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**The PKK in Germany and its Foreign and Domestic Effects on
Germany and Turkey**

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Introduction

Ethnicity and nationalism are powerful forces for a people who have been ignored in their own country. The Kurds have organized and used these principles to their own benefit, creating a powerful argument for recognition that neither Turkey nor the European Union can ignore. The PKK, the Kurdistan Workers Party, has filled the role as a national leader for the nation-less Kurds of Turkey. Understanding the unique and interesting histories of both the conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurds and the underprivileged Kurds living and working in Germany is key to connecting them both together. If the Turks had not made assimilation a requirement for the Kurds, or if Germany* had not signed a labor treaty with Turkey in 1961, the PKK either might not have been founded or might not have made Europe a powerful source of followers and capital. However, the Kurds' struggle has extended to Germany, and "the consequences are significant not only for Kurdish nationalism, but also for the maintenance of democracy in Germany, as well as Turkey's relations with Germany" and the European Union.¹

In this paper, the author attempts to unravel the background and causes for PKK activism in Germany and its subsequent effects on the domestic and foreign policies of Germany and Turkey. As Turkey attempts to join the European Union, the PKK's activities in Europe have brought Turkey's internal problems into Europe, and especially Germany. Turkey must meet the civil and political standards that the European Union has set to achieve membership, but Turkey's military establishment continues to resist change. For example, the government will not make substantive efforts to recognize the

Kurds as a particular ethnic minority and allow Kurdish to be taught in schools. The PKK has been instrumental in bringing the plight of the Kurds in Turkey to Europe and “in turn, Germany now fully recognizes that the presence of the Kurdish diaspora influences its relations with Turkey, and its politics at the *Land*, regional, and federal levels”.²

* When I use the term Germany before 1989, I am referring to the Federal Republic. The term “Turkish citizens” is used to denote the mix of ethnic Turks and Kurds in Germany and Turkey since the Kurds were never officially counted as a minority group.

Historical Background

Without the components of Turkish guest workers in Germany and the “Kurdish Issue” in Turkey, the conflict between the Turkish government and the PKK would never have been played out on German soil. However, the need for foreign labor in Germany and has linked these two countries and situations together. Germany experienced acute labor shortages after World War II, and subsequently invited foreign citizens to come to Germany and fill the gap. Germany has vehemently claimed that it is not a country of foreign immigration, but with such a large minority population this claim is beginning to sound ridiculous. Tensions between Germany and its foreign workers are major areas of concern for most German citizens and politicians.

To the east of Germany, after World War I, the nation of Turkey was created from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern state of Turkey, envisioned a unified nation of Turks. This vision did not leave much room for ethnic minorities, such as the Kurds. For most of the twentieth century after the Republic of Turkey was founded, the “Kurdish Question” of how to assimilate the Kurds into Turkish society has dominated Turkey’s national agenda.

Turkey’s denial of the ethnic Kurds has led many Kurds to flee Turkey. The Kurds generally came to Europe for political or economic asylum. Germany already has a large population of foreign laborers, invited to Germany in times of booming economic progress. Germany has the largest population of Turkish citizens in Europe, and the numbers are still growing. The combination of these two circumstances, Germany’s importation of labor and Turkey’s ethnic war, leads to the presence of many ethnic Kurds in Germany. This background information sets the stage for the later discussion of the

radical Kurdish organization, the PKK, and the consequences of its actions for German and Turkish domestic and foreign policy and ultimately Turkey's entrance into the European Union.

Foreign Labor in Germany

The importation of labor into Germany is not a twentieth century phenomenon. Germany has a long history of using foreign labor to augment its national work force. As early as the late 1800's Prussian Junkers were hiring Poles to work as agricultural laborers on their vast eastern farms.³ In subsequent years, many other laborers of different nationalities either sought work or were forced to work in Germany. After World War II, Germany faced a serious labor shortage and concluded several treaties with different countries to supply *Gastarbeiter*, or guest workers. These guest workers were not expected to settle in Germany permanently, but rather, a guest worker was ideally supposed to give Germany the "best years of his labor power" and then return to his home country.⁴ The growing right-wing response to foreigners living in Germany stems from the massive influx of Turkish workers in the latter half of the twentieth century and the inaction or the inability of the German government to deal with this problem. Turkish guest workers came to Germany, but many did not leave as the German government had originally planned.⁵ Who were the original guestworkers, and what jobs did they fill? What is the status of Germany's Turkish population now? These questions all impact the current situation of the Kurds in Germany.

On October 30, 1961 Germany signed an agreement with Turkey to be allowed to recruit Turkish citizens to work in Germany. Turkey was not the first country to make such an agreement, though. Germany already had recruitment agreements with Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and Yugoslavia.⁶ According to Ray C. Rist, the first guestworkers from Turkey arrived in Germany in 1956. Twelve workers and their families came to Kiel, Germany for vocational training, but after a while this program

was abandoned. The twelve workers and their families moved and found unskilled jobs in other German cities.⁷ These twelve were just the beginning of a massive immigration of Turkish citizens to the Federal Republic of Germany after the conclusion of the recruitment treaty. In the time frame from 1967 to 1973 the number of Turkish guest workers in Germany more than tripled to over 600,000 workers.⁸ Today Germany has a population of over 83 million people, and 2.4% of that population is Turkish.⁹ During the peak years of emigration, “eighty-two percent of all Turkish workers who went abroad . . . were male”.¹⁰ Wives and children filtered in to Germany in the coming years. The guest workers that came to Germany also represented some of Turkey’s more educated and skilled workers. By the mid 1970’s, Turkey “had sent one third of all its skilled workers abroad The combined total of those who were working outside the country and those skilled workers who wished to do so was more than 500,000, a staggering 85% of all skilled Turkish workers”.¹¹ These skilled laborers mainly relocated to Germany from urban areas of Turkey, though they were not necessarily urban born. Rist noted a trend for workers who emigrate to move to urban areas from rural areas before they leave the country. From a study done by Kudat and Ozkan, Rist points out that “17.7 percent of their respondents emigrated from villages, 25.3 percent from towns, and the majority (57 percent) from urban areas, though 43 percent of the total sample were rural born”.¹² Since these guest workers were skilled and moved from the cities in Turkey, they did not necessarily want to move back to rural Turkey to remit their skills and money. The Turkish government had hoped to gain development aid through the remittances of the guest workers, but this never realized.

What jobs did the Turkish guestworkers do? Though many think that the guestworkers from Turkey were unemployed in Turkey, interviews held and surveys analyzed by Ronald E. Krane prove otherwise. His research found that “at the time of their initial departure from Turkey it was necessary for 82 percent of the persons in the interview sample to sever employment relations. Eleven percent had been employed at some previous time but were not employed at time of departure. The remaining 17 percent had never held jobs”.¹³ Many of the Turks who came to Germany, therefore, had been employed and some even in skilled jobs. The jobs that they took in Germany were not necessarily skilled jobs, though. With the huge influx of foreign workers into Germany after World War II, the foreign workers took the jobs that they were offered. These jobs consisted of mostly unskilled work or the jobs that the Germans didn’t find appealing or want to do. In the 1960’s, “the highest concentrations of foreign workers . . . were in construction, the iron and metal industry, and in mining”.¹⁴ The willingness of guest workers to do these unappealing jobs kept wages low for German companies.¹⁵ Friedrich Heckmann formulated these steps to describe the effects that foreign workers had on the German labor market:

1. Between 1960 and 1970, the total number of those not independently employed rose only negligibly.
2. The number of blue-collar workers dropped by approximately one million over that same period (interim balance: one million “advancements”).
3. During that same period, the number of foreign blue-collar workers rose by some 1.7 million- i.e., another 1.7 million domestic blue-collar

workers must have been “replaced” and therefore “advanced” to better positions.

