



To the Graduate Council:


I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Charles A. Murphy entitled "Liberation Theology as Political Ideology." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.


J. Dodd, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:


Michael B. [unclear]
Kenneth T. [unclear]

Accepted for the Council:


Vice Provost
and Dean of the Graduate School

LIBERATION THEOLOGY
AS
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Charles A. Murphy

May 1989

Copyright © Charles A. Murphy, 1989
All rights reserved

DEDICATION

This dissertation is lovingly dedicated to my wife and four sons, whose patience is eternal, and in memory of our daughter, Tina, whose faith in her daddy was inextinguishable.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In the course of dissertation research, a number of scholars have assisted me generously. In particular I am indebted to Professors Joe Dodd, Robert Peterson, Vernon Iredell and Michael Betz, who served as my director and committee respectively. With their consultation, criticism, and encouragement, I was able to achieve results otherwise impossible. Whatever errors remain in my work, however, are solely my responsibility. I also wish to thank Robert Gorman whose challenges in radical political thought led to this study.

ABSTRACT

Liberation Theology is relatively new in that it first came upon the world scene in 1967 in Germany. It has found fertile soil in the Third World among the countries of Latin and Central America, with manifestations showing up in Africa and Asia as well. It has a sizeable following among intellectuals in North America as well.

An analysis of the published materials of Liberation Theology and the public and private statements of its adherents demonstrates that the movement is in reality a political movement, an ideology in the political sense, rather than a theology. That the theory and its political institutions are "Marxist" is readily admitted by both proponents and opponents, and since Liberation Theology purports to have the answer to the problems of injustice and unjust structures in Latin and Central America, it must be able to correctly identify the cause or causes of the inequitable situation and, once identified, be able to propose institutional remedies based on an alternative system. In that specific area of consideration, Liberation Theology's performance has been disappointing at best and a dismal failure at worst--being neither "liberation" nor "theology" it has thus far failed to reach its promised potential as a political movement because it has failed to adequately explain--and thereby to address--the real causes

for the area's economic and political backwardness in real development and liberty. It has, rather, been a hindrance, because of its affinity for Marxist rhetoric, to mutual understanding and real liberation of the peoples of Latin and Central America in particular and of the Third World in general.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
Definition of Terms and Concepts.....	2
Marxism and Communism.....	2
Socialism.....	3
Capitalism.....	3
Democracy.....	4
Theology.....	5
Church.....	6
Christian and Christianity.....	6
Gospel.....	6
Organization of the Paper.....	7
II. PERCEPTIONS OF LIBERATION THEOLOGY.....	11
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS.....	30
Overview.....	30
The European Religious and Philosophical Roots.....	32
The Sandino Theosophical Root.....	39
The Development of Liberation Theology in Latin America.....	46
IV. RELIGIOUS/POLITICAL EXTREMISM.....	63
Overview.....	65
Ireland--Catholic Religionists or Red Terrorists?.....	69
Overview.....	70
Modern Era.....	74
Iran--Islamic Revolution or Political Expediency?.....	84
Overview.....	84
Background.....	87
Modern Era.....	90
V. LIBERATION THEOLOGY AS POLITICAL IDEOLOGY: AN ANALYSIS.....	95
Overview: The Concept of Ideology.....	97
Theoretical Underpinnings: Dependencia and Marxism.....	103
Dependency Theory.....	103
Marxian Socialism.....	114
VI. CONCLUSIONS.....	122
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	132
VITA.....	140

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this dissertation is modest enough--to set forth and critically analyze the published materials of Liberation Theology and the public and private statements of its adherents in order to demonstrate that the movement is in reality a political movement, an ideology in the political sense, rather than a theology. The study is undertaken with the intent of providing a useful tool of analysis for academicians and policy-makers alike.

Liberation Theology is relatively new in that it first came upon the world scene in 1967 in Germany. It has found fertile soil in the Third World among the countries of Latin and Central America. It has a sizeable following among intellectuals in North America as well.

Presenting itself as "theology" is deceptive while dismissing it off-handedly as "mere communism" is dishonest intellectually, displaying an ignorance of the complex differences between Marxism, neo-Marxism, Marx's concept of communism, Lenin's concept of communism, Marxism-Leninism, Leninism-Stalinism, and particularly of Sandinismo and of Augusto Cesar Sandino's anarcho-communism, or "rational communism," and his "liberation theosophy." Liberation Theology is an attempt to provide both a political theory and an institution for political participation on the part

of the "people" in an area--Central America--which historically has had neither, and to do so from the historico-cultural perspective of the poor, the landless masses of the area's common people.

Definition of Terms and Concepts

When considering Liberation Theology it is necessary to identify the perceptual biases of both adherents and opponents since, without careful clarification, concepts common to North America and Europe, such as left-wing, right-wing, conservative and liberal, and even "democracy," for the most part are meaningless as tools of analysis for the Third World in general and Latin and Central America in particular. For example, few people, scholars or otherwise, can distinguish between a right-wing death squad and a left-wing death squad, or between a left-wing dictatorship and a right-wing dictatorship.

Marxism and Communism. The terms "Marxism" and "communism" for all practical purposes defy definition, not only in the narrower context of Liberation Theology and Latin America, but in the wider philosophical context as well as Jacques Ellul illustrates in his book Jesus and Marx: From Gospel to Ideology. The problem with the terms is that they are devoid of all radical content and meaning and have become rather empty phrases which anyone can adapt to any situation so that anyone can claim to be either Marxist or

communist. Within the text of this paper these terms will be defined and/or clarified according to the understanding of the person or group using the term, if indeed such can be determined from the writings or statements of those involved. For example, Liberation theologians ask us to use "Marxist analysis" when looking at the Latin American situation, but the term is left undefined and one is never quite sure what is meant by the concept.

Socialism. The term is for the most part left with no definition or only a vague definition by most of the Liberation theologians, although the references to installing a socialist form of government or socialism as an institution are common throughout the literature. Juan Luis Segundo, however, defines socialism as "the political regime in which the ownership of the means of production is removed from individuals and handed over to higher institutions whose concern is the common good" (Segundo, 115). That is an acceptable definition insofar as most social and political scientists are concerned, although it leaves "higher institutions," and "common good" open to interpretation.

Capitalism. Liberation theologians as a group and as individuals employ a definition of capitalism that speaks more of a pre-capitalist mercantilism, descriptive of Latin America in both the 19th and 20th centuries, than capitalism as it developed in the North during the same period. The writers do not use the term as Marx understood it, for

even when they speak of "class struggle," they are thinking primarily of the struggle within feudalism of landholders and peasants, hardly at all of the classic Marxist picture of an industrial proletariat. "Capitalism," as referred to in Latin America is a form of syndicalism or corporatism, which descends from the rights given by the Spanish or Portuguese crown to certain large landholders or adventurers and constitutes virtual monopoly over state mercantilism. (Novak Commentary 61)

Democracy. "Democracy," as normally defined in the North, becomes a problem if used as a tool of analysis, especially if in the Third World the term is understood philosophically in Marxist or Aristotelian terms, as it often is. To neo-Marxists and Liberation Theologists the word "democracy" and Marx's concept of communism, are synonymous, carrying the essential meaning assigned by Aristotle. In contrast, the term "democratic capitalism" probably carries the meaning better when used in the North, even though it falls short of describing the republican form of government established in the United States. North American and Western European "democracy" obviously is of a different character than that of Eastern or Soviet Bloc "democracy," the former being characterized by multiple political parties vying legitimately for political power, while the latter is characterized by a single political party legitimized by a plebiscite. Since both can and do

claim "free" elections, "democracy," and the "will" of the people, the usefulness of "democracy" as a tool of analysis of either system by the other system is nil.

Theology. If theology is to be taken as a synonym for philosophy, then the term has meaning within the context of Liberation "Theology." This definition is pivotal to any study of the movement if for no other reason than its name. Moreover, it is important since writers alternately call it a "new theology" and a "new way to do theology." According to the historical definition, that is as understood by the so-called early church fathers, theology is not something one can "do," but rather something to be studied by man in his efforts to get to know God.

Representative of traditional Protestant and some more traditional Catholic theologians, Augustus Strong, in Systematic Theology, defines theology as the "science of God and of the relations between God and the universe" (1). Thus the aim of theology is to "ascertain the facts respecting God and the relations between God and the universe, and the exhibition of these facts in their rational unity, as connected parts of a formulated and organic system of truth." (Strong 2). Contrasted to Gustavo Gutierrez' several loose definition(s)--from "God-talk" to "words about God"--the traditional definition, used by this study, admits of only one "theology"--whereas the various loose definitions found within Liberation Theology really

amount to a radicalized church "dogma" which constitute the generic synonyms for philosophy used by the various writers in Liberation Theology, herein referred to by the term "theologists" to distinguish them from traditional theologians.

Church. The term "church" has several meanings both within and without Liberation Theology. Unless otherwise noted, however, the term will be used to denote the formal organization in its normally recognizable structure with whatever descriptive adjectives are deemed necessary for clarification.

Christian and Christianity. The terms "Christian" and "Christianity" are somewhat more confusing since Ernesto Cardenal and Miguel D'Escoto, both Maryknoll priests serving officially in the Sandinista Front for National Liberation, have alluded to the possibility of being both atheist and "Christian," Marxist and "Christian," and communist and "Christian." "Christianity" is used in Liberation Theology for the most part as a generic name for a political movement with no single party expression, rather than deriving from the traditional theological sense of "believers in Christ." Therefore, the term "Christian" will be understood to refer to a member of that movement, in the sense that one speaks of a person being a Christian Democrat in Europe.

Gospel. As used in Liberation Theology it can mean any

number of things, including an all-inclusive "good news." The only place the term is defined in the Bible is in the fifteenth chapter of I Corinthians, the first four verses: "...I declare unto you the gospel...by which also ye are saved...for I delivered unto you first of all that which I also received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures; and that he was buried, and that he rose again the third day according to the scriptures...." In Liberation Theology, however, one encounters the "gospel of the poor," the "gospel of Solentiname," the "gospel of liberation from unjust structures," and myriads of other "gospels." The outsider will be more comfortable with the term "gospel" as used by Liberation Theology if it is understood to be a generic synonym for a general "philosophy of doing good," whether it be good works to help the poor, or to help destroy an existing governmental structure perceived, perhaps justly, to be unjust toward the masses of the common people. To distinguish between uses, this paper will use gospel to refer to the biblical definition, and "gospel" (with quotes) to refer to the various philosophies within Liberation Theology and within the Marxist and neo-Marxist groups.

Organization of the Paper

Chapter II, below, investigates differing perceptions of Liberation Theology and finds that for the most part the

existing literature reflects a basic confusion not only concerning what Liberation Theology is, that is, what to call itself, but also concerning the scope of the movement's primary concerns, that is, what it should be involved in, the methods of involvement and the levels of involvement. One finds within the literature that it really doesn't make much difference from which camp the literature purports to represent, whether friend or foe of Liberation Theology, the lack of clarity and coherence is obvious.

Chapter III presents the historical background and precedents of the movement by tracing three of its main roots: the European religious root; the European philosophical root; and the Sandino theosophical root. The first two roots are considered as a complementary pair as an introduction with the bulk of the chapter being devoted to the theosophical root of Augusto Sandino, due to the fact that it is in Nicaragua, and in the name of Sandino, that Liberation Theology is first fleshed-out as a revolutionary force. Most of those writing on the subject of Liberation Theology are quite familiar with the first two roots, but few have been exposed to the third and perhaps the most important root. From the third root, the chapter proceeds to its influence in the various conferences from which the modern expression of the movement sprang.

Chapter IV examines the phenomenon of religious/politi-

cal extremism and notes that religious extremism and political extremism exist as separate entities. The purpose of this chapter, however, is to draw attention to the concept contained in the combined term, religious/political extremism. Using two well-known modern examples, one of which is a non-Christian "liberation theology," the Islamic Revolution in Iran, and the other being the "troubles" in North Ireland--the Christian versus Christian "liberation theology"--the chapter shows that the concept is not new with the Nicaraguan or Latin American version of Liberation Theology.

Chapter V is an analysis of Liberation Theology as political ideology. What should be clear at this point in the paper is that Liberation Theology is not a "theology," wherein lies its deception. The majority of doctoral dissertations attack Liberation Theology on one or more of its perceived theological errors, points that will not be belabored here. Of far more importance is what Liberation Theology is or is becoming: an institution, perceived as indigenous, filling a political void, and a political theory particularly adapted to the situation in the Third World and in Latin and Central America in particular.

Chapter VI presents the conclusions of the study. Liberation Theology's shortcomings do not change the fact that it exists, that it is a powerful political movement and that the United States, both in its Congress and its

foreign policy, must be able to respond intelligently so as not to further alienate the Latin Americans and to help them attain the "liberation" they are so actively seeking.

CHAPTER II

PERCEPTIONS OF LIBERATION THEOLOGY

The definition of terms and concepts in Chapter I made reference to the confusion which abounds about and within Liberation Theology. This chapter will expand on that theme by showing that for the most part the literature reflects a basic lack of agreement as to what Liberation Theology claims to be or what it really is. One finds that it does not seem to make a great deal of difference from which camp the literature is presented, whether from the so-called religious new-Right in the United States or the radical Marxist left of Europe and Latin America, or, indeed, whether the author is speaking about "political theology" or "Liberation Theology" or any number of off-shoots, the perceptions of Liberation Theology lack any depth of coherence.

For the twenty years following the Conference of Bishops at Medellin, Colombia (1968), the primary publishing house for Liberation Theology has been Orbis Books, the publishing arm of the Maryknoll school in New York. Admittedly Marxist in orientation, the Maryknoll missionaries have been the prime movers in both theory and praxis. Other publishers have since joined the field, reflecting Catholic and non-Catholic, religious and secular, academic and "lay," viewpoints, and dozens of doctoral disserta-

tions have been and are being written on the topic. A few of the latter have tried to tackle the political side of the question relating to a specific set of circumstances, such as John Pottenger's study on Sandinismo and Liberation Theology at the University of Alabama at Huntsville; but for the most part dissertations have been directed to one or more of Liberation Theology's perceived "theological" failings or to its challenging innovations to the theological world.

Some of those challenges result from that lack of coherence or understanding among its supporters even as to what to call itself, and some of the challenges from its attackers result from a lack of coherence or understanding as to whether they are dealing with a single movement, a single ideological viewpoint, or with several different so-called "liberation theologies."

It is the position of this paper that there is only one Liberation Theology but that it has several different and sometimes conflicting expressions, just as in reality there is only one "Church"--that of Jesus Christ--but there are an infinite number of expressions as to what that church should look like, from within both major "camps" of Protestantism and Catholicism. The authors quoted in the following paragraphs are in fact speaking to a single movement, a single ideological outlook, but one which possesses several aspects of ideology, religion, church dogma, and political

theory, and one which, therefore, offers innumerable opportunities for misunderstanding and confusion on the part of friend and foe alike.

Gustavo Gutierrez, in A Theology of Liberation, for example, moves from the historical understanding of the term theology to the revolutionary understanding of the term and states:

...We will give special consideration to participation in the process of liberation, an outstanding phenomenon of our times, which takes on special meaning in the so-called Third World countries. This kind of theology, arising from concern with a particular set of issues, will perhaps give us the solid and permanent albeit modest foundation for the theology in a Latin American perspective which is both desired and needed.... It is for all these reasons that the theology of liberation offers us not so much a new theme for reflection as a new way to do theology. Theology as critical reflection on historical praxis is a liberating theology.... This is a theology which does not stop with reflecting on the world, but rather tries to be a part of the process through which the world is transformed.
(14-15)

Miguez Bonino, whose Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation appeared two years after Gutierrez, acknowledges the introduction of ideology into classical theology:

Finally, both the criticism and the introduction of historical verifiability introduce into the hermeneutical task new areas and instruments. We are not concerned with establishing through deduction the consequences of conceptual truths but with analyzing a historical praxis which claims to be Christian. This critical analysis includes a number of operations, which are totally unknown to classical theology. Historical praxis overflows the area of the subjective and private. If we are dealing with acts and not merely with ideas, feelings, or intentions, we plunge immediately into the area of politics.... The result of this research, though, does not leave us simply with a sum of facts; it

discloses a (more or less coherent, or partially modified) unified perception of the world, i.e., an ideology. (93-94)

However, in a later article, printed in the volume Frontiers of Theology in Latin America, Gutierrez contradicts that statement by denying that Liberation Theology has anything to do with the concept of ideology:

Liberation theology does not attempt to offer any Christian justification for stances already taken; it does not purport to be a Christian ideology of revolution. It is a process of reflection which starts out from historical praxis.... When I say that it does not purport to be a Christian ideology of revolution, I do not mean that it ignores the process of revolution. On the contrary, its starting point is its insertion in that process. Liberation theology wants to help that process to become more self-critical, and hence more comprehensive and radical. This is done by framing the political commitment to liberation within the context of Christ's gratuitous gift of total liberation. (22)

On the other hand, a conservative Protestant writer, Arthur Glasser, in his Contemporary Theologies of Missions, states that for all their diversity, the supporters of and contributors to Liberation Theology show a substantial measure of agreement in their presuppositions: 1) Theology is occurring in a new context: the dialectic of oppression/liberation; 2) Classical theologies lack contemporary relevance and must therefore be repudiated; 3) The role of Scripture is supportive--not determinative; and 4) The theologian must make use of Marxist analytical tools. (156-159)

He elaborates upon the third point by explaining:

Theology as traditionally understood has meant disciplined reflection on Holy Scriptures by the people of God with a view to discovering its application to the historical context in which they find themselves.... Liberation theologians, however, have uniformly broken sharply with traditional Christianity by calling for a theology of history in the present--which means politics. The focus must now be on God's activities in the world "wherever the action is." All theology must become the servant of social change...[and] the theology of liberation is built on social action (making human the structures of society); it starts not with the Bible text but with the existential situation. The prior commitment to concrete action on behalf of the oppressed, with full knowledge that this inescapably involves the risk of working alongside God for their liberation, means that Scripture's ethical norms dare not override the norms dictated by the existential situation. (158)

Glasser then elaborates upon the fourth presupposition by stating that

most liberation theologians have uncritically adopted a Marxist approach to social analysis. But is it possible to commit oneself to a process of social analysis which elevates material (economic) production to a higher level than any other dimension of human existence, and not (albeit unconsciously) adopt the Marxist ideology at the same time? (159)

Juan Luis Segundo, one of the original Liberation Theology authors, in his The Liberation of Theology, states:

Whether everything Marx said is accepted or not, and in whatever way one may conceive his 'essential' thinking, there can be no doubt that present-day social thought will be 'Marxist' to some extent, that is, profoundly indebted to Marx. In that sense Latin American theology is certainly Marxist. (16, 35 n. 10)

Tarcisio Beal, a theologian and scholar at Incarnate Word College at San Antonio, in a paper presented before

the International Studies Association at the University of Alabama, in commenting on the second meeting of the Latin American Episcopate (CELAM II), which he marks as the official beginning of the new Latin American church, states that

Medellin set the Latin American church on a new path. It took unprecedented positions which could henceforth disturb and irritate most Latin American governments, many conservative Catholics, and the paladins of capitalism everywhere: it specifically condemned Marxism and capitalism as systems which militate against the dignity of the human person; it placed the church squarely on the side of the poor and the oppressed of the continent, that is, in direct opposition to the established political and socio-economic order; it realized that in Latin America capitalism was much more at the root of the misery and injustice that victimized people than was Marxism and, therefore, to attack them on an equal basis was poor strategy: "When a system (capitalism) ceases to promote the common good and favors special interests, the church must not only denounce injustice but also break with the evil system. She must be prepared to work with another system that is juster and more suited to the needs of the day (II CELAM, 1970:64).... Liberation theology does not accept a separation between religion and politics. It...[starts] from the concept that the Lord is a God of liberation from every form of oppression and that Jesus of Nazareth set the example by dedicating himself to the poor and oppressed of this earth and by making them the first beneficiaries of the Good News of the Kingdom. (8, 9)

John Pottenger, a political scientist at the University of Alabama at Huntsville, also in a paper presented at ISA, displays a different perspective by classifying Liberation Theology as both a sociological movement and a philosophical position:

As a school of political/religious thought in the broad tapestry of Western political philosophy, liberation theology attempts to analyze social

problems, primarily those associated with chronic maldistribution of wealth and restrictive and repressive governmental policies, in Latin America and then to use these analyses in combination with religious and moral justifications for engagement in a variety of political activity. Consequently, liberation theology is both a sociological movement as well as a philosophical position.... Individuals in this movement use their religious convictions as a standard to gauge and critique the effectiveness of contemporary policies in meeting the basic needs of the citizenry. (2)

H. Mark Roelofs in an essay appearing in the American Political Science Review, on the other hand, perceives Liberation Theology as the "recovery of biblical radicalism" rather than as being Marxism in Christian disguise:

Liberation theology is not a Marxism in Christian disguise. It is the recovery of a biblical radicalism that has been harbored in the Judeo-Christian tradition virtually from its founding. As such, Liberation theology is the revitalization of one of the most profound social, political, economic, and religious challenges to established hierarchies that the West has ever known. Liberation theologians turn to modern Marxism chiefly to gain a comprehensive understanding of contemporary class conflict and poverty. Their primary concerns remain to define themselves as an "emergent church" in the biblical tradition, and to reflect upon the praxis of the "base community" movement they have spawned throughout Latin America. However, the principal liberation theologians of our day exhibit persistent ambiguities about how individuals should relate to their communities." (549)

Another conservative writer, Jerry Combee, a political scientist from Liberty University at Lynchburg, in a third paper presented at ISA, examines what he perceives as the primarily existential roots of Liberation Theology:

Novak seems sincerely to believe that, if shown enough evidence against dependency theory and socialism, the liberationists might be persuaded to abandon Marxism.

