To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Dianna L. Wright entitled "The Relationship between Women Athletes' Ways of Knowing and Moral Reasoning about Authority/Power in Daily Life and Sport." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Education.

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We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:

Vice Provost
and Dean of The Graduate School

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WOMEN ATHLETES' WAYS OF KNOWING AND MORAL REASONING ABOUT AUTHORITY/POWER IN DAILY LIFE AND SPORT

A Dissertation

Presented for the

Doctor of Philosophy

Degree

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Dianna L. Wright

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DEDICATION

This manuscript is dedicated to my Mom,
who empathetically listened to and heard my voice;

to my Dad,
who encouraged me to be my own authority;

and to Marge,
whose constant support and never ending encouragement
was so valuable in the completion of this manuscript.

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always remain a pleasant memory as I reflect on this process; I am truly changed.

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this investigation was to explore women athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power in daily life and sport. Conflict and preferred authority were chosen as issues to promote discussion concerning authority/power. A semi-structured interview was designed as the data collection technique to elicit responses from five intercollegiate and five recreational female softball players. The participants' responses were audio taped, transcribed, and analyzed in order to ascertain a way of knowing and moral reasoning level for each respondent in daily life and sport.

From the analysis of the interviews, it was concluded that six of the respondents were received knowers in both daily life and sport. Four of the respondents were constructed knowers in daily life and received knowers in sport. Nine of the respondents had moral reasoning levels of 3 and 4 in daily life and sport, and one of the respondents had a moral reasoning level of 5 in daily life and sport.

In situations of conflict with authorities in daily life and sport, the received knowers felt that they would not voice their opinion. The constructed knowers felt that they would voice their concerns with authorities in daily life, but not in sport. However, none of the respondents would follow their coach's directive when it involved intentional injury to an opponent. In situations of conflict with peers, all of the respondents felt comfortable voicing their concerns.

None of the respondents had a preference for a female or male in a position of authority in daily life. Although four of the respondents had no preference in a sport context, six of the respondents preferred a woman as coach. However, the respondents' preference for authority appeared to have no relationship to their ways of knowing in daily life or sport.

Representation of the world, like the world itself, is the work of men; they describe it from their own point of view, which they confuse with absolute truth.

Simone de Beauvoir
The Second Sex

In the course of our uncommon quest for a "common language," I can never forget that "in the beginning is the hearing."

Mary Daly
Gyn/Ecology

Power and knowledge are intimately linked. The old adage that knowledge is power is certainly true, but the reverse, that power generates knowledge is equally true. It is for this reason that knowledge about an underprivileged group, such as women, can only progress in small steps. A totally powerless group is totally mute. Protesting one's powerlessness is the first step towards gaining power. Only as a group finds a collective voice and collectively questions the legitimacy of an existing power structure can other data be generated which can then be used to challenge the validity of the viewpoint of the powerful group.

Margrit Eichler
The Double Standard

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Each individual life evolves through a dynamic process. Daniel Levinson (1978) coined the phrase "individual life structure" to define the human developmental cycle. Life structures, according to Levinson, were consistent habits of relationships, one's perception of roles, and patterns of interaction with the world. These included intimate relationships and acquaintances, societal roles in the public and private sphere, and patterns of work and leisure activity, to mention a few. Throughout this life structure, the individual developed basic assumptions about truth, authority, and knowledge. Life structure was an ongoing, ever changing process. Within the dynamic process of individual life structures, an individual's relationship to self, relationship to others, and exchange with the world evolves within the intellectual, moral, and psychological development of each individual (Bakan, 1966; Ericson, 1950; Gilligan, 1979, 1982; Levinson, 1978).

For many years, psychological theory was based on studies using primarily male subjects (Kohlberg, 1969). In addition, much of what was accepted as human developmental theory today had been articulated through a patriarchal culture. Only recently has there been a keen interest of women's experience by social psychologists, sociologists, psychologists, and physical educators, to mention a few.

Psychological literature often reported disparate themes in the psychological and moral development of women and men (Belenky, Clinchy,

Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986; Gilligan, 1977, 1979, 1982; Kohlberg, 1969, 1981, 1984). When females were included as subjects, researchers were usually interested in how the females conformed to, or differed from, their male counterparts (Kohlberg, 1969). Since masculine attributes had become the highly valued traits of western culture, those qualities, such as autonomy, independence, abstract critical thought, and the development of a morality of rights, received the emphasis in research. Traditional feminine qualities, such as interdependence, relationship, nurturance, and contextual thinking, were relegated to a lower status (Belenky et al., 1986; Butts, 1987; Gilligan, 1979, 1982). Men's experience and qualities were used as a barometer to judge both women's and men's development (Broverman, Broverman, Clarkson, Rosenkranz, & Vogel, 1970; Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, Clarkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972; Chodorow, 1978; Clinchy, Belenky, Goldberger, & Tarule, 1985; Code, 1981a, 1981b; Donovan, 1985; Farganis, 1986; Firestone, 1970; Rosenkrantz, Vogel, Broverman, & Broverman, 1968). Often this type of evaluation, comparing women's development to that of men, led researchers to conclude that women reached lower levels of both moral and intellectual development (Kohlberg, 1969, 1984).

In her recent book, In a Different Voice, Carol Gilligan (1982) posited that the disparity found between women's and men's development was not due to the inferiority of women's development, but, rather, to a misinterpretation of the research. Through a series of in-depth interviews used to develop psychological profiles, Gilligan (1982) found that women developed within a morality of responsibility and care

for self and others. This development progressed through three stages, each offering a different perspective and integrating a more complex understanding of self and others.

Gilligan (1982) suggested that moral decisions were not based on abstract principles, but instead were grounded in the context of relationship (Gilligan, 1982). Moral decisions were contextual and grounded in a milieu of relationship. The feminine conception of a "morality of responsibility" was different than the masculine conception of a "morality of rights" (Gilligan, 1982, p. 19). Women's morality was based on the ideal of connection rather than the men's ideal of separation. In other words, women rejected the conventional male idea of "blind justice" or total impartiality when making moral decisions. Instead, women embraced the idea that when making moral decisions, each context was different and every individual brought to the situation their own unique interpretation (Gilligan, 1982). As in Norma Haan's (1985) Theory of Interactional Morality, each individual was a moral agent, meaning that each person was actively involved in the moral decision-making process. Through interaction and dialogue, moral decisions were reached. The outcome was based upon what decision would be mutually beneficial for everybody involved.

> Women's construction of the moral problem as a problem of care and responsibility in relationships rather than as one of rights and rules ties the development of their moral thinking to changes in their understanding of responsibility and relationships. . . . Thus, the logic underlying an ethic of care is a psychological logic of relationships . . . (Gilligan, 1982, p. 73).

Gilligan (1982) posited that women's conceptions of self were intertwined with their morality. Women's self-identity also centered

around the idea of connectedness and relationship. This was juxtaposed to a morality of rights or defining the self in terms of separation, autonomy, and independence.

The psychological literature which examined the women's perspective widened the scope across disciplines from which all human development was viewed. Carol Gilligan's (1982) book, In a Different Voice, was one such piece of research. With an increase in research which included women's experience, formerly seen as inferior, the gap between women's and men's development was seen as a different developmental process. Research which examined women's perspectives and values was not only projected in the areas of psychological and moral development but also in the area of women's epistemological development. The different voice that Gilligan (1982) reported was expanded in a research project which explored women's ways of knowing about a variety of issues within the context of education. Some of the issues examined through the study were women's ways of knowing about authority/power; concept of self; and ideas about relationships, family, and morality.

Mary Belenky and her colleagues in their book Women's Ways of Knowing (Belenky et al., 1986) posited that women often felt alienated in academic settings and often doubted their intellectual capabilities. They found that much of what women valued as learning experiences had actually occurred outside the academic setting. This led Belenky et al. (1986) to question the appropriateness of the context of the current educational structure to meet the needs and values of women's

intellectual development. Within the educational structure, Belenky et al. (1986) found that women often felt voiceless and powerless due to the authority they felt that men held.

Belenky et al. (1986) "believed that conceptions of knowledge and truth that are accepted and articulated today have been shaped throughout history by the male-dominated majority culture" (p. 5). Little value had been placed on determining (a) whether or not women had different ways of knowing and (b) whether the current methods of teaching, evaluating, and course content were appropriate for women. "Relatively little attention has been given to modes of learning, knowing, and valuing that may be specific to, or at least common in, women" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 6). Women were simply integrated into the male-oriented mainstream of education. Belenky et al. (1986) postulated that perhaps the devaluation of women's ways of knowing may be due to the stereotypical idea of women's knowing as intuitive and emotional. This was contrary to the valued way of knowing as rational and objective. This masculine bias in pedagogy had been found by other feminist researchers in many disciplines and theories (Bowles and Duelli-Klein, 1983; Clinchy et al., 1985; Code, 1981a, 1981b; Du Bois, 1983; Harding, 1983; Harding & Hintikka, 1983; Held, 1985; Hoffman, 1986; Keller, 1982; Lloyd, 1983; MacGuigan, 1973; Nicholson, 1983; Palmier, 1979; Reinharz, 1984; Salner, 1985; Schaef, 1981; Sherif, 1979; Smith, 1974; Watkins, 1983). "Feminists are beginning to articulate the values of the female world and to reshape the disciplines to include the women's voice, while continuing to press

for the right of women to participate as equals in the male world" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 6).

In an effort to expand our awareness of human development and articulate the women's voice, Belenky et al. (1986) employed a longitudinal study using interviews with women of diverse backgrounds, ages, and educational experience to establish epistemological perspectives of women. They were informed by Gilligan's (1982) work on the psychological development of women and women's concepts of self, others, and morality. William Perry's (1970) work on the epistemological perspectives of Harvard male undergraduates, published in his book Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years, was also used as a map to help trace the evaluation of women's ways of knowing. Belenky et al. (1986) were concerned with (a) filling the void in Perry's (1970) work, due to the absence of women as subjects, and (b) hearing what alternatives women may add to the existing sequence of epistemological development.

In his work, Perry (1970) developed a scheme for intellectual development which consisted of four "positions" or "epistemological perspectives" through which his male subjects progressed. The first ground of knowledge was called basic dualism. From this perspective the student saw his world as polarized (e.g., either/or, good/bad, black/white, we/they). The dualistic thinker was dependent on authority to teach them the true meaning of right and wrong. From dualism, the student progressed to multiplicity, a position that entailed a gradual shift away from believing that authority was

external to believing that one's own internal authority had validity. As external authorities insisted on a logical and rationalized argument for the student's personal opinion, there was another shift to the position of relativism subordinate. The final stage, relativism, came when the student realized that knowledge was contextual and depended largely on the perception of the knower. The concept that truth was relative permeated not only the world of academe but also the student's entire life.

Belenky et al. (1986) used the above scheme to guide their understanding of women's epistemological orientation and how the women perceived themselves, others, and authority. From the 135 women interviewed, Belenky et al. (1986) drew their own map derived from the women's shared perspectives. There were four positions for women which paralleled those of the men's epistemology. However, Belenky et al. (1986) found the first intellectual perspective of women to be completely missing from Perry's (1970) schema of men's epistemology. They called this first position of women's way of knowing <u>silence</u>. This perspective, silence, was extremely important for Belenky et al. (1986) because it marked the introduction of the metaphor of voice. Extending into the other positions as well, when women spoke of knowing they often used the metaphors of voice and silence.

Belenky and colleagues (1986) expanded on Gilligan's (1982) concept of a different voice (i.e., the feminine voice). What Belenky et al. (1986) came to know as "the feminine voice" became "more than an academic shorthand for a person's point of view" (p. 18). The analogy

of voice corresponded with the feeling of relatedness to others. Voice also denoted a woman's feelings and thoughts related to her authority/power and/or powerlessness. In other words, the development or absence of voice within individuals was directly related to their perception of their own authority/power (Belenky et al., 1986).

The metaphor of silence and voice became the unifying theme in the work of Belenky et al. (1986). They joined in support of other feminist researchers and writers in the attempt to tell a story of the long journey women must make to begin: (a) to redefine their world in their own terms and (b) to "claim the power of their own minds and voices" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 19). Although there may be a common structure in women's and men's experience, extended literature supported the notion that women experience the world and themselves in the world differently than do men (Belenky et al., 1986; Boutilier & San Giovanni, 1983; Bowles, 1983; Duelli-Klein, 1983; Gilligan, 1982; Harding & Hintikka, 1983; Keller, 1983; Ruddick, 1980; Schaef, 1981; Stanley & Wise, 1983a, 1983b). As women begin to discuss and define their own unique experience, and as more and more in-depth research is done which includes the feminine voice, women's consciousness could be raised to the realization that their world has, so often, been defined by men. This realization extends to, and has great significance for, the sport world as well. Sport, as it currently exists, does not reflect women's ways of knowing, moral reasoning, or what women value in the process of knowing and moral reasoning. The demands of sport and the ways women are evaluated in sport are within a patriarchal

subculture. This raises the necessity to explore women's ways of knowing and moral reasoning in sport.

The work of both Belenky et al. (1986) and Gilligan (1982) has tremendous relevance for sport which is another area which promotes a masculine orientation. Sport incorporates the typical male values of independence, competition, autonomy, and aggression. Along with the increased participation of women in athletics has not come equal integration of the feminine values of interdependence, cooperation, and relationship. With the integration of women in sport, there has been no change in the methods of coaching, strategies, emphasis on winning, measures of success, or methods of evaluation. Sport remains another discipline where there exists a masculine bias. In order for women to be judged as successful in the sport world, they have had to accommodate the male value system. Sport has been conceptualized and constructed by men throughout history. It is a subculture that remains a male-dominated institution that has given little attention to the modes of knowing and moral reasoning that might be specific to, or at least common in, women. Thus, the issue of how women experience themselves as knowers and how women reason about moral issues is an important issue within the world of sport. Sport is another institution where women's experience, ways of knowing, and moral reasoning need to be delineated (Boulilier & San Giovanni, 1985; Bredemeier, 1984; Bredemeier & Shields, 1984a, 1984b, 1986b, 1986c; Butts, 1987; Hall, 1985; Shields & Bredemeier, 1984, in press; Theberge, 1981, 1985; Wright, unpublished manuscript).

One of the criticisms of the work of Belenky et al. (1986) was that their investigation was too broad (Holohan, 1986; Kovaks, 1986; Robb, 1986; Rosenblum, 1986) because it covered a wide variety of issues. Their work needed to be expanded by in-depth analysis about women's ways of knowing about specific issues in different contexts other than education. Therefore, the purpose of this investigation was to extend the work done by Belenky et al. (1986) by focusing on women athletes' ways of knowing about the issue of authority/power within daily life and sport contexts and the relationship ways of knowing might have with an individual's moral reasoning about authority/power. Since sport is an institution which has been built and maintained by a patriarchal hierarchy, and since women's and men's epistemological and moral development seem to differ, the issue of women's athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power is a pertinent issue.

Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this study was to examine women athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning about the issues of authority/power in daily life and sport contexts. In order to address the issue of authority/power, questions were posed to the athletes concerning conflict and preferred authority. Situations involving conflict and the notion of preferred authority were selected as areas that manifest issues of authority/power and, therefore, could elicit discussion about the athletes' ways of knowing authority/power. The investigation also

explored the relationship between women athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power in daily life and sport.

The following questions guided the investigation:

1. Was there a relationship between women athletes' ways of knowing authority/power in: (a) daily life and (b) sport?

2. Is there a relationship between women athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning about the issue of authority/power in: (a) daily life and (b) sport?

3. Do women athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power differ between situations involving authorities and situations involving peers in: (a) daily life and (b) sport?

4. Do women athletes' ideas concerning preferred authority impact on their ways of knowing about authority/power in: (a) daily life and (b) sport?

Definitions

Authority/power: Authority was the ability to judge or command (Sykes, 1982). It was the ability to define right and wrong and to define true and false (Sykes, 1982). Power was the ability to impact on thoughts, feelings, and actions. In this investigation these terms authority/power were used as the ability to define right and to impact on actions within a social relationship in daily life or sport. In this investigation, authority was the teacher, boss, coach, and/or peer depending on which person the respondent felt had the power to impact on the respondent's thoughts, feelings, and/or actions. The respondent

may also have thought of themselves as an authority and/or as having power. The respondent's thoughts and feelings about authority/power were elicited by questions 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9 in the section entitled Gender, Embodiment, and Preferred Authority in the interview protocol. All questions in the Ways of Knowing section of the interview protocol were used to elicit responses concerning the respondent's ideas about authority/power.

Conflict: A situation which involved differing ideas or feelings about right and right actions. Conflict was based on responses from the participants pertaining to times of disagreements with a teacher, boss, coach, or peer. Questions 1, 2, 4, and 8 in the section entitled Ways of Knowing in the interview protocol dealt with conflict.

Daily life: An aspect of involvement and experience aside from participation in a sport context. The respondent's daily life referred to everyday living, such as school or work. Daily life meant any time during the respondent's life other than sport.

Interview: A research technique designed to ascertain an individual's personal reflections about their world. A technique from which both subjective and objective data can be obtained. This research technique may be open-ended as well as semi-structured to allow the interviewer and the respondent to guide the investigation in terms of what information they experience as significant. It was also semi-structured to allow the interviewer to gather in-depth information which would enhance the study. The interview, in this investigation, consisted of three 1-2 hour sessions. The first session included the

demographic survey and the questions on gender. The second session consisted of questions about conflict and preferred authority. The third session involved the administration of four hypothetical moral dilemmas.

Morality: According to Haan (1985), morality was defined as the contextual, ongoing dialogue, real or imagined, concerning the relationship between self and others. This moral dialogue was a negotiation set in a particular context where the outcome would enhance the lives of all involved. Moral dialogue might be real (overt) or imagined (cover) and could vary in the forms of interaction from body language to traditional verbal communication. For the purposes of this investigation, Haan's (1985) definition of moral interaction was adopted.

Moral agent: Every individual was viewed as a moral agent in the Interactional Theory (Haan, 1985). A moral agent was an actor engaged in a moral dialogue within a particular context. Each respondent who participated in this investigation was considered a moral agent.

Moral reasoning: Moral reasoning was the process through which one reached a decision about the outcome of a moral conflict. This decision-making process, as stated earlier, was contextual and made within a dialogical relationship. Moral reasoning was measured by four hypothetical moral dilemmas.

Moral behavior: The outcome of a moral conflict would usually result in some form of action or interaction. This action was considered to be a moral behavior.

Preferred authority: The term referred to a person's preference for an authority of a particular sex. Preferred authority was used in this study as an area for investigation to elicit a person's thoughts and feelings about authority/power. Preferred authority was measured by question 8 in the section on Gender, Embodiment, and Preferred Authority.

Powerlessness: Feelings related to the inability to make decisions and impact on one's own or another's actions. Feelings of powerlessness were related to the metaphor of voice. Women who experienced powerlessness also perceived themselves as lacking a voice of their own. The respondent's thoughts and feelings about power and/or powerlessness were measured by questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9 in the section entitled Gender, Embodiment, and Preferred Authority and by questions 4 and 5 in the section on Ways of Knowing.

Right: A concept used in this investigation to refer to an individual's thoughts or feelings about what they deem appropriate as an idea or action. An individual may perceive the concept of right as: (a) originating from personal experience or (b) stemming from an external authority.

Right actions: Behavior deemed by an individual to be the appropriate response to a conflict. Right actions might have been instigated by an individual or by an external authority.

Sport: A competitive endeavor involving physical skill either on an intercollegiate level or a recreational level whereby the contest is organized and/or sanctioned by a national, state, or city organization.

The sport in this investigation was intercollegiate and recreational softball.

Voice: Belenky et al. (1986) used the metaphor of voice to convey how women experienced knowledge, truth, and authority. Voice was significant to feelings of authority/power and powerlessness. Each different perspective from research done by Belenky et al. (1986) gave a new insight into the experience of voice: (a) beginning with silence, where women felt they had no voice and were, therefore, powerless and (b) culminating with the fifth perspective of constructed knowledge where women perceived themselves as having a voice as well as authority/power. In the fifth perspective, the women's voice originated from within themselves as did authority/power. Women in the fifth perspective perceived themselves as holding the authority/power to resolve conflict and decide on right actions.

Ways of knowing: Belenky et al. (1986) regarded an individual's way of knowing as a perspective from which they viewed reality and came to understand the nature of truth, knowledge, and authority. As each individual developed patterns of exchange with the world, they formed basic assumptions about truth and authority. Their world view, as well as their participation within the world, was shaped by an understanding of the origin and location of authority/power. One's conception of morality and pattern of interaction with others were drawn from the basic premise of a person's way of knowing about authority/power. Ways of knowing were synonymous with one's epistemological perspective. Perry (1970) posited that individuals followed a sequence of

"positions," or epistemological perspectives, as they acquired knowledge. Epistemological perspectives, or ways of knowing, were an organized framework from which one interpreted the meaning of knowledge.

As one developed and gained more experience of the world, others, and one's self, one's way of knowing changed, and the individual gained a new or different perspective of reality. Therefore, a person passed through different epistemological perspectives as they grew and changed.

Belenky et al. (1986) grouped the women's perspectives, or ways of knowing, into five epistemological categories: (a) "silence, a position in which women experienced themselves as mindless and voiceless" and were dependent on external authorities; (b) received knowledge, a perspective in which women perceived themselves as capable of receiving and reproducing knowledge from external authorities but did not perceive themselves as able to create knowledge; (c) subjective knowledge, "a perspective from which truth and knowledge are conceived of as personal, private, and subjectively known or intuited"; (d) procedural knowledge, a position in which women learned and applied objective procedures to obtain and communicate knowledge; and (e) constructed knowledge, a perspective in which women saw knowledge as contextual, perceived themselves as capable of creating knowledge, and placed value in knowing both objectively and subjectively. The respondents' ways of knowing were measured by questions 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,

6, 7, 8, and 9 in section of the interview protocol entitled Ways of Knowing.

Women athletes: Women who were actively seeking the competitive experience or regular involvement in competitive endeavors either at an intercollegiate or recreational level. Competitive endeavors were those contests organized by a national, state, or city organization. The women athletes in this investigation were 10 female softball players.

Assumptions

The following assumptions were inherent in this investigation:

1. According to current research, women come to know the world they live in from a different perspective than men.

2. According to recent research, women differ from men in their concept of morality and their moral reasoning.

3. The interview technique is a valid tool to elicit information about a person's own understanding of issues in daily life and sport.

4. Sport provides an excellent arena for the study of ways of knowing and moral reasoning about the issue of authority/power.

5. The athletes' responses are considered to be valid personal accounts of their ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power in daily life and sport.

6. Women's ways of knowing and moral reasoning are legitimate in and of themselves and offer an alternative experience of reality. This

obviates the need for comparison to men's ways of knowing and moral reasoning but, rather, suggests another view of the human experience.

Scope of the Study

There were several restrictions associated with this study. First, the investigation was limited to responses to specific interview questions from female softball players. Consequently, the results of this study are only representative of that population. Second, only women were involved in the study; thus, the sample was (a) biased by sex and (b) specific to the sport of softball. Third, the women involved in the study were college age or older; no generalizations can be made to younger populations. Fourth, the investigation focused on the issue of authority/power; therefore, generalizations are limited to that particular issue and cannot be drawn about ways of knowing and moral reasoning about other issues.

Significance of the Study

This study was designed to expand upon a previous investigation of women's ways of knowing about a variety of issues within the context of education (Belenky et al., 1986). The intent of this study was to examine women athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power and to explore the relationship between ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power within daily life and sport. The significance of the study was approached with three perspectives in mind. First, the possibility that sport offered a context in which

ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power could be examined. Second, the articulation and examination of women's experiences in sport was relevant and important. Finally, this investigation may have potentially provided information regarding women's ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power in sport that had implications for reevaluation of the current sport model.

According to the concise Oxford Dictionary (Sykes, 1982), knowledge is defined as the familiarity gained by one's experience of another person, thing, or fact. It is a person's range of information about oneself, others, and the world around them. Knowledge is gained from the self, significant others, and general others (Thomas, 1983). Significant others are people such as parents, siblings, and friends. General others are laws, institutions, and patterns of a culture or societal expectations. Sport itself is the same as a generalized other--a subculture that has been institutionalized with expectations of its participants and rules that must be upheld. Significant others are also identified in sport to include coaches, spectators, teammates, and opponents. Sport provides an arena where athletes can experience themselves and others in a particular context. It is possible that through these experiences an athlete's information and knowledge about themselves, others, and the reality of sport may grow. Therefore, given these parallels, it seems apparent that sport provides a context in which knowing can occur.

Bredemeier and her research associates (1982, 1983, 1984a, 1984b, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c, 1986d, 1987, 1988, in press) established that sport was a context that involved moral reasoning and moral action. The athlete's relationship between themselves and their teammate and/or opponent entails a moral encounter (Bredemeier, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986a, 1986b; Bredemeier and Shields, 1984a, 1984b, 1985, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c; Bredemeier, Weiss, Shields, & Cooper, 1986d, 1987; Bredemeier, Shields, Weiss, & Shewtuck, 1988; Haan, 1985; Shields & Bredemeier, 1984, in press). During moral encounters between athletes, decisions are made concerning the right and/or wrong implications of an action, and then subsequent actions are taken to (a) maintain right actions or (b) correct wrong actions. Thus, sport is a context which involves moral reasoning.

The primary concern of this investigation was women athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power. Sport also provided an arena for the examination of this particular issue (Boutilier & San Giovanni, 1983; Butts, 1987). Sport is a hierarchical institution which involves authority/power at many levels. For athletes, the primary authority is the coach. This position as an authority figure provides the coach the possibility to impact on athletes' decisions and actions. Interactions between coach and athlete involve decisions by both individuals about (a) right and wrong and (b) good and bad. An athlete's reaction to the coach's demands involves not only moral decisions but also brings into play the

athlete's perception and way of knowing authority/power (Bredemeier & Shields, 1984, 1985, 1986; Shields & Bredemeier, 1984, in press).

Thus, the constructs of ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power could be examined within the context of sport. An individual's epistemological perspective, or way of knowing about authority/power, informed the process of moral reasoning. As a person's perception of the origin and location of authority/power changed, so did the person's way of knowing and moral reasoning.

The second perspective for significance of the study involved the necessity for further articulation of the women athletes' perceptions of sporting experience. Gilligan (1982) and Belenky et al. (1986) found divergent themes in the moral and epistemological development of women and men. Men developed their morality under the auspices of separation, autonomy, and independence. The values of separation and independence were also apparent in men's epistemological development. Women developed their morality and ways of knowing with values such as connection, interdependence, relationship, and care.

In the past, psychological researchers have used men's development as the norm by which women were then compared and evaluated. Women seemed to develop only to certain levels along the masculine developmental scale and, therefore, were seen as inferior. As was stated previously, the gap is now being viewed not as inferior but as a different developmental process (Gilligan, 1977, 1982). This study (a) expanded upon the work of Gilligan (1982) and Belenky et al. (1986) and (b) provided insights into possible parallels between the women's ways

of knowing and moral reasoning research done by Gilligan (1982) and Belenky et al. (1986) and the women athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power in this investigation. The significance of the current investigation is the additional understanding and articulation of the women athlete's experience of sport.

Belenky et al. (1986) and Gilligan (1982) expounded on a "different voice" found with the women in their study. This investigation attempted to expand the work of Gilligan (1982) and Belenky et al. (1986) in order to "hear" the voice of women athletes. The psychological literature previously cited (Belenky et al., 1986; Gilligan, 1977, 1982) has significant implications for women who are involved in sport. Perhaps the divergent theme of development, the different voice, found by Belenky et al. (1986) and Gilligan (1982) between women and men in a daily life context are also present in the ways of knowing and moral reasoning of women and men in the sport context. To expect women athletes to develop their potential within a system of patriarchal values seems counterproductive.

