



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
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


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
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The Graduate School

THE SPATIAL METAPHOR, ACTION LANGUAGE AND
PSYCHOANALYTIC OBJECT RELATIONS
THEORY: AN ALTERNATE VIEW

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Sharon M. Flaherty
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ABSTRACT

An integration of Kuhn's concept of scientific revolution, Wittgenstein's philosophy of language and Roy Schafer's action language is presented. It is suggested that, despite the changes introduced by object relations theorists to traditional psychoanalysis, the inconsistencies of the natural science model used by Freud are apparent throughout the psychoanalytic object relations literature. It is shown that none of the object relations theorists discussed ever questioned Freud's basic paradigm, nor did they question his premise that psychoanalysis should be based upon the model provided by 19th century physics. The maintenance of the spatial metaphor and the reification of constructs from Freud through Guntrip and Fairbairn is demonstrated. It is found that, just as Klein, with her retention of the concepts of drives and the id, did not carry the implications of her concept of object relations to its logical conclusion, so, too, Fairbairn and Guntrip, with their retention of such concepts as ego, libido and internal objects, did not carry out the implications of their formulations.

It is concluded that a scientific revolution, in Kuhn's sense of a paradigm shift, has not occurred within the psychoanalytic object relations literature, but that such a shift is possible through the application of Schafer's action language to psychoanalytic object relations theory. In this way, the paradigm conflict between phenomenology and psychoanalysis may be resolved.

Lastly, resistance in the field to eliminating the reified metaphors and anthropomorphism of the natural science model is addressed. It is postulated that those in the field maintain this pseudo-scientific way of viewing people's behavior and development for historical, intellectual, psychological and emotional reasons.

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INTRODUCTION

There have been a number of shifts in the psychoanalytic object relations literature which began with Freud and continued through Melanie Klein to modern object relations theorists on two sides of the Atlantic. On both sides there are those who cite their own work as being different from Freud's in some essential way.

Freud originated the concept of an object, first by discussing it as a counterpart to 'subject,' as by saying that every instinct has an object: "The object of an instinct is that in or through which it can achieve its aim" (Freud, 1915, p. 65). It is significant here that the emphasis is on the instinct, with the object of that instinct being secondary in importance. In the history of object relations thought, the object gained ascendancy and eventually became the focus of attention, as the idea of an instinct gradually became less focal. Melanie Klein was the pivotal point in this process, and, eventually, with Guntrip and Fairbairn, the instinct concept was rejected.

Guntrip and Fairbairn felt that major revisions were necessary in Freud's system, especially in the direction of seeing the individual as innately object-seeking rather than pleasure-seeking, and in the elimination of hydraulic metaphors of drive, psychic energy, the innateness of aggression and other pessimistic concepts. Guntrip (1973) argued for the usefulness of a "person-ego" rather than a "system-ego," and cited Fairbairn's work as a major break with Freud. Here the healthy

self is seen as a cohesive unit in which conflict and aggression only occur as a byproduct of frustration.

Harry Guntrip and others (Guntrip, 1974; Meissner, 1979; Home, 1966; Holt, 1972; G. Klein, 1976; Tonkin and Fine, 1980) have recognized a conflict in Freud's work between a humanistic element which deals with personal insights into human experiences and meanings vs. a mechanistic, reductionistic element which is based upon nineteenth century natural science. Guntrip (1974) saw the evolution of psychoanalysis to object relations theory, as the playing out of the conflict between these two orientations, towards a gradual resolution in favor of a more personal, less mechanical view. In many of his and Fairbairn's writings, they seem to be moving towards an interpersonal view of development. Examples of therapeutic interventions which occur in Guntrip's writings usually have interpersonal meanings.

Heinz Kohut (1971) is said to have introduced a new paradigm with new language elements (Tonkin and Fine, 1980) to the psychoanalytic literature. His approach is based upon the concept of a self system and a dual line of narcissistic development, with object relations being of primary importance. Kohut believes he provided a whole new perspective in the psychoanalytic object relations literature with his *Psychology of the Self*.

Other shifts can be seen in the history of psychoanalytic object relations literature. Leowald (1980) referred to a shift of interest from oedipal to preodipal stages, from so-called three-party to two- and one-party problems. The focus on the first year of life and on the

depressive and paranoid-schizoid positions as elaborations of the oral phase (Klein, 1975) has superseded the traditional psychoanalytic emphasis on the genital phase of development. This is a shift in issues from guilt to shame; from jealousy to envy; from the problems of finding ways to satisfy and control one's sexual and aggressive drives, to the problem of destroying oneself or others through one's love or hate; from fitting into the family and accepting society's limits, to concerns about one's own existence and the issues of "object constancy" (Mahler, 1975). Some factions in the field still cling to the primacy of the oedipal stage. Guntrip has seen this resistance as a product of the intensity associated with earlier developmental stages, and a reluctance to acknowledge their reality and move towards deeper self-understanding.

Concurrent with this focus shift came a new population of patients. Instead of seeing all patients as either neurotic or psychotic, we now tend to see them as borderline or narcissistic personality disorders. Whether a cultural shift has actually occurred to create larger numbers of developmentally earlier disorders with weaker superegos, or whether the new patient population is a byproduct of the theoretical changes, is an unresolved question. But there are many therapists now claiming that if the true neurotic ever existed, they certainly don't make them any more the way they used to in Freud's day.

With the new patients has come a change in the types of defenses emphasized. Instead of intellectualization, repression, isolation, projection, reaction formation and denial, we now hear more about splitting,

projective identification, omnipotence, devaluation and even more primitive denial. Despite the fact that these current disorders and defenses are seen as more primitive, the shift in object relations thought has largely occurred away from pessimism and towards optimism, away from a regressive theory of growth to a progressive one. Another component of the object relations trend is in terms of seeing the individual as more active during development, less a passive reactor to external stimuli and events.

Thus, many changes have occurred. However, if there has been a significant paradigm shift, it should be reflected in the language used, since language is often believed to structure and organize thought. A paradigm shift, according to Kuhn (1962), involves the introduction of a new metaphor to explain or organize old data. Thus for a shift to have occurred in psychoanalytic object relations thinking, a shift in metaphors would also have to have occurred. It may be argued that, despite all the changes described above, no such shift is evident, although we may be on the verge of one.

This paper provides an examination of the language used by the object relations theorists who purport to make a major break with psychoanalytic theory: Fairbairn, Guntrip, Kohut, and, to a lesser extent, Klein and Kernberg. The overall purpose will be to explore whether, in fact, there has been a paradigm shift in the field: in Kuhn's sense, a scientific revolution. The hypothesis is that Guntrip, Fairbairn and Kohut all use the same explanatory approach to human behavior that Freud used, despite apparent disparities in their work.

Schafer (1972) questioned the container metaphor which seems to occur throughout the psychoanalytic and object relations literature. He challenged the use of metaphors which conceptualize a psyche as a spatial reality with a biological basis, and claimed that processes such as internalization and projection are merely fantasies.

In a later book, Schafer utilized the concept of "action language" (1976) which replaces the inside-outside paradigm with nonspatial ways of looking at emotions and behavior. He rejected notions of localized substance, drive discharge and other inner structures and processes in favor of the use of gerunds and behavioral concepts. In contrast to both the psychoanalytic and object relations theorists, Schafer seems to present a novel approach to the ways in which people behave. Schafer's 1976 book presents the rules of action language in an introductory way, and he stated there that further work is necessary to refine his work and apply it.

In Language and Insight (1978), Schafer provided a number of logical and theoretical arguments for the efficacy of action language as a substitute for psychoanalytic metapsychology. These arguments go beyond the scope of this paper and, since they are well represented there, will not be repeated.

The organization of this dissertation is as follows. Chapter I includes a presentation and integration of the work of Kuhn, Schafer and the philosopher Wittgenstein, who has important things to say about language, language games and rules, and the ways in which we confuse

ourselves with our own words. Chapter II will begin by pinpointing some relevant elements of psychoanalytic theory; it will then go on to demonstrate that the metaphors used by the object relations theorists are elaborations of those initially introduced by Freud. Chapter III will apply Schafer's action language to the theoretical constructs used by these theorists, to demonstrate action language as a viable alternative to the anthropomorphism of psychodynamic theory. Chapter IV will draw conclusions and present some possible reasons--intellectual, emotional and historical--for the fact that these reified metaphors have been maintained for so long. Concluding remarks will include brief references to the contributions of Lacan, whose work suggests some interesting reasons as to why a paradigm shift has not occurred sooner. Lacan stated that it is typical of human beings to build up a language system, and then mistake it for reality, mistaking the signifier for the signified (Stewart, 1983).

Our intentions will be:

1. to show the roots of the container metaphor in Freud and the immersion of current theory in his thought;
2. to discover the state of the literature in regard to the question of whether a paradigm shift occurred in the psychoanalytic object relations literature since Freud;
3. to ascertain whether the container metaphor can be dispensed with, by applying the rules of action language to the hypotheses of psychoanalytic object relations theorists;

4. to present some explanations (descriptions) as to why (how) it is that these constructs have remained with us for so long.

First, however, some comments are appropriate concerning Freud. He was a prolific writer whose body of work represents many years of professional growth and development of his ideas. It would take long, detailed study to comprehend the many complex things he meant by what he wrote. Much of his thinking has been misunderstood, in his day, and perhaps even more so today, with the combination of the passage of time, cultural changes and some serious problems with the translations and interpretations of his words. It seems clear that Freud was on to something. But what was it? Perhaps even he did not really know--at least consciously.

As observed above, many writers, both sympathetic and unsympathetic to Freud, have noted the unresolved disparity in his work between the humanism and the mechanism. Holt (1972) argues that many of the inconsistencies in his writing are the result of his intellectual, and perhaps even his cognitive, style. One reason for the inconsistency, according to Holt, is Freud's long scientific life and his willingness to change his mind. Another source of confusion was Freud's tendency to shift into metaphorical, even poetic usage, reifying and personifying concepts in such a way that it is sometimes difficult to know which ideas he meant to be taken literally, what was meant to be presented as facts and what as theory. On the one hand, Freud made comments to the

effect that much or all of what he wrote was hypothetical, temporary and open to question; on the other hand he tended to present ideas with a tone of certitude and dogmatism. At times he contradicted himself and saw no need to go back and integrate or reconcile conflicting ideas. Perhaps Freud's comfort with contradiction and paradox represented his implicit understanding that there is no final answer to the questions and subject matter he studied, at least at the stage he was in. For all these reasons, Holt cautions against taking Freud's ideas too literally, or out of context.

Holt also points out that when Freud attended the University of Vienna medical school, the intellectual climate of the day was saturated with radical materialism, physicalistic physiology and frank reductionism, taught by men of great prestige, intelligence and authority. There is no way that Freud could have avoided being enormously influenced by the mechanistically scientific approach; the fact that he adopted and retained these biases is hardly surprising. What is remarkable is that he maintained all along the conflicting elements of the humanistic, the subjective, the personal, the interpersonal, the search for meanings rather than causes. Perhaps Freud was unable to reconcile the incongruities within his writings, or to question seriously the natural science approach because he was unable to break so radically from the intellectual climate of his day and from the authority of those from whom he had learned his basic ideas. Holt states, "There is little evidence after 1900 that Freud was conscious of harboring incompatible images of man, neither of which he could give up" (1972, pp. 6-7).

In a recent and important book, Bettelheim (1983), who shares Freud's cultural and linguistic background, indicates that "the number of inadequacies and downright errors in the translations (of Freud's work) is enormous" (p. ii). He points out that many of the translations into English have lost the emotional connotations of the original; in many cases, minor and sometimes major changes in wording have significantly distorted the original meaning. The mistranslations cited by Bettelheim always slanted the meaning towards the mechanistic, the dogmatic and the objective, and away from the mysterious, the personal, the subjective. These errors go beyond the well-known mistranslation of 'trieb' into 'instinct.' They include many of the most important concepts, such as ego, superego and id, which are literally translated as I, over-I and it, terms which have emotional resonances in German which would be difficult to capture in English.

Therefore, in criticizing the strong mechanistic, reductionistic element in the psychoanalytic literature, we are aware that we are as much criticizing those who followed and built upon Freud's theory as we are criticizing Freud himself. The disciples that built upon Freud's original ideas for some reason seized upon the scientific aspect to the neglect of the humanistic. If Freud reified his constructs, later theorists greatly magnified the problem: Hartmann (1964) with his ego apparatus, Blancke and Blancke (1979) with their specifically delineated ego functions, Kernberg (1966) with his differentially metabolized introjects and "interstitial web," and Melanie Klein who, in Roy Schafer's words, has "carried the reifications of metapsychology to a grotesque extreme" (Schafer, 1976, p. 3). These are only a few examples of the

way in which the inconsistency of combining the mechanistic with the humanistic has been carried into the present, and even amplified.

We can only speculate as to why the literature was developed in this way. Perhaps there is a clue in Guntrip's statement about the reluctance to move towards deeper self-understanding. Perhaps the rigid adherence to doctrine is a way to ward off confronting the intensity of the material. A "scientific" stance allows for a measure of distance from some very personal and emotion-laden topics.

There are those who might object that the theoretical constructs to be criticized are only metaphors and are not meant to represent real processes or substances. Meissner (1979a), for example, in critiquing Schafer's action language, reminds the reader that a concept such as 'mind' is not meant to refer to a place or a thing, but is a shorthand term.

I would have to wonder whether Schafer's approach to language is all too literal and fails to take into account the significance of figures of speech. Thus if I say "I must have been out of my mind" the literal form of my statement is expressing the thought in terms of a metaphor of location, but the intention of the expression is not to assert that mind is a place. Similarly, if I were to say "My mind plays tricks on me" the literal form of the expression can sustain an interpretation that I am referring to my mind as though it were a separate and independent entity, but in no sense is that the formal content and significance of the proposition. (p. 293)

However, as will be demonstrated later, these concepts are indeed treated as if they were meant as substantive. Arguments occur over in what ways the ego splits, how internal objects behave, and what egos relate in what ways to what inner objects. Home (1966) provided an example from clinical discussions in the scientific meetings of psychoanalysts in which,

It was impossible not to notice the tendency of discussion to run into an impasse, as for example when Kleinian comment sharply questioned the phallic interpretation of clinical material, which it felt patently referred to the breast. (p. 423)

The fact that such serious and extended disagreements occur suggests that more than metaphors or fantasies are being argued over. Moreover, the fact that there is no accepted way to resolve such questions as the one described by Home, indicates that there is no recourse to data--only to the literature. "Indeed," Home goes on, "the place of 'the literature' in psychoanalysis has no parallel, so far as I know, in any other science" (p. 43).

Meissner later acknowledges, in fact, "I am not arguing here that such propositions cannot be interpreted in the sense that Schafer gives to them, nor am I claiming that such a literal interpretation is never in fact in question" (p. 293). Furthermore, in a separate article, Meissner said simply, "The concept of structure is not simply metaphorical (Schafer, 1976)" (Meissner, 1979b, p. 346).

It is to be expected that when faced with the type of cogent criticisms levelled at theory of Schafer, theorists will eventually fall back on the defense that these scientific constructs are only metaphors, even if at other times they mean, think of, and use them literally. But even if they are only meant metaphorically--and, given the ambiguity of language, this could always be questioned--the fact remains that these are systems of language rules which are used to organize data. For these reasons, it is quite appropriate and relevant for Schafer to criticize the existing system and to propose an alternative. What are being discussed are theoretical options.

More will be said about the status of psychoanalytic object relations concepts as fantasies vs. realities when each theorist is examined separately. And Meissner's critique of Schafer will be discussed in more detail in Chapter I, after Schafer's work is presented. With this brief introduction, let us turn to the main body of the discussion.

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND

One cannot know how a word functions. One has to look at its use and learn from that. But the difficulty is to remove the prejudice which stands in the way of doing this.

Ludwig Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations 340

There has been reference to a paradigm conflict in the field of psychology (Tonkin and Fine, 1980). A paradigm (Kuhn, 1962) is a model that scientists use to organize the data that they observe, and it serves a number of purposes. Most basically, the paradigm is built around certain assumptions which are taken for granted by everyone who uses it, often without their being aware of them. Besides providing a basis for organizing data, the paradigm sets up rules about what types of evidence may be considered, what methods may be used, and what range of conclusions may be drawn. It dictates questions that can and should be asked and what solutions are admissible. It even states what types of data will be attended to and what will be ignored. In short, the paradigm tells scientists about the entities nature does and does not contain, how these entities behave, and provides a basic approach to the problems in the field.

Kuhn points out that for every paradigm there are anomalies in nature which are left unexplained; however, a paradigm is never renounced purely on the basis of such gaps in its explanatory power. Instead, some anomalies go unnoticed, some are disregarded and some are explored

through research. "Mature" science, according to Kuhn, is characterized by the fairly universal acceptance of a paradigm, which is then elucidated through research. Numerous modifications may be made in the paradigm to explain the anomalies in the context of the paradigm's tenets. Over time, however, more and more anomalies are accumulated which cannot be accounted for, and/or the number of additions and modifications become so great that the paradigm becomes unwieldy and problematic in itself.

After a paradigm has been adopted, it is not easily or readily relinquished. Kuhn demonstrated that, once it has achieved the status of a paradigm, a scientific theory is only declared invalid if an alternate candidate is available to take its place. In fact there is such a strong investment in a paradigm that a great deal of resistance impedes the acceptance, or even the consideration, of a new paradigm. It is sometimes necessary for those of the "old school" to die out before a new theory can achieve general acceptance.

When a new paradigm is introduced, there is a period of competition between the old and the new which is called a paradigm conflict or crisis. Eventually if the new paradigm is accepted, the cycle begins again. Science progresses, according to Kuhn, through the process of such paradigm shifts, which he termed a "scientific revolution." (At least he believed this is how the so-called "hard sciences" progress; he was undecided about paradigm development for the social sciences.) Such a paradigm shift occurred when Newtonian physics was supplanted by Einstein's relativity theory, or when the Ptolemaic conception of the world was replaced by the Copernican.

After the shift, one organizes one's perceptions and sees familiar objects in such a different light that scientists see new and different things when looking with familiar instruments in places they have looked before. Different areas are emphasized and the relationships between them are different. In Kuhn's words, "After a revolution, scientists work in a different world," (p. 135) since "when paradigms change, the world changes with them" (p. 111).

The emotional attachments which practitioners or scientists have regarding a current paradigm are based, in part, on the fact that their way of understanding and their orientation in the world is based upon it; the paradigm's organization lends a sense of security which people are reluctant to give up. Investment in a paradigm is in the nature of a commitment and the change of allegiance from one to another is compared by Kuhn to a conversion experience which then transforms the way in which one views the world.

Kuhn points out that it is not through logic or step-by-step analysis that someone is convinced of a new paradigm, but suddenly, like a gestalt figure-ground switch. More than one theoretical construction can always be placed on a given set of data. When scientists enter into a debate about paradigm choice, their arguments are necessarily circular, with each group using the assumptions and tenets of its own paradigm to argue in the paradigm's defense. Each paradigm calls upon different kinds of evidence (e.g., Christians might say, "It's in the Bible" to support their assertions). The decision lies in the appeal and persuasiveness of a particular paradigm, and other factors, such as the intellectual climate of the time.

When a science is still young, no one paradigm has yet been accepted. As in the paradigm crisis described above, such a period is characterized by deep debates over legitimate methods, problems and standards of solutions.

Tonkin and Fine point out that a paradigm consists of a set of ideas that is manifested in the form of the language used by its adherents. This theory or language system shapes the language used by the community of scientists. They also point out that the field of psychology can be seen as being in a pre-paradigm period, with competition between psychoanalysts, behaviorists and existential-phenomenologists. Each of these three approaches entails its own language system, assumptions, methods of research and admissible types of data, problems and proposed solutions. Since this paper will focus upon psychoanalytic explanations, we will now turn to the paradigm introduced by Freud.

Freud's Paradigm: Psychoanalytic Theory

Freud's structural, topographic, economic and dynamic models are included in his paradigm. The metapsychology of psychoanalytic theory is based upon the reductionistic and mechanistic assumptions of nineteenth century science, many of which are considered to be outdated today, and were becoming outmoded in physics before the end of the nineteenth century (Holt, 1972). This scientific approach sought explanation rather than description or interpretation of events and valued objectivity and an adherence to the subject/object distinction. To extend this view to human behavior meant to find causes and effects rather than reasons and purposes.

Freud's method of organizing clinical material from this approach is based upon the spatial metaphor in which the person is viewed as having an inside and an outside, with a boundary between the two which is permeable to varying degrees. Newtonian forces operate in the mind just as they move physical bodies in the environment. Identifiable structures are said to exist within the person, many of which have come there through the "taking in" of various aspects of the environment. Various processes are said to go on within the psyche, processes whose workings are based upon the economic point of view, also known as the hydraulic model. These inner structures and processes become the data to be analyzed, researched and treated. Thus comes the criteria that for any real change to occur, "structural" change is necessary.

The existence of these constructs must be inferred through the person's behavior, including verbal behavior; but no explanation or even description of that behavior is considered to be adequate unless these inner structures and processes are called upon. This circular reasoning shows these structures to be explanatory fictions, which merely restate the person's behavior in a more esoteric language system. If this can be done, the behavior or event is said to be explained or understood. Inner structures and processes have become the data, i.e., the focus of analysis and research, and the explanation for the data of behavior, all at once.

Like any other paradigm, the tenets of psychoanalysis dictate what types of questions may be asked, the parameters which the answers must have, and what can be considered as evidence. Working from outside

the paradigm, for example, one could point to choice and will as anomalies which are left unaccounted for by the system; adherents of the paradigm dispose of these concepts neatly by saying they do not exist. If asked to support this contention, they could only fall back upon the scientific assumptions on which the paradigm is based: e.g., behavior is determined.

Other anomalies exist which are recognized by those in the field. Tonkin and Fine point out that the borderline and narcissistic personality disorders do not behave in the consulting room as would have been predicted by the Freudian model. They do not form a stable transference neurosis, they are neither neurotic nor psychotic, and they are not analyzable by strict psychoanalysis. Because of this, modifications must be made in both the theory and technique of analysis to deal with them. If borderline or narcissistic patients were around in Freud's time, they either went unnoticed or were explained in terms of neurotic or psychotic categories, which were the only ones available at the time.

Tonkin and Fine contend that Kernberg and Kohut treat these anomalies differently, using different explanations and different conceptual approaches. Kernberg is said to remain within the parameters of the Freudian model, extending it to the point where it is somewhat overly complicated and unwieldy. Kohut, on the other hand, introduces a new model with new terminology, which leads to a simpler, more parsimonious construction. Kernberg's use of the old model of conflict and defense retains economic drive theory while Kohut's self system does not.

When the work of these two theorists is analyzed in Chapter II, it will be seen that the differences between them are more apparent than real, that their theories are based essentially upon the same metapsychology and scientism of psychoanalysis, and that their languages differ only in detail. It will be shown that even those in the psychoanalytic object relations literature who claim to break with Freud, such as Guntrip and Fairbairn, still retain the same scientific assumptions and metaphors--the same paradigm. To emerge from that paradigm, an entirely new language system is needed, and an entirely new set of assumptions.

Schafer's Paradigm: Action Language

Schafer (1976) criticizes Freud on a number of points which bring into question the natural science model. He points out that the language of natural science processes and functions is incompatible with the language of purposes and intentions. He believes that Freud kept both languages because psychoanalysis cannot do without the concept of the person as agent. The result is an uncomfortable hybrid of scientism and humanism, with an unavoidable gap in psychoanalytic theory between the person as agent on the one hand and the natural science apparatus on the other.

Schafer objects to the inconsistency, the dualism, the reductionism of the mechanistic view; its elaborate system of concepts infers a complex set of properties, qualities, structures, functions, forces, energies, apparatuses and mechanisms which are favored over concepts

such as purposes, reasons, intentions, meanings, subjective experiences and, worst of all, choices. The reified structures and processes working within the apparatus become the purposeful, meaning-creating, choice-making, action-oriented entities rather than the person himself: "ghosts in the machine" (Ryle, 1949).

Schafer notes that for Freud it made sense to ascribe agency and mentality to functions and energies, but not to the person. To wit, an aim is a purpose; a drive could be said to have one, but a person could not. Similarly, intentionality and judgment are classified as ego functions. Thus, Freud constructed an apparatus. But, in Schafer's words, "There was a person loose in the apparatus, a master-mind working the mechanism . . . the mover of the mental apparatus" (Schafer, 1976, p. 110). This was an attempt to reconcile the disparate elements of mechanism and humanism.

According to Schafer, psychoanalysis translates subjective concepts into an eclectic language mixing physiochemical and biological terms, in which

reasons become forces, emphases become energies, activity becomes function, thoughts become representatives, affects become discharges or signals, deeds become resultants, and particular ways of struggling with the inevitable diversity of intentions, feelings and situations become structures, mechanisms and adaptations (1976, p. 103).

Schafer explicitly challenges the container metaphor by which one conceptualizes the psyche as a spatial reality with a biological basis. He rejects notions of localized substances, drive discharge and other inner structures and processes, and claims that such processes

as internalization and projection are merely fantasies. He argues that it is time to stop using metapsychology and the reified metaphors whose existence is organized around the assumption that it is necessary to invoke anthropomorphized entities to explain human behavior. Most basically he eschews the notion that explanation is necessary.

Schafer takes issue with psychoanalysis in the following main points:

1. the biological-mechanistic-physicalistic model is inconsistent and ill-considered even within itself;
2. further inconsistency exists between the mechanistic and humanistic elements in psychoanalysis;
3. it is inappropriate to apply a mechanistic model to human beings;
4. the spatial metaphor and anthropomorphized entities are fantasies;
5. there is no need for explanation: description should suffice.

He also objects to the way in which the portrayal of inner entities as agents implies that the person is a passive reactor to forces and events, rather than an active initiator of action.

However, Schafer is aware that we cannot leave behind the outdated metapsychology or the spatial metaphor, until we have a set of language rules to replace them. In line with Kuhn's discussion, Schafer acknowledges that it is by adopting such rules that we establish what will count as facts, as well as a criteria of consistency and relevancy

in our conception of the world. Only by first establishing such rules can we achieve a systematic understanding of anything. This is part of the appeal that psychoanalysis holds.

Schafer asserts that in the literature of psychoanalysis, Freud and his followers refer to the theoretical constructs as if they were facts rather than what they really are: language rules which were as much created by the theory and theorists as discovered. It appears that in following the natural science approach, Freud did not realize he was making a decision about language rules--a choice among other possible choices--each of which entails both costs and advantages.

Schafer suggests a different choice, reflecting a completely different set of assumptions. He proposes a reconceptualization of psychoanalysis in terms of action language, which he considers to be both a philosophical enterprise and a choice of vantage points, just as psychoanalysis is. Schafer believes that action language can replace abstract theory and accomplish everything that psychoanalytic theory does, even referring to action in the unconscious mode. It does so while remaining closer to the language of everyday life and without forming elaborate, unfalsifiable propositions, engaging in speculation about what cannot be known, and without making inferences about the "vanishing point" of infancy. Schafer wishes to retain the clinical observations of psychoanalysis, but opposes the view that Freud's metapsychology must remain the language of psychoanalytic theory. In short, he believes that action language can communicate the same meanings, but in a more parsimonious, clear and consistent manner.

Schafer contends that clinical interpretation has never depended upon complex psychoanalytic theorizing, although the latter does give the illusion of deep and exact scientific understanding. In psychoanalysis the biological language of functions replaces the psychology of meaning and its changes through development. What "psychic reality" refers to, says Schafer, is subjective meaning, especially unconscious meaning. The minds within the mind, the homunculi, are the psychoanalytic alternative to descriptive classification by a behavioristic observer.

Schafer's language proposals entail the relinquishing of a mental apparatus and any substances, processes or qualities used as explanations for what the person does. Instead, the person is always portrayed as the initiator of what s/he does. To this end, all nouns and substantives are to be replaced by verbs and gerunds, and adjectives are to be replaced by verbs.

The spatial metaphor, with an assumed boundary between the internal and external, is not used to explain or understand what someone does. "Mental actions" do not occur in space, are not located inside or outside anything, beneath or above anything, do not move from place to place, except in fantasy--or, to be consistent, when one is fantasizing. Since there is no psychic space, the concept of internalization can only refer to a fantasy, not a process. The person then becomes the meaning-creating, choice-making agent, who organizes his/her life in a particular way, whether s/he does so consciously or unconsciously. The end result is that a person is thought of as taking an active role, not a passive one.

According to action language, then, the unconscious is not a place or a state; it is rather a mode of acting, as by selectively attending, which we do throughout life. We could say that someone does not realize, for example, that s/he wishes to kill a loved one, even that s/he prefers not to realize it, or fears realizing it, but not that s/he has an unconscious fantasy about killing. Behaving unconsciously will be returned to shortly below.

Schafer claims that action language is the neglected, unsystematized and devalued native tongue of psychoanalysis, because the person as agent has always been used in the consulting room. For example, the analyst works on the assumption that the analysand actively brings about his/her suffering, largely unawares. Through interpretations the analyst tries to help the analysand see that s/he is continuously organizing, selecting and directing a problematic way of living and tries to help him/her understand how and why s/he is doing so. The analyst addresses himself to the person and explicates the meaning and intentions which the theory attributes to drives and structures.