Some core concepts of liberation theology, however, are not mere Marxist add-ons acquired in the heat of praxis. The considerable scholarly apparatus evidenced in liberation theologians' footnotes was not picked up during communion with the Latin American proletariat. The similarity of Latin liberation theology and leading European radical theologies--e.g., "political theology" and the "theology of hope"--is not coincidental. The liberationists learned in the schools of Europe the mixture of Marxism and Existentialism which, as Allan Bloom has noted, typifies most contemporary radical thought--whether atheist, Christian, or something suspended in dialectical tension between the two. The Marxism, based mostly on the pre-1848 Communist Manifesto period of Marx's intellectual development, is not always called by that name; it is more concerned with ontology, epistemology, and anthropology than with political economy per se; but it is Marxism nevertheless. It mixes well with Existentialism since both so emphasize "the self," "self-realization," "creativity," [and] "values." In their purest (atheistic) forms, the starting point for each is the materialization of spirit and the immanentization of transcendence, with the attributes formerly reserved for the godhead transferred to man. Liberation theology is not just "Marxist"; L. John Van Til has quite correctly called liberation theology "existentialist." (5,6)

Harold O. J. Brown's essay in Liberation Theology views the movement somewhat differently than the others but still sees it as having three distinct roots: a linguistic root, a political root, and a nationalistic or ethnic root.

Of these, the linguistic root is the most legitimate, [but] it is made to produce more than it really can sustain.... The political root is important, sometimes so important that it causes critics to take liberation theology as political ideology in theological language. This criticism is noted by Jose Miguez Bonino, one of the foremost architects of liberation theology, who puts it perhaps better than his critics might: "The text of Scripture and tradition is forced into the Procrustean bed of ideology, and the theologian who has fallen prey of this procedure is forever condemned to listen only to the echo of his own ideology." In the context, Bonino acknowledges "that the criti-

cism is not without significance," although he ultimately rejects it. Bonino makes no bones about the Marxist basis of liberation thought, saying only that the "Marxist scheme cannot be taken as a dogma, but rather as a method." (9-10)

Ronald Nash's essay in that same volume states that

the foundation of liberation theology is a set of three claims: (1) Christians ought to become politically active on behalf of people who are poor and oppressed; (2) The major cause of poverty, injustice and oppression in the contemporary world is capitalism; (3) Christians should attack capitalism and work to see it replaced by socialism. (49)

Elaborating on the theme that Liberation Theology is a new way of doing theology, Robert McAfee Brown, in an essay in Mission Trends No. 4, describes Liberation Theology as an "attempt to look at the world in terms of involvement with the under-privileged and oppressed, and to find within the Christian gospel both the analytic tools and the energizing power to work for radical change in that world." He then proceeds to state that capitalism never has been compatible with Christianity:

Theology is not a set of timeless truths, no matter how much the goal of achieving such truths may have been sought by theologians in the past. It is rather a certain kind of reflection on what is going on in very specific situations.... In Latin America, as we have observed, Marxist analysis has been a particularly relevant tool for Christians and has provided a point of contact with members of the working class, many of whom are already Marxist.... Capitalism is no longer compatible with Christianity, if it ever was, and a full-scale change of direction is needed. (3, 15, 17)

Monte Palmer considers Liberation Theology and Islamic fundamentalism to be similar in many respects, a concept

which is discussed more fully in Chapter IV below. He states:

Liberation theology, although possessing many faces and interpretations, is essentially a reaction of many Catholic intellectuals, parishioners and clergy to the conservative, if not reactionary, role of the Catholic Church in Latin America. Liberation theology urges the Church to become actively involved in alleviating the suffering of the masses and, if necessary, in creating a political environment that will achieve that end. In its various forms it is an action-oriented theology that stresses mass involvement and mass mobilization to achieve its goals of welfare and reform. Traditional political regimes and the conservative bias of the Church are perceived as the enemy of the Catholic faith.... In spite of the left-wing ideological focus of liberation theology and the rightist orientation of Islamic fundamentalism, the two political movements are remarkably similar in their role as agents of social change and in their impact upon their respective societies.... In addition to blending Marxist analysis with religious doctrine, liberation theology incorporates a strong dose of dependency theory, or the belief that the continued underdevelopment and poverty of Latin America and the developing areas is directly attributable to the policies of the United States and other capitalist powers and their desire to force the developing areas into a state of perpetual servitude...[and] is often intensely anti-American. (110-113)

Emilio A. Nunez, a conservative theological writer, in his book Liberation Theology, explains that one of the difficulties facing anyone attempting to analyze Liberation Theology is that it necessarily involves entering the area of politics, which makes theologians somewhat nervous:

It should be obvious that it is impossible to evaluate liberation theology without entering the area of politics. Liberation theologians affirm that their hermeneutic is political and that the gospel has a political dimension. To evangelize is to "politicize".... That political option creates a serious problem for the Christian who wants to

evaluate liberation theology, because he cannot make any negative comments about it without running the risk of being called a "defender of the capitalists, or imperialists." (12)

However, in a later section Nunez recognizes the theological dimension, which is somewhat unnerving to political scientists:

Liberation theology does not consist only of a critical, sociological analysis of the Latin American situation. It includes much more than a description of economic, social and political reality. Even on the philosophical level the emphasis falls on action, on praxis, not on knowledge for its own sake. It is a philosophy of the transforming action of society. It strives to change the situation of poverty and underdevelopment. Furthermore, liberation theologians do not stop at that which is merely philosophical and sociological.... [Instead] they make an attempt at theology. (140)

Nicaragua will come under closer scrutiny in the next chapter, which investigates the historical background of Liberation Theology; but it also rates consideration here because of the close interrelationships between Liberation theologians and the Sandinista government. Donald C. Hodges writes in Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution:

Although Ernesto Cardenal's theology is far from representative of liberation theology in Nicaragua, it is the closest to representing the political and ideological views of the FSLN. It is one of the few theologies of liberation to give a religious significance to the new Marxism, and its extreme communist orientation makes it the only living substitute for Sandino's communist theosophy. Father Cardenal has made two significant contributions to the ideology of the Nicaraguan Revolution: first, the development of a unique theology of liberation whose key to the Scriptures is humanity's collective rather than personal existence; second, the adaptation of this theology to the

Marxist class struggle. Together they provide a religious justification of the Nicaraguan Revolution for those Sandinistas who are both Christians and Marxists. (279)

Answering the radical Christians for Socialism documents, also discussed in Chapter III below, the Declaration of the Chilean Bishops identifies Liberation Theology as primarily a socio-political movement:

In their documents, the members of Christians for Socialism describe the constitutive elements of the Church, her mission of liberation, the activity of her members, and the spirit of charity that is peculiarly hers. We find their description inadequate. Indeed their views seem to be equivocal on all these matters, when not actually erroneous. As we see it, they lay such stress on socio-political liberation that in practice they pay mere lip service to essential aspects of Christian liberation and to the proper way in which the Church is to promote justice in the world. In reality they lose sight of these points. The activity of the Church becomes indistinguishable from any other political current. One indication of this is their tendency to limit man's encounter with God and Christ to participation in a very specific revolutionary process. The primary and essential mission of the Church, it would seem, is to mobilize the masses in favor of one specific type of revolution. (Eagleson 200)

James V. Schall, S.J., a conservative Jesuit theologian, faults Liberation Theology for its lack of critical thought vis-a-vis Marxism in an essay in which he examines the political claims of the Liberation theologians:

The hostility towards, or at least avoidance by liberation theology, of the kind of thought represented by Alexander Solzhenitsyn and the Russian and East European dissidents over the precise Christian evaluation of Marxism is probably the most important controversy in this area. In so many words, if a Solzhenitsyn is right, liberation theology is disastrously wrong in many of its premises and perspectives. (Nash 86)

Segundo, on the other hand, tries to explain the difference between traditional theology and Liberation theology by stating:

The liberation theologian's suspicion is that anything and everything involving ideas, including theology, is intimately bound up with the existing social situation in at least an unconscious way. Thus the fundamental difference between the traditional academic theologian and the liberation theologian is that the latter feels compelled at every step to combine the disciplines that open up the past with the disciplines that help to explain the present. (Ferm 65)

Segundo then demonstrates an approach which enables him to relate past and present in dealing with the Scriptures, an exercise he calls the hermeneutic circle, referring to the reinterpreting of the Scriptures to reflect the current reality in order to change that reality and then to reinterpret again, and so on.

Hugo Assman, also one of the original Liberation Theology writers, in his book A Theology for a Nomad Church, states:

Commitment to liberation means introducing the class struggle into the church itself, [although] a truly historical reading of the Bible, particularly of the message of Christ, leads to a whole series of radical questions to which Marxism has not paid sufficient attention, of which perhaps the most significant is the Christian affirmation of victory over death, that final alienation to which Marxism can find no satisfactory answer. (144)

Regarding Assman, Paul E. Sigmund states in an essay appearing in the May 1988 journal The World & I:

More striking is the transformation of the thinking of Hugo Assman, often regarded as the most radical of the liberation theologians. In a paper deliv-

ered in 1985, Assman seems now to equate revolution with democracy.... Does this mean that liberation theology has become deradicalized in a way that is parallel to the deradicalization of social democracy in Western Europe? In a way it has, since the emphasis has shifted from conflict to negotiation, from the class struggle to solidarity with the poor. (566)

Richard L. Rubenstein, writing in that same journal, perceives the revolutionary element in Liberation Theology:

Liberation theologians assert that the poor do not need theoria, which masks their true condition. Instead, they require 'a concrete praxis of liberation.' By liberation praxis theologians...mean revolutionary activity whose objective is the abolition of the economic and social injustices and the material exploitation that have transformed the poor into nonpersons. (611)

Gutierrez tried to differentiate somewhat between the political/sociological and theological aspects by explaining what is meant by poverty at a conference specifically on Liberation Theology at Georgetown University in June of 1985, when he skillfully and eloquently equated the concept of poverty with a much more meaningful term--that is what he calls "insignificance":

When you in the North speak of poverty you are thinking in terms of money, of wealth. You are at the poverty level if you do not have a certain minimum amount of money for the year. In my country, in the Third World, poverty means being insignificant: it makes no difference whether you live or die. Alive you take nothing from the family--there is no food anyway--and dead you have not bettered their situation, you are insignificant. Liberation Theology's task is to liberate from poverty and from unjust structures that cause poverty.

Another group of academicians have examined Liberation Theology from the standpoint of economic theory and the

movement's failure to do an in-depth evaluation of the economics of Marxism, pre-capitalist mercantilism, real capitalism (meaning democratic capitalism and entrepreneurship) and of the real cause(s) of Latin America's so-called "dependency." Michael Novak and Ronald Nash perhaps rank as the leading writers in this camp. Also of significance are Carl F. H. Henry, Clark Pinnock, Brown (quoted above), Schall (quoted above), Richard John Neuhaus, Dake Vreem, Ed Norman and Robert Walton. These men view Liberation Theology primarily as an attempt to install a Marxian-socialist economic system based upon a Christian worldview that is genuinely held by the theologians.

Novak, for example, finds that there

is much in Latin American liberation theology to admire. There can be no question that great revolutions in political economy are necessary in Latin America, if that great and much-blessed continent is to fulfill its full human destiny.
(2)

But he contends that there also is much to find fault with as well:

Liberation theology says that Latin America is capitalist and needs a socialist revolution. Latin America does need a revolution. But its present system is mercantilist and quasi-feudal, not capitalist, and the revolution it needs is both liberal and Catholic. The present order is not free but statist, not mind-centered but privilege-centered, not open to the poor but protective of the rich. Large majorities of the poor are propertyless. The poor are prevented by law from founding and incorporating their own enterprises. They are denied access to credit. They are held back by an ancient

legal structure, designed to protect the ancient privileges of a pre-capitalist elite. (5)

A journalist's perspective is given by Pulitzer Prize-winner Shirley Christian in Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family:

Ernesto Cardenal told me he had declared himself a Marxist Christian in 1972 as a result of participating in the conference in Chile. Before going to Chile he went to Cuba, and was so impressed by the accomplishments of Fidel Castro's revolution that he decided it constituted the Gospel in practice. But it was not until he met the priests working in Chile that he concluded it was possible to combine Christianity and Marxism. (211)

Philip Berryman, a theologian, introduces the concept of Liberation Theology as radical--and therefore revolutionary--political action in his The Religious Roots of Rebellion:

There is no need to justify the topic: Christian involvement in revolutionary movements in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala is something new and unprecedented. Historically churches have opposed revolutions and only reluctantly have they submitted to revolutionary governments as de facto realities. While there has been Christian-Marxist dialogue in recent years, and a convergence of Christians and Marxists in Latin America (in the Christians for Socialism Movement, for example), it is in Central America that for the first time Christians have been significant actors in Marxist-led revolutionary movements that have taken power or may well take power. (1)

Theo Witvliet, in A Place in the Sun (a title drawn from the Nicaraguan Popular Church's desire to have from the Vatican "a space" in which to operate freely), tries to sum up the idea of Liberation Theology:

Since the beginning of the 1970s Latin American theology has undergone a marked development. It is

not easy to sum up this development under a single heading. But we would probably not be far wrong to describe it as a process in which the poor increasingly become the subject of theological thought rather than its collective object. Underlying the origin of liberation theology is an experience which can be described as the discovery of the world of the poor. (144)

A British scholar, Paul Lakeland, in Freedom in Christ, describes Liberation Theology as falling within a larger category which he labels "political theology":

As a theological direction, liberation theology falls within a small group of theologies which together can be called political theology. However different it may be from others in this group--and in some ways it is quite different--it shares with them the conviction that serious theology not only must have a political concern, but must in some sense begin from the everyday experience of a particular Christian community.... This present book, however...is an attempt to explain the underlying theology of liberation theology. (x)

Within that designation of political theology one finds Black "theology," feminist "theology," Chicano "theology" and Native American "theology," all of which take Liberation Theology as their starting point and some form of Marxism, however poorly conceived, either as their ideological goal or their ideological foundation.

To summarize the near cacophany of voices concerning how Liberation Theology is perceived both from within and without the movement, the authors quoted above have written about it being everything from merely a new way of "doing" theology (Gutierrez), to being an uncritical adoption of a Marxist approach to social analysis (Glasser), to being a true blend of religion and politics (Beal), to being both a

sociological movement and a philosophical position (Pottenger), to being a recovery of biblical radicalism (Roelofs), to being an existentialist philosophy (Combee), to being a political hermeneutic (Nunez), to being a religious justification for the Nicaraguan revolution (Hodges), to being primarily a concrete praxis (Rubenstein), and a myriad of other things to many other writers as well.

Despite the complex and sometimes contradictory perceptions of Liberation Theology represented in the material quoted above, both from within the movement and from outsiders, it is possible to derive a meaningful and fruitful understanding of the movement if one will follow its intellectual and ideological development both from its European roots and its Latin and Central American roots, and if one will keep in mind that the confusion surrounding the movement flows from its attempted confluence of a modified neo-Marxian political theory based upon what is known as dependency theory and a radicalized Christian dogma which it calls theology.

The following chapter traces the movement's European religious and philosophical roots, an understanding of which is essential to understanding the larger movement, and it traces the theosophical root flowing from Sandino's attempted blend of radical political theory with some form of religious belief for the benefit of the simple peasants

who made up his supporters. Sandino's early "liberation theosophy" is the praxis ancestor to Liberation Theology as it was first fleshed-out in Nicaragua, hence its importance to Liberation Theology's history.

CHAPTER III

BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL PRECEDENTS

Liberation Theology in its Latin and Central American expression can be traced through at least three main roots: the European religious root; the European philosophical root; and the Sandino theosophical root, which flows from Sandino's attempted blend of radical political theory, a combination of dependency theory and anarcho-communism or rational communism, with some form of religious belief for the benefit of the simple peasants who made up his army and his supporters. His particular form of religious belief was neither Christianity nor theology, but rather a form of occultism called theosophy, and his resulting "liberation theosophy" became the praxis ancestor to Liberation Theology as it was first fleshed-out as a revolutionary force in Nicaragua, hence its importance to the history and development of Liberation Theology.

Overview

The philosophical root of Liberation Theology goes back to the writings of Hegel and flow through the lineage of liberal theology, the "death of God" philosophy of Altizer and associates, and into what is currently termed secular theology.

Altizer affirmed that we must discover again Hegel's vision of a God who is no longer transcen-

dent over the world, but one who reveals himself through secular experience and the process of change in human history.... God is not a person, but only a universal idea [which] becomes identified with the great secular events on the human plane of history in favor of man's liberation from all oppressive social structures and dehumanization. (Leroy 2)

Altizer's philosophy was followed by an almost identical concept called the theology of hope which is an immediate precursor to the Liberation Theology of today.

Theologically the movement's European roots are found primarily in the documents of Vatican II (1963-65) and the various meetings of the World Council of Churches (Geneva 1966, Uppsala 1968, Bangkok 1973). The Latin American priests, for the most part trained in Europe, built upon those meetings and documents during the Latin American Conference of Bishops (CELAM) at Medellin, Colombia, in 1968, the Christians for Socialism movement in Chile in 1972, and again at Puebla, Mexico, in 1979, and gave Liberation Theology its peculiarly Latin American expression.

The European philosophical and religious roots converge in neo-Marxism, an intellectual movement based upon the early (pre-1848) writings of Marx in which an attempt is made to find a non-violent, messianic Marxian socialism, a blending of Christianity and Marxism that better explains history since the advent of the industrial revolution and the success of capitalism's avoidance of the "inevitable" revolution of the proletariat. The European and Latin American roots begin to converge in dependency theory and

the use of Marxist tools of analysis by Liberation theologians, while the use of Liberation Theology by the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) to provide a spiritual undergirding for the anti-Somoza revolution appears to be a continuation of Sandino's use of liberation theosophy for the same purpose in the 1920's.

The European Religious and Philosophical Roots

That Liberation Theology is heavily indebted to European philosophers such as Kant, Hegel and Marx and to European theologians such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Jurgen Moltmann, Karl Barth and Rudolf Bultmann is readily admitted by academicians and theologians alike, but the concept of a political versus mythical or philosophical theology goes back much further than 18th and 19th century Europe. The Stoics, for example, used the term political theology as the expression of those religious practices which served the needs of the state, and in Rome such theology enjoyed a position of prime importance. Contemporary theology, however, has been an attempt to counter what it sees as damaging influences of the Enlightenment which gave birth to the philosophy of liberalism.

Liberalism, which is intensely humanistic, is centered in the concept that man is essentially good and quite capable of solving his own problems and building a better world based upon scientific technology and education. The

optimism of liberalism was shattered by the First World War, a totally senseless slaughter and destruction that proved to many the essential evil, rather than good, of man and proved that there still is a need for a transcendent God.

The first European theological response to that need came in the form of neo-orthodoxy from the mind of Karl Barth, who emphasized the transcendence of God and the depravity of man (Nunez 37).

The road does not lead from man to God, but rather from God to man. Barth took the Scriptures seriously...although his concept of the inspiration of the Scriptures was far from being orthodox....Barth did speak of political preaching as necessary and showed that he had a civic conscience by opposing National Socialism [and] had to abandon his teaching post in Bonn for refusing to take the Nazi vow. (37, 38)

While Barth sought to exalt the Scriptures, his concept of inspiration drew immediate and continuing criticism from the more fundamental branches of Christianity. In Barth's view, only those portions of Scripture that specifically "speak" to an individual are inspired and only in that limited sense would be considered authoritative. Liberation Theology demonstrates that same concept of inspiration particularly in the dialogues of the CEBs recorded in Ernesto Cardenal's The Gospel in Solentiname, and in the emphasis placed on certain portions of the Scriptures by the priests and writers in the movement.

Liberation Theology's links to the philosophy of exis-

tentialism was mentioned in the previous chapter (Combee), but there is a link to Rudolph Bultmann's existential theology as well. In his book, Jesus Christ and Mythology, Bultmann attempted to remove what he called the myths of the New Testament by explaining that its cultural forms of expression hide a "deeper meaning" rather than expressing actual historical realities.

For Bultmann, the virgin birth of Christ, His miracles, His resurrection, His ascension, and the second coming are likewise myths, cultural forms for communicating certain religious ideas, but not information about historical realities or events in time and space. (Nunez 38)

Like Bultmann, Liberationists are not fundamentalist in their approach to the Scriptures. As Harvey Cox writes:

They are willing to make use of historical-critical tools. But unlike most historical critics, they do not believe that the meaning of a biblical text has been established once the exegetes agree on what it says (as liberal Protestants often do), or that its authoritative meaning is decided by the churchly magisterium (as many Catholics hold). Rather, they contend that the most reliable guide to its meaning is seen in what the text means to the poor. (154)

Bultmannian "demythologization" is also seen in Cardenal's book. For example, in explaining the story of the calming of the sea in Mark 4:35-41, Cardenal writes:

We can't know the details of what happened on the lake because the stories were modified by the readings of the first communities. Undoubtedly something once happened with Jesus on the lake, in a boat. There are very realistic details that were engraved on the memory of a witness: the fact that Jesus was asleep in the stern with his head on a pillow (maybe just some rope), and the fact that there were other boats crossing. There may have been a squall. He may have calmed their great

fright. But this dramatic story of the storm stopped in an instant was created for a frightened little community, and the words of Jesus are meant to take away their fear. They are no less now for us, and this is what is important in this gospel--not what happened once on a stormy lake in Galilee. (vol. 2, 188)

Relating to some of Assman's contributions, Alfredo Fierro says:

The realm of Christian symbols and myths has as its purpose a process of humanization, and this purpose is "practical, historical, and intrawordly [sic]." Its innermost aim is to give meaningfulness to daily living so that human beings "will be wise enough to live together as humans and, if necessary, die for their fellows." (220)

From Bultmann and his disciples (Ernst Fuchs, Gerhard Ebeling, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Friedrich Gogarten) came the concept of secular theology. Bonhoeffer, for example, sought a means to interpret the gospel for the modern adult and proposed a non-religious interpretation of the Scriptures, hence the term secular theology with its existential emphasis on the present, the here and now political reality that is at the heart of Liberation Theology.

