Ruinous Natures: The Approach of Social Timespace

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I would like to acknowledge the patience and consideration of my committee.

PREFACE

Socioanalysis.

This dissertation, *Ruinous Natures*: *Socioanalysis for Approaching Political Ecological Catastrophe,* covers the following fundamentals to a political ecological theory of society and environment.

First, a discussion of 'methods' and Theory developed for the political ecological investigation of five 'sites' as case studies: The Skaneateles Mill Ruins (Skaneateles New York), Overlook Mountain (Catskill Mountains, New York), Sweetgrass 'Political Ecology' (Mohawk Valley, New York; multiple sites), 'Cayuga Castle' *Gayaagaahne* (Ledyard, New York), 'The Underground Railroad' (multiple sites, New York passage to Canada and as terminus in Harriet Tubman's home and gravesite in Auburn New York). This discussion introduces the development of 'methods' by Theoretically Informed Social Science—predominately sociology—in technical investigations of structural analysis, tropology, discourse analysis and narrative analysis. The theoretical vantage points come from social theories that are various branded '(post- late-) structural', 'phenomenological', and 'critical'. The reader should not be surprised that a Theoretically Informed approach also draws from neighboring fields and several sub-disciplines. Anthropological, Historical, Literary, Philosophical, and Psychological disciplines have always enjoyed some of the least siloed interdisciplinary discourse; environmental sociology, critical criminology, political economy, sociology of art and literature, and historical sociology should be noted by the reader as having some sustained discussion in service of this dissertation.

The technical discussion is necessary to the themes in this work. The reader should not proceed without comprehending them, and where necessary the references should be used to assist comprehension, footnotes should not be neglected. The discussions of structure and 'synchronicity', history and 'diachrony' are very much in question both theoretically and analytically here. The technique of reading mute objects—ruins—as tropes and having a tropological structure, as figures and configurations in material/semiotic form-and-content, demands an understanding of inextricable 'timespace' from embodiment to milieu in which those bodies are found. The purpose of the technical discussion is to provide some familiarity with the language and terminology, more importantly the 'theoretical' position of observation and analysis itself as the actual reflexive centerpiece of the investigation. This should not be forgotten, nor should it be neglected in the studies of the 'sites' that follow as case studies.

There are four hypotheses for this study of 'ruins': 1.) Ruins come from (originate in) the past as priors; 2.) Ruins come from the future as projects that 'precede' or are 'in-advance', acknowledged in modern effects such as anxiety, precautionary principles, risk analysis, 'uncertainty', 'frontiers', and anomie; 3.) Ruins are superposed priors from these flanking timespaces of past and future upon the present, observable in the novel and

its indifference to timespace, as well as political and economic strategies of détente, impasse, and paralysis, that rely upon oscillations in mythos and palingenesis, history and utopia; 4.) Ruins are transposed priors, not relying upon the chirality of imagery posed ‘equally’, rather as asymmetric and offering structural closure to narratives, evidenced in cynical foreclosure and obviation, fatalist readings of ‘catastrophe society’ and persistent figures of nihilism in the imagery of historical ‘collapse of civilization’, ‘politics of exception’, and ecological crimes elevated to apocalypse.

As *prior* these various milieux are presented for the purpose of working through—conducting socioanalysis—of how subjectivity is disposed in these frameworks and worlds are sustained in contradiction to one another as objectal, as scenes of reference and for legitimation, and necessitating those subjects (character formations, ideas of personhood and personality) in their respective stratificatory organization, sedimentation of experience and habits (of mind, ‘speech’, and action), and operational closure, delimiting these fields as systems.

ABSTRACT

This Dissertation advances across three areas: first, a theory of social timespace that borrows from critical social theories, post-ontological systems theory, and literary critique; second, it proposes a revisioning of sociological ‘methods’ by an historical reproachment: how sociology is a method among others for the study of society and culture, what are called variously the social sciences, and how sociology also has a method of its own developed in the work of the first sociological institutions in the United States, Germany, and France, that is parallel to linguistic structuralism in the same historical period and has mostly been advanced outside the discipline in narrative and discourse analysis; third, the substantive matter of this dissertation concerns a shift in the sociology of the environment to a political ecology, and critique of the latter. The binding theoretic development, mode of analysis, and the object of a political ecology formed in environmental sociology, are configured under the singular term of socioanalysis. The technique of socioanalysis, its eco-environmental object, and theory implied by the practice of socioanalysis are the guiding proposition of this research.

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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION

This dissertation attempts to advance a critique of political ecology, a critique of methods, and the application of theory. The uniting technique of observation is socioanalysis and the thematic category is the flux of timespace observed in the objects of ruin—the ruderal remainders of social and ecological artefacts and the spoiled and stigmatized 'ruin' of persons. The former (timespace) will be discussed under the literary term owed to Mikhail Bakhtin's chronotope, the latter is a split object of Ruin/'ruin' that determines the technique of analysis and returns sociology to the forgotten application of theory by discourse analytic and narratological insights. The capitalized term Ruin is used to designate objects in their obdurate, brute, and material obstinance to investigation and opposition to our efforts at signification. As a discursive form the term Ruin always indicates a deictic center that organizes experience around *it.* The term 'ruin' in single quotes is the disquoted form of signs and words as objects that are corrosive of any immanent sense, significance, and meaning, as symbolic and communicative. The sociological example of stigma as a stain or blemish of character, person, or disposition that precedes and persists in hindering or obstructing action of thought, activity, and especially speech, is close to what is meant here. These two terms introduce an interobjective study that aims to disclose environmental and sociological relations between objects; between things and words.

It is my contention that American sociology had begun to forego theory in earnest with the combined socio-historic propensity of American methodologistic impulses from its early institutionalization in Chicago[1]. However, this has a much more lengthy history in a wider world of sociology that has acknowledged a crisis in social science since its inception. This crisis is emblematic following the now forgotten *Methodenstreit* of the early 20th C. (*Werturteilstreit* or 'value judgement crisis') and the *Positivismusstreit* of the 1960's with its return to the question of methods, and the much more farcical 'science wars' of the late 20th C. reveal the epistemological imperialism of technoscience particular to an American milieu.

[1] On the decline of the Chicago School of the early 20th C. see Cortese: *The rise, hegemony, and decline of the Chicago School of Sociology, 1892-1945* (Cortese 1995).
Also see Albion Small's *Adam Smith and Modern Sociology A Study in the Methodology of the Social Sciences* (Albion W. Small 1907) on the evidence of the crisis of the social sciences in the formation of American Sociology. In a paragraph that might well have been written at present, Small describes what Immanuel Wallerstein has referenced as the distinction between nomothetic and idiographic history, and what Max Horkheimer observed as the split between science and philosophy: "That is, [Adam] Smith realized the necessity of deriving principles, to be used deductively from inductive generalizations of previous experience. In this general form, his science was therefore more catholic and more convincing than that of his successors who obviously overworked the one or the other element of proof, and in either case left the proof limping from the weakness of the neglected support. In subsequent economic theory the illustrations have been many and conspicuous, on the one hand of a-priori use of generalizations not supported by a sufficient induction, and on the other hand of historical data-collecting which became virtually an end unto itself, because not carried to a completeness that afforded credible generalizations." (p.77) (Albion W. Small 1907).
More to the interest of this study of timespace is Small's following observation: "Speaking in the rough, there is only one source from which to derive principles of human conduct. That source is historical induction. Of course, this proposition extends the term "historical" beyond its ordinary meaning. Everything is past, and thus "historical," as soon as it has occurred, and thus made itself material for reflection. The present has become the past while the observer adjusts his attention to it." (ibid).

These crises are also the opposition that puts social science into motion, with sociology regularly positioned in these disputes for the paradoxical object and fact that all scientific efforts are ineluctably constructed socially. This embarrassment to empiricist notions across the social and so-called natural sciences is a productive paradox in the radical constructivist approach of Niklas Luhmann's systems theory, and has intimations in Pierre Bourdieu's reflexive sociology, the two approaches most informative to how this social analysis proceeds.

In this respect, I do not think that I am pursuing anything new, rather, I am pursuing a preeminent problem overlooked by sociologists unfamiliar with or disinterested in history, theory, and discursive accounts of their own concepts and arguments: the words and things of sociology as its own object[2]. This problem probably saw its last serious appraisal before 2000 and political and intellectual shifts toward a unilateral American superpower, inverted totalitarianism as its populist 'politics', and a farcical or outright dismissive anti-theoretic attitude. Thus, the emphasis upon a period following the linguistic turn and dominated by post-structuralism may seem over-represented, especially in the critique of methods. This is to neglect an ongoing crisis of the social sciences as what serves to constantly background these sciences in a complex reality complicated by scientific investigations themselves; most often for their 'methodical parsimony' and paucity of curiosity to outright negligence.

The very material consequences of this crisis have obvious symptoms in the familiar sociological problematization of identifications, classifications, presentation, and representation of gender, sex, race, and class itself. Thus the 'why' for which this socioanalysis has its mandate where the close critique of methodologism is the 'how' that explains a necessity for socioanalysis and demonstrates this technique critically and reflexively—starting with the discipline of sociology itself.

Where the little object of identification that is our materializable status as citizen, human, subject, and/or other, is the kernel that agitates us by stigma and validates a sociological problematization, the big object of planetary ecology parsed politically and symbolically, is the material un-acknowledgement of our environment. Socioanalysis demonstrated in the work of the Frankfurt school, and by Theodore Adorno specifically, established this dialectic and the reification of a thingly personhood and thingly world in an eccentric circulation that I will describes as *metabolism* of the socio-symbolic, and the mute and putatively material.

This brings me to a critical theory that relies upon environmental sociology, world systems analysis, and geography, for the efforts to advance theories of the environment. Here again I will introduce ruin in its two forms as the organizational prior for understanding, explaining, and interpreting, socioanalytically. The preponderance of the object begs a theoretic question: which object? To which the advances of 21st century theories of interobjectivity provides a response. This is to remind the reader that while theory in sociology may well have stalled, it is not the case in philosophical and literary criticism. And it may well be the case that the emphasis upon a period when theory and critique were more vibrant and less cynical than now, more interdisciplinary and to some fruitful purpose more *indisciplined*, that this dissertation leans overly much.

[2] This is of course best explored in American sociology by Harold Garfinkle's ethnomethodology and related conversation analysis.

Techniques for Socioanalysis

The Introduction of this dissertation *Ruinous Natures...* discusses the technique for socioanalysis applied in the five case studies that follow and elaborated in the four hypotheses as a methodical deployment. This technique is derived largely from narrative analysis originating with exemplary work of Roland Barthes and Fredric Jameson, especially the development of A.J. Greimas' *semiotic rectangle* in the latter (Barthes and Duisit 1975)(Jameson 1981)(Greimas 1983). This analytic device can be traced directly to Aristotle's *square of opposition*. However, it must be immediately stated that the term *socioanalysis* here is largely employed in the spirit of Pierre Bourdieu's usage in his *Introduction to reflexive sociology*[3]. This to me is both an acknowledgment of Bourdieu's own engagement with the psychoanalytic tradition in France at the time of that writing, and with the reference to *reflexion,* should recall for the sociologist that this is also a debt to the largely German tradition of critical theory. Wherein the Frankfurt School had begun a *socioanalysis* before the letter in their own integration of psychoanalysis with dialectic, phenomenology, and genealogical analysis as early as that schools foundation in 1924.[4]

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[3] The term itself is of older provenance, and is attributed mostly to the work of W.B. Bion at the Tavistock Clinic following World War II (Bion 1948a)(Bion 1948b)(Bion 1949a)(Bion 1949b)(Bion 1950). I do not think that this work on 'socio-analysis', at that time 'group-[psycho]analysis', is spurious in the least. This language already existed in Freudian psychoanalysis(Freud 1921). Much like the discipline of sociology itself, the reflexion upon a *societas,* as opposed to *familia/oikos, or commuitas,* for example is not lost upon the founding figures of sociology as we understand the discipline now. The *object* and *project* of sociology in *societas* as the associations made under conditions that *only* modernity necessitates is adequately given by Hannah Arendt, and is an inaugural article in Jurgen Habermas *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*: "Society is the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public." (p.46 *The Human Condition*) (Arendt 1959). Socioanalysis has its object and project in that retro-effect and sedimentation of socialization processes that have been fertile ground for transgenerational conditions for such events as populist violence, inverted totalitarianism, terrorism as 'resonance', and so on. It is important to recall that this *second world war* is precisely the socio-symbolic failure of the first nationalist and populist efforts at accomplishing a '*demos'* as its *agalma*. This must not be mistaken for the *ochlocratic desire* that it is; a stake in unity at all costs, that most definitely is better lost for its ochlocratic submission to an impossible *nationalist unity* of peoples. The history of Nazi *Grossepolitik* should serve as a reminder that this 'unity' was never a real possibility; palingenesis of this kind relied upon an eclipse of most peoples for the limited timespace of '10,000' years, itself a nihilistic admission to a cynical political economic *social artefact*. See Hannah Arendt's study: *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Arendt 1976).
See also Harry Dahms and Joel Crombez: *Alienation* (Dahms 2008), *Anxiety, Modern Society, and the Critical Method: Toward a Theory and Practice of Critical Socioanalysis* (Crombez 2022).

[4] Wiggershaus describes the 'indirect' relationship of psychoanalysis in institutional relations at Frankfurt as having begun in 1929, with the opening of the Institute of Psychoanalysis (pp. 54-55, *The Frankfurt School*) (Wiggershaus 1995), and largely attributed to Erich Fromm: "…his view was that both psychology and sociology were necessary, precisely for the investigation of the most significant problems, and that among `the most important psychological and sociological questions' was `what connections there are between the social development of humanity, particularly its economic and technical development, and the development of its mental faculty, particularly the ego-organization of the human being'." (p.55. ibid.) (Wiggershaus 1995).
The historical 'event' is not my point, the 'spirit', that is, social consciousness historically and categorially sedimented in the norms of the event are, and expressed in Carl Grünberg's opening address of the Frankfurt School: "There are pessimists who stand horrified and amazed in the midst of the ruins which the process of change brings with it, seeing so many things they were comfortable with, which were advantageous to them, which they had set their hearts on, fade away and disappear. They see the ruins not just as the ruins of *their own world,* but of *the world as such.* What they see seems to them to be not simply the dying away of something which was historically conditioned, which developed, matured and must now for that very reason decay. It seems to them, rather, to be death and corruption as such. What they really lack, however, is an understanding of the essence of life and in fact,

Parallel to this is the unique work of Mikhail Bakhtin that has permitted a specific turn toward the literary expression of relativization in the analysis of the *chronotope*—timespace—that is itself drawn from Bakhtin's grasp of this theorization in the so-called natural sciences of his time[5]. From Bakhtin's prescient exploration of the chronotope, and Jameson's practice of literary criticism as a 'laboratory' for a dialectical study of 'narrative as a socio-symbolic act' in those parameters, it is only as a *turn back* towards those so-called natural sciences, specifically ecology, that this study ultimately extends its argument and exploration[6]. Reflexion in historical and thus material terms is a kind of *reduction*, perhaps the hardest concept for the natural scientist to grasp, and of no small difficulty to Anglo-American social science, with its characteristic impatience and incuriosity with 'philosophy', where this operation has its place. The *epoché* or *reduction* is first fully developed in Edmund Husserl's phenomenology and it is this and the parallel discovery of *intentionality* that are absolutely necessary to the social-theoretic use of the chronotope, the formation of hypotheses, and the reflexive turn that these operations inaugurate[7]. The *reduction*—various forms are explored by Husserl—often as 'phenomenological' or 'transcendental' is the combined, indeed inextricable, 'bracketing of the world' and 'suspension of the natural attitude'; the judgments that are this manifestation of subjectivity[8]. This operation necessitates the precautionary effort that should be familiar to the sociologist in Max Weber's own 'value neutrality' thesis: it is always an incomplete effort to 'accomplish' value neutrality for that thinker, and for the sociological tradition that follows

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even more fundamentally, they lack the will to live. That is why they cannot be teachers or guides to us, although they would so much like to be . . ." (p. 25, ibid.)(Wiggershaus 1995)

[5] Bakhtin attributed this term to A.A. Uxtomskij, drawn from a lecture on biological theory in 1925 (Bakhtin 1981).

[6]Jameson uses this trope of the laboratory to describe the arbitrary and artificial literary timespace of *genre*: "Genre criticism thereby recovers its freedom and opens up a new space for the creative construction of experimental entities, such as Lukacs' reading of Solzhenitsyn in terms of an invented "genre" that might be termed the "closed laboratory situation," which project their "diachronic constructs " only the more surely to return to the synchronic historical situation in which such novels can be ·read as symbolic acts." (p. 145. *The Political Unconscious*) (Jameson 1981). Resuscitating the otherwise naïve notion of genre criticism under this sign, Jameson's work always points towards the 'absent cause' and 'missing third term' of history. I will not disagree with this thesis. However, it is my contention that what is meant by *history* is inclusive of timespaces that are historical in a variety of ways, what a historiographic extension of this literary sense affords. On this see Hayden White: *Metahistory The Historical Imagination in 19th Century Europe* (White 2013)

[7] This will be elaborated in the section on socioanalytic technique. Husserl's own reduction of consciousness to *intentionality* as always consciousness-of something is accomplished suspending the natural attitude that ordinarily conceals this linkage. It is important that there are limits to just such a 'transcendental reflection', and that Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Martin Heidegger took this up as a point of critique of Husserl's own, almost unlimited reduction (Moran 2000)(Merleau-Ponty 1962)(Heidegger 1982). An obvious limit is the discussion of an *unconscious*, what Husserl would have understood by his use of the term 'horizon' as establishing the possibility of grasping potentially knowable things. Yet there are aspects of any given thing that we will not grasp. Husserl did not, to my understanding advance a serious appraisal of this. This becomes a problem wherever Husserl's otherwise acute grasp of the temporality of any given horizon is faced with the oblivion of history or the anonymity of futurity that becomes the political unconscious that mythifies precisely these non-possibilities that at some unknowable limit, exceed all possible 'horizons'.

[8] This is historicized and taken up by Foucault via Heidegger—responding to how being-in-the-world is historical—in Foucault's grasp of multiple (they are isotopic) forms of westernizing, Christian pastoral, 'individualization' that he describes as: "individualization… by analytical identification", "individualization… by a whole network of servitude that involves the general servitude of everyone with regard to everyone… by subjection (assujettisement).", "…acquired… through the production of an internal, secret, hidden truth. …subjectivation". (Foucault 2007)

Alfred Schütz, this remains the case[9]. Here it is no different, the reduction affords a minimal necessary 'ontological difference' at least, between what (social) phenomena we observe, and the appearance or imagery and imaginary of it. Husserl himself was more assured in the use of this technique, and it is with some reservations that it is employed here[10]. The reduction importantly affords a minimal distance between the sense imagery and the sense-organs themselves such that their combination in a sense-consciousness appears, and with it the relativization of situations and their 'definition'. The oft repeated sociological question 'what is going on here' demands that the observer recall their own place in any situation as a 'second order observer' (Niklas Luhmann) that elevates 'the situation' immediately and irrevocably[11]. Notably, this moment of reflexion is theorized in the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan as *the mirror stage* as *irrevocable turn* in the topology of the ego and identifications made by the subject[12].

Irrevocable in that here, both the Luhmannian and Lacanian, as well as the Weberian and Husserlian precursors, are in tacit agreement that this is a diatactical turn from which there is no return: we become conscious of consciousness in this individuated and egoic way and it is also that which establishes a very external, institutional, and object-like *unconscious*[13]. This conscious, *figured into being*—to use Judith Butler's very helpful phrasing of the action of tropes upon materiality and embodiment—cannot be conjured away by language, *discourse*, that made it[14]. That is, as soon as we engage in self-reflection the social appears, only to be disguised by our zealous defenses against that constraint by the image of ourself in an *other's* consciousness;

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[9] The misreading of Weber is noted by Jameson with characteristic clarity: "The center around which the Freudian interpretive system turns is not sexual experience but rather wish-fulfillment, or its more metaphysical variant, "desire," posited as the very dynamic of our being as individual subjects. Is it necessary to stress the dependence of this " discovery" on the increasing abstraction of experience in modern society? Yet the same might be said of other interpretive themes developed during this period, and in particular the meditation, from Nietzsche to Weber, on the nature of value as such. The Nietzschean "transvaluation of all values" and also Weber's own notion of "value-free science" (commonly misconstrued as neutral scientific "objectivity") constitute so many attempts to project some Archimedean standpoint outside of social life, from which the inner-worldly values of the latter might be abstracted and studied in a kind of experimental laboratory isolation. Like the rather different Freudian abstractions, then, such conceptions of value are subjectively possible only on the basis of some preliminary objective dissociation within action or behavior itself;"(p.65. ibid) (Jameson 1981)

[10] The term 'ontological difference' is Heidegger's (Heidegger 1996).

[11] Also, Derrida in the statement of the irrevocable as: "there is no outside-text". For Luhmann's discussion of the 'second order observer' see: *Introduction to Systems Theory* (Luhmann 2013) and for a sustained discussion of the distinctions between this and Derrida's deconstruction see: *Luhmann--Deconstruction as Second Order Observing* (Luhmann 2002a)

[12] See Lacan: Ecrits (Lacan 2006)

[13] The discovery of a sociology as *the consciousness of consciousness* is attributable to Emile Durkheim: *The Elementary Forms Of The Religious Life* (Durkheim 1915).

[14] Butler's tropological understanding is crucial to this dissertation, although they typically use the term *prefigure* to accomplish much of the staging and presupposing of subjection : "The paradox of subjection implies a paradox of referentiality: namely, that we must refer to what does not yet exist. Through a figure that marks the suspension of our ontological commitments, we seek to account for how the subject comes to be. That this figure is itself a " turn " is, rhetorically, performatively spectacular; " turn " translates the Greek sense of "trope." Thus the trope of the turn both indicates and exemplifies the tropological status of the gesture. Does subjection inaugurate tropology in some way, or is the inaugurative work of tropes necessarily invoked when we try to account for the generation of the subject?" (p. 4)(Butler 1997)
It must also be made evident that Butler's *public socioanalysis* is the application of socioanalytic technique that is perhaps closest to what is proposed here. See Butler's most recent *socioanalysis* reported in The Guardian: *Is the show finally over for Donald Trump?* (Butler 2020), *Why Donald Trump will never admit defeat* (Butler 2021a), *Why is the idea of 'gender' provoking backlash the world over?* (Butler 2021b)

in their *gaze*, their *hearing* and our *sentencing*. To use Julia Kristeva's own formula, we are a *sujet en proces*: with that doubled connotation of being 'booked' in the socio-symbolic metonymy of signifiers for our person, character, and subjectivity, and the sense of being in process of that formation of person, character, and subjectivity[15].

The latter has a valuable parallel in the psychological theories of Lakoff and Johnson presented in *Metaphors we Live By*, and that of Varela, Rosch, and Thompson in *The Embodied Mind* (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991). In the former, the use of *metaphor* as actual *human thought processes* (p.6, ibid) (Lakoff and Johnson 2003) and the adoption of the neuronal understanding of *enactment*, where imagination, actuation, are often combined and occurrent in real time (pp. 254 -264, ibid) (Lakoff and Johnson 2003). This *embodiment* of *metaphor* is an inescapable anthropomorphism to which Lacan draws our attention by the *mirror stage*, wherein we cannot retrace the moment our disjunct bodily image was integrated into the 'human shape.' At this point I must momentarily pause on the *socioanalytic* comprehension of this same 'event'. This shift 'upwards' into a level of integration as a one-time event is *revolutionary*, and thus *political* in form[16]. Such political theory as that of Alain Badiou and Slavoj Zizek, read Rosa Luxemburg in observing the event of 'transforming' consciousness-of-consciousness to a higher integration as not only an observation of a social property, that once apparent, becomes part of the palimpsest of our self-reference and is only ever collective and shared[17]. The 'event' is not repeated, only farcically caricatured and revised in pastiche; or delivered ironically and after-the-fact. For Zizek following Luxemburg we are: "…constituted through this process," (pp. 62 – 63, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*) (Zizek 2008), and the farce becomes necessary in a socio-symbolic 'second death' that permits a separation from prior social structures as constitutive of consciousness and integration to new ones[18].

However, to grasp the nettle of social action as an event, above all of a consciousness of conscious, we have the work of Frantz Fanon to turn to:

> "6. When I began this book [Black Skin, White Masks], I wanted to devote one section to a study of the death wish among Negroes. I believed it necessary because people are forever saying that Negroes never commit suicide. M. Achille did not hesitate to maintain

[15] See Kristeva: *Desire in Language* (Kristeva 1980)

[16] Again, Jameson provides a short and succinct treatment of Marx's theory of knowledge and does so by way of Ernst Bloch: "(1) the notation of the particular… (2) the conquest of abstraction… (3) the transcendence of abstraction by the dialectic, the "rise to the concrete," the setting in motion of hitherto static and typologizing categories by their reinsertion in a concrete historical situation (in the present context, this is achieved by moving from a classificatory use of the categories of modes of production to a perception of their dynamic and contradictory coexistence in a given cultural moment) ." (pp. 97 – 98 FN 74. *The Political Unconscious*) (Jameson 1981)

[17] For a succinct grasp of the event as the other side of structure, as 'distinction' or 'form' see Luhmann: "Events (and this includes operations) cannot change because they have no time for change: they disappear as soon as they appear, they vanish in the very process of emerging. So again, one of these cheerful paradoxes: the only unchangeable components of systems are inherently unstable." (p. 103, *Deconstruction as Second Order Observing*)(Luhmann 2002a)

[18] Susan Buck-Morss comments on Badiou's use of Lacan's *Real* as 'truth' that 'punches a hole in knowledge' that: "…it is social action" (p. 64 *A Commonist Ethics*) (Badiou et al. 2013). She follows this with a list of properties that appear as ethical questions that only come from the event as irrevocable social action in its emancipatory inauguration: "1. What's happening (…)? 2. What's new (…)? 3. What gives (…)? 4. What's going on (…)? And only then do we get to the Big Question: 5. *What to do* (…)?" (pp. 64- 64 ibid.)(Badiou et al. 2013)

> this in a lecture, and Richard Wright, in one of his stories, has a white character say, .. If I were a Negro I'd kill myself ... ," in the sense that only a Negro could submit to such treatment without feeling drawn to suicide. Since then, M. Deshaies has taken the question of suicide as the subject of his thesis. He demonstrates that the studies by Jaensch, who contrasted the disintegrated-personality "type" (blue eyes, white skin) to the integrated-personality "type" (brown eyes and skin), are predominantly specious. According to Durkheim, Jews never committed suicide. Now it is the Negroes. Very well: "The Detroit municipal hospital found that 16.M of its suicide cases were Negroes, although the proportion of Negroes in the total population is only 7.61. In Cincinnati, the number of Negro suicides is more than double that of whites; this may result in part from the amazing sexual disparity among Negro suicides: 358 women against 76 men." (Gabriel Deshaies, *Psychologie du suicide,* note 23.) (pp.218-219) (Fanon 2008)

The event that anthropomorphizes us, instructs us in our embodiment and enaction, is social when we consider that this can be *compulsive* and thus the sabotage of identification as a process of cruel reflexion or *reification,* a normative sanction inculcated with our own socio-symbolic *self*-consciousness. Again, Judith Butler's early thesis in *Gender Trouble* is precisely this regarding *compulsive heteronormativity*[19].

However, it takes a Fanon to drive home the point that this subject identification is *political* and not explicable in the 'objectivity' of social science where that approach and its un-critical 'naive' practice disowns its social forms for its models-of society and simulations of the social actions and relations there. Starting with the event of embodiment as the enaction of socio-symbolic regimes and an imaginary biography and history, racialized and gendered in these cases, neither of which in their official and legitimate forms can ever be that of the majority of people anywhere ever, this model-of is revealed as a *model-for* socio-symbolic conduct. The *exception* is of course the disposition of the elite, who can enjoy this symbolic violence *as if a natural state of affairs,* and again *depoliticized,* which is to say disowned in a cynical mood of *denegation and condescension* directed at those they submit to *classification* and subordination by force and fraud.

The stakes of socioanalysis are not simply discovered in the event of our subjectification according with some natural milieu and historical context, and this assemblage assured as a comfortable 'human shape' with our subject interest in mind. And, they are not somehow simply

[19] A very important part of Butler's thesis is the racket form of gender trouble, and the socioanalytic import is quite helpful: that we discover ourselves *always already in trouble* as gendering goes, is to give away the lie when interpellated: "what are you anyway?". Which is a way of short-circuiting the exploration and aporia that is 'decidable' only as a form of trouble that must be parodic of this impossible foundationalist demand. More important is that this does slow-down or de-escalate the deconstructive and *critical* discussion of gender considerably, following the turns that are this parodic back-and-forth without reducing (not diminishing here! Rather, an expanding and spreading of unrestrained scrutiny. The opposite of pejorative reduction as incuriosity.) critique to a form of interrogation and demand to 'disclose one's aporia' instead of one's 'foundation'. This latter possibility is the critique of deconstruction offered by Helene Cixous's *bisexuality* for example, and Julia Kristeva's *Chora* (Kristeva 1980). Notably the mis-rendering of deconstruction at one time (when there were still graduate students attempting fluency in it) could be reduced to an inquisitorial practice or just more passively veiled identity policing. Thus the problem of cynical mis-construal and reification returns as anti-radicalism and desired power relations.

'theoretical' or some 'intellectualist fallacy'[20]. The methodologistic provocation and that of a-theoretical polemic betray their origin in service to power relations as another disposition of condescension and denegation by 'practice and application' in sociology. Socioanalysis demonstrates these academic arguments for the hypocrisy *necessary* to a continued social structure that is synchronic and externalized in the professional power struggles of institutionalize discourse as if 'debate'. This is no debate: conventional methodologistic social science is about power, period.

Theory does not have time for false 'applied-social-science' whether it is methodologistic or polemicist. That these sedimented discourses are the *ruin* of scientific discourse, and of careful research by untimely haste, is the point. Above all, in non-recognition and misrecognition of 'the event' of enaction as simultaneous thought-and-action, and the embodiment thereby as having an exigency that defies all-too pragmatic haste, the *apodictic* is overlooked. In this, academia has its own *political unconscious* by embodiment of polemical moods of accusation and methodologistic mis-reading of theory and technique as false oppositions in equally empty 'scientific' debates.

The stakes of socioanalysis are also *ecological* as soon as we recognize that the *metaphors* we use in an unthinking way constitute objects too. Here we can briefly turn to the psychological theory given in *The Embodied Mind* with a little more concentration. The text provides a sustained defense of embodied mind—*enaction*—where: "…perception is not simply embedded and constrained by the surrounding world; it also contributes to the enactment of this surrounding world." (p. 174, ibid) (Varela et al. 1991). The authors are careful to respect the ubiquity of conventional psychological (and social science theory) as having grounded itself in a subject/object dyad that has served the physical sciences as its model. This historical affair is not the history of the social sciences, only a pretense to it; the previous quote is following the psychological phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and in this tradition, this division (not simply of 'intellectual' and 'manual' labor) is a problem very often of a psychologistic kind, and the constant foil of Husserl's phenomenology. It is perhaps hasty to say that this split has been overcome, that it has been in Husserlian phenomenology does not simply translate into the sciences, despite all efforts to do so. It is also in this pursuit that we are forced to also recall Merleau-Ponty's own Marxian commitments and thus dialectic: "The properties of the object and the intentions of the subject… are not only intermingled; they also constitute a new whole" (ibid) (Varela et al. 1991), where we must still work-through those scientific investigations that become an actual history of ecological value for the simple reason that we can never abolish this relationship.

The latter will bear more important implications for social action, its *timeliness*, and a very different spatiality—it will be inescapably *planetary*—that is incomprehensible—

[20] This terminology is owed to Pierre Bourdieu who defends a phenomenological reading that does not become ensnared in subjectivity as an intellectualist puzzle shorn of practice: "To point out the perception of the social world implies an act of construction is not in the least to accept an intellectualist theory of knowledge: the essential part of one's experience of the social world and of the labor of construction it implies takes place in practice, without reaching the level of explicit representation and verbal expression." (p.235, *Social Space and the Genesis of Classes*, in *Language and Symbolic Power*)(Bourdieu 1991)

incommunicable—without working out these systemic implications. Our eco-environmental relationship is formed *immanently* in a double sense that action and thought are not separated such that normativity is always invoked in these performances of social action, and that our actions are always a fulcrum of decision that can change the very path and trajectory we take by re-constituting ourselves in those actions. Fanon recognized this in the working-through of the racialization that marks Blackness pejoratively, and both real and symbolic violence of transforming oneself under the non-recognition of white political economy. Similarly, Butler has demonstrated the chimerical body to be a response that disrupts this order of things and beings as a gendered political economy. These are very different response to the fact that embodiment can be *carceral* and a theatre of cruelty. When we are able to make the connection that these are dis-junctions that do not simply call for resolution and 'recognition', rather, raising these oppositive identifications to a sociological level they become intelligible *and they are not forgotten in the process,* we begin to grasp what scientific responsibility to history and biography might mean. However premature it may be to take on this process, how we 'lay down a path by walking', is the socioanalytic process observed here that will take place in the actual post-industrial catastrophe society we now live.

Yet it is apparent, as before, that like a political unconscious that evolves with the overlooked political property of subject formation, so too an ecological unconscious:

> "How can the public mind relegate matters of the environment, which is the ground of our whole lives, to the periphery of concern, as though they were the private interest of a group called "environmentalists"? At the same time, I have never met anyone who did not value and appreciate some part of the environment. How can we be so split in our thinking?" (P.1 *The Love of Nature and the End of the World,* Shierry Weber Nicholsen) (Nicholsen 2003)

Nicholsen's question should have some immediate resonance as soon as that split subject is the double consciousness of Du Bois and that of Fanon. In the latter 'the environment' is often interpreted as putatively social and somehow without 'nature'. One of the problems of a psychologistic reading is that *the world disappears,* and this should indicate that the subject is somehow neutralized too. Du Bois recalls the environment both in figurative language: "the sky was bluest… Here at last seemed to have been discovered the mountain path to Canaan…" (pp. 4,8, *The Souls of Black Folk*) and literally:

> "He died at eventide, when the sun lay like a brooding sorrow above the western hills, veiling its face; when the winds spoke not, and the trees, the great green trees he loved, stood motionless. I saw his breath beat quicker and quicker, pause, and then his little soul leapt like a star that travels in the night and left a world of darkness in its train. The day changed not; the same tall trees peeped in at the windows, the same green grass glinted in the setting sun." (p.172, ibid.)

'Nature', 'the environment', has a powerful hold on us. To anyone who is old enough to recall either Chernobyl, or for Americans who experienced 9/11, the sky is memorable for the sudden nameless fear that was suddenly inscribed there. This is the case for any war fought in the late 20th C to the present, where airpower is immediate destruction from a distance. With Covid,

sheer face-to-face proximity began to raise anxieties that were and are evolved with an *ecological unconscious* in a yet another way. The inexorable social is only temporarily eclipsed in ‘nature’ and likewise in so-called social situations, ‘the environment’ is what is extinguished to permit ‘social subjects’ their convenient myopia.

While the event of our anthropomorphic identification is troubled by the inequities of race and gender, and that this deictic ‘all too human’ center reveals itself as a kind of neutralization of our world, such that it is reduced to the social at the expense of those surroundings that are affective of that sociality itself, a political timespace and ecological inscription, this actuation is also invisibilized. The testing of how we are inhibitive and de-limiting of our understanding by our own actions of explanation will figure as the main social article under exploration as *ruins*: the de-scription that variously extinguishes world-and-subject in its complex configuration for a simplified and often *sociologistic* one.

Above all, race and gender are modes of *classification* where these can be ‘symptoms’ that can occur as ‘species’ irruptive of their own ‘genus’: categories that threaten to open social structures to scrutiny. This is the very insight of Karl Marx regarding that productive dialogue with Friedrich Engels, that is too quickly passed-over and by-passed by opponents of Marxian thought, detractors, and disciples alike[21]. *Categoriality* is the life of reason when we begin to grasp that tropes, metaphors, anthropomorphisms, figures of ‘world’ and ‘environment’, ‘situation’ and ‘milieu’, as imagery necessary to action because it is part of actuation inescapably. From the image of self-identity to the scientistic images of modern life, progress, and development, we are always enacting these models and frameworks with little regard for whatever road they pave for us.

A constant refrain in this introduction is that of ‘method’ travestied in social science by methodologistic impasse: *meta-odos* is a path-having-direction or cardinality, and *only* theory observes this clearly and *only* by actual technical effort. ‘Method’, for all its promises of reproducibility of conditions and measurability, replaces and defaces technique as the only ‘applied sociology’ or ‘social science’ for its actual praxeological commitment to a changing reality and changing conditions. Any ‘method’, oblivious to reflexion upon the neglected presuppositions of ‘the human’ and ‘the world’ this image is circumspect in, has already failed.

[21] Foucault here, in *"Society Must Be Defended":* “After all, it should not be forgotten that toward the end of his life, Marx told Engels in a letter written in 1882 that "You know very well where we found our idea of class struggle; we found it in the work of the French historians who talked about the race struggle." The history of the revolutionary project and of revolutionary practice is, I think, indissociable from the counterhistory that broke with the Indo-European form of historical practices, which were bound up with the exercise of sovereignty; it is indissociable from the appearance of the counterhistory of races and of the role played in the West by clashes between races.” (p.79) (Foucault 2003). The actual date of the letter is 1852. The history of race in Europe for Foucault involves discourse in that language is one such cultural marker of this difference, what is retained in the almost archaic use of the word “race” as synonymous with “culture”. This is a point made by Paul Gilroy, and notable in W.E.B. Du Bois own use of the word ‘race’ (Gilroy 1993)(Du Bois 2005).

‘Method’ and Theory

In an important lesson from the arts and literature is that of the artist that demonstrates the technique and the theory at the same time as these complex forms are formed for our pleasure. The play-within-a-play such as *Polyacchi*, the breach of the fourth wall that accompanies *The Tempest*, the story within a story that is in fact an intertextuality that must accompany any discourse, is such as example. The brushstrokes that Goya shows us while constructing *The Third of May* do nothing to betray the composition or diminish its effect, any more than Francis Bacon’s *Study after Velazquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X*. These are summons to our own reflexivity in the company of these works. The re-entry of technique into its own composition demonstrates that these *objet d’art* are indeed *made*, and that should be indicative of how the sociologist recalls Emile Durkheim’s *fait sociaux*[22]. However, this has definitely not been the case in American sociology, with a demonstrated inability to read social theory *and to apply it*.

These technical accomplishments of literature and painting are examples against ‘method’ construed methodologistically; by drawing out the abstracta in their very construction the simultaneous de-construction of the work is prepared. It is a *discourse* for the back-and-forth that this transposed image, by mere words or the touch of a mere filament, is also the active composition, without which it is meaningless[23]. An opera is no more than the elaboration of a musical score and paintings no more than well composed brush strokes in color and texture, yet these are not invisible in the works themselves. So too science: the imagery of science is first only in the properties that evidence provides and the measures that give it appearance, yet it is *the case* of that presentation in sum that must demonstrate both this composed observation and its techniques of observation—not just a list of analytics. What science often *turns upon*—figure into being, or prefigures—is indeed a technique that permits for more precise unitization, more accurate observation, often the one leading to the other. Most important is that re-entry of technique into the analysis itself as a *reflexive and ironic revisory turn*, such as the hapless non-escape from the conditions of the ‘observer effect’ in physics. Here the instrument becomes part of the analysis.

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[22] The exemplar of this is Harold Garfinkle’s *Ethnomethodology*, and his irritation of conventional sociology for the categories it constructed *as if non-constructed* categories *at the same time*. This well practiced ‘memoryless-ness’ is simply the performance of conventional sociology as a social *function itself* in the continuity of a social structure by *disavowal*. What is in fact the normative structure of professional sociology in constructing its own timeless—Wallerstein will call this *eternal*—timespace. Garfinkle, in the opening lines of *Studies in Ethnomethodology,* clarifies the stakes directly: “In doing sociology, lay and professional, every reference to the “real world,” even where the reference is to physical or biological events, is a reference to the organized activities of everyday life. Thereby, in contrast to certain versions of Durkheim that teach that the objective reality of social facts is sociology’s fundamental principle, the lesson is taken instead, and used as a study policy, that the objective reality of social facts *as* an ongoing accomplishment of the concerted activities of daily life… is a fundamental phenomenon.” (Garfinkel 1967), by which Garfinkle recovers from concretist misreading the active sense of *fait sociaux*.

[23] The example of calligraphy is the best example for the spareness of strokes in that composition, and poetry provides a literary example when the lines are few. Both of which also develop that ‘experiment’ of a *vertical time* that resonates by our following of these figurations, that is very different from the turns of horizontal time of everyday life events, where events follow one another rather than impose one upon the other as in a stack. The sense of vertical spatialization is precisely that of the cosmograph of worlds, typically discovered in theology. However, the predominate form in westernization is the Christianization of Aristotle’s ‘great chain of being’ as the ordinal and taxonomic *scala naturae.* Thus re-arranging what the philosopher wrote as a history of life-forms—*zoia historion*—what we commonly read as a ‘history of animals’, as the worlds of life-forms transposed in a hierarchy from divine to mundane to condemned.

Exemplary of the failure to understand that technique in letters—the abstracta of words as imagery—is the miscomprehensions of metaphors—tropes—as frames of environmental sociological *argument*. In a single tropic image, 'The Treadmill of Production', John Bellamy Foster was forced to wonder how the replacement of 'CAPITALISM' by Schnaiberg's trope was not only a way to avoid this term, but simultaneously communicative in a way that other tropes were not; perhaps his own careful recovery of *stoffwechsel,* 'metabolism', in the trope of a 'metabolic rift', was also educational in that what didactic Marxism too-hastily writes off as 'ideology' and liberalist scientism as 'mere rhetoric', reshapes the material itself[24]. It bears recalling that such material can only ever be social consciousness of real living people. Not too distant is that much more important case, now well worn, and as I will indicate here, now historical because historicized concept of 'neo-liberalism'; superseded by the naked illiberalism of the recent autocratic and nationalist strategies to forestall a social critique of environmental, anti-social, pro-violence (ultra-politics), elitism, and inverted totalitarianism[25]. Here the re-entry of 'free market' nonsense into the free-markets themselves, demonstrated by the successive Covid crash/corrections of 2019 and the hollow bids of digital currency, serve to denature this 'liberalist' institution as the illiberal absurdity that it is.

The oversight of environmental sociologists in debates over the reception of their work would benefit from a serious engagement with reception theory and aesthetics such as found in literary criticism of Wolfgang Iser (Iser 2012), however here most of this will be covered by the work of Paul Ricoeur, whose interest in the humanities—such as textual, discourse, narrative, and tropological analysis—and the crisis of the social sciences, is exemplary in his grasp of methods (Ricoeur 1970)(Ricoeur 1991). Of course, with little experience in engaging with the humanities, and imperialistic censure under so-called natural science expertise and its social status in a (neglected) social epistemology, this oversight remains structural to the discipline and 'invisibilized'[26]. We can start with discourse again as a kind of back-and-forth and the example of its superposition of imagery in film, where the image that precedes is retained—sedimented—for the advancement of the succeeding image in the line of time that gives *motion*. In actual

[24] Foster: "The use of the concept of "the treadmill of production" was successful on the occasion of that one luncheon address for the EPA. that allowed a powerful critique of capitalism with no mention of capitalism by name. In fact, it was not even necessary to mention that there was a system at all. The treadmill metaphor had such a concrete, pragmatic character that it was greeted as a mere description or reality with none of the baggage of political or ideological critique associated with it. At the same time, the talk could be published word for word in *Monthly Review,* where the critique of the system was the principal thrust and where the argument would be readily seen as such. … I have not subsequently been in a situation where I was unable to name the system. There has been no need therefore to use Aesopian language, and the "treadmill of production" concept in itself did not add anything indispensable analytically, not to be found in the more general Marxian (or neo-Marxian) ecological critique of capitalism."(Foster 2005)

[25] The most prescient theorist of politics to write on this is Sheldon Wolin through his concept of *inverted totalitarianism*; see Wolin's *Politics and Vision* (Wolin 2004). Also, the work of Étienne Balibar, *Violence and Civility* on *ultra-violence* as well as the short response by Slavoj Zizek to Jacques Rancière in *The Politics of Aesthetics* on *ultra-politics* (Balibar 2015) (Rancière 2004). All of which I take to be evidence of the rightist short-circuit of reason for action-as-violence that characterizes the mood of rightist pastiche in values and catachresis of political figures by brute re-integration.

[26] I will only use this term 'invisibilized' provisionally until deeper in the case studies where invisibility, hyper-visibility, and hypo-visibility can be distinguished as distinct classes of action in the eclipse of reason that erase themselves. However, it is largely to the sociology of Bourdieu that this formulation is first used, see: *Masculine Domination* (Bourdieu 2001).

material film, and differently in the encoding of digital formats, this temporality is obvious. What this points to is that an *optical unconscious* appears where we can slow or accelerate filmic sequences, even reverse them, and finally, strangely superimpose one image over another—or behind them—as in the green screen needed for contemporary CGI (Benjamin 2008). Yet none of this is impossible to understand as having previously been formal properties of painting specifically, where pictorial imagery has been manipulated in this way, and in literature, which with careful impositions and omissions in the line of line the story may jump years ahead or behind, giving the sense of consciousness making this passage.

The back-and-forth of the image retained as predicate and the image following, even seductive in projecting a succeeding image that either gives continuity or discontinuity (the latter ruthlessly exploited in Horror films as a jump cut) is immediately noticeable to us as the turns of imagery given as discourse[27]. It is the sense of time as linear, time as consequential, even time as thematic, that conjoins discursive forms and permits their storied form in narrative[28]. First, we will turn to the properties of *discourse*.

Discourse has several important properties that permit us to understand the timespace that discourse is:

> "First trait: Discourse is always realized temporally and in the present, whereas the language system is virtual and outside of time… Second Trait: whereas language lacks a subject—in the sense that the question, Who is speaking? does not apply at its level—discourse refers back to its speaker by means of a complex set of indicators such as personal pronouns. … Third trait: Whereas the signs in language refer only to other signs within the same system, and whereas language lacks a world just as it lacks temporality and subjectivity, discourse is always about something. … It is in discourse that the symbolic function of language is actualized. Fourth trait: Whereas language is only the condition for communication for which it provides the codes, it is in discourse that all messages are exchanged. In this sense, discourse alone has not only a world, but an other, another person, an interlocuter to whom it is addressed." (pp. 145 – 146. *The Model of The Text*)(Ricoeur 1981a)

Ricoeur distinguishes discourse from the linguistic study of language, yet this is not to dismiss the latter wholesale. Further, for immediate purpose, discourse analytic properties spell out what scientistic imagery simply misrecognizes by superimposition, and non-scientific imagery misrecognized by empty anticipation, or recognizes naively as unquestioned mythos. Scientistic argument, in an effort to demystify and disabuse mythic cosmologies by putative facts, moves too quickly by presenting a *scientific world that exists beyond time*; in critique of *creation*, disabuse asserts a speaker that appears to represent a *subjectless-ness* that is just as impossible; scientism tends to a-historicism by *disavowing the intellectual history of its own conceptualizations and explanations*, confusing the image of recent research with the principle that remained unmanifest in other historical instances (this is occasionally recollected whenever a classicist discovers an old mathematical discovery as 're-discovered', or archaeologists reveal engineering that relies upon scientific efforts also recently 're-discovered'.); finally, scientism

[27] On *Seduction* see Jean Baudrillard: *The Evil Demon of Images* (Baudrillard 1984)
[28] See Catherine Kohler Riessman: *Narrative Analysis* (Riessman 1993)

speaks into the void so to speak, forgetting its human audience through condescension and revealing its only actual *Other/interlocuter* in that scientific authority that is actually discursive in its '*methods'* as the realized instruction in the desiring of scientific knowledge. Scientism is always in response to this non-human structural *Other as Master*. That is, only in the *legitimation* of science by this *Other,* is the scientist and their discourse realized and socio-*politically recognized*[29].

The catastrophe of science in Ulrich Beck's *catastrophe society* is that this so-called 'meta-discourse', this second-order observation of science itself, is critical of the partition of the senses that explains more than a simple division of intellectual and manual labor (Beck 1992)[30]. Science is an intellectual property that is shared, unequally, and with the strategic division of it as an administerial profession first, and a research institution second. Thus, environmental sociological discourse that forgets this immanent critique, foregoes working-through how, in a nascent discursive form as part of an oppositive social structure that its mere presence contributes to, benefits from that critique that raises this to a higher level by taking this political unconscious seriously as institutionalized and external itself. That is to say, *social*, as a socioanalytic object of reflexion because of its reification in how we conduct this discourse.

What should interest us in the reified, scientistic image, that disposes environmental sociology as demystifying and at the same time productive of its own opponents in their denialism, or zealous un-reason, is how *this image* of the conflicted level of discourse is itself an object in the putative catachresis of cynical reason. How has this evidently tropologically disposed antagonism, conflict, struggle over the *classification* of scientific research itself become an instrument in un-reasoning and mythologization[31]?

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[29] Again, Bourdieu's discussion of recognition is helpful in that by this turn the sociologist means *naturalized,* such that someone, something, or someplace (time), is recognized as such. It is in mis-recognition that we can articulate *how* this naturalization is relational in terms of power. It would be remiss however to omit the recent and ongoing discussion of *recognition* that has been part of critical theory for the last decades and crosses into critical race, critical indigenous, and political economic critique.

[30] Especially see Beck and Kropp's *Environmental Risks and Public Perceptions* on the manufacture of 'frames' of risk and risk analysis and the ruins of modern institutions of expert power in the face of a catastrophic society that is also potentially transformative (Beck and Kropp 2007)

[31] The Rodney Needham critique that introduces Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss's *Primitive Classification*, is exemplary of both the translator's committed psychologism and empiricism that fails to observe *classification* in the proto-structural work that parallels such work as Benjamin Whorf—whom Needham does mention—and Ferdinand de Saussure—who he does not. This is exemplary of the inability of Anglo-American sociology lacking the instruments for comprehending *social structure* and failing to understand *classification* as *differentiation*, what Lévi-Strauss explicitly credits to Durkheim and Mauss (although not to them alone!) (Lévi-Strauss 1963). However, the *formalistic* tendency that Needham seemed completely oblivious too, where this opening critique fails to read *Primitive Classification* for its opening statement: "*On some primitive forms of classification: contribution to the study of collective representations",* is the simple obvious reading of this work along with the discussion of *collective representations* itself. Above all Needham does not understand that Durkheim's 'holism' or Mauss's 'total social services' *are* the demonstration of social structure where we only comprehend them *en detail* when presented at this higher level, *en masse*. Similarly, with Evans-Pritchard, the irritation at Durkheim and Mauss's explanation of "*changes",* or what might have been grasped as 'genealogical' shifts, as if *causal* explanations without the proto-structural ideas of *affinity* or *differentiation*, mis-comprehends that these are *logical* not factual shifts figured in collective tropes that are the product of a classificatory system that effectuates *delay* and *presupposition* (as retro-effect) by its own temporalization. It is fair to say that the translator and the anthropologist are as stymied on this observation as Durkheim and Mauss were; however, the latter are engaged with sociology and the former with mere empiricism as external critique, unrelated to the argument actually demonstrated.

The ruins of prior political economic systems are the social artefacts that this study takes as evidence for gradually disclosing this classificatory struggle. Further, lifting an apparently niche debate over the framing of environmental social science arguments out of its pejorative 'rhetorical' form and returning this to life.

Tropes, such as 'the treadmill of production' signal a kind of literalization, an ossified discourse, itself a stylistic effect in its *figure*. We can begin to detect the value of tropes, specifically metaphor, as a nascent effort to break with the literal by offering a 'deviation' from the imagery that is familiar, specifically a kind of juxtaposition that demands our restructured perception as it comes from the commonly received.
Ricoeur is instructive here where he observes that the 'poetic image' (metaphor, but also metonymy and synechdoche are also accounted for here):

> "…in fact, is something that the poem, as a work of discourse, unfolds in certain circumstances and in accordance with certain procedures. This procedure is that of *retentissement*, reverberation, an expression borrowed by Gaston Bachelard from Eugène Minkowski. To understand this procedure, however, is first to admit that the reverberation comes, not from things seen, but from things said. The question to which we must first return is then that concerning the circumstances of discourse whose use engenders the imaginary." (p.172. *Imagination in Discourse and in Action*) (Ricoeur 1991).

That is, the socio-symbolic universe we always already inhabit provides the circumstances for the imaginary, how we imagine, and use of images; for the scientist, *what* models, formulations, or simulations, *what* arguments and concepts, measures and explanations. Moreover, the socio-symbolic rules for the use of these images is always drawn from priors as if past or passed-by, without discerning any distinction between the timespace of these predicates. That is, upon returning to Beck's *catastrophe society* we are confronted with a future that has been obviated—by-passed—in the actions that are our actual past, and those that remain unmanifest *as if* by-passed as well.

There are then two sense of the uncertainty and non-knowledge that appear as soon as we no longer find ourselves ensnared in a putative past of undifferentiated 'past actions', and acknowledge a by-passing of future, alternative, trajectories as well as the extinction of the future in-advance. Thus, the *retentissement* of a prior discourse, it's systematic resonance, 'can be wrong' for having obviated future trajectories—because this is actually the case—and it can be wrong in the sense that we have bypassed these possibilities, when in fact we have not. To the sociologist this familiar pattern of Type I and Type II errors: presuming change when there is none, presuming no change when there is respectively, is typically tabulated against the 'truth' where we make the right decision in support of the preponderance of the evidence.

However, this is not extensive enough to cope with actual socio-symbolic conditions in an illiberal socio-symbolic environment. We must consider the duplicitous condition where we are 'right for the wrong reasons', thus *legitimations* are the disavowed object of such scientific 'methods', not science per se, and the insidious, albeit rarer yet hardly unknown case of 'doing

the right procedure (process) yet pursuing the wrong result': as in the unconstrained gathering of public data for private benefit in profits, surveillance, or intelligence, by 'social media' billed as 'communication' and 'connecting people'; the use of public money to subsidize private enterprise as in the bail out of wall street in 2008-2009, billed as necessary to the economy and not simply to a windfall by clearing the real estate field of its less powerful competitors.

Upon returning then to 'the past' misconstrued for bypassing possible futures actually or potentially-taken-as actuality, we can add the disavowed future because demythologized through condescending that: this IS how our subordinate thinking is flawed and illegitimate, and IN NEED OF CORRECTION BY AN EXPERT. In this case, of which 'gaslighting' is the predominate pop-psychological example *par excellance*, the sociological question of legitimation (thus power relations) is what is at stake in the retained and resonant past. We can sediment our social relations in this ferment of falsehood such that we bypass the future through sheer empty proceduralism, through a 'dynamic stability' that serves as impasse clothed in'progress'[32].

The final illiberalist example is that of establishing—instituting—the correct procedures, processes, or 'methods', and then simply ignoring them. This seemingly impossible irrationalism and venality is itself ignored as historic revision itself: what makes official history. The sheer unthinkability that comes with experts suddenly waving their fingers at political professionals for mis-representations and naked ignorance only reveals the political unconscious as cynical: political professionals have *never* had an interest in a past with any fidelity to actual circumstances. It is not a mistake that U.S. supreme court judge John Roberts simply wrote off social science as 'gobbledygook' and also ignored what he surely understood to be an impotent rebuke by the ASA[33]. This position is not a juridical position so much as brokerage in political

[32] This is a large part of Hartmut Rosa's thesis in *Social Acceleration: A New Theory of Modernity* (Rosa 2013).

[33] The letter from then ASA president Bonilla Silva October 13 2017:

Dear Chief Justice John Roberts:

I write today on behalf of the American Sociological Association, the nation's largest scholarly professional association of sociologists, to respond to a comment you made during oral arguments on Tuesday, October 3rd for the case of Gill v. Whitford. You said: "It may be simply my educational background, but I can only describe it [social science data] as sociological gobbledygook."

We were pleased to learn that Justices Kagan and Sotomayor subsequently expressed concern about your statement and spoke to the value of social science measures. In this letter, we provide additional context for understanding the empirical nature of social scientific data and the ways it has served the national interests.

In an era when facts are often dismissed as "fake news," we are particularly concerned about a person of your stature suggesting to the public that scientific measurement is not valid or reliable and that expertise should not be trusted. What you call "gobbledygook" is rigorous and empirical. The following are just a few examples of the contributions of sociological research to American society that our members offered in response to your comment:

- Clear evidence that separate is not equal
- Early algorithms for detecting credit card fraud
- Mapped connections between racism and physiologic stress response
- Network analysis to identify and thwart terror structures and capture terrorists

power. Similarly, the 'irony' of Larry Summers in his leaked memo on exporting waste and pollution was no irony, and the rebuke by David Pellow, despite its warrant, cannot but have been comprehended in advance by that ironist as an easily dismissible riposte[34]. The established juridical institution (The U.S. Supreme Court) and that of a research institution (Harvard) were in

- Pay grades and reward systems that improve retention among enlisted soldiers
- Modern public opinion polling
- Evidence of gender discrimination in the workplace
- Understanding of the family factors that impact outcomes for children
- Guidance for police in defusing high-risk encounters
- Strategies for combatting the public health challenge of drug abuse

We are certain that the social scientists and legal scholars at your alma mater would be disappointed to learn that you attributed your lack of understanding of social science to your Harvard education. Should you be interested in enhancing your education in this area, we would be glad to put together a group of nationally and internationally renowned sociologists to meet with you and your staff. Given the important ways in which sociological data can and has informed thoughtful decision-making from the bench, such time would be well spent. Please contact our Executive Director, Nancy Kidd, at nkidd@asanet.org if you would like us to arrange such a meeting. Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

[34] Summers Memo: December 12, 1991

'Dirty' Industries: Just between you and me, shouldn't the World Bank be encouraging MORE migration of the dirty industries to the LDCs [Least Developed Countries]? I can think of three reasons:

1) The measurements of the costs of health impairing pollution depends on the foregone earnings from increased morbidity and mortality. From this point of view a given amount of health impairing pollution should be done in the country with the lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest wages. I think the economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest wage country is impeccable and we should face up to that.

2) The costs of pollution are likely to be non-linear as the initial increments of pollution probably have very low cost. I've always thought that under-populated countries in Africa are vastly UNDER-polluted, their air quality is probably vastly inefficiently low compared to Los Angeles or Mexico City. Only the lamentable facts that so much pollution is generated by non-tradable industries (transport, electrical generation) and that the unit transport costs of solid waste are so high prevent world welfare enhancing trade in air pollution and waste.

3) The demand for a clean environment for aesthetic and health reasons is likely to have very high income elasticity. The concern over an agent that causes a one in a million change in the odds of prostrate[sic] cancer is obviously going to be much higher in a country where people survive to get prostrate[sic] cancer than in a country where under 5 mortality is 200 per thousand. Also, much of the concern over industrial atmosphere discharge is about visibility impairing particulates. These discharges may have very little direct health impact. Clearly trade in goods that embody aesthetic pollution concerns could be welfare enhancing. While production is mobile the consumption of pretty air is a non-tradable.

The problem with the arguments against all of these proposals for more pollution in LDCs (intrinsic rights to certain goods, moral reasons, social concerns, lack of adequate markets, etc.) could be turned around and used more or less effectively against every Bank proposal for liberalization.

— *Lawrence Summers*

the same event reduced to hollow vehicles for power, as *openly illegitimate practices*, of juridical and administerial praxis of cynical reason as the actual institution.

In these examples a *catastrophe society* catches up with us in the 21st C. for the obviations that come from the past, from the *ruins <u>of</u> the past* catching-us up in our present (presentist and misrecognized) history and biography. The travesty of public institutions responsible to power and nothing else is the obviation that naïve efforts to interpret the past 'historically', and not socioanalytically, simply miss. Just as the character types, dispositions, and subjection, that are 'biographical' also turns out to be caught-up in discourses that *compel* and *resonate* with this ruinate past, returning in our defense of identity and our biographical identifications—shorn of political and ecological circumstance—and that is to say in bowdlerized, diminished, and excised of these critical planetary discourses[35].

Discourse censured, 'hacked', or disconnected from political and ecological circumstances cannot but also be characterized by the censure and caricature of subjects, timespace, symbolic function of its own, and its other/interlocuter. Thus, we can observe for these conditions as the *discursive conditions* that very often are sedimented in those priors we attribute to the past. What we will discover is that discourse is by no means exclusively historical in this way, nonetheless it is only by historicization in a variety of modes that we begin to develop an incipient socioanalytic technique for analysis through discourse.

I will also extend discourse to a tacit—tangible—world of objects, with whose symbolic function we are also engaged in mute relations. From this vantage point that begins to examine eco-environmental timespace, discourse and its extra-discursive world, will be re-presented for intelligibilities that an an-aesthetized sense of the world will not be prepared.

A lengthy yet careful sense of the historicality of the rationalization and refraction of *sense* and thus *value* or *meaning* as also conjoined sensory-motor or psycho-physical phenomenon, is given by Jameson on this point:

> "So, to take an obvious example, as sight becomes a separate activity in its own right, it acquires new objects that are themselves the products of a process of abstraction and rationalization which strips the experience of the concrete of such attributes as color, spatial depth, texture, and the like, which in their turn undergo reification. The history of forms evidently reflects this process, by which the visual features of ritual, or those practices of imagery still functional in religious ceremonies, are secularized and reorganized into ends in themselves, in easel painting and new genres like landscape, then more openly in the perceptual revolution of the impressionists, with the autonomy of the visual finally triumphantly proclaimed in abstract expressionism." (p.63 *The Political Unconscious*)(Jameson 1981)

Although some of these points are contentious in discussions of aesthetics, reception, and importantly an *aesthetic unconscious* which fulfill figure more importantly later, Jameson's example of the *objectification of the eye*, of *sight*, and of *concrete objects of sight*, is itself an

[35] Again, this is 'reduction' in the conventional sociological parlance, itself a *sociologistic reduction* that fails to 'turn back to the things themselves'.

important observation of *intentionality*. It is this phenomenological advance that takes perception as always composed of sense and sense-object (noesis: how we sense, and noema: what we sense) and the 'subject' side of how we are datives of manifestation for the objects we *intend*, that is my concern[36]. However, Jameson's discussion here is important for its sociological grounding for literary (and aesthetic) criticism. Previously, Jameson introduces rationalization this way:

> "For the dynamic of rationalization-Weber' s term, which Lukacs will strategically retranslate as reification in History and Class Consciousness-is a complex one in which the traditional or "natural" [naturwüchsige] unities, social forms, human relations, cultural events, even religious systems, are systematically broken up in order to be reconstructed more efficiently, in the form of new post-natural processes or mechanisms; but in which, at the same time, these now isolated broken bits and pieces of the older unities acquire a certain autonomy of their own, a semiautonomous coherence which, not merely a reflex of capitalist reification and rationalization, also in some measure serves to compensate for the dehumanization of experience reification brings with it, and to rectify the otherwise intolerable effects of the new process." (ibid) (Jameson 1981)

Socioanalysis greatly benefits from this grasp of social artefacts as themselves *split* as their subjects are. Above all, Jameson provides the necessary genealogical sense important to these thingifications as 'economic', as 'post-natural', *for* both capitalist reification and *for* the 'compensatory', clinical advances in tandem with this destructive process. Again, socioanalysis must always take itself as part of those 'objects' and 'subjects' it seeks to elaborate, and this too has a history in both the clinical sense of working-through the sedimentations of this reification process and cynical misuse in efforts to dominate the process of working-through itself.

