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To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Darrell N. Blalock entitled "Communal Politics and Political Stability: Chinese Participation in the Malaysian Electoral Process." I recommend that it be accepted for nine quarter hours of credit in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in Political Science.

Major Professor

We have read this thesis
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:

Vice Chancellor for
Graduate Studies and Research

COMMUNAL POLITICS AND POLITICAL STABILITY: CHINESE PARTICIPATION IN THE MALAYSIAN ELECTORAL PROCESS

A Thesis

Presented to

the Graduate Council of

The University of Tennessee

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

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by

Darrell N. Blalock

March 1973

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is threefold: (1) to describe Chinese political participation and politicization in Malaysia; (2) to evaluate the degree of Chinese national and political integration relative to Malaysian political development; and (3) to identify the consequences of these factors for democracy and political stability in Malaysia. Each of these items is discussed in the context of the Malaysian electoral process.

Secondary sources were used to establish the background for Chinese participation in the electoral process of Malaysia--the migration of Chinese to Malaya, where they settled, and the ethnic distribution of the society. This is followed by discussions of Chinese cultural development in Malaysia, their obtaining of economic dominance, and their early participation in the Malaysian political system. Secondary and primary sources were used to discuss the events and campaign of the 1969 elections as well as the results of the elections. Malaysian government reports, the Straits Times, and Asian periodicals were used to lay the ground-work for the discussion of the three years since the elections of 1969, which assisted in developing trends concerning Chinese participation and their effects on the stability and the future of democracy in the political system of Malaysia.

This research indicates that Malaysian democracy does not function as westerners might think it should; but it nevertheless continues to be one form of democracy, and perhaps the most appropriate form for Malaysia at the present time. There is a high degree of Chinese,

as well as Malay, politicization. National integration has not taken place, nor does it appear likely in the near future. Moreover, there has not been sufficient Chinese political integration in the Malaysian political system to provide the necessary effective political institutions for rationally and logically resolving the problems connected with critical issues. The high degree of politicization without national and political integration could possible lead to continued chaos and violence, which in turn could destroy the resource capability now available for developing the political institutions necessary for political stability and democracy.

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INTRODUCTION

The problems involved in generating sound economic and political change in the states of developing areas are numerous and frequently seem insurmountable. In regard to the political arena one finds rather unique political problems in some societies but almost without exception all of the new states face the general problems of developing effective political institutions, national integration, and political integration.[1] Solutions to these problems must be found if a society's goals include economic and social change in the context of a reasonable degree of political stability. Such solutions, however, are not easy to come by in societies where resources are limited, where economic well-being varies widely, and where class distinctions are sharp. In addition, the difficulties faced by the undeveloped states are compounded in ethnically plural societies, where one finds sharp cultural differences.[2]

When awareness of ethnic ties is increased, "maneuvering" in order to maintain peaceful coexistence among the different ethnic groups appears to be a "natural" result of the electoral processes of democratic orders. Malaysia is an excellent example of the developing

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[1]Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development," Political Modernization: A Reader in Comparative Change, ed. Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), p. 150. The author defines national integration as "creating a sense of territorial nationality which overshadows--or eliminates--subordinate loyalties." Political integration is used throughout this study to mean the linking of the government to the governed.

[2]Clifford Geertz,"The Integration Revolution: Premordial Sentiments and Civic Politics in the New States," Political Modernization: A Reader

state with a plural society which has been relatively successful at maneuvering in order to remain democratic, politically stable, and ethnically divided.

Cultural pluralism of Malaysian society was evident prior to independence and is even more pronounced today. Prior to independence Malaysia was a country made up primarily of three distinct ethnic groups: Malays, Chinese, and Indians, each of which was further divided into smaller cultural, economic, and religious communities. There was very little interaction between the different ethnic groups and very little even among the different communities within each ethnic group. But as nationalism and political independence appeared on the scene, interaction among the different ethnic groups caused fears, suspicions, tensions, and conflict which enhanced the identity of each ethnic group.

Clifford Geertz points out that Malaysia today is a nation-wide system of "ethnic blocks" engaged in "total relations with one another," which sets the stage for a direct clash between personal identity and political integrity.[3] It is precisely this clash that makes Malaysia the focus of so much attention from scholars who seek "models" for the successful development of new nation-states with plural societies. Malaysia is a conglomerate of a variety of religious, linguistic, tribal, educational, economic, and political units. No ethnic group has a clear majority in numbers. In western Malaysia, which is the focus of this

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in Comparative Change, ed. Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1967), p. 175.

[3] Ibid., p. 184.

study, the Malays make up approximately 50 percent of the population, the Chinese 35 percent, and all others, including the Indians, about 15 percent. This unique "balance" of ethnic groups in Malaysia distinguishes the Malaysian plural society from all others in the Southeast Asia area.

The Malays are the predominant factor in all Malaysian political institutions, even though they require a broad base of support from the Chinese community; and the Chinese almost totally dominate the economy. This is true in other developing states of Southeast Asia as well, but nowhere are the numbers of Chinese as great and their economic power as prevalent. This has caused the Malays to fear and be suspicious of the Chinese, resulting in the use of their political power to safeguard their position in the plural society. In turn, this safeguarded position has caused reactions among the Chinese and has made it extremely difficult for the Malays to compete economically. This is where the situation stands today, with each ethnic group attempting to gain a foothold in the sector of society dominated by the other.

Aside from conflicts over political and economic power, the Chinese and Malays are further divided geographically, educationally, and in terms of living standards. The Malays are generally characterized by their rural setting, lack of education, and lower income per capita. For the most part, they are farmers and fishermen, Muslim, and lead an easy-going life devoid of the industriousness, thriftiness, and drive for economic gain so characteristic of the Chinese of Malaysia. The Chinese dominate the urban areas, even those where they are not in the majority, because of the aforementioned traits. As a

result of their total involvement in all phases of commercial activities, they tend also to have higher incomes, higher living standards, and better educational opportunities than the Malays.

The difficulties surrounding the development of effective political institutions and integrating the plural society nationally and politically in the context of an open democratic political system are formidable. Mass participation is necessary to provide legitimacy for the developing political institutions in a democratic setting, but as ethnic pluralism persists, ever changing and diverse demands are placed on the system. The difficulty involved in meeting such demands is that frequently the action required to meet one ethnic group's demands adversely affects the other ethnic group's interest. Political institutions in this type of system not only must have the structural flexibility to react to these demands in a rational and logical manner, but they must also have the natural and economic resources to do so. If either of these capabilities is lacking the political institutions are liable to fail. Generally, political institutions in developing states with open political systems and plural societies find that their main goals are national integration and political integration, consequently pressure is on these institutions from the very start to maintain an atmosphere of harmony.

Harmony is usually maintained in developing states, especially those with plural societies, by two means: "(1) the elimination of the distinctive cultural traits of minority communities and their merging into some kind of <u>national</u> cultural group--a policy generally referred to as

assimilationist; Americanization, Burmanization, detribalization; (2) the establishment of national loyalties without eliminating subordinate cultures--the policy of unity in diversity, politically characterized by ethnic arithmetic."[4] Many times a compromise between the two strategies is worked out. Regardless of the strategy employed, a delicate balancing act is required of the political institutions to avoid failure.

Political stability and democracy in Malaysia apparently hinges on changes in the social, economic, and political culture of the large Chinese minority. As suggested by Cynthia Enloe: "ethnic pluralism may persist and yet change in its character and political setting" and "the political system is bound to change as the patterns of ethnic pluralism change."[5] Significant changes are taking place that will have a definite effect on the future of Malaysia.

The purpose of this research is threefold: (1) to describe Chinese political participation and politicization; (2) to evaluate the degree of Chinese national and political integration relative to Malaysian political development; and (3) to identify the consequences of these factors for democracy and political stability in Malaysia. The research will be confined to western Malaysia.[6]

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[4]Weiner,, op. cit., p. 155.

[5]Cynthia Enloe, "Issues and Integration in Malaysia," Pacific Affairs, XLI, No. 3 (Fall 1968), 372.

[6]Western Malaysia is the focus for this research because it is the dominant factor, politically and economically, in Malaysia; however, the most important reason for not including eastern Malaysia is that it has not had sufficient electoral history for comparison.

The study begins with broad overviews of Malaysia's colonial history, the movement for independence, the formal government structure, and the pertinent articles of the constitution which deal with the "special rights" of the Malays. The historical development of the Malayan plural society, the current ethnic distribution of the population, and the beginning of Chinese political awareness and participation are discussed in Chapter II. Chapter III is concerned with the concept of the Alliance party system and its development, the ability of the Alliance to successfully govern and cope with elections from 1951 to 1964, and the inherent difficulties of the Alliance system of governing in view of increased Chinese and Malay awareness as related to several important issues. Chapter III also discusses the parties, platforms, issues and the campaign of 1969, with some emphasis on continuity and change from previous elections. Chapter IV contains an analysis of the 1969 elections at the national and state levels. The concluding chapter is concerned with post-election developments and the prospects for future political stability and democracy in Malaysia's plural society.

CHAPTER I

FROM COLONIALISM TO INDEPENDENCE

Chinese politicization, national integration, and political integration in the Malaysian political system can be adequately discussed only after the broad context in which they are taking place has been set forth. This background consists of early political developments and the movement for independence, the outgrowth of which was the present form of government and certain articles of the constitution pertaining to the "special rights of Malays." It was within this framework that Malaysia's plural society was born, its political institutions were developed, and a viable democratic process was created.

I. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS PRIOR TO INDEPENDENCE

It may be argued that political developments which took place prior to the arrival of the British in Malaya (early 1800's) played an important role in development of the present Malaysian political system,[1] however, those developments do not have important ramifications when considering the place of the Chinese in the development of the Malaysian political system. The arrival of the British had a most pronounced effect on the politicization, national and political integration of the Chinese.

The British practiced a system of "divide and rule" which was

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[1]See R. S. Milne, Government and Politics in Malaysia (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), pp. 13-14.

designed to maintain the status quo, thus avoiding conflict and interference which would hinder their commercial activities.[2] This system of rule was one in which each ethnic community (Malay, Chinese, Indian, etc.) and its sub-communities, had its own leaders that dealt directly with the British rather than with each other, thus eliminating any possibility of early interaction between races and integration of any kind. Just as important as the lack of interaction and integration is the fact that throughout the early colonial period, the Chinese are hardly mentioned at all, for the British considered the Chinese as transients. This fact becomes more obvious as the British gradually moved from the "divide and rule" concept to more centralized government and control over the area. As the colony develops politically and moves toward independence, the framework is established for the form of Malaysian government and the idea of "special rights" for the Malays is born.

The first administrative unit was the "Straits Settlements," formed in 1826 and made up of Singapore, Penang, and Malacca. These settlements later became a Crown Colony in 1867 and remained one until the Japanese occupation during the Second World War. A British Governor headed the "Straits Settlements" and was assisted by an Executive and Legislative Council which was composed of appointed British officials. This administrative setup was responsible to the British Crown. The remaining states of Malaya were to become British protectorates.

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[2] Ibid., p. 16. The British were concerned only with their commercial activities, not with the inhabitants of Malaya. Consequently, it

The British began securing separate treaties with the rulers of the remaining nine states of Malaya in order to protect their ever expanding interest and to provide some form of law and order. From 1874 to 1895 treaties were obtained with the Rulers of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang. Throughout this period of time each state was administered separately by what was known as the residential system, under which the Ruler had to seek the advice of an appointed British officer residing in his State, and act on that advice. This was a cheap and convenient form of rule for the British, but each resident had a tendency to go his own way. Consequently, it became necessary to affect some form of coordination. This resulted in the formation of the Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan and Pahang) in 1895 which made for more effective centralized control under the appointed British High Commissioner, who was also the Governor of the "Straits Settlements."

The remaining five States of Malaya--Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu and Perlis--became British protectorates in the same manner as the previously mentioned states. The State of Johore actually became a British protectorate in 1885 but did not accept a British officer as resident until 1914. The other four states of northern Malaya started becoming British protectorates in 1909 after rights of suzerainty had been transferred from the Siamese to the British. The procedure was completed in 1930 when these five states became known as the Unfederated Malay States.

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was easier, more convenient, and cheaper to accomplish their goals by a system of "divide and rule."

Each state in the Federated Malay States and the Unfederated Malay States had a State Council, with the British resident serving as a member, however, these councils served in an advisory capacity only. The big differences were that the Federated States were better organized, more efficient, and more centralized, while the Unfederated States retained greater autonomy and a more traditional form of government, with less control over the Rulers by the British resident. There was little change in this situation until the Malay peninsula was occupied by the Japanese in 1941.[3]

The people of Malaya no longer looked on the British as all powerful or invincible after the rapid defeat of the British by the Japanese. The Japanese occupation had provided the motivation for Malay nationalism and strengthened Chinese nationalism, as will be seen later. The gaps between the two major ethnic segments of the plural society had been widened, yet the British returned after the war intent on forming a more rational and uniformed system of government than that which had existed prior to the war.

After a brief period of administration by the British military the Malayan Union was formed in 1946. The Union, which included all of the peninsula except Singapore, was ruled directly by the British rather than indirectly as before. The Malayan Union was short lived as protest from all segments of the society destroyed it in 1948. Malay

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[3]The importance of the Japanese occupation during the Second World War to Chinese politicization, national integration, political integration, and the development of Chinese political institutions is discussed in Chapter II.

protest revolved around opposition to liberalized citizenship laws, which in any future electoral process would increase Chinese voting power, and the fact that the traditional Malay rulers were to lose their sovereignty to the British Crown. The Chinese were mainly apathic toward the Union; however, there was some movement against the proposal because they were not consulted.

In any event the British established the Federation of Malaya in 1948. Under this system the British took into account Malay criticism of the Malayan Union. In part, this was accomplished through a federal structure whereby the traditional rulers headed each of the nine states and "Governors" headed the former colonies of Penang and Malacca.[4] In spite of this rather elaborate federal structure, however, the British retained strong central control over the governmental system.

In addition to retaining strong control over the system under the new federation, the British also hoped to establish some form of equitible citizenship laws for the non-Malays as well as Malays. In fact, however, the British were once again responding to Malay demands when they established "special rights" for Malays. As a result, the British found themselves facing the same dilemma which confronts Malaysia today: how to maintain special rights for the Malays while at the same time looking out for the interest of the other ethnic components of the society.

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[4]For elaboration on the formal relationship between the states and the central government see Milne, op. cit., pp. 75-86.

The best example of this conflict arose over the question of citizenship for non-Malays. Under the Federation, as compared with the Union, the requirements were so strict that only after submitting a formal application proving beyond question that he was of good character could a Chinese even think about becoming a citizen. It was so bad in fact that in 1949 only about one-fifth of the Chinese residents had become citizens. It appears here that the British had accomplished only one of their goals, that of a highly centralized Government.

II. INDEPENDENCE AND FORMAL GOVERNMENT

On 31 August, 1957 a fully independent Federation of Malaya came into existance, consisting of the same nine states as its predecesor. In September 1963 the North Borneo States of Sabah and Sarawak, and Singapore joined the Federation, and it was renamed the Federation of Malaysia. Because of disagreements over constitutional issues (primarily of an economic and financial nature), different approaches to solving the racial problems, and personal political power controversies between the leaders of Singapore and those of Kuala Lumpur, Singapore seceded from the Federation of Malaysia on 9 August, 1965. Thus, Malaysia is now made up of the nine previously protected States of Malaya, the British colonial settlements of Penang and Malacca, and the two States of North Boreno, Sabah and Sarawak.

These 13 states are bound together by a federal constitution which provides for a "Parliamentary" form of government very much like

that of Britain.[5] Like Britain there is a nonpolitical head of state, the Yang-di-Pertuan Agong, who according to the constitution is the source of all authority; however, in practice he is not an absolute monarch but rather a "Constitutional" monarch. Only on a few matters may he exercise his discretion, however on all other matters he may be consulted, and may give advice, but he adhears to the advice of the cabinet and the Prime Minister.

The Yang-di-Pertuan Agong appoints as Prime Minister a member of the House of representatives who commands the confidence of the majority of the members of the House. He also appoints the Cabinet Ministers on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister heads the Cabinet, which is collectively responsible to the Parliament. Here is where the actual power of government in Malaysia is located. It is also where the different ethnic sectors of society are most notably integrated politically. It has become quite customary, for example, for a Chinese to be the Minister of Finance or the Minister of Commerce and Industry just as it has been customary for a Malay to be the Minister of Rural Development or Minister of Agriculture.

Ministeries may be combined, changed, increased, or decreased in numbers and their functions transferred from one ministery to another. This is done for many reasons: to balance ethnic representation within the Cabinet; to respond to a particular political event,

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[5]For a thorough understanding of Malaysia's Governmental structure see; Constitutions of Asian Countries, (Prepared by the Secretariat of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, Bombay, 1968), pp. 616-812; also see Milne, op. cit., pp. 130-178.

or to reflect the increased or decreased importance of a particular Ministry. It becomes quite obvious that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet are the sources of real political power in Malaysia even though they are responsible to Parliament.

The legislative authority of the Federation is vested in the Parliament which consists of a Senate and House of Representatives. The life of Parliament is five years unless dissolved sooner. The lower House has 144 elected members and the Senate has two Senators elected from each state by the State Assemblies plus 32 members appointed by the Yang-di-Pertuan Agong. Though the Malaysian Parliament is modeled after that of the British, there is one major difference. When the British Parliament makes a law it is supreme and cannot be challenged. The constitution of Malaysia is supreme in this case and gives the courts the right to challenge the validity of a law passed by Parliament. To prevent such challenges the constitution provides that the Senate should serve as a check against the House in legislative matters, yet in reality the Senate serves as a rubber stamp for the House. The most obvious reason for this, of course, is that the 32 appointed Senators are often appointed from the same party as that in the majority in the House. Also the Senators elected from each State Assembly are likely to come from the same party since the majority party in the states has usually been the same as the majority party in Parliament.

The state governments are organized very similarly to the federal government except that they have only one house in their State Assemblies, all members of which are elected. Of the eleven states

in western Malaysia, nine have hereditary Sultans as the Head of State and two--Malacca and Penang--have governors appointed by the Yang-di-Pertuan Agong after consultation with the Chief Ministers of the states. The Rulers serve for life while the Governors serve four year terms with the possibility of reappointment. The Chief Executive in each state is the Chief Minister or Mentri Besar, who is appointed from the majority party in the State Assembly.

One of the most important factors concerning state governments is that they cannot accomplish very much without federal aid, for they usually have only those funds allocated them for federally approved projects. Since the state governments have very little power in Malaysia, one must wonder why the federal system was selected to begin with. Though Malaysia contains a number of different ethnic groups, none are concentrated within an area which could easily be made into a separate ethnic state, with the exception possibly of the Northeast states where approximately 90 percent of the population is Malay. Actually, it was the existence of the hereditary Rulers and the tradition of indirect rule that prompted the selection of a federal system, which was to provide a strong central government and yet leave a measure of autonomy of the states. The states were not very autonomous, however, for about the only powers they received were powers with respect to the development of natural resources and the federal government is interested in that too. As will be seen later, however, the state governments have played an important role in the political development of Malaysia.

It is not, however, the formal structure of government and the relationships between its parts that is most important to political development, but rather its relationship with the plural society in which it functions. The most important aspect of Malaysia's Parliamentary government is that it is necessary for a political party or a coalition of parties to attain a majority of the seats in order to form a government. Also required is a two-thirds majority of votes in Parliament to amend the constitution. Last, but definately not least, is the fact that the Cabinet and the Prime Minister are appointed from the majority party or coalition. When the complexity of Malaysia's plural society is considered, the aforementioned aspects of Malaysian Parliamentary government also becomes simpler.

Though discussed in more detail in the following chapter, the plural society in Malaysia is one in which no racial group can likely claim a majority of the electorate; it is one in which each racial group is further segmented and compartmentalized according to social classes; and it is one in which racial differences are very sharp and distinct, made more pronounced and significant by the way in which independence was attained. It is within this context that a party government must gain a majority in Parliament if it is to rule effectively. A difficult task to say the least, yet a close examination of certain special features of the constitution, not found in constitutions of other countries, will clarify the political rules and framework by which the different racial groups play the game of politics within the government structure already outlined.