Thus there has always been a gap between clinical theorizing, which pictures the analysand as a passive mechanism, and interpretations, which usually explicate the person's way of intending and meaning this way of behaving. Even Freud admitted after his dream about Irma that he did feel it was his patient's fault that she was not cured (Freud, 1900): a strange opinion coming from a man who contended that all behavior is determined. Analogously, Schafer points out that

it is curious to conceive of the analysand as a responsible person with a mechanistic, organismic psychopathology. Yet this is what analysis suggests as it stands now.

For Freud, clinical interpretations were only part of the job for psychoanalysis. The other part was to translate these observations into a general theory; this translation into pseudo-scientific jargon was thought to represent explanation. The terminology served to make human phenomena more comprehensible because more ordered, systematic and part of a larger organizing system. Yet no phenomena are accessible which the person does not create or reveal, so little is lost if the constructs are bypassed in conceptualizing the person.

Schafer's proposed new language is an alternative mode of organizing, understanding and expressing wherein there is no gap between clinical observation and theory, there are no reified metaphors, and in which the traditional distinction between description and explanation is discarded. Schafer believes that the complex set of rules and propositions that make up the metalanguage of psychoanalysis lack clarity, consistency, necessity and relevance, and are inadequate to their theoretical purpose. We have followed Freud in shortchanging the language of everyday life.

Schafer states that Freud relied on two languages, one suitable for natural science and one for the unsystematic discourse of everyday life, never realizing that the discipline he created would need a language of its own before it could attain systematic refinement and elegance. In other words, it needed language rules suited to its method

and purpose: the interpretation of what people say about their lives and the difficulties they encounter trying to speak frankly and unrestrainedly.

Schafer further believes Freud's metapsychology does not serve their purpose, but further obfuscates; the analyst's task first is to translate what the analysand says into natural science language, then to make interpretations by translating from the natural science language back into everyday language. Action language is presented as the alternative to eliminate "the unsuitable, confusing, unnecessary and meaningless metaphors and metaphorical preconceptions" of Freud's metapsychology. Action language is deemed strategic because it is meant to be a technical language with specific and consistent rules, using plain English locutions.

As an example, consider the explanations in terms of moods and emotions. It is circular to state that one behaves in a certain way because of the presence of depression. This is because one can only ascertain the presence of depression through the way one behaves. To understand the depression, one must go on to question for further reasons. This is the process of analysis.

For example, Freud (1917) saw depression as the energetic resultant of the play of instinctual and other forces within the mental apparatus with mind as the arena in which mental forces struggle together. He also saw depression as a complex way of acting fearfully, angrily, self-punitively, protectively, ambivalently, lovingly. In the latter view depression is what someone does, but because of scientism, the latter

was seen as "mere" description in need of further elucidation or explanation, and not as a legitimate endpoint. According to Schafer, the agent is not the depression, but the person who is behaving reproachfully, guiltily, who protects loved ones from destructive actions, and deviously and covertly attacks others while seeming only to be self-attacking. He may also be behaving passively, stubbornly, wishfully, spitefully, etc. Depression is then seen as a way of acting, not as a state or mood.

Schafer's treatment of empathy is similar. He chose it as an example because it is so commonly surrounded by mystery, and seems to just happen by itself, or to be a quality which one simply has or does not have. His point here, as with all nouns of attribution, is that what is called empathy is something someone does, not has. When empathizing effectively, one attends in a focused way, relaxes, observes, concentrates, listens carefully, imagines, reflects, reacts emotionally, anticipates, free associates, forgets irrelevant concerns or extraneous stimuli in the room, and usually restrains most physical activity. It is best done in an unselfconscious, unreflected way, so that it appears to be done passively, and we are unlikely to realize exactly how we are doing it. In fact one empathizes actively and intentionally.

These two brief examples illustrate that when one replaces verbs and adverbs for nouns and substantives, eschewing need for explanation over description, the result is that one can conceive of emotions as enactments, not entities or passively experienced modes. The fact that people begin analysis seeing their actions and experiences as being out of their control is the problem to be overcome. As analysis progresses,

the person begins to realize how he creates the problems. Where Freud would say we wish to make the unconscious conscious, or where id is, there ego shall be, Schafer would say the client behaves in a more and more aware rather than unaware manner. He reflects more honestly, admits to himself and others more openly what he is doing, claims rather than disclaims the way he behaves. Instead of resolutely and even automatically forgetting certain events, he carefully considers events, thoughtfully recalls and talks about them.

Confusion enters because so many of these activities are accomplished unconsciously, which, perhaps surprisingly, is a viable mode of action in Schafer's scheme. It refers to activity which is usually complex, unacknowledged and poorly understood. Each case of seemingly unconscious activity is done for many reasons which are explored in analysis. According to Schafer, self-deception is a misnomer for faultily observed actions; one attends faultily or behaves inattentively for any number of reasons. The analyst's job is always to inquire, either more or less explicitly, "How is it that you do it unconsciously?" and then to investigate the various behaviors that make up that mode. One keeps things to oneself and does not put them into words, and may refrain from thinking about them, or may engage in some incompatible actions to distract oneself from what one is doing.

According to Schafer, the unconscious refers to two classes of action. The first is that behavior in which one is engaged, but desires to disclaim, and therefore observes or reports faultily as something else: as another action, another mode of action, someone else's action

or no action at all. The second major referent is to those actions in which one would be engaging, were one not refraining from doing so and/or engaging in counteractions. For instance, one may wish to murder a loved one, avoid admitting or even thinking about it, to such a great extent that one fearfully refrains from doing anything, because he believes that if he were to stop refraining from activity, he would indeed kill someone. Or one may preoccupy oneself by thinking repetitively about other things.

Behaving consciously in this system represents a reflected mode as described by Pollio (1982), whereas preconsciously involves the unreflected mode. The latter occurs when one is not reflecting upon what one is doing, but would readily do so if there were a reason to do so. The unconscious mode is more complicated, because it entails actions which one purposely resists thinking about or recognizing, either by engaging in incompatible actions, denying, refusing to attend appropriately, or any one of many possible actions which may be done fearfully, deviously, anxiously, stubbornly, willfully, etc.

Pollio points out that existential-phenomenology's emphasis upon acts rather than structures implies that "psychology is, and must be, a science of gerunds rather than a science of the all too-too solid noun" (Pollio, 1972, p. 6). Thus, the paradigm conflict between psychoanalysis and phenomenology might potentially be resolved if Schafer's arguments were applied to the subject matter of psychoanalytic theory.

Pollio further states that phenomenological philosophers such as Merleau-Ponty believe that behavior is neutral with respect to mind-body

distinctions. Every action has meaning and intention, and the use of gerunds and verbs implicitly imparts this idea. "To understand the meaning of a given piece of behavior is to understand its meaning for the behaving subject" (Pollio, 1972, p. 9)--not to understand how it fits into a theoretical system.

Furthermore, according to Pollio, Kohler suggested that, because psychology is much younger than physics, psychologists should not use physics as a model but should rather return to observing "our naive experience" of the world as physics did for centuries. This is consistent with the idea that we are in a pre-paradigm period, and have not yet settled the problem of language rules or a paradigm. Rather than imitating the assumptions of another field, we should seek our own paradigm.

This approach is also comparable to the way an existential-phenomenologist would emphasize the reasons, purposes and meanings behind every symptom or complaint, in the context of the person's entire way of living. Existentialists too avoid the need for explanation and assert that generalizing and theorizing in the abstract should be kept to a minimum. A descriptive approach values comprehension of current everyday occurrences as the most valid subject matter. It would involve "being here now."

One might criticize the nomenclature "action language," a noun, to name a system which emphasizes replacing nouns, which are static, with verbs and gerunds. It might be more consistent from this viewpoint to refer to the system in more action-oriented terms, such as "talking about

what people do." However, to use a noun in the name appears to be no more inconsistent than, for example, referring to "existential-phenomenology" in terms of a noun. The system allows one to use nouns, as long as they are not attributed to a person like a trait or in such a way as to imply that he is not acting when he is.

Throughout Schafer's discussions, he implicitly follows the ideas of another philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein conceived of a language system as a set of rules that constitute or communicate a view of reality or of the world. According to Wittgenstein, there are any number of different language games. A paradigm could be characterized as a certain language game, but there are other kinds, too. We will now turn to the philosophy of Wittgenstein to see how it applies to our current discussion.

Ludwig Wittgenstein: Language Games

In his Tractatus Logicus, Wittgenstein asserted that language is a picture of reality: language depicts the logical structure of facts. In this earlier work he contended that, from a logical point of view, all languages are one language with respect to the logical conditions they must satisfy.

The Philosophical Investigations (PI) is Wittgenstein's second major work. This book is composed of sentences and paragraphs each numbered, much like a book on the sayings of Confucius might be. It is customary when quoting from this book to refer to the numbered passage rather than the page number--e.g., (PI 340). This procedure will be followed here.

A major difference between the Tractatus and his later Philosophical Investigations is Wittgenstein's repudiation of the picture theory which says language is a picture of facts. Instead, he stated that language is a tool with a variety of uses. It is composed of different language games, some of which name objects, and most of which do not.

Problems occur when one confuses different language games, thinking they all operate by the same rules. For example, when we say 'John has a pen,' 'pen' refers to an object. But when we say he has a pain, or he has a hand, the rules of these games are completely different. There is no object to which the word pain refers, and one does not 'have' a hand in the same sense that one has a pen.

Wittgenstein came to believe that philosophical problems come about because of misunderstandings about language, and trying to make the rules from one game apply to another. In regard to psychoanalysis and object relations theory, we could say that people behave as if there were internal objects, as if there were forces operating within the mind; these are metaphors. But in the literature these metaphors are treated as if they were entities and events.

Wittgenstein said, "A simile that has been absorbed into the forms of our language produces a false appearance, and this disquiets us" (PI 112). Cook (1965) stated that sometimes language games are inappropriately combined for the purpose of humor: "When this is intentional and fairly obvious, it produces a laugh; when it is unintentional and unrecognized, it may seem to provide a penetrating insight into the nature of things" (p. 310).

The application of Wittgenstein to our previous discussion becomes apparent if we consider nouns like empathy and anger or ego, superego, and id. The error occurs when we falsely believe that, since these are purportedly the names of objects, they would behave as would any other object. Thus one might think that an ego can be split, or that anger can be stored up like water, released, or diluted by something else, such as love. Here we are haphazardly applying whatever language rules appear to be convenient and are disregarding the fact that words like anger and depression have their own rules of use. They call for a different language game. In fact, there is no such object as anger or depression or ego. But, as Wittgenstein put it, "Where our language suggests a body and there is none, there we should like to say, is a spirit" (PI 136).

For this reason we tend to assume that there is an ego there, though we can't see it, and so we assume it must behave in certain ways. This is the problem of reifying theoretical constructs and supports Schafer's contention that we should not refer to experiencing and acting, in terms of nouns. "Try not to think of understanding as a 'mental process' at all--for that is the expression which confuses you" (PI 154).

There is no limit to the possible number of language games. One of the problems in psychoanalysis, and psychology in general, seems to be the confusing of metaphorical or nonliteral language with the literal. The spatial metaphor may be useful at times to express the way one experiences oneself. Theorists have used the metaphor, however, as if it were an actual depiction of reality and then have gone on to try to

elucidate the characteristics of the psyche, its contents, and their actions.

Because every language game is different, the meaning of a word can only be learned by its use. Words that refer to so-called mental processes do not have one accepted use. For example, depression, as it is typically used, may be inferred from many different kinds of behavior. It may be seen in a negative, pessimistic outlook, in passive inactivity, in hostility, in promiscuity, or in what seems to be excessive activity, among other things. Therefore, to say that someone is depressed, or has an underlying depression, tells us very little. What the analyst would do would be to explore what the person is doing to create the so-called state of depression. But he is not exploring the depression, he is exploring the person's way of creating his lifestyle and problems.

The illusion that internal states and mental processes are entities underlies a great deal of the literature on psychoanalytic theory and metapsychology. Confusing metaphorical language games with literal language games, analytic theorists have built an entire theoretical system to explicate processes and entities that do not exist. In Schafer's terms, the theorists are treating fantasies as if they were realities. He suggests that internalization and expulsion of other people, or of feelings and substances, are fantasies we all engage in. We may concede that at least these are fantasies of the theorists who write about them. If others, children or adults, fantasize similarly, their language and metaphors will tell us so.

Wittgenstein's philosophy is not anti-metaphysical or anti-theoretical; although he did emphasize that metaphysical statements taken at their face value are absurd, he believed that they also help us to look at things in a different way. Ordinary language "holds our minds rigidly in one position, as it were, and in this position it sometimes feels cramped, having a desire for other positions as well" (Wittgenstein, 1958, in Fann, 1969, p. 95).

But theory, in introducing a new language game and rules, introduces a new use. Even if this involves only a slight deviation from the original data, it is still translation into a different game. If it is a considerable change, the original game is not described at all. By philosophizing or theorizing, we often create and solve the problems of a completely different game. Since explanation is merely translation into another language game, description should be the method of analysis. The more esoteric the language, the further from the original meanings the words are. "The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling, not when it is doing work" (PI 132).

Regarding Freud, Wittgenstein commented, "Freud is constantly claiming to be scientific. But what he gives is speculation--something prior even to the formation of a hypothesis" (Lectures and Conversations, in Fann, p. 94). He may have been recognizing here that psychoanalysis, like psychology, was not yet ready to adopt a paradigm.

Wittgenstein criticized metaphysics, not because it deals with unimportant matters, but because it is presented in empirical form. What he said about philosophy and metaphysics is easily applicable to

psychological theory and metapsychology. Because when philosophers philosophize, they take words in the abstract and try to make sense of them. So, too, a theoretician in psychology takes the words out of the context of everyday living and tries to set rules on them. As Wittgenstein said, "Let the use of words teach you their meaning" (in Pitcher, 1965, p. 123).

For the later Wittgenstein, to understand a word is not to understand what it refers to, but to understand what it does: what functions it has, what work it performs. If we apply this method to theoretical constructs such as so-called mental processes and structures, then, rather than mistakenly thinking of them as the names of objects, we would do as Schafer suggests, which is to understand their meanings in terms of actions. The meaning of a word is governed by the language game in which it figures, and its use can only be understood in its linguistic and social contexts. What emerges from these considerations is an instrumentalist or pragmatic conception of language.

Interestingly, the school of philosophy inspired by Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations is called "analytic" philosophy (Hartnack, 1959). Whereas the early Wittgenstein believed there was a one-to-one correspondence between each word and an object in the world, he later realized each word serves myriad purposes. This latter point is the one Schafer made about words such as depression and empathy, as shown above. Freud and his followers seem to believe that psychoanalysis is a reflection of reality rather than a set of rules regarding how to speak. This would be consistent with the nineteenth century scientific

reliance on facts and objectivity, and with Wittgenstein's earlier view in the Tractatus. Schafer's proposals are consistent with the Philosophical Investigations--an alternative set of language rules.

It is instructive to recall that this type of explication is exactly what the analyst does. In fact, Wittgenstein compared philosophy to psychoanalysis in that the analyst does not simply tell neurotics what is wrong, but gradually helps them recognize the significance of their words and actions.

For example, the presenting complaint, "I'm depressed" might be shown to represent the following: "I hate my family and want to make them pay for the way they have hurt me, but I fear losing them and so I avoid saying so. I enjoy getting them to respond guiltily and solicitously towards me. I also love them and I believe that this is the only way I can keep them with me, and so I do not admit to myself that I do this. Instead I sadly reflect on the past, which I imagine was better, and wish things were different." Each example of depression would be a different configuration of such actions. "What we do is bring back words from their metaphysical to their everyday use" (PI 116). The analyst constantly translates concepts like "sadistic superego" into actions when interpreting them to the client.

Each person uses his own set of language games, however, poorly understood, confused and/or inconsistent. The analyst helps the client to see how his symptoms function in his own language game, so that the problem is eventually dissolved, shown to be a problem of not having

understood one's own language game(s). When the analyst explicates the way in which the person has been behaving all his life, the problem of unintentional symptoms or incomprehensible depression is dissolved.

"The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known" (PI 109). This is reminiscent of the experience many analysands report--that they have really known all along what they just realized, or that, once pointed out, the truth seems very obvious. Wittgenstein's goal is to be able to make philosophical problems vanish, so that one can stop philosophizing whenever one wants to. And the analyst's goal, ideally, is for the analysand to be able to leave analysis and live more freely.

This discussion is related to Wittgenstein's argument against private language. "An inner process stands in need of an outward criteria" (PI 580). No inner process, object or substance can be discussed, according to this view, that cannot somehow be shown or expressed. If it had no behavioral counterparts, we would not be able to discern it, and it would be of no consideration. "Since everything is open to view, there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no use to us" (PI 126).

This notion can be applied to any construct in the psychoanalytic-object relations literature and any affect, trait or structure attributed to a person. These can only be inferred from the way the person behaves, including verbally. When naming sensations or talking about inner experience, we are not in a naming language game: "Don't ask for the meaning, ask for the use" (Wittgenstein, in Fann, p. 68).

If there were any substance or action that were completely private and hidden, there would be no way of confirming or disconfirming its presence. Private experiences, for Wittgenstein, are not so much denied, as they are said not to be a criteria for the employment of words. In this view, to say someone is in a given mental state is to imply a number of publicly observable actions. There is no one thing to which a word like depression or ego is a name. Similarly, Schafer reminds us that he is talking about language, not about reality; he doesn't deny inner reality as behaviorism does, he simply says that language has a nonlinear relationship to it.

Another point Wittgenstein made is that philosophical problems are rooted in everyday thinking, and are hidden because they are all too familiar to us. Similarly, the mind-body dualism of Descartes and Plato, and the spatial metaphor, seems deeply lodged in our everyday way of thinking; e.g., "I had so much anger built up, I exploded," or "Let it all out, you'll feel better." This point will be returned to in Chapter IV when we examine the difficulty we have had in relinquishing the assumptions and metaphors of psychoanalysis.

Criticism of Schafer

In a series of articles, W. W. Meissner criticizes Schafer's action language on a number of points. Each of his objections will be considered and answered in this section.

To begin with, Meissner disagrees with the idea that internalization and other theoretical constructs are merely fantasies.

Our discussion here refers to incorporation specifically as a process and not as a fantasy, even though the process may be related associatively to incorporative fantasies. But then again, all forms of internalization, and particularly those that are defensively motivated, may be associated with incorporative fantasies. This by no means implies that the mechanisms involved are equivalent to such fantasies or that their complex understanding can be reduced to the terms of corporeal incorporation (1979b, pp. 351-2).

The point that Meissner returns to again and again in his assertion that internal objects are not merely fantasies is that the only reason we cannot demonstrate their reality is because we have not yet ascertained how the internal world develops structure:

There is a supposition in the object relations view of development that the patterning of intrapsychic development depends on the sequence and quality of the infant's object experience. Yet there is no satisfactory conceptualization of the process by which external objects come to influence and affect the internal psychic organization. The question has to do with how structure is laid down, how structure is formed and modified, and what role the relationship with the external object plays in such structural organization. The concept of structure is not simply metaphoric (Schafer, 1976), since it expresses an inherent intelligibility, a quality of the mind whose immediate referents concern aspects of organization, differentiation, sequencing, patterning, enduring qualities and characteristics of the activity of the mind. But we do not know how structure is formed, and we do not have a good understanding of the role of the external object in influencing the process of structuralization (1979b, p. 346).

Meissner's implication is that if we can explicate the processes involved, we will be closer to understanding the nature of endopsychic structure. "The problem that confronts and confounds us is to be able to describe and define the nature of those internal changes and the specific mechanisms by which they take place. . . . the mechanisms remain obscure" (p. 352).

This seems very much like positing the Cartesian mind-body dualism and saying we do not know how matter affects spirit or vice versa, yet we know that it does, and if we only wait until we figure out how, we will have proof of the proposition. Meissner, in other words, is clinging to a belief in a process despite a lack of logic and of evidence for it. One wonders where Meissner would expect to look in order to find such a process. It seems appropriate to refer him directly to Wittgenstein, who said,

How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviorism arise? The first step is the one that altogether escapes our notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided. Sometime, perhaps, we shall know more about them, we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at this matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to know a process better (PI 308).

In other words, Meissner is maintaining the illusion that there is some referent to words such as 'internal object' and, because of the lack of support for such a notion, he simply continues to call for the need of evidence, rather than questioning the concept: "There is an inherent demand--perhaps more pressing at this juncture than ever before--to move beyond the level of metaphoric implication to the specification of particular processes and systematic formulation" (1979b, p. 358). Yet both Klein and Kernberg, as will be seen in Chapter II, have elaborately systematized the nature of psychic reality. And still, "The notion of structure remains problematical in psychoanalytic theory" (Meissner, 1979b, p. 358).

In a 1976 article, Meissner expressed a similar view to the one he asserted above:

The view to be expressed here is that internalization involves both process and product. Internalization as process refers to a series of real psychological events whose specific delineation and description has not been accomplished. The persistent theoretical need is to translate metaphorical usage into meaningful and consistent theoretical terms. Internalization as process is not other kinds of internal mental operations or content, such as the contents of images and the correlative acts of imagining, memories, fantasies, and other products of conceptual or cognitive processing. They also are not products of learning and other processes by which behavioral modification or experiential modification may be achieved" (1976, p. 385).

All that Meissner succeeds in doing here is to list a number of things these processes are not. He is still unable to say what they are. He finally comes right to the point when he says, "To what extent does the constructural apparatus provided by theory correspond in any real sense to the real organization and functioning of the human mind and psyche? The question is of course ultimately unanswerable" (1976, p. 392).

We would comment that Meissner is a step ahead of many theorists, in that he demonstrates an awareness that the nature of these processes and entities is undefined and problematic. Most seem to take their existence for granted.

Meissner also remarked, "It must be remembered . . . that we cannot speak of an object relation in a strict sense, but only in the presence of the individual's object relations" (1979b, p. 355). By "object relations" here Meissner is referring to one's relationships with people in the environment. This statement suggests that every internal structure must be demonstrable in the person's way of behaving and relating to others. This being the case, why not eliminate the former, and investigate whether any meaning is lost by doing so?

Despite his admission that the issue of the "constructural apparatus" is unresolvable, Meissner continues to call for a need for further growth in the field in order to shed light on the subject. Again it seems relevant to recall Wittgenstein, who said that when a problem of philosophy--and, by extension, any theoretical or language problem--is unsolvable, one must question the premises on which it is based so that the problem dissolves. This does not occur to Meissner as a possibility. Instead, he continues to argue for the need for metapsychology.

Acknowledging the inconsistencies and problems of the metapsychology of psychoanalysis, Meissner goes on to assert, "metapsychology is the theory of psychoanalysis. To the extent that psychoanalysis is a science, it must have a theory" (1981, p. 936). He further points out that the theory provides the basis for all methods, standards, organization of data, etc. Here Meissner is stating that Freud's metapsychology is the paradigm of psychoanalysis and is needed for that reason. He goes on to say that interpretive hermeneutics calls for an "economic-topographic (structural) and causal analysis," and on its own, it can only give a partial account of the subject matter of psychoanalysis. "Psychoanalytic understanding requires both meaning and structure" (p. 937).

This is an example of invoking the paradigm's assumptions as support for the continued need of the paradigm, just as Kuhn said would happen during paradigm conflict. If we take a broader view, we can ask, must psychoanalysis be scientific? Why not be systematic in a descriptive way that does not entail abstract theory? Meissner's

assertions demonstrate the way in which a paradigm can so organize a practitioner's world view that he does not even consider the idea of questioning it.

Here is an example of Meissner's attempt to differentiate between fantasy and structure:

Perceptual processes can be said to give rise to an inner image of the external object, yet perception or the cognitive apparatus allied to perception cannot be said to be a form of internalization. Similarly, the complex processing that gives rise to the formation of an object representation remains in the cognitive or representational frame of reference and does not yet constitute an internalization. While these processes and their products may be inner in some sense and may constitute some part of the subject's inner world, they have not yet become a part of his functioning self. What is internalized has become a part of the structure of the self and has been integrated into the structural organization of the psychic apparatus. Thus, the basic distinction first advanced by Hartmann and later emphasized by Rapaporte (1957) was made between the "inner world" and the "internal world." The inner world constituted a sort of intrapsychic map of the external world which was interpolated between receptors and effectors and provided the medium by which the ego regulated its interaction with the external environment. The internal world, however, referred to the organization and integration of intrapsychic structures that compose the psychic apparatus. The inner world is primarily cognitional and representational and must be carefully distinguished from the internal world, which is essentially structural (1979b, p. 347).

Note the way Meissner repeatedly returns to the word "structure." He seems to believe that whenever he uses that word, he is referring to something substantive, something unique, specific, meaningful. But the word merely gives the appearance of meaning. Words such as structure, representation, organization, substance, etc., all are interchangeable, in that they have no specific referent. Although one can go on at length theorizing about them, one ends up with no clearer understanding of the phenomenon in question than beforehand.

Meissner's specific arguments against Schafer's action language are several. For one thing, he complains that Schafer, while asserting that the concept of internal structure is problematical, neglects to let us know exactly how or why. This is obviously untrue and can be disproved by simply reading Meissner's own articles. He presents Schafer's views on metapsychology and the action language so effectively, that one wonders how, with such a complete and thorough understanding of Schafer's views, Meissner could be so opposed to them. In any case, Schafer's reasons for objecting to the spatial metaphor have been presented previously and will not be repeated.

Meissner has responded to several of Schafer's criticism of psychoanalytic metapsychology. The criticisms which Meissner opposes can be divided as follows:

1. the problem of anthropomorphism and reification of concepts;
2. the status of dispositional statements as explanatory fictions;
3. the category mistake;
4. the equivalence of explanation and description.

Each of Meissner's arguments will be taken separately and discussed.

(1)--Meissner acknowledges that anthropomorphism is an unfortunate and undesirable byproduct of the scientific approach to human beings, but says, "The question is whether or not in a science of human behavior, such as psychoanalysis, the science can exist and have meaning without such anthropomorphic contaminants" (1979c, p. 95). He suggests that anthropomorphic elements are unavoidable if we are to

formulate a scientific account of human behavior which deals with any more than extrinsic variables and radical behaviorism. Meissner is aware of Schafer's opinion that, if the scientific view necessitates anthropomorphism, we would be better off without the scientific view. But, asks Meissner, what then of the theory? One loses the whole potentiality of the middle range of theorizing that lies between the personal agent and specifiable actions, if one discards it.

We would point out that, in the first place, it is part of Schafer's viewpoint that the middle range of theorizing is not only extraneous and unnecessary, but in fact obfuscates the real subject matter which needs to be explored--i.e., the personal agent and his actions. G. Klein (1976), for example, believed that there is no need for the second level of theory to explain the already viable clinical theory of psychoanalysis. According to Klein, it made little difference what kind of metapsychological model one chose, since such models are irrelevant to the clinical enterprise.

A relatively few simple principles enabled us to see meanings^{*} in the most varied and heretofore senseless behaviors, such as dreams, mistakes, jokes and symptoms. Yet, as psychoanalysts came to formulate their ideas systematically, they abandoned this level and assumed the aims and mannerisms of natural scientists talking about energies, forces, cathexes, systems, layers, mechanisms, and physical analogies, rather than meanings. Thus, today psychoanalysis presents itself in two guises: the psychology in terms of which Freud interpreted dreams and symptoms and slips of the tongue . . . and on the other hand a theory--the theory of metapsychology--which explains the clinical theory (G. Klein, 1976, pp. 42-3).

* Unless otherwise specified, all emphases belong to the author being quoted.

The essential clinical propositions concerning motivation have nothing to do with reducing a hypothetical tension. . . . They describe relationships, needed and sought out, consciously and unconsciously, and how they are fulfilled through real conceptual encounters, symbol and action (G. Klein, 1976, pp. 47-8).

In answer to this argument, Meissner again invokes the existing theory as a reason to maintain it; he asserts that anthropomorphic metaphors only become a problem if the metaphor is taken for something more.

However, as demonstrated above, Meissner has gone to great lengths to argue that these metaphors are something more. As a heuristic and communication device within the consulting room, these metaphors or fantasies may serve a useful purpose. But not as attempted explanation for people's actions, which is the way Meissner tries to use them.

(2)--Next, Meissner disagrees that dispositional statements add nothing to our understanding, saying, "if the agent acts, he has the capacity for acting. If he feels, he has the capacity for feeling, etc." (1979c, p. 102). He admits that the difficulty here lies in "surplus meanings" for the hypothetical structures.

By this he seems to mean that there is no answer to the question of what is added by saying that one has the capacity for feeling or acting; the only way to determine the existence of such a capacity is post hoc: after the feeling or acting has occurred. In response, Meissner supposes that, if the surplus meanings cannot be defined by public or extrinsic action or denomination, the elements of the intervening construct must be regarded as internal. We could disagree and

say if there is no extrinsic denomination, the "intervening construct" could instead be regarded as nonexistent.

(3)--As for the category mistake, Meissner questions whether it is as devastating or conclusive as either Ryle (1949) or Schafer suggest. He says,

There appears to be little doubt that thinking in terms of hypothetical entities is implicit, not only in the ordinary use of language, but also in the most sophisticated scientific thinking. To regard merely as a logical mistake or as a primitive form of the use of language, which can simply be replaced by a more sophisticated linguistic modality, is to do an injustice to the complexity of scientific thinking. . . . A term need not be condemned or repudiated simply because of the questionableness or the uncertainty of its referent. A term need not be abandoned simply because it does not contain a demonstrable reference to a concrete entity or existing thing. Words can be used meaningfully and make perfectly good sense and yet not refer, e.g., The house is white - does not postulate abstract whiteness. One should not confuse a modality of expression or a linguistic convention for a category mistake. The use of terms without reference or with reference to only abstract entities does not destroy the usefulness or significance of the terms. To press the argument to the point of denial of existence and to the conclusion of the irrelevance or the theoretical meaninglessness of theoretical terms seems to me to result in the introduction of a basic confusion which may be even more harmful than the original conclusion and to put severe limitations on the process of scientific thinking and understanding (1979c, p. 93).

