Inclusive Force: *Innere Führung* and the Integration of Homosexuals in the Bundeswehr, 1955-2000

A Thesis Presented for the

Master of Arts

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

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December 2024

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

Abstract

In 2000, a court case before the European Court on Human Rights in France concerning the United Kingdom's discrimination against homosexual and lesbian servicemembers resulted in Germany ending its ban against homosexuals in the military. Since then, the Bundeswehr, the name for the German military, and several other NATO countries have acknowledged their past discriminatory policies and offered rehabilitation for the servicemembers whose military careers ended solely because of their sexuality. While the road to rehabilitation is an important topic, this thesis seeks to understand the political and societal culture that allowed democratic states to exclude homosexuals from military service.

To this point, this thesis will look at the history of the Bundeswehr, from its rearmament in 1955 until 2000, to understand how its policy against homosexual soldiers was a reflection of larger political and cultural debates in the Federal Republic of Germany and, by extension, the West. At the core of this debate is the concept of *Innere Führung*. Emerging as early as 1950, *Innere Führung* is a product of German military planning, which ensures that soldiers and the service reflect the democratic values of the state. After the Second World War, the FRG was founded as a democratic state committed to socially conservative policies in an attempt to stabilize its position in the emerging Cold War struggle. By 2000, Germany was now reunified, and the struggle between East and West had all but thawed. However, what happens when conceptions of democracy change? This thesis examines *Innere Führung* as a flexible yet stable concept that allowed the Bundeswehr to transform while maintaining its commitment to the state during periods in which conceptions of democracy changed. Specific to homosexuals in the Bundeswehr, military and political officials used *Innere Führung* to validate discrimination

against homosexuals and now as a tool that pushes for integration and inclusion of the German military.

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Introduction

Between 2023 and 2024, a monumental shift in policy transpired in several countries with regard to their historical discrimination against service members who engaged in same-sex sexual activity. On September 20, 2023, a spokesman for the United States Department of Defense (DoD) issued a statement that declared the U.S. would begin a proactive review of files for military personnel discharged under less-than-honorable conditions from the military because of their sexuality during the era of 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell."[1] This significant policy change was followed in June of 2024 with an unconditional pardon from President Biden for those same service members convicted due to their sexualities under the policy as well as a statement that said the DoD would officially begin the process for upgrading discharges.[2] Nor was the U.S. alone in these rehabilitation efforts. After an independent report was published in the United Kingdom on their discriminatory policies against soldiers, Prime Minister Rishi Sunak stated in July 2023 before the House of Commons, "The ban on LGBT people serving in our military until the year 2000 was an appalling failure of the British state – decades behind the law of this land . . . Today, on behalf of the British state, I apologise, and I hope all those affected will be able to feel part of the proud veteran community that has done so much to keep our country safe."[3]

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1. U.S. Department of Defense, "Background Media Roundtable on Don't Ask, Don't Tell Records Review Resources Update," Media Release, September 20, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/3531960/background-media-roundtable-on-dont-ask-dont-tell-records-review-resources-upda/.
2. Joseph R. Biden, "A Proclamation on Granting Pardon for Certain Violations of Article 125 Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice," Presidential Proclamation, June 26, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2024/06/26/a-proclamation-on-granting-pardon-for-certain-violations-of-article-125-under-the-uniform-code-of-military-justice/.
3. "Government apologises to veterans for egregious historic LGBT policy in the Armed Forces," Government Press Release, July 19, 2023, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/government-apologises-to-veterans-for-egregious-historic-lgbt-policy-in-the-armed-forces.

While these were noteworthy steps by two major Western militaries, they were not the first such stepsmade.

Germany faced a historical reckoning with its discriminatory practices in 2021. Before the Bundestag, the German Minister of Defense announced, "I very much regret the practice of discrimination against homosexuals in the Bundeswehr, which stood for the policy of that time . . . [and] apologize to those who suffered because of it."[4] This announcement was followed by specific legislation aimed at rehabilitating the service careers and lives of soldiers discriminated against by the German military due to their sexual activity. In the 2021 "Law for the rehabilitation of soldiers who are disadvantaged under service law because of their consensual homosexual acts, because of their homosexual orientation or because of their gender identity," the federal government approved legislation that allowed for service members who suffered career stagnation or discharged due to their sexuality and gender identity before the inclusive policy entered force in 2000 to receive both administrative rehabilitation as well as monetary compensation.[5] In the case of the U.S., U.K., and Germany, decades of silence about previous policies that directly discriminated against homosexual service members pivoted to open expressions of guilt and remorse by the highest agents in those governments.

Although these governments' changes in policy are noteworthy, the underlying question is why they were necessary. These three countries today are considered by a vast majority of people around the world leaders in equality and inclusion for their minorities. While today this is

4. Geir Moulson, "Germany apologizes for past military anti-gay discrimination,"*Associated Press*, September 17, 2020.
5. Bundesrepublic Deutschland, "Gesetz zur Rehabilitierung der wegen einvernehmlicher homosexueller Handlungen, wegen ihrer homosexuellen Orientierung oder wegen ihrer geschlechtlichen Identität dienstrechlich benachteiligten Soldatinnen und Soldaten," July 16, 2021.

relatively true, these countries' military personnel policies in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries reflect a different reality. When looking at the United States, for example, the legacy of segregation in the military for women and Black soldiers has continued to impact the level of diversity within its ranks today. In all three countries, the armed forces operate under strict control of the federal government, and military policies, both in personnel and warfare, are devolved per the national agenda. How could these states, which claim to promote opportunity and equality globally, discriminate against a small minority of citizens willing to risk their lives for their country and way of life solely due to their sexuality? In the case of Germany, this thesis intends to underscore how Germany's reflection on its past in the shadow of the Second World War led to conceptions of democracy that allowed for a policy of open discrimination. This thesis also promotes the idea that the understanding of democracy envisioned in 1949 was significantly different than that at the turn of the millennium. Given how recent Germany's and other countries' reckonings with past discriminatory military practices are, this thesis is a timely product used to understand the social and political conditions that led to these practices.

Sexuality in Post-War German Social History

This thesis benefits from a wide swath of historical research areas. The most obvious is the abundance of queer literature that began in the 1990s and has exploded in prevalence since. Perhaps one of the first pieces to take on the topic of sexuality as it relates to homosexuality in the post-war German state is Robert G. Moller's 1994 article, "The Homosexual Man Is a 'Man,' the Homosexual Woman Is a 'Woman': Sex, Society, and the Law in Postwar West Germany." In his article, Moeller contended that sexuality was a "surrogate medium," that could be used to analyze how West Germans dealt with their anxiety and discontent as they transitioned from the

Third Reich to the post-war democratic order.[6] Dagmar Herzog in 2005 also grappled with a similar understanding of the role of sexuality in post-war Germany. In *Sex After Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany*, Herzog highlights sexuality in post-war Germany as a reason for "the repeated reimaginings of the national past," both by the founders of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as well as the younger generation that ultimately protested the restrictiveness of the federal government in the 1960s and 70s.[7] In both of these foundational texts on queer, post-German history, the response against someone's sexuality was not solely due to prejudice but rather a result of how Germans came to terms with their recent past.

A recent piece of German, queer historical scholarship that uses homosexuality to understand German post-war social history is Samuel Clowes Huneke *States of Liberation*. Huneke centers on the experiences of homosexual men in the two post-war German states to "unsettle Cold War-era assumption about the supposed success of liberal capitalism in West Germany and the alleged failures of state socialism in East Germany."[8] The common trope in post-war history is the liberalized idea of the West as an ideological juxtaposition to the dictatorship and communism during the Cold War. However, Huneke showcases that it was the German Democratic Republic (GDR) that first, of the German states, reformed the National Socialists' legislation that criminalized male homosexuality. Huneke's analysis showcases homosexuality in the FRG within the context of the relationship between Western democracy

6. Robert G. Moeller, "The Homosexual Man Is a 'Man,' the Homosexual Woman Is a 'Woman'": Sex, Society, and the Law in Postwar West Germany," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 4, No. 3 (1994): 398.
7. Dagmar Herzog, *Sex After Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 6.
8. Samuel Clowes Huneke, *States of Liberation: Gay Men between Dictatorship and Democracy in Cold War Germany* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2022), 6.

and how Germans viewed their most recent past. Maria Höhn embarks on an analysis similar to Huneke in *GIs and Fräuleins*. Höhn underscores FRG political and religious leaders' views on sexual relations between German women and American soldiers in terms of racial hierarchies when it came to Black soldiers, and through the lens of the social degeneration of German women as a result of war and occupation.[9] In both cases, sexuality is the cornerstone concept used to understand the development of post-war FRG society.

This thesis aims to use sexuality similarly, to understand how leading politicians and military figures negotiated with the memory of the past to develop a German military palatable to post-war era West Germans as well as internationally. In the direct aftermath of the Second World War, the Allied powers dissolved the German military completely and restoring it was considered inconceivable by many Germans and the rest of the world. However, international realities intervened as the FRG found itself at the center of the Cold War. When the idea of a potential FRG rearmament emerged, the first question was what that meant for the post-fascist era. Additionally, in his memoir, Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the FRG, noted that the experience of Germans under National Socialism and war had "fractured" the fundamental principles of family and marriage.[10] According to conservatives like Adenauer, Germany needed to return to traditional mores to reinstill a sense of stability after the ravages of war. The Bundeswehr was created within the framework of a military alliance with Germany's former enemies in the west, against a potential Soviet threat, with a reemergence of conservative, religious principles in the FRG. How could a German military be established that aligned with

9. Maria Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 12-15.
10. Konrad Adenauer, *Konrad Adenauer: Memoirs 1945-1953*, trans. Beate Ruhm von Oppen (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1963), 171.

new democratic traditions while exemplifying the post-war social conditions of the FRG? This question guides the first two chapters of this thesis.

Post-War German Military History

The prominence of the Second World War in historical scholarship has resulted in a plethora of texts on the German Wehrmacht. However, the German military after 1955 diverges significantly in character from German militaries of the past. The story of the German military before 1945 is characterized often by overt militarism used to achieve the imperialistic and expansionist policies of the German Reich. Yet it was not until the Kosovo crisis of 1999 that the Bundeswehr broke with its founding principle of being a defensive force. Committing troops to a NATO campaign represented the first time a German Air Force had actively engaged in bombing campaigns against a foreign state since 1945.[11] The decision to create a military for the Federal Republic, and in what capacity after the catastrophic experience of National Socialism, is the major research interest of this thesis's first chapter.

To navigate the complexity of post-war German military history, David Clay Large's *Germans to the Front* is instrumental. Large's monograph documents chronologically the process of German demilitarization after the Second World War through the eventual rearmament of the FRG in 1955. Of particular note is Large's discussion on the newfound spirit that planners of the Bundeswehr attempted to imbue the service with to justify its invention. In his introduction, Large notes, "The new military was to be tightly integrated into the Federal Republic's pluralistic and democratic society and reflective of that society through its own

11. David Blackbourn, *Germany in the World: A Global History, 1500-2000* (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2023), 643.

'democratic' structures . . . *Bürger in Uniform* (Citizen in Uniform)."[12] As Large showcases, the "citizen in uniform" was part of the FRG's large democratic reform known as *Innere Führung* which was used to ensure that the military fell in line with the newfound democratic principles of the FRG and that soldiers remained committed to both the service and the constitutionality of the state.

Donald Abenheim's *Reforging the Iron Cross* also highlights the attempts made by FRG military planners to justify, domestically and abroad, recreating a German armed service. Abenheim's text "illustrates the general importance of coming to grips with [German] military heritage . . . [and] the difficulties faced by those who rebuild an army."[13] Abenheim showcases that for the planners of the Bundeswehr, it was a difficult balancing act to not restore the legacy of past German militaries but also respect the traditions that led to an effective military force. What resulted was *Innere Führung* as a "spiritual armament," that was the basis for military effectiveness while integrating soldiers within a democratic state.[14] It is clear through the text from Large and Abenheim that *Innere Führung* played a significant role in how the Bundeswehr operated under the democratic principles of the FRG. There was a unique connection between the social and political realities of the state and the policies of the Bundeswehr. The aforementioned texts on German post-war social history on sexuality highlighted that the social conservatism of post-war Germany led to the maintenance of criminalization for homosexuality throughout the FRG. If *Innere Führung* was to be the link between the state and the military, could it be used to understand why the FRG excluded homosexuals from military service, and

12. David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 7.
13. Donald Abenheim*, Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 7.
14. Abenheim*, Reforging the Iron Cross*, 96.

could it also be a justification for why Germany eventually allowed them to serve openly? This is another major theme of this thesis.

To assess the connection between post-war social policies and the Bundeswehr, this thesis relies on two critical documents produced by the Bundeswehr itself. The first is the *Himmeroder Denkschrift,* written by former Wehrmacht officers in 1950 as a result of discussions between the FRG and the Western Allies respecting a potential FRG military contribution to Western European defense. The second important text, published by the FRG Ministry of Defense, was the 1957 *Handbuch Innere Führung*. This handbook was the first product by the FRG's Ministry of Defense to outline, in detail, the concept of *Innere Führung* and what it meant for both the individual soldier and the Bundeswehr at large. The 1957 version of this document is critical to this thesis because it remained the central document of the Bundeswehr on *Innere Führung* until it was revised for the first time in December 2023. Both these documents highlight how social and political realities of the FRG directly influenced the foundation of the Bundeswehr and drove its policies through the second half of the twentieth century. While neither of these texts specifically addresses homosexuality in the Bundeswehr, they do note the importance of religion and social conservative policies in regards to a strong German military.

In addition to the secondary literature on the topics discussed, this thesis benefited greatly from significant primary sources that helped to illuminate the complexity associated with studying homosexuality in the Bundeswehr. Klaus Storkmann's *Tabu und Toleranz: Der Umgang mit Homosexualität in der Bundeswehr 1955 bis 2000* began as a study in 2017 initiated under then-German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen to understand the military's handling

of the issue of homosexual soldiers in military service between 1955 and 2000.[15] Storkmann, in collaboration with the *Zentrum für Militärgeshichte und Sozialwissenschaftern der Bundeswehr* (ZMSBw), produced a significant compilation of archival documents from the Bundeswehr on the topic of homosexuals in the military. The document types range from correspondence between individual soldiers and military headquarters and well as police and court records. Chapter 3 of this thesis relied significantly on the information in Storkmann's book to provide concrete case studies that show not only how the Bundeswehr discriminated against homosexual soldiers but also the arguments made by opponents of the ban's repeal such as the contradiction between the ban and the fundamental principles of the German Basic Law.

Innere Führung as a Change Factor

Innere Führung remains a foundational principle of the Bundeswehr nearly seventy years after the rearmament of the FRG. For most of that history, the 1957 handbook was the defining document, one that identified the role of the soldier within a military committed to the democratic principles of the state. However, in the seven decades since it was first published, the social and political realities of the FRG and Bundeswehr have rapidly changed. In 1955, the Bundeswehr was a male-only service composed primarily of soldiers conscripted into service. The leadership of the Bundeswehr in the 1950s was composed primarily of military leaders who were now expected to collaborate with foreign militaries that they once planned attacks against. Today, in 2024, the Bundeswehr is a leader in NATO, allows men and women to serve, and includes soldiers who are generations removed from the events of the Second World War. What

15. Klaus Storkmann, *Tabu und Toleranz: Der Umgang mit Homosexualität in der Bundeswehr 1955 bis 2000* (Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2021), xi.

remains the same is the commitment of the Bundeswehr to the democratic state of the FRG, however differently that is understood today from 1955.

In a journal produced by the U.S. Army War College, Jens Koltermann notes that *Innere Führung* "has remained intact" in the Bundeswehr over four paradigm shifts.[16] These shifts are 1) the rearmament and integration of former Wehrmacht and Reichswehr soldiers; 2) the integration of soldiers from the GDR after reunification; 3) the 1994 decision to allow Germany to send troops abroad; and 4) the 2011 decision to end conscription. In all four cases, Koltermann notes that *Innere Führung*, "ensures that the Bundeswehr serves as a democratically structured and operated armed force . . . [and] successfully [adapts] to the world's complex and uncertain strategic environment by adhering to its unchanging core values (consistent with the Basic Law)."[17] Through these four monumental changes in the Bundeswehr, *Innere Führung* remains a stable but flexible concept intended to ensure that the Bundeswehr stays true to its democratic origins, even as the meaning of democracy has changed over the ensuing decades. Similar to Koltermann, Michael Lux, who himself was advised by Donald Abenheim at the Naval Postgraduate School, analyzes in his MA thesis the necessity for *Innere Führung* in a rapidly changing Bundeswehr in the twenty-first century. Lux notes, *Innere Führung* "can help to create the necessary atmosphere where transformation is accepted as a chance for future forces. Once more it can act as an anchor for armed forces in its society."[18] Both men showcase *Innere Führung* as a force that allows the Bundeswehr to invite change while remaining true to the fundamental principles that the service was built on.

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16. Jens O. Koltermann, "Citizen in Uniform: Democratic Germany and the Changing 'Bundeswehr'," Parameters 42, no. 2 (2012): 109.
17. Koltermann, "Citizen in Uniform," 118.
18. Michael G. Lux, "Innere Fuehrung: A Superior Concept of Leadership," MA Thesis, (Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 91.