From Discourse to Narrative: Levels and Operations

The first advance that narrative analysis has for us is *the operation of levels,* and the dendrogram or 'hierarchy' that this structuralist imperative makes use of (Barthes and Duisit 1975)(Riessman 1993)(Czarniawska 2004)[37]. Where structure both unifies and differentiates, these levels are signaled by shifts in abstraction, better said higher levels of *abstracta,* where the complexity of our imagery, artistic or scientific evolves (q.v. footnote 14). Only by 'drawing-out' what properties are available at an immanent level of observation do we supersede them in discovering the logic that makes these intelligible patterns, rhythms of activity, or intelligible signs.

Jameson's example of aesthetic sight is however exemplary for the indication of history as a working-through the sociology of art or literature. What is often relegated to naïve genre study,

[36] In this study I will never mean 'intentional' as commonly used in such statements as "I intended to…". *Intention* and *intentionality* will only refer to the phenomenological sense.

[37] Although Riessman and Czarniawska differ in preference of approach—phenomenological (following Ricoeur and Merleau-Ponty) and structural (following Todorov)—both rely upon Barthes: "The theory of levels (as enunciated by Benveniste) provides two types of relations: distributional (if the relations belong on the same level) , integrative (if they straddle two levels) . It follows that distributional relations alone are unable to account for meaning. Thus, in order to carry out a structural analysis, it is necessary first to distinguish several levels of description *[instance de description]* and to place these levels within a hierarchical (integrative) perspective. Levels are operations." (p.242 *An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative*)(Barthes and Duisit 1975)

the literary critic raises to a higher level, what Jameson's own 'levels' of analysis, starting with the *socially symbolic act*, then *the ideologeme*, and culminating in the *ideology of form,* accomplish:

> "The study of the ideology of form is no doubt grounded on a technical and formalistic analysis in the narrower sense, even though, unlike much traditional formal analysis, it seeks to reveal the active presence within the text of a number of discontinuous and heterogeneous formal processes. But at the level of analysis in question here, a dialectical reversal has taken place in which it has become possible to grasp such formal processes as sedimented content in their own right, as carrying ideological messages of their own, distinct from the ostensible or manifest content of the works; it has become possible, in other words, to display such formal operations from the standpoint of what Louis Hjelmslev will call the "content of form" rather than the latter's "expression, " which is generally the object of the various more narrowly formalizing approaches. The simplest and most accessible demonstration of this reversal may be found in the area of literary genre." (p.99. ibid) (Jameson 1981)

What Jameson provides is a narratological study that retains the 'central instance of the human mind' that *is narrative* according to this critical literary thinker as also a theorist of methods and social consciousness[38]. A study of ideology in literature as the sedimented 'form' has another valuable approach that also offers some sense of how a kind of *mythos* returns with enlightenments' collapse back into its own structures. This last point is of course the point of many race and post-colonial scholars that observe that 'western enlightenment' has liberated markets and populist rancor, yet few people. Critical (radical) feminists and Queer theorists likewise can point to the history of 'western enlightenment' as having never fulfilled its promise nor even recognized its grudging omission of 'minor subjects' from the very first thinking of *whom* enlightenment is for[39].

Where levels are treated as operations however, we are not condemned to inevitable collapse, reification, and misrecognition, without also encountering that 'dialectical reversal' as revealing a step out of the merely psychological, the merely literary, or even the social fantasy of revolt. These become the sedimented objects, the *agalma,* that must be allowed their part in unsettling

[38] Jameson accurately describes the paradox of being part of the thing one studies in sociology, albeit the eclipse of this is remedied as soon as the cultural artefact is socio-scientific 'model', 'framework', etecetera: "The whole paradox of what we have here called the subtext may be summed up in this, that the literary work or cultural object, as though for the first time, brings into being that very situation to which it is also, at one and the same time, a reaction. It articulates its own situation and textualizes it, thereby encouraging and perpetuating the illusion that the situation itself did not exist before it, that there is nothing but a text, that there never was any extra- or con-textual reality before the text itself generated it in the form of a mirage. One does not have to argue the reality of history: necessity, like Dr. Johnson's stone, does that for us. That history—Althusser's "absent cause," Lacan's "Real"—is not a text, for it is fundamentally non-narrative and nonrepresentational; what can be added, however, is the proviso that history is inaccessible to us except in textual form, or in other words, that it can be approached only by way of prior (re)textualization." (pp. 81-82 *The Political Unconscious*)(Jameson 1981)

[39] Again, Jameson provides some acute readings that get at precisely the racializing and colonizing narratives found in Conrad, and the gendering and normativizing disguise of Eichendorff's *Aus dem Leben eines Taugenichts*. In these cases of *classification* and *(mis)recognition* the dative of western enlightenment is not simply the figure of the 'heteronormative white male', rather it is the classificatory social circumstances for this figuration, not the mystical individual that is the object.

our surety, knowledge and certainty, that we fully comprehend just what world we are *for* or *of*. The untimeliness of theory is the yield of socioanalysis that *can* imagine planetary change and world revolution because this is a higher level only made available when we let go of the caricature of these possibilities by a logic that exempts itself from such 'grand thoughts'. Such is utopia as *ou*-topia: a no-place come from a non-time too.

Both Roland Barthes and Fredric Jameson have developed a mode of narrative analysis reliant upon levels as operations that disclose meaning. Barthes levels as *functions, actions,* and *narration*, can be compared to Jamesons' *socially symbolic act, ideologeme,* and *ideology of form*, where the later term is the level that discloses the preceding and the semantic unit is demonstrated. That is, a *socially symbolic act* like Barthes *function* becomes meaningful for analytic purposes only when it is understood from the level of the *ideologeme* or in the case of the latter, *action*. For Jameson the final horizon cannot be fully disclosed and is the 'absent cause' of history itself.

The levels that I will work with here are 'tropological' insofar as they are increasingly generative figurations based on the trope (see Figure 1.). Likewise, these levels have a final horizon in reflexivity demonstrated as irony. This 'final' level is not terminal, it is *catastrophic* in that meaning is *inverted* because reversible and that is to say arbitrary, and turned back upon whatever preceded, effectively demonstrating a kind of closure[40]. However, this 'closure' is operational at best, and may also be the point at which meaning re-enters the system that generated it. We can conceive of *sociological levels* by simply entering a social fact into its own context and history as a way to raise its 'meaning'—how it is a *social fact* for a society because a *social value*—into observation, and most important for the sociologist, explanatory form.

The tropological levels follow Hayden White's fourfold use of these 'master tropes': Metaphor (I), Metonymy (II), Synecdoche (III), and Irony (IV). In this initial illustration the effect of levels is not evident, each proportion of the grid is the same, and although the phases can be read counterclockwise, this too indicates little of how levels are resonant.

The obvious connection to Ulrich Beck's theory of a risk society become a *catastrophe society* is retained here in the property of reversibility and the 'final' revisory form of reflexion that is inverse and thus catastrophic in this formal/logical sense: it is *ironic*. Beck's work on ecological reflexivity generated by modern processes that 'take themselves as their own theme', effectively their own subject matter, has consequences that the sociologist also noted for their political effects. This sociological theory also operates with a similar logic of 'irony' that is ruinate in that the non-effort at a nation-state levels and markets to curb the effects of climate change are

[40] A fine example of this is Niklas Luhmann's use of Spencer Brown's logic of forms and the imperative: "first, make a distinction!".

FIGURE 1. TROPOLOGICAL LEVELS

instead rather reliably a game of brinkmanship that has assured a guaranteed scarcity of habitability of much of the planet already. The 'irony' is that there is in fact *no rationality* other than demonstrated *irrationality* as the actual result of science and technology administered and openly neglected in political and environmental discourses. The logic of capital is stupid autonomy; better said *automaticity* as if 'economic' because efficient and without thought or *theory*, and demonstratable in *ideological closure* (see Figure 2.).

In this illustration, the phases are still followed in a clockwise and spiraling pattern that catastrophically 'opens out' into a reflexive closure of self referentiality. The problem then is to observe this systematicity and to 'enter into it the right way'. Which is to say, that entering into this invidious circle means observing what phase/level is paradigmatic in any given situation—framing the context—and testing for this. Change requires some investment in the phasic motion—a metabolism in a positive feedback loop—that is system's means of transforming itself. Paradoxically this requires *times* and not just *a time* for this 'right moment' that *Kairos* sought in transformative efforts.

When considering *sociological levels* of time we are immediately confronted with *how* social facts re-enter the social system at higher levels of temporalization, namely, how they are *historicized* and thus the problems of under-*historicization* appears in the sociologists own adoption of empty concepts: empty for having appeared as if out of time immemorial, and thus failing to account for intellectual history at the level of concepts, arguments, and thus theoretical developments/shifts. However, the possibility of *over-historicization* also lurks wherever the sociologist takes recourse to highly detailed yet narrow and non-comparative historical accounts, as is typical in much identitarian commitment to specific ethnographic 'histories' that are in fact much closer to biographical research. Nonetheless, it is by entering into this dynamic of historicization that *temporalization* comes back into view as the actual stakes, and what raises sociology to a level that is appropriately *socioanalytical*.

Simultaneous with the struggles of classification concerning *temporalization* are those *of* space, and thus empiricist geography and with the corrective of such ideas as *localization*; where the local is intensive (or spatialization as extensive) space of actions and of decisions embedded in architecture, landscape, and physis, are meant to counter such problems as *disembodied space* and *abstract space*. This under-represented 'localization' of course raises the geographers' efforts at *over-scaping* by geographic imagery—the map—and spatializing too hastily, and resulting in failures of *misplaced concreteness* that struggles to found meaning-of rather than explain what meaning is *for* in already over-topographized places: nation states, free trade zones, no-fly zones, suburbs, farmlands, brownfields, and derelict places of waste and memoryless-ness. Again, sustaining this struggle to classify space is where sociology is raised from mere inter-discourse with geography and materialist economism to socioanalysis by account for *how* meaning re-enters at higher levels of spatialization.

The last and most important level—because sociologistic—is that of 'context': variously 'frame', and '(social) situation' in American sociological parlance. I will stress the idea of *context* in terms of older provenance—not for antiquarian preferences—rather, to keep certain intellectual traditions in view, and to maintain a connection to contemporary advances in social and



FIGURE 2. IDEOLOGICAL CLOSURE

environmental theory[41]. As 'bracketed' and having a resemblance to some Gestaltist insight, *context* is a neutralized world that is *NEVER* separable from those 'subjects' that are also suspended in their subjectivity, when we come to understand this as *under-contextualized* and overlooking how often a context-less abstraction—an *image, concept, or explanation*—simply stands as if on its own and without relations to its surroundings—social of environmental. Likewise, *over-contexutalization* has become the favored 'tactic' of sociologists in combatting these prenotions and prejudices wherever an opponent can be figured into existence by the accusation: "aren't you forgetting the context…", which is *not a question*. Rather, an insinuating claim to the stakes of a presumptive, provoked, argument, and thus a *social situation* where subjects are suspended for empiricist assumptions about naively and *literally* (which is also to say concretely) identifying with what one's statements may 'literally' mean. Above all, this is the denial of reflexivity to an other as a way to disabuse them later. Colorfully put as 'liberal blackmail' by Slavoj Zizek, this is a naked display of disowned power relations and *cynicism* as the office of the professional in the mode/mood of 'intervention'(Zizek 2001).

Thus following sociologistic reduction to 'the context', and how meaning is re-entered by indices of power and professional office into association—social relations—sociology is raised from instrumental use by liberalism to its own actual, critical form as socioanalysis of the stakes of this 'contextualization' as a third area: *aesthetic* in the sense that it is to do with *perception/reception* and how percepts are *effectuated* by what we do. Yet also interpreted through 'moral' sense—in the sense of a genealogy of *morals* as *mores*—that are the embodied mind of 'conduct' or habitus. And, interpreted as 'empirical' in the sense of sensible—*sensuous*—things or objects of actuation; things upon which we act and thus perceive at all. The latter is to indicate again, that there is no *tabula rasa* other than that which we generate as the 'background world'. That this is a counter-intuitive approach, and an incipient 'anti-positivist' move that states that our actions are more often motivated by *limitation, constraint,* and *restriction*, rather than some kind of 'production' that is free from controlling *terms*.

A conventional history will explain nothing of how this irrationality and brinkmanship is social much less structural of uncritical liberalist historicism. Thus, this study does not risk 'comparative history' where demonstrably little environmental history is critical. The standout is William Cronon, with some work by John Demos, and Daniel Worster, and it is to Cronon that a good part of historicizing the 'environment' and 'background world' is rightfully owed(Cronon 1983)(Demos 1994)(Worster 2004). There are two more exceptions in the case of historical theory, the first being Hayden White, to whom the typological approach is owed, even if I do not follow White's lead into his particular historiography (White 2013). The other is the work of Carlo Ginzburg whose micro-histories provide excellent environmental details and an approach that bridges literary criticism and discourse analysis (Ginzburg 1980)(Ginzburg 2013). A great deal of this owed to the insight of Mikhail Bakhtin who already has a presence in Jameson's analysis using the *ideologeme*(Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978).

The discussion of levels must be extended to space for the interventions by geography into sociology through the conventional use of cartography. The exemplar here is David Harvey and it is too often his disciples, with significantly less of a grasp of Marxian theory, and too little

[41] I am referring to *thing theory* and *Object Oriented Ontology*, specifically. Both of which owe a debt to phenomenology, specifically the discussion of 'tool-being' of Graham Harman.

familiarity with even the most conventional sociology that advance an over-scaped topos as explanation (Harvey 1990). Again, this tends toward a kind of methodological artefact. A lesson in visualization can be learned by following the work of Pierre Bourdieu (whom Harvey also skillfully makes use of), where it is through a *temporalization of space* that these levels of meaning are developed[42]. Perhaps another approach can be developed by the literary critique of Franco Moretti, whose *Graphs, Maps, Trees*, also spatializes time in these different approaches from their literary sources (Moretti 2005). It is again to Mikhail Bakhtin that Moretti owes some of this insight, especially to his section on maps.

Similarly conventional sociology of 'context' also explains nothing. 'Context' as the aggregate of that haphazard 'mixed-methods' approach is a methodologistic artefact, not sociology. Perhaps more telling is that sociological levels 'micro-', 'meso-', and 'macro-', demonstrate the same a-theoretic understanding by recourse to a 'meso-level' as a kind of average position for intelligibility. This is to simply ignore that sociology has its own method: it is structural, and it is differential. It is to Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss that sociological structural-ism is owed (Durkheim and Mauss 1963), and it is to Max Weber and to some extent Ferdinand Tönnies that the use of ideal types in a strictly comparative mode is 'differential'[43]. Finally, both these sociologists carried out their respective studies using 'historical' evidence: *collective representations* in the case of Durkheim and Mauss (Durkheim 1915), *Gedankenbild* (historical imagery) in the case of Weber (Weber 1946). No context without history, and no context without social structure.

Thus, three *modes* (moods) in socioanalysis that together fall under a conceptual umbrella of the *chronotope* as analytic of timespace, and importantly its *figurations*. These are also non-positivist terms where by *actuation*—not *'action'* and the busybody productionism that governs everything from agriculture to academic knowledge-production—erases *prior* acts by working on whatever object or material is substantive of actuating limits, and thus shaping most often by elimination or extinction of what came before. Novelty results in a palimpsest for the meaning that is cast to temporal oblivion, spatial 'abysses', or contextual aporia, yielding an echo: a *ruins*.

Tropes and figures as words, phrases, sentences, and discourse.

The importance of the *trope* as a unit of observation and a *figure* as a minimal unit of analysis is a technique where the *trope*: "presenting one idea under the sign of another that is more striking of better known" (p.59. *The Rule of Metaphor*)(Ricoeur 1977) can subvert its own genus (figures as tropes that are not simply single words) is important for demonstrating a kind of *re-entry* of this sign into its own system. That is, the reflexivity already possible in figurative language from the very beginning of language. That is, the *image*, whether it is artistic or scientific, pictorial or model, is already formed reflexively for its re-shaping of meaning.

[42] See Harvey: *The Condition of Postmodernity* (Harvey 1990). Also Bourdieu's spatio-temporal analysis of the Kabyle: *Outline of A Theory Of Practice* (Bourdieu 1977)

[43] Not simply typological! Weber's commentators have been very clear about the comparative method of Weber's research program, and a careful reading of Tönnies will demonstrate that his ideal types, albeit more simplistic at first glance yield grades of difference, not simply discrete types. See Gunther Roth's Introduction to *Economy and Society:* (Weber 1978a) also Hans Gerth and C. Wright Mills Introduction in their *From Max Weber*: (Weber 1946).

The *trope* is not a unit of analysis here, rather the *figure,* following Ricoeur's treatment of Jean Genette (who is in turn following Pierre Fontanier), thus: "…the figure exists… only to the extent that one can oppose it to a literal expression… the criterion of figure is the substitution of one expression (word, phrase, sentence, and even group of sentences) for another, which the rhetorician must be able to restore mentally in order to have the right to speak to speak of figure… " (p.53. ibid) (Ricoeur 1977). That is, without being able to re-turn to the literal meaning that the figure is 'substituted' for, deviates from—and in this sense seduces us to divert us from a putative literal or concretist mistake and misrecognition—we cannot comprehend this shift in discourse[44]. Further, this shift can happen at the level of the word or that of a discourse in its entirety (a group of sentences)[45]. Thus, the test of levels here is strictly technical for the time being in that the shift concerns complexity at successively higher levels of discourse: from the word as figure to the phrase, the sentence, finally that configuration that is a collection of sentences or *discourse*.

However, Ricoeur, again following Genette provides more criteria for the differentiation of levels as operations wherein semantic and syntactic shifts are possible, where Genette's 'figure as substitution' yields a: "piercing and very precious awareness of the paradigmatic dimension of the units (small or large) of discourse" (ibid), again this dimension is in terms of complexity but also gives the paradigm in which these syntagmatic units occur. That is, this is complexity that is not simply 'more sentences and bigger enouncements' and thus quantitative in scale. By *paradigm* we begin to observe the surface—a topos—that is *the content of the form*. For the sociologist we can rephrase this yet again following Erving Goffman's preferred term, and reference this as a *content of the frame*[46]. Which is to say *what* is the meaning of framing this discourse *this way* and not some other.

However, to return this study to its foundations, nor betraying Goffman's own insight, the term *frame,* and the Gestalt that it closely resembles, are better examined with earlier terminology in view: the *content of world* where 'world' (*welt*) was the language of Alfred Schütz, and maintained something of both the Husserlian epoché wherein experience is bracketed, subjectivity suspended, and reasoning or any *discourse* placed 'in quotes'(Schütz 1967)(Sokolowski 2000)[47]. Such that this *world* comes into view and its *horizon*; how *it* is framed and thus predicated in yet some more expansive level of *worldly framing*.

Schütz produced a comprehensive 'typology' of 'worlds' in a tableau of temporal successors and predecessors worlds, by spatial worlds of consociates (face-to-face relations) and contemporaries

[44] See Baudrillard on *seduction,* q.v.

[45] It must be mentioned that this is precisely the allure of Jacque Derrida's work, and what is manifestly irritating to that deconstructionists' detractors. Like a long and complex joke, Derrida plays out a shift to a higher level of theorization by corroding the ordinary and all too operable meanings with which we are comfortably familiar.

[46] See Goffman's *Frame Analysis*, (Goffman 1974b) especially his introduction and pithy history of 'frame' in its conceptual history owed to Edmund Husserl and William James. The latter being owed the usage of 'world' here, not Heidegger, who although important for contribution to this thinking, is not some singular author nor final critic on this conceptualization either.

[47] Important to note here is that *categorial intuition* as the phenomenological description of reasoning is what defines the incipient and tacit un-quoted act, to quoted and explicitly interrogated act, and finally dis-quoted and implicit acts as a pattern of enouncements as *reason*. Only by returning to this *autopoietic* pattern of reasoning where (socially symbolic narrative) acts raise themselves out in dialogue by their own operations do we also have a model for dialectic and *diataxis*, and the recourse to both analytic and isotopic explanations in socioanalysis.

(remote spatial relations)(Schütz 1967). This classification provides some immediate sense of *how* our deictic position is meaningfully framed—bracketed—and thus *paradigmatic*. Our study of paradigms substantiates worlds through substitutions that are permissible in accordance to the paradigm with which we are operating. However, this permissibility is *syntagmatic* in that the kind of associations we may make are already predicated in a founding mythos as the guiding referent for a paradigm[48]. By working-through the substitutions, a redundant pattern of horizontal or distributed meanings give what is paradigmatic, what is a matrix for acts and things. However, this inexhaustible play of signifiers also signals the syntagm that is the governing referent and thus a *prior* level that it is integrated from, that this matrix is a ruling dative for.

Thus, a figure as word, phrase, sentence, or discourse, discloses its own terms of reversal as non-literal, complexity at the level of discursive formation, and a specific paradigm to which this syntagmatic shift (a reversal as dialectical) is owed. Especially the last is important in that literal discourse does not demonstrate the reflexive dynamic that figurative discursive objects do. Literalist and concretist 'thought' is horizontal, distributive, yet not investigative of its own predicates that would destabilize and render appearances, imagery, or concepts, distinct from what they represent, and thus introduce the figure. Where we reverse the ordinary flow of signifiers and we operate as datives by way of figurative discursive objects, the literal discursive object, naturalized suspension of subjectivity as 'objectivity', or 'neutrality', becomes demonstrably farcical. This farce of 'objectivity' typical of the disavowed scientized subject is a figure barred from re-entry into its own system, whereas the figurative discursive object permits just such an action, deviating us from simple acceptance and expectance of the literal and denotative. We become aware of the socio-symbolic itself. Jameson makes just such a claim in the historicization of literature:

> "Thus it becomes a little clearer how what is archaic in [Joseph] Conrad could overleap the now classical [Henry] Jamesian moment and become post-modernist. If the multiple narrative shifts in Conrad are to be seen as textbook exercises in point of view, then we must add something which changes everything: they are point of view conceived as being inseparable from speech, from the materiality of language. In this historical and dialectical reversal, Conrad's yarn-spinning becomes the epitome of a thinking which has discovered the symbolic; James, on the other hand, if he manifests, along with other modernisms, a powerful practice of the symbolic and of linguistic invention, is still theoretically locked into nonsymbolic, essentially "expressive" categories. For him, point of view is still a psychological matter, a matter of consciousness; but the discovery of the symbolic in its widest sense (all the way from Saussure to semiotics, or from Wittgenstein to Whorf on the one hand and Derrida on the other) is the sheerest repudiation, of just such notions as "consciousness" and "psychology. "" (p.224 *The Political Unconscious*)(Jameson 1981)

Social structure is, to recall for the reader, only decipherable in precisely such terms according to C. Wright Mills:

[48] Bruno Latour's efforts to use semiotics here is helpful to a limited degree. See *Pandora's Hope* where he follows Greimas' actantial model (Latour 1999).

> "For that imagination is the capacity to shift from one perspective to another—from the political to the psychological; from examination of a single family to comparative assessment of the national budgets of the world; from the theological school to the military establishment; from considerations of an oil industry to studies of contemporary poetry. It is the capacity to range from the most impersonal and remote transformations to the most intimate features of the human self—and to see the relations between the two. Back of its use there is always the urge to know the social and historical meaning of the individual in the society and in the period in which he has his quality and his being." (p.7. *The Sociological Imagination*)(Mills 2000)

For the sake of making clear the position here to the reader, Jameson is not eliminating the subject and Mills is not the unequivocal champion of a foundation in the psychological. Rather it is the stereoscopy that aligns a discussion of consciousness *with* its evolution in history and not as its atomic building block that both these thinkers have a commitment to. Despite whatever interesting differences between their respective investment in history and its subjects, it is more important to return to the figures of a socio-symbolic constitution of that history, those images that are the carriers of values and conduct across generations. That is, we must begin to comprehend the *figures of historical discourse.*

It is of no small importance that Jameson also signals a definitive *aesthetic* shift in perspective from 'expression' of content to form itself. 'Psychologies' in this reversal reveal themselves to be 'narrative shifts' that direct us to the material object of a text for its structure of these shifts. Let me repeat this: *structure* and thus the norms for being 'psychological individuals' in an atomistic perspective are what is under observation[49].

Milieu

A theory of Milieu in sociology is important in refuting Latour's diminution of *society* to 'modern settlement'. While it is laudable that Latour does sustain a post-ontological sense of society as an entity that does not exist in itself, this is an over-contextualization without equal. By too-quickly re-inscribing society as a result of settlement and thus a paradigm within which we are ensnared, Latour fails to exhaust the possible shifts within this paradigm. What he refers to as 'shifting in, shifting out, shifting down'. Again space, time, and deictic center (character) are impugned.

[49] A recollection of the lengthy anti-psychiatry movement is in order and the American propensity to incarcerate and isolate as a social norm is an historical fact. The famous article by D.L. Rosenhan from 1973 *Being Sane in Insane Places* (Rosenhan 1973), stands as exemplary of the failures of the modes of observation themselves; regarding hospital observation of hospitalized 'pseudopatients' (false patients, alleging symptoms of 'existential psychosis') Rosenhan states this: "The uniform failure to recognize sanity cannot be attributed to the quality of the hospitals, for, although there were considerable variations among them, several are considered excellent. Nor can it be alleged that there was simply not enough time to observe the pseudopatients. Length of hospitalization ranged from 7 to 52 days with an average of l9 days. The pseudopatients were not, in fact, carefully observed, but this failure clearly speaks more to traditions within psychiatric hospitals than to lack of opportunity." (… Rosenhan). Traditions, and that is to say that norms of *psychological* observations of supposed content of the mind/brain by outward symptoms can be simulated (not simply dissimulated). Further, it is the observation of these norms that are at issue in socioanalysis.

Milieu is materializable as *The Town*:

> "What is the milieu? It is what is needed to account for action at a distance of one body on another. It is therefore the medium of an action and the element in which it circulates.‡ It is therefore the problem of circulation and causality that is at stake in this notion of milieu. So, I think the architects, the town planners, the first town planners of the eighteenth century, did not actually employ the notion of milieu, since, as far as I have been able to see, it is never employed to designate towns or planned spaces."
> "On the other hand, if the notion does not exist, I would say that the technical schema of this notion of milieu, the kind of – how to put it? – pragmatic structure which marks it out in advance is present in the way in which the town planners try to reflect and modify urban space. The apparatuses of security work, fabricate, organize, and plan a milieu even before the notion was formed and isolated. The milieu, then, will be that in which circulation is carried out. The milieu is a set of natural givens – rivers, marshes, hills – and a set of artificial givens – an agglomeration of individuals, of houses, etcetera. The milieu is a certain number of combined, overall effects bearing on all who live in it. It is an element in which a circular link is produced between effects and causes, since an effect from one point of view will be a cause from another." (pp.20-21) (Foucault 2007)

The pragmatic matter of modifying space, of circumscribing the ambit of circulation, thus metabolism, is disowned in the performance prior to the notion of milieu. In effect, the delay and plenum of the notion of milieu is exemplary of that other of a political and ecological unconscious. It is the structure prior to institutionalization.

Ruin(s)

As soon as Milieux form they are already corrupted by metabolic demand. Ruins are sedimentations, strata, habits, the foregone and foreclosed and well as forgotten conditions that are the case of our structural opposition and accusation. The oppositive objects of milieux wear and conflict with each other: the shaping of space, and by this also bodies, is destructive.

Ruins are doubly negated, the concentration point of a double-injunction where we are barred, prohibited, in our subjection to these objects, and those objects are impermissible in objectivation, shunned or evaded things. The Lacanian debt here is to the relation of these subjects and objects, not as archaeological things, rather, as socio-symbolic manifestations that are inseparably material and symbolic. What makes analysis possible is the *excessiveness* of this prohibition, the redoubling of it, that signals that this is a *non*-event.

The exemplary passage referring to the metabolic exchange of ruinous thing as impossible and the Same (thus defying the event which is always a moment), and our subjection to it as fantasy, is the well known passage regarding the magic of the 'commodity fetish':

> "A commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men's labour appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labour; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labour is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labour. This is the reason why the products of labour become

> commodities, social things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses. In the same way the light from an object is perceived by us not as the subjective excitation of our optic nerve, but as the objective form of something outside the eye itself. But, in the act of seeing, there is at all events, an actual passage of light from one thing to another, from the external object to the eye. There is a physical relation between physical things. But it is different with commodities. There, the existence of the things *quâ* commodities, and the value relation between the products of labour which stamps them as commodities, have absolutely no connection with their physical properties and with the material relations arising therefrom. There it is a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things." (Pp.47-48. *Capital* Vol 1.)(Marx 1887)

Ruin(s) are commodities, however, we do not know them as *ruinate* until they actually become what they always were: expenditures and waste for the sake of advantage—*capital*—whether it is evidenced in 'economic' or 'cultural' form. We do not observe gas and oil production as the infrastructure of a world war industry until they are expended and it becomes clear that the only value was oppositional. We do not observe the production of cultural 'knowledge' as accusative and as provocation, as the infrastructure of war-industries, until that expenditure in words and images appears in the flesh: the corpse, the mangled soldier, the social reproduction of both.

These ruins are the derelict and the disjecta that only appear retroactively, following their expended social function, the actual violence and antagonism of destruction, and the form of their oppositive relations that is their archaized shape, itself cast off in forgotten logics to those conflicts.

What I will investigate are five cases of ruins in the *figurative images, concepts and arguments,* that defer our scrutiny, differentiate our attention of them and for them, such that these cases not only exist in plain view, they are also variously invisibilized through the social relations and social structures that are our subjection to them. Our retro-affected disposition by the ruins of industrialization is part of their composition, and our least opposition is the treasure that we hold to in such affects as nostalgia, progress, promise, and fatalism. That we *treasure* and even desire what in fact *grips us* in cataleptic seizure is the positive, evident, and overlooked force of socio-symbolic things. Above all the preponderance of the object as concept and word.

Agalma

> "Thus, Saussure resolves the question of the social and economic conditions of the appropriation of language without ever needing to raise it. He does this by resorting, like Comte, to the metaphor of treasure, which he applies indiscriminately to the 'community' and the individual: he speaks of 'inner treasure', of a 'treasure deposited by the practice of speech in subjects belonging to the same community', of 'the sum of individual treasures of language', and of the 'sum of imprints deposited in each brain'." (p.43 *Language and Symbolic Power*)(Bourdieu 1991)

The treasure of *langue* in the sense that Bourdieu grants to Comte and Saussure is the *agalma*: the part of our being within a socio-symbolic system of power exercised through language and

reductions to discourse (artistic, philosophical, scientific, etc.). Above all, we know this 'treasure' to be what is in us more than ourselves, just as it is what we seek in others as their 'agalma'. This is a strange concretion of the dialogical, its anti-empiricist opponent form:

> "The idea *lives* not in one person's *isolated* individual consciousness-if it remains there only, it degenerates and dies. The idea begins to live, that is, to take shape, to develop, to find and renew its verbal expression, to give birth to new ideas, only when it enters into genuine dialogic with other ideas, with the ideas of *others.* Human thought becomes genuine thought, that is, an idea, only under conditions of living contact with another and alien thought, a thought embodied in someone else's voice, that is, in someone else's consciousness expressed in discourse. At that point of contact between voice-consciousnesses the idea is born and lives." (pp.87-88 *Problems of Dostoevky's Poetics*)(Bakhtin 1984)

The contrary, or rather the *compensatory* position of the *ruinate* is the *agalma*. Where ruins are the corruption of things by our actuation of them, the treasure of collective social symbolism in others is the over-valuation of a 'soul' or 'the hidden'. Where ruins disappear into non-visibility by their mute occurrence, the agalma is disappeared by the actuation of that search for something that cannot exist in any concrete way at all.

Thus, the treasured socio-symbolic core of things in the environment withdraws just as surely as the spectre of ruins.

The Problem

The hypothesis, technique, theory, and case studies serve a central problem that I will most often reference to the figures of cynicism and nihilism, fatalism and catastrophe in its eschatological sense. I will observe that this problem is that in an eschatological social structure, the worst actors are motivated by the fatal circumspection that is needed to survive there, and as a consequence of being dead already. That is, circumventing explanation and working-through, undergoing and understanding entirely, the disposition to being already dead is a kind of thingification that is scarcely approached in discussions of barbarism. The worst cynicism is disposed to crimes that could only be committed in a kind of bad-faith, but a bad-faith that stems from accepting that crisis where one is already dead: sentenced and condemned, thus no criminal act is too gratuitous for that acceptance of that fate.

Naively, no question has been raised regarding those that knew they were predestined for a life in hell when Weber made the connection between the religious milieu of Calvinists and that of (proto)Capitalists. Most likely now it is because most sociologists gesture to Weber without literacy in theory or the long development of this particular sociological lesson. Neglect, as we will come to see, is that ruinous activity that carries on in the half-life of already-dead things.

The important 'methodological' connection between the technique, theory, and problem of this socioanalysis is well framed in a remark attributable to Roland Barthes which I will take in a kind of chiasmatic re-treading of Barthes original in translation: "everything has a meaning or nothing has." (p.245 *An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative*)(Barthes and Duisit

1975), which Barthes precedes this way: “Even though a detail might appear unequivocally trivial, impervious to any function, it would nonetheless end up pointing to its own absurdity or uselessness.” (pp. 244-245, ibid)(Barthes and Duisit 1975). This remark could of course be rewritten to some effect with Jameson’s preferred starting level of *the socially symbolic act* instead of ‘*function*’ and make more explicit that in socioanalysis ‘everything has a meaning’, social value, and mode of conduct with which it is evaluated, *or nothing has.* Such that in the case of nihilism this relativization *means explicitly that*. It is indeed the case that the value for valueless-ness that is the anomic praxis of trivializing everything as arbitrary, for the socially constructed veneer of collective representation, and thus ourselves as doubly inscribed as the arbitrary creators of this valueless world of the trivial, does indeed terminate in absurdity and uselessness. A genealogy of this cynical empiricism, of the fatefully and necessarily absent meaning, is the object of *ruins* caught just at the edge of the socioanalytic line of vision before it too disappears.

It is by theorizing this resonance as an echo that signals an erasure and memoryless-ness that is also part of our milieu—an umwelt—that *ruins* are also read as an act that cannot be represented.

This first chapter has set up a movement from text to action: from interpretative efforts to transformative efforts. The establishment of socioanalytic technique as a movement from the discursive to the sensible is mistaken if we fail to observe the mute ruins of sites and the silencing and invisibilization of peoples as the reverse of this: it is rather from the hold that the letter has upon sensibility, bodies, and things, in forms of naming, discursive category, stigma, and trivialization. This cataleptic seizure of bodies in the grip of discourse is unremarked until we observe how habits of speech, thought, and (socio-symbolic) activity is the evidence of a history of social scientific in-observance, ‘methods’, and figuring into being by fiat; by words made flesh.

CHAPTER TWO FROM TECHNIQUE TO THEORY: SOCIOANALYSIS OF SOCIETY STRUCTURED AS LANGUAGE.

Technique implies the Theory. In the following section I will discuss *categorial intentionality* used in discourse and narrative analysis, reprising important points on the phenomenological reduction, the technique of the *epoché*, what is variously referenced as 'framing', 'world', and *bracketing* when referring to the *definition of the situation*; and what is variously called 'indexicality', 'neutralization (as in 'value neutrality')', and 'suspension of judgment', when referring to the reflexive act of holding distinctions in abeyance that is the 'psychological' side of the reduction and the specific *intentionality* (noesis-and-noema) necessitated.
This discussion will be followed by a truncated discussion of the structural use of the Aristotelian *square of opposition* as a framing for explanations and arguments themselves. This is to say that this in agreement with a 'sociology of knowledge', and the more radical approach of 'immanent critique'. However, the technique is largely developed in the francophone world in the mid-20th C. and it is to this that most of the discussion will pivot. However, it is of signature importance that the thinking of *elective affinity* by Weber in particular is of the utmost importance for the final discussion of *discourse and narrative analysis*.

Categorial Intentionality

The discovery of categorial intentionality is the cornerstone of Husserl's phenomenology. It can be demonstrated—for it is a demonstration of logical properties—as a fundamentally discursive process with its own line of time:

***Un-quoted text* → "*Quoted text*"→ '*Disquoted text*'**

The reader should note that hereafter the use of italicized and *un-quoted text* is already an indicator of disquotation: all discourse and narrative analysis is already a second order observation, already reflexive, in that all subsequent analysis respects the line of time where the analyst is always at least a second reader and interpreter. The first order observation allows no alibi, no 'going back', and is a one time only *event*.

The arc of categoriality is representative of the hermeneutic arc:

understanding→ explanation→ interpretation

The sociologist should immediately recognize the pattern of a *verstehen soziologie*. This sociology of the background world of understanding is its unit of observation, what is variously called the *lifeworld* and obliquely *milieu*, and in an important sense *umwelt* as the surrounding environment/society.

The important shift in perspective at every level of this operation is well characterized by Luhmann's 1st, 2nd, and 3rd order observer, there can be more, and indeed there must be to 'complete' socioanalysis. I should note that most often this three-part schema is adequate in most theorists estimation, including Luhmann . However, it is my contention that while this is

efficacious for the logic of analysis, it is inadequate in failing to describe the multiplicity that is the redoubling, pleonasm, and structural transposition that is the source of much trouble in social-life. We cannot disclose structural closure by cynical irony that is the structure of whiteness imposed on the senses of non-whiteness resulting in Fanon's diagnostic in *Black Skins, White Masks*. Nor can we fully appreciate Butler's argument of how heteronormativity is *compulsive* by objective social institutions that redouble the categories of gender as binary opponents in the logic of social structure, *by* the desire for those categorizations in the performances of the categorized themselves.

Why this redoubling? For the simple socio-structural fact of *making social* as *'fait sociaux'*. It is not just that we do as the social constructivist states: "we make social facts", or even that we: 'make social facts by other social facts' as Durkheim had at length arrived at. It is that we are already part of a self-multiplying system when we: 'use an axe handle to make another axe handle', yielding that categorization to the habitus with which we are inculcated/socialized as *cause by continuity*. We are *compelled* to use the categories we already use. Thus, this social more of distinction is *not* ours—not of our will or desire alone—and indicate a will and desire that is 'social'; at least in so far as it is not our own, and only explicable by observing how it *is* how we are *social* in association with others who also already hold this social more and *morality*, in that restricted sense of *mors*.

Finally, without socioanalysis that 'completes' itself by disclosing inclosure by social-structure as categorial, we cannot unravel *social class* as always *classification*. Nor are we prepared for socioanalysis of those antagonistic distinctions that we know class by, as *class struggle*: that struggle over classification itself. This is precisely what puts theory back into motion, makes 'applicable' what we learn as opposed to lifeworldly common-sense understanding, and thus transforms this prior often naïve understanding by explanation to an interpretation that accounts for its own process reflexively and critically. Yet this is to also critique two other positions of absolutism: that of various fundamentalisms—above all economism as an absolute faith in markets or their domination or destruction—and nihilism. The latter, itself an impossibility, must be traversed to unravel it as the most durable objection to learning and reflexion. A favorite form—bad faith—is exemplary of the character formation that is apparently indifferent to the structure that it takes on in 'irony'—as if the performative reversal were all that were needed for reflexion. It is this latter attitude, a cynical socioanalytic disposition, that is the source of social science methodologism, positivism, and empiricism.

To accommodate this fourth observation, the center of the arc—explanation—is expanded as the systemic explication of social-symbolic structure. This *socio-symbolic* structure with its quadripartite positions and its torsion to generate character 'types' or dispositions admits a thorough treatment of meaning in a *systemic form*. It is NOT also worldly or actual in milieu. This is very important to comprehend: the explication by socioanalysis is *not* a mere model-of character type of even disposition, and it is *not* a proscriptive model-for these types and dispositions either. And, this explication is *not* the addition of these models to one another in a kind of neutralizing or natural logic of superposition, and it is *not* the anti-natural logic of transposing these models one over the other as we so choose. Rather, it is the exhaustion of these virtualities, as varieties of naïve and cynical socioanalysis, that is the measure of rigorous praxis: the good of theory that follows the distinctions that sociologists and socioanalysts already use is

its own good. As virtual, this socio-symbolic structure in its explication runs the risk of becoming the cynical transposition that it seeks to avoid. In a successful exercise of praxis it is the distinction of that system of positions demonstrated as a system and form alone.

Further, *praxis* is the surpassing of the socio-symbolic structure *by* its examination as one of its reflexive attributes: we are always already datives of the socio-symbolic objects that we exist for. We, as investigators of any segment of what we deem social or 'society', are already of that society; disposed to it in advance as it were. In the investigatory arc of forgetting and recollection, of memoryless naivete and vigilant criticism, we delay the closure of that investigation by irritants such as our own curiosity or obstinate indifference. Yet, it is when we interpret our own transference by the terms of the very structures we investigate that we enjoy the slim margin of freedom of thought that an exhaustive structural analysis provides by raising it into discourse. No longer a systems property, we are communicative at a level of actual discourse when the socio-symbolic system itself no longer cedes to the background. By interpretation we are responsible to the meaningful structures we investigate by disclosing them in discourse where social-symbols are open to public scrutiny and the event of discourse itself as it shapes and potentially sharpens understanding and meaning itself: transforming the structures we operate by as their datives our reflexivity and critique is a re-entry in these social systems by its own communicative operations (dispositifs, devices, 'instruments').

Categorial intentionality is the model of the texturation of the text insofar as it demonstrates how already disquoted texts are recollected in explanation where we bracket them/suspend our prejudgment that would naturalize these texts. We "quote" them and hold our judgment in abeyance by the simple question: '*what is the case?*'. This question of what the case is purported to be, has a critical component in that by bracketing discourse—texts or otherwise—we are also suspending identification with it by effectively asking *according to whom is this the case?* For whom is this 'natural'? For whom is this *the law*? For whom is this *meaningful*?

Categorial intentionality gives us the socio-symbolic measures we use for social reality: *mores* that disclose will and desire, *norms* that disclose standards of conduct including evaluation of conduct, and *values* as dually things of worth and 'value', and as bonds/barriers that are the relationality of values. The social value placed on the environment itself as background is a troublesome objective institution of neglect, where flora and fauna are treated with indifference and incuriosity, or as curios that can be commodified or wasted as generalizable things. This reification of timespace is met by fore-grounding the environment as a source of anxious concern and cynical interestedness: what seizes upon the 'advantages' of the environment in 'comparative advantage', 'timely fulfillment of contracts', 'progress', and 'acceleration' reifies by making a non human world into a zoo, pet shop, shelter, and CAFO, spelunking expedition and mineral exploration all in one.

Structural Analysis

The vehicle for explicating the systematic properties of the social as it is apparent in texts, discourse, and narrative is also the foremost proxy for exploring social relations themselves. This device is the *semiotic square,* founded in the Aristotelian *square of opposition*.

Again, it is important to this dissertation that it be comprehended that *language* and how it surpasses itself in *discourse* is a way to stage the study of systemic social structural attributes, often symbolized as language is. This is not to say that the relations that we are embedded in, the social, are isomorphic with language—they are not. However, by observing the transfer of meaning in a tropological sense of forms of communication, we can make use of the semiotic square following the example of Fredric Jameson in particular (see Figure 3.).

To read the semiotic square we start from the top left with S as a positive term[50]; this *posits*, states, imposes, or impels the system. The contrary term, the anti-term is symbolized as -S; as the negation of whatever is posited, stated, imposed, etcetera. Thus, the binary system has an antinomial principle at its root and can be detected in many social artefacts from statistical categories (0,1 as female, male) to sociologistic categories (white, non white). What is important here is that the negative term (-S as "not S") that again is absolute, is also contingent upon the posited term, yet this is where the antagonistic element of the structure—contradiction—drives the system as a *contrary*. However, the *contradiction* between the *posited universality* and *particularity* of the posited term helps us to understand the dynamic of structural opposition: universalizing a category such as "men" (all men are citizens: S) is contradicted by a particular (some men are citizens: $\bar{S}$), also providing a negative term (no men are citizens: -S) contradicted by a particular of its own (some men are not citizens: -$\bar{S}$). These are effectively two opposed systems necessary for the dynamic of a social structure to work in its conflictual and antagonistic manner. However, what is also of significant importance is the positions themselves as contraries and sub-contraries generated as subaltern positions to these antinomial principles (see Figure 4.).

These subaltern, positions -$\bar{S}$, and $\bar{S}$, designate operations that manifest the otherwise absolute and impossible structural principles in particular forms by reference to them on another scene, staged elsewhere, or represented by the operability of these particulars themselves. These subaltern positions are operations that distinguish *something else*: $\bar{S}$, and operations that distinguish *something more-or-less*: -$\bar{S}$, than what they signify.

Before exploring these attributes as social system elements, a few more attributes of this oppositive system need be highlighted: the imperfect mimesis of logical positions by socio-historical cases, and that evidently imperfect mimesis conceptualized as a figure-trope—'metaphor'—that is the indicator of how systems surpass their limitations. Max Weber's own comparative approach using ideal types formed from historical imagery to examine social

[50] This is of much greater importance than it appears. The 'positive' logic that is the *positing* of this position, allows for this term to be impossible because absolute, declaring the logic of the square to be a virtual system, and materializable only insofar that this term remains always at some vanishing point and yet also operating as its organizing primary principle. The humorous example of this logic is recollected in one of Slavoj Zizek's jocund formulations of the *sublime object of ideology*, the *petite objet a*: "the famous MacGuffin, the Hitchcockian object, the pure pretext whose sole role is to set the story in motion but which is in itself ' nothing at all' - the only significance of the MacGuffin lies in the fact that it has some significance for the characters - that it must seem to be of vital importance to them. The original anecdote is well known: two men are sitting in a train; one of them asks: 'What's that package up there in the luggage rack?' 'Oh, that's a MacGuffin.' 'What's a MacGuffin?' 'Well, it's an apparatus for trapping lions in the Scottish Highlands.' 'But there are no lions in the Scottish Highlands.' 'Well, then, that's not a MacGuffin.'… Needless to add, the MacGuffin is the purest case of what Lacan calls objet petit a: a pure void which functions as the object cause of desire." (p.183 *The Sublime Object of Ideology*) (Zizek 2008)



FIGURE 3. SQUARE OF OPPOSITION



FIGURE 4. SEMIOTIC SQUARE

structures in history and the same ideal types as one-sided conceptual apparatus for exploring and typifying historical imagery, is exemplary of a structural analysis before the letter. By combined efforts at what we can call an external critique of historical provenance, and internal critique of a system of social actions by (historical) imagery of social behavior that reveals elective and inner-affinities, the full thrust of a socioanalysis was inaugurated. Weber was very careful however to constantly caution against trying to locate rational types in history—pure ideal types that actually appear in history as an event—and in reminding the reader of the logical purity of those types against the historical forms that they both simplified systematically and explored as if systemic. *Mimesis* of structural ideal types by historical types was not mandated and not feasible with the obvious limits of archival data. Nonetheless it can always be assumed that some historical types emerge very closely resembling the logic of the social systems extrapolated. Tempting as this line of research may be, it is too foundationalist and completely fails to observe the object of socioanalysis in structure: those oppositive relations that enervate a social system, and even figure its institution into being by relations that do not stand still.

An ideal type is not properly speaking a trope; it is however an effect of the social structure imposed by analysis on an historical object on one hand—figuring that object into being by partition—and it is the effectuated typicity that actuates this historicity of that historical object on another. It is imperfect in representation and knowingly so. We stage the historical object in discourse that distanciates literal and figurative meaning. The materiality of the historical object, its spatial presence in any form, appears as an ir-resonant distribution in space—it cannot be that *two* objects occupy *one* space—and not for the impossibility of matter itself (bodies already envelope other bodies of the organism), rather for the numeracy that is the logic of thingly distribution in space. The historical object as spatialized resists by it's number—a one time only event—no more repeatable for its unique spatialization than for that temporal distance by which we make of this event a history, storied by the corrosion of that precise place as a ruins.

Space too is returned to us by this estrangement effect, as an 'homogenous medium' by historical analysis, that also quantifies as well as enumerates things in space by ceaseless division or *partition of the sensible*, where the sensible material world multiplies our experiences of it by the analysis we make. Ideal types are inexhaustible for the partition by typology of the historical objects they analyze. Nonetheless, the historical object endures for us *in time* in yet a different way than this. Historical objects are also composed of time as well as space.

The time of historical objects is of a *duration*: the resonance of distant events builds upon themselves, whether in recollection or forgetting, the latter is notable as a form of cultural memory invested in transgenerational traumas. By diminishing the time of historical events to indicatives in a putative chronology we "forget" the historical object for its storied, narratological effect upon us. Nonetheless, that history that appears in each heterogenous indicator of the historical event resonates such that one impacts the other in a duration beyond the putative moment of an historical action. This duration is of the utmost importance for understanding the gravity that ruinate forms of things and being have for us. The multiplicity of time differentiates *times* that overlap, and in this way surpass the structure of their historical object.

The resistance of historical objects—as thingly or as beings, as acts or events—by their spatialization is by the multiplicity that comes from their division in space as homogenous medium, just as temporalization by a resonance of a whole in every part of an historical object gives us time as heterogenous medium. Ideal types not only multiply in space, they multiply in time, by these attributes of our experience of timespace we may make use of tropological figurations in an ideal typical way that openly demonstrates the staging of timespace as a *chronotope*: as a ratio of time and space for comprehension of a timespace[51].

Briefly then, the system of oppositions demonstrated in any social structure must also be symbolic for what it communicates/circulates as meaningful to itself. The language-like properties of a social system in 'recognizable' socio-symbolic acts, narrative above all, begin to surpass the system itself as the systems' own efforts to sustain its integrity against its's environment; the corrosive force of re-integrating into that environmental medium or surroundings. Multiplicities are tropologically demonstrable for surpassing their own meaning and signaling an 'outside', a world beyond the immediate and intelligible horizon, as an environment that is only knowable to a system (social, biological, psychological, ecological) by its own *structural coupling* to that environment by the limited organs of sense it makes use of. This also results in a kind of *operational closure,* what names the restriction of the system—not as a closed system—rather, restricted to the operations that enclose it, and detects an environment that surpasses itself in complexity.

A ruinate chronotope is the detection of those corrosive forces too complex for our existing socio-symbolic systems. The approach of these environmental complexities generate chaos in these systems as they resonate too much and too little. Thus, the approach of social timespace, that complex environment of our own making, is only *indirectly* and thus *figuratively* comprehensible in the inaugural work of socioanalysis of society.

Tropology of social types: the mimesis of 'metaphor'

In characterological terms, this can be observed as the differing appeals to *master status* as the position *from* which we observe ourselves in a social system—what is socialized as an ideal—and the egoic 'character' that is our performance *of* this appeal—our persona and social role in service of this master status. What is important is this disposition to a master status is contingent upon a systemic social structure that effectuates a script for us in identification by oppositions. In the appeal to master status as *something else* we use a name or label to refer back to this master status from which our social role appears. The use of a patronym effectuates precisely this through connections to a patrilineage, often also notions of nation and ethnicity, with this a storehouse of imagery that includes presumptive beliefs in religiosity and political and economic pursuits. In appeal to master status as *something more-or-less* we use a form in part or as a whole in a mereological reference to give our social role. Military, juridical, and hierocratic religious forms all demonstrate this performativity; military roles as 'private', and 'specialist', refer to a chain of command and thus perform as a part performative to a whole to which the role is in

[51] This takes some liberties with Bakhtin's own restriction to the literary chronotope. Drawing upon this critical literary insight, the historical object, the futural object, the superimposed and transposed objects of timespace are obviously *extra-artistic* and *extra-literary* subjects of this use of the chronotope. (Bakhtin 1981)

service, whereas the role ‘general’ is that whole, explicit as commander, and is the performative to which all subordinate roles and relations concentrate as parts.

A major distinction here is between the metonymic displacement of names and the synecdochic integration of performance as very distinct attributes in the semiotic square that have so far remain unexplored in social theory. Further, the metaphoric figure of the universal positive term (S) and the ironic figure of the universal negative term -S) are important as principles of organization that are only rarely occupied for their impossible demands to rarefy character. Nonetheless, these positions do exist. By an appeal to master status as *something other* we have the metaphorical form as a *carrier* of universalizing, organizing, content or meaning. This is consciousness in irreflexive, zealous, service to an ideal, making the persona itself into a vehicle or carrier of this meaning. The shear simplicity of character is almost impossible to uphold, nonetheless this zealous observance has the attribute of denying any reflexion that does not carry out this *other will*. Obviously, these ideal personalities are few, and all but untenable, nonetheless, meritocratic idealism has the exemplar of the progressive attainment rarely occasioned in living out a ‘rags to riches’ story that perhaps one in a generation fulfills in attaining access to this *other scene*. Or, for example, the conservative paragon of ‘republican virtue’ that serves as ideal mediator/representative of their elite purpose in staging the political voice of an *other*. Similarly, the militant innovator whose actions are actually timely both tactically and strategically in re-organizing society by social action, demonstrating this *other* by force of zealous commitment alone is such a rarity.

The ironic position in its negation of the figurative itself is an appeal to master status that is ‘literal’, ‘realistic’, and impossibly ‘concrete’ in insistence. It is as an anti-tropological trope that seeks reversal of the indirect and figurative socio-symbolic conditions as if that were a simple matter of contra-positive or obverse logic. Here the brute materiality of sense is appealed to through the evacuation of meaningfulness itself: the empiricist that refuses all but the result of trial, means testing, and experiment, as the staunch transposition of power over the non-literal. The positivist that refuses all but the positively experienced, repeatable, conclusive, and sensory confirmation, as a refutation of all belief (therefore zeal and commitment) is that rare figure that transposes a paradigmatic materiality—figures into being—precisely an anti-figurative doctrine as literalized irony. The most sardonic observer of humans is the idealized image of this appeal. The rare example of scientistic absorption that actually does yield such putatively gained material results as a matter of personification in appeal to this master status is that ego. However, it is again a rare character type, yet nonetheless this ironist as realist is precisely this figure as the master logician of armies, the master-spy of espionage, the dominant entrepreneur whose ‘disruption’ realizes itself in reshaping economies, the master diplomat whose interventions realize power as if indisputable nature reversing upon the illusions of ‘mere fantasy’: in all cases seeking to dominate the very socio-symbolic system itself.

Yet in all these cases this negation remains wholly dependent upon the posited contrary, and as irony, always borders on satire that risks decomposing itself as its own ruin by a medley of corrosive hyperbole and litote. The universal demand to undermine whatever meaning and significance that poses difficulty.

The use of structural analysis can uncover a typology in analysis such as decomposing personas and roles to types in service to the stratifications that are the strata/boundaries of social systems. Yet this remains a social system without realisation in timespace, without an environment, subjects, and serves only as a *prior* by the posited terms of its systemic distinctions. Society is in this sense all pretext by distinctions and classifications without actual texturation in classes and distinctions among being and things. Until realised in institutions that surpass this pretext and system by material presence in the world, this system remains solely an article of analysis. However, as an historical object under the lens of analysis the most impossible social systems multiply, resonate, and as the living dead, 'come to life', to haunt a sociological imagination.

Structural Isotopy

The actuation of social-systems by their own socio-symbolic structure invites social fantasy in utopian images; an ideal ego from which we image (imagine or *figure*) ourselves into being; and ego that personifies an ideal image of itself by brute material symbolization. These are dispositions or character types posited by the social system by its own oppositive relations of principle (values) and their redundancy or iteration (mores and norms). It is a *mimesis*, a *mirroring*, that opposes an *idealized* ego (the tropological position from which we imagine our identity) to an '*ego-ized*' (materially symbolic) ideal, with imperfectable and indirect results[52].

Social mores can be comprehended in a partially (partial in the sense of particular) scripted desire in its split from demand (the values by which we learn to desire). *Social norms* can be discerned as signification that gives us a familiar and intelligible environment: milieu and social surroundings as *umwelt*. Embodiment, *hexis*, and *jouissance* as enjoyment are generated by the irruption of the socio-symbolic network where it overlaps the body and the senses[53]. Importantly this is described as a 'sieve' of enjoyment by Zizek, 'mortification' in Cooley, and a conjoined anesthetization and 'compensation' in the work of Jameson where the sensuous is a hypostasis as *catalepsis* (reification of sense consciousness by reifying sense organs and sense objects in their relationship to one another)(Zizek 2008)(Cooley 1964)(Jameson 1981)[54]. Above all, it is the excess of meaning that subverts the social system in part, surpasses it, such that it operates at all.

The hypostatic union that is the system comprehended in this individuated way is itself an iteration *for and of* a field of such social sub-systems. The locution *for and of* is important in signaling the dative sense in which individuation is for another, indirect object. We are *citizens of* a state, or we are *subjects for* a monarch, for example.

This self-multiplying effect of this hypostatic union of sense object and sense organ, a reified *intentionality as if natural*, relies upon values, mores, and norms, that are widely realized for compatibility. This *silent speech*, the communication of 'things' by way of their hypostatization, have an 'object' status made emblematic in the conceptual metaphor of *ruin*[55]. *Ruin* emblematic of this preservation/disintegration, has as actuated attributes both those things of concrete ruin

[52] See Lacan on 'the mirror stage': *Ecrits* (Lacan 2006)
[53] Also enactive cognitivism as *embodied mind*; see Varela, Thompson, and Rosch: *The Embodied Mind* (Varela et al. 1991)
[54] Jameson, pp. 62-62 *The Political Unconscious Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act* (Jameson 1981)
[55] See Lakoff and Johnson: *Metaphors We Live By* (Lakoff and Johnson 2003)

that impose a kind of silence as their gravity of incommunicability, and those ruinate things of subjectivity, from wasted projects to hollow pursuits, spoiled identities, labelled and trammeled personhood, that compel deciphering of their *affective* silence, traumas, harms, and crimes. The uncanny experience of 'master status' turns out to be very often that ruinate object 'in us more than we are ourselves'. The silent speech of these ruinate objects for which we are no more than the abject remainder is the how *society is in us always already*.

This *actuation* is the isotopy that reiterates objects as such in biological systems following the biological theorist Jakob von Uexküll, and it is carefully refined by Niklas Luhmann as *structural coupling* and *operational closure*. *Actuation takes time* as it is decisive in putting into motion those things in the world of organisms according to plans, routines, and durable patterns of action. In this sense, *actuation takes* space—it is also a taking place. These plans, routines, habits, etcetera, simultaneously erase prior actions and the patterns that make them intelligible structures, including the effective meaning of things as the normalization that is the organized experience of a lifeworld. The paradox of nature is that it is a naturalization of meaning to the point of its extinction, only the compensatory symbolic acts remain—ruins, traces, contours, remainders.

The *metabolism* of social and ecological systems is an interchange between virtual and actual, demonstrated between distinct timespaces that are wholly incompatible. This incompatibility is both the interchange within the system by its sub-systems attempting a *combinatoire* of social and ecological objects and the operational closure to the environment of the system itself; which is to say that it is always already 'eco-social'. This point has been belabored in concepts such as Moore's 'web of life', Lovelock's '*Gaia* theory', and 'Planetarity'. The last, however conceptualized after Gayatri Spivak's riposte to liberalist 'globalization', is a significant focal theme of this work.

This study of ruins theorizes a 'ruins' by starting from that individuation of the persona from within by its own enjoyment, and an interobjective Ruins that is 'the environment' itself (social and ecological), where the symptom of 'ruin' is the irritating environmental kernel that is the corruptive position from which we see ourselves in this very 'environment'. This antagonistic germ appears twice: as the *sublime* timespace of society/environment as Nature that surpasses our experience and its organization in all fields of temporality and place, and the *sublime object* that is our 'all-too human' and anthropomorphic 'nature' from which we identify ourselves as part of this larger environments and by which we conduct ourselves. The corrupting kernel of 'human nature' is not simply prospective mortality, a concern that has been exacerbated by the future oriented ubiquity of modern sensibilities. Natality too figures importantly, especially in those traditional cultures where infancy makes demands on a community both in its social reproduction of itself as a community and in the environmental needs that must be met in socializing children. Importantly the *infans* is one without speech, a not-so-silent communicability presides over the sphere of the newly born. The middle term of this familiar sequence too has a corruptive quality in that maturity is not for ourselves as individuals, rather as individuated to disposition in a social structure as subjects, citizens, consumers, producers, civil or in-civil members of society.

Ruin is an actuation that connects history and biography too-quickly in a structural coupling that hypostatizes these timespaces by *identification* as *classification* : over-historicizing by time as it over-contextualizes by space. The chief source of this universalizing impulse is the nomothetic demand to generalize that is the driver of the social sciences[56].

This *metabolism* of an eco-social environment is evident in how it's systematicity is surpassed in its lingering traces of the past, how the contours of the future surpass whatever it sustains at present, how that systematicity is surpassed in superimpositions of timespace that suspend the system by inertia and impasse, and how the transposition of timespace and its asymmetry redoubles to incite antagonism. For example, traces of the past are not simply history, they are more often myths and also sacred places whose imagery holds captive societies; contours of the future in aleatory practices from statistical research to prophetics claim more attention and inattention than sober recognition of non knowledge and doxology by rendering the university, wall street, and the intrigues of courts and legislatures as the timespace of this imagery; the superimposition of timespaces themselves has perhaps no better example than the multiple claims upon a Jerusalem where origins and eskatons are insuperable; the transposition of timespace by the occupation of colonists of colonized lands and their de-territorializations serve as a final example[57].

Structural isotopy[58] is the multiplication of timespaces—chronotopes—by the structural couplings that we ordinarily make and erase in day-to-day actuations. This metabolism between social structures and ecological structures can be demonstrated by the explication of structural closure as *ideological closure*: the resonance of a socio-symbolic system in our organization of experience from where our unquestioned 'natural' or 'common-sense' discourse comes from and multiplying these relations by narrative. These positions are the mediating efforts in the interstices of the semiotic square identified by Jameson (see Figure 5.):

The very useful psychoanalytic concept of *extimacy*—and a close approximation in an *objective unconscious* used by Pierre Bourdieu—describes this ideological closure as a kind of identification that occurs within the closure of discourse, within a signifying system that always takes recourse to a familiar field of conflicted meanings[59]. The conservative American dialogue

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[56] See Wallerstein: *The Time of Space and the Space of Time: The Future of Social Science* (Wallerstein 1998a). For a specific discussion of American Sociology see: *The Culture of Sociology in Disarray: The Impact of 1968 on U.S. Sociologists* (Wallerstein 2007)

[57] The examples used in this study have attributes that would satisfy all these conditions. However, it is the predominance of particular symptomatic attributes that exemplify an approaching timespace as it erodes the organization of experience.

[58] See A.J. Greimas on *Isotopy*: *Structural Semantics An Attempt at a Method* (Greimas 1983)

[59] See J.A. Miller: *Extimity* (Miller 2008)

Also, Bourdieu's *objective unconscious* as the forgetting of history by objectal remnant forms of history: "Language poses a particularly dramatic problem for the sociologist: it is in effect an immense repository of naturalized preconstructions, and thus of preconstructions that are ignored as such and which can function as unconscious instruments of construction. I could take here the example of *occupational taxonomies*, whether it be the names of occupations that are in currency in daily life or the socioeconomic categories of INSEE (the French National Institute of Economic and Statistical Research), an exemplary instance of *bureaucratic conceptualization*, of the bureaucratic universal, and, more generally, the example of all the taxonomies (age groups, young and old, gender categories, which we know are not free from social arbitrary) that sociologists use without thinking about them too

of ‘makers and takers’ is an example of a well known patrimonial mode of condescension that inscribes classes of entrepreneurs with the capitalistic class more of ‘making wealth’ against servile ‘takers’. This closed universe has its parallel in the liberal dialogue of education whose class mores include the mandate to disabuse the uneducated working classes and underclasses of their racism, sexism, and so on. Again, ignoring the power differentials between even minimally established middle-class professions and the precarity of everyone else that includes inaccessible educational opportunities. We can extend this to militant dialogues regarding ‘real revolutionary’ conduct, direct action and protest, reform and abolition. This fraught field of militant commitments also conveniently avoids the power differentials that are more than ‘tactical’ decisions and less than ‘strategic’, by way of the class positions of those involved. The conventional militant discourse covers over these gradations by the stupid binary opposition that zeal establishes and promptly refuses for its unconscious structural consequence of irresolvable internecine antagonism.

