To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Nasser Hadian-Jazy entitled "Skocpol's Theory and Islamic Revolution of Iran". I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

Joseph W. Dodd

Joseph Dodd, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:

Vice Provost
and Dean of The Graduate School

SKOCOPOL'S THEORY AND ISLAMIC REVOLUTION OF IRAN

A Dissertation

Presented For The

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Nasser Hadian-Jazy

December 1990

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I believe it is a great privilege for anyone to have many good friends and relatives in times of hardship and need. I have been fortunate to have many caring relatives and friends who helped me throughout my life in general and my education in particular. It is probably one of the most difficult tasks to find appropriate words which can desirably express one's thanks and gratitude to all those who have generously extended their utmost care, love and help. It is indeed very difficult for me to find strong enough words to express my thanks to all those whom I am deeply indebted.

I owe debt of gratitude to Dr. Dodd who accepted to advise and direct my dissertation. He always helped me and other students, particularly international students academically and otherwise in pursuing our study. I am greatful to Dr. Iredell who has been very generous in devoting his precious time to me in clarifying complex issues of socio-political nature. I thank Dr. Evans for serving as a dissertation committee member. His advice and precise critiques has always been helpful in making me re-think many issues. I thank Dr. Clelland for helping me throughout my graduate study. Without him I would have undoubtedly followed a different course of study. His logical thinking, his critical reasoning and his willingness to go beyond normalities and formalities in assisting a student, are qualities which have been admired by students. I wish to thank Dr. Gorman, Dr. Peterson and Dr. Lyons for helping me sharpen my critical reasoning.

Hadi Semati has always been available in helping me to get through the difficult years of the past. I wish to thank him for his generous help. I wish to thank all of my friends in Lexington and Knoxville for their help in preparing this manuscript. Habibollah Faraji, Ali Hootkany, Mojtaba Ardestani, Mohammad Rahmati, Majid Ramazani, Alireza Mardi, Mohammad Hafizi, Saeed Hadian and Hassan Pishbin were very helpful in preparation of this manuscript. I have also been very fortunate to have friends like Yousof, Farooq, Rezwan, Zafrul, and Mohammad Al-Shakhis. They were very instrumental in shaping my understanding of other cultures.

My mother has always generously extended her help in all circumstances to me, often at the expense of her comfort. I wish to thank her not only for what she has done for me throughout my life but also the many ways that she has influenced me and many others. I wish to thank Marzieh, Qodsieh, Tahereh, and Mohsen the best sisters and brother that someone could wish. I thank my nieces, nephews and uncles as well.

My wife painstakingly edited the entire manuscript despite her busy schedule. I am indebted to my wife, Shirin Parvini, for her patience and tolerance throughout the years of my study. She was successful in being a mother, wife and student. Last, but not the least, I thank my daughter, Tahereh, whom I believe has suffered the most because of her parents' school duties. She was deprived of the warmth of her relatives in Iran, missing many fascinating moments and experiences she could have enjoyed. I am forever indebted to her and I hope she will forgive me for my shortcomings in paying to her the attention she deserved and in depriving her of many desirable childhood experiences.

To The Memory of

My Father

and

My Sister

ABSTRACT

Skocpol's theory of revolution, the main concern of which is to explain why social revolution has been the crucial vehicle of transformation in a number of societies, has been applied to the Iranian Revolution for the purpose of evaluating its generalizability and its predictive and explanatory power in order to explore further the possibility of generating a theory which can be applied universally across time and societies.

Skocpol, with a new analytical emphasis on a number of factors such as the structural approach, the potential autonomy of the state, and the international and world historical contexts, has developed a comprehensive theory of revolution. She argues that the breakdown of societal control is due to international pressures, peasants' insurrections, and the presence of a marginal elite.

The history of the formation of the modern Iranian state, the type and extent of inter- and intranational pressures, the structure of peasants' life and their relation to state and large landowners, the relevant historical background of Shia political thought, the Ulama's role in Iranian society and in oppositional movements of the last two centuries, have been reviewed in order to measure the applicability, validity, and generalizability of Skocpol's theory. The study concludes that Skocpol's theory requires a number of major modifications in the formulation of causes of state incapacitation, peasants' revolutionary movement, and the role of ideology and leadership. Her emphasis on the role of state and transnational realities was found to be, though with modification, an important contribution to the analysis of social revolutions. Finally, the study suggests that attempts should not be made to develop universal generalization because of logical-theoretical problems and the nature of social revolution, most notably its non-repetitiveness and rare occurrence.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

PREFACE

Social philosophers have spent a great deal of time and energy in an attempt to conceptualize, analyze and understand social change. What are the consequences of its occurrence? How can we measure its intensity, duration, and strengths and weaknesses? Can we know about its direction? Can we plan and make a radical social change? These and many other interesting questions have been a life time challenge to a great number of social scientists.

Aristotle, Plato, Marx, Brinton (1937), Gurr (1970), Huntington (1968), Tilly (1978), Skocpol (1979), and Johnson (1982) are among the most influential social philosophers who have wrestled with a number of such questions. All of these scholars have sought to conceptualize the most radical changes -- social revolutions -- and to account for their causes, processes, and outcomes. Since discussing in detail, and applying all the available theories of social change and social revolution is not practically possible and even desirable, the study will be selective.

Skocpol's theory of revolution the main concern of which,is explaining why social revolutions have been the crucial vehicle of transformation in a number of societies, is applied to the Iranian Revolution to evaluate its generalizability, and its predictive and explanatory power in order to discover the possibility of generating a theory which can universally be applied across time and societies. Other theories of revolution as well are briefly discussed in the first chapter of this study.

Following Walton (1984:24), an attempt is made to steer a course between the twin problems posed by two of the foremost revolutionary historians: Hobshowm(1971:39), noted that "the danger of this type of study lies in the temptation to isolate the phenomenon of overt crisis from the wider context of a society undergoing transformation," while Moore(1978:82-3) cautioned that "there is a tendency, I believe, to over-emphasize the underlying long-run social trends behind revolutionary outbreaks as well as dramatic peaceful changes, and to underestimate the importance of control over the instrument of violence -- the army and the police -- and the significance of decision taken by political leaders.

In Chapter I the literature is reviewed. The history of the term "revolution," its diverse connotations, and confusion about its conceptualization is briefly discussed. Due to the extensiveness of literature about revolution, a number of scholars have developed classificatory schemes to organize and summarize the literature. Taylor, Goldstone, Andrioli and Hopple are among such scholars, and a brief word is be said about each. Important elements of the theories of Marx, Gurr, Johnson, Huntington, and Tilly are be described.

Chapter II lays out the methodological foundation of this inquiry. Comparative and case study methods receive special attention because of their centrality in this type of study.

Chapter III briefly discusses the Moore, Wolf, and Paige peasant theories of revolution as a background for the development of Skocpol's theory. It elaborates on how Skocpol, with a new analytical emphasis on a number of previously known factors, such as the structural approach, the potential autonomy of state, and the international and world historical contexts, has developed a more comprehensive and more completed theory of revolution. Breakdown of societal control due to international pressure, peasants' insurrections, and marginal elites, which are principal ingredients of her theory, is explained as well.

In Chapter IV the history of the formation of the modern Iranian state, the crises it has confronted, the social forces it has opposed, the economic policies it has pursued, the military alliance it has built, the foreign and international security policies it has fostered,are be briefly discussed.

Chapter V elaborates on the structure of Iranian villages, tribal lives, organization of production, landownership, and the class structure of rural Iran both before and after the Land Reform. Land Reform objectives and consequences are also pointed out.

Chapter VI traces the ideological roots of the Iranian Revolution. A brief history of relevant Shia political thoughts is set forth. The Ulamas' role in society before and after the Safavid (1501-1722) dynasty, their oppositional role in the last couple of centuries; and their contribution in making the Islamic Revolution possible, is reviewed.

In the concluding chapter the strength, weakness and modifiability of Skocpol's theory is discussed. The fruitfulness of a search for a universal, falsifiable, non-tautological, non-ideological, generalizable, and causal theory of revolution, is also discussed.

CHAPTER I

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Since the dawn of history in all parts of the world social change has been a phenomenon which social philosophers have spent a great deal of time and energy to conceptualize, analyze and understand. What is social change? How does it occur? What are the sources, causes, and consequences of its occurrence? How can we measure its intensity, duration, scope and its strengths or weaknesses? Can we know about its direction? Can we plan and make a radical social change? These and many other interesting questions have been a lifetime challenge to a great number of social scientists.

Undoubtedly, revolutions have been one of the most important vehicles of social change in human history in general and in modern times in particular. The duration and extent of change may be so great as to prompt the French philosopher, de Tocqueville, to make these comments about the French Revolution:

> For sixty years we have been deceiving ourselves by imagining that we saw the end of the Revolution. It was supposed to be finished on the 18th Brumaire, and again in 1814; I myself thought in 1830, that it might be over when I saw that democracy, having in its march passed over and destroyed every other privilege had stopped before ancient and necessary privilege of property. I thought that, like the ocean, it had at last found its shore. I was wrong. It is now evident that the tide is rising, and that the sea is still enlarging its bed; that not only have not we seen the end of the stupendous revolution which began before our day, but that the infant just born will scarcely see it. Society is not a process of modification, but transformation. (de Tocqueville,1861 in Zagorin,1973: 423).

Revolutions have been the subject of numerous studies across a variety of academic disciplines not only because of the duration and magnitude of change but also because they reveal so much about social structure:

> Social conflict, ranging from riots to revolutions dramatize crucial aspects of social structure because they are here strained to the breaking point Certain important problems can not be studied at all except in and through such moments of eruption, which do not merely bring into the open so much that is normally latent, but also concentrate and magnify phenomena for the benefit of the student, while - not the least of their advantages - normally multiplying our documentation about them. (Hobsbown, p. 39).

But in spite of the considerable scholarly attention given to revolution, certain fundamental questions have not been adequately formulated and answered. Lack of clear conceptualization and definition of the phenomena have led to a great deal of confusion. For instance, a number of social scientists, for the sake of quantitative explanation, have classified rebellion, revolt, social movement, coup d'etat, guerrilla warfare and so on all as "political instability" or "internal war" while at the other end of the spectrum some scholars have not only distinguished and differentiated among the above phenomena but also have devised and developed many classifications and typologies for each one of them. Hoping to avoid falling into such traps, this study begins with a definition of revolution.

Definition of Revolution

The American Heritage Dictionary defines revolution as:

a. An orbital motion about a point.

b. A single complete cycle of orbital or axial motion.

The Webster's New World Dictionary defines it as:

a. Movement of a body, as a star or planet, in an orbit.

b. Apparent movement of sun and stars around the earth.

Before the modern era revolution was used mainly in referring to natural and physical phenomena; and when it was applied to the social sphere, it kept its basic characteristics of cyclical motion, inevitability and supernatural origin. For instance, the uprising of the Portuguese against Spanish rule in 1547 was described by contemporaries as a revolution, because the Portuguese objectives were to "restore" and "reestablish" their independence and rule (Elliot, 1970:110).

During the seventeenth century the word revolution began to be used with a socio-political connotation but with reference to its physical characteristics, like "return", "restoration" and "cyclical" change. For example, the English Revolution of 1688 was seen by its contemporaries as a "restoration" and "return" to a legal system which had been violated by the King (Zagorin, 1973:26). Thus, at the end of the seventeenth century we do not find revolution used with the connotation of large scale socio-political change.

It was the occurrence of the French Revolution which largely broadened the reference of revolution, and still later marxism reinforced this pattern even further. The term in recent decades has been so much enlarged that every large-scale change can be called revolution: commercial, industrial, educational, intellectual, social, military, black, communication and so on. The concern in this dissertation will be exclusively with the socio-political connotation of the term revolution.

Conceptions of Revolution

Though the usage and references to the term have greatly increased, no clear consensus has arisen with respect to its ingredients. A group of scholars has conceptualized it so broadly that all sorts of political violence, civil disobedience, terrorism, collective violence, and social revolutions can be included in it (Gurr, 1970; Eckstein, 1964 and 1965). One of the fundamental problems with such a broad conceptualization is that it interferes with the objective of providing explanation for the individual variations among these phenomena. To group all together leads to a tendency to overlook the distinctions among them.

In reaction to such problems, some other scholars have restricted both the usage and ingredients of the term. Crane Brinton (1952:3-4) adopted a more empirical definition and distinguished two different kinds of political war and violence:

1. coup d'etat, which is a simple replacement of one ruling group with another and,
2. major revolutions, like the French and Russian Revolutions which fundamentally restructured society.

Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan (1950:252) refined the concept further by distinguishing palace revolutions, political revolutions and social revolutions. James Rosenau (1964) also distinguished three different kinds of political violence and warfare.

1. Personnel wars, which are basically fights for occupancy of existing roles

in the structure of political authority. An example of this sort of war is the Latin American coup d'etat.

2. Authority wars, in which rebellious groups and new elite groups not only seek the occupancy of existing roles but also look for arrangement and rearrangement of roles in the political structure. Good examples of this kind of war are the Mexican and Turkish Revolutions.

3. Structural wars, which are waged by insurgents to restructure the foundations of society and to inaugurate a new order. Hence, structural wars contain elements and ingredients of both personnel and authority wars. Good examples of structural wars are Communist revolutions (Tanter, Midlarsky,68:265).

Harry Eckstein and his colleagues at Princeton University launched a scholarly effort to clarify this conceptual confusion once and forever. They dropped the word "revolution" altogether and substituted "internal war." "Internal war" was defined by them

> as any attempt to alter state policy, rulers, or institutions by the use of violence, in societies where violent competition is not the norm and when well-defined institutional patterns exist. (Eckstein, 1964 in Stone, 66:160).

Two major problems emerge in this conceptualization.

1. Since this conceptualization includes all sorts of physical conflict, from a simple strike to total destruction of the state, it isolates the use of violence from "common" and "normal" processes of societal adjustment. It excludes all times and places where the use of violence is a fairly common

occurance;

2. It isolates one specific instrument, physical violence, from the political objectives that it is designed to serve (Stone, 1976: 161).

Lawrence Stone summarizes very neatly the criticism of "internal war" conceptualization:

> The concept of internal war is too broad in its comprehension of all types of violence from civil wars to strikes, too narrow in its restriction to normally non-violent societies, too limited in its concern with one of many means, too arbitrary in its separation of this means from the ends in view, and too little concerned with the complex roots of social unrest to be of much practical value to him. (Stone, p. 162).

Samuel Huntington is another leading scholar who has tried to define the revolution in a more restrictive way:

> A revolution is a rapid fundamental and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, government activity and policies. (Huntington, p. 264).

This definition too, is not without problems because it is arbitrarily exclusive and hence, can lead to elimination of a number of peasant revolts, urban insurrections, and national separatist rebellions which, are very crucial factors for both comparative and theoretical studies of revolution.

Hagopian defines revolution as

> a crisis in the patterns of (social, economic or political inequality in a state, which involves an ideological and elite-directed attempt to transform such pattern through power and violence. (Hagopian, p. 208).

The strong points in this definition are:

1. Analytical demarcation among acts of political violence and war. For example, coup d'etat, protest and civil war can be distinguished from

revolution;

2. Emphasis on the normative and elite-directed "attempt" rather than the "success" or failure" of the movement.[1]

3. Stratification of power structure.

Although the definition has these strong points and also is broad enough analytically to embrace a larger number of revolutions, it has empirical problems. It is not easy to sort out and distinguish different classes of political violence and war with this definition.

Stinchcombe's definition of revolution, it may be argued, would complete Hagopian's definition by 1) discussing of "predisposition" and "readiness" rather than "attempt" for revolution; and 2) distinguishing revolutionary situation from the occurrence of revolution. Stinchcombe believes that

> Rather than explaining the occurrence of revolution, a sociological theory ought to try to explain the occurrence of "revolutionary situation." Whether or not a change in the ruling powers of a society take place by means of violence depends both on the predisposing characteristics of the social structure and on concrete military and political situation at given historical time. The flow of historical events, the disposition of troops at particular times, the political loyalty of strategic groups, the tactical genius of revolutionary or governmental leaders are all situational variables which a sociological theory ought not explain. But it is possible to outline the conditions under which the means of political conflict tend to become unlimited. (Stinchcombe, p. 169).

Charles Tilly also has contributed to clarification and reduction of the confusion surrounding the concept of revolution. He states that there is no clear cut, all-embracing definition of revolution which can escape criticism by many different scholars who subscribe to different schools of thought and, therefore, evaluate the definition with a set

[1]The critique of those theorists who define the revolution in terms of its consequences or its degree of success will be followed shortly.

of particular standards. He believes choice about exclusion or inclusion of one's concept of revolution is inevitable, but elements and ingredients can be further clarified.

> No concept of revolution can escape some such difficulties because no conceptualizer can avoid such choices. Nevertheless, we can clear a good deal of conceptual ground by means of simple distinction between "revolutionary situation" and "revolutionary outcomes". Most significant disagreement about the proper definition of revolution falls somewhere along these two dimensions. (Tilly, p. 180).

As the above discussion suggests, the concept of revolution has been the subject of heated debate among students of revolution. Some scholars have defined it so broadly that practically any conflict can be included in the concept, while others have defined it so narrowly that only a few incidents in history might be qualified to be called revolution. Still other scholars have been very selective in their choice of ingredients and unjustifiably arbitrary in their definitions. Even in instances where there have not been the problems of over-inclusiveness or arbitrary and over-exclusiveness, and scholars have agreed upon the same criteria for distinguishing revolution from other kinds of political violence and instability, they have not been able to come to agreement on classification of the same incident. For example, the Hungarian "Revolution" for one author (Johnson, 1966:102) is "revolt" for another (Keckskemcti, 1961:2). The Iranian "revolution" for some (Skocpol, 1979; Johnson, 1982; Greene, 1984) is "revolt" for another (Hagopian, 1984:209). Hence, revolution, has joined the company of other concepts, like culture, value, norms, and development, which never will find a universal meaning (if such thing exists at all) that can be accepted by all scholars. Every time a scholar uses it, he or she should also define it. Though there has been some improvement and refinement in the past, the cloud of confusion around the concept, at least for the near future, will remain intense.[2]

Classification of the Literature

Since a large body of literature about revolution has emerged particularly in the past two decades, an effort will be made to classify and summarize this literature. Three kinds of classification have been developed to make understanding easier and quicker for those who want to study revolution.

Classification According to Discipline

One of the ways the literature has been classified and organized is according to the different academic disciplines. For example, Stan Taylor has organized his Social Science and Revolutions in the following manner: 1) Sociological theories of revolution, in which he discussed a) Johnson and structural-functionalist theories of revolution, b) Marx and Marxist theories of revolution, c) Barrington Moore and historians' theories of revolution, and d) Skoepol's Neo-marxists' structuralist theories of revolution; 2) socio-psychological theories of revolution in which he discussed a) cognitive psychological theories of revolution and b) frustration-aggression theories of revolution; 3) Economic theories of revolution in which he discussed: a) Ireland and Downsian model of revolution, and b) Tullock, Silver and Olson model of revolution; 4) Political theories of revolution in which he discussed a) Huntington and political functionalists'

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[2]For further discussion about definition and conceptualization of revolution see Cohen, Theories of Revolution: An Introduction; Close and Bridge, Revolution: A History of the Idea; and Walton, Reluctant Rebels.

theories of revolutions, and b) Tilly and the political conflict theories of revolution.

Classification According to Generation

Jack Goldstone has summarized and classified the literature in three "generations." The first "generation," whose academic life ranged approximately from 1900 to 1940, was in its conduct of inquiry almost a-theoretical, and basically searched for patterns and similarities in precondition, processes and outcomes. Lebon, Srokin, Pettee, Edwards and Brinton are major figures in this "generation." The second "generation," which falls roughly between 1940 and 1975, is much more theoretically oriented. It covers many academic disciplines and develops many complex and sophisticated theories. Johnson and Smelser are among sociological theorists (structural functionalists); Gurr and Davis among psychological theorists (cognitive psychology and frustration-aggression); and Huntington and Tilly are among political science theorists (the pluralists, interest group, political conflict) of this "generation." The third "generation," which has emerged approximately since 1975, has theorists who are more historical in their approaches, more holistic in their consideration, attempting to explain both the causes and consequences of revolutions; and in their analyses they seek to examine a greater variety of revolutions. Prominent figures of this "generation" are Paige, Skocpol, Trimberger, Obershall and Muller (Goldstone, 1980:425-6).

Classification According to "Methods"

Andriole and Hopple have attempted to categorize and classify the literature according to the "methods" used by scholars in conducting their inquiries and developing their theories. They have organized their survey of the literature into qualitative and quantitative approaches, Description, explanation, and prediction are also analytical foci which they have used to form a matrix. Figure 1.1 demonstrates the way they have organized their survey. According to Figure 1.1 six categories of literature can be identified:

1. Qualitative Description: Goldstone's first "generation" scholars can be classified under this category;
2. Qualitative explanation: Tilly, Skocpol, Moore, and Paige are all among this category. In fact, many of the second and third "generation" scholars of Goldstone can be included here;
3. Qualitative Prediction: Delphi, cross-impact analysis, and Baysesian, which use to a large degree "subjective", "expert-oriented" methods of forecasting political instability and revolutions, can be included in this category;
4. Quantitative Description: This category includes those who have tried to develop an empirical definition of revolution and political instability, and also those who have tried to develop data banks, computer-based "Early-warning" systems, and Internal Situation Profiles (ISPs) to describe political instability;
5. Quantitative explanation: Gurr, Davis, Tilly, Zimmermann, Olson, Saders, and many others are classified in this category. In general, those who

Method / Foci	Qualitative	Quantitative
Description		
Explanation	Political Instability Literature	
Prediction		

Figure 1.1 Survey organization

Source: Andriole, S. and B. Hopple, Revolution and political Instability, New York St. Martin's Press, 1984, p. 10.

have tried to quantify variables and "explain" the dependent variable - revolution and political instability - by quantified independent variables can be included in this category;

6. Quantitative Prediction: In this category are those who have tried to develop some forecasting methods which are not based on "subjective", "expert" sources of data.

   Those who have developed and used "simulation" for predicting domestic instability, such as FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service), Dahlgren, and Gurr can be included in this category. These classifications however are, far from perfect. Classification, categorization or "boxification" of individuals and theories may lead to:

1. Loss of important information. As the level of classification is broadened and the level of abstraction is higher, the loss of information is greater;
2. Coloring the view. Since theories and individuals are looked at in specific "boxes" which have been painted and colored by classifiers, the potential of being deprived of actual color is higher;
3. Fixation of views. Seeing an individual or theory in a wrong "box" may forever deprive an individual of the correct vision and analysis. Not having "boxes" and "classifications" surely would give more dynamism in conducting of a properly implemented inquiry;
4. Labelization of views. Most certainly classification makes it much easier for the people of opposing groups to label their opponents unjustifiably for

judgmental and evaluative purposes.

In spite of these potential dangers "classification" and "categorization" are very crucial for the advancement and accumulation of knowledge. Their advantages most certainly outweigh their dangers:

1. They introduce the individual to the literature in a more organized fashion. Entering such an immense amount of literature without some sort of classification is like entering an ocean without having a direction to swim in;
2. They give an overview of the existing literature and hence, help to choose more exactly what a researcher needs for his research;
3. Finally, as stated before, they help in the accumulation of knowledge, which is fundamental for the advancement of any discipline.

In general, Taylor, Goldstone, Andriole and Hopple have made positive contributions to the students of revolution.

Theories of Revolution

Since covering all the important contributions to the field of revolution is impossible in a part of a chapter, the presentation here must be selective. Major contributors will be dealt with except Skocpol and neo-marxists, which will be the subject of Chapter Three.

As stated earlier, the idea of revolution, of large scale change and political instability, has always been a major issue for social philosophers. A number of these scholars have studied political instability and revolution not because of an academic interest but rather because they have not been happy with its occurrence and consequences and thus, have sought to find the causes in order to prevent it. Among this group are Plato and Aristotle. Plato (1951:54) and Aristotle (1962:59) saw the roots of revolution in different and often-conflicting economic interests. They believed these differences between the poor and rich could lead to political instability in city-states in ancient Greece. Hence, poverty was one of the fundamental roots of revolution for both of these philosophers, as it was for Marx about twenty-two centuries later.[3]

Marx's Theory of Revolution

Most certainly Marx has been one of the leading social philosophers who has popularized the concept of revolution. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, who studied revolution and political instability to find its causes in order to prevent its occurrance, Marx studied it rather for promoting its happening. He developed one of the most sophisticated and influential theories of revolution, which over a century later, makes its power and influence felt in communities of scholars. Marx, with materialistic orientation and dialectical mind, searched history for "uncovering" the "highways" and "map" of previous events in order to "discover" the future course of events. For him, the history of human

[3]It should be pointed out that Aristotle has been more comprehensive in his analysis of revolution. Other factors which Aristotle discussed, according to Howell (1985), are: his emphasis on the fact that men rebel because they are convinced, first, that the existing distribution of power in their societies is unjust, and secondly, that they can remedy their economic and social grievances by seizing power for themselves. Aristotle also saw a class-basis of revolutionary movement; as well as the importance of psychological factors as causes of revolution. For a detailed analysis of Aristotle's view of revolution, see Howell The Greek Experience and Aristotle's Analysis of Revolution.

kind was the history of class conflict, a minority in power which exploits the majority of people; a minority which owns and controls the means of production and a majority which owns nothing but its labor. He illustrated the contradiction that existed between the forces of production - particularly technology - and the social relations of production - ideology, values and culture. He demonstrated that, once these contradictions and conflicts had become sufficiently intense and poverty quite widespread in society, a revolution had solved the problem and introduced the society to another era. He formulated and articulated the materialistic conception of history of which the basic thrust and principle is that rules and laws which governed the past will govern the future until the "highway" of history arrives at its preplanned destination, which is Communism. The important ingredients in Marx's theory of revolution are: class relation and conflict; class consciousness; contradiction between the forces of production and the social relation of production; and widespread poverty. Of course, Marxists in this century have developed further Marx's theory of revolution by assigning different weights to and sometimes by introducing new factors into its ingredients.[4]

Major problems with Marx's theory of revolution have been pointed out by many critics:

1. It is unacceptably deterministic and reductionistic. All causes and preconditions have been reduced to economic factors.
2. It is unjustifiably evolutionary. As noted above, Marx believed that history has been and is being governed by a preplanned set of rules and

[4]For further discussion see Norman Wintrop, Marx Lenin and Modern Revolutions; Taylor, Social Science and Revolutions; and Goldstone, Revolutions.

laws. History has unfolded itself through the passage of time and each stage of this passage is necessarily more "advanced" and "better" than previous stages. Revolutions are important locomotives of history's unfolding process. There is no theoretical, logical and empirical evidence and justification to support such an argument.

3. A link between the objective condition (class conflict, contradiction between the forces of production and social relation of production) and occurrence of revolution is missing or has not been clearly established.

4. As Tocqueville (1955:22) first suggested, poverty was not the leading cause of revolution in France. In fact, he argued that French peasants before the 1789 Revolution were more prosperous than their counterparts in the rest of Europe. Crane Brinton (1952:264) found the same thing as well. Brinton, after studying the English, French, American, and Russian revolutions, concluded that revolution occurred in societies where:

    a. the economy had improved and progressed;

    b. the class and status conflict was high;

    c. the alienation of intellectuals and intelligentsia was high;

    d. the disputation and friction among ruling groups was irreconcilable; and

    e. the government was incapable of dealing with the financial crisis.

As stated in foregoing discussion, Plato, Aristotle and Marx believed that poverty was the fundamental cause of revolution and political instability. Opposing view was expressed by Tocqueville and Brinton, who claimed that economically prosperous and advanced societies could experience revolution. James Davis came up with an interesting synthesis. He found (1962:6-7) that societies would be likely to experience revolution when an increase in economic development was followed by a sudden sharp decline. He argued that increased economic development would increase the expectation and aspiration of the people; then the sharp decline and incapability of the system to meet and satisfy these raised expectations and aspirations would bring about the revolution. Figure 1.2 represents graphically when revolution is more likely for Davis (1962:6).

Gurr's Theory of Revolution

A broader and more complete view on the same principles can be found in Ted Gurr's analysis of revolution and political instability. Gurr's major concern was to explain political violence, which he defined as all collective attacks within a political community against the political regime, its actors - including competing political groups as well as incumbents - or its policies (Gurr,70:3-4). Men are involved in political violence, according to Gurr, because of feelings of "deprivation" and "frustration." He argued that the perception of discrepancy between what people actually gain and what they expect and desire to gain would lead them to feelings of deprivation. Such a perception of discrepancy between expectation and actuality might occur when

1. Expectations remain the same as before but actual gain declines;
2. Expectations rise but actual gain remains constant;
3. Expectations rise along with actual gain for a while, but then gain declines.



Figure 1.2 Need Satisfaction and Revolution

Source: James Davis, Toward A Theory of Revolution, American Sociological Review, Vol. 27 No. 1, 1962, p. 6.

In all three forms the gap between expectation and actual gain becomes wider, and for Gurr, the wider the gap the greater the chance of involvement in political violence. It is worth noting that Davis only considered the third form of deprivation crucial for the involvement of individuals in political violence.

For Gurr, unlike Davis, the roots and causes of relative deprivation are not limited to economic and material factors. Political participation, status perceptions, personal development, denial of political or economic opportunities to ethnic groups etc., are among the causes of feelings of deprivation. For Gurr, perception and state of mind is important, not actual condition of society and reality. He argues that one can be poor and not revolutionary as well as rich but revolutionary. Gurr believed that the translation of deprivation into action against the regime depends on its <u>duration</u>[5], <u>adaptability</u>[6], its <u>scope</u>, its <u>disposition</u>[7] toward conflict, and its intensity. There are other variables which Gurr believed can prevent or facilitate the translation of relative deprivation into political violence. These variables are:

1. Government repressive capability, if it is exercised efficiently with high magnitude, can limit or prevent political violence.
2. Institutionalization - labor union, party system, effective judiciary system,and etc. - also can accommodate political violence and create

[5]Defined as persistence over time or how long a political system exists.

[6]Refered to as manageable response to change; political system with consistently democratic or authoritarian traits tend to persist more.

[7]Refered to as wheather value and belief system support and justify and political violence, and whether victory is possible or not- uitility of political violence.

avenues for channeling relative deprivation in a manageable way.

3. A recent history of violence, the communists' position in the society, insurgent groups' link to foreign actors, the natural geography of the society, plus its transportation network, are all "potential" important factors in political violence.

4. The legitimacy of the incumbent regime is also a very crucial factor for Gurr. For him, if a regime's legitimacy is high, it reduces the level of political violence and if it is low, it increases the level.

Gurr distinguished three kinds of political violence: turmoil, conspiracy, and internal war. By turmoil he meant anti-government riots, political clashes, strikes, demonstrations, injuries and assassinations, which to some degree are unorganized and spontaneous. Conspiracy referred to coup d'etat and elite replacement. Planned and organized attempts and acts like guerilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage and revolutionary invasion against the regimes and its policies constitute internal war.

Gurr's theory in sum, is a psychological approach to revolution. It locates the causes of revolution in the mind of individuals. Discrepancy between what people want and what they get leads to formation of deprivation which in turn, under some facilitating conditions, may be translated into aggression against the regime.[8]

There are several cogent criticisms of Gurr's theory of revolution.

1. As Zagorin (1973:44) pointed out, it is hardly possible to measure the

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[8]For a review of psychological and social psychological theories of revolution, see, Geschwender, Explanation in the Theory of Revolutions and Social Movements; Taylor, Social Science and Revolutions; Zagorin, Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography; and Stone, Theories of Revolution.

scope and intensity of relative deprivation. By what standard can someone measure whether deprivation is high or low? How can an individual compare different people with different capacity of accommodating deprivation?

2. How can state of mind (relative deprivation) be translated into action? Here exists a wide gap which should be adequately accounted for. For the sake of argument one might assume that people individually translate their relative deprivation into aggression, but how, collectively, can they do that? A valid theory of this kind should have explanations for infrastructure which not only address and link the relative deprivation to aggression, but also state how individuals collectively become aggressive.

3. Related to the second criticism is Gurr's failure to analyze sufficiently and independently the objective social and economic structure of society, the balances and shifting of power, and conflict and changes in the political system. He considered these factors only in relation to relative deprivation (Zagorin, 1973:44).

4. As Tilly (1978) powerfully demonstrated, Gurr's theory is mainly concerned with aggression against the regime; whereas the regime's use of violence and repressive power against the people is to a large degree ignored.

5. Finally, Gurr's theory basically seeks to explain "why" violence happens, not "how" it happens. Hence, "process", as Andriole and Hopple

(1984:105) pointed out, has been neglected.

Huntington's Theory of Revolution

Huntington is among those political scientists who have considered revolution in connection with modernization. Though modernization itself is a vague concept and cries for precision in terms of its contents and ingredients, for Huntington it has been the major force of instability in societies.[9] As noted above, Huntington in his definition considered only large-scale change with the use of violence as revolution. Large scale changes for him are: urbanization, industrialization, education, rapid mobilization, spread of literacy, expansion of communication facilities, etc. He believed such changes in societies would lead to socio-geographical dislocation, cultural disorientation, rise in political consciousness, mobilization of new groups into politics, rising expectation and aspiration, and also increased political demands and strain on the system.

He argued that traditional and modern societies are less susceptible to instability and revolution. Traditional societies for Huntington are societies of stability and very gradual minor change. In modern societies the presence of effective socio-political and economic institutions accommodate large-scale changes. Only transitional societies, due to their lack of capable institutionalization may experience revolution. Once a traditional society launches process of modernization, it does not have institutions capable of

[9]As Taylor (1985) points out, Modernization for Huntington has political, social and economic components. Economically, modernization involved urbanization, industrialization and the expansion of education; socially it involved, social mobilization, the breaking or eroding of older traditional commitments and their replacement by new ties and attitudes conducive to changing and expanding the productive capacities of individuals and groups in society; and politically it involved political changes, the changes necessary to develop from a traditional to a modern polity.

absorbing imbalances - disorientation, dislocation, rising of expectations and aspiration - which have been created by modernization's process - urbanization, industrialization, etc. For Huntington, two patterns of revolution are distinguishable, Western and Eastern. In the Western type -the French, Russian and Mexican Revolutions-, the collapse of political institutions and the incumbent government precedes political mobilization and inauguration of a new order. But in the Eastern type - the Chinese and Vietnamese Revolutions - political mobilization and organization came before the collapse of the old order.[10] Huntington sums up his theory as follows:

> urbanization increases in literacy, education, and media exposure (the determinant of social mobilization) all give rise to enhanced aspirations and expectations which if unsatisfied, galvanized individuals and groups into politics. In the absence of strong and adaptable political institutions such increases in participation mean instability and violence. (Huntington, 68:47). In the final analysis Huntington reduces his theory to three formulas:

$$\frac{\textit{Social Mobilization}}{\textit{Economic Development}} = \textit{Social Frustration}$$

$$\frac{\textit{Social Frustration}}{\textit{Mobility Opportunities}} = \textit{Political Participation}$$

$$\frac{\textit{Political Participation}}{\textit{Political Institutionalization}} = \textit{Political Instability}$$

Huntington's theory of revolution has provoked much objection:

1. Sigelman (1979) and Zagorin (1973:48) have argued, the formulas are deceptively simple and imprecise while the concepts are vague and need to be clarified and defined. What are social mobilization, economic

[10]For a review of Huntington's perspective of revolution, see Taylor, Social Science and Revolutions; Goldstone, Revolution; Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution.

development, social frustration, traditional, transitional, and modern societies? What are the indicators of these concepts and how can one measure them? How can someone, for example, measure social frustration? How can an individual know a society has an effective and capable political institutionalization? These problems lead to a second criticism.

2. It seems that Huntington is trapped in the fallacy of a tautology. His dependent and independent variables can be indicators of each other. For instance, when does one know the political system does not have capable institutions? Once political violence and revolution occurs, it can be argued that it did not have capable institutions. The capable institution which was supposed to measure the likelihood of revolution, itself can be measured by the occurrence of revolution. But this is clearly circular reasoning in which no independent measurement exists to enable researchers to predict the occurrence of revolution.

3. While one may agree with Huntington about greater involvement of the masses in revolutions, again it is not clear how a large fraction of the masses like the intellectuals, bourgeois, and aristocrats, etc., who have been involved in the old regime through the process of modernization, can turn against it and support the revolution.

4. Finally, Huntington has not made it at all clear why there should be two patterns of revolutions. It seems that to resolve the contradiction of his theory with a number of historical facts which did not fit, he proposed two

patterns and types of revolutions. As stated above, for Huntington, social mobilization must precede the collapse of the old order, but since this had not been the case in a number of revolutions, he unjustifiably devised and developed the two-type revolution model.

Tilly's Theory of Revolution

Tilly is a collective-action theorist who has viewed revolution as only one type of collective action which may range from peaceful to violent. For him there is nothing intrinsic in collective action which requires that it must be carried out violently. In fact, he argued that initially collective action and revolutions are not violent; it is the state's action and behavior which makes the course of revolution violent. Revolution for Tilly is not an "unnormal" phenomenon or disease (as it was for Brinton) which requires pathological treatment. Rather, he viewed it as extreme (but not qualitatively different) and rare but normal occurrence in the political process.

For most of the interest-group pluralist theorists, group is an important concept, and is for Tilly (Goldstine, 80; Taylor, 85) as well. Group interactions and transactions in society's political process are a central theme in Tilly's theory of collective action. Unlike previous theorists, who were primarily concerned with structures and conditions which facilitate or prevent the revolutions, Tilly is more concerned with more immediate political processes which may or may not facilitate or prevent a revolution. For Tilly the major components of collective action are:

1. Interests: gains or losses in group transactions.

2. Organization: arrangement of actors and units which most directly influence the group's capacity to act on its interests.

3. Mobilization: the process by which a group gains collective control over the necessary resources for action. Labor, weapons, goods, votes, geographical conditions, etc., can be considered as resources.

