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The Regionalization of Peacekeeping: A Solution to African Violence?

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The growing power of the European Union in the political and economic landscape illustrates the trend of regionalism that is expanding throughout the world. Regionalism has become a “buzz” word in the international relations field, and many developing countries are attracted by the promises of political influence and economic stimulation that regional organization has been able to provide the countries of Western Europe. An ever increasing list of regional organizations is being formed in the developing world, including Mercosur (Southern Common Market) in Latin American and ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Sub-Saharan Africa is another region that has fully embraced this trend of regionalism. Both continent-wide regional organizations like the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) and the new African Union are enjoying increasing memberships, while memberships in smaller sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) are also rising.

Traditionally these regional institutions have been primarily focused on unity and economic development, but recently a new trend has begun to emerge among regional institutions. Beginning with NATO’s 1995 (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) intervention in Bosnia, regional organizations have shown an increasing desire to become involved in peacekeeping. African regional organizations have eagerly welcomed the advent of regionalized peacekeeping forces as a way to mitigate the destabilizing effects of conflict. Given the rise of these regional peacekeeping efforts in Africa, this thesis asks: Are these regional peacekeeping missions an effective way of building stable governments and establishing lasting peace?

Background

Before I advance to the core analysis of my thesis, I will provide the reader with the background necessary to understand my later investigation into African regional organizations and their

peacekeeping initiatives. First, I will begin by outlining several key concepts that will recur throughout this paper.

Definitions

As the premise of this paper is the growing trend of regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa, it is important to define regionalism. Regionalism refers to the growing trend of countries organizing around shared economic and political experiences, as well as, around common security interests. Members of regional organizations choose to centralize decision-making in a common institution governed by the members themselves. By pooling together their sovereignty, regional organizations hope to “empower themselves *vis-à-vis* the external international environment.”¹ Regional organizations can have a variety of goals. For some regional organizations like the European Union, the focus is mainly economic cooperation. Other organizations (e.g., NATO) exist solely for security purposes. The regional institutions examined in this paper have expanded upon their traditional political and economic activities to include peacekeeping in their overall mandates.

The peacekeeping process is another term which needs to be accurately defined within the scope of this analysis. This paper outlines a very generalized definition of what comprises a peacekeeping mission. Any operation seeking to engage in conflict prevention or conflict mediation is designated a peacekeeping operation. Peacekeeping missions may occur in the case of any inter- or intra- state conflict in which an organization deploys a contingent of troops whose goal it is to establish or preserve a peace agreement.

History of Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa

¹ Laakso, Liisa. “Beyond the Notion of Security Community: What Role for the African Regional Organizations in Peace and Security?” *The Round Table*. Vol. 94, No. 381. September 2005. p. 491.

Sub-Saharan Africa is a region best known for its history of instability and violence. This widespread and permeating conflict is one of the reasons that my research question is so pertinent. After achieving independence from their colonial governments in the 1960s, most African countries experienced decades of rule by strong patrimonial leaders often called the “Big Men” of Africa.² These rulers led governments characterized by wasteful spending, failing economic policies, and ethnic tension. Rather than implementing principles of democratic rule, the “Big Men” of Africa maintained control by playing ethnic groups off of one another and exploiting long-standing hostilities. Their governments were focused on, “seeking personal gain, often precipitating violence for their own ends.”³

As poverty on the continent increased so did civil unrest as the “Big Men” began to lose their grip on power. Economic frustration and ethnic strain reached a peak in the 1980s, as the level of violence in Africa increased rapidly. Conflicts became both inter- and intra- state in nature. Countries including Angola and the Nigeria descended into chaotic and deadly civil wars. The widespread proliferation of arms and the Cold War proxy status of many of these conflicts guaranteed the civil clashes would be especially violent. These wars also created a variety of spillover effects, including the forced migration of refugees and involvement of external forces, both threatening the stability of entire regions. Tribal strife surfaced across the continent gripping countries like the Central African Republic, Congo-Brazzaville, and Cote d’Ivoire.

These civil conflicts are not a just a distant memory in sub-Saharan Africa. Their devastating effects still play an important role in region’s current instability. Many of the aforementioned conflicts occurred primarily in the late 1980’s and into the 1990s. For instance

² Meredith, Martin. *The Fate of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence*. Public Affairs: New York, 2005. ***Term taken from book...do I need a specific page number to cite?

³ Meredith 688.

civil conflicts like those in Rwanda, Burundi, and Sierra Leone all occurred within the last 20 years. Current conflicts are still causing widespread violence as in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The civil war in DRC has proved to be one of the most deadly conflicts on the continent, killing more than 5 million people in less than 10 years. The country has only recently achieved a tenuous peace agreement, and violence still jeopardizes the democratic process. Recent elections in Kenya also demonstrate the frailty of many African governments. Contested elections in January 2008 find the country teetering on the brink of a civil conflict. Hundreds have already been killed in outbreaks of violence between the rival Kikuyu and Luo tribes, and further hostilities are eminent if the leaders are not able to negotiate a settlement.

Civil unrest is not the only type of military problem facing Africa. Inter-state conflicts have also become a source of instability. Border wars like those in Ethiopian and Eritrea have claimed many lives and destabilized relations between nations. The Ethiopian and Eritrean war continued throughout the 1980s and did not conclude until 1991 when Eritrea achieved independence. The war took a great toll on the populations of both countries, resulting in more than 100,000 deaths and over one-third of Eritrean citizens being displaced.⁴ Inter-state conflicts have also resulted in violence in other countries including Senegal and Mauritania. Many domestic conflicts in Africa have also overrun national boundaries and caused violence in neighboring countries. The ethnic fueled conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi demonstrate this principle as they caused violent skirmishes in both the DRC and Uganda.

The many examples of violence described in the previous paragraphs illustrate the cycle of conflict encompassing many African countries in the last several decades. Violent conflicts are all too frequent in Africa. Jones and Duffey find that, "historical divisions and animosities

⁴ Meredith 678.

continue to exacerbate nascent and incipient conflicts” in many countries, while “ethnic fragmentation and nationalism have resurfaced as major sources of instability in some of the newly independent countries.”⁵ According to Table 1, Africa is second in the world in armed conflicts with 102 conflicts from 1990-2003.

Table 2: Armed Conflicts by Region					
	Europe	Middle East	Asia	The Americas	Africa
1990	-	4	13	4	11
1991	1	6	11	4	11
1992	3	5	12	3	7
1993	5	6	10	3	7
1994	4	6	10	3	6
1995	3	6	11	3	5
1996	1	6	10	3	3
1997	-	4	9	2	4
1998	1	4	9	2	11
1999	2	3	9	2	11
2000	1	4	9	2	9
2001	1	4	9	3	7
2002	1	2	9	3	6
2003	1	3	8	3	4

Figure 1: Moller, Bjorn. “Pros and Cons of Subsidiarity.” *Danish Institute for International Studies*. Working Paper. 2005. p. 6.

This data is sobering especially since it excludes many conflicts (e.g., the war in Sudan) that have erupted in the last five years. The huge number of African conflicts is troubling also in light of the great humanitarian toll of war. In the year 2000, “more than ten major conflicts were underway in Africa” with “one-fifth of all Africans [living] in countries batter by war,” and more than “12 million were classified as refugees.”⁶ Africa’s status as a conflict-prone region threatens stability and becomes a barrier for political and economic development.

The international community, primarily acting through the United Nations, has not ignored conflicts in Africa. The role of the international community is best illustrated by its

⁵ Jones, Richard and Tamara Duffey. “Sharing the Burden of Peacekeeping: The UN & Regional Organizations.” *Peacekeeping & International Relations*. Vol. 25. Issue 3. May/June 1996. p. 4.

⁶ Meredith 679.

reaction in two recent conflicts: Somalia and Rwanda. The Somali people, separated by the arbitrary lines of colonialism, began a decades-long struggle to reunite their nation after their independence from Italy in 1960. In 1961 the Republic of Somalia was formed bringing together a majority of the Somali people; however, large minorities of Somalis were living in the Ogden area of Ethiopia. The nationalistic desires of Somali leaders to form a nation-state became a source of great tension between Somalia and Ethiopia, as well as, a proxy conflict between the United States and Soviet Union. With the end of the Cold War, American support of Somalia decreased and domestic pressures sparked violence throughout the country. Conflicts culminated in a 1991 coup that destabilized the entire country. Somalia transformed into a nation with, “no recognized government, only a collection of rapacious militias vying for control, ready to loot and kill at will.”⁷

The United Nations under new Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali became increasingly concerned over the Somali conflict and believing an intervention was justified. He felt, “national sovereignty should be overridden by the United States Security Council in cases where it was deemed necessary for peace enforcement.”⁸ Following pressures from other aid organizations, the UN established the United Nations Operation in Somalia (Unosom) in April of 1992. Unosom’s initial purpose was to send 50 unarmed peacekeepers to monitor a tenuous cease fire and 500 UN troops to protect them.⁹ This mission suffered from a lack of resources, poor logistical support, and bureaucratic fighting. All of which contributed to the mission’s collapse.

As the cease fire expired in 1992 and the country descended back into violence, it became extremely dangerous and nearly impossible for humanitarian organizations to provide relief or

⁷ Meredith 471.

⁸ Meredith 471.

⁹ Meredith 472.

food aid. In response to widespread criticism from these humanitarian organizations, the UN later established another UN force, Unitaf, to provide a secure environment for the aid agencies to work in Somalia. This mission too proved to be a failure, as the estimated number of those that died from starvation before the Unitaf intervention is between 100,000 and 125,000.¹⁰

Despite the failure of Unosom and Unitaf, the Security Council approved the formation of another UN mission in the spring of 1993 known as Unosom II. The new mission's mandate was to disarm the militias and establish "a new government, a new police force, and a new justice system" and to rebuild the country's economy.¹¹ Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aided viewed this new mandate of disarmament as a declaration of war against the Somali people, and engaged the UN troops in guerilla-style battles in the streets of Mogadishu. The operation in Somalia descended into complete chaos as US raids attempted to capture Aided. This horribly failed mission in which 18 soldiers died and "the battered corpses of two dead soldiers were dragged as trophies through the streets by angry mobs" eroded all support for the Unosom II mission.¹²

As the US and other nations removed their UN troops from Somalia, the Unosom II mission was vacated. The final pullout from Somalia occurred in March of 1995. The \$4 billion mission was deemed a complete catastrophe, and Somalia was left to internal chaos resulting in violent clashes between warring militias. Even as the UN withdrew in defeat, looters descended upon the \$160 million UN compound, "stripping everything of value."¹³ The disastrous Somalia intervention had lasting effects on the UN's ability to act as a peacekeeper. Led by the US setting "[stricter] conditions on any US involvement in [future] UN peacekeeping

¹⁰ Meredith 477.