Extimacy has the initial sense given by Lacan and Zizek, of the traumatic kernel of the Real at the core of our most intimate identifications; what disrupts the smooth functioning of a socio-symbolic order is also what that order of things conceals as its vital antagonism. Later this position of the ‘internalized exterior’, the master status discovered as the position from which we observe ourselves as, for example, political subjects such as ‘good citizens’, ‘stalwart revolutionaries’, or ‘temperate progressives,’ and so on, threatens to implode the socio-symbolic milieu to which our very identifications belong. This exterminating and corrosive force of the Real is no more than the threat that society can be wrong in its ‘symbolic texture’, and that the very persistence of a socio-symbolic code indicates a system bounded and operable against its own prospective demise. Pierre Bourdieu, undoubtedly cognizant of Lacan’s sociological work, uses the important parallel of an *objective* unconscious: “What has to be constantly scrutinized and *neutralized, in the very act of construction of the object,* is the collective scientific unconscious embedded in theories, problems, and (especially national) categories of scholarly judgment.” (p. 40 *Introduction to Reflexive Sociology*) (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992)[60], that is, the structure of social positions and dispositions that we are always already part of, and that organ by which we are coupled to a social environment.

To provide an example of socio-symbolic structure explicated following Jameson’s example of ideological closure, and demonstrative of the extimate properties of the unconscious as social and environmental, a contemporary example is useful. However, this is also to set the stage for inquiring into how this very structure has come into shape itself. Here dispositions in the semiotic square are *datives* (see Figure 6.).

much because they are the social categories of understanding shared by a whole society.” (p.241) (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992)

[60] Also Wacquant’s footnote: p. 44 FN78 offers a clear sense of the extimate social structure that is the humanistic kernel of social values and its ‘objection’ to scrutiny as objective resistance: "Intending to remain master and possessor of itself and of its own truth, wanting to know no determinism other than that of its own determinations (even if it concedes that they may be unconscious), the naive humanism deposited in every person experiences as 'sociologistic' or 'materialistic' reduction any attempt to establish that the meaning of the most personal and the most 'transparent' actions does not belong to the subject who accomplishes them but to the complete system of relations in and through which they accomplish themselves" (Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron 1973: 32). (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992)



FIGURE 5. JAMESONIAN SQUARE



FIGURE 6. DATIVES 'FOR SOCIETY'

Positing a dative *'For Society'* is to establish a structural analysis of dispositions that are figured into existence as 'of, for,' society as the superordinate sociological form that includes state, market, and civil society. This last term appearing twice as the disruptive 'species that subverts its own genus': hypostatized, *civil* society (itself a pleonasm) *ruins* the social by its literal appearance and our categorial intuition of it 'as society'. Thus, the question of whose society is representative of civil associations encountered in notions of elite or 'high society'. Opposed to this are the antinomial dispositions figured into existence as *Not 'For Society'*, and that can also be understood as eco-environmental conditions that operate contrary to social organization of experience. The subcontrary position *Non 'Of/For Society'* is the opposition to this mode of existence, just as *Non Not 'Of/For Society'* opposes the antinomial contrary figure (see Figure 7.).

Using this Jamesonian Semiotic Square as explanatory of the social symbolic scandal of social-ecological metabolism as asymmetric and fatal, we can start on the right hand side with the disposition 'Human Zoo'; a pejorative mode/mood of political recognition. This disposition includes a variety of reactionary and neo-reactionary types that emerge as social operations that attempt to reconcile stakes of being 'Not For Society' and 'Non-For Society': in the former we might include the fictitious commodities of labor, land, and capital, as eco-environmental exemplars that are ''Not For Society, in the latter, the exceptions of Sovereigns, Producers, and Tourists, none of whom exist 'for society', rather they are figurations of a-social societal relations variously existing 'outside' 'Society'. The reactionary and neo-reactionary conceptualization of a human zoo, of preserving the environment by the concentrated citification of human populations is an effect of social antagonisms in society-environment metabolism that scandalize the thinking of society and its major institutions of a post-enlightenment period as failures of the modern project. The reactionary recourse to 'history' is observed as both inevitable: because 'history repeats itself'; and prudent: because history sets a precedent of what is 'historical human nature'. This conservativism is espoused by neo-reactionary Nick Land and his Silicon Valley disciples (who also happen to be proponents of AI research and include Peter Thiel). It is also toyed with by Peter Sloterdijk in his provocative suggestion of how to conserve the environment.

Moving to the bottom of this system of ideological closure we discover what has been characterized by Greimas in his formulation of the semiotic square as 'the neutral term'. Here those operations that seek to reconcile the presence of the exceptions of Sovereigns, Producers, and Tourists, as Non-For Society with what I will describe as the echoes of social movements, the traces of absent demos, and the erasure of zoomorphic 'others' as Non-Not-For Society (Non-Eco-Environmental), are branded historical exceptions. The empty idealism of Mannheim's 'free floating intellectuals' immediately presents itself as the neutral, mortified, and hollow institutionalization of intellect that exemplifies such scientistic 'objectivity'. However, survivalist values and disaster tourism as neutralizations of the trauma of eco-cide (or if preferred, the tourism of vitacidal historical sites/events) would also exemplify this retro-action that seeks to remedy what is not social nor ecological in this deadlock of eco-social metabolism. On the left hand side we have the reconciliation of being 'For Society' that includes Citizens, Consumers, and Cosmopolitans, and being 'Non-Not-For Society' or Non-Eco-Environmental by the Echoes, Traces, and Erasures of human/non human aggregates. This effort at reconciliation as Toxic Trade can of course be exemplified by the cynical use of carbon taxes



FIGURE 7. POLITICAL RECOGNITION

and carbon trading, and failures to internalize costs as ecological regulations (thus succeeding in destruction for so-called 'wealth creation'). However, this should simply be extended to a 'Summer's Irony' that is the venal performance that engages in nihilistic acceptance of a destructive socio-environmental metabolism by administerial expertise. The undisguised destruction of the non-human environment in erasure and other absences is combined with the liberal/administerial prefiguration's of progressive society, now an escalation of catastrophe society.

The last 'complex term' that effects a reconciliation of this ruinate eco-social metabolism is that of Political Recognition that prefigures discourses and discursive practitioners of emancipatory politics in this mode of recognition, and an education for maturity as preparatory for this disposition. A social-analysis can also be placed here, as a discourse that elides its own structured narratives where its aims are other than cynical, neutral, or reactionary by catalepsis. Nonetheless, this is no guarantee that such a complex term can yield a sustained engagement in this discourse.

The reader must keep in mind that these narratives can be found in contemporary discourse. That these discourses also have places and not just 'time': enclaves of neo-reactionaries in Silicon Valley for example; Disaster Tourists frequenting Chernobyl were not unknown prior to the War in Ukraine; the Toxic Trade of Larry Summer's was between the U.S. and countries with un-spoilt 'pretty air' (African countries for example); and the Politics of Recognition has a home in the politics of the Anglo-Sphere regarding post-colonial traumas of ultra-objective violence (colonization as violent re-territorialization of the surface of the earth) and institutional (symbolic) violence[61].

These cynical modes/moods have largely surpassed the aesthetic politics of the 20th C. in a widespread proliferation of interests that come from naturalizing the power relations that appear in a socio-ecological metabolism that I can now openly reference as *political-ecology*[62]: where the preponderance of this conflictual object is not reducible to imbalances in planetary

While this is certainly an effort to exhaust the typology of discourses that emerge in political *superpower* and its afterlife of an 'end of history', of an illiberalism or *inverted totalitarianism*—where the ochlocratic desire predominates as a populist irony of opposing 'totalitarian regimes' populations (human and non human), catastrophe and risk, political economy of consumption

[61] See both Glen Sean Coulthard: *Red skin, white masks : rejecting the colonial politics of recognition* (Coulthard 2014) and Harry F. Dahms: *Critical Theory Derailed: Paradigm Fetishism and Critical Liberalism in Honneth (and Habermas*) (Dahms 2019) on critical provocations to Axel Honneth's approach to a contemporary politics of recognition.

[62] *Aesthetic Politics* is the naturalized and normativized imagery of *GrossePolitik*—propagandistic devices—critiqued most infamously by Walter Benjamin in opposition by a critical disposition of *political aesthetics*—what makes representations of any kind, artistic, scientific, historical, literary, etc. undeniably political because held in common. Especial emphasis must be placed upon the artistic pastiche, quasi-prophetic, and hollow anticipatory mood of nihilistic futurism, which is important to comprehending the cultural—inculcating—purpose of spreading this imagery of naturalized violence. See Benjamin: *The Work Of Art In The Age Of Its Technological Reproducibility And Other Writings On Media* (Benjamin 2008)
Also discussed by Jacques Ranciére, here in a more anarchic critique, see Ranciére: *The Politics Of Aesthetics* (Rancière 2004)

and waste, nor ultra-subjective and ultra-objective violence[63] [64].historically and politically by terrorism and violence thereby becoming one itself—it is in no way that thorough[65].

In a much more cautious approach, this is only *one* set of explanations to be tested for the social and ecological relations there. It is a set of bracketed and "quoted" discourses available in the conservative dominated politics of the anglo-sphere and its economistic doxology. One yield of this kind of effort is to prosecute the restoration of these aesthetic political commitments and liberal economic fundamentalism as hollow, venal, and *monological* responses to complex planetary problems[66]. Even where authoritarianism has receded, the remnants of this monological staging of social domination returns in familiar hubris, bad-faith, and cynical self interest: the metabolic remainder of this increasingly poisonous eco-social environment[67].

To bracket this structural analysis of heterogenous discourse is accomplished by surpassing the systematicity demonstrated there. It is after all *ideological closure,* and it *is the problem* of an antagonistic planetary metabolism that we cling to, that prevents an eco-social science that meets this problematized interchange on a planetary scale. The pre-figuration of cataleptic, frozen systemic, and eternally redounding and retro-effective meaning *is* this system and its ontic-ontological 'conditions of possibility'. What phenomenology critically deployed, puts out of action for its *inaction* and eternalization of social science in an openly useless proceduralism stripped of insight and *theory*.

Discourse Analysis of Silent Speech[68]

Categorial intentionality is always a demonstration of the inextricable albeit asymmetric relation that is consciousness as always consciousness of something. The noesis (mode of consciousness)

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[63] On *Political Ecology* see Jane Bennet, especially her brief discussion of Theodore Adorno's *'preponderance of the object'*: *Vibrant Matter a political ecology of things* (Bennet 2010)
It is important to this study that the metabolism of *vibrant matter,* and it's risk of reification has a parallel in the paratactical—thus performative staging of critique—in the discourse of the 'baleful enchantment of the concept' in Jameson's reading of Adorno. The hypo-visible objectivity of concepts as seductive, even hypnotic attraction that is Adorno's advance upon Marx's fetish of the commodity form.
See Jameson: *Late Marxism Adorno, Or, The Persistence Of The Dialectic* (Jameson 1990)
and see Adorno on 'the preponderance of the object': *Negative Dialectics* (Adorno 1973)
[64] On the distinctions between *ultra-subjective* and *ultra-objective* violence see Étienne Balibar: *Violence and Civility On the Limits of Political Philosophy* (Balibar 2015)
[65] See Sheldon Wolin on *Superpower* and *inverted totalitarianism*: *Politics and Vision* (Wolin 2004)
[66] On the '*long restoration of monarchy*' In French political history see Alain Badiou: *The Century* (Badiou 2007)
[67] The 21st C. social type of *Social Dominance Orientation* has been studied variously by psychologists advancing Adorno et. al. in the study of *The Authoritarian Personality*, see the multiple works by the group in New Zealand: (Sibley, Wilson, and Duckitt 2007) (Sibley and Duckitt 2008) (Duckitt and Sibley 2009) (Sibley and Duckitt 2010)(Sibley and Duckitt 2013)
Especially, *THE AUTHORITARIAN PERSONALITY* (Adorno et al. 1950) and: *Aspects of the New Right-Wing Extremism* (Adorno 1967)
This work on Social Dominance Orientation has also been continued by David Norman Smith: ASA *Subject and society* (Smith 2020)
See also Harry Dahms: *Adorno's Critique of the New Right-Wing Extremism: How (Not) to Face the Past, Present, and Future* (Dahms 2020)
[68] *Silent Speech* (*La Parole muette*) is Ranciére's term for an oppositive relationship between the voice given by deciphering mute things, and the silent *punctum* that is the obstacle and objection to this 'giving voice-to' by the

and noema (object of consciousness) interdepend[69]. An object of sight and seeing are inextricable one from one another. The life of reason demonstrated phenomenologically is not different in its structure. Categorial intentionality is the categorial object—the object that 'I' (from whatever oppositive position within that structure) 'accuse' or denounce in these antagonistic discourses—inseparable from the accuser or opposer. However, this is an immature socioanalysis if it simply re-circulates, takes recourse to, the closure of structure that is its organ of *language and representation*, even when this is explicated as, for example, the *"language"* of 21stC. aesthetic politics ossifying a political ecological discourse.

Categorial intentionality has a more accurate and scientific use in surpassing this limited *mathesis* and its operational closure. From *κατα*γορευω (katagoreuo) we have 'denunciation', from the root, *κατ-αγω* (kat-ago) the language of the phenomenological reduction is formed: "lead, bring *or* carry down; lead to a place; bring down from the sea to the land; lead *or* bring back *or* home; [in the middle voice] come to land, put in; return". The phenomenological reduction as a 'return to the things themselves' is always the expression of this mode of categoriality. Reasoning is a categorial activity that has a narrative form in that to go on this journey, to follow the lead of the text, to trace the branch with a painterly gaze, to follow a melody, or lead through a storied event, carry-through a task, or simply carry a meaning from one sense to another in scientific, historic, or philosophic concepts and metaphors is made intelligible by explication in a narrative form.

Discourse analysis is itself surpassed, or better said, *overtaken* or even *possessed* in narrative as the articulation of this oscillation, this 'shuttling back and forth' of sentences, and its interlocuters, no matter distance or time span. I will extend this notion of discourse necessarily to include *sentience* and that also means *in-sentience* as well. We are *sentient* insofar as we 'feel, perceive, or have sensations [of something]', insofar as we 'learn, experience' and can be said 'to-feel'. Observation, acknowledgment—and we cannot help but now extend 'recognition' too—are demonstrations of sentience; as is insight, and the effectuation of 'having-observed', become 'convinced that', become 'considered' and to form opinions and think a person something [to consider another]. It is to this broader and more archaic, pre-modern, sense of

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things themselves in Ranciére's historiographic critique of(by) *the aesthetic regime of art*. See Rockhill/Ranciére: *The Politics Of Aesthetics* (Rancière 2004)
and Ranciére's text translated as: *Mute Speech* (Rancière 2011)

[69] On Husserl's *intentionality* see Dermot Moran for an historical introduction: *Husserl's discovery of the reduction and transcendental phenomenology* in his *Introduction To Phenomenology* (Moran 2000). But see especially Moran's account of intentionality distinct from a Kantian 'transcendental' position: "The content which provides reference to the object is not to be understood as a kind of formless matter of sensations, as in the Kantian account of the relation of form to content. For Husserl, the content of an act already contains a certain 'interpretative sense' (Auffassungssinn), which is then manipulated by the act-quality, be it a question, a judgment, a wish, or whatever." (p.16 ibid). This much more dialectical sense of intentionality must be stressed as an advance that also declares consciousness to be inextricable from environment by way of actuations on our part, and effectuations to that purpose, as well as the receptivity or perspicacity that is offered by the environment *to that effect*. It is this hermeneutic circle that is the sensuous as consciousness. Further, the reader should also understand as Husserl came to through investigations of *intersubjectivity* that this sensuousness-as-consciousness is public, and that is to say *social.*
See also Robert Sokolowski for his succinct formulation: "…every act of consciousness we perform, every experience that we have is intentional: it is essentially "consciousness of" or an "experience of" something or other." (p.8) *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Sokolowski 2000)

sentio that *sentience* is itself 'returned' in its Latin connotations. Stranger still will be the constant presumption of *insentience*, not as 'capacity' or some foundationalist trait; rather as those constant objectal companions of anything sentient; as that un-responsive obdurate and uncommunicative environmental *thing* that refuses all efforts on our part to *symbolize,* and thereby meaningfully *structure*. This is the *indomitable* extimate core for an object relations, and *interobjectivity*: the indication of indomitable places that refuse *domicile,* of indomitable beings and things that refuse *domestication,* of indomitable times that refuse our *dominion*.

In the ruins of language, the traces of how to both analyze sociologistic absences—we have a paucity of language for what we as sociologists forget, retro-effect, and delay by recollection—and how to 'return' to the heterogenous meanings that language *is,* is what socioanalysis offers us to start with. The *silent speech* of sociologistic constructs—cultural artefacts of 'methodology' and theory that stage society in models and social facts—are in no way exempt. The turn to words and phrases outside of English is one way to accomplish both an historical, because etymological, comparison of meanings across an abyss of times and spaces. This is not the only subtlety of discourse analysis that is too easily overlooked, that contributes to a sociological unconscious that is objectively disposed by its futural projects to neglect history in such trivia as words. The same sociology, it must be recalled, in the United States, forgot that gratuitous presence of *the environment* under the rural partition of society in a rural-cosmopolitan(urban)- division of that historical intellectual labor[70].

The most important theme of this study is that of the *agalma* as the yield of entering into the structured oppositions, denouncements, and accusations, and returning with reason[71]. These polemical distractions of opposition *are* the eco-social metabolism that is *ruinous* of things for our misprision of their 'insentience' and beings—interested and hubristic humans—for their elective and affinal naturalization of 'sentience'; as if a possession and property without relations. Ruins are things *out there* and 'ruin' is also that extimate thingly insentience that is 'more in us than we are': we are *carriers* of society as carriers of a virus or some other insentient trace of an object-relations we would rather deny as our 'metabolic function' in society and ecology.

The socioanalytic stakes of Discourse: four hypotheses.

I will follow the direction of Paul Ricoeur in his approach to discourse analysis[72]. This approach sustains insights into Greimassian (here Jamesonian) *isotopy*[73] as descriptive of the systemic motive force of a system sustaining its own boundaries, including that of language, and by proxy of *society* and planetary *ecology.* As *isotopic* this is also descriptive of a multiplicity of forms of timespace that overlap and imbricate one another, what will be explicated in the complex of hypotheses of the timespace of ruins that have been formed as a quadrature:

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[70] See Catton and Dunlap: *A New Ecological Paradigm for Post-Exuberant Sociology* (Catton Jr. and Dunlap 1980)
[71] On *agalma* see Zizek: *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality Contemporary Dialogues on the Left* (Butler et al. 2000)
[72] This section relies heavily upon Ricoeur's text: *From Text to Action Essays in Hermeneutics, II* (Ricoeur 1991) Also see Ricoeur on the *hermeutic arc*: *What is a text? Explanation and Understanding* in *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences* (Ricoeur 1981b)
[73] See Greimas: *Structural Semantics An Attempt at a Method* (Greimas 1983)

1. Do (these) ruins come from the past?
2. Do these ruins come from the future?
3. Are these ruins a superimposition of time(space)s?
4. Are these ruins a transposition of time(space)s?

This is a problem that has been broached repeatedly since the inception of the social science disciplines, prior even to their institutionalization. The form of anthropology and sociology having respective temporal orientations toward the past or future, as an overlooked and obvious case. Yet this question of timespace in social science has been exacerbated with post-modern critiques from the likes of Jean Baudrillard (Baudrillard 1994)—so often miscomprehended for his critical ironies, what is also often mistaken in Adorno—so-called post-structural critiques by the likes of Michel Foucault (Foucault 1970), phenomenological approaches to social science by Gaston Bachelard (Bachelard 2013), notoriously in the work of Martin Heidegger (Heidegger 1996), but more fruitfully in the work of Alfred Schütz (Schütz 1967)and his students (Peter Berger, Thomas Luckmann, (Berger and Luckmann 1966)and distantly Harold Garfinkle (Garfinkel 1967), and by extension Erving Goffman (Goffman 1974a) in his debt to these thinkers of 'frames' from the concept of 'worlds'); Husserl's own discussion of *The Origin of Geometry* from *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* is crucial to comprehending the work of those that followed this appraisal of timespace knowledge (Husserl 1970), and lastly by more modernist critiques in the work of David Harvey (Harvey 1990) and Immanuel Wallerstein (Wallerstein 1998a).

Ricoeur, as a representative of phenomenology and discourse analysis, is also important for his own efforts to address the crisis of the social sciences—the *methodenstreit*—and the importance of both structuralist *explanation* and hermeneutic *understanding* in dialectical operation. This discussion of the shift from a naturalized and unquoted world of common-sense familiarity, to the explanatory operation offered by use of the semiotic square, and 'back' to the world of practice as *praxis* in discourse analysis that accounts for this 'disquoted' discourse, is to 'complete' the *hermeneutic arc*. It should again be warned that this provisional 'completion' of socioanalysis is simply to say that we return to the object under investigation; its history and our biography together, comprehended more clearly. Hopefully having re-inaugurated our investigation by the sharpening of analysis by discourse analytic technique and by disclosing as patiently as possible the *life* of eco-social relations into which we are already thrown, we more thoroughly study the relations and systematicity of an eco-social metabolism and our political ecology. What is important above all is to observe this systematicity in its own integrity, its own operability, by the structures that couple an eco-social system to a world of humans.

This *autopoiesis* (again, a Luhmannian systems theoretic term) or *self-making* that is for our part descriptive of semiotic *isotopy* has its homologous sociological shape in *elective affinity* as the Weberian thinking of the paradox of a unity of opposites[74], and *social facts* as also *sui generis*,

[74] See Richard Herbert Howe on elective affinity, of especial importance is his thesis parallel Jameson's own structural reading of Weber; see Howe: *Max Weber's Elective Affinities: Sociology Within the Bounds of Pure Reason* (Howe 1978)
Also Jameson: *The Vanishing Mediator: Narrative Structure in Max Weber* (Jameson 1973)
Also, Peter Baer on elective affinity as 'correspondence' in Parsons, in Baer's introduction to: *The Protestant Ethic and the "Spirit" of Capitalism and other writings* (Weber 2002)

where the structure entailed of social facts is always double[75]: it takes one social fact in contrast to another to manifest this phenomenon in its relativity. The Durkheimian use of the Latin phrase *sui generis* has the important connotation of also self-generating *and* of one's own class, *genus*, or kind, *and* in one's own manner, mode, way, or fashion. The enclosure of ideology in discourse, semes, significations, identifications, classifications or actions, happens *after its own fashion*, as much as this object is *self-making* in roughly similar sense, and *of(for) its own kind.*

Sociology has a language of socioanalysis that has been forgotten. Dutifully neglected by good Anglo-American pragmatism and by a historically anti-theoretic methodologism that is its favorite brand of functionary obedience. This study is directly opposed to this *acedia*, critical of it, and in this sense will have its own critics in the defenders of positivistic and empiricist sociologism: thus, reductions of society to putative 'data' and equally ham-fisted analytic artefacts of so-called 'method'[76]. It is not for no reason that the refrain of this critical socioanalytic technique will always be antagonistic to this political economy, this *aesthetic* disciplinary politics and its division of intellectual labor into 'abstract and concrete' categories as a worthless, indeed ruinous polemic that must be deconstructed as part and parcel with the hostile and antiscientific society that it is the virulent carrier of. Sociology of *this kind* is *cynical*, venal, and it is so *after its own kind*. It is to be clear, *embodied* in the in-observant empiricist commitments to a seamless distribution of the sensible guided by scientistic misuse of discourse and categoriality[77].

To irrupt this ideological closure and its disciplinary power-relations, hazings, condescension and abuse of learning, the play of socio-theoretic language must be put into motion. This is not an 'intervention'—that worthless phrase that disguises the regress by disabusive 'disciplinary speech'—it is an effort to actuate, and to put into motion, the neglected theories consistently elided by a staid and static systematization by 'methods'[78]. This paralytic device is the professional performance of impasse as its actual object and the silent perlocutionary refusal of technique and actual *praxis* by these self-emptying directives[79].

Systems—disciplinary methodologies included—are surpassed in *discourse*. Acknowledging this difference in *levels of discourse* is crucial to giving a hearing that is not simply pedantic in either zealous stupefaction by the letter nor nihilistic in the same pedantry as venal 'bad-faith' in the significance carried by differentiation in letters[80]. These dispositions are not critical, they are

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Also, Stephen Kalberg on the limitations of *Wahlverwandtschaft* in: *Max Weber Readings and Commentary on Modernity* (Kalberg 2005)

[75] See Durkheim: *Rules for the Explanation of Social Facts* in *The Rules Of The Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and its Method* (Durkheim 1982)

[76] See Habermas on the historical formation of social science methods: *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society* (Habermas 1991)
Also Foucault: *Security, Territory, Population* (Foucault 2007)

[77] On the *distribution of the sensible* see Ranciére: *The Politics Of Aesthetics* (Rancière 2004)

[78] See Habermas on positivism: *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Habermas 1971)
See also Bourdieu on his critique of methodologism in: *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992)

[79] See Lacan on this deadlock in criminology for example: *A Theoretical Introduction to the Functions of Psychoanalysis in Criminology* in *Écrits* (Lacan 2006)

[80] Note that sociologists have addressed fetishism, cynical, nihilistic, and bad-faith misuses of social science knowledge; see Michael Schwalbe: *Finding Out How the Social World Works* (Schwalbe 1998) Joel Best: *Damned*

absolutist: absolving themselves of having to give audience through positions of condescension from relations of power/knowledge[81]. They are not sociological nor scientific and they are rejected here[82].

Further, to make socioanalysis actually *praxeological* in putting language into motion by discourse, we cannot continue in naivete and common-sense attitudes that are the recourse to 'practicality': what is no more than an apology for preferred and predisposed ignorance. Only by actually *working-through* the history of letters, and other mute objects in their semic neglect and obfuscation by 'familiarity' and 'common-sense' moods of 'already knowing', does sociology become socioanalytic[83]. The natural attitude of common-sense reasoning must also be rejected. However, it is here that an estrangement effect is also possible in irrupting this neutralization and anaesthetized intellect, and this rejection is not the same as what must be deployed against the zealot and the cynic for their arrogations[84].

Finally, not all critiques serve sociology adequately. External critique familiar to history and religious study is inadequate for simply ignoring internal structures to historical events and periods—in fact what periodizes and makes eventful—and for that reason must be rejected. Internal critique (typical of Anglo-American philosophy and psycholinguistic sciences) that prefers only to disclose the structure of argument and explanation must also be rejected for its mis-comprehension of *structure*—of incessant recourse to psychologistic and linguistic models most often—that evade the social and interdependent Real that this purely hypothetical and symbolic world of analytics covers over by its own socio-symbolic system. For failure to adequately comprehend *social structure* this 'critique' must also be rejected. Nonetheless these traditional dispositions will compete with socioanalysis by simply ignoring immanent critique and transcendental critique as the stronger forms of recovered dialectical approaches. The former admits the importance of time in the form of history and the latter of *times* in what is often described as a *poetics*[85]. Likewise, Immanent critique also returns to the body, the sensuous, as transcendental critique (negatively) returns us to motion and motive (the action of such things as mood and affect) and thus both give back that *space* of bodies and embodied mind. We can add one more mode of critique that must be rejected in the biologistic and 'socio-biological' programs of the natural sciences for miscarrying concepts of *altruism* and *environment* as universal patterns of a *bios*[86]. By delimitation to the immediately observable habits of non-humans we not only over-extend biologistic collectives discovered in 'social animals', in their hives, herds, schools, and flocks, as models of the organization of other—in this case humans—social experience, we also neglect what is unique for these collectivities in this putative and

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Lies and Statistics: Untangling Numbers from the Media, Politicians, and Activists (Best 2001) and Peter Berger: *Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective* (Berger 1963)

[81] See Michel Foucault on his thinking of power/knowledge: *Power/Knowledge Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972-1977* (Foucault 1980)

[82] On *strategies of condescension* see Bourdieu: *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992)

[83] On Adorno's discussion of *working-through the past* (Aufarbeiten) as response to retro-effect and *working-through* biographic identification in psychoanalysis (Durcharbeiten), see: *Education for maturity and responsibility* (Adorno and Becker 1999)(Adorno 2005b) See especially footnote 1 on the distinction between these terms.

[84] On the 'estrangement effect' see Jameson on Berthold Brecht: *Brecht and Method* (Jameson 1999)

[85] 'Poetics' from *poiesis* (ποιησισ): making, creating; poem, book. A poetics is associated with fabrication and instrumentation in other derivatives.

[86] *Bios (βιοσ)*: mode of life, livelihood. Note the important use of *bioō; in the middle voice: βιοω:* maintaining or preserving life.

literalist zoomorphism. Further, when considering 'the environment' from this perspective what is unique in non-human *umwelten* disappears from analysis by too-quickly reducing one species by the principle of another—the umwelt of flying animals differs by multiple sensory systems specific to them—some of which, such as echolocation and magneto-reception, are barely knowable to humans. It is then humans who must 'translate' these semes into the human semiotic of language to investigate and explain these motive forces *to ourselves, after our own fashion*. This also conceals an *innenwelt* specific to non-humans, a subjective 'life' that is more *bios* than *zoon*[87]. That is, non-humans have been repeatedly denied 'life' beyond mere mechanistic animacy in so-called 'modern science'. This inner-world to non-human life is of course the source of bio-semiotics that reveal much richer lives than would otherwise be predicted, moreso *predicated*.

In a not unimportant reversal that comes with the remaining insights of Traditional Indigenous Knowledge and a *grammar of animacy* embedded in some Native American languages and the people whose dialogue is in these discourses, we come to the realization that our own instrumental tongue may be the barbarizing device *sine qua non* for reducing our own *bios* to that of beastly, mis-represented, *zoon*[88].

The diagrammatic movement out of language and through discourse to the event of discourse, the understanding that surpasses the event, and the meaning that surpasses understanding can be illustrated this way:

Meaning
↑
Understanding (construal)
↑
Event of Discourse
↑
Discourse
≈
Language

From Language to Discourse

As a reminder to the reader the break indicated by ≈ is reminiscent of the arbitrary, parallel, and relative relationship of signifier to signified that is Ferdinand De Saussure's formula for *the sign* (Saussure 1966). That is, the sign is configured by this arbitrary signifier that we do not always encounter as the word; this too is arbitrary. Thus, the semiotic study that has always accompanied language is also what admits *silent speech* and the *mute object* as proper components of discourse. The exemplar of language is nonetheless where we will start.
For Ricoeur language has four properties of particular interest to us in both its definition and as grounding the isotopic possibilities that admit discourse as exceeding this system. First, language

[87] *Zoon (ζωον)*: living being, animal, creature, beast; figure picture, painting, ornament. Thus the '*zoon politikon'* is not without some depth of irony in its representation *as* 'representation'; not just 'something other' than a 'beast or god'.
[88] See Robin Wall Kimmerer on: *Learning The Grammar Of Animacy* in *Braiding Sweetgrass* (Kimmerer 2013)

is ‘outside of time’ and ‘virtual’, it is all *potentia*, until actualized in discourse; second, language has no proper subject, as Ricoeur states it: “[at the level of language] Who is speaking? does not apply at its level” (p.145. *From Text to Action*) (Ricoeur 1991), discourse gives its speakers by personal pronouns and self-referentiality (reflexivity); third, language lacks world, is symbolic, and exists only as system: “…the signs in language refer only to other signs within the same system…”(ibid) (Ricoeur 1991); fourth, language is always *prior* and has no proper interlocuter, no proper other person, and no proper addressee: “language is only the condition for communication for which it provides the codes” (p.146 ibid) (Ricoeur 1991).

Language is the a-temporal and non-spatial system of codes that must precede by always already exceeding its own linguistic limits by generating/systematizing codes. Notably this is retro-effective in our experience, easily observable when are seeking a representation: “there is a word for that”, whereby we consult a dictionary, *presuming it is already there*. However, this positivistic naming condenses by synonymity what it does not have a code for, and only occasionally does language come up short, demonstrating that: “it hasn’t got it”. Language may well be generated by our use, yet it is its own systematicity, and priority that erases our presence in *its* operation; and language may well irrupt time and space, yet it erases its own trace in history and in territory as having no origin anywhere or anytime, likewise it has no end in timespace either: language will have an afterlife when and where we do not.

It is in how language surpasses itself that we also have a sense of forms as well as names that make up a semiotic system of *mute objects* and *silent speech*. These figures, every bit as tropological as words, sentences, and discourses, will require a distinct effort in the case studies here. Yet this is important in the social system that accomplishes self-organization by its own codes inscribed *as flesh*. An interobjective relations of bodies is very much part of the cruelty overlooked in social reproduction, and it will constitute very important examinations of ruins as stigmatized, declassed, racialized, normativized relations at the level of society—*lived* in the day to day ‘discourse’ of institutionalized power/knowledge differentials. Forms will not, and have never been, restricted to human forms alone in eco-social interchange (metabolism) as a transmutation, what Patricia Hill Collins recalls as the hierarchic degradation in comparing social others: ‘to one another and to animals’ (Collins 1991). Yet stranger extimate effects will appear, as in Fanon’s anti-colonial psychiatric praxis where the virtual body materializes in the mis-identifications by way of racialization as an institution within[89]. Stranger still will be the interobjectivities of eco-social metabolism that yield an inverse zoonosis: how anthroponotic disease is the plague of environments, where human transmission is the unmentioned source of mass extinctions: trade—that supposedly neutral interchange of commodities—is the carrier of microbial life in viruses, bacteria, fungi and yeasts, invasive plant and animal species, and it is by the erasure of *terroir* and whatever came before that we have no more than traces of this system of eradications that erases its own trace.

For now, we will simply turn back to language and trace how this system ‘rolls out of itself’. Discourse surpasses language following the four-part comparison already begun in defining the attributes of language: first, discourse is language surpassing itself in a language-event or

[89] See Fanon: *Black Skin, White Masks* (Fanon 2008)
Also Du Bois in his almost verbatim description of the effects of a ‘looking glass self’ in: *The Souls of Black Folk* (Du Bois 2005)

linguistic-usage, by writing or speaking: "in the present" (p.145 ibid) (Ricoeur 1991), as an instance of discourse: discourse has a time of its speaking and writing; second, discourse is that instance as self-referential, having a speaker, having an inscriber, and in that speaker or inscriber, discourse re-enters language by reflexion upon how it is useful/usable; third, discourse has a world, it is of a world and for a world by describing, expressing, or scientifically or artistically representing it, here Ricoeur also reminds us that: "It is in discourse that the symbolic function of language is actualized." (ibid) (Ricoeur 1991); fourth, discourse is the materializable instance of the exchange of the codes of language and has discussants, interlocuters, addressees.

Discourse is always an articulation of event and meaning and thus an act that is the dialectical exchange between them: we can, as we shall see, always ask: "yes, but what do you want [from me]?", as an inquiry into an event that demonstrates this back-and-forth contained in the linguistic model of the sentence (the maximal unit of analysis in linguistics) informing Ricoeur's model of discourse (where the sentence is the minimal unit of analysis of discourse). Following Ricoeur's use of Searle and Austin's analysis of *locutionary act, illocutionary act,* and *perlocutionary act* we have a manifold of actuation by discourse[90]: locutionary action *acts by exteriorizing in the sentence—and by way of this, discourse—a sameness of proposition* in that the text is the same across readings or hearings. The durability of meaning is given in this form and event; illocutionary action *acts by exteriorizing (articulating) the force of this meaning*, how its aspect acts to inform (carrier of an indicative mood), to command or direct (as in the imperative mood), to suggest and inquire in the mode of questioning, anticipation, and incertitude (as in the subjunctive), or to wish (as in the absent optative mood that English lacks); perlocutionary action *acts by goad, stimulus, affect*, as in terrorizing by threatening tones or cold indifference, emoting grief or despair, joy or elation, in the paucity of words and uninscribed energetics or the lack of enervation that are nonetheless part of the discourse for its timing and profile of delivery.

From the instance of discourse to un-voiced meaning.

Discourse has a metabolism all its own in that meaning that only exceeds the event of discourse by our understanding, spiraling out of language by instance as event, up to the object of discourse that is sustained in our consciousness—typically memory. Inscription as that cultural artefact that is fixation by writing—texturation—is very often that aide-de-memoire that is the institution of statutes, instructions for use, formula for combination, policy, or strategy. Strangely, it is this alien object that is so often, by occupation alone, the imagery that is more in us than we are ourselves. The imagery of our world comes less from the historic religious image and more from the world of work, occupation, trade, and profession. Narrative, as that storied work that works through discourses as an adventure of these strange discursive objects—words and things—as *fictive* and that is to say conscious of the fabrication of discourse, is that always potentially reflexive, always potentially critical, re-entry of discourse into the system of language from which it came. This inversion of discourse by our storied accounts is the multiplication of discourses, an isotopy, that demonstrates the appearance of a system that makes systems by redoubling itself.

[90] See Austin: *How to do Things with Words*. (Austin 1962) It is curious that this condescension is precisely how one acts as an authority by way of the infantilizing title.

Yet it is also the strange metabolism of interobjectivity that is the circulation or alternation between language as non-event and discourse as instance of language. The doubling of discursive instance as event (often from speaking to writing), event as understanding (often the reverse: writ, script, or text moves to speech), and understanding redoubled as meaning (the extinction of 'the saying' for the always already 'said') returns the word to almost breathless silence in the power of its unspoken thingly meaning. In this last instance we come very close to the non-event of language in the decay of discourse by the approach of its meaning.

Society follows a pattern much as this one: by institutionalization society is put into motion as a slow moving and immense organizational field (an army, a corporation, a nation, a market), institutions surpass themselves in their own staging and milieu (armies adapt, corporations adopt, nations re-territorialize, markets expand and diversify desire/demand), this staging is overtaken by our understanding—doxa—as the naturalization of institutions and situations by their own more expansive milieu or *world* (doxa can be variously orthodox or heterodox in mode of belief, yet it is belief nonetheless, and a cosmos is its 'world'), finally the doxological climate is surpassed as having been, as already passed-over, in an almost senseless meaning demonstrating the objectal remainder of our institutionalized associations as a cataleptic social structure. This is the freeing of that world from its cosmos and doxological restraint by the doubling of its own atmospherics.

Catalepsis
↑
Doxa
↑
Staging (Darstellung)
↑
Institutionalization
≈
Society

Theory by Chronotope

"[narrative] is the central function or *instance* of the human mind." (p.13) (Jameson 1981)
Here, in a reversal of individual priority, it is narrative that conducts so much of our *conduct* and gives meaning and orientation in the form of *myth*. Social action in this sense is no longer so easy to misconstrue as an individual act of consciousness upon objects, rather it is the captivating gravity of the narrative object that holds fast and restrains consciousness[91].

Certainly, this condition alternates such that consciousness is sometimes captive to its object, and sometimes the object is actuated by conscious decision, yet this circumstance does not alternate by our own will alone. By following the timespace ratio that organizes narrative we have an experimental situation that we can use to examine narratives of just any type[92]. Here however

[91] This is to reiterate Horkheimer and Adorno's thesis in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*: (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002)

[92] See Jameson on this 'experimental' situation in the novel: "This final moment of the generic operation, in which the working categories of genre are themselves historically deconstructed and abandoned, suggests a final axiom,

those narratological objects, ruins, are the remainder that captivates retroactively as their retro-effect. We can again turn to the model of discourse outstripping language for the approach of a social timespace that disintegrates world and belief, the most durable institutions and their milieu in the term *society*.

Mikhail Bakhtin's *chronotope* provides a literary vehicle for working-through theories of timespace from the vantage point of narrative, more importantly by way of the adventure of letters, those trivial objects that are so ubiquitous as to bear no mention to the scientistic use of these invaluable things. Without a Saussure to guide us in the story of these *collective representations,* perhaps we would have completely neglected Emile Durkheim's own contribution to sociology. By social differentiation Durkheim posits timespace, knowledge, and logic as the result of distinctions in our social relations[93]. For Durkheim and Mauss, it cannot be the individuated body that gives us spatial sense, rather the proximations of social distance in social groups—themselves constituted by social distinctions from one another. It is not the lifespan of individual persons, rather the long-life of social groups as the afterlife of their own distinctions in time that biographizes persons in social relations. It is not the positing of individual sense that the logic of things is disclosed, rather it is the positing of the sense that individuals combined impose in shared means and the partition of ends a common cause[94].

Bakhtin's theorization of the chronotope provides both a literary critical technique that can be readily applied in socioanalysis, and precedes much of that work by the chronotopic property that Medvedev and Bakhtin introduce as *sociopoiesis* (Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978). What should also interest the environmental sociologist is the model of the chronotope on the organism/environment relations that Bakhtin makes use of. We will proceed with a short summary of the properties of the chronotope that most concern this socioanalysis.

1.) The chronotope is metabolic in the interchange of time-and-space that it represents, and toward that social timespace represented: "However forcefully the real and the represented world resist fusion, however immutable the presence of that categorical boundary line between them, they are nevertheless indissolubly tied up with each other and find themselves in continual mutual interaction; uninterrupted exchange goes on between them, similar to the uninterrupted exchange of matter between living organisms and the environment that surrounds them." (p. 254) (Bakhtin 1981) The interchangeability of the chronotope is tropological in how time is spatialized and space temporalized in the novel as representation of these dimensions of experience to one another in our experience of them. It is important to recall that tropics of the planet and the astronomic environment are 'turns' (tropes) as well, indicators of the rotational organization of the spheroid space of the earth's surface and the relativity to the astronomic region as the circumambulant environment above, given in scientific chronotopes: the temporal-spatialization of the earth and sky.

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according to which all generic categories, even the most timehallowed and traditional, are ultimately to be understood (or "estranged") as mere ad hoc, experimental constructs, devised for a specific textual occasion and abandoned like so much scaffolding when the analysis has done its work. … Genre criticism thereby recovers its freedom and opens up a new space for the creative construction of experimental entities, such as Lukacs' reading of Solzhenitsyn in terms of an invented "genre" that might be termed the "closed laboratory situation, " which project their "diachronic constructs " only the more surely to return to the synchronic historical situation in which such novels can be ·read as symbolic acts." (pp. 132-133, *The Political Unconscious*) (Jameson 1981)

[93] See Durkheim and Mauss on *'primitive classification'*: (Durkheim and Mauss 1963)

[94] See Durkheim: (Durkheim 1915)

2.) The chronotope has system's properties by what Bakhtin calls '*mutually inclusive relations*': chronotopes may have complex relations between and 'among' them, yet they never enter into relations 'within' another chronotope. In effect these are operationally closed systems; following the previous organism metaphor: "As long as the organism lives, it resists a fusion with the environment, but if it is torn out of its environment, it dies. The work and the world represented in it enter the real world and enrich it, and the real world enters the work and its world as part of the process of its creation, as well as part of its subsequent life, in a continual renewing of the work through the creative perception of listeners and readers." (p. 254) (Bakhtin 1981).

3.) The materiality of the chronotope is a transfer across the boundary lines of sentience and insentient 'dead' matter: the text inscribed in books, papyri, scrolls, etcetera and the voicedness of these inscriptions re-present dialogical relations of readers and writers, speakers and hearers in a *mediation,* the medium of which is timespace *storied* variously and generically. Isotopy is in this sense materializable by surpassing the system of language through inscription.

4.) The chronotope can be discovered in the dimensions of every motif (we can expand here immediately to other cultural forms such as music), and every word (the inscribed word is material and spatial, it is temporal in the time of its inscription—thus a history/etymology). Bakhtin refers to this property where: "…any and every literary image is chronotopic. Language, as a treasure-house of images, is fundamentally chronotopic. Also chronotopic is the internal form of a word, that is, the mediating marker with whose help the root meanings of spatial categories are carried over into temporal relationships (in the broadest sense)." (p.251) (Bakhtin 1981)

5.) The chronotope is representative of the metabolism of an historical world, what Bakhtin references as 'actual' historical reality (implying a virtual world of generic chronotopes), such that historical chronotopes are: "The world that creates the text" (p.253) (Bakhtin 1981). This is a sociopoetics that describes collective representation, and here Bakhtin historicizes this sociopoetics: "But in the treasure-house of language and in certain kinds of folklore this immanent unity of time is preserved, insofar as language and folklore continue to insist on a relation to the world and its phenomena based on collective labor. It is in these that the real basis of the ancient matrix is preserved, the authentic logic of a primitive enchaining of images and motifs." (p. 217) (Bakhtin 1981)

6.) The constitution of a world from the system of language by the (literary) work entails a *resonance*[95] across the boundary between insentient and sentient material. This is also discussed by Ricoeur (q.v.), yet Bakhtin is clear in this also having a metabolic property by way of this resonance:

[95] *Resonance* has a place in the ecological communication theory of Niklas Luhmann, see: *Ecological Communication* (Luhmann 1986)
However, resonance as *retenissement* also has a place in Discourse Analysis, see Ricoeur here:
Resonance enters into world systems analysis by way of Wallerstein's own thinking of metabolism as homeostasis, something Charles Lemert and Sam Han observe as parallel to Luhmann's own theorizing: *Whither the Time of World Structures after the Decline of Modern Space* (Lemert and Han 2020)
Finally, Hartmut Rosa's *resonance* also observes a mimetic relations of mirror neurons, again using the anthropomorph as a model in: *Resonance A Sociology of Our Relationship to the World* (Rosa 2019)

> "But inscriptions and books in any form already lie on the boundary line between culture and a dead nature; if we approach these items as carriers of the text, then they enter into the realm of culture and (in our example) into the realm of literature. In the completely real-life time-space where the work resonates, where we find the inscription or the book, we find as well a real person—one who originates spoken speech as well as the inscription and the book—and real people who are hearing and reading the text." (p. 253) (Bakhtin 1981)

7.) The chronotope has 'generically plot generating' varieties and actual historical types, what admits an 'ideology theory' that observes a kind of interchange between the former as reflective and refractive of the latter. Chronotopes differ in that ideological commitment that characterizes their inner workings as historical or general. We can recall this where we encounter the Braudelian and Wallersteinian thinking of timespace along socio-scientific divisions between the idiographic and nomothetic narratives that story timespace.(Wallerstein 2004)

8.) The chronotope has an individuating and internal dialogical property in the author/creator and voice in the text as narrator/hero. In this sense Bakhtin also historicizes narratology as the reflection of narrative, it is a redoubling of the text that also revises it[96]. As with Ricoeur, the sociopoetics of narrative escape the limits of the author and the text as the social properties that they always already were.[97]

To further condense these properties we can state that the organizational principle of individual timespace occurs by the approach of a social timespace in the storied form of the chronotope. This is the case for scientific revisions of timespace and our naïve relations to it, just as it is the case in un-questioned (un-quoted) naturalized conduct of social life.

Categorial reason will always begin with a chronotope, it is only in the bracketing of worlds (timespaces) that we begin to notice their heterogeneity and the system that lies behind the familiar case. It is also the disquotation that is the residue of explanation that returns a de-familiarized, suspended world to the system of quotidian existence. It is this last socio-scientific act that is open to critique: what Bourdieu criticizes as the intellectualist disposition of much phenomenology (he indicates Garfinkle and Schütz) is that this removal of the brackets and return does not in fact happen, and the intellectual game of neutralization does not end. This I will add, is due to the neutralizing effects of political economy, particularly those effectuations found in the division of intellectual labor. That is, the 'world' is suspended for the sake of an interminable analysis, that can be renewed at any time, much as a patient in a clinic is said to be 'in remission' ever after illness[98]. The timespace of social science itself must be bracketed as Bourdieu observes, and the stakes of this field observed as a way to return the struggle over scientific classification to the wider world struggle of classification (Bourdieu 1977).

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[96] See Lacan's inaugural article on the mirror stage: *The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Function as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience*, in *Écrits* (Lacan 2006)
Also, Freud's remarks in: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (Freud 1921)

[97] Please see pages 248-258 in: *The Dialogic Imagination* and note that this concluding section to *Forms of Time and the Chronotope in the Novel* were published in 1973. The body of the text was written between 1937-1938. (Bakhtin 1981)

[98] A not so trivial point made by David Rosenhan in his famous article: *On Being Sane in Insane Places* (Rosenhan 1973)

Discourse analysis is greatly strengthened by the chronotope as the storied/historical organization of timespace reflected in *genre;* by varieties of narrative and other discursive forms as generic organizations of storied timespace. Where discourse occurs we presume speech, yet this is not precise in the case of intertextuality, where the system of a text shapes the system of another text; where it is 'transposed into another text' (p.15 *Desire in Language*) (Kristeva 1980) and where: "…the functions defined according to the extra-novelistic textual set… take on value within the novelistic textual set." (p. 37 ibid) (Kristeva 1980). Closely following Bakhtin's own dialogical theory, Kristeva's *intertextuality* describes how historic texts (of all kinds!) come to shape novelistic texts (Kristeva 1980). By treating the text as texturing of one another by a transposition we have a kind of interobjectivity that also shapes timespace.

The material carrier of intertextuality itself comes into question with such discursive objects as the census, having an ancient history in Rome and the partition of taxable, recruitable subjects thereafter; the map, whether it is a cosmograph or Mercator map, whether of the 'vertical' cosmological space of the former, or the imposition of 'horizontal' mundane space in its distortions upon actual places in the latter (the mis-representation of the Indian sub-continent is often noted); and the museum, yet we can include a variety of other non public chronotopes such as Bakhtin's 'castle' in gothic novels with its repository of dynastic memorabilia and intrigues (Bakhtin 1981). It is owed to Benedict Anderson that these objects representative of timespace can be transposed deliberately in the re-shaping of narrative around nation-state histories as retro-effective myths of originality (Anderson 1991). It is also to these socio-cultural artefacts that myths of eschatological ends also enter the storied timespace.

Most important is that these 'texts' and texturations, whether as the 'dead material' that 'carries' the text and chronotope across time and space between audiences and author/creators; or as structuring of language at a pre-discursive level, such that it is transmitted in the rhythms of prosody, music (musemes), or mythic or scientistic imagery (the religious icon, table or graph), the chronotope is what generates the possibility of discourse escaping the confines of linguistic system.

In this sense discourse analysis must always rely upon that pre-discursive prior that is like language in systematicity. Yet as social facts of patterns of encampment, reckoning of days, or summoning to joint venture in early, 'pre-modern' group organization demonstrate; or in the social artefacts—census, map, museum—introduced specifically to re-organize society as nation in 'modern' group organization demonstrate, this pre-discursive level need not be language itself. Indeed, the collective representation of objects of any order will do[99].

Ruins as objects satisfy this by their organization of timespace. Yet this term also indicates a subject as well: the déclassé, the stigmatized, traumatized, as ruined, carry this social artefact—an object—'within' them that is more 'within' them than they are themselves, it is extimate. This idealized ego, ideal identificatory position of enunciation, 'master status', or dominant Role, erases its own presence in enouncement—elocution—only to become increasingly tangible and objectal in the gradations of illocutionary and perlocutionary silent speech. The ruins of barbarized speech as socio-symbolic acts are cries of war, insults and dehumanizations in service

[99] See Anderson: *Imagined Communities* (Anderson 1991)
See Durkheim: *The Elementary Forms Of The Religious Life* (Durkheim 1915)

to violation, and symbolic violence that goes beyond speech by objectivating voice: the cataleptic abolition of meaningfulness that is the shout that says more than what is shouted. The aggrieved are no different in the symbolic violence that bespeaks crimes committed elsewhere. Here the silence is the dissolution into a whisper of what was already unspeakable, and an objectal voicelessness remains[100].

Studies of Ruin

The following case studies focus on narratives of 'world' or 'milieu' on one hand, and narratives of identifications on the other. In the former the extimate object has a classificatory gravity of anaesthetization to ultra-objective violence: ruins organize experience by staging eco-social metabolisms of decay and corruption, the overtaking of ecosystems by industrialization/the overtaking of industrial systems of society by the environment, all of which are naturalized. The latter describes a normalization of ruinate timespace—of the chronotopes there in whatever form—by identification with ruins in the hypothesized forms: as traces from the past, as traces from the future, as superimpositions by nature, as transpositions by revisory power/knowledge. Here the more socioanalytically familiar name for ultra-subjective violence as Bourdieu's *symbolic violence* can serve as a guide. Nonetheless, it is by this pair of concepts that the approach of social timespace as *ruinate* in some way carries both naturalized and normativized meanings.

Here the use of these 'hypotheses' is effectuated as a process of socioanalytic working-through—*not* a process of elimination: only by the process of subjection to these timespaces do we gradually or radically come to surpass them as a system of prefigured ends that must be met to transform social consciousness towards a planetary society and environment[101]. A transformation from the capture of ideological closure in the aura of inevitable ruin.

The objectal remainder of Ruins is an eco-environmental chronotope paired with subjection to an extimate metabolism; a kind of ruinate chronotope within that is fatal, nihilistic, and simply the other term of objective institutional forms. A draft card, a marriage contract, minority status in legal or political organization, are all examples of this ruinate article of bad-faith. However, the American milieu includes an eschatonic core of both widespread religious fundamentalisms and economic fundamentalisms. Both imagine 'the end of the world' as a logical end; further, the cynical woundedness of political professionals, religious or economistic demogogues betrays how this particular catastrophic society has been figured into political existence. Yet there are

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[100] This catalepsis is drawn from the 'bare life' explored by Giorgio Agamben and especially the cruelties described by Slavoj Zizek in his portrait of this 'bare life', in *Did Someone Say Totalitarianism?* (Zizek 2001) See Agamben: *Homo Sacer Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Agamben 1998)
It must also be observed that I am drawing upon the Greek root used in philosophy *katalepsis* and its counterpart of *akatalepsis*, and in this sense, how comprehension surpasses itself in intensities of meaning. The case of Theresa of Ávila is such a case for example, of this trancelike objectal state that exemplifies this double sense.

[101] Michel Foucault's terms subjection and subjectivation are important here, although in both I will drift from Foucault's own preferred usage: the former speaks to that indirect, non-egoic conduct, that is (paradoxically) direct as a total social service; the latter, relating to a non-knowledge and 'unconscious' that is the extimate form of uncertainty within. Subjection as total social service has a discussion in the work of Marcel Mauss's *The Gift* (Mauss 1990). Subjectivation as production of the desire for individuation by becoming (again, paradoxically) *subject*.
See Foucault: *Security, Territory, Population*. (Foucault 2007)

other ruined forms in the seductive and anti-solidary enjoyment of alienation by an 'oppression olympics', and the reduction to criticasters of otherwise well trained academic activists by the cataleptic trap of polemic[102].

Ruins are however not wholly this eschatological image of corruption (or the obverse of incorruptibility), and it is in the more complex forms of superposed and transposed timespaces that we begin to encounter chronotopes that spatialize time and temporalize space to a different effect. The extimate and corrupting kernel that appears as if the 'undead' peered through our eyes, detectable in the self-mortifications of abasing ourselves before this gaze, wrongly attributed to 'others', becomes the signal of society within us. Further, how by working-through these sociological traces, their history and biography as our always situated *over-historicization* and *over-identification,* we come to leave behind—not merely surpass—this treasured antagonism. The *agalma* that is the cataleptic intensity that grips us at our core loosens with our observation of it.

The sociological types that we will repeatedly encounter in these chronotopes are those dispositions by *doxa*—they are doxological types—and *paradoxa* that demonstrate ideal typical subjection in the approach of ruin as *dispositional closure* as structural enceinte (see Figure 8.)[103].

The dispositions formed as *doxa* are the contraries of zealotry and cynicism, the *paradoxa* formed are typified as the sub-contraries of dissimulation and simulation. The impossible ideal typical character types of zealotry and cynicism must be stressed: the former is figured into existence by the accusative and oppositive *disabuse* of those posited to *simulate* social roles, and by the subaltern *disenchantment* of the dissimulator that lacks this doxic conviction to social mores yet desires this doxa nonetheless; the latter is figured into existence by the accusative and oppositive work of the dissimulator that cleaves to values that the cynic makes sport of, and the subaltern *disownment* of their own cynical simulation of social mores as being realistic and thereby morally responsible as opposed to the nihilistic tendencies of pure cynical reason. While the logical type may well exist, the ideal of the absolute zealot and the absolute cynic is a virtuality.

[102] Patricia Hill Collins has clearly stated this problem in her famous passages on the 'Matrix of Domination' in: *Black Feminist Thought* (Collins 1991)
See Adorno on the Grossepolitik of rightist accusations of the 'criticaster' in the short essay: *Critique* (Adorno 2005a)
See Bourdieu on *strategies of condescension*: q.v.

[103] The socio-symbolic capture of individuals, individuated by their subjectivation, has an important predecessor discourse that has also been invaluable in developing this structural analytic square and its torsion of dispositifs. The reader is encouraged to Max Horkheimer's study of the racket form as the ideological closure of classification, see Horkheimer: *On the Sociology of Class Relations* (Horkheimer 1943)



FIGURE 8. DISPOSITIONAL CLOSURE

By contrast, the appeals to and accusations of these positions are very typical and characterological. The paradoxical positions of dissimulation (as concealment of 'faking it to make it', thereby engaging in denial) and simulation (actually faking it into existence/disavowing that this is a disguise simultaneously) are ideal types that are not only possible but regular in the total social services rendered to societies[104]. It is these complicated positions that character development takes place from, and it is these narratives that surpass the impossible types by their enaction as social operations necessary to the socio-symbolic system itself. By symbolizing value-laden extremes in zeal and de-valued extremes in cynicism instrumentality, these positions find their allegiance and their opponents, enervating this social metabolism by naïve conduct according to this field.

Socio-symbolic acts of disenchantment are what 'reconcile' the impossibility of socially ideal values with the practical matter of upholding these ideals through existing normative conduct. Disavowal is a socio-symbolic act that attempts to resolve the deadlock of practicabilities: the very un-idealistic dissimulation of ideals and the simulation of them that is evidently in service to instrumental purposes. Disownment is a socio-symbolic act that is the reflex image of any act of denegation or condescension: when called out for cynical appeals to power/knowledge, disownment makes disclaimers and abnegates the socio-symbolic acts themselves as merely 'acts' in service of the practical as opposed to the ideal, an appeal to the non-instrumental but not rejecting this disposition either. (Mis)recognition is written this way to suggest a socioanalytic escape that can variously be clinical: working-through this socio-symbolic inclosure to liberate from its corrosive effects and acknowledge misrecognition as a way to surpass this ironical habit of mind and yet not collapse into zeal either; and cynical misrecognition, the effort to master this field as an obstacle for all who do not, entrapping them in the socio-symbolic efforts of reconciliation themselves[105].

While this is in no way more than a typology of social dispositions in the field of power/knowledge, it will have character types that fit very closely some of these dispositions and their motive positionality. It is this bracketed form of a ruinate social structure of corrosive power/knowledge that guides much of the structural analysis of historical and contemporary. In many of the chronotopes that account for the effects of ruins, these types are its dative—apodictic—and trivialized appearances as situated character or contextual disposition.

In this chapter I have made an attempt to explicate the hermeneutic arc of Ricoeur and to demonstrate the explanatory function of bracketing in socio-stnalysis as the application of theory in a socio-structural explanation of oppositive types. Structural analysis is itself a neutralizing function. By itself this technique is empty and offers no insight as mere explanation, until placed in the arc of understanding → explanation → interpretation. Only by the retro-effect of disquoted and interpretative socio-scientific acts is the explanatory power of structural analysis useful because insightful; it is *nous* in the Greek sense and a praxeological good. Nonetheless, structural analytics remain to be deployed in the concrete instances of specific case studies, to which we will now turn.

[104] The article by Robert Granfield is the reference here: (Granfield 1991)
[105] See Bourdieu on Misrecognition:(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992)

CHAPTER THREE THE SKANEATELES MILL RUINS

Of the remnants preserved/neglected on this site are the remains of at least two identifiable dams: at the North end the stone block revetment and backfill is still evident in the effort to canalize the waters to feed a now absent watermill; and toward the center/South end of the site another dam, of not dissimilar block and backfill construction, and still exhibiting a functional concrete sluice gate in three sections. Again, the actual Mill itself is no longer evident, only the foundation, the pool and canalization of the waters.

The structural analysis of disposition into oppositive social relations is organized by this inert architecture; another remnant overlooked in the naïve inclosure in the (hypo)thesis: *ruins come from the past*. We will now turn to that analysis. However, an important note to the reader that it is the presumptive diachrony, presentism, and such affects as nostalgia that are the otherly gaze from this site in its conversion of Ruins to a nature trail. The gentrification of this objectal remnant of *class*, of relations of production traced in the environment itself, is a socio-symbolic act in slow dispensation of mute speech and demand of our absorption and subjection.

The configuration of '*civilization*' and '*early settlement industry*' are the mute forms that intervene and correct the watercourse for human consumption. These putative demonstrations of human will and power over the landscape explain away whatever came before as a tabula rasa for the office of industry and work to foreground themselves upon. The idle gaze accepts 'the past' and its rubbish, recollects that these first industrial efforts have been superseded and works-through to this referent in objective progress over past enterprises. Perhaps there is some nostalgia for the quieter time of pastoral aestheticization: the sloshing water wheels, the stamp of hooves and the thrum of wagon wheels where the gas engine has not yet appeared. Perhaps there is some melancholia with the recognition that *these* mute objects are the real fiction made possible by the exodus of the Onondaga, and a life on the nearby shores of Skaneateles without governance by any Dutch, French, or English tongue: a pervasive mood of denial of the actual for the virtual stamp of industrializing prerogatives[106]. Those waters themselves, would have reflected much older trees, and wildlife that lived there would not have included the cow, the horse, and the pig; sport-fish such as Rainbow trout would not have been found in the lakes or streams.

To accommodate this imaginary and whatever socio-symbolic world that is historicized this way or any other we are interpellated somehow to 'suspend' the ordinary judgments and aesthetics that predominate, and further, we are called to 'bracket' the world we are familiar with and the histories that we may already accept and expect to be surprised at all with what else we may encounter. Where the hypothesis that *ruins come from the past* is effectuated, this is only to challenge a sense of past-ness and how we are normally—normatively—instructed in its reception by the artefacts of history.

[106] Ann Laura Stoler's introduction offers some passing insight into this, see: *"The Rot Remains": From Ruins to Ruination*, in *Imperial Debris On Ruins and Ruination* (Stoler 2013) however see Freud for the formulation of a split self in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*. (Freud 1921).

Whatever is summoned by nostalgia or melancholia is firmly disabused now: to the 'scholarly' eye all that is left are the images of words—such as these—and eyed with mistrust: "yes, but aren't you a colonist, is this not just another colonization by writing over silenced voices…". Itself a staged performance for liberal blackmail that gives itself away by the very standpoint of this farcical 'critique' in the professional congeries of academic capital (Zizek 2001). An intrusive, 'intervention' that disavows its abusive harvest: "now let me educate you here…", thus the *act* of such *activism* betrays its cynical denegation of the 'less educated' and 'naïve scholar' by making them naïve: a social fact of subjectivation forcing discovery of a crypto-colonist within. A theoretically informed sociology would recognize this bit of cultural-capitalist drama as the *fait sociaux* that it in fact is (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992)(Foucault 2007)[107].

The configurations thus far: the *mythos* of the settler-colonial imaginary and its *consumer* of whatever 'historical' imagery remains of the dammed watercourse and dilapidated stone and brickwork, plus historical anecdote. The dissembler in nostalgia for this myth and the disillusioned at its melancholic recollection of pre-settlement 'times' are simply proliferations of this mythos become a petite enlightenment. The professional joy in denegation, demystification, and disabuse that posits the myth only to disavow its fantasy as *necessity*, the treasured educational capital of the historian/educator, from whatever position affords publication and academically enchanted power-to-disenchant. Thus, yet another proliferation in the academic disposition that simply admits to this power for disenchantment as yet one more turn of disavowal to outright disownment of that very power by staging a reflexive performance[108].