Meissner's point would be well taken here, if the terms in question were only used as conventions, shorthand phrases, with the understanding that they do not refer to specific entities. This is not the way they are used in the literature, nor by Meissner himself, who continues to seek the real referent, as shown above.

The use of such metaphors to stimulate thought, speculate, and create new ways of looking at the ways in which people think and feel

about themselves and others, is useful and beneficial. Our purpose is not to eliminate metaphorical thinking from the field; but to use these metaphors as scientific explanations is an error. The point made by Schafer is that these heuristic metaphors are not the only way, or even the best way, to formulate the theory of psychoanalysis.

Offering an alternative method of systematizing the theory does not entail the total discard of all concepts which resemble metaphors. What must be given up, however, is the notion that anything can be explained by these metaphors, or that positing a quality or a disposition provides an explanation.

To take Meissner's own example, if someone were to argue, in regard to the example of whiteness, that the house is white because it possesses the quality of whiteness, the argument would be seen to be spurious. The same reasoning can be applied to show that nothing is gained by saying that someone behaves in certain repetitive and rigid ways because of an introjected object.

Meissner also fears that some information or understanding will be lost if theoretical formulation is collapsed into data description. "The explanation relies on specifying the reasons that serve to make actions comprehensible" (1979c, p. 89).

The question that needs to be raised is whether this implied equivalence of explanatory function can really be substantiated, whether the more traditional metapsychology can be adequately expressed in terms of a set of language rules, and whether the action language does not equivalently collapse all distinction between observation, the formation of laws and the establishing of scientific regularities, and theory formation (p. 89).

Explanation, however, attempts to specify causes, not reasons, as Meissner suggests. Schafer proposes a system by which reasons can be specified without recourse to explanations which entail a move to a different language system than the one being examined.

The answer to the question Meissner raises in the quote above will be provided in Chapter III, where it will be shown that the theoretical concepts in Chapter II can be translated into action language, providing laws, regularities, theory and observations all in the same language, without recourse to constructs or to traditional metapsychology.

Meissner acknowledges aptly that the decision about these issues rests on a prior philosophical commitment. He disagrees with Wittgenstein's notion of theory as a set of language rules, and clings to a belief in the possibility of some ultimate, verifiable explanation that goes beyond that which we can perceive. This brings us again to the nineteenth century natural science model, a paradigm which Meissner does not see his way to go beyond.

The theory tries to reach beyond appearances and the available descriptive data to postulate or infer inductively a structure, an organization, etc., that explains the observable phenomena. The specific purpose of the theory is to look beyond appearances to envision a real hypothetical structure whose capacities and processes would have produced the observable behavior (1979c, p. 100).

This passage was quoted for two reasons. The first is to indicate that any nonspecific words can be exchanged for the words 'structure' and 'organization,' and 'capacities' and 'processes,' without changing the meaning of the sentences above. The second is to

illustrate the contradiction in the phrase "real hypothetical," placed before that recurring term, "structure." If it is hypothetical, in what sense can it be real? How can it be real if it is hypothetical? This reveals the basic untenability of Meissner's position.

Discussion

To summarize, then, according to Kuhn, science begins with observation. As observations accumulate, scientists try to organize the data as a coherent whole, in the form of a theory or paradigm. In learning a paradigm the scientist learns theory, methods and standards, usually in an inextricable mixture. In addition, the theory provides a language system by which the data is believed to be understood, or explained. It comes from the question, "Why does this happen?" on the assumption that simple description, or "How does this happen?" does not suffice.

Psychoanalysis is such a theory or paradigm. It has been suggested (Tonkin and Fine) that there is a paradigm conflict even within psychoanalysis: Kohut's dual line of narcissistic development and the self system are said to introduce new concepts. Similarly, Guntrip and Fairbairn, with their rejection of the pleasure principle, the innateness of aggression, the death instinct and the hydraulic metaphors of drive, psychic energy and the id, cite their work as a major break with Freud.

It will be argued in Chapter II, however, that these theorists have not really departed from Freud's basic paradigm, that their language and assumptions parallel his in essential ways. Schafer sees

the work of theorists like Guntrip, Fairbairn and Kohut as transitional theoretical system, responsive to the shortcomings of psychoanalysis and searching for something better, but still Freudian in nature. This view is contrary to Guntrip's belief that the deeply personal, humanistic element is brought to fruition in object relations theory. This paper will show that the object relations theorists are as immersed in these metaphors as Freud was, though they are straining away from them. In fact, even the most radical object relations theories exemplify the confusion which Guntrip saw between the personal vs. the biological elements in traditional psychoanalytic thought.

Schafer represents a radical departure. He rejects the natural science approach and its basic premise that explanation is needed above and beyond description. This strikes at the most basic assumptions of Freud's paradigm. It represents a movement towards an existential-phenomenological view that values actions and experiences without recourse to theory, which is seen as several steps removed from reality (May, 1958). This view is also very Wittgensteinian.

Kuhn asserted that mature science involves the acceptance of one paradigm or theory, which is then researched by the main body of scientists. He stated there can be a "sort of scientific research" without paradigms, but he believed that the acquisition of a paradigm permits a more esoteric type of research, and is a sign of maturity in a field.

We might question whether a sign of maturity is instead represented in the relinquishing of a paradigm and its restrictive rules and assumptions, since this permits more freedom and shows less

dependence upon a need for structure and security. It shows the ability to research in the presence of the anxiety of not having a rigidly organized view of the world.

Within the clinical setting theory may be seen as providing a therapist with a sense of security while he goes about the business of relating to a client. To be willing to relinquish security would be a move in the direction of both freedom and anxiety. Kuhn pointed out that when no body of belief is taken for granted, the choice of supporting observation and experiment is relatively free, as there is no standard of methods--or even phenomena--that every scientist feels obliged to employ and explain. Kuhn persisted in seeing this as "something less than science," because it is pre-paradigm--despite his acknowledgement that the pre-paradigm period is not incompatible with significant discovery and invention. One byproduct of the esoteric research produced by a paradigm is jargon and technical language that eventually prevent any layman from following the progress of the science or even understanding its tenets. Whether this is an improvement seems questionable.

Other disadvantages can be observed. Adherence to the paradigm effectively prevents novel solutions and ideas from gaining acceptance and may produce false problems, just as Wittgenstein said philosophy does. The practitioners become so engrossed in the language, the theory, that they sometimes pay more attention to it than to the data themselves. Research within a paradigm does not aim at unexpected novelty because its purpose is to elucidate the paradigm, answer its

questions, and account for its anomalies in its own terms. Kuhn admitted that a paradigm can even insulate a community from socially or otherwise important problems that are not reducible to its terms or cannot be stated in terms of the conceptual and instrumental tools the paradigm supplies.

There is one further criticism of Schafer's action language which Meissner brought up, which was not discussed in the previous section. Meissner claimed at one point that Schafer's personal agent is itself a construct, the "anthropomorphic limit" (1979c, p. 99). This is untrue. Schafer's "personal agent" is a person, a human being. People act. They do things. They think, talk, move, feel. Of this we can be certain, and, unlike other agents in the theories to be presented here, Schafer's agent, the person, can be seen and touched. It will be the purpose of this paper to demonstrate that this is all we know and all we need to know.

CHAPTER II

THE SPATIAL METAPHOR

"Plus ca change, plus c'est la même chose."

Alphonse Karr (1808-1890)

Les Guepes (Jonvier, 1849)

In this chapter we will adopt the definition of psychoanalytic object relations theory as suggested by Kernberg (1976):

In broadest terms, psychoanalytic object relations theory represents the psychoanalytic study of the nature and origin of interpersonal relations, and the nature and origin of intrapsychic structures deriving from fixating, modifying, and reactivating past internalized relations with others in the context of present interpersonal relations. Psychoanalytic object relations theory focuses upon the internalization of interpersonal relations, their contribution to normal and pathological ego and superego developments, and the mutual influences of intrapsychic and interpersonal object relations (p. 56).

This definition shows the roots of the object relations movement in psychoanalysis, though each object relations theorist has his/her own version of intrapsychic structure and process. It should be noted that the term 'object' may be used in different ways in this literature. Sometimes the word is used in the sense of an introject, an internal object. At other times the word refers to an external object, i.e., a person. For instance, when Guntrip said that health occurs through healthy object relations, he meant that health occurs through healthy relationships with other people.

The similarity that all the object relations theorists hold with Freud is that the way a person relates to others, behaves, and organizes his world is thought to reflect his/her internal world, made up of

structures and processes; and, vice versa, one is thought to organize one's internal world based upon one's experiences with external objects. In order to change someone, the therapist, according to this viewpoint, must influence the internal world, which is believed to account for patterns of behavior. Here again the concept of "structural" change comes into play. For these theorists, psychoanalytic object relations theory links the interpersonal and social with the intrapersonal and intrapsychic. In Kernberg's words, "internalized object relations may be considered a crossroad where instinct and social system meet. . ." (1976, p. 59).

In this chapter it will be demonstrated that the paradigm used by object relations theorists is the same in its essentials as that used by Freud, their metaphors and constructs being different versions and elaborations of those introduced by Freud. To demonstrate this, specific writings will be examined from each of the following theorists: Freud, Klein, Kernberg, Kohut, Fairbairn, and Guntrip. These five object relations theorists have been chosen because they are prominent in the field, show a historical progression, and because each has been cited as distinctly different from each other and from Freud in a number of ways.

Klein and Kernberg follow Freud's model more directly than the other three, maintaining drive theory; rather than proposing major changes in Freud's metapsychology, they used his concepts to explicate developmentally earlier stages. The uniqueness of their contribution was to emphasize the object rather than the instinct.

Kohut and his followers, on the other hand, "believe that a major conceptual shift has occurred in psychoanalysis" with Kohut's work (Goldberg, 1978, p. 11). Goldberg said,

Such changes may be revolutionary or evolutionary, but there comes a moment when the participants are convinced that things are different. For many people this is painful, for others it is joyous. The reader should be aware that he is in the company of the latter. We feel that a new orientation to certain clinical problems has been offered by The Analysis of the Self and The Restoration of the Self (p. 11).

Guntrip and Fairbairn, whose thinking is closely allied, also see their work as a significant break with Freud. According to Guntrip (1974),

Fairbairn's work involves a decisive shift of the center of gravity in psychoanalysis from impulse theory, guilt and depression to the failure of ego development and the schizoid problem This calls for a new conceptualization of endopsychic structure Freud's pioneer theory of id, ego and super-ego . . . is too frankly mechanistic to meet our needs. Fairbairn provided a model that is consistently psychodynamic and fully personal (p. 836).

Fairbairn himself referred to his work as "a recasting and re-orientation of the libido theory and modification of various classical psychoanalytic concepts" (1941, p. 28).

The ways in which each of these theorists differ from Freud will be detailed below when each is considered separately. For each theorist, a synopsis of his/her developmental theory will be presented, with supporting excerpts from specified writings from each. Naturally it will be impossible to provide an exhaustive description of each theorist's views. We will limit ourselves to quotations which define terms and summarize the views of each on development, pinpointing areas

of continuity and discontinuity among them, and particularly, points of divergence from traditional psychoanalysis.

In each case it will then be shown in what ways each theorist manifests his/her retention of the psychoanalytic paradigm, which utilizes the spatial metaphor to explain behavior in a scientific manner. It will be seen that all of these theorists show the same theoretical inconsistency as Freud did, positing internal objects and structures as agents, while at other times referring to the person as agent. Lastly, a discussion will integrate the ideas in the chapter, add some final points, and indicate the direction to be taken in Chapter III.

A chart is provided (Figure 1) in which each theorist is listed with his/her theoretical concepts. By examining the chart one may follow the progression of ideas from Freud through Guntrip, and see more clearly how the concepts of those who followed him were all elaborations of Freud's ideas. It is demonstrated there that the spatial metaphor runs through the concepts of all the theorists, with structures, processes and some form of energy in every theory.

Initially Freud's theory will be summarized, based for the most part on his 1939 work, An Outline of Psychoanalysis. This was chosen because, being his last book, it can be said to represent the most advanced stage of his continually developing theory. It also condenses psychoanalytic theory, and was geared, not towards a popular audience,

	ID	SUPREGO	ENERGY	EGO	OBJECTS	PROCESSES
FREUD	Id: Instinctual cathexes seeking discharge: present from birth	Superego: Develops during oedipal phase	LIFE AND DEATH INSTINCTS Drives: Libidinal Aggressive Narcissistic or Object Libido Mobility/fixity	Ego: Develops later	Internalized or incorporated objects (e.g., superego) as an agent Cathect ego or objects	Repression Splitting Introjection Projection Regression Identification Incorporation of an object
KLEIN	Id: Life and death instincts: present from birth	Superego: Begins in first year	LIFE AND DEATH INSTINCTS Libido vs. aggression Cathexes	Ego: Develops from birth	Fantasied internal objects-- GOOD OBJECTS BAD OBJECTS	Repression Splitting vs. integration Introjection Projection Internalization Denial
KERNBERG	Id: Develops later from undifferen- tiated id-ego matrix	Superego: Develops from first year	Libido vs. aggression Valence or affective coloring Cathexes	Ego: Develops with id	Good self-obj. Bad self-obj. Good self-rep. Bad self-rep. Bad object-rep. Good obj-rep.	Repression Splitting Introjection Projection Internalization Identification Integration Incorporation
KOHUT	Id: Like Freud's	Superego: Like Freud's	Instinctual Energy: Libido and aggression Narcissistic cathexis of objects	Ego: Like Freud's	Self-object: Grandiose self Idealized par- ent image Self Self-reps.	Horizontal vs. vertical splitting Introjection Regression Fixation Fragmentation vs. integration
FAIRBAIRN	No Id	Superego develops from ALE, RO and IO	No pure energy: Dynamic structure Libido as object seeking	Pristine ego at birth Antilib. ego Libidinal ego Central ego "person-ego"	Rejecting obj. Exciting object Ideal object	Repression Splitting Introjection Projection
GUNTRIP	No Id	Superego: As per Fairbairn	No pure energy: Dynamic structure Libido as object-seeking	Pristine ego at birth Antilib. ego Libidinal ego Central ego Regressed ego "person-ego"	Rejecting obj. Exciting object Ideal object	Repression Splitting Introjection Projection

Figure 1. Historical Chart.

but towards a professional readership already familiar with psychoanalytic concepts (Strachey, 1973, p. 143). As Freud put it in his preface, "The aim of this brief work is to bring together the tenets of psychoanalysis and to state them as it were, dogmatically--in the most concise form and in the most unequivocal terms" (1939, p. 144).

Freud's Outline of Psychoanalysis

Freud began his Outline with the first hypothesis on which psychoanalysis is based (the second of which is the existence of the unconscious):

The first (hypothesis) is concerned with localization. We assume that mental life is the function of an apparatus to which we ascribe the characteristics of being extended in space and of being made up of several portions. . . . To the oldest of these psychical provinces or agencies we give the name of id. . . . Under the influence of the real external world around us, one portion of the id has undergone a special development. From what was originally a cortical layer . . . a special organization has arisen which henceforward acts as an intermediary between the id and the external world. To this region of the mind we have given the name of ego (1939, p. 145).

Freud then went on to explicate the characteristics of these agencies. The id ". . . contains everything that is inherited that is present at birth . . . above all, therefore, the instincts, which originate from the somatic organization and which find a first psychical expression here (in the id) in forms unknown to us" (1939, p. 145). In the following quote is illustrated Freud's portrayal of the ego as active agent.

. . . the ego has voluntary movement at its command. It has the task of self-preservation. As regards external events, it performs that task by becoming aware of stimuli, by storing up experiences about them (in the memory), by avoiding excessively

strong stimuli (through flight), by dealing with moderate stimuli (through adaptation) and finally by learning to bring about expedient changes in the external world to its own advantage (through activity). As regards internal events, in relation to the id, it performs that task by gaining control over the demands of the instincts, by deciding whether they are to be allowed satisfaction, by postponing that satisfaction to times and circumstances favorable in the external world or by suppressing their excitations entirely. It is guided in its activity by consideration of the tensions produced by stimuli, whether these tensions are present in it or introduced into it The ego strives after pleasure and seeks to avoid unpleasure (1939, pp. 145-6).

Lastly, of course,

The long period of childhood, during which the growing human being lives in dependence on his parents leaves behind it as a precipitate the formation in his ego of a special agency in which this parental influence is prolonged. It has received the name of superego. In so far as this superego is differentiated from the ego or is opposed to it, it constitutes a third power which the ego must take into account. An action by the ego is as it should be if it satisfies simultaneously the demands of the id, of the superego and of reality--that is to say, if it is able to reconcile their demands with one another. The details of the relation between the ego and the superego become completely intelligible when they are traced back to the child's attitude to its parents (1939, p. 147).

And "A distinction between ego and id is an unavoidable assumption" (p. 147).

These quotations clearly indicate the spatial metaphor and a differentiation between an internal and an external world. The internal world contains entities which behave in relation to each other and to the outside world. The entities are referred to both as agents and as substances which may grow, divide, or develop additional sections. They respond to forces or pressure from instincts or drives, or from the outer world. One characteristic of Freud's constructs is that they can be drawn schematically or pictured. This is true of all the theorists

to be considered in Chapter II and differentiates them from Schafer: one cannot draw a picture of his ideas.

Moving on from the general topic of structures, Freud continued by describing drives.

The forces which we assume to exist behind the tensions caused by the needs of the id are called instincts. They represent the somatic demands upon the mind. . . . They are the ultimate cause of all activity. . . . We have found that instincts can change their aim (by displacement) and also that they can replace one another--the energy of one instinct passing over to another . . . we have decided to assume the existence of only two basic instincts, Eros and the destructive instinct (p. 148).

We may picture an initial state as one in which the total available energy of Eros, which henceforward we shall speak of as 'libido,' is present in the still undifferentiated ego-id and serves to neutralize the destructive tendencies which are simultaneously present. (We are without a term analogous to 'libido' for describing the energy of the destructive instinct). At a later stage it becomes relatively easy for us to follow the vicissitudes of the libido, but this is more difficult with the death instinct.

So long as that instinct operates internally, as a death instinct, it remains silent; it only comes to our notice when it is diverted outwards as an instinct of destruction. It seems to be essential for the preservation of the individual that this diversion should occur. . . . When the superego is established, considerable amounts of the aggressive instinct are fixated in the interior of the ego and operate there self-destructively . . . Holding back aggressiveness is in general unhealthy and leads to illness (p. 150).

Thus the drives are portrayed as energies which can be transformed, directed and redirected, displaced, neutralized, and whose vicissitudes could be traced, despite their transformations, much like a radioactive substance could be traced through the body. Energy, whether libidinal or destructive, is seen as a substance originating from a source, flowing or being stored up, and it is generally spoken of in terms of quantities available.

All that we know of it (the libido) relates to the ego, in which at first the whole available quota of libido is stored up. We call this state absolute, primary narcissism. It lasts till the ego begins to cathect the ideas of objects with libido, to transform narcissistic libido into object-libido. Throughout the whole of life, the ego remains the great reservoir from which libidinal cathexes are sent out to objects and into which they are also once more withdrawn, just as an amoeba behaves with its pseudopodia . . . , a characteristic of the libido which is important in life is its mobility, the facility with which it passes from one object to another. This must be contrasted with the fixation of the libido to particular objects which often persists throughout life. There can be no question but that the libido has somatic sources, that it streams to the ego from various organs and parts of the body (pp. 150-1).

Freud's views on narcissism are rather confusing and contradictory. For example, elsewhere he stated that the id is the reservoir of libido; and how can the ego "at first" store the whole available quota of libido, when there is no ego "at first," because the ego only develops gradually over time? One would expect that primary narcissism exists before the ego has differentiated itself from the id. However, a consideration of this topic goes beyond the present discussion. We are now illustrating the way in which Freud described these processes and structures. Libido, like aggressiveness, can be directed towards oneself (cathecting the ego) or towards others (cathecting objects).

Neuroses and other psychopathology result from the fixation of libido on an infantile object--e.g., the mouth, a parent, a homosexual object tie, one's own ego, etc. Freud concluded that "the normal and abnormal manifestations observed by us (that is, the phenomenology of the subject) need to be described from the point of view of their dynamics and economics (in our case, from the point of view of the quantitative distribution of libido)" (p. 156).

Freud then went on to describe the topographical model:

There is no need to characterize what we call "conscious": it is the same as the consciousness of philosophers and of everyday opinion. Everything else psychical is in our view "the unconscious." We are soon led to make an important division in this unconscious. . . . Everything unconscious that . . . can thus easily exchange the unconscious state for the conscious one, is therefore described as 'capable of becoming conscious' or as preconscious (pp. 159-60).

Preconscious psychic processes are referred to as "pushing forward" into consciousness, whereas the "unconscious proper" contains those "psychical processes and psychical material which have no such easy access to becoming conscious . . ." (p. 160). Movement between these areas is hampered by "certain internal resistances," or anticathexes.

Freud summarized the development of the psychic apparatus thus:

Originally, to be sure, everything was id; the ego was developed out of the id by the continual influence of the external world. In the course of this slow development certain of the contents of the id were transformed into the preconscious state and so taken into the ego; others of its contents remained in the id unchanged, as its scarcely accessible nucleus. During this development, however, the young and feeble ego put back into the unconscious state some of the material it had already taken in, dropped it and behaved in the same way to some fresh impressions which it might have taken in, so that these, having been rejected, could leave a trace only in the id. In consideration of its origin we speak of this latter portion of the it as the repressed (p. 164).

Freud also introduced the concept of the splitting of the ego, first in reference to psychoses and fetishes.

. . . the ego often enough finds itself in the position of fending off some demand from the external world which it feels distressing and that this is effected by means of a disavowal of the perceptions which bring to knowledge this demand from reality. Disavowals of this kind occur very often

and not only with fetishists. . . . The disavowal is always supplemented by an acknowledgment; two contrary and independent attitudes always arise and result in the situation of there being a splitting of the ego (p. 204).

He went on to differentiate this type of disavowal from repression: "In the case of neuroses, one of these attitudes belongs to the ego and the contrary one, which is repressed, belongs to the id. The difference between this case and the other . . . is essentially a topographical or structural one . . ." (p. 204).

In the last chapter of An Outline, Freud referred to the superego as an object from the outside world which has been moved to the internal world.

A portion of the external world has, at least partially, been abandoned as an object and has instead, by identification, been taken into the ego and thus become an integral part of the internal world. This new psychological agency continues to carry on the functions which have hitherto been performed by the people (the abandoned objects) in the external world: it observes the ego, gives it orders, judges it and threatens it with punishments, exactly like the parents whose place it has taken (p. 205).

He indicated that the superego helps regulate the self esteem, whereas, previously, parental influence led to good feelings.

. . . if the ego has successfully resisted a temptation to do something which would be objectionable to the superego, it feels raised in its self esteem and strengthened in its pride as though it had made some precious acquisition. In this way the superego continues to play the part of an external world for the ego, although it has become part of the internal world (p. 206).

Guntrip (1974) pointed out that here Freud touched upon a truly object relational concept, though he did not articulate it quite this way. Guntrip referred to Freud as "a pioneer who said the first, not

the last word. . ." (p. 829). In the above statement Freud referred to an object both as an internal structure and as a person. The internal object behaves and relates to other structures within the psyche. In fact this is not the first time Freud referred to objects this way.

In "Mourning and Melancholia" he conceived of the object of one's affection being internalized and there subjected to aggressive assaults or esteem and affection. He stated (1917) that after a loss, or when a certain ambivalence exists towards someone, part of the ego identifies itself with that object and another part of the ego torments and aggresses against the first. Thus occur depression, self depreciation, even suicide.

Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, so that the latter could henceforth be criticized by a special faculty like an object, like the forsaken object. In this way an object-loss was transformed into an ego-loss and the conflict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification (1917, p. 249).

He went on,

We have elsewhere shown that identification is a preliminary stage of object-choice, that it is the first way--and one that is expressed in ambivalent fashion--in which the ego picks out an object. The ego wants to incorporate the object into itself, and the method by which it would do so in this oral or cannibalistic stage is by devouring it (1917, p. 160).

In the following summary can be seen clearly the notion that some portions of the psyche are considered to be farther or deeper within, with the result that they do not contact the outside world, while other parts of the psyche perceive and communicate with the world.

The core of our being, then, is formed by the obscure id, which has no direct communication with the outside world and is accessible even to our own knowledge only through the medium of another agency. Within this id the organic instincts operate, which are themselves compounded of fusions of two primal forces (Eros and destructiveness) in varying proportions and are differentiated from each other by their relation to organs or systems of organs (1939, p. 197).

The id, cut off from the external world, has a world of perception of its own. . . .

The other agency of the mind, which we believe we know best and in which we recognize ourselves most easily--what is known as the ego--has been developed out of the id's cortical layer, which, through being adapted to the reception and exclusion of stimuli, is in direct contact with the external world (reality). Starting from conscious perception it has subjected to its influence ever larger regions and deeper strata of the id, and, in the persistence with which it maintains its dependence on the external world, it bears the indelible stamp of its origin (as it might be "Made in Germany") (1939, pp. 198-99).

Before we move on to the object relations theorists, a few more excerpts from Freud will provide the proper background. In 1915 he wrote,

In so far as the ego is auto-erotic, it has no need of the external world, but, in consequence of experiences undergone by the instincts of self-preservation, it acquires objects from that world, and, in spite of everything it cannot avoid feeling internal instinctual stimuli for a time as unpleasurable. Under the dominance of the pleasure principle a further development now takes place in the ego. In so far as objects which are presented to it are sources of pleasure, it takes them into itself, 'introjects' them (to use Ferenczi's 1909 term); and, on the other hand, it expels whatever within itself becomes a cause of unpleasure. . . . For the pleasure ego the external world is divided into a part that is pleasurable, which it has incorporated into itself, and a remainder that is extraneous to it. It has separated off a part of its own self, which it projects into the external world and feels as hostile (pp. 135-6).

It would be difficult to imagine a statement that would more readily lead into a presentation of object relations. It is important

to note, however, that Freud sees the ego internalizing and cathecting objects as a byproduct of instinctual urges. There is no original interest in objects in and of themselves.

Melanie Klein

The forerunner of the object relations school is Melanie Klein, who saw herself as having kept the basic ideas of Freud, but as extending them to the first year of life, which he did not emphasize. Guntrip said, "Melanie Klein did not herself, I believe, recognize how radical was her development beyond Freud" (1974, p. 830). He went on to say that, although she maintained Freud's dual instinct theory, "even making more of the death instinct than Freud himself did," her emphasis on object relations made the concept of instinct, in effect, superfluous for psychoanalysis.

Klein retained drive theory while introducing a focus on object relationships which influenced all the subsequent theorists to be discussed here. Sutherland (1980) views her as having made the first major challenge to Freud's foundation, but as lacking the intellectual rigor to enable her to follow through the theoretical implications of her work (p. 830). We will now turn to Klein's work to discover exactly what this challenge was, and in what ways she remained wedded to Freud's way of thinking.

Three articles of Klein's will be used, all taken from her second book, Envy and Gratitude. In her articles "On the development of mental functioning" (1958) and "Our adult world and its roots in infancy" (1959),

both written late in her career, she summarized and defined the concepts in her ideas of development. "Notes on some schizoid mechanisms" (1946) consolidates her theoretical position. The exposition and quotations below will be taken from these three works.

Using terms taken directly from Freud, Klein made inferences concerning the first years of life, which he did not focus on. She also emphasized "object relations," whereas he emphasized the development and activities of drives and of the id, ego and superego. Hers was the first such move and proved to be the precursor for those to follow her. The point to be demonstrated here is that, although she changed the emphasis from Freud's, her assumptions and concepts are based on the spatial metaphor and on his paradigm. This point is illustrated in the chart on page 59.

The following definitions of introjection and projection portray the person as agent while retaining the spatial metaphor. ". . . introjection means that the outer world, its impact, the situations the infant lives through, and the objects he encounters, are not only experienced as external but are taken into the self and become part of his inner life. . . . Projection, which goes on simultaneously, implies that there is a capacity in the child to attribute to other people around him feelings of various kinds, predominantly love and hate" (Klein, 1959, p. 250).

For Klein the central processes, during development and throughout life, are of bad and good objects being introjected and projected, and she believed that the ego develops around the good object. She was never very specific about how this occurs, except to say that,

The internalized good object comes to form the core of the ego around which it expands and develops. For when the ego is supported by the internalized good object, it is more able to master anxiety and preserve life by binding with libido some portion of the death instinct operative within (1958, p. 237).

Here, though she disagreed with Freud about the way the ego develops, we immediately encounter such familiar concepts as ego, libido, internalization. Impulses related to the life and death instincts are seen as coming from the id. In fact, "I regard the id as identical with the two instincts" (Klein, 1958, p. 243).

Thus Klein essentially agreed with Freud's definition of the id, which she quotes: "Instinctual cathexes seeking discharge--that, in our view, is all there is in the id. It even seems that the energy of these instinctual impulses is in a state different from that in other regions of the mind" (Freud, 1933, in Klein, 1958, pp. 243-4). She also stated directly her agreement with the truth of his "discovery" of the instincts, "with their polarity and fusion operating from birth onwards," and with his formulation of the id, ego and superego. However, she provided some variations on these concepts.