The relevance of my own thesis aligns with this idea that *Innere Führung* is a force used to ensure the Bundeswehr remains true to its democratic origins while ensuring it changes in the direction that society does. On the Bundeswehr's official website today, the service labels itself as an inclusive force made up of all genders and sexualities and notes that the diversity of its troops ties the service to the diverse society it intends to defend. However, the Bundeswehr of 1955, and much of the second half of the twentieth century, was exclusively male and did not allow homosexuals to participate.

In the spirit of Koltermann's article, my thesis labels the integration of homosexuals as a fifth paradigm of transformation within the Bundeswehr. It is within this paradigm that the Bundeswehr's commitment to the democratic values of the FRG eventually ensured the total integration of homosexuals into the Bundeswehr. This is not to say that the process was not messy. As will be made clear, the leadership of the Bundeswehr and the FRG's Ministry of Defense took an active position against allowing such integration. However, over time supporters of integration used the language and spirit of *Innere Führung* to advocate for a repeal of the ban and it was the Bundeswehr's commitment to the democratic nature of the FRG that forced it to integrate.

Terminology

What words and how they are employed to talk about the past is incredibly important. To describe individuals who engage in same-sex sexual activity a whole host of terms can be used to include gay, homosexual, LGBTQ+, and, most notably, queer. While queer is perhaps the most commonly used term at present to both describe the individual as well as the segment of historical research that this thesis explores, this thesis will primarily use the term 'homosexual.'

This is done intentionally. To begin with, many of the documents written in German use the term *Homosexuelle* to describe men who engaged in sexual activity with other men. This German term translated easily to homosexual in English. Additionally, words such as gay and queer are often associated with issues of gender and identity. Men who might have identified as straight but happened to have sex with other men were also subject to removal and discrimination by the Bundeswehr. Therefore, the term homosexual can apply more broadly to all men who engage in sexual activity with other men. When women are discussed, the term lesbian will be used due to the difference in treatment under the law between women and men who engaged in same-sex sexual activity. For example, the law that criminalized homosexuality in Germany historically only applied to men and not women. This was reinforced in the post-war period as FRG politicians saw male homosexuality as a threat to society and not lesbianism. Additionally, due to the presence of two Germanys between 1949 and 1989, this thesis will use the acronym FRG to describe the political state known as West Germany and GDR to describe East Germany. In areas after the unification of the two states that this thesis covers, the term Germany will be used.

Organization

To understand change, readers must be taken on a journey, to see where the story began and what direction(s) takes. This thesis takes a chronological approach to describe Germany's path during the period of discrimination against homosexual soldiers in the Bundeswehr and towards their ultimate integration into service. Chapter 1 begins discussions on the establishment of the FRG in connection with the Western Allies. It was through the influence of Konrad Adenauer, the first Chancellor of the FRG, and his new political party that a focus on Western, Christian principles became the core for this new country that lied in the center of a divided

Europe during the Cold War. In addition to the founding of the FRG, this thesis also explores the debates, both in public and amongst politicians and former Wehrmacht officials, surrounding rearmament of the FRG. Ultimately, it was through these conversations that the Bundeswehr was created under the guise that soldiers would serve in the military while committed to the democratic and social values of the FRG, as defined by the Basic Law and politicians at the time.

In order to understand the state of homosexual legislation at the beginning of the FRG, Chapter 2 begins with a historical crash course of Germany's anti-homosexual policies from the founding of the German Reich in 1871 through the strengthening of these policies under National Socialism. Additionally, this chapter argues that the policies made during the 1950s in the FRG against homosexuals was part of a long, established trend in politics that, combined with its recent past, led politicans to attempt a deeper, more intense criminalization of homosexuals following the Second World War. Chapter 2 also examines how the FRG's wider social policy against homosexuals materialized within the Bundeswehr as an all out exclusionary ban against soldiers who engaged in same-sex sexual activity. It was truly in this regard that the Bundeswehr reflected the political and social positions of the FRG.

Finally, Chapter 3 focuses on the liberalizing of policies towards homosexuals in the Bundeswehr. This chapter starts off with a discussion of Adenauer and his party losing political control of the FRG and the installation of the SPD, who historically was a more vocal supporter of gay liberation, into the top echelons of FRG government. It was through the SPD's entrance into power that homosexuality was decriminalized. However, the Bundeswehr shifted its ban from all soldiers to those in leadership or supervisory positions in order to maintain a significant ban against homosexuals in the Bundeswehr. This chapter showcases that it was not internal pressure from politics or even German citizens that ended the ban but rather the position

politicians placed Germany globally during and after the Cold War that forced the Bundeswehr to change. It was through a European Court in France that ended the U.K.'s ban against homosexual service members and in turn forced Germany themselves to repeal its own ban.

Chapter 1

The Birth of a Democratic Military in the FRG

On 12 November 1955, Defense Minister Theodor Blank of the FRG handed out commissions to the first 101 senior officers of the newly founded German military, shortly after the event named the Bundeswehr (**Figure 1.1**).[19] The date was ceremoniously chosen to commemorate the two-hundredth anniversary of Gerhard von Scharnhorst, a Prussian military reformer who was an ideological inspiration to some of the Bundeswehr's founders, birth. It also marked the culmination of the FRG's ten-year transition from an occupied state following the collapse of the Third Reich towards a member of the Western alliance with recouped sovereignty of its domestic and foreign affairs from its Allied occupiers. The formation of a German military connected to the West and rooted in principles of democracy established the foundations by which the service adapted to future changes.



Figure 1.1 Minister Blank presenting commissions to the first Bundeswehr officers on 12 November 1955, source Luxembourg Center for Contemporary and Digital History

19. David Clay Large, *Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era*, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 243.

Foundations of Democracy in the FRG

In the shadow of the Second World War, the territories of the former Third Reich faced mass destruction, food and housing shortages, a military occupation, and immense uncertainty about the future of any German state. The Allied powers signed the Berlin Agreement on 5 June 1945 and assumed complete authority and regulatory controls over the German state at all levels of government.[20] As part of the post-war order, the Allies required unconditional acceptance of future declarations and ordinances they issued on political, economic, financial, and other daily requirements from the German people.[21] During the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the German population maintained no control over their own lives. However, many from the former German political class soon re-emerged from their Nazi-imposed exiles and ushered a complete realignment of the German state towards Western, democratic principles.

Perhaps the name most synonymous with the post-war reconstruction of the German state is Konrad Adenauer. Born in Cologne in 1876, Adenauer rose to prominence as the Lord Mayor of Cologne in 1917, a position he held until being expelled from it by the Nazis in 1933.[22] During his tenure as mayor, Adenauer guided the major industrial city of Cologne through the collapse of the German empire and the political turbulence of the Weimar Republic. He gained a reputation for his accomplishment in transforming Cologne into a cultural and commercial center and holding the presidency of the Prussian State Council from 1920-1933.[23] As a staunch

20. Legal Division Office of Military Government for Germany (US), *Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordination Committee: Allied Control Authority Germany*, 1946, 11.
21. *Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordination Committee*, 12.
22. Charles Williams, *Adenauer: The Father of New Germany* (London: Little, Brown, and Company, 2000), 212.
23. Edgar Alexander, *Adenauer and the New Germany: The Chancellor of the Vanquished* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Cudahy, 1957), 7.

Catholic and devoted member of the German Center Party, Adenauer favored a "spirit of genuine Christian and democratic responsibility," in support of the Weimar Republic.[24] After his expulsion from political office in 1933, Adenauer was among those arrested by the Gestapo following the Röhm Purge and the Night of Long Knives in 1934.[25] Adenauer remained on the Nazi Party's political enemies list through 1945. The Gestapo arrived at Adenauer's house twice following the failed 20 July 1944 assassination plot against Hitler to search his home, and they interrogated him in his study. They later sent him to the Brauweiler Internment Camp in September 1944.[26]

As the American military moved East through German territory, Lieutenant Colonel R. L. Hyles, the American Commandant of Cologne, installed Adenauer initially as an adviser and then mayor of Cologne after the cessation of hostilities to facilitate the restoration of order and the rebuilding of the city.[27] American authorities chose him for this position due to his previous political experience in the region and his "selfless and democratic ideals which he [incorporated] in his person and in his work."[28] His short run as the post-war leader of Cologne ended after the British took over the area from the United States as part of the reorganization of Germany into occupation zones under Allied control. The given justification by the British for Adenauer's removal was due to a loss of confidence in his ability to bring swift stability to the region.

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24. Alexander, *Adenauer and the New Germany*, 7.
25. Williams, *Adenauer*, 233. The Röhm Purge and the Night of Long Knives, also known as Operation Hummingbird, took place from 30 June – 2 July 1934 and was the systematic process of removing enemies of the Third Reich and consolidating the SA under Himmler and the SS by removing the leadership of the former. Plant, Richard. "The Roehm Affair." In *The Pink Triangle: The Nazi War Against Homosexuals*, 53-70. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1986.
26. Williams, *Adenauer*, 276-284.
27. Konrad Adenauer, *Memoirs 1945-1953* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1965), 20-21.
28. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 23.

However, this setback allowed Adenauer to join a political movement in its infancy that established the foundational principles of a future German state.

Prior to 1945, Christian politicians and religious leaders made efforts to unite Catholic and Protestant Germans under a single political party. During the German Reich, interconfessionalism gained slight traction as a movement towards this cause. Provoked by the rise of Socialism and Marxism among the working class, interconfessionalists in Germany responded to Pope Leo XIII's edict of 1891 to recognize workers as members of a class and develop a "coordinated Christian response," to common Catholic and Protestant labor issues.[29] This significant verbalization of a policy towards collaboration between Catholics and Protestants against the political left marked an early, albeit subtle, shift in how the dominant sects of Christianity could work together toward a common purpose. While religious and political figures did make efforts to continue collaboration between Catholics and Protestants, the turbulence of post-1918 Germany remained divided due to fundamental political differences. As Maria Mitchell notes in *The Origins of Christian Democracy*, Protestants remained loyalists to the Kaiser and the Hohenzollern dynasty as a "fealty to the nation," while Catholics viewed Weimar and the collapse of the German Reich as a "real opportunity to achieve Catholic ideological hegemony."[30] These core ideological differences between Protestants and Catholics for centuries persisted through the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich.

After the restoration of political parties and activities by the Allies in late 1945, Catholic and Protestant political figures reattempted a political union in the manner of interconfessionalism. The *Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands* (CDU) emerged first in

29. Maria D. Mitchell, *The Origins of Christian Democracy: Politics and Confession in Modern* Germany (Ann Abor: The University of Michigan Press, 2012), 16.
30. Mitchell, *The Origins of Christian Democracy*, 26.

Berlin and quickly expanded into all occupation zones as a party to unify Germany's different Christian confessions and act as an ideological bulwark against the rebuilt *Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD). As the former Mayor of Cologne, the former leading city of the Center Party, Adenauer surfaced as the chairman of the British zonal and Rhineland CDU parties.[31] Although the party's initial positions were ambiguous due to clashes between Protestant and Catholic politicians, Adenauer and the CDU developed a firm party platform at the second zonal CDU committee meeting at Neheim-Hüsten in February 1946. The CDU emphasized that "the principles of Christian ethics and culture and true democracy must be the foundation and informing spirit of the life of the state. The state's power is limited by the dignity and inalienable rights of the individual."[32] These three pillars–Christianity, democracy, and the individual—quickly defined the CDU and shaped its role in the future liberal-democratic, West German state.

Although there is no doubt that many of the early leaders within the CDU, including Adenauer, maintained deep religious convictions and believed interconfessional cooperation was important, the party's emphasis on democracy and Christianity served two specific political purposes. The first was that a post-1945 political party characterized by Christianity could avoid negative connotations associated with conservative parties such as the Center Party deemed as enablers of Hitler and the Nazi Party while claiming to want a return of morality throughout Germany. The Center Party was in all thirteen coalition governments between 1919 and 1930 and was often a political "mediator" between extremist elements on the ideological right and

31. Arnold Heidenheimer, *Adenauer and the CDU: The Rise of the Leader and the Integration of the Party* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), 63.
32. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 50.

left.[33] Whether justified or not, a break away from the Center Party allowed former politicians of the party to organize without the criticism of complicity in the political instability of the Weimar Republic.

Another notable break from the Catholic Party was due to the complicity associated with former Center Party politicians with the rise of Hitler. Franz von Papen, a devoted Catholic and a person with a noble Westphalian pedigree, rose in German politics first as a staff officer of the German High Command during the First World War and then as an effective spokesman for the Center Party during the Weimar Republic.[34] After a brief stretch as German Chancellor in 1932, von Papen joined politically with the Nazis and advocated German President Paul von Hindenburg to appoint Hitler as Chancellor with him as Vice Chancellor.[35] In this role he signed both the Enabaling Act of 1933, which gave Hitler the power to enact laws without the consent of parliament, and the *Reichskonkordat* with the Vatican.[36] The latter document guaranteed Catholic freedom to practice their faith by the Nazi government while prevented them from engaging in politics. Almost immediately after the signing, the Nazis violated the *Reichskonkordat* and lauched several persecution attacks at the Catholic Church. Although eventually acquitted, Papen was tried at the Nuremberg Trials after the Second World War for his role in the rise of Hitler and the Third Reich. While it is disingenuous to clain von Papen as singularily cupable for the rise of Hitler, it is not inaccurate to highlight that much of the German

33. Michael Burleigh, *Sacred Causes: The Clash of Religion and Politics, From the Great War to the War on Terror* (New York: Harper Collins, 2006), 35.
34. Larry E. Jones, "Franz von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic," *Central European History* 38, no. 2 (2005): 194-195.
35. Jones, "Franz von Papen, the German Center Party, and the Failure of Catholic Conservatism in the Weimar Republic," 215.
36. Mark E. Ruff, *The Battle for the Catholic Past in Germany*, 1945-1980 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 3-4.

public and occupational authorities did believe in a connenction between members of the former Catholic Party with the Nazis.

While some leading Catholic, political figures did enable the rise of Hitler, post-1945 Christian rhetoric labeled Catholics and Protestants as victims in their own right of Nazi policies. As Mitchell also demonstrates in *The Origins of Christian Democracy*, early CDU organizers framed Nazism as "an expression of centuries-old materialist forces hostile to Christianity," and not purely the result of one man's military dictatorship.[37] Materialism in this context was a direct reference to the idea that Nazism was a product of modernity both internationally and within Germany. Additionally, Ronald J. Granieri highlights in *The Ambivalent Alliance* that the CDU identified "'materialist' traditions of socialism, communism, and especially National Socialism," as a way to connect the crimes of the Third Reich to the ideological policies of their biggest political opposition, the SPD.[38] Leading figures within the CDU used the self-image of Christianity to connect themselves to traditional religious tenets and away from ties between the former Center Party and the Nazis while characterizing their political rivals with societal perversion closely associated with the Third Reich.

While German Christians and conservatives began to cooperate politically in the CDU, the Allies' cooperation disintegrated. The Soviet Union and Western Allies clashed after Soviet encroachments into Eastern and Central Europe and ideological conflict between communism and democracy. Churchill stated in a speech "A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist international organization intend to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits, if any, to their

37. Mitchell, *The Origins of Christian Democracy*, 77.
38. Ronald J. Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance: Konrad Adenauer, The CDU/CSU, and The West, 1949*-1966 (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), 14.

expansive and proselytizing tendencies . . . From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent."[39] The United States and the United Kingdom merged their occupation zones and created the Bizone in January 1947, eventually the Trizone after the inclusion of the French Occupation Zone, to promote rapid economic recovery in Germany and try to prevent a communist takeover of their zones.[40] Upon further negotiations for cooperation amongst the occupation zones, Western states and the Allied Occupational Governments agreed during the London Six-Power Conference of 1948 for representatives from the newly formed German states' legislation to form a 'Basic Law' as a provisional constitution for a democratic, western German state.[41] When a parliamentary council convened on 1 September 1948 to develop a constitution, members elected Adenauer as President of the Parliamentary Council for his role as leader of the CDU and due to his previous experience as the President of the Prussian State Council from 1920-1933.[42] Adenauer was in a position as the President of the council to hold some level of authority and influence over the crafting of the future constitution.

After nearly eight months of intense negotiations between the Parliamentary Council and the Allied Military Governors, the Basic Law was signed into force on 23 May 1949, thus creating the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), commonly referred to as West Germany.[43]

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39. Winston Churchill, "Sinews of Peace (Iron Curtain Speech)" (Speech, Fulton, Missouri, 5 March 1946).
40. Anne Deighton, "The 'Frozen Front': The Labour Government, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War, 1945-7," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 63, no. 3 (1987): 457.
41. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 117-120.
42. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 121. There were sixty-five members on the Parliamentary Council. Twenty-seven belonged to the CDU/CSU, twenty-seven were SPD politicians, five came from the FDP, and two were from the DP Center and KPD. The SPD and FDP help the first and second vice president positions respectively.
43. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 138.