This typified isotopy of social objects (mythos, historical referent, de-mythified corrective performance) and their social subjects (the romantic pastoral subject interposed by early industry and settlement artefacts, the disenchanted subjects in idealizing this past, the dis-enchanters themselves as products of the mythos that opposition sustains by mere accusation), gives us a picture of a social structure and its naïve exponents in their character formation by the organization of experience by the ruinate site itself.

The tropes that first appear in *mythos* are *actuations* as social-figures (the romantic, nostalgic, melancholic, dis-abusive historicist or contextualist), subject positions presumed and predisposed in the discourses of settler-colonial *ruins*. As actuated, these are *not* simply 'actions' any more than the 'activist scholar' example is engaged in producing anything: *actuations* are acts of *constraint for the sake of constraining; inhibition, undermining, impasse, conservation and delay.* This is what *actual* cultural memory presents itself as *structurally*—formally—in enacting the logic of this discourse. Notably, it is by the punctum of the relic, Ruin, and overlooked social artefact *as if* it were disclosed originally and correctly as *historical artefact* or *archaeological* in that putative sense of fetishistic concreteness. Thus, the overlooked subjection (and

[107] See especially Durkheim on 'the soul in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (Durkheim 1915)

[108] Wendy Brown offers an important element of precision here regarding the reactionary mood of domination by cynical disownment of sociality: *In the Ruins of Neoliberalism The Rise Of Antidemocratic Politics In The West*: "[society cynically disabused by Friedrich Hayek]… At best, he says, the term carries nostalgia for ancient worlds of small and intimate associations and falsely presupposes "a common pursuit of shared purposes." At worst, it is a cover for the coercive power of government. Social justice is a "mirage," and attraction to it is "the gravest threat to most other values of a free civilization." (p.30)(Brown 2019). Hayek's statement is a precise example of ideological closure in the 'disabuse' of nostalgia associated with more traditional right wing authoritarianism by libertarian social dominance orientation.

subjectivation by extimacy) to this structure also includes an actively—it is hyper-action in a very real sense—overlooked *objectivation* as well: the environment as palimpsest for all these responses and actuations is un-acknowledged for the objectal cultural memory that it is.

Political ecology first appears in what is overlooked and institutionalized as background and trivia, gratuitous 'historical' or 'archaeological' fact, and *not* as the social-facts, these made-and-staged-articles of *the social*; of a *socius*[109].

However, these subjections/objectivations are *naïve* in that they each persist to sustain an irreflexive standpoint—a *natural attitude*—that is dative of a world and horizon where the deictic center is the human, the cogito, the ego, as if itself a stranger and independent figure *necessary* to 'world' at all. That is, 'Nature' is only ever conceived in tandem with 'human nature' as its *petite objet*. What does not occur in these reversible configurations is exploited in the 'final' cynical form that is the treasured struggle for the stakes of these dative manifestations themselves. By eliding the reversibility that is romantic mythos for 'realistic' 'enlightenment' no such notion is ever entertained in the first place; in confrontation with this crisis of timespace in the ruins themselves, flight into nostalgia and melancholia are possibilities; failing this, and rounding upon its own in cannibalistic delight, the formerly disenchanted become professed (if not professional) as discursive de-mythifiers and disabusers in the name of reality; the narrative that pretends to the Real.

As I have indicated, these increasingly complicated subjectivities cede to what they are each and all disposed to serve: a cynical 'recognition' of these mis-recognitions as the stakes of a game for intellectualist if not outright discursive political power by manipulating the environmental imagery right before our eyes in *bad-faith*.

The configuration of these 19th C. ruins, exemplary only, and observable throughout the colonized United States, are what come back, recur, in the cynical standpoint of the administerial professional. The organization of the rubbished world of the past into a discourse of 'industry as progress' is the actuation of 'ruins' of a timespace itself. The *chronotope* of the industrial ruins demonstrates a concretist spatialization by context, over a temporalization that is the eclipsed past. *Memory as collective* is posited by the environmental imagery made 'historic' that generates a past as *passed over*, and only 'memorable'. This is however not to affirm its opposite in 'lived history'.

Timespace as Pedestrian Chronotope

Mikhail Bakhtin furnishes us with a wealth of literary chronotopes, and with these, a critique of aesthetic politics and aesthetic ecology organized by this specific figure-trope. Of significant importance is what Bakhtin describes as *historical inversion*:

[109] The *social fact* becomes something of a symptom of political ecology where this commonly accepted yet overlooked object is an irritant of political ecological type. It is more virtual than actual, this excess captivating differently across social classes. This point goes largely unremarked in Stoler's otherwise insightful text (Stoler 2013).

> "This distinctive feature manifests itself preeminently in what might be called a *historical inversion.* The essence of this inversion is found in the fact that mythological and artistic thinking locates such categories as purpose, ideal, justice, perfection, the harmonious condition of man and society and the like in the *past.* Myths about paradise, a Golden Age, a heroic age, an ancient truth, as well as the later concepts of a "state of nature" of natural, innate rights and so on, are all expressions of this historical inversion. To put it in somewhat simplified terms, we might say that a thing that could and in fact must only be realized exclusively in the *future* is here portrayed as something out of the *past,* a thing that is in no sense part of the past's reality, but a thing that is in its essence a purpose, an obligation." (p.147 *The Dialogic Imagination*)(Bakhtin 1981)

This is an important sense of how *ruin comes from the past* in narrative. It is how I will study ruins as *silent speech* (Rancière 2011), as that 'central instance of the human mind' (Jameson 1981) in the form of narrative, as it is always already imposed *upon and before us* as representations: ideas and motifs or concepts and explanations in art or science, ordinary or specialized modes of representation, that we only rarely if ever understand as other than the imaginary or socio-symbolic, that is as *real*. And this, only in retrospect, as an echo and resonance of this irruption. Jacque Rancière's *silent speech* is given by Gabriel Rockhill—Rancière's major translator from French to English—this way:

> "…the contradictory conjunction between two elements of this regime [*the aesthetic regime of art,* where the 'privilege of speech over the visible' has been eclipsed]. On the one hand, meaning is taken to be immanent in things themselves,… On the other hand,… the mute things of the world only speak if someone deciphers their latent meaning or speaks for them (…). This contradiction has given birth to at least two major forms of silent speech: the latent meaning beneath the hieroglyphic surface of written signs and the brute presence or *punctum* that remains a deaf and silent obstacle to all forms of signification." (pp. 96-97 *The Politics of Aesthetics*)(Rancière 2004)

Bakhtin's *historical inversion* is important to us in observing how ruins come from the past at the expense of the future. More importantly, how speech represents timespace to conceal and invisibilize modes of timespace—chronotopes—as part of those chronotopes themselves. Timespace is figured into being as a socio-symbolic system that reshapes literary figures and how we see ourselves in them, in their chronotopic milieu:

> "Here one must note, first and foremost, the influence of Aristotle on the distinctive methods of the ancient biographers, and in particular his doctrine of entelechy as the ultimate purpose of development that is at the same time its first cause. This Aristotelian identification of ultimate purpose with origin inevitably had a crucial effect on the distinctive nature of biographical time. From here it follows that a character at its most mature is the authentic origin of development. It is here that we get that unique "inversion in a character's development" that excludes any authentic "becoming" in character. A man's entire youth is treated as nothing but a preliminary to his maturity. The familiar element of "movement" is introduced into biography solely as a struggle of opposing impulses, as fits of passion or as an exercise in virtue—in order to invest this virtue with permanence. Such struggles and exercises serve to strengthen qualities of character that

> are already present, but create nothing new. The base remains the stable essence of an already completed character." (p. 140 *The Dialogic Imagination*)(Bakhtin 1981)

As with the frozen milieu rendered in *historical inversion*, the frozen character and disposition of *biographical inversion* speaks to a familiar trope of Marx's own *camera obscura*, where our 'historical life circumstances' are 'inverted' (Marx and Engels 1964). For the social theorist, Bakhtin's indispensable insight is itself proximal to historical life in the novel as allegorical of actual life circumstances. Social structure always presents itself in the mode of timeless and spaceless eternity of a system made of virtualities; of symbols of itself and nothing else. The frozen biography is a metonym for a frozen timespace. The character itself as a synecdoche of an immovable history and vice a versa.

The *pedestrian chronotope* is to be understood in a double sense: the trope of the gratuitously ordinary and so trivial as to be *overlooked embodiment* and the sensuous; and as pedestrian in another indirect sense of the discourse of mute objects by sheer distanciation and temporalization, not unlike the ratio of timespace that differentiates places by how slowly/quickly we tread them, scan them in our gaze, turn about in hearing (room noise is such an example: the hum of lights and whir of fans), catch the 'aroma' of what exudate marks them (interestingly, this term may indicate the scent of soil itself, a scent familiar to anyone who has plowed a field or turned a garden bed: from αρωμα), or even discover the strange gustatory *terroir* that could variably be what is particular in what grows in the soil, or the signs of poisoning as what has already leaked through our tissue into taste receptors (chemotherapy, radiation poisoning, pesticide poisoning, and some allergies elicit this).

A pedestrian chronotope can be how long (and by what intensity) it takes to discover exposure to toxic environments and how quickly we may neutralize the sounds and sights of a place in becoming common-place (sight and sound like scent, can become undetectable with repeated exposures that 'neutralize' their effect). These otherwise pedestrian senses can be trained and raised to levels of significant skill at detection and discernment, however they are for the most part common, and even held in common insofar as even in losing sense we gain partially 'regain' sense—the unique condition of blindsight, discovered by a sociologist, is such an example[110]—and in any case rely upon training our ears to voice and music made by others, to ornaments and depictions, to culinary artefacts, and etcetera.

A pedestrian chronotope is important in that this is how we come to also know the 'ticklish object' of the social: its virtuality and its effectuation of our many day to day, familiar objects. It is in this sense that a political ecology is always social in the associations that are organized by it (again, would it be too much to imagine that farmers as land-workers know the scent of arable land, as *aromatic,* because the soil is alive with organic matter as opposed to dead and inert as far as growing purposes are concerned?)[111]. We can turn back to a Ruins as that which organizes

[110] On Blindsight see: *The Making of Blind Men* (Scott 1969)

[111] In addition to ozone, which is an atmospheric compound, petrichor and geosmin are aromatics released from the soil with rainfall. Petrichor was named in: BEAR, I., THOMAS, R. Nature of Argillaceous Odour. *Nature* **201**, 993–995 (1964). https://doi.org/10.1038/201993a0 as a combination of *petra* (stone) and *ichor* (blood of the gods); Geosmin is identified as early as 1965 in: N. N. GERBER AND H. A. LECHEVALIER Geosmin, an Earthy Smelling Substance Isolated from Actinomycetes. APPLIED MICROBIOLOGY, Nov., 1965 Vol. 13, No. 6.

sense by its monumental obdurance: the back-filled dams that canalized Skaneateles Creek provided foundations for the Mills themselves, now useless, they are *carriers* of history and a past-sense that is a sensorial trace of the past. As a sensorial trace, we mark out the past in materials themselves: concrete, bricks, iron, mortar, and stone, are the obvious remnants that conceal the foreground of the Skaneateles Creek itself as a remainder of the canalizations and altered topography, the absence of old-growth forest, and the absence of the fauna that were purged from the waters, skies, and land.

Further, a pedestrian chronotope puts us into motion as *carriers* of their past: by overlooking the absent flora and fauna an ecological unconscious in its redoubled form *appears*. That we do not 'see' (we do not 'know it') the absent is a pleonasm only by inscription, an 'unknown unknown' only by structural predisposition to the past as such. In this sense we are the vehicle of this haunting remainder by its neglect—our ordinary bracketing of timespace as passed-by—is the tenor, or 'sense' of which is a kind of *insentience.* This ecological unconscious, is the motionless-ness of official timespace, lived as though long-dead so as to be forgettable. A pedestrian chronotope in that the ordinary sense of the forgettable past is an obviation that is practiced by the anesthetized sense of place that may well come with the memorialization of objects, what objects may conceal themselves by. The discursive epitaph *is* the bypassed remnants of the architecture itself: our performance of unacknowledgment the actual subjection in this socio-symbolic act.

Concrete, once forgotten, now ubiquitous, is a materialized obviation of space (see Figure 9.). Once we make the stuff it does not simply go away. Further, concrete has a strange lifespan of its own, curing over long periods of time, and in the case of some of its formulas, such as that of some Roman specimens, may even 'repair itself' too. Concrete is the construction material of modern cities and as of the early 21st C., and was estimated that: "Worldwide, over ten billion tons of concrete are being produced each year. In the United States, the annual production of over 500 million tons implies about two tons for each man, woman and child." (Meyer 2004)[112]. The very infrastructure of cities contributes to a changed atmosphere by another 'accidental' social artefact in the form of CO2 emissions: "…it has been estimated that the production of one ton of Portland cement causes the release of one ton of CO_2 into the atmosphere. CO_2 is known to be a greenhouse gas that contributes to global warming, and the cement industry alone generates about 7% of it." (ibid). And yet another, in that rubbished concrete is infrequently re-used, most often shipped to landfills.

After gas and oil and deforestation, concrete production, largely in China (and even during the Covid years) is the third highest emitter of CO2 (2016 Andrews). Ruins then also indicate 'ruin': the object that is effectuated in the miscognition that is an obviation-plus-trivial-absence; concrete as a familiar material is a subjection and captivation by this 'preponderance of the object' in our materialism. To get a sense of this materialism as sensory, as an overlooking and immobilization of an interobjectivity—the interaction between objects—we can turn to another substance: manure. In dairy country (upstate New York) the rebuttal by CAFO (Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations) operators to the offended noses of people living with the massive

[112] Christian Meyer (Prof.) (2004) Concrete Materials and Sustainable Development in the USA, Structural Engineering International, 14:3, 203-207, DOI: 10.2749/101686604777963757



FIGURE 9. GLOBAL CEMENT AND FOSSIL ENERGY PRODUCTION TO 2016 (USGS, 2014; MOHR ET AL., 2015). (FIGURE REPRODUCED FROM *GLOBAL CO_2 EMISSIONS FROM CEMENT PRODUCTION* EARTH SYST. SCI. DATA, 10, 195–217, 2018. ROBBIE ANDREWS)

volume of excrement in lagoons and injected into fields, is that: “it smells like money”. The reflexive irony here is easily lost, of course manure ‘smells like shit’ to the operators, nonetheless it is part of livelihood, and it is still disagreeable. The gallows humor also betrays something of the fatalism that is present throughout agriculture where the remaining large farms—CAFO’s—also echo the fatal discursive origin of their monopsony from the then Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz: “go big or go bust”, that turned out the last small farms when they were bankrupted and bought out in the decades of the Agriculture Crisis following President Reagan.

A pedestrian chronotope is a traversing of the interobjective relationalism of neglected, inert material, by ‘reading’ the already ‘emplotted’ history of living and in this case, insentient Ruins, that we are surrounded by. This ‘reading’ as pedestrian and ordinary may involve the resignation of our senses to CAFO waste and to industrial waste, of country and town. That we do not ‘see’ these Ruins nor do we ‘know’ the ‘ruin’ of subjection that naturalizes waste of entire landscapes and atmospheres, is the interobjectivity and relations of our bodies to these bodies. What we treat as mundane and insignificant, of neither consequence nor worth, we also tend to treat as immaterial; thus ‘materialism’ is that reification that invisibilizes matter and substance, making it available only indirectly, only figuratively.

David Harvey’s pedestrian is a valuable lesson in this chronotope: “De Certeau… treats social spaces as more open [than the localization of Foucault in carceral conditions of quadrillage] to creativity and action. Walking, he suggests, defines a ‘space of enunciation.’” (p.213 *The Postmodern Condition*) (Harvey 1990). What he will further elaborate by turning to Bourdieu’s *habitus* as mediator: “The reason why submission to the collective rhythms is so rigorously demanded is that the temporal forms or the spatial structures structure not only the group's representation of the world but the group itself, which orders itself in accordance with this representation…” (P.163 *Outline of a Theory of Practice*) (Bourdieu 1977). Harvey does not further establish the socioanalytic provenance of this language as explicitly that of Durkheim’s own study of sociocentric space through *Collective Representation*, what will be later developed in the work of Lévi-Strauss in his memorable analysis of the socio-political space of village life[113].

[113] See Jameson on this adaptation to the collective representation inscribed onto the body given by Lévi-Strauss: “…the visual text of Caduveo facial art constitutes a symbolic act, whereby real social contradictions, insurmountable in their own terms, find a purely formal resolution in the aesthetic realm. This interpretive model thus allows us a first specification of the relationship between ideology and cultural texts or artifacts: a specification still conditioned by the limits of the first, narrowly historical or political horizon in which it is made. We may suggest that from this perspective, ideology is not something which informs or invests symbolic production; rather the aesthetic act is itself ideological, and the production of aesthetic or narrative form is to be seen as an ideological act in its own right, with the function of inventing imaginary or formal "solutions" to unresolvable social contradictions.” (Jameson 1981)
But also see Durkheim and Mauss’ description of a sociocentric space: “Now besides this distribution of things, analogous to that reported from Australia, we can see the apparition, though in a rudimentary form, of notions of orientation. When the tribe camps, the encampment is made in a circular form; and within this circle each particular group has a fixed place. The two moieties are respectively to the right and the left of the route followed by the tribe, the ascription of sides being made with reference to the point of departure. Within the semicircle occupied by each moiety, the clans, in their turn, are clearly localized with respect to each other, and the same is the case with the sub-clans. The places thus assigned to them depend less on their relationships to each other than on their social functions, and consequently on the nature of the things subordinate to them and over which their influence is thought to be exercised.” (Durkheim and Mauss 1963)

Of philosophers and flaneurs

Derivé and *detournement* were the psychographic iterations of a pedestrian chronotope following the modernist flaneur of Charles Baudelaire. Later, with Walter Benjamin, Guy Debord and the situationists, perhaps terminating in the anarchic wandering of that stranger Jean Baudrillard we have the last of a certain line of itinerant socioanalysts (Debord 1983). Yet it would be hard not to follow Slavoj Zizek through a series of perverse irruptions in John Carpenter and Francis Ford Coppola's imaginaries—the philosopher/analyst appears in the Real of the Mojave desert and its graveyard of high modernity's invention: decommissioned commercial aircraft—and not recognize that here too is a pedestrian chronotope as narrative that owes much to Benjamin and the much earlier work of Siegfried Krakauer where film is concerned[114].

> "Baudelaire as the modern hero, then, is more than the flaneur who strolls the streets of Paris with an empathetic openness, and more than the commoditized purveyor of aesthetic commodities.
> He is the modern individual who has, piece by piece, been stripped of the possessions and security of bourgeois life and forced to take refuge in the street." (P. 16 *Walter Benjamin The Writer of Modern Life Essays on Charles Baudelaire* Jennings 2006)

The *alienation* of "the wanderer who comes today and stays tomorrow" (Simmel) as Georg Simmel introduces his stranger is doubly apparent: estranged from any subsistence whatsoever and estranged from any knowable mode of subsistence at all, the flaneur is the bourgeois no longer tied to any recognizable political ecology as 'Nature', dwelling entirely in 'non nature', and estranged from how one dwells in a political ecology for how one dwells in a polis itself removed from this polity of humans and non-humans, and an economy removed from any ecology—the proper *milieu* of the modern. Yet what Michael Jennings does in introducing Benjamin's *Baudelaire*—himself already a transposition of Baudelaire in his own poetics, as his own first reader/writer, later Benjamin's poet/flaneur, and finally Jennings's figure-trope for Benjamin—is an irony that elaborates by form alone *how* we are always already transposed a the world. In this case this is a *prefiguration* that precedes the modern and the middle classes with their demos insulated from rural life, a global south, a periphery, and so on. Yet the Baudelaire of Benjamin, this inertial wanderer, a loafing stroller who is a 'ruins' of this great political Ruin—the *polis*—no longer as place of the demos, emblem of a civilization for its brutality intermixed with whatever personifications are used to conceal the mis-shaping and ruining of human lives contained in the grid there.

Again, Jennings' introduction offers an important figure-trope in a modern poetics of timespace, its mood and mode:

Compare also the opening discussion of Weber's *General Economic History* for that theorist and sociologist's own spatial analysis: In the sketch the first or innermost zone contains the dwelling lots, placed quite irregularly. Zone Two contains the fenced garden land (*Wurt)* in as many parts as there were originally dwelling lots m the village. Zone three is the arable (see below) and Zone Four pasture (*"Almende").* Each household has right to herd an equal number of livestock on the pasture area, which, however, is not communal but appropriated in fixed shares. The same is true of the wood (Zone Five) which incidentally does not uniformly belong to the village; here also the rights to wood cutting, to bedding, mast, etc., are divided equally among the inhabitants of the village. House, dwelling lot, and the share of the individual in the garden land, arable (see below), pasture and forest, together constitute the hide *(German Hufe,* cognate with "have.") (p.22)(Weber 2003)

[114] Zizek's *Pervert's Guide to Ideology* is filmed by Sophie Fiennes (Fiennes 2012).

> “Baudelaire, says Benjamin, insists instead that modernity is bound to the classical through a shared *decrepitude,* by a "mourning for what was and lack of hope for what is to come." Those aspects of the modern city made to appear "truly new" under capitalism soon reveal themselves as outdated. "Modernity has changed most of all, and the antiquity it was-supposed to contain really presents a picture of the obsolete." As early as 1929, in his essay on Surrealism, Benjamin had expressed his conviction that meaningful social change might arise from the "revolutionary energies" of that which is obsolete. This conviction was founded on the contention that the mechanisms of the capitalist process reveal themselves fully only in their waste products-in that which no longer serves a purpose and is thus free from the mechanisms of ideological control so pervasive elsewhere. It is the *experience* of such obsolete artifacts, and through them, of the coercive illusions of capitalism, that might give rise to political action as a corrective. Baudelaire's spleen-that is, his profound disgust at things as they were-is only the most evident emotional sign of this state of affairs.” (p. 17. Ibid).

This estrangement effect of transposed ‘classical and modern Paris’ is itself a trope for the polis, and for *its* liberation by what *it wastes*: the technology of socially reproducible humans ‘the most wretched of commodities’. With this comment by Jennings, we also have the transposable-because-reflexive thesis of Horkheimer and Adorno’s *Dialetic of Enlightenment* put into action: “Myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology.” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002), such that the modern city reverses into the obsolete, the outdated. Capitalism, as we begin to understand it, is an assault on timespace itself by its escalation in progressus as obsolescence, what Harvey understands as ‘timespace compression’ as his answer to the more radical thesis of Baudrillard in the collapse and inversion-as-implosion of timespace into an irreal world, in hostile separation from its planet—the planet itself disappears in this ‘desert of the real’. It is most notable in the poetics of Benjamin’s Baudelaire who explores the nucleus of this expanding and accelerating phantasmagoria of political economy as the eclipse of the earth.

The photographer Daguerre is the focus of one of Benjamin’s early efforts in comprehending the transposable imagery of space and the spatialization of the city by the image itself: “The city dweller, whose political supremacy over the provinces is attested many times in the course of the century, attempts to bring the countryside into town. In the panoramas, the city opens out, becoming landscape-as it will do later, in subtler fashion, for the flaneurs.” (p.34 *Daguerre* in *Charles Baudelaire*) (Benjamin 2006). The panorama, the photograph of the milieu that comes from landscape, is itself our most familiar ‘framework’ in aesthetic politics, an all but literal bracketing out of the polis by the device of figuring it into landscape—as if it were a countryside. The city conceals itself in the dative of its appearance, a picture of itself, and in the depiction that is its consumer: the middle classes emancipated from eco-environmental *subsistence* for an economic “*subsistence*” are those models-of reality that subsume it as the models-for reality and for *life*; only later, what will invert in the ‘*subsistence*’ that cannot subsist, that cannot meet its habits of consumption and its non laboring way of life. A *Zoon Politikon* as mere *Bios,* a *bare life* no more subsistent ‘manually’ than ‘intellectually’, where the flaneur is the first disjecta of this approach of the timespace of modern social life, of *society,* as the excommunicated from this fleeting paradise of modernity; the impossible spatialization of this sociologistic and socio-centric eternal timespace.

The *demos* that has been overcome always-already in the *ochlos*, the throng that has unity simply by its sheer mass, is a *metabolism* wherein political life is reduced to a mere polity, just as the police order reduces the ecosystem of the city to an economy, a partition of the sensible. Nonetheless, it is to Benjamin's timely observation, that the transposed images of the future are already there for us. Before partition into the segmented life of home, work, commerce, Benjamin captures all three worlds in a glance at the Paris of Baudelaire:

> "The crowd is the veil through which the familiar city beckons to the flaneur as phantasmagoria-now a landscape, now a room. Both become elements of the department store, which makes use of flânerie itself to sell goods. The department store is the last promenade for the flaneur." (p. 40 *Baudelaire, or the Streets of Paris*, ibid)(Benjamin 2006).

The *promenade* as *walkway* and also *walk* returns in the nature walk, and with it, the flaneur. We have now the figure trope of *the road*, *pathway*, and *trail*. What delimits lands from one another as that rubbish space under foot; our nadir, is the tread that conceals the way we make of space a *social fact,* by the *social fact* of the wanderer themselves—for the nature trail a flaneur or a jogger—for the railroad or the road this nadir is the foundation for another time and space entirely. Nonetheless, as we shall see, the promenade is pathway that has continuously been retread. It is the transposable space that is the vehicle and the limit of timespace.

Metabolism

The prospect of political ecology has largely stalled in sociology by the work of Foster, Clark, and York, whose otherwise useful compendium, *The Metabolic Rift* reverses its effect as fetish for Marxist readings, and annihilation of socioanalytic research by its positivistic undertones, mostly relying upon natural science research as its principle form of evidence[115]. The foremost failure of this illuminating study is the too-positivist comprehension of metabolism stemming from the re-covery of Marx. Again, this re-reading of Marx in environmental sociology is welcome. What is not developed are the actual relations of humans to the soil that is the ultimate subsistence for life in that thin 1 1/2 inches where most of the life of a soil resides on the planet. Again, I will turn to David Harvey, and his recognition of the more thorough comprehension of a dialectical metabolism in the relational work of Pierre Bourdieu:

> "It is, suggests Bourdieu, through the 'dialectical relationship between the body and a structured organization of space and time that common practices and representations are determined.' And it is precisely out of such experiences (in the home, in particular) that durable schemes of perception, thought, and action get imposed (see figure 3.2). Even more profoundly, "the organization of time and the group in accordance with mythical structures leads collective practice to appear as "realized myth."" (p. 215. *The Condition of Modernity*)(Harvey 1990).

[115] Jason Moore is only partially correct in observing the 'Cartesian dualism' of Foster. This critique has limited merit for taking too many liberties with Foster's Marxism. However, Moore does manage to observe this positivistic and objectivating theory as also stalling dialectic; in this I am sympathetic to this charge, yet not entirely in agreement.

What Harvey gains from his study of Bourdieu is the temporal-spatial relations that give gender and age as datives of the household as the complements to its architecture, just as temporal-spatial relations give the middle classes in the flaneur or the late 20th C. as a mall-walker, or the late virtual complement of commerce that finally fuses the department store with the home by the screen and its quasi-anonymized scrolling as the promenade of the 21st C. Racialization by temporal-spatial relations, much as sexuation, is still very much an exclusive affair, with the political, juridical, and legislative timespaces still very much partitioned in the manner of apartheid: the large forms of gerrymandered and red-lined districts in the U.S. are simply extensions of the court houses, capitol buildings, and congressional chambers, with their anti-democratic performances of 'democracy' as either disavowals of the formal republic or outright political terrorist havens and their joy in domination of subordinated political subjects. These are the levels of actual metabolism as routine material semiotic exchange.

The loafing political professional or the idling bailiff, the judiciary recused to the golf course alongside the wanderings of businessmen, are the complement and datives of a republic in its stubborn resistance to the approach of a political ecological real. They are nonetheless the wasters and spoilers that determine only what their incivil society makes of them. Structured as useless supplements to an order of things that needs only the most mediocre, venal, and inactive, as the characteristic types needed for routines of governance and governmentality. The singular device in all such cases is that of *decision* and importantly the disguise of how those "*decision*s" are in fact the neutralization of whatever institution they are part of: the politician of a republic neutralizes representation for interest in power, just as the justice of the republic neutralizes juridical thought for interest as ideology, the legislator suspends law for graft. Thus '*decision*', as if thought, is the reflex action by which an incivil society makes its ambit in timespace *eternal*.

Harvey is, however, only partially correct in observing how modernization creates new meanings. *New* only in the sense that meanings are dead on arrival by their concrete and practicable appearance as "*new*"; already obsolete, already behind what has yet to arrive. Displaced in advance by the impossible real of '*new*' meanings. By his own logic of time-space compression this social fact is an irritant to the geographers' penchant for the positive and empiricist sense of space-time as concrete first, and materialist later. Most of all, Harvey consistently undercuts his own observation of his opponents in phenomenology by disregarding the fine-tuned sense of materialism that is discovered in the inseparability of consciousness from matter in the discovery of *intentionality*. There is no dissevered sense from sense organs in this philosophical tradition, and that is to say, that there is no meaning without material—no 'essence' without 'existence'. The mystery of the new is already phenomenologically displayed in Marx's 'secret' of commodity fetishism as being no mystery at all, but for the phantasmagoria of 'both perceptible and imperceptible' thinghood; the question of the 'preponderance of the object' where the concept outstrips that object by objectivation as its vehicle in our perceiving (active perception) as if not also receiving (active/disavowed reception) (Marx 1887).

In this chapter the social analysis of the Skaneateles Mill Ruins as organizing via by-passing history for un-observed social-structural historicization discloses how ruins are from the past at the expense of the future. By 'historical inversion' as temporal/spatial opposition, social structural analysis of disposition provides us with a pedestrian chronotope—itself overlooked as

embodiment and enaction with the Ruins itself. In the following chapter we will turn to the second hypothesis: *ruins come from the future* using the site of *Overlook Mountain* (see Figure 10.).

CHAPTER FOUR OVERLOOK MOUNTAIN

Overlook Mountain bears a South facing cliff face with a view to the valley and reservoir, the rising Sun and Moon. The Mountain itself had been deforested in the 19th C. Regrowth in Hemlock and White Pine at it's base gives way to mixed Maple, Oak, Cherry, and Yellow Birch, while approaching the mountain top. The mountain also harbors the remains of the *Overlook Mountain House*, a one-time rival of the politically significant *Caaterskill Lodge*, a pair of rivalrous retreats from the cities of the industrializing Northeastern Coast, especially New York City. The *Overlook Mountain House* has since burned and been rebuilt, fallen into disrepair and with a late venture in the 20th C. it has passed out of private hands into that of the state of New York. The property in fact has multiple ruins in close proximity to one another, an entire second house for the Mountain House proprietor and outbuildings among them.

From the Overlook itself, the ruins appear, rising from the mountain flank and over the tree line. The patrons had an exclusive access to sights otherwise denied by the enclosure of the mountain for private use. It is too easy to ignore that *aesthetics*—as having, and that is to say possessing a *'view'*—have always been the germ of private property. No longer; the mountain's accessibility permits traffic that it has surely never known in such volume at any prior time in its history, with nearby Woodstock and the proximity to a much wealthier and bigger New York City, than at any previous time.

The political ecology here should be obvious in terms of place, even period, and that is where the second thesis: *ruins come from the future*, makes its challenge. It is through future oriented speculation, enterprise, and the wastage by consumption and overuse that is destined to come that is the fatal mood of this assemblage. Subject to the approach of 'ruin' from the future we can ask how our experiences are organized with this anticipatory projection as datives of these Ruins.

The configuration of the 'rivalry' between the mountain houses in the early 20th C. as economic competition was hardly restricted to economic capital. The inducement to wealthy patrons *spatialized politics by its own impasse*. Which is to say that the 'smoke filled room', away from the city, away from the Capitol of the state and of the Nation was potentially located in one of these lodges; and this is the motive force that inhibited actual political consciousness, leaving common concerns in the hands of the few, the private, and elite. That these political architects of the Mountain Houses were inventing a mystique and mythology, is what constituted an actually instituted political unconscious that cannot be decoupled from the environment: the mountain as *remote*, as *inaccessible*, *as private*, a symbolic 'heights' 'therapeutic' in the flattery to power.

To *ascend* to the mountain's crown on foot is to tread the *subjection* to these ruins—the deforested mountain sides, the derelict enterprise, and the actually ancient overlook—into being: "[De Certeau]… treats social spaces as more open to human creativity and action. Walking, he suggests, defines a 'space of enunciation.'" (p.213, *The Condition of Postmodernity*) (Harvey 1990) states David Harvey against Michel Foucault's more restrictive sense of 'localization', by De Certeau's more open sense of 'spatialization'.

Harvey develops De Certeau's theorization of timespace further in an important methodological extension of 'totalization', understood here as explicitly structural because 'totalizing': "De



FIGURE 10 CLOSEUP OF OVERLOOK MOUNTAIN: USGS 1892 (GANNETT, WILSON, AND JENNINGS 1892) HTTPS://NGMDB.USGS.GOV/TOPOVIEW/VIEWER/#

Certeau… recognizes that the practices of everyday life can and do get converted into 'totalizations' of rationally ordered and controlled space and time. But he tells us little of why and how the rationalizations take the forms that they do." (p.215, ibid) (Harvey 1990). From this, Harvey turns to Bourdieu who echoes the more distant thesis of Emile Durkheim: "'The reason why submission to the collective rhythms is so rigorously demanded,' writes Bourdieu … 'is that the temporal forms or the spatial structures structure not only the group's representation of the world but the group itself, which orders itself in accordance with this representation.'" (ibid.) (Harvey 1990). This is to say that the ruins we now ascend precede us, but in terms of receptive and social structures that we enact by simply making the pathway a nature trail in the walking of it.

Further, that these actions are productive only in re-producing the controlled timespace in terms of *collective representation* as a norm to be taken up repeatedly, *for repetition and measure thereby of aestheticized politics* in this 'de-politicized space'. The *actuation* of political ecology occurs in this negative image of the ascent, that omits by recognition of object-like 'Nature' and the simple pedestrian act that is somehow subjection of 'human nature' to the rising path, the surroundings embeddedness and our engrafted enjoyment in this an-aesthetized political ecology.

To make the social fact of the ruins and the overlook a part of the ruinous inevitability of nature's course we must take recourse to the eclipse of social consciousness: where either the questionable subjection to Nature is un-questioned as political, or our naturalized object of our Environment is un-questioned for its 'ecology' as itself in any way natural at all—including that 'human nature' that consumes it as this inert, inertial spectacle—becomes *illicit* and most of all *illegible* to us. Historical alienation is to trace the past in the naturalization of our environment *for* our place within *it*, as social subjects that mis-recognize themselves in this *process* of subjection. *Mythos* then in a more sophisticated sense than we have so far broached it, is not simply the opponent of history, it is history in distorted form. Importantly, that form involves the bracketing of a world and suspension of our judgement where we would identify ourselves as part of a changing world. A world that is traced in our enaction of it in trivial activity that has the structural quality of organization for it and of our own character in configuration with this world disconjoined from the actual flux of timespace. The Ruins of this timespace rise to meet us in the pedestrian chronotope as mute speech.

The Mountain House ruins are the hollow organizing principle of flight from the city now, as in the early 20th C. and demonstrate also the ruin of efforts to make of these resorts a political space that it is itself flown to more remote places[116]. One cannot help thinking of Aspen, but above all Davos, as the mountain retreats of the 21st C political economic elite. And it cannot be ignored that the *Mount Pelerin Society* is that terrorist association of the 'free' market venality embodied again in elite prerogative after this older model and figuration that it made no break from and remains social-symbol of.

The tread up the mountain path is to re-tread and to re-trace as a *retro-action*, and in a strange reversal, *figure history into being* by simply entering into this configuration. The break I am making with history and its diachrony for a non-synchrony, or *untimeliness*, is important to grasp, and the sociological adoption of *sedimentation*, or *construction* in a slightly different

[116] This is still the case with flight from the polis, see Domhoff: *Who Rules America* (Domhoff 2022)

sense is the language in which this has persisted. Yet the more famous philosophical language of deconstruction from de-sedimentation has come to indicate both a Nietzschean *genealogical* emphasis on construction and the Husserlian sense of sedimentation at much the same time[117]. The ascent of mountain is still 'to summit', no matter how limited this project is, and its future orientation from the past is observed.

Where the path that we take inscribes the mountain and the ruins, we simultaneously erase the movement of history for the historicized myth of *Nature* and our place in it. The mountain path that at one time denied entry to all but the Mountain House patrons and staff, now traversed with no thought to this; more distantly the Algonquin people who knew the mountain and long since disappeared. However, perhaps here as much or more than in the Skaneateles mill ruins we have the absent crimes of industrialization in the slave labor that although impermissible in this place, and the indenture that was, was the political ecology that the elite financed always elsewhere. Yet what is absent in plain view are the déclassé 'whites' that were the colonizers, the lumberjacks, mountain house staff; the slave hunters from the south and the federal troops from the north, in all cases doing the illicit work of nation building that vast project; what is now the actual lasting stigma of violent racialization as 'white trash' now (Isenberg 2016).

'ruins' come from the future

This déclassé group is sedimented in the violence done here repeatedly, and casually recollected so as to dispossess further anyone with the pretension of fleeing this caste. The *aesthetic* of whiteness is a subject formation as prone to elite prerogative as the mountain view was exclusive. Thus, the oppositive mythos of the 'rugged mountain man' is the actual myth that, although impossible to fulfill without acknowledging the impoverishment that drove a diaspora of European settlers, persists in pride at having decimated this place in efforts to survive a voyage out of enserfed, indentured, and itinerant impoverishment from elsewhere. Within this supposed romantic idea, *for anyone* who has ever worked among people—specifically those that identify as men in this group—there is a *fatalism* that comes with such individualism. However such a myth is impossible, and the dissimulation of this hardship in valorizing a brutal way of life lived in brutal purpose, and the disappointment of having actually fled a status system for an economic system that was just as quick to expend life in commercial enterprise as in war, organizes itself in the ruinate ecology of the Catskills and by a ruinous elite edifice built to dominate the contest to despoil mountain and 'men' alike.

Yet the joy in disabuse here is provoked by these figures of a brutal past, those mountain people viewed as spoilers or bumpkins or both, when not speedily reminding the student of history that whatever hardship undertaken here it is still nothing compared to the crimes laid at the feet of these people for driving out the native peoples and neglecting the plight of fellow Americans in bondage. The misprision here is that classist negligence that *all* economies are planned and all of them are political, and the blanket accusation of 'whiteness' is greedily applied, indifferent to

[117] The contemporary importance to Luhmann's systems theory as *radical construction* and to Lacanian environmental and ecological critique—Timothy Morton is exemplary—where *nachtraglichkeit* or afterwardsness and delay figure importantly, deserve mention (Morton 2010)(Morton 2013). The most well known contemporary Lacanian/Marxian thinker is of course Slavoj Zizek who addresses this retro-effect in *The Sublime Object of Ideology* in detail and at length (Zizek 2008).

both poor and elite without observing how this disavows a form of racism that 'cracker' and 'hillbilly', from Black speech and non-black (middle-class 'white') speech respectively, readily assert (Isenberg 2016). A short recollection of the ill-fated event of Bacon's Rebellion makes clear that over-contextualization by sociologists, like the over-historicization of the historian, and over-scaping of geographers and environmentalists, fails to re-construct the conditions of life lived according with this subjection. These oversights empower the office of the 'intervenor' and il-liberal commitment to the actual value-system of mendacity and acedia that defines the middle-classes that very much need this difference from the rural to mandate their rightness[118].

What these disavowals accomplish is the actual structuring of liberalist history by officiating over the vision of the past as history that disavows itself as mythic. Recreating an American myth of simplistic oppositions and accusations *is the purpose* of a disowned cynical master disposition that these ruins materially inaugurate. From this *ends* the organization of experience by these ruins is an unspoken rage at a past that belongs to no one, yet is a crime bestowed in the liberal blackmail that remains unconscious of its own institution for the structural purpose of policing and correcting. Deferring to the prerogative served by middle-classes, those venal anomic 'values' of 'explaining' to the ignorant lower classes 'who they are', is the aestheticized politics of republican virtue in action.

The trope of 'mountain men', the dissimulated figure of 'rugged individualists' or the denial of the brutality of a declasse group marred by the stigma of violence, illiteracy, and poverty fulfills an idealist and romantic imagery of the past. This imagery followed by the opposing middle-classes that are responsible for the proliferation of the myth in writing, and its abuse and disabuse to fit their aesthetic politics, raises this figure into the familiar discourse of 'local history' and geography without context supplied by these ruinate figures themselves. So long as these revenants are silent as death, they are both foil and necessity to middle-class mythology of progress beyond those days of denuding Nature and subjecting people to precisely this process of destruction *as if brutes*[119].

We can move out of the study of subjection and character type into the social time and space that constitutes these lives, situations that are actually lived and demonstrable without recourse to crude statistical illustrations or the paucity of questionnaires[120]. To do this does not mean that such studies cannot eventually be of some aid, what is does mean is that these are secondary: structural analysis alone is the instrument of sociological technique, experiments in probability are not.

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[118] Domhoff is quite clear on the class distinction between nationalist elites and 'everybody else'(Domhoff 2022). However, this sense of 'political economic whiteness' can be gained in the last chapter of Charles Mills work as well (Mills 1997).

[119] What Bourdieu refers to following Goffman as a 'sense of one's place' is the actual socio-symbolic restriction that the sociologist describes as: "…the profound realism which most often characterizes the world view of the dominated and which, functioning as a sort of socially constituted instinct of conservation, can appear conservative only with reference to an external and thus normative representation of the 'objective interest' of those whom it helps to live or to survive." (p.235, *Social Space and the Genesis of 'Classes'*) (Bourdieu 1991)

[120] See Sheldon Wolin on political times and spaces: *Chapter One: Political Philosophy and Philosophy* especially pp. 7-8 *Political Thought and Political Institutions* (Wolin 2004)
Pierre Bourdieu has an excellent discussion of this: *Social Space and the Genesis of Classes*, in *Language & Symbolic Power* (Bourdieu 1991).

We can recall from the previous chapter the Bakhtinian insight into *mythos*, including myths of 'whiteness' and the political space and time of this political economy, that the future is erased in advance by a chronotope that refuses becoming development in this literary figure:

> "The future is not homogeneous with the present and the past, and no matter how much time it occupies it is denied a basic concreteness, it is somehow empty and fragmented—since everything affirmative, ideal, obligatory, desired has been shifted, via the [historic] inversion, into the past (or partly into the present); en route, it has become weightier, more authentic and persuasive. In order to endow any ideal with authenticity, one need only conceive of its once having existed in its "natural state" in some Golden Age, or perhaps existing in the present but somewhere at the other end of the world, east of the sun and west of the moon, if not on earth then underground, if not underground then in heaven." (p.148 *The Dialogic Imagination*)(Bakhtin 1981)

In the very last phrase Bakhtin briefly recalls the doctrine of predestination; '…if not underground then in heaven', the Weberian *Gedankenbild* of timespace frozen in the eternity of labor under capital. This is what Weber made very clear to the sociologist as the 'steel hard shell' that is also the instrumental relations that the world imposes as economistic imperative: 'we are forced to do so', compelled to work *as if* this were impulsion from within; in fact abiding this objective compulsion from economic ruin that is already our milieu and timespace(Weber 2002).

Just what timespace did the mythic 'mountain men' inhabit? Hereafter 'people' for the fact that the first way to strike down the bourgeois myth and the attendant racism is to observe that men may very well have been invested in gendered labor, but 'men' alone in no way did this. The actual event of settlement in the post-revolutionary war period was a *political* time for the fact that it can be periodized by how long it took for the topography to become a *political space* in the form of private properties: land claims, military tracts, and farms most of all, as the effort immediately following the disappearance of leather-stocking and later deforestation as the expropriations that also made for these and the settlement period an *ecological time and space* too.

Settlement meant families—often without community, as another *property* of settlement economy, and not integrated into any society to speak of—were formed and it is this social group that populated these *political ecological timespaces*. The chronicle of settlement thus also means that the narrative is that of settlement by families and according to whatever constraints this imposed. A sense of this is given by the inhibitions related in John Demos' *A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in Plymouth Colony* where communities were dominates by men with religious authority, including the power to settle, deny settlement to, or ostracize, from towns that were still part of the colonial system of the time, and thus chartered (Demos 2000). This meant that even if individuals made it to the colonies, it did not mean that there was room for them. Indeed, land as *territory* was precisely at issue during *Bacon's Rebellion*. With the end of the revolutionary war the victors divided up lands, *re-territorializing* what at one time belonged to British loyalists, including the Iroquois Confederacy who had oppose the expansion

of the colonies and sided with the British against the very obvious threat of a 'revolutionary' united states[121].

This process also included a much more important phase of *deterritorialization* that is most easily recognized as 'the frontier' and this is precisely the place of the Catskill mountain settlers in a political ecology that was defined by a timespace that was the singular catastrophic labor of destroying the old forests with the hope of replacing this 'wilderness' with the European image of settled agricultural lands. However, this was doubtlessly a failure in the minds of experienced farmers: thus, the intrepid settler might live off the land cleared for a few seasons before the soil was sloughed off the mountain slopes, and the lingering cold of late frosts and early autumnal weather truncated the growing season severely and drove these people off.

The 'disillusioned' then were a very real group of people—no longer exclusively men, yet the predisposition to gender distinctions of the 19th C. disincludes women and children, and any ambiguity by a masculinist binary of boys and men—who may have succeeded in an economy based on such things as a fur trade (leather stocking is still the image of settlement hear and in other parts of upstate New York such as the Adirondacks) and the period of wholesale timber harvest, but did not and could not have survived the failure of crops for even one season. Similarly, the dissemblers of the myth of rugged individualism had to move west to entertain this specific narrative—this chronotope as it organized them—or settle for its dissipation into valorization that specifically relied upon it being passed into memory. The masculinist history of 'mountain men' is familiar throughout the Rocky Mountains regions. This pedestrian chronotope, of settlement, diaspora, occupation, and frontier pioneering is subsumed at the western edge of this timespace expansion across the English speaking part of the North American continent under a myth of masculinism.

The subjectivation invested in disavowal emerges this way only after the establishment of the state and the end of the colonies. We can mark a late appearance by approximately the last generation of pre-revolutionary people disappearing, and with them any actual remembrance that would upset a newly official expert class of 'historical Americans'; ironically 'historical' for having no connection to the political myth that they disavow by a more settled, more domesticated recollection of their own, and its post-revolutionary political aspirations; aspirations based in new classes and social mobility. Yet this is spatialized ecologically by the last remnants of failed agriculture in the region that was the 'promise of progress' that was supposed to succeed leather-stocking and timber. Now we are no longer bound to the pre-revolutionary socio-political imaginary, rather a political-ecological socio-symbolic reality of actuations that served to guarantee the economic infrastructure that would resist British reprisal and foment a policy of manifest destiny that far exceeded this imaginary and its limits. That is, the identifications that are character formation and subjection are material and datives of specific material conditions. However, they are also transgenerational for the amount of time taken to exhaust the material conditions themselves and this is bound directly to non-human life: the ruins of forests themselves.

[121] By some heavy handed political violence in the Catskills region, the British managed to deny themselves the support of the population there. The settler-colonial population was largely indebted and indentured to a handful of landlords that obviously sided with the rebels in fear of losing their wealth to the King.

Yet this will prove to be only the beginning of a much stranger timespace than that prior, set exclusively in the past, and defined by memory and habitus sedimented in this familiar linearity. The timber harvesters looking to a future in agricultural exploitation of the newly cleared lands shared an already foreshortened timeline, for the same consequences of this risk of progress that those near the Skaneateles Mill had also met with, and likely the same fatal angst. Nonetheless, the terms were not a linear *progressus* from the past, they were foreshortened by consequences that will begin to unmake the diachrony that over-historicization imposes against its foil of the under-historicized period with the interpretive foreclosure of both the agricultural project as an object and the resistance that this signals in ecologies that cannot be deterritorialized in farm-settlement.

Here, ruins come from the future. In this case as a return of the repressed and insignificant socio-symbolic structure of the future; as the empty and meaningless effort to impose an impossible agricultural vision upon lands that will certainly reject that virtuality—and nonetheless some attempt is made:

> "Another form that exhibits a like relationship to the future is eschatology. Here the future is emptied out in another way. The future is perceived as the end of everything that exists, as the end of all being (in its past and present forms). In this respect it makes no difference at all whether the end is perceived as catastrophe and destruction pure and simple, as a new chaos, as a Twilight of the Gods, as the advent of God's Kingdom—it matters only that the end effect everything that exists, and that this end be, moreover, relatively close at hand. Eschatology always sees the segment of a future separating the present from the end as lacking value; this separating segment of time loses its significance and interest, it is merely an unnecessary continuation of an indefinitely prolonged present." (p.148 *The Dialogic Imagination*)(Bakhtin 1981)

The historically declassed, facing ruin, were already familiar with a hollow effort; it has 'always' been part of that mythos and its narrative form. The chronotope of an eschatological vision was *lived* as the actual metabolic exchange of virtual and actual. An ecological unconscious was already at work in the history and biography of settler-colonialism and its political deficit in opposing political economic imperatives.

Upon returning to character formation by disavowal we have an important elevation of the trope not just by a genealogical reversal, also by the *obstacles* that it realizes as socio-symbolic impediments of social timespace, what can only form where *symbolization* has already taken place and backgrounded as *natural*. The boundaries of properties and the economic timelines set by finance are symbolic first and foremost, and only function insofar as they remain in this naturalized position by genealogies to which they are invested: the territorializations of timespace and thus *lives* that are contingent upon them. These are the familiar divisions of political economy and can be readily observed in the investment in land by landowners wealthy enough to vie for the most dependable lands for production (farming, but also timber, fish if it is waters, and mining). Here again the geographer's space is not commensurate with social (time)space for the omission of time and its reverse in genealogy, in the establishment of cartographic quartering. The territory is always a spatialization that is circumspect for the peripheries that are the snares for the heedless entrepreneur and those that are simply wasted or expended, and this speaks to timeframes. Social space as situation or 'context' is also contested

aesthetically in the imagery that predominates. It is capital that is contested here, where economic capital is the advantage most familiar. Yet anyone who has paid even the faintest attention to the current war in Ukraine cannot fail to miss the fact that fields are not just host to farm machines but also war machines, and anyone with farm experience has no problem making this connection for the instruments that are used there. Economic capital is only an advantage where military advantage is not being exercised, and thus military capital remains the final decision upon all economies. This has an eschatological sense of circumspection that makes economic capital—though actually secondary—'primary', for the simple fact that without economic capital, military capital must diminish rapidly. Capital, in this absurd form of fatal advantage—despoiling the land directly by war or gradually by over-cropping—is recognizable to those who depend on this ecology, and thus make it political insofar as it is a common good[122].

Closure is the 'terminal' event of reflexion where timespace is bent back upon itself. *Ideological Closure* as a disposition terminates in cynicism and we 'know the feel of it' in an affective fatalism. Where timespace encloses in its future orientation the chronotope will be established in an eschatological way—entropic—commitment to knowing and speaking the end. The practices of expropriation that ended the fur-trade and the leather-stocking era was the diminution of both material stocks by extinguishing animal populations and the saturation of markets with hides diminishing the return of this investment for more lucrative and dependable trade goods. Thus, the entropic bracketing of the colonial world and the neutralization of the subjects there, in their 'natural' professions opens a window into the lost moments of actual reflexivity; events where people active in this work took stock of the reality of an inevitable collapse and re-investment by capital. That is, reflexion on work—labor—under capital includes the self-observation of an already delimited time and space; foreclosed upon *as the future*. With the gradual disappearance of the old forests these laborers had to set their efforts to new tasks that would be as short lived as whatever industries preceded them. The busybody habitus of labor as senseless activity is emblematic as always-already *short-term;* a fatalistic enaction and embodiment as socio-symbolic act.

If in the pedestrian inscription of the past by a nature trail obliviates history for myth it does so by the habitual irreflexion that this too must eventually end. The real estate valued sees its value goes up and public lands are alienated, or the value goes down and they are neglected and derelict. The suburban dog-walker in the Skaneateles mill ruins is part of this process by inscribing the future erasure of environment by an economic unconscious, just as the day-trip hiker eclipses Overlook mountain in the same mode. Both serve to alienate political responsibility by loosing a social structure of practiced and applied irresponse to environments that are already marred by disruptions from the past: "Closer to a class unconscious than to a 'class consciousness' in the Marxist sense, the sense of the position one occupies in the social space (what Goffman calls the 'sense of one's place') is the practical mastery of the social structure as a whole which reveals itself through the sense of the position occupied in the structure. The categories of perception of the social world are essentially the product of the

[122] Foster rightly observes only part of this problem in his short discussion of Justus von Liebig's reception by Marx. However, this argument fails to observe the direct connection to populations and war as Foucault does. See Foster pp. 75-82 in *The Ecological Rift Capitalism's War on the Earth* (Foster, Clark, and York 2010); see Foucault on milieu in: *Security, Territory, Population* (Foucault 2007) and dressage: *"Society must be Defended"* especially *Chapter Eleven 17 March 1976* (Foucault 2003).

incorporation of the objective structures of the social space." (p.235, *Social Space and The Genesis of 'Classes'*)(Bourdieu 1991). By 'incorporation' we should hear the *embodiment* of those actions that work upon objects in the world and thereby extinguish our perception by the limits imposed in real objective resistance to our efforts.

Again, it is not that we simply 'produce' anything, rather, it is by the resistance of materials that we are yoked to patterns of activity that place us in a socio-symbolic system of acts and the receptivity that effectuates how we work with the objects we encounter. The *lack of resistance* that the crushed stone and level bed of the *Charlie Major Nature Trail* offers is an objective constraint that offers least resistance and no necessity for the attention paid to footing that an actual walk through woodlands necessitates. And, with the *overlook mountain* trail, despite the slope and washouts from snowmelt and rain, this trail too requires little more attention, the necessity here is simply the lung capacity to make a regular ascent. The active Mill site would have at the least demanded that the walker avoid rutted ground from wagon tracks and ubiquitous horse manure, the timber harvest on the mountain slopes would always demand that a clear path away from falling trees unobstructed by already felled logs be a constant consideration on already uneven terrain.

These spatial hindrances are redoubled by the very real effort to claim as much of the harvest as one could, and thus the work against a timeframe that is itself collapsing by collective efforts in this economic destruction. This threat does not come from the past *then* anymore than the angst regarding the collapse of ecologies does *now*. We cannot say with certainty that *ruins come from the past*; progress in time, pathways in space, and future oriented projects deny this absolute.

Monuments to the eclipse of The Earth

The structure of this site is however a temporalized space: it is organized by struggle for the representation of time's line in a discourse of mute objects: the silent conflict between the mountain house proprietors for more than just guests and revenue. The duration of these temporalized spaces themselves, is testified by the *reconstruction* of the Overlook Mountain House as a Ruins; the rebuilt site was never completed and the era of these retreats ended before this venture could be realized. As a Ruins of capitalism the Overlook Mountain Ruins was made of concrete as resistance to fire that had destroyed it once, moreso than physical insurance as resistance, yet it could not resist the line of time itself. Corruption by fire was finished by the corrosion of capital itself when it picked up and moved into the socio-symbolic measure of a globalizing 20th C. world.

Overlook Mountain and its Ruin provides us a political ecological lens to *markets*, what liberal economics organizes as a *rational-type* in the form of a free market *and* the ruthless and cynical understanding that it is *never free* at the same time: its illusion is its *instrument* and *its instrumental rational mode* at the same time. The operable 'free market' is a system of significant 'irony' in that it produces itself as a ruthlessly inequitable and impossible model-for organizing reality at the same time that it dis-organizes reality in actual practice. The model of the liberal 'free market' is typically attributed the rational characteristic of: large numbers of sellers; large numbers of buyers; and perfect information regarding costs of production thus

pricing[123]. A 'rational type' is not an Ideal-Type, and the 'free market' seeks itself in timespace, in history and in futurity as an ideal seeking its realization by observing itself paradoxically as a presumptive model-of economy that responds to actual *scarcity* at the same time that it is a *model-for* scarcity—a model for-making-scarce or 'scarcification' to coin a term—thus, a farcical 'search' and research—liberal economics—is the result. Yet the farce is serious, it is by the illusion of endless growth and the research of 'wealth creation' that this pseudo-science sustains a doxological suspension of reality, the 'rift' of Foster, Clark, and York's *metabolic rift,* where the rift in its ruthless ironic mode of knowledge is realized as a material context[124]. A valuable corrective from the concretist comprehension of the metabolic rift comes from Jean Baudrillard's critique of our overgraphed and overcontextualized 'world':

> "We must bet on the *Witz* [Joke, jocular irony] of events themselves. If we lose, at least we shall have had the satisfaction of defying the objective idiocy of the probabilities. This obligation is a vital function - part of our collective genetic heritage. Indeed, this is the only genuine function of the intellect: to embrace contradictions, to exercise irony, to take the opposite tack, to exploit rifts and reversibility - even to fly in the face of the lawful and the factual. If the intellectuals of today seem to have run out of things to say, this is because they have failed to assume this ironic function, confining themselves within the limits of their moral, political or philosophical consciousness despite the fact that the rules have changed, that all irony, all radical criticism now belongs exclusively to the haphazard, the viral, the catastrophic – to accidental or system-led reversals. Such are the new rules of the game - such is the new principle of uncertainty that now holds sway over all. The operation of this principle is a source of intense intellectual satisfaction (no doubt even of spiritual satisfaction). Think of the computer-virus story: something in us leaps with joy when we hear of an event of this kind. It is not that we have a perverse love of catastrophe - this is not the glee of the doomsayer proved right. No, it is that there is a suggestion of fatality here - and fatality always provokes a certain elation in us." (pp. 39-40, *The Transparency of Evil: Essays on Extreme Phenomena*.)(Baudrillard 1993)

The split between material reality and its material*ism* is figured into being in the Ruins of Overlook Mountain: the scarce resource of political economic timespace in the stake-holders actual decision-making time and place corroded in the socio-symbolic Ruin of the Mountain House, just as the timber resource was expended at about the same time. That is, approximately 1880-1900 being the peak of deforestation and the denoument in this narrative of the mute objects of these retreats as reified political economic *things*. The 'object' of political economic

[123] See Wallerstein: *World Systems Analysis* pp. 23 – 28 (Wallerstein 2004)

[124] The weakness of the metabolic rift argument is the incomplete socioanalysis that stems from foregoing the effectuation of a material rupture by virtual—socio-symbolic and imaginary—object relations, what phenomenological sociology refers to as *objectivation*. The realization of this piece of evidence in 'Western Marxism' is exemplified by Adorno's 'preponderance of the object' in a complex way and in Marx's own work that supersedes Foster, Clark, and York's argument against Lukács, by having a more thorough grounding in phenomenology and its critique: "The early Marx can be seen to approach and anticipate the phenomenological concept of a 'pre-reflexive' unity of subject and object." (From Feenberg, quoted in *The Metabolic Rift* p.232) (Foster et al. 2010). The authors themselves largely ignore the first generation of the Frankfurt School. For another example of the role of phenomenology see John O'Neill *Can Phenomenology be Critical* and the Habermasian theses that O'Neill cites in Habermas own *Knowledge and Human Interests* (O'Neill 1978) (Habermas 1971).

timespace is also the objection to the ruinous approach of social timespace that melts away for renewed associations elsewhere.

The distinction between a material and concrete condition and that of the *abstracta*—the *effect* of names, forms, deeds, and 'thought' (really its systematicity, what is often synonymous with the non-exacting use of the words 'philosophy', 'theory', or 'worldview')—as materialistic or *virtual* properties, as an image in a mirror is effectuating of our identification with that image, and not necessarily the reality of the imaged thing, is the distinction that must be made[125]. Here, Wallerstein's careful thinking of markets in a world system accomplished a political economy 'of the sign':

> "A market is both a concrete local structure in which individuals or firms sell and buy goods, and a virtual institution across space where the same kind of exchange occurs. How large and widespread any virtual market is depends on the realistic alternatives that sellers and buyers have at a given time. …
>
> One can think of this complete virtual market as a magnet for all producers and buyers, whose pull is a constant political factor in the decision-making of everyone-the states, the firms, the households, the classes, and the status-groups (or identities). This complete virtual world market is a reality in that it influences all decision making, but it never functions fully and freely (that is, without interference). The totally free market functions as an ideology, a myth, and a constraining influence, but never as a day-to-day reality." (p.25 *World Systems Analysis: an introduction*, Wallerstein)

The gravity here is that of effect, and while materializable, is only so in effectuation to action as objectivation. This is the subtle point of Weber's cautious definition of social action which is studied by its *social affect* and not as putative behavior for example (Weber 1978a). It is also the source of Weber's concern with treating Ideal-Types *as if* actually occurrent historical-types, *as if* actual historical exemplars (Weber 1946). To do so would at best be historical research, more likely, and at worst, historicism trespassing the logic of those types—such as social structure—and the actuality of the historical subjects.

The virtual market is still the gravity felt in the disconsolate Mountain House Ruins as failed enterprise and the gravity of the regrowth of the mountain timber stand as a seduction to another round of capitalist lumberjacking. On one hand the useless nostalgia of the entrepreneur and on the other the effectuation of the desire to hijack ecology for capital in the normative indifference

[125] This is of course the crux of Jacque Lacan's discovery of the mirror stage, having a strange predecessor in the work of Charles Horton Cooley's 'looking glass self' and parallels in the fraught efforts by Durkheim to define social facts by other social facts. The *virtual* in sociology is however explored at length by Jean Baudrillard; a sober reading of Baudrillard's account of a mode of cynical reasoning affected for a mood of fatal consequence is well warranted: "Here we fall into full derision: lacking a real catastrophe, it will be easy to unleash a simulated one, one which will be as good as the first and can even replace it. You wonder if that is not what "experts" fantasize about—and it is exactly the same case in the nuclear domain: don't all the preventive and dissuasive systems act like virtual foci of catastrophe? On the pretense of prevention, they materialize all the consequences in the immediate future. How true it is that we cannot rely on chance to bring on catastrophe: we have to find its programmed equivalent in the preventive measures.."(p.41) *Fatal Strategies* (Baudrillard 1990)

to this political act as the gravity discovered of the political economy of the sign, of the virtual object in the *commodity* that is also *fait sociaux* of this political ecology.

However, Baudrillard has managed to describe a catastrophic chronotope that is not objective in effect so much as it effectual of the ironic, jocular, kernel that is the *Witz* objects—*for* those virtual objects: the event as aleatory speaks to the fatal enjoyment that is the knowledge of a symbolic and virtual world and its objects as its obverse, where the fatal is the joke played upon chance that reveals an eschatological punchline[126]. The *metabolic rift* fails as polemic because it does not in fact—it is a social fact that naturalizes our subjection to it—demonstrate the eschatological closure that is the rupture where the 'hocky stick' begins as also containing the end. That is, the marriage of opposites, the aleatory and the fatal codetermine one another. Our experience of this, as Baudrillard recounts, is the experience of social structure. The Mountain House Ruins allow us to enjoy capitalism in both its 'chancy' and 'cyclical' ideological forms at the same time by tracing the contour of the future: "well they took their chances… and they were doomed to fail." So which is it? Of course the paradox, what is not our 'agony of choice', is the affective enjoyment of fate[127].

A stronger example of this fatal enjoyment is what Michael E. Mann describes in his "six stages of denial":

> "1. CO2 is not actually increasing; 2. Even if it is, the increase has no impact on the climate since there is no convincing evidence of warming; 3. Even if there is warming, it is due to natural causes; 4. Even if the warming cannot be explained by natural causes, the human impact is small, and the impact of continued greenhouse gas emission will be minor; 5. Even if the current and projected future human effects on Earth's climate are not negligible, the changes are generally going to be good for us; 6. Whether or not the changes are going to be good for us, humans are very adept at adapting to changes; besides, it's too late to do anything about it, and/or a technological fix is bound to come along when we really need it." (p.23. *The Hockey Stick And The Climate Wars.*)(Mann 2014)

Mann stumbles across the perverse and fatal enjoyment of the aleatory beckoning the necessary—minus the *Witz*: '*Even if…*'; and the necessity that makes a 'final' salutation to chance: 'it's too late to do anything about it, and/or a technological fix is bound to come along when we really *need it'* where it is this end in fatal 'need' that reverses the direction of Mann's 'six stages' and demonstrates how this illicit thought has *already been* the organizing catastrophe that it has 'already become'.

