
PREFIGURATIVE POLITICS VS. PARTY BUILDING IN THE POST-SOVIET CONTEXT: IDEOLOGY AND RESOURCE MOBILIZATION IN LEFT-RADICAL GROUPS IN UKRAINE.

VOLODYMYR ISHCHENKO
Center for Social and Labor Research, Kiev

Abstract

I wrote this paper 10 years ago based on my MA thesis. Many things have changed since that time. The left groups mentioned in the article do not exist anymore. Some of their activists are still active politically but many are not part of radical left politics any more. In addition, now I am more skeptical of the postmodern theories of ideology I tried to use in the paper. If I were writing a similar analysis now, I would try to develop a more materialist and a more complex approach to ideologies and their effects on practical politics. However, the paper seems to be pointing to a much wider question than merely the problems of two small Kiev-based radical left groups. The radical left movement in Ukraine is slightly larger now, involving hundreds, not dozens, of activists, but it still lacks any strong organization and remains completely marginal politically. But it is not just a matter of the Ukrainian left. The recent waves of popular struggles in Europe and in Arab countries persuasively showed how anarchist suspicion of disciplined organizations and strategy politically disarms the movements. If lacking strong political organizations even massive mobilizations are at best able only to overthrow the old elite, while allowing the seizing of power by traditional "opposition" parties, which in reality block any prospects for fundamental political and social change. SYRIZA in Greece and Podemos in Spain may push progressive movements into an understanding of the need for political representation. Of course, these new left parties will need not just electoral but also political successes in implementing their programs in order to fix a shift in the contemporary radical left toward organized political strategy and away from an obsession with horizontal prefiguration.

In this article I point to some important problems of prefigurative political groups. Prefigurative politics implies identification of the means of social change with its ends. This solution of the means-ends dilemma may lead to strategic inflexibility and the reduction of activity oriented to a wide public, and to the withdrawal of activists into their group. These problems become especially evident when prefigurative groups are weak and recently founded, when they specify radical social change as their end, and when they are acting in a "hostile" social environment. I demonstrate this in the case of two left-radical groups in Kiev, Ukraine. Facing hostile public opinion produced by the discredit of left-wing rhetoric by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the decrease of the living standards of the Ukrainian population and therefore, a shortening of the available amount resources for activism, and, finally, from the lack of an activist political culture, the left-wing movement was (and still is) coping with the problem of primary mobilization of resources and membership in order to transcend the limits of marginal subcultures and to put its agenda into the public discourse. In this situation a Trotskyist group "Robitnychy Sprotyv" (RS, "Workers' Resistance") attained larger outcomes in membership and material resources mobilization than an anarchist group "Tigra-Nigra" (TN). I will argue that the cause of such a result was the different general strategic solutions contained in revolutionary Marxist ideology and in anarchism¹ that were grounded on opposing solutions to the means-ends dilemma. With regard to outcome, the ideology of the

¹ The general strategic solution for revolutionary Marxists (as Trotskyists call themselves) is the building of the workers' party and the struggle for the state power that is the tool for the socialist transformation. The general strategic solution for anarchists is prefigurative politics: social change through the change of their own behavior and realization of the main principles of the new society 'here and now'. I want to stress that both left-radical movements have the same goal – stateless and classless social order based on self-government and social property. The notions of "communism" and "anarchy" have a very similar, if not the same, vision of the future society.

Trotskyist group was more favorable as an instrumentally rational strategy, whereas the anarchists' ideology assumed value-rational, expressive and spontaneous political behavior that turned out to be less favorable for resource mobilization.

In addition, I analyze the general mechanism of ideological influence on strategic activity. Very often scholars working in social movement studies explicitly or implicitly neglect ideological beliefs of the activists in the explanations of processes and outcomes of their activity. Particularly, those researchers who have worked within classical paradigm of "mass society" / "collective behavior" were more interested in the social-psychological functions of the ideologies of individuals with certain psychological characteristics, and considered all ideologies almost interchangeable, despite the explicit differences in their contents².

The alternative "resource mobilization" / "political process" paradigm, which became popular in the 1970s, emphasized the rationality of social movement activists; within it culture and ideology were considered from an over-instrumental perspective, as a certain type of "frame" (Snow et al. 1986), "repertoire" (Tilly 1978: 151-66) or, generally, "tool kit" (Swidler 1986) for the achievement of a social movement's goals. Usually the choice between different practices from a "repertoire" or between different 'frames' was considered the result of rational calculation in the context of objective structural opportunities. In the meantime, the outcome of the growing interest in the role of ideological beliefs within the "cultural turn" (started by the theorists of so called "new social movements" in the 1980s) is mostly theoretical manifestos with an "ideology matters" leitmotif (for instance, Zald (2000), Oliver and Johnston (2000)) and a few single empirical studies (for example, Dalton, Recchia, and Rohrschneider (2003)). Still, there is a lack of knowledge on specific mechanisms of the influence of activists' ideology on the processes in social movements; it is necessary to investigate ideological influence not only on strategic decisions, but also on their outcomes.

In the first part of this article I build a theoretical schema (mechanism) of the influence of ideology on strategic activity, synthesizing the relational approach to collective action by Emirbayer and Goodwin with the theory of ideology by Laclau and Mouffe, while also taking into account the emphasis of the "new social movement" theorists on the importance of collective and personal identity. Resting on research on the resource mobilization process and outcomes of two left-radical groups in Kiev, I then demonstrate how different ideologies in different ways open and close structural opportunities and methods for social movement activists.

Ideology and strategic activity: The mechanism of influence

As was mentioned above, the "cultural turn" in social movement studies was started by the theorists of the so-called "new social movements" (Touraine, Melucci, Habermas, Inglehart are among the most prominent). These theorists labeled as "new" the social movements of the "late capitalist" or "post-industrial" society (e.g. feminist, environmentalist, gay and lesbian, peace movements), which, according to them, in a number of issues (ideology, social base, motivation for participation, organizational structure, political style) fundamentally differed from "the old" movements (first of all, from the labor movement) (Dalton, Kuechler, and Bürklin 1990). Although the thesis about the fundamental "newness" of those social movements has been very often exposed to harsh criticism (Calhoun 1995; Pichardo 1997; Scott 1990), the attention to scantily explored cultural processes, and to deep motivation to participation (activists' collective and personal identities) in contrast to over-irrationalist and over-instrumentalist approaches to analysis of culture in earlier paradigms is very important.

² According to the paradigmatic expression of Eric Hoffer, "When people are ripe for a mass movement, they are usually ripe for any effective movement, and not solely for one with a particular doctrine or program ...all mass movement are interchangeable. One mass movement readily transforms itself into another. A religious movement may develop into a social revolution or a nationalist movement; a social revolution into militant nationalism or a religious movement; a nationalist movement into a social revolution or a religious movement" (1951: 16, 18).