The text of the 1949 Basic Law, while a product of all parties involved in the council, was influenced by Adenauer and his CDU partners at the Parliamentary Council. Article 2 of the Basic Law states, "Everyone shall have the right to the free development of his personality, insofar as he does not infringe the right of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code."[44] Articles 6 and 13 emphasize the role of the state in marriage and in "protecting juveniles exposed to danger."[45] Article 20 clearly defines the FRG as "a democratic and social federal state."[46] Much as the case was at Neheim-Hüsten in 1946, Adenauer's perspective on morality, individuality, and democracy influenced the Basic Law of 1949 and soon also on a future German state.

Shortly after the ratification of the Basic Law, the FRG, the new German state created under the Basic Law, held its first federal election in 1949, and the CDU, with its Bavarian counterpart *Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern* (CSU), emerged as the largest party.[47] The CDU/CSU party joined into a coalition government with the liberal *Freie Demokratische Partei* (FDP) and the rightwing nationalist *Deutsche Partei* (DP) to control 208 out of 402 parliamentary seats.[48] One of the first decisions made by the new government was to elect Konrad Adenauer as the first Chancellor of the FRG. In the first four years after the collapse of the Third Reich, Adenauer molded the CDU based on his political and religious ideology, then the Basic Law, and now had the opportunity to shape the foundation of the FRG and its policies.

44. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, art. 1, sec. 1.
45. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, art. 6, sec. 1-2. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, art. 13, sec. 3.
46. Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, art. 20, sec. 1.
47. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 176.
48. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 182.

Rearmament of Germany

Historical developments between the two world wars impacted the victors' handling of Germany's military after the Second World War. The Treaty of Versailles had stipulated a gradual reduction of German troop strength until it reached a maximum allowance of 100,000 soldiers but allowed Germany to maintain regiments and a command structure.[49] It was believed at that time that the reduction in troop strength would prevent a future war with Germany. However, this small contingency would form the foundation of the Third Reich's military, the Wehrmacht. Hitler ignored the Treaty of Versailles, reintroducing conscription in 1935 to bolster troop numbers.[50] The post-WWII Allies committed to an "inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism," and through a series of regulations aimed to "remove or destroy all German military equipment; eliminate or control all German industry that could be used for military production."[51] Unlike in 1918, the post-WWII Allies disbanded the entire German military after the Second World War.

The geopolitical position of the defeated German territories as a buffer between East and West forced Allied leaders to rethink their position on German demilitarization. The French government broached the topic as early as 1945 in an internal memorandum that envisioned a German contribution to a wider alliance system in the face of mounting Cold War anxiety and tensions with the Soviets.[52] The topic of German rearmament traveled over to the Atlantic when

49. "Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles)," entered into force 10 January 1920, *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949*, Vol. 2.
50. Robert M. Citino, *The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920-1939* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999), 232.
51. Legal Division Office of Military Government for Germany (US), *Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Coordination Committee: Allied Control Authority Germany*, 1946, 2.
52. Large, *Germans to the Front*, 36.

Senators in the United States acknowledged that Germans needed to pay their "fair share" in Western security and the protection of Europe from the Soviet Union.[53] However, the turning point on the question of German rearmament was the beginning of the Korean War in 1950.[54] Korea, at the time, was not dissimilar from Germany. Split in half between communist and democratic-backed forces, the invasion of southern Korea from the north showcased the clear and present potential for a hot war between the former Allies. In addition, the Soviet Union successfully exploded an atomic bomb of their own the previous year and maintained a significant military force in the GDR that included attack aircraft and thirty armored divisions. Adenauer himself noted in his memoir, that it was not inconceivable that the FRG could fall under communist influences because there was little desire to oppose an impending attack from the East as "the advancing troops would be Germans . . . [and] because the events of Korea had taken away much of the [German population's] faith in the strength of the United States."[55]

While the Allies broached the topic of German rearmament, political and social challenges within the FRG placed it into doubt. In exchange for the Basic Law, the Allies introduced the Occupation Statute that allowed them to maintain control of the FRG's affairs. Specific to a future German military, the statute declared that France, the United Kingdom, and the United States reserved their authority on German "disarmament and demilitarisation."[56] The FRG could not just create a military if they wanted one since they did not have the authority to do that. The FRG also contended with strong anti-military sentiment among the citizenry. The

53. Large, *Germans to the Front*, 39.
54. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 271.
55. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 273.
56. The Occupation Statute of Germany, art. 2, sec. a.

proliferation of "*Nie Wieder Krieg*" (No More War) and "*Ohne Mich*" (Without Me) slogans resulted when rumors of Germans back in military uniforms started.[57]

The largest foundational development for a future FRG military contribution to Western defense occurred at the Himmerod Conference in October 1950. Taking place in the Himmerod Abbey in the Eifel Region of West Germany, Lieutenant General George P. Hays, the then-Commissioner for the US Occupation Zone in Germany, and the FRG Chancellery coordinated a list of former Wehrmacht officers from the Army, Navy, and Air Force that did not have direct ties to the Nazi Party nor a role in the atrocities of the Third Reich to plan a future German military force.[58] These former officers drafted the *Himmeroder Denkschrift* (Himmerod Memorandum), a document referred to at the twenty-fifth anniversary of the German military as the "magna carta for the Bundeswehr."[59]

The officers argued that a strong military was needed to combat the immediate threat posed by the Soviet Union against the FRG and Western security. This perspective did not occur within a vacuum but rather was a result of policies outlined by the CDU under Chancellor Adenauer. Only five years removed from the collapse of the Third Reich, the FRG was beholden to the authority of the Western Allies due to their former occupation, the housing of several hundred thousand foreign troops on West German soil, and increasing economic stability due to the Marshall Plan, a United States initiative that provided economic aid to Western Europe after 1945, which interjected $1.4 billion of financial capital between 1948-1952.[60] Increased

57. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 354.
58. Large, *Germans to the Front*, 97.
59. Donald Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross: The Search for Tradition in the West German Armed Forces* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 47.
60. Manfred Knapp, Wolfgang F. Stolper, and Michael Hudson, "Reconstruction and West-Integration: The Impact of the Marshall Plan on Germany," *Zeitschrift Für Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft* 137, no. 3 (1981): 421-422.

animosity against the East was also a result of the CDU's policy of *Westbindung* (Allying the FRG with the West). Granieri describes the importance of the FRG's relationship with the West as "both a political and a moral/ideological imperative that would help the Germans overcome their past and become respected members of the international community. . . After their narrow victory in the first West German elections in 1949, Adenauer and the [CDU] made a conscious choice to pursue close integration into the American-led system."[61] With regards to the FRG's military, the planners at Himmerod reflected many American arguments for the need of a German military. The document states, "the western security alliances of all three parts of the Wehrmacht in Germany must be strengthened in such a way that a surprise attack (without extensive and therefore recognizable deployment preparations) by the Red Army housed in the Ostzone is not possible . . . The stronger the security [of the FRG], the less incentive there is for the Soviet Union to pursue aggressive policies and the more secure the peace."[62] The cultivation of international relationships between the FRG and the West, namely the United States, as well as the CDU's inherent political animosity against communism and socialism forced upon the notion of a German military positioned against the Soviet Union.

The planners at Himmerod were also aware that citizens of the FRG might not be prepared for a military. From their perspective, " German people have committed themselves to the liberal ideas of the West, but are not yet internally prepared to make sacrifices for [the West]."[63] The idea of a lack of willingness to sacrifice on the battlefield had much to do with the

61. Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance*, 4.
62. "Himmeroder Denkschrift" (official memorandum, Himmerod, Rheinland-Pfalz, Germany, 1950), https://www.bundeswehr.de/resource/blob/5216326/77501d50befc687d9502723b2060a2b0/himmeroder-denkschrift-data.pdf, 4.
63. "Himmeroder Denkschrift," 4.

degradation of the German soldiers' image after the Second World War. Within the *Himmeroder Denkschrift*, the framers of the FRG military encouraged "the cessation of all defamation of German soldiers (including the Waffen-SS deployed as part of the Wehrmacht at the time) and measures to change public opinion at home and abroad."[64] Part of the defamation was the continued imprisonment of German Soldiers within the Soviet Union as prisoners of war (POWs). Following the war, the Soviet Union continued to detain nearly 1.5 million German POWs until 1956 and official reports conclude between 381,000 to one million soldiers died while in prison.[65] The intentionality of reframing the German soldier separate from the atrocities of Hitler gained traction shortly after the Himmerod Conference. General Eisenhower, then-Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, told reporters at Rhine-Main Air Base, FRG, in 1951

> that there was "a real difference between the regular German soldier and officer and Hitler and his criminal group. I have come to know the difference . . . For my part, I do not believe the German soldier, as such lost his honor. The fact that certain individuals committed, in war, certain dishonorable and despicable acts reflects on the individual concerned, and not on the great majority of German soldiers and officers."[66]

While this was not necessarily a full exoneration of German soldiers from the Second World War that would have been preferred by the FRG, it was a recasting of the Wehrmacht by the United States separate from the atrocities of the Third Reich that allowed for redemption of the image of German soldiers.

Weeks after the Himmerod Conference, Adenauer announced Theodor Blank as his Deputy to the Chancellor for Questions Relating to the Increase of Allied Troops. As a man with deep Catholic convictions similar to Adenauer, Blank came from a working-class family and

64. "Himmeroder Denkschrift," 44.
65. Susan C. I. Grunewald, *German Prisoners of War in the Soviet Union* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2024), 2.
66. Howard Kennedy, "Eisenhower gives views on German Soldiers," *Stars and Stripes* (Washington D.C.), Jan. 24, 1951.

turned down a position with the Nazi Labor Front early in the Third Reich. He enlisted during the Second World War, earning an Iron Cross, and, after the war, was among the earliest members of the CDU.[67] Blank represented an ideal candidate for Adenauer to spearhead the rearmament of the FRG. While he had military service, he was a civilian with religious convictions by nature, similar to many of the leaders within the CDU and FRG. Blank's organization, known as *Amt Blank* or *Dienststelle Blank*, was responsible for coordinating with occupation authorities for the buildup of Allied troops in Germany and planning the future of a German defense force. The *Amt Blank* began negotiations with the Benelux (Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg) countries, France, and Italy, to form a European Defense Community (EDC), outlined by the Pleven Plan.[68] Named after French Prime Minister Rene Pleven, the Pleven Plan was introduced by the French government to the NATO Defense Committee in October 1950 and was among the earliest proposals to allow for the rearmament of the FRG within the context of a supranational European military. The EDC was intended to be a fighting force with units from those countries that joined and would fall under a single command structure. The EDC intended to allow the FRG to rearm under tight control from Allied leadership while bringing it into the fold of Western democracies.

After the foreign ministers from the six states involved in the negotiations signed the treaty on 27 May 1952, the organization faced diplomatic roadblocks. Although the FRG was the first state to fully ratify the treaty, it was not without serious opposition. Besides political resistance to rearmament from the SPD and the wider FRG civilian population, the issue of the

67. Large, *Germans to the Front*, 112.
68. Sheldon A. Goldberg, *From Disarmament to Rearmament: The Reversal of US Policy toward West Germany, 1946-1955* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2017), 129-136.

Saar caused considerable tension between France and Germany during EDC negotiations.[69] As a region rich in coal and historically changed hands between Germany and France through conflict, France separated the Saar region from their occupation territory in 1947 and entered the region into a customs and economic union within France. Both states claimed sovereignty over the Saar region after the creation of the FRG. The Saar question ultimately was the last straw for a weary French political class. In 30 August 1954, the French government voted to table debate on the ratification of the EDC treaty and thereby killed the EDC and dashed hopes for creating an integrated European army.[70] Increased discontent on the Saar question and nationalistic sentiments led prominent French political figures such as then-President Pierre Mendes-France to fear the EDC as a loss of French sovereignty.

Adenauer foreshadowed the failure of the EDC in July 1954. In an interview, he remarked that if France failed to ratify the EDC treaty, the Western powers would have "no choice" but to allow the FRG to establish a national military.[71] Adenauer's inference on what would come next if the EDC plan failed came true. While the EDC plan took two years to fail ultimately, the FRG negotiated entrance into NATO with its independent force in seven months. Shortly after the collapse of the EDC, Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, proposed the 1948 Brussels Security Pact that included Britain, France, and the Benelux countries be expanded to include the FRG.[72] This plan created a safeguard by allowing the FRG to remilitarize while staying connected to Western democracies. France initially rejected the proposal under the same justification that led to the collapse of the EDC. However, the United

69. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 403. The SPD's main political argument against rearmament was that it would only provoke the Soviet Union and further delay the total reunification of Germany.
70. Goldberg, *From Disarmament to Rearmament*, 156.
71. Large, *Germans to the Front*, 210.
72. Goldberg, *From Disarmament to Rearmament*, 159-160.

Kingdom threatened to remove its military forces from continental Europe if France did not vote to approve the plan. France's parliament succumbed to pressure from its allies and voted narrowly to approve the FRG's entrance into NATO. The FRG ratified the treaties on 24 March 1955 and cleared its path towards rearmament as a full and equal member of NATO.[73]

The creation of an independent German military in 1955 was far from conceivable a decade earlier after the end of the Second World War. The acceptance of the FRG into NATO was followed on 5 May 1955 by the Allied High Commission formally rescinding the Occupation Statute and thus the Allies' authority over the FRG.[74] The FRG was a partially sovereign state with control over much of its day-to-day affairs. The path toward rearmament and NATO followed much of the same path as that of the FRG itself, towards Western integration through democratic values. When planning for an FRG contribution to European security, the importance of integration with the West was at the forefront of German planners. While the Western Allies ultimately accepted the FRG into NATO, the young democracy had to build its military force from the ground up and determine what kind of force it would be. Would it internalize the values of Western democracy? And just what would those values look like so soon after the catastrophe of WWII, with the nightmare of Nazism still looming large in the world's, the Allies', and the West German public and political class's memory?

Innere Führung and the Citizen Soldier

The FRG could not create a military that its citizens and international partners openly accepted without issue. During the Second World War, Germany fought and occupied many of

73. Goldberg, *From Disarmament to Rearmament*, 159-160.
74. Goldberg, *From Disarmament to Rearmament*, 159-160.

the very states the FRG planned to integrate with first under the EDC and then NATO. There was incredible skepticism on the part of countries, in particular France, that a rearmament of Germany meant a rebirth of Prussian militarism. For Germans, many of the symbols and traditions that characterized a German military "lost all positive meaning," due to the collapse of the German soldier's reputation after the war.[75] The process of rebuilding the image of the German soldier was as important as the planning to rearm.

At the Himmerod Conference, Count Wolf von Baudissin emerged as an influential figure in the discussions on the character of the soldier in the FRG. Count Baudissin, born in 1907, spent his childhood in West Prussia, and his models were Gerhard von Scharnhorst and August von Gneisenau, famed Prussian military reformers during the Napoleonic era.[76] Baudissin joined the Reichswehr in 1926 at the age of nineteen and stayed in service through the military's transformation into the Wehrmacht under Hitler.[77] During the Second World War, he was captured by the British in 1941 and remained a prisoner of war until 1947.[78] After a brief retirement from the military following his release, Count Baudissin was invited to the Himmerod Conference where he worked on the committee responsible for determining what would be referred to as "*Innere Gefüge*" (internal structure) of a new German military service. At the conference, Count Baudissin spearheaded the planning and drafting of what would become known as the inner spirit of the German military.

Section five of the *Himmeroder Denkschrift*, entitled "*Das innere Gefüge"* tackled the position of the soldier in the FRG. In this section, Count Baudissin discussed the need to ensure

75. Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 12.
76. Large, *Germans to the Front*, 178.
77. Large, *Germans to the Front*, 178-179.
78. Large, *Germans to the Front*, 179.

that a West German contingent to the defense of Europe should follow the new reality of West Germany within Europe, namely a connection to Western democracy, while ensuring that any values of the military "remain valid," as the organization and social reality change over time.[79] The commitment to European defense followed the position of the framers of the FRG who advocated for deeper integration with the West. Additionally, the notion is that the military force of the FRG should protect its core principles despite changes in the organization. In this, Count Baudissin noted that a future German armed force should "win young people for a united Europe," and make them committed citizens of the FRG.[80] Here Baudissin projects his internal convictions that the military should protect the democracy of the Bundeswehr while allowing soldiers to grow in their commitments both to the state and system of government.

With their mind on German history, the framers of *Innere Gefüge* at Himmerod discussed the need to avoid the issues that led to the collapse of the past. The future force could not become a "state within a state."[81] This was a direct reference to the Reichswehr that historically operated outside of the scope of political control during the First World War and outside of the political system of the Weimar Republic. Politicians and historians criticized the Reichswehr for operating outside of the regulations of the Versailles Treaty, which led to the Third Reich. The *Himmeroder Denkschrift* noted that future forces and soldiers needed to commit to "the democratic form of state and way of life."[82] This was another direct reference to the German military as the defender of the FRG and the embodiment of the service as an educator for the democratic values of the state to the soldier. While the document itself is only a basic outline, it

79. "Himmeroder Denkschrift," 44.
80. Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 97.
81. "Himmeroder Denkschrift," 45.
82. "Himmeroder Denkschrift," 45.

reflected the same debates surrounding the establishment and rearmament of the FRG. Notably, there is an awareness from the framers of past events and how they contributed to the fall of Germany. Additionally, the *Innere Gefüge* section is clear that any future soldier in the military must be dedicated to the principles of democracy and the FRG as a member of an international community.

