The Political Representation of Latinos in the U.S. House of Representatives

A Dissertation Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

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December 2019

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DEDICATION

Le dedico este trabajo a mi madre, Clementina, por creer en mí – especialmente en los instantes que falle y en los que dudé mis habilidades.

Y a mi esposa, Keri, por ser mi refugio en los tiempos difíciles y mi compañera en celebración de mis triunfos.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work could not have been completed without the help and support of so many people, and there's no way I can list every single one them out, but I hope that I can convey my immense gratitude to all that have helped me along the way.

First, I would like to thank Dr. Nate Kelly – my teacher, colleague, and friend – for all of his help and support during my time in Knoxville. Nate is an individual that has lived up to, and greatly surpassed, all of the expectations I had for an advisor coming into the program. His willingness and dedication to helping me develop as a student, researcher, and professional in this field is something that I will forever be grateful for. I know just how fortunate I am to have found Nate, and it is not something I take for granted. I hope that one day I am able to be half of the advisor and mentor that he has been to me.

Secondly, I want to thank the rest of the members of my committee – Drs. Tony Nownes, Christopher Ojeda, and Adam Newmark. The countless hours that these individuals have dedicated to me in, and outside of, the classroom have helped me develop as an academic and have unquestionably strengthened my arguments and development of ideas. Though all of these individuals have been extremely important in my academic career, it is Adam that deserves a special praise for encouraging me to pursue this career path (and academic institution) in the first place; I know that I wouldn't be here without the guidance and assistance he has provided to me throughout my graduate career.

I'd also like to express my sincere appreciation for Dr. Todd Hartman, an individual that took me under his wing early on in my graduate career and gave me plenty of opportunities to develop as a researcher and academic during my time at Appalachian State University. Relatedly, to Drs. Richard Pacelle and Phillip Ardoin – two of the best supervisors and teachers I could have ever asked for – I want to voice my gratitude, because they took a chance on me early in my graduate career. Their willingness to give me an opportunity to learn and grow as both a student and teacher in the classroom is something I will never forget.

In addition, I want to thank all my family and friends for their support because they played an important role in the completion of this dissertation. This feat would have undoubtedly been a lot harder without them supporting me through it all. Though I don't have the space or time to single every individual out, I hope everyone that has helped me knows how thankful I am for them. That said, I will do my best to acknowledge a few of them here.

To two of my closest colleagues, Allison Dillard Critcher and Yu Yan, I want to say: Thank you for everything you've done for me in, and outside of, the classroom; I genuinely appreciate your friendship and look forward to seeing you both progress in your academic careers and life.

To my in-laws, Ronald and Teresa Arrington, I want to give a special thanks to for the way in which they've welcomed me and truly made me part of their family; I know just how rare that is in this world, and I am so thankful for them. The support that they've provided is even more impressive, and I can't even begin to show my gratitude for all they've done to help me in this endeavor.

My mother, Clementina Hernandez – the person that to me epitomizes unconditional love, hard work, perseverance, and so many other enviable qualities – deserves all the praise in this world for everything she has done to help me reach this point. Her willingness to make all of the sacrifices she's made so that we (my siblings and I) would have a better life is truly awe-inspiring.

I am very thankful that she instilled in me her work ethic and critical thinking skills, because I know I would not have made it to this point without those skills. In addition, and more importantly, I want to express my gratitude for her unfaltering support and belief in me, especially in those times when I struggled and those times in which doubted myself.

I'd also like to take a moment and give a special shout out to my sister, Jazmin Morales, for her blind support in every step of my academic career and endless laughs; I really couldn't imagine life without her.

Jace Jedediah Hernandez, my son, deserves thanks for helping to keep my spirits up throughout this process. Though his infectious smile took me away from my desk plenty of times, it also provided me with so much joy and added motivation to complete this dissertation.

Finally, and most importantly, I want to thank my wife, Keri Leann Hernandez, for being the amazing, kind, and loving individual that she is. She has shouldered the burden of being a partner to a striving academic; something that isn't always easy. Without her: support in difficult times; her willingness to listen to (and read) my countless ideas; and being understanding during all those long workdays where I was in a zombie-like state, this dissertation would not be where it's at today. I truly cannot thank her enough for keeping me grounded and providing me with perspective and encouragement when I needed it the most.

"Like the other immigrant groups, the day will come when we win the economic and political rewards, which are in keeping with our numbers in society. The day will come when the politicians will do the right things for our people out of political necessity and not out of charity or idealism. That day may not come this year. That day may not come this decade, but it will come someday."
– Cesar Chavez

ABSTRACT

The Latino population has experienced significant growth in the last few decades, and as a result of that growth, the Latino population is now the largest minority group in the U.S. Despite this, our understanding of the attitudes, behavior, and representation of this group still lags relative to others in American society. As a result of that growth, the Latino population is now the largest minority group in the U.S. Amongst other things, which is why there is a need to explore how this group is represented in government. Prior work – be it due to data limitations, the low number of Latinos in office, or theoretical considerations – has been unable to provide an adequate picture of the level of representation afforded to Latinos. This study is an attempt to add to our understanding of Latino representation in the U.S. I do this through the presentation of three distinct but interrelated papers. The first paper looks at the level of congruence between Latinos and their legislators relative to non-Latino whites and their legislators. This paper finds that Latinos are at a disadvantage, one that is exacerbated in contexts where they make up larger segments of the population. In addition, I find that this disadvantage is rooted in both the attitudes and behavior of both Anglos and Latinos. The second paper explores legislative communication on Twitter with respect to the interests of the Latino population. I find that Latino and Democratic legislators are more likely to post about issues important to Latinos. I also find that there is a difference in the behavior of Latino and non-Latino legislators attributable to legislator ethnicity, with Latino legislators more likely to post symbolic messages than their non-Latino colleagues. The third paper explores the role of legislator ethnicity in policy framing on bilingual education. I find that shared ethnicity, or rather the lack thereof, between legislators and respondents does influence support for bilingual education in certain situations. Collectively, these papers provide a clearer picture of the relationship between legislators and their constituents and of the role that legislator characteristics and district demographics play in influencing legislative behavior.

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INTRODUCTION

Scholars have long been interested in the relationship between people and the individuals that represent them in office. Only relatively recently has this focus moved toward understanding representation as it relates to specific minority groups (see Smith 2004 for a general discussion of work on race within the discipline).[1] Latinos, because of their newfound status as the largest minority group in the U.S., have recently become the focus of pundits, candidates, and scholars alike.[2] Given the potential of this group to influence American politics, there is a need to more deeply understand what Latinos care about, how they behave, how they interact with the government, and how government represents them; the last of which is the key focus here.

At its core, this dissertation is concerned with exploring how Latinos are represented and accounting for the factors that produce variation in the representational process. This work – like the concept of representation itself – touches on different ways in which this segment of the population is represented.[3] The first chapter explores the extent to which Latinos are substantively represented in the U.S. House of Representatives and the underlying mechanisms structuring the situations in which they are not. In doing so, it taps into the preferences of Latinos relative to non-Latino whites, and it provides a more complete look at the contexts in which Latinos are likely to have their interests advanced by their legislators. The second chapter examines whether legislators are talking about the issues that are important to the Latino population, which speaks to symbolic

[1] The literature on Latinos (and, to a larger extent, Asians) is still underdeveloped when compared to that on African-Americans and whites in American politics.
[2] The terms Latino and Hispanic are used interchangeably throughout this dissertation, as is the norm in the literature within the discipline.
[3] Though this work speaks to different facets of Latino representation, no single project can adequately speak to the different types of representation afforded to any given group, much less, the American people as a whole.

representation, as what legislators say (or do not say) speaks volumes about how they view Latinos. The third chapter is focused on indirect representation, which can potentially be gained through the non-Latino Anglo population. This chapter asks: how effective can legislators be in garnering support for issues important to the Latino population through shaping the opinions of the non-Latino population?

Types and Levels of Representation

There are various ways to explore the political representation of groups in society. Much ink has been spilled in writing about the different types and levels of representation. It is the work of Pitkin (1967), however, to which the literature within the discipline traces key theoretical debates and conceptualizations regarding representation. The important types of representation for this work are descriptive, substantive, and symbolic.[4] Descriptive representation refers to whether legislators reflect the individuals they represent with respect to demographic characteristics (e.g., a black legislator representing black constituents). Substantive representation refers to the extent to which representatives advance the interests of the individuals they represent. Symbolic representation, according to Pitkin (1967), speaks to how representatives "stand for" their constituents[5], and it should be noted that it does not require the presence of descriptive representation nor the actual advancement of constituent interests. Though theoretically distinct, in practice these different types are often interconnected, which means that a single legislator can provide all three types of representation to a given constituent. This dissertation is aware of this

[4] Pitkin (1967) also speaks of formalistic representation, which speaks to the institutional arrangements that dictate who represents whom.

[5] Sinclair-Chapman (2002) defines symbolic acts as those "aimed at giving voice to group interests, agenda-setting, and offering alternative views or political possibilities [that] are integral to enhanced political deliberation [and] that address the concerns of disadvantaged groups" (p. 8).

and takes advantage of those different intersections when looking at the representation afforded to Latinos.

In addition to different types, the level at which representation is explored is another key consideration in the study of representation. Substantive representation can be explored at the individual level. This can be done by looking at the dyadic relationship between constituents and their representatives (Miller and Stokes 1963), which is the level of analysis to which much work in the discipline gravitates (see Griffin 2014). It can also be explored at the aggregate level, which can be done by looking at the collective attitudes of a district (or group of people) to see how they line up with the behavior of legislators (Weissberg 1978: Hurley 1982; Hero and Tolbert 1995) or that of the government as a whole (Wlezien 1995; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Gilens 2012). The level at which representation is explored has both theoretical and methodological consequences. It should also be noted that the finding of congruence at one level does not guarantee that the same applies to other levels.[6] Exploring the representation afforded to the people at different levels allows for a more complete picture of the relationship between the people and government.

Descriptive Representation

Descriptive representation, though not the central focus of any of these individual papers, provides the underlying foundation that ultimately holds my work together. Like the broader literature on minority representation, this work is aware of – and makes analytical use of – the ethnic ties that bind legislators to their constituents and citizens. Scholarship in this vein of the literature has long operated under the assumption – at least implicitly – that minority legislators

[6] Indeed, individual-level preferences and voting behavior of legislators could be consistent with each other while the collective outputs of the legislature may not be. The opposite could also be true.

bring something different to the table, something that results in the enhanced representation of their co-ethnic (or co-racial) constituents (see Mansbridge 1999; see also Griffin 2014).

Work in this area of study has explored various aspects of descriptive representation, from differences in the behavior of minority legislators and non-minority legislators – and the effect this has on the representation of their co-minority constituents – to the effect of descriptive representation on the attitudes and behavior of constituents (see Griffin 2014 for an overview). Indeed, a natural preoccupation in the aftermath of the passage of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) of 1965 has been gauging the impact of the increased election of minorities in Congress; but there are various ways to do this. Many scholars have looked at how the presence of minority legislators affects the way in which minorities are substantively represented (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Swain 1995; Cameron et al. 1996; Overby and Cosgrove 1996; Canon 1999; Lublin 1999; Whitby 2000; Tate 2003; Casellas 2007, 2011; Grose 2011; Rouse 2013). Other scholars have looked at how the presence of minority legislators influences constituents. Some have looked at how descriptive representation shapes how constituents feel towards and think about government (Gay 2002; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Sanchez and Morin 2011), while others have focused on its effect on the political behavior of minorities (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gay 2001; Banducci et al. 2004; Barreto et al. 2004; Rocha et al. 2010).

When considering the descriptive connection between legislators and constituents, the questions of what makes minority individuals different and how that translates to the expectation that they will better advance the interests of their co-ethnic (or co-racial) constituents inevitably arise (Mansbridge 1999; but see Dovi 2002; Rocha and Wrinkle 2011). Indeed, though much of the work in this vein assumes that minority legislators are in a better position to advance the

interests of her/his co-minority constituents than non-minority legislators are, it is a fairly strong assumption that the color of an individual's skin (or their membership in a given group) will influence their behavior (see Dovi 2002). However, this nation has a long history, and legacy, of societal and legal realities that have structured the relationships between individuals from different groups based on race (and ethnicity).[7] Therefore, minorities, because of shared history and life experiences have – to varying levels – a sense of linked fate, whereby individuals that are part of a racial (or ethnic) group believe that their own success is tied to that of their group more broadly, and this is something that has a bearing on how individuals behave (Dawson 1994; Schildkraut 2013; Lavariega Monforti 2014). This is the connection that scholars believe to be driving the behavior of minority legislators (Mansbridge 1999; Dovi 2002) and tying them to the segments of the constituency that are like them. Having that commonality is theorized to put them in a better position to advance the interests of those individuals that are like them (Mansbridge 1999).

Latino Representation

Scholars trying to understand the extent to which Latinos are represented have been primarily preoccupied with the factors that lead to higher descriptive representation (see Casellas 2009) and the subsequent effects of descriptive representation (and its absence) on the substantive representation of Latinos (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Kerr and Miller 1997; Lublin 1997; Casellas 2007, 2011; Griffin and Newman 2007; Knoll 2009; Minta 2009; Wilson 2010). The focus on the descriptive-to-substantive representation connection is substantively limited insofar as there are few Latino legislators in Congress and of the fact that many if not most

[7] Mansbridge (1999) mentions "contexts of historical political subordination and low de facto legitimacy," which definitely play a part in shaping the worldviews of individuals generally, and of legislators too, as a result (p. 628).

Latinos are not represented by co-ethnic legislators.[8] Nonetheless, there is some support for the notion that Latinos are better represented by co-ethnic legislators in both voting behavior and in the broader legislative process. Latino legislators not only seem to demonstrate an awareness of Latino interests, but also a willingness to advance those interests (relative to their non-Latino colleagues) at various stages in the legislative process (i.e., agenda-setting (Wilson 2010; Rouse 2013), in committee work and oversight (Minta 2009), and when voting (Griffin and Newman 2007; Casellas 2011)).

How Latinos in the electorate fare on the substantive representational front in the absence of descriptive representation is even more of a motivating factor in exploring the representation of Latinos, especially in the short-term because this population is only expected to keep growing.[9] Even if Latino legislators are more likely to advance the interests of Latinos in the legislative process than non-Latino legislators, that is not in and of itself normatively concerning. Indeed, all individuals, at least in theory, have the ability to adequately represent minorities. Further, if Latinos merely heighten the already adequate level of representation afforded to Latinos in the electorate by non-Latino legislators, then the absence of descriptive representation may not be problematic from a substantive viewpoint.[10] Nonetheless, the literature on the subject casts doubt on whether this actually takes place, even in those districts where Latinos increasingly make up larger shares of the total population (see Griffin and Newman 2007). Available scholarship on the

[8] There are currently 38 Hispanics in Congress (NALEO Educational Fund 2019), which is the highest number in the history of our nation, but much of the work on representation was done decades ago (see Welch and Hibbing 1984; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Kerr and Miller 1997), and the number of Latino legislators in Congress didn't eclipse the 20 member mark until the turn of the new millennium (Ornstein 2013).

[9] Granted, this could mean a close in the descriptive-to-population gap (Latinos currently make up about 18% of the total population and hold only about 7% of the seats in Congress (NALEO Education Fund 2019) that currently exists, but it could also mean that this gap only further grows.

[10] This is in no way meant to discount the other benefits that are commonly associated with descriptive representation.

subject suggests that Latinos are more ideologically liberal than their non-Latino co-citizens in the electorate (Griffin and Newman 2007; Segura 2012; Barreto and Segura 2014) and that the voting behavior of Latinos in Congress follows suit (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Kerr and Miller 1997; Casellas 2007; Griffin and Newman 2007). The work of Griffin and Newman (2007) also suggests that there is an ideological gap between Latinos and their legislators relative to whites and their own legislators, a difference that is not lessened by larger Latino districts and even exacerbated in those districts where Latinos get close to a majority. Not only is this finding in need of further exploration, so are the other ways that Latinos are represented by their legislators, and this dissertation is an attempt along these lines.

Though the literature on Latino representation provides a better understanding than what was available just a couple of decades ago, there are still questions in need of exploration along with some theoretical and methodological refinements that need to be made to the available work on the subject. The Latino population has grown significantly in the last few decades (Barreto and Segura 2014, p. 15; Brown 2014). This growth has led to an increased presence of Latinos in various offices from city councils to state legislatures and Congress (Casellas 2011). Even though those numbers still lag behind their numbers in the population, increased presence means that there is more statistical leverage to explore how their presence influences the relative representation afforded to Latinos by co-ethnic legislators when compared to that afforded to them by non-Latino officeholders. Similarly, with growth has also come a dispersion in the population of Latinos across the United States (Stepler and Lopez 2016; Milligan 2018).[11] In light of those trends, there is a renewed interest by pundits, campaigns, and researchers in this Latino "Sleeping Giant" as a

[11] The Western region of the U.S. still holds the majority of the Latino population, but the South and Northeast have experienced significant growth in their Latino populations since the turn of the millennium.

potential force in American politics in the years that come (see Barreto and Segura 2014, p. 15). That growth has not happened in a vacuum, however. Indeed, there are intergroup dynamics at play that need to be considered alongside said growth. The status of Latinos as the largest minority group in the U.S. (see Flores 2017) means that this segment of the population affects the demographic hierarchy in the country (see Vespa et al. 2018); something that has the potential to invoke anti-Latino attitudes and behavior (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). The different papers here speak to these demographic changes and their consequences for the representation of Latinos. I now turn to a brief discussion of each specific portion of the dissertation as well as outlining more of the substantive questions that I endeavor to speak to.

Overview of Papers

Paper Number 1: Substantive Representation

My first paper is focused on the extent to which Latinos are dyadically represented by their legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives relative to non-Latino whites. Prior work – be it as a result of limitations in the data, a low number of Latino legislators in office, or theoretical considerations – has failed to adequately explore the representation afforded to Latinos in the legislature. The Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) provides not only a nationally representative sample of Latinos and positions taken by them (and non-Latinos) on important issues of the day, but also roll call votes taken by their respective legislators (see Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2013). Clearly, dyadic representation is not the only way to explore representation (see Weissberg 1978; Hero and Tolbert 1995), but it is one of the most direct ways to do so. However, prior work, in its reliance on proxy measures for the interests of Latinos, has provided an imperfect measure of Latino representation. I use actual positions taken by individual respondents and explore how they line up with the voting behavior of their legislators.

In addition, and arguably more importantly, the paper explores the factors that account for variation in the representation afforded to Latinos relative to whites. Recent scholarship finds what appears to be a backlash effect, in which larger Latino populations lead to more ideological distance between Latinos and their legislators when compared to whites and their legislators (Griffin and Newman 2007). In essence, the explanation provided for such a deficit in the representation afforded to Latinos in more Latino-populated districts is that those larger populations lead to more anti-Latino sentiment. This is theoretically consistent with the in-group versus out-group dynamics posited by scholars going back to V.O. Key's (1949) seminal work on the effect of the size of the African-American population on the attitudes and behavior of the white population (see also Allport 1954; Blalock 1967; Quillian 1995; Hood and Morris 1997; Taylor 1998; Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Rocha and Espino 2013; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). While theoretically consistent with a racial backlash explanation, there is a need to explore the underlying mechanisms driving this effect. Indeed, it could be that this "backlash" effect is actually (or additionally) rooted in the attitudes and behavior of the Latino population. Latinos could be less likely to participate as their share of the population grows, something that may come from a lack of mobilization, a free rider effect, apathy, or from the fact that Latinos tend to be lower on the socioeconomic spectrum than non-Latino whites. Irrespective of the determining factor(s), finding that Latinos in more heavily Latino-populated districts participate at lower rates than those in districts with lower Latino populations could add a fundamentally different perspective to the equation. Similarly, it could be that the attitudes of Latinos become more distinct when we move from districts with lower Latino populations to those with higher Latino populations, which could

also explain a representational deficit, one that isn't rooted in the attitudes (or behavior) of the non-Latino white population. I explore those possibilities in the first paper.

Paper Number 2: Symbolic Representation

An important part of what legislators provide constituents is symbolic representation. Through their presence in the legislature, their behavior, and communication, legislators work to provide their constituents with psychological reassurance that they are aware of and working to advance their constituents' interests in office (see Sinclair-Chapman 2002). In my second paper, I explore the communication of legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives with respect to the interests of Latinos. More specifically, I look at both the substance (i.e., whether the tweets address issues important to Latinos) and nature (i.e., whether the tweets are policy-oriented, symbolic in nature, media, etc.) of legislative communication on Twitter. Since its introduction, Twitter has been widely adopted and used by candidates and legislators alike (see Lassen and Bode 2017), and it is currently used by millions worldwide, including many governments and heads of state. Unlike other parts of the legislative process (i.e., agenda-setting, committee work, and roll call voting), legislators do not face the same constraints on their behavior in how they communicate with their constituents. Indeed, they are, at least theoretically, free to post whatever they want on Twitter, which is why what they choose to post (or not to post) lets constituents know what their priorities are and whether legislators are on their side.

Legislative communication, however, is undoubtedly connected to the behavior (and success) of legislators in the broader legislative process. This means that legislators cannot post about their success on the legislative front if they are not able to get policies through the legislative process. At best, they can post opposition to the policies on the agenda or attempt to present issues important to their constituents. Symbolic acts have long been considered a strategy for legislators

to compensate for the lack of change in the status quo on the policy front (Henry 1971; Barnett 1975; Eulau and Karps 1977; Sinclair-Chapman 2002; Tate 2003; Dancey and Massand 2017; Tillery 2017). In exploring legislative behavior on Twitter, this paper adds not only to our understanding of how Latinos are represented in Congress, but also to that of minority legislative behavior in comparison to non-minorities in the legislature.

Paper Number 3: Indirect Representation (and the Limits of Descriptive Representation)

My third, and last, paper explores the possibility of indirect representation of Latino interests through the non-Latino population. A theoretical staple of the literature on minority representation is the descriptive connection between the people and the individuals that represent them in government. This flows naturally from the expectation that minority legislators are better positioned to advance the interests of their co-minority constituents. That connection has been tested in many ways, and at different stages in the legislative process, with the general conclusions being that minority legislators do advance the interests of their co-ethnic and co-racial constituents. This is important for the individuals being represented because, in addition to the psychological and emotional benefits of descriptive representation, there are actors actively working on the issues important to them as constituents. Nevertheless, legislators do not only represent their co-ethnic (or co-racial) constituents, which means that there is a need to garner broader support for their policies in office. Part of their job is representing all of their constituents. However, recent literature on interactions between legislators and their constituents with whom they do not share a racial or ethnic identity suggests that the communication between the two groups is strained, to say the least (see Butler and Broockman 2011; Broockman 2014; Mendez and Grose 2018). Work in this area shows that constituents are less likely to reach out to their representatives when there is not a demographic connection between the two (Broockman 2014), and also that legislators are

also less likely to respond to their constituents when they do not share the same racial or ethnic identity (Butler and Broockman 2011; Broockman 2013; Mendez and Grose 2018). Both of these realities may be rooted in the intergroup dynamics that scholars have been exploring for decades (see Huddy 2001; Hogg et al. 2017).

Since an important part of legislative success is ensuring that constituents support (or at the very least tolerate) the behavior of legislators in Washington, D.C., whether they can successfully communicate with constituents and garner support for their favored policies is of particular importance. Frames are at the heart of communication, individuals couch their arguments in the most favorable light, and legislators are no different. Policy frames in political communication have long been looked at as a means to gain support (or opposition) to issues on the political agenda (see Chong and Druckman 2007). A long literature on the subject suggests that frames are generally effective in doing so (Nelson et al. 1997; Nelson and Oxley 1999; Jacoby 2000; Chong and Druckman 2007; Merolla et al. 2013). More recent work has moved towards exploring the situations in which they don't (Brewer 2003; Hartman and Weber 2009). One such factor that may affect how effective policy frames are is the source cue (Hartman and Weber 2009; Nicholson 2012; Weber et al. 2012). While an oversight by earlier work on the subject, this is something so fundamental that it needs to be considered when looking at communication between two actors as this can influence how receptive individuals are to the message they are presenting. Indeed, the best policy frame may not be effective if the source presenting it isn't viewed as a credible, legitimate, or trustworthy one (Hartman and Weber 2009).

In this third paper, I account for the relative success that legislators can have in framing a political issue contingent on the shared (or not) ethnicity between them and their constituents. The

literature on elite-citizen communication suggests that the latter will sometimes adopt positions taken by the former (Minozzi et al. 2015; Butler and Broockman 2017), but we do not know how legislator ethnicity influences the propensity of constituents to do so. Based on the other literature on communication patterns between constituents and legislators, and that on intergroup dynamics, I theorize that policy frames will only be successful when there is a racial descriptive connection between the two parties involved. I explore this by using a survey experiment where the key manipulation is legislator ethnicity to see whether my theory is correct.

Broader Topics and Connections

One of the most important concepts in the study of American democracy is representation. Indeed, our republican form of government leads to the reliance on intermediaries for the advancement of the interests of the people. That dyadic relationship between individuals and their representatives plays an important role in whether the outputs of government reflect the will of the people – it is supposed to be, after all, a government by the people, for the people. The U.S. House of Representatives was meant to be the closest to the people by design, and though other actors (governmental and otherwise) can have a bearing on the policy outputs of the American political system, there is an expectation that the behavior of those individual legislators will reflect the preferences of those that they're tasked with representing. Granted, though debates about the proper role of representatives – with respect to how they represent constituents – in the American context is one that has been ongoing since our nation's infancy (see Burke 1774; Pitkin 1967: Mansbridge 2003), there is an expectation that the behavior of legislators sometimes reflect the preferences of the people that put them in office.[12] The first paper speaks directly to this

[12] Though there is still debate about the delegate versus trustee models of representation, and even more nuanced conceptions of the relationship between constituents and their representatives (see Rehfeld 2009), this work is built

relationship and in doing so highlights the gap in the representation afforded to Latinos relative to whites, which provides motivation for and informs the other papers here.