4. Opportunity: relation which a group has with its environment. Changes in the group or environment or in their relationship may open new possibilities for enhancement of interests or may endanger them.

5. Collective action: people's involvement in action together for the sake of their common interests. Collective action results from the changing combination of interests, organization, mobilization, and opportunity. Hence, extent, intensity, direction and scope of collective action is determined by the group's power, its organizational strength, its mobilization, current opportunities available to it and threats which confront its interests.

Polity is another important concept in Tilly's theory of collective action which needs to be mentioned here. The major ingredients of polity are: population, government, one or more contenders - either a member of ruling group and or outside it - and also coalitions of these groups.

a. Population is simply a group with common structure and shared belief.

b. Government is made up of groups who have control over crucial resources and a monopoly on force and are on their way out.

c. Contender groups can be of at least two types. Challengers are those groups which try to get into the system and those which are already in the system and are competing for control of resources and power.

d. Coalition is a special arrangement of these groups for a period of time, for shared interests.

Tilly also distinguished two kinds of collective action: Communal groups, which are relatively informal, traditional and unorganized, and associational groups, which are relatively formal, organized, rational and modern.

For Tilly random or spontaneous collective action is rare or nonexistent. In general, collective violence for Tilly often involves new contenders and declining groups and hence tends to cluster around entries into and exists from politics (Androlie, Hopple, 84:77). As stated above, Tilly also distinguishes between revolutionary situation and revolutionary outcome. Drawing from Trotsky (1965:224) Tilly argues that a revolutionary situation exists when more than one bloc effectively controls a significant portion of the state's apparatus which used to be controlled by a single sovereign polity. He calls this situation multiple sovereignty, and gives three immediate causes of its occurrence: 1) Advent of contenders or coalition of contenders who propose exclusive alternative claims to control over the state apparatus which is currently being exercised by a member of polity; 2) Commitment of a significant portion of population to those claims;[11] 3) Incapacity or unwillingness of state machinery to suppress the alternative

[11]It is more so when government can not meet its obligations and/or when it unexpectedly enforces or imposes new laws or regulations which are harmful to people's interests.

coalition and/or commitment to its claims.[12]

He defined revolutionary outcome simply as substitution of one set of power holders by another. Power here can be power over means of production, over symbols and over governments. Tilly argues that there can be a revolutionary situation but not a revolutionary outcome[13] and also there can be a revolutionary outcome but not a revolutionary situation.[14]

Figure 1.3 demonstrates the revolutionary situation and outcome in different types of power transfer (1978:198).

Full scale revolution was defined as where a high degree of division between challengers and the incumbent polity is associated with extensive power transfers; where civil wars are referred to, moderate to high splits in the revolutionary situation are accompanied by moderate to high degree of power transfers; where insurrection is involved, moderate to high split in revolutionary situation accompanied with low to moderate transfer of power; and where coups are considered, low to moderate splits are accompanied with low to moderate power transfers.[15]

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[12]This happens often due to a sudden change in the balance of coercive resources, loss of war or foreign intervention.

[13]This situation occurs when an incumbent government effectively suppresses the challengers who for a whole had a mutually exclusive claim.

[14]This situation happens when gradual changes lead to displacement of one set of power holders by another.

[15]For a detailed discussion of Tilly's view of revolution see Taylor, Social Science and Revolutions; Andriole and Hopple, Revolution and Political Instability; Goldstone, Revolution; and Skocpol, States and Social Revolution.



Figure 1.3 Revolutionary Situation and Outcomes in Different Types of Power Transfers

Source: Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution, London, Addison-Wesley, 1978, p. 198.

Stan Taylor (1984:144) has used Table 1.1 to organize and summarize the above information which is a fuller explanation of Figure 1.3 as well.

There are several drawbacks to Tilly's theory of collective action as well:

1. Tilly does not believe that collective action can be spontaneous. But as Androlic and Hopple (1984:18) argued, history records quite a number of unorganized collective actions.
2. Tilly has paid some attention to the elite's role in collective action, but as a "Mass" collective-action theorist he has surely neglected the profound role of elites in scope, direction and intensity of collective violence. Elite repression, elite conspiracy and coups are all important factors which may precede or follow collective violence and need to be considered more centrally in any theory of collective violence.
3. Usually collective violence theorists, including Tilly, in their theories of collective action, concentrate more on "how" collective violence occurs rather than "why" it occurs.
4. Related to the third criticism is the problem of causality. Since Tilly is more concerned with the state of the revolutionary situation and multiple sovereignty (appearance of contenders with exclusive claims, the mobilization of new groups, popular support, the government's loss of control of the monopoly of coercive forces,etc.) he does not show "why" contenders appear, "why" government should lose the coercive power, and so on. As Taylor (1984:145) has argued, revolutionary situation for Tilly

Table 1.1 Revolutionary Situations, Revolutionary Outcomes and Type of Collective Violence.

Extent of the split in the revolutionary situation	Extent of coalition in new regime	Extent of power transfer	Type of revolution
Moderate to high	None, very narrow	Massive	Full-scale revolution
	Narrow	Great	Full-scale revolution/ civil war
	Fairly broad	Moderate to high	Civil war
	Broad	Low	Civil war/ insurrection
	Very broad	Very low	Insurrection
Low to moderate	None, very narrow, narrow	Moderate to high	Coup/civil war
	Fairly broad, broad	Low	Coup

Source: Stan Taylor, Social Science and Revolutions, St. Martin Press, New York, 1984 p. 144.

was defined by these factors, but the main question is "why" these factors have been appearing on the scene. In other words, what are the causes for appearance of contenders, and why has a substantial segment of population transferred their support to such contenders, etc.?

5. Related to the fourth criticism is the problem of variation in groups'(challengers who want to enter the polity) attitude toward the polity: why some groups are revolutionary from the beginning and others are reformists; and also why the polity sometimes rejects the entering of one and not the others.

6. As Goldstone has demonstrated (1980:431), it is extremely difficult to measure many of the variables and factors which Tilly considered important for the existence of multiple sovereignty. For instance, it is extremely hard to measure magnitude of conflict and the resources of all competing groups.

Johnson's Theory of Revolution

Chalmers Johnson is a figure in the functionalist tradition who has attempted to employ social system analysis to explain the occurrence of revolution in societies. He (1982) conceives of revolution as

> Violence directed toward one or more of the following goals: a change of government (personnel and leadership), of regime (form of government and distribution of political power), or of society (social structure, system of property control and class domination, dominant values, and the like).

Employing a structural-functional mode of analysis, he begins his theory with the characteristics and prerequisite of a "normal," "functioning," and stable society. For a society to function smoothly, consensus on value structure, goals to be pursued, and means of implementing such goals is a necessity. Promotion and maintenance of such consensus is the principal function of the social system[16] in societies. The social system may employ coercion and or other means to sustain and support the existing order and status-quo. Occurrence of revolution for Johnson is an indicator of the social system's failure to fulfill its function of sustaining consensus and restoring equilibrium in societies.

Values, as stated above are an important category of phenomena in Johnson's analysis of societies. He believes that values both explain and define the situation and environment of the members of society, and also generate norms that regulate the behavior of individuals. As long as values are widely shared the social system will function smoothly, but once values, due to whatever reasons, are no longer being shared by the majority of population, the social system will become "dysfunctional".

> The reason why any question of values or value-environmental relationship is so important is that values, as they have been described, tend to subsume norms and roles as well as being the reason for the continued existence of the collectivity. When such values can no longer explain the environment, the social system will enter a period of great difficulty.

Johnson (1966) identifies four sources of change that may lead to the withdrawal of consensus:

1. Exogenous value, like the introduction of a new belief system and ideology from outside;

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[16]For further discussion of Johnson's view of revolution, see Zagorin, Theories of Revolution in Contemporary Historiography; Taylor, Social Science and Revolutions; and Hagopian, The Phenomenon of Revolution.

2. Endogenous value, like emergence and production of a new idea from within the society;
3. Exogenous environmental, like a defeat in war or the importation of new technology; and
4. Endogenous environmental, like population growth and food prices.

Social systems, Johnson argues, usually have the capability to adjust and adapt to the above changes, but if the changes are too rapid and beyond the capability of the system's adaptive mechanism, "multiple dysfunction" would be the possible outcome.

> Dysfunction occurs when the change taking place is too much for the adaptive and adjustive processes of the system. If dysfunction is not dealt with by purposeful measures to reestablish equilibrium, then it will multiply with widening effects of disorientation and protest within the society. At this point the action of the elite is crucial.

Johnson argues that in a stage of "multiple dysfunction" the elite's action is very important for the outcome of such contradiction. If the elite is capable and wise enough to inaugurate reformist policies, it can resynchronize the social system, adjust the dysfunction, and thus restore the equilibrium. But the elite's reliance on coercion for resynchronizing the system and maintaining the order, Johnson argues, would lead to "power deflation" and loss of authority. Elite intransigence, he believes, is a crucial factor for the creation of a revolutionary situation. Hence, multiple dysfunction plus elite inefficiency -- power deflation, loss of authority, intransigence -- would lead to a revolutionary situation.

Yet a third ingredient is necessary for transforming this situation into actual revolution. Johnson calls this factor "fortune". He outlined three types of fortune or precipitators: (a) reduction or loss of loyalty on the part of army to the ruling elite due to relationship of army to the wider society, discontent and dissatisfaction about their promotion criteria, status, etc.; (b) emergence of a belief among opposing groups that they can defeat the army and the elite; and (c) defeat of the army in the war.

Johnson's model of revolution can be summarized as follows: disequilibrated social system (due to failure of adjustive mechanism) + new changes (endogenous/exogenous value and environmental changes) multiple dysfunction; multiple dysfunction + elite inefficiency (power deflation, loss of authority, and intransigence) = revolutionary situation; revolutionary situation + fortune (loss of loyalty, a new belief, and military defeat) = revolution.
In other words, multiple dysfunction + elite inefficiency + fortune = revolution.

Johnson has developed a typology based on four criteria to account for varieties of revolutions: a) whether the revolutionary activity is directed toward government, regime or society; b) who the members and participants in the revolutionary movement are - elite, masses, or both; c) what the policy objective and goals of the revolutionary movement are -- reform, change property relation, nation-building, etc.; and d) whether the movement is spontaneous or deliberate and organized. On the basis of these criteria Johnson identifies six types of revolution:

1. Jacquerie. Peasants' revolts based on their grievances and directed toward local elite. Revolt is usually done on the basis of traditional authority --

church, king, etc. -- and does not challenge the legitimacy of the regime.

Example: the Pugachev rebellion in Russia, 1773-1775.

2. Millenarian Rebellion. Similar to Jacquerie type except that it is directed toward the regime with the belief of help from a living Messiah. Example: the Florentine revolution led by Savonarola in 1494.

3. Anarchistic Rebellion. A reaction to dramatic new changes and development with the vision of reestablishing an idealized old order. Example: Pilgrimage of Grace.

4. Jacobin-Communist Revolution. Directed toward government, regime, and society. It is the rarest among the types of revolution and can only occur in a highly centralized state with a good communication system, and seeks to establish a new order. Example: the Russian Revolution in 1917.

5. Conspiratorial coup d'etat. An attempt of a small elite to capture and use the state apparatus to implement radical social changes in society. Example: the Nasser revolution in Egypt.

6. Militarized Mass Insurrection. A phenomenon of the 20th century. It is the plan and strategy of a dedicated elite to incorporate the masses in guerilla warfare with the inspiration of nationalist and communist ideologies. Example: China and Algeria.[17]

A criticism of Johnson's model may be summarized as follows:

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[17]Social system, Johnson (82) argues,"is composed of actions (roles), played from statuses and guided by norms. Roles are obligations and rights which are socially recognized and which, being so recognized, allow (the individual) to determine his own behavior and to orient himself to the behavior of others."

1. Like other functionalists, Johnson uses many concepts and terms which hardly can not be operationalized and applied to the real world. It would be difficult for a researcher to identify empirically relevant values, norms, and statuses in a society or measure and operationalized disequilibrium, dysfunction, and synchronization of a social system. As Zagorin (1973:52) notes

> In placing himself [Johnson] on the heights of a general theory, he has not avoided the danger of making his fundamental propositions so expansive that they verge toward emptiness and thus fail to entail the concrete correlatives by which their adequacy can be tested.

2. As Taylor points out (1984:17), the distinction between social systems in equilibrium and disequilibrium is not clear and realistic. A perfectly functioning synchronized social system has never existed and will probably never exist in the real world. Societies are in a constant state of multiple tension and dysfunction and some degree of disequilibrium is always present. If it is accepted that societies have always had some degree of dysfunction, then the occurrence of revolution cannot be determined on the basis of the kind of social system, whether an equilibrium or disequilibrium - if it is a completely stable system no chance for revolution, otherwise, yes. Rather, the degree of disequilibrium in the social system is crucial to assess the likelihood of revolution.

3. Like many other structural-functionalists, Johnson has not been immune to tautological argumentation. Revolution on the one hand can be conceived

and understood as an indication of multiple dysfunction and desynchronization in social system; on the other hand, multiple dysfunction can also be conceived as the indication of revolution. Unless some empirical, testable indicators can be proposed, circular reasoning-tautology - may not rescue the theory.

4. Falsification is another logical problem which seems not to have been avoided in Johnson's theory of revolution. As Karl Popper (1959) has extensively elaborated, for a theory to have a "scientific" stand, falsifiability - empirically testable and refutable - is a necessary condition. As noted above, "fortune" is an important ingredient in Johnson's model. But it seems that "fortune" immunizes the theory from being falsifiable. No matter what happens or does not happen in the real world, the theory still cannot be refuted, because if revolution occurs it can be argued that it has occurred owing to "fortune", and if it does not occur, still it can be argued that it did not occur owing to lack of "fortune". It is clear that under no circumstances can the theory be refuted and falsified.

5. Although Johnson distinguishes six types of revolution, he does not successfully establish and elaborate on why there have been or still are six types of revolutions, and what the principal variables are which give rise to these different types.

Before this chapter is concluded a brief mention of Trimberger's "Revolution From Above" seems desirable. Trimberger, unlike the collective-action theorists, has focused on elite-based revolutions. By studying power displacement in Turkey in 1923, Peru in 1968, the Megi Restoration in Japan, and Egypt in 1952, she found that with old regime rulers ousted, extensive modernization programs have been launched. She also found that in these societies military and bureaucratic elites are separated from landlord and merchant classes. She believes these societies did not experience social revolution because of their capability to generate and collect enough new taxes and revenues from both upper classes (merchant and landlord) and lower classes to finance modernization. Those segments of the upper classes that could foresee more interests in modernizing processes, supported it. But those who did not foresee interests or benefits from such processes could not resist the military might and bureaucratic power of ruling elites. They did not have sufficient leverage in the army or state apparatus and sufficient resources in the society to mobilize against ruling groups. Trimberger concluded that in societies in which ruling elites are independent from upper classes the possibilities of modernization through elite action are high.

In summary, in this chapter theories of leading scholars in the field of revolution like Marx, Gurr, Huntington, Tilly and Johnson have been covered. Different conceptualization of the term and classification of literature also have been briefly discussed. In the next chapter the methodological foundation on which this dissertation will base its inquiry is laid out.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

Ideally, a social phenomenon like be studied by four possible methods: experimental, statistical, comparative and case-study. Since the comparative and case-study methods will mainly be used in this dissertation, this chapter will concentrate on them after a brief glance at the experimental and statistical approaches.

It is generally argued (Lijphart 1971, Campbell 1975, Meckstroth, 1975) that the experimental method is more closely associated with scientific inquiries than the others. Ability to have "control" over every factor and variable in a research design is a researcher's ideal, desirable condition.

In the social sciences, however, opportunity for application of the experimental method rarely happens. In its simplest form, there has to be two equivalent groups[1]: an experimental and a control group. In Time A, a variable or stimulus would be introduced to the experimental group. In Time B, both groups will be "compared." If there are differences between the two groups - provided everything else remains constant - they can be attributed to an introduced variable or stimulus. This is, of course, an ideal situation. In reality a researcher usually can not achieve such a degree of "control" because so many

[1] They can be the equivalent through selecting the groups from the beginning equally, through random selection, etc.

other "uncontrolled" factors would intervene from Time A to B which may have important impacts on the results of the experiment. Practical, financial, and ethical considerations are additional factors which would make the experimental method less usable in many areas of social studies.

The statistical method has been and is being used widely in social sciences as an alternative to the experimental method. In statistical method, through mathematical manipulation of the data, researchers attempt to enhance "control" over their inquiries.[2] However, the degree of "control" is much smaller in comparison to the experimental method. Another important difference between these two methods is in their findings. In statistical method, usually because of lack of control over the time factor, what the researcher can logically expect is "association" and "relation" among variables, whereas in experimental method, since time is controlled, researchers often can draw causal relationships.

The statistical method for a large portion of this century has been considered "the scientific method of inquiry" among social scientists, but in recent years it has lost some of its popularity both because of the re-emergence of the comparative and case-study methods, and the fact that "science" is no longer considered "the only valued enterprise" in the search for human knowledge.

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[2]Statistical devices like partial correlation and interaction in multiple regression analysis, have enabled researchers to exercise more control over their studies and account for unintended intrusion of undesirable factors.

Comparative Method

Many scholars argue (Lijphart 1971:684, Skocpol 1979:36) that the comparative method resembles the statistical method in all aspects except one. In the statistical method the researcher usually deal with many cases and a few manageable key variables; but in the comparative method cases usually are very few and the important variables many. In the comparative method, "control" by researchers over their inquiries is less than that of the statistical method, since in the comparative method the number of cases is few to be appropriate for statistical treatment.

Though researchers, through systematic and deliberate selection of similar cases, might provide a greater or lesser degree of "control," they cannot approach that of the statistical method. The comparative method has been the subject of many scholarly inquiries in recent years. Lijphart (1971) in an article, "Comparative Politics and Comparative Method," articulated and clarified many valuable points. Since then this article has been very influential in setting the standards for every discussion of the issue. He defined the comparative method as: "One of the basic methods--the others being the experimental, statistical, and case study methods--of establishing general empirical propositions." (Lijphart, 71:281).

He further clarified (1971:682-3) this definition by pointing out that:

1. The comparative method is definitely a "method" and thus must be distinguished from a substantive area or sub area of any academic discipline.

2. It is considered as "one of the basic scientific methods," not the only

scientific method.

3. It is a "method of discovering empirical relationships among variables, not a method of measurement." For him measuring variables is logically prior to finding relationships among them, and he referred to the latter activity as comparative method.

4. The comparative method should also be distinguished from techniques. Comparative method is a broad-gauge, general method, and thus differs from narrow, specialized techniques.

These definitions and clarifications, however, cannot be considered as definitive and without problems. First, as Meckstroth pointed out (1975:132), Lijphart defined the comparative method mainly in terms of its results rather than the logic of inquiry that is supposed to yield those results. Second, there is ambiguity in such basic terms as "discovering" and "establishing." Third, if by "discovering general empirical propositions" Lijphart meant to state an unrestricted relationship[3] among variables, it cannot be "established." General propositions always refer to events that range from the past to present and future. As Popper (1961:40) has powerfully argued, any generalization beyond what we have at hand and have observed cannot be considered as "conclusively established" and is subject to disproof and falsification, regardless of the number of corroborating instances. And if Lijphart by "established" meant to state some sort of confirmation and corroborating instances, Popper[4] argued, that cannot be achieved as

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[3]Relationship both in terms of time and space, otherwise it can not be considered general.

[4]For further discussion on the criterion of falsification see Poppers, The Logic of Scientific Discovery; and Meckstroth, "Most Different System" and "Most Similar System."

well, since

> all universals laws have zero confirmation ..., in a world which is in any sense infinite (temporal infinity suffices) ..., and even in a finite world their value would be indistinguishable from zero if the number of events in this world is sufficiently large. (Popper, 61:281).

Lijphart believed two major problems face the comparative method: dealing with many variables, which is common to all social science research regardless of the particular method researchers use to conduct their inquiries, and with the small number of cases, which is peculiar to comparative method. He made two suggestions for minimizing each problem:

<u>The Case Problem</u>

1. Increase the number of cases as much as possible. He believed this can be done through not only extending analysis geographically and cross-sectionally but longitudinally and cross-historically as well. He argued that comparative politics as an area of political science has been relatively successful in extending the analyses and cases cross-sectionally but not longitudinally, though, as Lijphart said, Edward Freeman in 1873 had called the comparative method and politics:

   > the greatest intellectual achievement which can discover a world in which times and tongues and nations which before seemed parted poles asunder, now find each one its own place, its own relation to every other. (Freeman, 1873:12-32).

   But since Freeman's day not very much has been achieved longitudinally.

2. Reduce the "property-space" of the analysis. If for any reason the cases

cannot be extended, Lijphart proposed that variables which basically possess same characteristics should be combined to form a single variable. Hence, the number of cells in the matrix representing the relationship is reduced while the corresponding number of cases increases in each cell.

The Variable Problem

1. Focus the comparative analysis on "comparable" cases. By "comparable cases" he means those variables which have many similar characteristics that can be considered "constant", leaving a manageable number of dissimilar variables for researchers to try to relate to each other, while accounting for their variation. He also suggested three mechanisms by which comparability can be maximized.

   a. Area approach. Since each area of the world tends to have many similar characteristics, a common pattern of behavior, and uniform physical environment, the chance of establishing crucial "control" for later generalization is greater.

   b. A longitudinal or diochronical approach. Analyzing the same unit or country in different times can lead to an even better "control" for later generalization than the area approach. Usually fundamental similarities exist among the people of the same country, though a perfect control cannot be achieved since things can never be the same in Times A and B.

c. An intrantional approach. Unless the political system itself is the unit of analysis, concentrating on intrantional rather than international comparison for the same reason can increase the level of comparability.

2. Focus the comparative analysis on the key variables. Comparative analysis, he argued, must avoid the danger of being involved with too many variables, since thatpractice can lead to loss of the "control," which, as noted earlier, is a fundamental factor for a valid generalization. Hence, it is necessary that comparative analysis restrict itself to operative and key variables.

Before turning to criticism of Lijphart's discussion of the comparative method, it seems necessary to say a few words about John Stuart Mill. As Lijphart (1971:68) and others (DeFELICE 1986:421, Meckstroth 1975:133, Skocpol 1979:36, etc.) have stated, Mill's idea of the Method of Agreement, the Method of Difference, and the Method of Concomitant Variation was and continues to be the most important foundation on which comparative method or comparative methods have operated and are at present being developed.

Mill's Method of Agreement refers to a situation in which the cases being compared are totally dissimilar except for the common presence of the same two factors in each case. The illustration below graphically demonstrates this method:

1)	A	C	D	E	F
2)	A	G	K	H	M

3) A N P W Z

It is clear that the only factor which is the same in all three cases is "A"; in all other respects the cases differ from one another. "A" thus can be established as the cause of line(1), (2), and(3).

Mill's Method of Difference refers to

> if an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs and in which it does not occur have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former, the circumstances in which alone the two instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause of the phenomenon. (Nagel, 1950:215-216).

Below illustrating illuminate the process of the Method of Difference:

1) A B C D E

2) B C D E

"B", "C", "D" and "E" are present and the same in both cases and hence cannot be considered as the cause or effect of one another. "A" is the only factor which is present in Line (1) and absent in Line (2) and can therefore, be registered as the cause.

Mill's Method of Concomitant Variations is a more sophisticated version of the Method of Difference. As in the Method of Difference, all factors have to remain the same except one, but instead of observing only the presence or absence of "A", rather its variation should be quantitatively measured. Mill (1872) himself wrote: "that we may be warranted in inferring causation from concomitance of variations, the concomitance itself must be proved by the Method of Difference."

The illustration below will clarify the Method of Concomitant Variations even further.

(1)	A_3	B_6	C_7	D_3	E_3	F_8	:	M_3
(2)	A_4	B_3	C_4	D_8	E_5	F_5	:	M_4
(3)	A_5	B_{15}	C_2	D_5	E_9	F_6	:	M_5

Clearly "B", "C", "D", "E", and "F" cannot be the cause of "M" because their rate and amount of variation are different from "M"; thus only "A" has variation corresponding to that of "M". As Lijphart stated (1971:688), Mill's Method of Concomitant Variation is often claimed to be the first systematic formulation and articulation of modern comparative method.[5]

This discussion now turns to criticism of Lijphart's consideration of the comparative method and also points out strengths, weaknesses and limitations in the method itself.

1. As Meckstroth has noted (1975:134), the basic problem of comparative method as a derivative of Mill's method, is its inability to offer any criterion for selecting among the limitless supply of variables and factors which might be considered as control or explanation for any given phenomenon. Hence, all possibilities are equally relevant as far as the method is concerned, and since a limitless variety of possibilities has to be considered, the method does not offer any conclusive statement about explanatory relationships. Ultimately, it is theoretical orientation and relevance which researchers have to rely on to select their operating variable from the endless sea of variables.

[5]For a more detailed analysis of Mill's method see DeFELICE, Causal Inference and Comparative Method; and Meckstroth, "Most Different Systems", and Most Similar System".

2. As Bacon has noted (Campbell 1975:185) when any proposition has developed, human understanding forces everything else to add fresh support and confirmation. It is a peculiar and probably permanent error of human understanding to be more moved and excited by an affirmative than a negative. For modifying this seemingly unchangeable habit, this study supports Popper (1968:36-57) in considering the position of those propositions which have plenty of corroborating instances as "not yet disconfirmed" and the priority of comparative method as falsification of propositions rather than "establishing relationship." Or, as Nagel and Cohen argued (1934:259), the comparative method may be regarded as the process and procedure for eliminating false propositions.

3. As described above, Lijphart argued that the fundamental problems which face the comparative method are problems of "many variables and too few cases." He recommended four procedures (two for each) for dealing with the problems. However, he recognized that his suggestions of maximizing the cases and focusing on comparable cases are not always in the same direction; in fact, later in another article (1975:163) he wrote that they are fundamentally always in different directions. First of all, why do many variables and a small number of cases constitute problems? He never addressed this question but simply assumed it as a problem. Secondly, in the same article Lijphart (1975:685) has defined the comparative method with reference to these characteristics. The logical question, then, is how

the same defining characteristics can constitute the problem for the very method to which they are supposed to be most relevant?

4. With regard to Lijphart's recommendation of focusing on key variables for reducing the number of variables- DeFELICE (1986:422) believes if this recommendation can be used as a means of case selection rather than as one of dealing with too many variables it is more fruitful. And as stated before, comparative method cannot help us in the selection of cases. Case selection has to depend upon a priori judgments or theoretical orientation concerning the causal influence of certain variables.

5. As Mill himself (Lijphart 1971:688) and others too (Przeworski and Teune 1970:34) have stated, although there may be many similarities in similar cases, there are almost always a sufficiently large number of differences to prevent any sort of reliable and valid generalizations. Great Britain, the United States, Australia, and Canada might be similar in many respects but most certainly they differ in more than one factor. Mill's method of difference and concomitant variations allowed only "one" difference, which was the very reason why Mill believed these methods should not be applied in social sciences.

Lijphart in another article (1975:153,164) modified some of the deficiencies of his first conception and formulation of the comparative method. He agreed not to use ambiguous terms like the "discovery" and "establishment" of empirical propositions and conceded that the primary function of comparative method should be the testing empirical hypothesis, thereby either corroborating or falsifying them.

> The comparative method can now be defined as the method of testing hypothesized empirical relationships among variables on the basis of the same logic that guides the statistical method, but in which cases are selected in such a way as to maximize the variance of the independent variables and to minimize the variance of the control variables. (Lijphart, 75:164).

However, as Teune argues (1975:195), there are some general drawbacks to comparative approaches applied in the social sciences: a) they are not strictly experimental; b) they are not case studies, and c) they do not deal with the ideal data, because of defective sampling, the small number of cases and observational difficulties.

The fundamental advantages of these approaches are their thoroughness and attention to details which are likely to be overlooked in statistical analysis; and, since they deal with few cases, they are in a good position to check the reliability of data and validity of the indicators. As Lijphart believed (1975:172), these are tremendous advantages which surely outweigh the deficiencies.[6] Figure 2-1 presents Lijphart's typology of scientific methods.

Stretton (1969:245-247) proposes an interesting alternative for the comparative method's primary functions.

> Rather than imitating experimental control, a more promising use of comparative study is to extend the investigator's experience, to make him aware of more possibilities and social capabilities, and thus they help his imagination of question-prompting, cause-seeking and effect-measuring alternatives, rational models, ideal types, utopias and other useful functions. The function of comparison is less to stimulate experiment than to stimulate imagination ..., comparison is strongest as a choosing and provoking, not a proving device: a system for questioning, not for answering. (Stretton, 69: 245-247).

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[6]For a more detailed discussion of comparative method see Smelser, Comparative Methods in the Social Sciences; and Lijphart, Comparative Politics and Comparative Method.

The Case-Study Method

The statistical method, discussed earlier in this chapter, can be applied to many cases, the comparative method to a few cases (a minimum of two), and the case study method to a single case, whether the case is the whole world, a country, a segment of a country, or an event. If one's analytical goal is to produce a detailed description of a phenomenon, most certainly the case study must be preferred to the other methods. Description, of course, is not the only task which case study method can produce; more often than not, the method goes beyond the compilation of simple facts in order to develop some level of generalization and test the accepted propositions. Case study has been and is a source of generating, collecting and classifying of much valuable information. It has often been the primary block of theory-building, which many argue is the fundamental characteristic of "science."

As Lijphart has stated (1971:691), six ideal types of case studies can be distinguished:

1. Atheoretical case studies usually are those studied which primarily seek to compile a description of a single country, tribe, family or the like. No "established theory" throws any light in these studies nor do they attempt to generate any proposition or hypothesis. Their most important value and utility is their generation of information, and they are valuable too when someone uses their data to develop a theory.

2. Interpretative case studies are the same as atheoretical case studies in terms of primarily being concerned with the case itself rather than testing or

generating any propositions. They differ from them in using an "established theory" for guiding their inquiry and research.

3. Hypothesis-generating case studies generate or formulate new hypotheses or sharpen and clarify the vague hypotheses which already exist in areas where no comprehensive and viable theory has as yet developed. This kind of case study and the remaining three differ from the first two in terms of being motivated by theory and attempting to generalize beyond their individual cases, hence they play a major role in theory-building.

4. Theory-confirming case studies begin with a theory or proposition in mind. Researchers apply their propositions to a case to see whether it can withstand the reality. If so, it can strengthen the proposition.[7]

5. Theory-informing case studies are like theory-confirming case studies except in one respect. They try to invalidate a proposition or hypothesis rather than confirm it. Single instances too can weaken a proposition only marginally.

6. Deviant case studies are analyses of cases which are believed to deviate from accepted propositions. They are being examined in order to clarify why they differ from the other cases or accepted propositions. Thus they may sharpen, reformulate and modify the accepted propositions to account

[7]It should be pointed out, however, this depends on the number of cases which the proposition has withstood before, if that number is large, this new withstanding cannot help a great deal.

for their failure to explain the deviance.[8]

Deviant case studies as well as theory-confirming or -informing case studies have been claimed to be comparative (Lijphart, 1971:63, Scarrow 1969:7). Smelser argued deviant case study is comparative because

> the investigator takes two "groups" that differ in outcome (dependent variable) and attempt to locate differences in conditions between them (independent variable). In deviant case analysis, one "group" is comprised of the deviant case itself, and the other by the majority of cases expressing the general finding. (Smelser, 73:56).

Before discussing the strategy of procedure in this dissertation, three short comments are in order. 1) As noted before, these six types of case studies are ideal type, hence in practice one might use all or only a few of them. 2) Related to the first comment is the lack of clear-cut, dividing lines in the real world corresponding to these six types. 3) The "scientific" status of case study method is not altogether clear, since "science," many believe, is fundamentally a generalizing activity, whereas case study has a very limited power in this regard. But there is not much disagreement among social analysts that case study in the contemporary state of the social sciences is an important tool in research.[9]

In this dissertation the comparative method and all six types of case studies will be employed. The study will:

1. have an appropriate, detailed description of the important and relevant

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[8]Failure of explanation here can be due to lack of precision on conceptualization or because of overlooking relevant variables.

[9]For further discussion on case study, see, Campbell, "Degree of Freedom" and Case Study; Lijphart, The Comparable Cases Strategy in Comparative Research.

factors of the Iranian Revolution;

2. use existing theories to organize and guide analysis;

3. generate a new hypothesis or refine the existing one;

4. try to infirm or confirm peasant-Neo-Marxist theories of revolution;

5. use the Iranian Revolution as a deviant case in order to "explain" the deviance and modify, if possible and necessary, the peasant-Neo-Marxist theories of revolution.

The study will not:

1. discuss the outcomes and consequences of revolution. What course a revolution takes, whether it is "good" or "bad", "modern" or "traditional", "democratic" or "dictatorial," etc., to a large degree depends on where someone stands. Personal beliefs, cultural orientation, interests, etc., are all important factors in one's evaluation of a phenomenon like revolution, which often times fundamentally challenges the long accepted beliefs, orientation, interests, etc., of the very person who is evaluating it. This limitation helps to prevent the intrusion of personal values and beliefs into the analysis, keeps the focus on the central topic of the study and is in accordance with Tilly's insistence on drawing a line between revolutionary situation and outcome.

2. Try to develop any universal generalization because of the inherent limits of the case study and comparative methods.

3. Try to predict or develop any method for prediction of possible future

revolutions.

Following Walton (1984:25), the attempt will be to steer a course between the twin problems which were posed by two of the foremost revolutionary historians: Hobshawn, who noted that "the danger of this type of study lies in the temptation to isolate the phenomenon of overt crisis from the wider context of a society undergoing transformation," (Hobshawn, 71:39) and Moore, who cautioned:

> there is a tendency, I believe, to over-emphasize the underlying long-run social trends behind revolutionary outbreaks as well as dramatic peaceful changes, and to underestimate the importance of control over the instrument of violence -- the army and the police - and the significance of decision taken by political leaders. (Moore, 78:82-83).

CHAPTER III

PEASANT'S THEORY OF REVOLUTION

As stated in the first chapter, Marx's conception and theory of revolution has been one of the enduring and debated ideas of modern times among social analysts. Ingredients of his theory have been subjected to a diverse and many times conflicting interpretation and sometimes even change -- whether adding new elements, or eliminating old ones, or assigning different weights to existing elements -- by a later generation of scholars.

One group of this later generation of scholars can be distinguished from others by virtue of its emphasis on the role of peasantry, state, and international factors as explanatory variables of modern revolution.

One of the first major works that attempted to modify Marx's idea was "Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy" by Barrington Moore. This book has undoubtedly influenced a large variety of scholars in different academic disciplines since its publication in 1966. Because of its immense impact on later works some scholars (Sheehan 1980) have even rated it as a "classic work." In this landmark book Moore attempted to provide explanation for

> The varied political roles played by the landed upper classes and the peasantry in the transformation from agrarian societies (defined simply as states where a large majority of population lives off the land) to modern industrial ones. Somewhat more specifically, it is an attempt to discover the range of historical conditions

under which either or both of these groups have been important behind the emergence of Western Parliamentary versions of democracy, and dictatorships of the right and left, that is, fascists and communist regimes. (Moore, 1966:vii).

Moore argues that the nature and occurrence of revolutions to a large extent depends on the impact of the processes of commercialization of agriculture on agrarian classes, and their relations to state expansion. He believes the particular form which class coalition takes in revolutionary processes is also very crucial in shaping the outcome of revolutions. England, France, the United States, China, Japan, India and to a lesser extent, Germany and Russia have been the focus of Moore's study.

According to Skocpol (1973) Moore has analyzed his cases with reference to three main variables:

1. The strength of the bourgeois impulse in a given society. Moore believes that landed classes do not always have identical interests in terms of supporting the status quo. Certainly among these classes can be found groups who farm for profit and seek to expand their "business" further. Hence they can be regarded as supporters of capitalist economy rather than its opposition.
2. The form of commercial agriculture is another important variable for Moore. He divided commercial agriculture mainly into two types:
    a. The labor-repressive type, in which landlords directly control the peasants and organization of work and,
    b. the "market" type, in which the landlord does not directly control the peasants. Peasants can be hired and fired, and some sort of

labor market exists in this type. Such peasants are like Marx's urban proletariat.

3. The revolutionary potential of peasantry is an important factor for Moore as well. He claims that where a paternalistic relationship exists between landlord and peasants the potential for revolutionary uprising is considerably lower than where the relationship is overtly exploitative.

Moore also departed from Orthodox Marxism by considering the state as relatively independent from dominant classes. The state's relation to the dominant classes and peasantry and other classes in society is a very crucial analytical tool for Moore in analyzing his cases. He believes different arrangements and configurations of state, classes and the three above-mentioned variables have been the important factors in shaping the processes and outcome of his cases. In general, he distinguished three main patters for such processes:

1. In societies where the bourgeois impulse was relatively weak, agriculture was labor-repressive, and the state and landlords were unable or unwilling to promote modernization, as in China and Russia, peasant revolutions have been the vehicle of modernization.

2. In societies where the bourgeois impulse was not strong, the peasant revolutionary potential was low, and agriculture was labor-repressive, but where the state and portions of landlords were closely associated and willing to promote the modernizing process, the outcome has been fascist revolutions. Japan and Germany are examples of this sort of revolution.

3. In countries where the bourgeois impulse was strong, peasant revolutionary potential was low, agriculture was "market" oriented, and the state was relatively independent from classes, the outcome has been parliamentary democratic capitalism. England and the United States are examples of such configuration. France had the same outcome but with a slightly different process. In France, peasant revolutionary potential was high, agriculture was mainly labor-repressive, and the state was associated with landed classes, but because of a strong bourgeois impulse in the early stages of the modernizing process, the bourgeois democratic outcome resulted as well.

