Developing Kenya’s Educational Capacity in Nuclear Security Through Nuclear Forensics Research

Nuclear energy’s distinctive characteristics give rise to special educational requirements. These requirements are necessary to not only address the potential danger of nuclear proliferation, but also to build capacity for a secure nuclear fuel circle. In this paper, I assess the status of educational capacity in nuclear security both in response to, and in support of, Kenya’s nuclear power program. I highlight the nuclear security educational infrastructure’s key features in the context of nuclear power, noting the low capacity at Kenyan universities. I identify the steps required to ensure that the country’s dynamic nuclear regulatory infrastructural framework is used effectively to build capacity in nuclear security. I then examine the link between nuclear security and nuclear forensics and discuss efforts toward developing educational capacity in nuclear security through forensics research at the University of Nairobi, emphasizing in-field nuclear forensics and management of nuclear and radioactive materials out of statutory control. Finally, I consider the research challenges and solutions, which include developing a National Nuclear Forensic Library as a database for illicit trafficking or incidents that involve nuclear and radioactive material. I conclude that, despite the challenges, progress is underway but can be accelerated by promoting broader stakeholder involvement and government buy-in for more comprehensive educational capacity building in nuclear security.


I. Introduction
A.

i. International Agreements
Developing a nuclear security infrastructure requires considerable effort, especially for a country new to establishing a nuclear power program. In consideration of this, Kenya is a state party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2016 Amendment (CPPNM, 1979) [1]. The Convention's scope encompasses physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material in domestic use, storage, and transport. It also criminalizes theft and smuggling of nuclear material and the actual or threatened sabotage of nuclear facilities. States are required to minimize any radiological consequences of sabotage and prevent and combat related offenses. In this regard, Kenya voluntarily shares incidents involving radioactive material on IAEA's Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB). Furthermore, by 2006, Kenya had already become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism [2], the Convention on Nuclear Safety [3], the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident [4], the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management, and the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management [5]. These treaties, among other regulatory and legal provisions, whether signed or in progress, demonstrate Kenya's commitment to securely pursue peaceful uses of atomic energy, including nuclear power development.

ii. Developing Domestic Infrastructure
Following the National Economic and Social Council's (NESC) 2010 recommendation that nuclear power is the most viable option for meeting the country's energy needs while reducing carbon emissions [6], Kenya incorporated nuclear power into its energy blueprint. Consequently, a nuclear energy programme implementing organization (NEPIO), now the Kenya Nuclear Electricity Board (KNEB), was established. KNEB's plans adhere to the IAEA Milestone approach and are currently in Phase 1 [7].
In the context of nuclear security, Kenya has established-via the radiation safety and protection regulatory agency (the Radiation Protection Board [RPB])-the national Nuclear Security Coordination Centre (NSCC), which brings together eighteen state stakeholders in nuclear energy. NSCC's overall objective is to promote a high level of nuclear security training and support services. The Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) was recently finalized and provides a regular summary of the country's activities toward enhancing nuclear security.

B. Nuclear Security and Nuclear Power
Although a country could establish some degree of nuclear security knowledge without a nuclear power program-for example, by promoting international non-proliferation comprehensive nuclear security education expertise, which enables a country to more holistically manage all nuclear security issuesnuclear security expertise is best developed in the context of a nuclear power program. Approximately fifty countries have attempted to develop nuclear power, but the only ones that succeeded had some degree of expertise in nuclear security and were already engaged in building a reactor. [11] that its nuclear power program accelerated. An effective national nuclear security infrastructure ensures that nuclear and radioactive materials do not fall into the hands of parties who could use them for criminal or terrorist acts and prevents acts of sabotage against facilities and associated activities, even when in transit [12]. In order to ensure such security, educational capacity in nuclear security must be an essential part of a nuclear power program [13]. This paper assesses Kenya's status and development of educational capacity in nuclear security, with focus on demonstrating how it is both responding poorly to the country's new nuclear power program, while simultaneously providing the impetus for, among other similar stakeholder activities, the University of Nairobi to remedy the situation.