Count Baudissin joined the *Sektion Innere Führung* (Inner Leadership Department) of the *Amt Blank* in May 1951 to further develop the military reform outlined in the Himmerod document. The relatively small section within *Amt Blank* emerged as a planning community directly under Blank to develop and eventually implement military reforms that showcased the German soldier as an integrated member of the FRG's democratic society, maintain their soldierly rights, and serve their country. Count Baudissin believed that ultimately this would "appeal to dislocated young people," who were searching for their place in the new FRG.[83] As the planners for an FRG contribution to the EDC and then NATO negotiated externally with international partners for several years after the Himmerod Conference, Baudissin and his team worked internally to develop the reforms of the German military. After the rearmament of the FRG and subsequent naming of the military as the Bundeswehr, the FRG Ministry of Defense released a document called *Handbuch Innere Führung* in 1957 which laid out in detail the relationship of the soldier and to the state that followed the principles the framers used when building the FRG: democracy, morality, and the individual. The importance of this document for the future of the Bundeswehr cannot be understated. While the German military published future documents that explained *Innere Führung*, most notably *Zentrale Dienstvorschrift* (*ZDv) 10/1 "Innere Führng"* and *A-2600/1 "Innere Führng: Selbstverstaendis und Führngskultur"*, the

83. Large, *Germans to the Front*, 182.

Handbuch Innere Führung was the first comprehensive publication from the Bundeswehr to describe *Innere Führung* and the role it played in the Bundeswehr and within the FRG and remained in its original published form until the Bundeswehr rewrote it in December 2023.

The soldiers' commitment to democracy and the state was a paramount feature in the handbook. Soldiers of the Bundeswehr are referred to as "servers of a free constitutional state."[84] The idea of the soldier as a server of the democratic values of the state was summed up in the 1957 handbook under the concept *Staatsbürger in Uniform* (Citizen in uniform). The *Staatsbürger in Uniform* is clearly defined as a relationship of mutual benefit and respect between the soldier and the state whereby the soldier fights to defend democracy on the battlefield but is still given the same rights and values as every other citizen in the state.[85]

The developers of the handbook paid particular attention to rapid changes in society and the impact on morals and social norms, particularly for the younger generation that grew up during and after the Second World War. The handbook notes that "the world of the child has fallen apart," with three million mothers without husbands, two million children having divorced parents, and a compulsion and addiction that leads women to work.[86] The handbook describes things such as comics, bad films, "*Schmutz- und Schundschriften*" (dirty and trash writings), and slot machines as cultural wastes that negatively impact children.[87] The rhetoric of *Schmutz und Schund* went back decades and was circulated by Catholic and conservative political parties to address social problems and label things that threatened German morality and Germany's

84. Bundesministerium für Vertiedigung, "Handbuch Innere Führung: Hilfen zur Klärung der Begriffe," (1957), 149.
85. "Handbuch Innere Führung," 23.
86. "Handbuch Innere Führung," 103.
87. "Handbuch Innere Führung," 102.

stability.[88] In a rapidly changing environment characterized by technological advancements and shifting social standards, the framers of the handbook believed that traditional social norms had lost their value in the eyes of the people. The collapse of morals in the FRG impacted the family. It was the responsibility of the Bundeswehr through *Innere Führung* to imbue the next generation of soldiers with the moral and social values of the FRG.

The handbook connected democracy and morals through the respect of the individual. The handbook noted that soldiers should bring their values from home, school, and previous work into their roles within the Bundeswehr to enhance the moral education of the entire force.[89] The Bundeswehr is thus regarded as a representation of the values of the state, which in this case meant a CDU-led conservative and Christian state. However, there is also a religious element which seems to be a reference to the Christian democracy platform that led the FRG for almost a decade at the publishing of the handbook. The handbook notes that the Bundeswehr should remain awake to the notion that man was created in the image of God.[90] Therefore, the acknowledgment of the individuality of the soldier underscores the need to imbue basic religious tenets into the Bundeswehr.

The handbook clarifies the foundational principle of *Innere Führung* in regards to the connection between individuality, democracy, and morality. This was summed up as,

> Only those who participate to the best of their ability in the political, intellectual, cultural and social life of their [fellow citizens] and who consider the moral norms of our order to be binding and worth defending can cope with these heavy demands and burdens a natural and necessary part of his civil rights and duties, who recognizes fellow soldiers and citizens as partners in a common cause, who fairly serves his employer as a jointly responsible public servant, but that is the *Staatsbürger in Uniform*.[91]

88. Mitchell, *The Origins of Christian Democracy*, 27.
89. "Handbuch Innere Führung," 93.
90. "Handbuch Innere Führung," 119.
91. "Handbuch Innere Führung," 43.

Innere Führung and its principle of the *Staatsbürger in Uniform* underscores the soldier as the server of the democratic foundations of the FRG. However, it is the responsibility of the Bundeswehr to treat the soldier as an individual and respect their rights at the same rate as any other citizen of the FRG. If both practice their respective duties, the Bundeswehr serves as an ideal organization that represents the morals of the FRG.

Impact

Innere Führung in the Bundeswehr represents a key development in the FRG's path toward sovereignty and rearmament. Konrad Adenauer, as a preeminent post-war politician, used his political standing to create a political party and then influence the Basic Law and the FRG towards Western democracies. The aim of the FRG initially was to integrate with the West. When the issue of West German rearmament came up due to the threat of the Soviet Union, the integration of Germany within the framework of a European military reflected the trend towards the West. Despite the collapse of the EDC framework, the FRG rearmed under Western integration through the NATO alliance.

The reform of the spirit of the Bundeswehr under *Innere Führung* showcased the intersection of individuality and morality within the context of a democratic military. The soldier is dedicated to the FRG and its democratic values but remains an individual and maintains the same rights as every other citizen. Therefore, the Bundeswehr becomes a reflection of the moral and social values of the state. However, the FRG and Bundeswehr were created at a period of mass change in society. The FRG went from occupied territories into a sovereign state while the Bundeswehr was not imaginable ten years before its founding. The concept of *Innere Führung* had to hold up to rapid change in values within German society.

Chapter 2

Exclusion From Service, 1955-1968

Writing in a Catholic organization's sponsored pamphlet, Bonn district court judge Richard Gatzweiler wrote in 1951:

> The formation of clubs must be regarded as particularly dangerous. Germany learned the significance of homosexual clubs from the so-called *Röhm-Putsch.* [. . .] A similar formation of clubs and sects is also underway in Germany. When it succeeds, the inverts will constitute a state within a state *(Staat im Staat*). Everyone knows they hold together like lice. Therefore, they would constitute a fearsome danger for the young German democracy.[92]

The inverts Gatzweiler refers to are homosexual men, men he claimed represented an existential threat to the FRG. The term ' sexual inverts' rose to prominence in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century to label those with sexual interests among the same sex, namely homosexuals. The foundation of the state, created under the leadership of the CDU-led government and Chancellor Adenauer had focused on the return of morality and social stability within a newly constituted democratic order. From Gatzweiler's perspective (as well as that of many other prominent West German religious and political figures), male homosexuality was a destabilizing force whose impact had to be mitigated at all costs. Gatzweiler was indicative of a larger conversation had amongst politicians and jurists that actively promoted the idea of legal discrimination for social stability. An institution like the Bundeswehr served the state in its defense from Soviet aggression while representing the steadfast beliefs of the FRG. In the 1950s and 60s, the idea that one could serve the FRG within the Bundeswehr and be homosexual was inconceivable especially from those with political and legal oversight of the FRG.

92. Samuel Clowes Huneke, *States of Liberation: Gay Men Between Dictatorship and Democracy in Cold War Germany* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2022), 46.

The Initial Post-War State of Homosexuals

The history of homosexual persecution in Germany predates the turbulence of the post-Second World War period. After consolidating German kingdoms and principalities in 1871, Section 143 of the Prussian Criminal Code was adopted unaltered as Paragraph 175 into the German Reich's Criminal Code. That meant that the German Empire as a whole adopted a more prohibitive attitude toward male homosexuality than, for example, Bavaria. The 1871 version of Paragraph 175 stated, "Acts of lewdness and lasciviousness contrary to nature committed between persons of the male sex or by humans with beasts, is to be punished by imprisonment; a sentence of loss of civil rights may also be passed."[93] The legal understanding of Paragraph 175 as defined in 1871 defined natural sex as sexual activity between persons of the opposite sex, male and female. Specific to this statute and in regards to sexuality among men, only acts such as fellation and penetrative intercourse between them were a violation of the law. Other types of homosexual expression outside intercourse, including mutual masturbation or same-sex sexual acts among women, did not merit prosecution under Paragraph 175. Despite several efforts by liberal politicians after 1871 to reform the law and a period of lax enforcement within larger German cities such as Berlin and Hamburg during the Weimar era, Paragraph 175 remained in its 1871 version until the beginning of the Third Reich.

Known as the Night of the Long Knives and the Roehm Purge, a coup against the growing influence of the *Sturmabteilung* (SA), Hitler ordered the execution of Ernst Roehm and other leaders in the SA. The wider impact was the SA was reorganized under Heinrich Himmler and the SS and Hitler appeased the worries from leaders of the Wehrmacht about the growing

93. Martin Burgi and Daniel Wolff, Rehabilitierung der nach § 175 StGB verurteilten homosexuellen Männer (2016), 13.

influence of paramilitary groups within Germany. After the purge, Hitler noted in a speech to the German public, "I want every mother to be able to send her son to the SA, the party, and the Hitler Youth without fearing that he might there be debased in his manners or morals."[94] In other words, Hitler used subtext to justify the execution of his political enemies by claiming he was protecting German youth from moral corruption by homosexuals. Shortly after the execution of Röhm and other leading SA officials, allegedly for homosexuality, the Third Reich passed a new, extended version of Paragraph 175 on 28 June 1935. While the Third Reich made several changes, the most consequential alteration to Paragraph 175 was the expanded list of acts considered "homosexual." While courts after 1871 upheld that only intercourse-like acts were prosecutable under the law, the new version of Paragraph 175 targeted the supposedly "lewd and lavacious."[95] This change in legislative text allowed authorities to charge men who engaged in all sorts of homosexual acts, including same-sex letter writing, kissing, hand-holding, and even the occasional glance from across the room at other men. The Third Reich's persecution of homosexuals extended from society to the concentration camps of the Holocaust. Men sent to the camps because of their sexuality received their own prisoner category type, the pink triangle. [96] In total, nearly 100,000 men were convicted under the new version of Paragraph 175 during the Third Reich.[97]

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94. Vergessene Opfer, 1994, Nr. 4, Nationalsozialismus, Schwules Museum, Berlin.
95. Rehabilitierung der nach § 175 StGB verurteilten homosexuellen Männer (2016), 15-16.
96. Among the expansive list of Holocaust survivor memoirs, there are only two widely known accounts written by homosexual survivors of Nazi concentration camps. *See Seel, Pierre. I, Pierre Seel, Deported Homosexual. New York: Basic Books, 1995* and *Heger, Heinz. The Men with the Pink Triangle: The True Life and Death Story of Homosexuals in the Nazi Death Camps. New York: Alyson Books, 1994.* Additionally, *Beck, Gad. An Underground Life: Memoirs of a Gay Jew in Nazi Berlin. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1999* is an account of a Jewish homosexual who lived in Berlin during the Second World War and fought as part of the resistance.
97. Huneke, *States of Liberation*, 8.

After the collapse of Germany following the Second World War, some believed a new era of homosexual liberalization would emerge. The Allied occupiers initially repealed several laws influenced by Nazi ideology. Many homosexuals who survived the Third Reich thought that the Nazis' sharpening of Paragraph 175 would be repealed and the anti-homosexual statute would, at minimum, revert to the 1871 version. Under the Allied Control Council Law no. 1, laws enacted during the Third Reich that favored those affiliated with the NSDAP or that discriminated on the basis of "race, nationality, religious beliefs, or opposition to the National Socialist German Labour Party or its doctrines," were to be repealed.[98] In addition, the general loosening of sexual mores seen in Nazi Germany continued after the war. As one religious commentator wrote in early 1949, "In broad circles a new sexual-moral attitude has emerged and spread that trivializes sexual intercourse and puts it on the same level as eating or drinking."[99] While the German state was destroyed physically and ideologically as a result of the Second World War, many homosexuals gained a sense of freedom around their sexualities. One particular homosexual reflected that, "I had a great time after 1945, for I was 15, the war had ended . . . and all the Americans [*sic*], the English, and the Germans wanted to make up for everything they had missed."[100] While all Germans struggled in the immediate aftermath of the war to rebuild their daily lives, many homosexuals no longer had the fear associated with being caught and sent to concentration camps on the sole basis of their sexuality.

98. Allied Control Authority, Law No 1 from the Control Council for Germany, Berlin, Germany, 30 August 1945.
99. Dagmar Herzog, *Sex and Fascism: Memory and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), 71.
100. Clayton J. Whisnant, *Male Homosexuality in West Germany: Between Persecution and Freedom, 1945-1969* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 24-25.

Yet as stability returned and West Germans took control of their own affairs in the late 1940s and early 1950s, post-war hopes for a complete repeal of Paragraph 175 faded under the rule of Christian democracy. The Allied Control Council refused to take a policy position on the validity of Paragraph 175 as a law influenced by Nazi ideology.[101] The U.S. and U.K. also had their own laws which criminalized all homosexuality, among men and women. The founding of the FRG and Adenauer's subsequent chancellorship infused his views on Christianity into democracy to rescind the sexual freedoms of the late 1940s. Meanwhile, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), formed also in 1949 out of the territory occupied by the Soviets, declared the 1935 version of Paragraph 175 to be an "instrument of power for the Nazi state to prepare for war" in 1950 and returned to the 1871 version. The Supreme Court of West Berlin, which was the FRG's equivalent of the U.S.'s Supreme Court, referred to Paragraph 175 as necessary for the "sexual integrity and thus the healthy development of the youth."[102] While homosexual men were no longer sent to concentration camps or murdered for their sexuality, the FRG continued to use justifications similar to those made by the Nazis, namely the protection of the youth and morality of the state, to target homosexuals.

However, the return of conservative sexual ideology was not limited solely to same-sex activity between men but reflected a wider trend of religious democracy in the FRG. Focusing on Birkenfeld and the Kaiserslautern regions of Rheinland-Pfalz, Maria Höhn in *GIs and Fräuleins* examines the social and political effects on these regions of the ongoing US military occupation. Of particular focus for Höhn is the labeling of German women who engaged in sexual relations

101. Samuel Clowes Huneke, "Can Democracy Be Queer?: Male Homosexuality, Democratisation, and the Law in Postwar Germany," *Central European History* 33, no. 2 (2024): 405.
102. Jennifer V. Evans, "Bahnhof Boys: Policing Male Prostitution in Post-Nazi Berlin," *University of Texas Press* 12, no. 4 (2003): 615.

with US soldiers as "sexually unrestrained," and morally bankrupt.[103] The German religious and political conservatives viewed "Veronikas", the derogatory name assigned to women who engaged in sex with US soldiers whether as sex workers or relationships, as a moral crisis influenced by materialism that could only be halted by a revival of traditional sexual norms.[104] As with the founding of the FRG, materialism was seen by the CDU, and by extension the government, as a destabilizing force that brought down the Weimar Republic and ushered in the rise of Nazism. Only a restoration of traditional Christian values within the state and the lives of citizens could rehabilitate German society and provide a sturdy foundation for West German democracy and society.

Policies Reflect Politics

The return to traditional gender roles within the FRG emerged as a result of the post-war experiences. These gender roles included the notion that women were responsible for the house and raising of the children while men served as the breadwinners and protectors of the family. Traditional gender roles, already in decline for decades, had been further altered as the social realities of the post-war era pushed women – like the "rubble women" -- into the job of rebuilding Germany, quite literally during the Third Reich, the Nazi Party alleged that women joining the workforce during the Weimar Republic had undermined men's job prospects, making it hard for them to find adequate work.[105] However, the Nazis also influenced gender roles as they attempted to make the party an appealing place for the younger generation. They introduced

103. Maria Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 14.
104. Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins*, 127.
105. Elizabeth D. Heineman, *What Difference Does a Husband Make? Women and Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 75-77.

the Hitler Youth and its female counterpart, the League of German Girls. As young men received instructions in fraternity and brotherhood, girls participated in "all the adventures [traditionally] reserved for boys" such as swimming and camping, which the Catholic clergy previously prohibited.[106] During the war, women took on new roles as men headed to the front. Even after the war, traditional gender roles were challenged as the former German territory attempted to rebuild in the face of Germany's defeat. Images of the *Trümmerfrauen* (rubble women) clearing destruction from bombed buildings and roads emerged as symbols of women's role in the rebuilding of daily lives on the streets of Germany, as many men either died in war or remained under Allied detention as POWs (**Figure 2.1**).[107] The Soviet Union and its satellite Soviet states touted women's social and economic equality and advertised the role of women in the workforce as contributing to the GDR's rebuilding efforts.[108] In the Western zone of occupation, relationships with U.S. soldiers seemingly influenced independence and free expression of sexuality for German women which appalled traditionalists in Germany.[109] Germany's destruction from war for a second time in 1945, alongside the perceived collapse of gender roles, led to an immediate perception amongst politicians that the fabric of German social stability was in retreat.

106. Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins*, 24.
107. David Clay Large, *Berlin* (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 377-379.
108. Rebecca Boehling, "Gender Roles in Ruins: German Women and Local Politics under American Occupation, 1945-1955," in *Gender and the Long Post War: The United States and the Two Germanys*, ed. Karen Hagemann and Sonya Michel (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2014), 58-59.
109. Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins*, 130-131.



Figure 2.1. *Trümmerfrauen* clearing rubble in Germany after the Second World War, source American-German Institute, Washington D.C.

Sarah Wiliarty notes the CDU's policy of "3Ks" -- *Kinder, Kirche, Küche* (Children, Church, Kitchen) -- as an attempt to shore up the patriarchal, nuclear family to restore stability. Adenauer wrote in his memoirs that "Recognition and protection of women in their life and work at home and in the family," formed the basis of the CDU's understanding of the relationship between the individual and the state.[110] Robert Moeller identifies in *Protecting Motherhood* that Adenauer, alongside his CDU/CSU coalition, viewed the traditional nuclear family as an essential element of the Christian Democratic principles that would reinvigorate the social stability of the German state. Additionally, the "unrestricted mobilization of women into wage labor," in the East was viewed as a rejection of Christian values, destroying the economy, and destroying the family.[111] The idea of a women's role within society defined in the context of the family was also an ideological distinguisher between the FRG and GDR.

110. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 50.
111. Robert G. Moeller, *Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 78-79.

While the CDU's *Kinder, Kirche, Küche* policy focused on the return of women to home and family, it created a new image of masculinity within the FRG. Masculinity in Germany before 1945 was often associated with military service. The "martial masculinity" of German society epitomized during the Second World War as the Third Reich called for men and boys to mirror the hardness and commitment to the fatherland represented by their military heroes.[112] Germany's total defeat in 1945, followed by revelations of war crimes, sullied the image of the soldier as the hero of the state. The military occupation of Germany by its former enemies further damaged the image of the soldier. In a post-1945 order, the image of the German man created through the FRG's family politics depicted masculinity in the context of morally strong and devoted fathers committed to providing for their families.[113]

The re-emergence of traditional gender roles as defined by the nuclear family also reinforced conceptions of deviancy associated with male homosexuality. After several cases within the FRG legal system on the validity of Paragraph 175 produced different results, the Federal Constitutional Court determined in 1954 that the criminalization of homosexuality was "compatible with the Basic Law."[114] This ruling meant that both male same-sex sexual activity was a violation of the FRG's moral order and that reforms made by the Third Reich on the topic of homosexuality was not National Socialistic in nature and could be used as a legal argument in the FRG.

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112. Kathleen J. Nawyn, "Banning the Soldier Hero: American Regulations, German Youth, and Changing Ideas of Manhood in Occupied Würrtmberg-Baden, 1945-1949," in *Gender and the Long Post War: The United States and the Two Germanys*, ed. Karen Hagemann and Sonya Michel (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2014), 120.
113. Nawyn, "Banning the Soldier Hero," 120.
114. Whisnant, *Male Homosexuality in West Germany*, 29.

These rulings against homosexuals further supported and influenced the *Bundestag* during the 1962 *Großestrafrechtsreforme* (Great Criminal Code Reform). After the 1953 FRG federal election, the CDU remained the largest single party in the *Bundestag* and entered a coalition government with smaller conservative parties, who elected Konrad Adenauer for a second term as Chancellor. In 1954, the federal government convened a criminal code commission to modify current laws that included Paragraph 175. The commission worked through several more federal election cycles (1957 and 1961) during which Adenauer and the CDU maintained leadership of the FRG. The Criminal Code Commission made up of FRG legal experts, submitted their findings to the Ministry of Justice as a draft criminal code in 1962, known as E-1962.[115] While this document discussed the entirety of the FRG's criminal code, the E-1962 portion that deals with male homosexuality highlights the government's strengthening opposition against male homosexuality over nearly a decade due to its overall impact on the health of the state.

The FRG government advocated for a legal reform of the German criminal code that maintained the criminalization of male homosexuality through a new legal statute, Section 216. This draft legislation introduced the necessity for the continued criminalization of male homosexuality based on popular opinion. It was said that same-sex male sexual activity destroyed the character and the moral feeling of the country.[116] The proponents of Section 216 placed male homosexuality within a historical and international context. They stated, "Where [male] same-sex fornication became rampant and widespread, the result was the degeneration of

115. Robert G. Moeller, "Private Acts, Public Anxieties: The Fight to Decriminalize Male Homosexuality in Postwar West Germany," in *Gender and the Long Post War: The United States and the Two Germanys*, ed. Karen Hagemann and Sonya Michel (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2014), 235-237.
116. Deutscher Bundestag 4. Wahlperiod, *Entwurf eines Strafgesetzbuches (StGB) E 1962*, 376.

the people and the decline of their moral strength."[117] While there is no explicit reference to Christianity in E-1962 as it relates to male homosexuality, the morality argument in the E-1962 document made against male homosexuality mirrors those from the CDU and Adenauer about the importance of restoring Christian values within the FRG.

Beyond the criminalization of homosexuality, E-1962 advocated for a criminal offense against causing a public nuisance. Homosexuality was included among those offenses. The main objective of Section 219 of the draft criminal law was, "*zum Schutz* gegen *das Eindringen der Homosexualität in die Öffentlichkeit wirksam verschärft wird.*"[118] Already by the early 1960s, the government grew increasingly concerned with the greater openness of homosexuality in the daily lives of its citizens. Films, newspapers, and advertisements began including male homosexuality as well as generalized images of sexuality. E-1962 specifically called "for the fight against homosexuality in public," to include the advertising of homosexual activity.[119]

The largest argument made in E-1962 echoes the argument made by Hitler in his speech after the Night of the Long Knives and many proponents of homosexual criminalization before, the protection of youth. Under Section 216, the FRG argued that most men who engaged in same-sex activity "acquired homosexuality in their youth," due to the intense influence it could have during a period of sexual instability in the formative period of a person's life.[120] This argument was not a new one. When the realities of the youth turning toward the male-sex trade in Berlin in the late 1940s and early 1950s prevailed, the wide standing opinion was that "male sexual deviance [homosexuality] . . . posed risks to society: their criminality might be passed on

117. *Entwurf eines Strafgesetzbuches (StGB) E 1962*, 377.
118. *Entwurf eines Strafgesetzbuches (StGB) E 1962*, 381. Translation: to protect against the incursion of homosexuality in the public sphere.
119. *Entwurf eines Strafgesetzbuches (StGB) E 1962*, 381.
120. *Entwurf eines Strafgesetzbuches (StGB) E 1962*, 375-378.

to future generations."[121] From the early days of post-war Germany, Adenauer and the CDU argued that the youth needed protection from the perils of the post-war era to safeguard the future of the FRG. Article 2 of the Basic Law specifically noted the need for individuals to freely develop within a moral and legal code. Linking homosexuality to the corruption of the youth effectively strengthened the government's argument that the continued prosecution of male homosexuality was a critical safeguard made in the defense of democracy and the Christian values that the FRG was based upon.

E-1962 and the Male Community

In terms of the military, the E-1962 contains one of the only references from the federal government in the first two decades of the FRG surrounding the service of homosexuals in the military. E-1962 asserted male homosexuality was a threat against the defensive institutions of the state such as the military and the police force due to the relationship required between men in these communities. The document referred to those who engaged in same-sex sexual activity as responsible for the "building of homosexual groups," that challenged the authority of the FRG.[122] Labeling homosexual men as a group served two purposes. The first is that it tied homosexuals to the idea of a 'state within a state,' a common trope that made slight references to the collapse of Germany and the rise of Hitler. It also created the notion that homosexual men could not be committed to the democratic principles of the FRG and were therefore a threat to the stability of the FRG. Section 216 states:

> "Finally, the threat that permitting same-sex fornication among adult men would pose to associations and groups that live together in larger or similar communities should not be underestimated. One should not only think of the police and the Bundeswehr, but also of

121. Evans, "Bahnhof Boys," 628.
122. *Entwurf eines Strafgesetzbuches (StGB) E 1962*, 375.

> shared apartments for men that were created to carry out larger work projects, to travel together or for other long-term purposes."[123]

Huneke notes the fear of homosexuals in military or civil service as indicative of a larger Cold War argument against homosexuals. The belief from politicians was that the entrance of homosexuals into military barracks could lead to homosexual groups forming and they would only higher other homosexuals for positions of authority.[124]

The concern of groups forming that were committed to each other over the state was part of the legitimate concerns brought up during the initial planning phase for the FRG's rearmament. The original planners of the Bundeswehr at Himmerod noted in the *Innere Gefüge* section, "the German contingent [to the EDC] is not permitted to be a 'State in the State," and must "affirm the inner convictions of the democratic state and form of life."[125] The characterization of homosexuals as a group within society by the government in E-1962 was intentional and echoed the same concerns brought up twelve years prior when early military planners met at Himmerod Abbey to develop the foundations of a future German military. The potential of a homosexual group not only would passively tear the moral order of the state but also negatively influence the future through the denigration of the youth. The government's perspective in 1962 was that homosexuality could not be allowed to be unchecked within the FRG as it would disastrously impact the morality and stability of the state and its democratic institutions.

123. *Entwurf eines Strafgesetzbuches (StGB) E 1962*, 377.
124. Huneke, *States of Liberation*, 94.
125. "*Himmeroder Denkschrift*," 45.

Masculinity and the Bundeswehr's *Männergesellschaft*

Shortly after the creation of the Bundeswehr, the FRG outlined the requirements for military service. On 19 March 1956, the FRG established the *Gesetz über die Rechtstellung der Soldaten* (Law on the Legal Status of the Soldier) also known as the *Soldatengesetz* (Soldiers Act). The *Soldatengesetz* identified the soldier as "anyone who is in military service due to compulsory military service or voluntary obligation."[126] On 21 July 1956 the FRG introduced the *Wehrpflichtgesetz* (Conscription Law) which stated that all men over the age of eighteen and are German citizens, as defined by the Basic Law, were required to fulfill a short period of required military service.[127] However, the Bundeswehr required both *Berurfssoldaten* (professional soldiers), those who volunteer to join and make the military a career, and *Soldaten auf Zeit* (temporary soldiers), those soldiers conscripted or volunteering for a short period, to swear an oath of loyalty to the FRG and to the defense of the rights and freedom of the German people.[128] The establishment of universal male service, made up primarily of younger soldiers, defined the Bundeswehr as a homosocial institution. As Friederike Brühöfener writes, the development of the Bundeswehr under this position effectively turned the military into a *Männergesellschaft* (men's society), linking masculinity to military service in support of the FRG's conservative values.[129]

Before the publication of the *Innere Führung* handbook in 1957, officer and NCOs inthe Bundeswehr, who were charged with implementing the early conceptions of *Innere Führung* into

126. *Soldatengesetz* (1956), art. 1 sec. 1.
127. *Wehrpflichtgesetz* (1956), art. 1 sec. 1.
128. *Soldatengesetz* (1956), art. 8.
129. Friederike Brühöfener, "Sex and the Soldier: The Discourse about the Moral Conduct of *Bundeswehr* Soldier and Officers during the Adenauer Era," *Central European History* 48, no. 1 (2015): 526.

their units, often struggled to balance traditional military values with the democratic reforms of the Bundeswehr. Many soldiers after rearmament criticized *Innere Führung* as "soft wave" and an "inner strangulation" of the German armed forces.[130] Some even reverted to Wehrmacht military customs to include the Wehrmacht salute, not the same as the Nazi 'Hitler' salute, and stopped using the US style of standing at attention with the hands extended on the side in a fist as opposed to the traditional German of all fingers extended along the seam of the trousers.[131] The implementation of change within the German military as a result of Allied intervention and democratic reforms made many soldiers believe that *Innere Führung* de-masculinized the German military traditions.

The 1957 *Innere Führung* handbook, while at its core connects the soldier to the democratic order of the FRG, seemingly tackles these critiques to define soldiers within the context of a masculinized organization. The handbook notes plainly in its final section, "*Innere Führung* does not mean femininity."[132] It goes on to explain:

> This shows that *Innere Führung* cannot be equated with general welfare or with effeminacy. [Leaders and supervisors] will use modern means and new forms to educate the soldier to have inner toughness and self-discipline, which are the most important prerequisites for his existence as a lone fighter. At all times, military leaders have tried to make their troops a powerful instrument under the given conditions. In German history in particular, men have repeatedly appeared who represented the demands of *Innere Führung* in similar endeavors. In view of the profound changes of our era and the threat from the East, this task is particularly urgent today.[133]

Not only was *Innere Führung* not to be equated with the so-called effeminacy of the military, it also implied that *Innere Führung* would safeguard he Bundeswehr soldier's masculinity. The

130. Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 174.
131. Abenheim, *Reforging the Iron Cross*, 174.
132. "*Handbuch Innere Führung*," 169.
133. "*Handbuch Innere Führung*," 173.

reference to the East, in a style ubiquitous during the Cold War,tied masculinity and military service to the FRG's fight against Soviet communism.

In addition to the inherent masculinity of the Bundeswehr, the *Innere Führung* handbook notes the importance of the German soldiers' education in the values of society. The handbook notes the purpose of military education within the context of *Innere Führung*, "Moral, intellectual and spiritual strengths, even more than technical skills, determine the value of the soldier in peace and war."[134] The handbook goes further to assert that the moral traditions and values engrained within the Bundeswehr and each soldier are the continuity that allowed for the rearmament of the FRG only ten years after the collapse of the Third Reich and during a time of rapid societal change.[135] The *Männergesellschaft* characteristic of the military not only highlighted the importance of traditional masculine virtues in the Bundeswehr to the success of the FRG but was also an outward reflection of the moral character of soldiers to the general public.

The Bundeswehr's Exclusionary Ban

Although the Bundestag failed to adopt E-1962 as the FRG's new criminal code, Paragraph 175 remained in place. This continued criminalization of male homosexuality in the FRG meant that the Bundeswehr and the Ministry of Defense did not need any special decree to prohibit homosexuals from joining. The lack of overt regulation banning homosexuals, although their service was not allowed, was a general practice as many nations criminalized

134. "*Handbuch Innere Führung*," 91.
135. "*Handbuch Innere Führung*," 109.

homosexuality and deemed gay men unfit for service.[136] For example, in the United States, the Lavender Scare swept across the political spectrum as politicians labeled homosexuals as disloyal to America and therefore incapable of serving the federal government in any capacity including the military.[137] Within the context of *Westbindung*, the FRG was aligned with its Western allies on military personnel policy. Politicians and military policymakers in Germany banned homosexuals from military service as just was the case in countries like the U.S., France, and the U.K. However, *Innere Führung* provided the Bundeswehr justification to defend the ban within the confines of the democratic positions of society. Male homosexuality was a criminal offense throughout the FRG under Paragraph 175. Therefore, the Bundeswehr did not need any specific statute on the topic of homosexual exclusion from the military because *Innere Führung* allowed the military to reflect the positions of the larger state. If the FRG criminalized homosexuality, so too could the Bundeswehr.

Despite the ban, male same-sex activity did occur within the Bundeswehr. However, the *Soldatengesetz* provided the necessary process to remove soldiers who violated Bundeswehr policy. Article 55 Section 5 was an important apparatus used by commanders to remove soldiers who engaged in same-sex sexual activity. This section of the *Soldatengesetz* states, "A temporary soldier can be dismissed without notice during the first four years of service if he has violated his official duties and remaining in his employment would seriously endanger military order or the

136. National Defense Research Institute, *Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy: An Update of RAND's 1993 Study* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2010), 275-320.
137. The Lavender Scare of the United States was a mid-twentieth century phenomenon that occurred at the same time as the more known Red Scare. For further information see Johnson, David K. *The Lavender Scare: The Cold War Persecution of Gays and Lesbians in the Federal Government.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006. and Eric Cervini, *The Deviant's War: The Homosexual vs. the United States of America* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux), 2020.

reputation of the Bundeswehr."[138] The Bundeswehr advocated that "soldiers should be encouraged to follow a Christian lifestyle and value family life," and that "the social and sexual behavior of Bundeswehr officers and soldiers would not jeopardize West Germany's social—and therefore political and military—stability."[139] Male same-sex activity amongst soldiers therefore highlighted a failure in the soldierly image cultivated in the early years of the Bundeswehr. In the case of two soldiers who engaged in sex in a private bathroom on a base canteen in 1962, the NCO faced a military court and was discharged due to his homosexual actions and abuse of authority. However, the other soldier, a Private, was removed without disciplinary proceedings because he had not yet completed his first four years of service.[140] As such, Article 55 provided the Bundeswehr to, without much resistance, if a homosexual did enter the Bundeswehr without his sexuality known, once it was known, he could be easily removed from service.