Rather than continued evaluation of women from patriarchal standards, perhaps it becomes necessary to integrate women's qualities into society and award them equal value. The opportunity for women to develop their full potential seems greater if society viewed their voices as worthwhile and meaningful. It seems evident that to expect women to develop fully--psychologically, intellectually, and morally--the perspective for evaluation should be from a context of human

development in which both voices, women's and men's, have equal value. This change of evaluation and integration of women's qualities extends to the sport model as well.

Sport is considered a male domain (Boutilier & San Giovanni, 1983; Butts, 1987; Coakley, 1986; Hall, 1985; Hart and Birrel, 1981; Williams, 1986; Wright, unpublished manuscript) which promotes the development of traditional male values. Some of these values are aggression, competition against another, and the primary evaluation of success as winning and/or monetary earnings. Sport has traditionally been viewed as a vehicle for building character and developing "men." Sport is a subculture supportive of the conventional male value system of the larger culture. Women are welcome into the subculture of sport as long as they accommodate the male value system. As in society at large, female athletes are evaluated according to male standards of achievement and success.

The third and final perspective of significance may be that this investigation on women athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power provides information regarding the needed integration of the women athletes' voice into sport just as there is a needed integration of the women's voice in the larger culture. Thus, the integration of female values and qualities into the subculture of sport would make sport a human domain, with equal value of both men's and women's voices.

CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Belenky et al. (1986) investigated women's ways of knowing about a variety of issues within the context of education. They explored women's ways of knowing about themselves, relationships, family, morality, and authority/power, just to mention a few of the topics. Through the context of education, Belenky et al. (1986) attempted to understand how women know themselves and the world in which they participate. Delimiting this broad array of issues, the focus of this investigation was the issue of authority/power within the context of sport, school, and work. Conflict and preferred authority were specifically identified as constructs related to authority/power. The issue of authority/power was explored in the domains of school, work, and sport in order to ascertain the possible relationship between sport and daily life. This literature review centered around the issue of authority/power and whether individuals perceived authority/power as originating within the self or from the other. Individuals' intellectual development and moral reasoning were the topics reviewed from the viewpoint of self and others centered around the issue of authority/power.

A person's way of knowing was defined as familiarity or awareness of another subject or object gained through personal experience (Belenky et al., 1986; Perry, 1970). A person's way of knowing corresponded (a) to their epistemology, or personal theory or

interpretation of what constituted knowledge, and (b) from where they thought knowledge originated (Belenky et al., 1986; Hall, 1985; Harding, 1984; Held, 1985; Keller & Grontkowski, 1983; Lyons, 1983; MacGuigan, 1973; Rosenberg, 1982). To investigate a person's way of knowing was to explore how that person interpreted the nature and origin of knowledge, value, and responsibility. A person's assumptions about the origin of knowledge helped form that person's perception of the world and how they viewed themselves as participants within the world (Belenky et al., 1986; Perry, 1970; Thomas, 1983).

After gaining knowledge, or awareness and familiarity, of a subject or an object, people often attached value to the acquired knowledge. Value was a person's judgment of what had worth, desirability, utility, and/or importance in life (Sykes, 1982). Many times, what a person valued was defined by authority. Authority was the power to judge, act, or command (Sykes, 1982). In this investigation, authority and power were used to indicate the ability of a person to impact on their own or another's thoughts, feelings, and actions. Authority and power could be viewed as external to the self, originating from others; or, authority and power could be viewed as originating within the self.

Power (a) was often used interchangeably with authority (Bernard, 1971, 1972, 1975, 1976) and (b) was an important component of leadership, social roles, intergroup and interpersonal relations, and communication (Frieze, Parsons, Johnson, Ruble, & Zellman, 1978). McClelland (1975) viewed power as an aspect of personality or a

person's need for power or feeling of powerlessness while Cartwright (1965) viewed power as an aspect of interaction within a social relationship. Power was used in this investigation as Cartwright defined it.

Authority and power were a part of every person's life (Cartwright, 1965; French & Raven, 1960; Johnson, 1976; Josefowitz, 1984). Each person experienced authority as someone in a position to define right and/or impact on a person's actions. In some situations, a person experienced authority as someone in a position to judge or command. They experienced the authority to have the power to impact on the person's thoughts, feelings, and/or actions. Authority and power were built into norms for social interaction and were often subconscious or unnoticed (Johnson, 1976). For example, when a person followed traffic directions given by a policeman, they were acting on societal norms which gave the policeman power to impact on the actions. The reasoning that the policeman had power over them went unnoticed. People could also use direct modes of power by directly issuing a command, as a teacher or superior often did. Or, they may have used indirect forms of wielding power (for instance, by hinting or smiling) to get their way. Both women and men used indirect approaches to power, but women tended to use indirect or personal modes more often than did men (Johnson, 1976).

Often, the term power had negative behavioral connotations such as aggression, manipulation, and control rather than a positive behavioral connotation of effectiveness and resourcefulness (Johnson, 1976;

Josefowitz, 1980, 1984; Lensky, 1986). Power was thought of as overbearing behavior; and powerlessness was thought of in terms of weakness and vulnerability. Because women had been oppressed by the power of men for so many years, women more often than men thought of power in negative terms (Josefowitz, 1980, 1984; Friedan, 1963, 1981; Newton & Walton, 1974; Welch, 1980). The negative connotation of power remained in the minds of many women because power or authority was still seen as unattainable. Even when women did obtain authority or power, it was still seen as inferior to the same type of authority/power in men (Friedan, 1963, 1981; Josefowitz, 1984; Johnson, 1976; Welch, 1980).

Researchers (French & Raven, 1960; Hersey & Natemeyer, 1984; Kanter, 1977; Raven, 1965) developed typologies of power to which people have access and have determined how power is gained. Most social influence was initiated from one of six power bases: (a) reward, (b) coercion, (c) referent, (d) legitimate, (e) expert, and (f) informational (French & Raven, 1960; Raven, 1965). "Power base" referred to the source of the power which the influencer used in the relationship with the influencee (Raven, 1965). These sources of power were summarized as follows: (a) formal, power given to people because they held legitimate titles and positions; (b) referent, power given to people because they were liked and similar; (c) expert, power derived from having superior knowledge and skills; (d) reward, a promise of the power to influence people because of hope of gain; (e) coercion, power because of the threat of punishment; and (f) informational, power

derived from having new information regarding the outcome of the other's compliance (French & Raven, 1960). Another way of gaining power was through activities which were extraordinary and through alliances with superiors and colleagues (Kanter, 1977). Hersey and Natemeyer (1984) added connection to others to French and Raven's (1960) typology, and Gadon (1968) wrote about reciprocity, or owing favors to another, as a dimension of power. Raven and Kruglanski (1970) and Cartwright (1965) suggested three determinates of power choice from which a person chose to operate. First, a person estimated the effectiveness that a particular power base might have and the initial cost in terms of money, time, and effort. Second, the person evaluated possible reactions of others to the choice of a power base. People usually chose a power base which was consistent with their role in society, since rewards were often given to comply with societal expectations. And, third, a person's needs and desires influenced their voice of a power base. The way a person knew or viewed the world could influence their power choice as well as their interpersonal goals.

Power was often seen in terms of outcomes, which was a male-oriented viewpoint (Bernard, 1971, 1972, 1975, 1981; Josefowitz, 1984). The female orientation to power was viewed more often in terms of relationships (Josefowitz, 1980, 1984). Josefowitz (1984) posited a model that considered power from a personal and relational perspective. This model proposed two points of view which were primary in this investigation: (a) power as perceived in others and (b) power as

perceived in self (Josefowitz, 1984). Vested power and attributed power were the two characteristics of power perceived in others. Vested power was that power which outside sources gave to an individual (Josefowitz, 1984). The president of a country had vested power and could influence a person indirectly by initiating new laws and regulations. A person of vested power, such as a teacher or a superior, could also influence a person directly by taking away something a person needed or desired.

The second characteristic, attributed power, was the power a person believed another person held (Josefowitz, 1984). The person may not really hold vested power but may have influence if another person believed in their power. Attributed power was also indirect or specific (Josefowitz, 1984). An author or professor had indirect power over a person because they did not know them personally but attributed truth to the writing or words of the author or professor. Attributed power became specific when a person perceived power in a peer or colleague out of fear, respect, or a need to please.

Power, as perceived in the self, was also vested or attributed power (Josefowitz, 1984). If a person was the president or a professor, then they had vested power: (a) indirectly, as a formulator of policies, and (b) specifically, in the form of giving grades. Attributed power was the power a person gave themselves or the power given to them by others (Josefowitz, 1984). In this investigation, power perceived in the self was the power that a person attributed to themselves. In other words, when a person perceived themselves as

having authority and power, they viewed themselves as having a choice about their thoughts, feelings, and actions. The authority or power to choose was seen as originating within themselves rather than from an external authority of powerful other. Included in the following pages is literature reviewed to identify the status of research on intellectual and moral development: (a) specifically focusing on the self and the other; and (b) concerning the issue of authority/power. To date, there has been no sport-related literature which focused on women athletes' ways of knowing and the relationship to ways of knowing in daily life. Women athletes' ways of knowing about authority/power has not been an area of investigation. There has, however, been research on moral reasoning within a sport context. Therefore, this literature review includes sections on (a) intellectual development, (b) moral development, (c) women's moral development, (d) sport and morality, and (e) a final section on methodology and feminist research.

Intellectual Development

In his book Forms of Intellectual and Ethical Development in the College Years (1970), William Perry described the evolution of undergraduate students, primarily male, in their interpretation of the nature and origins of knowledge, value, and responsibility. He interviewed each undergraduate at the completion of each of their four years at Harvard University. He was interested in the university's impact on the student's understanding and relationship to knowledge, authority, and truth. In other words, Perry (1970) was concerned with

how the student experienced knowledge, authority, and truth throughout their years as undergraduates. Perry (1970) was interested in exploring changes, if any, in the student's perspective on knowledge, authority, and truth. He was also concerned with each student's understanding of their responsibility to knowledge, authority, and truth. Through analyses of the students' responses to personal interviews, Perry (1970) outlined a scheme for intellectual and ethical development. He considered the outline to be hierarchical in nature and proposed that this stagelike evolution related to all individual intellectual development.

Perry (1970) outlined four basic position from which his subjects interpreted their educational experience and gave meaning to their world: (a) basic dualism, (b) multiplicity, (c) relativism subordinate, and (d) relativism. Basic dualism occurred when the student viewed the world in polarities such as we/they, good/bad, and right/wrong (Perry, 1970). Students considered (a) there was only one right answer for everything and (b) the role of the authority was to teach these basic truths. In this position rested the notion of absolute authority and absolute truth. From the perspective of basic dualism, the student felt that the teachers, or authorities, knew what was right and there was only one truth, or absolute, for each problem.

Within the pluralism of the university, the student was confronted by diverse opinions which changed their view of absolute authority and truth. As the students began to realize that the authorities may not always have the right answer, dualism faded into multiplicity

prelegitimate. The student equated these differences of opinion to either unqualified authorities, or exercises given by the authority to the student in order for the student to discover the truth, or right answer, on their own (Perry, 1970). Perry (1970) suggested that the student also accepted diversity of opinions as areas where the authority had not yet found the truth. In multiplicity prelegitimate, the student was still authority dependent, but was not certain of the nature of the authorities' standards by which they evaluated the student.

In the third position (Perry, 1970), multiplicity yielded to relativism subordinate where the student developed an independence from external authority and concluded that everyone had a right to their own opinion. However, within this position, the student learned that the standards by which the authority evaluated the students were dependent on the students' ability to support their opinion in a rational, analytic manner. They learned that the authority, or teacher, did not only want a personal opinion but also wanted the student to be able to analyze and support their opinion by rational and objective means. Relativism subordinate gave way to the fifth and last position, relativism, when the student began to perceive all knowledge as relative and contextual (Perry, 1970). Meaning had to do with the context of an event and the understanding of the known. In the fifth position of relativism, the student not only viewed truth and knowledge as relative in the world of academia but also in all other aspects of his life (Perry, 1970). The self became the individual's final

authority and subsequently was comfortable with life's ambiguity and able to see the contextuality of the world. The final appeal for the truth, or judgments of right and wrong, no longer was to external authorities but instead to the internal authority, the self (Perry,, 1970).

As was stated earlier, Perry (1970) proposed these positions to indicate a stagelike progression in the developmental process. Other researchers (Loevinger, 1963) also observed this development to be a stage-by-stage process. Perry (1970) believed such a developmental sequence had practical implications for the educational process. For example, in grouping students he felt they should be exposed to diverse cultures with special care for those who may experience culture shock. Also, teaching methods should be geared toward the current position of the students. Dualistic thinkers would learn in a different manner than relativistic thinkers, etc. (Perry, 1970).

Perry's (1970) developmental process from simple dualistic polarities of interpretation to a complex understanding of an ambiguous world with relative values and contingent knowledge had important implications for educational institutions. It provided a framework for education and a way of understanding intellectual development in young adults.

As in the above research and in the social sciences, women as research subjects were excluded (Bernard, 1971; Gilligan, 1979, 1982; Harding & Hintikka, 1983; Keller, 1982; Sherman & Beck, 1979). The research findings, based on responses of male subjects, were

generalized to the female population (Belenky et al., 1986; Bernard, 1971; Gilligan, 1979, 1982; Harding & Hintikka, 1983; Keller, 1982; Sherman & Beck, 1979). The studies that generated theories of human development were done largely with male subjects and developed by male theorists (Belenky et al., 1986; Bernard, 1981; Gilligan, 1979, 1982; Harding & Hintikka, 1983; Keller, 1982; Sherman & Beck, 1979). When women were included in a research investigation, the researchers usually looked for ways in which women conformed to the developmental pattern of the male subjects (Belenky et al., 1986; Gilligan, 1982; Harding & Hintikka, 1983). Many times, when the women did not conform, their behavior was interpreted as less developed, immature, and deficient when compared to the male population (Broverman et al., 1972; Gilligan, 1982; Belenky et al, 1985, 1986).

In the book Women's Ways of Knowing, Belenky et al. (1986) worked with women in order to enlarge the current understandings of intellectual development.

> Nowhere has the pattern of using male experience to define the human experience been more clearly found than in our descriptions of intellectual development. The mental processes that are involved in considering the abstract and the impersonal have been labeled "thinking" and are attributed primarily to men; while those that deal with the personal and the interpersonal fall under the rubric of "emotions" and are already relegated to women. As dichotomous "either/or thinking" is so common in our culture and as we tend to view human beings as closed systems, the expenditure of energy in one part of the system has been seen inevitably to lead to a depletion elsewhere (Belenky et al., 1985, p. 7).

Academic institutions were created by and for men. Rarely had any attention been given to the way women learn, know, and value. It was thought that women's knowledge came mainly from emotional and intuitive

thinking, both of which were devalued in our society where rational and objective thinking were the esteemed means of knowing and thinking and were attributed mainly to men. Many feminist researchers claimed to have found a masculine bias in many methodologies and theories used in our academic disciplines (Gilligan, 1979; Harding & Hintikka, 1983; Keller, 1985).

Maccoby and Jacklin (1974) in their book The Psychology of Sex Differences were among the few who attempted to narrow the gap between women's and men's ways of thinking and knowing. They tried to show how women (a) could develop the intellectual capacities of rational thought and (b) could function in the academic world (Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974). However, in their research, no attention was given to the possibility that women may have other modes of thinking and knowing quite unique to women and that these modes were legitimate ways of knowing and thinking (Harding & Hintikka, 1983; Mies, 1983).

Belenky et al. (1986) interviewed 135 women of diverse ages, background, ethnicity, and educational experience to enhance the understanding of women's own ways of knowing. The interviews were semi-structured and focused on how women conceived of truth and themselves as knowers. Their work was informed by William Perry's (1970) research on Harvard undergraduate males in order to develop a schema for beginning to map women's intellectual development. However, in the course of analysis of the interviews, Belenky et al. (1986) found that the women they had interviewed did not fit into Perry's (1970) intellectual positions. Belenky et al. (1986) therefore

developed their own map of women's development and placed the women from the interviews within the epistemological perspectives that Belenky et al. (1986) understood to be salient in the women's lives. Thus, from the 135 women interviewed, Belenky et al. (1986) drew their own map of intellectual development.

Belenky et al. (1986) developed five epistemological positions, four of which somewhat paralleled Perry's (1970) epistemological positions. They called this first position of women's ways of knowing silence. This perspective was extremely important for Belenky et al. (1986) because it marked the introduction of the metaphor of voice. Even extending into the other positions from which women viewed the world, when women spoke of knowing they often used the metaphor of voice and silence. It seemed to Belenky et al. (1986) that the women's epistemological perspectives were closely related to the women's conception of their own voice. The women in all the perspectives often spoke of (a) gaining or losing a voice, (b) having to be silent or seen but not heard, and (c) sensing how their voice changed as their way of knowing changed (Belenky et al., 1986).

The metaphors of speaking and listening were different from the metaphors of vision so often used in science and philosophy such as the "mind's eye" and "truth as illumination" (Belenky et al., 1986; Keller, 1982). The main difference is that metaphors of vision "encourage standing at a distance to get a proper view" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 18). Thus, the philosophical perspective of vision implied a separation between subject and object, while the metaphor of voice

implied a connection between subject and object because the ear operates under close proximity to distinguish subtle changes. Hearing and speaking related to dialogue and interaction, requiring a closeness of subject and object, unlike the metaphor of the eye suggesting distance and a separation of subject and object (Keller & Grontkowski, 1983). Evelyn Fox Keller (1982) talked about how the separation of subject and object was related to a masculine bias in science by suggesting a separation of the knower and the object to be known (Keller & Grontkowski, 1983).

The metaphor of voice, as was stated earlier, became a coherent theme in the women's interviews and was used to help trace the women's intellectual development. It became clear to Belenky et al. (1986) that changes in women's ways of knowing were closely related to their perception of their capacity for having a voice. The relationship between voice and power was related to feelings of power and powerlessness. women who felt silenced, or felt their lack of voice, felt powerless and vice versa. Their authority/power was external to themselves, grounded in the other. The external authorities were the ones with the power. The voiceless or powerless women felt that the external authorities' voices had the power to influence decisions, feelings of worth, and values within the voiceless.

Women who had gained a voice felt their own power. They were now their own authority and made their own decisions, formed a self-image from within, and chose their own values. Gaining a voice was related to their feelings of authority/power being vested within the self, a

discovery process that authority/power was not necessarily external (i.e., in the other) but could also come from within the self (Belenky et al., 1986).

Belenky et al. (1986) developed their own map of women's intellectual development using five perspectives. The first perspective, or way of knowing, was silence. In this epistemological perspective, women were totally dependent on external authority for any sense of right/wrong, and/or, good/bad. They saw themselves as having no voice and having no mind, totally unable to think on their own. These women in their way of knowing often saw words being used against them like weapons and were dubious to their own ability to understand, therefore learn, from the words of the external authorities (Belenky et al., 1986).

The second way of knowing was called "received knowledge" (Belenky et al., 1986). Women in this perspective also relied heavily on authorities, but also had a sense of themselves as learners. These women saw things in dualistic terms, much as Perry's (1970) dualistic thinkers, as good/bad, right/wrong, and/or, true/false (Belenky et al., 1986). The authority's role was to espouse these truths to the learner and, in this perspective, learning was seen as the ability to regurgitate the authority's words just as they were heard. In this way of knowing (a) authorities had the truth, (b) truth was concrete, (c) there was one definite right answer, and (d) every other answer was wrong (Belenky et al., 1986). This lack of seeing ambiguities in life also invaded these women's moral reasoning. Again, this way of knowing

symbolized morality as good or bad, right or wrong. The women in this way of knowing perceived being moral as conforming to societal expectations and norms. Authority/power was external (Belenky et al., 1986). The women in the perspective of perceived knowing were dependent on external judgments for who they were. Their self-concept was based on living up to others' expectations. Thus, external authorities had the power to define and influence the women in the received position. The women at this perspective, according to Belenky et al. (1986), valued the objective over the subjective. Although they were able to talk among peers, they still viewed themselves as voiceless. Their subjective voice had no bearing on the truth, which was externally based. They really could not envision themselves as being able to create or develop ideas, only able to repeat the authorities' words (Belenky et al., 1986).

As women began to move away from this silence and external orientation towards authority, they moved to the third perspective which Belenky et al. (1986) called subjective knowing. In this perspective, women began to think of themselves as their own authorities. This marked a significant shift, according to Belenky et al. (1986), because now these women saw themselves as having a voice (i.e., their own voice). For subjectivists, truth was derived from their own first-hand experience, not from external authorities. Truth and morality were still viewed as dualistic in nature. There was still a definite right and wrong. However, for the women in the subjectivist way of knowing, it was their own experience that dictated right and

wrong. Their choices and actions were based on what they knew, not what they had been told nor from external expectations. If they disagreed with peers, again, they relied on their own experience (Belenky et al., 1986).

When women became their own authorities, their self-concept also became grounded within themselves. They began to rely on their inner feelings and intuitive processes when defining themselves, making choices, and taking action (Belenky et al., 1986). However, this could be a lonely experience for some women because the "truth within" concept, embraced by the subjective knowers, could be seen as alienating them from others. The claim by Gilligan (1982) that women defined themselves through their relationships may explain the feelings of alienation and loneliness. Even if they disregarded any kind of knowing from authorities, when they did accept any form of external knowing it was from those persons who they perceived (a) as most like themselves and (b) as having shard the same experiences (Belenky et al., 1986).

The shift to the fourth way of knowing involved the realization that (a) "intuitions could be wrong; (b) some truths were truer than others; (c) they could know things that they had never seen or touched; (d) truth could be shared; and (e) expertise was often worthy of respect" (Belenky et al., 1985, p. 19). Women in this perspective, procedural knowledge, were becoming aware of reason.

Belenky et al. (1986) saw this transition stemming from criticisms of personal opinion. For instance, in school, the authorities

(teachers in this case) did not want the personal opinions of the women students but rather the logical procedure which led to the women's analysis. The authorities required substantiation of opinion based on reason (Belenky et al., 1986).

Women in the procedural way of knowing valued the objective way of knowing over the subjective way of knowing (Belenky et al., 1986). They learned to silence the inner voice when dealing with academic matters. The personal voice was only welcome in their private lives and relationships. For this reason, they were engrossed in being able to acquire the correct procedures for analysis and then being able to apply those same procedures to their academic work.

Belenky et al. (1986) discussed two ways of knowing within the perspective of procedural knowledge, separate and connected knowing. Gilligan (1982) used these terms to elucidate about her conception on self which will be discussed later. According to Belenky et al. (1986) a separate knower constructed the line of reasoning at a distance from the object to be known. The women in this way of knowing understood and learned by studying the object from an external vantage point. Separate knowers valued critical thinking and saw argument as the way of discussing (Belenky et al., 1986). Separate knowers attempted to silence the voice that the subjective knowers valued so highly. Separate knowers attempted to use pure reason and remained impersonal to the object (Belenky et al., 1986). Separate knowers saw these procedures as wielding power in the academic world.

Connected knowers, on the other hand, attempted to know by means of approximating other's experience (Belenky et al., 1986). They attempted to enter into the object in order to know. Connected knowers attempted to empathize in order to gain an understanding of the other. Whereas separate knowing tried to remain impersonal, connected knowing "involves feeling, because it is rooted in relationship" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 121). Authority was viewed by connected knowers as having common experiences with the object they were trying to know.

Connected knowing was still procedural; the procedures were simply different than for separate knowing. But, both connected and separate knowing were objective. Both separate and connected knowing were ways of knowing that marked the growth of analytical powers (Belenky et al., 1986).

Within the fifth epistemological perspective, the voice of the knower was allowed to reappear (Belenky et al., 1986). Separate and connected knowers attempted to suppress any projection of the self. In this new perspective, the self was seen as the constructor of knowledge. Therefore, Belenky et al. (1986) called the fifth way of knowing constructed knowledge. According to Belenky et al. (1986), women in this perspective asked questions of themselves and others in order to know the self and the other. They attempted to know another by posing questions and listening to what others had to say. Self-examination also involved question posing. Through this process of asking questions, the learner realized that they were responsible for

constructing their own knowledge. "All knowledge is constructed, and the know is an intimate part of the known" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 137). In this way of knowing, women were open to and realized the ambiguities of life. They sought to construct their own unique understanding by trying to emerge themselves in the other and then arriving at their own way of knowing. They used themselves as instruments to understand (Belenky et al., 1986).

Constructed knowers saw morality as dependent on the situation. These women attempted, once again, to pose questions in order to attain a better understanding so that the dilemma might be resolved, and they refrained from premature generalizations or judgments (Belenky et al., 1986). The women in the fifth way of knowing tried to understand each person's perspectives and needs involved in the dilemma, and then tried to reach a solution that might best suit everyone involved (Belenky et al., 1986).

Constructed knowers were able to integrate both dichotomies of (a) objective and subjective and (b) mind and feeling (Belenky et al., 1986). Therefore, they were able to see the whole, to integrate public and private. Because they saw knowing as being cultivated in interpersonal relationships, they were interested in gaining access to other people's ways of knowing. "Knowing requires intimacy and equality between self and object" (Belenky et al., 1985, p. 21). Constructed knowers were highly capable of having empathic feelings. constructivist women seemed to be "whole people who attempted to

contribute to the empowerment and improve the quality of life of others" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 152).

Procedural and connected knowers had different concepts of authority/power. Authority/power for procedural knowers was vested in the other, where the other, in this case, was the external system in which the individual was involved. Separate knowers viewed authority/power as stemming from the system and dictating the way in which they were supposed to know, or the position from which they should argue a point. Their private life was distinguished from the educational process as less important. Separate knowers' authority/power, within their private lives, was gauged on how well they adhered to the external system (Belenky et al., 1986). For connected knowers, authority/power also remained external. The external authority was not the system, however, but rather the other subject or object which the connected knower was attempting to understand, or to know. Constructed knowers viewed the issue of authority/power as contextual (Belenky et al., 1986). They realized life's ambiguities and the possibility of fluctuating power. However, although authority/power could fluctuate within different circumstances, the final decision on values (e.g., right or wrong, good or bad) for the constructed knower rested within the self. Constructed knowers were able to give credence to a variety of viewpoints, but their personal choice originated from within the self. They had the power to choose (Belenky et al., 1986). The intellectual process began with authority/power solely vested in the other, or having external

origins. As the individual progressed through the various stages, the locus of authority/power gradually shifted from being externally grounded to an internal origin (Belenky et al., 1986).

As was previously stated in this research, according to Belenky et al. (1986) women did not necessarily follow the course of men's development in traditional, hierarchical institutions. Belenky and her colleagues (1986) took issue with Perry's (1970) findings that projected doubt over belief and separation over connection as necessary elements for cognitive growth in his sample of Harvard males. Following years of cognitive conflict where professors aggressively challenged the undergraduate's idea, which supposedly acted as an impetus to the student's intellectual growth, the males in Perry's (1970) research took their respected places among the community of their superiors. Belenky et al. (1986) posited that "this scenario may capture the natural course of men's development"; however, "for women, confirmation and community are prerequisites rather than consequences of development" (p. 194).

In the study done by Belenky et al. (1986), they found that many of the women participants had been treated in an academic environment as if they were stupid and knew nothing. These women had experienced authorities, or teachers, as "experts who usually tried to assert dominance over less knowledgeable people either by assaulting them with information or withholding information" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 194. Through discussion with the women involved in their investigation, Belenky et al. (1986) found that women experienced education as more

interesting and desirable when they were treated as if they already had ideas and feelings that were viable and that they need not be guided in learning but could "be trusted to know and to learn" (p. 195).

