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To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Omar Ali Al-Abed entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Egypt During President Eisenhower's Administration." I recommend that it be accepted for nine quarter hours of credit in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in Political Science.

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U. S. POLICY TOWARD EGYPT DURING PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S ADMINISTRATION

A THESIS

Submitted to
The Graduate Council
of
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in
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by

Omar Ali Al-Abed

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PREFACE

The brief history of American-Egyptian relations, which date from the exchange of diplomatic representatives in 1946, has been marked by a number of serious differences of approach to matters concerning both countries directly and indirectly. These differences have arisen largely not out of direct conflict of interests between them, but rather out of a complex pattern of international relationships involving other nations such as Britain, Russia, France, Israel, and various Arab states. No profound ideological tension arose between the United States and Egypt, at least up to the early part of 1955.

At the end of the second World War, American-Egyptian relations were cordial. Americans were thought to be sympathetic to the Arab cause. American prestige throughout the Arab world was, in the immediate postwar period, higher than at any time before the war or in the years that followed. This era of good feeling toward the United States ended with American espousal of the Zionist ambitions in Palestine. Outright American support of the Zionists has cost the United States heavily in the Arab world. By helping to create the state of Israel, the United States has displaced Britain and France as the object of Arab enmity, and dissipated the accumulated good will of the early post war years.

The establishment of Israel contributed to the turmoil and instability that has come to dominate the scene in the Middle East. This coincided with the decline of British domination in the region,

and with dissolution of the French position there. The United States, whose cardinal aim was to contain Soviet expansion, started to build regional defense arrangements in various parts of the world. Since Egypt was the most populous and potentially the strongest country in the Middle East, the United States entertained the hope that Egypt might someday be made the pivot of a regional defense alignment. Egypt, since the Soviet Union was not present physically in the area, and since Israel was her most important antaganist, did not develop much interest in the American plan.

Another consequence of the Palestine fiasco was the Egyptian revolution, which took place shortly before the advent of President Eisenhower's administration. The young army officers who experienced the defeat overthrew the corrupt regime of King Farouk in the bloodless revolution of July, 1952. Their basic objective was to reform their country and solve its appalling problems. They sought U. S. assistance and spelled out the things they needed. These included military and economic aid, diplomatic support on the Suez and the Sudan issues, impartial policy in the Arab-Israel conflict, arms, and financial assistance in building the High Aswan Dam. The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine American policy with respect to these matters, and to analyze the causes of its failure.

CHAPTER I

GENERAL BACKGROUND

New Leadership

If the Second World War solved one problem, that of axis aggression, it created a host of other problems. Among these was the rise of two hostile great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, which soon became mortally suspicious of each other. The war had destroyed the balance of power in the world through the weakening of Britain and France and by the complete overthrow of Germany, Italy, and Japan. The United States and the Soviet Union, which enjoyed strategic geographic locations, and possessed both huge reservoirs of manpower and raw materials and great productive capacities, emerged from the war as the strongest powers on the globe.[1] After the breakdown of the wartime coalition between these two powers, mutual fear and distrust have come to dominate their relations. The actions and motives of each were either misinterpreted or distrusted by the other. Each believes that her existence and survival is menaced and threatened by the power of the other. Their hostility is intensified by great differences in policical and economic systems, cultures and ideologies. Both of them emerged from periods of relative isolation without having

[1]Marchall Knoppen, An Introduction to American Foreign Policy (New York: Harper, 1956), pp. 11-15, 42-45.

substantial experience in world politics or in dealing with each other.[2]

The conclusion of the war left the immediate leadership of the world principally dependent upon the United States and Russia. The crucial problem then was whether or not these two giants could find a basis for cooperation and durable peace. During the two years following the war, negotiation for a general peace settlement of world issues with the Soviets was abortive. Through their negotiations with the Soviets concerning the eastern European countries, Germany, and Iran, it had become clear to the American policy-makers that the Soviet aims were very different from those they had agreed upon during the war. Thus, in response to events, rather than by design, the United States developed the policy of containment. The new policy was "defined as one of 'firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter force at every point where they show signs of encroachment upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world.'"[3] To implement this policy, the United States initiated the construction of a defense alliance and a wide range of aid programs such as the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, Point IV, etc.

The first application of the Containment policy was in the Middle East, where Soviet threats to Turkey and Greece appeared. Britain, which was the dominant power in the region, could no longer handle the problems

[2]Edger S. Furniss, Jr., and Richard C. Snyder, An Introduction to American Foreign Policy (New York: Rinehart, 1955), pp. 114-115.

[3]Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs 1951 (New York: Harper, for Council on Foreign Relations 1952), p. 10.

of the area alone, or fight a major campaign on a large scale. Britain's heavy war costs and war destruction, combined with the rise of nationalism in her colonies, were the decisive factors in Britain's decline. On February 24, 1947, Britain notified the United States that she would be forced to discontinue her assistance to Greece and Turkey at the end of the forthcoming month. On March 12, 1947, the President enunciated in an urgent message to Congress what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. He declared that

> ...the survival and integrity of the Greek nation are of grave importance in a much wider situation. If Greece should fall under the control of an armed minority, the effect upon its neighbor, Turkey, would be immediate and serious. Confusion and disorder might well spread throughout the entire Middle East.
> ...Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East. We must take immediate and resolute action.
> ...If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world--and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation.[4]

The President requested the allocation of $400 million to be given as economic aid to both countries, and sent special missions to supervise the aid program and train their armies.

The Doctrine signalled the first active U. S. concern with the Middle East. It came at a time when the Palestine problem was also approaching a crisis.

The Truman Policy Toward the Zionists and Israel

During the Second World War, the Zionist movement had shifted its

[4]L. Larry Leonard, Elements of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1953), pp. 299-300

center of activity and agitation from Britain to the United States, where the Jewish Community was the wealthiest in the world and second in numbers only to the Jewish Community in the Soviet Union.[5] Its propaganda and its appeals for the Jewish Cause in Palestine had great influence on American public opinion, political parties, Congress, and the White House. The American public, relatively uninformed on questions of strategy and power, was impressed by the dramatic possibility of making Palestine a home for displaced German Jews. In 1944, both Democratic and Republican parties included in their platforms planks favoring unrestricted Jewish immigration to Palestine, and the establishment of a free Jewish Commonwealth there. Congress passed a similar resolution, which was dropped only because of the war and the State Department's objections, which were based on the consideration that a violent Arab reaction to Zionist aims would interfere with Allied military plans. However shortly after the war ended, Congress passed a resolution calling on the administration to use its good offices to persuade Britain to allow Jews to enter Palestine freely.[6] The position which Congress and the two political parties took was originally suggested by the American Zionist Organization in New York in 1942.[7] This organization had established "one of the most

[5]William Yale, The Near East: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press, 1958), p. 263.

[6]John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs 1947-1948 (New York: Harper, for Council on Foreign Relations, 1948), p. 311.

[7]Sydney N. Fisher, The Middle East: A History (New York: Knopf, 1959), p. 477.

powerful lobbies ever organized in Washington."[8] During President Truman's administration, it became "the controlling factor in determining America's Middle East policy in the postwar (period)."[9]

By 1945, there were two divergent views on the policy that should be followed toward Palestine. The State and Defense Departments emphasized the importance of the Arab countries' oil and their strategic value to the United States. Congress and the White House dwelt on the suffering of the Jews, and on a Palestinian Homeland as a solution to their problem.[10]

On August 31, 1945, President Truman requested the British government to admit 100,000 Jews to Palestine. His request was turned down, and Britain suggested instead a joint Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to study the problem fully. The committee's task was also to review the previous commitments of both states, as well as certain extra-Palestinian considerations.

> Bartley Crum, one of the American members of the Committee, was shocked when he read the secret State Department files on Palestine. 'Each time a promise was made to American Jewry regarding Palestine,' he worte in his book reporting his experience, 'the State Department promptly sent messages to the Arab rulers discounting it and reassuring them, in effect, that regardless of what was promised publicly to the Jews, nothing would be done to change the situation in Palestine.'[11]

[8]Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Bipartisan Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality? (New York: Row Peterson, 1957), p. 119.

[9]Christian Century, July 18, 1951, p. 837.

[10]Campbell, op. cit., pp. 312-313.

[11]Ibid., p. 313.

He regarded this as a confirmation of the charges of double-dealing on the part of the United States and Britain. The Committee, in its report, recommended that Palestine should not be divided into Arab and Jewish states, but should have the fullest measure of self-government consistent with the paramount principle that neither community should dominate the other. To avoid any breakout of hostilities between Arabs and Jews, it recommended that the British mandate should be continued until a trusteeship agreement could be negotiated with the United Nationa. It favored the admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine and urged the whole world to share the responsibility of finding homes for the European Jews.) Its recommendations were not satisfactory to either of the contending parties, and therefore were rejected by both.[12]

On the day the Anglo-American Committee's report was released, President Truman publicly expressed approval only of the recommendation in favor of the Zionists, without referring to the others which ran counter to the Zionist program. He said nothing about taking the responsibility of putting them into effect. The reaction of Mr. Attlee to the President's statement

> ...was 'extremely sharp.' The Prime Minister 'very properly' deprecated the President's selective attitude towards the Committee's recommendations; . . . and . . . declared that the [British] government could not admit so large a body of immigrants as the 100,000 originally proposed by Weizmann, underwritten by President Truman.[13]

[12]Ibid., pp. 313-315.

[13]George Kirk, Survey of International Affairs: The Middle East 1945-1950 (London: Oxford University Press, for Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1954), pp. 215-216.

Secretary Ernest Bevin, who was angered by the President's equivocal statement, said "that American insistence on the 100,000 Jews derived from the fact that 'they did not want too many of them in New York.'"[14]

American diplomats in the Arab World amply warned their government of the dangerous consequences bound to result from a pro-Zionist policy. The American Ambassador to Iraq, George Wadsworth,

> ...had cabled Washington to the effect that American support of the Zionists would cause the loss of the Middle East to the Russians within ten years. Forty-eight hours after Mr. Wadsworth cable was sent, every American ambassador, minister, and consul general in the area had endorsed it or sent similar views of their own. Theirs was not an expression of anti-Semitism, nor a moral judgment of the issues involved, but a professional assessment of what American diplomats believed Arab reaction to U. S. policy would be, and the damaging effect this would have in the long run on American interests in Asia and Africa.[15]

In October, 1946, these diplomats were recalled. After hearing their views, President Truman told them: "'I'm sorry, gentlement, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents.'"[16]

After her failure to work out a settlement acceptable to both Arabs and Jews, a failure for which Mr. Truman was held partially responsible because of his support of the Zionists, Britain formally

[14]Campbell, op. cit., p. 316.

[15]Harry B. Ellis, Challenge in the Middle East: Communist Influence and American Policy (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1960), p. 91

[16]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Study of the United States Foreign Policy: Summary of Views of Retired Foreign Service Officers, Hearings before the Committee, 86th. Congress, 1st. Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, June 15, 1958),p.69.

referred the Palestine question to the United Nations on April 2, 1947. The General Assembly set up an ad hoc Committee of eleven members to study the problem and to submit recommendations. The Committee then came up with two solutions. The first was the partition plan, which was supported by Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, and Uruguay. According to this plan, both an Arab and a Jewish state should be established, and Jerusalem should be placed under international control. India, Iran, and Yugoslavia opposed the partition plan, and favored a federal state which would meet the demands of both peoples. They recommended that Palestine should be administered for a time by the United Nations, after which its independence would be declared.[17]

The American Departments of State and Defense opposed support of the partition plan, on the ground that it might throw the Arab states into the orbit of the Soviet Union whose attitude was still uncertain.[18] Undersecretary of State Lovett warned that "while much emphasis has been placed on the distress and the commotion among the Jews, there was an equal danger of solidifying sentiment among all of the Arab and Moslem peoples against the United States."[19] Secretary of Defense James Forrestal "lectured his Cabinet colleagues long and hard on the military necessity of making friends of the Arabs and even showed his opponents

[17]Campbell, op. cit., pp. 319-325.

[18]Ibid., p. 327.

[19]Ernest B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, Dynamic of International Relations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1956), p. 283.

intelligence reports to back up his arguments."[20] In spite of these warnings, the United States finally voted for the partition plan, which was adopted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947.

At the United Nations, the United States was charged with exerting pressure on the six states which apparently had planned to oppose the partition. These states were Haiti, Liberia, Ethiopia, China, the Philippines, and Greece. Although this is a debatable charge, certainly there was a good deal of unofficial pressure exerted.[21] Mr. Summer Welles, a supporter of the plan and an informed observer writes:

> By direct order of the White House every form of pressure, direct and indirect, was brought to bear by American officials upon those countries outside of the Moslem world that were known to be either uncertain or opposed to partition. Representatives or intermediaries were employed by the White House to make sure that the necessary majority would at length be secured.[22]

Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, another informed observer writes:

> The delegates of those six nations and their home governments as well were swamped with telegrams, phone calls, letters, and visitors. Many of the telegrams, particularly, were from Congressmen, and others as well invoked the name and prestige of the United States Government. An ex-Governor, a prominent Democrat with White House and other connections, personally telephoned Haiti urging that its delegations be instructed to change its vote. . . . A well-known economist also close to the White House, and acting in liason capacity for the Zionist Organization, exerted his power of persuasion upon the Liberian delegate. Both states reversed themselves and voted for partition.[23]

[20] Ibid.

[21] Campbell, op. cit., pp. 330-331.

[22] Summer Welles, We Need Not Fail (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), p. 63.

[23] Kermit Roosevelt, "The Partition of Palestine: A Lesson in Pressure Politics." Middle East Journal, January 1948, pp. 14-15.

Of the strength of pressure to which he was subjected by the Zionists, President Truman, in his memories, writes:

> I do not think I ever had as much pressure and propaganda aimed at the White House as I had in this instance. The persistence of a few of the extreme Zionist leaders--actuated by political motives and engaging in political threats--disturbed me and annoyed me. Individuals and groups asked me, usually in rather quarrelsom and emotional ways, to stop the Arabs, to keep the British from supporting the Arabs, to furnish American soldiers, to do this to do that and the other.[24]

On May 14, 1948, President Truman was informed by the Jewish Agency that a Jewish state called Israel would be proclaimed at one minute after 6 p.m. (Washington time) on that same day. A few minutes after 6 p.m., Israel was accorded de facto recognition by the United States.[25] The State Department was ordered by the White House to appoint the pro-Zionist James G. MacDonald as minister to Israel. When Mr. Lovett protested against the appointment, the President stated that "he did not want any discussion of the matter but to have action followed at once. . . by the State Department."[26] In January, 1949, Israel received $100,000 from the Export-Import Bank, the amount which it had been promised after its establishment.[27] Between 1946 and 1954, Israel had received from the United States a total of $350 million, 60

[24] Life, January 30, 1956, p. 83.

[25] John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs 1948-1949 (New York: Harper for Council on Foreign Relations, 1949), p. 385.

[26] Haas and Whiting, loc. cit.

[27] George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 349.

percent of which was in the form of aid grants, while all the Arab states combined had received only $87 million, chiefly in the form of technical assistance and credits.[28] Moreover, West Germany, under U. S. pressure, agreed in August, 1952, to pay Israel $882 million in reparations.[29]

In brief, the President's policy, which was the decisive factor in the establishement of Israel, was inconsistent with both the national interest and the containment policy. "The United States insured for itself a harvest of unending trouble in relations with the Arab world, as many informed Americans foresaw and warned at the time."[30]

As an immediate result of the creation of Israel, ferment and confusion came to dominate the scene in the Middle East. The hostility between the Arabs and Jews was intensified by the presence of a million Arab refugees, who were forced to flee from their homes in Israel. By 1950, no peaceful settlement was in sight, nor did real stability exist. In a joint statement issued on May 25 of that year, the United States, Britain, and France, who were alarmed by the instability of that region, pledged themselves to maintain the balance of power between the Arabs and Jews by supplying them with arms, only for the purpose of defending themselves and insuring internal security, and by preventing any armed

[28]Robert Straus-Hupe and others, American-Asian Tensions (New York: Praeger, 1956), p. 176.

[29]Fisher, op. cit., p. 593.

[30]John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems for American Policy (revised edition; New York: Harper, for C.F.R., 1960), p. 316.

agression across the existing armistice lines in Palestine. They stated that if armed aggression should take "place, they would take appropriate action against the aggressor, 'both within and outside the United Nations.'"[31] This statement became known as the Tripartite Declaration. Its issuance came after the lifting of the United Nations' arms embargo in August, 1949. In effect, it was designed to maintain the existence of Israel rather than to promote peace, and France was the first of the three to supply Israel with arms as events have later shown.

The U. S. and King Farouk's Regime

Before the Second World War, the United States had little contact with Egypt. Trade relations had been established between the two countries early in the eighteenth century, when Egypt was a part of the Ottoman Empire. Since 1945, however, their contacts have multiplied. During the war, Egypt provided bases for U. S. troops and aircraft, engaged in the North African campaign. The United States, on its part, helped Egypt in training its armed forces, and also supplied her with war materials.[32] In 1946, the United States turned over Payne Field to the Egyptian government for use as an international civil airport. Its army also undertook the training of Egyptian personnel in the operation and maintenance of the navigational and communications

[31] Ibid., pp. 85-86

[32] Crabb, op. cit., pp. 137-138.

instruments with which the field was equipped.[33]

In 1947, the Egyptian Chief of Staff visited the United States for the purpose of obtaining advisory and technical assistance for the Egyptian army. Egypt also sought an $88 million loan from the United States.[34] When the Egyptian government decided to terminate the services of the British military mission in that year, its prime minister went in person to Washington to invite the American government to send a military mission to Egypt, to assist in the training of the Egyptian armed forces and in the production of armaments. His request was rejected, on the grounds that the United States was unwilling to encroach upon territory falling within the sphere of influence of a principal ally, or to become militarily involved in the Palestine crisis.[35]

Egypt, however, received a loan of $5.6 million (later increased to 7.25) from the Export-Import Bank for construction, agricultural needs, and the development of chemical industries. On November 3, 1948, the two countries concluded an agreement under the Information and Exchange Act of 1948. This agreement established a program under which the equivalent of $300,000 in Egyptian currency (was to be spent annually) to finance an exchange program in the field of research and

[33]J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Dilemmas: The Background of United States Policy (New York: Harper, for C.F.R., 1953), p. 85.

[34]Lenczowski, op. cit., p. 413.

[35]Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 85

education.[36] The total American aid to Egypt which was given in the form of grants and loans between 1945, and 1951, was $18 million.[37] In the early postwar years, the United States became the second largest exporter to Egypt. Because American shipping formed an important part of the traffic using the Suez Canal, the first American was named to the Board of Canal Directors on June 8, 1948.[38]

The Anglo-Egyptian dispute over the Suez Canal was subordinated to the Palestine problem. After the establishment of Israel, feeling throughout the Arab world was bitter against Britain and the United States who were held principally responsible for the Arab-Israeli-crisis in Palestine. Nationalists in Egypt demanded complete evacuation of the British from the Suez Zone. The Palestine issue impinged directly on the Suez question when Britain refused (in accordance with the United Nations decision that neither the Arabs nor the Jews should receive arms) to supply Egypt with arms and ammunition from the Suez base. The British refusal was regarded by Egypt as a breach of the Treaty of 1936. Egyptian Nationalists advocated neutrality in the Cold War, and thereby alienated Western governments. When the Wafd government came to power in 1950, it refused to participate in the

[36] Ibid., p. 85.

[37] Leonard, op. cit., p. 497.

[38] Hurewitz, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

Korean War. It demanded instead that the United Nations should first take action to correct Jewish aggression in Palestine and British aggression in Egypt.[39] The difficulty of settling the Anglo-Egyptian dispute "...became considerably greater as a result of the Palestine situation."[40]

By the beginning of 1951, the Egyptian government had still not succeeded in concluding an acceptable agreement with Britain concerning the Suez and Sudan issues. The Egyptian stand on these two issues had been hardened to such a degree that Egypt could accept nothing less than the eviction of the British from the Suez base, and unity with the Sudan. After a series of sterile negotiations through which Britain had shown its reluctance to give up its military base in the Suez zone, the Wafd government on October 8, 1951, declared "The abrogation of the 1936 Treaty, the abolition of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium Agreements, and the proclamation of King Farouk as King of Egypt and the Sudan."[41] Britain immediately denounced the Egyptian action, declaring that she had no intention of recognizing the unilateral abrogation, and reinforced her contingents at the Suez base.[42]

[39]Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey (second edition, London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 192.

[40]Ibid. p. 192

[41]Ibid., p. 194.

[42]Stebbins, op. cit., pp. 287-288.

The United States, which played no direct part in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiations, deliberately intervened at this juncture. It announced that bilateral agreements, which formed the essence of the British defense system in the Middle East, had probably outlived their usefulness. The Suez Canal, it said, should be in friendly hands, and should be operating efficiently so that it would be ready for use in the event of war. The United States decided that multilateral arrangement, on the NATO pattern, might provide an effective solution to the Suez problem, not only in Egypt but in the Middle East as a whole.[43] This appeared the most promising alternative to the Anglo-Egyptian impasse.

The United States and Britain then invited France and Turkey to include the Middle Eastern countries in their growing defense system. The sponsoring powers

> decided first to approach Egypt and only Egypt. The idea was that Egypt held the key position because of the Suez base and its leadership of the Arab League. If Cairo agreed, the other Arab states could be expected to follow. . . . The whole fate of the proposal depended on Egypt.[44]

On October 13, 1951, their plan was presented to the Egyptian government. Egypt was invited

> 'to participate...on a basis of equality and partnership with other founder members.' The purpose of the command, it was explained, was to defend Egypt and the other Middle Eastern countries against external aggression. . . . If

[43]Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 92.

[44]Campbell, op. cit., p. 42.

> Egypt were prepared to associate itself with the proposed command, the 1936 treaty with the United Kingdom would be terminated. . . . Finally, it was stipulated that 'the present British base in Egypt would be formally handed over to the Egyptians on the understanding that it would simultaneously become an Allied base within the Allied Middle East Command with full Egyptian participation in the running of the base in peace and war.'[45]

Two days afterward, Egypt announced its refusal to participate in the scheme, the underlying reason being that

> Its presentation came at a time when abrogation of the treaty was raising national fervour to unprecedented heights. This made its acceptance highly improbably; and its form, which made evacuation--which is an unquestionable right in Egypt's eyes--conditional upon a close alliance with the main Western powers whose policies, since the Palestine conflict, had been widely and increasingly condemned, made its acceptance by the Egyptian Government virtually impossible.[46]

Moreover, the Egyptian Government looked at the proposal as a device to prolong the British occupation, with the added backing of the United States. Israel being the real Arab enemy, Egypt naturally would not join such a defense alliance, which Israel was presumably to join at a later date. "While the American and British Governments were well aware of that fact, they saw that they could not do much about it at the moment, whereas the need for an organized defense against the Soviet Union was urgent."[47]

[45]Hurewitz, op. cit., pp. 93-94

[46]R. I. I. A., op. cit., p. 195.

[47]Campbell, op. cit., p. 46.

