is action. The easiest one to apply
here to economics is the crime of “fraud”, but the crime of “incitement” may also apply, though there is a fine line between “incitement” and “conspiracy,” itself, in the case of doctrine.

The legal definition of “fraud” is clear and consists of specific elements. By law, it is an act, with knowledge of the falsity of a statement or the harm that will occur to another, made with intent to cause harm, where another party relies on the statements to their detriment, and where harm occurs. Where a doctrine is a direct appeal to cultures that destabilizes them, a court could find direct guilt of genocide on the basis of this act. The teaching itself changes the peoples of the culture directly through a form of cultural imperialism without the need for additional actions by others.

“Incitement” is a bit fuzzier in its legal doctrine and merges into conspiracy when applied to a profession. Under English common law, incitement was defined as: persuading, encouraging, instigating, pressuring or threatening others in ways that created harms. Now, however, the United Kingdom has codified the law such that the standard of incitement is now “encouraging or assisting crime". England also had a law for “conspiracy to corrupt public morals” or to “outrage public decency” that can be an incitement crime/ speech act. Academic doctrines seem to fit with this legal definition.

With “conspiracy” usually defined as an agreement between two or more persons to break the law with at least one overt act in furtherance of the agreement or completing an incomplete act, the only way to distinguish incitement is to suggest that there was an actual spoken agreement by economists who promoted a doctrine, with governments, international banks and businesses. In the law of conspiracy, however, the proof is made easier because those agreements can be inferred. In the case of economic doctrines that are targeted at multiple activities throughout the world (“global development” and the “international economy” and “globalization”) these agreements could be seen as already implicit in the daily functioning of the economics profession through the linkages of its practitioners and scholars.

Genocide law has criminalized the Nazis on the basis of a “common plan.” In demonstrating the existence of a “common plan”, it is not necessary for the conspirators to be involved in all stages of the planning or to be aware of all of the details to be held guilty of conspiracy. Moreover, a conspiracy may also exist where legal means are used to accomplish illegal results. An agreement between economists and policy makers or between economists and businesses or development organizations could, therefore, be considered to exist given the relationships of the professions in jobs and funding as well as mutual recognition.

For several years, the United States has prosecuted conspiracy under a statute known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act (18 U.S.C. 1961). This act loosely and widely defines conspiracies as activities that collectively support an “enterprise” or organization and that include criminal acts by one or more members resulting in economic benefits for members of the group. Though the statute was originally intended for use in prosecuting organized crime groups, the economics profession could certainly fit its intent in ways that facilitate prosecution for conspiracy on the basis of common doctrine, common financial gain, and specific actions by high status members of the group promoted to positions in government or economic institutions with the direct or implied consent of the members of the profession. This existing theory is also easy to fit with the context of both the international laws of genocide and crimes against humanity.

For the purposes of this article, the legal determinations that I test and make here, below, in Step 4, distinguish between the direct acts (that directly promote genocide or crimes against humanity through specific policies that directly undermine a culture with the knowledge of the economics profession that this will be the result) and conspiracy, but without reviewing the crime of “incitement” that is a gray area in between. I test the liability of economics using the standard for conspiracy where an economics doctrine in itself does not advocate for a specific policy that results in genocide but where it could be seen to influence others in a way that would result in such acts, with those acts as immediately foreseeable consequences of promoting the doctrine. For example, advocating for sales of resources that are essential to the survival of a culture in a specific environmental context is a direct act. Advocating for increased sales in general is not a genocidal act but when the person receiving the message will foreseeably commit an act, it could then be considered to be part of a conspiracy. There is a difference between bringing a
gun to the furtherance of an assassination plot (in which case the conspirators are guilty of the act) and selling a gun to a mental patient who says he wants to kill someone. The intent is different and the amount of culpability is different. The distinction between direct crime and conspiracy, thus also partly depends on an analysis of intent.

**Intent**

Genocide is an “intent” crime. The international statute requires the act to be “deliberately” perpetrated. Deliberation requires thought rather than an automatic, primal, instinctive reaction. Similarly, proof of crimes against humanity requires that the acts be “systematic,” not “sporadic,” which also implies deliberation. The harms that are caused cannot simply be random, accidental or unintended. To be held guilty, economists pushing the doctrines that were harmful need to have known that the doctrines were harmful or need to have acted with disregard for the harms in order to be held accountable. In fact, by analogy to several criminal laws, it is easy to prove the intent of economists that would link the promotion of doctrines to specific harms.

Indeed, under international law, there may not even be a need to “prove” the intent of economic doctrines to demonstrate intent to cause harms that result from them since the intent is often evident in the very wording of the doctrines. Here are some examples of intent to eliminate culture, which is a harm recognized under international law as a violation.

- The idea that cultures should become part of the global economy and industrialize, for example, is already a clear doctrinal intent in economics to eliminate cultural differences.
- Promotion of a cash crop for export by a group that has previously been sustainable within its resource based is a direct intent to make the culture dependent on trade and part of the global economy in ways that destroy that culture forever.
- Making nomads sedentary is a destruction of their culture. Industrializing rural peoples is destruction of their culture.
- Calling on nations to act in terms of “gross” or “aggregate” benefit even if it means harms to specific groups is also intentional.

It is hard to claim that the intent is otherwise than this. Economists are clear. They may even actually believe that other people are better off giving up their culture in the same way that colonial missionaries may have believed that destroying culture was part of a “civilizing” mission and that enslaving peoples was part of the “white man’s burden.” They may believe that “domesticating” peoples whom they view as “primitive” or “undeveloped” is noble because it potentially offers higher “living standards” according to the measures that economists use. Whatever the belief, belief does not negate the intent. The intent is to change cultures in ways that “destroy” “in part” or in whole, those cultures. The reasons why beliefs, no matter how sincere, do not negate intent, are discussed below in a section on possible defenses.

The question of intent in a legal prosecution for specific harms is not whether economists have thought through the implication of their doctrines for cultures and for communities. An educated person able to write an economics exam or paper to earn a college degree or doctorate can be judged to have the reasoning ability, state of mind, and intelligence to know whether an assumption is questionable or false. An educated person has the affirmative duty to be aware of critiques and falsity of doctrines that they teach or promote as policy. Under the law, they are expected to be aware of the existence of international treaties that are readily available and that contradict economic doctrines, and basic knowledge of other disciplines that contradict economic doctrines, as well as internal contradictions within economics itself.

The only real question that is relevant on beliefs and intent relates to punishment. How much personal gain is connected to how much known harm? If economic doctrines are criminally accountable as fraud, perpetrated on domestic publics, on foreign governments, and on foreign peoples in a direct attempt to take resources, sell people products they do not need, and disrupt their systems for economic and political advantage, the amount of criminal culpability is usually proportionate to the size of the gain and the amount of harm done to achieve that gain.
Part of the determination here in looking at the amount of harm that is done to native peoples or communities rests on the standards used in tort law where harm is measured in terms of whether it is “reasonably foreseeable” by the person committing the act that causes the harm.

In looking for analogies here, specifically for “genocide,” laws on “homicide” can serve as a guide since the crime of genocide, the destruction of a genetic or ethnic group, was invented as an analog to homicide, the destruction of a person. In criminalizing different levels of homicide, courts seek to distinguish different mental states of intent. “Homicide,” the killing of another human being that may be justified, accidental (two defenses that can be considered for genocide, below), or illegal, is criminalized in two different categories based on intent: manslaughter and murder. Manslaughter and murder are distinguished by the existence of “malice or intent,” with murder sometimes classified as of the “first degree” or “second degree” by the degree of intent. The key here as analogized to genocide and crimes against humanity would appear to be the amount of “malice aforethought,” as to how deliberate and “premeditated” or calculated an act was. Note, however, that this standard is, itself, self-referential. Finding one implies the other. The distinction really seems to be whether behavior that is reckless can be considered to be deliberate and courts currently hold that recklessness itself implies “malice” in cases of homicide. In other words, rather than suggest that there are two different levels of intent, the suggestion is that there are two ways or more of determining intent. One is a conscious decision to “inflict grievous bodily harm” or to commit a dangerous felony or use of a deadly weapon to intentionally harm. A second is to show reckless indifference to an intentionally high risk to human life.

The implication for doctrines of economists and genocide or crimes against humanity is that not only a calculated, pre-mediated exploitation of peoples but also the reckless disregard for the impact of economic doctrines on others (the unwillingness to take responsibility to investigate the impacts of doctrines or to challenge or replace doctrines), combined with self-interest, could itself be determined to constitute “malice” and to ratchet up the severity of punishment and reform that is necessary.

Defenses: Negating the Element of “Intent”

The only real defenses that economics could offer in a court if their doctrines are directly linked with harms, is to suggest that the promotion of these doctrines is either justified or accidental. In courts that are untainted by economic ideologies and in which legal standards can be objectively enforced, it is difficult to imagine that such defenses would have any merit.

Probably the only occasion in which genocide might be considered justifiable is the necessity of wartime where saving certain cultures might result in harm to cultures in border areas or who are in areas where the extraction of certain resources is essential. Such defense might be applied by defenders against aggression who felt threatened. In the case of Cambodia, the fear of Vietnamese in Phnom Penh has apparently not been allowed as a defense by the Khmer seeking to protect Khmer culture, but that does not mean that such a defense could not be applied elsewhere. Yet, this is not the case for economists, today, whose doctrines are those of the most powerful countries whose goal is economic benefit, not protection of a culture at risk. Perhaps during the “Cold War” it might have been possible to make such an argument, but the fact that both sides would have been making the same argument (with the Soviet ideology almost parallel to those of U.S. and Western European economists, as described above) would render it absurd. It would more likely appear that groups on both sides were using the threat of war as an excuse to justify genocide, when there were more economically productive alternatives on both sides to war. Assuming it were legal and also not just an attempt to raise fear in order to promote interventions in countries with oil and other resources, the “War” on “Terror” could also be potentially used as a justification for globalization that has resulted in interference today in almost every country on the globe. Yet, to make this argument, the courts would need to be convinced that the “War on Terror” is a “necessity” for defending the planet. In fact, since even economists like Joseph Stiglitz have begun to recognize the economic absurdity of the “War on Terror,” there is little likelihood that an independent global court would be convinced that it was a “necessity” to protect the survival of white Europeans and the U.S. or all humanity. More likely, this claim itself and the actions taken in support of it have raised
the level of anger, violence and instability and postponement of sustainable development and protection
alternatives in ways that make humanity more vulnerable (Lempert and Nguyen, 2011).

Some economists might also try to make a similar argument about actions after the Cold War in the
countries of the former Soviet Union where they offered economic advice of “privatization” (often
referred to by the victimized populations as “piratization”) and dismantling of government welfare and
regulatory functions that they euphemized as “structural readjustment.” No matter what they may have
actually believed they were doing, the results have been reported as the looting and brain-draining of
these economies and the placement of economic ownership into the hands of foreigners and oligarchies.
The underlying goal actually appeared to be to weaken the former “enemy” countries and to impose
control over their economies. A possible defense here is that these activities were militarily justifiable.
In response to arguments that the Marshall Plan after World War II worked to rebuild Germany as an
economic and democratic power, economists would claim that elites in the former Soviet Union retained
power and nuclear weapons and this form of weakening was justifiable. If economists were on trial
simply for application of their doctrines in enemy countries, part of the argument might be plausible.
Nevertheless, a rational prosecutor and judge would recognize that reducing threats of rivals could better
be achieved by trying to really transform them as was promised rather than seeking to loot and control
them under a pretext of helping. Economists have not offered this defense in an attempt to distinguish
this as a special case. Their doctrines have been applied uniformly to all (Lempert, 1996b).

Were I to be acting as the defense lawyer, or were defense lawyers aware of my previous writings,
there is another creative and unusual argument that could be offered as a similar “self-preservation”
defense for at least one ethnic group of economists, though there would be risks to making the argument
(Lempert, 1998). This article began asking how Joseph Stiglitz, a Jewish economist, could be in denial of
international law regarding protection of minorities, given that the law itself was inspired by a Jewish
lawyer to protect all groups from the kinds of victimization that remain fresh in the minds of Jews.
Indeed, the ranks of famous economists include many Jews, as do the ranks of international rights
lawyers. The explanation of their denial is that self-defense of Jews within European empires in which
the discipline of economics is prominent have required Jews to support the harmful acts against others as
a means of self-protection. Jewish economists, if able and willing to express their underlying fears and
motivations, could rationally argue that their denial of law is a result of their own fear and desire to
protect Jews; that they have made an alliance with power and have agreed to support what the know are
harmful, irrational, unscientific and illegal doctrines in order to gain influence to achieve larger benefits.
They could argue that they have made a “Devil’s Bargain” for justifiable reasons. While I do believe that
many Jews who have risen in economics and in other academic professions where legitimacy is
compromised (such as the study of the Soviet Union where ideological explanations of “capitalism versus
communism” were offered in place of serious scientific comparison, for psychological motives), I believe
these motives are at such a deep subconscious level, given the amount of fear behind them, that they
would not be rationally articulated and weighed. It is more likely that the minority international lawyers
who uphold the law ad who rationally reflect on these fears in their own career choices, have chosen to
uphold the law rather than to try to justify its violation. So, while this defense would not absolve ethnic
minority economists, and while the very fear that underlies this defense would probably prevent it from
even being made, it does at least help to offer a psychological explanation of what seems paradoxical
about the violations for ethnic minority economists. It also helps to show why the solution for
transforming economics will not only need to deal with ideological and religious beliefs but also with
deep seated fears of ethnic minorities who are economists.

Certainly, beyond “self-defense,” economists would argue in their defense that in most cases “living
standards” have increased in destroyed cultures and that the populations survive, or that even if those
populations are smaller, the overall aggregate benefit justifies the sacrifices. Life expectancy and
consumption would be shown to have increased. Domestication and contemporary forms of enslavement
would be described as beneficial for “primitive” peoples living in “poverty”. This defense would fail for
the same reason that the defense to battery crimes – that claim that the victim “wanted” to bit hit or that
the beating was in the “best interests” of the victim, or that the majority benefits – also fails. Belief by a
perpetrator that he/she is fulfilling the will of “God” or even of the majority also does not mitigate the intent to cause the harm or change that is criminalized. It is the action and the intent to perform that action that is criminalized, not the belief about the intent. Germany may have been cleaner and more prosperous after committing genocide but that is not a valid defense for it. It is not the prerogative of the perpetrator or the perpetrator in collaboration with certain representatives of a victimized group that has the authority to judge itself for acts that are defined as criminal. The belief that the cultural changes or dislocations that economics doctrines have promoted are in the “best interests” of the cultures being changed or that those cultures desire those changes (without direct cultural measures that the cultures are independently evolving to the new beliefs, freely choosing them, and are not under any pressures or being misled to do so) or that the economists are simply acting in accordance with established directives or agreements of major international organizations like the U.N. system or multi-lateral banks, also fails as a defense.

The only form of belief that may constitute a defense in criminal law is the incapacity of the defendant; the inability to form a normal mental state (i.e., insanity). Nevertheless, even if economic doctrines are “insane” and represent a kind of mental “incapacity” such as the inability to form reasoned judgment based on reality, the irrational belief in certain ideas contrary to normal perception, or other delusional behavior, that would not appear to be a defense here. Even if they completely disparage the rights of others and the value of the choices of others, economists still have the ability to understand ideas of rights, right and wrong, and symmetry. As mathematicians studying market behavior, the idea of symmetry and negotiation over value is fundamental to economics. The fact that economists apply the principle selectively to benefit their own interests over others does not indicate that they are insane but suggests the opposite; a calculating self-interest. Even if economists would claim that they are entirely amoral beings who exist without any emotional attachment or understanding of humans or nature as a result of (or as the attraction to) their discipline, and that the discipline has created mechanisms to specifically choose people for it who are unable to have any empathy with others and/or who delight in use of power, manipulation and harm to others (some of the basis of psychopathic behaviors) this form of pathological belief and incapacity would not be sufficient as a defense. Economists would be seen by courts as choosing a selective application of these beliefs in their own interests which is the standard of criminal behavior. Rather than speak to criminal liability, this defense might instead speak to the types of necessary remedies. If economists think only in financial, cost-benefit terms for people like themselves, with no attachment to the environment, to future humans, or to the planet, this is certainly a pathological behavior and would likely be classified as a type of mental illness if the classification were made not on the basis of ability to function in society but in terms of mental state. This kind of picture of economists would suggest that economists would be unable to reform the discipline themselves or to teach a reformed discipline and would need to be given other work; perhaps as mathematicians or engineers, in ways that would be useful for society without resulting in harms.

The argument that the choice of economic doctrines is somehow “accidental” and not a deliberate attempt to promote certain interests over others would also be viewed in the courts as without merit. Here, the “reasonable person” standard that courts use in judging behaviors and intent, would be applied to economists in a way that held them to the standard of behaviors expected for the “reasonable professor with a higher education degree”. Under that standard, economists would not be able to argue that the fundamental doctrines of the subject in which they had spent a lifetime training and as experts were the products of an “accident.” What economists might claim is that their doctrines were largely intended for use in certain, specific contexts with which they are familiar; with technological societies like the United States and its already developed trading partners. Although academics currently might claim effectively that they and the society in which they live trains and requires them to be insular and unaware of the events of their government’s activities overseas, with little foreign language skill or awareness of their own communities or neighbors, and with little knowledge of anything real and outside of presentations on electronic media, and could seek to claim that this ignorance is part of their upbringing (Lempert, et. al, 1995), that should not be an excuse because they would be considered to have a “duty” under the law to study the implications of their teachings. Claiming that they are ignorant of non-technological societies
and lacked the intent to cause harm is a claim of “ignorance” that is not something a Ph.D. academic can claim. Ignorance of an academic would not be a defense. Even if one might accept this profession of ignorance on its face, given the reality of modern society and of even its leading academics to accept this defense if not to reinforce it through their teachings, methods, and university policies, one would also have to accept that economists have absolutely no knowledge of history, no knowledge of even place names around them, and no understanding of their own family histories or even of the genetic and class differences directly visible around them. All societies in which economics is taught have a known history of minority interactions and destruction of cultures. Many of them have place names that bear the names of exterminated or assimilated peoples. It would be impossible to claim that economists do not know the potential effects of their doctrines on minority cultures and on communities given the historical evidence directly around them even if what may describe as the “dumbing down” of societies in order to create this ignorance has become the reality.

Even if economists were raised as children to be ignorant and were selected at universities for their ignorance and/or certain perceptual disabilities that prevented them from forming any clear judgments of much of the historical or social reality around them including hypnotic or other susceptibility to suggestions or delusions, the mathematical logic by which they are selected and advanced would still enable them to perform the simple logical tasks required to test the consistency, veracity and consequences of doctrines they were told to repeat. The lack of effort to use this logical capacity to determine the truthfulness of economic doctrines is itself a form of “gross negligence” and absence of a “duty of due care,” for which the defense would be negated and they would be held legally liable.

A colleague and I have published some tests of this defense. We have logically applied some of the most fundamental economic doctrines and have published them in academic literature where they are easily available on-line. Simple applications of economic doctrines generates results that prove the underlying model on which economists base their work to be essentially suicidal for even the societies in which economists work (Lempert and Nguyen, 2011). My colleague, Hue Nguyen, researching whether modern industrial societies can move towards sustainability based on the current ways in which material incentives are used to reward workers for their behavior, shows that all industrial societies are fundamentally unsustainable and can only exist by exploiting other cultures. Technological growth is unable to fuel enough consumables to support sufficient reinvestments for continued growth in technology and productivity. The economics profession appears to know and disregard this fundamental truth that even the profession’s own existence may be dependent on violation of international law (Nguyen, 2008). One well-known economist, Herman Daly, charges that the doctrine of unlimited “growth” is actually designed by economists to divert attention to calls for redistribution and concern for other ethnic or kinship (family) groups and that it serves to substitute a regressive “trickle-down” form of aid to others for actual sharing or concern (Daly, 2011). In his view, it is designed to cover up harm and to rationalize irresponsibility without any logical thought to whether or how much growth is really possible or of benefit. In short, that does not make predatory behavior a defense. It is the predator that would have the responsibility to change or be caged.
Applying the Law in Two Steps

**Step 4: Evaluating the Possible Verdicts:**

Given a set of doctrines to test, the specific laws by which the doctrines could be held liable, and the elements of the crime, it is a relatively simple process to evaluate potential verdicts against the economics profession under international laws. These tables suggest several likely guilty verdicts and a number of potential verdicts. I summarize this process in the four tables below; each table examining one of the four sub-areas of economics and the various doctrines in each sub-area (the 15 doctrines identified for testing).

In Step 5, I present a summary of these results and discuss their implications.

There are four columns in each table.

- The first column, on the left simply states the economic doctrine being tested against the law, sometimes with a short explanation or interpretation;
- The second column denotes which of the two international criminal laws is being applied to test the legality of the doctrine. Note that some of the doctrines can be tested for violations of both laws. In such cases, there are two rows of analysis for each doctrine; one for each of the two laws.
- The third column asks and answers the question, “Does the Doctrine Reflect Self-Interest (Motive) and is it in Violation of an Empirically Tested Observation/ Fact?” This column helps to explain the selection of the doctrine for testing. It offers information to confirm that the economic doctrine being challenged for a violation of law indeed meets the test for a “doctrine” or a form of actionable-speech, as distinguished from an empirical observation or scientific theory that would be fully protected free speech of a discipline. It offers evidence that this particular doctrinal statement is contradicted by proof in other disciplines or is internally contradictory within the discipline of economics, itself, and that it is really ideological dogma. It offers an explanation for why economists know or should know that this doctrine is false or should be subject to testing and challenge rather than accepted on (religious) faith.
- The final column is labeled, “Potential Verdict Against Economists on the Basis of Promotion of this Doctrine (if Law were Enforced): Meeting the Elements of a Causal Act, Harm and Motive.” This column tests whether the doctrine can indeed be linked with the type of harm that the law requires for prosecution; either genocide or crimes against humanity. It briefly explains how the doctrine causes the harm – whether it is by defrauding a group to accept harm in the belief that they are being helped or whether a group is being encouraged to commit harm against others, or other act. It differentiates the direct acts that cause harm from indirect acts that can be seen as part of a conspiracy to commit the harm. It links the doctrine, motive, elements, and the specific crime and then offers a judgment on a likely verdict. Some of the verdicts are clear. Others depend on the actual type of harm and context in which the harm occurs from a specific doctrine since a doctrine can potentially be used in various ways by different actors in different contexts.
### Test of the Legality of Specific Economic Doctrines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Doctrine</th>
<th>Law That Applies (Whether there is a Judicable Violation)</th>
<th>Does the Doctrine Reflect Self-Interest (Motive) and is it in Violation of an Empirically Tested Observation/ Fact? (i.e., Is there “intent” that could constitute a potential legal cause of action?)</th>
<th>Potential Verdict Against Economists on the Basis of Promotion of this Doctrine (if Law were Enforced): Meeting the Elements of a Causal Act, Harm and Motive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Micro-Economics:</strong> 1. All societies and individuals wish higher consumption (“homo economicus”). Zero growth and such balance with nature are not even options. This is sometimes called the “Scarcity assumption”</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</td>
<td>Yes. Human populations tend toward stability and formation of norms and regularity to adapt to their environments. Destabilizing this is part of a goal to promote sales of technology and of products to exploit and profit by destabilizing others.</td>
<td><strong>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy</strong> (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of society by fraudulently changing adaptive production and consumption patterns (knowledge of the falsity of the measure, reliance by weaker country/culture on the advice of the economist, with detriment to the weaker country/culture) in ways that cause cultural destruction with malice implied by blatant disregard for protected rights.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Rome Statute, Crimes Against Humanity</td>
<td>Similar to above.</td>
<td><strong>Possible future conviction for crimes against humanity</strong> as the harms of over-consumption become increasingly evident in climate change, overpopulation and the resulting famines, civil strife and wars that are easily predictable using existing social science and that economists choose to disregard for benefit of a few and for personal self-interest.</td>
</tr>
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</table>
2. Preferences exist as free and individual choice, even if corporate power and cultural or cultural hegemony shape them, with the basic unit of analysis of the discipline (the actors exercising these choices) being a sovereign individual consumer and producer.

<p>| Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP | Hard to say. There is still a debate as to the extent of free choice versus cultural and biological determinism as well as the influences of unequal power on choice. The failure seems to be in not adding in those extra dimensions, not in the choice of starting with one or another. This may just be an assumption for a starting point for unit of analysis that needs to be placed within clear cultural context and looked under clear conditions to offer useful information. IF this doctrine is used in international development in combination with other beliefs (“mobility of capital and labor”) to promote sale of community assets in ways that disrupt the balance of societies, then it is a self-interested doctrine that could promote a legal cause of action (see the analysis below of doctrines of International Trade) | Possibly guilty of conspiracy to commit genocide IF the proselytization of this belief is done in a way that hides inequalities and exploitation and furthers them in ways that promote the self-interest of economists, particularly if it is used to justify inaction and promotion of international trade and development schemes that change preferences within cultures or make assets and resources vulnerable in ways that undermine the culture. It is when this belief is restated as part of International Development and International Trade doctrines that it then becomes actionable. (See below.) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3. Goods and resources are fungible/ substitutable and can be replaced once they are exhausted, by “the market” (demand and supply).</th>
<th>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</th>
<th>Yes, certain objects are sacred and certain institutions are irreplaceable if cultures are to be sustainable and to have the opportunity to adapt in ways that do not destroy their integrity. This belief works to accelerate changes without responsibility for the consequences on human systems and the violent dislocations that are caused by abrupt losses due to over-use of resources as a result of deliberate lack of planning and under-valuation of cost of transition by vulnerable cultures. The conflict of interest is that economists work for the powerful countries and interests that benefit from the rapid exploitation of these resources. <strong>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy</strong> (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of minority cultures with intent to destroy those minority cultures in whole or in part by promoting pressures that undervalue their resources and preferences and make them vulnerable to disappearance. Malice can be implied from disregard of the known and inherent dangers of the inequities and destruction that the doctrines reinforce. Assuming that all goods and people are fungible also suggests that all cultures are fungible, that all changes are acceptable and that accelerated destruction of human diversity even in violation of international legal requirements for protection is something acceptable because all substitutions will be of equivalent value.</th>
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<tr>
<td>4. All objects and values can be reduced to a single economic denominator as measures of value and exchange.</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</td>
<td>Yes, economists know that preferences are contingent and inter-related (Arrow’s paradox). This is because a functioning culture requires an interactive set of activities acting in balance and balances cannot be forced specified on the same single dimension. Dominant social groups in specific roles that rig a system in favor of measures in their interests, undermine that system. Economists join that self-interested rigging by promoting this principle. <strong>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy</strong> (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of minority cultures with intent to destroy those minority cultures in whole or in part and with malice implied from disregard of the inconsistencies of known economic doctrines.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rome Statute, Crimes Against Humanity</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Possible similar guilt of crimes against humanity if commercialization is seen as promoting destruction of heritage, family and personal value such as to cause degradation and affront to human dignity.</td>
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<td>5. Economic benefits are to be calculated by producers as aggregates independent of cultural values (e.g., profits, productivity) or impacts on cultural values for the purposes of efficiency, to promote the “maximization of income”. Catering to minorities is “inefficient” because of higher costs of reaching “small market niches.” Minority preferences are valid only when it is efficient for markets to cater to their needs. Meeting these unmet preferences is a social and political choice not a market failure that requires replacing the approach.</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP; Other international rights treaties are relevant but they are not actionable</td>
<td>Yes, this is an example of one of several known market failures/externalities that are introduced by economic doctrines, due to the stressing of a particular doctrinal goal rather than recognizing the importance of promoting several system sustaining goals simultaneously and recognizing that economics must be seen in its social and political context. The conflict of interest here is that economists represent the industrialized, urbanized, market cultures that are politically and militarily dominant as well as the majority ethnicity within those societies. They also legitimize actions by producers that are blind to the survival of the very communities in which they act and belong. Unlike other doctrines where the harms are known but there is no real challenge and rejection of the doctrine among economists, this doctrine may now be coming under partial challenge from within economics itself by women and minorities, but the discipline still does not deal with the implications of pressures on minority cultures from mass marketing of certain products (including media in a form of cultural imperialism) or consumer culture, itself.</td>
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<td>IF economists deliberately exclude the implications of this doctrine and do not teach it as an example of a place where there is a need for government action (such as in the case of regulating monopolies, where most economists at least give lip service to conditions necessary for regulating a free market), then it would be possible to reach a determine of guilt of genocide and conspiracy (public incitement and complicity through silence and distortion when there is a duty of care to act) to commit genocide through undermining of minority cultures and their ability to maintain existing systems of trade or consumption that support those systems. Malice can be implied from violation of duty of care given knowledge of the consequences. If the profession itself could be said to be promoting one ideology, the profession could be found guilty as a whole. Otherwise, guilt might be a judgment here of individual actions given some existing dissent from a unified view.</td>
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<td>6. Preferences (calculated in standard units of the basic “utility” or “util”) can be expressed in currencies (e.g. U.S. dollars) as part of valuation model, though these units have built-in characteristics of political inequality and social context.</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</td>
<td>Yes. Economists know that terms of trade are dependent on inequalities including military hegemony threatening minority groups, and these imbalances are reflected in economic currencies which reinforce the power of those who are initially allocated with these currencies as accidents of birth and nationality that confers them superiority (e.g., the countries where economists work and are paid). Economists continue to promote the measurements of values using these media of exchange and hide the starting point inequities and their inherent dangers..</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
**Macro-Economics:**

| 1. Equity is not a rational choice preference and can be violated in the quest for “efficiency,” leaving inequities for the political process to correct. In “developing” societies, “equity” that promotes the same consumption patterns among individuals and across cultural and ethnic lines can be important as a way to promote productivity. | Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP; Other international rights treaties are relevant but they are not actionable unless they can be linked to the Rome Statute | Yes, not only is the belief culture specific since studies show that some societies prefer equity and community to individual aggrandizement and hierarchy, but the proselytization of this belief by countries, organizations or elites works to create the very inequalities that enable them to accumulate wealth by creating conditions leading to pressures for destruction on minorities not engaged in the wealth and production systems that this doctrine promotes. Moreover, there is a clear and known contradiction in the belief since economic inequality translates into political inequality and short-circuits political action and regulation of competitive markets and of rights protections, including those of minority cultures. | **Guilty of genocide and conspiracy** (public incitement and complicity when there is a duty of care to act) to commit genocide as a result of deliberate exclusion of the implications of this doctrine on distinct minority cultures and the false implication that equity principles should be used to change the consumption and production patterns of all cultures in ways that would create equality through cultural assimilation and destruction. Malice can be implied from disregard of the known and inherent dangers of the inequities and destruction that the doctrines reinforce. The Genocide Convention assumes equity of political power of cultures to protect sovereignty and also assumes that any increase in aggregate wealth will not be an excuse for generating inequities that threaten the survival of minority cultures. |
| Rome Statute, Crimes Against Humanity | Similar to above | Possible guilt of crimes against humanity if harms from financial disruption (such as the 2008 financial crisis that resulted from known promotion of financial regulations to eliminate public safeguards) and other such, promoting the financial class for no justifiable reason other than aggrandizement at the expense of others, can be characterized to include degradation or humiliation of one or more human beings and attacks on human dignity. Economic, social and political rights promoted in the various U.N. declarations are not yet actionable and are really competing policy choices, but in the case of reckless theft that also has consequences for the future of the planet (not only immediate harms of poverty but resultant political instability and war), these could be seen as degradation. It should be easy to prove intent (or reckless disregard for known consequences), motive and knowledge in changing regulatory laws and weakening enforcement that directly led to the financial crisis and enrichment of a small group in ways that destroys families and leaves people homeless. |
2. Externalities (including economic and social justice issues and destruction of cultures), are the role of the political process to correct and economists can ignore them (similar to above but applied to other distributional effects and costs)

| Externalities | Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP; Other international rights treaties (e.g., political, social and economic) are relevant but they are not actionable | Yes. Economics is a policy discipline designed specifically to advise policy makers and economists are often appointed to political positions where they offer advice on increasing productivity that has a clear benefit for the economic elites who appoint them. To claim that one sort of policies that are in their self-interest belong in the discipline and another set, that does not promote their interests, should not be in the discipline, is an abuse of power and hypocritical. | Guilty of genocide and conspiracy (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of minority cultures and their environments, weakening their ability to protect themselves and arguing against any responsibility to assure such protections. Same reasoning as above as a corollary: |

|   | Rome Statute, Crimes Against Humanity | Similar to above | Possible guilt of crimes against humanity for the same reason as in 1, above. |
| 3. The law is part of the enabling environment and corporations can assert political power over individuals to change laws in their favor. Corporate personhood legitimizes corporations as political actors and elites can also use capital holdings to change the rules of the game. (Taught in the author’s MBA program at Stanford in what was originally an “ethics” course.) Rather than strengthen citizens to control corporations, corporations can be trusted to develop an ethic of “corporate social responsibility.” | Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP | Yes, this is a hypocritical argument that economists know to be false. The assumption of free markets promoting efficiency and aggregate benefits depends on a regulatory system that creates a level playing field that cannot be politically short-circuited. Economists promote a logical contradiction out of self-interest. The argument here is similar to the above: economic inequality translates into political inequality and short-circuits political action and regulation of competitive markets and of rights protections. Corporations and wealth are established as part of the enabling environment for productivity and incentives, but any activity that allows for these forms to have political influence is a distortion. The idea that businesses can be trusted to be “socially responsible” or can be trained to do so is a fraudulent doctrine promoted to weaken efforts at citizen and government regulation. The legal economic doctrine that reveals the duplicity is that corporations exist only to pursue shareholder profit. Suggestion that corporations can self-regulate is self-interested propaganda to promote corporate interests tied to those of economists. | Guilty of genocide and conspiracy (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of minority cultures with intent to destroy those minority cultures in whole or in part by promoting pressures that undervalue their resources and preferences and make them vulnerable to disappearance. Malice can be implied from disregard of the known and inherent dangers of the inequities and destruction that the doctrines reinforce. Corporations and elites amassing capital are known to use this power time and again historically to dislodge cultures from their resources and to weaken cultural bounds in order to free labor for exploit. |
| Rome Statute, Crimes Against Humanity | Similar to above | **Possible guilt of crimes against humanity** if the harms (e.g., the 2008 financial crisis as an example of the impact of economic doctrine on financial markets) in this category can be characterized to include degradation or humiliation of one or more human beings and attacks on human dignity. It should be easy to prove intent (or reckless disregard for known consequences), motive and knowledge in changing regulatory laws weakening enforcement that directly led to the financial crisis and enrichment of a small group of people in ways that destroyed families, left people homeless. |
## International Development:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Use of GDP as measure instead of per capita assets, thus convincing non-economists to measure progress and value on that basis, and promoting sales in dollar measures rather than locally converted measures of long-term asset wealth and value/utility.</th>
<th>Genocide Convention, III. (c), with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</th>
<th>Yes. Standard business practice measures wealth by assets, not by income, and this is a basic tenet of business that is deliberately overridden in economic doctrine to promote sales that benefit the country, organization (bank or investor) or class proselytizing use of this measure, with dollar income also directly benefiting those whose value system is reflected by monetized assets.</th>
<th><strong>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide</strong> (public incitement and complicity) through depletion of a cultural group’s asset base through fraudulently (knowledge of the falsity of the measure, reliance by weaker country/culture on the advice of the economist, with detriment to the weaker country/culture) convincing owners to trade resource wealth for short-term income, resulting in loss of sustainable assets and subsequent cultural disintegration and impoverishment. With the malice implied by blatant disregard for consequences in light of international treaties.</th>
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<tr>
<td>2. All societies desire industrialization, urbanization and technology (domestication of humans).</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</td>
<td>Yes, same as above as a corollary.</td>
<td><strong>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy</strong> (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of minority cultures and their environments. Same reasoning as above as a corollary.</td>
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<td>Rome Statute, Crimes Against Humanity</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Possible similar guilt of crimes against humanity if urbanization can be directly linked to deals between governments that fuel land grabs and displacement of family farms in the name of “economic efficiency” and possibly of other policies that create dependency and put pressures on resources in ways that lock countries into unsustainable development. The global phenomenon of landlessness that is fueled by foreign capital or urban capital pushing peoples off of their lands and has led to the same kinds of harms that are the result of war and natural disaster but are caused by human action, including increased malnutrition and deaths among children and social harms to displaced adults. A court could find guilt if the land invasions and “resettlements” are for no justifiable reason other than aggrandizement at the expense of others and if the harms are characterized to include degradation or humiliation of one or more human beings and attacks on human dignity. Economic, social and political rights promoted in the various U.N. declarations are not yet actionable and are really competing policy choices, but in the case of reckless theft that causes death and dislocation in ways that cannot be defended simply as a “policy choice,” these could be seen as degradation. It should be easy to prove intent (or reckless disregard for known consequences), motive and knowledge in land and resource thefts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Traditional culture is a form of “negative social capital” that impedes development</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</td>
<td>Yes, similar to above. Human cultural diversity is part of human adaptability to different environments for human survival. This economic doctrine reflects is a self-interested and hypocritical use of a linked economic doctrine that favors “competition” and individual preferences (“sovereignty”) for utility maximization and that calls for political neutrality. Devaluing different adaptation patterns and choices is an attempt to destabilize other cultures for profit.</td>
<td>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide with direct evidence of intent to destroy minority cultures in whole or in part and with malice implied from disregard of empirical fact in ways that also directly contradict other economic doctrines. Same reasoning as above:</td>
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<td>4. International measures of “human development” that measure current per capita health and consumption standards do not need to incorporate measures of cultural adaptability/ sustainability/ survival since these consumption preferences reflect universal choice</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</td>
<td>Yes, this approach suppresses historical measures of human life expectancies through history (finding it was historically longer in “primitive” cultures, for those who survive childbirth at various times), and conflicts with the discipline’s claim that economics maximizes choice and fulfillment of preferences by promoting human diversity, the true expression of “competition.” The goal of promoting a single, high level of consumption favors societies in which economists work, where economic benefits arise from the sales of consumer goods to poorer and less powerful societies in exchange for their resources and the ability to cheaply exploit their labor.</td>
<td>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide with direct evidence of intent to destroy minority cultures in whole or in part through promotion of consumption and production patterns that assimilate and destroy those cultures while creating direct benefits for the more powerful societies and classes which economists serve, with malice implied from disregard of empirical fact in ways that also directly contradict other economic doctrines. Same reasoning as above:</td>
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<td>International Trade:</td>
<td>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP; Rome Statute for Crimes Against Humanity</td>
<td>Yes, when trade is extended into economies that are not already trading cultures or that are induced to trade beyond their ability to remain sustainable within their own environments, the idea of comparative advantage is violated and systems become dependent on the country, organization or class promoting the trade and then acting to manipulate the dependency and terms of trade.</td>
<td><strong>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy</strong> (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of society with direct evidence of intent to destroy a culture in whole or in part so that there is a reliance on trade and a detachment from sustainability within an ecological niche and with malice implied from the blatant disregard for consequences in light of international treaties. The doctrine of comparative advantage implies dependency on products or labor from outside an eco-system and turns cultural systems that are stable in their environments into those no longer in homeostasis, with dependency on outside products.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rome Statute, Crimes Against Humanity</td>
<td>Similar to above.</td>
<td><strong>Possible future conviction for crimes against humanity</strong> as the harms of over-consumption become increasingly evident in climate change, overpopulation and the resulting famines, civil strife and wars that are easily predictable using existing social science and that economists choose to disregard for benefit of a few and for personal self-interest.</td>
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2. Consider capital and labor as mobile and interchangeable, free-flowing “factors of production” rather than integral cultural assets.  

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<td>2. Consider capital and labor as mobile and interchangeable, free-flowing “factors of production” rather than integral cultural assets.</td>
<td><strong>Genocide Convention, II. (c), III (c) and (e) with interpretations from Rio Declaration (3 and 8) and UNDRIP</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Yes, when a country’s resources and its key people are viewed as objects for purchase with no attempt to provide protections that maintain their balance and basic functions and when it is assumed that weak groups are freely approving these sales and able to maintain themselves when there is clear and repeated evidence to the contrary, over generations, cultural sovereignty and sustainability is being sacrificed in the interests of powerful countries and interests for whom economists work that are able to make the deals that promote sales of these assets.</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Guilty of genocide and conspiracy</strong> (public incitement and complicity) to commit genocide through destabilization of society with direct evidence of intent to destroy a culture in whole or in part so that there is a reliance on trade, an absorption into an international system where certain cultural groups will be destroyed, and a detachment from sustainability within an ecological niche and with malice clear from the blatant disregard for consequences of uprooting clear components of a sustainable culture for sale and economic exploitation in light of international treaties and the attempts to justify this cultural disintegration as free and informed choice.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rome Statute, Crimes Against Humanity</td>
<td>Same as above</td>
<td>Possible similar guilt of crimes against humanity</td>
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<td>If this ideology of mobility of capital can be directly linked to deals between governments that fuel land grabs and displacement of family farms in the name of “economic efficiency” and possibly other policies that create dependency and put pressures on resources in ways that lock countries into unsustainable development. The global phenomenon of landlessness that is fueled by foreign capital or urban capital pushing peoples off of their lands and has led to the same kinds of harms that are the result of war and natural disaster but are caused by human action, including increased malnutrition and deaths among children and social harms to displaced adults. A court could find guilt if the land invasions and “resettlements” are for no justifiable reason other than aggrandizement at the expense of others and if the harms are characterized to include degradation or humiliation of one or more human beings and attacks on human dignity. Economic, social and political rights promoted in the various U.N. declarations are not yet actionable and are really competing policy choices, but in the case of reckless theft that causes death and dislocation in ways that cannot be defended simply as a “policy choice,” these could be seen as degradation. It should be easy to prove intent (or reckless disregard for known consequences), motive and knowledge in land and resource thefts.</td>
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Step 5: The Verdict and its Implications:

The verdicts resulting in Step 4 are clear. Economics is guilty as charged in promoting a series of doctrines that it knows or should know result in harms and that are in violation of international laws, and doing so in ways that promote their personal gain. Given the number of doctrines at fault and their interrelationship in causing similar kinds of harms, the implication is that economics as a discipline has not only been acting systematically with other large and powerful interests to promote those harms, but that it may serve as the ideological doctrinal system (or “church”) that specifically acts to try to legitimize and inculcate those harms into the major industrial societies where economists work.

Here is a quick summary, shown also in the table below. Of the 15 economic doctrines tested, each one independently sufficient to be raised as evidence of legal violations of international law in international courts if standing were granted for raising them, 13 of them would likely be found in violation of the law outlawing genocide, both as direct causes of genocide and part of a conspiracy with the remaining two in possible violation, and 8 of them would possibly be found guilty of crimes against humanity. In each of the four sub-areas of economics held to scrutiny -- micro-economics, macro-economics, international development and international trade -- the fundamental doctrines are in violation of international law. The only hedging on these verdicts is on the specific harms to specific populations under the crimes against humanity and the lack of “ripeness” of cases for the harms of “unsustainability.” It is likely that economic doctrines are creating the context now for global economic depression and World War, with the collapse of a number of industrial economies. However, since the full extent of these harms has yet to occur and is still considered “speculative,” the current crime against humanity may only be at the “attempt” stage. It is not yet fully “ripe” for adjudication until the harms occur or until it is clear that the crime could be prosecuted for the attempted harm (reckless disregard for foreseeable harms). The verdicts are summarized in the table below.

Summary Table: Legal Verdicts on Economic Doctrines

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Sub Area of Economics</th>
<th>Key Doctrines Tested</th>
<th>Likely Verdicts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Micro-Economics</td>
<td>Six doctrines, four of them fundamental</td>
<td>Four of these, including three of the four key beliefs can be held to violate the Genocide Convention (both genocide and conspiracy) while the other two are possible violations, and two of the four key beliefs are possible crimes against humanity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macro-Economics</td>
<td>Three fundamental doctrines</td>
<td>All three can be found to violate the Genocide Convention (genocide and conspiracy) and to be possible crimes against humanity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development</td>
<td>Four fundamental doctrines</td>
<td>All four can be found to violate the Genocide Convention (genocide and conspiracy) with one to be a possible crime against humanity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Trade</td>
<td>Two fundamental doctrines</td>
<td>Both can be found to violate the Genocide Convention (genocide and conspiracy) are possible crimes against humanity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Given the extent of these violations, the relative silence of international law and the relative lack of attention by the enlightened public, one might reasonably wonder how this could be. How is it that such an honorable and respected group of some of the most highly educated people in the most advanced technological societies could be judged guilty of so many violations and with so little outcry? This is not
the first time the author has sought to provide answers to these questions, but this piece attempts a systematic look at the situation and its causes (Lempert and Nguyen, 2011; Lempert, 2015).

Further, if economics has gone rogue, how many other disciplines and institutions have also run amok? Where are the mechanisms in advanced society to self-correct and to measure “progress” and human long-term interests? Why are they failing?

When systems turn out, under examination, to be something so opposed to what they claim to be and to what people assume them to be, that means that the claims and the assumptions are likely wrong and that systems need to be called what they are and replaced. What, then, exactly is the profession of economics?

According to this legal analysis, above, economics is a group of people promoting a series of doctrines that cause harm and receiving a great deal of money and status out of the profits of those harms. What, then, is that?

- If economics were a science, it would be neutral, defining real variables and relationships between them, offering predictions and theories, not doctrines. It would predict behaviors and model reality according to identifiable laws. That is not what this legal test reveals it is.
- If economics were a limited management tool for an agreed ends, acting like an engineering discipline, it would be within the law. It would use simple variables unique to industrial societies, looking at policy mechanisms and impacts, with variables such as taxes and other fiscal tools and monetary tools, with no need for so much energy on mathematical systems and for doctrines that do not demonstrate the workings of these tools. It is not that either, according to this test. In large part, economics is doing something else.

The identification of so many doctrines, with so many of them in violation of the law suggests that economics is an ideological or indoctrination system, but what kind?

- Is economics a management or political control system for protecting an elite “class” and their assets and power, using technical tools?
- Is economics a religious ideology promoting certain beliefs on faith to maintain a natural order, shaping public behaviors to conform to these, without testing of truth or alternatives?

The legal test, above, suggests that economics is both of these. In technological society, where religious beliefs can challenge power and technology, economics may serve as a religious and ideological system to protect powerful interests and to legitimize their violations of legal and moral principles. Where religion in traditional societies and in early empires largely merged with political power to serve its interests, it appears that economics serves in this role. It may have evolved as a “moral philosophy” and “moral science” affiliated with the church to become a religious and control system affiliated with the modern, industrial, or corporatist State, dependent on one’s descriptive word of choice.

Part II of this article analyzes how economics may have evolved to fill this combined religious and political role and how it used the outward symbols of science and mathematics to gain legitimacy and to insulate its exercise of this role. That also helps explain why it has been so difficult to hold accountable and why it will be so difficult to reform. Religious belief systems, ideologies, and power are resistant to legal, moral and political challenge because they become the central underpinnings of the social order. Such analysis can serve as the basis for understanding where economics went wrong, where it could fit, and how it could be restructured, which is what international legal oversight would need to recommend.

The 15 doctrines examined above, viewed together, as a system, rather than as a list of separate violations, do work together as a coherent ideology. These doctrines are not “economics.” Much as the doctrines of industrialization, production, collectivization, homogenization, and militarism were really political doctrines within the Russian (Soviet) Empire (and similarly in other empires), promoted by the State outside of “economics,” they seem to work the same way in the U.S., in Europe, and even, ironically, now in China. Economics is an ideological system promoting power and neo-colonialism. The essential ideology of this system, based on “scarcity” (unlimited wants), and growth, reflects a consistent ideology that devalues groups that do not have the same military and economic coercive power. It knowingly seeks to undermine their cultures and to replace them, with deliberate unapologetic intent. It
posits that all peoples desire this change and control and that higher consumption and newer technologies are universally desired; overriding the reality that the system creates the very instability, uncertainty, violence and pressure that forces adaptation, trade, and militarism. While cultures seek stability and balance and while humans seek security and habit, this ideological system is based on the premise of created instability, vulnerability, and insecurity, in contrast to the goals of international law. None of the doctrines are presented with caveats for protecting certain groups or allowing them to opt out of this system. The assumption is that certain standards of living and consumption achievable with trade and technological and cultural change are the only desirable alternative, that choice is linear, and that there is “no alternative.” That is an ideology of power and control, with the sanctity of a religious belief.

Today, with the ascendancy of economics, the definition of “practical” has come to mean “what people in power will pay for and support” rather than “those simple steps that can actually be taken to best meet human needs.”

Those who have been indoctrinated by the thinking of economics certainly recognize that legal institutions today are not separable from political realities today where economics as a discipline represents power and those with power will not hold themselves liable for its criminal violations. Their “practical” view of the world is that the criminalization of economics and its replacement is “not practical” because power does not allow for rule of law. Those with this “practical” view will wait for the current system with its economic doctrines to collapse before thinking that any prosecution and change can really occur. These “practical” thinkers would say that solutions and alternatives are unrealistic or idealistic. They may even seek to protect and prop up that system, hoping only for minor changes, believing that it is “too big to fail” and must be bribed to change, much like the failing international and financial and banking system. They may believe it is “practical” to bribe those in power in the hope they will change, allowing them to continue to extort governments and legal systems, despite published findings even of economics itself (in risk and reward curves as a function of income) that shows that the wealthy really aren’t motivated to change by additional financial incentives and are unlikely to take additional risks for more benefits. Those with wealth and power are likely to simply pocket the extra wealth and see it as reinforcing their power.

If, on the other hand, there are other, like the author of this piece, who take a different view on what is “practical”, viewing what is “practical” as looking for mechanisms for human survival that can actually be adopted, and seeing existing human inventions like law and their application as one of those “practical” mechanisms for practical people for practical survival needs. If you are a “practical” thinker like the author of this piece, who looks for solutions rather than just seeks to spin fantasy theories, you might recognize that being ready for change also means having a “practical” workable, real, and clear alternative that meets standards of legality and social science and that puts together a set of building blocks of work that already exists, into a logical framework, rather than just advocates and hope for “change”. You would recognize that it is important to have some simple tools for understanding why things went wrong and what kinds of patterns of thinking can, practically, be changed, to overcome these mistakes. I invite you then, to read Part II of this piece, with that analysis.
The actual extent, impact, and underlying goals of cultural changes as a result of post-war occupation and through international aid, including organizations like the United Nations still raises questions and I do not wish to imply that these are appropriate models of applying international law to education, simply to note that these actions have occurred. The author is currently engaged in research in Germany to examine these changes and the actual impact.

One might perceive of defendants as in different “classes” as well as in specific organizations. Economic professors, economists who are members of associations such as the American Economic Association, particular economics faculties at leading universities, editorial boards of leading professional journals or the journals themselves, or even all economics degree holders who work in positions where they are hired as or identify themselves as economics could be among the classes. The majority of these leading the profession are in the U.S. and Europe but of course there are now economists in almost every country. One particularly intriguing defendant is the Nobel Prize Committee in Stockholm that both identifies and awards money and prestige to leading economists every year. They could certainly be seen as a major certifying organization of the discipline and they may be more directly vulnerable to prosecution than economics journals in the U.S.

This study was both as an undergraduate major and as a “Master of Business Administration” (M.B.A.) and was reconfirmed consistently in practice in work with economists in government, international financial institutions, in private industry, and in international development for nearly 30 years.

Competition can certainly be described as a motivating factor that leads to innovation and efficiency. Scientific observations of human (and animal) behavior confirm this observation not only in economics but also in biology. Competition is not the ONLY motivation, however, and the lack of recognizing other kinds of motivation using empirical study is a doctrine of economics that competes with scientific observation.

Humans (and animals) also cooperate. The conditions under which competition and cooperation occur could both be described as “self-interest” using observable data. In genetics, it appears that cooperation may have evolved to promote survival of individual genes, making cooperation a form of enlightened self-interest. In this case, such precepts or tenets are perfectly legitimate approaches to study. What makes them “doctrines” is their combination with assumptions that turn their teaching into ideological appeals to shape behaviors and to restrict certain study. The idea that human desires are unlimited and must always generate “scarcity” takes the motivation of self-interest, that can be studied along with other motivations, and transforms it into a political doctrine that can undermine fundamental human interests. Similarly, teaching that cultural mechanisms that regulate self-interest in order to promote cooperation and equity and reduce conflict, are obstacles to development, transforms the tenet of self-interest into a doctrine. Political theorists studying the idea of social contract and governance, such as James Madison, also start with the basic premise of individual self-interest as human motivation (Madison et al, 1788). They use that belief to structure political and legal systems to best manage this competition and to demonstrate that these approaches improve human welfare. It is by undermining such approaches (essentially undermining the essence of law) that economics offers doctrines that can be examined for their legality.

The irresponsiveness of universities to community and student needs, and resistance to competition and to democratic values, all violate the principles advocated and purported by economists with little effort to fix these market failures. Indeed, it is economists whose doctrines largely seek to reinforce these failures through voucher systems and privatization schemes to promote subsidization of education for and ideology of the rich. This reflects and reinforces the existence of those economic doctrines. Yet, there is no reason to include the problems of the hidden curriculum here. This hidden curriculum is not unique to economics. The economic doctrines speak for themselves in terms of content without the need to examine the form in which they are taught.

Though similar sanctions have yet to be enforced, they have been raised by several human rights lawyers in regard to public figures moving back and forth between universities and political office. Among them recently in the public eye are law Professor and White House Lawyer John Yoo, hired by the University of California, Berkeley and strongly criticized by human rights lawyers who believe he sought to legitimize violation of the Geneva Convention in the use of torture while working in the White House. Similar charges are made against, Condoleezza Rice, the Stanford Political Science professor who many believe approved of violation of the Geneva Convention in the use of torture as well as alleged murder and other crimes relating to promoting U.S. attacks on Iraq and its civilian population. There are similar charges made against former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld who was awarded a fellowship at Stanford’s Hoover Institute. This is not simply a charge directed at one political party. Many human rights lawyers and activists question whether President Barack Obama could return to law school teaching without challenge, given reported violations of international law with his direct approval, including targeting international assassinations and attacks on civilian population.

United Kingdom Serious Crimes Act of 2007.

As of 2008, the cost to the U.S. alone in direct costs (not in future social and economic consequences) was estimated at well over $1 trillion U.S. (at least $3,000, on average, from the pockets of every U.S. citizen) and perhaps several trillion with little compensatory benefit. David Herszenhorn, “Estimates of Iraq War Cost were not Close to Ballpark,” The New York Times, March 19, 2008.
Part II
Is There a Current Social Science of Economics in Economics or Elsewhere that Meets the Requirements of “Social Science”?
If Not, Why Not?

DAVID LEMPERT, PH.D., J.D., M.B.A., E.D. (HON.)

Introduction to Part II

How is it that a discipline that is classified as a “science” can act so long as primarily an ideology or religion, in ways that violate international law, as demonstrated in Part I of this piece? What is the fundamental problem in economics? Assuming there is a political will and opportunity to improve the discipline (or a requirement to do so after a legal challenge), how can the discipline be restructured to set it on an appropriate course?

Part II begins by seeking to clarify what has gone wrong in the discipline of economics by distinguishing the various potential and actual roles and functions of the discipline, seeking to separate the various activities and methods of four different intellectual endeavors -- science, applied technical skills, creation of an overall belief system that is religion or science (what some have called the symbolic “superstructure” of human activities) and the political mechanisms, stories or ideology to reinforce that order and system of beliefs -- that have come to fuse together within the discipline. Like other disciplines that began or largely developed within religious institutions (in the “Church” in European cultures) as moral philosophy and then later separated into science and philosophy, the roles of economics now remain blurred as both “science” and “humanities” in ways that have actually substituted religion (and pseudo-science) along with political ideology for the clear roles that the discipline could actually serve in a scientific culture. To see this, Part II examines the history of the discipline of economics, starting with its roots in the “Church”, along with other university studies that were cloistered examinations of religious texts rather than scientific empirical study. In following that history to the present, it becomes clear that economics remains intertwined with basic religious assumptions. These beliefs in the discipline of economics and in other social sciences today work to prevent development of human sciences in ways that would view humans as parts of the natural world, evolving from other animals and amenable to study and comparison in the same ways as animals and the natural world. These assumptions restrict comparisons and tests and begin with specific theological and ideological views in their place, preventing the discipline of economics from serving predictive theories and effective technical applications for human advancement.

The problem facing economics as a discipline is not limited to economics but also infuses political science, anthropology and other “disciplines” as some other examples in this section suggest. Given that cultures tend to avoid or restrict changes, perhaps it isn’t surprising that since the “social sciences” have long been rooted in religion that they would still have a tendency to fill the social function of religion, even in “modern” society. The distinction between “science,” “ideology” and “religion” is easily blurred today and it would not only be surprising for religious doctrines to find themselves entering into assumptions, causal models and doctrines in what are viewed as the natural and social sciences, but it would be hard to separate them. The process of “de-criminalizing” economics is, therefore, not just one
of removing or replacing doctrines but requires solutions that recognize the different social roles played by the discipline in society as rooted in the institutional development and needs of society and that offer clear ways of distinguishing these roles.