Obviously, in arguing that the behavior of activists is substantially determined by activists' identities, researchers could not stand on a primitive definition of identity - on, as it were, a one-word answer to the question "Who am I?" It is clear that identity, for example, the identity of a worker, may have both radical ("I am one of the exploited proletarians; we can improve our lives only fighting together for our rights") and conformist ("I am an employee in a corporation and I should work hard in order to step-up") interpretations. Therefore, the identity of "worker" itself, regardless of the context of the meanings and beliefs in which it is used, does not say much of anything about the behavior it presupposes. To state the opposite means to be trapped in essentialism, and this is indeed one of the main accusations against many "identity politics" proponents (Somers 1994:610-11).

To solve the problem of essentialism and to take into account the socially constructed nature of identities, theorists of the "new social movements" expanded the meaning of the concept of identity. For instance, according to Melucci (1996:70-71), the concept includes three levels: 1) cognitive goals, methods, and field of the action definition; 2) a network of the active interrelations among actors; 3) a certain level of the emotional investment because of which individuals feel as parts of the whole. However, such wide definition leads to the situation when even on the cognitive level "collective identity" becomes an equivalent for the concepts of group culture or ideology. Being aware of the danger of limiting the collective identity concept only to boundaries and members of a group, theorists of the "new social movements" extend it to include "a fixed content of meanings, frames of interpretation, and normative and valuational proscriptions that exercise influence over individual social actors" (Johnston, Laraña, and Gusfield 1994:28). Besides the fact that excessive extension of the concept's meaning narrows its explanatory capacity, in this particular case it leads to abolishment of the boundaries between the concepts of individual and collective identity, and to the impossibility of applying these concepts in the explanation of different levels of activists' motivation to participation in social movements (Stryker 2000:26). I argue that a more adequate solution to the problem of essentialism lies in emphasizing the relational nature of any identity (Somers 1994). It is impossible to analyze the influence of identity on human actions without considering the belief system in which an identity is embedded and within which people see the sources of the meaning for behavior rationalization³. In this case identity is conceptualized not as an equivalent for ideology, but as a social-psychological mechanism that motivates a person to orient him or herself to a certain ideology (ideologies) among all belief-systems with which he or she is familiar.

In this case one should approach ideologies from a relational point of view and consider them as "cultural structures" or "conceptual networks" (Somers 1995a; 1995b), or as constituents of the "cultural context of action". According to Emirbayer and Goodwin's definition, the cultural context of action "encompasses those symbolic configurations or formations that constrain and enable action by structuring actors' normative commitments and their understanding of the world and of their own possibilities within it" (1996:365). Together with social-structural and social-psychological contexts (that are relatively autonomous), the cultural context constitutes the objective structure for action that restricts and directs human agency.

The approach to ideology as a cultural (symbolic) structure or network is based on an assumption that symbols, concepts, and beliefs in a cultural context of action are combined in clusters that have a certain structural logic (it is important that this logic is unique and cannot be reduced to the logic of interaction in social-structural or social-psychological networks). Therefore, the task of a researcher is to analyze persistent structural relations between symbols, concepts and beliefs within cultural networks. It is important that in each particular situation a person orients only to some symbolic networks or structures (among an infinite number of actually existing ones), and in this analysis the significance of identity as

³ I refer to Castells in the understanding of identity as the process of prioritization of the meaning sources (Castells 2004:6-7).

one of the mechanisms⁴ activating the logic of certain symbolic networks among all known for a particular person becomes clear⁵.

Thus I have defined identity as a mechanism of the influence of ideology on human behavior. To finish the construction of the theoretical schema it is necessary to consider two additional links: that between ideology and identity and that between identity and behavior.

In the definition of the link between identity and ideology I will use the term “articulation” proposed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Their theory of ideology is very close to the relational approach of Emirbayer, Goodwin and Somers. Laclau emphasizes the impossibility of existence of meaning independent from symbolic structures (or discourse). Concepts are floating signifiers that in different discourses may have different meanings, but what is more important is that within one discursive network the floating signifiers acquire meaning that is equivalent to all other components of the network (Laclau 1996:208). For example, the concept of “freedom” obtains completely different meanings in a “socialist” chain of equivalences (“freedom-equality-solidarity”) from those, which it obtains in a liberal discourse of “freedom-individualism-private property”. Articulation, as Laclau and Mouffe define this process of partial fixation of meaning⁶, creates a so-called nodal point (Lacan’s point de capiton) that is constitutive for any discourse or ideology (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:113). On the level of the structure of ideology a nodal point is analogous to identity since it signifies shared meaning of the components of network and at the same time differentiates the concrete network from other similar symbolic structures (Zizek 1999:104-5). Thereby, the articulation process constructs a unique source of meaning and connects it with the individual identity of a person.

The mechanism of authenticity explains the relation between identity and behavior. Gekas (2000) considers authenticity as a sort of self-motive referring to an “individual’s strivings for meaning, coherence and significance” (p. 101). Motivation to maintain authenticity causes activists to avoid activity (or inactivity) that contradicts the ideologies in which their identities are articulated, since these are mutually challenged in cases of discrepancy between real behavior and the ideological orientations. This authenticity mechanism is then the last component in the explanation of the way ideology limits the number of available ways of action and structures behavior of its followers.

I consider the solution to the means-ends dilemma then as one of the “axioms” (van Dijk 1998:49) that structure ideological beliefs and activists’ behavior through the aforementioned mechanism. Besides the fact that concrete tactical and strategic decisions embedded in ideology (for activists, these constitute their repertoire of action) are grounded on such axioms, these general principles can also directly structure activist behavior.

4 I stress that identity is only one of the motivating mechanisms of symbolic network selection as long as it is obvious that a person may orient his or her behavior on certain symbolic structures without identifying him/herself with them. As, for example, when an advertiser orients on tastes and beliefs of the target group that are interesting for him or her only within the context of profits. Within the realm of social movements this is the situation in which activists frame goals and tasks of their movement for different groups of potential resource providers. I suggest that it is the presence of identity mechanisms that differentiates the effect of ideology from framing processes. For more on difference between ideology and framing see Oliver and Johnston (2000) and Westby (2002).

5 Unfortunately, there is a tendency among scholars-relationalists to neglect the importance of motivating mechanisms. For example, Somers, while analyzing the reproduction of the meta-narrative of Anglo-American citizenship theory in works by Habermas and Parsonian political culture researchers, does not give any idea why these theorists must have oriented to the logic of this meta-narrative (1995b:263-67). It is as though Anglo-American citizenship theory were acting “through” aforementioned scholars independently from their will and theoretical or ideological preferences. Recent attempts by McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001) to build a systematic relational theory of social movements also pay almost no attention to level of motivation.

6 It is partial because any concept even as it acquires new meaning within a chain of equivalences does not lose its specificity, a specificity that is guaranteed by its inclusion in other discourses that in this way become the external “objective” environment for this particular symbolic network (Laclau and Mouffe 1985:113).