4. Grand total of “workers advancing”: 2.7 million.
5. Simultaneously, the number of white-collar workers during this decade increased by 2.3 million. This increase should be accounted for principally on the basis of a move up by workers from blue-collar positions. The most important conditioning factor for this was the influx of *Gastarbeiter*.¹⁶

The introduction of foreign sources of labor helped to fuel the growing German economy after World War II, and gave German citizens an employment advantage. With foreign workers employed in menial jobs, Germans were free to advance. The eagerness of the guest workers to take on dirty jobs was good for the Germans, but later it fueled the resentment of the Turkish guest workers towards Germans.

Though Germany does not want to be a country of immigration, in reality Germany has a very large foreign population. In May of 1999, Germany amended its citizenship laws for the first time since 1913. The law from 1913 determined citizenship by a person’s bloodline. Foreigners whose children were born in Germany were denied citizenship, while ethnic Germans living in other parts of the world could claim German citizenship. The new changes now allow children born to foreign parents in Germany to have German citizenship along with their parent’s citizenship. At the age of 23, they must choose a single citizenship. Another provision cuts the naturalization time from 15 to 8 years.¹⁷ While these changes in citizenship law are a move in the right direction, Turks, and especially Kurds, are still an “other” in Germany. In fact, many Turks do not

take advantage of the naturalization process because “the official requirement that naturalisation should be preceded by a degree of cultural assimilation makes it an unattractive option”.¹⁸ The Turks are tied to their own culture and do not want to assimilate to the western, Christian culture of the Germans.

There is still a gap between the Turks and Germans. Turks are still more likely to be employed in blue-collar jobs, which has helped to create “*Unterschichtung*, the formation of a proletarian underclass . . . a large proportion of foreign labor already belongs to the category of difficult to employ, the hard-core unemployed”.¹⁹ This gap continues as the second- and third-generations of guest workers are afforded only marginal education. “Only 28 percent of German, but 44 percent of Turkish pupils, leave school with the lowest educational qualification,” argues Kursat-Ahlers, and “28 percent of young Germans and 6 percent of young Turks pass the *Arbitur* and gain the right to study at university”.²⁰ The societal situation of Turks is not much better. Prejudice surrounds the Turkish guest workers and has turned into violence. In the first years of the 1990’s, extreme-right political members set houses on fire and brutally killed several guest workers. These incidents also coincided with the New Right party obtaining “6.2% of the vote in the Bremen election, 7.5% in the 1992 Schleswig-Holstein election, and 11.8% in the Baden-Wurttemberg election”.²¹ The existence of a large, obviously foreign minority causes tension, and Germany has to face that tension and find solutions to the problems that guest workers face in living in Germany.

The “Kurdish Issue” in Turkey

The Kurds, an ethnic minority in Turkey, are denied the right to use or teach their native language and express their own unique cultural heritage by the Turkish state. This suppression has led to violence on the part of both the Kurds and the Turks. According to Gürbey and Ibrahim, “the equalization of Kurdish national endeavors with separatist terror still persists thus preventing a legal and organized opportunity for finding a political expression”.²² The Kurds have had to use terrorist tactics to force the government to pay attention to their claims. A civil war has been raging in Turkey between the Kurds and Turks, and only recently has there been a chance for peace between them. The nature of the conflict between them has allowed the hostilities to cross the borders of Turkey into other countries in the Middle East and even into Germany. The origins of the Republic of Turkey and subsequent Kurdish rebellions highlight the problems within Turkey and thus, the radical response of the PKK to Kurdish suppression has ultimately led to the transnational nature of this conflict.

From the ruins of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish state has produced “what might well be seen as the first modern democracy in the non-Western world”.²³ But during the early stages of the Republic of Turkey and even now, democracy has not been apparent. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, in reality a nationalistic authoritarian dictator, refused to acknowledge the Ottoman government after the end of World War I. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey gathered several times, and finally in November of 1922 voted to eradicate the position of sultan and caliphate, making Turkey a secular state. The Assembly also pronounced that the “Ottoman regime ceased to be the government of Turkey when the Allies seized the capitol in 1920, [and this] in effect [abolished] the

Ottoman Empire”.²⁴ Atatürk’s dream was a unified, secular Turkey. He inspired “the Turkish people with his vision of a modern, secular, independent, and ultimately democratic Turkey. The authoritarianism was a necessary means to achieve an ultimate goal.”²⁵ While the aim of Atatürk was democracy, his harsh policies towards ethnic minorities such as the Kurds denied them any sort of cultural freedom, representation, or even recognition. Necmettin Erbakan, elected Prime Minister of Turkey in 1996, said, “We have bonds of brotherhood. There is nothing more absurd than ethnic differentiation among Muslim brothers”.²⁶ The origin and attitudes of the Republic of Turkey have contributed to the lasting discrimination of the largest ethnic minority in Turkey.

Gunter asserts that “the Kurds are the largest nation in the world without their own state”.²⁷ They have lived in several different countries in the Middle East, with the majority of them living in Turkey with smaller populations in Syria, Iran, and Iraq. The Kurds are originally from the southeast region of Turkey. Due to the conflicts that these states have had with the Kurds, no precise count of their population is known, but it is estimated that 10 to 12 million Kurds live in Turkey today. Turkey does not recognize them as a minority; however, the Turkish government has used the name “Mountain Turks” from 1924 to 1990 to designate the Kurds.²⁸ The Kurds are mainly Sunni-Muslims, and they speak Indo-European languages- the majority in Turkey speak Kurmanji, while others speak Zaza. While the Kurds are a distinct minority from the Turks, many wealthier Kurds have moved to the West and assimilated to Turkish culture. These Kurds generally do not speak either of the Kurdish languages.²⁹ Turkey’s goal in relation to the Kurds has been to make all Kurds assimilate to Turkish culture and language. Assimilation was one of Atatürk’s main tenets for a unified Turkey.

To force the Kurds to assimilate, and thereby achieve a unified state, laws have been passed to ban Kurdish organizations. Atatürk passed a law on March 3, 1924 that banned “all Kurdish schools, organizations, and publications, as well as religious fraternities and medressehs, which were the last source of education for most Kurds”.³⁰ Language suppression is the main way that Kurds have been forced to assimilate to mainstream Turkish culture, but they have also been deported from their homelands. After a Kurdish insurrection in 1930, another law was passed to further disperse and deport Kurds from their homelands to promote assimilation. This law deported Kurds to areas in which they only accounted for 5 percent of the population. Later in the 1960’s, “law 1587 furthered the process of changing Kurdish names, ‘which hurt public opinion and are not suitable for our national culture, moral values, traditions, and customs,’ into Turkish names”.³¹ Names of towns and cities were changed to promote Kurdish assimilation into the greater Turkish culture. In 1982 a new Turkish constitution was drawn, and this constitution was harsh to the Kurds as well. Several different laws banned the Kurdish language and established Turkish as the sole mother tongue of Turkey.³² While the law that prohibited Kurdish speech was revoked in 1991, other laws, such as laws that make it illegal to broadcast in Kurdish, are still enforced.³³ The government of Turkey has marked the suppression of the Kurdish language as the way to assimilate the Kurds into mainstream Turkey. Turkey has violated the Kurds’ basic human rights to freedom of speech, press and association, and the freedom of cultural expression. Kurdish nationalists are angry, and they have organized to fight the Turkish government.