In examining what has happened to economics and in looking for alternatives and means of restructuring, Part II examines the sub-discipline of “economic anthropology” to see whether academic responses to failures in economics are able to free themselves of the same cultural biases. What the test shows is that, for similar reasons, economic anthropology fails today as a potential “social scientific” and “applied social science” replacement for economics. Economic anthropology has itself moved from potentially a science into a “moral” response to economics. Rather than offering a solution and implanting itself in primate evolution and human history for a scientific study of human economic behavior rooted in culture, genetics, and environment, the discipline of anthropology in which economic anthropology is a subfield has also become entwined is now, today, also an anti-science, anti-Darwinian, set of doctrines. These doctrines have entered economic anthropology and other anthropology subfields that parallel other social science disciplines, like political science in ways that undermine a real challenge to these other disciplines that have also strayed from science and/or from legality. Economic anthropology has created itself as a parallel opposite to economics, seeking to take over the moral ground but not the scientific one. That role has been left to other disciplines like Human Geography and Human Ecology that are also examined here in Part II, finding that their narrowness has rendered them inadequate to offer a real challenge.

Overview: What Has Gone Wrong?

Is Current Economics a Social Science, Technique, Mathematics, or Theology?

The title of a recent book on economics, Puzzle of Modern Economics: Science or Ideology, suggests that economists are puzzled as to the social role that economics does or should play (Backhouse, 2010). Like other “modern” disciplines, economics should potentially be playing four different functional roles and the question is whether they are all consistent or appropriate. The analysis below suggests that economics appears to currently offer only a bit of science (and more the appearance or illusion of science), some engineering (mostly for national production and the consumption that goes with it), while acting largely as a religion (reinforcing certain beliefs on the social order and fitting in with established Christian beliefs that seek to detach humans and causality from the animal world and environment) and serving as political ideology (for industrialization, empire, and an elite class). Each of these four different kinds of functions may be needed in modern society but not in the ways that economics currently partially or distortedly or illegally fills them. The puzzle is to clarify these different functions of economic study and to see that they are all appropriately labeled and filled, rather than distorted and confused.

This section seeks to distinguish the various roles and functions of the discipline of economics. It starts by defining what these different functional roles are that a discipline might play and by describing what their key elements should be, as well as how to test that these needs are being met. What follows is an analysis of how the discipline of economics fails to fill these roles, with an explanation of why and where, historically, it went off track. The concepts may seem to be a bit abstract, theoretical, and new to the thinking of those not used to them, but I try to present them clearly and succinctly here.

The Different Ideal Roles that Economics Could Play as a Discipline in a Sustainable Society

Although anthropologists have recently shied away from trying to define structures and functions in societies because of the difficulties of finding all of these functions and structures across all societies, there is still agreement on some of the basic categories found in almost every society and particularly in technological societies. These include structures and functions of: science itself, in practice (for understanding and adapting to the surrounding environment, particularly for dealing with change), engineering, the technical application of predictive science (applications of knowledge to recurring
needs), religion or other kinds of belief systems like science (on questions of values and existence) and rituals including story-telling and promotion of political ideology to reinforce the beliefs and maintain the social order, sometimes a part of the education or socialization function for the young, as well as protecting against deviance and maintaining solidarity and collective beliefs).

In fact, the four of these fit together in a logical way.

- Science and engineering work together, with basic science revealing the laws that can then be used in application. In the social sciences, the science develops the laws used in policy ("social engineering") and in technical, professional application.

- Religion or other belief systems like the belief in science and reinforcing rituals or political ideology can also be viewed together and in different parts. Religion (creation of doctrine) defines social and cultural systems while ritual and (political) ideology work to reinforce existing political and economic systems. Sometimes the stated religious beliefs and the rituals to reinforce the beliefs, through ideology, seem to be different, which is what helps them to be seen as different functions. Part of the difference is that the stated religious belief may be different from a hidden belief that is really being promoted by the ideology (such as the teaching of "peace" and "love" by religion but the actual ideology of militarism and competition in societies). This is not to say that the functions do not exist but that they are easy to mis-identify because of conflicting statements. (It is part of the role of good social science to identify the actual, underlying beliefs and ideologies.) Belief systems and the ritual ideology to promote them can also be tested and shaped as part of the adaptation of societies to change.

- These two couplets of science-engineering (social science-policy/technology) and religion/belief systems-reinforcing ideology (doctrine-philosophy/humanities) can also work in parallel. Ideally, for instance, the humanities disciplines or the parts of social science disciplines that include humanities would also include study of philosophy and literature (the humanities) relating to specific scientific disciplines and technologies, as a way of imagining new alternatives and legitimizing transition. In this way, humanities work to develop the new belief systems and reinforcing rituals for long-term sustainability and this is the ideal role in relation to sciences in an adaptive society that values science. Reinforcing ideology-philosophy can serve to imagine new possibilities and direct scientific inquiry or can reinforce and legitimize certain scientific approaches. In other words, the study of humanities can be directly complementary to individual sciences or social sciences. (The practicality of how this could work in a remade discipline of economics is described in Part III.)

For economics and other social sciences, each of these four roles can work in parallel and can either mutually reinforce each other in a way that promotes change and innovation (in a “Stable Adaptable Scientific Society”) or can mutually influence each other to prevent it (in an “Unstable, Mal-adaptive Scientific Industry Society”), or both, at different times and in different ways.

To make these functions easier to see, and to help understand how they work in different societies, I have put them in a short table, below. The first row describes a successful, model “Stable, Adaptable Scientific Society” in which social sciences, including economics, fulfill appropriate functional roles, as opposed to the current situation, of the second row, where they are failing to work together in a consistent way. The third row presents the case of non-scientific, non-technological “Stable Traditional Societies and Cultures” that do not have developed science or social science. This table also helps show that in an industrial society where social sciences like economics are failing, the society is not only unsustainable but is returning to the form of a traditional, non-industrial society.
## Analyzing Disciplines by their Roles in Society

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Society with Different Roles of Academic Disciplines</th>
<th>Functions that Academic Disciplines Play or Can Play in Different Societies</th>
<th>Belief Systems for Social Sustainability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Science and Adaption to the Environment</td>
<td>Belief Systems for Social Sustainability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Science (How the World Works)</td>
<td>Religion (Belief Systems) [Social]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineering (Applied Science)</td>
<td>Ritual (or Ideology) to Maintain the System [Political]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable, Adaptable, Scientific Society</td>
<td>Social Science as Predictive Human Science</td>
<td>Empiricism and Objective Science</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Sciences as Applied Human Science</td>
<td>Adaptive and Innovative Science for Long-Term Stability and Meeting Universal Human Aspirations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unstable Mal-adaptive Scientific Society [Current Situation of Economics]</td>
<td>Social Science as Pretense (Literature and Play), with No Real Predictive Social Science for Major Questions</td>
<td>Slow or Minor Technical Adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Doctrine to Reinforce the Existing Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable Traditional Culture</td>
<td>No Science or Social Science in Reality or Pretense</td>
<td>Technology to Reinforce Existing Order and promote interests of those with authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slow or Minor Technical Adaptation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Doctrine to Reinforce the Existing Order</td>
<td>Technology for Minor Adaptations when necessary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The suggestion of this chart in the second of the three rows is that the idea today within the social sciences and of economics, that they can be both predictive science and a “humanities”, has actually failed to protect the appropriate four functions as distinct but working together. Instead, it has blurred them to politicize the science and to transform it into something that is no longer science. In other words, it has changed the objectives of sustainability for a scientific society into one that simply maintains inequalities and stagnation, and promotes a political ideology that opposes the systems of international law and universal aspirations that would keep modern industrial systems adaptive and sustainable. In much the same way, the 16th to 19th century European idea of the social science as branches of “moral philosophy” and then as a “moral science” also blurred the functions and promoted a colonial system that led to the calamities of World War and the potential for human annihilation in the 20th century. What exists today may be a continuity from the past without the changes that are needed for a sustainable industrial society.

The way to see this is to look closely at the four different functions and the role that an appropriate social scientific discipline of economics, meeting the standards of international law and of science, would ideally play in a sustainable, adaptable technological society and comparing it to the role it actually does play today.
What one would expect to see for economics in an ideal “modern,” sustainable (“progressive” in the sense of meeting human aspirations and assuring flexibility and adaptability), scientific, law abiding, human society is as follows.

**Economics as Science**

As a science in a sustainable technological society, economics would offer predictions on the global questions about economies: how they rise and fall in particular environments, what one would expect to see with certain populations and climates and resources, what kinds of satisfaction, growth, scientific achievement, division of labor, and equality would exist in those conditions and what is possible. Behaviors in reaction to different incentives and controls, revealing mechanisms and pathways, would be modeled with the causality also tested. One test of whether an intellectual activity is a science that can be applied to economics as a basis for distinguishing whether the discipline is actually pursuing scientific questions or just humanistic questions is to see whether the measures used to answer the question are rooted in the natural world: if animals have similar activities that can be studied and if there are parallel principles to understand similar phenomena in animals, the study can be presumed as a science. For example, animals have societies and they have politics. They also have economic organization. Real economic science would therefore start with what is observable in nature, then specifically in primates with biological/genetic influences mapped out, then with historical archaeological explanations of various pathways. Rather than start just with industrial societies, industrial society models would need to be shown in relation to other societies but with additional variables. One further way to distinguish science from humanities is to test the variables measured to see if they relate to the tangible natural world or if they are just creations of the human mind. For a humanities, unlike science, one studies symbols and ideas that only humans have and do – literature, history, art. Similarly, symbols of money and prices can also be seen as partly symbolic and part of humanities study rather than science unless fully grounded in measurable quantitative real variables. The absence of use of natural variables and natural comparisons in economics today (and evaluated further below) would suggest that it is not really science. Similarly, if much of what is simply story and art form in economics today or “religion” or “ideology” of certain economic ideas and doctrine would really be studied only as literature, myth and religion and no longer propagated in the scientific discipline, then it would not meet the definition of science. Furthermore, if it were a science, economics today would not only have an agenda of global questions that included the full range of human cultures and societies and natural interactions as well as biological and chemical processes. It would also follow the scientific method of deductive reasoning following observations and comparisons through hypothesis testing, controlled experiments, and comparisons. Variables would be subject to challenge for their objectivity and rootedness in the measurable world. Causal assumptions would also be subject to testing to determine the actual relationship between physical and material conditions and biology and economic choices, rather than assuming full human choice as an independent variable.

**Economic Engineering of Sustainable Societies:**

The technology of economics is inextricably linked to the science of economics (the full range of technologies that are possible to apply scientific knowledge) as well as the moral and religious questions (for whom, to do what). A fully applied social science is linked with a fully expressed scientific social science discipline. If there is little predictive social science in economics today, then what would exist in the form of applications could at best only be something narrow. Properly structured, economics would serve as a technology and policy instrument to promote sustainable diverse cultures of all types, to seek to promote science and advance in technological societies, to promote equity and fulfill humanitarian political goals, to promote peace and eliminate wasteful spending on violence, status displays, and rigid social controls. Today, with little development of economics based on measurements and comparisons drawn from reality, with predictive value, and serving the spectrum of human needs throughout different
Economics as a Religion or Belief System (of Science, Law, Universal Human Values, and Requirements of Sustainability)

Teaching and disciplines can all be viewed as promoting some kind of belief system by definition of their being “disciplines”. Science is one such belief system, but not a “religious” or “political” one. Science it is a belief system that does not require faith or rigidity, only constant empirical testing of its beliefs in ways that allow them to be replaced in the face of empirical fact. In a law-abiding scientific culture, social science disciplines, including that of economics, reflect and promote belief in science (merit, mind, and knowledge) and the ideals of science for technological and related social progress (to meet university human values and aspirations and to protect long-term human survival and sustainability). By contrast, the test in Part I suggests that economics today seems to promote only the interests of specific cultures and their consumption patterns, in defiance of the consensus principles of humanity established in international law and promoted through scientific enquiry.

Economics as a Form of Reinforcing Ritual as an Internally Law Abiding, Moral “Ideology” to Protect Sustainability through Universal Concepts of Social Progress in an Industrial Society

In a culture that follows rule of law and in which science is a key to prolonging and improving the human future and as stewardship over universal resources, it is linked to reinforcing rituals. These rituals could be called an “ideology”, but they are not for promotion of any specific individual or group interest, which is the usual definition of an ideology. They are only promoting human survival in general by reinforcing a belief system of empiricism. In a scientific and law abiding culture, these rituals promote rights to culture, diversity, and protective co-existence and interaction with nature as these are recognized as human “universals”. The test of “doctrines” and of systems in economics as appropriate or “political” and “ideological” is whether they reflect these fundamental beliefs of science and beliefs of political equality that are parts of rights culture and “social progress” (improving human systems to better meet the objective goals of human survival and sustainability in ways that meet universal human aspirations). Inappropriate parts of this belief system are those views that are specific to individual cultures or groups in those cultures to promote specific interests (political ideology). In holding up the doctrines of “neo-classical” economics to international law in Part I, it would seem clear that the opposition of the discipline to established principles of cultural rights and sustainability works to promote a single ideology of a single culture and the interests of specific institutions and leaders of those institutions within that culture. Contemporary industrial societies looking towards long-term sustainability seek to answer questions of values based on reasoned answers to ways of promoting long-term human survival as well as promoting scientific inquiry and exploration into all of the unanswered questions of our universe and of our existence. In small societies with limited science and technology, religion provides doctrinal answers on value that are designed to protect the survival of those cultures and the environments in which they exist. In our contemporary society, with advanced technology that allows us to shape our environments and to control our consumption within our environments, the moral role of economics is to think about the actual goals of consumption and production; not just to advocate for increase. It is to consider how we measure human progress, how we define real value of what is difficult to measure – scientific and intellectual advance, human satisfaction and well-being, human nature, security versus risk, the environment, and how we measure what is possible in terms of distribution and equity. The moral philosophical role of contemporary economics is not to assume only one possible system and to advocate for it as doctrine but to continue where thinkers like Marx, the guild socialists like Cole, Buckminster Fuller, and others imagined utopian communities and the paths to reach them (Cole, 1920).

Though there is now a cynicism towards communitarian or planned models of production, the technological reality of space travel means that planning of new economic forms will not only be a moral
question but also a relevant technical engineering one. Similar moral questions that are of relevance to economics are whether economic growth and peace are compatible or whether war, military competition and violence are necessary incentives for economic growth, how drives and incentives for competition and cooperation and diversity versus conformity can be balanced. It is moral questioning that serves to inform and direct scientific inquiry by freeing the human imagination. In the way that science fiction helps lead, regulate, and integrate scientific research and application, moral philosophy, utopian fiction, and science fiction on economic trends, possibilities and the dilemmas they create are the role of morality in economics. In addition to science fiction, it is partly the role of social science (including economic anthropology as a facet of anthropology and an approach to an alternative discipline of economics) to serve as culture critique to show these alternatives but not simply to start with and argue for a different standard of value.

How Economics Now Ineffectively Fills these Functional Roles and Threatens Social Unsustainability and Instability

While contemporary economics contains some elements of science and engineering, the part that is heralded as science is largely pseudo-science using trivial variables and hiding behind the language of mathematics, while its role in engineering is strictly limited to promoting production and consumption in technological societies (within the limitations of relatively fixed technologies and social systems) and to profit maximization for enterprises. In its religious and moral roles, economics serves to undermine science, law and humanistic, moral concerns in ways that by definition (since law and morality are, by definition, designed to assure long-term adaptability and stability) threaten humanity.

Historians question when economics broke away from its church doctrine origins as a “moral science.” Indeed, it may never have broken away and these definitions may be misleading. While it may still be theological and ideological, the contemporary discipline of economics does not meet the definition of a science as being an empirical, hypothesis testing exercise leading to the creation of predictive models that are invariant across cultural context. One might think of its activities, given the legal determination of Part I, as more of an “immoral” “pseudo-science.” Starting from an abstract model (the principles of “neo-classical economics) that does not derive from experimental data and then searching for ways to justify the model is the antithesis of science. It falls into the realm of religion, propaganda, and ideology.

Economics as a Pseudo-Science

Ironically, the economic theory of “Gresham’s Law”, that weak forms of currency will drive out stronger formal ones, one of the narrow arbitrary “laws” of individual psychological behavior, that have crept into economics as “economic theory”, has an analogue in what has happened in the discipline of economics, itself. In its central teachings, arbitrary untested assumptions paraded as universal laws of behavior, dressed up in mathematics and jargon, have replaced the actual scientific method of observation and hypothesis testing of economic systems using real variables. What has resulted is either pseudo-science or a capture of another discipline (like the study of individual human behaviors that falls within the discipline of psychology) that is rebranded as “economics” (e.g. parts of psychology rebranded as “behavioral economics”).

Economists make their claim as scientists by relying on the approach of positivism and basic definitions that came out of physics. “Force” and “mass” are not immediately visible but are concepts that are established as the basis for describing interactions, abstracted from observation. Economists make the parallel but false claim that the “rational economic person” and their assumptions of scarcity are abstracted from reality in similar ways and that a series of interactions and relationships can be explained and derived as laws which follow. What makes economics a pseudo-science is that these abstractions and the interactions that follow are not subject to the same tests as in natural science where certain mathematical terms like “mass” or “force” can be described by observations of nature. Physicists test concepts of mass and force to derive measures of gravity and velocities. Their descriptions of matter are
subject to tests and description in its various forms and universal constants like the speed of light and gravity. Economists, by contrast, stop with assumptions that are contradicted by observable data in other disciplines that explore human behaviors and cognition (psychology) and that show how preferences are actually derived, such as from culture (anthropology) or genetics (biology). The charts in Part I listed the various assumptions of “neo-classical” economics and the observations of other disciplines that revealed them as fantasy, while noting that economists have nevertheless held onto them in defiance of objective reality and without any attempt to replace them following the established practice of science. To make the comparison clearer and to help reveal the failure of economics, consider the following as a kind of “thought experiment”. Imagine if physics started with the assumptions that are the basis of economics; of maximization of matter as a goal, or of scarcity or “limited resources”, or even of rational behavior of matter. None of these basic assumptions are units of measurement chosen as building blocks that allow for testing, the way that definitions of “matter” and “mass” and “force” do, as the basic assumptions of observations that physics set out to test. Were physics to have started using the same assumption approach of economics, what would be the result on modern physics and the study of the nature of matter or measures of the universe? The answer is that it would not and could not exist, because economics starts with a conclusion of a belief system rather than an attempt to study a phenomenon (like how different “masses” fall or attract each other, or how different “forces” act on each other). There would be no study of light as a wave and particle, as matter an energy inter-convertible, or the irrational behavior of matter, of anti-matter or principles of uncertainty because economic assumptions do not define things to measure and compare. Instead, they work to prevent actual measurements and comparisons. The result in economics is not only that there no testing, but that there is no attempt at neutral observations that are independent of the observer (in the case of economics, cultural and political biases.) The basic premise of science is that it must be replicable and culturally neutral, independent of time and place. Economics already defines itself as measuring and representing phenomena in the industrial environments where economists live, work, isolate themselves and their research and claim as the highest form of civilization. A physics similarly limited to only the elements found in a laboratory would not be physics.

It would be wrong to grossly overgeneralize to say that economics never contained elements of social science or that one cannot find social science in economics today. There is some science in economics as a social science. However, to be considered a social scientific “discipline”, its recognized work must follow the standards, methods and goals of science. Malthus’ Law on Population and consumption that was one of the discipline’s initial doctrines dating to the early 19th century is testable science with clear measurable variables even though mainstream economic doctrines today deny it and do not teach it. Game theory models of competitive behavior that have been widely propagated since the 1950s are drawn from observation and can be tested along with other psychological attitudes towards risk, reward (including gambling behaviors and impacts of taxes), and cooperation. Though some observers like Backhouse believe that game theory, itself, is the essential scientific model that is most widely accepted in the discipline, this scientific component of the discipline is still more likely to be found in international relations departments or in specific applications in business schools rather than in mainstream economics. That means that economists can recognize what science is and that they can employ it but if the discipline is “scientific” it must also distinguish the science from the non-science. It may be that all economists today use “data” and can be considered “empirical,” (Backhouse, 2010), but that does not mean that they employ the scientific method or that the data they use answers fundamental comparative questions. The problem with those major scientific approaches that have developed within economics is that they have not been formalized into the building blocks of the discipline in the way that Newton’s laws, for example, are basic building blocks in the discipline of physics. Nor have they swept away the doctrines that are still presented in introductory courses, are basic parts of the discipline’s training, and that are not taught with laboratory methods and subject to the challenge of the scientific method. They have largely been shunted aside as “political economy” and other marginal subareas. Further, much of the contemporary work today in economics that uses empirical methods and hypothesis testing is limited to industrial societies and certain production and consumption variables in ways that do not replace or challenge the
discipline’s basic non-scientific doctrines or that apply behavioral psychology to production and consumption decisions and then label it as “economics”. Where economists apply the scientific method and test hypotheses with data, today, it is largely through limited observations of some micro-behaviors (particularly psychological dimensions of risk and reward) with attempts to link minor variables to output and to look at industry behaviors such as learning and costs of scale curves, to conduct (with few ethical protocols) national experiments on investment strategies public and private, to examine national budgets, or to measure links between research and development and productivity. These are largely technical results to confirm what is often intuitive advice for profit maximization by firms or for national spending that is otherwise obstructed by the strength of political and economic ideologies. In that sense, it is also a form of pseudo-science that just confirms definitional relationships that are common sense. Often, the variables used are not hard, natural measures but are collinear variables of socially constructed objects like money and prices. Though these are not widespread in the discipline and do not lead to its classification as a science, they are at least a core of a future potential for recreating the discipline as a science. Even where these may be culturally circumscribed studies offering results applicable within a specific cultural context, they can show interesting relationships while confirming and measuring obvious impacts of law and regulation or on public human investments over military and social control expenditures on efficiency and productivity.

Although not widespread in economics, itself, scattered scientific studies of economic phenomenon can be found throughout other disciplines which also suggests that economics as a social science could exist. There are socio-biological studies of several economic phenomena among primates and other species – production, technology, distribution; hierarchies. Archaeology and economic anthropology have conducted comparisons of economic phenomena across societies. Sociology has looked at transition of economic systems in human history/ development of technologies; environment and technology; environment and consumption; economic relations across species. Ecologists now continue where Malthus left off with predictions of eco-system collapse; engineering technology studies and predictions of resource limitations and impacts. These are some of the scientific approaches that need to be pulled together with the existing science within the disciplines margins in order to build a discipline of economics as a legitimate social science.

Economic Engineering of Production and Domination

Although economics rarely describes itself as a technical field apart from its applications like “business school,” standard textbooks are offering policy tools and practical advice, specifically within a limited range of industrial societies and those subject to their political influence rather than to the wide range of questions that could compromise the applied social science of economics. A typical economics text today opens by appealing to students on the basis that, “Your understanding of economics will help you to make decisions about earning money and about saving, investing, or spending your money;” instructing readers on how to be good workers and consumers (Smith, 1991, p. xxiii). Another simply notes that, “The economist describes how our economic system works” (the italics added for emphasis) (McCarty, 1988, p. 4). Robert Solow, a Nobel Prize winning economist (in 1987), noted for his work on economic growth, notes matter-of-factly that “between 1940 and 1990 … economics became a self-consciously technical subject” (Solow, 1997, p.42) like that of engineering. The very basics of the discipline, of “supply and demand”, are really business concepts rather than economic categories of consumption and production that one would expect as the basis of a science. In my view, existing sub-fields of economics could actually be renamed to correspond with actual technical functions as follows:
Current (Euphemistic) Name of Sub-field of Neo-Classical Economics | Actual Technical/Engineering Role (Renamed in Plain English)
--- | ---
Micro-Economics | Corporate Market and Profit Engineering
Macro-Economics | National Production Engineering for Corporations
International Development/Trade Economics | Economic Globalization, Colonialism and Assimilation
General Business Administration (Already Applied) and Industrial Engineering Subjects | Supplier, Worker, Consumer, and Government Regulator Manipulation and Control

- Micro economics is a euphemism for corporate market concepts and profit engineering. Though the subject covers consumer demand, it certainly does not teach consumer organizing for market power or consumer and community protection skills, culture protections or economic rights and regulation.
- Macro-economics is a euphemism for the corporate national production engineering.
- Development economics and trade economics social engineering for globalization and urbanization of rural and minority cultures and for control over independent economies.
- Business education and Industrial engineering are technical fields for worker, consumer and supplier control.

**Economics as Religious Faith, Acceptance of Rigidity, Inequality and Control**

More often than is consciously acknowledged, the teaching of economics introduces symbols and appeals based on “faith” that are most similar to those used in primitive magic, appealing to authority or acceptance of divine guidance in place of scientific testing and fact. The constant reference to the metaphorical “amazing invisible hand” described by Adam Smith in the 18th century when the discipline was rooted in religious teachings and taught by members of the clergy established a doctrinal tone in the discipline that remains today without a direct attempt to eliminate it. Economic doctrines, cloaked today in mathematics and jargon and inaccessible to the naked eye and testing of the layman are also to be accepted on faith as a form of acceptance of existing hierarchies of power and invocations to divine right that bestow legitimacy on market system empires and on economists. The common reference in economics to the “market” and its “invisible hand” invokes the Christian belief in an invisible “God” blessing Christian countries and assuring happy endings (Smith, 1776). This “invisible” hand is an extension of the benign “God” of the Christian New Testament that asks blind faith in its teachings, rather than in the constant challenges against the irascible “God” of the Old Testament whose power was continually subject to human reason. In writing about “capitalism” in describing the economics of Western Christian industrial societies, Max Weber even gave a religious benediction to economics in 1904, linking it to the “Protestant ethic” (Weber). The situation of the discipline in England and the U.S. with its restrictive focus on European industrial societies and societies copying or forced to follow the model, reinforces the doctrine as part of a socially specific religious ethic. Some economics historians note how even the language of the discipline has lost any universal objective quality as this recent quote suggests. “The term ‘economy’ is as specific to the English language as solidarité is to the French. If the various meanings of the word are obscure in English, their translation into most other languages is even more problematic. . . . Britain and America have dominated global capitalism in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries respectively and so, gradually, the peoples of the world have come to absorb something of their economic terminology as common usage” (Hart and Hann, 2007).

While any discipline can express certain amount of wonder at the construction of the universe that suggests some kind of divine choice – the properties of the carbon atom as seen by chemists and some of the paradoxes seen by physicists – the characteristic of a religion is that it creates wonder out of what can be studied and it substitutes faith for experimentation and explanations. The typical economics textbook begins by establishing this religious sense of wonder and magic about ordinary events, with statements like this one. “You can be almost certain that if you go to the nearest supermarket, both the corn flakes and bananas [you wish for breakfast] will be there waiting for you” (Smith, 1991, p. 17). In fact, there are complex set of explainable interactions at work here – hegemony, corporate power, government coordination, control over consumer choices, controls over the labor force. Much of it is environmentally and culturally determined. But that is not how these texts present it. Science, by contrast, allows for experimentation and rational explanation of all of these, but economics assumes away biological, cultural and political explanations, avoids experimental observation, and ascribes events to divine intervention and blessing of the producers. Everything is assumed to follow the motivations and activities found in the industrial cultures with the set of values where economists work. The discipline acts to confirm and praise that culture’s values, psychology, and interactions.

The divine faith propagated in the discipline is that the “market” finds a solution to all problems through its divine laws of supply and demand and that these create a divine form of autonomous regulation. Though some of these doctrines are discarded when events reveal their absurdity, the discipline of economics seems to immediately replace them with other beliefs to be taken on faith as one of the major political economists of the late 20th century, John Kenneth Galbraith, satirized. Galbraith’s history of economics notes how one of the long held religious beliefs that was sanctified as “law” in economics has now reappeared. The early doctrine was “Say’s Law”. Say’s Law postulated on faith that supply of products in an economy would always equal demand and lead to full employment (Galbraith, 1987) as part of the magic and miracle of the market. That “law” ultimately came face to face with a bit of reality … the Great Depression of the 1930s. Though Say’s Law was discarded after the Great Depression, it has since been replaced by new doctrines of economic faith such as the “Kuznets curve” and other fantasies to sustain the theology of globalization, of industrialization and of laissez faire economics. These new laws again ask for faith in the “market” and “growth” as forever sustainable, with productivity always rising to meet consumption demands, with new resources always replacing those that are exhausted and with the poisoning of the planet always being reversed by a newly appearing technology to be produced by the “wealth” that resulted… at least in the long run. Realists note that “in the long run, we are all dead” and that once humans die out from the exhaustion of resources, the failure of science to meet the needs “on demand” and the catastrophic impacts of pollution and war, there certainly will be a balance at “zero” but economic dogmas are continually generated to deny the reality by averting attention to the history of collapse of past economies and cultures. One scholar putting these contemporary economic dogmas to empirical test, but outside the discipline of economics, refers to them as “toxic omissions” and promotion of “cancerous growth” (Nguyen, 2008).

The reliance on mathematics as the language of economics also fills a religious function that is seen in religious activity in other human societies. In many cultures, magic and the power of those wielding it are reinforced through the use of special language known only to a few, revealed in incantations and “spells”. In physics, mathematics serves to measure and explain through formulas so it is used as a way of demonstrating relationships between physically measurable substances. In economics, however, it serves to hide the lack of empirical content and to create exclusivity among its practitioners through a common use of obscure symbols. Like the use of Latin by the Church and in legalese among lawyers, and the length of time studying it, mathematical equations have become the abracadabra of economics in a way that gives it a religious character.

In addition to the discipline of economics using the techniques of religious institutions, it also maintains some of the dogmas and assumptions of the Christian Church, itself, out of which it arose. One
way to make the distinction between economics as a science and economics as a continuation of the principles of the Christian Church is to look at how the discipline treats the evolutionary principles of Charles Darwin to see if the discipline ever really broke with the church and accepts the idea of humans as part of nature and of evolution of social systems following natural processes. The key difference between the Church’s view of humans and that of human sciences is the break imposed between the natural/animal world and humans. Sciences assume a continuity of forms that allows for comparison along with causality that explains human systems as a product of natural, environmental factors. The Church assumes not only that humans as a species are not comparable to other primates or animals and lack shared characteristics of other species on earth, but that human decisions are independent of nature and that “God” or humans cause events, thus reversing the logic of science. The discipline of economics not only starts off with assumptions of completely independent human choices, not only free from nature and any kind of genetic or other determination but free from society and culture as well, but the focus on modern industrial society also seeks to detach societies today from human history and from cross-cultural comparisons. In this way, the discipline of economics reflects both the Church’s assumption of causality and its separation of study of economic behavior of humans in “civilized” societies from similar economic behaviors of animals, primates, or non-industrial human societies. It postulates the idea of a linear, teleological evolution in which societies all move towards a single industrial form that is at a “higher” level than other cultures, such that its assumptions do not have to be tested on less complex societies and that study of political science, psychology and anthropology can also be de-linked from it. In fact, economics is not alone among the “social sciences” in discarding basic scientific assumptions of causality that are consistent with Darwin’s theory of evolution. Other social science fields today are discarding science and choosing “moral models: in the “humanities”; substituting the assumptions and teachings of the Church in order to avoid any form of deterministic, predictive and scientific explanations relying on nature and comparisons (Andrade, 1995).

Economics as a Reinforcing Political Ideology of Imperialism, Inequality, Dislocation and Disempowerment

One of the easiest ways to distinguish social sciences from ideology is to use a method suggested by a linguist, Noam Chomsky. By definition, ideologies are taught as “isms” while science is simply presented as law. Physicists don’t teach “Newton-ism” or “Einstein-ism” or “mechanics-ism.” They teach Newton’s laws and Einstein’s theories that are testable as law. Economists teach labels of “isms”: capitalism and socialism, monetarism, free market liberalism, and, in critique, Marxism. In doing so, they are teaching ideologies.

The doctrines taught in economics and the conflicts of interest they represent are described in Part I of this article. The analysis of “neo-classical” economics as in violation of the consensus on international law and substituting self-interest of the profession, linked to the wealth of specific elite groups in specific societies, is the very definition of promoting an ideology rather than a science.

A more common critique is that the values promoted by economists are not simply economic exploitation and genocide but themselves reflect the “system” of “capitalism” as a specific ideology. Despite social science debunking the idea of economic “isms” as distinct choices and as recognizing significant differences in the workings of mass industrial societies, the idea of the existence of such “isms”, that they differ, and that systems can freely “choose” all aspects of their economies without any form of determinism, economics (and many other disciplines today) hold onto this belief as part of its ideology. In Part I, I offered comparisons of teachings in past and contemporary empires to demonstrate that the doctrines of economics today are really those of economic self-interest and imperialism that can be found in almost all other industrial empires, but economists and political theorists readily describe their teachings as fitting into a coherent set of beliefs that they in fact admit are ideological. These ideological beliefs are largely imaginary constructions that describe competing trading blocs without clear definition or scientific basis as to their applicability or origin. They reinforce the idea that economics is motivated
by a desire to offer and “compare” ideologies even where they are illusory, fantasy beliefs that may not even reflect real or actual choices. Most introductory economics textbooks offer comparisons between the U.S., described as a form of “capitalism” with the Soviet Union and China, as well as Japan, and sometimes Sweden, representing some kind of “mix” of public oversight, consolidation and coordination, public benefit and political power, without reference to particular political relationships or environments. All of these books seem wedded to an ideological supposition that these economic systems are easily distinguishable by their “choice” of economic ideologies from among these limited models of industrial societies in very different geographies and with different resources and niches. Without explaining the nature or causality of these choices or the contexts in which they arise, economists appear to make value judgments and labeling of these systems based on their own interests in rising in the systems where they work. In teaching these “isms,” economists make no attempt to reveal the material conditions in which they arose, the deep structures of the societies where they exist, and how these ideologies fill a social function to reinforce the social order. They make no attempts at actual observations of empirical reality of humans in individuals and groups/cultures. Nor do they examine their own role in how these teachings work to distract attention from the impacts of these ideologies on human cultural survival and diversity, on sustainability, on social and intellectual progress or on adherence to international law. Indeed, in his work seeking to predict the evolution of industrial economies, Karl Marx found very little difference between the two stages that he described as “monopoly capitalism” and “state socialism” and one wonders if he even could have found a meaningful difference between the economies of Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and the United States, would he have lived to apply these terms (Baran and Sweezy, 1968). The creation and manipulation of this false debate in place of science and actual moral choice and creative thinking is itself part of the political ideology of the discipline.

Summary: What has happened in economics to result in this failure of the discipline to fill its appropriate functions?

At the root of the failure of economics to promote science, rule of law and sustainability is a tension between the different approaches to social functions in industrial and traditional systems and the rooting of industrial cultures in non-industrial traditions that kept cultures stable without long-term planning. Today, this need for industrial social systems to have the science and technology to adapt to changes that could threaten survival along with the religion and ideology to define what long-term survival, (and progress), mean on the one hand, and the need for maintaining social order and stability continue to compete with each other.

In the area of religion, ideology, and morality, the search for long-term values to protect humanity has been blurred with the rituals and teachings of faith in preserving the existing society and power structure, even where that structure may be immoral and in violation of human goals (sometimes because of it). In allying with power, religion becomes a promotion of blind beliefs in an existing order rather than a set of principles for long term identification and protection of human moral values like universal law that protect human survival beyond simply the short term survival of a particular society.

In the area of science and engineering, the goal of societies for balance and harmony sometimes restricts science in order to prevent its findings from leading to rapid changes in the social order and in beliefs. In those cases, technology begins to serve an established order or a particular social group for particular ends (military, control, or simply pleasure consumption). Where science becomes suppressed, it can itself begin to adopt the attributes of religion or pseudo-science, with mathematics and jargon taking the place of real experimentatation and model building.

In modern society, where science serves to explain and control the laws of nature for human enlightenment and adaptation, the role of humanities is to apply the moral beliefs of universal law and progress to the use of science (technology) to assure that it serves humanitarian ends. In such a society, ideology serves not to promote a certain class or self-interest but to reinforce rule of law, universal law and human moral principles as well as adherence to the scientific method.
In trying to understand the factors at the basis of this tension in order to seek means of reconciling it and restructuring disciplines and the institutions that pressure and influence them, it is important to look at some of the history and institutional workings of economics as a discipline.

The History and Evolution of the Discipline of Economics as a “Moral” Discipline Self-Described as a “Science”

In creating their own shared version of the history of economics, economists have invested in telling a story that focuses attention on the narrow aspects of the discipline as applied only to modern societies and certain contemporary institutions. In doing so, they have promoted ideological goals in the place of science that did exist in the discipline’s history but that was and continues to be marginalized. Though scientific approaches have occasionally entered economics, as have concepts of science, alongside different moral and political principles of various times, economics has moved to maintain itself as the immoral dismal non-science. Given the success of industrialization in increasing the power of modern empires, the role of economics has largely been one of maintaining the social order of these successful empires through ideology and religion, rather than preparing societies with the science and technology for the economic failures that were predictably bound to occur.

The focus of the following interpretation of the history of economics is on the myths that economists have created about their own discipline. Their own story-telling is in parallel to the discipline’s actual activities – avoidance of empirical study and use of available methodologies to do such study. Focusing on what is missing reveals what economists have feared and how their discipline’s ideology and religious precepts have worked, while helping to better understand how to challenge and replace them. This focus challenges whether economics was ever a “moral” discipline (intent on principles of law for long term human adaptation and survival) and whether it was ever a science and helps to reveal where it failed and why.

Overview: Examining the History of Economics as a Discipline and Measuring its “Progress” and Change

Given that much of the history that economists tell today of their discipline focuses on its “moral” aspects, though it fails to meet the international consensus of morality that is enshrined in international law (the subject of Part I), it is fitting to ask where this idea of “morality” comes from and how it is to be measured as well as where the story told about the discipline’s history comes from and what measures and definitions are used to establish what is included and excluded.

Today, in a time of rapid technological transformation where technological progress is often viewed as modern religion and where technology has brought longer lifespans and political power to those who embraced it, there is a tendency to believe that industrial societies are achieving social progress on a similar linear trajectory, and that technological process implies social progress. At the heart of economists’ telling of their history is this hidden assumption that the promotion of “productivity” and “technology” is also the measure of success of the discipline in its “moral” goals. In fact, technological progress and social progress are quite different and often at odds given the potential abuses of technology (Lempert, 2016). Technology can also progress even in a culture with limitations or restrictions on science. While social science would seem to be necessary for social progress and for human adaptation and sustainability, the development of social sciences does not seem to be linear, either.

What is presented as the history of economics today, by economists, is not really the history of all economic studies. It is, instead, the “lineage” or “ancestral history” of the discipline of economics as self-defined and subjectively selected by those who are anointed in that discipline, today. It is the “official” “corporate” history. It largely excludes everything that isn’t part of a written lineage of teachers and pupils starting with some upper class British authors, slowly widened to include a number of mostly
American males, though occasionally challenged by other Europeans, from the start of and following the industrial revolution.

Trying to examine the history of “economics” is problematic. Today, it is possible to measure and analyze the activities and doctrines of those who call themselves economists. At the same time, it is possible to list all of the appropriate functions (presented above in this chapter) that the discipline should include, and to look for them elsewhere, even if the might go under other names like “ecology” or “ethology” or “environmental policy.” Doing it for the past, however, is difficult.

As an ideology and “religion,” economics has invested its effort in diverting attention from the economic activities of the real world in order to shape a particular dogma and doctrinal vision of the world with hidden assumptions about social progress. In the official history of the discipline, economists do the same thing in creating unverified assumptions about what constitutes “progress” in the discipline itself, by detaching measures of the success from the discipline in answering fundamental human questions about economics and society and substituting measures of prestige, influence, and narrowness. Examining the history of economics requires establishing baselines of what the discipline sets out to do in answering scientific questions to meet human needs and in focusing on where there were real advances. In looking at their created version of their history or “lineage,” it is important to focus not on what economists themselves include but on the significant economic studies and social science tools they leave out.

The Creation Myth of Economics: When Does Economic Study Really Begin?

The histories of “economics” as told by “economists” often start with the word that names the discipline, “economics.” The assumption is that none of the activities of the discipline existed before the creation of the word, nor for some 2,000 years after! The very naming of the word “economics” establishes part of the mythology of the origin of the discipline that rewrites the history in a way that establishes it as something European.

The word that became “economics” in English and is similar in other European languages, comes from the ancient Greek, “oikonomia” meaning ‘household management’ (“oikos for house; nomos for law/custom/rules). It implied “the imposition of order on the practical affairs of a house, usually a large manor house in the countryside with its slaves, animals, fields and orchards” (Hart and Hann, 2007). But this was only one word in one language. It is one that itself limits the study of economic activity to the later pattern of the discipline that focuses on specific units of economic activity and their management.

Though modern economists do not recognize it, there certainly was a science (and a technology) of economics before England’s industrial revolution. There probably were several. In the same way that there was medical science, chemistry, architecture and engineering in early civilizations, proven by the archaeological record even without formal writings, there also had to be a science of economics and probably were more than one. In the same way that it is clear that there was a subject of architecture in early civilizations even without the texts of architects, because of the existence of infrastructure and monuments with engineering complexity that required the existence of a profession with teachings, the same is true if economics. Societies that had industry, division of labor and public works had to have economists to coordinate these activities.

Kings have always had economic advisors. They systematized all kinds of public contributions and tax systems of different peoples in their empires, taught the princes who later became kings, and based their reputations on the effectiveness of their advice. That means their teachings had to be systematized, recorded, measured and tested in some way. There would have been parables and parallels based on observations of nature, on animals, and competing groups. That is economics as a science. There may already be efforts to compile and contrast the early teachings of these economists from the archaeological record and from ancient texts. If there aren’t, there should be as a way to partly re-establish the track of the discipline and to partly help systematize economic data from other civilizations. Perhaps the 17th and 18th century British scholars writing on economics started to analyze the history and
it has now been purged. Or, perhaps they began the purge in an effort to eliminate or discount approaches before theirs that may have been empirical and that may have invited direct, detailed comparisons between the British Empire and imperial economic systems of the past.

The British scholars who are viewed as the first economists had classical and religious education, likely reading the Bible and texts in ancient Greek and Latin, and they would have recognized their profession in biblical historical accounts if they had wished to do so. At least one economist is fairly clearly described in the Bible as an economic advisor along with some of his advice in ancient Egypt, more than 3,000 years ago. Joseph, one of the early “Hebrews” was an economist who went to ancient Egypt to work as an economist. He advised the Pharaoh on stockpiling surplus for distribution to offset regular flooding of the Nile as part of a national insurance system funded by public taxation. It isn’t known how sophisticated a mathematical system he used for insurance calculations, how he apportioned the tax, how he compensated the collectors and the overseers of the warehouses, how he viewed convertibility of different goods based on nutritional value and likelihood of waste, how he stored and apportioned seeds for replanting and so in, but certainly he had to calculate and recalculate these based on experience. When faced with requests for monumental public spending, military spending, religious functions, and research and development, he almost certainly faced the same questions that public economists face today. Certainly, there would have been comparisons with other Middle Eastern peoples that could even be seen as experimental knowledge as the “science” of economics.

In the same way that the Romans learned from the Greeks, Egyptians and Babylonian Empires, and probably from the Chinese and Indian civilizations, and in the way that Renaissance Europe resurrected the scientific teachings of the Romans and Greeks, there probably would have been an attempt to transfer and build on earlier knowledge of economic science. Almost certainly, there were economic principles of public administration that had direct benefit to rulers and their societies, making it rational to invest in this area of knowledge and to protect it like other areas of administrative planning, such as military strategy. While modern economics has largely served as an ideology to promote elite interests and the social order, its sub areas of business administration and public economics are developed because of the direct benefit they offer and this would have been the incentive for the historic development of public economics. There were certainly scientific principles of taxation, labor and land use in early civilizations. The Bible also records early land laws and environment rituals, taboos, and sacrifices and of bride prices and security systems like the levirate and sororite. In the Biblical texts, the Sabbath is described as a day of rest from work and its functions. Though they might have been called by other names and had other tasks, “economists” and others practicing “economics” were essential to the development of these systems.

The real question is, what happened to these branches of economics such that they were not recognized as such by the early self-recognized British “economists” and such that these areas of inquiry were not directly merged with the scientific method to form a real social science of economics at the time of the industrial revolution? Why were questions about incentive systems, hierarchies, distribution, investment, social security and risk not at the basis of what became economics? Why were questions about labor shunted off into sociology, questions of sustainable adaptation placed in biology, and those of equality and distribution isolated in political science, with economics becoming abstractions about the “economic man” and “scarcity?” Did the idea of comparative science just not fit the Church ideology of supremacy of modern industrial Christian society and did the Church act to make it a rarefied isolated subject? Did the idea of labor rights and spiritual intellectual values other than wealth maximization and greed not fit the political ideology of slavery and worker exploitation that the Church wanted to promote as part of what Weber called the “Protestant Ethic”?

Was there an idea or predisposition, from the start of “modern” economics and social sciences to split social science disciplines in ways that reflected ethnicity, religion, social class and gender? In the U.S. and elsewhere, disciplines are themselves stratified. In both the Soviet Union and the U.S., for example, Jews are highly over-represented as human rights lawyers and business lawyers while the dominant ethnicities in those societies (Russians in the Soviet Union, Europeans in the U.S.) are prosecutors.
Sociology, addressing issues of labor market opportunities and deviance, largely attracts educated minorities and women; the same groups seeking to rise in multi-cultural societies (empires). Anthropology has become a discipline of minorities and women, promoting issues of identity of these groups. Did this kind of ethnic and gender coding of disciplines that is visible today also work to direct economics at its origin, and did it become an embedded underlying part of the “deep structure” of the discipline, beneath its real content?

In the histories presented by economists themselves, of their own field, including those that study the history of the discipline from the perspective of “morality” or study it as a “moral science” one would expect to find similar clarity as to the definitions of “morality” and “science” and analysis of the role of the discipline (e.g., Alvey, 1999). In presentations of the history of economics by anthropologists in the sub-field of economic anthropology, one would expect to find a contextual analysis of economics, looking at its social role throughout history in terms of structures and functions (e.g., Hart and Hann, 2007). But most of the histories, even by critical thinkers like John Kenneth Galbraith, seem to be recitations of the “Great Works” of the field in histories that are really an ancestral lineage of high priests who define what they do as economics (Galbraith, 1987).

The “Year Zero” and Mythical History of Economics from the 18th Century

Most of the histories of economics as told by contemporary Western economists start with Adam Smith and the idea of economics as a moral philosophy in the 18th century, rather than a science. Yet, they seem blind to the very moral (political) philosophies of the 18th century as much as to the scientific advances and approaches that characterized the era at the start of the industrial revolution. These histories don’t mention any great scientific discoveries or theories other than those of (ironically, the Reverend) Thomas Malthus. Malthus appears early on the list, usually just after Adam Smith, who is often viewed as the founder. Malthus’ scientific approach and then its disappearance are usually an unexplained anomaly.

Adam Smith’s work appeared at the time of the emergence of the political philosophies of social contract, political equality, and group rights (in the U.S., the “anti-Federalists”) and of the American and French revolutions that apparently inspired Karl Marx in his economic analyses but these questions are surprisingly absent for almost a century in the earlier lineage. These public rights and law movements were the real moral philosophy of the day and directly linked with ideas of economics – land rights, taxation, accountability of economic actors. Yet, these public concerns do not appear in economics, as if the discipline resisted these secular trends and remained isolated, somewhere else, perhaps in the church. It is as if the emergence of economics or at least the historical rewrite of the discipline is part of a determination to detach these concepts of equity, community, and accountability from those of economic control and to establish a competing ideology that perhaps can be used to protect upper classes and new emerging economic institutions like corporations. Perhaps economics emerged precisely to counter political philosophy, to oppose scientific movements of the time and to promote an ideology that fit the religion of upper class Americans and Europeans. One could speculate that there were religious and class variables at work, with the ancestral economists representing wealthy Anglo families affiliated with the Church, while Marx, in sociology and outside of formal economics, was from a family of middle class Jews.

Adam Smith’s “moral philosophy” of economics was apparently the ideology of the aristocracy of the British Empire and is reflected in his statement of the discipline’s goals: “the great objects of the political economy of every country, is to increase the riches and power of that country” (Smith, 1976b, p. 372). If the contemporary approach of “deconstructing” is used to try to explain what are viewed as the founding goals of the discipline of economics, what one finds is neither value-free science nor direct religious morality. It is the ideology of empire. It is this ideology that appears to have remained central and continually reaffirmed in the doctrines of the discipline. Smith viewed the British empire, despite its enslavement and genocidal economic doctrines, as among the “civilized and thriving nations” where
“even of the lowest and poorest order … may enjoy a greater share of the necessaries and conveniences of life than it is possible for any savage to acquire” (Smith, 1976b, p. 10). This went hand in hand with the civilizing mission of the British Empire to covert the remaining subjugated peoples and slaves. The goal of economics was “growth”. It was not legality, equity, increased choice, sustainability, science, spirituality, or happiness. Even today, Western economists writing about Smith describe these views of empire as a “value-free science,” based on the “fact” that humans behave in a rationally self-interested manner (Alvey, 1999).

For the next century following Smith, little of the work in the discipline of economics is viewed as having lasting influence. Malthus, who was prominent in the early 19th century at the start of the industrial revolution, the rise of corporations and urbanization, became the first professor of what was then called “political economy” in England. Unlike other economists who followed him, it is not only his science that makes him anathema to the economists who followed him, but probably also his humanism. Like the anti-federalists in the U.S. (agrarian farmers like Thomas Jefferson, promoting community rights), Malthus’ moral values as a reverend were to protect communities and lower classes.

Histories of the discipline do not mention any predictive models that can be seem as essential building blocks for the discipline nor do they list disciplinary questions and their relevance to all societies. Histories of economics largely avoid study of the specific role and impact of the discipline in terms of the policy advice offered and at what level, at who studied and funded the discipline, on who it served and how. They do not discuss the growth of business school education and other technical fields of the corporate state or of other social sciences and how different questions were distributed among these disciplines, with the relationships changing. Also left out of these histories are explanations of how labor and class issues ended up in sociology and how ethnic groups entered that field. Similarly absent is discussion of the growth of legal and jurisprudence movements (including “legal realism”) of the 1930s, and various studies outside the discipline of corporations, concentrations of wealth, and organized crime (Berle and Means, 1933; Mills, 1956; etc.) along with the responses to them. Attempts to rebuild a joint discipline of political-economy and to raise larger questions of regulation and equity are also apart from the discipline’s history (Lindblom, 1977). In a sense, these histories like the discipline, itself, appear in an isolated bubble without minimal reference to social and historical context, its relevance or application, or its actual social functions. They create an isolated pristine model that exists in a vacuum, making value choices as to what gets included without setting a standard of what constitutes the boundaries of the study and where and how it is found. The general impression is that economics remained a toy of the upper classes for their amusement and justification of the existing order. That, itself, is a religious function.

The Shift of Economics Away from Malthus and Science and the Development of Its ideology: The Political Realities of Concentration of Economic Power with the Industrial Revolution that are Missing from the History of the Discipline

What might explain the anti-science turn in the discipline after Malthus, roughly fifty years later in the 1870s, is contact with political reality and the attempts of economists to serve emerging economic power. Economic historians note two major “political economists” after Malthus and before economics separated itself from “political” (and legal) concerns of equity and protectionism; David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill. While both are described today by disciplinary historians as “influential” thinkers, the reality may be the opposite and a purposeful attempt to justify the alliance of the discipline with wealth and power. Malthus invented a theory that created the scientific subfield of economic demography and it was shunted aside. Ricardo and Mill, like many other similarly praised “influential thinkers” of the past and today, offered no new science but may have simply risen to fame by writing the justifying ideology of the elites of the time or promoting that ideology through their actions. In the renamed United States (previously, “these united States”) the 1860s marked the de facto end of community rights (federalism) with the victory of northern industrialists in the civil war. In Europe, industrialists similarly triumphed against the workers of the Paris Commune in 1848 and against other uprisings against the concentration
of State power under industry. Among the legitimating rhetoric of this new political reality is the work of John Stuart Mill in which the tyranny of the urban majority and their industrial culture is euphemistically termed “utilitarianism.” It is this philosophy and is terminology – the promotion of this abstract “utility” over rights, freedoms, sustainability, and happiness – that has ultimately merged into the basis of economic doctrine and goaded its illegality ever since. As with Smith’s work that was nuanced and not so easily subject to characterization in its own time, parts of Mill’s work seem to have been taken out of their overall context in order to serve the ideological function of the discipline.

In contrast to Malthus’ thinking that seems to have represented the Enlightenment ideals of the 18th century, this new ideology attributed to Mill and of economists is stark. Human fulfillment and happiness in all of its forms – scientific discovery, art, invention, passion and health – are reduced in this new economic philosophy to the lowest common denominator; the “util,” the unit of usefulness in this new theory of “utilitarianism.” Mill, himself, was not the originator of the philosophy of utilitarianism. It dates back at least to Jeremy Bentham, a political philosopher writing at the time of the French revolution (Bentham, 1789). Like Bentham, Mills believed in individual rights and other political ideals of the late 18th century (though not in the idea of “natural rights.”) But, as a political economist, he brought the essential idea of “utilitarianism” – the majoritarian principle of gross or aggregate benefit, “the greatest good for the greatest number” – into economics where, along with individual (economic) rights, it has merged into contemporary “neo-classical” economic doctrine.

Mill introduced the concept of the “economic man” as a wealth maximizing machine along with the concept of “utility” that ultimately brings everyone and everything to the lowest common denominator. Despite all of his caveats, Mill offered this ideology that has been at the base of immorality and greed in economics and that makes it appear acceptable. The idea of “greatest good for the greatest number” has been heralded as a democratic approach for urbanizing society despite its violations of contemporary international law. It perfectly fit the ideology of the northern merchant class in the U.S. civil war and fits, today, the destruction of native peoples, their communities and cultures, as well as rural life. Though Bentham and Mills might have been shocked to see how their idea could have been twisted, in reality utilitarianism is an easy ideological cover for majority tyranny and the ideologies of “Red” and “White” fascism. The imperial ethic common to Nazi Germany, Stalinist Russia and to the U.S. empire has been promotion of “gross national product” for “national benefit” to meet the “democratic” goals of the majority (and now the urban global majority). There are other more generous interpretations of John Stewart Mill but whatever Mill’s actual intent it seems that economists were intent on using his ideas for these political purposes. Some critical economists today believe that Mill’s actual writings, partly like those of Adam Smith, are selectively quoted and twisted well beyond their actual intent in order to serve business interests, today. Herman Daly actually lauds Mill for supporting the idea of a “stationary state,” non-growth (sustainable) economy, that was replaced by a corporate ideology and fantasy of unlimited “growth” as the key to the greatest good for the greatest number in distortion and suppression of Mill’s actual belief (Daly, 2011).

Even at the time Bentham was writing, when the U.S. threw out its Articles of Confederation, that protected community rights, and established its more centralized Constitution, the federalists and the country’s mercantile imperial agenda were already victorious over the anti-federalist, agrarian farmers and individual political and social rights advocates. The 19th century began to mark the capture of government power in the U.S. and Europe by industrialists. In the U.S. civil war, the industrialists of the north took control. As one of the later European countries to industrialize, in the Russian Empire/ Soviet Union, the Stalinists ultimately declared a “war” on the peasants (including the “holodymir,” the imposed famine and starvation of millions of Ukrainians) in establishing their control.

What is interesting about the establishment of utilitarianism as a basic doctrine of economics is how barren and minimalist the concept is. As much as economists point to the diversity of products and desires they claim can be expressed in the market to be purchased with money and generated through productivity, the real essence of their vision of humanity is summarized by their real measure of value in
life. It is the “util.” They live in a uni-dimensional world where the richness of human existence is reduced and valued in common units.

**Economics as a Religious and Political Ideological Movement During the Era of Western Industrialization and Colonialism**

Given the missing history is the presentation by economists, one can understand the actual history by looking at the religious, economic and political currents in Europe and the U.S. over the past two centuries. The gaps in the history of economics as a discipline can be understood by examining the religious and political ideologies that shaped economics and other social sciences from the beginning of the mid-19th century in which economics is described as being born in Western countries, with economic largely paralleling and reinforcing existing beliefs and powers.

**The Church’s Ideological Challenge to Economics and Its Suppression of Science and Social Science that Continue, Subconsciously, Today**

In trying to fully understand why Malthus’ scientific approach disappeared from economics, specifically during the era of modern industrialization and science, perhaps the answer also lies in looking at the scientific developments of the 19th century. One of the major scientific advances of the 19th century is easily linked to Malthus’s work and could have promoted continued development of economics as a social science, but that have been written out of economics and out of the discipline’s history. But it was also anathema to the Church.

In 1851, Charles Darwin published “The Origin of the Species” (Darwin, 1851). Biological adaptation is, in fact, a perfect segue from Malthus and demographic economics; Evolution adds a missing element into Malthus’ equation where population and production grow at different rates. If societies can’t increase production, they need to change consumption in order to re-establish a balance. Darwin observed how other species dealt with the same problem. Species adapt to change their ecological niche. In addition to regulating population and seeking ways to change production, humans can also change their ecological niche. This is the history of human evolution and Darwin wrote on it later (Darwin, 1871; 1872). It is also the history of cultural change that is central to the study of real world economics and economic history. With Darwin, like Malthus, natural science merges with social science to address the issues of environment and adaptation; human economic successes and failures. Theories and data appear for examining how economic systems have worked throughout human history and pre-history. The power of Darwin’s work in biology and in extension to human biology and human individual and group behaviors (i.e., the basis of social science) is that it offered a theory to look at group adaptations of humans as well as individual adaptations within human groups, including relationships with real variables of climate, geography, and with other species. Given this breakthrough in biology and the opening of the door to the social sciences, the question to ask is, “Where is this work found economics and in the history of economics”? Shockingly, the mention of Darwin is actually used to reverse his scientific findings of multiple and diverse adaptations (adaptive radiation) rather than to incorporate it into a social science. Darwin’s work in economics, rather than being welcomed to propel it forward, becomes transformed into a false, anti-scientific legitimating rhetoric of industrial societies as part of a linear evolution that makes them unique and not subject to study or comparisons (Morgan, 1877). In other words, Darwin’s work was and is today used to justify the already existing theology of the Church, of humans as unique and of urban (white) societies as unique in themselves, detached from nature, not subject to comparison, shaping environment rather than being part of it or evolving within it.