¹¹ Meredith 478.

¹² Meredith 483.

¹³ Meredith 484.

operations,” the UN organization as a whole became much more hesitant about advocating further interventions.¹⁴ The general attitude towards UN involvement in Somalia experience is best expressed as “a Unicef official described Somalia as ‘the greatest failure of the UN in our lifetime.’”¹⁵

The Somali conflict is not the international community’s only experience with peacekeeping missions in Africa. UN peacekeeping forces also intervened in the 1994 Rwandan crisis. Once a picturesque tourist destination with a stable economy and government in the 1970s and 1980s, Rwanda symbolized African potential. The beginning of the 1990s saw the country regress into instability. Using historic tensions between the Hutu majority and the Tutsi minority group, “a fanatical elite engaged in a modern struggle for power and wealth using [this] ethnic antagonism as their principal weapon.”¹⁶ Through the careful manipulation of the media and exploitation of the Hutu fear of Tutsi dominance, elites incited a genocide of historic proportions, and by July of 1994 more than 800,000 people had been slaughtered and nearly 2 million more were refugees.¹⁷

In the decades since its independence from France, Rwanda appeared stable from the outside while ethnic tension simmered below the surface. Many Tutsi minorities had been forced into exile in neighboring countries where they organized the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). RPF’s mission was to resettle Tutsi exiles and support reform of the one-party Rwandan political system. In 1990, RPF launched an incursion into Rwandan territory. Sensing the growing tensions and possibility of wide destabilization the international community pressured Habyarimana to sign a cease fire in 1992. The withholding of aid by Western donors eventually

¹⁴ Meredith 484.

¹⁵ Meredith 474.

¹⁶ Meredith 487.

¹⁷ Meredith 523.

forced Habyarimana to sign the Arusha Accords peace agreement with the RPF in 1993. This tenuous peace agreement was virtually ignored as the Hutu government continued to stockpile machetes and other weapons, while militia groups began to recruit and train members.¹⁸

During this time the international community acted to protect the fragile peace. The Arusha Accords established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (Unamir); however, the UN remained haunted by its failures and was apprehensive about its level of involvement. This trepidation delayed the deployment of the mission for several months as officials wrangled over the exact size of the contingent. Military experts recommended a minimum of 8,000 peacekeepers while the U.S. only proposed deploying 500. Led by Canadian general Romeo Dallaire, the Unamir mission finally consisted of 1,300 troops. The force was primarily composed of Bangladeshi soldiers who were poorly prepared and ill-equipped.¹⁹

This lack of support and preparation would become a theme for the Unamir mission. Dallaire found himself “short of vehicles, fuel, ammunition, radios, barbed wire, medical support, and even petty cash.”²⁰ Rather than enforcing the peace agreement, Unamir spent more time fighting with the UN for supplies and support. The ineffectiveness of the mission was almost assured as the UN denied Dallaire the intelligence support needed to monitor the Hutu militias and their plans. The ghosts of the UN’s military failure in Somalia caused the UN to also refuse the Unamir mission the mandate to conduct arms seizures. Even presented with knowledge of Interahamwe, the Hutu militia, planning and stockpiling weapons in preparation for an ethnic cleansing, the UN denied Unamir’s request to confiscate arms shipments. This mandate refusal was perhaps the most debilitating limitation, leaving Dallaire powerless to stop the impending genocide.

¹⁸ Meredith 501.

¹⁹ Meredith 502.

²⁰ Meredith 502.

The UN's fear that another highly public failure like Somalia "would produce a UN meltdown" reduced Unamir to a bystander status watching the genocide unfold.²¹ Violence engulfed the entire country following the April 6 assassination of President Habyarimana. Almost immediately planned murders were executed by the Hutu militia targeting prominent Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Hutu leaders began to call on the larger population to assist them in eradicating the Tutsi enemy. Ten UN peacekeepers were also killed in the violence.

The Unamir mission remained on the ground and General Dallaire refused to comply with UN pressure urging him to abort the mission and evacuate. He and his troops were left isolated with no support. The Belgian contingent of peacekeepers under orders by their government to withdraw left Unamir in dire conditions. Nevertheless, Dallaire still felt that the genocide could be curbed with more troops and adequate support. Ignoring Dallaire's advice and feeling Unamir was doomed, the UN passed a resolution removing the majority of its peacekeepers. However, unexpectedly days later the UN, under pressure from secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali, authorized a second peacekeeping force, Unamir 2. Conflict over the deployment location of the 5,500 additional troops prevented this mission from taking effect.

The genocide came to a close in July as the RPF forces secured control of Kigali. The conflict left Rwanda as the poorest country in world and more than one-third of its Tutsi population murdered.²² The conflict also spilled over into other countries including the DRC and Burundi, further destabilizing the entire region. The UN missions Unamir and Unamir 2 were deemed complete failures as they proved incapable of stopping the genocide. Rather than being motivated by the lessons of Somalia, the UN was paralyzed by its fear of becoming too deeply involved in a humanitarian conflict. Coupled with its catastrophe in Somalia, the UN's

²¹ Meredith 505.

²² Meredith 523.

reputation as a world peacekeeper was severely tarnished. African countries were left feeling abandoned by the international community.

The Way Peacekeeping Works

The disastrous effects of conflict like those seen in Somalia and Rwanda have generated a strong international interest in preventing widespread ethnic conflict and genocide. This interest has raised the importance of developing mechanisms for effective conflict resolution.

Peacekeeping has emerged as one of the primary mechanisms of conflict prevention and resolution. The violent nature of many inter- and intra-state conflicts have necessitated outside intervention for a variety of reasons, most notably humanitarian needs. There are two basic approaches to peacekeeping—international and regional. Both methods have their pros and cons, and this paper's primary focus will be on the potential of the latter form. Nonetheless, it is important to understand the benefits and challenges of the more established international approach before an analysis of the regional method can take place.

International Peacekeeping. International peacekeeping efforts take place under the auspices of the UN. Peacekeeping is not explicitly mentioned in the UN framework as the preferred method of conflict resolution. Rather it was "invented by the United Nations as a new and innovative way of addressing conflicts, in light of the ineffectiveness of the collective security provisions under the charter."²³ With the end of the Cold War, the UN felt the need to change its approaches to conflict. It expanded upon the strictly military operations of its past and modernized to meet the needs of today's more multidimensional conflicts. This transformation has included growing involvement in humanitarian crises and intra-state conflicts.

²³ Kieh, George Klay. "International Organizations and Peacekeeping in Africa." *Peacekeeping in Africa*. Ed. Karl P. Magyar and Earl Conteh-Morgan. New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1998. p. 15.

Although they are not outlined in the original United Nations Charter, peacekeeping missions still derive their mandates from the UN Charter. Chapter VI of the charter outlines a procedure for conflict arbitration between two states, while Chapter VII authorizes military involvement on behalf of the UN.²⁴ Peacekeeping has become a new mechanism by which the UN deals with the problems I described in previous chapters. In fact, former secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld referred to peacekeeping, “as belonging to ‘Chapter Six and a Half’ of the Charter, placing it between traditional methods of resolving disputes peacefully, such as negotiation and mediation under Chapter VI, and more forceful action as authorized under Chapter VII.”²⁵

With respect to its peacekeeping missions in Africa, the UN has used both Chapter VI and Chapter VII to authorize its involvement. Chapter VI has been the primary mandate for African peacekeeping missions.²⁶ The Rwandan conflict is an example of this authorization as Unamir was deployed only after the signing of the Arusha Accords. Unosom and Unosom II, the UN missions in Somalia, fell under the mandate of Chapter VII as the missions sought to militarily “establish a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid.”²⁷ Using these two mechanisms the UN has authorized 20 African peacekeeping missions, making it an integral part of the efforts to build a sustainable peace on the continent.²⁸

Launching a multilateral response from an established international organization like the UN provides several advantages in the conflict resolution process. The neutrality of the United Nations is unparalleled and is a tremendous asset in peace negotiation. A Security Council

²⁴ United Nations Charter. <<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>>

²⁵ United Nations Peacekeeping. <<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/>>

²⁶ Boulden, Jane. “UN Security Council Policy on Africa.” *Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organizations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. P. 14

²⁷ Boulden 14.

²⁸ Boulden 12.

resolution authorizing peacekeeping activities lends an inordinate amount of legitimacy to an operation. The UN's impartiality also ensures that "the viewpoints of third party states and subnational actors will be represented" in the peacekeeping operation.²⁹ By mobilizing minority factions and investing them in the peace process, agreements are more likely to be upheld.³⁰

In addition to neutrality, another asset of UN led peacekeeping is its financial and resource support. In contrast to regional or single-nation organizations, the United Nations has a much larger portion of its budget devoted to peacekeeping. It also has a large constituency to which it can appeal for additional funding. The relative wealth of the UN allows it to provide its troops with access to state-of-the-art technological resources, both in safety equipment and logistical support. Access to these financial and technological resources allows the preparedness of UN forces to be far superior to that of other multilateral and regional peacekeeping forces.

While the resources and impartiality of UN troops are unrivaled, there also several disadvantages to mobilizing UN peacekeeping operations. First there is the large bureaucratic structure of the United Nations. The veto power of the five permanent members of the Security Council makes it difficult for the UN to authorize the deployment of a peacekeeping force. For instance, since the Somalia crisis the United States has been wary of funding or providing resources for large-scale missions. This has made the U.S. much more likely to exercise its veto power. The growing tension over human rights between the U.S. and China has also acted as an obstruction to the peacekeeping process. Often criticized for its own human rights abuses, China has shown great reluctance to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations. Together these obstacles help account for the devastating delays and inaction of the UN peacekeeping missions as seen in Rwanda and Somalia.

²⁹ Diehl, Paul F. "Institutional Alternatives to Traditional U.N. Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multinational Options." *Armed Forces and Society*. Vol. 19. No 2, 1993. p. 22

³⁰ Diehl "Institutional Alternatives" p. 22.