Kurds have formed organizations that range in actions from political to terrorist to assert their right for cultural expression. Pro-Kurdish political parties have been formed and re-formed as the government bans them from office. Gürbey states that “the term ‘terrorism’ has become a verdict being branded on any Kurdish attempt at self-realization and thus provides the theoretical justification for actions against them. It is also seen as an obstacle for possible improvements resulting in priority given to fighting ‘terrorism’”.³⁴ Though not all pro-Kurd political parties are terrorist, the Workers’ Party of Kurdistan (PKK) can rightly be named a terrorist organization. The PKK initiated guerilla warfare in Turkey in 1984 to bring attention to the plight of the Kurds. The PKK’s ideology has changed and shifted since the late 1970’s when Abdullah Öcalan created the party. In the early stages of the party’s development, the PKK used Kurdish nationalism and Marxist views to shape the party’s ideology. Violence was used against the Turks, as well as rich Kurds, and Kurds that are loyal to the Turkish government. As the fighting continued in the 1990’s, Öcalan proclaimed that he wanted a peaceful political solution. He subsequently introduced several cease-fires. Former demands for an autonomous Kurdish state were dropped, and Öcalan asked for democratic reforms to recognize the Kurds. Since the Turkish government ignored the cease-fire demands, the violence used by the PKK escalated.³⁵ In April of 1999, Öcalan was arrested in Nairobi and was brought back to Turkey for trial. Öcalan asked his compatriots to lay down their arms and look for a peaceful solution to the question of Kurdish nationalism.³⁶ The PKK’s struggle has never been just isolated in Turkey, though. This group has formed branches all over the world, and thus the PKK has carried the conflict between Turkey and the Kurds across national boundaries.

The Conditions Conducive to PKK Development in Germany

Germany contains the actors who bring the conflict between the Turks and the PKK from Turkey to Germany, but why is Germany the country in which this ethnic conflict finds such marked expression? What allure does Germany have for extremists? Economics and politics are important in attracting Turkish citizens to Germany and may be some of the causes for the transfer of the Turkish and Kurdish conflict to Germany. However some authors argue that extremists do not come to Germany, rather, Germany makes the Turks and especially the Kurds into extremists. These different factors shed light on the reasons that the ethnic conflict native to Turkey has shifted to include Germany, too.

Germany is a country with a varied political history, but currently the government is characterized as a federal republic with democratic elections. One of concepts outlined by Gurr and Harff to predict ethnopolitical violence is political environment. They conclude that democracies are less likely to breed violent ethnic conflict because they contain mechanisms for expression of dissent.³⁷ The Kurds are not allowed to express their own cultural identities in Turkey, and Turkey represses any form of pro-Kurdish political participation within its borders. Gürbey points out that in Turkey “the stance of the state is marked by a fundamental policy of doing everything to prevent and marginalize a Kurdish representation in politics and parliament”.³⁸ Germany is quite different. While most Turks and Kurds in Germany do not have the right to vote, they are still able to peaceably demonstrate and express their political opinions in Germany without fear of repression or retaliation. Even though Germany is a democracy,

democracy might be one of the reasons that the ethnic conflict has appeared in Germany because “democratic structures tend to benefit insurgent groups”.³⁹ When the guest workers first arrived in Germany “the barriers to the expression of their identity were lifted in the territory of a liberal democratic state and it became possible to explore and express Kurdish cultural and linguistic identity”.⁴⁰ The democracy of Germany is one factor that encourages the expression of Kurdish identity that in turn sparks the conflict between the Turks and Kurds, not between the Turkish citizens and Germany.

Another consequence of Turkey’s repression of Kurdish ethnicity is the lack of feeling of a strong Kurdish community in Turkey. The sense of community that they do feel “derives principally from their common persecution and banishment”.⁴¹ In Germany, the Kurds have found ways to express their cultural identity, thus creating a distinct Kurdish community, as opposed to just a Turkish guest worker community. The “development of the collective insurgent consciousness” of belonging to a distinct, persecuted group gives the Kurds the strength in numbers to assert their right to culturally and linguistically express themselves in Germany.⁴² Once in Germany, “the drive to experience, express and share the Kurdish identity can be observed in the dramatic proliferation of Kurdish cultural organizations . . . as well as an increase in their print and Internet publications”.⁴³ This newfound sense of community has also manifested in the trend for officially registered Turks to find their Kurdish identity once in Germany. Also showing a growth of Kurdish expression, the amount of children given Kurdish names at birth instead of Turkish names has risen.⁴⁴ A sense of community is an important ingredient to the development of the PKK in Germany because “rare is the individual who single-handedly challenges institutions or society at large. Finding like minded

individuals with similar grievances intensifies discontent and increases willingness to take action”.⁴⁵ The Kurds in Germany have created a community in Germany and have been mobilized for action by the PKK.

Besides the political and societal reasons, there are economic reasons that have helped the PKK to develop in Germany. Germany invited guest workers to fill the shortage of workers in the 1960's and early 1970's, and the workers came from Turkey because Germany held better financial prospects for them. They could earn more money in Germany and send it home to Turkey. Kurds also came to Germany for asylum, and the PKK cashed in on this point. The PKK is funded through

the Kurdish communities in Western Europe, especially Germany and, to a lesser degree, Sweden, where it has commanded the loyalty of a majority of exiled Kurds. This is not surprising, given that Kurds in exile include large numbers of politically motivated migrants, and given that the political mobilization of Kurds in Europe, including the (sometimes forced) levy of taxes, is considerably easier than in Turkey, where state restrictions are far more stringent.⁴⁶

The relative wealth of the German-Kurds to the Kurds in Turkey lured the PKK to Germany to raise funds for its campaigns held in Europe and in Turkey. Since the PKK has actively sought money in Germany, they have encouraged the ethnic conflict between Turkey and the Kurds to develop in Germany. This money spreads the ethnic conflict because “most of the financial resources that the PKK leadership can access are used to purchase weapons for the ‘war of national liberation,’ to produce and disseminate propaganda materials, and to provide active cadre members with sufficient cash flow”.⁴⁷

The availability of money in Germany and the PKK's success in raising money in Germany have contributed to the development of the PKK in Europe. The money raised is used to finance diplomatic and violent operations in Europe against Turks.

Germany is fertile ground for radical recruitment, especially within the segments of the Kurdish population that are German-born. The PKK has had much success in recruiting Kurds from Germany to join in a struggle in Turkey that they may have never even encountered in their lives in Europe. According to Eccarius-Kelly, "the PKK continues to attract young German-born Kurds into its cadres through effective marketing campaigns based on an idealized myth of the homeland".⁴⁸ The PKK targets these Kurds for membership and to fight for the rights of the Kurds in Turkey in Germany. The PKK must continue to recruit in Germany because "the creation of continued layers of conflict among second- and third-generation Kurdish and Turkish immigrant groups is essential to the PKK's long-term goal of representing the Kurdish voice in Europe".⁴⁹ When the politicians of the PKK or even the Turkish government come to Germany, they contribute to the development of the ethnic conflict by emphasizing the atrocities of the other side and seeking to find German recruits to join in the armed or political struggle. The PKK has been very effective in communicating its agenda to the young Kurds in Germany and recruiting them to join the crusade against the Turks, even if it is from Germany.

Another important theory has been proposed to explain the fecundity of radical Kurdish behavior in Germany. The foreign population in Germany now is not all foreign-born. Germany has recently changed its citizenship laws to allow children born in Germany to decide their citizenship when they reach a certain age. While this is a good step for the German government, there are still many "foreigners" that have lived in

Germany their whole lives. These foreigners are social outcasts and often haven't had the educational opportunities that German children have been given. Factors such as these often cause a sense of alienation. Claus Leggewie supports this theory in his article "How the Turks became Kurds, not Germans", as does Vera Eccarius-Kelly in her article "Radical Consequences of Benign Neglect". Leggewie proposes that "the Turks have become Kurds because the Turkish state denies them cultural recognition and the German state denies them political recognition".⁵⁰ Eccarius-Kelly further poses that as a repercussion of denying citizenship to the second- and third-generation guest workers, Germany encouraged the PKK to infiltrate the German-Kurds and provide much needed community structures for them.⁵¹ These theories are important because they blame Germany for creating the environment that encourages radical behavior by neglecting to incorporate the foreign population into the mainstream. German citizens do not recognize the difference between the Turks and Kurds, and tend to lump them both together as "Turks". They are then seen as part of the "Turkish Problem," and not seen as Kurds with their own identity struggles.⁵² The frustration that the Kurds feel towards German social and economic structures leads them to follow radical groups, such as the PKK.