The scientific approaches of Malthus and Darwin were and are not only a challenge to Church doctrine, but also to the elites in industrial society who are essentially aligned with the Church. Empirical study and scientific theory were and are a potential threat to power because they reveal it and because they challenge the blind faith in its legitimacy. If human societies simply evolve to fill niches, the power of Christian industrial societies is not a divinely bestowed choice. It is random. That means that the
societies being enslaved and whose resources are exploited are not “inferior” but have just adapted to different niches. It means they have equal claims to humanity and rights.

If there were any 19th century economists at all who were trying to continue the scientific traditions and infuse concepts of rights as well as to try to look at evolutionary processes and predict them, the most well-known was probably Karl Marx, whom economists do not recognize. Marx, himself, should not have been seen as an outside threat to the discipline, but he is seen as outside of their history. In fact, was not really promoting the idea of ethnic identity and rights, even though he was a minority. He probably sought to repress identities and to promote industrialization as a way to end the pain of ethnic discrimination (Lempert, 1998). It is his representation of an empirical tradition, his studies of political power and that his raising political rights questions in the discipline that probably made it essential for economics to try to eliminate all of these approaches in one sweep.

The pseudo-scientists representing power, and the Church, propping up that power and benefiting from it, had to react to Malthus, Darwin, and Marx’s scientific approaches to economic issues, and had to eliminate them or face social change that would have made them irrelevant. So, it is in the 1870s that the major reorientation of the discipline of economics occurred that broke it away from politics and from science and establishes the doctrines and approaches that dominated throughout the industrial era. It was at this time that economics was repackaged in form and content, as were other social sciences.

*The Distortion of Science in the Name of Science: The Modern Packaging of Economics Supporting the Supremacy of European and American Industrial Imperialism*

A number of different political and religious beliefs seemed to merge in creating the core doctrines of the discipline of economics in the late 19th century in ways that reinforced the American and European empires as higher stages of “development” and “evolution” and promoted the institutional power of the emerging industrial administrative corporatist state. The approach restricted comparisons, accepted the Church’s approach to causality (detached from natural variables and deterministic processes), and split the discipline off from political science as part of a “specialization” that also eliminated political and distribution questions and study of the links between economic and political power. While it is difficult to separate out the different institutions and ideologies that were at work in the 19th century as Western empires industrialized, taking an outsider’s perspective on ideologies and institutions and the purposes they may have served, allows for the generation of some hypotheses as to what was really going on in economics at the time. Rather than take philosophies and ideologies as given and look at their internal logics, a political and sociological look at different institutions and the roles they served for different professional and social groups points to what may have been going on in the discipline. This perspective helps to place the change in economics as a discipline within the context of the politics of the time (real power that economics would have served), suggesting that the transformation of economics into a (pseudo) science was a way to free it from moral and political challenges (particularly of those believing in natural rights). This perspective also suggests how this new (pseudo) science also protected the Church and elites from challenges brought by real science, including Darwin and biologists who would have supported minorities and the environment against the damage wrought by industry and empire. It suggests how economics also fit itself into the same kind of doctrinal order based on faith and divine legitimacy as the Church.

*The Real Politics of Industry and Empire Driving the Transformation of the Discipline of Economics since the Late 19th Century*

Rather than face new competition, the empires of Europe increased their global dominance with the rise of industry. The position of different empires changed in relation to each other, but the idea of empire and the economic power they represented continue to grow. At the same time, it is in the 19th century that corporations began to assert themselves as legal persons with the rights of persons in direct challenge to the laws of Adam Smith’s time that saw corporations as government chartered institutions to
be subject to direct public oversight. When corporations took over production and the State regulated it, the discipline became a study of the regulation of corporate productivity and the technology of doing so in the interests of the owner class of this larger “household.”

Following the civil war in the U.S. and the triumph of the industrial northern states, the new individual rights laws that gave equality to African-Americans (the 14th Amendment to the U.S. constitution) also gave birth to the idea of rights of the illusionary “corporate person.” With the conquest of community rights in the U.S. came a strengthened ideology in economics of individual rights that began to see individuals and corporations as the basic economic productive units and not families (family farms and businesses) or communities. This new idea of individual rights was reinforced and neutered in the discipline by the economic doctrine of the rational economic actor and it fit the needs of an urban, industrial economy.

How the Transformation of Economics into a “Science” Detached it from Legal and Moral Challenges

William Jevons in Manchester, Carl Menger in Vienna and Léon Walras in Lausanne, writing in the early 1870s, became the new voices and faces of what became modern economics. Their names are little known today outside of economics, probably because they invented little of permanence. They worked to package the discipline as a pseudo-science by introducing mathematics as its form. At the same time they reduced its content to minimize the scope of study and to eliminate most empirical study. The paradox of the discipline is that while it began to incorporate mathematics and statistics, it moved farther away from real world measurements and economic concerns that might have challenged its doctrinaire beliefs. First, it anointed itself as a “science” without any moral oversight. Then, it manipulated actual science to fit its doctrines. Then, it used certain doctrines of the Church to give it a religious legitimacy, to create itself as an order of faith and to prevent scientific challenge.

Jevons’ goal was to incorporate “a perfect system of statistics” to make the discipline “an exact science” and a “mathematical science” with more and more precision about less and less (Jevons, 1970, pp. 84). Maybe this is a partly a misreading of Jevons and he did hope for an actual science but even giving him the benefit of the doubt, he was still unable to articulate the proper variables and problems of study that would have met the requirements for economics to be a “social science” “discipline”. Assuming Jevons’ intentions actually were to turn the discipline into more of a science, the problem with his approach was that he began by making suppositions about human nature without measurements and by offering philosophical essays rather than testing hypotheses. In other words, he was introducing the language of science but without the scientific method that was essential for actually doing science. Jevons and his contemporaries began to reinforce the ideological doctrine of contemporary economics that started by identifying “economic value” and looking to “maximize utility” rather than studying actual economic variables about how economic systems and individuals placed in different hierarchical, functional, gender, age, and other roles within them actually behaved under different conditions.

Economic historians describe the emerging methodology of the discipline at this time as one of “positivism” which implies use of the scientific method (Alvey, 1999). But “positivism” is a slippery concept since it incorporates many aspects of the scientific method and it hides what these economists actually did. In their use of “positivism,” economists essentially distorted scientific objectivity into something closer to religious subjectivity and then claimed that they were meeting the requirements of science when they weren’t. Buddhists also claim that they follow the scientific principles of viewing reality and then meditating on it so that the basic principles underlying it emerge in their sense of universal truth. But they do no hypothesis testing and no controlled experiments or even thought-experiments using data. They view their extraction of principles as akin to science but it is not. Buddhists say this is similar to what physicists do in imagining basic concepts that can be used in their equations and it may be, but that is not enough to qualify it as science (Capra, 1975; Pirsig, 1974). Economists say they are doing the same; that they are using this introspective method and then building equations in a field in which controlled experimentation and hypothesis testing are (in their view)
impossible. But that does not make it science. In critiquing science and social science today and throwing it out, anthropologists use this comparison and say that science is fundamentally no different from religion since it is based on a subjective abstracting from reality that is not really objectively verifiable. The fallacy is that real science does have a standard for objective validity and testing. It establishes common, universal measures and applies comparisons and tests to yield repeatable results. It distinguishes between ordinary observations and measured observations and between arbitrarily extracted principles and those that can be used for comparisons. Where controlled experiments are impossible, it finds ways of using data for simulated experimental comparisons that allow for the extrapolation of results. In eliminating experimentation, empirical measurements and comparisons, and hypothesis testing, economists were left with what they viewed as “neutrality” and “agreement” but that they also distorted to mean agreement by those within their doctrinal order.

What seems to actually have been going on in economics is that the idea of “science” was really being used to eliminate moral and humanistic concepts from the discipline so that it was free to represent particular ideological interests. As one historian explains, “a mathematical science of economics came to be seen as the logical alternative to a moral science of economics” (Alvey, 1999, p. 26). The real goal of promoting “positivism” seems to have been not to promote science but to eliminate the idea of “natural law.” Here is where the legal concepts introduced in Part I help to interpret what this debate might really have been about.

When “natural law” was first posited as something universal, it really was offered subjectively. Ironically, in the same way economists say they extracted certain scientific principles from nature, legal scholars say they extracted certain principles from nature about law in the form of “rights.” The two systems were apparently derived in the same way but each was claiming superiority. Eventually, they split apart from each other as political economy eliminated ideas about rights and equity from its study. Which side was right and what was really going on?

Today, there is little talk about “natural law.” Instead, certain ideas of “rights” are described as “universal law.” In fact, some of the “universal law” of today is really the “natural law” from the 18th and 19th century, with a significant difference. Many ideas about rights were originally posited as natural or “God given” and offered on faith. But, in fact, today, these principles can be tested against standards of human survival. That is how, in Part I, the validity of “universal law” in areas like cultural diversity and cultural rights were easy to distinguish from attempts by economists to deny them. Rather than being simply subjective beliefs, some rights concepts actually fulfill long-term human survival goals. That allows them to be commonly recognized as universal principles. Rather than being “natural”, they are in fact recognizable as “universal.” If these universally help principles meet the logical test of promoting long-term human survival in ways understood by all cultures, then they are in fact “natural” and “moral.” In some societies, the same tests can be applied to equality and individual rights, using the mathematical idea of symmetry and suggesting that those societies also best survive when they support egalitarian principles that promote equal opportunity and diversity. In those societies, such a principle (e.g., the “Golden Rule” of symmetry) would be “moral” and even seem “natural.” In the 19th century, the “natural law” scholars weren’t able to use such scientific justification to defend the legitimacy of those natural laws that represent “universal” principles and those that are moral guides to science and other disciplines in the context of industrial societies. Lacking that armor, they were unable to force economics to incorporate their principles in order to meet universal law and the moral principles of activity in industrial societies. So, economists were able to claim their assumptions as “natural”, though they are not.

Economics’ opposition to “natural law” and the ability to undermine its legitimacy, actually meant that the concepts of “rights,” “equality” and protection of diversity could be driven out of the discipline as “unscientific” even though they were fundamental goals and needs for the survival of humanity, while other precepts that undermine human survival were incorporated as the basis of the discipline. The legacy of this split not only had ramifications for economics. If economics was able to claim itself as a science and to denounce the application of moral and legal standards as something “unscientific,” then the natural sciences and other disciplines could do the same. In fact, even though the
concept of rights has more of a scientific basis than the approach taken in economics, the disengagement of morals and rights standards from science meant that any kind of abuses were now possible in the name of “objectivity” and “reason.” If it was legitimate to strip humans of all of their actual biological drives and behaviors, including those of community and relation to nature, and to redefine the moral study of humans as limited to selfish economic motives that could be viewed as “rational,” then it could be considered equally moral and acceptable to treat humans as fungible chemical compositions that could be turned into soap with little remorse.

In splitting off political science (political economy) from economics, not only were questions about natural rights eliminated but so were questions about the political impacts of accumulation of economic power and the controls needed to put it in check. Questions of ownership, of externalities, of community values, and many others were simply eliminated from the scope of the discipline in one fell swoop.

Though these questions seemed to have continued independently in political science and government administration for some time, as well as in some remaining combined departments of political economy, political science ultimately seems to have copied the approach of economics for similar self-interested purposes and these questions have also largely disappeared. The recent transformation of political “science” into a mathematically based discipline that also avoids empirical study and comparisons the natural world, human genetics and evolution, and questions of community, equity, and law, seems to be in an exact parallel. The two cases appear to represent the same adaptation to similar phenomena. Splitting political economy into two disciplines appears to have ultimately trivialized both in the name of “dividing up variables for study.” One can analogize what has happened to splitting the periodic table in half and claiming that chemistry was becoming more scientific and specialized. Political science variables, like those of economics, that are not placed in holistic context and are not measures of relations between biological, environmental and other real variables and behaviors, ultimately lead to trivial or preposterous results. Such results serve only to distract from reality and real prediction and adaptation, and to legitimizing and supporting power within a specific existing system.

The kinds of debates that raged in the 1960s and affect social science today – of science being fundamentally anti-human because of the ability to reduce humans to an inventory of chemicals that can easily be turned into soap in the name of “objectivity” and “neutrality” – were resolved in economics in a way that gave a moral stamp of legitimacy on a pseudo-science rather than allow for a humanistic, morally accountable social science. That opened the door to attack on social sciences that actually were doing social science, unlike economics.

It is ironic that what has happened in anthropology and other social sciences is how their reaction to this choice in economics has resulted in a failure at the opposite extreme. They have now rejected social science today (and science). They have turned to what they call a “moral model” of humanities that has no fundamental grounding because it has also become detached from the ideas of universal and natural law and accountability to the goals of human survival and progress subject to measurable standards. Like economics, without any scientific standard, they have drifted to a version of pseudo-science that exists for specific methodologies rather than the scientific method. These failures exist side by side using “moral” rationale in different ways to render an amoral result.

How the “Science” of Economics Denigrated and Distorted Existing Scientific Approaches and Deflected Scientific Challenges, Fitting with the Ideology of the Church and Opposing Political Challenge

In responding to scientific challenges posed by Darwin and the social, cultural and political interests that this science in fact represented, economics also delegitimized cultural rights and individual rights and diversity in a way that supported genocide and inequality. The approach was to delegitimize population-demography studies like that of Malthus, and other related fields, to prevent any comparative study of cultures (existing and historic) and their economic adaptations as well to prevent any comparative study of early humans, or primates, and other species and their economies, as well as their relations to each other and to their environments. Creating the study of industrial societies as unique in themselves and not
comparable, with no testable hypotheses about alternatives and no empirical study of the reality of how they worked to shift attention from the legitimacy of other societies as well as connections to and value of nature.

Darwin used study of biology to suggest that humans and human societies could also be compared to animals as a way to understand basic underlying processes. Darwin’s theories posed challenges to the existing economic and political order by reinforcing the idea of “natural rights” that economics wished to evade. The idea of life as simply “process” meant that hierarchies had no independent “divine” legitimacy. The evolution and adaptation of individuals and species represented a fundamental equality of all things that reinforced the idea of natural rights. Indeed, the very concept of cultural rights that has become part of international law as a universal principle, comes directly out of Darwin’s science. In the theory of evolution, the rise of primates and humans was a random event that is one of several responses to cataclysmic changes on earth in which complex forms of life disappeared when confronted with abrupt changes. Human survival, like the survival of other species, requires constant adaptation to change, and that adaptation is best served by evolution and diversity. Cultures have equal rights to survival on the basis of their “natural right” to be part of the natural process of evolution and adaptation that Darwin documented.

What economics did in the 19th century was to substitute a new view of Darwin. This new view justified empire and inequality while limiting study to an abstract concept of humans as something entirely separate from biology and environment with the ability to entirely shape the aspects of economy in ways that were completely removed from nature and actual consumption or biological needs. In the place of nature was the creation of an abstract, non-existent “rational man” in an economic system of paper money, products, wages, and factors of production, in an industrial system representing the “highest stage” of social evolution and the only one of any value and worth considering.

Lewis Henry Morgan’s view of “social Darwinism” (1877) came from outside of the discipline of economics and never directly become part of its teachings, but it entered the discipline in other central works such as Rostow’s “stages of growth” (1960) and the “Kuznets Curve” (1955) that remain part of the doctrine today. Darwin’s description of evolution as an adaptive and “radiative” process with evolution following no specific teleology of increasing complexity, was replaced by a model of evolution as linear and progressive, with a moral implication that equated complexity and technological superiority with moral superiority and “progress.” Rather than classifying economic systems by their adaptability and comparing processes, economists accepted this linear view that corresponded with the ideas of the Church; that humans are superior to and separate from animals, that industry and urbanization is superior to agriculture, that technology is superior to simplicity, and that “development” is a linear evolutionary process measured by technological complexity and military superiority rather than by these and/or social, legal, and political changes. This reshaping of the concept of humans and of nature eliminates the historical evidence of advanced technological societies continually collapsing and disappearing due to their unsuitability to their environments and their inability to adapt to change or to damages that they caused. It replaces it with the false belief that technological empires are a continuous stream of successes that have conquered nature (and human nature) and are invulnerable.

The linear evolution model not only serves to create hegemony and reinforce an ideology of superiority (and uniqueness) of current industrial powers, but it also helps cover up the missing science. If economics were a science, it would need to look at animals, primates, history and change to understand the commonalities and differentiation processes as well as vulnerability. The idea of linear evolution is a way to quickly dismiss this gap and cover it over while promoting the supremacy of European (“Western”) industrial empire over “primitive” societies and vulnerable minorities who needed to be “cleansed” out of Europe for reasons of “hygiene” and “purity.”

In the 1930s and 1940s when the global depression and World War among countries that had traded with each other gave impetus to a return to science to understand economics, the arguments defending the myopic approach of economics were very similar to those of the Church. One of the defenders of economics, Frank Knight, argued that comparisons between large and small societies (let alone with the
human historical record and with primates and the animal kingdom) had no validity because of the specific nature of industrial societies as an advanced form unto its own (1941). It is this argument of “modernization” and incomparability that has also invaded other social sciences today in ways that also prevent such comparisons. In the same way that the Church stopped Galileo and the advance of medicine by preventing dissections and comparison with animals, economics trumped science and defended doctrine. The natural sciences ultimately gave way, recognizing that there could be no space program without the chance to first send animals into space, and there could be no medical advance without first testing on animals. Economics stopped these challenges by upholding a doctrine that opposed evolutionary principles, reversed causality, and prevented the entrance of real science.

*How Economics Institutionally Established itself as a Religious Order of Faith, Similar to and Aligned with the Church*

In preventing scientific challenges to economics, the keepers of the doctrines of the discipline had to find a way to assure uniformity and to punish deviance and challenge within not just its doctrine but its institutions. What they did was to redefine “discipline” to mean obedience to doctrine and replacement of the scientific ideal of continually challenging doctrine with facts. To do that, it had to adopt the methods of advancement that were already part of the legacy of the university system that came out of the Church; a system of sacred texts, hierarchy, “peer review” with no outside accountability or challenge, and a blind worship and faith in the sanctity and divinity of the doctrine.

In the ancestral lineage history of economics, the reason for starting with Adam Smith and the “invisible hand” may be precisely because of the alliance of economics with the Christian Church and with the mythology that echoes the Church belief in “God” and the “Holy Ghost.” Even though they come out of the Bible, if economics were to start with Joseph and the Egyptians from the Jewish Old Testament, Malthus’s scientific approach to population and famine and Marx’s combination of science and moral questions would immediately have legitimacy. Starting with Adam Smith changes the lineage, creates a link to the Christian New Testament, and establish the discipline as one based on “God given” doctrines based on faith. In order to understand economics, one cannot do empirical testing of one’s own. One needs to be led by the priests of the discipline who have employed a special process of thinking that only those advancing in the order can appreciate and employ. This system produces certain ordained truths that are then tested through rigorous “mathematics” that also requires special study. Rising in economics (and thus in affiliated political power) is tied to the blind faith in certain assumptions and methods. It is a system based on hierarchy and faith.

Those who “have faith” (i.e., believe in something contrary to normal human experience) and substitute it for reason and empiricism, will accept any dogma given by a hierarchy. The Church understood this when it established the rituals of allegiance to invisible spirits and belief in the “virgin birth.” Those who are willing to accept a belief like a “virgin birth,” and of “Heaven,” are then likely to accept other beliefs from similar authorities that require dying for country rather than for morality and lie, and protecting superiors/elites. It means agreeing to kill eco-systems that are the basis of life, destroying human diversity, and inflicting pain. In economics, for adherents, it thus becomes easy to deny and override the basic principles of international law and civilization as well as to accepted the discipline’s myths of sustainability and “progress” in the face of contradictory evidence and theory. Indeed, some of the more basic doctrines of economics that have no relation to reality, such as that of endless “growth,” can be directly analogized to the Christian belief in Heaven. Rather than offer redistribution and opportunity that was an original belief of “Christianity” (the Jewish teachings of Jesus), the Church aligned with the State and offered the poor an ideology of benefits in the “afterlife” in “Heaven” as a reward for obedience, sacrifice, submission and support of inequity and power of colonialism and empire in Christianized countries. Today, the poor are offered the ideology of “growth” and “trickle down” benefits as a similar belief for their compliance. If they agree to support the demands of producers and the wealthy and accept indebtedness and sacrifice, they are told that unlimited “growth” will bring them a
share of future wealth, without any equivalent sacrifices from those with wealth and power. This future “growth” that they can expect (with its current and future social and personal costs that likely negate the benefits) are the mythical “Heaven” and “afterlife” (Daly, 2011).

Economic historians do not include the contemporary “hidden curriculum” of universities and other schools (the replacement of trade education of direct practical application and experimentation with factory models (lectures and regurgitation of doctrine in closed settings) merging with the methods of the Church (the sermon and mass)) but the teaching of economics as a doctrine rather than as a laboratory, field social science taught using democratic, market mechanisms also reinforces the connection between economics and religion. With the emergence of economics as a “science,” the broad, interdisciplinary education of economists disappeared, putting blinders on those entering the order in both content and method (Lempert, Briggs et. al., 1995).

If economics is a religion following the model of Christian Church beliefs and if pressures for conformity to the doctrine are so intense, one might ask how it is that so many Jews are major economists and why, for example, someone like Joseph Stiglitz would also so blindly support principles that would oppose what one would think it central to Jews. The answer to that question is likely that minorities look to the discipline to rise and to demonstrate their loyalty. This is how minority groups in empires secure themselves. Though there is a seeming contradiction here, the logic of what has happened follows clear social science principles. Readers can consider the conclusions of my other pieces on this phenomenon in Cold War social science (Lempert, 1998; Lempert, 2015).

Economic Anthropology: Solution or Ideological Response?

One of the obvious places for a social science of economics and a moral philosophy of economics (consistent with international law and as a key to progress and meeting human needs) to develop would have been in anthropology, the most holistic of the social science disciplines. Though economics moved away from science and became increasingly narrow and doctrinal, there was an opportunity for the appropriate functions of the discipline to appear elsewhere such as in a science in anthropology or in any one of the other emerging social sciences in the 19th and 20th centuries. In the 1940’s, when anthropologists began to offer comparisons of different types of economies that could have addressed the predictive failings of economics and then again, since the 1960s, when anthropologists began offering a moral challenge to many disciplines and ideologies of imperialism, there was an opportunity for anthropology to become the discipline that filled these gaps. But even with every opportunity to do this – in methodology, data, and self-definition of its mission of “culture critique” through comparison and imagination – the discipline of anthropology and its subfield of economic anthropology failed to do this. Somehow, economic anthropology turned away from the potential it had to replace economics and retreated to becoming simply a theoretical response that itself became characterized by the same shortcomings of the discipline of economics. One explanation is that anthropologists simply turned away from social science believing that any predictive work would be co-opted and used immorally and illegally against Native peoples and humanistic concerns (Duncan, 1995). Another is that the same social forces that co-opted economics also co-opted anthropology but in a different way. Instead of turning it into an ideology of power and a technical tool of elites, it was neutralized and transformed into a place where critics of power simply became marginalized storytellers.

To see what happened and why anthropology still has the opportunity to fill these gaps if it chooses, as well as the pressures and legacies it will have to now overcome, this section examines the state of “Economic Anthropology” today and why its current approach is surprisingly different from its promise. It reviews the history of how it got that way, and then speculate on how (and why) it failed in order to understand what difficulties also exist in transforming this sub-discipline to fill the appropriate roles that economics and economic anthropology have both abandoned.
What Economic Anthropology Is Now and Why it is Surprising

In turning to some of the basic texts that define the sub-discipline of economic anthropology, one finds initial basic statements, like these of the discipline’s mission, that sound very much like the role that the discipline of economics has failed to play. In the International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, for example, the definition on economic anthropology starts out this way: “Economic anthropology studies how human societies provide the material goods and services that make life possible.” (Narotzsky, 2001). Yet, as with economics, once the methods, assumptions of study, and the research questions are defined, what appears is something far from what one would expect to find in meeting the potential of the discipline as a social science and as a subject of the humanities. To see this, one need only start with the expectation for the sub-discipline and compare it to how the self-defined economic anthropologists, writing and teaching in this sub-field and as members of the Society of Economic Anthropology, today, actually describe what they do.

In its role as a social science, there was good reason to expect that anthropology would have filled the role described above for economics as a social science. Anthropology’s branches offered the data and the scientific methods and theories that could have built an economic social science, including human evolution and adaptation (physical anthropology), archaeology (the historical record of human economies), and social and cultural anthropology (comparative study of the roughly 6,000 existing cultures on the planet, today). Economic anthropology could have grounded the study of economics in material variables, links to the animal kingdom, to primate evolution and to human history. Anthropologist’s principle of cultural relativism, following Darwin’s idea of adaptive radiation of human societies in ways that see them all as equal rather than on a chain of linear evolution, could have continued where Malthus and Darwin left off and where economics went off track. Moreover, economic anthropology could have replaced the influence of the Church on economics that turned it away from science and reversed scientific principles of causality that explained human adaptation to the environment. Indeed, there were signs that anthropology started to do that in the 1940s and 1950s, but suddenly that ended. Yet, today, anthropology has also become entwined in an anti-science, anti-Darwinian, set of doctrines that have undermined any real challenge. The sub-discipline of economic anthropology has in fact, created itself as a parallel opposite to the discipline of economics, seeking to take over the moral ground but not the scientific one. That role has been left to other disciplines like Human Geography and Human Ecology, though their narrowness (described below) has rendered them inadequate to offer a real challenge.

In this moral role, anthropology could have also offered the challenge to economics that would have pushed it to change, but it has failed there as well. Anthropology sees itself today as offering “culture critique” by demonstrating how different societies solve similar problems in ways that moderns societies say are impossible or undesirable. On issues of distribution, opportunity, economic power, regulation, calculation of quality of life, and “progress,” anthropology has in fact offered critiques. But it has failed to go the additional step of imagining how modern society could move to different forms in order to better meet human needs in ways that are sustainable, in promotion of long term human survival, and that meet a larger range of human aspirations. Again, that role has largely been left to other disciplines like Human Ecology, or simply abandoned.

Instead of these goals and approaches, the definitions of economic anthropology offer only discussions of “power and meaning” (continuing the encyclopedia definition above) in place of prediction and offering of visions (Narotzky, 2001). Rather than define how economies work and how they could work, anthropologists look at the “spiritual meaning” as well as the “personal” and “social” implications of exchange relationships. This is not very different from the micro-approach that economists use for “supply and demand” and it has remained the basic approach now in this sub-discipline for almost a century (Mauss, 1925). It appears that economic anthropologists are co-dependent on the discipline of economics and that rather than create something new, they simply offer a theoretical rebuttal to the economists’ abstract definitions, such as those of “value”, by suggesting that material “values” are
insufficient descriptions of the complexity of motivation. Major debates in the sub-discipline are centered not on the new predictive models developed by economic anthropologists as a social science, or on what kinds of societies are possible, desirable and the pathways of achieving them. Instead, the debates are on philosophy, in rebuttal to the religious and ideological assumptions of economists on “value,” and on economic frameworks and their applicability, with attempts to update some of the critiques made by Marx and apply them to current processes of globalization. Most of my colleagues in economic anthropology offer new labels, a new jargon (rather than the mathematics and equations of economics) but little else.


For most of its history, economic anthropologists defined themselves in relation to the other, more influential discipline (Wilk, 1996), either using neoclassical theories and concepts in the study of traditional economies, or arguing that these were inadequate in explaining the economic behavior of people in traditional societies. This was the key issue in the polemic debate between substantivists and formalists that dominated economic anthropology from the late 1950s to the early 1970s.

There is no need here to try to unravel the debate between the “substantivists” and “formalists” other than to note again that it was not in the context of either social science or culture critique, but a diversion from both.

Today, economic anthropology, much like many other disciplines, is defined not by disciplinary question, hypotheses, and human needs, by a specific narrow methodology and an area in which the methodology is used without any mention of objectives or role. In anthropology, the method is “ethnography” or participant observation; qualitative recording of data. It is “empirical” but it is blind and not scientific because it reports and pontificates instead of doing hypothesis testing and comparison. The area of economic anthropology is “economic institutions and behavior” (Platner, 1989). Similarly, while studying urban societies and some economic questions within them, sociology today defines itself in its use of “questionnaires”. By definition, an economic anthropologist seeking to use questionnaires or looking at demographic or environmental data or consumption data to gain a picture of the holistic economic reality of a society, is defined outside of the discipline, while an intern in a soup kitchen writing a diary or an anthropologist recording attitudes about the potato in Russia or sugar cane in the tropics or the tin mines in Bolivia is considered an “economic anthropologist.”

These are no longer scientific approaches and do not apply the scientific method. Much as with economics, a specific methodology in economic anthropology has come to create the impression of a science but without the actual scientific method. Here, the method used by anthropologists – ethnography – is empirical but it lacks the essential elements to distinguish it from journalism (Duncan, 2012). The social science methodology of hypothesis testing, comparison, and experimentation has been stripped away. So has the idea of social modeling that was the basis of ethnography; the idea of writing an “ethnography” that viewed a culture (an “ethnic group”) in its whole and sought to reveal its workings by showing the links between various sub-systems.

Some sciences and social sciences isolate variables and look at causal relations and/or feedback relations. Others analyze systems and show the relationship between different functional components as they model those systems. In the past, ethnography was invented as a way of doing a systems analysis and then using the model of each system to provide data for making comparisons of specific variables (how climate might drive certain cultural choices) and for culture critique (to question whether certain systemic relationships and the conditions driving and allowing them, could be generated in another society and weighing their desirability). Anthropology and economic anthropology have now so circumscribed the methodology and so stripped away the context that it does little more than generate written data in the form of journalism, or even just journals (diaries or blog).
How Economic Anthropology Derailed Itself

Reading the history of economic anthropology is much like reading the history of economics. It appears that similar political pressures and cultural realities are operating in parallel in a kind of mirror imagery. While anthropology as a whole began to question the use of social science for imperialism and established standards and critiques of imperialism that were also reflected in the critiques that economic anthropology made of economics, the discipline also dismantled itself as a social science in ways that defanged any real challenges to the societies in which anthropologists worked. As the discipline of economics became an ideology to serve and legitimize power and to prevent scientific inquiry and challenge, economic anthropology voiced challenges but made itself innocuous and irrelevant by dismantling its own scientific inquiry, development of alternative models, and use of tools to try to achieve real change. By agreeing to be part of a debate, it essentially assured the authority of the (more powerful and well connected) system it claimed to be criticizing. Indeed, the criticism, itself, sent the message that economics and the powers it represented were in control and that little real alternatives existed. A real challenge would have treated the discipline of economics as a charade, replaced it with something of value, and used the tools of a real economic social science and engineering, combined with visions of alternatives, to try to achieve those visions.

Much like the history of economics that reinforces an ancestral lineage of an ideology that starts in the West and in the Church, the histories that have been published of economic anthropology, such as those of Hart and Hann, are written as examples of patronage networking and ancestor worship (2007). They list those who consider themselves part of the club, but avoid starting with the questions for the sub-discipline that need to be explored and the models that need to built and asking who does it, where, and why, and what progress has been made on the discipline’s agenda. In histories and textbooks of natural science, one finds the questions of the discipline and the story of experiments and building blocks in those areas, with some explanations of how failures led to the breakthrough experiments, laws, and theories which followed. In economic anthropology and in economics, much like the history of religious scholarship, one finds simply a linear retelling of arcane debates by those self-selected over time within the disciplinary order. The histories go nowhere other than recounting the agendas created by those with power. Similar to contemporary politics; the debate creates its own false reality and values rather than respond to a scientific agenda to answer fundamental questions about processes and change.

With some exceptions in the 1940s such as Herskovitz’s, Economic Anthropology: The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples (1940) and partly by works that still followed this line for about a generation after like Marshall David Sahlins’ Evolution and Culture (1960) and Stone Age Economics (1974), there was an initial attempt to establish a comparative science of economics that compared and contrasted economies using a number of different variables and structures. These served some of the scientific goals of a science of economics as well as moral comparisons and visions (ideas of leisure, distribution, cooperation and community). But, even by the time of Sahlins, they were already plunging back into theoretical debates over value and meaning in exchange relationships and away from understanding and predicting processes and adaptations.

Even before the contemporary movement to transform anthropology into simply story telling and away from social science, it had already turned to theory and away from science and challenge. One anthropologist has suggested that was an attempt to protect anthropological work from ever being used by empires again, as it already was being used at the time Sahlins wrote, by the post-World War II European empires of the U.S., France, Soviet Russia, and others, to use Native Peoples as Cold War pawns (Duncan, 1992). In Duncan’s view, anthropologists saw themselves as powerless to confront and try to change their own societies and decided it was best to destroy the discipline lest its fruits come into the hands of those with power, as seemed inevitable. Anthropologists could still have tried to create a moral social science that would challenge power in overall long-term human interests. They could have tried to demonstrate the value of an economic social science in improving quality of life and sustainability in much the way sociologists continued to demonstrate the economic futility of investments in prisons, war
and control systems, rather than education and freedom (at least until that discipline was transformed in the 1990s into one serving prosecutors, “criminologists,” wealthy interests manipulating jury systems, advertising, and political processes), but they did not.

Some anthropologists did make major efforts to collect and standardize data in what was the beginning of a major scientific initiative in the profession. Certainly, this data could have been used by economic-anthropologists as the basis for building a predictive social science. Though not complete, Human Relations Area Files still keeps records of kinship systems, geography and land use patterns, distribution, ritual exchanges, and production for a number of cultures, using information collected and standardized by anthropologists. Using such a basis, anthropologists could model how economic systems worked on the basis of environment and production, needs for labor and risks of labor, and on other economic questions. Yet, anthropologists have failed to use them for systematizations that would be used for the modeling of cultural clusters as economic systems and for revealing of mechanisms using the different kinds of models existing in the sciences. Anthropological models rely less on correlations and statistical models and more on what Levi-Strauss called “structural models,” that can partly be analogized to Gregor Mendel’s genetic tables for expression of dominant and recessive genes, and system models of linkages and feedback relations. Indeed, the standard anthropology textbook is still written like an illustrated dictionary that lists examples of various social and cultural forms by category but that makes no attempt at synthesis that would link these forms to specific conditions that would allow for predictions of where they would be found, or that would model how they transform in response to certain changes in conditions.

Without these models, anthropologists also failed in applications to contemporary societies, where the benefits of an economic social science would have been demonstrated and would have reinforced the value of such study. When Frank Knight challenged economic anthropologists who were studying primitive societies, by suggesting that small, non-industrial societies could NOT be compared with industrial societies, he may have triumphed over economic anthropologists for the wrong reasons (1941). Anthropologists studying “primitive societies” did compare them to each other and used their findings as a cultural critique, but they didn’t develop scientific models that would extend their findings to industrial societies for predictive purposes. They certainly could have modeled sustainability, abuses of power, cyclic behavior, hierarchies, and other phenomenon and could have created predictions. But, they did not. In part, they may have lacked the skills to do such study. In part they may have been bullied to avoid or not publish such study. In part, they may have simply faced turf battles with sociology, that defined itself as studying complex societies, and that created a split that worked to prevent real comparisons. Whatever the cause, economic anthropologists stopped dead rather than actually find predictive laws and develop the real skills to explain empires and industrial economies. They did their individual ethnographies and became experts on “their” “tribes,” but stopped short of using the scientific method to generate conclusions and predictive models.

As one recent economic anthropology text describes it, anthropologists distorted their agenda in studying small societies so that they were simply serving ideological goals rather than those of science. Though they were looking to show that other human alternatives existed, they weren’t active in looking at models of how large societies could actually transition but simply assumed the same causality as the Church, that humans could choose systems without exploring the real causal relations between the environment and human systems. As Hart and Hann explain it, “The purpose of economic anthropology, when still known as ‘the economics of primitive man’, was to test the claim that a world economic order must be founded on capitalist principles. The search was on for alternatives that might support a more just economy, whether liberal, socialist, anarchist or communist. Hence the interest in origins and evolution, since society was understood to be in movement and had not yet reached its final form” (2007).

In adopting the Church’s approach to causality, economic anthropology also implicitly accepted the Church and political establishment’s refutation of Darwin that had in fact been the mainstay of physical anthropology! In looking at “primitive societies” and differentiating them from industrial societies by suggesting that there were no laws applying to both, economic anthropology reinforced the idea of linear
evolution that undermines the discipline’s moral premise of cultural relativism and equality due to adaptive radiation. Economic anthropologists began to reinforce the idea of historical progression from hunting and gathering, agriculture and state formation, to “modern” industrial societies, with discontinuities between these.

What partly seems to have happened is that in the interests of criticizing economics, many economic anthropologists began to champion Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels, rather than develop their own economic science. Yet, Engels’ The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884) draws heavily on Lewis Henry Morgan’s Ancient Society (1877), and Marx’s work continues the idea of linear evolution of economic and political systems.

Where they now do work that has some attribute of science, economic anthropologists today are continuing to react to the discipline of economics rather than build social science. One widely heralded recent work among economic anthropologists, for example, is the “cross-cultural application of game theory” (Henrich et. al., 2004). What economic anthropologists like Heinrich now do is simply take the assumptions of economics (like rational wealth-maximization) and test them in other cultures to see if they hold. While that might generate the evidence that helps in a trial of economists for adhering to doctrines that violate international law, even when there is proof that they are erroneous, it does little to build economics as a social science. Yet, Hart and Hann herald it as, finally, an attempt to return to a “19th century agenda” and to “build bridges to economists and biological anthropologists.” Indeed, for the first time in more than half a century, it has enabled anthropologists to begin to publish in major economic journals (Hart and Hann, 2007). This explanation of hierarchy (why would anthropologists desire to publish in economic journals, and not vice versa?) may explain the motivating factors behind the failure of economic anthropology to do anything more than this.

Similar cross cultural comparisons beyond “theories of value” and motivation, are whether markets and money are universal, and how “exchanges,” consumption and private property are defined and designed. These have supplanted the search for laws of economic organization that were descriptive and predictive and kept the sub-discipline at a level of religious debate over starting assumptions and definitions. There have been philosophical arguments about “human nature” and its moral basis (Wilk and Cliggett, 2001) with critiques of theories but no synthesis of laws of cultures.

Though they claim to be driven by morality, economic anthropologists have largely failed to extend their critique to action. After almost a century of critique, some economists have now started to recognize the absurdity of their assumptions and to seek to add in “culture” (in what they call “community” or “social capital”) to try to resurrect their models. Anthropologists already had the real variables to describe the failure of economic models. Kinship and male dominance and grouping behaviors can explain corruption, but economic anthropologists did not offer the model. Fear of the “other” and definitions of identity can explain hierarchy and military spending as well as why current aspects of sustainable development and globalization are failing (Lempert and Nguyen, 2011) but such a simple relationship took decades to appear in academic literature. Relations between environment and political and economic choices that show that ideologies are the dependent variable and not the independent, explain the Russian and U.S. economies (Lempert, 1995), but this remains outside of economic anthropology. So do Malthusian and neo-Malthusian models of political economy, and many others.

Much of modern economics is ritual and pseudo-science with mythical beliefs about “free choice” and causality. Economic anthropologists have partly recognized the “primitive magic” at work in modern societies, but their approach has been their own form of doctrine, jargon, and primitive magic in return, in the very same type of university structures that also come out of the Church (Lempert, Briggs, et. al., 1995). Economists work with a limited range of variables – money, government spending, interest rates, taxes, regulation, investments, and simply measure the different impacts on other variables – employment, production, “satisfaction,” wealth, that have largely distracted attention from the reality of the collapse and unsustainability of modern economies. Economic anthropology had the chance to offer the alternatives with clear predictions and solutions. They had the chance to reveal the deep structures of
the failed systems and to begin to experiment and model transformative change. Works that tried, even within anthropology, were largely ignored and that sub-discipline has also failed.

**How and Why Anthropology as a Whole an Economic Anthropology as a Sub-Field, Failed to Fill the Role of Economic Social Science or Moral Ideology**

In a short analysis, it is difficult to distinguish the socio-economic, individual psychological and institutional forces that prevented anthropologists from building an effective social science challenge to economics and to other disciplines that failed to fulfill their roles. It appears, however, that the same social forces that worked to distort economics would have also been at work on other disciplines within the same university system, even if they claimed to hold to different beliefs. One can probably analyze the discipline of anthropology in terms of its funding and political power and conclude that it simply didn’t have the chance to offer a real challenge and that its members chose an opportunistic solution that appeared to offer a challenge while also protecting their careers or that they chose to use the discipline in what they thought (rightly or wrongly) was the “best” way to offer any challenge at all.

In some cases, anthropologists may have chosen to neuter the discipline in the belief that this was the best way to protect peoples who might be harmed by the science and technology they were creating (Duncan, 1992). Some may have believed that direct challenges to authority were futile and that it was still moral and possible to make a difference by confronting ideology and writing stories. That may be a delusion that contradicts some of the very principles of anthropology and social change, but without anthropology as a science teaching those concepts, perhaps the discipline’s practitioners really believed the ideology they substituted. Perhaps the discipline even began to attract those who were running from economics and other disciplines and simply sought a haven to exist.

Today, there are two clear taboos in anthropology that denigrate scientific explanations and also reinforce the Church’s attack on Darwin in doing so. Both are presented as “moral” objections and probably reflect a fear in how science is used that has led to a fear and purge of science altogether. They involve issues of biological differences in gender (the reality of “sexual dimorphism”) that women’s bodies are smaller and that there are also differences in male and female brains, and biological differences in race that mean that different ethnic groups have adapted to different environments. These are obvious results of evolution and they have important implications for economics. Bodies have genetically adapted to different economic functions. Yet, today, in a society that wants to promote equality in competing for all economic positions, there is a political desire to suppress the reality of biological differences and to assert that biological advantages and liabilities do not exist such that anyone can fill any position in modern industrial society. Of course, biological differences do not imply discrimination and harm, but the reality anthropologists see is that favored groups use evidence of difference to reinforce their advantages rather than to compensate for those differences in ways that promote equality and individual (or group) satisfaction. By suppressing the use of science, economic anthropologists and anthropologists suppress research on biological differences and, they believe, thus better protect their political interests. So, paradoxically and ironically, they ally with the Church, the institution that has promoted gender discrimination and racial discrimination, to suppress science in the belief that science, a system based on objective merit, will be used to support subjectivity and inequality. A better explanation for this apparent contradiction may be that despite what they may say about morality, economic anthropologists and anthropologists in general may be in direct alliance with economic power in a way that offers them personal benefit.

Perhaps, the discipline was also co-opted like economics, by political and economic pressures that rewarded members of the discipline for creating the illusion of reform and challenge while actually doing nothing to advance it, while driving out anthropologists who sought to do more. The placement of economic anthropology in anthropology departments today itself suggests that this may be the case. While study of economics is fundamental to understanding living and extinct cultures and remains central to archaeology and physical anthropology, two of anthropology’s sub-disciplines, that study the material
culture and survival of humans and pre-humans in the past, it is largely peripheral to studies of living cultures. The part of anthropology devoted today to the study of living cultures is called “social and cultural” anthropology and it largely focuses on the social and cultural aspects of cultures that are merchandized as part of globalization rather than those parts that would see cultures as independent, sustainable, integral wholes with rights of existence. The study of dance, food, music, art, religion, folklore and “identity” of assimilating and disappearing cultures is the central part of the discipline while the study of their economies, their political systems (political anthropology), and their legal systems (legal anthropology) are de-emphasized or distorted. This seems to be a deliberate attempt by anthropology, itself, to marginalize resistance to globalization under the New World Order and to promote acceptance of assimilation into it. Culture itself is only identified by its remaining attributes that can be turned into economic products – ethnic restaurants, dance performances, art and music – without any assertion of fundamental rights that would challenge globalization and commodification of peoples. Thus, even the name for the sub-discipline no longer protects the ideas of cultures as functional wholes with their own land, economies, and political and legal systems but merely as high cultural artistic forms and social forms in the system of empires in which economists have high positions.

This may also be the reason why anthropology has failed to “study up” and include comparisons of behaviors of elites and their organizations, as well as of the real functioning of large societies, in direct comparisons with native peoples (Nader, 1982). Even the full editorial board of one of the leading journals in political anthropology recently worked to censor pieces that look at how industrial societies are “converging” in their political practices and denying rights. While laws openly allow for free speech of citizens to write about elites, the journal reversed the discipline’s very protections designed to protect the victims of globalization and elites and sought to use them to target the author of such comparisons. They claimed that writing about elites must include their informed consent (a misstatement of actual public law of free speech of citizens in writing about public officials) and they refused to protect the identities of informants on elite behaviors would not be protected (an attempt to put authors writing about elites and their families in direct risk of retaliation by elites, also in denial of the association’s ethics code).

Today, anthropology has largely become one of the disciplines used by the university for political purposes in hiring; offering an outlet for feminism, minorities, and gays to affirm their identities and for universities to appear to be meeting diversity pressures without any major transformation of disciplines or society. Purged scholars during the Cold War who critiqued economics and other disciplines (including those who taught the works of Marx) may have burrowed into anthropology as a way to hide in the same way that it serves as a collective of feminists, minorities and poets, today.

Whatever their individual reasons, the results in the discipline are also visible in terms of skills and abilities. One reason anthropology today does not accept science and does not offer a vision for industrial economies may simply be because the people now admitted and attracted to the discipline do not have the aptitude and are not encouraged to develop the skills that would enable them to analyze the complexities of modern systems. Though archaeologists and physical anthropologists often come with scientific and technical backgrounds and/or develop them in their training, social and cultural anthropologists who study and teach economic anthropology rarely combine their study of anthropology with any technical training in business, marketing, finance, management, accounting, statistics, engineering, environmental biology, materials sciences, or any other tools that would enable them to effectively analyze the transfer and use of resources that comprise the material and biological basis of economic systems. Nor do they have the training in the modeling of systems or the quantitative methodologies that would enable them to make effective analysis and comparisons of complex economic systems. The “experts” in economic anthropology blindly enter economic institutions and write poetry about their feelings or criticize the obvious without really knowing or understanding what is going on in the systems they are observing. They are left focusing on how workers are treated, on the intimate stories of human relations in organizations that are not really relevant to the deeper structure of the system, or how consumption is
fetishized, in ways that make what they see exotic but that offer no real comparative study of human economic systems. They are left with little other than journalism.

In some ways, the sub-discipline simply abandoned its potential and knowingly chose a political, ideological agenda of opposing the contemporary industrial system without being clear on what could be reformed or how. As one of the recent leading textbooks in economic anthropology describes it,

In Capital, Marx (1867) expressed humanity’s estrangement from the modern economy by making abstract value (money) the principle organizing production, with the industrial revolution (machines) as its instrument and people reduced to the passive anonymity of their labour power. Marx’s intellectual effort was aimed at reversing this order and that remains our priority today. (Hart and Hann, 2007)

Meaningless dualistic moral debates drive out any space for real change. They create the illusion of opposition without any real action or content. In many societies, debates are frames in terms of a contrived duality that presents entrance of alternative views and impedes any real action. The “opposition” argument may be a straw man for protecting the system as it is, or it may be used to create fear of change in that it offers something unreasonable or frightening. In some cases, it may simply offer a parallel version of what exists that partly rotates with another alternative to create an illusion of “change” that is really just a rotation of similar alternatives. It appears that economic anthropologists may have agreed to serve in this social role in ways that reinforced economics rather than offered real opposition.

Other New Disciplines, Filling the Gap?:
Human Geography, Human Ecology and Others:

It seems as if new university departments are being created every day in areas like “Peace and Conflict Studies,” “Women’s/Gender Studies,” “Human Ecology,” “Environmental Policy,” “Globalization Studies,” “Politics and Economics of Industrial Societies,” “Ethnic Studies,” “Nationality Studies,” “Colonial Studies,” “Sustainability Studies,” geographic area studies, and many more. None of them really claim to be “social sciences” (or claim really to be anything in the overall scheme of human knowledge and disciplinary approaches) though they do claim to be filling missing gaps or responding to perceived demands or needs. Some do come out of sciences and see themselves as professional or engineering disciplines (such as the energy efficiency components of Sustainability Studies), offering Masters of Science degrees. As new areas, they offer the potential to evolve into competition for failed social sciences elsewhere. Yet, for now, most of these seem to be ad hoc political additions to universities that address disciplinary failures by offering symbolic courses that represent specific ideologies or interest groups rather than seek to fundamentally correct the distortion of the social sciences. Like economic anthropology, they are subject to similar forces that seem to transform any fundamental challenge into just rhetorical responses. Though some do address some of the missing issues and approaches of economics, few seem to really be filling the gap for a social science of economics or a humanistic economics. In some cases, they may actually be making it harder to rebuild social sciences by continuing the fragmentation process that occurred with economics splitting with political science and with sociology splitting off of anthropology. Taking disciplines that started with holistic, systems views of human societies or of individual humans and began to split off and extract the variables, as economics did with political science and demographics and as women’s studies now does with gender and area studies does with ethnicity, makes it more difficult to look at processes and relationships and to build predictive, explanatory models.

Perhaps the closest to the different missions of economics are “Human Geography” and “Human Ecology,” which are bringing issues of sustainable development and relationship between societies and the natural environment to the forefront and that do seem to look at human societies in somewhat of a contextual, systems approach. Rather than split off particular variables for a political emphasis, they seek
to add in basic natural variables (geography and species) and to then examine economic systems. Both of these new departments (or sub-departments) are found in many universities and have their own journals. Part III returns to the larger context of the organization of the social sciences and humanities – or human knowledge into disciplines – to look systematically at what is missing and where rebuilding can occur. Here, Part II concludes by briefly looking at what these two sub-disciplines appear to do and whether they are or can be a place for the rebuilding (or replacement) of economics as a discipline.

The evolution and fit of these two sub-disciplines, “Human Geography” and “Human Ecology” is interesting because they are evidence of a disciplinary branching rather than strict approach to formalizing knowledge and inquiry. Geography fits somewhere among the natural sciences between physics and chemistry as an application of both to this planet, as part of the planetary sciences with planetary Geology. Similarly, Ecology is an extension of the natural science of biology. Both arise in parallel but not together to look at parts of earth; one at the face of the surface and its inorganic base and then the other at the biological systems that emerge on top of that geography. Both then independently add the human dimension on top of the layers they are studying.

Human geography maps humans onto landscapes and human ecology inserts humans as one of the species in a biological system. From there, the aspects of economics that are noted within each of these sub-disciplines are the type of economies on the geography and the impact of the economies on the ecosystems. Both of these kinds of studies are, of course, parts of economics that are missing from economics. They are real world, empirical economics in terms of relations to physical variables and to biological systems.

Yet, because of the way both disciplines phrase questions and work within subsets of larger studies, they are unlikely and unable to reconstruct economics as a predictive social science in all of its various elements, or as a humanities imagining the types of economies and their political and distributional elements that are possible, and how to achieve them. They are unlikely to discuss psychological factors or place economics in the holism of culture.

Human geography seems to be more concerned with demographic mapping that shows where humans live by different classifications on different geographies than looking at predictions of cultural forms that develop and how they change on particular landscapes. Much of the work today focuses on spatial patterns on land rather than the explanations of how and why certain types of human societies can be expected to be found under specific conditions. That kind of “mapping humans onto the terrain” was originally one of the goals of anthropology that could have ended up in economic anthropology but did not. Human geography does not currently fill that gap and is not likely to do more, but it could serve as a place for scholars who are seeking to do this in a way that anthropology currently seems unable or unwilling. One human geographer, for example, Jared Diamond, essentially takes archaeological and anthropological data of human societies in vulnerable geographic environments and tries to determine some of the factors that have led to collapse of their economies and of their cultures (Diamond, 2005). But he may be the exception to the rule and his work also focuses on the geography and human impact on the environment rather than on how cultural practices actually work to collapse or protect economies, or on how results could be predicted.

Human ecology addresses one of the fundamental questions of economics that follows on Malthus – the “carrying capacities” (maximum human populations) in different environmental niches with different technologies, and also includes measures of human energy usage within those environments (Ehrlich, Ehrlich, and Holdren, 1973; Hardin, 1993; Schumacher, 1973). It also moves partly into areas of zoology and genetics to look at some basic concerns of human adaptation and community (Hardin, 1977). Yet, it also appears to appear to avoid the predictive and developmental questions of human cultures that are missing from economics as well as other key economic questions that one would expect to be part of this discipline, such as the co-evolution of humans with different species (e.g., the domestication and co-evolution of humans with wolves/dogs and felines/cats) and the rise of different types of economies, though it may be partly moving in this direction (Brown, 2004). Its focus is largely limited to that of “sustainability” measures of populations as ways to engineer them appropriately to their environment,
which is a technological application of economics that could certainly supplement what is really now a
discipline of “national production engineering” that doesn’t address whether that productivity is in
balance with a particular environment and consumption pattern (cultural choice). But it lacks the social
science questions of prediction and change (Arrow, et. al., 1995).

Human ecology is partly a response to and an extension of economics, complementary to
environmental and social accounting that have been adjustments to economic growth measures (measures
of “externalities”) but that don’t ask the larger questions about sustainability, cultural choice of
consumption and production patterns, and how they develop and change. The result on economics itself
has been to simply adjust current measures with additions like “natural capital” and “social capital”
without changing the ideology or approach. Kenneth Boulding (1970) and Herman Daly and Joshua
Fairly (2003), with their “index of sustainable economic well-being,” following William Nordhaus’
“measured economic welfare index” (2000), have been among the pioneers here in trying to refine
growth accounting to incorporate environmental measures of various types, though the approach is
limited to measurements rather than to changes in approach. Other indicators continue to appear that
more fully incorporate externalities and social costs into measures of economic growth, such as the
“Genuine Progress Indicator” used in the U.S. State of Maryland (2011). Though economists still don’t
accept measurements that would challenge their doctrinal beliefs and accept different cultural preferences
(such as Bhutan’s “Gross National Happiness” indicator), there seems to be an attempt to merge or co-opt
the human ecology approach before it would challenge economics and become an economic social
science and a humanities raising additional moral questions about distribution, choice, hierarchy, and
change among human and other biological populations. Overall, human ecology goes beyond
environmental economics to use a systems dynamics approach to model economies within environments,
though it stops there.

More recently, some of the frustration with economics has led scholars to try to create new names for
human ecology approaches that would encourage economics to start with these perspectives and perhaps
to rebuild economics. There is a movement called “economology” (and other attempts at “econology”) to
try to create an economics of ecology, starting in the other direction from economics. Thus far, these
seem to be human ecology by a different name, under economists, rather than a coherent attempt to
rebuild economics from first principles of social science and humanities.

It seems clear that a more systematic approach to recreating the discipline of economics. These
approaches thus far are offering important work that is missing. One can’t really expect existing scholars
to start from first principles and recreate something outside of their knowledge and comfort zones based
on a template and a schedule. To do that, someone needs to offer first principles, establish categories,
outline the kinds of questions and problems that can be addressed in those categories, and attract the next
generation of scholars by demonstrating the importance and logic of particular work and by inspiring and
encouraging it among those entering a discipline in transition, with the excitement, opportunity, challenge
and risk that it brings.

In fact, in starting from first principles, it becomes clear that that there actually is quite a bit of
material already that has been produced that could fit into a new discipline of economics, but it is not easy
to find. Some of it is indeed in Human Geography, in Human Ecology, in Economic Anthropology, and
on the margins of economics, itself. Other work is in demographics, in biology (animal behavior and
particularly primate study, and genetics), architecture and design, energy studies, urban planning, political
science, sociology, history, and area studies. The moral approach of economics, that is not social science
but that can work with it, can be found in the humanities like philosophy and fiction (particularly science
fiction of imagined worlds and their economic and political-economic systems). The problem is that it
has not been collected into any discipline and where it appears it bears the stamp of the discipline
promoting it rather than a link to economics. There is certainly much more than any one scholar,
certainly including the author of this piece, can possibly be aware of and have the chance to collect, given
the need to be versed in so many disciplines and to have the time and inclination to follow the literature.

Trying to establish this framework is the task of Part III.
In applying to various programs in law, business, and anthropology in the 1980s and 1990s and then teaching in these fields and in other social sciences, it was clear that the disciplines offering the highest salaries (the professions) attracted students with the highest aptitudes for quantitative analysis, logic and systems thinking. They also attracted more highly motivated and competitive students. Students studying in anthropology are not chosen for analytical or mathematical or scientific abilities or aptitude, nor do they express any interest in such critical thinking. They are largely attracted by the chance to write or film, and particularly to think about and proclaim their own identities.

[Editor’s note. See some of the other articles in this issue for specifics.]
IS ECONOMICS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?
REMAKING ECONOMICS AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE

Part III
The Rebuilding Process for the Discipline:
Where Economics Fits and What is Missing

DAVID LEMPERT, PH.D., J.D., M.B.A., E.D. (HON.)