The miscalculation over Egypt eliminated the chance of winning for the West some of the other Arab governments, such as Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, which were in favor of the defense proposal, but ". . .none of them could be expected to defy Egypt on a decision taken against 'imperialists' in the name of nationalism and the sacred sovereignty of an Arab state."[48]

On October 16, the Egyptian parliament adopted decrees abrogating the treaties with Britain. On the next day, Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that "Egypt's unilateral action was 'not in accord with proper respect for international obligations. For its part, the U. S. Government considers the action of the Egyptian Government to be without validity.'"[49] The Chief of United States Naval Operations, Admiral William M. Fechteler, declared on November 2 that the Suez Canal was essential to the operations of American forces in the Mediterranean and that is closure would restrict or reduce U. S. mobility. The British reaction came formally on November 6. Egypt was notified that her action was illegal, without validity, and contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter. In addition, Egypt was held responsible for the consequences which might develop. The United States, with other sponsors, in an effort to frustrate Egypt's attempt to organize the Arab League against their proposed alliance,

[48] Ibid.

[49] Hurewitz, op. cit., p. 95.

announced a new set of principles under which any Middle Eastern states might voluntarily join the proposed alliance, thereby qualifying for military aid. However, this move did not camouflage their defeat. For the time being, this scheme remained a draft proposal. A stalemate had been reached in Egypt.[50]

On January 17, 1952, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, suggested to the United States "that 'token forces of the other partners in the Four Power [Middle East Command] proposal...[be] stationed in the canal zone as a symbol of the unity of purpose which inspires us.'"[51] The United States refused this suggestion and tentatively explored the possibility of persuading the British Government to meet Egyptian demands in the Sudan as a means of winning Egypt's military collaboration. Britain, however, was cool toward this feeler, and the United States then had to wait until passions in both Egypt and Britain cooled off.[52] In Egypt, the violence which broke out after the abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty led in July, to the establishment of a new order by a group of Army officers. Since the Egyptain Revolution had certain effects on subsequent American policy, it is necessary to review it briefly.

[50] Ibid., pp. 94-95.

[51] Ibid., p. 96.

[52] Ibid.

The Egyptian Revolution

The overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy and the setting up of a republic by a group of young army officers was the result of a long historical struggle which began in the early part of the nineteenth century. The seeds of the Revolution were planted during the rule of Mohammed Ali, who ended the exploitation of Egypt by Mameluk feudal alndowners and replaced them by another landowning class which was to dominate the economic and political life of the country for more than a century. Europeans who came to help modernize Egypt soon gained control of the important military and civil services in the government. Khedive Ismail (1863-79) left the country heavily indebted to private European banks, especially those of France and Britain. This financial disaster eventually led to dual control of governmental finance by the British and French.[53] The Egyptian army officers, under the leadership of Ahmed Arabi, who resented foreign interference in internal affairs and the preferential treatment of foreigners, revolted in 1881. Britain unilaterally suppressed the revolution, and the dual Franco-British control was superseded by a British occupation.[54] From that moment until 1936, "...the Khedives were only puppet rulers."[55] Britain, in order to prevent further uprisings, kept the Egyptian army small,

[53]Yale, op. cit. pp. 436-439

[54]Hurewitz, op. cit., pp. 61-62

[55]Ibid., p. 62.

impotent and British-officered. The army's "pay was low and so was its prestige, and at a time when everything British was loathed, nothing seemed to be more British than the Egyptian army."[56]

The suppressive influence of the British occupation created conditions that fostered revolutionary movements. In 1911 and 1919, the Egyptians revolted against Britain, but nothing significant was achieved. In 1936, Britain and Egypt concluded a new treaty which established the independence of Egypt. The treaty made possible the expansion of the Egyptian army which was now dominated by the new lower-middle element. A new movement began to arise among the young army officers in 1938. It was organized and led by Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser. Its basic goal, Nasser stated, was to "...fight imperialism, monarchy, and feudalism. . . . This aim will be achieved by force of arms, if need be. The task is urgent because the country has fallen into chaos. Freedom is our natural right. The way lies before us--revolution."[57]

The army movement grew up rapidly in the postwar years, especially after the Palestine debacle. King Farouk proved his lack of ability and his incompetence as a ruler. He was the center of power and "...the constitution did little to further representative government. Rigged elections, British intervention in cabinet appointments,

[56]Jean and Simonne Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (New York: Criterion Books, 1958), p. 194.

[57]Tom Little, Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 209.

and inevitable dissolutions of Parliament receiving valid electoral majorities"[58] were the characteristic features of Egyptian policical practice. Farouk displayed little interest in solving his country's social and economic problems. "His ideology--if his outlook can be dignified with that term--may be summed up in the phrase of an earlier monarch 'Apres moi, le deluge.' His life of self-indulgence and debauchery alienated the population."[59]

Egypt emerged from the Second World War as a creditor nation, due to the vast expenditure of Britain on war material during the war. Because of financial maladministration, a large treasury deficit developed. The cost of living soared, and unemployment reached a high peak.[60] Sixty percent of the cultivated land (about 6 million acres) was owned by one-tenth of one percent of Egypt's landlords.[61] Until 1952, the landlords had "never experienced any encroachment on their interest, and paid light taxes on their property."[62] Economic development was considerably hampered by political instability and by government restrictions on foreign firms.[63]

[58]Haas and Whiting, op. cit. p. 341

[59]Ibid., p. 347.

[60]R. C. Mowat, Middle East Perspective (London: Blandford Press, 1958), p. 228.

[61]Time, August 25, 1952, p. 28.

[62]Doreen Warriner, Land Reform and Development in the Middle East: A Study of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq (London: Oxford University Press, for R.I.I.A., 1957), p. 31.

[63]Reader Bullard, Sir, The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey (third edition, London: Oxford University Press, for R.I.I.A., 1958), p. 217.

The Palestine catastrophe brought the army, for the first time, into open opposition to the King. Two weeks before the war was fought, army leaders petitioned the King, advising that the army was neither fit nor ready for a desert campaign. Describing Farouk's reaction, General Majuib stated later that the King "scorned these warnings and called their authors children."[64] Farouk decided to go ahead with the war. European observers tended to regard the decision

> as an artificial diversion by a ruler...,little more than a form of suicide through carelessness. . . . We are shown a Farouk upset after being jeered at for the first time as he left a cinema in February 1949, and shaken by the police strike in the following April, desperately trying to win back a little prestige by playing double or quits, and deciding that a declaration of war would at least allow him to rule with an iron hand and silence and insolent crowds.[65]

The King also had in mind the idea of leading a Pan-Arab movement. King Abdullah of Jordan had similar ambitions. For this reason, King Farouk "secured from the Ulema a fatweh purporting to prove the manifestly untrue fact that he was descended from the Prophet Mohammed."[66]

The Egyptian army, which was badly equipped, badly trained and badly led, performed poorly in the war. Its defeat was taken as proof that the corrupt ruling class had emasculated the country. "In 1950, the Palestine arms scandal broke and the country learned that swindlers had piled up a fortune of $500,000 by selling ammunition which exploded

[64] Time, September 8, 1952, p. 33.

[65] Lacouture, op. cit., 101.

[66] Little, op. cit., p. 177.

prematurely, killing dozens of front-line soldiers."[67]

The Palestine fiasco intensified domestic unrest, and extremist groups grew up rapidly. The Moslem Brotherhood Society, whose aim was to "return to the strict practices of primitive Islam in personal and political life,"[68] assassinated Premier Noqirashi in December, 1948. The government crushed the society ruthlessly[69] and on February 12, 1949, its founder, Hassan Al-Banna, was murdered by the King's Iron Guard officers.[70] This was a severe blow to the Brotherhood Society and its activities slowed down perceptibly.

The Free Officers, upon whom fell the burden of the war, felt that their biggest battle would have to be fought in Egypt, not in Palestine. They determined to overthrow the corrupt regime which was the cause of their humiliation. A network of sub-committees of officers of similar rank was set up to spread propaganda among the rank and file. Their organization, consequently, grew rapidly in influence and in numbers during and after the war.

The rise of the Wafd Party to power in 1950 meant that the King had no alternative but to secure his cabinet members from the Wafd party. He had come into conflict with the other parties, from which he had formerly chosen his premiers, because of his personal conduct. "Protected

[67] Time, September 8, 1952, p. 33.

[68] Mowat, op. cit., p. 229.

[69] Bullard, op. cit., pp. 188-189

[70] D. Peter, "The Muslim Brotherhood--Terrorists or Just Zealots?" The Reporter (March 17, 1953), p. 10.

by a vigorous censorship and legislation against lese-majeste, the young King had become increasingly addicted...to certain personal and private pleasures in which he was encouraged by disreputable courtiers."[71] Hussian Sirri--an independent--whom the King asked to form a Cabinet, "made it a condition of assuming office in 1949 that there should be a purge of the corrupt elements in the palace entourage."[72] In the election held in 1950, the Wafd party won. At that time

> ...there was, behind the scenes, contact between the palace clique and the Wafd by which the idea was elaborated that if the Wafd abandoned its enmity for the King, the two could come together and govern the country without trouble, the King with his prerogatives supporting the popular force of the Wafd.[73]

The outcome of these efforts was that the King and the Wafd agreed to end "...their old feud by a 'gentleman's agreement' to live and let live, each conniving at the corruption and incompetence of the other."[74] Thus the Wafd party, which once had stood for complete independence, unity with the Sudan, and social and economic reform had become corrupted too. The Minister of Finance was dismissed because of his opposition to the party's "racketeering on the cotton market and involve-

[71]George Kirk, "Egypt: The Wafd and Great Britain", Survey of International Affairs 1951 (London: Oxford University Press, for R.I.I.A., 1954), p. 261.

[72]Ibid.

[73]Little, op. cit., p. 179.

[74]Bullard, op. cit., p. 189

ment in other shady deals."[75] The party leaders enriched themselves by "manipulation of land taxes, raising of tariffs, and regulating legislation to facilitate speculation."[76] When highly-placed persons in the palace entourage were accused of making handsome profits by purchasing defective munitions for the government during the Palestine war, the Wafd government "removed the Attorney-General who was too zealously conducting the inquiry."[77]

The growing discontent with the administration was channeled against Britain. Rather than reform itself, the Wafd government abrogated the Anglo-Egyptian treaty and charged Britain with Egypt's ills and economic stagnation.

The small-scale clashes which broke out after the denunciation of the treaty culminated in the death of more than forty-two Egyptian policemen and three British soldiers of Ismailia. On January 25, 1952, the British command warned the auxiliary police to evacuate their building immediately.[78] When the warning was ignored, "The police buildings were bombarded by the heavy guns of the British tanks, and finally taken by assault by the infantry supported by tanks."[79] Describing the

[75]Mowat, op. cit., p. 228.

[76]Haas and Whiting, op. cit., p. 345.

[77]Survey of International Affairs 1951, p. 280.

[78]New York Times, January 26, 1952, p. 1.

[79]Survey of International Affairs 1951, p. 288.

massacre, the special correspondent of the London Times reported:

> It was a sobering and distrubing sight to see the enormous fire-power of a modern military force turned upon a barracks full of policemen, however malicious their action in the past and whatever menace they might offer for the future ...but many British soldiers are tonight finding it harder than ever to remember the ultimate objectives of the present British operations...which are, after all, concerned with the maintenance of peace and the prevention of bloodshed.[80]

This grave event inflamed the Egyptians' national feeling and widespread demonstrations broke out the next day. In Cairo, where these demonstrations went out of control, many buildings were sacked and burned. Apparently, the King was chiefly responsible for this destruction. On that day, he held a banquet for 600 officers at his palace.

> Some have regarded this luncheon, which kept in the palace those forces which might have intervened, as proof of deliberate malice on Farouk's part. His great-grandfather Mohammed Ali had secured his power by inviting several hundred mameluks in order to have them massacred at dessert.[81]

On the eve of that day, when he heard a rumor that British troops were marching toward Cairo and were about 30 miles from the city, the King asked the army to restore order. He feared a new British occupation. Martial law was proclaimed, and the Wafd government was dismissed the next day.

[80]London Times, January 26, 1952, p. 4.

[81]Lacouture, op. cit., p. 117.

The fall of the Wafd government led to the rise of a new group. The army became the sole means of maintaining law and order. The King's fear of the army began when his nominee (his brother-in-law) for the presidency of the Officers' Club was defeated. The young officers succeeded in elevating their nominee, General Mohamed Najuib, to that post in December 1951. As a result the Club was closed, and the King's enmity was focused on General Najuib. After that, suppression of the Free Officers' clandestine movement was the focal point of the dispute between the King and his premiers, who felt that the army should be reformed. On June 20, Ahmed Najib al Hilali, the former premier who had been forced to resign on May 28 because of his investigations into the arms scandal, was recalled to form a new cabinet. Hilali persuaded the King that the former Minister of War and Marine should remain in his post. But when he and his ministers went to the palace to take oath on July 22, the King insisted on appointing his brother-in-law as Minister of War and Marine. In choosing him "the King was seeking an obedient minister who would be willing to use the King's faction in the army to root out the mutinous officers."[82] The Free Officers "now realized that they must strike at once or be destroyed."[83] On the night of 22-23 of July, they took over, in a bloodless revolution.

[82]Little, op. cit., p. 189.

[83]George Kirk, "The Egyptian Revolution and National Aspirations," Survey of International Affairs 1952 (London: Oxford University Press, for R.I.I.A., 1955), p. 210.

King Farouk was forced to abdicate in favor of his infant son and to flee the country on July 26. "With no policy for his people and no virtue in his character [he] fled Egypt...,taking with him as much personal wealth as possible and leaving behind no visible evidence of public regret at his departure."[84] "No one opposed his going."[85] A Regency Council composed of three men was set up, but the Revolutionary Command Council, which had been formed on July 23, was the supreme power in the country. It consisted of eleven army officers.

General Mohammed Najuib, who became the commander-in-chief, was chosen as the ostensible leader of the revolution. His appointment was due to his dissatisfaction with the former regime, his respected position in the army as a senior officer and the reputation he had gained in the Palestine war.[86] Ali Maher, a pro-westerner, was appointed premier, in order to remove any impression that the revolution had been inspired by the Communists or extremists. After their successful coup d'etat, the Free Officers had two major problems to deal with. The first of these was rescuing "the country from economic chaos"[87] and introducing

[84]Haas and Whiting, op. cit., p. 347.

[85]Mowat, op. cit., p. 230.

[86]Carel Bell, Survey of International Affairs 1954 (London: Oxford University Press, for R.I.I.A., 1957), p. 186.

[87]Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs 1953 (London: Oxford University Press, for R.I.I.A., 1956), p. 149.

economic measures and social reforms. The second was evicting the British forces from the Suez base and uniting the Sudan with Egypt. This second problem was an old one which dated back to the time when the British occupied Egypt in 1882. Since then Britain had not only been the effective ruler of Egypt, but also of the Sudan, which had been under nominal Egyptian administration since 1842. The Sudanese, however, were as eager as Egypt to get rid of British domination, and liked the idea of Sudanese-Egyptian unity.

President Truman and the Revolution

After the establishment of Israel, American diplomats in the Arab world who were alarmed by the strong anti-American feeling which had sprung up there started searching for an Arab leader capable of coming to terms with Israel and settling the Arab-Israeli dispute. The search began in Syria, early in 1949. The chief of staff of the Syrian army, Col. Husni Zaim, held the Syrian government responsible for Syria's poor showing in the Palestine war. He sounded out a member of the United States Legation in Damascus about his plan to overthrow the civilian government and replace it with an army regime headed by himself. The United States gave him an encouraging response. On March 30, he did away with civilian government and seized power. The United Stated hoped that an Arab leader strong enough to settle the Palestine problem had now been found. But the early failure of his regime dashed the American hope. After six month, Zaim was killed

in a new coup d'etat led by Col. Sami Hinnawi. In December, 1949, Adib Shishakly took over, and ousted Hinnawi. Thus the "American intervention in Syria had failed to produce a leader who could help the United States out of its impasse over Palestine."[88]

Even after this failure in Syria the United States did not give up, and its hope lingered that an Arab leader who would cooperate with its policies would eventually come to light. This hope remained an important element in her thinking when, in July 1952, the Free Officers overthrew the monarchy of Egypt, and the State Department first focused its eyes on Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser, whom American diplomats and private individuals had contacted before the Revolution. But these contacts did not bear the desired fruit.

> ...Nasser made it clear that whatever he decided to do would be an independent move and that he would not be a party to any 'imperialist plot.' Nasser insisted he would do "what was good for Egypt, regardless of whether or not it fitted into plans of one or another of the Great Powers.'[89]

The United States was impressed by Nasser's forthrightness and intelligence, and regarded his determination to act independently and his refusal to discuss his plans and make commitments as good signs.

In executing their plans for the revolution, the Free Officers were almost sure of the support of the masses, because of deep discontent against Farouk's corrupt regime. They were not disappointed.

[88]Ellis, op. cit., p. 34

[89]Ibid.

The great danger of possible external intervention, in their view, stemmed from Britain, which had suppressed the army revolt of 1882.[90] The possibility of another such action was carefully and successfully prevented. Immediately after the revolution, King Farouk asked Britain to intervene. But General Najuib had already made it clear to Britain, through the United States,

> that the coup was a purely domestic affair concerning Egyptians only, that the life and property of foreigners would be respected, that if the English refrained from intervention they would be treated as all other foreigners, but if not they would be responsible for the bloodshed that would inevitably follow.[91]

The United States, which "expected...no real changes in Egyptian policy to result,"[92] supported Najuib's view. She notified Britain that "'...in the given circumstances [the U.S. was] decisively opposed to foreign intervention.'"[93] Britain, interpreted the revolution "as a reaction against intrigue and corruption."[94] Therefore she refrained from intervention in favor of the King. When he was deprived of external intervention, Farouk became concerned only with his personal safety, and the succession of his infant son as King Ahmad Fuad II.[95] Therefore, he appealed for assistance to the American

[90] V. B. Lustskii, "The Revolution of July 1952 in Egypt", The Middle East in Transition (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 500.

[91] Ibid., pp. 500-501.

[92] New York Times, August 24, 1952, p. 1.

[93] Lustskii, op. cit., p. 501.

[94] New York Times, August 24, 1952, p. 1.

[95] Survey of International Affairs 1952, p. 210.

Ambassador, Mr. Jefferson Caffrey, who deployed his whole energies to save the King's life. By this time, the Free Officers had already decided to exile Farouk, rather than execute him.[96]

The United States anticipated that cooperation with the new military regime would be much easier than with the former government. She was optimistic that Egypt would join the Middle East defense command. Discussions on the manner in which this proposal could best be submitted to Egypt were resumed with Britain. The State Department felt that both the Arab States and Israel should be consulted. Britain was of the opinion that only the Arab states should be included in the regional defense alliance with a minimum of prior discussion. From her experience, she had learned that such discussion would agitate the Arab people. Therefore, she wanted to have the pact drawn up and signed as soon as possible.[97] However, the new regime had not yet sufficiently consolidated its internal position to go ahead with such a step; then it asked the two western powers "to wait a while before presenting a defense proposal."[98]

The first aim of the new leaders was to reform the country. They came to office with no clear-cut program. In explaining that lack of planning, Nasser wrote:

> I confess that the full picture did not become clear in my mind until after a long period of trial after July 23rd.

[96]Little, op. cit., p. 197.

[97]Newsweek, August 18, 1952, p. 30.

[98]Newsweek, August 25, 1952, p. 37.

> It was the details of this experience which filled in the details of the picture. . . . Before July 23rd, I had imagined that the whole nation was ready and prepared, waiting for nothing but a vanguard to lead the charge against the battlements, whereupon it would fall in behind in serried ranks, ready for sacred advance toward the great objectives. And I had imagined that our role was to be this commando vanguard.[99]

During their first six weeks in power, the new Egyptian leaders had

> sent Farouk into exile, legally abolished aristocracy, declared war on corruption, promised land reform to break up the great estates, raised the rich man's taxes, lowered the poor man's prices for sugar and cotton, . . . abolished censorship, relaxed restrictions on foreign investment. . . ...For the first time in living memory, there [was] hope in Egypt.[100]

On September 6, the government issued the land reform decree which limited the size of estates to 200 feddans[101] (one feddan = 1.38 acres). It would compensate those landowners whose excess lands were to be confiscated. This law contemplated the redistribution of land-ownership, the reduction of rent and a rise in agricultural wages. On September 7, the Agrarian Reform was put into force.[102]

> But perhaps more important than all of these specific measures are the new feelings of self-respect, hopefulness, and unity which have emerged in Egypt. A few ci-devant pashas and wealthy men look back with nostalgia on the douceur de vivre of ancien regime, but the overwhelming majority of the

[99]Gamal Abdul Nasser, The Philosophy of the Revolution (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 32.

[100]Time, September 8, 1952, p. 33.

[101]New York Times, September 7, 1952, p. 19.

[102]Warriner, op. cit., p. 32, 12.

> country, including the middle class, has rallied to the new government.[103]

To carry out the plans for social and economic reform, Premier Ali Maher asked the United States for economic aid, either in the form of a loan or a grant. General Najuib requested arms.[104] He stated: "It is only natural that I should want military aid from the United States, but will I get it?"[105] At that time, the United States was reluctant to give aid because she felt that the situation was not stable and that "If the Najuib-Maher alliance should collapse. . . it could be. . . fatal to the prospect of Anglo-Egyptian accord on defense."[106]

The first official American reaction to the revolution came on September 8, when Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in his message to the new regime, stated:

> There have been some encouraging developments in Egypt since we last met together, including the reform programs announced by the Egyptian government. We are following events with much interest and we wish Prime Minister Ali Maher and his civilian and military colleagues every success in their efforts to solve the internal problems of their country.
>
> ...We look forward to an era in which new areas of cooperation and mutual benefit can be brought into being.[107]

[103]Charles Issawi, Egypt at Mid-Century, An Economic Survey (London: Oxford University Press, for R.I.I.A., 1954), p. 272.

[104]Newsweek, August 18, 1952, p. 30.

[105]New York Times, August 8, 1952, p. 1.

[106]Newsweek, loc. cit.

[107]Department of State Bulletin, September 1952, p. 406.

Land reform brought the army officers into conflict with Ali Maher, not over the principle of reform, but over its tempo. They were determined that it should move foreward rapidly. Agrarian reform was an important part of their plan to uproot feudalism. They forced the resignation of Ali Maher, who showed reluctance to proceed with them. General Najuib took the post of premier, and at the same time, he retained his post as Chief of Staff. Commenting on this change in the Egyptian Government, Mr. Michael J. McDermott said, "Since the program of the Egyptian Government remains based on principle rather than personalities, there is no change in the attitude of the Government of the United States."[108] The State Department was optimistic, and gave every indication that it would cooperate closely with General Najuib. American and British diplomats who had watched him in the preceding few weeks hoped that in his own quiet way he would succeed. They regarded him "as the most promising figure to appear in the Middle East since Turkey's late great Kemal Ataturk."[109]

These western diplomats felt that the success of Najuib's regime depended largely on whether or not the United States and Britain would prove willing to launch a large scale program of foreign aid.[110] "Simply to stay in power," Time wrote, "Najuib needs arms to keep order,

[108] New York Times, September 9, 1952.

[109] Time, September 8, 1952, p. 33.