III. SPECIAL FEATURES OF THE CONSTITUTION

The important features of the constitution can be placed into three categories; first there are those embodied in the "bargain" between the Chinese and Malay political elite.[6] The bargain was one by which the Chinese sought to participate fully in the political activities of the new Federation. In turn the Chinese were to accept certain forms associated with Malay traditions.

The Chinese gained relaxed citizenship laws, thus increasing their voting power, and therefore their political power. Though not explicitly stated in the constitution, it was implied that the Chinese were also to continue their dominant role in business without hindrances. The Chinese elite agreed as a part of the bargain that Islam would be the state religion, Malay the national language after 1967, and that certain functions assigned to the hereditary Rulers were to be accepted. Only one of the aforementioned agreements on the part of the Chinese political elite has remained a focal point of dissatisfaction on the part of the Chinese masses.

The religion and special functions of the hereditary Rulers only serve as indicators of discrimination as far as the Chinese are concerned. These two aspects of the agreement serve to widen and sharpen racial differences, yet the Chinese are not prohibited from

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[6] Milne, op. cit., pp. 38-39. The term Chinese and Malay political elite is used here to refer to the leaders of the Malay political party (United Malays' National Organization) and the Chinese political party (Malayan Chinese Association), which will be discussed later. The agreement referred to was actually made by these two parties. Milne discusses this "bargain" in detail.

practicing their religion and the only significant result of the delegation of special functions to the hereditary rulers is that a Chinese may never become Head of State (Yang-di-Pertuan Agong). However, the language question is another matter indeed.

Article 152, as amended by the National Language Act of 1963, makes Malay the national language and ultimately the sole official language. Though the language article was designed to promote national integration and ease political integration, it has served as a focal point of Chinese discontent. It creates two problems: one involves traditional Chinese culture and the other education and economics. The first of these problems is easily understood. The article tends to lessen the ability of Chinese to raise their children in their traditional language and culture. The second problem is very important and though proposals are constantly being made to solve it, it remains a serious point of debate. Since Chinese schools use Chinese and English as the mediums of instruction, the Chinese youth is discriminated against when he takes college entrance examinations that are given in the national language. Of course, without a higher education the Chinese youth is not able to compete for the better jobs. He is also hindered in obtaining government jobs where the language used is Malay, not Chinese. It is access to the ever-expanding industrial and technical sector of Malaysia's society that the Chinese feel they are being denied by the language policy. It is the educational and economic aspect of the language issue that overlaps with the second category of special features of the constitution.

The second category of constitutional features is spelled out

in article 153, which safeguards the special position of the Malays. This article spells out special rights which are intended to narrow the economic and educational gap between the Malays and Chinese, and stimulate social change which will enhance national integration and political stability. It has, however, only created dissention, fear, suspicion, and tension among the various elements of the plural society. The special rights include: (1) advantageous quotas for Malays in higher education and scholarship opportunities; (2) a 4:1 recruitment ratio in favor of the Malays for the Malayan Civil Service, which is the administrative elite of the public service, and a 3:1 recruitment ratio for Malays in the External Affairs Service, the Judicial and Legal Services, and the Customs Service; and (3) Malay advantages in the purchase of land.

Table 1 depicts the effect of the special rights regarding higher educational quotas and scholarships for Malays; however, it gives a somewhat inflated picture of actual Malay achievements in this area due to the high percentage of Malay drop-outs not shown.[7] The non-Malays had almost a 4:1 enrollment advantage over the Malays among all students in 1962-63. The increased quotas and scholarships for Malays narrowed this ratio to almost 2:1 among first year students, in 1965-66 and even to 1:1 in 1969-70. Only in one area have the Malays pulled ahead of the non-Malays in enrollment, that being

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[7] Gordon P. Means, "Special Rights as a Strategy for Development," Comparative Politics, V, No. 1 (October 1972), 45.

Table 1. Student Enrollment by Faculty at University of Malaya

	Malay		Non-Malay		Total
	No.	%	No.	%	No.
1962/63 (all students)					
Agriculture	6	8	68	92	74
Arts	247	34	476	66	723
Engineering	5	2	223	98	228
Science	16	5	302	95	318
1965/66 (first year students)					
Agriculture	21	45	26	55	47
Arts	294	45	359	55	653
Engineering	3	3	98	98	101
Science	13	7	169	93	182
Medicine	15	12	107	88	122
1969/70 (first year students)					
Agriculture	25	26	70	74	95
Arts	722	59	505	41	1,227
Engineering	5	4	109	96	114
Science	79	26	228	74	307
Medicine	50	30	116	70	166
Economics and Administration	197	39	308	61	505

Source: Gordon P. Means, "Special Rights as a Strategy For Development," Comparative Politics, V, No. 1 (October 1972), 45.

in the arts. The enrollment figures for the School of Arts and the School of Economics and Administration indicate a desire on the part of the Malays to take advantage of the Civil Service recruitment advantage which they have. At the same time the non-Malays have maintained their large numerical advantage in the more technical fields such as Engineering, Science, and Medicine, which indicates the more traditional commercial and industrial interest of the non-Malays, especially the Chinese. The trend here appears to be one of widening the economic gap instead of decreasing it, for salaries seem to be

higher in the more technical industrial complex than in the Government. The point is clear, however, that the special educational rights provided the Malays are narrowing the education gap and constitute a form of discrimination on the part of the Malays against the non-Malays.

The Malaysian government argues that the recruitment ratios that are favorable to the Malays have not actually been discriminatory, but a method by which the racial balance in the government employment can be equalized among the different races. Government reports attempt to illustrate their point by figures like those shown in Table 2. The figures in this table are fine, except that they do not show the whole picture. Division I Government Officers are at the lowest echelon of government and here the table shows that the Malays and Chinese are almost equal in percent of employment for the year 1968. It also shows that the Chinese have a higher percent of employment

Table 2. Ethnic Composition of Division I Government Officers

	1957 %	1962 %	1968 %	Population Base Line %
Expatriate	61.0	14.1	----	----
Malays	14.1	29.3	36.3	45.9
Chinese	13.2	34.0	36.1	35.7
Indians	7.0	15.9	21.5	9.6
Non-Muslim indigenous	----	----	----	6.6
Others	----	----	----	2.2
Total number	2,761	2,902	4,308	

Source: Gordon P. Means, "Special Rights as a Strategy For Development," Comparative Politics, V, no. 1 (October 1972), 47.

than their population base line percent. What the table does not show is the fact that in the higher echelons of the government Civil Service, Malays hold 85.1 percent of the positions.[8] Rapid and discriminatory promotion practices have distorted the picture painted by Table 2, since as British expatriates began to disappear from the roles of the Malaysian Civil Service after independence, Malays were hired in large numbers to replace them. Malays were promoted from the lower divisions of the government while the Chinese and others remained, consequently the recruitment ratios favoring the Malays for employment in the Malaysian Civil Service have been very discriminatory. This practice of course has hindered Chinese political integration and certainly caused enough ill-feeling on the part of the Chinese to seriously effect national integration.

The last area of Malay "special rights" to be covered here is the "Land Laws" which were designed to promote economic development among the Malays and to protect the Malays from the economic dislocation that resulted from the influx of European enterprises and large numbers of Chinese laborers, traders, money lenders, and entrepreneurs. These laws were actually the first to deal with Malay "special rights." In 1891 the Selangor Land Code attempted to put a stop to practices whereby Chinese and other non-Malays were taking advantage of the rural Malays. As the Chinese eagerly sought their fortunes in Malaya, they used their inherent thriftiness and business-sense to acquire huge land holdings, either by taking land from Malays who had become indebted to them or by claiming unsettled land. The Selangor Land Code required that

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[8] Ibid., p. 47.

the original land holder must be Mohommedan (most likely a Malay) and that those holding such land could not sell or mortgage it to a non-Muslim (most likely a non-Malay).[9] Malay Reservations were set aside in 1913 in which only Malays could own or lease land, unless previously owned by a non-Malay prior to the establishment of the reservation. Non-Malays could neither hold mortgages on such land or seize it in the discharge of debts. This system of reservations which reserved land only for Malays was continued by British public policy under the Federation Agreement of 1948. Land policy pertaining to Malay Reservations has survived and is now enshrined in the Malaysian Constitution and is probably more difficult to amend than the constitution itself. It is doubtful that this "special right" of the Malays has proved any more successful than the two preceding "special rights" that were discussed. It may very well be that the economic and educational gaps between the Malays and Chinese have been narrowed, and that social change has taken place; however, the result does not appear to have been national integration as intended, but just the opposite.

The effect of the fundamental liberties provided for in the constitution on politicization and national integration should be substantial since they apply equally to all races. This is not the case, however, for the fundamental liberties of freedom of speech and expression, of peaceable assembly, and of forming associations are qualified in the same article in which they are given.[10] Generally, the restrictions which Parliament may place on these liberties are

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[9] Ibid., p. 32.

[10] Milne, op. cit., p. 41.

of two kinds: first, if Parliament feels that Malaysia's security or public order is threatened from within or without, these liberties may be terminated; second, laws and ordinances which permit "preventive detention," meaning imprisonment without trial, may be passed. These restrictions have been a serious point of contention on the part of the Chinese, mainly because they feel that they are aimed at them. If they speak up against Malay "special rights" as an example, then it is possible that they could be detained for "promoting feelings of ill will and hostility between different races or other classes of the population likely to cause violence."[11] These fears may be justified, for every time there is some form of major disorder in Malaysia, such as the "riots in Penang of 1967," and the "riots throughout most of Malaysia" in 1969, even government figures show that more Chinese are arrested, detained, and missing than Malays. Here as with the case of Malay "special rights" the effects on national integration and politicization have not necessarily been good.

In the context outlined above, it appears safe to assume that Chinese politicization, national integration, and political integration could not possibly have followed a smooth and harmonious path. The broad context presented in this chapter provided the basis for much of the tension, fear, suspicion, and conflict which arose as the Chinese segment of Malaysia's plural society was created, its political institutions developed, and Chinese politicization increased. These developments were directly related to the British system of rule in

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[11] Ibid.

which early political developments took place, and the pattern of events around which the movement for independence revolved. The Chinese had to participate according to the rules put forth by the constitution and within the framework of government which came with independence. It is from this starting point that subsequent events will be analyzed relative to political stability and democracy in Malaysia.

CHAPTER II

THE CHINESE SOCIETY: ECONOMIC, CULTURAL, AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

R. S. Milne has noted that "more than anything else, the racial composition of Malaysia is the key to understanding the whole picture."[1] The economy, the form of government, the constitution, and the political party system have all been shaped by the uniqueness of the Malaysian plural society. Thus, an understanding of Malaysia's problems of attaining national and political integration and developing effective political institutions can be arrived at only by tracing the evolution of the Malaysian Chinese society while at the same time relating this development to the evolution of the Malay society and its attitudes.

In briefly tracing this development several important factors must be considered. The first major factor is the personal characteristics and traits of the Chinese. These characteristics and traits have had a significant bearing on the second factor to be considered: Chinese economic development. The Chinese culture, the values placed on it, and the changes that it has undergone

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[1] R. S. Milne, Government and Politics in Malaysia (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1967), p. 3.

is the third factor considered in this chapter. As will be seen, economic and cultural development began to add a sense of permanence to the Chinese presence in Malaysia. This permanence made the complexity of the plural society increasingly difficult to deal with as did both the size and geographic locations of the Chinese. The fourth factor considered in this chapter is the racial and geographical breakdown of the population. As Chinese dominance of the Malaysian economy grew, as Chinese culture became more suited to the Malaysian environment, and as the Chinese permanently settled in certain areas, they began to awaken from their political apathy, to divorce themselves from events in mainland China, and to perceive the political events in Malaysia as relevant to their welfare. In turn, these changes led to significant changes in Chinese political institutions and political integration.

I. THE CHINESE MIGRANTS

The Chinese that migrated to Malaysia can be placed into two groups: those that came prior to the British colonial period and those that came after the arrival of the British in Malaya. The fact that the arrival of the first group in Malaya was separated by a rather lengthy period of time (about 100 to 300 years) from the arrival of the second group had a very pronounced effect on the complexity of Malaysia's plural society. The same can be said for the circumstances under which they came to Malaya, for the conditions that existed in both China and

Malaya at the time they came and for the area of China from which they departed.

The first group of Chinese migrants came to Malacca, to Penang, and to Singapore. Their migration was gradual and lasted from around the beginning of the fifteenth century until the early part of the nineteenth century.[2] Those that came were shopkeepers, traders, carpenters, and artisans of all kinds. There were even some farmers that came and ventured inland to grow spices. Chinese miners were the last of the first group to migrate, arriving in the early nineteenth century when rich deposits of tin were discovered in Perak. Regardless of the means that the Chinese migrant adopted for making his living, he was usually very successful.

The reasons for the Chinese migrants' success revolved around personality characteristics. Descriptions of the Chinese of Malaysia usually refer to such characteristics as "resourceful," "dynamic," "enthusiastic," "willing to work hard," and "thrifty." Chinese willingness to work and persist in the face of hardship was evident, and their early society revolved around the success which these traits brought them. The Chinese have a sense of

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[2]Though Chinese were known to have visited Malaya more than 1000 years ago, there is no accurate account of any large numbers of Chinese settling in Malaya prior to the early sixteenth century. For early Malaya history, see Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), and Wong Cung Wu, Malaysia: A Survey (London: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).

personal pride and loyalty to the family that prohibits them from being unsuccessful. They have proven that they have the patience and willingness to sacrifice in order to be successful.

Those that came in this first group were not an impoverished lot either, for they had come from China at a time when the situation there was one of relative prosperity. To have come so far and failed would have been a fact that few Chinese would have been able to accept.[3] They had come from southern China which traditionally produces adventurers while the northern half of China has traditionally produced the scholars.[4] Not only did southern China produce the adventurers, but it produced adventurers who spoke many different dialects. Southern China was heavily populated and consisted of many communities that would not communicate with each other in a common language.

This first group of Chinese migrants came to Malaya over a long period of time, and the fact that they settled in different parts of Malaya at a time when travel and communication was difficult at best served to isolate them from each other. Just as important was the fact that they spoke different

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[3]For further speculation on the reasons for Chinese success and their personal characteristics, see Mahathir bin Mohammad, The Malay Dilemma (Singapore: International Press Company, 1970), pp. 24-38.

[4]Purcell, op. cit., p. 1.

dialects and had different economic interests. This also segregated them into small ethnic groups. Though this first group of migrants became known as the "Straits Chinese," they were by no means as united as the name may imply.

Although the second wave of Chinese migrants was made up of large groups who came over a very short period of time, it had no more unity than the first group. The second wave began their exodus to Malaya during the first decade of the twentieth century. By this time, rubber had been found to grow easily almost anywhere in Malaysia. As some of the "Straits Chinese" began to move inland to prosper, by either growing rubber or by providing services to the rubber industry, the British, who were well established in Malaya by this time, also became extremely interested in the rubber industry. It was the British that provided momentum for the second migration of Chinese because the Malays were satisfied to continue their ways of easy living and farming and fishing at the mouths of the rivers and along the rich valleys of these rivers. Thus, with the need for more labor, a greater influx of Chinese began.

They came from all over southern China, mostly with the desire to make their fortunes and then return to their homeland. Some came under deplorable conditions, much like those under which the Negro slaves who came to America, while others came under contracts and agreements that would eventually take them a

lifetime or more to work off. It appears that most of the Chinese in this group were willing to accept poor conditions because during this period China was very unstable and poverty was common. Nevertheless, this group of migrants generally had the same characteristics and traits that the earlier migrants had, except that they were so impoverished that their will and eagerness to sacrifice in order to do well financially may have been even greater.[5] In any case, the first group by this time had passed through several generations, had done quite well economically, and had made their place in the economic community.[6]

The second group of Chinese migrants only served to further enhance the complexity which already existed, because they were usually from the impoverished lower social class and

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[5]Alvin Rabushka, "Racial Stereotypes in Malaysia," Asian Survey, XI, No. 7 (July 1971), 711-716. The author conducted a survey in 1970 which demonstrated that the characteristics discussed here are recognized by the Malays as well as the Chinese.

[6]Though the two groups were distinguishable, each had a common problem. In a society where the indigenous Malays frowned on intermarriage, the lack of Chinese women came to greatly concern the British. So much so, in fact, that in 1930 the British prohibited Chinese male immigration and intensified their efforts to increase the migration of Chinese females. By the end of 1931 there were 100 Chinese females to every 142 Chinese males. See Willard A. Hanna, "The Federation of Malaysia: Population and Development," American Universities Field Staff Reports, XIX, No. 7 (Hanover, N.H.: American Universities Field Staff Reports, Inc., January 1971), 3. That was quite an improvement over the 100 females to every 1000 males a year earlier. Purcell, op. cit., p. 174. Though the migration of Chinese females continued at a slow pace, this was for all practical purposes the end of Chinese migration to Malaya.

as a result lacked the "culture" that the first group had. Again, they were separated by language and were involved in different sectors of Malaya's economy. The most important fact, however, was that they settled widely all over the interior of the western states of Malaya rather than in the "Straits Settlements."

The end result of the Chinese migration to Malaya was many small clans of Chinese, scattered from one end of Malaya to the other, working in different sectors of the economy, speaking different dialects, and maintaining different customs. All of this in a time when travel was limited and communications poor left them with only two things in common: the color of their skin and the characteristics which enabled them to successfully exploit Malaya's growing and ever-expanding economy.

II. THE CHINESE AND MALAYSIA'S ECONOMY

It became apparent early in the twentieth century that the Malays would not or could not possibly match the industriousness of the Chinese.[7] During this period the Chinese increasingly diversified their interests, becoming industrialists, financiers, and large land-owners. Because of their eagerness to work hard and their willingness to endure hardships, to take on jobs that others did not want, and to persist in the face of cruel and harsh treatment, the Chinese often

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[7] Rabushka, op. cit., p. 711. This fact is apparently recognized even today.

advanced from laborer to entrepreneur to bourgeois in a very short period of time. The Chinese took advantage of the abundance of commercial and industrial opportunities until finally they were active in almost every sector of the economy. Because of their large numbers, they gained substantial power over the economy of Malaysia.

Some of the methods and principles used by the Chinese to seek their fortunes still characterize their society today. A Chinese business was usually a family enterprise and beyond that the Chinese was tied to his clan and race. Because of this, the Chinese would usually not permit non-Chinese into their business concerns unless it was completely unavoidable. This resulted in a situation where nearly all retailing outlets were owned by Chinese and controlled by Chinese communal guilds and Chambers of Commerce, which in turn excluded all other races from successfully competing with the Chinese businesses.[8]

III. THE MALAYSIAN CHINESE CULTURE

The development of a Malaysian Chinese culture and the changes which have taken place within that culture have had less to do with the development of pluralism in Malaysia's society than either the Chinese migration or economic development, yet they have had a very significant effect on Chinese politicization and national and political integration.

By the later stages of colonialism, many of the Chinese who had come to Malaya to make their fortunes and hopefully return to their homeland had developed deep roots and a sense of security in Malaya.

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[8]Mohammad, op. cit., pp. 53-57.

Thus they decided to make Malaya their home. There are three possible reasons for the Chinese remaining in Malaya. First, there was the conflict between the Chinese and the Japanese at the end of the nineteenth century. Second, during the same period economic and social conditions in China were rapidly deteriorating. These events likely forced Malaysian Chinese to have second thoughts about returning home. Third, Chinese society in Malaya had been affected by the economic success of the Europeans and Chinese. Though some of the Chinese made the journey back to China and some had their remains returned for burial alongside their ancestors, the dream of returning to China had ceased to exist for the most part by the time the Second World War began.[9] The longer they remained in Malaya and the more settled they became, the more likely it was that their culture would change.