Moore used India as a non-revolutionary case for checking the outcome of his other cases. He suggests that India did not have a revolution because of the unique arrangement and configuration of low peasant revolutionary potential, weak bourgeois impulse, repressive labor agriculture and dependent state-landlord relationship. India was different from Germany and Japan in terms of the relative weakness of bourgeois impulse. She differed from the United States and England in her relative weakness of bourgeois impulse, labor-repressive agriculture and dependent state-landlord relation. In comparison with France, India did not have a strong bourgeois impulse and high peasant revolutionary potential. Her difference with Russia and China was with respect to India's low revolutionary potential of peasantry. Hence, Moore concluded that India did not experience any revolution because of both low peasant revolutionary potential and weak bourgeois impulse. Table 3.1 summarizes the above information.



Figure 2.1 Typology of Scientific Methods

Source: Lijphart Arned, The Comparative-Case Strategy in Comparative Research, Comparative political Studies 8 (July 1975), p. 162.

Table 3.1 Moore's Case Studies Analysis

Outcome	Case	System of Agr.	State/Class Relationship	Peasant Revolution Potential	Strength of Bourgeois Impulse
Non-revolution	India	Labor repressive	Dependent	Low	Weak
Peasant Communist Revolutions	China Russia	Labor repressive	Dependent	High	Weak
Fascist Revolutions	Germany Japan	Labor repressive	Dependent	Low	Moderate
Bourgeois Revolutions	England U.S.A.	Market	Independent	Low	Strong
	France	Labor repressive	Dependent	High	Strong

Source: Stan Taylor, <u>Social Science and Revolutions,</u> St. Martin Press, New York, 1984 p.31

Though Moore discussed rather lengthy revolutionary processes and outcomes he never developed and formulated a full-fledged theory of revolution which would account for causes, processes and outcomes.[1] Eric Wolf (1969) in his studies of the Mexican, Chinese, Vietnamese, Russian, Algerian, and Cuban revolutions has attempted to develop a theory of revolution that explains the occurrence of revolution in these societies.

Wolf argues that the global economy and penetration of the international market in local societies in general and peasant life in particular has an enormous impact in setting in motion a revolutionary process.

Traditional forms of life, subsistence farming, and the nature of landlord-peasant relations (becoming wage labor) have been transformed with the introduction and penetration of international market into villages.

Another important factor in Wolf's theory of peasant revolution is the structure of peasant communities. He claims that among different strata of peasants only "middle peasants" have the capability of participating in revolutionary movements, since the poorer peasants do not have sufficient resources to use against landlord and to be mobilized for power struggles. He argues

> Ultimately, the decisive factor in making a peasant rebellion possible lies in the relation of the peasantry to the field of power which surrounds it. A rebellion can not start from a situation of complete impotence. The poor peasant or landless laborer who depends on landlord for the largest part of his livelihood, or the totality of it, has no tactical power: he is completely within the power domain of his employer, without sufficient resources of his own to serve him as resources in the power struggle. Poor peasants and landless laborers, therefore, are unlikely to pursue the course of rebellion (Wolf, 1969:290).

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[1]For further discussion on Moore's ideas see Taylor, Social Science and Revolutions; Skocpol, A Critical Review of Barrington Moore's Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy; and Tilly From Mobilization to Revolution.

On the other hand, rich peasants do not have sufficient motivation to revolt against the status-quo, because:

> As employer of the labor of others, as money lender, as notable co-opted by the state machine, he exercises local power in alliance with external power holders. (Wolf, 1969 p. 291).

Hence, only the middle peasantry[2] due to its structural position, falling prices, unfavorable national market conditions, and the intolerable damage caused by the penetration of the international market in the villages, has the sufficient resources and motivation to embark on a revolutionary upheaval.[3]

Wolf concludes that

> The peasants rise to redress wrong; but the inequities against which they rebel are but, in turn, parochial manifestations of great social dislocations. Thus, rebellion issues easily into revolution, massive movements to transform the social structure as a whole. The battlefield becomes society itself, and when the war is over, society will have changed and the peasantry with it (Wolf, 1969:301).

Jeffery Paige (1975) is another influential social scientist who has developed a slightly different kind of theory of peasant revolution. He, like Wolf, also argues that impingement of international markets into the village and the structure of peasant life is an important factor in every peasant revolution. His difference with Wolf, however, lies in his emphasis on different kinds of relationship which exist between landlords and peasants. He believes that where landlords primarily derive wealth and income from landownership and peasants are mainly wage labor - either share-cropping or migratory

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[2]Middle peasantry for Wolf (1969) are small landowning peasants, or those who are in a peripheral region outside the domain of landlord control and have access to resources of their own and cultivated land with family labor.

[3]For further discussion of Wolf's view of peasants' revolutionary movements, see Walton, Relevant Rebels; Yeganeh, Agrarian Structure under Adaptation, Reform and Revolution; and Goldstone, Revolutions.

labor - the likelihood of peasant revolution is high, that where both landlord and peasant depend on land the chance of spontaneous revolt is high, and that where landlords primarily gain their wealth and income from other sources, the likelihood of reform and accommodation is high.

In explaining his claims, Paige argues that when the landlord primarily depends on land for his wealth, income and livelihood, he tends to be very uncompromising in giving up some of his privileges. Paige suggests that the landlords with wage-labor peasants,

> combine the inflexible behavior of the cultivators of a landed estate with the strong cultivator organizations of corporate planation. When both conditions exist simultaneously, the result is likely to be an agrarian revolution in which a strong peasant based guerilla movement organized by a nationalist or communist party attempts to destroy both the rural upper class and the institutions of the state and establish a new society (Paige, 1975:358-359).

Paige comes up with this theory through an intense and thorough analysis of the Peru, Angola and Vietnam Revolutions. Seventy developing countries were examined for supportive evidence.[4]

Though Moore, Wolf, and Paige have contributed to the development of the theory of peasant revolution, Theda Skocpol, by building on the works of these scholars, has proposed the most comprehensive theory of revolution yet.

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[4]For a more detailed analysis of Paige's idea see Skocpol, State and Social Revolutions, and Andride and Hopple, Revolution and Political Instability.

The Skocpol's Theory of Revolution

Moore, as has been noted, did not develop a full-fledged and comprehensive theory of revolution, though to a large extent, he pointed out the salient elements of a theory. Skocpol, one of his students at Harvard, furthered several of Moore's main points and developed a comprehensive theory of revolution which is considered one of the landmarks in the field.

Skocpol mainly attempts to explain why some societies have modernized and changed through social revolutions and others have modernized through other means. She also tries to account for their varying outcomes. As stated above, this study will not try to elaborate on the consequences and outcomes of revolutions; hence only the first objective of Skocpol, the causes of social revolution will be discussed.

Skocpol distinguishes between rebellion, political, and social revolutions. For her, rebellion, even when successful, does not eventuate in structural change; rather it involves a revolt of subordinate classes with no intention of societal transformation. Political revolution has been conceptualized by her as a change of state and elite structure, not societal structure. Skocpol argues that social revolutions

> are rapid, basic transformations of society's state and class structures; and they are accompanied by and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below. Social revolutions are set apart from other sorts of conflicts and transformative processes above all by the combination of two coincidences: the coincidence of societal structural change with class upheaval; and the coincidence of political with social transformation. (Skocpol, 1979: 4).

Skocpol claims her conception of social revolution differs from others in two important aspects. First, social revolution is a complex object and cannot be reduced to a single analytical feature - such as violence or political conflict - which may be common among many events of diverse nature and outcome. Second, this conception of social revolution identifies only successful sociopolitical changes -- actual changes of state and class structure -- as the defining characteristic of social revolution. For her, differing macro-structural and historical contexts are fundamental causes of successful social revolution, failed social revolution, and nonsocial-revolutionary change. Hence, considering complexity and success as the defining characteristics of social revolution, it is possible to classify only a few instances in history as social revolution. The structural and fundamental changes occurring in the process of modernization do not constitute social revolution, because they do not necessarily coincide with political revolution and elite displacement. In spite of opposition from the upper classes, quite conceivably, the ruling elite of a society can promote structural changes, as has been the case in Turkey, Japan, and Germany. But, for Skocpol, these cases cannot be classified as social revolution. For her social revolution must have the ingredients of lower class revolt and a transformation of the socio-political arrangement.

Skocpol's Emphasis on New Analytical Points

Although some of these analytical points have been discussed rather elaborately by social analysts since the beginning of recorded history, what makes Skocpol's emphasis different from the others, is her unique configuration of them to characterize and account for the occurrence of revolution.

Structural versus purposive analysis of revolution.

Skocpol argues that all the existing theoretical approaches, though differing in many respects, share a number of analytical elements in their analysis of revolution. They all believe, in one way or another, that conscious actors with purpose and goal translate and bridge the objective situation to the actual occurrence of revolution. For Gurr, politicization of widespread discontent through leaders; for Johnson personal disorientation followed by conversion to alternative revolutionary movement's value system; for Tilly, organized revolutionaries competing for power and sovereignty; for orthodox Marxists, Vanguard parties; and for a number of European Marxists (Lukacs, Gramci) class consciousness or "class-for-itself," are important factors in the discussion of revolution. Skocpol claims that purpose and volunteerism play important roles for a number of above scholars, because of their explicit or implicit presumption that societal order is possible only when a working consensus is present and that withdrawal of consensual support would lead to a radical reordering and transformation of society. She rejects the consensual approach to societal order on empirical grounds with reference to South Africa as a clear example of the presence of order through coercive means rather than majority consensus.

Skocpol argues that no revolution has ever been "made" by conscious actors or revolutionary agents. She believes that only when a state is militarily, economically, and politically paralysed, can revolutionary actors utilize the possibilities thus created to further the chance of a fundamental transformation and reordering of society. In fact, she claims history has witnessed many instances in which masses and leaders have acted independently and differently in revolutions with no organizational or ideological link to each other.

Skocpol points out that in historical revolution groups and classes are situated and motivated differently from one another. Understanding their objective "location" and "interests" and their "conflicts of interests" most certainly can be a fruitful mode of explanation and understanding. In her analysis of revolution she argues that these conflicts have been shaped and limited by existing socio-economic and international situations. Since many actors and variables are involved in the unfolding of revolutionary processes, not any one agency can be singled out, however important its role in the processes, as shaper, maker, or controller of revolution. And this is the reason why Skocpol argues that the outcome of revolution has never been the same as what had been foreseen or intended. She suggests that one can properly analyze the revolution

> only by focusing simultaneously upon the institutionally determined situations and relations of groups within society and upon the interrelations of societies within world-historically developing international structures. To take such an impersonal and nonsubjective viewpoint - one that emphasizes patterns of relationships among groups and societies - is to work from what may in some generic sense be called a structural perspective on socicohistorical reality (Skocpol, 1979:18).

<u>International and world-historical contexts.</u>

Skocpol's second analytical point in the discussion of revolution is the impact and influence of the international environment on a specific revolution. She argues that international relations have in previous revolutions powerfully helped the emergence of revolutionary processes and, to a large extent have determined the course of struggle and outcome as well.

Skocpol distinguishes two transnational realities which have strongly influenced and shaped the course of modern history. The spread of capitalist economy, she argues, has entailed greater flow of transnational trade, exchange, and investment across the globe. The world economy has continuously evolved as a unified system with capitalism as the dominant mode of production, exchange, and consumption. Nation-states in this world system are differently located and situated. Since this system is a stratified and hierchical entity, the locations of nations are very important in their transnational transactions. Those in the "core" have a privileged position in their transactions with "peripheries."

The spread of capitalism in the world has another important impact inside each nation-state as well. The emergence of a world capitalist economy has entailed uneven development, unequal exchange, and international division of labor throughout the globe. These processes have been accompanied by a restructuring of class relations; change in patterns of production, exchange, and consumption; and adjustment of the internal structure of society to correspond with and fulfill the needs and requirements of the capitalist world system.

A second transnational reality which Skocpol points out as an important factor in influencing the emergence, process, and outcome of revolution is the international states system. Unlike economic reductionist theorists who view the state as an instrument of ruling classes and groups, and thereby explain the state's transactions only in economic terms, Skocpol argues that states are potentially autonomous in their relation both with domestically powerful groups and with strong foreign states. She claims that the international states system was not created by capitalism and indeed had emerged before capitalism. Past history is full of instances of military competition and ventures, wars and spheres of political influence which many times have been principal causes of reorganizing societies through reform, coup d'etat, and revolution. For her, the international states system throughout modern world history:

> represents an analytically autonomous level of transnational reality - interdependent in its structure and dynamics with world capitalism, but not reducible to it. The military relevant strengths and international advantages (or disadvantages) of states are not entirely explicable in terms of their domestic economies or international economic positions. Such factors as state administrative efficiency, political capacities for mass mobilization. and international geographical position are also relevant (Skocpol, 1979: 22).

The structure of the world capitalist economy and the international state system together constituted one of the "contexts" in which nations should be seen and analyzed. "World time" is the other important context which, Skocpol argues, has crucial impact on particular models a revolution may follow and the options open to it. Previous revolutions not only have had tremendous influence in terms of ideas and ideals on later ones, but also have demonstrated the path and strategies of successful revolution. Most certainly the Bolshevik Party has been a very important breakthrough in this century in depicting the path and strategies of subsequent revolutions. Other events, like the Industrial Revolution and French Revolution, have been important factors in influencing later revolutions as well.

Hence, for Skocpol, the position of a state in the world to a large extent determines its chances of experiencing a revolution. She argues that states which are situated in disadvantaged positions both in the world capitalist system and the international states system have a higher likelihood of experiencing revolution. "World time" would determine the strategies and options of revolution as well.

<u>The potential autonomy of the state.</u>

Implicit in the above discussion of the international states system is Skocpol's belief that the state is potentially autonomous.

Skocpol rejects both the liberal and conflict theorists' view which sees the state as a political arena in which conflicts over socio-economic interests are fought out. She argues that liberal theorists view the state's authority in principle as contractual and consensual while conflict theorists view it as coercive and dominating.

Subscribers to the consensual view of the state [whether formation of consensus has utilitarian (Gurr) or valuative (Johnson) reasons] believe the state cannot consistently and continually exercise coercion and force against the will of majority for a long period of time. For them, once consensus does not exist, the state is condemned to collapse.

Conflict theorists (Lenin, Tilly) view the state as an arena in which socio-economic conflicts are resolved through coercion rather than consensus. For them the state is organized coercion which controls the principal means of suppression (army, police, etc.), and would exercise it against any popular or unpopular uprising.

Hence, successful revolution for consensual theorists is an indication of the state's loss of legitimacy in the minds of the majority of people, while for conflict theorists it is an indication of the incapacitation of the state's suppressive apparatus. However, it should be pointed out again that the state for conflict theorists is the direct instrument of the ruling group and class and does not have any autonomy in its action. Indeed, many times in their analysis the state and ruling class or group are not distinguishable from one another but are simply meshed together.

In reaction to the above theorizing on the state, a number of neo-marxists such as Poulantzas, Therborn, Offe, and Milband, have developed an alternative perception. They argue that the state is not the direct instrument of the ruling class or group but rather is relatively autonomous from a ruling class and need not be a direct instrument of it. The principal function of a state is to preserve the long term interests of the dominant class and not short term interests of any one member of that class within the broad structural constraints which the dominent mode of production places upon the range of state actions and options.

Skocpol argues that all of the theorists named above are concerned with "how" states vary with and function for the dominant mode of production and ruling class. The state has not been considered in its own right with a logic and interests of its own. Skocpol has an "organizational" or "realist" perception of the state. The state is an actual organization which attempt to control territories and peoples. Though conditioned by the international context and the class structure, the state is autonomous in its relations and activities from them. Skocpol believes the state properly conceived

> is no mere arena in which socioeconomic struggles are fought out. It is, rather, a set of administrative, policing, and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by an executive authority. Any state first and fundamentally extracts resources from society and deploys these to create and support coercive and administrative organizations. Of course, the basic state organizations are built up and must operate within the context of class-divided socioeconomic relations,

as well as within the context of national and international economic dynamics (Skocpol, 1979:29).

The state, Skocpol argues, competes with dominant classes in extracting resources from the economy and society to finance its basic functions and plans. And the allocation of resources is not always in a direction to benefit the dominant class. In fact, many times, as has been the case in revolutions from above or below, the state's interests has conflicted with dominant class interests. She points out that where the state has been sufficiently strong and independent from dominant class, revolution from above has occurred; and where the opposite has been true, revolution from below has happened.[5]

For Skocpol the state has two fundamental functions to perform: maintaining order within and competing with other actual or potential states in an international context.

Like the Marxists, she believes that the state does support the existing class structure and economic order but for totally different reasons. For the state, preserving the status quo is the smoothest way to maintain order. And when there is a crisis, the state does not hesitate to make concessions to subordinate classes against the dominant class to retain order.

As noted above, states are situated in a stratified world system. They compete among themselves for survival and, when possible, upward mobility. A state's activities are conditioned and limited both by its geopolitical situation in the international environment and by the existing economy and class structure inside its territory.

Many times international threat and economic competition may force the state to

[5]For a further discussion on this issue see Skocpol and Trimberger," Revolutions and the World-Historical Development of Capitalism" in Kaplan, Social Change in the Capitalist World Economy.

attempt policies that contradict the interests of dominant classes within. For instance, a military threat or conquest can force the state to impose new measures for more revenue from the economy and to appropriate more resources from the dominant class and, when necessary, even change the course of national development. Past history and past revolutions are witnesses to this fact.

The state has a very central role in Skocpol's analysis of society. She believes that social revolution occurs when the state attempts to appropriate resources to finance modernization of the economy, army, and administrative apparatus and is in intersectioned between international pressures on the one hand and class struggle and class conflict on the other.

Structural perspectives, international and historical contexts, and the potential autonomy of the state, are important analytical elements utilized by Skocpol to account for social revolution. The comparative method, which was elaborated in Chapter II, has also been an important tool for her study of social revolution. An attempt to lay out the main ingredients of Skocpol's theory of social revolution now follows.

Skocpol believes that a revolutionary situation arises when an agrarian bureaucracy faces international challenges and pressures on the one hand, and on the other lacks the capacity to extract sufficient resources to finance the means of standing against the foreign pressure. Such situations paralyze the state, thus providing the opportunity for susceptible peasants to revolt. The above points require elaboration.

The general characteristics of agrarian bureaucracies.

Agrarian bureaucracies are societies in which agriculture is the dominant source and mode of production. In such societies, the majority of the people live in rural areas and land is the principal means of subsistence. In most circumstances, agricultural products are divided between peasants and landed upper class in rather diverse patterns and with different ratios. In these societies market relations also exist but are mainly local and regional.

A centralized state, Skocpol argues, with relatively differentiating administrative apparatus and an organized military as the principal means of coercion exists in such societies.

However, these states are weak relative to modern nation-state. Not only are they not able to, for instance, reorganize the local relations of production and consumption, but also they cannot exercise sufficient direct control over vital resources. Their main functions are maintaining necessary general order, defending the society or waging wars against foreigners, and appropriating enough taxes for bare survival. Since a landed upper class is the chief authority in rural life, states normally collect taxes indirectly through this class or directly from the peasants but with reliance on and the cooperation of members of the landed upper class. The central state, in turn, uses its coercive power when needed to secure the return of rents, taxes and other dues, to the landed upper class. Hence, an interdependent relationship exists between the central state and the landed upper class. They need the help of one another in regard to appropriation of peasant surpluses. However, as will be discussed shortly, the interest of one is not necessarily identical with that of the other. They may be mutually exclusive.

Peasants, as mentioned above, are being exploited by both the state and the landed upper class. Skocpol believes that the very nature of such a relationship is prone to periodic revolt, particularly if it coincides with fluctuation in food prices, higher taxes, and higher rents. Indeed history has recorded many such peasants rebellions. Sometimes the peasants have been able to destabilize the existing institutional relationship, but most of the time they have been suppressed.

Skocpol argues that modernization, too, has been and still has the potential to be the destabilizing phenomenon in agrarian societies. She understands modernization as not merely an intrasocietal process, but also as an intersocietal phenomenon. Once a state has achieved a higher level of technological advancement, a more efficient administrative apparatus, a stronger and better equipped army, and more of the world market, such achievements most certainly put immediate pressures on competing states to launch the same processes.

Though launching modernization processes seems a necessary action on the part of the state, extracting enough revenue to finance such processes undoubtedly is a challenging task for it. A high proportion of revenue in agrarian societies, as pointed out above, comes from peasants surpluses. Due to maximum surplus extraction from peasants for other functions and objectives, squeezing more revenue from them to finance modernization processes may not be conceivable and practical. Hence, other sources of revenue must be examined if modernization processes are to be launched. In agrarian bureaucracies the only available source for such purpose is the landed upper class. This class, as noted above, has relatively strong authority and control in rural areas and is the crucial partner of the central state in exploiting the peasants and hence is unwilling to change such relationship and give up its privileges. Thus the state's options and actions are severely limited in such a structured relationship.

Social revolution has been one of the main vehicles for resolving such situations. Social revolutions, through a fundamental reorganization of economy and class structure, have been able to create a more centralized state, a more efficient administrative apparatus, and a more organized military. However, one important question immediately comes to mind and should be posed here. Since in all agrarian societies the peasants discontent is present and almost the same pattern of relationship between state and landed upper class exist, why have some of these societies experienced social revolution and others not? Skocpol argues that magnitudes of international pressure, the structure of peasant life, and the presence of an independent elite are important factors in the occurrence of social revolution in some of these societies and not in others. Below is an elaboration on each of these factors.

Foreign pressures and administrative/military collapse.

As discussed above, in all modernizing agrarian societies a conflict of interest objectively exists between the central state and that landed upper class. A central state under economic and military pressure from outside has to reform the economy and army for its very survival. A landed upper class, on the other hand, has the rural power, prestige, interest, and control which its very livelihood depends upon and hence is reluctant to give them up. Two possible outcomes can be assumed for the resolution of such a conflict: a) the state's breakdown and emergence of a new state capable of reorganizing society and economy; b) the state is able, under such pressure, to reorganize the society and economy.

Skocpol argues that the first outcome will come about if the state and army are staffed - particularly in the middle and upper ranks - from among the landed upper class. In such a case, the state cannot easily make a decision about modernization process but even when such a decision is made, the state cannot enforce it, because of military reluctance to suppress the class from which its leadership is chiefly drawn. Skocpol believes such a condition leads to military and administrative collapse, which paves the way for peasant revolts.

The second outcome occurs when military and state are not staffed from among landed upper class. Due to the independence of the leadership, reorganization of political structure and class relations and decisions about modernization can be made and "enforced" without the state's being overturned. Such processes and outcome have been characterized by Trimberger (1978) as "revolution from above."

However, it should be noted that there are cases in which the state has had the independence and capability to launch modernization process but, due to tremendous pressure from outside, particularly involvement in war, has become so much incapacitated, that it could not prevent a subsequent peasants rebellion and social revolution. Russia is the best example of a state's loss of capacity through foreign pressure and war. Her involvement in World War I consumed so much of the state's resources that there was no force capable of suppressing the peasants insurrection. Hence, the magnitude of foreign pressure, the institutional pattern of the state and army recruitment are crucial factors in the breakdown of old regime states.

The above discussion has dealt with the conditions under which societal control would collapse and hence pave the way for social revolution, the focus of analysis being from the top down. Now the focus will be reversed. What sort of peasant community is susceptible or conducive to insurrection and social revolution?

Peasant insurrections.

Skocpol argues that peasant insurrections though given less attention than other factors, have been crucial in all previous social revolutions. She argues that though urban unrest has been important in previous social revolutions, it is minor in comparison with that of the peasants, who represent the dominant mode of production and the major part of the population. Skocpol distinguishes two aspects of peasant revolt as having been crucial in previous social revolutions. The first aspect is extensiveness of the revolt across the land and the second, its direction against the landlords. As discussed above, peasants have always had sufficient economic grievances to rebel, but they usually cannot make their rebellion society-wide because of the repressive power of the state or the landlords. But in previous social revolutions, Skocpol argues, owing to incapacitation of the state's coercive power and the particular institutional pattern of village life, the peasant rebellions became rapidly widespread. The anti-landlord characteristics too, are quite understandable due to visibility of landlord as prerogator, extractor of their surpluses, the owner of land, and the collector of taxes and rents. Skocpol believes that it is this concrete unjust situation that made the peasants "revolutionary" in previous revolutions, not, as some have argued; their conversion to radical ideology or desire to have a strong nation-state.

However, the presence of grievances and objective unjust relationships do not fully account for why and how peasants revolt.

Skocpol claims that peasants cannot revolt from a situation of total impotence. They require some sort of "internal leverage" or "tactical mobility", - an organized capacity to engage collectively against landlords - to be able to launch revolts. Unlike Wolf (1969), who thinks "middle peasants" are more revolutionary, Skocpol argues that middle peasants or small land holders alone can not explain peasant revolt. She believes that the fundamental factors in any valid explanation of a peasant insurrectionary movement are: a) institutional patterns of peasants' relations to one another, to their tools and land in the village; b) the institutional pattern of the peasants'relations to landlords; and c) the state capacity or lack of capacity to repress the revolts. Since "c" has already been discussed, "a" and "b" will be further elaborated.

To understand fully the structural condition of peasants' life, Skocpol believes attention must be focused on both class relations and local political arrangements. She claims that in communities in which the village as a single unit is responsible for production, land, tools, rents, and other dues, the sense of solidarity and cohesiveness is stronger than in those communities where such an institutional arrangement does not prevail. In such communities normally day-to-day decisions about many aspects of life are being made autonomously by the community itself and landlords do not intervene in such processes. They collect taxes, rents, and other dues through particular arrangements with the leaders of the village. Skocpol argues that such arrangements unite the individual village families and give them very important autonomy and "tactical mobility" against landlords. As Goldstone puts it

> what appears to be important is not merely the level of grievances, but whether such grievances are widely shared and widely directed at the same target. When the state sharply increases taxes or landlords raise the dues of whole villages or seek to take over village lands, entire village share common grievances toward obvious targets. But where villages have few or no communal lands, or where each family holds land under different obligations to landlords, some families may suffer great hardships and yet whole villages will not rise in revolt. (Goldstone, 1980:10).

As previously stated, the local political structure is also important in widespread occurrence of a peasant revolt. If the sanctioning apparatus is locally controlled, Skocpol argues, the likelihood of widespread rebellion would be diminished. She believes that as long as the repressive machinery is centrally controlled and is being applied effectively to suppress the rebellion, the likelihood of its becoming widespread also diminishes. But once centrally controlled machinery, due to international pressure, loses its effectiveness and unity, peasants can then utilize such situations to launch and direct their revolts and anger against the landlords and indeed against the whole complex of agrarian relations. Thus, who controls the means of coercion is also a fundamental factor in discussion of peasant revolts. Hence for Skocpol a successful peasant revolt is possible only when and where several key factors like peasant solidarity and community; peasant capacity; and landlord vulnerability simultaneously coincide and coexist.

Skocpol proposes that none of the above factors that are necessary for social revolutions to occur, can be "planned" or "made" by some revolutionary groups or party:

In the highly abnormal circumstances of social revolution, administrative

> breakdown, political rebellions of marginal elites, and peasant insurrections "interacted" to produce transformations that none alone could have occasioned or accomplished. (Goldstone, 1980:79).

The marginal elite.

The other important ingredient which Skocpol believes should be present for a social revolution to occur is an urban independent elite.

Skocpol argues, that typically when social theorists analyze the elite's role in social revolutions, they are mainly concerned with the elite's socio-economic background or seeking to establish some sort of relationship between what elites preach and propagate on the one hand, and what they gain on the other. Such social theorists usually presume that elites are representative of certain classes or groups which are pursuing their class or group interests. If the elites' social backgrounds are manifestly different from what they are preaching or struggling for, then these social theorists would link their struggle to their ideological orientations, which in the final analysis have subsequent social interests for them. Thus for such social analysts the role of the elite in social revolutions is the promotion of their class, group, or ideological interests.

Skocpol believes that knowing the general backgrounds of elites would hardly help us to make valid predictions. If one knows, for instance, that the elites are mainly from a certain group or have a particular ideological orientation, one is not, logically speaking, in a position to predict the occurrence of social revolution or the shape of its outcome.

Skocpol claims that in analyzing the elite's role in social revolution, the state should be the central focus. She primarily looks at elites as would be state builders whose main concern is rationalization, centralization, and bureaucratization of state power rather than simply being representative of a certain class or group in society whose benefit they attempt to secure. Skocpol searches the elites' background but for a totally different reason -- mainly for their "career" orientation, to find out how their backgrounds correspond to their future role as state builders. Not surprisingly, she found that in previous revolutions the core constituent of participant elites has been from educated groups with interests in and orientation toward state activities and employment. They were professionals[6] who, due to lack of nobility or connection to dominant classes or lack of wealth, had been deprived of upward social mobility in the state or society. In agrarian societies, such marginal elites always have sufficient grievances and interests to participate in the mobilization and organization of the masses in social revolutions and to build and consolidate state power in revolutionary interregnum.

However, it should be pointed out that international contexts have been important not only in economic, military, and political matters but in cultural matters as well.

The emergence of capitalism as the dominant mode of economic development in some countries has influenced educated groups of other countries to pursue the same objectives in their own societies. For these educated, professional groups, whether inside the state or outside of it, whether belonging to radical or conservative camps, the state has been viewed as the primary and principal vehicle of economic, political, and military development , both at home and abroad. Such marginal elites, once revolutionary crises due to international pressure and peasants insurrections have paralyzed the old regime

[6]Lawyers, middle-level military or administrative officials of the old regime, engineers, doctors, etc.

states, do not and will not hesitate, according to Skocpol, to seize the state power and apparatus to build a new agency capable of enhancing national economic and military standing.

Revolutionary ideology is an important and relevant issue in discussion of the elite's role in social revolutions. Skocpol argues that an incorrect view of the function of ideology exists among a number of social scientists in general and politicians in particular. Such scholars claim that the ideological orientation of leadership is a very important parameter in the destruction of the old regime and the shaping of its successor. Leadership committed to Marxism-Leninism, they argue, would perceive the old regime state differently and employ a different strategy for its destruction, in comparison to a liberal view. Most certainly they have a different vision and program about the outcome of a revolution as well. Thus, for these scholars ideology provides a blueprint of the way leadership confronts the old regime state and a practical agenda and strategies for its replacement. Otherwise, how can the diverse patterns of the destruction of states and their diverse subsequent outcomes be accounted for?

Skocpol rejects such a view with reference to past social revolutions. She argues that the patterns of state destruction and subsequent outcomes of previous social revolutions have been greatly different from what the particular ideology and leadership committed to each had announced. Because of the changing structures of societies and of the international and world historical contexts, leadership have to adjust and indeed have adjusted the ideology so as to fit the emerging and evolving situation while, in turn, such an adjustment has helped them to gain, maintain, and expand their power.

However, for Skocpol, the role and functions of ideology are: 1) to establish and hold the integrity and cohesiveness of the leadership committed to it; 2) to provide an appropriate platform or framework to unite a diverse population[7] with particularistic backgrounds -- ethnic, religious, racial, etc.; 3) to provide justification for leadership's action and the objectives and means of achieving those objectives, on the one hand, and the unquestioned submission, acceptance and commitment of the masses to them on the other. In sum, Skocpol believes that the elite's behavior is and has been limited by the structural conditions of society, and by international and world historical contexts in recent and in previous social revolutions. Such limitations have been the principal reasons why elites with similar ideological orientation have acted quite differently in revolutionary processes, and have produced quite different outcomes from those they had originally believed in and proposed.

Skocpol claims such facts should not seem surprising since

> revolutionary crises are "not" total breakpoint in history that suddenly make anything at all possible if only it is envisaged by willful revolutionaries! There are several reasons why this is so. For one thing, revolutionary crises have particular forms, and create specific concatenations of possibilities and impossibilities, according to how these crises are originally generated in given old-regimes under given circumstances. Furthermore, although a revolutionary crisis does entail institutional breakdowns and class conflicts that quickly change the parameters of what is possible in the given society, many conditions -- especially socioeconomic conditions -- always "carry over" from the old regime (1979: 171).

To sum up Skocpol's theory of revolution, it should be pointed out that she argues that only a certain type of society, an agrarian regime, is prone and susceptible to social

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[7]This is of course, a characteristic and function of universalist ideologies like Marxism- Leninism.

revolution. When collapse of societal control due to international pressure - particularly military threat or defeat - coincides with peasant insurrection and marginal elite involvement, social revolutions happen and would act as the vehicle of changing class relations, and enhancing the national standing of revolutionary societies in the international environment. Figure 3.1 summarizes Skocpol's theory of revolution.

Criticism

As stated in Chapter I of this dissertation, Skocpol defines social revolution as "rapid, basic transformations of society's state and class structures [that] are accompanied and in part carried through by class-based revolts from below."

1. The problem with such conceptualization of social revolution lies in the vagueness of terms like "rapid", "basic", and "class-based revolts." How can the rapidity and basicness of a change be measured?

   Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia of 1990 present a good example of societies which can not be easily identified by the above criterions as societies which have experienced social revolution. Have the processes of change in these societies been sufficiently "rapid" to be considered as Social revolution? Have the changes been thorough enough and "basic" that qualify the event as social revolution? Have the processes been carried through and accompanied by class-based revolt? Answers to these questions are not as obvious and straightforward as they have been for the cases which Skocpol studied. Because of such ambiguity and vagueness,



Figure 3.1 Skocpol Model of Revolution

Source: Jack Goldstone, <u>Theories of Revolutions: The Third Generation</u>, World Politics, 32(April 1980)

Skocpol's conception of social revolution needs further refinement and clarification.

2. Linking the objective structures to the actual outbreak of revolution has not been adequately explicated in Skocpol's theory. Indeed, obsession with "structures" has made her theory sacrifice or dismiss non-structural "facts" or "factors" which did not fit. Even where non-structural "facts" or "factors" have been so salient and obvious that they could not be ignored or dismissed, they have been used and employed, unjustifiably, with a structural connotation and frame of reference. For instance, competition among states as noted earlier is a very crucial factor, Skocpol argues, for setting in motion the process of social revolution. But competition in the sense and context which Skocpol applies, undoubtedly is a non-structural phenomenon, because it depends, to a large extent, on rulers perception of their principal rivals. For instance, who was Iran competing with and why in 1977-79? Was it Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, Iraq, or the West? In fact, it is hard to establish that Iran was competing with these countries, but even if Iran was competing with them, still one cannot proclaim with which one or ones and why except with reference to the ruling groups' perception of their principal rivals. Therefore, referring to the states' competition does not make the argument "structural."

3. As Chalmers Johnson (1982:173) argues, most of the structural mode of analysis is an integral part of a theory of history as well. Subscribers to

such a mode of explanation view history as a live entity with a logic, rules and laws of its own. History for these scholars is directed and moving toward some particular set of goals, objectives, and destination. Hence, a structural analysts' main task would be to search history to "discover" the rules and laws which govern it. Skocpol, as a structural analyst, argues that societies will experience modernization either through revolution from above or from below. And her main task is to "discover" when societies experience revolution from above and below.[8] The major weakness of such theories, Johnson (1982) argues

> is their inability to deal with political change that falls outside their definitions. Structural theorists usually devise a subclass of "true," "classic," or "great" revolutions, and as a result cannot characterize a development as revolutionary until several decades or generations have passed - that is, until it can be clearly seen whether the event contributed to democracy, modernization, a realignment of classes, a new mode of production, or whatever criterion is held to be the mark of true revolution.

4. As Himmilstein and Kimmel (1981) noted, one of the greatest shortcomings of Skocpol's theory of social revolution lies in her failure to explain and describe the processes which intervene between and bridge the preconditions and outcomes. Skocpol, as a structuralist, downgrades or dismisses the importance of factors like ideology, leadership - in terms of setting short-term tactics and strategies - and political organization,

[8]As Taylor (1984) points out, "Skocpol claims concerning inevitability and the primacy of structural variables could only be fully substantiated if she had developed her model independently of particular cases and then demonstrated its predictive powers (which ran counter to the comparative historical method) or if she had transformed conclusions based upon case studies into hypotheses which could be tested by reference to other cases."

which are and should be integral and indispensable ingredients of a comprehensive theory of revolution.[9]

5. The Relative or potential autonomy of the state has been perceived and welcomed by many Neo-marxists in recent years as an advance in the conceptualization and analysis of the state. Although the relative autonomy of the state has been widely and hotly debated, its definition and boundaries are a matter of dispute and controversary among Marxists scholars. Is the state autonomous in its action and behavior toward the forces of international state system, world capitalism, world time, ruling class, lower classes, and/or other structures? Subscribers to such a view of the state may agree that the state is "relatively" autonomous with respect to class structure and class relation, but, in regard to the other aspects, controversy and ambiguity are more prevalent. Even the state's autonomy in its relation to other classes has been accompanied by the vague concept of "relativity," which, unless its boundaries can be depicted, is nothing more than a polemical term for immunizing the analysis from being falsified by empirical facts.

6. Although Skocpol recognizes the empirical importance of world historical

[9]It should be pointed out that Skocpol, in an article about Iranian Revolution (1982) has admitted the inadequacy of her own "structural" perspective. Her failure, she believes, is due to assigning inadequate weight to the "possible role of ideal systems and cultural understandings in the shaping of political action." She further wrote (1982):"I was unremittingly critical of all theorists who have assumed that revolutions are "made" deliberately by revolutionary, mass-based social movements. Instead I insisted on a structural perspective to get at the historically unfolding intersections of the efforts of differently situated and differently motivated groups - groups not operating even under the shared rubric of a revolutionary ideology."

time, she has not been successful in accounting for it theoretically in her analysis of social revolution. As Taylor (1984:47) notes, she has employed world historical time "not as a genuine independent variable, but as a means of enabling the ad hoc introduction of explanations to rectify deficiencies in the predictive power of other variables."

7. As noted above, Skocpol downgrades the importance of leadership in her analysis of social revolution. It might be true that leadership cannot create a revolutionary situation by itself, but, undoubtedly, once such a situation emerges, without leadership to unite the opposition[10] and to exploit the emerging situation and resources, the old regime state cannot be overthrown. Neither are old regime's rulers passive receivers of "structural" forces.