In somewhat of a literalist backlash to existentialism in theological matters, Jurgen Moltmann attempted to restore eschatological concepts in Christianity but at the same time to avoid what he considered eschatology's deadening effects on Christians, that is, the bland acceptance of the here and now because it's going to be better by and by. Moltmann's Theology of Hope (1964) presents eschatology as a dynamic process that progressively creates the fu-

ture. Each fulfillment of the promise opens a new perspective, a new eschatological horizon. (Nunez 41) "The theologian is not concerned merely to supply a different interpretation of the world, of history and of human nature, but to transform them in expectation of a divine transformation." (Moltman 84)

That transformation can only be accomplished, the liberationists say, through Liberation Theology because of its concrete praxis. As Fierro writes:

Today the idea of salvation is applied to the realm of society, politics, and concrete praxis.... Political theology differs from other Christian theologies insofar as it has a different notion of salvation. It does not picture salvation as liberation from the dominion exercised by cosmic, biological, or demonic forces. Instead it sees salvation as liberation from the dominion exercised by specifically human and social forces. Thus the idea of salvation is no longer construed in terms of the cosmos or the hereafter, but rather in terms of earthly history and the sociopolitical situation. (224)

The philosophical underpinnings of Liberation Theology flow through Hegelian and non-Hegelian idealism and through the various formulations of Marxism and neo-Marxism. While some writers make reference to a linkage through the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory's neo-Marxism, the movement's overall understanding and application of Marxism can be seen rather as a modification of New Leftism along with major concepts drawn from the Frankfurt School, as Gorman in Neo-Marxism explains:

The Frankfurt School of Critical Theory is obsessed with reflection and theory at the expense of

practical political activity, while the New Left sees revolutionary action as an end in itself. (3)

The name most often mentioned in liberation literature from the Frankfurt School is that of Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), a leader of the Italian Communist Party when Mussolini came to power. Gorman writes:

Gramsci borrowed from both Lukacs and Korsch, adopting the former's Hegelianism and the latter's hesitancy to abandon the everyday world for idealism's heavenly abstractions. This synthesis is formed, speaking generally, by emphasizing the active moment of the a priori totality, while always assuming that praxis reflects and expresses a universal pattern of historical development.... Marxism...is a "philosophy of praxis." (Gorman 108)

Gorman further describes Gramsci's appeal:

Gramsci's idealist Marxism enticed disillusioned Westerners. It unequivocally rejected orthodox materialism as just another unverifiable metaphysics. But Gramsci emphasized the subjective moment of Hegel's dialectic more than predecessors.... Proletarian praxis reflects a long process of learning to think differently, abandoning outmoded bourgeois ideas for more relevant socialist ones.... Reflective public opinion is the guarantor of truth.... Gramsci lauded basic civil liberties--individual freedoms of thought, press, speech, and association--as hallmarks of historical rationality. Just as the minds of individual workers must be won through the open interplay of competing ideas, each nation must respond in its own manner to capitalism's challenge. (114)

The New Left branch of neo-Marxism, in Gorman's words, would be considered Marxism's "atheists" while the Frankfurt School would be considered its "agnostics." (254) The New Leftists contend that

it is less important what workers think than that they liberate themselves from bourgeois or Party oppression. Most of Marx's work is valueless, in-

tellectual trash. Only his insights into the class struggle and the necessity of worker rebellion have any practical worth [therefore] action is what counts, not reflection. (254-255)

Gorman gives the three broad tenets of New Leftism as:

the revolution is self-justifying and can occur whenever and wherever a properly organized group destroys extant elites and institutions; revolutions totally transform the entire network of bourgeois values and institutions; and men and women must determine their own fates. (274-275)

One of the leading intellectuals of the New Left is Herbert Marcuse, who is perhaps best known for his writings in Freudian Marxism. Although Liberation Theology is intent on using Marxism, it wants to avoid the excesses and perversions of Marx that they see in the Soviet version.

On this point, Gorman relates Marcuse's thoughts:

Soviet Marxism still thinks capitalism will bow to history's objective will and collapse. It twists Marxism, introducing new material variables (for example imperialism, war, inflation, state capitalism) to explain workers' unanticipated reactionary attitudes. At home, the socialist economy is artificially inflated from "above," to "push" history and secure the revolution--inadvertently grooming a domineering bureaucracy.... By naively stressing history's objective moment, Soviet leaders reproduce the repression traditionally plaguing bourgeois culture. (135)

In a later essay appearing in John Raines' book, Marxism and Radical Religion: Essays Toward a Revolutionary Humanism, Marcuse gives a not-so-subtle warning to theologians that Marxian theory, Christianity and the church do not mix, nor indeed can they mix in any meaningful way, at least from the perspective of Marxian theory:

While Marxian theory remains irreconcilable with

Christian dogma and its institution [the church], it finds an ally in those tendencies, groups, and individuals committed to the part of the Christian teaching that stands uncompromisingly against inhuman, exploitative power. In our times these radical religious tendencies have come to life in the priests and ministers who have joined the struggle against fascism in all its forms, and those who have made common cause with the liberation movements in the Third World, especially in Latin America. (10)

Nevertheless, Liberation Theology insists that only by using Marxist tools of analysis is it possible to accurately comprehend the unique situation of Latin America.

Even given in general categories, the branches of neo-Marxism seem to defy any attempt at consolidation as evidenced by Gorman's discussion of Materialist Marxism, Hegelian Idealist Marxism, Humanist Marxism, Freudian Marxism, Structural Marxism, Mystical Marxism, Empirical Marxism, and Experiential Marxism, among other concepts both as precursors and off-shoots. How this consolidation comes about for Liberation Theology is examined in the sections following below, beginning with Sandino's theosophical foundations.

The Sandino Theosophical Root

If it were not for Liberation Theology's active participation in the Nicaraguan revolution and the revolutionary process in its aftermath, it is doubtful that the movement would be enjoying the immense popularity it has since achieved throughout the religious and intellectual worlds

in Europe and North America. In fact the movement would likely have remained as a cloister on a remote part of the island of Solentiname in Lake Managua. Since the movement did in fact become an active revolutionary participant, and its priests became active combatants and later ranking members of the ruling FSLN, and because of the remarkable similarity and kinship to Sandino's earlier dependency-theory-based religious philosophy, this root requires the detailed historical investigation which follows.

Augusto Cesar Sandino is most often identified as a rebel leader whose main goal in life was to get the Americans, especially the U. S. Marines, out of Nicaragua, and who was murdered by Anastasio Somoza Garcia in a treacherous move on February 21, 1934. Sandino is most often pictured by his enemies as an illiterate peasant communist who gave little or no intellectual consideration to doctrinaire ideological beliefs of any sort. By those who claim to be his intellectual heirs through Sandinismo, he is considered to be a messiah. The truth lies somewhere in between, as Donald C. Hodges puts it:

...each side is mistaken in its assessment of Sandino and its interpretation of the Sandinista leaders. A careful examination of the intellectual sources indicates that Sandino was a dedicated revolutionary on the border between anarchism and communism, and that the FSLN's leaders are neither Marxist-Leninists nor social democrats but representatives of a Marxist and Leninist New Left that incorporates anarchist elements." (x)

Not only was Sandino a dedicated revolutionary in the

political sense, but he also served as a dedicated spiritual leader for his men, the Defending Army of Nicaragua's National Sovereignty, as he recognized that his revolution needed a spiritual undergirding if it was to maintain support from the peasants who constituted his army. The particular type of spiritual input was not Christianity but anarchist Spiritism.

From his first arrival in Mexico in 1923 until his death in Nicaragua in 1934, Sandino came under the influence of two thinkers, primarily: the anarchist Ricardo Flores Magon, and the Spiritist Joaquin Trincado. Flores Magon's thought prevailed until Sandino returned to Mexico in 1929, after which Trincado became his chief mentor. (Hodges 14)

The thing that attracted Sandino to Trincado was the latter's conviction of the importance of spiritual reform and the hope of establishing a universal commune, the first step toward which would be the establishment of a Spiritist government in Central America:

[Sandino] combined the anarcho-communism learned during his first stay in Mexico with the ready-made synthesis of anarchism and Spiritism taught him by the Magnetic-Spiritual School. It was an almost perfect fit. (14)

Theosophy is not really a religion in the traditional sense, rather it is a tradition of occult wisdom transmitted by superior beings known as mahatmas or guiding spirits of humanity.¹ Theosophists lay claim to an inner light, to

¹The following material is a partial summary of Hodges' 400-page work, The Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution, regarding Sandino's theosophy of liberation.

a unique form of knowledge derived from long hours of meditation assisted by clairvoyance and telepathy, powers that Sandino is said to have possessed. He was cautious about revealing his theosophical convictions in public, fearing that they might undermine his political credibility. At first he revealed his belief only to his most spiritually adept and trusted officers, but with their encouragement he proclaimed it to all the men under his command and began educating them in spiritual matters as early as February 1928, thus creating in his army a religious sect imbued with the fire of a new revelation.

Criticized as being an ideology so idiosyncratic that it lacked mass appeal, the evidence points otherwise as the members of his Defending Army revered him as a religious teacher and seer, and frequently repeated his words of wisdom concerning God, the human spirit and death. In Sandino's day the only effective religious protest against the rigid and reactionary theology of the Catholic church took the form of outright rejection, and since the historical conditions were absent for developing a theology of liberation within the church, a religious substitute was found outside it. Sandino's patriotism was mainly a vehicle for making a revolution and spiritually redeeming his countrymen.

For the philosophical foundation of his anarcho-communism Sandino turned to the study of occult philosophy, the

chief attraction of which was its subversion of the ideological status quo. Spiritualism and revolutionary Freemasonry were two schools of thought influencing him, but his theosophical studies convinced him that "Communist Spiritism" rather than Spiritualism or Freemasonry was the activating ideology he needed. He believed that he possessed the psychic powers required to receive and to transmit spiritual messages and claimed that his ideas and even his voice could be heard in distant places.

It is likely that Sandino was already a theosophist before joining the Argentine Magnetic-Spiritual School of the Universal Commune. Years later he would identify Zoroaster as the founder of theosophy and indicate a knowledge of the Zoroastrian texts, acquired independently of the school. His assimilation of Zoroastrian doctrines can be traced to three different but related sources: the Zend-Avesta or Zoroastrian scriptures, the Jewish Gnosticism of the Kabbalah, and Trincado's austere rational philosophy. Zoroaster's God was the Spirit of Light and Truth, and basic to Sandino's theosophy was the struggle between the forces of light and darkness, between good and evil--a doctrine traceable to Zoroaster. In Sandino's theosophy are found the three stages of the Zoroastrian cosmic drama--creation, the progress of the human spirit, and universal redemption. Zoroastrianism shared with revolu-

tionary anarchism and communism a fraternal philosophy committed to the complete transformation of human society.

For Sandino the superiority of Trincado's philosophy was its fusion of Spiritism and anarchism, giving both a spiritual justification to anarchism and an anarchist dimension to theosophy, which in turn led to his concept of rational communism or anarcho-communism. Although he never explained exactly what he meant, we know that his belief in a world communist revolution was based on his theosophy, which proclaimed itself rational rather than dogmatic. A rational communist was a communist guided by divine reason and therein lay the two essential components of his theosophy of liberation. Arguing that theosophy is not religion, he declared that he was guided by reason, that reason and religion were opposed, and that theosophy was a rational substitute for faith.

Sandino rejected faith in a personal god and denied the divinity of Christ, but was not averse to encouraging religion in others, believing that faith might also become an impulse to revolution. Among the great prophets of humanity Sandino gave first place to Zoroaster and then listed Adam, Moses, Jesus, and Mahomet. Thus the four great monotheistic religions were fused with the Oriental doctrine of reincarnation as revived by modern Spiritualism, the free-thinking outlook of modern Freemasonry, and the theos-

ophy of the Magnetic-Spiritual School, into Sandino's theosophically based anarcho-communism.

Revolutionary he was, but it was through appeals to patriotism that he led his followers from liberalism through populism and socialism to his own blend of communism and anarchism reinforced by a theosophy of liberation. To encourage all Nicaraguans to support his cause, Sandino reinterpreted the symbolism of his flag to suit the circumstances: to revolutionaries it was black for anarchism and red for both socialism and communism; for liberals, the red and black symbolize "Liberty or Death!"; and in the final stage of his struggle came the theosophical significance of black as death and red as resurrection after death. Couched in theosophical symbolism, his patriotic objective was based on the expectation of a future brotherhood and reign of universal love and his theosophy aimed to create a new man, strengthen his nationalism, upgrade his populism and make his independent brand of communism halfway respectable.

The development of the current expression of Sandinismo and of Liberation Theology in Latin America builds philosophically on Sandino's liberation theosophy in both methodology and justification. Sandinismo refers to the basic ideology undergirding the Sandinista Front for National Liberation as well as being a name for Nicaraguan

patriotism and a rallying point for those who support the revolution for whatever reason.

The Development of Liberation Theology in Latin America

Gustavo Gutierrez, a Maryknoll priest from Peru, is often considered to be the founder of Liberation Theology because of his coining of the term in his book Teologia de la liberacion, Perspectivas, published in 1971 in Lima and in 1973 in Maryknoll with the English title A Theology of Liberation. The Latin American expression of the ideology now known as Liberation Theology did not suddenly spring from his pen but his was the first widely published version to reach the outside world, although he himself is uncomfortable with the title of founder.

This section considers the development of the movement first from a chronological aspect, including organizations and documents, and secondly from an ideological aspect, beginning with theology and ending with Sandinismo.

One of the difficulties encountered at this stage is how to establish a beginning point, for as Beal says:

the Catholic Church in Latin America has been, throughout her history, eminently political. The very nature of Iberian Catholicism was such that separating religion from political and patriotic duties was unthinkable...that is, as long as the church remained a strong pillar of the established order. (1)

But change has taken place and most of the academics associated with Liberation Theology agree that three

significant efforts of the Catholic Church to face the challenge presented by modern Latin America have been Catholic Action (CA), the Catholic Trade Union Movement (CLASC), and the Christian Democrat Parties (CDP). Catholic Action, formed in the early 1950s, found its main field of activity among the intellectuals in a program of aggressive lay witnesses, as Kirk relates:

Catholic Action [was] based on the premise that the modern mission of the Church should be founded on a new and aggressive lay apostolate, which would seek to penetrate all aspects of society with an up-dated Catholic witness. [It recognized] the need to mobilize intellectuals 'for it is more important to work in a university than in a new parish.'

Although one of the great instruments of this contemporary renovation will be a new-style catechis (the responsibility of the clergy), its concrete outworking in society will be entirely in the hands of the laity: 'it is vital that the laity assume their social responsibilities.' Initially the CA organisations saw themselves as bulwarks against the materialism and atheism of communists and socialists. Stress was laid on the education of leaders. (15)

Berryman also agrees and relates the early development of the groups:

Later developments in the Catholic church, and especially the radicalization of important sectors, are the outgrowth of a renewal movement going back to the late 1950s and early 1960s.... In the late 1950s a group of young Catholic intellectuals had shifted from a more "Italian" (conservative) kind of Catholic Action to a "French-Belgian" line emphasizing "temporal commitment." Some of these people went into the nascent Christian Democratic Party. (100)

The Catholic Action groups, the CDPs in Central America, and the various intellectual spin-offs they produced

served to raise social concern among workers and peasants prior to the development of Liberation Theology and its attempt to provide a theoretical basis for those concerns (Berryman 173-174). Their methodology was that of conscientization, a word coined by Paulo Freire, a Brazilian Catholic educator. By conscientization Freire meant "making aware" as a method for bringing change from the grass roots:

He stressed that poverty was directly caused by a few people (such as landowners) defending their privileges against the masses, and that it could be solved only as the poor liberated themselves from their 'dominated-conditioned' attitudes. (Kirk 25)

The term would also show up in the Medellin documents, and it would become the methodology of Liberation Theology that still is in use today.

Pertinent documents laying the ideological foundations of Liberation Theology come from major meetings such as CELAM I, Brazil (1955), Vatican II, Rome (1962-65), CELAM II, Medellin, Colombia (1968), Christians for Socialism, Chile (1972), and CELAM III, Puebla, Mexico (1979).

The Latin American Episcopal Council (CELAM) was born on the occasion of the first General Conference of Latin American Bishops which was called by Pius XII and held at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from July 25 to August 4, 1955. It was created to study issues of interest to the church in Latin America, to coordinate pastoral activities, and to plan future conferences of Latin American bishops called by

the Vatican (Nunez 97). Concerning its impact on Liberation Theology, a statement by Dom Helder Camara is of more importance than are the documents of the conference.

Helder Camara has been an impassioned voice for those he perceives as having no voice, and has been called "the red bishop of Brazil" and "Lenin in a priest's cloak."

(Nunez 105, 106) His conclusion was:

For the underdeveloped countries I find no solution either in capitalism or in neocapitalism. Nor do I find one in existing socialism, either from Cuba, or from Russia, or from China.... If you wish, you may say socialism, but a socialism that respects in reality--not only in theory--the human person, and that doesn't fall into dictatorship. Not a government dictatorship or a party dictatorship. (106)

Then 13 years later in a statement sounding much like one made by Sandino, Helder Camara, addressing a conference of the Catholic Institute of Recife (1968), said that Christians do not need to fear a world movement toward socialism because "Christians can offer a mystique of universal fraternity and incomparable hope far more comprehensive than the narrow mystique of historic materialism." (107)

According to Catholic theologians across the board, whether for or against Liberation Theology, the greatest event in this century regarding church history was the Second Vatican Council convened between 1962-65 by the newly elected John XXIII. Prior to that council it was commonly thought by Catholics that the business of the church was to get people into the state of grace and keep them there. Outside the church there was no salvation.

Vatican II turned this view inside out, literally, for now it is considered that God's grace is everywhere saving mankind. Such a revolution in theological thinking raised more questions than it immediately answered. In addition, the laity are now equal with the clergy, and that being so, what good are sacraments, and the priests who administer them? Basically the church's full-time religious and clergy had to redefine their whole *raison d'etre*. Rather than merely opening some windows of opportunity, the council opened a floodgate of energy and creativity. (Berryman 26) A goodly portion of that creativity and energy spilled over into what has become Liberation Theology through elaboration of the council's concepts at the Medellin conference in 1968, and the various councils and conferences that followed in the next decade as well.

Theo Witvliet expresses the importance of Vatican II to Liberation Theology by stating:

In church life the dynamic elan of these years found expression in the pressure for renewal from the Second Vatican Council with its aggiornamento (adaptation) to modern society and in the favorable voyage of the ecumenical ship, buoyed up on the favorable tide by a 'theology of hope' (Jurgen Moltmann)....There is a clear line from the aggiornamento of Vatican II, through the decisive conference of bishops at Medellin (1968), to the publications of Latin-American theologians like Gutierrez, Leonardo Boff, J. L. Segundo and others. (24,25)

Later he also relates:

Without doubt Medellin was able to build on the renewal of Vatican II.... However, the assembly demonstrated that it had a mind of its own by

showing that the specific reality of the Latin American subcontinent was the starting point for its thought. Terms like "dependence," "domination," and the "imperialism of multi-national finance" were used to describe the situation in Latin America. This state of affairs was described as social sin, as it is in conflict with the will of God.... (121)

Novak and Kirk agree with Witvilet and other Liberation writers regarding the essential importance of Vatican II and Medellin, the former to the latter, and the combination of the two to the overall formulation of Liberation Theology. Novak, for example, writes that

twenty years ago, beginning already at the Second Vatican Council (1962-65), the Latin American bishops had discovered a new continental unity--and through it resolved to attack the continent's socio-political problems head-on...some opted for yet more 'radical' views. (21)

Meeting at Medellin, Colombia, in 1968, the entire episcopal conference of Latin America (CELAM) issued a letter that became the manifesto of a new church in Latin America, clearly committed to a much needed, long-delayed social transformation of the continent. (Novak, 21) Kirk states:

...a permanent episcopal organisation for consultation, study and action, CELAM (Consejo Episcopal Latino Americano), was set up in 1955. This council's most effective role has been the interpretation for Latin America of certain key Encyclicals, especially those dealing with social issues. The bringing together of the concerns of Vatican II and a fresh socio-political and economic analysis of Latin America in the documents of Medellin (1968) became a significant catalyst for the "theology of liberation" movement. (16)

Tommie Sue Montgomery's essay in Trouble in Our Backyard, states:

The contemporary social doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church comes out of the Second Vatican Council (Vatican II) which met in Rome between 1962 and 1965, and the Second Latin American Bishops Conference...in 1968.... It was at Medellin...that the church changed sides. Sin ceased to be simply a personal failure between oneself and God. Sin...may also be institutional. (Diskin 78, 79)

Nunez writes:

When the second Latin American Episcopal Conference was held in 1968 in Medellin, Colombia, the Catholic church throughout the world was already experiencing the effect of the currents of renewal that Vatican II had set into motion. Medellin was definitely a sequel to that council.... [Medellin] made every effort to apply the renewal initiated by the council to Latin America as the theme...clearly shows: "The Church in the Contemporary Transformation of Latin America in the Light of the Council." (98)

One of the Medellin documents, the Document on Peace, opens with this statement:

If development is the new name for peace, Latin American underdevelopment, with its own characteristics in the different countries, is an unjust situation which promotes tensions that conspire against peace.... When speaking of injustice, we refer to those realities that constitute a sinful situation.... (Ferm 3)

The document continues into many different subjects, including armaments, but primarily focuses on economic injustice and poverty and how they are caused by powerful, monied interests that use violent means to maintain their position as well as the structures and institutions that undergird their elitist power and position.