From the least to the most privileged women in their sample, Belenky et al. (1986) found that all, at one time or another, experienced self-doubt and "expressed the need to be accepted as a person, as opposed to being oppressed or patronized" (p. 196). They needed to be recognized and respected.

From the consistent findings of women's needs for community, confirmation, and care within the learning environment, Belenky and her colleagues (1986) proposed a different model of education, a model they called "connected teaching" (p. 214). Connected teaching was a model "in which the expert examines the needs and capacities of the learner and composes a message that is courteous to the learner" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 194). In order to develop a schema that was felicitous for women, it was necessary to explore the values and experiences of women in academia (Palmeiri, 1979). Belenky et al. (1986) found that traditional courses in academic institutions were not interested in past experiences of the students, nor were they interested in what the students already knew, but were only concerned with what the teachers knew.

> The courses are about the culture's questions, questions fished out of the mainstream of the disciplines. If the student is female, her questions may differ from the culture's questions, since women, paddling in the bywaters of the culture, have had little to do with positing the questions or designing the agendas of the disciplines. (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 198)

Even though women have not been primary in the establishment of academic curriculum and criteria, they will have sought education for purposes of liberation (Belenky et al., 1986). However, the very education that women have sought in order to become equal to men, or to liberate themselves from isolated domestic roles, may have served to estrange them from their own values. Mary Jacobus (1979) pointed out that "this access to a male-dominated culture may equally be felt to bring with it alienation, repression, division--a silencing of the 'feminine'; a loss of women's inheritance" (p. 10). Therefore, Belenky et al. (1986) posited a model of education which would encompass the "feminine" (i.e., the women's voice).

The model of connected teaching was in support of the values Belenky et al. (1986) found salient in the women in their research. They hoped that connected teaching would support women as valuable persons by encompassing the prominent values heard in the women's interviews. The intention of a connected teaching model was (a) to let women see that they were capable learners and knowers; (b) to let them know that their experience was important and valuable; and (c) to let them feel that subjectivity, as well as objectivity, was a viable and valued way of knowing. Through connected teaching, women would be confirmed and trusted to know and to learn (Belenky et al., 1986). Connected teaching was a way to liberate women from having to accommodate to existing male structures for education.

None of the women interviewed by Belenky and colleagues (1986) liked having teachers always "giving" the students knowledge. They did

not value seeing the professor as a god who secretly organized his lecture with no flaws. They appreciated the human qualities of their teachers. This seemed to give the women more confidence that they, too, could have and generate ideas (Belenky et al., 1986).

> Women have been taught by generations of men that males have greater powers of rationality than females have. When a male professor presents only the impeccable products of his thinking, it is especially difficult for a women student to believe that she can produce such a thought. Women students need opportunities to watch women professors solve (and fail to solve) problems. They need models of thinking as a human, imperfect, and attainable activity. (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 217)

Connected teaching provided such a model whereby the teachers were involved in the learning process. The teacher became a "mid-wife-teacher" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 217), one who helped the students "articulate and expand on latent knowledge. They assisted the students in giving birth to their own ideas, in making their own tacit knowledge explicit and elaborating it" (p. 217).

Connected teachers were interested in focusing on the student's knowledge and experience and supported the student's thinking process. The connected teacher was a guide who nurtured the student's thinking. Knowledge was not the private property of the teacher but was a "medium for provoking critical reflection of both teacher and student" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 219). Rather than the teacher depositing facts in the students' minds, both teacher and student shared the struggle of critical thought by relying on their own knowledge and experience and respecting the other's perspective. Each person's subjectivist view was seen as valuable.

Knowledge was a dialogue between teacher and students, rather than a hierarchical monologue of teacher to student. Diversity was welcomed in a connected class. Objectivity was valued as a way of seeing the other's perspective within their own terms. In contrast to traditional education, where the student attempted to see everything from the teacher's point of view, the connected model of teaching gave merit in the teacher being able to accept the student's unique perspective. "The connected class constructs truth not through conflict, but through consensus, implying not agreement, necessarily, but a crossing of the barrier between ego and ego, bridging private and shared experience" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 223). In this way the student realized that the teacher's methods of constructing arguments were not flawless. Students realized that teachers also struggled in their grasp, articulation, and presentation of knowledge and, also, that the teachers own unique perspective and individual experience entered into the knowing process.

In connected teaching, the purpose was to enter into the student's experience of the material. The connected teacher, even though they might disagree with the student's viewpoint, must trust the student's experience as valid. Trusting did not mean tolerating all viewpoints, but rather it meant "trying to connect, to enter in to each person's perspective" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 227). Although each perspective was subjective, it was a disciplined subjectivity. Erikson (1964) coined the phrase "disciplined subjectivity," meaning that the observer, in a systematic way, empathized with the participants. The

teacher, then, used her reactions to the students' ideas to construct her own hypotheses. This meant that the teacher did not relinquish, or renounce, her own perspective. The role of the connected teacher was not that of another student. But, rather, the connected teacher was a socratic guide for her students' knowing. Connected teaching was not power over the student, as in traditional education, but carried a special responsibility. The authority of the connected teacher was not based on subordination of the student but, instead, was based on cooperation (Belenky et al., 1986).

In the connected model of education, evaluation adhered to the expressive value of subjectivity. Teachers evaluated students in a cooperative manner, in collaboration with the student. Impersonal standards of evaluation, where the students became objects, were replaced by personal standards of evaluation. The student was compared to their own past performance rather than to other students. Thus, the connection between teacher and student continued. "Many of the practices embedded in the masculine curriculum masquerade as essential to the maintenance of standards, but in fact they accomplish quite a different purpose: the systematic dehumanization of both female and male children through the loss of the feminine" (Noddings, 1984, pp. 192-193). Therefore, according to Belenky et al. (1986), "in an educational institution that placed care and understanding of persons rather than impersonal standards at its center, human development might take a different course, and women's development, in particular, might proceed with less pain" (p. 209).

Theories of Moral Development and Moral Reasoning

Morality, over time, had been studied from a variety of viewpoints. The study of morality usually fell within the domain of theologians and philosophers. As time went on, social scientists also became interested in moral development. The scope of this section was limited to moral reasoning, primarily women's moral reasoning. Moral reasoning is the process a person utilizes when deciding the outcome of a moral dilemma (Haan, 1977a, 1977b, 1978, 1983, 1985; Kohlberg, 1969, 1981).

One of the most prominent theorists on moral development was Lawrence Kohlberg (1969, 1981, 1984). For Kohlberg, moral development occurred when persons reached a state of disequilibrium at their current stage of moral reasoning. This dissatisfaction usually occurred when a conflict arose and the moral ideas, or arguments, at the particular stage in which the person currently functioned were not satisfactory to resolve the dilemma. The conflict might have been a result of reactions to self, other, or another's reaction to oneself. Because of the dissatisfaction with current moral ideas, the person formed new arguments for conflict resolution and this marked a transition to a new level of moral development (Kohlberg, 1969, 1984).

Kohlberg's (1969) cognitive developmental theory was based on Piaget's (1966) studies with children. Kohlberg (1969) believed that individuals reflected and logically drew conclusions about moral dilemmas. Kohlberg (1969) set forth a system composed of six stages of moral development, whereby an individual subsequently experienced each

of the hierarchical stages. He hypothesized that this stage-by-stage development was invariant and culturally universal. Each stage had rules, or structures, referring to the way an individual reasoned at that particular stage (Kohlberg, 1969, 1984).

The first two stages, which Kohlberg (1969) called preconventional, represented the level at which an individual reasoned in an egocentric and individualistic manner. The next two stags, called conventional, implied that an individual's social group dictated their moral reasoning. The postconventional stage, encompassing the final two levels, ushered in an understanding of universal laws and principles that the individual used to resolve moral conflict. These highest stages represented Kohlberg's idea of independent morality (i.e., justice). These stages were not culturally bound (Kohlberg, 1969). Kohlberg's (1969, 1981, 1984) theory was the dominant theory used by researchers and educators in the past. However, a nascent theory that entered the scene was Norma Haan's "Interactional Morality" (Haan, 1985). Haan's (1977a, 1978, 1983; Haan, Aerts, & Cooper, 1985) model of moral development focused on different aspects of moral development than did Kohlberg's (1969) model. In the following section, Haan's and Kohlberg's models of moral development were contrasted in order to identify the basic differences between the two models. In the next section, possibilities of using the interactional model in a sporting context were reviewed along with literature investigating morality in a sport context.

Comparison of Paradigms

The two paradigms in question were Norma Haan's (1977b, 1978, 1983, 1985) theory based on interactional morality and Lawrence Kohlberg's (1969, 1981, 1984) theory of morality based on cognitive development. The two theories were compared as to similarities and differences. A closer look was taken at Haan's theory because it seemed to be a more consistent and viable theory for everyday living. Haan began her search for a theory of morality for everyday living because it seemed that "social science faced a crisis in legitimation" (Haan, 1983). Social scientists were confronted about their value neutrality, which had become a concept that was no longer defendable. It seemed to be difficult for social scientists to study human behavior without some biases (Haan, 1983). Haan's observations and analyses led her to what she considered an everyday morality which was empirically based. Her Theory of Interactional Morality was a formulation of that model (Haan, 1985).

Haan's (1983, 1985) and Kohlberg's (1969) theories differed on two basic standpoints. First, Kohlberg relied heavily on the works of philosophers and Piaget's (1966) work with the child's development of logic. Secondly, he applied his ideas of morality basically to the development of children. Haan disagreed that these should be the starting points for studying morality. Her insistence was on a practical morality. In Haan's (1985) Theory of Interactional Morality there was discussion concerning moral development, but the emphasis was more on action (Haan, 1985).

Both cognitive and interactional theories involved a hierarchical notion of moral development. Each theory regarded an individual's use of a more mature level of moral reasoning as advancement, or moral growth. These organized ideas were called "structures" in each theory. Arguments from both theories supported the concept that the mind became better able to interact with the environment as it developed or had additional opportunities for moral interaction. They were similar also in their concept of the human mind as constructivist. This meant that "morality is constituted, considered, and decided in the minds of people" (Haan, 1985). This held two important meanings: (a) morality was not totally based on emotions, reasoning was involved; and (b) external forces were not the only forces acting on decisions. However, this was where the theories began to differ. Haan's (1985) theory stated that development was in experience but was based on interaction. Kohlberg's (1969) theory defined morality as concrete organizations that developed through experience and mitigated behavior.

The theories also differed concerning how they viewed the moral agent, or actor, within a situation. Kohlberg's (1969) cognitive theory proclaimed the individual to be the important factor. Each individual acted on a continuum from autonomous to rational, following the rules in a logical fashion in order to reach a moral judgment. Thereafter, each similar circumstance was dealt with in the same way. Thus, judgment "must transcend or rise above immediate circumstances" (Haan, 1985, p. 27).

In contrast, all sociopsychological aspects of the situation were taken into account by the interactional moral agent (Haan, 1985). The moral agent relied on dialogues, either real or imaginary, with others to come to an understanding of each participant's emotions, experience, and moral understandings in order to deal with each situation. Extenuating circumstances were dealt with before any judgment could be made. Rather than rising above the situation, resolutions coincided with the situation (Haan, 1985).

The cognitive theory allowed more psychological interest in the individual (Kohlberg, 1969). The interactional theory was more sociologically based in that an individual was seen in a social context (Haan, 1985). Cognitive theory relied on abilities which an individual had already grasped, whereas the moral agent within the interactional theory had to adapt to each new situation.

Even though the cognitive theory was constructivist, it did not describe development as something new that the individual must discover or invent. To the contrary, the cognitive theory viewed morality as a tradition that would be displayed to the individual as they moved from one stage to the next (Kohlberg, 1969, 1981).

Kohlberg (1981, 1984) viewed moral development through the idea of growth in logical thinking. Persons had different perspectives on morality depending on what stage they found themselves. He termed these stages of morality development as preconventional, conventional, and postconventional (Kohlberg, 1969, 1981, 1984). These were reflected in the individual as concerns for the individual to society

and to a more universal understanding. Each level had two stages, and Kohlberg (1969) posited that an individual's moral development involved a person's evolution from the lower levels to the subsequent levels. Each individual had to satisfy the thinking needs and questions of each stage before progressing to the next. Preconventional judgment was based on individual needs. It was egocentric. Conventional judgment relied on society's expectations and norms. Postconventional judgment was reflective towards societal values and norms, but out of these values the individual constructed universal principles (Kohlberg, 1969).

The cognitive theory had usually been studied by discussing hypothetical dilemmas (Haan, 1985). Real dilemmas were too emotional and not conducive for logical reasoning. The transition from one stage to the next was largely based on the growth of logical reasoning. It was thought that in underindustrialized and less developed societies that logical thought was retarded (Kohlberg, 1969, 1981). Therefore, moral reasoning was also lower. Even in our society, only about 5% of human beings reached stage five, even fewer reached the sixth stage. Most people remained in stages three and four (Kohlberg, 1969, 1981, 1984).

The interactional view (Haan, 1985) relied fully on the idea that each mind constructed its own reality. Conflict with self and conflict with others created disequilibrium, therefore necessitating a reformulation of equity. The individual was involved in dialogue with oneself and/or another in order to understand the other's position and

also gain insight into one's own emotions, thoughts, and values. The individual was viewed as an active agent in each situation attempting to create equity for all agents involved in the conflict (Haan, 1985).

The process of interacting with the environment, one's self, or another began in infancy (Haan, 1985). The children's learning to deal with conflict by engaging in dialogues (a moral exchange) produced improvement and growth in the ability to relate. Kohlberg (1969) thought the improvement and growth was somewhat historical because children learned how to relate much from their parents, there were limited ways in which social interaction occurred, and the problems faced by adults and children were similar. However, the existing situation, coupled with existing levels of experience and moral understanding, were more important than what had gone before. It was not a theory based on generalized rules and regulations but one based on solving conflict within a given context in a way that, through the resolution, all involved were heard, considered as worthy, and benefited (Haan, 1983, 1985).

The actor grew through the experience of socio-moral interaction (Haan, 1977b, 1978, 1983, 1985). People were motivated to develop because (a) everyone liked to consider themselves as moral and (b) interactions were moral, both of which benefit all involved. Through interaction individuals realized that others deserved to be heard, even if their opinions, ideas, and values were different than one's own, and it also increased self-reflection. Through participation in moral interactions, individual growth occurred (Haan, 1985).

Action was not an important concept in the cognitive theory (Haan, 1985). The emphasis was on development in that an individual would act according to their stage of development. The situation had no bearing on the cognitivist's actions because they were expected to act according to specific rules. Kohlberg's theory (1969, 1981, 1984) suggested that people would rise above specific situations, and their emotions and their actions would be consistent with their level of cognitive development.

Action was the key to the interactional theory (Haan, 1983, 1985). Dialogue was considered action. Emotions were important indicators in the discussion and were present in all discussions of dilemmas, even when hypothetical. Emotion was not all there was to moral activity, but it certainly was one of its most persistent qualities (Haan, 1985). For example, heated discussions were emotional, and the dialogue involved emotion when each person was revealing their ideas and arguing for what they saw as right and just (Haan, 1985).

Conscience regulated people and people wanted to see themselves as moral (Haan, 1985). If there was a discrepancy between action and what should be, guilt ensued (Haan, 1977, 1985). Even though emotions sometimes clouded an individual's thinking or their ability to see the other point of view, through dialogue this was often accomplished. If a resolution was thereby constructed, it was assumed that each participant would act in the moral way according to the judgment made through the dialogue. Stress was a factor in all dialogues dealing with emotional and moral judgments (Haan, 1977b, 1978, 1985). Haan

(1985) described moral courage as "being displayed when persons, energized by need and outrage, take action at great cost to themselves. Stress can work to either raise or lower the quality of moral action, depending on the context and the person's personal resources" (Haan, 1985, p. 52). Usually, the final agreements made in a moral dialogue involved expectancies and motivated those involved to act morally (Haan, 1985).

In the interactional theory, the dialogue served to sort out individual differences of desires and needs and produced a solution that aided all involved (Haan, 1985). Usually the solution was appropriate for the situation; therefore, each new situation afforded a new resolution. These resolutions may not have been "perfect"; therefore, interactional theorists viewed morality as an ongoing, dynamic idea (Haan, 1985). This meant morality was not always concrete. Life involved compromise and injustice that must be dealt with. Life also involved awareness and forgiveness of human inconsistencies and faults. Feelings and emotions may also overrule fact. The interactional theory of morality provided consideration for all of these human characteristics (Haan, 1985).

In the cognitive theory, differences in people's morality came from different levels of development. Individual differences in the interactional theory were explained in three ways. First, some people simply had fewer resources with which to deal with situations. This created stress, and individuals highly stressed or unable to deal with stress often acted immorally (Haan, 1977b, 1985). Second, immoral acts

may have been brought on by an environment that consistently created stress for those individuals in that environment (Haan, 1977b, 1978). this could be an environment which was corrupt or inhumanitarian and never really met human desires and needs. Thirdly, excessive stress may have caused highly moral people to act immorally at times (Haan, 1977b, 1985). These three constructs made it possible for the interactional theory to explain issues that involved the moral actions of people who usually acted in a moral way (Haan, 1977, 1985). The cognitivist theory, based on evolving from one level to another, provided no sufficient reasoning for moral deviance (Kohlberg, 1969).

The last difference between the two theories to be discussed involved the notion of family and peers. Kohlberg (1969) felt that the family had no more effect on moral development than anything else in society, whereas peers were seen as important. The interactional theory (Haan, 1985) placed equal importance on both family and peers. Haan (1985) felt that both interaction with family as well as interaction with peers provided important opportunities and social contexts in which individuals interrelated (Haan, 1985).

In summary, the main similarity between the two theories was that they both considered the mind to be involved in constructing reality. Neither theory assumed a neutral view of reality. They both made judgments of good and bad morality. Both theories chose moral grounds that distinguished a "preferred reality." They also both agreed that psychologists should be the main researchers of morality (Haan, 1985).

Differences involved the projected grounds of morality. These differences involved the dichotomous questions of whether (a) individuals developed from one hierarchal stage to another, making moral decisions on generalized rules, or (b) were people constantly involved in actively ascertaining a moral resolution for a social situation. Cognitivists viewed the individual as reflective, while interactionalists viewed the individual as involved in dialogue. Haan stated that "the cognitive model is that of rational being, the interaction model is that of social being" (Haan, 1985, p. 34).

Women's Psychological and Moral Development

Much of what was accepted as human psychological and moral developmental theory was based on research with male subjects and then articulated through a patriarchal culture (Bernard, 1981; Gilligan, 1979, 1982; Harding, 1983, 1984; Harding & Hintikka, 1983; Keller, 1982; Schaef, 1981). Only recently has there been a keen interest in women's moral development (Belenky et al., 1986; Gilligan, 1977, 1979, 1982; Salner, 1985; Sargent, 1984).

Psychological literature reported disparate themes in the psychological and moral development of women and men (Broughton, 1983; Code, 1981a, 1981b; Farganis, 1986; Gilligan, 1982; Lloyd, 1983; Nails, O'Loughlin, & Walker, 1983). As was mentioned, Kohlberg (1969) claimed that his six stages of moral development were universal, but, in his research, men often developed to the higher stages of moral development whereas women often only developed to stage three of his six-stage

sequence. Thus, women were viewed as inferior to men in their moral development and moral reasoning, and only when women entered into some form of activity traditionally identified as male activity could they recognize the inadequacy of this reasoning and be able to progress to the higher stages of Kohlberg's cognitive developmental sequence (Kohlberg, 1969, 1981, 1984).

When women were included as research subjects, researchers were usually interested in how the women either conformed to or differed from the male subjects (Belenky et al., 1986; Gilligan, 1977, 1979, 1982; Martin, 1982; Nails et al., 1983). Since masculine attributes had become the highly valued traits of western culture, those qualities such as autonomy, independence, abstract critical thought, and the development of a morality of rights received the emphasis in research (Gilligan, 1977, 1979, 1982; Nicholson, 1983; Scheman, 1983; Sherif, 1979; Sherman & Beck, 1978; Sherman & Denmark, 1977). Traditional feminine qualities such as interdependence, relationship, nurturance, and contextual thinking were relegated to a lower status (Belenky et al., 1986; Code, 1981a, 1981b; Harding, 1984; Firestone, 1970; Friedan, 1963, 1981; Gilligan, 1982; Lloyd, 1983; Parsons, 1979). Men's experience and qualities had been used as a barometer to measure both men's and women's psychological and moral development. Often this type of evaluation had led researchers to conclude that women reached lower levels of both moral and intellectual development (Belenky et al., 1986; Gilligan, 1982; Lloyd, 1983). In her recent book <u>In a Different Voice</u>, Carol Gilligan (1982) posited that the disparity between women

and men was not due to the inferiority of women but rather to a misinterpretation of the research. Kohlberg's (1969) study on moral development was completed with 84 boys. Girls were excluded. those qualities found in women, known as expressive qualities, were seen as inferior to the instrumental qualities expressed by males. However, with more and more research having been done with women, the gap between women's and men's development, rather than viewed as inferiority, was viewed as a different developmental process (Belenky et al., 1986; Gilligan, 1982).

Carol Gilligan (1982), through a series of in-depth interviews used to develop psychological profiles, found that women's moral judgments developed from a concern for survival to a focus on goodness as seen through the eyes of others, and finally to an understanding of care and responsibility for self and others. This development progressed through three stages. Each different perspective integrated a more complex understanding of self and other. Gilligan (1982) posited that women's conceptions of self were intertwined with their morality. Moral decisions were not based on abstract principles but, instead, were grounded in the context of relationship. Women were oriented toward establishing and maintaining caring relationships. Decisions about conflict and morality were made with the other in mind and in relation to the situation. Moral decisions were contextual (Gilligan, 1982).

The feminine concept of a "morality of understanding" was different than that of men which was a "morality of rights" (Gilligan,

1982, p. 19; Lloyd, 1983; Lyons, 1983; MacGuigan, 1973). women's morality was based on the ideal of connection rather than the men's ideal of separation. "Women's construction of the moral problem as a problem of care and responsibility of relationships, rather than, as one of rights and rules, tied the development of their moral thinking to changes in their understanding of responsibility and relationships . . . . Thus, the logic underlying an ethic of care is a psychological logic of relationships . . ." (Gilligan, 1982, p. 73).

Gilligan (1982) cited research from Piaget (1966) and Lever (1976) that suggested that the "morality of responsibility" developed quite early in life. In their studies with young boys and girls, Piaget (1966) and Lever (1976) found that boys played longer at the intricate, rule-bound games which they developed whereas girls' games were less bound by rules and were stopped when quarrels broke out. Girls seemed to be more interested in maintaining the relationship rather than arguing to continue play. Lever (1976) also found that girls chose to play games in which each person had a turn, such as jumping rope or hopscotch, "where success by one individual did not necessarily indicate failure by another" (p. 10). In women's morality, to hurt another caused conflict. Thus, self-sacrifice was seen as a higher value than inflicting harm on another.

According to Gilligan (1977, 1979, 1982), one of the greatest conflicts for women was between responsibility and selfishness. In the moral evolutionary pattern, this conflict between selfishness and responsibility was continually reevaluated. After reinterpretation,

new levels of moral reasoning were reached. The most reasonable context for resolving moral conflict was understanding and care. The moral progression went through three levels, according to Gilligan (1982). In the first level, the primary concern was caring about self where survival and one's own desires and needs were primary. The transition to the next level involved the conflict between selfishness, the concern with one's own desires and needs, and responsibility to others. The issue was the integration of responsibility and care. Connection with others was highly valued. On this second level, the traditional feminine voice resounded clearly. One's self-worth was based on caring and responsibility for others. Self-sacrifice was seen as the highest value (Gilligan, 1982).

The transition from the second level to the third centered around the conflict between self-sacrifice and responsibility to oneself (Gilligan, 1982). The transition to seeing oneself and one's ideas as worthwhile and valid initiated a moral crisis involving the concept of selfishness. Here women began to question the idea of self-responsibility in relation to selfishness. The individual began to question whether responsibility should also include being responsible for oneself as well as others. Thus, Gilligan (1982) posited that the central moral problem for women involved the conflict between self and other. Within this transition, women began to realize that not only do they have a responsibility to others but they also were responsible for themselves (Gilligan, 1982).

In the past, women evaluated their worthiness as being the caretakers and protectors of others (Gilligan, 1977, 1979, 1982). Women's goodness was seen as always involving an "other." This other was the recipient of the kindness and the nurturance women provided. During this period of development, the second level of Gilligan's (1982) moral states, women saw their strength resonating from their ability to care for another. This stage related to typical societal stereotypes for women. Women judged themselves on what others (e.g., society, males, and other groups) had to say about them.

The conflict that initiated the transition from level II to level III once again involved the issue of selfishness (Gilligan, 1982). Women, in this transition, began to question the idea of self-sacrifice. They began to realize that one's own needs were also important and that a morality of care must also involve caring for oneself. The issue of hurting arose as a central conflict at this point (Gilligan, 1982). Realizing that one's own needs had equal value with the other's, woman had to choose between self and other. They had to decide who would be "the victim." "It is precisely this dilemma, the conflict between compassion and autonomy, between virtue and power, which the feminine voice struggles to resolve in an effort to reclaim the self and to solve the moral problem in such a way that no one is hurt" (Gilligan, 1982, p. 71).

Again, the central moral problem for women arose between self and other (Gilligan, 1982). Now women realized that they had a choice. The choice involved self-sacrifice for the other, or responsibility to

oneself. They must decide who to hurt, who would become the victim, the other or themselves (Gilligan, 1982).

The realization that women had a choice between self and other marked the transition to the third and highest level of morality in Gilligan's (1982) view. Hurting was still a central issue; however, the conflict of choosing who to harm was solved by the introduction of the value of nonviolence. One should not cause harm to another, nor should they cause harm to themselves (Gilligan, 1982). On this level, the principle of nonviolence governed all moral decisions, and self and other were seen as equally valid and important. Therefore, when a conflict arose between self and other, and one had to decide who would be the victim, the decision was contextual and based on the best possible outcome that would benefit all involved. Once again there was the idea of a morality of relationship that was based on connectedness rather than separation. It was a morality that was contextual, not one based on abstract rules or principles (Gilligan, 1982). This was also a higher level of moral reasoning in Norma Haan's (1985) Theory of Interactional Morality. In her theory, to reiterate, each individual was a moral agent. This means that people are actively involved in the moral decision-making process. On the higher levels of moral reasoning, the decision was based within a situation or context, and the outcome was based upon what decision would be mutually beneficial for everybody involved (Haan, 1985).

On the third level, the woman realized that she had a choice and that it was possible to be responsible for others as well as for

herself (Gilligan, 1982). She realized that her voice was as important as the voice of others. Her goodness no longer came from outside herself, or external societal judgment, but was now grounded internally in the idea of truth. Truth here involved one's own judgment of intentions and consequences of one's actions. There was a shift from goodness as judged by others to truth as a judgment from within (Gilligan, 1982).

Although on the third level, the conflict between self and other still existed in the form of a dilemma of who to hurt, the issue between selfishness and responsibility was narrowed within the concept of nonviolence. Responsibility for care included both the self and the other (Gilligan, 1982).

Gilligan (1982) posited three steps of transition in women's moral development from initial concern towards oneself, to caring for others, to responsibility for caring for others and oneself. The critical issues of psychological and moral development for women involved self-worth in relation to others, acceptance of the power to choose, and acceptance of responsibility to choose between oneself as well as others (Gilligan, 1982).

In conclusion, the distinction between self and other remained the salient issue in terms of women's psychological and moral development. The essence of the decision-making process resided in the context of (a) who was seen as the authority or (b) who had the power to impact on a person's choice. Women's moral development, as did their intellectual development, proceeded from an external attribution of

power to the realization that the power to choose between oneself and the other resided within the self (Gilligan, 1982). The final interpretation was the illumination of the self as authority (Gilligan, 1982).