The ban against homosexuals from military service impacted soldiers from all echelons of military service. A highly decorated veteran of the Second World War turned general officer within the Bundeswehr was unceremoniously released from military service in April 1958 after the Cologne police caught him touching a civilian man sexually in a car in an empty parking lot at one o'clock in the morning.[141] After the civilian police officer handed his report to the military, the officer was questioned by military disciplinary lawyers and was no longer allowed on base. Before the disciplinary proceedings started, the President of the FRG approved the officer's request to resign his commission and the officer left Germany before he could be prosecuted for violating Paragraph 175. Nearly three years later, the civilian trial of the officer

138. *Soldatengesetz* (1956), art. 55 sec. 5.
139. Friederike Brühöfener, "Sex and the Soldier," 539-540.
140. Klaus Storkmann, *Tabu und Toleranz: Der Umgang mit Homosexualität in der Bundeswehr 1955 bis 2000* (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 2021), 120-121.
141. Storkmann, *Tabu und Toleranz*, 121.

took place and after the arresting officer failed to provide credible information about what he saw took place between the men, the judge found the removal of the officer from the Bundeswehr not warranted.[142] Although the trial weighed the officer's previous wartime experience favorably, the damage to his career already took place. The charges of homosexuality in 1958 were enough for the Bundeswehr to react negatively against the officer which ultimately led to his removal.

The Bundeswehr as the State's Defender

The *Innere Führung* handbook notes, "*Verteidigenswert ist, was lebenswert ist* (What is worthwhile is worth defending)" As the FRG grew in stature during the 1950s two fundamental characteristics solidified as core to the state—democracy and morality. As Brühöfener notes:

> The arguments over the social value of the Bundeswehr and over compulsory military service were … simultaneously a debate about conflicting conceptions of masculinity and sexuality. They constituted an effort to align the social and sexual conduct of West German servicemen not only with the military demands and political agendas but also with civilian norms and expectations.[143]

The Bundeswehr, as an institution, was designed not solely for the physical defense of the FRG from communism and the perceived Soviet threat but also as the defender and representor of democracy and morality within the FRG. *Innere Führung* cultivated the spirit of democracy within the Bundeswehr. Each soldier was responsible for defending and upholding the FRG's democratic principles while the state bore the responsibility of ensuring the protection of each soldier's rights as defined by the Basic Law. As a reflection of the state's core principles,

142. Storkmann, *Tabu und Toleranz*, 122-123.
143. Brühöfener, "Sex and the Soldier," 526.

soldiers and officers within the Bundeswehr became the embodiment of the FRG's social and moral reconstruction after the Second World War.

The Bundeswehr's ban on homosexuals, from its inception through 1968, was not based solely on specific targeting of men who engaged in same-sex sexual activity but was also a condition of the FRG's restoration of certain heteronormative sexual standards and gender roles prevailing in West Germany in the decades immediately following the Second World War. Paragraph 175 criminalized male homosexuality and could disqualify candidates for military service. While statistics are not complete based on the military records that remain from the time, between 1956 and 1965 the Bundeswehr initiated 36 disciplinary proceedings against officers for homosexuality. 182 disciplinary proceedings were initiated against non-commissioned officers between 1964 and 1965.[144] This figure does not take into account the many undocumented cases of individuals denied entry into military service as a result of their openness to homosexuality.

During the early years of the Bundeswehr,the CDU and federal government cultivated conservative social policies in the FRG. The *Innere Führung* handbook notes, "The mainstay of the Bundeswehr is the willingness of its soldiers: moral and intellectual willingness to take responsibility for the basic values that need to be realized and protected for [the FRG] people in the state."[145] At the core were democracy and morality which were rooted in *Westbindung* and Christianity. The exclusion of homosexuals from service within the Bundeswehr was a reflection of the FRG's overall position that male same-sex activity was a destructive force to the stability associated with post-1945 Germany.

144. Storkmann, *Tabu und Toleranz*, 174.
145. "*Handbuch Innere Führung*," 46.

Chapter 3

Liberalizing Towards Inclusion, 1968-2000

For the first two decades after the Second World War, the FRG's standing rapidly transformed within the international community. Immediately following the collapse of the Third Reich, Germany was the defeated enemy occupied by the Allies. However, the establishment of the FRG and GDR in 1949 saw divided Germany as the front of a wider international struggle for hegemonic dominance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Through Adenauer's policies as Chancellor and the CDU as the largest party in the federal government, the FRG increased its international stature through governance that asserted "Germany [belonged] to the West by tradition and by conviction."[146] The FRG's vision of Western alignment was understood as a movement towards democracy to recoup the stability lost after 1945. Socially, stability was sought through a series of conservative, social policies that focused on traditional gender roles as defined by the CDUs policies of *Kinder, Kirche, Küche*. The party viewed the family within the context of women concentrated primarily with the domestic sphere, men as stable providers for the family, and the youth "was to sustain and shape the new state and had to grow in such a way as would enable it to assume responsibility of public life."[147] By the mid-1960s, the FRG's conception of gender roles threatened and eventually destroyed the political dominance the CDU maintained for nearly two decades after the founding of the FRG.

Innere Führung started as a tool used to sell the idea that a German military after the Second World War was not only fundamental different than the Wehrmacht and previous German militaries but also committed to the values of the FRG, *Westbindung* and democracy.

146. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 419.
147. Adenauer, *Memoirs*, 168.

During the 1950s and 60s, the FRG strengthened its position on male homosexual criminalization in further alignment with other Western states and regularly viewed it as a destabilizing force within a democratic state. By the late 1960s, the stranglehold of Christian democracy on the FRG began to collapse and democracy increasingly became associated with policies that reflected the respect for the individual. This manifested itself through the Bundeswehr in how *Innere Führung* was understood by the soldiers discriminated against because of their sexuality as well as proponents of integration of the Bundeswehr.

CDU's Weakening Influence

During the 1957 federal election, the CDU/CSU alliance achieved for the first time in the young, federal government's history an absolute majority of the vote share and constituency seats and entered government without the need to enter a coalition government and electing Adenauer for his third of four terms as chancellor.[148] Four years later, signs of Adenauer and the CDU's loosening domination of the electorate emerged as they lost their absolute majority in the 1961 federal election and entered into a coalition government once again with the FDP, again with Adenauer elected as Chancellor.[149] While the FDP made up for their previous loss in the vote share, the SPD also did remarkably well under the leadership of Willy Brandt, the mayor of Berlin, as the party reversed much of its opposition to the Adenauer government, especially in terms of "foreign policy, including European integration and NATO," as well as the economic

148. James E. King, "The German Elections of 1957," *SAIS Review* 2, no. 2 (1958): 17.
149. Samuel H. Barnes, Frank Grace, James K. Pollock and Peter W. Sperlich, "The German Party System and the 1961 Federal Election," *The American Political Science Review* 56, No. 4 (1962): 900.

reforms made by the Adenauer government following the Second World War.[150] The 1961 federal election was a pivotal moment specifically for the SPD as its traditional oppositions against rearmament and Western cooperation subsided for closer realignment with that of the CDU/CSU.

The election of Adenauer to Chancellor in 1961 stood in stark contrast to his resignation from the position two years later in 1963. Granieri, in *The Ambivalent Alliance*, notes that the downfall of Adenauer resulted from his loss of authority on the FRG's position of western alignment. After the 1961 election, the FDP, as a coalition partner, advocated for new policies focused on East-West German reunification as well as a deeper emphasis on "Atlantic" cooperation.[151] Although the Adenauer government always advocated for *Westbindung*, deep division emerged between those who felt the future of the FRG laid with closer ties with France and other European states or, as the FDP believed, nestled within an Atlantic alliance dominated by American leadership. Adenauer took the previous position and remarked in 1962, "[the FRG] must first solidify the European economic and political community before [it] can even consider the question of Atlantic community."[152] While shrouded in political jargon, this sentence reflects the increasingly strong position of Adenauer who wanted a European over an Atlantic alignment. Adenauer's political opposition to the views of the FDP was a turning point in his leadership.

Socially, the CDU's control over the FRG since 1949 began to crack as disenfranchised protestors responded to the perceived authoritarianism of the federal government in 1962. After "Fallax 62", NATO's first war-gaming exercise that planned for a third World War started by a

150. Barnes, Grace, Pollock and Sperlich, "The German Party System and the 1961 Federal Election," 902.
151. Granieri, *The Ambivalent Alliance*, 152.
152. Granieri *The Ambivalent Alliance*, 153.

major attack in Europe, *Der Spiegel* reported that NATO High Command found the Bundeswehr, "Conditionally suitable for defense", the lowest level of readiness possible assigned.[153] The fallout from *Der Spiegle*'s article impacted both the publisher of the article and the federal government. In response to the publication of the article, the police arrested *Der Spiegel*'s publisher Rudolf Augstein, federal authorities occupied the publication's newsroom, searched its offices in Hamburg and Bonn, and the then-Defense Minister, Franz Josef Strauss, coordinated with Spanish authorities to arrest the author of the article who was on vacation in Spanish Andalusia.[154] The immediate political fallout from the affair forced Strauss to resign as Minister of Defense. The lasting impact of the affair in the FRG was the "[strengthening of] civil courage as well as grassroots democracy," as students, artists, and the entire media sector self-mobilized against the federal government and began a trend of questioning the actions of the federal government.[155]

The combination of division between those in government that advocated for closer European integration and those supporting a wider Atlantic collaboration in addition to the *Spiegel* Affair resulted in a loss of confidence in Adenauer's ability to lead the FRG. Within a year of the scandal, Adenauer resigned from the Chancellorship, and Ludwig Erhard, the lead engineer of the FRG's economic recovery after 1945, took up the mantle as Chancellor (**Figure 3.1**).[156] After another federal election in 1965, the CDU entered another coalition government with Erhard elected on Chancellor. However, the coalition disintegrated the following year after

153. "Bundeswehr: Bedingt abwehrbereit," *Der Spiegel*, October 09, 1962.
154. Thomas Birkner and Sebastian Mallek, "The Spiegel Affair, 1962: The incident that changed German journalism history and mediatized politics," in *Critical Incidents in Journalism : Pivotal Moments Reshaping Journalism around the World* ed. Edson Tandoc, Jr., Joy Jenkins, Ryan Thomas, Oscar Westlund (London: Routledge, 2020), 209.
155. Birkner and Mallek, "The Spiegel Affair, 1962," 212.
156. Granieri *The Ambivalent Alliance*, 196.

the FDP removed themselves from government due to their growing discontent with the CDU. Kurt Kiesinger replaced Erhard as Chancellor and entered into the FRG's first "Grand Coalition" government with the SPD.[157] The change in political structure from 1957 through 1966 was remarkable. The CDU went from an absolute majority in 1957 to a coalition with their greatest political opposition nine years later. The SPD's entrance into a governing coalition, first in 1966 then as leading party in 1969, marked the first time that the party was in the majority since the time of the Weimar Republic.



Figure 3.1. Konrad Adenauer leaving the chancellory for the last time after fourteen-years as Chancellor of the FRG, source German History in Documents and Images

Historically, the SPD typically sided with those interested in reforming the way Germany treated its male homosexual citizens. In 1898 Magnus Hirschfeld, the director of the newly

157. Ludger Helms, "The Grand Coalition: Precedents and Prospects," *German Politics & Society* 24, no. 1 (2006): 48-49.

formed Scientific-Humanitarian Committee in Berlin, circulated a petition to remove Paragraph 175 of which the SPD, under its leader August Bebel, willingly signed on.[158] Another vote came about in 1905 to remove Paragraph 175 from the Reich's criminal code, and the SPD was once again the sole party that spoke for and voted in favor of the repeal. However, the SPD's advocacy was also conditional based on politics. As the NSDAP gained political traction, the *Müncher Post*, a pro-SPD publication, referred to the Nazi Party as a "warm brotherhood," and asserted that "the homosexual line from Munich to Berlin got longer," as the party's numbers increased.[159] The warm brotherhood comment was a popular euphemism at the time used to describe the community of men who had sexual relations with other men. The SPD was not above using negative stereotypes against homosexuals if it meant a maintenance of their political power. It was decisive though in 1966 that the party with historical ties to homosexual liberation in Germany was now in political power with the social conservatives of the CDU.

FRG Gay Liberation: Not in a Vacuum and Responding to Nazism

While the 1960s marked a political reshuffling in the federal government, it also marked a growing shift in the perceptions of sexuality both within the FRG and internationally. Emily Hobson in *Lavender and Red: Liberation and Solidarity in the Gay and Lesbian Left* notes that homosexual liberation from the late 1960s through the 1980s was a "transnational phenomenon," that intersected issues of gender, race, class, and nation.[160] Hobson specifically discusses the connection between sexual liberation and sexual politics within the anti-war movements of the

158. Richard Plant, *The Pink Triangle: The Nazi War Against Homosexuals* (New York: Holt Paperbacks, 1986), 33.
159. Politik mit anderen Mitteln, 1994, Nr. 3, Nationalsozialismus, Schwules Museum, Berlin.
160. Emily K. Hobson, *Lavender and Red: Liberation and Solidarity in the Gay and Lesbian Left* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2016), 3-5.

late Cold War period. Eric Cervini, for his part, showcases what might be considered the gay and lesbian 'right'. Cervini examines the story of astronomer Frank Krammey within the context of gay and lesbian American citizens who fought for the right to work for the federal government despite the anti-homosexual ban in *The Deviant's War: The Homosexual vs. The United States of America*. W. Jake Newsome in *Pink Triangle Legacies: Coming Out in the Shadow of the Holocaust* traces the historical trajectory of the pink triangle first as a symbol of homosexual Nazi persecution and then as a symbol for gay activism in the United States and then the FRG. Globally there was a noticeable shift in social perceptions of homosexuality in the 1960s that only intensified during the following decades. In the case of the FRG's ultimate integration of homosexuals into the Bundeswehr, it resulted due to legal cases and foreign militaries' policy changes throughout Europe. The story of homosexual integration of the Bundeswehr is itself a transnational history.

In addition to gay activism, the relationship between the FRG and its Nazi past began to change. Immediately after the war, politicians such as Adenauer positioned the CDU's conception of Christian democracy as a rebuke to the moral decay of the Third Reich. In the immediate post-war era, conservatives and religious figures connected Nazism to sexual promiscuity. In the perspective of one Catholic physician in 1951, and many like him, "NS-schools and the like," pressured "premature sexual contact" on young people under the false pretense of "natural-free experiencing of the erotic event," and linked non-marital sexual contact to the criminality of the Nazi regime.[161] During the 1960s, Germans started to connect the sexual repression of the FRG to the Nazi past. Hans Joachim Schoeps, a Jewish reémigré and historian

161. Dagmar Herzog, "Sexuality, Memory, Morality," *History and Memory* 17, no. 1–2 (2005): 243.

of religion at the University of Erlangen called for the repeal of Paragraph 175 in December 1962 based on the history of Nazism enshrined in it. He noted:

> Since the persecution of the Jews during the Third Reich, in the eyes of the world the German people stands under the suspicion that it has a tendency to torment, persecute, and terrorize its minorities. Of course homosexuals are not an ethnic-religious minority, but certainly they are a biological-anthropological minority with the *Volk* as a whole. Since the gas ovens of Auschwitz and Maidanek burned . . . one should think twice, or three times, whether one also in the new criminal code wants to continue to treat the minority of homosexuals as people from whom there must be separate laws.[162]

He also added that "for homosexuals . . . the Third Reich has not yet passed."[163] Where the 1950s was a time in FRG history when political leaders attempted to distance the country from the Nazi past, the 1960s began to converse with the continued legacy of the Third Reich in the new state.