The ultra-political as brinkmanship, as the cruellest 'joke' because objective, is unknown to natural scientists as the naïve that preserves science as 'naturalistic' in the first place:

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[126] See also Goffman's discussion of our commonplace risk taking and opportunism, appraisal in aleatory and fatal terms and the attraction to chance in *Interaction Ritual* (Goffman 1967)

[127] On this condition of bad-faith held in common see Berger: *Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic* Perspective (Berger 1963). Berger does not develop this study much further here, the 'enjoyment of fate' is not elaborated beyond indicating that is always already part of even the most coercive social surroundings.

objectivating 'Nature' and naïve human nature simultaneously[128]. It is also for this reason that they lack the analytical perspicacity to discern at what point 'denial' has already become *disavowal*. Further, they lack enough respect for social-science to comprehend where their own denegations are simply the *structural* other side of this fatal enjoyment: Mann's hacked emails were simply the old scientistic condescension needed to irritate contrarians in their own enjoyment of abject ignorance, and spin the most ignorant populists into quasi-social action of whataboutism, denial, and contrarian discourses necessitated by opposition and 'accusation' in turn to undermine actual scientific efforts. It is important to note here, in this example, that Mann's error is not in his scientific work—not at all. It is the undisciplined analytic attitude that fails to distinguish where scientism has become *political economy,* where the belief in science is the mark of expert power/knowledge and the privilege to condescend to 'non-scientists', read as: non *natural* scientists. In this way *doxa* undermines natural science for the inability of the natural scientist to curb their habits of softly ridiculing anyone unfamiliar with their respective niches as fools.

Only structural and socio-symbolic phenomenon are indicators of how Ruins come from the future, how lives are 'ruins' in advance by this appearance on the horizon of which they are a dative. Where we have this condition, socioanalysis alone is prepared to describe it. However, socioanalysis that cannot articulate the complex phenomena of such events as a metabolic rift or the virtualized rift that exploits captivity to concept, fails in articulation. Again, this is part of the preponderance of the object and its own baleful enchantment in holding our attention by our reflected and refracted signs. Re-articulating those signs are what is necessary, and this is not simply a matter of that pejorative use of 'rhetoric' as some frivolous spin. Socioanalysis must turn to the humanities and the arts, above all literature, to take this seriously in the first place. By moving between socio-scientific timespace to literary and later extra-artistic *chronotope,* this articulation can be elaborated.

Timespace as explanatory chronotope

It is to the credit of Immanuel Wallerstein's short paper—a lecture at the Tyneside Geographical Society on February 1996 titled *"The Time of Space and the Space of Time: The Future of Social Science"*—that we have an operable analytical effort to straddle timespace as Bakhtin's dialogical examination of the novel by its ratio(s) and particular attributes of time-and-space, and that of Wallerstein's own engagements with such thinkers as Fernand Braudel and the Annals school. Here a socioanalysis of Wallerstein's adoption of Braudelian categories of time-and-space as 'timespace' provides something of an extension beyond that of David Harvey's more geographically inspired critiques (Foucault and De Certeau in particular) and his otherwise very good practice of Bourdieu's theoretically informed ethnography[129].

Wallerstein's own identification of five distinct timespaces allows for him to argue that at the very least, the social sciences are captive to a crisis of method—the historical *methodenstreit*—

[128] See Zizek on the discussion of evil in: *DID SOMEBODY SAY TOTALITARIANISM ? Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion* (Zizek 2001).
[129] It is to Ilya Prigogine that running the terms together as timespace earns its reversibility as the relativity of this category.

that he attributes to the early observation of this by Windelbrand[130]. For Wallerstein, this also will permit a discussion of different observations of timespace that support the core of his World Systems Analysis and the major advance he identifies with Braudel in positing a *structural timespace*—drawn from the nomothetic impulse of the social-sciences as he understands them—that is foundational to World Systems Analysis; and a *transformational timespace* that explains the most pivotal attributes of the 'event', so far discussed in the work of Alain Badiou, and to which Wallerstein also observes a kind of revolutionary political moment[131]. By comparison, the so-called natural sciences face no such 'crisis', the self-assurance of truth seeking by these methods of science only encounter technical crisis of explanation: "Science can only ever offer weights of evidence, degrees of confidence, and estimated risk. "Proof" is reserved for mathematical theorems and alcoholic beverages". (p.23, *The Hockey Stick And The Climate Wars,* Mann 2012).

No.

Speaking for science through statistical evidence is the source of 'confidence', and in some cases 'risk', at least insofar as its 'estimation' is concerned. As for weighing evidence, this may rely upon statistical evaluations as a substitute *evidencing* by case studies or cross-comparisons. I am not taking issue with any of these techniques, and I am not disputing climate science most of all. I am disputing this *positivism* as failing to account for its own *necessary* abstraction; that trivial discourse that explains how *relativism* intrudes by the elision of truth that reserves 'proof' for mathematical demonstrations as frivolity.

The technical particulars of climate science do not speak for themselves, they are explained, and these particulars are also what are exploited by the corrupt American juridical standards that also seem untroubled by exploiting *legal* technicalities as the ordinary graft by which law and institutions of 'justice' in fact operate. That is, the *appeal* to justice by natural scientists is as charming and naïve as when social scientists have made their incipient efforts to negotiate with such political terrorists in sheep's clothing (q.v. the bad-faith memo sent by ASA president Bonilla-Silva). This is a chronotope, and it is one we may well already know the twists and turns of, as a familiar *fatal* and tragic story that appeals to *cynicism*. The unspoken depredations on scientistic naivete by political negligence in the quasi juridical style of proceedings, and the useless grandstanding there, as if public demonstration of the political, *is the joke*. James Hansen, like Michael E. Mann, are the butt of the republics' joke on scientific advances: 'yes you can produce knowledge, we will even help fund it; but your discourse means nothing to Realpolitik. You can expect a hearing; or you can expect to be hacked, unless you stay out of our playground.' Thus, the actual discourse is the familiar 'irony' with which Larry Summers memo is the proper Gestalt for our understanding of ultra-political cynicism. However, it is perhaps the Exxon study of climate change and subsequent non disclosure that is the most striking example

[130] The animus of the *Methodenstreit* is here addressed through the work of Husserl: *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology* (Husserl 1970) and especially Ricoeur, whose essay: *What is a text? Explanation and Understanding* (Ricoeur 1981b) is informed by Dilthey, Saussure, Gadamer, and Lévi-Strauss.
[131] The timespaces described by Wallerstein are an advance upon Braudel's own *l'histoire événementuelle*, *l'histoire conjoncurelle*, and *l'histoire structurelle*, and a fourth *les temps des sages* (Wallerstein 1998b)*;* what Wallerstein develops as *episodic geopolitical timespace*, *cyclico-ideological timespace, structural timespace*, *eternal timespace*, and a fifth; *transformational timespace* (Wallerstein 1998a).

of how natural science, indisposed to 'proofs' and thus social-structure, will take the check and intellectual property disclosure agreement in liberal political economic 'good faith'.

If it is not clear to the reader, the effectuation by science—so called 'natural' and social—of a world objectivated by this often instrumental/technical knowledge of it, is what is at stake here. That failing to demonstrate how so-called natural science *as* a mode of zealous belief, *as* something to be denied and dissimulated, later *as* something to disabuse the 'non-scientist', and later to be disowned *as* the venal joke of political irony, *is the social structure* that no natural science can comprehend with its limited discourses and that is also vulnerable to the non-comprehension of political hacks. Science of this kind is that eschatological future actualized out of the belief in the techniques themselves.

Effectuation by science of our world, our timespace and it's storied appearance, is in Marx's early writings, and in Foster, Clark, and York's recovery of some of this argument; and more thoroughly articulated preceding the ecological Marxists is the Frankfurt school's own institutional effort, and mandate for its own existence (Wiggershaus 1995). In this sense I am reading Wallerstein as developing another strand of this thinking(Wallerstein 2004).

The opening sections of this dissertation, with the necessary critique of contemporary sociology as a *method* of social science that also has its own appropriate structural method, relies most of all upon Wilhelm Dilthey (Hermeneutics) and Edmund Husserl (phenomenology) through the discourse analytic theory of Paul Ricoeur to address this very 'crisis'[132]. However, there is a more subtle connection to Marx via Alfred Sohn-Rethel in this thinking of method that is shared with Lacan, which I will associate with both of these approaches[133]. *Method* appears twice in sociology, and *only* in sociology insofar as it is a reflexive—hermeneutical and phenomenological—science. That is, where sociology *is* a method in the social-sciences, this discipline offers a unique position to *critique* broader social-scientific efforts from its own re-entry of this operation into its own system. Method becomes theoretical and informed necessarily by theory that comes from this second order observation (observation of observation in Luhmann's terms; wherein every observation is also a distinction, redoubling the observer much in the manner observed by C.H. Cooley in1902 and later by Lacan[134]). And, simultaneously,

[132] Most of this study's effort is due to an early encounter with Husserl's *The Crisis of the Human Sciences* (Husserl 1970). This to me is the appropriate launch point for a discussion of the *lifeworld* in respect to the more specialized activity of the sciences, and what Habermas describes in systems. However, see Habermas: *The Theory of Communicative Action Volume II Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason* (Habermas 1987).
[133] See Zizek: pp.10-18 *The Sublime Object of Ideology* (Zizek 2008). Zizek follows Sohn-Rethel in a discussion of 'real abstraction': the effectual or virtual and 'as if' attribute that is 'more objective' than the object itself. The absurd treatment of commodities where the commodity *form* appears enduring, magically incorruptible, unchangeable in the act of exchange. This impossible feature of commodities terminate in an ironic form where, for example, the 'value' of whatever tokens of exchange are used in exchange are both specific and general at the same time; money is both used in general and it is also localized and temporalized in specific currencies.
[134] Lacan's own *stade du miroir*—mirror stage—relies upon two of Freud's texts: On *narcissism* (1914), and *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921). That inaugural re-thinking of psychoanalysis *Le Stade du miroir comme formateur de la function de Je, telle qu'elle nous est révélée dans l'expérience psychoanalytique, Revue Francais de Psychoanalyse, XVIII* (1949) was delivered in Marienbad on June 16, 1936. The obvious value to socioanalysis in the latter and of the Marxian thinking of *alienation* and *Fetishism* in the former needs to be stated. However, Lacan also relied upon the anthropological writings of Marcel Mauss, who with Emile Durkheim, developed concepts of *collective representation* and *total social services* as informative of Lacan's: *symbolic order*.

sociology where it retains *structural analysis*, is reflexive of its own technique of observation as also technical self-observation: the social—society as modern phenomenon in its scale and scope—has outstripped all prior forms of organized human life such as community and family by associations that are realized as arbitrary, systematic and without space, devoid of particular subjects, and timeless, all of which is to say that the social *is not 'real', it is virtual:* rather the social is no more than that socio-symbolic system staging our actual experience of organization, and it is no less in effectiveness. Yet this virtuality does not make it any less effectual of objects that are 'real' and 'material'. Socio-diagnostic technique *is a social fact* distinguished by the *making social* of facts that are otherwise naturalized, reified as natural facts, and as *debarred*—excluding—by actively neglecting what is effectual and virtual (usually by claims of 'objectivity' and 'neutrality'); such as figure-tropes that effect the turns in perception that we enjoy and those that we suffer as lack. An anesthetized and 'neutral' paradigm for studying 'natural facts' is always already an aesthetic in the sense that this overlooked neutralizing disposition *is also perception*. This inversion is necessarily the counter to cynical and ironic seduction of objects such as a metabolic rift.

These effectuations of objects that are material—they are not the effectuation of virtual objects such as we encounter in the knowing use of fantasy or imagination by figure-tropes in the arts or literature—are particular in that they are redoubled in appearance; they appear twice in representation as when we use a *model*, or a *concept*, that can be compared with the thing it represents, frames, or *brackets* in some way. It is of especial importance that we comprehend that representations neutralize or otherwise put-out-of-action the very things they represent by doubling them through the virtuality of the model or the concept. We are seduced by commodities in that infamous discourse of Marx's commodity fetishism, where we attribute magical properties of timeless durability and sublime depth in space, to things as we do in the reverence for techno-gadgets and techno-fixes.

For Wallerstein, *transformational timespace,* insofar as we observe a rupture and change in these conditions, has a 'right' time despite appearing as accidental to the structure of timespace that it irrupts as a rupture, and it has an 'approximate' (it is only important that it is proximal in time and place to the site of the event) value in that this 'right' time does not finally matter to the belief in the rupture as effectuating world change. Moreover, this 'world change' changes both past and future meaning (as accident) as well as paradoxically occurring only when it could have occurred (as essential) in the span of time. As virtual or approximate, this sublime object is 'the world' observed in transformational timespace, and its disclosure and chronotope is indicated by an impossible doubling of this 'world' as '*Nature',* or '*the natural*'.

We can detect this in such as accusatives directed at a person such as: "well it is your *nature*…" indicating that someone has paradoxical attributes in what is 'essential' to their 'character' and at the same accidental: "You are prone to making mistakes… it is in your nature". By suspending this doxa, this belief in *human* 'nature' for its contradictory attributes, we are also forced to bracket a world in which this is a condition of possibility: "people are naturally curious" or "people are naturally aggressive" where the personal is superseded by some kind of vaguely social, or vaguely interactional effect that we might call 'world' in the same sense that we say we live in 'the anthropocene'.

Such an epochal world of 'the anthropocene' relies upon an event that has been long since superseded by both understanding that backgrounds the event, and meaning; and milieux that the event supersedes as well as the social structure that is put into motion by milieu, such that the structure becomes invisible beneath its refraction and redoubling in the institutions that make up social milieux.

Transformational timespace is 'the right moment' only by becoming what it has already been, and this means surpassing what Wallerstein calls *eternal timespace*, which, ironically, is also the proper timespace of the method of sociology, like economics and political science insofar as they are nomothetic and concerned with time as the present, and not the past (history) nor space (anthropology, Oriental studies[135]), nor predominately idiographic in methodological practice, and defined by Wallerstein as operating by *episodic geopolitical timespace*.

Mikhail Mikhailovich Bakhtin and Pavel Nikolaevich Medvedev had already proposed something of this surpassing of *eternal timespace* by sociology in their development for, and critique of sociopoetics in 1928, (sociological poetics) against the 'sociological method' proposed by formalists who excluded art and literature from sociology:

> "The formalists consider specification to be the isolation of a given ideological domain, the sealing off of this domain from all other forces and energies of ideological and social life. They see specificity, individuality, as a force that is sluggish and hostile to all other forces; that is, they do not think of individuality dialectically and therefore are not capable of combining it with the living interactions of concrete social and historical life" (p.37 *The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship*)(Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978)

That is, Medvedev and Bakhtin comprehend sociology as a dialectical operation coming from social life, not exclusive of it:

> "Speech tact is determined by the aggregate of all the social relationships of the speakers, their ideological horizons, and, finally, the concrete situation of the conversation. Tact, whatever its form under the given conditions, determines all of our utterances. No word lacks tact.
>
> Under certain circumstances, in certain social groups, speech tact creates grounds favoring the formation of utterances having characteristics the formalists consider typical of poetic language: brakings, evasions, ambiguities, crooked speech paths. It is from this source that these phenomena sometimes penetrate the poetic structure, granted, only to its periphery ...." (p. 150 ibid)(Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978)

The ellipses and the trivialization: 'granted, only to its periphery….' indicate the critics' observation that the formal method in fact isolates itself by its own method from the importance of social situations to poetics and having a root in everyday prose. The sociological returns by irrupting the formalist poetics that would otherwise bar this intrusion by just any social group, by

[135] Wallerstein also describes geography as concerned with space too, yet it is nomothetic, captive to the moods and methods of the natural sciences, however, it is also historically relegated to secondary school and only lately has it earned a more prestigious position in university education (Wallerstein 2004).

observing the illocutionary and perlocutionary effects in 'speech tact', and how speech tact: 'creates grounds favoring the formation of utterances… typical of poetic language' (Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978).

What is also offered here is the possibility of sociology surpassing its own discourse and the nomothetic constraints placed upon it. This is of course the promise of Bourdieu's ethnographic details, Foucault's localities; in Medvedev and Bakhtin's terms those specificities and individualities that surpass themselves dialectically. What nomothetic 'laws' would impose and ossify time by, in a progressivist imitation of *progressus,* what would superpose a 'dynamic stability' by way of sociological formalism—a methodologistic 'filling in the gaps'—is critiqued as eternalizing and putting out of commission the movement of history insofar as it is *narrative,* and that is to say *storied*. This strange and contrary sense of eternalization is suggested wherever memory demonstrates itself as simultaneously a form of delay: we come to insight 'at the right time' after gestating thought for some time; or we recollect 'all of the sudden' and just in time; our thoughts that seemed so hard to articulate are suddenly put into words and image in serendipity, and at the right moment. However, this sense superimposes past and future by the retro-effect of timeliness: it seems as though this serendipity also confirmed some kind of plan or design, having an eternalizing because self-confirming effect.

Wallerstein's timespaces can be developed from the Braudelian insight into *social time* as *structural timespace* what he references as *longe durée* and having a cyclical dynamic that Wallerstein attributes to Kondratieff; what the latter called 'long waves' of 50-60 years in capitalist expansion and stagnation. The Braudelian insight into structural timespace is commensurate with other structural insights in linguistics (Suassure), anthropology (Lévi-Strauss), and sociology (Durkheim and Mauss), and has a less well recognized form in the work of Weberian sociology, infamously through his cross-productive states of an otherwise paradoxical *Protestant Ethic* and a *Spirit of Capitalism*. Again, without instruction in this kind of structural analysis, artfully the demonstration of Goethean *elective affinity* (itself an old trope of early modern chemistry (Howe 1978)), even social scientists and geographers fail to comprehend the demonstrative and apodictic results of structural analysis here, as well as in the adoption of some Weberian and Simmelian sociology by the Frankfurt School and by systems theorists such as Niklas Luhmann.

Briefly then, Wallersteins' *Structural TimeSpace* has a chronotope of long term explanations and significantly large spaces, greater than nation-states and longer than their duration[136]. Wallerstein

[136] *Has* a chronotope as an attribute that comes from the object itself and should not be confused with the object of that timespace. As an attribute of structural timespace, this explanation is categorial and is already a relations to a much broader more 'transcendental' timespace of time-and-space than the anthropomorphic horizon terminated in natality/mortality. It is also propertied in the sense that a chronotope has a unique quality of its own, not just the intersubjective relations of human lives organized in its field of gravity. The approach of this timespace is registered by us wherever we encounter objects of uncanny duration and vaster temporal persistence. For the sociologist, the envelopment in imperialist imagery (often of modern era eurocentric imagery) that guides much of the thinking with and against the durable and persistent nation-state; those durable exchanges of/for 'total social services' of a capitalist economy that de-values everything in advance, as Net Present Value, Futures, Derivatives, and other forms of ruinous capital demonstrate a persistent marketization; and the persistent and durable refractions—partitions and (re)distributions—by 'self-identifications' of/for civil society by market and state nomos (the quasi-scientific nomothetics expressed in statistical categories of police and cameral sciences), best expressed in the contagion of 'social media' that stimulates a compulsive auto-critique by an exceptionalist politics and policing of social/civil

notes that these explanations are: "in fact definitions of the kind of historical system in which we live as well as its boundaries in time and space." (*"The Time of Space and the Space of Time: The Future of Social Science"*) (Wallerstein 1998a). This is to say that *how* we define a history in its officialdom or not, is closely bound to the time and space limits in which we actually *live* these definitions; how we *enact* them in our habits insofar as these 'structures structure the fields in which we operate' as workers, citizens, family and household members, etcetera. Or, to put it in the language of early American social theory—the definition of the situation is in this case historical in its context as much as they are indeed biography as the lived-graphical record of our lives. Bourdieu establishes a Weberian structure to *habitus* this way: "In short, the habitus, the product of history, produces individual and collective practices, and hence history, in accordance with the schemes engendered by history." (p.82 *Outline of a Theory of Practice*)(Bourdieu 1977). Gerth and Mills give Weber's method as the bracketing of the very history of these graphical-recordings—officialized by the sheer fact and event of their persistent and durable record—that Bourdieu describes: "By use of a battery of ideal types, he builds up a conception of a particular historical case. In his comparative studies, he uses the same ideal type conceptions, but he uses history as a storehouse of examples for these concepts." (p. 60 *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*)(Weber 1946). What Weber and Bourdieu both accomplish is a careful method of comparative sociology that is idiographic in its specific historical structure by the concatenation and construction of ideal types *and* nomothetic in that those ideal types have examples in history *from which they are abstracta* (images of social-relations, historical-relations, also political and economic), and *to which they are dative* (*how* they are *to* or *for* a specific historical type: what is 'fit *for* a king' or 'owed *to* the master by the bondsman' are archaic examples, the affect of whose imagery persists and endures—is made to live beyond their corruption by other social forms—in autocratic governing institutions and patrimonial households for example). A fine example is given by Weber this way: "In general, all kinds of practical ethics that are systematicially and unambiguously oriented to fixed goals of salvation are 'rational,' partly in the same sense as formal method is rational, and partly in the same sense that they distinguish between 'valid' norms and what is empirically given." (ibid: p.294 *The Social Psychology of the World Religions*) (Weber 1946). Weber quickly makes his caveat regarding the role of historical definitions following this mention of systematicity in practice and 'formal method' on one hand, and the ethical distinction of 'valid norms and what is empirically given' on the other, a difference between structural logic and dispositions (habitus) disposed according to this *typology*:

> "In order to make this attempt, the author must take the liberty of being 'unhistorical,' in the sense that the ethics of individual religions are presented systematically and essentially in greater unity than has ever been the case in the flux of their actual development. … The author has always underscored those features in the total picture of a religion which have been decisive for the fashioning of the *practical* way of life, as well as those which distinguish one religion from another." (ibid)(Weber 1946)

boundaries as a self-reifying system of policed and corrected 'identities'. Especially the latter—civil society—is identified by Medvedev and Bakhtin as *sociopoetic*: as *autopoietic* in generating its own subsystems for self organization *as society* by increasingly differential *associations*, arbitrary and formal in their specific poetics of communication (Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978).

Structure is the social timespace evident in practice always-already as necessary *prior*, and it is practice that puts history into motion as a socio-symbolic act in the first place; the question then is *how* and to what *ends*. The problem of *social structure* then is the intellectualist reduction to an *a priori* category, presumptive only of 'mind' on one hand, and the more naturalist reduction by so-called practice in positivistic or putative empiricist 'applicability' that reifies structure in such things as an 'economic base', or 'real context', brute physical geography, and busy-body, agent-centeted 'time' as the 'historical event', often attribute to (individual) human action. The second is a short-circuit of actual materialism as a metabolism dependent upon consciousness as material; what the naturalist irrreflexivity simply refuses in its simple minded zeal. The first however, at least has the possibility of inaugurating an intellectual life and reflexion; yet this too is a short-circuit of the sensuous wherever it refuses materiality altogether for disembodied and hypothetical puzzles.

Wallerstein's *Structural Timespace* becomes the foundation for *Cyclico-Ideological TimeSpace*: "those categories by which we sometimes explain immediate history… [emphasizing] a longer run of time [than events or the episodic], and that involves some definition of the situation deriving from an evaluation of the meaning of location in time and space of particular groups." ("*The Time of Space and the Space of Time: The Future of Social Science"*)(Wallerstein 1998a). I must emphasize two elements of my critique and use of Wallerstein's categories here: 1. That his *Structural Timespace* only becomes foundational *after* the fact of surpassing structure for realization in the socio-symbolic explanations of *Cyclico-Ideological TimeSpace*, a pattern that I will successively emphasize in reading these categories; 2. That this retro-effect also assumes a *proto-effect*, pre-emptively ending a discourse in obviations of the form itself—a *particular group* in its *particular timespace* can only partition structure by its limited definitional imagery or *sociopoetics*.

However, this very *particularity*, by its own failure to ever complete or perfect a 'definition of the situation', *succeeds* by only ever arbitrarily bracketing and reducing reality to its limited discourses as mere fractions. Thus, this limited sociopoetics must also necessarily generate exponential *uncertainty*, as its own outside and objective unconscious, thereafter—retro-effective of—actually founding *mythifications* as its envelope of *environment* and *society*[137]. What is so often referenced as *milieu* or *atmosphere* for their allusion to a diffuse and un-definable, indeed indefinite horizon, that we disown as our own making or practice.

In surpassing *Structural Timespace* by *Cyclico-Ideological TimeSpace*, an isotopy presents itself, and not merely an analytics, what Wallerstein's argument tacitly demonstrates: "Today concepts

[137] It is worth observing that the discovery of the unconscious in aesthetics by Schiller, the discovery of society in the collapse of the old absolute monarchies for a recognizable civil society, and environment and umwelt appear in the early part of the 19th C.. On the discovery of an aesthetic 'unconscious' of society see Ranciére: "Schiller's 'aesthetic state, by suspending the opposition between active understanding and passive sensibility, aims at breaking down—with the idea of art—an idea of society based on the opposition between those who think and decide and those who are doomed to material tasks." (p. 41 *The Politics of Aesthetics* Ranciére, 2004 [2000]) on the emergence of 'environment' and 'umwelt' see Luhmann: "…a theoretical turn that began in the nineteenth century when the terms *'Umwelt'* and *'environment'* were invented and which has reached its culmination today: systems define their own boundaries. They differentiate themselves and thereby constitute the environment as whatever lies outside the boundary. In this sense, then, the environment is not a system of its own, not even a unified effect." (p.6 *Ecological Communication*, Luhmann).

like bifurcations, chaos that creates new order, and fractals are suddenly popular. Suddenly, the particular interpretation that nineteenth-century social science made of time and space is being undermined and therefore can be openly discussed. Suddenly, boundaries of the disciplines are once again up for grabs." (Ibid) (Wallerstein 1998a). That is, the proliferation and prolixity of conceptualizations multiply, refract, and diffract *within* the social sciences, irrupting their nomothetic law—the chronotope of what distinguishes them one from another by their own boundaries and what Wallerstein will refer to as an *Eternal Timespace*—where the social sciences permeates so-called natural science, technology, and mathematics. This permeation by such reflexive issues of 'risk' in technologies, trades such as law, medicine, architecture, and engineering; incompleteness in mathematics, and uncertainty in physics and biology; are all *interested* by the investments in political economy[138]: invested with the physical and symbolic force of political violence, police, and international order, and economic/business techniques of fraud and guile, both of which rebound upon themselves in invidium and intrigues. 'Risk' management—if there is such a thing—is the superimposition of timespaces: threats from the future and past neglect stack up in a waste dump or wasting of lands, waters, and skies (Gross 2020)[139].

Here is also where the major distinction between Wallerstein's own conceptualization of types of Timespace will shift away from an apparently 'ordinal' arrangement in part inherited from the Braudelian conceptualizations toward an isotopy of opposed and strangely redoubling timespaces by their explanatory attributions and the ratio of timespace—that is, by a distinctive and discursive chronotope. *Structural Timespace* is of long time and large space, Wallerstein uses the capitalist world system as his primary example. This Chronotope itself is constituted by another 'medium duration' timespace: "Within any structural TimeSpace there is cyclico-ideological TimeSpace, because this is the kind of TimeSpace that permits the system to function." (ibid) (Wallerstein 1998a). A careful reading can immediately draw important parallels with systems theory, especially Luhmanns' *structural coupling* and *operational closure* as the metabolic regularities, 'equilibrium', and cycles that characterize this 'function'[140]:

> "The analogy, and not a bad one, is to human breathing. If we did not inhale and exhale, the human organism could not survive. But inhaling and exhaling are different moments, and the body functions differently when it is doing the one or the other. Cyclico-ideological TimeSpace is also subversive, particularly of our modern world-system. By emphasizing long-term repetitive patterns, it raises into question the ideology of slow accretions of progress, the new always being seen as something better. But if the new is not really new? Or rather, if we learn to distinguish that which is cyclical from that which is a linear progression, may we not see more clearly what are the contradictions of a given system and therefore how cyclical processes are mechanisms to restore an equilibrium that is inevitably being undermined as the system moves implacably and irremediably far from equilibrium?" (ibid)(Wallerstein 1998a)

[138] The topic of risk in eco-environmental discourse here is largely owed to Ulrich Beck and Niklas Luhmann (Beck 1992)(Luhmann 2002b).
[139] Gross' comment in this presentation is telling regarding risk; as 'the manifest inability for societies to deal with uncertainty'. A tacit admission of an unconscious that comes from the future in the ruinous form of risk (Gross 2020).
[140] See Luhman: *Introduction to Systems Theory* (Luhmann 2013).

Wallerstein will further indicate, much as Luhmann had, that structure are operations, and that by operational closure provide continuity to (social) systems: “Structural TimeSpace emphasizes continuity, yes, but it also puts a time limit on the continuity. Structures continue until their internal contradictions, their evolving trajectories, force a bifurcation, and then they explode or implode, and real change occurs.” (ibid) (Wallerstein 1998a)[141]. Metabolism in a system has both negative feedback loops in the form of familiar cyclical explanations, and positive feedback loops in the form of anticipatory resonance that builds upon itself, redoubling until the system corrodes.

However, *Structural Timespace* also contains an even more briefly durable timespace, that of *Episodic Geopolitical Timespace:*

> “Archives normally contain data defined in terms of episodic geopolitical TimeSpace. After all, who writes documents and who collects them? Primarily the states, and primarily to keep records of current geopolitical transactions. There was indeed a further constraint: archives contained secrets, and as a result states normally made them available only for periods long gone by. A fifty-year rule was commonplace. Hence, archives could not be used to analyze the present. … ethnologists were also using episodic geopolitical TimeSpace, even though the term "geopolitical" sounds anachronistic here, because the meanings are those given to the customs by the immediate context in which they occur.” (Ibid)(Wallerstein 1998a)

Here the explanatory form of *Episodic Geopolitical Timespace,* the chronotope, is described by Wallerstein by the ‘method’ adopted:

> “The idiographic thrust, using episodic geopolitical TimeSpace, tells us in effect that there is no useful explanation of what has happened, beyond recounting the sequence of events that preceded whatever it is we are observing. The amount of detail that is included in such a sequence is a function of the availability of records, the judgment of the one who reconstructs the sequence as to what merits inclusion, and the energy of the scholar and the reader.” (ibid)(Wallerstein 1998a)

Contextualization of this kind is distinct from the more systemic explanation of *Cyclico-Ideological Timespace*. What is important here is that this episodic form that can be accounted for in the short span of a human life; it is in fact determined in Wallerstein’s estimation by the withholding of archival data for about 50 years. Whereas cyclico-ideological forms exceed this, and here the model is that of Kondratieff cycles of 50-60 years, which differ for the fact that they

[141] Luhmann’s description, albeit a combination of terse formula and directness regarding how political-ecological catastrophe occurs in systems theory, is closely parallel to Wallerstein: “Under these circumstances we must realize that politics is used as a launching-pad and transmission system for ecological desiderata when and wherever these enter the consciousness of individuals and social communication. Then the political system may function as a kind of continuous-flow heater. But this only increases the probability that, on the occasion of the exposure to ecological dangers, a socially internal intensification of resonance will result that combines politically convenient and acceptable solutions with functional disturbances in other systems. Such an oscillation of resonance will probably have destructive consequences within an evolutionarily highly improbable social system, therefore any claim to political rationality would have to include reactions to the effects of politics in its calculations.” (p.120) *Ecological Communication* (Luhmann 1986)

are *cycles* not *events* (ibid) (Wallerstein 1998a). The repetition of these cycles immediately surpasses what is most often considered the upwards limit of even very old humans—100-120 years.

These timespaces are contained by structural timespace in the form of a capitalist world system where *Cyclico-Ideological Timespace* is the innovation for understanding structure and *Episodic Geopolitical Timespace* is 'dust': "Events are dust not only because they are ephemeral but also because they are dust in our eyes." (p.291 *The Inventions of Timespace Realities*)(Wallerstein 1988). This statement follows a previous explanation of the Braudelian antipathy to 'events' as ephemera:

> "In place of the events that are dust, Braudel urged us to focus our attention on two objects of analysis, two kinds of time he considered more real. There are the enduring structures (primarily economic and social) that determine over the *longue duree* our collective behaviour - our social ecology, our civilisational patterns, our modes of production. And there are the cyclical rhythms of the functioning of these structures - the expansions and contractions of the economy, the alternation of emphasis in political and cultural phenomena that regularly occur. Underneath the ephemeral happenings of the immediate public arenas lie the enduring continuities of patterns (including the pendular patterns) that change slowly." (ibid)(Wallerstein 1988)

Nonetheless, the idiographic case of the event remains: the 'dust' of events, or episodic geo-political timespace thrust under the motive force of cyclico-ideological timespace. Were we to invert this enclosure a different situation appears when we unfold this structure from the Wallersteinian form. We can illustrate Wallerstein's form this way:

$$\textit{Structural Timespace} \left\{ \begin{array}{c} \textit{Episodic Geo-political Timespace} \\ \hline \\ \textit{Cyclico-Ideological Timespace} \end{array} \right.$$

Following Paul Ricoeur's model of discourse analysis where *language* is treated as a parallel form to *Structural Timespace* for shared structural differences: language exists outside time, it has no subject of its own, it has a system not a world, and it is a *prior* for a text; *Structural Timespace* exists 'outside time' as boundaries that delimit by defining our horizon of explanations: "The explanations here are much more long-term, and are in fact definitions of the kind of historical system in which we live as well as its boundaries in time and space." (*The Time of Space and the Space of Time: The Future of Social Science*)(Wallerstein 1998a), it has no subject in that such timespace is already beyond the scope of even the oldest human for its cyclical constitution, it is systematic for much the same reason—the structuring of time and space by cyclical shifts institutions—and, it is prior to our understanding of either those cycles and the events that are its ephemera nonetheless both of these accounts are much easier for us to account of it in the abstracta of archival and ethnographic evidence or that of cycles established by medium term studies of the durability and *metabolism* of economic, political, and social institutions, with their respective milieu or environments. I will add that it is definitive of the 19th C. that *society* enters discourse following the appearance of social classes (middle-classes) that

define the terms of economic and political institutions only after the self observation of their own 'civil society' as culturally distinct from previous forms of the 'political' and the 'economic'. What was once the domain of the sovereign as the 'great house' and as 'nation' that encompassed lesser oikos, had been inverted in that time period called modernity as Hannah Arendt observed:

> "Society is the form in which the fact of mutual dependence for the sake of life and nothing else assumes public significance and where the activities connected with sheer survival are permitted to appear in public." (p.46 *The Human Condition* Arendt)(Arendt 1959)

Thus, the cycles that surpass *Structural Timespace* as those of so-called 'civil society'; those who are consumers of the total social services in the overlapping forms of economies and polities. From this we have a differently organized arrangement of timespace by its chronotopes:

Episodic Geo-Political Timespace
↑
Cyclico-Ideological Timespace
↑
Structural Timespace

That is, *Structural Timespace* is surpassed by the ideologies that are put into motion to explain it, and at the same time ossify this chronotope. However, against Braudel's 'dust' and 'ephemera' as a way to explain away idiographic contexts of very localizable meaning, it is this very chronotope that surpasses ideology by also retroactively putting *it* into motion as those norms that it attempts to rupture. What Wallerstein and Braudel did not observe is how *failure* is the success of such 'episodic' timespace, what necessitates renewed cyclical efforts to reinstate the deposed, reestablish the fallen, and restore the lost objects of ideology.

The example of Louis Bonaparte's return to France, the re-appearance of populism in fascist Italy and Nazi Germany—and not simply a reaction to market failure in a putative double-movement (it is actually a redoubling, what Polanyi, despite his perspicacity did not observe)—the return of market liberalism in neo-liberalism, are all examples of waves of failure taking place in 'society' that permit the return of middle-class police order as *normative* and *moral*. Only by observing the failures of civil society in these and other societal forms do we begin to establish what the approach of social timespace necessarily *ruins*.

The completed form of Wallerstein's model is however justified in how the event of geo-political timespace is itself surpassed by those 'eternalizing' and 'universalizing' claims of social science; precisely sublime for scope, magnitude of presumptive effect, scale, complicatedness etecetera. Thus, we should be wary of claims that social science must be generalizable and that a 'macro-level perspective' is the obvious choice. Rather, it is precisely in surpassing the event that social structure continues its journey, and it is when this nomothetic imperative fails by its own success, where social-analysis is cynically misused for episodic gains in professional prestige, careerism, or made fungible for advantages gained in economic or political engineering

(marketing, public opinion research) that a critical moment of transformation/catastrophe becomes evident. The specific form (episodic) subverts the general (eternal) yielding the contradiction and catastrophe that is also transformational. Thus:

Transformational TimeSpace
↑
Eternal TimeSpace
↑
Episodic Geo-Political TimeSpace
↑
Cyclico-Ideological TimeSpace
≈
Structural TimeSpace

Great Houses

The failure of the *Overlook Mountain House* is indeed 'dust'. It is the Ruin that as hieroglyph diffuses its haunting and uncanny atmosphere for the hypo-visibilization—the foregrounding that is also foreclusion and obviation—that conceals the rise and fall of polities and economies according to the consumption of these social services, their actual material form. That is, by those *discourses* that neglect the obdurate fact of capitalist failure as the abiding source of its restoration in a succeeding cycle.

The fire that destroyed the first building was the actual destruction of this enterprise, the successive failure was the socio-symbolic death and actual corrosion beyond this corruption in flame, smoke, and ash. Yet it is also the promise of corrosion as the actual patina on the past that provides nostalgia on one hand, and a melancholy that this really was only ephemeral; not even the past is safe, especially not the past into which capital legitimates its social *structure*. In this surpassing of structure by collapsing cycles of social reestablishment for dead mores and empty norms, the future is constrained to ephemeral discourses as the event of hope (also desire, will, and promise) itself, what must fail as the necessity of the cyclical return of the same, as cyclical failure, is the success of the structural.

In this chapter the introduction of the parallel 'alternative' hypothesis to *ruins come from the past*, as *ruins come from the future* admits the summary rejection of both as too simplistic. More important, is how this opposition masks the superimposition of timespace, the pivot point of these case studies, and to which we shall turn next. In interrogating the theorizations of timespace thus far, the possibility of bridging a reflexive social science with the naivete of the objectivations of so-called natural sciences is possible through their limited comprehension of 'self-organization' or *autopoiesis*. The work of Immanuel Wallerstein figures largely here for his own recognition of the thought of Ilya Prigogine. This is an advance in thinking theoretically, although it is likely the former would not at all enjoy this term. It is the neglected work of Lacan and the thought of Luhmann that has mostly supplied a language from phenomenology and psychoanalysis for socioanalysis.

The next chapter will introduce superimposed timespace and an important observation that already bridges the span between philosophy and science in the traditional indigenous knowledge and botany of the work of Robin Wall Kimmerer, her students, and Sweetgrass.

CHAPTER FIVE WIINGAASHK

A problem that is raised in the observation of timespace distinctions, as an already nettlesome question of the 'origin' of ruins, is the presupposition that there is an origin, and thus an ends after all. This was the first hypothesis: *ruins comes from the past*. An almost pointlessly gratuitous statement, the development of the Mill Ruins an effort to elaborate how this 'past' is punctuated by futurities and not just historicizations. The project of industrialization was in a sense over before it began—as *ruins from the future*—given the colonial upsurge was itself an unruly exploitation of labor; what the gentrification that Skaneateles compels of this place as its limiting *narrative*. In this chapter the socio-scientific discourse seeking after origins-and/or-ends is critiqued through a socioanalysis informed by an ecological system itself: the Ruins of Sweetgrass that neither serve as remnants of the past nor solely as traces from a future eschaton. Further, by critique of a politics of recognition a critique of political ecology comes into view from a zoomorphic perspective.

Compensation

The compensatory, *supplementary*, figures of life in non humans, are the compensation of an *ecological structure*, that the *prior* of society as human artefact and foundational myth allegorizes in its digital entities. This superimposition of the commodity form of non humans will bend back upon the creators: as reflexion and reification.

That is, where the flora and fauna have disappeared into the CAFO and Cropland, the residue, their ruinate form is *the product*. Food, sometimes medicine, apparel, textiles, building materials, and in effect, all the subsistence of life and for it. It is the fork that conceals what is on its tines in naked display. It is precisely this moment that Benjamin observes in the futurist negligence of its own materiality in the impossible manifesto of Marinetti with his *"fiat ars—pereat mundus"* (Benjamin 2008), and what Benjamin describes as the revenge of technology upon its users by things of no use in their cycles of obsolescence and profligate waste:

> "Imperialistic war is a rebellion of technology which collects, in the form of "human material," the claims to which society has denied its natural material. Instead of draining rivers, society directs a human stream into a bed of trenches; instead of dropping seeds from airplanes, it drops incendiary bombs over cities; and through gas warfare the aura is abolished in a new way." (Benjamin 2008)

In understanding the past of industrialization and modernization we are forced to observe a ruinate *prior* from a timespace that eternalizes social order and its imaginary as engineering in the name of a 'better world', or in the case of the fascist experiment of the early 20th C., to perish the world for the creation of a future state subsistent upon power. Most important, is not to separate these impulses and to confront the token of social structure upon which one is simply the reversive side of the other. Still more important not to fall into the simplistic trap of a 'double-movement' that accepts a society/economy decisionism, what is the false choice that conceals actual social systems of society/polity/economy.

The putative *ruins* that come from the past are the remains in the line of time, a linear system that conveniently hierarchizes time and timing (events) without questioning how this is actually experienced. Thus, the great strength of Mikhail Bakhtin in his use of the *chronotope* to examine the variations of timespace in the novel. Bakhtin's parallel in the work of Wallerstein and Braudel, the theorization of a *longe durée* commensurate with a Mediterranean world gives ample room for later theorists such as Paul Gilroy to theorize a *Black Transatlantic* and the culture there as having its own timespace (for Gilroy and very differently for Fred Moten and Stefano Harney, that chronotope is *the ship* and *the shipped*. But we can also add Christina Sharpe's *Wake* to this too.), and alternative to the territorializations legitimized by imperial exploits of *land*s (Gilroy 1993)(Harney and Moten 2013)(Sharpe 2016).

However, Wallerstein and Braudel do not recognize that the re-organization of the planet by World Systems Analysis as a model, as a means, stifles the event—rather they display antipathy for the *evenementuelle*, and recover it in the *transformational*. The structure of timespace is the disciplinary heart of this project, and the correlationism that is its center/periphery logic. What is overlapped at the center, that polis as deictic kernel, makes peripatetic whatever it cannot fetter by its gravity and attraction. The peripheral/rural is a ruderal timespace, rubbished by successive waves of expropriations, or reserved for future projects as some kind of spatialized frontier; of which sea-floor mining, thawing permafrost, an ice-free arctic all promise as *ecological capital*. Ruins come from the future, and the acceleration to this ends is the temporalization of these spaces as already rubbished and wasted.

With these more sophisticated theorizations, the Mill Ruins are raised to a higher level of discourse, and the old narratological line is now made consequential: rather than a hierarchization, a recognition of the condensation into an *istoria* that is 'early industry', and intensified in the overlapping of bypassing and by-gone days that signals that this figuration, is also 'the price of progress' reducing a nightmare of history to a minor bout of insomnia. The obviations that deny the future are part of the past as *by-passed*. Hierarchy of levels neatly arranged in time are now overlapped by consequence and 'multiple causes'. The problem is no longer how to seek a foundation, but not to be so quick in resolving to such empiricism or brute historicism. Instead, it is to acknowledge by 'comparison' what differs from one discourse to another, and what does not. A *correlationism* is at the root of both a disciplinary sociology of policing thought, as well as a disciplinary history that polices the thinking of the past. Both disciplinary knowledges and their fetishism of methods are the *symbolic and impactful retention* (*retentissant*) of a narrative and explanatory 'intervention' that denies shaping discourse as it 'discovers' these correlations that justify it simultaneously. 'Interventions' very often are a symbolic violence that erases itself in disavowal.

'Early industry' having more analytic distinction for its negative appearance: The Mill ruins are not part of the local political ecology that the Overlook Mountain Ruins' socio-symbolic organization relies upon. One is 'industry' that is less than important to elite entrepreneurial concerns with economic capital and a windfall created by early settlement and de-territorialization, the other clearly 'leisure' that is more than just a minor political past-time and a retreat from administerial interests.

A somewhat overlooked phenomenon emerges where the rejection of shared homogeneous time and official representation by officialized 'history' have been refused but not rejected. We may well refuse 'origins and ends', which does free timespaces as contexts from rule by official history. Yet it does not address the radical relativization of time's line. The first sense we have of this is the *overlapping meanings* that deconstruct timespace and any particular *chronotope*. We may well be *for* one or many timespaces and their narrative organization of them, and this is a *superimposition*. It is a part of the political unconscious where we observe our disposition as observers in a naïve way, in an irreflexive *faith* to the role and its prejudices. This *unconscious* is constructed with the very objects of ruin themselves as organizing a paradox of timespace in an ecology that is inclusive of our observation within it, and also as part of it—contained and integrated as distinct properties that overlap, delay and fulfill one another in collective memory.

The chronotope of this superimposition of lives—human and non human—is concrete in the careful work of Robin Wall Kimmerer, her students and collaborators on the scientific study of the restoration of sweetgrass[142]. Kimmerer, a citizen Potawatomi member and botanist describes the overlapping lifecourses—an ecology—that is aesthetic for the effect of making perceptive in the first place:

> "Many grasses undergo a physiological change known as compensatory growth in which the plant compensates for loss of foliage by quickly growing more. It seems counterintuitive, but when a herd of buffalo grazes down a sward of fresh grass, it actually grows faster in response. This helps the plant recover, but also invites the buffalo back for dinner later in the season. It's even been discovered that there is an enzyme in the saliva of grazing buffalo that actually stimulates grass growth. To say nothing of the fertilizer produced by a passing herd. Grass gives to buffalo and buffalo gives to grass." (p.164 *Braiding Sweetgrass*)(Kimmerer 2013)

The effectuation of perception by the process of this metabolism between plant and animal is doubled when it is observed by us. The symmetry of timespace, that of the multiple periods of regrowth that the plant actuates from out of the soil, and the return of grazers to the same territories that actuates the plants, put soil, grass, and buffalo into motion as a system:

> "The system is well balanced, but only if the herd uses the grass respectfully. Free-range buffalo graze and move on, not returning to the same place for many months. Thus they obey the rule of not taking more than half, of not overgrazing. Why shouldn't it also be true for people and sweetgrass? We are no more than buffalo and no less, governed by the same natural laws." (p.164 ibid) (Kimmerer 2013)

That is, the same natural laws of this *ecosystem, of its' nature are the object*. Failing to observe this systemic law—the silent mores of mute objects: grass, soil, buffalo—as the 'nature' of a timespace, as a chronotope that is meaningful if tacit in its communication, is how mute objects live an interobjectivity[143]. It is equally important to note that what first appears as an

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[142] See: *Reestablishing Roots of a Mohawk Community and a Culturally Significant Plant: Sweetgrass* (Shebitz and Kimmerer 2005).

[143] *Interobjectivity* here relies heavily upon Timothy Morton's use of the term to indicate a relationality: "[hyperobjects] …exhibit their effects *interobjectively;* that is, they can be detected in a space that consists of

anthropomorphism: '…they [buffalo] obey the rule of not taking more than half', reverses when we observe that we the observers are also in this eco-symbolic system by way of our observation, making a zoomorphism of *us*: 'we are no more than buffalo and no less'. Yet it is the ecological norms of the latter that are always endangered by unavoidable attribute of the memorylessness of norms in the first place. They are relative to timespace, and surpass this putative notion as a *chronotope* only in our all-too human articulations—the instance of our stories.

This simultaneity, an *ecological unconscious* is the event of the second order observer first refusing and then denying what is underfoot, by what one 'sees' and vice versa, where we deny visual representations by what is tacit or tactile; that is as *tacit*—what is passed over in silence, unmentioned—and what is *tactile*—what is tangible and available to touch yet not signified in a semiosis—as a hieroglyph, and is only ever represented by 'speaking for it'. This is not a conjuncture at all, it is a dis-conjuncture, and when raised to consciousness as deconstructive of both categories of sense and representation the paradox proves to be, as Luhmann delights in so regularly, the beginning of knowledge[144]:

> "If one tries to observe both sides of the distinction one uses at the same time, one sees a paradox-that is to say, an entity without connective value. The different is the same, the same is different. So what?
>
> First of all, this means that all knowledge and all action have to be founded on paradoxes and not on principles; on the self-referential unity of the positive and the negative-that is, on an ontologically unqualifiable world." (p.101 *Deconstruction as Second-Order Observing*)(Luhmann 2002a)

In deconstruction what is an aporetics, *is* the praxeological training in *inventio*: the generation of new discursive objects, and an opening of the otherwise enclosed systems of meaning that structuralism, reliant upon undecidability and thus uncertainty, has so far elided. An aporia, like a paradox—or in the case of where an anthropomorphism ends and a zoomorphism begins—is the division of the sensible that we must traverse, and this actuation takes time. If we wish to understand the life of the plant we must also understand that of the buffalo *in this chronotope*.

Yet it may occur to us all at once, this paradox is the chirality of past and future eroding whatever simpler narrative has come before: ruins that unquestionably come from the past, or

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interrelationships between aesthetic properties of objects." (p.1) in *Hyperobjects Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World* (Morton 2013)

[144] Thus the critique of Wallersteinian/Braudelian timespace is notable in that *L'histoire conjoncturelle*—Cyclico-Ideological Timespace—with its *phases* resembles metabolism more than metabolism itself does. This immediately dispenses with the misreading of Wallerstein's own thinking of 'conjuncture' of Kondratieff cycles—a kind of putative and too-empirical world systems analysis—by neglecting the phase-like property of these medium term timespaces as *flux* and as *waves*. See Wallerstein's *The Invention of TimeSpace Realities: Towards an Understanding of our Historical Systems* (Wallerstein 1988). This also raises the *analysis* of Foster, Clark, and York, as having been right for the wrong reasons, and disavowing the conceptual 'metabolism' of their own usage for disabuse: correctly recognizing planetary metabolisms, and yet neglecting to comprehend the *disjunctions* in them by scientistic models, simulations, and concepts. Precisely how Foster stumbles on the discursive efficacy of Schaiberg's Treadmill figure-trope, and the elision of capitalism is this trivialization of the metabolic exchange between virtual (the trope of the treadmill) and real (the actual forces of production that include historical treadmills and other devices that organized human labor as in 'machinofacture') *materials* (Foster 2005).

even the scandalous play on the arrow of time where ruins inevitably come from the future that is of our making. Good positivism and historical facts and good relativism and social facts are too simplisitic. *Ruins are superposed priors of past and future flanking whatever present we claim*, it is undecidable whether the grass anticipates the buffalo, or the buffalo anticipates the grass. To observe this is to engage in theorization. That is, the *habitus* we form is not positive at all, is always a delay and deferral, where the event returns as what takes no time, and yet retroactively founds timespace and narrative. *Habitus* is disciplinarity and *dressage* if we want to use Foucault's sense of *dispositif* as a counterpoint to Bourdieu.

Habitus—as structuring structure—is actuation of the object, what puts it into motion plus the receptivity that this object entrains in the observer. On occasion, this receptivity plus actuation is shocked ever so little, impelling us as we are to perceive otherwise. To observe an ecological system: soil-grass-buffalo, we can no longer suffer the pedantic articulation of one-sided analysis that seeks merely the *artifice of separation* and the cost of *distinction*. That is, it is analytically rigorous to parameterize by distinguishing parts and wholes, identities and manifolds, absences and presences and what binds them together; it is to proceed without rigor to take any of these structural models and make a distinction *as a separation*, a partition that appears in the object is a partition in ourselves and observational powers. It is a *transposition* of a negative meaning, and without irony, a figure-trope of separability and alienability.

To return then to the *superposition* of Kimmerer's eco-systemic example, it is possible to reify this, to anthropomorphize these relations in some way that cheapens the insight and reduces soil to dirt, plants to fodder, and buffalo to a carcass—meat or hides. This is the *aesthetic ecology* of political economy; the recoil from which is the haunted earth that returns wherever the stupefaction of parsimony becomes an actual mode of 'science'. Worthless scientism marauds in intellect wherever the case is mistaken. Wherever it is ignored that what we are observing is gazing back at us. That is the 'natural law', the entropic structural design of systems as they captivate our gaze: perhaps we only observe the buffalo and ignore the soil and the grass, or perhaps we reverse this, such minimal units of analysis demonstrate analytic failure.

Nonetheless, there is the problem of the romanticized, and too-quick interpretation of the superposed eco-system that does no more than treat non humans as if humans, to dissimulate the ideal human shape upon forms that are not served by this narcissism. This is simply part of the same structure of observation that parses life—bios—too quickly as the actualized anthropomorphization in the closure of destroying these eco-systems; a fetishistic division by use and uselessness. *Values* then, are made in both cases, and it is these values—"useful and useless"—that anesthetize at the same time as this aesthetic becomes diminished ecology as *economy*. It is a metabolism treasured by instrumental reason.

However, Kimmerer is not naïve, this ecology given in superposition raises the differing timespaces into view: of soil as it replenishes the grass along with the grazers, the grass restores the grazers along with the soil that absorbs their trammeling hooves and waste, the buffalo restore the soil with organic matter in manure and finally in decay just as the grass roots mine the soil and make it tractable for microbial life and nutrient uptake by grass. Observing this too is an aesthetic ecological gaze, what superposes the life span of buffalo upon the life span of the enduring pasture and the much longer enduring fertility of the soil itself. What should claim our

attention is the operation of each for the other insofar as we are attentive enough 'to see', which is to use the metaphor of vision to also say *theorize*. The observer is not separate from the observed in stupefaction or concentration.

Thus, we may have the stupefied gaze: what anthropomorphizes the plants and animals with human attributes, and we may have the dissimulation of this too in the caricature that functions to deny that we are no more buffalo nor grass and that the non human is ignored for its difference, and the denial that outright refuses that there be a difference at all. Yet these naïve modes of observation are not the dominant forms, rather, we may have the much more typical anthropomorphic gaze that actually does parse animals and plants from humans by its divisions and classifications for its own interest—a performance that affirms the human supremacy of being the outside observer of 'dumb creatures'—in that silence of authority and domination; and it may return in the open disownment of having carried out this performance of denegation, of having diminished life to mere bios: this is the not so spectacular admission of a political ecology, of how our stupid anthropomorphic disownment of our own actions and *perceptions* are part of a system, an ecology that we do not observe because we are in it. The ecological unconscious that lives in its screens and concrete barriers, is itself barred from observing *this*.

Finally, if we begin to accept this reversal of the anthropomorphizing gaze as collective and narcissistic of humans and collective and fetishistic of non humans as *properties without relations* of their own, we indulge that nonsense that the Summers memo criminally ignores as 'ironic' in nihilistic pollution of a planet from periphery to core.

These are the 'ruins', the ruined scientists and engineers, 'owners' and 'producers' of non humans, nakedly displayed by the endemic waste of their own reflexivity and their own busy-body actions. That is, by fetishism, dissimulation, denial, denegation and disownment, finally by literalized irony, the superposed image of political economy and making 'scarce' at increasing higher levels of ecological harm, worlds—ecosystems—are hostage taking efforts over worlds. Actual eco-terrorism is this graduated political act of parsing the planet and all of its life into the human shape that it also disavows.

We can begin to observe how this self-contained system of anti-politics (anti political so as to disown ourselves the power to reason and negotiate at all) and anti ecology (anti ecological, for the system that we caricature-to-disown becomes the actual observation of eco-systems thereby; it is a metabolism reliant upon virtualized entropy that we manipulate) is no paradox: the romanticizing anthropomorphism that the scientist disabuses of, is of a piece with the anthropocentrism that is simply this image in its performance of condescension. No difference at all: the same *is* different and the different *is* the same; actual rigorous observation does not forego the irritating detail that attributes are not just properties, they are also relations. How systems are *systemic* at all is a matter of relations *in our relation to them by observation*. We are already 'inside' the system we observe some how—and *that* is the case[145].

[145] Here of course is the unmentioned Derridean phrase that is the kernel of Luhmann's discussion and critique of deconstruction: "there is no outside text"; which is to say we are always already part of the system's we observe—or in this case the mute objects that captivate.

So much for actually useless and actually ruinous scientism as the superposition that brackets the world to own it, and dominate whatever cannot be held hostage, held in bondage, or otherwise 'propertied' by domination in farce or force.

There is another way to observe the superposed image of an ecosystem's operations—its' *isotopy*—of interobjective *meaning-for* its members, what we can call an integration at some points and dis-integration (which amounts to the same thing) at others: integration *presumes* differentiation already, and differentiation—the actual perceptual shock that makes for observation as an event—presumes its own sudden and momentous appearance by disappearing back into hypo-visible familiarity; foregrounding itself such that *it*—the event—is overlooked. With climate change, global heating, the sky really is falling, and yet the familiarization of this event is overlooked as a chronotope. As the catastrophe that is reshaping us already, it is as if the Real of this planetary eco-system hides in the open[146].

No different, in fact subordinate to this social fact is the natural fact: that meteorological indicators all point to the unchecked and increasingly unstoppable rise of temperatures. However, the sense of this as *inevitable* as having an *'aura of inevitability'* in Eviatar Zerubavel's very poignant phrasing, is the superposed timespace of human lives in terms of many future generations that have already been compromised (Zerubavel 1985). Both by the hubris of international 'order' that invented this costly and wasted military-industrial infrastructure of a capitalist economy, and the hubris that we can 'just do something about it' or that 'we are responsible for this by complicity of complacency'. No difference: both are anthropomorphisms that flatter a human sense of supremacy over ecologies we would rather establish as voiceless objects or those we must speak for out of obligation. A 'political ecology' that stops with either or fails to observe both, is *uncritical* and *irreflexive* until it resolves to observe actual interobjective membership as relational, systemic perhaps in observation only, and only for the paradigmatic vision that is a 'holism' that is hard to escape. A *Gestalt*—and a 'bracketing' that simultaneously neutralizes our own judgement and perceptivity—for a naturalized reception and relations to *things*.

Taken seriously the superposed is a reification in one sense: it is the social structure of ordinary pejorative anthropomorphisms in their variety, that are both its charge and its actuation. By characterization under the human shape of reality, the Real flatters us in our perspicacity by that bracketing and framing that is our 'world'. An irreflexive 'reduction' and 'epoché' *is* how human supremacist 'vision' simply carries on unchecked in critique. In another sense, this superposed eco-environmental chronotope is a *trope* that educates by the neutralization of "world" and its deictic "human" core—its kernel in a treasured and contested commodity—what we must traverse up to its "final" ironic closure in working through our relations to the planet[147]. A

[146] Timothy Morton has developed a poetics of this 'abyss before our eyes' in his literary criticism; see *Hyperobjects Philosophy and Ecology after the End of the World* (Morton 2013)

[147] This problem of 'world' against the hyperobjects is important for Morton: "Hyperobjects are directly responsible for what I call *the end of the world*, rendering both denialism and apocalyptic environmentalism obsolete." (p.2) (Morton 2013). It must also be mentioned that Spivak's own thinking of the planetary *other* is also a thinking of this that resembles much of the Derridean inflection of her work. An abridged statement of Spivak's introduction of the alterity of the planet and her own transposition of the planet in 'over-writing the globe' can be found in Elias and Moraru's *The Planetary Condition*: "I propose the planet to overwrite the globe. Globalization is the imposition of the same system of exchange everywhere. In the gridwork of electronic capital, we achieve that abstract ball covered in

planetary socioanalysis is an extension of that much older Mills-ian phrase of conjoining 'biography and history', 'personal and political', by completing this circuit in a reduction to the world history that already declares our interdependence in the first place.

This then *is not* reification in any sense familiar to either a Lukaćs in his accusatory nor Latour in his valorisations. It is a necessary *symptom* of traversing the fantasy of human dominated ecology by a *zoomorphism* that we learn from non humans themselves:

> "With a long, long history of cultural use, sweetgrass has apparently become dependent on humans to create the "disturbance" that stimulates its compensatory growth. Humans participate in a symbiosis in which sweetgrass provides its fragrant blades to the people and people, by harvesting, create the conditions for sweetgrass to flourish." (p.164, *Braiding Sweetgrass*)(Kimmerer 2013).

The *long durée* of cultural use is that superposed chronotope, history-and-biography, that includes humans in an environment that is *aestheticized* by the pleasure of the vanilla scented grass in its captivation of human sense. It is *politicized* in that it is the relations of plant/human participation that is figured into being by harvest, that 'disturbance' that is the social fact that makes for the natural fact, the cycle of generation and degeneration. Nowhere here is the event of speech, except in the prayer that is used to dedicate tobacco at the site of sweetgrass harvest: "*megwech"* (for example, 'thank you'; Ojibwe). Sweetgrass, having already made its own olfactory announcement, and is *answered, responded to,* in this response-ability:

> "[in Potawatomi] …there are several words for *thank you,* there is no word for please [as in "please pass the salt"]. Food was meant to be shared, no added politeness needed; it was simply a cultural given that one was asking respectfully. The missionaries took this absence as further evidence of crude manners." (p.52 Ibid)(Kimmerer 2013)

The *zoomorphism,* becoming plant perhaps, is not without its own imagery, its own *Witz*. The plant of course is engaged in that silent speech that is aromatic, and the human does not anthropomorphize sweetgrass in response. Rather, being the junior participant in learning how to gear into this world of flora and fauna with *its own interests,* the joke is on us: the irony is that the imagery of words is always inadequate for a world that gets along fine without *this aestheticization,* rather we must learn its language. In a bit of indigenous wisdom that is too easily observed as mere practice (cultural or instrumental application of pseudo-science, or science before the letter, both of which it is to Durkheim and Mauss's credit to have not fallen prey too) we are already working through all-too-human hubris by recalling that this world *precedes us*, and that our participation in it is late: "What happens when we truly become native to a place, when we finally make a home? Where are the stories that lead the way?" (p.207 ibid) (Kimmerer 2013). This question is of course also the very contemporary question of scholars

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latitudes and longitudes, cut by virtual lines. . . . To talk planet- talk by way of an unexamined environmentalism, referring to an undivided "natural" space rather than a differentiated political space, can work in theinterest of this globalization in the mode of the abstract as such. . . . The globe is on our computers. No one lives there. . . . The planet is in the species of alterity, belonging to another system. . . . Planet thought opens up to embrace an inexhaustible taxonomy of such names [for a radical alterity and intention toward the other]" in *Death of a Discipline* (Spivak 2005)
See also, *The Planetary Condition* in *The Planetary Turn Relationality and Geoaesthetics in the Twenty- First Century* (Elias and Moraru 2015).

such as Glenn Coulthard as to whether the rootless diaspora of settler-colonial whites can become native to any place. In reversal of the politics of recognition, Coulthard's question, also iterated by Kimmerer, is not a question of the presumptive master-slave dialectic in its conventional forms (Coulthard 2014). Rather, the 'master' is that ignorant instructor in the weeds and the rocks and the roots, that rubbish of an already *aestheticized* politics of recognition that cannot yet come to respond to the beckoning of birdsong or the beauty that is the ecosystem of Asters and Goldenrod[148]. Perhaps it will be that grass will grow over some cities and not others, for the eschatological negligence that is the foreshortened perception of too much enlightenment that refuses its own mythos.