For example, unlike Freud, who believed that the ego develops gradually, Klein believed the ego exists from the beginning of life.

When I wrote The Psycho-Analysis of Children, I had already come to the conclusion that under the impact of the struggle between the two instincts, one of the ego's main functions--the mastery of anxiety--is brought into operation from the beginning of life (1958, p. 236).

Notice Klein's portrayal of the ego as an agent in the following:

The danger of being destroyed by the instinct of aggression sets up, I think, excessive tension in the ego, which is felt by it as anxiety, so that it is faced at the very beginning of its development with the task of mobilizing libido against the death instinct (1958, p. 237).

The instincts, however, are sometimes portrayed as agents, as well.

. . . the ego is called into operation and developed by the life instinct. The way in which this is achieved is through its earliest object relations. The breast, on which the life and death instincts are projected, is the first object which by introjection is internalized. In this way both instincts find an object to which they attach themselves and thereby by projection and reintroduction the ego is enriched as well as strengthened (1958, p. 245).

Klein made the point that Freud had stated that the ego is enriched by the id, neglecting the way that the ego is also nourished through relationships.

Klein based her theory on the fears of annihilation which exist in the infant because of the operation of the death instinct. She saw aggression as innate and attributable to the death instinct, as Freud did. According to this view, aggression would occur even in the absence of frustration and bad experiences only activate a tendency towards destructiveness which is already present in latent form.

Klein believed that both splitting and integration are processes that go on from the beginning of life.

In my view, the splitting of the ego, by which the super-ego is formed, comes about as a consequence of conflict in the ego, engendered by the polarity of the two instincts. This conflict is increased by their projection as well as by the resulting introjection of good and bad objects (1958, p. 240).

In other words, it is because of the two conflicting drives that the infant has no choice but to divide the world into good and bad.

The infant first introjects the good object which becomes the foundation of ego structure and organization. The internalized good object becomes the core of the ego, around which it expands and develops, eventually becoming able to master anxiety. The internal world is gradually built up around fantasied good and bad objects and the ego's relationship to them.

The child experiences his own aggression and destructiveness as a threat to his own existence, and so he projects it onto the outside world, i.e., he experiences the objects around him as bad or destructive. The mother's breast is felt to be good (idealized) or bad (persecutory), depending upon the child's current experience. Once the destructive impulse is projected onto an external object, however, it becomes transformed into a fear of an uncontrollable destructive object. This object is then introjected in order to control it. This leaves only momentary respite, if that, because the child then fears internal persecutors and the fear of destruction from within is reinforced.

The destructive impulse is controlled because it has been changed into a bad object whose existence is denied, split off and alternately projected and introjected. Defenses such as these (denial, splitting, introjection and projection) are erected by the ego in the service of the life instinct as the infant constantly strives to retain good objects, to eliminate bad ones, and not to be overwhelmed by fears of annihilation. This is what Klein originally called the paranoid position, which is characterized by pervasive splitting. The main anxiety

of this stage is the fear that persecutory objects will get inside and overwhelm the ego.

The following quote demonstrates Klein's conception of the internal world as having varying degrees of permeability between compartmentalized sections:

Normally, no splitting is absolute, any more than repression is absolute. The conscious and unconscious parts of the ego therefore are not separated by a rigid barrier; as Freud described it, in speaking of different areas of the mind, they are shaded off into each other. When, however, there is a very rigid barrier produced by splitting, the implication is that development has not proceeded normally. The conclusion would be that the death instinct is dominant. On the other hand, when the life instinct is in the ascendant, integration and synthesis can successfully progress. The nature of splitting determines the nature of repression. If splitting processes are not excessive, the conscious and unconscious remain permeable to one another (1958, p. 244).

Throughout her work Klein speaks about the internal world as explaining or causing the individual's growth, behavior and experience, seeing these observable phenomena as the result of the interplay between internal forces. For example,

I have recently put forward the hypothesis that it is essential for normal development that a division between the good and bad object, between love and hate, should take place in earliest infancy. When such a division is not too severe, and yet sufficient to differentiate between good and bad, it forms in my view one of the basic elements for stability and mental health (1958, p. 242).

People who are on the whole stable--and that means they have firmly established their good object and therefore are closely identified with it--can overcome the intrusion of the deeper unconscious into their ego and regain their stability. In neurotic, and still more in psychotic individuals, the struggle against such dangers threatening from the deep layers of the unconscious is to some extent constant and part of their instability or their illness (p. 243).

Though the rejected aspects of the self and of internalized objects contribute to instability, they are also at the source of inspiration in artistic productions and in various intellectual activities (p. 245).

Thus Klein went into explicit detail about how the psychic apparatus develops and differentiates. Her contribution was to focus on the role of relationships to external and internal objects rather than on drives, as Freud did.

The analysis of very young children has taught me that there is no instinctual urge, no anxiety situation, no mental process which does not involve objects, external or internal; in other words, object-relations are at the centre of emotional life (1952, p. 53).

Although revolutionary, this was only a beginning step in the object relations literature, because of her maintenance of the pleasure principle and her view that relationships are motivated by and based upon instincts. "If, however, Freud's conception of the two instincts is taken to its ultimate conclusion, the interaction of the life and death instincts will be seen to govern the whole of mental life" (1958, p. 245).

If we examine the way Klein wrote about development, we find that she sometimes referred to internal substances as agents, as she frequently did in the above quotations, but at other times, she referred to the person as agent. Klein seems to see no incongruity between these two approaches, apparently believing that it is logical to alternate between the person as originator of action and an internal mechanism as initiator. This is a theme that recurs throughout the psychoanalytic object relations literature. Thus the dual nature of psychoanalysis

between the mechanistic and the humanistic is carried over into object relations theory.

Klein also maintained a differentiation Freud made between the ego and the self. In the following quote, the self may be thought of as the person.

The ego, according to Freud, is the organized part of the self, constantly influenced by instinctual impulses, but keeping them under control by repression; furthermore it directs all activities and establishes and maintains the relation to the external world. The self is used to cover the whole of personality, which includes not only the ego but the instinctual life which Freud called the id (1959, p. 249).

Another incongruity in Klein is that she sometimes writes about these internal processes as if they are real, and sometimes as if they are fantasies. At one point she said,

The processes I have described are, of course, bound up with the infant's phantasy-life; and the anxieties which stimulate the mechanism of splitting are also of a phantastic nature. It is in phantasy that the infant splits the object and the self, but the effect of this phantasy is a very real one, because it leads to feelings and relations (and later on, thought processes) being in fact cut off from one another (1946, p. 6).

First of all, her thinking is confounded by the assumption that there are real substances called feelings, internal object relations and thought processes which may be cut off from one another and kept separate. But another objection even more clearly reveals her reasoning to be illogical. Klein said that the ego develops around the good internalized object. Does this mean that the ego is a fantasy as well? There is nothing in Klein's writing to suggest that she believes it is. In fact, she implies that the ego actually splits and fragments. Yet

how can a real structure develop out of a fantasy? And, on the other hand, if the ego is also a fantasy, how can a fantasy have a fantasy or do something in fantasy (i.e., fantasize)? Obviously neither position is tenable. We are faced with the equivalent of the Cartesian mind-body dualism and the question of how something real or substantive interacts with something unreal, spiritual or "phantastic in nature."

Klein further stated,

I believe that the ego is incapable of splitting the object--internal and external--without a corresponding splitting taking place within the ego. Therefore the fantasies and feelings about the state of the internal object vitally influence the structure of the ego. The more sadism prevails in the process of incorporating the object, and the more the object is felt to be in pieces, the more the ego is in danger of being split in relation to the internalized object fragments (1946, p. 6).

And,

Omnipotent denial of the existence of the bad object and of the painful situation is in the unconscious equal to annihilation by the destructive impulse. It is, however, not only a situation and an object that are denied and annihilated--it is an object relation which suffers this fate; and therefore a part of the ego, from which the feeling towards the object emanate, is denied and annihilated as well (1946, p. 7).

All these quotes suggest the same logical problem to which Klein provides no answer. There is no way to explain how fantasied structures and processes interact with endopsychic structure. As will be seen, Fairbairn also criticized Klein for never specifying how fantasies provide the substance for internal structure (Fairbairn, 1949, p. 154). His resolution, however, was to conclude that the objects, the splitting, the introjection, etc., must also be real. An alternative view is that the ego, the id, the drives and the other inhabitants of the

internal world are all fantasies, too. In this case they would be fantasies of the theorists doing the writing, which is Schafer's contention.

The clinical implications of Klein's theory are significant. Freud traced behavior to the vicissitudes of the drives and impulses, in which relationships with other people only occur because one depends upon others for gratification of oral and sexual impulses as well as for survival and for the release of tension. Klein saw the instincts as expressing themselves in and through objects in the environment, and as being struggled with only through objects. Her continuity with psychoanalysis involves her maintenance of Freud's metapsychology and his model of the mind to elucidate and explain behavior. Her theories are also based upon the spatial metaphor, whether internal objects are considered as fantasies or not.

Guntrip described Klein's departure from Freud as follows:

The unconscious has been reinterpreted, described no longer biologically in terms of a seething cauldron of id drives, but psychologically as an internal world of ego-object relationships. Thus by projection and introjection human beings live in two worlds at once, the inner mental world and the external material world, and constantly confuse the two together (1974, p. 830).

Guntrip further stated that Klein's work was a development of the personal element of Freud's superego concept--i.e., the superego as an internalized object which relates to the ego as the parent did. He believed that Klein underestimated the extent to which she differed from Freud and failed to see that the implications of her work would demand a complete redevelopment of ego psychology.

Klein also postulated a new stage of development, the depressive position, which occurs towards the end of the child's first year. At this stage the child merges the split loved and hated object, replaces splitting with repression, and becomes depressed realizing that the good and bad object are really one and the same person. For Klein this process is essential for normal development and allows the child to integrate his/her inner world and his/her experience of self and other people. It is a prerequisite for satisfactory object relations.

The point, however, is that as long as the unconscious, the drives, internal structure, etc., are the basis for theory, the nature and language of the theory are essentially Freudian.

Otto Kernberg

Otto Kernberg based much of his work on that of Melanie Klein and W. R. D. Fairbairn in England and Edith Jacobson in the United States (Kernberg, 1966). He agreed with Fairbairn's criticism of Klein to the effect that she never explained how fantasies of incorporating objects orally gives rise to the establishment of endopsychic structures. He also felt that the models proposed by both Fairbairn and Klein oversimplify the structural development of internalized object relations; for example, he agrees with Jacobson's criticism that Klein failed to differentiate between self-images and object-images in her concept of internal objects. At the same time Kernberg feels that Klein posited highly complex psychic structures too early in development, whereas the various structures he proposes develop gradually over the first few years of life (Kernberg, 1976).

From these few introductory comments, it already becomes apparent that Kernberg has adopted the same model as the one used by Freud and Klein. The spatial metaphor and corresponding structures, processes and energies are quite obvious in Kernberg's formulations. Despite a number of technical disagreements, such as those just described, he agrees with Freud's dual instinct theory, "namely the theory of libido and aggression as the two major instincts" (Kernberg, 1976, p. 117), and he sees these instincts as motivators in their own right. "Libido and aggression arise out of the undifferentiated matrix common to the ego and id" (p. 119). Thus, though he rejected Freud's and Klein's use of the term "instinct," he retained the drive concept as a central mechanism in development.

Kernberg himself acknowledges the basis of this theory in psychoanalysis. His contribution has been to further elucidate the processes in the first years of life, building on what Klein began. He showed how the ego and other internal structures consolidate and develop, and he examined in further detail the effect of object relations on these processes. Like Klein, Kernberg focused upon splitting of the ego, which, according to him, occurs in the first year of life and, in normal development, is later largely replaced by repression. His assertion that there is more to splitting than mere splitting of the ego, directly follows from Klein's belief that, when splitting occurs, an entire object relation is split.

According to Kernberg, if splitting rather than repression continues to dominate, as it does in pathological development, the split

becomes a stable structure which accounts for ego weaknesses seen in such patients as borderline and narcissistic character disorders. He used and extended the concepts introduced by others, notably Freud and Klein, to account for a completely different patient population than Freud did.

In order to demonstrate these points, excerpts will be taken from the first three chapters of his second book, Object Relations Theory and Clinical Psychoanalysis. This is his most recent book and provides an integration and overview of his theory. Before presenting some rather extensive quotations, the essentials of his developmental theory will be summarized briefly. Terms in the chart on page 59, taken from the quotes to follow, show clearly how all of Kernberg's constructs flow from Freud and Klein.

In Kernberg's view the earliest images of the world contain object-images and self-images that are not differentiated from one another. Each such self-object image is attached to a "valence" of positive or negative feeling, also called affective coloring. We then have a good self-object representation and a bad self-object representation. Gradually self- and object-images are differentiated, but those of opposite valences are kept separate from each other (split). The result of this is the existence of good self-representations, bad self-representations, good object-representations and bad object-representations. At first the bad tends to be projected out, and the good retained; but in the next stage all images of the self, good and bad, are consolidated, and all images of the other, good and bad, are

consolidated. Splitting decreases and is largely replaced by repression. These refinements are said to help develop and integrate such ego functions as memory and perception.

The most mature level of ego development involves ego identity, in which, to use Kernberg's terms, the internal world is depersonalized as the internal objects are metabolized; functions and structures become autonomous, and more primitive remnants of earlier stages are repressed. Interestingly, Kernberg speaks of the id only coming into existence at this point, because without repression there is no real differentiation between ego and id. This is in contrast to Freud, who saw the ego developing later out of the id.

In psychopathology, the individual is fixated at one of these developmental stages. The psychotic is seen as having an undifferentiated self-object image, which accounts for his inability to distinguish inner and outer reality. The narcissistic and borderline personality disorders have maintained splitting of the differentiated good and bad self- and object-images.

Following is Kernberg's complex description of the developmental process. He divides the development of object relations into five stages.

Stage 1: Normal 'Autism' or Primary Undifferentiated Stage:
The earliest stage of development precedes the consolidation of the 'good' undifferentiated self-object constellation built up under the influence of pleasurable, gratifying experiences of the infant in interaction with his mother. This phase covers the first month of life. . . . Throughout this stage there is a gradual buildup of the normal, primary, undifferentiated self-object representation (Kernberg, 1976, pp. 59-60).

Throughout his theory of development, Kernberg continues to focus upon the development and integration of structures and processes in the internal world, as he does here.

Simultaneously with the development of this 'good' self-object representation, another primary, undifferentiated self-object representation is formed, integrating experiences of a frustrating, painful affective tone. It needs to be stressed that the 'good' and 'bad' primary intrapsychic structures are organized separately under different affective circumstances, determining two separate constellations of 'affective memory'. . . .

Stage 2: 'Normal Symbiosis' or Stage of the Primary Undifferentiated Self-Object Representations. The consolidation of the pleasurable or rewarding 'good' self-object image signals the beginning of this stage, which extends from the second month of life to somewhere between the sixth and eighth months of age. This is the basic 'good' self-object constellation, which will become the nucleus of the self system of the ego and the basic organizer of integrative functions of the early ego. . . . Stage 2 in the development of object relations comes to an end when the self-image and the object-image have been differentiated in a stable way within the core 'good' self-object representation (pp. 60-1).

Notice how in the following paragraph Kernberg indicates that the developmental changes occur because of these internal, structural object representational changes.

As a consequence of these processes, the following developments would take place: (1) increased arousal and general alertness would lower perception thresholds and facilitate the infant's perception of touch, smell, and of those intraceptive and proprioceptive sensations included in the nonspecific or 'coenesthetic' constellation of stimulus modalities; arousal would also increase the scanning of the environment and 'external perception'; (2) the activation of inborn attachment patterns (including crying) would, in an average, expectable environment, bring about mothering behavior, which in turn would provide, in addition to food intake and its direct physiological changes, a crucial sensorial enrichment and modification of the sensory input; and (3) all the information contained in the various components mentioned so far would be stored in the infant as its total perceived situation, presumably in the form of primitive 'affective memory' (p. 62).

Continuing with Stage 2,

Later, efforts are made to 'expel' the 'bad' self-object experience, while the 'good' self-object representation becomes the nucleus of the ego. The expelling of the 'bad' self-object representation to the 'periphery' of psychic experience originates a motivated conception of the 'out there,' but, as a more realistic exploration and perception of the external environment occurs in the context of self-object differentiation in the 'good' self-object realm, the 'bad' nucleus of self-experience is ascribed to 'uncanny,' disturbing, or frightening experiences and is subject to later projective mechanisms

Stage 3: Differentiation of Self- from Object-Representations. This stage begins with the completion of the differentiation of the self-representation from the object-representation within the core 'good' self-object representation, and includes the later differentiation of self- from object-representation within the core 'bad' self-object representation. It ends with the eventual integration of 'good' and 'bad' self-representations into an integrated self-concept, and the integration of 'good' and 'bad' self-representations into 'total' object-representations, that is, the achievement of object constancy. This stage begins between the sixth and eighth month of life and reaches completion between the eighteenth and thirty-sixth months (p. 64).

Kernberg has not yet focused on the infant or what he does, nor what the parent does, even when the mother-child interaction was mentioned in passing, above. Kernberg's description of these developments has the same biological-mechanical element that Freud's description of the growth of the ego and its functions had. The implication here is that whatever the child does is a result of these processes. This focus continues through the next two stages.

Stage 4: Integration of Self-Representations and Object-Representations and Development of Higher Level Intrapsychic Object Relations-Derived Structures. This stage begins in the latter part of the third year of life and lasts through the entire Oedipal period. It is characterized by the integration of libidinally invested and aggressively invested object-images into 'total' object representations. Ego, super-ego, and id, as definite, overall, intrapsychic structures are consolidated in this phase (p. 67).

I have suggested that all these integrative processes reduce the utilization of splitting mechanisms and that, some time in the third year of life, repression . . . becomes the main defensive operation of the ego. Insofar as the operation of repression now separates id from ego, one might say that the id as a psychic structure comes into existence only at this point. This formulation implies the differentiation of the id out of a common matrix from which ego and id develop; the id now integrates functions which previously existed 'separately' or, rather, as part of early, mutually dissociated or split systems of internalized object-relations. Thus, primitive aggressive and libidinal drive derivatives or their respective affective states have access to consciousness before the integration of the id (pp. 67-9).

Again, it is the id that is seen as integrating, the ego that splits or represses. Lastly, "Stage 5: Consolidation of Superego and Ego Integration. Stage 5 begins with the completion of the integration of all levels of the superego" (p. 72).

Kernberg, unlike Klein, sees introjection as an actual process, which he differentiates from the fantasy of incorporation.

Introjection is the earliest, most primitive, and basic level in the organization of internalization processes. It is the reproduction and fixation of an interaction with the environment by means of an organized cluster of memory traces implying at least three components: (i) the image of an object, (ii) the image of the self in interaction with that object, and (iii) the affective coloring of both the object-image and the self-image under the influence of the drive representative present at the time of the interaction. This process is a mechanism of growth of the psychic apparatus (p. 29).

Following Erikson (1956) I considered introjection, identification and ego identity as a progressive sequence of such internalization processes. . . . (Incorporation refers to the orally determined content of primitive fantasy formation implied in early introjections, but not to a specific process and structure in itself) (pp. 75-6).

If the above statements sound highly complex and technical, one should be aware that these excerpts provide only a few condensed

examples of Kernberg's formulations. This observation may recall Meissner's assertion that we need only to further explicate the processes by which internal structure develops, and of what substances it is composed, in order to complete a coherent object-relations theory. One might reply that if, after all of Kernberg's elaborate suppositions, this goal still has not been achieved (and by Meissner's own admission, it has not) it probably never will be, at least not by pursuing this line of theorizing.

It may also be noted that Kernberg utilizes a number of the interchangeable, vague terms which may be used to replace Meissner's 'structure' and 'organization'--e.g., matrix, constellation, nucleus, representation. These all, once again, imply substantive meaning without adding any significant information.

To return to the original discussion, the following two statements support the view that Kernberg uses the internal world as an explanation for behavior and experience. "Basic trust ultimately derives from the first internalization of a gratifying, reliable mother representation in relation to a loving, gratified self-representation" (p. 73), and "the internal world not only shapes the perception of the external one, but influences by means of the character structure, the individual's personal field" (p. 75).

Throughout Kernberg's writings, the model of Newtonian forces operating in psychic space is evident. Internalized objects are spoken of as entities which are "digested" into the fabric of the personality in health, or maintained in a primitive unmetabolized state in

pathology or early development. Drives and affects are referred to as if they were energy charges attached to structures that may be linked together or split apart. Freud's tripartite psychic structure is maintained, as is the natural science model and its internal structures, processes and energies in continual flux within the person, and between the internal and external worlds.

Heinz Kohut

This discussion will be based on the first three chapters of Kohut's first book, The Analysis of the Self (1971), in which he defines terms and summarizes his developmental theory, and on Chapter 5 of his second book, The Restoration of the Self (1977), in which he explicates the differences between his theory and traditional psychoanalysis. It will be demonstrated that, while Kohut attempts to move beyond traditional psychoanalysis, he remains immersed in the spatial psychic metaphors described above.

Kohut agrees with Freud's model of the ego, superego and id, but states that a "psychology of the self" is necessary in addition to it, in order to account for another type of pathology seen in clients that were not helped by traditional psychoanalysis. Like Kernberg, he is attempting to deal with a class of patients which Freud did not, and both see these patients as developmentally earlier: pre-oedipal. Kohut postulates two different types of pathology: 1) the typical neurosis that Freud described, and 2) disturbances of the self. His contribution is the "psychology of the self," an attempted answer to the

question of "how the theoretical framework of psychoanalysis can be reshaped to accommodate the diverse phenomena we observe today with regard to the self" (1971, p. xv).

Kohut's self psychology focuses on the problems of a self struggling to maintain cohesion, motivated by disintegration anxiety, as opposed to Freud's model of a psychic apparatus trying to deal with drives and structural conflict, motivated by castration anxiety. Kohut emphasized, especially in his second book, that, using the "principle of complementarity," which states that explanation of the psychological field may require more than one theoretical framework, Freud's original formulation in terms of forces (drives), counterforces (defenses) and the interaction of forces within a hypothetical space, can be maintained.

However, this

classical theory of drives and objects . . . falls short in providing an adequate framework for some of the most important experiences of man, those that relate to the development of the self and its vicissitudes. . . . These theories fail to do justice to the experiences that relate to the crucially important striving of the nuclear self, once it is laid down, to express its basic patterns (1977, pp. 223-224).

A similarity between this and Freud's approach is immediately evident, since Kohut is portraying the self as an agent. In the quote above, it is apparently the self that is seen as striving to express its basic patterns, not the person. It appears that Kohut wanted to achieve a more personal, phenomenological view but was unable to get rid of the reified metaphor of an internal agent. Just as Freud wrote of the ego striving to compromise between the demands of the id, the

superego and reality, Kohut writes of the self striving to build and maintain cohesion.

Integrating traditional psychoanalysis with self psychology, Kohut states that the presence of a firm, cohesive self is a precondition for Freud's Oedipus complex to occur. He wishes to enrich classical theory by adding a self-psychological dimension.

The (sexual and destructive) id and the (inhibiting-prohibiting) superego are constituents of the mental apparatus of Guilty Man. . . . The conceptualizations of mental-apparatus psychology are adequate in explaining structural neurosis and guilt-depression--in short, the psychic disturbances and conflicts of Guilty Man. The psychology of the self is needed to explain the pathology of the fragmented self (from schizophrenia to narcissistic personality disorder) and of the depleted self (empty depression), i.e., the world of unmirrored ambitions, the world devoid of ideals)--in short, the psychic disturbances of Tragic Man (1977, p. 243).

Kohut, like the other theorists, assumes the need for explanation, referring at one point to "the two-step procedure--understanding-explaining--that characterize depth psychology" (1971, p. 142). He expressed the hope that his own theory will be evaluated on its own merits as an explanatory system, despite the fact that it could be interpreted as a challenge to traditional psychoanalysis.

The confusion in Kohut's formulation is evident when he attempts to define what he means by the self. The psychology of the self, he states, "requires two approaches: a psychology in which the self is seen as the center of the psychological universe, and a psychology in which the self is seen as a content of the mental apparatus" (1971, p. xv). The latter, considered to be the narrower sense, views the self as a structure within the mental apparatus, which develops early

in life and is a vitally important mechanism for the regulation of self esteem, goals, ambitions and creativity. The former sense, where the self is seen as the "center of the psychological universe," is an attempt to put the person into the apparatus.

Thus, in trying to move towards a less mechanistic view of the person, the nearest Kohut achieved is to speak of the self as representing the "whole psychic apparatus" and everything else that makes up the person. This is identical with the way both Freud and Klein described the concept of a self (see quote, page 75). Thus Kohut's theory is equally inconsistent, with the two elements--the personal and the mechanistic--explicitly delineated within it.

Continuing to define the self, Kohut said it

is a structure of the mind since, (a) it is cathected with instinctual energy and (b) it has continuity over time, i.e., it is enduring. Being a psychic structure, the self has, furthermore, also a psychic location. To be more specific, various--and frequently inconsistent--self-representations are present not only in the id, the ego, and the superego, but also within a single agency of the mind. There may, for example, exist contradictory conscious and preconscious self-representations--e.g., of grandiosity and inferiority--side by side, occupying either delimited loci within the realm of the ego or sectorial portions of that realm of the psyche in which the id and ego form a continuum. The self, then, quite analogous to the representations of objects, is a content of the mental apparatus but is not one of its constituents--i.e., not one of the agencies of the mind (1971, p. xv).

Here Kohut demonstrates his retention of Freud's energetic concept of libido, as well as the spatial metaphor with a frank description of location within the psychic space. The conceptual confusion of regarding the self as the "center of its psychological universe" while also referring to isolated self-representations within "agencies of the

mind" is seen by Schafer as a result of Kohut's attempt to inject a phenomenological concept into the natural science model. While the concept of a holistic self might imply a move beyond the anthropomorphism of psychoanalysis, there is an obvious reluctance to challenge Freud's theory. In Schafer's words,

The formulations regarding the narcissistic self overlap and are confused with elements of the tripartite structure. It suffers from an inherent ambiguity which results from the attempt to mix a phenomenological . . . concept with the traditional structural-energetic metapsychological entities. It represents an attempt to fashion a compromise model within which the components of psychodynamics and a structuralized theory can find meaningful integration with more subjective and experiential accounts (Schafer, 1976, p. 116).

It is interesting to note that Kohut even feels comfortable attributing the capacity for choice to the self. When the self develops properly, it becomes "a center of initiative: a unit that tries to follow its own course" (1971, p. 142).

We will now turn to Kohut's theory of the development of the self. He stated that the crucial theoretical concept in his framework is the self-object, which is defined as an object which is experienced as a part of the self.

The small child, for example, invests other people with narcissistic cathexis and thus experiences them narcissistically, i.e., as self-objects. The expected control over such (self-object) others is then closer to the concept of control which a grownup expects to have over his own body and mind than to the concept of control which he expects to have over others (1971, p. 26).

Like Kernberg, Kohut sees development progressing as unrealistic, infantile internal objects develop into realistic, integrated images of the self and others, and then into mature, healthy functions, as the

child interacts with his environment. Both focus upon the internal world of structure to account for developmental stages. Kohut summarizes his version of the process as follows:

The equilibrium of primary narcissism is disturbed by the unavoidable shortcomings of maternal care, but the child replaces the previous perfection (a) by establishing a grandiose and exhibitionistic image of the self: the grandiose self; and (b) by giving over the previous perfection to an admired, omnipotent (transitional) self-object: the idealized parent imago (1971, p. 25).

The term grandiose self will be used henceforth in the present work . . . to designate the grandiose and exhibitionistic structure which is the counterpart of the idealized parent imago. . . . Under optimal developmental conditions, the exhibitionism and grandiosity of the archaic grandiose self are gradually tamed, and the whole structure ultimately becomes integrated into the adult personality and supplies the instinctual fuel for our ego-syntonic ambitions and purposes, for the enjoyment of our activities, and for important aspects of our self-esteem. And under similarly favorable circumstances, the idealized parent imago, too, becomes integrated into the adult personality. Introjected as our idealized superego, it becomes an important component of our psychic organization by holding up to us the guiding leadership of its ideals . . . If the child, however, suffers severe narcissistic traumas, then the grandiose self does not merge into the relevant ego content but is retained in its unaltered form and strives for the fulfillment of its narcissistic aims. And if the child experiences traumatic disappointments in the admired adult, then the idealized parent imago, too, is retained in its unaltered form, is not transformed into tension-regulating psychic structure, does not attain the status of an accessible introject, but remains an archaic, transitional self-object that is required for the maintenance of narcissistic homeostasis (pp. 27-8).

In addition, both Kernberg and Kohut see psychopathology as caused by the individual's having maintained archaic internal structures into adulthood. If introjected structures have not been integrated, they determine later behavior, such as one's ability to regulate tension within oneself, strive for realistic goals, perceive other people and their individual needs, etc.

