To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Charles Stephen Byrum, entitled "Intrinsic Value and Play." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Philosophy.

Rolf-Dieter Herrmann, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

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INTRINSIC VALUE AND PLAY

A Dissertation

Presented for the

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Degree

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Charles Stephen Byrum

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TO PHYLLIS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A doctoral dissertation represents a plateau which inevitably requires an extended period of time to achieve. During that time, there are many individuals, in addition to those whose writings and lectures influence one's thoughts and are reflected in the dissertation itself, who contribute to that plateau being reached. Any formal acknowledgements that I might make would have to begin with that first professor who took an individual interest in my work, and prompted my entrance upon the "way of the examined life." Hugh C. White first taught me philosophy from Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics; I have never gotten far from the context with which he framed my thinking. I am sure that I would not be at the present juncture of my life, had it not been for his efforts.

From those undergraduate days until the present time, I have been fortunate to work with scholars of the highest quality. The members of my dissertation committee are especially indicative of this scholarship: John Davis has generously provided encouragement and direction, as the head of our department, throughout my graduate program; Roy Cebik, the chairman of graduate studies for the department, has always provided precise, helpful criticism of my work; and, David Linge has made the thought of Gadamer available without which the dissertation would be incomplete. Special acknowledgement must be given to Rem Edwards who introduced me to the thought of Robert Hartman (who I was fortunate to study with for two years before his death); I received more hours of formal instruction from Dr. Edwards than any other professor, and his

thought and style of teaching will be of continued influence on my work.

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In addition to these "professional acknowledgements," I want to express my thanks to my wife, Phyllis, whose effort and encouragement have made this work possible. Her "empathic and emphatic involvement," to use Hartman's words, has touched every aspect of this dissertation. Our relationship has provided a context in which ideas such as intrinsic value experience, aesthetic truth, play, fun, and love have a meaning which goes far beyond the expression of words on these pages. Out of her musical expertise, she has been specifically instructive in regard to the aesthetic elements of the study; it is one thing to study about, for example, Bach's counterpoint, and quite another to hear it played and have it explained from the notes of a score. It is but a small token of my gratitude and affection to dedicate this work to her.

A doctoral dissertation is a unique form for the dissemination of ideas. It is my greatest hope that the ideas expressed here will have the opportunity of judgement and re-expression by others who will participate in this "play of Being" of which all men are a part. The following quote from Citizen Tom Paine by Howard Fast best describes my attitude toward the work now completed:

> He had no delusions; what he wrote might never be read by more than a dozen persons, but it was all he could do and what he had to do. Men don't make new worlds in an afternoon; brick has to be placed on brick, and the process is long and incredibly painful.

And, if the process is an expression and fulfillment of one's human being, of Being itself, it is play.

ABSTRACT

This dissertation is primarily concerned with the question of what it means to be human. In answering the question, two levels of response are noted. First, man is extrinsically human as he has specific properties which distinguish him from other objects of his environment; he is Homo Sapien, and not a horse, a tree, or a circus — all of which have their own specific, defining properties. Man is also extrinsically human as he is defined in terms of some deterministically enforced role or function by his society. In this second instance, he is Homo Faber, "man the worker," caught in the midst of a de-volution into Homo Fabricatus, "man the artifact" — a cog in the machine.

A second level of response to the question of human being is that man is intrinsically human. On this level he has an "authentic existence" which is involved in an interplay and creative dialogue with his present environment, his fellows, and his past traditions. The paradigm of intrinsic human being is the playing child who has achieved a natural reciprocity with his world. In the maturation of this paradigm, the authentic human can be compared to the creative artist; human being is seen in terms of a person becoming a "virtuoso at living."

Beyond these levels of definition, a guiding presupposition of the discussion is that most people exist on the extrinsic level. This may be because they have simply not developed all of their human potentials — perhaps they do not know how. More than likely, it is proposed that they have been prohibited in this development by the fragmenting

emphasis on reason and the rational nature advanced by the technological society. To be fully human is to understand oneself in terms of a "whole" which includes Being itself, and to have "whole-experiences," rather than to understand oneself as a body, a soul, or a mind. The leading question of the dissertation is modified to the point of asking how authentic, intrinsic human being can be achieved.

It is then suggested that authentic human being is directly related to an individual's ability to intrinsically value. The first chapter attempts to define intrinsic valuation, and discusses its possibilities. Again, the paradigms are the creative artist and the child as he plays. The relationship of authentic human existence and play provides a point of contact between a philosophical issue, the question of human being, and a primary concern of Homo Faber. Throughout the next two chapters, which complete the first section of the dissertation, the idea of play is encountered. The discussion begins with the ideas of Huizinga, and moves through a discussion of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Fink. The idea of Homo Ludens or Anthropaidian, "man the player," is introduced, along with a non-competitive level of play, paidia, which is then seen as being synonymous with intrinsic valuation and authentic human experience. Finally, a self-understanding of man as part of the "play of Being" is developed. The third chapter is the key chapter of the entire dissertation.

In the second section, which is constituted by chapters four through nine, the central discussion of the first section is expanded and substantiated by reference to the idea of play in the work of several other thinkers. The understanding of play as it relates to Plato and Schiller should already be well-known, but the idea as it relates

to Nietzsche, Sartre, and Whitehead should not only add to the distinctions of the dissertation, but should also give a new perspective on each of these individual philosophies. In each instance, it is suggested that the idea of play is a formidable concern of their work. The second section is then concluded with an investigation of the poetry of Wallace Stevens. This reference is highly suitable for inclusion in the dissertation at this point for several reasons. It cogently synthesizes the ideas of intrinsic valuation, artistic creativity, and play, and develops the idea of the importance of the imagination as man's intrinsic valuing capacity. It also serves as a mediating example of this sort of activity, and constitutes a movement into an area where philosophy and poetry, ethics and aesthetics begin to coalesce; the merger into an area of authentic human experience and expression like this is discussed throughout the dissertation.

Finally, the dissertation is brought to a close in a section of conclusions which are represented by the final three chapters. A rigorous attempt is made to bring the philosophical concerns to a level understandable by modern man. It is felt that the area of play offers the best alternative for relating modern man to intrinsic value experiences, and the implications of the dissertation are thus discussed in terms of man's work and his interest in contemporary athletics.

Man may continue to exist extrinsically without hindrance for as long as his technological genius can sustain him. However, intrinsic human existence is severely threatened in the present age by man's own inventions. The greatest threat of all is not that he will destroy himself with a nuclear weapon or by an ecological disaster, but that he will turn himself into a function, a "thing." Any hope for

authentic human existence is contingent upon man's ability to learn to intrinsically value, and to intrinsically experience and create his own "Self" as he is imaginatively creative — as he plays.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I.	THE CONCEPT OF INTRINSIC VALUE	1
II.	*HOMO LUDENS*: MAN THE PLAYER.	45
III.	THE PLAY OF BEING.	74
IV.	THE IDEA OF PLAY IN PLATO.	141
V.	SCHILLER'S AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MAN.	159
VI.	NIETZSCHE'S CONCEPT OF PLAY.	175
VII.	THE IMPORTANCE OF PLAY IN SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY.	192
VIII.	PLAY AND AESTHETIC EVENT IN WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY . . .	216
IX.	IMAGINATION AND PLAY IN THE POETRY OF WALLACE STEVENS. .	241
X.	IMPLICATIONS: WORK AND PLAY.	268
XI.	IMPLICATIONS: *PAIDIA* AND CONTEMPORARY ATHLETICS.	293
XII.	*ANTHROPAIDIAN*: THE AFFIRMATION OF *HUMAN* BEING.	307
BIBLIOGRAPHY.		331
VITA.		339

CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF INTRINSIC VALUE

It should be quite clear from the title of the dissertation as a whole, that one of its primary presuppositions is related to the idea of intrinsic value. That presupposition, essentially stated, is that intrinsic value is a legitimate value predicate. It is believed that the veracity of the concept holds important implications, not only for ethics and aesthetics as differentiated disciplines, but also for that little-explored area of philosophical investigation where ethics and aesthetics merge in the epitome of authentically human existence. "Intrinsic Value" is a controversial concept, however, with many excellent philosophical statements rejectings its usage, and questioning its substantive reality. It would seem, therefore, that it would be incumbent upon any discussion which aims to opt for the concept's usage in a significant manner, to make an explicit position statement about how the concept is to be used. It would also seem important to make this statement in relation to its most prominent objectors.