With each generation that was born in Malaya, the ties with the ancestoral homeland grew weaker. Because of poor communications in the early periods of colonialism, the migrants were unable to keep up with the cultural changes that were taking place in their homeland. Thus, they fell into the pattern of dropping those portions of their culture that were not necessary for survival in their new country. Furthermore, Wolfrom Eberhard concludes that many of the Chinese migrants, especially those in the last group to migrate to Malaya, did not bring the "total of their culture" with them.[10]

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[9]"For the Overseas Chinese, a Return to the Good Life," Far Eastern Economic Review, LXXV, no. 3 (January 1969), 14-15.

[10]Wolfrom Eberhard, "The Cultural Baggage of the Chinese Emigrants: Stories and Novels Read by Chinese Students in Malaya," Asian Survey, XI, no. 5 (May 1971), 461.

that the Chinese were growing in numbers more rapidly than they were. This feeling of the Malays served to enhance the fears, tensions, and suspicions of the Malay sector of the society, thus having a great bearing on the early politicization of the Malays, the form of government which came with independence, and the inclusion in the constitution of the "special rights" for the Malays.

Table 3 indicates two important findings. First, there is no evidence to support the Malay feeling that the Chinese were out-growing them. Second, the Chinese were not transients as the Malays and British had perceived them to be, but rather Chinese that were going to remain in Malay for a long time to come.

Table 3. Racial-Ethnic Composition of Malaya (Excluding Singapore) 1911-1964 (Population in Thousands and Percentages)

Year	Malays		Chinese		Indians		Others	
1911	1,437	53.7%	916	34.2%	267	9.9%	51	2.2%
1921	1,569	54.0%	856	29.4%	439	15.1%	43	1.5%
1931	1,864	49.2%	1,285	33.9%	571	15.1%	68	1.3%
1947	2,428	49.8%	1,885	38.4%	531	10.8%	65	1.8%
1957	3,125	49.8%	2,334	37.2%	707	11.3%	112	1.8%
1960[a]	3,510	50.0%	2,595	37.0%	785	11.2%	126	1.8%
1964[a]	3,963	50.1%	2,918	36.8%	884	11.2%	153	1.9%

[a]Official estimates.

All figures are rounded.

Source: Gordon P. Means, Malaysian Politics (London: University of London Press, Ltd., 1970), p. 12; Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Malaya (London: Oxford University Press, 1948), Appendix III. Pakistanis and Ceylonese are included in the Indian figures.

Other evidence illustrates that while Malaysia has a high rate of population increase, the birth rate is not the same for the Malay and Chinese sectors of the society. The Chinese births are only 32.5 per 1000 population while the Malay rate is 38 per 1000.[12] The Malay death rate is just slightly higher than that of the Chinese but not enough to give the Chinese a higher rate of increase in population.

The breakdown of the plural society of Malaya by race and state depicts the difficulty involved in attempting national and political integration. This same breakdown when related to the cultural and economic compartmentalization of the Chinese sector of the plural society gives some idea of the problem that the Chinese face in developing national political institutions (see Table 4). Though Table 4 does not depict it, the racial compartmentalization goes deeper than the state, i.e., the urban and rural sectors contain overwhelming majorities of one race or the other.

Ninety percent of the Chinese of Malaya live in the eight states of the west coast along with 70 percent of the Malays. The Chinese are concentrated in the cities and urban areas while the Malays are located on the fringes of the cities and in the rural areas. Only 10 percent of the Chinese and 30 percent of the Malays live in the three states on the east coast. All of the important trade centers, ports, and usually the State capitals are predominantly Chinese. Approximately 75 percent of the Chinese live in the cities, towns, and villages of

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[12]Willard A. Hanna, "Family Planning in Malaysia: Programs and Prospects," American Universities Field Staff Reports, XIX, No. 6 (Hanover, N.H.: American Universities Field Staff Reports, Inc., January 1971), 3.

Table 4. Western Malaysia's Population Distribution by Race and State[a]

State	Population	Percent		
		Malays	Chinese	Other[b]
Johore	1,216,754	48	42	10
Kedah	873,568	68	17	15
Kelantan	636,812	90	9	1
Malacca	384,371	49	41	10
Negri Sembilan	480,395	42	41	17
Pahang	399,275	57	35	8
Penang	714,423	9	90	1
Perak	1,547,990	40	44	16
Perlis	111,876	78	15	7
Selangor	1,317,046	29	48	23
Trengganu	356,530	90	9	1
Total	9,250,000	50	35	15

[a]Malaysia's total population is 10,650,000 (1965 estimate). The percentage figures for the Chinese in Kedah, Kelantan, and Trengganu are estimates as are those for the Malays in Penang, and the "Others" in Kedah, Kelantan, Penang and Trengganu.

[b]Others includes Indians, Pakistanis, Ceylonese, and Europeans.

Source: Encyclopedia Brittanica (Chicago: William Benton, Publisher, 1971). Vols. XVII, 61, 548, 591, 630; XIV, 658; XIII, 55, 267, 271; XX, 179; XXII, 214; XIV, 187.

1000 or more. Even in those cities where the Chinese are not in the majority it appears that they are because they seem to be everywhere and are so active in the day to day activities of the city or town.[13] Wherever the Chinese are located, such as the west coast states and cities, the area is much more densely populated, more industrialized, and more active commercially. The east coast states appear retarded by comparison. There is some deviation from this pattern, however, for all Chinese do not necessarily live in the urban areas nor has their location always been self-imposed.

Some of the Chinese are farmers and fishermen, while others work in the tin mines located mainly in the rural areas, and some are plantation workers. An extreme example is the state of Johore where 79 percent of the rural population is Chinese.[14] Not all of those that live in the rural villages have always had a say in where they lived. As a result of the predominantly Chinese guerrilla action in the jungles during the "emergency," and the fact that the rural Chinese rendered support to the guerrillas, many were resettled in "new" villages. They were moved to villages along the roads and rivers which were easier for the British to control. As the towns and villages began to flourish, the Chinese became reluctant to leave them after the "emergency" was over.

By the time the independence movement was approaching success the Chinese population, both in terms of numbers and geographic location, had fairly well stabilized.

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[13] Hanna, "Federation of Malaysia," p. 1.

[14] Ibid., p. 3.

V. EARLY CHINESE POLITICIZATION AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

Chinese migration to Malaysia, the period of colonialism, the development of the economic and cultural sectors of the Malaysian Chinese society, and the movement for independence, all played an important role in the slow process of Chinese politicization and the development of political institutions. But the traditional Chinese views toward government and politics in general hindered the beginning of these two processes of development. The recent dynamic participation in the Malaysian political system represents a change in these views and will likely have an important bearing on the future political stability and democracy of Malaysia.

According to the traditional Chinese view, an ideal government was one which maintained public works and allowed average citizens the opportunity to go their own way in pursuing economic and social interests. This view was a result of the old warlord system of government in China which did not facilitate political participation by the masses.[15] Government was considered a necessary evil by the Chinese masses, primarily for protection and maintaining some form of law and order. According to the traditional Chinese view, government should be run by professionals with special skills, just as any other professionals, and any attempt to seek public support or participation in policy-making was a sign of weakness. The traditional Chinese did not feel that this system of government or any government could be improved upon;

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[15]Means, Malaysian Politics, pp. 32-33.

consequently the Chinese that migrated to Malaya did not concern themselves with the government in Malaya.

In addition to their views on government and politics, the Chinese considered themselves superior to the Malay. Whether this was due to their economic prowess, cultural heritage, educational superiority, or a sense of Chinese nationalism is not known; but it was another reason for leaving the "dirty job" of government to the Malays.

While the job of governing Malaya was in the hands of the Malays and British, the Chinese were generally left to themselves. They developed their societies in a traditional Chinese fashion. Each Chinese community was lead by its own selected leader, called "Kapitan China" by the British.[16] It was through these leaders that the British maintained some form of communication with the Chinese, and control over them. As the Chinese population in Malaya grew, a significant step toward Chinese politicization and the development of political institutions was being taken.

It was during this period, while the Chinese society was growing, that "secret societies" became more prominent. The secret societies were deeply rooted in traditional Chinese society, and the British thought they served a useful purpose by taking care of the social problems of the Chinese community. Extortion rackets, opium smuggling, and prostitution were all a part of the secret societies' activities in Malaya, just as they had been in China. Problems caused by the activities of the secret societies began to mount, however, and

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[16] Ibid., p. 27.

consequently the British gradually strengthened their control over the societies. The effect of this control was to impede, though not intentionally, the politicization of the Chinese.

As migration increased the size of the Chinese population, it also increased the number and variety of secret societies and clans within the Chinese society. Contact between the different Chinese communities was also increasing. As a result, clashes between the clans and secret societies of one community and those of others took place. These clashes eventually led to outlawing of all Chinese societies by the authorities in 1884. This was also due in part to the many illegal activities of the societies, such as the protection rackets and gambling rackets that the societies operated. Many of the secret societies went underground and set up front organizations, thus continuing their existence.

The politicization of the Chinese and the development of their political institutions were strongly influenced by developments in mainland China in the early years of the twentieth century, primarily because of close communal ties, secret societies, and the perceived relevance of the happenings there to their expected return. Though the first real political organizations in Malaysia were formed by the Chinese, they were not concerned with the events in Malaysia at all, but rather with those in China.

Sun Yat-Sen, founder of the Kuomintang Government in China, actually visited Malaya prior to the 1911 revolution in China and actively sought the political and financial support of the Chinese in Malaya. When Sun Yat Sen died and Chiang Kai-Shek became the leader

of the Kuomintang in China, he pronounced all "Overseas Chinese," regardless of where they were born or lived, Chinese citizens forever. This gave rise to Chinese nationalism in Malaysia. Though Communism in Malaysia sought non-Chinese support when the situation made it practical, it was the rise of ethnic nationalism which aided in bringing about the Communist movement in Malaysia. Fu Ta Ching,[17] reportedly a special agent for the Chinese Communist Party, arrived in Singapore in 1925 and began organizing Communist activities within the Kuomintang. The Communists were also operating within the Kuomintang in China; however, when Chiang Kai-Shek purged the Kuomintang of Communists in China in 1927, the Kuomintang duplicated the feat in Malaya. Communist activities began again a year later, under the name of the Nanyang Communist Party. It was headquartered in Singapore and directed Communist activities throughout most of Southeast Asia.

In 1930 the Nanyang Party became the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) with activities centered in Malaya and Thailand. Their activities were concentrated among the Chinese in the labor movements. The MCP was fairly successful in leading labor strikes, which caused the British some embarrassment, yet it was in 1931 that a significant event occurred which further served to unite the Chinese of Malaya. Strong anti-Japanese sentiment developed among the Malayan Chinese when the Japanese captured Manchuria. The MCP became the leader of the anti-Japanese movement in Malaya; consequently when the Japanese

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[17] Frances L. Starner, "Communism in Singapore and Malaysia: A Multifront Struggle," The Communist Revolution in Asia, Robert A. Scalapino, ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969), p. 237.

occupied Malaya in 1941 the MCP underground forces had the support of the Chinese population in Malaya.

During the Japanese occupation the Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA) was formed, having as its core members of the MCP. British concern for their interest in Malaya caused them to equip and train the MPAJA for their fight against the Japanese. This was facilitated by the fact that the Chinese Communist Party had already directed the MCP to drop its anti-colonial campaign against the British in order that the British war effort would not be impeded. With British support and direction, the MPAJA developed into a sizeable and almost entirely Chinese guerrilla force by the end of the war. Since members of the MPAJA had been supported by a large segment of the civilian population (mostly Chinese), a rather large following was created.[18] It was during this war period that the Chinese segment of Malaysia's plural society really began to unite.

As already mentioned, the Chinese had begun to unite to some degree because of China's fight against the Japanese in China; with the spread of Japanese brutality and discrimination against the Chinese of Malaya during the Japanese occupation, Chinese unity increased.[19] There was another factor which also aided Chinese unity even more and helped widen the gap between the Chinese and Malay segments of the plural society. The Malays had all but openly refused to take part in the anti-Japanese movement, usually either collaborating with the Japanese

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[18]Means, op. cit., p. 69. Guerrilla strength was estimated to be between 5,000 to 7,000 members.

[19]Purcell, op. cit., pp. 243-262.

or avoiding any stand at all. This caused resentment of the Malays on the part of the Chinese. Thus, a sense of Chinese nationalism was being developed and the problem of national integration was becoming more pronounced. The Japanese occupation had served as the catalyst needed to spur Chinese politicization.

After the war the British were anxious to deactivate the MPAJA so that its MCP faction would have no military organization to strengthen its political position. The MCP had returned to its prewar anti-colonial campaigning against the British. An agreement was reached with the MCP whereby the MPAJA was to be disbanded and disarmed. Though the MPAJA was disarmed, it retained enough weapons captured and stock-piled during the war to at least begin any future action that it might have planned against the British colonial rule. However, immediately after the war the MCP directed its activities toward the trade unions.

The trade unions became very powerful shortly after the war and were predominantly pro-communist. The colonial government arrested many of the people affiliated with the unions, especially the Chinese. For this reason, the Chinese became wary of having anything to do with the unions and even today are reluctant to become involved with them. Though the unions themselves were considered to be non-political, many of their members were active in politics. They had considerable political influence and most of the leaders were connected in some way with the Socialist Front (i.e., Labour Party and Partai Rakyat).[20]

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[20]The Labour Party is a Chinese left-wing party and the Partai Rakyat, a Malay left-wing party. They formed the Socialist Front, a coalition party.

The MCP organized and controlled most of the 289 unions listed by the Labour Department in 1948. This of course gave the MCP considerable power and made them a source of constant problems for the British colonial rulers. Though the MCP maintained a legal and registered party status, its leadership was not satisfied with the party's progress.

The Chinese leadership of the MCP was impressed by the Communist revolution in China and decided against open political participation in favor of the armed revolutionary approach to the expulsion of the British from Malaya. The revolution by the Communists began in Malaya in 1948. The "Emergency," as it was called, was well under control in 1955, yet it was not officially terminated until 1960. Though the MCP's revolution had ended, it continued to play an important role in the political scene of Malaysia by taking every opportunity to create chaos and violent disturbances, playing on the peoples' emotions, and infiltrating political parties. The MCP tried to recruit Malays but was not too successful; consequently, it remained a predominantly Chinese organization, led by the MPAJA hero, Chin Peng.

The MCP was not the only political organization after the war, for other Chinese began to unite against the Malayan Union proposed by the British. They did so primarily as a result of the Malay protest that was successful in forcing the British to replace the Union with the first Federation. Its constitution included provisions for Malay "special rights." The first significant political organization of the Chinese to appear after the founding of the MCP was the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU). It was considered to be a left-leaning nationalist party, as all the early Chinese political parties were.

This was due in part to the fact that they all sought equal rights for Malays as well as for the Chinese. The MDU was not a Communist organization nor was it intended to be communal in nature. The MDU considered itself the future labor party of Malaya and concerned itself with labor organizations. Because of its left-wing orientation it became a prime target for infiltration by members of the MCP. Concerned about the British proposals for the Malayan Union, the MDU organized the Council for Joint Action, as it was originally known, consisting of eleven parties, both Malay and non-Malay. The Council later became known as the All-Malayan Council of Joint Action (AMCJA). Since the Malay parties that participated in the Council had different interests, they gradually withdrew from the Council until the AMCJA became the first real supporter of purely non-Malay interest. After the "emergency" was declared and the MDU and MCP factions split over the MCP's advocacy of open revolution, the MDU disbanded on June 25, 1948.[21]

The end of the MDU did not mean that the Chinese no longer had political representation other than the now outlawed MCP, for other political parties were beginning to spring up among the Chinese, the most significant of which will be covered later. Political parties which, regardless of their intent, were communal in nature, were also being formed by the Malays and Indians as well. Since the communal party system in Malaysia is not just a Chinese oddity, it appears that it is the primary root of the political integration problem facing the country. If a political party does not appeal to the interest of a

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[21] Means, op. cit., p. 88.

certain ethnic segment of the plural society, or in some cases, appeal to a particular class or regional group within that segment, then that party will lose support of that ethnic segment or group to the party that does appeal to their interest. The important factor here is that Malaysia's society is not only divided rather evenly between two major races with vast differences in cultural views and economic interests, but that the society is also divided politically according to race.

Each of these divisions has its effect on the problems of national integration, political integration, and the development of effective political institutions. Throughout the period discussed in this chapter the trend was away from national integration because of the differences between the Malays and the Chinese in economic, cultural, and political status. The Malays fear the almost complete dominance of the economy by the Chinese, while the Chinese are beginning to fear the control of government by the Malays. Ironically, both the Malays and the Chinese permitted each other to gain their respective positions by remaining indifferent toward that sector of the society in which the other was active. Other factors, such as the Japanese occupation, and the form of government and Malay "special rights," served to create tension and conflict between the Malays and Chinese.

CHAPTER III

FROM THE ALLIANCE TO THE 1969 ELECTIONS

This chapter consists basically of two parts. The first part deals with the rapid development of certain important political institutions during the movement for independence and their successes, failures, and problems in maintaining political stability in Malaysia. The second part concerns itself with the continuity and change of the political parties, especially those with a Chinese bias, which contested the elections of 1969. The character of the issues, the campaign, and the significant events which played an important role in the 1969 elections are included in part two. The first part will include a discussion of the effects the institutions had on Chinese politicization, national integration, and attempts by the Chinese at political integration, and the second part will include a discussion of the effects the parties had on these matters.

I. THE ALLIANCE AND THE ELECTIONS

Chinese politicization, though still rather meager in scope, had become a reality after the Second World War. However, effective Chinese political institutions and political integration had not developed. It was at this point that the most important political development in Malaysia's history began.

As pointed out earlier, the easy defeat of the British in Malaya by the Japanese had demonstrated to the people of Malaya that the British were not all powerful as had been thought. Thus, it was not

a difficult task to organize the movement for independence or the opposition to the British-proposed Malayan Union, especially among the Malays. This organization was on the same plain as the earlier political parties already discussed, that of regionalism and communialism. Consequently, the first concentrated effort against the proposed Malayan Union was by a regional and communal organization, the Peninsular Malay Movement of Johore. The movement spread, however, and Dato Onn bin Ja'afar, the founder of the Johore movement put together the first Malay national party. It was in May, 1946 that the United Malays' National Organization (UMNO) became a reality. The first step had been taken which would lead to Malaysia's most important political event.

The second step was taken in February 1949, when the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) was formed. The Chinese now had an alternative to the communist organization to which they could turn. The MCA elected as its first president the respected Straits Chinese and past president of the short lived AMCJA, Tan Cheng Lock. Since the British were intensely involved in fighting the predominantly Chinese insurgency at the time, they eagerly supported the MCA's activities because of the alternative that it offered the Chinese people of Malaya. Because of British encouragement, the first MCA activities were more social than political. It raised funds for and assisted in the resettlement of the Chinese squatters that the British were moving in order to discourage support of the communist guerrillas. It was not until later that the MCA began its attempt at political integration and began participating in the political process of Malaya.

The MCA joined the United Malays' National Organization in an

ad hoc alliance for their first political adventure in the municipal elections of Kuala Lumpur in 1952. They were successful in defeating the Independence of Malaya Party and decided to try the alliance formula again later in other local elections. They were again successful, and formalized the Alliance Party in 1953. The Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) joined the Alliance as the representative of the Indian segment of the plural society in 1954, thus finalizing the most important political development in Malaysia's history as will become more and more apparent as this study progresses. Since there had been a lack of national integration in the complex plural society, the Alliance Party formula appeared to be the easiest solution to the new independence movement's problem of attaining enough national support, to attain legitimacy and maintain political stability.

There were two problems caused by the complexity of the Malayan plural society which made the Alliance Party necessary. First a purely ethnic-oriented political party in Malaya faced the highly improbable task of winning sufficient votes to attain the majority of seats required to form the national government. Though this is not a mathematically impossible task, it is one very unlikely to be accomplished.[1] This task is complicated even more by the usual regional nature of most ethnically oriented parties and their candidates. Secondly, a completely non-ethnically oriented party faces the task of meeting conflicting demands on issues such as Malay "special rights," religion, and language.

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[1]With approximately 50 percent of the population being Malay the mathematical possibility of a Malay party winning a majority is conceivable.

It would be almost impossible for a national party, which was not ethnically oriented, to win the support of the Chinese community when for example it had acted favorably on a Malay demand which adversely affected the Chinese. The Alliance Party was formed with these problems in mind.