The bureaucratic infighting is not confined to the authorization of missions. In Somalia and Rwanda the disagreements among the UN member states continued to affect the missions after they were approved. The lack of adequate support has rendered many missions virtually ineffective. For example, the fighting over resource allocation hampered General Dallaire's ability to halt the genocide in Rwanda. He was unable to secure enough soldiers, supplies, or logistical support to mount an effective effort. Another inefficiency resulting from the bureaucratic structure of the UN is its incapacity to designate missions with the appropriate mandates. Afraid of causing conflict among its member states, the UN often refuses to give its peacekeeping forces any real power. The operation in Rwanda was denied permission to seize arms, a decision which proved disastrous as these weapons promulgated the genocide.

Regional Peacekeeping. The UN's inability to deploy peacekeeping missions until conflicts have spiraled out of control, along with the delays caused by bureaucratic infighting have led many nations to take peacekeeping into their own hands. The rise of regional peacekeeping developed as a second approach to peacekeeping and conflict resolution in the wake of the UN's difficulties. The UN Charter indicates a preference for regional action in the incidence of a conflict. It states in Chapter VI Article 33, the "parties to any dispute threatening international peace or security 'shall, first of all, seek a solution...[and]...resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.'"³¹ This sentiment is echoed again in Chapter VIII which states, "such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council."³² To reinforce its support for regional peacekeeping institutions and "to remove any doubt of the preference for a lower-tier approach, the Charter

³¹ O'Brien, David. "The Search for Subsidiarity: The UN, African Regional Organizations and Humanitarian Action." *International Peacekeeping*. Vol. 7, No. 3. Autumn 2000. p. 60.

³² United Nations Charter. <<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/>>

stipulates that the Security Council should [also] actively promote regional solutions to regional problems.”³³ In fact, many scholars have argued that this preference for “disputants to exhaust regional possibilities before invoking UN measures, in effect [makes] regional agencies the ‘gatekeepers’ for the Security Council.”³⁴

Although encouragement of regional means of conflict prevention and resolution is well entrenched in the UN Charter, regionalism was not a popular approach until the 1990s. O’Brien finds that this renewed interest in the potential of regional organizations has developed because of the “UN’s midlife crisis brought on in part by the stress resulting from African conflicts.”³⁵ He believes that with “repeated humanitarian crises there are mounting political and financial reasons why donors are calling for greater participation of regional organizations.”³⁶ The UN was under tremendous pressure during the 1990s as it faced “state collapse and armed conflict in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Mozambique, Angola, and the Great Lakes.”³⁷ The “escalating expense of deploying Blue Helmets to more places for larger costlier missions” caused the UN and its donor states to look towards regional cooperation as a potential solution to its overstretched infrastructure.”³⁸

Regional organizations quickly answered the call of the UN and have dramatically increased their peacekeeping operations. Evidence of this growing involvement by regional organizations is demonstrated in Table 2.

³³ O’Brien 60.

³⁴ Marnika, Maurice. “Regional Peacekeeping: The Case for Complementary Efforts.” *Peacekeeping and International Relations*. Vol. 25, No. 3. May / June 1996, p. 9.

³⁵ O’Brien 60.

³⁶ O’Brien 60.

³⁷ O’Brien 61.

³⁸ O’Brien 61.

TABLE 2: PEACEKEEPING INITIATED BY THE UN AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 1947–2005

Period	Regional Organizations	United Nations
pre-1954	1	2
1955-1971	3	8
1972-1988	5	6
1989-2005	31	44

Figure 2: Diehl, Paul F. and Young-Im D. Cho. "Passing the Buck in Conflict Management: The Role of Regional Organizations in the Post-Cold War Era." *Brown Journal of World Affairs*. Vol. 12, No. 2. Winter / Spring 2006. p. 195.

The period 1989-2005 illustrates the extraordinary increase in the responsibility of regional organizations. Troubled Africa's reputation as a conflict-prone region, African regional organizations have responded with the greatest enthusiasm to the UN's emphasis on regional peacekeeping. Prior to 1994, only eight peacekeeping operations had been undertaken by African organizations. By 2005 the number had increased to 25.³⁹ The dominance of African regional organizations in the peacekeeping field is seen in Table 3.

TABLE 3: REGIONAL PEACEKEEPING BY ORGANIZATION, 1945–2005

	CIS	EC/EU	ECOWAS	LAS	NATO	OAS	OAU/AU	OSCE	SADC	Others
Number of Operations	1	4	5	4	6	2	12	1	2	3

Abbreviations used: CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States), EC/EU (European Community/European Union), ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), LAS (League of Arab States), NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), OAS (Organization of American States), OAU/AU (Organization of African Union/African Union), OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), SADC (Southern African Development Community). Others include CEMAC (Economic and Monetary Union of Central African States), CEN-SAD (the Community of Sahel and Saharan States), and OECS (Organization of East Caribbean States).

Figure 3: Diehl and Cho. "Passing the Buck." P. 196.

The four sub-Saharan African organizations listed, OAU / AU, ECOWAS, SADC, and CEMAC, together account for over half of all regional peacekeeping operations undertaken since the Second World War.

³⁹ Diehl and Cho. "Passing the Buck." p. 196.

With the growing inclination of regional organizations to resort to their own peacekeeping operations, a more detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of these regional operations is necessary. One of the key advantages of regional peacekeeping is that it encourages local solutions to local problems. In the words of a report released by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “the lesson of Rwanda for African leaders was that they ‘should no longer wait for action by the international community or the Security Council.’”⁴⁰ This type of attitude shift is seen across Africa as leaders guided by South African President Thabo Mbeki have encouraged an African Renaissance. The movement “seeks to inspire African leaders to create the conditions for peace, security, and development.”⁴¹ Focusing on their own abilities to resolve conflict, not only decreases the overall financial burden of the UN, but it also encourages African countries to take responsibility for their own security. The increased accountability creates an environment where African nations work eagerly to ensure stability and prevent conflict. Aware of the high financial and humanitarian costs of peacekeeping missions, countries are more likely to engage in an early intervention if they are the ones forced to pay the expenses of a full-scale peacekeeping operation.

Another benefit of the regional approach to peacekeeping is the increased knowledge that regional states have about local conflicts. A regional organization is better able to understand the origins and tensions of a specific conflict than a larger organization like the United Nations. Marnika argues that this indicates regional organizations are “better able to provide early warning, information gathering and fact finding,” elements essential to successful operations.⁴² Additionally, the regional peacekeeping forces’ understanding of the conflict grants them more legitimacy with the local populations. The greater support bestowed on regional forces as

⁴⁰ O’Brien 63.

⁴¹ O’Brien 63.

⁴² Marnika 10.

opposed to a multinational force like the UN is “based on the notion that people and governments in a region have a natural affinity with those in that region and an inherent suspicion of what is perceived as outside intervention.”⁴³ Legitimacy allows regional forces to operate more efficiently and effectively, cooperating with the local population.

A principal benefit of regional peacekeeping is the ease at which consensus can be met. One of the UN’s greatest peacekeeping failures is its ability to rally member states to authorize a peacekeeping deployment. Regional organizations have an advantage “over global [organizations] because their membership is more homogenous.”⁴⁴ “States in a regional organization are more likely to be at the same development level, have similar historical roots, share some ethnic or tribal roots, and have similar outlooks flowing from facing common regional problems”—all of which make consensus probable. Also increasing the likelihood of consensus is the possibility of spillover effects. Conflict in the region could destabilize other countries by causing spillover effects or an influx of refugees.⁴⁵ These potential and undesirable effects encourage regional organizations to respond quickly to disturbances.

While the regional approach to peacekeeping has strengths, it also has several weaknesses. A key disadvantage for regional operations is the general resource deficiency these organizations encounter. It has proved incredibly difficult for regional associations to supply their peacekeeping troops with the same level of technology and logistical support as the UN is able to provide its peacekeepers. The financial burden on a regional organization would be immense. For example, “a regional peacekeeping operation would incur expenses similar to those of a UN operation, but would have fewer states to draw upon for contributions.”⁴⁶ This

⁴³ Diehl. “International Alternatives...” p. 5.

⁴⁴ Diehl. “International Alternatives...” p.4.

⁴⁵ Marnika 9.

⁴⁶ Diehl. “International Alternatives...” p. 6.

resource problem has been exacerbated in regions like Africa, where most states are poor and not very technologically advanced.⁴⁷

The composition of regional peacekeeping troops is another area of concern. Whereas the increased knowledge about local conflicts is a positive aspect of having troops from neighboring countries, local troops can be quite problematic. Diehl finds that “a key requirement for peacekeeping success is that the troops be composed of personnel from disinterested states and that they be perceived as impartial by the combatants.”⁴⁸ Regional peacekeeping troops violate this criteria as their force “would likely be composed of regular soldiers from national armies [who]...are more likely to go beyond the limitation imposed by the peacekeeping strategy and become embroiled in the conflict.”⁴⁹ The troops composed of these national army soldiers are also often lacking in the “accumulated experience to mount and sustain” a successful peacekeeping mission.⁵⁰ The varying levels of training and technology across individual contingents of troops results in a lack of standardization which can dramatically complicate a mission’s objectives.

In addition to the problems associated with troops, regional peacekeeping operations also face challenges in resisting dominance by a regional hegemon. The lack of resource and financial support needed to deploy a peacekeeping mission often leads regional organizations to depend heavily on their wealthiest members. This reliance becomes problematic as the “larger, wealthier states become politically dominant because of their overwhelming role.”⁵¹ In this case, a hegemon would be able to dictate the operations of the mission with little regard as to the concerns of other members. The opposite can also prove true. A regional hegemon could

⁴⁷ Diehl. “International Alternatives...” p. 7.

⁴⁸ Diehl. “International Alternatives...” p. 8.

⁴⁹ Diehl. “International Alternatives...” p. 8.

⁵⁰ Marnika 10.

⁵¹ Marnika 10.

effectively block the authorization of peacekeeping mission it does not support or intentionally sabotage a mission if one is approved.⁵²

Why My Research Question Is Important

In recent years, Africa has confronted many conflicts by undertaking regional peacekeeping missions. This begs the question: Is this an effective approach? To address this question I will analyze two case studies of African regional peacekeeping—Chad and Liberia. Authorized by two different African regional organizations during two different decades, these case studies offer an opportunity to examine the varying methods of regional organizations and the evolution of regional peacekeeping in Africa. The Chadian Civil War in the early 1980s is an important case as it marked the first regional peacekeeping endeavor undertaken by an African organization. My other case, the Liberian Civil War of the late 1990s is an interesting situation as it was the most widespread intervention by an African regional organization to date. An analysis of these two cases hopes to provide enough information to effectively evaluate whether regional peacekeeping missions are valuable in establishing sustainable peace agreements.