[110] Ibid., p. 38.

technical assistance to make land reform work, capital to build factories and raise Egypt's living standards."[111] As a price for the aid, the State Department, thinking of the Jewish vote, made it conditional upon "1) Egypt's settling its differences with Israel and 2) Egypt's joining the Middle Eastern Defense Organization proposed by Britain."[112] Though American foreign policy had antagonized the Arab people by giving more aid to Israel than to the Arab countries, the State Department apparently was still determined to do nothing to offend Israel. General Najuib might favor both proposals privately, but he could not accept them without endangering his regime.[113] He could not approve them "since the Egyptians of all parties profess to regard friendship with Britain as treason."[114]

It seems that the two Western powers followed an inconsistent policy toward the new Egyptian regime. While they were afraid that open support of Najuib would cost him popularity, they attached strings to their offer of aid which were potentially more dangerous to him than open support. As an American observer said, however logical U. S. and British

> caution may appear, it does not make much sense. There is such a thing as being oversubtle, even in Middle Eastern politics. In rushing to Najuib's side, there [might] be a danger that we would play into the hands of his enemies.

[111] Ibid.

[112] Ibid., p. 40.

[113] Ibid.

[114] Ibid., p. 38.

> But that risk should in any case be carefully weighed against the danger that, by lurking melodramatically in the wings and croaking encouragement, we may let pass the best chance to build along the right lines that we have yet had in the Middle East.[115]

Premier Najuib, for his part, favored the idea of Egyptian participation in a Middle East defense organization, but made it conditional first, on meeting Egypt's national aspiration--eviction of British troops from the Suez--and second on reaching an agreement concerning Sudan.[116] He stated:

> The nation must be free. Then we would naturally recognize the necessity to defend our country and this region. We realize nowadays no country can stand alone in the world. There are only three possible courses for a free Egypt: to remain neutral--and this is at the very least extremely difficult, if not impossible; to join the Eastern bloc, which is out of the question as we are not Communist; or to join the West. It is our natural inclination to work with the West whose people we know.[117]

He criticized the United States and Britain for their lack of confidence in Egypt's ability to defend herself, and declared:

> If the defense of Suez is left to Egypt, we will defend it heartily and efficiently as part of our own national soil, which it is. After all, in the past British garrisons there have been troops from India and Cyprus. Are they better than Egyptians? I do not think so.[118]

He also expressed his disapproval of Western support of Israel, which jeopardized the relations between the Arabs and the West. The Israeli-

[115] Ibid., p. 40.

[116] New York Times, December 11, 1952, p. 4.

[117] Ibid., p. 14.

[118] Ibid.

West German agreement, in his view, was designed to strengthen Israel.[119]

[119] Ibid.

CHAPTER II

NEW ADMINISTRATION AND NEW REGIME

Egyptian leaders were convinced that President Truman's policy in the Middle East had been influenced by the Zionists, to the extent that Israel had been considered more important than all of the Arab states put together. After the American election of 1952, which elevated General Eisenhower to the presidency, the Egyptian foreign minister stated: "Egypt would be . . . interested in a change in the United States policy toward her and the Arab world."[1] When President Eisenhower took office in January, the Egyptian leaders hoped that "the Republican administration [would] give more emphasis to Arab affairs and less to Israeli affairs than did its predecessor."[2]

Among the tasks that President Eisenhower had to face was the recent decline of American prestige in the Arab world. As a result of Mr. Truman's policy, the United States would need to modify her policy in the Middle East or face the loss of this area to Communism.[3] Having been out of office for about twenty years, the Republicans came into office with determination to take a "new look" at all existing policies. During the Truman era the basic objective of American policy had been to draw Egypt into a regional defense alliance. Her basic objective remained unchanged, though some of the approaches and

[1] New York Times, November 6, 1952, p. 11.

[2] New York Times, March 8, 1953, p. 36.

[3] Time, January 26, 1953, p. 16.

methods used were altered. The Republicans determined to do what they could to settle the Anglo-Egyptian and the Arab-Israeli disputes, and clear the way for military arrangement. They were encouraged by "recent developments in Egypt, the richest and most influential of the Arab states, which held the keys to a settlement of the Suez base issue and whose example might well prove decisive in Arab relations with Israel."[4] The new administration "pinned its hopes on [Nasser] as the keystone of its new Middle East policy."[5]

The Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, decided to look into the situation himself by visiting Egypt and other major Middle Eastern countries in the spring of 1953. He was impressed by the new Egyptian leaders, whose aim was to develop their country. Concerning the Anglo-Egyptian problem, he said:

> I am convinced that there is nothing irreconcilable between this international concern and Egyptian sovereignty. We asked, with some success, that there be further time to find a peaceful solution. The United States is prepared to assist in any desired way.[6]

His visit eased the tension between Egypt and Britain, and accord was reached concerning the Suez issue.

[4]Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs 1953 (New York: Harper for Council on Foreign Relations 1955), p. 292

[5]Time, March 11, 1957, p. 26.

[6]Denise Folliot, Documents on International Affairs 1953 (London: Oxford University Press, for Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956), pp. 260-261.

Suez Settlement

To many American observers and commentators, the new Egyptian regime

> had seemed to offer a heaven--sent opportunity for removing the obstacles which. . .prevented the inclusion of the Middle East in the Western scheme for the containment of Russian expansion. . . . The only obstacle remaining to the identification of General Nagib's Egypt with the 'free world' was. . . . the presence of British troops and authority in the Canal Zone and the Sudan.[7]

The United States urged the British government to win the good will of the new Egyptian leaders by arriving at an agreement on both issues, rather than waiting to see how the new regime would turn out. She pressed Britain to take a moderate stand on the Sudan question in order to induce Egypt to reach an agreement about the Suez base. The American Ambassador in Cairo, Jefferson Caffrey, played an active role in encouraging the negotiations that led to the Sudan accord. Egypt, instead of insisting on the unification with the Sudan under Egyptian rule, "proposed that the Sudanese should have a choice between complete independence or union in one form or another."[8] When Britain accepted this proposal, compromise became possible, and an agreement was concluded on February 12, 1953. General Najuib praised the United

[7]George Kirk, "The Egyptian Revolution and National Aspiration," Survey of International Affairs 1952 (London: Oxford University Press, for R.I.I.A. 1955), p. 220.

[8]Reader Bullard, Sir, The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey (third edition, London: Oxford University Press, for R.I.I.A. p. 429.

States' efforts during the course of negotiation and declared that "these had direct effect on the successful conclusion of this agreement."[9]

The agreement itself:

> provided that the Sudanese people should 'exercise self-determination' at the end of a transitional period which was to last not more than three years, and could be ended before then by a resolution of the Sudanese parliament desiring that arrangements for self-determination be put in motion. Such a resolution was to be followed by the election, under international supervision of a constituent assembly to decide the future of the Sudanese, and to choose between complete independence or a link with Egypt.[10]

The Sudanese election that was held at the end of 1953 brought the National Unity party to power. Though at first it stood for unity with Egypt, its experience in power caused it in the end to choose independence.[11]

Two days after the conclusion of the Sudan agreement, General Najuib declared that talks on the Suez issue would be resumed very soon. British Foreign Minister Eden went to Washington to confer with Secretary of State Dulles about the problem of obtaining an agreement with Egypt for retention of the British base in the Suez, and inducing Egypt to participate in the Middle East defense arrangement. In his opinion, "it is essential that the United States and British policy toward Egypt be

[9]New York Times, February 13, 1953, p. 5.

[10]Carel Bell, Survey of International Affairs 1954 (London: Oxford University Press, for R.I.I.A., 1956), p. 199.

[11]Ibid., pp. 200-201.

brought into the closest possible alignment to prevent Egypt from playing one country against the other in quest of economic and military aid."[12] Moreover, he felt that the loss of Iran's oil was due partly to differences in British and American attitudes and policies.[13] This visit caused some suspicion and uneasiness in Egypt. Najuib held that unconditional and immediate British evacuation was the only way to gain Egypt's confidence.[14] Britain wanted U. S. participation in the Suez negotiation, but Egypt rejected this in the interest of preserving good American-Egyptian relations.[15] A crisis arose when the American ambassador accompanied the British ambassador to a meeting held with General Najuib and the Egyptian foreign minister.[16] However, the United States made it clear that she would not take part unless she were invited to do so by both parties.[17]

The wide discrepancy between the Egyptian and British viewpoints caused a delay in commencing formal negotiations. Egypt demanded an immediate British withdrawal from the Suez zone, and refused to discuss anything else with Britain until a settlement of this issue could be worked out. Britain, on the other hand, made the withdrawal conditional

[12]New York Times, February 21, 1953, p. 3.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs 1953 (London: Oxford University Press, for R.I.I.A., 1956), p. 163.

[15]New York Times, March 19, 1953, p. 19.

[16]Survey of International Affairs 1953, pp. 163-164.

[17]New York Times, March 19, 1953, p. 19.

upon Egypt's joining a regional defense alliance. On April 11, Nasser:

> urged that negotiation should be begun at once for a just solution, upon the understanding that this involved evacuation and no discussion of the Middle Eastern defense. He expressed Egyptian lack of trust, which he ascribed to the delay in beginning discussions after the conclusion of the agreement on the Sudan, and to British attempts to link the question of the Canal Zone with questions of regional defense.[18]

The discussion was then resumed on April 27. Britain believed that the Suez base should be kept in a state of constant readiness, and that Egypt could not operate and maintain it without outside aid. Nasser conceded the British view and recognized the need for British technicians, since the base had been run by British. But he held that Egypt must have the right to look where it would for help if Britain became uncooperative. The talks were suspended when Egypt demanded a clear statement of British intentions to withdraw from the base before proceeding to discuss other matters. Britain refused to give such a pledge without first discussing the security of the Suez Canal.[19]

Just at this moment, Secretary Dulles arrived in Cairo on his survey tour. He presented to General Najuib a pistol as a gift from President Eisenhower.[20] During his visit, he discussed with the Egyptian leaders the problems of the Middle East, particularly the Suez problem and the problem of defending the area. On his departure, he made an aerial detour to the Suez base. He expressed his grave concern

[18]Survey of International Affairs 1953, p. 165.

[19]Ibid., pp. 165-166.

[20]Stebbin, op. cit., p. 295

regarding its future.[21] He backed the British view that experienced administrative and technical personnel was needed to operate the base efficiently.[22] "The matter has an importance which goes beyond Egypt, for the base serves all Near Eastern and indeed Western security,"[23] he said. After his return home, he urged the resumption of negotiations, and on July 30, the Egyptians and the British met again.[24] By the end of the year, negotiations at which Ambassador Caffrey "constituted himself an informal mediator"[25] had confined the dispute to:

> (1) the size and character of the contingent technicians which, both parties agreed, must be left behind to maintain the base after the main British forces withdrew; and (2) the conditions under which Britain might reenter the base in the event of war or threat of war.[26]

The United States apparently desired that the British government should go further toward meeting Egyptian demands. But the British indicated that they had reached the limits of concession on these points.[27] In December 1953, at his meeting with President Eisenhower, Prime Minister Churchill "'made it clear. . . .that there was no prospect

[21] Ibid., p. 167.

[22] New York Times, May 12, 1953, p. 1.

[23] Folliot, op. cit., p. 260

[24] Survey of International Affairs 1954, p. 170.

[25] Guy Wint and Peter Calvocoressi, Middle East Crisis (Baltimore: Penguin, 1957, p. 45.

[26] Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs 1954 (New York, Harper, for C.F.R., 1956), pp. 338-339.

[27] Ibid., p. 339.

of any modification in the British position.'"[28] In the House of Commons, he asserted that "British action '[would] be based on a careful and faithful study of the merits of the problem, and [would] not be dictated either by the violence of our foreign enemies or by the pressure of some of our best friends.'"[29] This was an obvious reference to the United States.

Early in 1954, negotiations were broken off[30] because of a dispute between Najuib and Nasser over the future of the new Egyptian regime. Najuib regarded the military regime as a brief transitional stage during which arrangements should be made for establishing constitutional government while Nasser, along with the majority of the R.C.C. favored completing the revolution by pressing on with radical reforms under military rule.[31] The feud between them precipitated Najuib's resignation, which apparently followed the censoring of a speech in which he attacked Pakistan for its intention to join what became known later as the Baghdad Pact. On February 24, his resignation was approved.[32] Nasser assumed the post of the president. Britain feared that the ousting of Najuib would eliminate the opportunity of concluding an agreement. The United States was less pessimistic, and

[28]The United States in World Affairs 1953 , p. 297.

[29]Ibid.

[30]The United States in World Affairs, 1954, loc. cit.

[31]Bullard, op. cit., p. 195.

[32]Survey of International Affairs 1954, p. 186.

felt that the change would not alter Egyptian foreign policy.[33] However, Egyptian public opinion did not approve of Najuib's resignation, and after three days he was invited by the R.C.C. to return "to the presidency, on the agreement that he would accept the limitations of power implied in that post."[34] He immediately promised a constituent assembly and general election, and abolished martial law and press censorship. He resumed the post of Prime Minister and chairmanship of the R.C.C.[35] On March 29, Nasser regained control of the R.C.C., and all previous decisions taken by Najuib were rescinded. Shortly afterward, Nasser became the premier, the chairman of the R.C.C. and the effective ruler of the country, without opposition from any source. Najuib remained the president until November, but never again exercised any authority.[36] Most foreign observers in Egypt "concluded that Najuib,. . .[lacked] the capacity to govern Egypt effectively himself and he would almost certainly be used as a front man by whatever group succeeded in capturing him."[37] His final downfall came on November 14, when he was charged with giving his approval to the Moslem Brotherhood intrigue which was instigated against Nasser.[38] Foreign

[33]New York Times, February 26, 1954, pp. 1, 3.

[34]Survey of International Affairs 1954, p. 187.

[35]Bullard, op. cit., p. 196.

[36]Survey of International Affairs 1954, p. 189.

[37]New York Times Magazine, September 1954, p. 12.

[38]Survey of International Affairs 1954, pp. 190-191.

diplomats regarded his removal as a stabilizing move[39] which would put an end to the dual nature of Egyptian leadership.

The solidification of Nasser's position paved the way for the resumption of negotiations with Britain. Nasser appeared more ready to compromise than had Najuib. The United States, which was doing its best to promote a settlement agreeable to both parties, exploited every opportunity to that end. When President Eisenhower and Mr. Churchill met in June, 1954, they agreed that keeping a large concentration of men and materials at the Suez base was of doubtful expediency in an age of nuclear warfare. On June 10, Britain modified its previous conditions regarding the technicians who were to remain at the base, and so an agreement on the foacl points of the dispute with Egypt was concluded on July 27. The final and more detailed agreement was reached on October 19.[40]

The new agreement, which replaced the treaty of 1936,

> provided for a total withdrawal of British troops over a period of twenty months. Britain was given the right to return to the base, but only in case of an attack, by any country except Israel, on any member of the Arab League or Turkey.
>
> Installations were to be maintained not by the British army, but by civilian technicians employed by British and French civil firms. Egypt also reaffirmed the Constantinople Convention guaranteeing the unimpeded passage of ships through the Suez Canal.[41]

[39] New York Times, November 16, 1954, p. 5.

[40] The United States in World Affairs 1954, pp. 339-340.

[41] Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 44.

It was to last for seven years.

For the Egyptian leaders this was the end of a long struggle to be rid of British troops, which had been in Egypt since 1882. For the British it was the best deal they could get in a situation which was becoming increasingly difficult.[42] Both Nasser and Mr. Eden expressed their gratitude to the United States for her help in bringing about this accord.[43] Undoubtedly, Ambassador Caffrey played a considerable role in mediating their differences. The American aim "was to hasten the day when Egypt would be prepared to cooperate voluntarily in Western defense."[44] The United States affirmed that the Western power would be in a stronger position in the long run if Britain came to terms with Egypt.

President Eisenhower hailed the new Anglo-Egyptian treaty which, in his view, had terminated the friction not only between Egypt and Britain but also between Britain and the United States.[45] In June, 1953, General Najuib had requested U. S. military and economic aid. In replying to him, President Eisenhower stated that "with a Suez accord he would be prepared to see the United States enter into 'firm

[42]John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problem of American Policy (New York: Harper, for C.F.R., 1958), p. 65.

[43]The United States in World Affairs 1954, p. 341.

[44]Campbell, op. cit., p. 66.

[45]New York Times, July 29, 1954, p. 1.

commitments for economic and military assistance.'"[46] For the same reason, the United States had been withholding $20 million worth of aid which had been earmarked for Egypt.[47] The Suez dispute had deprived Egypt of major military and economic assistance. For three years prior to 1954, Egypt had received only a small amount of aid under the technical assistance program. However, the Suez agreement had now removed any reason for withholding American aid to Egypt.[48] President Eisenhower "hoped that Egypt could now go ahead with her friends toward improving both her economic and security position."[49] On November 7, the United States agreed to grant Egypt $40 million for economic development. This sum was below the figure of $100 million per year which the Egyptian government had asked be guaranteed for a ten-year period.[50] Egypt was denied the grant when she refused to take part in a regional alliance with the West.[51] Egypt did not accept any military aid because of the strings attached to it. Nasser said:

> It is not possible to give aid without a mission. However, here in our country doing this would work against [the United States] and against the the regime. The people will say that

[46] New York Times, October 22, 1954, p. 8.

[47] Robert Strausz-Hupe and others, American-Asian Tensions (New York: Praeger, 1956), p. 176.

[48] New York Times, July 29, 1954, p. 4.

[49] Ibid.

[50] New York Times, November 7, 1954, p. 6.

[51] Time, September 13, 1955, p. 37.

> after great efforts we were able to get rid of the British mission, but that now this Government is bringing us an American mission, and that our country will be under American rule.[52]

Events proved that the Western hope that Nasser would voluntarily cooperate in the military sphere was ill founded. Nasser showed no disposition to join any sort of defense alliance. Criticism of the American role in the Anglo-Egyptian negotiation mounted in Britain. It was said "that the United States put pressure on the British to induce them to agree to give up the Suez and thus bear responsibility for the weakening of the Western position through the loss of this key base."[53] But it is fair to say that the withdrawal from the base was a British decision and that Nasser made the final concessions necessary to get Mr. Eden to agree to evacuate Suez.[54] Mr. Eden thought that he had been betrayed by Nasser.

> Eden, one of the most emotional prime ministers whom this [Britain had] known, [seemed] to have come step by step to feel implacable anger against Nasser. He saw Middle East politics as a duel between himself and Nasser. He became convinced that British interests, and world peace, required that Nasser should be put down.[55]

After the Suez accord, the Egyptian leaders intended to establish closer economic and military cooperation with the United States, "but apparently,. . . public opinion, conditioned by seventy-two years of

[52] U. S. News and World Report, September 3, 1954, p. 29.

[53] Campbell, loc. cit.

[54] Ibid., p. 66-67

[55] Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 47.

opposition to British domination, would not now support them in an overt defense alliance."[56] Instead of waiting for the Egyptian people to get used to the idea of a defense alliance, the United States soon proposed the Baghdad Pact. The series of events which followed the making of this proposal eventually destroyed all confidence between Egypt and the United States. Among these events were: Nasser's diplomatic offensive against the pact; Israel's large-scale attack on Gaza, the unwillingness of the United States to sell Nasser arms, the Egyptian arms deal with the Soviets; Egyptian Cold-War neutrality, the American withdrawal of the High Dam offer, and the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. But the Israeli question remained the focal point of conflict.

Baghdad Pact

Secretary Dulles, after his visit to the Middle East in 1953, concluded that a regional defense alliance was an eventual, rather than an immediate, possibility, since many of the Arab countries were involved in quarrels with Israel or Britain or France. As a result they paid little heed to the Soviet menace. The "northern tire" of nations, in Dulles' opinion was most aware of the Communist danger.[57] Any sound defense arrangement, he felt, must not be "imposed from without. It

[56] New York Times, November 7, 1954, p. 6.

[57] Document on International Affairs 1953, p. 266.

should be designed and grow from within out of a sense of common destiny and common danger."[58]

Early in 1954, it seemed that the concept of the "northern tier" offered an opportunity to those countries which wanted to be strengthened themselves to do so without increasing the tensions present in the Middle East. Turkey, which had already joined NATO, became the cornerstone of the northern tier alignment. Pakistan, with whom the United States had signed a military assistance agreement, was the second choice. Those two Middle Eastern nations signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation for security on April 2, 1954. The United States then began to offer its military aid to those nations which would be willing to join the new defense scheme. The Pact was in effect a substitute for the Middle East Defense Organization, which Mr. Dulles "believed was abortive as a means of given stability to the oil-bearing region."[59]

The United States had been eying Iraq, not Egypt, as a potential Arab member of the new organization. On April 21, 1954, Washington approved, in an exchange of notes, an Iraqi request for military assistance under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program. This approval was based on an understanding between the two countries that Iraq would assume a formal commitment in regional defense.[60] Earlier in January,

[58] Ibid.

[59] Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 50.

[60] Campbell, op. cit., p. 52.

Iraq, at the meetings of the Arab League Council, expressed disapproval of the League's announced policy of neutralism.[61] However, the Iraqi Cabinet fell, shortly after accepting the American aid. The reason was the heavy popular opposition to the "project of adhering to the Turco-Pakistani treaty."[62] The matter of adhesion was then postponed until things cooled off. In August, Premier Nuri es-Said, the most reliable Arab leader who shared the Western view, intended to join in the new defense organization, "taking a chance on being able to control any domestic opposition, legal or illegal."[63] The only major problem facing him was to make her more palatable to Egypt which has great influence upon Arab opinion.

Egypt, however, was unwilling to commit herself to any defense arrangement including non-Arab countries. On August 19, Nasser stated:

> After the Suez settlement there is nothing standing in the way of our good relations with the West, but this hammering, hammering, hammering for pacts will only keep alive the old suspicions in the minds of the people, and the Communists know well how to exploit these suspicions.[64]

He warned: "'It is a matter of group psychology with deep roots and until the Arabs realize that there is no longer any hidden domination or control in pacts, any pressure to obtain them will be dangerously premature.'"[65]

[61]The United States in World Affairs 1954, p. 343.

[62]Survey of International Affairs 1954, p. 207.

[63]Campbell, op. cit., p. 53.

[64]The United States in World Affairs 1954, p. 342.

[65]Survey of International Affairs 1954, p. 211.

He stated further: "'I cannot defend any of these schemes because our people are poisoned against any organization of this type. They consider such organization as an imperialistic thing, and just colonialism in disguise.'"[66] The kind of cooperation he wanted with the West was the strengthening of the Arab League with Western assistance, and without any military alliance with non-Arab countries.[67] He privately did not exclude the possibility of an indirect alliance between Egypt and a NATO country.

In refusing to join any defense arrangement, Nasser was motivated by a number of considerations, both practical and ideological. He was not immune to the suspicion that the United States and Britain, in pressing for defense cooperation, were trying to regain a foothold in Egypt for some nefarious aims of their own. The only threat to the Arabs, in his opinion, stemmed not from Russia but from Israel. He did not want to tie his country to powers whose stand on the Arab-Israeli dispute was so different from that of the Arab countries. His major aim was to improve his country's economic and social conditions.[68]

In August, 1954, the Egyptian government sent the Minister of National Guidance, Saleh Salem, to Iraq to discuss the matter of regional defense with Iraqi officials. On September 15, the Iraqi Premier, Nuri el-Said, went to Cairo to confer privately with Nasser on the same

[66] U. S. News and World Report, September 3, 1953, p. 27.