A. Nuclear Security Training
In 2009, the IAEA recognized the need to establish and develop human resources for nuclear security in member states. Overseeing capacity building and human resource development to support the nuclear power program roadmap is among KNEB's mandates [14]. In collaboration with the IAEA, Kenya has hosted national and regional nuclear security training courses for border and other security personnel to improve illicitly-trafficked radioactive and nuclear material detection capability. IAEA has provided radiation-detection equipment support toward this initiative. In the context of IAEA's Emergency Preparedness and Review Mission to the country in 2015 [15], Kenya developed a National Nuclear and Radiological Emergency Preparedness and Response Action Plan.
In terms of domestic capacity building in nuclear security, these efforts translate merely to basic skills in responding to nuclear and radiological emergencies. Nuclear security is a much broader discipline that relates to the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal transfer, or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances, and their associated facilities [12]. In this context, the alarmingly scant educational capacity in nuclear security at Kenyan universities is easily noticeable.

B. Nuclear Security Education
None of Kenya's thirty-one universities with public charter currently have a nuclear security educational program. Before the advent of the country's nuclear power program, only Kenyatta University and the University of Nairobi (the country's oldest and largest university) had graduate programs in Applied Nuclear and Radiation Physics [16]. These graduate programs build on the normal, basic undergraduate Atomic and Nuclear Physics courses, and none offer Nuclear Chemistry or Radiochemistry. The University of Nairobi's Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology's 1979 mandate to train human resources in the multidisciplinary applications of nuclear science techniques is limited and, nearly forty years later, produces only a handful of graduate students (about five every year since its inception). No Kenyan university has a program in nuclear engineering. Furthermore, nuclear energy topics are noticeably absent in Law, Engineering, Economics, and other related courses. Considering the interdisciplinary characteristics of nuclear security, this narrowness contributes significantly to Kenya's educational capacity building problems. emphasizes the importance of considering existing capacities at international, regional, and national levels when designing nuclear security academic programs. As the responsibility of nuclear security rests wholly within each state, member states need educational infrastructure development strategies. This is best accomplished through a friendly partnership among university, industry, and government organizations that recognize the interdisciplinarity of nuclear energy. The goal of this collaboration should be to create, develop, and promote career pathways by adapting the existing programs to nuclear security needs. For this purpose, gap analysis and needs assessment are crucial. This study employs these methods to bridge the gap in a twofold way: (i) by pursuing generic capacity building in nuclear sciences to support government organizations in making knowledgeable nuclear power-related decisions; and (ii) by developing technical nuclear forensics professionals to help implement nuclear security.

i. Nuclear Forensics in Support of Nuclear Security
Nuclear forensics is the examination of nuclear or other radioactive materials, or of evidence that is contaminated with radionuclides, in the context of legal proceedings. Nuclear forensics can be utilized not only for a post-event investigation, but also for prevention of nuclear security events. For example, nuclear forensics can help identify previously unknown nuclear security gaps at both the facilities level and the state level, thus pointing out the existence of unaddressed deficiencies in materials accounting, control, and physical protection as well as highlighting the existent needs to improve a country's nuclear security regime [18]. In the case of an explosion, nuclear forensics can reconstruct key features of the nuclear device and can help identify its origins. Through rapid characterization of nuclear materials, nuclear forensics is thus a deterrent in itself against nuclear security threats, such as illicit trafficking and danger of terrorism utilizing improvised nuclear devices and/or radiological dispersal devices.
For these reasons, nuclear forensics is an essential component of the IAEA nuclear security program, in direct relation to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) [1]. Such essentiality is due to nuclear forensics' role in enabling cooperation and assistance in the event, or credible threat, of theft, robbery, or any other unlawful taking of nuclear material. Its involvement is geared toward the recovery of unlawfully taken nuclear material, the prosecution or extradition of alleged offenders, and the provision of assistance by member states in connection with criminal proceedings. CPPNM's scope extends to nuclear facilities and material in domestic use, storage, and transport. As such, nuclear forensics plays a role in the expanded cooperation among states, enabling rapid measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of sabotage, and prevent and combat related offenses. Nuclear forensics also contributes to the Convention by assisting in the establishment of new nuclear smuggling, illicit trafficking, and sabotage offenses, as well as acts directly contributing to the commission of such offenses. These contributions are in line with the UN Security Council resolution 1373 and 1540 adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in 2004 [19] and as such, states are obligated to adopt and enforce these measures and offenses.