The first major step towards developing Liberation The-

ology following the Medellin conference in 1968 was that of the Christians for Socialism movement in Chile, an ill-fated attempt that collapsed with the coup of 1973. Even though it was indeed ill-fated, the movement was the first more or less formalized expression of Christian-Marxian confluence in Latin America.

Pope Paul VI in Octogesima Adveniens (1971) noted that "Some Christians are today attracted by socialist currents and their various developments." As Berryman explains:

The pope did not issue condemnations but he urged caution and discernment.

He probably had Chile in mind where, under the Popular Unity government of Salvadore Allende, a group of "Christians for Socialism" was in formation. In 1972 delegations from all over Latin America met in Santiago, Chile, in a Christians for Socialism conference, whose final document may be seen as representing a further development of issues coming from Medellin. Some statements reflected more the situation in Chile, for example, vigorous rejection of a "third way" between capitalism and socialism (namely, Christian Democracy). Other statements reflected the optimism of the moment--for example, "the revolutionary process in Latin America is in full swing"--or should be taken as referring to a broad historical period. The document noted a "growing consciousness of the need for a strategic alliance between revolutionary Christians and Marxists," utilizing a term employed by Fidel Castro on a visit to Chile in late 1971. (Berryman 29)

Christians for Socialism was the brainchild of a group of priests who became known as The 80, taken from their initial document, Declaration of The 80. That declaration opens with:

We are a group of 80 priests who live and work with the people of the working class. We came together to analyze the present situation of Chile as it

begins to develop and implement socialism.
(Eagleson 3)

The declaration goes on to discuss how the working class is still subject to exploitation, how the system is characterized by private ownership of the means of production, and that

such a situation cannot be tolerated any longer. It is clear to us that the working masses found great hope in the accession of the People's Government to power and in this respect they were not mistaken. (Eagleson 3)

They also state that as Christians they see no essential incompatibility between Christianity and Marxian socialism, and that it is therefore necessary to "destroy the prejudice and mistrust between Christians and Marxists." (4)

Following the declaration and taking advantage of the political situation then existing in Chile, The 80 decided to hold the First Latin American Convention of Christians for Socialism in Santiago and issued a draft agenda. To summarize, the draft agenda stated the central objective was to exchange, analyze, and probe more deeply into the concrete experiences of Christians who are actively involved in the revolution to liberate Latin America. The basic idea was for the convention to represent Christians from every country in Latin America and from every Christian confession. The criterion of selection was to be the real-life option for revolution of those invited, and the abil-

ity of the potential participants to contribute to the goals of the convention.

The draft specified that reflection should take place in three stages, the first of which was to analyze the phase in which the revolutionary process existed in each country, viewed primarily in terms of the emergence of the proletariat and the mobilization of the people. Also in that first stage they were to analyze the role of Christians and the function of the Christian element as impediments to, or mainsprings of, the progress of the revolutionary struggle. The second stage called for the participants to seek out and determine, on both the theoretical and practical level, the structural causes, the hidden whys and wherefores, the underlying factors that account for the role which the Christian element does in fact play, and can play, in the revolutionary process. The third stage called for getting a clearer picture of the operation of the Christian element in the revolutionary process. The draft stated:

We want our revolutionary praxis, viewed within the framework of the overall revolutionary process, to be an enriching component of revolutionary theory itself. This presupposes a basic option on our part: i.e., effective real-life participation in the revolutionary process on a long term basis. To put it another way, it presupposes strategic participation rather than mere tactical participation. (Eagleson 19-31)

When The 80 sent an invitation to Cardinal Silva to become a patron of the upcoming convention they also sent a

copy of the draft agenda for his review. In rejecting the invitation, Cardinal Silva noted six main problems with the draft agenda (listed here without his elaboration):

1. You propose anonymous Christianity without the Church....
2. You propose a narrow formula of revolution as the only way....
3. You reduce Christianity to the revolutionary class struggle and to the historical situation....
4. You reduce theology to ideology in a superficial way....
5. You reduce Christianity to a single dimension: socio-economic transformation....
6. In general, you reduce Christianity to something that is purely sociological and that has no element of mystery in it. (Eagleson 41-46)

Those six points in fact became the ground of contention between the hierarchy and the new movement and the liberation movement it spawned.

In their Final Document, The 80 include the statement:

The economic and social structures of our Latin American countries are grounded on oppression and injustice, which in turn is a result of our capitalist dependence on the great power centers. In each of our nations small minorities serve the cause of international capitalism and its accomplices. Using every means in their power, they seek to maintain a situation that was created to benefit themselves. This structural injustice is in fact violence, whether it be open or disguised. (Eagleson 161)

The Chilean bishops were quick to respond to The 80, and the bishops' declaration contains this rebuttal:

The group mentioned above uses the name "Christian" and is under the direction of priests. But it takes positions so clearly and decidedly political that it is indistinguishable from political parties or similar currents of opinion and activity. (Eagleson 182)

The bishops' declaration was more than 40 pages long

and carefully spelled out the doctrinal and theological reasons for their rejecting the claims of The 80. Nevertheless, the letters and documents of The 80 provided the intellectual groundwork that would see fruition in Gutierrez' first book, in Hugo Assman's book, in Ernesto Cardenal's first communal efforts on the island of Solentiname at the southern end of Lake Managua, and the recognition that a new movement, Liberation Theology, rapidly was gaining ground in Latin America. As Cardinal Silva pointed out in his fourth objection (above), the new movement would not have been possible without making the move from theology to ideology, and it was primarily because of that charge that Gutierrez and his Peruvian group worked so hard on the actual wording of the Puebla documents seven years later.

Although expected to be a conference of heated debate with the traditionalists exiting victorious, the Puebla documents in fact were a rather mild upholding of what the Liberationists had been preaching for the previous ten years, particularly regarding the preferential option for the poor. Perhaps influencing the outcome of the conference most were, first, Pope John Paul II's opening remarks that the poor were God's favorites and, second, his obvious support for the results of the Medellin meeting.

The Puebla documents mention "institutionalized injustice" many times, whereas Medellin used the term only once, and Puebla went further in identifying what is meant by

that term, viz., "permanently violating the dignity of the person." (Ferm 29) John Paul's opening address said:

Analyzing this situation more deeply, we discover that this poverty is not a passing phase. Instead it is the product of economic, social, and political situations and structures, though there are also other causes for the state of misery. In many instances this state of poverty within our countries finds its origin and support in mechanisms which, because they are impregnated with materialism rather than any authentic humanism, create a situation on the international level where the rich get richer at the expense of the poor, who get even poorer.... The growing affluence of a few people parallels the growing poverty of the masses. (30)

The pope had earlier told the Amerindians of Oazaca and Chiapas that they have "a right to have the barricades of exploitation removed." (30) He also called at Puebla for bold transformations and daring innovations to overcome the grave injustices of the past. (O'Brien 55)

The significance of those and other remarks of the newly elected pope is best understood in context of their immediate chronology: In October, 1978, John Paul II is elected to that office; in January, 1979, the Third Conference of Latin American Bishops meets at Puebla, Mexico; and in July, 1979, Managua falls to the Sandinistas.

As Connor O'Brien explains, Puebla was the first major challenge of the new pope. The previous meeting at Medellin had seen some notable victories for the concept of el Dios de los Pobres and had endorsed "the clear perception that in man everything is mediated politically." It also had been a disaster for conservatives in the Latin American

church. (55) Contrary to what the new pope had intended, his call for bold transformations and daring innovations, along with the preferential option for the poor, provided another victory for the radicals and defeat for the conservatives. What the pope had intended was the strengthening of, really restoring of, papal authority, not the enhancing of Liberation Theology or Marxian trends within the church, as his later actions and encyclicals demonstrate. But from his initial harsh words of reproof during the March 4, 1983, visit to Managua and subsequent statements on trips to Brazil and other Latin countries, including his 1984 warnings to Cardenal and D'Escoto to leave the Sandinista government or face defrocking, the pope is seen to have backed down completely in his April 1986 "Instruction on Christian Freedom and Liberation," and to have given up in the papal authority restoration attempt. The people and the priests simply were not following his leadership in the matter of Liberation Theology any more than they have been following his leadership in the matter of contraception. O'Brien elaborates on that failure and its implications for the Liberationists in their move from theology to political ideology:

The contemporary failure of the magisterium seems to have far-reaching implications for Latin America. The revolutionary Christians fought for their espacio; the traditionalist counterattack has failed, and the revolutionaries now seem to be securely in control of that espacio, where they have "appropriated" the symbols of the Catholic Church--such as the Viacrucis--and the emotional loyalties

that go with these.... But the revolutionary reformers of our time don't need to break with Rome. They can keep the Roman symbols--and the Roman sacraments, which is more important--without Rome's retaining any vestige of real authority over them.... The most remarkable words in last April's Instruction are those that proclaim it "perfectly legitimate that those who suffer oppression on the part of the wealthy or politically powerful should take action." A later passage makes it clear that "armed struggle" may be included under "action." (66)

The move from theology qua theology through philosophy to the political and economic ideology expressed in Sandinismo is thus intellectually quite easy to make for the Liberation Theologists, especially given their ecclesiology, although the move is not necessarily justified by the traditional definition and understanding of theology, soteriology, or harmatology.

Given the changed definitions, for instance that of sin (being structural as well as individual), and given the desire to identify with and help the poor, the logical place to take action was against the structures most identified with international capitalism. In Central America, that was epitomized by the Somoza regime in Nicaragua, and the logical group to help was the Sandinista Front for National Liberation in their efforts to topple the Somocistas, since both the Liberation Theologists and the Sandinistas spoke the same language and understood Marxism in essentially the same manner.

Ernesto Cardenal's four-volume series on Solentiname describes how the shift from theology to ideology takes

place. Penney Lernoux and Tommie Montgomery also describe the dialogue process in their works. Basically, the process begins within a Christian Base Community, such as at Solentiname, with the presentation of the Exodus story, emphasizing that God is against unjust government structures. Through the course of the dialogues, neo-Marxist versions of Marx's writings are brought in as they parallel the biblical presentations. In the case of Nicaragua, the only group that can be identified as on the side of the poor are the anti-Somoza Sandinistas, particularly when three or four of the Liberation Theology priests are working actively as members of the FSLN.

Montgomery states that the CEBs "are, perhaps the most subversive institution the Latin American church has developed....[and] are the medium by which the message of liberation theology is delivered." (Diskin 82-83) She continues:

By the mid-1970s many young people in Solentiname were convinced that the Nicaraguan political and economic system would not change until Somoza was gone. They also believed, as Christians, that both Scripture and church social doctrine justified their decision to join the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). (84)

Connor Cruise O'Brien also relates concerning the impact of Liberation Theology upon the Nicaraguan process:

Certainly, the radical currents in the Church, set in motion by Vatican II, and swelled at Medellin, contributed to the Nicaraguan process. And the result of the process was something unique in history: a revolutionary government including four Catholic priests, having widespread Catholic sup-

port, and regarded by a significant section of the Catholic Church as an earthly manifestation of the will of the God of the Poor. For these believers the process is to culminate in el Reino de Dios: the Kingdom of God. For them nothing less than that is what is at stake in Nicaragua. (55)

Thus a complex interweaving of seemingly diverse and unrelated threads of occultism, religion, philosophy, economic theory, and political theory come together in Liberation Theology as a not-so-distant cousin to Sandino's liberation theosophy, with each serving essentially the same function--the one for the FSLN and the other for Sandino's Defending Army--viz., the religious undergirding needed by Sandino and his namesakes, the Sandinistas, to maintain popular support from the masses.

The resulting religious/political extremism is not new to the world, nor is the concept of religiously-sanctioned violence, which it spawns. The following chapter examines the phenomenon by considering two well-known examples: the Islamic Revolution and the Irish "Troubles."

CHAPTER IV

RELIGIOUS/POLITICAL EXTREMISM

Religious extremism exists as a separate entity as does political extremism, and there are many studies of each in print. It is not the purpose of this chapter, nor indeed of this paper, to examine either entity in its respective separate corner of the world. The purpose is to draw attention to the combined term, religious/political extremism--as it relates to Liberation Theology--and through two well-known examples, that of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the IRA in Ireland, to show that much of what is called religious extremism is in fact political extremism, viz. political action to enforce religious ideology or "theology" upon a public that is not necessarily predisposed to follow that particular set of teachings or beliefs. The reverse also is true in that religious action is used to thrust a political ideology upon a public that is not necessarily predisposed to follow that particular form of political control. Iran falls into the first category, the IRA and Liberation Theology into the second category.

Lebanon also could be used as an example with its three warring tribes, or "theologies": Sunni Islam, Shi'a Islam and "Christianity," not to mention Jewish involvement via the Israeli troops. Rather than expand this chapter into a separate dissertation-level study, and in the interest of parsimony, the two examples of Iran and Ireland will more

than adequately bear the burden required of them, and that is to maintain the distinctiveness of the concept expressed by the combined term of religious/political extremism.

Ireland and Iran were purposely chosen for this task because of their sharing several similarities with the actors which make up Liberation Theology and yet Iran, at least, is at the same time vastly different in almost every other aspect. For example, Iran obviously is not a part of the "Christian" world and in fact considers the Christian world to be "the Great Satan." However, within Revolutionary Iran one finds two distinct branches of Shi'a Islam: one branch, the Mujahideen, being a radical political group with religious beliefs and the other branch, the Feyadeen, being a radical political group without any religious pretensions. In Ireland one finds not only two branches of Christianity, Catholic and Protestant, but within Catholicism one finds the IRA, which lost its religious beliefs in antiquity but still maintains the outward attachment to them for propaganda purposes, and Catholic fundamentalists who do not support the terrorist activities of the IRA but who do want a unified Ireland.

In Revolutionary Iran one finds a non-Christian "liberation theology" and in Ireland one finds a Christian versus "Christian" version of "liberation theology"--both versions featuring religiously-sanctioned violence and support for revolution. Due to the seeming strangeness of the two

examples, some details of their historical development are necessary to their understanding.

Overview

Both the religious world and the political world are well acquainted with religious/political extremism, although the concept may not be verbalized or consciously defined by the actors involved. Indeed, one may even state with some credibility that there is an overt effort on the part of most such actors to avoid recognizing the concept, as witnessed by the commonly expressed desire to avoid talking about religion and politics. That blind-sidedness, however, has added to the confusion surrounding Liberation Theology, the Islamic Revolution, Ireland, and numerous other hot spots around the globe and throughout history.

In both the New Testament and Old Testament eras, the researcher will find the concept of religious/political extremism. The Liberation Theologists, for example, find legitimate use of political action in the Exodus story. They also refer to examples of Jesus as a political revolutionary. Those two examples, however, lose some significance when an attempted application is made to today's situation because in the Exodus the Hebrews were living under a theocracy with its concomitant visible and verbal manifestations of God intervening directly into the affairs of men, and such manifestations as recorded in the biblical

narratives are not experienced today. In the New Testament narratives we find Jesus avoiding political confrontation rather than encouraging it on the part of his followers, and Luke, writing in the Acts of the Apostles, chapter five, records the activities of two religious/political revolutionaries in a negative connotation. Three of the better known extra-biblical examples of religious/political extremism in the New Testament era are the Zelotes, the Sicarii, and the Essenes. The last are best known as being the group responsible for hiding the scrolls in the caves at Qumron, and for their open anti-Roman stance. The Zelotes, according to Unger's Bible Dictionary, were members "of a Jewish patriotic party: a class of men who were faithful defenders of the theocracy; and who, while taking vengeance on those who wronged it, were themselves guilty of great excesses. They sprang from the group known as Pharisees." (Unger 1185) Josephus tells about the Sacarii in his volume, Jewish Wars, II:

When the countryside has been cleared of bandits, another type sprang up in Jerusalem known as the Sicarii who committed murders in broad daylight in the heart of the city. The festivals were their special seasons, when they would mingle with the crowd, carrying short daggers concealed under their clothing, with which they stabbed their enemies. Then, when they fell, the murderers joined in the cries of indignation and, through this plausible behavior, were never discovered. The first to be assassinated...was Jonathan the high-priest, after his death there were numerous daily murders. The panic created was more alarming than the calamity itself; everyone, as on the battlefield, hourly expected death. Men kept watch at a distance on their enemies and would not trust even their

friends when they approached. Yet, even while their suspicions were aroused and they were on their guard, they fell; so swift were the conspirators and so crafty in eluding detection. (254-257).

The point, which needs little elaboration, is that religious/political extremism has existed in every identifiable age of history from the beginning of recorded time. From the biblical era on through the declining days of the Roman empire, through the middle ages, the Reformation, and on through to the twentieth century, no matter where the researcher begins to dig, one will find a then-current example of religious/political extremism no matter which country or continent is picked. It should not seem at all strange, then, for the concept to remain even in this more enlightened stage of the twentieth century in the forms we see in Iran, Ireland, Lebanon, and Latin America for, as David Rapoport states in the Introduction to The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications:

Terrorism could be justified, however, on religious grounds, and there are some striking and enormously significant examples. No instance of rebel terror in the modern world has had (or perhaps even could have) the impact of the Jewish Zealots and Sicarii, known to us now principally through the spectacular mass suicide at Masada in the first century. Their earlier outrages created the conditions for the loss of the homeland, an Exile that lasted until the present century. The Jewish memory of those deeds and of their consequences had a traumatic continuing impact for two thousand years on Jewish character and institutions.

The durability or continuity of some early terrorist groups seems quite remarkable. No group in our world has exceeded the tenacity of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) which has struggled for more than sixty years. (xv)

The moral base for all such religious/political extremism is a perversion of the concept of the "just war," in which one party is believed to be morally culpable, while the other intends to right a wrong. The problem comes, as Rapoport says, because

the just party, consequently, is not constrained to accept some limitations on his mode of conducting war, and he has the right to destroy any person who can (but does not necessarily) bear arms against him. This view stands in striking contrast to the conventional understanding of war in the past few centuries, where all combatants who are entitled to particular rights are obliged to accept specific limitations in return, and where distinctions between the statuses of combatants, noncombatants, and neutrals are understood. (8)

John Duggard's essay in that same volume elaborates on the history of the just war:

The idea of the just war, jus ad bellum, has been a recurring theme in Western philosophy. St. Augustine, St. Thomas Aquinas, Franciscus de Victoria, Gentilis, Grotius, and a host of other philosophers, theologians, and jurists sought to distinguish just wars from unjust wars and enunciate the circumstances which justify resorting to war, the ultimate means of terror. St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, required both fault on the part of the attacked party and a "right intention" (recta intentio), an intention to advance good or avoid evil, on the part of the belligerent claiming a just cause. Grotius was more specific: just causes were defense, recovery of property, and punishment; unjust causes included the "desire for richer land," the "desire for freedom among a subject people," and the "desire to rule others against their will on the pretext that it is for their own good." (78)

Monte Palmer in his book, Dilemmas of Political Development, makes the following observations concerning violent

political action among ethnic or religious groups within a state:

A fourth pattern of violence-related change is one in which conflict among the ethnic or religious groups within a state becomes so intense that the state more or less dissolves and the territory is thrown into civil war and dissolution. This pattern has been prevalent in former colonial areas in which the boundaries of the colony were determined by the colonial powers without concern for the ethnic, tribal, and religious complexion of the territory and in which little progress was made toward the integration of parochial groups along national lines.... The intense violence that has accompanied the civil wars in Pakistan, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, the Congo, and Lebanon finds its roots in their consociational structure. Consociational states are those states in which primary loyalties are directed to tribal, religious, ethnic, or regional groups rather than to the state. (99-100)

Later in that same article he elaborates on how intense politization takes place:

At the mass level, protracted violence often draws apolitical and docile members of society into the fray and makes them intensely political creatures. This was certainly true of the youth in their early teens who became armed combatants in the civil wars of Nigeria and Pakistan and who continue to be combatants in Lebanon and Northern Ireland. It is also true of the rural religious leaders of Iran as well as of many of Iran's urban workers. (101)

The next section examines the two well-known examples of Ireland and Iran, followed in Chapter V by a consideration of the question of ideology as a lead into an analysis of Liberation Theology as political ideology.

Ireland--Catholic Religionists or Red Terrorists?

The seventy-plus years of warfare raging between the

two sections of Ireland has for the most part been billed as a battle between the Catholic south and the Protestant north. Indeed, one can scarcely find a single news item concerning the area that does not at least obliquely refer to the conflict as primarily of religious origination. Even appeals for support for one side or the other normally are directed to religious loyalties first and political loyalties second. The latter, however, may be more true of the Republic than of the North which makes its appeals based on loyalty to the Crown.

Overview.² It was Henry VIII's daughter, Queen Elizabeth I (reigned 1588-1603) who first imposed English rule over the whole of Ireland. At war with Spain, she feared that Catholic Ireland might form a willing stepping-stone for Catholic Spain to invade England. She was somewhat justified since a number of Anglo-Irish barons who had remained Catholic and some Irish chieftains were certainly involved in intrigue with the Spanish. Thus began four centuries of despoliation, oppression, and mass displacement of the Irish people by the English that formed the heritage of hate which still causes emotional resentment in even usually calm and moderate Irishmen everywhere today. Ireland also became the battleground for struggles for the Crown of England.