[67] Campbell, op. cit., p. 68.

[68] The United States in World Affairs 1954, pp. 342-343.

subject. Subsequent events proved that no clear-cut decision was taken. Nuri stated that Nasser approved his decision to join the Western defense scheme, but he was urged to hold off until the conclusion of the Suez agreement. In October, after the Suez settlement, Iraq began to negotiate with Turkey. The Arab League Council met again at Cairo in December to consider the military alliance project and to settle the differences between Iraq and Egypt.[69] At the end of the conference,

> Iraq and Egypt had agreed that the [Arab] Collective security pact should be strengthened and developed into an effective military organization, which, following the British withdrawal from Suez, would take over exclusive responsibility for the defense of the Middle East.[70]

The decision was no surprise, because the majority of the Council's members believed that the cold war with Russia was a Western affair, and that as long as they were not tied to Western policy, they had nothing to fear from Russia. On April 13, the Jordanian foreign minister, expressing his gratitude for the Russian veto on the Palestine problem, declared that it "was 'worth all the aid of American and Britain.'"[71] In December, Jordan began to press Britain to revise the treaty of 1948, whereby the British maintained certain ground forces and two air bases in their country. Saudi Arabia asked Washington, on October 17, to close down the American foreign aid mission and leave her to finance her own technical assistance. In November, the

[69]Campbell, op. cit., p. 54.

[70]Geoffery Barraclough and Rachell F. Wall, Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956 (London: Oxford University Press, for R.I.I.A.,1960), p. 25.

[71]The United States in World Affairs 1954, pp. 344-345.

Syrian premier said that his country would not tie itself to either the East or the West.[72]

On February 24, 1955, less than a month after her agreement with Egypt, Iraq, which was ruled by a dictatorial government[73] concluded a treaty of mutual defense with Turkey. She did so under pressure from Britain.[74] The:

> sudden volt face of Nuri es-Said had an air of insincerity and double dealing. It is true that the Iraqi government argued that the agreement with Turkey was compatibly with the aim of the Arab League, but little, if any, credence was given to this view.[75]

This agreement came as a shock to Arab opinion.

> Arabs saw in it one more desire by the West to try to use Arab countries as pawns in their Cold War against Russia. In their eyes such a manuever was a denial of Arab equality and sovereignty. It reinforced their suspicion that the West never gave anything without a plan of entangling the Arabs in its military plans. The West seemed determined to treat the Arab countries as satellites, not as equals.[76]

Demonstrations broke out in protest throughout the Arab countries.

The United States and Britain, it seems, did not anticipate the effects of such a treaty on Egypt, although Nasser earlier gave adequate warnings of what would happen. He reacted very strongly and took the

[72] Ibid., p. 344.

[73] Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 25.

[74] Hallis Barber, The United States in World Affairs 1955 (New York: Harper, for C.F.R., 1957), p. 155.

[75] Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, loc. cit.

[76] Wint and Calvocolressi, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

lead in organizing the Arab countries against it.

> The immediate reaction was one of suspicion both that Turkey was now making a bid for the leadership in the Middle East which she had lost after the first World War, and that Britain, and less directly the United States, were hoping to use the Baghdad Pact to restore their vanishing control over the Arab world and were using Turkey as a tool to give the operation an aura of respectability.[77]

Nasser charged that "the United States and Britain had violated a 'gentlemen's agreement' with Egypt, which envisaged that the latter country should take the lead in constructing a purely Arab defense alliance."[78] He supported his position by pointing out that:

> (1) Whenever there is a treaty or pact between big powers and small powers, the small powers will be used by the big ones for their purposes, no matter what the treaty stipulates. . . .
> (2) The Arab world already had enough ties with the West to insure adequate cooperation. There was the Anglo-Egyptian Suez agreement, the Anglo-Jordan Treaty of Mutual Defense, the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Mutual Defense, and the American air base in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. . . .
> (3) The Baghdad Pact was a blow at Arab unity, since it linked Arabs with non-Arab states. This would weaken the Arabs' ability to work together as a close-knit diplomatic bloc for the achievement of distinctively Arab objectives.[79]

It seems that his arguments, in view of the fears and suspicions of colonialism rife throughout the Arab world, were understandable, but they failed to win understanding in the West. In spite of his anger against the Pact, Nasser, even after the British adhesion to it,

[77]T. E. M. McKitterick and Knenneth Younger, Fabian International Essays, (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 123.

[78]Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 29.

[79]Wilton Wynn, Nasser of Egypt: The Search for Dignity (Cambridge: Arlington, 1959), pp. 111-112.

maintained that Egypt would fight on the Western side in the event of global war.[80]

The reaction of the other Arab countries also betrayed considerable miscalculation. Though none of the pact's sponsors had seriously expected Egypt to participate, they certainly expected at least to bring in Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan. Instead, Syria settled her differences with Egypt and followed Nasser's lead against the pact. "Turkish pressure on Syria, even when supported by troop concentrations, equally failed to bring about a weakening in Syrian support for Egypt."[81] Her "grievance against Turkey over the port of Alexandretta (Iskenderon) acquired by the Turks in 1939"[82] and her policy of neutrality were the major reasons for her refusal to join. In Jordan, British pressure and an "offer to modernize [the Jordanian] army in return for Jordian adhesion to the Baghdad Pact"[83] brought adverse effects. The outraged demonstrations against the pact toppled three governments within a week. King Hussein and the "old reliable" leaders could no longer control the situation. The initiative had been taken by the nationalists who favored following Egyptian leadership.[84] Lebanon, which tried to bridge the rift between Iraq and Egypt, in the end came out

[80]Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, loc. cit.

[81]Ibid., p. 27.

[82]Survey of International Affairs 1954, p. 210.

[83]Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 283.

[84]Campbell, op. cit., p. 59.

on the side of the latter.[85] Saudi Arabia, being traditionally pro-Egypt and anti-Hashemite, supported the Egyptian campaign politically and financially.[86] Her dispute with Britain over Buraimi was another reason for her resolute opposition to the pact. Yemen also joined the Egyptian camp, not only because she had traditionally sided with Egypt, but also because of her conflict with Britain over the Aden protectorate.[87] In this context, Nasser met with success on all sides.

The immediate consequence of the pact was the virtual demise of the Arab League and a rapid effort by Egypt to secure a new alignment of the anti-pact countries. Egypt regarded Iraq's accession to the pact as a violation of the spirit of the Arab League's collective security pact. Egypt announced the dissolution of the League's pact and, as a substitute for it, outlined proposals for a new pact from which Iraq was to be excluded. A system of bilateral and multilateral defense pacts under Egypt's leadership was established, linking Egypt with Syria, Saudi Arabia, Yemen[88] and Jordan. By setting up this system, Egypt re-established her influence in the Arab world and thrust Iraq into isolation. In criticizing American policy for this development, Mr. John C. Campbell, Director of Political Studies of the Council on Foreign

[85] Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 98.

[86] Campbell, op. cit., p. 54.

[87] Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 30.

[88] Ibid., pp. 25-27.

Relations, writes:

> [Iraq's] isolation from its brother Arab states is unnatural and unlikely to be permanent. No other Arab state has been drawn into the pact, and the pull of the Arab world is inherently stronger than that of the West. . . .
>
> America should help Iraq to hold firm, recognizing that it will remain with the West only if the West can find a sounder relationship with the rest of the Arab world. Otherwise the relationship becomes too heavy a burden for Iraq. . . . The only hopeful course is one which frankly admits Arab aspirations to self-determination, equality and independence.[89]

Because she had not been consulted, France opposed the pact. More important,

> There were many French complaints, not only that it was not receiving support from its Anglo-American allies, but still more that the United States and England were intriguing to expel France from North Africa and to use Libya as an anti-French base.[90]

Because of these developments, the attitude of the United States became equivocal. Her hesitation made the supporters of the pact suspicious. In a reply to Nuri's appeal for participation, the State Department made it clear that this was a matter "of timing, not of a basic change in policy."[91] The United States, apparently,

> was deterred by fear of increasing the already high tensions in the area, antagonizing Egypt's Abd'al Nasir who in any case was gravely displeased with U. S. sympathy for

[89]John C. Campbell, "From Doctrine to Policy in the Middle East". Foreign Affairs, April 1957, p. 445

[90]Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 24.

[91]Ibid., p. 27.

> the pact, adding fuel to the fire of anti-colonial protests at the Bandung Conference, and alienating Israel and its friends in the United States.[92]

Moreover, the United States:

> wished to keep whatever chance still remained of working with Saudi Arabia and Egypt; it did not want to provoke any new Soviet move into the Middle East;...and it did not relish the prospect of a debate in the Senate on ratification which might throw its whole Middle Eastern policy into the arena of domestic politics.[93]

Though these were logical reasons for putting off joining the pact:

> the fact remains that, for the supporters of the Baghdad Pact, the attitude of the United States administration was a serious blow, which was only partially offset when, on 30 March, the conservative government in England announced its decision to adhere to the Turco-Iraqi treaty.[94]

Britain joined formally on April 4. Pakistan followed suit in September, and Iran acceded in October.

In the view of the State Department, the British had joined the pact for certain specific purposes. Their chief aim was the renewal of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, which would expire in 1957. Mr. Eden, in the House of Commons, stated: "It has been our aim to forge a new association with Iraq. . . . the 1930 Treaty, which, as the House knows, would in any event have terminated in 18 months."[95] In 1948, Britain failed to secure a new agreement with Iraq. At that time, public opinion in Iraq, because of the Palestine problem, made it

[92]The United States in World Affairs 1955, p. 155.

[93]Campbell, op. cit., p. 60.

[94]Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, pp. 27-28.

[95]Documents on International Affairs 1955, p. 290.

impossible for any prime minister to make such an arrangement.[96] Thus Britain availed herself of this opportunity to sign a new agreement with Iraq.

After Britain's accession to the pact, its purpose changed. The original plan of Secretary Dulles was to promote a rampart against the Soviet Union. Instead the pact became an instrument for blocking Nasser's ambitions in the Arab world, where British policy had suffered a series of defeats. Moreover, Britain, as the only Western power in the pact, assumed the role of leadership. She considered the pact to be the cornerstone of her policy in the Middle East. Mr. Eden flatly stated "'our purpose...was very simple. I think that by...[joining] ...we have strengthened our influence and our voice throughout the Middle East.'"[97] After agreeing to evacuate the Suez, Britain looked to her position in Iraq as a means of protecting her interests throughout the region. She felt that she could not depend on Egypt's promise to let her use the Suez base in case of war. However, there was uncertainty as to how successful her new arrangement would prove since "Iraq's adherence depended on Nuri. There was no certainty that his successor would continue it. Nuri wove his own personal policies; he was not, like Nasser, the agent of forces which would continue even if he were removed."[98]

[96]Survey of International Affairs 1954, p. 290

[97]Campbell, op. cit., p. 58.

[98]Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 53.

The Baghdad Pact caused some friction between the United States and Britain. The President, admitting this, said: "There were slightly different viewpoints with respect to...the Baghdad Pact."[99] Secretary Dulles, angered by the British exploitation of the pact for their own purposes, stated that "the United States would only join the Baghdad Pact 'when it can be seen to contribute to the general stability of the area.'"[100] The British, on the other hand, criticized the United States for considering "Nasser as a 'western type democrat with healthy anti-colonialist ideas which should be encouraged.'"[101] Mr. Eden privately deplored the United States' failure to join the pact and thought that the United States was attempting to take credit for non-participation in Cairo. But he admitted later that Britain's "conflict with Egypt over the Baghdad Pact caused renewed deterioration of [Anglo-Egyptian] relations and offset the gain."[102]

In November, 1955, the five participants met at Baghdad to set up the formal organization, including a Council of Ministers and special committees for military and economic cooperation. A permanent headquarters was established in Baghdad. The United States sent observers to the meeting. The decision of the United States to participate fully in the pact's committees was announced at the next meeting held at Tehran in April. Since Britain, Turkey and Pakistan were already linked with

[99]Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 305.

[100]Ibid., p. 285.

[101]Ibid., p. 305.

[102]Ibid., p. 29.

the United States through the NATO and SEATO arrangements, the pact did not add much to the system of defenses the West was building up. In Campbell's words:

> Fathered by American initiative, the pact was left weak and unformed by virtue of the disparate interest of its members and the half-heartedness of American support; uncertain of its future in the growing crisis which its very existence had helped to create.[103]

While the Baghdad Pact was designed to combat Communism in the Middle East, it laid the basis for a Soviet-Egyptian rapprochment. The Soviet Union joined the Arab nationalists in their opposition to the pact, and offered to arm the Arab Collective Security Pact through those members prepared to accept Soviet arms. A formal offer to Egypt was made in January 1955.[104] Of no less importance, the pact also

> marked a major turning point in the evolution of Egypt's leadership: the revolutionary drive which had toppled the old regime and its supporting structure in Egypt now turned outward, and 'Nasserism' became a driving force in the Arab world. A major incident along Israel's border helped spark this transformation.[105]

Arms Deal

The question of arms forms a bitter chapter in American-Egyptian

[103]Campbell, op. cit., p. 62.

[104]Little, op. cit., p. 274.

[105]Keith Wheelock, Nasser's New Egypt: A Critical Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1960), p. 222.

relations. It is a problem which is ultimately rooted in the even more difficult problem of Israel. Throughout 1948, 1949, and 1950, Egypt kept pressing the United States for arms. Disturbed by the Anglo-Egyptian dispute, the United States made the selling of arms contingent upon Egypt's inclusion in the Middle East defense alliance, which the Egyptians thought would prolong the presence of the British in their country. When the Korean War broke out in 1950, Egypt refused to take part in it because of her dissatisfaction with the attitudes of both the United Nations and the United States toward Israel. This stand denied her U. S. arms, which were given to the participants in that war. The Egyptian leaders, then, threatened to get arms from the Soviet Union, and enter into a non-agression treaty with it. In the end, the old regime failed to secure arms either from the West or from the East.[106]

The new Egyptian leaders expressed their desire for arms shortly after the revolution. They sent a mission to the United States to purchase arms in the fall of 1952. After much painstaking negotiation, the mission returned empty-handed. President Eisenhower, in his letter to General Najuib on July 15, 1953, made it clear that selling arms would be possible only after a Suez settlement with Britain, which had imposed an embargo on arms shipments to Egypt. The U. S. sold Egypt only light weapons for the police, and some ambulances. The two Western allies sought to isolate Egypt from other sources of supply. The United States persuaded Spain to cancel armaments contracts, totalling over $3 million,

[106]Strauz-Hupe, op. cit., pp. 151-153.

with Egypt, on the grounds that they were contrary to the provisions of the American-Spanish Military Aid Agreement. Though Britain lifted her arms embargo in August, 1954, the United States remained reluctant to meet Egypt's military demands.[107] American military aid to Egypt also was conditional upon her signing agreements under the Mutual Security Acts which contained conditions Nasser found unacceptable. To him, all this constituted a basic affront to Egypt at the time when American aid continued to flow to Israel.[108] However, the Egyptian leaders were not in urgent need for amrs, since "their original objective had been internal reform"[109] and since the expansion of the army had to be limited by the need to develop Egypt socially and economically.[110] Another important factor was the relative quietness on the Egyptian-Israeli border.[111]

In 1954, "the Israeli army was still judged by observers to be stronger, more efficient and better armed than the Arab forces that could be deployed against it."[112] The Western powers felt that "the supply of arms to the Arab countries would not significantly alter the balance of power between them and Israel for about two years."[113]

[107]Wheelock, op. cit., p. 228.

[108]Wynn, op. cit., pp. 117-118.

[109]George Lenczouski, The Middle East in World Affairs (second edition, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1956), p. 363.

[110]Little, op. cit., p. 268.

[111]Ibid.

[112]Survey of International Affairs 1954, p. 215.

[113]Ibid., p. 214.

But the feud over the Baghdad Pact changed the situation.

Early in 1955, Ben Gurion, after more than a year spent in retirement, returned to power as Prime Minister and Minister of Defense. His return to office caused premonitory anxiety both among the Arabs and in the West. Within ten days of his taking office, the Israeli army launched the most destructive attack in its history. The attack was directed at the Egyptian army in the Gaza strip on February 28. The Egyptian casualties were 69. The date of this attack "is one of the most fateful dates in Middle East history."[114] Now "Israel began to think in terms of the use of force in order to drive the Arabs to make peace."[115] But it is uncertain that Israel benefited diplomatically from the Gaza attack and other large-scale attacks that followed it.[116] As a justification of its action,

> Israel calimed that the attack had been provoked by numerous fedayeen ('death squad') raids mounted from Gaza--a claim which was not substantitated by Henry Byroade, the American Ambassador in Cairo, United Nations Mixed Armistice Commission reports, and the New York Times chronology for the preceding six months.[117]

This claim was also, and perhaps inadvertently, refuted by the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations, who stated that "the fedayeen conducted their first raid in to Israel in August 1955."[118]

[114]Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., pp. 57-58.

[115]Ibid., p. 56.

[116]Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 96.

[117]Wheelock, op. cit., p. 222.

[118]Ibid., p. 226.

Egypt held Ben Gurion responsible for the prearranged and planned attack, and took it "as confirmation that he had inaugurated a phase of aggressive frontier policy."[119] The attack revealed the utter weakness of Egypt's military defense, and alarmed Nasser greatly. He refused to retaliate because he felt that this would start a chain reaction leading to war with Israel. He

> had, in fact, nothing to gain by promoting trouble on the Israeli border, and most of the time he tried to avoid it. Organized guerilla activity inside Israel was not started until weeks after the first Gaza attack, and even then it was very limited form of counter-action designed to provide the maximum propaganda effect at home.[120]

As a leader of a military regime, he could not suffer military humiliation without risk to his position at home. He began to fear that his army, through which he ruled the country might revolt and his fears were not empty ones. "Recalling the fate of King Farouk, many officers frankly threatened an anti-Nasser coup unless sufficient arms were forthcoming to cope with Israel."[121] "The Gaza attack gave the impression that Nasser had done little more for the army than had Farouk."[122]

With this turn of events, Nasser could no longer leave his army

[119]Little, loc. cit.

[120]Ibid., p. 270.

[121]Wynn, op. cit., p. 116.

[122]Ibid., p. 114.

in a position of inferiority. He believed that the Tripartite Declaration of 1950 would never be implemented effectively against Israel. He was determined to get arms.[123] In this connection, it should be noted that the United States and Britain did nothing effective to prevent the border fights during 1955. The United States "still believed it possible to remain uncommitted in the Middle East. It wanted a free hand when a crisis should arise."[124] For different reasons, Britain was also unwilling to take any stabilizing action.

Nasser first endeavored to purchase arms from the Western powers which, "although willing to supply a certain quantity for limited purposes of 'legitimate self-defense,' were not willing to provide them unconditionally."[125] Therefore, he appealed to all nations.

On the day previous to the Gaza attack, Mr. Henry Byroade, the new American Ambassador to Egypt, had arrived in Cairo. He hoped, through Egypt's support, that he would succeed in settling the Arab-Israeli dispute. But the Gaza attack shattered his hope.[126]

Shortly after his arrival, Mr. Byroade established excellent informal relations with Nasser. He is the only U. S. Ambassador who dealt with Nasser on this basis. Nasser and his countrymen came to

[123]Little, op. cit., p. 271.

[124]Wint and Calvocoressi, op, cit., p. 59.

[125]Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 95.

[126]Little, op. cit., p. 269.

trust Byroade, but not the United States.[127]

Impelled by the necessity of securing arms for his restive officers, Nasser intensified his appeals to the United States. He appeared willing, even anxious, to procure his military requirements from the West.[128] He asked first to buy $100 million worth, but progressively brought his request dwon to about $20 million. Mr. Byroade, realizing that the amount of arms which could be purchased by this sum would not enable Egypt to defeat Israel, strongly favored the approval of Nasser's request. He was convinced that Nasser wanted the arms principally to improve the morale of his army and to counter growing unrest among its officers. Negotiations, which dragged on through spring and summer, did not produce an agreement. Neither Mr. Byroade nor Nasser could get a definite reply from the State Department.[129]

Besides the Gaza episode and Baghdad pact, a third event occurred in April that moved Nasser father from the West. It was the Bandung Conference, where he met Nehru, Choi En-Lai, and other Asian leaders. After his return, he was convinced that he could look to the East for help.[130]

In July, Mr. Shepilove, editor-in-chief of Pravda, was invited

[127]Wynn, op . cit., pp. 114-115.

[128]Wheelock, op. cit., p. 229.

[129]Harry B. Ellis, Challenge in the Middle East: Communist Influence and American Policy (New York: Ronald, 1960), pp. 41-42.

[130]Wynn, op. cit., p. 115.

to Cairo to attend the third anniversary celebration of the dethronement of Farouk. This seemed to the Russians to be the opening for which they had been looking for so long. In September, 1953, Mr. Daniel Solod, the best Russian Middle East expert, was appointed as the Soviet Ambassador to Cairo. He worked patiently, and Nasser's suppression of the Egyptian Communist party did not disturb him. His government, after Staline's death, modified its policy and decided to approach the Arabs not from the bottom, but from the top, through trade. After his appointment, Solod repeatedly told Nasser that if Egypt would simply adopt a neutral policy, Russia would support any effort made by Egypt to liberate herself from "perfidious imperialists," and, further, that "Russia would co-operate with Egypt in the economic field without conditions."[131] He

> argued that the Arabs could safely regard Russia, not as a proselytizing Communist state, but as one great power playing politics with other great powers. [He] tried to prove that in international affairs there were common interests between Russia and the Arab states; the Arabs could co-operate in promoting these interests without being in danger of undergoing Communist revolution.[132]

Since they had no power in the Middle East, the Russians felt they had nothing to lose there and everything to gain. They committed no atrocities against the Arabs, who were more than half inclined to believe that the adverse accounts of Communist oppression were Western proganda. So the summer of 1955, when the Western powers were in serious

[131]Little, op. cit., p. 273.

[132]Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., pp. 60-61.

trouble in the Arab world, was a favorable moment for the Russians to move in.

> Arabs and Israelis were tense;...the Baghdad Pact had been formed, and with it a breach within the Arab League. . . . the Geneva meeting at the 'summit in July, evidently convinced the Soviet leaders that they could proceed without fear of forceful intervention by Washington or London.'[133]

The Soviet Union now offered arms to Egypt in huge quantities and without conditions.[134]

After Shepilove's visit, Nasser warned the United States that if she refused to sell him arms, he would get them from Russia. Mr. Byroade took Nasser's warning seriously and "made a final appeal to the Department of State urging that favorable action should be taken on the Egyptian request."[135] On September 4, Nasser again confirmed the Soviet offer. But all this was taken by the State Department as a tactic to spur the sending of arms and also as blackmail.[136] Moreover, the State Department, apparently, felt that under no circumstances would Nasser turn to the Soviets for weapons.[137] So, it did not take the warnings seriously, especially since it was thought in Washington that

> For many years, Arab politicians had been making feeble attempts to blackmail American by threatening to 'turn to the Communist.' None of them dared such a step, of course.

[133]The United States in World Affairs 1955, p. 161.

[134]Ellis, op. cit., p. 42.

[135]Ibid.

[136]The United States in World Affairs 1955, p. 160.

[137]Wheelock, op. cit., p. 230.