Focusing on patients with what he calls narcissistic personality disorders, Kohut summarizes their pathology as follows:

These patients are suffering from specific disturbances in the realm of the self and of those archaic objects cathected with narcissistic libido (self-objects) which are still in intimate connection with the archaic self (i.e., objects which are not experienced as separate and independent of the self). . . . we can say these patients remained fixated on archaic grandiose self configurations and/or on archaic, overestimated, narcissistically cathected objects. The fact that these archaic configurations have not become integrated with the rest of the personality has two major consequences: (a) the adult personality and its mature functions are impoverished, because they are deprived of the energies that are invested in the ancient structures; and/or (b) the adult, realistic activities of these patients are hampered by the breakthrough and intrusion of the archaic structures and of their archaic claims. The pathogenic effect of the investment of these archaic configurations is, in other words, in certain respects analogous to that exerted by the instinctual investment of unconscious repressed incestuous objects in the classical transference neurosis (1971, pp. 3-4).

Kohut believes that in analysis, the client can regress, activating archaic forms of object relations, with a corresponding transference manifestation,

which consists of the amalgamation of unconscious narcissistic structures (the idealized parent imago and the grandiose self) with the psychic representation of the analyst which becomes drawn into the therapeutically activated, narcissistically cathected structures. The most far-reaching regressions, as was pointed out earlier, lead to the activation of experiences of isolated fragments of the body-mind-self and its functions and to the breakup and loss of the archaic narcissistically cathected objects. This stage of the fragmented self corresponds to the developmental phase to which Freud (1914) referred as the stage of autoeroticism.

Kernberg likewise believes that certain primitive structural elements in the patient's psyche are activated in the transference to permit a re-experiencing of primitive states and an eventual

reorganization of the psychic structure through therapy. Kohut has a specific term for the process by which internal structure is transformed in interaction with the world. He calls the process "transmuting internalization," and believes that, if it does not occur during the first few years of life as it should, it can occur during analysis and effect a cure. His description of the process is detailed in the following quote.

The relationship between the formation of psychic structure and the withdrawal of object-instinctual and narcissistic cathexes from object imagoes is demonstrated best by pointing out the following three factors which play an important role in the process of structure formation--one that I should like to call transmuting internalization.

1. The psychic apparatus must be ready for the formation of the structure, i.e., the psyche must have reached a maturationally preformed receptivity for specific introjects. . . .

2. Preceding the withdrawal of the cathexis from the object there is a breaking up of those aspects of the object imago that are being internalized. This breaking up is of great psychoeconomic importance; it constitutes the metapsychological substance of what, in a term that is closer to empathically or introspectively observable experience, is referred to as optimal frustration. The essentials of the process of fractionized withdrawal of cathexes from objects were, of course, first established by Freud (1917a) in the metapsychological description of the work of mourning. Expressed concretely, the withdrawal of narcissistic cathexes takes place in a fractionated way if the child can experience disappointments with one idealized aspect or quality of the object after another; transmuting internalization is prevented, however, if, for example, the disappointment in the perfection of the object concerns the total object, e.g., when the child suddenly recognizes that the omnipotent object is powerless.

3. In addition to the just-mentioned breaking up of specific aspects of the object imago there takes place, in the process of effective internalization (i.e., of internalization which leads to the formation of psychic structure), a depersonalizing of the introjected aspects of the image of the object, mainly in the form of a shift of emphasis from the total human context of the personality of the object to certain of its

specific functions. The internal structure, in other words, now performs the functions which the object used to perform for the child--the well-functioning structure, however, has largely been divested of the personality features of the object. Imperfections in this part of the process are well known; the superego, for example, usually shows traces of some of the human features of the oedipal object, and the drive-controlling basic fabric of the psyche may work with specific personalized methods of threat and seduction which are directly derived from characteristics of preoedipal objects and from their specific attitude toward the child's drives (pp. 49-50).

It should be clear from the above excerpts that Kohut retains the theoretical boundary between the internal and the external which is assumed to exist in the natural science model. Two points should be added for the sake of completeness. First of all, Kohut postulated two types of splitting: vertical and horizontal splitting. Horizontal splitting corresponds to the repression barrier between conscious and unconscious; vertical splitting is analogous to splitting as used by Kernberg, as a disavowed, denied sector of the ego which coexists with what Kohut calls a reality ego. Secondly, although Kohut de-emphasizes aggression by comparison to the previously discussed theorists, he does retain the concept of the aggressive drive, referring to such concepts as neutralized and unneutralized aggression being directed towards objects or the self.

His view of sexual and aggressive drives in the context of the broader meaning of the self is that drives do not exist by themselves, but only in the context of object relationships.

I am certain that, at least in some significant and important instances, aggression cannot be drained like an abscess or discharged like a man's semen in intercourse. . . . We come nearer to conceptual clarity . . . when we shift our focus from the processing of a drive via a mental apparatus to the ideal of the relation between the self and self-object (1977, pp. 129-30).

In other words, instead of the aggression being stored up, what is retained is an internal object relation based upon rage and frustration: a structure. Although this is a different way to conceptualize the apparent maintenance (fixation) of anger over time, it does not do away with the appeal to internal object relationships to account for the phenomenon. And he equivocates even in making this step, by the use of the phrase, "at least in some significant and important instances." As was seen above, he retains Freud's original concepts of drives in regard to some aspects of development, such as in the formation of the tripartite id-ego-superego structure and the economic theory by which Freud said they develop. Overall it appears that Kohut's formulations are muddled by his attempts to introduce many new perspectives without committing himself to discarding old ones.

While the structural model is essentially the same, however, we would be selling Kohut short if we did not point out that he posited some novel aspects of child development. As with the other theorists discussed here, the unique part of his contribution exists on the personal, humanistic side of his theory. He originated such notions as the growing child's need for mirroring and appreciation by an empathic parent, if he is to develop into a healthy, self-confident adult. Kohut also postulated that "healthy object relations" can only occur through gradual disillusionment with the idealized parent, as opposed to traumatic disappointment or loss.

If one eliminates the intricate model of the internal world and translates the metaphors into what they mean in terms of the interaction

between parent and child, Kohut's theory does have some new ideas to offer. The problem is that these meanings are continually interspersed with their supposed structural counterparts, largely because the theory is considered to be incomplete without them. Again, the similarity in all these theories is the intrapsychic component which they all believe to be necessary. The following quote, which will end the section on Kohut, is typical of this pattern.

In the specific case of the traumatic loss of the idealized parent imago (loss of the idealized self-object or disappointment in it) up to and including the oedipal phase, the results are disturbances in specific narcissistic sectors of the personality. Under optimal circumstances the child experiences gradual disappointment in the idealized object--or, expressed differently: the child's evaluation of the idealized object becomes increasingly realistic--which leads to a withdrawal of the narcissistic cathexes from the imago of the idealized self-object and to their gradual (or, in the oedipal period, massive by phase-appropriate) internalization, i.e., to the acquisition of permanent psychological structures which continue, endopsychically, the functions which the idealized self-object had previously fulfilled. If the child suffers the traumatic loss of the idealized object, however, or a traumatic (severe and sudden, or not phase-appropriate) disappointment in it, then optimal internalization does not take place. The child does not acquire the needed internal structure, his psyche remains fixated on an archaic self-object, and the personality will throughout life be dependent on certain objects in what seems to be an intense form of object hunger. The intensity of the search for and of the dependency on these objects is due to the fact that they are striven for as a substitute for the missing segments of the psychic structure. They are not objects (in the psychological sense of the term) since they are not loved or admired for their attributes, and the actual features of their personalities, and their actions, are only dimly recognized. They are not longed for but are needed in order to replace the function of a segment of the mental apparatus which had not been established in childhood (pp. 45-6).

Passages like this would be incomprehensible to anyone unfamiliar with the literature. This idea recalls Kuhn's statement about the way

the use of a paradigm leads to increasingly more technical jargon which effectively prevents any layman from following progress in the field. Those in the field understand what is meant here, finding it exciting and stimulating, only because, it would seem, they automatically translate the technical language into what it means in plain English. Everything said in jargon could be explained to a naive listener by translating it into what is meant in terms of what people do and what happens between them. This suggests that, despite practitioners' reluctance to give up the appearance of deep and scientific understanding, the jargon is unnecessary and could be dispensed with.

W. R. D. Fairbairn

The works of Fairbairn which will be examined here are two. The first is his 1949 article, "Steps in the development of an object-relations theory of personality." It is one of his last writings and, in it, he summarized his beliefs and clarified the differences he saw between himself and Freud. The second is the 1946 article, "Object relationships and dynamic structure." This was chosen because its aim was "to give some general account of the special point of view which I have now come to adopt, and which was developed in a series of papers published during the 1939-45 war" (1946, p. 13).

Fairbairn's central disagreement with Freud involves the latter's seeing libido as primarily pleasure-seeking. Freud saw the main aim of the organism as being the satisfaction of oral and sexual drives, the striving for pleasure, which was seen as tension-reduction. This is

the pleasure principle. For Freud, object relationships were a byproduct of the satisfaction of needs. But Fairbairn saw the main aim of libido to be the seeking out of objects--i.e., human relationships--in the environment.

For Fairbairn, the primary need of the infant is that of being valued and enjoyed by the mother. Psychopathology--and the development of internal structure--comes into existence when she fails to provide the experience of being loved for his own sake, as a person in his own right. When such a failure occurs, the external object (mother) is internalized, split and established as a structure within the psyche; the ego and its relation to the object is also split. Fairbairn specified that the bad aspects of this object are split into exciting and rejecting aspects (the exciting object and the rejecting object) with the accompanying libidinal ego (which relates to the exciting object) and the antilibidinal ego (which relates to the rejecting object). The antilibidinal ego, which embodies all the rage associated with frustration persecutes and helps repress both the libidinal ego (which contains all the neediness) and the exciting object. The part of the object that is left over from these splits becomes the ideal object, and the part of the ego that is left becomes the central ego, and these relate to each other. The ideal object becomes the ego ideal, and, later, with the antilibidinal ego and rejecting object, forms the basis of the superego.

The ego's ability to relate in a realistic way to the world and to external objects (i.e., people) is weakened if the antilibidinal ego

system is overdeveloped because of too much negative experience. In such a case, the ego becomes more invested in its relationships to inner objects than to external, real ones.

Psychology may be said to resolve itself into a study of the relationships of the individual to his objects, whilst in similar terms, psychopathology may be said to resolve itself more specifically into a study of the relationships of the ego to its internalized objects (Fairbairn, 1943, p. 60).

Fairbairn is the one who criticized Klein for never specifying how fantasies give rise to the establishment of internal structures. The tripartite splitting of the ego, with its concomitant splitting and internalization of the object, is his explanation.

. . . as it seems to me, Melanie Klein has never satisfactorily explained how phantasies of incorporating objects orally can give rise to the establishment of internal objects as endo-psychic structures--and, unless they are such structures, they cannot properly be spoken of as internal objects at all, since otherwise they will remain mere figments of fantasy (1949, p. 154).

Fairbairn used and built upon Klein's concept of multiple internal objects and fantasied object relations. But he broke away from classical drive theory, completely rejecting the psychoanalytic concepts of drives, impulses, the id or pure psychic energy. He asserted that no impulse can exist without the activation of the ego; i.e., a source of energy (such as an instinct) does not exist apart from structure (such as an ego or an internal object). Instead, he postulated the "principle of dynamic structure, in terms of which both structure divorced from energy and energy divorced from structure are meaningless concepts" (1946, p. 149).

The revised conception of the ego which arises at this point involves a reconsideration of the theory of repression. According to Freud, of course, repression was directed against

impulses, but in order to explain the mechanism of repression, he felt compelled to postulate the existence of a structure (the superego) capable of instigating repression. I was only taking another step in the same direction, therefore, when I postulated the existence of structures which are repressed--as I did in recording the conclusion that what are primarily repressed are internal bad objects. At the time when I took this step I considered that impulses also became subjected to repression in a secondary sense. After my adoption of a psychology of dynamic structure, however, this view could no longer be maintained; and I substituted the view that what became subjected to secondary repression was that part of the ego which was most closely involved in a relationship with repressed objects. This conception presents us with the phenomenon of a split in the ego characterized by the repression of one dynamic part of the ego by another dynamic, but more central, part of the ego (1949, p. 158).

Thus, for Fairbairn, only structures--egos or objects--can be repressed or split. And this only occurs as a result of negative experiences.

The similarity between Fairbairn's view and Kohut's can be seen here. Fairbairn took the step that Kohut did not, and stated that in no case does a pure impulse or drive ever exist. Here Fairbairn departed, not only from Freud, but also from Klein and Kernberg. Kernberg expressly disagrees with Fairbairn's "radical object relations theory," which, in Kernberg's view, denies the importance of the instincts in determining personality. In opposition to both Guntrip and Fairbairn, Kernberg sees no inconsistency between object relations theory and instinct theory (Kernberg, 1976, p. 119).

Returning now to Fairbairn's differences from Freud, who saw the ego developing later from the id, Fairbairn believed that the ego exists from birth, and that there is no id. For Fairbairn the ego starts out as a unitary structure which is object-seeking from the start. The pleasure principle, by which objects are of interest purely for the

instinctual gratifications they provide, only gains ascendancy when something goes wrong with the object relatedness of the child. Despite the fact that some ego-splitting is inevitable, the origin of psychopathology is seen in this splitting and the concomitant withdrawal from the outside world. Most importantly, rather than accepting the idea of a death instinct, Fairbairn believed that aggression only comes about as a reaction to the frustration of needs. Theoretically, if there were no frustration or unpleasant experiences, no aggression would occur.

The following quotations are Fairbairn's own descriptions of these processes. In the first, he describes his reconceptualization of the erotogenic zones as mediums through which the infant or adult relates to objects, rather than as the objects of interest in and of themselves, as Freud believed.

The real libidinal aim is the establishment of satisfactory relationships with objects, and it is accordingly the object that constitutes the true libidinal goal (1946, p. 138).

. . . libido is not primarily pleasure-seeking but object-seeking. This is a conclusion which I registered in a paper published in 1941, and to which I subsequently adhered. It is a conclusion which involves a modification of Freud's conception of erotogenic zones--a modification to the effect that these zones cannot properly be regarded as themselves the sources of pleasure-seeking aims, in the interest of which objects are more or less adventitiously exploited, but rather that they constitute channels adopted for the fulfillment of libidinal aims which have their source in the ego and are directed towards the establishment of satisfactory relationships with objects. . . . I also formulated the view that, with the two exceptions of schizophrenia and depression, the various classical psycho-analytic conditions represented, not fixations at specific libidinal phases, but specific techniques for regulating relationships with internal objects (1949, p. 155).

Thus, if someone is "fixated" at an oral level, this is seen as being stuck in a certain way of dealing with people, rather than as a fixation of instinctual energy at a given erotogenic zone.

The following is Fairbairn's description of the development of his tripartite splitting of the ego, described above. He states that the "incorporative attitude" by which the infant relates to his mother

manifests itself, not only in the ingestion of milk, but also in the psychological incorporation of representations of objects into the psychical structure. . . . It must suffice if I draw attention to the earliest developments which take place during this first stage, and which, in my opinion, include the following series of process: 1) The splitting of the internalized bad object into (a) an exciting object and (b) a rejecting object; 2) The repression of both these objects by the ego; 3) The splitting off and repression of parts of the ego which remain attached to the repressed objects and, so to speak, follow them into repression, and which I describe as respectively the libidinal ego and the internal saboteur; 4) A resulting situation, which I call the Basic Endopsychic Situation, and in which we find a Central Ego employing aggression in the exercise of Direct Repression (a) over the Libidinal Ego attached to an Exciting Object, and (b) over the Internal Saboteur attached to a Rejecting Object; 5) The operation of a process which I describe as Indirect Repression, and which consists in the exercise of aggression on the part of the internal saboteur, aligned with the rejecting object, against the libidinal ego, aligned with the exciting object. The outstanding feature of the basic endopsychic situation, to which I have so briefly referred, is that it is produced by means of a splitting of the ego and therefore involves the establishment of the Schizoid Position (1947, pp. 145-7).

This schizoid position entails a withdrawal from the world and from people, and is unavoidable to some degree in everyone, since no one can go through infancy without some frustration.

The changes that Fairbairn made have been viewed by many as quite revolutionary. Ernest Jones, in his brief forward to Fairbairn's book, said,

Fairbairn started at the center of the personality and described its strivings and difficulties in its endeavors to reach an object where it may find support--in contrast to Freud, who began with the stimulation of the nervous system and proceeded from the erogenous zones and internal tension from genetic activity. . . . This constitutes a fresh approach in psychoanalysis. . . (in Fairbairn, 1952, p. v).

Sutherland (1980) similarly saw Fairbairn's approach as novel:

Instead of grafting the implications of relations onto a theory that started from a different standpoint, what the British group has done is to show that the development of the person has to be conceived as the progressive differentiation of a structure from a unitary matrix that itself interacts at a holistic personal level from the start. Fairbairn was the first analyst to expose the questionable logic of a developmental scheme based upon the energetic concepts that Freud retained as his theoretical base (p. 858).

And Guntrip believed that Fairbairn was the first to use the concept of the self relating to objects in a truly consistent manner (Guntrip, 1974).

With this view we must disagree. Fairbairn did take a step forward when he postulated the infant's central aim to be the need to relate to other people, rather than to satisfy a physical need. However, his formulations are as inconsistent as those of the other theorists described thus far. Fairbairn is still using the concept of internal structure as a fundamental component of his theory. The fact that it is "dynamic structure," rather than pure energy and structure, which make up the internal world, does not change the basic premises and assumptions being used. Even though Fairbairn only believes that structure develops in response to frustration, his maintenance of the concept of internal structure shows that he is using the same paradigm as the others.

It is still the ego which has aims, which seeks and cathects objects, rather than the person. His rejection of energetic concepts did not stop Fairbairn from stating that "libido"^{*} is object-seeking" (1963, p. 224). Internal substances are still portrayed as agents. Why not say instead that the infant seeks contact with other people, or at least that the infant is object seeking? This would be a more consistent way of using the concept of the person as motivated for contact with other people. Though Fairbairn moved towards an interpersonal theory, he persisted in assuming the presence of an inner world to explain or elucidate the repetitive, maladaptive behavior of people with problems. It emerges, then, that Fairbairn's theory is also a hybrid of the personal and the mechanistic.

At one point, Fairbairn said, "It would appear contrary to the spirit of modern science to confer the status of entity upon 'instincts'; and in the light of modern knowledge an instinct seems best regarded as a characteristic pattern of behavior" (1931, p. 218). If he could see this, why did he refer to internal structures as agents, portraying them as structural elements in the psyche, rather than also redefining them as characteristic patterns of behavior (ways of behaving, as Schafer would prefer)?

Fairbairn retained the concepts of repression, splitting, ego, superego and internal objects, and continued referring to libido, even his last publication (1963). The relationship between the libidinal and antilibidinal egos is in essence no different from Freud's original

^{*}This writer's emphasis.

notion in "Mourning and Melancholia" that one part of the ego identifies with an object and another part of the ego aggresses against the first. Fairbairn's concept of introjection takes as its starting-point Freud's concept of the superego as an internalized representation of one's relationship to the parents. In short, Fairbairn speaks the same language as Freud, although what he says is in some ways different. This point is illustrated in the chart on page 59.

When Fairbairn translated the concept of fixation into specific techniques for regulating relationships, he made a progressive move towards formulating human behavior as active rather than passive, as purposeful rather than determined by the pressures of internal or external forces. But whenever his explications moved away from the intrapsychic, he always returned to it, seeing both the interpersonal and the intrapsychic as indispensable concepts. Though he preferred a more personal theory, the mechanistic, pseudoscientific element was maintained.

One rejoinder that may be made is that, when Fairbairn and Guntrip used the term 'ego,' they did not mean the same thing that Freud did. Guntrip frequently emphasized that it is a "person-ego," not a "system-ego," which he and Fairbairn espouse. Since Guntrip considered this issue in detail, it seems appropriate to turn to his theory to continue with the present discussion.

Harry Guntrip

Guntrip spent a great deal of his professional life explicating and defending Fairbairn's work and criticizing Klein's. In the process

he described his own views, which follow closely upon Fairbairn's. Guntrip's major contribution was to bring Fairbairn's work further, highlighting the importance of so-called regressed ego states and exploring their characteristics.

For the following discussion the last three chapters of his 1973 book, Psychoanalytic Theory, Therapy and the Self, and a 1974 article, "Psychoanalytic object-relations theory: the Fairbairn-Guntrip approach" will be used. These were chosen because they provide definitions of his terms and summaries of his own viewpoint in a context wherein he discussed other theorists and indicated areas of agreement and disagreement with them. In addition, in the 1973 book, he dealt with the question of exactly what he meant by ego, and addressed the issue of the overall meaning of the term in theory and therapy. Like other sources used in the present analysis, these are also among the most recent of his publications.

Guntrip believed that object relations theory did away with the inconsistent, mechanical-biological component of psychoanalysis and "represents the ultimate emergence to the forefront of the personal, properly psychological part" of the theory. He stated, "This is believe psychoanalysis, especially in its form as object relations theory to be: the science of human beings as persons developing in the medium of personal relationships, past and present" (1974, p. 831). This statement exemplifies his continual striving towards a holistic, phenomenological view of human development. Throughout his writings, however,

he maintained concepts such as ego, and never resolved the basic inconsistency between this term and the interpersonal direction towards which his formulations were moving.

Guntrip was completely opposed to Freud's dual instinct theory and, taking his cue from Fairbairn, he took issue with Klein's uncritical retention of it. Also like Fairbairn, he rejected the concept of id, and objected to the conceptualization of the ego as a mere appendage which develops from the id.

The truth seems to me to be that there is one basic psychophysiological life-drive towards the object-world, which generates fear and aggression when thwarted. This theory eliminates the purely speculative and clinically impossible idea of neutralized energy made available for the use of the ego and super-ego. This idea presupposes the id-ego theory, which would only really be viable if it could be proved that there are id-drives, both libidinal and aggressive, before birth and that the ego only begins to be after birth. Once we substitute for this speculative idea the concept of a psychosomatic whole with ego-potential, developing primarily libidinally in object relations, but also aggressively if thwarted, then the ego is the whole psychic person, the psychic aspect of the basic psychosomatic whole being. This person-ego has its own energy or life-drive, and develops a structural identity and individual characteristics by organizing its experiences as it goes along. There is no place for the idea of neutralizing original sexual and aggressive id-drives to make a pale characterless energy, neutralized and available to a system-ego that has no proper energy of its own (1973, pp. 133-4).

Note that Guntrip still thinks in terms of a drive as an agent: here the "life-drive" is portrayed as "generating fear and aggression when thwarted." It is the person-ego that possesses this "energy or life-drive," the "person-ego" which develops an identity by organizing its experiences as it goes along--not the person.

Although Guntrip rejected Klein's ideas on the instincts, he asserted that, "her use of projection and introjection is absolutely

essential for psychoanalysis," and believed that she "... allowed the ego concept to fall too much into the background" (1974, p. 831). Yet he did not see this as a retention of the mechanistic element of psychoanalytic theory.

Guntrip embraced Fairbairn's concept of the tripartite splitting of the ego, and added a fourth split to explain the schizoid problem of regression. In the following quote he indicates his endorsement of Fairbairn and his interpretation of the meaning of the split ego system.

Melanie Klein provided most of the material but not the concepts for a new theory of endopsychic structure, nor could she do so since she retained the nonpsychological impersonal "id" and substituted the term "libidinal ego" to denote the pristine unitary but as yet undeveloped nature of the child. Libidinal ego seems to me to be the obvious psychoanalytic term to represent the infantile starting-point of our psychic life, and it makes possible the conceptualizing of subsequent development, either as growth in ego-strength, or else as ego-splitting and the proliferation of ego-weakness. The internal bad objects are at first the exciting but frustrating and unsatisfying aspects of parents. Fairbairn's term "antilibidinal ego" exactly describes the "against all natural needs" attitudes of the internalized authoritarian parents. What confuses and disturbs the infant is that bad parents excite his needs (if only by being there and being his parents) and then fail or refuse to satisfy them. He is faced with both exciting and rejecting or denying internal bad objects, and his weak ego splits under the strain. He in part identifies with the rejective parents, develops an antilibidinal ego and becomes a self-hater; but in part he goes on being excited and having his needs stimulated, and goes on being a libidinal ego fighting for his rights (1973, pp. 171-2).

As just observed, Guntrip's unique contribution was to postulate a "regressed ego" which splits off from the libidinal ego, if deprivation is severe enough, leaving the central ego further weakened, and leading to a desire for passivity and regression, which is associated with disintegration and must be rigorously defended against.

. . . there is one last ultimate split in the ego, in the infantile L. E. itself, into a clamoring, orally active L. E. (hysteric), and a deeply withdrawn, passive L. E. (schizoid). This I have called the Regressed Ego, and it would account for a wide range of phenomena . . . all the marked schizoid states (1974, p. 841).

Explaining what is meant by the regressed ego, Guntrip said,

. . . a more secret split-off part of himself withdraws from the hopeless struggle, and becomes a lost regressed or withdrawn schizoid ego. All of this is hidden on a conscious level by a conformist central ego avoiding trouble by idealizing parents in real life. . . . Fairbairn's terms for the basic threefold pattern of ego-splitting, libidinal ego, anti-libidinal ego, and central ego (to which I would add the schizoid regressed or withdrawn ego) is a development from Freud's first experimental definition of endopsychic structure, but has the advantage of being more accurate because it is based on later developments in research. It is the most convenient way I have found for summarizing our present state of knowledge of the internal disunities caused by an overly disturbed development in the earliest years. Here, in this complex pattern of ego-splitting or loss of primary psychic unity, with all the weakness and internal conflict it involves, is the root cause of personality disorders in later life; and the most vulnerable part of the self is the most hidden part, the schizoid ego, cut off from all human relationships in the depths of the unconscious. To reach and help this lost heart of the personal self is the profoundest problem posed for psychotherapy (1973, p. 172).

Guntrip's regressed ego lacks contact with objects (both internal and external) and results from a regressive withdrawal based on frustration which is too intense and too long. In therapy Guntrip spoke of the necessity to "set free" something in the patient, an "imprisoned self to be understood and faced in therapy" (1973, p. 184). The schizoid dilemma, for Guntrip, involves the basic unrelatedness of the regressed ego. Fairbairn came to accept this addition as the logical development and completion of his theory, feeling it

accounted for phenomena he had not previously been able to fit into his conceptual scheme (Guntrip, 1974, p. 841).

Guntrip believed that perfect psychic health would result in a unified person with no ego-splitting nor internal objects. In this view, conflict and splitting are not normal, as Freud, Klein and Kernberg indicate, but are a sign of pathology. "In health, ideally, our objects are not internal objects but real persons, even though in fact none of us can be as healthy as that" (Guntrip, 1969, p. 388). The theory emphasizes that the ego can only mature, develop and organize in the context of a healthy relationship. If relationships are absent, panic ensues. Thus, it is better to relate to internal objects, even persecutory ones, than to no objects at all.

It is this conceptualization of the ego as primarily object-seeking which is thought to be most neglected in Freud and instinct theory.

To emphasize the ego and its search for security, which it can find only by dealing satisfactorily with its objects and maintaining reliable relations with its good objects, is to bring the whole problem of object relationships into the very center of the psychoanalytic inquiry. It also lifts psychoanalysis above psychobiology to the level of a true psychodynamic theory--that is, a theory of the person, not simply of the organism--and it gives full meaning to Freud's term "psychic reality," with psychoanalysis having the status of psychodynamic sciences. With Melanie Klein instinct theory still held the place that should have been held by the ego, for, as Fairbairn later pointed out, instincts are the instincts of, or properties of a person-Ego since modern science does not now separate energy and structure (or id and ego). However Klein regarded the phenomena of internal object relations as illustrating the vicissitudes of instincts rather than the struggles of an ego in search of security. . . . On the nature of the ego, I accept Fairbairn's view of its absolute fundamental centrality and importance for psychoanalytic theory (Guntrip, 1974, p. 832).

These quotes show that Guntrip is still thinking in terms of endopsychic structure, but sees his and Fairbairn's reconceptualization of the internal world to be a vast improvement over Freud's. Guntrip even retained the concept of repression, but agreed with Fairbairn that objects and egos (dynamic structure), not instincts (pure energy), are repressed. "Repression is carried out not on instincts, but on internal bad objects and the parts of the ego related to them. . ." (1974, p. 839).

Guntrip did struggle with the concept of the ego, tried to broaden its meaning to represent the entire person or self, and to interpret the concept in terms of personal experience and actions. Yet he did not relinquish the construct and turn full attention to the person as the center of the theory. Words like psyche, self, person-ego, continually maintain the focus on the internal world. At one point he wrote,

. . . What is an intact ego? Is there such a thing? In practice the term is meaningless, but it was many years before it became clear that the problem of the ego, not of the instincts, is the one radical problem throughout the whole gamut of mental illness. Intact ego could only describe a whole and healthy personality (1973, pp. 163-4).

One might question, if the term is meaningless, why is the "problem of the ego" the radical problem to be solved? Guntrip attempted to deal with the term by translating its meaning into experiential terms. For example,

An internalized object is itself an experience of the ego or self. . . . The distinctions Fairbairn made within the overall whole of the complex ego structure are thus not entities (like parts of a machine) but processes, differing but simultaneous

reactions of a whole personal ego dealing with his environment of complex personal objects. Some of these reactive processes are so fundamental that they become habitual and relatively enduring characteristics of the whole person, especially those based on the infant's and small child's reactions to the parents, and can be used to describe the relatively enduring structure of the psychic self in its dealing with its object world, its human and cultural environment (1974, p. 833).