What Niklas Luhmann draws to our attention in a fruitful cross-disciplinary possibility is the shift from the invisible and unsaid to the visible and sayable. This is also considered by Pierre Bourdieu as the political stakes of social space, and it is the cornerstone of much of the work of Jacques Ranciére on aesthetics *and* politics[149]. Here Luhmann is channeling the work of Jacques Derrida: "Everything we say… is and cannot but be deconstructive and deconstructible."(p.100, *Deconstruction as Second Order Observing*.)(Luhmann 2002a) alongside the biological theorization of Humberto Maturana: "Everything that is said, is said by an observer" (ibid) (Luhmann 2002a). Luhmann wryly observes, that following yet another conceptualization, that of Gotthard Günther, we may nonetheless reject or accept the framework of deconstruction and deconstructible language itself. It is Luhmann's contentious play of the second order observer that is of interest[150].

What is at stake here is the sociologists technique of raising variously named struggle (Bourdieu), dissensus (Ranciére), or paradox into observation, and as Luhmann notes, 'whether we should or not'. This is to say that we must be responsible for the knowledge we seek to make *resonate*[151]. That is, we are faced with *how* we establish knowledge and not just what knowledge is put into motion. This displaces the sense of habitus as tactical knowledge of the field in which it is necessary, and begins to question the field for the kind of resonance and *retentissant* (resounding impact) it is responsible for. It makes little sense, for example, to admit the interests of more business majors into ecology for the simple fact that they are yoked to destroying anything that gets in the way of economic growth. Similarly, there is no reason to accept political professionals in a republican state into actual political discourse for their desire to 'represent' those issues and demonstrate their 'virtue' which will always undermine a demos by appealing to the crudest organizational will of an ochlos, its desire for unity at any cost, and the police order

[148] See Kimmerer on this interobjective aesthetic: *Asters and Goldenrod* in *Braiding Sweetgrass Indigenous Wisdom, Scientific Knowledge, and the Teachings of Plants* (Kimmerer 2013).

[149] These are very different positions on the same issue as we shall see. Bourdieu is critiqued for ceding to sociologistic disciplinarity and Ranciére courts a kind of dissensus that as easily cedes to liberalist organization of sense and thus its own erasure of dissent.

[150] Notably it is precisely this issue that Bourdieu also raises concerning 'the infernal machine' of systems theory in the hands of Luhmann and his own parallel of *field* as having the property of contention from within the field itself, even if the stakes are often denied to those dominated there. See Bourdieu: pp. 102-104, *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology* (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992)

[151] See Luhmann in his *Ecological Communication* on those communications that are of 'too-little' and 'too-much resonance' in political, social, psychic (meaning human), and ecological systems (Luhmann 1986). On one hand naïve indifference and on the other, environmental anxiety.

to make this so[152]. Again, where political ecology includes non-humans, such a project makes no sense, and reflexion must come from elsewhere. The question is then 'from where?'
A consequence of this late introduction of Luhmann's paradoxical foundation for knowledge and knowing is that it retroactively provides explanation to the zealous disposition of analytic ignorance: ignorance by way of the parsimonious bracketing of analytic procedural fetishism. Infamously stated as, 'about that which we cannot speak we must remain silent' or as Luhmann states: "Unfoldments, then, are the result of unasking this question [what distinctions protect us from the error identifying the unidentifiable?]." (p.102 ibid) (Luhmann 2002a). Where the protection from error surpasses the actual scientific risks of uncertainty as the constant companion of any scientific effort. Here *risk* in terms of knowledge and what can be said is the *risk* that imprecise and inaccurate saying and visibilizing thereby in written form, are tantamount to shouting 'FIRE!' in a crowded room, and from which the clear headed analyst is trying to save *US*. This is an unabashed and un-strategic 'strategy' of condescension regarding licit and legible production of language.

It is the *presupposition* that some discourse somewhere is not tainted by the *late* effects of theory and imagination, and that analyzing one's way back to the truth is a possibility that can dispense with whatever figures and tropes that have permitted such scientific discourses, histories, and allegories, so far. Of course, *power*, to produce such authority over analysis itself is also unquestionable in this mode/mood. Whatever 'process of elimination' this analysis is, it is one-sided and purposed only for the denegations that appeal to power/knowledge—not learning. The genealogy of this zealous and romantic refusance is of course lost upon the instigators, the *originators* of their own structural capture by this poetics of philosophical knowing. Thus, again we have *risk* as that reflexivity openly *refused*, and not *denied* nor rejected.

But what is this risk? In a word it is discovered in the stupid formalism of parsimony perverted and multiplied. We can take precisely the figure from before and yell 'FIRE!' in the theater and find out that sometimes people believe there is a fire and sometimes they don't, we could discover a room full of soldiers who misrecognize the imperative and are compulsive in seeking to return fire, or firefighters who know something about leaving in an orderly fashion if there is reason to do so, and to call this bluff if it is that. The zealous disposition of refusance without rejection seems to be conserving a state where it is these perverse possibilities of interpretation that are the actual threat; that it is best to calmly avoid the necessity of a higher level of reflection afforded in deconstructing a trope or figure and stick to the empirical and evidently analyzable.

In a less figurative example of risk we can take the example of the illicit use of insurance by Adrian Parr:

> "Three men are enjoying a sunny afternoon at the poolside of their luxurious retirement home when Bob asks his two friends what kind of work they did in the past that landed them in such a salubrious setting at this late stage of their lives. Joe explains that he had a

[152] See Ranciére: *Hatred of Democracy* (Rancière 2006) and Emily Apter on the appropriately titled chapter *Milieu* in her *Unexceptional Politics On Obstruction, Impasse, and the Impolitic* (Apter 2018). It is also in this text and in Ranciére's own *The Philosopher and his Poor* that Ranciére critiques sociology—in particular that of Bourdieu—as an effort in 'miserabilism'.

> corner store selling cold cuts; he did reasonably well until one day he turned up at work, and the place had been completely burned to the ground. "The insurance policy paid me a nice sum of money and set me up for retirement;' he says. Then Jon chimes in: "I had a packing warehouse down by the river. Business was steady but nothing remarkable. One day, the place simply flooded. Insurance, you gotta love it:' At which point, Bob shares his story: "I had a tailoring business in the middle of town-that is, until a hurricane swept through the area. Luckily I was insured!" The other two men stare incredulously at Bob and exclaim: "How do you make a hurricane happen!"" (P. 22 The Wrath of Capital)(Parr 2014)

The subsidized criminality of the business class, a misprision, is the illicit thought that we must consider as what the literal, analytical, operation simply overlooks in the formal insurance arrangement. That we already exist in this milieu is what is refused. The insurance audit in this case is necessarily literal to conceal the figure-trope of cynical irony: if there is no reason to suspect arson or flooding to claim the insurance, then it might as well be as good or better than actually doing legitimate business. However, to reach this conclusion as if perfectly rational other naïve positions must be considered; that of the dissimulator who knows that the one time insurance claim is less risky than the day-to-day risks of actual business, and yet persists in doing business in good faith and denial of widespread cynicism and fraud. To the cheat this attitude is irrational and naïve, and not daring enough to get along in hard-nosed business. We could also consider that disavowal that this is the case, the acknowledgment that fraud occurs, some of which gets caught, and some of which does not, and in any case, business is still a hard-nosed affair for the tough minded. This is of course one of the most valuable apologetics of a business class that profits off of the regular and irregular public subsidies of these private enterprises. Of course, such apologetics are welcome for, yet still not risky enough for the cynic. Here the test is clear from the system that is in place, and it is a distorted reflexivity that agrees to the terms, demonstrating a willingness to play this game this way, even distort the rules yet never actually overturn them or reject them. Critical social analysis has the strength of disclosing this field in its entirety and the stakes too.

Reflexivity as a condition of *re-entry* where the observation of a system (‘psychic’ meaning ‘human’, ‘communication’ meaning ‘social’) from within the system is a distinction between system and environment. We ‘know that we do the knowing’ in our own psychic systems, and as Luhmann observes, society communicates that it is *it* that does the communicating (ibid) (Luhmann 2002a). However, the problem with time appears again in the curious form where re-entry (reflexion) ‘is and is not the same’ (ibid) (Luhmann 2002a). The superimposition of two states presents a paradox.

In the case of ‘knowing that we do the knowing’ we are confronted with the decision as to what we will analyze and how. However, in the case of society, where ‘society communicates that it is it that does the communicating’ we are operating at a higher level than human comprehension if for no other reason than that society is older, endures longer, and encompasses greater spaces and more of them, than we ever will. The temporal issue is important in both cases too: the overlapping observation of a ‘psychic system’ as reflexivity of individuals reveals that this term “individuals” itself must be suspended in its ordinary use as beings of one mind, for the strange temporal evidence of a split consciousness—what is reflexive of itself—and simultaneous in ‘individual’ experience.

This simple categoriality in discourse analysis: *individuals* → "*individuals*" → '*individuals*' demonstrates a subtle shift from tacit → "explicit" → 'implicit' and the integrating actuation of disquotation. First, the initially disquoted *individual* is the miscognized, because hallucinatory permanence of the form (our form as if objective, as idealized, and as immutable/unchanging), where disquotation is itself the suspension of reflexivity for zealous refusal to partition the appearance, literal from figural. The word means only what it says. Second, the quoted "*individual*" is the mis-recognized form, because 'naturally' recognized form, now clearly apparent as an appearance (we identify ourselves as apparent roles, operators, functionaries, and thus distinguish 'who we really are' to ourselves, what the limits of indignity are, how we accept our appearance to others, etcetera). This at once stirs the positivist impulse to action in 'getting back to the things themselves', denying that appearance may be the attraction of the thing that distorts our apprehension of it, our immediate intuition[153]. This positivist inobservance does not carry through a phenomenological reduction that also inquires as to the busy-body 'action', the putting into motion, not of the thing or even our observation, rather stirring to action our busy-body action itself as the essential quality that interlinks observer/appearance/thing. Third, '*individual*' is disquoted, the temporary suspension of the appearance returns to the undertheorized world of practice as *praxis* itself. This exercise is a good of its own, in that we practice our individuation differently than before, at least with more responsibility to it. We are altered, if not transformed slightly for having gone through the process of this structural analysis. In this sense, we are never separable from what we observe, what we study, and the gratuitous disclosure of this fact warrants discussion as much as the concealment and neglect of this actual state of affairs—what is actually the case of our complexity.

Now for *society* → "*society*" → '*society*': First *society*, what is disquoted is a milieu that we miscognize for its objectivity as inevitable and immutable; the image of society to itself is unaltered by the re-entry of its own operations: the state seems natural because it simply precedes in its interests in ordering bodies as citizens and aliens, and records; the market seems natural and inviolable as always organizing exchange in terms of buyers, sellers, and information without observation; civil society is the substrate for political life in the state and economic life in the market as unquestionably meritocratic in some natural way—the best master the system, and the rest do not. Second "*society*", when suspended is that loose association that permits both states that are authoritarian and those that are democratic, permits markets that are monopolistic and monopsonist, defying the very ideal structure of markets and their clear price signals by unconcealed avarice. Civil society, when suspended is evidently very much indifferent to wrongs, incivilities and crimes, just as it is often indifferent to social goods in the practice of civility, faultless morality, and normativity (even prior to law); these are treated as intrusions into the social order by interest groups, and un-invested deviants by the social system[154]. Third

[153] The obvious debt to Lacan's *phenomenology of the ego* and his mirror stage should be evident.

[154] The empty discussions of choice and agency within social science, presumptive of this 'liberty' political, legal or otherwise, tend to obviate by presumption the old socio-theoretic discourse of social mores, 'morality' and pedantry. This is well covered in some short comments by Harriet Martineau who not only observes the problem of *mores* as moralistic and pedantic obeisance to authority, specifically *The Word* of Biblical authority as master discourse, she also grasps the problem of 'will' and 'whose will do we will': "Where intellect has a fair chance, there is no pedantry, among men or women. It is the result of an intellect which cannot be wholly passive, but must demonstrate some force, and does so through the medium of narrow morals. Pedantry indicates the first struggle of intellect with its restraints; and is therefore a hopeful symptom." *Society in America* (Martineau 1837)

'*society*', when returned by disquotation to its undertheorized state offers no alibi for its existence. No sociology that re-enters its own social system seems to have communicated anything more than its own survival to itself by new multiplicities. A problem of early social constructionist efforts in the United States was the incuriosity as to the often already neutralized immanent conditions of their own discourses:

> "Moreover, the constitutive power which is granted to ordinary language lies not in the language itself but in the group which authorizes it and invests it with authority. Official language, particularly the system of concepts by means of which the members of a given group provide themselves with a representation of their social relations (e.g. the lineage model or the vocabulary of honour), sanctions and imposes what it states, tacitly laying down the dividing line between the thinkable and the unthinkable, thereby contributing towards the maintenance of the symbolic order from which it draws its authority." (p. 21 *Outline of A Theory Of Practice*)(Bourdieu 1977)

That is, the *retentissiment* (resonance and retention) of prior conduct, of prior discourse, delays, forestalls, and obscures, observation of the social system itself. Habitus in the form of familiarity with doing sociological analysis itself often fails to surpass its own language—concepts and arguments—failing to return to the discursive history of these inventions and the events of biography of those authorizing their unquestionability. Sociologists have the singular mandate and scientific responsibility to turn the 'mirror of society' upon themselves first as the incipient measure of actual *rigor*; as a *socio-scientific norm, the immanent practice of which can be upheld or lost for its socio-scientific praxis*.

Bourdieu's corrective to a phenomenology that is overly cautious—as many German born sociologists in the mid 20th C. had learned from their time in both Nazi Germany and the quasi-fascism of American populism, what Bourdieu himself is incautious in, by his non-acknowledgment of *these* implicit crisis conditions—occurs in his own early work following a too-intellectualist *epoché*: a bracketing of the world that forgets to return to the crisis that inaugurated this possibility. Bourdieu returns the disquoted social object (belief as *doxa*, and thus a distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy and more importantly the universe of opinion that must be de-naturalized to observe these opponents) to critical socioanalysis this way:

> "The critique which brings the undiscussed into discussion, the unformulated into formulation, has as the condition of its possibility objective crisis, which, in breaking the immediate fit between the subjective structures and the objective structures, destroys self-evidence practically. It is when the social world loses its character as a natural phenomenon that the question of the natural or conventional character *(phusei* or *nomo)* of social facts can be raised. It follows that the would-be most radical critique always has the limits that are assigned to it by the objective conditions. Crisis is a necessary condition for a questioning of doxa but is not in itself a sufficient condition for the production of a critical discourse. In class societies, in which the definition of the social world is at stake in overt or latent class struggle, the drawing of the line between the field of opinion, of that which is explicitly questioned, and the field of *doxa*, of that which is beyond question and which each agent tacitly accords by the mere fact of acting in accord with social convention, is itself a fundamental objective at stake in that form of class

> struggle which is the struggle for the imposition of the dominant systems of classification." (pp. 168 -169 ibid)(Bourdieu 1977)

Bourdieu carefully renders the invisible visible, the structure of belief, and most importantly the limits of a field that are themselves the stakes that are held by authorities. Thus, the captive players in this game (politics, economics, *civilité* of civil society, *kultur* as what is also *kulturelle,* an accomplishment that may well shape *kultur as* a 'people') are held hostage to the retained and resonating (*retentissant*) communications that communicate *social values* and not individual values.

The paradox is that the meeting of antithetical worlds is made possible by bracketing those opponent structures that are otherwise presented symmetrically as if in a kind of chirality. This mirror image is precisely what does not happen in sociology that simply engages in disabuse and demystifications. Under these conditions the sociologist moralizes what is already moral—already a social more of position and power given by institutional authority—and forgets that the stakes are not in convincing the players of the game how to recognize civil society and its embedded political and economic arrangements, it is to outline the horizon of society itself.

The timespaces of both the Skaneateles Mill and Overlook Mountain are mistakenly superimposed in a chirality where *ruins come from the past* only to be countered by the image of *ruins come from the future*. Modern social systems with their future orientations and projects overlook these Ruins by means of a *progessus.* However, the asymmetry of an oblivion from which we know little in the form of history and denature with myth, is not countered by the anonymous future that we can know nothing of with any certainty—only speculate by probabilism or prophetics—and thus distort by obviation. This asymmetery in our subjective experience of timespace is that of *ruins superimposed upon themselves* and the organization of experience that not only has now slipped the line of time (having foundation in past oriented terms, resonance as *retentissant* where the impact is of *having no impact*) and that of consequence (having future oriented open projects and protentions that attract or draw us in and out of familiar worlds, that are too familiar for us to acknowledge our captivation to them) and containment by intensities too.

The superimposition of ruins appears where for example we observe the slow disappearance happening in the Mill Ruins, the dams retreating into the gorge walls and the overgrowth and thus observe that this architecture is 'from the past' and it is also a mirror of how all things corrode over periods of time that are too *slow* for us to observe them. Yet this is also the mirror of all corroding things, ourselves included, and thus this architecture now appears 'from the future' in our anxiety at mortality too; what is too *fast* for us to catch up to (thus the anxious and perpetually anticipatory horror of future catastrophe). Which is it? The putative empiricism becomes a stupifying deceit that this is strictly speaking an 'historical fact' when faced with properties that are existential. However, it seems flimsy to ignore the objectal remnant—Ruins—for the anxiety 'ruin' that is clearly the organization of an experience that could just as well be something else, say, discovery of the enduring relic across time's span. These experiences together are the organization of a fractured experience, the *ruinate* other side of the superimposition of this thing.

When observing ruins of other kinds we have another discovery instead. In the remainder of Iroquois Confederacy settlements—*Haudenosaunee*—nearby stands of *Hierochloe Odorata* signal a past: the plant does not reseed readily, is better proliferated by harvesting with some regularity as a way to sustain existing stands of this plant—*sweetgrass*—by regular interaction with humans. The reversal here is important, the plant is cultivated by humans for the vanilla scented fronds/the humans are cultured by the plant that entices the periodic harvest that sustains its place and time in the meadows that it prefers.

Ruinate: stands of *Wiingaashk* are *from the past* in a superimposition with an ecology that is also *from the future,* and it is here that the old Greek *Ρεω* as 'flow, stream, river, flood; fall or drop off, melt away' admits the movement of timespace, the *flux* and metabolism of eco-systems into which we are already thrown. The lifespan of *Wiingaashk* exceeds that of individual humans, and while we will cede to corruption sooner as our ruin, these organisms will much later. Most strangely, with regular care, they are dative appearances of a much greater timespace: they exist *with us to precede us* in both their extant place on the surface of the earth and their promise of return from a future that anonymous future generations will come to know. That knowledge will be *tangible*:

> "You can smell it before you see it, a sweetgrass meadow on a summer day. The scent flickers on the breeze, you sniff like a dog on a scent, and then it's gone, replaced by the boggy tang of wet ground. And then it's back, the sweet vanilla fragrance, beckoning." (p.156, *Braiding Sweetgrass*)(Kimmerer 2013)

The care for *Wiingaashk* is harvest, not fertilizer and watering nor pesticides and regular re-planting, and it is an "honorable harvest" invested by an exchange that Robin Wall Kimmerer describes in her conversation with a Mohawk elder, Lena:

> "…to never take the first plant you see."; ""to always leave a gift for the plants, to ask if we might take them? It would be rude not to ask first""; ""to take only what we need. I've always been told never to take more than half.""; ""The most important thing to remember is what my grandmother always said: If we use a plant respectfully it will stay with us and flourish. If we ignore it, it will go away. If you don't give it respect it will leave us."" (P. 157 ibid)(Kimmerer 2013)

The scientistic reception of these principles of an 'honorable harvest' is a captivation to the image of plants in that old *scala naturae,* as a lesser life-form than humans and for use that is indifferent to the grammar of animacy that is the imagery of much North American Indigenous language. We do not address any being other than human beings as 'equals', often not even that, and most importantly we never seek to suspend that value we call "equality" and ask what it is we are doing by its invocation.

"*Equality*" as *equality* connotes a distinction from the *in-equitable;* as what cannot be equated for some reason, and the *un-equal;* which is to say most often the 'merely different' by order, rank, level, or succession in some quasi-natural way. These ordinary usages are what else must be suspended in our observation of critical Indigenous socioanalysis—if I can persuade the

reader to abstain from the ordinary order of things long enough. "*Equality*", when suspended, its conventional isotopy bracketed with it, reduces to a world that is structured thus:

> "*equality*" opposes "*in-equality*" as "that which is *not-equal*" as a contrary;
> What is *equal* is opposed by the *non-equal* as a neutral term: some beings are non-equals when they do not share a genus and cannot be compared;
> What is *not-equal* is opposed by the *non not-equal* as a complex term: some beings are hybrids in the sense that they negate the what is not-equal;
> *Equality* generates this isotopy by the negation of its own properties in an antinomy, by the opposition of its own properties, and by contra-indication of its own properties.

This schema can be elaborated more clearly when attributes: properties and qualities, relations and moments, can be enounced in their structural opposition, when a discourse surpasses this language and logic by the isotopy that is also autopoietic of a structure, in this case between living beings. Thus, the relations: *equal↔different, equal↔not equal, different↔not different, not equal↔not different*. Which can be displayed this way (see Figure 11.):

Discourses of human and non-human "*Equality*" bracketed this way yield a narrative of typical anthropomorphic form: where only humans are *equals*, and all other life is *different* for not being human; further, not being human is to be *not equal*, such as the case of political minorities, economic dependents, and in-civil humans: criminalized, enslaved, medicalized as incapable of civilized discourse; and finally there is the case of not being non-human (*not different*): the cases of pets, dependent plants and animals that are not disposable to mere difference by their difference—as food, as apparel—such as quasi-domesticated animals: Lapp relations to Reindeer, and for bird watchers, the annual return of migrant birds to feeding grounds for example. This can be extended to the annual renewal of perennials such as trees after dormancy, and some plants after hibernation underground, as rosettes, or skeletonized over winter. These discursive others are detectable in the accusation of 'anthropomorphization' or personification: "well the plants don't like the cold".

Nonetheless this anthropomorphism is a complex term, and that is what makes it all the more important for the scientistic resistance to bio-social structures that suggests an elective affinity between disparate cultural/linguistic systems and an intertextuality that threatens the monologue of scientism with a dialogical reciprocity that is *more* than merely cross-cultural for a cross-fertilization that trespasses disciplinary boundaries (see Figure 12.); such dialogism trespasses epistemic and ontic-ontological boundaries of the dominant paradigm of 'western' and anglo-american culture. In short, it is potentially *ruinous* in eroding this edifice. *Ontological closure* is nonetheless the result of seeking *being* for its presumptive 'natural' order or (scientistic) cause.

The demonstration of the semiotic square has a narratological application in the torsion of this device upon its central axis, what will generate the structural components of narratives that seek, as the Weberian elective affinity does, to elaborate a system of meaningful social acts(Jameson 1973). It will also be useful in elaborating an intertextuality that erodes such a system by the heteroglossia that comes about in the complex terms that irrupt such ideological closure[155]

[155] *Heteroglossia* is the eventful condition that any utterance will have a difference from any other timespace condition in which it is uttered. See Emerson and Holquists entry in *The Dialogical Imagination* (Bakhtin 1981)



FIGURE 11. 'EQUALS'



FIGURE 12. ONTOLOGICAL CLOSURE

Ideological closure in the *scala naturae* prohibits anthropomorphism as a discourse that admits non human life by a multitude of discourses that resolve the apparent difference between humans and all other living things. What follows might be better rendered in a medieval bestiary, nonetheless, this imaginary survives into the 20th C in caricatures that appear in discourses as different as historical discourse, science fiction, scientific racism and sexism, and theology. Starting from the top, the figure-trope of a discourse of *supra-humans* is the resolution that the old *scala naturae* has indicated as the divine. In no small amount of fascination with supra-human life however, is the imagery of the eschatological animals of the apocalypse: the cock, eagle, ox, and lion as also the animal-headed hybrids of the righteous (which includes several other animal headed humans as well). This religious scene has been a kernel—*Gedankenbild* (historical-image or 'be-thought' image from history)—explicated in works by Jacques Derrida: *The Animal That Therefore I Am,* Giorgio Agamben: *The Open,* in which the latter also cites Georges Bataille and his sacred conspiracy in the *Acéphale* group, and Walter Benjamin in a letter to Florens Christian Rang *'on the saved night'* (the latter discussed by Agamben) (Derrida 2008)(Agamben 2004)(Bataille et al. 2017). The latter is perhaps the clearest demonstration among these thinkers in opposing—and thereby establishing the metabolism of nature opposed to history, and also nature opposed to art.

To the right then is the figure-trope for a discourse of *monsters*; what resolves from non humans (animals, plants, microbial life, fungi) and 'minorities, dependents, and in-civil' humans, is a being as Frankenstein's monster: a combination of instincts and human attributes that is 'savage' for its lack of civilization and captive to its own non human impulses.

At the bottom is the resolution in those beings that are between minimal human attributions and those living beings that have been anthropomorphized. The figure-trope of the *brute* as 'wild man' is discussed by Hayden White as variously the counterpart to the divine, to grace, a fallen state, and for a more immediate purpose as outside the social state in how this figure-trope and its discourse also fills out an important part of the socio-symbolic arrangement of discourses that structure *life* as *bios*:

> "By his use of the concept of wildness as a fiction, Montaigne "brackets" the myth of civilization that anchors it to a debilitating parochialism. His purpose is not to turn all men into savages or to destroy civilization, but to give them critical distance on their artificiality, which both prohibits the attainment of true civilization and frustrates the expression of their legitimate natural impulses." (p.176 *Tropics of Discourse*)(White 1978)

The bracketing of the 'myth of civilization' gives another valuable property to White's historiographic analysis in the observation of history as a system of narratives. The brute as 'wild-man' is the reversive side of the supra-human, giving the structure of a discourse of its own and of its obverse *Other*. This is also what permits White to follow this 'pedigree' of tropes across early religious imagery into the scientific sphere eventually occupied by social science itself:

> "Montaigne's fictive use of the notion of wildness is a characteristically ironical tactic. In Roman times the historian Tacitus used the concept of the barbarian, in his *Germania,* in precisely the same way, consciously stressing the presumed virtues of the savage tribes to

> the north so as to force his readers to contemplate the vices of the civilized Romans in the south. The same tactic appears in much of the work of the modern cultural anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss on primitive peoples and "the savage mind." Levi- Strauss suggests that what civilized men conventionally call "the savage mind" is a repository of a particularly powerful imaginative faculty that has all but disappeared from its "civilized" counterpart under the impact of modernization. The savage mind, he maintains, is the product of a unique kind of relation to the cosmos that we exterminate at the peril of our own humanity." (p.177 ibid)(White 1978)

The ironic and revisory narrative of the wild man in White's own tropological approach presumes naïve positions that fail to arrange the structure of this figure-trope among others as a structural relations. In citing Lévi-Strauss we also have the important advance of structuralism itself as part of this 'humanity', and a critique of it. The structural anthropologist is part of those very historical discourses as a structure and operation itself.

Finally, on the left is the figure-trope of the discourse of *creations*: a place that resolves anthropomorphs with humans and in this we can imagine all manner of androids, automatons, replicants, and clones, that somehow have human attributes that are *more human than human*. A kind of redoubled life found in efforts to perfect a human or to simply augment so as to be *more* than equal to human life. Is this not the creation of a 'perfect servant' to 'Man'? Here one cannot help but note the socio-symbolic place of a certain kind or racism that sought to cultivate and completely re-territorialize the human shape in notions of 'fitness', or a kind of sexism that sought the perfect 'mate', yet no equal nonetheless, certainly the *discipline* of Foucault fits this genesis as well.

Life-Chances as sociological superimposition

In the lives of humans, nonhumans, and an ecology that is structured by these relations, we have a familiar, integral mirror of three worlds where our own intelligibility comes back to us in the line of time as our natality, maturity, and mortality. It is integral in the sense that it bestows the familiar image of the temporal integrity of a human life course, and, paradoxically the intensification and overlapping of these periods, blending into an unknowable future—it is not the future perfect sense that mortality, our death supplies—that upsets all of them retroactively from that uncertain vanishing point of their condensation, it is that of life as transcendental. This is a superimposition of timespace wherein the lifecourse is an event of structure—we are the dative of it.

We grasp this in the uncanny sense of such terms as 'the good life' wherein this *eudaimonia* is division that is also reflexive (*daimon* from *daiō* [δαιω]: in the middle voice as 'divide, distribute, share out; tear'. Where *daimon* is also imported into Latin as *genius*, and *eudaemon* not uncommonly associated with the Socratic genius): it is not necessarily an *ekstasis*, it is rather the self-reflection that is *reflexive*, a tutelage that comes from observing our own actions and their consequence. The sense of a lifecourse in which we are always the consequence of our own actions, where we constitute ourselves by acts of all kinds.

We get some sense of this from W.E.B Du Bois in the tutelage of double-consciousness:

> "In those sombre forests of his striving his own soul rose before him, and he saw himself, -- darkly as through a veil; and yet he saw in himself some faint revelation of his power, of his mission. He began to have a dim feeling that, to attain his place in the world, he must be himself, and not another." (p.9 *The Souls of Black Folk*)(Du Bois 2005)

Du Bois also recalls for us that the veil is certainly what splits us. In the case he makes, it is the split that is the color line, the twoness of being Black and American simultaneously. Yet he also references the veil in this estrangement effect before the letter, where he recalls the veil as a *caul*: "…the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second sight in this American world,—a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him see himself through the revelation of the other world." (P.5 Ibid)(Du Bois 2005).

An important advance upon social consciousness begins here, and has an important formulation in the rejection of that integration of consciousness that moves too quickly in understanding the event of structure as simply re-integrating. Du Bois is clear about what 'the Black Savant' demands *of themselves*: "The history of the American Negro is the history of this strife—this longing to attain self-conscious manhood, to merge his double self into a better and truer self. In this merging he wishes neither of the older selves to be lost." (Ibid) (Du Bois 2005). That is, Du Bois does not deny this difference, rather his socioanalysis works through to the elevation of these shares of Blackness dialectically and negatively: "He would not Africanize America, for America has too much to teach the world and Africa. He would not bleach his Negro soul in a flood of white Americanism, for he knows that Negro blood has a message for the world." (Ibid) (Du Bois 2005). *Not* '*Americanization'/Not 'Africanization'*: the 'Black savant' communicates something *more* and not just something *else* nor something *other* in society.

Perhaps the most fragile form of sociality—politics—which is also what Du Bois has in mind throughout this first chapter, slips away as quickly as we would like to catch up with it. It is notable that Du Bois cites the event of the 1876 presidential election as the end of Black American politics, what would not begin to be redressed—and functionally still has not—until the overtures of the civil rights era. If it is permissible to observe how politics slips away into either recollection or foregone projects, we can also begin to understand how politics under liberalism is impermissible by the operations of the market in governmentality[156]. It is also here that the lifecourse at the level of the political cannot be simply personal or individual alone, rather the superimposition that is life occurs with others.

From this position it is possible to observe the work of Glenn Coulthard for an extrapolation of the political as a collective reflexion *of life chances held in common* that comes from distinct political ecologies. Above all the figuring into being forms of life by enaction that accounts for itself in advance:

> "By contrast [to a politics of recognition] the resurgent approach to recognition advocated here explicitly eschews the instrumental demands that we *enact* or *practice* our political

[156] This is of course the radical dissent of Foucault from orthodox Marxism and its projected control over the state. See Foucault on *governmentality* in particular: *Security, Territory, Population* (Foucault 2007)

> commitments to Indigenous national and women's liberation in the cultural form and content of our struggle itself. Indigenous resurgence is at its core a *prefigurative* politics—the methods of decolonization prefigure its aims." (p.159 *Red Skins, White Masks*)(Coulthard 2014).

Eskaton: "Over your cities the grass will grow"

The eschatological line of time in mythic imagery is the *Gedankenbild* that *distorts structure to make structure by antagonism*: there is no guarantee nor promise of ends or beginnings, yet by making structural what is merely logical, a virtual world is figured into being from what is otherwise imagery as non-actuating signs. This twist is the 'turn' that Weber tried to develop sociologically in his *Protestant Ethic and Spirit of Capitalism*, where the logic of each system is torqued by antagonism from itself and from another alien system: Protestant *ethos*, what appeals to the tradition, finds itself in the future orientation of capitalist *mentalité*/capitalist expectations find affinity in the pre*destination*, that is the self-justification of Protestant *objection*, and yet the object of Protestant otherworldly orientation and that of this-worldly capitalist interest in immediate advantage are not the same.

There is a similar 'discursive' and semiotic conceptualization in the *intertextuality* of Julia Kristeva[157]:

> "The novel's nondisjunctive function is manifested, at the level of the concatenation of its constituent utterances, as an *agreement of deviations*: the two originally opposed arguments (forming the thematic loops life-death, good-evil, beginning-end, etc.) are connected and mediated by a series of utterances whose relation to the originally posited opposition is neither explicit nor logically necessary. … These kinds of utterances reappear with obligatory monotony and make of the text an aggregate of recurrences, a succession of closed, cyclical utterances, complete in themselves." (pp. 51-52, *Desire in Language*)(Kristeva 1980)

The 'concatenation' that binds together oppositives (themes of life-death, good-evil, …) is a consequence of the structural qualities that opposes these themes in the first place: from life, not life (death), non-life (lacking attributes of life, yet persisting in a suspended-life state) and non-not life (lacking the attributes of death, yet persisting in the suspension of the state of death, thus *un*-dead)[158]. All of which can be illustrated using the Greimassian square (see Figure 13.):

[157] This in turn has a Bakhtinian predecessor in *The Poetics of Doestoevsky*, where dialogism is elaborated:
[158] What should be immediately noticeable is that this describes Michel Foucault, Achille Mbembe, and Giorgio Agamben's discourses on *biopower*, with the biopolitical sovereign right to kill or grant mercy illustrated in the antinomies of Life and Not Life (Death) and the necropolitical power to make live or let die Non life being 'made to live' and Non not life as being 'let die'. See Foucault in his last chapter of :*"Society Must Be Defended"* (Foucault 2003), Mbembe: *Necro-Politics* (Mbembe 2019), and Agamben: *Homo Sacer Sovereign Power and Bare Life* (Agamben 1998)



FIGURE 13. 'LIFE'

The strength of this device is that by introducing these oppositions as also bound to one another we have the 'closure' of structure by its own antagonism. Thus, the ecological imagery that is the recourse of eschatological closure, is the effectuating of the terms of a particular logic of beginnings-to-endings that is storied in the manner of a founding mythos. One could just as well establish a different logic that does not rely upon an 'end' in a prophetic fashion at all. Nonetheless, the imagery of eschatological ruin is a potent historical thought for the shared mythos of the major monotheistic traditions, with Protestantism being a representative of Christianity. However, again, this imagery is very differently operable, say in the apocalyptic, and sometimes mystical Judaica of Benjamin's thesis on history, or the use of the Hebrew bible and Gnostic imagery in the work of Agamben (*The Open*), Bataille (*Acéphale*: see the recent publications by Marina Galleti of these papers, 2017), and Derrida (*The Animal Therefore I am*)[159].

The prolific work of Anselm Kiefer, including the substantial ruined installation in Barjac 'La Ribaute' and the documentary of this *Gesamtkunstwerk* by Sophie Fiennes in *Over Your Cities Grass Will Grow* (Fiennes 2010) sustains much of this religious imagery. Kiefer, having grown up in Germany after the devastation of the Second World War, has also relied extensively upon a confrontation with this past as well. The rubble of cities is a consistent recurring theme for the artists imaginary combined with the bric-a-brac of sculpture and painting that physically captivates with materials that are themselves very often rubbish or simply materials left to decay. This vision, as important as it is, tends to reinforce meditations on 'the end of the world' or civilizations. The ecological overtaking the societal and civilizational in biblical imagery is itself a captivating image and socio-symbolic figure-trope for a world facing catastrophe. It is from this catastrophe that another vision of the ecological can be differentiated in the work of indigenous American scholars such as Robin Wall Kimmerer.

What Kiefer's work demonstrates by its aggregates of rubble and decay, and what Kristeva observes where: '…utterances reappear with obligatory monotony and make of the text an aggregate of recurrences, a succession of closed, cyclical utterances, complete in themselves.', is certainly a kind of ideological closure in words, as it is mediation by depiction and sculpture, a form that is better said as *inclosing* in the active sense, and not merely an 'enclosure'. Notably, it is by a kind of trancelike and somniferous repetetion of a poetics that the novel of Kristeva brackets itself as the *Gesamtkunstwerk* of La Ribaute does for Kiefer. It is also by this closure that we can observe the life of language itself, as Roland Barthes says, 'it's adventure' in which we take part. The life of the letter, of the virtual, is what the Marxist ecology of Foster, Clark, and York lack—despite and otherwise erudite materialism—yielding to positivism, this discourse evades how 'metabolism' is mediation on multiple levels of meaning.

The rubbish of things mediates a subjectivity that is also a 'ruins' in the capture of the senses[160]. However, art and literature that lifts the dis-conjoined and disjunct into view is also a poetics, is

[159] Bataille's *The Accursed Share* volume 1 also provides some limited discussion of the eschatological implications for political economy from Islamic historical imagery (Bataille 1991).

[160] What Jameson characterizes as: "[stripping] the experience of the concrete of such attributes as color, spatial depth, texture and the like, which in their turn undergo reification." (p.63)(Jameson 1981), and what he later refers to as a 'hypostasis' that is of language (its effectuation of our sense of activity/actuation) and is the abstracta itself in being for language (the foregrounding of an image that can only ever represent a moment, a contingency, and for the sociologist *a relations*). The central instance of the human mind that is narrative is in this sense captive to the

tropological, in figuring meaning into being. The artwork admits our reflexion and the possibility of critique from this *crisis* openly demonstrated as such. What crisis is it? Industrialization? Colonization? Modernist disseverance from the planet?

The poetics of these discourses, much as that of life/death, are what is at stake; more than the brute matter to which positivism refers. Wiingaashk (sweetgrass) demonstrates a 'site' wherever it grows in the confederacy—among the Haudenosaunee—that is animate for one thing and thus shifts our thinking of Ruins and 'ruin' on the other: of the past; it is a standing animate milieu; and of the future it is the flux of whatever the confederacy has always already been, and interpellates a return; as Coulthard's sense of resurgence extended.

The superimposition of discourses from the past and from the future simultaneously are a kind of *vertical time* as opposed to the *horizontal time* that is preserved in a trajectory from past to future. And even in the reverse, future to the past, this does not address the fundamental *resonance* of times-upon-times in the constitution of a temporality in a superimposed timespace. Music might be the best example: where from the end to the beginning we hear in the last strains of a compelling song, the whole buildup of this performance. So too with the pleasure of lost time in a book: the text carries us along to constitute the story that culminates at the end. When in retrospect we recall these endings in particular—yet *any* moment in an impelling story or work will do the same—we can recall the *entirety* of the work as it stacks upon itself: the entire work resonates in one note a single titular phrase. So too for vertical space that defies the surfaces, interiors and exteriors that we traverse most often. Nonetheless some spaces have the same affective, resonant power in superimposing an entire mythos at once. The cosmographic world of sacred sites was this, and places of worship obviously are, yet a vertical space that aligns a cosmos is possible in any place that we story in such a way that it imposes upon us at the very thought of its traverse—even when we are remote from it. The *sublime* has this sense when applied to space of great depth, height, and or vastness, especially where orientation is lost momentarily: as with losing time we can also lose space.

Superimposition of timespace, and the chronotope that carries this, is often mute because it defies articulation in the line of time established by the sentence or at length by discourse, and rather demands a poetics, a heteroglossia, that can carry this resonance as opposed to explain it. Narrative corrupts in this reverberation—explosion or collapse—thus the form of such timespace captivates a Marinetti, nauseates a Benjamin, in the aesthetic ecology of political violence. The timespace of these images superimposes very differently and very disparately multiple discourse of the sublime horror of industrial warfare: the same field harbors human industry and plant life/harbors human weaponry, denuded of all but the dead.

Vertical timespace, a superimposition not only corrodes by its flux, melts away time and space in horizontal forms, it superimposes disparate imagery as the old cosmographs of heavens and hells. Now these sublime depths and heights and the strange resonance they approach with, appear under combinations of imagery that an intertexuality gives us as systems of symbols, one

imagery of *the word*. What is lacking is an appraisal of this 'orphan letter' available to anyone who can read, hear, speak, and/or write it, *on its own terms*(Rancière 2004). What Barthes recalls for us as the 'adventure of language' that we indulge in narrative (Barthes and Duisit 1975); in how we story the world, and in discourse more widely as it must come back to narrative for intersubjective constitution of what we variously call humanity, civility, and culture.

overlapping the other. Superimposition is an aporetics that appears where vertical timespace ruptures the socio-symbolic fabric by an imaginary, a mythos, that returns. However, this organization of experience by the sublimity of Ruins, of the sublimity of *stigma*—which is also *stigmata*—a mark that is combined blemish or stain and tattoo or brand of 'ruin', now becomes the clearer where embodiment and identification are what melts away horizontal time by the organization of experience. The body is that mute object that is a carrier, as much as the vast silent world remainder that surrounds us, objects of sublime opacity *and* sublime transparence overlaid as the problematics we call biography and history. The (narrative/narratable) organization of vertical timespace is discoverable by turns—tropes—not by the non figurative language of the literal and the denotative.

Tropological Bracketing: The frames of discourse

Discourse is already bracketed by the poetics of its explanatory style, what Hayden White's historiography brings back into view in this discipline, and what White identifies by four master tropes: metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, and irony.

Tropes are both content and form wherever social facts are compared to reveal how they are non-natural, non-literal, and non-concrete: social facts are non-natural for having always already been naturalized such that they appear as inevitable and obdurate *natural facts*[161]; they are non-literal for figuring into being yet other tropes as a way to extend a dialogue, whereas literal enouncements most often punctuate discourse or leave it open to explication as a hieroglyph, the property that literal enouncements lack is the heteroglossia that proliferates speech and texts; they are non-concrete in figuring relations into being, often proliferating new relations as well as visibilizing those that already exist.

As content and form, tropes may re-enter their own poetics of explanation in proliferations, what Henry Louis Gates Jr. describes as a game of "trope-a-dope" in Black American discourse (Gates, Jr 1989). We can observe that Du Bois *veil* is the trope that figures *double consciousness* into being as a partial visibilization of Black Americans, closely tied in his *Souls of Black Folk* to the loss of political representation in 1876 and the legacies of insufficient legal and educational representation—thus Du Bois work in the foundation of the NAACP and his tactical investment in a 'talented tenth'.

The trope of *anthropomorphism* figures a relational 'being with non-humans' into existence. More importantly, a *Grammar of Animacy* that is the poetics which circumscribes world as having living and dead attributes makes "*anthropomorphism*" into a pleonasm: there is no necessity in this trope within languages that do not make ordinal distinctions of how life is ensouled and interiorized on levels of discourse, rather operate by a surface that is at the least more monistic, such that distinctions between humans and non-humans exist as distinctions of another kind. This is opposed to naturalized scales of ordered separations. Further, "living" as *animate* and "dead" as *inanimate* generate 'anthropomorphisms' of an important kind: 'the dead' can fascinate what lives—an anthropomorphism insofar as the human shape can be adopted by the 'already dead'—the living can disguise their 'living' by other 'lives' and even by 'the

[161] See Zerubavel, *The Seven Day Circle* (Zerubavel 1985)

dead'—an anthropomorphism where the human shape is adopted by other living beings and can even appear as dead and without life, in effect a feigning death or 'playing dead'.

Nanabozho's footsteps, White man's footsteps

Kimmerer's trace of the first man and Coulthard's trace of the later arrival… can settler colonists become indigenous?

The question of how our stories become us, how our perceptions are shaped by the narrative discourses we hold, is the individuating mediation of *identification*. How the ruin of lives is biographized and historicized, as ruins; later "ruins", and as 'ruins' is already enculturated by the poetics we live by: *pedestrian, anesthetic,* and *anthropomorphizing*; where the last is how we are shaped as 'human'.

Kimmerer's *Nanabozho* as *istoria* is 'myth as already enlightenment' and as always a *re*-telling,; 'enlightenment returning to myth'. However, this closure is important in the telling for the structure that it retains *against* the fracture of nomothetic efforts to generalize based on text alone. The story is already of a second order observation as a second order *practice;* a practice that de-conceals 'theory' as theoria—thought and vision—as it has been 'transcribed' into talk (or in this case, writing). The performance of *telling* is an much an act as thinking is. Another attribute of this story, and many others, is that it generates meanings as isotopies.

A paradox emerges here: talk—dialogue—erodes the objects about which it speaks, a sentence or judgement in law, a policy enounced, displaces the object for the medium of discourse in this mediation; and, stories erode this talk, any discourse, even text, by re-representation, by redoubling the images and giving away their corrupting actuation and affect.

This paradox is how discourse has a life of its own and how the virtual is always a metabolic exchange with 'the real', to the point of being 'impossible'.

In this chapter the effort to transform the discourse of ruins has relied upon rejecting a simple binary opposition of past or future for the ambiguity of ruins in timespace: they are not simply either remnants-or-portents, the mythic imagery of westernization and 'civil society'. We can briefly recall that before this notion of a west and the rest, before the possibility of this presentism, there was a peripheral world to Persia and Egypt that introduced the root word for ruin:

Ρεω

The latin root in *ruo* shares antiquity with the Greek stem word *ρεω:* given in the passive voice as 'flow, stream, run gush; fall or drop off,' or to 'melt away'. The obvious material source is often riverine but also nivean in the melting of snow, or also in Greek experience, a volcanic discharge, as much as by flood. Ruin in this material/semiotic sense is always connotative of 'Nature' and 'natural forces', and for sociological purposes it must be stressed that this language—now hollowed out by the movement of language itself—*is imagery*. Above all it is *historical imagery,* and were we to pay closer attention to the Weberian use of *Gedankenbild* for

its obvious religious overtones, where historical-thought-imagery is iconic in the typical organization of experience in which much 'history' is recorded and decoded by religious motifs, we have that old poetics of a *pre-monotheistic religiosity*: the numerous divinities of the Greek world inhabited rivers, snow capped mountains, and even thought itself, as we recall that the Greek *daimon (δαιμων)* governed the intellect[162].

The *imagery that is words*, is language itself, is a social fact *non plus ultra*. Sociology has a ready made analysis wherever it undertakes even the most limited etymological investigation for the devices of reification that subjugate the 'user' in their enjoyment of these instruments and the advantage they bring, however that advantage is brought about. This subjugation being the simple *memoryless-ness* that accompanies their naturalized use: in common-sense speech, holy writ, orature, literature, or technical jargon.

Ruins then are not themselves for the distinctly anthropomorphic turn of the modern phrasing. The flux of timespace holds possibilities—they are so often improbable as Luhmann so often reminds his readers—including the possibility that we comprehend wrongly.

In the succeeding chapter we will turn the transposition of timespace, the narratives that conceal the aporia presented by superimposition and the improbabilities of transformation for the near certainties of cynical foreclosure on timespace. An approach of timespace that is all too familiar in the fatalist mood of the 21st C.

[162] To which Peter Berger ascribes the 'passion' of doing sociology in his witticism at the end of the first chapter of his *Introduction to Sociology*.

CHAPTER SIX GAYAGAAHNAHE

‘The Forbidden Path’ (see Figure 14.)

General political economy

Unlike superimpositions of timespace, transposed timespace is an overruled or overturned timespace when specified, a shadowed or eclipsed timespace when generalized. The transposition of the asymmetery of ruins—what is retained and what is a trace and protention—is clearly a difference between a past of which we can have some knowledge/power and thus a narrative that is founded in some way, and that is to say seduced by bad-faith essentialism when needed to ‘intervene’ and thus police the liberal constitution of discourse and its legitimate knowers; and a future of which nothing can be known with certainty or completeness at all—it is increasingly anonymous—and thus *unfounded* knowledge/power and narratives that seduce by a bad-faith relativism. That is, the desire *not* to intervene and thus ‘pattern’ society or disturb a ‘natural’ population of its habitus and its projects.

This il-liberalism openly disowns a cynical perspective that it also openly practices. Further, this open hypocrisy is simply another position for the transposition of an uneven timespace to ruin and undermine *any rhythm of activity* and *any effectual reception* of one’s acts as *erasure;* as the crime that it is in obviating the future and obliviating the past for private—anti-political—interest. Further, this transposition as cynical wisdom makes no effective action, except empty ‘cost effective’ efforts or ‘risk mitigation strategies’, as the anti-ecological spatialization of time: where that time is the contract fulfilled and the return on investment accomplished.

Most important is that the superimposition of lives and thus timespaces remains ‘naturalized’ and undertheorized. The proletarianization of peoples is the assurance that this unevenness remain capitalistic and concerned only with political or economic advantage and that is to say power. The mirror of society appears legitimately meritocratic for example in the sciences, where it is imagined that superior explanations will displace inferior narratives. This is itself the worst naivete one can assume in any intellectual work, where it is plain that explanations are already enforced by disciplinarity and specialization, and that private money can invisibilize research agendas too. That for the STEM major there is always private money to be made in application of those skills for economic and political manipulation of market and polity[163]. So much for the objectivity and neutrality of the ‘hard sciences’ and their quantitative aptitudes.

This superimposition that imagines an *order of things* that is really no more than a series of interventions as sabotage of the very system they purport to uphold unveils the actual hierarchy that is the inverse of a ‘meritocracy’, the kind of thinking of a Bernard Mandeville is here more ‘realistic’ for the socio-symbolic universe that this thinker demonstrated than that of an Adam Smith[164]. Despite the latter’s injunction to observe the acquisitive classes incessantly for their cunning, it is Mandeville in his *fable of the bees* that openly demonstrated that this was the core of liberalism in *misprision* in a double sense (Mandeville 1962): a mis-comprehension that

[163] Cathy O’Neill’s *Weapons of Math Destruction* is something of a confessional to just such practices (O’Neil 2017).
[164] See Smith: *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (Smith 1976)



FIGURE 14. FORBIDDEN PATH CLOSE-UP OF THE PENNSYLVANIA AND NEW YORK BORDER, THE APPROXIMATE LOCATION OF THE FORBIDDEN PATH, THE WESTERN DOOR GUARDED BY THE SENECA IS NOT MARKED. (1771) *MAP OF THE COUNTRY OF THE VI NATIONS*. GUY JOHNSON. (JOHNSON 1771)

oscillates between performances of bad-faith in essentialist and relativist doxa, and a criminality in knowingly concealing these pastiche and distortion of the event for the secure racket of constructing social structures that can be manipulated and known, especially when knowledge of any discipline (no matter the appeals to nature or history) is uncertain and incomplete.

Transposition is a *seriality* and in the sense that *a satire is a medley*, this mode of irony is distinct for its self-satisfying closure by exhausting by reversion to prior forms. The use of history to this effect in the closure of possibility—thus establishing an ontology of records—is one form, juridical precedent being another, medicalization with its retroactive label of 'in remission', criminalization with its 'recidivists', all speak to overwriting history and biography in power/knowledge.

With no irony, the superimposition of organized society, conceals the associations that actually govern it, as criminal in commission of any act whatsoever that sustains this closure and predicatability. Especially by omission, what the de-territorialization that de-regulation spells out for capitalist markets, and is the most seamless of vehicles for the busy-body non-action, in-action, and hyper-action that consistently *performs* its stabilizing structural operation. What is called 'progress' is mostly a pastiche of actual ideas rendered inert and concepts hollowed out by mis-practice and over-application.

Thus, transpositions in timespace, narratives and figurations that narrate uneven temporalizations and spatializations of politics and ecology, justifying them for their 'activity', are in fact the disownment of the very principles they claim as their own. This disownment however is part of the ends to which *governmentality* is the means and in at least a much looser sense than that of the state, also its own redoubled ends[165]. We will have some cause to consider what this means for a political economy that has no use for government of this kind or indeed any modernizing kind, relying instead upon a political ecology. Yet both are an interest in the order of *things*. The first, memorably recounted by Michel Foucault following Guillaume de La Perrière as:

> "…the intrication of men and things", where things are: "…men in their relationships, bonds, and complex involvements with things like wealth, resources, means of subsistence, and of course, the territory with its borders, qualities, climate, dryness, fertility, and so on. "Things" are men in their relationships with things like customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking. Finally, they are men in their relationships with things like accidents, mmisfortunes, famine, epidemics, and death." (pp. 96-97 *Security, Territory, Population*)(Foucault 2007).

That is, the knotty relationships to milieu and one's own conduct were generalized under this political economy. The second is well discussed in the work of Georges Bataille, Pierre Clastres, and the work of Marshall Sahlins (here repeated in the work of Clastres) wherein 'primitive society':

> " …structurally, writes Sahlins, "economy" does not exist. That is to say that the economic, as a sector unfolding autonomously manner in the social arena, is absent from the DMP [domestic

[165] Foucault was quite cognizant of his theory of governmentality as reversing the role of the state and market for example: the state as a means for market power/knowledge (Foucault 2007).

> mode of production]; the latter functions as consumer production (to assure the satisfaction of needs) and not as production of exchange (to acquire profit by commercializing surplus goods). What is clear, finally (what Sahlins' great work asserts), is his discovery that primitive societies are societies that refuse economy." (p.111, *The Archaeology of Violence*)(Clastres 1994)

The transposition of a state was refused by way of the refusal of economy that also formed markets in any modern sense. In a demonstration of structure such as this, the value rational form of exchange gains the anthropological example of societies that have developed means for 'neutralizing' (making neutral as a social fact) instrumental rationality in its practice. With this, the commodity form can also be said to be displaced foundationally by a truly magical form for object relations. What precisely cannot be generalized and can only be specific, forestalls closure and the hollowing out of the order of *things* by serialization, in this case gradations of topography (see Figure 15.). With this form, the horizontal timespace is also more permeable to vertical timespace (roads as chronotopes).

The Chronotope of an Objective share

The topography of 'great gully' and the proximity to the shore of Cayuga Lake provided a confluence of habitable conditions in the finger lakes for people: the winters of the pre-21st C. were colder and the value of the gorge was as a barrier to wind, whereas proximity to the lakes did provide somewhat warmer conditions to withstand the winter months and admitted some of the earliest snow free weeks of spring. This is of no small importance for growing crops, but also for foraging and hunting where snow pack made places further inland harder to negotiate. The lake itself attracts significant herds of Whitetail Deer and flocks of Turkeys, especially during the late winter months into early spring. At one time fishing the lake in the spring would have been possible in April with the promise of significant catches. The timing again at the end of the winter when food stores diminished would have been hard to overlook for sustaining habitation here.

The soils here have the benefit that valleys and lowlands often do, with the regular replenishment by nutrients that come from higher elevations. Runoff and snowmelt mobilizing nutrients from further away and with regularity, assures consistent growing conditions. Atmospheric conditions were milder, they still are, making for the possibility of less winter injury to perennial plants[166]. The example of Peach trees grown on these shores, demonstrate a tree that would not have fared nearly so well even as little as a few hundred feet up the slopes that rise away from the lake. With the combined conditions for regular food supplies, shelter, and the resource of the lake itself for sanitation and transportation, *Goi-O-Gouen* was a site unlike others that the Cayuga made use of. It was also these very properties that would attract colonists, and the campaign of Butler and Sullivan in destroying the economic resource, if not the people that depended upon it, as a way to de-territorialize the region. This would only be one in a chain of transposed timespaces that would forecast and rememorate upon this site.

[166] The author was involved in regular data collection for projects in the finger lakes that demonstrated significant climatic differences in proximity to the lakes themselves.

FIGURE 15. GREAT GULLY TOPOGRAPHIC MAP: CLOSEUP (2023) *GREAT GULLY TOPOGRAPHIC MAP* HTTPS://WWW.TOPOZONE.COM/NEW-YORK/

The transposition of official history upon the site itself was attempted during the re-memoration of the foundation of the United States by the State of New York and then again during the crisis years of the 1930's by the State Education Department, where economic catastrophe of another kind had thrust this nation into an economic depression. We can understand this as an *aesthetic politics* where the destruction of pre-State populations was the civilizing mission that placed the 1932 historical markers in immediate proximity to their predecessors. The narrative spelled out here is delivered in the most spare language:

Cayuga Castle (1932, State Education Department):
Site two miles east
Cayuga village destroyed
In Sullivan Campaign
September 1779

Also **Cayuga Castle (1932, State Education Department):**
Site of principal
Cayuga village
Destroyed Sept. 23. 1779
Sullivan Campaign

Indian Mound (1932 State Education Department):
Just east of here
Known to be the site of
an early Jesuit mission

Routes of the Armies (1929, State of New York)

front face
An expedition against the hostile Indian nations which checked the aggressions of the English and Indians on the frontiers of New York and Pennsylvania, extending westward the dominion of the United States.

rear face

Goi-O-Gouen

The Cayuga castle capital of the Cayuga nation and outlying villages extended from this spot eastwardly on the Great Gully to Scipioville and Mapleton. Here in 1656 labored the Jesuit missionaries Chaumanot and Menard later Le Moyne, De Carheil and Raffeix. They built here the first house of Christian worship west of Onondaga. Hither came also the Moravian missionaries Cammerhoff and Zeisberger first, later Sir William Johnson. The Cayuga reservations were here the last Cayugas and Tuscaroras departed about 1800.

The Cayuga castle and near-by towns were taken and destroyed by a detachment from General Sullivan's army commanded by Lieut. Col. William Butler on September 22-23, 1779

Ge-Wa-Ga (1929):

A village of the Cayuga Nation, stood near this spot. It was occupied and destroyed by a detachment from the army of General John Sullivan, commanded by Lieut-Col. William Butler, which bivouacked here on the night of September 21, 1779, before proceeding to the capture and destruction of the main Cayuga villages at Great Gully about one and a half miles south of this place on the next day.

Missionaries to the Cayuga (1911 The Auburn Council of the Knights of Columbus)
This valley was the site of the principal Cayuga Indian village

To the brave French Jesuit missionaries whose heroism was almost without parallel Joseph Chaumonot and Rene Menard who as guests as of Chief Saonchiogwa built here in 1656 the first house of Christian worship in western New York Stephen De Carheil who for nine years ministered here and his co-labourer Peter Raffeix this memorial is respectfully erected

Dedication Plaque
This monument was dedicated on Columbus Day Oct 12, 1911 under the auspices of Auburn Council Knights of Columbus

These *interpassive* devices are the machines of historization that assure the observer—who does not need to read them—that they have a history, that they identify through these *things* and by way of this enter into the socio-symbolic network of objects *objectively*—as an object themeselves[167]. Further, that the supremacy of this civilization—this imperium of things—is evidenced in the event of the Cayuga's disappearance when they could not be civilized by religion. The belief objectively invested in these things is not simply 'virtual', *it is actual belief*; it is the manifest and materialized *doxa* and the rules of this network is a material *doxology* in *how to believe*.

When we observe the dates we also discover that in those years of dedication up to 1929 the purpose is ceremonial and informative, in 1932 the spare plaques are dedicated to the site of the event of erasing the incivil, and cementing timespace into this discourse of eradication. Transposition is a *forced superimposition*. With civil unrest in the United States following the

[167] *Interpassivity* is a concept developed by Robert Pfaller in his psychoanalytic work, *Illusionen der Anderen* (Pfaller 2003), and used to great effect by Slavoj Zizek . The term denotes a reliance upon a kind of interobjective relations: we passively enjoy a comic show where we do not have to laugh and watch idlely, we listen to passionate music and enjoy that our speakers are working so we do not have to concentrate affectively, our gaze comes back to us through the machines we use and the otherwise inert and familiar things of our environment that do our gazing for us (Zizek 2006). Interpassive things in our environment do what we lack the energy, time, and position to do ourselves. We are *inter-passive with them* and *by way of them*. As Zizek points out in several places, this interpassivity is how we serve ourselves *totally* and that is to say *generally*: "This third gaze - the point from which I see myself as likeable, in the guise of my ideal ego - is the ego ideal, the point of my symbolic identification , and it is here that we encounter the structure of interpassivity: I can be active (shining on the basketball court) only in so far as I identify with another impassive gaze for which I am doing it, that is, only in so far as I transpose on to another the passive experience of being fascinated by what I am doing, in so far as I imagine myself appearing to this Other who registers my acts in the symbolic network. So interpassivity is not simply a symmetrical reversal of ' interactivity' (in the sense, described above, of being active through (our identification with) another): it gives birth to a 'reflexive' structure in which the gaze is redoubled, in which I 'see myself being seen as likeable' ." (pp.116-117) *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality Contemporary Dialogues on the Left* (Butler et al. 2000)

depression, the looming war in Europe, and the height of political terror in the South against Black Americans, these devices are the performance of governance over the word, territory, and time in a single iron sign. An administration of things becomes its own serialized pastiche of relations to a 'world' by an *aestheticized* and de-politicized environment, and *anesthetized* affect by the eco-environmental conditions that are objectively, ineluctably, 'there' (see Figure 16.). A transposition of power such that the site—a mute object—becomes the contradictory—impossible—object of a hieroglyph to be interpreted by these instructions, and an unspeakable silence 'a brute presence', that refuses meaning and symbolization as a trope of hyperbolic incommunicability. The impasse of meaning/non-meaning bars a political ecology in the first place, and impresses an obvious absurdity at the same time. This *non-synchronous* synchrony of the site as a place of ruined history and culture is not an epitaph, it is the indication that, 'not even the dead are safe' from this enemy[168].

It is not that these histories were superimpositions of timespace, a kind of history that explains what this place is and what that period was. Rather, a *transposition* that disowns the relativization of peoples in terms of force: 'Destroyed Sept. 23. 1779'. Which is to say that what was not accomplished by missionaries, was finally accomplished as retaliation in the name of dominion: 'An expedition against the hostile Indian nations which checked the aggressions of the English and Indians on the frontiers of New York and Pennsylvania, extending westward the dominion of the United States.' The allegiance of the Iroquois against the colonists provides a picture of the stakes of the war as a landgrab, and especially in light of the evidently more respectful policy of William Johnson who was the British governor leading up to the revolution. The Haudenosaunee perspective of this event is permanently embedded in the founding name of Washington: 'Town Burner'; whose own perspective on the campaign is firmly embedded in the orders delivered to Major General John Sullivan:

> "But you will not by any means listen to ⟨any⟩ overture of peace before the total ruin of their settlements is effected—It is likely enough their fears if they are unable to oppose us, will compel them to offers of peace, or policy may lead them, to endeavour to amuse us in this way to gain time and succour for more effectual opposition. Our future security will be in their inability to injure us the distance to which they are driven and in the terror

[168] Ernst Bloch has one of the most insightful discussions of the transposition of timespace upon class and character formation among the Frankfurt School's 'fellow travelers' with his *Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its Dialectics*: "The fallen branches of duty, education, and "estate" of the middle strata, in a time that no longer knows a middle, are subjectively non- synchronous in the meager sense, but tinder in the face of anger. Corresponding to this is the objectively nonsynchronous as the after-effect of older relations and forms of production and older superstructures, no matter how thwarted they may be. The objectively nonsynchronous is that which is far from and alien to the present; it includes both declining remnants and, above all, uncompleted past, which has not yet been "sublated" by capitalism. The subjectively non- synchronous contradiction activates this objectively nonsynchronous one, so that both contradictions come together, the rebelliously distorted one of pent- up anger and the objectively alien one of left-over being and consciousness." (p.31) (Bloch and Ritter 1977). Also Benjamin's cryptic and insightful *Theses on History*: "The only historian capable of fanning the spark of hope in the past is the one who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he is victorious. And this enemy has never ceased to be victorious." (p. 391) (Benjamin 2003)

FIGURE 16. GEN. SULLIVAN'S MARCH: CLOSEUP (1779) *MAP OF GEN. SULLIVAN'S MARCH FROM EASTON TO THE SENECA & CAYUGA COUNTRIES*. (ANONYMOUS 1779)[MAP] RETRIEVED FROM THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, HTTPS://WWW.LOC.GOV/ITEM/GM71002211/.