8. The cognitive content of ideologies, Skocpol argues, cannot "in any sense provide a predictive key to either the outcome of revolutions or the activities of revolutionaries, who built the state organizations that consolidate the revolutions."[11] Because of many factors, ideologies may be adjusted so as to promote the gaining, maintaining and expanding of power for leadership, but such adjustment is not absolute and limitless. For instance, it can be predicted that in an orthodox Marxist-Leninist type of revolution, a free-enterprise economic system would not have as salient

[10]Leadership may unite the opposition by focusing on issues and ideologies which provide susceptible and solidifying cross-cutting alliances (Greene, 84:83).

[11]Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions.

a role as it might have in a non-orthodox Marxist-Leninist revolution. Thus, though the content of ideologies may not give us an exact prediction of future action, nevertheless it gives us general boundaries and the likelihood of actions and alternatives.

9. If ideologies are not a constant in an analysis of revolution and are variables, what are the principal causes and sources of their variance? Do similar structures give rise to similar ideologies? Can different structures give rise to similar ideologies or similar structures give rise to different ideologies? Is ideology a dependent variable required to be explained by other variables in a theory of revolution or is it an independent variable that would provide partial explanation for the occurrence of revolution? To be valid and comprehensive a theory of revolution should have a clear and adequate conception of ideology and answer to the above questions.

10. Skocpol argues that war has been a fundamental factor in providing susceptible foundations for the incapacitation of the state and subsequent social revolution. But as Goldstone (1986:15) points out,

> although in some instances war has led to revolution, empirical studies have shown that the relationship between wars and internal political instability in general is weak. For the past two centuries virtually the broad relationship between defeat in war and occurrence of social revolution is nil.

11. Skocpol also does not pay enough attention to geopolitical and ecological factors in formulation of her theory. Geographical, the location of a

country undoubtedly play an important role not only in the occurrence of a revolution but in the shape of its outcome as well. Hungry in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, El Salvador in 1990 are all good examples of societies which might have experienced revolutions but did not mainly due to their geographical position. Natural resources, population - its density, diversity -, water, weather, natural characteristics, - mountains, deserts, distance between cities and villages, communicational facilities and infrastructures, are all important factors for the emergence, success or failure of a revolution which have to be incorporated as an integral part of a theory of revolution.

This chapter has set forth the main ingredients of Skocpol's theory of social revolution as well as the influences and impacts of other scholars on her. Finally, her theory has been criticized mainly on theoretical grounds.[12] The next three chapters will lay the foundation to examine her work with emphasis on empirical grounds.

[12]For a detailed review of Skocpol's theory of revolution see Goldstone, Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation; Taylor, Social Science and Revolution; Farhi, State Disintegration and Urban-Based Revolutionary Crisis.

CHAPTER IV

THE IRANIAN STATE BEFORE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

Iran is a plateau with mountains, uninhabitable deserts and agricultural lands both irrigated and unirrigated. It is a country of 1.64 million square kilometers - 627,000 square miles - which is equal to the size of western Europe. Deserts and poor pastures constitute approximately 70 percent of the total land. The fifty million - according to the census of 1988 - people of Iran live in about 15 percent of the country's land. On the north the Alborz Mountains divide the plateau from the coastal lowlands of the Caspian Sea. Mountains, deserts and rivers have always been fundamental factors in the mode of settlement and principal barriers between diverse ethnic groups. On the south, southwest and west, the Zagros, another range of mountains which is parallel to Alborz, separate the plateau from the Persian Gulf Coastal lowland, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, and Lurestan. The plateau region on the east and southeast gradually merges into the highlands of Afghanistan and Baluchestan. Two large deserts, Dashte-e-Kavir and Dashte-lut, constitute about 50 percent of Iran's total land. Average rainfall is generally low - about 16 inches - for the country, and many of the farmers rely on irrigation water for cultivation. The complex climate of Iran ranges from subtropical to subpolar with 131° F (55° C) in Khuzestan and -35° F (-37° C) in Azerbaijan. Figure 4.1 portrays Iran's provinces.



Figure 4.1 Provinces and Cities

Source: Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, Penguine, Middlesex, 1979.

Russia to the north, has the largest borders with Iran. Iraq and Turkey are located on the southwest and northwest. Iran is bounded by Afghanistan and Pakistan on the east and northeast and the Persian Gulf is Iran's southern border.

Cultural and Demographical Information

The natural geography of Iran has provided a safe refuge for different religions and ethnic groups. Iran is a multi-ethnic society in which Persians constitute about 50 percent of the total population. Language, religion and tribal affiliation are fundamental variables in ethnic identity. Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2 presents shows the ethnic and linguistic groups of Iran.

Islam and the Persian language are the two most important factors in creating a sense of national culture and national identity. Shia, a minority sect in the Muslim world, is the religion of 90 percent of the Iranian people. Shia became the official religion of Iranian state during the Safavid dynasty (155-1 - 1722). Figure 4.3 portrays the geographical distribution of minority religions of Iran.

Iran's population has increased from an estimated 9.9 million at the beginning of this century to 14.6 million in 1940, 20.4 million in 1956, 27 million in 1966, 33.6 million in 1976 and 50 million in 1988 (Halliday, 1979). In the 1930's about 21 percent of the total population lived in urban centers; by 1956 this had increased to 31 percent; in 1976 approximately 47 percent of the population lived in urban centers; and by 1988 this had risen to 56 percent. Due to natural characteristics and governmental policies population distribution is very uneven in Iran. The largest concentration is in Central

Table 4.1 Major Ethnic and Linguistic Groups in Iran

Group	Ethnic Percentage	Linguistic
Iranian		
Persian	50	50.2
Kurdish	6.5	5.6
Gilani	6.5	6.1
Lori	2.5	5.7
Baluchi	1.5	2.3
Turkish		
Azarbaijani	22	20.6
Qashqai	1.5	
Turkoman	0.5	1.7
Semitic		
Arabic	2.5	2.0
Assyrian		0.4
Armenian		
Armenian	0.25	0.6

Source: John Limbert, Iran at War with History, Boulder, Westview Press, 1987, p. 21.
Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1971, p. 179.



Figure 4.2 Linguistic Groups

Source: Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, Penguine Books, Middlesex, 1979.



Figure 4.3 Iran: Minority Religions

Source: John Limbert, Iran at War with History, Westview Press, Boulder, 1987, p. 30.

province where Tehran alone accounts for over a fifth of Iran's population (Halliday, 79; Limbert, 87). Figure 4.4 portrays the Iran's population density in 1966, and Table 4.2 presents the latest statistics on Iran.

Historical Background

Iran has been a unified nation with a centralized state for at least 25 centuries. Egypt is the only country in the Middle East which has a longer history as a unified nation than Iran. In its continuous existence over 25 centuries Iran has been repeatedly invaded by foreign powers; it has had numerous cultural and economical encounters with its neighbors; it has gone through different periods of internal violence and instability; and many dynasties have forcefully inaugurated their reign and have been reluctantly forced to abdicate it. Although in different times in its history, parts have been annexed or separated from Iran, and different languages, customs, religions, and rulers have been imposed or introduced to it, once the occasion has passed, the people have accepted what they considered right for them and have rejected the rest. Even when Iran accepted-Islam in seventh century A.D., unlike other countries in the Middle East or North Africa, she did not change her language or lose her cultural identity. Rather she adapted and flourished within the new framework of Islamic civilization (Limbert, 469, 1987).[1]

The Achaemenian dynasty (559-330 B.C.) established the first Persian empire,

[1]For a thorough discussion of Iran's contribution to Islam and Islamic contribution to Iran see Motahari "Khadamate Moteqabel Islam va Iran." (Islam and Iran: A Historical Study of Mutual Services) This book has been translated to English in several parts in Al-Tawhid Vol. VI, No. 2,3,4 in 89. and Vol. VII No.1 1989.



Figure 4.4 Population Density 1966

Source: Fred Halliday, <u>Iran: Dictatorship and Development</u>, Penguine, Middlesex, 1979.

Table 4.2 Some General Information on Iran

General Profile	
Area	1,648,000 SQ KM
Population 1988	51,924,000
Population Growth	3.23%
Population Density	32 /SQ KM
GNP 1988 (Millions)	$82,169
GNP per Capita	$1,582
Capital City	TEHRAN
Literacy Rate	48%
Urbanization	51.4%
Age Distribution:	
% Male 0-4	9.1%
% Female 0-4	8.5%
% Male 5-14	13.4%
% Female 5-14	12.4%
% Male 15-24	9.6%
% Female 15-24	9.1%
% Male 25-34	6.9%
% Female 25-34	6.4%
% Male 35-44	5.0%
% Female 35-44	4.7%
% Male 45-54	3.5%
% Female 45-54	3.4%
% Male 55-64	2.3%
% Female 55-64	2.2%
% Male 65~	1.7%
% Female 65~	1.8%

Source: PC Globe, Collected by Dr. Mehdi Kaighobadi.

which ruled much of the world for about two centuries. This dynasty created a centralized state and army which were essential for securing the reign. Achaemenian divided the empire into different provinces with a governor in charge of each province, with civil power for collecting the king's taxes. The army too had different divisions throughout the empire where officials were responsible directly to the king. Standard gold and silver coinage were established and considered to be the symbol of power for the reigning king. However, due to provincial revolts and lack of efficient machinery, the Achemanian dynasty was ended in 330 B.C.

Other dynasties ruled Iran for several centuries until the Sassanid dynasty (224-651 A.D.) assumed power and created a centralized state and rigid stratified society with the king and his family at the top; clergy, army officials, and rich artisans next; and the rest of society - mainly peasants - at the bottom of the ladder. Very large scale irrigation in the Tigris-Euphrates River Valley and mercantile trade formed the backbone of Sasanid economy (Akhavi in Banuazizi, 1986). Social mobility upward or downward was uncommon. Each stratum believed its position was a natural manifestation of good and righteousness. Justice, it was beleived, would be best served if everyone did his utmost to strive to perform his predetermined duty. During the Sassanid reign agricultural production increased, population grew, customs changed, new cities emerged, and a more efficient centralized administration materialized. Zoroastrianism became the state religion, and religious tolerance diminished in this period.[2]

A majority of the Achaemenid and Sasanid kings formed relatively strong central

[2]For a full account of Iran's history before Islam see Girshamn, Iran From the Earliest Times to the Islamic Conquest

bureaucracies which enabled them to process transformations in demographic patterns, agricultural output, craft production, market exchanges, and social ceremonies (Akhavi in Banuazizi, 1986).

Islamic Period

With the advent of Islam in the seventh century A.D. and conquests of Iran by its forces, Iranian society underwent a thorough change not only in the composition of its dominant forces but also in the very fabric of society. The state's roles and functions were no longer conceived of as before and its merger with religion in the early years of Islam created an awesome power which influenced all aspects of life, both personal and social.

Conceptions about the state require an elaboration of the notions of Ummah[3] and Imamah - or Khilafah. The concept of Ummah denotes a religio-political body with a worldwide membership of all those who believe in God and His prophet, Mohammad (Sachedina, 81). Ummah life and organization is associated and sustained by its leader - Imam or Caliph. The leader in Islamic political theory, and in the early years of Islamic practices as well, functioned both in spiritual and temporal realms. In Shia the spiritual authority of Imam included the power to interpret the message embodied in the Quran without corrupting the revelation, and to guide the faithful toward salvation (Sachedina,

[3]The word Umma is derived from the Arabic etymological root meaning mother or source, by which it comes to have more expanded meaning of Islamic community or organic family of Muslims. Umma is a broad concept that transcends national borders, political boundaries, and racial- ethnic distinctions. The foundation of Umma is the principle that designate submission to the will of Allah, obedience to his law and commitment to his cause (Azar and Moon, 1983). For a good discussion of this concept, see Michael Hudson, Arab Politics (New Haven: Yale University. Press, 1977), pp. 34-38; Ziya Cokalp, the principle of Turkism (Heiden E and Brill, 1968), Chapter 1; and Shariati Ummat va Imamat.

81). The political authority of the leaders included matters of resource extraction and allocation, order, social justice, taxation, and defense (Akhavi in Banuazizi, 1986).

However, since the reign of the Omayad dynasty (eighth century) and the establishment of a monarchy, the state assumed the responsibility of non-religious matters and Ulama - religious experts - gradually came to be in charge of religious affairs. Two different but related spheres were created in which monarchs often utilized religious leaders and symbols to further consolidate their power and broaden their support base.[4]

The unified Islamic state was no longer a reality in the ninth and tenth centuries; insurgence and revolts were a common pattern of collective expression of discontent in many parts of Iran. Persian, Turkish, and Mongol dynasties ruled Iran - often not all parts of the country - for several centuries; but in the fifteenth century, with the lack of a strong central state to suppress the regional revolts and rebellions, conditions conducive to formation of a new strong administration which could expand its control to all corners of the country were present. As Cohen argues:

> Among the basic factors leading to the formation of new states or revitalization of ones in serious decline are: demographic pressures; long distance or foreign trade; warfare or military pressures; internal violence; efforts by elites to protect their privileges, in the face of overwhelming challenge by counter elites and social forces; religious movements of millenarian sort; organizational needs, innovations, or pressures. (Quoted in Banuaziz; 1986).

In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries Iran foreign trade was expanding; military pressure from neighboring and western European countries was mounting; elite and

[4]See Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, which is probably the best book about Islam in English; Lambton, State and Government in Medival Islam: an Introduction to the Study of Islamic Political Theory: The Jurists; and Enayat, Modern Islamic Political Thought. For a brief discussion of Iran under the Umayad dynasty, see Armagani, Iran, pp. 50-66.

counterelite activities in the form of tribal rivalry in different parts of the country were increasing; religious movements were gaining broader and stronger support from the people. Thus it can be reasonably argued that Cohen's prerequisites for the emergence of a new state most certainly were met.[5]

The Safavid dynasty was founded on religious grounds in such a situation. Dynasty leaders were assisted in their attempt to establish a centralized state by a well-organized network of teachers; spiritual advisors; and military leaders. By relating themselves to Shia[6] seventh Imam - Mosa Kazim[7] - and linking their heritage to previous great Iranian kings they sought to establish and enhance their legitimacy[8] (Limbert, 1986). The Safavid period was an era in which economic and non-economic transnational activities increased and Iran began to be incorporated into the emerging capitalist world economy. Declining prosperity, regional revolts, foreign attacks, and inefficient central administration were the main characteristics of the late Safavid dynasty.[9]

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[5]For a further description of this period, see Bausani, The Persians, pp. 25-135; Lockhart, Nader Shah; and Perry, Karim Khan Zand.

[6]Shiism will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters.

[7]According to official genealogies, Safi al-Din (the founder of Safavid dynasty) was a descendant of Imam Moses Kazim. As Limbert (1987) argues, most scholars dismiss this genealogy as Safavid propaganda. He state that, recent research suggests that the family's Kurdish ancestors migrated to Azerbaijan in the eleventh century.

[8]As Razi elaborates (1990) religion and nationalism have been and still are the primary sources of legitimacy in the Middle East. By declaring Shia as the official religion of the state and glorifying the great kings of old Persian, Safavids exploited both sources to legitimize their rule.

[9]For a brief history of the Safavid dynasty see Limbert, Iran at War with History, pp. 70-75. For a more detailed account see Savory, Iran Under Safavids.

Qajar's Rule:

The establishment of the Qajar dynasty (1795-1925) did not help in bringing control back to the state either. Qajar rule is associated with political corruption, military defeats, loss of territories,[10] foreign influence, economic stagnation, and inefficient central administration. Lacking a significant standing army or efficient bureaucracy, the two pillars of a centralized state, Qajar kings heavily depended on unreliable tribal levies. Without any rapid means to reach the provinces, they were forced to delegate much of their authority to provincial governors, tribal leaders, and lower authorities (Keddie, 71). Certain configurations of domestic and international forces helped the Qajar stay in power in the nineteenth century.

A technologically advanced Europe, with its growing politico-economic power, presented itself to the Iranian polity both as a model to be emulated - by "westernized" intellectuals[11] within and outside the government - and a challenge to be confronted with or defended against - by Islamic revivalists and nationalists.[12] As Najmabadi (1987) pointed out, Iranian politics since the mid-ninteenth century have been primarily

[10]In the nineteenth century, following the Russian occupation of Georgia in 1801, Iran went to war to regain its lost territories. But in the 1813 Treaty of Golestan, Iran had to renounce its claims to Georgia, Darband, Ganjeh, and Baku. The Second Russo-Persian War (1825-1828) ended with the treaty of Turkmanchai. Iran ceded Armenia and Nakhchevan to Russia and gave up its right to have a navy on the Caspian Sea. Iran also had to pay a heavy war indemnity, limit duty on Russian goods to 5 percent, and grant Russian merchants extensive and unprecedented extraterritorial privileges or "Capitulations" (Limbert, 1987).

[11]For instance, Mirza Malkom Khan, Akhundzadeh (1812-78), Majd al-Mulk (1809-89), Mirza Sipahsalar Azam (1826-81), Nazim al-Dawlah (1833-1908), and Abd al-Rahim Talibov (1834- 191 1) are among well-known intellectuals who viewed the west as the model to be followed. For further discussion of their ideas see Hairi, Shism and Constitutionalism in Iran, pp. 11-51.

[12]Sayed Jamal al-Din, Ayatollah Shirazi, and Naini are among the Ulama who attempted to resist the wave of Western secular ideas and ideals.

preoccupied with the material transformation of a backward society. Modernization - conceived of as total or partial adoption of Western lifestyle - in one form or another, was considered to be the political solution to this central concern.

Qajar kings, due to lack of a significant standing army and efficient bureaucracy remained in power mainly by using the rivalries among European countries - particularly Britain and Russian who were the most influential foreign powers in Iranian polity-- and by giving them politico-economic concessions.[13] Figure 4.5 presents foreign spheres of influence in 1907-1947. Domestically they utilized the religious, ethnic, class, and tribal differences to secure their rule. Foreign powers, landlords, religious leaders, tribal chiefs, provincial governors, and a new emerging bourgeois all had claims to the king's power; and the kings could only stay in power by setting them against each other and/or by giving them concessions.[14] Naser al-Din Shah in a concession in 1892 sold the monopoly of distribution and export of tobacco for fifty years to an Englishman. This action created widespread opposition throughout the society. The leading Marja-e-taqlid, religious leader, of the time, Ayattolah Shirazi,issued a decree ,fatwa, which forbade the

[13]The two most important concessions are Reuter and Tobacco. In the Reuter concession of 1872 Nasaru'd-Din Shah granted a monopoly of the working of the nation's mines, construction of railways and the national bank to Nlius de Reuter, a British subject. In the Tobacco concession of 1890-92, the Shah sold a monopoly of tobacco production, sale and export for fifty years to Britain. For a thorough discussion of these two concessions, see Keddie, Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892; Lambton, The Tobacco Regime: Prelude to Revolution; and Algar Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906: The Role of Ulama in Qajar Period. For the influence of Russian and Britain in last half of Qajar rule see Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia 1864-1914: A Study in Imperialism.

[14]It should be pointed out that foreign powers did not always challenge each other for gaining more influence in Iran. The Anglo-Russian agreement gave Russia an exclusive zone in northern Iran, including most of the population, trade, and agricultural centers. In this zone Britain pledged "not to seek for herself, and not to support in favor of a political or commercial nature." Britain also promised "not to oppose directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by Russian Government." Russia made the same promises for a smaller British zone in the southeastern corner of the country. The rest of Iran was left as a "neutral zone" (Kazamezadeh, as quoted in Limbert,1987).



Figure 4.5 Spheres of Foreign Influence and Autonomy Movements, 1907-1947.

Source: John Limbert, Iran at War with History, Westview Press. Boulder, 1987, p. 80.

consumption of tobacco by the people. Secular intelligentsia, urban bazaaries, clergy, and a vast majority of the population supported the decree and boycotted the consumption of tobacco.[15] Russia too supported the opposition due to its rivalry with Britain. This united opposition was the nucleus of a later coalition which forced the Mozaffar al-Din Shah and his son Mohammad Ali Shah to accept and ratify sets of laws ,the Iranian Constitution, that limited their powers.

The Constitutional Revolution, unlike previous social movements, was not an endeavor to change the rulers; rather it was an attempt to limit and restrain the power of the monarch and allot power to an elected assembly, the majlis (Shikholeslam in Banuazizi, 1986; Halliday, 1979). The Constitutional Revolution was a watershed in modern Iranian political history, and was mainly carried out by a coalition of Ulama,[16] secular intelligentsia, and Bazaaries (Moghadam, 1989). As Hairi argues (1977), they were influenced in their attempt by: 1) the tyrannical rule of Qajar kings, which were associated with corruption, loss of territories, economic stagnation, and inefficient central administration; 2) the Qajar kings' collaboration and dependence on foreign powers, particularly Britain and Russia, as well as the subservience of the regime to the interest of these powers; 3) and various constitutional movements in the Middle East (Egypt, Turkey) and around the world (Russia, Japan, India). In the end, it should be pointed out

[15]It is interesting to note that even the wife of the Shah observed the fatwa and stopped smoking tobacco. The universal observation of the fatwa forced the Shah to cancel the agreement.

[16]As Fathi points out (1980): the traditional authority of the religious leaders, based on the religious belief of the masses, was a tremendous force in shaping these events. Whether the majority of the Iranian religious leaders were ignorant of the parlimentary system of government, or were motivated by short-range goals, or were trying to crush the advance of foreigners, their influence among the masses can not be denied. It is this influence or authority by whatever combination of intentional and accidental factors which rallied the people behind the constitutional movement and assured its success in 1906.

that although the Majlis and constitution remained formally in existence, the shahs were able to regain their position, with no revolution occurring, and the state not fundamentally altered[17] (Halliday, 1979).

The secular intelligentsia with the support of Britain or Russia did manage for a short while to exercise control over the Majlis. The clergy was put aside or withdrawn from the Majlis and political processes due to its perception of incompatibility of laws passed by Majlis with Islamic laws. The Bazaar withdrew its support due to enactment of unfavorable business laws. With the disintegration of a coalition, the Shah of Qajar, even though not powerful, could still exercise power beyond what had been set forth by the constitution for him. World War I and the Russian Revolution - and their respective direct and indirect affect on the composition of political forces in Iran - also contributed to a further disintegration of central government which led to the emergence of a number of socio-political movements in different parts of Iran, such as the Gangali movement in Gilan, the popular movement of Col. Mohammad Taqi Kahn in Khorasan, and the tribal revolts in the mountain area (Halliday, 1979; Limbert, 1987). Keddie (1971) nicely summarizes the main characteristic of the Qajar period[18]:

> If one accepts Weber's acute definition of the state as 'a human community that (successfully) claims the "monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force" within a given society",the Qajars had no state, since tribes, city factions, local governors,

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[17]For further discussion about Constitutional Revolution, see Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions; Keddie, Iranian Politics 1900-1905: Background to Revolution I, II, III; Algar, Religion and State in Iran 1785-1906: the Role of Ulama in Qajar Period; Hairi, Shism and Constitutionalism in Iran; and Afshari, The Pishavaran and Merchants in Precapitalist Iranian Society: An Essay on the Background and Causes of the Constitutional Revolution.

[18]For detailed account of the Qajar Period, see Bosworth, Hillenbrand, Qajar Iran; Abrahamian, Oriental Despotism: The Case of Qajar Iran. For the econmic history of Qajar, see Issawi, The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914.

and even members of the Ulama class, had private armies and engaged in battle without the central government's being able to intervene. In this, Qajar Iran was quite like many other pre-modern societies, including Western ones, with the added decentralizing features of scattered settlement, mountainous and difficult terrain, and a large population of armed and largely autonomous nomadic tribes.

Reza Shah's Reign:

Reza Khan, an angry colonel, with the support of the British took power under these circumstances. He first became the prime minister and then king in 1925.[19] He created a centralized, well-organized and well-equipped standing army[20] which suppressed oppositional movements of Major Lahuti in Tabriz, Colonel Taqi-khan of Khorasan, and an already weakened Gangali movement of Gilan, and forced many tribes to settle in lands where he assigned them[21] (Limbert, 1987; Keddie, 1971).

He also "centralized the ministerial departments, instituted a pattern of provincial and local government that was patterned on French Prefecture System, and placed

[19]Reza Khan was the commander of Persian Cossack Brigade in 1921, when he joined forces with Seyyed Zia al-Din Tabatabai, a prominent pro-British, liberal journalist and politician - to take power by means of a bloodless coup. Reza Khan became war minister; and in three months forced Tabatabai, who was then Prime Minister, to leave the country. In 1923 Ahmad Shah, the last Shah of Qajar, appointed Reza Khan, now defacto ruler of Iran, Prime Minister and left the country for the last time. In 1925 a constituent assembly crowned Reza Khan as the first Shah of Pahlavi (Limbert,1987).

[20]Reza Shah did not follow his predessor in creating an army from tribal levies. He molded his military from the Cossack Brigade and the Swedish gendarmerie, undertaking tactical alliances with tribal groups against which he subsequently turned. The centerpiece of his military reform, however, was the military conscription Law of 1925, which permitted the recruitment of individuals throughout the country into a new national service organization, the standing army (Akhavi in Banuazizi, and Weiner 86:208).

[21]As Akhavi (as cited in Banuazizi, 1986:210) writes: "government repression of the tribes was a product of a number of considerations. These included the relative size of the tribes, their ideological orientation, their access to resources in competition with the state, and possibly, their political structure. In any case, developments in the rural areas in the Reza Shah period seemed to represent policies for the systematic enclosure of lands."

budgetary authority in the central state agencies" (Akhavi in Banuazizi, 1986). Establishment of a standing army and a centralized administration were fundamental factors in the formation of the Iranian modern state.[22] He was aided in centralization of state machinery by "construction of Trans-Iranian Railway, new roads, and government-owned industries, as well as by his concentration of economic life and decisions in Tehran" (Keddie, 1971). The growth of such infrasturcture facilities helped both to enhance the reach of the state into the periphery and to promote opportunities for extending linkages from the outlying areas to the center (Akhavi in Banuazizi, 1986).[23]

Reza Shah substantially reduced the roles and functions of Ulama to further consolidate state power. He substituted the traditional school system which was primarily controlled by Ulama with a French secular education system, sent many students to France for higher education, and recruited those teachers who had secularized training. He also deprived Ulama from their judicial function by secularizing the laws; and requiring the judges to hold a law degree. Finally, the government's endowment office was given full power to supervise all the public endowment and thereby extending

[22]Reza Shah's successful restoration of the Iranian state may be seen in the light of certain generally necessary conditions for the emergence of any state: "Specialization of government roles; centralization of enforceable authority; permanence or at least more than ephemeral stability of structure; and emancipation from real or fictional kinship as the basis of relations between the occupants of governmental roles and those whom they govern" (Akhavi as cited in Banuazizi, and Weiner 1986:202).

[23]As Akhavi (as cited in Banuazizi, and weiner 1986:205) points out, "the integration is a two-way process if it is to be successfully achieved. Reza Shah appeared to approach the integration process, however, from the point of view of absorbing the periphery into a centralized bureaucratic state.... He slighted the process of having regionally or locally based groups establishing organic ties to the center, thus fostering a rather brittle state-society relationship that became unravelled upon his departure from the scene."

government control over one of the important sources of Ulama's income[24] (Afshar, 1985; Limbert, 1987; Najmabadi, 1987).

Reza Shah also attempted to revive pre-Islamic nationalism both for enhancing his legitimacy[25] and diminishing the role of the Ulama in the society. Achemanian glory was emphasized in contrast to Islam; Arabic words were purged from Farsi language;[26] women were forced to unveil; and a new western dress code for men was introduced,[27] all for the purpose of instituting new foundations for secular legitimacy. In the final analysis, however, no symbols of secular solidarity or secular nationalism binding his regime to the people developed and indeed the collective identity of the Iranian people remained Shia. His rule was based on sheer force rather than popular perception of

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[24]Although government for a while continued to use the income from endowments for religious and other public purposes, increasingly the government controlled the usage of this income. Reza Shah and later his son tried to set up a religious structure to rival the Ulama. A Faculty of theology at Tehran University during Reza Shah's rule; the Sipah-i-Dini a religious corps; and Muravvijin-i-Din - corps of religious propagandists, in Mohamad Reza Shah's reign were established with the endowment's income not only to reduce the power of the Ulama but increasing their legitimacy as well (Momen, 85). In general political leaders in Islamic societies, have found it wise to profess and sponsor religion regardless of the depth of their own belief and commitment (Razi, 1990).

[25]Reza Shah had Iranian history rewritten to play down the Islamic period and instead glorify the pre-Islamic past stretching from the fifth century B.C. The state promoted archaeological work to excavate the remains of this period. This propagandistic history was what children were taught in schools. Nationalism and Monarchism were carefully used to reinforce each other, since the constant theme was that Iran is only strong when it has a strong Shah (Halliday, 79). For a further discussion of Pahlavi's attempt to create a pre-Islamic nationalism look at Halliday, <u>Iran, Dictatorship and Development</u>, pp. 58-61; Limbert, <u>Iran at War with History</u>; and Cottam, <u>Nationalism in Iran</u>.

[26]In 1936 Reza Khan, attempted to purge the Persian language of foreign words, especially Arab and Turkish ones, and to introduce new "Pure Persian" (farsi-ye-sere) substitutes. Official documents in the army were supposed to be written in this neolistic style but the policy was overall a failure. The Shah himself never spoke in "pure Persian" (Halliday, 1979).

[27]In 1928 a law was passed which made western dress compulsory, although the Ulama were exempt from this. The Law stated that they had to prove their status by examination (except for recognized mujthids), thus giving the government the de facto power of deciding who was and who was not a member of the Ulama (Momen, 1985).

legitimacy.[28]

Reza Shah reduced the power of the landlords who had significant leverage on the country's affairs in the Qajar period. He abolished their aristocratic titles, confiscated their land; and himself became by far the biggest landowner in the country. But in general, he let them keep their old privileges and social status, though he was careful to promote the interest of those who were willing to support his government. He was firm not to permit any autonomy to this group because of their socio-economic power which was deeply rooted in the fabric of society for a long time.[29] (Keddie, 1971).

Tribes suffered greatly by Reza Shah's policies. He forced them to pay rent for agricultural land and a grass tax for pasture; to build permanent dwellings; and "migration were forbidden in some area and in other areas were allowed only under careful regulation at certain times of the year" (quoted in Akhavi in Banuazizi, 86). In sum, Reza Shah's policies of settlement and disarmament of major tribes, which often succeeded by armed struggle, effectively ended tribal autonomy, tribal susceptibility to independent alliances with foreigners, and the tribal military threat (Keddie, 1971).

Merchants who had been an influential force both in economic and political terms in the Qajar period, lost their political power to Reza Shah's dictatorial mode of government. Their economic power however, was increased further by the introduction

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[28]That force alone was the basis of state had long tradition, alluded to by Kaikavus, advising his son. This minor medieval king wrote "In the courage of your kingship never permit your commands to be treated with indifference. The king's solace and pleasure lie in giving commands; in other respects the king is like his subjects, and the difference between them is that the king issues commands which the subjects obey." (Sheikholeslam as cited in Banuazizi, and Weiner 1986:231).

[29]Reza Shah's relation with landlords will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

of military security, the building of new communication network, roads, railroads, and the expansion of telegraph lines, etc. These infrastructures facilitated the emergence of a national market. But market development under Reza Shah, unlike in western countries, was not an important mechanism and concomitant of state formation and consolidation. Reza Shah's endeavor in the creation of a central state was more on the basis of military, administrative, social and legal reforms rather than economic ones (Akhavi in Banuazizi, 1986).

Reza Shah's economic policies to a large extent were restricted to government investment in building infrastructures for unclear or not sufficiently clear modernization processes. No articulated policies were ever made for the involvement of the private sector in the shaping of the economy. As Looney pointed out, government programs did not reflect any clearly defined set of policy objectives, and, thus, the allocation of resources was not determined on the basis of any specific investment criterion, which led to a number of investment projects in different sectors of the economy without any coherent framework for a comprehensive development program. Reza Shah raised taxes and was able to collect them more effectively, prices were relatively controlled by government, and foreign trade was regulated and mostly done by central government.[30]

As a result of Reza Shah's policies, a major shift occurred in groups power: a relatively modernized and well-organized army and bureaucracy for the first time were created and with these new forces under his control Reza Shah was able to subdue two

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[30]See Katozian, The Political Economy of Modern Iran: Despotism and Pseudo-modernism 1926-1979; Issawi, The Iranian Economy 1925-1975: Fifty Years of Economic Development. In Iran under the Pahlavis, edited by Lencrowski pp. 141-166 and almost all of Looney's publications particularly, The Economic Development of Iran.

of his chief rivals for power, the Ulama and the tribes (Keddie, 1971).

His policies also led to emergence of a new elite of military officers, managers of state industrial enterprises, senior civilian officials, and loyal landlords, who were supporting Reza Shah's policies either because of their material gains or threat of punishments (Limbert, 1987).

His systematic obstruction of demand for participation in political processes by new and traditional elites of society created oppositional forces within the country which proved to be important factors in shaping the political landscape of Iran in the following years. Those aristocratic politicians who had roots in the Qajar dynasty and were not absorbed by Reza Shah opposed him when they could do so. Tribal chiefs who were either in prison in Tehran or killed by government, provided, among other policies, sufficient ground for grievances in tribes to oppose Reza Shah's regime. Clergy also opposed Reza Shah because of westernization of the country, de-Islamization of society - forceful unveiling of women, relaxation of ban on alcoholic drinks, etc. - and loss of power. Intellectuals - Marxists, Nationalists, Islamists - did not support Reza Shah mainly because of his dictatorial rule and dependence on Britain for gaining, maintaining, and expanding power (Limbert, 1987).

In 1941 Reza Shah was removed from power by the allied forces because of their perception of his possible cooperation with the Germans, and the strategic location of Iran in supplying military and non-military goods for the Soviet Union.[31] His young inexperienced son, Mohammad Reza, was considered an appropriate alternative by allied

[31]For the role of Russia and Britain in this period see Eshraghi, Anglo-Soviet Occupation of Iran in August 1941; and Lenczowski, Russia and West in Iran 1918-1948.

forces to assume the power (Halliday, 1979).

1941-1953, Period of Political Activities

The period from 1941-1953, many writers and observers of Iranian politics argue, was one of the most free periods in modern Iranian history (Limbert, 87; Halliday, 79; Moghadam, 89). Many social organizations and political parties with diverse ideological persuasions came to being in this period. The Majlis became the center of socio-political activities and competition increased for acquiring its seats . Competition for Majlis and state power involved the Nationalists with the leadership of Mossadeq and a base in urban secular intelligentsia, clergy with the leadership of Ayatollah Kashani and a base in urban dwellers and bazaar, and the Communists, with the leadership of the Tudeh party and a base in the workers union and secular intellectuals.[32]

During this period a self conscious labor movement was organized; a national bourgeoisie, which could be differentiated from traditional merchants of the bazaar, emerged; clergy again became politically active in opposition to the monarchy; and owners of the largest agricultural estates attempted to assert their political power (Binder, 88). Thus, tension gradually increased between the Shah, who was attempting to consolidate his power, and a loose coalition of opposition forces who were seeking to

[32]It should be pointed out that other parties and organizations with considerable power existed in this period which were not mentioned because of their association with one of the three forces discussed above. For instance, Iran Party, with the leadership of Allahyar Saleh and Bazargan, who were pursing some sort of western style social democratic policies supported the Mossadeq and later became one of the forces in the National Front. Fadaeyan-e -Islam was another miliant religious organization with the leadership of a junior clergy, Navab Safavi who had supporters among young bazzaries and young intellectuals in the universities. Alyhough Fadaeyan often approved Ayatollah Kashani's agenda, they differed on a number of issues.

reduce the power of the royal court and increase that of the Majlis (Gasiorowski in Azar and Moon, 1988).

Due to weakness and inefficiency in the central government and the release of many of the imprisoned tribal leaders, a number of tribal revolts occurred in this period. Democratic parties of Azarbaijan and Kurdistan in the north and northwest of Iran, with the help of the Soviet army which had not yet removed its forces from Iran after World War II, announced their autonomy and independence from the central government. In late 1945, Pishavaran, the Communist leader of the Democratic party of Azarbaijan, asked for autonomy of his province, and greater representation in Tehran. In early 1946 Kurdistan's Democratic Party proclaimed the Kurdish Republic with the Presidency of Qazi Mohammad. They demanded total independence from the Central government[33] (Limbert, 1987; Moghadam, 1989; Abrahamian, 1982).

With the emergence of the United States as the major player in world affairs after World War II and her policy of containing Soviet expansionism, the old equation of power in Iran was no longer desirable or practical for America. The U.S. and Britain, through political maneuvering in the United Nations, applied pressure on the Soviet Union to remove its forces from Iran. Once the pressure was joined by promises of a greater role and power for Communists forces in Iran and Prime Minister Qavam's friendship with the Soviet Union, Soviet forces left Iran. Departure of the Soviet forces was soon followed by a collapse of the Democratic parties of Azarbaijan and Kurdistan, which

[33]For further discussion of Communist movement in Iran, see Abrahamian, Communism and Communalism in Iran: The Tudeh and Firgah-i Dimukrat; Eagleton, The Kurdish Republic of 1946; and Zabih, The Communist Movement in Iran.

helped the central government to expand its control once again to these regions. Indeed, this was one of the most important crises which the Pahlavi dynasty encountered in its reign (Halliday, 1979).

In 1949 Mossadeq, a member of the Majlis who had been active in politics in the Qajar period as the minister of finance and foreign affairs, led a coalition of different organized and unorganized politicians primarily for nationalization of the oil industry. The Iran party, the Toiler's party (Hezb-e-Zahmet-Keshan), the National party, and the Mojahedin-e-Islam (warriors of Islam) were among the organized supporters and constituents of the National Front. Traditional middle classes, small bazaars, artisans and Ulama; modern middle classes, teachers, students, government employees and other professionals; and urban poor masses were among non-organized supporters of the National Front and its leader Mossadeq.