Communication is an important part of the relationship between citizens and their representatives. It is a way for the people to let officeholders know what they want and for officeholders to keep citizens informed. Legislators go to great lengths to let constituents know about their behavior in and outside of the geographical districts they represent (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978; Arnold 1990; Jacobson and Carson 2015). The second and third papers explore legislative communication in two distinct ways. The Twitter paper looks at how legislators communicate with constituents and what they choose to communicate with them, both of which can provide us with a better understanding of how Latinos are represented. The last paper focuses on legislative communication in a different way; it looks at how effective (or ineffective) Latino and non-Latino legislators can be in communicating with constituents as influenced by shared ethnicity or the lack thereof. This is important because it adds to our understanding of a still growing literature on the strained relationship between constituents and legislators (see Mendez and Grose 2018).

How legislators behave in office has consequences for their own electoral aspirations and for the representation afforded to the individuals responsible for putting them in office. How legislators choose to spend their time in office is indicative of their priorities. Scholars have looked at legislative behavior in different parts of the legislative process in an attempt to get a better understanding of what makes them tick. Though far removed from Fenno's (1978) bird's-eye view

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on the notion that there should be some level of congruence between the preferences of the people and the individuals that represent them. In addition, and more importantly, as the work that follows will show, there is a disconnect between the preferences of Latinos and their legislators that is more pronounced than that between whites and their legislators, and this is something that any view of representation would have issues reconciling.

of legislative perceptions and behavior, the subsequent work on legislative behavior also gives us an idea of what is driving the behavior of legislators. Indeed, aside from making decisions on things like how much time is spent in the district versus at Capitol Hill or the amount of resources allocated to staffing, legislators are also tasked with engaging in the legislative process. In that formal process (e.g., committee work, roll call votes, etc.) legislators also have to make decisions about how they can increase their likelihood of being re-elected. It is there that more substantive differences in behavior amongst legislators can be gleaned.

An important argument normally made for increased descriptive representation is that it is a way to increase the substantive representation of underrepresented groups in society.[13] This work deals with those differences in legislative behavior based both on the individual characteristics of the legislators (e.g., race, ethnicity, partisan identification, age, etc.) and the composition of their districts (e.g., district demographics). As a result, the dissertation as a whole speaks to the differences in behavior and their bearing on the representation of Latinos. For example, the first paper looks at how the aforementioned factors influence the representation afforded to Latinos across different geographic contexts. The second chapter looks at how those same contexts influence what legislators are talking about on Twitter and how they're doing it, which highlights differences in priorities and legislative strategies chosen in their communication, the latter of which is of particular importance here. The last paper touches on the way in which demographic characteristics can moderate the communication between legislators and their constituents and, in doing so, provides some insight as to how legislators behave. A lack of receptivity on the part of

[13] In addition, there are also non-policy benefits believed to be associated with increased descriptive representation such as increased feelings of efficacy (Merolla et al. 2013), decreased feelings of political alienation (Pantoja and Segura 2003), and psychological reassurance rooted in symbolic acts on the part of minority legislators (Sinclair-Chapman 2002).

constituents could potentially lead legislators to change their outreach strategies and behavior more broadly in pursuit of their re-election bids on their horizons.

These different papers complement each other, as each is able to speak to different aspects of the political representation of Latinos. For example, the leading paper looks at whether or not the roll call votes of legislators are consistent with the preferences of constituents, which is important in its own right, but it is only one part of the legislative process and of the relationship between constituents and their representatives. Indeed, the absence (or presence) of congruence in that part of the legislative process does not mean that Latinos cannot be (or are not) represented in other ways and in other parts of the process.[14] The second paper looks at the representation of Latinos through the communication of legislators, which provides insight into the issues that legislators are discussing and how they are doing so. In addition, it also highlights differences in communication amongst legislators and, in doing so, points toward differences in the symbolic representation of Latinos. Therein lies the connection between those papers, as the realities of navigating the legislative process – and success on the legislative front – can influence the behavior of legislators and how they communicate with their constituents. Relatedly, the third paper is concerned with looking for an alternative path to increased substantive representation and it also deals with constituent communication. The former is a direct connection to the first paper as it is also preoccupied with variation in substantive representation, albeit through the non-Latino population. The latter is a connection to the second paper insofar that it adds to our understanding of communication between legislators and constituents.

[14] Nonetheless, that finding – and other literature on the subject – provide a basis for developing expectations for the exploration of representation in other areas.

Conclusion

This dissertation is an attempt to gain a better understanding of the representation afforded to Latinos by legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives. However, as the discussion above makes clear, there are different types of representation and various areas in the legislative process that can be looked at to gauge the representation afforded to this group. The leading paper explores representation on the back end of the legislative process: roll call voting. The paper that follows looks at representation via communication on Twitter. The last paper explores the possibility of indirect representation and a limitation of descriptive representation. The closing chapter discusses avenues for further study, new questions, and my research agenda moving forward.

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CHAPTER 1: THE REPRESENTATIONAL DEFICIT OF LATINOS IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Abstract

This paper explores the extent to which Latinos were substantively represented in the 112th U.S. House of Representatives (2011-2013). I make use of a large national sample of Americans to tap into the congruence of the attitudes of constituents with actual roll call votes taken by their legislators in office. In doing so, I am able to make comparisons between constituent attitudes and legislative behavior for Latino versus non-Latino constituents. Using a more refined measure than previous studies of constituent-legislator dyads across congressional districts, I find that Latino respondents face a representational deficit relative to non-Latino whites and explore the various factors, individual- and contextual-level, that explain variation in that relationship. One such factor is the size of the Latino population in a district. I find that larger Latino populations are associated with decreased representation for Latino respondents and, further, that this deficit is largely rooted in anti-Latino attitudes and behavior on the part of non-Latino whites in those districts. On the whole, the findings here are consistent with the backlash hypothesis

Introduction

Latinos are currently the largest minority group in the U.S. and make up about 18 percent of the population (Alonzo 2018). The 116th Congress is the most racio-ethnically diverse in our nation's history, with the largest number of Latino legislators in our history. But there is still a disconnect between the size of the Latino population and the number of Latino legislators in office.[1] One lingering question, that the available literature does not fully address is the extent to which Latinos are substantively represented in Congress. Work on the subject within the discipline is scarce, and that which is available does not provide an adequate picture of the aforementioned relationship. Thanks to the availability of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES), I am able to present a more refined measure of Latino preferences that takes into account actual constituent and legislator positions taken on issues of the day, instead of relying on general ideological measures or interest group scorecard ratings.

In addition, as a result of mixed findings on the expected effect of the size of the Latino population on the representation of Latinos, and more recent work citing an anti-Latino mobilization effect coming with larger Latino populations (see Griffin and Newman 2007), I also explore the role of Latino population size on the attitudes (and behavior) of whites as well as the underlying mechanisms responsible for any "backlash" effect on the representation afforded to Latinos. Indeed, while Griffin and Newman (2007) find that there is an ideological gap between Latinos and their representatives when compared to whites and theirs, a difference that is exacerbated by districts where Latinos comprise a larger segment of the population in the district,

[1] Latinos hold 38 seats in Congress, which is about 7 percent of the total membership in the 116th Congress, a number that lags behind their share of the population, which is currently above 18 percent of the total population (NALEO Educational Fund 2019).

they do not directly test for a backlash hypothesis. While this backlash explanation – rooted in group dynamics (i.e., in-group versus out-group attitudes) – is a possibility, it could also be that the behavior and/or opinions of the Latino population itself are fundamentally different in those districts where they comprise a larger segment of the population. Whether this gap is rooted in the behavior (and attitudes) of the Anglo and the Latino population has both practical and normative implications for the study of Latino representation. In any case, there is a need to explore differing explanations and flesh out the underlying mechanisms for that aforementioned gap – something that the available work has failed to do.

My work is an attempt to explore not only how Latinos are represented relative to non-Latino whites, but also to uncover the factors that account for variation in that representation. Amongst the factors explored are various individual-level respondent characteristics (i.e., partisanship, education, income, and participation) and contextual level factors (i.e., the size of the Latino population in a respondent's district, being in a district where a respondent is represented by a Democratic (and/or Latino) lawmaker), along with their interactions. Descriptive representation has long been lauded as a way to increase the substantive representation of minority groups. But even now – with more seats held by Latinos than at any previous time in the history of our nation – many Latinos are still not represented by co-ethnic legislators. This is but one reason why it is essential to account for the variation in representation afforded to Latinos in instances where they are not represented by co-ethnic legislators. I take up these – and other considerations brought forth by the available literature – to explore Latino representation here.

Theoretical Foundations

Representation

Representation is at the heart of our democracy. The American populace relies on officeholders at all levels of government to come up with (and pass) policy on their behalf. Therefore, the extent to which the preferences of the people are advanced in government tells us something about the health of our republic. One of the most explored facets of the relationship between the people and the government is centered on that particular part (i.e., congruence between the preferences of the people and the behavior of elected officials) of the policy process, and this paper is too. Even though policy responsiveness (or roll call congruence) is not the only way to conceptualize representation – as will be made clear below – it is one of the most direct ways to explore the relationship between the people and the individuals that represent them in office.

Representation has many dimensions (e.g., descriptive, substantive, symbolic (see Pitkin 1967)) and levels at which it can be explored (i.e., dyadic versus collective (see Miller and Stokes 1963; Weissberg 1978)). In regard to the latter, representation can take place and be explored at the dyadic level, which is that between individuals and their representatives and it can also be examined from a macro perspective (i.e., collective), which is how an institution (e.g., Congress) as a whole represents individuals or groups in society. On the former, representation can refer to the extent to which legislators mirror constituents demographically (i.e., descriptive), to the extent to which the behavior of legislators reflects the preferences of their constituents (i.e., substantive), or to "public gestures of a sort that create a sense of trust and support in the relationship between representative and the represented" (i.e., symbolic representation, Eulau and Karps 1977, p. 241; see also Edelman 1964; Pitkin 1967; Sinclair-Chapman 2002). Though different theoretically, these are intimately linked in practice – especially when we think about minority representation –

because they all have a bearing on how individuals are represented.[2] Here, the primary focus is on the substantive representation of Latinos in the electorate. But the presence of Latino legislators in Congress also allows for the exploration of how descriptive representation influences the substantive representation afforded to that segment of the population.

Though there are various ways to explore representation, congruence – or lack thereof – between the voting behavior of legislators and their constituents has long attracted the attention of scholars in the discipline (Miller and Stokes 1963; Erikson 1978; Bartels 1991; Hill and Hurley 1999; Wlezien 2004; Clinton 2006). Recent work in this vein of the literature has explored behavior in other areas of the legislative process such as agenda-setting (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Sinclair-Chapman 2002; Bratton 2006; Wilson 2010), committee work (Gamble 2007; Rouse 2013), and oversight (Minta 2011; Rouse 2013)), but roll calls are arguably more visible, and easier to access and evaluate. In general, the work that looks at this dyadic representation suggests that the behavior of legislators reflects the preferences of constituents at least some of the time (Miller and Stokes 1963; Hill and Hurley 1999; Wlezien 2004; Clinton 2006). We know less about how the preferences of Latinos are mirrored by their legislators and about the factors that influence variations in the behavior of legislators with respect to Latinos.

Minority Representation

The extent to which the behavior of minority and non-minority legislators is different has consequences for the individuals that they represent. Indeed, if there is no substantive difference in the way in which minority and non-minority legislators represent their constituents, then the reality that there is a large segment of the minority population that is not represented by someone

[2] The literature on minority has demonstrated that descriptive and other types of representation are linked, as race and ethnicity have been found to influence the behavior of legislators in office (see Griffin 2014 for a review; see also Hero 2017).

that mirrors them racially or ethnically should not be concerning from a representational standpoint, at least on the policy front.[3] However, the literature on minority behavior – at both the state and congressional level – suggests that there is something inherently different that minority legislators bring to the table which is evident in their behavior, as alluded to above (see Griffin 2014 for a review). This does not provide a rationale for increasing descriptive representation, however. But when coupled with the literature showing that there is often a disconnect between the preferences of minority and non-minority constituents (Griffin and Newman 2008), and between minority constituents and their representatives (Griffin and Newman 2007, 2008) [4], the representational deficit raises some concerns and ultimately calls for more descriptive representation.[5] Here, I explore whether or not such a deficit exists for Latinos and its potential causes, as those have a bearing on whether or not there should be more calls for descriptive representation or any other course of action taken on this front.[6] However, before moving on to the discussion of why we should expect to see a deficit or its causes, there is a need to look at other work on dyadic representation

Though the literature on the broader legislative process suggests that minorities behave differently in various ways, what is of particular importance here is whether their roll call voting

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[3] This is not in any way meant to discount the symbolic or psychological benefits associated with descriptive representation. However the paper is focused on substantive representation and that is the lens through which this argument is being made.

[4] In addition, some research also suggests that there is a disconnect in the two-way communication line between constituents and legislators, where the former is less likely to reach out to their representatives when they don't share the same race (Broockman 2014) and the latter is less likely to respond to requests from constituents that aren't of their own racial group (Butler and Broockman 2011), neither of which bode well for the representation of minorities.

[5] Indeed, if Latinos aren't being adequately represented by non-Latino legislators, then one tried solution is to increase the number of Latino representatives in office.

[6] That deficit could be rooted in the attitudes and behavior of non-Latinos, in that of Latinos, or a mixture of both, though more on this below in the discussion of potential factors explaining differences in representation for Latinos relative to non-Latino whites.

behavior is different and how this affects the representational prospects of the individual that put them in office. The literature on the representation of African-Americans in Congress suggests that black legislators not only display an awareness of the interests of their co-racial constituents – and members of the African-American population more broadly (Grose 2011) – but also show it in their voting patterns (Lublin 1997; Canon 1999; Lublin 1999; Whitby 2000; Tate 2003; Grose 2011). Similarly, work on the representation of women suggests that women display a higher propensity than men to advance the interests of women more broadly (Vega and Firestone 1995; Swers 1998, 2002; Dodson 2006; see also Reingold 2008). Though not the only factor that has a bearing on the representation afforded to the individuals that comprise the American population, descriptive representation is one that has to be considered here, especially in light of the deficit found by recent work (i.e., Griffin and Newman 2007). In addition, though the noted differences between minority and non-minority legislators remain after accounting for other factors (e.g., size of the minority population, legislator age, etc.), it is difficult to ignore the role that partisanship plays in the level of representation afforded to individuals. For example, Cameron and his colleagues (1996) note that in the absence of descriptive representation, blacks were generally better off when represented by Democratic legislators than by Republican ones.

Latino Interests

A prerequisite for variation in representation is variation in the preferences of the Latino population relative to those of the non-Latino population. Indeed, if Latinos and non-Latinos see eye-to-eye on political issues, then a discussion of differences in representation – at least with respect to constituent preferences and legislator behavior – is unnecessary. Although the contours of Latino public opinion are still being explored, there is enough work on the subject to indicate that the preferences of Latinos and non-Latinos generally differ, and also that there is enough pan-

ethnic cohesion in the preferences of Latinos to consider them a group (Leal 2007; Segura 2012; Barreto and Segura 2014). Latinos differ from their non-Latino counterparts in their preferences and also in the relative importance they place on political issues.

Immigration is an issue that normally gets pegged as a Latino issue, but pigeonholing the Latino population as a one-issue constituency is neither wise nor warranted, as there are other issues that are of particular importance to the Latino population. Indeed, bilingual education, health care, the economy, crime, and income inequality, amongst others, are issues on which Latinos demonstrate distinct preferences from non-Latinos (Leal 2007; Segura 2012; Barreto and Segura 2014). These issues also regularly top the "most important problem" lists among Latinos (Sanchez 2016; Vargas 2016; Barreto et al. 2018; Barreto 2019). Thus, there is a basis for exploring variation in representation afforded to Latinos and non-Latinos, one rooted in their diverging preferences on various issues. Here, I explore this by looking at congruence between respondents and their legislators on various issues ranging from tax cuts to ending "Don't Ask, Don't Tell." It should be noted that some of the issues I examine here are not necessarily high on the Latino agenda, but they are still worth exploring.[7] I describe the data in more detail below, but before doing so, I review the literature on representation with respect to the Latino population and the general expectations that stem from that literature.

Latino Representation

At its core, this chapter is concerned with explaining the level of representation afforded to Latinos, and in explaining variation in the representation afforded to this segment of the

[7] Though exploring representation on issues that Latinos care about (or place a primacy on, priority-wise) would be advantageous – insofar that it accounts for issues particularly important for this segment of the population – the data currently available doesn't allow for that. In addition, there is some value in exploring how Latinos are represented on issues that are on the political agenda.

population. The available literature on the subject is limited but does provide some guidance. In their seminal work, Welch and Hibbing (1984) explore the effect of legislator ethnicity and district composition (i.e., size of the Latino population) on legislator votes. Their work shows that in general, Hispanic legislators display a more liberal voting record than their non-Latino counterparts, and perhaps more importantly, that non-Latino legislators in districts with higher Latino populations are also more liberal than those from districts with smaller Latino populations (Welch and Hibbing 1984, p. 333). More recent work on the subject supports the general patterns found by Welch and Hibbing (1984). Indeed Casellas' (2007, 2011) work, which explores several Congresses (i.e., the 87th through the 104th), finds that the roll call behavior of Latino legislators is significantly more liberal than that of non-Latino legislators, even after accounting for various other factors including party affiliation (see also Kerr and Miller 1997, Lublin 1997; but see Hero and Tolbert 1995).[8] While insightful, these works are limited in what they can say about how Latinos are represented substantively.

For a variety of reasons, prior work has failed to provide an adequate picture of the extent to which Latinos are represented by their legislators. Take Welch and Hibbing's (1984) work as an example; it uses Conservative Coalition Support (CCS) scores as the dependent variable, which is a flawed measure of legislative action on Hispanic preferences. In addition, and arguably more importantly, the 96th Congress – the most recent of those which they look at – had only six Latino legislators, something that greatly limits the inferences that can be drawn from their analysis

[8] Exploring the 100th U.S. House of Representatives, Hero and Tolbert (1995) find that there is no discernable difference in the roll call voting behavior of Latino legislators when compared to their non-Latino colleagues. Casellas (2007) confirms this but finds that in all of the other legislatures explored that this is not the case. In addition, Kerr and Miller (1997) refute the findings of Hero and Tolbert (1995) on methodological grounds and conclude that their assessments of the models were incorrect, instead suggesting that there is a statistically significant difference in the behavior of legislators based on ethnicity.

(Ornstein et al. 2013).[9] Similarly, several works that were building on that of Welch and Hibbing's (1984), also suffer from some of those issues, though to a lesser extent (see Hero and Tolbert (1995); Kerr and Miller (1997)). Hero and Tolbert (1995) explore the 100th Congress, which had more Latino legislators and they also use the Southwest Voter Research Institute (SWVRI) scores as the dependent variable. That measure, while still an imperfect measure for Latino interests, does provide more votes to explore the relationship between legislator ethnicity and voting behavior. However, even then, there were only 10 Latinos in the legislature (see also Kerr and Miller 1997). Casellas' (2011) work is a departure from those kinds of measures mentioned above; he uses Poole and Rosenthal's DW-NOMINATE scores, which provide an assessment of legislator ideology based on all roll call votes taken in a given session (see also Lublin 1997; Griffin and Newman 2007). Griffin and Newman (2007) use respondent self-placement on an ideological scale, which while a closer measure of Latino interests, is problematic in its own right in light of what we know about how imprecise ideological self-identification is with regard to issue preferences (see Ellis and Stimson 2011).

While a definite improvement over earlier work (i.e., that of Welch and Hibbing 1984), there is an important part of the equation left out by prior scholarship on the subject: the preferences of actual constituents. Indeed, in using those aggregate (and proxy) measures for Latino interests, scholars are in essence imposing views on Latinos that may not be appropriate across different districts, which is theoretically inappropriate given the potential for variation in preferences across contexts. Though not quite in the image of Miller and Stokes' (1963) seminal work – because I do not have direct measures of legislator preferences – data made available

[9] The authors studied legislators in office between 1972 and 1980, but the 96th Congress was the most recent one and it had the highest number of Latino legislators during that period.

relatively recently allows for the exploration of dyadic representation with a national sample of Latinos (and non-Latinos). Accounting for positions taken by respondents on individual roll call votes allows for a better picture of this dyadic relationship amongst respondents and legislators across districts while accounting for a variety of variables at both the individual level and at the contextual level, those of which I turn to next.

Reasons to Expect Variation in Latino Representation

Prior work shows that there is a difference in the behavior of legislators – one partly rooted in ethnicity (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Kerr and Miller 1997; Lublin 1997; Casellas 2007, 2011) – and that legislators tend to be more ideologically distant from Latinos when compared to their white counterparts in the electorate (Griffin and Newman 2007).[10] Legislator ethnicity is but one factor that needs to be accounted for when trying to explain the level of representation afforded to Latinos. The literature on the subject suggests that there are both individual-level and contextual-level factors that need to be accounted for when exploring variation in the representation afforded to this particular group.

Income is one factor that naturally comes to mind when thinking about variation in representation because Latinos tend to be lower on the socioeconomic scale compared to non-Latinos (Amenta and Smith 2016), and there is some research to support the notion that the preferences of the rich seem to be better reflected in the behavior of legislators than the preferences of the poor (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2009, 2011, 2012; Gilens and Page 2014). Relatedly, Latinos generally lag behind non-Latino whites and blacks in voter turnout (Shaw, De La Garza, and Lee 2000; De La Garza 2004; McDonald 2017), which, when we take work showing that voters are

[10] The connection being made here is that ideological distance – as measured by the voting records of legislators – means lower representation of the interests of a given group, here Latinos.

more likely to have their preferences advanced by their legislators (i.e., Griffin and Newman 2005), leads to the need to account for individual voting behavior when exploring variation in representation.

As the scholarship on the subject has long acknowledged (see Welch and Hibbing 1984), the size of the Latino population in a given district needs to be accounted for theoretically and empirically. This decision stems from a majoritarian perspective, where Latinos in districts with larger Latino populations are expected to have their preferences advanced by legislators more than those with lower Latino populations their district. It also flows from the work on legislator motivations, as the electoral connection is one that is ever-pressing and posited to influence the behavior of legislators (Mayhew 1972; Fenno 1978; Arnold 1990). In addition, as other work on representation shows, whether a given respondent is in a district where she is represented by a co-ethnic or co-partisan legislator is also likely to influence the relative representation afforded to them. Some work also shows that both Latinos and Democrats are more likely to advance the interests of Latinos when compared to non-Latino and Republican legislators, respectively (Casellas 2007; Griffin and Newman 2007).

Backlash and Out-Group Threat

In addition to exploring congruence, this chapter is concerned with exploring variation in the representation afforded to Latinos relative to non-Latinos in Congress because more recent scholarship has touched on the presence of potential backlash associated with growth in the Latino population (see Griffin and Newman 2007, 2008; see Abrajano and Hajnal 2015 for a review). From a majoritarian perspective, an increase in the number of Latinos in a given district should increase the representation afforded to that group. Indeed, in those districts where non-Latino whites are an outright majority and Latinos make up a small segment of the population – to the

extent that their preferences differ – there should not be the expectation that both groups are afforded the same representation, as the former has more power over whether legislators keep their jobs. However, in districts where Latinos make up a larger share of the population relative to non-Latinos, there should be a corresponding increase in the level of responsiveness to Latinos. Griffin and Newman (2007) find that this is not the case, showing that larger Latino populations are associated with lower representation as measured by ideological distance between respondents and their legislators. Though Griffin and Newman (2008) find some suggestive evidence regarding a "backlash" effect, missing is an exploration of the underlying mechanisms driving changes in ideological distance between Latinos and their legislators.

The work on political backlash is largely rooted in the literature on racial threat theory (see Key 1949; Allport 1954; Blalock 1967; Quillian 1995; Hood and Morris 1997, Taylor 1998; Tolbert and Grummel 2003; Rocha and Espino 2013; Abrajano and Hajnal 2015) and the in-group versus out-group dynamics posited by the social identity theory literature (see Tajfel and Turner 1979; McLeod 2008). At their core, both types of studies explain majority attitudes towards an out-group (e.g., blacks, Latinos, etc.) as an artifact of a perceived threat posed to the majority's well-being (for a review see Berg 2015). Irrespective of the underlying mechanisms driving backlash – whether rooted in out-group animus, a threat to material interests, or something else – it can potentially explain why Latinos, in spite of growing numbers, do not see the expected representational gains that their numbers would warrant. If this is the case, then we would expect to see that the attitudes of non-Latino whites become more anti-Latino as we progress from districts with low Latino populations to those with high Latino populations.

Work in the discipline has explored – and found support for – a backlash effect in which we see the preferences of whites change in response to demographic changes (see Abrajano and Hajnal 2015). But I want to make the explicit connection here between backlash theory and the political representation of Latinos. More specifically, I want to see how population differences across districts influence the attitudes and behavior of non-Latinos (and Latinos themselves) in order to better explain the mixed findings of prior work on the subject. The data used here gives me more statistical leverage because it has large enough samples and contextual variation to capture attitudinal and behavioral differences in each of the populations of focus here (i.e., Latinos and non-Latino whites). Though the backlash theory has some teeth, it could also (or alternatively) be the case that Latinos themselves are responsible for any representational deficits. This possibility has different consequences and implications for the study of how Latinos are represented, and it is one whose theoretical merits I look to now.

Latino Engagement and Attitudinal Distinctiveness

Scholars have long noted the connection between socioeconomic status and participation (Milbrath 1965; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1995), a relationship that has far-reaching implications for the Latino population, which generally tends to be lower on the socioeconomic status spectrum (see Barreto and Segura 2014). In turn, Latinos – because of their lower propensity to participate in the political process (Shaw, De La Garza, and Lee 2000; De La Garza 2004; Barreto and Segura 2014; see also Jones-Correa et al. 2018 for a review) – may experience lower levels of representation, even when comprising a plurality or a majority in a given district. However, this itself doesn't directly explain the variation in the ideological distance between Latinos and their legislators relative to whites, unless Latinos in districts with larger Latino populations display a lower propensity to participate in the political process than those in districts

with fewer Latinos. This is an interesting possibility because if Latinos in those districts with higher Latino populations tend to participate less than others, then Latinos would be partially negating any representational gains that their raw numbers would warrant. Prior work has noted that Latino participation, at least in majority-minority Latino districts, increases, which – though it doesn't speak to those districts with less than a minority of Latinos – casts doubt on the notion that Latinos will participate less in districts where they constitute a larger share of the population (Segura and Woods 2004).