There are two extreme solutions for the means–end problem, one of which corresponds to the value-rational action and the other of which to instrumentally rational action, according to Weber’s classification. The solution that emphasizes identity of means and ends corresponds to the value-rational action, i.e. direct realization of the ultimate goal. Means contradicting the central values of the ideology are considered at the least ineffective, and at the most blasphemous. In the reverse order the solution that sharply separates means from ends is related to the instrumentally rational action. It presumes the construction of a hierarchy of intermediate goals, which must be realized step-by-step; for the realization of more urgent goals it is possible, and sometimes necessary, to use means that contradict more distant goals. The means are selected exclusively according to their efficiency, not on the basis of their correspondence with the ultimate values⁷.

I claim that in the case when a social movement organization (SMO) sets radical, systemic transformation of the social relations as the ultimate goal, the instrumentally rational solution of the means-ends dilemma will be more favorable to strategic activity than the value-rational solution, since it allows for use of all opportunities within the System (in the widest meaning of the word, including “systemic” ways of behavior). Further, the emphasis on spontaneous action provides reasons not to use even those means for strategic activity that are compatible with the ultimate values of the “good” society.

In the next part of the article I will present an empirical illustration supporting this hypothesis. I will demonstrate how the instrumentally rational solution of the means-ends dilemma in the ideology of a Trotskyist group “Robitnychi Sprotyv” had been favorable for larger outcomes in mobilization of material and human resources when compared to the solution of an anarchist group “Tigra-Nigra” whose ideology assumed a value-rational solution to the problem.

Ideology and resource mobilization of Kiev left-radical groups: Research results

This section is based on the analysis of 32 semi-structural in-depth interviews, the majority of which I conducted during April–May 2004 with current and former members (by the time of the fieldwork) of “Robitnychi Sprotyv” and “Tigra-Nigra”. Moreover, I rested on my own observations, observations that I made during public events, internal meetings, and in personal communications with activists of both groups. I conducted interviews with almost all key persons of both groups present in Ukraine at the time of the fieldwork, although among my respondents were “ordinary” (less active) members. A profile of the respondents is provided in the Appendix. For the analysis I used documents from the web-sites of RS www.antiglobalizm.net.ua, www.workres.kiev.ua and TN – tn.zaraz.org⁸, from “The Left Vanguard”, which is the newspaper of the Committee for the Workers’ International (formerly the Ukrainian branch of the RS) in the Community of Independent States (CIS)), and internal documents from electronic mail-lists workres@yahoogroups.com, kinoclub@yahoogroups.com, cwi-ua@yahoogroups.com, and from the personal archives of some activists. The information collection and analysis were made along the following dimensions: outcomes of human and material resource mobilization; ideological beliefs; strategies that were used for human and material resources mobilization, the way these strategies were caused by the ideologies, and other factors (first of all structural) that could also influence resource mobilization outcomes.

⁷ It is important to mention that according to Weber instrumentally rational action is not identical with material interest satisfaction: “choice between alternative and conflicting ends and results may well be determined in a value-rational manner. In that case, action is instrumentally rational only in respect to the choice of means” (Weber 1978:26). The difference between instrumental rationality and value rationality lies on the level of the structure of action, not on the level of its substantial content.

⁸ Unfortunately, by the time of writing of the article (the fall of 2005) all web-sites stopped functioning, since both groups did not exist anymore. The documents that were placed on the web-sites which were referred to in the article can be provided by the author on request.

Background and outcomes

Both RS and TN had their roots in the leftist environment that appeared in Kiev, as well as in many other Soviet cities, in the last years of the U.S.S.R.'s existence. General liberalization of the political regime at the end of the 1980s opened political opportunities for public agitation and the founding of informal associations (Butterfield and Sedaitis 1991). For certain youth, both Trotskyism and anarchism were attractive “third ways” between Soviet “socialism” and market capitalism (Interview no. 29:5; interview no. 13:1).

Because of the size limitations of this article, I will not herein present a detailed history of Kiev leftist organizational transformations⁹. I will mention only the most important stage in their development - “The Leftist Youth Association” (“Live obyednannia molodi”, LOM), which was founded by Kiev State University students in 1993. LOM had united several factions of activists representing all left-radical tendencies in Kiev, from anarchists to Stalinists critical of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and, including Trotskyists (the germ of the future “Robitnychi Sprotyv”). Approximately at this time the Trotskyists became members of one of the international Trotskyist organizations, the Committee for the Workers’ International (CWI).

In 1995 LOM ceased its unified activity because of ideological and personal conflicts (Interview no. 29:5-6; interview no. 13:7-8; interview no. 31:1). It is necessary to mention that among the former LOM factions only RS maintained its organizational continuity and had existed with the same name until 2004. Starting from 3 people in 1994 RS had grown to have a membership of 29 at the first half of 2003 in Kiev and at one time had more than 70 members in 14 Ukrainian cities (Interview no. 2:2; interview no. 29:22). Approximate membership dynamics are presented at Figure 1¹⁰. In addition, in the first half of 2003 the Kiev RS group had more than 100 so called “contacters”, i.e. people who were not formal members of the organization but who were included in its informational network, while the most promising of them were purposefully “worked on” by the activists trying to persuade them to join the organization. The annual budget of the organization in the last years of its existence was \$6,000-\$7,000 (interview no. 2:7)¹¹.

Anarchist Initiative “Tigra-Nigra”, although it had the same origins in LOM, proceeded along a completely different historical path. The former anarchist faction acted as the student trade union “Direct Action” for several years after the disintegration of LOM. In 1997 five former LOM activists founded “Tigra-Nigra”, where activity of the same 15-20 Kiev anarchists’ had been concentrated (Interview no. 2:10). However, in 1998 the TN activists suffered repression from the Ukrainian Security Service (USS)¹². The scale of repression was shocking for activists: “In those days we lived in an ivory tower, in the world of illusions and so on, and then we met the reality and it struck us very violently...” (Interview no. 21: 4). By 1999 the membership of the group had decreased to 2-4 people (p. 1).

9 For more on the leftist movement in Ukraine at the beginning of the 90s see Dubovik and Skrozitskii (1995) and Fedorov (n.d.).

10 I asked one of the senior members (who at the same time was one of the actual leaders of the organization (respondent no. 2)) to indicate the number of the RS members in each year starting from 1994. Afterwards other senior activists confirmed these figures. I could not use the meetings’ protocols as the majority of them were lost after the organization’s collapse.

11 In this case I could rely only on interviews. RS had financial documentation, but on least one occasion it was purposely destroyed (Protocol of RS meeting in September, 2002, p.1; “Otchet o poseschenii Kieva (Mai, 2003)”, p.3). Moreover, the group did double-entry book-keeping, creating fake financial reports for CWI; this was the consequence of their financial resource mobilization strategy.

12 TN joined the series of protest actions of the radical greens in April and May 1998 against the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development that was going to give a credit to Ukraine for building of new blocks of the nuclear reactors aiming to substitute for the closed Chernobyl nuclear station. Under the pretext of “the damage to the international image of Ukraine” USS interrogated anarchists and environmentalists, threatened them, searched their apartments, Seven persons got short-term imprisonment (Fomichev 1998; Rainbow Keepers 1998).