Oil nationalization and restoration of constitutional limitation of monarchical power were among fundamental factors in uniting the otherwise divided social forces behind Mossadeq. Mossadeq's own personality and character as an independent individual, his insistence on national pride and nationalists principles, and his familiarity with international politics all helped the formation and preservation of the coalition.

Nationalization of oil was the most crucial factor in helping Mossadeq to assume the premiership of Iran in 1951. Government revision of a 1933 agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1950 created an atmosphere of hostility toward the Shah and Britain. The National Front was able to mobilize sufficient resources to block the passage of a bill from the Majlis and set the foundation for the subsequent premiership of Mossadeq. Social forces outside the Majlis and deputies inside it stood behind Mossadeq's Premiership following the resignation of Hosayn Ala.[34]

The National Front gradually weakened once its forces left the Front. Ayatollah Kashani's forces and the Toiler party supporters left the Front in dispute with Mossadeq's different socio-economic and religious programs. Their departure most certainly damaged the nucleus of the coalition. Majlis' opposition to Mossadeq's reforms led to the dissolving of the former by the later which further disintegrated the coalition[35] (Halliday, 1979; Libmert, 1987).

Ultimately in August 1953, Gen. Zahedi overthrew Mossadeq's government and became the Shah's new prime minister with little resistance from coalition forces[36] (Moghadam, 1989; Gasirowski, 1988). Instrumental in the overthrow were the electing in the United States of Eisenhower who was much more comfortable with a regime more friendly to America and more hostile to the Soviet Union; the British blockade of Iranian oil; economic hardship inside the country; disunited and fragmented elites; alienated masses due to power struggles among different factions; lack of sound socio-economic

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[34]Following - Prime minister Razmaras's - assassination by a member of the Fedaien-e-Eslam, the Majlis approved an oil nationalization bill; and Hosayn Ala became the new prime minister. When he refused to implement the new law, the majlis nominated, and the Shah named, Mossedeq prime minister on April 29, 1951 (Limbert, 1987).

[35]Mossadeq dissolved the Majlis in the summer of 1953 by ordering the National Front deputies to resign in a bloc and sought approval of this extra legal move in a general referendum (Limbert, 1987). It is interesting to note that "Mossadeq, the constitutional lawyer who had meticulously quoted the fundamental laws against the Shah, was now bypassing the same laws and resorting to the theory of the general will. The liberal aristocrat who had in the past appealed predominantly to the middle class was mobilizing the lower classes" (Abrahamian, 1982).

[36]For further detail of the coup see Limbert, Iran at War With History, pp. 95-97. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions; and M.S.A. (P.S.G.) Mossadeq va Nehzate Mellie Iran, pp. 127-135.

policies; and a dissatisfied army (Gasirowski, 1988).

1953-1963, Period of Intense Suppression

After 1953, the United States was a major player in Iranian politics. In this decade America helped the Shah establish a centralized administration and create a ruthless secret police (SAVAK), whose reputation for innovative torture and suppression of political opposition went beyond the borders of Iran. With increasing oil revenue and U.S. financial aid Shah initiated different socioeconomic plans. He eliminated almost all of his actual and potential adversaries and consolidated his power to an unprecedented scale.

In 1962-1963 the Kennedy administration pressured the Shah for a measure of liberalization and reform from above to prevent revolution from below.[37] The White Revolution Program[38] was introduced in this period with the purpose of forestalling the occurrence of revolution.

Political parties and organizations restored their activities with much less ambitious politico-economic goals and objectives. However, a new force emerged in this period which in 1978-1979 proved to be a catalyst of opposition to the Pahlavi dynasty. With the death of Ayatollah Bourojerdi, the leading Marja-e-Taqlid - religious leader, Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as one of the leading religious leader. Unlike Ayatollah

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[37]President Kennedy noted in 1960 (as quoted in Shahshahani, 1986) "Instead of abandoning African nationalism to anti-western agitators and Soviet agents who hope to capture its leadership, the United States....must redouble its efforts to earn the respect and friendship of Nationalists leaders."

[38]The White Revolution Program first included: Land Reform, sale of public sector factories to pay compensation to landlords affected by land redistribution, nationalization of forest, new electoral law, profit sharing for industrial workers, and literacy corp. Later a few more provisions were added to the above list. For a detailed discussion of the White Revolution Program, see Shahshahani, 1985; Yeganeh, 1986; Kazemi, 1980.

Bouroyerdi, Ayatollah Khomeini was active in political arenas. His support base was largest among small merchants, urban poor masses, young religious intellectuals, and young militant clergy. He further broadened his support base by harsh criticism of the regime's hostility to Islam, widespread government corruption, rigged elections, patron-client relations with the United States, and friendly relation with Israel (Limbert, 1987). His direct attack against the Shah in a time when nobody even dared to modestly and implicitly criticize the regime; his relative familiarity with international as well as domestic politics; his credentials as the outstanding teacher and scholar of philosophy, ethics, jurisprudence, and mysticism; and his physical appearance were all helpful in making him a charismatic leader in the eyes of many of his followers. However, secular intellectuals, communist forces, and modern middle classes, followed a different course of action in 1962-1963, and did not offer their support to Ayatollah Khomeini.

Following his attack on the regime he was arrested in June 3, 1963. The news of his arrest caused massive rioting in different cities, particularly in Tehran, Qom,Tabriz, Shiraz, Mashhad and Varamin was only ended by the army's brutal massacre.[39] This bloody repression indeed was a turning point for many political forces in adopting new policies for challenging the regime. In October, 1964, Ayatollah Khomeini sharpened his attack on the Shah due to the law which granted immunity to United States military advisors and their families (Capitulation). He was soon arrested and exiled to Turkey and then to Iraq until his return to Iran in February of 1979.

The bloody suppression of the 1963 rioting further intensified and broadened the

[39] For details of the June uprising of 1963, see Rohani, Tahlil-e Nehzat-e Imam Khomeini Dar Iran.

existing antagonism between the regime and opposition forces. A number of opposition forces came to the conclusion that peaceful mechanisms no longer existed to influence the policies or channel their grievances to the government. Soon after 1963, guerrilla warfare became an important strategy in the struggle to overthrow the monarchy.

Two radical organizations, Mojahedin-e-Khalq (people's crusaders) and Fadaien-e-Khalq (people's sacrificing guerilla), were established in 1966. Mojahedin's founders came from the Liberation Movement Organization[40], an Islamic organization with a moderate stand toward political change. Fadaien's[41] founder who came from the Tudeh party, the main communists party of Iran, arrived at the same conclusion both as a result of the 1963 bloody suppression and influence from other revolutionary movements around the world like Che Guevera's activities.

1963 - 1978, Period of Imperial Dictatorship: Domestic Policies

From 1963 to 1978 the Shah's regime was able to contain the oppositional forces

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[40] Hanifnejad; Badizadegan, and Mohsen were the founder of Mojahedin organization and were originally active in oppositional politics in the early 1960's. In 1966 they founded the organization and in 1971 they launched their first guerilla attack. All were arrested and executed by the regime. The history of Mojahedin can be obtained form the following sources: Abrahmian, The Guerilla Movement in Iran: 1963-1977; Abrahamian, Iranian Mojahedin. It should be pointed out that another underground armed group which was founded in this period was Heiathaye Motalefehy-e Eslami (Islamic Coalition), whose members were mainly from theology students and bazaar shopkeepers. They were responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister Mansour. Following this assassination, regime brutality suppressed them).

[41]Fadaien, an independent Marxist guerrilla organization "was created when three small groups which had been established independently in the mid-1960's in the cities of Tabriz, Mashhad and Tehran merged in 1970. The founders of the three groups were university students and graduates, among them such figures as Amir Parviz Poyan, Bizhan Jazani, Masud Ahmadzadeh, Hamid Ashraf, Behrooz Dehqani, and Ashraf Dehqani. These individuals are identified with the ideological development of the Fadaien and its later guerrilla operations and strategies" (Alaolmolki, 1987). For further discussion about ideological orientation of this organization see Ahmadzadeh, Armed Struggle: Both a Strategy and a Tactic; Jazani, Armed Struggle in Iran; Poyan, On the Necessity of Armed Struggle and a Refutation of the Theory of Survival; and Alaolmolki; The New Iranian Left.

either by brutal suppression or co-optation. The White Revolution Package, particularly The Land Reform Program (which will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter), - expanded government bureauracracy to encompass almost all portions of the country. Increasing oil revenues made the purchases of sophisticated weaponaries and expansion of the army possible. Though the army theoretically was supposed to defend the country from foreign attacks, it was practically the instrument of internal repression. The Shah did not hesitate to use the army for suppressing any opposition. For example, in 1963 and 1978-79, the army was the principal tool of massacres. Hence expansion and strength of the army was a fundamental factor for further consolidation of the central government in this period.[42]

Increasing oil revenue also made the government the largest employer, investor (all the large investments were being done either by government directly or by Shah and his family) and consumer (Katozian, 1981). The central government's policy of employing high school or university graduates primarily was in regard to a political consideration, silencing the unemployed, rather than sound economic reasoning. It should be pointed out that if Reza Shah relied on oil revenues as one source of economic development his son had consummated this process to the point that Iran had become a classic rentier economy (Akhavi in Banuazizi, 86). Table 4.3 presents the growth of oil revenue from 1966 to 1977, and Table 4.4 shows the growth of the labor force in the state sector.

[42]For the role of the army as the instrument of political repression, see Halliday, Iran Dictatorship and Development, pp. 64-102; Hickman, Ravaged and Reborn: The Iranian Army; and Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War.

Table 4.3 Iranian Oil Revenues

Year	U.S. $
1966	593
1967	737
1968	817
1969	938
1970	1,093
1971	1,870
1972	2,308
1973	5,600
1974	22,000
1975	20,500
1976	21,700
1977	20,500

Source: Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, Pengunie Books, Middlesex, 1979, p.143.

Table 4.4 Distribution of Labor Force in State and Private Sectors (Percentage)

	1956	1966	1976
All wage workers	100	100	100
Private sector	83	80	64
State Sector	17	20	36

Source: Ramy Nima, The Wrath of Allah, Pluto Press, London, 1983, p.21.

Although oil revenue benefitted all segments of society in absolute term, it did so very unequally.[43] It created a sense of discontent rather than satisfaction. As Limbert (87) pointed out, the gap between the facilities available to rich and poor seemed to increase until the former could shop in Europe while the latter had to stand in line to buy onions.[44]

In this period, Iran was called "The Island of Stability" by President Carter. Many foreign military and civilian advisors and investors found Iran a secure and safe place to work and invest particularly with the favorable conditions the regime offered them to work and invest.

As Halliday (1979) pointed out, the main social base and principal beneficiary of the state's policy was the bourgeoisie, which consisted of the upper strata of government and military employees; capitalists landowners; and all those large investors in industry, finance, and trade. Although they were not satisfied with the dictatorial form of government which the Shah had instituted, particularly in regard to their lack of participation in decision-making processes, they generally supported the Shah.

The expansion of industry, education, armed forces, and state bureaucrats led to the growth of two classes. The modern middle class, which was mainly white collar

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[43]For the role of oil in Iranian society, see Halliday, Iran, Dictatorship and Development, pp. 138-173; Hussain, Islamic Iran, pp. 13-16. Nima, The Wrath of Allah pp. 5-9; Looney, The Impact of Oil Revenues on the Pre-Revolutionary Iranian Economy; Bakhash, The Politics of Oil and Revolution in Iran; and Banisadar Naft va Solteh (Oil and Domination).

[44]In 1959-60, the richest 10 percent of urban households accounted for 35 percent of the total expenditures and the richest 20 percent for 51.7 percent. At the other end of the social pyramid, the poorest 10 percent accounted for 1.7 percent of the total expenditures and the poorest 20 percent for 4.7 percent. The middle 40 percent accounted for 27.5 percent. In 1973-74 the top 20 percent of urban families accounted for as much as 55.5 percent of the total expenditures. The bottom 20 percent for as little as 3.7 percent, and the middle 40 percent for no more than 26 percent (Abrahamian in citing Goldstone, 1986).

workers employed principally by the government, from 1953 to 1978 grew from 324,000 to 630,000 and constituted 6.7 percent of the country's labor force. It may be referred to as one class because of lifestyle, consumption pattern, wage earning, western oriented ideals; and place of residence. Industrial workers also grew from 300,000 in 1953 to 1.7 million and constituted 16 percent of Iran's work force in 1978 (Abrahaminan in Goldstone, 1986). Table 4.5 portrays the distribution of the labor force in 1963-1978, while Table 4.6 shows the contribution of each sector to the GNP for the same period. The Shah's regime failed to obtain the support of modern the middle class and workers mainly because of: 1) its financial independence from them due to increased oil revenue, 2) the 1953 coup, which not only overthrew the popular leader Dr. Mossadeq, but also destroyed labor unions, professional associations, and all independent political parties; 3) implementation of policies that principally benefitted the upper classes rather than middle and lower classes (Abrahamian in Goldstone, 86); 4) unfulfilled expectation which arose due to exposure to higher education, new ideas and ideals; and 5) alienation as a result of cultural dislocation.

Traditional middle classes were adversely affected by the Shah's policies. Bazaar[45] shopkeepers, artisans, and craftsmen all were insecure with government policies

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[45]The Bazaar has for a long time been the main center of urban life in Iran. The strength of the bazaar derives from its unique combination of productive and commercial activities with religious and social functions (Nima, 1983). The bazaar has always had social, financial, political, ideological and historical links with Ulama. As Abrahamian pointed out (in Goldstone, 1986) on the eve of Revolution, bazaars numbered approximately 250,000 shopkeepers and controlled about two-thirds of the country's trade. The Tehran bazaar alone covered some three square miles and housed over 10,000 stores and workshops. The bazaar entrepreneurs exercised considerable influence over peddlers, small retailers, store assistants, workshop employees, petty brokers and small manufacturing plants in villages. The bazaar was able to keep its organizational framework, particularly its trade and craft guilds. In sum, the bazaar was more like a communal center with a life, values, norms, and social relationships of its own (Nima, 1983).

Table 4.5 Distribution of Labor Force in Different Sectors 1963-78.

Sector	1962-63 % of Total	1967-68 % of Total	1972-73 % of Total	1977-78 % of Total
Agriculture	55.1	49.0	40.9	32.2
Industry	20.6	24.7	29.0	33.2
Oil	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6
Services	23.8	25.7	29.5	34.0
Total	100	100	100	100

Source: Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, various dates.

Table 4.6 Share of Different Sectors of Economy in GNP 1963-78 (Percentage)

Sectors	1962-63 % of GNP	1967-68 % of GNP	1972-73 % of GNP	1977-78 % of GNP
Agriculture	27.4	21.6	10.3	9.2
Industry	17.8	20.7	12.6	18.5
Services (exlcuding oil)	40.0	36.4	23.9	34.6
Oil	12.3	18.0	50.0	34.7

Source: Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, various dates.

which favored big chain stores and large industrial and manufacturing enterprises. Corruption,[46] foreign influence, domestic pressures, and open defiance of the regime from Islamic principles were among fundamental factors which made them oppose the Shah and his regime.

The Shah's Land Reform Policy, though if helped some farmers to acquire land,[47] alienated many of the landlords, landless villagers, and lower peasants who had to sell their land and immigrate to cities in search of a better life. Even those who benefitted from Land Reform did not support the Shah primarily due to isolation and lack of sufficient infrastructure to facilitate communication and transportation to cities. Those who were not benefitting from the program joined the opposition forces in cities and indeed constituted the most militant participants in the revolution (Kazemi, 1980).

After the 1953 coup-de-tat the Shah instituted a ruling apparatus which to a large extent was dependent on him as a person for effective operations. All the top military and civilian positions were occupied by those who had fully demonstrated their loyalty to him. He was above all the arguments and failures of the top government officials and had the final arbitration power in the affairs in which he chose to be involved. "To get

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[46]By 1977 the sheer scale of corruption had reached a boiling point. The Pahlavi Foundation had become a blatant method of grabbing wealth for the royal family. Senior officers obtained vast wealth from commissions. Senior officials who ran companies such as Iran Air and National Oil Company hardly bothered to conceal their extortions. Even conservative estimates indicate that such corruption involved at least a billion dollars between 1973 and 1976. (Quoted in Abrahamian as cited in Goldstone, 86).

[47]Although land was transferred to 1,638,000 peasant families, 96 percent of villagers were left without electricity; farm cooperatives were starved of credit; and agricultural production stagnated, mainly because of price controls on basic commodities. For every two families that received land, one received nothing and for every one that obtained adequate land (7 hectares - each hectare is equal to 2.47 acres) three obtained less than enough to become independent commercial farmers (Abrhamian, as cited in Goldstone, 1986). Land Reform will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

things done, one needs power, and to hold on to the power one must not ask anyone's permission or advice. One must not discuss decisions with anyone." (Shah in Halliday, 79). Though there was uncommon incidence of opposition to the Shah from the ruling elite,[48] by most standards Iran had an unified ruling elite for the last decade of Pahlavi's rule.

The attitude and behavior of the Shah was perceived as the Law of the Land by the elite within and outside the government as well as the masses. No opposition group could meaningfully participate in political processes. There was no established mechanism available to the people to convey their grievances[49] to the government. The Shah, by concentrating so much power in himself, shattered any chance of pluralism in society and consequently increased his political fragility. As Arjomand argues (1986), "among the political regimes of the modern world, monarchies - particularly patrimonial one in which government is extremely personal - are especially fragile and vulnerable to revolution because popular discontent can be focused on a single person."

People from all walks of life - the poor, the rich, the illiterate, the educated, the young, the old, the leftists, the rightists, the unemployed, the unemployed (Nasri, 1980) - had found enough grievances to participate in the struggle for a fundamental rearrangement of society. Due to his position, the Shah was easily targeted as the main

[48]Ruling elites are those who exercised and possessed political power to a greater degree than others. Power here means an interpersonal relationship in which the behavior of one actor alters the behavior of another actor (Zonis, 1971).

[49]Widespread grievances were brought about, as Keddie (1981) argues, by I) a "modernization" characterized by massive corruption benefitting especially the rich and the royal family; 2) a growing gap between rich and poor, between city and countryside, and between the two cultures; 3) the association of the dynasty with Western control and with everything unIslamic; and 4) jailing, executions, tortures, and growing controls on free speech and press.

cause of all wrong doings in society and the principal barrier to its development.

In a society in which political symbols and rituals for a long time had a religious tone and fervor (Sheikholeslam in Banuazizi, 1986), and religion provided the standards and codes of behavior and was the principal ingredient of the cement which held the Iranian society together, any attempt to remove its influence or substitute for it a secular religion could have been expected to generate widespread alienation[50] among the population. Urbanization and industrialization also further deepened the sense of alienation among the masses, particularly by diminishing the role of traditional authority and weakening the extended family that used to give its members the combined services of employment agency, welfare office, health insurance agency, family counselor, ward boss, and marriage broker (Limbert, 1987).

A regime may be regarded as legitimate if a consensus exists in society that monopoly of the means of coercion and the exercise of power rightly belong to the state. While in all societies, states rely on a combination of coercion and consent, the relative weight of these two forms of influence determines the nature of the rule (Halliday, 79). Consent can be achieved by democratic processes, co-optation, implementation of popular

[50]Enayat also acknowledged the widespread alienation in the society when he wrote (1983:195-6) "Revolution was undoubtedly proceeded by a decline in the traditional modes of authority and the criteria of assessing one's social standing. This was not entirely the result of the Shah's drive for modernization; it was not therefore unavoidable. Evidently, the weakening of the extended family, the migration of rural groups to towns, the habits and mores inseparable from industrialization, the imbalance between defective or superficial modernity and traditional values and attitudes, could to a considerable extent account for its breakdown. People were torn away from their cultural and moral roots. The sense of individual identity,, of group solidarity, and of corporate loyalty was placed under intolerable stain."

policies[51], people's perception of fidelity, integrity and charisma of political leaders, and society's acceptance of the devine or other supernatural right of a particular leader, or type of leader, to rule.

Although Shah attempted to gain legitimacy through these mechanisms, he was not successful in his attempt as Gasiorowski (in Azar and Moon, 1988) points out. In the final analysis in the absence of consent and legitimacy the Shah's rule was more and more based on coercion.

The expansion of military and civil bureaucracies and growth of the security apparatus SAVAK, and other police forces extended the control of the regime over the activities of the population. Two hand picked political parties, Melliyun (later Iran Novin party), and Mardum party and since 1975 only one party, Rastakhiz, had been allowed to have activities. As has been argued (Halliday, 1979; Limbert, 1987) those political parties indeed were the instrument of control and coercion rather than a means of channelling the aggregate demand of the population to the government. Trade and labor unions, and cultural and social associations were all government run or highly controlled by it to generate support for the regime and mobilize the people to declare their loyalty to the Shah.

News agencies, press, and electronic media all were tightly controlled and

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[51]In the absence of other sources of legitimation, a regime can often gain legitimacy by carrying out popular policies. Economic policies that improve the welfare of politically important sectors of society will make a regime more popular and thus enhance it legitimacy. Policies that affect society and customs such as the promotion of education, sports, and the arts, can enhance a regime's legitimacy as well. Public policy can also affect the structure and evolution of society, especially in developing countries, by bringing about the emergence of new social groups, such as industrial working class or a technocratic class. These groups are likely to feel indebted to the regime that created them, giving it a strong social base and thus enhancing its legitimacy. (Gasioroswki as cited in Azar and Moon, 1988).

censured. They had to observe the official guidelines which SAVAK sent them each month. The mass media in Iran, like in many other countries, indeed was the principal tool of generation, adoption, dissemination, and enforcement of values and beliefs which were supposed to enhance the legitimacy of the Shah and his regime.

Oil and Economic Policies

Five economic plans that lacked a coherent framework for a comprehensive economic development. were designed and partially implemented in this period As Looney stated (1988) the investment program was dominated by relatively few capital intensive projects and was prepared more on the basis of a project by project approach than any clearly defined development policies. However, this period can be characterized as a period of high growth rate with accelerating inflation and continuation of infrastructures works which was initiated in Reza Shah's reign. The private sector and foreign capital were more active in this period and oil undoubtedly played a much more important role in all aspects of the society's life than it had played in previous periods.

Although oil was the most important factor in the Iranian economy, its importance in the socio-political sphere was by no means less significant. Oil helped the government to be independent of social classes and forces which otherwise had to be relied on as the main source of finance. As Katozian argues:

> While the state is the chief consumer, investor and employer, it does not depend (directly or indirectly) on the domestic means of production for the maintenance of a high level of expenditure. In fact, the historical position is reversed; it is the domestic economic sectors, including the private sector, which are dependent upon the state for direct and indirect welfare gains through the latter disimbursement of oil revenues. (Quoted in Shashaani, 1986).

Modernization processes were not financed by surpluses which had been generated by the domestic economy as in advanced capitalist countries nor were surpluses extracted from governmental enterprises as in socialist countries. Rather, oil revenues created a unique situation in history that enabled the state to be relatively independent from the operation of domestic economy and social classes. Like other peripheral formations, state autonomy was enhanced by the historical inability of local industrialists to assume the progressive role which bourgeois have played in core countries[52] (Farhi, 1989).

The oil industry did not play a leading sector role in the development of the Iranian economy, as for instance, textile, iron, railroad, and automobile industries, played in western capitalist countries. As Looney pointed out (1988):

> The oil industry was important largely in Iran's development program because it provided source of easily controlled and easily mobilized revenue for the government and a supply of foreign exchange greatly in excess of what the indigenous Iranian industries could possibly earn not because it imparted directly its dynamism to the rest of the economy.

In sum, oil revenue helped the government create a situation that enabled the central state to maneuver and set policies in the economy and the socio-political spheres of the country with less dependence on domestic socio-economic forces in comparison with other countries, who relied more on the domestic economy for generating revenue to finance their projects and programs. However, oil revenue also made the government more

[52]In addition to the historical weakness of the bouregeoisies, the expanded role of the Iranian state in productive process also enhanced its autonomy. The state was also interested in the control of labor, profit maximization, and the securing of the privileged use of resources for its personnel. This privileged use was not only influenced by private benefits for those in charge of specific programs, but also by those collective demands of sections of the state apparatus, - the military being the most notorious, that had a vested interest in channelling public funds into projects that served their interests, often to the detriment of the economy as a whole (Farhi, 1989).

vulnerable and prone to revolution in comparison to a "non-rentier state."[53] Table 4.7 demonstrates the share of the oil and gas sector in government revenue, foreign exchange receipts, and GNP during the last three five year plans.

National Security and Foreign Policies

If one accepts the definition that " National Security Policies are those policies that governments undertake to protect or extend vital national values[54] against threats from existing or potential adversaries" (Gasiorowski in Azar and Moon, 88) it can be stated that the Shah's national security policies were: enhancement of military capabilities through formation and expansion of armed force structure, police units, and intelligence services; efforts to promote economic development mainly by further integration of Iran into the world market and system of international finance (Binder, 88); and a close relationship with the West in general and the United States in particular (Gasiorowski in Azar and Moon 1988).

Although Iran did not experience any formal colonial type of government, it has been heavily influenced by foreign powers in the last couple of centuries. Russia and Britain were the two important players in the politico-economic life of Iran until 1953.

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[53]Until the oil is viewed as a source of cheap raw material rather than a source of easily mobilized revenue, it will not play its proper role in the economy. As Looney notes (as quoted in Shahshahani, 86) "The economy must be in a position to look at the oil sector not so much for its capital requirements, but as a source of inexpensive raw materials and energy. The oil sector, therefore, must become an appendage of the rest of the economy if the country is ultimately to achieve self-sustained growth."

[54]It should be pointed out that vital national values for the Shah were nominal maintenance of national independence and territorial integrity plus preservation of his regime. Thus, national security matters which are associated with "mass politics", like protection of citizen's life, improvement of nation's material welfare, endeavor to have informed citizens, and socio-political freedoms were not the main ingredients of Shah's national security concerns.

Table 4.7 Share of Oil and Gas Sector Government Revenue, Foreign Exchange Receipts and GNP During the Five Year Plan

	In Government Revenues %	In Current Foreign exchange Receipts %	In GNP %
Third Plan (1963-67)	48.1	75.8	18.7
Fourth Plan (1968-72)	55.2	76.2	24.0
Fifth Plan (1973-77)	77.7	84.7	37.4

Source: Central Bank of Iran, Annual Reports and Balance Sheet,1967, 1972, 1977.

After the coup of 1953, the United States was the principal player in helping the Shah to build a centralized administrative apparatus; to create a strong army and secret service, SAVAK; and to contribute to the formulation and implementation of many socio-economic plans, although the Iranian people were not the primary beneficiary and sometimes not even the target of these policies.

In the second half of the sixties and in the early seventies Iran's foreign policy capacity was further enhanced[55] largely due to Washington's financial, political, diplomatic, military, and skilledd manpower support. As Ramazani notes (1982):

> As early as 1942 the Shah had begun to cultivate American friendship both as a means of strengthening his regime through military modernization and as a counterweight to the Soviet Union, the Shah's "bete noir". American oil companies acquired a share in Iranian production for the first time in 1954 (40 percent); the United States was accorded an unprecedented opportunity for private investment and commerce in Iran under a treaty in 1957. American firms constituted about one-third of all foreign firms in Iran and accounted for more than a third of all the foreign capital invested outside oil before the Shah's fall in 1979.

In the early seventies three independent events dramatically influenced the direction and capacity of Iran's foreign policy: 1) British withdrawal of her force from east of Suez, including the Persian Gulf, followed by the Shah's decision to land forces in Abu Musa and two other small islands, which established Iranian control over the entrance of the Persian Gulf and the strategic Strait of Hormuz;[56] 2) the sudden

[55] Iran was perceived to be the most powerful state in the Persian Gulf, a leading regional power in adjacent areas of the Middle East, South Asia and the Horn of Africa, and a potential middle power in world politics (Ramazani, in Koury and MacDonald, 1982).

[56] However it should be pointed out that it is highly probable that the Shah captured those islands for other reasons rather than strategic. In the words of one British official: "Advisors to the Iranian government told us that the Shah did not want the islands for military or strategic reasons, despite his statement and

increased oil revenue (due to the Arab-Israeli War of 1973) from 194 million dollars in 1972 to about 22 billion dollars in 1974 which enabled the Shah to spend more money on the military than the militaries of Australia, Indonesia, Pakistan, South Africa, and India;[57] and 3) the end of the Vietnam War and its subsequent influence - "Vietnam Syndrome" - on American foreign policy,[58] which led to a reliance on the Shah as the "policeman" of the Gulf in securing the United States interests (Ramazani in Koury and MacDonald, 82). Table 4.8 reveals the extent of the Shah's military budget and the share of United States arms sale from 1970 to 1977.

Halliday (79) argues five factors have been important in choosing the Shah as the "policeman" of the region:

1) Iran had been a very close ally of the U.S. since the end of World War II. The Shah's loyalty to Washington guaranteed him U.S. support on different occasions and in different forms. Since the late 60's the Nixon administration backed Iran in its drive for regional dominance by financial,

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much official propaganda to that effect. Rather, he needed to take them in order to enhance his image as a forceful and decisive monarch." (Quoted in Halliday, 1979).

[57]According to western analysts (as cited in Shashaani, 1985), "in 1966, Iran ranked twenty-ninth in the league of world arms expenditure; today it is the eighth largest spender on defense seen in terms of European spending on defense, spending on Iran's military budget is now approaching that of Britain, France and Germany and by 1980 will exceed the $20,000 million mark.

[58]Other factors undoubtedly have also been important in adoption of a particular foreign policy, as Cotton (as cited in Keddie and Hooglund, 1986) points out: "most fundamental of the assumptions which provide the underlay for competing American foreign policy preferences are estimates of Soviet foreign policy intentions, and estimates of American capability to play a prominent foreign policy role in areas many thousands of miles distant from the North American continent."

Table 4.8 Iranian Military Budget and Share of the U.S. Arms Sale 1970-77.

Year	Defense Budget $ Million	U.S. Military Sale to Iran $ Million*
1970	880	113.2
1971	1,065	396.8
1972	1,375	519.1
1973	1,525	2,157.4
1974	3,680	4,373.2
1975	6,325	3,021.0
1976	8,925	1,458.7
1977	9,400	4,312.0

Source: Compiled from Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, Penguine, Middlesex, 1979, pp. 94-95.

diplomatic, technical, and military means;[59]

2) Iran's strategic and geopolitical position in Asia. Iran had the potential to be one of the strongest countries between western Europe and Japan;

3) Internally, the Shah was able to consolidate his power, particularly after the crushing of the June 1963 uprising, and by all accounts had formed a strong central state. The Monarch's energy before this period was indeed consumed more on internal power struggle, monopolization of means of coercion, suppression of socio-political movement and tribal resurgence, and, thus, could not have a sound and active foreign policy worthy of consideration. Foreign powers also were active by supporting the contender that they perceived would serve them best. Since the 60's however, United States administrations exercised its influence

more and more through the government of Iran, which had for the first time, been capable of consolidating its power and thus ready to assume a much more active role in international arena;

4) The growth of Iranian power abroad could have been used and it was indeed used as confirmation of the legitimacy of Iranian monarch[60];

5) Due to decomposition of the colonial system in previous decades, and

[59]In 1972, Nixon and Kissinger visited Tehran and discussed a new relationship with Iran based essentially on the Nixon Doctrine and relying on the Shah as a surrogate in the region (Sick, in Keddie and Houglund, 1986). To enable the Shah to become the policeman and create a "credible deterrent," they promised the Shah he could buy anything he wanted from the U.S. except nuclear arms (Limbert, 1986; Ramazani, in Koury and MacDonald, 1982).

[60]As Halliday points out, "if the domestic consolidation of the regime is (was) in one way a precondition for Iran's current (pre-revolution) foreign policy, the latter for its parts helps to confirm the domestic allocation of power and reinforce the political image which the Shah tries (tried) to foster."

withdrawal of British forces whose presence were the guarantor of status-quo in newly independent countries, the Shah's regime was an appropriate alternative to replace Britain as the dominant military power and guarantor of the existing local regimes.[61]

Although adoption of such a role and other pro-western policies intensified tension between Iran and Moscow, in general the Shah's regime responded favorably to Soviet overtures of "peaceful coexistence" by attempting to resolve long-standing financial problems, border disputes, and pledged to forbid foreign missile bases in Iran (Ibid). Trade and technical relations improved to the extent that Soviet Union built a trans-Iranian gas pipeline and the first Iranian steel plant in Isfahan. Trade with the Soviets accounted for 15 percent of Iran's export in 1973. In 1976 a five-year trade agreement was signed, worth three billion dollars, in which Iran was supposed to export gas, textiles, shoes, cotton, mineral ores and dried fruits to the U.S.S.R., while the Soviet Union was supposed to export machinery, iron, steel, chemicals, wood, cement and trucks to Iran (Halliday, 1979).

The Shah's regional policies, however, reflected his close alliance with the United States. He supported all pro-American regimes of the area sometimes in defiance of the Soviet Union. He developed a good relationship, involving various sorts of cooperation, with the post-Nasser regime of Egypt and with Saudi Arabia, the two important Arabian countries. He also built a workable relationship with small countries of the Persian Gulf

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[61]It should however, be mentioned that the Shah's regime also was involved in counter- revolutionary activities elsewhere - in Ethiopia, South Vietnam, Zaier, Zofar, etc. the Shah's regime role in these cases was that of restablizing a situation which had become unstable in the aftermath of colonialism (Halliday, 79).

by helping some of them to suppress their internal opposition and by pledging to help them against any possible attack by pro-Soviet regimes. After a long period of hostility with Iraq, the Shah signed an agreement in 1975, the Algerian Agreement, with the Iraqi regime which settled boarder disputes and reduced the tension between the two countries. Iran strengthened her friendship with Turkey and Pakistan by her involvement and cooperation in CENTO. Iran had important economic, political and security ties with Israel[62] as well (Halliday, 79; Limbert, 87). In summarizing, the Shah's foreign policy involved in regional affairs to portray his image as a strong leader abroad and through it enhancing his legitimacy inside the country. He actively supported U.S. positions and interests in the region, sometimes in obvious opposition to the Soviet Union. The United States fully supported the Shah's regime both in its ambitious foreign policy objectives[63] and in its internal repression of any opposition voice[64].

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[62]While Iran often voted with Arab countries in the United Nations and sent a token relief force to them after the 1967 War, she sold oil to Israel and sought security assistance from her (Keddie, 71). Israel provided military supplies, intelligence and military training for Iran. According to one author, basing his information on discussions with the Shah," virtually every general officer in the Shah's army has visited Israel, and hundreds of junior officers have undergone some aspects of Israeli training" (quoted in Halliday, 79). As Halliday (1979) points out, Israel's Mossad and SAVAK have cooperated since the 1950's, and it is believed that a number of SAVAK officials have been trained in Israel.

[63]For a detailed discussion of Iranian foreign policy, see Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, pp 249-284; Koury and MacDonald, Revolution in Iran: A Reappraisal, pp 9-48, 88-109; Ramazani, Iran's Foreign Policy, 1941-1973; and Chubin and Zabih, The Foreign Relation of Iran.

[64]As Miller (in Keddie and Houglund, 86) states: "The record of the overthrow of Mossadeq, CIA, SAVAK, military repression, political manipulation, interference in internal affairs, the corruption of individuals and groups all contribute to the elaborate mosaic of the history of the United States-Iranian relations since 1945." The Shah's deepened reliance on the United States, particularly after 1974, was indeed viewed in a negative light by the opposition in Iran. Tudeh members and the left in general saw it from their historical pro-Soviet and anti-American ideological standpoint. The National Front Centrists perceived it against the background of U.S. help in overthrowing Massadeq. The religious activists viewed it against the background of bloody suppression of 1963 uprising and exile of Ayatollah Khomeini. All believed that the Shah's foreign policy had made Iran utterly subservient to Washington (Ramazani, in Koury and MacDonald, 1982).

CHAPTER V

IRANIAN RURAL STRUCTURE ON THE EVE OF ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

Agriculture has always played an important role in the socioeconomic life of Iran. The village had been the fundamental unit of agricultural production and the dominate pattern of settlement in Iranian society long before Iran embraced Islam. Islam through encouragement of communal bond further strengthened the village life.

Scarcity of water has been another important variable in shaping the mode of settlement in Iran (Shashaani, 1985; Bowen-Jones, 1968). Due to insufficient rainfall in many parts of Iran, sources and flow of water have been crucial factors in making the people settle and gather around the water. Gilan, Mazandaran, Bakhtaran, Azarbaijan, Kurdistan, the northern part of Khorasan, and parts of Fars were regions with a relative sufficiency of water and hence, dense populations. South, east, and central parts of Iran were covered with desert and therefore had scattered population. Table 5.1 shows different land usage categories, and Figure 5.1 portrays main cultivated areas in Iran.

In the center of the village were located the mosque and shope. Houses were clustered in walking distance of the center of the village and further out in bigger villages, caravansaries could be found. Fruit producing farms or gardens were located on the borders of the village. Next to these gardens were farmlands and further out pastures were

Table 5.1 Land and Land Usage Categories, Iran 71

	Area (million hectares)	Percent
Total land area	164.8	100
Arable land	16.6	10
Under cultivation	8.8	5.3
Irrigated	(3.6)	(2.2)
Rain-fed	(5.2)	(3.1)
Fallow	7.8	4.7
Forests and Scrubland	19	11.5
Permanent pasture	10	6.1
Desert, wastes and poor pasture	119.2	72.4

Source: Lili Shashaani Capitalism, Land Reform and Agriculture Development: The Case of Iran, Ph.D Dissertation (Michigan State University), 1985, p.280



Figure 5.1 Main Cultivated Areas

Source: Fred Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development, Penguine, Middlesex, 1979.

located (Lambton 1953:3-9).