The backlash theory posits that there is a change in the attitudes and behavior of the majority group (see Abrajano and Hajnal 2015) when minority groups become larger. But the "backlash" found in prior work on representation (i.e., Griffin and Newman) could be attributable to the Latino population itself. Theoretically, there is a possibility that Latinos in districts with larger Latino populations have less homogeneous preferences, which in turn could make it harder for legislators to adequately represent them (Clifford 2012). It could be that as we move from districts where Latinos are a clear minority to those where they constitute a plurality (or close to a majority) we see that Latino preferences become more similar to non-Latinos, in the sense that Latino respondents in the latter districts support policies not supported by a majority of Latinos, in the collective sense. Be it due to sub-ethnic diversity, a desire to become more mainstream, or some other dynamic, the possibility that the preferences of Latinos change with growth in the population is something that needs to be accounted for empirically, as it can potentially explain the backlash effect that scholars have attributed to non-Latino whites; an effect that has fundamentally different causes and consequences for the study of Latino representation.

Hypotheses

Prior work suggests that the policy preferences of Latinos and non-Latino whites differ (Sanchez 2006; Leal 2007; Segura 2012; Barreto and Segura 2014). Indeed, Latinos generally tend to be more liberal than their non-Latino whites (Griffin and Newman 2008; Segura 2012). When paired with the fact that whites have a majority status in the demographic composition of our nation, the idea that Latinos will be afforded less representation than whites is not a controversial one – at least from a majoritarian perspective, as, all things constant, the majority group's preferences should carry the most weight. Though prior work suggests that a representational deficit exists for Latinos relative to non-Latino whites (Griffin and Newman 2007), there is a need to see whether this applies to the more direct measure being used here. From previous work comes the expectation that – all other things constant – legislators will be more responsive to the preferences of non-Latino whites than to those of Latinos.

Hypothesis 1: *The policy attitudes of Latinos are less congruent with those of their representatives than are the policy attitudes of non-Latinos.*

The size of the Latino population in a given district might also play a role in how Latinos are represented relative to non-Latinos. Theoretically, a larger Latino population should lead to increased representation. However, the literature on the subject is a bit mixed on this notion. For example, whereas Welch and Hibbing (1984) find that larger Latino populations were associated with more liberal voting records by legislators, subsequent works (i.e., Hero and Tolbert 1995; Casellas 2007) find no such thing. Griffin and Newman (2007) – in exploring variation in ideological distance between Latinos and their legislators relative to whites and theirs – find that the size of the Latino population seems to only influence representation in districts where Latinos

get close to a majority – in so-called "threat districts." They attribute this effect to backlash coming from the non-Latino white population – though they do not formally test for alternative explanations or underlying mechanisms. As a result, there is a need to see how the size of the Latino population influences the congruence between Latinos and their legislators and whites and their own.[11]

Hypothesis 2: *There is a negative relationship between the level of congruence between the attitudes of Latinos and those of their representatives and the size of the Latino population*

As discussed above, the backlash theory posits anti-minority group (here, Latinos) sentiment rooted in an ethnic threat posed by the size of that minority population on the attitudes and behavior of the white population (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; see hypotheses 3 and 4 below).

Hypothesis 3: *White respondents will hold more anti-Latino positions as we move from districts with low Latino populations to those with higher Latino populations.*

Hypothesis 4: *Latino respondents will hold attitudes less consistent with the broader Latino population as we move from districts with low Latino populations to those with higher Latino populations.*

The threat explanation theoretically captures any representational deficit that may manifest itself, but again, the finding alone doesn't explain whether it really is a backlash effect or something else. Indeed, that representational deficit may be rooted in the attitudes and (or) behavior of the Latino population itself, in addition to or entirely separate from that of non-Latino whites. It could be that larger Latino populations work to mobilize the white population and/or lead to more anti-Latino policy preferences, both of which would be compatible with the backlash theory. It could also be

[11] Though that discussion may suggest that there is a need to model the effect of the population as curvilinear, no such relationship exists (see Appendix A). Therefore, I address it here instead of in the modeling section later.

the case that the preferences and (or) behavior of the Latino population itself are different in districts where Latinos have few co-ethnics in their geographical region as compared to those where those individuals have many co-ethnics living around them. This latter possibility, though logically not as appealing as the backlash theory, is possible, as Latinos in districts with larger populations may "free ride" (or depend on their co-ethnic citizens to vote and participate, more broadly) or they could grow more fractured as a result of intragroup attitudinal heterogeneity.[12]

Hypothesis 5: *White respondents will become more active as we move from districts with a low number of Latinos to those districts with larger Latino populations.*

Hypothesis 6: *Latino respondents become less active as we move from districts with a low number of Latinos to those with larger Latino populations.*

Data and Methodology

Congruence

The 2012 iteration of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) survey – with more than 5,000 Latino respondents across congressional districts – allows for the testing of my hypotheses.[13] Not only does the survey capture a nationally-representative sample of Latinos, but it also provides their preferences, as well as the roll call votes of their respective legislators across several policy issues, which makes it ideal for exploring the representation afforded to this segment

[12] Sub-ethnic variation does – in some cases – lead to differences in the preferences of Latinos (e.g., Puerto Ricans holding different positions than Cubans; see De La Garza and Jang 2011). In larger districts, this could be more likely to come into play as sub-group competition could have a bearing on who gets what. Unfortunately, the data doesn't allow for the sub-ethnic exploration, but, if this is happening, then it should manifest itself at the aggregate level and provide at least suggestive evidence for whether this is the case.

[13] This data set is supplemented with the U.S. Census Bureau's American Community Survey (ACS) estimates and information about individual legislators from their official house websites, personal websites, and other publications, when necessary.

of the population.[14] In addition, the survey provides data on non-Latino respondents to allow for comparison.

Individual respondents are nested within their districts, and I must account for this in my modeling. Theoretically, there is reason to expect that the individual contexts in which respondents are nested will influence the representation afforded to them. Multi-level modeling allows for the exploration of individual-level characteristics (i.e., ethnicity, education, income, etc.), contextual-level factors (i.e., size of the Latino population, co-partisan district, etc.), and their interaction.

Representation – the primary dependent variable here – is conceptualized as congruence between constituents and their legislators. In order to capture this, a congruence index (see Ellis 2013) is created which sums the instances where legislators and constituents have the same response (or do not) on a given policy area to create a variable that ranges from 0 to 1, with zero being a situation in which the respondent and their legislator are never in agreement and one being the opposite.[15] For each respondent in the data set, I take their positions on the different individual policy issues and match it up with the roll call votes of their legislators. A binary variable is created for each of the individual issues where 1 represents congruence between respondents and legislators and 0 means that the two take different positions. Those variables are then used to create the abovementioned index.[16] This congruence index has a mean of about 0.52, which indicates

[14] The CCES is an amalgamation of the research efforts of various scholars – several different research teams across the U.S. – with the purpose of studying how "Americans view Congress and hold their representatives accountable during elections, how they voted and their electoral experiences, and how their behavior and experiences vary with political geography and social context" (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2012, p. 7).
[15] Other dependent variables are used for auxiliary analysis and they will be described in detail below.
[16] The index accounts for how many times the roll call votes of legislators matched up with the positions taken by their constituents. So, for an individual and a legislator that are on the same page on every issue, the main dependent variable takes a value of 1.

that, on average, the preferences of constituents and their legislators are congruent about half of the time (see Table A1 in Appendix A).

The individual issues used to construct the index come from the survey item that asks respondents the following: "Congress considered many important bills over the past two years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle." That prompt was followed by issues including then-U.S. House Speaker Paul Ryan's budget bill aimed at cutting spending in Medicare and Medicaid, immigration reform, the repeal of the Affordable Care Act, and the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy in the military, amongst others (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2012, p. 63).[17]

Respondent ethnicity (*Latino)* is the key explanatory variable, and it is captured through the use of a binary variable which takes the value of 1 when a given respondent self-identifies as Hispanic, and 0 when they identify as white and state that they're not of Hispanic origin.[18] Similarly, legislator ethnicity (*Latino MC)* is captured with a binary variable using information from the Office of the Historian of the U.S. House of Representatives and it also takes the value 1 when a given legislator is identified as Hispanic (Wasniewski et al. 2013). Legislator partisanship (*Democrat MC*) is captured by a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when the legislator is a

[17] The complete list of roll call votes available are: Paul Ryan's 2011 House Budget Plan, which would cut Medicare (and Medicaid) by 42%; the Simpson-Bowles Budget Plan, which would make cuts of about 15% "across the board in Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid, and Defense, as well as other programs. Eliminate many tax breaks…[and] reduce debt by 21% by 2020"; the Middle Class Tax Cut Act, which would "extend Bush era tax cuts for incomes below $200,000. Would increase the budget deficit by an estimated $250 billion"; the Tax Hike Prevention Act, which would "extend Bush-era tax cuts for all individuals, regardless of income. Would increase the budget deficit by an estimated $405 billion"; the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, which "would remove tariffs on imports and exports between South Korea and the U.S."; a repeal of the Affordable Care Act; a bill to approve the Keystone XL Pipeline; a bill to end "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in the military (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2012, p. 63-65).

[18] This variable is constructed using the question "Are you of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic origin or descent?" (Ansolabehere and Schaffner 2012, p. 29). Individuals that answered "Yes" were categorized as Hispanic and those that no weren't.

Democrat and 0 when that individual is Republican.[19] The size of the Latino population in a given district (*% Latino*) is operationalized as a variable that captures the percentage of Latinos in each respondent's district with data from the U.S. Census Bureau's 2011 American Community Survey (ACS) population estimates. This variable ranges from 0.6 to 81.9 percent, but on average, Latinos take up about 15 percent of a given district (see Table A1 in Appendix A). Other individual-level variables used here are respondent gender family income, intention to vote, and educational attainment.[20] At the contextual-level, variables capturing whether respondents are nested in districts where they're represented by co-ethnic legislators and Democratic legislators, respectively are created as dummy variables. At that same level, a measure that captures the percentage of Latinos in a district is also used.

In addition to holding the individual-level respondent characteristics constant in estimating the effect of ethnicity on congruence, I also explore how intersections of Hispanic ethnicity affect the representation afforded to members of this group. More recently, scholars have started to think about the fact that individuals can be part of various disadvantaged groups, those based on race, ethnicity, gender, sexual identity, and religion (amongst others) and that those different categories overlap (McCall 2005; Hancock 2007). As a result, when thinking about marginalization, being in multiple categories (i.e., minority female or a poor minority) may lead to further disadvantage than simply being a part of a single group. Within the context of this paper, I explore how those different

[19] There were no independents in the 112th U.S. House of Representatives.

[20] Respondent gender is a binary variable which takes the value 1 for female respondents and 0 otherwise, family income is an ordinal variable ranging from $0-10,000 to $500,000 and up, educational attainment ranges from no education to completion of a graduate degree, and intention to vote in the 2012 election takes a value of 1 for yes and 0 for no.

categories interact with respondent ethnicity. That is, how do Latinas, poor Latinos, and Latino non-voters fare on the representational front. [21]

To explore the level of congruence afforded to Latinos relative to non-Latino whites, I make use of multi-level modeling because it allows me to account for the fact that individual respondents are nested in their congressional districts. This is important because it allows for the exploration of how geographic (and congressional) context (i.e., district population and being in a district in which a respondent is represented by a Latino legislator) influence the effect of respondent ethnicity and other respondent characteristics. In order to allow for that possibility in the models, I use a district-specific intercept and allow the effect (the slope-estimate) of respondent ethnicity to vary across districts. [22] [23]

Results

Constituent Preference-Legislator Vote Congruence

Before exploring potential backlash mechanisms, there is a need to confirm whether Latinos do face a representational deficit relative to non-Latino whites. A starting point for this analysis is the exploration of whether Latinos face a deficit when compared to whites in all of the individual issue areas that make up the congruence index. I run a separate model exploring the effect of respondent ethnicity on congruence for each of the issue areas available. That is, 8 different regression models with the dependent variable being congruence between respondent preference and legislator roll call vote (see Appendix A). On 5 of the 8 issues available there is a

[21] Non-voters would not typically fit in an intersectionality framework, but the focus here is on the existence of multiple characteristics connected to representational disadvantage, so considering non-voting alongside the traditional focus on women and class-based disadvantage seems appropriate.
[22] This means that the models used here are random slope, random coefficient models, which are estimated using Stata 14's *mixed* command.
[23] All of the models computed here include only Latino and non-Latino white respondents in an attempt to stop comparisons from being additionally complicated by race; this is the same thing that Griffin and Newman (2007) do in their analysis.

difference in the level of congruence between Latinos and their legislators and their non-Latino counterparts in the electorate. On the repeal of the Affordable Care Act and preferences towards the Keystone XL Pipeline, we see that Latinos face the largest representational deficit when compared to whites (see Figure 1.1). However, on the proposal to repeal the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy in the military, which would allow gays to openly serve in the U.S. armed forces, Latino respondents tended to have higher congruence than their non-Latino counterparts. With this, I move on to the exploration of deficit (or lack thereof) when all issues are accounted for.

In order to capture the representation of Latinos, I explore respondent characteristics, contextual factors, and interactions of those measures to see whether Latinos face a representational deficit with a more refined measure (see Table 1.1 for all core models). A consistent finding across different specifications is that Latinos do in fact face a representational deficit relative to non-Latino whites, something evident in the negative and statistically significant coefficient for respondent ethnicity (see the first row in Table 1.1). In essence, that estimate suggests that the difference between Latinos and non-Latinos (and their respective legislators) is about 1 percent, which naturally seems small at first glance. However, when we take into account that members of the U.S. House of Representatives vote on hundreds of pieces of legislation every year, even a 1 percent difference is likely to be consequential for Latinos. This provides support for the first hypothesis.

The second column in Table 1.1 shows several interactions between respondent ethnicity and other respondent characteristics, which are there to explore how intersections of ethnicity and categories of disadvantage affect Latino respondents. To best visualize those interactions, I rely



Figure 1.1: The Effect of Latino Ethnicity on Representation by Issue

Table 1.1: Models of Constituent Preference-Legislator Roll Call Congruence

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Individual Characteristics Latino	-0.005% (0.003)	-0.025** (0.009)	-0.011*** (0.003)	-0.016*** (0.004)	-0.012*** (0.003)	-0.008 (0.005)	-0.009** (0.003)
Female	-0.013*** (0.002)						-0.013*** (0.002)
Family Income	0.002*** (0.000)						0.002*** (0.000)
Education	-0.002* (0.001)						-0.002* (0.001)
Voted	0.003 (0.002)						0.003 (0.002)
Individual Interactions Latino x Female		0.011 (0.006)					
Latino x Income		-0.001 (0.001)					
Latino x Education		0.004 (0.002)					
Latino x Voted		0.005 (0.006)					
Contextual Characteristics Democrat MC	0.073*** (0.003)	0.073*** (0.003)	0.067*** (0.003)	0.067*** (0.003)	0.068*** (0.003)		0.071*** (0.003)
Latino MC			-0.001 (0.009)				-0.001 (0.009)
% Latino			0.000 (0.000)				0.000 (0.000)

Table 1.1 Continued.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Contextual Interactions Latino x Democrat MC				0.013* (0.006)			
Latino x Latino MC					0.018% (0.009)		
Latino x % Latino						-0.001 (0.000)	
Constant	0.535*** (0.005)	0.495*** (0.004)	0.491*** (0.002)	0.494*** (0.002)	0.494*** (0.002)	0.512*** (0.003)	0.505*** (0.005)
Individuals	39060	39060	44091	44516	44091	44516	38680
Districts	431	431	425	431	425	431	425
#Level 1 R^2	0.0019	0.0376	0.0314	0.0316	0.0313	0.0026	0.0372
#Level 2 R^2	-0.0064	0.5181	0.5141	0.5108	0.5125	0.0361	0.5206

Note: The dependent variable here is an index constructed using congruence (or lack thereof) between respondents and their legislators on all available issues in the 2012 CCES. This measure ranges from 0 to 1, with one being perfect congruence between the two actors (see Appendix A for descriptive statistics).
Standard errors in parentheses
% p<0.10 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
# Snijders and Bosker R-Squared estimate

on charts that show the marginal effects (or predicted outcomes) as the values of the interacting variables change. First, I look at the interaction between ethnicity and a respondent's income (see Figure 1.2). The interaction, though not statistically significant on the whole, shows that in general, as income increases, the effect of ethnicity on congruence seems to become more negative, a finding that wouldn't necessarily be expected, as income is generally associated with increased representation (Bartels 2008; Gilens 2009, 2011, 2012; Gilens and Page 2014). Moving to the effect of gender (see Figure 1.3), it appears as if Latino men face a larger representational deficit relative to non-Latino men than do Latinas when compared to non-Latino women. In this particular case, it appears that women, in general, are at such a representational disadvantage that ethnicity doesn't further disadvantage Latinas compared to non-Latinas. Next, in Figure 1.4, I chart the effect of ethnicity on congruence as contingent on education. At the lower levels of education, congruence for Latinos is lower than that of non-Latinos. However, moving from the lower levels of education towards the higher levels, the negative effect gets closer to zero and the difference between the two groups becomes statistically insignificant, which speaks to the power of education. In essence, education allows Latinos to catch up to non-Latinos with respect to their level of representation.[38] The last of the individual-level interactions explored is that between ethnicity and voting. Figure 1.5 suggests that like education, participation essentially erases any representational differences between Latinos and whites, a finding that fits the work on participation and representation (see Griffin and Newman 2005).

Moving to the contextual level, the first effect that stands out is that of being nested in a

[38] Whether this is due to Latinos being better educated (and the representational benefits that normally come along with that) or to Latinos changing their preferences – in a way that reflects those of non-Latinos – is not something that I am suited to address here. However, irrespective of the underlying mechanism, the end result is that Latinos are represented at higher rates holding all else constant.



Figure 1.2: Latino Effect on Congruence as Family Income Increases



Figure 1.3: Latino Effect on Congruence for Men and Women



Figure 1.4: Latino Effect on Congruence as Education Increases



Figure 1.5: Latino Effect on Congruence for Voters and Non-Voters

district where a given respondent is represented by a Democratic legislator greatly improves congruence, irrespective of ethnicity (see Column 3 in Table 1.1). However, the main preoccupation here is how these contextual realities affect the representation afforded to Latinos. Sticking with partisan representation with respect to ethnicity briefly, it is clear that Latino respondents represented by Republicans are at a representational disadvantage when compared to non-Latino whites in districts where they're represented by Republicans (see Figure 1.6). On the flipside of that, there isn't a statistically significant difference in the representation afforded to Latinos relative to whites when they're both represented by Democratic legislators. Looking at descriptive representation, it is apparent that Latino respondents don't seem to be at a representational surplus relative to whites when represented by Latino legislators, but having a Latino MC does erase the deficit noted above (see Figure 1.7). However, in the absence of descriptive representation for Latinos, that representational deficit is there, with whites being better represented by non-Latino legislators.

The last of the contextual interactions – and one of the most pressing here – is that between respondent ethnicity and the size of the Latino population in a given individual respondent's district on representation. Figure 1.8 shows the level of congruence afforded to Latinos when moving from districts with the lowest to the highest Latino populations. Similar to the "backlash" effect found by Griffin and Newman (2007), districts with larger Latino populations were associated with lower levels of representation. This is definitely inconsistent with a majoritarian perspective because instead of their (Latinos) representation increasing with their numbers – except in the highest levels of Latino populations in districts (i.e., around 80% in a district) – we



Figure 1.6: Partisan Representation Effect on Substantive Representation



Figure 1.7: Descriptive Representation Effect on Substantive Representation



Figure 1.8: Latino Representation as Latino Population Size Increases

see Latinos are further disadvantaged moving from one extreme to the other.[39] This lends support to the second hypothesis; larger Latino populations don't lead to increased representation here.

Backlash Mechanisms

Now that I have confirmed an effect that has been construed as attitudinal "backlash" in other work (i.e., Griffin and Newman 2007), there is a need to explore whether this change in the representation afforded to Latinos in those district with higher Latino populations is in-fact rooted in anti-Latino-motivated behavior and (or) attitudinal change on the part of non-Latino Anglos or in the Latino population itself. As alluded to earlier, the "backlash" effect could be rooted in participatory and attitudinal differences by Latinos in those more Latino-heavy districts. To explore these possibilities, I create a new dependent variable. To do so, I first look at the way in which the preferences of Latinos and non-Latinos change across districts when we move from those with lower Latino population to those with higher Latino populations. To capture this change, I create an index designed to measure pro-Latino attitudes – one similar to the congruence index discussed before. This is done by determining the relative position of Latinos and non-Latinos for each of the individual roll calls, then recoding each one so that the position more favored by Latinos relative to non-Latinos was positive, and finally summing them into an index where higher values indicate that respondent attitudes are more consistent with the preferences of Latinos relative to non-Latino whites. This variable ranges from 0 to 1 and has a mean of about 0.49 (see Table A1 in Appendix A). As before, the key explanatory variable here is respondent ethnicity, though the size of the Latino population in a given respondent's district and control

[39] This suggests that Latinos need to have an overwhelming majority for their respective legislators to mirror their preferences (in roll call voting behavior) at a rate similar to that afforded to non-Latino whites.

variables are included in the model aimed at exploring changes in individual attitudes across different districts.

This exploration of attitudinal change across districts is plotted in Figure 1.9. This figure shows how pro-Latino attitudes change amongst non-Latinos (and Latinos) moving from the low to the high end of the percentage Latino estimate across districts. The figure shows that while the attitudes of non-Latino whites do seem to become slightly more anti-Latino as a function of the size of the Latino population, the preferences of Latinos also shift when moving from districts with low Latino populations to those with higher Latino populations. The attitudes of Latino respondents in districts with larger Latino populations become more pro-Latino. Thus, there is some support for the backlash theory posited by Griffin and Newman (2007) – and for the 3rd hypothesis – and none for the notion that the attitudes of Latinos become more anti-Latino – at least in this cross section – in larger Latino districts (i.e., hypothesis 4).[40]

Another potential manifestation of the so-called "backlash hypothesis" is a change in the participation of non-Latinos, though I also explore the potential change in the participation on the part of Latinos. As it relates to the former, the expectation would be that whites become mobilized by larger Latino populations as they pose a threat to their status on the social hierarchy. A more active Anglo population would definitely fit into this backlash explanation and could indirectly explain the representational deficit experienced by Latinos.[41] However, it could also (or alternatively) be the case that Latinos don't participate at the same rate when there are more

[40] However, even then, the more pro-Latino preferences could still be negatively affecting the level of representation afforded to Latinos, as the more pro-Latino that attitudes become, the more distinctive they are, and thus further away from the mainstream.

[41] The implicit, and thus untested, relationship here is that between political behavior and heightened representation. However, Griffin and Newman's (2005) work finds some support for the notion that voters are better represented than non-voters.



Figure 1.9: Attitudinal Change Across Districts

Latinos, a free riding effect of sorts, which could also explain the abovementioned gap in representation. Sorting out which (or what mixture) of the two is taking place has practical, strategic, and normative implications. If it is the case that this "backlash" is rooted entirely in the behavior of the non-Latino population, then that's different from it being rooted in the fact that Latinos in those more heavily Latino-populated districts are less likely to take part in the political process. Each of those entails different strategies to alleviate the representational gap for Latinos.

To explore this possibility, I create a political participation index to use as the dependent variable.[42] This participation index ranges from 0 to 1 and has a mean of about .20 (see Table A1 in Appendix A). Figure 1.10 shows changes in the political participation of Latinos and whites across districts to see whether either group displays a higher (or lower) propensity to participate in the political process as Latinos comprise larger segments of their district's population. In-line with a backlash explanation, non-Latinos do in-fact seem to be more likely to participate in those districts with higher Latino populations. On the other side of that, Latinos display the opposite and instead become less likely to participate in the political process in those districts with higher Latino populations, which doesn't bode well for the Latinos when paired with the suggested mobilizing effect of larger Latino populations of whites. Together, those two findings provide support for the 5th and 6th hypotheses, respectively.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this paper, I explore several hypotheses related to the level of substantive representation afforded to Latinos and non-Latino whites by their members in the U.S. House of Representatives.

[42] This index is created using a principal components analysis of political attendance meetings, political sign displays, having worked for a candidate, and monetary donations to candidates and political organizations in the last 12-months leading up to the survey.



Figure 1.10: Political Participation Across Districts

The results provide support for the notion that Latinos are at a representational deficit and for the idea that this deficit seems to be exacerbated in districts where Latinos make up a larger share of the population. Prior work has relied on imperfect measures of Latino interests, and of legislator voting behavior, that don't directly tap the preferences of constituents. My work, because I use the CCES data with actual positions taken by respondents and subsequent votes taken by their legislators, is able to get more empirical and theoretical leverage on explaining how Latinos are substantively represented.

On the substantive front, I find, as mentioned above, that Latinos face a representational deficit when compared to whites. I also find, however, that descriptive and partisan representation provide contexts that can close that gap in representation. Relatedly, there are also individual-level factors that the findings suggest can work to decrease that deficit. More specifically, educational attainment and political participation both seem to place Latinos and their non-Latino co-constituents on a more even playing field with respect to representation, all else equal. On the whole, I show that Latinos do experience a representational deficit when compared to non-Latino whites, which doesn't on its own raise any flags because they are a minority group in American society. However, this deficit is increased across districts where they constitute a larger share of the population, which is concerning from a majoritarian perspective. This work provides a preliminary exploration of the factors contributing to the representational deficit, which hasn't been directly accounted for in other work.

This chapter, in its exploration of the potential mechanisms driving the representational deficit for Latinos, contributes to our understanding of the level of representation afforded to Latinos and the role of the non-Latino population in that representation. Indeed, the additional

analysis on the attitudes of non-Latinos lends some support to the backlash hypothesis as we can see that whites become more politically active as we move from districts with low Latino populations to those with higher Latino populations, and that their attitudes become more anti-Latino across districts because of increased Latino populations. However, that exploration also shows that Latinos tend to participate less in districts where they make up a larger segment of the population, which further contributes to their disadvantage.