²The following historical background highlights are a summary of Edgar O'Ballance's 285-page work, Terror in Ireland: The Heritage of Hate.

After the English Reformation there was a great feeling of animosity by the Protestant English against the Roman Catholics and the non-Conformist sects. The colonization policy put into practice in Queen Mary's reign (1516-58) involved displacing native Irish from their land and giving it to English or Scottish settlers.

If the 16th century had been a bad one for the native Irish, the 17th was to be even more disastrous. It brought confiscation of land, displacement of people, and mass deportation. It was the century of the heritage of hate, associated with Oliver Cromwell.

The 18th century was a sad one of emigration, not only of Irish Catholics but also of immigrant non-Conformists, mainly Presbyterians, who had become disillusioned and were being discriminated against by the ruling Protestants. They fled from Ireland to the New World. After the abortive rebellion of 1798, the British prime minister forced through the union of Ireland with England and Scotland by an act passed in 1801. The Irish parliament in Dublin was dissolved, and about one hundred Irish members of parliament were elected to sit in the British parliament at Westminster.

The Irish revolutionary spirit survived the Great Famine and the unsuccessful 1848 Rebellion. On St. Patrick's Day, 17 March 1858, the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood was formed in Dublin. Later it changed its name to the Irish

Republican Brotherhood (IRB). Suspecting and disliking all secret societies, the Irish Catholic Church denounced the IRB and its front organization, the Brotherhood of St. Patrick.

In 1866 the British Liberal prime minister, William E. Gladstone, declared that it was his mission to pacify Ireland. He disestablished the Anglican Church of Ireland, which freed Irish Catholics from paying tithes. In 1870 a "Home Rule for Ireland" movement had been instigated, although it failed to pass parliament.

Reinforcing the heritage of hate of the native Irish for the English, three distinct power blocs began to emerge as the 20th century opened. One was the "Orange Card" of Protestants and non-Conformists in Ulster; the second was what was left of the old Anglo-Irish Ascendancy; and the third was the scarcely articulate native Irish republicans. Home Rule finally passed both houses of parliament on September 18, 1914, barely a month after the outbreak of World War I.

The next great episode of violence adding to Ireland's troubles was the Easter Rising on April 24, 1916. Gen. Sir John Maxwell had been sent to Ireland with full powers to crush the rebellion, and he dealt harshly with the rebels. When it was over, 1,351 had been killed, 179 buildings had been destroyed, 3,500 men and 79 women had been arrested,

more than 160 courts-martial had been held which resulted in 97 being sentenced to death and 16 being executed.

In December 1916 David Lloyd George became prime minister of Britain. Neither he nor President Woodrow Wilson wanted to rock the boat over the Irish problem with the war raging against Germany. Lloyd George offered John Redmond, leader of the Irish National Party, immediate home rule in exchange for conscription, but was turned down. In 1917 Lloyd George began releasing the Irish political prisoners and those in internment. They returned home with the aura of revolutionary heroes and began to reform and revitalize their groups. There were now three main groupings, the first and largest being the Sinn Fein, still a legal political party, still led by the aging Arthur Griffith. On October 26, 1917, Eamonn de Valera, the only surviving Dublin commandant of the Easter Rising, was elected its president. The second was the framework of the Irish Volunteers who had been the shock troops of the Easter Rising, and the third was the Irish Republican Brotherhood. During the period of uncertainty, known also as the Tan War, between 1919 and 1921, in the fighting against the British security forces, the insurgents collectively and unofficially became known as the "IRA," the Irish Republican Army.

On December 22, 1919, Prime Minister Lloyd George pushed the Partition Bill through the British parliament;

it emerged as the Better Government of Ireland Act. It provided for two parliaments in Ireland--one in the south at Dublin, and the other in the north at Belfast--and a joint Council of Ireland to coordinate the two parts, which could proclaim a "Union" of Ireland with a single parliament. This was acceptable to the Ulster Unionists, but neither Sinn Fein nor the IRB would look at it. Meanwhile, Irish insurgency was developing into a wide scale war of ambushes and raids against British security forces.

The Irish Catholic Church took a neutral course in this Anglo-Irish struggle, with the priests, especially the older ones, urging restraint on the IRA. But as the war wore on, an increasing number of younger priests came out openly in sympathy with the insurgents, some giving active support.

Modern Era. Maurice Tugwell's essay, "Guilt Transfer," published in Rappoport's The Morality of Terrorism, draws attention to a major tactic used by the IRA:

During Easter Week 1916, about 1,250 Irish rebels in Dublin seized a number of key buildings, important symbolically or tactically or both, and challenged the might of British rule. By the end of the week some 300 men and women were dead--56 rebels, 120 police or military, the remainder uninvolved civilians. Nearly a thousand people were wounded. Damage to the city by fire, bombardment and looting amounted to nearly one-third of Ireland's total annual revenue. This uprising occurred in the middle of the first Great War, in which a quarter of a million Irishmen were fighting in the British ranks, and the rebels received little support from the Dublin population, who jeered the survivors as they were marched away into captivity. The Irish Times wrote: "The rapine and bloodshed of

the past week must be finished with a severity which will make any repetition of them impossible for generations to come." Yet, within months it was the British who had begun to feel guilty about the Easter Rising, while Irish nationalists glorified the deed and its martyrs, and invested both with symbolic significance for the future. Guilt for the bloodshed and violence had been transferred from the shoulders of the rebels and their supporters onto those of authority and its constituency--the British government and people. Guilt transfer is a very old technique of propaganda which is perhaps more in use today than ever before. (275)

The second major propaganda tactic has been to continue billing the conflict as being between two religious factions, viz. the Catholics versus the Protestants, and to recruit money, weapons, and support from Irish Americans on that pretense. While the roots are undeniably religious in nature, going back to the middle ages, the Irish Troubles have long since ceased to be religiously based and have become instead another expression of international terrorism disguised as a religious and/or nationalist movement to defeat British hegemony in the isle.

Tom Baldy, a senior research fellow at the National Defense University, characterizes the conflict in Battle for Ulster:

I view the British operation in the province as unique, not as an evolutionary step in Britain's counterinsurgency efforts refined in areas such as Malaya, Cyprus, Kenya, and Aden, for it deliberately de-emphasizes, and at times even contradicts, classic military counterinsurgency doctrine. This contradiction is caused by a British refusal to characterize the violence in Ireland as symptomatic of a genuine national liberation movement. Rather, they define it as a civil disturbance, albeit with complicating sectarian overtones.... There is also the necessity of denying legitimacy to a Republican

movement fundamentally hostile to both Britain and the Irish Republic. A more conventional campaign would elevate the status of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, whose increasingly radical tendencies arouse British fears of a united, leftist Irish state on their western flank. Finally, a leaked British intelligence memorandum in 1979 admitted that the Army could not defeat the Provisional IRA in the near future and concluded that the campaign of violence would continue as long as the British remained in Northern Ireland. (3, 5)

There are two IRA's, the Official IRA (Officials) and the Provisional IRA (Provos). The more violent Provos split from the former in 1969 because the Officials were considered to be a bunch of communists and cowards who wouldn't fight. There is some truth to that charge, since the Officials had opted for a negotiated political settlement, after giving up the armed struggle in 1962, and had sold their entire arsenal by 1968. J. Bower Bell, in The Secret Army: The IRA 1916-1979, quotes the Provisional Army Council's first official pronouncement:

We declare our allegiance to the 32-County Irish Republic proclaimed at Easter 1916, established by the first Dail Eireann in 1919, overthrown by force of arms in 1922 and suppressed to this day by the existing British-imposed Six-County and 26-County partition states. We call on the Irish people at home and in exile for increased support towards defending our people in the North and the eventual achievement of the full political, social, economic and cultural freedom of Ireland. (366)

Bell further explains that the Officials' obsession with politics was scorned, the failure to maintain the basic military role of the Irish Republican Army was criticized, and the inability of the Army to provide the

maximum defence possible for the people of Belfast was noted in the document, reported in the Irish Times. (366)

Few writers have assessed the religious/political extremist component of the Provos with more poignancy than has Claire Sterling in The Terror Network. An investigative reporter with an admitted leftist slant, Ms. Sterling nevertheless is merciless to the leftist terrorists in her revealing report:

No sooner did Billy Kelly take a few drinks than he would forget himself. Once he poked a U. S. Senator in the ribs and muttered, "Any hardware?" At another meeting, he complained that the Catholic Church had made a lot of trouble for Ireland. "Excuse me, did I hear you say something against the Catholic Church?" asked an agitated Irish-American lady. "[expletive deleted] off," he snarled, and was hurriedly summoned home.

Billy Kelly had been among the first to pot a protestant and doubtless suffered from battle fatigue..."Though in many ways a representative freedom fighter of the Irish Republican Army," wrote Maria McGuire in her book about life in the Provos, he certainly blew it in the States.

Like everybody sent over to extract arms and money from Irish-Americans, she explained, Kelly "had been briefed as to how the audience should be played." He was instructed "to make copious references to the martyrs of 1915 and 1920-1922--the period most of the audience would be living in. Anti-British sentiment, recalling the potato famine and the Black and Tans, could be profitably exploited. By no means should anything be said against the Catholic Church. And all references to socialism should be strictly avoided. Tell them by all means that the Ireland we were fighting for would be free and united. But say nothing about just what form the new free and united Ireland would take." (150-151)

Sterling goes on to explain that in this manner were fifteen million Irish-Americans conned into bankrolling the Provos. Thinking that it was an open and aboveboard war to

free the Irish North from Britain and merge it with the free Irish South, the Irish-Americans provided millions in dollars and clandestine arms to the Provos.

In fact, it was and is a war against north and south both--the "colonial north" and the "quisling south"--fought to "destabilize capitalism in the whole of Ireland," and in Great Britain as well, and in all Western Europe besides. The Provos have said as much, in so many words, to their friends. ("We must educate the workers to destabilize capitalism in the whole of Ireland through armed struggle, creating an irremediable conflict between the needs of local capitalism and international imperialism, and those of the popular masses," they confided to ControInformazione, the house organ of Italy's Red Brigades.) (151)

There used to be a time when 90 percent of the Provo's weapons and funds came from the United States, but not anymore.³ Fund-raising is done at home through protection rackets, brothels and massage parlors, drug running, and bank robberies (preferably in Dublin where the police are unarmed). Most of the incoming military hardware is of Soviet manufacture, including helicopters, RPG-7 rocket launchers, bazookas, mortars, hand grenades, carbines, AK-47 assault rifles, and machine pistols. Whatever else the Provos might need may be had for the asking from the Libyans, or Palestinians, or Russians.

By 1971, the IRA was becoming the focal point for worldwide armed revolution second only to the Palestinians. To foment civil war in the Six Counties was to put colos-

³The following material is a summary of Claire Sterling's chapter on the Provisional IRA in her book, The Terror Network.

sal strains on the United Kingdom, interlocked with the entire Western structure of trade, industry, banking, and military alliances. Outwardly a religious and nationalist confrontation, it would in reality be an assault on vital organs of the Multinational Imperialist State.

The first IRA contingents were off for Jordanian guerrilla camps in 1969. Invited by both the PLO and PFLP, they were soon drawn into the intimate circle around George Habash. Two years later, in October 1971, they were guests of honor in Florence at the historic conference that launched Europe's Red International.

Irish freedom fighters touring the United States for guns and cash did not go around calling the free Republic of Ireland "a fascist state designed for privileged capitalist sycophants," as they did at home. Nor, on profitable junkets to the Bronx or Brooklyn, did they mention their "total commitment to revolution across the board and from top to bottom." In reality, though, the Provos would be well to the left of the Officials before the decade was out.

It had, after all, grown out of a militant confrontation pressed by rather heavily politicized people. Bernadette Devlin, the Irish Torch who roused the world to the Catholics' plight in Ulster, had joined the Trotskyite IV International in 1969. So had her partner in founding People's Democracy at Belfast University, Michael Farrell.

For Ferrell, "Victory in the north means not just defeat of the [Protestant] Loyalists and the unity of Ireland, but also the collapse of the government in the south and an anti-imperialist revolution in that country. And a revolution in Ireland could have incalculable consequences in disturbing the United Kingdom and, considering the crisis of Western capitalism, in all Europe." Italy's Red Brigades would later call the IRA an "unrenounceable point of reference for generalized guerrilla warfare on the European Continent."

Before long, there would be a steady flow of IRA men to South Yemen, getting crack training in Wadi Haddad's camps under Cuban and East German instructors. The Palestinian connection began to pay off at once. Starting in 1972, the Haddad-Habash front held a series of secret meetings in Dublin, putting together the multinational terrorist team soon to take off under Carlos. When a million dollars worth of weapons were divided up among them, the Provos got the lion's share.

Colonel Qaddafi of Libya got into the act in 1972 also. Although he still was in the Black International's camp, he was enough of a revolutionary to overcome his anti-Red prejudice when the occasion warranted. "We support the revolutionaries of Ireland who oppose Britain and are motivated by nationalism and religion," announced his Libyan radio that summer. "The Libyan Arab Republic has stood by the

revolutionaries of Ireland.... There are arms and there is support for the revolutionaries of Ireland." By the late 1970's, he was giving the Provos \$5 million per year.

The first truce was broken in 1972 and in that same year the IRA Provos got locked fast into the international terrorist circuit. It was from the midsummer of 1972 onward that massive terrorist aid began to flow in from all over the world, and a worldwide Soviet-sponsored campaign "against British repression in Ireland" suddenly materialized. What followed over the rest of the decade brought Ireland closer than any country in the West to the kind of conflict that Marxist revolutionaries call a civil war of long duration. There was no such thing as a political solution, no way to end it on their terms, no way to alter their terms, and not much hope of ever calling it off so long as they had a bountiful terrorist confraternity to fall back on.

Ruairi O'Bradaigh, spokesman for the IRA's lawful political arm, the Provisional Sinn Fein, stated flatly: "We do not want a confederation of the South with the North. Nor do we want an independent Ulster. We want a general dismantling of the existing Establishments in the Irish Republic and Ulster both." What he had in mind for their version of a free and united Ireland was "a Democratic Socialist Republic, something Third World-ish, a bit like Allende's Chile, similar to communism but not exactly like

it, Marxist in analysis, designed to nationalize industries, control the means of production and distribution, and take over agriculture under state-run cooperatives."

Finally, the Provos stated in An Phoblacht, that "both the Quisling regime in the Free State and the colonial regime in the Northern war zone have failed to produce a lasting solution. The war will continue until these structures are demolished."

Explaining the impact of sectarianism, Tom Baldy writes:

The assumption upon which criminalization is based --that Northern Ireland possesses a serious crime problem, complicated by sectarian violence--is wrong. More accurately, much of the crime is a direct result of the sectarian hatred--hatred that is created by the collision of two nationalities. The viciousness of "tit-for-tat" murders in the mid-1970's based on a victim's religious beliefs underscores the intense hatred which surfaces from time to time...[But] [s]ectarianism is a division transcending religion, a gap between societies filled with misunderstanding of one another. Strict sectarian education inhibits understanding. (77, 78)

Sean MacStiofain in the introduction to his autobiography, Revolutionary in Ireland, briefly addresses the sectarian question while explaining his revolutionary stance:

I still believe that revolutionary violence is the only way for an oppressed people to win their freedom. Great nations as well as small one owe their existence to it. Who thinks that the people of Mozambique or Angola could overthrow the Portuguese colonial system by debate? Or that the blacks of Rhodesia will defeat Ian Smith's racialists by constitutional means? For these and for all such imprisoned, exploited peoples, there is no reliable route to freedom other than the armed struggle.

But in advocating it, I am not motivated by

either sectarian or racist views.... Like all Republicans, I stand by the Proclamation of 1916 and its guarantees of religious and civil liberties, equal rights and equal opportunities for all...[And] in the new Ireland towards which Republicans strive, new political and economic structures will be needed to return the ownership of Ireland to the Irish people. New social attitudes in keeping with our common Christian heritage will have to be formed to mould the new society which is needed to eradicate snobbery, class consciousness, sectarian bigotry and similar forms of prejudice. (viii, ix)

Religion, or religious sectarianism, thus becomes a rallying point, a propaganda tactic to foster patriotic loyalties in a battle between conflicting ideologies, ideologies which are contrary not only to each other, but in the case of the Provos also to the people from whom support is enlisted. Indeed, Frank Burton in the introduction to his book, The Politics of Legitimacy: Struggles in a Belfast Community, explains religious/political extremism of the IRA as being central to the social consciousness of Northern Irish Catholicism:

This consciousness is presented as a world-view or total ideology. I shall argue that the representations constituting this world-view manifest the dominant categories of the Northern Irish, Catholic consciousness. Within the Catholic Weltanschauung I locate the particular ideology of the Irish Republican Army. It is the particular ideology of militant Republicanism which allows the commitment to kill and be killed for a cause. By establishing IRA violence directly within its social context, the particular ideology within the total, the analysis gains explanatory power. The central argument is that the potential political consciousness implicit within the wider representations of Catholicism is explicitly expressed within the politics of the IRA. By firmly rooting IRA ideology within the total ideology of Catholicism, the intention is to demonstrate how the genesis of current IRA poli-

tics emanates from the structure of Northern Irish society.

Posing the analysis in these terms represents a broad theoretical contention. IRA violence is only one manifestation of the increasing phenomenon of world-wide guerrilla and terrorist activity...[or] politicized violence. (1, 2)

Revolutionary Islam, considered next, has an even more direct link with political violence as expressed in the concept of religious/political extremism than does Ireland.

Iran--Islamic Revolution: Religion or Political Expediency?

Overview. Suroosh Irfani would state the above question somewhat differently, as seen in the title of his book: Revolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship? Explaining the word khashm, meaning rage, he states:

[It] was the code word Muslim activists used for their struggle against the Pahlavi dictatorship, climaxing in the Islamic Revolution of 1978. Quite appropriately, the word expressed the rage of a nation against a dictatorship that sustained itself through intimidation, torture, imprisonment and the execution of its political opponents. The word was formed by putting together the first letters of the three forces in the Islamic spectrum that brought about the Revolution--Khomeini, Shariati and Mujahideen-e-Khalq [People's Struggle for Allah].

Of the three forces, Khomeini represents the politicized Shia clergy which has exercised a major influence in the affairs of the State ever since the mass conversion of a Sunni Iran to Shiism in the 16th Century under Safavi rule. Khomeini's main accomplishment was to successfully place the struggle against the Pahlavi dictatorship in an anti-imperialist framework and give the struggle religious sanctity by invoking his position as a Maria-e-Taglid (literally: Source of Imitation), one of the highest ranks possible in the informal hierarchy of Shia Islam. In so doing, Khomeini consciously followed the anti-imperialist approach

of Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani, the 19th Century Muslim revolutionary who believed that by emphasizing the social and political dimensions of Islam and mobilizing the Muslim masses it was possible to forge an Islamic Front for confronting the forces of despotism and colonialism in Muslim lands. Shariati and the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, in pursuing the ideological direction implicit in Afghani's anti-imperialist movement, were able to develop a revolutionary Islamic ideology to form the basis for a progressive Islamic movement. (1)

He goes on to point out that "the central ideological concern of the progressive Islamic movement is to redefine Islam in the light of modern knowledge and scientific advancement--a task and a challenge which requires the Muslim intellectual to 'rethink the whole system of Islam without breaking with the past.'" (1)

As Palmer explains, politicized expressions of Islamic fundamentalism in the modern era gained attention with the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928, and spread rapidly in a number of Arab states such as Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine, and Syria. (111) "Not unrelated to Islamic-fundamentalism," states Palmer, "was the ability of the Ayatollah Khomeini, a main-line Islamic leader exiled by the shah of Iran, to orchestrate the collapse of the shah's regime in spite of the fact that the shah possessed one of the strongest military establishments in the region and was supported by the intelligence and counter-insurgency services of the United States." (112)

Palmer then draws the following conclusions:

1. Both liberation theology and Islamic fundamentalism undermine the traditional role of the relig-

ious establishment as a stabilizing, conservative force in society. Rather than preaching passivity and the acceptance of the status quo as inevitable, both manifestations of radical theology urge their adherents to take matters into their own hands. Change, if not revolution, has been transformed into a religious virtue, the pursuit of which can expedite the road to salvation.

2. The obvious popularity of radical religious movements has forced established religious authorities to move in the direction of the radical doctrines in order to block the appeal of the extremist movements. Religion, as a whole, will find it increasingly difficult to support a political status quo that is insensitive to the social as well as the spiritual needs of the masses.

3. Radical religion politicizes the masses and particularly the poor. It encourages discussion of social inequities and encourages political as well as religious solutions. In radical religion, prayer and politics do mix.