This first chapter will demonstrate the influence of the thought of Robert S. Hartman, with particular attention being given to his concept of intrinsic value. Indeed, it was the influence of Hartman's work that prompted the author's initial interest in intrinsic value. The approach to Hartman's thought will initially be rather general and simplistic in order that the reader can quickly come to grasp the essential thrusts of his thinking. Moreover, the basic ideas of the work of Hartman may be more important, at least for the purposes of

this discussion, than the highly schematized intricacies developed in his work which relate to logic and transfinite mathematics.

It is also possible to use several of Hartman's suggestions without appropriating his metaphysical belief that there was a Kantian noumenal ego or self which existed beyond the present world of appearances. "Hartman assumed that forms of time and space were required for plurality, and outside of space and time all was one."[1] (It will also be important to interpret a statement such as this in a manner that has very little relationship to Kant.) Following the introductory comments in this chapter on Hartman, the basic objections to the use of the concept of intrinsic value will be considered. Then, the responses to these ideas in the work of Robert Edgar Carter and Rem B. Edwards will be seen. A further statement on Hartman will be developed out of a consideration of these objections, and attention will be given to his attempt to respond to criticism[2] that his concept of intrinsic value could be given more clarity and explication. The chapter will be concluded with a position statement on intrinsic value which will act as a mediating presupposition for the discussion as a whole.

Hartman's The Structure of Value is an axiology, a science of value.

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[1]Rem B. Edwards, "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value and Valuation," unpublished manuscript (The University of Tennessee at Knoxville, 1975), p. 6.

[2]Paul Weiss commented in the preface to Hartman's The Structure of Value: Foundations of Scientific Axiology (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967, and hereafter noted as SV) that work in the area of intrinsic value remained to be done. Weiss stated: "Dr. Hartman has not attended to this branch of his theory (i.e., intrinsic value) to the same extent that he has attended to others, and much therefore remains obscure" (p. xv). The Structure of Value was Hartman's magnus opus, and this "obscurity" in it seemed to act as the compelling impetus to the work which followed it. In the remainder of his writing, it is the understanding of the concept of intrinsic value that is given utmost consideration.

The emphasis on science is decisive for Hartman. Science provides a method for ordering with precision the phenomena of existence.

> Science in general is neither natural nor moral science It is simply science. It is the application of a logical frame of reference to a set of objects. In other words, science in general is a method, and it has nothing to do with the content or subject matter of a particular science.[3]

Such disciplines as physics, chemistry, and astronomy are indicative of such science as they are logically ordered by mathematics. However, there is no corresponding framework which can be applied to what is commonly called "the social sciences." Hartman distinguishes these as philosophies instead of sciences. Following Kant's distinction between philosophy and mathematics, Hartman understood philosophy as using analytic concepts, and science as using synthetic concepts.[4]

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[3]Robert S. Hartman, Freedom to Live: The Bob Hartman Story (to be subsequently noted as BHS), unpublished manuscript prepared for The Nationwide Insurance Corporation (Columbus, 1963), p. 10.

[4]Perhaps it would be helpful to provide a fuller discussion of the distinction between analytic and synthetic concepts. With the help of this notation, the distinction will be more easily understood in the body of the paper. Analytic concepts have to do with categories and predicates, while synthetic concepts have to do with axioms and formal relations. An analytic concept is an abstraction from sense experience, while a synthetic concept is a construction of the mind. Particular attention should be given to the discussion of Aristotle and Galileo on motion below, as the Aristotelian concept is analytic, while the concept of Galileo is synthetic (cp., SV, op.cit., pp. 31-43).

Concepts also have meaning or "intension," and reference or "extension." The extension of a concept includes all of the objects referred to by that concept. For example, the extension of the concept "chair" would be all of the chairs in the world. On the other hand, the intension of a concept includes that set of words or symbols which constitute, as a set of mental properties in the world of thought, the definition of an object. The concept "chair" thus has for its intension the set of words: "knee-high structure with a seat and a back" (SV, op. cit., p. 31).

This definition is an organizing principle for description and definition which in its purest state can be extended by implication to infinity. In doing so, intensional content becomes increasingly vague;

Hartman understands science in terms of "orderly thinking"[5] which is for him "a procedure which accounts with a minimum of concepts for a maximum of objects."[6] The procedure is identified with fact itself: "construction of patterns isomorphous with the subject matter."[7] (It may be that what is meant by "fact" is rather ambiguous of this point. The discussion will attempt to develop an epistemological position which demonstrates that ideas such as those implied in the present scientific worldview of the word fact are inherently oblique and ambiguous.) Hartman quotes Hermann Lotze:

> Science must clarify the judgements of value which grow out of reflective feeling and transform them into cognition. Thus they will cease to be the unrestricted property of individual sentiments and become sublime truths beyond the changes of moods and attitudes.[8]

Hartman says[9] that his quest for orderly thinking about value began as a reaction against Adolph Hitler. As Hitler had been able to organize evil, it became the life task of Hartman to organize good. He wanted, however, to be very clear about his purpose in developing a science of value. He was not attempting to create a means for scientific

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however, at the opposite extreme of this referential movement ad infinitum is a movement to a concept which cannot analytically be made any simplier. The latter type of concept is what G. E. Moore termed an "ultimate simple."

[5] Hartman, SV, op.cit., p. 3.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid., p. 4.

[8] Ibid., p. 2.

[9] Hartman, BHS, op.cit , p. 44. The importance of this quote is indicated by its inclusion as a preface to a major chapter.

legislation of value which could be used as a pawn of the technological society as in the Orwellian classic 1984. He was, rather, seeking to develop an intelligible system for speaking about value which would enhance one's ability to make creditable value judgements.

> The axiologist is the expert in value . . . as axiologist his task is to . . . be familiar with the fundamental principles and general laws that underlie all valuing. This book (i.e., The Structure of Value), then, is to value as a treatise on pulmonary physiology is to breathing.[10]

Most people usually identify axiology with ethics, and use it to answer such questions as: what is good? what things are good? or, what good action should one do? However, in regard to this type of ethics, Hartman's work is a meta-ethics, for he is concerned with asking value questions which are prior to the questions asked above. He asks what value words such as good or beautiful mean. And, more importantly, he develops a scientifically precise methodology for their use in specific value sciences. Value words have been in use since the invention of language, but they have often been ambiguous or vague, and dependent upon the uncontrollable and unpredictable inanities and inconsistencies of individual moods and attitudes.

Hartman is well aware of the advanced state of the modern technological society, especially in the areas of mathematics and physics. He knows that by the use of precise laws and formulas, that the natural sciences have given a formal frame of reference to the world that has issued in massive technological progress. However, in the field of value science, men of the modern age are in his opinion still living by

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[10]Hartman, SV, op.cit., p. 7.

value theories as old as Aristotle's, and in the entire history of man, there has been very little moral or value progress.

> We have on the one hand Einsteinian physics, and on the other, Aristotelian ethics. Aristotle wrote a book about physics, too, but his physics is no longer taught because it was all wrong. Aristotelian ethics is just as wrong as Aristotelian physics, but it is still taught. I taught it myself for awhile with the other philosophical ethics, and my students would come to me afterward and say, "Do we now know how to be good men?" "Well," I would hedge, "you are supposed to." "But," they said, "we do not." I could not help but agree, and my students were always disappointed and depressed. In the absence of an ordering logic and science of value, we find it difficult to realize the fruits of good will and good intentions because we do not know exactly what it is we want to realize.[11]

Hartman was compelled by the question that "in view of the fact that situations of human life seem to be at least as complex — they are actually more so — as those of nature, should not the language of ethics be equally structured?"[12]

The philosophical "hero" of Hartman's thought is Galileo. Galileo lived in a time in which motion was understood in the Aristotelian terms of "fulfillment (entelecheia) of the potential qua potential,"[13] or "the change of potentiality into actuality."[14] Aristotle was not really defining or explaining what made up motion as much as he was simply offering experiential synonyms. He was not describing formal relations, but relations between predicates; this is analytic thinking. Galileo then fathomed the analytic depths of motion to see the formal relations,

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[11] Hartman, BHS, op.cit., p. 60.