Different conditions and theories attempt to explain why the ethnic conflict that originated in Turkey between the state and the Kurds has developed in Germany. Democracy and the absence of cultural repression have encouraged the Kurds to express their unique identity among the Turks and use their language without fear of retaliation. The Turkish state considers this threatening, so it has escalated foreign diplomatic pressure on Germany. Since the Kurds are freer to express themselves, they have found

communities and associations in which to interact. In a communal group the Kurds are more likely to act out on their hostilities towards the Turkish government and even the German government, more so than individually. The relative wealth and generosity of the Kurds in Germany make them attractive for donations and taxes for the PKK. The PKK also uses Germany as a fertile recruiting ground for new radical members. They target the younger generations that feel alienated. This feeling of alienation could come from Germany's reluctance to make a clear effort to incorporate and accept the differences of the foreigners into German society. The feeling of alienation leads to the Kurds looking for places to belong. These theories and conditions all contribute to the development of the PKK and ethnic violence in Germany.

Radical Kurdish Actions in Germany

In his article for the *Wall Street Journal*, Hugh Pope reported that after Abdullah Öcalan was captured, “the European Kurds were ordered to slow down and not commit acts like self-immolation . . . but he [Nizamettin Tas, PKK council member] pleaded with the Kurds of Turkey to show more fighting spirit”.⁵³ The PKK members in Germany are extremists, and will go to great lengths to make Turkey acknowledge their minority presence in Turkey. To bring attention to their cause, the Kurds in Germany have engaged in several different types of action. They have used violent and passive means to gain media, and more importantly, governmental attention. Lyon summarizes:

First the PKK seized every opportunity to bring the conflict in Turkey to the attention of the German and European public. This was done by staging demonstrations decrying Turkish military engagement in southeastern Turkey, organizing hunger strikes, holding large-scale protests to promote visibility and solidarity, and engaging in highway blocks. A second set of activities that brought the PKK into the limelight was the attacks against Turks, Turkish businesses and associations in Germany. Later on, a new kind of protest activity emerged as PKK sympathizers began to protest against German actions taken against the PKK.⁵⁴

Radical Kurdish and PKK action in Germany culminated in 1993 and 1999. Both of these years contained significant amounts of violence, provoked by actions in Turkey, by the Turkish government, or even by the German government.

As Michael Gunter notes, “a tremendous increase in fighting occurred in southeastern Turkey during the summer of 1993. Mirroring this situation, a totally unprecedented outbreak of PKK-led violence also struck western Europe”.⁵⁵ The fighting in Turkey directly influenced the flare up of Kurdish PKK activism in Germany. The PKK in Germany hoped to influence the course of events in Turkey, and Germany’s foreign policy response to them, through its actions. In June of 1993, the Kurds in Germany attacked Turkish businesses. In this lashing out at the Turks in Germany, the Kurds attacked “Turkish consulates, banks, airlines offices, and travel agencies”.⁵⁶ The Kurds took hostages from the Turkish consulate office in Munich, and tried to manipulate Chancellor Kohl to urge the Turks to stop the war in Turkey against the Kurds. A peaceful protest, a sit-in in Karlsruhe, turned violent once the police arrived.⁵⁷ These actions led Germany and France to ban the PKK. Outlawing the PKK did not have the desired effect, though. PKK activism and violence did not disappear. Attacks also occurred in November of 1993 directly after the German government banned the PKK. A day after the PKK was banned, 3,000 Kurds gathered to commemorate the fifteenth anniversary of the founding of the PKK.⁵⁸ These attacks and protests all gained attention for the Kurds’ grievances with Turkey and Germany, though it was not positive attention.

Another notable round of violence occurred after Abdullah Öcalan, leader and founder of the PKK, was captured in Nairobi, Kenya, and sent back to Turkey for trial in February 1999. The Turks rejoiced that this terrorist would finally come to justice, but the Kurds protested and attacked. “Cologne, Bonn, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Hanover, and Dusseldorf,”⁵⁹ are all cities in Germany where protests occurred. The Kurds attacked the Greek consulate in Berlin to protest the arrest and extradition, and

once again Turkish businesses were targeted. Renewed outbreaks of Kurdish protesting and attacks happened after the court in Turkey sentenced Öcalan to death, and again after the Turkish Court of Appeals reaffirmed his conviction and capital punishment.

Thousands of Kurds protested in Germany and, “German Interior Minister Otto Schily issued appeals for calm from the large Kurdish minority and repeatedly reminded protestors that Turkey will not carry out the sentence until the European Court of Human Rights hears Öcalan’s case”.⁶⁰ Through their protesting in Germany, the Kurds were trying to affect a change in Öcalan’s sentence in Turkey. German politicians certainly were aware of the Kurds’ demands and willingness to use violence in Germany to affect the situation in Turkey. German officials went to Turkey and “placed Turkey under intense diplomatic pressure . . . [and] requested that the death penalty be lifted”.⁶¹ The PKK once again successfully used violence and protesting, if not to affect change in Turkey, than to at least gain attention in Europe.

The PKK in Germany has mobilized the large population of Kurds in Germany to protest and lash out violently to gain attention for their fellow Kurds in Turkey. According to Lyon, though, “the use of violence became counterproductive . . .the PKK sought an alternative method of protest that was more suited to the current political milieu, distancing the PKK from violence and couching the struggle as a political, not military, struggle within a democratic setting”.⁶² Öcalan is still on death row in Turkey, and the Kurds in Turkey are still denied basic minority rights. While the Kurds have not held any large-scale protests in Germany recently, the organizational structure of the PKK is still in Europe and could still be mobilized to act out in Germany to influence events in Turkey.

Foreign Policy and Domestic Consequences of PKK Action in Germany and Turkey

The conflict between the Turkish state and the Kurds has an impact on the foreign policy of Germany and Turkey. The radical actions of the PKK in Germany, and all over Western Europe, have received the attention of the European Union and the respective country's governments. All of the press hasn't been good, but it has helped to raise awareness in Germany of the plight of the Kurds in Turkey. Germany has been forced to take action in its foreign policy towards Turkey to appease its Kurdish residents, and act to appease the Turkish government. Germany's acknowledgement of the Kurds and their radical elements has forced Turkey to take diplomatic action against Germany. This all adds up to a rocky road towards Turkey's already difficult goal of membership in the European Union. Both Germany and Turkey have had to change some of their domestic laws and policies, too. While it is difficult to track the foreign policy changes of a country towards another country back to one specific non-state group, the radical actions of the Kurds in Germany have had important consequences for the governments of Germany and Turkey.⁶³

Germany

Germany has been affected by the radical behavior of the Kurds in the PKK. PKK members have staged violent and peaceful demonstrations to get the attention of their host country. German politicians have had different reactions to these displays. Germany has reacted with several different changes in its domestic laws concerning citizenship rights and terrorist groups. The radical behavior of the Kurds has also affected the landscape of Germany's political parties. Violence between the Turks and Kurds has exacerbated the feelings of distrust and dislike of foreigners in Germany resulting in a re-emergence of radical right-wing political parties. Germany has also become more conscious of its arms sales to Turkey, and changed its policy towards the arms sales to placate the protesting Kurds. The radical actions of the PKK in Germany have affected the foreign policy of Germany towards Turkey, and the domestic policies of Germany towards its foreign residents.