The Alliance Party combined the efforts of political parties, purely ethnic in nature, and appealed to their respective segments of the plural society on a national basis. In addition, and probably more important, was the method by which the Alliance Party attempted to solve the problem of conflicting demands. This method has been called "ambiguous rule."[2]

Ambiguous rule relied on two methods. First, multi-racial harmony was to be maintained by modifying the demands of each ethnic group when possible to preserve inter-ethnic cooperation. If modifying demands was not possible, then a diversion, such as the "Indonesian Confrontation" in 1964 could be used to create a sense of common purpose on the part of all segments of the society, thus making the conflicting demands based on racial issues seem insignificant. It must be remembered that the political culture in which this concept was put into practice was being fundamentally transformed by the introduction of elections.

Elections were relatively new to Malaya. The first elections were the municipal elections of Georgetown, Penang in 1951. The British had planned to build a strong political awareness among the people of Malaya by giving them experience in the electoral process, first at the

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[2]Cynthia Enloe, "Issues and Integration in Malaysia," Pacific Affairs, XLI, No. 3 (Fall 1968), 375.

local level and then at the state level. This was eventually to lead to experienced and well-oiled electoral machinery for national elections. However, four years is a very short time for a complex society such as that of Malaya to develop effective political institutions and undergo national politicization. Consequently, when Malaya held her first national elections, only one party, the Alliance Party, resembled a national political party. The politicization that had occurred was not national but regional and within each ethnic segment of the society.

The first general elections were held in 1955 for seats on the Colonial Legislative Council. These elections were characterized by ethnic and communal politics, just as the first elections were in 1951. There was no internal competition within each ethnic segment of society due primarily to the lack of rolls listing voters according to race. The candidate with a plurality of the votes was elected. The Alliance Party won handsomely in 1955 with 79.6 percent of the vote and 51 of the 52 Legislative Council seats. The lack of internal competition had certainly aided the Alliance cause, but so had the movement for independence which loomed larger than all other issues. The results provided legitimacy for the Alliance Party and aided in forming a sense of political stability. This was the election scene in 1955.

The scene in 1959 was not the same as in 1955. Internal competition within each segment of the plural society had begun, but especially within the Chinese segment. The reason for this change was the the citizenship laws had been liberalized by the "bargain"

made between the MCA and UMNO, which increased the Chinese electorate from 11 percent in 1955 to 34 percent in 1959.[3] This increase in the Chinese electorate allowed the development of more Chinese political institutions, which increased competition for the Chinese vote. Without a successful diversion, such as the drive for independence had provided in 1955, the Alliance Party found it more difficult to gain support, as its concept of modifying the conflicting demands of the plural society was not working as well as expected. However, the Alliance still won 74 of the 104 Parliamentary seats, which gave it a comfortable majority. But in 1959 the Alliance won only 51.8 percent of the vote, as regional opposition parties won a large share of the votes. The vote, however, was split among seven opposition parties, and they were unable to win many seats.

The 1964 elections were a different story. They provide an excellent example of the operation of the diversion concept of the Alliance Party, as the "Indonesian Confrontation" severely threatened Malaysia's independence. The Alliance won a phenomenal 89 Parliamentary seats and a substantial 58.5 percent of the vote. The increasingly politicized electorate recognized the need for strong government, disregarded racial issues, and gave the Alliance the majority of seats needed to form a strong party government. The opposition parties again had to split a large portion of the vote, as seven parties again opposed the Alliance.

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[3] Jean Grossholtz, "Integration Factors in the Malaysian and Philippine Legislatures," Comparative Politics, III, No. 1 (October 1970), 98.

Elections in Malaysia have always been very competitive and the turnout excellent. Since the liberalization of the citizenship laws, it is estimated that some 80 to 90 percent of the electorate is registered to vote.[4] In light of this high percentage of registered voters, it is important to note that 73.3 percent of the electorate voted in 1959 and in 1964 the figure was 78.9 percent. It now becomes obvious that the society had become politicized as evidenced by previous electoral participation, and that political institutions have had varying degrees of success at mobilizing support from the highly politicized plural society.

The early elections made clear certain trends which were developing alongside Malaysian politicization and the development of political institutions. First, the Alliance had been successful in each election and had proven to be the only national political party in Malaysia. There were four major reasons for this success: (1) the Alliance concept, as discussed earlier, had served its purpose by directing attention to "immediate consequences and the problems of implementation,"[5] thus leaving long range goals and intentions uncertain. The movement for independence, the "emergency," and the "Indonesian Confrontation" had provided the necessary diversion, thus enabling the Alliance to avoid action on the issues which might have caused their defeat; (2) the regional and ethnic bias of the opposition political parties did not provide adequate national competition which

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[4] K. J. Ratnam and R. S. Milne, The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964 (Singapore: The University of Malaya Press, 1967), p. 69.

[5] Enloe, op. cit., pp. 372-373.

could defeat the Alliance; (3) the opposition also lacked unity or inter-party cooperation. In most contests opposition votes were split among many different candidates; and (4) the Alliance had won power in 1955, and after independence it controlled the federal government, which enabled it to coerce many voters because of the fear of losing federally financed programs in their area.

The second trend was a trend toward increasing difficulties for the Alliance. The drastic drop in votes for the Alliance Party from 1955 to 1959 was, of course, alarming and even with the large number of seats won in 1964, it was apparent that something was wrong. There was no great increase in votes in 1964; consequently the Alliance had not received overwhelming support from the electorate, but had been successful because of a lack of effective political opposition. So it must be assumed that there was dissatisfaction with the Alliance Party's method of governing, and that the traditional issues of language, education, and Malay "special rights" were still very much in the minds of the electorate, especially within the Chinese segment. A trend of this nature would eventually cause the Alliance Party to lose its legitimacy.

This trend was directly related to the politicization of the plural society and the change which was taking place in the character of the traditional issues. Malaysia's society was beginning to modernize: communications were improving and the economy was expanding; interaction and cooperation between the different segments of society was becoming increasingly necessary. The relevance of the traditional issues to the status of the ethnic groups in the ever-expanding industrial

and technical segments of society became increasingly important. Put simply, the Malays were not improving their economic position in relation to the Chinese, even with their legal advantages; and the Chinese feared that these Malay advantages threatened the continuation of economic dominance. Because of the high degree of politicization in Malaysia, the Alliance could no longer forestall action on the Malay and Chinese demands or modify them in order that each segment of the society would be temporarily satisfied. The Alliance now faced the same demand, economic improvement from each segment of society.

Prior to the 1969 elections the Alliance had handled the issues by refusing to permit them out into the open or by attempting to successfully meet the demands of each segment of the society through legitimate bargaining. As a result, the gap between the ethnic communities widened and tensions began to smolder beneath the surface. Political integration of the Chinese through the MCA into the Alliance Party government had allowed the Alliance, through some compromises on the issues, to maintain the status quo. However, national integration was not taking place, but rather a stronger sense of ethnic nationalism was forming within each segment of society. New political institutions were developing among the non-Malays as well as the Malays, as a result of the dissatisfaction with the Alliance government. With these difficulties and developments in mind, it is now possible to discuss the 1969 issues, campaign, and elections.

II. THE 1969 PARTIES, ISSUES AND CAMPAIGN

Seven major parties took part in the 1969 general and state elections. Two minor parties and a handful of independents also took

part. There was a turn to party affiliation in 1969 as only four Independents competed where eight had done so for Parliament seats in 1964. Only the three Alliance parties, the Pan Malayan Islamic Party (PMIP), and the People's Progressive Party (PPP) had competed in all three past elections. Three new parties entered the 1969 election campaign: Gerakan Ra'ayat Malaysia (GRM), the Democratic Action Party (DAP), and the United Malayan Chinese Association (UMCO). Each party's political and communal orientation can be seen in Table 5.

Table 5. Malaysian Party Political and Communal Orientation

Communal Orientation	Political Orientation: Radical	Centrist	Conservative
Malay	PR, PMIP		UMNO
Inter-Communal	Ex-Socialist Front	Alliance	
Chinese/Indian	LPM, DAP	GRM	MIC, MCA, PPP, UMCO

The Alliance Party is made up of communal parties representing the Malay, Chinese, and Indian segments of society. These parties are linked at the top by a non-communal pact. This, of course, gives it an inter-communal orientation overall, yet places tremendous stress on the communal parties which make up the Alliance. Each communal party has to maintain its respective communities' support in order for the Alliance to successfully compete in an election, yet each party has to

work with the other communal parties in order for the Alliance to successfully govern Malaysia. This tends to make each of the parties in the Alliance take a center of the road stand on the critical racial issues. The Alliance has approached each election with the problems and advantages created by this formula.

The Alliance Party was satisfied to run on its past record in 1969 and did not appear too concerned with the possible results. It had won so easily in previous elections, especially in 1964, that complacency had probably set in. The MCA campaigned primarily for the urban Chinese vote, the MIC campaigned for the Indian labor vote and the UMNO campaigned for the predominantly rural Malay vote. Promises and warnings were a major part of the Alliance campaign--only by re-electing the Alliance could future development programs be successful, stable government and prosperity be continued, and racial harmony be maintained. According to the Alliance candidates, all of this would cease to exist if the opposition was voted into power.

The PMIP was the primary opposition for the UMNO in its battle for the rural and east coast Malay vote. Already the second party in Parliament, the PMIP was strongly anti-Chinese in its doctrine; consequently it was a purely Malay party. It was also strongly anti-Alliance because of the "bargains" which had been made between the UMNO and the MCA. The PMIP campaign centered around its main appeal, religion, and its proclamation that the Malays were the only "true sons of the soil." They advocated a more equal distribution of wealth and a government which looked after the Malays' welfare exclusively.

The PPP was just the opposite of the PMIP, insomuch as it was

constantly airing the grievances of the Chinese and Indians, and protesting the alleged discrimination against the Chinese and Indians by the Alliance. It was also very much a regional party of the state of Perak. The PPP proclaimed that complete equality between the Malays and the non-Malays should be the goal of Malaysia; that the "special rights" of the Malays should be ended; and that multilingualism, not one national language, should be the policy of Malaysia.

The DAP was formed from remnants of Singapore's People's Action Party (PAP) after Singapore withdrew from Malaysia to become an independent state. Though the DAP was a new party in name only, this was its first campaign. The DAP professed to be an inter-communal party, yet it received most of its support from the non-Malay segment of society. It also selected very carefully, as will be seen in the next chapter, the constituencies in which it entered its candidates in order to insure that each had considerable non-Malay support. DAP was the biggest competitor of the MCA for the urban Chinese vote. The reasons for the DAP's obvious lack of Malay support can be seen in its platform. It calls for an end to the distinction between races in Malaysia; social and economic reforms in terms of taxation and labor laws; recognition of the Chinese, Tamil, and English languages; and recognition of foreign university degrees (usually only attained by non-Malays). The whole complexion of the DAP was non-Malay, as evidenced by the fact that its candidates were nearly all non-Malay. So, in reality, the DAP was a non-communal party by proclamation only.

The GRM was also proclaimed to be non-communal; however, it was very much like the DAP, insofar as its platform was concerned and in

terms of the predominantly non-Malay support it received during the campaign. Its platform called for "Equality, Justice, and Equal Opportunity," which was usually interpreted to mean recognition of the Chinese language, moderation of Malay "special rights," and elimination of restrictions on non-Malays.[6] Again, as with the DAP, it is easy to understand why the GRM was an inter-communal party in name only.

The UMCO, a minor conservative Chinese party which put forth a platform built around Chinese grievances, contested only a few seats in Negri Sembilan and had no significant effect on the outcome of the elections.

Only one-half of the Socialist Front competed in the 1969 elections; however, both the left-wing, primarily non-Malay Labour Party and its minor Malay partner, the Party Ra'ayat, entered the campaign. The Labour Party boycotted the elections, but worked hard to persuade others not to vote. The Party Ra'ayat did contest some seats with an agrarian reform program. Its platform was of a radical nature, because it declared its support for the Vietcong, demanded an end to emergency powers and British defense agreements, and a reinstatement of local elections.[7]

It was these nine parties that took part in the campaign and

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[6] David Hawkins and Stuart Drummond, "The Malaysian Elections of 1969: Crisis for the Alliance," World Today, XXV, No. 9 (September 1969), 399.

[7] Ibid., 399n. Local elections were suspended in 1965 because of apparent Alliance opposition success, which limited the Alliance's power and control in certain important cities (e.g., Malacca, Ipoh, and Penang).

elections of 1969, which had a different complexion from past elections for the following reasons: increase in party affiliation provided fewer candidates than before; better organization and selection of constituencies in which to enter candidates by the non-Malay opposition parties enhanced the chances of defeat for the Alliance partners; the lack of a major diversion forced out into the open the critical issues; the character of the issues had changed and left the Alliance Party in a precarious position when it ran on its past record; and, most important, the electoral pacts that had taken place prior to the campaign solidified the non-Malay parties against the Alliance.

The formation of the non-Malay electoral pacts began in December 1968, when the GRM and DAP, who had fought bitterly over the language issue in a by-election in Sudang, were defeated by the MCA with a plurality of the vote.[8] D. R. Seenivasagam of the PPP was a close observer of this event, and though the DAP, GRM, and PPP had attempted to form some sort of electoral agreements before and failed, he was able to bring the three parties together again to discuss the necessity for cooperation on the part of the three parties if each was to be effective during future elections. After considerable discussion, the DAP and GRM came to an agreement on which constituencies each would contest. Each had already agreed to a three-cornered pact with the PPP in Perak, and the pact was formalized in February 1969. From all reports, it did not appear before the campaign that the Alliance had

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[8] Hawkins and Drummond, op. cit., p. 39. The DAP and the GRM received 5,928 and 1,330 votes respectively while the MCA's margin of victory was only 607 votes.

taken this pact or the other changes in the campaign too seriously. However, the preparations by the Alliance's opposition had been going on for months as evidenced by the PPP-DAP-GRM electoral pact; and the campaign was to have significant influence on Chinese politicization and future political integration.

On 20 March 1969, Parliament was dissolved and the announcement was made that 10 May would be the polling day for the General and State Assembly Elections in western Malaysia.[9] This announcement launched the campaign and the same gentleman's agreement was reached between parties as in 1964; irresponsible and unethical electioneering was mutually outlawed, that is, there was to be no incitement of racial tension and outlandish personal attacks were excluded. Although this agreement was to have been binding on all parties concerned with the elections, it did not appear to hinder anyone. Charges and accusations flew back and forth between parties and no one avoided them. The Alliance Party's campaign was formally launched on 30 March by the Tungku and millions of copies of its manifesto were distributed in Kuala Lumpur.

The Alliance began its accusations by charging the PMIP with being anti-Chinese on the one hand and bargaining with the DAP to split the Alliance vote on the other. The Alliance continued its attacks on the PMIP in Kelantan as a part of its all-out effort to regain control of the state government, which was in the hands of the

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[9]The elections in eastern Malaysia were to be staggered from between 10 May and 7 June. State elections in Sabah were not scheduled concurrently with the Parliamentary elections.

PMIP. The Alliance stated that in its twelve years of governing Malaysia the rich upper class had grown, a new large middle class had developed, and that nowhere but in Kelantan, where the PMIP was in power, was there any longer a large poor class. Huge sums of money for development projects were promised by the Alliance if Kelantan would oust the PMIP in favor of the Alliance.[10]

While the Alliance was promising federal aid and financial assistance, which only it was logically able to do, other parties that promised development projects were immediately opposed by the Alliance with the statement that the funds would not be granted to an opposition-controlled state for these projects. The Allinace, which controlled the police, military, radio, television, and press, made use of its position of power in other ways as well. It used state employees and resources for party purposes; imposed strict controls on the mass media to stifle debate on important issues such as unemployment and the economy; and arrested radical politicians in the name of internal security.

Nearly everyone was accused of receiving foreign support which threatened Malaysia's security in one fashion or another. The Alliance claimed that the DAP was Singapore-controlled. The PMIP was accused of importing Thai communists to help it campaign, and one MCA ex-minister was alleged to have been a member of the CIA by the GRM. Although no one was able to escape the wealth of allegations on racism, anti-Malaysianism, foreign influence and financial assistance,

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[10]Hawkins and Drummond, op. cit., p. 400. $M548 in development aid was promised if the state elected the Alliance to power.

these were not the issues which were to determine the outcome of the election.

The non-Malay opposition parties were forced to challenge present government policy and focus their campaigns on the sensitive racial issues. The Alliance government had pleaded with all parties to forego public debate and discussion on these issues, yet when the Alliance refused to discuss the other important political issues such as the economy and unemployment, the opposition parties had to turn to the racial issues. This in fact served to force the government's hand on the issue of unemployment and the economy, for it was easy for the different ethnic segments of society to associate these issues with traditional racial issues which had changed in character.

The higher economic and educational status of the Chinese gave the Malays reason to push for their "special rights" as guaranteed by the constitution and for stricter enforcement of the language and education laws. This would of course enable the Malays to close the gap economically on the Chinese. At the same time, the Chinese easily related to these issues because of the many educated Chinese that were graduating each year and found it difficult to gain employment in the Civil Service because of the Malay "special rights." It was just as easy for them to associate the education and language issues with opportunities for further education and eventual positions in the expanding industrial and technical society of Malaysia.[11] It was this

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[11] James C. Scott, Beliefs of an Elite (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). In an interview with 17 top-ranking Malaysian civil servants with regard to the scarcity of capital materials and resources

last issue that brought about heated debate between the MCA and the non-Malay opposition parties.

The educational issue had assumed a new form long before the campaign and had placed the MCA relationship with the UMNO in the Alliance under severe stress. During late 1967, Chinese guilds and associations had proposed a Chinese-speaking university which the non-Malay opposition parties immediately supported. The majority of the Chinese sentiment seemed to be for this proposal; consequently the MCA submitted counter-proposals which called for the organization of Chinese studies under a new Chinese Studies Department at the University of Malaya and an increase in the funds devoted to them. This proposal was not accepted by the Chinese segment of the society, so another proposal by the MCA was forthcoming. The "Tungku Abdul Rahman College," a pre-university, was proposed by the MCA. This was done in cooperation with the UMNO, which wanted to gradually phase out Chinese and Tamil altogether from the school systems; consequently it opposed the establishment of the "Merdeka University," as its supporters called the Chinese-speaking university. This was an issue used by the Alliance's non-Malay opposition to gain the attention of the Chinese segment of the society, and it was very likely that it had a major effect on election day, for all the non-Malay opposition parties had a more pro-Chinese solution than the UMNO permitted the MCA to put forth. All of the non-Malay opposition parties also had solutions to the language issue which

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for growth, he concluded that "they believe that in the Malaysian society the rewards were fixed in quantity; consequently, men must compete for larger slices of what is."

were quite different from that of the MCA. Everything from no official language to four official languages was proposed. It was the economic aspect, not the cultural aspect of the education and language issues that brought a new segment of the society into the political arena.

The university students would soon be looking for jobs, and the economic outlook was not bright, especially for the Chinese students. Consequently, they took up the non-Malay opposition parties' position on the educational issue. At the same time, many students were attracted to attempts by the Communist Party (underground), and left-wing organizations, to make an issue of the fact that the Alliance Party lacked an ideology. For the first time the Chinese students issued a manifesto during the campaign. The manifesto was distinctly anti-Alliance, and was explained to the public at well-attended meetings.[12]

As the campaign came to a close it was obvious that it had been a loud and tough one with accusations and counter-accusations dominating the scene. The traditional racial issues had become as prominent as ever before. The only questions remaining were: (1) just how relevant to their everyday lives did the Chinese and Malays perceive the government to be? (2) how effective would the non-Malay political institutions be? and (3) was there even a chance that the meager political integration by the MCA could be improved upon? It has already become apparent from the nature of the stands taken by the different segments of the society on the political issues that national integration was a long way from surfacing at this time.

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[12] Jerome R. Bass, "Malaysia: Continuity or Change," Asian Survey, XI, No. 10 (October 1971), 157n.