[12] Hartman, SV, op.cit., p. 27.

[13] Ibid., p. 34.

[14] Ibid.

and offered the axiom $m=^{s}/_{t}$ (the formal relationship between the space traversed by a moving body and the time of the traversal). The axiom occurs, and the fundamental, organizing principle for the creation of a new science is obtained, when the connection is made between a simple, analytic concept (motion), and a simple, synthetic concept ($m=^{s}/_{t}$). Ironically, the axiom is both a formal construct of the mind and a symbolic metaphor of the intuition;[15] in this almost paradoxical sense, it is both systemic and intrinsic. Galileo's thinking was synthetic, axiomatic thinking, and described the relationship between properties; from this thinking a new science did develop. Hartman wants his axiology to describe the formal relations between axiological, value properties, and to develop a methodological basis for these formal, synthetic relations.

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[15]Hartman refers to this intuition as an "aha experience" (SV, p.9; BHS, p. 137, where he describes the event in terms of a "minute mystical experience"), and gives as examples of it Newton's law of gravitation which was exhibited in the falling apple, Franklin's drawing lightening through the kite string, and the Darwinian pattern of evolution to which Darwin was alerted while reading Malthus. Einstein said of his Theory of Relativity: "There is only the way of intuition" ("The Origin of the Theory of Relativity," Time Magazine, January 26, 1970). Hartman speaks of the process of science in a similar manner: "In the process of science the initial vision is continuously deepened and widened, and its ecstacy, its shock, is owing to the sudden recognition of the infinite unity of the whole field. Such discoverers, then, see nothing new; they only see the integrative core of the totality of all the phenomena in question" (SV, p. 9). This understanding of discovery and knowledge is thoroughly Platonic, and Plato called this sort of intuition noesis; it is followed by dianoia, "the development of the formal relations between the elements or terms of a system — the unfolding of the axiom" (SV, p. 322).

This idea of truth "unfolding" itself in the "aha experience" of the sudden recognition of the infinite unity of the whole phenomenal field is quite similar, in essence if not in metaphysical detail, to the Heideggerian a-letheia truth. Here truth is seen in terms of its "no longer escaping notice, its unveiling, the acts of its making itself known" (James M. Robinson and John D. Cobb, Jr. (editors), The Later Heidegger and Theology (New York, 1963), p. 22).

The most immediate background of Hartman's thought is the Principia Ethica of G. E. Moore, which is a discussion of what was ultimately an unsuccessful attempt to understand what is meant by the word good. Moore made two primary contributions to the investigation which led to the claims about intrinsic value constructed by Hartman. First, he arrived, in regard to the meaning of good, at the formulation of what he called the "naturalistic fallacy."[16] He recognized that most of the history of ethics had been involved with understanding good in terms of natural properties which belonged to things which were good, and believed that when these properties had been named, that good had been defined. For example, pleasure may in fact be good, but that one is able to define pleasure, does not mean that good has been defined. The fallacy occurs when there is a confusion of a property with the empirical representation of that property; when there is a confusion between the first question of ethics (what does the word good mean?), and the second question of ethics (what things are good?).

However, even in his own estimation of his work, Moore found his analysis to be incomplete. It is questionable if he ever fully realized the full import of what he had done. Hartman says concerning Moore: "It is very common to hold a doctrine without being clearly aware what it is you hold."[17] Writing twenty years after Principia Ethica, Moore was still frustrated by the relation of goodness and descriptive properties. He did, however, provide the further contribution of the understanding

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[16]G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 10-13. Also see Thomas E. Hill, "The Distinctiveness of the Concept of Good," in John W. Davis (ed.), Value and Valuation (Knoxville, 1972), pp. 3-20.

[17]Hartman, SV, op.cit., p. 103.

of good as an "ultimate simple,"[18] something that cannot be broken down into further definable parts (Hartman will emphasize the idea of a gestalt). In speaking of the word good, Moore said:

> It is one of those innumerable objects of thought which are themselves incapable of definition, because they are the ultimate terms by reference to which whatever is capable of definition must be defined.[19] The notion of good is so simple as to be incapable of proof, so transparently clear as to be in no need of proof, so self-evident as to be understood as soon as it is mentioned, so unique as to belong to nothing but Ethics, and so fundamental as to serve as basis for a systematic science.[20]

In Hartman's movement beyond Moore, especially as it was influenced by the implications of the "naturalistic fallacy," good is understood as a non-natural property. It may apply to things that exist in space and time, but it is not spatio-temporal itself. It cannot be defined analytically, but only synthetically; good is a property of concepts rather than objects. For example, if someone were asked to pick up a certain car in a parking garage, and were to inquire as to how that car could be distinguished, only to receive the reply "pick up the good car," it would probably be impossible to find the particular car in question. Good is certainly not a distinguishable property of a car in the sense that a windshield, an engine, or a radiator is. Good is rather the property of the concept of car, and if a particular car

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[18] Robert S. Hartman, "The Definition of Good: Moore's Axiomatic of the Science of Ethics," Proceedings, The Aristotelian Society (1964-1965), p. 1.

[19] Closely parallel to these "ultimate simples" are Kant's "schemata" of the categories of understanding such as cause or substance; notions so primitive that they cannot be broken down into constiuent parts.

[20] Moore, op.cit., p. 9.

fulfills all of the properties of that concept, it is a "good" car. One can thus speak of a "second order property," which is not a property of things, but a property of properties, a property of a concept of a thing. There is, finally, a great deal more that could be said about the influence of Moore on Hartman. However, the key element seems to be the way in which Hartman understands good in terms of concept fulfillment which is directly dependent upon the naturalistic fallacy idea.

Hartman was finally able to make the breakthrough to the axiomatic formulation of goodness which sees good in terms of concept fulfillment, and which can ultimately be stated in mathematical framework. "A thing is good if it fulfills the intension of its concept!"[21] Hartman recalls spending several years collecting literally thousands of definitions of the word good, and then in 1949, during a sabbatical year, he attempted to "wring" an answer from his mass of evidence. It might be said that he had compiled the "phenomenal field" of the word good. Then, on the day before Christmas in an "aha experience," the axiom, the formulative principle, the "core" of that phenomenal field unveiled itself, and suddenly he had the answer upon which he would build his axiology. He wrote in his diary on that Christmas eve: "Finally found the solution for the logic of good; x (anything) is a good member of its class means that x is a member of the class and has all the properties of that class."[22] He later said that "a thing is good when it has all the properties it is supposed to have,"[23] or "a thing is good when it fulfills

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[21]Hartman, SV, op.cit., p. 259.

[22]Hartman, BHS, op.cit., pp. 55-56.

[23]Ibid., p. 57.

its definition."[24] For example, a horse is a good horse if it has all of the horse properties which are essential for the concept "horse." Hartman was then able to show the potential use of an arithmetical model in his axiology by demonstrating that a thing is good if it has all of its properties (n), fair if it has more than $^{n}/_{2}$ properties, bad if it has less than $^{n}/_{2}$ properties, and not good if it has only one or no properties.