Sport and Morality

Bredemeier and Shields (1986) proposed that research on morality could be scientific. The support for their proposal was precipitated through a social scientific understanding of morality. This section focused on (a) possible differences between real life morality and sport morality, (b) general differences in moral reasoning and possible effects on sport and sport participation, (c) sport as an arena for moral growth, and (d) the scientific study of morality.

As was discussed earlier in this paper, philosophers approached morality from principles from which ethical discussions could be deducted. Social scientists equated this with a person's ability to make moral decisions at a high level on a consistent basis. Kohlberg's (1969, 1981) theory likened "first principles" in philosophy to his highest form of morality (i.e., justice). Through growth, a person reached different levels, each more closely related to Kohlberg's principle of justice. Haan (1985) chose to discuss morality form a practical level as opposed to abstract principles. For her, dialogue involved an attempt to understand and integrate diverse moral perspectives into a resolution for action that would benefit those involved. The dialogue involved a search for "hints of truth," and

Haan's (1985) contention was that science utilized these same methods. Through certain processes, science attempted to reach the "truth." Neither the natural scientists nor the social scientists were completely neutral. They both had inherent assumptions about values (Haan, 1982). Therefore, the conclusion was that the study of morality could be scientific.

The function of morality in sport had been of interest to several researchers (Bredemeier, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986a, 1986b; Bredemeier & Shields, 1983, 1984a, 1984b, 1985, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c; Bredemeier et al., 1986d; Shields & Bredemeier, in press; Smith, 1986). In 1982, the American Academy of Physical Education published a position paper proclaiming moral development as one of three critical issues that needed to be investigated in relationship to physical education and sport. Physical educators were urged to respond. Thus, Bredemeier and Shields initiated a research program on moral development based on Haan's (1985) interactional model. The thrust of their research was that moral reasoning abounds in the sport world; however, reasoning about such issues may differ in several ways: (a) nonathletes may differ from athletes, (b) females may differ from males, and (c) moral reasoning in a sport situation may differ from moral reasoning in real life (Bredemeier, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1986a, 1986b; Bredemeier & Shields, 1983, 1984b, 1986a, 1986b, 1986c). Moral reasoning may differ in the sport situation from a real life situation because sport takes place in a different context. Goffman (1974) referred to it as a different "frame." Sport varied from real life in

that it was in a joyful context and "only pretending" (Huizinga, 1944). It differed temporally in that sport had a definite beginning and end and spatially because sport took place in a special location. Because of this variance between sport and everyday life, Bredemeier (1986b; Bredemeier & Shields, 1984b, 1986b, 1986c) posited that the athlete's moral reasoning may also differ between sport settings and everyday life situations. There may be differing factors acting upon an athlete in a sport context as well a varying actions that are accepted in sport but not in everyday life. She called this "game morality" (Bredemeier, 1986b; Bredemeier & Shields, 1984b).

Sport was often perceived as releasing the participants from everyday functioning (Bredemeier, 1983, 1985, 1986b; Bredemeier & Shields, 1984a, 1984b, 1986b). At times the moral decisions were seen to fall only on the coaches or officials. When the athlete must make some form of moral decision, sometimes they appealed to the rules as a regulator, but more often they reasoned differently within sport than in everyday life (Bredemeier, 1985, 1986b; Bredemeier & Shields, 1984a, 1984b, 1986b, 1986c). Haan's (1985) Theory of Interactional Morality was used to clarify this concept. Reiterated, Haan's (1985) theory of morality was seen as a process of interacting dialogue whereby individuals came to an understanding and an integration of diffuse perspectives. The maturity level for this process developed through experiences is dialogue and social interaction. There were five levels of development which could be grouped into three phases. The first phase, containing Levels 1 and 2, Assimilation, was egocentric (i.e.,

one's own interests and needs were paramount to those of others). The next stage consisting of Levels 3 and 4, or the Accommodation Phase, was one in which the needs of others were seen as important and one's own wants and needs were subordinated. The fifth level was one in which all persons' needs were seen as important. The attempt at this level would be to maximize the positive aspects of a solution for everyone involved (Haan, 1985).

Bredemeier (1984) proposed that sport reasoning was in the first phase, that of assimilation, where one's own needs were subordinate. Research on athletic aggression (Bredemeier, 1986a; Bredemeier & Shields, 1984a, 1984b, 1985, 1986b) supported this notion. Bredemeier and Shields (1983, 1984a, 1984b; Bredemeier et al., 1986d) divided aggression into two categories:

> Category A included: (a) robust play within the game's formal rules and informal norms; and (b) the intentional infliction of relatively minor injury or mild pain for strategic purposes. Category B included: (a) the intentional infliction of serious injury; and (b) physical force that was used apart from relevant game skills" (p. 26).

They found that there were some uncertain areas where athletes actually drew the line for legitimate or illegitimate aggression. Some athletes felt that serious bodily harm was the same as a bloody nose if it was inflicted within the context of the game. Legitimate aggression would be of the kind to intimidate an opponent without seriously harming them. It was Bredemeier (1985) and Bredemeier and Shields (1984a, 1984b) contention that any injurious act that went beyond the scope of the game was a violation of game reasoning and thus was illegitimate.

In conclusion, Bredemeier and Shields (1984a, 1984b) found that a large number of athletes felt that infliction of minor pain was legitimate and fell under the category of robust play. the athletes appealed to rules and officials to mediate discussion of those sorts of injuries. If it was within the rules, then no moral conflict was experienced.

However, Bredemeier and Shields (1984a, 1984b, 1986b) posited that the most mature athletes relegated injurious activity to the category of illegitimate acts and that these types of situations created moral conflict (Bredemeier & Shields, 1984a, 1985, 1986c). Bredemeier (1983, 1984, 1986) suggested that perhaps those games involving such acts attracted less mature athletes. Another point raised was that Haan (1977b, 1985) posited that stress causes moral default, and many game decisions were made under stressful conditions. Bredemeier and Shields (1984a) suggested that to reduce aggression "strategies for reducing stress and employing alternative behavioral responses, providing means for ego support" (p. 25) may promote a more affluent milieu for moral growth.

The issue of gender differences was advanced through Kohlberg's (1969) model of moral development. Some theorists held that female moral development was at a lower level than male moral development (Kohlberg, 1969, 1981, 1984). Although the majority of Kohlberg's research was done with male subjects, the female subjects consistently scored at Stage 3, whereas the majority of males' scores were at Stage 4 (Kohlberg, 1969). This difference had been explained by the fact

that the values within Stage 3 were highly related to society's expectations of femininity. Those who suggested that females were less morally mature than males subordinated societal values for women to those of men.

Carol Gilligan (1982) criticized Kohlberg's ideal of justice as being the highest principle. Her ideal of women's moral principle was that of nonviolence. As previously discussed, in Gilligan's view the stages of moral development progressed from survival and self-protection to a sense of responsibility toward others in Level 1. The transition from Level 1 to Level 2 involved the individual's adherence to society's wishes for the goodness of the other. A person's integrity stemmed from being able to care for the other even if it involved self-sacrifice. Eventually, goodness, as seen through society's eyes, changed to the search for truth. Personal needs came to the forefront again, only this time it was in a sense of altruism, not in a sense of what others perceived to be the correct action (Gilligan, 1982).

The third level equated others with the self and extended the ideal of nonviolence to self and others. In Gilligan's (1982) view, violence "fractures" the human connection. One's integrity stemmed from the ability to care. The realization of interdependence was paramount. "The conflict between self and other thus constitutes the central moral problem for women . . . which the feminine voice struggles to resolve in its effort to reclaim the self and to solve the moral problem in such a way that no one is hurt" (p. 71).

When sport was viewed through the model that Gilligan asserted, it seemed apparent that sport, as society expected it to be, would not have been an arena where women reached their human potential (Postow, 1983; Theberge, 1981, 1985; Wright, 1986). The argument extended to males, as well, when it was considered that men in mid-life often possessed characteristics of care and responsibility (Gilligan, 1982). At this time, the egocentric stage seemed to have been transcended. As was mentioned earlier, Bredemeier (1984) and Bredemeier and Shields (1984a, 1984b, 1986) posited that moral reasoning in sport was on an egocentric level. This would seem to indicate that athletes were functioning at a preconventional level. If this were the case, then it would seem necessary to transcend, or move beyond, the current inherent values of sport, such as "winning is everything" or competition for the purpose of defeating another, in order for moral growth to occur. This type of focus in sport promoted egocentricity. In contrast, if the interaction among participants were focused on equity, justice, and nonviolence, perhaps the outcomes would be growth promoting.

For example, if a football player were self-reflective and began to see the dialectics of the decisions made by himself and his teammates, he would then realize the "good" and "bad" within the game. He would differentiate between the "bad" (i.e., injuring the opponent's quarterback in order to make winning easier) and the "good" (i.e., attempting to win with both teams performing at optimal levels). He could transcend the dialectic and choose the "good," moral decision.

This would be an example of sport which encompasses the values posited by Gilligan (1982).

Kohlberg (1969) would ascertain a move in the football player's morality development from a lower stage to a higher stage. The athlete transcended his egocentricity and society's demand to win at any cost and made a decision based on an ethical judgment. Haan's (1985) theory relates also in the choice for equity (il.e., "you play your best and I'll do the same and may the best person win").

This model of sport would not be deleting any importance from winning, necessarily. The proposed model would, rather, question the "how" and "why" of winning. A moral choice might be one in which one hoped the opponent and oneself performed at optimal levels, both attempting to achieve excellence or potential. The emphasis was on individual performance rather than competition against another. Perhaps a focus as such would enhance the possibility for moral growth within sport.

Research confirmed that there were gender differences in sport orientation. Bredemeier (1984, 1986b) expounded on two different orientations to sport. The "play orientation" was one in which fairness and skill were seen as more valuable than success. "Professional orientation" was one in which competence and winning were more highly valued than fairness. It was found that those who had not had much experience in sports participated with the "play orientation." And, at all levels of participation, males scored higher in professional oriented than females (Bredemeier, 1984). These concepts

spoke to the values inherent in sport. As was previously argued, it seemed that the moral choice was to perform with skill to achieve one's potential, not simply to win. It was the age-old argument that questioned if it was truly victory if one did not fulfill one's potential or play one's "best." And would not victory be enhanced if both players performed optimally?

Bredemeier (1984) also found that there were differences when values were categorized into expressive and instrumental. White males, irrespective of their level of participation, preferred instrumental values. Females in professional sports preferred instrumental values, those in intercollegiate sport were mixed, and those involved in recreational activities preferred the expressive values. Instrumental values are those deemed by society as masculine behavioral characteristics such as being autonomous, aggressive, competitive, etc., and expressive values include those behaviors that society characterized as feminine such as cooperative, dependent, and submissive.

After comparison of the two models and review of the sport related literature using Haan's (1985) model, the Theory of Interactional Morality was chosen for this investigation to explore moral reasoning in sport. The interactional model was used as the moral developmental model in this investigation to score responses from women athletes about everyday and sport moral dilemmas.

Methodology and Feminist Research

Methodology is the way a person approaches problem solving and searches for answers (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). The models of inquiry a person chooses are shaped by their interests, purposes, and assumptions. The person's beliefs about the world influence their choice of methodology and influence the questions they ask and their interpretation of the findings which are generated (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Du Bois, 1983; Duelli-Klein, 1983; Kuhn, 1962; Luijpen, 1969; Mies,1983; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). The ways a person organizes and interprets their experiences informs their model of reality and in turn, influences their beliefs. These beliefs are ways of knowing and reflect their conceptualization of reality, what they want to know about reality, and how they would go about knowing that reality (Du Bois, 1983; Jacob, 1987).

Social science utilizes two major models of inquiry. The first theoretical perspective, positivism, found its beginnings with August Compte and Emile Durkheim (Jacob, 1987; Kerlinger, 1979; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). Positivism adopted a natural science model of research in a search for facts and causes of social phenomena (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). This method of inquiry considers facts as external "things" that influence people. Usually, positivism attempts to collect data which would lend themselves to statistical analysis (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984).

Taylor and Bogdan (1984) described the second major theoretical perspective as phenomenological. Max Weber (1968) posited that the

phenomenologists are committed to "verstehen," or a quest to understand social phenomena from the actor's point of view. Phenomenologists are concerned with how people experience the world and the individual's internal ideas, feelings, and motives (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Idhe, 1984; Luijpen, 1969; Mies, 1983).

The methods promoted by the positivist perspective are usually quantitative in nature. In other words, a positivist attempts to collect data amenable to statistical analysis and wants to quantify, or attach numerical meaning to the data. On the other hand, in the quest to understand, phenomenologists utilize qualitative methods. This type of methodology yields descriptive data (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984).

In a quest to understand women's experience and beliefs, or ways of knowing, this investigation for the most part used a qualitative model of inquiry (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). In this section, qualitative methodology was defined and reasons for choosing this methodology were given. The discussion was grounded in feminist theory and ideology.

Qualitative methodology, like quantitative methodology, is another way to approach the empirical world (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Borg & Gall, 1983;1 Bowles & Klein, 1983; Goetz & Le Compte, 1984; Martens, 1987; Mishler, 1986; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). It is a methodology based on people's own written or spoken words and behaviors which yield descriptive data in the quest to understand the individual in their own terms. Question posing is the primary tool to elicit personal

information from individuals (Benjamin, 1981; Bowles & Klein, 1983; Mishler, 1986).

Qualitative research begins with flexible research designs (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). Instead of concrete hypotheses, qualitative research often begins with a vague idea of the questions which might be asked (Goetz & Le Compte, 1984). Through induction, the qualitative researcher develops concepts and interpretations through patterns in the data. Individuals are not reduced to numerical variables. The person is viewed within a particular context, and both are seen as a whole. In this way, the researcher attempts to empathize with the individual in order to better understand each individual's interpretation of their experience of the world. In this respect, the researcher utilizing qualitative methods becomes a part of the people and settings being studied (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Bowels & Klein, 1983; Goetz & Le Compte, 1986; Mies, 1983; Mishler, 1986; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984).

Qualitative researchers are aware of the effects they have on the subjects under study and take this into account when interpreting the data (Bogdan & Taylor, 1985; Duelli-Klein, 1983; Goetz & Le Compte, 1986; Mishler, 1986; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). As Gary Zukar (1979), in his book The Dancing Wu Li Masters, explained, anything which was observed was changed. This is a simple explanation of the Heisenberg Principle, but a very necessary understanding for qualitative researchers. Rather than attempting to remain aloof and objective, qualitative researchers become involved in the procedures. With

involvement, the qualitative researcher realizes that her/his presence changes what they are attempting to observe (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Duelli-Klein, 1983; Goetz & Le Compte, 1986; Mishler, 1986; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984).

To study people qualitatively is to get to know them personally and to gain a more in-depth experience of their daily struggles. Qualitative methodology introduces a way to study concepts such as beauty, love, pain, and frustration. Often, to reduce people to statistical equations would be to lose sight of these aspects of humanity (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Duelli-Klein, 1983; Du Bois, 1983; Freire, 1970; Polanyi, 1958; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984).

In the qualitative research process, validity is emphasized. Reliability and replicability are also emphasized. However, researchers such as Mishler (1986) suggests that reliability has been overemphasized in social research. He posits the overconcern for consistency without much regard for being right or wrong. Valid studies of the empirical world make it hardly possible to achieve perfect reliability (Mishler, 1986). For these reasons, validity is the major concern. In order to assure validity, qualitative researchers attempt to obtain first-hand knowledge and to insure that the data collected correspond with what was actually said and done (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). Along the same line, Mishler (1986) posits that there was not just one absolute truth but rather that there are various interpretations. External validity is concerned with assuring the correctness of the interpretation (Bogdan & Taylor, 1984; Mishler,

1986). Also, internal validity stressed the meaningfulness of analysis to interested audiences, the care of the research process, and the importance of theoretical framework for inferences and interpretation (Mishler, 1986).

Qualitative researchers (Benjamin, 1981; Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Du Bois, 1983; Mies, 1983; Mishler, 1986; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984) believe that the qualitative research process is a craft, an art. The qualitative researcher's methodology is often guided by their own intuition and experience. Rather than being tied to specific procedures and techniques, the qualitative researcher uses their methods to best suit the research process. It is "time-consuming and intellectually fatiguing" to study human behavior (Mishler, 1986, p. 21), and oftentimes the success of a qualitative study depends on the ability of the researcher who becomes a craftsperson (Taylor & Bogdan, 1984).

Feminist Methodology: Empowerment of the Personal

Many academic feminists (Bowles & Klein, 1983; Du Bois, 1983; Harding, 1983; Harding & Hintikka, 1983; Hoffman, 1986; Keller, 1982; Klein, 1983; Reinharz, 1984; Rosenberg, 1982; Ruddick, 1980) have attempted to relate feminist principles with research. Like phenomenology, feminist research is concerned with capturing the individual's processes of interpreting their own world. They are interested in how people define their world. By listening to what people say and observing what people do in their everyday lives,

feminists have attempted to construct a feminist methodology that takes into account individuals' personal meanings of their lives (Stanley & Wise, 1983a, 1983b).

The feminist critique of positivism began with the positivistic claim of one true reality, which could be discovered if the researcher remained objective by removing themselves from the objects of the study (Du Bois, 1983; Mies, 1983; Stanley & Wise, 1983a, 1983b).

> In brief, positivism is an ontological approach, a way of seeing and constructing the world, which insists that physical and social worlds are in all essentials the same. Positivism claims . . . one true set of events (the facts) which is discoverable . . . . It describes social reality as objectively constituted and so insists that there is one true "real" reality . . . researchers can objectively find out this real reality because they remove themselves from involvement in what they study" (Stanley & Wise, 1983b, pp. 193-194).

These kinds of assumptions promoted the subject/object dichotomy which permitted a power relationship between the researcher and the respondent within the research process. The researcher was seen as above and separate from the researched. And by remaining aloof, the researcher attempted to determine the meaning within each subject's responses. Feminists reject the idea that anyone can become an expert in another person's life (Stanley & Wise, 1983a). Therefore, along with other researchers (Benjamin, 1981, Belenky et al., 1986; Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Bowles & Klein, 1983; Mishler, 1986; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984), feminists attempt to break down the power relationship between the researcher and the researched. One way of achieving this dismantling process is by empowering the respondent (Mishler, 1986; Mies, 1983) and including the personal in the research process (Du

Bois, 1983; Klein, 1983; Mies, 1983; Mishler, 1986; Stanley & Wise, 1983a, 1983b). Feminists believe that "the personal is the political" (Bowles & Klein, 1983; Du Bois, 1983; Donavan, 1985; Keller, 1982; Reinharz, 1983; Ruddick, 1980; Stanley & Wise, 1983a, 1983b), and that people's everyday experiences are important to study in order to truly understand how individual's "know" their world.

Mishler (1986) and Mies (1983) defined empowering the respondent as having the respondent involved in the process of understanding and giving meaning to their own words. Mishler (1986) posited "a further step in the direction of reducing the power differential in an interview was to accept interviewees as collaborators . . . full participants in the development of the study and in the analysis and interpretation of data" (p. 126). In this way, the researchers could gain a fuller, more true understanding of exactly what the respondent meant, the respondent's personal meaning and interpretation of their world.

In order to recover the personal, academic feminists and other scientists (Belenky et al., 1986; Bowles & Klein, 1983; Du Bois, 1983; Mies, 1983; Mishler, 1986; Oakley, 1981; Polanyi, 1958; Reinharz, 1983; Rosenberg, 1982; Ruddick, 1980; Stanley & Wise, 1983a) adopted qualitative methodology to pursue their interests. Ethnomethodology was one theoretical perspective which was used as a research process. Ethnomethodology is based on how people construct meaning in their everyday lives and how they maintain a sense of external reality. Ethnomethodology projects the belief that each person experiences an

external reality. External reality may or may not be experienced in the same way by everyone, but everyone uses beliefs and concepts: (a) to construct their perception of reality and (b) to give their reality meaning (Goetz & Le Compte, 1986; Mies, 1983; Mishler, 1986; Stanley & Wise, 1983a).

The interview became a valuable tool within ethnomethodology. Research interviewing is a method for understanding individual experiences through the voices of those people being studied (Chu, 1982; Mishler, 1986). The philosopher Sara Ruddick (1980) talks about how the process of question-posing helps researchers gain a better understanding of the personal. Through listening and talking with respondents, both the interviewer and the interviewee construct the meaning of the interview process together. In this way, the interviewer has a chance to truly understand what the respondent said and meant. Interviewing, by empowering the respondent, supports the feminist's principle of getting back to the personal and is a way of explicating experiences. It also supports another feminist ideal: dismantling the power relationship between interviewer and respondent (Bowles & Klein, 1983; Mies, 1983; Mishler, 1986).

To summarize, phenomenologists view human behavior (i.e, what individuals say and do) as a product of how individuals define their lives. The task of a phenomenological endeavor is to capture and understand the process of how individuals interpret their world. Phenomenologists attempt to do this by watching and listening to individuals in order to understand how they define their world from

their own perspective. Ethnomethodology is a theoretical perspective of phenomenology (Bogdan & Taylor, 1975; Goetz & Le Compte, 1986; Mishler, 1986; Stanley & Wise, 1983a; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984), and interviewing is a valuable tool within the ethnomethodological perspective (Bogdan & Taylor, 1983a; Goetz & Le Compte, 1986; Mishler, 1986; Stanley & Wise, 1983a; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984).

This research project is phenomenological in nature because it is an attempt to explicate and to gain an understanding of women athlete's experiences of their reality. The project is from an ethnomethodological perspective because it is a study of women athletes' experiences in their everyday lives. Phenomenology and ethnomethodology are both sympathetic with feminist ideals, due to the importance of the personal in both frameworks. In addition, the interview was chosen as the tool for collecting data because of the intent of the interviewer to hear and understand women athletes' interpretations of their world from their own points of view. Feminist scholarship is concerned with finding new ways of exploring women's experience, whereby women participate actively in the articulation of their experience. Feminists recognize the masculine attributes of science, such as rational rather than emotional, objective rather than subjective, and the public life of the individual as being more important than the private life (Bowles & Duelli-Klein, 1983; Chodorow, 1978; Code, 1981a, 1981b; Donavan, 1985; Du Bois, 1983; Eichler, 1980; Firestone, 1970; Harding, 1983; Keller, 1982; Mies, 1983). Science, from a feminist perspective, does not negate objectivity, rationality,

and so forth, but seeks alternative methods of exploring knowledge and truth (Jayaratne, 1983). One of the alternative methods of feminist scholarship is qualitative methodology (Harding & Hintikka, 1983; Mies, 1983; Mishler, 1986). In this way, women can be active in the exploration and explication of their lives. The content of the data is validated through the accuracy of the women's personal account of their experience and articulation of the meaning of their world (Mies, 1983; Mishler, 1986; Newton & Walton, 1974; Watkins, 1983). Sport psychology and sport sociology are subdisciplines of psychology and sociology. Within the parent disciplines there is a struggle to define a feminist methodology (Bowles & Klein, 1983; Du Bois, 1983; Eichler, 1980; Mies, 1983; Smith, 1974). Feminists from these disciplines are encouraging other feminists and researchers to explore new methods for obtaining knowledge (Mies, 1983; Smith, 1974; Stanley & Wise, 1984a, 1984b; Welch, 1980). This project is an attempt to join other feminists in defining a feminist methodology to articulate the women's voice. Thus, since this investigation is about women athletes' personal experience of authority/power, the problem is approached from a feminist perspective. Embraced within this perspective are feminist ideals of the personal as important and women as active participants in articulating their experience. The methods chosen for this investigation, as stated earlier, are sympathetic with feminist ideals.

CHAPTER 3

PROCEDURES

The purpose of this study was to expand upon the finding of an initial investigation of women's ways of knowing by Belenky et al. (1986). This investigation examined women athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power. As was stated earlier, this study was qualitative in nature and embraced particular feminist ideals. Since the intent of this project was to understand and articulate the personal experience and meaning of each individual respondent, this investigation could be considered phenomenological. To aid in the understanding of each respondent's experience as well as to establish rapport with the respondent, the interview was given in three parts. Each section was conducted on a separate day. Each interview session lasted 60-90 minutes. The steps in this investigation proceeded as follows: (a) selection of data collection technique, (b) construction and evaluation of the interview questions, (c) selection of subjects, and (d) analysis of the data.

Selection of the Data Collection Technique

The use of the interview technique was employed in this study because of its strength in promoting self-reflection and the ability to gain an in-depth understanding of a person's experience as well as the meaning the person attached to the experience (Harding & Hintikka, 1983; Mies, 1983; Mishler, 1987; Taylor & Bogdan, 1984). The interview

questions were open-ended and semi-structured to allow each respondent's reflections and their own frame of reference to emerge. The interview questions provided the basis for attaining a more in-depth understanding of how sporting women came to know and reason morally about authority/power.

Some of the questions used by Gilligan (1982) and Belenky et al. (1986) were initially adopted for this project. After several revisions, the interview questions were modified to directly approach the issue of authority/power within daily life and sport. From the questions, the voice of the athlete was explored in order to understand the female athlete's way of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power in daily life and sport. Every attempt was made to listen intently to each athlete in order to hear the athlete's own thoughts and feelings rather than the researcher's preconceived hypotheses. Since the interview technique elicited personal responses from the respondents, every attempt was made to establish rapport and relax the relationship between the interviewer and the respondent in order to facilitate honesty and openness throughout the interview. Within the semi-structured framework of the interview questions, each athlete was given every opportunity to guide the interview in directions she felt important and meaningful (Belenky et al., 1986; Benjamin, 1986; Bogdan & Taylor, 1974; Goetz and Le Compte, 1986; Mishler, 1986; Taylor and Bogdan, 1984).

Construction and Evaluation of Interview Questions

After reviewing the work of Belenky et al. (1986), 24 structured questions were developed to elicit responses concerned with daily life and sport experiences of women athletes. Some questions came directly from the work of Belenky et al. (1986), others were revised to ascertain the relationship between women athletes' ways of knowing in daily life and sport. In order to gain background knowledge from each athlete, the initial interview began with the question, "What stands out for you in your life over the past few years?" (Belenky et al., 1986). The interview then proceeded to questions on self-description, gender, relationships, ways of knowing in daily life and sport, and a conclusion. Each individual was given an opportunity to respond about the process of the interview and their feelings during the interview. Questions pertaining to sport were included in each of the above sections.

In the summer and fall of 1987, a pilot study was conducted in order to establish the appropriateness of the interview questions and to develop the investigator's interviewing skills. Five interviews were arranged with female athletes who had participated in sport at the college and/or postcollege level. Each interview was audio-taped and several were transcribed. All interviews were analyzed for the significant questions which would elicit the pertinent responses. The interviews were also evaluated for any needed corrections in technique that might have been necessary in helping the interviewer control the flow of conversation and maintain a relaxed atmosphere during the

interview session. The interviewer's technique was observed and evaluated by persons with expertise in the area of qualitative research and interview technique.