From all accounts, there did not appear to be any unusual increase in racial tension until just prior to election day. On the evening of 9 May a Labour Party youth, killed on 4 May while painting anti-election slogans on a road, was buried.[13] The youth's funeral consisted of a staged parade with approximately 10,000 persons waving red banners, shouting communist slogans, and taunting the authorities. Tension had begun to mount on the eve of the election.

[13]"The May 13 Tragedy," Report by the National Operations Council (Kuala Lumpur: Government Press, October 1969). The youth had been killed by a policeman when he failed to obey warnings about painting anti-election slogans and attacked the policeman. His body was frozen so that the funeral procession could disrupt the elections.

CHAPTER IV

THE 1969 ELECTIONS

The 1969 Parliamentary and State Assembly election results from western Malaysia demonstrate certain trends in Chinese politicization, national integration, political integration, and the development of political institutions. Important overtones are found in these trends for future political stability and democracy in Malaysia. Generally, the trends regarding politicization and national integration are only extensions of those trends already found developing in the preceding chapters. However, the 1969 election results indicated changes in political integration and the development of political institutions. In this chapter the trends are developed by examining the elections.

First the results of voter turnout in the Parliamentary and State elections are examined. Here it is demonstrated that a high degree of politicization has taken place in the Malaysian society, especially among the Chinese.

Second the Parliamentary results are examined. Several important conclusions are developed: (a) Alliance losses in terms of votes and seats indicate that both the Malays and Chinese were dissatisfied with the Alliance method of governing; (b) better Chinese political integration which has lessened the complexity of the plural society and a continued lack of national integration as evidenced in the ethnic distribution of seats and votes; (c) dissatisfaction of the Chinese with the Alliance government, the effectiveness of the new political institutions, and the polarization of the Malaysian society which was

defeating attempts at national integration, was made obvious by the predominantly two-party contest between the MCA and opposition parties; and (d) the urban, quasi-urban, and rural voting patterns further demonstrate the lack of national integration and the fact that Chinese national unity is not only a reality, but has lessened the complexity of the plural society.

Third, the State Assembly election results are examined. An analysis of seats won and lost in each state by the MCA and its non-Malay competitors shows a high degree of politicization, a lack of national integration, better political integration within the state governments, and the development of effective non-Malay political institutions.

I. THE TURNOUT

On 10 May 1969, the Parliamentary and State Assembly elections were held in western Malaysia without serious incident.[1] There was also a decline in the turnout of the electorate from that in 1964. At first glance this decline appears to contradict the assertion that Malaysian and especially Chinese politicization was nearly complete. However, when a developing democratic society has a registration of 80 to 90 percent of the eligible voters and 70 percent of those registered vote as they did in Malaysia in 1969, it is obvious that politicization is a reality in that society.

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[1] Stuart Drummond and David Hawkins, "The Malaysian Elections of 1969: An Analysis of the Campaign and the Results," Asian Survey, X, No. 4 (April 1970), 328. Some minor incidents occurred, such as

Many reasons have been given for the decline in turnout, but the most commonly expressed theory does not appear to account for all the abstentions. The lack of a major national issue, such as the very concept of Malaysia and its survival during the 1964 "Indonesian Confrontation" likely accounted for part of the 6.1 percent decline.[2] The Labour Party's call for a boycott probably met with some success in the southern and western states, yet the general feeling appeared to be that it accounted for very little of the decline in turnout.[3] Both of these factors probably accounted for some of the decline, but there were other factors that appear to have been important too.

First there was a decline in the number of Parliamentary seats contested by the Alliance Party's opposition in 1969. In 1964 there had been only two seats for which the Alliance Party had no opposition, both in Johore. In 1969 there were nine unopposed seats for the Alliance and one seat in Malacca for which no voting took place due to the death of an Alliance candidate just prior to the elections. An excellent example of how the lack of contested seats may have contributed to the decline in turnout was Johore where five Alliance Party candidates ran unopposed

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Labour Party youths trying to stop the ballot boxes from moving to the counting center in Kuala Lumpur, and a few PMIP and Alliance workers having a brief encounter in Kelantan.

[2]Drummond and Hawkins, loc. cit.

[3]K. J. Ratnam and R. S. Milne, "The 1969 Parliamentary Election in West Malaysia," Pacific Affairs, XLIII, No. 2 (Summer 1970), 211. The authors argue very effectively that probably only one of ten voters abstained because of the Labour Party's call for a boycott. Also Drummond and Hawkins, loc. cit. Here it is tentatively concluded that perhaps as much as 3 percent of the electorate followed the Labour Party instructions in the south and west.

in 1969. The Parliamentary turnout dropped 9.3 percent from that of 1964, yet the State Assembly polls showed an actual increase over 1964 of approximately 9 percent. If this is the major reason for the decline in turnout then it is likely that the level of politicization in Malaysia has not decreased.

Another reason could have been that those Malays and non-Malays who were strongly anti-Alliance were faced with the non-Malay party pact between the PPP, DAP, and GRM. In a predominantly Chinese constituency, there may have been no Malay candidate--only candidates from the MCA or PPP-DAP-GRM. If a Malay voter was strongly dissatisfied with the Alliance Party government, yet maintained a strong sense of Malay nationalism, he would not likely have voted for either of the Chinese candidates. This of course does not mean that politicization decreased, but rather that a stronger sense of ethnic nationalism and dissatisfaction with the Alliance prevailed. Politicization of this portion of society was evidenced by a strong desire not to aid the political cause of another ethnic segment of society, and at the same time a refusal to support the government for which a strong feeling of dissatisfaction existed.

The last reason is the rise of the age-old feeling of apathy and complacency which does not necessarily constitute a decrease in politicization. Previous strong party showings in certain areas may have resulted in a feeling of indifference, or a "why vote, they'll win anyway" attitude. This could very well have been the case in Johore, Kelantan, and Pahang, where one party usually dominated the elections. This means that some of the electorate just did not take the time to

vote, not that they perceived the government as irrelevant to their everyday lives.

Regardless of the reasons for the decline in turnout, Chinese politicization in Malaysia appeared to have been on the rise in 1969. In five of the seven states where Chinese make up over 40 percent of the population, there was an increase in turnout from 1964 for the State Assembly elections. A very good example was in Penang, where approximately 90 percent of the population is Chinese. In 1969 the turnout was 85.5 percent as compared to 83.5 percent in 1964. This high degree of turnout definitely suggests a high degree of politicization on the part of the Chinese. The reasons for this kind of increase in turnout at the state level will be discussed later in this chapter.

None of the reasons for the decline in overall turnout for 1969 really reflected a decrease in politicization of the Malaysian society, especially in light of the high percent of turnout (72.8). This leads one to believe that Malaysians do perceive their government as relevant to their everyday existence and that they have chosen to participate in the electoral process rather than ignore or fight against it. This appears to be especially true of the Chinese, and it is this fact that will play an increasingly important role in Malaysia's political system if political stability and democracy continue.

II. THE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS

The ruling Alliance Party maintained its majority in Parliament even though it lost a considerable number of seats that it had formerly held. While the Alliance won 89 seats in 1964, it won only 66 seats

in 1969, of which 9 were uncontested.[4] The seat that was undecided in Malacca lowered the total number of contested seats to 94 (Table 6). The Alliance was opposed in 102 constituencies in 1964 and won 85 percent of them, yet it could manage to win only 60 percent of the 94 contested seats in 1969. Though all three Alliance partners, the UMNO, MCA, and MIC, lost seats, it was the MCA that took the defeat hardest, so hard in fact that Tun Tan Siew Sin, national president of the MCA, announced the withdrawal of the MCA from the government on 14 May.[5] A closer look at the picture in each state shows that dissatisfaction with Alliance government was widespread throughout the country; and that the opponents of the Alliance, particularly the Chinese, had built effective political institutions.

In 1964 the Alliance won all 46 Parliamentary seats in the states of Johore, Kedah, Malacca, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, and Perlis. In 1969 seven of those seats were lost, of which four were in the states of Malacca and Negri Sembilan. Forty-one percent of the population of each of these states was Chinese. In the remaining four states (Penang, Perak, Selangor, and Trengganu), the Alliance in 1964 had won the majority of the Parliamentary seats (41 of 48). Seventeen of these seats were lost in 1969 and all but one of the losses were in states with a Chinese population ranging from 44 percent to 90 percent. Just as damaging to the Alliance Party as the loss of seats was the fact that

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[4] Five seats in Johore, two in Pahang, and one each in Negri Sembilan and Penang.

[5] Straits Times (Singapore), May 14, 1969, p. 1.

Table 6. Parliamentary Results by State and Party, Depicting Seats Won and Percent of Vote for 1964 and 1969

State and Number of Seats	Alliance		PMIP		GRM[a]		DAP[b]		PPP		PR[c]		Ind.		UMCO		Total % Turnout	
	1964	1969	1964	1969	1964	1969	1964	1969	1964	1969	1964	1969	1964	1969	1964	1969	1964	1969
Johore (16)																		
Number	16	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent	71.7	67.6	1.4	4.0	3.7	4.2	.9	21.5	--	--	22.1	--	--	--	--	--	80.9	71.6
Kedah (12)																		
Number	12	9	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent	68.6	53.4	25.1	41.1	1.6	5.5	--	--	--	--	4.7	--	--	--	--	--	76.4	75.6
Kelantan (10)																		
Number	2	4	8	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent	42.9	47.5	56.9	52.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	.2	--	--	.1	--	--	80.1	74.6
Malacca (4)																		
Number	4	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent	66.2	45.2	3.7	18.4	--	--	3.3	22.7	--	--	26.8	13.7	--	--	--	--	84.2	76.8
Negri Sembilan (6)																		
Number	6	3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent	59.3	46.4	--	16.3	9.8	--	4.6	35.5	1.4	--	22.7	--	2.2	--	--	1.8	80.0	74.5
Pahang (6)																		
Number	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent	71.1	60.8	10.8	24.4	--	--	--	--	--	--	18.1	14.8	--	--	--	--	77.6	71.0
Penang (8)																		
Number	6	2	0	0	1	5	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent	47.3	36.9	2.7	7.4	18.0	44.4	.3	11.0	--	.4	31.7	--	--	--	--	--	83.5	77.5
Perak (20)																		
Number	18	9	0	1	0	1	0	5	2	4	0	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent	55.6	43.2	10.5	17.9	6.5	3.7	--	16.1	16.6	18.8	8.3	--	2.5	.3	--	--	79.5	72.3
Perlis (2)																		
Number	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent	63.2	51.2	36.7	42.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	6.7	--	--	--	--	81.6	80.2
Selangor (14)																		
Number	12	9	0	0	0	2	1	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent	53.9	43.8	2.4	7.3	--	17.5	11.0	31.4	.9	--	31.8	--	--	--	--	--	73.3	65.8
Trengganu (6)																		
Number	5	4	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent	56.5	50.0	32.1	50.0	--	--	--	--	--	--	4.5	--	6.9*	--	--	--	77.4	75.5
Total (104)																		
Number	89	66	9	12	1	8	1	13	2	4	2	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent	58.5	48.4	14.6	23.8	4.3	8.6	2.0	13.7	3.4	3.9	16.1	1.2	1.1*	.3	--	.1	78.9	72.8

Source: 1969 figures were computed from results published in Straits Times, 12 May 1969; 1964 figures were taken from K. J. Ratnam and R. S. Milne, The Malayan Parliamentary Elections of 1964 (Singapore: The University of Malaya Press, 1967).

Note: Figures include unopposed seats in Seats Won column, but percentages are for opposed seats only. Opposition contested 94 seats only.

[a]Considered to be the UDP for the 1964 elections.

[b]Considered to be the PAP for the 1964 elections.

[c]PR was a partner to the Labour Party, in the Socialist Front, for 1964.

*Includes insignificant third parties in 1964.

for the first time, because of its poor showing in terms of votes won, its legitimacy was in doubt.

In 1969 the Alliance managed to win only 48.4 percent of the vote. In other words, its popular vote was down 10.1 percent from 1964; the percent of the popular vote it won decreased in every state but one. The Alliance had won over 70 percent of the vote in two states in 1964, over 60 percent in three more states, and over 50 percent in four others. Only Penang and Kelantan had failed to provide the Alliance with more than 50 percent of the vote in 1964, yet in 1969 only Johore and Pahang provided the Alliance with more than 60 percent of the vote, while Perlis, Trengganu, and Kedah were the only other states to provide it with better than 50 percent of the vote.

None of the states with large Chinese electorates gave the Alliance Party more than 46.4 percent of the vote. Also for the first time a single non-Malay party had received more of the popular vote than the MCA; the DAP received 13.7 percent of the vote to the MCA's 13.0 percent. More important, however, was the fact that the PPP-DAP-GRM electoral pact provided those parties with 26.2 percent of the vote in 1969, while their counterparts in 1964 had managed to obtain only 9.7 percent of the vote, without an electoral pact of any kind (see Table 7).

The effectiveness of the PPP-DAP-GRM electoral pact is also apparent in the ratio of seats won to the number of candidates entered in the Parliamentary race. In 1964, without an electoral pact, the PPP-UDP-PAP won only 4 of 47 contests, while in 1969 their counterparts, the PPP-DAP-GRM, won 25 of 43 contests. The MCA's losses were just as

Table 7. Parliamentary Seats Contested, Won, and the Percent of Vote by Party for 1964 and 1969 (Number of Candidates in Parentheses)

Party	104 Seats 1964		Percent Vote	104 Seats 1969		Percent Vote
Alliance	89	(104)	58.5	66	(104)	48.4
UMNO	59	(68)	38.4	51	(68)	34.2
MCA	27	(33)	18.6	13	(33)	13.0
MIC	3	(3)	1.5	2	(3)	1.2
PMIP	9	(53)	14.6	12	(62)	23.8
GRM/UDP[a]	1	(27)	4.3	8	(13)	8.6
DAP/PAP[b]	1	(11)	2.0	13	(24)	13.7
PPP	2	(9)	3.4	4	(6)	3.9
SF/PR[c]	2	(63)	16.1	0	(6)	1.2
UMCO	D.N.C.[d]			0	(3)	*
Independents	0	(12)[e]	1.1	0	(4)	.3
Total	104	(279)	100.0	103[f]	(222)	100.0

[a]UDP is considered the predecessor to the GRM.

[b]PAP is considered the predecessor to the DAP.

[c]PR was a partner with the Labour Party in the Socialist Front for 1964.

[d]D.N.C.--did not contest.

[e]Includes other minor parties.

[f]One seat in Malacca was undecided due to the death of a candidate.

*Less than .1 percent.

Source: Martin Rudner, "The Malaysian General Election of 1969: A Political Analysis," Modern Asian Studies, IV, No. 1 (1970), 13. The figures for number of candidates and seats won were taken from this article. Percentages of vote was taken from Straits Times, 12 May 1969.

significant as their opponents' gains. The Alliance entered the same number of candidates for each of its member parties in 1969 as it did in 1964; and while each party lost seats and votes, it was the MCA loss of seats that had the most profound effect. The MCA had won 27 of the 33 seats it contested in 1964, but was able to win only 13 seats in 1969. Considering that three of the MCA's candidates were returned unopposed, the picture appears even darker. This meant that the MCA won only one-third of its contests with the opposition, while in 1964 it had won more than 80 percent.

It appears safe to assume at this point that the failure of the Alliance to meet the conflicting demands of Malaysia's plural society had caused dissatisfaction in a majority of each ethnic segment of that society. The method the Alliance had worked out for retaining power and handling the important issues appeared to have antagonized both the Malays and Chinese. However, it was the Chinese who finally formed a well organized national opposition to the Alliance. The effectiveness of the new opposition placed the Alliance in a precarious position. It no longer had an effective non-Malay political partner of national prominence.

No sooner had the election results been posted than it became apparent that Chinese political integration had not only increased but also taken a swing toward a more radical position. A brief glance at the ethnic distribution of Parliamentary seats by race and party tends to bear out this observation. As can be seen in Table 8, the MCA no longer constitutes a majority of the Chinese representation in Parliament. The PPP-DAP-GRM now hold custody of the Chinese and Indian

Table 8. Election Results by Seats, Community and Party, 1969

Party	Malays	Chinese	Indians	Total
UMNO	51	--	--	51
MCA	--	13	--	13
MIC	--	--	2	2
PMIP	12	--	--	12
DAP	--	10	3	13
GRM	1	4	3	8
PPP	--	2	2	4
Total	64	29	10	103

Source: Martin Rudner, "The Malaysian General Election of 1969: A Political Analysis," Modern Asian Studies, IV, No. 1 (1970), 13.

interest in Parliament. The Alliance non-Malay representation by the MCA and MIC had dropped to only 15 in 1969 while the DAP-PPP-GRM had a total of 24 seats (16 Chinese and 8 Indian). It was apparent that the Alliance Party could no longer claim to represent each ethnic groups' interest, however, the UMNO had remained the representative of Malay interest, even though the PMIP had gained three more seats than in 1964.

The turn away from the MCA accomplished two things: it demonstrated that the non-Malay segment of society was dissatisfied with the Alliance method of governing, and that political integration was no longer a tool to be used by the UMNO as a trade-off for economic privileges from the Chinese. These accomplishments certainly added to the problems of the Alliance Party. It did not appear that the new, more radical Chinese political institutions now representing Chinese interest would be as cooperative as the MCA had been because of these stands on the critical issues. Thus, the conflicting demands of society

may not be as easily modified or avoided in the future. Just as obvious was the fact that national integration was fast slipping from Malaysia's grasp.

The lack of national integration and the ever-widening gap between the Malay and Chinese segments of Malaysia's plural society is illustrated in Table 9.[6] The Alliance Party's inability to

Table 9. The Ethnic Distribution of Votes by Party for 1969 by Percent

Party	Percent Malay Vote	Percent Non-Malay Vote	Percent Total Vote
UMNO	41.4	23.0	33.7
MCA	11.4	16.4	13.5
MIC	1.4	1.0	1.2
Alliance Total	54.2	40.4	48.4
PMIP	40.2	1.0	23.8
DAP	2.0	30.0	13.7
GRM	1.9	17.8	8.6
PPP	0.5	8.6	3.9
PR	0.7	2.0	1.2
UMCO	---	0.2	0.1
IND.	0.5	---	0.3
Opposition Total	45.8	59.6	51.6

Source: K. J. Ratnam and R. S. Milne, "The 1969 Parliamentary Election in West Malaysia," Pacific Affairs, XLIII, No. 2 (Summer 1970), 2.

effectively handle the conflicting demands of the plural society is reflected by the large amount of support received by each of the anti-Alliance political parties from its respective segment of society. The

[6] Ratnam and Milne, op. cit., pp. 217-220. The authors presented a logical formula for computing the ethnic distribution of the vote.

PMIP, a strongly anti-Alliance, anti-Chinese party, received 40.2 percent of the Malay vote. In comparison, the PPP-DAP-GRM, which was strongly anti-Alliance and expressed extreme dissatisfaction with Malay "special rights," received 57.4 percent of the non-Malay vote. The important fact here is that each ethnic segment of the society was supporting political institutions which were at opposite ends of Malaysia's political spectrum. This, of course, left the Alliance in the middle, still facing the dilemma of how to maintain harmony, political stability, democracy, and political power at the same time.

Table 9 suggests that Malaysian society may be even more divided than we have so far indicated. First it shows that the UMNO won more Chinese votes than the MCA. Since there was little opposition from non-Malay parties in the majority of the constituencies where the UMNO ran, many non-Malay votes there went to Alliance candidates rather than to other Malay candidates, such as those of the PMIP.[7] Secondly, by subtracting the Indian vote from the non-Malay vote, the MCA won more Malay votes than Chinese votes.[8] Since there was little opposition from Malay parties in the constituencies where the MCA ran, many Malay votes there went to the Alliance rather than to Chinese candidates from parties such as the PPP-DAP-GRM. These figures suggest that

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[7]More than 75 percent of the UMNO non-Malay vote came from constituencies in this category. There were possible exceptions in places like Kelantan where some Chinese have possibly lived in harmony with Malays under the PMIP state government and have not been discriminated against, consequently, there is a chance that they may have voted for the PMIP.