This idea of good applies for the most part to extensional, expositional, and definitional properties. These preliminary distinctions can then be understood as a prelude to a movement to the section of Hartman's work which is most important for the present discussion, where one finds in his thought the establishment of three levels of value: systemic, extrinsic, and intrinsic. Using the example of a horse as n: on the systemic level there is either value or no value, the object of valuation is either a horse (n), or it is not a horse (not-n), it either has a prescribed number of definitional properties, or it does not fit the idea of horse at all; on the extrinsic level there is class or expositional value, the horse (n) as a part of the class of all horses (all n); on the intrinsic level there is uniqueness, which is the (n+1) value of the thing or individual, as for example in the love that the young boy had for the red pony in Steinbeck's classic novel. This intrinsic level, which will always have at least one more property than the class level which makes it unique, a world of its own, is the creative level of poetic value or imagination. In regard to aesthetics, this

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[24] Ibid. Hartman changed this latter formulation by replacing "definition" with "intension of its concept." This change was made at the suggestion of Rem Edwards whose work is elsewhere noted, and is reflected in SV, op.cit., p. 103.

level of imaginative creativity is the most important level of consideration for Hartman. In aesthetics, value is equal to richness in or density of properties, and the intrinsic level is the level of the richest properties. "It is the level of poetry, metaphysical language, and emphatic and empathic self-identification."[25] However, care should be taken to note that intrinsic value is not merely a matter of abstraction and exposition; as should become quite clear as a major thesis of this discussion, it positively is not.

Hartman's paradigm of intrinsic valuation is Michelangelo who has an "experience of oneness" with the artistic process of imaginative creativity which leads from the marble block presented to him by the City of Florence to the magnificent "David"; in a similar sense, Shakespeare's characters "come alive" like few characters on the theatrical stage because of the way that in the development of a particular character that Shakespeare became that character; and, Van Gogh becomes "one" with a pair of peasant shoes. Galileo said: "I <u>became</u> a falling body," and Goethe similarly expressed, "I <u>live</u> my poems." The artist's subject matter transcends the spatio-temporal world, and becomes a world in itself in which the artist completely dwells. Therefore, one can call Van Gogh's "The Shoes" a creation, because through the artistic process something new and unique has come into existence. To consider

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[25]With the help of Hartman, I have developed a set of value tables which provide a lengthy, more graphic description of the distinctions between systemic, extrinsic, and intrinsic value. While the Steinbeck note seems to be sufficiently demonstrative at this point, these may be found in either of the following: Charles Stephen Byrum, "The Possibilities of a Theologic in the Hartman Value Structure," <u>The Journal of Value Inquiry</u>, X (1976); or, Charles Stephen Byrum, "The Value Structure of Theology," Master's Thesis for The University of Tennessee at Knoxville (1974), pp. 13-17.

the shoes as objects in a spatio-temporal world, as a cobbler probably would, would be to make an extrinsic dis-valuation of an intrinsic object. In the unique, artistic encounter, the artist does not simply observe an object, he is addressed by an object; an event takes place in which there is an intrinsic relatedness (Martin Buber's Ich/Du relationship) between the object (perhaps subject is now the better word) and the artist. It can also be noticed that in this process of self-identification that there is first a problem, then a meaning, and finally an identification with a material.

In John Hospers' book on aesthetics, Meaning and Truth in the Arts, which Hartman uses as a vehicle for demonstrating the aesthetic dimension of intrinsic value, there is a lengthy section on artistic truth. Hospers considers the artistic production as a proposition that is not, and in fact cannot, be dependent on words in the conventional sense. Propositions are symbolic statements (i.e., they are axiomatic and synthetic), and only when those symbols are words do the statements take the form of sentences. In such artistic media as painting, sculpture, or music, propositions are made which are "too definite"[26] for words. However, the poet has the paradoxical problem of having to use words to describe that which is beyond words (i.e., that which is part of a meta-language). Therefore, the poet must use language in such a way that it does not merely label and classify (systemic and extrinsic valuation). The poet's use of words is not, therefore, ultimately descriptive at all, but rather evocative; he uses a language

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[26] John Hospers, Meaning and Truth in the Arts (Chapel Hill, 1949), p. 79.

which is not "truth-about," but "truth-to" experience. By "truth-to,"[27] Hospers means the poetic relation to or valuation of "purified forms . . . disengaged from accident,"[28] the "purified forms" being the intrinsic forms, the essential qualities of the artistic creation which require the designation "unique," and "accident" being extrinsic, spatio-temporal form which involves the definitional and expositional prerequisites that extensionally and intensionally distinguish an object from other objects.

The key to artistic truth is the poet's imagination, which Hospers refers to as a "heightened consciousness."[29] "The poem picks out of reality something which we, owing to a certain hardening of our perceptions, have been unable to see ourselves."[30] In comparison to the poetic man of imagination, "ordinary people have almost no idea of what things really look like,"[31] or, as Hartman has said, "most people's lives are sadly, very dull."[32] Hartman places on the opposite extreme from this "dullness" what he calls "interpenetration." "At its maximum, intrinsic value means the interpenetration of the valuer and the valued, as in

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[27] Ibid., p. 162.

[28] Ibid., p. 165.

[29] Ibid., p. 180.

[30] Ibid., p. 179.

[31] Ibid., p. 185.

[32] Hartman, orally, in a seminar discussion. A published account similar to this can be found in "The Value Structure of Creativity" (to be subsequently noted as "Creativity"), The Journal of Value Inquiry, VI (Winter, 1972), pp. 243-279, where he says (p. 278): "The vast majority of men stop at narrow ranges of creativity." This quote explains more succinctly what he means by "dull." He further quotes Kierkegaard: "Man . . . has for the most part a very lowly conception of himself,

love, in artistic creation and appreciation, in mystic rapture . . . ."[33]

> The more one becomes involved in the object, the more properties one becomes aware of, the richer the concept of the thing, and hence, the more valuable it becomes to the person. The more properties one becomes aware of, the more one knows about the object.[34] . . . cognition and valuation are identical; the degree of cognition is the degree of valuation.[35]

It is the poet, thus, whose intrinsic valuation provides the highest degree of cognition, and then is provided with the opportunity to see the richest truth possible. Poetic truth infinitely surpasses the usual cognition of so-called "factual"[36] experience.

In regard to the artistic experience, the central idea of the "fulfillment" of the intension of what Hartman calls a "singular concept" can be discussed. A singular concept is the type of concept which is particular to the intrinsic level of valuation, and can be contrasted to the formal concept or construct which relates to the systemic level and the analytical, empirical, or class concept which relates to the extrinsic level. It is to the degree that the object of valuation and

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that is to say, he has no conception of being spirit, the absolute of all that a man can be . . . . Not only does a man prefer to dwell in the cellar; he loves that to such a degree that he becomes furious if anyone would propose to him to occupy the bel étage which stands empty at his disposition . . . ." In discussion with Hartman, he was in full sympathy with the view advanced by secular theologian Harvey Cox in his On Not Leaving It To The Snake (New York: Macmillan Company, 1964) that the principle "flaw" of man was not found in his attempting to be more than he should (pride), but in his being less than be could (sloth).

[33]Robert S. Hartman, "The Logic of Value," The Review of Metaphysics, XIV (March, 1961), p. 420.

[34]Robert Edgar Carter, "Intrinsic Value and the Intrinsic Valuer," unpublished manuscript, p. 14.

[35]Hartman, "Creativity," op.cit., p. 262.