> For the old-school Arab politician, going Communist would have hurt him much more than it would have hurt the West. Nasser's threat had an old, familiar ring. But Washington failed to realize that Gamal Abdel Nasser was a new-style Arab politician.[138]

Nasser first kept the Soviet offer secret, and only a few key members of his government knew about it. But his army officers

> were quick to learn from the Foreign Ministry that Nasser had an opportunity to secure badly needed arms, but that he was stalling because he wanted to retain friendship with the Americans. This reason was almost totally incomprehensible to these officers.[139]

They felt Nasser should accept the Russian offer, since the Soviet Union had now decided to support the Arab side, while the United States was still friendly to Israel. However, Nasser was able to stall from July until September before deciding to accept the Soviet offer. In the opinion of Mr. Byroade, Nasser was doing the best he could, under the circumstances, to avoid accepting the offer.[140]

On September 26, the United States announced that she "had agreed 'in principle' to Egypt's long-standing request for the sale of arms"[141] The American response came too late. On the next day Nasser announced the conclusion of a barter agreement with Czechoslovakia, which agreed to supply Egypt "with weapons in accordance with the Egyptian army needs and on a purely commercial basis. . . . This agreement...[stipulated] ...that Egypt...[should]... pay for these weapons

[138]Wynn, op. cit., p. 119.

[139]Ellis, loc. cit.

[140]Ibid., pp. 42-44.

[141]The United States in World Affairs 1955, p. 160.

with products such as cotton and rice."[142] Later, the Soviet Union admitted that the agreement had been concluded with her, not with Czechoslovakia. Nasser conceded this in his nationalization speech. Apparently their negotiation started after Shipilion's visit. No details have yet been disclosed about the exact amount of arms and their value.

In Congress there was a feeling that the reason for the failure of negotiations was that the price was too high. Admiral Arthur Radford, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, refuted this.

> In a committee hearing Senator Hubert Humphrey asked him if it was not true "that the Egyptians offered to buy arms from the United States, and we offered to sell, but our price was too high?" [he replied] 'I don't think that was the real reason. What they wanted to buy, as I recall them, were types of weapons we did not want them to buy. Maybe the price had something to do with it, but in my opinion it was not really the controlling factor.'[143]

In making the deal, Nasser desired not only to obtain arms but also to dispose of large quantities of Egyptian cotton. This commodity had traditionally constituted 85 per cent of the Egyptian foreign trade.[144] Britain had even the principal customer, but her imports of cotton had been falling steadily since 1951 and a fall in Egypt's current earnings of sterling had resulted.[145] In 1955, British imports declined sharply

[142]Noble Frankland and Patricial Woodcock, Documents on International Affairs 1955 (London: Oxford University press, for R.I.I.A., 1958), pp. 371-372.

[143]Wheelock, op. cit., p. 229.

[144]The United States in World Affairs 1955, p. 161.

[145]Bullard, op. cit., p. 224.

from their already low levels.[146] Moreover, Nasser feared that the United States might dispose of its surplus cotton at competitive world prices. Although he was given assurance from Washington on August 17 that the United States had no intention of doing so at that time, the possibility of a change in policy was not to be excluded.[147] Therefore, Egypt was "forced to find new markets for cotton and new methods of paying for goods she had to import."[148]

The news of the arms deal upset Washington greatly. Secretary Dulles immediately dispatched his Assistant Secretary of State, George Allen, "to Cairo to give Nasser an 'ultimatum' outlining serious consequences for Egypt if Cairo accepted the Soviet arms deal. Among these consequences was the threat of American economic warfare."[149] Ambassador Byroade heard of the forthcoming visit, not through official channels of the Embassy, but via the Associated Press. Upon his arrival in Cairo, Mr. Allen was strongly advised by Byroade, Eric Johnston and Kermit Roosevelt not to deliver the ultimatum. Mr. Allen agreed to hold it.[150] He, accompanied by Mr. Byroade, went to meet Nasser to discuss with him the new development. However, Nasser deliberately kept them waiting for a while. Egyptian officials later explained the

[146]Little, op. cit., pp. 276-277.

[147]The United States in World Affairs, 1955, p. 161

[148]Bullard, loc. cit.

[149]Ellis, op. cit., p. 44.

[150]Ibid., pp. 44-46.

incident as follows:

> We kept Mr. Allen waiting because we had heard he was bringing from Washington an indignant letter and that he intended to bang the table and give us a lecture. We kept him waiting until he agreed not to present the note he had been sent to deliver.[151]

Mr. Allen held a courteous meeting with Nasser but nothing was accomplished. The Allen trip served to enhance Nasser's prestige throughout the Arab world and convinced Nasser and the Arab public that the West was panicky. A few days later

> Nasser disclosed the contents of two 'secret documents,' one British and the other French. They were presented as 'conclusive proof' that, although Israel, rather than Egypt, was suspected of aggressive military intentions in 1955, the West permitted extensive shipments of arms to the state of Israel.[152]

Ambassador Byroade now could do nothing but appeal to Nasser not to go too far in his relations with the Soviet Union. He and Nasser reverted to formality. Many American observers held that, had Washington understood Nasser's dilemma and acted accordingly, the outcome would have been the saving of at least some American influence in Egypt.[153]

The news of the arms deal was received everywhere in the Arab world with overwhelming enthusiasm. Overnight, Nasser's popularity reached a height unknown in modern Arab history. An American diplomat

[151]Robert St. John, The Boss: The Story of Gamal Abdul Nasser (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 210.

[152]Wheelock, op. cit., pp. 230-231.

[153]Ellis, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

commented: "If Nasser ran for president in Lebanon, Syria, or Jordan today, he would be elected unanimously."[154] The American reaction convinced the Arabs that Nasser had brought the West to its knees. Any remaining doubts were dispelled when the Western foreign ministers met a short time later in Geneva to discuss the new situation in the Middle East.[155]

Campbell sums up the impact of the transaction on Nasser's career as follows:

> by making the deal [he says] Nasser declared his independence of the West and proclaimed his leadership of the Arabs. . . . The magnitude of his political success probably surprised even Abdul Nasser himself. In any event, it proved to be a great turning point in his career. It made him a world figure.[156]

Western statesmen warned the Egyptians that Nasser had mortgaged Egypt's economy to the Soviet bloc, but the economy did not seem to suffer. The Western press began to attach Nasser, calling him a "crypto-Communist". It charged him with opening the Middle East to the Soviets. The Zionists exploited the situation by intensifying their propaganda campaign against Nasser.[157]

The deal had brought the Soviet Union her first great propaganda victory in the Arab world. Up to the time it was made the Arabs were

[154]Wynn, op. cit., p. 120.

[155]Ibid.

[156]Campbell, op. cit., p. 73.

[157]Wynn, op. cit., p. 121.

suspicious of the Russians as well as the West. They resented the intrusion of the alien Communist ideology. They blamed the Soviet Union for helping to create Israel by supporting the partition plan and selling arms to Israel during the Arab-Israeli war. But now, the arms deal made it possible for them to applaud Russia as a powerful friend. The Soviet Union gave aid and required nothing in return.[158] The special correspondent of the London Times in the Middle East "has rightly remarked that probably 'nothing since the Palestine war has so weakened the Western position in the Middle East as this affair of arms from Czechoslovakia.'"[159]

The stage for the final calamity was now being set. Israel thought seriously of preventive war. France, agnered by Nasser's support of the Algerian revolt, believed that Nasser should be overthrown. Mr. Eden, after his failure to draw Jordan into the Baghdad Pact, determined to halt the extension of Nasser's power. The United States vacillated.

Israel

Upon returning home from his trip to Egypt in 1953, Mr. Dulles said:

> The United States should seek to allay the [Arab's] deep resentment against it that has resulted from the creation

[158] Ibid., pp. 121-123.

[159] World Today, volume II(November, 1955), p. 461.

> of Israel. In the past we have had good relations with the Arab peoples. . . . Today the Arab peoples are afraid that the United States will back the new state of Israel in aggressive expansion. They are more fearful of Zionism than of communism, and they fear lest the United States become the backer of expansionist Zionism. . . . [The Tripartite] Declaration when made did not reassure the Arabs. It must be made clear that the present U. S. Administration stands fully behind that Declaration. We cannot afford not to be trusted by millions who could be sturdy friends of freedom.[160]

To win Arab support in his struggle against Communism, Dulles sought to modify somewhat the unequivocal nature of the American commitment to Israel by adopting an impartial policy in the Arab-Israeli dispute. The new administration believed that the Arabs would not come to terms with Israel unless Israel gave sustained evidence of its peaceful intentions. It called upon Israel to accept the internationalization of Jerusalem and to instruct its forces to refrain from crossing Arab borders in pursuit of infiltrators and from carrying out reprisals against Arab villages.[161] In this connection, it should be noted that

> poverty-stricken Arab refugees constantly crept across the armistice line, usually under cover of darkness to steal crops and water pipes from their old farms in Israel. . . . Until 1955, these raids usually were carried out by individual Arabs evading Egyptian guards on their own side of the frontier. The Israeli army replied to these damaging forays in organized and continued raids.[162]

These small border raids by Israel soon developed into large-scale

[160] Folliot, op. cit., p. 265.

[161] New York Times, March 3, 1953, p. 4.

[162] Wynn, op. cit., p. 116.

attacks, which, in the view of the United States, could only prejudice the chances of a peaceful settlement. Rebuking Israel for them, Assistant Secretary of State Henry Byroade told the Israelis

> You should drop the attitude of the conqueror and the conviction that force and a policy of retaliatory killing is the only thing the Arabs would understand. You should make your deeds correspond to your frequent utterance of desire for peace.[163]

He suggested "that immigration into Israel should be limited in deference to the fears of the Arabs who saw in the growth of population there a threat of eventual Israeli expansionism."[164] In reply to this suggestion, the Israeli foreign minister stated, "It is impossible for Israel to restrict the right of Jews to enter the country."[165] In fact the Israeli Prime Minister, Ben Gurion, some years later, went so far as to say that "Jews who lived outside Israel were godless and violated the precepts of Judaism every day they remained away from the country."[166] Israel has never deviated from this policy of unrestricted immigration despite the fact that as Senator Ralph E. Flanders has said "there can be no peaceful relations in the Mid-East so long as Israel is prepared to flood its area with a population which will inevitably exceed existing living room."[167] Non only did

[163] New York Times, April 10, 1954, p. 6.

[164] Survey of International Affairs 1954, p. 214.

[165] Ibid.

[166] New York Times, December 29, 1960, p. 1.

[167] Freda Utley, Will the Middle East Go West? (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1957), p. 151.

the Israeli government continue to encourage immigration but it also

> paid remarkably little heed to the necessity of coming to some terms with the fact of living in the heart of the Arab world. . . .[It] did nothing toward solution of the problem of the Arab refugees. It merely offered compensation, in principle, for their property while barring their return.[168]

In 1956, the Arab fears of Israel were not imaginary. "After Israel's attack on Egypt and obvious reluctance to withdraw from Sinai and Gaza, who can say that this fear is without reality or without justification?"[169]

After the conclusion of the Suez agreement, the United States in collaboration with Britain had started to work out a solution for the Arab-Israeli conflice which was the major remaining obstacle to establishing an effective defense arrangement. They made a thorough study of all the possibilities and thorny questions.[170] Before they could submit their suggestion to the parties concerned, two events had taken place. The first was the discovery of an espionage ring by the Egyptian government on October 6, 1954. After a fair trial, as a French lawyer later testified,[171] the Egyptian Government asserted that the ring had provided military information to Israel and that some of its members had tried to start a fire in the United States Information

[168]Campbell, op. cit., p. 83.

[169]Ibid., p. 303.

[170]Ibid., p. 87.

[171]Ellis, op. cit., p. 41.

Service building in Cairo. . . . to arouse American opinion against Egypt.[172] This episode has come to be known as the "Lavon Affair". The second event was the Israeli attack on Egyptian forces at Gaza. After this attack Nasser said,

> 'Until last February 28, I felt the possibility of real peace was near. The border between Israel and Egypt had been quiet since 1952, and I felt at peace.' When the Jews struck at Gaza, that feeling left. 'That is why I bought arms from Czechoslovakia. I would rather have spent the money on social development.'[173]

Badeau and Gunther, after reviewing Nasser's book, The Philosophy of the Revolution conclude that "there is no bitter diatribe against Israel, and there is no dedication to wipe out Israel."[174]

Nasser remained upset at the continuing American aid to Israel.

> The United States annually was giving more economic aid to Israel, with its million and a quarter population, than to all the Arab states combined with forty million population. To Nasser early in 1955, this meant only the United States was supporting his mortal enemy.[175]

As he phrased it:

> I have always tried to build friendly relations [with the United States] only keeping in mind that these relations must not take us toward any port of domination. But gradually, I have realized that there is always some obstacle between us, and that obstacle is Israel. America helps Israel with money and moral support, and they use

[172] New York Times, December 29, 1960, p. 1,4.

[173] Time, January 16, 1956, p. 34.

[174] John S. Badeau and John Gunther, Nasser: The Philosophy of the Revolution (Buffalo: Smith, Kenyes and Marshall, 1959), p. 18.

[175] Wynn, op. cit., p. 114.

> the money to buy equipment to be used against us. . . . But when we ask America to supply us with arms for defense, nothing is done.[176]

On August 26, 1955, in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations, Secretary Dulles outlined his suggestions for bringing the Arab-Israeli dispute to an end. He proposed a resettlement and repatriation of Arab refugees, a special status for Jerusalem, and a frontier adjustment. He expressed U. S. readiness to participate in an international loan to assist Israel in paying compensation to the Arab refugees.[177] In November, Premier Eden made a companion speech at the London Guildhall in which he proposed "a territorial settlement representing a position somewhere between that set out in the United Nations resolution of 1947 and the Armistice agreement of 1949--a 'mutual compromise' which Mr. Ben-Gurion scathingly rejected."[178] The Israeli premier commented that "the proposal to reduce Israel's territory is entirely without legal, moral or logical basis and therefore not to be considered."[179] Nasser, on the other hand, described "the Eden proposals as 'constructive,' and recognized that in making them, Eden was trying to be fair."[180] The Arab governments welcomed Mr. Dulles' proposal with caution. Nothing came of these proposals, however, since Ben-Gurion "would 'not allow

[176] Time, September 26, 1955, p. 26.

[177] Document on International Affairs 1955, pp. 361-365.

[178] Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 97.

[179] Documents on International Affairs 1955, p. 385.

[180] The United States in World Affairs 1955, p. 179.

one inch to be taken from [Israel].'"[181] Mr. Wilton Wynn, the head of the Associated Press Bureau in Cairo, later wrote:

> I had watched the Palestine problem closely for a decade, and I knew that there never had been such a good chance of getting a settlement. The Israelis always had blamed Arab intransigence for failure to get a peace settlement in the Holy Land. Now, at last, the Arab's most powerful leader was waving the olive branch.[182]

It soon became evident, however, that the Israeli leaders were not really serious about making peace and were only bluffing.

The failure of Mr. Dulles to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue can be attributed to many factors. First, although the new administration "inclined. . . to attend to Arab arguments and oil, [it] remained a firm and powerful friend of Israel."[183] Writing in 1956 Grant McClellan said:

> To date, [impartial] policy has not succeeded because it has not been implemented. What the Administration has offered are the palliative proposal of the Johnston plan for joint Israeli-Arab use of the Jordan water and Mr. Dulles's Council on Foreign Relations speech of August 26.[184]

American Zionists and Israel should also share the blame. When the administration moved toward the adoption of an impartial policy the Zionists exerted a great deal of pressure upon the administration. Their "big complaint...[was]...that the United States, after helping to launch

[181]Survey on International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 97.

[182]Wynn, op. cit., p. 130.

[183]Survey on International Affairs 1953, p. 149.

[184]Grant S. McClellan, The Middle East in the Cold War (New York: Wilson Co., 1956), p. 181.

the fledgling Israel,...[was]...losing its enthusiasm."[185] The Israeli Finance Minister said "Israel has put her faith in the Jews of America and trusts that they will recognize the vital need for added giving even at the expense of sacrificing some of their activities in the United States."[186] Not only the Zionists but also Congress urged the Republicans to modify their policy in the Middle East. The Democrats were in control and they have always been more strongly influenced by the Zionists than the Republicans. Senator Warren Magnuson of Washington "warned the Administration that if it did not speedily revise its policy, it would risk formidable opposition from Democrats."[187] When Egypt bought arms, a group of members of the House of Representatives urged the administration to allow Israel to purchase arms from American private sources.[188] The Zionists' influence on the American press was also remarkable. As Mr. Charles Issawi of Columbia University writes,

> For the last dozen years the American press has indulged in an inrestrained campaign of vilifications of the Arabs. . . .It is fair to say that none of the world's many underdeveloped peoples have received as little sympathy and

[185] New York Times, November 3, 1954, p. 28.

[186] New York Times, November 5, 1954, p. 5.

[187] Grubb, op. cit., p. 144.

[188] Noble Frankland and Vera King, Documents on International Affairs, 1956 (London: Oxford University Press for R.I.I.A. 1959), pp. 49-51

> understanding of their very complex problems--or as much abuse and criticism for their shortcomings--as have the Arabs.[189]

The leading newspaper, the New York Times, demonstrated this fact when it wrote on November 17, 1957, that "'the Arab objection [to Israel] is kept venomous by feudal or semi-feudal rulers and ruling groups whose real opposition is to the democratic and economic features of Israel.'"[190] All this made the Israeli leaders confident "that their favorable press and many sympathetic coreligionists in the United States make it difficult for any American administration to act for long in a manner unfriendly to Israel."[191]

On the effects of the Israeli question upon American policy, Mr. John Campbell writes:

> No American who has anything to do with the Arab world can be unaware of the depth of Arab feeling on Palestine. It is a real obstacle to the success of any American policies, for it colors the attitudes of Arabs both literate and illiterate. It goes as deep as political consciousness goes. . . . If there is any feasible way in which this country can repair the damage to its position in the Arab world by addressing itself to the territorial problem. . . , it is worth a serious effort to find.[192]

The former British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, has rightly pointed out that the greatest mistake that has been committed by the West in the Middle East was the creation of Israel.

[189]Charles Issawi, "United States Policy and the Arabs," Current History, March, 1958, p. 138.

[190]Ibid., p. 137.

[191]Sydny N. Fishisher, The Middle East: A History (New York: Knope, 1959), p. 594

[192]Campbell, op. cit., p. 311-312.

Neutrality

A few days before their seizure of power, the Free Officers "declared that they would never agree 'to any further negotiation [with Britain], to any alliance or defense pact with imperialistic blocs' but demanded 'liberty, full independence, complete neutrality and armed struggle for the liberation of the Fatherland.'"[193] Their experience in office, however, made them more moderate and flexible as time wore on. Faced with overwhelming internal and external problems, their foreign policy remained vague. After the settlement of the Sudan and Suez issues in 1954 and after Nasser's visible assumption of power, the general pattern of the Egyptian foreign policy began to crystallize. Knowing much less about the United States than Britain, Nasser hoped to cooperate with the former in developing his country. He believed the United States would have no objection if Egypt were left free to make her own political decisions and remained independent of big power blocs. This was the genesis of his new foreign policy. As he defined it, "Egypt's policy [is] positive neutralism."[194]

When Secretary Dulles started combatting Communism by building defense alliances, Nasser believed that he could cooperate and get American aid without joining any such schemes. Information he received

[193]Survey on International Affairs 1955, p. 221.

[194]Foreign Affairs, October, 1956, p. 59.

from his Embassy in Washington and his daily dealing with the American Embassy in Cairo led him to believe so. Therefore, he felt there was no obstacle standing in the way of cooperation between his country and the United States. But, gradually he became disillusioned with this view.[195] By the end of 1954, he concluded that he had cooperated with the West in every possible way he felt he could. The outcome of that was unpopularity among his people and the other Arab peoples as well. He was accused by the Arab nationalists of being a Western stooge. Egypt was isolated and despised by the Arab countries which were supposed to be under her leadership. He felt the United States still treated his country as a semi-independent, not a sovereign state, and had the tendency to do business with him through London or Paris. When American aid was offered to him, it was hedged with numerous of conditions. He got the impression that the United States did not trust him with arms or money. He considered this to be humiliating evidence that the West still regarded Egyptians as inferior beings who did not have the capability of governing themselves.[196] All this turned him away from the West and stiffened his neutral policy. Other factors which also shaped his new policy were "his discussions with Nehru and Tito, the clash with Iraq over the Baghdad Pact. . . the Israeli

[195]Ellis, op. cit., p. 37.

[196]Wynn, op. cit., p. 110.

attack on Gaza,"[197] and his disappointment "over failure to achieve quickly the evacuation of the Canal Zone."[198] Of no less significance, due to her need for foreign capital and a market for cotton, the domestic affairs of Egypt were "inescapably tied up with international affairs."[199] It seemed "evident that a country in Egypt's position would be obliged to remain neutral in a 'Cold War' world if it were to retain any degree of real freedom of action with respect to both its domestic and foreign affairs."[200] Neutrality has become the cornerstone of Nasser's foreign policy. And After the Baghdad Pact was signed he began to lash "out at the West including the United States whenever his 'positive neutrality' was being subjected to pressure."[201]

Even after the Baghdad Pact was signed, but for a short time only, "Nasser privately continued to believe that in the long run certain 'fundamental American principles,' as he termed them, would govern the attitude of the United States toward Egypt."[202] This fact he thought would allow the working out of some kind of mutually profitable relationship which would not conflict with his concept of neutral policy. But events gradually proved to him otherwise and dashed his hopes. He then

[197]Wheelock, op. cit., p. 223.

[198]New York Times Magazine, September 19, 1954, p. 64.

[199]William Yale, The Near East: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1958), p. 454.

[200]Ibid., p. 455.

[201]Ellis, op. cit., p. 38.

[202]Ibid., pp. 38-39.

began to believe that the United States government, at least so long as Secretary Dulles remained in office, would not respect his neutral policy unless he were strong. He realized his weakness economically and militarily. He became convinced that unless positive neutrality "were adopted by other Arab states"[203] their governments could make 'end runs' around him to Washington and...[thus render]...Egypt's 'positive neutrality'...meaningless. He could keep the other Arab states from joining a foreign pact that might isolate Egypt through his influence over the Arab masses. The only instrument for reaching these masses, he told his American friends, was the radio--The Voice of the Arabs. He used this most powerful propaganda weapon to make Arab people everywhere oppose actions by their governments which were against their interests and aspirations. Nasser's success was surprising. Almost overnight he found himself not an Egyptian leader but a leader of the Arabs. As early as 1956, "no Arab leader dared speak out against Nasser. Nasser was so popular that to oppose him meant political suicide."[204] The British, Israeli, and Arab pro-Western clandestine counter-stations failed to produce any tangible results. Their vigorous attacks on Nasser only brought the Arab masses closer to him.

> The Voice of the Arabs won out over these competitors, not because of superior propaganda skill, but because it was saying what the Arabs wanted to hear. It was not

[203] Ibid., p. 39.