[8]Ratnam and Milne, op. cit., p. 221. By deducting the Indian component of the non-Malay vote, the Chinese would be less than the Malay vote (Malay vote: 138,016; Chinese vote: 117,655).

even more dissatisfaction might have been expressed by each segment of the society in many cases had there been a more suitable choice of candidates. This of course would have served to further widen the gap between the Chinese and Malays.

The dissatisfaction of the non-Malays, and especially the Chinese, with the Alliance is not clearly pictured in Table 9 either. The DAP and GRM each received more of the non-Malay vote than the MCA while running 6 and 16 fewer candidates, respectively, because they were highly selective in their choice of constituencies to contest. Both the DAP and GRM avoided the rural areas where the percentage of Malays was high, as did the MCA. Consequently, the PMIP and UMNO captured approximately 76 percent of the rural vote which included many Chinese voters who might have voted for a non-Malay candidate had the opportunity presented itself.

While it was true that the Alliance lost popularity with both the Malays and non-Malays, the commonly expressed view that the loss was greater among the non-Malays than Malays seemed to be in error. Though 54.2 percent of the Malay electorate supported the Alliance and only 40.4 percent of the non-Malays did so, the loss of vote from 1964 was only 7.9 percent for the non-Malays as compared to 13.0 percent for the Malays. The fact that the PMIP presented eight more candidates in 1969 than in 1964 likely had something to do with this.[9] This does not mean that the MCA was any more popular but that the non-Malays had less opportunity to show their dissatisfaction because of the lack of suitable non-Malay candidates.

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[9] Ibid., p. 220.

Although the lack of suitable candidates of a particular ethnic group and party may have complicated the otherwise clear picture presented by Table 9, page 81, it was obvious that national integration was not close at hand in Malaysia. The Malays as well as the Chinese had demonstrated their dissatisfaction with Alliance Party government policies on the critical racial issues. The results seemed to indicate that Malay and Chinese voters were turning away from the Alliance in opposite directions.

The lack of national integration is further reflected in the ability of political parties in opposition to the Alliance to attract votes on an ethnic basis. This was accomplished in a few cases where the PMIP entered the race in a predominantly non-Malay constituency. It is very likely that the Malay vote which went to the MCA in 1964 went to the PMIP in 1969, as can be seen in the example of Buras (Perak):[10]

1964		1969	
MCA	53%	PPP	41%
UDP	34%	MCA	39%
Ind.	13%	PMIP	20%

This example brings out the importance of presenting ethnically acceptable candidates to each constituency; when this is done racial politics is more prominent than ever in Malaysia. Just as important is the fact that when ethnically acceptable candidates for each segment of society were presented in a constituency, the dissatisfaction of the electorate with the Alliance was very much in evidence.

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[10] Drummond and Hawkins, op. cit., p. 332.

With the fact in mind that the majority of the plural society and especially the Chinese appeared to be dissatisfied with the Alliance Party government, we may now examine just how effective non-Malay opposition parties were in mobilizing this dissent against the MCA. Non-Malay opposition had not been very effective against the MCA in previous elections. The increased effectiveness in 1969 arose first from the way in which the non-Malay opposition parties selected the constituencies in which to enter their candidates. The PPP-DAP-GRM did not contest any seats where the non-Malay portion of the electorate was less than 30 percent and in fact only contested seats in seven constituencies where the non-Malay portion of the electorate was less than 50 percent.[11]

Table 10 shows that there had been some shift in population since 1959. The Chinese were in at least a relative majority in 40 of the 104 constituencies in 1969. In that year the PPP-DAP-GRM

Table 10. Parliamentary Constituencies with Various Racial Majorities for 1959, 1964, and 1969

Category	1959	1964	1969
Malay absolute majority	60	59	60
Malay relative majority	3	3	4
Total Malay majority	63	62	64
Chinese absolute majority	26	32	32
Chinese relative majority	15	10	8
Total Chinese majority	41	42	40
Total seats	104	104	104

Source: Jean Grossholtz, "Integrative Factors in the Malaysian and Philippine Legislatures," Comparative Politics, III, No. 1 (October 1970).

[11] Ratnam and Milne, op. cit., p. 220.

entered 43 candidates for Parliamentary seats. Since it has already been stated that they did not enter candidates in any constituencies where the Chinese segment of the population was less than 30 percent, it appears logical to assume that most, if not all, of the above 40 constituencies were contested by the PPP-DAP-GRM. Because the MCA and MIC contested 33 and 3 seats respectively, and because of their past policies with respect to selecting constituencies in which to enter their candidates, it again appears logical to assume that they also entered candidates in most of the aforementioned constituencies. The fact that the MCA and MIC retained only half of the 30 seats that they had won in 1964 indicates the ever-growing dissatisfaction on the part of the Chinese electorate and the effectiveness of the new anti-Alliance non-Malay political institutions.

The real effectiveness of these political institutions is directly related to the PPP-DAP-GRM electoral pact, which gave them a solid front against the Alliance for the first time, and the fact that the Chinese electorate was dissatisfied with the government of the Alliance Party. Table 11 clearly indicates the lack of support received by the Alliance (MCA) from the majority of the Chinese segment of the society. In straight clashes with the PPP, DAP, or GRM, where there was either no or an insignificant third party vote, the MCA managed to win only 4 of 22 contests. The MCA obtained only approximately 33 percent of the vote in these essentially two-party party fights. As pointed out earlier, it is likely that a good portion of the MCA vote was Malay due to the lack of Malay candidates in such cases. These figures, of course, suggest that very likely the

Table 11. Parliamentary Contest Between the MCA and Various Opposition Parties, 1969

Parties	Total Contest	Won by MCA	Won by Opposition	MCA Vote	Opposition Vote	% of Vote MCA
MCA vs. DAP[a]	15	4	11	142,226	227,850	38.4
MCA vs. DAP[b]	1	1	0	7,882	9,083	46.1
Total	16	5	11	150,048	236,933	38.7
MCA vs. GRM[c]	4	0	4	28,040	78,911	26.1
MCA vs. GRM[d]	2	1	1	19,790	36,404	35.2
Total	6	1	5	47,830	115,315	29.3
MCA vs. PPP[e]	3	0	3	19,640	63,766	23.5
MCA vs. PPP[f]	2	0	1	12,396	32,832	27.4
Total	5	0	4	32,036	96,598	24.8

[a]No third party votes were significant.

[b]Contest with significant third and fourth party vote.

[c]No third party votes were significant.

[d]Contest with significant third and fourth party vote.

[e]No third party votes were significant.

[f]Contest with significant third and fourth party vote. GRM won one contest.

[g]All third and fourth party votes are included in opposition vote.

Source: Figures were computed from results published in Straits Times, 12 May 1969.

MCA position was even weaker and dissatisfaction with the Alliance Party among the Chinese even stronger than previously indicated.

An excellent example of the electoral pact's effectiveness was in Seremban Timor (Negri Sembilan):

1964		1969	
MCA	44%	DAP	60%
PAP	25%	MCA	36%
SF	23%	UMCO	4%
UDP	8%		

Here the MCA had won with a plurality vote in 1964, as it had in six other constituencies; but in 1969 the PPP-DAP-GRM electoral pact enabled the parties opposing the Alliance to take advantage of the strong sentiment against the Alliance. Though the MCA lost only 8 percent of its 1964 vote, it still lost the seat to the DAP in 1969 by a very substantial margin. This scene was repeated many times in 1969; however, the most important aspect of the electoral pact was that it gave the non-Malay opposition to the Alliance the capability to compete effectively for the first time.

All of the non-Malay opposition parties were regional parties with the DAP being strong in the southern states of Johore, Malacca, Negri Sembilan, and Selangor, while the GRM and PPP were strong in Penang and Perak, respectively. By not competing with each other for the same seats, they were able to effectively mass, on an almost nationwide basis, the anti-Alliance vote for the first time. The Alliance was left with the prospect of becoming an almost totally Malay party because of the poor MCA showing. National integration appeared to be a long way off. The plural society was becoming even more distinctly divided.

The distinct division between the Chinese and Malays becomes obvious when the urban,° quasi-urban, and rural election results are examined.[12] All developing states are faced with some form of urban-rural conflict. While not unique in this regard, Malaysia's urban-rural conflict is complicated by the extremely large Chinese population, and as mentioned earlier, the fact that the urban areas are predominantly Chinese while the rural areas are primarily Malay. This becomes apparent when examining which party contested what type of constituency and how each fared in terms of voter support (see Table 12).

The urban areas, six in all, showed a loss of popularity by the MCA and the Alliance among the Chinese. All six urban seats were contested by the MCA, yet it was able to win only one seat and a meager 25.7 percent of the vote. The MCA lost its Bandar Malacca (Malacca) seat to the DAP and its Bukit Bintang (Selangor) seat to the GRM. Both of these losses were by very substantial margins. Not only did the MCA fail to win more than one urban seat, but it failed to gain much support from the largest concentration of Chinese in Malaysia. The fact that only two Malay candidates contested seats in the urban area indicates that these constituencies are predominantly Chinese. This being the case, the gap between Malays and Chinese becomes wider, because the Chinese clearly demonstrated disapproval of the Alliance, which receives the majority of its support from the Malays.

The relative strength of the Malay electorate in the urban

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[12] Ratnam and Milne, op. cit., p. 204. The authors define and list the urban and quasi-urban constituencies.

Table 12. 1969 Parliamentary Seats Contested, Won, and the Percent of Vote According to Party and Urban, Quasi-Urban, or Rural Areas

Party	Urban			Quasi-Urban			Rural		
	Seats Contested[a] (6)	Seats Won[a]	% of Vote[b]	Seats Contested[a] (25)	Seats Won[a]	% of Vote[b]	Seats Contested[a] (73)	Seats Won[a]	% of Vote[b]
UMNO & MIC	0	0	0	12	10	23.6	59	45	44.3
MCA	6	1	25.7	13	4	20.8	14	8	8.9
DAP	2	1	16.1	12	7	28.5	10	5	7.1
GRM	2	2	21.9	7	3	13.8	5	2	4.4
PPP	3	2	32.5	0	0	0	4	2	2.1
UMCO	0	0	0	2	0	.3	0	0	.1
PMIP	1	0	1.1	10	1	10.6	51	11	32.1
PR	1	0	2.7	2	0	2.4	2	0	.5
Ind.	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	.5
Total	(15)	6	100.0	(58)	25	100.0	(149)	73	100.0

Totals in parentheses are total possible seats.

[a]Seats contested and won include unopposed seats.

[b]Percent of vote is based on contested seats only.

Source: Figures computed from results published in the Straits Times, 12 May 1969.

areas can be seen below in Table 13. In the two constituencies where Malay candidates ran, their vote was very insignificant; consequently in those constituencies where there were no Malay candidates, it is not likely that the Malay vote which went for the Alliance (MCA) aided the MCA cause significantly. The overwhelming defeats of the MCA clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of the PPP-DAP-GRM electoral pact and the fact that the Chinese were highly dissatisfied with the Alliance Party.

Table 13. Urban Parliamentary Seats Contested and Won with Votes by Party

Constituency	GRM	DAP	PPP	MCA	PR	PMIP
Tonjong Malim (Perak)	--	7,787	--	7,822	--	1,296
Dato Keramat (Penang)	17,272	--	--	5,635	--	--
Menglembu (Perak)	--	--	29,089	6,818	--	--
Ipoh (Perak)	--	--	23,979	5,231	--	--
Bandar Malacca (Malacca)	--	18,562	--	7,346	4,621	--
Bukit Bintang (Selangor)	18,488	--	--	9,137	--	--
Total	35,760	26,349	53,068	41,989	4,621	1,296

Source: Figures taken from Straits Times, 12 May 1969.

The PPP-DAP-GRM electoral pact was just as effective among the non-Malays, and dissatisfaction was just as prevalent, if not more so, in the quasi-urban sector as in the urban sector of Malaysia's complex plural society. The big difference, of course, was that there was a larger Malay electorate within the quasi-urban sector. However, the voting trend here further united the Malays in one political camp and the Chinese in another.

Although the Alliance won 14 of the 25 quasi-urban seats, this was a loss of 9 seats from 1964.[13] The significant factor here was that for the first time well organized non-Malay parties captured 10 seats. These non-Malay parties had won only two seats in 1964. The MCA ran candidates for 13 seats, which gives some idea as to the number of constituencies with relative non-Malay majorities; however, the MCA won only 3 contested seats and 1 that was uncontested.

Some of the MCA and UMNO wins were by a plurality of the vote, thus providing an even darker picture for the Alliance, when one considers how these contests might have gone. The 14 to 11 advantage in seats enjoyed by the Alliance could just as easily have been reversed in the quasi-urban sector, if the three plurality wins had been two-party contests without the PMIP. A comparison of these contests and the one plurality win by the GRM, in Table 14, clearly indicates the effect that the PMIP had, though it received fewer votes in each instance. Because of the moderate non-communal platform of

Table 14. Quasi-Urban Seats Won with a Plurality Vote

Alliance (MCA)	9,016	Alliance (UMNO)	8,931
GRM	8,543	GRM	6,859
PMIP	7,258	PMIP	4,661
Margin	1.9%	Margin	10.1%
Alliance (UMNO)	8,798	GRM	15,641
PR	7,491	Alliance (MCA)	10,774
PMIP	3,438	PMIP	4,962
Margin	6.5%	Margin	15.5%

Source: Straits Times, 12 May 1969.

[13] Ratnam and Milne, op. cit., p. 206.

the GRM, it was possible that two of the above plurality wins by the Alliance could have gone to the GRM if the PMIP had not entered the race. It is also likely that if either the PR or PMIP had not contested the other seat, it would have gone to the opponent of the Alliance.[14]

The anti-Alliance vote was split between the non-Malay and Malay opposition parties, thus indicating a rather strong feeling of dissatisfaction on the part of the Malays and Chinese. The Chinese were especially anti-Alliance as evidenced by the meager vote received by the MCA in the quasi-urban sector. The MCA received only 20.8 percent of the vote as compared to 22.6 percent in the urban sector, while the DAP, GRM, and UMCO received 42.6 percent of the quasi-urban vote.

A trend appears to be developing in the quasi-urban sector as the number of Malays increases in each constituency. It was rather obvious that the Chinese were voting for the non-Malay opposition parties, but with the increase of the Malay electorate came a higher percentage of the vote for the PMIP. This situation certainly did not appear to be favorable for the Alliance Party or national integration, since the Malay and non-Malay opposition parties were a considerable distance apart on the political spectrum regarding the important racial issues.

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[14]Ratnam and Milne, op. cit., p. 212. Apart from some discrepancies, in the absence of a PMIP candidate some of the opposition Malay vote (probably an average of 5 percent of the total vote cast for the seat) will go to a candidate from a non-Malay opposition party, i.e., DAP, GRM, or PPP. This is in addition to any Malay vote that

The change in the complexity of Malaysia's plural society becomes more obvious when the rural election results are analyzed and compared with the urban and quasi-urban results. The success of the non-Malay opposition parties in the urban and quasi-urban sectors was forcing the Malay political parties into the rural sector for political support. This was especially true of the Alliance, since its Chinese party was unable to cope with the dissatisfaction of the Chinese electorate, which had been so successfully mobilized against it.

Of the 73 rural seats the opposition parties won only 9 in 1964, but managed to win 20 in 1969. This again showed that the anti-Alliance feeling was widespread. The non-Malay opposition parties made their appearance for the first time in the rural constituencies, and this was one reason for the increase in opposition seats. When given the opportunity to vote for a non-Malay party, the rural Chinese and Indians appeared to do so, as evidenced by the nine seats won by the PPP, DAP, and GRM. This combination of non-Malay parties received 13.6 percent of the rural vote while the MCA received only 8.9 percent. The Chinese in the rural constituencies had continued the trend established in the urban and quasi-urban sectors by the Chinese. Some form of national unity was being finalized within the Chinese segment of the society.

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the DAP, GRM, or PPP would receive even if a PMIP candidate had stood for election in that constituency. Using this formula the MCA would lose its plurality win, the GRM would retain its seat easily, and the UMNO would have a very tight race for the other two seats.

Significant among the findings produced by the examination of the urban, quasi-urban, and rural segments of Malaysia's plural society was that the Chinese and Malay segments of that society were not just dissatisfied with the Alliance Party government, but that they were moving further away from one another. The ethnic groups which make up Malaysia's society were no longer internally divided by regional goals and demands which the Alliance Party government could modify and manipulate in order to maintain its power and harmony among the different members of society. The regional divisions within each ethnic group had disappeared and goals and demands had been unified, the result being a polarization of Malaysia's society, with a primarily rural Malay segment and a predominantly Chinese urban segment competing with each other for a larger chunk of the economy through the political process.

The 1969 Parliamentary election results demonstrated a high degree of politicization, a severe lack of national integration, better political integration for the Chinese and other non-Malays, and the development of effective national non-Malay political institutions.

III. THE STATE ELECTIONS

In 1964 the Alliance won over two-thirds of the State Assembly seats in each of the eleven states in western Malaysia except Kelantan, giving the Alliance a total of 240 of the 282 seats possible (see Table 15). The Alliance also captured over 50 percent of the vote in each state except two in 1964--Kelantan and Penang--and only in Kelantan was the Alliance vote less than that of any single opposition party.

Table 15. State Assembly Results by State and Party, Depicting Seats Won, Percent of Vote, and Turnout for 1964 and 1969

State and Number of Seats	Alliance		PMIP		DAP[a]		GRM[b]		PPP		PR[c]		Ind.		UMCO		Total % Turnout	
	1964	1969	1964	1969	1964	1969	1964	1969	1964	1969	1964	1969	1963	1969	1964	1969	1964	1969
Johore																		
Seats Won	32	30	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	D.N.C.	0		
Percent Vote	76.6	65.1	2.3	6.6	.4	18.0	.3	1.9	--	--	23.7	.05	2.5	7.6	--	--	80.6	91.0
Kedah																		
Seats Won	24	14	0	8	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent Vote	67.6	53.1	25.1	41.2	--	--	1.7	5.7	--	--	4.9	--	.7	--	--	--	76.6	75.6
Kelantan																		
Seats Won	9	11	21	19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent Vote	42.9	48.0	56.9	51.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	.3	--	--	80.1	76.7
Malacca																		
Seats Won	18	15	0	0	0	4	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent Vote	65.1	48.0	5.3	17.1	2.6	12.7	--	4.4	--	--	26.7	51.9	.3	1.9	--	--	84.3	97.5
Negri Sembilan																		
Seats Won	24	16	0	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent Vote	57.8	46.2	3.2	10.5	--	36.4	11.5	--	1.9	--	20.7	.7	4.9	4.3	--	1.9	80.1	82.3
Pahang																		
Seats Won	24	20	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	D.N.C.	0		
Percent Vote	68.5	54.1	8.6	15.9	--	1.8	.5	2.1	--	--	18.6	11.4	3.8	14.7	--	--	78.0	84.7
Penang																		
Seats Won	18	4	0	0	0	3	4	16	0	0	2	1	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent Vote	47.2	34.5	2.0	7.0	.5	8.3	17.6	46.8	.3	.3	32.2	1.4	.2	1.7	--	--	83.5	85.5
Perak																		
Seats Won	35	19	0	1	0	6	0	2	5	12	0	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent Vote	54.8	43.5	11.3	18.5	--	9.5	4.6	3.8	20.7	24.6	7.5	--	1.3	.1	--	--	79.5	71.1
Perlis																		
Seats Won	11	11	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent Vote	60.8	53.5	37.3	43.8	--	--	--	--	--	--	1.5	2.7	.4	--	--	--	81.8	78.0
Selangor																		
Seats Won	24	14	0	0	0	9	0	4	0	0	4	0	0	1	D.N.C.	0		
Percent Vote	55.1	41.5	3.4	9.6	5.1	31.0	--	16.5	2.6	--	33.5	--	.3	1.4	--	--	73.3	63.3
Trengganu																		
Seats Won	21	13	3	11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	D.N.C.	0		
Percent Vote	55.2	48.1	32.7	51.1	--	--	--	--	--	--	3.7	--	8.4	.8	--	--	77.4	61.6
Total																		
Seats Won	240	167	25	40	0	31	4	26	5	12	8	3	0	3	D.N.C.	0		
Percent Vote	57.6	47.9	15.2	22.8	.9	11.8	3.9	8.9	4.5	4.8	16.4	1.5	1.5	2.2	--	.1	78.9	76.7

Source: 1969 figures were computed from results published in Straits Times, 12 May 1969; 1964 figures were taken from K. J. Ratnam and R. S. Milne, The Malayan Parliamentary Elections in 1964 (Singapore: The University of Malaya Press, 1967).