[36]Ibid., p. 421. Hartman liked to use as an example of intrinsic

the valuer achieve a unified whole (Gestalt or continuum) in interpenetration, that the intension of the singular concept is fulfilled, or the dimension of the intrinsic level where the singular concept can be experienced is achieved. The evaluative experience of intrinsic value occurs in direct porportion to the degree that the nondenumerable infinity of properties of the experience become one, or move toward what Hartman calls a "unity in centeredness." (Hartman uses the language of transfinite mathematics, which will be explained in more detail below, but which suggests various levels or ranges of infinity; beyond ordinary infinity, there exists that which is termed "denumerable infinity," and beyond that a range of infinity which is termed "nondenumerable.") The unified whole which is achieved in this experience of "oneness" is then tantamount to a "new creation." It has never existed before, and may never exist again, but in this one moment or event, which is paradoxically within chronological time and at the same "time" timeless, of intrinsic

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valuation these descriptions of furniture in the Spanish poem "Cuarto" ("Room") by Juan Ramon Jimenez:

> How quiet are the things
> and how cozy to be with them!
>
> Everywhere, their hands
> and our hands meet.
> How many descreet caresses,
> what respect for ideas;
> how they look with ecstacy
> at the dream one is dreaming!
>
> How they like what one
> likes; how they wait,
> and, upon our return, how sweet
> their smiles, with parted lips!
> Things — friends, sisters,
> women — fulfilled truth,
> who eagerly return to us
> the slightest flicker of shooting stars.

experience, it has existed in its own uniqueness. It has also been coextensive and mutually reciprocal with the experienced uniqueness of the valuing Self, which not only apprehends the uniqueness of the object, but also its own uniqueness. Intrinsic valuation is both a form of object-knowledge and Self-knowledge, and it is in the actualized ability to have this sort of relationship to and knowledge of an object that authentic human existence is achieved and maintained.

The individual who is able to accomplish this level of Self/object knowledge, or that one who "is able to make one person out of the infinite fractions of one's life in time and space,"[37] is considered by Hartman to be a genius. The power of genius is manifested in the ability of concentrated interpenetration and an intrinsic relatedness to life. The genius is called a "virtuoso at living," and the word virtue (from the Greek arete) for Hartman means "the capacity for fulfilling essence." Thus, a word that in its common usage is applied to the expert, accomplished artist is now, at least potentially, applicable to all men, and living itself can be understood in terms of artistic, intrinsic creativity.

As has been said, Michelangelo in Hartman's opinion is the paradigm intrinsic valuer for this type of creativity, especially in regard to the above mentioned "David." Hartman does not tire of describing Michelangelo's process of intrinsic valuation by telling how he lived and even slept with the block of marble that the Florentines had given him. When he had finally grasped the "meaning" of David, the idea cried out to be manifested in the material, and he began to carve. "He could not

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[37]Hartman, BHS, op.cit., p. 85.

think of anything else now, could not bring himself to stop for food or change of clothes. He fed his marble hunger twenty hours a day . . . he was David."[38]

Among those who have rejected the idea of intrinsic value is Monroe Beardsley whose basic thesis is that "the concept of intrinsic value is inapplicable — that even if something has intrinsic value, we could not know it, and therefore that it can play no role in ethical or aesthetic reasoning."[39] Beardsley gives credit to the ideas on intrinsic value advanced by John Dewey as providing the fundamental presuppositions for his argument. Dewey complained that such words as "intrinsic," which to him implied a priori ideals, standards, and principles, were almost always used arbitrarily and ambiguously. Such an idea gains according to Dewey no veracity by simply claiming for itself the status of being a "quality" which makes something valuable in and of itself; usually that which claims such status is termed an "end-in-itself." However, something that was literally an "end-in-itself" would stand out of relation to anything else, and for Dewey the very basis of knowledge is the ability to see relationships. The more that one knows about an object, the more that one understands its relationships to other objects, and it could be implied from this that something that was intrinsically an end-in-itself would be incapable of being known. It might be asked: would there not at least always have to be a relationship

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[38] Ibid., p. 262. My wife and I recently found an unusual man who can only be described as a craftsman to refinish an organ which belonged to my wife's grandmother. The man spoke of "caressing" a piece of wood until a beauty came out of it (aletheia) which caused one to weep.

[39] Monroe C. Beardsley, "Intrinsic Value," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XXVI (Number One, 1965), p. 13.

to a knower?

> The glorification of ends at the expense of means would be taken to be a sign of complete insincerity or even insanity. Ends separated from means are either sentimental indulgences, or if they happen to exist, are merely accidental . . . . Construction of ideals in general and their sentimental glorification are easy; the responsibilities of studious thought and of action are shirked.[40]

Dewey concedes that there are abstract and general principles which may operate as a priori, intrinsic principles, but he is explicit in stating that these "are the outcome of a great number of definite, empirical inquiries, not an a priori, preconditioning 'standard'."[41] Rather than "ends-in-themselves," Dewey opts for "ends-in-view" which ultimately relegate any understanding of intrinsicality to the seemingly lower realms of instrumentality and serviceability.

Following from the influence of Dewey, Beardsley focuses the preliminary attention of his thought on two phrases often used in the definition of intrinsic value, "for its own sake" and "in itself." He makes a somewhat questionable rejection of the first definition, which may be seen to be a major weakness in his effort, and moves to a consideration of the second definition which he relates to G. E. Moore's distinction between internal and external properties, the former being represented by the relationship of qualities, and the latter by the relationship to other things. To speak of intrinsic value in this context, is to describe a reality which has value without regard to any exterior relationship; as Moore said: "if they existed by themselves, in absolute isolation,

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[40] John Dewey, The Quest For Certainty (New York, 1958), p. 308.

[41] John Dewey, Theory of Valuation (Chicago, 1939), p. 6.

we should yet judge their existence to be good."[42] Beardsley comes to the conclusion that sense cannot be made of the internal-external debate as long as objective properties are given priority. All that can be spoken of as being intrinsically valuable is the experience that an individual has with, for example, an object of art. However, it is not proper, for Beardsley, to say that the object of art has intrinsic value "in itself," but to say that it has an inherent value which has been primordily provided by the psychological state of the observer in confrontation with the painting is correct. Therefore, intrinsic value would be wholly dependent upon a relationship to something external, in obvious contradiction to the thesis of Moore. However, in the first chapter of Principia Ethica, Moore advances the thesis that the best examples of intrinsic value are experiences, which necessarily implies a relationship to something external; Beardsley does not appear to have recognized this important part of Moore's presentation.

Beardsley next investigates what he says are the three arguments for intrinsic value which some thinkers have considered as approximating formal proofs. The first two of these, which are termed "the argument from definition" and "the argument from dialectical demonstration," are rapidly dealt with in an attempt to return to his main concern of the association of intrinsic value with experience. The third argument is called the "Empirical Confirmation Argument," and is related to the work of C. I. Lewis. For Lewis, it is only experiences that can have intrinsic value, and "goodness" is directly related to immediate, intuitive presentations in direct experience. Such immediate experiences of good

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[42] Moore, op.cit., p. 187.

or bad are called "value-qualities,"[43] and, in the case of goodness, are the primary indications of intrinsic value.

The emphasis on what he considers arbitrary experience becomes the major point of attack for Beardsley, as it was for Dewey. To depend too exclusively on immediate intuition is to divorce one's argument completely from reason. The appeal to reason is the key point in this argument, but such an exclusive emphasis also would leave one open to a too simplistic association with, for example, pleasure which has already been thoroughly discounted by Moore's naturalistic fallacy argument. However, in defense of those who would feel the need of making an association of intrinsic value and pleasure, it can be claimed that pleasure, satisfaction, or a general positive feeling or reaction does seem to be a contingent phenomena of the experience of intrinsic value. The major caution that must be heeded in this regard is not to see the two equated, or to say that one necessarily follows from or requires the other. It may even be said that a necessary relation between reason and the experience of intrinsic value cannot be irrevocably substantiated, although for most so-called rational beings the rational dimension would undoubtedly be present. Beardsley continues with his emphasis on reason:

> If we ask why the experience of a good painting has intrinsic value, the answer will be that "it contains (or is characterized by) aesthetic enjoyment." And if we ask why aesthetic enjoyment is intrinsically valuable, we have reached an end. For no further reasons can be given . . . . We can only say that it is self-evident to some cognitive faculty that is equipped to grasp the self-evidence of such truths as this. I cannot honestly appeal to such

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[43] C. I. Lewis, Theory of Knowledge and Valuation (LaSalle, 1946), pp. 374-375.