Case Studies

In this section, I will examine two case studies of regional peacekeeping in Africa: Chad and Liberia. The civil wars raging in each of these countries and the interventions led by the OAU and ECOWAS provide ample material to examine the outcomes of regional peacekeeping initiatives. It is also important to determine how the regional approach to peacekeeping functions in an sub-Saharan African environment.

Chad

Chad's history is that of a nation caught between two worlds. Bordered by Arab-controlled, Muslim North Africa to the north and black Africa to the south, the domestic

⁵² Diehl. "International Alternatives..." p. 9.

problems of Chad mirror this unique geography. The country is divided between the many Arab, semi-nomadic tribes of the northern Sahelian region and the black, sedentary Sara Christians of the South. The relationship between these groups has been “replete with animosity and conflict” for several centuries.⁵³ Much of this historic tension resulted from the region’s reliance on the slave trade as its economic engine. Northern tribes captured and exported southerners as slaves to neighboring countries, including Sudan, Egypt, and Libya. Clashes between the two groups periodically engulfed the country in violence.

The deep-seated hostilities that began with the slave trade were only exacerbated by colonialism, “when peoples of different cultures and with histories of enmity were lumped together on paper without even a pretense of integration made by the colonial overlord.”⁵⁴ Immune to the precarious cultural situation of the Chadian territory, French colonists inflamed ethnic tensions by favoring the black tribes of the South. Impressed by the willingness of the Sara people to adopt the French language and culture, the colonists rewarded them with “economic resources, administrative skills, and military power.”⁵⁵ The “Muslim north vehemently rejected Christian penetration and secular western education” as they resisted all aspects French rule.⁵⁶

Perhaps the most significant legacy of colonial rule was the abolition of the historic slave trade. By outlawing the trading of black slaves, the French killed the economic livelihood of the northern tribes. This led the “southern Sara ethnic group [to view] the French as ‘saviors,’” while northerners “viewed the French as ‘infidels’ imposing a foreign rule over them.”⁵⁷ As a

⁵³ Amoo, Sam G. “Frustrations of Regional Peacekeeping: The OAU in Chad, 1977-1982.” The Carter Center. February 1991. Columbia International Affairs Online, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ams02/ams02.html>. p. 3.

⁵⁴ Amoo 3.

⁵⁵ Amoo 3.

⁵⁶ Amoo 3.

⁵⁷ Mays, Terry. *Africa’s First Peacekeeping Operation: The OAU in Chad, 1981-1982*. Westport: Praeger. 2002. p. 19.

result of slavery's end economic power became concentrated in the hands of the southerners and created a "dramatic reversal of the historical relationship" between the two groups.⁵⁸ By the time Chad achieved independence under President Francois Tombalbaye in 1960, "the Sara of the south dominated the government, the economy, and the army."⁵⁹ The power shift left the country ripe for conflict as tensions simmered just below the surface. As Mays explains, "the French preference for southerners over the more hostile northerners, compounded with a lack of development and a long history of conflict, helped set the stage for post-independent strife in Chad."⁶⁰

Conflict history. Following independence Chad was ruled by the Sara people. Bitter memories "about depopulation and ravaging of whole areas and destruction of entire tribes by Muslim slave raiders were still alive" and caused the black administrators to "savor their new power and [rule] with brutal vengeance."⁶¹ President Tombalbaye consolidated his power "by relying primarily on naked force and the strategic use of violence."⁶² Muslim groups in the North were forbidden to organize an opposition party and barred from government participation as Tombalbaye instituted a one-party state.⁶³ Northern tribes refused to succumb to the new power balance favoring the southerners. In an effort to "rearrange the power structure in their favor [and] regain their autonomy" they formed FROLINAT (Front Liberation Nationale du Tchad).⁶⁴ FROLINAT, founded in 1966, was a united insurrection force that joined together three separate anti-government movements.⁶⁵

⁵⁸ Amoo 3.

⁵⁹ Amoo 4.

⁶⁰ Mays 20.

⁶¹ Amoo 4.

⁶² Amoo 4.

⁶³ Amoo 4.

⁶⁴ Amoo 4.

⁶⁵ Mays 29.

The subsequent FROLINAT rebellions destabilized the Tombalbaye regime as they spread from the regional level to a nationwide revolt. Under a constant barrage of attacks, Tombalbaye sought French help to stabilize his government. The French launched the MRA (Mission de la Reforme Administrative) which served as “a military holding operation designed to contain the civil war while Tombalbaye introduced a series of reforms and reconciliation measures prescribed by French advisors.”⁶⁶ Despite French intervention, FROLINAT forces maintained a strong presence, and the southern government remained under constant pressure. Refusing to institute any reform measures, Tombalbaye was eventually killed in a 1975 coup led by his own army officers. Support for the united FROLINAT force also began to waiver as the group splintered, and factions led by Hissene Habre and Goukouni Weddeye battled the support of the Muslim North.⁶⁷

OAU response. “Although the conflict in Chad had been raging since 1965, it was not until 1977, at its Libreville (Gabon) Summit” that the OAU (Organisation of African Unity) began to discuss intervening in the Chadian crisis.⁶⁸ Founded in 1963 by a group of African leaders, the “primary goal of OAU was to create “a continental organization that would foster African unity.”⁶⁹ The OAU sought to cultivate a pan-African identity and reject the vestiges of colonialism. While the founders expressed concern about the potential for arbitrary colonial boundaries and the tribal nature of African society to cause conflict, the development of a peacekeeping infrastructure remained an afterthought.⁷⁰ The Charter of the OAU does not specifically authorize military intervention, but “Article 20 makes a provision for a Defence

⁶⁶ Amoo 4.

⁶⁷ Mays 18.

⁶⁸ Amoo 5.

⁶⁹ Jonah, James. O. C. “The OAU: Peace Keeping and Conflict Resolution.” *The Organization of African Unity after Thirty Years*. Ed. Yassin El-Ayouty. Westport: Praeger. 1994. p. 3

⁷⁰ Jonah 4.

Commission and Article 2, paragraph (f) urges members to co-operate in the fields of defence and security.”⁷¹ Building upon these informal arrangements, the OAU had previously delegated its conflict resolution duties to a variety of ad hoc commissions established for specific disputes.⁷²

The OAU’s initial attempt to halt the violence in Chad was through the establishment of the Chadian ad hoc committee in 1977. The first task of the committee was to investigate the charges that the Libyan government was providing funds and support for the FROLINAT forces.⁷³ Meanwhile, the Chadian government continued to deny allegations that the conflict was a civil war, maintaining “the façade that its conflict was with Libya, and that the OAU’s intervention was constitutionally permissible only in that situation of inter-state conflict.”⁷⁴ Despite Chad’s refusal to recognize the domestic nature of the conflict, the OAU’s willingness to mediate “was unique, because it was, at the time, the only internal conflict in Africa in which substantial intervention by a regional organization was permitted by the state in crisis.”⁷⁵ After several months the ad hoc committee was able to broker a peace deal between Chad and Libya, as well as secure “the first ceasefire agreement between the Chadian government and the FROLINAT” forces.⁷⁶

Signed in March of 1978, the ceasefire never took effect because of the growing domestic crisis in Chad.⁷⁷ Fighting between the northern and southern groups continued and in February of 1979, northern forces defeated Tombalbaye’s successor, Malloum. The overthrow of

⁷¹ Naldi, G.T. “Peace-Keeping Attempts by the Organisation of African Unity.” *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*. Vol. 34 No. 3 July 1985. p. 593.

⁷² Jonah 4.

⁷³ Amoo 5.

⁷⁴ Amoo 5.

⁷⁵ Amoo 5.

⁷⁶ Amoo 5.

⁷⁷ Amoo 5.

Malloum's government meant an "end to southern domination over the Muslim north."⁷⁸

Although FROLINAT forces had secured control of the Chadian government, fighting still continued as the conflict transformed into "a struggle for power among the Muslim leaders themselves as Hissene Habre was challenged by his longstanding northern rival, Goukouni Weddeye."⁷⁹ 1979 produced another significant change in the Chadian crisis. According to Mays, it was during this year that "Nigeria emerged as a principal backer and regional leader behind a negotiated settlement in the crisis."⁸⁰ It was through Nigeria's efforts that peacekeeping first emerged as viable strategy in "the long-term conflict management process."⁸¹ Nigeria believed the deployment of a peacekeeping force was essential "to support peace negotiations."⁸²

The Kano conference in March of 1979, led by Nigeria, "was the first attempt to bring together all important factions and interested parties, within and without Chad for the purpose of seeking a negotiated settlement of the conflict."⁸³ Despite a few initial setbacks, the meeting was greeted as a success. Its chief accomplishment was the signing of The Kano Accord on National Reconciliation. This document established a transitional government, known as the Transitional National Union Government (GUNT) which "would govern Chad until national elections could be held."⁸⁴ Each of the factions involved in the conference received two ministerial positions in the government, although Habre and Weddeye were barred from participation in the new government⁸⁵ In addition to the founding of the GUNT, the Kano Accords also saw the signatories agree to a "cease-fire and the fielding of a peacekeeping force manned by Nigerian

⁷⁸ Amoo 5.

⁷⁹ Amoo 5.

⁸⁰ Mays 35.

⁸¹ Mays 35.

⁸² Mays 35.

⁸³ Amoo 5.

⁸⁴ Mays 36.