4. In much the same manner, radical religious politics provides a conduit for the political mobilization of religious individuals distressed by inequities of their societies, yet rejects leftist doctrines as incarnations of the devil. Radical religion, in short, legitimizes political activism. It provides a religiously-sanctioned outlet for radical political expression. (112)

That the Shah needed to be overthrown is beyond dispute in most educated circles since torture and injustice had become synonymous with his regime. As Irfani puts it, "The Revolution began with the slogan 'Down with the Shah'. It needed no elaboration. It simply called for the overthrow of a monarchial system that had sustained itself over the years through sheer tyranny." (149)

Writing in Revolution in Iran: A Reappraisal, Robert Darius of the Strategic Studies Institute stated that the "ultimate objective of the 1978-79 revolution in Iran is to transform its political system.... [It] was indigenous,

deeply-rooted in Iran's cultural, religious foreign policy, developmental aspirations and changing identity." (30)

Background. Darius, as most authors do, traces the source of the conflict from the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905 to 1911, which was

essentially led by the ulamas to reduce the absolute, arbitrary power of the Qajar dynasty. The attitudes and views of Iranians are deeply and unalterably influenced by the political philosophy of Prophet Ali; the martyrdom of Shia Islamic leaders; the continuing theme in Shia Islam of the need for justice; and the legitimacy of the ruler. (31)

The Qajar dynasty was overthrown by Reza Khan, who ascended the throne on December 25, 1925, beginning the rule that eventually led to the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 led by Khomeini. In October prior to his being proclaimed monarch, Reza Khan secured the backing of the Majlis which included emergency powers and the title of commander-in-chief of the armed forces. Dilip Hiro, in Iran Under the Ayatollahs, writes:

He encouraged an anti-Qajar campaign. It reached a peak in October when Ahmed Shah Qajar was abroad, in Paris. On 25 October the Majlis voted by eighty votes to five, with thirty abstentions, to depose Ahmed Shah Qajar and appoint Reza Khan Pahlavi as regent. (Following the law passed in the spring, which required all citizens to acquire a birth certificate and a surname, Reza Khan had chosen for his family the name of an ancient Iranian language, Pahlavi.) Reza Khan Pahlavi immediately banned gambling and sale of alcohol, slashed bread prices and promised to enforce moral conduct and 'the true laws of sacred Islam.'" (24)

Four months later [in the month of April, 1925], "dressed in military uniform and royal jewels, Reza Khan

Pahlavi crowned himself the Shah-en-Shah--King of Kings--of Iran. Thus began the Pahlavi dynasty." (24)

Reza Pahlavi Shah's early policies contrasted with his views prior to his becoming monarch in that he created a national civil service and a police force while centralizing and modernizing Iran. His new policies accelerated the pace of economic development to the benefit of a rising middle class of secular teachers, lawyers, doctors, engineers, technicians, civil servants and journalists. He considered the ulama to be "ill-equipped to deal with the problems of modern times, and steadily curtailed their power in their traditional fields of law, education, and religious endowments, waqfs." (25)

Those actions, along with the Law of Military Conscription of 1925, began building the tensions one might expect to accompany such intrusions by the state into ecclesiastical matters.

Other laws of importance were: the Commercial Code of 1925; the Provisional Civil Code of 1928; the Uniformity of Dress Law in 1928, whereby he attempted to make a national identity out of many ethnic ones, often dramatized by different dress; a decree in 1929 restricting the definition of a theological student or teacher; the Law of Sharia Courts of 1930, restricting them to marriage, divorce, guardianship, and deciding only the innocence or guilt of the accused; the Law Concerning the Registration of Docu-

ments and Property of 1932, ending the right of the Sharia court to act as registrar of documents; and a law in 1936 banning clerics from acting as judges in state courts.

(26, 27)

Other changes made in 1935 in the interest of modernization included not only outlawing the veil--particularly the chador, an all-embracing shroud commonly used by Iranian women; but also decreeing that all men must replace their Pahlavi caps with European felt hats--a move that interfered with the Islamic way of praying, which includes touching the ground with the forehead.

Many Muslims defied the order. The matter came to a head at the shrine of Imam Ali Reza, the eighth Imam, in Mashhad on 10 July 1935: the twenty-fourth anniversary of the Russian bombing of the shrine. Despite threats by the police, the faithful refused to don brimmed hats. For two days there was a standoff between the pilgrims and the security forces. On the third day the troops summoned from Azerbaijan entered the shrine and fired, killing over 100 people, including women and children, and wounding nearly 250. The event shocked the nation. Realising the gravity of the army's action, the Shah ordered an inquiry. When the investigators put the blame on the shrine's administrator, the Shah had him executed. (28)

The Shah abdicated the throne on September 16, 1941 in fear that he would be deposed by the advancing Soviet army. His son Muhammad Reza, then 23 years old, took the fleeing Shah's place under the very difficult circumstances of occupation by foreign powers. His youth and inexperience precluded the possibility of autocratic rule as did the

reduction of the army by the occupation forces to a role of maintaining internal security.

Modern Era. Following the war and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet military forces, the new Shah began to consolidate his position by first warming to the religious leaders of Iran and reversing some of the modernizing laws passed by his father. Internal conflicts, including religious fundamentalists and middle class merchants, had to be balanced with external influences, including foreign oil companies and British and American intelligence organizations. Internal political conflict centered in the person of Muhammad Mossedeq, appointed premier by the Shah in May 1951 and given emergency powers for six months on August 3 and then extended in January by the Majlis.

The conflict between the Shah and the premier ended in a U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and British Ministry of Intelligence financed coup on August 19, 1953, which Hiro describes:

The 19 August 1953 coup laid the foundation for royal dictatorship which lasted a quarter of a century. It destroyed any chance that Iran had of evolving as a Western-style democracy. The Shah set out systematically to wreak vengeance on his opponents. He set up military tribunals to punish all those who had participated in anti-royalist activities. These were to become a permanent feature of the Pahlavi regime. The persecution of the Shah's adversaries went on for two years, and claimed 5,000 lives. In addition, it drove about 50,000 men into self-exile. (36)

Both Pahlavis failed to understand how much their policies of modernization had weakened traditional Islamic

leaders and institutions. Indeed they seemed not to care in the least about such considerations. The modernization effort resulted, however, in a serious religious/political backlash by Iran's 32 million religious Shia Muslims expressed in the 1978-79 revolution. Khoury analyzes the experience this way:

[The modernization efforts] were viewed as another clear manifestation of arbitrary decisionmaking by the Shah. In this contest, the Iranian upheavals were, in part, a consequence of rapid industrialization, arbitrary decisionmaking by the Shah, rising expectations at all levels of society, frustration of those expectations, the failure on the part of the Shah to seek popular consensus for his plans, and to lead the nation in a manner consistent with its traditional values. In its anatomy, the Iranian revolution appears to establish a precedent for some of the basic aspects of countries around the world; deeply ingrained traditional politico-religious values are threatened by a massive modernization; rising expectations are frustrated; catalytic events radicalize the population; forces of nationalism are misperceived; and charismatic leader overthrows an established regime which lacks popular support and legitimacy. (32)

In other words, instead of grasping the significance of nationalism as a potent force within Iran, the Shah created more and more obstacles to prevent its growth and legitimate expression. For, as John Stempel writes in Inside the Iranian Revolution:

Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was a weak personality until the early 1960s. Unfortunately events conspired to ensure that even when he developed into a strong leader, he still would be identified as dependent upon the West, specifically the United States.... The events of 1953 have become so enshrined in legend that obtaining the complete truth may never be possible. Yet two points emerge which help in understanding subsequent political attitudes. First, whatever U.S. involvement actu-

ally was, it became an article of faith throughout Iran that the American participation had been critically important, and that therefore the Shah was a U.S. "puppet." Second, there actually were powerful forces within the country in 1953 who supported monarchical rule. Large and influential sectors of the population wanted the Shah to return, either because of dissatisfaction with Mossadeq's policies, which had left the economy weak and disorganized, or because of apprehension that Mossadeq was preparing the country for a communist (Tudeh Party) takeover. Today Iran's revolutionary liturgy denies this second point. (5)

Prior to 1963, the Shah purified the army by purging some 400 officers who were Tudeh Party members or sympathizers, and created the dreaded SAVAK, a sort of combined FBI-CIA that gathered foreign and domestic intelligence and repressed dissent by monitoring and controlling opposition groups. By 1963 the Shah began to make radical changes in the economy beginning with what he called the White Revolution or the Shah-People Revolution. The resulting changes were attacked by fundamentalist elements as being contrary to Islam and as being designed to enslave the people rather than to free them.

Riots, sparked by the religious harangues, began on June 5, 1963. They lasted for two to three days in Tehran and other major cities. Up to this time the revolt was a model of revolutionary activity to come in 1978. But this time the riots did not lead to the overthrow of the monarchy because Prime Minister Asadollah Alam was convinced, on behalf of the Shah, that he should use harsh measures and call in overwhelming military force to put down the unrest. Estimates of casualties ranged from official government figures of 86 killed, 100 to 200 injured, to opposition claims of several hundred killed, 1,500 wounded.... The most important development from this anti-Shah uprising, aside from the fact that it failed, was the beginning of collaboration between the two types of opposition--the sec-

ular forces and the religious groups. Fifteen years later this close cooperation had expanded and gained in strength. Without it Mohammad Reza Pahlavi would not have been overthrown. (Stempel 6)

He was, of course, overthrown. In answering the question as to why it was Khomeini's leadership that effected the overthrow, Irfani draws attention to the fact that no political organization was capable of assuming leadership of the Islamic Revolution:

[This was] due to the fact that the Movement was going ahead at such a rapid pace that political organizations had no option but to follow the massive spontaneity of the Movement. In this respect, only the clergymen, given their national organizational network in the form of mosques, their direct contact with people, and the uncompromising leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini calling for the overthrow of the monarchy appeared to present the only possible avenue for leading this movement.... Primarily, however, it was by successfully blending politics and religion in an anti-imperialist and anti-dictatorial framework that Khomeini succeeded in making his leadership attractive and acceptable to various sections of society. By insisting that politics and Islam were inseparable, Khomeini had followed the path laid down by Syed Jamal-ud-Din Afghani a century ago. (162, 163)

Stempel states that the

emergence of the religious extremists as the dominant political force occurred as much by happenstance as by design. Although Khomeini had already written a book about how an Islamic government should function, neither he nor his colleagues could explain how to establish such a regime initially...[b]ut the fundamentalists controlled the Revolutionary Council and the revolutionary committees set up in each neighborhood and both organizations soon became as powerful as the government. (197)

The religious/political extremism embodied in the revolution was brought home to the United States with the cap-

ture of the American Embassy on November 4, 1979 by a group of 500 militants calling themselves "students" and "Followers of the Imam's Line." Before that event, the political dynamics of the post-revolutionary period had centered around hatred of the Shah and the manipulation of anti-Western and anti-modernization sentiments. Although the radical clerics in fact "controlled the Revolutionary Guards and the Mujahidin, they could only influence--not dominate--the militants occupying the embassy." (Stempel 222)

Thus the concept of religious/political extremism can be traced from biblical antiquity to both Ireland and Iran, through the justification of the "just war," the heritage of hate of native Irish for the English, to the overthrow of the Shah, and the enthroning of the Ayatollah through religious revolution. The concept of religious/political extremism presents a dilemma to American policy makers due to an inherent pluralistic mindset which looks askance at having to attack another person's religious beliefs, but if the concept is in reality an expression of political ideology rather than theology the dilemma disappears. Chapter V is an analysis of Liberation Theology as political ideology and its unrealized potential as a powerful grassroots political movement.

CHAPTER V
LIBERATION THEOLOGY AS POLITICAL IDEOLOGY;
AN ANALYSIS

What should be clear at this point is that Liberation Theology is not a "theology," wherein lies its deception. The majority of doctoral dissertations attack Liberation Theology on one or more of its perceived theological or hermeneutical errors, and those particular points will not be belabored here. Of more importance than such largely unresolvable theological bickerings is what Liberation Theology is becoming, or at least has the potential of becoming: an institution, perceived as indigenous, filling a political and ideological void, and the beginnings of a political theory adapted to the unique situation of the Third World and of Latin and Central America especially, with its 400-plus year history of authoritarian and dictatorial structures in government, in society, and in the church. That the theory and its political institutions are "Marxist" is readily admitted by both sides, especially its adherents but, as will be shown below, it is a badly misconstrued version of Marxism.

Since Liberation Theology purports to have the answer to the problems of injustice and unjust structures in Latin and Central America, it must be able to correctly identify the cause or causes of the inequitable situation and, once

identified, be able to propose institutional remedies based on an alternative system. This chapter deals with its failure to do so thus far and its unlikelihood of being able to do so because its theological and political supporters, and its theorists and writers, have fallen victim to the "fallacy of a false cause," seeing wealth as a zero-sum game rather than as something that can be created.

The only distinctions that need to be drawn in respect to the theological bickerings mentioned above are the distinctions between ideology and theology, theology and religion, and perhaps between ideology and religion, although in that respect there is more correlation than distinction.

A central problem for Central America and for U.S. policies in the area, as Wiarda explains in his book In Search of Policy, is an almost complete lack of institutions of any sort capable of holding the society and polity together or carrying out effective programs. (124) Liberation Theology, as political ideology, has the potential to become that missing element of democratic participatory opportunity, although the opportunity stands a greater chance of failure due to misconceptions generated by its confluence of "theology" and neo-Marxist ideology. It is ironic that that element which is counted by its adherents as its greatest strength--viz., its Christianity coupled with Marxist tools of analysis--is in reality the Achille's heel of the movement from the pluralistic foreign policy viewpoint of

the decidedly anti-Marxist North and therefore its immense potential as the promised viable political institution to lead them out of injustice in all probability will not be fully realized.

Overview: The Concept of Ideology

John Plamenatz in Ideology tells us that the word "ideology" was invented in France and that it meant the science or study of ideas, and that it was first used to refer to a type of philosophy fashionable at the turn of the century (eighteenth to nineteenth), a philosophy whose exponents prided themselves on not being metaphysicians. Instead, they explained all ideas as deriving ultimately from sensations:

The most famous French thinker of this school was Condillac, a disciple of the British empiricists, but the epithet ideologue or ideologist was applied, not so much to him, as to men who came after him. This early meaning of the word would perhaps be even more forgotten than it is, if Napoleon had not picked on it and used it to express the impatience and even contempt of the man of action for men so much more interested than he is in abstract ideas.... In its later, and much more important sense, it is used to refer to a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes, characteristic of a group or community. (15)

The modern use of the word primarily derives from that of Marx, who often called ideology "false consciousness," by which he appears to have meant a set of mistaken beliefs about matters important to them shared by a whole group of persons or even a whole community. (Plamenatz 25) Indeed,

D.J. Manning in The Form of Ideology, states that according to Marx and Engels

an ideology is a systematic attempt to demonstrate the rationality of the existing distribution of wealth and the social utility of the order in which the wealthy hold positions of power [and] has always, in Marx's view, been inseparable from a class experience and interest at variance with the progressively more universal experience and interest of those who make the major contribution to the creation of wealth. (3)

And, David McClellan in his book, Ideology, states:

Marx deserves a whole chapter to himself as it was the influence of his writings that gave the concept of ideology the wide currency that it now enjoys. Marx was familiar with the favourable view of ideology as a beneficial science of ideas in the works of de Tracy; but he preferred to give it the critical edge popularized by Napoleon's scorn of 'cloudy metaphysics'. It is the conservation of this critical edge and the different reasons for justifying it that gives to the Marxist tradition its interest. In Marx himself the pejorative sense of 'ideology' comprised two main elements: first, ideology was connected with idealism which, as a philosophical outlook, was unfavourably contrasted with materialism: any correct view of the world had to be, in some sense, a materialistic view. Secondly, ideology was connected with the uneven distribution of resources and power in society: if the social and economic arrangements were suspect then so was the ideology that was a part of them. (10)

Plamenatz goes on to state that

ideology is overtly descriptive and explanatory. Sets of beliefs or theories that are ideological purport to tell us how things are or were, and how they come or came to be so...[but] ideology is primarily "persuasive" and secondarily "prescriptive." (75)

Ideology as persuasive has far more in common with religion than it does with theology, and in the understand-

ing of many, religion is a particular form or expression of ideology. Plamenatz explains:

It was not really until the eighteenth century that political theorists and philosophers in the West began seriously to inquire how it comes about that men have religious beliefs. Until then, they had confined themselves to examining the doctrines of the theologians, especially their proofs of the existence of God, accepting some and amending or rejecting others. They had sometimes expressed doubts about traditional accounts of the origins of particular religions, but had little to say about the origins of religion in general or its place in the life of man, or about the different kinds of religion. Ordinarily, they had approved of religion as a support of morals, and had deplored religious fanaticism; for example, Machiavelli, who thought religion a good thing. The founders of religions are, he thought, even more to be admired than founders of states as benefactors of mankind. Though he took care not to deny that Christianity is of divine origin, he clearly thought of the founders of other religions as inspired predominantly by political motives. Hobbes was less inclined to praise the founders of religion, though he said nothing against them. There are, he said, men who claim that God has spoken to them and who pass on his message to other men; there are prophets, false and true. It is for the ruler to decide who the true prophets are, since diversity of religious beliefs is a danger to domestic peace. Most political theorists, even champions of toleration such as Locke, condemned atheism. (84, 85).

Eighteenth century speculation about the origins of religious beliefs and myths grounded such ideas in curiosity, ignorance and fear. Pascal, for example, believed that man needed religion to give him a sense of place in the world, an idea also shared by Rousseau who thought that religion provided men with additional motives for behaving well or consoling them in suffering. Kant believed that there are three beliefs necessary to man if he is to be moral and

happy: he must believe in God, in the freedom of the will, and in immortality. Hegel believed that religion expresses figuratively what philosophy seeks to make explicit. Marx spoke of religion as fantasy of alienated man. (Plamenatz 86-91) Engels constructed a hierarchy of ideologies, citing

religion and philosophy--in contrast to politics and law--as realms of ideology which soar still higher in the air. Engels sometimes excluded politics and law from the ideological altogether and gave the impression that he considered ideologies to be more ideological the more removed they were from the material economic basis and the nearer they approached the tip-top of the super-structure." (McClellan 22)

McClellan continues:

Engels clearly retained a negative concept of ideology since he connected it with thought that was detached from reality and with ignorance. But he did sometimes talk generally of 'ideological super-structures' as did Marx in 1859, and sometimes gave the impression that ideology was merely socially-determined thought. But the first person to declare that Marxism was itself an ideology was Edward Bernstein whose attempts to revise Marx's ideas gained prominence around 1900. Bernstein based this conviction on the very revisionist idea that Marxism was based on a moral ideal and on the curious argument that Marxism must be an ideology because it consisted of ideas--and ideas were by definition ideological. Thus socialist conceptions of state and society were riddled with ideology. (24)

Lenin, on the other hand, ascribed an ideological position to every class, including the proletariat. In What is to be Done?, Lenin states:

the only choice is--either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind has not created a "third" ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms there can

never be a non-class or an above class-ideology). Hence, to belittle the socialist ideology in any way, to turn aside from it in the slightest degree means to strengthen bourgeois ideology. (156)

Manning gives the classical definition of ideology as referring to "the systematic exposition of what purports to be theoretical knowledge claimed by its advocates to be indispensable to rational conduct in social, economic and political life." (1) He goes on to state that "the distinct feature of the classical application of the term ideology is that it performs both the function of identification and that of evaluation of a type of belief." (1) Of Mannheim he states:

After Marx the most influential use of the term ideology is that of Mannheim. In some important respects it is similar to that of Marx. For example, Mannheim accepts that ideology is a practical view of reality comforting to those with a vested interest in the survival of the existing social order. It cannot serve as the basis for 'rational' action by the underprivileged. (4)

As the "systematic exposition of what purports to be theoretical knowledge indispensable to rational conduct in social, economic and political life," ideology has much in common with the sociologist's, the political scientist's and the theologian's understanding of the term and concept of religion, as distinct from the classical definition of theology. Without belaboring the point too far, to the classical theologian religion and ideology may indeed be referring to the same thing in that "religion" is centered in man--man's beliefs, man's efforts to reach up to God,

man's efforts to placate or please God, etc.--while theology is centered in God and is, in fact, the study of God and God's revelation of Himself to man in the Bible, of God's reaching down to man. Thus, to the classical theologian, there can be and indeed are many religions, or ideologies, but only one "theology." Maintaining that distinction is essential to understanding the phenomenon of the political movement, or political ideology, known today as Liberation Theology. It also is necessary to maintain the distinction between the uses of the terms Christian or Christianity, as given in the definition of terms (Chapter I, above), to understand Liberation Theology. It should be obvious that the terms religion and Christianity and the terms ideology and Christianity may or may not be used interchangeably, depending upon the particular writer's definitions, which seldom are given with any specificity in the Liberation literature.

It should be noted that ideology is used by political groups and movements everywhere as a change force, and many times it is a rationalizing factor or a legitimizing factor to provide justification for what the group or movement has already decided as their course of action to bring about the desired state of change. The Liberation Theology writers tend to use ideology in that fashion. Thus, in that sense, Christianity and ideology, and religion and ideology, and "gospel" and ideology are interchangeable in

Liberation literature, for as the French writer Jacques Ellul in Jesus and Marx: From Gospel to Ideology observes:

Today's political universe is littered with ideologies that make the practice of politics both easier and more difficult. They make it easier to manipulate the masses through propaganda, but they complicate decision making, since the ideological effect must always be taken into account.... Christianity is not an ideology. But has become one, and relentlessly continues to become one.... Anytime we read the Bible to find arguments or justifications, we wallow in Christian ideology. (1-3)

Theoretical Underpinnings: Dependencia and Marxism

Dependency Theory. The main political and theoretical linchpin of Liberation Theology is dependency theory. Indeed, Liberation Theology is to a large extent a religious restatement of dependency theory which, as dependency analysis, has a long tradition within Latin America among sociologists and political scientists attempting to understand and explain economic development/underdevelopment. "The dependency model of Latin American underdevelopment identifies contemporary Latin American social and economic structures shaped by economic dependency and it distinguishes underdeveloped Latin America from pre-capitalist England and Europe. Instead of hypothesizing underdevelopment as an original state, it asserts that the now developed countries were never underdeveloped and that contemporary underdevelopment was created." (Chilcote, 27) In other words, the process of capitalist expansion, which brought growth

and development to the now developed countries, brought about the underdevelopment of Latin America.