The results here have the potential to inform those interested in studying Latino representation and those interested in closing the representational gap between the two groups explored here. On the former, this work suggests that while legislators play an important role in the representation afforded to Latinos, there is a need to consider how intergroup dynamics structure the level of congruence between Latinos and their legislators. Indeed, while other work on the relationship between constituents and their legislators suggests that there is a disconnect (and distortion) in the representation afforded to minorities as a result of variation in the propensity of minorities to contact non-minority representatives (Broockman 2014) and of legislators to contact constituents when they're minorities (Butler and Broockman 2011; Mendez and Grose 2018), at least some of this deficit seems to be rooted in a backlash effect on the part of non-Latino whites. On the latter, this work suggests that Latinos, activists, reformers, and candidates can take action to lessen (or close) that representational gap. Efforts to do so could be in the form of Latino mobilization, reform to encourage more educational attainment, and the election of Democratic and Latino legislators all have a bearing on the representation afforded to Latinos outside of the behavior of Anglos.

While this work does show that at the dyadic level Latinos face a representational deficit, it doesn't speak to the possibility that Latinos can be substantively represented at the collective level (see Weissberg 1978; Hero and Tolbert 1995). Indeed, these roll call-based dyads don't account for the aggregate level outputs. Nonetheless, at either level – because Latinos are in the minority – there are things that may not make it to the agenda, which means that a representational deficit would still exist, irrespective of the things being voted on by legislators and being passed through the legislature. Relatedly, while it would be interesting to explore this dyadic relationship on bills that are atop the Latino agenda, at this point – because of data limitations – isn't possible, at least not in the same fashion as it was explored here. This is an important consideration because it could be the case that the analysis here underestimates the representational deficit face by Latinos relative to whites. Future work needs to address this possibility.[43] In addition, this work doesn't provide a picture of how the sub-groups that make up the Latino population are represented, which is important because although there is enough homogeneity in the preferences of Latinos as a group, there are still notable differences at the sub-ethnic level (e.g., differences between Latinos from Mexico when compared to those from Cuba or Puerto Rico), which need to be accounted for. However, in the absence of comparable and fine data that allow for that, the current analysis will have to suffice. In the same vein, unlike the data used by Griffin and Newman (2007), the survey here (the CCES) only explores the attitudes of English-speaking Latinos, which can also muddy up the results captured here, likely overstating congruence between Latinos and their representatives. In addition, this work can benefit from an exploration of Latino interests (and

[43] This may not necessarily be possible in the near future because Latinos still constitute a numerical minority in the legislature and surveying Latinos is costly and difficult to do, especially at the national level. Indeed, the CCES is distinctive insofar that it captures a national sample of Latinos along with the geographic variation and thus allowing for the exploration done here; it, however (and unfortunately) is an outlier in the available data.

representation) across time, as the findings here could be strengthened (or attenuated) by such exploration.

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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics and Additional Models

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics Table

Variable	Minimum	Mean	Median	Maximum	St. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	N
Dependent Variables Congruence Index	0	.519	.5	1	.191	-.039	2.72	53742
Participation Index	0	.202	0	1	.277	1.302	3.799	44534
Latino Preference Index	0	.472	.5	1	.189	-.182	2.695	53862
Independent Variables *Respondent Level* Latino	0	.108	0	1	.31	2.525	7.376	51190
Female	0	.531	1	1	.499	-.124	1.015	54535
Education	1	3.621	3	6	1.462	.218	1.776	53949
Family Income	1	6.094	6	16	3.24	.424	2.392	47384
Voted	0	.728	1	1	.445	-1.022	2.045	53949
Contextual Level Democrat MC	0	.409	0	1	.492	.369	1.136	53949
Latino MC	0	.049	0	1	.216	4.184	18.504	53382
% Latino	.6	14.927	9.6	81.9	15.631	2.129	7.767	53840

Table A2: Individual Issue Congruence Models

	Ryan Budget	Simpson-Bowles Budget	Tax Cut	Tax Hike Prevention	Korea Free Trade	Repeal ACA	Keystone XL	Don't Ask, Don't Tell
Latino	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.022** (0.008)	-0.024** (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	-0.028** (0.009)	-0.039*** (0.008)	0.029*** (0.007)
Democrat MC	0.612*** (0.008)	-0.004 (0.006)	0.099*** (0.010)	0.407*** (0.012)	-0.016* (0.007)	0.083*** (0.008)	-0.335*** (0.014)	-0.334*** (0.011)
Constant	0.215*** (0.005)	0.513*** (0.004)	0.535*** (0.007)	0.302*** (0.008)	0.514*** (0.004)	0.518*** (0.005)	0.770*** (0.009)	0.608*** (0.007)
Obs.	42714	42605	41605	42085	42138	42483	38669	42731
Districts	423	416	422	426	425	430	422	417
#Level 1 R^2	0.3647	0.0002	0.0091	0.1644	0.0003	0.0078	0.1211	0.1076
Level 2 R^2	0.9284	0.0036	0.1625	0.7471	0.0129	0.2255	0.5707	0.6921

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
# Snijders and Bosker R-Squared estimates

Table A3: Testing for Curvilinear Relationship

	Model
Latino	-0.012*** (0.003)
% Latino	0.001 (0.000)
% Latino^2	0.001 (0.000)
Democrat MC	0.068*** (0.003)
Constant	0.491*** (0.003)
Individuals	44516
Districts	431
#Level 1 R^2	0.0318
Level 2 R^2	0.5146

Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
# Snijders and Bosker R-Squared estimate

CHAPTER 2: TWEETING TO LATINOS? LEGISLATIVE COMMUNICATION IN THE 115TH U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Abstract

This paper explores the extent to which legislators in the House of Representatives talk about the issues important to Latinos on Twitter. In addition, it explores differences in the behavior of legislators rooted in individual-level and geographic characteristics. This work is concerned with both the substance and nature of legislative behavior on Twitter, as the literature on minority legislative behavior leads to the expectation that Latinos will not only post about different issues than their non-Latino colleagues will, but will also do so in a different fashion (i.e., Latinos being more likely to post symbolic messages than white legislators). To explore the behavior of legislators, I use data collected from the official accounts of members of the 115th U.S. House of Representatives. I find some preliminary support for the notion there are differences in the behavior of legislators attributable to legislator ethnicity.

Introduction

Since its introduction, Twitter has become an integral form of communication for candidates and legislators alike (Williams and Gulati 2010; Lassen and Brown 2011; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Lassen and Bode 2017). However, usage alone tells us little about how legislators communicate with and representing their constituents. This paper is concerned with the nature and substance of the communication between legislators and their constituents on this platform. How legislators interact with constituents on this new platform may have electoral consequences, but also, and arguably more importantly, representational consequences. Legislative communication is a means to keep constituents informed, but it also serves other purposes. One such purpose, and the focus of this chapter, is signaling to constituents that legislators are working to advance their interests. Whether this signaling manifests itself in legislators informing constituents about events in their districts, telling constituents about how they voted on a given piece of legislation, or something else, it is a way for representatives to establish and develop trust and rapport with constituents (see Fenno 1978). In addition, and important for the ongoing discussion, it is part of how legislators represent constituents. Communication is central to the constituent-legislator relationship; MCs need to know what their constituents want in order to have the opportunity to act on those demands and constituents need to know whether or not their legislators are doing so. Here, I explore how legislators represent the interests of the Latino population on Twitter and how they do so.

Latinos currently constitute about 18% of the total population in the U.S. – making them the largest minority group in American politics – which is why understanding this group's attitudes, behavior, and representation in (and by) government is important. The focus here is on

representation because there is a need to understand government responsiveness to the interest of the group that is poised to change American politics in the decades to come. We now know, thanks to advancements in the study of Latino public opinion, a great deal about what Latinos care about policy-wise, though our understanding of how Latinos are represented in government is still underdeveloped.[1] This work is an attempt to address this gap and gain a better understanding of how legislators speak to the interests of Latinos on Twitter. In what follows, I explore what and how legislators are posting on Twitter. That is, I look at both the substance (i.e., symbolic versus policy) and the issues that MCs discuss (i.e., what policy areas they focus on) on Twitter.[2] I do this using data collected from the Twitter profiles of members in the 115th U.S. House of Representatives. Given the linkage between descriptive representation and the interests of minorities in the broader population, I also explore whether there is a difference in the legislative behavior of Latino legislators when compared to non-Latino legislators. I explore this both with respect to what legislators are posting, and the way they post because the literature suggests that legislator ethnicity should influence both.

Theoretical Foundations

Communication and Symbolic Representation

Communication is central to the relationship between citizens and the people that represent them. How legislators choose to communicate with, and what they choose to communicate to, constituents can impact their electoral prospects (see Fenno 1978). It is how legislators keep constituents informed and part of what can influence whether representatives keep their jobs

[1] That is in comparison to the study of whites and blacks in the study of American politics.

[2] Though the question of what legislators are posting with respect to the Latino population is important in its own right, exploring differences in how Latino and non-Latino legislators are communicating on Twitter adds to our broader understanding of the different ways in which individuals of each group have to navigate the legislative process.

(Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978; Yiannakis 1982; Arnold 1990). Legislators – and politicians more broadly – are motivated to present themselves in a favorable light. Politicians go to great lengths to make themselves look good to constituents, whether by showing them that they frequent the same hole-in-the-wall restaurants, that they are like them, or that they are fighting for them in office. Indeed, there are various examples of politicians trying to connect with their constituents. Whether it is President Ford's infamous tamale faux pas[3] highlighted by Popkin (1991, p. 1-2), or former Wisconsin governor Scott Walker's brown-bag lunch theme (Cramer 2012, p. 30), it is easy to see that elected officials feel a need to make a good impression on constituents and potential voters. Acts like those and countless others demonstrate how legislators work to develop and nurture the trust of constituents; something important to their own reelection efforts and other aspirations in office (Fenno 1978).

What legislators choose to share with constituents is important, not only for their electoral fortunes but also for the perceptions that constituents have of them and the government more broadly.[4] That communication conveys a certain level of awareness of the interests of the people they represent, and it is part of what scholars describe as symbolic representation. Symbolic representation refers to how legislators "stand for" a group and it hinges on the belief that representatives share the interests of minority constituents. Hansel and Truel (2015) describe it as "any gesture that symbolizes a commitment to the group or symbolizes the ideal that the group espouses" (p. 957; see also Edelman 1964; Eulau and Karps 1978; Stokke and Selboe 2009).[5] In

[3] President Ford bit into a tamale without removing the husk, which serves solely as a wrapper and isn't meant to be eaten.
[4] Whether constituents think their legislators are advancing their interests have the potential to impact their own feelings of trust and efficacy (Miller et al. 1980).
[5] Similarly, Sinclair-Chapman (2002) refers to symbolic acts as those "aimed at giving voice to group interests, agenda-setting, and offering alternative views or political possibilities [that] are integral to enhanced political deliberation [and] that address the concerns of disadvantaged groups" (p. 8). Eulau and Karps (1978) describe

their communication, legislators have the opportunity to demonstrate an awareness of the group interests within their constituencies. They can show constituents that they care about the issues that are important to them even if the aggregate outputs of government do not reflect what constituents want. This is important because individual legislators, due to majoritarian dynamics (and other institutional realities), may not always be able to show constituents they are fighting for their interests in their voting behavior or the laws being passed.

In addition to being important for the communication strategies chosen by legislators (see Edelman 1964; Eulau and Karps 1977, 1978; Tate 2001; Sinclair-Chapman 2002; Nteta and Schaffner 2013; Hansen and Treul 2015; Dietrich et al. 2017; Tillery 2017), symbolic representation is important for the potential effects it can have on constituents (Lawless 2004; Hansen and Treul 2015; Hayes and Hibbing 2017). Scholars often cite the psychological benefits of symbolic representation, whereby being symbolically represented gives "psychological reassurance to group members that representatives are working in their interests and responsive to their needs" (Sinclair-Chapman 2002, p. ii; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003). That is what is believed to be driving other attitudes and behavior. Symbolic representation has the potential to influence constituents' perceptions of the individuals that represent them (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003; Tate 2003; Lawless 2004; Dietrich et al. 2017) and of government more broadly (Pantoja and Segura 2003). There is also evidence to suggest that symbolic representation, broadly construed, can influence the behavior of minorities in the electorate (Stokes-Brown and Dolan 2010).[6]

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symbolic representation as manifesting itself in the "public gestures of a sort that create a sense of trust and support in the relationship between the representative and represented" (p. 63).

[6] Some scholars speak of symbolic representation and descriptive representation in tandem (see Hayes and Hibbing 2017), but they are distinct concepts (Pitkin 1967) and though descriptive representation itself can be symbolic, it is not a prerequisite, as any legislator can behave in such a manner that communicates an awareness to the interests of minority groups. In this work, I focus on symbolic acts in communication, not mere presence.

Minority Behavior and Symbolic Representation

Prior scholarship has demonstrated the distinctiveness of minority legislative behavior in various areas of the legislative process (see Griffin 2014). While it may not be surprising that minority and non-minority legislators tend to vote differently on policy questions (Griffin and Newman 2007; Casellas 2011), scholars have also found divergence at other parts in the legislative process (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Sinclair-Chapman 2002; Bratton 2006; Gamble 2007; Wilson 2010; Minta 2011; Rouse 2013). For example, Rouse's (2013) work demonstrates that Latino legislators work to advance the interests of Latinos in the agenda-setting phase of the legislative process. Elsewhere, Minta's (2011) work shows that African American and Latino legislators are more likely to advance minority interests in committees and through oversight (see also Rouse 2013). Minorities generally display not only an awareness of the interests of the communities they represent but a willingness to work to try to bring about change that reflects those interests in the legislative process.

Though all legislators face the collective action problem, there is reason to expect minority legislators to be more likely than non-minority legislators to rely on symbolic communication because of it. Even if they are a part of one of the partisan coalitions in Congress, they are still a minority in the racial (or ethnic) sense, which means that they are less likely to get things important to their co-racial (or co-ethnic) constituents to the floor, much less passed by government. It is because minority legislators are less likely to have "policy wins" (Griffin and Newman 2008) that there is reason to expect that they will be more likely than their non-minority colleagues to resort to posting symbolic messages to gain and develop the trust of their co-ethnic (or co-racial) constituents to compensate for the lack of change in the status quo, at least with respect to that subgroup's interests. The literature on legislative behavior in other areas of the legislative process

suggests that the differences attributable to race (or ethnicity) may manifest themselves in the communication of legislators.

There is no shortage of examples of symbolic acts by legislators, something which applies to minority legislators to a larger extent (see Sinclair-Chapman 2002). Indeed, there are plenty of examples of legislators proposing (or supporting) resolutions that, even if passed, do not fundamentally change anything on the policy front, or in the status quo for that matter (Edelman 1964; Sinclair-Chapman 2002). Even a casual look at the legislative communication of legislators seems to suggest that Latinos in office do indeed post symbolic messages.[7] A recent example of this is a resolution introduced to the Senate judiciary committee by Congresswoman Catherine Cortez Masto, a Latina senator from Nevada, titled "A resolution recognizing the heritage, culture, and contributions of Latinas in the United States" (S.Res. 111, 2019).[8] Representative Adriano Espaillat (NY-13th) introduced a resolution before the House to rename "Hamilton Heights, Washington Heights, and Inwood, New York…'Quisqueya Heights'," a nod to the Hispanic population with Dominican roots (H.Res. 63, 2019).[9] Congressman Espaillat also stated that the purpose of that resolution was to "fight against the gentrification of [the] neighborhood" and to honor "the long-standing history and rich contributions of Dominican-American elected officials, artists, small-business and bodega owners, writers, and trailblazers" (H.Res. 63, 2019. In a press release celebrating Hispanic Heritage Month, Congresswoman Lucille Roybal-Allard (CA-40th), stated:

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[7] Though all legislators engage in symbolic representation, I focus on examples of Latino legislators given the focus of the paper. Nonetheless, it should be noted that there are plenty of examples of non-Latino legislators that could be used here (see Tate 2001; Sinclair-Chapman 2002).

[8] Congressman Luis Correa introduced the same resolution in the House of Representatives on the same day (H.Res. 234, 2019).

[9] Quisqueya is a municipality in the Dominican Republic.

> While this is a wonderful time to celebrate these contributions [referring to the history and accomplishments of Latinos], it is also a time to remember we must continue to work to ensure all our Latino communities get a fair chance at the American dream, including a good-paying job, a first-class education, and quality and affordable health care.

This demonstrates an awareness of the issues important to the Latino community (Roybal-Allard 2018; NALEO/Latino Decisions 2019).

Similarly, on April 30th, Representative Nydia Velazquez (NY-7th) posted the following on Twitter: "FACT: Latinos are more likely to suffer from: Diabetes, Liver disease, High blood pressure, Obesity, Asthma, Cancer. This #MinorityHealthMonth, let's pledge to reduce racial and ethnic inequities in the Hispanic Community" (@NydiaVelazquez). These examples, and plenty of others, highlight a commitment to the interests of the Latino population. Nonetheless, not one of them specifically references any actual policy or votes taken to bring about change and the resolutions – though technically part of the legislative process and can be voted on – do not change anything substantively on the policy front. However, as noted by Tate (2001), "200 or more such symbolic resolutions are generally passed in each Congress, [which suggests that] there must be political rewards and tactical advantages associated with them" (p. 626).

Twitter and Communication

Twitter, as evidenced by numerous political events (e.g., the Black Lives Matter protests and movement, the Occupy Wall Street movement, and the Arab Spring), can be a valuable political tool for the people. Politicians have seemingly come to understand its importance and reach, as suggested in their adoption and usage over time (see Lassen and Bode 2017). Though seemingly just another platform to some, Twitter has fundamentally changed the way that legislators communicate with their constituents and supporters. Unlike franking, newsletters, or

press conferences, Twitter allows individuals to instantly communicate with millions of users at the touch of a cell phone, tablet, or computer.[10] Though distinctive in its reach, Twitter falls in line with the other mediums that legislators have, and continue to use, for communicating with constituents in the sense that it allows them to discuss what they are doing for them, so as to not fall out of favor with them.

It did not take long for Twitter to gain traction with legislators and officeholder hopefuls.[11] Twitter is now a key communication platform for politicians on the campaign trail (Evans et al. 2014) and once in office (Golbeck et al. 2010; Evans et al. 2013; Straus et al. 2013; Straus et al. 2014; Lassen and Bode 2017). Twitter is part of American politics and a platform that is used not only by members of Congress but by the president and other prominent actors (Gainous and Wagner 2014). It is not uncommon today for a tweet to make national news, something that speaks to how impactful and important to our politics this relatively new medium has become. In addition, it is a platform that allows politicians to do various things from sharing their current meal to talking about policies and pieces of legislation on the agenda. And these messages – unlike a newsletter, C-SPAN showing, or floor speech – have the potential to have an immediate impact because they are posted on a social networking site that many adults in the U.S. rely on for news (Shearer and Gottfried 2017).

Much of the research on congressional Twitter use has focused on explaining variation in the adoption (Williams and Gulati 2010; Lassen and Brown 2011; Straus et al. 2013; Evans et al.

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[10] This work is built on the assumption that legislators are followed by at least some of their constituents. However, as the work of Barbera et al. (2014) shows, it is not too strong an assumption because there is a non-trivial percentage of constituents that follow at least one member of Congress. Nonetheless, even in the absence of a large constituent following, I think it is safe to assume that legislators behave as if their constituents are watching, otherwise it would be difficult to explain the activity that we do see on the platform.

[11] Twitter was introduced in 2006 and it didn't take long for large segments of the citizenry and legislators to adopt the platform (see Gainous and Wagner 2014).

2014) and general usage of the platform by officeholders (Ardoin 2013; see also Bode et al. 2011; Hemphill et al. 2013; Gainous and Wagner 2014; Lassen and Bode 2017; Wagner et al. 2017). However, we are now at a point where Twitter has experienced widespread adoption by individuals in both legislative chambers, so there needs to be more of a focus on what legislators are posting and why they are doing so.[12] More recent work has started to move in this direction (see Dancey and Massand 2017; Stout et al. 2017; Tillery 2017).

Still, the available work leaves something to be desired on the "why" front and on the question of whether Latino interests are reflected in that communication. On the former, there is a need to better understand the driving factors behind what legislators are posting on Twitter. We have the motivation (i.e., re-election), and an idea of what factors account for adoption and a propensity to post, but our understanding of what causes certain legislators to post certain things (e.g., a picture of their pet or meal as opposed to a roll call vote or something else) is lacking (but see Hemphill et al. 2013). Part of this is rooted in the fact that the available work was done at a time where few legislators were actively using Twitter (e.g., Golbeck et al. 2010; Mergel 2012; Hemphill et al. 2013), it specifically focused on a subset of legislators (e.g., Tillery 2017[13]) or issue area (e.g, Dancey and Massand 2017; Stout et al. 2017[14]), or is concerned with more particular behavior that does not speak to Latino behavior (e.g., Wagner et al. 2017[15]). Relatedly, we know that certain legislators are more likely to advance the interests of Latinos in the broader legislative process, but we do not know if their behavior on Twitter reflects that or the contributing factors of such behavior. Indeed, at least theoretically, there is the possibility that legislators can

[12] All members of the 115th U.S. House of Representatives had a Twitter account.
[13] Tillery (2017) only looks at members of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC).
[14] Both of these works are concerned with legislative behavior with respect to the black lives matter movement.
[15] This work looks at gender differences in Twitter behavior.

use communication as a means to demonstrate that they are aware of the things important to the Latino community, even if their behavior in other areas of the legislative process doesn't.[16] This work contributes to both of those areas by exploring differences in the behavior of legislators based on individual characteristics (e.g., legislator ethnicity, partisanship, or age), district demographics (e.g., the number of Latinos in a legislator's district), or both. Since Latinos constitute a minority in the populace and in the legislature, knowing if there is a difference in the behavior of Latino legislators relative to non-Latino legislators can affect the discourse on Latino representation in Congress.

Minority Legislators on Twitter

The descriptive-substantive connection is at the heart of work on minority representation because there is the assumption that minority legislators are in a better position to advance the interests of their co-racial (or co-ethnic) constituents.[17] The work cited above suggests that this does indeed appear to be the case in various areas of the legislative process, and some work on the behavior of minority legislators on Twitter suggests that it extends to this area too.[18] Though sparse, the available literature on minority communication on Twitter gives weight to the idea that minority legislators post about issues important to the co-racial (Stout et al. 2017; Tillery 2017) and co-gender[19] (Evans and Clark 2016) populations that they represent. For example, Tillery (2017) shows that members of the Congressional Black Caucus in the 113th Congress were more

[16] This could be either legislators that try to establish and build trust through communication in the absence of being able to accomplish things in other areas of the legislative process, or it could be those legislators that may pander to Latinos on social media in order to get support without the intent of advancing their interests in other areas (e.g., voting, committee work, agenda-setting).

[17] This expectation stems from shared life experiences, a sense of linked fate or identity, and interactions between those individuals and their co-racial/co-ethnic populations (see Dawson 1994; Mansbridge 1999; Grose 2011).

[18] Granted, the literature exploring minority representation on Twitter almost exclusively focuses on blacks (but see Gervais and Wilson 2017).

[19] Women aren't a minority in the racial or ethnic sense, but they are a minority in the legislature, which is why I include this work here.

likely to talk about racial issues than their non-black colleagues in the legislature. Similarly, Stout and his colleagues (2017) find that black legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives were more likely to display support for "black-centered social movements" than their white counterparts in Congress were (p. 493; see also Dancey and Massand 2017). Women legislators (and candidates), according to the work of Evans and Clark (2016), are more likely to speak to women's issues on Twitter than males are. All of this fits the broader literature on minorities in Congress well, as minorities generally display an awareness of the interests of the individuals they descriptively represent (see Griffin 2014).

Latino Interests

To the extent that the interests of Latinos are different from those of their non-Latino counterparts – and there is reason to believe that they are – there is a need to explore how legislators speak to the interests of this population. Indeed, as Segura's (2012) work shows, there are various issues on which the Latino and non-Latino Anglo population differ (see also Sanchez 2006; Leal 2007; Baretto and Segura 2014). Furthermore, public opinion polls (Baretto et al. 2018; Barreto 2019) and Latino interest group reports (Sanchez 2016; Vargas 2016) consistently show that there are certain issues atop the Latino political agenda.[20] Not surprisingly, immigration reform is one such issue, and one that often gets slotted as a "Latino issue." But there are others such as bilingual education, health care, the economy, crime, and income inequality, that have been identified as those important to Latinos (de la Garza et al. 1992; Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Barreto et al. 2002; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Leal et al. 2008; Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014; Lopez et al. 2016; Barreto et al. 2018; Barreto 2019). None of those issues are of concern *only* to Latinos, but they are

[20] Both Latino Decisions polls and Latino interest groups (i.e., the National Association of Latino Elected Officials and the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda) demonstrate that certain issues (e.g., immigration, education, etc.) are important to Latinos.

amongst those that this segment of the population would like to see addressed and, as alluded to above, in many instances the positions taken by Latinos – relative to Anglos – are fundamentally different. Here I explore the factors influencing the propensity of legislators to tweet about immigration, education, and health care because these are issues important to Latinos and also those on which we see diverging preferences held by Latinos relative to non-Latinos (de la Garza et al. 1992; Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Barreto et al. 2002; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Leal et al. 2008; Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014; Lopez et al. 2016; Barreto et al. 2018; Barreto 2019).

In addition, Latinos, as a result of the size of the immigrant population and their ties to the U.S.-born Latino population, have a vested interest in the advancement of these issues even if they are not issues only important to them. On immigration, for example, undocumented immigrants of Latino origins constitute the largest segment of the unauthorized population (Migration Policy Institute 2019), which means that they have plenty of reasons to want to see this issue addressed by the government. [21] Education is another issue important to Latinos – and higher on the Latino agenda relative to that of non-Latino whites – because they are more likely to have English as a second language than their non-Latino Anglo counterparts. As for health care, Latinos tend to be lower on the socioeconomic spectrum than non-Latino whites (Fontenot et al. 2018), and are also dealing with an aging undocumented population (Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Trevelyan et al. 2016), which helps explain their prioritization of the issue relative to whites. All this is to say that there may be something inherently Latino to these issues which could potentially explain the salience of these issues for Latinos.

[21] Undocumented immigrants from Mexico and Central America alone constitute about 67% of that population (Migration Policy Institute 2019).