Figure 1. Approximate dynamics of the membership of "Robitnychi S protyv" (Trotskyist group) in Kiev, from 1994 till the end of 2003

However, in 2000 "Tigra-Nigra" reappeared in renewed membership ("Ob initsiativa" 2003). At the end of 1998 two TN activists were among the organizers of the club of socially active youth that, in contrast to the old TN ("classical political group") was more prefigurative, and was "an effort to create freedom space" (Interview no. 32:6), with the organization of work in accordance with anarchist principles of the minimization of hierarchy and consensus decision-making. At the beginning the activity of the group was limited, first of all, to anti-smoking and anti-alcohol activity or, generally speaking, to social work. However, later younger participants got to know about ideas of the Western "anti-globalization" movement (anti-corporate resistance, "no borders", "no copyright", "no wars" and so on) (Interview no. 26:6). Thus in 2000 some club members started explicit political activity for which they revived the label of "Tigra-Nigra".

Figure 2 presents the approximate membership dynamics of the group from 1999, i.e. of the "club" and new TN¹³. Expenditure for political, anarchist activity was no more than \$500-\$1,000 per year (Interview no. 24:11; interview no. 32:7). Besides this, around \$2,000 per year was saved for the expense of obtaining grants for social projects (interview no. 32:7) which least potentially could be used for political activity.

Thereby, despite the fact that at the beginning of the 90's Kiev anarchists were more numerous than Trotskyists, in 2003 the Trotskyists had significant superiority in comparison with the anarchists in

13 Since TN did not have formal membership and not everybody in the group was an anarchist, I asked respondents about: 1) the number of "anarchists" in the group, i.e. those who identify themselves with anarchism and work on political projects under the framework of Anarchist Initiative "Tigra-Nigra"; 2) the overall number of people who work on different projects of the club. They indicated me the approximate number of people who are not active participants but sometimes attend their events and meetings (mostly these are their friends). In Figure 2 for the last category I used the term "mobilization" based on Flacks' distinction between "activism" and "mobilization" (2004: 143). The "mobilization" can be regarded as roughly analogous to RS "contactors".

the number of activists and “contacters” for mobilization - also, it had stable positive dynamics of membership growth and financial resources till the collapse in 2003,¹⁴. Moreover, these differences could not be explained with external factors, particularly, by the differing attitude of Ukrainian population towards these groups or by the difference in the structure of political opportunities.

According to the results of the survey conducted in February 2005 by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology (1,991 respondents were interviewed) both the anarchist and revolutionary Marxist identities are marginal in the mass consciousness of Ukrainian citizens; out of ten political directions only 0.6% respondents chose the anarchist one, and only 0.2% chose the revolutionary Marxist one. Moreover, there is evidence that Ukrainians prefer the value-rational solution of the means-ends dilemma proposed by the anarchists to the instrumentally rational Trotskyist one. Out of two statements 1) “Facing the current level of corruption and criminality in our society we have to use the most efficient methods to achieve a socially important goal, even if they are not honest and humane. Otherwise, we will not get results”, and 2) “Even though it might damage the efficiency of achieving a socially important result, we always have to be honest and humane”; 60.5% of the respondents chose the latter and only 23.3% chose the former (even despite the stronger argumentation proposed in the first statement than in the second). Besides this, almost all activists whom I interviewed answered the question “In your opinion, are there more anarchist or Marxist supporters among young people?” in favor of anarchism¹⁵. Usually they believe this to be the consequence of the discredit of the Marxism of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and anti-Marxist propaganda in independent Ukraine (Interview no. 4:8), while anarchism was considered more attractive for protest-oriented youth and some youth subcultures (Interview no. 15:17; interview no. 11:15). Therefore, the Trotskyist group had reached larger outcomes despite being viewed more unfavorably in public opinion than anarchists.

The only one difference in the structure of the political opportunities for RS and TN was repression against the anarchists in 1998. Indeed, the repressions were one of the reasons for the almost complete dissolution of the “old” Tigr-Nigra. However, the number of the anarchists in 1999–2000 was only slightly lower than the number of the formal RS members (8 and 15 against 12 and 18 respectively). Moreover, the repression in 1998 could not directly cause the negative dynamics of the anarchist group starting from 2001.

In the rest of this section I will present an ideological explanation of the processes and the outcomes of resource mobilization by RS and TN between 2000 and 2003. The earlier time limit was chosen because, first of all, the source of my data (interviews with the activists, which means low reliability of the information about events distant in time); second, 15 out of 29 respondents started their political activity only from 1999. At third, this period is much better documented because of the start of extensive use of the Internet. The later time limit is determined by intrusion of the independent social-psychological and social-structural factors in the internal processes within RS and TN. Starting from the fall of 2003 during one year RS experienced two splits because of the fight for leadership, personal conflicts, and the international Trotskyist movement reaction to their fraudulent way of financing. From the end of 2004, RS ceased to exist as a political group. At the beginning of 2005 because of several personal conflicts three of the main activists left TN and that caused the dissolution of the group¹⁶.

14 There is a problem of inadequate comparison between the number of “formal members” in RS and “active members” in TN. Around 5-6 formal members of the Trotskyist group were characterized as “dead souls” (Interview no. 4: 7), i.e. passive (not participating in the work of the organization) for several months running (Interview no. 6: 6). Probably, people with the same activity level would not be considered as “active participants” in the anarchist group. However, this fact does not change the picture significantly because there were 23-24 active Trotskyists, approximately three times more than there were conscious anarchists.

15 Except for two respondents who believed that there was in any case no difference (Interview no. 25:6; interview no. 27:9). Both RS and TN used to be explicitly youth groups, therefore it is logical to assume that young people were their target group.

16 It is necessary to mention that the collapse of both groups does not mean that their former members have completely stopped their political activity. Now the majority of the former RS members are members of another




Figure 2. Approximate dynamics of "Tigra-Nigra" (Anarchist group) from the end of 1999 till 2003

Ideologies: The general strategic solution and means-ends dilemma

Since there are a lot of different interpretations of anarchism and Trotskyism it is necessary to analyze the specific versions of these ideologies held by the activists of "Tigra-Nigra" and "Robitnychi Sprotyv", particularly, their solutions to the means-ends dilemma.

"Robitnychi Sprotyv". The program of CWI-section in the CIS¹⁷ clearly states that it is based on classical Trotskyist ideological sources: "documents of the first four Congresses of the Third International (Comintern), the founding Congress of the Fourth International"¹⁸ and also on specific theoretical documents of the CWI ("Prohrama sektsii SND Komitetu za Robochyi Internatsional"). The most widespread personal political identity of the interviewed activists of RS was "Marxist" or "revolutionary Marxist".