At one point he said that in psychopathology

we are faced with a human being who has lost psychic unity, who develops conflicting and incompatible reactions to his own needs and to the people and situations he meets. This is what is broadly meant by ego-splitting, and we need a terminology to express this inner disunity, not an instinct terminology but one that clarifies the strongly persisting differences of attitude and reaction within the overall ego, which prevent it from presenting a unified front to life and undermine self-confidence. . . . If early experience is bad the infant cannot cope with it and it remains, to use Bion's term, as "undigested foreign bodies" in the psyche. The inner world of Melanie Klein comes into being (1974, p. 834).

Note the way he switched from talking about a human being reacting to people and situations to the internal world.

. . . the final problem is an infantile ego too weak to be able to cope with the outer world, because he is already split in his growing emotional life by the inconsistency of his primary parental objects, and becomes a prey to loss of internal unity, radical weakness, and helplessness. While still partly struggling to deal with the outer world, he also partly withdraws from it and becomes detached, out of touch, "introverted" (Jung), finding refuge in an internal fantasy world. This is not a problem of impulses, but of ego splitting, and it calls for a different type of theory of endopsychic structure (1974, p. 835).

This is a different theory of endopsychic structure--not a relinquishing of the theory of endopsychic structure.

Guntrip referred to the person-ego, as opposed to a system-ego. By this he meant that the word "ego" does not refer to an apparatus but to a person. But he did not relinquish the spatial metaphor.

. . . at birth there is a "pristine unitary whole human psyche with ego potential" that immediately begins to grow into a developing self, a person-ego. . . . Good object relations simply promote good ego development. . . . In the struggle to cope with his mixed experience and difficult outer world, the infant goes through a series of spontaneous psychic maneuvers that result in his external objects becoming represented by internal psychic counterparts. . . . Broadly the infant seeks to see his outer world as good when it first becomes intolerable by the expedient of taking its bad aspects into his inner mental world to deal with them there. . . . This is not, however, adequately described as fantasy, for it becomes an enduring factor of his psychic life and develops as the unconscious structural pattern of his personality. (Structure per se is unconscious and only becomes knowable through active functioning) (1974, p. 837).

The last sentence is in implicit agreement with Wittgenstein's notion that no private experience exists that cannot in some way be observed, described or acted upon. The inconsistency in Guntrip's writings, as in all the above theorists, is to sometimes speak of the individual or the infant in active terms--as an agent--and yet to always return to the Newtonian view which divides the person into sections which function on their own and influence his behavior. "Libido is the energy of all three subegos into which the primary psyche or nascent whole ego is split" (p. 838).

The continuity with the traditional psychoanalytic paradigm should be evident. Though Guntrip saw the Newtonian and mechanistic principles inherent in the concept of libido as a separate energy source, he did not see the Newtonian nature of concepts like dynamic structure, or an ego able to divide itself and introject aspects of the environment, in response to negative experience--not even when in his writing he demonstrated the curious inconsistency of referring to the ego as "he" did

it occur to him to discard the ego concept in favor of the person as a whole.

If the word "ego" represents the person, as Guntrip repeatedly said it does, why not eliminate the concept "ego," and use "person," instead? Person-ego still maintains a reified metaphor. "Libido is essentially object-seeking" can be translated, for instance, as "People need, seek, want to relate to other people from the beginning of life." Such a translation would get rid of anachronistic mechanisms left over from the psycho-biological language Freud originated.

Discussion

Both Guntrip and Fairbairn reformulated the inner world Freud created, but the assumptions of enduring internal structure as explanatory, a separation between the inner and outer worlds, and the spatial metaphor, are still the same. All of the theorists discussed here retain the notion of internal structure which needs to be changed or eliminated for any therapeutic change to occur. All of the object relations theorists also assume that if someone does, thinks or says anything, an internal process must precipitate or underlie the action. Of course, by infinite regress, we can ascertain that such reasoning is solipsistic. Another assumption is that something or some process carried around within the person, accounts for his behavior.

The chart on page 59 shows how each theorist has his/her own version of the internal world. A separate category is given to the id because some interpret it differently and some do not use it.

Although all of Freud's concepts were not retained by all theorists, all constructs used by later theorists can be traced back to Freud. For example, "dynamic structure" is a combination of energy and structure, and is still Newtonian. Returning to the definition of psychoanalytic object relations theory given at the beginning of this chapter, each theorist sees interpersonal relationships and events, and intrapsychic relationships and events, as interacting through the individual's behavior.

In 1939 Freud proposed psychoanalysis as a science based upon physics.

The hypothesis we have adopted of a psychical apparatus extended in space, expediently put together, developed by the exigencies of life, which gives rise to the phenomena of consciousness only at one particular point and under certain conditions--this hypothesis has put us in a position to establish psychology on foundations similar to those of any other science, such, for instance, as physics. In our science as in others the problem is the same: behind the attributes (qualities) of the object under examination which are presented directly to our perception, we have to discover something else which is more independent of the particular receptive capacity of our sense organs and which approximates more closely to what may be supposed to be the real state of affairs (Freud, 1939, p. 196).

The point reiterated throughout this chapter is that within the paradigm described by this approach, the natural science model, the theorists differ. However, this paradigm and its assumptions are maintained. This model perpetuates the problems delineated in Chapter I.

It has been said that Fairbairn and Guntrip brought Klein's work on endopsychic structure to its logical conclusion by showing how the inner world is influenced by and inextricably linked to reality (Sutherland, 1980). While Klein focused on internal processes formed

by innate conflicts, which were only secondarily influenced by reality, Guntrip and Fairbairn showed how these same processes were shaped by outer events. For example, Klein saw the infant as taking in objects as part of its nature whereas Fairbairn saw introjection and splitting as a product of frustration. In the latter view, the infant, feeling impotent in relation to reality, introjects the entire situation.

Klein expressly took issue with the notion of the infant as object-seeking. For her, object relations are shaped by libido and aggression, and the ego at birth seeks gratification, not objects; i.e., although the infant is object-related, for Klein, he is not object-seeking. Rather his object-relatedness is a byproduct of needs and innate impulses. Klein thus held to Freud's belief in the pleasure principle. Fairbairn believed, in contrast, that the problem for the infant at the earliest stage concerns attachment and the desire for a good object-relationship. For Klein, the resolution of inner turmoil, not the establishment of object relations, was the central task for the first year of life.

For Klein the healthy ego develops around the introjected good object, whereas for Fairbairn, health occurs through healthy object relations, i.e., healthy relationships with people. Guntrip agreed with Fairbairn that love, not destructiveness, is the driving force in the infant. Klein believed that Fairbairn underestimated the importance of early destructiveness in his rejection of the primacy of the instincts and his underrating of hatred and anger from the beginning of life (Klein, 1946).

Kernberg's developmental views are highly complex, but follow closely upon Klein's assumptions. As Kernberg accused Fairbairn of oversimplifying (Kernberg, 1976), Guntrip believed that Kernberg "tried to explain too much too exactly" (Mendez and Fine, 1976). In the following quote, Kernberg disagrees with Kohut on the nature of libido.

I disagree with Kohut (1971), who thinks that narcissism is defined "not by the target of the instinctual investment (i.e., whether it is the subject himself or other people) but by the nature or quality of the instinctual charge" (p. 26). I do not think there exists such a thing as the nature or quality of instinctual (in this case, libidinal) charges unrelated to the respective development of affects and internalized object relations. The normal or pathological nature of narcissism depends upon the normal or pathological nature of the self and its component elements, which, in turn, are intimately related to the normal or pathological nature of internalized objects and their component object-representations (Kernberg, 1976, p. 115).

Despite experience-distant, technical disagreements such as these, Kernberg and Kohut are more alike than either is similar to Fairbairn and Guntrip. They both retain Freud's original formulations and add to them. Fairbairn and Guntrip are the only two theorists here who actually reject some of Freud's original constructs and reformulate the inner world. Fairbairn's "radical object relations theory" is among the most divergent from traditional psychoanalysis. Yet he followed Freud's lead in imitating the natural or "hard sciences." In 1946 Fairbairn suggested that, since physics has progressed, the least we can do is to keep pace with that field.

On consideration it becomes obvious, of course, that Freud's divorce of energy from structure represents a limitation imposed upon his thought by the general scientific atmosphere of his day. It is a curious feature of modern times that the scientific atmosphere of a period appears to be always

dominated by the current conceptions of physics. Be that as it may, the scientific atmosphere of Freud's day was largely dominated by the Helmholtzian conception that the universe consisted in a conglomeration of inert, immutable and indivisible particles to which motion was imparted by a fixed quantity of energy separate from these particles. However, modern atomic physics has changed all that; and, if psychology has not yet succeeded in setting the pace for physics, it is perhaps not too much to expect that psychology should at least try to keep in step. So far as psychoanalysis is concerned, one of the unfortunate results of the divorce of energy from structure is that, in its dynamic aspects, psychoanalytic theory has been unduly permeated by conceptions of hypothetical "impulses" and "instincts" which bombard passive structures, much as if an air-raid were in progress. . . . From the standpoint of dynamic structure, however, "instinct" is not the stimulus to psychic activity, but itself consists in characteristic activity on the part of a psychical structure. Similarly, "impulse" is not, so to speak, a kick in the pants administered out of the blue to a surprised, and perhaps somewhat pained, ego, but a psychical structure in action--a psychical structure doing something to something or somebody (Fairbairn, 1946, p. 150).

For some reason, the concept of a psychical structure giving a "kick in the pants" to a person, is considered by Fairbairn to be an acceptable way of thinking about human behavior. This view demonstrates Fairbairn's failure to question whether or not psychology should or should not try to be scientific and seek explanations in the same way that physics does. Apparently it never occurred to him that psychologists should seek their own way of systematizing.

Guntrip also addressed these issues. Regarding Klein's formulations, he said,

In what terms can we construct a psychodynamic science? I have much sympathy with Home's view that some metapsychological statements literally do not mean anything, as for example, when Hanna Segal tells us "the infant projects the death instinct onto the breast." This extraordinary statement is due both to careless use of words (if the infant has such a

thing as a death instinct, it certainly cannot project it anywhere else), and a confused mixing of psychodynamic and biological concepts. "Projection" is a psychodynamic concept, "instinct" is a biological concept. An instinct cannot be projected (Guntrip, 1969, pp. 380-1).

Guntrip's reasoning is on target as far as it goes. But by asserting that "some metapsychological statements literally do not mean anything," Guntrip implies that some do. It is contradictory that, while he so eloquently demonstrated the illogic of the idea of projecting a death instinct, he persisted in believing that an object can be introjected and an ego can be split.

Guntrip went on to state that his goal is a consistently psychodynamic theory of the unique individual in his personal relations, and this is what, in his view, the emergence of object relations theory is about. But when Guntrip says "psychodynamic," he is referring to internal structure. He stated that psychoanalysis "does now have a truly psychodynamic theory of the development of the individual ego in personal relations; but not of the complex fact of the personal relationship between two egos" (Guntrip, 1969, p. 389). The reason for this lack is Guntrip's language confusion, and his continually distinguishing between inner and outer. A consistent theory might not need to distinguish between the interpersonal and the intrapersonal, and would not need reified metaphors to bridge the gap between the two.

Guntrip and Fairbairn, according to Sutherland (1980), adopted the term "self" as more appropriate than "ego." Sutherland stated that Fairbairn retained "ego" so as not to introduce too many new

terms and alienate many analysts, and that in actuality he retained the term "ego" for the part of the self that is adapted to outer reality, leaving the term "self" for the comprehensive "psyche" or person. He also reverted to the term "libido" when, as he later pointed out, it would have been more consistent had he said that the individual in his libidinal capacity seeks objects.

First of all, this differentiation of the ego as part of the self, and the self as the whole person, is identical with Freud's use of these terms. Secondly, "self" and "psyche" are entitative terms like "ego" and are not satisfactory substitutes for "person." If what Sutherland says is true, Fairbairn's interest in placating the conservative analytic world led him to retain concepts which were inconsistent with his system and with Guntrip's expressed goals.

Fairbairn at one point expressed ambivalence regarding the idea of internal psychic structures. In 1931 he observed,

The data provided by the case under discussion seem to leave no doubt about the existence of functioning structural units corresponding to the ego, the id and the superego; but the same data seem equally to indicate the impossibility of regarding these functioning structural units as mental entities. After all, the general tendency of modern science is to throw suspicion upon entities; and it was under the influence of this tendency that the old "faculty psychology" perished. Perhaps the arrangement of mental phenomena into functioning structural groups is the most that can be attempted by psychological science (p. 218).

Thus, Fairbairn was aware of the problem, but was unaware of any way to move beyond it. Like Guntrip, he recognized the fallacy of regarding instincts as entities. But neither of them saw that terms like ego, object, and dynamic structure belong to the realm of

the mechanistic which they rejected. In the quote immediately above, Fairbairn seems to see mental entities as being necessary evils. In order to change this view he would have to have questioned his premise that psychoanalysis should be a science modelled on physics.

Summary

The paradigm used by all six theorists discussed in this chapter is the same: they all retain the spatial metaphor, and contain the same problematic elements outlined in Chapter I, such as anthropomorphism and reification of metaphors, intrapsychic structures used as explanation, the incongruity of the person as agent vs. the inner structures as agents. However, the developmental and clinical implications of these theories are different, and their differences will be highlighted in Chapter III when the mechanistic element is truly eliminated. Action language provides the new terminology Guntrip alluded to (p. 112, above), answers Guntrip's question about how to refer to the "personal relationship between two egos," (p. 119) and resolves Fairbairn's problem with mental entities.

CHAPTER III

ACTION LANGUAGE IN ACTION

"The inner world of experience is a kind of telling, not a kind of place."

Roy Schafer, 1978, p. 197

The following pages will translate the theoretical formulations of each theorist into Schafer's action language, focusing on the quotations and terms cited in Chapter II. It will be seen that differences among the theories are actually highlighted and clarified when the spatial metaphor is abandoned. Many examples of action language can be found by sifting through the theorists' own writings; when writing, the theorists tend to alternate between the language of structures and drives, and the language of the person as agent, as if one is meant to explain the other. If we focus upon the latter, we find many descriptions of what the theorist actually means by his/her theoretical constructs. The purpose in this chapter is to show that action language can be successfully applied to the theoretical constructs listed in Chapter II--i.e., that every construct has a corresponding "outward criteria" that can be expressed in terms of action language.

It will be seen that the different theorists hypothesize that certain events occur during development as well as in adulthood. They postulate certain laws and rules about how people behave and construe their lives. One may disagree with their postulated laws and rules, but the point to be made is that these ideas make up the body of the

theory and can meaningfully stand alone without the need for further appeal to the spatial metaphors inherent in Freud's metapsychology.

Considerable attention has been paid recently to the distinction between impulse or drive theory vs. purely structural theory (Greenberg and Mitchell, 1983). It will be shown that this distinction is in part a disagreement about what people want and need--the reasons for what they do and how they develop. Freud, for example, believed that people develop as they do because they need and want to gratify themselves orally, sexually, pleasurably. Guntrip believed they develop as they do because from birth they need and want contact with and relate to other people. This is the crucial differentiation between traditional psychoanalysis and modern object relations theory.

It is relevant first to address a few definitional issues. Many theorists postulate the presence of needs--i.e., they state that a person needs specified things. We must ask what is meant by saying that an individual needs for something to occur, as in the postulated need to relate to other people. Does one need other people in the same sense that one needs food to survive?

The answer lies in the idea of the consequences of the needs being unsatisfied. To say that someone needs food is to imply that certain events will occur if one does not obtain food, namely starvation. To say that an infant needs to relate to others means that s/he must do so, or certain results will follow. Each theorist provides his/her own version of what events will occur if postulated needs are frustrated. The theorists discussed here usually wrote in terms of

both internal and external events, actions and feelings. We will speak of them in terms of what people do when their needs are frustrated, making no distinction between internal and external.

As Schafer (1976) points out, the emphasis here is on the idea that people experience an event in terms of the way they construe or assign meaning to a given situation or event. Therefore, to say to a client, "You are experiencing yourself as fragmenting," contains the subtle implication that there are other ways that he could experience himself at that moment, and other meanings we could assign. This implication is of crucial importance, and it goes to the heart of the advantages of this language system, the assignment of the person as the creator of what he experiences.

In this framework, it is assumed that what someone reports as experience is based upon one's interpretation of a past or present event. We do not believe that an actual internal event has occurred, e.g., that someone has fragmented. Instead, the person's reporting of the experience is seen as the subject matter to discuss and explore. Schafer (1978) expressed it succinctly,

. . . strictly speaking, that report in itself cannot be taken to show that anything is really the case in the sense that there is some final, unanalyzable, unredescribable account of reality being reached through inspection of experiential reports. There is no unanalyzable account of experience. To claim to verify a statement about the mind by looking into an independently given world of the mind is to lose sight of the fact that one can only be using one report to confirm another (p. 197).

It will also be discovered in the following pages that when we use verbs and adverbs instead of nouns and adjectives, the person

necessarily appears in the sentence where he might not have been before. Consider what happens when we translate the question, "What comes to mind about that dream?" into action language. We cannot do so without referring to the person and what he is doing: "What do you think of in relation to that dream?" With the introduction of the person comes the implication that what the person intends to do or not do is also relevant.

Consider the difference in meaning if one answers, "Nothing," to each of the above questions. If "Nothing comes to mind" is the response, then the person is implicitly absolved of responsibility for this regrettable internal event. However, if he responds, "I don't think of anything," or "I am not thinking of anything," he is suddenly the agent of his not thinking, and it is reasonable to then ask, "Why don't you think of anything?" or "How is it that you aren't?" We are now in a much better position to inquire into what the person is doing and for what reasons. Note also the difference between "You react angrily to your mother," and "You have a lot of anger towards your mother."

It bears repeating that this is one of the main goals of analysis: the analysand comes into the office with some symptoms or problems he feels unable to control or resolve. The analyst gradually helps him to see that these problems are the result of his own way of living and organizing what he experiences--i.e., he produces the so-called symptoms and creates the problems.

This touches upon the topic of "can" and "can't," which are not frequently used in the action language. We prefer to speak of what people do or do not do. If one "can't" do something--i.e., study--this is because he is doing other things which are incompatible with studying or he is refraining from studying, and these are done for reasons. These are the actions and reasons we wish to investigate. In analysis we search for the often obscure reasons and intentions for what people do or don't do. No value judgment is implied in the abandonment of the concepts of "can" or "can't." The issue of whether or not there is free will, and whether or not people should be blamed for what they do, need not be resolved here either. We only say what they do or don't do, what they agree to do or refuse to do.

Words such as ego, libido and object are considered inappropriate for an action language approach to psychoanalysis. Not only are they nouns referring to experiences and actions that are not static entities, but they belong to another era, another frame of reference, and are considered to be anachronisms in the present context. Just as Guntrip once said, ". . . Id is a bad nonpsychological term . . ." (1969, p. 425), so too, we would add, are libido and ego. And "object" is an impersonal, nonrelational word, the meaning of which is antithetical to everything Guntrip believed in. It connotes a mindless, intentionless search for and attachment to some vague being, dimly perceived. Such words belong to the realm of natural science, the portion of psychoanalytic theory which Guntrip rejected as inapplicable to a psychology of human beings.

It should be noted that nouns of attribution or quality may be used to describe part of what a person believes about himself. For example, we might say that someone experiences oneself as competent and effective, or believes oneself to be helpless, weak, ineffective. Thus portrayed, one is seen as attributing to oneself certain qualities, capacities or abilities--and as acting according to what s/he believes. We might ask, "Why do you believe you are helpless?" or "Why do you want to believe you are helpless?" Although no such qualities actually exist, people often believe that they do, and this needs to be incorporated into the theory.

A further note is that many verbs can be analyzed into more specific meanings. For instance, in the sentence, "One benefits from interacting with other people," both verbs can be narrowed down to a less general level. "Interacting" refers to a wide range of possible meanings: talking, listening, touching, supporting, etc. "Benefiting" may refer to enjoying, relaxing, learning, etc. As long as action language has been used, we will consider our task accomplished. To dissect every word into all potential meanings would be impossible, especially since each word will mean something slightly different for every person in each unique situation.

Lastly, there are a number of gerunds which are typically used as nouns. "Feeling," for example, is a verb that, because of popular usage, may connote a passive experience of emotion, rather than an experience brought about by one's construction of a given situation.

"Meaning" and "being" present similar implications. Whenever gerunds like these are used in translating constructs, they are meant as verbs, not as nouns.

In the following discussions the pronoun "he" will be used to refer to the person being discussed, the subject, the infant, the child or adult, the analysand. This is done for the sake of simplicity, and in no way is meant as prejudicial. When referring to the analyst, the mother or the parent, the pronoun "she" will be used in order to readily differentiate to whom we are referring.

Each construct from the chart, which was listed because it is central in the theory, will be translated below into action language. A basic understanding of the theories and their constructs is assumed, and is necessary to follow the progression from Chapter II to Chapter III.

Freud

In the versions of his work quoted above, Freud was quite specific that the psyche exists in a hypothetical space, populated by three mental agencies or provinces, one of which exists from birth (the id) and two of which develop later (the ego and the superego). The unconscious and conscious regions are separated by a repression barrier which may be rigid or porous. Although he wrote in metaphorical terms, these ideas can be developed in action language terms.

We would start by saying that it is the infant or young child (not the id) who acts on the basis of the pleasure principle, wanting

what he wants when he wants it. Likewise, the infant or child (not the ego) faces the task of reconciling the fact that he wants several contradictory things. He wants to gratify himself orally, sexually, pleasurable. He also wants to survive. And he wants to escape disapproval and punishment from his parents, upon whom he depends for both survival and gratification.

According to Freud, the child primarily seeks to feel good and to avoid feeling bad. But he learns to postpone gratifying himself and to take into consideration what others want and demand of him. Gradually the child learns to moderate his demands for what he wants, to refrain from behaving aggressively and from insisting upon gratifying himself whenever he wants to. The child remembers past events, avoids whatever he experiences as painful, and learns either to adapt to or to bring changes about in the world, through his own doing. These all refer to actions by the individual which Freud saw as functions of the ego.

As for the superego, we would say that the child eventually begins to approve and disapprove of himself as his parents have done, and feels good when he behaves according to what he believes is right. He adopts the beliefs his parents have communicated to him, and treats himself as they would, according to whether or not he conforms to what he and they believe he should do. This is "identification."

Freud's drives may be reconceptualized as what the child wants and feels. At first, according to Freud, the child loves or hates-- he innately behaves aggressively or lovingly. He at first cares only

about himself (cathecting the ego; narcissistic libido), and later he begins to love and care about others (cathecting objects; object libido). The latter occurs only because he associates other people with gratification and survival.

The child learns to live according to what Freud termed the reality principle. He learns to control wanting to destroy, just as he controls wanting to gratify himself immediately. He may behave aggressively towards someone other than the person to whom he would unconsciously like to attack--e.g., he kicks the dog rather than dad (displacement). He feels and expresses love and caring, when he unconsciously would prefer to attack someone--e.g., he kisses his baby sister rather than killing her (reaction formation). He relegates to the unconscious mode whatever he perceives as unacceptable (repression). Freud gave one "action language" portrayal of aggression turned on oneself: "he tears his hair or beats his face with his fists, though he would evidently have preferred to apply this treatment to someone else" (Freud, 1939, p. 150). Needless to say, there are more subtle ways of attacking oneself than this example suggests.

At first the child wishes to be fed and gratified orally, and does not care who or what feeds him. Later he wants to be satisfied sexually and decides he wants sexually to possess his parent. To develop normally, he must repress sexually wanting his parent, and seek a more suitable person. These are examples of "mobility of libido." One's libido is "fixed at an earlier stage" when he continues wanting to gratify himself in inappropriate ways. For example,

if one continues sexually to desire one's mother, one is said to be "fixated." When one is said to "regress," this means he imagines or believes himself to be as he was at an earlier time, or reenacts the way he acted at an earlier time.

Freud talked about repression as if it meant relegating a wish, drive or fantasy to a lower or deeper area of the mind. We can reconceptualize the topographical model by saying that a person may behave either consciously, preconsciously or unconsciously. These modes of behaving were described in Chapter I. If we repress what we are doing, we disclaim it, refrain from consciously thinking about or realizing it. Thus one may refuse to consciously admit that he sexually desires his mother and fears that his father will punish him.

How would we know that someone were unconsciously wanting, fearing and imagining in this way? The answer to this question lies in the fact that the person may act or not act, without understanding why. He might, for example, report that he fears and avoids sexual encounters with women, and question why. But we do not have to postulate an ego, nor an area of the mind to discuss repressing. It may be noted that repressing is done unconsciously. When one consciously avoids thinking about something, this is usually called suppressing.

Since we do not consider the conscious and unconscious to be different regions of the mind, but rather different modes of behaving, we would not refer to resistances to moving from one area to another. Instead we would say that a person may resist consciously admitting or

realizing what he has been doing, instead thinking or fantasizing unconsciously.

Sometimes one represses rigidly and excessively, sometimes flexibly. This would be shown in the ease with which one consciously conceives of or admits that which he has been doing unconsciously. People may pervasively repress or avoid experiencing what they want and need. This would be seen as repressing excessively. If such a person consulted an analyst, the analyst would try to help the person realize what he is doing and the reasons for it, so that he might admit and experience more of what he wants.

One may repress for a number of reasons. The following is only one example. One may repress remembering past painful events--forget them--because, when one remembers the past, one frequently experiences oneself as he felt then, responding as angrily, helplessly, desperately, etc. as he did at the time. People seem to want to avoid feeling in these ways, and therefore they may avoid recalling the events they associate with feeling that way.

Splitting was defined by Freud as an act of disavowal by the ego which results in the arising of two contradictory and independent attitudes, as well as in the splitting of the ego itself. To translate this idea, we would focus on the idea that, when one "splits," one disavows something he feels, believes, does, perceives or experiences. He maintains his belief in two contradictory opinions, or maintains two contradictory ways of feeling.

Splitting is different from repressing because, in repressing, one way of behaving or feeling is done unconsciously, the other consciously. Splitting refers to one's consciously feeling or acting in contradictory ways at different times. In other words, when repressing, we consciously do one thing and unconsciously do another--e.g., consciously listening to a therapist while unconsciously fantasizing about internalizing her. Here the two acts are done simultaneously and need not be contradictory, though they may be. With splitting, however, one performs two contradictory acts at different times. Here the discrepancy can be seen over time--e.g., at one point the person denies hating the therapist, asserting that he loves her, and at another time he denies loving her, asserting that he hates her. In splitting, both the disavowal and the acknowledgement Freud referred to, are done consciously.

Freud referred to introjection as a portion of the external world being taken into the internal world. He wrote less about projection, only saying it is the ejection by the ego of "whatever within itself becomes a cause of unpleasure," whereby the ego feels the world to be hostile. In action language terms, introjection can be seen as the person's adopting new ways of behaving (including thinking and feeling), perhaps imitating or modeling what he has seen others do.

What Freud precisely meant by projection is uncertain; he did not clarify whether he meant it to be a fantasy, an experience or an expulsion. It seems best to translate his words to mean that the person sees his own negative ways of feeling, which he disowns, as being

outside of himself, and experiences the world and other people, rather than himself, as hostile. Later theorists developed these terms in different ways.

Although many of Freud's constructs are incompatible with an action language approach, his concepts can be transformed into action language terms. That is, we can talk about them as the way people behave, rather than as what they contain. There is a problem, however, in trying to describe the concept of drives in terms of what people do. To say that "the child loves and hates from the beginning of life," is awkward. To say the child innately behaves aggressively or lovingly, actually seems to tell us very little of value.

It appears that the only way to express what Freud meant is to express it in his own terms--i.e., to posit the existence of two innate drives. But this is contrary to our goals of seeing the individual as the initiator of what he does. It can be seen here that the use of action language, in stating more clearly what is meant by the theory, shows up the lack of logic and meaning in drive theory.

Melanie Klein implicitly addressed this issue in her focus on "object relations." She pointed out that it only makes sense to refer to the person's loving or hating someone or something. One does not love or hate in a vacuum. But since this discussion entails a closer consideration of her work, we will turn to Klein in the next section.

Klein

It was observed in Chapter II that Klein maintained the concept of the life and death instincts and the spatial metaphor while at the

same time, turning her attention to object relations as fantasies the infant has from the beginning of life and which form the core of the ego. Klein defined introjection to mean that people, situations and events are taken into the self through fantasy and become part of his inner life. It is consistent with action language to say that the child fantasizes that he takes in people, parts of people, feelings and experiences, and then fantasizes that he carries them around with him. In regard to projection it is also consistent to say that he attributes the way he feels to those around him, and may fantasize that he expels bad contents from himself into others, or vice versa.

Klein's theory is based upon hypotheses like these. She believed that the ego develops around the good object; we would say instead that as the child believes he has introjected good parts of his mother, remembering her as a satisfying, fulfilling person, he imitates her by learning to do for himself what she previously did for him. For example, he calms himself down, soothes himself, copes, etc. to the degree that he trusts she will be there for him when he needs her. Unless he has experienced her this way, thinks of her in positive terms and trusts her, he does not identify with her, does not learn to do these things confidently and effectively. He does not trust himself.

Klein's maintenance of drive theory corresponds to the reasons she believed the child relates to the mother. She believed that the infant innately loves (and concomitantly organizes and integrates) as

well as hates (destroying and disintegrating himself) from the beginning of life. Because of these constitutional givens, he projects and introjects in order to cope. In other words, if he experiences his mother as frustrating him, he believes the bad feelings to be his own doing and denies their existence (introjection and denial of bad objects). However, he then irrationally fears that the imagined bad feelings and parts of himself will annihilate him and/or his mother. He fears he will destroy her or himself by hating. Therefore, he again attributes his bad feeling or hating to the world and his mother. Then he again fears that bad external objects (possibly imagined monsters) will attack and destroy him.