In 1999 the German Parliament passed a new law reforming its old citizenship laws. As mentioned earlier in this paper, these new laws allow children born in Germany to at least one parent that has legally resided in Germany for at least eight years to choose which citizenship the child wants to be considered at the age of 23. Adults who have resided in Germany for 8 years can be considered for citizenship now, instead of the old prerequisite of 15 years.⁶⁴ The second- and third- generations of the original guest workers have lived in Germany their whole lives without recognition of being an appreciated part of German society, and these new laws are mainly to correct this situation. While not only the Kurds have affected the decision to change the citizenship laws, Turks (as Kurds are also officially called in Germany) are recorded as being the

largest foreign group in Germany. According to the articles by Eccarius-Kelly and Leggewie, alienation from German society is an important reason that the Kurds, who are classified as socially and economically beneath even the Turks, have turned to radical groups and causes to get the attention of the German government. Eccarius-Kelly suggests that the citizenship reforms are Germany's way of trying to rectify the Kurds' problems in Germany and hopefully alleviate some of the violence that the PKK has brought to Germany. She is not hopeful of the outcome, though, because "it is argued that the country's new citizenship laws effective January 2000 will not prevent further inter-ethnic clashes between German-Kurds and German-Turks".⁶⁵ Regardless of the outcome of the citizenship law changes, the radical behavior of the Kurds has been a consideration for the German government in changing the old laws. The PKK has effectively changed a part of German domestic policy.

The German government banned the radical Kurdish organization, the PKK, in 1993 due to the actions of the group in Germany and partly due to pressure from Turkey. Turkey has condemned the PKK as a terrorist organization since its beginning and became frustrated when European countries did not label and treat the PKK as such.⁶⁶ Even though Turkey put pressure on Germany, Germany was slow to ban the organization. The government began watching the activities of the PKK in 1985, and by 1987 the PKK's violent and criminal ties "began to erode Germany's willingness to tolerate Kurdish expressions of dissent".⁶⁷ German officials still were not entirely sure if the acts of terrorism were being carried out through the PKK or just by individuals in the PKK. Finally though, the radical behavior of the PKK led to Germany banning the organization in 1993, even though Germany was "uncomfortable about proceeding

directly to a ban which could be seen as an excessive curtailment of the freedom of association and opinion”.⁶⁸ Along with the PKK, Germany also banned any organization that was related to Kurdish culture or education because the organizations were thought to be connected to or pretenses for the PKK.⁶⁹ Once again the Kurds’ radical actions were catalysts for change in German policy. While this was not an action that the Kurds supported by any means, their presence and open ethnic conflict with the Turks on German soil were the reasons for it.

Another domestic consequence of the ethnic conflict between the Turks and the Kurds in Germany is the emergence of the radical right-wing politicians in Germany. The inter-ethnic violence is not the only cause of the emergence, though. The right-wing parties have long labeled the guest workers and asylum seekers as the cause for many of Germany’s problems, but the fighting between “foreigners” on German soil has only brought them bad publicity, making them a symptom of the anti-foreigner sentiment in Germany. Eccarius-Kelly reports that “the German and German-Turkish press has focused on the sensational aspects of the struggle for a Kurdish state . . . meanwhile, public opinion in Germany is increasingly turning against the Kurds as an entire community”.⁷⁰ In the early 1990’s the new right-wing parties enjoyed some electoral support from the German public. Around this time statistics on crimes committed by foreigners in Germany were especially high, and the New Right political successes corresponded with areas in which foreign crime was higher.⁷¹ Nationalist Kurdish violence against the Turks in Germany became prevalent in the early 1990’s, and this “violence between ‘native’ Turks and Kurds, who are officially classified as Turkish, has contributed to the negative perceptions many natives have of non-EU foreigners”.⁷²

These “negative perceptions” led to the modest successes of the New Right parties. Though none of the parties ever reached the five percent electoral threshold that German political parties must have to take seats in the Bundestag, the emergence of political parties, such as the Republikaner, was troubling to many people across the world. Wesley Chapin warned, “if the established parties are unable to deal successfully with the warring Turkish and Kurdish groups, New Right parties like the Republikaner might be able to capitalize on the situation”.⁷³ Ethnic violence between the Kurds and Turks on German soil was one of the reasons that led German people to look towards the anti-foreigner slogans of the New Right.

The ethnic conflict between the Turks and Kurds in Germany has also forced Germany to be wary of its foreign policy towards Turkey. While Germany formally recognizes Turkey as a sovereign state, German politicians have had to consider the approximately 400,000 to 450,000 Kurds living in Germany when making foreign policy decisions concerning Turkey.⁷⁴ The Kurds have not been shy about voicing their demands to the German government and have let German politicians know that if Germany supports Turkey’s aggression against the Kurds, the Kurds in Germany will consider Germany an enemy along with Turkey.⁷⁵ Germany has proceeded cautiously in its foreign policy towards Turkey, especially in the early 1990’s regarding the sale of arms. Robins notes that the Kurds in Germany monitored the sale of arms to Turkey:

In March 1992 Germany halted all arms sales to Turkey after it was asserted that armored personnel carriers sold to Turkey had been used in the anti-insurgency operations in the southeast [of Turkey]. The gravity of the issue was never in doubt. The subsequent bureaucratic error that

resulted in fifteen Leopard tanks being delivered in spite of this ban was the cause of the German defense minister Gerhard Stotenberg's forced resignation.⁷⁶

Robins also noted that the importance of this arms embargo was made clear by “the fact that in the thirty years after 1964 Germany supplied Turkey with \$3.9 billion worth of arms”.⁷⁷ Germany's foreign policy towards Turkey continued to be tenuous throughout the 1990's. Several times German government officials received information concerning the use of German arms against Kurds in Turkey. This information mobilized Kurdish protests against the German government, and the government was forced to stop shipments of arms to Turkey, if only for a little while. The ethnic conflict between the Turks and Kurds influenced German foreign policy towards Turkey because for Germany, “the overriding need was for the federal government to protect itself against domestic criticism rather than trying to evade Turkish anger”.⁷⁸

Turkey

Turkey gladly sent its citizens to Germany as guest workers in the 1960's. This decision has had implications in the present for Turkey's domestic and foreign policies. When Turkey exported its labor to Germany, it also exported its ethnic conflict between the majority Turks and minority Kurds. The presence of this ethnic conflict on Western European soil has brought much attention and even sympathy to the plight of the Kurds, much to the chagrin of Turkey. According to Philip Robins, "relations between the Federal Republic and Turkey have been subject to frequent periods of angry outbursts and recrimination, often directly as a consequence of the Kurdish issue".⁷⁹ In its domestic policies in response to the transnational ethnic conflict, Turkey has had to acknowledge the Kurds as a minority group, but still remains wary of pro-Kurdish political parties. Turkey must also deal with its human rights abuses. In its foreign policy, Turkey has had to rethink Germany as a major ally in the European Union. The ethnic conflict has also delayed Turkey's bid for entrance into the European Union. The political lobbying and mobilization of the Kurds in Germany has made the rest of the world aware of Turkey's domestic and foreign policies.