[204] Wynn, op. cit., p. 133.

creating attitudes among the Arabs; it simply reaffirmed and stimulated attitudes that already existed.[205]

Nasser's widespread popularity gave the United States the impression that he was starting to think of himself as a champion of the Arabs. American-Egyptian relations began to deteriorate again because of Nasser's supposed intrigues in the other Arab countries. Secretary Dulles was convinced that Egyptian agents were plotting to embarrass or over-throw the pro-Western governments of Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq. Nasser, on the other hand, was convinced that the United States was encouraging Premier Nure es-Said of Iraq, King Hussein of Jordan and President Chamoun of Lebanon to adopt frankly anti-Nasser policies, and that American agents were actually intriguing to install an anti-Nasser government in Syria through a coup d'etat. Nasser insisted that his followers in the other Arab countries were not organized by Egypt.[206] A senior associate of Nasser's once stated that "'These self-appointed priests of Nasserism in other Arab countries are a constant source of embarrassment to us. We would be better off if we chose our own supporters rather than [allowing] them to choose themselves.'"[207]

This dispute over the problem of unity in the Arab world is, Nasser's view, one of the major differences between the United States and Egypt. He once said that the United States wanted the Arabs to be

[205] Ibid., p. 143.

[206] Ellis, op. cit., p. 133.

[207] Ibid., p. 40

Both leaders flew to Burma where they met U Nu and later were joined by Red China's Prime Minister, Chou-En-Lai. Nasser, flanked by Mr. Nehru and U Nu, held talks about trade with the Chinese Prime Minister. He made it clear to Chou that he was not inclined to discuss political matters such as Egypt's recognition of Red China. Chou conceded the point and expressed willingness to talk about buying Egyptian cotton. Nasser also met with President Soekarno of Indonesia. He refrained from exploiting the conference to campaign either against Iraq or the Baghdad Pact. He emerged with considerably enhanced prestige among the Asian leaders.[212] After his return to Cairo, he declared:

> The states of Asia and Africa met for the first time without the participation of those powers which dominated them, to proclaim to the world at large that it is high time for Asia and Africa to be liberated, and that henceforth these areas cannot remain under the domination of imperialism or its lackeys. . . .I went to Bandung to announce that Egypt has been liberated, and that it speaks for the cause of self-determination and freedom of the nations, the suppression of imperialism, and the independence of all states. Egypt desires that the world go hand in hand, and that its states not be playthings of the big powers in the arena of political competition.[213]

Egyptian criticism of the United States was very rarely in the abstract. It usually related to Israel, British policy, regional defense, economic assistance, etc. After the Bandung Conference, the leading Egyptian newspaper, Al-Ahram, wrote:

[212]Little, op. cit., pp. 265-267.

[213]Strausz-Hupe, op. cit., p. 184.

> What excuse has a great nation which hoisted the flag of freedom and self-determination during the two world wars for persisting in policy toward Arabs and Jews which has made us lose any appreciation or confidence we had in America?...American will learn that it will lose much by satisfying five million Jews in the United States at the expense of antagonizing seventy million Arabs. Twenty-nine nations at Bandung voiced support of the Arab case in Palestine. America should have heard this by now.[214]

In this connection, it should be noted that the Conference endorsed the United Nations resolutions of 1947 on the Palestine question and demanded their enforcement. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia followed suit. Writing in 1956 Grant S. McClellan said that these developments left the United States and Britain with "no real choice...the neutral and all small nations of the middle world have right on their side. It is the United States and Britain, pressured by Zionism, who have erred all along."[215]

One of the things that annoyed Nasser most about the United States was the tendency Americans showed to bring nationalists and communists together.

> [There] has been talk', he wrote in 1955, 'of Communist inflitration' in the various Arab and African nationalist movements.' It would be unwise for the United States to take that view of nationalist activities, led by sincere patriots whose only desire is to see their nations free from foreign domination. Americans recognize this to be the inalienable right of every man, yet balk at supporting these nationalist for fear of annoying some colonial power that has refused to move with the times. . . . There would

[214] Ibid., p. 180.

[215] McClellan, op. cit., p. 183.

> not be any Communist infiltration in any part of the Middle East and Africa if the United States could develop a courageous policy--and the only morally correct one--of supporting those who are anxious to get rid of foreign domination and exploitation.[216]

Neutrality paid tangible dividends to Egypt. She gained more diplomatic support in her struggle against Israel. She received needed arms from the Communist bloc and at the same time got rid of huge quantities of cotton. She also received economic aid from the Soviet Union which totaled $475 million in loans and $5 million in grants between January 1955 and December 1957. Interest payments were set at 2½ percent and no strings were attached. Nasser accepted the Soviet aid "whenever it suited his purposes. Positive neutrality was Abdel Nasser's watchword in the East-West struggle; at home in Egypt, the Communist party was outlawed."[217] After the arms deal, both the United States and Russia, motivated by political rather than economic considerations, hastened to offer Nasser aid in building the High Dam.

In 1955, the United States became resentful of Nasser's policy of positive neutrality. On November 6 of that year, Secretary Dulles in his meeting with Marshal Tito at Brioni asked the Yugoslav president to emphasize to Nasser the value of moderation during his forthcoming visit to Cairo.[218] It should be noted that Mr. Dulles disapproved of

[216]Gamal Abdel Nasser, "The Egyptian Revolution," Foreign Affairs, January 1955, p. 211.

[217]The United States in World Affairs, 1958, p. 185.

[218]Survey on International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 282.

neutrality even after President Eisenhower's approval of it. On June 6, 1956, the President stated that "neutralism was an acceptable policy for any nation. It was neither immoral nor necessarily unwise for a country to avoid military pacts. Nor did it signify indifference 'as between right and wrong or decency and indecency.'"[219] On June 9, Secretary Dulles stated that

> The principle of neutrality pretends that a nation can best gain safety for itself by being indifferent to the fate of others. This has increasingly become an absolute conception and, except under very exceptional circumstances, it is an immoral and shortsighted conception.[220]

Later, in order to make his statement compatible with that of the President, Mr. Dulles confined his attack to the neutrality of Switzerland. However, though the United States continued to aid Yugoslavia, India and other neutrals, Egypt was not included.[221]

[219] Current History, October, 1956, p. 214.

[220] Ibid., p. 215.

[221] Ibid., pp. 214-215.

CHAPTER III

UNITED STATES AND THE SUEZ CRISIS

The new Egyptian regime proposed the building of High Dam on the southern part of the Nile River, a major means of preventing the standard of living from falling because of the rapid growth of population. The dam was to be one of the largest in the world: five kilometers long, 110 meters high, with a storage capacity of 130 million cubic meters. When completed, it would increase the arable land of Egypt by some two million acres and provide annually about ten billion kilowatt hours of electricity. Thus it would make possible the establishment of new industries and the expansion of old ones. The dam would take fifteen years to build and would cost an estimated $1.3 billion. The plan was to construct the dam in two stages. The cost of the first was to be $200 million. The time needed for its completion would be four years. Since its location was to be in the deep south, agreement with reparian states would be necessary--particularly with the Sudan.[1]

Egypt could by no means bear the total cost of construction alone and therefore she sought foreign capital. Both the West and the Soviet Union displayed interest in helping Egypt to finance the project. On

[1]Geoffrey Baraclough and Rachell F. Wall, Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956 (London: Oxford University Press, for R.I.I.A., 1960), pp. 302-303

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October 17, 1955, Egypt let it be known that the Russians "had made a firm bid to loan some $200 million at a mere two percent interest, repayable in Egyptian cotton and rice over a thirty-year period."[2] The United States and Great Britain, which had "shown little interest in the previous two years, had made a preliminary offer of 70 million dollars."[3] On the day following the Egyptian announcement, Soviet Ambassador Daniel Solod, stated that "the U.S.S.R. still intended to participate in the project unless barred."[4] Nasser, it would seem, hoped to get the loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development perhaps because he felt that "Russia probably hoped to entangle Egypt in an alliance,"[5] though he was confident he could avoid the snares. He also "feared that western aid would make [Egypt] more vulnerable to pressure, since the West might threaten its interruption in case of political disputes."[6] In any case, he was determined to build the dam and to receive aid regardless of its source. He requested from the West and Russia a minute clarification of their terms in order to make sure that the required guarantees would not put Egypt's

[2]Hollis W. Barber, The United States in World Affairs 1955 (New York: Harper, for C.F.R., 1957), p. 187.

[3]Survey on International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 303.

[4]The United States in World Affairs 1955, p. 188.

[5]Guy Wint and Peter Calvocoressi, Middle East Crisis (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1957), p. 67.

[6]Ibid.

economy under foreign control.[7]

Negotiations also started between Egypt and the International Bank on January 28, 1956, and on February 9,

> a provisional agreement was announced: the International Bank would lend Egypt $200 million on condition that Britain and the United States would lend her $70 million to pay for imported materials and services required for the dam. Egypt was to provide the equivalent of $900 million in the form of local services and materials, and the whole scheme was made dependent on the concurrence of the Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia.[8]

The Bank also asked Egypt to provide it regularly with information about her economic status and foreign exchange position as another condition of the loan.[9] Egypt refused, and after protracted negations, the International Bank accepted Nasser's proposal that "the Egyptian government voluntarily would supply the necessary information."[10]

The United States agreed to supply $56 million out of the $70 million and the remainder was to be obtained from Britain. Their grand aim was to outbid the Soviet Union.[11] The United States also had some other reasons for making the offer. She:

> believed Egypt capable of leading an Arab bloc which would not be neutralist in the Asian sense, but would exercise a

[7]Survey on International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 303.

[8]Reader Bullard, Sir, The Middle East: A Political and Economic Survey (third edition, London: Oxford University Press, for R.I.I.A., 1958), p. 202.

[9]Wilton Wynn, Nasser of Egypt: The Search for Dignity (Cambridge: Arlington Books, 1959), p. 156.

[10]The United States in World Affairs 1955, p. 188.

[11]Survey on International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 303.

> passive benevolence towards the West. Since Nasser was, in American eyes, the key to the area, they felt he should be treated with care, and sought financial formulas which would make the loan politically acceptable to him.[12]

Although Britain did not share this view at the beginning, because of her trouble in Jordan for which Nasser was held responsible, she yielded eventually. President Eisenhower in his State of the Union message "emphasized the value of long-term economic agreements, and appealed to Congress 'to grant him limited authority to such projects to be fulfilled from appropriations to be made in future fiscal years."[13]

During the course of the negotiations between the United States and Egypt, some developments occurred which shattered the hopes of reaching an agreement. Britain again attempted to draw Jordan into the Baghdad Pact and the result was the dismissal of the Arab Legion Commander, John Bagot Glubb, a British officer, and the termination of the Anglo-Jordanian treaty. Concerning this event Wiltor Wynn later wrote, "feeling against the pact was intense that I am certain the internal explosion would have occurred in Jordan even without the influence of Egyptian propaganda.[14] . . . The Arab attitude toward Glubb [showed] clearly that these people no longer [wanted] any part of condescending Western 'tutelage' of any kind."[15] Anglo-Egyptian

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Wynn, op. cit., p. 147.

[15] Ibid., p. 151.

relations which had been improving in the last few months now severely deteriorated. The campaign of rapprochment between the British government and Nasser ended. The Foreign Office denounced the unfriendly acts of Nasser toward Britain. The British press regarded Nasser as a new Hitler and Britain's mortal enemy. To Nasser, British action "looked like nothing less than the kind of deceit and duplicity he had by now come to expect from the West, an unabashed double-cross and betrayal of a promise"[16]

The second and more important episode was the NATO conference which was held at Paris in the spring of 1956. Nasser learned that the Western powers had adopted a new arms policy which meant more arms for Israel. It came to his attention that they were planning to impose an arms ban through the United Nations.[17] At that time, there was some evidence that the Soviet Union had ideas about an embargo. However, the United States, because of her suspicion of Nasser's "intentions, authorized France to divert some Mystere jet fighters from NATO production for delivery to Israel."[18] "France shortly afterwards began delivering more jet planes to Israel. After the Israeli attack on Egypt late in 1956, it was disclosed that the

[16]Ibid., p. 146.

[17]Survey on International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 306.

[18]John R. Beal, John Foster Dulles: 1888-1959 (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 257.

French military aid to Israel was far more extensive than had been previously admitted."[19] Nasser responded by according recognition to Red China on May 16. He calculated that he could still obtain arms from her on the grounds that she was not a member in the international organization, if a U. N. embargo were imposed. As a matter of fact, the recognition was inevitable and only a matter of time since Nasser had already exchanged trade missions with her and had had nothing to do with Nationalist China.[20] This move of Nasser's incensed the United States which regarded it "as a gratuitous affront to her."[21] Some Congressmen who had been advocating a stern policy toward Communist China became enraged. As a result of Zionist propaganda, Nasser's prestige in the United States reached its lowest ebb though he "had done no more than Britain had done immediately after the Chinese civil war."[22] The anger of the United States was further increased when the Egyptian minister of national porduction announced that "the Soviet offer to...finance the construction and equipment of the dam still...[stood]...and that Egypt was free to accept this offer whenever...[she chose]."[23] In making this statement the Egyptian minister was beginning to put the West on its mettle. In his reply

[19]Wynn, op. cit., p. 144.

[20]Tom Little, Egypt (New York: Praeger, 1958), p. 282.

[21]Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 306.

[22]Wynn, op. cit., p. 145.

[23]Survey on International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 306.

to the statement, Mr. Dulles declared that the United States would not help Egypt in its project if Russia participated.[24]

In the middle of June, Dmitri Shepilov came to Cairo to attend the celebrations of the British withdrawal from Egypt. On June 18, the last British soldier left Egypt, and "for the first time since the Persian conquest long before Christ, Egypt was free of foreign troops."[25] On June 24, Nasser was elected first president of the Republic and the new constitution was ratified by the people. The constitution declared "Egypt to be an Islamic, Arab state under a republican and democratic form of government, headed by a president whose term of office is to be six years."[26] While Shepilov was still in Cairo, it was reported that he had offered to finance the whole project. At that time the President of International Bank, Mr. Eugene Black, was in Cairo too. He and Shepilov were conducting competitive negotiations and each was trying to offer better terms than the other. Meanwhile, the United States was having second thoughts about the subject. Since the Soviets' concept of peaceful co-existence had not been accepted by the United States, the State Department was questioning whether it should accept Nasser's type of neutralism. It felt Nasser's recognition of Red China did nothing to strengthen Egypt's independence. It was wondering if Nasser, in recognizing Red China, was promoting

[24]Ibid.

[25]Wynn, op. cit., p. 158.

[26]New York Times, January 17, 1956, p. 10.

his country's interests or those of the Soviet bloc. The State Department's doubts about Nasser were increased by his statement that he wanted to be on good terms with all nations, but that he would not seek to maintain friendly relations at the expense of Arab nationalism. The State Department also viewed Nasser's forthcoming visits to Yugoslavia in July and to Russia in August with suspicion.[27]

Obviously, Egypt was willing to accept the Western offer but was only trying to get better terms. As early as June 21, Nasser urged the United States to speed final negotiation of the loan. By June 30 the end of the fiscal year, no agreement had been reached and the U. S. appropriation for the financing of the dam ran out. On July 4, Khrushchev, at the American Embassy in Moscow, made the Soviet "position clear by stating that it was for Egypt to choose between the Soviet and American offers."[28]

By now time was running against the Republican administration. After the allocations for the dam lapsed, "the Appropriations Committee of the Senate directed that none of the mutual security funds could be used for the dam without its prior approval."[29] It "would have been difficult...for the Administration to defend such a grant to

[27]Ibid., pp. 306-308.

[28]Ibid., p. 307.

[29]John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problems of American Policy (New York: Harper, for R.F.R., 1958), p. 74.

an Arab state before Congress in an election year."[30] "In Congress there was a strong anti-Egyptian lobby, composed of Zionist supporters of Israel, those who had been angered by Egyptian recognition of the Chinese government, and opponents of any measure leading to an increase in Egyptian cotton production."[31] Actually, no cotton was to be raised on land that would be reclaimed by the dam.[32] It became impossible for President Eisenhower to control Congress. His six-month-old request had not yet been approved by Congress. Mr. Dulles, for his part, declared that he reserved freedom of action and the Administration would not be bound by the finance committee's decision regarding funds already voted. But he promised that none of the funds which might be appropriated for the fiscal year 1957 would be committed to financing the High Dam without special prior consultation with the Appropriations Committee. Top officials at the White House expressed serious doubts about going ahead with the project. Because of the Arms Deal, some financial experts expressed their doubts about Egypt's ability to allocate the necessary funds for the dam.[33] The United States was rapidly infected by hostile Anglo-French attitudes toward Egypt.[34] By July 17, it was already widely believed that the offer

[30] Ibid.

[31] Survey on International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 308.

[32] Wynn, op. cit., p. 157.

[33] Survey on International Affairs 1955-1956, pp. 308-309.

[34] Wynn, loc. cit.

was dead because of the strong opposition in Congress. More important, there was discontent in the Soviet bloc as signified by the Paznan riots.

> This change in 'the east-west picture generally' could not fail to have repercussions on American policy toward Egypt. 'Informants in an excellent position to know,' put forward this view that large-scale Soviet aid to Egypt would aggravate 'discontent behind the iron curtain,' and that the United States would 'profit more' by leaving the Soviet Union to undertake this additional economic commitment.[35]

Of less importance, Egypt had not yet reached an agreement with the Sudan over the distribution of Nile water. Although there was no urgency for the agreement, the offer could not take effect until it was concluded.[36] Actually the agreement was in sight.[37] The State Department was also distrubed by Nasser's neutral policy and his friendly relations with the Communist bloc.[38]

The Egyptian ambassador to the United States, who had just returned to Washington declared that his government had accepted the Western offer and he would immediately meet Mr. Dulles to inform him of the fact. The manner with which he made the announcement confirmed the report that Nasser had instructed him, before he had left Egypt, that if the loan were not forthcoming it was his intention to nationalize

[35]Survey on International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 309.

[36]Little, op. cit., p. 283.

[37]Survey on International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 309.

[38]William Yate, The Near East: A Modern History (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958), p. 455.

the Suez Canal Company.[39] Mr. Dulles, when he met with the ambassador, is reported to have asked specifically for positive evidence that Cairo's request for aid was part of 'a great shift in Egyptian foreign policy towards the west and away from neutralism.'"[40] Not unnaturally this demand would not be acceptable to Nasser, who was meeting with Mr. Nehru and President Tito with whom he reaffirmed his faith in positive co-existence at Brioni on July 18, The United States officially withdrew her offer on July 19. The International Bank had made its offer conditional upon participation by the two Western powers and Britain, from the start, had been reluctant to join with the U. S.[41] After the United States withdrew its offer Britain and the Bank followed suit.[41]

In a statement justifying the withdrawal, Mr. Dulles stated that

> Developments within the succeeding 7 months [had] not been favorable to the success of the project and the U.S. government [had] concluded that it [was] not feasible in present circumstances to participate in the project. Agreement by the riparian states [had] not been achieved and the ability of Egypt to devote adequate resources to assure the project's success [had] become more uncertain than at the time the offer was made.[42]

[39]Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 308.

[40]Ibid., p. 309.

[41]Ibid., pp. 309-310.

[42]Noble Frankland, Documents on International Affairs 1956 (London: Oxford University Press, for R.I.I.A.), pp. 69-70.

The State Department also decided that "there would be no more aid to Egypt. . . . Diplomatic relations would be on a correct but minimum level."[43] Furthermore, the American Ambassador, Henry Byroade, was recalled from his post in Cairo.

After reviewing classified State Department documents, Senator Fulbright, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, stated that the United States' "decision to withdraw the offer to Egypt was made against the advice of the United States Ambassador to Egypt, and the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development."[44] A dispatch from Washington "flatly stated that the dam cancellation was designed to bring about the downfall of Gamal Abdul Nasser."[45]

The consequences of the offer's withdrawal were misjudged by the United States and Britain. It was possible, but not probably, that they had calculated that their action

> would undermine Nasser's position at home, and perhaps even dislodge his government. But although there may have been satisfaction in both Washington and Whithall at the expected setback to Egyptian policy, it seems likely that the greater importance was attached, in Washington, at any rate, to calling the Soviet bluff.[46]

[43]Campbell, op. cit., p. 75.

[44]Freda Utley, Will the Middle East Go West (Chicago, Henry Rengnery Co., 1957), p. 95.

[45]Robert St. John, The Boss: The Story of Gamal Abdel Nasser (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 245.

[46]Survey of International Affairs 1955-1956, p. 310.

It was believed that the Soviet Union was in no position to fulfill its promise and that Nasser would be forced to return to the Western camp. It was recognized also that Mr. Dulles was "playing for extremely high stakes" at a diplomatic game in which Egypt was not a principal party. He underestimated Nasser's resourcefulness though there was some evidence that Nasser had considered the nationalization of the Canal. If the High Dam seemed only a chess piece to the West and East in their diplomatic struggle, it was of vital importance for Egypt and a matter of prestige to Nasser.[47]

The manner and the timing of the withdrawal as much as the withdrawal itself "was a stinging public rebuff to Nasser. If he had dangerous enemies at home, this would have been their signal for action, so imperilled was his prestige."[48] Mr. Shepilov dramatized the situation when he declared on July 21 that his country did not consider the financing of the High Dam an urgent matter. The speculation then was "that some major thing would follow--either a rapid deflation of Nasser and a change of balance in the Middle East, or a convulsive response."[49]

Nationalization of the Canal

Before discussing the nationalization crisis it is necessary to

[47] Ibid.

[48] Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 69.

[49] Ibid.

review very briefly the history of the Suez Canal Company. In 1834, Khedive Mohammed Ali refused to give concessions to those who wanted to dig the canal because "He was afraid of creating a new Egyptian question."[50] His son and grandson Said and Ismail respectively, being less prudent, gave concessions to the French engineer DeLesseps to build the canal. The original agreement contained the seeds of slavery. It "provided the right of forced labor for four-fifths of the work."[51] Though forced labor was officially abolished by the agreement of 1866 in fact '[it] lasted until recent years."[52] Many thousands of Egyptians died in digging the canal for the benefit of French and British ahareholders.[53] By building the canal, Egypt lost considerable profits from overland travellers. In time she also lost her share in the canal's future profits[54] because in 1866 Khedive Ismail sold the Egyptian stocks to Britain[55] at bargain price. Though the canal enhanced Egypt's strategic position, it brought her "the debt fund, the British occupation, the protectorate and the secession of the Sudan."[56] Only after

[50]Jean and Simonne Lacouture, Egypt in Transition (New York: Criterion Books, 1958), p. 63.

[51]Little, op. cit., p. 285.

[52]Lacouture, op. cit., p. 65.

[53]Utley, op. cit., pp. 78-79

[54]Little, op. cit., p. 284.

[55]Lacouture, op. cit., p. 67.

[56]Ibid., p. 63.

1949 was Egypt able to claim 7 percent of the profits in royalties. Egyptian nationalists regarded the Suez Canal Company "as a wicked inheritance from the country's servile past, imposed on the nation by avaricious powers to serve their ends."[57] "Untrammelled possession of the Canal ranked only second in nationalist thinking to the evacuation of the British troops."[58] In fact, the Egyptian government set up a committee in 1954 to make preparation for taking over the Canal. Though there is no certainty about the government's intentions, it undoubtedly did not intend to renew the concession when it expired in 1969.[59]

The news that the offers of aid for the building of the Aswan Dam had been withdrawn enraged Nasser, who was visiting with Marshall Tito. He immediately concluded his visit and returned to Cairo. He strongly emphasized that "his irritation arose not from the refusal of credit but from the aspersions cast on Egypt's finances, which he interpreted as a deliberate attempt to undermine world confidence in the Egyptian economy."[60] He declared he would promptly take the necessary action to finance the dam without western aid. On July 26,

[57]Little, loc. cit.