Following the initial pilot study, the interview questions were revised to directly ascertain information about women athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power. Copies of the interview questions were given to several people who were familiar with the work of Belenky et al. (1986) and with the purpose of this study. These persons were asked to evaluate each question for clarity to obtain information related to the research problem. Questions were modified again and a final interview protocol (Appendix A) was established. The final interview protocol was constructed to elicit information from women athletes concerning their way of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power in daily life and sport. The issues of conflict and preferred authority were chosen to elicit information about authority/power. Questions were established to probe the athlete's ways of knowing authority/power in daily life (i.e., work or school) and in sport. Moral dilemmas (Appendix B) were also constructed to elicit the athlete's moral reasoning about authority/power centering around issues involving conflict. Four dilemmas were constructed in order to examine the respondent's moral reasoning in daily life (i.e., two from school and two from work). Two more dilemmas were constructed to explore the women athletes' moral reasoning in sport. The moral dilemmas were further divided into conflict with peers and conflict with authority in both daily life and

sport. These dilemmas were matched so that the college and postcollege respondents would receive the same type of problem. The college athletes received the moral dilemmas pertaining to school (i.e., one dilemma concerning conflict with peers and one dilemma concerning conflict with an authority in a school situation; for example, a teacher). The postcollege athletes received the dilemmas pertaining to work (i.e, one dilemma concerning peers and one dilemma concerning conflict with an authority in a work situation; for example, the boss). Both groups were administered the same two moral dilemmas concerning sport, one pertaining to a conflict with a peer and one dilemma pertaining to a conflict with an authority (i.e., a coach). The interview questions were also constructed so that the appropriate word (i.e., teacher, boss, peer, and/or coach) could be inserted depending on the respondent and the question.

The final interview protocol consisted of (a) an introduction (Appendix C); (b) a demographic survey (Appendix D); (c) questions pertaining to gender, embodiment, preferred authority, and conflict; and (d) six moral dilemmas (Appendixes A and B). The entire interview was then divided into three sessions. The demographic survey was administered in the first interview session in order to help establish rapport with the respondent. Included in the first interview session were the questions on gender and embodiment. The second interview session consisted of the questions on ways of knowing authority/power centered around conflict and preferred authority. The third interview session included the administration of the moral dilemmas and a period

for debriefing. Each respondent received two dilemmas pertaining to daily life (i.e., work or school) and two dilemmas pertaining to sport. The debriefing session was to permit each athlete a time (a) to offer additional reflections or considerations and/or (b) to discuss their personal reactions to the material covered in the interview sessions and the interview process.

Subjects

The respondents in this investigation were 10 female athletes involved in the sport of softball at the college and postcollege levels. There were five athletes chosen at each level. The college athletes were juniors and seniors, age 20-22 years, and the postcollege athletes ranged between the ages of 23-37 years.

Prior to conducting the interviews, university policy was followed at both The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and at the University of California, Berkeley, in order to secure approval to conduct Human Subjects Research. Appropriate measures were taken to protect the rights of the participants of this study.

Each individual was informed of her rights as a respondent in this investigation and asked to sign a consent form (Appendix E). The athletes were informed that the interview sessions would be audio-taped, subsequently transcribed, and that all responses were confidential. If the participants wished to receive a copy of the results of the study, a summary was made available upon completion of the project.

The investigator contacted each athlete by phone to explain the research project and to inquire if they would be willing to be a participant in the project. The investigator then set up a preferred time and place with the athlete for the interview. The location of the interview was where both the interviewer and the respondent felt comfortable and relaxed so that the questions could be explored with openness and honesty. Each respondent participated in three interview sessions, each lasting approximately 1 to 1 1/2 hours. If the respondent had any further thoughts, feelings, or questions, they were able to contact the investigator and either discuss the concern by phone or schedule another meeting. No respondent contacted the investigator following the final interview.

Analysis of the Data

All the interviews were audio-taped and transcribed. Each transcription was numerically coded. The first step in analyzing the data was for the researcher to read through the transcription completely in order to attain an understanding of the respondent as a knower. This initial reading was an overview to obtain an understanding of how the respondent viewed herself as a knower and the story she was telling. The Educational Dialectics (Appendix F) developed by Belenky et al. (1986) were used as a guide by the researcher to ascertain the respondent's way of knowing.

Subsequently, each interview was reread. This reading involved a search for quotes that indicated the respondent's perspective on

knowing authority/power. The appropriate quotes were transcribed onto the Reader's Notation Sheet (Appendix G). If a quote reflected two ways of knowing authority/power, then it was copied in both sections.

All the quotes were reread, and an explanation depicting the investigator's reason for placing the quote in a particular category was written opposite the appropriate quote. This rereading of the quotes offered the researcher a more in-depth understanding of the respondent and their perspective on knowing authority/power. It aided the investigator in attaining a deeper understanding of the interview.

A final reading of both the interview and the quotes served two purposes: (a) material that seemed insignificant during the first reading could now be added to the salient quotes, and (b) old quotes were moved from one category to another because of a better understanding of the respondent's story. After all the quotes were placed in the proper category, the investigator read the quotes a final time and characterized the respondent under one of the ways of knowing. The position was recorded numerically at the top of the Reader's Notation Sheet and a brief written summary was added at the bottom of the sheet depicting the investigator's judgments of the respondent's perspective and the basis for the investigator's conclusion.

The moral dilemmas were not scored by the investigator in order to protect against researcher bias. The transcribed responses to the moral dilemmas were distributed to six scorers who were not familiar with the respondents who participated in the research project. Each of the scorers used the scoring method from Haan's (unpublished

manuscript) Interpersonal Morality Manual. Each moral dilemma was scored by two scorers. The scorers' findings for the daily life moral dilemmas were totaled and compared to Haan's (1985) Interpersonal Morality Coding Schema (Appendix H). If the scorers' findings were not within four points of each other, a third person scored the dilemma. The three scores were compared and the dissimilar score discarded. The final scores were (a) totalled, (b) averaged, and (c) compared to Haan's Interpersonal Morality Coding Schema. From the comparison to the coding scheme, a final daily life moral reasoning score was given to each respondent (Appendix I). The same procedure was used with the sport moral dilemmas. The coding scheme was used to find the respondent's moral reasoning score in daily life and sport.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The research completed by Belenky et al. (1986) provided the impetus for this research project. Belenky et al. (1986) investigated women's ways of knowing in an educational context. Perry's (1970) work with Harvard undergraduate males informed the work of Belenky et al. (1986). Using Perry's (1970) schema of intellectual development in the initial stages of their research, Belenky et al. (1986) found that the women they were interviewing did not fit into Perry's (1970) original design. Therefore, Belenky et al. (1986) developed their own design for women's intellectual development using the themes that were salient to the women in their study.

This investigation was an extension of the work of Belenky et al. (1986). In order to narrow the focus, daily life and sport were the chosen contexts from which to investigate women athlete's ways of knowing authority/power. Although Belenky et al. (1986) explored women's ways of knowing within a variety of issues, authority/power was a common thread running through the women's discussions on knowing. Thus, authority/power was chosen as the focal point from which to investigate women athletes' ways of knowing in this research. Conflict and preferred authority were considered pertinent areas from which to elicit responses from the participants about authority/power.

Consistent with other feminist writers, Belenky et al. (1986) used the semi-structured interview as the tool for collecting information

about women's ways of knowing. The same technique was used in this investigation. The semi-structured interview was chosen because of its strength to elicit personal responses from respondents. Through this technique, each respondent was able to reflect and articulate their personal thoughts and feelings around issues brought forth in the interview.

Each respondent had a unique way of articulating their response to the interview questions. The quotations in this chapter were taken directly from the transcriptions. They, therefore, reflect the individual style of each respondent and do not always fit the writing style of the investigator. In order to achieve clarity and make reading the text and quotes easier, the investigator of this project took the liberty of adding punctuation to the quotes when needed. However, this did not effect the meaning of the responses.

The respondents in this investigation were women who participated in the sport of softball. Their ages ranged from 19 to 37. Each of their transcribed interviews were reviewed and analyzed in order to ascertain a way of knowing in daily life and a way of knowing in sport. Quotes were extracted from the interview to support the ascribed way of knowing in daily life and sport.

The purpose of this chapter was to describe the reflections of the women athletes who participated in this research project. The respondents were asked to talk about how they viewed authority/power in daily life and sport. The data were analyzed by integrating and reporting responses to the questions in the interview. The stories

they told were articulated following the guidelines of the questions proposed in Chapter 1 to guide the investigation. Thus, this chapter was divided into sections each of which dealt with one of the proposed guiding questions (Ch. 1, p. 11). The sections were further divided into the two categories of daily life and sport. An introduction to describe a brief background of the relevant concept of each question was included following each guiding question. Results follow the introduction (a) describing the athlete's responses about daily life and (b) describing their responses about sport. At the end of the results pertaining to each guiding question are a discussion and summary of the responses for the pertinent question.

Guiding Question 1. Was There a Relationship Between Women Athletes' Ways of Knowing Authority/Power in: (a) Daily Life and (b) Sport?

In review, from their research, Belenky et al. (1986) described five ways of knowing: (a) silence, (b) received, (c) subjective, (d) procedural, and (e) constructed. Women in the first way of knowing had no voice of their own. Words of authorities were seen as weapons used to manipulate and demand the women's actions. Silent women felt isolated. They were unable to see "the power of language for exploring and learning from . . . experience" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 14). Women, in the silent way of knowing, doubted their capacity to understand words that others used, and therefore, felt that they could not acquire knowledge.

Although silent women were unaware of the power of language, women in the received way of knowing thought of the learning process as requiring listening to the voices of others. To the received knowers, listening was a vigorous activity (Belenky et al., 1986). Words were the core of the learning process for received knowers. Because they could not perceive of an idea originating within themselves, received knowers felt that they were the recipients of the ideas and the ideals of the professor. They felt that knowledge was the ability to receive, retain, and return the words of the authority (Belenky et al., 1986).

Received knowers were not comfortable with ambiguities. For them, the world was an expression of dualistic terms (e.g., good or bad, and/or right or wrong) (Belenky et al., 1986). They felt that there was only one right answer to any problem, and the teacher possessed the right answer. Received knowers thought that the teacher possessed the truth, and the teacher's job was to transmit their ideas to the student. When one teacher disagreed with another, the received knower appealed to a higher authority. If there was no higher authority, received knowers went to books, or what they considered to be the basic source of the idea. Received knowers believed that teachers (a) did not construct ideas, either; (b) learned the ideas from higher authorities, or the basic source which received knowers felt to be books; and (c) were eternally capable of receiving the right answers from the highest authorities and retaining them with the utmost accuracy (Belenky et al., 1986).

Received knowers saw reality as concrete (Belenky et al., 1986). They valued the objective over the subjective. They were unable to integrate their voice with their mind because they viewed truth as a tangible idea (Belenky et al., 1986). The received knowers were unable to integrate their personal lives with the educational process. They relied on external authorities for ideas and had no concept of applying their personal experience to what they were learning.

The women who held the perspective of received knowing embraced close relationships with their friends. They operated out of the assumption that they shared identical experiences and opinions with their peers. Received knowers had a tendency to exaggerate similarities and, therefore, tended to adopt their friends' feelings and ideas as their own. The experience of mutual feelings in their relationships with their peers not only served as security in their personal lives but was sometimes the catalyst which enabled the received knowers to begin to disengage their voice from the voice of their peers. These reciprocal friendships were a strong stimulus for received knowers eventually to gain a feeling of their own abilities as a knower (Belenky et al., 1986).

Although received knowers valued close relationships with their peers, they did not think of their friends as possessing the truth. This domain was that of the professors. The women in this perspective only shared feelings and opinions with their peers, but their teachers possessed the truth (Belenky et al., 1986).

The third way of knowing involved a shift from listening to the voices of others to listening to one's own voice. This was known as subjective knowing. Subjective knowers thought that for every person there was a right answer, depending on that person's point of view. They relied on their own experience for the truth. The voice of authority was ignored. Subjective knowers valued the subjective over the objective (Belenky et al., 1986).

In the fourth way of knowing, women were beginning to cultivate reason. They were interested in learning the procedures to obtain, evaluate, and communicate knowledge. They had transcended the subjective way of knowing by learning that subjective feelings could be incorrect and "some truths are truer than others" (Belenky et al., 1985, p. 19).

Procedural knowers negated the intuitive voice as a way of knowing. They considered using reason as the highest form of knowing. To learn using the powers of reason meant standing apart from the object under study. Procedural knowers saw no place for the inner voice in the process of knowing (Belenky et al., 1986).

Constructed knowers, the fifth way of knowing, saw themselves as actively constructing their own reality. They were not bound to external sources of knowledge, but were able to integrate the expertise of others with their own experience. They felt that knowledge depended on the context and on the perceptions of the knower. Constructed knowers were able to integrate their feelings with the process of

knowing. Persons in the perspective of constructed knowing were able to integrate the subjective with the objective (Belenky et al., 1986).

Women in the constructed way of knowing accepted contradictions they felt within themselves. They had made the transition to constructed knowing through intense self-reflection. By realizing the ambiguities internal to themselves, they had realized that they had a choice. Constructed knowers developed the ability to take past and present experience and integrate the two into a whole vision of reality. In the same way, they were able to embody the complexities proposed by others and merge opposing perspectives into an integral view of reality. Constructed knowers were able to guide their own thinking and were interested in being able to communicate life's ambiguities to others.

In the process of knowing, constructed knowers "entered" into the object they were attempting to know. They appreciated close relationships with people and were able to share empathic understanding with individuals. Constructed knowers felt that "knowledge is constructed, and the knower is an intimate part of the known" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 137).

Daily Life

None of the athletes in this study were described as silent knowers. In daily life, six of the respondents were identified as received knowers by the investigator. Whereas the silent knowers, in the research done by Belenky et al. (1986), felt they had no voice and were not capable of learning, the six respondents who were received

knowers in this investigation saw themselves as able learners. They were able to take the words of the authorities and use them as information in the learning process. The respondents did not perceive the words of the authorities to be negative, as did silent knowers, but rather received the authorities' words as concepts and ideas that the respondents felt were necessary to know in an academic environment. They accepted the authorities' words as truth. For these women, listening was an active way of knowing. Although they felt they had a voice, the final word or authority came from a superior, teacher, or some external authority. Their voice remained an internal expression of themselves, shared only with their peers. They regarded listening to authorities as an active process, and they evidenced little confidence in their own authority, or ability to generate unique ideas (i.e., they were primarily receptive to what external authorities offered as the truth).

A woman athlete in college talked about listening to her teachers as the authority in the following way: "I tend to listen to the teacher. Teachers know what they're talking about more than I do. I don't say too much if it's somebody that's an authority. They know how to do it, so you go along with it" (S6). This woman expressed typical received knowing patterns: (a) the teacher was the authority and (b) to her, her own voice was unimportant in the company of authorities. She felt that the teachers knew what they were talking about and, therefore, should be obeyed. Another athlete stated: "The authority's in charge, you have to do what they say" (S2). The athlete who made

this statement had no intention of disagreeing with the teacher. She felt that she really had no choice than to obey the authority. However, within peer relationships, she expressed her willingness to speak out.

> If I thought I was right about it, then I'd continue to think I was. But, I would listen to what they thought because we usually see "eye to eye," and if it was kinda close, like it usually is, then, maybe we could meet in the middle about it. (S2)

Another woman athlete felt that she might be able to evaluate the authority's command as right or wrong, but she felt that she had no right to disagree. The teacher was the one in charge and whether they were right or wrong, this woman felt that she must do as they asked. "I would respect an authority's decision whether I thought it was wrong or not, because they know what's right. I don't. They've learned their stuff and are teaching us now. And, when they make a decision, it's the right one" (S1). In a very global statement, another received knower put her feelings about authorities in the following manner: "The teachers know!" (S2). And another received knower had this to say: "The teacher, in my book, has the last say" (S5).

The women in the received way of knowing relied on the authorities to guide them on decisions of right and wrong. They considered themselves recipients of knowledge. Even though these women had a feeling of being able to have their own thoughts, the teacher still held the final say. "I think everyone should be able to think for themselves . . . but the teacher is there to teach and always has the final say" (S6). Their "own thoughts" were saved for discussions with their peers.

> You know, you can talk to your friends. We have alot in common anyway; plus, if you're wrong about something they don't care. They don't make a big deal out of it. We just keep on talking about it 'till we understand. (S6)

Again, this remark typified the received knowers' feelings concerning mutual experiences with peers and their ability to share their feelings and thoughts with their peers. To be able to express their thoughts with peers was an important step for received knowers. Through the process of exploring their inner voice and their own experience with their peers, received knowers began to make the connection that they, and their peers, were capable of independent thoughts. Belenky et al. (1986) found that the process of discovering the inner capability to think independently was an important one in the women that they interviewed because it marked the beginning of a transition to a different way of knowing. It indicated the initial process of the received knowers' realization that there were differing ideas; the actualization that the world was not always black and white. From this realization, received knowers began to integrate these differences and began to transcend their dualistic worldview. They realized that there were a variety of ways of looking at reality, and that their way was also viable (Belenky et al., 1986).

Some of the respondents in the received knowledge category felt that there were many different answers, but there was just one really right answer. When differences appeared, they did not see themselves as able to decide; instead, they would attend to whatever the teacher told them was right. They viewed the teacher as the authority who had

the knowledge and knew the right answer. Two received knowers expressed their feelings about the teacher's authority in this manner:

> I mean there's all sorts of different answers to different problems and none of the ways are right unless the teacher says that's the only way that's right. . . . (S6)

> If the teacher was talking about it, they would know what they're talking about. I'd just give the teacher the benefit of the doubt, or I'd ask another teacher. (S1)

The women athletes in the received knowledge position felt that they were able learners. They were receiving an education and were capable of learning the material the teacher presented. However, like the women who were received knowers in the study done by Belenky et al. (1986), the women in this investigation did not want the teacher to ask them to apply the material nor discuss the meaning of the material with them; they wanted the teacher to teach. The following quote gave a flavor of those feelings:

> It's my education and he [the teacher] should be helping me or else I'm wasting my time. He [the teacher] should be educating me, not me educating him. I feel you should be able to contribute in class by asking questions, if you don't understand something, but the teacher should know their stuff and teach it. (S3)

As did the women in the study by Belenky et al. (1986), the women athletes in this study "felt betrayed" when asked to apply the material being taught (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 42). The athletes did not want to integrate the material independently, but rather preferred that the teacher integrate the material and, subsequently, present it to the students. They did not care to evaluate the material which the teacher had proported as fact, but only wanted to reproduce that material, either verbally or on an exam.

Four women athletes, who were in their 30s, were able to integrate reason, intuition, emotion, and the authority of others. The ability to integrate a variety of intellectual and emotional aspects of daily life may be due to their chronological age and their maturity. They were aware of their own authority, and their own ability to construct reality, rather than relying on external authority. They were able to take the ambiguities of life, reflect on them, and then articulate their own interpretations. They were constructed knowers (Belenky et al., 1986). From their views on authority/power, it was apparent that these four women believed in themselves as authorities in daily life and were also able to integrate other people's authority into their personal view of reality. They were capable of listening to another's point of view, as well as voicing their own point of view. They saw themselves in authority roles and also respected others in roles of authority. As one woman voiced, when asked about conflict with authorities:

> Well, of course it depends on the issue. I really try to tell what my concerns are about the issue. In this particular school, we happen to be a lot more cooperative about the way we run things, rather than this iron hand telling us what to do in terms of administration. If I really feel strongly about something and _____ disagrees, I'll try and present my side, not emotional, not raise my voice or anything, just try to back whatever I feel with any kind of facts. She'll come back to me, also, and we'll either agree to disagree or sometimes I have to concede. But, I won't ever concede if I really believe what I'm doing is right. (S8)

The women athletes in the constructed way of knowing were able to transcend institutions and other external systems of authority. As was common with the constructed knowers in the study done by Belenky et al.

(1986), the women athletes who were constructed knowers in this project were not bound by the directives of others, but rather considered themselves and others as mutual constituents in discovering and constructing reality. These women realized that others do not always have the final say. The constructed knowers realized that they were active participants in the process of knowing the world. They used to follow the dictates of external authorities, but now they saw themselves as also having a say.

> I used to be much more timid, you know. I'd do anything that they'd say, you know, they'd say jump and I would say how high . . . and that's changing for me because in the past, in disagreements with authorities, I would just swallow it . . . and maybe some of that comes from athletics. You know, my priority was to play and, now my priority is to have a job. If this person controls my destiny, then I have to do what they want. But, usually, now, depending on the degree and type of conflict, my first instinct is to speak right out. But, you know, what I think is important, too. I mean, it's my life. (S10)

One woman, realizing that she had authority as a teacher, began to integrate the words of others with her own words in order to come to a decision where she indicated "I felt at peace with myself." When asked how she went about deciding what was right when dealing with a conflict with an authority, she said:

> Well, I'll give you the birth control issue because that's an issue that's important to me. I won't risk having another child when I'm not ready to have the child, because it would be too detrimental on my family that I have now. So, I realize that the churches' teachings, and the Pope, you know the way he is supposed to be divinely inspired, that when it comes right down to it, it's between me and God, and I have to be able to see that it's basically my decision. I'm the one who has to decide if I'm making the right decision. (S9)

The same woman when asked if there was more than one really right answer replied:

> Definitely, I think in terms of human situations there will be differing opinions. In different situations, the right thing to do will vary. Yes, I definitely think so. I mean, you can't, cut and dry, think that this kid steals, he's a jerk, or he should be suspended or whatever. You have to look behind the reason he did it. It can't just be a blanket decision. That's wrong. There's no way I could do that. (S9)

This athlete was able to see that there may be times when her superior had the final say, but she would still voice her concerns. Constructed knowers realized that part of life's ambiguity is that authority/power fluctuates. This woman expressed the contextuality of right decisions. She was willing to take the circumstances into account, and not rule by blind justice. When asked how she decided what was right she answered:

> Well, I won't ever just blanket say the boss is right . . . I'll probably want to sit back and get more facts . . . I might try and stop a discussion and say wait a minute, clarify. Do you mean this and this, or do you mean this. If the boss is trying to get me to do something that I didn't think was right, his opinion or whatever, that wouldn't make me do it. You have to weigh everything and decide yourself. (S9)

One woman expressed her ideas about the complexity and ambiguity of "right answers" in this manner:

> Yea, I think there's all sorts of answers. I can see a problem or a conflict and say, "Oh, yea, this is the way to solve it." Then, someone else that's different would look at the same problem and decide to solve it a different way, and, both ways work. I mean there's all sorts of different answers to different problems. (S8)

She expressed her feelings about authority in this manner:

> Nobody ever has the right answer, really. They think they have the right answer, but I don't think anybody has the exact right answer. Nobody has that much authority. I mean, everybody can sit there and say, "Yea, I have the right answer," but they don't. And, that's what's important. You have to be able to take it all in and decide how you see it; what's your own experience here. (S9)

Still another woman, a constructed knower, when asked about her own authority and situations of conflict said:

> The decision comes from within me on the experience and the knowledge that I have gained and then what's best for those that I'm overseeing. I don't like to make decisions until I've looked at the problem cognitively and emotionally. I think you can look at the negative and the positive and the yes and the no's of virtually everything or any occurrence and, depending on your experience and background, it will dictate what your response is. (S7)

As a constructed knower, another woman athlete reflected about the importance of experience in the process of becoming a knower.

> I think that as you get more experience in life, you see that things just aren't black and white. Things just aren't that simple and there's lots more factors that you can think of that affect your decisions. It's just lots more complicated. There's more options, more variables, and, so, that's what makes it hard. It's not black and white like it was when you were younger. (S10)

She continued to speak of the ability to integrate the subjective with the objective as an important step in her knowing process.

> I think that those people that can see things more clearly, or at least, for themselves, where it feels right to them, they could support it subjectively and objectively. For me, it was a big step to be able to see that broad picture. (S10)

These women saw themselves as having a part in constructing the outcome of situations. These constructed knowers paralleled the constructed knowers in the study done by Belenky et al. (1986). They had gained a voice of their own. They saw that the world was complex and ambiguous, and that they were involved in finding the solutions and constructing the meaning of a situation. A constructed knower expressed the notion of independence in the construction of one's own reality in this manner:

> Well, I think we are all an accumulative value of what our experience is, . . . and it all comes down to working together, but, yet, being able to maintain an independence. I will be real wishy-washy on alot of decisions until I have made up my mind, cognitively and emotionally, on how I feel about something. And, then you'd be hard pressed to get me to move off of it once I have taken a stand and really examined it. (S7)

She expressed that she was capable of making decisions based on both rational and emotional aspects of the situation. She was aware of the relevance of personal experience to the process of problem-solving and decision-making. As was stated, constructed knowers integrated a number of parts into their overall view of the whole. As was evident from the women quoted above, constructed knowers considered the accumulative value of their lives to be an integral aspect of knowing. They believed themselves to be the authority when constructing their view of reality. The constructed knowers in this investigation, attempted to understand the situation as fully as possible, and then, proceeded to make contextually based decisions. They were the active participants in constructing their reality, rather than an external authority. They had a voice of their own and believed in their own internal authority.

Sport

The six respondents who were received knowers in daily life were also received knowers in sport. They had similar concepts regarding the coaches' responsibility to coach as their concept regarding the teachers' responsibility to teach. They felt they were able learners of softball, both techniques and strategies, and the coaches' job was to tell them how to perform the techniques of softball and what was

the right thing to do in specific situations. The following quotes described the women athletes' views on the coach as an authority:

> People need someone to tell them what to do. I'd rather have a coach tell us what to do. (S4)
>
> You always have to do what the coach says. (K2)
>
> The coach is always right. (S5)

These quotes embodied the perspective of the received knower. The received knower relied on external authorities to tell them what to do; what was right. They did not perceive themselves as capable of thinking for themselves, therefore, they wanted the coach to tell them what to do. Not only did they want the coach to guide their actions, but the women athletes who were received knowers believed the coach to always be right, and, therefore, the players must do what the coach said to do.

The four respondents who were constructed knowers in daily life were received knowers in sport. The analysis of their responses about sport revealed that they perceived the coach as the authority in the context of sport. Even at times when they felt the coach might be wrong, they still felt it necessary to follow their coach's rules and instructions.

> Even if I felt the coach knew more, or less, than I did, or we had a difference of opinion as far as positioning and stuff, I never really voiced it to them. I figured they're the coach, it's their headache and I'm not going to add to it as long as I get to play. (S7).

They wanted the coach to do the coaching, plan the practices, and tell them how and what to do. They felt the coach needed to "take

charge." In an athletic situation, the athletes felt that the rules were well defined and the coach was supposed to be the one in control. "In sports, the success of the team often requires that you just give blind authority to that coach . . . you just need to do what they say and not fight with them" (S7).

The constructed knowers in daily life were received knowers in sport. Their views about the authority of the coach were no different than the six received knowers' views about the coach's authority. Both groups felt that they were the recipients of the concepts the coach was teaching, and, whether or not they agreed or disagreed with their coach's decision or remarks, their job as an athlete was to follow the coach's directives.

One of the primary pieces of evidence that the constructed knowers in daily life were received knowers in sport was the fact that they believed that the coach had the final say on the playing line-up. Even though some of the women felt that they had experience and expertise in softball, and they may even voice their opinion at times, when it really came down to it, they felt that the coach had the power to play the person or not let them play. Therefore, there were many times when the women in this investigation felt it was not appropriate to voice their opinion. The women felt that if they wanted to play, they had to go along with the coach.

> . . . my priority was to play, and so I had to create the impression that she [the coach] had absolute control over me. I had to do some compromising kind of things, or shut up, when I would have preferred to speak out in order for her to feel that she had the ultimate power and authority. Then, when she was safe

> in that assumption, she felt free to let me play, because she felt that here's one she had control over. (S10)

This quote epitomized the hierarchical relationship in sport. The player wanted playing time and many times must subordinate their feelings about an issue in order to maintain their playing status. One of the constructed knowers in daily life personified the received knowers in sport by saying: ". . . I'm not going to voice my opinion so long as I get to play" (S7). One woman spoke of her coach as a "dominant woman that would not let us use our experience. You know, we were just puppets" (S9).