Note: Accuracy of figures published in the Straits Times, 12 May 1969, may cause some of the state turnout figures to be slightly in error.

[a] PAP is considered the predecessor to the DAP for comparison.

[b] UDP is considered the predecessor to the GRM for comparison.

[c] The PR and LP made up the Socialist Front in 1964.

After the 1969 elections, the Alliance saw Kelantan remain in the hands of the opposition and two other states fall to opposition majorities. A fourth state election ended in a deadlock. The Alliance found that it had as many as two-thirds of the seats in only 5 of the 11 states. The Alliance managed to return only 167 candidates in 1969 and had as much as 50 percent of the vote in only four states. In three states in 1969 a single opposition party received more votes than the Alliance.

The voting trends were more pronounced in the state elections and accurately portrayed the lack of national integration. The large number of votes received by the opposition, especially in straight party fights with the MCA, served as a notice to the MCA that its role in the Alliance was considered inadequate in terms of meeting the demands of the Chinese segment of society.

By examining the success of the electoral pact between PPP, DAP, and GRM, one can see that the Chinese were not only abandoning the MCA as an instrument of integration, but were also becoming more integrated at the state level by the use of other means. The 1969 state elections also demonstrated the degree of Chinese advancement in the development of their political institutions.

In 1969 the PMIP won 40 State Assembly seats, an increase of 15 seats from 1964. At the same time, the non-Malay opposition (PPP-DAP-GRM) was winning 69 seats, an increase of 60 seats. Most of the PMIP seats were won in the predominantly rural Malay states of Kelantan, Kedah, and Trengganu. The non-Malay opposition won most of its seats in the primarily Chinese states of Penang, Selangor, and

Perak. The trend here demonstrates a serious dissatisfaction with the Alliance government on the part of both the Chinese and Malays. Because of the Alliance Party's failure to meet the conflicting demands of the plural society, each segment of the society was voting for political parties which maintained a strong ethnic bias. Of course, this situation only served to widen the gap between the Chinese and Malays, thus drawing them further away from national integration.

A more drastic turn away from the MCA and toward the more radical non-Malay opposition by the Chinese was definitely a hindrance to national integration in Malaysia. Of the 282 Alliance candidates, 82 were members of the MCA and only 27 of those candidates managed to win contested seats. While the non-Malay opposition was winning 66 of the 104 seats contested in the six Malaysian states where the Chinese make up over 40 percent of the electorate, the MCA was able to win only 19 of the 66 seats it contested in these six states. The MCA also took a severe beating in terms of votes, as the average number of votes received in contested constituencies strongly favored the non-Malay opposition in every state except Johore.[15]

The effectiveness of the predominantly Chinese political institutions can be seen in Table 16. Since the electoral pact did

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[15]The average poll for the MCA and the non-Malay opposition in direct contest by states with over a 40 percent Chinese population:

State	MCA	Opposition
Johore	5,352	3,113
Malacca	2,237	2,831
N. Sembilan	2,078	2,697
Penang	2,412	5,653
Perak	3,782	5,879
Selangor	4,506	6,686

Table 16. State Assembly Contest Between the MCA and Various Opposition Parties, 1969

Parties	Total Contest	Won by MCA	Won by Opposition	MCA Vote	Opposition Vote	% of Vote MCA
MCA vs. DAP[a]	26	6	20	98,097	163,210	37.5
MCA vs. DAP[b]	6	5	1	13,971	17,724	44.0
Total	32	11	21	112,068	180,934	32.2
MCA vs. GRM[c]	18	1	17	54,979	125,041	30.4
MCA vs. GRM[d]	1	0	1	3,088	4,248	42.0
Total	19	1	18	57,885	129,289	30.9
MCA vs. PPP[e]	9	0	9	31,703	84,859	27.1
MCA vs. PPP[f]	4	0	1	9,083	28,386	24.2
Total	13	0	10	40,786	113,245	26.4

All third and fourth party votes are included in opposition votes.

[a]No third party votes were significant.

[b]Third and fourth party vote was significant insomuch as it forced a plurality win or drastically affected the outcome.

[c]No third party votes were significant.

[d]Third and fourth party vote was significant as stated in note b.

[e]No third party votes were significant.

[f]Of these four contested seats, neither the MCA or PPP could win the three that went to the GRM. The GRM vote (21,635) is included in the opposition total.

Source: Figures computed from results published in Straits Times, 12 May 1969.

not appear to formally exist at the state level, the results are even more significant in terms of dissatisfaction of the Chinese and the effectiveness of Chinese political institutions. These factors were evidenced by the overwhelming success of the PPP-DAP-GRM over the MCA in direct confrontations even without the electoral pact. There were 64 such confrontations in 1969, of which the MCA won only 12. Only the PPP failed to win more seats than the MCA in such contests, mainly because the PPP faced the MCA only in Perak, and it was here that the PPP won 10 seats and the MCA none. The high degree of dissatisfaction on the part of the Chinese was demonstrated by the MCA's poor showing in these direct confrontations. Against the DAP, the MCA received only 32.2 percent of the vote; against the GRM, only 30.9 percent; and against the PPP, only 26.4 percent.

In Penang, the GRM won 16 of the 24 State Assembly seats. Thus, for the first time, a single non-Malay (primarily Chinese) political party was in the position to form a state government. A coalition of non-Malay opposition parties was also in a similar position in Perak where the PPP (12 seats), DAP (6 seats), and the GRM (2 seats) had captured half of the 40 seats. However, strong persuasion was needed if the lone PMIP candidate was to join the non-Malay parties in a coalition government.

Selangor saw the Alliance win 14 of the 28 State Assembly seats, yet a possible coalition between the DAP (9 seats), GRM (4 seats), and the lone independent would result in no group being able to form the government.

Though the non-Malay parties were not as successful, they were

nevertheless highly successful in Malacca and Negri Sembilan. Here the non-Malay opposition contested only 22 of the 40 seats, yet they won 13 seats (5 seats in Malacca and 8 seats in Negri Sembilan). Even more significant than seats won was that while contesting only six seats in Malacca, they won 17 percent of the vote. In Negri Sembilan the non-Malay opposition contested 16 seats and received 36 percent of the vote.

The increased politicization of the Chinese had finally paid off in the State Assemblies. Political integration in the states where the majority of the Chinese live had become a strong reality. Chinese political institutions were highly effective in mobilizing the dissatisfaction of the Chinese on a regional basis. However, this had the effect of uniting the Chinese and delaying the possibility of national integration. The effects of the Chinese success in the realm of state politics will become more obvious in the last chapter.

IV. CONCLUSION

The overall picture presented by the 1969 Parliamentary and State Assembly elections is one of questionable political stability within a viable democratic setting. Political stability appears to be further threatened by the high degree of politicization within all ethnic segments of the society, the increased political integration of the Chinese, the more evident lack of national integration, and the development of effective non-Malay political institutions.

The Alliance formula for handling the conflicting demands of Malaysia's plural society served to alienate a good portion of the

society. In dealing with the conflicting demands, the Alliance appears to have been rather biased toward the Malay sector of society (i.e., Malay "special rights"). This situation motivated Chinese politicization and resulted in their viewing the Alliance as a Malay (UMNO) party. Because of this same situation the Malays view the Alliance government as the "UMNO government."[16]

As politicization has apparently increased to a very high level in Malaysia, so have the problems associated with political stability. National integration has become an almost impossible dream, due to the increased politicization and the inability of the Alliance government to meet the conflicting demands of each segment of the society. The gap between the Chinese and Malays was widened during the 1969 elections, as evidenced by the vast Chinese support rendered the non-Malay political parties and the increasing Malay support which was received by the Malay PMIP.

Dissatisfaction with the MCA combined with the more evident politicization of the Chinese aided the development of more effective Chinese political institutions. It became obvious that when a non-Malay was offered a non-Malay candidate other than an MCA candidate, he voted for him. With dissatisfaction with the Alliance a high level, the non-Malay political parties did the obvious; they carefully selected the predominantly Chinese constituencies in which to enter their candidates and agreed not to compete with each other for the same seats.

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[16]Marvin L. Rogers, "Politicization and Political Development in a Rural Malay Community," Asian Survey, IX, No. 12 (December 1969), 926.

The results obtained by the newly effective non-Malay political institutions were outstanding, and a higher degree of political integration was reached, both in Parliament and the State Assemblies. The Alliance was no longer in a position to dominate Chinese representatives in Parliament, nor was it in a position to easily control all of the state governments as in previous years. The Alliance Party government had been weakened. Because of the lack of support received by the MCA, the Alliance had lost part of its broad base of support, thus becoming an almost totally Malay political institution opposed by another Malay political institution which was increasing in strength on one side and a united Chinese political front on the other.

It becomes important at this point to elaborate on a very significant observation regarding previous elections and the trends developed in this chapter. There is a certain similarity between the 1959, 1964, and 1969 elections which gives importance to the apparently new-found Chinese unity and the development of effective political institutions. Although the Alliance won a phenomenal 89 Parliamentary seats in 1964, there appeared to be considerable dissatisfaction on the part of the electorate even then. The Alliance has won no more than 58.8 percent of the vote in each of these elections; consequently, dissatisfaction was present within a relatively large segment of the society during each of these elections. It appears safe to assume that the large number of seats won by the Alliance was not necessarily due to any widespread popularity on their part, but rather to the lack of effective non-Malay political institutions operating on a national scale and the lack of unity within the Chinese segment of the Malaysian plural society.

It was the development of a sense of Chinese unity and effective Chinese political institutions that largely determined the results of the 1969 elections; and it was these results which brought about events that almost ended democracy in Malaysia.

CHAPTER V

THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEMOCRACY IN MALAYSIA

Chinese politicization, national integration, political integration, and the development of effective political institutions underwent changes during the 1969 post election period. These changes have had an important effect on the possibility of political stability and democracy in Malaysia. By outlining the effects of the election aftermath and the significant events which followed we shall try to shed some light on Malaysia's alternatives for the future.

In an attempt to maintain political stability and democracy following the elections of 1969 the Alliance government found itself in a weakened position because of the lack of national integration in a highly politicized society and because of new dynamic and effective non-Malay political institutions which had forced stronger Chinese political integration on the Alliance government. All of this had taken place amidst strong Malay and Chinese expressions of dissatisfaction with the Alliance government and its methods of dealing with the plural societies' conflicting demands. The emergence of a high degree of politicization within the Chinese segment of society, after so many years of political indifference, greatly surprised the Alliance when the election results were posted. For the first time, the Chinese had put together an effective national vote to show their dissatisfaction with government policies on the issues which affected their everyday lives. The important fact here is that the Chinese and Malays perceived the government as relevant to their very existence

because of the racial issues and policies of the government.

Because of the successful politicization of the plural society and the great dissatisfaction expressed at the polls by both Malays and Chinese, calls went out immediately from the non-Malay political opposition to the Alliance asking Prime Minister Rahman to make a full appraisal of and drastic modifications in the government's entire nation-building policy, including such issues as language, economic justice, and political equality.[1] It had become obvious that the Chinese considered the traditional Chinese political institutions to be a failure since the MCA had not properly represented the Chinese.

New and more effective Chinese political institutions were developed to look out for Chinese interests. For the first time the Chinese were offered and accepted an alternative to the perceived ineffectiveness of the MCA.

The losses of the MCA caused concern among the Malay Alliance members; but rather than crumble in the face of a strong non-Malay opposition, the Alliance stood fast. Tengku Rahman stated: "There [will] still be a strong centre government and [I hope] that the Alliance M.P.'s which lost [will] return in 1974."[2] Though the Alliance intended to remain in strong control of the government regardless of the situation, the effectiveness of the new Chinese political institutions was recognized by Deputy Prime Minister Razak when he called for all opposition leaders to work together with the ruling Alliance Party for the good of the country.

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[1] Straits Times, 12 May 1969, p. 5.

[2] Ibid., 13 May 1969, p. 1.

The effectiveness of the new Chinese political institutions became more evident when the president of the MCA, Tun Tan Seiw Sin, announced the withdrawal of the MCA from the Alliance on 14 May.[3] The new Chinese political institutions had been successful in attaining recognition as the new political force of the Malaysian Chinese and in causing the traditional Chinese political institution, the MCA, to reappraise its past performance and stands on issues.

Chinese political integration had become a reality and the Chinese had indicated that they intended to be taken seriously when it came to governing Malaysia. This was especially true in the State Assemblies but also in Parliament, where the Chinese were better represented than ever before. No longer did the Chinese appear to be token representatives in Parliament. However, there appeared to be one flaw in the political integration of the Chinese--with the withdrawal of the MCA from the Alliance government, political integration at the top level of government, such as the cabinet, was nonexistent.

As a result of the 1969 elections, it appears safe to assume that national integration was not taking place in Malaysia. The election results showed an increased polarization between the races as the Alliance formula for bridging the racial differences did not appear to be working. As long as the critical issues like language and education remained traditional, they were not particularly divisive. However, as they took on an economic coloration the picture changed. The demands of the two segments with respect to the critical issues

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[3] Ibid., 14 May 1969, p. 1.

came increasingly to conflict. Thus communal voting became more prevalent than ever and each segment of society began maturing and forming new loyalties, expecially the Chinese.

The problems facing the Alliance Party government immediately after the 1969 elections are well summed up in two of the reasons for the failure of the Alliance given by Dr. Lim Chong Eu, Chief Minister-designate of Penang (GRM):[4]

> (1) The inadequacy of its economic and fiscal policy to promote the well being and welfare of the people; and
> (2) the failure to integrate the various races living in Malaysia into the national community.

This was the situation prior to 13 May 1969, when events began to change the whole complexion of Malaysia's society and demonstrate what course political stability and democracy were to follow in the future.

I. THE AFTERMATH

The racial fears, tensions, and suspicions which had been suppressed for so long were finally released on 13 May 1969. As counter-celebrations were held by the UMNO on 13 May following those held the night before by the Chinese, violence erupted in Selangor. Claims by the government and counter-claims by the Chinese began to fly on the subject of who started the riots. The government claimed that the Chinese communists started them, but later withdrew this claim.[5]

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[4] Ibid., 12 May 1969, p. 10.

[5] "The May 13 Tragedy," p. 27. The government view changed to one of blaming the communists for generating racial tensions to a dangerous pitch and taking advantage of riots; however, they dropped the idea of planned riots by the communists.

Regardless of how or why the riots began, they did in fact take place and the Chinese were the big losers. The government report even indicates this. The majority of the dead, arrested, homeless, and missing listed were Chinese.[6]

The riots seriously threatened democracy in Malaysia: the elections in east Malaysia were cancelled,[7] Parliament and State Assemblies were suspended, and the press was silenced. Some newly elected politicians were reported under arrest. The Yang di-Pertuan Agong issued a proclamation of Emergency on Thursday, 15 May, and under the Territorial Army Ordinance called out volunteers of the Territorial Army. At the same time, under the Malay Regiment Enactment he called out reservists. The Tungku spoke of a "real attempt by disloyal elements to overthrow the government by force of arms and to spread panic throughout the country."[8]

As a result of these events, a National Operations Council (NOC) was formed to run the government and maintain law and order. Abdul Razak, Deputy Prime Minister, was appointed head of the NOC, and an emergency cabinet was formed. MCA officials reversed their earlier decision and joined the emergency cabinet. Apparently the NOC decided to wait out the situation, hoping for tension to relax and tempers to cool, because no policy was formed by the NOC for trying to solve problems that had led to the riots. This strategy failed and riots again broke out on the night of 28 June. Though Chinese were killed

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[6] Ibid., pp. 88-96.

[7] Sabah and Sarawak, loc. cit.

[8] Straits Times, 15 May 1969, p. 1.

in this new outbreak, it was the Indians who bore the brunt of Malay attacks. No real cause was known for the renewed violence; however, rumors were as rampant as they were in May. The NOC chose to suppress these rumors and consequently gave some credibility to them in the eyes of the people.

The new outbreak of violence only strengthened the NOC's determination to rule by decree. At this point only two alternatives appeared open to the NOC: a move to a more authoritative Malay-controlled government, or the difficult alternative of returning to the previous coalition government.[9] The NOC had already received strong pressures from Malay ultras to nationalize industry, thus controlling employment and management. The NOC did not appear ready to jump in this direction since about 90 percent of Malaysian investment capital came from the Chinese.[10] The Malaysian government would apparently have to live with the economic prowess of the Chinese or lose all this capital to Singapore or Hong Kong. If the Chinese capital was lost, then the Malaysian government would have to make up the difference which it could ill afford to do.

As a result of increased tension the NOC finally decided to act. In mid-July a Department of National Unity was established to formulate an ideology which could unite the society. At this point, the talk of Malaysian Nationalism came under attack from the Malay students. On 19 July students from the MARA Institute of Technology

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[9]Derek Davies, "The Racial Balance Sheet," Far Eastern Economic Review, LXV, No. 28 (July 1969), 119.

[10]Ibid., p. 121.

burned an effigy of the Tengku and demanded that he step down as Prime Minister.[11] These students proudly boasted to foreign correspondents that "they were fighting for the survival of their race"; and that "the Chinese must realize that this is not their country."[12]

The Chinese had always assumed that if anyone was going to save them from the wrath of Malay discrimination and violence, it would be the Tengku;[13] consequently, with indications that Abdul Razak might soon step into power, the Chinese communists stepped up their activities. If Abdul Razak came to power, the communists could foresee even more unrest and dissent rising in the Chinese segment of society.[14] They, of course, thought that this would aid their cause. Consequently, with increased frequency the predominantly Chinese communist guerrillas began attacking Army units as well as rural Chinese and Malay villages in the northern states along the Thai border.[15]

The year 1969 ended with Chinese politicization, national integration, political integration, and the development of effective political institutions in a state of flux. Chinese politicization would remain in doubt until it was decided to return to Parliamentary government and hold elections. The likely

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[11] Bob Reece, "The Tengku Rides Again," Far Eastern Economic Review, LXV, No. 32 (August 1969), 321.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid., p. 322.

[14] Abdul Razak did not have the confidence of the Chinese people, nor the rapport that Tengku Rahman did.

[15] Bob Reece, "Chin Peng Strikes Again," Far Eastern Economic Review, LXV, No. 33 (August 1969), 391-392.

assumption of course was that the riots would provide the impetus for stronger Chinese unity and politicization. The 1969 elections had already demonstrated that there was a lack of national integration and a trend toward the polarization of the Malay and Chinese segments of society. Thus, the riots served only to widen the gap between races even further. The suspension of Parliament and the State Assemblies made the increased Chinese political integration resulting from the election appear insignificant. The effectiveness demonstrated by the new Chinese political institutions during the 1969 elections appeared to have been all for naught, because of the suspension of Parliament and the State Assemblies.

The year 1970 began with promises of a return to Parliamentary government when the country was ready to accept it. In order to prepare for this return, a consultative council was established, which included all the opposition parties and various professions. The topic of discussion at its meetings was the "sensitive issues" that had caused the May riots.[16] Parliament remained suspended throughout 1970 and the NOC continued to rule by decree in an attempt to suppress communal issues and promote national unity, while seeking to establish the basic institutions required for a stable Parliamentary democracy.

The problem still had not changed. In order to survive, the Malaysian government had to rely on rural Malay political support and urban Chinese economic prowess, while attempting to either avoid the conflicting issues or meet them in one way or the other. A step

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[16]Sensitive issues are those dealing with special Malay privileges: education, language, religion, and equal rights.

was taken toward the creation of national unity by the announcement of a national ideology, i.e., Rukunegora.[17] It spelled out five principles of national unity: belief in God, loyalty to King and country, upholding the constitution, rule of law, and good behavior and morality. Of the five principles, the one dealing with "upholding the constitution" appeared to be impossible to realize as long as the constitution remained in its present form. It is those items spelled out in the constitution such as national language, national religion, and Malay "special rights" that have caused the Chinese to fear and be suspicious of the Malays. Thus, it is unlikely that the new National Ideology will aid national integration.