The ultimate goal of the organization is, of course, communism, the "creation of conditions for free realization of potential, creative potential, for development of each person" (Interview no.11: 15). It is necessary to mention that the former actual leaders of "Robitnychi Sprotyv" used the terms "anarchy",

organization "Liva Initsiatyva" ("The Leftist Initiative"), orienting on the very broad left-radical ideological platform. Having existed only for two years it became twice as large as RS was in 2003. The similar situation is with TN. The group did not stop political activity; now it has even more participants (however, it is all the same much smaller than "The Leftist Initiative") but it is no anarchist anymore and it does not call itself "Tigra-Nigra" (as respondent no. 24 mentioned in his comments to the draft of this article).

17 There was no independent national Ukrainian section in CWI; it was considered a branch of CIS-section.

18 Called by Alexander "the 'sacred texts' of the movement" (1991: 26).

“self-government”, and “communism” interchangeably, (Interview no. 2:19; interview no. 8:2); presumably following Lenin’s insistence that the stateless society is the common aim of both Marxists and anarchists (Lenin 1975: 353). However, the Trotskyists interviewed unambiguously rejected prefigurative politics as a method of social change. They conceived it as non-realistic, simply “utopian”:

I mean, we live integrated into the surrounding reality with economic relationships, and to some extent it has an effect on relationships in the organization, its activity, functioning. This effect is harmful for some things, but for other things, I think, we need to borrow some elements, for example organization of ... some campaigns, marketing tactics... God knows! I think we do not totally reject the surrounding reality, not at all (Interview no. 11:16).

This approach reflects an instrumentally rational solution of the means-ends dilemma. An organization has to be an adequate tool to destroy the System: “...if the repressive bourgeois system fights with you, then you must fight fire with fire... They have a repressive apparatus; therefore, you must have a repressive apparatus too” (Interview no. 2:21).

The existence of “the elements of the future society” inside the organization is dependent on the current situation of the struggle with the system:

It is clear that there should be some democratic forms that gradually are developing into full self-government. But at the same time the organization should not be completely chaotic and anarchic because the anarchic structure is responsive to the communist society, where party is necessary. When it is a communist organization, it is obvious that it should be minimally vertical and maximally horizontal. But under the conditions of confrontation with the capitalist system, which is strictly hierarchical and totalitarian, then the organization should have the vertical elements together with horizontal ones (Interview no. 29:14-15).

Thus we have a step-by-step strategy of radical social change: building the revolutionary organization, capturing state power, radical transformation of the relations of production, and suppression of the resisting remnants of the old society, developing the elements of self-government and the building of communism. The transition to the next step can be done only after success at the previous stage. Therefore, on the each step one particular task and activity have the highest priority; other tasks and activities are secondary ones. One can see a clear-cut hierarchy of the means and ends.

“Tigra-Nigra” did not orient to some clearly defined ideological sources. Moreover, none of the younger activists whom I interviewed (No. 19, 22, 24, 26, 27) have ever managed to read a classic anarchist writer, though some of them tried to begin reading Kropotkin. Nevertheless, most of them identified themselves as anarchists and they shared certain basic ideological principles of the group, which were formed during the personal communication with older anarchist activists (Interview no. 24:5) and also from group seminars and discussions (Interview no. 22:6).

The short description of “Tigra-Nigra” on the web site states, “the main and the most global goal of the group is libertarian development of the society through libertarian development of personality” (“Ob initiative”). The libertarian development of personality means not only individual self-improvement, but also, what is no less important, rebuilding of social relations in which the individual is involved in the principles of self-organization, mutual help, consensus decision-making, the absence of hierarchy (Ibid; Interview no. 22:6).

The ideology of the group clearly equates the means of social change with its goals. Anarchism is first of all “a way of life”, alternative to the ways dominant in the System.¹⁹ This means that prefigurative politics is the only possible way to change the System; it is necessary to create a new alternative society parallel to the System: the network of “autonomous communities” (Interview no. 19:5) or “free

¹⁹ “Because every activity that at least somehow is similar to the activities of the System is the part of the System” (Interview no. 21:5).

informational zones” (Interview no. 20:4). It is implied that if the new way of life is evidently better than the dominant one, other people will see this and will understand the difference, and subsequently will be trying to realize the same principles themselves. Anarchists can consciously help social change by disseminating “these ideas” (however, in an unobtrusive way, and not via propaganda) (Interview no. 22:5; interview no. 24:3; interview no. 32:3).

Actually, the elements of better social relations are already intertwined with the elements of the System in the society. For example, each person is involved both in the dominant economy of private capital and in the “anarchist economy” based on gifts and on informal social networks (“Eto to kak vygliadit demokratiia?”).

However, here lies the problem: anarchism may become just “a way of life”, the attempt to live as a “good” and “happy” person inside the current System.

These are some autonomous territories where you feel well and comfortable when you feel cooperation when you can unite with your friends and to make something... Probably from the outside it does not seem to be anarchism, but just pleasant, comfortable conditions for life. For me these make some sense (Interview no. 19:6).

It is implied that political activity must be only spontaneous and enthusiastic; otherwise, it does not make any sense. The motives “it was interesting” or “it became boring” in the explanation of starting or stopping some activities were often mentioned in the interviews. Moreover, this emphasis on spontaneity is the result of the radical identification of means with ends. From this point of view it is completely logical that if you strive for the better society, in which your personal life will be easier and more pleasurable, then psychologically comfortable life becomes a way of social change in itself. Thus, on the one hand, enjoying your life is “political”; on the other hand, political activity driven by the feeling of obligation (“I must”) and not by the spontaneous deep desire (“I want”) is senseless (“Vasha politika skuchna!”).

Nevertheless, only one activist from “Tigra-Nigra” pointed out that anarchy is not the future form of society, but merely a way of living within contemporary society (Interview no. 21:9). Others reported the belief in the necessity of dissemination of their ideas and the change on the mass level, not only on the level of small groups. However, as I will show below, the emphasis on spontaneity and refusal to use “systemic” means was one of the causes of the relatively lower outcomes of resource mobilization of the anarchist group.

Dynamics of group membership

I will analyze strategies and mechanisms of new members’ recruitment to the Trotskyist group, and simultaneously will explain why the anarchist group did not use those methods, or why they had not been useful in its case.

The main Trotskyist method of recruitment of new members was obtrusive persuasion combined with invitations to RS events and to involvement in its activities. The main goal was not so much ideological conversion as persuasion to become a formal member of the organization. Quantitative growth was considered as one of the most important tasks if not the most important for the current stage of the development of the organization (Interview no. 8:4; interview no. 6:7). “We seriously worked on each person who somehow caught our sight. The person was included into the list of ‘contacters’, we established responsible comrades: who is for persuasion, who is for integration... I mean, we drove him to such a stage where he even dreamt of the RS...” (Interview no. 2:11). Each opportunity for communication and interaction could be used for this. The activists intensively used the social networks in which they were involved in the process of earning money and spending leisure-time. New members of RS could be acquaintances from a theatrical school or students of activists teaching in universities. In addition, from 1994 until 2002 RS used traditional Trotskyist tactics of “entryism” in different established

mass parliamentary left-wing political parties and in their youth offspring organizations. They looked there for disappointed activists not agreeing with, for example, “reformism” or “opportunism” of the leadership of those parties, and who potentially could have the desire to join a more radical organization.