C. Richard Bath and Dilmus D. James elaborate upon the concept in an article entitled "Dependency Analysis of Latin America: Some Criticisms, Some Suggestions" which appeared in the Latin American Research Review:

The dependency approach was first adopted by a group of "radicals" in the United States, partially as a reaction to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, but also as a part of a general attack on the capitalist system, the military-industrial complex, and U.S. imperialism.... In addition to needed methodological criticisms of existing developmental theory, dependency analysis has already made two major contributions to an understanding of the inter-American system. First, it has pointed out...:It is impossible to discuss the internal economic and political systems of Latin American countries without reference to their relationship to outside factors, especially the role of the United States.... Second, the dependency approach has stressed the need for combining economic and political analysis. (3, 4)

Bath and James then proceed to define four specific areas or points on which dependenistas are in agreement:

First, the condition of underdevelopment is intimately connected with the expansion of industrial capitalist countries.... A second consensus is found in the view of development and underdevelopment as two components of one unified system.... Third, the dependenistas universally insist that viewing underdevelopment as a natural and temporary precapitalistic state ignores reality completely.... Fourth, the dependenistas are convinced that the subordinate relationship of Latin America is not exclusively an external, country-to-country matter. Rather, they claim, the dependence extends to the internal decision-making apparatus, social structure, ideological beliefs, and cultural elements.... [T]he radical dependenistas assume that the only means of destroying the existing relationship between the capitalist, developed countries and the underdeveloped countries is through

violent revolution carried out by the masses. If such a revolution is unsuccessful...the likely result will be a neofascist military state. (5, 12)

A year later in that same journal, Richard Fagen's article, "Studying Latin American Politics: Some Implications of a Dependence Approach," states:

Although nothing approaching a consensus theory of change is to be found in the literature, the dependency framework shares with Marxism the assumption that economic arrangements are, in the long run, the primary determinants of political, social and cultural forms.... Dependency theory is also, at least implicitly, a theory of conflict as well. (9)

Some Latin American social scientists and most, if not all, Liberation Theologists were quick to recognize that for them dependency theory went further in explaining the peculiar circumstances of Latin America and the Third World if for no other reason than that the theory proceeds from the same basic premise of Marxist analysis which they had already rather firmly embraced. For example, as Gutierrez explained in a 1979 article in the journal Theological Studies (quoted by Sigmund, "The Development of Liberation Theology: Continuity or Change?"):

For poor countries, oppressed and dominated, the word liberation is appropriate, rather than development. Latin America will never get out of its plight except by a profound transformation, a social revolution that will radically change the conditions it lives in at present. Today, a more or less Marxist inspiration prevails among those groups and individuals who are raising the banner of the continent's liberation. And for many in our continent, this liberation will have to pass, sooner or later, through the paths of violence. (Sigmund 553).

J. Samuel and Arturo Valenzuela's article in Comparative Politics entitled "Modernization and Dependency" also notes that

In its emphasis on the expansive nature of capitalism and in its structural analysis of society, the dependency literature draws on Marxist insights and is related to the Marxist theory of imperialism. However, its examination of processes in Latin America imply important revisions in classical Leninist formulations, both historically and in light of recent trends. The focus is on explaining Latin American underdevelopment, and not on the functioning of capitalism, though some authors argue that their efforts will contribute to an understanding of capitalism and its contradictions. (543, 544)

Liberation Theologists accept at face value the basic premises of dependency theory, particularly as it directs its antagonism towards the United States, the embodiment, the incarnation of capitalism, and while there have been literally hundreds of books written on the subject of Liberation Theology, none really advances beyond the original six or seven authors' foundational theoretical statements. All of the writers, for example, support Gutierrez' call for a concrete praxis of liberation by which is meant revolutionary activity designed to abolish the economic and social injustices and exploitation which are the natural results of inequitable relations between the dominant and dependent countries. John K. Roth in an essay entitled "How Latin American Liberation Theology sees the United States and the USSR," appearing in the May 1988 issue of

the Washington Times journal, The World & I, points out therefore that

Latin American liberation theologians do not necessarily disagree with President Ronald Reagan's claim that the Soviet Union is an evil empire. Mainly, however, they reserve such judgments for the United States. As that point is documented, note that Latin American liberation theologies criticize what they call the abstractness of European and North American theology. By contrast, they regard theirs as concrete and particular. It is ironic, therefore, that on most occasions they do not speak directly about the United States or the Soviet Union. Even indirectly, they have relatively little to say about the Soviet Union, but that is hardly true where the United States is concerned. In the vocabulary of Latin American liberation theology, capitalism is at least a four-letter word. One never misses the bull's-eye by much in thinking that the liberationists mean "capitalism" to be code for the United States.... They believe that there can be authentic development for Latin America only if there is liberation from the domination exercised by the great capitalist countries, and especially by the most powerful, the United States of America. (631)

In Chile the concept of dependence came to be identified most closely with multinational corporations (MNC's) and their control of the copper industry, as Theodore Moran explains in Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence:

The use of the word "dependence" to characterize some of the key problems of Chilean development grew out of the domestic desire to reassert sovereign control over the economic and political life of the nation. It was also a reaction against the disparities of power that had historically conditioned relations between the foreign copper companies and the host country.... But there was a third dimension to dependencia. The rationale for moving in on the copper industry and finally taking it over did not originate entirely in concerns about the division of returns or the loss of sovereignty. Rather, Chileans elaborated the idea of

dependencia...[as] a sense that the country contributed "captive production" to...[an] integrated corporate system. (11, 12)

Cardoso and Faletto, also from Chile, state that "from the economic point of view a system is dependent when the accumulation and expansion of capital cannot find its essential dynamic component inside the system. In capitalistic economies the crucial component for the drive to expand is the capacity to enlarge the scale of capital." (xx) Such expansion requires "complimentarity from dependent economies." (xxi)

And, in "The Final Document" of the Christians for Socialism Convention, the 400 delegates at Santiago stated that

the economic and social structures of our Latin American countries are grounded on oppression and injustice, which in turn is a result of our capitalist dependence on the great power centers. In each of our nations small minorities serve the cause of international capitalism and its accomplices. Using every means in their power, they seek to maintain a situation that was created to benefit themselves. This structural injustice is in fact violence, whether it be open or disguised.... The growing acuteness of the class struggle makes it clear that there are only two possible alternatives in Latin America today: dependent capitalism with its resultant underdevelopment, or socialism. (Eagleson. 161, 162)

Witvliet writes that it is worth realizing that Latin American figures "like Helder Camara and Leonidas Proano did not discover the fact of Latin American dependence in libraries, but by going about their pastoral work among the people." (123) He does not, however, put as much weight on

the concept of dependency theory as do the other writers as he explains:

This analysis of structures of dependence appeared in the 1960s, and it is known as the 'dependence theory.' However, it is quite wrong to assume that since Medellin a number of bishops and priests... untrained in social and economic matters, have succumbed to a Marxist theory of society which hardly goes further than propagating the breaking of ties with the capitalist world. This conception fails to see what precedes the susceptibility towards the dependence theory: the discovery of the contradiction between the de facto dependence and domination...and the myths of development and progress. Gutierrez is right in saying that the use of the 'dependence theory' by liberation theologians cannot in fact be called naive because there is no alternative. However, it is no more than an expedient for understanding reality.... The term 'dependence theory' causes misunderstandings. There is no such thing as the dependence theory, nor has there ever been. (123)

Assman, however, has no such problems with semantics or with definitions of concepts, stating:

There is probably no more obvious example of a committed science anywhere today than sociology in Latin America, which has taken the decisive step of making "dependence" the central theme of its investigations into the real situation in Latin America. This situation of dependence is the basic starting-point for the process of liberation.... The theory of dependence springs from the crisis of the theory of development. Rather than complementing it, it represents total rejection, seeing under-development not as a backward state preceding developed capitalism, but as a direct consequence of it, a special and engineered form of development: dependent capitalism. The fact that dependence has been a situation constant throughout our history, and productive of it, means that it can become a scientific category to explain our history.... It is a situation that has moulded the internal structures of our countries. (129-130)

The point overlooked by all dependency proponents is that large and powerful nations, judged either by military

might or economic strength, throughout history have always imposed some form of economic dependence upon their smaller and weaker neighbors. That has been equally true of capitalist and non-capitalist nations alike. For example, Cuba as a single-product exporter (sugar, though some might arguably include tobacco and revolution) remains in a dependent status following its successful revolution and has only changed from being dependent upon United States capitalism to being dependent upon Soviet Union socialist state capitalism. In other words, Soviet economic imperialism has been no less a reality than the United States capitalist variety. Ignoring that fact, Miguez Bonino in Christians and Marxism: The Mutual Challenge to Revolution gives the Soviet Union rather high praise as the major seedbed for the political practice of what he calls Marxist socialism:

Whatever our misgivings, it is difficult not to feel a sense of admiration and gratitude for a movement that, in less than a century, through its direct action in some areas and through indirect influence in others, has raised to a human condition the life of at least half of the human race!
(89)

In the real world of politics one would be hard pressed to define or describe just what such a non-dependent country would be like since dependence/non-dependence is best understood to represent a continuum rather than a dichotomous relationship. Nations therefore are either more or less dependent upon one or more of the rest of the interna-

tional community of nations, including that epitome of imperialistic capitalism, the United States which itself has become financially dependent upon Japan and other nations of the Pacific Basin by becoming a debtor and importing nation rather than its somewhat traditional role as a lender and exporting nation.

The initial criticism of dependencia came from David Ray in the Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs in an article entitled "The Dependency Model of Latin American underdevelopment: Three Basic Fallacies." The three basic fallacies of the dependency arguments which he sees are:

(1) The model claims that dependency is caused by the economics of capitalism. In making this claim, the dependency theorists consciously choose to ignore an equally plausible and much more comprehensive explanation, and they do so on a shallow and patently illogical pretext.

(2) The model asserts that private foreign investment is invariably exploitative and invariably detrimental to Latin American development. This assertion is an oversimplification of a highly complex reality....

(3) The model repeatedly suggests that dependency/nondependency is a dichotomous variable, thereby implying that nondependency (which is left carelessly undefined) is a potentially achievable alternative.... (7)

Ray then gives an example of the Soviet-Yugoslav negotiations between 1945-1947, noting that the relationship as desired by the Soviets was shocking to the Yugoslavs and reflected "demands characteristic only of relations between capitalist countries and their colonies." (8)

Another major failing of dependency theory is its basis

in zero-sum reasoning, saying in effect that "we in Latin America are poor because you in the capitalist North are rich," or vice-versa. That form of reasoning proceeds from the premise that there is only so much wealth to be had in the world--a fixed amount--and if one is to get more it can only be through redistribution of existing wealth so that the other now has less. The incarnate evil to be attacked is variously understood to be "capitalism," the thief that made Latin America poor.

As Novak so graphically illustrates in his books and articles, the Liberationists are setting up a strawman and beating him to death, when in fact they are grossly ignorant of capitalism. The evils described by the liberation literature are the result of 400-plus years of pre-capitalist mercantilism, the landed nobility oppressing the landless masses, and not the result of real capitalism, which Novak describes as democratic capitalism or entrepreneurial capitalism:

What do I mean by "democratic capitalism"? I mean three systems in one: a predominantly market economy; a polity respectful of the rights of the individual to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; and a system of cultural institutions moved by ideals of liberty and justice for all. In short, three dynamic and converging systems functioning as one: a democratic polity, an economy based on markets and incentives, and a moral-cultural system which is pluralistic and, in the largest sense, liberal. (Nash, 21)

Jack Nelson-Pallmeyer is typical of the Liberation writers concerning the concept of capitalism in that he care-

lessly ascribes evils that are characteristic of individual human beings, regardless of their economic or political or religious philosophy, to a system which he does not seem to understand:

Capitalism concentrates wealth and power.... Capitalism spurns equity and targets production to the profit-desires and the demands of the wealthy.... Capitalism measures success by gross national product.... Capitalism stresses ownership.... Capitalism thrives on greed.... Capitalism promotes unlimited possession and consumption as a means to ultimate fulfillment.... What is required is a politics of compassion that embodies personal and social commitments to build justice into economic relationships, lifestyles, political systems and governmental policies. Christians must be freed from the idolatry of capitalism if they are to be a spiritually whole people working for socio-economic justice. (55, 56)

In reality, the opposite is true. What Latin America needs is for governmental structures to be modified to allow the development of an entrepreneurial class which in turn will provide jobs for those who are unemployed who in turn will break off with new ideas for new businesses to employ more of the unemployed, as Novak illustrates in Liberation Theology: Will It Liberate? The problem is not in capitalism, but in capitalism being misunderstood and misrepresented by the remnants of mercantilism. That very misunderstanding has led the Liberationists to embrace a form of Marxian socialism as the vehicle to bring about economic emancipation in Latin America.

Marxian Socialism. Clodovis Boff, in Salvation and Liberation, states that

we must come right out and say it, loud and clear: liberation is the social emancipation of the oppressed. Our concrete task is to replace the capit-alistic system and move toward a new society--a society of a socialistic type. (116)

But, given the fact that not one example of extant socialism can be shown to be the prophesied vehicle of emancipation, the question that begs to be answered is: "How is it that intelligent, educated Third World leaders see in Marxism their only hope?" Jacques Ellul, formerly a French Communist and now a French anarchist, goes even further by stating that classical Marxian economic theory is dead in the water as far as European intellectuals are concerned:

What is left of Marx in our day? Nothing. I say "nothing" even though I take Marxists themselves into account. What do they think of Marx's political economy? It has been quietly swept into a corner; it contains so many errors, ill-conceived explanations, and false predictions that Marxists generally prefer not to mention Marx's political economy in concrete terms. What about Marx's philosophy? Insofar as it attempted to provide a coherent materialist system, Marxists have usually abandoned it as well, so that materialism is no longer considered an essential axiom. Marx's materialism was necessarily tied to the overall thought of the nineteenth century. And Marx's strategy? Why, Communism was supposed to come to life in the most economically developed country, where capitalism had reached its greatest potential.... In our day we have changed all this: now Communism can come to life in the most poverty-stricken countries. But this is profoundly anti-Marxist; even the most convoluted explanation fails to harmonize the two notions. What remains then, are scattered pieces of Marx's thought; Marxists clutch at these, as if by themselves they could

have some obscure meaning: class struggle, prevailing ideology, relations of production, etc. Certain quotations of Marx are especially useful-- profound phrases that get applied to everything, and can be interpreted however one likes.... How marvelous that after the end of Stalinism, there are dozens of Marxisms to choose from! (15)

Ellul goes on to describe both Marxism and Communism as having declined into meatless ideologies and to being about as threatening as membership in an exclusive country club. In the ebb and flow of political movements, that description probably is true of the Continent, may be becoming true in Central and Latin America as well, and may well be the reason for the Liberation Theologists' vagueness when trying to define just what sort of Marxian-messianic-kingdom they hope to help establish throughout the Third World or just what they mean by "Marxist" (for example, see Segundo's comment on page 14, above).

Like Novak, Roanald Nash in Liberation Theology draws attention to the lack of understanding on the part of the liberation writers concerning both capitalism and socialism by stating:

Like capitalism, socialism is an umbrella-term that covers a range of options. What do the options along the socialist range of the continuum have in common? Many times, the common element is simply an opposition to capitalism along with a predilection for centralized economic control. While socialists may not always know what capitalism is, they are certain that it is immoral and irrational. So-called Christian socialists find additional support for their position in the belief that capitalism's stress on the pursuit of profit and its pandering to greed, materialism and selfishness making it an unsuitable choice for any Christian. They find socialism preferable because, they think, it encour-

ages such basic Christian values as community.... [Existing] state socialisms are a frequent source of embarrassment to some liberation theologians who insist, with few specifics, that the socialism they promote is different. For example, Archbishop Dom Helder Camara of Brazil has stated: "I am a socialist.... But I don't see the solution in the socialist governments that exist today...The Marxist record is awful.... My socialism is a special one which respects the human person and turns to the gospel. My socialism is justice." (quoted in Bonino, 46, 47). (57)

The love affair between Latin American church leaders and Marxian socialism began before Medellin and Vatican II, and has gained intensity over time, progressing through those two meetings as well as the "Third World" movement in Argentina by means of groups of priests who had opted for socialism. In a post-convention document of the Christians for Socialism Convention in Santiago, Gonzalo Arroyo observes that

In Chile the "Young Church" movement began in 1968, and "The 80" priests stepped into the picture in 1971. They publicly espoused socialism, and this led to the creation of "Christians for Socialism" in 1972. Initially the latter organization was composed of priests and ministers who lived and worked among the common people. Gradually it took in the more aware sectors of the Christian working classes, radicalized sectors of students, and the petty bourgeoisie.... Socialist Christians judged that the real choice was between capitalism and socialism, that there was no third alternative, and that Christians and Marxists should unite around the project to implement socialism. This position is based on the tenet that the chief contradiction is not between Christians and Marxists but between exploiters and exploited. It is important to point out that these socialist Christians did not try to derive their political stance from their faith.... They derived their political stance from an analysis which they wanted to be as objective and scientific as possible, and which they saw authenticated

by the political praxis of the workers and their
avante-garde. (Eagleson 234-235)

Phillip Berryman elaborates on that point somewhat in
his volume The Religious Roots of Rebellion, maintaining
that Central American Marxism is homegrown and "more heur-
istic than doctrinal, more a questionnaire than a set of
ready-made answers. It is a way of looking at society."

(352) Stating that Marxism as a tool of analysis does not
guarantee a clear and accurate vision since tools can be
used very badly or very well, he nevertheless considers it
to be the most accurate of all analysis tools (see, for
example, the quote on page 24, above).

Jose Miranda is perhaps the most convinced Liberation
Theologian concerning the necessity of blending communism
and Christianity. Indeed, for Miranda, the two are really
synonymous, but "to identify communism with Marxism implies
a crass ignorance of history" (Ferm, 161). He explains:

For a Christian to say he or she is anti-Marxist is
understandable. There are numerous varieties of
Marxism, and it is possible that our Christian is
referring to one of the many materialistic philoso-
phies which style themselves Marxist without having
much at all to do with Marx.

For a Christian to claim to be not only anti-
Marxist but anti-Marx as well, it is probably owing
to not having read all of Marx, and the repugnance
is a symptom of simple ignorance....

But for a Christian to claim to be anticommunist
is quite a different matter and without doubt cons-
titutes the greatest scandal of our century....

Marxism is a mere episode in the history of the
communist project.... But the communist project is
explicitly defended in the Bible as proper to and
characteristic of Christianity. (160-161)

Miranda later identifies the Soviet Union as an example

of failed Marxism and a primary current example of state capitalism, a concept readily recognized by political scientists in the North. Miranda's concept of communism may not be quite as recognizable, however, due to its referring to the concept of Christian community as found in the Bible in the book of The Acts of the Apostles--quite different from the mental images of the ravages and excesses of Stalinism conjured up by the term "communist" when used in the United States. Ellul agrees:

In summary, we have witnessed in recent years the rejection of everything that made the Communist Party hard and uncompromising. All rough edges and areas of disagreement with other political orientations have been eliminated, along with all of Communism's key affirmations.... I believe that Communism (in general and in all its forms) is so thoroughly spread and integrated into our society, so utterly assimilated to our present world, and so completely penetrated by the various prevailing ideologies that it has lost all its vigor and specificity. The result is a kind of ideological stew into which you can throw anything so long as it agrees with the ideology of the clientele. (17)

It is the fact that the clientele he mentions has grown enormously in recent years on every continent, including Africa and Latin America, that Marxian socialism has been so watered down that it, too, fits all categories including the religious. He elaborates:

It no longer brings with it a hard and pure concept of the most die-hard socialism. Instead, it is subject to the most ordinary stream of beliefs, desires, needs, and tendencies.... These new supporters are nationalists who believe in democracy, freedom, equality, etc., and their goals are comfort, happiness, and a higher standard of living. Obviously, since Marxism and Communism have been utterly voided of content, people can join up with

no difficulty.... We can say, then, that present-day Communism has become an ideology in the most vulgar sense of the word. It is worthless: a bunch of beliefs, a mixture of all sorts of things, since it has grasped everything that belonged to our society's mood. Communism is the most perfected ideology, because it makes use of absolutely everything that makes up the ideological panorama of our society. (18)

The truth of that statement is borne out by the fact that when this research project was begun some four years ago (in the summer of 1984) the main point of confusion surrounding the movement at that time, at least as reflected in the literature, was in the movement's improper use of the term "theology" and its attempted blending of Marxian theory with theology. The main point of contention, which has not changed, was that the movement was and is primarily a political movement with no single party expression. Over time, however, the areas of confusion have multiplied both within and without the movement and the uninitiated outsider may often get the feeling that he is dealing with ideological quick-silver--here it looks for all the world like a bonafide religious movement; there it looks for all the world like a subversive plot to bring in world communist domination by sneaking into the peoples' minds by using religious terminology and clerical garb--reflecting the continually shifting positions of the Liberation Theologists themselves between classical Marxism and the call for participatory democracy and the economic opportunities made available by a mixed economy.

That ideological "coat of many colors" could, however, become its greatest political strength by providing the necessarily broad spectrum needed to enable the movement to succeed as the institution capable of holding the society and polity together and carrying out effective programs of reform so desperately needed throughout Central America and the Third World. Liberation Theology, at least within the CEBs, has provided hands-on experience in self-government and participatory democracy among the members of the communities in contrast to the often-rigged elections held by the ruling dictatorships. They have even provided small examples of a working socialistic-type of economy, based not, however, on Marx or Lenin but rather on the almost opposite concept of Christian community. Neither example, however, gives much practice in the handling of real-world problems on a national and international scale as faced by the governing body.