Types of Tweets and Issue Areas

There are various ways to explore the behavior of legislators on Twitter. Here, my focus is on understanding what issues individuals talk about and how they talk about them. Since the key preoccupation here is trying to understand whether the behavior of legislators on Twitter reflects the interests of Latinos, I look at the issue areas that legislators are discussing on Twitter with respect to Latino interests. Legislators are free to post about whatever they wish on this platform, but we know from prior work that a significant amount of what they do is policy-focused (Golbeck et al. 2010; see also Lassen and Bode 2017), which means that they are making decisions about what to focus on and, as a result, are speaking about certain issues while ignoring others.

There is also a need to explore how legislators use the platform. In other words, we need to know what form tweets take (i.e., are they policy-oriented, announcing district events, etc.). As discussed above, minority legislators – because of their numerical minority status – may be less likely to focus on policy than non-Latino white legislators will, and this is a way to capture that. Looking at these differences across legislators (and contexts) can add to our understanding of legislative behavior and has the potential to highlight different experiences faced by minority and non-minority legislators in Congress.

Determinants of Behavior on Twitter

Whether the focus is on explaining variation in the type of tweets (i.e., policy, appeal to action, etc.) or issue areas (i.e., immigration, education, etc.) that legislators are posting about on Twitter, there is a need to account for both the ethnicity of a given legislator and the size of the Latino population. Latino legislators – because of their own backgrounds, interactions with, and shared experiences with the Latino constituents they represent – may be more likely to speak about the issues pertinent to the broader Latino population. Similarly, for the reasons mentioned above,

Latino legislators should be more likely to resort to symbolic representation than their non-Latino white colleagues in the legislature. Nevertheless, speaking to the issues of the Latino population, or even working to give psychological reassurance to Latino constituents via symbolic representation, does not require shared ethnicity. Indeed, at least theoretically, Latino and non-Latino legislators should be able to advance the interests of Latinos. Relatedly, the size of the Latino population might influence responsiveness to the interests of the Latino population, a potential effect independent of legislator ethnicity, as more Latinos in a given legislator's district may increase the incentive to talk about issues important to Latinos because of the electoral connection.[22] Prior work has also noted that there are other legislator characteristics (e.g., gender and partisan identification; Tillery 2017; see also Ardoin 2013; Evans et al. 2014; Stout et al. 2017) and district-level factors (e.g., size of minority population; Ardoin 2013; Stout et al. 2017; Tillery 2017) that affect legislative behavior on Twitter.

Hypotheses

Based on the literature on minority legislative behavior (see Griffin 2014 for a review) comes the expectation that Latino legislators will be more attuned, and vocal about the issues important to Latinos than non-Latino white legislators.

Hypothesis 1: *Latino legislators are more likely than non-Latino white legislators to tweet about issues important to Latinos (i.e., immigration, education, and health care).*

[22] It could also be that larger Latino populations give legislators the flexibility to talk about issues that aren't a priority to their non-Latino constituents.

Though some legislators may (or may not) be predisposed to be sensitive to the issues important to Latinos due to shared ethnicity, given the electoral connection (see Mayhew 1974), the expectation is that a larger Latino population in a given member's district will increase the likelihood that they post about issues important to Latinos.

Hypothesis 2: *There is a positive association between the size of the Latino population in a legislator's district and the legislator's propensity to tweet about issues important to Latinos (i.e., immigration, education, and health care).*

Latino legislators, because of their minority status – in both the ethnic and numerical sense – are likely to engage in the political process differently. Though the literature on the subject leads to the expectation that their policy-related behavior (i.e., positions taken, bills presented, etc.) might be different, it is their behavior more generally that might be influenced. In the absence of having the required majorities to push policy through Congress, the expectation is that Latino legislators are less likely to have policy victories to flaunt and will subsequently be forced to use other types of messages to keep their positions in office (see hypothesis 3). From this line of thinking – and the literatures on minority legislative behavior and on symbolic representation cited above – comes the expectation that Latino legislators are more likely than their non-Latino white counterparts to engage in symbolic messaging on Twitter to signal to their constituents that their interests are important even if they (as legislators) are unable to act on them in a way that the status quo is changed. Relatedly, (non-)Latino legislators in districts with high Latino populations may also be in the same situation and thus resort to symbolic messaging.

Hypothesis 3: *Latino legislators are less likely than non-Latino white legislators to post policy-oriented tweets.*

Hypothesis 4: *Latino legislators are more likely than non-Latino white legislators to post symbolic tweets.*

Hypothesis 5: *There is a positive association between the size of the Latino population in a legislator's district and the legislator's propensity to post symbolic tweets.*

Research Design and Methodology

Data

To explore legislative behavior on Twitter, I collected almost two years' worth of tweets for each member of the 115th U.S. House of Representatives using Python and the Twitter application programming interface (API). I scraped tweets from the official profiles (i.e., those linked to the websites of legislators) from the start of the legislative session until the first week of November in 2018.[23] [24] That span of almost two years yielded over 493,000 tweets, which is an average of over 1,100 per legislator in that time span (see Table 2.1).[25] This is to be expected, as legislators vary in their propensity to post on the platform (see Lassen and Bode 2017); some did not post at all and others posted thousands of tweets.[26] Tweets are not as long as press releases or newsletters, but coding almost half a million tweets is no easy feat. Instead of coding each and every one of those tweets by hand, I chose to rely on a method that is increasingly used by scholars in the field: supervised machine learning (see Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Grimmer 2016; Lassen and Bode 2017). This method, though computationally intensive, is useful for large-scale projects

[23] Tweets were collected until the week of the U.S. national elections in 2018.

[24] I supplement this data with legislator characteristics from legislator profiles (and online sources) and the U.S. Census Bureau's 2017, 1-year American Community Survey (ACS) estimates.

[25] Tables 1 and 2 have summary statistics for both the entire chamber and for the Latino and white members. This is because only the latter is used for the core analysis. The difference I am concerned with is that between Latinos and non-Latino whites in the legislature.

[26] Five members (Clay Higgins (LA-3rd), Jim Bridenstine (OK-1st), Pat Meehan (PA-7th), Rob Bishop (UT-1st), and Evan Jenkins (WV-3rd)) were excluded because they did not meet the minimum threshold of fifty tweets to be included in the analysis.

Table 2.1: Number of Tweets

	Total # of Tweets for Each MC Full Chamber	Total # of Tweets for Each MC Whites and Latinos
Minimum	48	48
Mean	1148.037	1084.732
Maximum	6755	6401
Standard Deviation	941.1811	882.6737
Skewness	2.17794	2.1884
Kurtosis	10.42675	10.62242
Sum	493,656	401,351

(like those being tackled by researchers in this new era of big data) and also fairly intuitive. The method relies on researchers to train algorithms on a subset of the data, which then allows the software to code the rest of the data using the different trained algorithms. Using this technique, I hand-coded a random sample of over 5,000 tweets, which I then used to train three algorithms (i.e., maximum entropy, support vector machine, and glmnet; see Jurka et al. 2013, 2015).[27] Those algorithms were then used to code the rest of the tweets using an R program called *RTextTools*, which was created by Timothy Jurka and his colleagues (see Jurka et al. 2013), and is used to take on projects similar to this one (see Hemphill et al. 2013; Lassen and Bode 2017). However, getting to that point took some time and effort, as there are several things that needed to be done in the processing stage to ensure data quality for analyses.

The algorithms used here classify the tweets using a "bag of words" technique, which does away with word order and relies on the roots of the words in the tweets (see Grimmer and Stewart 2013 for a more nuanced discussion; see also Lassen and Bode 2017). [28] In practice, this means that I had to stem the words in the tweets (e.g., changing running to run). In addition to stemming, I removed unnecessary information (i.e., getting rid of numbers, punctuation, usernames, hyperlinks, and very (un-)common words in the data) that does not help the algorithms (see Grimmer and Stewart 2013; see also Jurka et al. 2013 and Welbers et al. 2017).[29] These procedures

[27] I chose these three algorithms because they are those which not only have already been used for a similar purpose by other scholars (i.e., coding tweets; see Lassen and Bode 2017; see also Jurka et al. 2015), but they are ones that have been identified as low-memory algorithms. The latter is of particular importance, especially when one considers the sheer size of the data being explored here.
[28] See also Welbers et al. 2017 for more information on preprocessing data and techniques used.
[29] Once the algorithms were trained, a fivefold cross-validation method was used to test the algorithms. This means that the trained data was tested by partitioning it into five random sub-sets and those different configurations were tested for accuracy with the hand-coded data (see Lassen and Bode 2017). Individually, no algorithm performed better than 62%, but when at least two were in agreement, they coded about 99% of the data.

are standard for this kind of analysis and they help reduce the size of the tweets used for coding, which aids in the use of resources needed for coding. [30] [31]

The procedures outlined above allowed me to code each tweet based on whether it was policy-oriented, event-related, or otherwise, a categorization scheme I will discuss below. However, I am not only concerned with the nature of the tweets posted by legislators, I also want to know what they are tweeting about. To explore whether legislators are tweeting about issues important to Latinos, I take a different approach to the one described above.[32] Specifically, I go back to the unprocessed master list of tweets and make use of keywords to identify tweets for each of the three issue areas. On immigration, for example, I use the following keywords to find tweets regarding this topic: "immig," "daca," "undoc," "dreamer," and "green card," amongst others.[33] Here, I am solely concerned with what legislators are talking about, which is why such a crude categorization scheme is useful. Granted, this technique ignores the valence of text about these issues, but there is value in knowing whether they are talking about the issues at all; indeed, whether issues are being discussed at all has a bearing on how the interests of the Latino population are being advanced.[34]

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[30] I also translated the tweets not posted in English. While some of those were tweets where the legislator was simply posting something they had already posted in English in a different language, the majority of tweets were those in which they weren't.

[31] Though there is naturally a concern of losing valuable information, as Grimmer and Stewart (2013) note, that scholars have "consistently across applications…shown that this simple representation of text is sufficient to infer substantively interest properties of texts" (p. 273).

[32] Though going the machine learning route here would give me more leverage in regards to exploring what MCs are talking about relative to other topics, not just those identified as important to Latinos, that is not necessary for what I'm interested in exploring here.

[33] The same is done for education and health care.

[34] There are issues that never get addressed in the formal legislative process, which likely speaks to the majoritarian and partisan processes that take place in the institution. However, on Twitter (and in their communicative strategies more broadly) legislators have the ability to address any issues they want. A failure to do so can be viewed as a strong signal to constituents that those issues aren't important or relevant.

Variables

The categorization scheme used here for the dependent variables is adapted from Lassen and Bode's (2017) work (see also Golbeck et al. 2010; Tillery 2017). The *symbolic* category captures tweets where MCs demonstrate an awareness of the issues important to minorities without an explicit reference to policy or a roll call vote (see Tillery 2017; see also Sinclair-Chapman 2002). The *policy* category captures explicit mentions of roll call votes and/or pieces of legislation. The *partisan* category captures tweets that use of partisan language and (or) the explicit reference to either of the political parties. The *appeal to action* category captures tweets where legislators attempt to get viewers to do something, be it repost a tweet, read a newsletter, or call a hotline. The *events* category has tweets that explicitly mention an upcoming event, campaign-related or otherwise. The *media* category houses tweets where legislators are sharing general information and media (e.g., pictures, articles, videos, and links) and messages that don't fall into any of the other categories (see Table 2.2 for a distribution of the tweets for the 115th U.S. House).[35]

With the tweets identified and categorized, I use the raw number of tweets to compute the proportion of tweets in a given category (or issue area) for each legislator, and these proportions serve as the dependent variables for this study (see Table 2.3 for descriptive statistics).[36] For the issue areas, I compute the proportion of tweets in each of the policy areas described above.[37] The key explanatory variables are legislator ethnicity and size of the Latino population in a given

[35] Though the key category here is symbolic, the other categories provide a more holistic view of how legislators are using Twitter to communicate with constituents.

[36] About 62 percent of the data was unanimously coded by all three algorithms and about 37 percent of the tweets were coded by at least two of the algorithms. On one percent of the data, none of the algorithms were in agreement. Ideally, I would like the unanimously coded percentage to be higher but relying on two algorithms should still provide us with a general idea of the different types of tweets.

[37] Each of those dependent variables, for immigration, education, and health care, are calculated by identifying how many tweets of the total count fall into those individual areas. These issue area dependent variables were constructed independent of those by tweet type (i.e., policy, symbolic, etc.).

Table 2.2: Average Proportion by Category

Type of Tweet	Average Proportion Full Chamber	Average Proportion Whites and Latinos
Media	.786584	.7863112
Policy	.1251629	.1295553
Symbolic	.0027964	.0024182
Partisan	.0403114	.0360725
Appeal for Action	.0278641	.0283785
Event	.0053884	.0055587
No Code*	.0118928	.0117057

*These are tweets where none of the three algorithms were in agreement with one another. These tweets will be coded by hand in the future.

Table 2.3: Descriptive Statistics for Latino and Non-Latino White Legislators in 115th U.S. House

	Minimum	Mean	Maximum	Std. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	N
Proportion Variables:							
Policy	.010989	.1295553	.3103448	.0472527	.3573358	3.41606	370
Symbolic	0	.0024182	.0214395	.0036952	2.303299	9.329297	370
Immigration	0	.0326319	.3316551	.0413321	2.930808	14.97024	370
Education	0	.0470207	.157931	.022193	1.080273	5.996295	370
Health Care	0	.0369691	.184466	.0302068	1.820873	7.413398	370
Legislator Characteristics:							
Latino	0	.1	1	.3004062	2.666667	8.111111	370
Age	33	58.0973	88	10.56154	-.0925915	2.782222	370
Female	0	.1621622	1	.3690986	1.833089	4.360215	370
Democrat	0	.3783784	1	.4856394	.5015504	1.251553	370
District Characteristics:							
% Latino	.8	17.96	88.1	18.62167	1.769903	5.612799	370

legislator's district. The former is a binary variable (*Latino*) that takes a value of one when the legislator is Latino, and the latter is the percentage of the Latino population (*% Latino*) in each district (see Table 2.3).[38] [39] In addition to ethnicity, other legislator characteristics included in the models as controls are *age*, gender (*female*), and partisan identification (*Democrat*).[40] At the district level, the size of the foreign-born population is also included in the models, as it can potentially help explain variance in legislative behavior, especially for issues such as immigration and education.

Modeling

Legislators vary in their propensity to post on Twitter (Golbeck et al. 2010; Lassen and Brown 2011; Straus et al. 2014; Lassen and Bode 2017), which is why using a simple count model isn't appropriate here.[41] Using the proportion of each MC's tweets in each category (or issue area) allows me to account for that variance, but that decision comes with its own methodological considerations. Proportions, especially those with distributions skewed towards the extremes (i.e., 0 and 1), make ordinary least squares regression problematic (see Ferrari and Cribari-Nieto 2004).[42] In addition, because certain legislators have zeros for some of the dependent variables, there is a need to adequately model those zeros and not lose them to data transformation (see

[38] Legislator characteristics (i.e., ethnicity, age, party identification) were taken from a data set composed by Stephen Wolf (2017).

[39] I ran the models comparing Latinos to non-Latinos in general (i.e., all other non-Latino groups) and comparing Latinos only to non-Latino whites, and the results do not change substantively. In fact, comparing Latinos to only non-Latino white legislators seems to strengthen the results captured here. The results as presented here are arguably stronger tests because they also include other minorities in the non-Latino category.

[40] Party identification is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 when the MC is a Democrat and 0 when the MC is a Republican. Unlike the U.S. Senate, there are no members in the 115th House that don't fall into one of those two camps (see Wolf 2017).

[41] The variance in tweets amongst legislators for the period studied here also suggests that a count model isn't appropriate.

[42] These types of distributions violate ordinary least square normality assumptions. Nonetheless, the substantive results stay intact when these relationships are modeled using ordinary least squares regression. The post-estimation tests suggest heteroscedasticity is present, which is what is expected based on the nature of the dependent variables.

Williams 2018). Though a zero-one inflated beta (ZOIB) distribution model (Buis 2010) might seem appropriate, it rests on the assumption that there are different processes – and as a result, different independent variables – influencing legislators that have no tweets in a given category (or issue area) when compared to those with some tweets in those same variables (Buis 2010; Williams 2018). However, this work is operating under the assumption that all legislators have the same capability (or freedom) to post whatever they want on the platform. As a result, the zeros that are present in the data come from the lack of desire or motivation to post about issues important to Latinos. In this case, using a fractional response generalized linear model, seems more appropriate because it allows for the modeling of proportions (including zeros) without the same assumptions that come with Buis' (2010) ZOIB model (Williams 2018; see also Papke and Wooldridge 1996; Wooldridge 2011).[43]

While all of the dependent variables are proportional, there are two different groups of models that are computed here. One set of models explores the issue areas (e.g., what explains the likelihood that legislators post about immigration?), and the other set of models focuses on the types of tweets (i.e., policy and symbolic). The former is centered around trying to answer the extent to which legislators speak to the interests of the Latino population and the latter to the nature of their communication.

Results

The purpose of this paper, as mentioned above, is two-fold: finding out what legislators are posting on Twitter and how they're doing it; I will address the former first and then switch my focus to discussing the latter. What issues legislators are discussing on Twitter provides

[43] This is done using the *fracglm* command in Stata 14 from Williams' (2018) user-written package.

constituents with an idea of the priorities of the individuals that represent them. Though exploring all of the different policy issues that legislators are discussing would help better contextualize the behavior of legislators on Twitter, I chose to look only a few issues that consistently sit atop the priority list for Latinos in the electorate. This does not capture whether legislators are speaking in support (or opposition) of these issues, but it does provide us with a basic idea of what's being brought to the discussion of ideas, which is generally a precursor to more substantive action in the legislative process.

Before explaining the results, there is a need to explain what the tables and figures actually show. Unlike ordinary least squares estimation, the coefficients from the fractional response generalized linear models are not readily interpretable (see Williams 2018). As a result, the table shows the marginal effects of the independent variables on the proportional dependent variables and the figures display the predicted proportion of tweets in a given category at different levels of the independent variables. In addition, and more importantly, it should be noted that it is not easy to contextualize the results because the dependent variables – in order to account for variance in the propensity to vote from one legislator to the next – capture the proportion of tweets from each legislators total. That means that it is difficult to say how many more tweets legislators post in a given issue area (or category) because there is a variance in the total number of tweets posted by legislators on the whole.[44] Therefore, the focus here is explaining the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variables by looking at the direction and size of those effects and not the number of tweets when moving from one level to another of a given independent variable.

[44] In the data set, this ranges from about 50 to well over 6,000 in the two-year span (see Table 1, column 2).

Issues

Immigration is one issue that is inextricably tied to the Latino population, and it is also one that many Latinos have a vested interest in given their own transnational ties (and those of their constituents). As would be expected, the descriptive connection between Latino legislators and their co-ethnic members of the American public increases the likelihood that Latino MCs will post about immigration on Twitter (see Table 2.4 and Figure 2.1). The predicted proportion of immigration related tweets for Latino is almost twice as much as it is for non-Latino whites (see Figure 2.1). This is a finding that lends some support for the first hypothesis that there is a difference in behavior rooted in legislator ethnicity, at least with respect to immigration. The size of the Latino (see Figure 2.2) and that of the foreign-born (see Figure 2.3) populations both influence the likelihood that a given legislator will post about immigration on Twitter, irrespective of their own ethnicity. This is consistent with the second hypothesis, whereby legislators with larger Latino populations are more likely than those with lower Latino populations to post about immigration. For the former, a move from a district with a one percent of Latino population to one with a Latino population of eighty-one percent in the district leads to almost a three-fold increase in the proportion of immigration tweets, all else constant (Figure 2.1). A move from a district with a foreign-born population of one percent to one with a foreign-born population of forty-nine percent leads to an almost twofold increase in the proportion of immigration tweets posted by a given legislator (see Figure 2.2). These results are not surprising, as those legislators with larger Latino, and foreign-born populations more generally are those most likely to be face pressure from those communities to take action on this particular issue. In addition to those results, it is evident that Democratic legislators are more likely than their Republican colleagues to post about immigration (see Figure 2.4). This result is also not surprising, as Democrats are usually more

responsive to the interests of the Latino population than Republicans are (see Griffin and Newman 2007).

Unlike immigration, legislator ethnicity does not appear to be a driving factor when looking at legislator propensity to post about education or health care; this a finding that is at odds with the first hypothesis. Even though the issues are those that Latinos place atop their priority list for governmental action, they are not issues that only Latinos care about or have a vested interest in. That aside, and though not part of the core hypotheses being tested here, there are some notable findings when looking at other legislator characteristics. More specifically, legislator gender and partisan identification were statistically significant in most of the models here, both in regard to the issues and on substance (see Table 2.4). Female and Democratic legislators were both more likely than their male and Republican colleagues, respectively, to post about education and health care on Twitter (see Figure 2.5).

Substance

As discussed above, keeping constituents in the loop on the policy front is an important part of legislative communication, and the data allow for the exploration of what accounts for variance in that type of message. I look at this by using the *policy* proportion of each legislator's total tweets (see Table 2.4, column 4). This finding fails to provide support for the third hypothesis, as there isn't a statistically significant difference in legislators' propensity to post policy-related tweets. Even if Latinos are not as likely to have as many policy "wins" as their non-Latino white colleagues, they may still choose to talk about legislation in other ways. Indeed, they could be communicating that they voted against something or about bills that they have presented or sponsored which could – in their minds – be just as good. Though the analysis here cannot speak to either of those possibilities, it does clearly go against the expectation that Latinos are less likely

Table 2.4: Fractional Regression Models

Independent Variables	Proportional Dependent Variables				
	Immigration	Education	Health Care	Policy	Symbolic
Latino#	.0189617*** (.0073979)	.0015814 (.0045175)	-.0012516 (.0073662)	.0025998 (.0136569)	.0012375** (.0007137)
Age	.0002021* (.0001192)	.0000575 (.0001024)	.0001549 (.0001174)	.0002014 (.0002268)	.0000237** (.0000116)
Female#	-.0020528 (.0031674)	.0114665*** (.0035962)	.0032117** (.0031127)	.0183889** (.0069009)	.0015741*** (.0003655)
Democrat#	.0221418*** (.00288)	.0045936* (.0024647)	.0348757*** (.0034186)	-.0098139 (.0059863)	.0037627*** (.0003479)
% Latino	.000411*** (.0000924)	.0000392 (.0001063)	-.0000837 (.0001443)	.0001526 (.000274)	-.0000119 (.0000127)
% Foreign Born	.0003861*** (.000159)	-.0002007 (.000162)	-.0001752 (.0001518)	-.0001526 (.0003852)	.0000222 (.0000183)
N	370	370	370	370	370
Pseudo R^2	.0780	.0014	.0235	.0009	.0686

#Estimate denotes a discrete change of binary variable from zero to one.
The estimates shown are marginal effects and the standard errors are in parentheses.
* p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01



Figure 2.1: Predicted Proportion of Immigration Tweets Based on Legislator Ethnicity



Figure 2.2: Predicted Proportion of Immigration Tweets Based on Latino Population



Figure 2.3: Predicted Proportion of Immigration Tweets Based on Foreign Born Population



Figure 2.4: Predicted Proportion of Immigration Tweets Based on Legislator Party Identification



(a) PID and Education



(b) Gender and Education



(c) PID and Health Care



(d) Gender and Health Care

Figure 2.5: Predicted Proportions of Education and Health Care Tweet Based on PID and Gender

to talk about votes or legislation on Twitter than are non-Latino white. Like ethnicity, most of the coefficients in the model were statistically insignificant. The sole exception in that model was legislator gender. The results show that female legislators were significantly more likely to post policy-oriented tweets than their male colleagues in the House (see Figure 2.6). This is an interesting finding, though not unexpected, as literature on female legislators in Congress shows that women are more likely than men to speak on the floor on political issues of the day (Pearson and Dancey 2011). Congresswomen may – because of gendered norms – feel like they have to devote more of their efforts to highlighting policy-oriented activities as a way to demonstrate that they are supposed to be there.[1]

The next, and final model that I discuss here, is that exploring the propensity of legislators to post symbolic messages. Though symbolic tweets seem to have been published sparingly by legislators in the 115th U.S. House of Representation (see column 2 in Table 2.2), the results provide some support for the idea that Latino legislators are more likely than their non-Latino white colleagues to post symbolic-type tweets. This provides support for the fourth hypothesis (see Figure 2.7).[2] In addition to legislator ethnicity, gender and partisan identification were also statistically significant.[3] More specifically, women and Democratic legislators were more likely than their respective counterparts to post symbolic tweets (see Figure 2.8). Whereas women are historical minorities in the legislature, in the 115th Congress, a majority of them – by being part of

[1] Though primarily focused on the intersection of partisanship and gender, Pearson's (2015) work demonstrates that women go to great lengths to prove their credentials. Amongst other things, this is evident in their floor speeches.
[2] Given the prevalence of symbolic acts in other facets of the legislative process (e.g., symbolic resolutions (Sinclair-Chapman 2002), in floor speeches (Hill and Hurley 2002)), it is surprising that this type of tweets aren't more prevalent here. However, this can potentially be attributed to the fact that the method of exploration chosen can't pick up symbolic tweets that come by way of photographs, links to other media (e.g., videos, articles, press releases, etc.), or other non-text presentations.
[3] This means that hypothesis five is not supported in this study.



Figure 2.6: Predicted Proportion of Policy Tweets Based on Legislator Gender



Figure 2.7: Predicted Proportion of Symbolic Tweets Based on Legislator Ethnicity



Figure 2.8: Predicted Proportion of Symbolic Tweets Based on Legislator Gender

to post symbolic messages. Though symbolic tweets seem to have been published sparingly by legislators in the 115th U.S. House of Representation (see column 2 in Table 2.2), the results provide some support for the idea that Latino legislators are more likely than their non-Latino white colleagues to post symbolic-type tweets. This provides support for the fourth hypothesis (see Figure 2.7).[4] In addition to legislator ethnicity, gender and partisan identification were also statistically significant.[5] More specifically, women and Democratic legislators were more likely than their respective counterparts to post symbolic tweets (see Figure 2.8). Whereas women are historical minorities in the legislature, in the 115th Congress, a majority of them – by being part of the Democratic party – were also a minority in the partisan sense since Republicans controlled the House during that span (Congressional Research Service 2018).[6] Those two realities may have compounded to a heavier reliance on symbolic communication by female legislators in this time period. By similar logic, Democratic legislators in the minority party may have felt more pressure to reassure constituents that they were aware and fighting for their interests especially because of fewer victories to lay claim on the policy front (see Figure 2.9).[7]

Conclusion and Discussion

The issues important to Latinos in the electorate do appear to be reflected in the messages posted on Twitter by legislators. Though the raw proportions of tweets here do not account for whether the messages posted are in line with the positions preferred by Latinos, they do show that

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[4] Given the prevalence of symbolic acts in other facets of the legislative process (e.g., symbolic resolutions (Sinclair-Chapman 2002), in floor speeches (Hill and Hurley 2002)), it is surprising that this type of tweets aren't more prevalent here. However, this can potentially be attributed to the fact that the method of exploration chosen can't pick up symbolic tweets that come by way of photographs, links to other media (e.g., videos, articles, press releases, etc.), or other non-text presentations.