The village was a composition of several boneh and each boneh consisted of several households. Boneh was a cooperative unit in which several peasant families worked on a common land. The division of labor was decided inside the boneh, with each household's share being determined on the basis of its contribution after deducting all the expenses. Each boneh collectively was responsible through a headman in its relation with landowners. Since inter- and intra-boneh marriages were common in the village, family bonds were relatively strong. It should be pointed out that boneh and village as a mode of organizing production had an important economic function as well.[1] Livestock (cattle, sheep, goat, donkey, horse and poultry) were also very important factors, both as socio-economic assets and as means of production in the village.

In general, on the eve of land reform a subsistence economy based on small family production, use of primitive technologies, low income, illiteracy, and lack of socioeconomic and geographical mobility, were the main characteristics of Iranian villages.[2] As will be elaborated upon later, other forms of production had been co-existing in villages throughout Iran.

Nomads and tribes were another important segment of the rural population. At the beginning of this century nomads constituted approximately a quarter of Iran's

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[1]For further discussion about boneh and its functions look at Sefinezhad, Boneh Systems of Collective Agriculture Production; and Farhadi, Boneh Shenasi (Bonehlogy).

[2] For a detailed discussion of villages functions, see Ashraf, "Deh" (village) Community and Rural Settlement Patterns in homogenous Iran; Keddie, The Iranian Village Before and After Land Reform; and Ono, On Social-Economic Strutures of Iranian Villages.

population, about 2.4 million. At the middle of the century due to Reza Shah's forceful settlement of nomadic population the number was only 500,000. Nomads controlled 70 percent of Iran's sheep and goats the main forms of meat, a significant source of cheese and yogurt, and the principal supplier of material for the carpet-weaving industry. Livestock and grazing land were fundamental factors of production for nomads and tribes. Since the dawn of recorded history, nomads and tribes have been moving from one part of Iran to the other depending on weather and availability of grazing lands. Due to the power and unpredictability of nomad's actions,the central government had always sought to settle them in specific locations with little or no success. Many times the central government has collapsed in its fight with nomads.

Six different nomadic populations existed and still exist in Iran: Arabs, Baluches, Kurds, Lurs, Torkaman, and Turks. Each nomadic population consists of several sub-groups, the smallest unit of each sub-group is a tent which includes husband, wife and children. Several tents make a camp or mal; several mal form a tireh; several tireh establish one tayefeh; and several tayefeh constitute one eyel or tribe (Barth, 1961, as cited in Shashaani, 1985).

Since each tribe was hierarchically organized and well armed, the leader or chieftain of it enjoyed tremendous power in the tribe and the society as well. As Helfgott stated:

> The chieftain functioned within the tribe as: (1) the arbitrator of a system of legality that ensured the maintenance of order and reciprocity; (2) the mediator among the disparate economic units; and (3) the organizer and leader of tribal military activities. As mediator between the tribe and outside society the chieftain functioned as: (1) the conduit for external ideological, religious and cultural forces; (2) the agency of interaction between his tribe and other tribes and sedentary groups; and (3) the representative of trial affairs within the ruling power (1977:49).

Due to such power, central governments have many times sought assistance from the tribal leaders in suppressing rebellious movement in different part of Iran. Foreign governments too solicited help from tribal chieftains in fighting the central government or a rival foreign power.

In general, nomadic and tribal populations were important both economically and politically. Their surplus of animal production was exchanged for agricultural production and weapons. Where they stayed or moved and in their migratory route they played an important role in the adjacent area in the mode of consumption, production and exchange. Their military myth and hierarchical organization made them a political power which the central government and foreign countries looked to in achieving their goals[3].

Land Tenure System Before Land Reform

Change has not been a rapid phenomena prior to the last couple of centuries throughout the world in general and in rural Iran in particular. Patterns of landholding, landlord-peasant relationships, organization of production, power, and class structure,

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[3] For a review of nomads and tribes life in Iran, see Beck, Economic Transformations Among Qashqai Nomads, 1962-1978; Helfgott, Tribalism as a Socioeconomic Formation in Iranian History; Loeffler, Tribal Order and the State: The Political Organization of Boir Ahmad; Stauffer, The Economics of Nomadism in Iran; and Fazel, Tribes and State in Iran: From Pahlavi to Islamic Republic.

have been relatively constant for a long period of time in Iran. Prior to the Pahlavi dynasty and the Land Reform of 1962, several modes of landholding had existed in Iran: (1) Toyal or Iqta; (2) Waqf; (3) Khaliseh; and (4) Private lands.

1) Toyul System

Toyul (Iqta), or benefice, was an arrangement which enabled the rulers of society to appropriate and assign the land to the states' servants both military and civilian, as a means of compensation for their services. Since these lands were assigned as a compensation for services, discontinuation of services due to whatever reasons often led to reappropriation of land by the rulers.

With the coming of the Constitutional Revolution in 1906, one of the first actions of first National Consultative Assembly was to abolish the toyul system an action that resulted in enhancing the position of an already developing set of private landowners (Shashaani, 1985). The abolishment of the toyul system was not often accompanied by a reclamation of assigned land from assignees, thus ownership of assigned land was transferred from the state to the private sector. The private sector henceforth consolidated its power base and established itself as one of the main players in both the economic and political life of Iranian society (Hooglund, 1982).

2) The Waqf Land

Waqf (pious endowment) is an Islamic concept which refers to the "placement of property in trust for the purpose of the perpetual utilization of its benefits for public or private institutions or persons" (Yeganeh, 1986). Two kinds of waqf were distinguished: 1) those endowments that were for private purpose; and 2) those that were for public interests. Most of the waqf land in Iran was devoted to general purposes, which included upkeeping shrines, religious schools, public libraries, mosques, and other public institutions. Waqf lands could be exchanged for better property but it could not be sold or confiscated (Lambton, 1953). Waqf land was often rented to peasants and its revenue was spent for public purposes.

Safavid shahs endowed a great deal of land as waqf which led to a weakening of private landownership, enhancement of the ulama's financial independence,[4] and a centralization of administration in these lands (Shashaani, 1985). Reza Shah and later his son gradually took control of awaqf (plural of waqf) and deprived the ulama of one of their main sources of income. Whether controlled by religious institutions or the state, waqf lands in general did not help in the strengthening of private ownership in Iran.

3) <u>Khaliseh</u>

Khaliseh lands were those belonging to the crown and were acquired mainly through conquest, inheritance, confiscation, and sometimes purchase (Shashaani, 1985). The Khaliseh lands were the largest portion of Iran's most fertile lands. Due to the government's emergency needs for cash some of these lands were sold to the private sector at the end of the last century. Reza Shah however, transferred large amounts of land through confiscation and forced purchase at a low price to crown land. Other portions of Khaliseh lands were divided and sold by Mohammad Reza Shah in 1950 under pressure from the United States for enhancing the regime's legitimacy and

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[4] It should be noted that the ulama's financial independence has been a very crucial factor in making them one of the strongest social forces of Iran in previous centuries; and as it will be discussed later, they have exercised great influence on all the major social movements of the last couple of centuries.

preventing potential peasants's rebellion. The distribution of Khaliseh land, which constituted the largest form of landownership, was regarded as an important step toward further growth of private land ownership.

4) Private Land

As stated above, both Toyul and Khaliseh lands ended up being helpful in the expansion of private landownership. Private landownership has always co- existed with other land holding practices in Iran without becoming the dominant pattern.

Two sorts of private landowners could be recognized: 1) those who owned more than one village; and 2) those who shared one village. Since the size of landowning was directly and positively correlated to the size of political power and social status and not to income, many of the landowner's endeavors were involved with increasing their possession of lands.[5] These landlords often resided in big cities, rarely visited their property, and administered their rural affairs through their agents. The prevalence of private landownership was a fundamental step to the introduction of commercial agriculture in the northern and southeastern parts of Iran. Table 5.2 shows the configuration of landownership before Land Reform.

Organization of Production in Rural Iran Before Land Reform

Different forms of organizing agricultural production had emerged in Iran due to factors like labor, water, population density, size and cultivatability of lands, weather, etc.

[5] There have been some landlords who possessed more than 400 villages, and 37 families owned 19,000 villages, 38 percent of the total (Shashaani, 85). Royal family, large landowners, and tribal chiefs possessed about 70 percent of arable land, pastures and forests in 1957 (Khosravi, 61).

Table 5.2 Landownership Before the Land Reform

Proprietors	# of Villages	Total Area	%
State and crown land	2,500	800,000	5
Weqf land	7,500	2,400,000	15
Large landowners	32,500	10,400,000	65
Small landowners	7,500	2,400,000	15
Total	50,000	16,000,000	100

Source: Bahman, Nirumand, "Iran: The New Imperialism in Action", New York: Monthly Review, 1969.

Three major categories of mode of production can be distinguished: 1) sharecropping or rayati; 2) family smallholding or Melki; and 3) modern mechanized agriculture. Table 5.3 below shows how much land was associated with each type of production in 1960.

Sharecropping

Sharecropping, as Table 5.3 demonstrates, was the dominant mode of production in rural Iran before Land Reform. Sharecropping in the Iranian context referred to a type of production in which five main elements of agriculture production - land, labor, water, seed, oxen - had different weights, and suppliers of each item took his share according to the weight of the element contributed by him. In this sort of organization of production, occupancy and usage of land belonged to the sharecropper, and usually the informal contract between sharecropper and landowner was renewed as long as the sharecropper wanted to do so. There has surely been cases where landowners had not sought to renew the contract and forced the sharecropper out of the land. As everywhere in the world, however, the terms and conditions of the contract were mainly dictated by landowners or their agents. The sharecropping agreement existed in all forms of landownership - Khaliseh, Toyul, Waqf, and private ownership (Shashaani, 85).

Family Smallholding

In this type of production, ownership of land belonged to a family. Labor was supplied by family members and sometimes, depending on the size of land and seasons of the year, on outside labor. Water, oxen and seeds could be rented, borrowed or

Table 5.3 Type of Holding by Number and Area (Hectares), 1960.
(in thousands)

	No.	%	Area	%
Sharecropping	1,049	56.5	7,064	62.2
Family smallholding	624	33.6	2,975	26.2
Modern	204	10.9	1,317	11.6
Total	1,877	100.0	11,356	100.0

SOURCE: Compiled from Syrus Yeganeh, Agrarian Structure under Adptation, Reform, and Revolution: The Case of Iran in a Case of Iran in a Comparative- Historical Perspective Ph.D Dissertation (new School for social Research), 1986 p. 157

purchased by owners. Family smallholders mainly produced for local consumption, and surpluses were exchanged through middleman for necessary goods. Due to insufficient cash for their livelihood, these family smallholders had to foresell their crops for a much cheaper price to local money lenders. Their income varied according to the size of land on which they were working and the size of the family. Seven percent of these families had less than half a hectare; 25 percent, less than one hectare. The average size of landholding for these types of production was 3.5 hectare (Yeganeh, 1986).

Modern Mechanized Enterprises

By the late 19th century commercial agriculture was emerging as an alternative form of production in Iran. In the 20th century, machines, like elsewhere, were found to be a good instrument for development and growth of agriculture by some merchants, landlords, and the crown family. Importing of modern machinery, however, was not widespread due to governmental restrictions and non-familiarity with international trade and world markets. In fact, mechanized agriculture was predominant only in the large and fertile land of the northern part of Iran, particularly in the Gorgan area in the northeast, where a suitable infrastructure was already in place. Capital intensive production, wage labor, profit motivated production, and scientific management and decision-making techniques were fundamental characteristics of modern agriculture in mid- 20th century Iran.

Class Structure of Rural Iran Before Land Reform

The type and size of landowning and landholding are fundamental criteria in distinguishing the class position of the rural population in Iran. Three major classes can be identified: 1) landowners; 2) landholders, and 3) landless classes.

Landowners

Landowners refers to a class of people whose entitlement to land gave them tremendous prestige and socioeconomic power. Many of them often resided in urban centers and rarely directly cultivated their land. Their income was obtained from their two-thirds or three-fifths share of the produce and was often channelled to urban areas and spent on consumption and not invested in the land (Afshar, 85).

The landowners class can be divided into at least three main categories. One category consisted of those who owned more than one village and was comprised of traditional or old landowners, civilian and military officials, merchants and contractors investing in land, and tribal chiefs. In one estimate 32,500 out of 50,000 villages belonged to this category, with 400 to 450 families among them owning 19,000 villages (Halliday, 79).

Since agriculture was the most important sector of the Iranian economy before Land Reform, and due to central governments dependence on this class for its revenue and recruitment, landowners did enjoyed a special politico-economic power and social prestige in Iran. The luxurious life which they could afford was not comparable to that of any other class in Iranian society. Many of the important governmental positions, both civilian and military, in congresses or in the executive branch were occupied by the members of this class.[6]

The landowners could exercise considerable political power in rural areas through provincial or district governors and gendarmes who were either appointed by the influence-peddling of landlords in the capital or were co-opted by them (Yeganeh, 86).

The second category consisted of those who owned less than one village. These owners often cultivated the land themselves and did not enjoy the same sort of politico-economic power and social prestige as the first category did. They often, however, had a higher social status relative to landholders. It should be noted that many times they supplemented their income with other sources.

The third category were those: 1) who owned small plots of land; 2) whose family provided the bulk of labor; 3) whose production was principally oriented toward internal consumption and local markets; 4) whose technology and methods of farming were to a large extent primitive; 5) who did not enjoy any privilege due to their ownership of land. This class comprised about 20 percent of the rural population before the Land Reform; and many of its members were forced to sell their land and migrate to urban centers in search of a livelihood.

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[6] Zonis (71), in his study of Iranian elite, found 55.7 percent of political elite on the eve of Land Reform came from large landowners family. During the period of 1907-1924, landowning class comprised 45 percent of majlis deputies, in the 1925-41 period, 60 percent, and in the 1941-1961 period, 65 percent (Shajii, 65 in Yeganeh, 86). In the Senate from 1950 to 1970 approximately 70 percent of senators came from large landowners families (Ibid).

Landholders

Landholders, on the other hand, did not own the land, often resided on the land, always cultivated the land, and did not enjoy power and prestige camparable to that of the landowners. Landholders refers mainly to sharecroppers who did not own the land but had the right to cultivate it; and those who rented the land entirely for a fixed price. Although landholders did not own the land, their rights to land distinguished them from the landless classes. Many of them often enjoyed a higher income and social prestige relative to wage earners in rural areas. It is estimated that roughly 1/3 of the rural population could be classified as landholders.

Landless Class

The landless class can be divided into at least two groups: 1) The agricultural laborer who did not own any land and had to work seasonally for landowners and landholders. This segment of the population was among the poorest part of rural communities. Agricultural workers comprised about 80 percent of the landless class. 2) The other group consisted of tradesmen, shopkeepers, peddlers, money lenders, blacksmith, carpenters, barbers, and all other service workers. The landless class was a heterogeneous class with diverse interests, at different income level and distinguishable socio-economic power and prestige. Money lenders and artisans had a relatively higher income and social prestige in comparison with the other strata of this class. The landless class constituted about 40 percent of the rural population.

Land Reform

Since the beginning of this century several attempts have been made to rearrange the pattern of landownership and landholding in Iran. The Constitution Revolution of 1906-11 was accompanied by abolishment of the Toyul-benfici-system. The Gangali movement encouraged redistribution of land in the northern part of Iran. Mossadeq also introduced bills to reform a number of structural barriers to a higher productivity and a more humane relationship between landlords and peasants. In 1960 the Shah proposed a Land Reform package to institute a fundamentally new pattern of landownership and power relation in the country. Due to practical problems in its implementation and opposition from various strata of society, the Land Reform Package went through different stages.

The Shah's principal reasons for articulation and execution of the Land Reform Program were:

1) The American government pressured to his regime, due to U.S.concern with the deep frustration of peasants and their potential for a revolutionary movement. Iran was too important strategically for the Kennedy administration in the Cold War era to allow it to fall into the hands of "Russia." Therefore, United States pressure was mounting on the hesitant Shah to implement Land Reform in the face of landlord opposition in order to prevent a pro-Russian peasant upheaval. Revolution from above seemed the only way into halt a revolution from below.

2) Reduction of the regime's dependence on the landlord class as the main

source of revenue and political recruitment. Increasing oil revenue made it possible for the regime to successfully decrease its financial dependence on landowners.

3) Further penetration of the state's bureaucracy and control in the rural areas.[7] Enhancement ofthe state position in rural communities was, however, at the expense of the landowners' demise.

4) To redistribute lands in order to create a class of prosperous peasants as a social support base for the regime in a new alliance.

5) To substitute the inefficient subsistence farming with commercial, profit-oriented, and technologically more advanced agriculture.[8]

Different social groups opposed the Shah's reform for different reasons:

1) Landlords opposed it for the obvious reasons of losing political, social and economic privileges which they had enjoyed for a long period of time.[9]

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[7] The government thus stationed in villages various agents, institutions and organizations to integrate the village's social, economic, and political affairs into the government's bureaucratic machine, the main purpose of which was to prevent the villages from gaining socio-economic power and thus political autonomy (Shashaani, 1985).

[8] As Shashaani (1985) points out: "Agricultural development in any society is dependent on the availability and distribution of resources. Whereas availability is related to a natural variation of resources, distribution is a structural issue originating in the socio-political base of the society. More specifically, how the available resources are allocated to different sectors depends on government policy, which in turn reflects the nature of transformation of the society."

[9] It should be pointed out that a number of leading large landowners could preserve their economic and social prestige and obtain a political position by yielding to the authority of the Shah and the ruling apparatus. For example, Assadollah Alam, a member of one of the largest landed families was appointed as prime minister after the defeat of Amini. Sharif Emami, a member of the landed aristocracy, was appointed as speaker of the Senate; members of Farmanfarmaian family, the oldest large landed family, were assigned important government positions, including director of the Plan Organization (Zonis, 1971); Mehdi Batman Gholich, whose estate was larger than Switzerland (Newsweek, June 12, 1968:48~, was appointed as governor of Khorasan Province and head of the largest religious endowment organization. The former large landowns were known as "the one thousand family" and were the upper crust of the large

Although the Shah offset many of their losses by offering them shares in the factories, farm corporations, and agro-businesses, or governmental positions, they did not in general enjoy the same prestige and privileges.

2) Bazaaries opposed the Reform mainly due to the predictable further incorporation of Iran's economy into the world capitalist system which they perceived would jeopardize their very livelihood. Although the bazaar had for a long time been at the core of urban economic activities, particularly through the distribution of agricultural products throughout the country, it found itself more and more on the periphery of Iran's economy.

3) Religious leaders opposed the Reform due to their perception of diminishing agricultural productivity, which would lead to further susceptibility of the country to foreign influence. A number of religious leaders opposed the Reform either because they came from the landowners family or were benefitted by them.

On the eve of the Land Reform, the agrarian structure of Iran, was characterized by:

1) the growth and establishment of private land ownership in the system of land tenure;

2) the growth of commercial and capitalist extensive agriculture in the organization of production, side by side with traditional sharecropping and

landed families (Shashaani, 85).

tenancy;

3) the introduction of new urban bourgeoisie and bureaucratic elements into landowning classes;

4) the consolidation of political power of the landowning classes vis-a-vis the various strata of the peasantry and;

5) the absence of revolutionary potential among the peasantry.

These characteristics, Yeganeh argues, were consequences of industrialization, bureaucratization, and urbanization that had began in the beginning of this century.

Effects of Reform on Pattern of Land Ownership

The Land Reform of 1960's led to further consolidations of private land ownership. The division of crown land which had begun in 1950 was speeded up after the Reform. In the first three stages of Reform crown lands were divided and distributed among sharecroppers who had traditionally been cultivating these lands. On the fourth stage waqf lands were also transferred either to private or in a few cases, to state sectors (Yeganeh, 1986). At the end of the fourth stage 90 percent of the land was owned by the private sector of which 75 percent of it belonged to new smallholders, previously sharecroppers, and old smallholders.[10] The other 15 percent, which were mechanized commercial farms, belonged to old and new landowners. The state also owned 10 percent of the agricultural lands, which included mechanized commercial land and newly emerged

[10]For a detailed analysis of patterns of land distribution, the type and size of lands which peasants received and later were forced to sell see Shashaani, Capitalism, Land Reform and Agricultural Development: the Case of Iran pp. 147-188; and Yeganeh, Agrarian Structure Under Adaptation, Reform, and Revolution, pp. 192-228.

big agribusinesses. In sum, the primary objective of Land Reform (apart from its political context), the elimination of the sharecropping mode of land holdings, was accomplished; and private ownership became the dominant form of land holdings at the end of the fourth stage of Reform (Shashaani, 1985).

Effects of Reform on Organization of Production

Three major forms of organization of production can be identified in Post Land Reform Iran: subsistence farming; commercial family farming; and modern commercial farming.

Subsistence Farming

As the result of Land Reform important changes occurred in the pattern of landownership and organization of agricultural production. As stated above, the majority of sharecroppers became family smallholders, and the traditional organization of group farming, boneh, which had been a workable mode of production for quite a long time, disappeared.

> Boneh was an organized team which managed all productive activities. It had an important place in the agrarian society of Iran, since it was a collective response to all tasks necessary in the productive process, including plugging, weeding, irrigation, harvesting, and the like" (Shashaani, 1985).

The main characteristics of subsistence farms were as follows:

1) The goal of production was to fulfill the family food needs rather than commercial sale; and surpluses, if any, would have been exchanged for necessary goods in local markets;

2) Labor was mainly furnished by family members for both agricultural and non-agricultural activities.[11] Technology and methods of farming were traditional and relied less on specialization;

3) The size of lands was so small that they could barely feed the family.

As Shashaani (85) points out, about 82 percent of the peasant families landholdings were below 10 hectares and most provided a purely subsistence living.[12] Table 5.4 presents the distribution of land holdings by size and type of labor in 1974.

Commercial Family Farming

The better-off peasants who had good agricultural experience, larger size landholdings, of land, and used more advanced technology and methods of farming, specialized in producing highly cashable crops for the local and national market. Many times they rented the land from those peasants who could not afford to cultivate their lands, or from absentee owners whose main source of income was not agricultural activities. Both family and hired labor were employed in processes of production. The contribution of commercial family farming to agricultural production was indeed high relative to other modes of production (Shashaani, 1985).

[11]The peasant's family was the basic unit of a multi-dimensional social organization that was involved in various agricultural activities, husbandry, non-agricultural works (crafts work), subsistence activities (bakery, dairy production, etc.) and the like (Shashaani, 85).

[12]It has been stated out that on average a family of five members needs about 7 hectares of land to support itself. Hooglund (82) extrapolated approximately 75 percent of the peasants received less than 7 hectares due to Land Reform. Since half of the land was left fallow because of lack of water and other agricultural input, it can be concluded that an overwhelming majority of subsistence farms were used for reproduction of family (Shashaani, 85).

Table 5.4 Distribution of Land Holdings by Size and Type of Labor

Size of Land (hectare)	Total	Production Only by Family Members %	Production Mainly by Family Members %	Production by Hired Labor %
Less than 1	100	75	20	5
1-2	100	61	34	5
2-5	100	61	34	5
5-10	100	54	40	6
10-50	100	44	48	8
50-100	100	18	45	37
100 and over	100	8	25	67

Source: Salnameh-ye Amari Keshavarzi (Statistical yearbook of the Agriculture), Tehran,: Statistical Center of Iran 1976, p.7

Modern Commercial Farming

As a result of Land Reform modern commercial agriculture became more prevalent in rural communities. This type of agriculture production required large plots of land and huge sums of capital which could have only been provided by agribusinesses, government and shareholding. The main characteristics of modern commercial farming were as follow: 1) prevalence of wage labor as the predominant pattern of labor usage; 2) preference of highly cashable crops for production; 3) hiring of skilled managerial staff who often did not own the enterprise; 4) utilization of irrigated land; and 5) use of highly advanced technology and methods of farming in the process of production.[13]

Three types of modern commercial farming can be distinguished after Land Reform: private commercial farming, farm corporation, and agribusiness.

1) In private commercial farming one or several individuals, usually urban merchants, invested in agricultural land often for cash crop production. Production was capital intensive oriented and advanced agricultural machinery and new irrigation techniques were extensively employed. Hired wage labor, the practice of "scientific" management techniques and modern decision-making process, and the application of advanced methods of supplying, producing, and marketing goods were other common characteristics of private commercial farming. Hooglund (1982) estimates

[13]It should be pointed out that the governments agricultural policies favored modern commercial farming by 1) assigning land below the newly erected irrigation dams to them; and 2) grants in aid, easy credit, and low interest loans from the Agricultural Development Bank of Iran. Between 1971 and 1978 this bank granted 97.4 billion rials (approximately each dollar was equal to approximately 75 rials) in low interest loans and grants-in-aid to about 2,800 large commercial agricultural units, - at an average of 35 million rials per loan (Yeganeh, 86).

that approximately 7,000 individuals invested in this type of farming and about 10,000 villages might have been fully or partially affected by private commercial farming.

2) Farm corporation is another form of modern commercial agriculture which came into being in the third stage of Land Reform to help peasants and petty landowners pool their resources together to form a larger capital for investing in highly mechanized agriculture. They exchanged their resources, mainly land, for shares in corporations. As Hooglund (1982) points out, the main objectives of farm corporations were

> modernization of agriculture by using a high rate capital investment, mechanized production, scientific method of agriculture, and cultivation of the non-productive peasants land holdings.

The government's representatives were often the coordinators of corporations with much control and power over policies in regard to type of cash crop, process of production, and marketing targets. Government supported farm corporations by providing easy credit, large sums of capital, agricultural machinery, skilled manpower, and tax exemption (Shashaani, 1985). Farm corporations in general helped the government to expand its control even further in rural areas.[14] It should be pointed out that farm corporations, despite such favorable conditions, did not

[14]By 1978, ninety-three farm corporations were established throughout Iran with 35,444 shareholders which covered approximately 400,000 hectares (Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report, 1978:129). Each farm corporation consisted of several villages with each cultivating about 1,000 hectares or more of land (Shashaani, 85).

significantly help to increase agricultural outputs in pre-revolutionary Iran.[15]

Production cooperatives were variants of farm corporations in which landowners did not give up their entitlement on land in exchange for shares. Unlike farm corporations, the members of production cooperatives directly participated in the process of production according to their past experiences (Shashaani, 1985). Farmers in production cooperatives also exercised more control over the decision making processes. These cooperatives received credit, capital, and other assistance from the government, but not as much as farm corporations.[16]

3) In the agro-business type of farming, one enterprise controlled the process of production from the farm to the market. To encourage this type of farming, government provided excellent credit conditions, agricultural machinery, the best fertilized land, irrigation infrastructures, tax incentives, and huge sums of capital. The government's rationale in promoting agro-business was:

1. to minimize the initial capital investment and the cost of water supply;

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[15]For a detailed discussions of farm corporations see Freivalds; Farm Corporations in Iran: An Alternative to Traditional Agriculture; and Azkia, The Effect of Rural Development on Iranian Peasantry Between 1962 and 1978 with Special Reference to Farm Corporations.

[16]The farm corporations were modelled basically on the Israeli Moshavim cooperatives of individual producer, and many managers of these units were trained in Israel; the private capital- intensive farms were modelled on U.S. agribusiness corporations (Halliday, 79).

2. to minimize the cost of land-leveling activities and land preparation for cultivation;

3. to minimize the cost of using agricultural machinery and services, e.g., supplying fertilizers, seeds, and pesticides;

4. to minimize the public-service costs such as power, communications, fuel distribution, clinics, and schools;

5. to maximize the possibilities of agro-industry establishment;

6. optimum use of skilled manpower and professionals. (Source: Agricultural Development Bank of Iran in Shashaani, 1985).

Foreign and domestic entrepreneurs[17] were invited to utilize such advantageous conditions, and quite a few indeed did invest in agro-businesses. A large portion of Iran's best land in Khozistan went under agro-business type of production and large sums of money were spent in building the necessary infrastructure for the operation of such enterprises. Agro-business, however, did not expand beyond specific areas of Iran. In spite of all the money and energy which government spent on agro-business type of farming a general consensus existed among the officials, investing companies and individuals, that the program as a whole was a failure and did not even return the original capital[18] (Shashaani, 1985).

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[17]By 1976, thirty-four production cooperatives existed covering 80,000 hectares and 181 villages (Central Bank of Iran, 1977:179).

[18]For a review of agro-business contributions to agricultural output see Richards, Land Reform and Agro-business in Iran.

As the result of Land Reform three types of land exploitation developed with distinct characteristics. The government promoted through different policies[19] modern commercial agriculture at the expense of other types. Although government was relatively successful in furthering the politics of this mode of production, it did not achieve its economic objectives of increasing agricultural outputs.[20] As Katozian (1981) notes:

> (a) nearly all the state and private credit was injected into disastrous twins, the farm corporations and the agro-businesses, and for both political, economic and institutional reasons these "modern" sectors performed extremely poorly; and (b) the traditional sector was starved of foods, and pushed around by the gendarmerie and other state officials, including those involved in cooperatives. Therefore, the "modern" sector failed miserably, while the traditional sector, which was almost positively persecuted, could not do so well as to compensate for the failure of the former.

<u>Effect of Land Reform on Class Structure</u>

Land Reform had a significant impact on the class structure of rural communities in Iran. As the result of Reform the landowner's power and prestige was substantially

[19]In order to encourage investors government provided the following incentives: 1) Tax relief for ten years; 2) Excellent credit and financial support; 3) Tax and tariff relief for importing agricultural machinery and related industries; 4) The long term tenancy agreement between the state and agro-business enterprises in areas with fertile lands and adequate water, such as Khuzistan; 5) Securing of a minimum purchase price for staple agricultural products such as wheat, rice, corn, beets, and the like that is produced by agro-business companies, and payment of 20 percent of fertilizers and 50 percent of treated seed costs to these enterprises by the government; 6) The government is (was) also responsible for the construction of road networks of 1,000 hectares and drainage facilities of 100 hectare lands within the boundary below the Daz Dam in Khuzistan; and 7) The government should guarantee the repatriation of capital and profits that belong(ed) to foreign entrepreneurs and to their home countries (Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 75 in Shashaani, 85).

[20]The failure of agro-business and farm corporations mainly was due to 1) lack of motivation of the investors, who were interested in quick profits rather than long term planning and agricultural developments; 2) mismanagement and unfamiliarity of foreign investors with the environment; 3) the size of the farms under operation which was too large for efficient management and production.

reduced. The state enhanced its position and control in villages; urban entrepreneurs engaged in mechanized commercial agriculture and animal husbandry; the size of the smallholders class was doubled; and a new power arrangement emerged.

Landowners

Landowners' privileges and political power declined because of: 1) a reduction in the functional significance of the agriculture sector and the rise of the functional significance of the industry and service sectors of the economy; and 2) the rise of the central bureaucracy and thus the fall of the landowning class as the basis of Monarch political power (Yeganeh, 1986). It should be pointed out, however, that due to some of the provisions of the law, the landlords could retain in their entitlement limited amounts of the best land with the best infrastructure, access to roads, electricity, etc. (Graham, 1980). Many of the landowners became active as shareholders in urban factories and village farm corporations. As Najmabadi (1987) notes:

> the Land Reform program eliminated the absentee landlords as a socially important and politically significant class. Individually, these landlords became industrialists, commercial agriculturalists, or investors in urban real estate and commerce. As a social group, they ceased to exist and have a political voice in the affairs of the country.

Following the Land Reform implementation the traditional tenure system was eliminated by transforming the sharecroppers into family smallholders;[21] and many of

[21]The only category of land to be excluded throughout all stages was mechanized land. The options offered to the landowners concerning their non-mechanized lands were: 1) Sale of the land to the peasants; 2) division of land between landowners and peasants in proportion to their traditional crop sharing agreement and the sale of the peasant's share to him; 3) renting land to the occupant sharecropper on a long-term lease; 4) establishment of farm units under the management of the representatives of landowners, sharecroppers and village trustees (Yeganeh, 86).

the traditional landowners were replaced by urban entrepreneurs who engaged in mechanized commercial agriculture and animal husbandry (Yeganeh, 1986).

Family Smallholdlers

Family smallholders, whose membership was doubled after the implementation of Land Reform and constituted about two-thirds of the rural population, did not often possess sufficient economical land to be able to survive, and many of them had to supplement their income with work in urban centers. Family smallholders were a heterogeneous group with a few upper peasants occupying the top of the hierarchy, the middle peasants hardly surviving, and lower peasants at the bottom of the pyramid.

Upper or rich peasants who owned considerable amounts of arable land did enjoy relative prosperity in comparison with those in other strata of peasantry. Its members to a large extent came from landholders who had land before the Land Reform, larger sharecroppers, who in the course of Land Reform became the owners of their cropshares, and village shopkeepers and owners of small capital who, through money lending and extension of credit to peasants, accumulated land (Yeganeh, 1986).

Rich peasants often owned larger plots of land[22] in comparison with those in

[22]Rich peasants owned from 10 to 100 hectares and had access to 52 percent of the total cultivatable lands, which included 17 percent of the peasant's households. It should however, be pointed out, that the lands of majority of this group consisted of five to sixteen plots of land with the average size between 2.5 to 17 hectares which under such conditions reduced their income (Shashaani, 85).

other strata of peasantry, employed wage labor,[23] produced a substantial amount of their crops for market, and utilized commercial farming techniques and modes of production. In the absence of the former landowner, rich peasants consolidated their political power, social status, and material rewards through control of village council, the "house of justice," the "house of rural culture," farm corporations, and production cooperatives, often in cooperation with government agents in the rural communities[24] (Yeganeh, 1986; Shashaani, 1985).

The middle peasants were those who owned roughly 2-10 hectares of land, resided in the village and worked on the land, used mainly family labor and only occasionally hired wage labor, and relied more on agricultural activities as the principal source of income in comparison with other segments of peasantry. They owned about 35 percent of the total cultivated lands. A number of them produced more than subsistence requirements and were able to exchange their surpluses for other necessary goods in local markets. Because of dependence on agricultural activities for their income they rarely migrated to urban centers.[25]

The poor peasants constituted about 40 percent of family smallholders and owned

[23]In 1974, of the holdings with less than 50 hectares, 121,000 units employed wage labor for most of their production, and 830,000 units employed wage labor for a minor portion of their production. Yeganeh (86) argues, that it can be assumed that all of the former groups and some of the latter consisted of rich peasants.

[24]Another group which has been included in rich peasantry are traders and owners of small capital. In 1976, more than 100,000 were listed as engaged in wholesale, retail, and vending activities. Most of the peasants in one way or another were indebted to the shopkeepers, future buyers, and usurers in rural areas (Yeganeh, 86).

[25]According to some recent surveys, only 5 percent of middle peasants migrated to cities during the last seven years (Shashaani, 85).

about 5 percent of the total cultivated lands (Khosravi, 1980). They usually owned less than 2 hectares and often could not cultivate all of it due to water shortage or other agricultural input. Due to lack of producing at subsistence level, poor peasants had to sell their labor to local rich peasants or urban capitalists.[26] The rate of migration in this category was among the highest in family smallholders in the last years of the old regime[27] (Shashaani, 1985).

Poor peasants mainly came from families who possessed small plots of land prior to Land Reform, from small sharecroppers before Land Reform, from peasants who possessed the right of cultivation to adequate[28] land but under the "division" option lost one-third of the land, and thus joined the smallholders category, and from those who claimed some of the abandoned or uncultivated land (Yeganeh, 1986).[29]

Khwshnishins or Landless Villagers

The landless population of villages increased due to provisions in the Land Reform Program which made the sharecroppers the only recipients of land. Following their change

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[26]The poor peasants indeed did not rely on agriculture as the sole source of income. About 77 percent of their income came from non-agricultural activities.

[27]Approximately 90 percent of migrants in urban areas in the last seven years came from the poor peasants (Plan and Budget Organization, 78 in Shashaani, 85).

[28]Adequacy and size of land are relative and should be considered in relation to the type of cultivation and irrigation. "Small" may be applied to half a hectare of paddy or citrus in the Gilan or Mazandaran province, or to 50 hectares of unirrigated wheat farming in Baluchistan. The total size of the poor peasants is estimated to have been about 700,000 to 800,000 households (Yeganeh, 86).

[29]For a detailed analysis of peasantry in Iran see Khosravi, Jamea-Ye Dehqani Dar Iran (-Peasant Society of Iran); Azkia, The Effect of Rural Development Programs on the Iranian Peasantry Between 1962 and 1978; Shashaani, Capitalism, Land Reform and Agricultural Development.

of status from sharecroppers to smallholders, many of the latter group sold their land to others because of uneconomical land plots, lack of sufficient credit, and inability to pay their installments to the government.

Different strata of landless villagers were affected differently by the Land Reform Program. Shopkeepers, money lenders and tradesmen benefitted from the program because they supplied the basic goods of the villagers, their agricultural tools, and lent them money for both agricultural and non-agricultural purposes. Before the Land Reform many such needs would have been provided by landowners or their agents, but the absence of the landlords from the scene and the increased number of smallholders who sought to borrow money[30] for their livelihood enhanced the socio-economic position of this strata of landless villagers.

Blacksmiths, carpenters, shoemakers, and other service workers were adversely affected by the Reform Program. With the availability of inexpensive mass produced manufactured goods, the traditional handmade products of village craftsmen were undermined (Shashaani, 1985). As Hooglund (in Shashaani, 1985) notes:

> (After the Land Reform) such necessary items as shoes, clothing, copper, utensils, earthenware, cutlery, wooden furniture, and agricultural tools are now mass produced in factories and sold in the local markets and village shops at prices which often are lower than the cost of raw materials artisans must obtain in order to fashion similar goods.

Village craftsmen who could not compete with manufacturer goods either migrated to

[30]Because government agencies did not lend money for non-agricultural purposes peasants had to borrow it from other sources. As Shashaani (85) points out, from 1965-70, 61.4 percent of the loan received by peasants were spent for family expenses (non-agricultural purposes) against only 38.1 percent of the loans that had been used for agriculture and husbandry purposes. Government agencies also were very slow in providing the fast needed credits of peasants.

urban centers or became agricultural laborers.