The greatest weakness, as stated above (page 91), is its confluence of Marxism and Christianity because of perception problems from the North, particularly from the standpoint of United States foreign policy makers who see a manifold danger in the Marxian socialist and/or communist party ideologies and yet who also fear attacking someone's "religion." Therefore, the movement's insistence upon Marxist ideology, however badly misconstrued, and however meaningless in reality, effectively limits its potential

as the promised deliverer since it fuels deeply ingrained mistrusts in both the North and the Third World and hinders effective communication between the two worlds.

Thus, as political ideology the movement is caught in the bog of what both Marxism and communism have become, that is, a mere shell devoid of real content as Ellul describes, but thereby it has alienated itself from assistance from the very anti-Marxist North. But, it is further mired in a bog of religiosity by claiming to be a "theology" and thereby it has alienated itself from assistance from the majority of Christendom, including the more conservative branches of its parent Catholicism, regardless of how favorable such groups may be regarding Liberation Theology's call to practice Christian community--that is, in their terminology, Christian "Marxism."

The next chapter deals with the response possibilities from the North given the limited alternatives allowed by the Liberation Theology mindset as it is hooked on using a Marxian vocabulary.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

Liberation Theology's failures and shortcomings do not change the fact that it exists as a powerful (at least potentially) popular political movement, and that the United States, both in its Congress and its Executive Branch's foreign policy, must be able to respond intelligently to the challenges of the movement so as not to further alienate the Latin Americans and to help them attain the reality of "liberation" they are so actively seeking. This chapter deals with that response possibility based on the limited alternatives allowed by the Liberation Theology mindset and its affinity for Marxian socialism as supported by, and expressed in, dependency theory.

One of the conclusions alluded to in a previous chapter is that once the original six or seven major writers--that is, the founders of the movement--are consulted, the writers who follow do not add much of significance to the movement known as Liberation Theology, nor indeed to the broader concept of political theology. While most philosophers produce a vocabulary peculiar to their own musings, those who have produced Liberation Theology have chosen rather to adapt (as distinct from adopt) the vocabulary of Marx as modified by the neo-Marxists and New Left, and have attempted to blend that vocabulary into

biblical or theological terminology and ecclesiastical teachings so as to provide, by their definition, an identification with the poor in their reality. More than that, the Liberation clergy have also transformed the concept of spiritual salvation from being a deliverance from sin to a state of grace into being political liberation from unjust structures to a Marxian socialist utopia--justifying the transformation by resorting to a politicized eisegesis (reading meaning into) of biblical passages instead of following traditional exegesis (reading meaning out of) methodology, and by redefining sin from being a personal offense against God to being structural offenses against the poor, who are the genuine people of God.

The problems generated by such a transformation are recognized by some of the Liberation writers and are the subject of dissertations at most of the major seminaries. The major problem from the standpoint of the political, sociological and theological worlds is that by resorting to such eisegesis any possible standard of measurement that may have existed is "elasticized," leaving all such measurement and evaluation to be done according to the judgment of the individual writer, priest, political scientist, or theologian according to his or her own interpretation both of biblical precepts and of Marxism, despite the lack of agreement or coherence regarding Marx's essential thought among even the most die-hard Marxists or neo-Marxists.

A second conclusion of note is that by blindly accepting a so-called Marxist analysis, Liberation Theology to a rather great extent ignores the compelling reality that there is no extant example of a Marxian socialism that has liberated a people from unjust social structures--which they admit in regard to Russia and China--and it ignores, or is ignorant of, the difference between "capitalism" and pre-capitalist mercantilism and consequently falls victim to the "fallacy of a false cause" endemic to dependency theory. By using a misunderstood and ill-defined capitalism as an all-purpose whipping-boy--and a misunderstood and ill-defined Marxism as the deliverer--Liberation Theology, and Sandinismo, preclude any realistic cooperation from the very free market economy systems that are best able to aid in the real development of the states involved in Latin and Central America and the Third World.

That there have been crimes committed by "capitalists" is not at all denied, but the overall market economy system should not be thrown out because of them--especially since the crimes in question were for the most part committed in collusion with mercantilist leaders and dictators of those Latin American countries, such as the Samoja families in Nicaragua's modern era, and with an American foreign policy essentially designed to protect American investments rather than actively to assist in the development of entrepreneurial capitalism and the resulting economic and political

liberation of the people. Indeed, when considering the history of the Third World and Latin and Central America in particular with its long-term abuse of the principles of what the United States likes to call a free market economy, the wonder is not that there have been Marxist-oriented revolutions against such abuses but that such revolutions took so long to develop in the first place.

A third conclusion, and perhaps the most important in reference to Liberation Theology as political ideology, is the remarkable kinship and likeness in design, methodology and philosophy to Sandino's liberation theosophy, or anarcho-Communism, discussed in Chapter III above. The kinship and likeness becomes all the more remarkable when the Sandinista leadership, including avowedly ardent atheist Bayardo Arce, refers to the revolution as the "Kingdom of God" and when that leadership includes four Catholic priests in the official governmental structure of Nicaragua. Augusto Sandino recognized the need for a spiritual element to undergird the revolution if he hoped to inspire the ignorant masses of people to rally to his cause and maintain their loyalty throughout the long struggle against what he somewhat loosely described as "capitalist imperialism." Liberation Theology today serves that same function for the FSLN, in addition to providing both a rationale supporting Marxian socialism for the common people and spiritual, or biblical justification

for the use of violence to overthrow the existing "unjust" governmental institutions and social structures.

But Liberation Theology goes one step further than just those two supports in that it provides the original vehicle for Marxist indoctrination among a mostly illiterate class of peasants and indians, all the while equating Marxist principles with biblical teachings and biblical illustrations (see, for example, Tommie Montgomery's article quoted on page 57, above). The motive behind the indoctrination initiated within the CEBs is admittedly political in nature and, as already mentioned, the CEBs are an exercise in participatory democracy and in group decision-making. The problem arises in just that area, the blending of "church" and "politics" and church support of political violence, making Liberation Theology just the latest step in the history of religious/political extremism as well as just the latest version of "the opiate of the masses"--in an opposite application than Marxism originally intended for the phrase.

The dilemma presented to governments and non-radical Christendom in the North--particularly in the United States with its peculiarly pluralistic Judeo-Christian heritage in both the public and private sectors--is that no matter how either group would challenge or attack Liberation Theology its adherents offer the counter claim that they are the "authentic" voice of Christianity and that their version of

Marxian socialism is the only "Christian" form of government. Foreign policy makers, diplomats and other government officials from the United States are hesitant to deal with the phenomenon because here we do not attack another person's "theology" or religion no matter how weird or radical it may seem--after all, even Jim Jones had federal, state, county and city government recognition as a legitimate social welfare agency in California as a "church," and snake-handlers are tolerated in the South as an authentic form of worship "according to the dictates of one's own conscience," and therefore protected by the Constitution.

The supposed dilemma is false, however, because Liberation Theology is neither theology nor religion, except in the sense of being an ideology or an ideological support for a political movement. Liberation Theology in reality is a religious version of dependency theory with its heavy reliance upon neo-Marxist and New Leftist ideological sloganism, as clearly demonstrated in the liberation literature. But now theological language is used and it is supported by appropriate biblical examples as if to provide it an additional measure of legitimacy--but a legitimacy that is protected in the awesomeness of the "absolute" and thereby perhaps gaining a measure of immunity from any sort of penetrating political analysis. The timid and the intimidated with a pluralist mindset find the footing rather fearful within those constraints.

However, the constraints, like the dilemma, are false as well and the entire Liberation Theology political movement is open to question and analysis, even penetrating economic and political analysis, just as any other political movement or economic system--particularly since its supporting classical Marxism has been abandoned as unworkable by the movement's European counterparts and the radical Christianity of the movement is not accepted as authentic in most quarters of Catholic, evangelical, and/or fundamental Christendom. The political analyst should recall that for Sandino and also for Sandinismo there is little or no difference in using theosophy, the occult, Freemasonry, or the Christian religion--either the traditional elements of Catholicism or the radical elements of Liberation Theology--since each or any combination thereof can serve just as well as the needed spiritual element to subdue and dupe the ignorant spoken of by Sandino. The political analyst, diplomat or policy maker, particularly those with a pluralist bias, should handle Liberation Theology in that same light--according to Sandino's definition--rather than to be intimidated by fears of attacking one's religion.

As Ellul so eloquently relates, even the Marxism and the Communism espoused by the Liberationists are devoid of all radical meaning. The Marxian socialism explained by the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister, Alejandro Bendana, for example, includes the concepts of participatory democracy,

Christian involvement in the government structure, and a mixed economy: "We are Marxists, but name me one Communist country that has multiple political parties represented in free elections, that has three Christian priests in the official government, and that has sixty percent of its economy still in private hands--how then can you in the United States call us Communists?"⁴

The first--and perhaps only--realistic response possibility is that while American foreign policy makers need not fear to tread upon Liberation Theology as religious beliefs, it must be taken into account as a possible grass-roots and populist political movement with much potential to accomplish the very goals that are in the best interests of both the United States and the common people in Central and Latin America, viz., the economic and political freedom they are so desperately seeking. But at the same time, to dwell too much and too long on the essentially meaningless Marxist rhetoric of the movement will be counterproductive by simply clouding the issues at stake and thereby adding to the problem. Therefore, getting beyond the mistrusts and biases generated by Liberation Theology's Marxist rhetoric-infused religiosity is the sine que non to meaningful dialogue. And, given the operational definition of "Marxism" as used by the Liberationists and the Sandinistas, that should not be too difficult a task if real two-way

⁴In a telephone conversation August 12, 1988.

communication is established to replace the current name-calling and sloganism being bantied back and forth between the adversaries.

The greater task follows the establishment of meaningful dialogue and that is resolving all the inbred misunderstandings saturating all areas of our reciprocal relationships. It is impossible to read much of the literature in the field of Latin and Central America without being somewhat overwhelmed by the lack of understanding on the part of the Americans concerning the history, people, resources, governments, and real needs of the area as well as the lack of understanding on the part of the Latin Americans toward the United States in both its official government policies (to say nothing of its policy making processes) and its ability to be of genuine assistance in reaching the laudable goals of economic and political liberation. Whatever steps were being made in that direction, and however poorly they were being accomplished--from Kennedy's Alliance for Progress to the current situation--neither side has communicated well with the other and little has been accomplished to effect the attainment of the stated goals. In that specific area of consideration, Liberation Theology's performance has been disappointing at best and a dismal failure at worst--being neither "liberation" nor "theology" it has thus far failed to reach its promised potential as a political movement because it has failed to adequately explain--

and thereby to address--the real causes for the area's economic and political backwardness in real development and liberty. It has, in fact, been a hindrance (because of its affinity for Marxism and the rhetoric mentioned above) to mutual understanding and real liberation of the peoples of Latin and Central America in particular and of the Third World in general.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abbott, Walter M., ed. Documents of Vatican II. New York: Guild Press, 1966.
- Almond, Gabriel A. Political Development: Essays in Heuristic Theory. Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1970.
- Alvarez, Roberto, ed. Report on Human Rights in El Salvador. New York: Vintage Books, 1982.
- Anderson, Gerald H. and Thomas F. Strarky, eds. Mission Trends #4: Liberation Theologies in North America and Europe. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1979.
- Assman, Hugo. Theology for a Nomad Church. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1976.
- Baldy, Tom F. Battle for Ulster. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1981.
- Baloyra, Enrique. El Salvador in Transition. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982.
- Bath, Richard and Dilmus D. James. "Dependency Analysis of Latin America: Some Criticisms, Some Suggestions." Latin American Research Review Vol. 11, #3, 1976.
- Bell, J. Bowyer. The Secret Army: The IRA 1916-1979. Dublin: The Academy Press, 1970.
- Berryman, Phillip. The Religious Roots of Rebellion: Christians in Central American Revolutions. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1984.
- Betto, Frei. Fidel and Religion. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987.
- Bigo, Pierre. The Church and Third World Revolutions. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1977.
- Boff, Leonardo and Clodovis Boff. Salvation and Liberation. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1984.
- Bonino, Jose Miguez. Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975.
- Burns, E. Bradford. At War in Nicaragua: The Reagan Doctrine and the Politics of Nostalgia. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1987.

- Burton, Frank. The Politics of Legitimacy: Struggles in a Belfast Community. London: Rutledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1978.
- Cardoso, Fernando and Enzo Faletto. Dependency and Development in Latin America. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979.
- Christian, Shirley. Nicaragua: Revolution in the Family. New York: Random House, 1989.
- Cobb, John B., Jr. Process Theology as Political Theology. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982.
- Collier, David, ed. The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979.
- Collins, Joseph. Nicaragua: What Difference Could a Revolution Make? New York: Grove Press, 1986.
- Cornell, George W. "Liberation Theology Founder Fends Off Attacks." Chattanooga News-Free Press August 6, 1988.
- Cox, Harvey. Religion in the Secular City: Toward a Postmodern Theology. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984.
- Crenshaw, Martha, ed., Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power: The Consequences of Political Violence. Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 1983.
- Dickey, Christopher. With the Contras. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985.
- Dickinson, Richard D. N. To Set at Liberty the Oppressed. Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1975.
- Diskin, Martin, ed. Trouble in Our Backyard. New York: Pantheon Books, 1983.
- Ellis, Marc H. "Liberation Theology and the Crisis of Western Society." The World & I May, 1988.
- Ellul, Jacques. Jesus and Marx: From Gospel to Ideology. Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1988.
- Eagleson, John, ed. Christians and Socialism. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1975.
- Fagen, Richard R. "Studying Latin American Politics: Some Implications of a Dependencia Approach." Latin American Research Review Vol. 12, #2, 1977.

- Fauriol, Georges, ed. Latin American Insurgencies. Washington, D. C.: National Defense University Press, 1985.
- Ferm, Deane William, ed. Third World Liberation Theologies: A Reader. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1986.
- Fierro, Alfredo. The Militant Gospel. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1975.
- Gettleman, Marvin E., et. al., eds. El Salvador: Central America in the New Cold War. New York: Grove Press, 1986.
- Gibellini, Rosino, ed. Frontiers of Theology in Latin America. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1975.
- Glasser, Arthur F. and Donald A. McGavran. Contemporary Theologies of Missions. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1983.
- Gorman, Robert A. Neo-Marxism: The Meanings of Modern Radicalism. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1982.
- Greene, Thomas H. Comparative Revolutionary Movements: Search for Theory and Justice. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1984.
- Gutierrez, Gustavo. A Theology of Liberation. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1979.
- _____. On Job. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1987.
- Hiro, Dilip. Iran Under the Ayatollahs. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1985.
- Hodges, Donald C. Intellectual Foundations of the Nicaraguan Revolution. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986.
- Josephus, Flavius. The Works of Flavius Josephus. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1979.
- Kirk, J. Andrew. Liberation Theology: An Evangelical View From the Third World. Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1979.
- Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. Dictatorships and Double Standards: Rationalism & Reason in Politics. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982.

- Koury, Enver M. and Charles G. MacDonald, eds. Revolution in Iran: A Reappraisal. Hyattsville: Institute of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs, 1982.
- Lakeland, Paul. Freedom in Christ. New York: Fordham University Press, 1986.
- Leiken, Robert S. and Barry Rubin, eds. The Central American Crisis Reader. New York: Summit Books, 1987.
- Lenin, Vladimir I. The State and Revolution. Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1976.
- Lernoux, Penny. "Vatican Using Theology to Dominate Latins." National Catholic Reporter Vol. 20, April 20, 1984.
- MacStiofain, Sean. Revolutionary in Ireland. Edinburgh: R. and R. Clark, Ltd., 1975.
- McCann, Dennis P. "Liberating Without Being Liberationist: the U. S. Catholic Bishops' Pastoral Letter on the Economy." The World & I May, 1988.
- McLellan, David. Ideology. Stony Stratford: Open University Press, 1986.
- Maduro, Otto. Religion and Social Conflict. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1982.
- Manning, David J., ed. The Form of Ideology. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1980.
- Moran, Theodore H. Multinational Corporations and the Politics of Dependence. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.
- Nash, Ronald H., ed. Liberation Theology. Milford: Mott Media, Inc., 1984.
- Nelson-Pallmeyer, John. The Politics of Compassion. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1986.
- Noori, Ayatollah Allama Yagya. Islamic Government and the Revolution in Iran. Glasgow: Royston, Ltd., 1985.
- Nordlinger, Eric A. Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977.
- Novak, Michael. "Liberation Theology and the Pope." Commentary June, 1979.

- Novak, Michael. Will It Liberate: Questions About Liberation Theology. New York: Paulist Press, 1986.
- Novak, Michael. The Spirit of Democratic Capitalism. New York: American Enterprise Institute/ Simon and Schuster, 1982.
- Nuccio, Richard A. What's Wrong, Who's Right in Central America? New York: Facts on File Publications, 1986.
- Nunez, Emilio A. Liberation Theology. Chicago: Moody Press, 1977.
- O'Ballance, Edgar. Terror in Ireland: The Heritage of Hate. Novato: Presidio Press, 1981.
- O'Brien, Connor Cruise. "God and Man in Nicaragua." The Atlantic Monthly August, 1986.
- Ogden, Schubert M. Faith and Freedom: Toward a Theology of Liberation. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1979.
- Palmer, Monte. Dilemmas of Political Development. Itasca: F. E. Peacole Publishers, Inc., 1985.
- Peeler, John A. Latin American Democracies. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1985.
- Plamenatz, John. Ideology. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970.
- Raines, John C. and Thomas Dean, eds. Marxism and Radical Religion: Essays Toward a Revolutionary Humanism. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1970.
- Rapaport, David C. and Yonah Alexander, eds. The Morality of Terrorism: Religious and Secular Justifications. New York: Pergamon Press, 1982.
- Ratliff, William E. Castroism and Communism in Latin America, 1959-1976. Washington, D. C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976.
- Roelofs, H. Mark. "Liberation Theology: The Recovery of Biblical Radicalism." American Political Science Review Vol. 82, No. 2 June, 1988.
- Rubenstein, Richard L. "Liberation Theology and the Crisis of Western Society." The World & I May, 1988.
- Schwartz, Stephen, ed. The Transition: From Authoritarianism to Democracy in the Hispanic World. San Francisco: ICS Press, 1986.

- Segundo, Juan Luis. The Liberation of Theology. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1976.
- Sigmund, Paul C. "The Development of Liberation Theology: Continuity or Change?" The World & I May, 1988.
- Stempel, John D. Inside the Iranian Revolution. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1981.
- Sterling, Claire. The Terror Network. New York: Readers Digest Press, 1981.
- Strong, Augustus. Systematic Theology. Old Tappan: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1907.
- Valenzuela, Arturo. The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Chile. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.
- Vilas, Carlos M. The Sandinista Revolution. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1986.
- Wald, Kenneth D. Religion and Politics in the United States. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987.
- Walker, Thomas W. Nicaragua: The Land of Sandino. Boulder: Westview Press, 1986.
- Webber, Robert E. The Secular Saint. Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1981.
- Welch, Sharon D. Communities of Resistance and Solidarity. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1985.
- Whelan, James R. and Patricia R. Bozell. Catastrophe in the Caribbean. Ottawa: Jameson Books, 1984.
- Wiarda, Howard J. In Search of Policy: The United States and Latin America. Washington, D. C.: The American Enterprise Institute, 1984.
- Witvliet, Theo. A Place in the Sun: Liberation Theology in the Third World. Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1984.
- Wynia, Gary W. The Politics of Latin American Development. London: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

CONFERENCE PAPERS

- Beal, Tarcisio. "The Roman Catholic Church in Contemporary Brazil: Foundations and Directions of Her Political Activism." Tuscaloosa: International Studies Association, South. 1987.
- Beaver, Wayne. "Radical World Theologies." Winona Lake: Grace Theological Seminary, 1984.
- Brown, Lyle C. "From Revolution to Liberation Theology: Church-State Relations in Twentieth-Century Mexico." Tuscaloosa: International Studies Association, South, 1987.
- Combee, Jerry. "On Refuting Liberation Theology: Novak's Not Enough." Tuscaloosa: International Studies Association, South, 1987.
- Pottenger, John R. "Sandinismo and Liberation Theology: The Political Theoretical Confluence." Tuscaloosa: International Studies Association, South, 1987.
- Shaw, Royce Quinton. "Political Participation in Central America." Columbia: International Studies Association, South, 1985.

BOOKLETS

- Leroy, William R. "Liberation Theology." Cape May, New Jersey: International Council of Christian Churches, June 1979.

VITA

Charles Alan Murphy was born in Duncan, Oklahoma on June 6, 1942. He attended elementary schools in that city and was graduated from Blackwell High School, Blackwell, Oklahoma in June 1960. That same month he entered Oklahoma State University, graduating in June 1968 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Science. He interrupted his studies with a four-year tour of duty with the United States Marine Corps from 1961 to 1965. After graduation he accepted a position with the Central Intelligence Agency in Washington, D. C., which was followed by graduate studies at both the Oklahoma State University and the Temple Baptist Theological Seminary at Chattanooga, Tennessee.

In December 1982 he received the Master of Arts degree from Oklahoma State University and accepted a teaching position at Tennessee Temple University, Chattanooga for that fall. The following spring he entered the University of Tennessee's graduate program for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in Political Science which he received in May 1989.

The author is a member of the American Political Science Association, the International Studies Association, and the Academy of Political Science. He will remain at Tennessee Temple University upon graduation.