Introduction to Part III

Perhaps one might ask whether the world is better off without economics at all and should just dismantle it, put its high priests behind bars or at least retrain them for something useful for which they may be suited like mathematics, though some critics of the discipline even disparage its mathematics. Given that the discipline has caused so much harm, maybe should transform itself into something innocuous like the poetry and story-telling that has now become the mainstay of anthropology (Duncan, 2012). Or perhaps, they should be left to their own prescriptions, to find non-existent work in the global economy while relying on the miracle of “the market”.

Economists have claimed they could make work life easier, increase human health and happiness, promote peace and higher pursuits (paradoxically, science and morality), safeguard and increase wealth and harmony with existing resources. They claimed they could predict business cycles, smooth depressions and disruptions, stimulate innovation, adaptation, and diversity. Even though they may have lost sight of all of these and replaced them with benefits for a few, all of these questions remain, along with many others about the kinds of economic distribution and security that are possible, the process of transferring resources away from war and to peace, and of balancing human needs with nature, and others. Simply because a discipline has turned to criminality does not mean that it cannot be rebuilt to answer those fundamental questions and to develop those technologies that it originally claimed it would offer and that fill an important social role in building a better world.

The U.S. has been the center of the discipline of economics for most of the past century, following leadership in the field from Britain. It has been a field that developed and served two empires, the second of which is now collapsing. It appears that the global system that economists promoted may also be collapsing. Now is the time to create a new, rebuilt economic discipline that is not U.S. centric or culture bound and that will not similarly become a tool of the next rising economic and military super power looking to justify the harms it creates by claiming them as promoting human well-being. For a sustainable human future it is important to create an economic discipline that is an empirical and predictive social science applicable for a wide variety of circumstances where humans live and adapt together. It is important to create an economics that predicts global economic crises and offers theories of real social change that can help transform societies to deal with crises rather than one that creates crises and refuses to predict them out of self-interest of its members.

Part III offers a new framework for a scientific discipline of economics to replace the current discipline’s roles of “national production engineering,” religious belief and political ideology to promote economic interests of elites in industrial market systems. This part discusses the roles that economics can play as a technology for sustainable development in protection of human diversity, the place that it can address political concerns like equity, and the area in which it can support universal legal principles and raise other humanistic questions without serving as doctrine or dogma. Alongside it, Part III offers a
suggestion for rebuilding a complementary “humanities” of economics that acts to invigorate and hold the social science accountable to moral concerns.

The process for rebuilding economics is one that must also go beyond this single discipline given that other social sciences have developed in reaction to economics and in response to similar influences and pressures. To do so, Part III maps the social sciences, the technical training of social engineering, and the “moral” social philosophic/ “humanities” roles of these disciplines to see where economics really fits and what is missing. It returns to the goals of the social sciences and humanities in terms of their areas of analysis and questions for individual disciplines and then offers a new framework for a scientific discipline of economics and a new humanities of economics linked with it. The approach that this piece offers – of economics as an empirical social science for prediction -- links measures of consumption, production and distribution to biological and ecological principles. In doing so, it replaces the current starting assumptions that are culturally biased “moral precepts.” It moves the discipline forward, beyond its position within industrial market systems where it serves as an ideological and technical tool to promote economic interests of elites in those systems.

Overview of the Rebuilding Process:
Mapping the Social Sciences, Social Engineering and Social Philosophy Disciplines

In rebuilding economics in its various appropriate roles as outlined in Part II, it is wise to start by thinking about categories of academic disciplines in general, how they relate to each other and what they are designed to do. Though the word “economics” dates back to the ancient Greeks, the modern history of social science disciplines is so relatively new and with so many redefinitions and re-establishment of boundaries and methodologies that it makes sense to start afresh and to re-imagine the very enterprise of establishing these disciplines in a process of rebuilding. Using logic and imagining all of the different social sciences together can create that fresh start by inductively and deductively “mapping” out the social science disciplines within the context of natural sciences and humanities.

Why start with this kind of classification approach, with the assumption that continues to be under attack that human knowledge can be extracted from nature in an orderly way? The answer is that, despite the difficulties of organizing knowledge and setting boundaries, the very idea of “disciplines” and collecting and advancing human knowledge relies on some kind of framework. Rather than avoid such discussion and to do the ordering subconsciously and then examine the results, it is worth stepping back and thinking about the tasks and boundaries. Scholars currently rely on language and historical traditions to establish categories and the result has been disciplines like economics and other social sciences going off track with little understanding of their purpose, their scope or their boundaries. While others call for creative and “pluralistic” challenges to economics that will redesign it, or offer “transition” models (Daly and Farly, 2003) branching in different directions, existing linguistic categories, institutional and bureaucratic customs, and limitations are likely to lead to approaches that again fail to fully meet the needs.

Science and “discipline” require putting information and experience into categories, asking clear questions in broad categories, specifying variables and building models that reveal relationships and build understanding within the scope of the enterprise of the discipline. This is “positivism” in its basic sense. Currently, disciplines are failing. Their results are trivial. The questions are small and of limited use. The variables are meaningless. The models are simplistic. The concept terms including the names used for the discipline and sub-disciplines are themselves filled with connotations and ideological meaning that trip up any real analysis. To progress, it is important to strip away what exists and go back to first principles and basic steps. It is important to return to studying small systems that are easy to test and where results are easy to collect and then rebuild from there.

Graduate student dissertations and professional research in social sciences and humanities today seem to be largely directed by research funds, much by narrow questions and low expectations of professions and journals, and often simply be random selection without any direction towards significant questions
that fit into larger scientific agendas or human needs. Unlike the natural sciences and mathematics that lay out specific agendas and not important unsolved problems waiting to be attempted, (Kuhn, 1970), it is rare to find research agendas in social sciences that list the theories waiting to be empirically tested and the specific problems that remain to be solved. Too often, research topics are selected as forms of journalism, with researchers picking a place or a topic or simply turning their existing employment into a case study for publication. Too rarely is there any attempt to start with an important, scientific research question and hypothesis, first, with wide applicability to different systems and contexts, followed by the selection of methodologies and search for appropriate data.

Economics needs to start with a wide scope of everything that may fit and also look at what has been fit elsewhere an why. The rebuilding of economics is not a process that can be limited to the discipline of economics, for a number of reasons. Not only have other social sciences developed in reaction to economics (and failed in similar ways in response to similar influences and pressures). Economics has itself split off some of its variables into other disciplines when it narrowed from political economy and philosophy. At the same time, much of what is economics appears in other disciplines, from ecology/biology and geography to demographics and sociology, though it is not recognized as “economics” to psychology and incentives (what today is called “behavioral economics”). In order to rebuild economics in its four potential social roles (the important roles of carrying out social science, applying it through technical training/social engineering, conceptualizing science, and promoting the “moral” social philosophic/“humanities” role of science), what follows below is the exercise of mapping economics and related disciplines to see which disciplines are doing what and what is missing. This is a first step to repackaging and rethinking the disciplines.

There are two approaches to such mapping, combining inductive and deductive reasoning. The inductive approach starts with the global view of human knowledge and study to suggest how knowledge in the social sciences might ideally be organized and where economics fits. The social science disciplines can be mapped to see what is currently happening in the different functional roles. Indeed, such maps should ideally present a full spectrum of predictive research questions and applied and parallel technology-policy as well as parallel humanities discipline to drive the science and technology and to consider both its potential and dangers.

1. Inductive Structuring of Scientific Knowledge, from a Global Perspective, Following Comte

One of the first attempts to try to systematize scientific knowledge, including both the natural and social sciences, dates back to the early and mid-19th century. This is about the time that Darwin was conducting his research and economics and other social sciences in Europe and the U.S. were defining themselves and often transitioning, radically. Auguste Comte, considered by some to have been the “father” of social science and first establishing sociology (in 1838), offered the first “hierarchy” of natural and social sciences. It offers a way to rethink what happened with economics and other social sciences before they emerged in their contemporary forms. With few contemporary attempts to explain the relationships of modern disciplines, including economics, in any real logic, it may be that Comte was the last scholar to really think through the appropriate ordering and relationship of the social sciences (Comte, 1853, 1865). Today, with boundaries largely defined by methodologies and subjects of study rather than level of analysis and research questions, perhaps it is no wonder that the challenges to economics are appearing in a confusing array of new disciplines and interdisciplinary study that seem to follow little logic. Perhaps Comte’s logic holds the key again to the basic building block in establishing and teaching all of the social sciences.

Comte’s hierarchy of natural sciences and social sciences is presented schematically in the table below with Comte’s original scheme in boldface and my elaborations included alongside it. It is relatively easy to follow simply by applying the “levels of analysis” approach to the different fields.

- Physics, the most basic level, studies the essence of matter and energy.
- Chemistry studies matter at the level of the elements and their combinations.
Biology studies the units of life at the cellular level, level of the organism, at the level of species and of eco-systems, though Comte doesn’t really differentiate this level. Note that astronomy and geology, the planetary and earth sciences, don’t appear on this table, though they are mostly levels of inorganic chemistry, also following physical principles. Nor do any technical or engineering fields appear here, since they are offshoots of basic sciences.

The jump from the basic sciences to the human sciences is not that clear since biology itself studies at different levels. Humans are a species and also a part of eco-systems and aren’t necessarily a linear level above all biology. Comte recognizes the jump and then essentially divides the study into two categories: study of the individual (psychology) and study of humans in natural groups of cultures and mass societies.

- At the lowest level is psychology, the study of the individual human. Though there are now behavioral sciences for study of other species, Comte is recognizing the complex brain functions of humans and determining that it merits a separate study and that the study of the individual as a unit is a level of complexity different from just biology.

- In moving to the next level and inventing “sociology,” Comte was essentially saying that all of the studies of humans at the level of society (and culture/community as the basic human group) could be grouped into a general level of analysis. Comte sought to unify history, economics and, from below, psychology into a single social science given the belief that the key for study was the level of analysis and not the specific “functions” or roles within that level, like politics and economics. So, before economic or social or political variables were split off in ways that prevented holistic study of humans in individuals or groups, Comte affirmed the value of holism.

It is probably here where most contemporary scholars give up on Comte, finding his classifications lacking clear enough boundaries and indisputable logic. Yet, the distinctions and levels of the natural sciences has been a relatively useful construct for thinking about scientific problems, even though there is a blurring at several levels (physical chemistry, bio-chemistry, and biophysics are examples, though they don’t negate the individual disciplines as cores for study). Psychology as a discipline has also become increasingly biological, chemical and physical in the study of brain functions and nerves, but in ways that also seem to draw on principles from the core disciplines in application at a different level, rather than denying the construct of the disciplines.

To try to fit modern concepts into Comte’s view of study by levels of analysis, I have made some additions to Comte’s table. My goal is to try to suggest those disciplines that still exist and that offer a transition between that natural sciences and Comte’s idea of a unified social science. Darwin had already published his major work in the 1850s, when Comte was also producing his major works. Though slightly later, Darwin’s work on the *Descent of Man*, 1871 and the *Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* in 1872 were attempts to start moving biology into social science. The discipline that now examines the link between animals and humans, individually and in groups, is “physical anthropology”, the biological (and cultural) evolution of primates to humans. So, for argument’s sake, it can be added as the most basic step of Comte’s table between psychology and the unified social science.

Since Comte also believed in unifying history with the social sciences, I also add the “scientific discipline of history” into this table. That discipline is “archaeology”, the study of the physical record of humans that establishes the history in the way that “physical anthropology” seeks to establish the earlier, pre-human history. Archaeology can be seen as the study of human social and cultural evolution and as the science of human history and social evolution. This differs from the literature or philosophy of that record which is much of the current discipline of history as “story” and ideology rather than testable science in a framework used for prediction. This study of human history (and prehistory) is also found today with “physical anthropology” in anthropology departments as part of attempts to study human societies holistically.

Probably the closest discipline to Comte’s idea of a unified social science that would serve as scientific modeling of cultural and social systems, was anthropology of the early and mid-20th century, that saw itself as an holistic discipline for the comparative and scientific study of all human groups and
their adaptation and evolution. It no longer does that today, for reasons described in Part II, but it was defined to originally serve that holistic role.

In order to make all of this easier to see in a picture of where several disciplines and sub-disciplines do fit together and in a hierarchy, it makes sense to just call things by what they are so that the relationships are clearer. “Physical anthropology” is really “Pre-Human Biology and Society”; the study of human evolution with both successes and failures. It examines of the evolutionary linkages between biology and modern humans. “Archaeology” is really the study of “Extinct Cultures and Physical Record of History of Living Cultures” as well as the study of their evolution. What today is called “social and cultural” anthropology” and that was the science of anthropology just a few decades ago, was really once the study of “Living Cultures” in all of their dimensions and in their evolution; not just social and cultural but also economic, political, legal, and other systems. By using these terms, it is possible to see the steps of science of cultures from the holistic study of pre-humans to the holistic study of extinct cultures to the holistic study of living cultures.

What Comte’s analysis suggests is that the remaining social science disciplines, other than psychology and “the unified social science for groups” that I have likened to mid-20th century anthropology, should be seen only as offshoots of a unified holistic social science and should be also approached in an holistic way. The branches of this unified social science that have today broken off into individual disciplines on their own – sociology, political science, and economics – could study the social, political, and economic institutions and functions of society/culture as part of the whole, and should not do so in isolation with just a division of variables that fragments them into individual isolated disciplines and then further fragments them even more with study of isolated variables (like “gender” or “area” or activities like “migration” that also break off today as individual disciplines). Before they are broken off with the focus on narrower and narrower questions or reporting, these disciplines (and then any sub-disciplines) need to start as subsystems that are part of the larger system, following the same levels of study as that of holism, starting with their places (e.g., the place of economics, politics and social institutions and questions) within physical anthropology, archaeology, and comparisons of different types of societies in the ways that anthropology originally set out to compare societies. That is quite a different approach to the current one that moves immediately to fragmentation, breaks up the whole, and creates entirely new hierarchies with detached and narrow sets of problems and information collection.

In looking at rebuilding all of the social sciences, together, in their appropriate sub-categories, it is also important to note what happened to sociology, itself, after the era of Comte, and how it actually broke off a chunk of economics. Several decades after Comte lived, at the end of the 19th century and early 20th century, the two scholars who are considered the “founders” of modern sociology erased Comte’s approach and brought key economic variables under the umbrella of sociology, where they have remained, in studies that may have started out as holistic but that led to fragmentation and allocation of questions in a way that was unsystematic. Durkheim’s classic work in “sociology” on “the Division of Labor in Society,” (1893), was essentially a look at the social aspects of economic production and its systematization, which began as holism but then seems to have led to the transformation of much of sociology to that of issues of economic inequality and segmentation in the labor force. Meanwhile, Weber’s “Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism,” (1904), linked religion and culture to a form of economic productivity in a way that also began holistically but that also paved the way for sociology to focus on economic relations. In defining itself as a discipline, sociology largely began to focus on production and later on incomes and social class (Mills, 1956) rather than on the actual holistic goal of how societies emerge to integrate or absorb human cultural groups into a larger whole and then to explore how societies then relate to each other. At the same time, sociology also began to add narrow studies of “social institutions” and questions that detached social relations from the whole, with concentration on deviance, socialization/education and age stratification, inter-ethnic relations (focusing mostly on status of individuals) in complex societies, and gender/family that are really the social institutions and aspects of society.
Both economics and sociology have also not only taken a set of variables onto themselves and a particular methodology in a retreat from the holism envisioned by Comte, but both have also sought to break themselves off from other disciplines in a way that would establish another level of analysis that runs counter to Comte’s logic. Comte did not differentiate between small human societies and complex or between agricultural and industrial. He did not suggest that they required a different level of analysis. But it is by this principle that sociology might appropriately split itself off from anthropology, that of collections of cultures at a more complex level. Instead, sociology has taken that study and has also taken the study of social institutions within the lower level of cultures/ethnic groups (!), thus confusing itself as a sub-discipline studying social institutions AND one studying only complex societies. Similarly, it is by this false division that economics has defined itself as dealing only with industrial societies rather than with all human cultures and their economies. By Comte’s principles, these disciplines need to be reorganized to end the confusion and gaps they have created.

Of course, there are still questions about how other subjects can fit into this table. How are mathematics, music, and human languages related to the sciences? Is linguistics as a cognitive science, an offshoot of psychology, with all of these then individual representations of brain functions that can be seen as offshoot disciplines in the same way that astronomy and geology are offshoots of sciences? Probably some kind of classification logic of that sort could fit into Comte’s table in that way. Assuming that those disciplines can logically fit into an expanded table and that such work can be left to others, I will move on, below, to try to complete a logic of social sciences that includes all of the appropriate roles for economics and for other social science disciplines.

**Comte’s Hierarchy (in bold) with Additions (non bold):**

| Anthropology as a **Social Science**  
| [Living Cultures and Scientific Modeling of their Systems]  
| with Social Science Branches of Economic Social Science, Political Science  
| Archaeology [Extinct Cultures and their Human Social and Cultural Evolution]  
| Physical Anthropology [Pre-Humans and their Human Biological Evolution]  
| Psychology  
| Biology  
| Chemistry  
| Physics  

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2. Structural Functional Analysis, with Interpretation

By taking Comte’s approach further and adding in the functions that specific disciplines like economics could serve as sub-disciplines under the holistic study of human cultures and societies, it is possible to reveal where there are gaps in economics and the other disciplines and to point out ways to fill those gaps in social science as a predictive science, applied social science/technology/social engineering, and humanities. This starting point for analysis is quite revealing. It isn’t perfect, since it rests on the assumption (subject to challenge) that societies (and cultures) can actually be viewed in terms of their social, political, and economic institutions and functions of such institutions. Since the named disciplines of sociology, political science, and economics that suggest the existence of these separate types of institutions and functions in cultures and societies, it is possible to use this as a starting point for examining these disciplines. This may not ultimately be the best way to start reorganizing all disciplines, but it offers an interesting perspective now on what has happened with economics as a discipline in ways that point to some logical alternatives for restructuring.

I start with Comte’s model of disciplines and expand his table to view the social sciences at the holistic level he envisioned and then assume that the “functions” of cultures and societies fit into at least three basic overall types that would fit specific disciplines (social, political and economic). I map out a table of social sciences to include these three sub-levels of:

- sociology (social institutions across all cultures and societies),
- political science/“poliitology” (political institutions across all societies), and
- economics/“oikonomology”/“econonomicology” (economic institutions across all cultures and societies).

Although no one today in anthropology or sociology is clarifying the different “functions” that exist in society and the kinds of structures or systems that they might represent, viewing this to be outdated along with Comte, in fact the social sciences (and humanities) implicitly rely on this kind of thinking about human groups (cultures and societies) even though they deny it. In the same way that biologists studying the cells of plants and animals and the bodies of humans and animals define their study into categories based on the different structures and functions they see repeatedly, across species, so does the same type of categorical thinking of structures and functions categorize the disciplines that focus on human individual and group behaviors. The discipline of biology offers an analogy to help think about these disciplines of human behavioral study. In biology, in looking at the body, different systems are studied that co-exist: the circulatory system of the heart, lungs and blood, the nervous system of the brain and nerves, the lymphic system for fighting disease, the skeletal and muscular system, co-exist. The study of human groups has implicitly worked in the same way and this is what has led to distinctions of economic, political and social and the disciplines that follow them. I will look for the places of these to put in a table, below.

In setting up the table, I use three columns using three parallel branches of learning next to each other:

- predictive (social) science (experimentation and modeling using the scientific method and comparisons where direct experimentation isn’t possible) filling the central column of the table,
- applied (social) science/engineering (application of scientific knowledge within specific contexts) on one side, and
- humanities/philosophy (value questions and epistemological questions relating to science and offering creative ideas and critiques) on another side.

Now that I have columns, I want to use the rows as places for different disciplines. The question is how to set up the rows given the difference between the ideal of different disciplines and the existing disciplines today. I want the table to show what should be ideally and then demonstrate where the disciplines are today and what is missing.

Above, I noted that anthropology and sociology are both potentially holistic disciplines studying human groups at the levels of culture/ethnic group (anthropology) and society/collections of cultures and
between cultures (sociology) and that there are also the three structures and functions within the whole: social structures, political structures and economic structures. So the table needs to be split into a set of rows for holism and then a set of rows for the structures and functions. So, how should I fill in the table?

Already, the definitions of the basic disciplines are problematic for the basic, central column of social science as well as for the humanistic study and for engineering/social engineering as well. For example,

- Is “Sociology” really the “scientific study of social institutions across all societies” or the “study of societies (complex groups of human cultures as a unified entity), as noted above?
- Is “Political science” really the right word for scientific study of all political institutions or just for the Greek concept of “polities” such as “city states”? Maybe that word also needs to be changed and split into several areas to fit.
- What word fits the scientific study of “Economics” and is the Greek idea of “oikos” and “nomos,” the study of “household” “laws/customs/management” of any relation to what the discipline is about given that it is really about production and consumption and that this is a “household” function only in some cultures?

It is easy to poke a bit of fun at the expense of anthropologists and the way they have already both criticized and reinforced the use of “structural functional” sub-disciplines and have done so in a way that creates a kind of mess. The confusion about where “economic anthropology” (as described in Part II) fits this table and what it is today, represents a contradiction (or hypocrisy) in the discipline, today, that itself would lead to calls for expansion of this table beyond economic, political and social systems if their current approach in the sub-discipline would need to be fit into this table. In my view it does not fit, as noted in Part II, because it does no predictive science, it does no applied social science and it offers no “thought experiments” with potential scientific questions that fit the appropriate role of a humanities discipline linked to social science and applied social science. Here is an explanation of this mess, to clear away this potential confusion before returning to a clear approach to filling in the table. Even though anthropologists today have thrown out the idea of “structural functionalism” (Malinowski, 1944) as a way to compare and study different cultures, as part of a contemporary bias against “science” and systematization, the reality is that they already do it themselves and know that maintaining a “discipline” demands it. This is how “economic anthropology” as well as “social anthropology” and “political anthropology” appeared. The confusion is that even in denying structural functionalism, anthropologists offer plenty of other subjects that also follow the same kind of functional logic and structures that they say don’t exist, well beyond these three. Among them, for example are “cultural anthropology” and “medical anthropology” that cover health systems and functions and cultural (i.e., “high cultural” functions and structures). But these do not fit together into a cohesive logic since, as described above, economic anthropology itself is mostly a reaction to what is going on in economics rather than an attempt to structure a comparative study of economies in different human groups. Moreover, rather than say they are studying “Living Cultures” with all of their functions as sub-topics, anthropologists studying living cultures say that they are doing “social and cultural anthropology.” But, how can they be really doing holistic study if they have renamed holism in terms of only two of its functions, social and cultural, and then classify economic and political functions somewhere below, along with “legal anthropology” and, somewhere off to the side, medical anthropology (the functions and institutions of health and body grooming)? This is a microcosm of the confusion that now exists for putting disciplines back together.

Rather than worry here about the actual final design of a full table of all of the social sciences that accurately divide or assign structures and functions that are found in human cultures, I limit the classification to economics and to the established disciplines that should be at a parallel level; sociology and political science, whatever the eventual names should be for these disciplines. If the table were extended to include other functions found in society beside social, political and economic, there might be a row for cultural studies and the social science of public health systems as well as possibly jurisprudence or legal science (here, on this table, I have included them as sub-sets of political institutions since law can
be seen as a part of governance, social control and politics), but these are just additions that add complication. For now, I leave these complications out of the table.

To make things easy, I use two different tables. The first one is offered as a reference point to show where economics fits. The second one concentrates entirely on the discipline of economics.

In the first table, I take the idea, above, of an overall holistic social science of “Living Cultures” (early 20th century “anthropology”) and then start the analysis of two of the main sub-levels, political science and sociology, in the central columns for social science. In filling in the table, I have decided to use regular print and bold where I think the subject of study currently exists and italics where I think that the social science that I name does not currently exist (!). Where a subject exists but its current name seems to hide what it actually does today, I have tried to “translate” the current name into an actual description of what I think that discipline or sub-discipline actually does, using underlining.

Here is what shows up in the center column of the table, in italics.

- There is no longer an holistic social science of anthropology that studies living cultures anymore, since anthropology has turned away from science in the study of living cultures. The only science now for anthropology is the study of extinct cultures and prehistoric humans, as described above.
- Similarly, there is no real “political science” at the sub-level of studies of politics, for similar reasons that there is no existing real science of economics.
- There is a bit of comparative science of sociology and this is why sociology is in bold and not italicized in the table. But since sociology now only studies urban systems and not the social institutions in all human groups, the table notes that missing area with italics.

From the central column, I move then to the right to see whether there is any technical, policy, or engineering discipline that corresponds to the social science. In fact, several of these technical and professional disciplines exist, even if the science behind them is weak or non-existent.

- There are emerging holistic planning disciplines, some of them including sustainable development planning.
- Anthropology itself has medical anthropology, which isn’t holistic but is one kind of technical application of anthropology that could also be considered part of public health science and applied public health, neither of which are shown on this table. “Applied anthropology” is not included in the table because it is difficult to see it as a specific discipline and is more just a use of anthropology for the ends of specific employers, rather than a profession or separate subject.
- Within political science, four technical applications are noted but only one of them, “public administration”, actually offers basic administrative skills in its teaching. The others are largely offering ideology in their teaching methods and content and the table uses underlining to offer a more direct restatement of what the subject actually teaches, next to the current euphemistic name of the discipline, in bold. For example, law schools today do not teach students how to advocate for justice, protect rights or establish efficient moral and sustainable systems. Instead, they teach application of rules and ideologies that maintain the established order, its ideologies and myths, and is renamed. International relations schools do not teach the skills of protecting peoples and sustainability in ways that reduce long term conflict and create a better world. They teach advocacy for the leaders of the countries in which the courses are offered along with rhetoric and excuses to protect that order. Political science today is largely the teaching of how to manipulate electoral processes, not how to achieve democracy, challenge power, create equity or promote long term rights or human interests, so it is also renamed to reflect its actually ideology and teaching. What is visible on this table is that political science is actually largely a discipline teaching ideology rather than a social science, and thus it is placed in the right column on the table while the central column for political science is filled only in italics with a speculative discipline that does not now exist.
The left column represents the functions of philosophy, morality, imagination and critique. Contemporary social and cultural anthropology, law, political science, and theology all contain elements of imagination, critique, and ideology. They aren’t really fulfilling the functions of helping to imagine and map out real potential alternatives, which is what I view as the ideal role of humanities in relation to sciences. In my view, many mostly create a sense of fatalism, but the fact that they are filling this role rather than one of social science puts them on this side of the table.

The second table, now presents a picture of what is going on in the discipline of economics and this is the table that can be used as a guide to remaking the discipline. Note that in this table, I use blue shading to highlight what actually does exist within the discipline of economics today and to separate it from what is presented as economics or what actually is economics, that exists outside of the discipline today. Note that since this entire table is devoted to economics, I have just used boxes in the three columns where they belong but without any specific relationship across the rows. Here is what the table shows.

- Economics today does not really exist as a social science, so the central area is, therefore, blank.
- There are actually several branches of applications and technical work that are part of economics including objective skills like accounting, finance, econometrics and calculations of inequalities in labor economics that are being done largely in sociology rather than in economics, itself. What should be part of economics, in planning for sustainable development, is now being done mostly in human ecology and “environmental studies” so I have put these on the table to indicate that. Economics as applied today, in what is called “macro-economics” and “trade economics” is really “National Production Engineering” under a euphemistic name, with the table noting the real name, using underlines. “Development studies”/”development economics” is another misnomer for what is being taught today and that is really the “Globalization and Urbanization” of rural and minority cultures.
- Economics also has a major hole in the area of humanities, since its only real thrust today is in national production engineering and in ideology for the producers, with little thought to equity, sustainability or real human needs. Other than the teaching of critiques like those of Karl Marx and the minor debates on values from economic anthropology, there is no sustained culture critique of modern economies derived from studies of small, historic, or animal cultures. Nor is there much of a utopian vision of preferable economies and how to get there, though some of this is being done by environmental policy and sustainable development planners.
- Some of the actual missing science of economics can be found in the discipline of psychology and some of the applications actually come out of psychology or human ecology.

Given the identification of what is missing and what is far flung outside of economics or misnamed, the next step is to suggest what a rebuilt economics would look like if it filled its roles of social science and humanism.
Table of Related Disciplines and Sub-Disciplines to Economics, Classified by Actual Activity, with Missing Elements and Suggested Renaming:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophy/ Morality/ Humanities</th>
<th>Science</th>
<th>Engineering/ Technology/ Policy/ Professions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Holistic Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and Cultural Anthropology</td>
<td>Anthropology as a Social Science [Living Cultures: Scientific Modeling of Social and Cultural Systems]</td>
<td>Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(“Anthroposophistry”)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Urban Planning]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Demography]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Medical Anthropology]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rights Based Democratic Political Systems</td>
<td>Political Science/ “Politology” as a Science of Political Institutions and Relations</td>
<td>Protection of Power through Legal Institutions (Law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theology, Law</td>
<td>[Jurisprudence/ Legal Science]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Jurisprudence/ Legal Science]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>Public Administration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election and Public Opinion</td>
<td>[Jurisprudence/ Legal Science]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering (Political Science)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintaining the New World Order and Hegemony (International Relations/ Political Science)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sociology (as a Science of Social Institutions and Relations) at the level of complex societies and individual cultures</td>
<td>Pedagogy/ Education</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pedagogy/ Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Criminology and Social Control</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Table of Economics and Related Disciplines and Sub-Disciplines Classified by Actual Activity, with Missing Elements and Suggested Renaming:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philosophy/ Morality/ Humanities</th>
<th>Science</th>
<th>Engineering/ Technology/ Policy/ Professions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-Level</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Utopian Economies, and Culture Critique</strong></td>
<td>Economics/ “Econology”/ Economic Social Science (as a Science of Social Institutions and Relations)</td>
<td>National Production Administration/Engineering (currently Macro Economics and Trade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marxist Economics/ Economic Anthropology</td>
<td></td>
<td>Globalizing and Urbanizing the Second and Third World/ Rural and Minority Cultures (currently Development Studies/ Development Economics)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic Anthropology</strong></td>
<td>Labor Economics/Engineering (currently major components of Sociology)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accounting</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Econometrics and Linear Programming</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Human Ecology</strong>/ Sustainable Development and Cultural Protection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organizational Behavior/ Decision Science [currently in Psychology]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Advertising/ Marketing (really applications of Psychology)</td>
<td></td>
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</table>
Remaking Economics as a Social Science along with a Complementary Economic Humanities

The second table, above, helps now to identify five key steps to remaking the discipline of economics in order that it fulfills its needed functions that are currently missing, consolidates the work within the framework of a discipline and institutionally protects itself from the pressures that have previously and currently undermine it.

1) First, it is important to start with a consistent definition of the areas to be covered by the field (and that have now been scattered) to agree on boundaries that allocate areas with other social sciences disciplines. In other words, it is important to define the discipline’s scope. This step is relatively easy using the functional analysis approach of the three columns of the table. Since the word “economics” can be readily understood back from its Greek roots, there is no need to change the name of the discipline in remaking it, even though the discipline fails to fulfill its promise and narrows its questions and methods.

2) Second, once the scope of the discipline is clear, it is easy to move towards building the field as a science by setting the array of scientific questions to be solved, followed by a compilation of existing “laws” and approaches that begin to answer those questions. The purpose of restructuring economics as a science is to assure that it identifies a broad set of questions of value to a number of different groups whose interests have now been excluded, on the one hand, while assuring that the discipline “builds” on itself as discovers the predictive laws that answer the questions and then goes deeper and deeper in refining explanations as a “discipline”. Disciplinary questions help not only to establish a direction but also create a framework for taking available findings that meet the definition of economic social science but exists now across several disciplines and integrating them into a single restructured discipline with a recognition of the value of those studies and their methodologies.

3) Third, application of the discipline as policy or engineering should also naturally follow from the rebirth of the discipline as science, since application takes the scientific tools and applies them to specific needs.

4) Fourth, clarifying the scientific questions that allow for a broad scope of study and for building predictions, simultaneously gives new voice to some of the humanistic inquiries that can bring the “what if” questions into the discipline.

5) Finally, it is important to assure the institutional processes that protect these disciplinary inquiries against the pressures that have prevented them in the past and today. Economics hasn’t just failed in its content. Economics has failed in its processes as an “institution” to be accountable to society and to professional standards. To set the discipline on a path that will be open to further broad questions, that will generate and test laws, and that will develop the data, methodologies, and continuing research agenda to build on requires larger political structural changes in academic and research institutions as well as larger cultural changes. Even an imposition of a new model on the discipline would do little to set it on course for the long term. Even if international courts criminalized economics and forced it to remodel itself in concert with restructuring of other disciplines, the same political, economic and cultural pressures that degraded the discipline would largely still exist and would continue to interfere in its development. It is important to understand the forces that make change difficult both to try to change thinking and to establish the political mechanisms that can override them.

These can be examined in turn. Given that the institutional protection of a restructured discipline of economics is much more difficult than just outlining what the discipline “should” do, and may or may not be possible, I devote that discussion to Part IV.
1. Defining the Area of Study (Scope) of Economics

There already is generally agreement on the scope of “economics.” Both within and outside the existing discipline it is recognized as encompassing production and consumption to fill basic human needs (food, clothing, and shelter) as well as other kinds of human aspirations and needs that require the use of resources. This is the social function of and includes the activities and institutions that constitute the “economic” part of cultures and societies. The problem in contemporary economics has actually resulted from the narrowing and politicization of this general area, taking leaps into ideology, doctrine, and faith, after starting off with this overall agreed scope.

Many economics textbooks start out in agreement with this general subject area of the discipline of economics but then fail when they seek to qualify and limit it. It is easy to get a feel for how to protect the overall scope of the discipline and to assure agreement on the overall definition of what it includes by challenging and repairing some of the basic definitions in existing textbooks. Consider the following three examples found in current texts:

a) “Economics is the study of how people make their living, how they acquire the food, shelter, clothing and other material necessities and comforts of this world.” (Wonnocotts, 1986, p.4). This definition is a bit limiting (lowbrow) in the sense that it does not consider the resources needed for meeting other human needs for art, intellectual exploration, expression, community, and spirit, and other needs that perhaps humans don’t want to recognize as “needs” (aggression, sexuality, hierarchy, bonding) and that may not always be “comforts” as also part of an economy, though they are all reflected in economic transactions. Immediately after this start, Wonnocotts’ text, in a way that is typical in the field today, then narrows and redefines the scope as the study of “scarcity” rather than also including the definition and negotiation of needs and wants. In the discipline’s definition of its goals, it is important to assure that the scope remains open to looking at all human needs, defining them, seeing how they relate to each other, and then looking at all of the factors on how they are fulfilled (how consumption and production occur to meet these needs).

b) “Economics is the study of “how human beings satisfy their material needs and wants” offers an even shorter version of the above, but in general agreement (McCarty, 1988, p. 4). Immediately after this start, however, McCarty skips over scientific questions and models and moves immediately to turn the discipline into one for technicians, substituting engineering for science. It is a failure to narrow the discipline’s scope to suggest only that, “Economics seeks to measure the benefits and costs of alternative answers to these questions” as if everything is for sale and calculable within the value system of the authors and their class/culture and that there are no major scientific or philosophical questions to ask about the full range of needs, aspirations, consumption and production and the factors in fulfilling them. This is why it needs to be clear that the scope is the scope of scientific, predictive questions and philosophical questions to ask about this area.

c) Better well known is Samuelson’s text, that is similar to these above but that did in its earlier versions, a half century ago, partly include some scientific and cultural questions (Samuelson, 1961). Samuelson’s text included a discussion of Malthus as well as some, albeit extremely brief, cross cultural comparisons, noting sacred cows in India and the potlatch of the Kwakiutl as culturally defined needs and consumption. But, Samuelson also narrowed the scope of the discipline by taking cultural choices for consumption and production as givens, without seeking any scientific explanation that would allow for comparisons of cultures to understand the nature (causes and explanations) of consumption preferences, one of the most basic questions of economics and the study of “how men (sic) and society choose.”
With an agreed scope, it is possible to start to reintroduce some of the important scientific and then humanistic questions that have been purged out of the discipline and that can be reintroduced along with others that readers, themselves, can introduce.

2. Setting Research Questions of Economic Social Science

Once the topical boundaries of any discipline are clear, that discipline is really defined by the questions it asks and the kinds of problems it seeks to solve. To start this process for economics, it is easy to see what is failing, what is needed to catalyze the process of asking questions, and to then sketch out the categories in which to generate questions, with some of the kinds of questions that the discipline should be addressing.

What makes contemporary economics criminal and largely obsolete is that it avoids answering some of the questions that are key to our time and not just of our time or society but of all time and for all humans – of extinction being faced by half of the cultures on the planet that is driven by economic actors, of collapse of economic systems as a result of actions by economists and people they represent, of lack of sustainability of the current economic systems dominating and changing the planet, of failed responses to and preparations for crises, of needs for the future on and off the planet, of dissatisfaction with current distributions and with the quality of work, of lack of identifying a complete vision of human aspirations and wants that economics can fulfill other than simple animalistic desires for consumption of “more,” and so on.

What one should expect to see in a remade discipline of economics is a list of questions at the beginning of introductory economics texts, in the descriptions of every sub-sector, and for discussion at meetings of economists, with constant additions to the agenda coming from within and without. One can judge the health of the discipline by the breadth and importance of the questions it places at its center and in the openness it offers for adding questions of breadth and depth while systematizing the search for answers without cutting off application of methodologies, models or forms of thinking that could help provide answers.

What one finds today are economics textbooks and courses that avoid questions of survival, of quality of life, of human diversity, and of choice – that are the questions of human existence and life and that all have relations to economics. Instead, economics texts demonstrate their inhumanity, shallowness, and cynicism and that of the discipline with petty questions about “scarcity” and “utility” and assigning price tags. These are questions for the raising of animals, not for the development of human beings. What should appear are questions about human nature and possibilities as humans and the role of economics as part of this nature, rather than something as shallow as “the firm/supply and demand,” “national production,” and “comparative advantage” of “international trade.” A healthy discipline is driven by questions, not by theological assumptions or by a methodology. That is different from what one finds today with a top-down, insulated agenda that assumes a crystallized, static mathematical approach to a single path and solution driven by the “experts” with all of the questions determined in advance. Questions help keep in mind the goals and for whom, as well as what humans are and can be.

What questions should the discipline of economics try to answer, for what reasons, for whom?

What is the full scope of questions? To start to generate the right questions, it is important to start with the right general initial question.

_In the area that can be defined as economics, what concerns are of importance to long term interests of all human beings in all cultures and societies ( singly and together)?_
Another way of thinking about it is this.

What does economics need to predict and explain to be of value to the long term interests of all human beings in all cultures and societies (singly and together) in all of their various positions and roles as human beings?

Asking the questions in this way – in terms of universal principles to first test potential standards and then to look at relationships and predictions – is different from the engineering questions that apply the proven scientific prediction to promoting a chosen outcome in a particular social context. Questions that focus on one population or one type of economy and/or that do so looking just at a limited range of variables that will not reveal the workings of a system, are usually engineering questions rather than scientific ones.

In generating questions, one can also think about the process as a fully inclusive one. Currently, the role of economics has been to maintain elites. The discipline works to indoctrinate and maintain an order rather than to solve questions that enable society to adapt. For each group that has been excluded and harmed, and for all of the failures that have occurred, what questions need to be asked, what solutions need to be sought, and what kinds of predictions need to be made and how can these be aggregated into general questions for such groups in general rather than narrowed only the interests of specific and new interest groups posing them?

Given that the distortion of the agenda of economics has largely come as a result of politicization and corruption of the discipline, the source of broad questions must assume an open process. The methods and discipline are the role of experts but the agendas need to come from everywhere in a social science and humanities. Those currently calling (albeit from within the discipline) for a pluralistic economics recognize that valid questions for improving the discipline must come not only from within but from other social scientists frustrated by the failure of economics (such as the author of this piece) and from the overall public that funds universities and research and that seeks to study in the disciplines for answers to public questions. Questions about the goals of economic production, about the full range of human aspirations, of quality and meaning of life, of quality of work distribution that are now pre-defined and proscribed by producers, elites and the academics they pay to represent their interests, would be fully re-opened in a pluralistic economics. So would questions of political power and opportunity that are relevant to minority communities and to those of different age and economic status.

Again, while it is possible to start off the questioning here and try to make sure that the initial broad range of questions remains at the forefront of the discipline without being censored out, until they are fully addressed and answered, institutionalizing an open questioning process requires long-term structural and institutional changes. These assurances are really a part of a political process of flexibility of a discipline, accountable to society and students from bottom up, rather than top down.

Even if the process of asking questions is fully open, it is difficult to generate all of the right questions at once. Questions arise in response to human problems that need to be solved and also depend on the quality of the process for allowing free thought and for allowing different groups to participate in bringing questions. Analysis also leads to new questions. There is also a tension between questions, laws and predictive models that have been identified, and areas/units of study. These develop at different rates and in a relationship with each other.

Some of the questions to be generated are scientific questions (for predictions) and some are humanistic ones about what is desirable and possible (that may be scientific questions once the methodologies for providing scientific answers are better developed or better ways are devised for framing the questions so that they can be answered). These can be divided into questions of science, humanities and engineering (that can overlap), before moving to define all of the units and levels of study that can bring in data to answer those questions, while noting the progress that is already made on defining laws and theories (following in the next sections). Before separating them, however, the questions can be systematized.
There is a way to systematize the questions, but there is no way to come up with all of the potential questions or categories. Way more is possible than can be imagined here. This is just the start of a framework following a logic. It is possible to roughly define the categories as follows, at the “meta” (all encompassing, overall) level, at the categorical level looking at the various parts of economic activities, at the system level looking at how the parts actually fit together, and then within systems. A quick way to assign these categories is as follows:

- Overall (“meta”) level questions about the goal of economics to serve what human needs and to achieve and measure “progress” on what dimensions, in what ways, for what ends, for whom;
- Consumption questions (at the categorical level), defining human “needs,” desires, patterns of consumption, by whom, for whom, and all of the biological, psychological, environmental, and cultural factors that drive them;
- Production questions (at the categorical level) defining how production is organized and all of the dimensions and factors that drive it and relate to it;
- Systems level questions, looking at the relationship between production and consumption, at the overall balance of the two with each other and in an overall eco-system and resource base (sustainability), in the context of social systems, and causes of failures or weaknesses in the overall system, and the implications of this system for other systems on which they depend, the overall change of the system, and the prediction of adaptability and development of different kinds of economic systems in different conditions and contexts; and
- Internal dynamics questions including distribution, equity, hierarchies and human relations.

Some of the kinds of questions can be placed in these categories as a start, as follows. Many of these are already being asked but are not yet inside economics as a discipline or they are not linked to scientific explanatory modeling that gives them a predictive dimension and applications.

For those who fear that the questions below do more than establish what should be in economics but begin to usurp the role of other disciplines like political science (in defining wants and equity as “economic” consumption and production and distribution questions rather than “political ones”) or biology and psychology (defining the source of preferences) or anthropology (defining the sustainability of systems), my answer is that all disciplines need to rethink where they start, need to recognize their dependence on others, and then need to reset boundaries and allocate work on the important questions for humanity that are being mishandled by current disciplines.

- In my view, the boundaries of with political science are those of power and decision-making. These include economics and values but focus on the interactions and balancing, not what is valued and met or how, which are economic questions.
- Similarly, the questions for anthropology are those at the level of overall systems and all of their functions, taken together, at the system level, with economic structures, political structures, social structures and other structures and functions. Cross cultural studies of value or production that exist today in anthropology are not anthropology because they are cross-cultural or because the use of cross cultural study raises the philosophical questions.
Overall (“Meta”) Level: What is economic progress? What are the real goals of economic activity? To serve what human needs, on what dimensions, in what ways for what ends, for whom?

How do different economies define progress? How do they compare in how they allocate “surplus”? How do they allocate different amounts for writing systems or not, for research, for military, for art, and what factors are linked to this that predict these differences, with what results? How do different economies define ultimate goals of human survival and of attributes of being human and what factors are linked to these goals?

What is the human intellectual potential beyond gluttonous consumption? What is the purpose of technology and science; purpose of art? How do humans assign value? How do humans weigh security and freedom as economic values? Is being domesticated better than being free, with what measurable linkages? Do humans accept gender differences in life expectancy, health, and welfare? What is real per capita “wealth”? What is the real measure of Gross National Happiness?” How do societies define future goods and values?

International law already determines that humans allow for different choices of consumption patterns to reflect different sustainability choices of different cultures and do not apply a single standard. That makes the application of single measures like GDP per capita and “human development” indices as the standard of international policies. But within industrial societies and not forcing those values on others, there are still questions about what the standards are for human well-being.

Much of that is defined in human development indices, for comfort. The real questions are about how to achieve these benefits, for whom, over what long time frames, as well as how to incorporate the different cultural views of benefits.

Unlike contemporary economics, this set of questions does not end with the assumption of the human being as analogous to a common pig, simply rationally seeking “more” and in more dimensions. It assumes that humans are complex and social beings with a variety of aspirations and interrelations (creative, scientific, hierarchical, biological) that define a complex set of interdependent needs and desires within society and with the natural and physical world, that shape economic systems and create a variety of goals and possibilities for economic systems. Economics needs to start with overall questions about what these are and how they work, and looking at the kinds of biological and social systems that give rise to them, without limiting and specifying what has yet to be investigated.

What makes these questions more than just fuzzy philosophical speculation is that many of the answers of human motivation is already answered or partly investigated by studies in anthropology, evolutionary biology, and psychology but the questions have yet to enter economic modeling and to continue as part of full scientific inquiry that establishes their sources or how they can be predicted. Leaving them at the level of speculation and philosophy is not enough. That indicates a disciplinary failure.
* Consumption: (Categorical Level): How do humans define and measure needs?

What part of needs are genetic and biologically determined, what part are cultural, what part are individual, and how are they shaped, expressed, bounded, weighed against each other, interactive, changing over life and time?
What is economic security? How do societies define “enough” rather than “always wanting more” (the ideology of production in Statist corporatist industrial societies and empires)?
What explains non-efficient consumption patterns: status and hierarchy consumption (business suits, potlatch), war (economics of empire and population control mechanisms); social control (know prisons are a much worse investment than schools but humans build them maybe because of kinship/clan/ethnic fears and utilities); male risk behaviors to impress women and the consumption economics of mating choices; importance of nature versus artificial environments and how socialization works in natural versus artificial environments and the costs?
What are the boundaries of choice? What biological factors drive and set them?
Are there biological adaptations to famines (fat) and psychological adaptations?
Is consumption part of genetic hierarchies for order and reproduction? (i.e., high status high consumption females and males)? Is consumption part of the aggrandizement of leaders as ways to secure fear and power? Who in society decides on consumption needs? How can these be predicted?

* Production: (Categorical Level): How is production organized and what are all of the factors driving it and relating to it?

What causes economic depression?
What stimulates productivity in ways that are balanced with consumption demands? What stimulates productivity in ways that are balanced with resources?
What promotes new levels of scientific achievement and of types of technology? Is military competition necessary for innovation? Is high consumption a necessary incentive for innovation in ways that doom some technological societies to unsustainability (Nguyen, 2008)? Must there be population and resource pressures?
Are inequalities necessary as a motivation?
What motivates managers, workers, and “shareholders”/stakeholders? What other values do productivity serve that are part of utility functions (Locke’s view of mixing with soil, Tolstoy’s view of joy of work)?
What “utility” is derived from cooperatives, self ownership, shop, factory work, collectives, cooperation?
What are the social dynamics of production and their inefficiencies?
Overall System Level Questions: What is the relationship between production and consumption, the overall balance of the two with each other and in an overall eco-system and resource base (sustainability), in the context of social systems? What are the causes of failures or weaknesses in the overall system, and the implications of this system for other systems on which they depend? What causes the overall change of the system? How can the adaptability and development of different kinds of economic systems in different conditions and contexts be predicted?

Given geographic, climatic and resource variables and existing levels of technologies and accessibility of populations, what economic systems can be predicted to arise and what can be predicted about their cultural adaptive forms?

What causes system collapses and what behaviors, responses, and forms of collapse can be predicted to see with different conditions?

What factors influence carrying capacities?

What are the energy system dynamics of economies?

What are the likely economic scenarios for natural disasters that are known to occur and what are the investments now to cope with them – meteoric impact; massive volcanic eruptions?

And for human made disasters: climate change; toxins in food chain; nuclear war; genetic modification; etc.?

What can be predicted will happen after imperial collapse? With climate change and environmental collapse? After World War III?

What factors explain in a predictive model the post World War II plastic, conspicuous consumption economy of the U.S.?

How would the U.S. and Soviet economy’s current state (including the U.S. current transformation to a military-prison-hedonism economy) have been predicted using data available back in the 1970s? What political and economic factors interfere with the ability of prediction?

How do different economies interact with each other and establish dependencies, exploitation or synergies? How do these processes work and how are their impacts measured?

How can the convergence of economic systems, the divergence, and diffusion of processes be predicted and measured?

What objective measures are there for categorizing and comparing economic systems by types and what are the specific environmental/ climatic, political hegemonic, and internal choices that actually shape these systems?

Are there natural evolutionary processes of economic systems and if so what are the predictive factors?

How do individual choices affect human biological evolution as beings and what does that mean? How do individual choices effect the co-evolution of other organisms with humans and the eco-system? How do individual choices change the planet and the universe?

How do technology and robotics, as they become part of a new integrated environment, drive the demands and the economy rather than just serve them?

What are the relations between environment and economy, including the new technological environment? Is there a necessary ideology that the created environment that may be one of mechanical artificial space becomes the ends rather than the means for the human future, and where does such an ideology come from? (Lempert, 2011b)

What does it take to establish a fully self-sustained industrial economy on another planet or in a space vehicle? What is the basic sustainable size; what resources are needed and size to assure division of labor, transmission of education and values, genetic diversity? Are any of the contemporary visions of space colonization consistent with economic realities?
* Internal Dynamics Questions (including distribution, equity, hierarchies and human relations):

How much equity and what types are possible with what relations to other variables? How much inequality is needed to allow for certain other benefits? Is relative poverty part of human nature and society and a needed motivating force for industrial production? How much mixing of cultures and discomfort promotes innovation? Which kinds of inequality of consumption and working conditions are acceptable and what are the overall costs and benefits? Different cultures allow differential choices for family transfers; they allow different consumption equity for sexuality and for children; for kinds of diets. How can economics institutionalize processes to stop the trends that occur towards the monopolization and control of the regulatory system? Are all political rights driven by climate/environment and economic organization or can they be driven independently (as human choice and independent variables rather than dependent variables)?

How are appropriate bargaining powers set: labor versus producers, public controls over management, control over monopoly and economic power aggregation, intergenerational protection and transfers? How do systems of intra-gender competition work (between older and younger males, between males in groups and out of groups, between males of different characteristics, between women), choices and relations between males and females of different ages, group behaviors of genders? What other kinds of personality dynamics are at work in productivity that reinforce groups, competition, bonding, various kinds of production? What are the underlying dynamics of age and socialization in production? How do factors of caste/ethnicity/slavery, patriarchy/kindship and the state, drive and influence consumption and production decisions/including mating and reproductive decisions as part of the system economics? How are demographic/reproductive choices and genetic implications of those choices for the future related to and interact with the economic system? How are age stratification and other division of labor and discrimination issues handled across societies and what are the factors influencing them? How is the treatment of the aged related to factors of production, consumption and sustainability? How do different levels of individual deviance and diversity and the mechanisms for controlling them interact with other economic outcomes and variables? How can group rights/cultural diversity of small cultures really be protected given the economic propensity to exhaust resources and to view theft as a cost saving alternative?

Note that some of the internal questions are currently being discussed in sociology, as the charts in the previous sections indicated. But sociology does not ask these questions in comparative ways to build an overall science of causes, effects, and predictions of these economic variables that are simply relegated to factors of “labor” (and not also linked to consumption, sustainability, genetics, and other variables and outcomes). Moreover, the basic work that is currently done on labor measures in sociology may actually be better in a unified economics, placing these variables back in a full context. Overall, what these questions already indicate is that a complete discipline of economics will need to draw on evidence and methodologies that are currently scattered in a number of other disciplines and will have to draw them together to come up with models, “laws,” and tentative answers. The discipline won’t be able to pretend to exist independently and then to slowly add in outside factors as if they are new discoveries worthy of an international prize. The discipline will have to reconstruct itself by drawing from and teaching biology, environment, culture, energy systems, materials science, psychology, law and politics.
In rebuilding the discipline of economics, there is no room for making ideological determinations that such questions or categories are too hard or not really important or relevant. These are among those questions that are structurally central to the discipline. To find answers, it is possible to go right to existing evidence. That evidence is in human history. It is in biological evolutionary record. It is in anthropological data and available through comparative study. It is available through direct observation and testing. It is in all of the very sources and methods that economics currently avoids. Thus, that is where the discipline needs to be re-established as a social science.

Some Basic Foundations of Economic Social Science:

Building the social science of economics is a logical process following from the above. It is well beyond the scope of this section to show how the initial textbook for that field is likely to look in content, but what it is possible to do here is sketch out the method for answering questions, the places to look, and the kinds of existing answers. As in the process of generating the discipline’s basic questions, above, it is important to be open to a wide range. Indeed, answers can be found in what is now a variety of disciplines, and it is important to be open to a variety of methodologies. It is possible to pull together a variety of information and methods to recreate the discipline.

In rewriting the basic textbook of economics as a social science as a guide to the field, it is possible to follow a step-by-step process. It is possible to go down the list of questions above and classify the answers to those questions by what is known (laws that have withstood testing, theories that are being tested and are partially verified or competing, and untested hypotheses) in a body of principles that meet the standards of the scientific process. The work of economists is to continue to test what is unknown as well as to develop the methodologies and organize categories of existing data for use in the process. The key principle is to look for natural laws and for theories that can be tested, offering predictive value, or ways of answering and asking questions that the social science has yet to examine. Everything else is story or fable.

While critics of social science will claim that this will end up with an empty textbook, the reality is that there is plenty to fill such a book. There may not be “experiments” to test every question, but there are plenty of scientific comparative methods that have yielded predictive hypotheses that can be tested on current social systems and behaviors. It is scattered among a number of fields, but it already is science. And there already is a great deal of it. For instance, Malthus explains system collapse and there are plenty of other works that extend on this and also explain what kind of behaviors result when there is competition for resources, including political and economic systems that form to regulate economic behavior (Diamond, 2005). There are equations for measuring carrying capacities for population for different environments and economic systems (Gross, 1976) and for measuring balance and sustainability such as the “IPAT” equation (Ehrlich, Ehlich, and Holdren, 1973). There are theories and tests on the relations between population and innovation (Boserup, 1981). These provide some direct “laws” and theories still being tested in the areas of systems questions shown above. What is missing is to fill in the questions with what known and what isn’t known and how it can be tested.

In other areas, while there may not yet be testing of specific variables, there are some systems models that can be used for thought experiments like those in physics and that can be tested by then sampling human behavior. These “structural models” like those of game theory now in economics and other kinds outside of economics like Mendel’s model for expression of dominant and recessive genes, can be used to provide answers to specific questions and can be integrated into the list of questions (e.g., Lempert and Nguyen, 2011).

Although much of contemporary economics falls into the categories of technical and engineering fields, this does not prevent using existing data for some scientific questions where the variables are not specific to just one culture and type of economy. There has been some advance in valuations over time and in clusters of preferences and in how tradeoffs are made, how risks are assessed, how the future is weighed under different conditions, and how bargaining occurs in different societies. There has been
some look at various forms of distribution and impact of these different distributions. There are some measures of externalities. There have been tests of money as an incentive, tests of some kinds of investments on output, on various taxes and regulations and the incentive effects, on competitive behaviors which can perhaps partly be fit into scientific modeling. These are largely trumped by the doctrine and attempts at control and aggregation of wealth by elite groups, that dominate the basic principles, but these could be integrated into economics as a science, without the current blinders and placed appropriately in the hierarchy of factors describing how economic systems work, collapse and adapt.

What makes this a difficult process and more challenging than writing current textbooks that just take current doctrines, add some new material and change some of the emphasis, is that it requires searching through several disciplines with various kinds of data with fluency in those disciplines and then the ability to aggregate the material such that it not only presents the answers but also presents the models, frameworks and methodologies in a unifying way that promotes a continuing common endeavor with continued linkages.

Building a social science of economics along with rebuilding the social sciences in general is not just a task for economists. For example,

- Anthropologists need to look back again at holistic systems and their ideologies to offer social scientific models in which the workings and factors influencing economic subsystems will be clear.
- Political economists also need to look again at the global questions that link politics and economics.

But, it is possible to start the process within economics, itself, in ways that also show what these other fields have developed that is useful and how they can also offer more data and results that is useful across fields within this rebuilt umbrella of social sciences. The process can be outlined here with a sketch of its key buildings blocks, the places where existing information can be found, and a list of the existing methodologies that can lead to answers and how they can be taught.

Instead of going down the list of questions for economics as a social science and trying to point to answers and methodologies that have already begun the process of answering those questions in a variety of disciplines, it is quicker to start the process here by pointing directly to the disciplines that can be inventoried and invited as participants in this newly rebuilt social science of economics, and that can offer the methodologies.