While it is impossible to pinpoint the exact cause for policy changes, the pressure that European countries have put upon Turkey in response to the transnational ethnic conflict being played out on their soil has caused Turkey to take steps to reconsider its domestic and foreign policies. Some of the changes made were semi-forced upon Turkey in order to harmonize with the European Union, but the presence of the ethnic conflict, especially in Germany, has accentuated the need for change in Turkey to help alleviate

some of the PKK violence in Europe. Turkey has recently taken steps to recognize the Kurdish minority, such as relaxing language laws that prohibited the broadcast or publication in the Kurdish tongue. The Turkish government still retains the right to limit any publication or broadcast that might “threaten national security”.⁸⁰ So has Turkey really acknowledged the fact that it has an ever growing, ever radicalizing ethnic minority? The laws passed to loosen the constraints upon the Kurds’ use of their mother tongue were a step in the right direction for recognizing and incorporating the Kurds’ ethnic identity into Turkey. The next step for recognition would be to allow children to learn in Kurdish, but the government has steadfastly opposed this and has arrested around 5,000 people protesting for this right. The civilian government and military are aligned on this issue:

The reaction of Turkey’s politicians has . . . been pretty tough. ‘No concessions are possible on education,’ Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit declared, while the all-powerful National Security Council, which brings together the country’s civilian political rulers with the chiefs of the military, characterized the Kurdish language campaign as ‘separatist activities . . . directed by a terrorist organization’.⁸¹

The radical actions of Kurds in the past, as orchestrated by the PKK, have affected the domestic policies in Turkey about Kurdish recognition. While the government is willing to recognize the Kurds to try to appease the European Union members, it is not ready to give the Kurds any sort of cultural autonomy or significant recognition.

Another domestic effect of the radical Kurdish actions is wariness and sometimes the exclusion of Kurdish political parties in Turkey. For a long time, Kurdish political

parties were either banned or excluded from Turkey's government. They have been excluded because the Turkish government fears that they are just a political cover for the PKK and that they will incite Kurds to secede from Turkey. When pro-Kurdish parties have been allowed to exist and Kurdish politicians are elected, they are often harassed by the military that "had been fighting a Kurdish insurrection in the hinterland for 15 years and had long regarded Hadep [a pro-Kurdish party] as a political front for the rebels".⁸² A case currently in court in Turkey will decide the fate of Hadep. Gorvett reports that "it seems likely that the judges will be obliged to ban Hadep, as they have every other Kurdish party, despite its popular following".⁸³ The Turks are afraid of the radical Kurds in the PKK, even though the PKK has declared a cease-fire since its leader, Öcalan, has been captured and put in jail. The PKK is trying to break into non-violent politics in Turkey and Europe, but the radical actions of the PKK and the Kurds in the past have made the Turkish government and the Turkish people extremely wary.

Perhaps one of the European countries that Turkey is closest to is Germany because of the significant minority of Turkish citizens living and working in Germany and their trading relationship.⁸⁴ Turkey's foreign policy towards Germany and other Western European states has also been affected by the actions of the PKK and other radical nationalist Kurds in Europe. Diplomatic tensions often run high between Turkey and Germany because of the "Kurdish Issue". Turkey is unhappy that Germany is sympathetic to the plight of the Kurds in Turkey, would not extradite Ocalan to Turkey, and that Germany has not helped Turkey's application for the European Union. Though Germany has banned the PKK, "Bonn has, however, frequently been the subject of sniping from Ankara as to what it is prepared to do to give substance to this position".⁸⁵

Turkey often views Germany as being lenient on the PKK and does not like Germany's acknowledgement of other Kurdish organizations. Recently, the European Union produced a list of terrorist organizations, and Turkey was irritated that the PKK was left off of it. Turkey's Defense Minister shared his views with the German Defense Minister. The list drew "Turkish criticism for not mentioning armed militant groups, such as the outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C). Those groups are active in some European countries under different banners".⁸⁶ This recent announcement has only been a further example to Turkey that the European Union and Germany are lax about the PKK operating from Europe, and this causes foreign diplomacy problems between Turkey and Germany.

Another foreign policy problem that Turkey has with Germany is that Germany refused to extradite the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, to Turkey to stand trial. Öcalan moved in-between several European countries and cities, and none of them would honor Turkey's request to extradite him. The refusal from Germany was a real blow, though, because Germany is supposedly Turkey's biggest ally in the European Union.⁸⁷ Germany "which had previously issued an arrest warrant for Öcalan on charges of murder of another PKK member, announced it wouldn't request Öcalan's extradition" from Italy, where he had been found earlier.⁸⁸ The Turkish citizens and government were appalled by this decision because to them "Öcalan is a criminal, and European unwillingness to hand him over to Turkey is an act of 'criminal collaboration' that flouts the EU principle of the rule of law".⁸⁹ Though Turkey eventually did get Öcalan on Turkish soil to hold a trial, the harsh feelings left for Germany and the European Union from Turkey also have risen the diplomatic tensions between the countries.

Probably the largest way in which the Kurds in Europe have affected Turkey's foreign policy, though, is by calling Germany's and the European Union's attention to Turkey's human rights shortcomings. Turkey has looked to Germany as an ally in the European Union, but Germany has not done much to ease Turkey's way into the Union. This creates further diplomatic tension between the two countries. Germany, along with other countries, have told Turkey that the path to the European Union is through recognizing the Kurds' cultural rights and improving its human rights record. According to Lyon, "The Kurdish question has become a thorny issue between the EU and Turkey, especially because it figures prominently in the EU's refusal to consider Turkey's applications for membership on human rights grounds".⁹⁰ Germany's large population of Kurds makes it unable to ignore their plight in Turkey and whole-heartedly endorse Turkey's inclusion in the European Union.

The radical actions of Kurds in Germany and the rest of Europe have effects that reach the domestic and foreign policies of Turkey. Domestically, Turkey has had to begin to implement changes to recognize the Kurds' distinct culture. Unfortunately, the Turkish government is still very wary of pro-Kurdish political parties and their possible links to the PKK. Turkey's foreign policy aimed at Germany has had to take into account the Kurdish population in Germany, too. Turkish foreign policy towards Germany has not been without strain over the issues of Germany's supposed leniency towards the radical Kurds and refusal to help Turkey extradite Abdullah Öcalan back to Turkey. Germany has not helped Turkey's bid for the European Union, and this is also a cause of foreign policy tension.

Turkey and the European Union

In the previous sections the effects of radical Kurdish actions have been explored on Germany and Turkey's foreign and domestic policies. The Kurds in the PKK have played an important role in shaping Turkey's chances to join the European Union as a full member state. The "Kurdish Issue" has continued to haunt the Turks, and until they create a viable, non-military solution, the European Union will have a hard time admitting Turkey into its circle. Emotions in Turkey run strong about the European Union. Some see this as the "Western" goal that Turkey has been working towards since its inception, but others see the European Union as "riding rough shod over Ankara's national interests".⁹¹ The Kurds and their radical actions in the past still figure greatly into this picture. In order for Turkey to gain entrance into the EU, it must first comply with the plans that the EU has laid out for it to harmonize with the rest of the countries, especially in political and social aspects. Will Turkey be able to successfully make the changes? Turkey's history with the European Union has not been without contention, and its future is anything but completely certain now. The Kurds have been extremely successful in gaining attention for themselves in Europe, and they will play a major role in Turkey's future within Europe.