⁸⁵ Mays 37.

soldiers.”⁸⁶ The first peacekeepers arrived by the end of March and worked as “a ‘buffer-force’ between the government’s forces and those of Habre.”⁸⁷

Even with the additional peacekeeping forces, the conflict in Chad persisted. Several difficulties surfaced after the signing of the Kano agreement, including the exclusion of several important factions.⁸⁸ Not invited to the Kano talks, a series of northern leaders banded together and “threatened to form a counter group to challenge GUNT.”⁸⁹ “Dismayed by the deterioration of the situation in Chad, Nigeria hosted a second Kano peace conference on April 3, 1979” in hopes of correcting the problems of the first conference.⁹⁰ The Kano II talks immediately erupted in controversy as “Nigerian authorities reportedly placed [Habre and Weddeye] under house arrest until they agreed to cooperate with the other factions.”⁹¹ The GUNT fell apart as the Weddeye and Habre formed a new government placing themselves at the center of authority and excluding the peripheral factions.⁹² The situation descended into further disarray as “relations between the principal Chadian factions and Nigeria became increasingly contentious.”⁹³ In an effort to force the factions to comply with its mediation attempts, Nigeria “resorted to an oil boycott, cutting off oil supplies to landlocked Chad.”⁹⁴ This only served to further enrage Weddeye and Habre who responded by “[denouncing] the high-handed behavior of Nigeria” and “[demanding] the withdrawal of Nigeria’s peacekeeping force that the Chadians now viewed as an ‘occupation army.’”⁹⁵

⁸⁶ Mays 36.

⁸⁷ Mays 37.

⁸⁸ Mays 38.

⁸⁹ Mays 38.

⁹⁰ Amoo 6.

⁹¹ Mays 38.

⁹² Mays 38.

⁹³ Amoo 6.

⁹⁴ Amoo 6.

⁹⁵ Amoo 6.

Following the disastrous failure of the Kano II talks, Nigeria once again attempted a mediation conference in May of 1979. Despite the attendance of the five factions originally excluded from the Kano I conference, the talks ended in disappointment the following day. The four controlling factions of the new GUNT, including Habre and Weddeye refused to take part in the reconciliation attempt.⁹⁶ Finally in August, Nigeria enlisted the help of the OAU in organizing the Lagos II conference. This meeting included “the participation of all eleven Chadian factions.”⁹⁷ The most significant outcome of the Lagos II conference was the Lagos Accord, an agreement which allowed the OAU to assemble a peacekeeping force to ensure cooperation and stability in Chad. The Lagos Accord laid out the following conditions concerning the OAU force:

1. The independent monitoring commission will oversee an effective neutral force.
2. The neutral force will:
 - a. oversee the ‘specialized services,’ including the Air Force and maintenance personnel, of the Chadian armed forces until the formation of a new GUNT.
 - b. protect all important Chadian personalities.
 - c. protect the civilian population of N’Djamena, Abeche, Faya, Moundou, and Sahr.
 - d. ensure the free movement of the civilian population throughout Chadian territory.
3. The neutral force should consist of soldiers from one or more countries not sharing a common border with Chad. [After signing the Lagos Accord, the signatories agreed to accept the offers of Benin, Congo, and Guinea to contribute contingents to the force.]
4. The mandate of the neutral force terminates when a national integrated army is established in Chad.⁹⁸

As laid out above, the OAU peacekeeping force had an ambitious role to play in Chad. After the failure of Nigeria’s mediation attempts, this OAU force seemed to be Chad’s only hope for a peaceful end to the conflict.

⁹⁶ Mays 39.

⁹⁷ Amoo 6.

⁹⁸ Mays 46-47.

Much of the optimism espoused in the Lagos Accord had already begun to erode as none of its key provisions had been implemented by the end of 1979.⁹⁹ Funding problems also plagued the OAU as the peacekeeping force was set to begin its mission. Without any additional OAU funding, the countries which “were to provide the neutral African force appeared unable to bear the cost of such an undertaking.”¹⁰⁰ Although Benin and Guinea had promised to contribute to the peacekeeping force, only the “Congolese contingent consisting of 550 soldiers, arrived in N’Djamena on January 18, 1980.”¹⁰¹ The under preparation of the force for such a large task was immediately evident in its transportation problems. The force reportedly “arrived in N’Djamena aboard Algerian aircraft piloted by Angolans.”¹⁰² Facing hostile fire and a lack of logistical support, the Congolese peacekeepers were “sequestered in barracks till they were evacuated by the French” less than 3 months after the beginning of their mission.¹⁰³

The Chadian conflict became more complicated following the withdrawal of the initial OAU peacekeeping force. The fighting between Weddeye and Habre continued as a large scale intervention of Libyan troops in support of Weddeye’s regime invaded Chad. By the end of 1980, “6,500 Libyan troops were stationed in Chad, with 2,500 stationed in N’Djamena.”¹⁰⁴ Following widespread outcries by the other factions in Chad, several African nations, and even France, the OAU initiated a long, tenuous negotiation process to remove the Libyan troops. After several setbacks the Libyan troops departed and the second OAU peacekeeping mission was deployed in November of 1981.¹⁰⁵

⁹⁹ Amoo 6.

¹⁰⁰ Amoo 6.

¹⁰¹ Mays 48.

¹⁰² Mays 48.

¹⁰³ Amoo 6.

¹⁰⁴ Mays 60.

¹⁰⁵ Mays 79.

The second OAU peacekeeping force had better organization and was composed of soldiers from Zaire, Nigeria, Senegal, Benin, Congo, and Togo; however confusion over the peacekeeping force's mandate immediately complicated the mission.¹⁰⁶ While the OAU intended to remain a neutral force, Weddeye "still envisioned the OAU force performing a peace enforcement mission within Chad and protecting GUNT from [Habre's] offensive."¹⁰⁷ The force also encountered significant financial problems, as OAU member states were still unable to finance the mission predicted to cost around \$162 million.¹⁰⁸ The individual countries contributing troops were relegated to depend on the assistance of France and the United States to fund their operations. The OAU sought UN financial support for the mission, but the Security Council refused to "commit itself to any extensive financial or operational contribution to a peacekeeping operation that would not be under its own political authority and military direction."¹⁰⁹

Without a widely supported mandate and financial security, the peacekeeping mission succumbed to failure. The ceasefire established with the deployment of the second peacekeeping force ended and fighting between Weddeye's and Habre's forces continued. Weddeye began to attack Habre's contingents "withdrawing behind OAU lines [following the attacks], knowing that Habre's men were avoiding contact with the neutral soldiers."¹¹⁰ Despite this underhanded strategy, Habre's forces had secured control of much of Chad and launched a successful attack on the capital, capturing it on June 7, 1982.¹¹¹ Having already ordered the withdrawal of peacekeepers before the attack on N'Djamena, the OAU only sped up the process, and all

¹⁰⁶ Mays 83.

¹⁰⁷ Mays 85.

¹⁰⁸ Amoo 7.

¹⁰⁹ Amoo 7.

¹¹⁰ Mays 98.

¹¹¹ Mays 99.

peacekeepers were removed by the end of June.¹¹² In less than “a seven-month period between November 1981 and June 1982 [the OAU] witnessed the fielding, maintenance, and withdrawal” of its peacekeeping mission in Chad.¹¹³

Assessment of the OAU response. The complete failure of the OAU’s two peacekeeping deployments makes it difficult to outline many positive outcomes. Withstanding the barrage of criticism directed towards its actions in Chad, the OAU did receive some praise for its willingness to attempt mediation. The OAU’s deployment of peacekeeping troops represents an honest endeavor at finding an African solution to an African problem. The organization sought to preserve the stability of the region and end a humanitarian crisis by launching its own response to the growing conflict in Chad. The OAU was also able to lend some legitimacy to the peacekeeping process as it was able to bring all factions to the negotiation table during the Lagos II conference.

Following the embarrassing withdrawal of its first two peacekeeping deployments, it is important to examine the shortcomings of the OAU’s mission in Chad. The first series of problems resulted from the complexities of the conflict in Chad and the OAU’s overly complicated mandates. Amoo finds that the “mandates for the peacekeeping initiatives, Nigeria’s and the OAU’s, were too broad, overly ambitious, and unrealistic.”¹¹⁴ For instance, the troops were supposed to enforce a cease-fire between the warring Chadian factions; however, no ceasefire had ever been successfully implemented. The vagueness of the mandate meant that there was not a widespread understanding as to the “status and specific functions of the

¹¹² Amoo 8.

¹¹³ Mays 79.

¹¹⁴ Amoo 9.

peacekeeping force.”¹¹⁵ This left troops vulnerable and unprepared in the midst of a conflict zone.

Additionally the mission failed as it was unable to establish the necessary respect amongst the warring factions. The “perennial refusal of the various warring factions to cooperate with the peacekeeping force” caused the continual failure of negotiations.¹¹⁶ The factions feared that any “cooperation with the peacekeeping force would diminish their individual opportunity to seize control of state power.”¹¹⁷ Collaborating with the peacekeepers was also unpopular as many groups viewed them as another warring faction. For example, Weddeye head of the GUNT believed the mission’s purpose was “to repel any threat to the security of his government” and while under siege from Habre’s forces he “demanded the military assistance of the neutral force.”¹¹⁸ At the same time the peacekeeping force was supporting the Weddeye regime, the “Zairean contingent [was providing] logistical and other support to other factions.”¹¹⁹ By taking sides in the conflict, often contradicting their own efforts, the OAU peacekeeping mission was doomed to fail. Their biases prevented them establishing the respect needed to conduct a successful mission.

Nigeria’s dominance throughout the mediation process is another problematic outcome of the OAU’s intervention into Chad. Beginning with the earliest peace conferences in Kano and Lagos, the roles of Nigeria and the OAU became entangled. It is unclear as to the level of involvement and support the OAU provided during the negotiation process. The OAU’s willingness to allow Nigeria to control the peace process had disastrous effects. Rather than viewing the peacekeepers with as agents working on behalf of an internationally recognized

¹¹⁵ Amoo 9.

¹¹⁶ Kieh, 25.

¹¹⁷ Kieh 25.

¹¹⁸ Amoo 9.

¹¹⁹ Kieh 25-26.

organization, the warring Chadian factions viewed the peacekeepers as agents of Nigerian foreign policy. This contributed to their reluctance to cooperate with the peacekeeping force.