> with which the severity of the chastisement they receive will inspire ⟨them.⟩ Peace without this would be fallacious and temporary—New presents and an addition of force from the enemy would engage them to break it the first fair opportunity and all the expence of our extensive preparations would be lost.
>
> When we have effectually chastised them we may then listen to peace and endeavour to draw further advantages from their fears. But even in this case great caution will be necessary to guard against the snares which their treachery may hold out—They must be explicit in their promises give substantial pledges for their performance and execute their engagements with decision and dispatch. Hostages are the only kind of security to be depended on." (George Washington 31 May 1779)(Washington 2010)

Hanödaga꞉nyas or Conotocaurius was a name already given to Washingtons' forbear John in the 17th C. by the Seneca Tanacharison, the 'half king', and applied to George Washington in 1753. Notably George Washington took on this label himself when negotiating with the Oneida in 1755.

The importance of the brutish label as a transposition of a chronotope, cannot be understated when not considering that it was the open admission of ruthless violence, attacking and destroying villages. And, it would be incorrect to imagine that this violence was not already part of the colonies from the very first efforts at their establishment (that is, this violence is transposed from the settler-colonial futurity of military tracts as rewards for service. See Figure 17.). The structure of invidium is already in motion by the time of the revolution.

The settler-colonial chronotope is itself this transposition as well: the forcible impress of timespace in terms of frontiers, tracts, trade corporations, patents (to develop and settle land, as in the colonization of Appalachia), and later the campaign to found a state separate from the British Empire. However, this chronotope, with its special storied relation to the future really is future oriented in an ultra-futural way, a supreme ironic jest in that wherever the frontiers are, they are already erased in search of a new one; wherever trade happens it is already upstaged by a yet more lucrative market on the horizon; corporations are already spent, patents already sold, and colonization already completed before it happens. Yet this is a supreme farce of imperial narrative, to remind ourselves of this we can turn again to Bakhtin: "To put it in somewhat simplified terms, we might say that a thing that could and in fact must only be realized exclusively in the *future* is here portrayed as something out of the *past*, a thing that is in no sense part of the past's reality, but a thing that is in its essence a purpose, an obligation." (p. 147 *The Dialogic Imagination*)(Bakhtin 1981). That purpose and obligation may well be entirely *empty*, and its insignificance in reified form may well be its *significance* and for the sociologist, its meaningful relationship as interest that is really an un-interest, and not even a dis-interst. Again, to observe this social structure Bakhtin's dialogic imagination of the literary chronotope is a helpful tutor in socio-structural chronotopes:

FIGURE 17. 1826 'BURR MAP': CLOSEUP OF 1826 'BURR MAP' GREAT GULLY IS THE WATERWAY BETWEEN MILITARY TRACTS #13 AND #18 WHERE THEY MEET THE CAYUGA LAKE SHORE, AND THE PINK AND GREEN TOWN BOUNDARIES ARE ESTABLISHED BY THE GORGE TOPOGRAPHY. (BURR 1829) HTTPS://IIIF-PROD.NYPL.ORG/INDEX.PHP?ID=433806&T=G

> “This peculiar "trans-positioning," this "inversion" of time typical of mythological and artistic modes of thought in various eras of human development, is characterized by a special concept of time, and in particular of future time. The present and even more the past are enriched at the expense of the future. The force and persuasiveness of reality, of real life, belong to the present and the past alone—to the "is" and the "was"—and to the future belongs a reality of a different sort, one that is more ephemeral, a reality that when placed in the future is deprived of that materiality and density, that real-life weightiness that is essential to the "is" and "was."” (Ibid)(Bakhtin 1981).

As we shall see, this futurity and its transposition is a secular eschatology of military-industrial advantages brought to bear as ‘inevitable’. Having an aura of indisputable mastery and above all an interminable present that has serialized and revised past and future, ‘*the force and persuasiveness of reality, of real life, belong to the present’*, which is to say that timespace has been immobilized despite all appearances of movement and of progress, and in this sense functions as a ‘dynamic stability’(Rosa 2013). What is left to question is what system has been imposed, and what this has been imposed upon that preceded it.

Todariohroones

Perhaps a stronger sense of this *transposition of timespace* can be gained from the discourse that brackets the Sullivan campaign, the ruin delivered by Butler to the Cayuga and Seneca, and the re-territorialization by settler-colonists in the years following. The disappearance of the *Todariohroones*, a people already displaced from the South, and following roads that might otherwise have been hostile to them at an early time of conflict with the Haudenosaunee, is only briefly mentioned in General John S. Clark’s footnotes:

> “In the same year they [the *Todariohroones*] are mentioned as attending a conference at Mt. Johnson, and are described as "one of the nine confederate nations." The town is indicated at the head of Cayuga lake on the Guy Johnson map of 1171, in the same position where it was found by Colonel Dearborn in 1779, under the name of Todevighrono, the name of the people. In 1750 Zeisberger, the Moravian missionary, passed through this valley while on his way to visit the Cayugas, but makes no mention of an Indian village in the vicinity. Undoubtedly they settled there in the summer of 1753. Their cleared fields were found on the present site of Ithaca on the first settlement of the country by the whites and were the first lands occupied in the county. The town is indicated but not named on the map of Mr. Lodge, the surveyor who accompanied Colonel Butler's detachment. To stand on the identical spot from which this people sunk into oblivion, appeared like standing on the grave of a nation. Their history, the beginning of which extends far back into the unknown and unattainable; ends where that of civilization begins, and adds another name to the long list of extinguished nationalities that preceded us in sovereignty. Here their council fire, fanned by the last expiring breath of a once brave and numerous people, was extinguished forever.—J. S. C.” (p. 78 *Lieut. Col. Henry Dearborn Journal* [General John S. Clark, *J.S.C.* : notes appended in 1879, the centennial of the Butler expedition in the Sullivan campaign. See reference on p. 76])(Dearborn 1887)

The finality of this Catawaba people, that the rebels feared would support the loyalists by assimilation into the Cayuga, is doubled by the footnote in the Sullivan Campaign collection. In effect, this transposed chronotope and its milieu is the forgetting of the people and the obviation of Indigenous resurgence in one "final" note. This transposition of place: *Todevighrono* as nation, as grave of a nation, is overwritten again by *Ithaca*, and becomes '*final*', as extinct/extinguished nation. The "whites" however, referenced here, deserve some explanation for their recent appearance in the consciousness of the colonists. By the time of the Sullivan campaign this designation would be well known, its provenance is a different matter:

> "It is worth making still closer scrutiny of the terminology which Englishmen employed when referring both to themselves and to the two peoples they enslaved, for this terminology affords the best single means of probing the content of their sense of difference. The terms *Indian* and *Negro* were both borrowed from the Hispanic languages, the one originally deriving from (mistaken) geographical locality and the other from human complexion. When referring to the Indians the English colonists either used that proper name or called them *savages,* a term which reflected primarily their view of Indians as uncivilized, or occasionally (in Maryland especially) *pagans,* which gave more explicit expression to the missionary urge.
> When they had reference to Indians the colonists occasionally spoke of themselves as *Christians* but after the early years almost always as *English.* In significant contrast, the colonists referred to *Negroes* and by the eighteenth century to *blacks* and to *Africans,* but almost never to Negro *heathens* or *pagans* or *savages.*" (p.95 *White over Black* Winthrop D. Jordan 2012 [1968])(Jordan 2012)

The English of the 18th C. had a well established language for the enslaved and enslaveable, and thus also those foregettable in advance, by the transposition of anglo-sphere's preferred 'human shape' drawn from its own Christian mythos, which it managed to abridge in the colonies. This is also the seamless transposition of the English language into the nascent America of the 1776 rebellion, and it brings with it the much older designation by which the winners of this war would classify themselves following older pre-modern juridical distinctions:

> "Most suggestive of all, there seems to have been something of a shift during the seventeenth century in the terminology which Englishmen in the colonies applied to themselves. From the initially most common term *Christian,* at mid-century there was a marked drift toward *English* and *free.* After about 1680, taking the colonies as a whole, a new term appeared—*white.*" (ibid)(Jordan 2012)

This shift, following the religious wars in Europe of the 17th C. is comprehendible as the dawn of an age after the Peace of Westphalia, where secularization, Realpolitik, and nausea for pervasive violence throughout all of Europe lent only hypocrisy to Christian war upon other declared Christians. 'White' does the job of invisibilizing one difference for another: in terms of the relatively new notions of sovereignty and nation, and the subjects therein, religious difference was no longer the predominate means of classification by (new) citizen subjects and their own classifiers.

The ruinate chronotope of traversing history, of passing through it, is incomplete for the separation made by the Generals' footnote. This mark, an apostrophe to the *Todariohroones* is

unreconciled, and effectuates the 'ruin' of social consciousness that neglects the empty fields now become a city of white settler-colonists. It is by tracing the "ruin" of the Generals' own consciousness in its uncomprehending modernism: 'To stand on the identical spot from which this people sunk into oblivion, appeared like standing on the grave of a nation. Their history, the beginning of which extends far back into the unknown and unattainable; ends where that of civilization begins…'; *as if* a civilization did not also *end*. The disavowal is a transposition that conceals crimes—barbarization—by the condescension of the footnote to whomever reads it. It is an instruction in a ruinate chronotope of *presentist un-interest*: the people of *Todevighrono* are already dead—un-dead—in the rewriting of a past in a perfectible list of dead nations, *and*, they are un-dead by the un-interest that is their future too: diminished to a footnote in the performance of an official history as it carries on with its only interest in spoilage—not even the spoils remain. Bakhtin's insight resounds: '*the force and persuasiveness of reality, of real life, belong to the present'*.(Bakhtin 1981)

A testament to *authority/authoritarian dominance* and to *power/knowledge* as biopower in the repopulation of places in social reproduction—not somehow the beginning of a *white civilization* an impossibility in that 'white' is an old imperial designation[169]—is the non knowledge of a political ecology as an ultra-violent and economistic unconscious, and it is part of the *disposition* by settler-colonial institutions—the social structure for this character and mind.

And in its structural obverse, it is already part of the consciousness of the Haudenosaunee in their territorial designation and ban on the use of their 'Forbidden Path' by the Senecas (see Figure 18. for the approximate location): "Few white men had ever visited this land before, for the Senecas had generally forbidden them all access to it. It had taken a small army, composed mostly of Indians, to escort white men along the Senecas' Forbidden Path." (p. 102, *Joseph Brant 1743 – 1807 Man of two Worlds*)(Kelsey 1984). This gateway into the heart of the Six nations confederacy sets apart timespaces and their respective modes of acknowledging one another. Not only will the transposition of languages and peoples and territories occur in this metabolism of settler-colonial occupation, so too will the chronotope itself in the chronotope of the *road*.

[169] Winthrop D. Jordan's investigation of the history of 'white and black' as racializations is of significant importance for the initially imperializing/christianizing mode of classification that these terms represent in socio-symbolic history of racial discourse: "In the long run, of course, the Negro's color attained greatest significance not as a scientific problem but as a social fact. Englishmen found blackness in human beings a peculiar and important point of difference. The Negro's color set him radically *apart* from [white] Englishmen. It also served as a highly visible label identifying the natives of a distant continent which for ages Christians had known as a land of men radically defective in religion." (p.20).(Jordan 2012) Above all it is the imperial juridical biopower rooted in christian mythos that inspired this distinction in the discourse of Sir Edward Coke: "at the time of the Flood "all Things were common to all," but afterward, with the emergence of private property, there "arose battles"; "then it was ordained by Constitution of Nations . . . that he that was taken in Battle should remain Bond to his taker for ever, and he to do with him, all that should come of him, his Will and Pleasure, as with his Beast, or any other Cattle, to give, or to sell, or to kill." This final power, Coke noted, had since been taken away (owing to "the Cruelty of some Lords") and placed in the hands only of kings. The animating rationale here was that captivity in war meant an end to a person's claim to life as a human being; by sparing the captive's life, the captor acquired virtually absolute power over the life of the man who had lost the power to control his own." (p. 55 Ibid)(Jordan 2012)



FIGURE 18. THE FORBIDDEN TRAIL MAP HILBERT 1991, CROOKED LAKE REVIEW. (HILBERT 1991)

An important first distinction between language and discourse, structure of the socio-symbolic order and its imaginary, is described by Bakhtin:

> "Abstract thought can, of course, think time and space as separate entities and conceive them as things apart from the emotions and values that attach to them. But *living artistic* perception (which also of course involves thought, but not abstract thought) makes no such divisions and permits no such segmentation. It seizes on the chronotope in all its wholeness and fullness. Art and literature are shot through with *chronotopic values* of varying degree and scope. Each motif, each separate aspect of artistic work bears value." (p. 245 *The Dialogic Imagination*)(Bakhtin 1981)

The socio-symbolic structure of reality, like language, is structural and consistent of images insofar as they are differentiations one from another. This differentiation is hollow otherwise, having no fundamental properties besides those of the differences that give a paradigmatic field or system of symbols, and a syntagmatic possibility of combinations therein by what imagery it delimits. 'Abstract thought' admits differentiation as (socio) symbolic, yet this is not how a discourse and our imaginary of the social are actuated with the objects we encounter in the world. For this, we put language and the socio-symbolic order into action—as structures—which within the limits of abstracta, words, and symbolic things, do much of the work of 'imagining' for us (see Figure 19. especially for the obvious blank spaces that delimit the anonymous map-makers imaginary.).

The importance of the imagery of a chronotope is given already by Bakhtin with the important observation of the tropological dimension of timespace as alienable only in an 'abstract' mode/mood that separates imagery from its structural dimensions. This lifts the chronotope into view for the metabolism of material/semiotic that it represents to us:

> "A literary work's artistic unity in relationship to an actual reality is defined by its chronotope. Therefore the chronotope in a work always contains within it an evaluating aspect that can be isolated from the whole artistic chronotope only in abstract analysis. In literature and art itself, temporal and spatial determinations are inseparable from one another, and always colored by emotions and values." (Ibid)(Bakhtin 1981)

The transposition of timespace involves an asymmetry in this 'evaluating aspect' as a fundamental element of the work of art or literature that might appear otherwise as 'instructions for use'. We attend to literature and art in how these works tutor us in *how* such texturations are textured, as a way to enjoy them, and to enjoy ourselves enjoying them. We follow the instructions faithfully in transference of our interests into the work and the reflexivity that gives us our subjectivation in these discursive objects, at least until we are jarred by something that does not seem to be acceptable there.

The insight Bakhtin offers here into the captivation of narrative discovered in the novel can be demonstrated in socioanalysis by the captivity to any discourse that puts mythos into motion, any socio symbolic structure animated by social fantasy. The chronotope of the road is an important transposition into a world without them:

FIGURE 19. ANONYMOUS. MAP OF THE SULLIVAN CAMPAIGN. (ANONYMOUS 1779)

> "General James Clinton had joined forces with Sullivan on August 22, and the two armies set out together along the old Forbidden Path. They hardly knew where they were going. Out of twenty-five Oneidas who had urged on the expedition and who had volunteered to show the way, only two remained. … For guides the rebels finally had to manage with the two remaining Oneidas and a Stockbridge Indian from Massachusetts who probably knew as little about the route as they did. The Forbidden Path was still a *terra incognita* to white men." (p.261 *Joseph Brant*)(Kelsey 1984)

Terra incognita, and that is not just to say a country without discernable shape, it is a place without roads too. For socioanalytic purposes, this barrier to the social fantasy, the desire and unknowable demand of the rebel's own social consciousness—sense of norms drawn from the day to day antagonisms of war and the campaign itself, the longer (if relatively recent) and enduring social mores of nationalist investment, and the values placed in territory itself—are all drawn from a mythos given in *historic inversion* that also de-territorializes as much as it annihilates the future in this project. De-territorialization in this case is the dissolution of the unknown lands of the Haudenosaunee for the knowledge/power of them. Again, to develop this chronotope into the objective unconscious of settler-colonial soldiers and the political ecology therein, we turn to Bakhtin:

> "Without touching here upon the question of the changing functions of the "road" and "encounter" in the history of the novel, we will mention but one crucial feature of the "road" common to all the various types of novels we have covered: the road is always one that passes through *familiar territory,* and not through some exotic *alien world* (Gil Bias' "Spain" is artificial, and Simplicissimus' temporary stay in France is also artificial, since the foreignness of this foreign country is illusory, there is not a trace of the exotic); it is the *sociohistorical heterogeneity* of one's own country that is revealed and depicted (and for this reason, if one may speak at all about the exotic here, then it can only be the "social exotic"—"slums," "dregs," the world of thieves)." (p. 245 *The Dialogic Imagination*)(Bakhtin 1981)

The imaginary is especially well illustrated in the narratives of these venturers into *terra incognita* for the demonstration of the structure of their own territorializing imagination. The road as chronotope, this trope of timespace, reveals the transposition of social structure in the early formation of society itself as it seeks a way to emerge into the political ecological imagination. The staging of this imaginary is available to us in the difference between the virtual and the actual, the representations that materialize a nation from the occupiers milieu as metabolism. By alienating these lands and the peoples therein, the alienated become familiar, hypo-visible, and concealed in the foreground.

A 'Traversement Socio-Symbolique': a scoundrel's disowment

Transposition relies on an illusion of superimposition: 1. Not all positions are equal; 2. The traverse is a bar, a ban, and a split, partitioning to (re)organize timespace by its mark. When facing the transposed timespace it at first appears *eternal* and foundational to its own transformative meanings, as if these also came from a *terra incognita* and future found somewhere other than right here. This is the illusion that one begins their own path of discovery by going somewhere other from here. Of course, this is the mark of concealment issued in

discovery itself. The novel, for Bakhtin is the reflection and refraction of reality, it is ideological in the sense that it could not be otherwise (Bakhtin and Medvedev 1978)(Bakhtin 1981). Yet it is the structural tropology of the chronotope in various materials already familiar: the road, the castle, the salon, the town, the pastoral/idyll, that spatialize time when it is otherwise 'objective' in that these spatializations resist us and our investigation—they are thingly in their unknowability Other in their inevitability— properties that we do not share with them as changeable and mortal *subjects* above all (Bakhtin 1981).

That is, *they* are an 'objective' share divided from ourselves: the institution of roads, castles,… idylls are all spatializations of human occupation. Nonetheless objective and spatial things, once placed into the sociopoetics of literature and art, and put into motion in affinity with a temporality that gives these knotted spaces specific attributes, disclose themselves as tropes for a reality that is otherwise invisible and unconscious. By temporalizing these spaces, 'the encounter on the road', the 'course of life' itself allegorized, and the 'collapse of social distance', are reflected and refracted (Bakhtin 1981). These themes of traversing, crossing, and passage, are also the refusal of things to our scrutiny. The bar that was the Forbidden Path now designates both the ban on whites by the Senecas, and the barred political ecological *Other* that is given in the Haudenosaunee as the symptom of this social fantasy of an unclaimed idyll. That is, the *Other* to whom the settler-colonial consciousness is owed in the Sullivan campaign is not the Seneca for example, who are symptoms of this political ecological unconscious in its cruel Law and demand. Rather, it is the dominion and territorialization by a nascent rebellion itself as a socio-symbolic act held collectively as a misprision—the commission of a crime against a king—that is the actual measure of this *Other*.

The transposition of this crime is redoubled as the greater crime against the native inhabitants, not in war where crimes that can be ascribed unevenly, yet they appertain to anyone involved in this violence. Rather, it is the crime that redoubled in electing war rather than solidarity against both kings and colonial landlords by accepting politics over war on one hand as also a familiar mode for reason and negotiation—even if that is couched in power—and accepting an ecology on the other—the lifeways needed for this 'new world' that the colonists simply transposed another violence upon.

What were those lifeways? William Cronon provides a view to this in the comparison of Native American and colonial American ecological imperatives related to 'property':

> "Because the Indians lacked the incentives of money and commerce, [John] Locke thought, they failed to improve their land and so remained a people devoid of wealth and comfort.
> What Locke failed to notice was that the Indians did not recognize themselves as poor. The endless accumulations of capital which he saw as a natural consequence of the human love for wealth made little sense to them. Marshall Sahlins has pointed out that there are in fact two ways to be rich, one of which was rarely recognized by Europeans in the seventeenth century. "Wants", Sahlins says, "may be 'easily satisfied' either by producing much more or desiring little" Thomas Morton was almost alone among his contemporaries in realizing that the New England Indians had chosen this second path.

> As he said, on their own understanding, they "lived richly," and had little in the way of either wants or complaints." (pp. 79-80 *Changes in the Land*)(Cronon 1983)

That the colonists also knew this, no matter how obliquely, is to uncover the crimes against *community* that are the foundation of a 'revolt' over property that would redouble in a nation state the chronotope of this tranposition, and what would become mythologized in the mode of an historical alibi for harms which have none. To make this point clear, 'society', as the Latins well knew in their grasp of *societas,* was a gathering just as likely an association in defiance of communal bonds for crimes that would be unconscionable in any community, as 'society' might simply be assembly of disparate persons; rounding out how to live with one another against the forces that aggregated them this way and not some other. *Ignorance* as valorized non knowledge is the primary virtue and nihilistic power of the rebel's Republic against ecology, and a scoundrel's political unconscious is the ultra-politics that traverses this social fantasy of dominion and domination.

In this chapter the foreclosure by transposed socio-symbolic and physical violence, upon peoples and ecologies, has been explored to demonstrate not simply how *ruins come from the past or future,* and not simply as neutral and ineffable *superposed priors of past and future*. By demonstrating the bad-faith and disownment of cynical transpositions of timespace upon ecologies and peoples we have a *political ecology* and an opening to a critique of political ecology has been demonstrated. In the following and final case study the question of disposition within a cynical political ecology comes to light through the distribution of the sensible, specifically the foregrounding and naturalization of perspectives that overlook peoples and ecologies by the transposition of timespace.

CHAPTER SEVEN THE UNDERGROUND RAILROAD

The Underground Railroad

> And so it is we remain in the hold, in the break, as if entering again and again the broken world, to trace the visionary company and join it. This contrapuntal island, where we are marooned in search of marronage, where we linger in stateless emergency, in our our lysed cell and held dislocation, our blown standpoint and lyred chapel, in (the) study of our sea-born variance, sent by its pre-history into arrivance without arrival, as a poetics of lore, of abnormal articulation, where the relation between joint and flesh is the folded distance of a musical moment that is emphatically, palpably imperceptible and, therefore, difficult to describe. Having defied degradation the moment becomes a theory of the moment, of the feeling of a presence that is ungraspable in the way that it touches.
>
> Stefano Harney & Fred Moten.
> *Logisticality, or the shipped.*
> From: *The Undercommons*(Harney and Moten 2013)

The hold as a chronotope that describes the conditions for a catalepsis where the carceral has become the measure of a socio-symbolic metabolism between environment and peoples, is the theme of this chapter. The 'moment' as event of transformation that is also haptic, tacit, and tangible, yet too quickly passed over in silence, is still so often that *Kairos* as insight: what sociology only gains from theory; theory from critique; critique from reflexion founded in negation. That we have the possibility of saying No is the root of reflexion that releases us from naturalizations; that we perform this negation by silence is itself a transposition in the blink of an eye, and often enough, meant to be overlooked.

The Road Disappears

Ruins do not approach from the past alone. The cycling of history that is so often the emblem of this, the narrative that history repeats itself leaves to the anonymous future less than nothing. Narratives of repetition and even the return of traumas and crimes, are compelling for their erasure of effectuations from the future: everywhere it appears, the future is a contrary condition that is refused for the knowable past. The naturalization of racialization is the how ruin approaches from the past.

This same resistant attitude operating against the transposition of timespace, opposes the asymmetry of timespace for its *social fact*. Again, and more strongly, timespace is romanticized for having a law of its own and a perfect knowledge. This mythos *is* the actually ruinous effect of timespace as it appears in a place—the Ruins of places become a hieroglyph to be read as if this natural law. Thus, the endless efforts to shore up political economic whiteness as a 'way of life' and 'heritage' by concealing the naturalization of this myth by non education: segregation and the school to prison pipeline are no more than the old ruse of barred literacy, used to elevate self-avowed "whites".

The underground railroad, is however the erasure of this naturalization of timespace and the hieroglyph of Ruins by the simple absence of itself. Above all it is the transposition that uses the

irony of the industrial freight system of modernization as its figure-trope, and what makes of this virtual entity something all the more real than the socio-symbolic racialization and caste system that is thwarts. The 'ruin' of people is itself undone by the rumor that reduces the myth of natural castes and races to the farcical display of power—not natural law—and further unmakes the ideology of classification by racialization. The asymmetry of the approaching timespace of emancipation demonstrates the possibility of a transformative timespace; a timeliness that is the actual glimpse of a metabolism between the confines of a planet that already limits human movements and actions, and the capture and incarceration of humans as if this were natural fact, and by way of the social fact that does more than grant knowledge of reified delimitation, serves to erode this imaginary and its socio-symbolic constraints before the eyes of the captors and captives alike[170].

A more problematic issue is the approach of ruin from the future, a narrative of anxieties and doomed projects that bring their own apocalyptic judgment and partition of sense with them. The greatest enemy to Harriet's traverse across the Mason-Dixon line and further North was the fear of being already caught: of walking into a trap. Here it is the past that is obliviated, treated as finished event and empty of meaning; as if escape did not happen. This is the weapon of cruel and open acceptance of social facts without the necessity of explaining how they were made. The virtual hostage taking device of the plantocrats. The is not a sagacity—it is not eternalization—so much as brute ideological fact whose farce is redoubled: the future is what we make of it, and it is already made up. The imposition of which is emblematic in the open abuse of Joe by one of these plantocrats, who upon acquiring this enslaved man, ordered him to be whipped as a show of domination, and nothing more (pp. 40- 41*Harreit Tubman The Moses of Her People.*)(Bradford 1993).

This gesture of an empty meaning is significant for its insignificance. The brute geopolitical ideology of space territorialized to the will of the strongest is no foundational social more and it does not pretend to be [171]. Only the changeability of social norms, that average mode of conduct that might as well have been invented yesterday, remain to legitimate the terms of timespace. This openly fatal obstinance of a social fact doubled upon itself in cynical Realism and saturnine enjoyment also opposes the reversibility of a superimposed timspace, what demonstrates the barrier of becoming-what-one-already-is as no less than a socio-environmental trap of existence. A reversibility of fortunes as the socio-symbolic rule that cannot be mastered. The superimposition of habit from the future, of angst coming around again as the approach of a future timespace, was and is very much what law does to milieu; the generation of an atmosphere of political terror that it effectuates is a collective crime. It is very important to note that this milieu is no structure itself, rather, it is what structure gives continuity too. Even upon escaping to the Northern United States, the Fugitive Slave Law still made it possible for lawless plantocrat power to persist. Nonetheless, 'bloodhounds' from the South were unwelcome in the North and

[170] Bruno Latour has weighed in on this planetary carcerality by his terms planet *security* and planet *exit*. See Latour: *"We Don't Seem to Live on the Same Planet" – A Fictional Planetarium* (Latour n.d.) See also: *Conflicts of Planetary Proportions--a conversation* as an extension of these concepts (Latour and Chakrabarty 2020). However, it is to my knowledge that a 'carceral planet' is already very much in the thought of Foucault.

[171] This is an important point made by Harriet Martineau on power and its differential cruelty toward women and enslaved people, see *Society in America* (Martineau 1837), what we would observe as a thinking of *the matrix of domination* before the letter. This 'right of the strongest' is also what Du Bois references in his 'test of the republic' in *The Souls of Black Folk* (Du Bois 2005).

the law itself was not enforceable for the sympathy that could be found among abolitionists in providing refuge. Law is not inevitable, and in this case, a demonstration of its own illegitimacy was the fact of its making and its political *interest* in political/legal terrorism.

Narratives of fatalist and nihilist explanations demonstrate their own hollowness, when these brazenly trumpeted social facts as barbarous reifications, are faced with the fact of their own making. Ruin comes from the future by outrunning the Real with socio-symbolic means, and effectuating its own reception and imaginary as if inescapable. Nonetheless, this open irresponsibility founders where the superimposition of timespace reveals this evident reification as a way to erase the past by its imperative.

Seth Conklin appears in history because he is dead (Still 2019). Sarah Bradford recounts Harriet's story of Joe arriving in Canada because he is not in America, a land of lethal consequence. Only those *beyond* the chronotope of the United States, and its carceral timespace, appear. The rest of it is invisible, the way trauma eclipses perception, for fragments and remnants.

William Still recounts the story of Seth Conklin, killed on the banks of the Mississippi after daring to aid Peter Still's Family, Vina, Peter, Levin, and Catherine, in escape from Alabama up the Mississippi and then to Canada. They were caught in Indiana, where Concklin and Peter Still's Family were jailed, despite efforts to evade capture. Concklin, under the assumed name 'Miller' was found dead: "…drowned, with his hands and feet in chains and his skull fractured" (p.37, *The Underground Railroad*)(Still 2019).

Sarah Bradford's account of Joe and his escape with Harriet offers few details. What is recounted is that the party that included them took many routes to accomplish the flight to New York and then on to Niagara. Joe, who had a very high price placed on his capture: "First a thousand dollars, then fifteen hundred, and then two thousand". (P. 43 *Harriet, the Moses of Her People*)(Bradford 1993), discovered upon reaching the anti-slavery office in New York City, that his image was already there with a bounty. The road to Canada through the state was three hundred miles and still very dangerous. It is this road that likely followed paths that were much older, and that brings the pedestrian chronotope of the road into perspective for the final time[172]: "They were surely safer on their own tired feet, where they might hide in forests and ditches, and take refuge in the friendly underground stations; but here, where this large party would be together in the cars, surely suspicion would fall upon them…" (p. 47 ibid)(Bradford 1993). The transposition of the road here is placed upon those roads that came before. A very differently transposed Timespace here includes a past when these roads were denied white men, and again, these roads would guide refugees from the South with a future in Canada; the vertical space of emancipation overlapping the routes of flight and invasion.

This is not to exist outside the timespace of the United States of the 19th C., it is to exist within the structural logic of settler colonialism and its imperial vision its *vertical time,* just not in this particularly fatal department of international order. The unconscious of 19th C. political economy

[172] It is likely that they followed the Mohawk River Valley, once the main pathway through the Haudenosaunee, now Interstate Route 90. The other route would have tracked along the Pennsylvania border and would have followed a route similar to the Forbidden Path.

is revealed to be the latifundia, the plantation—the camp—as the social artefact that unites this order of timespace in this unconscious(Zizek 2001). A dehumanization in chattel slavery that guarantees its opponent project of liberation and freedom, *laissez faire* economics, and liberalist politics and cannot be separated from the demagoguery of American revolutionaries and an ochlocratic design formed in the 'hatred of democracy'(Rancière 2006).

The inverse of the enlightenment humanization project is dehumanization as its limit case. To understand this requires only that we begin to follow the play of these institutions as they figure one another into existence by a differentiation of ontological objects.

However, it is the road that runs West to East that will bind together what else appears along the way by the material of both motif and action:

> "Of special importance is the close link between the motif of meeting and the chronotope of the road ("the open road"), and of various types of meetings on the road. In the chronotope of the road, the unity of time and space markers is exhibited with exceptional precision and clarity. The importance of the chronotope of the road in literature is immense: it is a rare work that does not contain a variation of this motif, and many words are directly constructed on the road chronotope, and on road meetings and adventures.
>
> The motif of meeting is also closely related to other important motifs, especially the motif of recognition/nonrecognition, which plays an enormous role in literature (for example, in ancient tragedy)." (p. 98, *The Dialogic Imagination*)(Bakhtin 1981)

Enceinte and enclosure

W.E.B. Du Bois provides us with a sense, shared much later with Michel Foucault, of how the cruelty of a carceral world, a world where the end is determined from the beginning generates its own resistance as a foil, and a liberty that is no more than ensnarement in the scoundrels attempted mastery of this indomitable closure (Du Bois 2005)(Foucault 1995). By perceiving from the end to the beginning we have a world of instrumental reason if for no other reason than that we need a structural-coupling that completes itself to provide intelligibility—rationality—and that this rationality is also *ratio* in the sense that it is an economy of intelligibility itself; self-limiting, self-contained, a restricted economy. It is cruel irony: the reversibility of actions that are nonetheless involuted upon themselves in hostility and antagonism as the constraint to the field of power dictates as imperative and vicious satire.

Nobody is listening, nobody sees…

Nobody noticed Harriet as a child: she underperformed as a house-slave, she was given to spells of 'somnolency'. Nobody noticed Harriet later, imitating a slave, an old 'master' passing by ignored her as presumably someone else's chattel. Sarah Bradford does not conceal that by the measuring tape of the late 19th C. United States Harriet was underestimated: "She was not so entirely in a state of nature… She seemed a dazed and stupid child… But that brain which seemed so dull was full of busy thoughts, and her life problem was already trying to work itself

out there." (pp. 14-15) (Bradford 1993). The point here is that this misrecognition was precisely what allowed for evasion of the 'bloodhounds' that killed Seth Conklin.

However this is a sociology, and sociology is nothing if not two things: it is not sociology if not *theoretical*, in that without addressing the expectations of societies—our socialization, which is to say *education*—we learn nothing and know little of 'what it is we are doing'; and, it is not sociology if not *structural*, in that without addressing how we are disposed in our 'naturalized' 'common-sense' relations as *opposed* in the asymmetries of recognition that this socialization *is*, this mutual accusative that is the actuation-of our habits of action—including 'thought' *against* one another to the point of denying the alter's existence to the ego—we fail to observe the antagonisms that erase one another. The transposition of a carceral timespace is the presumption of structural closures, and, it is what is ruptured by following this vertically storied transposition until its limits are exhausted in by its own limited horizon. It is the environment against which a 'steel-hard shell' was made to resist and in turn encased and imprisoned. Reversing this transposition is an irony and an *inversion,* not a *reversion* to old tropes. Harriet's tactics of evasion will not likely ever be known, they could not really be known for her inventiveness and 'right timing' that was *transformational timespace* put into motion; it surpasses itself now in this twice-told tale. To follow old paths alone would be tactically foolish, and only treading new ones by inverting existing routes, proceeding along them differently or not at all is the inverse and irony of a pedestrian chronotope.

This hyposvisibility—invisible in plain view—is the inversion of that imperium of things and the interpassivity that is the automaticity of this milieu. Such that no one noticed Harriet later either. Thus, Bradford's preface describes a structural memoryless-ness—the *ruins* of the too-quickly unacknowledged remainder of the civil war—the haunting of society by its own hyper-historicization: an exceptional nation-state in the international order of things, having overcome by civil war, its own past[173].

Thus, a state of exception, and a state without memory. A structural inequity that psychological and historical accounts both fail to give any intelligibility to. These individualistic and thoroughly atomistic approaches are part of the evasion of this relational reality: Harriet's hypovisibility is the oppositive, negative relations, that are structural to the transposition of society in its racializing and gendering forms that cannot be "additive" rather, must be "both/and" in the matrices of this invisibilizing logic (Collins 1991). The actualization of this naturalization of an 'additive', horizontal logic in a serialization of race, class, gender, etc. identifications *is* the embodiment of horizontal timespace and its narratives. Again, this is to neglect the vertical timespace that a 'both/and' logic raises, and the irony there that irrupts the cruel satires of law and policy that forces the choice of identification: "well you can only check one box for each category… race, gender, SES".

[173] Harriet was denied a pension until multiple outside efforts secured one for her from her wartime employments as scout, spy, and nurse. All doubly dangerous for the exposure to surveillance and the impassive force of disease in hospitals.

The hypo-visible woman

In a gendered society Harriet was unrecognizable, *except* as a woman; in a racialized society *except* as Black, and in the particular conjunction of these commodity traits she disappeared everywhere into the foreground in the imperial interobjective relations of *thingifications*. While Harriet could and did navigate lands and waters, and did so at length, and in inclement weather, and while avoiding opportunistic slave-hunting 'whites', it was not simply invisibility in the passages between 'railroad stations' but also the passage into and put of the hands of 'conductors', and thus inhabited places that demonstrated that a hypo-visible recognition by 'white society' and its political economic patriarchs. Instead of camouflage to blend into the background—a kind of deception of an observation seeking something unfamiliar and queer to normalized patterns—it is a camouflage that trivializes that hides in the open, flaunting the obvious.

Un-seen and *un-recognized* as the nation-state observes through the stock of its subjects, the underground railroad could exist in the open by persisting as a troubling symptomatic 'secret'. To acknowledge that this institution represented a solidarity that resisted the criminal political economy proposed of the South and its slave-holding states, and the indifferent proto-industrialists of the North—a crime of non-recognition that proved to be more strategically enduring—threatened the ordering principles of both proposed social forms as forms of life[174]. The nascent economic-class emphasis in the North and the sustained patrimonialism of feudal privilege and status in the South demonstrate a split that Weber had recognized clearly[175]. What that thinker did not elaborate at the time of that writing was the anti-solidary attitudes of both. Despite historians insistent misreading, and sociologists inaptitude with Weberian 'typology', the *contrast* and thus 'tension' between these classifications in modernization *are* the actual 'macro-level' of interaction. A point amply demonstrated and defended in the most famous essay of this social theorist: *The Protestant Ethic and the "Spirit" of Capitalism and other writings* (Weber 2002). Further this 'macro-level', a misnomer that is owed to American methodologism and not to the theorists that actually did the work, is not even the 'level of analysis' that it purports to be; with justice we can only understand the sublime social of this span and scope to be the differential effect of a 'micro-level' that Weber insists upon as social-action and reducible *necessarily* to the imagery of the 'individual' (Weber 1978a). It must be noted that this is no different that the insistence of Durkheim that the individual is the result of society (Durkheim 1997). What distinguished one from the other is not the claim but rather the actual method that puts their respective sociologies into motion. For his part, Weber understood his *verstehen soziologie* to be one sociological method among others (Weber 1949)(Weber 1978a).

To return to this point is to note that it is by the sedimentation of imagery that is religious onto-theological in shape, that so-called macro level foregrounding conceals the classifications used by a society for its members, and the very scheme of distinctions themselves[176]. Sociologists that have willfully un-acknowledged class in resistance to Marxist chauvinism simply fall into this

[174] See Coulthard: *Red skin, white masks : rejecting the colonial politics of recognition,* on *non recognition* in the work of Fanon and as distinct from misrecognition (Coulthard 2014).
[175] See Vol. 2 *Economy and Society*: *Class, Status, Party* (Weber 1978b)
[176] A point that animates almost all of Durkheim and Mauss's social-analysis in *Primitive Classifications* and especially *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (Durkheim and Mauss 1963)(Durkheim 1915).

snare and have so for decades[177]. The price of this negligent essentialist approach is that neither previous sociology and theory are comprehended nor even the resistance and critique of these earlier texts, what is also reduced to unintelligibility. The history of the structural-couplings that are the images of history to a group of people, whether they 'self-recognize' or not is the point of socioanalysis. Harriet was *not* recognized in either that macro-perspective of American political economies, nor in the micro-perspective of the subjects themselves, and that is why the solidarity between 'races' in the 19th century was both corrosive of the inequities and injustices of *both* Northern and Southern claims to authority, and to the very aesthetic politics that misshaped the gaze of its citizen-subjects as well. Finally, to observe this contrast and asymmetry is the test of a socioanalytic stereoscopy that defies the methodologistic 'levels of analysis' by their singular differential attributes in playing one off against the other so as to make *both* visible simultaneously; that actual *nous* and reward of a social consciousness is this resonance in how this simultaneity is struck such that it resounds. Doing sociology with a hammer is not the brute art of polemicists. Socioanalysis must always have a sensitivity to timespace, its discursive and its mute chronotopes, for the vertical timespace conditions that are the imposition—by aporia or by symbolic violence—of superimposed and transposed futures-and-pasts in overlapping, impactful, resounding *imagery*.

Hypovisible because Haptic: how praxis comes back in the things themselves

Biologism against eugenics

Cynical social science, like *society* itself as those arbitrary associations that demonstrate mores, norms, and values, that we neglect for their different (differential and actually complex) levels of construction, has always been with human communities, families, religiosities, modes of governance and social reproduction. It is precisely the case that Monique Wittig's: "all births are planned" that delivers a Queer critique to this kernel of human life as also always a *humanizing sentence* or '*proces'* (recalling here Kristeva's *sujet en proces*, as a mode of subjection that begins *before natality*) (Wittig 1981)(Kristeva 1980).

Thus, two anti-natalist readings of the Silenus wisdom:

> "Oh, wretched ephemeral race, children of chance and misery, why do ye compel me to tell you what it were most expedient for you not to hear? What is best of all is beyond your reach forever: not to be born, not to *be*, to be *nothing*. But the second best for you—is quickly to die" (p.8 Quoted in *The Birth of Tragedy*)(Nietzsche 1995)

First, the simple reading of a satirical nihilist doctrine. Second the rapturous revelling in the deathless/birthless *nature* to which this refers *ironically* and *inversely*, not simply as satire. The simplistic reading of the Silenus mythos *is not* a doctrine espoused by the philosopher and philologist—that supposed core of Nazi palingenesis. *Against doctrine*, the second reading is the retro-effect of this actual non human satyr wisdom indicating the inextricable materialism of our 'human nature' as part of our planet—our world—and thus its metabolism. And, against the

[177] See Bourdieu: *Distinction A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Bourdieu 1984); although his examples here and elsewhere are typically concerned with French society, the problem of orthodox use of misreadings of 'base and superstructure' separability are a glaring historical problem anywhere Marx's work is misused.

simplistic natalist accounts that supposedly counter-act gloomy morbid accounts of mortality, an anti-natalist recognition of *nihilism as the approach of timespace in all-too human terms*. What cannot account for our own proto-effectuation of ourselves is any biologism that reduces life to merely, exclusively, or solely human life in serial evolution or in any other 'scala naturae', while obviating this proto-effectuation that is always the *plan* of birth as a *composition of life's continuity as its own good*. A narrow natalist 'usefulness' of life cannot grasp life as praxis, only as 'biology' in the institution of its controllability, extort-ability, and research-ability to such *ends*. A simple 'biologism' that refuses a phenomenological 'reduction', a *return to the thing of life itself*, insofar as it is always already surpassing human life, is the practice of vivisection—and nothing more (Nicholsen 2003). Eugenics is the *social isotopy* of this vivisectionist 'research' on the usefulness of 'life'.

The hostile separation of 'man from the other man' that is Marx's own formulation and socioanalysis of the vivisection of *species-life* and its *species-being* as social-being, provides yet another perspective into the nihilistic partitioning of the eugenicist against that *dynamei* of differentiation (Tucker 1978). What this analytic attitude foregoes and misrecognizes. The speciation of nature is *not* reproducible where society is mimetic of environment in a 'survival of the fittest'; that sociologism that betrays this industrialist disposition as the actual 'ruined' 19th sociology character type of the Spencerian sociologue—that enduring *dispositif,* device, and instrument— that persists in scientific racism to this day.

Mimesis, in that it is *metabolic,* is the interchange of perception and its effectuation of an aesthetic world along with the interchange of reception and its actuation in *learning* by our own actions in the world as socio-symbolic *and catastrophic at every turn*. It is precisely this that the domination of nature by putative biologism refuses *aestheos* (perception) *by an-aestheos* for *power* instead: the naturalization of will as a singular human attribution and *conatus*, that is only ever *willful* at best; what *acedia*—ignorance, negligence, and incuriosity—we inculcate as if it were as good as knowledge becomes 'knowledge'.

Biopower: 'race war'[178] as war of survival against power and domination

Instrumental Ignorance

The success of the underground railroad is by the actual failure of recognition—what Bourdieu makes clear as only ever mis-recognition—that dehumanization and making *hypo-visible,* foregrounding the instrumental and administerial logic of classification by race; and by race the erasure of culture/race in both the dehumanizing measures for enslavement and subordination and the barbarizing enjoyment of this arbitrary cruelty in supra-humanization. This foreground being the socio-symbolic communications of those muted objectal remnants of this socio-symbolizing process as either mute and voiceless, or hieroglyphic and representable by another's voice: two forms of aesthetic politics, two forms of interlocking strategies of subordination contingent upon *ignorance* as the primary virtue of the Republic: a scoundrel's political unconscious is the ultra-politics that has only ever been the ruling imperative.

[178] See Foucault FN21 q.v. : pp. 65-85 "*Society Must Be Defended"* (Foucault 2003)

By reduction of life to instrumentality, it was not just possible, it was *necessary* to overlook this classificatory system as the actual communications of this society of slavers, colonizers, settlers, and their opponents: the slave that knew they were a free-being, the colonist that knew they were an immigrant, the settler that knew they were an alien. The double-consciousness of the very few has always to be zealously guarded against in the Republic, with the *exception* of the cynic. It is the irruption of this system of dispositions that is feared more than even the actual inevitable corruption of its institutions by the advance of time. By instrumental ignorance it was—and it still is—possible to 'pass unnoticed' for the simple reason that this is to turn the demand to be invisible into a tactics of invisibility; and also the instructions in how not to 'see' or 'recognize', thus always misrecognize, into the obverse of camoflogue and backgrounding, as *hypovisibilization*.

Yet these tactics are of the moment. It is the cynical act of satirical, serialized *nonrecogntion*: "the master laughs at the slave", that is the cruel joke that must be inverted (Fanon 2008). Thus, the *inversive* irony of the *Witz* of Baudrillard: "I am a nihilist. I observe, I accept, I assume the immense process of the destruction of appearances (and of the seduction of appearances) in the service of meaning (representation, history, criticism, etc.) that is the fundamental fact of the nineteenth century, of modernity." (P.160 *Simulacra and Simulation*)(Baudrillard 1994). Thus, the casualty of this collapse is also the possibility of perverse joy that signals the primacy of meaning making in its positivistic revolt against *nothing,* by *disenchantment,* by that relativization in *interpretation*. 'Acceptance' occurs in name only as 'nihilism'.

"I observe, I accept, I assume, I analyze the second revolution, that of the twentieth century, that of postmodernity, which is the immense process of the destruction of meaning, equal to the earlier destruction of appearances. He who strikes with meaning is killed with meaning." (pp. 160-161, Ibid)(Baudrillard 1994); refusance, denialism, dissimulation of impossible and imperfectable objectivity in empiricism, is the backlash against the already organized scientism of a state (as if these arbitrary boundaries were naturalizable by sovereignty, or exception), of a market (as if these exchanges were naturally organized advantages and disadvantages in labor, land, and tokens of exchange), of civil society (as if civility did not have its strangers, barbarians, and deprived others that made this social nature incompletely naturalizable as such), as the project of an *Other* and *its Law* that we accept this chronotope. However, if Baudrillard were not so persistent in analysis, this would reduce to satire—not an artful socioanalysis.

Baudrillard provokes a *negation by the negation* of actual existing chronotopes—social and historical explanations—that are ignorant, first *positively*, second *relatively*. "The third stage, the critical stage is empty. There is no more stage. There is no therapy of meaning or therapy through meaning: therapy itself is part of the generalized process of indifferentiation" (p.161 Ibid.)(Baudrillard 1994) Here, the Silenus wisdom is evident just as the trope reverses, superimposing those negations; with every step we build up our encasement in scientistic meanings that too-quickly dissipate for lack of resonance, facts and explanations merely intervene in one another as staged combat, only to erase themselves; and those meanings resound too-long, a surplus of meaning envelops to immobilize us in a path-dependence and obviation that runs faster to stand still. Under the *transposed aporia that is the fabrication of conditions of a superimposition,* even clinical socioanalysis folds into the forms it makes for making intelligible—making social—and risks institutionalization as its own objective ignorance. The

danger of flattery in the clinic is separated from by rejecting ‘therapy’ in a politics of recognition. One can also ask: recognition by whom *for* whom? And from this question why not reject the question *of* recognition itself as the interpellation of so many mute objects that depend on our objection for them to exist: the inequity of markets and crimes of society, the imperative to state dominance as if our conditions of bare existence?

“The stage of analysis itself has become uncertain, aleatory: theories float (in fact, nihilism is impossible, because it is still a desperate but determined theory, an imaginary of the end, a weltanschauung of catastrophe)”. (ibid) (Baudrillard 1994), the name for this mood—melancholia—this affect by the impossibility of nihilism reveals the actual protest of Baudrillard, the stumbling block of hypovisiblization when it turns around and winks at the audience, is where classification itself is hollow and meaningless; not just for its imposition that demands that we take a position, also for the imposition that there is none.

That there is no imposition because the demand itself comes from an empty *Other*: the state is untrustworthy for its recourse to force that can turn against anyone and everything; the market is worthless for its guile and racketeering and crimes against all; civil society is finally classificatory of nothing social nor civil for the differentiations and refractions that mobilize *it*. It is to *melancholia*, that re-entry of the ‘nihilist’, that ‘ruins’ of persons, re-enters (observes its own orthodoxy or heterodoxy of observation) into the Ruins of society, and thereby market and state. Thus, the radical gesture of lived dialectic: “It is the trait of reversion that effaces the remainder, just as a single ironic smile effaces a whole discourse, just as a single flash of denial in a slave effaces all the power and pleasure of the master” (p.163 Ibid)(Baudrillard 1994).

Not bad for a peasant turned socioanalyst.

CHAPTER EIGHT CONCLUSIONS

Afterlife

The afterlife or social actions are resonant in the systems in which we 'find ourselves' *and,* they *are* the social systems as systematized resonance: *retenissiment* as an echo that dissipates or a reverberating, motivating, and driving force; and *retentissant* as the rupture that resounds, trauma, irruption, and *catastrophe*.

Ecologies are already composed of both: the dead tree, a catastrophe in that it is a turn from live tissue to dead, becomes the harbor for hundreds of insects, for fungus, for the birds that will forage these minute hollows, for the large vertebrates that will den in the large ones. The death of the tree may in fact also be a yielding to its own scions; a nurse tree steadily retreats by giving way to the foraging of young roots from sprouts and saplings. This is not a model, it is *an ecological system*, having its own species of *durée*: the episodic girdling that that introduced death and the fungus that would exploit this moment, the cycles of resistance over several seasons that are the growth rings that now dessiccate, the time of the forest to which it belongs, and what guarantees that its scions have a place in the substrate formed as a durable soil for so long as they last—perhaps millenia—and the slightly shorter time that is the structure of that tree in the forest as a whole: probative of the atmosphere by its canopy, as its roots are exploratory of the soil, and both of which communicate to its surrounding trees times of growth, fertility, and dormancy.

The simple stupid un-wisdom of capitalism is infantile, uncommunicative, and parasitic by comparison. Yet it is the afterlife of this social plague that must be considered: capital is virtual advantage realized in war as actual advantage. It is a system, wholly modern for the world-violence that it is, where capitalism is the superstructure of wars and their planning that is the institutional 'delay' in ethno-nationalist 'memory', racist 'preparation' for 'civil war', sexist instructions in 'stable institutions'. It is a slow violence at these levels and systemic. However, the actual infrastructure remains 'men and materiel': where 'men' means populations, however divided for expenditure towards conflagration, materiel as the munitions, the ordinance, the ration, the *ratio*, and economy of resources combined in lethal and *thingly* form. The political is very often the afterlife of violence, symbolic and ultra-subjective, physical and ultra-objective, and it is in the object-relations of the latter that war and capital demonstrate technology and science as distorted modes of cynical reason. Politics, which may have as emblematic a timespace as any in the wartime orature of Athens, has its now forgotten form in the timespaces I have elaborated in the remaining stands of sweetgrass that stood not so far from the fires around which the Haudenosaunee gathered to make their nation. Again war and mourning demanded council.

A planetary sociology requires a recognition that there is nothing that this social systemic virulence in service of cynical reason will not take hostage—the planet itself by its own dead hand. The afterlife of this is the mutually assured destruction that is the insurance of the nihilist. It is also our greatest obstacle—objectivation—of socio-symbolic Law: this dead hand doctrine is *the Other* that now destroys itself: the planet actually does die and the bombs need never explode to demonstrate this, despite the decades of techno-military buildup for a fight that was

hollow from inception. We are already in the afterlife of an 'international order' and its 'politics', just as we are in the afterlife of climate change and its 'ecologies'.

Socio-Symbolic, Eco-Symbolic

The socio-symbolic world starts with an alarm clock and ends with a deadline, the eco-symbolic world starts with the sun rise, ending after dusk. The former overwriting the latter and increasingly the only resonance of time for us is in the clock and the calendar, of space, the ambit of occupation to and from work. Work that most often accomplishes the deadening of timespace. The encroachment of the business classes, entrepreneurs, economists, and liberalist social science are doomed to fail. Skill-less, devotees to spoilage who remunerate nothing and no one, leaving only waste in their wake. How can so many so-called radicals routinely fail to observe that this and the militant response to it is the other side of war: *capital* meant *advantage* in the early modern era. After Marx's critique of political economy, this has been almost entirely hollowed out. '*Capitalism's war on the earth'* is the remnant of a thought reduced to figurative speech—it is not the figure that brings insight into this historical matter into being. It is not a reduction in the sense that the figure-trope has any meaning. As with all matters of productionism, including the publish or perish world of academia, the product has long since forgotten the process. The superimposition of timeless 'Capitalism' has a gravity that is not so easily escaped. Even this supervacuous term has a history.

We do not need to recall that a book is a paper product and made of the earth itself, after felling a forest and milling trees en masse, to commodify this good. Recollection *is the delay* that only suggests we have yet to go through a socioanalysis, where perhaps on the other side of this, the commodity appears as our epitaph, and that of the forest too. This is one possibility of political ecology. Further, this is the evidence that 'naming and shaming' will not catch out the criminal economist nor executive that decides on greed as a value; this is hardly a decision for an entire class of people—it is compulsive and their 'environment'. Rather it is this entire criminal class that must be dealt with for the commission of crimes against the earth by this 'environment'. And this raises the sticky problem of what to do about it.

The scientific answer, the only answer that sustains reason in the face of such an un-reasoning and malevolent class, is also the response that recognizes the depth of the imagination for harms, the criminal fantasy of the business class. We must come to terms with how through terrorism, hostage taking, and stupidfying acts of objective (environmental) and subjective (symbolic) violence, every effort has been made by elitists and conservatives to hold onto ignorance and hierarchy. This in no way absolves liberal unreason: the naturalization of the market as a way to attain the status that they oppose is no paradox when we consider that middle-class social scientists will never look into the mirror they hold up to shame the rest of society. Militant radicals, sadistic conservatives, and ashamed liberals make for a particular westernized society, ignorant that this is its social structure. The fourth term of which is that ignorance itself: unconscious recourse to this system such that no one of these parties releases the others from the antagonism that binds them all together. An unconscious that begins to appear as the transposition of each of these chronotopes in the 'politics' they deny or disavow as a way to hasten to their own respective 'end of history'. The unifying theme of course is 'the end' of the earth that is cynically risked as the exigency necessary for symbolizing their respective

doxological commitments. It is a transposition of multiple narratives and misprisions that claim the same timespace as their own. Whether it is the protest that claims 'the street', 'the people', and time as 'revolution', or the police that claim to 'protect property', 'life', and 'liberty', or the reactionary mob that claims 'nation', 'race', and 'righteous' violence, these practiced narratives resonate by overlapping with their opponents. An actually radical thought starts with this social fact and this social structure, and it is from this position that the 'unthinkable' begins to become possible as actual revolution and transformation; and specifically not the 'unthinkable' as the exigency that catastrophizes the planet to dominate a globe.

The illicit thought is that this socio-symbolic structure can be rejected. That it is not inevitable and it is no place from which to think social-science. The socio-symbolic structure of this tripartite westernized world, with its variety of organizing principles—the revolutionary event of the militant, the hierarchy of the conservative, the equilibrations of the liberal, are themselves *objects*—that also *objectivate* such a 'world'. Whether fetishized or reviled as cynical ploys—they are always both—whether made practicable by the naïve or staged in criticism, the realization of these *virtual* things are strangely denatured; it was never the case that such objects be anything other than mere *potential* or *dynamei*, a motive force and not materializable otherwise. We know these in yet other ways for their excess, for the dynamism that surpasses its own structure to its meaning and even transformation.

As *drives* these are collective objective manifestations only in action, in the actuation that simultaneously conceals the socio-symbolic system that drive belongs to, just as it puts it into motion. It was never the case that these mythoi and their *vertical time* (not abiding the horizontal time of the anthropomorph: natality→ maturation→ mortality), and their *disembodiment* (the dissevered mind/body, mind/world, mind/word, that animates anglo-analytic imagination), their *a-subjectivity* (having no proper subject the militant generates its own antagonists, the conservative its own biopolitical subjects, and the liberal its necropolitical citizens) and their *incommunicability*, be made *real*. These virtual objects are *objects* and resist and obstruct, *object*-to our inquiry as their captivating power; the power of the concept, later the experiment[179].

'Real-izing' a drive is objectivation, and in the paradox demonstrated here, the object is also a compelling force in the world as worldly thing—yet only for the fact that it is *made* objective 'in the first place'. Working through this invidious circle means surpassing the inertia of political economic mythoi for their timeless-ness and displacement (de-spatialization); what Wallerstein notes as 'eternal time of the social sciences' and what much earlier Benjamin indicated as the stasis of official history, what Bourdieu refers to as the paralysis of a destiny effect, and what Luhmann refers to as a *supervacuous* attribute of systems[180] (Wallerstein 1988)(Benjamin 2003)(Bourdieu 2001)(Luhmann 2013). It also means working-through a hollowing out of *a-subjectivity*, of inertial and captive *identifications* (Adorno 2005c); the use of the term *dispositif* covers this sense of our 'intimate' trait of personality or character as also a device and instrument

[179] See *Science as a vocation* in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (Weber 1946). On Adorno's advance upon this, see the relevant chapters in *Negative Dialectics* (Adorno 1973)

[180] A turn on the other Latin phrase, *superfluous*, which is the Marxian thinking of ruin in flux—ρωο—par excellence. Poetically: "all that is solid melts into air", especially that *Verdammt Metall* of gold as *specie* and the objective drive of liberalist state- and cameral-science: statistics.

of/for *quadrillage* and the 'grid' of social types into which we are thrown (Foucault 1995)—the yield of instrumental reason that is *extimate* in the Lacanian phrasing (Miller 2008)(Zizek 2008), and very well anticipated in that refraction of milieu in the individual as *Stahlharte Gehäuser* (steel-hard shell) as Weber's astute formulation—ironically lost now upon multiple generations of sociologists by mistranslation or by functional illiteracy when it comes to this work (Weber 2002). Finally, this socioanalytic working-through must observe the incommunicability of these objective, *extimate*, drives: the attribute of their systemic repulsion of our inquiry, explanation, and understanding, as the doxological, non-knowledge, and foregrounded miscomprehension—*misprisions*—that they are. Again we can turn to the language of harms and crimes and observe that it is *doxological*, that militant *belief* in a revolutionary event *is what is real* and not comprehending it as *potential*; the conservative *belief* in hierarchy is *real*, not the hierarchy imposed; that liberal *belief* in equilibrations *is real*, not the actual balance points, 'sustainable economics', 'steady states', or other Club of Rome systems fantasies. These structural objects are delimited by their devices of 'action', 'sovereign power', 'progress', and so on, that always point beyond themselves in bad-faith in that other venerable Protestant ethic of stupefaction: "here I stand, I can do naught else".

These unacceptable *terms* also place transformative thought—theory—beyond the pale of such limited world views. The 'rightness' of Wallerstein's 'transformative timespace' is an event that is not 'dust' in his words as they follow Braudel's own denigration of 'geo-political timespace'. Wallerstein, having no place for theory, and by this sense of the rightness of an event as opposed to its forgettable eventuality, no place for politics either, resembles the on one hand the spectre of a Marx that distrusted Comtean sociology, and on the other the later sociologists that also vied for an end to politics as a matter of social organization instead. I am not stating that Wallerstein ever held such positions, nor am I doing as many pragmatist sociologists do and valorising an atheoretical anti-idiographic 'macroview' of society as its proper mode of analysis.
A pleasant surprise is that Wallerstein's cautious language allows that 'transformative timespace' and however this chronotope shapes that narrative instance, to be differential:

> "By transformational TimeSpace, finally, I mean exactly the opposite kind of analysis, one which emphasizes the specialness of the occurrence, its exceptional quality, and its profound effect on all the major institutions of our world. The Christian explanation of the coming of Christ on earth is one such explanation. We can cite the year and the place, but do they matter Or if you prefer a more secular example, we talk of the "agricultural revolution." Here too we can cite the year and the place, though much more approximately, but once again, does it matter? What matters is the profound transformation or rupture that we believe has occurred, and which has affected everything subsequent to it. And yet, although the particular place and time do not seem to matter in the sense that they are not really part of its intrinsic or even its immediate explanation, transformational TimeSpace is said to occur, as we shall see, at the "right" time and place, therefore in a sense at the only time and space at which it could have occurred." (p.3 *The Time of Space and the Space of Time: The Future of Social Science*)(Wallerstein 1998a)

The virtual erodes the actual, the flux and ruin of the event—the rupture—in what we only observe after the event. Close to Foucault's rupture and Bachelard's epistemic break to be sure, and not poorly aligned with the Real of Lacan, Beck's choice of the word *catastrophe* for the society that is transformed as reflexive of its event of transformability is a good choice for the ruinous timespace of political ecology.

The difference between virtual and actual is the metabolism that we fail to observe in the naturalistic reception to time's arrow and the surfaces we transit in ordinary activities. Horizontal time and space appear as the inevitability of the flow from past to future and the familiar ineluctable surface that is neither of any significant expanse nor depth. Ruins appear to refer only to what is eroded into past and the insignificant refuse that flows towards inertia. This is challenged by that horizontal time that allows that what were ruins were actually traces of a coming timespace; a future and space that appears from out of the opacity of the horizon, now as a frontier. Time meets us from a direction that appears to be the reverse of the obvious and natural. The Platonic concept becomes the Baconian technological ideal in the experiment and introduces uncertainty and anonymity to worlds much more rigid and predictable than this risky adventure. Science and theory, if restricted to these terms remains positivistic: direction is still possible and intelligible, horizons may have expanded yet they are not broken nor transcended. This is the thinking that has seemed most threatened by the discoveries of the social sciences, the resonance of social systems makes evident that time and space are neither separable this way, nor are they constrained to horizontal, equalizable and thus readily and conveniently calculable modes of perception.

The major shift is not the reversibility of time's direction nor the expansiveness as opposed to localization of space and surface. Rather it is the paradox of timespace that Bakhtin assures is the grounds of the litterateur and what allows Wallerstein to reappraise the event as rupture and transformation. The aporia of this fusion, 'timespace', and the chronotope as the play of the virtual and actual in the experiment of the novel, provide us with the superimposition of time-and-space, "running the terms together", and also demonstrating our suspended disbelief to be a doxological experiment in this impossible perspective of relativized timespace as real—because real in effect. The vertical time of this superimposition operates because it resonates or it does not. The same for the superimposition of spaces. Wallerstein notes this effect:

> "Whatever explanation I provide within the context of any of the five varieties, there will be others who will say that I have got the particular definitions of time and space wrong. Surely that is what is at stake in Ulster. For the Sinn Fein, Ulster is part of a space called Ireland morally and historically, if not juridically. For the Unionists, Ulster is part of a space called the United Kingdom morally, historically, and juridically. In addition, if you ask either side for how long this has been true, you will get different answers." (p.4 ibid)(Wallerstein 1998a)

More examples follow for each of the five examples of timespace. However, what I have tried to do is theorize the *levels* at which these timespace operate, and the attribution of their phases in relation to one another—much as Bakhtin's literary chronotope—and as properties of timespace that defy familiar experience of 'worlds' or frames. This is why the terms 'epoché', 'bracketing' of world and 'suspension' of familiar perception have been important in their articulation as uncommon and passé terms; when phenomenology was new these terms were unfamiliar for their novelty, not their history. By superimposition, whether the fading into a past or dissipating into the future, demonstrates a flux that is not two different timespace events. The aporia of vertical timespace is the overlapping and stacking that builds upon itself—it is precisely an event sui generis—in the resonance of which that thing is also our recognition of it. Society has become knowable to us not for its history as the inverse household and visibilization of the invisible. Rather, *it* is this vertical timespace of communications that resonates or not and organizes our experience thereby. Ruins come from this superimposition as the effect of an

approach ‘from out of nowhere’ and a disappearance much the same. The approach of social timespace is not timely at all, but it is resonant. We are part of this resonance by our recognition of it.