[58]Ibid., p. 285.

[59]Ibid., pp. 285-286.

[60]Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs 1956 (New York: Harper, for R.C.F., 1957), p. 256.

the fourth anniversary of King Farouk's abdication, he announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. Its income of $100 million a year would be used to build the dam. The first article of the nationalization decree read:

> The Suez Canal Maritime Company, S.A.E., is nationalized. All money, rights and obligations of the company are transferred to the state. All organizations and committees now operating the company are dissolved.
>
> Shareholders and holders of constituent shares shall be compensated in accordance to the value of the shares on the Paris Stock Market on the day preceding the enforcement of this law.
>
> Payment of compensation shall take place immediately. The state receives all the assets and property of the nationalized company.[61]

News of the nationalization was received with an overwhelming enthusiasm by the Arab peoples everywhere. "It is a measure of Nasser's popularity...that not a single Arab ruler could afford publicly to disagree with Nasser at that time. Every Arab leader in public gave Nasser unconditional support."[62] Most of the Afro-Asian nations together with the Soviet Union also supported Nasser. They felt that he was "merely taking possession of an asset that rightfully belonged to [Egypt] and, in the process, scoring a victory over colonialism."[63]

The British and French reactions were immediate and vigorous. These two Western governments abruptly delivered very strongly-worded

[61]Documents on International Affairs 1956, p. 114.

[62]Wynn, op. cit., p. 163.

[63]The United States in World Affairs 1956, pp. 251-252.

protests to the Egyptian ambassadors accredited to them. These protests were not accepted.[64] Premier Guy Mollet promised that strong action would be taken against Nasser. The French National Assembly, with only the Communists dissenting, "resolved that President Nasser was 'une menace permanente pour la paix' and that his action called for 'les measures les plus energiques.'"[65] The British Prime Minister, Mr. Eden, declared in the House of Commons that "no arrangement for the future of this great international way could be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government which would leave it in unfettered control of a single power."[66] Since there was nothing in international law to prevent Egypt from controlling the canal after 1968, it seemed that Mr. Eden was

> ...using Egypt's abrogation of the concession before 1968 as a ground for claiming after 1968 something that nobody had ever claimed before. More simple perhaps he was advancing a pretext for the armed action which the British and French governments were trying to set on foot and which they were at this point only prevented from launching by the discovery that their forces were not in a position to strike.[67]

After meeting hastily with their chiefs of staff Eden and Mollet discovered that Britain had not enough strength in Cyprus to strike "on such short notice,"[68] and most of France's troops were in Algeria.

[64]Little, op. cit., p. 288.

[65]Documents on International Affairs 1956, p. 74.

[66]Ibid., p. 123.

[67]Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 73.

[68]Campbell, op. cit., p. 102.

Probably it would take them several months to build up enough strength to attack Egypt.[69] Nasser, alarmed by their intentions, stated "I place full responsibility on Britain and France for any curtailment of shipping in the Suez Canal when I state that Egypt will maintain freedom of shipping in the Suez Canal, and that since Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company, shipping has been normal."[70]

After it became evident that Britain and France could not attack Egypt they applied economic pressure to her. Britain froze Egypt's sterling balance, amounting to about $294 million in London. Since Egypt had extensive dealings with Britain, this was a heavy blow to the Egyptian economy. France followed suit though the Egyptian assets in her hands were insignificant. So did the United States freeze Egyptian assets worth about $42 million.[71]

Meanwhile, Britain and France had begun their build-up. On August 2, Mr. Eden informed the House of Commons that certain precautionary military measures were being taken. These included the movement of certain Navy, Army and Air Force units toward the Mediterranean and the recall of a number of reservists. "Our aim," he said, "is to strengthen our position in the Eastern Mediterranean and our ability to deal with any situation that may arise."[72] Britain asked

[69] Ibid., p. 102.

[70] Documents on International Affairs 1956, p. 121.

[71] Wynn, op. cit., p. 170.

[72] Documents on International Affairs 1956, p. 129.

the Jordanian and Libyan governments for permission to use her military bases on their soil in her military preparation. The British request was turned down by both governments.[73] Britain then relied on her military bases in Malta and Cyprus. She also allowed French forces to be stationed in Cyprus.[74]

The reaction of the United States was more moderate. From the beginning, she had opposed the Anglo-French idea of using force against Egypt. On July 29, tripartite talks were held in London to consider what action should be taken to meet the Suez crisis. After hearing the Anglo-French views, Deputy Undersecretary Robert Murphy sent a cable to Washington in which he said that war might very likely be on the way. At the request of President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles flew to London to avert war. On his way to London, he drafted a paper which became the Tripartite statement of August 2. It was issued as a communique of the conference.[75] The three foreign ministers agreed on a conference to be held in London on August 16 to 23 inclusive. The major job of the proposed conference was to consider steps that "should be taken to establish operating arrangements under an international system designed to assure the continuity of operation of the Canal as

[73]Little, op. cit., p. 291.

[74]Susan Strange, "Suez and After," The Year Book of World Affairs 1957 (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 80.

[75]Beal, op. cit., pp. 265-266

guaranteed by the Convention of 29 October , 1888, consistently with legitimate Egyptian interests."[76] Twenty-four invitations were sent to those nations which were parties to the Constantinople Convention of 1888 and to the principal nations using the Canal. The three Western powers did not refer the issue to the United Nations because they knew that they could not get the necessary votes to endorse the resolutions they wanted. Another reason was the American fears "of a public disucssion of the Panama Canal."[77]

Several countries were reluctant to accept the invitation since the conference would only "approve international control rather than discuss it. The British and French were accused of wanting to stifle discussion and get an international rubber stamp put on their predetermined policy."[78] These charges came up because the British and French "staff talks and military preparations went forward even while the invitations to the conference were being sent."[79] The Anglo-French build-up had "compelled Egypt to hold forces in position against a possible attack by the Western powers and weakened her ability to resist Israel."[80]

Upon his arrival in Washington, Mr. Dulles said:

[76]Documents on International Affairs 1956, p. 138.

[77]Harold Karan Jacobson, America's Foreign Policy (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 701.

[78]Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 74.

[79]The United States in World Affairs 1956, p. 261.

[80]Little, op. cit., p. 290.

> Now, there were some people who counseled immediate forcible action by the governments which felt themselves most directly affected. This, however, would have been contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter and would undoubtedly have led to widespread violence endangering the peace of the world.[81]

However, Mr. Eden did not renounce his idea of going to war. Instead he railed against Egypt declaring on August 8 "we all know this is how fascist governments behave and we all remember, only too well, what the cost can be in giving in to fascism."[82] On the same day, Mr. Nehru, disturbed by the course of events, "condemned the Anglo-French military preparations, which were now publicly underway, and declared that India would take part in the London Conference only for the purpose of contributing to a 'peaceful settlement of the dispute.'"[83]

On August 12, the Egyptian government sent its refusal to the invitation and refuted the charges against the legality of the nationalization. The following extracts are taken from its reply:

> The Egyptian Government cannot agree to the statements contained in the three power Communique relating to the Suez Canal Company.
>
> This Communique has tried by all means to give the Suez Canal Company a character different from its real character in order to produce a pretext for interference in matters of Egyptian sovereignty.
>
> I. Paragraph one of the three powers' Communique states that: 'The Universal Suez Canal Company has always had an international character.'
>
> The Egyptian Government regrets to declare that such a statement is wholly unfounded. The Suez Canal Company was

[81] Documents on International Affairs 1956, p. 154.

[82] Ibid., p. 160.

[83] Ibid., p. 75.

an Egyptian company which was granted its concession from the Egyptian Government for the duration of 99 years. Article 16 of the concession concluded between the Egyptian Government and the Company in 1866 provides that: 'The Suez Canal Company is an Egyptian Company subject to Egyptian laws and customs.'

The British Government itself recognized this fact and defended this view before the Mixed Courts in Egypt. In the memorandum submitted by the agent of the British Government to the Mixed Court of Appeals of Alexandria in 1939, the following assertion was made: 'The Suez Canal Company is a legal person in accordance with Egyptian law. Its nationality and character are solely Egyptian.'

The Egyptian Government regrets to notice that the three powers' communique misrepresents the facts in attempting again to give the Suez Canal an international character.

Article 14 of the 1888 Convention clearly points out the fact that no real relations exist between the 1888 Convention and the Suez Canal Company.

Thus it states that:

'The obligation resulting from the present convention are not limited by the duration of the concession granted to the Suez Canal Company.'

Paragraph I of the Communique states that Egypt has in the agreement concluded with the United Kingdom in 1954, recognized in article 8 that the Suez Canal is 'a waterway economically, commercially, and strategically of international importance.' The Communique deleted the first part of article 8 which explicitly states that the Canal is an integral part of Egypt.

The Suez Canal Company had never been responsible at any time for the freedom of navigation in the Canal.

The 1888 Convention itself states that it remains in force during the duration of the concession and after its expiry and the transfer of the administration of the Canal to the Egyptian Government.[84]

As a counter proposal, Egypt suggested a wider conference to include all signatories of the 1888 Convention and other states whose ships pass through the Canal. If an agreement were reached by such a

[84] Ibid., pp. 168-171.

conference, it "would be registered with Secretariat of the United Nations and published by it."[85] The three Western powers rejected this proposal.

The London Conference opened on August 16 and was attended by delegates from twenty-two countries. Greece, because of its dispute with Britain over Cyprus, was the other country which declined to accept the invitation. The convened nations failed to subscribe to a unanimous proposal since some of them had already supported the nationalization and others were committed to internationalization. The most significant proposals discussed at the conference were that of Mr. Dulles, which received the support of the majority, and that of Mr. Krishna Menon of India, which was backed by the minority. Mr. Dulles "proposed that the Canal should be subjected to the control of an international board on which Egypt should be represented but over which she should not be sovereign."[86] The Menon proposal was "based on the recognition of the Suez Canal as 'an integral part of Egypt.' The user interests were to be merely, in association with 'the Egyptian Corporation for the Suez Canal.'"[87] Ceylon, Indonesia, and Russia endorsed Menon's proposal. The seventeen nations which supported the American proposal were: Australia, Britain, Denmark, Ethiopia, the West Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand,

[85] Ibid., p. 173.

[86] Ibid., p. 76.

[87] Ibid., p. 76.

Norway, Pakistan, Persia, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Turkey.

These eighteen nations agreed to send a mission under the chairmanship of Premier R. G. Menzies of Australia to present the American proposal to President Nasser. Mr. Menzies "was not given powers to negotiate any alternative. He simple was to present the plan and relay Nasser's 'yes' and 'no' to London."[88] He stayed in Cairo from 3 to 9 September and his talks bore no fruit. "The Anglo-French military preparations which had been carried on throughout the conference, featuring the dispatch of aircraft carriers and troops ships to the Mediterranean, did not appear to have made [Nasser] more compliant."[89] After the collapse of the negotiations, Nasser declared "'now only strong American intervention can prevent the British and French from using force against us..'"[90] On September 11, President Eisenhower stated that "the United States was not going to be a party to 'any kind of military action under present circumstances."[91] Mr. Khruschev said "that if war were to break out the Arabs would 'not stand alone' since it would be 'a just war' and there would be 'volunteers.'"[92]

Nasser now came out with a new proposal. He suggested the formation of 'negotiating committee' of all nations using the canal to

[88]Wynn, op. cit., p. 174.

[89]The United States In World Affairs 1956, p. 265.

[90]Wynn, op. cit., p. 175

[91]The United States in World Affairs 1956, p. 266

[92]Ibid., p. 265.

work out a plan for operation of the waterway."[93] The Western powers refused this proposal without even discussing it. On September 14, all French and British pilots, in response to an order from the old company, left their jobs. The State Department also urged American pilots to resign.[94] The London Times correspondent in Paris pointed out that "'either shipping will be held up or the Egyptians will force the [pilots] to remain, and it is felt here that either event could well provide Britain and France with a pretext for military intervention.'"[95] The following day, Mr. Eden at the House of Commons said

> that Britain, France, and the United States had agreed to form a Suez Canal Users' Association (SCUA) which would employ pilots, co-ordinate traffic, and act generally on behalf of users of the Canal: if Egypt refused to co-operate, Britain and other nations in the Association would be free to take action.[96]

He promised not to resort to force before taking the dispute to the United Nations "if circumstances allowed or, in other words, except in an emergency."[97] On the following day, Mr. Dulles said that SCUA was only a negotiating body. He added that American "ships would not be permitted to 'shoot their way through the Canal,' and made it clear that the United States government was unalterably opposed to the use

[93]Wynn, loc. cit.

[94]Ellis, op. cit., p. 49.

[95]Utley, op. cit., p. 86.

[96]Bullard, op. cit., p. 206.

[97]Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 75.

of force in connection with the Suez Canal dispute."[98] Nasser brushed aside the SCUA plan regarding it as nothing less than a device to provoke war. He said "we might just as well set up a Users' Association for the Port of London."[99] The surprising success of Egypt in maintaining normal navigation through the canal had weakened the Anglo-French position and SCUA as well. Only a few of the users supported the proposed association. The Anglo-French position was weakened further by the Soviets' denunciation of the plan and their charges that Britain and France were planning aggression against Egypt. If war came they made it plain that they would not be indifferent.[100]

The second London Conference was held between September 19 and 21. The eighteen powers formally set up SCUA, but it was left to the members to decide independently on their own respective policies.[101] By now it appeared that the course Britain and France had been following would not lead to a settlement for the crisis. This left the Security Council as the last resort before using force to resolve the impasse. Britain first hesitated to refer the issue to the U. S. because of its inability to muster a majority there, and because of its memory of the Iranian Oil Case in 1951. But domestic pressure and pressure from some members of the other SCUA members made going to the Security Council

[98]Bullard, loc. cit.

[99]The United States in World Affairs 1956, p. 267.

[100]Ibid.

[101]Bullard, loc. cit.

virtually unavoidable.[102] On September 23, Britain and France formally submitted the Suez problem to the Security Council. Egypt at the same time also referred the issue to the U. N. Both submissions were inscribed on the Council's agenda.

Mr. Dulles apparently was taken by surprise when the Suez issue was referred to the Security Council. Though he approved the Anglo-French move, "it seemed to prejudice his plan of first bringing SCUA into existence and then using it for discussion with Egypt."[103] However, the third London Conference was held on October 1. The purpose of the conference was "to draw up more precise regulations for the Suez Canal Users' Association."[104] Japan, Pakistan, and Ethiopia declined to join it and Iran insisted that it must not use force or resort to economic warfare against Egypt.[105] Mr. Dulles admitted there were some differences between the convened powers on the Suez question. On October 2, he stated "that the United States would hardly identify itself '100 percent either with the so-called colonial powers or with the powers which are primarily and uniquely concerned with the problem of getting their independence as rapidly as possible.'"[106] He emphasized that "'there were never 'teeth' in [SCUA] if that means the use of

[102]The United States in World Affairs 1956, p. 268.

[103]Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 76.

[104]Documents on International Affairs 1956, p. 241.

[105]The United States in World Affairs 1956, p. 268.

[106]Documents on International Affairs 1956, p. 241.

force.'"[107] So nothing was accomplished at this conference.

The Security Council debates started on October 5 and ended on the 13th. With the mediation of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Egypt worked out six principles for a settlement. These were:

> (a) There should be free and open transit through the Canal without discrimination...
> (b) The sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;
> (c) The operation of the Canal should be insulated from politics of any country;
> (d) The manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by agreement between Egypt and the Users;
> (e) A fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development;
> (f) In case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Universal Suez Maritime Canal Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled by arbitration.[108]

When Britain and France introduced these six principles to the Council, they added a proposal for international control: SCUA. The Council approved unanimously the six principles. But the attached proposal was vetoed by the Soviet Union, and also Yugoslavia voted against it.[109] On October 19, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold continued his efforts toward negotiation and after his contact with the Egyptian Foreign Minister he proposed to Britain and France that talks be resumed in Geneva on October 29.[110]

[107] Ibid.

[108] Ibid., p. 249.

[109] Bullard, op. cit., pp. 206-207.

[110] Little, op. cit., pp. 298-299.

Tripartite Aggression

Throughout the negotiations, the underlying aim of the British and French, as the London Economist pointed out, was not to negotiate a settlement for the Suez issue, but to overthrow President Nasser.[111]

> There was an ultimatum-like quality in almost every word or action by the British and French Governments: in the build-up of troops in the Mediterranean area, in the take-it-or-leave-it message of the Menzies Mission, in the repetition--as in the case of the announcement of the Suez Canal Users' Association--that Egypt must accept or take the consequences, in the refusal to negotiate on the Security Council's 'six principles' for a settlement unless Egypt produced a new offer.[112]

Both governments made no secret of their aim. On August 8, Mr. Eden, in the House of Commons, declared, "our quarrel is not with Egypt, still less with the Arab world; it is with Colonel Nasser."[113] "With dictators you always have to pay a higher price later on."[114] The French government foresaw no end to its troubel in Algeria unless Nasser was overthrown. That was its prime concern. It was always obvious that France would use force, if she could get Britain to join her. British action would be the determinant of what would happen.[115]

[111]Utley, op. cit., p. 104.

[112]Little, op. cit., p. 288.

[113]Documents on International Affairs 1956, p. 159.

[114]Ibid., p. 160.

[115]Dean Acheson, Power and Diplomacy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 112.

Humiliation of Nasser was considered desirable by both Britain and France as a matter of prestige. In the postwar era, the two nations had lost or withdrawn from several colonies in Asia and Africa, the latest and most significant was Indo-China where the French were very badly defeated. They felt they had become weak in the eyes of the world, particularly in these two continents. They were still fighting in Algeria, Kenya, Oman, etc. As a Briton put it, "Once we re-occupy Suez, we again become the dominant power in the Middle East. And the dominant power in the Middle East will be one of the great powers of the world. We British have been pushed around a lot in recent years, but now that's over. We are coming back."[116] As to the French feeling, the correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, Darsi Gillie, in Paris, wrote:

> Apart from other advantages, the dominion system has conveniently concealed the fact in Great Britain that an empire was in process of disbandment. There has been no such comfort for [French] withdrawal within two years from Hanoy, Saigon, Pondincherry...Rabat and Tunis. The withdrawal has been the more bitter because of the long-wasted effort in opposing it. It has created a psychosis of frustration which the Suez policy...comforted.[117]

But, apparently, Mr. Eden was the one who was most deeply affected by the Suez nationalization. In September, a Briton who was thoroughly briefed by the Foreign Office, explaining Eden's reaction, said:

[116]Wynn, op. cit., p. 179.

[117]Strange, op. cit., p. 85.

> Nasser's nationalization of the Canal completely changed Eden. Before that, he was a weak, vacillating character. Now he has become a determined man. He has made up his mind to move into Suez, and he is willing to go through a blood bath, if necessary, to do it.[118]

In addition to its military preparations, economic pressure, and the withdrawal of the pilots, Britain also resorted to internal subversion. Its powerful clandestine broadcasting station opened up with unrestrained appeals to the Wafdists, Muslim brotherhood, Socialists, and other opponents of the regime to get rid of Nasser. Its hope was to exert sufficient pressure to induce an internal coup d'etat against him.[119] This weapon also failed to produce the desired results.

After the defeat of the Anglo-French resolution at the U. N., force was the last weapon to be used against Nasser. Here there is a clear example of collusion. Though it was denied at the time, "there was plenty of evidence to show that the two attacks [the Israeli and the Anglo-French] were planned in collusion."[120] "In this conspiracy, France was the instigator, Britain a belated partner, and Israel the willing trigger."[121] The scheme began to take shape shortly after the nationalization. Only a few days after the nationalization, Prime Minister Mollet sent his Defense Minister to London to work out a joint military plan for reoccupying the Suez Canal. The outcome was that a

[118] Wynn, op. cit., p. 179.

[119] Ibid., pp. 170-172.

[120] Time, November 12, 1956, p. 32.

[121] Ibid.

"joint organization was set up and named Amilcar."[122]

Simultaneously France also approached Israel. Signs of growing affinity between them began to be noticed late in the summer. "Menahem Beigin, one-time terrorist and leader of Israel's Herut party, which advocated expansion to Israel's 'historic border, visited Paris and was given the unprecedented honor of being asked to address the Chamber of Deputies.'"[123] The Israeli director of the intelligence service also made a trip to France. Because of the French arms being supplied to Israel, "the French ambassador to Israel became 'the most popular man in the country.'"[124] On September 23, Ben-Gurion stated, "in obvious reference to France, that Israel had at last found a true ally."[125] On the strength of the French-Israeli contact, Mr. John C. Campbell writes:

> the closeness of the collaboration between France and Israel seems clear enough. France sent considerable military equipment, especially fighter aircrafts, to Israel in September and October, and some officers with it. Diplomatic and military contacts were mutliplied. And when the crisis came, French naval units and aircraft, under French orders, provided important operational assistance to Israel's forces. Planes of the French air force participated in Israeli operations in Sinai.[126]

On October 16, Mr. Eden and Foreign Minister Selwyn Lloyd met in Paris with Premier Mollet and M. Christian Pineau, the French

[122] Ibid.

[123] Beal, op. cit., p. 274.

[124] Ibid., p. 270.

[125] Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 89.

[126] Campbell, op. cit., pp. 105, 107.

Foreign Minister, for five hours in absolute privacy. The New York Times then reported that "the British were informed of certain military arrangements made between France and Israel."[127] Britain gave in to

> France's urging to back Israel in the Middle East. As the French knew, Israel was already on the edge of launching a preventive war. . . . The evidence indicates that...Eden and Mollet agreed to reoccupy the Suez Canal Zone jointly on the pretext of protecting it from Israel's planned attack.[128]

Mr. Eden admitted later that "the possibilities of an Israeli attack on Jordan or on Egypt were discussed at the meeting of October 16, and that 'if there were to be a break-out it was better from our point of view that it should be against Egypt.'"[129] Mr. Pineau described the meeting "as of 'capital importance.'"[130] Premier Mollet, answering the questioners at the National Assembly, said "'you must have confidence in me. Something is going to happen before the end of the year. I cannot say any more; there is a diplomatic secret to be kept.'"[131] On the day after the London secret meeting, Ben-Gurion told the Israeli Knesset that "Egypt was 'the main enemy' (although the recent weight of Israeli action had been directed against Jordan)."[132]

[127] Strange, op. cit., p. 87.

[128] Time, November 12, 1956, p. 33.

[129] Campbell, op. cit., p. 108.

[130] Strange, op. cit., p. 87.

[131] Time, November 12, 1956, p. 33.

[132] Little, op. cit., p. 299.

Upon Eden's return to London from Paris, the British Defense Minister, Sir Walter Monchton, resigned. His resignation, it was believed, could be ascribed to his strong opposition to the use of force against Egypt. After the London meeting, Britain and France began to coordinate "their planning and preparing their forces on Cyprus for action."[133] Here, it should be noted that

> Eden and Lloyd were technically truthful later on when in speeches before the House of Commons they insisted that there had been no plotting with Israelis. American officials who knew the inside story noted, however, that they always were careful to put it in terms of Israel, not France. Their dealings had been with France.[134]

The United States warned France and Britain that seizing of the Suez Canal would not automatically topple Nasser from power. She also told them that if they seized the Canal, Egypt would block it; they would engage in the same kind of frustrating guerilla warfare that was already plaguing France in Algeria; and the pipelines carrying oil from the Persian Gulf would be sabotaged. This would subject Europe to a critical oil shortage.[135]

After October 15, the British and French cut off their diplomatic contact with the United States as far as the Middle East was concerned. "U. S. queries were turned aside, requests for information

[133] Time, November 12, 1956, p. 33.