Perhaps the greatest negative aspect of the OAU's intervention was its inability to adequately fund and support a peacekeeping force. The mission was vastly understaffed. With only 3,000 soldiers, it was impossible for the force to "police more than ten militia, each with thousands of armed combatants."¹²⁰ The OAU was also unable to provide enough funding for the mission. With an estimated cost of \$162.8 million, the OAU was only able to collect \$500,000 for the force.¹²¹ This placed the primary cost burden on the countries contributing soldiers. Member-states struggled to provide funding for their troops as the domestic economies were often very poor. For instance, Benin which committed to sending peacekeeping troops was ultimately unable to send soldiers "because its troops had no military uniforms and equipment."¹²² The lack of funding and dependence on member-states also created many logistical problems for the peacekeeping contingent. For example, "the battalion from Zaire which was to take care of the medical needs of all the troops went with doctors, but without any drugs and medical equipment."¹²³ The Benin contingent mentioned above was responsible for communications, and their inability to mobilize damaged the effectiveness of the entire mission. Together the funding problems, inability of the force to establish themselves as an independent party, coupled with Nigeria's dominant role and the overly ambitious mandates of the OAU caused the Chadian intervention to end as an embarrassing failure.

Liberia

¹²⁰ Kieh 25.

¹²¹ Amoo 9.

¹²² Kieh 25.

¹²³ Kieh 25.

While Liberia has been splintered by conflict for much of the last 20 years, this case study will isolate the Liberian experience to only the conflict which occurred from 1989-1997. Beginning as a society for freed American slaves in the 19th century, Liberia has fiercely maintained its independence. Nurtured politically and economically by the United States, Liberia developed as it capitalized on its natural resource wealth. Its large rubber plantations owned by the Firestone Corporation created a strong export economy; however, politically and socially Liberia was a sharply divided society. Following Liberia's independence the relationship between the Americo-Liberian settlers and the native black ethnic groups remained tense.

Conflict history. Liberia was ruled by the U.S.-supported Americo-Liberians until 1980 when Samuel Doe, a military officer, led a successful coup. Doe's subsequent rule had disastrous consequences for Liberian society. He forcibly suppressed all opposition creating a severely authoritarian, military government. As African studies scholar Herbert Howe writes, Doe "drove the country into deeper ethnic hostility and economic ruin [paving] the way for Liberia's civil war."¹²⁴ Doe exacerbated existing ethnic tensions, placing his own ethnic group and supporters in powerful government positions. For instance, he politicized the army making it a presidential protection force, ethnically dominated by his own Khran people.

Although his repressive nature was well documented, Doe maintained close ties with the United States. Liberia was an important Cold War ally for the U.S., as it helped to resist the spread of Soviet influence in Africa. The U.S. also had other strategic interests in the country including a navigation station and the largest Voice of America transmitting station on the

¹²⁴ Howe, Herbert. "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping." *International Security*. Vol. 21, No. 3. Winter 1996-1997. p. 148.

continent.¹²⁵ Doe's regime was rewarded for its allegiance to the U.S. as it was one of the largest recipients of aid money. Between 1980 and 1985 alone, Liberia received about \$500 million in U.S. aid.¹²⁶ This influx of U.S. aid allowed Doe to remain in control; however, as the Cold War ended, his grasp on power began to slip. Liberia suffered the fate of many countries similarly used as Cold War pawns. No longer needed as an anti-Soviet ally, the U.S. dismantled its Liberian aid payments and programs. The loss of external investments dramatically increased domestic pressure on the Doe government which was unable to ensure political or economic stability.

Rebel groups sensed this vulnerability and seized the opportunity to begin organizing against Doe. The major rebel group that developed during this period was the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) led by Charles Taylor. Building his force primarily from the Mano and Gio ethnic groups, "Taylor was able to capitalize on ethnic tensions mobilizing large numbers who hated Doe."¹²⁷ Taylor received support from the neighboring Francophone West African nations of Burkina Faso and Cote d'Ivoire, both of which strongly disliked the Doe regime. Trained in Libya, by 1990 NPFL troops numbered around 10,000, although more than 30 percent were under the age of 17.¹²⁸ They proved to be a threatening force to the Liberian government.

By August of 1990 the NPFL had successfully destabilized the country, and Doe regime had lost all effective control of Liberia. Fierce fighting between the NPFL and Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) had broken out around Monrovia and in the countryside. Each group targeted specific ethnic populations, driving the country into a tumultuous civil war. Splinter groups also developed and became involved in the conflict. The INPFL (Independent National

¹²⁵ Draman 6-7.

¹²⁶ Draman, Rasheed and David Carment. "Managing Chaos in the West African Sub-Region: Assessing the Role of ECOMOG in Liberia." *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies*. Vol. 6, No. 2. Fall 2003. p. 6-7.

¹²⁷ Howe 149.

¹²⁸ Howe 149.

Front of Liberia) broke off from Taylor's forces and began fighting against both the NPFL and the AFL. Within months the economic infrastructure of Liberia was destroyed and large numbers of internally displaced peoples were at risk of starvation. Because of its close ties to Liberia and its stationing of 2,000 Marines off the Liberian coast, many expected the United States to take action; however, it was becoming increasingly improbable "that the United States would physically intervene and even less [likely] that the United Nations would."¹²⁹

The refusal of the international community to react to the growing Liberian crisis pushed the West African regional organization into action. The members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) feared the war "would increase refugee flows and political instability in their already impoverished states and further persuade foreign investors not to invest in West Africa."¹³⁰ Other concerns centered on the well-being of foreign citizens living and working in Liberia, as well as, apprehension that the "constantly shifting military alliances could prove too much for these unstable and largely authoritarian regimes."¹³¹ Consideration of these factors led ECOWAS to authorize its first peacekeeping intervention into Liberia.

ECOWAS response. ECOWAS was initially established in 1975 as "a vehicle for economic collaboration."¹³² Its original charter included several non-aggression pacts but did not express any motivation to become involved in peacekeeping or conflict resolution. In the wake of the Liberian conflict, ECOWAS established the Standing Mediation Committee whose purpose was to design an appropriate peacekeeping infrastructure. In its first decision the Standing Mediation Committee called for the following objectives to be met in Liberia:

¹²⁹ Draman 7.

¹³⁰ Howe 150.

¹³¹ Draman 7-8.

¹³² Muller 30.

1. The parties to observe an immediate ceasefire;
2. An ECOWAS ceasefire monitoring group (ECOMOG) to be set up for the purpose of keeping the peace, and restoring law and order and ensuring respect for the ceasefire;
3. A broad-based interim government in Liberia set up through a National Conference of political parties and other interest groups;
4. Free and fair elections within 12 months leading to the establishment of a democratically elected government;
5. The exclusion of all leaders of the various warring factions to the Liberian conflict from the Interim Government; and
6. The creation of a Special Emergency Fund for the ECOMOG operation in Liberia¹³³

A key aspect of this decision was the establishment of ECOMOG (Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group) on August 7, 1990 created to function as the peacekeeping branch of ECOWAS. ECOMOG was initially composed of contingents from several member-states' militaries and was "deployed in a non-threatening manner" hoping to persuade "Taylor and his men that this was not a force of occupation, or a force assembled in support of Doe."¹³⁴ The peacekeeping contingent was given an ambitious mandate of neutralizing the "warring factions through forcible disarmament if necessary" and "to conduct mediation and conciliation with the leaders of the warring factions."¹³⁵ Its ultimate goal was to restore "law and order and to create the necessary conditions for a free and fair elections to be held in Liberia."¹³⁶

Less than a month after its creation, ECOMOG had launched its first intervention. Expecting "the NPFL would lay down its arms once ECOMOG made clear both its determination and its armed capability," ECOMOG's Force Commander Ghanaian General

¹³³ Weller, M. (Ed.). *Regional Peace-keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

¹³⁴ Olonisakin, 'Funmi. *Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa: Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG Operations*. The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 2000. p. 105.

¹³⁵ Draman 9.

¹³⁶ Draman 9.

Arnold Quainoo was stunned to encounter hostile fire during the force's landing.¹³⁷ While the NPFL continued its assault on ECOMOG forces, the two other factions offered support. Cooperating for purely self-serving reasons, the INPFL and the AFL were "too weak to challenge ECOMOG directly, but each could benefit from ECOMOG's protection and from any destruction ECOMOG inflicted upon Taylor."¹³⁸ Close ties with two of the warring factions complicated ECOMOG's mission and damaged its reputation. As Draman and Carment explain this cooperation, "unnecessarily escalated the conflict by pitting the 'peacekeepers' against one of the parties to the conflict in a way that created a disturbing disequilibrium."¹³⁹ This relationship between ECOMOG and the INPFL and the AFL was further complicated when INPFL forces murdered 70 of Doe's bodyguards at ECOMOG headquarters and then murdered Doe nearby.¹⁴⁰ The AFL understood this assassination as an act of aggression undertaken with ECOMOG support, and they retaliated by torching entire sections of Monrovia.¹⁴¹ Less than six months into its intervention, there was a "widespread perception within and outside West Africa that ECOMOG had indeed become a warring faction in the Liberian conflict."¹⁴²

Following its initial difficulties, ECOMOG's commander General Quainoo resigned and was replaced with Nigerian Joshua Dogonyaro. His impact was immediate as he switched ECOMOG's mission from one of peacekeeping to one of peace enforcing. Coupled with a reinforcement of troops and supplies, ECOMOG was able to gain control of Monrovia and force Taylor to sign the Bamako cease-fire agreement in November of 1990.¹⁴³ ECOMOG and NPLF began meeting in Yamoussoukro, Cote d'Ivoire in 1991 to participate in peace talks designed to

¹³⁷ Howe 154.

¹³⁸ Howe 154.

¹³⁹ Draman 15.

¹⁴⁰ Howe 154.

¹⁴¹ Howe 154.

¹⁴² Draman 16.

¹⁴³ Howe 155.

create a permanent cease-fire and settlement. While temporarily successful in halting the fighting in Liberia, the cease-fire did not prevent the warring factions from allowing the conflict to spillover into neighboring Sierra Leone. Taylor began to fund the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a group of Sierra Leonean rebels, in an effort to pressure the government to withdraw support from ECOMOG.¹⁴⁴ Anti-Taylor refugees and former AFL members responded by forming ULIMO (United Liberation Movement of Liberians for Democracy). The fighting between the two groups spilled back into Liberia, destroying the progress that had been made during the 1991 Yamoussoukro peace talks.