It is possible that sport is an institution which promotes received knowing because of its hierarchy. Even the few women who were constructed knowers in daily life subordinated their own thoughts and feelings in sport, as received knowers. When asked if they would prefer a situation where the coach was not the superior, but was interested in the players making their own decisions on what to do, most of the women, in college and post-college, preferred that the coach take an authoritarian role. Several quotes exemplified these feelings:

> I would probably feel frustrated . . . and my instinct would be kick him and say, you know, fish or cut bait. (S3)

> I wouldn't like that. You could go to a free gym anytime. I want specific drills from someone who knows them and knows what we need to work on. As a player, you don't always know. I wouldn't like that. I like that structure. (S3)

> I'd prefer the coach to know what he or she is doing and utilize her authority and say -- do this now. It feels good to be asked [what you think or want] once in a while, but not all the time. That wouldn't be good. (S6)

> I remember a couple of those situations. I got scared. It was like -- you want me to decide what to do at bat -- I just don't like that . . . when it comes right down to it, the coach is the head. . . . (S1)

These quotes exemplified the hierarchical nature of sport. The male model of sport promoted the dualistic hierarchy between coach and player. Because women have had no other model, and in order to be accepted into the masculine subculture of sport, they have accommodated to the traditional sport hierarchy.

Summary and Discussion

In summary, for six of the respondents there was a direct parallel between their daily life way of knowing and their way of knowing in sport. They were received knowers in both daily life and sport. External authorities were regarded as having the authority to determine right and wrong and the received knowers accepted the dictates of these external authorities. The external authorities were mainly teachers, because five of these women were in college. The women athletes felt they were there to get an education. Education, to them, meant receiving and retaining the ideas and words of the authorities as truth.

There was, however, no direct relationship between the daily life and sport way of knowing for the other four respondents. In daily life, they saw themselves as having authority in their work situations and in their personal lives. They were able to integrate reason and emotion and felt comfortable with life's ambiguities. However, their sport way of knowing was that of a received knower. They considered

themselves as being the recipients of the ideas and directives of the coach, and no longer felt that they had the authority to decide on their own. Not only did they rely on the coach, but they also wanted the coach to have the authority to decide and act. They felt comfortable with the hierarchical relationship between player and coach.

The implication of this finding was that sport promotes received knowing within its participants because of the hierarchical relationship between the coach and the players. The relationship between coach and player maintains that the coach makes the decisions in practice and the games. The coach is in charge of choosing a team, selecting the players that will start each game, and making decisions pertaining to all aspects of game procedures and practice schedules. The input of the player is minimal. The players are expected to follow their coach's commands. These directives involve times of practice, actions during games, and at times extends into the personal life of the players. For instance, some coaches attempt to dictate with whom the players will spend time, their players' clothing, what and when their players will eat and when they will sleep. The coach is the authority. This perspective of authority promotes received knowing. The issue that is raised revolves around individual development as knowers. Because the constructed knowers in daily life reverted to received knowing in sport, it seemed that sport did not facilitate growth in the constructed knowers' ways of knowing, but instead caused a regression in their way of knowing.

A woman who was a constructed knower in daily life spoke of her coach as a person on a "power trip." The athlete felt that in order to be able to play she had to compromise many of her daily life values, for instance, her own voice.

> I remember feeling this great injustice. I didn't respect her. I felt like she was on a power trip and, so, I allowed her to have that power in order to achieve what I wanted, which was to play. I don't think she made wise decisions in certain situations, and, so, here you've got a situation where she is the absolute authority; however, in the back of our minds, or in the back of me, I'm not agreeing with what she's saying. But, you know, --, I wanted to play, so. . . . (S10)

The above quote was an example of a constructed knower in daily life relinquishing her own voice, her ability to "speak right out." For her, sport did not promote her development, nor her continuance as a mature knower.

Perry (1970) considered his schema of intellectual development to be hierarchical in nature and a stage-like progression in which all individuals were involved. Although Belenky et al. (1986) did not declare their framework to be hierarchical, it seemed evident that the women in their study evolved from one epistemological perspective to the other (Belenky et al., 1986). Given recent attacks on the old adage "sport builds character," perhaps intellectual development introduces another area where sport is negligent. In this investigation, the issue of authority/power was explored to determine how 10 women softball players came to know authority/power in school/work and sport contexts. In terms of these women realizing their own authority/power, this investigation raised the question of an area where sport may not necessarily "build character." For the

constructed knowers in daily life, their sport participation involved a regression to received knowing in order to "play the game." More in-depth research is needed to determine the underlying reasons for this duality in life and sport contexts.

Another explanation of the dual perspectives is that perhaps sport is a place where people can escape the daily routines and expectations of authority that are placed upon them, simply to relax and release authority/power to another for a particular time period. More research is needed to determine why people are willing to go from constructed to received knowing. Also, the question is raised concerning the possibility that sport could still be "fun," as well as facilitate the evolution of knowing one's own authority/power.

Responses from the participants in this investigation supported findings of Belenky et al. (1986) and the need for a connected model of education (refer to Ch. 2, p. 45). Even the received knowers in daily life responded in support of an atmosphere of cooperative learning. The question "What about a situation where the teacher not only enjoyed working with you, but felt that they also really learned from you and respected what you might have to say?" was used to elicit information concerning the participants' thoughts about connected teaching. The following quotes summarize the feelings of the received knowers.

> How do I feel about that? That makes me feel really good because you feel like you taught them something. Nobody ever stops learning; I mean a teacher doesn't get their degree and that's it. It makes me feel like I have some sort of authority and I can do things, too, when the teacher does that. (S6)

> I'd feel good because I feel that everybody has something to give. It would make me feel like the teacher was giving me alot,

> maybe not just what their teaching, but, how they present things, how they feel, if they feel warm, do they want to help you if you stay after class. I feel good if they understand my potential and how I feel. I learn something new everyday and I'm sure they do too. (S3)

The received knowers saw the teacher as the authority. They respected the teacher's background and education, and preferred that the teacher act as the authority. However, when they reflected about the possibility of an educational environment where the teacher was not above them, and their experience was not subordinated, the received knowers felt that that way of teaching would be a positive experience.

The connected knowers felt that the experience of having a superior who respected and accepted input from them in the work environment would have a positive effect, also. All four constructed knowers felt that this type of work environment would enhance their self-esteem. One constructed knower expressed it in this way:

> Great! There is just no question that I'd like that situation. It would instill that the boss trusted my opinion, which is a reconfirmation that they think I'm OK, which is a good feeling. (S9)

Another constructed knower responded in this way:

> I would feel very good. If someone in a position of authority over you feels like you're doing a good job and performing well, and that they could learn from you, that's a real compliment. That's a real strong does of confidence. That makes you feel a little less of an underman. It makes you feel like you really have an input. When you are contributing and you're helping them to learn also, the distance between you and them is lessened. There is more of a sense of equality in a small respect. They're obviously still the boss, but you feel more worthwhile. I'd really enjoy a situation like that. (S7)

When asked the same question about a sport situation, where the coach learned from the players, seven of the received knowers in sport

felt that a sport model such as that would be positive. The three received knowers in sport who did not respond positively to that statement could not envision how a model such as that would work. As was stated earlier, they felt that the coach was the authority and that was the way it had to be. The following quotes gave a flavor of how received knowers in sport felt who thought a situation like that would be positive.

> That would be the ideal coaching situation. I'd like that because you feel like you have something that is valuable to them and they respect you. I mean everyone wants to be respected, that's the bottom line. If the coach listened to me and listened to my input, maybe put in a drill I wanted to do, that would be great. It makes you feel more powerful because you're helping. (S6)

> Yea, I'd like that. I'm sure coaches learn things all the time. If they learn something from you, it makes you feel good that they're listening to you and they learn from you just like you learn from them. (S1)

> It would be a great situation if the coach respected you and learned from you. I'd probably play better because I'd know she respected me. (S2)

> I'd feel comfortable. I'd like that situation only if they told you that that's how it was, 'cause alot of coaches never say anything, but what they're coaching on. But, if I knew I was helping them and they respected me, and, of course, I was learning from them, too, it would be alot more comfortable for me. It would be more comfortable than just having to do exactly what they said because if you didn't, you wouldn't get to play. (S3)

Additional research is needed on women athletes' ways of knowing authority/power in order to clarify possible relationships, if any, the connected model of teaching might have for sport. However, when the above statements by the women in this investigation were considered in the light of research done by Belenky et al. (1986), some suggestions for sport were considered. Comments from the women athletes during the

interviews, such as the above quotes, suggested that a model of sport which adopted aspects of a connected teaching model might enhance the experience of athletics for women athletes.

According to some feminists (Belenky et al., 1986; Firestone, 1970; Harding & Hintikka, 1983; Gilligan, 1982; Reinharz, 1984; Sherman & Beck, 1978; Smith, 1978), women have sought access to the male-dominated culture in hopes of reaching equality. However, even though there have been more and more women entering male-dominated fields, these women still have not had much to say about issues in which they were involved. This is also true of sport. Although women have gained access to sport, sport has remained a masculine domain. The masculine values of competition in the sub-culture of sport paralleled the masculine values of the culture. Rather than bringing about equality, perhaps women's involvement in the male-dominated sub-culture of sport has created alienation and repression in some of its participants. In sport, as in education, there has been a silencing of the women's voice (Boutilier & San Giovanni, 1983; Butt, 1987). Noddings (1984) pointed out that within the educational institution, masculine practices were seen as necessary for maintenance of standards. It has, again, been the same in sport. Current practices in sport are seen as essential to preserve the male domain of sport. In order for women to gain access to sport, they are expected to accommodate to the masculine value system (Boutilier & San Giovanni, 1983; Butt, 1987; Oglesby, 1984). Women's involvement in the patriarchal institution of education paralleled their involvement in the patriarchal institution of sport.

In keeping with suggestions for change in the educational institution to adopt the connected teaching model, these same suggestions are offered for sport.

The model of connected teaching posited by Belenky et al. (1986) provided suggestions for a connected model of coaching. The connected model of coaching would support women athletes as valuable persons by encompassing salient issues and values gathered from research with women and women athletes (Belenky et al., 1986; Gilligan, 1982).

The connected model of coaching would embrace the values of connected education. Athletes would be co-creators of their experience, rather than the traditional hierarchy where the coach is the authority. The proposed coaching model would be a blending of egos which would confirm athletes as worthwhile individuals, instead of tools used toward the accomplishment of goals deemed important by external authorities. Evaluation of athletes and their accomplishments would be based on their own past performance, rather than comparisons with other athletes, or opponents.

A connected model of coaching would place care and understanding of persons, rather than impersonal standards, at its center. Human development within the sub-culture of sport might take a different course, and women's development might be enhanced. If, as Belenky et al. (1986) posited, women need confirmation and community as prerequisites for development in education, then the same may be necessary for development in sport. The needs and capacities of the learners must also be recognized and respected in sport.

A constructed knower, reflecting on a class she had attended in graduate school, felt a "good feeling" when the teacher exhibited respect for her. "It was neat! She [the teacher] treated us like real people, like we could really contribute; like we had something to say" (S7). When asked how she would feel about a situation in sport that reflected the values of a connected teaching model, she responded in the following way:

> I would feel great in that situation, too. It would be nice not to feel like you don't have anything to say about what's going on; like you're just there to OBEY the coach. You know, I'd just feel better about myself if I felt like the coach respected my input. (S7)

The connected coach would enter into the athlete's perspective and they would struggle together for improvement and development. Knowledge would not be the private reserve of the coach, but a means to expand the latent ability of the athlete. The coach would be a mid-wife, one who assists the athlete in giving birth to their own talents. The coach enters into the athlete's experience in order to enhance the experience. The coach would empathize with the athlete, while helping the athlete construct their own meaning, rather than dictating what the athlete will accomplish. The power, or authority, of the coach would not be to subordinate the athlete, but to cooperate with the athlete, so that the athlete is also involved in the construction of their experience.

The constructed knower in daily life who had relinquished her voice expressed a concern about not being respected and recognized as a person while participating in sport.

> I don't know. Maybe it comes from being a woman, you know, sometimes you get treated like you're dumb and don't know a -- thing. I would've liked the coach to treat me with a little respect, you know, like I know something. I mean, I've been playing softball for years. (S10)

This woman athlete wanted to be treated as a person with worthwhile experiences of her own. She wanted a confirmation that she was worthwhile as a person, as well as a softball player.

Connected coaching would promote constructed knowing. The coach and athletes would be co-participants in the competitive process. Adreinne Rich (1979) wrote "in a women-centered university," more courses would be conducted in the style of community, fewer in the "masculine adversary style of discourse" (p. 138). A connected model of sport would value the style of community, rather than the hierarchical style of didactics. Rather than constructed knowers in daily life having to revert to a position of received knowing, the connected sport model would promote constructed knowing. Perhaps this would facilitate epistemological development within sport participants. This question can only be answered with research on men athletes' way of knowing, as well as further research with women athletes' ways of knowing. Integrating the women's voice of care, community, and cooperation into the sub-culture of sport could potentially enhance the sport experience of women, and perhaps the sport experience for all persons involved. The proposed model, which may have flaws, posits the beginnings of an alternative to the existing model of sport. As Hall (1985) proports in her essay on the development of a feminist epistemology,

> These principals are at present more in the form of rebellions rather than . . . statements about what constitutes a feminist epistemology. They may be perceived as reactive and oppositional . . . but, most of our thought is still conditional, constrained, and limited by the fact that we first learned to think using the tools and categories devised by men to understand their reality, not ours. (p. 32)

The proposed sport model is no different. First, with continued research regarding women athletes' ways of knowing, our consciousness must be raised. Only then can the consolidation and articulation of a sport model which includes the women athletes' voice begin to be initiated. Since sport is another institution that promotes a masculine perspective, it could be a significant vehicle for transformation and expression of the women's perspective (Hall, 1985).

In conclusion, six of the respondents' way of knowing in daily life paralleled their way of knowing in sport. These six respondents were received knowers in both contexts (i.e., daily life and sport). However, for the four respondents who were constructed knowers in daily life there was no apparent relationship between their ways of knowing in daily life and their ways of knowing in sport because they were constructed knowers in daily life and received knowers in sport.

Guiding Question 2. Was There a Relationship Between Women Athletes' Ways of Knowing and Moral Reasoning about the Issue of Authority/Power in: (a) Daily Life and (b) Sport?

Moral reasoning in daily life and sport was another aspect of this investigation. Each participant was asked to respond to four

hypothetical moral dilemmas. Two of the dilemmas surrounded daily life decisions and two of the dilemmas were within a sport context. The college participants received daily life dilemmas dealing with school situations, one of which dealt with teachers as the authority, and the other dilemma was in a situation dealing with peers. Post-college participants received dilemmas within a work situation. The first dilemma dealt with an authority (i.e., their superior), and the second dilemma was in a situation with peers. All 10 participants were given the same two sport dilemmas. One sport dilemma was in a situation with a coach and the other dilemma was in a situation with peers. Each dilemma was subsequently analyzed and scored according to Haan's (unpublished manuscript) Theory of Interpersonal Morality. The participants were given a daily life moral reasoning score and a sport moral reasoning score. The relationship between the respondents' level of moral reasoning in daily life and sport and their way of knowing in daily life and sport was discussed in this section.

Haan's (1985) Theory of Interactional Morality was based on the idea that each person was a moral agent, involved in moral dialogue. Moral dialogue was real or overt and/or imagined or covert. The overt or covert actions varied in the forms of action from body language to traditional verbal communication according to the situation. Haan (1985) considered morality as a process of interacting dialogue, whereby individuals come to an understanding and an integration of diffuse perspectives. The maturity level of every individual developed through experiences in dialogue and social interaction. The Theory of

Interactional Morality (1985) had five levels of development which were grouped into three phases. The first phase, Assimilation, contained Levels 1 and 2. The Assimilation Phase was egocentric in nature in which individuals viewed their own needs and desires as paramount. An individual reasoning at Level 1 had no view of the others' interest, nor any concept of mutual interest. Level 2 reasoning consisted of trade-offs (i.e., an eye for an eye, or you scratch my back and I'll scratch your back). Level 2 reasoners were willing to let others have what they wanted as long as they received what they wanted. Accommodation was the next phase which consisted of Levels 3 and 4. In the Accommodation Phase, the individual's needs and desires were subordinated to the other. Specifically, Level 3 individuals were primarily concerned with being thought of by others as a moral being. They were more apt to succumb to another's wishes than to assert their own wishes. Individuals on Level 4 subordinated their needs and desires, also. However, they subordinated their wishes to the common good, or their society. Institutions and systems, such as society, were seen as the moral agents, and individuals at Level 4 relinquished their personal objectives to the common good of whatever system in which they were involved at the time. The fifth level was one where all persons' needs were seen as important. At this level, individuals attempted to reach a solution to maximize the positive for all persons involved.

According to Belenky et al. (1986) and to Gilligan (1982), received knowers looked to external agents for moral prescriptions.

"Their judgments conform to the conventions of their society" or to the dictates of the external system which they chose to emulate (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 46). The moral language of the received knowers consisted of such words as "should" and "ought." They subordinated their desires and needs to what society dictated as the moral imperative. Received knowers had no tolerance for ambiguity in their way of knowing, nor in their moral reasoning. Their moral thinking was dichotomous, whereby a moral decision was either right or wrong (Belenky et al., 1986). Women in the received way of knowing accepted that the "world is and should be hierarchically arranged and dualistic" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 46).

Constructed knowers saw moral decisions as depending on the situation. They attempted to pose additional questions about moral situations in order to discover more about the situation and better understand the persons involved. Constructed knowers had no premature generalizations of the right or wrong decision. Their moral decisions were contextually based and they only attempted to resolve the conflict after they felt all the pertinent information about context and individual was accounted for. They attempted to resolve conflicts "not by invoking a logical hierarchy of abstract principles, but through trying to understand the conflict of each person's perspectives, needs, and goals and doing the best possible for everyone that is involved" (Belenky et al., 1986, p. 149).

Daily Life

The received knowers reasoned morally at Levels 3 and 4 in daily life. Three of the women athletes had a daily life moral reasoning level of 3, and three of the women athletes had a daily life moral reasoning level of 4. Level 3 moral reasoners were interested in others thinking of them as moral beings. Therefore, they would subordinate their personal objectives for the other in order not to have a conflict. The received knowers in daily life were concerned that people like and accept them. The three women athletes that reasoned at Level 4 assumed that society was the authority. They felt that society established the rules and standards by which moral beings must abide. The Level 4 reasoners solved moral dilemmas by conceding their objectives for those of the common good. The Level 4 reasoners regarded the authority to be whatever institution in which they were currently involved.

The constructed knowers in daily life did not differ from the received knowers in their moral reasoning scores. The constructed knowers had daily life moral reasoning levels of 3 and 4, also. Two of the constructed knowers reasoned at Level 4, and one constructed knower reasoned at Level 3. They, too, subordinated their desires for the external authority they chose to emulate. However, one of the constructed knowers reasoned morally at Level 5. She was one of the older women athletes, and perhaps had had more social interaction or more moral dialogue.

Sport

The received knowers in sport had reasoned morally at Levels 3 and 4 for the sport moral dilemmas. They considered the institution of sport as the external authority whose rules and standards they chose to emulate in this case. The ideal of the "expected" in a sport context was chosen by the received knowers as the resolution to the moral dilemma. Received knowers in sport relinquished their responsibility for moral decision-making to external others, such as the officials and/or the coach. The received knower who had a daily life moral reasoning level of 5 also reasoned at Level 5 in a sport context. Again, perhaps it was her experience in situations of social interaction involving moral dialogue that enabled her to reason at a more mature level.

Summary and Discussion

In this investigation the moral reasoning of the received knowers paralleled the moral reasoning of the received knowers in the research done by Belenky et al. (1986) and was in support of their findings concerning the moral decision-making of received knowers. There was a relationship between the women athletes' ways of knowing and their moral reasoning. Of the six women athletes who were received knowers in daily life and sport, three had a sport moral reasoning level of 3 and a daily life moral reasoning level of 3, also. Two of the received knowers in daily life and sport had a moral reasoning level of 4 in both daily life and sport. And, one of the received knowers was evaluated in daily life and sport to have a daily life moral reasoning

level of 4 and a sport moral reasoning level of 3. Because the moral interview only consisted of the administration of the moral dilemmas and provided no follow-up with additional questions, it was difficult to say why one athlete had a discrepancy in daily life and sport moral reasoning (i.e., daily life level of 4 and a sport moral reasoning level of 3). However, the finding supported research done by Bredemeier and Shields (1983, 1984, 1986), which found that some athletes scored higher on daily life dilemmas than on sport dilemmas.

However, the fact that the women athletes who were received knowers in daily life and sport reasoned at Levels 3 and 4 of Haan's (1985) Theory of Interactional Morality parallels the findings of Belenky et al. (1986). The six athletes who were received knowers in daily life and sport solved the moral dilemmas using the same moral balances and structures for moral reasoning as the received knowers in the study done by Belenky et al. (1986). The women athletes who were received knowers viewed the dilemmas as an either/or situation. Their resolutions for the moral dilemmas stemmed from what they felt their actions "should" be, as dictated by society or by an external authority, such as a teacher and/or a coach. As in their received way of knowing, whereby they accepted the hierarchical arrangement between teacher/student and player/coach, these women athletes also solved the moral dilemmas by appealing to a hierarchy. In the daily life dilemmas, the received knowers appealed to the society-at-large, or the teacher, for the resolution. When the dilemma was with a teacher, the received knower resolved the dilemma by doing what the teacher asked.

Resolutions in the sport context revolved around what the coach said, or what the athlete felt that the institution of sport would dictate. Once again, as in their way of knowing, the received knowers were comfortable with the hierarchical arrangement in sport and abided by society's directives.

The constructed knowers in daily life in this project also reasoned morally at Levels 3 and 4. There was no difference in their moral reasoning levels and those discussed above for the received knowers. The women who were constructed knowers in daily life and received knowers in sport reasoned about the moral dilemmas in daily life and sport at Levels 3 and 4, with one exception. One of the constructed knowers reasoned at Level 5. The daily life moral reasoning levels of all participants were the same as their sport reasoning levels. Two of the constructed knowers reasoned at Level 4, one reasoned at Level 3, and one had a moral reasoning level of 5.

The finding that the sport moral reasoning was at Levels 3 and 4 was expected because the women athletes who were constructed knowers in daily life were received knowers in sport. Therefore, they would be expected to follow the same line of moral reasoning as the other received knowers. However, the fact that they also reasoned morally in daily life as a received knower was unexpected. This finding could be explained by research conducted by Gilligan (1982) who found that women, when asked about moral situations, often subordinated their self-interest to the other or the group. Self-sacrifice was seen as the highest value for some women because it paralleled a woman's self-

concept as one who must serve and care for others (Gilligan, 1982). Although these women athletes saw themselves as having authority/power in the workplace and were constructed knowers in daily life, perhaps in moral situations they remained primarily concerned with the other, instead of with themselves. According to Gilligan (1982), the traditional women's voice is salient throughout women's psychological and moral development (i.e., responsibility and care for others and self-sacrifice). Even though these women athletes had developed to a constructed way of knowing in daily life, they still saw themselves as responsible for others and considered self-sacrifice as a high value when confronted with moral decision-making.

Gilligan (1982) offered the additional explanation that in much of women's lives they judged themselves on what others (i.e., society and external systems) had to say about them. This explanation might help to explain why the women athletes reasoned at Level 4, in which their needs and desires were subordinated to the group or to the external authority which they chose to emulate. While working in daily life, the constructed knowers in this investigation felt comfortable asserting themselves and taking charge in the construction of their reality. However, in times of moral decision-making, they continued to embrace traditional women's values, such as caring and responsibility to others. In this investigation there was no way of knowing when the women athletes' perspective of constructed knowing was initiated. The scope of the interviews was limited to exploring the epistemological perspective of the women, rather than identifying turning points at

which a more mature way of knowing may have been initiated. Perhaps the longer the women athletes remain constructed knowers, the more comfortable they may become with a different level of moral reasoning that is more consistent with the constructed knowers in the investigation of Belenky et al. (1986).

The woman who was a constructed knower in daily life and who had a moral reasoning level of 5 in daily life and sport was one of the older participants. She may have had more experience with individual and social interaction which, according to Haan (1985), was a criteria for mature moral reasoning. The more experience an individual had as a moral agent involved in moral dialogue, the higher the probability of a superior level of moral reasoning. Again, perhaps her age and experience was the reason for a higher level of moral reasoning.

In conclusion, all but one of the respondents had moral reasoning levels of 3 and 4 in both daily life and sport. They used parallel structures and balances in their moral decision-making processes in daily life and in sport. One respondent had a moral reasoning level of 5 in both daily life and in sport.

Guiding Question 3. Did Women Athletes' Ways of Knowing and Moral Reasoning about Authority/Power Differ between Situations Involving Authorities and Situations Involving Peers in: (a) Daily Life and (b) Sport?

Conflict was selected as an issue to initiate discussion about authority/power. Received knowers, when confronted with conflict,

usually subordinated their desires and needs to the other. Again they had an intolerance for ambiguity (Belenky et al., 1986). In situations of conflict, received knowers thought in terms of either/or (i.e., they must choose between themselves or the other) because they had no concept of mutual interests. When confronted with a conflict with an authority, received knowers appealed to external authorities for a resolution. During conflicts with peers, received knowers were primarily concerned with maintaining the relationship. Therefore, they would subordinate their desires and needs to the other (Belenky et al., 1986).

Constructed knowers, during conflicts with authorities, felt able to voice their concerns and opinions (Belenky et al., 1986). However, they were also aware of fluctuating authority and realized that there were situations which required them to relinquish their authority, such as when their job was at risk. Constructed knowers were interested in the maintenance of the relationships with their peers, as were the received knowers. However, constructed knowers were capable of realizing mutual interests. Therefore, they were interested in reaching a solution which would benefit all persons involved, or at least in reaching some form of agreement or compromise (Belenky et al., 1986).

Daily Life Ways of Knowing

In situations of conflict, the received knowers in this investigation, once again, looked outward for resolutions. They felt that external authorities, whether it was their teacher or society-at-

large, had the primary resources to establish right and to direct right actions. They conformed to the conventions of society and resolved conflict by thinking in terms of "I ought" or "I should." The received knowers subordinated their desires and needs to the external authority. Conflict was seen by received knowers as an either/or situation. Typical of received knowers, they viewed conflict as dualistic (i.e., they believed there was a right and a wrong thing to do). In situations involving conflict with peers, received knowers operated under the auspices of care and responsibility. They subordinated their desires and needs to the other. They saw strength within themselves as empowering others, or in giving authority/power to others.

In contrast, the constructed knowers refused to deny aspects of themselves in order to avoid conflict. They recognized the inevitability of conflict with both authorities and peers. When involved in a conflict, constructed knowers attempted to communicate their understanding of the problem. They were also willing to attempt an understanding of the other's point of view.

In order to further explore the respondents' ways of knowing authority/power, situations of conflict with authorities and peers were chosen to elicit the women athletes' reflections. The athletes were asked to respond to how they would feel and act in situations of conflict with authorities and situations of conflict with peers. All the respondents, including the women in the constructed position of knowing, felt that during a disagreement involving an authority (i.e., teacher or superior) the authority would have the last say. Most of

the authority, that the women in this investigation felt the superior or teacher held, was from a power base of coercion or from the power derived from the threat of punishment (French & Raven, 1960). This study supported the findings of French and Raven (1960), in that the women athletes still in college perceived the punishment, or power of the authority, to be related to grades. The working women viewed the power of the authority as the ability to dismiss them from their job or to make their job situation uncomfortable. A constructed knower put it this way:

> I'd say, "Hey, you're the boss, you can make my life miserable, you will have the ultimate say so. This is my opinion and you can take it for what it is worth and do what you want with it. I do, or don't, disagree with you on these points." I would do this on a face to face deal and then I would be fine. I would be OK with his exercising his authority because I got my two cents worth in and I would always try to do it in a positive way. And even though they would continue to do it the way they wanted to do it because they are the boss and I do not agree with it, I would live with it and accept it. (S7)

Another constructed knower stated:

> I would agree to disagree. They're going to do what they think is the right thing to do. I just try to communicate my understanding of the situation. But, they're going to have the final say. (S9)

And, another constructed knower put it in the following way:

> Sometimes when I don't agree with something at work, I just walk away and keep quiet. In a job, sometimes I don't think voicing a difference of opinion is worth it. I would decide in my head that it would be better not to rock the boat. It's a choice of what's easiest or less painful. I don't want to lose my job. (S10)

Again, the main concern for the constructed knowers during situations of conflict with an authority revolved around maintaining their job. Even though they might mention their opinions or state disagreements, the final outcome was up to the authority in charge.