[134] Beal, op. cit., p. 276.

[135] Ibid., p. 275.

evaded, interviews deferred."[136] The United States felt she was being deceived by her allies, who kept secret what they were doing. Explaining the reason, Premier Guy Mollet stated later that

> The United States had known the French point of view of Suez in advance of the military intervention there. If [U. S.] Government was not informed of the final developments, the reason--the only reason, I confess it--was our fear that if we had consulted it, it would have prevented us from acting.[137]

The United States was also aware of the British intention of resorting to war, but she did not know when. Some of the most powerful members of the British government made this intention clear to her.[138] Early in September, the American ambassador in Paris, Douglas Dillon, informed Mr. Dulles that the French government, which would probably be joined by the British, would attack Egypt sometime after October 20. But Mr. Dulles responded that he was confident that Mr. Eden and Mr. Mollet would never make such a move in the midst of the American presidential elections.[139] However, the United States had "never told them how it would react if they did so."[140] The British and the French, on the other hand,

> tended to under-estimate both the sincerity of the American 'moral' objection to force and the seriousness of the American

[136] Time, November 12, 1956, p. 33.

[137] New York Times, December 10, 1956, p. 3.

[138] Acheson, op. cit., p. 111.

[139] Marquis Childs, Eisenhower: Captive Hero (New York: Harcourt, 1958), p. 233.

[140] Campbell, op. cit., p. 109.

> conviction that the contest with Communism for the Middle East and the whole uncommitted world could not be successfully waged, and might even be irreparably lost, by a reversion to 19th century strong-armed methods.[141]

This led them to false expectations. They apparently counted on the American "'benevolent' neutrality, even without advance consultation, and looked to American influence as a counter-weight to any Soviet inclination to intervene."[142]

In the Middle East tension was mounting at the border between Israel and Jordan rather than on the border between Israel and Egypt. For the past few months there had been little trouble between Egypt and Israel. Nasser had tried to avoid any conflict with Israel since the nationalization, possibly because he did not want a two-front war. He, in fact, withdrew some of his forces from Sinai.[143] He had already permitted two Israeli ships to pass through the Canal.[144] On October 11, Ben-Gurion told the Knesset that he would never start a war, and that "'Preventive War' would be madness."[145] But this attitude of Ben-Gurion's soon changed. It was reported that he "informed Mollet of Israel's plans at a secret meeting at an airport near Paris on October 22."[146] On October 23, Premier Mollet himself flew "to London,

[141] Ibid., p. 104.

[142] Ibid., p. 109.

[143] Little, op. cit., pp. 297-298.

[144] Wheelock, op. cit., p. 240.

[145] Time, November 19, 1956, p. 39.

[146] Campbell, op. cit., p. 107., citing Merry and Serge, Les Secrets de L'Expedition d'Egypt (Paris: Edition des 4 Fils Aymon 1957), pp. 55-56.

reportedly to tell Eden that Israel was all ready to launch a preventive war on Nasser."[147] Two days afterward, October 25, an Israeli official declared "that fedayeen activities had been resumed by Egypt, although there was little or no evidence to support the statement."[148] Ben-Gurion then decreed a general mobilization. By October 28, President Eisenhower, alarmed by the dangerous situation in the Middle East, had already sent two personal messages to Ben-Gurion urging him to refrain from taking "forcible initiative...which would endanger the peace."[149] On the same day, the State Department urged all Americans whose presence in the Middle East was not vital to leave immediately, until the situation became normal.

On Monday evening, October 29, Israel invaded Egypt. The Egyptian troops on the borders were taken completely by surprise. "Ben-Gurion's moment was well chosen because it was reasoned, 1) the U. S. would not dare move decisively against Israel on the verge of presidential election and 2) the Hungarian rebellion, then at its height, would keep Russia's hands tied."[150]

When the news of the aggression reached Washington, President

[147] Time, November 12, 1956, p. 33.

[148] Little, op. cit., p. 299.

[149] State Department, The Suez Canal Problem July 26-September 22, 1956: A Documentary Publication (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 134.

[150] Time, November 12, 1956, p. 33.

Eisenhower declared that the United States "had pledged itself to assist the victim of any aggression in the Middle East."[151] On October 30, the United States called for an emergency session of the Security Council to stop the fighting. At the same time, she sought to implement the Tripartite Declaration of 1950. But Britain, and especially France, which was "doing most of the dirty work in linking the three nations in conspiracy,"[152] rejected the American proposal that the Tripartite Declaration be applied. They were interested neither in halting the Israeli invasion nor in branding the Israeli as aggressors.[153] Meanwhile, the American ambassador in London met with Secretary Lloyd to discuss with him the American resolutions. But the British foreign minister did not tell the ambassador that the British delegate at the United Nations had already been instructed to veto the American resolution, and Premier Pineaus was expected to arrive in London in half an hour to join in handing ultimatums to Israel and Egypt, so phrased as to invite Israel to advance 100 miles into Egyptian territory.[154]

The British and French governments, on that day, delivered their ultimatums to Egypt and Israel. They called upon them to withdraw their forces 10 miles away from the Canal, and asked the Egyptian government,

[151]State Department, op. cit., p. 137.

[152]Time, November 12, 1956, p. 33.

[153]Ibid.

[154]Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., pp. 79-80

in order to protect the Canal, to permit the Anglo-French forces to occupy "temporarily" Port Said, Ismailia and Suez. Israel and Egypt were given twelve hours to reply, and if these requirements were not met "British and French forces [would] intervene in whatever strength [might] be necessary to secure compliance."[155] An American official at the State Department described it "was 'the most brutal ultimatum in modern history.'"[156] It seems clear that Britain and France were determined to occupy Egypt whether the fighting was stopped or not.[157] Israel, whose forces had not yet reached the line from which it was supposed to withdraw, accepted the ultimatum. Egypt could only reject.[158] By now, Nasser had pulled the rest of his troops back, in order to defend the Suez zone and his capital. The Israeli forces then lost contact with the Egyptians.[159]

British and French planes abruptly started a systematic bombardment of the Egyptian airfields, seaports, railways and communication centers. An invasion from the sea soon followed.[160] On October 31, President Eisenhower, in a broadcast, declared "that 'the United States were not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions. Nor were we informed of them in advance...We believe these

[155]State Department, op. cit., p. 139.

[156]Wheelock, op. cit., p. 243.

[157]Beal, op. cit., p. 280.

[158]Bullard, op. cit., p. 207.

[159]Time, November 12, 1956, p. 32, 34.

[160]Documents on International Affairs 1956, p. 243.

actions...'to have been taken in error.'"[161] In the opinion of the Afro-Asian nations, the British and French "were simply trying to reimpose 'colonialism' in an area from which it had been expelled."[162]

At the Security Council, on October 30, the American resolution "which called upon Israel to withdraw her forces behind the 'established armistice lines and upon all members of the United Nations to refrain from the use or threat of force in the area,'"[163] was defeated by an Anglo-French veto. It was Britain's first veto and France's third. A similar resolution was then submitted by the Soviet Union, but again France and Britain vetoed it. Yugoslavia, with the support of the majority, succeeded in referring the controversy to the General Assembly. It invoked the "Uniting for Peace" resolutions of 1950. On November 2, the General Assembly adopted resolutions calling for an immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice line. Sixty-four votes were in favor and five were against. The five negative votes were from Australia, New Zealand, Britain, France, and Israel. On the next day, Britain and France announced that they would accept the U. N. resolutions if a United Nations Force was set up to assume the mission of their own forces. Israel also informed the General Assembly that it would approve the resolutions if the withdrawal were

[161] Ibid., p. 244.

[162] The United States in World Affairs 1956, p. 332.

[163] Documents on International Affairs 1956, p. 243.

not to be based on the Armistice Agreement of 1949.[164]

At this point the Soviet Union sent three identical notes to Britain, France, and Israel. It was a good opportunity for Russia to divert world attention from Hungary to the Suez. In his letter to M. Pineau, Premier Bulganin asked, "'in what situation would France find herself were she attacked by other states that have modern formidable means of destruction?'"[165] Bulganin's letter to Mr. Eden was similar in tone. It suggested that well armed countries which opposed the action "could, at the present time, refrain from sending naval or air forces to the shores of Britain and use other means, for instance, rocket weapons."[166] The letter to Ben-Gurion was the sharpest. Bulganin stated

> The Government of Israel is playing with the fate of peace, with the fate of its own people, in a criminal and irresponsible manner; it is sowing hatred for the State of Israel among the people of the East which cannot but affect, the future of Israel and which will place a question upon the very existence of Israel as a state.[167]

The Soviet government recalled its ambassador to Israel, and threatened to send volunteers into the Middle East.

Mr. Bulganin also sent a letter to President Eisenhower in which he suggested that

the United States had a strong naval force in the Mediterranean

[164] Ibid., pp. 243-244.

[165] Ibid., p. 245.

[166] Ibid.

[167] State Department, op. cit., p. 188.

> and that the Soviet Union also possessed a strong navy and air force. 'The joint and immediate use of these means by the United States of American and the Soviet Union, on a decision of the United Nations, would be a reliable guarantee for ending aggression against the Egyptian people, against the countries of the Arab East.[168]

The White House, concerned more about the Soviets' intervention in Hungary, described the Soviet proposal as "unthinkable."[169]

Back at the United Nations, the General Assembly decided to establish a United Nations Emergency Force on November 4. Its task was to insure and supervise the cease-fire. On the following day, Mr. Eden, after the landing of Anglo-French troops at Port Said, announced that a cease-fire would be put into effect at midnight.[170] Egypt and Israel had already accepted the U. N. order.

In the battlefield, Egypt suffered heavily. The Israeli forces captured most of the Egyptian military equipment in Sinai, and about 5000 soldiers. They destroyed the oil fields there, and took away as much material as they could.[170a] Israel claimed that within one hundred hours, its forces reached the Suez Canal.[170b] The Israeli victory can be attributed to the complete withdrawal of the Egyptian forces from Sinai in order to defend the Suez Zone, and to the French

[168] Ibid., p. 181.

[169] Document of International Affairs 1956, p. 246.

[170] Ibid., pp. 245-246.

[170a] Little, op. cit., p. 301.

[170b] Wynn, op. cit.

participation in the Sinai military operations. As Sir Reader Bullard wrote, "The high qualities of the Israeli forces are generally admitted, but what part, if any, was played in their victory by the French navy and air force has still to be determined."[170c]

During the war, the canal was blocked. Nasser ordered its clearance delayed pending complete withdrawal of the invading forces from Egypt. The Soviet threat of sending volunteers increased the U. S. insistence on securing an immediate and complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from Egypt. The United States government informed Britain and France "that it would not feel compelled to take action in case of a Soviet attack on their Suez and Cyprus forces."[171] They, in turn, notified Ben-Gurion that "they could promise him no support if hs insisted on holding Sinai."[172] President Eisenhower asked Ben-Gurion "to back down so as to give the Russians no pretext for intervention."[173] Britain and France capitulated, and they completed their withdrawal on December 23. Ben-Gurion persisted and only under heavy pressure from the United Nations, Russia, and President Eisenhower, who threatened him with economic sanctions, did he eventually yield, because he "could not afford to alienate the country on which Israel depended for its economic existence."[174] On March 8, 1957, Israeli troops with-

[170c] Bullard, loc. cit.

[171] Time, November 19, 1956, p. 33.

[172] Ibid., p. 34.

[173] Ibid.

[174] Campbell, op. cit., p. 117.

drew completely. The Tripartite Aggression proved that

> the creation of Israel had been a Western plot for the purpose of securing a bridgehead in the Arab world from which attacks could be launched on the Arab world. It really did appear that 'imperialism' was not just a term of abuse to label something of which Abdul Nasser did not happen to approve, but that it was an active, evil force, seeking to suppress any manifestation of independence among the Arab nations.[175]

In conclusion, the [Suez] adventure must certainly be written down as a colossal blunder whether or not it was also the crime that much of the world believed it to be."[176] It "is one of those episodes which make an indelible mark on the course of events; it will always have a chapter in history books."[177]

American Policy after the Suez Affair

After the Suez crisis, there was a possibility for an American-Egyptian rapprochement. The United States' stand against the invaders had enhanced American prestige in Egypt, and had mitigated the effects of the earlier American blockade. It had also prevented the Soviet Union from reaping all credit for acting on behalf of the Arabs. President Nasser applauded the United States' moral support during the Suez war. But the United States dashed Egypt's hope of reconciliation by turning down the Egyptian request for 435,000 tons of American wheat.

[175]John Marlowe, Arab Nationalism and British Imperialism: A Study in Power Politics (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 139.

[176]The United States in World Affairs 1956, p. 332.

[177]Wint and Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 89.

Before the Suez crisis, Egypt had received, under Public Law 480, considerable amounts of American wheat. The United States justified her sudden refusal on the ground that the authorization under P. L. 480 was nearly exhausted. This happened at a time when Egypt was pressed severely for hard currencies, and when she was suffering from a food shortage. Nasser interpreted this as a deliberate rebuff. He was forced to get his country's supply of wheat from the Soviet Union at slightly above world market prices. Nevertheless, he was anxious to establish friendly relations with the United States. But the State Department

> pursued a policy of isolating Egypt, and to a lesser extent Syria, polictically and economically. Egyptian government funds, which had been blocked in July, 1956, remained frozen through 1957, and permits to export lubricating oil and mechanical spare parts to Egypt were difficult to obtain. The British and the French gladly cooperated in this campaign.[178]

In the view of American policy makers, the collapse of Britain as the major foreign power in the Middle East had created a so-called "power vacuum" which should be filled by the West...otherwise the Soviet Union would move in. The Soviet Union had become the most popular foreign power in the Middle East because of its material and moral support to the Arabs in their disputes with the Western powers and Israel. This new situation, in the opinion of the American policy makers, made urgent a review of the United States policy in that area as a whole. A firm and comprehensive policy was demanded--one which

[178]Wheelock, op. cit., p. 250.

would commit the United States to the defense of the Middle-East nations and strengthen them militarily and economically by increased foreign aid. Mention of expanding the Baghdad Pact as a means of achieving that goal was avoided largely because it would further alienate Egypt and other Arab states. Instead,

> the Administration chose the method of a public law which would combine a declaration of policy extending 'security frontiers' of the United States across the Middle East gap between NATO and SEATO with a dramatization of the aid programs already in existence and increased flexibility in their future use.[179]

In his message to Congress on January 5, 1957, the Chief Executive emphasized the importance of the Middle East to the United States and to the West as a whole and proposed a joint resolution which would

> (1) authorize the President to employ as he deems necessary the armed forces of the United States to secure and protect the integrity and independence of any nation or group of nations in the general area of the Middle East requesting such aid against overt armed aggression from any nation controlled by international communism;
> (2) authorize the Executive to undertake programs of military assistance to any nation or group of nations in that area desiring such aid;
> (3) authorize cooperation with any nation or group of nations in the development of economic strength for the maintenance of national independence.[180]

He also asked to be given a free hand in spending $200 million from the funds which already had been appropriated for that area. These proposals have come to be called the Eisenhower Doctrine.

[179]Campbell, op. cit., pp. 121-122.

[180]Ibid., p. 122.

In Congress, some criticism of the doctrine arose as a result of Mr. Dulles' failures in handling Middle Eastern affairs in the previous year or two. Senator W. Fulbright, the Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that "the withdrawal of the offer to help finance the Aswan Dam led to the Suez War.[181] Perhaps the most justified criticism was that the doctrine evaded the basic problems, such as Palestine and Suez, from which the Soviets built up prestige and influence in the area; not by force of arms, but by well-timed political moves.[182] As recent events had shown, the real danger did not spring from the Soviet Union, but stemmed from Britain, France and Israel.

Evidently the Eisenhower Doctrine sought to contain Nasser's outward thrust in the Arab world "through alliance with older political groupings."[183] In the view of most Arabs, Soviet aggression was "remote geographically, unknown historically, and... unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future. . . . The silence of the Doctrine about colonial or Zionist aggression must be considered as likely to encourage such aggression."[184]

In January, 1957, Nasser was informed by the Egyptian Embassy in Washington

[181]Utley, op. cit., p. 97.

[182]Campbell, op. cit., pp. 123-124.

[183]W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena: An Essay in Recent History (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 361.

[184]Utley, op. cit., p. 137.

> that the United States was about to use all the economic weapons at her command to try to accomplish what Britain and France had failed to achieve with their invasion: to isolate him, to prevent him from establishing himself as the strong man of the Middle East, and to bring about his eventual downfall, if possible.[185]

For this reason, he "spent much...of 1957 resisting Western attempts to isolate him diplomatically;...with countertactics."[186] On January 19, he held a meeting attended by the heads of Saudi Arabia, Syria and Jordan, to consider the Eisenhower Doctrine. The conferred leaders "solemnly 'agreed on rejection of the 'vacuum theory,'[and] resolved 'never to allow their countries to become a sphere of influence for any foreign power.'"[187]

The next month, King Saud visited the United States at the invitation of its government. This visit produced a change in his attitude toward the Doctrine. During his stay, he approved the Doctrine and agreed to extend the lease of the American base at Dahran for another five years. In return, the American government promised him some economic aid. En route home, he stopped in Cairo, to pass on his new impression of the doctrine to the Arab leaders with whom he had previously agreed to reject it. He urged them to approve it and to state clearly that the real danger to the Arab world was Communism.

[185]John, op. cit., p. 272.

[186]Wheelock, op. cit., p. 252.

[187]The United States in World Affairs 1957, p. 76.

Only King Hussein of Jordan gave him his support.[188]

Expressing his view of the doctrine to an American newsman, Nasser declared:

> It seemed to us that the U. S. sought the same objectives as Britain and France in their aggression. Until last May we hoped for peaceful relations. I told the U. S. Ambassador it was my duty to be friendly to the U. S. The result was passive. You were under the impression that this regime would not last for more than six months. We offered you friendship, but it was refused. It was most clear that we must explain American plans.[189]

Nasser maintained friendly relations with the Afro-Asian nations "and with neutralist leaders such as Nehru and Sukarno, who reciprocated Nasser's warmth by stating that Indonesia desired a 'guided democracy' such as that practiced in Egypt."[190] In March, Nasser agreed to an Afro-Asian conference to be held at Cairo, as a means of showing that Mr. Dulles could not isolate him. However,

> American enmity was not to Nasser's liking, for it prejudiced his game of economic and political neutralism. So even when he criticized the United States for a 'policy of invasion from within,' he was careful to temper this charge with acknowledgment of American support during the Anglo-French-Israeli military action.[191]

American-Egyptian relations deteriorated further due to the conflict over the Arab world and Israel. The United States felt Nasser

[188] Ibid., pp. 178-179.

[189] Newsweek, November 25, 1957, pp. 57-58.

[190] Wheelock, op. cit., p. 252.

[191] Ibid., p. 256.

was trying to subvert the pro-Western governments in the Arab world. And when Egypt charged that King Hussein was conniving with Israel, the U. S. said that the charges were made "'completely out of whole cloth.'"[192] On the other hand, Nasser held the United States responsible for the overthrow of the nationalist government of Jordan in April. He felt that the American intrigues in Syria would fail, and only drive that country closer to the Soviet Union. On the question of Israel he stated that "were it not for Secretary Dulles' personal animosity toward him, it still would be possible to establish a mutually satisfactory modus vivendi between the United States and Egypt despite differences over the question of Israel."[193] He felt that Mr. Dulles was supporting Israel at tremendous expense to American interests. Many of Mr. Dulles' actions were interpreted by Nasser as persistent support of Israel, regardless of the cost to U. S. prestige in the Middle East as a whole. He remained convinced that Mr. Dulles was trying to destroy his regime. He held Dulles to be the one individual most responsible for causing all that trouble in the Middle East which the Russians well knew how to exploit. In spite of these feelings toward Mr. Dulles, he continued to feel a modicum of friendship toward him in segments of the American government. His suspicions about Mr. Dulles did not affect his relations with individual American friends,

[192] Newsweek, November 25, 1957, p. 58.

[193] Ellis, op. cit., p. 50.

some of whom, however, he thought were directly involved in anti-Egyptian intrigues.

Late in 1957, the United States adopted the policy of "attentive inactivity" toward Egypt. This policy only succeeded in narrowing Nasser's "suspicions of the United States government down to Secretary of State Dulles."[194] On February 1, 1958, Egypt lost its international entity as a result of its merger with Syria into the United Arab Republic. An attempt was made to prevent the merger by assassinating Nasser, who blamed the attempt on the West and its friends in the Arab world particularly Saudi Arabia. Nasser "had some justification in the case of Saudi Arabia, for there was strong evidence that agents for King Saud had paid 1.9 million pounds for the assassination."[195] Finally,

> the truth was that...the Eisenhower Doctrine had not by any means succeeded in unifying the Middle East in opposition to Soviet designs. It would be more accurate to say that it had introduced a fresh element of division among the Middle Eastern countries, perpetuating and in some cases accentuating the division already created by the Baghdad Pact and other manifestations of Western policy in past years.[196]

[194] Ibid., p. 52.

[195] Wheelock, op. cit., p. 259.

[196] John C. Campbell, Defense of the Middle East: Problem of the American Policy (Revised Edition, New York: Harper, for C.F.R., 1960), p. 175.

Evaluation

The underlying principal of United States policy toward Egypt was to induce her to join a military defense alliance which was conceived as a means of protecting American interests in the Middle East. American policy not only failed to achieve this aim but also failed to establish a relationship outside the military alliance which would associate important aspects of Nasser's goals with the West, via economic development. It failed because of its inconsistency with American national interests and ideals and because of the conflicting objectives of the United States in the Middle East.

The first and most important cause of its failure was the question of Israel out of which the others developed. Against warning, and strong opposition of the American diplomats in the Middle East and of both the Departments of State and Defense, President Truman, under pressure from American Zionists, assumed the major role in the establishment of Israel. American financial assistance to the Jewish state was enormous. Israel could not survive without it. Israel's creation in the heart of the Arab world was against the American ideal of the rights of self-determination. It was also against American interest in the Middle East because Israel became the main obstacle in the way of building a regional defense organization. Its creation opened the door for the Soviet Union to enter Middle Eastern politics.

President Eisenhower's administration failed to solve the problem of the Arab-Israeli conflict because though it talked about adopting

an impartial policy it never did so in fact. It also failed because it relied on the old Arab political group in implementing its policy. Of no less significance, was its identifications with Britain and its approach to economic development in the Middle East.

In the future if American policy is to succeed it must address itself to bringing about a fair settlement of the problem of the Arab refugees and adjusting the Arab-Israeli borders. Neutralism should be considered as an established fact in the Cold War. Finally, American aid should be spent largely on economic development programs which would create real stability. Surely this would keep the Soviet Union out of the area since there is a deep ideological conflict between nationalism and Communism.

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