> intuitive apprehensions of intrinsic value, when I do not possess them myself.[44]

Beardsley finally conceives of a situation in which a young child is swinging at a playground, and reflects on the statement that might be made in that situation that the intrinsically enjoyable, and thus valuable, act of swinging justifies itself. He opposes such an idea with the Deweyan thesis that the child's swinging actually raises the question of the justification of his swinging which, as long as no objection can be raised to it, requires no justification. This is, however, quite different from saying that the swinging has intrinsic value, or that it is valuable "for its own sake." There are, thus, situations of value-judgement neutrality, in which there are no rational considerations that hold precedence, and in which to do something "for its own sake" is tantamount to "no reason why you shouldn't if you want to."[45] Therefore, to assign the designation "intrinsic value" is to make an arbitrary assessment which could be better dealt with in terms of pragmatic problem solving.

In a paper entitled "The Importance of Intrinsic Value," Robert Edgar Carter makes a lucid, critical response to Beardsley. As was seen above, Beardsley somewhat haphazardly dismissed Moore's ideas of "for its own sake" as they related to intrinsic value, and gave his attention to "in itself." Carter points out that Moore felt that the "in itself" definition was inferior, and that the definition dismissed by Beardsley was much more important. In Carter's opinion, Beardsley was also guilty

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[44] Beardsley, op.cit., p. 13.

[45] Ibid., p. 16.

of completely overlooking a third formulation, which ultimately became Moore's final statement, that intrinsic value is more related to experiences than things. Moore affirmed:

> I am inclined to hold that whether a given experience possesses it (i.e., intrinsic value), and the degree to which it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of that experience.[46]

The key element in the discussion seems to be that for those who object to the use of the term "intrinsic value," there is the rejection of the idea that there is some intrinsically valuable property of an object which can be reasonably isolated. For those accepting the use of the idea of "intrinsic value," primacy is given to an experience in which the object is only one of several contingent elements, none of which can be analytically isolated in such a way that an intrinsically valuable property can be found. It is rather the uniqueness of the entire (Gestalt) experience (i.e., Moore's "the intrinsic nature of that experience") which creates an event[47] which can be apprehended as being of intrinsic value, and which would be worth having for its own sake — even if it existed along, or related to any explicitly rational consideration in no determinative manner whatsoever.

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[46] G. E. Moore, Philosophical Studies (London, 1922), p. 95.

[47] The word event (ereignis) is being used with special connotation. In the hermeneutical theology of the students of Rudolf Bultmann, Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling, which is in direct descent from the work of the later Heidegger, one finds the terminology "language-event," (Sprachereignis), and often synonymously Wortgeschehen. In the less theological work of Heidegger and Gadamer, language is considered to be the primary manifestation of Being. Fuchs and Ebeling speak of the Christian kerygma and incarnation as "word-events" (Jesus was the "word made flesh") in which the "Being" of God (or, the Being of "God") is encountered. Later, this discussion will derive a mutation of the terms, and describe a "play-event" (Spielsereignis) in which Being is similarly disclosed. (Cp. Robert W. Funk, Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God, New York: Harper and Row, 1966.)

While criticizing Beardsley in the above mentioned article, Carter does admit that the concept of intrinsic value needs to be treated with more precision, and in a later article entitled "Intrinsic Value and the Intrinsic Valuer," he finds Hartman's system satisfying in this regard. Carter again recalls the final position of Moore which related intrinsic value to human experience, and finds the nature of the intrinsic value experience explicitly described by Hartman. An experience is an intrinsically valuable experience to the degree that there is accomplished what Hartman called above "interpenetration," in which "the concrete richness of the valuer (is married with) the concrete richness of the valued in an infinity of meanings."[48] Instead of becoming involved with one property, and being able to say that it is intrinsically valuable, one encounters or somehow is overcome, with a non-denumerable infinity of properties,[49] all of which contribute together to make the event what it is.

Carter also finds Hartman referring to the intrinsic value experience in relation to a capacity which is particularly human. It may even be said that it is only to the degree that this capacity is actively present that one can legitimately use the word human.

> It is the capacity of complete concentration on a thing or person, the personal involvement of the artist, the inventor, the teacher: the capacity of empathy and sympathy. It is the kind of knowledge possessed in the highest degree by the creative genius.

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[48] Hartman, "Logic of Value," op.cit., p. 422, amd SV, op.cit., p. 224.

[49] Robert S. Hartman, "The Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," unpublished manuscript, p. 26. He says: "It is like Isis myrionoma, 'Isis of the ten thousand names, or like the Zen's universe of the ten thousand things."

> It is possible only in a person who is himself fully integrated and has all his powers available for outgoing and meeting persons and things . . . . It is the projection of the whole person into others . . . . This kind of knowledge is direct, immediate, intuitional.[50]

A final consideration of Hartman can be made by giving attention to one of the last articles which he wrote before his death, "The Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value."[51] The article is designed to overcome any inadequacies of the treatment of intrinsic value in The Structure of Value. There is also the desire to develop his thought in particular regard to the relationship of intrinsic value and the intrinsic valuer. In writing the article, Hartman is aware, with highest regard, of the Carter articles.

Hartman places emphasis upon the poet's use of metaphor, and sees in the metaphor an analogy for describing the unique relationship of object and subject which occurs in the intrinsic value experience. A metaphor is logically a predicate which has an infinity of variability. The example is given of "Frailty, thy name is woman!" This metaphorical sentence is seen as being quite different from the statement "women are frail." The latter statement can be explicated by defining what is meant by "frail." However, the former statement defies rational explication, for in it there is a dense[52] intertwining of subject and predicate. The proposition goes beyond the range of both analytic and synthetic judgement; Hartman creates the word synlytic to describe the kind of judgement that is involved. "In this proposition, the subject has a

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[50]Hartman, "Nature of Valuation," unpublished manuscript, p. 20.

[51]Robert S. Hartman, "The Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value," The Journal of Value Inquiry, VIII (Fall, 1974).

[52]The word density was often used by Hartman to describe "good" art,

content so infinite, as not only to 'contain,' but as a Gestalt, to embrace and enclose the predicate, forming one organic whole."[53] It is, in the light of this, proper to speak of a "universe of intrinsic value" in which the subject and object become densely intertwined as with the metaphor.

> Subject and object form one close continuum; one internal relationship (again, Moore's "intrinsic nature of the experience itself") which encompasses and enshrines them, as it were, the Urbeziehung (i.e., the primitive connection") in the sense of Buber, the primary relation in which the Other, no matter whether person, thing, or thought becomes a Thou,[54]

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music, or poetry. If a work of art or a line of poetry or music had "density," it was thought to potentially hold an infinite plethora of meanings, or synonymously, values and intrinsic experiences. "Thus, a line of Picasso (Hartman had a line which had been drawn by Picasso which was among his most favorite works of art) may be charged with a world of meanings, vibrating back and forth between the beholder and the line." See Ibid., p. 17.

[53]Ibid., p. 14. In Risieri Frondizi, "Value as a Gestalt Quality," The Journal of Value Inquiry, VI (Fall, 1972), pp. 172, 173, and 178, the following understanding of the relationship of intrinsic valuation to Gestalt is presented: "What is Gestalt? The basic characteristic of a Gestalt is that it has properties that are not reducible to those of its constituent parts or members. That is why there is always novelty in it. It is the totality springing out of the relation of its members that is significant . . . . Gestalts are fully primary realities; they are not the product of our imagination nor made up of something else which is actually real. In the case of Gestalts, instead of trying to derive the properties of the wholes from the properties of their parts, we should look for the meaning of the parts as members of an organic whole, like the characters in a play or the musicians in a symphony orchestra . . . . It is not the set of objective qualities that makes a Gestalt in the case of values, but the fact that those qualities are perceived by a subject physiologically and psychologically constituted as we are and in a certain particular condition. Values are neither in the object nor in the subject, but they are the result of a relation between the two."

[54]Buber uses the German word du for what is translated as Thou. However, the translation is misleading, for the present usage of Thou suggests highest formality, and du has no such connotation. "German lovers say du to one another, and so do friends. Du is spontaneous and unpretentious, remote from formality, pomp, and dignity" (Martin Buber,

a Self to the I.[55]

The "universe of intrinsic value" thus becomes the "universe of intercourse,"[56] and any implied reference to sexual intercourse would not be entirely missplaced. Hartman felt that there was an important relationship between the kind of knowledge which he considered intrinsic value to be, and the way that the verb "to know" was used to indicate the epitome of human relationship in The Old Testament.