**Finding Answers to the Questions of the Social Science of Economics**

The range of disciplines that has already conducted social scientific tests on economic questions but whose work largely remains outside of economics and un-integrated with the other disciplines includes disciplines that have examined human biology and evolution (evolutionary biology/ethology/zoology and physical anthropology), those social sciences that study individuals (psychology), those that study all kinds of societies (archaeology, anthropology, and sociology), interdisciplinary social sciences of humans and nature (human ecology, human geography, demography), those joint social sciences (political economy), and emerging sub-fields. Such works in these disciplines study economic variables and economic systems to determine which aspects are biologically or culturally rooted and how they are influenced. In many cases, studies they have done seek to answer some of the above questions at the same time, rather than separate them. Below, it is possible to list some typical work in a number of these fields that belongs in a social science of economics.

Note that even though these outside disciplines can be ordered with each other (such as human evolution and evolution of human societies), the goal is not to take the different information and put it into a single sequence to describe a single line of evolution of economic systems (Boas, undated). That would replicate the failure of economics in the past. The goal is to “mine” all of these disciplines for the answers they offer about individual humans and about human societies through the various methodologies.
and comparisons that they have conducted, in answer to a full range of questions about how economic processes work. While it is certainly important to ALSO look developmentally, at small systems to large, as well as change processes, that is simply one of many, many questions about economic systems.

The scientific approach is to use smaller systems the same way that Drosophilia (the fruit fly) was used in genetics, amoebas are used in cell biology, and rats are used in cognitive psychology. It is to focus on comparisons, on the one hand, and change processes, on the other, rather than make the mistake of assuming that the levels are part of an evolutionary scheme that can be used to explain transitions and “development.” At each level, it is possible to look at consumption/needs, production, and overall system and internal dynamics questions. It is to look at different systems levels to understand how systems work, succeed and fail. A linear evolution from amoebas and the fruit fly to humans is not assumed, but they are studied on a small scale to reveal common processes. The answers that all these disciplines offer to different questions on economics is much more and much different than a linear teleological explanation of historical development of humans and their economies. Theories of development are important – from genetics to sociology (e.g., Toffler, 1980; Bell, 1972; etc.) but linear explanations are not part of the collection of scientific information that starts to rebuild the discipline of economics.

For these disciplines, it is possible to look briefly at the areas of work that answer economic questions as a guide to integrating that information into a social science of economics. These disciplines do not necessarily have definitive answers (yet) on human economic systems and behaviors, but they have been collecting data in their fields to raise questions and to point to answers. They allow for similar processes that open the way for further examination through experimentation, biologically and culturally.
Evolutionary Biology: There are many analogies of animal behavior to human behaviors. Not only do animals also have “economies” with divisions of labor and various innate and culturally developed ways of meeting production and consumption needs in their environments. They also co-evolve with their environments. Since there are many common genes and common adaptive processes, it remains to carry the study further to reveal exactly which attributes are shared and expressed in which ways. (E.O. Wilson, 1978)

Animal economics can be studied from various populations including bees, ants, and other species with their differentiation of labor and consumption and choice patterns. Gender relations are a key part of economics for all species, though economists currently deny the costs and incentives of breeding/sexuality/genetic transfer and of courtship and bonding expectations and costs. The biology of male and female dominance hierarchies, status displays, preening behaviors, and pecking orders (alpha males) are also analogous to human consumption, production and distribution in areas that go beyond current economics study of “rational” and “efficient” “maximization behavior.” Virility symbols and displays are also seen in human consumption and production behavior and explanations for human activities like monument building (and construction of phallic symbols) and violence are partly explainable by observations of animal behavior.

Humans not only co-evolve with the environment (human ecology explanations, below) but also seem to have domesticated both animals and plants in ways that have been part of a co-evolution that has reinforced economic systems. Dogs and cats appear to have been domesticated and co-evolved with humans (some studies suggest the changes in human senses of smell and hearing are due to co-evolution with domesticated wolves/dogs and cats) to fulfill economic roles and to offer economic synergies. Internal parasites (in the digestive tract) and other organizations are believed to have symbiotically co-evolved with humans and may still be co-evolving in ways that have an impact on consumption choices, evolution, and the workings of human economic systems.

Studies of key behaviors for the survival of human economies have also used animal studies including:
- imprinting of bonding and cognitive behaviors (Lorenz, 1982);
- the evolution of cooperative behaviors (Axelrod, 1984) and explanations of competition versus competition and the “limits of altruism” (Hardin, 1977);
- population adaptations and diversity, war, and economic collapse, in demographic and evolutionary studies (Darwin, 1871, 1872; Malthus, 1986)

Physical Anthropology: Specific studies of primate groups, their cultures and economic behaviors (including peace and harmony, territoriality, food strategies as carnivores and herbivores, technology, hierarchy, sexuality) now not only focus on study of groups in the wild but comparative cultural studies of different communities reacting in different ways to environmental change or to individual laboratory conditions.

The studies of various chimpanzees and special case of the bonobo chimpanzee, closest genetically to humans but apparently making different cultural choices, offers scientific comparisons of human economic possibilities and of human evolution (Van der Waal, 1982).
Psychology: Psychology is already combined with economics in the applied subjects of marketing/advertising, negotiation, and environmental psychology. More basic studies of cognitive psychology, group psychology and of needs, pathologies and choice are offering a fuller picture of human beings alone and in groups that can provide the basis for describing what economies do and what purposes and uses exist for consumption, production and distribution under various “normal” and “abnormal” conditions.

Maslow’s “hierarchy of needs” is among the early studies of human consumption and production needs and how these needs are not linear and fungible as economists have established through ideology, but are hierarchical and interdependent (1943).

Pathologies of consumption due to insecurity, such as obesity (preference for fat and sugar as a “comfort food”) explain how consumption decisions and “needs” are also subject to complex relational and environmental factors and not linear and fungible as economic ideology has asserted. “Efficiency” and stability need to add psychological factors to devise full models.

There are also studies of relations between economic organization of society including economic institutions and social institutions, sometimes in replication (father figure and authority from the family to the society), adaptation, and in parallel, including among criminal organization and survival strategies among the poor, even looking at organized crime and ghetto families as economic enterprises that fit and reflect the larger economy (Sharff, 1981).
Archaeology and Anthropology (with a rebuilt economic anthropology that can be absorbed into economics as a social science): The clearest data on human economic systems, on their internal and overall system dynamics, comes from the human record, itself, offering comparisons and the ability to do scientific hypothesis testing by searching for common cases. Moreover, the very concept of economic sustainability for cultures and complex systems originally comes out of anthropology and needs to be at the basis of economic measures and analysis focusing on long-term human outcomes.

The classification of types of economic niches of various cultures is still incomplete as is the classification of economies beyond quick assignations by technology (hunting and gathering; agricultural; industrial) or ideological factors to define current “friends” and “enemies.” One finds not only scientific cultures but “copycat” spinoff or “free rider” cultures (e.g., Ukraine and Belorus next to Russia; Viet Nam next to China), niche cultures (Roma or Jews fulfilling specifically economic roles in a larger society), dependent or subordinate cultures or those playing a neutral role among larger systems (Switzerland and its banking economy; Singapore and Mauritius as trade zones; Laos as a buffer); and former empires pushed into highlands to subsist marginally (about one third or half of the peoples of Asia, including the H’mong, Black Tai, many others) or smaller niches such as lowland or river areas (the Cham). This is a much more complex way to look at human roles and interactions than the simplistic center versus periphery approach of dependency theorists looking at political economy (below). Among some of the classification works are those looking at peasant economies and their organization and risks (James Scott’s classic “moral economy of the peasant”, 1976), studies of nomadic systems and their interrelationships with other economies, (Evans-Pritchard’s classic study of the Nuer, 1940); and the economics of highland tribes including their social structure (Leach’s classic study of highland Burma, 1954).

Some of the classic work in anthropology has looked at the rise of different complex economic systems with specific geographic areas where there is a major resource subject to control like a major river delta or strategic connection area of rivers promoting kingships and empire (Harris, 1977), the integration of different peoples in those empires (Whitten, 1969), and the social and political economy of empires in general (Lempert, 2012; 1995).

Some studies have “mapped” economic systems onto particular territories, noting how geography and climate sustains industrial production in certain areas only with particular types of political systems because of the production risks and the ways in which families and communities are either autonomous or need to be cohesive in order to survive. A study of Russia, for example, reverses current ideological assumptions about economic “choices” and demonstrates how in a society of “industrial igloos,” climate and spacing patterns and risk are determinative of the political economic systems and choices that the Russians have made (Lempert, 1995).

A key concern for anthropology has also been to explain social change and social evolution including economic transitions (Lempert, 1995).

Food taboos and choices are largely related to ecological adaptations, particularly for grazing animals like pigs and cows, where their advantages are weighed against impact on topsoil and the resources they consumer in the Middle East and India, were originally explained by anthropologists doing economic anthropology, though this has recently been driven out of the discipline (Harris, 1977).

What economists have called “corruption,” has also largely been explained by anthropologists in terms of kinship networks and production and distribution systems that maintain cultures within their environments.

Biological and structural functional models that were originally part of anthropology in the past offer models of economic and cultural systems with their attached variables. Though anthropology has discarded much of this as has economics, a return to science would resurrect these approaches (Malinowski, 1944). They would also provide a full picture of motivations and costs to create a complete
economic model of resource use, production, consumption and distribution. These earlier anthropological models looked at individual roles in groups and the social functions of harmony, charity, and other maintenance of an overall system. None of these fit in current economic models of rational, profit maximizing individuals but they do offer a full picture of human needs and resources used to fill them in the context of cultural sustainability.

In contemporary economics, cultural and biological realities are viewed as constraints to be overcome, or they are assumed away, or perhaps grudgingly added as an afterthought into economic models. In fact, they are central attributes of economic activity and motivations and are the starting points of models.

Central to anthropology in the past, and in need of resurrection in ways that would also invigorate economics as a social science, are comparisons of cultures living in similar environments to see the kinds of economies that have independently arisen in those environments and modeling the factors that gave rise to them and promoted their survival. Among some kinds of comparisons are those of:
- Cold climates and urban life: (e.g., St. Petersburg, Stockholm, Anchorage);
- Desert climates: (e.g., Dogon of Mali and the Native American Pueblo cultures and their similarities);
and
- Mountain peoples: (e.g., peoples of the Andes and the Himalayas).

Though there were originally attempts to systematize information on cultures through data bases like the Human Relations Area Files that would have allowed for modeling of the relationships between environmental variables, economic production and various other cultural factors, that information is still too poorly systematized to do those comparisons other than in a rudimentary and ad hoc way. But, perhaps there will be a way to continue such work within the discipline in the future. For example, it seems clear that dowry and bride prices, choice of matrilineality and matrilocality, and even exchange of nephews in some Pacific island societies are about much more than kinship and exchange ritual, which is mostly how anthropologists describe them today. These are actually economic investments that could be described as forms of “asset/portfolio management” and “risk balancing,” “future valuation of income stream” and social security systems in societies where people and their labor are the major assets. Since few anthropologists have training in accounting and finance and since those economists who do have denigrated study of financial and investment issues in non-industrial cultures, much of this data has yet to be analyzed and placed into predictive models as part of a social science of economics.

Material in applied anthropology (outside interventions in “development”) is also too poorly systematized for comparisons though there are also plenty of reported case studies. Though he is an economist, Amartya Sen’s work on land distribution and famine/productivity (1987) is an example of the kind of economic case study that one finds in the “applied anthropology” or “anthropology of development” literature on the interaction between agricultural and other economic productivity and culture.
**Sociology:** Much of sociology already is a study of labor economics and inequalities (gender, class, race/ethnicity/religion), structural and institutional power, and socialization (age cohort analysis) as well as deviance in urban societies. The discipline already exists as a supplement to and critique of economic policies on behalf of groups that have been excluded from mainstream economics. Much of this can be integrated into economics. Most of these studies and approaches are easy to find and don’t need to be referenced here. But there are other kinds of studies that can remain part of sociology as central to the discipline that also offer answers for economics.

Division of labor in society, the connection of religion to modern economic ideologies, and the nature and form of industrial societies are questions that were at the basis of the foundation of modern sociology and that offer some answers and models for key questions of economics as a social science (Weber, 1904; Durkheim, 1893).

As in anthropology, there have been some attempts to look at “evolution” of economic systems, but in sociology it is in terms of particular technologies with a look at how the technologies, themselves, change the human environment and require different kinds of economic and social organization (Toffler, 1980; Bell, 1972).

Sociologists have also looked at urban areas as micro-cosms of industrial society, studying their class and ethnic/caste structures. Among the classics that look at these urban economic systems in the U.S. are “Yankee City” (Warner, 1947), “Middletown,” and others of the southern U.S., as well as overall (Mills, 1956). Anthropology would add international comparisons following similar models.

Economic histories and profiles of wealth as well as of the workings of economic institutions, like corporations, have also been the purview of sociology (Berle and Means, 1933). Though in its infancy, the study of human societies and their economies in space as well as the economic interests and ideologies driving it has started to develop within the discipline of sociology as a social science of living in space that some scholars have termed “astro-sociology” (Lempert, 2011b).

**Ecology and Environment:** The concept of economic sustainability, really a subset of holistic measures of sustainability stripped of its essential cultural component, is currently developed in measures of ecology and the environment. These measures cannot exist alone since cultures cannot survive economically with ONLY their productive functions sustainable and without any consumption directed towards other functions (health care, spiritual needs). But, these are essential to economic study and are only now slowly partly entering the fringes of economics even though they are central to economics as a social science.

Some studies have taken specific kinds of economies – fishing, farming, hunting – and mapped out the particular resources and behaviors necessary to promote sustained production, noting how biology, environment, and human productivity are integrated systems (Brown, 2004).
Demographics/ Population/ Public Health/Human Biology: Some of the basics of the study of human needs and of human populations have found their way into a variety of disciplines ranging from those of public health and human biology (issues of diet/nutrition, sanitation and water, exercise and environments) to overall population dynamics and issues (genetic and economic preparation for biological and natural disasters, reproduction and family issues and needs). Some of this is simply a mathematics of population growth, epidemiology, and predictive modeling of costs, catastrophes and demand. It has also extended into issues of psychological health and costs of social pathologies and “appropriate” environments for meeting mental health “needs.” All of these have economic implications and are central to economic modeling in economics as a social science as well as the engineering of sustainable economies and of defining human “progress” and economic goals.

Basic methodological studies are able to determine human “carrying capacities” for sustainability (populations that can survive in particular environments with given technologies) (Gross, 1976). Similar studies try to determine these limits by looking at human dietary needs, generating equations for long term sustainability (Ehrlich, Ehlich and Holdren, 1973), or defining “basic needs” (Streeten, 1981). Studies of innovation and production (Boserup, 1981) have identified links of technology and militarism. New applications of Malthus link issues of sustainability to political violence, collapse or to political transition (Lempert, 1987; Goldstone, 1991).

Political Economy/ Political Science: Somewhere on the fringes of both political science and economics, the combined discipline of political economy has continued in different forms, promoting work that was originally an intrinsic part of economics but that now lacks a clear home. Work at this level looks at political-economic “systems” as well as larger global processes, touching on the political questions of modern economic systems that economists have suppressed in their own studies.

Key works in political economy start where economists leave off in noting the failures of what they call “market economies” and look for examples of systems that have measured and tried to build legal, political and other institutions to resolve these failures though without specifically explaining why some systems choose to resolve these and others don’t (Lindblom, 1977). Some authors challenge the blind ideology of economists, directly, by showing how true solutions that “perfect the market” (for example, through “political markets”) actually resolve the problems that economists hypocritically determine are outside of the scope of the discipline (Lempert, 1996b). Convergence theory studies (Galbraith, 1967; Dimock, 1951; Kerr, 1983) have sought to determine how much diversity is possible for industrial economies to see if industrial technology requires a certain type of economic, social and political organization that transcends geographic, genetic, and historic-cultural differences.

“Dependency” and “World Systems Theorists” have presented a much more simplistic model than the anthropological approach that should be to look at different clusters of cultures to see how they fill different roles within empires or next to large empires in terms of political and economic power relations (Gunder Frank, 1972; Wallerstein, 1979; Lempert, 2014).

Not included here in this section, but noted above in Part II is the work of scholars in Human Geography and Human Ecology on themes that are those of economics as a social science but that are currently being done outside of the discipline. In its infancy, for example, are predictive economic studies that start with an environment and predict what kind of economy will arise, noting the specific conditions that will lead to different kinds of changes over time.
Teaching the Methodologies for Rebuilding the Social Science of Economics:

Economists today are virtually illiterate in all of the above fields. They likely have never taken a single psychology, sociology, anthropology, human biology, archaeology, or ecology course. They may have taken no physical science laboratory courses to apply scientific methods. Indeed, the discipline of economics today works to purposefully narrow the range of ideas and to prevent knowledge from these other fields or use of their methodologies, other than to usurp outside disciplines by co-opting ideas and imposing new definitions on existing concepts. Therefore, rebuilding the discipline of economics as a social science will also require that trained economists are not only fluent in the range of outside disciplines that do empirical study of economic phenomena, but that they also have the training in the use of some of those methodologies and in the ethical and professional precepts behind their use. Economists need not be archaeologists, primates biologists, or zoologists but they should be able to read primary source studies in those fields to incorporate such findings. They should, however, be fluent in some of the methodologies of other social sciences, particularly those of psychology, ethnography (qualitative methods of anthropology), and sociology, as well as in system modeling.

Note that today, one can look at almost any course list in the world’s major universities in their bachelors, masters, and doctoral programs and equivalents in social sciences and applications and probably find, nowhere, a list of actual skills and methodologies in the social sciences that are important for actual social science research. One will find lists of courses by subjects and by geography, but most of these courses will be lists of readings. One will find one or two methodology courses that currently define specific disciplines and that are the basis of distinguishing those disciplines (sociologists using surveys, anthropologists using “participant observation,” or economists using “econometrics” mostly in computer programs rather than in independent modeling of biofeedback mechanisms for iterative testing). But I have yet to see a list of methodology courses offering essential tool kits for the solving of particular social science problems at different levels of analysis. That is both a comment on and evidence of the failure of social sciences today to actually function as social sciences rather than as doctrine and ideology.

While a future article (or text) is needed to properly outline the basic methodologies essential for economics as a social science, it is possible to also list some of the already existing methodologies outside of the current discipline that are being used to empirically examine economic phenomena. These are supplementary to some of the methodologies that are already used by public and private managers, if not by economists. Again, this is just a start for the purposes of indicating the need for a broader and more scientific approach. Readers will certainly be able to supplement the list below.

Among the basic training of any social scientist, and particularly those in economics as a social science, from outside of the current field of economics and in the disciplines where they are now found are the following subjects with their methodologies:

- Psychology: group psychology, organizational behavior including leadership/group think, environmental psychology, risk assessment, cognitive psychology (understanding and preferences). Some of these are already taught to administrators in the form of marketing and advertising and in organizational behavior, though it is largely with the purpose of manipulating the public and controlling workers, rather than in understanding how control systems work and can be understood and made responsive to actual human needs;
- Ethnography: qualitative field methods and ethnographic modeling; kinship systems and how they work for social protection and other sharing of resources (termed “corruption” and “nepotism” when viewed from the outside by economists), and network analysis as well as up to 10 additional specific methodological tools for understanding body language, environment that are rarely taught even within ethnography courses;
- Ecology: footprint analysis, sustainability analysis, time allocation, labor, energy, materials inputs, diet and caloric intake and minimum nutrient analysis;
- Statistics: data analysis and models; and
- System dynamics and systems modeling including Bayesian and competitive game simulations and the art of designing and testing models rather than using existing simulations and linear programming models for optimization.

From within economics, itself, there are already some useful methodologies, but they need to be taught in ways that apply to real problems with real variables in comparative settings and general hypothesis testing. Among these are:

- Accounting: financial accounting and asset valuation, cost accounting; managerial accounting; public/national accounts, environmental accounting
- Energy systems accounting and materials and resource values and costs, including externalities and risks;
- Econometric modeling (but these models need to be improved with real, material variables);
- Game theory; and
- Bargaining and negotiation dynamics.

In teaching these methodologies to the next generation of economists, it will be important to turn the teaching of the discipline into one similar to the natural sciences, with laboratory practicum courses comprising as much as half of the curriculum to ensure that methodology is integrated with the teaching of laws and theories. As in sciences, the purposes of laboratories is not only to assure learning of the skills but also to show how existing laws were discovered (and can be retested), how model building is accomplished, and how the social sciences requires ethical protocols and protections as well as standards of benefit to the general public that comprises the subjects, funders, and beneficiaries of humanistic research.

Indeed, both in the former Soviet Union and countries under its influence as well as in the U.S. and Western Europe, there have been a number of changes since the 1990s in curricula and in gender and ethnicity of teachers. Yet many actual changes are illusory because these changes have not included transformation in the teaching methods, accountability, administration, or hierarchy or in the university and in the larger society. In Russia in 1990 and in countries like China and Viet Nam in the following years, the Western economics textbooks and doctrines critiqued in the first part of this essay were translated and adopted to replace State planning doctrines and “Marxist” ideologies in much the same way that these texts had replaced Church teachings and early economics texts some 70 years earlier (Lempert, 1996a). Far from changing economics doctrines in universities in Europe and the U.S., the gender and ethnic “balancing” of teaching staffs and the introduction of new courses to meet the politics of these constituencies has also offered little real challenge to economics to its core principles, questions, or methodologies. There is a need for changed teaching methods and university structure at the same time, to replace the hidden curriculum of obedience to top-down doctrine with community oversight and values, pluralistic competition, and intellectual accountability.

3. Application of the discipline

Application of economics should also naturally follow from the rebirth of the discipline as science, since application takes the scientific tools and applies them to specific needs as defined in the questions above. Here, I note only in brief the need to transform the teaching of economics so that both its scientific courses and its applications include field work and interaction with community.

Sample curricula and methodological advice on how to design laboratory field science courses alongside basic theory courses and in more complex applications such as in national development planning for sustainable development and field study of economic history are already available as well as potential mechanisms for changing structure and funding of universities so that the processes are also democratized as the curriculum itself is more open and empirical (Lempert with Briggs, 1995). Similar materials for graduate level, including for management training, in countries throughout the world have been designed (Lempert, unpublished manuscript). An example of an application of an overseas national development planning project for sustainable development in which students produced an economic
development plan and presented it on national media and to a country President, in person is also accessible (Lempert, 1995 and 1998). For preparation of curricula looking at the social science of empire or for comparative empires such as the U.S. and U.S.S.R., there are also available materials (Lempert, 2012; Lempert, 1997b). An outline of questions and approaches for the economic and social science study of living in space that can be used as the basis of a curriculum has also been published (Lempert, 2011b).

4. Rebuilding Economics as a Humanities: A Necessary Corollary to Social Science:

While most natural scientists and engineers have an affinity for science fiction and the arts because of their ability to stimulate creative thinking, to raise ethical and moral questions, and to spur dreams about what is possible, today’s economists as pseudo-social scientists and their colleagues in many other false social sciences and humanities have acted in ways that have polarized their work and closed doors to questions. With the re-opening of economics as a social science, it will also be possible to re-open the humanities of economics as a place where visions and dreams can be expressed, ethical and moral questions can be raised, comparisons with other cultures can be offered as critiques and questions about what may be possible in our own, and science fiction, itself, of imagined economies on and off of the earth, can seek to answer and to raise new questions about economics that can also feed back into economics as a social science. In what is now viewed as the “dismal science,” this is part of the missing joy that needs to be and can be reintroduced.

Economics today is fiction and fantasy in itself, but it is the wrong kind. Real science fiction and fantasy when linked with the social science of economics is the kind that seeks to imagine and test economic laws and theories in future settings in ways that push science and engineering into new areas. Many of the questions posed above, as the basic questions for the discipline of economics, are questions that also require imagination and creative testing in the form of “thought experiments” about pathways of possible actions and results, before it is possible to experimentally test them in fact.

What makes the reading of alternative works such a threat to economists today and what has stifled such thinking is not that imagined alternative systems might lead to brutal totalitarianism in the march towards goals of equity and community. Current economic doctrines have already marched us off to brutality and uniformity that violate human laws and poison the future in the name of “choice” and “sovereignty.” It is that economic doctrines, themselves, have worked to kill off truth and imagination of alternatives. By focusing on a single set of doctrines and in suppressing empirical study of issues like the spiritual emptiness of work in industrial society and of the traumatic impacts of economic institutions on weak cultures and on the vulnerable, economists distort truth. At the same time, economists also destroy imagination and the search for alternatives. Religious doctrines act to destroy the belief that there are alternatives and to suppress the imagination that would consider what they might be like and how to achieve them. Economic doctrines have worked both to assault the search for truth and the human capacity for imagination and search for a better world. The belief that the existing economic system is inevitable and that no other alternatives exist, exerts a psychological tyranny that crushes hope and the human spirit. Such doctrinal thinking was mirrored on both sides in the Cold War (Lempert, 1995) as it is found in the teaching of economic doctrines in almost every major industrial empire today.

An appropriate humanities of economics will be open to philosophical questions, to utopian visions, to culture critiques (including offering different standards of progress, sustainability, and of values), and to science fiction that imagines various economies. Already, science fiction has offered economic predictions as well as positive and negative utopias. Yet economists do not respond to them now in teaching or testing them through research. For example, one might ask, is the science fiction vision of Soylent Green (an overpopulated planet where humans are recycled as food) one that is an actual possibility according to what we know about economics? Which post-Apocalyptic visions following nuclear war, natural catastrophes, global climate change, and collapse of empire and of globalization, are realistic? Do science fiction space economies make sense? Are they desirable?
An appropriate humanities side of economics will re-open the door for utopian thinking that has been suppressed by power and a sense of fatalism. It will recognize that creative thinking is also essential to human adaptation on a planet that will ultimately die and that in the near future is also facing massive ecological changes that will force economic and political-economic adaptations in consumption, production and lifestyle. Without imagining alternative futures and linking them with the economic realities of economics as a social science, humans are unlikely to succeed in averting the potential failures we are currently causing and also to be prepared for the world that will follow.

Not all imagination about economies fits the standard for what is appropriate in a humanistic economics as an adjunct to an economic social science. The adjunct to social science is not simple dreaming in the belief that passion and hope will quickly replace a failed system with a successful alternative. That belief is also a fiction. It characterizes what is wrong with much of humanities today including much of the criticism of contemporary economics that is found in places like anthropology, where one would hope to find evidentiary based cultural critique and testing of pathways to visionary alternatives, rather than just criticism. Good science stimulates the imagination and generates parallel thinking that demonstrates an understanding of scientific possibilities combined with moral and philosophical questions. Such thinking presents laws that limit certain possibilities but also opens up technologies and cures to solve human problems. Fantasy without science undermines rational belief and the ability to work on real improvements by creating the fiction that improvements can occur without sacrifices/tradeoffs.

While it is beyond the scope of this article to lay out a textbook or a course for the teaching and listing of all work that would fit into an humanities of economics in parallel to a social science of economics, one can start from the list of questions above and start to fill in some of the existing work in economic philosophy that already probes these issues.

While it might be best to list the kinds of philosophical and imaginative thinking that has gone into the questions that comprise the full study of economics, as outlined above, in a parallel to those categories for measuring progress, looking at consumption, at production, at internal issues in economic systems like equity, and at overall questions about economic systems, their sustainability and change, currently existing work that raises these issues often looks at several of these issues at once. In order to “mine” various works to compile a list of works addressing these issues, one might start by looking at the different disciplinary and methodological approaches as a whole. One way to think about where to look, here, is to start with different “genres”: philosophical works that challenge social sciences and that include essay and literature; utopian works of fiction and of visionary planners that seek to test alternative economic forms, as well as some forms of “culture critique” and comparison; and future visions of negative utopias (post-apocalyptic scenarios) as well as speculation of “off-Terra” economies (life off of earth). A short list of existing materials is indicated below in each category, but there is certainly much more that readers could add. This is just a brief start.
Humanistic Questions about Economic Needs: Measuring and defining concepts of beauty, progress, happiness, and satisfaction are philosophical and religious questions but they are also economic questions that scholars have raised with economic implications.

Works that raise the central questions about the purpose of economic production ask about the relationship between humans and nature and how humans understand ourselves as a part of nature (Carson, 1962) as well as about how much is enough and whether more or bigger is really better and to what extent (Schumacher, 1973).

Others, largely within popular sociology, focus on technology and its implications for the structure of society and the definition of what is human as well as whether it is possible to reorganize society for better lives with technology or are just destined to serve it (Toffler, 1980; Yablonsky, 1972; Goodman, 1956; Bell, 1972).

Almost forgotten today, after some several decades, are questions about the possible forms of the “new industrial state” and whether industrial societies must “converge” to a single form (Galbraith, 1967). The nightmarish visions of bureaucracy and control in industrial societies that were raised in fiction by authors like Kafka and Orwell seem to some to be inevitable, and the lack of scientific attention to the questions seems to reinforce that view (Duncan, unpublished):

Though there is a lot of focus on technological change and on equity issues as well as some questions on health and quality of life, there still isn’t much focus on measuring and defining social “progress” in ways that measure human diversity or creative aspirations to determine whether human societies are ever really “advancing.” Is social “progress” merely an ideology promoted by cultures finding themselves in the minority, for which there is no real human motivation and possibility of achievement (Lempert, 2015)?

Utopian Economics: Utopian fiction and models or plans are largely about visions of political and economic systems. Today, it seems almost impossible to publish models unless one is already well known and vetted, and the pressures to suppress teaching of earlier visions or historical experiments have largely driven them out of social science disciplines like economics unless they are packaged as “sustainable development plans” and stripped of political and legal questions of rights, opportunity and equity. But many exist. While utopian fiction is abundant, if it is taught it is usually in literature courses rather than by scholars who can test which models might actually be feasible and how it would be possible to test them, rather than to tar them all with ideological slogans and disregard them in their entirety.

The classic visions of “communism” are still taught (Marx, 1867), but more interesting are later applied visions of guild socialism (Cole, 1920), of the kibbutz model, and of mixed economies and choices (Lindblom, 1977).

There are several tests of planned communities like Arcosanti, of architectural plans and shapes like those of Buckminster Fuller, of “sustainable cities,” of “livable cities,” of communal farms and cooperatives, as well as histories of religious utopian communities and alternative economies (including those of the Amish in the U.S. that are among those that survive despite the pressures and risks that usually lead to failure or directly undermine them). Most of the questions can still be raised and tested. Are the small cities of Eastern Europe, with their mixes of racial and religious groups maintaining their strong identities and filling different economic roles, possible or desirable again as a model? (Lempert, 2008)

More policy oriented proposals calling for large scale economic reforms to deal with issues of equity and sustainability or “steady state” economy, also fit here (Sen, 1987; Daly, 2011; Korten, 2007).
Visions of the Economic Future: Post apocalypse (Negative Utopias) and Economics of Life in Space

The false and singular optimism of contemporary economic ideology has largely banned any realistic discussion of how humans will or could cope with the results of failure or calamities in a practical way, particularly given the way contemporary industrial economies are “high entropy” systems (high complexity and ordering, with each individual specializing in a limited area and unable to recreate most of the basic attributes of economic functioning ones own).

Predictions of resource exhaustion and collapse or disaster are largely avoided as too “speculative” or “negative,” though disaster planning, particularly as a result of climate change, is now a mainstay of work in the “developing” world. Re-imagination of the “death of the suburbs” (Kunstler, 2005) or “life after …” are critical parts of scientific understanding of risk and human adaptation, as well as part of planning. Is it necessary to redesign education systems and dispersal of information and technology to prepare survivors for calamity?

Living in space questions on what is human and how these space environment economies will be structured are extensions of the earlier utopian community questions but into artificial environments that must be artificially created to carry almost everything they will need. Astro-sociology and critics are starting to map these out (Lempert, 2011b).

In building a new humanities of economics to replace the little that currently exists (mostly in economic anthropology, where large questions have mostly withered away just to questions of “value” that respond to economists), there is also a model of what not to do. For a humanities of economics to have meaning, scholars working in this part of the discipline must be fluent in the genres (the humanistic methodology) of appropriate critique and vision as well as maintain a focus on the key questions for the discipline and on a symbiotic rather than confrontational relationship with the social science and applied parts of the discipline.

Within the “social sciences,” social and cultural anthropology has largely declared itself as a humanities subject in the past two or three decades. It had the potential to develop a critique that would have challenged and invigorated the social science being done in the discipline and in other (conceptually subordinate) social sciences like economics. Yet, anthropology has failed as an humanities because it has sought to destroy and replace rather than refresh its discipline’s own social science. It has offered only political advocacy for interest groups in a fragmentation of the holistic systems approach of the discipline into variables that could align with different constituencies. As an humanities, contemporary social anthropology almost entirely lacks the genres above of utopias and negative utopias and visions of the future. Its cultural critiques have been minimal in recent years, and the humanistic questions it asks about human needs have become increasingly limited and without context. Few, if any, social anthropologists today try to define “progress” or offer visions of achieving it. Without a social science of contemporary cultures existing in parallel to its work as an humanities, it has largely failed in its mission of focusing and supplementing the discipline’s own social science and technical applications on moral questions and on broad humanistic concerns.

At first, there was potential. Though not an anthropologist, Ursula Kroeber Le Guin, the daughter of a leading anthropologist, Alfred Kroeber, introduced questions of gender, sexuality and economic organization into her widely acclaimed alternative science fiction novels. Yet, few if any anthropologists followed. Instead, anthropologists today largely offer journalism, blog, ideological response to ideology, and political advocacy for interest groups they personally represent in the profession on the basis of gender, nationality, ethnicity, and sexuality, or their specific artistic or peculiar interests like film or music or food. One scholar, incensed with what he views as the self-destruction of that discipline, has offered a set of tests of colleagues’ work to separate out journalism and blog from academic approaches, as a kind of guideline that could be useful here to keep economics on track (Duncan, 2012).
This is using the parallel Greek roots for “polis” (polity or political entity) and “logos,” the “study of.”

This is using the parallel Greek roots for “oikonomia” (“economics” the study of “household management”) and “logos.”

Anthropologists recognize “social and cultural” anthropology as two distinct sub-categories, meaning that they already recognize social institutions and functions as not broad enough to cover “Cultural Institutions” and functions. This meaning of “culture” is a different one from the meaning for the classification of peoples by shared strategies of survival that are passed down through generations by a group usually in a specific ecological or geographic or social niche and tied together by shared language and traditions. Here, the meaning of culture is defined as encompassing those functions that are not basic to biological survival but that are characteristic of communities and that include what is sometimes referred to as “high culture.” This meaning of “culture” here includes dance forms, musical forms, clothing and other decorative styles, folklore, and usually religion.

[Editor’s note: See Polly Sly’s article in this issue.]
IS ECONOMICS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?
REMAKING ECONOMICS AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE

Part IV
The Challenge of Institutional and Cultural Change in Academia

DAVID LEMPERT, PH.D., J.D., M.B.A., E.D. (HON.)

Introduction to Part IV

Challenging social science by holding it to legal standards and to scientific principles is a relatively straightforward process if legal and academic institutions are functioning properly. In a scientific culture and one with rule of law and procedures, where a discipline fails to predict reality and where applications also fail, scholars offer better theories and science progresses. That, however, is not the world we live in. In practice, the ideal is not the reality in law, science, or in “the marketplace”. Underlying structures of political and economic power along with religious beliefs and ideologies that are linked to each other prevent change of institutions, cultures, and beliefs. Challenging religious beliefs and ideologies is often seen as a challenge to one’s basic sense of identity and security. Law, logic and evidence alone do not suffice to replace theological beliefs. Even when crisis shakes one’s basic belief systems, it is still difficult to replace those systems with something that seems new.

Outlining a new discipline of economics (Part III), presenting a set of measures of roles that a discipline should follow (Part II), and focusing on the law for holding a discipline accountable (Part I) all offer a political and legal vision for change. Actual change, however, is much harder. This section, Part IV, discusses what institutional and cultural/social changes beyond just the law are required to reform the discipline of economics and whether or not they are even possible.

This section analyzes the structural needs in contemporary society that are essential for a real transition in the discipline of economics and how or whether they can be changed, including a cultural analysis of the ideological and religious currents that have been intertwined in economic doctrines in ways that deflect challenges and will make its transition to a social science so difficult. The piece ends with a short conclusion pointing to the areas of society that would need to change in order for a scientific and international law compliant discipline to emerge.

Author: Please direct all correspondence to: superlem@alumni.stanford.org.
Why the Rebuilding is So Difficult: The Politics and Ideologies that Promote Theologies over Science and that Distort Academia and Research:

It is easy to outline a legal and policy solution but when the wrongdoing is that of an elite group whose institutions and ideology are deeply rooted in society, it is difficult to imagine how things will change. Even if international courts criminalized economics and forced it to remodel itself in concert with restructuring of other disciplines, the same political, economic and cultural pressures that degraded the discipline would largely still exist and would continue to interfere in its development. Economics as a discipline has not just failed in its content. Its institutional structures of departments, think tanks, and universities have also failed to be accountable to society and to stated professional standards. Those academic and political institutions that are responsible for enforcing laws and assuring the value of academic research and teaching to the survival of society and humanity have also failed.

To set the discipline of economics on a path that will be open to further broad questions, that will generate and test social science laws and theories, and that will develop the data, methodologies, and continuing research agenda to build on requires larger political structural changes in academic and research institutions as well as larger cultural changes. The problem here is that very problem that economists themselves recognize in theory but do not confront in reality; the problem of “public goods” and their corruption by market forces, with failure of regulatory institutions, professional codes, and incentives.

Economists speak of “incentives” and “rational behavior” as leading to choice. If these, alone, were enough, those societies today that are facing unsustainability and economic decline, like those where the discipline of economics is prominent, would seek change. But they do not. Instead, these societies are in denial given their global power and the financial and military power of the elites, themselves. They reinforce current behaviors and shield themselves from reality. These behaviors may be “rational” in the short-term but they are not in the long-term and that is the problem. Elite behaviors do not appropriately way long-term consequences of behaviors that are self-destructive and retaliatory. Meanwhile, those societies whose economies are currently rising also focus only on the short-term without seeing long-term implications. They see themselves as perfectly successful, with no need for change or attention to the long run. In a sense, the systems that elites build prevent any real re-examination or change. Where disciplines like economics have mis-educated professionals for generations, few have the mindset and the training for the kind of scientific, objective thinking needed to establish reform. As systems collapse, most also find themselves having to deal with the anger, fear, and backlash of those who are suffering the results of failure. This makes it difficult to reform.

The next three sections discuss the realities of confronting:

- current economists as violators of the law,
- institutions that maintain the failing and law breaking economics discipline, and
- overall “social forces” or “deep structures” of beliefs and ideologies that make change difficult, using different strategies of behavioral and social change.
Dealing with the Individuals (Economists and the Financial and Political Interests Behind Them) and their Mental State as the Source of the Problem, through Behavioral Interventions

The simple approach of holding economists accountable to international and criminal law assumes that there is a small group that has violated existing rules and norms and that such a group can be punished, reformed and reintegrated or isolated back in the society. That requires an overall commitment to rule of law and an ability to punish or reform those who are at fault. If the criminality is an indication of a larger failing of the culture (or part of the cause of that failing) and may have also created or is linked to so many institutions that propagate such misdeeds, the process of change may be impossible to conduct from within. The deeper roots of institutional behavior and social processes often make change difficult unless it is directed by a more powerful, outside, authority but if the international system is unable to act legally in a time of relative prosperity, will it act at all in a time of breakdown, chaos and uncertainty?

In an ideal world, following the “rational” behavior that economists say people follow to maximize their (long-term) self-interest, it would be simple to change the failures of economics through legal enforcement and through medical (mental health) interventions. Given that the behaviors of economists seem to be long-term irrational as do the behaviors of other elites required to enforce international law for long-term human interests, what the legal analysis described in Part I as a “legal problem” may actually be an emotional problem and may require behavioral rather than legal solutions.

Criminologists would most likely define the behaviors at the base of the international crimes of economists identified in Part I to be more than simply actions on the basis of rational self-interest. They could easily define them as reaching the level of psychopathic or sociopathic behavior. This is because economists are not simply stealing or causing harm for direct self-interest. They have covered up their behavior with a system of beliefs to rationalize what is multiple, repeated harm that is against their own (and humanity’s) self-interest and delusions as to the nature of reality. Under some definitions, that would classify as a mental disorder. Reforming such behavior even through simple law enforcement and sanction would be difficult because the perpetrators may not even have the rational and logical ability to understand what they have done wrong and why it does not follow the standards of observations, conclusions and logic about real world events.

Economists are perfectly able to act in society and appear normal, but, if the analysis of economics as in violation of international law is correct, then by definition, economists are a threat to themselves or others (the standard for defining mental illness24). For psychological and/or chemical reasons, something has apparently failed in economists in their ability to empathize with other human beings unlike themselves and to accept and appreciate those differences and choices. Economists also fail in their ability to perceive their own long-term interests, in their perception of the world around them and its workings, and their ability to reason.

Even if the international legal system could hold economists criminally accountable, there is a good basis for approaching economics colleagues, teachers, and officials with compassion and understanding, despite the lack of apparent sympathy they show for others and despite the harms and probably inability they have to understand or show remorse for the harms they have caused, and seeking behavioral solutions. In both media stereotypes of amoral business executives and in everyday life, those studying economics are largely view as people lacking in the more humane qualities found throughout society. While there are few studies of behavior types of professions and such studies are hard to define as “objective”, I simply open up the issue here for discussion as part of looking at solutions. Personality types fitting into universities today are changing as the roles and professions change, including the movement of economics towards sterile mathematics. That kind of work would attract those lacking real self-confidence, or creativity who are withdrawn and may feel excluded or deprived. They appear to need aggrandizement, affirmation from powerful and wealthy people, to affirm their lack of self. At the opposite end, those who study finance and business and who plan careers in areas like trade and corporate policy, where they can do damage, might fit the profile of a psychopathic personality25.
Assuming that economists are in denial about their behaviors, one approach to some of them would be to confront them directly with the reality and results of their behaviors and the victims, surrounding them with truth telling. As of now, that has yet to happen and it is not clear who would do it. Currently educational methods and lack of real historical, comparative, or cross-cultural and field research in economics helps to promote denial by avoiding contact with reality. Empirical social science works well to promote empathy, overcome denial and ignorance, and to promote model building in social sciences like economics but people would have to engage in it and institutions would have to promote it (Lempert with Briggs, 1995)\textsuperscript{26}. Economists are elites today in society such that even if people can feel compassion for them (something often impossible when one feels relatively powerless and victimized), they are likely to fear confronting them for good reason. There are many ways by which economists can use their current networks to retaliate against those who would see to change them, rather than act to reform and correct the damage they have caused.

It is particularly difficult to confront elites with their behaviors when they have built a strong wall of denial. The myths that economists promote, though they may be harmful and delusion, have permeated society and culture, making it difficult for most people to participate in the confrontation without feeling some shared guilt and denial. That calls for a focus on the other factors that need to change.

*Political, Institutional, Structural Reforms*

Unless there are also larger political, institutional and structural reforms, economics as a discipline and a profession will still be vulnerable to degradation and capture. Like the institutional reforms needed in economics as a discipline, many necessary political reform solutions are also relatively straightforward on paper. Not only are there specific legal mechanisms of institutional oversight but there are structural democratic mechanisms to ensure the protection of an entire system in perpetuity and to protect it from the kinds of corruption (of economic and military power that distort what appear to be effective systems, on paper) that appear to distort almost every existing political system, today. Yet, like the reforms of university disciplines and like enforcement of law, these are also trumped by cultural realities.

The “post autistic economics” group is right in calling for a pluralism in economics, but they are only starting the process as a single interest group within the discipline. For their demands to be met, they have to have the leverage of funding of the university and of legal and political accountability of the university to public needs.

In societies where public democratic oversight of institutions and participation – in the political process, in the courts, in the media – has also been corrupted, the rebuilding needs to focus on oversight of university funding and responsiveness as well as of political institutions to confront the lack of real democracy and accountability in the modern state.

Though the specific mechanisms of political reform to protect minority cultural rights at all levels of political power, as well as individual rights at those levels, are too detailed for this article, there are solutions to address the problems of concentration of economic, military, and political power (Lempert, 1994; 1996b) as well as means of creating a democratic culture and democratizing the university, itself (Lempert with Briggs, 1995)\textsuperscript{27}.

Seeking institutional changes, however, also requires a focus on the cultural context that prevents it.

*Cultural Obstacles to Change*

What makes economics as a discipline so hard to change is that it has deeply intertwined itself with modern culture in such a way that attacking its doctrines today is, first, a direct attack on religion (Christianity) and, second, a direct confrontation on issues that have become “taboo” that subjects critics to personal attack and ostracism. Third, the processes that economists have set in motion that international law criminalizes – destruction of cultures and threats to the survival of humanity – have been initiated in such a way that short-term attempts to reverse them and undue the harms will cause
considerable immediate hardship. It is almost as if economics has worked to create a self-destructive process that cannot be reversed. These three “mine-fields” to change can be examined in turn.

1. How Economics Forestalls Challenges by Establishing Attack on Economics as an Attack on Religion

As this article demonstrated in Part II, economics historically worked to ally itself with doctrines of the Church in Christian countries, both in the function of the discipline (serving a religious function) and in political alliance and symbolism. While one can rationally confront scientific arguments, by mustering evidence and tests, the acceptance of religious beliefs is not rational and it is difficult or impossible to challenge religious beliefs with rational argument. One cannot confront believers in the idea of “virgin birth” or the “invisible hand” of the market with scientific fact because the beliefs are established on the basis of power, ritual, and manipulation of emotion in ways that generate “faith.” Religious beliefs only falter when the “Gods fail” and the benefits that the faith promises can no longer be provided by society.

In the absence of adherence to scientific standards and democratic approaches, prosecution and court processes are equally or more likely today to target academic innovators rather than those who represent and abuse power. Academics who have written in defense of educational standards in the U.S., for example, have often been those seeking to uphold the values and power of the Christian Church and Western ideologies rather than those of science. William F. Buckley’s “God and Man at Yale,” (1951) and Allan Bloom’s, “Closing of the American Mind,” (1987) were widely heralded as calls to suppress the development of social science rather than to promote it.

Moreover in contemporary industrial culture that is scientific but that has mis-educated people about science, it is difficult to gain consensus on even the most basic knowledge to challenge economics as pseudo-science. In the U.S., for example, half of the country does not accept Darwin’s theory of evolution and many schools are now required to teach it as a “theory” with equal time to “creationism.” With economics allying itself with the anti-Darwinists, how can one challenge economics?

How is it possible to rebuild economics as a science by bringing in comparisons of human societies with the animal kingdom and the economic systems of other species when the Church opposes the teaching of Darwinism and economics allies itself with the Church? The problem in rebuilding economics as a social science is that it immediately positions the changes as coming from “other” religions that do not self-censor such scientific discussions. That turns the challenge to economics into a polarized religious battle between Christians (and those who support them as the dominant power in “Western” societies) and those who would oppose them. The problem is not just that studying ant colonies and their division of labor as a way to understand division of labor in human economies is frightening to those who see human systems as entirely, distinct, separate and “divine.” It is that the very approach and narrow boundaries of economics today reinforces Church beliefs that people learn from birth and that are given a status that amounts to their being “sacred” and unchallengeable. Showing how human pecking orders and consumption displays among males are simple behaviors from the animal kingdom linked with sexuality is frightening to those that adheres to religious Church dogma that seeks to deny human connections to nature and responsibilities to nature. Studying relations among Bonobo chimpanzees and their choice to replace war with sexuality, is also not welcome by the Church nor economics. The modeling of nature and of simple systems as analogues to understand complex systems and relations between population (reproduction), war, and technological advance are questions religion has declared off limits and that contemporary economics reinforces.

The ideology of “growth” without end, a doctrine some believe was specifically created to mask harm to other groups on the pretext of helping them, is also rooted in the idea of missionaries and charity, thus also giving it a kind of “holiness” and false morality that makes it difficult to challenge. Much like the belief in Heaven and an afterlife and other beliefs that have followed Western imperialism and missionary work to undermine foreign cultures and prepare them for exploitative colonial “trade” and production, the “faith” in perpetual “growth” works to prevent calls for redistribution and equity (Daly, 2011). Exposing such underpinnings of commonly held beliefs would be politically explosive.
Transforming economics into a social science also implicitly opens up questions of how different cultures and religions maintain different economic systems. These beliefs include the “Protestant ethic” and family relations (attitudes about abortion) that reinforce warfare to maintain land divisions (European land went entirely to the first born male, the second born male went to the imperial army while the third son went to the church, with this system promoting population and imperial expansion). Similarly, Christian beliefs work to maintain control of labor forces, promising them a better life “after death” in reward for their current obedience.

Economics has so allied itself with religious beliefs such that the attack on the discipline is likely to be directly or subtly described as a religious battle between Christians and non-Christians. That turns a scientific and legal disagreement into the kind of religious war that has characterized much past violence between Europe and other societies (particularly the Middle East).

If both the U.S. Empire and Europe continue to fall and are replaced by China as the major world power, will this then change, or has the economic doctrine already wedded itself to “religious” beliefs in China?

This article, in Part II, offered reasons for why Jews and other non-Christians in the U.S. and Western Europe have already made the religious “conversion” to promote the religious beliefs of economics as part of their need to show their loyalty and to rise in those systems. One might argue that countries like China that have entered the “world system” and are now using it to their economic advantage have also partly converted to this religion, even though they oppose the direct teachings of Christianity. The portions of economics that are aligned with Christianity, in accepting beliefs from authority figures on faith and in opposing the ideas of causality that are based in evolution are quite consistent with various Asian religions. The Buddhist “after-life” (really, the “next” life in the cycle of lives) and its idea of self-denial while elites prosper, with postponed equity until the “next” life, is not unlike the faith that Christianity merges with economic doctrine. While Asian religions of Taoism and Buddhism may have more ties to the natural world and more respect for nature than Christianity, these religions do not prevent the destruction of nature.

Chinese seems to have fully adapted to teaching of economics and one would expect them to continue to reinforce it as part of a state religion. Even without the Church, there will still be reticence among Chinese authorities to fully promote scientific thinking, and the state (one Party) religion of divine right and of faith/trust in hierarchic leadership and nationalism (promoting the advance of the country on the basis of race, rather than for any particular human ideal) will likely trump real science.

In Vietnam, economic beliefs have now merged with the State religion in slogans that define the national essence, such as “Giao mơn” (“Rich and Powerful”) and other reinforcing ideologies as to industrialization, commerce and investment comprising attributes of “civilization” with those outside of this system as “outdated” or uncivilized.


Economists in all countries have sought to label those who look at distributional issues, individual rights, and cultural rights as disloyal, opposing national unity, and a threat, rather than long-term thinkers who offer legitimate intellectual challenge in the interests of science and humanity. Thus, beyond finding themselves pulled into a religious confrontation, those who challenge economics will also likely find many of their attempts at reform being turned into attacks on their loyalty. In academic discourse, disciplines representing elites identify their positions with the nation and work to transform professional debates into witch hunts against critics. Scholars raising issues of distribution, political rights, and public oversight have long been smeared as “Marxist” and disloyal. The transformation of economics into a social science must confront these ideologies of elites in opening up debates that have become taboo.

In a social science of economics, choosing to scientifically examine geography and the environment as variables that could be used to understand and predict aspects of the economies and linked political
choices of Russia, China and the U.S. would immediately eliminate the political-ideological stereotyping that current social science disciplines use to define and demonize “enemies” and to distract attention from similar (and failing) choices in society (Lempert, 1996a; 1998). It is to the advantage of elites to continue this demonization of “enemy” economies and their internal collapses (labor camps, wars, and civil wars) and to oppose those social scientists who seek to describe economic phenomenon on the basis of environmental and cultural failure instead of “bad choices” of economic “isms” by an “enemy leadership.”

Re-opening economics to the real-world issues that it avoids today of political control and equity – slavery, class systems, kinship and corruption, feudalism – also opens for scrutiny the processes through which elites maintain power in violation of law and of promises and principles. Comparisons with the animal kingdom and their economies would raise questions about how elites use economic doctrines in ways that are stark and perhaps shocking. Ant societies and bees have production, consumption and division of labor that in many ways are like the inequities that are found in the global economy today. Beyond the questions of whether such hierarchies and divisions are biologically hard wired and inevitable, and how much variation and “choice” is possible for humans, are questions of how different human workers really are from worker ants, and whether economists really think of there being much more to life or humanity. There are reasons why those who try to raise these approaches would face strong opposition as well as ridicule.

The more one examines the possibilities for what a science of economics would study, the more it actually exposes shocking attributes of elites in society and positions of the masses. Take, for example, the case of how several species have integrated with others for different synergistic roles. Humans have “domesticated” dogs, elephants and horses in what are essentially “paid” exchange labor relations with other species. Dogs and cats in a household can also have exchange relationships and division of labor. Were economists to discuss these parallels it would also become all too clear that modern labor forces have been created on the model of humans and animals with human workers filling a role no different from horses, cats or dogs. One can see why economists would go to great lengths to prevent the discipline from raising these comparisons and questioning why their view of human motivation (“maximization behavior”) is also so similar to that of their view of the behavior of domesticated animals.

To take these scientific analogies farther, intestinal bacteria or parasites in humans form a synergistic relationship integrating with human hosts in what is a science of economics would also describe as an economic “system.” Humans with parasites do change their own demand and consumption patterns, so there is another parallel here as well. The adaptations are long term evolutionary, short-term biological as well as psychological. This is not far from what Lester Brown and others suggest about economic systems of humans as really biological environmental production systems (fishing, farming, hunting) that need to be studied exactly in that way (Brown, 2004). To open up these questions for study as an integral part of economics as a social science raises fundamental questions about the human relationship with nature and definitions of being human.

Once these questions are raised, then it is hard to stop questions as to why converting live things into dead things is the aim of a society based on current neo-classical economic teachings and why economists do not measure the full spectrum of consumption desires for achieving quality of life, across dimensions beyond the limited (animalistic) vision of elites and the “modern” societies.

Once these questions are raised and become integral to a new discipline of economics, other questions would certainly follow about how the current economic and political systems were maintained with such limited vision and such primitive views of human beings, for so long. That would open up examination of how preferences and wants are shaped and how socialization and education and control systems actually work today. These are questions that elites have a short-term interest in suppressing and that they would subject to ridicule.

In academia today, even outside of economics, raising biological and environmental questions within social science is also largely a taboo. In anthropology, for example, the very biological and genetic questions about different ethnic groups and about human evolution that stress the very differences and
specialized needs are suppressed today on the pretext that considering differences and needs across ethnicity and gender somehow prevents “equality”. This role of economic anthropologists and new disciplines today in suppressing science because of the discomfort in recognizing biological gender differences (sexual dimorphism) and racial differences, ends up reinforcing the anti-science approach of economics and the suppression of rights rather than their protection. Economics avoids issues of biology, evolution and comparison by arguing that economic preferences are personal choice to meet wants that are adjusted in the marketplace, not that competing genetic populations are in a hegemonic struggle for the resources they need to meet their specific biological needs. This ideology within social science has reached the point of absurdity but it is still not subject to question despite simple reality that most children recognize. Europeans manufacture sun screen for their white skin and also have different dietary needs. The Russians may have a high tolerance for vodka as a processing of sugars in the winter and Russian bodies may have adapted to famine. But, attention to these issues of biology and of the hegemony of certain racial groups in the “market” to meet their genetic needs in ways that limit minorities, is considered to be taboo. The modeling of economics based on competing cultural needs and gender biology is suppressed as a taboo under the ideology of the “rational economic man” and the “free market” because opening up study of biology and genetics that could stereotype groups would also could create the need for rights and accommodation for others where businesses and governments have sought to eliminate such debate. Society would have to accept and promote diversity as a way to promote adaptability and not turn all societies into “efficient” “melting pots.” It would have to spend the resources to protect cultures and individuals. These questions would call for significant reorientation of resources from private goods to social goods for future benefit. There would be calls for real measures of long term human survival that meet a protected scientific standard.

The parallels between animal economies and contemporary economies are intuitively understood. In fact, the concepts are already deeply embedded in language. Words like “Queen Bee,” “worker ant,” and the “rat race” are clearly understood in English. In saying they are “working like a dog,” people also recognize the economic relationship between humans and domesticated animals. While some species are viewed differently in different cultures, there are many universals. The very word in Vietnamese for a feudal economy, for example, is “phong kien,” meaning “ant society.” Usually, when something is so easily understood, its suppression requires extreme measures to turn the topic into a “taboo.” That has what has happened, making it difficult to challenge with some of these ideologies rooting themselves so deeply that attempts to change them also result in difficult short-term economic costs.

3. How Economics Culturally Embeds its Principles, Setting in Motion a Downward Vicious Cycle, Offering Short-Term Payoffs, that Cannot be Reversed

A final cultural factor that militates against changing economics as a discipline is that economic doctrines of globalization, consumption and “growth” have created such high short-term costs to reversal and offer such short-term incentives to continue, that they are almost impossible to reverse, even though they may have put society on a downward, self-destructive path.