There were two other important events which took place in 1970. First, the MCP announced on the anniversary of its founding that the party would bring about a new democratic revolution on a class basis, including the largely Malay rural communities.[18] Second, Tengku Rahman stepped down and was replaced by Tun Abdul Razak on 27 September. A new cabinet was announced and promises of a return to Parliamentary democracy continued. The emergency cabinet provided some Chinese political integration, with three MCA members appointed; however, there were no appointees from the other non-Malay opposition parties.[19]

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[17] Marvin Rogers, "Malaysia/Singapore: Problems and Challenges of the Seventies," Asian Survey, XI, No. 2 (February 1971), 123. Rukunegara is formed by two words: rukun, which means article of faith or fundamental doctrine, and negara, which means state or country.

[18] Article by James P. Sterba, New York Times, 7 March 1972, p. 2.

[19] New York Times, 27 September 1970, p. 27.

In January 1971 the ban on public rallies for election campaigns was lifted to permit electioneering for the Parliamentary seat in Malacca Seletan which was undecided in 1969. The UMNO won rather easily over the PMIP and PR. The turnout was light, yet it appeared that the electorate was taking heed to warnings by Premier Razak: "the country would not return to democratic rule unless a two-thirds majority could be assured and the constitution amended."[20] It was also made clear that the NOC would not be dissolved until after Parliament had reconvened and amended the constitution regarding the "sensitive issues." The amendment would in effect be a ban on public or Parliamentary debate on the issues with respect to Malay "special rights," religion, education, and language. Again, by avoiding these issues the Alliance government hoped to create racial harmony and cooperation.

The amendment to the constitution did not take place prior to the dissolution of the NOC, for the NOC was dissolved on 19 February 1971 and Parliament reconvened the following day. The reason for this was that the Alliance needed only two more seats for the two-thirds majority required to amend the constitution, and when the Sarawak United People's Party (5 seats) and the PMIP (12 seats) decided to favor the amendment, there was little chance the amendment would fail to pass.[21] Shortly thereafter the "sensitive issues" bill was passed over strong protest by the opposition's 33 members of Parliament.

After the return to Parliamentary government and the passage of

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[20] James Morgan, "Smoothing the Way," Far Eastern Economic Review, LXXI, No. 7 (February 1971), 13.

[21] Ibid., p. 13.

the "sensitive issues" amendment, numerous other events took place which had a tremendous effect on the potential for political stability and democracy in Malaysia. First was the almost complete neutralization of the previously effective non-Malay political institutions. The GRM was virtually destroyed in January 1972 when the Chief Minister of Penang, Dr. Lim Chong Eu, brought the GRM into coalition with the Alliance. Dr. Lim had been cooperative with the Alliance at almost every turn, thus alienating much of the leadership within the GRM. After the coalition, the GRM split, with most of the leadership leaving to form the Social Justice Party.[22]

The riots of 13 May 1969 were attributed by the government in part to the communal activities of the DAP and some of its allies. This put the DAP in a bad light, both with the Malays and many Chinese. The Malays considered the DAP to be anti-Malay, and many Chinese wanted nothing to do with a party that might cause them trouble with the government.[23] The DAP began to weaken and only nine of its original members of Parliament remained after defections and resignations occurred. Two prominent Parliament members defected to the MCA and there were many defections within the State Assemblies. All of this left the DAP only a hull of a party.

In April 1972 the Alliance formed a coalition with the PPP in Perak. Though this coalition did not destroy the PPP, it did serve

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[22]James Morgan, "Friendly Opponents," Far Eastern Economic Review, LXXII, No. 16 (April 1972), 10.

[23]James Morgan, "Democratic Defections," Far Eastern Economic Review, LXXII, No. 21 (May 1972), 21.

as a step toward "national consolidation" and strengthening the government.[24] Apparently one of the goals of the PPP was a possible cabinet post, for the PPP was not too much unlike the SUPP in Sarawak, which had accomplished this feat through a coalition with the Alliance.[25] While the PPP remained a strong regional party, there were strong suggestions that a pact between the PMIP, another regional party, and the UMNO was a possibility.[26]

The aforementioned coalitions and the defections by members of the DAP and GRM served three purposes: they tended to make the Alliance more representative of the plural society; they weakened what had been the two strongest and most effective non-Malay opposition parties; they occurred in a fashion whereby the UMNO virtually ignored the MCA and MIC while dealing with the PPP and GRM, thus forcing the two junior partners of the Alliance to seek improvement of their support from the non-Malay segment of society.

The MCA had not regrouped its lost support, and the short-lived Chinese Unity Movement, which was designed to refurbish the MCA's image within the Chinese communities, only served to create clashes between the old and new blood of the MCA. This movement attracted the younger and more extreme elements of the Chinese society, thus conflicting with the moderate cooperative alliance with the UMNO. The MIC split in arguments over leadership. Moreover, the two non-Malay

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[24] Morgan, "Friendly Opponents," p. 10. [25] Ibid.

[26] M. G. G. Pillai, "Redrawing the Battle Lines," Far Eastern Economic Review, LXXII, No. 32 (August 1972), 9.

partners of the Alliance began quarreling among themselves over non-Malay support. As a result of these developments the UMNO began to seek multi-racial support through alliances with the other non-Malay opposition parties. This not only increased the political power base of the UMNO but served to awaken the MCA and MIC. At the same time, it was weakening the other non-Malay opposition parties.[27]

The last significant development which had been taking place all along and requires close observation is the increase in communist activities. The insurgents launched a major campaign to gain favor with the economically depressed rural villages and to recruit Malays for their Chinese dominated forces. The guerrilla forces have become very active in the five northern provinces of Malaysia; re-establishing old supply networks, building training camps, and obtaining newer weapons, such as AK47's and American M-16 rifles.[28] The insurgents were also conducting typical phase one and two activities of an insurgent movement, such as collecting taxes from the remote villagers, spreading communist propaganda, recruiting support and securing sanctuaries, and carrying out hit-and-run terrorist activities.[29]

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[27] Sterba, op. cit., p. 2.

[28] Ibid., also the AK47 rifles are new automatic rifles used by most communist bloc countries and are usually produced in Russia or China. The M-16 automatic rifle is the newest basic weapon of the American infantryman.

[29] Ibid. See also Psychological Operations: U.S. Army Doctrine, Department of the Army Field Manual (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1965), p. 27. The U.S. Army describes the different levels of insurgency as falling into three phases. Phase one involves no major outbreaks of violence, with the movement establishing the base of operations and winning the support of the populace. Phase two is one of

These activities did not compare with those of the "emergency," yet they were real enough to cause concern, especially as they threatened government development projects in the northern states. The communists have had little success elsewhere except where they have infiltrated student organizations. In reference to the increased guerrilla attacks, Prime Minister Razak stated: "It is a real problem and it is getting serious."[30] Curfews had to be established in parts of Perak and over half of the 48,000-man armed forces are involved in putting down this increased activity. Malaysian authorities seem to feel that the new second 5-year plan for development will end the insurgent movement. To quote Deputy Prime Minister, Dr. Ismail: "I think this is really an admission on their part that it is now or never."[31]

The election of 1969, its results, and its aftermath, not only brought on increased communist activity, but also produced changes in Chinese politicization, national integration, political integration, and the development of effective political institutions. These changes have added to the uniqueness of political stability and democracy in Malaysia.

II. THE TRENDS

The three basic questions that this research set out to answer were: (1) to what degree has Chinese political participation increased

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guerrilla warfare against the established authority. Phase three is one of conventional warfare which aims to openly overthrow the established authority.

[30] New York Times, 1 July 1972, p. 36.

[31] Sterba, op. cit., p. 2.

or has Chinese politicization been successful; (2) to what extent have Chinese political institutions developed and to what extent has political and national integration taken place; and (3) what are the consequences of these factors for democracy and political stability in Malaysia. The following evaluation of these factors should give an insight into what to expect from the Malaysian political scene in the near future.

Chinese political participation has increased, although the Chinese were forced into it by unjust citizenship laws, economic discrimination, and social and cultural discrimination. Fears heightened by the brutal treatment of Chinese in other Asian countries increased their awareness of the necessity of organizing and protecting themselves. The Chinese of Malaysia gradually discarded their strong ties and loyalties to mainland China as they became economically entrenched in Malaysia. Though some Chinese did return to mainland China, few could afford to do so, nor were there many willing to sacrifice their economic well-being to return.

At first, Chinese politicization was due to the fear of losing certain aspects of their culture and traditions in Malaysia. However, as citizenship laws were relaxed and the Chinese electorate enlarged, Chinese politicization increased because they perceived the government as relevant to their position in the ever-expanding industrial and technical society of Malaysia. Though a high degree of politicization should provide legitimacy for the government in a developing state, thus providing political stability, just the opposite occurred in Malaysia due to the fact that no ethnic group contained a clear majority

of the population. Consequently each ethnic segment of society has seen the necessity of mass participation in the electoral process in order to prevent domination by the other segment of society. This has generated conflicting demands on the government and a gradual decrease in support from each segment of society.

The Alliance (considered to be synonymous with UMNO) demonstrated during and after the riots in 1969 that it did not intend to relinquish control of the government, regardless of the situation. Consequently, Chinese politicization may suffer from a severe case of apathy in future elections--one will just have to wait and see.

A high degree of politicization in an ethnically balanced and unintegrated plural society such as Malaysia requires a delicate balancing act if conflict, which may result in a violent disruption of democratic society, is to be avoided. This has definitely been the case in Malaysia, as national integration appears to be only a dream. Attempts to integrate the Chinese into the national society of Malaysia are relatively new. No real attempt was made until after independence.

Though efforts are still being made to integrate the Chinese into the nation through such institutions as the Department of National Unity and the National Unity Councils, integration appears to have less and less chance of success. The very nature of Chinese political participation which, especially in 1969, was characterized by communal voting and stands on the "sensitive issues" indicates both their dissatisfaction with the Alliance government and their own sense of ethnic nationalism. This has enhanced the ethnic polarization of the plural society.

It does not appear that the Chinese will ever be integrated in the sense of sharing with the Malays a common language, religion, culture, or economic status. Nevertheless, because of their relative wealth and their dominance of the economy, they must be accepted by the Malays as the driving force in the economic development of Malaysia, which the Malays cannot do without. The Malay masses, however, are also dissatisfied with the Alliance government and its actions with respect to the conflicting demands. This also enhances the polarization of the plural society. Though Malaysia has remained tranquil during 1971 and 1972, the tensions, suspicions, and fears must still exist below the surface. Because of the 1969 riots, the scars of racial hatred will be difficult to overcome.

The important factor here is that the society is no longer as complex as it once was. The polarization of the two major ethnic groups had simplified the society; the two segments of the society have become united internally. They have also begun to share the same interests and to interact with one another, Increasingly, conflict between races has been the result.

Because of the regional nature of Chinese political institutions, they have disappeared after each election just about as fast as they had appeared before each election. Because of the MCA's association with the Alliance, it was always the only effective national Chinese political institution. However, 1969 saw non-Malay opposition parties, regional in nature and ethnic in origin, combine their efforts for the first time. This enabled them to mobilize the Chinese dissatisfaction with the Alliance government and as a result they became the major

representatives of Chinese interest in Parliament. They also gained control of one state government and threw others into a state of confusion.

Their effectiveness, especially at the state level, had provided Chinese political integration of considerable strength; however, their success had forced the MCA out of the Alliance government, thus destroying Chinese political integration at the highest level of government. The effectiveness of these political institutions and their political integration was short-lived. The aftermath of the elections eliminated any chance they had of accomplishing anything constructive on behalf of the Chinese segment of society. However, when the NOC was established and the emergency cabinet named, it was the MCA whose members were selected to participate in these governing bodies. So for the next 21 months the accomplishments of the DAP, GRM, and PPP were to appear insignificant.

With the return to Parliamentary government in 1971, it was apparent that the UMNO had recognized the weak posture of the MCA and MIC, while at the same time recognizing the vast Chinese support enjoyed by the non-Malay opposition parties. Realizing of course that it needed support from the economically dominant Chinese sector of society, the UMNO began forming coalitions with the PPP in Perak, the GRM in Penang, and even attempted to form a pact with the PMIP in Kelantan. This not only made the Alliance more representative of the people, but provided more opportunities for Chinese public participation in the decision-making process. This improved Chinese political integration to a small degree, yet it created fears

among Malays concerning Chinese influence at the highest levels of government.[32]

Overall, effective Chinese political institutions had been neutralized by the ability of the Alliance (UMNO) to remain in power at the national level and at the state level. Chinese political integration, especially with regard to the more radical opposition, has not necessarily been successful; however, its performance during the 1969 elections and the coalitions which have since been formed may very well provide the impetus for improvement. The method the Alliance used to continually maintain power may have eased racial tension between the Malays and the Chinese, but it did not end the Chinese suspicions that exist below the surface and required attention from the Alliance.

III. THE FUTURE OF MALAYSIA'S POLITICAL STABILITY AND DEMOCRACY

Though tranquility has prevailed over Malaysia for the past two years, this does not necessarily mean political stability has become a reality. There are two areas of possible trouble which could turn the tranquility into chaos; however, so far the Alliance government has successfully managed both, thus maintaining a tranquil state of affairs in Malaysia.

The first area of concern is the economy, which produces the resources on which the political institutions depend for their success. There are three aspects of the economy which have made important

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[32]Morgan, "Friendly Opponents," p. 10.

contributions to the tranquility which prevails over Malaysia. First, even though exports dropped, the domestic economy grew (GNP went up 6% in 1970 and 5% during 1971).[33] This can be attributed in part to the successful diversification of Malaysia's economy. Tin and rubber were supplemented by palm oil and mineral oil. It can also be attributed in part to foreign investments in industry. Second, unemployment dropped sharply and there has been a growth of job vacancies. Third, Malaysia has maintained a stable cost of living; the retail price index rose only 2% in 1971, and even that was attributable to agriculture shortages caused by floods.[34] The stable economic situation appears to be taking the edge off the "sensitive issues," thus providing peace and harmony, on the surface at least.

The second area of concern is the communist insurgency which is taking place in the northern states. So far this problem has been kept under control and does not appear to be a serious threat to the government's power. Estimates indicate that the number of communists is now less than a third what it was during the "emergency"[35] when the strength of the communists reached its peak. Two important ingredients are necessary before any insurgency movement can be successful: (1) support of the people, at least in certain areas, and (2) sufficient outside support to at least make up for losses. Neither of these ingredients appears to exist in Malaysia today. Communism

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[33]Derek Davies, "The Three Year Recovery," Far Eastern Economic Review, LXXII, No. 20 (May 1972), 12.

[34]Ibid.

[35]Sterba, op. cit., p. 2, places the number of guerrillas at between 1,200 and 2,000.

is rather difficult to sell when the economy is good, unemployment is down, and the standard of living is improving.

If Malaysia can continue to control these two areas of possible trouble, then its next step toward political stability and continued democracy must concern the Chinese segment of its society. If it is to avoid racial conflict and attain political stability and harmony there are basically four alternatives open to a plural society such as Malaysia. The first possibility is to separate the races geographically into two distinct political units. This solution is not practical insomuch as there is no one area where the Chinese are concentrated enough to warrant even attempting to draw boundaries. This solution would also destroy the economy of Malaysia which the Chinese dominate and the Malays could not do without.

The second alternative, the complete destruction of one of the races, could come about unintentionally. However, in a plural society, where the population is so evenly balanced, this would mean a terrible blood bath and the complete social and economic destruction of the society. The third possible alternative is simply ignoring the critical problems of the society and attempting to change one segment of the society so that it conforms to the other. Malaysia has practiced this method in the past and all it resulted in was racial tension, strife, and conflict between the races. The results were seen in the 1969 riots, which led to 21 months without democracy institutions.

The fourth alternative would be to make an all-out effort to politically integrate the Chinese, thus making national integration possible and the development of effective political institutions a

reality. The vast amount of dissatisfaction with the Alliance displayed by the Chinese during the 1969 elections may have been the motivating force behind the recent coalitions the Alliance has formed with the successful non-Malay opposition parties. Though this may give the Chinese added influence in government, it does not mean that the UMNO is ready to permit wholesale Chinese political integration. On the contrary, it appears that the Malays intend to control the government and permit only that political integration necessary to provide racial harmony and maintain their position of power.

Only through proper Chinese political integration could Chinese and Malays possibly bargain rationally and logically to solve the pressing racial issues, thus providing the one capability that has been missing in Malaysia for the building of strong and effective political institutions. The other capability is resources. These are already present in sufficient quantities. This becomes especially clear when Malaysia is compared to other developing countries.

When one considers these alternatives it becomes apparent that certain developments have made political stability and continued democracy in Malaysia not just a dream but a strong possibility. Many have argued that the present tranquility in Malaysia is the calm before the storm because the Chinese have not been properly assimilated into the society. Depending on the way one views assimilation, another conclusion could be reached--that the Chinese in Malaysia are there, a force to be dealt with daily. Regardless of how they are accepted by the remainder of society, because of their sheer numbers and economic dominance, they must be accepted in Malaysia as a reality. The Chinese

have made themselves heard through the electoral process, the economy, and the conflicts. Assimilation is not the problem in Malaysia, for assimilation means adopting the characteristics of another culture. The Chinese do not appear to be doing that nor because of their numbers and economic prowess is it necessary. What is necessary is national and political integration, whereby the society is opened to all its ethnic groups without restrictions.

It does not appear that assimilation is any longer the goal in Malaysia, as evidenced by the widespread acceptance and practice of racial politics. Integration has to be the goal, with each ethnic segment of society accepting the other for what it is. Some of the recent changes seem to indicate a willingness on the part of most of the society to integrate, at least in some degree. Thus the way may have been cleared for Malaysia to begin the long and rough road to political stability and full fledged democracy.

The political system has changed to accommodate the new political interest and cooperativeness of the Chinese. The power base of the ruling Alliance Party was changed and it has become more representative of people of all races. The fact that some of the goals or methods of the political system have proved unchangeable has actually forced the Chinese to become more active and cooperative. Consequently, the non-Malay political institutions are breaking up, members are forming new political parties, defecting to the Alliance, or forming coalitions with the Alliance.

Though other political parties still exist and will undoubtedly receive sufficient support to remain strong enough to be taken seriously,

only two Malay political parties remain in the mainstream of the Malaysian political system, the UMNO and PMIP. The non-Malay political parties will still provide the multi-racial element after each election; however, the more effective use of coalitions will provide better representation for the Chinese and serve to ease racial tensions. It appears that the MCA and MIC will no longer be the non-Malay representatives in the government but rather take their place alongside other non-Malay parties.

In conclusion, it is obvious that national integration has not begun to take place, nor will it until political integration has proceeded far enough to provide effective political institutions capable of rationally and logically resolving the problems connected with the "sensitive issues." Otherwise, the high degree of Chinese and Malay politicization without these other ingredients will only result in continued chaos and violence which could destroy the resource capability now available for developing the political institutions necessary for political stability and democracy, "Malaysian Style."

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VITA

Captain Darrell Nix Blalock was born in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, on April 25, 1938. He was raised in Cullman, Alabama, and graduated from Cullman High School in 1956. He attended the University of Alabama and Florence State University, and in January 1961 he received a Bachelor of Science degree in Business Administration. At this time he was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Army. Except for a short break in service and employment with IBM in Huntsville, Alabama, he has made the Army his career. He has completed five years service in the Fareast (Japan, Korea, and Vietnam) and graduated from the Armored Officer's Basic Course and the Armored Officer's Career Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

While serving as an assistant professor of Military Science at the University of Tennessee from 1969 to 1972, he entered Graduate School. He received his Master of Art's degree in Political Science in March 1973.

He is married to the former Melanie Jane Killen of Florence, Alabama, and has two children, Ingrid Shawn, age 10, and Stephen Todd, age 6.