III. Toward Nuclear Security Education at the University of Nairobi
Presently, Kenya's highest priority is developing measures to detect, deter, prevent, and combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and related (i.e., radioactive and radiological) materials.

A. New Course Structure
The new program, targeting young graduates from engineering and natural sciences backgrounds, is composed of ten courses in year one, instead of the previous eight. In the first semester, Advanced Nuclear Physics is retained (but appropriately revised) and is taken along with another four fundamental courses, one of which is required to be Reactor Theory. During the second semester of year one, students in the Nuclear Security and Safeguards track will take PHY-2, PHY-3, and PHY-7 plus any other two courses (following guidance) from the list below. The thesis research pursued in the second year will focus on the student's track, but emphasize our current research strengths: (i) Nuclear forensics and attribution methodologies in support of nuclear security (ii) Analysis and modeling of nuclear traces and dynamics in complex ecosystems (iii) Size-resolved radiogenic characterization of atmospheric aerosols and hot particles The above courses are also intended to enrich our recently developed undergraduate-level Nuclear, Radiation & Health Physics track, where we have tailored experiments focusing on modern microscopy, fundamentals of image formation with applications in nuclear sciences, detector electronics and digital signal and image processing. Furthermore, our course development recently assisted the University of Nairobi's School of Medicine in starting their MSc Forensic Science program. We suggested and developed two 20-hour course modules in their new curriculum, namely Elements of Nuclear Security and Nuclear Forensic Radioanalytics.
Ideally, the new program will both motivate and prepare students for careers in nuclear security. The new course recognizes the interdisciplinary dimensions of nuclear security and adapts the existing program to the emerging needs of the nuclear power program. The promotion of safeguards, safety, and a security culture are integral to the program. However, challenges continue to exist in designing a proper curriculum and identifying appropriate teaching and assessment methods to promote student learning in this exciting area [26]. Examples of the challenges include a lack of qualified staff to sustain a graduate program which can be accredited and which favorably benchmarks with similar programs in nuclear security elsewhere; the narrowed breadth of the program to fit into our nascent research line in nuclear forensics; and the initial restriction of the program to mostly physics (and related) graduate students, given the interdisciplinary character of nuclear security. However, these challenges are expected to reduce as the program matures and generates enough graduates versed in nuclear security to become faculty, and as research capacity in nuclear security expands beyond nuclear forensics. Furthermore, the gradual maturing of Kenya's nuclear power program will compel infrastructural development in nuclear security, thus providing a partner, as well as stakeholder, to our educational efforts.