The discovery of superimposed timespace allows for a world that has no boundaries, rather it has intensities, what Wallerstein would assent as centers in their centripetal attraction, and peripheries that are the centrifugal dispelled detritis. The misappropriation of such a world yields transpositions of cornucopian impossibility, of a stupefying limitlessness that is the ruins of the earth for the expropriation of it, that resonates desire to the point of limitless avarice and rejects whatever does not resonate this way.

Transposed timespace can also be the actually transformative rather than recursive over-graphing of the planet. The amassed timespaces already have the seeds of resonance of a different kind in them. By intensifying these we transpose desires upon them to make them resonate. Do we make timespace resonate or do we recall it and forecast it? Wallerstein has observed that the precise idiographic dating of events does not matter to ruptures in social timespace.
A transposed timespace demonstrates—it is not an experiment—our responsibility to the resonance that is the social, how in constituting it, we are simultaneously of it. We build an awareness, or not, into timespaces by the overlapping maps, monuments, documents, and roads that are a superimposition that disorders the ordinary flow of time and cardinality of space by such things as cosmographs, and innocuous stands of grass. These interobjective bundles of relations are realised in resonance. A typology concerning life and death can be imposed this way.

The superimposition of timespace, what Bergson—before Braudel and Wallerstein—comprehends as *durée*, is both a strange *velocity* and *resistance*: the former a relativization by ‘speed’ of collapse or emergence, acceleration or deceleration in flight or flux. It is the ‘collapse’ of timespace in social theorists such as Baudrillard and the ‘compression’ of space-time in the work of Harvey. The latter—resistance—is, the *umwelt* that is the dative ‘given-ness’ and *apodicticity* of Husserl’s subjects/objects, the being-in-the-world that Heidegger discloses and exploits *for* intelligibility—his own dative of manifestation. That dative has a milieu that Foucault describes as an order of beings and things, a close relative of an administration of things. This Heideggerian radicalization is precisely what is questioned in the Luhmannian question of post-ontology regarding our response to this circumspection that we are already involved in. That is *involuted* as our ‘milieu’ or social and environmental framework. Just what knowledge/power are we responsible to?

Afterlife in the sense that our actions all have consequences includes *theory* and *therapy*. We can zealously cleave to, foolishly neglect and deny, disabuse by and armor ourselves in ‘theory’—or whatever goes by that name—as a way to ignore social actions as part of social systems. Methodologism is that oscillation between dissimulating the power of processes and techniques—*as if* these social actions where not more virtual than practical, a model is not that which it models—when not knowingly denying that they are no more than flight from the captivity to the very techniques themselves; what deforms and turns around as condescension by pedantry delivered in bad-faith. Similarly therapy must come to ruin through the zealous resistance to knowledge that is collective memory and mythos, later the hollow gesture to these

impossibilities and the denial that this is a story ‘twice told’, what oscillates with the reactive disabuse—as if this was the goal of therapy and socioanalysis—and disownment of this power/knowledge; lastly the scoundrels progress turns back on itself by becoming the ‘therapist’ because there is none. Missing the point: we are resistant—objectal—and it was this objective unconscious we were to discover in psychoanalysis.

In socioanalysis this *collective* and institutional resistance to institutional (self)knowledge (reflexive upon its own reifications) by the delay of institutional memory—both the simple storied process of audience, of giving a hearing to our own embeddedness in collective and shared social actions, *and* the delay that is the neglect to give audience, to give a hearing at all, as actual repression—is also the timing that is *apropos* to collapsing distinctions too-fast (the correctivism of the demand to ‘check your privilege’ becomes deputization) or exploding classification too-slowly (the appeal to juridical power/knowledge that openly admits that it is decades behind cultural knowledge of racism, sexism, etcetera, and then proceeds to slow the realization to a standstill) as the well placed *malaprop*.

Institutional memory exists in the very infrastructure that make these institutions possible. Working-through may come to mean that the roadway that conceals overlapping pedestrian chronotopes, the footpath that was guarded against colonization, later the pathway of invaders and later still fugitives, is beneath our feet and disappearing into the foreground. It will also come to mean that every settlement, and every erasure becomes storied for the silent lesson that has for us, should we attend it and its silence. Finally the ruin of stigma is the silent speech of political economy made flesh, our interobjectivity. Just as the Ruins that resonate with us in sublimity are not so inanimate in their silence either. The remnant ecologies promise the contours of the future as much as they are also a remainder of a past, and these are superimposed such that we always face the aporia of a bios and metabolism that we are no more or less a part of. Learning this may demand giving audition to the silent ruins of the earth.

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APPENDIX

GLOSSARY

Terminology in social science—its concepts and explanations—are not stable, not continuous and lawlike, above all not universal, and often used without reference nor recognition of actual provenance; that is, neither its *historical context* nor *socio-political context* within states or among peoples is carried through in its use. This neglect of the socio-historical reality of classification in language is perpetuated by the practices of the sociologists themselves.

This absence of context in sociological articulations is itself a recent, mid-twentieth century development with two very obvious trajectories: the increasing operationalism of terms following experimentalist approaches stem from the natural sciences vital to post world war two re-construction and a military-industrial complex necessitated by cold war partitions of technical and scientific efforts; and the return of positivism also rooted in the natural sciences, yet no longer following the work of August Comte and Herbert Spencer, rather the work of Paul Lazarsfeld, in company of Robert Merton and Talcott Parsons. The role of Lazarsfeld in particular in the a-historic vacuum that is a methodologistic reception of 'grand theory', with or without either the practical parlance of Merton or the sophistications of Parsonian theory, has inaugurated another phase of 'crisis' in sociology that has splintered the discipline, and invisibilizing itself, has also become lost to institutional memory too (who recalls 'the crisis' was the language of Alvin Gouldner)?

A political and socio-historic context of neglect of language, and a language-like social structure of society, is also a phenomenon of the Anglo-Sphere in its selection and often outright rejection of social theories from Europe. The work of Ferdinand de Saussure and Claude Levi-Strauss were regularly reassessed in the Francophone world throughout the post-world war two period, only beginning to resonate in the U.S. late in this century. What would be called 'structuralism' in France following Levi-Strauss in particular, has a parallel in German sociology following Karl Marx's own infra-structure/super-structure model and much later reassessed with the vindicating insights coming from the discovery of Marx's notes in *The German Ideology*, which has been important to both the Frankfurt School following Georg Lukacs, and later, by Ernesto Laclau and Stuart Hall following the work of Antonio Gramsci. This example is particularly important in the opposition to Leninist and Stalinist appropriations of Marx and socio-political context of these distinct readings of the term *Ideology*. Max Weber's subtlety in constructing *Ideal Types* is often lost where *Gedankenbild,,* as 'historical-images of thought', are neglected as figures most often (but not exclusively!) discovered in language itself. Here the debate around his most famous essay, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* has been entirely misrepresented, most especially by a literal reading of this thesis and ignoring that the configuration, or *constellation of the argument,* is what constituted the kernel of debate in Weber's own time, and not the literalist reading demonstrated by the misunderstanding of historians. A failure of functional literacy that not only neglects to recognize this constellation as a willfully constructed figure for our understanding (Weber refers to his construction of *ideal-types* as deliberately "one-sided" for historical comparison), it simply reduces Weber's historiographic interpretation to a linear and chronicle-like explanation.

Travesty may well belong to poor translation, yet the perpetuation of this insensitivity to language is what is in fact reproduced, with the ironic consequences that it is precisely Weber's

own thesis that has fallen prey to this popular constellation of false 'historical-imagery'—a mis-representation—of Weber's own thought.
Another important example is that of the absent political and socio-historical provenance of *Socioeconomic Status (SES)*, a common sociological term that has been de-coupled from theory, specifically *class*, in either Marx or Max Weber's definition and *theorization*. In this double sense *SES* is both a positivist reading of *class* in terms of measure drawn from census work in the early twentieth century and an obviation of any theory of *classification* whatsoever. There are obvious consequences of reducing *class* to *SES* and omitting both theory and the shift in sociological language, not the least of which is the important reassessment of *SES* for the omission of the effect of *intersectionality*: the matrix of unduly neglected and disproportionate socio-economic effects, and un-measured inter-generational traumatic affects of race (white political economic racialization), and (masculine dominated, asymmetric binary structures of) gender, in this mode of classification, insofar as it has become part of the institution of Law in the United States.
This glossary will illustrate the usage of these terms for the purpose of this dissertation, although this is not the predominate purpose of making use of the language of social theorists and the intertextual resources of socio-theoretic discourse. Rather, it is for comparative purposes that different theorizations are raised; as comparisons between different modes of theorization and the timespaces from which they are generated. As in the previous examples, these comparisons can lift out distinctions in socio-political conditions for sociological discourse and its recollection, socio-cultural theories of ideology, mis-readings and misprisions of arguments or concepts, and the disavowal if not outright disownment of the effects of classification and class as crimes of omission legitimized by the institution of law and legal language itself.
***<u>Glossary entries that include citations are quotes</u>.** I have removed the quotation marks only for ease of reference, and frequently either omitted words or sentences in paraphrase of the original quote and to condense the text for the purpose of definition. In all cases the reader requiring the full passage for the quote is directed to the text reference that follows the entry. In other instances, I have either re-arranged or supplemented these quotes with material from the original which appears in square brackets: […].
Where I have interjected my own voice into the quote this appears in square brackets and my initials: [… T.B.]; and where I use my voice to introduce concepts it is italicized following the bolded entry number under the concept or term, e.g.: **4.** *Abstraction* as *misplaced concreteness*. Additionally, the sources referenced are included in a separate bibliography at the end of the glossary, denoted by a superscript reference to the text that supplies the definition in the glossary.

Abductive. *See also LOGICS.* **1.** *As syllogistic forms of reasoning from premises in a rule (a concept) and result (evidence) to 'the case' and as "hypothesis", and distinct from reasoning to "results" as DEDUCTION and reasoning to "rules" as INDUCTION*: The chief business of the logician is to classify arguments; for all testing clearly depends on classification. The classes of the logicians are defined by certain typical forms called syllogisms [e.g.]:

DEDUCTION.
Rule.—All the beans from this bag are white.
Case.—These beans are from this bag. .".
Result.—These beans are white.
INDUCTION.

Case.—These beans are from this bag.
Result.—These beans are white. .".
Rule.—All the beans from this bag are white.
HYPOTHESIS [ABDUCTION].
Rule—All the beans from this bag are white.
Result.—These beans are white. ..
Case.—These beans are from this bag. (Peirce 1878 [1866])
2. *as the logic of theory-finding*: According to Peirce, abduction is a form of reasoning which guides many commonsense procedures and is also an important strategy of theory-finding in science. (Luckmann 1983)

Abstract, Abstracta, Abstraction. 1. *Abstract; as the absurd final form in the value theory of labor*: The need for money is therefore the true need produced by the economic system, and it is the only need which the latter produces. The *quantity* of money becomes to an ever greater degree its sole *effective* quality. Just as it reduces everything to its abstract form, so it reduces itself in the course of its own movement to *quantitative* being. *Excess* and *intemperance* come to be its true norm. (Marx 1844) **2.** *As Phenomenological Abstracta:* It is possible for us to think and speak about moments by themselves: we can speak about pitch without mentioning sound; we can refer to hue without mentioning color; we can talk about vision without mentioning the eye. When we consider moments simply by themselves, they are *abstracta*, they are being thought of abstractly. The possibility of speaking about such abstract parts, the possibility of speaking abstractly, arises because we can use language; it is language that permits us to deal with a moment apart from its necessary complement of other moments and its whole. (Sokolowski 2000) **3.** *Abstraction as the process of making abstract by separation of the fictitious commodities of labor, land, and capital as tokens of exchange*: Thus only for the workers is the separation of capital, landed property, and labour an inevitable, essential and detrimental separation. Capital and landed property need not remain fixed in this abstraction, as must the labor of the workers. (Marx 1844) **4.** *Abstraction* as *MISPLACED CONCRETENESS*: because we can refer to a moment by itself, without mentioning its associated moments we may begin to think that this moment can exist by itself, that it can become a concretum. We may begin to think about vision, for example, as though it could be by itself, apart from the eye. (Sokolowski 2000)

Actant. 1. Bruno Latour's term for a source of action; an actant can be human or not, or, most likely, a combination of both. (Bennet 2010) **2.** Something that acts or to which activity is granted by others. It implies no special motivation of human individual actors, nor of humans in general. (Bennet 2010 [Latour 1996]) **3.** An actant is neither an object nor a subject but an "intervener". (Bennet 2010 [Latour 2004]) **4.** Akin to the Deleuzean "quasi-causal operator". An operator is that which, by virtue of its particular location in an assemblage and the fortuity of being in the right place at the right time, makes the difference, makes things happen, becomes the decisive force catalyzing an event. (Bennet 2010 [De Landa 2002])

Agalma. A grave good, ornament; a splendid work; statue. In Lacanian analysis the agalma is a treasure that is 'the subject more than they are themselves', the space of/for collective life that is our social subjectivity (Butler, Laclau, and Zizek 2000).

Alienation. 1. *As the relation of* '*estrangement*' (Entfremdung): The relation of the worker to the *product of labor* as an alien object exercising power over him. This relation is at the same time the relation to the sensuous external world, to the objects of nature, as an alien world inimically opposed to him. (Marx 1844) **2.** *as the relation of* '*self-estrangement'* (Selbstentfremdung): The relation of labor to the *act of production* within the *labor* process. This relation is the relation of the worker to his own activity as an alien activity not belonging to him; it is activity as suffering, strength as weakness, begetting as emasculating, the worker's *own* physical and mental energy, his personal life – for what is life but activity? – as an activity which is turned against him, independent of him and not belonging to him. Here we have *self-estrangement*, (Marx 1844) **3.** *as the production of an aggregate world of estranged things, translated here as objectification* (Entaüsserung): the object which labor produces – labor's product – confronts it as *something alien*, as a *power independent* of the producer. The product of labor is labor which has been embodied in an object, which has become material: it is the *objectification* of labor. Labor's realization is its objectification. Under these economic conditions this realization of labor appears as *loss of realization* for the workers; objectification as *loss of the object and bondage to it*; appropriation as *estrangement*, as *alienation*. (Marx 1844) **4.** as *estrangement from the ENVIRONMENT following Hegel*: The domination of the land as an alien power over men is already inherent in feudal landed property. The serf is the adjunct of the land. Likewise, the lord of an entailed estate, the first-born son, belongs to the land. It inherits him. Indeed, the dominion of private property begins with property in land — that is its basis. (Marx 1844)

Apodeictic. *See also DEIXIS.* **1.** *Apodeictic*: Apodictic statements express things that could not be otherwise; they express necessary truths. Moreover, they are seen to express such necessary truths. We see that what they say could not be otherwise. They tell us what we already know. They are not new information, but even if they do not tell us anything new, they can still be important and illuminating, because we often are very confused about just such trivialities and necessities. (Sokolowski 2000)

Autopoiesis. 1. *Autopoiesis*: Can be applied to social systems if we succeed in identifying an operation that meets the following conditions: it must be one single operation; it must always be the same; it must possess connectivity. The concept of autopoiesis explains next to nothing, except this beginning with self-reference: an operation that possesses connectivity [*compare to the Latourian sense of novelty as post ontological. T.B.*]. (Luhmann 2013)

Categorial, Categorial Intention, Categorial Intuition. 1. *Categorial*: The word "categorial" is related to the Greek term *katēgoreō,* which originally meant the act of denouncing or accusing someone, of stating publicly that some feature belongs to him, that he is a murderer or a thief. In philosophy, the term came to mean that act of saying something about something. (Sokolowski 2000) **2.** *Categorial intention*: This is the kind of intending that articulates states of affairs and propositions, the kind that functions when we predicate, relate, collect, and introduce logical operations into what we experience. (Sokolowski 2000) **3.** *As categorial intuition arising from the experience of objects, see also ENACTION*: suppose we are perceiving an object; suppose we are looking at a car: (1) at first, we just look at in a rather passive way. No particular thinking is engaged as we continue to perceive. (2) Now, suppose that some abrasions on the surface of the car catch our attention. We zero in in them. We highlight this part of the car; not just this spatial part, but this feature, this abrasiveness, in the spatial part. (3) We interrupt the continuous flow of

perception; we go back to the whole (the car), and we now take it precisely as being the whole, and simultaneously we take the part we had highlighted (the abrasion) as being a part in that whole. At this point we can declare, "This car is damaged." This achievement is *categorial intuition*, because the categorial object, the thing in articulation, is made actually present to us. We do not just have *the car* present to us; rather. *The car's being damaged* is made present. (Sokolowski 2000)

Catastrophe. As *environmental catastrophe* **1.** Risk society is a *catastrophic* society. In it the exceptional condition threatens to become the norm. (Beck 1992)

Catalepsis. The hypostasis of meaning where subjects do not just persist in bad-faith, also subsist upon it. A cruel seizure or captivity to systems of discourse.

Chronotope. *See also TIMESPACE.* **1.** Literally, "time-space." A unit of analysis *for* studying texts according to the ratio and nature of the temporal and spatial categories represented. The distinctiveness of this concept as opposed to most other uses of time and space in literary analysis lies in the fact that neither category is privileged; they are utterly interdependent. The chronotope is an optic for reading texts as x-rays of the forces at work in the culture system from which they spring. (Holquist [Bakhtin], 1981)

Class, Classification. 1. *Class*: There are three great social groups whose members, the individuals forming them, live on wages, profit and ground-rent respectively, on the realisation of their labour-power, their capital, and their landed property. However, from this standpoint, physicians and officials, e.g., would also constitute two classes, for they belong to two distinct social groups, the members of each of these groups receiving their revenue from one and the same source. The same would also be true of the infinite fragmentation of interest and rank into which the division of social labour splits labourers as well as capitalists and landlords-the latter, e.g., into owners of vineyards, farm owners, owners of forests, mine owners and owners of fisheries. (Marx, n.d. [1894]) **2.** *Class*: We may speak of a "class" when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, insofar as (2) this component is represented exclusively by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) *is* represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets. This is "class situation." (Weber 1978b) **3.** *Social Classification*: The negotiations between antagonistic interest groups, which arise from the establishment of collective agreements and which concern, inseparably, the tasks entailed by a given job, the properties required of its occupants (e.g., diplomas) and the corresponding advantages, both material and symbolic (the name) , are an institutionalized, theatrical version of the incessant struggles over the classifications which help to produce the classes, although these classifications are the product of the struggles between the classes and depend on the power relations between them. (Bourdieu 1984)

Climate. Micro-, Meso-, Macro-climate as examples of *Umwelten* and *Milieu.*

Centrifugal, Centripetal. *See also DEIXIS.* **1.** *Centripetal and Centrifugal*: These are respectively the centralizing and decentralizing [or decentering) forces in any language or culture. The rulers and the high poetic genres of any era exercise a centripetal-a homogenizing and hierarchicizing-influence; the centrifugal (decrowning, dispersing) forces of the clown, mimic and rogue create alternative "degraded" genres down below. The novel, Bakhtin argues, is a de-normatizing and therefore centrifugal *force.* (Holquist [Bakhtin],

1981) **2.** *Tension of Centripetal pressures and Centrifugal pressures*: Any text is part repetition, part creation, and texts are sites of tension between centripetal and centrifugal pressures. Centripetal pressures follow from the need in producing a text to draw upon given conventions, of two main classes; a language and an order of discourse – that is, a historically particular structuring of discursive (text-producing) practices. More concretely, one obviously has to use English words and sentence structures in producing a text in English, and one has to select amongst the genres and discourses available in the order of discourse. Centrifugal pressures come from the specificity of particular situations of text-production, the fact that situations do not endlessly repeat one another, but are, on the contrary, endlessly novel and problematic in new ways. Texts negotiate the sociocultural contradictions and more loosely 'differences' which are thrown up in social situations, and indeed they constitute a form in which social struggles are acted out. (Fairclough 1995)

Concrete, Concreta. *See also ABSTRACT, ABSTRACTA. For* **Misplaced Concreteness** *See ABSTRACTA.* **1.** *Concrete as labor*: only when *labor* is grasped as the essence of private property, can the economic process as such be analyzed in its real concreteness. (Marx 1844) **2.** *Concrete as opposed to abstract*: Hegel having posited man as equivalent to self-consciousness, the estranged object – the estranged essential reality of man – is nothing but *consciousness*, the thought of estrangement merely – estrangement's *abstract* and therefore empty and unreal expression, *negation*. The supersession of the alienation is therefore likewise nothing but an abstract, empty supersession of that empty abstraction – the *negation of the negation*. The rich, living, sensuous, concrete activity of self-objectification is therefore reduced to its mere abstraction, *absolute negativity* – an abstraction which is again fixed as such and considered as an independent activity – as sheer activity. (Marx 1844) **3.** *Concreta*: a whole can be called a concretum, something that can exist and present itself and be experienced as a concrete individual. A piece, an independent part, is a part that can itself become a concretum. Moments, however, cannot become concreta. Whenever they exist and are experienced, they drag along their other moments with them; they exist as blended with their complementary parts. (Sokolowski 2000)

Correspondance, 'Correlation'. *See also ELECTIVE AFFINITY.*

Deixis. *See also MASTER TROPES.***1.** *As the "I" centered discursive form of TIMESPACE, see also CHRONOTOPE*: The archetypal plot of discursive formations appears to require that the narrative " I " of the discourse move from an original METAPHORICAL characterization of a domain of experience, through METONYMIC deconstructions of its elements, to SYNECDOCHIC representations of the relations between its superficial attributes and its presumed essence, to, finally, a representation of whatever contrasts or oppositions can legitimately be discerned in the totalities identified in the third phase of discursive representation [*as IRONIES*]. (White 1978) **2.** *As situational deixis*: [individuated and ideational] representation of experience and the world [by] tying texts to [immanent, immediate] situational contexts. (Fairclough 1995) **3.** *As restorative hermeneutics*: we can undertake a first type of reading which formally records, as it were, the text's interception of all relations to a world that can be pointed out and to subjectivities that can converse. This transference into the 'place' – a place which is a non-place – constitutes a special project with respect to the text, that of prolonging the suspense concerning the referential relation to the world and to the speaking subject. By means of this

special project, the reader decides to situate himself in the 'place of the text' and in the 'closure' of this place. On the basis of this choice, the text has no outside but only an inside; it has no transcendent aim, unlike a speech which is addressed to someone about something. [*see also: IDEOLOGICAL CLOSURE, STRUCTURAL COUPLING, ENACTION, and UMWELT on deictic enclosure. Note that Ricoeur is also indicating the infamous and frequently abused statement by Derrida here*: *il n'y a pas de hors-texte, "there is no outside-text". T.B*.] (Ricoeur 1981b) **4.** *As hermeneutical reflection*: in reflective hermeneutics – the constitution of the *self* is contemporaneous with the constitution of meaning. On the one hand, self-understanding passes through the detour of understanding the cultural signs in which the self documents and forms itself. On the other hand, understanding the text is not an end in itself; it MEDIATES the relation to himself as a subject who, in the short circuit of immediate reflection, does not find the meaning of his own life. Reflection is nothing without the mediation of signs and works. (Ricoeur 1981b)

Dialectic. *Not to be confused with DIALOGISM nor DIATAXIS.* **1.** *as society*: What is society, whatever its form may be? The product of men's reciprocal action. Are men free to choose this or that form of society? By no means. Assume a particular state of development in the productive faculties of man and you will get a particular form of commerce and consumption. Assume particular stages of development in production, commerce and consumption and you will have a corresponding social constitution, a corresponding organisation of the family, of orders or of classes, in a word a corresponding civil society. (Tucker 1978 [Marx 1846]) **2.** *As historical consciousness*: the identity of nature and man appears in such a way that the restricted relation of men to nature determines their restricted relation to one another ['society' T.B.] and their restricted relation to one another determines men's restricted relation to nature [*see STRUCTURAL COUPLING and MILIEU*], just because nature is as yet hardly modified historically; and, on the other hand, man's consciousness of the necessity of associating with the individuals around him is the beginning of the consciousness that he is living in society at all. (Marx and Engels 1964 [1845-46]) **3.** *As reciprocal human nature/environmental NATURE*: Dialectics, comprehends things and their representations, ideas, in their essential connection, concatenation, motion, origin, and ending. Nature is the proof of Dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has furnished this proof with very rich materials increasing daily, and thus has shown that, in the last resort, Nature works dialectically and not metaphysically; that she does not move in the eternal oneness of a perpetually recurring circle, but goes through a real historical evolution. (Engels 1892)

Dialogism. *Not to be confused with DIALECTIC nor DIATAXIS*. **1.** Dialogism is the characteristic epistemological mode of a world dominated by HETEROGLOSSIA. Everything means, is understood, as a part of a greater whole-there is a constant interaction between meanings, all of which have the potential of conditioning others. Which will affect the other, how it will do so and in what degree is what is actually settled at the moment of utterance. This dialogic imperative, mandated by the pre-existence of the language world relative to any of its current inhabitants, insures that there can be no actual monologue. One may, like a primitive tribe that knows only its own limits, be deluded into thinking there is one language, or one may, as grammarians, do, seek in a sophisticated way to achieve a unitary language. In both cases the unitariness is relative to the overpowering force of heteroglossia, and thus dialogism. (Holquist [Bakhtin], 1981)

Diataxis. 1. *as the dynamic movement of a discourse*: This notion has the merit of suggesting a somewhat different kind of relationship between the DISCOURSE, its putative subject matter, and contending interpretations of the latter. It does not suggest that discourses about reality can be classified as HYPOTACTICAL (conceptually overdetermined), on the one side, and PARATACTICAL (conceptually underdetermined), on the other, with the discourse itself occupying the middle ground (of properly syntactical thought) that everyone is seeking. (White 1978)

Discourse. 1. A discourse moves "to and fro" between received encodations of experience and the clutter of phenomena which refuses incorporation into conventionalized notions of "reality," "truth," or "possibility." It also moves "back and forth" (like a shuttle?) between alternative ways of encoding this reality, some of which may be provided by the traditions of discourse prevailing in a given domain of inquiry and others of which may be idiolects of the author, the authority of which he is seeking to establish. Discourse, in a word, is quintessential, a *MEDIATIVE* enterprise. As such, it is both interpretive and preinterpretive; it is always as much *about* the nature of INTERPRETATION itself as it is *about* the| subject matter which is the manifest occasion of its own elaboration. (White 1978)

Double Contingency. 1. The model includes an *ego* and *alter* that oppose one another. Each of them can be an individual or a group and has its own needs and effective abilities. The former depends on the successful performance of the latter, and the latter on those of the former. For instance, there was the model case of a battleship and a merchant vessel that are heading towards the same island. The island lies between them, and the combat vessel would like to catch the merchant ship. If the latter decides to circumvent the island on the northern route, then the battleship has to do the same thing. But is the battleship steers north, then it is prudent for the merchant vessel to go the other way. (Luhmann 2013)

Ecology. 1. *As conditions for social life*: the connection between the social system and its environment. (Luhmann 1986) **2.** *As Nature*: according to stoic [pre-christian] and Christian practical [political] philosophy [theory], non-human nature was to be used by everyone. *Dominium terrae* thereby became a concept by which the sacralization of all nature was prevented and the specification of what was religious was secured. Nature in this sense, so ecologically important today, was de-sacralized nature. (Luhmann 1986) **3.** *As RUINS*: Civilization took the place of the sacred as the counter-concept [18th C.] to nature. Thereby nature became, on one hand, an irretrievably lost history and, on the other, society's field of research. (Luhmann 1986) **4.** *As paradox—both terms of unity of the ecological interconnection and the difference of system and environment*: all [ecological] facts must be treated in terms of unity and difference; the unity of the difference of system and environment, not the unity of an encompassing system. (Luhmann 1986)

Elective Affinity (*Wahlverwandtschaft*), Inner-Affinity (*innere Verwandtschaft*). *See also CORRESPONDANCE, 'CORRELATION'*. **1.** A notion taken from Goethe that implies an internal connection between two different phenomena rooted in a shared feature and/or a clear historical linkage (for example, between certain religious beliefs and a vocational calling). The causal relationship is not strong enough to be designated "determining". (Kalberg 2005)

Emplotment. 1. *See also* EXPLANATION: Providing the "meaning" of a story by identifying the *kind of story* that has been told is called explanation by emplotment. If, in the course of narrating his story, the historian provides it with the plot structure of a Tragedy, he has "explained" it in one way; if he has structured it as a Comedy, he has "explained" it in another way. Emplotment is the way by which a sequence of events fashioned into a story is gradually revealed to be a story of a particular kind. (White 2013)

Enaction. *See also STRUCTURAL COUPLING.* **1.** *As embodied action*: perception consists in perceptually guided action and that cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided. **2.** *As proscriptive not prescriptive, a-priori*: cognition is not representation but embodied action and that the world we cognize is not pregiven but enacted through our history of structural coupling. (Varela et al. 1991) **3.** *As anti-biologistic and anti-Natural Selection (adaptive or optimal fit) as the received view in biological theory*: much of what an organism looks like and is "about" is completely *underdetermined* by the constraints of survival and reproduction. Thus adaptation (in its classical sense), problem solving, simplicity in design, assimilation, external "steering" and many other explanatory notions based on considerations of parsimony not only fade into the background but must in fact be completely reassimilated into new kinds of explanatory concepts and conceptual metaphors. (Varela et al. 1991) **4.** *As reciprocal*: living beings and their environments stand in relation to each other through *mutual specification* or *codetermination*. Environmental regularities are the result of a conjoint history, a congruence that unfolds from a long history of codetermination; the organism is both subject and the object of evolution. (Varela et al. 1991)

Environment. *See also MILIEU*.

Expectation. *See also MENTAL ECOSOPHY and MENTAL ECOLOGY.* **1.** *As projection*: one might perhaps say that memory is nothing but a continuous consistency test of different information, always in light of certain expectations – be it that one is aiming at certain achievements, be it that one is afraid of something, or be it that one simply sees something coming and would like to react to it. (Luhmann 2013) **2.** *As psychological concept*: The concept of expectation was introduced in psychology in the thirties in order to complicate the rigid input/output relations and stimulus-response models that were prevalent. Thus, it became possible to imagine that stimulus and response do not stand in a fixed relation to each other but instead are controlled by the expectations of the system. A stimulus can only be identified if one has certain expectations. The notion of "Generalized Expectations" (George Herbert Mead), among others, is derived from this view. (Luhmann 2013) **3.** *As definitive of STRUCTURES:* structures, then, are expectations in relation to the connectivity of operations. These operations can consist of mere experience or of action. And expectations should be understood in a sense that is not necessarily subjective at all. (Luhmann 2013)

Explanation. *See also HERMENEUTIC ARC, TWO CULTURES.*

Explanation by Ideological Implication. *See also IDEOLOGY*. The ideological dimensions of a historical account reflect the ethical element in the historian's assumption of a particular position on the question of the nature of historical knowledge and the implications that can be drawn from the study of past events for the understanding of present ones. By the term "ideology" [is meant]

a set of prescriptions for taking a position in the present world of social praxis and acting upon it (either to change the world or to maintain it in its current state); such prescriptions are attended by arguments that claim the authority of "science" or "realism". Following the analysis of Karl Mannheim, in *Ideology and Utopia* [it is postulated] four basic ideological positions: Anarchism, Conservativism, Radicalism, and Liberalism. (White 2013)

Extimate. From Lacanian psychoanalysis. Here as the 'outside within', or the 'object within the subject' that demonstrates the asymmetry of experience of society in us as much as it envelops us (Miller 2008).

Futurity. *See also EXPECTATION*. **1.** *As ontological*: In its factical being Da-sein [*Da-sein* as Heidegger's semiotic for the ontic-ontological disposition of 'Man' or 'Human being'] always is as and "what" it already was. Whether explicitly or not, it *is* its past. It is its own past not only in such a way that its past, as it were, pushes itself along "behind" it, and that it possesses what is past as a property that is still objectively present and at times has an effect on it. Da-sein "is" its past in the manner of *its* being which, roughly expressed, on each occasion "occurs" out of its future. (Heidegger 1996)

Hermeneutics. 1. Concerns the rules required for the interpretation of the written documents of our culture. The human sciences may be said to be hermeneutical (1) inasmuch as their *object* displays some of the features constitutive of a TEXT, as text, and (2) inasmuch as their *methodology* develops the same kind of procedures as those of *Auslegung* or text-interpretation; [where *Auslegung* as the term used by Wilhelm Dilthey] implies something more specific: it covers only a limited category of signs, those which are fixed by writing, including all the sorts of documents and monuments which entail a fixation similar to those of writing. (Ricoeur 1981a) **2.** *In world-systems analysis*: Originally, scholarly interpretation of Biblical texts. The term now more generally refers to an epistemology that allows the analyst to empathize with and interpret the meaning of social action, as opposed to analysis through some set of "objective" modes of knowing, say statistical analysis. (Wallerstein 2004)

Hermeneutic Arc. *See also CATEGORIAL INTENTION*. [If] we regard STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS as a stage – and a necessary one – between a naïve and a critical interpretation, between a surface and a depth interpretation, then it seems possible to situate EXPLANATION and INTERPRETATION along a unique *hermeneutical arc* and to integrate the opposed attitudes of explanation and understanding within an overall conception of reading as the recovery of meaning. (Ricoeur 1981b) (see Figure 20.)



FIGURE 20. THE HERMENEUTIC ARC

Heteroglossia. 1. The base condition governing the operation of meaning in any utterance. It is that which insures the primacy of context over TEXT. At any given time, in any given place, there will be a set of conditions-social, historical, meteorological, physiological that will insure that a word uttered in that place and at that time will have a meaning different than it would have under any other conditions; all utterances are heteroglot in that they are functions of a matrix of forces practically impossible to recoup, and therefore impossible to resolve. Heteroglossia is as close a conceptualization as is possible of that locus where CENTRIPETAL and CENTRIFUGAL forces collide; as such, it is that which a systematic linguistics must always suppress. ([Holquist] Bakhtin 1981)

Hyper-Visibilization. *See also INVISIBILIZATION*. **1.** The structural contradiction that is at their heart condemns movements springing from dominated and stigmatized groups to oscillate between invisibilization and exhibition [a form of *hyper-visibilization*], between the suppression and the celebration of difference. (Bourdieu 2001)

Ideology, Ideology-critique. 1. *Ideology as historical concept*: from Destutt de Tracy, who had introduced the neologism 'ideology' in order to conceptualise an exact *science* of ideas, to the consecutive attack on the 'ideologists' by Emperor Napoleon I. (Rehmann 2014) **2.** *Ideology as neutral concept of Marxism-Leninism*: In both 'Marxism-Leninism' and the 'sociology of knowledge', which became the predominant school in 'Western' social theories, the ideological was then considered 'neutral' in the sense that it functioned as a medium allowing the expression and representation of different, even opposing, class-interests. (Rehmann 2014) **3.** *Ideology as critical concept of Marx & Engels*: the critique of ideology as necessarily inverted consciousness; ideology was accomplished by the thinker with a 'false consciousness', who missed the real motive impelling him. (Rehmann 2014) **4.** *Ideology as critique of false-consciousness*: Both Feuerbach and Marx shared the theoretical perspective of fetching back the wishes and yearnings that had been 'alienated' in religion, and to strive for their fulfillment on earth. The main difference was that Marx described this alienation not in terms of a general humanism, but located it in the 'inverted world' i.e. in the structures of domination of class-societies. (Rehmann 2014) **5.** *Ideology-critique as reconstructive of real inversions in social relations*: [Marx and Engels] identified such inversions first in the division of manual and intellectual labour, then in fetishism of the commodity, money, and capital, and finally in the detached position of the state emerging with class-antagonisms as the 'first ideological power' (Engels) over society. [*Rehmann's text continues by investigating the loss of these themes in "the consecutive development of Marxism" as the subject matter of its early chapters: chapters one, two, and three, respectively. Ibid, T.B.]* (Rehmann 2014) **6.** *Ideology-critique as deciphering of guile or suspicion*: an exegesis of meaning; [beginning with Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche] understanding is hermeneutics: henceforward, to seek meaning is no longer to spell out the consciousness of meaning, but to *decipher its expressions*. What must be faced, therefore, is not only a threefold suspicion, but a threefold guile, against the prejudices of their times, a mediate *science* of meaning, irreducible to the immediate *consciousness* of meaning. To make their 'conscious' methods of deciphering coincide with the 'unconscious' *work* of ciphering which they attributed to the will to power, to social being, to the unconscious psychism. *Guile will be met by double guile.* (Ricoeur 1970) **7.** *Ideology-critique as a de-psychologizing reactivation of the 'labour' of TEXTS as cultural artefacts*: The entire theory of hermeneutics consists in mediating this interpretation-appropriation [of texts] by the series of interpretants which belong to the work of the text itself. Appropriation loses its arbitrariness insofar as it is the recovery of

that which is at work, in labour, within the text. What the interpreter says is a re-saying which re-activates what is said by the text. (Ricoeur 1981b) **8.** *In world-systems analysis*: Usually, a coherent set of ideas that inform a particular point of view. The term can be used either neutrally (everyone has an ideology) or negatively (the others have an ideology, as opposed to our scientific or scholarly analysis). The term is used more narrowly in world-systems analysis to mean a coherent strategy in the social arena from which one can draw political conclusions. In this sense, there have been ideologies only since the French Revolution, after which it was necessary to have a coherent strategy about the continuing demand for political change, and there have been only three: CONSERVATISM, LIBERALISM, and RADICALISM. [*See also EXPLANATION BY IDEOLOGICAL IMPLICATION.* T.B.] (Wallerstein 2004)

Ideological Closure. 1. *As textual symptom of socio-structural enclosure by contradiction*: The point about this binary opposition, however, is not its logical accuracy as a thought concerned to compare only comparable entities and oppose only terms of the appropriate category, but, on the contrary, its existence as a symptom; opposition as an antinomy for the mind, a dilemma, an aporia, which itself expresses-in the form of an ideological closure--a concrete social contradiction. (Jameson 1981)

Idiographic-Nomothetic. This pair of terms was invented in Germany in the late nineteenth century to describe what was called the Methodenstreit (battle of methods) among social scientists, one that reflected the division of scholarship into the TWO CULTURES. Nomothetic scholars insisted on replicable, "objective" (preferably quantitative) methods and saw their task as one of arriving at general laws explaining social realities. Idiographic scholars used largely qualitative, narrative data, considering themselves humanists, and preferred HERMENEUTIC methods. Their principal concern was interpretation, not laws, about which they were at the very least skeptical. (Note that idiographic is different from ideographic. "Idio-" is a prefix derived from Greek and means specific, individual, one's own; hence idiographic means of or relating to particular descriptions. "Ideo-" is a prefix derived from Latin and means picture, form, idea; hence ideographic means of or relating to a non-alphabetic writing system, such as Chinese characters.) (Wallerstein 2004)

Immanent Critique. 1. *Sociology presented as critical theory*: [bourgeois themes] found expression as insufficient freedom, equality, justice or reason. The part that sociology played within this social discussion was the self-critique of society vis-à-vis determinate ideals, not frustration regarding uncertain hopes and fears [ecological risks]. The theoretical background for this discussion has long since disappeared even though the ‘simultaneity of the non-simultaneous’ still had to be reckoned with for a long time. (Luhmann 1986)

Inductive. *See also LOGICS.*

Inter-Objectivity. A term variously used in flat ontology associated with Bruno Latour and Object Oriented Ontology associated with Graham Harman. In this text it is drawn from Timothy Morton’s work following O.O.O.: interrelationships between aesthetic properties of objects (Morton 2013).

Interpassivity. Here following Robert Pfaller and Slavoj Zizek is exemplified by the canned laughter that gives us the freedom not to laugh. Interpassivity is an institution that does affective work for us (Pfaller 2003)(Zizek 2006).

Interpretation. *See also HERMENEUTIC ARC, TWO CULTURES.*

Intricant. A term borrowed from Emmanuel Levinas, specifically in his phenomenology of the other. *Intricant* social relations are the oppositions and accusations that we take recourse to despite the trouble they very clearly create by simply regenerating 'wicked problems'; dysfunctional systems that (somehow) continue to function. Compare to the problem of *complication* raised by Bruno Latour in his Science and Technology Studies, and Niklas Luhmann's careful distinction of STRUCTURAL COUPLING, as the concepts, Gestalt, or 'frame', by which observers of systems (mis)understand systems meaning for the system that they observe. Finally, compare to the 'knot' of complications in Lacanian psychoanalysis that exist only to complicate matters of identification and desire, for the sake of transference as the continuity of the Other.

Invisibilization. **1.** Oppression in the form of 'invisibilization' comes through a refusal of legitimate, public existence, i.e. of an existence that is known and recognized, especially by law, and through a stigmatization which never appears more clearly than when the [social] movement claims visibility. It is then explicitly invited to return to the 'discretion' or dissimulation that it is ordinarily required to observe. (Bourdieu 2001)

Isotopy. Following Greimas isotopy is the repetition of a seme in a sentence. Here isotopy is the multiplication of meanings by enaction of socio-symbolic acts (Greimas 1983).

Logics: Deductive, Inductive, Abductive. 1. *Problems of deduction*: The supreme task of the physicist is … the search for those most general, elementary laws from which the world picture is to be obtained through pure deduction. No logical path leads to these elementary laws; it is instead just the intuition that rests on an empathic understanding of experience. In this state of methodological uncertainty one can think that arbitrarily many, in themselves equally justified systems of theoretical principles were possible; and this opinion is, *in principle*, certainly correct. But the development of physics has shown that of all the conceivable theoretical constructions a single one has, at any given time, proved itself unconditionally superior to all others. No one who has really gone deeply into the subject will deny that, in practice, the world of perceptions determines the theoretical system unambiguously, even though no logical path leads from the perceptions to the basic principles of the theory. (Einstein 1918, 31; Howard's translation) (Howard, Don A. Giovanelli 2019) **2.** *the problem of induction*: Hume asks on what grounds we come to our beliefs about the unobserved on the basis of inductive inferences. He presents an argument in the form of a dilemma which appears to rule out the possibility of any reasoning from the premises to the conclusion of an inductive inference. There are, he says, two possible types of arguments, "demonstrative" and "probable", but neither will serve. A demonstrative argument produces the wrong kind of conclusion, and a probable argument would be circular. Therefore, for Hume, the problem remains of how to explain why we form any conclusions that go beyond the past instances of which we have had experience (T. 1.3.6.10). Hume stresses that he is not disputing that we do draw such inferences. The challenge, as he sees it, is to understand the "foundation" of the inference—the "logic" or "process of argument" that it is based upon (E.

4.2.21). The problem of meeting this challenge, while evading Hume's argument against the possibility of doing so, has become known as "the problem of induction". (Henderson 2020) **3.** *problems of abduction*: In the philosophical literature, the term "abduction" is used in two related but different senses. In both senses, the term refers to some form of explanatory reasoning. However, in the historically first sense, it refers to the place of explanatory reasoning in *generating* hypotheses, while in the sense in which it is used most frequently in the modern literature it refers to the place of explanatory reasoning in *justifying* hypotheses. In the latter sense, abduction is also often called "Inference to the Best Explanation." (Douven 2021)

Long Dureé. *See SOCIAL TIME*.

Master Tropes. 1. *From Scienza Nuova*: **(1) Metaphor:** 404 All the first tropes are corollaries of this poetic logic. The most luminous and therefore the most necessary and frequent is metaphor. 405 It is noteworthy that in all languages the greater part of the expressions relating to inanimate things are formed by metaphor from the human body and its parts and from the human senses and passions. **(2) Metonym:** 406 In such a logic, sprung from such a metaphysics, the first poets must have given names to things from the most particular and the most sensible ideas. Such ideas are the sources, respectively, of synecdoche and metonymy. Metonymy of agent for act resulted from the fact that names for agents were commoner than names for acts. Metonymy of subject for form and accident was due to the fact that, as we have said in the Axioms [209], they did not know how to abstract forms and qualities from subjects. Certainly metonymy of cause for effect produced in each case a little fable, in which the cause was imagined as a woman clothed with her effects: ugly Poverty, sad Old Age, pale Death. **(3) Synecdoche:** 407 Synecdoche developed into metaphor as particulars were elevated into universals or parts united with the other parts together with which they make up their wholes. Thus the term "mortals" was originally and properly applied only to men, as the only beings whose mortality there was any occasion to notice. The use of "head' for man or person, so frequent in vulgar Latin, was due to the fact that in the forests only the head of a man could be seen from a distance. The word "man" itself is abstract, comprehending as in a philosophic genus the body and all its parts, the mind and all its faculties, the spirit and all its dispositions. **(4) Irony:** 408 Irony certainly could not have begun until the period of reflection, because it is fashioned of falsehood by dint of a reflection which wears the mask of truth. Here emerges a great principle of human things, confirming the origin of poetry disclosed in this work: that since the first men of the gentile world had the simplicity of children, who are truthful by nature, the first fables could not feign anything false; they must therefore have been, as they have been defined above, true narrations. (Vico 1948 [1744]) **2.** *Tropes as pre-figurative turns of phrase*: 409 From all this it follows that all the tropes (and they are all reducible to the four types above discussed), which have hitherto been considered ingenious inventions of writers, were necessary modes of expression of all the first poetic nations, and had originally their full native propriety. But these expressions of the first nations later became figurative when, with the further development of the human mind, words were invented which signified abstract forms or genera comprising their species or relating parts with their wholes. And here begins the overthrow of two common errors of the grammarians: that prose speech is proper speech, and poetic speech improper; and that prose speech came first, and afterwards speech in verse. **3.** *As types of indirect figurative discourse*: Both traditional poetics and modern language theory identify basic tropes for the analysis of poetic, or figurative, language: METAPHOR, METONYM, SYNECDOCHE, and IRONY.

These tropes permit the characterization of objects in different kinds of indirect, or figurative, discourse. They are especially useful for understanding the operations by which the contents of experience which resist description in unambiguous prose representations can be prefiguratively grasped and prepared for conscious apprehension. (White 2013 [1973])

Mediation, Mediator. *See also VANISHING MEDIATOR.* **Medium**. *See also MILIEU. Mediation:* **1.** The relationship between the levels or instances, and the possibility of adapting analyses and findings from one level to another. Mediation is the classical dialectical term for the establishment between, say, the formal analysis of a work of art and its social ground, or between the internal dynamics of the political state and its economic base. (Jameson 1981)

Mental Ecology. *See also MENTAL ECOSOPHY, EXPECTATION,*

Mental Ecosophy. *See also EXPECTATION.* **1.** For a wider discussion of ecosophy see 'The Ecosophic Object' in *Chaosmosis*. While it shares with traditional ecology a concern for biological species and the biosphere, ecosophy also recognizes 'incorporeal species' that are equally endangered, and an entire 'mental ecology' in crisis: ' How do we change mentalities, how do we reinvent social practices that would give back to humanity - if it ever had it - a sense of responsibility, not only for its own survival, but equally for the future of all life on the planet, for animal and vegetable species, likewise for incorporeal species such as music, the arts, cinema, the relation with time, love and compassion for others, the feeling of fusion at the heart of the Cosmos?' ([Guattari] Pindar and Sutton 2000 [1989])

Milieu. *See also SYSTEM* **1.** *As environmental milieu*: The eighteenth century discovered the meaning of milieu, i.e., of being situated concretely, for example, as the connection between climate and culture. Stimulated by progress in agricultural technology, the early French economists (physiocrats) saw property as a legal institution that is both economically and ecologically ideal because it guarantees the proper treatment of natural resources while it reconciles them with human interests. (Luhmann 1986) **2.** *as historical—platonic and Aristotelian—milieu*: historical investigations of the concepts of *periechon*, *continens*, *ambiens*, *ambiente*, and medium can show that what is today called environment was viewed by the Greek and even the medieval [European] tradition as an encompassing body, if not as a living cosmos that assigned the proper place to everything in it. These traditions had in mind the relation of a containment of little bodies within a larger one. (Luhmann 1986) *See also UMWELT*. **3.** *as system environment*: As the totality of external circumstances, it is whatever restricts the randomness of the morphogenesis of the system and exposes it to evolutionary selection, the 'unity' of the environment is nothing more than a correlate of the unity of the system since everything that is a unity for the system is defined by unity. (Luhmann 1986) **4.** *As inverse (converse) property relations*: [in the 18th C., France] the *internalization* of the consequences of actions and their inclusion in rational calculation were viewed as a function of property. Today the converse is the case: the consequences of actions are discussed in terms of *externalization* and property is criticized for lacking in responsibility for these consequences. (Luhmann 1986).

Narrative, Narratological. 1. *As individual* history: in order for people to understand their own lives people put them into narrative form – and they do the same when they try to understand the lives of others. (Czarniawska 2004) **2.** *As a history of narratives; how individual narratives are related to societal narratives:* To understand a society or some part of a society, it is important

to discover its repertoire of legitimate stories and find out how it evolved. (Czarniawska 2004) **3.** *As societal narratives, enculturation, or* socialization: the chief means of moral education in pre-modern societies was the telling of stories in a genre fitting the kind of society whose story was being told. Thus in the process of socialization, or as anthropologists call it, enculturation, young people were helped to attribute meaning to their lives by relating them to the legitimate narrative of the society to which they belonged. Thus the main narrative of, and in, heroic societies was epic and saga, whereas the genre of city-states was tragedy, both reflecting and expressing the prevalent stance toward human fate and human communities. (Czarniawska 2004 [MacIntyre 1981-1990]) **4.** *As form of social life*: A narratological approach in both the humanities and social sciences is useful to think of an enacted narrative as the most typical form of social life. This need not be an ontological claim; life might of might not be an enacted narrative but conceiving of it as such provides a rich source of insight. (Czarniawska 2004) **5.** *Narrative as central in philosophical idealism*: [narrative is] the central function or instance of the human mind. (Jameson 1981) **6.** *Narratology as human conduct understood as enacted narrative*: it is impossible to understand human conduct while ignoring its intentions, and it is impossibly to understand human intentions while ignoring the settings in which they take place (Czarniawska 2004 [Schütz 1973]).

Narrative Analysis. 1. *As analysis of linear TIMESPACE* : in *Poetics* Aristotle said that a narrative has a beginning, middle, and end. Ever since, scholars agree that sequence is necessary, if not sufficient, for narrative. [In linear timespace] stories follow a chronological sequence: the order of events move in a linear way through time. (Riessman 1993) **2.** *As analysis of consequential TIMESPACE*: [In consequential sequences] one event causes another in the narrative, although the links may not always be chronological. (Riessman 1993) **3.** *As analysis of thematic TIMESPACE*: [In thematic sequencing] an episodic narrative is stitched together by theme rather than by time. Western, white, middle-class interviewers seem to expect temporally sequenced plots and have trouble hearing ones that are organized episodically. (Riessman 1993)

Nature (environment). *See also ECOLOGY, MILIEU*.

Nature (human). *See also UMWELT, INTRICANT*.

Operational Closure. 1. *as SYSTEMS property, see also STRUCTURAL COUPLING:* the property of being autonomous and being structurally coupled. (Varela et al. 1991)

POLITICS, THE POLITICAL. 1. *Politics as a continual political activity of defining the political*: politics includes the following: (a) a form of activity cenering around the quest for competitive advantage between groups, individuals, or societies; (b) a form of activity conditioned by the fact that it occurs within a situation of change and a relative scarcity; (c) a form of activity in which the pursuit of advantage produces consequences of such a magnitude that they affect in significant way the whole society or a substantial portion of it. Politics as one reflection [of Western communities in particular, compelled to undergo drastic readjustments to changes within, and without] has come to be an activity expressive of society's need for constant readjustment. (Wolin 2004) **2.** *The political as relational effect of the function of institutions*: the system of political institutions in a given society represents an arrangement of power and authority. At some point within the system, certain institutions are recognized as having the

authority to make decisions applicable to the whole community. The exercise of this function naturally attracts the attention of groups and individuals who feel that their interests and purposes will be affected by the decisions taken. When this awareness takes the form of action directed towards political institutions, the activities become "POLITICAL" and a part of political nature. [Human activities become political] in the "relating" function performed by political institutions. (Wolin 2004)

Political Space. 1. The locus where the tensional forces of society are related, as in a courtroom, a legislature, an administrative hearing, or the convention of a political party. (Wolin 2004)

Political Time. 1. [Political institutions in POLITICAL SPACE] also serve to define "POLITICAL TIME" or the temporal period within which decision, resolution, or compromise occurs. (Wolin 2004)

Political Ecology. 1. [to discover] in a non- or not-quite-human body evidence of the VITALITY of matter, [and], to confront the hard question of the *POLITICAL* capacity of ACTANTS. (Bennet 2010)

Political Unconscious. 1. *as the gap formed by constellations of social-structural opposition*: From this perspective the convenient working distinction between cultural texts that are social and political and those that are not becomes something worse than an error: namely, a symptom and a reinforcement of the reification and privatization of contemporary life. Such a distinction reconfirms that structural, experiential, and conceptual gap between the public and the private, between the social and the psychological, or the political and the poetic, between history or society and the "individual, " which-the tendential law of social life under capitalism-maims our existence as individual subjects and paralyzes our thinking about time and change just as surely as it alienates us from our speech itself. [*note that this is a CYNICAL distinction made from socio-structural disposition to POLITICAL advantage; see also SOCIOANALYSIS and POLITICS. Also recall that 'maimed existence', 'paralysis of thought about time', and 'alienation from speech' refer to an UMWELT and MILIEU. T.B.*] (Jameson 1981)

Reification. *See also ALIENATION.*

Risk, Risk Society. *See also CATASTROPHE.*

Ruin, Ruins. *See also ECOLOGY.*

SES. *Socio-Economic Status*; not to be confused with CLASS. A concept for quantitative CLASSIFICATION developed in mid 20th century Anglo-American milieu for social science. See especially the historical de-coupling from the theories of Karl Marx and Max Weber in Oakes and Rossi: *The measurement of SES in health research: current practice and steps toward a new approach.*

Structuralism, Pre-Structuralism. *Not to be confused with STRUCTURE.* **1.** *Structuralism as a theory paradigm*: a connection between concepts of structure and relation and thus a moment of constancy [where the legacy of Lévi-Strauss, and French thinkers from the 1950's—60's also

adds on] another analytic or cognitive moment, [where] structures are conditions for cognition, regardless of who is the subject of this cognition, [thus connecting] relationality, the relative permanence of relations, and totality as the condition of cognition. (Luhmann 2013) **2.** *Pre-structuralism as Durkheim's ticklish rule of social differences; a deadlock of neither causal, nor discrete or continuous variables, describing relations of difference as socio-structural antinomies*: Durkheim could not solve the riddle of the rule imposed upon his sociology; he came upon the means [in *Elementary Forms*] but could not apply it: the means were collective representations. But the application of the concept in the strict semiotic sense had to await Lévi-Strauss who recovered Durkheimian themes in Saussure to allow for differences as a transformational grammar. (Lemert 2006)

Structural Analysis. *See also EXPLANATION.*

Structural Coupling. 1. *As self-organizing, see also AUTOPOIETIC*: the capacity of a complex system to enact a world, constrained by a history of coupling with an appropriate world. (Varela et al. 1991)

Structure. *See also EXPECTATIONS and DOUBLE CONTINGENCY.* **1.** *A.J. Greimas'* **'***First definition'*: the presence of two terms and the relationship between them. (Greimas, [1966] 1983) **2.** *A.J. Greimas' 'Second definition'*: structure is the mode of existence of signification, characterized by the presence of the articulated relationship between two semes [semes as meaningful significations]. The semic categories, we have seen, are inherent in the object-language, but can be formulated only outside of it [thus the problem of containment and metaphors of containment as environmental discourse: *see also MILIEU.* T.B.]. (Greimas, [1966] 1983) **3.** *Saussure, Linguistic structure*: the elements of a language—phonemes, morphemes, and so forth—are not "substances," but "forms," and forms that are generated out of opposition to other forms in language in a system, or "structure," of differences. ([R. Schleifer] Greimas, 1983) **4.** *Levi-Strauss' anthropological structuralism*: Structure has no distinct content; it is content itself, apprehended in a logical organization conceived as a property of the real. ([R.Schleifer] Greimas, 1983) **5.** *Luhmann's systems theoretic definition of*: structures, then, are expectations in relation to the connectivity of operations. (Luhmann 2013) **6.** *As the distinction between two distinctions*: [Talcott] Parsons claimed that two different distinctions have to be distinguished. On the one hand there is the distinction between structure and process and, on the other, the distinction between stability and change. Systems have a structure, and systems have processes at their disposal. This implies that it is possible to distinguish between the structures of processes and the processes of structures; [and over the long term] to see structural change. The distinction between stability and change is a different matter. It is possible to reflect on and investigate whether and for how long unchanged structures are used. In contrast, it is also possible to investigate structural change or the change of structures [that is, '*change of structures'* , as their displacement and subsequent replacement, not just their re-formation, re-configuration, or morphology in '*structural change*' T.B.] (Luhmann 2013)

Socioanalysis. *Following Pierre Bourdieu*: **1.** Unfortunately, whether we like it or not, scientific analyses of the social world, and of the intellectual world in particular, are liable to two different readings and uses. (1) *Clinical use of*: On the one hand, uses that may be called *clinical,* such as those I just evoked with the idea of socio-analysis [to deliver an inaugural lecture at the College

de France, at the very moment when you are being taken in and by the game, is to assert that you are trying to be free from it.], in that they treat the products of science as instruments for a self-understanding shorn of self-complacency; (2) *Cynical abuse of*: on the other hand, uses that may be called *cynical*, because they consist in seeking in the analysis of social mechanisms tools for adjusting one's behavior in the social world (this is what some readers of *Distinction* do when they treat it as a manual of etiquette) or to guide one's strategies in the academic field. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992)

Social Spaces. *See also ZONE.* **1.** *As TEXTS*: texts are social spaces in which two fundamental social processes simultaneously occur: cognition and representation of the world, and social action. (Fairclough 1995) **2.** *Function in systemic linguistics, See also DEIXIS*: language in texts always simultaneously functions ideationally in the representation of experience and the world, interpersonally in constituting social, interaction between participants in discourse, and textually in tying parts of a text together into a coherent whole (a text, precisely) and tying texts to situational contexts (e.g. through situational deixis). (Fairclough 1995)

Social Time. *See also TIMESPACE*. This concept, particularly favored by Fernand Braudel, suggests that the analyst should look at different temporalities that reflect different social realities. Braudel distinguished between the two widely used social times: the short time of "events" used by idiographic scholars and the "eternal" time of nomothetic social scientists (see IDIOGRAPHIC NOMOTHETIC). He much preferred two other social times which he considered more fundamental: the structural time that was long-lasting and reflected continuing (but not eternal) structural realities, which he called the LONGUE DUREE; and the cyclical time of ups and downs that occurred within the framework of a given structural time. (Wallerstein 2004)

Subjection, Subjectivity. Drawn from Foucault (Foucault 2007). Advanced here where: the former is individualization within a system of total social services that ‘excludes’ the ego as extimate; the latter also extimate as the secret object that is the treasured self that the subject is dative of.

System. 1. *as systems theory after Parsons definition of system by ‘boundary maintenance’ between a SYSTEM and ENVIRONMENT*: A system *is* the difference between system and environment [such that the term system occurs twice as a different difference][*also note that Luhmann observes that this distinction occurs in the late 1950’s-early 1960’s. T.B.*]. (Luhmann 2013) **2.** *as ECOLOGICAL systems theory*: the unity of the difference of the system of society and its environment. In other words, the theme is the world as a whole, seen through the system reference of the system as society, i.e., with the help of distinction by which the system of society differentiates itself from an environment. (Luhmann 1986)

Text. 1. *As subject of discourse analysis*: A rather broad conception has become common within discourse analysis, where a text may be either written or spoken discourse, so that, for example, the words used in a conversation (or their written transcription) constitutes a text. (Fairclough 1995) **2.** *As subject of cultural* analysis: In cultural analysis by contrast, texts do need to be linguistic at all; any cultural artefact – a picture, a building, a piece of music – can be seen as a text. (Fairclough 1995) **3.** *As discursive object*: Any discourse fixed by writing. (Ricoeur 1981b)

Texture, Textural. 1. *As the content of a text's form*: the sorts of social and cultural phenomena that such [discourse] analysts are oriented towards are realized in textural properties of texts in ways which make them extraordinarily sensitive indicators of sociocultural processes, relations, and change. Partly linguistic and partly intertextual – partly a matter of how links between one text and other texts and text types are inscribed in the surface of the text. (Fairclough 1995)

Timespace. *See also CHRONOTOPE*. **1.** TimeSpace. A recently invented concept. The capitalization and running-together of the two terms reflects the view that for every kind of social time, there exists a particular kind of SOCIAL SPACE. Thus, time and space in social science should not be thought of as separate, measured separately, but as irrevocably linked into a limited number of combinations. (Wallerstein 2004)

Trope. *See also MASTER TROPES.*

Two Cultures. A term invented by C. P. Snow in the 1950S. It refers to the quite distinctive "cultures"-really, epistemologies-of people in the humanities and the natural sciences. The split, sometimes called "divorce;' of science and philosophy was consummated only in the late eighteenth century, and has again come into question in the late twentieth century. [*See also UNIDISCIPLINARITY*] (Wallerstein 2004).

Understanding (verstehen). *See also HERMENEUTIC ARC.*

Umwelt. *See also STRUCTURAL COUPLING.* **1.** Characterized by Jakob von Uexküll as the arc from perception/reception to effectuation and from effectuation to perception/reception (see Figure 21.).



Figure 1. *The functional circle*

FIGURE 21. 'UMWELT' UEXKÜLL (1982)

2. *As the reverse of MILIEU*: systems-theoretical difference of system and environment formulates the radical change in world view; reversed only by a theoretical turn that began in the nineteenth century when the terms ‘Umwelt’ and ‘environment’ were invented and which has reached its culmination today: systems define their own boundaries. They differentiate themselves and thereby constitute the environment as whatever lies outside the boundary. In this sense, then, the environment is not a system of its own, not a unifed effect.(Luhmann 1986) *See also MILIEU*. **3.** The world of daily life [as the place of *anomie*, standardization, and rationalizing desacralization] (Jameson 1981).

Unidisciplinarity. This term should be clearly distinguished from multi- or trans-disciplinarity. The latter terms refer to the now-popular ideas that much research would be better done if the researcher(s) combined the skills of two or more disciplines. Unidisciplinarity refers to the belief that in the social sciences at least, there exists today no sufficient intellectual reason to distinguish the separate disciplines at all, and that instead all work should be considered part of a single discipline, sometimes called the historical social sciences.

Vanishing Mediator. 1. *As reappropriation of things, the objects of consciousness*:. That the object as such presents itself to consciousness as something vanishing – this is the above-mentioned *return of the object into the self*. (Marx 1844) **2.** Also see Jameson where the vanishing mediator is drawn from Weber’s observation of the role of Calvinism in the early formation of Capitalism (Jameson 1973).

Vitality. 1. The capacity of things—edibles, commodities, storms, metals—not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own. (Bennet 2010)

Zones. *See also SOCIAL SPACES.* Zones are both a territory and a sphere of influence. Intention must pass through "zones" dominated by other characters, and are therefore refracted. A character's zone need not begin with his directly quoted speech but can begin far back in the TEXT; the author can prepare the way for an autonomous voice by manipulating words ostensibly belonging to "neutral" authorial speech. This is a major device of comic style. In Bakhtin's view there are no zones belonging to no one, no "no-man's land." There are disputed zones, but never empty ones. A zone is the locus for hearing a voice; it is brought about *by* the voice. (Holquist [Bakhtin], 1981)

VITA

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