The results of this study, as reflected in the exemplary quotes above, support the findings of Belenky et al. (1986) that constructed knowers realized: (a) the ambiguities of life and (b) the possibility of fluctuating power. Constructed knowers felt comfortable with different circumstances lending themselves to differences in the women's own authority/power. The job situation was one of those circumstances where authority/power fluctuated.

The received knowers, still in college, were concerned about their grades. They considered voicing differences of opinion with the teacher a "risky business."

> If it was the teacher, I would give him the benefit of the doubt because he controls my grade. (S6)

> Well, the authority's the boss and they're in charge so you have to do whatever they say whether you agree or not. If you disagreed out loud with your teacher it would be risky business. (S1)

However, all 10 respondents felt that in situations of conflict with peers, they would voice their opinion. They felt safe and capable of disagreeing with peers without causing tension in the relationship. The main concern when situations of conflict with peers developed was to reach an agreement or "happy medium." A received knower put it in these words:

> I think I'd really try to work it out so there could be a happy medium between the two of us. You know, I want to get my point across and hope they get their point across and then hope we can make an agreement. (S3)

Two constructed knowers responded:

> I try to view a disagreement with a peer as a brainstorming event in that I try to shape the way that they're looking at it even

> though we're disagreeing. We'll work it out because the friendship is the main thing. (S8)
>
> I don't mind disagreeing, but the relationship is more important. (S7)

As exemplified in the previous quotes, the women athletes were more concerned with maintaining the relationship with their peers than proving their point or changing the other person's opinion. Several commented that they "don't like disagreements to begin with, especially with a friend." This supported the assertion by Gilligan (1982) that relationships were very important in the lives of women. Gilligan's (1982) research supported the idea that caring for the other, rather than setting the self over and against another, was a primary issue in the psychological and moral development of women (Gilligan, 1982).

Sport Ways of Knowing

The results of the analysis of conflict in a sport context were parallel to the results in a daily life context. All 10 athletes felt that the coach had the final say. The primary issue regarding the athlete's concerns for not voicing their opinion if it differed from the coach, was that the athletes wanted to be able to play. Several quotes reflect the athletes' feelings about disagreements with the coach.

> Like I said, even if I disagreed with my coach, I want to play, so I'm going to keep my mouth shut. (S7)
>
> I've got to play the game. If the coach thinks a squeeze bunt is on, and I think he's crazy, well, I guess if I want to keep my starting position then I've got to do what he says. (S1)

They felt that the coach had the final say, and it was not the athlete's right to argue. The athletes' main concern was to be able to play. The athletes were willing to subordinate their thoughts and feelings in order to play. The athletes felt that the coach's power was exemplified by the decision about the starting lineup, as well as who would continue to play. The athletes did not question whether or not the coach should have that power, but as received knowers, they accepted the coach as the authority.

In disagreements with peers, support was the key issue. The women felt: (a) that they should support their teammates and (b) if the conflict was inevitable, then it should be resolved as soon as possible so as not to disturb the community of the team. These following quotes supported this idea:

> I feel like disagreements with my teammates are like with my family. I don't like it. You know, a team has to be together, so you've got to get past conflicts with your friends. It's usually not that important anyway. The important thing is staying friends and being a team, a family, and playing a game. (S3)

> Well, I don't like disagreements, anyway. I don't want to lose a friend and I don't want to lose the community feeling of my team. So I try to empathize and say, "Look, it's OK we disagree, let's just drop it and be OK. (S4)

> I would try to resolve the problem, but if I couldn't, then I'd rather not lose the team's feeling of togetherness. I would just, you know, let my conflict go so we could be a team. (S10)

Daily Life Moral Reasoning

The second part of the third question was regarding the women athletes' reasoning about moral issues involving authorities and peers. The college sample was asked to respond to two moral dilemmas in a

school setting, one which involved a conflict between a student and a teacher and the second involved a conflict between a student and his peers. The working women were given dilemmas from a job setting which paralleled the dilemmas given to the students (i.e., the first dilemma involved a conflict with a worker and her superior and the second dilemma involved a conflict between a worker and her peers). All the respondents were given the same sport dilemmas involving a conflict with a coach and a second dilemma involving conflict with teammates.

When asked about the dilemma involving a student and a teacher, the responses from the college sample revolved around the fact that the teacher had the final say and was in charge. Even if the student was supposed to be able to take the final early, the teacher had the right to change her mind because of her position of authority. The women athletes felt that the institution of education, which involved the teacher, was the highest authority in that situation and the student really had no other choice but to observe the teacher's request. The following quotes reflected this point of view.

> I would stay there and take the final because that's her only choice. I mean, the only choice from the teacher, and they have the final say, whether they said it before or not. I would stay there and take it because of the grade. (S6)

> I think she should have to take the final whenever the teacher says. (S2)

> I would say she should stay there and take the final. There must have been a good reason for the teacher to change her plans and, well, she's the instructor and you either take it when I say or you don't take it at all. (S3)

When dealing with the same type of situation, a dilemma involving an authority in the work environment, the constructed knowers in the

post-college sample were more sympathetic to the worker. Consistent with the constructed way of knowing, these respondents commented on the ambiguity and context of the situation. They commented on alternatives, rather than being directed by exactly what the boss requested.

> It probably depends on a lot of things. For instance, how long Renee has been working there. She can choose to get another job,too. It would depend on what Renee really wants to do. If she can talk to the boss and maybe say she can't change her plane reservation. It would depend on what's more important, the job or the vacation. (S7)

However, both groups of respondents were sympathetic with the worker in the dilemma involving a conflict with peers and were able to transcend the spoken agreement. They all commented that the peer group would probably understand. The dilemmas involved a spoken agreement with peers and an unforeseen illness involving the mother. All the responses revolved around the fact that if the mother was ill and needed the daughter to care for her, then the peers would have to understand. The respondents felt that in both the school dilemma and the work dilemma, there were alternatives. When responding about the school dilemma one woman put it this way:

> Well, her Mom needed her. She's made the commitment with her peers, but I'm sure she could get somebody to do her part for her. Hopefully her friends would understand. (S1)

Another college respondent commented:

> I think she should be with her Mom. I think it's an emergency situation . . . She should try to help her class as much as she can for the situation she's in, but I still think she should be with her Mom. (S6)

A comment from the post-college sample summarizes their responses:

> She should take care of her Mom. She could always look for another job, but in a situation like this, her co-workers, even though they're on a strike, would probably understand. Her mom is more important than a strike and her peers would probably do the same thing. I mean they'd probably go take care of their family member, too. (S7)

All the respondents felt that a person's life was more important than an agreement with peers. Each respondent commented that "agreements are important," but when a human life was involved, the life took precedence over the agreement.

> You should keep an agreement whenever possible, yes, but when the unforeseen just absolutely changes all the circumstances under which you made the promise, then, yeah, you don't keep it, you'd have a good reason why. (S10)

This type of moral reasoning supported the research done with women by Belenky et al. (1986) and Gilligan (1982). In their research, they found that women's moral reasoning was contextual. Gilligan's (1982) research asserted the notion that women's decisions about conflict and morality were made with the other in mind and in relation to the situation. The feminine concept of morality was a morality of responsibility. It was a morality based on the ideal of connection rather than separation. The responses from women athletes in this investigation supported Gilligan's (1982) finding. Rather than the moral decision being based on abstract principles, such as a promise, the respondents in this research project responded in a context of relationship. They thought that it was more important to take care of the mother, than to keep an agreement.

Sport Moral Reasoning

Contextual morality was also prominent in the two dilemmas in sport involving the coach and an agreement with peers. The respondents, college and post-college, based their responses on the situation, rather than an abstract principle. The abstract principle in both dilemmas was the agreement. The first dilemma involved an agreement with peers. Although the respondents felt that the agreement was important, they gave reasons why it might have been important to break the agreement. "If Debbie could get a scholarship or something you know, do better with another team, then go ahead. I'm sure the team would understand. I would" (S1). Again, the moral decision was contextual. However, when the dilemma involved injuring another player, there was total agreement throughout the respondents that it was not right to injure another person. The coach had requested that the pitcher take the opposing batter out of the game with a fastball. None of the women athletes in this investigation viewed that request as legitimate. Essentially, this was another example of a moral decision based on the context. Even the daily life and sport received knowers felt that the coach should be disobeyed in this situation. To reiterate, the respondents in this study in sport context were received knowers. This meant that they saw the final authority resting with the coach. Even when they disagreed with the coach, they would not declare their disagreements to the coach. However, in the moral dilemma where another player on the opposing side was going to be injured, all of the women athletes felt, in that situation, that it was necessary to stand

up to the coach and disobey the request to injure someone. The respondents' quotes in support of disobeying the coach were strong statements. The following quotes summarize the responses:

> Tina should tell the coach to jump in a creek. I just don't think that's right. (S8)
>
> Tell the coach where to stick it. That's dirty play. She should never have played for that woman anyway. (S1)
>
> Don't hit her. Tell the coach you won't do it. That's morally wrong. (S3)

These statements from the respondents are in strong support of disobeying the coach in this situation. Injuring another player was not seen as a legitimate way of winning. Even though these women athletes were received knowers in sport, they reasoned about this moral dilemma in a contextual manner. As Gilligan (1982) cited, hurting was a central moral issue for women. Women saw hurting others as a central problem when making moral decisions. However, the dilemma of who to hurt was solved by the introduction of non-violence (Gilligan, 1982). The women athletes' responses about the injustice of the coach's request to injure a player was in support of Gilligan's (1982) findings of women's introduction of non-violence into the moral decisions, whereby, no one should be hurt.

Summary and Discussion

The received knowers in daily life felt that in situations of conflict with authorities in daily life, such as a teacher, that the teacher had the final say. Because of grades, the teacher had the authority/power to make the final decision. The constructed knowers in

daily life expressed their willingness to voice their concerns in situations of conflict at work. They felt that their superior would have the final say, but they felt comfortable as their own authority to voice their thoughts and feelings. The received knowers in sport felt that the coach was the authority and had the final say, except in the situation involving intentional injury. All of the respondents expressed that they would not obey the coach when told to injure an opposing player. In that case, the received knowers in sport appealed to the larger institution of sport which they felt supported the notion that intentional injury to an opponent was not in the "spirit of the game."

In situations of conflict involving peers, all of the respondents felt that maintaining the relationship was the important issue. They felt that by discussing the conflict and trying to see the other's point of view, a compromise could be reached. By attempting to realize and understand the complexities of the other, as well as the context of the conflict, those involved could reach a resolution.

Thus, the women athletes in this investigation felt that in situations involving conflict with authorities, in both daily life and sport contexts, that they would subordinate their desires and needs to the teacher and/or superior. Whereas, the received knowers felt it was not their right to disagree with the teacher, the constructed knowers in this study felt that they would voice their concerns to their superior in a work situation. In a sport context, all of the athletes felt that the coach had the final say, except when the coach's

directive involved intentional injury to an opponent. In situations of conflict with peers, all ten athletes in this investigation felt that their primary concern was to maintain the relationship.

Guiding Question 4. Did Women Athletes' Ideas Concerning Preferred Authority Impact on Their Ways of Knowing about Authority/ Power in: (a) Daily Life and (b) Sport?

Preferred authority was chosen as an issue to elicit responses about authority/power, and the results were based on only one question in the interview pertaining to preferred authority (Appendix A).

Daily Life

The final question concerned whether the 10 respondents preferred a male or a female in a position of authority. None of the participants had any preference for one sex over another in their school or work environments. They saw both sexes as equal in the ability to teach and lead in a school or job situation. The following quotes summarized the thoughts and feelings of the total sample.

> I think people are equal, it doesn't matter race or sex. I think men and women have the same smarts if they have the proper education. I think they can do the same work most likely. If it's not hard labor, but using the brain, they can do the same thing. (S10)

> I guess I put myself in a pretty equal role with a male. I know that there are some things that men can do that I can't do. It's just sheer strength. As far as mentally, I think I can do anything that a man can do. Naturally, we can bear children. (S8)

The women in this study acknowledged the superior physical strength of most men, but intellectually saw males and females as

equals. They viewed themselves as having the ability to gain and maintain positions of authority in job situations. They also saw themselves as having the capability to be in "command" of their personal lives. Their personal power meant being able to make independent decisions concerning their own life.

Sport

However, six respondents preferred a female in a position of authority in sport. Although four had no preference, six participants had experienced both women and men coaches and preferred to be coached by a woman.

> I prefer a woman because the guys I've had didn't really know how to deal with girls . . . I think women can relate [to women] a little bit better. (S3)

> If I could choose, I'd rather have a woman coach. (S9)

> I'd prefer to be coached by a woman. And I also prefer to see other girls coached by a woman . . . I just think that women are smarter, what a horrible thing to say, but I think that women have more resources to pull from . . . It's OK for women to be less selfish than a man, in our society at least, . . . because of that women developed their intuition and their emotional aspect of their personality far better than a man did. So, because of that I think it adds to her ability as a coach because it helps her relate to people better. I think that you could be intellectually equal but when you add that dimension you're just a much stronger coach or teacher. (S10)

Although preferring a female over a male coach, a salient issue for all the respondents was the opportunity for a professional career in athletics for men and not for women. Because of this, the respondents felt that men had more authority/power in sport. They had opportunities to make more money and they had a greater chance for

recognition. Newspapers, radio, and television coverage still favored the male athlete.

> I feel they [men] have more authority, men do, because they can survive on it, you know. They can live on playing a professional sport and they can raise a family and they can just survive. (S6)

In essence, preferred authority had no impact on the women athletes' ways of knowing. They all expected expertise in a coach and felt that the role of the coach was to be the leader. The six respondents who preferred a female coach did so because they felt that a female coach was more capable of understanding and relating to female players. They seemed to feel that a female coach, because of an ability to empathize with the players' feelings and reactions, might be a better coach. The athletes involved with this investigation felt that a female coach could relate in a more understanding and personal manner and, therefore, communicate in an understanding and personalized way.

> . . . they just know you better. They can talk to you and you to them because they're a woman, too, and know what it's like to feel like and be a woman. (S10)

Summary and Discussion

In summary, in a work or school situation, none of the respondents had a preference for a male or a female in a position of authority. They felt that both women and men were capable of leadership. In sport, however, six of the respondents preferred a female as a coach. The salient reasons for preferring a female coach were that a woman in that position was able to integrate care into the job of coaching.

However, preference for a women or a man in a position of authority had no impact on the respondents' way of knowing. Thus, none of the respondents in this investigation had a preference for a male or a female in a work and/or school context. However, in sport six of the respondents preferred a female as a coach in a sport context.

Chapter Summary

In this investigation, six of the respondents were received knowers in daily life and sport. Four of the respondents were constructed knowers in daily life and received knowers in sport. Nine of the respondents reasoned morally at Levels 3 and 4 in daily life and sport, while one of the constructed knowers in daily life reasoned morally at Level 5.

In situations of conflict, the received knowers in daily life felt that the authority had the final say. The constructed knowers felt that they would voice their concerns and opinions in the work situation. However, in sport none of the respondents felt that it was the athletes' place to voice their opinions. The coach had the authority/power. In situations involving conflict with peers in daily life and sport, all the respondents felt that maintaining the relationship was paramount. They felt that the best resolution for conflicts with peers was one of understanding and compromise.

None of the respondents had a preference for a female or a male in positions of authority in daily life. Four of the respondents had no preference for a female or male in a position of coach. However, six

of the respondents preferred a woman as a coach. Their preferred authority had no impact on their ways of knowing or moral reasoning about authority/power.

CHAPTER 5

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A summary of the findings and conclusions concerning women athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power in daily life and sport are presented in this chapter. Recommendations for further study are also projected.

Summary

The purpose of this study was to explore the interrelationships among women athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power in daily life and sport. Research has shown a disparity between women's and men's intellectual and moral development. Through interviewing and observing undergraduate males at Harvard University, Perry's (1970) research mapped a course of intellectual development and the evolution of their thoughts about knowledge, truth, and authority. This theory of development was proposed (a) to be hierarchical and (b) to correspond to the development of all individuals. However, when women were included as research subjects in the investigations, researchers found that women followed a different pattern for their intellectual growth. Belenky et al. (1986) interviewed 135 women, and from their research they developed a schema of women's intellectual development. They posited that women did not follow Perry's (1970) schema of men's intellectual development. Belenky et al. (1986) grouped women's ways of knowing into five

epistemological perspectives: (a) silence, (b) received knowing, (c) subjective knowing, (d) procedural knowing, and (e) constructed knowing.

The disparity in research in the area of epistemology extended to research in moral development as well. Kohlberg (1969, 1981) developed a hierarchical theory of moral development and proposed that his theory related to the moral growth of all individuals. When women continually failed to reach the higher stages of his theory of moral reasoning, Kohlberg (1969) concluded that women matured to a lower level of moral reasoning than men and were less developed in their capacity to reason at the more advanced stages of his hierarchy. Focusing on Kohlberg's (1969) theory of moral development, Carol Gilligan (1982) posited that the suggested inferiority of women's moral development was a misinterpretation of the research, rather than inferior moral development. From her research, Gilligan (1977, 1982) proposed that women developed moral reasoning patterns within a morality of relationship, rather than a morality of rights (Kohlberg, 1969, 1981).

Perry's (1970) and Gilligan's (1982) research informed the work of Belenky et al. (1986). Acknowledging the absence of women in research in the area of epistemology and moral reasoning, Belenky et al. (1986) projected the need to investigate and articulate women's ways of knowing. The current research project was an extension of the work of Belenky et al. (1986). Rather than study women's ways of knowing in a broad context of education, this investigation narrowed the focus to

the specific issue of women athletes' ways of knowing about authority/power in the contexts of daily life and sport.

In order to explore women athletes' ways of knowing about authority/power, a semi-structured interview was designed. The issues of conflict and preferred authority were adopted to elicit responses from the athletes concerning their perception of authority/power. Women athletes' moral reasoning was explored through their responses to four hypothetical moral dilemmas: (a) two dilemmas in a daily life context and (b) two dilemmas in a sport context. During January of 1988, 10 female softball players were interviewed in northern California. Five of the women athletes were intercollegiate softball players and five of the athletes were postcollege recreational softball players. Each of the athletes participated in three interview sessions, each lasting from 60-90 minutes. The recorded interviews were transcribed and analyzed. The individual athletes were given scores for (a) a daily life way of knowing, (b) a sport way of knowing, (c) moral reasoning in daily life, and (d) moral reasoning in sport. Additional analyses determined the relationship between the women athletes' ways of knowing authority/power in daily life and sport. The relationship between the women athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power was also examined in daily life and sport contexts. Based on the analyses of the interviews with women athletes, the following conclusions were drawn regarding their way of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power in daily life and

sport. The conclusions followed the guidelines of the questions set forth to guide the investigation in the statement of the problem.

In response to the first guiding question concerning the interrelationships between women athletes' ways of knowing in daily life and sport, six of the women athletes were received knowers in daily life. They regarded themselves as capable recipients of the knowledge expounded upon by their professors. The received knowers viewed their teachers as the authority. They depended on the teacher, as the authority, to inform them of what was (e.g., right and wrong or true and false). They did not see themselves as independent knowers capable of producing and developing ideas but relied on the authority to dictate the truth.

These six athletes were also received knowers in sport. For them, the coach was the authority, and the athletes gave the coach the power to determine their right actions in the context of sport. The received knowers did not perceive themselves as independent thinkers in sport but preferred that the coach tell them how to perform the techniques and what to do in specific situations.

Four of the women athletes were constructed knowers in daily life. They were able to integrate life's ambiguities, and they participated in the construction of their own reality. Both objectivity and subjectivity were seen as necessary in the process of knowing. They considered themselves as their own authority. The constructed knowers voiced their opinions in daily life and considered themselves as

holding the authority/power to decide what was right and true for themselves.

However, the four constructed knowers in daily life were received knowers in sport. In the context of sport, they no longer perceived themselves as the authority, but instead looked to the coach as the authority. They gave the coach the authority/power to govern their right actions in the sport context. The women athletes who were constructed knowers in daily life did not outwardly question the authority/power of the coach. The questions in the interview did not elicit discussion concerning the possible conflict that reversion to the received way of knowing in sport might create for a constructed knower.

There was a direct relationship between the women athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning in daily life and sport. The six women athletes who were received knowers in daily life and sport used the same moral balances to solve both daily life and sport moral dilemmas. In both contexts, they appealed to the authority to resolve the conflict. The received knowers were content with the hierarchical relationship between student/teacher and/or athlete/coach. The received knowers' resolutions about the moral dilemmas resided in what they thought the teacher and/or coach wanted or in what they felt society would dictate. Their actions depended on what they felt they "should" do based on the directives of external authorities.

The relationship between the received knowers' way of knowing and moral reasoning about authority/power was in the fact that they relied,

in daily life and sport, on external authorities' judgment of right and truth. They had no concept that they could make an independent moral decision based on their experience of what was right (or what they thought was right). They did not question the authority's judgment of right. All knowing and judgments were based on an external authority's directive.

The constructed knowers' ways of knowing and moral reasoning in daily life and sport did not parallel one another. Based on Haan's (1985) Theory of Interactional Morality, individuals who reasoned at Level 5 were able to integrate the desires and needs of all persons involved in the dilemma, and they attempted to resolve the dilemma in such a way that all involved would benefit. Resolutions for moral dilemmas were contextual. In the same light, constructed knowers viewed knowing as the domain of the knower. Knowing was also contextual.

The constructed knowers in this investigation reasoned morally at the identical levels of moral reasoning as the received knowers. This finding was expected when reasoning about the sport moral dilemmas, as the constructed knowers in daily life were received knowers in sport. However, it was an unexpected finding that the constructed knowers in daily life reasoned at Levels 3 and 4 in the daily life moral dilemmas. This finding was explained through research completed by Gilligan (1982). Women in her study tended to subordinate their desires and needs to others because self-sacrifice was perceived as a high value in the lives of many women, and their self-esteem was based on what others

felt about them (Gilligan, 1982). Perhaps the women in this investigation still held self-sacrifice as a value. The moral dilemmas were not constructed to ascertain possible reasons why the athletes resolved the dilemmas as they did. Nor were the questions constructed to elicit discussion about the athletes' moral values or why they embraced particular values in moral situations.

In response to the third guiding question, the athletes differed in their responses during situations of conflict with authorities. However, all 10 athletes had similar responses in situations of conflict with peers. The received knowers in daily life and sport regarded the teacher and the coach as the authority. Whatever the teacher and/or coach wanted, that was what was to be done. In situations of conflict with authorities, the received knowers felt that the authority had the power to make the final decision. The received knowers did not perceive themselves as capable of questioning the demands of individuals in roles of authority. They accepted the directives of the teacher and/or the coach and did not consider voicing their opinion if it differed from the authority's directive.

On the other hand, the constructed knowers in daily life felt that they would voice their opinion in situations of conflict with an authority in daily life. They felt that they had the authority to let their superior know their concerns. However, because of concerns about maintaining job status, the constructed knowers felt that the authority, or their superior, would have the final say in particular situations of conflict. This was indicative of the constructed

knowers' capacity to integrate ambiguity. Even though they saw themselves as having authority in their life, they realized that there were situations when authority might fluctuate. They also recognized that there were times when they may have to relinquish some of their authority; the work situation being one of those times.

In sport, however, the constructed knowers thought that the coach had the final say in situations of conflict. The constructed knowers, who were received knowers in sport, voiced their concern over the possibility of losing their playing status if they disagreed verbally with the coach. It was primarily for that reason that they did not consider voicing their opinion when it was in conflict with the coach's directive.

All 10 respondents felt that in situations of conflict with peers in daily life or sport that they would voice their opinion. They felt that the pertinent issue in situations of conflict with their peers was the maintenance of the relationship in daily life and continued team harmony in sport. The important point in both contexts was to reach a resolution through mutual compromise and/or mutual understanding.

The women athletes' ideas in this investigation concerning preferred authority had no impact on their way of knowing in daily life or sport. In daily life, none of the respondents in this investigation had any preference for a male or female in positions of authority. They felt that women were equal to men in their leadership ability. The respondents felt that they could learn from and/or work with either sex.

However, six of the respondents preferred a female in the position of authority in a sport context. Although four had no preference, six of the women athletes had played for both women and men coaches and preferred being coached by a woman. The salient reason for preferring a woman coach was that the athletes felt that a woman coach had the ability to integrate emotions with intellect. Not only were the women coaches able to instruct the players on technique and strategy, they also portrayed a caring attitude toward the players. The women athletes discussed what they felt was the female coaches' capacity for caring and her ability to intuit the athletes' needs as individuals.

In summary, preferred authority had no impact on the women athletes' ways of knowing. They felt that either sex was capable of exhibiting expertise in their given area.

Conclusions

1. There were two ways of knowing evidenced in daily life (i.e., received knowing and constructed knowing) and one way of knowing evidenced in sport for all 10 respondents. Six of the respondents were received knowers in both daily life and sport. Four of the respondents were constructed knowers in daily life and received knowers in sport.

2. All of the respondents, with one exception, used the same moral balances and structures in their process of moral decision making. Nine of the women athletes reasoned at Levels 3 and 4 of Haan's (unpublished manuscript) Interpersonal Morality, while one person reasoned at Level 5.

3. In situations of conflict in daily life involving an authority, the received knowers felt that they would not voice their opinion if it differed from the authority due to the fact that the authority had the final say. However, the constructed knowers in daily life felt that they would raise concerns if they differed from their superior, even though they were aware that the superior had the final say. In a sport context, none of the respondents felt comfortable voicing their opinion if it differed from the coach's directive, except when the coach issued a directive which involved injuring an opponent.

4. None of the respondents had a preference for a woman or a man in the leadership role in the work or school environment. Although four of the respondents also had no preferred authority in a sport context, six of the respondents preferred a woman as the coach. However, the respondents' preferred authority had no impact on their way of knowing.

Recommendations

Recommendations for further study of women athletes' ways of knowing authority/power in daily life and sport are suggested.

1. Reduce interview questions in order to explore women athletes' ways of knowing authority/power in the sport hierarchy in more depth.

2. Revise questions in the Way of Knowing section in the interview to elicit more personal reflections from the athletes about their way of knowing authority/power.

3. Add interview questions to explore the athlete's personal experience of authority/power in sport and possible conflicts.

4. Seek responses from athletes participating in a variety of sport contexts.

5. Investigate the relationship that the connected model of teaching suggested by Belenky et al. (1986) might have to sport.

6. Further clarify how the athletes' ways of knowing impact on their sport experience.

7. Investigate how ways of knowing might promote or deter an individual's involvement in sport.

8. Seek responses from women who are physically active but do not participate in competitive sport endeavors concerning their way of knowing authority/power.

9. Seek responses from women who compete in other areas (i.e., music, debate, art, business, etc.) concerning their way of knowing about authority/power.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

GENDER, EMBODIMENT, AND PREFERRED AUTHORITY

In order not to appear prejudiced in our responses to the next questions, we want to be aware that there are times when a person's mobility might be limited for one reason or another. For example, a person might be restricted to a wheelchair, or, perhaps, an illness or disease has limited their activity; or maybe an injury or an accident has temporarily limited their activity. Taking these limitations into account, let's think about what being a physically active person means to you. We'll also include some questions about what being a woman means to you.