In short, Klein seems to be saying that at first the infant does not differentiate between the way he is feeling and the way others are feeling. He fantasizes in a primitive, irrational way about how he and others interact, and he experiences and thinks of himself and other people in extremes of good (loving and caring) and bad (hating, destroying). This is called splitting and, as the child matures, he represses more than he splits--i.e., his primitive and irrational fearing, hating and fantasizing is done unconsciously. As he splits less, he learns to organize and integrate what he experiences and feels--he understands what he does and feels. This integration^{*} can be seen as related directly to internalization,^{*} because the child is doing what previously the parent did and the child may fantasize that he is incorporating the mother and what she does for him.

^{*}In Klein's terms.

Both Freud and Klein posited the existence of innate drives which must be discharged or expressed in some way. As observed above, it is difficult to communicate this idea in action language terms because of the awkwardness of saying that someone loves or hates per se. The only way to meaningfully express the idea is to say that the infant loves or hates someone or something. Klein's assertion that drives only exist in conjunction with object relations becomes more comprehensible when viewed in this way. This assertion of hers was the beginning of a transformation of Freudian theory, but Klein still postulated those innate drives, which she saw as qualities inherent in the person, with all the problems that have been shown to go along with that notion.

Klein has been criticized for hypothesizing that such detailed and elaborate fantasizing goes on so early in life. If it does occur, it seems likely that it would be a more global experiencing than actual thinking or imagining in the way an adult would do. But we need not resolve the question of the viability of Klein's theory; all we wish to do is to show that her concepts can be expressed in action language terms, whether we agree with them or not.

Fairbairn and Guntrip also criticized Klein as having taken only an incomplete step towards a consistent object relations theory, with her retention of drives as motivators. Other inconsistencies, such as the illogic of supposing that fantasies become real internal structures, have already been noted. Fairbairn and Guntrip did not consider the idea that they, too, took only a partial step towards a

consistent theory with their retention of mechanistic concepts such as the ego and internal objects. They, like Klein, seem to believe that the ego actually splits or fragments under certain conditions. But to examine their work is ahead of the present discussion.

Up until the depressive position the child reacts to his mother either angrily, hating her and what she does, or lovingly, idealizing her. He imagines that there are two different mothers, good and bad. In the so-called depressive position, the child gradually realizes anxiously, guiltily and sadly, that he hates and loves the same mother. Thereafter he reacts to her in a more moderate, concerned manner. He understands implicitly that she both frustrates and rewards him, and he tries to make up for his having hated and wished to destroy her. Now when she frustrates him, he controls and moderates the way he reacts, and refrains from consciously fantasizing about violent destruction.

According to Klein, unless the child grows in his understanding this way, he never relates empathically, caringly, realistically and satisfactorily to others. He continues to attribute to others what he feels at the moment, blames others for the way he feels, sees them as persecuting him, misunderstands and misperceives what they are doing, etc. Overall he tends to interpret what other people are doing in terms of what he is feeling at the moment, and he tends to feel either very positively or very negatively about others. This affects the way he relates to everyone.

Kernberg

Kernberg also maintained drive theory and followed directly from Klein in his emphasis on the object relational aspect of development. It was observed above that, unlike Klein, he considers internal objects to be internal structures, not merely fantasies. In action language terms, he agrees with Klein that the child innately behaves aggressively and lovingly, and always in relation to other people or himself. First Kernberg's theory of development will be summarized in action language terms.

Kernberg believes that at the beginning of life, the infant experiences his different ways of feeling in an unconnected, fragmented way. During the first month of life the infant begins to separate good ways of feeling from bad. This is the first method of organizing he achieves. But at this point he does not differentiate between himself and the other person. This is the stage of the good self-object and the bad self-object.

From the second to the sixth months of life the baby learns to differentiate himself from the other but he views his mother in terms of her either lovingly giving to him, or as deliberately frustrating him--as if she were two separate people. At this stage he experiences himself in corresponding extremes: either reacting ragefully, helplessly, painfully, or as happily satisfied and loving. As he organizes himself in this primitive way, Kernberg believes the infant begins to attend more alertly, perceive more sensitively and acutely, communicate, relate to and attach himself to the mother.

Later the child begins to disavow the negative ways of feeling and experiences them as originating and being perpetuated outside of himself. As he disclaims negative ways of feeling, he claims positive ways of feeling and identifies himself with them. In the next stage the child integrates good and bad ways of feeling, and claims both as his own; concomitantly he perceives the mother in a more moderate and variegated way. As he thus decreases splitting, he begins to repress more primitive ways of thinking--i.e., relegates them to the unconscious mode.

We are now at the beginning of the third year of life and Kernberg's Stage 4. During this period of time the young child continues to organize, reorganize and integrate what he experiences and feels, learns to function in new, more mature ways, identifies with his parents, controls more and more the way he feels and what he does and responds emotionally in new ways. The more effectively he represses more primitive ways of thinking, feeling and being, the more realistically he perceives the world and other people, and the more maturely he understands and relates to others. He also develops intellectually at this time, being able to integrate and organize progressively more complex and sophisticated ways of seeing issues and questions.

Kernberg asserts that one only learns to organize, integrate synthesize and think logically and rationally to the degree that one can relate to other people in a nonstereotyped, realistic, emphatic

manner. One learns to perceive accurately, remember and understand, to the degree that one accurately views other people and oneself. This can only occur if the person replaces splitting with repressing. This notion is associated with Kernberg's belief that in splitting, the split becomes a "stable structure" which prevents mature functioning. This in turn means that when one perceives other people in extreme terms, one also experiences oneself in extremes, and does not tolerate believing that someone can behave in moderate or conflictual ways.

If a person persists in splitting throughout life, he will continue to view himself in stereotyped ways which are based upon how he feels at the moment. When he perceives others as frustrating him, he actively denies that the other has ever behaved in a loving, caring way, and that he ever liked or loved the other. If he is experiencing the other as loving and caring, he denies that he ever perceived the other as behaving in the opposite way. This is an action language translation of the three components of the split introject (the image of the other, the image of the self in interaction with the other and the affective coloring of the interaction). It is a primitive way of thinking and feeling about oneself and other people. Unless one develops beyond this way of experiencing oneself and others, one does not mature. The so-called ego weaknesses which result are immature ways of thinking and feeling.

To conceptualize the processes of introjection, identification and ego identity, one needs only to consider what each term means in regard to the developing child. At first (introjection) the child or

infant thinks of himself and others in the stereotyped, extreme ways described above. He uncritically accepts ways of thinking and feeling as they seem in terms of his limited, immediate experience, rather than maintaining them over time in a stable way. These are the simple ways of feeling and behaving that he adopts as he perceives others around him.

Later (identification) the child sees others and himself in more moderate terms and identifies himself with the parent--i.e., he imitates her, claims the parents' views and ways as his own, considers himself to be like the parent or part of the parent.

Lastly, in ego identify, the child sifts through what he knows of the parent and others in the world, choosing what he wants to claim as his own way of living, and rejects other ways. This is done in a more realistic way, with a wider understanding of what is being adopted, including what it means in the larger social context. He no longer relies on his parent's judgment when he draws his own conclusions. As he more maturely and independently adopts a set of beliefs and way of living, he no longer associates what he feels and believes with the reaction his parent would have had--this is "depersonalization."

Having translated the concepts of both Kernberg and Klein into action language, one theme has emerged which, it will be seen, is common to all object relations theorists. This is the idea that a person learns to relate to others and to himself through the way he relates to his parents or significant others in his early life. One maintains

these ways of relating throughout life. Object relations theorists also believe that the way one relates to and feels about oneself is based upon the ways one has related to one's parents and continues to relate to others through life. This is what is meant by a split in the ego occurring when one splits one's image or relation to others.

Kohut

In order to translate Kohut's concept of the self into action language, we need only to substitute the word "person" for "self." It is the person who learns to develop realistic goals or ideals, towards which he may ambitiously and consistently work, and it is the person who struggles to express himself uniquely and creatively, and who strives to establish and maintain a feeling of cohesion and security. What Kohut views as the cohesive self is really a way of viewing oneself, treating oneself, feeling about oneself. There is no quality of self esteem to be built up within the person and no such thing as "low self esteem." Instead, one may either value oneself, or one may treat oneself (and others) contemptuously.

We do not believe that anything is needed beyond describing what happens in these terms. The concepts such as cathecting a self or objects with various kinds of instinctual energy is irrelevant here. The person loves and cares for himself, and others, or he does not. If one develops and matures properly, one can initiate actions and organize one's own goals and ideals realistically and pursue them.

Kohut postulated that the growing child needs and wants the parents to appreciate him and mirror him. Kohut believes that at the beginning of life, the infant or child does not experience himself in a cohesive, organized way, but experiences the way he feels at different times in an unconnected, fragmented manner. He may experience himself as fragmented, although there is really nothing to fragment. As the child establishes the idealizing view of his parents, he feels that he is whole and worthwhile because he sees himself as reflecting them. He exhibits himself proudly for them to admire, enjoys showing them what he can do. If they consistently value and esteem him, he learns to value and esteem himself.

At first the child idealizes his parents and himself, perceives the parents as being all-powerful. He considers himself to be an extension of them (and they to be a part of him) and he thereby sees himself as grandiose and powerful. This is the stage of the self-object and can be seen as the child's way of counteracting feeling small, weak, vulnerable and helpless compared to the adults around him. Perceiving the parents as part of himself, he expects to control them as he would control what he himself does. He also relates to them in a self-centered, narcissistic way, focusing upon what he wants, needs and feels, with little or no regard for what they need, want and feel. Some people continue to relate to other people this way for their entire lives (fixation). In early life, however, Kohut considers it normal for the child to aggrandize himself unrealistically as long as

he believes he is a part of the powerful parents, about whom he thinks in "larger than life" terms.

According to Kohut, if the child is to develop normally, he must gradually realize that his parents are not the all-powerful and perfect beings he believes them to be. For this to occur, they must respond to him empathically, only disappointing little by little, so that he can cope with the disappointments by gradually taking over more and more of what they have been doing for him. When the parents admire, praise and reward what he achieves, he feels that they are enriching him, and he will eventually learn to maintain a sense of himself as a valuable person without them. He will relinquish the unrealistic fantasies and adopt a set of goals, purposes, ambitions and ideals. He learns to modulate the way he feels and views the world. He organizes all his ways of feeling into an integrated, cohesive and coherent way of living and viewing himself and others. Most importantly, he no longer relates to other people in a narcissistic, self-centered way, but learns to focus on others in terms of what they want and need from him, as well. This may partially be seen as his imitating what his parents (or the analyst) have done for him (internalization). Rather than expecting to control other people and use them to supply what he wants, he learns to respect and consider what others feel, want and need. He appreciates and enjoys other people for themselves to the same degree that he appreciates and enjoys himself-- and he does this to the same degree that his parents appreciated and enjoyed him.

If the parents disillusion the child suddenly or traumatically, if they criticize, derogate or reject him, or simply respond to him unempathically, he will not develop normally. In this case he will conceive of himself as worthless and inferior, and he will simultaneously continue to fantasize that he is superior and grandiose, maintaining an illusory view of himself while denying that he feels empty and worthless. He will continue to relate to others in a self-involved way with little or no regard for them as individuals. He will not relate to them empathically or care about them in any real sense. Instead he constantly attends to maintaining an inflated sense of himself to counteract feeling worthless and depleted. Never having abandoned this primitive way of living, he has not developed realistic views or goals, except to conform to what others have demanded of him.

This way of living describes Kohut's vertical splitting, with contradictory self- and object-images existing side by side with the reality ego. The person simultaneously despises himself and others as worthless, inferior, empty, etc., and aggrandizes himself in an unrealistic, excessive manner, imagining himself to be superior. It is possible for the former to be done unconsciously and the latter consciously. One may consciously exhibit oneself proudly and excessively for others to mirror and admire, despising others as inferior, while unconsciously feeling empty and worthless, and despising himself.

The person also denies and avoids realizing that he views himself and others in such contradictory ways, since he prefers not to experience himself as being worthless, empty and depleted. In this

case the person is likely to attach himself to another person whom he idealizes and manages to view as part of himself, just as the child normally does with his parents in early life. When living this way, one does not function effectively and competently, since one invests oneself in regulating these anxious and conflictual ways of feeling.

During analysis Kohut believes the analyst can make up for what the analysand's parents did not provide in his childhood. When the analyst does not introduce what she needs or wants, nor make demands upon the person, the analysand begins to perceive the analyst in the same unrealistic way he perceived his parents (regression or activation of archaic objects). He demands of the analyst what we would expect a young child to demand, and he reacts with rage and a feeling of injury when the analyst does not empathize or mirror him perfectly. If the analyst treats the person as empathically and caringly as his parents should have, the person begins to understand himself better, learns to view himself and others more realistically and gives up fantasizing about himself or others as being grandiose (decathecting the archaic objects and internalizing the more mature functions of the analyst). During analysis he experiences many of the ways of feeling and thinking he has heretofore repressed and disavowed and gradually integrates different ways of perceiving and feeling about himself and others.

We now have touched on the action language translation of the transmuting internalization process. We would say that, as the other optimally (i.e., little by little) disappoints and frustrates the

person, he gradually stops fantasizing about the other as all-powerful and perfect. Concomitantly he begins to function independently and more freely and competently in a variety of spheres. If the other disappoints him too suddenly, he clings to fantasizing about the perfect other who will fulfill him--as if he did not have enough time to practice functioning autonomously before he had to give up relying on the other. When one has developed maturely, he functions independently and securely without fantasizing that he is relying upon powerful others who, he imagines, lend their power and approval to him.

Rather than referring to the functions of the psychic apparatus which become internalized as structure, we refer to the child or adult's learning to do certain things for himself securely, confidently, effectively, which he previously relied upon his parents to do for him. This may refer to quite intangible acts, such as reassuring oneself, calming and soothing oneself to prevent panicking, encouraging oneself, valuing and taking care of oneself, enjoying oneself, supporting oneself, going to sleep, approving or disapproving of what one wants and needs, liking, loving or hating oneself, viewing oneself proudly or ashamedly, accepting vs. rejecting oneself, etc.

There is no need to postulate inner structures, processes or energies to explain one's doing these things. This is the trap Kohut falls into, as shown in the previous chapter. However Kohut did propose some novel ideas about how one learns to perform these acts

independently. He suggested that certain interactions must occur between the parent and child in order for the latter to mature and develop as described here.

In a footnote, Kohut commented on Schafer's action language approach, saying, ". . . however logical Schafer's line of thought may be, he does not take into account the need for gradualness in theory change if the psychoanalytic 'group self' is to be preserved" (1977, p. 85). In this interesting remark, Kohut seems to imply that Schafer's ideas are so revolutionary that we should perhaps put off seriously considering them, lest they cause too much upheaval in the field. He further pointed out that there is a distinction between colorful, metaphorical language and anthropomorphism, an objection which has already been addressed.

It is possible that during analysis and during development, the interactions described here occur with fantasies of internalization on the part of the analysand or child. If so, his language will tell us this. We can assume that such fantasizing occurs in the analyst, however, if he has read and espouses the object relations literature.

Fairbairn

Fairbairn rejected Freud's concepts of the instincts and psychic energy and believed that dynamic structure should be the object of study, with the antilibidinal ego system being the cause of all psychopathology. It was observed above that Freud's concept of drive translates into postulated motivation for behavior--or, as we would prefer,

the reasons for what a person does. When Fairbairn discarded drive theory, he disagreed with the notion that the infant relates only to people for the purpose of gratifying himself orally or sexually. Instead, Fairbairn believed that the infant seeks to relate to his parents purely for the sake of relating to them. This is what Fairbairn meant by the concept of the libido as object-seeking. Fairbairn believed that only if the child does not establish fulfilling, satisfactory ways of relating to people does he seek primarily to gratify himself orally and sexually. Only if the first people he encounters frustrate or reject him, may he begin to view them purely as means by which to gratify himself in other ways.

Thus Fairbairn's theorizing is based upon the notion that people need and want to relate to and contact other people from the beginning of life. They seek out meaningful ways of relating to other people and usually the most immediate people available are their parents. They need for their parents to love and value them for themselves and they react joyfully if their parents respond to them in this way. Such infants develop into adults who enjoy living, loving, playing, working and who readily, but not blindly, trust others and continue to seek others, whom they experience as supporting and enhancing. They expect other people to relate to them positively and sympathetically.

Fairbairn thought that no one would grow to hate and fear other people unless his parents or primary caretakers rejected or frustrated him in infancy or childhood. Since no one can grow up without at some point experiencing others or the world as frustrating, the point is

almost academic. But it does differentiate him from Freud, who believed that people normally resent each other, because of the fact that one must sacrifice unrestrainedly gratifying oneself due to others' existing and wanting to gratify themselves, too.

Fairbairn believed that when the child is frustrated by the object, he introjects parts of the object into his psyche, with concomitant withdrawal and splitting of the ego. We would reformulate and say that when the parent, by her presence, excites the infant and then frustrates him at the same time, the child reacts angrily and withdraws. He continues needing and wanting his mother, and goes on hating and resenting her for frustrating him; both are done more and more intensely as time goes by. But, because he continues needing and wanting his mother, he represses what he is doing, and consciously idealizes her. He also does something else: he begins to hate and despise himself for wanting and needing his mother in the face of her frustrating him. He treats himself as he feels he has been treated-- here we touch on the concept of identification. He continues to want the mother, who, he imagines, possesses everything and could give him what he wants; and he hates the mother he feels has rejected him. Unconsciously he may fantasize that the rejecting, frustrating mother and the loving, giving mother are two different people.

As he does this, he withdraws from the mother as a real person. Rather than perceiving her realistically, he either idealizes her or acts in accordance with one or another of the mothers he fantasizes-- being demanding and clinging, or aggressively hating and rejecting her.

Withdrawing can also be seen as a way of behaving aggressively. Later in life he reenacts these ways of relating with other significant people, and may even seek out people who will play a complementary role. In short, when one's parents have been rejecting and frustrating, one tends to expect others to behave in a similar way, and to isolate oneself from them while desperately wanting to reach out to them.

Thus Fairbairn's antilibidinal ego system has been reconceptualized as ways of behaving which one maintains unconsciously. Here there is no structure, dynamic or otherwise, no libido, not even as a convention, no ego, and not even a self, only a person behaving conflictually. He is likely to experience himself as split, divided, but this does not mean he actually is, since there is nothing to split or divide.

It was noted above that Fairbairn reconceptualized the psychoanalytic view of the development from the oral through the anal and phallic stages. For Fairbairn, the infant needs and wants to relate to others, and the stages described by Freud are viewed as modes of relating. One's libido is not fixated in certain stages; rather, one is "fixated" at a certain way of relating to objects. We would translate these ideas as follows.

In normal development, the child relates to his mother through the oral mode. For Fairbairn, this means that the infant or baby introjects aspects of the mother into himself. We could reinterpret this in action language to mean that the child imagines or believes he introjects the mother, or parts of her, into himself. He feels

that he is gaining sustenance, being fed psychologically by her when they interact. He assumes that all he needs to do, in order to relate to her satisfactorily, is to take in what she provides. This is an immature method of relating to other people, but some people continue to relate this way throughout life, believing they should only have to take what is provided by others, in order to relate to them in a fulfilling way. They react angrily throughout life when others do not respond in accord with what they expect and demand, either overtly or covertly. This is an example of what Freud might have called fixation of libido at the oral stage. Similar analogues may be made for the anal and phallic stages.

If the child does not encounter rejecting and frustrating parents, he does not withdraw as much, but eventually begins to perceive them more realistically and relate to them more maturely. For instance, he will begin to want to give something back to them in return. At first, still in a primitive mode, he may think his feces are a suitable gift. Later he may decide that he wants to give a baby to the parent, or give to the parent sexually. Eventually the child will learn to give and receive in such symbolic ways as through talking, touching, creating or enjoying. More mature ways of relating may be associated with the person's unconsciously fantasizing the giving and taking in more primitive ways. This is why people may relate to others anxiously, fearfully or mistrustfully. We may view the introjected objects as being what one expects or assumes about others consciously and as the way one fantasizes about them unconsciously.

Again, we may ascertain that someone is fantasizing unconsciously in two ways. First, he will act as if what he fantasizes were true, usually without consciously knowing why; i.e., he may avoid contact with people as if any contact with them would destroy him. Secondly, he will provide clues by what he says. The language and metaphors he uses ("I love my mother to death.") should be carefully attended to.

Projection and introjection are used similarly by both Guntrip and Fairbairn. When the person "introjects an object," he experiences himself as being the same way that he experiences those around him, or he treats himself as he perceives others have treated him. If his mother treats him harshly, he feels badly, hates himself, etc. If his mother loves and accepts him, he accepts himself as he is. He also tends to see the world in terms of the way he has experienced others or the way he fantasizes relating to others.

When Fairbairn states that drives do not exist apart from structure, he is saying that we do not simply feel aggressive or behave aggressively in a vacuum. We only behave aggressively in regard to another person or to ourselves. Fairbairn recognized that we can only feel in relation to people, real or imagined, present or remembered. It makes no sense to refer to loving, hating, emoting or aggressing, out of the context of relating.

Using action language, we can refer to loving and hating ourselves, viewing and treating ourselves in various ways. By saying there can be no splitting of objects without splitting of the ego, is meant that we cannot love or hate another without a corresponding

change in the way we feel about ourselves. Both Fairbairn and Guntrip asserted that if we hate significant others, we hate ourselves, and if our parents treat us harshly we treat ourselves harshly.

Fairbairn retained the concept of repression, saying it is structure, not drives, which are repressed. Recall that repressing represents rendering and maintaining some past or present act in the unconscious mode. In other words, repressing involves the child's or adult's purposeful forgetting, preventing oneself from remembering what has happened, or preventing oneself from realizing what is presently being done. When this is done consciously it has been referred to as suppressing, whereas one represses unconsciously.

Fairbairn's point about repressing structure--the ego and objects--rather than impulses, relates to his idea that drives do not exist in and of themselves. What we repress are ways we feel about people, fantasize about them, relate to them, treat them, believe about them, and how we believe or expect them to relate to us. We also repress the way we feel about and treat ourselves. One may repress these ways of relating for a number of reasons, such as one's associating them with unpleasant ways of feeling. But always what the analyst needs to learn and reveal to the client is his manner of relating to others and himself in self-defeating ways.

Fairbairn's concept of the antilibidinal ego persecuting the libidinal ego and indirectly repressing the exciting object is also easily described in action language. The person despises himself

for wanting and longing to contact people, and he treats himself and others hatefully and contemptuously instead of communicating that he craves and longs for others. Concomitantly he mistrusts others, rather than believing that people exist who would support him. The concept of splitting corresponds to the fact that these two ways of behaving, withdrawing and needing others, are so extreme as to be mutually exclusive ways of behaving in what Fairbairn would consider an unhealthy and conflicted person. A more unified way of acting would involve less extreme and more compatible ways of feeling and relating to oneself and others. It would involve less repressing and less splitting.

It may also be recalled that Fairbairn, in saying that the individual is object-seeking from the start, said that the ego works on the reality principle from birth. This is also an anachronism, since the reality principle originated as a counterpoint to the pleasure principle in a dualistic theory Fairbairn largely rejected. The reality principle represents the child's attempt to reconcile the demands of reality with the demands of the id and the superego, and was conceptualized as the activity of an ego which was not seen as object-seeking. If one wanted to think in terms of principles, it would be more consistent for Fairbairn's theory to postulate an object-relational principle of some kind. However, since Fairbairn wished to get rid of pseudo-scientific concepts, it seems most consistent to refrain from postulating any principles as such, at least at the present time.

Guntrip

Most of Guntrip's concepts are based on Fairbairn's theory and are used by him in the same way as they were used by Fairbairn. This applies to the antilibidinal ego system, the concepts of repression and splitting, and libido as object-seeking, translations of which will not be repeated in this section.

When one's parents do not value, love and accept the child for his own sake, the child reacts in a number of ways. The antilibidinal ego system represents the child's withdrawing from others; the regressed ego means he withdraws and avoids people. If the parents reject the child long enough and pervasively enough in his efforts to contact them, he eventually avoids involving himself with other people. Instead he immerses himself in his own thinking, daydreaming, fantasizing. He prefers being alone and not communicating, to risking making contact with people. In short, he habitually withdraws.

This is a description of Guntrip's regressed ego, deep within the psyche and lacking contact with objects. Much more could potentially be said about it. The person fears contacting people, imagining he will be annihilated or destroyed, or that he will annihilate or destroy them (as by greedily attacking them) if he relates intimately and lovingly to them. He longs desperately to relate to others in a loving, fulfilling way. The longer one isolates himself from others, the more intensely one desires and craves relating to people, and the more one fears making this contact. Therefore he withdraws and avoids

them, and this may be done shyly, angrily, contemptuously, etc., depending upon the individual. In Guntrip's words,

Such an infant grows up only able to use, not really able to relate to, people. His inner unsureness of his own reality as an ego is likely to be shown in role playing, exhibitionism, with little real communication, taking rather than giving, fearing to give since it may feel like a loss or self-emptying. He may seek to bridge the gulf between himself and others by "thinking" rather than "feeling," by impersonal intellectualization with greater investment in theories and creeds than in real people (1974, p. 834).

Here Guntrip wrote about what the person was doing in action language terms, with a few notable exceptions; e.g., we would exclude the phrase "as an ego" in the second sentence. We hope that not even the most schizoid child or adult ponders over his own "reality as an ego."

Let us examine more closely the quotes by Guntrip from the preceding chapter. If we were to remain consistent with his statement referring to psychoanalysis as the psychology of "persons developing in the medium of personal relationships, past and present," (1974, p. 831) we would have a consistent theory. However it may be recalled that he went on to say that, "the truth seems to me to be that there is one basic psychophysiological life-drive towards the object-world, which generates fear and aggression when thwarted."

This was an immediate and typical move away from the developing person and towards mechanistic and cause-effect thinking. Instead we should say that when the parents frustrate the child's attempts to reach out to them, i.e., if they do not value and love him for himself,

or if they ignore, reject or neglect him, he reacts angrily and fearfully. Above all, he needs to contact his parents closely, to experience them as loving, supporting and caring for him. They must nurture him emotionally as well as physically. There is no need here for a concept of energy, except to say that the child energetically seeks his parents out and communicates that he desires to interact with them.

Guntrip further stated that he preferred "the concept of a psychosomatic whole with ego potential, developing principally libidinally in object relations, but also aggressively if thwarted," with the ego as "the whole psychic person, the psychic aspect of the basic psychosomatic whole being." "Developing libidinally" must refer to learning to trust, love and care for other people as the child has been cared for himself. If he does not experience loving and supporting parents, he begins and continues behaving aggressively; he tries to contact them more forcefully, insistently, demandingly, and if he tries unsuccessfully over a long period of time, Guntrip described how the child progressively withdraws, mistrustfully hiding the fact that he needs and longs to contact people. He also begins to fear contacting others and fears his wanting and needing to contact them. According to Guntrip, the child withdraws hopelessly, begins behaving helplessly, passively and regressively, cutting himself off from others. He experiences himself as being vulnerable, weak, fragile, and he lives secretively, resentfully, anxiously and fearfully.

As an aside, we might question why Guntrip named his ego the regressed ego. The term "regressed" seems to imply that there is a

very early point in life during which the child is withdrawn and avoids relating to others. This contradicts Guntrip's view of the young infant. Therefore it seems that "withdrawn ego" or "schizoid ego" would have been more appropriate nomenclatures. However, the only direct bearing of this on our present discussion is to indicate another point of inconsistency in Guntrip's theorizing.

To return to our discussion, we reiterate that, if the ego represents the whole person, we do not need the concept of ego. Instead of saying the ego "develops structural identity and individual characteristics by organizing its experience as it goes along," we would say that the person develops habitual ways of responding, reacting, behaving, living and relating to others by organizing what he experiences and perceives. The "primary natural self" is simply the person, the regressed ego represents what he does if his parents frustrate him for too long. (Guntrip believed that when problems develop, it is because the parents actually frustrate the child, rather than the child's inaccurately experiencing them as frustrating.)

Guntrip saw development "either as growth in ego-strength or as ego-splitting and the proliferation of ego weakness." This means that the child either learns, grows, develops and matures psychologically and emotionally, in which case he experiences himself as and behaves competently, assertively, constructively, productively, and effectively, or else he behaves weakly, confusedly, conflictually.

Guntrip wrote about the so-called schizoid person holistically when he said that, in effect, the closer we examine their way of living,

the more they are found to be experiencing themselves as empty, worthless nonentities--meaningless, futile, isolated, lonely and aimless. They experience a craving for close contact for security's sake . . . which at the same time they fear because they feel they can do nothing effective to realize or accept it (1974, p. 836).

Schafer couldn't have said it better himself.

From what Guntrip wrote, we can conclude that he believed that the infant is unable to cope with rejection from parents, and that an adult with a split ego is unable to cope with other people and the world. We could reformulate this idea and say that the infant copes by denying that he needs others, by withdrawing, rejecting other people angrily, etc. And one continues to behave this way in order to protect oneself from experiencing similar painful feelings, which he then expects throughout life. As an adult he does not allow himself or others to become aware that he wants and needs other people, thus reacting in two incompatible ways to other people (both wanting and withdrawing from them), both of which he disclaims.