After less than two years of peace, the cease-fire was violated by the NPFL as it launched "Operation Octopus." The operation was a "two-month siege of ECOMOG-held Monrovia."¹⁴⁵ Taylor's actions forced ECOMOG back into its strategy of peace enforcement, and intense fighting took place for several months. Reacting aggressively, ECOMOG was able to intensify pressure on Taylor. His troops retreated across Liberia losing much of their territory and economic base.¹⁴⁶ The dire condition of his NPFL army compelled Taylor to participate in the 1993 peace talks in Cotonou, Benin. Adebajo gives ECOMOG much of the credit for the formation of the new cease-fire, as they "had in effect bombed Charles Taylor to the negotiating table."¹⁴⁷

The Cotonou agreement was unique in that it included the dispatching of UN observers to ensure the peace agreement was upheld. In early 1994, 368 UN observers comprising UNOMIL (United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia) arrived in Monrovia.¹⁴⁸ This mission was the first

¹⁴⁴ Howe 156.

¹⁴⁵ Howe 158.

¹⁴⁶ Howe 158.

¹⁴⁷ Adebajo, Adekeye. *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2002. p. 127.

¹⁴⁸ Howe 159.

time that a UN force had been deployed simultaneously with a regional peacekeeping force.¹⁴⁹ Although a significant development for peacekeeping cooperation the UN force was extremely limited in its activities rendering it virtually ineffective.

Despite its initial promise, fighting between splinter groups also eroded the Cotonou cease-fire. Conflict reignited in 1994 and continued through 1995, despite a series of failed negotiations. The first Abuja Accords signed in 1995, “like all those before it, collapsed under the weight of inter-group rivalries and widespread killing.”¹⁵⁰ As ECOWAS leaders began to realize the popularity and power of Charles Taylor, they found “the need to align themselves in order to achieve peace and stability in Liberia.”¹⁵¹ A series of meetings between Nigerian leader Sani Abacha and Taylor in 1995 “paved the way for a peace settlement.”¹⁵² In August of 1996 leaders of the warring factions agreed to a revised version of the Abuja Accords. A series of benchmarks set by the agreement included the “implementation of disarmament and demobilization by 31 January 1997; dissolution of all factional militia by the end of February 1997; general elections by 31 May 1997; and formation of a national government by 15 June 1997.”¹⁵³ This new agreement created stability, and the conflict came to a close as Charles Taylor was democratically elected to the Liberian presidency in July of 1997.

Assessment of the ECOWAS response. It is important to evaluate both the positive and negative aspects of the ECOWAS intervention in the Liberian conflict. This assessment is integral in determining whether regional peacekeeping forces are a legitimate surrogate to large international or United Nations-led contingents. ECOWAS’s actions demonstrated, “a bold attempt in designing African solutions to African problems within the current environment of

¹⁴⁹ Howe 159.

¹⁵⁰ Draman 21.

¹⁵¹ Draman 22.

¹⁵² Howe 160.

¹⁵³ Draman 21.

international neglect and state failure.”¹⁵⁴ In a situation where both long-time Liberian supporter, the U.S., and the United Nations refused to become involved, ECOWAS formulated a swift response in order to halt the high number of casualties and refugees. The ECOMOG forces also proved “to be far less casualty-scared than, say, those of the United States or other western powers.”¹⁵⁵ The organization’s willingness to intercede and its steadfast resolve to stop the conflict have led even critical observers to “believe that the initial intervention was laudable.”¹⁵⁶

Other successes of the ECOWAS deployment in Liberia included its ability to contain the conflict, “preventing the situation from degenerating into genocidal proportions like the type of all-out slaughter witnessed between April and July 1994 in Rwanda.”¹⁵⁷ The series of cease-fires between 1990 and 1995, though all ultimately failed, were able to slowing the killing and allowing relief supplies to reach citizens. Howe explains that the Bamako cease-fire in 1990 “certainly saved thousands of lives by preventing a factional battle for Monrovia and by restoring peace that allowed food and medical supplies to enter Monrovia [while providing] breathing space for subsequent negotiations.”¹⁵⁸ These types of actions mean that the “wider civilian populace in Liberia welcomed the presence of ECOMOG in the country.”¹⁵⁹ Many citizens viewed ECOMOG force “as the ‘deliverer,’ who rescued them from the horrors of war.”¹⁶⁰

The formation of a peacekeeping infrastructure was another positive outcome for ECOWAS. The creation of ECOMOG was greeted as groundbreaking, because it was the “first subregional military force in the third world since the end of the Cold War, and the first subregional military force with whom the United Nations agreed to work as a secondary

¹⁵⁴ Draman 29.

¹⁵⁵ Moller 33.

¹⁵⁶ Human Rights Watch. “Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights.” Vol. 5, No. 6. June 1993. <<http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/liberia/>>

¹⁵⁷ Draman 17.

¹⁵⁸ Howe 155.

¹⁵⁹ Olonisakin 125.

¹⁶⁰ Olonisakin 125

partner.”¹⁶¹ ECOWAS has continued to expand on its experiences in Liberia and develop a foundation for further peacekeeping missions. The 1999 Lome Summit saw the adoption of the “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping, and Security.” This protocol broadened the circumstances in which an intervention can be authorized, outlining the conditions as, “in the case of conflict between two or several Member States; in case of internal conflict: that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster or that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region.”¹⁶² Other activities legitimized under the protocol include “the supervision of elections and general support for the development of democratic institutions, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programmes [for child soldiers], and measures to control the follow of small arms.”¹⁶³ With this infrastructure firmly in place, ECOWAS has undertaken additional peacekeeping interventions in Guinea-Bissau (1998-1999), Guinea-Liberia (2001), and Cote d’Ivoire (2002).

While impressed with the early actions of the ECOMOG force, observers began to point out critical mistakes in ECOWAS’s function as a peacekeeper. The first problems arose over a series of contradictions concerning the ECOMOG mandate. Many observers were skeptical of the initial intervention as it attempted to create a cease-fire in the midst of a hostile environment. Olonisakin adds that “the traditional concept of peacekeeping presupposes that a cease-fire already exists, or that, at the very least, the parties to a conflict have shown a willingness to agree to a cease-fire or to pursue a solution via peaceful means.”¹⁶⁴ At the time of the 1990 intervention neither Taylor’s NPFL forces nor Doe’s AFL showed any inclination of stopping the fighting. International outcries also erupted when ECOMOG declared its intentions to

¹⁶¹ Howe 146.

¹⁶² ECOWAS. “Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security.” <<http://www.sec.ecowas.int/sitecedao/english/ap101299.htm>>

¹⁶³ Moller 33.

¹⁶⁴ Olonisakin 103.

encourage free and fair elections in Liberia. This goal seemed like a “novel function for most of ECOMOG’s forces, [as] few of the governments contributing to the ECOMOG had been democratically elected.”¹⁶⁵ In fact, most West African leaders “had gained power through military force, like Taylor himself was attempting, and few of them tolerated much domestic dissent.”¹⁶⁶ These inherent contradictions in the ECOWAS mandate lost the organization some of its international support.

Another key problem in the ECOWAS intervention was the sharp division among ECOWAS members about the nature of the peacekeeping mission. There was a great deal of disagreement between the Anglophone and Francophone member states, with Francophone states refusing to endorse the intervention. As a result the ECOMOG force was primarily composed of soldiers from Anglophone states like Nigeria and Ghana. Many of the Francophone states, like Burkina Faso, had previously provided the NPFL with training, logistics, and supplies. Division among ECOWAS members also developed as the states discussed what role Charles Taylor should play in Liberia’s new government. Ghana firmly believed that Taylor was an essential part of Liberia’s future due to his immense political power and popularity.¹⁶⁷ Nigeria who commanded the most control over the mission disagreed, thus very little negotiation took place that initially included Taylor.¹⁶⁸ Nigeria’s role in within ECOWAS has also produced a significant amount of criticism. Moller finds that “the greatest weakness of ECOWAS may be its critical dependency on the contribution of Nigeria both in military and other terms, and the accompanying suspicions that the organization is little more than a convenient multilateral

¹⁶⁵ Howe 162.

¹⁶⁶ Howe 162.

¹⁶⁷ Howe 166.

¹⁶⁸ Draman 17.

framework for Nigerian interventions.”¹⁶⁹ This Nigerian dominance is made both the international community and the warring Liberian factions wary of the ECOMOG mission and decreased its effectiveness.

The negative aspects of the ECOWAS invention mentioned above were further compounded by severe operational difficulties. With forces numbering anywhere between 2,700 and 12,500, while recommendations estimated a need of 20,000 soldiers, ECOMOG forces were drastically understaffed.¹⁷⁰ The ECOMOG mission also suffered from a lack of precedence. Without any prior experience in peacekeeping, “many [doubted] the credibility of both the force and ECOWAS.”¹⁷¹ ECOWAS was forced to intervene without any effective peacekeeping infrastructure, creating a series of problems. For instance, the force often lacked the necessary technology needed to operate effectively as there was no template of military cooperation to build upon. Member states often had under-funded and underdeveloped militaries and would hoard [technology and resources] for their own domestic purposes.”¹⁷² The troops that did participate in the intervention had disparate levels of training, creating a dangerous lack of standardization amongst the force. Some militaries had trained pilots and soldiers, while others contributed extremely inexperienced, young soldiers. There are countless stories of untrained troops unable to hit their targets and mistakenly hitting humanitarian and civilian targets instead.

Further operational problems were the unexpected language difficulties. With troop contingents composed of soldiers from several different member states, there was often a language barrier. Commanders in charge of designing the overall mission did not anticipate this problem, thus several contingents were unable to effectively communicate their orders to all

¹⁶⁹ Moller 33.

¹⁷⁰ Howe 168.

¹⁷¹ Olonisakin 122.

¹⁷² Howe 168.

soldiers. The lack of a peacekeeping infrastructure made it difficult for the organization to ensure all soldiers were compensated in a timely manner. Funding from the ECOWAS organization was incomplete at the time the mission began, and many of the “junior officers in the Nigerian and Sierra Leonean contingents often did not receive their pay for several months.”¹⁷³ Unpaid soldiers resorted to the “black market or theft from humanitarian relief shipments.”¹⁷⁴

A variety of negative ethical effects also accompanied the ECOWAS intervention into Liberia. As mentioned above, the looting and pillaging of ECOMOG soldiers caused many to lose respect for the contingent. Other accusations included reports of human rights violations by ECOMOG and the factions it supported. Olonisakin finds that “the decision to employ the assistance of [the INPFL and the AFL] in countering the NFPL offensive, proved costly for ECOMOG.”¹⁷⁵ These groups were charged with allegations that include ethnic-based killings, torture, rape and even cannibalism.¹⁷⁶ By aligning themselves with the INPFL and AFL factions, ECOMOG destroyed its status as a neutral party. The human rights abuses committed by the other factions were attributed to ECOMOG, as ECOMOG provided them with supplies and weaponry. These stories of abuse by a peacekeeping force garnered international attention causing irreparable damage to the mission’s reputation. As the conflict spiraled on, human rights organizations like the Human Rights Watch issued strong admonishments criticizing the ECOWAS intervention and recommending its withdrawal.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷³ Howe 169.

¹⁷⁴ Howe 169.

¹⁷⁵ Olonisakin 138.

¹⁷⁶ Howe 163.

¹⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch. “Waging War to Keep the Peace: The ECOMOG Intervention and Human Rights.”

Evaluation of the Regional Peacekeeping Approach and its Viability

With both case studies complete it is now necessary to determine whether regional peacekeeping is a viable alternative for sub-Saharan Africa's conflicts. In this section, I will summarize the general advantages and disadvantages of the regional peacekeeping approach in practice. Following this evaluation, I will propose a role for regional peacekeeping within the larger international peacekeeping framework. My proposal will also include suggestions for the development of several infrastructural systems to aid in the effectiveness of regional peacekeeping.

Regional Peacekeeping in Practice

The examples of the OAU intervention in Chad and ECOWAS's mission in Liberia accurately depict the complexities involved in undertaking a regional peacekeeping mission. Both missions faced many of the same problems. The lack of a peacekeeping infrastructure severely limited the abilities of the troops. Without a clear mandate, soldiers were often uncertain of their role in the conflict. They were also unsure as to whether military actions taken to disarm militias were appropriate. As the first peacekeeping missions of their kind, there was not previous precedent to look towards for guidance. This lack of precedence forced the OAU and ECOWAS to learn about peacekeeping in a "trial by fire" situation.

Funding became a key issue for the Liberian and Chadian interventions. As predicted in the general theories of regional peacekeeping mentioned earlier in this paper, the finances of regional institutions were ill-equipped to support widespread missions. The domestic economies of member-states were not strong enough to contribute the billions of dollars needed to adequately fund the interventions. This under-funding led to the development of many other problems for the troops. Both military and humanitarian supplies were in short supply.

Cutbacks on in training also meant that troops were unprepared for their new roles. As funding ran dry many soldiers went unpaid, leading to the widespread looting seen in Liberia.

A third major problem seen in the experiences of regional peacekeeping missions was the violation of international standards of neutrality. The interventions in both Chad and Liberia are littered with examples of soldiers favoring one warring faction over another. In some cases this progressed from merely providing factions with supplies to full-fledged cooperation with militias. Aligning themselves with the warring parties they were supposed to enforce peace among, the peacekeeping missions lost authority and respect. The hegemony of Nigeria also proved to be a major obstacle. Theorists warned against the dominance of the peacekeeping process by one nation. Nigeria's lead role in both conflicts further damaged the impartial status of the missions. Militia leaders began to view the peacekeeping missions as agents of Nigeria's foreign policy.

While the negative outcomes of regional peacekeeping are numerated in the previous paragraphs, there are several aspects of this approach that show promise for the future. The desire for African countries to prevent conflicts in their own backyard is a tremendous step towards halting the deadly wars ravaging the continent. Neighboring countries are much more likely to become involved in conflict prevention as they are directly affected. This offers an alternative to the reluctance of international organizations like the UN. This proved especially true in Liberia and Chad as ECOWAS and the OAU launched prompt responses when the UN refused to become involved in the conflict. The local knowledge that African peacekeepers bring to the conflict is a valuable asset to any mission. The countries immediately recognized that the tribal conflicts could have a devastating and destabilizing impact on the entire region. Another positive outcome is the low-cost of these regional missions. While severely under-

funded in the case of Chad and Liberia, a properly funded mission still holds significant savings over a UN-led mission.

My evaluation of regional peacekeeping missions in Chad and Liberia leads me to conclude that the negative aspects of these missions can be overcome. I find that the regional peacekeeping method provides a hopeful direction for the future of peacekeeping missions, especially those in conflict prone sub-Saharan Africa. The positive aspects of regional peacekeeping mentioned in the previous paragraph demonstrate that if properly developed regional peacekeeping has many advantages over a traditional international force; however, in its current state regional peacekeeping is unable to assume a lead role in the peacekeeping process. In the next section I propose the implementation of a series of infrastructural reforms and support mechanisms to improve the regional peacekeeping process.

Regional Peacekeeping Reform

In order to utilize the many advantages of a regional peacekeeping force in sub-Saharan Africa a permanent infrastructure must be created. The establishment of a regional peacekeeping infrastructure will eliminate many of the problems associated with the Chadian and Liberian interventions. The key to this new regional peacekeeping structure is the formation of peacekeeping institution within each regional body. Much of the chaos of Liberia and Chadian missions resulted from the lack of coordination among member-states. By designing a permanent peacekeeping branch, a regional organization would be much better prepared in the event of conflict. This institution would function as a subsidiary of the larger regional organization. For instance, ECOWAS would have a specific sub-group solely in charge of the coordination of peacekeeping missions. One key benefit of this plan is the improved and streamlined communication between the regional organization and the member-states. The

peacekeeping institution would also have the mandate to authorize the deployment of troops and the use of force. This type of central authority must be counter-balanced by placing representatives from each member-state on the committee with a rotating head in charge of leadership. This new structure would prevent missions from being dominated by regional hegemons, as was the case with Nigeria in both Chad and Liberia. Another benefit of a peacekeeping institution is the standardization of logistics and technology. The regional institution would be in charge of all logistics and training of troops, ensuring that soldiers from every contingent are working on the same system.

Following the creation of a sub-regional group, the new institution should begin the task of developing a conflict action timeline. This timeline would standardize the responses of the regional organization in the instance of conflict within or between its member-states. By setting a guideline the regional organization ensures that it responds in a timely manner to any threats of conflict. A timeline would also encourage early conflict resolution and prevention measures. A mediation process could be initiated in the beginning stages of a conflict, perhaps negating the need for a full-scale intervention. The adoption of action timeline guarantees that a regional organization will not become involved in peacekeeping missions without the establishment of a ceasefire. The premature deployment of troops in both Liberia and Chad without a secure ceasefire in place needlessly endangered the lives of many soldiers.

Another key aspect to reforming the regional peacekeeping process is to refine the coordination between regional organizations like the OAU and sub-regional organizations like ECOWAS. I believe the primary peacekeeping activities should be undertaken by the regional organization (in sub-Saharan Africa this would now be the African Union). The countries of sub-regional organizations are often too closely involved with the conflict to operate an

effectively neutral force. Sub-regional organizations also have very limited resources with which to independently operate a peacekeeping mission. I propose a system of cooperation between regional and sub-regional organizations to improve the peacekeeping process. Sub-regional organizations have an extremely valuable knowledge about local conflicts and tensions, and they should still work with the regional peacekeeping institution to identify potential conflicts. Sub-regional organizations are also an important source of resources including military support and technical and logistical assistance.

An integral part of reforming regional peacekeeping in sub-Saharan Africa would be the establishment of a standing peacekeeping force. This standing force would almost act as a continental army. Member-states would contribute soldiers to serve in the force. Modeled after the European Union's proposed Rapid Reaction Force, this peacekeeping force would be designed to respond quickly to emerging conflicts. A key advantage of creating a force like this is the troop training programs that could be established. Peacekeepers could be specially trained in conflict mediation and peacekeeping techniques used by well-respected forces like the United Nations. Ethical training could also be integrated into the program. This would aid in preventing human rights violations like those observed in Liberia. A standing force would have the additional benefit of standardized training and equipment, only increasing cooperation in the field. A rapid reaction force would allow the centralization of troops and create a power hierarchy which would report directly to the regional peacekeeping institution. This increases communication and accountability, while preventing member-states from giving their military contingents conflicting orders.

A standing peacekeeping force offers several other benefits. It would ease the financial burden of member-states and make them more likely to contribute soldiers. The standing force

would be paid for by the regional organization. While an expensive undertaking, the regional organization could solicit funding from larger international organizations and Western countries. For instance, many countries like the United States have found regional peacekeeping to be an attractive option for conflict prevention. Donating money to a regional organization is a much cheaper alternative to becoming directly involved in conflict. A standing peacekeeping force is also more likely to garner regional and international respect. As an established and permanent institution a regional peacekeeping force will be better revered by warring factions and nations than the ever-evolving contingents deployed in Chad and Liberia. A standing peacekeeping force can also be utilized in peaceful times. Once training has been completed the force could assist in humanitarian missions until regional conflicts arise.

A final reform of regional peacekeeping is to improve coordination between the UN and regional organizations. The UN is the international organization with the most experience in peacekeeping missions, and regional organizations should view the UN as an asset. Throughout its many difficult missions, the UN has garnered a wealth of knowledge on how to and how not to run a peacekeeping mission. The UN should also foster its relationships with regional organizations. The deployment of UN observers and monitors would aid in the training of regional peacekeepers and the success of future missions. The rise of regional peacekeeping is also positive development for the UN as it lessens their peacekeeping burden.

Widespread reform is the only way that regional peacekeeping can assume a lead role in conflict prevention. Many lessons can be drawn from the missions in Liberia and Chad, and the set of infrastructural improvements I propose are step towards rectifying those mistakes. Through the creation of a peacekeeping institution and a standing army, along with improved

regional and international coordination, regional peacekeeping can become an effective alternative to international peacekeeping missions.

Conclusion

This thesis addressed the following research question: Is the rise of regional peacekeeping missions in sub-Saharan Africa an effective way of building stable governments and creating a lasting peace? Following a careful examination of the dynamics of conflict in Africa and the failure of international peacekeeping to effectively respond, I find that regional peacekeeping missions are an integral part of the solution to Africa's violence. The case studies in Chad and Liberia demonstrated the complex issues involved in regional peacekeeping, and several negative outcomes were accurately predicted in the general theories of regional peacekeeping. I proposed a series of institutional reforms to remedy these issues. For example, focusing on the creation of a permanent peacekeeping infrastructure is essential to creating a successful regional peacekeeping force. This includes the founding of specific peacekeeping bodies working in coordination with the United Nations, sub-regional organizations, and member-states. The improvement of peacekeeping strategies is crucial to resolving conflicts in Africa, and this thesis finds that the development regional missions are a central part of this process.

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