1. What does being a woman mean to you? What does being a woman in sport mean to you? Does being a woman mean different things to you in different situations? Has your idea of being a woman changed over the years? Have there been any significant events that led to that change, possibly involving authority/power?

2. Has being an athlete or a physically active person had any impact on your way of knowing authority/power?

3. Do you think that being an athlete has given you a different way of knowing authority/power than an nonathlete? Why?

4. Do you think that being an athlete has helped you know a personal power? What does that mean?

5. Has being an athlete helped you know or understand things? To think differently about things?

6. Because you are an athlete, do you see yourself as having a different, or more, authority/power than nonathletes? Why? Do you think others see you as having more authority/power because you are an athlete?

7. Do you have more respect for someone who is physically active or an athlete? Why?

a. Peers/Teammates: Do they hold more authority/power Is it different for males who are active?
b. Coach/Teacher/Boss: Do you listen more if they are physically active? Do you give them more authority/power because they are active? Why?

8. Does it matter to you if your coach is a woman or a man? Why? Why not?

9. Do you think being female or male influences how much power or authority a person has? Why? Should it matter? Do you ever feel advantaged by being a woman? Limited?

Ways of Knowing

1. Think about the times when you had an idea or an opinion about something that differed from someone else's. Like when someone else thinks one thing is true and you think something else is true.

How do you actually <u>decide</u> what is true, given the different opinions? (How would you know what was right?)

Generally, how do you handle situations like that?

How do you think handling the situation this way affects your relationship with people?

Do you feel differently about disagreeing with others now than you did in the past? How so? What accounts for the change?

1a. If disagreements with authorities are not covered, ask: Now think about the times when you and an authority or expert had different opinions about what was true.

If having a hard time ask: Who comes to mind when thinking about authorities or experts? Like when (authority mentioned) thinks one thing is true and you think something else is true.

How do you go about deciding what is true in situations like that? (How would you know what is right?)

Generally, how do you handle situations like that?
How do you think handling the situation this way affects your relationship with authorities? How do you feel in these situations?

Do you feel differently about disagreeing with authorities now than you did in the past? How so? What accounts for the change?

1b. If disagreements with peers are not covered, ask: Now think about the times when you and a friend had different opinions about what was true. How do you go about deciding what is true in situations like that? (How would you know what was right?)

Generally, how do you handle situations like that?

How do you think handling the situation this way affects your relationship with friends? How do you feel in these situations?

Do you feel differently about disagreeing with friends now than you did in the past? How so? What accounts for the change?

2. We've talked about times when you disagreed with other people. Now think about the times when you and someone really agreed and seemed important to you. What's that like for you when it happens?

2a. If agreeing with an authority not covered, ask: Has that ever happened to you with an authority? What was that like for you?

2b. If agreeing with a peer not covered, ask: Has that ever happened to you with a friend? What was that like for you?

3. Can there be more than one really right, or true, answer? Why? Why not? If there can be, who decides, or how do you decide what to do? How do you know what's right or true? Can you explain what you mean by right?

4. Where do these people (teachers/bosses/coaches) get their authority? When these people have authority, should they be able to dictate your actions? Why? How?

5. How do people get authority/power? How do you usually get your authority/power? Where does authority/power come from?

6. (Hand her four cards.) Here are four statements by others. I would like you to comment on each of these. (These are conversation starters and give a chance to explore their thinking and their developmental history more.)

Sometimes classroom/work discussions are so confusing. I tend to trust more what a teacher/boss says than what a student/co-worker says. The student/co-worker is giving her opinion; it might not be the right one. The teacher/bosses are always more or less right.

What about a situation in sport where teammates are giving their opinion, but the coach is, more or less, always right.

How about a situation where teachers/bosses/coaches aren't above you--aren't being the boss. A situation where you can make your own decision about what you're going to do. How would you feel or act in that situation?

What about a situation where the teacher/boss/coach not only enjoyed working with you and helping you but felt that they really learned from you, too. They respected what you might have to offer. How would you feel, or act, in this situation?

7. (The comments below are designed to promote discussion of procedural and constructed knowledge.)

Here are other statements I would like you to comment on:

A. I think it is important to be objective.

1. Do you agree? Why?
2. What does being objective mean to you?
3. Do you think being objective is a more "powerful" way to know or that being objective gives a person more authority?
4. Do you think that women and men differ in their ability to be objective? Does that enter into your feelings of respect for them?

B. I think that life is pretty complicated, and I feel comfortable and OK about that. I used to think that I could figure things out and settle things. Now, I realize that nothing is ever really settled or resolved.

1. How do you feel about that statement?
2. What does it mean to you that "the world is complicated"? Do you agree? Why?
3. What do you think this statement means in terms of authority?

8. (The comments below are designed to promote discussion on separate and connected knowing.)

A. I like to argue. I never take anything someone else says for granted. In fact, I like to take just the opposite point of view and really try to challenge their way of thinking.

1. How do you feel about this statement?

2. Are there different situations where you might agree or disagree? When? Why?
3. Could you see an athlete having this point of view? How so?
4. Do you think this point of view might cause conflict? What would you do in that situation? (Probe.)

B. When someone else and I disagree about something, I try to see things from their perspective. I try to understand why they think that way or why they think they're right.

1. How do you feel about this statement?
2. What situations do you think this way of thinking might fit? Where would it not fit?
3. Do you think this could be true in sport? When? Why?
4. Do you think that this kind of thinking takes away from a person's authority/power? Why? Why not?

9. Looking back over your life, can you tell me about a really powerful experience you had in a situation, possibly involving conflict, that changed your ideas or thoughts about who has or should have authority/power (school/job/sport)? Tell me about that.

Closure and Conclusion

1. In thinking about authority/power, how do you see yourself in the future?

2. Can you think of anything else--thoughts, feelings, ideas--you could tell me that might shed some more light on the things we've talked about?

3. How do you feel about the process of this interview and the things we've discussed?

APPENDIX B

MORAL DEVELOPMENT INTERVIEW

Each study participant will reason about four hypothetical moral dilemmas: two set in sport contexts and two in either work or school contexts, depending on whether the study participant is a student or is a full time wage earner. Thus, the moral interview will consist of four of the following six dilemmas:

Conflict with Peers: Sport

Conflict with Authority: Sport

Conflict with Peers: School

Conflict with Authority: School

Conflict with Peers: Work

Conflict with Authority: Work

Conflict with Peers: Sport

Debbie had an excellent finish at the end of last softball season and promised Helen, her best friend, and the rest of the team that she would play again the following year. In the beginning of the next season, Debbie attended practice and played in a couple of the practice games. Everyone was becoming good friends and everything was going well. Debbie had started where she left off--she was the best player on the team and the team had hopes of performing better than ever. A member of another team noticed how skilled Debbie was and asked her to play for her team, a more successful team that had qualified for nationals several previous years. Debbie's original team reminded her of her promise and commitment to them and asked her to remain with them. Debbie was torn.

1. What should Debbie do? Why?

2. Give reasons on the opposite side.

3. How would you balance the two?

4. Do you think a commitment is more important than playing on a better team? Why?

5. Would it make a difference if the team she started on was really good, too, and didn't need Debbie? Why?

6. Do you think it would make a difference if Debbie wasn't friends with members of her team? Why?

7. Is it more important to keep promises to friends than to strangers? Why?

8. Do you think promises should always be kept? Are there times when you should break a promise? Why?

Conflict with Authority: Sport

Tina is a pitcher for the Generals, a softball team, and has played for the same coach a long time. When she first started pitching, her coach, Roxanne, would tell Tina when to hit an opposing batter with a pitch to take them out of the game. Tina complied with her coach and obeyed without question. One time, however, Tina hit another player with a pitched ball and hurt her very badly. After that incident, Tina told Roxanne that she would never try to hit another batter, and Roxanne promised never to ask her to do that again. The team did very well that year and made it to nationals. During the semi-final game, Roxanne realized that if Tina could eliminate the opposing pitcher from the game that winning would be certain. During a time-out, Roxanne told Tina to take out the opposing pitcher with a fast ball.

1. What should Tina do? Why?

2. What would be the most important reason for refusing to obey Roxanne, the coach?

3. What would be the most important reason for obeying the coach?

4. What is the basis of the authority of the coach over the player? Should the coach have this kind of authority? Why? Why not?

5. What does the player owe the coach, if anything? Why?

6. Are there times when a player should refuse to obey the coach? Why? When?

7. Which is worse in this situation: for Tina to break an agreement with her coach or to go against her principles? Why?

8. Are there times when a player or coach should subordinate their own principles for the "happiness" or "good" of the team? When? Why?

Conflict with Peers: School

Joan's class in school decided together that they would have a money raising project for a get-together at the end of the semester. During the semester they had become very good friends. Everyone promised to help raise the money because it would take everyone's efforts to raise enough money, and Joan was very important because she knew a lot of people to contact. When it was time to begin raising money, Joan's mother feel and broke her hip and was confined to a bed. She needed Joan to take care of her during the day. This took all Joan's time because they didn't have enough money to hire someone to come in. Joan couldn't help raise the money for the class. Her classmates reminded her of her promise to help raise the money.

1. What should Joan do? Why?

2. Give reasons on the opposite side.

3. How do you balance the two?

4. Choose the appropriate: Do you think a promise is more important than self-concerns? Why? Do you think Joan's concern is more important than her promise? Why?

5. Do you think promises should <u>always</u> be kept? Why? Are there times then you should break a promise? Why?

6. Is it more important to keep promises to friends than to people you don't really know? Why?

7. If she does stay with her mother, what, if anything, should she say to her classmates when she returns to class? Why?

Conflict with Authority: School

Carrie wanted to leave school before the end of the semester. She lived very far from her family and her only chance to see her family during the year would be at this time. She asked her English professor, Ms. Hughes, if she could take her English final early so she could leave. Ms. Hughes gave her permission. Carrie made all her plans and plane reservation. The day before Carrie was to take the final, Ms. Hughes happened to see her in the hall; Ms. Hughes informed Carrie that she had changed her mind about their previous agreement and felt it only fair to the class that Carrie take the final with everyone else. Carrie was angry and did not want to change her plans.

1. What do you think Carrie should do? Why?

2. Give reasons on the opposite side.

3. How would you balance the two?

4. (If necessary:) Which do you think is more important--fairness to the class or the prior agreement? Why?

5. What should the authority/power of the professor be over the student in a case like this? Why?

6. Should an agreement be kept by the professor? Why?

7. Do you think an agreement should <u>always</u> be kept? Are there times when you should break an agreement? Why?

8. Do you think agreements to friends or peers are more important than agreements between a teacher and a student? Why?

Conflict with Peers: Work

The employees of a small business had decided to organize a strike in response to unfair labor practices. All the employees agreed to stay away from work until a fair settlement was reached. It was a very small business and everyone was very close. During the strike, Sue's mother became ill and needed 24-hour care at home. Sue was an only child and her mother's only source of support. In order for Sue to pay for nursing care, she had to return to work. Her boss eagerly agreed and would give Sue back pay if She returned to work. Her fellow employees reminded Sue that she had made an agreement and it would be harmful to the strike if Sue returned to work.

1. What should Sue do? Why?

2. Give reasons for the opposite side.

3. How do you balance the two?

4. Choose the appropriate one: Do you think a promise is more important than someone's health? Why? Do you think someone's health is more important than a promise? Why?

5. What are Sue's commitments to her co-workers? Why are the commitments important?

6. Do you think promises should <u>always</u> be kept? Are there times when you should break a promise? Why?

7. Is it more important to keep promises to friends than to people you don't really know? Why?

8. Do you think promises should be kept? Why or why not?

Conflict with Authority: Work

Renee, a mechanical engineer, asked her boss, Ms. Schick, if she could have two weeks of her vacation during a specific time. Ms. Schick agreed, if Renee completed her project she was working on first. Renee made all the arrangements for her trip and worked overtime, completing her project two days prior to her vacation. But, when Renee turned it in, Ms. Schick told her that there was another project for Renee to do. It wasn't urgent, but Renee was the only one capable of doing the project, and Ms. Schick wanted it done immediately. Knowing that the new project would take at least two weeks to do, thus altering Renee's vacation plans, Renee considered Ms. Schick's request unfair and thought about refusing to do what Ms. Schick had requested.

1. Should Renee give up her vacation and do what Ms. Schick has asked? Why?

2. Ask for reasons for the opposite choice.

3. Balance the two.

4. Who has the right to follow through with their plans? Why?

5. What should an employee do for the boss here or in general? What, if anything, does an employee owe a boss? Why? What is the basis?

6. In terms of fairness, what is the important issue here?

7. Why should an agreement be kept by a boss or anyone?

8. If an employee breaks a promise to the boss, is that better or worse than the boss breaking an agreement? Why?

9. Would it matter if the boss was a woman or a man? Why?

APPENDIX C

INTRODUCTION

Each one of us has a unique perception of reality and from this way of viewing the world we organize our own thoughts and feelings about the world we live in and our interactions with the world and the people we relate to. Our perceptions, our thoughts and feelings, are our own way of knowing about certain things. What I'd like us to focus on in this series of discussions is your way of knowing about authority and power around issues of conflict, preferred authority, and decision making in general life and sport contexts. It might help if I shared with you how I'd like us to think about authority and power. I think about power as the ability to impact on thoughts, feelings, beliefs, and actions. Authority, in this context, is power given to a particular person.

I'd like to reassure you that everything we talk about is strictly confidential, so I'd really appreciate your honest thoughts and feelings about this stuff. If there is anything about the questions that you don't understand, feel free to ask me and I'll try to be more clear. Also, some of the stuff we talk about may not be things you think about all the time, so take your time to think about it. We don't have to be uncomfortable in silence. In fact, I see us as being co-participants in these discussions. You might have some thoughts or feelings about this stuff that I haven't thought to ask about. Or you might have some insights that would help me understand

what you really mean. Please, feel free to share these things with me. If this happens, don't hesitate to give me a call. Maybe we can talk about it over the phone or, if we need to, we'll get together again. So, that's where I'm coming from. I'd really like us to grapple with these issues together. I'll try to be as clear as I can be about my meaning and you really try to help me understand what you're saying.

APPENDIX D

INTERVIEW #1

COLLEGE SAMPLE

DEMOGRAPHICS & SPORT INTEREST SURVEY

1. What age are you? _____

2. What year in school are you? _____

3. What is your major? _____

4. What degree are you seeking? _____

5. Are you:

   White _____ Black _____ Latino _____ Asian _____ Other _____

6. Are you male _____ or female _____ Check one.

7. How many brothers do you have? _____

8. How many are older brothers? _____

9. How many sisters do you have? _____

10. How many are older sisters? _____

Using the list below, please write the number in the space provide that best describes:

11. Your fathers (male guardian) education _____

12. Your mothers (female guardian) education _____

7 Graduate or professional training after college degree
6 College or university degree
5 Some college training (1 year or more)
4 High school graduate
3 Some high school (completed grades 10 or 11)
2 Junior High School (completed grades 7, 8, or 9)
1 Less than 7 years completed

13. What is the title of your fathers (male guardian) job?

_____

14. Briefly describe what your father (male guardian) does in his job.

_____

_____

15. What is the title of your mothers (female guardian) job?

_____

16. Briefly describe what your mother (female guardian) does in her job.

_____

_____

17. Did your father (male guardian) and/or mother (female guardian) play sports? Did they play softball? What level of competition?

_____

_____

18. Did your father (male guardian) and/or mother (female guardian) play sports with you? Circle the correct number.

How often?

Father (Male guardian)

(1) 1/2 - 1 hour, 1 day/week
(2) 1/2 - 1 hour, 2-4 days/week
(3) 1/2 - 1 hour, 5-7 days/week
(4) Other _____

Did they play softball with you:

How often?

(1) 1/2 - 1 hour, 1 day/week
(2) 1/2 - 1 hour, 2-4 days/week
(3) 1/2 - 1 hour, 5-7 days/week
(4) Other _____

How often?

Mother (Female guardian)

(1) 1/2 - 1 hour, 1 day/week
(2) 1/2 - 1 hour, 2-4 days/week
(3) 1/2 - 1 hour, 5-7 days/week
(4) Other _____

Did they play softball with you

How often?

(1) 1/2 - 1 hour, 1 day/week
(2) 1/2 - 1 hour, 2-4 days/week
(3) 1/2 - 1 hour, 5-7 days/week
(4) Other _____

19. Did your father (male guardian) and/or mother (female guardian) come to watch you play on a sport team? Write father and/or mother.

    How often?

    (1) Home Games _____

    (2) Home and away games _____

    (3) Tournaments _____

    (4) Games & tournaments _____

    (5) Other _____

    Did they come to watch you play softball?

    How often?

    (1) Home Games _____

    (2) Home and away games _____

    (3) Tournaments _____

    (4) Games & tournaments _____

    (5) Other _____

20. Did they encourage you to play sports? Did they encourage you to play softball?

    _____

    _____

21. Would they rather you have played another sport instead of softball? What sport? Why?

    _____

    _____

22. What is your major sport?

    _____

23. How many seasons and at what level did you participate in softball?

Seasons of Participation	Level of Participation
_____	Intercollegiate
_____	High School
	Recreational/Club
_____	Fall
_____	Spring/Summer
	Highly Competitive
_____	Fall
_____	Spring/Summer

24. What other sports do you play?

Sport	Seasons of Participation	Level of Participation
_____	_____	Intercollegiate
_____	_____	High School
_____	_____	Recreational/Club
_____	_____	Highly Competitive

25. How skilled do you perceive yourself to be as an athlete? As a softball player?

_____

_____

26. How do you think other people see you? Is that important to you? Why?

_____

_____

_____

27. How important is being a "highly skilled" athlete to you? Softball player? Why?

28. What do you want out of your softball experience? Out of your overall sport experience?

29. Do you think you will continue to participate in softball? In sport? Why?

30. Do you participate in other extracurricular activities? What? How often?

31. How important is/was your education to you? Why?

32. How did sport (softball) fit in with your education?

Substitution Questions for Post-College Sample

2. What degree/s have you completed? Your major?

3. What is the title of your job?

4. Briefly describe what you do in your job?

APPENDIX E

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

BERKELEY • DAVIS • IRVINE • LOS ANGELES • RIVERSIDE • SAN DIEGO • SAN FRANCISCO — SANTA BARBARA • SANTA CRUZ

DEPARTMENT OF PHYSICAL EDUCATION
200 HEARST GYMNASIUM
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94720

CONSENT FORM

I understand that this research project is being conducted by a researcher who is associated with the UC-Berkeley campus as a visiting third year doctoral student from the University of Tennessee.

I understand that this is an invitation to participate in a research project of which the purpose is to study the relationships among women's ways of knowing and moral reasoning in general life and their ways of knowing and moral reasoning in a sport context.

I understand that I will participate in three interviews lasting from 60-90 minutes each. The interviews will be on an individual basis involving myself and the researcher at a location comfortable for both. The interviews will be conducted at convenient times for the researcher and the participant.

I understand there will be no foreseeable risks or discomforts accompanying the research.

I understand that all my oral responses will be taped and transcribed and will remain completely confidential. Data will be numerically coded and kept in a locked file cabinet. I understand that only group data will be used for anlaysis. At the completion of the project, I understand that all tapes will be completely erased.

I understand that my participation is entirely voluntary. No coercion of any kind has been used to obtain my cooperation.

I understand that I may withdraw my consent and terminate my participation at any time during the project.

I understand that a summary of the results of the project will be made availble to me at the completion of the study, if I so request. I also understand that I may ask any questions pertaining to purpose and procedures at any time during the project and that I have access to the telephone number of the investigator.

I wish to give my voluntary cooperation as a participant.

Signed: _____ Date: _____

Address: _____

Phone: _____

Dianna L. Wright
(916) 244-4325
(415) 724-4061

These are my phone numbers in case any questions or concerns arise during the study.

To Whom It May Concern:

The project you are invited to participate in is a study on how women athletes' ways of knowing and moral reasoning in general life might be related to their ways of knowing and moral reasoning within a sport context. You will be asked to participate in three interview sessions where you and the investigator will discuss your experience about specific issues in general life and sport contexts. This is an opportunity for you to reflect on your sport experience and the connection, or meaning, it may have for your life. The interviews will be structured in a way that you may assist the investigator in acquiring insights into the way you, as a woman, have come to know through your sport experience. It will be a shared struggle in an attempt to give your voice an understanding ear so that our understanding of the women's sport experience may grow.

The researcher,

Dianna L. Wright
University of California
Berkeley

APPENDIX F

EDUCATIONAL DIALECTICS

Belenky et al. (1986), in their analysis of the women's interviews, first categorized the women's ways of knowing according to epistemological perspectives. To further capture the way in which women experienced themselves as knowers, they developed bimodal categories which they labeled Educational Dialectics. These dialectics were defined as a continuum of knowing where each pole was considered a possible and valuable source of knowing. The 10 bimodal categories chosen for analytical purposes in this investigation were used to operationalize the construct of authority/power. Women's quotes and ideas about authority/power were organized and categorized under the pertinent dialectic. Since the dialectics were viewed as continuums of knowing, a certain amount of subjectivity was used when placing a particular way of knowing along a continuum. The dialectics in this investigation were defined as follows:

(a) Process oriented-Goal oriented: This category related to a person's thoughts and feelings about their way of knowing authority/power as a dynamic process or as an unchanging truth whereby the attainment of the answer from the authority obviated further exploration in that area.

(b) Discovery-Didacticism: This category construed how an individual viewed the acquisition of knowledge. Discovery denoted a personal construction of knowledge whereby the knower took an active role in constructing her ideas and knowledge. In contrast, didactism referred to knowledge derived from an external authority, a received knowledge.

(c) Rational-Intuitive: This category exemplifies the process by which knowledge was attained and the value the knower placed on methods used to analyze and act in a conflict or dilemma.

(d) Discrete-Related: Belenky et al. (1986) saw this as a continuum where, on one end, knowledge was seen as discrete facts, none of which related to one another. Knowledge was also seen as discrete, or separate, from a person's personal life. the other end of the continuum was where a person was able to see the complexity and interrelatedness of knowledge. The person at this end of the continuum felt that knowledge was related to their personal life. They did not separate their educational experience from their personal life.

(e) Being with others-Being alone or on own: This category represented an individual's situational preference for learning. A person may prefer to learn either in an atmosphere of cooperation or one of competition.

(f) Support-Challenge: Another category which delineated optimal conditions for learning, as well as who and what are experienced as supportive/nonsupportive and challenging/nonchallenging.

(g) Personal-Impersonal: A continuum which described a person's way of knowing authority/power.

(h) Self-concern-Responsibility and caring for others: A continuum which represented the basis for a person's decision. A person would act based on self-concern if they were reasoning at Level 1 or 2. At Level 3, 4, and 5, a person would make decisions based on their feeling of responsibility to others.

(i) Inner-Outer: This category was concerned with the knower's experience of whether the factors controlling the learning process were external or internal to the person. The category also covered who or what was perceived to validate knowledge.

(j) Listening-Speaking: This category was used to convey the knower's experience of voice.

APPENDIX G

Reader's Notation Sheet
WAYS OF KNOWING INTERVIEW

Subject: #
Reader:
Date Read:
Position Code:___ Separate Knowing present___ predominate___
Connected Knowing present___ predominate___

---

1) EVIDENCE FOR SILENCE

2) EVIDENCE FOR RECEIVED KNOWLEDGE

3) EVIDENCE FOR SUBJECTIVE KNOWLEDGE

4) EVIDENCE FOR PROCEDURAL KNOWLEDGE

5) EVIDENCE FOR CONSTRUCTED KNOWLEDGE

EVIDENCE FOR SEPARATE KNOWING

EVIDENCE FOR CONNECTED KNOWING

OTHER INTERESTING RESPONSES that don't fit:

SUMMARY EXPLAINING WEIGHTING USED: (Pay attention to the tenses used etc to speculate on development--e.g. have they just overthrown one position for another? Note if position or mode varies depending on the context or content of the learning.)

APPENDIX H

MORAL REASONING SCORE SHEET

Subject #_____ Interviewed by_____

Scorer:_____

Work/School (Authority)

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____
7. _____
8. _____
0. _____

Major:_____

Minor:_____

Work/School (Peer)

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____
0. _____

Major:_____

Minor:_____

Sport (Authority)

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____
0. _____

Major:_____

Minor:_____

Sport (Peer)

1. _____
2. _____
3. _____
4. _____
5. _____
6. _____
0. _____

Major:_____

Minor:_____

CODING OF MORAL DATA

Interpersonal Morality: Haan

The following coding scheme should be used for ALL coding of interpersonal data; that is, both interviews and observations.

Level		
Major	Minor	Code
1	1	01
1	2	02
1	3	03
2	1	04
2	2	05
2	3	06
2	4	07
3	1	08
3	2	09
3	3	10
3	4	11
3	5	12
4	2	13
4	3	14
4	4	15
4	5	16
5	3	17
5	4	18
5	5	19

*Must be within 4 points.

APPPENDIX I

LIFE AND SPORT MORAL REASONING LEVELS

	Life Authority		Life Peer		Sport Authority		Sport Peer	
L = 4	4/5	16	5/4	18	5/3	17	5/3	14
S = 4	4/3	14	4/3	14	4/5	16	4/4	15
L = 4	4/2	13	4/3	14	4/2	13	2/1	04
S = 3	4/4	15	4/3	14	4/2	13	2/4	07
L = 4	4/5	16	4/5	16	4/5	16	4/5	16
S = 4	4/5	16	4/5	16	4/5	16	5/2	17
L = 3	3/4	11	3/4	11	3/2	09	3/2	09
S = 3	3/4	11	3/4	11	3/3	10	3/3	10
L = 5	5/4	18	5/4	18	5/4	18	5/4	18
S = 5	4/5	16	5/4	18	5/4	18	4/4	15
L = 3	3/4	11	3/5	12	3/5	12	3/3	10
S = 3	3/3	10	3/4	11	3/4	11	3/3	10
L = 3	3/4	11	3/4	11	2/3	06	2/2	05
S = 3	3/3	10	3/3	10	3/3	10	3/3	10
L = 4	4/2	13	3/5	12	4/3	14	3/4	11
S = 4	4/4	15	4/3	14	4/3	14	3/4	11
L = 3	4/2	13	3/4	11	4/3	14	4/3	14
S = 3	3/2	09	3/3	10	3/3	10	3/3	10
L = 4	4/5	16	4/4	15	4/4	15	4/2	13
S = 4	5/4	18	5/4	18	5/5	19	4/4	15

VITA

Dianna Louise Wright was born in Aberdeen, Maryland on April 23, 1954. At the age of 11 she moved to Knoxville, Tennessee where she was graduated from West High School in June 1972. She attended California State University at Long Beach where she was a member of the varsity volleyball and tennis teams and was graduated in August 1976. In the fall of 1976 she accepted an assistant coaching position for women's volleyball at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville and attended graduate school. She received her Master of Science degree in August 1977 and accepted a coaching/teaching position at Rio Hondo Community College in California. After teaching a year, she returned to Tennessee and completed work for her teaching credential. She developed the Junior National Women's Volleyball Team in Knoxville and was active in promoting women's volleyball in the southeast. After receiving her teaching credential, she accepted a teaching position in Physical Education at Doyle High School. In September 1980 she accepted a coaching/teaching position at California State University at Chico. She taught there until her admission as a doctoral student at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville in the fall of 1985. She did her third year of doctoral work at the University of California, Berkeley where she worked with Dr. Brenda Bredemeier. She received the Doctor of Philosophy degree with a major emphasis in Sport Psychology in August 1988. After graduation she began an internship in northern California as a psychotherapist.