Finally, intrinsic value is not for Hartman merely perceived or merely thought; rather, "it captivates and is captured."[57] The event or moment of intrinsic value "casts an 'unreal' spell over the valuer, yet, in this spell he feels more alive than in the 'real' world."[58] And, any attempt to ultimately confine intrinsic value to rationality would be tantamount to the emasculation of a living organism: "mere factuality is a scandal."[59] In drawing a conclusion on intrinsic value that will serve as the operative presupposition of this discussion, it can be said that there is an experience, which is not uncommon to creative, human beings, that Hartman's ideas do describe. In the ultimate sense (and it certainly does not seem clear what any such "ultimate sense" would be)

I and Thou, tr. by Walter Kaufmann, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1970, p. 14).

[55]Hartman, "Axiometric Structure," op.cit., p. 21.

[56]Ibid., p. 23.

[57]Ibid., p. 25.

[58]Ibid.

[59]Ibid. Also see Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens (Boston, 1964), p. 135 where he reports that in Icelandic skalds (a form of poetry), that too much clarity is seen as a technical fault.

of what is usually meant by "rationality," this experience may not be reasonable. However, it is the position of this discussion that reason may not be the only governing criterion, and that in fact, there may be a realm of knowledge (no Platonic sense is intended) which goes beyond reason, and is "ir-rational" in a positive sense of that often maligned word; perhaps, "supra-rational" would be a more descriptive usage.

It should be recalled that value for Hartman is equated with meaning, and that intrinsic value is a special kind of knowledge. For example, Ortega y Gasset says of the metaphor:

> it is an indispensable intellectual instrument, it is a form of scientific thought. The metaphor is an intellectual procedure through which we are able to apprehend what is beyond our (analytic) conceptual power . . . . The metaphor is a truth, it is a knowledge of realities. This implies that in one of its dimensions, poetry, it is research and discovers facts as positive as those found in scientific exploration. Poetry, in other words, is the scientific instrument of intensional variability. It is the key to a realm beyond the sensory, where meaning means more, and something other than what it means.[60]

On the intrinsic level, Hartman is describing an experience of that which is constituted by discursive elements, but which can only be understood non-discursively. Language about intrinsic value is much like the language about God in contemporary theology; it must always consciously attempt to be iconoclastic to the point of disallowing all attempts at ultimate objectification. Therefore, the experience of intrinsic value is not merely one of mystical pantheism with an object, but a confrontation with an object in such a way that its uniqueness[61] is known.

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[60] Hartman, "Logic of Value," op.cit., p. 419.

[61] The knowledge of uniqueness should not be considered as a knowledge of a substantive defining characteristic. It is knowledge, not of a concept, but of a "unicept"; an experiential entity, and not a mental

Intrinsic value is not merely the concern of the poet, artist, or mystic, but also the epistemological concern of the philosopher; it is the way of knowing on the most superior level of knowledge. One is not merely on the systemic level of encountering "essence," or on the extrinsic level of "existents." Rather, one confronts "Reality Itself," or what Hartman calls "concreteness," in which there is an experience of the empirical in its non-empirical sense. The effect on the valuer of this experience is that of "centering," or the recognition of the valuer's Self at the center of the experiential field, or in this case, at the center of the whole world or the universe of value.

At this point, the discussion is indebted to and in agreement with three major points of a critique on Hartman's work by Rem B. Edwards entitled "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Value and Valuation" which was noted above. An attempt will be made to carefully move through the consideration of these points as they are of utmost importance for the discussion as a whole at this juncture. First, Edwards claims that Hartman has confused the use of "intrinsic value" and "intrinsic valuation." He meticulously demonstrates[62] that Hartman gives a divergent range of definitions for these terms, and further shows that the separate definitions do not necessarily relate to one another. This dissertation has

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image that brings together the common features of several things. See John W. Davis, "A Defense of Unique as an Aesthetic and Value Predicate," in Davis, op.cit., p. 193.

[62] Edwards, op.cit., pp. 2-5. As regards intrinsic valuation alone, Edwards finds Hartman attributing to the concept the following extended range of meaning.

i1 that he relates conceptually to X through concepts with non-denumerably rich intensions.
i2 that he relates conceptually and/or emotionally to the non-perceptual, non-spatio-temporal aspects of X.
i3 that he relates uniquely to the particular object in

tried to bring some precision to this confusion by clarifying the relationship which exists between "intrinsic value" and "intrinsic valuation." The idea has been rejected, as with Beardsley and Dewey, that an object has a property which is intrinsically valuable. Emphasis has here been placed upon the event of intrinsic valuation, and an experienced event has been termed intrinsically valuable to the degree that there is an interpenetration ("oneness") of valuing subject and objective. As was stressed in the comments on Buber and Frondizi, the "ground" or Ersprung of intrinsic value and intrinsic valuation, and the locus of the coalescence of the two terms, is in the relationship between the object and the valuer.

Intrinsic value, as has been stressed, is thus conferred by the act of intrinsic valuation. Every event of intrinsic valuation is personal, and thus necessarily, in the most precise consideration, arbitrary. However, the necessary arbitrariness of it should not be taken to the extreme, for to do so would fail to recognize that a response to an entity is occuring. In a similar sense, to take the idea of conferring

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that he "emphatically and empathetically" identifies himself with X. This seems to take many different forms, as when Hartman writes that "at its maximum, intrinsic value means the interpenetration of the valuer and the valued, as in love, in artistic creation and appreciation, in mystic rapture, in the sartori experiences of Zen, and others." Thus, we get:

- i3a that he enjoys, appreciates, or takes satisfaction in X.
- i3b that he has an intense positive emotional involvement (love, compassion, sympathy, etc.) with X.
- i3c that he experiences mystical union with X.
- i3d that he creatively produces or generates X.
- i3e that his conscience approves or disapproves of X.

i4 that he regards X as unique.

i5 that he regards X as an end-in-itself.

value to what might be its logical extreme does not do justice to the fact that it is the entity as it is intrinsically related to the valuer that is the value. The terms arbitrary and conferred are used in the sense that they would be used in describing what takes place in the creation of a language. In what may be the ultimate logical description of that situation, an individual or groups of individuals determines that entity X will be known by name Y. However, to take only this, limited stance to the "arrival" (to use Heidegger's terminology) of language is to grossly disregard its responsive nature. While it may remove the tendency for absolutization by saying that some activity is arbitrary, it does not follow that that which is ultimately an arbitrary experience is not important or of value. In fact, one would be hard pressed not to admit that there is an arbitrary element in all judgements of "Truth" or "Fact"; as Nietzsche said, "all facts are interpretations — all truths are useful fictions." In the event of intrinsic valuation, Hartman stresses that the object-field, with which the valuer participates as part of a Gestalt, is tantamount to being a "Self" (Buber's "Thou"). However, this may not have to mean that there is manifested by the object-field some underlying noumenal ego. While admittedly this is what Hartman meant, it could also mean that "Self-hood" is conferred upon the object-field; that it appears to be, and that one can relate with it, as if it were "Self." In the artistic experience, the artist's object takes on, and the artist is impinged upon by, a personal character; i.e., that the object (which in the experience "leaps" into the realm of "subject") has the power to address the artist — it may "speak" through the artist, but nonetheless it does "speak." It should be kept in mind, that when the poet says that "all the world is alive," that he is taking

part in the highest form of "as if activity" or play that his language can provide him, the metaphor. He is in no way necessarily reverting back to a primitive animism that may have more modern expressions such as "noumenal ego." Huizinga will be seen to say[63] that the capacity to have the "as if" experience, which is the primary attribute of play, is as important to human life as the capacity for rationality, and that the exercise of this capacity is a "need" of human life on the same level as nutrition and self-preservation.