The entrance of the SPD into a coalition with the CDU in 1966 did not initially propel gay liberation in the FRG but did stop the strengthening of anti-homosexual legislation. As a coalition partner, the SPD held cabinet positions for the first time in the FRG including the Minister of Justice post. Gustav Heinemann as the newly appointed SPD Minister of Justice quickly abandoned the E-1962 document created by the ministry under previous CDU/CSU and FDP ministers. The year after taking on the position Heinemann vowed to decriminalize "homosexuality among adult men," due to the law's noticeable distinction between men and women.[164] While this was no gleaming endorsement of homosexuality, it was a significant shift in tone on the topic of Paragraph 175 and changing conceptions of democracy in the FRG. Democracy was previously rooted in the CDU's understanding of Christian morality as a

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162. Herzog, *Sex After Fascism*, 134.
163. Huneke, *States of Liberation*, 97.
164. Friederike Brühöfener, "Contested Masculinities: Debates about Homosexuality in the West German Bundeswehr in the 1960s and 1970s, in *Gendering Post-1945 German History Entanglements*, eds. Karen Hagemann, Donna Harsch, and Friederike Brühöfener (New York: Berghahn Books, 2019), 302.

stabilizing force. After 1967, politicians began envisioning a democracy rooted in equality under the law. At a national meeting of German jurists in Nuremberg in September 1968, the repeal of Paragraph 175 was heavily discussed. These jurists described the continued enforcement of Paragraph 175 as an extension of the Nazi value system and noted the FRG had come to a point where it might "embrace a truly pluralistic democracy in which individual citizens, not the state, made moral judgments," and rejected the regulation of morality under the concept of the "Christian West."[165]

Following the shift in perception, the FRG embarked on two reforms of Paragraph 175, the first in coalition with the CDU and then within their governing coalition. The reformed version of Paragraph 175 passed by the FRG in 1969 read:

> (1) A term of imprisonment of up to five years shall be imposed on:
>
> 1. A male over eighteen years of age who commits lewd and lascivious acts with another male over twenty-one years of age, or permits himself to be so abused for lewd and lascivious acts,
> 2. A male who, by abuse of a relationship of dependence upon him, in consequence of service, employment, or subordination, induces another male to commit lewd and lascivious acts with him or to submit to being abused for such acts,
> 3. A male who professionally engages in lewd and lascivious acts with other men, or submits to such abuse by other men, or offers himself for lewd and lascivious acts with other men.
>
> (2) In the cases of Paragraph 1 No 2. the attempt is punishable.
> (3) For an involved party who at the time of the act had not yet reached the age of twenty-one years, the Court can refrain from punishment.[166]

The major reform made in 1969 was that consensual sex between males over the age of twenty-one was no longer criminalized. However, if a man was over eighteen and had sexual relations

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165. Robert Moeller, "Private Acts, Public Anxieties: The Fight to Decriminalize Male Homosexuality in Postwar West Germany," in *Gender and the Long Postwar: The United States and the Two Germanys, 1949-1989,* ed. Karen Hagemann and Sonya Michel, 329.
166. Burgi and Wolff, *Rehabilitierung der nach § 175 StGB verurteilten homosexuellen Männer,* 25.

with another male under twenty-one, even if consensual, they could still be charged under Paragraph 175. This last part was specifically added after consideration of the Bundeswehr belief that male sexual activity within the military could impair military order and "thereby compromise the army's effectiveness."[167] Chief proponent for the age of consent remaining over the age of twenty-one was then General Inspector of the Bundeswehr, General Ulrich de Mazière, considered one of the founders of Innere Führung alongside Count Baudissin, who believed the proliferation of homosexuality in the Bundeswehr would result in a negative image of the service and poor order and discipline.[168] Four years later, after the SPD entered the government as the leading party, an additional reform of Paragraph 175 in 1973. The major change was in Section 1 art. 1 which lowered the age of consent to eighteen.[169]

Loosening Policies Against Homosexuality in the Bundeswehr

The first change in Bundeswehr policy against homosexuals occurred after the initial reform of Paragraph 175. As Friederike Brühöfener describes, the situation for homosexual men after the reform of Paragraph 175 until the end of the twentieth century can be described as "Fit to Serve, but Not fit to Command."[170] While their sexuality was no longer an immediate disqualifying characteristic, homosexual men could join the Bundeswehr under conscription but not hold positions of authority or leadership. In other words, homosexual men could serve under

167. Burgi and Wolff, *Rehabilitierung der nach § 175 StGB verurteilten homosexuellen Männer,* 25.
168. Storkmann, *Tabu und Toleranz*, 137.
169. Burgi and Wolff, *Rehabilitierung der nach § 175 StGB verurteilten homosexuellen Männer,* 27.
170. Brühöfener, "Contested Masculinities," 305.

universal, temporary male military service but not as officers or NCOs, nor could they make the Bundeswehr a career.

Initially, the Bundeswehr exclusionary ban from military service did not change as a result of the reforms made to Paragraph 175. Although male same-sex sexual activity among those over eighteen was decriminalized, Bundeswehr leadership asserted that male same-sex sexual activity could still be an official offense even if it was not criminal. However, in the late 1970s, the demand for conscript soldiers increased and the Bundeswehr altered course and began to allow men who admitted to same-sex activity to join the service but not as leaders and supervisors nor could they expect to make the military a career. This shift in policy was not due to liberalizing efforts nor advocacy but rather due to necessary action needed to curtail falling troop numbers in the Bundeswehr. Low birthrates among entering year groups into the military created pressure to accept a wider swath of applicants. Only if they were medically unsuitable for service could homosexual men be denied entrance into the Bundeswehr.[171] This policy would be reversed during the early 1990s as the demand for conscripts decreased as a result of a military drawdown. Near the end of the twentieth century, "almost all homosexual conscripts [were] eliminated," from entrance into the Bundeswehr due to the "agreed cut in manpower strength from almost half a million to a maximum of 370,000 soldiers by the end of 1994."[172] However, until the drawdown occurred in the 1990s, the homosexuality of conscripts was not an immediate disqualifying factor for service in the Bundeswehr.

171. Klaus Storkmann, "The most Liberal in NATO? How the (West) German Ministry of Defense Looked to Other Armed Forces' Regulations Concerning Homosexuality (1966 to 1999)," *International Journal of Military History and Historiography* 42, no. 1 (2022): 74.
172. Bernhard Fleckenstein, "Homosexuality and Military Service in Germany," *Sozialwissenschaftliche Institut der Bundeswehr (SOWI) Arbeit Paper* Nr. 84, (Munich, 1993), 8.

The Bundeswehr's policy against homosexual leaders and professional soldiers in the late 1970s through 1990s was not initially a result of official decrees but rather a result of legal decisions against homosexual soldiers. A Bundeswehr reserve lieutenant received a letter in June 1972 from his military leadership that said to report to them in the following days to accept his letter of promotion.[173] He responded to his leadership that he could not accept the promotion until the military clarified its position on homosexuals serving in the Bundeswehr. The request was submitted to the Bundeswehr's central personnel office which responded that the officers, upon admission of homosexuality, would no longer engage in further exercises and therefore his promotion was no longer recommended. After the lieutenant sued the Bundeswehr, the lawyers for the military argued, "According to all experience homosexual men in the military sector endanger the discipline and combat effectiveness of troops. There would be serious concerns if homosexuals in the force have to perform functions as officers and at the same time set an example for their subordinates."[174] The lieutenant lost his case and was administratively removed from the Bundeswehr.

After several additional cases of officers and NCOs coming out as homosexual emerged through the 1970s and early 80s, the Bundeswehr did officially issue guidelines regarding homosexual superiors. First in 1982 and then in 1984, the Bundeswehr's policy read, "an officer or NCO who states that he has homosexual tendencies must expect to no longer be promoted or entrusted with higher level tasks. Furthermore, he can no longer remain in a position as a direct superior in the force . . . He must be given a position in which he is no longer the immediate superior of predominately younger soldiers."[175] This 1984 position was upheld throughout the

173. Storkmann, *Tabu und Toleranz*, 191-195.
174. Storkmann, *Tabu und Toleranz*, 192.
175. Storkmann, *Tabu und Toleranz*, 203.

1990s. According to the Bundeswehr's *Legal Status of Military Personnel*, "Homosexual orientation . . . does affect the assessment of a soldier's aptitude for service because it restricts the assignments on which he can be employed in the force. Homosexual regular servicemen and temporary-career soldiers are not considered suitable as superiors."[176] While this may sound as if the Bundeswehr allowed homosexual soldiers to remain in service as long as they were not superiors, this was not the case as all leadership positions maintained supervisory roles. Additionally, the argument about leading younger soldiers was in direct correspondence to the image of the Bundeswehr imagined during the rearmament process. Society viewed the Bundeswehr as a place for families to send their sons and the Bundeswehr believed that families would not wish to have their sons go to a place riddled with immorality as they perceived homosexuality to be.

The Kießling Affair

Since 1955, Bundeswehr policies concerning homosexual service altered with minimal results. For the first fifteen years, the Bundeswehr supported personnel policies that matched the FRG's stance regarding homosexuals. The explicit criminalization of male homosexuality under Paragraph 175 manifested itself in the Bundeswehr as a complete ban of homosexuals from the Bundeswehr. As the FRG reformed Paragraph 175 to decriminalize same-sex activity for those over eighteen, as a result of shifting social policies in the FRG, the Bundeswehr also modified its policies to allow homosexuals to join the service as conscripts. However, a career in the military and holding positions of authority within the Bundeswehr were still not options for homosexual

176. Bernhard Fleckenstein, "Homosexuality and Military Service in Germany," 7.

troops. A wider public criticism of the Bundeswehr's policy did not emerge until the Ministry of Defense was caught in another scandal, the Kießling Affair.

Born in 1925, Günter Kießling entered the Wehrmacht's NCO training at fourteen and by 1945 had achieved the rank of lieutenant.[177] Following the war, he finished his high school education and earned a doctorate in economics. Kießling reentered the German defense sector, first as a member of the Federal Border Guards and then as an officer in the Bundeswehr in 1956, following the rearmament of the FRG. He rose quickly through the ranks to become one of the youngest generals ever in the Bundeswehr. By 1983, Kießling was one of the top three generals in the Bundeswehr and served as the Deputy to the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in Europe. However, Kießling's rapid career advancement came to a screeching halt in December 1983 when Minister of Defense Manfred Wörner relieved him of his position due to allegations of homosexuality.

Following his forced removal, the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* reported on 5 January 1984 that General Kießling was unceremoniously removed from his position at NATO and retired from the Bundeswehr due to a combination of poor health and increased tension between himself and both Defense Minister Wörner and the NATO Supreme Allied Commander, U.S. Army General Bernard Rogers.[178] The tabloid newspaper *Bild-Zeitung* followed the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*'s with its own reporting that the true reason for Kießling's retirement was an allegation that he frequently visited two prominent gay clubs in Cologne a decade earlier. The reporting added that fellow officers caught Kießling holding hands with a male colonel at NATO headquarters in Mons, Belgium. The *Bild* article reported that Kießling's position became untenable as General

177. Horst Bacia, "Günter Kießling Gestorben," *Frankfurter Allgemeine* (Frankfurt am Main), Aug. 28, 2009.
178. Möllers, *Die Affäre Kießling*, 116.

Rogers refused to work with him due to the allegations of homosexuality.[179] Following the story break, Kießling immediately denied he was homosexual and that the allegations were fabricated. In the following weeks, Kießling pursued a high-profile media campaign and legal dispute against the Ministry of Defense and Wörner.[180]

During Kießling's media campaign, notable newspapers sided with the former general against the defense ministry. Several media organizations asserted the Ministry of Defense and the Bundeswehr held hypocritical attitudes in their treatment of homosexuals in the Bundeswehr. A week and a half after the scandal emerged in the media, an article in *Der Spiegel* noted:

> Homosexuality is not a criminal offence, and does not even justify conscientious objection. Homosexuality is not dishonorable. If General Kießling had homosexual relations, contrary to his assurances, his superiors did not notice for almost 30 years. Or if they did notice, it would not have prevented them from sending him to NATO headquarters in Brussels as one of the three highest-ranking [West] German officers.[181]

Der Spiegel's further argued that if homosexuality was not consistent with Bundeswehr regulations, how could Kießling have risen so high within the military? The article also argued that even if Kießling did have same-sex sexual relations, which he denied, his actions were not illegal under Paragraph 175 and therefore should not impact his military career. The media coverage against the military started a wider conversation that any ban against homosexuals in the military was an issue of credibility for the service itself instead of an ability to serve by homosexual soldiers. After the *Bundestag* conducted a parliamentary investigation into the Kießling Affair, the final report noted that the Military Counterintelligence Service (MAD) conducted a "sloppy investigation," and never proved the allegations against Kießling.[182]

179. Möllers, *Die Affäre Kießling*, 121-126.
180. Möllers, *Die Affäre Kießling*, 127.
181. Rudolf Augstein, "Die Vorhinrichtung," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Jan. 15, 1984.
182. "Die schwere Vergangenheit des 'Herrn K.'," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Mar. 17, 1985.

General Kießling's professional career was shortly thereafter "rehabilitated," in the sense that he was allowed to return to active service in order to receive an appropriate retirement. However, as *Der Spiegel* reported, fellow officers and defense officials within the Bundeswehr continued to shun Kießling solely because of the accusations well after they were proven unfounded.[183]

The Kießling Affair was a unique moment in the history of homosexuals in the Bundeswehr. For starters, it created a sense of public awareness on the Bundeswehr's official policy against homosexuals which in turn resulted in policy debates within the federal government. Until his death in 2009, General Kießling denied all allegations of homosexuality lodged against him but was forced into retirement, as Michael Schwartz argues, due to a "transnational stereotype," that homosexuals posed a security risk and could not, therefore, be allowed to lead troops.[184] During a parliamentary debate about the scandal, the Green Party asserted that homosexuality should not be the sole reason for the Bundeswehr to dismiss personnel from military service. In response, the Defense Ministry clarified its position that homosexuals were only discharged if they failed "to integrate," but also noted that homosexuality "diminishes [a leader's] official authority, and sometimes gravely endangers military discipline and can hurt the [Bundeswehr's] reputation."[185] After the three major parties, the CDU, SPD, and FDP, argued only that military counterintelligence needed oversight in the future and not against the Bundeswehr's policy against homosexuals, the Green Party created a minority report that lambasted the connection between consenting male homosexuality and security risks.[186] Although the Kießling Affair did not result in a policy change, it did create

183. "Die schwere Vergangenheit des 'Herrn K.'," *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Mar. 17, 1985.
184. Storkmann, "The most Liberal in NATO?," 78-79.
185. Huneke, *States of Liberations*, 175.
186. Huneke, *States of Liberations*, 175-176.

public conversation from a growing minority of voices which advocated for policies that reflected the growing social changes in the FRG.

In terms of the military, the Kießling Affair highlighted a failure within the FRG's military and defense leadership. Heiner Moellers, Head of the Projektbereichs *Militärgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland* im Forschungsbereich *Militärgeschichte nach 1945* at the *Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr in Potsdam (ZMSBw)*, wrote that the Kießling affair identified a critical failure of *Staatsbürger in Uniform*, the central tenet of *Innere Führung*, within the upper echelons of Bundeswehr leadership.[187] His argument stems from the idea that soldiers in the Bundeswehr, especially leaders, are charged under *Innere Führung* to protect and standby their fellow servicemen, especially in times of difficulty. However, many of the FRG's top military leaders abandoned Kießling during the affair and remained distant from him after the allegations went unfounded. While the 1957 *Innere Führung* handbook asserts that the soldier is a fixed, emblematic representation of the FRG's social values, the Kießling Affair highlighted that these perceived stable values come in direct contrast to the social realities of military and daily life.

An Undemocratic Ban?

In 1993, a court ruled in a case concerning a doctor in the Bundeswehr that the military's ban against homosexuals in the military was constitutional and aligned with the values enshrined in the Basic Law. After a doctor applied to swap tracks from a temporary soldier to a career

187. Heiner Möllers, *Die Affäre Kießling: Der größte Skandel der Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Christoph Links, 2019), 15. Heiner Moellers's position translates to head of the Military History of the Federal Republic of Germany at the Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr.

soldier, the Bundeswehr denied his request due to his homosexuality but allowed him to remain as a temporary soldier due to a shortage of medical professionals in the Bundeswehr. The Bundeswehr argued that it was the responsibility of the service to remove homosexual doctors because troops could refuse to be treated by them, thus hurting military effectiveness.[188] After the doctor appealed the decision, the Ministry of Defense argued that the military's policy against homosexuals in the military was in accordance with the Basic Law. The Ministry of Defense remarked in their rebuttal, that although "homosexuality is per se not an exclusion criterion," for military service, the doctor's open acknowledgment of homosexuality represented an inability "to control his sexual preferences and inclinations to the extent necessary for permanent employment," in the Bundeswehr.[189] The use of the Basic Law argument from the military codifies that through the 1990s they considered the ban against homosexual military service as constitutional and in line with the democratic values of the FRG. Upon appeal of the case, a judge in Hamburg did find the Bundeswehr's decision against the doctor to be unlawful and a violation of his rights as enshrined by the Basic Law.[190] Whereas previous court cases nearly always ruled in favor of the military, just as in the Kießling Affair, opposition began to emerge against the Bundeswehr's homosexual ban. In the case of the doctor, a high appeals court ruled in favor of the Ministry of Defense and the original decision against the doctor stood.

During the early 1990s, more voices emerged which amplified the idea that Bundeswehr's ban against homosexuals was unconstitutional. The spokesman for the Gay Association in Germany (SVD), Volker Beck, wrote to the Minister of Defense Volker Rühe about the intolerance facing homosexuals in the military. He said, "The claim of the soldier as a

188. Storkmann, *Tabu und Toleranz*, 226.
189. Storkmann, *Tabu und Toleranz*, 228.
190. Storkmann, *Tabu und Toleranz*, 229.

citizen in uniform, [and] the model of an army in a democratic state, is not fulfilled as long as the gay citizen in the Bundeswehr is treated differently because of his sexual identity . . . [the SVD] considers soldiers and conscripts capable of learning and democracy to expect them to have gay trainers and superior.[191] Whereas *Innere Führung* was used historically as an argument to justify the Bundeswehr's stance of a military that reflected the moral and social values of the FRG, opponents of the ban used the idea of *Innere Führung* to highlight a need to reform the Bundeswehr to reflect the shift in society and criticize the policy against homosexual soldiers. policies and advocate for the integration of homosexual soldiers into the Bundeswehr.

The SVD's argument that Bundeswehr policy violated the democratic norms of the FRG was pushed further in 1999 when an appeals court argued in favor of a senior sergeant who was removed from command after MAD discovered his sexuality during a routine security check. The appeals court noted, "The justification for the judgment branded the [Bundeswehr's] position as a violation," of the legal protection offered to all citizens under the Basic Law.[192] In particular, the appeals court judge noted that sexuality was a part of the private sphere and policies against a soldier's sexuality were a clear infringement of human dignity guaranteed by the first three articles of the Basic Law. Ultimately the sergeant was removed from the service because his contract as a temporary soldier ended, but the Bundeswehr and Ministry of Defense were placed on notice that military policy was falling out of line with the legal system's interpretation of democracy within Germany.