Since its beginning as a republic with Kemal Atatürk, Turkey has looked to the West instead of the East. According to Kubicek, "Europe was clearly the model [for Turkey], and links to Europe, not Turkey's Islamic neighbors, were given top priority".⁹² Turkey is a part of many European institutions and has been for many years. In 1948 Turkey joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Council of Europe in 1949. Turkey was further included in the West when it joined

NATO in 1952, but Turkey's aspirations to belonging in the West were brought even closer to satisfaction when the Ankara Treaty announced that Turkey was an associate member of the European Community in 1963.⁹³ These were great accomplishments for Turkey's goal of "westernization", but after Turkey became an associate member of the European Community the process slowed. According to Aybet:

Turkey was thus absorbed into the Western security community and its role within this community was never questioned during the Cold War. In the post- Cold War era, with the shift in the objective of the Western security community from collective defense against an identifiable threat to the promotion of the Western values of democracy, free markets and human rights to the post-communist world, Turkey's place within it is changing.⁹⁴

Turkey applied for full membership in the European Community in 1987, but due to the increasing radicalism of the Kurds and the PKK inside Turkey around this time, Turkey's application was denied.⁹⁵ Ten years later when the European Union listed the countries in line for accession, Turkey's name was still not on the list. To add insult to injury, Cyprus, with whom Turkey has had many problems, was listed as being on the fast track to accession. At the 1993 Copenhagen summit after the Cold War, the criteria for admissions into the EU became much stricter, "particularly emphasizing the conditions for stable democracy, human rights and protections of minorities".⁹⁶ The Union's confidence in Turkey's ability to uphold these conditions was not strong. In 2000 Turkey was finally accepted as a candidate state, but this is not without controversy in Turkey. In order to become a full member, Turkey must complete a set of democratic reforms,

some of which refer to the way that the Kurds are treated within Turkey. Recently, Tuncer Kilinc, the secretary-general of the National Security Council in Turkey spoke out against the accession process. He has proposed that Turkey look elsewhere, like Russia and Iran, for alliances. He said, “Regarding those issues that touch upon its national interests, Turkey has not received the slightest assistance from the EU. On the contrary, it is obvious that the EU holds a negative view on these issues”.⁹⁷ The National Security Council is a very powerful force in Turkey, but the Turkish government plans to continue with the reforms so that Turkey can indeed join the European Union. The EU will decide next fall on which states will be able to join.

Though Turkish politicians, such as Prime Minister Ecevit, are hopeful that the reforms that Turkey has implemented will be enough to satisfy the requirements of the European Union, the EU is watching the reforms with a critical eye. Many are not sure that Turkey can meet the requirements set for membership. Some of the most important requirements that have been the most controversial in the accession process are the removal of the death penalty and rights for minorities. Both of these requirements are tied to the “Kurdish Issue” in Turkey.

Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the PKK, was captured in Nairobi in February 1999. Since then he has been brought to trial for the struggle that he perpetuated against Turkish rule for 15 years. He used violence and politics to bring international attention to the status of Kurds in Turkey. The result of the trial was a death sentence for Öcalan.⁹⁸ None of the countries of the European Union endorse the use of capital punishment, and if Turkey wants to be seriously considered for membership, it must abolish the death penalty and subsequently not execute Öcalan. Though Turkey has made progress in

reforms, Öcalan's position might still be very tenuous because "the latest constitutional reform package was intended to abolish the death penalty- in line with EU law. What it did, though, was almost create Öcalan as a special exception".⁹⁹ The new law still allows for the death penalty to be used as a punishment for terrorism. According to Gunter, "if he is executed, however, it is likely that Turkey will simply buy for itself another generation of embittered Kurds and a struggle that challenges so unnecessarily its very political, social and economic foundations . . . not executing Öcalan would also probably facilitate Turkey's long-cherished dream of admission into the European Union".¹⁰⁰ Since its founding in 1984, the PKK has been a threat to the unity of Turkey. Öcalan's death would mean justice for the Turkish government, but for the lives of many, entry into the EU would be much better. The German ambassador to Turkey said, "if you execute Öcalan, you can forget Helsinki," referring to the summit when Turkey was finally accepted as a candidate for membership.¹⁰¹ Öcalan has been on death row for about three years now, and the longer Turkey waits the less likely they are to execute him because the rewards of the European Union would be so much better than the bitter revenge exacted from killing this man.

Another huge stumbling block for Turkey on its way to joining the European Union is minority rights. As mentioned earlier, the European Union demands that the Turkish government recognize the Kurds as a legitimate ethnic minority. In the European Union's *2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*, for Turkey's progress on granting minority rights, the EU found:

A number of restrictions on the exercise of fundamental freedoms have remained. The extent to which individuals in Turkey will enjoy a real

improvement in the exercise of fundamental freedoms in practice will depend on the details of implementing legislation, and the practical application of the law . . . Over and above what has been said above on cultural rights and the possible impact of the constitutional amendments, there has been no improvement in the ability of members of ethnical groups with a cultural identity and common traditions to express their linguistic and cultural identity. Turkey has not signed the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and does not recognize minorities other than those defined by the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty.¹⁰²

Minority rights are still not completely recognized, and major changes in the attitude of the Turkish people and government are required to make the constitutional changes work. Can Turkey truly implement the changes that it needs to recognize the Kurds as an ethnic minority? The European Union is serious about these provisions because the Kurds in Europe, and especially in Germany, have acted out in protests and attacks. The European Union does not want Turkey's internal minority problems. This will be one the hardest transitions for Turkey because the façade of national unity has been the pretext for the war against the PKK for the past 25 years. Over 30,000 people have died and millions have been displaced from their homes.¹⁰³ Until Turkey can really embrace the spirit of the changes to its constitution that it has made, it will not be able to join the European Union.

Conclusion

In this paper the author has attempted to show the effectiveness of the PKK in influencing domestic and foreign policies in both Germany and Turkey. Both governments have acknowledged and reacted to the PKK's violent and diplomatic activities, an important accomplishment for an ethnic group that has only recently been officially recognized by its home country. Turkey still must overcome many obstacles to fully and without prejudice allow the Kurds their own cultural expression, but to join the European Union, it must. Turkey's population is tired of the civil war, and Germany's population is tired of the violence perpetrated on German soil by the PKK in the name of Kurdish nationalism. According to Östergaard-Nielsen, the Kurds "by introducing the politics of their homeland to their host country [Germany], . . . [the Kurds] break down the distinction between domestic and foreign politics".¹⁰⁴

Now that the PKK's leader is on death row in Turkey, he has asked his followers to lay down their arms and work politically to come to a solution for the "Kurdish Issue". This is a dramatic change coming from one who had previously threatened that "each and every Kurd can become a suicide bomber".¹⁰⁵ However, if the Kurds are allowed legitimate ways to participate in the political processes in both Turkey and Europe, the need for armed violence might dissipate. The PKK has been effective in the past because both Turkey and Germany did not allow for any moderate Kurdish associations. In Turkey, any form of Kurdish expression was squashed as terrorism. In Germany, once the PKK was banned, all Kurdish organizations were in effect banned. The Kurds, if they wanted to express their displeasure with Turkey's or Germany's policies, or if they just wanted to express their ethnicity, were left with one option: the PKK. Moderate Kurds,

even if not a part of the PKK, were lumped together with the radical organization simply due to the fact that the PKK overshadowed any other attempt to express the Kurdish point of view.¹⁰⁶ The debate in Turkey today is whether or not the PKK should be allowed to participate in the political process in Turkey as a legitimate political party. A Turkish Minister of State believes that if the PKK were allowed to participate in elections in Turkey, it wouldn't garner much support among the Kurdish community and then would lose its sense of power.¹⁰⁷ This, if true, would certainly quash the Turkish government's number one Kurdish enemy decisively, and more importantly for Turkey's bid to join the EU, democratically.

Notes

¹ Alynna J. Lyon and Emek M. Ücarer, "Mobilizing Ethnic Conflict: Kurdish separatism in Germany and the PKK," Ethnic and Racial Studies 24, no. 6 (2001): 925.

² Lyon and Ücarer, 942.

³ Ulrich Herbert, A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880- 1980 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 11.

⁴ Herbert, 212.

⁵ Herbert, 202-248.

⁶ Herbert, 210.

⁷ Ray C. Rist, Guestworkers in Germany: The Prospects for Pluralism (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978), 89.