The doctrines of economics may have created a self-fulfilling prophesy and “vicious cycle” such that once certain processes are started, it may be impossible to reverse them. For example, once cultures that are sustainable in their own environments are forced into globalism, they may no longer have a choice but to face immediate collapse or future collapse with much greater violence and death if they try to opt out. For many cultures, what globalization does is to replace sustainable consumption with dependency on trade while populations grow. This new cycle forces them further into exploitation of their environments that make them further unsustainable and make them further reliant. Their vulnerability also increases from climate change as a result of over-consumption of resources by industrial societies, or by invasions of their resources, or by dependency on resource exploitation or a cash crop for the global market. Once they are “hooked” on outside goods to meet increased demand and to replace local consumption with foreign products that they no longer produce locally, they become vulnerable to the rising price of those
goods, meaning that they must increase the short-term destruction in order to receive them. Since sustainable consumption policies are never a part of the current economic doctrines, once cultures are pushed into globalization (trade), their population usually jumps at first as a result of “donor” “anti-poverty” health improvements and quick incomes. This population increase and the taste of elites for foreign goods as well as their replacement of local production for export production changes their consumption patterns. Fear of invasion and theft of resources also simultaneously pushes increased military consumption that creates a further drain on the economy in what for many countries is a vicious cycle that ratchets up their dependency and the overall unsustainability of the global system (Lempert and Nguyen, 2011).

Economists know that most countries that are being pushed into globalization do not have the infrastructure and understanding to control their consumption and to invest in ways that will lead them to sustainable development. Moreover, the international banks and donors have no interest in sustainable development planning. It is their very weakness that makes their labor and other resources easy to exploit.

In other words, economics doctrines have the impact on many cultures and communities that destroys their cultural homeostasis –sustainable balance with their environment –in such a way that it must continue to depend on imported technologies and imported goods. The culture or community is hooked on a pattern that forces it to more quickly deplete its own resources and to reach the potential limits of technology where it faces collapse and poverty. In doing so, it essentially loses the ability to change because any attempts at reversal (such as that of Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge Cambodia in the 1970s) guarantee a short-term crisis. The result is to postpone the decision-making to the future, to a much larger crisis.

This contemporary neo-classical economics ideology of immediate “growth” to combat poverty is more than just an illusion intended to divert focus from equality and sustainable resource management. It is an ideology that establishes continued short-term dependency on outside technology in order to continually resolve, every time in the short-term, the inevitable poverty that results after the benefits of the new technology have been exhausted by increased population and consumption and by increased social costs or declining quality of resources (and ultimately lower returns to the technology or to sale of an export good). Scientists refer to this process as “autocatalysis.” Start of a process becomes almost a chain reaction that accelerates the process in a way that is irreversible. Its long-term prognosis is collapse: resource exhaustion, famine, war, and collapse or extinction (Diamond, 2005, page 186).

Similar processes are underway today in industrial countries to prop up neo-classical economics doctrines; extorting funds to certain economic sectors in ways that also promote this vicious cycle. Rather than invest in public goods to promote sustainability with long term gains, elites seek short-term spending to maintain their current industries and workers in those industries, such as military and social control (prisons and police) and seek to maintain them no matter how productive they will be in the long run.

One could also describe what occurs as similar to an addiction. If “growth” and “trade” are introduced as “solutions,” the destabilization they create in the balance of consumption, production, and resources, ratchets up the need for more growth along the same lines. Currently in the U.S., the addiction to growth and fear of the unemployment that results when resources like oil are over-exhausted and when non-productive or inefficient industries and government spending become “too big to fail,” reinforces the call for the very processes of “growth” that worsen the problem; more subsidies to the failing industries, more exploitation of resources and elimination of regulation, more military spending to take resources. All of this is to “create (short-term) jobs.” In response, the increased militarism drives exploitation of the environment and militarism (and terrorism) in response. Like any addiction, this is just a short-term “fix” that drives the failures. Since the harms create a continuing incentive for the short-term addictive fix, the neo-classical economic doctrine of “growth” is reinforced rather than discarded and those who oppose it are painted as unpatriotic and wanting to cause pain to “workers” or “soldiers” in the non-productive industries, or opponents of “security”.

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Even the small countries most vulnerable to climate change, to militarism, and to changing export demands, are wedded to the short-term fix of environmental projects that “promote livelihoods” and boost consumption rather than protect resources, to more “growth policies,” and to more military spending in the paradoxical desire to be “rich and powerful” at the expense of their current resources and with increasing consumption demands, rather than future investments.

The economists’ focus on the short-term, with the doctrinal assumption that all goods are fungible and that systems are all self-correcting, prevents any long-term sustainability calculations or investments and helps to reinforce such addictive behavior.

In his work, *Collapse*, Jared Diamond poses the question, “What did the person cutting down the last remaining tree on Easter Island think when doing it?: given that we know in hindsight that the deforestation of the island was its death warrant making it uninhabitable (Diamond, 2005). He wonders how people were unable to think ahead and choose and seems unable to analogize it to contemporary experience where we have reason and science and “choice” to avoid economic disasters. If the Easter Island native were like those today who are raised on economic doctrine, the cutting of the tree may have been part of a system of beliefs driven entirely by fear and short-term needs. If this system of beliefs had been rigged such that neighbors were constantly in fear of violence of all forms (from group and individual “enemies”) the cutting of the tree would be essential to generate the weapons and wealth to protect against those enemies. The system of beliefs is such that the only “patriotic” solution is to consume and generate weapons and “protection,” even at the cost of destroying the future. In promoting the types of crimes for which they could be held liable, economists have rigged the global economy into a downward spiral (Lempert and Nguyen, 2011).
The Challenge: Where Do We Go From Here?

Science has a way of progressing on its own, though often at a slow or uneven pace. Sooner or later a society decides that a forgotten or repressed science and technology are in its interest and they invest in such work, it is recorded, and it becomes part of the body of human knowledge. It is difficult to say if economics and other social sciences will re-emerge as true social sciences in the lifetime of this author, but so much work has been done, fragmented among various disciplines, that it will at least continue underground and in some form, until there is an opportunity to do it systematically and with mainstream recognition.

How can we reverse the corruption of social science disciplines by money and military power and insulate social sciences so they can go forward in the broad, humanistic ways that (perhaps unlike the natural sciences, that often seem to go hand-in-hand with nationalism and empire) these disciplines need to survive?

- Corporations want to prepare employees and policy makers to promote their interests.
- Publishers are corporate and even research journals are now selling their space.
- Think tanks hire scholars to promote their ideologies and corporations endow chairs and hire armies of research assistants and secretarial services to promote their views and to crowd out competitive work.

Academics live with the pretense of objectivity, peer review, but it is permeated with financial influences, power and conflicts of interest that are unchallenged.

Political reality is that empires that are successful continue to promote the ideologies that underlie their success. In the world today, where much thinking among elites is still relatively short-term (despite the rational benefit of long-term thinking) and where technology and the economic doctrines that helped bring resources to major powers have contributed to that success, the only real challenges to economic doctrines will come in the countries that recognize the need to change and to invest in long term strategies. Empires are unsustainable but they accumulate power quickly as they rise. The doctrines of economics today reinforce the weapons spending and violation of rights (genocide, land invasions) that characterize successful empires of the West and East (China, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Japan, etc.) and oil rich autocracies of the Arab world. One can little expect these countries to suddenly change their approaches to that of sustainable development and stewardship for planetary survival when their leaders are oriented towards short-term consumption and when motivation is often anger and avoidance. Empire funds ideology of empire, not sustainable development, diversity, rule of law and diversity.

Within empires, can social sciences re-emerge to offer outlets for groups within those empires to look for solutions to some of their internal problems? One might suggest that some social sciences actually arose in the past to do this. If so, which disciplines could do this?

Disciplines today have become defined narrowly by methodologies rather than by research questions and discoveries. Academics today are promoting self-interest and many social scientists have defined that self-interest as using their fields for political platforms for interest groups or to protect peoples by seeking to destroy science all together, so it is not misused. But, there are also advantages to using social science to create change from within and to protect interests in a rational and scientific way.

No society completely rejects science or technology. Cultures only seek to limit their scope and protect certain beliefs about human power and action. The influence of Christianity (and similarly, Buddhist ideas of fate and some other religions) that limits social science in fear that it undermines what is considered sanctified in human action, is not completely incompatible with science. The idea of determinism is fearful but social science does not imply a lack of any human action. It implies probabilistic predictability, like Mendelian genetics. There are still random processes at work but science can predict the likely probably outcomes based on experience. Certain laws are at work and there is probabilistic evidence. What is not certain and pre-determined is what the specific outcome will be in each particular case.
There are reasons to think that self-interest could lead to a return to social science thinking and solutions, even if it only starts with short-term self-interest. Even if one suggests that the social sciences were only able to partly develop as social sciences in the early 20th century because of the need of Western empires to understand how to better meet the needs of their minorities and better understand how their systems worked so as to avoid instability, that was still enough to open the door to social science.

Psychology made the transition from a philosophical discipline of Freud and Jung to an experimental science looking at brain chemistry, genetics, environmental factors, and evolution. One could say it has also become driven by control objectives of advertising, political merchandising, and social control (as well as profit of drug companies creating needs and diseases in ways that also inject politics, ideology and pseudoscience). Yet, the idea of experimentation and comparison as well as ethical protocol is embedded in the discipline. Some would say it has become too driven by science because of the commercialization of drugs and genetic therapies and that it needs more ethical oversight of experiments and applications, but few would say that it has completely rejected science.

More likely, a “real” economics will go underground, developed by independent scholars, on the funds of the authors, depending on scholars in small countries or minority groups or with special interests in communities on the periphery who see social science and humanitarian work as a calling. This is costly to the human beings who make the sacrifices to do it and it is hard for science to break through the din of ideologies. Real science, however, has an advantage over ideology in that it can stand the test of time and can be verified. Work with little content is easy to clear away. Scientific ideas meet the challenges of proof and can be translated into technologies for human betterment. They ultimately stand out.

In Vietnam, a country with little commitment to sciences or to scientific thinking other than in the field of herbal medicine, I was astonished to hear the following story praising Chinese historians from 2,000 years ago for their willingness to die rather than violate their obligation to faithfully and truthfully record history. The Han Chinese Emperor summoned the chief royal historian to write about historical events that suggested the Emperor had deviated from tradition and to falsify the historic record. The historian noted his requirement to present an honest history. The Emperor had him beheaded and called in the deputy chief. He was told the same. The Emperor had him beheaded and brought in the third historian in line. This continued until every one of the Chinese historians was beheaded. All maintained their oath to the profession over the commitment to the Emperor; something also astonishing in a country where the traditions have largely been to worship the Emperor as a servant of Heaven, except (according to Confucian teachings) in times of crisis where the “contract” between the Emperor and the people is broken and one can challenge the Emperor.

Despite the current traditions in China to obey authority, and even weaker commitment to any kinds of ethics or professional codes in Vietnam, this story continued among the Chinese and into Vietnam with a sense of praise for the martyred historians. Moreover, there were also parallel stories of un-corruptible Chinese judges and Mandarins, respecting seemingly lost traditions.

This ethic survived for centuries and still has resonance as part of popular culture seeking to resurrect ancient traditions even in conflict with modern authority. That suggests that there must be a universal human understanding of scientific inquiry and its protection. While most “scholars” today would seem to fear beheading for upholding professional ethics and fighting for humanistic and scientific scholarship, times like these also call for return to principles, including those of universal law and empirical inquiry. Even in the face of strong religious invocations and ideologies, that basic understanding may also be part of human universal values and part of the full scope of human needs that goes well beyond the short-term self-interest assumed and practiced by contemporary economists and other scholars.
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24 See, for example, California’s Welfare and Institutions Code Sections 5150-5157. These sections offer the immediate justifications for confinement under mental health laws with the determination of medical professionals.

25 See, for example, studies like one done recently in Denmark, reported here, “Did You Study Business or Economics? Then You Might be a Psychopath, Claim Scientists,” by Tim Collins, May 4, 2017, [http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4473012/Studied-business-economics-psychopath.html](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4473012/Studied-business-economics-psychopath.html)

26 As I partly explain in *Escape from the Ivory Tower* (Lempert with Briggs, et. al., 1995) my own awakening to the failures of economics doctrines and of the training I received even at top universities in the U.S., came from interactions in the Third World and in poor areas of the U.S. with the very peoples the doctrines I was taught were supposed to be helping. This independent experience and confrontation of my beliefs, at a young age, was a rude wake-up call and forced me to abandon many of the doctrines that I had also been taught to accept. It led me to generate and test a new empirical social science curricula that included teaching of economics through laboratory field work and applied projects. Part of the reason I feel compassion for economists and offer the psychological analysis above is because I am able to reflect on my own reasons for studying economics and on the backgrounds, personalities, and motivations of classmates and teachers, including many of whom were minorities like myself (Jews and others), who felt awkward, and looked for disciplines that would offer recognition, acceptance, and high status. During my college career, I found the cold, unemotional and powerful appeal of economics and related fields to be seductive, including its ideologies of “greatest good for the greatest number” and its measures of industrial, technocratic “progress” that I
now recognize as in error. My confrontation with reality occurred in experiences where I was alone and forced to think; something that does not happen with economics students or professionals at universities or in institutional settings. Not only did my beliefs have to be continually confronted with reality, but I also had to recognize my own fears and needs in order to act rationally to overcome those fears.

Though unpublished, I have written a three volume work comprising a coherent system of political oversight that resurrects 18th century political principles that have all been effectively used in the past, and applies them to the institutions of the modern state (in the form of two sets of amendments to the U.S. constitution to restore federalism and individual rights). One of the two sets is presented in a published article, cited above, offering a model constitution for Ukraine, with some of the theory presented in a short published article that is also cited. The idea of the work was to “translate” existing legal and constitutional mechanisms that were already tested and established in the culture prior to the industrial revolution, but that had been lost since, into the contemporary context following the industrial revolution, to deal with the rise of corporations including mass media, and public bureaucracies including professional military and police powers. Although the U.S. and other countries claim their systems today are “democratic” because they use some of the limited mechanisms of 18th century political equality, the discarding of other mechanisms that assured effective balance of powers and managerial oversight have essentially rendered the remaining mechanisms mere ritual. One can go back to the actual principles of balance of powers and managerial oversight and control and reapply them so that they have real meaning. Today, however, curricula of political science, political economy, and law, have also removed such topics, thus creating the view among academic publishers that there is “no demand” to support publication of such work.

I lived and conducted research in Vietnam between 1998 and 2006 and completed two yet unpublished ethnographies of Vietnamese culture and history.
AN ECOLOGICAL ECONOMIST’S VIEW ON
“IS ECONOMICS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?
REMAKING ECONOMICS AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE”

Response

PETER SÖDERBAUM
Professor Emeritus, Mälardalen University

Introduction

Is mainstream economics with its many theories and recommendations compatible with international law, such as the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP, 2007) or the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development of 1992 (UN Rio Declaration, 1992)? Are globally renowned universities teaching economics in ways that violate international law? Can economics as a discipline be questioned in this way and held legally accountable? If so, who are the responsible persons or organizations to be prosecuted? Asking questions of this kind seems to be extremely relevant and timely.

As an ecological economist who has questioned the neoclassical mainstream, I find David Lempert’s challenge to contemporary economics to be thought-provoking in more ways than one. Lempert highlights that consumers and firms are the only entities in neoclassical theory while aspects of society and ‘culture’ are missing. Indigenous peoples (and cultures) are just one example of those public interests that are excluded. As economists, whether neoclassical or heterodox, we need to acknowledge that the neoclassical “allocation of scarce resources” and its ideas about rationality and efficiency can cause local and regional cultures to suffer.

As a heterodox economist focusing on issues of sustainable development I share Dr. Lempert’s call for scrutiny of mainstream economics in relation to ethical and legal principles. My subjective judgment is that the near monopoly position of neoclassical theory in economics education is dangerous to various communities and the global society at large. It is a threat not only to local cultures but also to humankind. It is the monopoly and the protection of this monopoly that is at fault. Neoclassical theory is not wrong when it preaches competition but what is needed is competition and pluralism as a challenge to neoclassical theory, itself.

Economics as Science and Ideology: Restructuring the Discipline to Benefit Society

Lempert’s central premise is that economics pretends to be a science but actually hides value-judgments (ideologies) representing specific political interests in ways that violate public purposes. In his piece, he extends some previous critiques that recognize the need for values in social science and adds an approach to assure that such values reflect public interest and law. Previously, some Nobel Prize winners have confronted the issue of value neutrality, but without a solution to the dilemma of how to assure that value-driven social science reflects public purpose. Dr. Lempert opens the door to solutions.

The so called “Nobel Prize in economics” is well known and Lempert critiques how it has seemingly reinforced a certain set of values and a specific approach in the discipline. This prize, that should more
correctly be termed “the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel”, is in my judgment questionable, but even some of its winners have also seemed to challenge the award’s basis. Gunnar Myrdal, who was awarded the prize in 1974, is known for his argument that we cannot refer to value-neutrality in economics research and education:

“Valuations are always with us. Prior to answers there must be questions. There can be no view except from a [political] viewpoint. In the questions raised and viewpoint chosen, valuations are implied.” (Myrdal, 1978, p. 778)

While Myrdal uses the term values or rather “valuations” in the above citation, I prefer the term ‘ideology’ or ‘ideological orientation’ since it helps to focus on what is wrong.

In a democratic society, politicians and political parties refer to their ideology in attempts to attract citizens. Citizens then respond to such invitations in one way or another suggesting that they, too, have ideological orientations. Ideology here reflects ‘means-ends relationships’ guiding behavior. Differences in ideology in society are healthy. Individuals differ with respect to ideological orientation and such differences are relevant in a democratic society in the marketplace of ideas. Some persons may hold an extreme market ideology while others may try to reorient their behavior towards a more sustainable lifestyle or mission. Therefore, in the political arena, ideology serves a role.

Not many economists use ‘ideology’ as part of their vocabulary or recognize that it has entered social science but Douglass North is one. He writes,

“By ideology, I mean the subjective perceptions (models, theories) all people possess to explain the world around them. Whether at the micro-level of individual relationships or at the macro-level of organized ideologies providing integrated explanations of the past and the present, such as communism or religions, the theories individuals construct are colored by normative views of how the world should be organized (North, 1990, p. 23, emphasis in original)

Many assume that individuals are guided by their ideological orientation which may contain short term and/or long-term elements, be narrow or broad, complete or fragmented, certain or uncertain. Ideologies may vary over time and situation or context. Mathematical functions to be optimized are a special case of ideology found in economics rather than the only possible ideology that could shape the research questions and applications of the discipline. The ideological orientation of individuals as actors is broader than the ‘utility’ of individuals as consumers (or as actors in other roles) that is the basis of neoclassical economic theory. This reference to utility does not invite studies examining how individual ‘A’ assesses his/her utility compared to individual ‘B’. Some other vocabulary is clearly needed if the field is to reflect the full set of economic interests and actions of human beings.

Democratizing Economics: Promoting Pluralism

Dr. Lempert refers to international law when he argues that economics and actors connected with economics (professors, Departments of Economics, universities) need to be scrutinized and held accountable. He offers a standard for determining which approaches are in violation of law. In my view, there is another important concern in a democratic society for the social sciences; not just whether one ideological approach violates international law, but whether there is an adequate pluralism of competing social scientific approaches that reflect those different values and ideas that are fully within the boundaries of international law. I suggest that economics can also be expanded to reflect a standards of pluralism of ideas that are necessary and expected components of social science and its applications in a democracy. This is the expectation found in key elements in the national constitutions of countries such as USA and Sweden (Söderbaum and Brown, 2010).
It is a fact that neoclassical theory is specific in ideological terms. It is also a fact that neoclassical theory in economics education holds a close to monopoly position in my own country and many other countries where Gregory Mankiw’s textbook “Economics” (2011) or similar textbooks are used. Considering that ideology is behind what is described as a scientific discipline, a monopoly for one theory, in this case neoclassical theory, is not compatible with democracy and a democratic society. University departments of economics in fact today play political propaganda role beyond any scientific achievements. Beliefs in the wonderful performance of markets, monetary profits in business and self-interest by consumers are legitimized by this ideological role.

One way out of this that fits the goal of democracy is to promote pluralism in economics. Rather than promoting competitive political interests through political representation in universities, I believe in a return to the teaching of the history of economic ideas, focusing on the changes in dominant schools of thought along with consideration of heterodox schools. If neoclassical economics is judged not to respond so well to the challenge of sustainable development, for instance, then ecological economics (which claims to be “economics for sustainable development”) may be worth trying. Instead of “paradigm shift” ideas (Kuhn 1970), I favor a promotion of “paradigm coexistence” (Söderbaum, 2000). As part of the more democratic “paradigm coexistence”, there will likely be a ‘shift in [the] dominant paradigm’.

A Note on Theory of Science: How Economics Can Do it Right

I believe Dr. Lempert is correct that economics needs to follow the principles and methods of science and social science. At the same time, I offer a challenge to colleagues to widen their scientific questions and paradigms within each social science field.

In economics, proponents of neoclassical theory have attempted to borrow ideas about science and scientific work from physics. Lempert finds them to be hypocritical and to substitute ideology for science. In the classic view of science, hypotheses should be tested, controlled experiments are to be encouraged (but seldom accomplished, in my experience), bias is to be avoided and “value neutrality” is to be observed. This positivist idea of science is what critics refer to as the “physics envy” aspect of neoclassical theory, education and research. If value neutrality in economics and other social sciences is an illusion (von Egan-Krieger, 2014) and we need to recognize that science must go hand in hand with values (i.e., those that meet the requirements of international law), then we may think of scientific work in more than one way. We need not pretend that objectivity and neutrality in any final sense is possible and can deal with our values and ideologies more openly. A democratic society is characterized by the existence of more than one political party and by respect for differences in ideological orientation and so, too, can social science work with pluralistic scientific approaches.

Neoclassical theory can be described as attempts to find regularities about consumers, firms or other subjects: “Consumers maximize utility subject to monetary constraints”, “Firms maximize monetary profits” and, as part of public choice theory, “Farmers cooperate in rent-seeking behaviour”. At the macro level, the doctrines are that “nations maximize economic growth in GDP-terms (hopefully) subject to some constraints”. In cases of investments in infrastructure, “Public interest is assessed by using (neoclassical) Cost-Benefit Analysis”.

Similarly, the more recent interest in psychology and “behaviour economics”, including “nudging”, reflects an attempt to find ways of influencing behaviour of all individuals in specific situations. Though this subfield partially reflects pluralism in economics (by bringing in psychology to study some of the things that economists previously studied) and may provide some answers to specific questions, the approach appears to me to be a bit mechanistic and recalls what I view as the “physics envy” syndrome.

I agree with Dr. Lempert that going back to larger and more important social questions with economic dimensions is the way to spark a diversity of social scientific approaches in economics. Another way is to start by looking at peoples and concerns that do not fit existing models and seeking to build more incorporative models, overall (but not to fragment disciplines into just promotion of those individual groups and concerns). As an example of the empirical basis for new modelling, I was once asked to
participate in a session about public choice theory as part of the conference with the International Economic Association in Athens, in 1990. Since I am not enthusiastic about public choice theory my presentation was accordingly entitled, “What is the alternative to public choice theory?” I argued that if we observe farmers carefully we find differences between them. Some are conventional farmers while others so-called eco-farmers. Within the category of eco-farmers, we find additional differences. In a democratic society such differences between individuals (or organizations) as actors are worth studying and are perhaps more important than similarities and expected regularities.

Some economists will continue try to improve mathematical models of forecasting and will refer to basic assumptions in neoclassical theory and what they see as established theory and knowledge in order to try to retain their place in the discipline. In my view, that is a dead end. Instead, the main task ahead is to look for a new conceptual framework and language of economics. We may even need different conceptual frameworks for different fields in economics. For sustainable development (and perhaps also other fields of research in economics) we need to start with a different definition of economics, such as:

> “multidimensional management of limited resources in a democratic society”
> (Söderbaum, 2017, p. 34)

‘Multidimensional’ means that we can take some of the 17 UN sanctioned Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that include concerns like equity and justice and avoid reducing them to their alleged monetary equivalents. In a democracy no consensus can be assumed about the idea of valuing everything in monetary terms and about “correct values” for each kind of impact for purposes of assessment at the societal level. This “trade-off” philosophy in monetary terms is rather part of the problem today with economics.

The goal of promoting a democratic and pluralistic economics points in the direction of making each actor participate in society in a responsible and accountable way. This in turn suggests that we need to elaborate our ideas about individuals and organizations as actors as well as our understanding of their relationships in networks, markets and other institutions within the study of economics, including those ways that Dr. Lempert’s piece suggests. We need alternatives to neoclassical *Homo Oeconomicus*, to profit-maximizing firms, to markets understood in terms of supply and demand. We also need to replace neoclassical Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) with multidimensional approaches such as Positional Analysis (Brown et al., 2017). In accordance with an emphasis on democracy and pluralism, the neoclassical Economic Man needs to be replaced with the Political Economic Person, while the profit-maximizing firm needs to be replaced with the concept of Political Economic Organization, and so on.

**A New Economics: Offering a Challenge to our Political-Economic System**

Reforming the discipline of economics is not simply a matter of encouraging competition within the discipline but also of the kinds of legal and political challenges and accountability that Dr. Lempert’s article raises. While we aim at sustainable development we need to also admit that present development approaches are unsustainable in many parts of the world and that changes are needed in politics and in education as well as in policies regarding contemporary economic institutions, themselves.

In the final sections of his article, Dr. Lempert points to the power of transnational corporations alongside many vested interests in present unsustainable trends. Radical changes in laws and regulations of individuals and organizations can therefore not be excluded from the politics of achieving sustainability. The behavior of transnational organizations in the oil and mining industries is such that we must consider the possibility that joint stock companies need new public regulatory approaches including restructuring of economic enterprises and their models of operations.

Departments of economics and the university context are in need of transformation. I agree with Dr. Lempert that the neoclassical mainstream model of economists with their references to value-neutrality and their preferences for mathematical modelling is often devoid of reality and too many of my
colleagues, have organized their work to reduce or eliminate responsibility. We need to discuss University Social Responsibility (USR) as much as we need to discuss Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). We may need legal reforms to replace those who do not take democracy in economics, or the rights of indigenous people, seriously. “Nudging” within the scope of present regulations is probably not enough.

In making reforms, even public choice theory may have something to offer. We should look at individuals as actors but we also need to study collectives of actors in networks, organizations and cultures. As I see it, the “rent-seeking” model can very well be applied to describe neoclassical economists as a category. Perhaps we can speak of the culture of neoclassical economists. I hope that there will be a segment of neoclassical economists, themselves, who will support the idea that also universities need to be scrutinized in relation to sustainable development and democracy as a way to restore the integrity of the discipline.

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Response

UGO MATTEI
Alfred and Hanna Fromm Distinguished Professor of International and Comparative Law
UC Hastings and Professor of Civil Law at University of Turin, Italy

“Is Economics in Violation of International Law?” is both the title and the research question of this very ambitious work by David Lempert. The work boils down to a frontal critique of economics, the queen of social sciences, both in its mainstream i.e. neoclassical, marginalist economics and in its anthropologist’s version, i.e. economic anthropology.

The critique however, rather than being carried on in its own terms takes, so to say, the perspective of a very broad legal question. The author questions economics from the point of view of international law claiming that the values and principles of international legal coexistence are at odds with those underpinning economics.

Dr. Lempert also says that because economics is an ideology rather than a science the issue of whether it is contrary to international law is politically and intellectually relevant. Indeed ideology is part of the political and institutional construction of the reality.

In the spirit of a vigorous dialogue between scholars sharing a critical agenda I will not devote time to describe the impressive wealth of erudition and knowledge in economics, law anthropology, humanities and social science displayed by the author. Readers will be able to realize from themselves that they are in front of a quite impressive accomplishment. I will rather point out at two fundamental remarks that make me think critically of the research question in general and some of its assumptions in particular.

The epistemological assumptions of Dr. Lempert’s work exude positivism both in its legal and in its scientific form. The distinction between science and ideology, to begin with, is assumed as if it existed in the sky. Is there a science that is not ideology? Most recently, Fritjof Capra and I have approached the issue in The Ecology of Law. Toward a Legal System in Tune with Nature and Community (2015). Historical reconstruction available since Marx’s discussion of the primitive accumulation show how ideological has been the scientific method of Descartes, Bacon, Galileo and Newton. “Hard” scientists now co-exist with humanists, having abandoned the tight separation between subject and object, especially because the tools of observation clearly determine what is observed. Social scientists find it hard to accept this early twentieth century epistemological revolution because the conclusion it produces is nothing less than the political acceptance of the impossibility to distinguish the is from the ought to be. The distinction between science and ideology, that between the is and the ought to be, and that between the subject and the object of observation are all legacies of mechanistic thought and scientific positivism questionable from both a phenomenological and an ecological perspective.

Lempert compares “Economics” his reified object of observation with “International Law” another reified entity. Is there such a thing as an International law “out there” to be described, ontologically different from the interpretation and the political praxis of its authors, governments, transnational corporations, non-governmental organizations or even resisting social movements? How can one say that
an idealized objectified form (economics) is contrary to another such form (international law) without considering that both are the product and the outcome of political processes?

The vision of international law that Lempert shows is moreover highly positivistic even in the more narrow meaning of legal positivism. Even lawyers lacking the impressive interdisciplinary background of the author feel that international law, among all the areas of the law, is the one most at odds with notions of legal positivism because of the lack of a centralized authority. In international law not only the subjects and the object are fused in each-other (which I claim is the case in every aspect of law) but there is no clear hierarchy of sources of law that can at least make the most narrow legal positivists hide behind a fig leaf.

Because of what I argued above, the test of international legal compatibility of economics is a suggestive metaphor to add weight to the political critique of mainstream economics that must be understood as such, outside of its claim of being based on a better scientific standard (whatever this means).

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THE NONSENSE AND NON-SCIENCE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
A POLITICALLY INCORRECT VIEW OF ‘POLY-T(r)IC(k)s’

POLLY SLY, PH.D.

Abstract

The purpose of this short essay is to highlight the failures in contemporary Political Science by sketching a small model of what the discipline would look like if it were in fact a “discipline” driven by scientific questions and methods responsive to public benefit rather than to indoctrination and control. Rather than simply accept, on faith, the “expert” assurances of quality, or the subject labels or claims of “inclusiveness” and “representation”, this essay offers some questions and alternatives that the educated public can use to hold the discipline to its mission and to assure that it is not simply serving itself and power.

“None of the social sciences can predict worth a damn.
It’s not just in economics but in political science, in sociology.
We tried to make predictions, and they didn’t work out.
That has created a kind of failure of nerve.”
— Seymour Martin Lipset, a professor of political science and sociology at Stanford U.’s Hoover Institution (1985)

Introduction:

A poll of American Ph.D. “political scientists” some 50 years ago found that two out of three “agreed” or “strongly agreed” that much of what was considered “scholarship” in their discipline was “superficial and trivial” and most discussion was “little more than hair splitting and jargon” (1964 study, cited in Ollmann, 2015, p. 1). It seems that little has changed today.

If you ask a contemporary Political Science Ph.D. today to define the basic research questions of the discipline, the definition of key terms that would constitute the building blocks of a discipline, and the benefits to humanity from such a discipline, they will likely look at you in bewilderment before spouting a stream of apologetic jargon that leaves you feeling like the discipline is stuck back in the time of Plato’s Republic (380 B.C.E.) and Aristotle’s Poetics (335-323 B.C.E.) combined only with mass survey data and computer printouts.

While Political Science teaches, in its subfields of Public Policy and Public Administration, the need for setting clear goals and objectives that are in the form of “missions” and “visions” to solve specific problems in ways that are measurable, publicly accountable and ethical (Barry, 1984; Brown and Moore, 2001; Bryson, 1988; Emmanuel, Merchant and Oatley, 1990), none of this applies today to the discipline, itself. That contradiction suggests either that the discipline itself is a fraud or (more likely), that it is another unaccountable, corrupt bureaucracy now desperately in need of reform.

In theories of accountability and public administration, professions devote themselves to technical excellence and work to enforce those standards of excellence on their members in order to maintain their

Author: Please direct all correspondence to the author, care of Brooks Duncan at: brooks.duncan@yahoo.com.
reputations and their public support. The mechanisms of public funding, competition, and legal enforcement (prosecution and civil suits) work to maintain standards.

In the area of academia, where the work of the professions is that of advancing and disseminating knowledge, the standards follow the idea of “discipline” in which there are basic research questions and specific problems to be solved, measurable technical skills for solving the problems, measures for comparative success in teaching the skills and concepts, public and private benefits of application, and ethical concerns, the assumption is that these missions and measures are regularly reported and that there are also effective systems of feedback and accountability. The assumptions are that the public exerts direct accountability through the choices of students and what they study, through public funding decisions, and by private funding, and that academics in the discipline also agree to see their work as a “calling” with human advancement, public benefit, and intellectual progress as their sworn objectives.

For decades, however, it has appeared that these assumptions may be wrong, both for specific university disciplines like Political Science, and for the functioning of governments (and public and private markets). Whether the result of pressures of controlling military bureaucracies and/or other elites (Schrecker, 1986) or economic institutions (corporations) and other forms of economic power (Lindblom, 1977) or all of these, coordinating with each other (Mills, 1956), the idea of independent, professional, accountable academic disciplines may be a myth. Similarly, as Charles Lindblom, then President of the American Political Science Association, noted in 1981, the idea of government agencies and political parties working on behalf of public interest and the long-term human future rather than for their own individual or institutional benefit, or for the benefit of specific elites interests, may also be a false assumption, if not an agreed mythology (or ideology) of the political science profession (Lindblom, 1981).

Neither the exposure of the failures of accountability of academic disciplines, nor the failures of specific disciplines like Political Science, to challenge systematic biases and its own contradictions between what it teaches/preaches and what it does, itself, have led to any internal changes or any external oversight and/or pressure for change.

Rather than view Political Science as a “discipline” answering specific scientific questions about human group behaviors in the political sphere, for long-term human benefit, as a result of rigorous codes and public oversight, one might view the “discipline”, instead as an example of an unaccountable bureaucracy, promoting the self-interest of its members, seeking status and funding in areas where it would have advantage (government management) in the service of and collusion with powerful actors in their sphere of interest (military powers, police powers, media, and other political elites) and as a bridge for other elites seeking political access and political power (economic elites) and helping them maintain power. This short-circuiting and corruption of institutions is among those areas studied by Political Scientists, particularly in their applied sub-disciplines (public administration) and in those systems that are disparaged as failures, but with assurance that the lens is rarely, if ever, turned back on Political Science or on the powers-that-be that they serve.

At a time when some of renegade Political Scientists have begun to break ranks and declare so-called “democracies” as in the very opposite of how they have been painted, and in-fact either oligarchies (Gilens and Page, 2014) or “inverted totalitarian regimes” (Wolin, 2003), it appears that it has been Political Science that has also been subverted and that was responsible for much of the “inverting”. The actual role of Political Scientists today seems to have become the training of bureaucratic Kafkaesque functionaries (Kafka, 1922; Whyte, 1956) and the (“wannabee”) political class for manufacturing consent (Chomsky and Hermann, 2002) and controlling the mass public and “detering dissent” (Chomsky, 1977).

The purpose in this short essay is to highlight the failures in contemporary Political Science by sketching a small model of what the discipline would look like if it were in fact a “discipline” driven by scientific questions and methods responsive to public benefit rather than to indoctrination and control. Rather than simply accept, on faith, the “expert” assurances of quality, or the subject labels or claims of “inclusiveness” and “representation”, this essay offers some questions and alternatives that the educated public can use to hold the discipline to its mission and to assure that it is not simply serving itself and power.
This essay will offer a short overview of what one finds in the institutions of Political Science today, a point by point analysis of its failures in meeting the requirements of an academic discipline (question, definitions, boundaries, methodologies; a discussion of the role/social function it would serve as a public benefit social science and the role it actually does seem to serve with comparisons to similar roles in major empires; and then some thoughts for the future².

**Problematic Roots and Recent Degeneration of the “Discipline”:**

From its past until today, one way to easily recognize the confusion and failure of the discipline of Political Science is to see what isn’t there; fundamental disciplinary questions and then use of the scientific method to provide answers and to raise new questions to build on what is confirmed.

At the basis of an academic discipline are a set of intellectual questions and at the basis of a social science discipline are the initial experiments that test hypotheses and seek to begin to build basic predictive models in answer to the original questions. Yet if one explores both the people and works of those whom Political Scientists herald as their “founders”, along with the general documents today that describe the state of the discipline and seek to describe it to others, there is little to be found other than confusion. For these failures in the discipline to have existed this long and to this extent suggests that this confusion is in the discipline’s design and is in the interests of those who control it.

**The Lack of Actual Origins and Founding of the Discipline:**

The history of established disciplines is usually to identify thinkers who began to pose the discipline’s original questions and to then identify those who began to use the scientific method (testing hypotheses with experiment/data) in providing the first answers, as well as to indicate when specific questions were set in frameworks either within larger fields or next to those of other fields. The fact that Political Scientists cannot agree on these today is itself good evidence that no real discipline has yet to form and no real social science of Political Science has emerged.

European and North American Political Scientists originally identified the founders of the discipline as Plato (380 B.C.E.) given his writings and teachings defining a “Republic” and governing institutions and Aristotle (335 to 323 B.C.E.) for his writings and teachings on “politics”. Both began to define the terms that political scientists still use (like “democracy”) and some ideals of government, but beyond definitions and moral arguments they didn’t clearly identify sets of disciplinary questions.

If these ethical principles and observations are considered early Political Science, it would then be difficult to exclude early religious and legal teachings like those of Moses (from nearly another millennium before the Greeks) or the writings and teachess of Confucius (564/480 to 484/400 B.C.E.) in China, on governance a century before the Greek philosophers. Although these are not included, the effort to accept some Asian origins of Political Science does allow the inclusion of Chanakya (4th Century B.C.E.).

Others say that Political Science really started with Machiavelli’s work in 16th century Italy with his advice on ruling a principality, derived from his practicing experience (1513). But if Machiavelli’s practical experience in maintaining power is considered “political science”, then it would seem that the claims of military generals on their use of (military) power in international relations would also qualify as Political Science, such as that of Sun Tzu in China (5th Century B.C.E.).

Assuming these are really just the records of observers and practitioners and not the actual discipline of Politics, then the question is when the first experiments were conducted to test hypotheses about political behavior in order to predict specific phenomena. Here, there is also confusion and a failure to establish logical boundaries with other fields.

Where is the science and the first proof of hypothesis testing? In the United States, many departments start with the French government officials Tocqueville and Beaumont who travelled to the U.S. for comparative studies of different aspects of government and who tried to explain the differences (Tocqueville, 1835-40; Beaumont, 1835). What they did, however, was not hypothesis testing. It was
more like what the humanities and non-science of social anthropology does today in using journalistic methods to raise larger questions.

Perhaps closer to science is the work of Emile Durkheim (1893) and Max Weber (1947 [1925]) describing governmental and corporate bureaucracy and their form of organization in mass society. Indeed, the study of government bureaucracy and influences of corporate and economic power are now staple aspects of Political Science. Neither of these approaches, however, are considered Political Science, because they do not start with “government”. So while they may have largely founded the contemporary Political Science sub-discipline of Political Economy, they are still viewed as “Sociologists”.

Political Scientists also began in the mid-19th century to apply Charles Darwin’s concept of evolution, from biology, to human systems, in an effort to provide what they called “scientific” explanations of political hierarchies, internal to societies and in their international relations in theories of “social Darwinism” (Morgan, 1877) and other explanations of “social evolution” (Marx, 1867). Morgan’s work has now been abandoned but Marx’s theories are still cited by segments of Political Science professors like the “New Political Science” (sic) adherents. Given that neither the work of Morgan or Marx has become the consensus basis for predictions in the discipline, neither would seem to qualify as the founding social science, though it is arguable that some of Marx’s propositions were hypotheses of political change that have been shown valid through testing. Nevertheless, there seems to be little effort today to distinguish the proven theorems for prediction from theories that were more akin to ideological (or religious) assumptions about human nature that cannot be tested or that are not valid for predicting political phenomenon and that are used, instead, to try to change beliefs and promote policy.

If there is any primary statement of Political Science questions that is understood as the core of the discipline, perhaps it may be found in the title of Harold Lasswell’s book, Who Gets What, When, How, but it did not appear until 1936.

This inability or unwillingness of the discipline to establish those aspects that meet the name of the discipline as “science” and those aspects that are just an humanities, continues. While there is a sub-field of “Political Theory” that one might assume would fill the role of the humanities aspects of the field, to question the direction of causality and on types of variables, to speculate on new theories and models that could then be scientifically tested and to offer thought experiments (in forms of utopian/dystopian models) and raise ethical and moral questions that could be tested in some way, the roles of science and humanities in the discipline remain in confusion.

The Lack of Boundaries and Clarity on the Placement of Political Science with Other Social Sciences and the Relation of its Scientific Theory to Technical Applied Sub-Fields

As a science, Political Science should logically fit alongside other social sciences with a clear division of questions and subject matter, and it should also have two clear levels of its own; one for science and one for technical applications of the science. It does not have either.

Fit within the Social Science

Along with a lack of clarity on basic questions and lack of commitment to the scientific method as the second missing essential founding block of the discipline, Political Science has also never clearly defined the boundaries of its study and its fit with other disciplines and social sciences. This has also been a source of confusion.

At its core, there does seem to be a basic logic of the sub-disciplines within Political Science that can be depicted diagrammatically. Most Political Sciences have roughly eight sub-areas: six of them thematic that can be depicted in three levels, and two of them functional areas serving the discipline (Political Theory and Methodology).

Figure 1 presents the six sub-areas in these three different levels.
The central core area of the discipline is Comparative Politics. To establish itself as a discipline, Political Science has to at least list different kinds of political systems and compare them. A sub-area of this core is the study of the domestic system of the home country of the Political Scientist.

At a more global level, different political systems interact with each other. The word that Political Scientists use is “International” Relations rather than the real term, which should be “Political System” relations.

At a micro level are the specific institutions of government and politics. In most systems, there are executive agencies to administer funds and to use force, legislative agencies to arbitrate funding and oversight, and judicial agencies to handle disputes. Though there are three areas, most current Political Science scholars only recognize the executive agencies, calling the field Public Administration. Of course, there are also other political actors influencing or educating the public and government, but they are not studied separately as institutions.

The field of Political Economy is essentially an enlargement or an addition to the field of Comparative Politics, adding economic institutions and their interrelationships with government and political actors. Modern corporate forms both influence and are regulated by governments and are part of the expanded concept of Comparative Politics.

Public Policy is an output of government and part of the activity of politics but it touches on every sphere: health, environment, resources, food, clothing, and shelter. It is not directly a subject of Political Science but rather of these other fields, with a governance dimension.

Although the sub-fields of Political Science do have this internal logic, the confusion occurs in the relation of the studies to the general social science study of human behavior. Figure 2 presents the problem in the form of a chart.

When the social sciences began to emerge as separate disciplines in the 19th century, they began to divide their areas of study on the basis of areas of analysis. The first segregation of levels was relatively easy. Humans exist in groups and behavior can be studied at the group level, and they have individual behaviors that can be studied at the individual level. Psychology generally studies behavior at the individual level, including individual behaviors of individual humans within groups. The other main social sciences study behavior at the level of groups. There is not yet a clear linkage between these two levels of study. Figure 2 depicts the two levels.

At the level of groups, we recognize human behavior in a number of levels of groups, from family units to communities to humanity as a species. The social sciences have generally been ordered in ways that recognize two cohesive and long-standing units, of “culture” (ethnic-language groups in particular geographic environmental niches) and of complex “society” (multiple cultures together in the form of large political and social units of empires or nation-states). The two disciplines that study these two levels are Sociology (the level of society) and Anthropology (the level of human cultures, from the evolution of primates and differentiation of humans to historical human groups to modern ethnic and language groups and then clusters of cultures). The upper boundary of anthropology has been a bit blurred with sociology since complex societies are cultures of cultures and also may be considered “cultures”, so there is bit of a blurring in “social anthropology”.

Within the level of culture at all levels are three recognized groupings of human institutions and functions that became the other three basic social sciences: Economics (for economic functions and systems), Political Science for political functions and systems, and Sociology (for social functions like education and care, and smaller units like the family, community, and other age groups and networks). This hierarchy is shown in the upper left side of Figure 2.

The problem is that Political Science has not clearly meshed within this framework and that is why the discipline, depicted in Figure 1, is shown in Figure 2 in three possible places that essentially overlap.

By the logic of the social sciences, Political Science should focus on the functions and institutions of Politics and government at the level of culture, both in individual cultures (and across the scope of cultures from primates to historical cultures to contemporary cultures) and in the “cultures” of complex
societies. As a social science, it would integrate its perspectives by working at these different levels of culture.

Yet, for reasons that seem to be purely ideological (and perhaps religiously motivated, in order to avoid recognizing evolution and the connection of humans to nature), Political Science has chosen not to fit itself within the level of human cultures, evolution of humans (and the politics of primates), or most of human history. It has avoided the study of “Intercultural Relations” of political systems and political determinants and organization of cultures and has substituted only relations of the European, colonially imposed “nation states” and the colonial governing systems of nation states at the level of “nation states”. That is what is clearly implied by the sub-discipline of “International Relations”. The implication of the structure of the entire discipline is that it is defined by a political mission to further nation states rather than to study the actual science of politics and government. “Comparative Politics” is essentially the study of “Comparative Nation-State Colonial and Post-Colonial Systems” and “Public Administration” is essentially the study of “Colonial Government Administration” rather than of the actual scope of human political action and governance at all levels.

The actual boundaries that Political Science has set in relation to fields like anthropology and sociology, seems to be for these political ideological reasons rather than for disciplinary ones, described in the following sections. The sub-disciplines of “Political Sociology” and “Political Anthropology” reflect the distortions created by the inability of Political Science to actually fit itself as a social science within social sciences. The result is not only a confusion within these two other disciplines that has also fragmented study into specific types of systems and specific times, and thus destroyed the ability of any of them to actually produce a coherent science that works across all cases (the basic requirement of a science) but has also made it impossible for them to come together to build a social science of politics and government.

At the same time, apparently in the effort to control political behaviors within the context of the nation-state, at the micro-levels, Political Science has also broken the barrier between the levels of analysis of human behaviors, at the group level and at the individual level, largely defining itself within these restricted frameworks of levels of analysis (1961) with disputes on the levels mostly within this framework, and has become a second discipline of Psychology in the area of seeking to predict and control individual behaviors for applications of political hegemony.
It is a bit ironic that in making this observation, Lipset may have also been referring to his own failure of nerve. His major theoretical contribution, the correlation between wealth (“modernization”) and “democracy”, is somewhat spurious given that the measure of “democracy” implies the loss of one’s cultural differences and rights to measures of production and
consumption and values that are defined as “modernization”. The two definitions are measuring the same cultural values and are of course correlated given that they are measuring acceptance (or forced acceptance) of the same ideology and its authority.

2 For purposes of terminology, rather than putting words in quotations (""") to indicate irony and degeneration of the language to denote the opposite of its earlier meaning (what Orwell would call “Newspeak” or “Doublepeak” (Orwell, 1949; Lutz, 1997)), this essay will use the words “Political Science” without putting the word “science” or “political” in quotes, though the current “true” meaning, in the view of this author that would be more appropriate would be either “Political Theology” (in the sense of being ideological dogma and political ideology (Chomsky, 2002) and maintaining itself as a religious order with rituals, and not in the sense of promoting a specific religion (Rousseau, 1762; Bella, 1967) or state or civic religion (Schmitt, 1996 [1932]), though there are aspects of that, too) or “Politic(ized) Science”. Similarly, the word “discipline” will be used to connote the institutional structures of the profession (its graduates, professors, and members of its association, as well as its academic departments, institutes and journals) even though the author believes the more appropriate terminology today would be “indiscipline” or “business/industry” (noting that it exists for its own corporate business interest, rather than an actual scholarly or humanitarian public benefit purpose) or “cabal” (given that it is a self-perpetuating collective existing for its own benefit and does not produce anything substantive, unlike a business or industry) or, perhaps, “priesthood/ministry” (given that it is not very different from a religious order).
Figure 2. Fit of Political Science into the Framework of the Social Sciences
Disciplinary Hierarchy of Theory and Application

Were Political Science to fit into the framework of a humanistic social science, it would also have a clear hierarchy between pure science and technical (technological) applications of that science as well as a clear set of ethical principles assuring the humanitarian oversight and use of the technologies to assure human well-being and advancement. In fact, there are aspects of Political Science that are predictive and scientific and there are existing disciplines that apply the predictions of Political Science as “technologies” (essentially a form of “social engineering”). The problem is that there is no systematic recognition of these relationships and there is very little humanistic ethical and legal oversight to assure that the technologies are used to promote humanitarian goals rather than elite goals of exploitation and control.

Table 1 systematically presents both the existing and possible technological fields of “Applied Political Science” in direct relationship to the existing sub-fields of Political Science, described above. It is unclear if Political Science as a discipline and Political Scientists are consciously aware of this structure as a whole, though parts of it are clearly recognized, such as the teaching of “Diplomacy” as an adjunct of the “science” of International Relations.

The left column of the chart presents the sub-fields of Political Science, including those implicit but not explicitly recognized fields like Legislative Administration, Judicial Administration, and “Inter-cultural Relations” (as a subset of “International” Relations). Next to it is the technical application field. Some of these are already recognized and named, like Diplomacy, but others do not exist as specific “disciplines” even though they may be recognized as professional categories (such as “Democracy Building” and “Good Governance” in the area of “International Development” interventions).

Since there is currently no clear ethical oversight or public or legal oversight of these disciplines and they have emerged freely, the second and third columns of the table are designed to suggest both the humanitarian uses of these technologies (and specific kinds of professionals who do or could apply them) and the short-term, self-interested or political elite controlling objectives of these technologies.

The final column recognizes the professionals who perform administrative roles related to these technologies and who may also be trained in them at a lower level.

What Table 1 reveals is not only the large number of applied technologies that actually rely on Political Science as a science, to drive the development of applications (some nine categories, including the mixed category area of “Policy” but not including the non-science subfield of Political Theory, that can promote the science of Political Science and that has applications, but is not really a technology). It also reveals how many of these areas cannot find science in Political Science and have begun to seek it from other social sciences or new “disciplines”. The role of Political Science in Human Rights, in Peace Studies, in International Development, in Judicial Administration and Legislative Administration, is ambiguous. Civic Education/Political socialization and social control are now in sociology. Jurisprudence (the Science of Law/Law and Social Science) is almost non-existent. All of this represents a confusion and failure in Political Science.
Table 1. Idealized View of Political Science as a Science with Technical Applications, Noting Ethical Obligations and Risk of the Technologies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Fields in Political Science Departments (Missing areas in Italics)</th>
<th>Technical/Applied Field</th>
<th>Administrative Functionary Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comparative Politics (At the system level)</td>
<td>Political System Engineering (“Democracy and (Good) Governance”)</td>
<td>Project Administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building Democracy, Autonomy, Sustainability, Human Rights (Progress): Humanitarian statesman/women</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic (e.g. “American”) Politics and Law (An Example of a Domestic system, over time)</td>
<td>Global Harmonization: Neo-colonial administration/Globalization;</td>
<td>Civic Educators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Relations (At the global level, between nation-state systems and also, potentially, internally between cultures)</td>
<td>Political Reformers, Public Advocates and Watchdogs</td>
<td>Pundits/ Propagandists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diplomacy (Foreign Service, Foreign Affairs)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diplomacy (Peacemakers/ Negotiators); Heritage protection and education</td>
<td>Translators, Case workers,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diplomacy (Praetors for Control/ Assimilation and Espionage for Regime Change)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human Rights Lawyers building constitutions and rule of law systems for cultural and individual rights</td>
<td>NGO Functionaries for short-term benefits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>“Rightswash” missionaries (rights propaganda) and Distortions promoting single rights categories while forcing assimilation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Colonial development of markets, exploitation of resources and labor, harmonization</td>
<td>Project Administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense</td>
<td>Military Strategy and Imperialism (Generals)</td>
<td>Soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Defense and Civilian Military Oversight/ Balance of Powers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 attempts to summarize these failures with some quick commentary for each category. In the views of this author, only one of the nine categories could be said to have some basic science (Political Economy). None of the categories appear to have any real scientific basis for applications. Work continues but appears to be driven by ideology or by established techniques that are established practices without any science behind them. Many of them today are described more as “crafts” (“statecraft”) or “arts” (diplomacy) or driven by tradition or ethics (law, rights) rather than by science. Others appear to have developed a scientific basis for the technical based on measured experience of what has worked (e.g., military tactics) but without being driven by any science or “natural laws” of politics and government systems.
Table 2. Assessment of Political Science as a Science with Technical Applications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Fields in Political Science Departments (Missing areas in Italics)</th>
<th>Technical/Applied Field</th>
<th>Assessment of Role of Political Science in Establishing the Science for Technical Application in Humanitarian-Legal Interest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comparative Politics (At the system level)</td>
<td>Political System Engineering (“Democracy and (Good) Governance”)</td>
<td>Little science and little humanistic application.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic (e.g. “American”) Politics and Law (An Example of a Domestic system, over time)</td>
<td>Overseas</td>
<td>Domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Relations (At the global level, between nation-state systems and, potentially, also internally between cultures)</td>
<td>Diplomacy (Foreign Service, Foreign Affairs)</td>
<td>Technical application has little scientific basis to draw on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development and Human Rights</td>
<td>Diplomacy</td>
<td>Technical application has little scientific basis to draw on and is co-opted by economics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Defense</td>
<td>International Development and Human Rights</td>
<td>Technology has no scientific basis to draw on.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Administration Theory/ Administrative Science/ Bureaucracy (micro level, institutional theory of executive institutions)</td>
<td>Public Management (Executive)</td>
<td>The Technical application exists but with little real science behind it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jurisprudence/ Legal Science/ Court Administration (micro level theory of judicial institutions)</td>
<td>Judicial Administration/ Management</td>
<td>Little basic science and little application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Science (micro-level institutional theory of legislative institutions)</td>
<td>Legislative Administration/ Management</td>
<td>Little basic science and little application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Policy (applied, sectoral level)</td>
<td>[Mixed Disciplinary Areas of “X”-Policy or “Public X”, e.g., Environmental Policy, Public Health)</td>
<td>[Not relevant]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Economy (system level extended to additional institutions)</td>
<td>Public-Private Sector Managers</td>
<td>Some basic science but little application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Theory (Humanities corollary of Political Science) [not a science field with applications]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>No current scientific application</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Lack of Statements of Goals of the Discipline Today

Even if the traditional development of Political Science as a discipline may have come out of non-scientific beliefs (e.g., religious principles of a “good society”), the discipline could be moving towards a science if it were orienting itself towards finding answers to specific questions using empirical methods, without relying on pre-determined assumptions. A quick review of the strategic plans and self-descriptions of the discipline by political science associations and academic departments, however, shows that there is no recognition of a scientific basis nor even the standard requirement to fulfill a public “mission” and to address specific problems that are the basic requirements for all public organizations, as the discipline itself teaches as the standard required for others.

Although the American Political Science Association (APSA) does have a “strategic plan” (2017), there is not a single mention of the actual academic mission of the organization! There is no list of research questions to answer, no mention of public benefits, and no priorities. The “plan” is to develop the form of the profession, with additional work, in specific subject areas and tasks, but without any substance. Indeed, one might describe the current APSA four year plan as no different from the five year plans of academics in the Soviet Union, that were based only on published pages and numbers of students taught government approved doctrines.

A quick search of two Political Science department websites for their mission statements shows the exact same fault. In a Google search, the listings are sparse. It may be, in fact, that Political Science departments no longer have or recognize missions and the concept of discipline. The reality is that few Political Science departments come up in the search because few even claim to present any mission or purpose beyond keeping their faculty employed and funneling students into classes and either further study or the job market.

The website for Harvard’s Government department offers a good example of the lack of any connection with disciplinary goals at all (Harvard Government department, 2017). The department describes its “excellent resources” and “dedication to excellence” in “the study of politics” and lists some areas of work but without any mission or purpose other than noting it is an “extremely flexible concentration”, apparently bending to whatever pressures and demands are placed on it but without any self-direction. It is designed to “serve you well in whatever endeavor you choose”. Graduate students are told that they will have “an opportunity to define and explore your own questions about politics and government”. Apparently the department no longer recognizes a framework of questions and a mission of the discipline other than being constituency driven.

The department that comes up first in a search of those that do have mission statements is that of Miami University of Ohio, whose web page bears the key title, “Political Science Mission and Goals” (2017). Nevertheless, the statement describes neither a mission nor a goal. Not a single research question is mentioned. Not a single public benefit is defined. The statement simply describes the department’s topics (“the study of politics and government” with no further definition), its subject areas, and titles of courses. In place of describing the skills it teaches and its applications, the statement simply claims that it works to “prepare” students “for their futures” of further study or specific positions, without describing what they will do or for what purpose. The statement praises the faculty for “awards” but without describing what problems they solved or contributions they made.