191. Storkmann, *Tabu und Toleranz*, 233.
192. Storkmann, *Tabu und Toleranz*, 242-244.

Western Values?

Although the FRG vacillated between a policy of Europeanism and Atlanticism, *Westbindung* still placed the state within the confines of a Western alliance through the 1990s. However, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union forced the FRG to deal with the societal differences between the two Germanys after reunification. After the Second World War, the GDR, unlike the FRG, discontinued the use of the Nazi version of Paragraph 175 and reverted to the original 1871 version.[193] In 1968, the GDR reformed the law as Paragraph 151, which targeted men of legal age who had same-sex sexual relations with minors. In 1988, the GDR annulled Paragraph 151 entirely, removing all references to homosexuality, whether concerning men or women [?]from the GDR criminal code. Although the GDR did initially have policies excluding homosexuals from military service, the Defense Ministry asserted in 1988 that "from the political-moral standpoint every citizen has the right to live according to his sexual orientation," and that service members could remain in the military, irrespective of their sexuality.[194] On January 13, 1994, following reunification, the FRG finally removed Paragraph 175 from its legal code. The Bundeswehr, however, continued to maintain its exclusionary policy.[195]

In 1997, the FRG inquired among its defense attachés in several NATO and former Eastern bloc states to determine how the Bundeswehr's policy concerning homosexuals in the ranks compared to those countries. The Dutch military was of particular interest to the German Ministry of Defense as they often engaged in military cooperation with the Bundeswehr but

193. *Rehabilitierung der nach § 175 StGB verurteilten homosexuellen Männer*,19-20.
194. Huneke, *States of Liberations*, 214.
195. Bundesgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 1994, Teil I, "Neunundzwanzigstes Strafrechtsänderungsgesetz - §§ 175, 182 StGB (29. StrÄndG)," (Bonn: Die Bundesministerin der Justiz, 1994), 1168.

dramatically differed in its regulation of homosexuals in military service. The Dutch Ministry of Defense has allowed homosexual men and lesbians to serve in the military since 1974. In 1986, the ministry announced that sexual orientation could not be grounds for exclusion or dismissal from the service and the following year provided financial support for the Foundation for Homosexuals in the [Dutch] armed forces.[196] The Dutch military and the Bundeswehr collaborated often in exercises and shared a joint headquarters. Due to the Netherlands's liberal policies towards homosexuals in the military, the FRG determined "that homosexually inclined Dutch soldiers should not become the superiors of German soldiers."[197]

At the same time, the Bundeswehr's ban appeared slightly more liberal compared to the major military powers within NATO such as the UK and United States. The case of homosexuality within the American military proved a delicate balance for the Bundeswehr. Due to federalism in the United States, homosexuality was neither completely decriminalized nor criminalized. Determinations were state-by-state until 2003, when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in Lawrence v. Texas, that a Texas law criminalizing sodomy was unconstitutional.[198] The U.S. military's policy concerning gay and lesbians in the military was changed from a complete ban into "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in 1993.[199] This policy allowed gay and lesbians to join the military as long as they did not disclose their sexual orientation and prohibited military members from asking and questioning others about their sexuality. However, what emerged was a policy where

196. National Defense Research Institute, *Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy*, 299.
197. Storkmann, "The 'Most Liberal in NATO?'," 91-92.
198. Sara Rosenbaum and Taylor Burke, "Lawrence v Texas: Implications for Public Health Policy and Practice," *Public Health Reports* 118, no. 6 (2003): 559
199. Francine D'Amico, "Race-ing and Gendering the Military Closet," in *Gay Rights, Military Wrongs: Political Perspectives on Lesbians and Gays in the Military*, ed. Craig A. Rimmerman (New York: Garland Publishing, 1996), 5.

service members operated in a sense of fear that the military would find out about their sexuality and discharge them without much notice.

In the UK, consensual same-sex sexual activity was legalized similarly as the 1969 reformed version of Paragraph 175. Under the Sexual Offenses Act of 1967, consensual same-sex sexual activity amongst those twenty-one and older was legal.[200] Although the military decriminalized homosexuality within the service in 1994, they still maintained that "homosexuality is still deemed to be incompatible with military service and, once discovered, homosexuals are discharged by administrative action."[201] The Royal Air Force specifically argued in 1995 that the military's position against homosexual service members was justified because:

> We consider that homosexuals and homosexual activity should be excluded from the armed forces in that way because of the different, and unique, nature of service life. No parallel exists in civilian life. Service personnel are often required to live and work together in very close proximity to one another. They have little choice about living in communal single-sex accommodation, with the resultant lack of privacy. . . . Moreover, some 35 percent of new recruits to the armed services as a whole are aged under 18. The services have a responsibility for the welfare and morale of their young recruits, and in that sense, act in loco parentis. Parents, as well as the young people themselves, trust the services to look after and safeguard them properly. We should be failing in our duty if we did not do so.[202]

The arguments of the UK's military reflected the same conversations had within the FRG and Bundeswehr. Although both countries legalized consensual same-sex sexual activity amongst adults, the militaries could restrict homosexuals from military service. The main arguments in both countries were the protection of younger soldiers as well as the idea of homosexuality as a destabilizing force within the service.

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200. "Sexual Offences Act 1967," *Her Majesty Stationary Office*, 21.
201. Tom Dodd, "The Armed Forces Bill [Bill 5 of 1995-96] Research Paper 95/125," *House of Commons Library: International Affairs and Defence Section* (1995), 37.
202. Dodd, "The Armed Forces Bill [Bill 5 of 1995-96] Research Paper 95/125," 38.

In this international context, the Bundeswehr was not a forerunner of inclusion for homosexuals in the military. But nor were they as restrictive as the militaries of the U.S. and U.K. In contrast to those states, the Bundeswehr had allowed homosexuals to serve as conscripts since the 1970s. If a soldier's sexuality becomes known, whether in a professional or leadership position, that soldier is removed from service. As Storkmann notes, the introduction of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" in the U.S., was "a regulation of the kind the Bundeswehr had been practicing since the 1970s."[203] In this respect, the Bundeswehr was truly aligned with the ideological center among Western militaries. Additionally, the fact that the FRG attempted to view its policy in connection with its international partners showcased the importance of *Westbindung* in the context of homosexuality and military service.

Overnight Reversal

In what seemed like an overnight change in policy, the Bundeswehr's ban against homosexuals was rescinded by a verdict involving the U.K. As noted, the U.K.'s Ministry of Defense took an active role in excluding and removing homosexuals from its military. While this was a long-standing policy of the government, it did not stop some soldiers from attempting to enter or fighting to stay in. In two separate cases, the fate of homosexuals and lesbians in the U.K.'s military collided with the government's ban before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Situated in Strasbourg, France, and founded in 1959, the ECtHR is a European tribunal that allows individuals and civil society actors to raise claims against signatory states once all domestic options have been exhausted.[204] The ECtHR maintained jurisdiction over cases

203. Storkmann, "The 'Most Liberal in NATO?'," 94.
204. Dia Anagnostou, "Introduction: Untangaling the Domestic implementation of the European Court of Human Rights' Judgements," in *The European Court of Human Rights : Implementing*

involving the U.K. and FRG since both states were signatories to the convention. While once viewed as an institution committed to textualism, the ECtHR, since the 1970s, began interpreting the articles of the convention as a "living instrument," capable of changing along with shifts in social values.[205]

Although the ECtHR took on cases of sexuality as early as 1955, two cases in 1999 concerning homosexual and lesbian service members of the U.K. would be the first, and ultimately most consequential, decision made by the court. In the case of Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. The United Kingdom, both men served in the Royal Navy and were dismissed from the service after third parties brought their sexuality to the attention of their commands.[206] Mr. Lustig-Prean was an officer in the Royal Navy and had served since 1982. After twelve years of service, the military was provided an anonymous tip that Lustig-Prean was homosexual. Mr. Beckett enlisted in the Royal Navy in 1989. In 1993, he spoke to a chaplain about his homosexuality.The Chaplain informed Beckett's commander. The two men were administratively discharged from military service in 1995 and 1993, respectively, due to their sexuality.

In the case of Smith and Grady v. The United Kingdom, Ms. Smith and Mr. Grady were both members of the Royal Air Force until the military conducted investigations about their sexuality after civilians disclosed their sexuality to the service.[207] Ms. Smith joined the Royal Air Force in 1989 as a nurse, and after a female caller left her a voicemail saying she informed the

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Strasbourg's Judgments on Domestic Policy, ed. Dia Anagnostou (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 1.
205. Dia Anagnostou, "Introduction," 4.
206. Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. The United Kingdom, Applications nos. 31417/96 and 32377/96 (European Court of Human Rights, 1999).
207. Smith and Grady v. The United Kingdom, Applications nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96 (European Court of Human Rights, 1999).

military of her sexuality, Smith was investigated for lesbianism in 1994. Mr. Grady joined the Royal Air Force in 1980 and disclosed to his then-wife, with whom he had two children, that he was homosexual. His wife told their nanny, who in turn told another client who happened to be married to the head of British Defence Intelligence Liaison Service (North America). The military discharged both Smith and Grady in 1994 due to their sexualities. After courts within the U.K. denied the discharged service members an appeal to the decision of the military, all four individuals successfully appealed for the ECtHR to take on their cases. Both cases alleged that the U.K.'s complete ban on homosexuals from military service violated their human rights as outlined by the 1953 European Convention of Human Rights.

After a trial, the ECtHR found that the U.K.'s military had indeed violated the soldiers' human rights. In the Lustig-Prean and Beckett v. The United Kingdom case, the court found that the plaintiffs' Article 8 rights were violated. Article 8 states:

> 1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
>
> 2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.[208]

In addition to Article 8, the ECtHR decided that the U.K. violated Smith and Grady's Article 13 rights as well. Article 13 read, "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official

208. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, *entered into force* Sept. 3, 1953, *as amended by* Protocols Nos 3, 5, 8, and 11 *which entered into force* on 21 September 1970, 20 December 1971, 1 January 1990, and 1 November 1998 *respectively*.

capacity."[209] The two judgments sent shockwaves not only in the U.K. but also throughout every European country, whose states were signatories to the Convention of European Rights, that held some form of discrimination within their militaries.

The rapid change in policy within the U.K. was no more evident than in a parliamentary debate two months after the ECtHR's decision in November 1999. After being pressed on the Ministry of Defense's policy, the Minister of Defense for the U.K.. Geoffrey Hoon stated, "My predecessor made it clear on 27 September [the ECtHR's decision date] this year that we accepted the decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the case brought by homosexual former members of the armed forces."[210] For a country like the U.K. which maintained, what some might label, homophobic policies within the military, there was a rapid reversal in the situation. On January 12, 2000, Defense Minister Hoon issued a statement before parliament which noted:

> As all personal behaviour will be regulated by the code of conduct with the object of maintaining the operational effectiveness of the three services, there is no longer a reason to deny homosexuals the opportunity of a career in the armed forces. Accordingly, we have decided that it is right that the existing ban should be lifted. As no primary or secondary legislation is required, with effect from today, homosexuality will no longer be a bar to service in Britain's armed forces.[211]

Within four months, the military of the U.K. underwent a rapid transformation from a complete ban on homosexuals, to acceptance of the ECtHR's decision, and finally to a policy that allowed

209. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
210. UK Parliamentary Debate, "Armed Forces (Homosexuals)," Volume 337: Debated on Monday 8 November 1999, https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1999-11-08/debates/301b8246-ddaa-44ee-80a9-a1479482121e/ArmedForces(Homosexuals).
211. UK Parliamentary Debate, "Armed Forces(ECHR)," Volume 342: Debated on Wednesday 12 January 2000, https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/2000-01-12/debates/319899c0-e81e-4040-9c3a-d67060f47894/ArmedForces(Echr).

for the open service of homosexual service members. The same process that led the Royal Military to reverse policy also transformed the Bundeswehr.

As a signatory member of the European Convention of Human Rights, the rulings applied equally to the U.K. and FRG. The Bundeswehr followed a similar path as the Royal Military in that the policy surrounding homosexuals in the military changed not through official decrees but rather statements. Under pressure from their lawsuit by a former Bundeswehr officer discharged due to his sexuality in conjunction with the decision by the ECtHR, FRG Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping declared on July 3, 2000, "Homosexuality is no reason for restrictions with regard to employment or status and therefore does not constitute a suitability criterion that requires separate examination."[212] Therefore, the rapid reversal of policy was not due to a changing perception of homosexuality but rather a changing Europe and a shifting conception of democracy.

The clear shift in the Bundeswehr and FRG Ministry of Defense's conception is seen in a leadership aid produced on 20 December 2000 entitled "*Umgang mit Sexualität*." The document opens up with:

> 1. As part of a person's private life, the intimate and sexual area is produced under constitutional law under Article 2 Paragraph 1 in conjunction with Article 1 Paragraph 1 of the Basic Law. Every Person is also expressly protected under Article 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
>
> 2. Art. 3 Para. 1 [of the Basic Law] protects against the unequal treatment because of sexual orientation. Through Article 14 [of the European Convention on Human Rights], the prohibition of discrimination is anchored in European law and is binding law for the Federal Republic of Germany.[213]

212. Klaus Storkmann, "Tabu und Toleranz-Zusammenfassung," *Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr*, 10.
213. "Umgang mit Sexualität," Bundesministerium der Verteidigung and Generalinspekteur der Bundeswehr, FÜS I4 - Az 35-04-09, Berlin, 2000.

The language the Ministry of Defense and Bundeswehr used in the document highlighted the rapid shift in democracy within the FRG. Before the 2000 decision, the Basic Law was used by the Bundeswehr to demand the exclusion of homosexuals from the service. The Ministry of Defense argued on numerous occasions that homosexuality either violated the principles enshrined with the constitution or that the constitution did not apply to homosexuals in the Bundeswehr. As of 2000, the opposite was now true and sexuality was protected. Additionally, the connection of the FRG to the idea of the West, and more specifically Europe, is enshrined within the debate of homosexuals in the Bundeswehr as the leaders of the service asserted that the laws that regulate Europe also ring true within the FRG.

Conclusion

In 2023, the Bundeswehr released the first update of the *Innere Führung* handbook since the original 1957 version was published. In the forward for the document, the service acknowledges that the military and society occupies a different reality than the mid-1950s. The new handbook reads, "The first manual on *Innere Führung* appeared in 1957. Over 65 years later, language and society have changed . . . *Innere Führung* as a dynamic concept prepares us all for the diverse challenges of the present and future with a confessional testimony to our past."[214] The handbook no longer places the Bundeswehr against the backdrop of the Cold War nor does it make references to the July 20th conspirators which was heavily prevalent in the original document. However, the new handbook offers an outlook that the Bundeswehr is a reflection of the moral values of the state, such as equality, inclusion, and diversity, which was seldom referenced, if at all, in the 1957 version. However, both versions of the handbook note the Bundeswehr as a institution engrained within the democratic fabric of Germany. This spirit in the document is remarkably consistent with the 1957 version.

The origins of the Bundeswehr cannot be understood without serious consideration of occupied Germany's post-war realities. While there was cooperation among the occupying powers early in the postwar era, Germany "fast [became] a battleground," in the emerging Cold War.[215] While ideological and political discontent heavily influenced the growing divide between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies, protection of the soldier's individuality in Europe from the major international actors skewed the direction of history towards the Cold War. Of the nearly $100 billion, in 2024 value, the U.S. gave to European states after the war under the

214. Bundesministerium für Vertiedigung, "Handbuch Innere Führung," (2023), 9.
215. Large, *Berlin*, 399.

Marshall Plan, no future communist state received any money.[216] Ten days after the Berlin Airlift commenced in Germany, foreign policy leaders from the U.S., U.K., and Canada met in Washington to discuss plans for a future North Atlantic, military alliance.[217] The result of these discussions was the birth of NATO. In conjunction with the development of an Atlantic military alliance was the belief that the western occupiers should unite their zones as a buffer to Soviet expansion in the East. After several unifications of zones, first between the U.S. and U.K. and then with France, the FRG was created in 1949 under the guidelines of a what a German state that was palatable to the West would look like.

The FRG was created with a particular understanding of European unity and democracy in the aftermath of their destruction by the Nazi state between 1933 and 1945. Konrad Adenauer noted in his memoir, "All our work [in the Federal Government] would be animated by the spirit of the civilization of Western Christianity and by respect of the rights and dignity of the individual."[218]

The story of homosexual integration is more than just a history of how a small minority of German citizens earned the right to serve their country despite the belief, embedded in the Bundeswehr,that being homosexual could not be compatible with military life. The transformation of the Bundeswehr into an inclusive force for homosexuals 1955-2000 is a story of the remarkable resilience of *Innere Führung* to maintain the values of the force in a rapidly changing society.

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216. Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin Book, 2005), 91.
217. Judt, Postwar, 149.
218. Adenauer, *Konrad* Adenauer, 191.

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