[5] This means that hypothesis five is not supported in this study.

[6] Women held 92 seats in the House, and 67 of those were held by Democratic women.

[7] Age also increases the likelihood that MCs post symbolic tweets (see Figure 2.10)



Figure 2.9: Predicted Proportion of Symbolic Tweets Based on Legislator PID



Figure 2.10: Predicted Proportion of Symbolic Tweets Based on Legislator Age

some of the issues important to this segment of the population are being discussed by legislators, which is important on its own. Only for immigration does ethnicity exert an effect on messages posted, which likely speaks to the salience and prioritization of the issue for Latino legislators. The same applies to the size of the Latino population in a given legislator's district, which makes sense, as it is an issue arguably more directly linked to the Latino population than the others explored.

In line with expectations, Latino legislators during the period covered were more likely to post symbolic tweets than their white colleagues were. Unexpected, however, was the paucity of symbolic tweets in relation to the total number of messages posted on the platform. One potential explanation could be that legislators, in general, do not feel the need to post these kinds of tweets because they engage with their co-ethnic (or co-racial) constituents in person or through other mediums. It could also be that they believe that speaking to policy, irrespective of aggregate outcomes, is more beneficial to their reelection efforts than reassuring their constituents that they are aware of their interests. As mentioned above, policy, as defined here, speaks to roll call votes and direct mentions of pieces of legislation, which are more concrete things that legislators can hang their hats on. However, even policy seemed to be less of a focus relative to general media posts, which constituted the vast majority of tweets during the period studied. Legislators may view the platform as more useful for general informational purposes than I expected. Indeed, many of those media tweets provided readers with information ranging from what legislators were having for lunch to information about their non-voting legislative affairs and links to outside content.

One limitation of this work is that it only focuses on one Congress, which does not allow me to see how differences in party control affect communication. That is, we do not know how

members behave on this platform based on whether they are in the majority or minority party. In addition, and arguably more importantly, this work does not allow me to pick up on subtle cues across messages, some of which are made possible by pictures. The software used for coding the tweets here cannot rightfully pick up what a legislator was trying to portray by posting a picture of her dining at a hole-in-the-wall restaurant in her district or that of wearing a LGBTQ+ pride pin, and though the case can be made that they are symbolic in nature, the algorithms can only categorize it as media. Nonetheless, this study is valuable insofar that it provides us with a snapshot of legislative communication and an idea of what legislators are posting about on Twitter.

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CHAPTER 3: FRAMING SUPPORT FOR LATINO INTERESTS AND THE LIMITS OF DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION

Abstract

How does shared race (or ethnicity) influence the effectiveness of policy frames presented by legislators to constituents? Recent scholarship highlights the role of race in the strained communication between legislators and constituents (Butler and Broockman 2011; Broockman 2014; Mendez and Grose 2018). Work on intergroup relations provides the basis for the expectation that shared racial (or ethnic) identity may influence how receptive constituents are to communication from legislators (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Scholars have long viewed policy frames as a way to change public opinion (see Busby et al. 2018 for a review), and it is a way that legislators can garner support for the policies they champion or are forced to take up as a result of partisan and majoritarian dynamics. However, scholarship on the subject has failed to take into account the role of race as a source cue in framing and its potential effect on the effectiveness of frames. Shared identity (or lack thereof) between legislators and constituents may provide some insight into the distorted communication between the two and can also inform our understanding regarding the advancement of Latino interests through the non-Latino population. Here, I explore how ethnicity as a source cue influences the effectiveness of legislator policy framing on bilingual education through a survey experiment. The results suggest that, in general, getting respondents to think about the issue decreases support for bilingual education. In addition, and more importantly, the results show that white respondents presented with an anti-bilingual education frame by a Latino legislator display significantly less support for bilingual education than those in the baseline condition.

Introduction

The communication between legislators and constituents has a direct impact on the representation afforded to citizens. While all legislative-constituent communication is important, that between minority constituents and non-minority representatives is particularly important given work that shows representational disadvantages for those individuals who are not descriptively represented (Mendez and Grose 2018). Here, however, the focus is on the communication between minority legislators and their non-minority constituents. We know that there is an apparent disconnect in communication in the absence of the descriptive connection (Butler and Broockman 2011; Broockman 2014). This disconnect has implications for the way in which constituents are represented, but also for the way in which legislators go about doing their jobs.

Legislators are tasked with representing all constituents in their districts. Therefore, even if, as is normally expected, minority legislators are willing to vote in a manner that reflects the interests of their co-racial (or co-ethnic) constituents, they need to be aware of, and sensitive to, the interests of their non-minority constituents. Relatedly, the legislative process and the institutional realities faced by legislators lead to situations in which legislators are forced to vote on or take positions that may go against what their constituents want (Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Cox and McCubbins 2005; Lebo et al. 2007). As a result, there is a need to better understand how effective legislators can be in getting constituents to support the policies they are advancing or forced to take because of pressure from other actors in the broader process.

Though this is a dilemma faced by all legislators, minority officeholders are in a distinct position relative to their non-minority colleagues. Not only are they a minority in the racial (or

ethnic) sense, they are also numerical minorities, and, depending on partisan control of governmental institutions, partisan minorities. This means that these individuals are more likely to have to take positions that may be out of favor with their constituents, which means that they are also more likely to need to convince constituents to tolerate or get on board with the choices made (or those that have to be made).

How information is presented can affect its effectiveness. Placing a spin on a message to increase how receptive individuals are to it is something that is fundamental in communication. In politics, this is normally described as framing (Druckman 2011), and it is a way to get individuals to be more receptive to an issue stance as a result of how the issue is presented. Here, I explore the effectiveness of framing on constituents in the absence of shared ethnicity. The literature on elite-citizen communication demonstrates that constituents will sometimes adopt the positions of their representatives (Butler and Broockman 2017), but this does not account for the role of shared race or ethnicity between legislators and constituents. This is an oversight that the nascent literature on how source cues influence framing has acknowledged (see Hartman and Weber 2009). While the message itself is important, the source that the message is coming from can also be impactful, and it is something that needs to be accounted for in the study of framing. This paper is an attempt to add to our understanding on this front, and it does so within the context of Latino representation.

Latinos are one of the fastest growing groups in American society (Brown 2014) and currently hold more seats in Congress than they have at any other time in our nation's history (NALEO Educational Fund 2019).[1] As a result of this, Latinos have become a group whose

[1] Though the election of Latino legislators is definitely tied to the size of the Latino population, Latinos are not the only group responsible for electing Latino legislators, nor are they the only individuals that those individuals represent while in office.

behavior has attracted the attention of academics and non-academics alike (see Barreto and Segura 2014). The election of more Latinos has been viewed as a way to increase the substantive representation of Latinos in the electorate (see Casellas 2011), but absent from that discussion has been information about how those legislators represent and interact with their non-Latino constituents. In addition to the connection between legislators and constituents that come along with the office, legislators also need to establish connections with their non-Latino constituents because there are electoral consequences that are associated with doing so or failing to do so (Fenno 1978). I explore how successful Latino legislators can be in trying to influence the attitudes of non-Latino whites relative to the success of their Anglo colleagues through the use of a survey experiment. The expectation, coming largely from the literature on intergroup relations, is that Latino legislators will be less effective in garnering support via framing than their Anglo colleagues.

Theoretical Foundations

Descriptive Representation

The literature on minority representation often focuses on how the descriptive connection can be used to advance the substantive interests of the co-racial (or co-ethnic) constituents that those individuals represent (see Griffin 2014). On that front, the literature shows some support for the idea that minorities in office reflect the preferences of their co-minority constituents in their voting behavior (Hero and Tolbert 1995; Swain 1995; Cameron et al. 1996; Overby and Cosgrove 1996; Canon 1999; Lublin 1999; Whitby 2000; Tate 2003; Casellas 2007, 2011; Grose 2011; Rouse 2013) – and outside of it (e.g., agenda-setting (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Sinclair-Chapman 2002; Bratton 2006; Wilson 2010), committee work (Gamble 2007; Rouse 2013), and oversight (Minta 2011; Rouse 2013)). However, minority legislators do not only represent their co-racial or

co-ethnics in office; they are tasked with representing their entire district. As such, there are electoral consequences that come along with the demographic diversity in any given district and legislators need to figure out how to balance the interests of their different constituents (Fenno 1978; Grose 2011; Hansel and Treul 2015).

The absence of descriptive representation is something that is normally discussed in the context of how it increases or decreases the substantive representation afforded to minorities; that is, scholars are normally preoccupied with how minority constituents fare in situations when they are not represented by a co-racial (or co-ethnic) legislator (see Cameron et al. 1996). An important part of descriptive representation that is oftentimes left out of the discussion is the relationship between minority legislators and their non-minority constituents. Indeed, descriptive representation is presented as a means to increase the substantive representation of their co-minority constituents, but what about those that are not part of a given minority legislator's demographic group? The relationship between those citizens that aren't descriptively represented and their legislators is one that needs to be further explored, as it can have democratic, representational, and electoral consequences.

Legislator-Constituent Communication

Legislator-constituent communication is at the heart of our representative democracy. There is an interdependent relationship between the two that hinges on whether or not constituents provide legislators with information about their preferences and the legislators keeping constituents in the loop (Miller and Stokes 1963; Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978). Much work concerns itself with communication from constituents to legislators, but communication from legislators to constituents is also important. Communication is itself a means to establish and develop trust with constituents; it's something that is important, especially when the demands of

the job pull legislators away from their home districts, geographically and in terms of partisan (and other) pressures (see Fenno 1978). Plenty of work demonstrates the lengths that legislators go to in an attempt to ensure that their constituents view them in a favorable light (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978; Arnold 1990; Jacobson 2015). Communication is used not only to let constituents know about their doings in Washington, D.C., and at home, but also as a way to garner support for their own policies and choices.

In part then, legislators are in the business of trying to get constituents to support policies they care about or are trying to pass. Though the focus in the literature is normally on whether the behavior of legislators mirrors the preferences of the electorate, whether MCs can influence the preferences of constituents has a bearing on whether they advance policies important to them while in office. [2] After all, legislators have their own preferences and pressure from other political actors that are not their constituents, which means that they have a need to be able to get support for their policies in and outside of the halls of Congress. One such place they may look for support is their constituents.[3] Brockman and Butler's (2017) work finds that citizens will sometimes adopt the positions held by their legislators (see also Minozzi et al. 2015). Though the authors explore various political issues and different variations in the intensity of the message, their work does not examine legislator ethnicity. We know from other work that citizens are less likely to communicate with their representatives in office when the two are not of the same ethnicity, something that applies to both minority and Anglo respondents (Broockman 2014; Mendez and Grose 2018).

[2] Relatedly, it could also be policies that are imposed on them as a result of partisan and institutional realities (i.e., the need to logroll or form other coalitions for success) they face in office.

[3] While legislators can technically support (or try to advance) any policies they want, they are constrained by various factors in practice (e.g., parties, the president, interest groups, constituents, etc.), which can lead them to turn to the people that put them in office.

Whether individuals are receptive to legislators that are not of their same racial or ethnic groups has practical consequences. Principally, as related to this work, white constituents not receptive to communication efforts from non-white legislators means that the prospects of indirect representation via Anglos diminishes as the need arises to rely on white legislators to advance the interests of Latinos in this sense. That is if only non-Latino Anglo legislators can successfully communicate with their co-racial constituents, then the prospects of garnering support for Latino-favored policies through the Anglo population diminishes because then there is a need to get white legislators to support those policies. However, even thinking outside of that possibility for a second, if constituents – generally speaking, not just whites – are not receptive to communication from legislators that are not like them, then this leaves a large segment of the population that isn't part of the legislative process in this sense. From that vantage point, this work has the potential to speak to not only the limits but also the potentially undesirable side-effects of descriptive representation.

Latino Interests and Bilingual Education

The extent to which the policy interests of the Latino population differ from those of the non-Latino population has representational consequences for this segment of the population. This work would not be necessary (or possible) if there were not differences between the two groups. On this front, the available research suggests that Latinos and non-Latino whites differ not only in regard to their policy preferences (Leal 2007; Griffin and Newman 2008; Segura 2012; Barreto and Segura 2014) but also in the way in which they prioritize those issues (Sanchez 2016; Vargas 2016; Barreto et al. 2018; Barreto 2019). There are several issues where an overwhelming majority of Latinos and whites sit on diametrically opposed sides (Leal 2007; Griffin and Newman 2008; Segura 2012). Immigration, health care, the economy, crime, income inequality, and bilingual

education are amongst those issues, and they are those that consistently come up in polls and surveys of Latinos (de la Garza et al. 1992; Martinez-Ebers et al. 2000; Barreto et al. 2002; Pantoja and Segura 2003; Leal et al. 2008; Rouse 2013; Wallace 2014; Lopez et al. 2016; Barreto et al. 2018; Barreto 2019). Though there are several issues that can be explored to see how shared ethnicity affects receptiveness to policy frames, I focus on bilingual education because it is one that meets the criteria that I will discuss now.

In order for framing to be a viable route, the issue needs to be one: that is salient to Latinos; where there is a difference between Latinos and non-Latino whites; and where there is a theoretically-plausible common ground to bridge the gap in support between the two sides. Bilingual education meets these criteria. Bilingual education is an issue that is important to Latinos in the U.S. (Sanchez 2006; Leal 2007; Baretto et al. 2018). It is also one where we see a divergence in support for it when comparing Latinos and non-Latino whites (Cain, Kiewiet, and Uhlaner 1991; Huddy and Sears 1995; Houvouras 2001; Sanchez 2006; Leal 2007). Even if the two populations differ in their support for bilingual education, there are large segments of both groups that are for immigrants (and citizens) learning English (Jones 2013). Indeed, Sanchez (2006) notes that "over 90 percent of Latinos in the [Latino National Political Survey] agreed that all citizens and residents of the U.S. should learn English" (p. 436). If bilingual education can be presented in a way that emphasizes the acquisition of the English language and not the retention (or development) of a non-English language, then it can potentially elicit more support than it would otherwise. However, prior work on the determinants of Anglo attitudes toward bilingual education policies suggests that this may be easier in theory than in practice because those attitudes are in part rooted in prejudice towards Latinos (Huddy and Sears 1995; Houvouras 2001; Shin et al. 2015). This is

where the ethnicity of the legislator comes into place as it can provide respondents with a cue that links the policy to Latinos (and/or immigrants) and thus potentially stunts any effect that the frame may have.

Indirect Representation via Framing

The Latino population has experienced tremendous growth in the last handful of decades and is now the largest minority group in the U.S. (Flores 2017). Even with the strides made in the election of more Latinos in Congress (Bialik 2019), there are still many Latinos that are represented by non-Latino legislators. The absence of descriptive representation and that population growth can compound and lead to representational deficits faced by the Latino population (see Griffin and Newman 2007), something that highlights the need to look for alternative paths to decrease said deficits. One potential path that doesn't require overwhelming Latino majorities or more Latino officeholders – an admittedly longer-term strategy – is by gaining support for Latino policies outside of the Latino population. Though cross-ethnic minority coalitions (e.g., blacks and Latinos) provide one viable route, the Anglo population is still the numerical majority, and thus holds a significant amount of influence in the political process as a result.[4]

This work clearly speaks to descriptive representation in general – as the discussion above makes clear – but it also has a bearing on how the interests of the Latino population can (or cannot) be advanced through the non-Latino white population. Substantive representation (i.e., how legislators advance the interests of the individuals they represent) is at the heart of the study of political representation, as there is a need to see to what extent the government is responsive to the interests of the people (Pitkin 1967). As it relates to the representation of minorities, the concern

[4] Whites are more likely to participate in the political process (Schlozman et al. 2012) and more likely to have their preferences reflected in government as a result (Griffin and Newman 2005).

is usually with exploring how descriptive representation (i.e., whether legislators mirror constituents demographically) affects substantive representation (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Kerr and Miller 1997; Casellas 2007). The literature suggests that there is a representational deficit for Latinos on the substantive front (Griffin and Newman 2007; see also Chapter 1 in this dissertation). The number of Latino legislators relative to their size in the electorate suggests that there is also a deficiency on the descriptive front, which means that there are plenty of Latinos in the electorate not represented by someone like them (Congressional Research Service 2018). Aside from the psychological and symbolic effects that the presence of having legislators mirror them may have on constituents, research on the subject shows that minority legislators are in a better position and more willing to advance the interests of their co-racial (or co-ethnic) constituents (Sinclair-Chapman 2002; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003; Tate 2003). However, the aforementioned disconnect in the population and descriptive representation suggests that there is a need to look outside of the Latino descriptive dyad for the advancement of Latino interests. An alternative way to advance the interests of Latinos can come through the support of the non-Latino population. Anglos, because of their sheer size and potential influence on the political process, provide for an indirect route to the representation of Latinos. If non-Latino whites can be presented with information that changes how they view a given issue, then there is the possibility that the policies important to Latinos (and other minorities) may be advanced in government.

Framing

Framing is built on the assumption that there are different ways to view any given issue on the political agenda. For example, poverty can be presented as an issue that is caused by structural factors or individual decisions (or behavior), and while both may be adequate, viewing said issue

from one perspective as opposed to another can lead to different considerations. Take the work of Nelson and his colleagues (1997) as an example (see also Nelson and Oxley 1999; Jacoby 2000; Chong and Druckman 2007; Merolla et al. 2013). There they present a Ku Klux Klan (KKK) rally in two distinct lights: as free speech, and as a public order disruption. As a result, the authors find that individuals presented with the free speech frame were more tolerant of KKK rallies than those that were presented with the public order frame (Nelson et al. 1997, p. 572). In this work, a frame refers to "alternative conceptualizations of an issue or event" (Druckman et al. 2013, p. 58) and a framing effect takes place "when in the course of describing an issue or event, a speaker's emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations causes individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions" (Druckman and Nelson 2003, p. 730; see also Jacoby 2000 and Busby et al. 2018).

The notion that frames can be used to gain support for policies is not a new one; it is one that scholars have long viewed as a vehicle for doing so (see Busby et al. 2018).[5] Scholarship on the subject has demonstrated that how an issue is presented can influence the preferences of respondents (see Chong and Druckman 2007). At its core, this work is concerned with whether or not issues important to Latinos can be framed in a manner to elicit support from non-Latinos. However, the study has broader implications for the study of framing, as it can potentially show situations in which frames are not effective. This can add to the on-going debate about how effective frames are and the situations in which they don't work (Brewer 2003; Chong and Druckman 2007). One thing largely ignored by scholars – until relatively recently – in the exploration of the effectiveness of policy frames has been the role of the source presenting the

[5] This doesn't say anything about the normative implications of framing; only that scholarship has demonstrated that it can be effective.

frame. This is an important oversight because a source has the potential to communicate a plethora of information, and it needs to be explicitly accounted for theoretically and empirically. More recent work has moved in this direction and has explored the effect that partisan and ideological cues on the effectiveness of frames (Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2006; Hartman and Weber 2009; Weber et al. 2012). Race (or ethnicity), as a result of its centrality in our politics, and its ability to demarcate different groups in society is another factor that needs to be accounted for directly, and this is what I do here.

Source Cues in Framing

As alluded to above, more recent work has moved away from exploring the effectiveness of frames and towards exploring the circumstances under which frames do not work and factors that can moderate them (see Busby et al. 2018 for a review; see also Brewer 2003). Source cues have been identified by scholars as one of the factors that can influence the effectiveness of a given frame (Brewer 2003; Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2006; Hartman and Weber 2009; Nicholson 2012; Weber et al. 2012). Fundamentally, the idea is that there is a need to account for the source in charge of transmitting a given policy frame because it can potentially influence how receptive individuals are in general. While the substance of a given message is important, the source that is presenting the information should also be considered, as there are few times in the political arena that a message (or information) is presented without a source (see Hartman and Weber 2009 for a discussion). Also, while a source cue is more likely to be impactful in certain situations than others, here, the central preoccupation is with how shared identity influences how receptive individuals are to policy frames.

A source has the potential to provide plenty of information to the receiver, some of which can influence how receptive the latter is to the former. In general, there are various dimensions on

which source information can be categorized. Amongst them are credibility, power, and identification attributed to the source (Hartman and Weber 2009). Source credibility has been found to influence how receptive a respondent is to information, with higher credibility generally being associated with more receptivity to information (Zaller 1992; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Druckman 2001; but see Weber et al. 2012). Similarly, as the work of Hartman and Weber (2009) suggest, identification with the source can also influence how receptive individuals are to information. Indeed, though their work looks at the ideological match, or lack thereof, between respondents and the information source, there are various other identities that can be called on when looking at source-respondent congruence.

Ethnicity – like race – plays an important part in our politics as a result of its historical legacy and thus has the potential to structure intergroup relations in American society, which makes it one such factor where a match (or mismatch) can influence how receptive individuals are to messages.[6] This is important when we consider social identity theory and the theoretical expectations derived from it. Research on social identity theory has long posited that identification with a given group (even those arbitrarily ascribed) can lead individuals to hold more hostile views towards an out-group (see Tajfel and Turner 1979; see also Hogg et al. 2017). Racial and ethnic identities are those that – whether self- or externally-imposed – have the potential to draw the "us versus them" dynamics in individuals. In turn, if individuals hold more favorable views towards those in their own group, then there is the possibility that they may be more receptive to individuals who are a part of their own group and the opposite for those who are not. Relatedly, this match (or mismatch) can provide individual respondents a basis through which they can make political

[6] Here – because of the focus on Anglo attitudes – the focus is on the racial match (ethnic mismatch) between the fictional legislator and the white respondent.

judgements. Alternatively, it could be that bilingual education, like other issues in American politics, has become racialized and would make any frame, irrespective of source race or ethnicity, ineffective. While this is definitely a possibility, the work of Merolla and her colleagues (2013) suggests that this may not be the case, as their paper shows that even on a salient (and racialized) issue like immigration (see Levy, Wright, and Citrin 2015), we can still see a shift in opinion based on how an issue is framed.[7]

These potential underlying causes (i.e., identity match and out-group hostility) are not necessarily incompatible, and though fleshing these out is beyond the scope of this work, explaining what might be expected if one is likely the cause versus the other is something I can briefly discuss now. If the identity match theory is correct, then we would expect the respondents to be more likely to support (oppose) bilingual education when presented with the pro-frame (con frame) when the legislator is white and oppose it irrespective of the pro or con frame when the legislator is Latino. If the source cue allows respondents to link (or not link) bilingual education to Latinos, then we would expect to see respondents in both the pro and con frame to be less supportive when the legislator presenting the frame is Latino. At least in the conditions where the respondents and the legislators don't share the same racio-ethnic identity, we would expect the results to be the same across the board, irrespective if it's a lack of identity match or anti-Latino prejudice manifesting itself.

Hypotheses

Though the literature on framing suggests that policy frames can be effective in influencing respondent positions on issues, newer work on source cues and the literature on intergroup

[7] Merolla et al. (2013) find a 17 percent shift in public opinion on support for a path for legalization, a change that they attribute to a change in framing from "amnesty" to "opportunity to eventually become citizens" (p. 799).

dynamics suggests that the frames alone are not the only parts of the equation influencing how effective those frames are. The descriptive connection between legislators and respondents is one that leads to the expectation that respondents will be responsive to the bilingual education frames. Shared race between the two (i.e., legislator and constituent) leads to the expectation that respondents will be more likely to support bilingual education in the pro-bilingual education frame and the opposite in the anti-bilingual education frame when compared to the baseline condition. Indeed, the literature on framing suggests that the frame, irrespective on what side of the issue it is on, should be effective in shifting public opinion on the issue (see Chong and Druckman 2007 for a review). We know from prior work on public opinion that Anglos are more likely to show opposition to bilingual education than Latinos are, all else constant (Huddy and Sears 1995; Houvouras 2001; Leal 2007). Therefore, there is the expectation that the respondents not exposed to any frames (i.e., the baseline condition) will be less supportive of bilingual education on the whole. Since the respondents here are expected to be less supportive of bilingual education in general, the expected effect between the baseline and the pro condition should be higher than that between the baseline and the con condition. Nonetheless, the pro and con frame conditions should be able to demonstrate any significant movement in opinion induced by the frame.

H1: *Respondents in the pro-bilingual education frame condition with a white legislator (shared race) are more likely to support bilingual education than respondents in the baseline category are.*

H2: *Respondents in the anti-bilingual education frame condition with a white legislator (shared race) are less likely to support bilingual education than respondents in the baseline category are.*

Unlike the conditions in which respondents share the same race as their legislators, those in which respondents are exposed to a policy frame by Latino legislators, the expectation is that the frames

will not be as effective. Respondents in the pro-bilingual education condition with a Latino legislator should be less likely to support than those in the baseline condition. Whether it is because Latino legislators are not of their own demographic background, or that Latino legislators allow respondents to link the issue to the broader Latino population – and thus draw a backlash response – the expectation is the same: less support for bilingual education (than the baseline condition).

H3: *Respondents in the pro-bilingual education frame condition with a Latino legislator are less likely to support bilingual education than respondents in the baseline condition are.*

The last condition is where the legislator is Latino and there is an anti-bilingual education frame being presented to respondents. Since respondents – based on the review of the literature – are already expected to be more likely to oppose bilingual education and the frame is being presented by a Latino legislator – which means less receptivity because of a lack of shared identity – the expectation is that there will not be a statistically significant difference in the preferences of respondents when compared to the baseline.

H4: Respondents in the anti-bilingual education frame condition with a Latino legislator should not exhibit any distinguishable deviation from the baseline condition.