Despite the fact that anarchists recognized the necessity of the dissemination of their ideas for social change on the mass level, they did not agitate for affiliation at all. An obtrusive persuasion (like Trotskyism) would violate the authenticity of the anarchist identity that was articulated in the context of ideology, in which prefigurative politics is the general strategic solution. Imposition of their own point of view was unacceptable for anarchists. An old disappointed anarchist activist reconstructed this logic in the following way:

If we actively press into an ordinary person some slogans, then we are not different from fascists, who do the same thing, or from bourgeois mass-media, which do the same thing, advertisements and so on. Our task is to awaken the consciousness of the person, shift her mind, to make her to look at this world and feel terrified. But in no way we can impose her our ideals (Interview no. 13:4).

This does not mean that anarchists did not produce anything oriented to the masses. However, their activity had the aim of achieving soft changes in the minds of people (at least they believed so) with, for example, sticker “campaigns” in the metro on some actual issues or replacing commercial advertisements with papers carrying the reinterpretation of some hot news topic.

Combined with obtrusive persuasion to join the organization, Trotskyists also used the mechanism of social-psychological integration of potential activists with the RS group. They actively invited their “contacters” to participate in their events (for example, in their internal meetings, street actions or public discussions) and to involve in the current activity of the organization (for example, writing an article). First of all, participation and involvement created opportunities for political discussions and persuasion (Interview no. 1:1). Further, a “contacter” might have become interested in a particular activity (Interview no. 11:2; interview no. 16:1) or in cooperation with certain people, or might have established friendly relationships with them. Thus a person may have become an actual activist and comrade of RS before becoming a formal member, and formalization of the status was frequently only a matter of time.

Obviously, the result of this mechanism of integration was directly dependent on the intensity of activity, on the frequency of events that provided occasions to invite potential activists. Generally, between 2000 and 2003 RS was much more active as a political group than TN, if one measures activity by the quantity of street actions, the frequency of political discussions, internal seminars, video-clubs, and publishing printing materials. Moreover, the activity of TN was decreasing with time, while activity of RS was increasing. It was only in June 2003 that TN came to exceed RS in Internet activity (and only in Internet activity) maintaining www.zaraz.org portal, while RS web sites were updated very rarely²⁰.

Trotskyists approached public activity as a very important component of the strategy of party building. It was done not only with the aim of dissemination of ideas but also “in order to attract new people and integrate older ones” (Interview no. 4: 7). Each public event ended with collecting contact phone numbers or e-mail addresses by RS activists from the maximal number of new participants. Later those new “contacters” received invitations to subsequent events. Another aim of public activity was attracting attention of mass media and promoting the brand of “Robitnychi Sprotyv” (Interview no. 8: 4-5). This strategic approach to public activity directly influenced its intensity: if public activity was absent or on a very low level, it would make senseless the entire existence of the organization: from a Marxist point of view just enjoying your life in a small community will not advance the world revolution.

On the contrary, for anarchists public activity was spontaneous and not strategic. Street actions, for example, could be made “just to shout ... that there are people who think differently. We are trying to make them interesting for us and they are oriented on media” (Interview no. 24:6). But their orientation on media had nothing to do with the promotion of the brand of the organization by Trotskyists. As the

²⁰ Data on activity retrieved from analysis of messages from web-sites, mail-lists, documents and interviews.

same activist explained, “I have my own theory for this case. I don’t like advertisements very much and support anti-branding. I mean, the constant use of one and the same name may be effective, but it is branding. You develop it yourself” (p. 2, added emphasis).

The second important moment is that street action must be interesting at least for organizers themselves, other things are secondary. Here is the description of the May-Day picnic in 2003:

For 4 hours we were dancing, distributing leaflets, entertaining people passing by with anarchist cookies, drinking lemonade, flying a kite, reading our poems, selling (for the cost price, without profit) CDs... *We* agitated minimally – though, maybe we should have agitated more, but, we wanted to leave a pleasant unstrained first impression of us as people (as for political essence they could get the information from the leaflet), and, second, we made the action first of all for ourselves... It was a party after all! (“Otchet [pervomaiskii piknik ‘03]”, added emphasis).

At the beginning of the leaflet the anarchist roots of the holiday were explained, as was anarchism itself, and the question “what is to be done?” was asked. The answer: “Actually, you can try even now. I try to lessen the control of money and power over my life. To expand the space of human solidarity. Less to buy, more to gift. Less ingratiation of yourself to your boss, more support for your colleagues. Less TV watching, more communication with friends...” (“Tekst listovki [pervomaiskii piknik ‘03]”).

From the point of view of prefigurative politics “anarchist” changes in behavior are really more important than formally joining an anarchist group. However, this does not mean that anarchists consciously did not want to attract new people at all. Interviewed activists recognized the problem that the group needs “fresh blood” and even recognized that public seminars and discussions could be used as events where to invite new people (Interview no. 22:6; interview no. 24:8; interview no. 26:10). Although even earlier “seminars were done more for the internal dynamics, for ourselves” (Interview no. 21:2). In 2002 they lost the apartment used as an “office”, much of their activity had gradually stopped, “and many people left the club when we stopped organizing public seminars” (Interview no. 22:9).

The problem of a spontaneous, expressive approach is that it is too vulnerable to random factors and the changing interests of activists. The TN’s interpretation of anarchism ascribed a political meaning to a prefigurative community of close friends, and did not demand anything more from activists. The reduction of public activity naturally led to the decrease in the number of newcomers that were not replacing the older activists leaving because of the change in interest or for personal reasons. Further, the group dynamics, the development of friendly relationships caused an “internal” orientation towards activists to prevail over an “external” orientation towards the rest of society. “We already have a group that is enough for communication, and it does not demand more people, I mean, people so close to us.” (Interview no. 24:2). Anarchists did not feel expansion as a necessity. “From a theoretical point of view it would be good if it was a mass movement”, but “new people could enter only when they wanted to, because nobody paid attention to them” (Ibid).

At the same time Trotskists considered “tusovka”²¹ as a problem. They also had an “office” where several activists lived permanently. In the course of time it had grown into a community of friends. On the one hand, it attracted some people close to the “subculture” or “psychology” of this community but, on the other hand, it pushed off people from other “subcultures” despite the fact that they might share ideological views of the group (Interview no. 2:11). However, as is the case with high intensity activity, maintaining the authenticity of Marxist identity as articulated in the context of an instrumentally rational solution to the means-ends dilemma demanded from RS activists that they build mass organization on the principles of shared political ideas and independently of personal sympathies and antipathies.

²¹ Russian colloquialism for a group of people often spending leisure-time together, a group of friends.