The second university department that comes up in the search is that of Spelman College, which is an historically black institution and that one might expect would focus on specific value to African-Americans in understanding African and African-American political systems as well as issues of specific concern to political minorities. The department’s statement is titled “Political Science Goals and Objectives” (Spelman College, 2017) and one might expect it to list the questions and skills of the discipline with specific additional emphasis on political science questions of concern to African-Americans and Africans. This website does provide an attempt at specifics on “Goals” and “Objectives”, but it simply draws them from the “requirements for an excellent department as outlined by the American Political Science Association”, meaning that they also appear as empty form with zero content in the way of actual research questions, scientific methods, and skills. The “goal of the political science department”
Nonsense and Non-Science of Political Science

is stated only as “to transmit the knowledge of the discipline” without describing what that knowledge is or how it can be used, if at all. There are six objectives that are described as what “students should be able to do” “upon completion of the courses”, but they comprise an empty list with form but no content: “demonstrate an understanding of the concepts and principles of political science”, “apply the knowledge of the discipline”, “organize ideas and focus them effectively”, “demonstrate an outstanding (sic) of verbal and written communicative, analytical and critical thinking skills”, “recognize their personal value systems” and “provide content for integrating skills for teacher preparation”. The statement is entirely boilerplate and applicable to any discipline, with only one or two words specific to Political Science, and apparently not even proofread. Along with the statement from Miami University, this one suggests that Political Science is in fact a joke.

This is not to say that there are no scientific questions and no science in Political Science. If one goes beyond these statements and opens up course syllabi or course descriptions in university catalogues, one can start to find a few of the key scientific questions of the discipline that it seeks to answer, and some answers. The problem is that the profession and its departments are not, today, oriented to organizing their work around actual research missions for applications with social benefit, and apparently no one is able to hold them accountable.

The Result of This Confusion, Visible in the Work of Political Scientists, Today

The test of what is happening in Political Science is to be found in major journals in the field, where one should be able to survey the key questions that are being asked and the progress that has been made after some 2,500 years, or perhaps the past nearly 200 years of the discipline. If Political Science is functioning correctly as a discipline, its work should be steadily building upwards with each generation building upon the discoveries of the previous one and applying the basic science with new technologies. Scientists (it may have been Isaac Newton), describe themselves as each contributing a small amount to this ongoing endeavor, likening it to “standing on the shoulders of giants”. In sampling three journals in Political Science to try to answer this question – the American Political Science Review (APSR) of the APSA, the journal of New Political Science (NPS) that sees itself as an innovative counter to the discipline and an attempt to invigorate it with alternative approaches, and the applied journal of Foreign Affairs – it appears that either Political Science has stood still for its history with little or no progress or that what may have been discovered in the past is now being systematically erased by “current debates” so that it is lost and forgotten. There may be some elements of both.

An examination of the February 2017 issue of the APSR suggests that Political Science today has become a self-parody. The questions that are asked seem trivial attempts to prove what seems to be long-known or common sense. Definitions that should have been settled 2,000 years ago are being reopened in ways that seem to assure paralysis. Focus seems to be on very specific cases on very narrow concerns that have little applicability outside of one political system (generally the U.S.) and that have built-in assumptions and ideology. The research also seems to be in the area of individual psychology and workings of specific institutions rather than at the level of society or culture that would characterize a social science.

The major article on theory, for example, “A Problem-Based Approach to Democratic Theory”, states simply in its abstract that “Over the last few decades, democratic theory has grown dramatically in its power and sophistication ... But these debates are increasingly unproductive” because they focus on “elections” or “deliberation”. The author here believes he has something new to say to solve the problem, by asking the politically and ideologically loaded question, “What kinds of problems does a political system need to solve to count as ‘democratic’? ... it should empower inclusions, form collective agendas and wills, and have capacities to make collective decisions.” Indeed, one could argue that oligarchy, corporatism/fascism, and benevolent monarchy all fit this definition. One wonders what Political Science must be teaching to lead to this and whether Plato and Aristotle are rolling over in their graves. The obvious principle that most non-political scientists could answer immediately is that democracy requires a “balance of power” at the level of communities and individuals, and this is the principle one finds discussed in the U.S. 250 years ago in creating a “federal” system to balance ethnic community interests
along with a system of individual rights. So, why is Political Science intent on destroying its definitions and concepts and starting all over with politicized definitions to undermine discipline?

Another article, “Moving beyond Elections to Improve Well Being”, also belabors the obvious and also apparently seeks to rewrite centuries of recognized political concepts. Its statement that “competitive elections alone” do not assure specific improvements, restates what has been known for hundreds of years about the importance of public oversight of government, of legal checks and enforcement, and of civil society. The data here comes from Brazil. Is Political Science now simply defined by the need to include data from different countries, with no focus at all on questions? This seems to be what is happening in the social sciences today in the era of “political correctness” and “neo-liberalism”.

The ideological biases of the discipline in favor of promoting nation-states and specific institutions like political parties to ensure the continuation of neo-colonial control also come across clearly in article titles and abstracts. An article on “State Development, Parity and International Conflict” suggests that the underlying ideology of the discipline is to promote “state maturation” and globalization rather than to question the legitimacy of the nation-state, itself. Similarly, rather than increasing mechanisms of public oversight and control, the subjective bias is for “Making Parties more Deliberative”, a concept that is now appearing in the APSR but that is actually taken from the mantra of one-Party states as ways of justifying their monopoly on power (!).

Articles like “How Public Opinion Shapes Religious Beliefs” and “The Incumbency Curse” arguably belong in psychology journals rather than in Political Science.

While New Political Science opens up hopes for replacing ideology and non-science with objective, humanistic, science, it is as if NPS is a reverse negative of APSR that offers an opposing set of undefined ideological or theological buzz words in a perverse co-dependency. Indeed, a blind reviewer of this essay and a member of the New Political Science group even asked that I refrain from critiquing New Political Science for engaging only in politics but not the science of political science, claiming that the group had no intent to do social science but only to offer a political ideology to counter and to be “critical of” the existing political ideology, with neither group interested in doing social science. This lack of any social scientific grounding is visible in its articles. An article in the February 2017 issue asks, “What if this is not capitalism anymore but something worse?” as if the agencies of inequality are not human action following certain describable laws of social behavior but “isms” that appear like incurable diseases. Eliminating the idea of human agency and identifying a labeled “devil” is a return to primitive beliefs and anti-science. Perhaps that is what is “New” Political Science today. One might ask the authors and editors, “What if NPS is not intellectualism anymore but something worse, like symbolism and regressivism, recidivism, and just another form of neo-colonialism and globalism?” These theological “isms” like “capitalism” continue to be used as explanatory variables (both dependent and independent (!)) even though no one actually agrees on the definitions and they do not seem to exist in a pure or measurable form given that human systems have always had mixes of public and private incentives and mixed management forms (Lindblom, 1977).

Typically, the articles in NPS are either purely ideological, like the one above, or simply representational advocacy for particular groups rather than any attempt at science. In the same issue is another article that “builds upon post-pluralist and post-Marxist insights to outline the advocacy system’s ‘politics of affirmation’ … using recent antigay legislation.” The article concludes with political advocacy designed “to destabilize neoliberalism’s hegemony”, targeting yet another ideology as the disease to be eradicated, rather than focus on human agency. Political scientists today seem reduced only to labeling in place of predicting.

Another example in the same issue of NPS that seems to be in the issue only as a form of representation of women, is entitled “The Colonized Vagina” and it concludes with this sentence in its abstract as the “conclusion” of this scientific research study. “Contemporary feminists, I conclude, should claim their ‘right to return,’ in this case to the vagina as home and place of belonging on the fluid borderlands between the hymen and uterus, as a step towards ending sexism.” If there is any actual social science in this piece, this author cannot find it. The assumption of this author is that if there is a “colonized vagina”, the human agent doing the colonizing must be a “colonizing Penis”. Probably it
would take a rocket scientist and undoubtedly a female one, to describe whether and how a male feminist
should claim the “right to return” to “the vagina as home and place of belonging.” Both as a feminist and
as a beneficiary of feminism, and especially as a supporter of such views, I am personally embarrassed to
see such scholarship masquerading as “political science”.

*Foreign Affairs* describes itself as “the leading forum for serious discussion of American foreign
policy and global affairs” since 1922. Among its articles in its March 21, 2017 issue were those on “How
Trump Should Manage Afghanistan” (apparently, the magazine seems him as its new owner) and on “The
Fight for Mosul: Why It’s Taking Longer than Expected” (meaning that Political Science predicted that it
could and should be taken with a quick fight, but apparently failed again to consider actual behavior of
human beings.

What these journals suggest is that Political Science today is actually a discipline in a two-
dimensional “Flatland” (Abbott, 1884) where it is unable to build anything because it currently
undermines the most basic fundamentals of a discipline; starting with a definition of terms and then the
methodology of hypothesis testing using empirical data on objectively measurable phenomena. It appears
that the goal of the discipline is to either undermine attempts at predictions or comparisons (particularly in
areas that might lead to human betterment and transformation, like rights protections and power
balancing) or to promote science on very limited questions that strengthen existing institutions and
hierarchies. The discipline seems to be working to undermine itself and to prevent advances.

**Contemporary Trivial Pursuits: The “Current Debates”:**

**The Replacement of Science with Ideology:**

A recent critique of Political Science suggested that the discipline itself was somehow “governed”
(though not explaining how) by five myths:

1. That it studies politics
2. That it is scientific;
3. That it is possible to study politics separated off from economics, sociology, psychology and
   history;
4. That the state … is politically neutral [and] available … to whatever group wins the election; and
5. That [it] advances the causes of democracy.” (Ollmann, 2015).

The first three parts of the critique are essentially those challenging the discipline as not meeting the
requirements of a social science in terms of its questions, its methods, and its boundaries. The last two
critiques are essentially those challenging its neutrality and ethics, seeing it as driven by ideology and
elite interests.

Where Ollman and other critics have fallen short is in outlining what Political Science would look
like as a social science, what questions it would ask, what variables and methods it would use, and what
ethical goals and procedures would regulate its applications.

Table 3 is a rough initial attempt to model what a humanitarian, objectively, scientifically based
Political Science might look like and how it compares to a generalized (though perhaps slightly
caricatured) depiction of Political Science today. The table takes contemporary subjects in Political
Science and suggests the research questions it should pursue, the methodological approaches it should
take and types of variables it should use, as well as how it might be applied, compared to current Political
Science that appears to be driven, in whatever countries it appears, to serve existing political power and
elite control by limiting and narrowing questions and methods or by distorting them.

**The Failure of Political Science as a Science**

If Political Science were a “science”, it would ideally need to meet the definition of science and use
scientific methods, assuring: “a systematic study of the structure and behavior of the physical and natural
Though I use a simple dictionary definition here that works across the social sciences, this is one that has
its roots in the philosophy of science and uses the elements that political theorists, themselves, recognize
for scientific testing; that of positivism, elaborated by Ludwig Wittgenstein (Temelni, 2015) and falsification, of Karl Popper (1983 [1956-57]). If political science were a social science, it would use the scientific method of hypothesis testing and comparisons rather than simply offer case studies, posited models with specific assumptions about behavior that have no empirical basis or about systems that do not come specifically from observation (“rational actor” models, “behavioral models”). It would offer empirical observations at the level of cultures and societies with links to the natural world, rather than behavioral questionnaires and other measures only of subjective beliefs and transmitted ideology. It would offer objective definitions rather than those based on ideological views (“isms”) (Domar, 1988).

Not only do political scientists study the concepts of science in their discussions of political theory and political philosophy and not only do leaders in the field, like Lindblom, periodically offer critiques, but the approach favored by this author for how to “do” social scientific Political Science has been promoted in political science methodology texts like one by several leaders in the field (King, Keohane, and Verba, 1994). Yet, “knowing” and having the tools are one thing and “acting” is another. Political scientists are ready to discuss and critique, but they prefer this pedantry to actually “doing” social science and building the discipline.

The Failure of Questions

Table 3 lays out the fundamental questions for prediction in Political Science that are the major questions specific to the sub-fields; questions on the predicting of revolution, genocides, war, discrimination, equality, and sustainability, and then narrower sub-questions that fit into an overall framework. Some of these have been the staple of Political Science and one can find them scattered throughout the literature, but often they are just marginalized inquiries of single political scientists and a small group of colleagues without being the driving questions of an overall framework (e.g., the study of “political violence”, Gurr, 1970).

In place of this fundamental agenda and important global questions, the discipline has largely substituted narrow and trivial questions to serve specific interest groups rather than humanity, such as predicting election results rather than predicting larger questions of collapse and system change or “progress”, predicting specific policy outcomes by small groups of individuals, predicting the ability to spread certain controlling ideologies, or predicting short-term “stability” for corporate investment or colonial hegemony.

The Failure of Methods

Along with the narrowing of questions is the restriction on methods. Like the discipline of Economics, Political Science methodologies have often begun with ideological or theoretical assumptions about human behavior (short-term individual “utility”/benefit maximization, rational pursuit of interest), about causality, and about proof. Although the discipline is set at the level of human groups (cultures and societies) in order to uncover the logic of choices at the group level, Political Science has largely refused to start with empirical study of cultures and societies and has moved instead to individual psychological behaviors in institutions (behavioralism, taken from psychology; game theory models from psychology; rational choice and “utility” models from economics) and to study of nation-states and institutions of the nation state system that are already placed in an established global framework constraining their choices and actions. These frameworks make it impossible to study cultural and system evolution or “irrationality” since there is already a religious assumption that all choices are made at the individual level and not influenced by larger social objectives, biological constraints (and human “failings”, irrationality, emotions and self-destructiveness). The assumptions on causality are largely those of the Catholic Church, in opposition to principles of social and cultural evolution that have been recognized in the past two centuries since Darwin (1871). The assumption is that nature and environment and biology are irrelevant and that all choices of political systems and policies are independent free choices with nothing other than outside human constraints1. The assumptions are that contemporary institutions are the
highest form of human development, that they are benign, that they promote human long-term survival and interests, and that they will choose the “best” long-term outcomes.

The constraint on methods has not only been set by a religious ideology about human behavior and by political ideologies about who Political Science, itself, serves, in its own institutional short-term interests of aligning itself with the existing structure of power and resources, but also with an ideology of measurement. Political Science has restricted its data to contemporary reporting, contemporary surveys, and contemporary definitions, as well as small controlled experiments. By avoiding more historical data, more definitions of political units (cultures and historic empires2, rather than just nation-states), and thought experiments, it restricts itself to micro-behavior, posited models and case studies.

If any “prediction” is being done in political science today, it is limited to predicting elections or political choices, largely using models of “interests” and “utility” with data that is drawn only from either public polls or “expert opinions”. Among the leading examples today is the work of Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, whose focus is limited to leadership selection and who now largely works for clients like the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, other government agencies and businesses (Bueno de Mesquita, 2002; Sniedovich, 2012).

The author challenged a number of political science colleagues to see if they could identify work that they considered “predictive” and “science” in Political Science. All said that they could. They dispute the conclusions in Table 3 below that the work of political scientists does not meet the definition of science. Yet, though they offered work from different sub-fields of Political Science, it all had the same flaw of the work of Bueno de Mesquita. It offered guesswork of some future event in a limited time frame and context of current events or that was actually outside of the framework of “political” questions, looking instead at psychological behaviors or project management. None were larger questions about humanity and political systems, their rise and fall and ability to change. They were limited to the same kind of short-term electoral or policy choices or choices among leaders. They are predicting minutiae and largely for the purposes of political control, such as predicting “terrorist attacks” and local crime (Schrodt and Brackle, 2013).

The work of EGAP (Evidence in Governance and Politics, 2017) is simple project intervention using funds and marketing to change specific attitudes and behaviors. What they are doing is marketing studies and project evaluation, rather than asking fundamental questions of the discipline of political science to predict war, genocides, system changes, and types of systems that arise in given conditions. EGAP’s work on public awareness “campaigns” is simple another part of a portfolio of standard international interventions like the “anti-poverty” projects that they also manage. The project on their website for “making voters more informed about their politicians” is simply a public education activity that they are measuring, though they describe it as “vigorouse evidence” and “empirical research in the social sciences” (EGAP, 2017). Political scientists today, however, seem unable to see the difference between measuring political (or propagandistic) advertising and its impacts and asking scientific questions about politics.

The Failure of Definitions and Variables

By restricting its assumptions to religious views of human choice and to beliefs about what constitutes “government” and “political systems” (only those contemporary systems within the global nation-state framework), Political Science also assures that its variables, definitions, and cases are all tautological. Eliminating all natural variables as potential independent variables to describe human behaviors means that the only remaining variables are subjective, human defined, value-laden terms. Studies like those of animals and how they respond and organize themselves in response to social density or to other environmental changes and restrictions as ways to explain group behaviors are immediately eliminated from the discipline (Calhoun, 1962). What is left are “isms” like “capitalism”, “socialism”, and “fascism” that are mostly used ideologically to distinguish between the position of the political scientist defending his/her society and its empire or trade networks, and its opposition. Most of the “proofs” of the discipline use variables that are multi-colinear (essentially measuring the same system and values but using different words) to essentially reach conclusions like “our system promotes growth”, “our system promotes peace”, “our enemy systems promote war”, and “our enemy systems are not
progressive or humane”. “Our system is better because votes show that people want it” rather than, “People vote for our system because of these mechanisms of control”.

When these approaches lead to absurdities, such as “People are rational actors, therefore if they do not vote it is because either they are completely satisfied or the costs of voting are high, therefore we must lower the costs of voting”, they are backed by suppression of other variables and assumptions such as “If people do not vote, it is because they know that voting makes no difference and it makes no sense even with almost zero cost to spend time on something that has no impact on their lives and just legitimizes elite control”. Rather than add more variables and open up the assumptions to testing, the response seems to be to then measure types of systems that will increase voting (e.g., mandatory voting, electoral campaign fear tactics, more propaganda and pressure, changed school curriculum) that implicitly borrow from the models of totalitarian, one-party systems, rather than that move towards actually measures of power balances and political control or mechanisms of social and political change.

*The Failure of Units of Analysis and Boundaries*

The existing divisions between what Political Sciences studies, the variables and methods it uses, and the data it uses, and the study of political phenomena and institutions in other social science disciplines like Anthropology (in Political Anthropology) and Sociology (in Political Sociology) works to assure the disintegration and stagnation of the discipline as a social science.

- **Political Anthropology and its Wall with Political Science** – The current division between Political Science and the sub-field of Political Anthropology within Anthropology essentially poisons the study of political phenomena in both disciplines.

Were Political Science to recognize its connection to the four fields of Anthropology, including primate behaviors, the archaeological record of human cultures and political systems, and the current expression of politics at all levels within all contemporary societies and cultures in the holism of culture and complex society, Political Science would exist as part of a scientific continuum rather than an isolated self-legitimizing study of colonial and post-colonial nation-states in the single global system. It would have a large and diverse data set of human phenomena, several new sets of models to study failures and change of political systems in cultural and social context, unlimited types of variables and data to test, and openness to alternative modeling of causality, logic and levels of behavior. But it has chosen to avoid all of these.

Primates have politics and humans are primates so there are already basic models of politics to use to understand the actual logic and systems of behaviors, rather than to start with religious assumptions (Van der Waal, 1982).

Similarly, on major questions like those of predicting war and peace, collapse, genocide, inter-ethnic relations, and equity, there are also anthropological models. The discipline started with holistic views of systems in their ecological and human niches and then examined how individual cultures adapted. This is a potentially richer approach than the standard methodological approach in Political Science of assuming that all countries and political systems are the same and that one or two variables can be extracted for “cross national” regression analyses to “prove” the impact of a single, supposedly “independent” variable somehow induced and imposed entirely apart from its cultural context. The relevance of the anthropological approach is analogous to the approach of cell biology and animal testing in studying immunology and medicine. The approach of Political Science today is like trying to understand disease without cell biology (Feierbend and Rosalind, 1966). Even when Political Scientists may be asking an important scientific question, the data and methods (level of analysis) assure a dead end. That means that the question will not be answered.

The right question to ask here, though, is, if Political Anthropology offers the frameworks, data and integrated approach to asking these larger questions, why hasn’t it effectively competed with Political Science and replaced it? In this author’s view, the answer is that the same forces that have corrupted and
distorted Political Science, disintegrating holism, eliminating science, narrowing questions, and forcing the discipline to serve elite interests and ideologies (like globalization, and “exceptionalism” of major powers) as well as religious assumptions of causality, have also prevented Political Anthropology from continuing as a social science and fulfilling its humanistic role.

Political Anthropology has been cut up to assure that it is a dead discipline.

- At the level of Social Anthropology, Political Anthropology has copied Political Science in no longer examining political systems at the level of culture and focusing on globalization. It has eliminated scientific testing and prediction. It has reversed causality to accept the religious view of human choice. Its focus is on rituals of politics and power and on how minorities can assimilate themselves more quickly into the global system in order to destroy their cultural differences. It calls for group advocacy but no applications. It presents theory and philosophies of “power” and “voices of oppression” without measures. Indeed, one of the scholars who bridged the two fields and may have opened the door to current crossovers, James C. Scott, a political scientist using ethnographic methods, brought the models of social networks to study hierarchies of power as a potential new tool to understand micro-level exchanges, but still without much in the way of predictions or comparisons at the level of culture or society (Scott, 1976).

- At the level of Archaeology, Political Anthropology has become story telling of the “evolution” of political systems in a straight line from tribes to chieftaincies to modern empires in ways that mostly justify globalization as the highest form of development. It has developed its own jargon that is unintelligible to Political Science and to Social Anthropology and that assures its insularity. Rather than speak of political systems and measure power balances, it defines “polities” and “state” and kin networks. Rather than measure Empire or rights, it justifies globalization by looking for historic examples of “trade” and even fitting slavery into “systems of trade” with slaves as goods to be traded, rather than as part of a human record of empire, hegemony, and genocide.

- At the level of Physical Anthropology (Human Evolution), Political Anthropologists ask questions about war, violence, and alliances that are at the heart of politics, but they do not seek to explain contemporary human behaviors. Instead, they engage in religious arguments about “human nature”.

- Political Sociology and its Wall with Political Science – While Sociology at the level of mass society offers the variables for Political Science to use to understand the holistic deep structures of contemporary societies, Sociology today seems more concerned simply with the homogenization of groups into the nation-state structure rather than with scientific predictions or humanistic solutions.

The promise of Sociology is that its ability to segment society for study on the basis of variables like ethnicity, profession and institution, caste and class, offers sets of variables for measuring political power balances, networks, and control in ways that are predictive at the level of society. Given that Political Science chose to work at the level of societies/nation-states, sociological variables offered at least a broader spectrum of measurable variables to use for political questions. Within Political Science, Barrington Moore (1966), brought these social variables into modeling of political regimes as did sociologists in their studies of “aristocracy and caste” (Baltzell, 1964) and power elites (Mills, 1956), more than fifty years ago. Studies of political movements and violence also used demographic and economic variables. These models were admittedly limited in that they still accepted the same approach to causality as Political Science, in which they did not explain the origins of differences, only the relationships between segmentation and political power. They partly changed the causal arrow to suggest that society and economics could influence government/politics and vice versa, though without explaining exactly where human action could change these. Political Sociology also continued to reintroduce the larger questions of Political Science into debates with Political Science, such as determinants of revolution, wars, and inequality, and the ethical questions of Political Science. It is possible that the basis
for the Political Sociologist’s concerns for ethics and equity issues may have reflected the ethnic and
gender compositions of the two disciplines, with Sociology presenting the concerns of minorities and
women, as opposed to the more establishment-based discipline of Political Science.

Today, however, Political Sociology appears to be little different from what one finds in New Political
Science; interest group advocacy and strategies for homogenization based on economic and survey data,
identity politics, and ideological, anti-scientific reasoning with non-predictive “explanations” using
“isms” like “Marxism”, “capitalism”, and “socialism”. Along with it are approaches to “Criminology” to
support punitive forms of control rather than to expose them and to advocate for humanistic reforms, as in
the past.

Conflicts of Interests and Ideological Distortions of Political Science

Fifty years ago, the Sociologist Daniel Bell wrote a short article examining some ten different
theoretical models that Political Scientists were using to try to explain the differences between the Soviet
Union’s political system and that of the United States, that he provocatively titled, “Ten Theories in
Search of Reality” (1969). Rather than start with reality and try to see what predictions and explanations
it could yield, the goal of much of Political Science has been to start with a political position and then to
create what looks like “science” and “evidence” in order to proselytize it. Both the political pressures and
the funding of Political Science, wherever it develops, seem to be to assure that the “science” offers
justification for those in power behind a veneer of “science” that the public cannot challenge.

In the United States, during the Cold War and beyond, the goal of Comparative Politics was to
demonize the Soviet Union, China, and other empires while promoting the American Empire. Today, it is
to promote its “exceptionalism”, in a position above international law and morality. The goal of
International Relations was to study foreign systems to understand how they could be transformed or
manipulated for corporate commercial and strategic military interests and to shift focus in support of
whatever system promoted those interests, including support for the Nazis before World War II (Oren,
2002). The goal of American Government was to confirm the U.S. political system as “democratic” and
“progressive” while that of Political Economy was to proselytize the superiority of the American political
economy and to bless the growth of corporate power and corporate hierarchies.

It is easy to reveal the many myths that Political Science promoted in its teachings and research to
maintain the status quo and to suppress aspirations for participatory democracy and more effective citizen
oversight of public and private institutions in ways that reflect actual balances of power and legal
principles of accountability, transparency, sustainability and human rights.

The standard teaching of American politics, however, almost entirely excludes the historical political
systems of the Native Americans in the past and today, the cultural influences of Native Americans on the
U.S. system (including federalism and caucuses) (Johansen, 1998) and the environmental influences on
these systems. It mostly excludes the ethnic political differences of European colonial territories and the
Corporate political systems and religious political systems brought by Europeans. It almost entirely
excludes the workings of political power within modern corporations and institutions, within the military,
within the national security state and within police forces. It mostly excludes the power of political
networks and of international power and networks and kin relations. It mostly excludes the workings of
assassination and paramilitaries and organized crime in political power.

The study of the U.S. political system is mostly a myth, focusing only on formal rules that are not
followed and institutions on paper. There is no empirical study of power balances and actual measures of
political power and influence and how they work, the workings of propaganda, control or fear. What is
left is a mythology of formal structures.

“Democracy” is redefined in terms of the formal structures and voting, rather than in terms of actual
measures of power, rights, balances and influences.

Indeed, the teaching of Political Science in the United States, is almost exactly parallel to the teaching
in one-Party states that also teach their populations that they are “independent”, “sovereign”,
“democracies” of “the people”, teaching the formal written Constitutional documents to claim the
existence of citizen rights and powers as a diversion from reality. Rather than allow direct study of reality, “evidence” is limited to the documents and data that existing powers write and control.

The teaching of “law” and “legal systems” is similarly confined in almost all countries to the written law and to studies of what judges SAY about what they are doing as justifications, with little real study of how the system works. It is little different from the Church scholarship of centuries ago.

To understand how the discipline is being manipulated today, once can look directly at its funding sources and how recipients of funds claim that they are doing “science” in the public interest without pressure. This statement of funding from an article that sounds innocuous, on simple “coding” of “political event data” is itself written in a kind of code that almost sounds like self-parody. “This research was supported in part by contracts from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency under the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) program (Prime Contract #FA8650-07-C-7749: Lockheed-Martin Advance Technology Laboratories) as well as grants from the National Science Foundation (SES-0096086, SES-0455158, SES-0527564, SES-1004414) and by a Fulbright-Hays Research Fellowship … The results and findings in no way represent the views of Lockheed-Martin, the Department of Defense, DARPA, or NSF” (Schrodt and Brackle, 2013). Would any reader, taught to analyze views based on “interests” and “following the money” believe that work could not be influenced in some way by such funding? One might joke that “the results and findings in no way represent the views of the funders, but the questions asked and the ideology of the work certainly led to its selection.” Recipients of such funds cannot deny that they need to sell their work in ways that require self-censorship and subservience to interest of the funders. If funding is driven by militaries rather than directly by citizens, can the discipline really claim to have an humanitarian and public agenda?

While Political Science today is different in many countries from what it was some fifty years ago, because of the inclusion of different representational groups in the discipline as well as in political positions, the fundamental approaches of the discipline have not changed. The stories of additional groups have simply been added to the mix of voices without change in the methodologies or of the purpose of the discipline in protecting the existing system.

There is still no real public oversight of the discipline and no enforceable ethics code to assure that its work meets public needs and evidences a professional, scientific standard rather than an ideological standard influenced by elites6.

Applied Political Science, in the form of Public Policy, continues to either provide solutions for control and manipulation used by elites to maintain electoral and political power or to manipulate foreign governments for gain, or to address public needs with the same “solutions” that are reproduced over and over again but never implemented because the focus is never on public mobilization to assure progress.

Much of Political Science has degenerated into journalistic reporting on foreign systems, on public views, on political movements, and on domestic political actors to serve the needs of those with power to protect their interests by manipulating those actors.

Discussion: The Social Role of Political Science:

What Table 3 really shows is that there are two fundamentally opposing views of what Political Science as a discipline could and should be: one as a predictive social science providing solutions for public benefit and progress as defined by professional standards and international rights treaties and laws, and one as a process of political indoctrination and control that serves the existing structure of power and seeks to maintain it with predictions on very narrow questions of marketing political ideas and controlling some minor current events that may be random noise against the background of longer, fundamental concerns and underlying political and governmental concerns that are no longer the focus of political scientists. Although Political Science claims that it is the first vision, following scientific principles and the public interest, it appears in fact to be much closer today to the second. The problem is that both of these functions may be “legitimate” institutional functions in complex societies at different times, but the blurring and merging of these roles undermines both.
A complex, industrial society relies on social science in order to maintain flexibility and to protect the use of its resources. Without science and technology to preserve and protect human systems, it is always at risk of collapse, war and conquest, or disintegration. If Political Science is not serving this role, then it is easy to argue that the risks of these events are high.

Meanwhile, all societies rely on some form of unifying “religion” and rituals to maintain a sense of identity and cohesion as well as to reinforce important fundamental beliefs for the society. In the past, religious education and indoctrination served that role. Today, that role is apparently being continued by university disciplines and by political actors, essentially acting in conducting a state religion and its rituals. If Political Science and other university disciplines were appropriately fulfilling the role of protecting opportunity, equality, efficiency, flexibility, choice based on evidence and reason, professional ethic, and progress, they would be serving as watchdogs and the ethical and moral conscience of the system in order to protect it. If Political Science and other university disciplines are partly serving in this role today only to promote and serve power and stagnation, in destruction of actual social science and in place of religious institutions, then they have gone well beyond the role of promoting cohesion and have been corrupted and co-opted.

What seems to have happened today is that Political Scientists have traded in their professionalism and ethics simply to serve their own institutional and individual interests for advancement and proximity to the political power they study rather than to the science, public, and ethic that they are supposed to serve.
**Table 3**: Comparison of Idealized Political Science as a Social Science with Humanistic Applications to the Current Approach of the Discipline, by Existing and Logical (Missing) Sub-Fields

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-Fields in Political Science Departments</th>
<th>What Political “Science” Would Do</th>
<th>What It Does or Seems to Do and the Problem</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comparative Politics (At the system level)</td>
<td>Predict: What political systems form in different environments (distribution and mechanisms/functions including control), processes of change and influences, what is possible to change. Approach: Seek hard variables (natural and physical measures like demographics, environment) linked to power and influence, with models of the “deep structure” of systems. Applications: Democracy Building and Good Governance: Promote human goals of sustainability, social progress. Restore and revitalize traditional mechanisms.</td>
<td>Predict: No fundamental predictions; only those of micro-level changes of specific leaders and policies. Approach: Labeling, reporting, and promotion of ideological rankings to promote propaganda about the benefits of the systems in which political scientists work and to demonize others as well as to collect information on them for political control and influence. Applications: Harmonization of weak systems into hegemonic blocks with information used by business and (colonial) governments for facilitating relations in manipulating foreign governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic (e.g. “American”) Politics and Law (An Example of a Domestic system, over time)</td>
<td>Predict: [Same as above, applied to U.S.] Approach: Full history and applications starting with Native systems, genocide, empire Applications: Transform empire to sustainable rights based global partner with an internal democratic system fulfilling its stated principles and international law</td>
<td>Predict: Predict elections and policy outcomes. Approach: Present only the formal institutional systems not the deep structures in ways that describe all changes as “progress” and that regurgitate the history of elites. Promote elites and status quo with only incremental efficiency and interest group changes as the Panglossian “best of all possible worlds” (Voltaire, 1759) while discrediting other change. Applications: Electoral and NGO mobilization for political control.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| International Relations (At the global level, between nation-state systems and, potentially, also internally between cultures) | Predict: Find the determinants of War and Peace, Genocide, Political conflict/violence; Empires and Disintegration; and Alliances, Global Distribution and Mechanisms  
**Approach:** Use all units of analysis (cultures and groups, not only nation states)  
**Applications:** Peacemaking, Global human rights protections, sustainable development, civil defense and civilian military oversight. | Predict: Predict autonomy and justice movements in order to suppress them and co-opt them.  
**Approach:** Assume only one acceptable unit (nation states), one linear path of progress to ensure homogenization and hierarchy in favor of major powers and assume a preference for control and assimilation rather than diversity with negotiated conflicts.  
**Applications:** Information for business and military to create weakness and instability to allow for exploitation. Promote corporate elite interests and profits of military and industry. Proselytize interventions and disruptions as “security”, “democracy”, “assistance” and “development”. Promote trade blocks and globalization to promote corporate elites. |
|---|---|---|
| Public Administration Theory/Administrative Science/Bureaucracy (micro level, institutional theory of executive institutions) | Predict: Predict root causes and mechanisms of system failure at the micro/institutional level (imbalance of interests) and of success (efficiency, accountability, sustainability, rights realization), within the context of what is possible for a given political system in a given environment, and factors of change and repair.  
**Approach:** Map all interests, powers, motivations of stakeholder individuals and groups in relation to mechanisms and all types of causality and logic.  
**Applications:** Public and NGO Management (Social entrepreneurs and watchdogs). | Predict: No predictions beyond micro-level choices of individuals based on personal interests and psychology.  
**Approach:** Make assumptions about political parties, bureaucracies and elites of long-term interest, representation, rationality and other posited attributes in models without empirical evidence and modeling of actual choice and causality.  
**Applications:** Increase bureaucratic autonomy and resources with a government rubber stamp for those actions that promote elites with the reverse for those to protect citizens. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Predict</th>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Applications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jurisprudence/Legal Science/Court Administration (micro level theory of judicial institutions)</td>
<td>Predict: Predict root causes and mechanisms of system failure at the micro/institutional level (imbalance of interests) and of success (efficiency, accountability, rights realization), within the context of what is possible for a given political system in a given environment, and factors of change and repair.</td>
<td>Approach: Map all interests, powers, motivations of stakeholder individuals and groups in relation to mechanisms and all types of causality and logic.</td>
<td>Justice System Builders and Reformers: Promotion of equity, participation, and oversight in the justice system at all levels of process of juries (grant and petit), oversight, equal access to lawyers, private attorney generals, class actions, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legislative Science (micro-level institutional theory of legislative institutions)</td>
<td>Predict: Predict root causes and mechanisms of system failure at the micro/institutional level (imbalance of interests) and of success (efficiency, accountability, sustainability, rights realization), within the context of what is possible for a given political system in a given environment, and factors of change and repair.</td>
<td>Approach: Map all interests, powers, motivations of stakeholder individuals and groups in relation to mechanisms and all types of causality and logic.</td>
<td>Citizen legislative mechanisms, legislative system techniques, electoral selection techniques, recall and oversight, challenges to party monopolies and duopolies,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Policy (applied, sectoral level)</td>
<td>[Not political science]</td>
<td></td>
<td>[Not really existent today in political science. Found partly in law schools as part of the “legal realism” movement (Frank 1949; Llewelyn, 1939) and partly scattered throughout social sciences in “Law and Society” but mostly as theory or area reporting particularly on the U.S., and partly in Judicial Institutes as well as in international projects for “Administration of Justice”.] Predict: No predictions other than short term electoral victories and spending agendas. Approach: Focus on “elections” as the key element of “democracy” rather than on other forms of citizen oversight and participatory democracy. Applications: Promotes powerless puppet “show” Parliaments, tied to financial interests and under surveillance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Political Economy (system level extended to additional institutions) | Predict: Model for predicting the relation between environment-production systems, inequalities, and productive organization and political systems and for the workings of control mechanisms that prevent other forms.  
**Approach:** Test and study all kinds of enterprises and public (worker-community) participation and oversight. Direct compare systems on multiple attributes and use all methodologies to “study up” the hierarchies.  
**Applications:** Public-private sector managers promoting cooperatives, socially responsible finance. | Predict: Predict public uprisings to prepare for suppression and control/co-optation.  
**Approach:** Allow only related variables (GDP, corporate democracy, party voting, peace between trade partners) to confirm and promote the ideological linkages. Restrict testing and measurement of alternative forms. Focus on short-term and claim inability of long-term measures.  
**Applications:** Promote “stability” and “growth” through teaching of doctrines. |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Political Theory (Humanities corollary of Political Science) | **Approach:** Alternate variables, models and theories to diversify potential for proof and predications, including thought experiments of Utopian and dystopian systems and change.  
**Applications:** Future political systems in space; Restoration of lost mechanisms and harmed cultures (traditional systems) | **Approach:** Present history (ancestor worship for the discipline).  
**Applications:** Diversion of the agenda of science, reason and humanistic applications and replacement of skills and logical predictions of outcomes of inequalities and imbalances, through confusion/nihilism based on the belief of the inability to find absolutes and objectivity. Cheerlead for or divert criticism of and focus on new forms of authoritarian control and human obedience as part of “security”, “cooperation”, “harmony”, “order” and technological “progress”. |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Guiding Principle for Science:</th>
<th>Guiding Principle for Doctrine:</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Choose the methodology and variables to answer the intellectual disciplinary questions objectively. Choose methodologies that do not have ideological assumptions at their basis and allow for all forms of modeling and directions of causality, feedback. <strong>Variables:</strong> Focus on measurable (natural) variables and specific actions/agency, not ideological terms that remove agency and measurability and create tools for measuring the variables and outcomes. <strong>Methodologies Taught:</strong> All qualitative and quantitative measures and models allowed including social experiments, invention of new measures, and studying “up” and down hierarchies. Long term, historical, sociological, business and management, legal elements and other measures. All courses taught with field methods and skills.</td>
<td>Choose the methodology to fit the goals of social control and then let the methodologies define the questions that are and can be asked. Choose starting assumptions about human nature to be confirmed (individual benefit maximizing, behavioral conditioning) and causality (human free choice not constrained by biology, environment, Culture and society) and then fit reality to these models. <strong>Variables:</strong> Focus on non-measurable (ideological, vaguely defined) variables that remove agency and measurability and on subjective beliefs rather than measurable actions. <strong>Methodologies Taught:</strong> Journalistic, idiosyncratic measures, opinion polls and ambiguous choice measures, regressions using only cross-country data but not structural or deep structural modeling. Test only pre-vetted “theories” that reinforce pre-chosen beliefs about institutions and systems as being the only choices and the “best” choices.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conclusion:

The idea of a predictive and humanistic social science is not an idea foreign to the public, though the discipline of Political Science treats it only as fantasy. Since World War II, one of the world’s best-selling science fiction writers, Isaac Asimov, based his series of *Foundation* novels (1942-86) on the idea that political events could be predicted, and he outlined some of the concepts that it would follow. In our world, however, Political Scientists have hijacked, narrowed, and distorted the enterprise of Political Science as a science, much as Asimov and several dystopian science fiction writers also have predicted they would. What has yet to be predicted is how, when, and under what conditions we can hope for and build (or rebuild) a humanistic scientific Political Science, if ever.

We seem to be seeing a failure of almost every public and private institution, today, despite Political Scientists and elites largely pretending that everything is fine and exactly the way everyone wants it to be and it should be. Among institutions, not only are Parliaments, executives, courts, the media and international organizations failing to meet their stated purposes and commitments, in the face of public mistrust, but Political Science, among other social sciences, has failed to uphold its mission as a science and its claim to public protection. Rather than fulfilling its role in serving humanity with scientific advances and humanistic technological applications, the profession of Political Science has become like many other bureaucracies; a self-perpetuating monopoly acting in its own interests.

Although it has allowed for the entrance of some previously unrepresented groups, to study and advocate for their particular interests (women, minorities, and sexual minorities) so long as they support assimilation, globalization, increasing political and economic inequality, and the ascension of corporatism, the national security state, and militarism, little if anything else has changed.

Existing control systems appear to be rigged to assure that nothing will change. The discipline colludes with for-profit publishers who help to screen work to assure the maintenance of political hierarchies and interests, while also serving military, the security state, corporate and public bureaucracies domestically and globally (Schrecker, 1986). Control systems for advance within the discipline prevent the entrance of new methodologies, of changed assumptions, of alternative variables, of ethical guidelines, of broader questions, or of alternative systems of governance and oversight. Publications will only review work that follows the “current debates”, cites the accepted authorities, and falls in ideological line with either the mainstream or innocuous co-dependent ideologies that offer no real challenge to the discipline and suggest no real social change.

Competing disciplines that could reinvigorate and challenge Political Science like Sociology and Anthropology have fallen in line to the same pressures and agreed to similarly suppress social science.

There are still some pockets of Political Science existing at the margins and popping up in new sub-disciplines or in quirky journals. Some disciplines that are essentially parts of Political Science have arisen independently, including areas such as Sustainable Development/Development Studies (though still largely influence by Economics), Human Rights (though largely legalistic and philosophical rather than social science), Legal Studies (that is mostly advocacy and philosophy today rather than social science), Peace and Conflict Studies, and Global(ization) Studies. They offer some potential challenges if and when there is a real demand and opportunity to challenge Political Science.

Countries can potentially develop competing Political Science as well, though most are now fitting into the same global Political Science hierarchy.

In the processes of “scientific review” or even public review, scholars and teachers with better approaches could fairly compete by demonstrating the predictive value and public benefit of their theories. In a rigged system that abandons science and substitutes political power, networks, and proselytizing, there is little they can do other than wait and hope for the collapse of the current system and the benefits of relying on science and public benefit. Given the lack of predictive power or public benefit of contemporary Political Science, the principles and predictions found in science fiction like classics of Asimov, are likely to prove true.
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Nonsense and Non-Science of Political Science


1 Editor’s Note. For an example of how reversing causality can actually predict political violence and political stability/instability, see Lempert, David (1987). "A Demographic-Economic Explanation of Political Stability: Mauritius as a Microcosm," Eastern Africa Economic Review, Vol. 3 No. 1.
2 Editor’s Note. For an outline of a social science of empires, see Lempert, David (2012). “The Social Science of Empire,” (Review Essay using four books of “The American Empire Project” as a take-off point), Journal of Developing Societies, Fall, Volume 28, No. 4; 441-68.
6 Editor’s Note. At least one such protective code was presented to applied Political Scientists in a major journal of the field, some 20 years ago, but it has not been adopted or enforced. Lempert, David (1997). "Holding Accountable the Powers That Be: Protecting Our Integrity and the Public We Serve,” in Public Administration Review, Spring.
RETURNING DISCIPLINE TO THE DISCIPLINE:
A MODEL PROCEDURE FOR REVIEWS IN ANTHROPOLOGY, SOCIAL SCIENCES, AND OTHER RELATED DISCIPLINES

DAVID LEMPERT
Ph.D., J.D., M.B.A., E.D. (Hon.)

Abstract

This piece uses participant observation of and research into disciplinary procedures to reveal that review policies in anthropology, other ‘social sciences’, and related disciplines have become arbitrary and politicised with little to protect professional standards of a discipline and to avoid conflicts of interest that prejudice scholarship. To address the problem, this piece takes the initial step towards establishing procedural standards. The piece offers a model procedure to incorporate in journal article and book publisher review policies, applying legal approaches to anti-corruption and procedural fairness along with key human resources principles to measure skills and competence. It also applies best practices from experiences from peer review failures in the natural sciences. This procedure offers standards to test the quality of policies of journals and publishers while offering journals and publishers the opportunity to demonstrate compliance. This focus on process is part of a larger effort to re-establish clear standards in anthropology (as a social science and humanities) as well as in related disciplines through which disciplines can hold themselves accountable and measure ‘progress’ while seeking to resolve internal debates over content.

Introduction

Nearly 20 years ago, physicist Alan Sokal sought to challenge the lack of scientific competence in and the politicisation of social science and humanities disciplines by submitting for publication a nonsensical article designed to test review policies of a journal in ‘postmodern cultural studies’. Now referred to as the ‘Sokal hoax’, Sokal’s article, filled with ideology and scientific illiteracy (referring to quantum gravity as a ‘social and linguistic construct’) was quickly published; sending a shock wave throughout the academy (Sokal 1996).

While the journal that fell victim to the hoax (Social Text) and other similar journals claim that they now have review procedures to assure that they will not be fooled again, the result may be exactly the opposite of what Sokal hoped and what academic discipline demands. Sokal’s hoax was designed to spur more quality research and objectivity (‘discipline’) in social science by exposing basic incompetence and politicisation of disciplinary procedures, but there is little evidence that there have been efforts to focus on competence and objectivity in review procedures.

This study offers evidence that rather than improve, the procedures adopted by Social Text after the hoax sought to narrow who and what is published. Journals in anthropology and related fields have, in whole or part, explicitly or implicitly, followed this anti-intellectual path. Rather than assure that reviewers meet standards of methodological and scientific competence and are free of political or ideological biases, current procedures are actually designed to evade scientific standards of review and discipline in the name of discipline, while assuring conformity and control, as this article will demonstrate. This process works in much the way that churches establish doctrinal order to promote conformity to ‘peers’ but without any independent standard of quality. In short, current ‘peer review’ processes act to promote shared group benefits without any reference to objective standards that are
Returning Discipline to the Discipline in Review Processes

independent of the subjective interpretations of the observer. Review processes now offer no procedural safeguards to assure disciplinary competence or to screen out political biases or conflicts of interest. Indeed, the methods now used specifically reinforce these biases, promoting existing ideologies and shared interest at the expense of the stated professional goals of the field.

In a separate unpublished article on book reviews and the procedures and policies relating to book reviews in anthropology and related fields, the author demonstrates that social anthropology and apparently other related fields have degenerated into politicised cliques operating on the basis of power and self-interest rather than adhere to recognised procedural safeguards (Lempert unpublished). Within anthropology, the reason for this appears to be that the discipline has lost basic agreement on content and goals and simply works to allow researchers to present their data to say what they please and to define their goals as they choose, so long as those goals fit those of the journal editors. In other disciplines the problem may be the opposite; the discipline’s rules may be clear but there are attempts to prevent objective challenges that would reveal underlying fallacies and political corruption. Within anthropology and, in general, across related fields, it appears that the very sense of agreement on objective process has disappeared and along with it any real ‘discipline’ (Duncan 2013; Lempert 2014b). Having lost adherence to basic principles in reviewing other work and having turned review processes into personal, idiosyncratic and political ones based on factors such as contacts, networks, hierarchy, and ideology, as this article demonstrates, the basis of ‘discipline’ is also lost.

Although those who have established careers in these disciplines can protect themselves from directly hearing the ridicule from outsiders like Sokal, this short-term protective strategy is ultimately one that is self-destructive. University disciplines facing shortages of public funding must recognize that they bear much of the responsibility. Given the realities of funding, if disciplines cannot continually generate predictive theories and applications, and only serve the interests of a few or of a certain sector of society rather than long-term, overall human interests and the advancement of human knowledge and technologies, they will attract neither students nor community support (Lempert, Briggs, et. al. 1995).

Corruption of review procedures is not the only failure that can undermine a discipline. For example, corruption of funding and hiring policies may be more responsible. Further, power is exercised without accountability or control in many components of publication decisions beyond simply ‘review’ procedures. Nonetheless, this article focuses on mechanisms to return ‘discipline’ to some of the components of the publication review process that are failing.

Background of the Debate in Anthropology and Social Sciences and Where Procedural Solutions Fit

Most social and cultural anthropologists today agree that an abrupt change has occurred in the field in the past twenty or thirty years. The discipline of anthropology, once viewed as the holistic social science of human behaviour in groups, no longer recognizes this mission of social science. Other social sciences that could have fit under its umbrella (examining political, economic and social behaviours of groups – the fields of, political science, economics, and sociology) or above it (sociology as the study of cultures together in complex systems) have also turned away from taking a scientific approach to human behaviours at the level of groups.

In the 1960s and 1970s when I first learned about anthropology and was excited by it as a student, there was a core of anthropologists who believed the discipline could follow social science principles, much as psychology models and predicts individual behaviours (Harris 1979). In ‘struggling for a science of culture’, this group agreed to the use of the scientific method and hypothesis testing as the disciplinary standard. The belief was that the discipline could be built through a standard of measurements and testing of hypotheses that would be independent of each individual observer, with cases used to find principles rather than simply present information and idiosyncratic views. In doing so, their hope (indeed, “our” hope, since I was one of them as a student) was to free anthropology of ideological biases (shared group beliefs that were not independent of the group) and political biases (beliefs favouring the distribution of
resources for the benefit of specific groups, independent of objective measure and merit) that largely came from the colonial objectives of the governments in the places anthropologists worked in the early 20th century. Physical anthropology, studying the evolution of humans as primates, had followed this scientific approach, focusing on measures of environment and biology to derive explanations and predictions. So did archaeology and linguistics, the other two parts of four-field anthropology. As with the study of psychology, that is increasingly linked to biological and chemical studies, ‘four-field’ anthropology had been developing as a mixed natural and social science with social and cultural anthropology linking contemporary social and cultural processes to the longer historical record and the physical variables used in the other three sub-fields.

Today, social and cultural anthropology is not only increasingly detached from these other fields, but it has largely abandoned any link to science. Some anthropologists today readily admit that their goal is to support political interests and ideologies (either those of colonial governments or those of specific interest groups under them) (Duncan 2013; Lempert 2014b), much as earlier anthropologists had predicted would happen once scientific approaches were abandoned (Harris 1979). In doing so, they have largely turned social and cultural anthropology into political advocacy, journalism, and armchair philosophy with the very anti-science bias that Sokal’s hoax revealed. Though this has been described as an attempt to establish a ‘moral model’ for the discipline (Hymes 1982; Andrade 1995), the morality of political groups pursuing particular interests rather than human knowledge and ideas of human betterment itself raises moral questions.

This attack on science is also an attack on the discipline, itself. Though ideology and politics can enforce adherence to specific sets of beliefs shared by a group (e.g., anti-science and promotion of political interests), this is simply a substitution of arbitrary control for objective standards of an academic discipline. Unlike science, the current anti-science processes of standardisation and control cannot be challenged by testing and replaced by better theory. This is because ideological and political controls do not allow for challenges, testing, or independent observations the way the fundamental tenets of science does.

Rather than focus on content in an attempt to define the direction of these disciplines to promote a particular politics and ideology, this piece focuses instead on the process issues. Procedural controls can rig selection of materials and views and determine the content/theory debates. The lack of fair, open, and consistent processes itself undermines the basic procedures for reaching scholarly consensus and assuring legitimacy. Once an appropriate process is in place, the content issues may then resolve themselves through the process. First, however, there must be a legitimate process to justify the definition of academic work as a ‘discipline’. For those of us who see ourselves as social scientists, this is the basis of the scientific method and the establishment of disciplines (Comte 1853). For those of us who also or independently see ourselves working in the humanities, this basis of ‘discipline’ is a fundamental belief grounded in law and political process with truth emerging through the competition of ideas (Madison, Hamilton and Jay 1788).

The central questions this article asks are:
- As anthropologists (and academics in related disciplines), what processes can we adopt to ensure quality as a ‘discipline’ and that assures debates occur in a way reflecting common standards rather than idiosyncratic prejudices?
- What review standards do we agree to offering some way of measuring and recording achievement and progress in solving certain research questions and problems?
- How can we assure real competence in our disciplines and sub-disciplines rather than simply substituting position, authority, and political norm for competence?
- How can we assure fair treatment of new and challenging work and eliminate conflicts of interest that politicize our field and destroy ‘discipline’?
- What hidden or uncomfortable problems do we need to address in establishing and adhering to process that prevents us from doing this?
- How can we address them?
Disclosure of the Author’s Position in Scholarship and Openness to Diversity with Discipline

The presentation here of approaches to re-establishing procedural legitimacy to academic disciplines is not targeting academia in isolation. The author of this article has worked in the field of law and governance reform, focusing on mechanisms of procedural fairness and safeguards against corruption across the globe, for more than 30 years. During this time, I have designed procedures for holding governments and international organisations publicly accountable to universal standards of community and individual rights, equity, opportunity, and procedural fairness, while also promoting the full advance of human inquiry following the principles of scientific neutrality and integrity (promoting the perspectives in this article). I have been drafting and publishing laws and indicators for accountability as well as extensions of professional ethics code in anthropology and related disciplines (Lempert 1997, 2011). The purpose of this piece is to apply the very same principles of standard processes and ethics to current activities in academia that are central to the idea of a ‘discipline’ and that call for the same kinds of reforms and safeguards in other public activities.

While I am a member of a minority ethnicity, a feminist, and someone who loves his country (and many others and their peoples), as well as an author of fiction, poetry, and essays, my reasons for entering anthropology were NOT:
- to use it as a vehicle for promotion of my sexuality, my gender or my feminist politics, or my ethnicity;
- to use it in a search for meaning over confusion of identity;
- to use it as a vehicle for power over any peoples or area or attempt to convert them or ‘develop’ them to promote any nationalist political goals or to become an area expert to categorize and monitor an area or peoples;
- to use it in an attempt to homogenize people for some standard or uniform equality; or
- to use it for any other goals that would open the door to any conflicts of interest with the advancement of social science and its humanitarian purposes (including the promotion of cultural diversity and sustainability of cultures).

I entered anthropology inspired by the goal of uncovering truths about how societies and cultures work and how to make them more accountable, more equitable, more diverse, more open and freer, through fair procedures. He believed he could uncover principles of sustainability, cultural survival, and change that could open the door to improvements in balance with nature, diversity, and choice. For me, those beliefs were also part of a cultural tradition of ‘progress’ and empiricism that were part of the teachings of Judaism (Cahill 1998) and that have been reflected in the work of secular Jews who were among many of the founders of American anthropology (including Boas and Sapir) and its scientific adherents (Wolf and Harris).

In my view, not only is the idea of social science (and perhaps also of humanistic progress) under attack today, but the current disconnection of social and cultural anthropology from the other three fields of ‘four-field’ anthropology appears an attack on Darwinian theories of evolution and on the partly natural and biological determination of human behaviours, including culture. In my view, the idea that culture is ‘created’ (or ‘imagined’) seems to reinforce a Christian theological belief similar to the anti-Darwinists of the 19th century, seeking to reverse the basic principles of scientific causality and to replace them with beliefs of magic, randomness, and religious faith in individual free will completely apart from the natural and social worlds. In the same way that an attack on Darwin and on science is fundamentally a political and ideological attack on the idea of progress, the author finds similar parallels today in social and cultural anthropology (and other social science disciplines), even though they come from groups whose specific interests may (seem to) be opposed to fundamental religious teachings. That larger debate, however, is beyond the scope of this article and not something readers need to agree with in order to support the objective processes offered.
Format of the Piece:

This article is two parts. The first part examines the workings of review processes in academia, noting how these are corrupted and fail. The second part offers a solution that this journal has already partly tested by allowing the reviewer of this article to apply it in his/her review of this piece.

In presenting the evidence of how review processes work, the first part of the article follows a social science framework, offering both evidence and hypotheses, in a model of what social science articles can be but rarely are. In offering a solution rather than ending with fatalism, the second part of the article is something this author believes is rarely seen (or allowed) in anthropology articles today. This also makes a point about the implications of what has happened.

Revealing a problem, offering ‘proof’ and speculation where full proof is outside the current scope, and then a solution, makes this article longer than that allowed almost anywhere in anthropology, today. Even though many anthropologists today claim that they are being ‘political’ and working for ‘social justice’ and change, as part of the new “moral model” of the discipline (Andrade, 1985; Hymes, 1982) even something as seemingly innocuous as length requirements has consequences for a discipline. If the essence of social science is comparisons and hypothesis testing, and if the basis of anthropology is modelling societies, that requires more words. Shorter lengths are suited to single ‘arguments’, single ‘case studies’ and something more akin to journalism for rather than for doing the full holistic ethnographies, comparative studies of various cultures at once, or complex social modelling that a social science of anthropology originally envisioned and demands advancing social science knowledge and improving society.

Part One. Investigating the Problem of Current Review Procedures

A recent editor of perhaps the premier journal in the field of anthropology describes the review process of his journal as ‘fair’ and ‘thoughtful’, relying on ‘professional reviewers’. At the same time, he ardently objects to any attempts to screen reviewers for conflicts of interest or competency in the fields of the articles they review because he had ‘enough trouble finding reviewers as it is’. Asking reviewers to acknowledge conflicts of interest and areas where they lacked competence in reviewing colleague’s work would ‘daunt or even possibly antagonize many, many prospective reviewers’. In other words, his journal would lose most of its current reviewers if they would be required to disqualify themselves due to lack of competence or conflicts of interest. Anyone familiar with professional societies and journals knows that it would be very simple and probably welcome to create a requirement on members of a professional society that they register their areas of expertise and agree to assume responsibility for serving as a journal reviewer in order to advance and protect the field. Certainly, anyone who publishes in a journal should also agree to serve as a reviewer. It is both professionally responsible and easy to create such a data bank and to run such a system, and there are precedents for it. So, the fact that anthropology’s professional associations make the conscious choice NOT to follow established precedents and professionalize review obligations is good evidence that the association has other motives. Indeed, the author of this article would gladly serve as a reviewer for the field’s major journals and for the dozens of journals in which he has published but is rarely asked.

If the current review system, even in the field’s most eminent journal simultaneously claims that the process is ‘fair’, ‘professional’ and legitimate while being based on reinforcing conflicts of interest and hiding incompetence, this is an admission of fraud. This may be the reality of how review processes work.