Research Design

Design

I use a survey experiment to explore whether ethnicity as a source cue influences the effectiveness of a policy frame (see Appendix B for the survey).[8] To see whether or not ethnicity plays a role in how receptive white respondents are to the framing of bilingual education, I manipulate the ethnicity of a fictional legislator by changing the surname across treatment

[8] The survey experiment was fielded online through the Qualtrics research firm between June 14th - 17th, 2019.

conditions. The fictional Latino legislator in this study is named David Hernandez and his Anglo analog is named David Miller. Here, the only thing that changes between the different conditions – aside from whether the frame is for or against the issue, of course – is the last name of the individual.[9] Though there are various ways to present the policy frame, I chose to do so in the form of a press release, as this is one of the most common forms of communication for legislators (see Grimmer 2013). In addition, unlike a newspaper article – or other forms of communication that rely on a middle person or entity – these messages are coming straight from the source.[10]

Individual respondents in the study are randomly assigned to one of the following conditions: a pro-bilingual education frame with a Latino legislator, a pro-bilingual education frame with a non-Latino white legislator, a con bilingual education frame with a Latino legislator, a con bilingual education frame with a non-Latino white legislator, and a control condition where respondents are not exposed to any frame or legislator. Though there are different ways to explore framing effects (for a discussion see Chong and Druckman 2007, p. 109), given the nature of the study, I have chosen to use a no frame/no cue condition as a baseline (see Joslyn and Haider-Markel 2006; Weber et al. 2012).[11] While there is disagreement amongst scholars on whether to include a baseline (and the nature of said baseline), in this particular situation, having the chosen

[9] Legislators almost always include their picture in press releases, so in order to make the press release look authentic, I use a picture of former Congressman David Valadao. I chose his picture because he is an individual that: is Hispanic, served in Congress, and looks like he could be non-Latino white legislator; that last one is important because it avoids any additional complications that may come with differences in skin tone between the fictional legislators in the different conditions.

[10] While staffers and speech writers can play a part in this, at least as it's presented here, the information is a straight quote from the legislator's floor speech on a fictional vote.

[11] It's difficult to present the frame on its own because it would have to be different from a press release, which could bring other complications into the mix.

control condition allows for the directional comparisons (i.e., pro-frame eliciting more support than the baseline, con-frame eliciting less support than the baseline, etc.).[12]

As mentioned above, there are various ways to frame political issues (e.g., from an economic or moral perspective), and here, the angle is English proficiency. Though we generally see that whites are opposed to bilingual education (Huddy and Sears 1995; Houvouras 2001; Shin et al. 2015), there is also a large segment of this population that is in favor of English-only laws (Frendreis and Tatalovich 1997; Schildkraut 2003), which means that if bilingual education can be framed as a means to help non-English language learners (ELLs) to achieve English proficiency, then that may elicit support from whites. The pro frame places an emphasis on the ability of ELLs to achieve proficiency and excel in other subjects (see Gandara and Escamilla 2016; see also Bialstoyk 2018).[13] The con frame highlights the fact that ELLs in bilingual programs take longer to become proficient than those in English-immersion programs (Jepsen 2009; see also Umansky and Reardon 2014). The press release includes information about the ELL population and the fact that there's variation in instruction across the U.S. It also highlights a key objective of bilingual education: English proficiency, and then communicates the benefits of bilingual education (pro frame) or problems with it (con frame) with respect to that objective (see Appendix B for visual of treatments[14]).

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[12] The canon, which comes from Nelson et al. (1997), is not using any baseline, but I don't think that's appropriate for the reason just mentioned.

[13] Umansky and Reardon (2014) find that ELL students in bilingual education programs take longer to achieve English proficiency than ELLs in English-immersion programs, but they also find that those students generally perform better in other areas (e.g., mathematics and standardized testing), something confirmed by Bialstoyk 2016; see also Valentino and Reardon 2014; Gandara and Escamilla 2016). Similarly, Jepsen (2009) shows that this gap in reaching proficiency is present for grades one and two, but nonexistent in grades three through five.

[14] The appendix shows one of each side of the issue (i.e., pro and con) and one of each of the two legislators (i.e., Anglo and Latino). However, the only difference between those shown in the appendix and those omitted is the surname; irrespective of the side of the issue, the only difference between the two pro or two anti-bilingual education newsletters is the surname of the legislator (i.e., Miller versus Hernandez).

Data

To measure respondent attitudes on bilingual education, I use a question borrowed (and modified) from the General Social Survey (GSS), which asks: "'How do you feel about bilingual education [in public schools]? Are you strongly in favor of it, somewhat in favor of it, somewhat opposed to it, or strongly opposed to it?'" (Houvouras 2001, p. 142).[15] In addition to the responses presented there, I include a middle-of-the-road response (i.e., "[n]either in favor nor opposed to it").[16] Prior work on the determinants of bilingual education attitudes amongst whites has identified anti-Latino sentiment as a factor (Huddy and Sears 1995; Houvouras 2001; Shin et al. 2015). In general, respondents who hold more hostile views towards Latinos are more likely to oppose bilingual education. There are different ways of accounting for this potential disposition for Latinos. One is through direct measures of warmth towards the group (i.e., a feeling thermometer) and another less direct way is through measures that tap the so-called "new racism [or prejudice]" (see Huddy and Sears 1995 for a discussion). With the latter, the purpose is to try and gauge how Latinos are viewed more generally through attributions of failure and/or stereotypes. In other words, we attempt to find out if respondents generally think Latinos are lazy and to what do they attribute any perceived disadvantages (e.g., Latinos lack the same opportunities as non-Latinos, there aren't enough jobs to go around for this group, etc.). To capture these concepts, I use a feeling thermometer for respondent attitudes toward Latinos and a Latino prejudice scale.[17] For the latter, I use three questions to construct a scale; individuals are asked whether they agree or disagree with

[15] The variable is coded as support for bilingual education, where strongly opposed to it at the low end and strongly in favor of it at the opposite end.

[16] I do this in order to allow respondents that don't have a preference on the issue to state such. The original wording of the question would essentially force respondents to take a position on the issue that would be inconsistent with their own preferences.

[17] This measure asks individuals to describe how warm or cold they feel about Latinos on a scale from 0 to 100, with 0 being cold, 50 being neither cold nor warm, and 100 interpreted as holding this group in very high regards.

the following statements: “Hispanics can get ahead if they work hard enough,” “A lot of Hispanics are not well off because there aren’t enough jobs to go around,” and “The financial situation of Hispanics would improve if they had a chance to get a good education” (see Huddy and Sears 1995).[18] In addition, I include a feeling thermometer towards Anglos, as more affinity for one’s group may increase the likelihood that respondents oppose bilingual education because it can undermine their own group status (Valentino et al. 2013).[19]

In addition to those aforementioned attitudes, researchers have found that individual context and threat perceptions can also have a bearing on support for bilingual education (Huddy and Sears 1995; Shin et al. 2015). Though there are different ways to tap into respondent context, I use the size of the Latino population in a respondent’s zip code and that individual’s own perceptions of the size of the Latino population in the U.S. and in their community.[20] The idea is that the more Latinos respondents have in their district – and the larger they perceive this particular group – the more opposition to bilingual education should manifest itself as a result of some threat posed by Latinos (Huddy and Sears 1995; Shin et al. 2015). Population size (or perceived population size) is not the only threats that need to be accounted for as scholars have noted, there are others such as educational and linguistic that may influence attitudes on bilingual education (see Huddy and Sear 1995; Shin et al. 2015). On the educational front, the questions that can be asked are whether respondents have children in school, whether those children are in schools with large Latino populations, and/or whether they’re in bilingual programs (see Huddy and Sears

[18] The scale ranges from 0 to 1, and a higher score on the scale means more anti-Latino perceptions.
[19] The feeling thermometers range from 0 to 100, with zero indicating coldness to the group, 100 indicating warmth towards the group, and 50 being neither cold nor warm towards that group.
[20] Though imperfect, this measure is good enough to get a sense for the general disconnect between the perceptions that respondents have in relation to reality (Wong 2007 does something similar).

1995). Huddy and Sears (1995) tap into educational threat by using various measures, but only having a child (or children) under 18 was statistically significant. However, not all adults in the U.S. have children, which is why there is a need to use a separate measure that will tap into educational threat without excluding a large segment of the population. To tap linguistic threat, I use the following two questions to construct an openness to non-English languages: the first asks whether respondents are fluent in any non-English language and the second asks about their level of proficiency.[21] The idea is that those with self-exposure to a non-English language might be more supportive of bilingual education and vice versa.

Aside from the aforementioned attitudinal and standard demographic controls (i.e., respondent gender, family income, educational attainment, age, ideology, and partisanship), I also include a political knowledge scale.[22] This scale is composed of several items that tap whether respondents know the names of prominent political actors and rules of the political system.[23] Though there are different schools of thought on how political knowledge should influence framing (for a discussion see Chong and Druckman 2007), I include the measure here to see whether it influences how receptive individuals are to the frames.[24]

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[21] This is an ordinal measure ranging from not fluent to fluent in a non-English language (see Shin et al. 2015). Zero means that respondent doesn't know any non-English language, 1 includes respondents that know a non-English language at a basic level (i.e., "Hardly at all" or "Not Well"), are those that know a non-English language "Very well," and 3 houses those that know a non-English language "Well."

[22] The ideology variable ranges from "Very liberal" to "Very conservative" with moderates at the midpoint.

[23] In specific, I use the following questions to create an index: what proportion of Congress is needed to override a presidential veto?; who is the current speaker of the U.S. House of representatives?; what amendment to the Constitution protects free speech?; and how many justices serve on the United States Supreme Court?

[24] There is disagreement amongst scholars as to whether political sophistication should even be considered when exploring framing (for a discussion see Chong and Druckman 2007). For example, Nelson and his colleagues (1997) posit that political sophistication shouldn't matter because framing isn't contingent on an individual accepting a given frame because no new information is being presented when framing, only a specific perspective on an issue (but see Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2001).

A total of 751 non-Latino Caucasian adults participated in the survey experiment. From this total, the breakdown across conditions was about 150. Of those respondents, about a third identified as Republican (33.7 percent), close to the same as Democrats (28.2 percent), about 25 percent as Independents, and the remaining either stated "Other" (10.4 percent) or no partisan affiliation (2.7 percent). The breakdown for self-ideological identification was as follows: 8.4 percent "Very Liberal," 16.6 percent "Liberal," 32.4 percent "Moderate," 20.2 percent "Conservative," 9.3 percent "Very Conservative," and 13.1 percent "Not sure." The sample was made up of about 80 percent of women. About 45 percent of the respondents had at least a 2-year college degree, and the average age was about 41 years of age (see Appendix B for descriptive statistics table).

Results

A cursory look at the initial breakdown of bilingual education support across experimental conditions suggests that this sample of the non-Latino white population seems to be generally supportive of bilingual education in public schools (see Table 3.1).[25] In addition, and arguably more importantly, when looking at the different experimental conditions relative to the baseline condition (i.e., no frame and no source cue), it is apparent that the results do not seem to be fundamentally different on the whole. It seems, at first glance, that getting respondents to think about bilingual education generally decreases support, all else equal. Indeed, the baseline condition has the most respondents in the favor side of the response scale (see the last two rows in the third column of Table 3.1). One thing that does stand out in the table is the difference in support between the baseline and the Latino legislator group in opposition framing conditions. Having a Latino

[25] Respondents were screened in an attempt to ensure that there were only non-Latino white adults in the study (see Appendix B for survey instrument).

Table 3.1: Distribution of Bilingual Education Preferences by Experimental Condition

	MC White		Baseline	MC Latino	
	in Support	in Opposition		in Support	in Opposition
Strongly opposed to it	8.11	8.22	5.10	9.52	7.84
Somewhat opposed to it	13.51	11.64	10.19	9.52	15.03
Neither in favor nor opposed to it	33.11	28.09	30.57	24.49	35.96
Somewhat in favor of it	27.03	32.19	29.30	28.57	31.37
Strongly in favor of it	18.24	19.86	24.84	27.90	9.80
Total	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Note: Column percentages shown

legislator present an argument in opposition of bilingual education seems to significantly decrease respondent support for bilingual education in public schools. That opposition frame coming from a Latino legislator decreases support in the "Strongly in favor of it" category by more than half of that in the baseline. Relatedly, though not as pronounced, respondents in the white legislator in support of bilingual education frame condition also display a difference in support for bilingual education when compared to the baseline condition, though not in the expected direction. Contrary to expectations, the stimulus actually seems to depress support for bilingual education relative to the baseline group (see Table 3.1). Nevertheless, there is a need to more rigorously examine the underlying processes that this casual browsing is unable to provide.

To see whether or not the differences between the different conditions are statistically distinguishable, I conduct a series of independent samples t-tests (see Table 3.2). In essence, these tests show whether the differences in means between the two populations are statistically significant or not. The dependent variable starts at "Strongly opposed to it" and ends at "Strongly in favor of it," which means that a higher mean is indicative of more support for bilingual education in public schools. The first test in column 1 suggests that there is generally less support for bilingual education when the white legislator presents an argument in support of bilingual education and this is a difference that is statistically significant ($p=0.058$). The second and third columns for the white legislator in opposition and that for the Latino legislator in support, respectively, show no statistically discernable difference in support for bilingual education in comparison to the control condition (see Table 3.2). The last column in Table 3.2 shows the difference in support for bilingual education between respondents in the control condition and those in the condition where the Latino legislator presents an argument against bilingual education.

Table 3.2: T-Test Statistics for Different Treatment Conditions Compared to Baseline Condition

Condition	MC White		MC Latino	
	in Support	in Opposition	in Support	in Opposition
Treatment	3.34 (0.10)	3.44 (0.10)	3.56 (0.10)	3.20 (0.09)
Baseline	3.59 (0.09)	3.59 (0.09)	3.59 (0.09)	3.59 (0.09)
Difference	-0.25* (0.13)	-0.15 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.39*** (0.06)

Note: The dependent variable is support for bilingual education, and it starts at 1 (strongly opposed to it) and ends at 5 (strongly in favor of it) with a midpoint of 3 (neither in favor nor in opposition). The number for observations for the MC White in Support condition is 148, 146 for the MC White Opposition condition, 147 for the MC Latino in Support condition,153 for the MC Latino in Opposition condition, and 157 for the baseline condition. The results here show two-tailed t-tests. The estimates shown are means with the standard errors are in parentheses.
*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

Here – as can be seen above in the breakdown of support for bilingual education across experimental conditions – the treatment group displays more opposition to bilingual education than the control group (see Table 3.2). That difference is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level (p=0.002).

In addition to comparing the conditions to the baseline, there is a need to compare the conditions to each other to see whether ethnicity has an impact on support for bilingual education. Though the comparisons above allow for grounded comparisons as a result of using the baseline condition, the effect of ethnicity on support for bilingual education can also be explored by looking at how the opposition and support conditions differ in support based on legislator ethnicity. The t-test statistic of the two pro-bilingual education framing conditions shows that the difference in support for bilingual education is not statistically significant, which suggests that the ethnicity was not a determining factor amongst those two conditions (see the first column in Table 3.3). The comparison of the opposition frames suggests that the lack of shared ethnicity decreases support for bilingual education; a difference that is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level (p=0.009).[26] These preliminary tests suggest that legislator ethnicity can influence support for bilingual education, if only in the anti-bilingual education framing conditions. Though collectively, the results fail to provide any convincing support for the hypotheses as laid out above, this does not mean that the source cue was not an important factor influencing support for bilingual education. [27]

[26] See the appendix for a multivariate model comparing the effect of the two opposition conditions on support for bilingual education. The results there also confirm this statistically significant difference attributable to legislator ethnicity. There it is clear that the Latino opposition condition decreases support for bilingual education relative to the non-Latino Anglo legislator in opposition condition.

[27] None of the comparisons of the treatments to the baseline were in the expected direction.

Table 3.3: T-Test Statistic for Differences in Support Based on Ethnicity

	Support Frame	Opposition Frame
White Legislator	3.56 (0.10)	3.56 (0.10)
Latino Legislator	3.34 (0.09)	3.20 (0.09)
Difference	-0.22 (0.13)	-0.36*** (0.13)

Note: The dependent variable is support for bilingual education, and it starts at 1 (strongly opposed to it) and ends at 5 (strongly in favor of it) with a midpoint of 3 (neither in favor nor in opposition). *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

The results, though at odds with the hypotheses, still present some interesting findings that need to be further explored. Take the aforementioned difference between the baseline condition and those respondents in the anti-bilingual education frame presented by a Latino legislator condition. Why is it that respondents presented an anti-bilingual education frame by a Latino legislator display a higher propensity to oppose bilingual education? The literature on intergroup relationships would lead to the expectation that this framing condition would not necessarily affect support as the information is coming from a member of an outgroup and that is further supported by the fact that whites generally display a lower propensity to support bilingual education (Huddy and Sears 1995; Sanchez 2006; Leal 2007). The only difference between the Latino legislator in opposition and the white legislator in opposition conditions is the last name of each legislator (i.e., Hernandez versus Miller, respectively). This suggests that at least some segment of respondents were able to pick up the source cue, but it was only salient in the Latino condition. The differences (or their absence) in the other conditions (e.g., white legislator in favor and Latino legislator in favor) relative to the baseline may be attributed to a weak or inefficient policy frame, but the difference in the opposition conditions suggest that the source cue was something that respondents should have picked up on.[28] However, the theoretical foundations presented above make it difficult to square away why only the MC Latino anti-bilingual education frame proved to be a determining factor of support for bilingual education in the sampled population. I will return to this question shortly, but first, I explore the robustness of these findings in a multivariate setting.

[28] The fact that everything else in the treatments were identical except for the surnames suggests that respondents each of the conditions (save for the baseline) were able to get the source cue, as it is difficult to explain the results in the MC Latino in opposition condition.

Multivariate Regression

To explore the robustness of the findings from the independent samples t-tests, I turn to multivariate regression. The dependent variable – as measured in the survey – is ordinal, which is why I use ordered logistic regression here. However, in an attempt to ensure that the findings are robust, I also collapse that variable into a binary one where support takes the value of one and zero otherwise; this means that I have to use logistic regression for modeling as well.[29] Table 3.4 shows the results of both dependent variables (i.e., binary and ordinal) across the different experimental conditions with the baseline condition serving as the comparison in those different models.

The results do not look completely different from those of the t-tests , as both of the support conditions (i.e., Latino and white legislators presenting a supportive position on bilingual education) are statistically indistinguishable from the control condition (see Table 3.4).[30] In addition, the Latino in opposition frame is again the one where the difference between the treatment and control group is clearly distinguishable, but more on this shortly (see the last two columns in Table 3.4). Unlike the t-test results, the ordered logistic regression model suggests that there is a statistically significant difference in support for bilingual education that is attributable to the white legislator in opposition framing condition, as indicated by the negative coefficient (see column 4 in Table 3.4). However, upon further exploration, it is that clear the effect of the treatment on support for bilingual education is minimal and bordering on insignificance. This assertion is backed by the p-value of 0.08 and the marginal effect of the treatment (i.e., the white

[29] The original variable has five categories (i.e., strongly opposed, somewhat opposed, neither, somewhat in favor, strongly in favor). Of those, the two favor categories take the value of 1 and the other three categories take the value of 0.

[30] The appendix houses a table that includes all of the different variables included in the models shown in Table 4 in addition to a party identification variable. The results do not change fundamentally, but the size of respondents in different experimental conditions does change significantly as a result of respondents that didn't consider themselves partisans. Therefore, in an attempt to address that issue, I show models both ways.

Table 3.4: Multivariate Regression Models of Support for Bilingual Education

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
	MC White				MC Latino			
	in Support		in Opposition		in Support		in Opposition	
	Logistic	Ordered Logistic	Logistic	Ordered Logistic	Logistic	Ordered Logistic	Logistic	Ordered Logistic
Treatment	-0.347 (0.283)	-0.202 (0.232)	-0.392 (0.284)	-0.415* (0.237)	0.248 (0.287)	0.203 (0.239)	-0.633** (0.267)	-0.717*** (0.229)
Female	0.117 (0.356)	0.167 (0.292)	0.164 (0.343)	0.178 (0.286)	0.170 0.350	0.415 (0.295)	-0.249 (0.318)	-0.151 (0.273)
Education	0.237 (0.113)	0.159 (0.093)	0.242** (0.107)	0.199** (0.091)	0.085 (0.109)	0.077 (0.900)	0.078 (0.101)	0.066 (0.087)
Age	-0.021** (0.010)	-0.030*** (0.008)	-0.026** (0.010)	-0.030*** (0.009)	-0.032*** (0.011)	-0.033*** (0.009)	-0.008 (0.009)	-0.015* (0.273)
Family Income	0.005 (0.046)	-0.001 (0.037)	-0.003 (0.044)	-0.029 (0.036)	-0.061 (0.047)	-0.049 (0.038)	-0.004 (0.043)	-0.001 (0.036)
Conservative	-0.549*** (0.149)	-0.643*** (0.124)	-0.340** (0.134)	-0.305** (0.114)	-0.425*** (0.143)	-0.475*** (0.121)	-0.304** (0.127)	-0.343*** (0.108)
Prejudice Scale	-1.611 (1.089)	-0.932 (0.899)	-2.456** (1.063)	-2.312** (0.010)	-2.527** (1.174)	-1.949** (0.973)	-1.967* (1.094)	-2.749*** (0.964)
White Thermometer	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.006)	0.005 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.007)
Latino Thermometer	0.021*** (0.007)	0.025*** (0.006)	0.009 (0.007)	0.012* (0.006)	0.012* (0.007)	0.016** (0.006)	0.015** (0.007)	0.014** (0.006)
Language Threat	0.160 (0.199)	0.195 (0.166)	0.009 (0.007)	0.142 (0.149)	0.124 (0.192)	0.278* (0.164)	0.102 (0.166)	0.133 (0.147)

Table 3.4 Continued.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Perceived Size of Latino Population	0.014 (0.011)	0.006 (0.010)	0.004 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.009)	0.013 (0.011)	0.018* (0.009)	0.006 (0.011)	0.001 (0.009)
Political Knowledge Scale	0.583 (0.442)	0.454 (0.367)	0.579 (0.412)	0.420 (0.342)	0.652 (0.456)	0.451 (0.369)	0.733** (0.417)	0.376 (0.348)
Constant	0.881 (1.109)		1.353 (1.060)		2.767** (1.094)		1.831* (0.977)	
Cut 1		-4.841 (0.974)		-5.089 (0.965)		-5.279 (0.929)		-5.842 (0.913)
Cut 2		-3.385 (0.937)		-3.641 (0.922)		-4.054 (0.893)		-4.427 (0.869)
Cut 3		-1.817 (0.919)		-2.166 (0.901)		-2.675 (0.871)		-2.976 (0.848)
Cut 4		-0.144 (0.922)		-0.542 (0.899)		-1.137 (0.864)		-1.267 (0.843)
Adjusted or Pseudo R2	0.154	0.1048	0.110	0.0630	0.129	0.0933	0.091	0.0629
N	262	262	258	258	253	253	271	271

*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

Note: The dependent variable in the logistic regression columns is coded as support for bilingual education equals 1 and 0 otherwise. The dependent in the ordered logistic regression columns is coded from strongly in opposition to strongly in favor of bilingual education with neither in the middle. Standard errors shown in parentheses.



Figure 3.1: Marginal Effect of MC White in Opposition of Bilingual Education Condition on Support for Bilingual Education

legislator in opposition of bilingual education) on support for bilingual education. Figure 3.1 shows that relationship across values of the dependent variable. While the treatment does seem to decrease the likelihood of respondents choosing either of the support options (i.e., "Somewhat in favor of it" or "Strongly in favor of it") and increase the others, all of those estimates are very close to zero. In addition, the effect on the predicted probability of a given respondent selecting "Strongly opposed to it" is not statistically significant. Together, those different observations – paired with the non-significant coefficient in the binary dependent variable model (see column 3 in Table 3.4) – lead me to dismiss those results as substantively insignificant.

As mentioned above, the results of the MC Latino in opposition condition hold up in the multivariate regression setting. The results of the last two models – shown in the last two columns of Table 3.4 – show that the effect of the treatment on support for bilingual education is positive and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence (p=0.002). This means that respondents exposed to the anti-bilingual education frame from a Latino legislator were more likely than their counterparts in the baseline condition to oppose bilingual education. This can be more clearly seen in the marginal effects plot. Indeed, Figure 3.2 shows that the treatment variable decreases the likelihood that a given respondent will select either "Strongly in favor of [bilingual education]" or "Somewhat in favor of [bilingual education] and inceases the likelihood that respondents in this condition choose one of the latter categories. In addition, unlike the estimates from Figure 3.1 (the non-Latino legislator in opposition condition) discussed above, the effects on the probability of the treatment variable on support for bilingual education are clear and statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.[1]

[1] All of the marginal effects estimates meet this threshold.



Figure 3.2: Marginal Effect of MC Latino in Opposition of Bilingual Education Condition on Support for Bilingual Education

Though the effect of the MC Latino in opposition condition could be interpreted as demonstrating support for the notion that Latino legislators can frame support for some issues on the political agenda, the rest of the results from the survey experiment cast doubt on this possibility. From the perspective of the theory advanced here, the idea that respondents would be more receptive to an individual from an outgroup does not make much sense. However, the difference in the findings between the two opposition conditions suggests that legislator ethnicity played a role in the effect captured in the statistical analyses. It seems as if having a member of an out-group take a position inconsistent with their own in-group (i.e., a Latino taking an anti-bilingual education stance) sends a signal that resonates with Anglo respondents.[2] Though the underlying mechanisms at play leading to the results captured cannot be explored here, the study provides an interesting result that needs to be further explored. Indeed, it may be that the source cue paired with a message that is inconsistent with a stereotype normally associated with that group gives respondents the freedom to then display opposition to it that has been there latently all along. It could also be that the Latino legislator is viewed as a more credible figure because it is an issue that can be connected to the Latino population. The latter explanation, however, doesn't seem as plausible in the absence of the other framing condition (i.e., pro-bilingual education) by the same fictional legislator. The experiment, though definitely different from what was expected, picked up some interesting results that need to be squared away moving forward. In addition to the main results discussed here, there was another interesting result captured by the experiment that merits discussion; I turn to that now.

[2] Though in a different context (i.e., immigration), Hainmueller and Hopkin's (2015) work shows that individuals perceived to be at odds with broader group stereotypes may be viewed in a more favorable manner than others of the same outgroup.