Mobilization of Material Resources

In the last section I will analyze the most important strategies of material resource mobilization (mainly financial) and explain the ways in which they were caused by the solutions to the means-ends dilemma in the ideologies of Trotskyism and anarchism.

“Robitnychi Sprotyv”. Despite the fact that RS had several sources of finance mobilization (including membership fees, newspaper selling, direct sponsorship from CWI²², resources of those parties and organizations where they used “entryist” tactics), the largest part of the group’s budget came from the so-called “International Department” (“Mezhdunarodnyi otdel” (MO)) (Interview no. 2:6). The essential task of MO was to simulate the existence and activity of Ukrainian branches of different small leftist international organizations using intensive Internet communication, gathering virtual groups for western “emissaries” and participating in international meetings of some tendencies for which Ukrainians simulated desire to join them. Afterwards, they invented various public actions and other activity about which MO reported via Internet. When organizations became part of this network, RS started to receive financial aid (mostly in the same forms as it got from CWI) that was completely used by RS for CWI branch development (“Otchet komissii KRI o deiatelnosti t.n. «Mezhdunarodnogo otdela» v sostave Kievskoi gorodskoi organizatsii”, p.2). Therefore, financial mobilization by “Robitnychi Sprotyv” had an explicitly strategic character, aiming to create the material base for expansionist party building. The activity of MO structurally resembled more the work within a commercial firm or bureaucratic organization (with “perfect organizational structure”, a “high level of discipline”, “quite good financial reporting” (Interview no. 6:4)) than it did working within social movements.

It is impossible to understand the choice of this manner of strategic financing without taking into consideration the structure of networks of Trotskyist ideology. The logic of party building led to the necessity of establishing regional branches of the group that presupposed the existence of permanent office, stable Internet connection, regular party meetings, and All-Ukrainian conferences, etc. (Interview no. 8:7). Almost every Trotskyist whom I asked about possible ways of fund-raising for a revolutionary party said that there was no other way except for cheating somebody (with certain reservations such as not cheating leftists, or in another way, or not in such scale, or with better conspiracy etc.) or did not see any way of financial mobilization at all. Only one person said that it was possible to build a party solely on membership fees (Interview no. 6).

Receiving money from any Ukrainian organization or private person could lead to loss of independence (Interview no. 31:2); this is why small (and relatively rich because of the difference in life standards between the First world and Ukraine) Western organizations were more attractive for strategic cheating. MO tried to work with other organizations but they had success only with Trotskyists; this was explained by the lack of knowledge and skills needed to cheat other tendencies²³. Furthermore, the instrumentally rational solution of the means-ends dilemma took away any “moral obstacles” for such activity. After the start of MO projects the leaders began to recommend the reading of Trotsky’s article “Their morals and ours” (1936) where he argued for the class character of any morality and rejected any appeal to “eternal values” as “bourgeois moralizing”. The high level of sectarianism among Trotskyist

²² Wages for two activists for organization building and coverage of costs for travel to international CWI conferences.

²³ “The work was rather delicate, and they were those organizations that we understood, understood the logic of their actions, understood how to work with them... With any other organizations we had to work blindly. Even if we had had a success, we would have reached it significantly later. Thus, I would say, it was for the reasons of efficiency” (Interview no. 8:7).

organizations²⁴ (who consider other leftist tendencies rather as enemies than as allies) created preconditions for the use of the same methods as against “bourgeois forces” (Interview no. 2:4)²⁵.

“Tigra-Nigra”. The main source for projects of “Tigra-Nigra” was activists’ own money (Interview no. 19:11). They did not try to collect money on a regular basis as Trotskyists did, but as it was required by a specific project or action (Interview no. 20:11), and this completely corresponded to the spontaneous character of their activity. Activists could cover no more than \$200; more expensive projects faced a lack of money (Ibid: 12). This problem was partially solved with economically used grants received for the social projects of the club.

Can this manner of operation be compared with Trotskyist MO-technology? From the theoretical standpoint of the “cultural tool-kit” (Swidler 1986) the cases are not fundamentally different. Anarchists had experience in social work, so it was easier for them to receive grants and then use them for their own purposes; just like the Trotskyists who chose the path of least resistance and worked with organizations with which it was easier for them to work. But if one is to take into account the level of motivations, one will see the difference and why it has produced the different outcomes in resource mobilization. For anarchists social work had the same priority as political projects: “Not only some ideological work, swinging flags and throwing stones at McDonald’s, but real, immediate change ... You want change in the society? Here is the society, take it and change it” (Interview no. 26:5). Social projects were not virtual ones, and the main parts of grants were spent directly on them (Interview no. 32:7). To continue the comparison with MO, when the club received a proposal to get money from the World Bank, they refused the offer “because of ideological reasons”: “Because the World Bank favors this, this, and this, this, this, and this. It turns out that everything we fight for, I mean, the World Bank crosses out. And so this money was not taken...” (Interview no. 24: 14). This argumentation radically differs from that of the Trotskyist. The value-rational solution of the means-ends dilemma rejects any possibility of adaptation to the structure of interest in the System and tactical cooperation with ideologically unsympathetic forces.

Moreover, the spontaneous character of the activity did not push the anarchists to receive money even from ideologically acceptable sources. For example, the antiglobalist network “No Borders” proposed to choose one of them as a “full-timer”, who was to receive \$200 as permanent wage. They refused this offer,

...because if you take money, its means that you have to undertake obligations. Moreover, they are good people. You assume obligations to good people. Thus, you must fulfill them. We did not find anyone of us who was ready to commit herself on a regular basis to No Borders. (Interview no. 24: 11, added emphasis).

This attitude is completely opposite to the “professional”, strategic one of the Trotskyists towards financing. The latter allowed realizing MO technology, which sometimes demanded exhaustive work (“Obraschenie k Kievskoi konferentsii KRI 18-19 oktiabria 2003 goda”) and was constantly accompanied by psychological tension because of the risk of being exposed.

²⁴ The list on the “Leftist Parties of the World” web-page contains 36 Internationals identifying themselves with Trotskyism (retrieved on April 4, 2004 – <http://www.broadleft.org/trotskyi.htm>).

²⁵ Financial mobilization through MO had very important negative consequences for the work of the Kiev organization. The high level of conspiracy (full information about all international projects had only several persons in RS (Interview no. 25:4)) led to the development of distrust and personal aversion between activists. Spending energy and time of activists on virtual projects caused the reduction of the amount of real political activity of RS as the section of CWI (Interview no. 6: 10). The growing discontent with MO activity increased tensions between internal groupings inside the organization and caused the split of RS when information about cheating leaked out to the West, triggering a huge scandal among the leftist public and dissolution of Kiev group by CWI. A majority of the group dissatisfied with “betrayal” left RS.