B. Nuclear Forensics as a Nuclear Security Education Tool
The Nuclear Security and Safeguards track is strongly supported by a relatively new research line in nuclear forensics. We consider nuclear forensics research as a means to both foster scientific innovation in nuclear security and to support non-proliferation by enabling the identification of high-confidence nuclear forensic signatures. The research aims to support the nuclear security infrastructure necessary for the country's safe handling of nuclear materials and to promote its nuclear power program. Building a nuclear forensics workforce requires a scientific education primarily in physics or chemistry with specialization in radiochemistry, health physics, nuclear physics, etc., followed by hands-on experience working with nuclear material and analytical techniques. Our research group is composed of three faculty, one PhD student, and five MSc students from various backgrounds (physics, chemistry, and nuclear science).
Nuclear forensics-normally pursued to support criminal investigation of illegal use, transfer, or disposal of nuclear and radioactive materials-probes the relationship between the materials' origin and intended use [27]. Thus, nuclear forensics is a useful tool in the nuclear fuel cycle. The nuclear forensic signatures of interest include isotopic (U, Pu, Th, Co, O, Pb, Sr, Nd, S) chemical (compound, rare-earth element patterns, trace metal, ionic) impurities as well as microstructural information on the materials. As materials move through the nuclear fuel cycle, these nuclear forensic signatures are created, modified, and destroyed; therefore, each step provides information that can be used to constrain the source [28]. In our research, we emphasize the science behind the detection and attribution of the materials. As trace evidence and microanalysis are ubiquitous in nuclear forensics, we have developed multimodal, machinelearning-enabled nuclear forensic analytical and imaging spectrometry methodologies for this purpose, utilizing chemical (metal, molecular), isotopic, and structural signatures of the analyzed nuclear and radioactive materials to support national nuclear security concerns.
Advances in photonics, especially in optics and imaging spectrometry that enable material analysis at microscale resolution, enable the development of such rapid nuclear forensic analysis methods. As a result of the nuclear renaissance, nuclear proliferation is a growing danger that is further complicated by possibilities of terrorism through the utilization of improvised nuclear devices and/or radiological dispersal devices. Such risk places a critical challenge on the existing nuclear forensics analysis methods, which are usually radiochemical or radiometric and costly, to cope with tasks that demand rapid, direct, and minimally invasive characterization of nuclear and radioactive materials, especially if they are of limited size and/or concealed. This underscores the need to develop new methods and improve on the existing ones, for nuclear materials and post-detonation debris analysis. Analytical capability for microsize samples is an especially powerful tool for monitoring undeclared nuclear activity, verifying nuclear safeguards, responding to nuclear anthropogenic releases, and analyzing materials from radiological crime scenes. For these purposes, we employ X-ray fluorescence spectroscopy, laser-scanning microscopy, laser Raman microspectrometry, and laser-induced breakdown/ablation molecular isotopic spectroscopy (LIBS/LAMIS) [29-31].
While the advantage of combining the above techniques is clear, the interpretive challenges of highdimensional data [32] complicate the identity and distribution of nuclear forensic signatures. Incorporating machine learning broadens the techniques' applicability by enabling mining (management, analysis, and visualization of large data sets) and extraction of useful information embedded in the spectra as well as images that are acquired from the instruments while providing greater versatility. For instance, genetic algorithms hybridize deductive models and evolve predictive rules applicable to nuclear forensics attribution, revealing unexpected information. Machine learning further enables amplified analytical sensitivity. The major advantage of machine learning is its ability to represent multivariate data into few dimensions in a graphical interface [33,34], allowing us to use data fusion to derive robust forensic attributions. Our research results are the first systematic nuclear forensics data in the country and will help guide the development of a national nuclear forensic library (NNFL). An NNFL is an essential facility for any country with a nuclear power program and, in Kenya, will bolster response capability to nuclear security events through a broad spectrum of signatures and methods that contribute to nuclear non-proliferation.

C. Leveraging International Partnerships
Forging international links is key to creating a global, nuclear-secure regime.

IV. Conclusion and Prospects
This paper has assessed the status of education capacity in nuclear security both in response to, and in support of, Kenya's nuclear power program. The nuclear security educational infrastructure's key features have been highlighted in the context of nuclear power. The low levels of nuclear security educational capacity at Kenyan universities have been recognized and appropriate strategies identified for remedying the situation, namely the current effort at the University of Nairobi toward developing educational capacity in nuclear security and research in nuclear forensics. The link between nuclear forensics and nuclear security has been examined in detail. It has been argued that the multimodal photonic microanalytical approach to nuclear forensics research is enabling the identification of a comprehensive combination of nuclear forensic signatures to manage nuclear materials out of statutory control. However, more rapid progress will require stronger involvement of stakeholder networks extending to all sectors of the nuclear fuel cycle. I propose a National Working Group on Education and Knowledge Management in Nuclear Security in Kenya to identify a course of action and the steps required to ensure effective use of the country's infrastructure for nuclear security education. In this regard, the Kenya Nuclear Electricity Board should serve as a think tank to bring all stakeholders together to discuss the plans. KNEB is the promoter of the country's nuclear power program and therefore it must fulfill its role in increasing and sustaining political buy-in and government investment in nuclear security initiatives. This will improve national capacity to build a nuclear power plant earlier than projected.