Political Knowledge

Irrespective of what is driving the results, the role of political knowledge is something that merits attention. A long line of scholarship has concerned itself with the level of sophistication of the electorate and its consequences (see Fowler and Margolis 2014 for a review). More to the subject of this paper, scholars writing on framing have gone back and forth on what the role of political knowledge in moderating receptiveness to policy frames (see Chong and Druckman 2007).[3] The interaction between the treatment condition and political knowledge for the Latino legislator in opposition condition is statistically significant (p=0.08). Figure 3.3 shows the marginal effect of the treatment condition that comes from the interaction of the treatment variable and political knowledge on both sides of the scale. What this figure communicates is that the combination of the source cue and frame (i.e., MC Latino in opposition of bilingual education) only had an impact on the politically sophisticated individuals.[4] This finding is interesting because it suggests that whatever the actual impact of the stimulus was on the preferences of respondents, it was undoubtedly pronounced in the individuals at the highest end of the political knowledge scale (i.e., those that can be considered political sophisticates). Even more interesting, however, is the fact that the effect manifests itself in the decreased probability that political sophisticates selected either of the favor responses and increased the likelihood that respondents chose one of the other opposition categories. This suggests that either the frame worked as it should have even though it came from a source that is not of those respondents' in-group or that the political sophisticates were better at connecting the source cue to the policy area better than those on the opposite end of

[3] Relatedly, the literature on voter sophistication has also debated on what individuals are more (or less) likely to be receptive to new information (see Zaller 1992).

[4] See the Figure B1 in the appendix; it shows the same relationship with the results from the ordered logistic regression model.



Figure 3.3: The Marginal Effect of MC Latino Opposition Frame on Bilingual Education Support by Political Knowledge

that knowledge scale.

Discussion

Though interesting, the results here fail to provide adequate support for the theory outlined above. Neither of the pro-bilingual education conditions were able to influence support for bilingual education at all. The pro-bilingual frame presented by a white legislator failed to increase support for bilingual education in public schools and the same frame by a Latino legislator failed to move public opinion in the other direction (i.e., decrease support), both of which were expected. Similarly, though the anti-bilingual education frame presented by an Anglo legislator was statistically significant and did seem to depress support in bilingual education, the effects were quite weak. Though strong, the results from the last frame – especially in the absence of expected results for the other conditions – fail to provide support for the role of source cue in framing theorized above. Instead, it seems as if there is something else going on. Unquestioned, however, is the notion that legislator ethnicity plays a role in influencing support for bilingual education, even if it is only in the situation mentioned above.

It could be the case that the frames presented, especially in the pro-bilingual education conditions, just weren't strong or clear enough. While it is theoretically plausible that the wording of the pro-bilingual education frame was just not adequate, the source cue alone should have influenced support for bilingual education in some way; that is, being able to link Latinos to bilingual education should have decreased support for it if my theory was correct. However, this is clearly not what took place. Alternatively, it could be that the middle-of-the-road option for the dependent variable allowed individuals to engage in satisficing and/or allowed those that had positions on either side of that option to provide a socially desirable response to the question, the

latter of which masks true support for the policy. Whatever may be the case, there is still further work to be done.

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Appendix B

Table B1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Minimum	Mean	Median	Maximum	St. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	N
Dependent Variable Bilingual Education	1	3.424	3	5	1.163	-0.399	2.437	750
Binary Bilingual Education	0	0.493	0	1	0.500	0.011	1.000	750
Independent Variables *Respondent Demographics* Female	0	.808	1	1	0.394	-1.564	3.446	750
Education	1	4.561	4	7	1.462	0.030	2.095	750
Age	18	40.725	38	82	15.066	0.382	2.150	750
Family Income	1	6.247	6	14	3.472	0.284	1.998	750
Republican	0	0.544	1	1	0.499	-0.177	1.031	465
Conservative	1	3.064	3	5	1.112	-0.080	2.415	652
Threat & Prejudice Latino Thermometer	0	60.213	60	100	22.708	-0.299	2.848	750
White Thermometer	1	71.084	71.5	100	21.599	-0.473	2.785	750

Table B1 Continued.

Variable	Minimum	Mean	Median	Maximum	St. Dev.	Skewness	Kurtosis	N
Language Threat	0	0.356	0	3	0.825	2.299	7.039	750
Anti-Latino Prejudice Scale	0.2	0.638	0.6	1	0.133	0.299	3.577	750
Perceived % of Latino Population	0	13.645	10	100	13.275	2.053	9.551	750
Political Knowledge Knowledge Scale	0	0.509	0.5	1	0.352	0.022	1.667	750

Table B2: Ordered Logistic Regression of Support for Bilingual Education Across Opposition Conditions

	Opposition to Bilingual Education
Treatment (1 = MC Latino in Opposition 0 = MC White in Opposition)	-0.411* (0.231)
Female	0.234 (0.284)
Education	0.013 (0.089)
Age	-0.010 (0.008)
Family Income	-0.002 (0.035)
Conservative	-0.105 (0.106)
Prejudice Scale	-3.575*** (0.995)
White Thermometer	-0.004 (0.006)
Latino Thermometer	0.010* (0.006
Language Threat	0.148 (0.125)
Perceived Size of Latino Population	-0.009 (0.009)
Political Knowledge Scale	0.147 (0.334)
Cut 1	-5.331 (0.995)
Cut 2	-3.944 (0.959)
Cut 3	-2.506 (0.942_
Cut 4	-0.736 (0.939)
Pseudo R2	0.0418
N	267

Note: The treatment variable takes the value of 1 for those respondents in the MC Latino in opposition frame and the comparison group (i.e., 0) are those respondents from the MC White in opposition frame.

*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01

Table B3: Ordered Logistic Regression Full Models with Party Identification

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
	MC White		MC Latino	
	in Support	in Opposition	in Support	in Opposition
Treatment	-0.125 (0.285)	-0.236 (0.414)	0.207 (0.479)	-0.679** (0.016)
Female	0.018 (0.365)	-0.121 (0.746)	0.182 (0.627)	-0.229 (0.489)
Education	0.159 (0.115)	0.160** (0.146)	-0.007 (0.946)	0.019 (0.862)
Age	-0.227** (0.010)	-0.027 (0.011)	-0.026** (0.016)	-0.016* (0.089)
Family Income	-0.013 (0.045)	-0.037 (0.103)	-0.045 (0.346)	0.016 (0.715)
Republican	-0.014 (0.380)	-0.381 (0.336)	-0.439 (0.288)	-0.761** (0.048)
Conservative	-0.662*** (0.168)	-0.195 (0.241)	-0.420** (0.019)	-0.208 (0.192)
Prejudice Scale	-1.770 (1.144)	-2.867** (0.010)	-1.868 (0.113)	-3.450*** (0.004)
White Thermometer	-0.005 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.645)	-0.005 (0.487)	-0.005 (0.491)
Latino Thermometer	0.020*** (0.008)	0.010 (0.178)	0.019** (0.008)	0.012 (0.116)
Language Threat	0.056 (0.206)	-0.010 (0.954)	0.317 (0.102)	0.248 (0.184)
Perceived Size of Latino Population	0.005 (0.011)	0.001 (0.919)	0.026** (0.021)	0.007 (0.521)
Political Knowledge Scale	-0.038 (0.460)	0.709* (0.083)	0.113 (0.799)	0.459 (0.300)
Cut 1	-5.585 (1.261)	-5.520 (1.204)	-5.565 (1.185)	-6.127 (1.159)
Cut 2	-4.070 (1.215)	-4.178 (1.165)	-4.312 (1.148)	-4.819 (1.112)
Cut 3	-2.641 (1.887)	-2.797 (1.136)	-3.029 (1.119)	-3.480 (1.085)
Cut 4	-1.135 (1.185)	-1.278 (1.126)	-1.550 (1.106)	-1.845 (1.074)
Adjusted R2	0.1060	0.0704	0.1105	0.0929
N	175	183	175	180

*p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01



Figure B1: Marginal Effect of MC Latino Opposition Frame on Bilingual Education Support by Political Knowledge with Ordinal Dependent Variable

U.S. Congressman

David Hernandez

Representing Our District at Home and in D.C.

Congressman Hernandez's Statement in Support of the Bilingual Education Bill Before the House

For Immediate Release

May 23rd, 2019 | Press Release | Issue: Education

Washington, D.C. – Congressman Hernandez made the following statement on the House floor today:

"According to the U.S. Department of Education, in 2015 the number of English language learners (ELLs) was estimated to be about 10 percent of the total enrolled population. We currently have different curriculums being used across states in an attempt to get those individuals to become proficient in the English language. Not only do the sizes of ELL populations differ across the U.S., but so does the instruction method used. Some states require complete English-immersion while others teach these students in more than one language. The ultimate objective of all language programs is to get those students to master the English language, but there are other things to consider here. For example, research shows that dual language programs allow ELL students to not only catch up to their non-ELL counterparts in regard to proficiency but also excel in other subjects and standardized testing when compared to ELLs in English immersion programs.

This is why I'm sponsoring the bilingual education bill brought before the House this week."

###

Figure B2: Pro-Bilingual Education Frame with Latino MC

U.S. Congressman

David Miller

Representing Our District at Home and in D.C.

Congressman Miller's Statement in Opposition of the Bilingual Education Bill Before the House

For Immediate Release

May 23rd, 2019 | Press Release | Issue: Education

Washington, D.C. – Congressman Miller made the following statement on the House floor today:

"According to the U.S. Department of Education, in 2015 the number of English language learners (ELLs) was estimated to be about 10 percent of the total enrolled population. We currently have different curriculums being used across states in an attempt to get those individuals to become proficient in the English language. Not only do the sizes of ELL populations differ across the U.S., but so does the instruction method used. Some states require complete English-immersion while others teach these students in more than one language. The ultimate objective of all language programs is to get those students to master the English language and research shows that children in bilingual programs take longer than those in full English immersion programs to become proficient in the English language.

This is why I'm voting against the bilingual education bill brought before the House this week."

###

Figure B3: Anti-Bilingual Education Frame with Anglo MC

Text B1: Survey Experiment Items

Q1 [Race]
What racial group best describes you?
[1] White
[2] Black or African American
[3] American Indian or Alaska Native
[4] Asian
[5] Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
[6] Middle Eastern
[7] Mixed
[8] Other

Q2 [Ethnicity]
Are you of Spanish, Latino, or Hispanic descent?
[1] Yes
[2] No

Q3 [Age]
In what year where you born?

Q4 [Education]
What is the highest level of education you have completed?
[1] Less than high school
[2] Some high school
[3] High school degree
[4] Some college
[5] 2-year college degree
[6] 4-year college degree
[7] Post-graduate degree

Q5 [Party identification]
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, and Independent, or what?
[1] Republican
[2] Independent
[3] Democrat
[4] Other
[5] None

Q6 [Ideology]
When it comes to politics, how would you describe your viewpoint?
[1] Very conservative
[2] Conservative

[3] Moderate
[4] Liberal
[5] Very liberal
[6] Not sure

Q7 [Zip code]
What is your current zip code?

Q8 [Family income]
Thinking back over the last year, what was your family's annual income?
[1] Less than $10,000
[2] $10,000 - $19,999
[3] $20,000 - $29,999
[4] $30,000 - $39,999
[5] $40,000 - $49,999
[6] $50,000 - $59,999
[7] $60,000 - $69,999
[8] $70,000 - $79,999
[9] $80,000 - $89,999
[10] $90,000 - $99,999
[11] $100,000 - $149,999
[12] $150,000 - $199,999
[13] $200,000 - $249,000
[14] More than $250,000

Q9 [Political knowledge item 1]
What is the name of the current speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives?

Q10 [Political knowledge item 2]
What amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects freedom of speech?

Q11 [Political knowledge item 3]
How many justices normally serve on the U.S. Supreme Court?

Q12 [Political knowledge item 4]
What proportion of Congress is needed to override a presidential veto?

Q13 [Bilingual education]
How do you feel about bilingual education?
[1] Strongly in favor of it
[2] Somewhat in favor of it
[3] Neither in favor nor opposed to it
[4] Somewhat opposed to it
[5] Strongly opposed to it

Q14 [U.S. population estimate]
Just your best guess – what percentage of the United States population is currently in each group?

Whites	[##] %
Blacks/African Americans	[##] %
Hispanics or Latinos	[##] %
Asian Americans	[##] %
American Indians	[##] %
Other	[##] %

Q15 [Community population estimate]
Just your best guess – what percentage of the people who live in your local community is each group?

Whites	[##] %
Blacks/African Americans	[##] %
Hispanics or Latinos	[##] %
Asian Americans	[##] %
American Indians	[##] %
Other	

Q16 [Language]
Can you speak a language other than English?
[1] Yes
[2] No

Q17 [Fluency]
How well do you speak that language?
[1] Very well
[2] Well
[3] Not well
[4] Hardly at all

Q18 [Anglo feeling thermometer]
I'd like to get your feelings toward groups that are in the news these days. You will be provided the name of a group and I'd like you to rate that group using the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50-degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold towards them. How would you rate Caucasians using the thermometer? Note: If you rate the group at 0, then you have to move the pointer off of 0 and return it in order for your response to be recorded.

Cold										Warm
0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100

Q19 [Hispanic feeling thermometer]
I'd like to get your feelings toward groups that are in the news these days. You will be provided the name of a group and I'd like you to rate that group using the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50-degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold towards them. How would you rate Hispanics using the thermometer? Note: If you rate the group at 0, then you have to move the pointer off of 0 and return it in order for your response to be recorded.

Cold										Warm
0	10	20	30	40	50	60	70	80	90	100

Next, I will provide you with some statements and I want you to tell me whether you agree or disagree with them.

Q20 [Prejudice item 1]
Hispanics can get ahead if they work hard enough.
[1] Strongly disagree
[2] Somewhat disagree
[3] Neither agree nor disagree
[4] Somewhat agree
[5] Strongly agree

Q21 [Prejudice item 2]
A lot of Hispanics are not well off because there aren't enough jobs to go around.
[1] Strongly disagree
[2] Somewhat disagree
[3] Neither agree nor disagree
[4] Somewhat agree
[5] Strongly agree

Q22 [Prejudice item 3]
The financial situation of Hispanics would improve if they had a chance to get a good education.
[1] Strongly disagree
[2] Somewhat disagree
[3] Neither agree nor disagree
[4] Somewhat agree
[5] Strongly agre

CONCLUSION

This dissertation speaks to the various ways in which Latinos are represented in the American political process. It also adds to our understanding of the relationship legislators have with the Latino population and of the way in which they engage in the legislative process. All of those things are important for understanding the representation of Latinos, especially when we consider the current state of the study of Latinos in American politics. When compared to some other groups in American society, Latinos are an understudied population within the discipline. The paucity in the literature on the attitudinal, behavioral, and representational dimensions in the study of the Latino population can partially be explained by the fact that only recently has this segment of the population become the largest minority group in the country. Nevertheless, the growth that this group has experienced, and the increasingly pivotal role that this population plays in state, local, and federal elections, means that this group merits the same exploration and methodological rigor applied in trying to understand other populations in the U.S. This work is an attempt to add to that exploration. In the sections that follow I will summarize each of the core parts of the study, discuss their limitations (and proposed work moving forward to address them), and provide some ideas for broader future work.

Summary

The first substantive chapter looks at how Latino constituents fare on the representational front relative to their Anglo counterparts in the electorate. While it isn't the only way in which Latinos – or any other group in society is represented – the dyadic connection between constituents and their legislators is one that is supposed to be the closest citizens are to the core institutions of the federal government. As a result, how responsive these representatives are to the people that put

them in office has consequences for the way that those individuals view government and how they interact with it. In addition, that relationship has consequences for the way in which the interests of groups are advanced in government. Amongst other things, the first paper in this dissertation shows – using a more precise measure of constituent preferences than earlier accounts and accounting for contextual differences across geographies – that Latinos face a representational deficit relative to their non-Latino Anglo co-citizens. However, the paper also adds to our understanding of the underlying processes structuring the relative representation afforded to Latinos. This is important because understanding the causes of the differences in representation inform the potential avenues that can be taken in an attempt to ameliorate them. On this front, the paper suggests that this disconnect in the preferences of Latinos and the behavior of their legislators is rooted in both anti-Latino behavior (and attitudes) and the behavior (or lack thereof) on the part of Latinos themselves. This suggests that any strategy to address the gap in the preferences of Latinos and their legislators needs to account for both the intergroup dynamics at play and also the underlying factors responsible for differences in participation between Latinos and non-Latinos.

The second substantive chapter explores a different facet of the representation of Latinos: via legislative communication. It looks at whether legislators speak to the interests of Latinos and the factors that explain variation in their propensity to do so. Though this is different from roll call voting or the advancement of Latino interests in other areas of the legislative process (e.g., in agenda-setting and in committee work), what legislators are talking about, or failing to talk about, speaks volumes about their priorities and their perceptions of their constituencies. However, the paper also contributes to our understanding of the different ways in which minority legislators

maneuver in the legislative process when compared to their non-minority colleagues. On the former, the paper shows that Latino legislators and Democrats are more likely to speak to issues important to Latinos in the electorate. On the latter, it shows that Latino legislators are more likely to engage in making symbolic appeals, something I attribute to the majoritarian processes influencing the behavior of Latinos in office and of minority legislators more broadly.

The third core part of this dissertation is also focused on communication, but not that between Latinos and their legislators. Instead, the focus is on Latino legislators and their non-Latino white constituents as compared to white legislators and their white constituents. More specifically, it explores – through a survey experiment – the role of ethnicity as a source cue on framing. I look at how receiving a pro- or anti-bilingual education frame from a Latino legislator influences support for bilingual education in comparison to that argument presented by a non-Latino white legislator. The results suggest that ethnicity does play a role in how receptive Anglo respondents are to arguments regarding bilingual education.

Even with all of its contributions, there are plenty of other questions raised by this dissertation and others that are beyond its scope. In closing, I will focus on some of the limitations in each of the components of the dissertation and then discuss potential avenues for future research. The papers taken collectively add to our understanding of Latino representation and legislative behavior in the U.S. House of Representatives, but this dissertation is merely a starting point for the work that is to come. I will address the limitations of this study and then describe how future work can improve on the foundation set here.

Limits and Coming Improvements

Representation as I define (and operationalize) it in the first paper only explores one of the many ways in which Latinos can be represented by the individuals in office. Though the level of representation afforded to Latinos as discussed here is likely connected to the other forms of representation and activities that legislators engage in, there exists the possibility, if only theoretically, that the interests of Latinos are advanced in other ways and in other areas of the political process. Outside of that, there are other limitations in the work. For example, the data used only has issues that the principal investigators decided to include, and the survey was only fielded in English, both of which limit what a study like this can say about the representation of Latino interests. Relatedly, even though the data set includes a nationally representative sample of Latinos in the U.S., the sampling doesn't account for the sub-ethnic diversity in the Latino electorate, which is definitely important when trying to generalize about Latino interests. While I am currently constrained on the data front – like many researchers before me – a smaller scale survey (or group of surveys) can potentially capture the relationships explored in that paper while also providing a clearer picture of Latino representation – one that accounts for the sub-ethnic diversity and language differences that the CCES currently cannot.[1]

The research design for the second paper – while novel and ambitious – can benefit from a more nuanced and qualitative supplement. Indeed, though undoubtedly capable of capturing variation in the communication strategies chosen by legislators and being able to discriminate amongst different issue areas, that method (i.e., machine learning) is not, at least at this point, able

[1] Indeed, though the CCES is a great and valuable resource, there are clear limitations to it as I make clear in the preceding paragraph, and, in the absence of getting the resources to get questions included in the survey, or having the principal investigators to be sensitive to those limitations, I am forced to deal with those constraints.

to pick up the nuance in the messages posted by legislators. For one, the design in the paper is unable to pick up on the visual cues presented by legislators in photographs. Indeed, something as small as a pin, clothing, product, or even place have the potential to communicate things beyond what is published in a newsletter, tweet, or anything of the sort. That subtlety is lost in the analysis I conduct, but it is nonetheless part of the signaling that legislators are engaging in an attempt to make and develop connections with their constituents. To address this, moving forward I plan to take a subset of Latino and non-Latino legislators and qualitatively explore the content of their Twitter profiles in a way that captures their communication with a sensitivity to those non-textual cues. Relatedly, I also plan to look at press releases or other text messages released by legislators, as they can bypass the visual cue limitation described before.

The framing paper looks only at one issue: bilingual education. This is one glaring limitation in said work. Exploring other issues can provide more theoretical leverage, as the findings of the study could be isolated to the issue chosen and possibly the nature of the frames used. It could also be the case that economic (or other) angles (e.g., cultural) may be more effective than those used. Relatedly, it may be that the newsletter, though one of the most common forms of communication used by legislators, could be too lengthy for respondents and subsequently stunting its effectiveness. Though the use of both pro and con policy framing conditions helps to ease concerns about validity, the study only looks at one-way communication between legislators and constituents, which may not always be applicable, especially in the midst of campaigns. To address those issues, the next iteration of this study will not only include other issues but also different frames and, most importantly, seeing how exposure to more than one frame and source cue impacts support for the chosen issues.

Future Work

Though I focus on the communication from legislators to constituents in this dissertation, communication going in the opposite direction is also important because it can potentially provide a way to better understand the responsiveness to Latinos on the policy front and in legislative communication. A key assumption of the dyadic representation model is that legislators have an idea of what their constituents want. However, if Latinos aren't communicating with their legislators at the same rate as their non-Latino counterparts in the electorate, then that can potentially explain the deficit captured in this dissertation research. With those considerations in mind, moving forward I'd like to explore the variation in Latinos' efforts to contact legislators across districts and the role that shared ethnicity plays in that propensity and decision-making on the part of Latino constituents. In addition to exploring the situations where Latinos have Latino representatives or white ones, I am interested in seeing how they communicate with other minority legislators (e.g., African American, Asian, etc.). Relatedly, when exploring the situations in which Latinos are represented by Latino legislators, I want to examine how sub-ethnic ties (or their absence) influence propensity to contact legislators. Indeed, the country of origin to which a given individual identifies (e.g., Cuba, Mexico, Argentina, etc.) could affect the willingness of constituents to contact legislators.

In this dissertation, I focus on comparing how Latinos and Anglos in Congress differ in their communication with the Latino population but that leaves out the rest of the members that serve on the legislature.[2] How other minorities communicate, and foster relationships, with the

[2] Though this is defensible given that the majority of legislators in office are white, and prior work suggesting that the descriptive connection between Latinos needs to be accounted, there is still a need to branch out and look at the relationships other non-Latino legislators have with the Latino population.

Latino population is also an interesting avenue that merits exploration.[3] Though the literature on cross-ethnic coalitions and competition between African Americans and Latinos clearly demonstrates that the relationship between the two groups is multifaceted and complicated by things such as feelings of commonality (Kaufmann 2003), contact (McClain et al. 2006), and acculturation (Sanchez 2008), amongst others, shared experiences and similar positions in society set the foundation for expectation that the two groups will, under certain conditions, come together (see Kauffmann 2003 for a discussion; see also Cutia Wilkinson 2014). In addition, and more important for the ongoing discussion, is the reality that all minority legislators have Latino constituents in their districts, which means that there is likely an electoral incentive to develop those relationships with, and amongst, constituents.

Though this is important from a political communication perspective, cross-ethnic coalitions are also important to study with respect to their influence on the representational prospects of these different minority groups. Indeed, intergroup dynamics are at the heart of American politics. With the U.S. seemingly moving towards a majority-minority nation in the decades that come (Frey 2018), there is much more to be explored about the interactions, relationships, and political behavior of these different groups in American society. Exploring the relative homogeneity in the preferences of different minority groups across different contexts is something that I would like to explore moving forward.

We know that descriptive representation is important for the advancement of minority interests, but, as the ongoing discussion makes clear, institutional and partisan realities can sometimes get in the way of those interests being advanced. How constituents view legislators in

[3] Relatedly, how Latino legislators appeal to non-Latino minorities also warrants exploration, especially as Latinos continue to increase their presence and profile in Congress.

those instances when their roll call voting is not in line with the interests of constituents is an avenue that merits exploration. Though there is work looking at the attitudes (and behavior) of constituents as impacted by the presence of descriptive representation (Bowen and Clark 2014; Casellas and Wallace 2015; English et al. 2018), it may be fruitful to explore the relative leeway afforded to Latinos in office by their co-ethnics as compared to their non-Latino constituents. That is, how are Latino legislators viewed when they fail to behave in a way consistent with their co-ethnic constituents? Relatedly, how do non-Latino constituents view Latino legislators when the same happens, are they more (or less) tolerant of such behavior? Future work might also benefit from looking at communication between constituents and legislators with a special attention to what Latino constituents are telling their (non-)Latino legislators. Recent work on communication between constituents and legislators highlights the role of shared race and ethnicity (or their absence) in affecting communication between the two (see Mendez and Grose 2018). In light of those studies there is a need to look at what Latinos are actually saying to their constituents in the situations that they do communicate with their legislators, co-ethnics or otherwise. This can add to our understanding of the relationship between Latinos and their representatives, which undoubtedly has representational implications and consequences.

Conclusion

In the three papers presented above, I explore different facets of the political representation of Latinos in the U.S. House of Representatives. In doing so, I add to our understanding of the relationship between constituents and their legislators, along with that of how different contexts affect the behavior (and attitudes) of both constituents and legislators. The coming demographic changes – in both the Latino population and outside of it – ensure that race and ethnicity will

continue to play a role in the interactions and relationships between the different groups that make up the U.S. population and the government that represents them. The papers here provide a foundation for accounting how these changes affect the representation afforded to Latinos moving forward. I will build on the insights provided here and will do so with a sensitivity to the different ways in which representation takes place in American politics with respect to Latinos.

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VITA

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In 2015, Giovanny continued his graduate studies at the University of Tennessee-Knoxville by enrolling in the Political Science program to pursue his doctorate degree in political science. He was awarded the department's David Mock and John Shanks prizes for outstanding performance as a Graduate Teaching Associate and as a student in the field of American politics, respectively. He was also the recipient of the Thomas Family and the College of Arts and Sciences fellowships, which were given for the continuation of his research agenda and the completion of his dissertation at the University of Tennessee-Knoxville.

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