Conclusions

An empirical examination of the left-radical groups in Kiev has demonstrated the limitations of the approaches to ideology that consider it either as an irrational obstacle for “pragmatic behavior”, or as a “cultural toolkit” disregarding the deep motivations and content of ideological systems. I have shown that the opposed solutions of the dilemma of the means and ends of social change in the ideologies of the Trotskyist and anarchist groups in Kiev were causally related to their different outcomes in membership numbers and in the amount of material resources mobilized. There were two specific mechanisms through which ideologies caused such outcomes in the groups:

1) The instrumentally rational solution opened opportunities that contradicted the vision of the future social order as radically different from the current one. Particularly, it allowed for Trotskyists' intensive exploitation of the political and non-political networks, co-optation and cheating of other organizations relatively independently of their ideological orientations. Generally speaking, it allowed them to survive within the System using its own methods. For the anarchists orienting to the value-rational solution, these ways were closed because of rejection of those methods of change of the system that were the system's own rules of the game, and giving the prior political meaning to the activity that was transcending the System, i.e. to the construction of the new society here and now.

2) The value-rational solution demands the spontaneous, expressive nature of political activity, while the instrumentally rational solution requires the “professional”, strategic one. If the first mechanism justified for Trotskyists a wider range of potential methods of mobilization than for anarchists, the second mechanism justified for anarchists the disuse of even those methods that were compatible with the vision of anarchist society. Particularly, there was nothing wrong with the reduction of public political activities. Combined with the factor of group dynamics it had gradually led to the transformation of “Tigra Nigra” / the club of socially active youth into a closed group of friends. From the point of view of Trotskyists such transformation is extremely undesirable and in the result removes any political reason for the existence of such a group.

With regard to the general mechanism of the influence of the ideological network of the interrelated solutions of the means-ends dilemma, general strategic and tactical solutions for strategic activity and for resource mobilization of the activists was the mechanism of identity articulation and of the maintaining of its authenticity, as described in theoretical section of the article. Activity that contradicted the ultimate values of the future society of freedom, equality and solidarity had no political sense and its exercise was violating for the anarchist identity articulated in the context of value-rational solution and prefigurative politics. In contrast, reduction of the political group to a close group of friends violated the authenticity of Marxist identity that was articulated within the context of the instrumentally rational solution and party building.

I have also shown that the difference in the objective situation cannot explain different outcomes of resource mobilization. Trotskyists did not suffer repressions from the state but the repression of anarchists in 1998 cannot explain the negative dynamics of membership since 2001 was long after the repression had ended. The evidence from public opinion shows that the situation was even more favorable for anarchists than for Trotskyists.

In the end I want to point out some limitations of my analysis and perspectives for future research. First of all, there is the question of the possibility of the generalization of these conclusions. I suppose that processes I have described here will be the most evident in the case of radical movements struggling inside “hostile” environments. The more desirable society differs from the existing one, and the fewer opportunities are open for radical activity, the more there will be results from strategic flexibility and professional organization of political activity. In Ukraine these unfavorable conditions for the leftist movement were decreasing living standards of the population, which could influence the amount of resources spent on leisure-time associations (McCarthy and Zald 1977: 1224), the relatively low level of political activity of the population (Howard 2002) (at least until the “orange revolution” in 2004), and the

discredit of socialist rhetoric. It is possible that under different structural circumstances outcomes of instrumentally rational and value-rational politics would be different.

Therefore, my goal was not to “blame” prefigurative politics and in some way “condemn” it as “ineffective”. I deliberately avoided using such terms as “success”, and wrote only about outcomes, since Trotskyists and anarchists understand “success” differently. For Trotskyists the quantitative growth of the organization is the necessary stage on the way to the revolutionary party; for anarchists it does not make sense without qualitative change in behavioral practices. I have pointed out the tendency of prefigurative groups to close up within themselves (that within certain conditions might develop further, but within other conditions might stay latent), and to the existence of a problem, but I do not argue the complete impossibility of social transformation at the macro-level with prefigurative methods.

Comparison of the value-rational and instrumentally rational approaches to politics within different structural conditions will allow transcendence of the one-dimensional “idealistic” model, and the investigation of the mechanisms of the political socialization of activists, of formations of ideological identities and of their articulation within the context of specific symbolic networks. In other words, it will allow the placement of ideological processes within concrete social contexts and will allow us to put them into dynamic perspective.

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Interviews

The references to interviews (Interview no. [1, 2, 3...]) relate to the transcriptions of interviews conducted by the author in April-May 2004. The Appendix contains the profile of interviewees.

APPENDIX: THE PROFILE OF INTERVIEWEES

No.	Date of interview	Former involvements (from 1997)	Current involvement ^a	Sex	Age ^a	Occupation/Education ^a
1	7.04.04	RS	RS	Male	29	Taxi dispatcher
2	7.04.04	RS	LI	Male	32	Lecturer of law
3	8.04.04	RS	RS	Female	24	Ph.D. student of philology
4	10.04.04	RS	RS	Male	32	Student of social work
5	10.04.04	RS	RS	Female	21	Agent on purchase and sale of real estate
6	10.04.04	RS	RS	Male	29	Ph.D. student of economics, engineer
7	11.04.04	RS	LI	Male	n.a.	n.a.
8	11.04.04	RS	LI	Male	33	Tourist-agent
9	12.04.04	-	RS	Male	23	Student of programming
10	12.04.04	RS	RS	Male	21	Student of psychology
11	12.04.04	RS	RS	Male	23	Journalist
12	14.04.04	-	RS	Male	21	Student of law
13	14.04.04	TN, then RS	LI	Male	29	Archaeologist
14	15.04.04	RS	RS	Male	24	Student of archaeology
15	15.04.04	RS	UKRS	Male	23	Engineer-designer
16	17.04.04	RS	LI	Male	21	Student of law
17	17.04.04	RS	-	Male	19	Student of programming
18	18.04.04	RS	LI	Male	31	Philologist
19	18.04.04	TN	TN	Female	25	Journalist
20	18.04.04	TN	TN	Male	30	Teacher of design
21	19.04.04	TN	TN	Male	27	Freelance (?) artist
22	20.04.04	TN	TN	Male	26	Journalist

23	21.04.04	RS	-	Male	40	Political scientist
24	22.04.04	TN	TN	Male	22	Designer
25	27.04.03	RS	LI	Male	22	Newspaper editor
26	29.04.03	TN	TN	Male	23	Manager of sociological researche
27	29.04.03	TN	TN	Female	21	Student of law
28	1.05.03	TN, then RS	-	Male	n.a.	n.a.
29	26.02.03	Respondent No. 2				
30	26.02.03	Respondent No. 25				
31	12, 14.02.05	Respondent No. 2				
32	16.02.05	TN	TN	Male	31	Manager

^a – at time of interview.

Here RS means Vseukrainske marksystske obyednannia “Robitnychi Sprotyv” (All-Ukrainian Marxist Association “Workers’ Resistance”),

LI – Liva Initsiatyva (Left Initiative – split from RS, 2003),

TN – Anarchist Initiative “Tigra-Nigra”,

UKRS – Ukrainska Komunistychna Robitnycha Spilka (Ukrainian Communist Workers’ Union – split from RS, 2002)