This article is not the first critique of the corruption of academia by politics and ideology. Previous examinations of the processes for selection of articles for journals in other fields have discovered how existing procedures tend to reinforce selection of works from certain universities, citing certain authors, or adhering to specific ideologies in processes that reinforce hierarchy rather than objective disciplinary standards. A colleague recently exposed how this process works in economics (Klein 2006) and one would expect similar factors are at work in anthropology and related fields. Indeed, there seem to be
similar processes and problems common among social science and humanities in universities today (Lempert with Briggs 1995).

Part One of this article begins by applying the standard methodologies of our field for revealing this problem. It presents findings using the two different methodological approaches and discusses how current social science review procedures allow easy corruption by editors’ political and ideological interests while failing to assure competence and objectivity.

Methodology

This article collects evidence of the problems of lack of procedural safeguards in review processes in (social and cultural) anthropology in two ways:

1) From participant observation of processes -- the research standard for primary source data that is the central methodology of social anthropology that allows for the selection of a microcosm of the cultural whole as a means of providing a window for viewing the whole, and with the use of cross cultural data as a form of critique, and

2) From a review of existing codes and policies for reviews in journals inside and outside of anthropology, to determine whether there are any existing safeguards in use, and whether those existing minimize or reinforce conflicts of interest and lack of appropriate competence.

Observations as a participant observer come from experiences publishing articles and books, as well as reviewing them for various journals and publishers for over 20 years. I present my views not as ‘proof", since they are idiosyncratic, but as detail of how things can go wrong in the absence of agreed procedural (or ‘disciplinary’) standards and enforcement, in comparison with established principles of fair process in law and in natural science. Although beyond the scope of this piece, replication of studies of review procedures by sociologists could identify how the lack of standard procedures may be working to reinforce particular ideologies and political interests from within anthropology or exerted on it from outside (Price 2003).

Findings

The findings from the two types of data collected are as follows:

I. Findings from Participant Observation: Absence of Safeguards for Objectivity and Quality in Peer Reviews

Presented below are:

a) The chronology of how journal articles enter the ‘peer review’ process and the subjective or political biases that enter to distort it at each stage;

b) A summary list of observations on failures, offering observations of the politicised decisions that are promoted by the current process; and

c) The author’s speculations on the ‘deep structure’ of the incentive systems that are at work to corrupt the process under a pretext of ‘fairness’ and ‘expertise’.

Most of this should not surprise the reader, but the systematic presentation and collection of evidence taken together is what should generate thought. Some of the problem areas point already to the kinds of solutions that needed.

a) The Chronology of the Review Process and the Subjectivity (Conflicts of Interest and Undermining of Professionalism) that Occur or can Occur at Different Stages

Here is how I encounter the process of preparing and submitting articles (and books) for review.

⇒ The initial limitation is one of format. Article formats are circumscribed and this influences content. The basis of ethnography is holism, so that human behaviour is studied at the level of the
culture and with comparisons of cultures, but holistic ethnographies (that can amount to multi-volume works of hundreds of pages, like this author’s ethnography of Leningrad) no longer ‘fit’ the space requirements of book publishers (for some 200 or 300 pages) or journals that demand a single ‘argument’ in 8,000 words or less. There is no longer a place to present a new model, a critique with a solution, a new tool or a new philosophy of any real length or complexity, or to conduct comparative studies or anything more complex than just a journalist case study. Any readers who can prove the author wrong, please write to the author, who will gladly respond by sending an avalanche of unpublished work that cannot even be reviewed due to the lack of publication outlets.

⇒ Forums for publication are generally limited (compared to the amount of work competing for space) and journals often have very narrow outlooks on what fits their categories. This enables editors to weed out material that is not already favoured and to limit reviewed work to those promoting their careers or views. If a scholar offers a new measurement tool and tests it, designs a procedural code, fleshes out a new subfield (e.g. ‘astro-antropology’) or offers a new interdisciplinary model (e.g., demographic models of cultural violence; ethnic explanations of social ‘progress’) there is very little opportunity for it to enter on its own merit. Each new journal is open to small groups of colleagues whose incentives, they readily admit, are to promote their own works for a like-minded audience.

⇒ A small but significant percentage of journals or issues (perhaps 5 to 10%) are devoted to ‘symposia’, pre-selected topics, or guest editors in which a small group of people with the influence of outside funding or with a cohesive interest, essentially takes over the slots, subject matter, and promote the ideology of a journal. Though there is still a claim of ‘peer review’, this is usually a pre-politicised process among a pre-selected group.

⇒ No triple blind processes appear to exist. Almost always, the first approach to an editor is to ‘market’ oneself and one’s work. No journal guarantees review. Institutional backing, professional standing, link to specific cohorts, gender, and ideology all seem to weigh in. This is not this author’s interpretation of reasons for refusal of review but simply a direct reporting of reasons given by editors, themselves. Even when pre-selecting journals with sympathetic mission statements, my experience is about two thirds of pieces are refused review for subjective reasons reflecting ideological or in-group biases not found in journal mission statements such as belief that the scientific method is only an “opinion” or that only the local “emic” perspective is valid but not an outside critical perspective, or that all citations must be of the authors of the journal or on narrowly focused debates in the past few years (almost a kind of “newspeak” rather than including classic works in the discipline or in related fields offering alternative approaches to the same research questions. This percentage is even higher for book publishers. Some journals claim that editors have conducted ‘reviews’ but offer no reasons or evidence to back their subjective judgments. Where pieces are particularly unusual (interdisciplinary, challenge to orthodoxy), the inability to find reviewers is often used as an excuse to reject a piece, with no reference to the merits.

⇒ Peer review processes are usually single blinded but not always double blinded. In other words, the reviewer’s competence and objectivity is hidden from the author, with no opportunity for challenge or for transparency about the selection. Authors who are insiders have some opportunity to manipulate the process by naming favourable and biased reviewers.

⇒ Use of the reviews is itself subjective and politicised with no standard for what constitutes sufficiency to reject or to accept and no standardisation of criteria. I have yet to see a set of reviews that demonstrates any determination based on explicit professional competence criteria and evidence. Academic book publishers simply make a subjective decision on their view of what will earn profits, with no market testing or academic standards at all. In some cases, editors simply ask reviewers for a majority vote as to whether they ‘like’ the work and if it needs the
imposition of conditions before publication (like citing the work of insiders or articles in previous issues of the same journal). Since there is no clear objective competence or licensing standards in review procedures, the determination of whether shortcomings are critical or reparable is also a political one. Minor and unfounded objections can be used as a pretext for discarding a piece (often alongside a political or conflict of interest objection). At the same time, my experience in conducting reviews has shown that editors can ignore reviewers’ objections to promote the work, ideologies, and interests of themselves or their friends. A university publisher published one academic book I reviewed because the author had solicited political endorsements, despite the misuse of evidence and methodology. Similarly, an article based on government-funded research on controlling minorities that called for violations of international law and misused data and methodology was printed because the journal editor sought to curry favour. Such works then received the stamp of ‘peer review’ even though the reviews demonstrated they were unfit for publication.

Authors seeking an appeal by referencing standards or even the stated policies of the journal or ethics of the profession have nowhere to turn. Editorial boards exist on paper with no responsibilities. There are no processes in the discipline to challenge alleged abuses of power by journal editors and journals, and attempts to do so risk ostracisation and blacklisting from those journals. Journal boards act as a single voice backing the editor. My experience in one challenge to test the ethics code of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) is that the associations turns such matters over to its lawyer who is not a member of the profession, with the focus on protecting the association and its staff, without considering implications for the profession.

Use of the courts for review of procedures in the discipline, in an attempt to enforce public and contractual standards, is possible but not a practical alternative. Lawyers and judges avoid these cases because no large sums of money are involved. Outsiders prefer to avoid involvement in academic disputes that they seem to view already as lacking any enforceable standards and with little real public concern.

Tenure review and academic committees in universities also have no incentive to deal with these disputes. Their focus appears to be on reputation and funds, not on standards in a discipline. Since there is no uniformity or agreement on skill sets and certification within most of the subfields of social and cultural anthropology, little in the certification of anthropologists by universities seems to offer any guidance as to the skills and qualifications making one eligible to competently review academic work, even in a sub-discipline. In interdisciplinary work, this problem is even more pronounced.

b) Summary of Findings: The Visible Lack of Standards in Reviews

Send an article or book manuscript to any publication in anthropology or in other social sciences and humanities fields today and the process everywhere is almost exactly the same; mixing several subjective elements with a procedure claimed to be scientific and objective but also offering little assurance of standards. Subjectivity seems to enter at every stage while safeguards, quality controls, competency standards, procedures, and disciplinary bedrocks do not seem to enter anywhere.

There are often calls for citations and addition of or response to arguments but rarely any explanations that determine whether use of data or methodology is correct or incorrect or why. Journal and book editors do not articulate and may not even be able to articulate what makes scholarship ‘good’ beyond quality of style and conformity to political or group prejudices. This seems to be due to the lack of standards.

In my experience, the typical reasons for acceptance of manuscripts reflect conflicts of interest more than tests of competence. Paraphrased, this includes the following statements:

- I agree with it.
Among reasons for rejection, reflecting a process riddled with conflicts of interest, are these:
- Most people disagree with the author (suggesting that majority ideology is the standard);
- The article challenges or criticizes colleagues and that is not allowed;
- The author does not use the approach that my disciplinary faction prefers and does not cite the authorities that my faction prefers (whether or not they are relevant);
- The piece is not important to me and I do not like it;
- The methodology partly comes from an outside field and no one knows whether it is valid or not. Better to reject it than to risk something new;
- The question is too big to ask or different from those others ask;
- There are some minor errors in terminology and I assume that means everything else is flawed, though I do not know enough to tell;
- The conclusions are uncomfortable;
- I never heard of the author or this line of work.

For book publishing, where publishing opportunities are even rarer, processes also seem to reinforce subjective factors under the pretext of merit. Here, double blind determinations are rare and add the following subjective criteria:
- The author is not famous and in a high position in the field and should not be published (or should be published simply as a result of position);
- The author’s ideology is not fitting with the mainstream, so universities would not assign it (or should be published because it reinforces a mainstream ideology); or
- The author does not have an existing group of students or other readers to extort to purchase the work, and should not be published (or the opposite).

One might suppose a methodological basis to the standards of publication for research monographs. For works that might reach a wider market, one might expect financial considerations to enter, with publishers’ test-marketing works and entering into contracts that allowed authors to subsidy works and share risks. In fact, true market and financial considerations seem to be irrelevant, with financial reasons used as justification on the assumption that authors know little about either the economics of publishing or of marketing. Academic publishers routinely make publication decisions based on ideology and politics under the pretext of ‘the market,’ without any actual testing of what the market will bear. Since academics rarely take the risk of starting their own book publishing companies and simply defer to the existing publishing hierarchy and its operations, this screening has become the norm in book publishing.

This also may explain why book publications are increasingly collections from multiple authors that offer little depth and little new. The idea seems to be to assure an established group of buyers and promoters belonging to an existing clique with the ability to promote each other and extort others to buy their book. Similarly, works with more secondary sources and quotes are favoured over more scientific works that would challenge convention and fill new market niches, as the quoted authorities have a stake in promoting the book.

Overall, in the U.S. and Europe, processes that often censor material are euphemistically called ‘peer review’ and utilize what is a deserved but unacknowledged pun; the ‘blind review’. Ironically, these processes are almost the same as those I observed in the Soviet Union and documented there (Lempert 1995) and that were described by Western academics as in violation of procedural standards and unsuited to a democratic culture or to a system that had prospects of intellectual (and economic) advances.

c) The Deep Structure (‘Etic’) of ‘Peer Review’ Processes: A Testable Hypothesis on What is Happening

The author’s interpretation of what is happening in social anthropology is that review processes today reveal networks of individuals at similar levels exchanging favours and reinforcing self-interest of their
cliques (horizontally) as well as partly vertically, through patron-client networks of teachers and ‘disciples’ following ‘lineages’ (and funders). This view of universities as following in the tradition of the church, from which they developed, should not be surprising given that it confirms the anthropological principle of cultural continuity. Nor should it be surprising that review processes maintain such hierarchies and maintain sects. What is surprising is that a church model that appears to protect standards for natural sciences simply replaces professional objective discipline in the social sciences. Rather than promote the profession through a shared and enforceable professional ethic and standards that are subject to objective verification and that could protect the discipline and its participants against political pressures, review processes appear to work to cement political alliances and ideologies that oppose or distort sciences, and are self-reinforcing through an exchange of favours. Marcel Mauss (Mauss 1954) probably didn’t develop his idea of society being based on exchange relationships (‘the gift’) from watching cliques of academics using review processes to insulate the profession from outsiders, promote their friends and isolate those who sought standards and measurable benefits and ‘progress,’ but probably he could have, using contemporary observations. As the number of academics has grown, and as social and cultural anthropology has become associated with political interests (feminism, ethnic groups), and as funding has become scarce and also tied to specific commercial or (elite) interests, one can certainly understand how short-term interests could have entered to corrupt review processes. Instead of providing the required ‘discipline’ to the discipline, they work to promote friends, punish competitors, show fear of and subservience to elite funders, erase previous work in the field regardless of its validity or value if it does not serve current political interests, and create obligations for future favours from colleagues or currying favour from superiors.

The incentive structure seems to be this:
- Journal editors and book editors use journals as ways to advance their careers and those of a small group of peers (whom they put on the boards, establish as reviewers and whose works are published) rather than to set standards for answering professional questions in the discipline. Once editors have a journal, the first goal for many of them seems to be to offer a place to publish their own work and that of their friends on theme issues that create the opportunity. The journals offer a way to establish patron-client networks and to reinforce ‘disciple’ networks of older scholars and young. One also finds a number of interlocking boards (similar to the issue of interlocking directorates of corporations that establish de-facto oligopoly power). Often, the only journals in a specific subfield have the same group of people on their boards, define the subfield and then effectively lock out any new entrants in ways that prevent the ethic and accountability that is part of the process of an academic discipline. In the most egregious case of one subfield, I noted four different journals edited by four different editors as the main author and the other three as members of the interlocking editorial boards. On their C.V.’s or references, each scholar listed several publications written jointly with one or more members of the same group, publishing materials in journals of the co-editors.
- As euphemisms for the lack of competence and the narrowness of the field, material outside of the clique may be discarded out of frustration or lack of ability and interest to review it. The remaining criteria, in absence of wider competence, is political, with the editor seeking political protection in a way that will assure no road blocks to career advancement. Today, the standard political vetting is a request for addition of footnotes of the work of the group comprising the journal.
- No social science or related discipline seems to have established any obligation of members to conduct reviews, to report on conflicts of interest or to license and register specific skills for the review process, though it would not be difficult to do so. Editors choose reviewers not from an existing list of objective specialists but either from reviewers suggested by the authors, themselves (potentially favouring authors in an established reinforcing network) or from works cited. This gives reviewers the chance to punish critics with the protection of
anonymity, to compete against colleagues, and to favour those in patron-client networks. It also offers opportunity, with the protection of anonymity, to promote the citation of reviewers’ own works.

II. Findings from Research into Existing Codes and Approaches

A search for codes of ethics, standards, accountability, and guidelines in review processes in anthropology and in other disciplines draws mostly blanks. Random spot check on journals and a search for review guidelines that assure competence and that direct reviewers to follow and justify disciplinary standards suggest that they do not exist. Nor is there any screening for conflicts of interest. At best, one can find some attention to the issues of research falsification and influences of funding agencies in the hard sciences and applied research. Overall, it appears that no written standards exist and that processes are arbitrary and easily open to corruption (perhaps by design).

In anthropology as a whole, the closest thing to procedural standardisation of any kind appears to be the AAA Code of Ethics (1998). It offers a human subjects statement for research ethics and some mention of conflicts of interest, though nothing directly applicable to review processes within the discipline itself. Even with various draft changes under consideration, there is still no process for enforcement or review within the discipline even among academics. The Code does not apply to professional work or to sanctioning of outside organisations (including book publishers or interdisciplinary journals) that pressure members to violate the standards (Lempert 1997).

The current editor of the American Anthropologist (since 2012) has introduced a set of six review questions for journal articles where there seems to have been no list. The idea of a template is a step forward given that few journals even go that far. Most book publishers ask reviewers to answer a list of questions and one can sometimes find these in journal review procedures such as the six questions now used by the American Anthropologist. Yet, none of these templates seeks to screen for competence of reviewers or conflicts of interest. The American Anthropologist’s questions ask reviewers to comment on whether the research findings are ‘novel’ or inventive in their subjective judgment; whether they have ‘general significance’; whether the articles cites and engages with ‘scholarship’ without defining it; whether the data and analysis support the claims; whether there is clear writing and whether the piece meets the journal’s space limit. There is no written protocol for the selection, certification, or screening of reviewers. Reviewers are not asked to report conflicts of interest or provide any objective basis for their claims. There is no challenge procedure, nor is there any ethics oversight. In several cases, this author has directly challenged editors where there was direct evidence of conflicts of interest and biases as well as rejections with no substantive merit. The standard response is almost always, ‘The reviewers are experts in the field and the journal relies on their judgment. Good luck finding another place to publish your work.’ This is a purely subjective process at the discretion of the editor, following the subjective discretion to grant a review (denied to this article because of both length and content).

Indeed, the American Anthropologist’s procedures are almost exactly like those that Social Text adapted after the Sokal hoax (shown on their website, 2015). Their categories of questions for reviewers ask whether the material is ‘original’; methodologically ‘sound’; ‘ethical’; offers clear results that support conclusions; and offers correct references to previous work.

The one place that addresses the issue of ethics in reviews is the Accountability in Research Journal that promotes the Committee on Publication Ethics Code of Conduct (2011). This code only partially covers the many issues of ethics and standards. Moreover, it only offers guidance, no dispute resolution mechanisms, binding enforcement or legal obligations. The standards it offers are also subjective in some areas. For example, the Code ‘champions freedom of expression’ with a peer review process subject to ‘standards’ but without describing how freedom or standards are to be determined or protected. Though there is some attempt to recognize legal commitments, the standards are not set in accordance with actual contract law. For example, ‘New editors should not overturn decisions to publish submissions made by the previous Editor unless serious problems are identified.’ However, what is a ‘serious problem’?
Similarly, ‘Editors should not reverse decisions to accept submissions unless serious problems are identified.’

Though it deals with even fewer issues, outside of social behavioural fields, the Geological Society of America’s Ethical Guidelines for Publications (2011) offers a definition of conflict of interest and references the scientific method. Nevertheless, it goes little beyond that.

In the natural sciences, specific disciplinary procedures for presenting and testing evidence and for certifying that reviewers also know these procedures is what makes those fields ‘disciplines’. There are agreed standards of proof and testing. Training to the level of a Ph.D. or similar degree assures that reviewers have the same body of knowledge and skills that certify their competence. Some of the natural sciences have taken steps to try to codify their peer review processes in ways that protect against ‘peer review failures’ to spot abuses in use of data, or other misrepresentations in scientific work. There have been a number of discussions in the scientific community as to how to police the review process and protect against pressures introduced by funding agencies (Michaels 2006). The question on improving reviews in those fields, however, is generally limited to technical issues as to how the burdens of proof are determined (on proponents of ideas or on opponents?) and on technical standards of proof. Though there are some similar concerns of conflicts of interest and biases against new approaches, the sciences do not seem to have yet come up with clear procedures on how to address them.

In comparing how review processes work in the natural sciences (based on use of the scientific method and licensed skill sets) and in humanities, it may be possible to explain why social science peer review processes are so easily corrupted but also so readily treated as if they are legitimate. The hybrid mixture of procedures for screening social science and humanities articles invalidates both procedures through a logical design flaw. Rather than separate them for different types of articles, journals merge the two processes and distort the required quality tests without understanding the implications. There is little understanding that, to be more than just journalism, advocacy, or essay, scientific articles must meet scientific competency and methodological standards of proof and humanities articles must meet disciplinary standards. Such standards not only link them to scientific and disciplinary questions but offer structured ways of testing their implications, raising new questions, offering thought experiments, introducing ethical concerns, or providing cultural critique (Duncan 2013).

‘Standards’ used by journals in anthropology and other social sciences today reinforce internal biases against empirical social science and the scientific method but claim legitimacy at the very same time on the basis that they use scientific and professional review procedures. For articles that are pseudo-science and political or ideological, a functioning discipline would screen them out in two steps.

- First, it would demonstrate that the questions asked do not fit the framework of questions that are the basis of the discipline’s steps for advancing human knowledge.
- Second, it would demonstrate that the procedures do not follow the scientific method for hypothesis testing.

Today, where anthropology and social sciences have now eliminated the idea that there is even a matrix of questions or ‘laws’ to be explained by empirical testing, there is no measure of what even constitutes a new or important question. With no certified standards to use in answering these questions, and with no testable models for predicting social reality, there is no competence test for reviewers. Nonsensical work is peer reviewed because colleagues judge it on whether the author ‘does what he/she sets out to do’ and whether it ‘fits with previous work’. Case studies that take what is already known and simply apply it to a different context, or that focus on a sub-topic even more miniscule and inconsequential, are described as ‘opening up a new field’. The processes of screening simply reinforce pseudo-science and protect ideology in the same way that church scholarship maintains an order.

With the introduction of scientific work using a rigorous method that would overturn existing ideological biases, the existing review procedure works to screen it out. Current review process assures that reviewers will include the very scholars (and often the most senior scholars) whom the author is criticizing, rather than seeking objective professionals who are expert in the methodology that the author is using. The screening of whether the work is ‘methodologically sound’ or ‘ethical’ by definition reports
back that it disagrees with the established ‘majority view’ that is the ‘standard’ or ‘norm’ in the field, rather than whether it is actually professionally competent. It is easy to screen out new work as ‘not significant’ and not engaging correctly with the existing ‘scholarship’ (i.e., not following doctrinal authority).

Moreover, there is no way of using legal or other outside mechanisms as a check against this kind of politicisation. In American law, courts often consider enforcement of customary dealings when there is a recognised standard of the ‘trade’. As an attorney, I consulted with colleagues who are experts on copyright law and contract to see if the courts recognize disciplines as having clear and enforceable standards to protect against politicisation of review processes. Though my belief is that there were clearly understood standards at least as of the 1980s, leading legal scholars today claim there is no recognised standard at all other than respecting the hierarchical authority of journal editors to act arbitrarily (!).

**Results and Discussion:**

**The Apparent Disappearance of Procedural Standards and Its Implications for the ‘Discipline’**

Peer review processes today appear to offer no standards of accountability in social and cultural anthropology (or in related fields) that fit the idea of a ‘discipline’ promoting human advancement through scientific discovery or other measurable benefit. The recent opening up of the discipline of anthropology to multiple perspectives through selection of faculty members based on criteria of ‘representation’ has come with an elimination of disciplinary standards. Meanwhile, other social sciences have become increasingly doctrinaire in ways that impose discipline but have turned away from the goals and review procedures of social ‘science’.

Though social and cultural anthropologists operate today on the assumption that ‘social science’ was improved by the transition to a ‘moral model’ (Andrade, 1995) for a ‘re-invented’ (Hymes, 1985) humanities ‘discipline’, there is in fact no ‘moral model’ in anthropology or other social sciences and humanities because there is no set of moral standards or procedural protections in evaluation of work. If there were, anthropologists and those in other fields would gladly agree to hold themselves and their colleagues to legal standards, let alone moral ones, as well as to build a standardised ‘discipline’. In short, the ‘moral model’ has turned anthropology into (or has reproduced) the very thing the discipline was (and other social sciences and related disciplines were) being criticised for – the arbitrary use of ‘discipline’ to enforce forms of group self-interest and discrimination in absence of any real standard. The people and politics has simply changed to reflect certain under-represented groups, like women and certain minorities, with particular agendas (Duncan 2011; Lempert 2014b) but perhaps without any real ‘moral’ improvement that assures the discipline will be truly open to equal and fair competition of ideas and merit, rather than just new forms of politicisation.

Work that replicates and praises by offering case studies of what is accepted ideology, with multiple citations to the members of the group of ‘peer’ reviewers and with appropriate ‘ancestor worship’ (citations of its leaders) is favoured. There is less science because science would challenge the doctrines rather than recite them. There is less in new solutions and methodology.

Though *Social Text*’s editors and many scholars in the social sciences and humanities questioned Sokal’s ethics in exposing their lack of competence and their lack of fair procedures, it is difficult to find any enforceable standard of ethics in journals or book publishers today that puts the public and advancement of disciplines above personal interests of editors and reviewers.

What happened in anthropology is that, in its push to ‘broaden’ the field and bring in new questions, the idea of a doctorate certifying an inventory of skills, ethics, and understanding has disappeared. Certification with an M.A. or Ph.D. does not assure licensing or competence in anything that is standardised and fits a discipline. It simply suggests that one has paid money, shown up and taken a degree. The skills learned in anthropology departments today may be little more than glorified film journalism or language ability for work in a specific cultural setting. With no standard degree that reflects
the basis of a discipline, ‘peer review’ is unable to test the competence of a professional to apply specific skills. These two processes run together. Without any clear certification, it is difficult to claim objective, competent, and standards-based peer review.

In neighbouring disciplines, the situation is different but no better. One can argue that certification in other fields (such as economics, political science, and law) is training the wrong skills, the wrong ethics, and asking the wrong questions in a way that turns science into pseudoscience and undermines discipline (Lempert, 2018). Using disciplinary concepts of science and humanities could hold those disciplines to scrutiny and put them back on the track as social sciences and human intellectual pursuits rather than as theologies/ideologies and misapplied technologies.

To summarize the current situation, I have prepared the following table (Table 1), examining the current control processes that are at work in the basic social science disciplines. Note that while social and cultural anthropology has chosen to become ‘anti-science’ without any form of social scientific competency review, and no real discipline for works that are ‘humanities’ approaches de-linked from science, most of the other social sciences have review procedures that work to transform them into pseudo-sciences that claim to be scientific but are not. They actively screen out works that introduce objective variables and challenge biases embedded in the choice of disciplinary questions, methodologies, and conclusions.
Table 1: Current Peer Review Control Systems, by Discipline, to Distract or Suppress Social Science Inquiry

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Discipline</th>
<th>Methodological Restrictions Rather than Free Choice of Methods to Answer Questions</th>
<th>Ideological Restrictions on the Questions/Subjects and Objects of Study</th>
<th>Restrictions on or Rejection of Scientific Method of Prediction and Hypothesis Testing</th>
<th>Restrictions on Choices and Definitions of Variables</th>
<th>Political Restrictions on Acceptable Conclusions and Proposals/Applications for Change</th>
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<td>Holistic</td>
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<td>Sociology (Societies)</td>
<td>Use of survey methodology to examine stratification more than processes of mass societies or modelling of societies. (E.g., little historic or contemporary modelling and comparison of ‘empires’ and change processes).</td>
<td>Goal is to promote uniformity in mass society rather than cultural diversity.</td>
<td>Use of scientific method but within the restrictions of policy outcomes for distribution or social action within specific industrial systems.</td>
<td>Historical and cross-cultural work is disfavoured with the focus on contemporary industrial society, established categories of stratification, and civil society or movement organisations.</td>
<td>The current discipline is really ‘distributive equity in industrial systems’. Conclusions must not challenge tenets of current civil society and service providing organisations on their values and benefits.</td>
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<td>Anthropology (Cultures)</td>
<td>Ethnography/journalistic case study method limits focus and comparisons as well as long-term change over time.</td>
<td>Restrictions on ‘studying up’ and dealing with challenges to elites and change, other than advocacy for specific interest groups.</td>
<td>Rejection of Scientific Method and solutions, replaced with philosophy and advocacy.</td>
<td>Holistic modelling, comparisons, and links to environment and genetics are replaced with ‘deconstruction’, micro-studies, and ‘arguments’.</td>
<td>Disfavouring of evolutionary, deterministic, predictive models. Schism in the profession between serving power for better assimilating minority cultures and for protecting cultural rights and opposing those who promote globalisation.</td>
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<td>Functional Sub-Set Disciplines</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Sociology (Social)</strong></td>
<td>Focus on institutions, strata and ‘equity’</td>
<td>(See above)</td>
<td>(See above)</td>
<td>(See above)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economics</strong></td>
<td>Mathematics and a priori behavioural assumptions (e.g., ‘rational’ choice, ‘maximizing consumption’ and ‘individual utility’) set the framework and data must then fit these assumptions rather than follow from empirical reality.</td>
<td>Limited to questions about ‘growth’/productivity and others that fit existing industrial economies and systems of trade and hegemony.</td>
<td>Only econometrics and some studies of psychology of individual economic behaviours follows empirical social science but within restrictions to protect existing systems. Little comparison of the full range of economic systems.</td>
<td>Variables are limited to those of ‘policy tools’ (e.g., interest rates) and impact on ‘growth’, ‘efficiency’, individual behaviours, rather than the actual study of economies in relation to demographics, environment, and other physical and social variables over time. Data must reinforce pre-determined assumptions and conclusions.</td>
<td>Favoursing of globalisation and assimilation of cultures, industrialisation and urbanisation with increasing consumption. The current discipline is really ‘production engineering’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political Science (Political)</strong></td>
<td>Regression analysis and single variable studies across cultures rather than holistic modelling.</td>
<td>Restrictions on comparisons between contemporary powers (e.g. U.S.) and ‘enemies’ (e.g., Soviet Union, China, Nazi Germany) to model similarities.</td>
<td>Extract single variables from all cases and compare the cases without looking at the context and meaning.</td>
<td>Restrictions on use of natural variables and replacement with ideological definitions (‘communism’, ‘democracy’) and limited processes without their context (‘free elections’).</td>
<td>Reinforce the superiority of the U.S. political and social system or other powerful institutions and contemporary ideologies. Criticism cannot be in the form of real proposals (e.g., alternative constitutions) or empowerment (socialisation) but should focus on ideologies (‘communism’) to prevent change.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In visits to law schools in the early 1980s, Ralph Nader explained why his consumerist movement and publications had to be presented entirely outside of established legal scholarship even though he was a Harvard trained lawyer. He told law students that ‘you can’t have a new idea in law reviews’ (the journals of ‘legal scholarship’) ‘because you can’t footnote them’. When the test of a peer review becomes adherence to something already vetted in the profession by an authority, rather than by a test of competent use of methodology, there is no possibility for intellectual advancement. A discipline becomes doctrinal, imposing loyalty tests rather than competency tests. This is a form of censorship and self-censorship rather than the free and open testing of ideas through agreed procedures that constitute the essence of an academic discipline. Nor is it an approach that meets the real goals of inclusiveness and fairness that anthropologists claim are behind changes in the discipline.

Rather than have disciplinary standards that assure objective testing of social phenomena and presentation of ideas, we seem to have a system of pluralistic censorship and self-censorship. There is freedom but it depends on one’s ability to find peers and to start a publication, rather than reliance on objective established disciplinary procedures and standards.

Though academics present themselves as subject to higher standards of discipline than other professions, the current reality may be that they are, or have become, indistinguishable from other contemporary bureaucracies in both the public and private sectors (of which academia is a mix). This means that academic disciplines now need the same anti-corruption solutions needed in other corrupt institutions.

Note, again, that the potential solution presented in the second part of this article is only one of many necessary steps, since corruption enters academic disciplines in many other ways. For example, many journals now offer publication and review for a fee. Money is already a factor that already influences the profession in several other channels (Lempert and Briggs, 1995) as are other kinds of political pressures (Price 2003).

Part Two. Solutions: Recreating Discipline:

A Model Procedure for Reviews in Major Journals and Book Publishers:

Although anthropology and other social science disciplines today have failed to establish clear standards to assure professionalism, the procedural solutions for improving reviews are relatively straightforward, following immediately from the problems and applying existing approaches from natural science review procedures and from law. Presenting solutions that confront short-term interests and appeal to long-term human needs is, indeed, the role and purpose of social sciences, though much of this ethic and vision has also been lost. Rather than just ‘deconstruct’ and leave the scattered pieces, one important role of a humanities side of a discipline is to reconstruct by offering visions of what is possible, arguing why they are beneficial, and then considering the possible pathways to achieving them as well as noting what could prevent them. This is in addition to offering predictive scenarios and seeking to establish a social science research agenda that is relevant to human needs and appropriate to the realities of human behaviours.

The proposal below calls for ‘self-discipline’ or voluntary acceptance as the first step towards returning to ‘discipline’ to anthropology, which must be done through adherence to clear procedures and professional and enforceable standards.

Since there are no specific existing Codes that represent agreement for review processes, this article presents the basic outlines of such codification as a first step in a challenge to journals and publishing houses to build their reputations on their procedural integrity rather than on false, short-term attributes like their abilities to attract funds and prestige. Below are some preliminary drafts of the tools and commitments that incorporate standard best practices for safeguards against corruption and for measuring
competence in five key categories. These approaches create responsibility at several levels: on the profession as a whole to commit to procedures and to their enforcement (1 and 5); on journal editors in the selection of reviewers and the way reviewers are used (2); on scholars submitting articles to think about their content and contribution and to use the abstract as a way to check if they meet professional standards (3); and on reviewers to recognize their competence and conflicts of interest (4).

They are as follows.

1. Standardisation of Review Procedures and Commitment to a Procedure that Reflects Competence and Screens Out Biases;
2. Policy on Selection of Reviewers and Screening for Conflicts of Interest and Competence;
3. Standardisation of Abstracts to Aid in the Process of Building Categories and Reviews in the Field (Beyond the Limitations of ‘Key Words’);
4. Review Template with Guidelines for Objective and Competent Peer Reviews; and
5. Enforcement of Policies and Due Process Commitments.

Note that these are procedural mechanisms to protect processes and their legitimacy. They are only indirect mechanisms to resolve debates over appropriate content, questions, and ‘discipline’ in social science discipline’s teachings and ordering of knowledge. The goal here is not to restrict freedom of new journals to promote political goals in scholarship, especially where they seek to develop approaches not protected elsewhere in the discipline. It is simply to assure the accountability of journals and publishers and the transparency of their biases and competencies. Likewise, disciplines as a whole should be accountable to their principles as academic disciplines. Journals established to represent associations of disciplines or sub-disciplines must be subject to certain obligations for protecting those disciplines and sub-disciplines, as caretakers of the public interest. This approach holds them to their responsibility to demonstrate objectivity, fairness, openness, measurable standards and concern for the public rather than hide conflicts of interest, ideological biases and inadequacies.
1. Standardisation of Review Procedures and Commitment to a Procedure that Reflects Competence and Screens out Biases

There are different ways of protecting the integrity of the review process as well as encouraging minority approaches (to challenge orthodoxy). Journals and book publishers should clearly state how they are accountable to their missions and goals in these processes. Included below are statements for ‘triple blinding’ and ‘one-way blinded, transparent’ procedures. These are in clearest compliance with good governance procedures and do not seem to be used anywhere.

**Statement on Review Procedure**

This journal follows the review procedure of:

**Triple Blinding Peer Review**

All communications with the journal editors and by reviewers will be completely anonymous to ensure no favouritism in the screening or the review process. If this journal uses a preliminary screening and does not send all articles for review, the journal will place a full accounting of the reasons for non-review and will open a web page for interactive comments. Otherwise, all articles are reviewed using the review template shown for this journal. Reviewers and authors are blinded from each other. A description of procedures for reviewer selection, for challenges to reviewer competence and conflict of interest, and oaths to codes of conduct follows … The journal also welcomes scholarship from anonymous authors and authors writing under pseudonyms since its focus is on ideas and the discipline, not on personal careers, conflicts, or interests.

**OR**

**Transparent and Accountable, One Way Blinded Peer Review**

Communications from authors will be anonymous but those of the journal will be open, signed, and accountable, with reviewers responsible for using our review template, reporting all conflicts of interest (subject to challenge by authors) and offering clear reasons for determinations based on specific methodological and competence standards (subject to challenge by authors through the following procedures …).

**OR**

**Independent Review Process (for Independent Journals)**

This journal does not adhere to established review policies in the belief they restrict scholarship, hide self-interested decisions, and promote agendas of … in the field of this journal’s publication. The purpose of this journal is to advance scholarship that has been disfavoured and that does the following … In the interests of promoting scholarly integrity, competence, objectivity and discipline within this area, all pieces submitted to this journal must meet the following standards with use of the following objective procedures …

AND [for all]

To protect the public interest and profession from corporate or other funding biases, the journal will investigate and disclose the funding sources and influences of any articles submitted for publication. The journal will find reviewers who will also protect the public interest and profession from any manipulation of the discipline’s agenda from funding biases. The journal will be open to ethics challenges through …
2. Policy on Selection of Reviewers and Screening for Conflicts of Interest and Competence

Policies like the one below can change the incentive to review from self-interest to professional duty and will professionalize reviewer selection.

**Policy on Reviewer Selection and Obligations**

All members of the association or authors submitting to this journal are placed on a list of potential reviewers by various specialties. Every member will be obligated to serve in turn, as a faithful reviewer as a requirement of membership and affiliation with the association and/or this journal. All reviewers take an ethical oath to faithfully report on competence and skills level and answer competence questions in the review template.

3. Standardisation of Abstracts to Aid in the Process of Building Blocks, Categories and Reviews in the Field (Beyond the Limitations of ‘Key Words’)

Professional, standardised abstracts can help bring discipline and clarity to the review process and to the discipline as a whole. They can also aid in the selection of competent reviewers by helping to develop categories of work and licensing of skills. Current approaches are haphazard and encourage the lack of discipline since they do not classify work by disciplinary approaches (or questions) and methodological categories. This is part of a larger problem. Universities are now failing to certify graduates in measurable skills within the social sciences and related humanities. Fields no longer appear to have a set of specific problems to address or categories (sub-fields) that serve to focus on sets of related problems. Many of the categories that did exist have broken down. The scheme below for standardizing abstracts is part of a process to recreate disciplinary structure where members demand study and certification of specific skills and to view disciplinary questions in a context of solvable problems rather than in terms of area studies, case studies, ideological or random labels.

An additional goal of a standardised abstract with a simple declaratory checklist to show that the purpose of the article complies with a disciplinary mission, is to expose work that is simply journalism and case study or scripture/church scholarship/ideology with secondary sources, and to distinguish work that may be essay, advocacy, literature review, or curricular material so that it can be judged in an appropriate category. Readers can test the process on the abstract for this article, which should reveal that the article is dealing with a meta-problem in the discipline (of standardisation) that is key to the process of the discipline, offers a new tool/methodology and can be applied to the discipline to improve it.

**Standardised Article Abstract**

**to Aid in Review Process and Placing Works in Disciplinary Context**

The abstract should include:

- The scholarly problem being addressed or tested;
- Why it is important to the discipline;
- Whether the contribution is a scientific hypothesis test or humanistic approach to further the science (culture critique; thought experiment; moral concerns; application)
- What is new (methodology, proof, tool);
- The methodologies used; and
- Potential applications and benefits of the work to humanity.
4. Review Template with Guidelines for Objective and Competent Peer Reviews

Rather than being motivated by self-interest, the key to a competent and uncorrupted review is the professionalism of reviewers’ judgments and the specific matching of skills with particular pieces of scholarship. No process can ensure full honesty, but the only way to move toward disciplinary integrity is to hold individuals accountable for their actions. The review template below seeks to do that.

It might be possible to transform this template into an indicator for use as a checklist to ‘score’ compliance by specific journals and their editors with standards of competence and protection against conflicts of interest. The purpose here, however, is to simply offer a template for reviews almost any journal or book publisher can use.

| Review Template with Reviewer Guidelines for Professional Journal Articles For Double (or Triple) Blind Review |
| Qualifications/Competence: |
| What is your specific sub-fields expertise for the area(s) of review of this article that qualifies you as a ‘peer reviewer’ for that sub-field? (What specific certification and methodological expertise do you have that is specific to either the question the author is trying to solve or the specific methodology used to try to answer that question?) Does it apply to everything in the article or just certain parts? [This question requires the author and editor to identify the sub-fields in advance.] |
| Are there any methodologies or parts of the article that are unfamiliar to you? |
| What disciplines or sub-disciplines in the article are outside of your specific expertise (specific pages/parts of the article)? |
| Conflicts of Interest and Biases: |
| Might you have any direct conflicts of interest with the author? (Note that you are bound to reveal these as a professional ethics obligation.) |
| Do you have any indirect conflicts of interest that might be challenged by the author such that publication (or rejection) of this article might have a positive or negative impact on your career, colleagues and the subfield? |
| Do you have personal, political, ideological reactions to the piece when you read it? (Place them here and NOT in the part of the professional review since these are to be separated from analysis of the actual work) |
| Where does this piece fit in terms of the ideology of contemporary articles within and outside of the discipline, today? |
| Social Impact: |
| Does the work ask an important question for social betterment that will have benefit for the human prospect and how do you and your profession measure that benefit or lack of benefit? |
| Is the work broadly and easily applicable outside of a single case study/area such that scholars and/or practitioners will be able to use the tools/findings for application in several other areas? |
| Is there a specific technological application that leads to one of the moral and ethical goals of our field for human betterment? |
| Do you suspect that the framing of questions in this work may favour a corporatist agenda, or the agenda of a large organisation or institution (diverting attention from larger questions of public interest or self-censoring)? Or, do you suspect that this work is part of an effort to dominate a research agenda for narrow interests rather than the public interest? |
Professional Evaluation of the Work:

Context:
Is there a clear research question or hypothesis posed that the author is trying to answer or new methodology being presented or tested? Is this a new and necessary field-expanding test, or simply ‘new’ because it replicates something already known in a new geographic area or sub-area?
How does the work expand on or test existing questions in the field? Is it clear in the article?
Is the work appropriately placed within the context of previous work that it might either: replicate, extend, or refute (and which label best describes the piece)? What works do you feel are missing that extends this mission of replication, extension or refutation?
Given potential conflict of interest, are you mentioning any specific works of yours/ your students/ your teachers or professional networks? If so, how do they specifically relate to this article, such that not mentioning them specifically disproves or disqualifies the central content of this article and therefore be an act of professional negligence/incompetence? How can you objectively back this criticism?
Are there too many citations, (e.g., for the purposes of political support or educating readers or using secondary sources as proof, in place of primary data and analysis)?
If you believe there are too few citations, is this for a political or educational reason (e.g., the piece offers a minority view; few readers know the subfield) that really is discretionary, or does the piece really need to distinguish its approach or conclusions from previous work to clarify where it fits?
Are citations used correctly?

Content:
Are the correct methodologies to test the research questions or hypotheses employed? What makes another methodology better, is it possible to use this methodology here and what is the objective basis used in the field for such determination?
Is the methodology used correctly? If not, how significant is the error and on what standard are you relying other than personal judgment?
Is evidence sourced correctly? Is there better, more objective sourcing, is it possible here and what is the objective basis for such determination?
Do the Results, Discussion, and Conclusions follow logically? Are there alternative explanations or tests?
If so, how significant are the errors for this piece?
If the test is valid, are there political and ideological reasons that might cause other reviewers or readers to be uncomfortable and to seek to undermine the piece? How does or can the author deal with this?
What is your personal reaction to the specific conclusions?

Writing Style:
Do you find the style to be jargon free and simple/direct?
Are there other concerns for copy editing or writing?
Recommendation:
Publish as is/Publish subject to revisions-inclusions/Resubmit to the following professional specifications/Reject

- If you suggest rejecting this piece, what are the names of three other journals you believe are better suited for this piece and how do you suggest the author approach them?
- If you suggest rejecting this piece for reasons of professional competence, what do you think has gone wrong such that this piece that does not meet professional standards? What implications might there be for the profession, if any, for where changes are needed?
- If you suggest publication of this piece, do you feel this piece reflects a minority view that a majority vote of reviewers in the discipline would be likely to reject? Does this piece deserve special support and tagging as something representing a minority faction or innovation in the discipline that the mainstream might otherwise seek to suppress or disregard?

What are your feelings on the possibility for a fair review of this piece if it is multi-disciplinary, new, or unusual? Is this a piece that might be difficult to review in this field? Should a piece like this be tagged as unusual and placed in a category of ‘novel’ or ‘multi-disciplinary’ pieces that are published for discussion and without the usual review process? Do you suggest any changes in the journal to deal with a piece like this one?

5. Enforcement of the Model Review Procedure and Commitment to Due Process

It is an openness to challenge which makes self-reported information reliable, and this lack of enforceability makes current review processes easily corrupted.

Enforcement of Policies and Due Process:

Ethics Code

[This journal subjects itself to ethics challenges for conflicts of interest and professionalism, open for adjudication by X body and open for legal challenge in X courts]

This journal (or book publisher) offers the following procedures for accountability to the profession and the public:

- Journal board members will receive and hear any complaints of ethical or editorial unfairness and offer an appeals process;
- The Journal will open itself up to a panel of scholars from outside fields not covered in the journal and members of interest groups to comment on the public value and biases of the journal;
- The Journal will offer X amount of its space (and/or an open website area) in the form of a Commentary and Letters to the Editor section, with independence from the journal editors, to print, hear and post alternative views on journal articles and policies.
- The Journal will welcome challenges to its policies before the ethics panel of its professional association and in the courts, including openness to lawsuits under the False Claims Act (if in the U.S. or applicable elsewhere) for use of public funds.
Conclusion: Pathways to Improvement and Practical Concerns

Will this journal make a pledge to adopt these procedures or will it only open up academic discussion in a way that is co-dependent on problems and avoids solutions? What about the journals that the reader edits?

Using the proposed Review Template could potentially require twice the time of a current review, requiring reviewers to think through his/her own biases and to present them. These immediate costs are higher and many academics may be unwilling to spend the time given an incentive to have greater influence (conduct more reviews). Nevertheless, when seen from the perspective of either the discipline or society, the result of that additional time is higher standards of quality for the profession, a greater diversity of material with a wider presentation of views, and quicker time of acceptance for an unusual piece like this one.

There also appears to be a common fear among many academics today; that most standardisation is promoted by a corporatist, statist or other elite agenda with motives that are anti-intellectual (Strathern 2000). Although, by creating a united code of professionalism that binds actions and deters pressures, quality professional standards are the very thing that protects professionals against political pressures, the system of standards have so broken down today that there are fears at trying even to rebuild. Perhaps, behind the fear of politicisation, many academics also fear their replacement by those more competent, or the revelation that they actually promote the very politics they claim to oppose (agendas such as globalisation, colonialism, hierarchy and inequality, and suppression of ideas).

Indeed, a typical excuse among academics today that is used against efforts to establish procedures like those in this article is that procedures, themselves, as a whole are faulty and cannot be trusted (which, itself, makes a mockery of the idea of ‘scholarship’). Their ‘argument’ is that political pressures and finance have so destroyed legitimacy that one cannot even think of relying on standardised or legal judgments, let alone seek to listen to the public. Yet, if scholars do not set standards based on the principles they would expect others to apply, they (we) are part of the problem.

The Sokal hoax suggests that much of social science today invites its own ridicule, and that in continuing to produce scholarship that is far removed from science, from community benefit, and indeed from reality, many disciplines including social and cultural anthropology are actively in the process of their own suicide without acknowledging or realizing it. This requires a wake-up call followed by action that both recognizes the discipline’s traditions and reaffirms them.

It may be impossible to put the Humpty Dumpty of social anthropology and many related fields back together even with some attempts at standardisation and codification of process. The current lack of standardisation may have so politicised and fragmented the discipline and so distorted social sciences and humanities that any kind of rational consensus may be impossible. There are now scholars who, to protect their own work and position; have a definite interest in opposing any kind of discipline or standardisation.

However, creation of a ‘discipline’ is also a competitive process where standards advertise their own quality and results. Among those who are committed to a professional ethic beyond a political or financial one, it can partly work to replace a lack of standards.

One suggestion for recreating a social science of ‘social and cultural’ ‘anthropology’ would be is the creation of at least one journal of anthropology of living cultures. This journal would be committed to social science, with physical anthropologists and archaeologists on the board to help assure the commitment to social science of the contributions on living cultures, and with written procedures for reviews and related processes.

One suggestion for recreating a humanities of ‘social and cultural’ anthropology would be to assure there is at least one humanistic journal of anthropology of living cultures that would serve as culture critique with utopian visions, pathways, and measures of ‘progress’ and goals and with written procedures for reviews and related processes.

Both of these basic journals would enshrine a framework of the fundamental questions that the discipline is to solve. We must restart the discipline with a framework of the fundamental questions we
are trying to solve and see both the questions and the discipline in a global perspective, each with their relative importance. It is only by engaging in such a process that anthropology will not descend into work driven by journalistic access, places, or topics, with few questions and without any relative sense within an academic discipline.

Social and cultural anthropology’s introductory textbooks should do this, but they fail to do so. Similarly, sub-field journals should do this for their sub-fields but they also do not. They simply establish a medium for publication without any real semblance of order.

Perhaps the discipline could return to an ‘Annual Review of Anthropology’ (or of ‘Social Science’) in a way that offers at the end of each year a systematisation of the questions anthropologists are asking (and not asking) and the progress in each as a way to mark achievement in the discipline that goes beyond pages produced and research projects completed.

Now, without written and enforceable procedures, when anything goes, when authority can be used for protecting one’s cliques without any real accountability to a higher duty to human knowledge and to humanity, the field’s challenge is simply to establish the basics of ‘discipline’ to assure that there is work worth funding and publishing at all.

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
(RESURRECTING THIS HISTORICAL SECTION)

Editor’s Note

The lifeblood of science and social science is competition among ideas in healthy debate testing scholarly standards and findings. In recent years, as standards have begun to disappear in social science and as journals begin to advocate for doctrine in place of social science and discipline, the opportunity to challenge colleagues (and editors) to adhere to disciplinary standards has also disappeared. Many journals have simply eliminated Letters to the Editor sections and discussions. Others have moved discussions to on-line pages where discussions often deteriorate into short emotional reactions or factional in-fighting in place of constructive scholarly debate to promote advances in the discipline. Below is an example of a letter that was accepted for publication by the editor of Anthropology in Action, one of two practicing anthropology journals (along with Practicing Anthropology), in late 2014. The letter was vetted but never published because Anthropology in Action, like Practicing Anthropology, changed its policy and no longer prints letters to the editor. In both publications, articles are increasingly shorter, book reviews are fewer, and discussions are disappearing. Despite the possibility of on-line publication that would open up such space, neither publication has moved to such option. Not a single letter to the editor has now appeared in Anthropology in Action for four years and possibly much longer before that. This is not to single out those publications since this is part of a widespread problem not limited to a single sub-field, publication or editor. The letter below is an example of one that poses a challenge to a sub-discipline to define its actual fit with the goals, questions and definitions of the discipline where such standards seem to have disappeared.
Redefining Anthropology?

How can it be “Ethnography” if it doesn’t Study an “Ethnic Group”?
How Does “Organizational Anthropology” Fit the Definition of “Anthropology”
(the Study of Humans at the Level of “Culture”)
if it is Only Looking at the Level of an Institution?

To the Editor of Anthropology in Action:

Your Summer 2014 issue announced a call for a 2015 special issue on “impact in anthropology” but it also contained a review of a book claiming to be in the field of anthropology that passed through the hands of Anthropology in Action’s editors and reviewer without any discussion of whether or why it meets the definition of work in our field. How can we measure “impact” if we cannot recognize whether or not much of what passes for work in our “discipline” today meets the basic definitions of our field?

One of the two book reviews in Volume 21, Issue 2 was of a work by Christina Garsten and Annette Nyqvist, Organisational Anthropology: Doing Ethnography in and among Complex Organisations. The authors are two scholars self-described as anthropologists and the work was reviewed by a graduate student in an “anthropology department”. Yet, the research described in the book had no mention of ethnic or cultural groups or their study at the level of holism, which is the level of analysis that defines our discipline and separates it from psychology (study of humans at the level of the individual), from other social sciences looking at functional aspects of cultures (economic, political, or social and their subdivisions) or at the level of multiple cultures in complex societies (part of sociology). If anything, the study of organizations and institutions is a subset of economics (businesses), political science (governmental and non-governmental organizations) and sociology (community and voluntary organizations). What review describes is at best a kind of political journalism and essay writing, perhaps using some of the methods that both anthropologists and journalists regularly use (participant observation, structured interviews and other qualitative methodologies) but only methodologies without fit into the subject of study and the questions of the discipline. A journalistic study of a business organization is far from the requirements of “ethnography” (holistic study of a culture or ethnic group to understand how human groups adapt to their environment over a period of several generations) or “anthropology” (looking at these adaptations in terms of language/linguistics, history/archaeology, biological evolution/physical anthropology, and in contemporary form).

If we are creating false subfields that do not fit the definition of our discipline and no longer seek answers to the questions that are central to our discipline, it would appear as if we are replacing and destroying our discipline and our reason for being. This book, the review, and its placement in Anthropology in Action suggest that we no longer even realize our field or our purpose. By analogy, what is happening here is akin to the discipline of zoology, the study of species at the level of species, claiming that the study of cellular mitochondria is still zoology because mitochondria are akin to ancient unicellular animals. Any cell biologist and zoologist would recognize that as nonsense. Why don’t we?

The answer, according to various anthropologists critiquing the discipline, is that the whole discipline of anthropology may have been turned into philosophy, journalism, jargon filled essay and narcissism, by design, and that we no longer have a discipline that can have any impact at all. What we have is “Anthropology as Blog” (Duncan, 2013). Perhaps in the case of “Organizational Anthropology” we are now simply serving organizations.

At its founding, our discipline had a very clear scope and relation to other disciplines. The questions to ask about impact were moral questions not disciplinary ones. The definition of the discipline was clear. The problem then, as today, is that the discipline was used (and particularly in the area of “applied anthropology”) to control and assimilate minorities rather than to protect the rights of minority cultures, to help them adapt and survive after genocides, environmental calamities or failed strategies, or to promote
larger global objectives of sustainability, global peace, or social progress and human development. Most of what today is considered “applied anthropology” seems, instead, to be opportunistic use of some anthropological methods to be applied wherever they are profitable (e.g., “institutional anthropology” for corporate efficiency and worker control). We risk being transformed from anthropology to “cross cultural X studies” and “X anthropology” such as “medical anthropology” or “educational anthropology”, working cross-culturally to serve other disciplines to meet the objectives of those other disciplines, rather than address the larger concerns once posed by our discipline at the level of cultures. That isn’t to say there is anything wrong with study of organizations. I welcome it. What I do not welcome is such work replacing our field because we know longer know who we are or our purpose. I do not welcome us rushing to embrace what is popular or politically expedient or serves financial interests and then erasing our field.

Theoretical anthropology was supposed to create the science to generate a technology for the larger problems facing cultures at the level of cultures. These technologies were to be the core of applied anthropology. Today, however, it appears that the tail is wagging the dog, with the goals of other disciplines and dominant cultures defining the agenda and anthropologists simply working to offer a few methodologies in an approach that is opportunistic and politicized.

The place for institutional and organizational study was originally clear. It was part of the anthropology of complex cultures and industrial societies to understand how they worked holistically through use of more sophisticated tools that were needed to understand these cultures. Anthropologists needed to have specialized ability to understand organizations in complex cultures in the same way they needed special abilities of language, material culture and environment as well as perhaps astronomy, geology and other sciences, to understand non-industrial cultures. With this specialized knowledge (such as finance/economics, law, and administration) they could then holistically model industrial cultures. But that is not what seems to have happened. This book and its review make it clear that “anthropologists” now enter institutions with no skills at all other than some qualitative observational methodologies. They then write essays about what they see and feel, with no attempt or ability to look at the level of the ethnic group or society and its deep structure, no ability to model the whole, and no ability to generate any beneficial technologies for the larger problems of human cultures that are the goal of the discipline. It is easy to measure the impact of this on answering our discipline’s questions and on promoting the human betterment that our discipline promises. It is close to zero.

In 1989, when I began my career as an anthropologist, it was with field work in an institution; the law school in Leningrad, Russia, where Lenin (and at that time shortly after I was there, Vladimir Putin) studied law. But for that work to become “anthropology”, I had to turn it into a three-volume study, fitting that study of the institution into a second study of legal and political institutions (legal and political culture), and then into an holistic ethnography of Russians and urban Russians, placing the law school and law in the context of geography and environment.

Doing that kind of study required not only anthropological skills and language study but also a degree in law and one in public and business administration to understand how institutions worked. It also required a set of methodological skills for industrial cultures that are not usually taught in anthropology, including survey methodology (from sociology), quantitative and linear modeling to look at data, as well as social psychology and social experiment skills.

As applied anthropologists, in working with organizations to improve their environments and in taking the perspective of minorities to understand how they can confront institutions or use them to try to protect their cultures, we can use anthropological methods and thinking on a micro scale. It is wrong, however, to confuse this with the kind of theoretical work that Garsten and Nyqvist are doing that they are claiming as anthropology. If they are skilled in administrative sciences and technologies, then they are doing organizational studies. If they aren’t, they are simply embedded journalists hiding behind jargon. What they are doing is not “anthropology” or “ethnography”. We need to be sincere in our study and in our goals and principles.
Before we even start to measure impact on what and for whom, we need to remember what our discipline is, what it was designed to do at what levels, the questions it was supposed to ask and answer, and the ethical obligations for applying both the answers and the technologies (and methodologies) that were developed. As it stands now, we hardly seem to even have a discipline left, let alone the ethics or skills to measure its actual impact. If we can’t even recognize it in our own journal, how can we claim to advise outsiders?

David Lempert, Ph.D., J.D., M.B.A., E.D. (Hon.)

References