Agricultural laborers or rural proletarits were among the poorest portion of villagers. After the Land Reform Program not only did the size of this group increase but also its misery intensified. Such laborers transferred from being attached to the land to being seasonal wage labors with no social or job security. They often had to move from one farm or village to another in search of jobs. They were deprived of participating in village affairs and were prevented from being members of the new organizations, such as the village council, "house of justice", and the cooperatives (Yeganeh, 1986). The other segment of the rural proletariat was non-agricultural workers, who provided personal services in villages, such as barbers, farm watchers, shepherds, manual workers, and the like. They did not have a better life than the agricultural workers and they were the first who left the villages to work in cities, particularly as construction workers[31] (Shashaani, 1985).

Land Reform significantly changed the rural landscape of Iran. The village as a unit of production, as well as a socio-political territory was weakened (Shashaani, 1985).[32] The prime beneficiary of Land Reform Program was the government which extended its control over the area in which it could not previously exercise it. Through

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[31]For a detailed description of landless villagers see Hooglund, The Khoushneshins (Landless Villagers) Population of Iran;, and Shashaani, Capitalism, Land Reform, and Agricultural Development: The Case of Iran.

[32]Craige (1978) in his case study of a village before and after and Land Reform in the Fars Province concluded that: "The White Revolution undeniably changed the status quo between 1965 and 1973: Land titles changes hands, the village headman and landlord were excised from village affairs, and new institutions were established. However, in many ways the changes came full circle and several of the pre-reform problems remained unsolved ten years after the reform. While at the outset there had been optimism and cooperation on the villager's part there was now factionalism, stratification and disenchantment with the government (Pesaran in Afshar, 1985).

agencies like cultural houses, houses of equity, village councils, party cells, literary, health and development corps, government to a large extent replaced the local authority of landowners and indeed changed the power structure of rural community and society in general. The division and distribution of land reduced the traditional power and authority of landlords as a strong social class with the state bureaucracy replacing the landowning class as the social base of the regime (Yeganeh, 1986).

Although Land Reform was accompanied by substantial changes in the socio-political structure of rural communities and rearrangement of class structure, it nevertheless was an economic failure (Shashaani, 1985; Hooglund, 1982). The peasant standard of living and their productivity was adversely affected, and agricultural output did not experience the growth expected. Agriculture lost its prominent role in Iranian economy and was no longer the largest source of employment or principal means of subsistence.[33] Oil revenues replaced agriculture as the primary source of income for the state (Yeganeh, 86). Table 5.5 demonstrates the distribution of the labor force in different sectors and the share of each sector of the economy in the GNP from 1963 to 1978.

Land Reform further increased the mechanization of agriculture,[34] the centralization of agricultural tools and machinery, and the opportunity for incorporation of village into the emerging capitalist mode of production throughout the country. It

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[33]Iran was largely self-sufficient in foodstuffs up to the early 1960's and could balance the deficit by export of cotton, fruits (peaches and limes) and nuts. After the 1973 oil price rise food consumption increased and created substantial dependence upon imports (Graham, 80).

[34]In 1960, machine power was used by less than 10 percent of landholders, of which only 4 percent were fully mechanized. Seventy-five percent of landholders used animal power and 15 percent employed only human power. In 1966 the number of tractors increased to 16,000 and in 1971 reached 23,000 (Shashaani, 86).

Table 5.5 Distribution of Labor Force in Different Sectors and Share of Each Sector of the Economy in G.N.P.

	Year	Agriculture	Industry	Services	Oil
% of G.N.P.	62 - 63	27.4	17.8	40.0	12.3
% of Total Labor Force	62 - 63	55.1	20.6	23.8	0.5
	67 - 68	21.6	20.7	36.4	18.0
	67 - 68	49.0	24.7	25.7	0.6
	72 - 73	10.3	12.6	23.9	50.0
	72 - 73	40.9	29.0	29.5	.06
	77 - 78	9.2	18.5	34.6	34.7
	77 - 78	32.2	33.2	34.0	0.6

Source: Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report and Balance sheet, various dates.

facilitated the merging of the village market into the international market and fully linked the local production process to the global economy. Rural economies no longer were immune from the fluctuation in the world economy.

Land Reform had a significant impact on the composition of the population as well. It forced a considerable proportion of the landless villagers and those family smallholders who could not produce even at a subsistence level to migrate to urban centers in search of survival.[35] Because wealth had been highly unevenly distributed throughout the country, apart from mal-distribution by class, there was a great concentration of wealth in the cities in glaring contrast to the underdeveloped countryside (Hudson in Pesaran in Afshar, 1985). These villagers' migration was one of the important factors in decreasing the contribution of the agricultural sector to the GNP. Table 5.6 presents the composition of urban-rural population from 1956 to 1978.

Land Reform also further weakened the probability of the peasantry being involved in any type of resurgence activities. Although the Iranian peasantry had not shown any revolutionary activities in spite of its discomfort and state of destitution, the United States insisted on Land Reform as it had done in Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Latin America, in order to diffuse any potential peasants' rebellious movement[36] (Yeganeh,

[35]Peasant movement rarely took place on a national scale. As Kazemi and Abrahamian write (76): "During the turbulent periods of 1946 and 1963, the Iranian press reported only 22 incidents of peasant protests. Of these 22, 8 consisted of peaceful demonstrations in mosques, 4 involved rival villages, and only 10 directly challenged landowners." Geographical dispersion, and cooperation among villages due to water shortage which made the rebellions by breakaway groups difficult have been cited as the main reasons of peasant's lack of revolutionary activities (Halliday, 79).

[36]Construction and manufacturing were two important sources of urban employment for such villagers. Between 1975 and 1977, the village migrants accounted for about 15 percent of the entire urban labor force employed in construction (Shashaani, 85).

Table 5.6 Iran's Population by Urban and Rural Areas

Year	Total (000s)	Urban (000s)	Rural (000s)	Degree of Urbanization[1] %
1956[a]	18,955	5,954	13,001	31.4
1966[a]	25,789	9,794	15,995	38.0
1976[a]	33,662	15,792	17,865	46.9
1978[b]	35,509	17,342	18,167	58.8

Notes: [a] Census data; [b] Estimated

[1]The percentage of total population residing in urban areas.

Source: Central Bank of Iran, Annual Report and Balance Sheet, Various dates.

1986).

As Yeganeh (86) notes, Land Reform brought about

> 1) the establishment of various forms of state and private landownership in the system of land tenure, 2) the establishment of capitalist enterprises and state commercial farms side by side with traditional peasant family smallholdings in the organization of production, 3) further weakening of the revolutionary potential of peasantry, and 4) the partial transformation of traditional landowning class or its replacement by the new urban entrepreneurs and government bureaucracy.

In short, Land Reform was the major instrument of industrialization, bureaucratization, and urbanization in Iran. It destroyed the semi-feudal system of social relations and ushured in the emergence of capitalism.[37]

[37]For a detailed discussion of Land Reform and its impact on Iranian society, see Lambton, The Persian Land Reform; Hooglund, Land and Revolution in Iran 1960-1980; Shashaani, Capitalism, Land Reform, and Agricultural Development: the Case of Iran; and Yeganeh, Agrarian Structure Under Adaptation, Reform, and Revolution. This chapter heavily relied on the above sources.

CHAPTER VI

SHIISM AND THE ULAMA

Leadership and ideology, as have been acknowledged by many scholars(Skocpol, 1982; Arjomand, 1986; Enayat in Sullivan, 1983) played an important role in making the Iranian revolution possible. A closer look at the history of Shia political life, and Ulama's role in Iranian society in general and socio-political movements of last couple of centuries in particular would help the students of the revolution and Iranian studies to have a better understanding of 1979 revolution.

Shia is a minority group in Islam which came into being primarily due to 1) a particular interpretation of divine revelation and Sunnat - tradition - of prophet Mohammad and 2) the issue of succession and successors of Prophet. Although the issue of succession was indeed a crucial factor in the advent of Shiism, it was not as, some scholars (Keddie, 86; Ismael and Ismael, 1980) argue, its sole raison d'etre. As Husayn Nasr writes (in Tabatabaie 1971):

> The problem of succession may be said to be the element that crystallized the Shiites into a distinct group, and political suppression in later periods, especially the Martyrdom of Imam Husayn - upon whom be peace - only accentuated this tendency of the Shiites to see themselves as a separate community within the Islamic world. The principal cause of the coming into being of Shiism, however, lies in the fact that this possibility existed within the Islamic revelation itself and so had to be realized. In as much as there were exoteric and esoteric interpretations from the very beginning, from which developed the schools

(Madhhab) of the Shariah (Jurisprudence) and Sufism in the Sunni world, there also had to be an interpretation of Islam which combine these elements in a single whole. This possibility was realized in Shiism, for which the Imam is the person in whom these two aspects of traditional authority are united and in whom the religious life is marked by a sense of tragedy and martyrdom.

Tawhid (belief in Divine Unity), Nabuwat (belief in prophecy of Mohammad),and Maad (belief in resurrection) are the three principles (Usul al-din) which both Shia and Sunni agrees upon[1]; but Imamate and Divine Justice are the two main principles which distinguishes Shia from Sunni Muslims. Both of these principles have been very important in the subsequent development of Shia theology and political theory. Shia believes successors of the prophet not only rule the community but also have to be so qualified - Masum or infallible, free from sin - that they can interpret the inner mysteries of Quran (Nasr in Tabatabaie, 1971). As Algar (1969) points out, Imamate is "an institution of a succession of charismatic figures who dispense true guidance in comprehending the esoteric sense of prophetic revelation." Thus, in Shia, religious and political affairs are inseparable and Imams are in charge of both. Divine justice is the other principle which distinguishes Shia from Sunni. Shia argues that justice is an intrinsic quality of God and God can not and will not act in an unjust manner because it is His nature to be just, in other words to be unjust would violate His own nature which is impossible (Nasr in Tabatabaie, 1971; Motahari, 1978; Sobhani, 1986).

Divine justice means that God is infinitely removed from every evil act and from being remiss in what is declared as incumbent. Al-adl (justice) depends on the knowledge of good and evil as determined by reason; reason guides a person to such knowledge, and asserts that good is good in itself, and evil is evil in itself,

[1]Although different interpretations and conceptions of those principles existed among the scholars of both sects, particularly in the field of Kalam (theology); but a relative consensus has existed among the ordinary believers of both sects in regard to general meanings of those principles.

whether the law gives pronounces it so or not (Sachedina, 1981:19).

Asharism the predominant school of theology in the Sunni world, argues that justice is not a set of standards and rules which God acts according to and can not violate; rather it is what God wills and acts. As a result of such theological argument Asharism followed a very deterministic perspective toward human action. They considered all human action as the direct and unmediated effect of God's will; human acts are being caused not by their power and their will but by divine will which is the sole producer of all effects (Lari, 1989:161).

Mainstream Shia and Motazeleh[2] - Sunni - schools of theology, as a result of believing in Divine Justice,and the capability of human intelligence - aql - to judge the justices or injustices of an act, argues that it is

> completely meaningless were God on the one hand to compel men to do certain things and on the other hand to reward or punish them. It would surly be unjust were the Creator of the world to set us on whatever path He chose by means of His power and His will, and then to punish us for actions we have committed without any choice on our part (Lari, 1989:171).

In other words, not to have the power and capability to do "good" or "evil," to violate or conform God's commands, and to be punished or rewarded for the behaviors which human beings do not have control over, would oppose Divine Justice (Motahari, 78; Sobhani, 1986).

These theological arguments had many political implications as well. The rulers often used determinism as an excuse to deny all responsibility of their unjust and tyrant

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[2]Motazeleh is a sunni school of theology whose interpretation of divine justice is very close to main stream shia. For further elaboration on common elements of these theological schools, see Motahari, Adl-e Elahi(Divine Justice).

behavior; they claimed that their hand was the hand of God, and what they do is what God has willed. The oppressed were then "obliged to endure and accept whatever the oppressor does (did) with them, because to struggle against his (their) injustice would be in vain and efforts to bring about change would inevitably fail" (Lari, 1989:164). Asharism also helped to avert the threat of any rebellion by proclaiming that the injustice of the ruler was God's punishment for his subjects' sins and depravity. Social injustice was thus related to divine origins rather than to the unfair power arrangement of society[3] (Sheikholeslami in Banuazizi and Weiner, 1986). On the other hand, Shia and Motazeleh theologians, by attributing justice to God as His intrinsic nature, and believing in determinism of human thought and action, sought justice in the ruler's behavior and in society in general.[4]

As before, political succession crystallized the Shia as a distinct entity among Muslims. Although Shiite did not militarily challenge the first three caliphs who succeeded the Prophet, it never accepted the reign of them as legitimate successors of Prophet primarily due to lack of esoteric qualifications and credentials. Shia believes Imam Ali - the fourth caliph of Sunni and first Imam of Shia - was the only qualified person who was chosen by divine decree (Nass) through the Prophet to succeed him (Nasr in Tabatabaie:1971).

[3]Barrington Moore (79) argues "that so long as it is assumed that God rather than man is responsible for inequality and injustice, no rebellion can be expected to take place" (Sheikhoeslami, in Banuazizi and Weiner, 86).

[4]For discussion of these two principles in Kalam and political theory, see Motahari, Adl-e Elahi; and shariati, Ummat va Imamat.

Imam Ali's Rule

Imam Ali's rule, however, was not without challenge and civil wars. Muawiyah fought with Imam Ali in the battle of Siffien and later established the Ummeyah Dynasty. With the establishment of the Ummeyah Dynasty succession became hereditary; and the seeds of separation between the realm of politics and religion indeed were sown in this period.

Imam Ali's short period of rule, however, is very significant due to its lasting effect on politico-legal theory of an ideal Islamic government. It has inspired many of the Shia activists throughout Islamic history to evaluate and challenge the existing political system with the standards of Imam Ali's rule. His practices of justice, virtue and egalitarianism "explicitly or implicitly, consciously or sub-consciously, has constantly inspired political dissent and rebellion throughout the various ages in Shia history" (Dorraj, 1990:45).

On the eve of the Islamic Revolution, in almost all of the demonstrations, strikes, house and shop's walls, revolutionary pamphlets, etc., the most commonly used slogan and demand of the people was the establishment of Imam Ali's type of government, with a return to his traditions and practices. In Shiites eyes the government of Imam Ali was the crystallization of the rule of virtue and justice. His advice to Malek Ashtar, one of his closest friends and the appointed governor of Egypt, which has been used widely both before and after the Revolution as the guide for both the people and the government, demonstrates his view of the ruler and the ruled. Below is a short synopsis of his letter to Malek:

> You must be just, and the serving of the common man must be one of your prime objectives; the gratification of the aristocracy is insignificant and can be ignored in the face of the happiness of the masses. No other people are like the aristocracy: they are a heavy burden on the ruler during the easy times, and are nowhere to be found when hardship strikes. They do not appreciate your gifts and never forgive you when you do not deliver. It is the layman who are the backbone of religion: hardworking and always ready to fight the enemy. Look after the deprived (Mahrum) and dispossessed (Mostazaf) who need food and shelter. They deserve your help. Give to them generously from bait al-mal (public fund). It is your duty to protect them and their families. Be kind to those you rule. The people will obey their ruler if they are immune from his abuse. Avoid nepotism and do not give land to your relatives. They may force others to work on it as slaves, and may harm them and accumulate wealth at their expense. Do not base your rule on bloodshed, because this will weaken you and will turn the tide of events against you (in Dorraj 1990:51).

In the same letter Imam Ali stated that rulership was worth less than an old shoe to him; and if it had not been for taking the rights of oppressed from the oppressor, and implementing the Allah's law, he would not have accepted it. This further reiterated the Islamic view of the state's goal and objectives. As Pfaff (63) points out:

> In theory Islamic state is communal in scope, rather than territorial, embracing all the faithful within the "domain of Islam" (Dar al-Islam). Its raison d'etre is to administer Allah's law the Sharia (literally "way" or "path) to the community of the faithful (Umma al-Mumminin). Thus, the ideal Islamic state is not merely a theocracy, but a nomocracy. It is the duty of the caliph (or Imam) to maintain and enforce the Sharia. The very word "Islam" means submission, and "muslim" is one who submits - to the will of Allah, the Sharia. But whether the Sharia is enforced or not, the muslim, qua Muslim, is obligated to follow the conduct set forth by that normative code.

Imam Husayn's Martyrdom

Imam Husayn, the second son of Imam Ali and grandson of the Prophet, Shia Third Imam, went to war with Yazid, the son of Muawiyah. He knew full well that his death was inevitable in the face of the awesome military power of Yazid (Tabatabaie, 1971:198). When he was told about the extreme odds against him in fighting Yazid, Imam answered:

> O People, the Apostle of God said during his life , "He who sees an oppressive ruler violating the sanctions (halal) of God, revoking the covenant of God, opposing the Sunna of the Apostle of God, dealing with the servant of God sinfully and cruelly; [If a man sees such a rule] and does not show zeal against him in word or deed, God would surely cause him to enter his abode in the fire" (in Dorraj 1990:66).

Imam Husayn and his close relatives and associates, in a desert in Iraq named Karbala, fought with Yazid forces and were all, as expected, killed in the battle. But this event left the strongest influence on history in general and Shia opposition movements in particular. The Ummayad dynasty was overthrown a few years later by those who stood up to take revenge for Imam Husayn's death. On the anniversary of Imam Husayn martyrdom the most emotional rituals - self-flagellation and weeping - have been performed by Shiites who see his martyrdom as a deliberate decision to uphold a principle - that the Shiites must struggle against oppression regardless of how adverse the situation or what the cost (Dorraj, 1990:66).

Imam Husayn's martyrdom also has been perceived in the light of Quranic injunctions which view the martyrs not as dead but rather as a live and well, rewarded by God. Since death sooner or later would embrace all mortal lives, selecting the type of death which is conducive to eternal life is what courageous, dignified and rational Shiites would do.[5] The symbolism associated with martyrdom[6] makes the individual and community deeply conscious of themselves and their historical mission. A number of

[5]In fact all the eleven Imams of Shia have been martyred-the twelfth Imam has gone to occultation-and their martyrdom have been very significant factor in molding of shia mentality in regard to "Red Death" as a "Desired Death".

[6]For further discussion on this topic, see Shariati, Shahadat.

rituals of the anniversary represents a symbolic continuation and extension of Imam's life; and the very upholding of the anniversary in the eyes of Shiites is indeed a valid witness to immortal life of a martyr. This event has become:

> the reference point for almost all popular preaching ... its focus is the emotionally potent theme of corrupt and oppressive tyranny repeatedly overcoming (in this world) the steadfast dedication to pure truth; hence its ever-present, latent, political potential to frame or clothe contemporary discontent (Fischer, 1980:13).

As a result of Imam Husayn's martyrdom, a symbolic resource - as Fischer puts it, Karbala paradigm[7] - was created which Shia opposition movements have always resorted to in condemning ruling elites and soliciting the people's participation against the tyranny in the face of immense odds. In the process of the Islamic Revolution, by identifying the Shah as the Yazid of the present time, Ulama were successful in linking the "Karbala Paradigm" to the struggle against the Pahlavi regime.

Imam Mahdi's Occultation

Imam Mahdi - the twelfth Imam born in 872 - Shia believes, went to occultation in his early childhood. His occultation will be continued until before the resurrection day when he will come forth and would fill the earth with justice and equity instead of oppression and tyranny (Tabatabaie:71). Many of the fundamental ingredients of Shia political theory indeed have evolved from Imam's occultation; because as long as the Imams lived in their societies, the answer to questions of who should rule and how, was

[7]Fisher (80:191) has referred to this event as "Karbala Paradigm." Karbala Paradigm, he stated, is a "device for heightening political consciousness of the moral failings of the government" and which also provide "multiple levels of channelling feelings of solidarity and conflict, of which the overt political metaphor of oppression by tyrannical King is only the most obvious."

rather obvious, but so long as Imam Mahdi remained in occultation, "a shadow of illegitimacy was bound to cover all worldly striving and activities, above all those related to government. There was no true authority nor possibility thereof: only power." (Algar:1969).

Due to the minority status of Shia in a predominantly Sunni government, the immediate and practical concerns of the Ulama were to extrapolate from the Quran and Hadith the possibility, extent and circumstances of Shiite cooperation with or involvement in a Sunni government. A number of Ulama[8], for preservation and survival of the Shiite community, prescribed silence and sometimes obedience to the Sunni rulers[9] (Enayat in Sullivan, 1983). These Ulama, unable to change the socio-political realities:

> had to come to an accommodation. The process of depoliticization of religion was a direct response to the futility of political challenge. The stronger the state and the less capable the society in mobilizing against it, the more the religion became pacified and the less it was concerned with secular world (Sheikoleslami in Banuazizi and Weiner, 1986:234).[10]

But other Ulama did develop - particularly in recent centuries - more radical recipes in dealing with existing socio-political realities. They considered all temporal rulers in the absence of the Imam as illegitimate power holders. They argued that

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[8]It should be noted that Shia as Keddie points out, does not have unity of doctrine or any council or individual (since the occultation) who set doctrine for the future, thus several doctrines may exist at the same or different times with or without a dominant doctrine.

[9]This may be called diquiyyah - expedient dissimulation - but, as Enayat (in Sullivan, 83) points out, in recent shiite literature is reinterpreted less as a negative stance and more as another form of clandestine struggle against tyranny.

[10]For instance, they argued that "unjust kings were not to be abused because security was achieved through them; however tyrannical the king, the good achieved through his existence was greater than the evil which came through him"(sheikoleslami in Banuazizi and weiner, 86:233).

religious leaders are better equipped morally and legally to represent the hidden Imam[11]. For them, dividing the tasks into the religious and the temporal with Ulama in charge of the former and state responsible for the later, happened mainly due to establishment of hereditary monarchy in which the throne and authority often did not have the credentials and qualifications to rule a religious community. They believed their authority derived from the Imam Mahdi, "as the supreme (religious and political) leader of the community - a position unique to Shiite "Ulama" - and not from their function as the learned advisors of believers with knowledge of the ethically binding sacred law - a function they have in common with the Sunni "Ulama" (Arjomand, 1979).

Anticipation (Entezar) of Imam's return has also produced contradictory attitude in Shiite community. On the one hand it led to quietism, submissiveness and passive acceptance of the existing socio-political arrangement, in the hope that real salvation is to come later (Enayat in Sullivan, 1983). The subscribers of this interpretation argue, that a number of almost impossible preconditions must be met in order for Imam to reappear; and in fact, the readvent of Imam was relegated to the realm of the other world (Akhir-l Zaman), and thus any potential of rebellion against the existing order was severely reduced (Sheikoleslami, in Banuazizi and Weiner, 1986). In some extreme cases the tyranny, corruption, and oppression in societies even were encouraged, because they believed that Imam will return when the world is filled with tyranny and corruption.

On the other hand, anticipation of Imam's return generated a sense of hope and historical conviction in the final triumph of the right (Haq) over wrong (Batil); produced

[11]Even those Ulama who prescribed accommodative recipes, however, would have preferred a religious leader - shia - to a secular leader (Keddie, in Bonine and Keddie, 81).

a sense of strength and dynamism in paving the way for his triumphal return, thereby promoting militancy (Motahari, 1978; Enayat in Sullivan, 1983). Shariati argues that the very meaning of Entezar (millenarian anticipation) contains a rejection of status-quo, because the existing situation is so unjust and far from "true Islam" that Imam should return to bring justice and equity on earth. "Entezar means futurism; Entezar is historical determinism; the expected man is a ready man, ready to fight the final Jihad which will definitely take place, and revolution will triumph" (Bayat in Bonine and keddie, 1981:55).

Hence, the occultation of Imam Mahdi has served both rebellious and conservative causes throughout Shia history. On the eve of the Islamic Revolution, however, the radical version was the dominant interpretation. Iranians were told to be on alert at all times and also to pave the way for readvent of the Imam by constantly re-evaluating their current socio-political life, and acting to translate the current circumstances into a situation conducive to the reappearance of the Imam. As Sachedina (1981:182-3) points out:

> the Chiliastic vision of history in Shiism continues to be expressed, even today, in terms of radical social protest in the face of political oppression. Had it not been this deep sense of paving the way for the reappearance of the Imam, the Shiites would not have felt the need to re-evaluate their social circumstances and shortcomings of their present lives. Thus, the Ghaiba (occultation) of the Imam has acted as a creative force in the lives of the Imamites (Shiites) in order not only to help them bear with patience the difficult times, but also to prepare to fulfill their historical responsibility of establishing a true Islamic rule, even before the Imam assumes the leadership of the Imamiyya (Shiites).

Ulama's Role In Iranian Society

With the establishment of the Safavid dynasty (1501-1722) and declaration of Shia as the official religion of the state, a more formal and independent political, cultural, financial institution was developed by Ulama. In this period Ulama often had a smooth relationship with the state and occasionally even assumed official position. In education, legal and cultural issues they exercised great influence. By declaring Shia as the official religion of the state, public submission to Shia doctrine, endowing large quantities of land as Waqf, building glorious mosques and shrines, and participation in religious ceremonies and rituals, the Safavids, in general, were successful in developing a good bilateral relations with the Ulama and, as a result, not only pacified the threat of a potential adversary but also greatly increased the legitimacy of their rule.

With the establishment of the Qajar dynasty (1795-1925) Ulama played an even more important role in influencing the course of events in nineteenth and twentieth century Iran. Under the Qajar dynasty, administration was largely decentralized, weak and corrupt; tribes were well-armed and strong; foreign influence was very substantial in the royal household and ruling elites; indigenous bourgeois were severely wounded because of the concessions given to foreigners; and Ulama were independent and well-organized. The Middle class, though wounded, was growing due to an expansion of bureaucracies, urbanization and further incorporation of Iran into the capitalist world economy. Qajar kings did not form any strong and long term coalition with any of the socio-political forces in the country and when the crisis struck the society, they were vulnerable to opposition coalitions which were consolidated under the Ulama's leadership (Sheikhoeslami, in Banuazizi and Weiner, 1986).

Ulama formed and led several coalitions of urban bourgeois - merchant, shopkeepers, artisians, and craftsmen; and secular intelligentsia - against the state. They were successful in forcing the Qajar kings to cancel the Reutger Concession (1872) and replaced the prime minister who negotiated the concession; cancel the Tobacco concession (1892); and approve a new constitution which limited the king's power. In each of these movements and in later socio-political movements as well,[12] the great mass of the people participated in the process "only at the instances of the religious leaders; or to put it conversely, without the active engagement of the religious leaders, the agitation for those various causes would not have enjoyed the support of the vast majority of the people" (Enayat in Sullivan, 1983:198).

Several factors, however, have been important in enhancing the Ulama's power in the society:

1. As discussed before, occultation of Imam Mahdi cast a shadow of illegitimacy on all temporal rulers. Ulama increasingly argued[13] that they are more qualified to provide legitimate guidance in the absence of the Imam. The outcome of a theoretical dispute in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries between Akhbarion - those Ulama who stressed

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[12]It should be pointed out that though Ulama were not united, leading Ulama gave ideological leadership and direction to the movements. As Keddie (83) noted: "In the Tobacco movement the climax occurred when the top leader of the Shia from Ottoman Iraq issued (or confirmed) a decree outlawing all use and sale of tobacco, and boycott was universally observed. In the Constitution revolution Ulama gave ideological direction at all stages."

[13]In the last couple of centuries the shiite understanding of this and in fact a host of other issues have been slowly transformed "partly by dint of the general awakening of Iranians, in response to changing social and political conditions, and partly through a natural evolution of Shiite mind, brought on occasionally but its inherent mechanism for change as represented by institution of "Ijtihad" or individual judgments. The result invariably has been the discarding of the quietest interpretation of each issue in favor of a militant one" (Enayat in Sullivan, 83:201).

reliance on Hadith (traditions, saying of the Prophet and Imams) as the sole source of guidance - and Usulion - those Ulama who considered Hadith as one source of guidance besides Quran, Ijma (consensus among Ulama), and Aql (intellectual or rational reasoning) - which led to the victory of the later, was very crucial in solidifying the power of Ulama in Shia community (Keddie in Bonine and Keddie, 1981; Motahari, 1984). One of the most important consequences of the Usulian doctrine was that every Shiite either must be a Mujtahid - an Ulem (singular of Ulama) who by his own exertions form his own opinion in matters pertaining to the law, and whose legal opinion can be followed by non-mujtahids (Sachedina, 1981:201) - or a Muqalid - a layman who must follow a living Mujtahid in religious affairs. In practical terms this victory gave great power to those Mujtahid[14] who had greatest following in the Shiite community (Keddie in Bonnie and Keddie, 1981).

2. Shiite Ulama, unlike their Sunni counterparts, were economically and

[14]"Shi'i tradition since the time of the usuli-akhbari controversy of the eighteenth century C.E. has established a structure of authority,termed marja'iyyate, wherein a number of the most learned religious figures (pl. maraji' taqlid, "sources of emulation") provide an example of religious practice for the less learned (muqallidin, "imitators" or "followers"). The maraji' technically act independently, but practically consult with their colleagues on major issues. If one is not adequately educated in religious sciences to exercise independent judgment (ijtihad) on questions of religious practice, one must emulate a marja'-e taqlid, usually through consulting a manual of religious practice (risalah al-tauzih al-amaliyyah) published by the maraji'. The maraji' administer the religious establishment and higher religious education. They collect and disperse the Khums tax, a source of financial, and hence political, independence unavailable to Sunni ulama. Since the nineteenth century C.E. there have been periods in which a most learned marja' has risen over his colleagues to become sole marja'-e taqlid. Among those who have held this high honor were Shaikh Mortaza Ansari (d.A.H. 1281/1864 C.E.), Ayatollah Mirza Mohammad Hasan Shirazi (d.A.H. 1312/1894 C.E.), Ayatollah Fathollah Isfahani (d.A.H. 1339/1920 C.E.), and Ayatollah Husain Bourujerdi (d.A.H. 1381/1961 C.E.)." (Rose in Keddie, 1983:167-8)

financially independent from the government. This independence to a large extent enabled them to form and lead coalitions and social protests against the government while articulating a wide range of political demands to the government. Financial dependence from the government, however, led to dependence on the people for financial support. This dependence, as Ayatollah Motahari (1984) argued, had both advantages and disadvantages. The advantage was that it kept the Ulama in close contact with the people's needs, aspiration, happiness, and sadness. The disadvantage was that many of the Ulama often could not take a stance on issues which they believed were right but unpopular.

3. The leading Mujtahid often resided in shrine cities of Iraq and enjoyed great freedom in issuing decrees against the government's policies in Iran without being afraid of government retaliation.

4. Identification of Ulama with popular anti-foreign causes also greatly enhanced their image (Keddie, 1971:5). Not only did Ulama not participate in initiation, articulation and approval of any concession to foreigners, they in fact, led several popular movements against foreigners and their internal constituency in Iran and Iraq. As Keddie (1971:5) points out, ever since the first wars against Russia in the early nineteenth century, Ulama regardless of their dispute with central government, have actively engaged in anti-foreign causes.

5. Since religion was one of the main ingredients of the legitimacy claims of

the state, Ulama as the embodiment and principal protectors of Islam challenged the state's anti-Islamic policies on Islamic grounds. Islam provided a vehicle for Ulama to articulate their concern to the government while the network of religious organization and communication allowed them to express their political demand and social sentiments in familiar words and concepts to the people (Bernard and Khalilzad 1984:34).[15]

6. The constitution of 1906 secured the Ulama's control over the legislative by entitling them to veto all the Majlis bills which contravened Islamic law (Afshar, 1985:222). It should, however, be pointed out that, in practice, Ulama were never able to exercise this right due to weakening of their coalition which made the constitutional victory possible, and emergence of Reza Khan who brutally suppressed all those who did not approve his policies.

Reza Shah substantially reduced the roles and functions of Ulama by: substituting the traditional school system which was primarily controlled by Ulama, with French secular education system; sending many students to France for higher education; and recruiting those teachers who had secularized training. He also deprived Ulama from their judicial function by secularizing the laws and requiring the judges to hold a law degree. Finally, the government's endowment office was given full power to supervise all the public endowment and thereby extending government control over one of the

[15]If it is accepted that in each society certain institutions are responsible for modifying and even creating standards of behavior in ambiguous and novel situations, Ulama, because of their highly respected positions, could and did reinterpret the existing standards and sometimes created new ones (Fathi, 1980:88).

important sources of Ulama's income (Afshar, 85; Limbert, 87; Najmabadi, 87)[16]

Reza Shah also attempted to revive pre-Islamic nationalism, both for enhancing his legitimacy and diminishing the role of the Ulama in the society. Achemanian glory was emphasized in contrast to Islam; Arabic words were purged from the Farsi language; women were forced to unveil; and a new western dress code for men was introduced[17] all for the purpose of instituting new foundations for secular legitimacy. Had he been successful in his attempt, Ulama's role and function would have been reduced severely; but in the final analysis no symbols of secular solidarity or secular nationalism emerged to substitute for Islam and the collective identity of Iran remained Shia. If one accepts that "all societies need to affirm, through ritualized processes, holidays, or parades, their collective personality, or, as Durkhiem called it, their collective sentiment,"[18] in Iran such rituals continued to be predominantly Islamic.

In Reza Shah's period, one of the most important religious centers of the Shia world was established in the city of Qum by Ayatollah Hairi. Soon the center's influence grew by recruiting well-known religious scholars; and by training a number of talented

[16]Although for a while government continued to use the income from endowments for religious and other public purposes, government increasingly controlled the usage of this income. Reza Shah and later his son tried to set up a religious structure to rival the Ulama. Faculty of theology at Tehran University during Reza Shah's rule; Sipah-i-Dini -religious corps-, and Muravvijin-i-Din -corps of religious propagandists- in Muhammad Reza Shah's reign were established with the endowment's income not only to reduce the power of the Ulama but enhancing their legitimacy as well (Momen, 85). In general in Islamic societies, political leaders have found it wise to profess and sponsor religion regardless of the depth of their own belief and commitment (Razi, 1990).

[17]In 1928 a law was passed which made western dress compulsory. Although the Ulama were exempt from this, the law stated that they had to prove their status by examination (except for recognized mujtahids), thus giving the government the de facto power of deciding who was and who was not a member of the Ulama (Momen, 1985).

[18]Shiekoleslami, in Banuazizi and Weiner, 1986.

students in different fields of religious sciences. Qum became the spiritual capital of Iran and later the first bastion of the Islamic Revolution. Ayatollah Hairi was largely quiescent in political matters, and his important legacy lies in his institutional achievements, confirmed and amplified by Ayatollah Bourugerdi in the years 1945 to 1962, which laid the foundation for the revolutionary role Qum played under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini (Algar, 1988:208).

Ayatollah Hairi died in 1937 and the religious institution was temporarily headed by three of the senior Ayatollahs, Sadr, Hujjat, and Khwansari. A few years later Ayatollah Bourujirdi assumed the leadership of the institution. Ayatollah khomeini actively promoted the candidacy[19] of Ayatollah Bourujirdi on the assumption that he would utilize his powerful position to redefine the role and function of Ulama in society and to challenge the Shah's regime.

Ayatollah Bourujirdi's important legacy, however, was his institutional achievements. He reorganized the religious institution, established a network for dissemination of religious knowledge throughout the county; and centralized the collection of religious dues - Zakat and Khums - which "imparted invaluable financial stability and independence to the clerical hierarchy as well as an organizational center and a national network that proved vital during the 1977 - 1979 mass mobilization. By the mid 1970s,

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[19]Since there is no formal hierarchical religious organizations in Shia, the prominent religious leaders gain their status due to their intellectual ability, moral virtues, and reputation among their peers. When a prominent leader dies, there is usually no immediate successors. It takes a while until one gradually emerges in his place. This type of process produces some degree of flexibility in the system and provides autonomy at the lower levels of the institutions. Local religious leaders are not accountable to the higher religious authorities, and to become a religious leader one simply has to be accepted by other religious leaders and the people. In fact, one need not be a full time religious leader (Fathi, 1980:93).

this constituted a body of some 100,000 clerics and preachers and 15,000 theological students" (Najmabadi, 1987:210). Ayatollah Khomeini inherited such a network through the existing mosques, religious schools, and network of local preachers, organically embedded in society, and provided it a political focus and inspiration (Najmabadi, 1987).

With the death of Ayatollah Bourujirdi, Ayatollah Khomeini, who was a well-known scholar in religious circles and a talented teacher of ethic, philosophy, and jurisprudence, attracted the attention of the people by his uncompromising attacks on the Shah's policies. Due to his influential role in Iranian society and Islamic revolution, a closer look at his life would shed light on understanding him and the Revolution he led.

Ayatollah Khomeini and The Islamic Revolution, Formative Years

Ayatollah Khomeini was born on 24 September 1902 in Khomayn, a small town in Central province of Iran. He completed his primary education in Khomayn and went to Arak and Qum for advanced religious studies. In these formative years, he acquired the mastery of many religious subjects; published a number of influential books in Irfan (Gnosis), philosophy, ethics, and polities; and trained many talented students, who later constituted the leadership body of the Revolution. During these years, as Algar (1988:204) points out:

> all the major elements of his world view were put into place: a firm belief in the mission of Ulama to guide, lead, purify, and defend Iranian society; a conviction of the need to cultivated the spiritual and even the gnostic aspects of Islam; a hatred and rejection of the Pahlavi state; and determination to rid the Islamic lands of foreign control; and a profound distrust of culturally alienated secular intellectuals.

In early 1940s he published Kashf al-Asrar (uncovering the secrets) in which he strongly attached Reza Shah's policies which had led to pervasive immorality and cultural decadence. He wrote:

> All orders issued by the dictatorial regime of the bandit Reza Khan have no value at all. The laws passed by his parliament must be scrapped and burned. All the idiotic words that have proceeded from the grain of that illiterate soldier are rotten and it is only God's law that will remain and resist the ravaged of time.