Guntrip said that splitting refers to one's reacting conflictually to the fact that one needs people. One denies that one needs other people and disavows the experiences of needing others and all the ways he feels about others and himself. When he disclaims what he is doing, he undermines himself and does not act confidently. He then experiences himself as lacking something he may call confidence, esteem or some other ability or quality. Guntrip said that an internal object is an experience of the ego or self. We would prefer to say an internal object is a way of experiencing oneself as well as being a way

of relating to other people. An internal object relation is a way of experiencing and relating which one may maintain throughout life, habitually, unthinkingly, unknowingly, unconsciously.

Guntrip too retained the concept of repression. But for Guntrip, as well as Fairbairn, one only represses the way one relates to others, currently or remembered. There is no wish or drive per se that is repressed, only what we believe, feel, hope, want, need, in regard to ourselves and other people.

Guntrip also took note of Fairbairn's inconsistency in retaining Freud's concept of the reality principle, saying "Fairbairn subordinates the pleasure principle to the reality principle, which is now seen as the object-relationships principle" (1969, p. 289). He pointed out that Fairbairn meant something quite different from what Freud meant in using the term "reality principle," so different that a different term should really have been used.

Guntrip said that one part of the person withdraws while another part struggles with the outer world, so that the person is prey to a loss of internal unity. With our current way of thinking, we do not believe there is anything internal that can be unified or split, and do not believe that one "part" of a person can do one thing while another "part" does another. Rather, one may do several different things simultaneously or alternately. The person may feel that one part of himself is doing something while another part is doing something else. But this is not true. He is doing it all. This is what we must help him to understand.

In the case of the regressed ego, one is wanting, denying that one wants, withdrawing and rejecting others, and disclaiming or repressing that one is doing so. We would not be surprised to discover that the individual in question experiences himself as "prey to a loss of internal unity," although he is not "prey" to any impersonal force or situation. He has managed to avoid relating openly to someone else, and simultaneously avoided realizing consciously why he has done it, or even that he has done it. While he is busying himself doing all this, no wonder he feels unable to do anything in an effective, confident, unconflicted manner. One cannot behave in an unconflicted way if one is behaving in a conflicted way! In one consciously wants to behave freely and unconflictedly, while unconsciously behaving conflictedly, and believing the latter is necessary, one is likely to see oneself as helpless or weak.

The child or adult may fantasize that it is a part of himself that is withdrawn (the regressed ego). But again, it is he who has withdrawn and continues to withdraw. He hides what he thinks and feels, and imagines that he is still the demanding, clinging, destructive baby he once was, imagining that he might kill or destroy anyone who related to him closely or intimately. Thus he is also behaving protectively when he avoids contacting others closely. To say he is regressed means that he unconsciously believes himself to be in past situations, or experiences himself or others as if he were in past situations. Perhaps he has not yet learned to see things in another

way. He does not trust anyone enough to risk changing the way he behaves. The therapist's task is to help the person trust rather than mistrust, reveal rather than hide, admit rather than disclaim, reach out and communicate rather than withdraw, risk rather than clinging to habitual ways of thinking and feeling.

For Guntrip the ideal is to develop in a unified, unconflicted manner, relating freely and directly to other people rather than withdrawing conflictually. One can only mature this way if one relates in a healthy, satisfying way to others from the beginning of life. If the parents prevent the child from relating to them in a healthy way, the child expects other people to treat him in a similarly frustrating and rejecting way, and acts accordingly. He may even perceive or experience others as frustrating and rejecting him as his parents did, and react in a hostile, withdrawn, rejecting or fearful manner for that reason. He may never give others a chance to prove themselves to him, and if someone treats him in a friendly way, he may misinterpret this, ignore it, and reject the person. The more rejecting one's parents have been, the more resolutely and completely one withdraws and isolates oneself, and the more tenaciously one clings to one's way of seeing others. One may even seek out people who will relate to him in a similarly rejecting way, i.e., who will confirm what he expects.

Thus a truly personal theory need not be a psychodynamic theory, but rather a humanistic theory. Here the person and his way of behaving is of "absolute fundamental centrality and importance," not the

ego. We focus on what the person wants and needs, not on the libidinal strivings of his ego; and on the way he relates to people, not his object relations. This removes a false dichotomy between internal and external objects: one either relates to people realistically and openly, or withdraws fearfully, expecting others to treat him badly, and angrily isolating himself from them. To make this theoretical change, we need only say the person does whatever Guntrip says the ego does. This is a simpler and more parsimonious way of viewing the person.

Discussion

A number of objections might be made in regard to the language on the preceding pages. First of all, one may object that these are all highly general statements. For example, to say that "one acts according to what one believes about oneself and others" may be seen as providing little specific information. However, this is no more general than the corresponding psychodynamic statements, such as, "The ego relates to internal objects," which form the body of the currently accepted theory.

The statements presented here provide a necessarily limited number of examples of the way in which theoretical constructs can be expressed in terms of the person's way of behaving. Since each person carries out these possibilities in his own way, there are an unlimited number of directions in which these descriptions could be elaborated, refined, specified or elucidated. Here we have demonstrated that the

constructs can be transformed in a meaningful, nonsimplistic way. Despite what might be expected, action language does not limit us to specifying only obvious, observable acts.

Another objection might be to the repetitive nature of certain terms, such as "experiences oneself" or "perceives others." Here we would again call attention to the original theory, and point out that these words are no more repetitive than, for example, the words "ego," "libidinal strivings," and "objects" are in Guntrip's and Fairbairn's theories. In addition, our terms relate directly to the person, rather than to some non-experiential constructs which must be translated to be understood.

Some of the constructions above may seem awkward or unwieldy. This is to be expected when developing a new way of talking about people and what they do. The language of theory needs to be precise and exact, especially at first. Later on, after it has been perfected and we have gained experience using it, we might risk referring to shorthand terms like "expectations" or "hopes" as nouns, as long as we were aware that these actually refer to ways of behaving. But now, when nouns of attribution tend to be so readily thought of as qualities, we should circumspectly state exactly what we mean.

It is important to note that this way of theorizing answers Guntrip's question about how to conceptualize "two egos interacting." Using action language we can state that people influence each other, affect each other, hurt each other, aggressively attack or injure each other, or lovingly support and nurture each other. The point

is that here there is no sharp differentiation between the way we speak of one person, as opposed to the way we speak about two people relating to each other. This can be done because there is no distinction between inner and outer, and therefore no need to explain how two egos could affect each other. We simply have two people interacting.

It has been said that Klein did not take her object relational theory to its logical conclusion and reject drive theory. We would assert that Guntrip and Fairbairn did not take their personal theory to its logical conclusion, which would have meant rejecting the concepts of ego, object, libido and any other constructs left over from the natural science model. If they had followed the implications of what they were saying, they would have discarded dynamic structure and psychodynamic theory, and focused on the person.

It has been shown that all the ideas in the theories can be expressed with the person as agent. This includes those hypothesized events of early infancy which Klein and Kernberg speculated about. In his book, Schafer (1978) remarked that the infant does not act in the same intentional way that an adult does, and we cannot know what the infant is doing or meaning to do. This is a viable position, but, even if we do not know, we can theorize and speculate about it, and many have. As used here, the usefulness of action language lies in part in our being able to communicate even the speculative and controversial ideas of Klein and Kernberg, without the use of explanatory internal fictions.

The definition of psychoanalytic object relations theory given by Kernberg (Chapter II) focused on the interaction between the interpersonal and the intrapsychic. In our reconceptualizing we have found that a different theme recurs in all the theorists' ideas. They all contend that people relate to each other and to themselves in terms of the ways they have related to significant others in the past, usually parents. They learn to relate to others and to themselves by the way they relate to their parents; and they maintain the problematic ways of relating they learn early in life unless they learn new ways to relate in a different setting.

Psychoanalytic object relations theory is a theory which delineates the way people develop ways of relating to other people and to themselves, the way they reenact these ways of relating later on, and how a therapist can intervene to help the person change and mature, developing new ways of relating. The theory states that people learn their ways of living, acting and relating only in the context of relating to others, and can only change in that context. The theory also specifies that the way we feel about and treat ourselves is intimately related to the way we feel about and treat other people, and vice versa.

Naturally it has not been possible to translate every concept in every theory, but it has been demonstrated how this translating can be done. It has been found that it is actually quite simple to do such translating. One needs only to consider how a given construct refers

to the way a person acts, what it means in terms of the person, and then reconceptualize in terms of what the person is doing, rather than as entities within the mind. As Wittgenstein said, the difficulty is in overcoming the prejudice which stands in the way of doing so. To that topic we will devote Chapter IV.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

The end of all our explorations
Will be to come back to where we began
And discover the place for the first time.
T. S. Eliot

Hans Leowald (1979), in a thought-provoking article, addresses the current predominance of interest in preoedipal development. In it, he discusses the oedipal complex in terms of the guilt aroused in any descendant who assumes or asserts responsibility that once belonged to a parent or authority figure. Leowald presents a view that seems to go beyond Freud when he suggests that the repression and sublimation of the oedipal conflict--actions which are traditionally viewed as a successful resolution--are not the most mature way of dealing with oedipal issues.

Repression and sublimation imply the unconscious retention of the old parental relationships, while acting on them in disguised form. This precludes the possibility of creating a truly novel way of living and relating to others. A mature object-choice would not involve seeking mother or father in one's spouse, argues Leowald, which is the implication if repression or sublimation occur. A mature choice--of a love object or of a way of living--entails the renouncing of the tie to the parent, both consciously and unconsciously. Such a renunciation is a painful and difficult thing to do.

Leowald refers to a conflict experienced between one's quest for emancipation and independence, vs. the desire to remain loyal, connected to and dependent upon one's parents. He focuses on the idea that when a person begins to act autonomously, significant emotional ties with the parents are severed and parental authority is destroyed. Sadness, concern, a desire for atonement and a metamorphosis of one's way of living follow, all of which are integral components of a mature approach to life. But Leowald presents a more radical idea, namely that "the assumption of responsibility for one's own life and its conduct is in psychic reality tantamount to the murder of the parents, to the crime of parricide" (1979, p. 757).

Taking over the power and authority one's parents once held involves diminishing them at a time when their power may be waning in many areas, due to age and the passage of time. One may fantasize that one is contributing to their death and decline. Seeing one's parents move inexorably closer to death strikes a chord of impending loss and may lead to one's wanting to hold onto whatever aspect of the parent one can, even if this means deferring or submitting to their authority.

Resolving this conflict and moving beyond it requires that one implicitly admit and own one's own feelings, including resenting the parents and wishing to kill them. Thus the attainment of self-responsibility is symbolically both the "guilty deed of parricide" and the restitutive atonement for that crime. Without this deed, according to Leowald, we would not be able to seek out novel ways of relating,

being enriched by the novelty and creatively destroying and reconstituting the old parental relationships. As he puts it,

Parents or children tend to be rendered relatively impotent, at least as far as the generational engagement itself is concerned. Parricide, if the child convincingly develops as an individual, is more than symbolic or on the plane of intrapsychic reorganization. Not to shrink from blunt language, in our role as children of our parents, by genuine emancipation we do kill something vital in them--not all in one blow and not in all respects, but contributing to their dying. As parents of our children we undergo the same fate, unless we diminish them (p. 764).

In addition, renouncing parental authority involves the realization of past disillusionments, disappointments and realities which are difficult to accept. One may have long ago forgotten, but secretly harbored from childhood, beliefs about the limitlessness of the parents' power, and their ability to take care of one. These must be superseded by one's having to care for oneself in a world where nothing is secure or invulnerable, and nothing lasts forever.

Repressing and sublimating are ways of avoiding the conflict. They are ways of compromising between clinging to our parents on the one hand, and annihilating the old way of relating to them, on the other. By repressing the conflict, we unconsciously maintain immature, illusory views or relationships to them, while consciously maturing. Then we do not have to completely renounce or destroy the illusions.

What we believe and prefer not to believe makes up who we are and how we live. Therefore, those who stop short of true autonomous living by merely repressing, will somehow express this. They may develop reactionary or conservative views or resist change. They may

set up some figure as a revered and idealized authority, whose word is not to be questioned. This person's ideas may be maintained in static, dogmatic form, much as one would keep the room of a loved one just as it was when the person was alive--losing sight of the fact that, had the person continued living, the room would probably have constantly changed. In psychoanalytic object relations theory, psychopathology is seen as stemming from such rigid fixations on past events, beliefs or attachments; through such adherence to the past we prevent the emergence of changing perspectives and blind ourselves to new possibilities.

According to object relations theory, the child believes in a delusional fusion with mother which is gradually dispelled. Attaining "object constancy" (Mahler, 1975) involves the fantasizing and feeling that mother is still there when he ventures away. The most mature step would be to relinquish the fantasy that the parent is still there with us, and to realize that we are alone and can be alone securely. By continuing to believe in inner objects as structural entities in the mind, the psychoanalysts and object relations theorists are shying away from that mature step.

Instead these theorists wish for an authority figure--a father figure, if you will--who, one imagines, imparts the truth and may be respected as timelessly wise and knowing. Overthrowing his ideas might represent killing him off. At the very least, rejecting the metaphor of internal objects involves surpassing or moving away from

him, and embracing an autonomy free of fantasies and illusions about union with internalized parents who live on inside us.

There is evidence in the vernacular that psychoanalytic object relations theorists share a fantasied view of people with nontheorists. People frequently refer to what goes on "in their heads" or inside them, "building up" or "letting out" feelings, etc. The prevalence of such popular usage suggests that we all share these fantasies, possibly maintained from childhood or infancy, a time when we knew nothing more than the taking in and putting out of substances. The longing for unity with others might lead to a reluctance to relinquish these fantasies, a reluctance to realize that we are all unchangeably separate.

This may in fact motivate theorists to resist changing their views. To say there are no internal objects would be to annihilate the parents we think we have in our heads, and to stand alone. It would also mean taking Freud off the pedestal we have erected for him--misguidedly--with all the attendant implications Leowald suggested. ". . . the oedipal attachments, struggles and conflicts must also be understood as a new version of the basic union-individuation dilemma" (Leowald, 1979, p. 775). So too is the relinquishing of a paradigm espoused by one's intellectual and personal mentors.

People frequently begin therapy with the idea that something prevents them from behaving in an autonomous way. Although the therapist's job is to help the person realize there is nothing preventing him but himself, the theory states that there is something

inside preventing him from acting. The person may resist believing that he is an autonomous, fully responsible individual. He may prefer to imagine that his parents, or parts of his parents, are inside him, influencing him in some way. He may comfort himself by thinking he can take intangible substances from others, that he can somehow manage to overcome the separateness and merge with others. This would deny his ultimate and unalterable separateness and differentiation, not only from parental figures, but from everyone else, as well.

There are other emotional reasons for wanting to maintain a belief in the container metaphor as real. Schafer believes that the appeal of psychoanalysis stems from its being congruent with the archaic bodily language of infancy, a language that has long pervaded the metaphors of everyday speech. He focuses on the concreteness of this language and the fact that it is deficient in terms defining the individual as an active agent.

We do not know what the infant experiences, but we may speculate that the infant experiences himself as helpless and passive, since to a large degree (to adult standards, at least), he is. One often brings this way of experiencing oneself into adulthood, continuing to feel like the helpless, passive victim of external forces, and remaining oblivious to the notion that one could take control of one's life. One in fact may come to resist the latter notion, as it would involve a reorganizing of one's world view. Choice and responsibility may seem unsettling and anxiety-provoking, if only because

they represent a significant change from a view of people's behavior as being determined. Besides these individual reasons for maintaining these illusions, there are reasons in the interpersonal sphere.

Schafer also said that by disclaiming our actions we limit the excitement, the violence, etc. of social interactions. Humans have developed language conventions to spare themselves the intensity of their feelings, alluding to them as they overlook them. We find it tactless, even threatening, to speak plainly and directly, particularly in relation to others. The substantive metaphors permit the use of the passive voice and soften the message, protecting both the listener and the speaker. Consider the difference between saying, "Our time is up," and "Please leave now."

In the therapy room, thinking in terms of what people are doing would mean no longer focusing upon the past, nor the internal world as explanatory. It would necessitate attending to what we are doing in this room now--two individuals interacting, with all the attendant degrees and intensity of feeling. This is potentially much more disturbing than a study of the client's endopsychic structure or even his past. It is unsettling to encounter ourselves or each other without scientific explanations, which are removed from direct experience, on which to dwell or distract ourselves.

In the theoretical realm, too, it is often easier to intellectualize in terms of impersonal forces than to speak simply about what people do. In action language terms, we must realize that people

affect each other: they touch each other, help, support and nurture each other, but also hurt, injure and destroy each other. Realizing such bare facts about people is not easy to stomach. For example, it is less disturbing to say that the infant internalizes a bad object, than to say that the mother hurts the child by rejecting him, hurts him in a way that he may not recover from for many years, and then only through considerable pain and effort.

The Conservative Analytic World

The conservative nature of much of the analytic world is well known. We have already discussed Sutherland's (1980) statement to the effect that Fairbairn refrained from changing analytic theory as much as he could have done, so as not to unduly ruffle the analytic feathers of his colleagues. Perhaps he would not even have proposed as divergent a theory as he did, had he not been practicing in a relatively isolated location, largely cut off from communication with other analysts for a good portion of the time (Jones in Fairbairn, 1952, p. v).

Besides Fairbairn's possible reticence, one wonders if Kohut may have deferred to tradition in a similar way. The tone of sections of Chapter 5 of his second book, sound like a reaction to a conservative backlash from his earlier book. He hastens at one point to assure the reader that, by the principle of complementarity, we need not reject Freud's original formulations. ". . . we are not questioning the data of Freud's discovery . . . we are not necessarily denying the truth of the classical theory of the central position of the Oedipus complex. . ." (Kohut, 1977, p. 223).

The word "necessarily" might impart the presence of an impulse on the part of the writer to place some other problem as central, at least in some cases, but a concurrent reluctance to do so. Kohut again seems to be placating a defensive analytic readership when he says,

It does not indicate any lack of respect for the great explanatory power of the classical formulations, or any lack of appreciation for their beauty and elegance, when I affirm now that it is possible to, from the viewpoint of the psychology of the self in the narrower sense--i.e., from the viewpoint of a theory that considers the self as a content of the mental apparatus--to enrich classical theory by adding a self-psychological dimension (1977, p. 227).

Perhaps Kohut would have placed the development of the self as the center of his theory, if not for a felt need to maintain the tripartite id, ego and superego as Freud originally formulated them. So Kohut compromised and kept both: the theory of the self in the broader sense, and the theory of the self in conjunction with the tripartite structure as proposed by Freud. He did this despite the conceptual confusion and lack of parsimony that results.

Of course, even if he had only formulated the self in the "broader" sense, this would not have entailed a major paradigm change, because the self is seen as a structural component of the mind invested with libidinal energy and enduring over time. We simply mean to point out that Kohut's ideas might have been more consistent and more novel within this paradigm, had he not felt constrained to avoid tampering with any of Freud's constructions.

To continue this line of thought, recall that Kohut stated that a firm, cohesive self is necessary in order to experience the oedipal

phase. He believed that, if the self is well established as a structure, the trials of the oedipal period become more like achievements. Healthy parents who have emphatically and supportively responded to the child prior to this period, are likely to respond joyfully, proudly, and affirmatively towards the child's sexual and aggressive striving at ages 3-4. Parents who have not done so before this time are unlikely to respond affirmatively during the oedipal phase, either.

This suggests that oedipal problems might be only one era in a history of traumatic interactions between parents and child. In the context of healthy parent-child relationships, the oedipal phase, though difficult and painful, need not be as overwhelmingly negative as traditionally portrayed. In this view, a child's problematic negotiation of this phase suggests the likelihood that there were problems earlier. The implication here is that the oedipal stage might be no more central or crucial for development than earlier years.

Kohut said that, if the parent responds empathically through infancy and childhood, the oedipal phase becomes a source of potential strength, rather than weakness. Yet he did not go as far as postulating the formation of the cohesive self as the central problem of development. This is in contrast to Fairbairn and Guntrip, who made more radical theoretical changes (still within the same paradigm) by their outright rejection of some major portions of classical theory and a reorganization of some others.

The upshot of this line of reasoning is to reiterate that Freud has been given the status of a magus whose word was final, and to

demonstrate another possible way this has impeded thinking in novel ways. As Kuhn pointed out, a paradigm, once adopted, is a way of thinking which effectively prevents novel solutions and ideas from gaining acceptance. This is ironic, since Freud did alter his theory over time, and probably would have continued to do so if he had continued to live.

What Did Freud Mean?

Holt referred to Freud's annoyance at those who, even in his own time, took his every sentence as profound (1972, p. 6). In fact, in reading Freud we find that he frequently remarked that these are only hypotheses, which are open to change and revision as we learn more. For example,

Whereas the psychology of consciousness never went beyond the broken sequences which were obviously dependent on something else, the other view, which held that the psychical is unconscious in itself enabled psychology to take its place as a natural science like any other. The processes with which it is concerned are in themselves just as unknowable as those dealt with by other sciences, by chemistry or physics, for example; but it is possible to establish the laws which they obey and to follow their mutual relations and interdependences unbroken over long stretches--in short, to arrive at what is described as an "understanding" of the field of natural phenomena in question. This cannot be effected without framing fresh hypotheses and creating fresh concepts; but these are not to be despised as evidence of embarrassment on our part but deserve on the contrary to be appreciated as an enrichment of science. They can lay claim to the same value as approximations that belong to the corresponding intellectual scaffolding found in other natural sciences, and we look forward to their being modified, corrected and more precisely determined as further experience is accumulated and sifted. So too it will be entirely in accordance with our expectations if the basic concepts and principles of the new science (instinct, nervous energy, etc.)

remain for a considerable time no less indeterminate than those of the older sciences (force, mass, attraction, etc.) (1939, pp. 158-9).

Analysts seem to have overlooked or forgotten statements like this in trying to preserve the edifice Freud built, and looking with disfavor on any questioning of his ideas. Here Freud acknowledged that he was attempting to formulate a vision of reality which would only remain useful as long as fresh hypotheses were tried and the ideas in the field continued to grow and develop.

It is doubly ironic that analysts cling to Freud's words because, after all the time that has passed since Freud wrote, we can never be sure what he actually meant by what he said. In fact, if Bettelheim is correct, we cannot even be sure of what Freud actually said--at least not by reading him in English. Bettelheim (1983) persuasively argues that Freud has been grossly misunderstood by the English-speaking world because of seriously faulty translations which took phrases and words rich in emotional connotations and transformed them into sterile scientific jargon, far removed from anyone's personal experience or feelings.

Bettelheim suggests that one reason for these mistranslations is, as he puts it, the universal desire to avoid the unconscious. We, of course, would prefer to characterize people as wanting to avoid recognizing and confronting themselves with direct immediacy, and especially wanting to avoid their unconsciously maintained ways of feeling, experiencing and thinking. Such recognitions are potentially upsetting.

In terms of conceptualizing the person as agent, a theme which has recurred again and again in these pages, it is relevant to note that a literal and more faithful translation of Freud's Ich is not "ego," but "I." Perhaps the sterile abstractions of the mechanistic element in Freud's theory would not have so easily gained prominence, if his work had been translated correctly. The misunderstanding of Freud was perpetuated by M. Klein, already cited as the mother of the object relations movement, so to speak. Ironically, Klein believed she was being faithful to Freud when, despite all opposition, she retained the concept of instinct, and even emphasized the death instinct. According to Bettelheim, Freud never used the German word for "instinct" when referring to people, only when he was referring to animals. And this distinction was apparently important to him.

Based upon mistranslations such as these, Bettelheim asserts that, "The English translations cleave to an early stage of Freud's thought, in which he inclined towards science and medicine, and disregard the more mature Freud, whose orientation was humanistic . . ." (p. 32). Those who followed Freud have seized upon the mechanistic and perpetuated the inconsistency between it and the humanistic. The drives, the structures, and internal processes have become the focus of theory, with the implication that if we could but understand and explain them, we would understand people (n.b., Kernberg, Meissner). This method of avoiding self-knowledge and self-confrontation is, again according to Bettelheim, antithetical to what Freud wanted to convey.

Up to now we have considered emotional and historical reasons for the retention of the container metaphor. But there are intellectual reasons, as well, for the reluctance to relinquish the natural science paradigm. We use the tenets of psychoanalysis to organize our way of perceiving and understanding what people do. There is a certain inertia inherent in a particular way of thinking, which is self-perpetuating. That is to say, we structure our thinking with the methods and assumptions of a given paradigm, thereby perpetuating that way of conceptualizing reality. Therefore the premises on which the paradigm is based seem to be almost self-evident, and we are unlikely to question them.

Kuhn's engaging discussion points out, furthermore, that there are emotional factors intertwined with the intellectual. He calls our attention to the emotional commitment made by people to a particular paradigm. We gain a sense of security by viewing the world in one particular way. To give that up would entail a period of confusion and disorganization we generally prefer to avoid.

Jacques Lacan

Jacques Lacan saw all of Freud's words as metaphoric, except for Freud's concept of the unconscious. The unconscious for Lacan is reality, forever unknowable. Lacan believed that there is not a linear relationship between what we say and what exists in reality. In Lacan's terms, the unconscious is made up of a language, and conscious discourse is not translatable to it. Words do not reflect reality,

but are only parallel to it. To put it another way, the language we speak is far removed from our unconscious mode of being. What we say and believe consciously, and what we are, feel, think and do unconsciously, are very different (Stewart, 1983).

According to Lacan, we attempt to know ourselves from a position in which we are already divided against ourselves--through language. We cannot experience or get to know ourselves through language; when we speak or reflect, we are always removed from the immediate experience about which we are speaking or reflecting.

Lacan's view is consistent with existential-phenomenology, in that phenomenology also states that there is no objective reality about which we can speak; there is only what we say about it, which is always subjective. Lacan calls reality the unconscious, because in psychoanalysis or psychology, the subject matter is the person. The psychoanalytic object relations paradigm conceptualizes the person in terms of a metaphor, the spatial metaphor. But Lacan states that reality, the unconscious, can only be talked about in terms of metaphors which reflect or approximate, but do not capture reality. Lacan believes that the spatial metaphor is useful in talking about human experience, but that we can never get to the reality of human experience through words. The truth is forever unobtainable; and language, which seems to impart understanding, only results in the mistaking of misunderstanding for comprehension.

Wittgenstein and Lacan have some interesting parallels. They both use cryptic statements to express themselves, focusing on the

process of their communication as a way to teach the reader, in addition to the content. Both separate reality from the world of discourse, believing that no final truth can be expressed in words.

Schafer's approach is consistent with both of these theorists, because he sees both his own and Freud's systems as one way to describe reality, about which no real explanation is possible.

Lacan pointed out that it is typical of human beings to build up a language system and focus upon it as reality, mistaking the signifier for the signified. This is a normal process which occurs as the child is socialized, and is often done defensively. It corresponds to our view of the way psychoanalytic object relations theorists have taken their words and metaphors literally, rather than viewing these as ways of telling about what we experience.

Lacan's argument is analogous to the phenomenological view of reflected behavior. We can never really comprehend an unreflected act because, no matter how much we reflect upon what we are doing, there is always an unreflected act in process. We can never truly be the object of study, because we are always the subject. This is also true of an interaction. We can never be "objective" about another person, because we are always part of that person's field, influencing and participating in what he does. In this sense the "I" (or the "we") is like the eye of a tornado, which is only defined by its relation to the world, not by any substance or structure (Pollio, 1972).

Psychoanalysis and Phenomenology

It is suggested that applying Schafer's system, with its emphasis on present acting and intending, to psychoanalytic clinical and developmental observations, might reconcile the apparent conflict between phenomenology and psychoanalysis. Phenomenology bids us to look at the individual as unique, rather than looking for theoretical generalities, and not to divide the person into functioning entities or structures, but to view him holistically. It has been shown via action language in Chapter III that one need not divide the person into structural units to meaningfully interpret his actions in psychoanalytic terms.

Phenomenology's emphasis upon acts and intentions in the present, when combined with insights provided by psychoanalytic object relations theory, provides an entirely new perspective on the person as he walks into the consulting room. We see that he is not really empty, fragmented or split. He will neither be destroyed nor fragment, nor will he destroy someone else, by relating intimately with them. But he believes that he will, and acts accordingly. When reacting anxiously, he may even go as far as to fragment his thinking.

He may behave as if he carried internal objects around with him. He may feel like he has things inside him and he may even hear them talking. But these are only metaphors, "as if's." If we can help him to see this, he may learn that it is not necessary to continue living as he has been doing. To do this, we focus upon what

he does in the present situation to create problems for himself, based upon what he has learned and decided in the past.

The container metaphor is just that--a metaphor--and, like most metaphors, it is very useful in helping us to conceptualize and communicate our comprehension of what the person is experiencing. We must learn the patient's language before we can teach him a new one. We hope not to impose upon him the language of a theory, but rather to listen to his own words and use these as a starting point.

It has been shown that all the changes in psychoanalytic theory by object relations theorists have occurred within the natural science paradigm Freud originally espoused, and which remained an integral part of his theory. In this sense there has been no paradigm shift. The application of Schafer's method of systematizing introduces a new paradigm, and still allows us to communicate meaningfully. It permits us to focus more readily upon what the person is doing now, without sacrificing the unique insights provided by talented and perceptive clinicians--like Kohut, Fairbairn, Guntrip and Freud.

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