⁸ Herbert, 230.

⁹ Central Intelligence Agency, "Germany," The World Factbook, July 2001, <<http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gm.html#Intro>> (March 10, 2002).

¹⁰ Rist, 95.

¹¹ Rist, 95.

¹² Rist, 96-97.

¹³ Ronald E. Krane, "Effects of International Migration upon Occupational Mobility, Acculturation and the Labor Market in Turkey," in Manpower Mobility Across Cultural Boundaries, ed. Ronald E. Krane (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1975), 170.

¹⁴ Herbert, 216.

¹⁵ Rist, 35.

¹⁶ Friedrich Heckmann quoted in Ulrich Herbert, A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880-1980 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990), 217.

¹⁷ Caroline Wyatt, "New laws on German Citizenship," BBC News, 7 May 1999, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_338000/338258.stm> (10 March 2002).

¹⁸ Elcin Kursat-Ählers, "The Turkish Minority in German Society," in Turkish Culture in German Society Today, eds. David Horrocks and Eva Kolinsky (Providence: Berghan Books, 1996), 116.

¹⁹ Herbert, 241.

²⁰ Kursat-Ählers, 130.

²¹ Wesley D. Chapin, Germany for the Germans? The Political Effects of International Migration (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1997), 102-104.

²² Gulistan Gürbey and Ferhad Ibrahim, "Introduction," in The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy, eds. Gulistan Gurbey and Ferhad Ibrahim (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 10.

²³ Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), 4.

²⁴ The Library of Congress Federal Research Division, "Area Handbook- Turkey", 1995 <[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+tr0021\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+tr0021))> (11 March 2002).

²⁵ Gunter, 7.

²⁶ Gunter, 4.

²⁷ Michael Gunter, "The Kurdish Question and International Law," in The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy, eds. Gulistan Gurbey and Ferhad Ibrahim (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 31.

²⁸ Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflict in World Politics, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), 37.

²⁹ The Library of Congress Federal Research Division, "Area Handbook- Turkey", 1995 <[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+tr0021\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+tr0021))> (11 March 2002).

³⁰ Gunter, 5.

³¹ Gunter, 4-6.

³² Gunter, 9-10.

³³ The Library of Congress Federal Research Division, "Area Handbook- Turkey", 1995 <[http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field\(DOCID+tr0021\)](http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+tr0021))> (12 March 2002).

³⁴ Gulistan Gürbey, "Peaceful Settlement through Autonomy?" in The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy, eds. Gulistan Gürbey and Ferhad Ibrahim (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 65.

³⁵ Gunter, 23-59. For this section I relied heavily upon Gunter's analysis of the PKK from the late 1970's to the early 1990's.

³⁶ Gulistan Gürbey and Ferhad Ibrahim, "Chronology," in The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy, eds. Gulistan Gürbey and Ferhad Ibrahim (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 205-208.

³⁷ Gurr and Harff, 83-95.

³⁸ Gürbey, 65.

³⁹ Lyon and Ücarer, 934.

⁴⁰ Lyon and Ücarer, 933.

⁴¹ Leggewie, 80.

⁴² Lyon and Ücarer, 932-933.

⁴³ Lyon and Ücarer, 933.

⁴⁴ Eccarius-Kelly, 171.

⁴⁵ Gurr and Harff, 84.

⁴⁶ Cornell, 39.

⁴⁷ Eccarius-Kelly, 170.

⁴⁸ Eccarius-Kelly, 162.

⁴⁹ Eccarius-Kelly, 167.

⁵⁰ Leggewie, 79.

⁵¹ Eccarius-Kelly, 162.

⁵² Leggewie, 82.

⁵³ Hugh Pope, "Kurd Faction, Leaderless, Faces a Struggle," The Wall Street Journal (Feb. 18, 1999): A18.

⁵⁴ Lyon and Ücarer, 935.

⁵⁵ Gunter, 102.

⁵⁶ Gunter, 102.

⁵⁷ Lyon and Ücarer, 938-939.

⁵⁸ Lyon and Ücarer, 939.

⁵⁹ Michael M. Gunter, "The Continuing Kurdish problem in Turkey after Öcalan's capture," Third World Quarterly 21, no. 5 (2000): 851.

⁶⁰ Lyon and Ücarer, 942.

⁶¹ Lyon and Ücarer, 942.

⁶² Lyon and Ücarer, 943-944.

⁶³ Östergaard-Nielsen, 23.

⁶⁴ Consular Services, "Citizenship Reform and Germany's Foreign Residents," http://www.germany-info.org/newcontent/gc/ho/cs_2.html (March 28, 2002).

⁶⁵ Eccarius-Kelly, 161-162.

⁶⁶ Cornell, 40.

⁶⁷ Lyon and Ücarer, 937.

⁶⁸ Lyon and Ücarer, 937.

⁶⁹ Eccarius-Kelly, 172.

⁷⁰ Eccarius-Kelly, 166.

⁷¹ Chapin, 65.

⁷² Chapin, 12-13.

⁷³ Chapin, 139.

⁷⁴ Gunter, 101.

⁷⁵ Gunter, 105.

⁷⁶ Philip Robins, "More Apparent than Real? The Impact of the Kurdish Issue on Euro-Turkish Relations," in The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990's, ed. Robert Olson (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1996), 123.

⁷⁷ Robins, 131.

⁷⁸ Robins, 124.

⁷⁹ Robins, 123.

⁸⁰ John Gorvett, "Kurds at the Crossroads," Middle East no. 321 (March 2002): 11.

⁸¹ Gorvett, 12.

⁸² "Europe: A Turn for the Worse; Turkey and its Kurds," The Economist 362, no. 8258 (Feb. 2, 2002): 50.

⁸³ Gorvett, 51.

⁸⁴ Pia C. Wood, "Turkey: A Rising Regional Power?" Old Dominion University <<http://socialscience.tyler.cc.tx.us/mkho/fulbright/1998/turkey/wood.htm>> (March 26, 2002).

⁸⁵ Robins, 123.

⁸⁶ "EU Terrorism List tops Cakmakoglu's agenda in Germany," Turkish Daily News. 7 March 2002.

⁸⁷ Paul Kubicek, "Turkish-European relations: At a new crossroads?" Middle East Policy 6, no. 4 (1999) 166.

⁸⁸ Rana Dogar and Mark Dennis, "Turkey vs. Europe," Newsweek (Nov. 30, 1998) 9.

⁸⁹ Kubicek, 166.

⁹⁰ Lyon and Ücarer, 944.

⁹¹ "Top Turkish General Lashes out at EU," AFP (March 7, 2002).

⁹² Kubicek, 158.

2. ⁹³Gulnur Aybet, "Turkey and European Institutions," The International Spectator 34, no. 1 (1999):

⁹⁴ Aybet, 2.

⁹⁵ Kubicek, 160.

⁹⁶ Aybet, 4.

⁹⁷ Jean-Christophe Peuch, "Turkey: Frustration Mounting Over EU Demands for Reform," Radio Free Europe (March 15, 2002).

⁹⁸ Gorvett, 11.

⁹⁹ Gorvett, 12.

¹⁰⁰ Gunter, (2000), 857.

¹⁰¹ Gunter (2000), 863.

¹⁰² Commission of the European Communities, 2001 Regular Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession (Brussels, Belgium 13.11.2001): 24-29.

¹⁰³ Dogar, 9.

¹⁰³ Lyon and Ücarer, 941

¹⁰⁴ Östergaard-Nielsen, 35.

¹⁰⁶ Ecarrius-Kelly, 166-167.

¹⁰⁷ Mohammad Nouredine, "EU bid has forced Turks to focus on Kurdish Question," Daily Star (12 March 2002).

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