The publication of Kashf al-Asrar, despite its obscurity at the time, ushered in the emergency of a new political thinking among the Ulama. Whereas a segment of the Ulama had participated in pervious socio-political movements in piecemeal fashion to modernize Iranian society, "there has now emerged from their midst a personality who clearly recognized that the accumulation of little changes was giving rise to a threatening new reality."[20] A reality which was increasingly and systematically becoming secular. He recognized that the state has been the primary agent of such processes and launched a major, systematic attempt inside the religious circle to combat the regime. His ideas, however, did not have much impact until the death of Ayatollah Bourujiridi.

After the death of Ayatollah Bourujiridi no single successor to his position emerged. But Ayatollah Khomeini's prominence spread, first within Qum, and soon after throughout the Shia world in general and Iran in particular. Unlike Ayatollah Bourjirdi, Ayatollah Khomeini actively engaged in political affairs. His support base was largest among small merchants, urban poor masses, young religious intellectuals, and young militant clergy. He further broadened his support base by harsh criticism of the regime's hostility to Islam; widespread government corruption; rigged elections; patron-client

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[20]Najmabadi (1987), p. 210.

relations with United States; and friendly relations with Israel (Limbert, 1987). His direct attack against the Shah in a time when nobody even dared to modestly and implicitly criticize the regime; his relative familiarity with international as well as domestic politics; his credentials as the outstanding teacher and scholar of philosophy, ethics, jurisprudence, and mysticism; and his physical appearance, were all helpful in making him a charismatic leader in the eyes of many of his followers.

Following his attacks on the regime he was arrested on june 3, 1963. The news of his arrest caused massive rioting in many cities, particularly in Tehran, Qum, Tabriz, Shiraz, Mashhad, Isfahan, Varamin, and was ended by the army's brutal massacre. Although the Shah was successful in crashing the 1963 uprising, Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as a national leader and spokesman for popular discontent. This bloody repression indeed was a turning point for many political forces in adopting new policies for challenging the regime. A new era was inaugurated in which socio-political movements became radical and ideological - primarily Islamic or Marxists - with the goal of total destruction of monarchy and establishment of a new order. In October, 1964, Ayatollah Khomeini sharpened his attack on the Shah due to the law which granted immunity to United States military advisors and their families (Capitulation). He was soon arrested and exiled to Turkey and then to Iraq, and returned to Iran in February of 1979.

Ayatollah Khomeini's Latter Years

The publication of Welayat e-Faqi (Islamic Government) in 1971 marked an important development in Islamic political theory as well as in the Islamic revolutionary movement of Iran. He forcefully argued that in the absence of Imam Mahdi, a virtuous, conscious and well-trained faqih is more qualified to represent the Imam than the secular rulers. His reasons in formation of the government by the faqih were:

> if we (the Ulama) want to immortalize the rules of Sharia (Islamic laws) in practice, to prevent violation of the rights of weak people, to prevent corruption on earth, to apply the Sharia law justly, to fight the heresies and deviations decided upon by the sham parliament and to prevent the influence and intervention of the enemies in the affairs of the Moslems, we (the Ulama) must form the government because all this is carried out by a government led by a trustworthy and pious ruler who commits no injustice, deviation or corruption (Ayatollah Khomeini, 1979:617 in Ismael and Ismael, 1986).

With the publication of Islamic Government Ayatollah Khomeini developed an alternative normative theory of government. Islamic activists, after a long time, found an idea which was familiar in tone and principle for them and could fulfill their dreams of social justice, freedom and independence. No longer were variants of Marxist governments, social or liberal democracies, the sole options of the movements as had been the case in previous socio-political movements.

After reviewing the previous popular movements of the last couple of centuries, Ayatollah Khomeini recognized that Ulama provided the leadership and crucial support to enable the movements to achieve their initial objectives, whether it was the cancellation of the concession (1892), or adoption of fundamental law (1906), or nationalization of oil (1951). But once victory was achieved they were excluded from the political scene either by the government or the secular forces who managed to gain the upper hand (Enayat in Sullivan, 1983:198). Ayatollah Motahari, the most important ideologue of Islamic Revolution and a student of Ayatollah Khomeini noted:

> The history of Islamic movements during the last hundred years reveals an unfortunate defect in its leadership: it has continued the struggle under its leadership (only) up to the moment of victory, but has refused to carry it on further (preferring instead) to go after its own business and allow others to usurp the result of its efforts.[21]

Ayatollah Khomeini differed fundamentally from other Ulama who have played significant roles in previous socio-political movement in respect to his mobilization of the entire institution of clergy to achieve his objectives. Unlike Ayatollah Kashani (d. 1962) and Ayatollah Taleqani (d. 1979), who operated outside the religious institution and contracted alliances with variety of non-Ulama groups in order to realize desired objectives, he always worked from within the clergy institution (Algar: 1988). He always stayed at the center of religious institution and trained many students who themselves established autonomous network, which was embedded in the larger institution of clergy and proved to be essential in mobilization of both the entire clergy and society for active engagement in revolutionary processes.

He also differed fundamentally from religious and secular intellectuals in respect to his ability to communicate with the masses, a blessing that no other intellectual could match. Unlike the intellectuals whose knowledge of society was acquired primary through books and had special audience, Ayatollah Khomeini's knowledge came from his deep involvement with day to day problems of average people, and often targeted them as his main audience. He always utilized simple, clear language with Islamic metaphor to capitalized on values and beliefs which public had the most intense and personal feelings (Kamrava, 1990: 128).

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[21] In Enayat, in Sullivan (1983), p. 199.

> His message was simple enough to be understood by all, rational enough to make common sense, and bold and daring enough to be intriguing. The Ayatollah also won much popularity and respect for appearing aggressively defiant of the regime and for being determined to continue the battle to the end regardless of victory or defeat.[22]

Thus the ascendence of the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 as the undisputed leader of the Revolution was not a historical accident. As the custodian of traditional values deeply embedded in the society and promoter of popular culture, with decades of political activism, Ayatollah Khomeini's rise to power was not an irrational probability. His charisma and revolutionary credentials enabled him to be successful in soliciting personal sacrifices which helped to integrated the individual with the community and as a result strengthened the communal bonds and spirit of the collectivity. Without such bonds and spirit undoubtedly the Iranian Revolution could not have happened. His role was also very significant in the first phase of the Islamic Revolution, which led to the destruction of the Shah's regime, it was accomplished

> without the existence of a mass political party, a guerrilla army, or any other form of political organization familiar to the modern world; decisive for its success was the grant of loyalty and obedience by the mass of the Iranian people to a figure seen by them as possessing the whole moral authority of Islamic tradition ... the normative embodiment of tradition in its purest and most authentic sense.[23]

In sum Ayatollah Khomeini was successful in emphasizing the existing injustice; in simplifying the possibility of fundamental changes; in soliciting devotional actions; in justifying the leadership behavior; in selecting appropriate conflict strategies; in identifying and focusing the target of revolutionary actions; in providing adequate tools

[22]Kamrava (1988), p. 129.

[23]Algar (1988), p. 283.

for mobilization of resources; in giving the masses the moral will to persist in the face of attempts at armed repression; in depicting a familiar alternative political system; and in getting the majority of the people to agree on a small number of simple and general slogans - freedom, independence, Islamic Republic.

Skocpol, in "Rentier State and Shia Islam in Iranian Revolution," acknowledged the importance of Ulama and Shia in the making of the Revolution.

> Once protests against the Shah began, the networks and symbols of communication among Shia cleric, and between clerics and lay people (through mosques and religious occasions) became crucial to orchestrating and sustaining widespread popular resistance to the state. The Husayn myth provided a framework for labelling and reaching against the Shah as the evil, tyrannical "Yazid of the present age." The Islamic annual calendar of collective rituals, the weekly public prayers meetings, and the prescriptions for public funeral processions to mourn the dead all provided widely understood forms in which to channel simultaneous mass political action."[24]

[24]Skocpol (1982), p. 274.

CHAPTER VII

EVALUATION OF SKOCPOL'S THEORY AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF DEVELOPING A UNIVERSAL THEORY

As discussed in Chapter III, Skocpol argues that revolutions occur when the state administrative and military apparatus become incapacitated due to several structural pressures. First, the state will should be located in an agrarian society with specific internal characteristics and a disadvantageous position in the international state and world capitalist system. In competition with stronger states in the context of uneven international power structure or from threat of a military defeat, the state attempts to modernize itself. To finance such modernization efforts such states only have the option of squeezing landed upper class for needed revenue. The landed upper class, on the other hand, has: rural power, prestige, interest, and control, which its very livelihood depends upon and hence is reluctant to give them up. Thus, two possible outcomes can be assumed for the resolution of such a conflict: a) the state is able, under such pressures to reorganize the society and economy; b) the state breakdown with the emergence of a new state capable of reorganizing society and economy.

The first outcome occurs when the military and state are not staffed from among landed pper class. Due to the independence of the leadership, the reorganization of political structure and class relations and decisions about modernization can be made and "enforced" without the state's being overturned. Such processes and outcome have been characterized by Trimberger (1978) as "revolution from above".

Skocpol argues that the second outcome will come about if the state and army are staffed, particularly in the middle and upper ranks, from among the landed upper class. In such a case, the state cannot easily make a decision about modernization process, but even when such a decision is made, the state cannot enforce it, because of military reluctance to suppress the class from which its leadership is chiefly drawn. Skocpol believes such a condition leads to military and administrative collapse, which paves the way for peasant revolts.

However, it should be noted that there are cases in which the state has had the independence and capability to launch the modernization process, but, due to tremendous pressure from outside, particularly involvement in war, has become so much incapacitated that it could not prevent a subsequent peasants' rebellion and social revolution. Russia is the best example of a state's loss of capacity through foreign pressure and war. Her involvement in World War I consumed so much of the state's resources that there was no force capable of suppressing the peasants insurrection.

Though state incapacitation is necessary for the occurrence of any revolution, it is not sufficient. The presence of peasant revolutionary movement and marginal elites are also important factors of successful happening of a social revolution. The outcome of peasant insurrectionary movement depends on: a) institutional patterns of peasants relations to one another, to their tools and land in the village; b) the institutional pattern of the peasants' relations to landlords' and c) the state capacity or lack of capacity to repress the revolts. Skocpol argues that only in those communities in which the village as a single unit is responsible for production, land, tools, rents, and other dues and thus the sense of solidarity and cohesiveness is strong, and in where the sanctioning apparatus is not locally controlled, will peasants find it possible, due to incapacitation of central repressive machinery, to launch and direct their widespread discontent and anger against the landlords and indeed against the whole complex of agrarian relations.

Marginal elites, once revolutionary crises due to conjuncture of previously mentioned factors has emerged, do not and will not hesitate, according to Skocpol, to organize and direct the opposition movement against the regime, to mobilize ideological resources of society to justify leadership actions and mass sacrifices, to unite a diverse population, and to seize the state power to build a new agency capable of enhancing national economic and military standing.

A number of Skocpol's arguments seem irrelevant to the occurrence of Iranian Revolution, and others need modification for applicability.

Inter and Intranational Pressures on the Iranian State

1. As has been argued by many scholars (Halliday, 1979; Shashaani, 1985; Farhi, 1989), Iran was not an agrarian society at the time of her Revolution. Agriculture was not the dominant mode of production and the principal means of subsistence for the majority of people. Years before the Iranian Revolution, agriculture, as was discussed in Chapter V, had lost its prominent role in the economy and was no longer the largest source of

employment or contributor of GNP.

If capitalism is a system in which the factors of production, land, goods, labor, can be privately owned and like commodity be exchanged in the market (Halliday, 1979: 38), and urban workers form the majority of the labor force, most certainly Iran has since the mid-twentieth century become more and more capitalistic in its mode of production. Industrialization which was deeply dependent on the world system required accessibility to cheap labor which in a feudal society was tied to land and out of reach. Thus, the old system had to be changed in order to release a large portion of the population and reserve them as cheap labor (Shashaani, 1985). Market relations and consumption patterns in feudal societies were locally oriented and could not stimulate demand for manufactured and imported goods. Hence, for expansion of demand and output, feudalistic barriers had to be removed to pave the way for capitalism to prevail (Halliday, 1979; Shashaani, 1985). The land Reform of the 1960's was indeed an important step toward removal of pre-capitalist barriers and the strengthening of capitalism. By most accounts, Iran could not be considered an agrarian society on eve of her Revolution.

2. The Iranian state was not under an intolerable pressure from stronger states or world capitalist economy to force it to launch modernization processes. The Iranian army did not engage in any major military activity and thus

did not experience a military defeat. Although international factors were important in the occurrence of revolution their importance differs from Skocpol's articulation. As Goldfrank (1979:148-149) points out, Skocpol does not take into account the structurally weak position of peripheral states:

> Perhaps because the cases she has treated are all states with great power ambitions if not great power status, she does not explicitly raise as a causal necessity favorable configurations of the world system as a whole and of the immediate international context. As one moves toward the present temporality and toward the periphery of the world system spatially, this condition becomes increasingly crucial the Cuban Revolution in our own day depended at first on the opinion within the U.S. and later on Cold War rivalry to sustain its momentum. And the Vietnamese Revolution is in part clearly a creation of determinate great power configurations: the displacement of the French by the Japanese and the former's attempt to reestablish sovereignty; the U.S. effort to stop the spread of communism, and the Soviet and Chinese candidates to thwart that effort (in Farhi, 1988).

The Iranian army also did not engage in any military activity which might have led to its incapacitation as a repressive machinery. Iranian military officers, particularly high to middle ranking officers, were indeed among the privileged strata of society. On the eve of Revolution, the Iranian army not only was intact and did not experience any military defeat; but it was becoming increasingly powerful in terms of organizational capacity, skilled manpower, sophisticated weaponry,and involvement in domestic and foreign policy decision making processes. Iranian experience is indeed another case which support Goldstone (1988:15) argument that

> although in some instances war has led to revolution, empirical studies have shown that the relationship between wars and internal political instability in general is weak.... For these two centuries, the broad relationship between defeat in war and revolution is virtually nil.

3. Even if it can be accepted that the Shah's regime was under pressure to launch modernization processes, a further squeezing of landlords was not its sole option. As discussed in Chapters IV and V, the Shah's regime made itself less and less dependent on internal sources of revenues in general and the agriculture sector in particular and relied on oil revenue as the principal source of income. The Shah did not originally link or allied his regime to any independent social class[1] that could potentially force the regime to adopt policies that would bear intolerable pressure on it. The regime's main link to the population was through expenditures and allocation of resources[2] (Skocpol, 1982). It should, however, be noted that, Iranian state was vulnerable to fluctuation on oil price and demand. When in the 1970s oil prices were high, the Shah did spend large sums of money for different projects which led to new employment opportunity, rising wages, and easy profit; but when the prices began to come down

[1]"For any state to survive a crisis, it must have a solid base and enjoy the support of a significant portion of its constituency. The Shah, despite the vast oil revenues, failed to link his regime to any social class. The Shah was not only unsuccessful in obtaining the support of workers and intelligentsia, he also embarked on a course in 1975 that brought him to a head-on collision with the bazaaries and the powerful religious establishment. Thus when an acute economic crisis hit the country in 1975-77, the regime found itself first isolated, then besieged from all sides, and eventually submerged in a flood of hatred directed not only at the monarchy and its military establishment, but also at the ruling class and their foreign patrons" (Abrahamian in Goldstone, 1986:127).

[2]Through expenditures on the military, on development projects, on modern construction, on consumption subsidies, and the like (Skocpol, 1982).

and demand for Iranian oil was reduced, it led to inflation, unemployment, and loss of profit (Skocpol, 1982). The Shah, who ruled the country single handedly and made all the major decisions[3] in the country and was indeed the embodiment of the whole regime's authority, was targeted as the principal source of all the hardship and problems for the country.[4]

The reality and nature of the Shah's regime and the way it was embedded and situated in Iranian society and in the international community forced Skocpol to modify her assumption in regard to the type of states that are susceptible to revolutionary upheaval. She added "rentier states" to agrarian bureaucracies as regimes that are vulnerable to insurgency movement. By broadening the scope of theory she attempted to account for new variation in occurrence of revolutions but this ad hoc articulation could not be neatly woven into her previous theory because: a) she could not explain why only the Shah's regime, among many, "rentier states" experienced revolutionary movement; and b) the differences between "rentier states" and agrarian states; the differences in the processes

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[3]The Shah, as stated in previous chapters, personally made decisions about official appointments, about military procurement, foreign relations, and major economic projects. He played bureaucrats and military officers off against one another, and was fully alert to prevent a stable coalition or lines of responsible authority to develop (Skocpol, 1982).

[4]As Abrahamian pointed out: "Pahleivi regime failed to make political modifications appropriate to the changes taking place in the economy and society inevitable strained the links between the social structure and political structure, blocked the channelling of social grievances into the political system, widened the gap between new social forces and the ruling circles, and, most serious of all, cut down the few bridges that had in the past connected traditional social forces, especially the bazaars, with the political establishment" (in Goldstone, 1986:119).

of revolution, state building, and pattern of coalition formation in Iranian Revolution and the social revolution which agrarian bureaucracies experienced; and differences in the type of international pressure exerted on them; were so immense that no single theory could provide appropriate explanation for the causes, processes, and outcomes of such diverse revolutions.

Facing such difficulties, Skocpol (1989) abandoned the development of a single theory and attempted to provide explanation for Third World revolutions as a distinct category. This attempt was not successful due to inadequate explanation for the necessity of creating such a category; clear conceptualization; lack of logical cohesiveness; and empirical validity. Critique of her latest formulation is, however, beyond the scope of this study.

<u>Peasant's Insurrections</u>

4. Skocpol argued that the structure of village life and who controls the sanction machinery are fundamental factors in creating opportunities or barriers for any peasants insurgency movement. In Chapter V it was demonstrated that many different forms of organization of production existed in different parts of Iran and in a single village as well. Iran had villages which were considered as one unit of production in which responsibility of decision-making in regard to day to day affairs rested in

the hands of the village. Iran had, however, other types of villages which nuclear or expanded families were the fundamental unit of production with no cooperative efforts among the families for coordination in production or exchange affairs. Still in other villages family farms have existed side by side with other forms of modern mechanized agriculture. The presence of tribes in Iranian rural communities makes village life more complex and heterogeneous than what Skocpol has articulated.

The absence of revolutionary movement in Iran's peasantry have been attributed to: 1) the differentiation of the peasantry into three distinct groups with distinct economic interests in political proclivities which led to internal conflict and prevention of solidarity formation among different strata of peasantry; 2) the maintenance of "communal order" by coercion of landowners or their local agents and by government agencies, like gendarmerie; 3) the physical dispersion of the rural communities over a vast area of land with difficulty of communications and low population density (Yeganeh, 86); and 4) the Iranian peasantry's fatalism and resignation which were an integral part of its outlook and culture probably because, like everywhere else, the lot of peasants, as Weber argues "is so strongly tied to nature, so dependent on organic processes of natural events, and economically so little oriented to rational systematization that in general the peasantry will become a carrier of religion only when it is threatened by enslavement or by proletarianization."[5] (In Banuazizi and Weiner, 1986).

Land Reform not only reduced the power and authority of the large landowners, it further diffused the potential threat of peasants revolutionary movement and paved the way for incorporation of the village into an emerging capitalists mode of production throughout the country. Land Reform significantly changed the rural landscape of Iran. The village as a unit of production as well as a political territory was weakened (Shashaani, 1985). With the division and distribution of land, large landowners were stripped of their traditional power base. The emergence and growth of modern mechanized agricultural sectors was attributed to the Reform program as well. Through agencies like cultural houses, houses of equity, village councils, party cells, literary health, and development corps, government to a large extent replaced the local authority of landowners and indeed changed the power structure of rural community and society in general.

As stated earlier, government extended its control to rural areas after the Land Reform. Sanctions machinery too was totally controlled by the government. But even before the Land Reform the sanctions were not the simple case of either being controlled by central government or landlords.

[5]For further discussion on the lack of revolutionary movement among Iranian peasantry, see Kazemi and Abrahamian, The Non-Revolutionary Peasantry of Modern Iran.

In many cases, both had existed side by side in alliance to suppress any rebellious movement and in other cases they have targeted each other in alliance with peasants. In sum, rural Iran was quite different from the Skocpol's formulation of a revolutionary village community.

Structuralism, Ideology and Leadership

> 5. As for causes, no matter what form social revolutions conceivably might take in the future (say in an industrialized, liberal-democratic nation), the fact is that historically no successful social revolution has ever been "made" by a mass-mobilizing, avowedly revolutionary movement (Skocpol, 1979:17).
>
> Their (Iranian) revolution did not just come; it was deliberately and coherently made - specifically in its opening phase, the overthrow of the old regime (Skocpol, 1982:267).
>
> Revolutions are ultimately "made" by revolutionaries, but not of their own free will - not within political contexts they themselves have chosen, to paraphrase Karl Marx, but within very specific sorts of political contexts that are not the same for all who would make revolutions (Goodwin and Skocpol, 1978:495).

As the above quotation demonstrates, Skocpol's position in regard to nonvoluntarism and structural determinism has been significantly changed since the publication of State and Social Revolutions. In her article "Rentier State and Shia Islam in Iranian Revolution" she acknowledged her "understanding of the possible role of idea systems and cultural understandings in the shaping of political action" has been deepened due to the role which leadership and ideology played in the Iranian Revolution. The role of Ulama in mobilization of crucial resources, mosques, their network, Shia mythology, etc., and the role of Ayatollah Khomeini as a uniting force of a diverse population with diverse interests in the Iranian Revolution were so obvious which they could not be ignored or downplayed. Due to a widespread popularity Ayatollah Khomeini could focus the anger and grievances of a multi-ethnic society, on a single target. He set the strategies for challenging the regime;[6] and the Ulama through the mosques and their networks, with the help of university and high school students, could substantially realize those strategies. Islam and history of Shia provided a familiar form for the people; and they were used by the Ulama to communicate with the people, to request utmost sacrifices, to justify a particular action, to limit the options of anti regime strategies, and to encourage the masses to embrace Islam as a comprehensive code and path of life.

> Iranians could join together even beyond the ranks of the religiously devout, because Shia Islam and Khomeinie's visible uncompromising moral leadership provided a nationally indigenous way to express common opposition to an aloof monarch too closely identified with foreigners" (Skocpol, 1982:275)

Because of the obvious and important roles which Ayatollah Khomeini, Ulama, and Islam played in the Iranian Revolution, Skocpol was forced to modify her stance in regard to the role of ideology, leadership and action in social revolutions.[7]

Skocpol's main contribution to an understanding of revolutions, however, lies in her emphasis on the role of the state both before and after the revolution. The State in Iran and probably in all Third World countries is the most important vehicle for

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[6]Ayatollah Khomeini's role in targeting the foundation of monarchy as the goal of the movement is so obvious that few have argued that without him the monarchy would have disintegrated. Almost all the other political leaders were calling for reform and modification of monarch system of government - with a return to constitutionalism.

[7]For a detailed discussion on this point, see Skocpol (1982), (1986), (1989); Himmelstein and Kimnel (1981); Sewell (1986); Taylor (1984).

transformation of societies. Central governments not only make the most important decisions in all aspects of life in these societies, but minor decisions and policies are being made by them as well. The Iranian state was the principal player in the launching of modernization, Land Reform, widespread education, urbanization, and industrialization. It built the socioeconomic infrastructure of both the rural and urban areas, and to a large extent rearranged the pattern of state-class relations.

Importance of the State's Role in Understanding Iranian Revolution

Since the central government was the only recipient of oil revenue and oil revenue formed the major portion of state's income and country's foreign exchange, the central government exercised a considerable degree of influence in determining which projects to fund, which social groups to give privileged access to the increased consumption possibilities, and which country or bloc of countries constituted Iran's major partners (Halliday, 1979:20-21). As stated in previous chapters, Iran had close economic, military and political ties with the international power structure. Core countries of the world system could exert their influence in the economic sphere through the oil market and investment in Iran, in the political-military spheres through the alliance formed since the Second World War, and in arms sale. In all the economic, political and military spheres the central government was the crucial institution which mediated the intervention of core countries in Iranian society sector (Halliday, 1979:21).

The presence of the state in economic, political, military, cultural spheres of Iranian society was so overwhelming that hardly anything outside the state autonomously could be done. Given the overwhelming presence of the state in all aspects of life, it could be easily conceived that political conflicts increasingly takes the form of interaction between the central government and organized groupings. This was even more true in urban settings, because all of the social classes demanded access to collective material conditions of daily life and often their conflicting demands could not be resolved except by the intervention of the state (Farhi, 1988:246). As Castells (1977:42-43 in Farhi, 1988) points out:

> this can politicize the totality of urban contradictions; transform the state into a manager of the means of daily life, and globalized the conflicts that emerge in this sphere.

In such a situation it is quite predictable that urban antagonism become conflicts between urban social classes and the government, which managed class relations (Farhi, 1988). If however, this government has been ruled by a single party, or an individual for a long period of time, antagonism would be directed against that individual or that party, because they can easily be identified and focused on by the opposition as the principal source of the people's hardship. People could easily identify the Communist Parties of Eastern bloc countries, the Shah of Iran, Marcus of Philippines, Duvalier of Haiti, as the main source of their difficulties. As Arjomand (1986:385) points out:

> Among the political regimes of the modern world, monarchies are especially fragile and vulnerable to revolution because popular discontent can be focused on a single person.

Since a single party or a single institution also has the same characteristics of a single person in respect to being easily identified as the focus of popular grievances, it is vulnerable to revolution as well. Longevity of the period of rule also is an important factor in the identification of vulnerable political systems. In societies in which power changes from one party or individual or institution to another either regularly, in cases of democracies, or irregular, in cases of coup-d'etat , sudden death, etc., the chances of revolutionary upheaval is not high. Turkey, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and many of the Latin American countries are good examples of the latter societies. Coup-d'etat have been a rather successful mechanism in preventing a number of societies to experience social revolution. Coming, going or alternating of military and civilian institutions, individuals or parties have greatly diffused the discontent and frustration of people, because no one of them were long enough in power to be the focus of the grievances against the whole structure of the state.

In sum, this study supports the idea of bringing the state back into the analyses Third of World countries in general, and revolutionary societies in particular.[8]

What Other Factors are Important in Understanding the Iranian Revolution

The Iranian Revolution demonstrated that transnational realities had an important influence on the emergence of crises in the country. Economically, the fluctuation of oil prices and demands substantially affected the course, scope, intensity, and direction of changes that occurred. The reduction in oil prices and demands in 1975-77 had a major impact on subsequent unemployment, inflation and emergence of a revolutionary situation.

[8]The importance of the state's role in Iranian society and revolution and other Third World revolution have been noted by Halliday (1979); Parsa (1989); Farhi (1988); Skocpol (1989), Goodwin and Skocpol (1989).

Iran's unfavorable position in the structure of the world capitalist system was also important in bringing about such circumstances. Politically, the Shah's close ties with the west and the U.S.; the extent and degree of internationally received support or pressure; the geopolitical position of Iran; disadvantageous location in the structure of international state system; and the demonstration effect of other revolutionary examples, were all crucial variables in creation of the revolutionary crises. Culturally, the promotion, encouragement, and prevalence of western ideas and ideals led to a widespread cultural dislocation, alienation, and loss of national identity. Restitution and reassertion of the sense of national identity and character was translated to mean a full fledged struggle against the regime which was considered to be the embodiment of foreign values, interests and influence. On the other hand, increases in literacy, education, and exposure to international media enhanced the aspiration and expectation of a large portion of the society. Not being able to satisfy these aspirations, the regime galvanized individuals and groups into political struggle against its very existence.[9]

The army was an important institution in assumption, cultivation, preservation, and expansion of state power in Iran. Although the Iranian army was trained to direct its loyalty first and foremost to the person of the Shah, (and for a significant part of its life the Iranian army indeed did so) in the final stages of the revolution not only did it withdraw support and loyalty from the regime, it also actively participated in the processes of revolutionary upheaval and made the final victory possible by their military

[9]For further discussion on this issue, see Farhi (1988), Goodwin and Skocpol (1989).

engagement[10] with the royal forces. The Philippine and Romanian armys' active involvement in the process of destroying the old regimes can also be cited as the emerging pattern of the armys' role in political upheavals.

Which branch or unit of the army first joined the revolutionary forces? why did they join the people when they are among the most privileged beneficiary of the regime? What is their social class and family background? These are important questions which must be answered in order to shed light an a better understanding of the role of army in revolutionary upheaval.[11]

Cooperation between mosques and universities was also a very crucial factor in making the revolutionary change possible. Mosques became the center of political activities, distribution of necessary goods, decision making about local struggle strategies, and strengthening of coalition bonds among a diverse population. University students and their associations were indeed the most important element in building of infrastructure for communication and dissemination of revolutionary aspiration in different areas of a city. Since Third World cities, particularly the capital city, increasingly are becoming the center of bureaucracies, factories, and education, the relations of these centers to one another would also increase and become more important. When revolutionary situations arise due to pressure from national and transnational realities, the coalition and relation

[10]It should, however, be pointed out that not all the branches of the army joined the opposition forces at the same time and in the same way. The Air Force in Iran was the first branch of the army that joined the people and fought against the Imperial guard. Some others though did not engage in repressing the people but were reluctant to join the opposition forces.

[11]For further study, see Zabih (1982), Skocpol (1989), and Tien-lung Liu (1988).

of these forces and religious institutions can be crucial for realization of social change.[12] Recent experiences in Iran, Poland, and the Philippines indicates the important role which coalition of these forces can play.[13] It should, however, be pointed out that the formation and type of coalition among these forces to a large extent depends on their structural location in the power structure of the state and the city, their material and nonmaterial interests, and the extent of benefit and privileges they are receiving from the existing regime.

Demonstrations and strikes also are becoming the dominant techniques of struggle against existing political systems. Massive demonstrations and widespread strikes were the main techniques of challenging the Shah's regime in Iran. They reduced the legitimacy of the regime, paralyzed the economy, created a sense of unity and courage, and demoralized the supporters of the government. Guerrilla warfare, both urban or rural types, did not play a significant role in the process of revolutionary change in Iran. Demonstrations and strikes were also the main techniques of protest in all the Eastern bloc, the Chinese and the Philippine anti-government movements.

In sum, transnational realities and their influences on the state and societies which are situated in a disadvantaged position; the type of state; the state, military and urban forces relations to one another, are important ingredients of a recipe for a better understanding of modern social revolutions.

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[12]When national and international structural pressures and contradiction are present and have the potential of paralyzing the state, the relation of these forces will indeed determine the type of change and outcome. Social revolution is only one outcome of such relation. Reform and status quo can also result.

[13]For a comparison of state-bureaucracy-military, state-class-clergy, and clergy-class relations of Iran and Poland, see Tien Lung Liu (1988).

Possibilities of Developing a Universal Generalization

"Theory, my friend, is the evergreen tree of life" (Goethe).

Where indeed can all these modifications of Skocpol's theory lead a thoughtful researcher to? Why did Skocpol's theory, despite its widely acknowledged strength, lack adequate explanatory and predictive power? It is the argument of this study that the nature of the subject, the method of its inquiry, the limits of human knowledge, and the lack of precision in application of logical principles into study are among factors which can account for the inadequacy of Skocpol or any other theory.

The study of revolution like many other social science subjects is deeply affected by conscious or unconscious intrusion of values and ideologies. Theories of revolution are hence to a large extent the reflection of researchers or theoreticians beliefs and values (Taylor, 1984). Since revolutions, unlike natural phenomena are subjectively defined by researchers who are attempting principally to account for the "causes" of occurrence, the "explanations" which researchers provide is indeed very much the expression of their aware or unaware values and ideologies. As Taylor (1984:132) noted

> Knowledge about revolutions must be inherently ideological. Theories of revolutions are ideological statements, and the multiplicity and diversity of the "third wave" theories can be interpreted as a reflection of the different values, or value-combinations of those social scientists who have studied revolutions.

John Dunn (1972) after comparing eight twentieth century revolutions, argued, that the differences between these cases were "at least as striking as the uniformities" and uniformities were "on the whole more like lexical preconditions for applying the category of revolution at all than... empirically discovered attributes." Hence, according to this argument, only those characteristics which defined a phenomenon as revolution are uniformities of revolutions; and the "causes" of them are unique to each case thus, a general causal theory of revolution is either not possible or is tautological.

> If theories were not based on specific cases, they had to be tautological: if the only uniformities were the characteristics of revolutions, then such theories had necessarily to posit that the characteristics of revolutions were also the causes of revolutions, i.e. revolutions were explained by revolutions.... if tautology was to be avoided, theories of revolutions would have to be based upon specific cases; but, given that those were unique, clearly findings could not be generalized.... Thus, theories of revolution were tautological in so far as they were general and non-tautological in so far as they were specific, i.e., they could not be both non-tautological and general. (Dunn, 1972).

The very proliferation of theories of revolution which are tautological and nonfalsifiable on the one hand and the presentation of different causes or different configuration of causes for a specific revolution is indeed a valid witness to the impossibility of generating a non-ideological, non-tautological, falsifiable, and general theory of revolution.

As Greene (1984:214-215) has also pointed out, many proposed theories of revolution, particularly relative deprivation, system and political conflict theories, are non-falsifiable and thus lack the vigorous scientific standards[14] and practical values. They have been conceptually designed in a way to account for any variation in empirical facts; and nothing in the real world can happen which would lead to disconfirmation of

[14]Falsifiability is an important criterion for demarcation between science and non- science. A theory has scientific standing not by the number of times it has been confirmed by facts, but by one's ability to conceive of findings that would disconfirm the theory (Greene, 1984:214). In other words, the scientific standards require a theory to be in a status of "not yet disconfirm" rather than verified or confirmed. For further detail see Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, and Greene Comparative Revolutionary Movement.

them[15].

Establishing causal relation has been both the goal of theories of revolution and a common error that they have frequently committed. Very few theories of revolution can be found which have not attempted to demonstrate the fundamental and underlying causes of revolution. But to establish causality in social science in general and in revolutions in particular, logically speaking, is hardly possible.[16] Association of variables would rather be more appropriate and closer to reality than causal relations between them. As Nagel (in Cohen, 1975) has suggested, four conditions must be met to be able to establish causal relation between two objects. 1) the relation must be invariable and uniform; 2) the objects (or events) must be spacially contiguous; A must be next to B; 3) one event (A) must precede the other event (B) in time; 4) the relations must be asymmetrical; if A is cause of B, B cannot be a cause of A. Once these four conditions have been met, a researcher can establish that both the sufficient and necessary requirement of a causal relationship are present. But, as Nagel (in Cohen, 75:42) has pointed out, social researchers

> are rarely if ever in a position to state the sufficient conditions for the occurrence of the events they investigate. Most if not all historical explanations, like explanations of human conduct in general - and indeed, like many explanations of concrete events in the natural sciences - mention only some of the indispensable (or as is commonly also said, "necessary") conditions for these

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[15]For further discussion, see Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery; Greene Comparative Revolutionary Movements; and Souroosh, Danesh va Arzesh (Knowledge and Values).

[16]In order to establish causal relationships, the researcher must demonstrate that if A is the cause of B then it is always true that whenever A happens B will happen as well, a requirement that may never be fulfilled (Cohen, 1975:41).

occurrences.

If the researchers of revolution can not establish causal relations; avoid incorporation of values in their research; generalize beyond specific case except at the expense of tautological and non-falsifiable propositions; fully explain and thus predict the occurrence of the revolution, then the main question is what can they do? This study supports the view that:

1. If it is not possible to make accurate predictions due to lack of objective knowledge of both necessary and sufficient conditions, it is quite possible to make probablistic or tendency statements;[17] and necessary conditions to a large extent can be within the grasp of researchers of revolution (Cohen, 75:48);
2. Although no theory[18] of revolution can be developed which is fully immune from the incorporation of ideological conviction, the extent and degree of ideologically loaded explanations has been reduced. Researchers from attempting the impossible - value- free theory - or abdication (Mackenzie in Taylor, 1975:158) should chose the former, because the imperfect knowledge is preferable to ignorance;[19]
3. Researchers goals in the study of revolution should not be that of

[17]These probablistic or tendency statements have indeed been of considerable value in different areas of social sciences such as in study of voting behavior.

[18]Theory here means "an empirically testable series of hypotheses and propositions that are logically deduced from a broad-range and falsifiable generalization" (Greene, 1984:221).

[19]In other words, social researchers should continue, as Taylor (1984:158) points out, "to strive for objective knowledge even though this can only be ideological."

establishing generalized causal relations between variables and across cases rather, an association of variables in particular cases would probably provide more insights into an understanding of revolution (Taylor, 1984:159);

4. As Greene (1984:219) has pointed out the conceptual utility declines as the level of generalization increases in order to account for every possible variation which may occur. Relative-depreciation, status discrepancy, population density, the rate of urbanization, industrialization, bureaucratization, the role of government violence or disintegration, etc., are among important variables of theories of revolution which hardly can be tested empirically[20]. To avoid that, theories must formulate hypothesis which can be empirically tested and as a result be confirmed, modified or rejected. Rather than broadening the scope of theory to include explanation for all possible variation, the researcher's goal should be articulation of proposals which not only explicitly state under what condition the theory is applicable but also the occurrence of what event, or events, would lead to its modification or rejection.

In sum, it is possible to develop a conceptual paradigm, or framework, which is not so general as to include tautological propositions, and yet abstract enough to include falsifiable hypotheses. Its advantages or disadvantages, however, are matter of

[20]This is partially due to the difficulty of assigning appropriate values to the many variables that have to be included in broad-range theories; for instance how can one 'weigh" the variables such as status discrepancy, population density, the extent of inequality, etc.?

"self-evidence" rather than "empirical validity" and its "conceptual utility is likely to vary according to the values of the researcher and the particular society under study.[21] But as Greene (1984:225) points out, "human beings naturally are inclined to know or to think they know; .... theory satisfies the mind, thus the search for theory is endless", and "theoretician is unlikely to find what he or she is searching for.... It is the searching, however, that gives meaning to life."

[21]Greene, Comparative Revolutionary Movements, p.221.

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