The dissertation is attempting to shift the major focus of its attention to the event of intrinsic valuation. The attempt is also being made to say that the capacity for having such an experience, or relating to one's environment and fellows in the manner that the discussion of the experience suggests, may be of importance to man's total humanization. While it may be entirely impossible to number the "non-denumerable infinity" of the properties of an object, or for a person to confirm their intrinsic value by having a "non-denumerable infinity" of thoughts, "non-denumerable" and the entire transfinite mathematical scheme may have metaphorical significance for heightening the seriousness with which one encounters one's environment, one's fellows, and one's own self. Paradoxically, this "seriousness" is rooted in play, the ability to relate to one's universe with the power of "as if."

It continues to be an unresolved, plaguing question as to whether Hartman ever looked upon his schematic system, and the noumenal egotism of his metaphysics, as being metaphorical in nature. It may be quite

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[63] Jacques Ehrmann, "Homo Ludens Revisited," in Ehrmann, Game, Play, Literature (Boston, 1971), p. 40.

possible that he did for an axiom of any system, and especially an axiological one, is metaphorical, and Hartman undoubtedly recognized that natural science posits such "realities" as ideal fluids, perfect vacuums, and material points without the larger pursuit being refuted or detrimentally held in question simply because their "real" existence is held in question. Such an assumption does become clearly confirmed in the last lectures which Hartman gave before his death, and particularly in a late article entitled "The Value Structure of Creativity,"[64] in which it was not the scheme that was given primary attention, but the experience of human creativity and the capacity for intrinsic valuation. In his thoughts on creativity, he brought his philosophy to the question of the existence and nature of God, which an investigation of his autobiography suggests was a mediating concern through his life; the mathematical scheme remained in the background, and creativity itself became the primary model of understanding. For this dissertation, the extremes of the scheme (see addendum to this chapter) do have metaphorical significance, and are not seen as scientifically absolute instruments of confirmation. It may, parenthetically, be admitted that such a sharp distinction between science and metaphor may be overstated from a philosophical perspective. However, from the perspective of most scientists and the conventional wisdom of the populace as a whole, this would not seem to be the case. In the final analysis, the scheme is looked upon as a mode of intrinsic valuation which appears with no surprise to anyone familiar with Hartman's penchant for mathematical and scientific precision. The whole transfinite scheme may be seen as Hartman's personal

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[64] Hartman, "Creativity," op.cit., p. 262.

manner of "playing with properties."[65]

A second major part of the Edwards' paper deals with the above mentioned understanding of intrinsic valuation as a special kind of knowledge. Edwards carefully reveals a confusion in Hartman's thought at this point. He first shows that initially valuation is an activity of measuring entities by concepts, and that this process is totally dependent upon rational conceptualization. This is the type of activity that would arise out of a strict adherence to the definition mentioned in the preliminary treatment of Hartman that "a thing is good when it fulfills its definition."

However, when the idea of "definition" is replaced by that of "intension of concept," the ability to treat valuation in terms of ordinary, rational conceptualization actually is no longer feasible. Edwards says: "I would hold that intrinsic valuation is primarily a matter of emotion and feeling, and that conceptualization actually plays little or no role at all."[66] He then shows what this discussion has emphasized above, that Hartman actually transcended the realm of ordinary conceptualization in his own understanding of intrinsic value. Hartman is quoted as saying that "almost all our articulate valuation is extrinsic. Intrinsic valuation is inarticulate."[67] The recognition of this distinction might also act as a confirming indication of the movement of Hartman's thought beyond the schematic dimension which was discussed above.

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[65] Hartman, Ibid., p. 245.

[66] Edwards, op.cit., p. 6.

[67] Hartman, SV, op.cit., p. 252. Quoted in Edwards, op.cit., p. 6.

Related to the idea of conceptualization is the question of expertise. Hartman often said that there was a direct relationship between expertise and intensity of value experience. For example, the expert musician would have an experience of greater intensity at a classical concert than a member of the audience who had no special training of musical knowledge. The reason for this is that the expert whould be aware of more properties, and value-experience intensity is porportionate to "density" or "richness" of properties encountered. Common sense confirms this assessment by Hartman; the expert obviously "gets more out" of the concert than the relatively uninformed spectator. A similar result might be observed by comparing the experience of a college football coach during a ballgame, and that of a foreign student seeing that particular type of sporting event for the first time.

However, it would seem that some consistency is demanded between the statements on expertise, and those on valuation and conceptualization. That consistency can be provided only if the valuation of the expert and that of the less-informed viewer are compared on the extrinsic, expositional level of valuation. Admittedly, on this level the expert is aware of a greater density of properties. Yet, in the movement to the intrinsic level, such criteria of judgement are no longer appropriate because they are fundamentally impossible to calculate. On the intrinsic level, it becomes impossible to articulate "how much" one "gets out" of an experience. Two individuals may disagree, without any absolute standard of resolution, on which one had the more fulfilling experience on the intrinsic level; the arbitrary factor appears once more. It may even be possible, to posit a further difficulty, to have level of high intensity on the extrinsic level which is beyond

a low level of intensity on the intrinsic level. One might also consider the possibility of the extrinsic level reaching a point that a "leap" occurs to the intrinsic level which leaves some sort of "gap" which cannot be fully accounted for.

A final point to be considered in Edwards' essay relates to his critique of Hartman's use of the above mentioned idea of uniqueness as it relates to intrinsic valuation. Edwards criticizes Hartman's view that an object is unique if it has at least one property that is not possessed by objects of its particular class. He further states that this emphasis on uniqueness is quite opposed to the mainline of historical axiology, which has seen repetition, as in repeatable kinds of things such as love, virtue, knowledge, and pleasure, rather than individuated uniqueness, as the determinative factor for designating intrinsic goodness. However, it may be that the ideas of uniqueness and repetition need not be juxtaposed. For example, in the illustration mentioned in the preliminary statements on Hartman about the Red Pony in Steinbeck's novel by that name, Hartman agreed that it was the love of the young boy for the pony that made the pony have unique (n+1) value. John Davis suggests that this difficulty might be overcome by understanding love, virtue, pleasure, and wisdom as special classes of unique experience or intrinsic valuation in which repetition would act as a maintainence factor. It is clear that uniqueness is a conferred property; it is not a recognizable, isolatable property of an object "in itself." Uniqueness <u>occurs</u> in an event of intrinsic valuation. In regard to this intrinsic occurence, it should be carefully noted that uniqueness does not simply become a distinguishable, substantive entity when the event occurs. To make such a transition would involve one with the same

problem encountered in isolating a property of an object. If the relational aspect is maintained, uniqueness will retain its proper status as a property of properties.

In further regard to repetition, the realized occurence of uniqueness on a repeatable basis is that which provides the justification for designating a particular entity, or activity in relation to an entity, as being "intrinsically good." For example, that which enables a relationship between two individuals to be prolonged and to grow in intensity is the repeatable experiencing of novelty, which is a primary term for designating the manner in which uniqueness is manifested. In this type of uniqueness, there is encountered the limitless possibility (except for death) of the continual experience of the infinite depth of human being. Relationships that falter, usually do so because of the more than proverbial "rut" of stagnating boredom that settles upon an experience. Even Buber says that almost all Ich/Du relationships have a way of slipping into the ordinary, the I/It.

Similar statements can be made about works of art which are given recognition as being "classics." One can come to works such as Picasso's "Guernica" or Renoir's sculpture "The Burghers of Calais" time and again; continually discovering some new facet, looking at it from a different perspective, having the light fall upon it in a way that had not been seen before. The person, in the first example, or the work of art may have an infinite capacity of realizable novelty in events of intrinsic valuation which is synonymous with the realization of uniqueness. A Bach Fugue is based on this principle, with a single theme being experienced in a wide range of variations. The American poet, Wallace Stevens, who will be considered in more detail in a latter

chapter, conveys the same sort of experience in a poem entitled "Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird." To sum up, it might be better to say that "intrinsic value" or "intrinsic goodness" is most experienced in situations of repeatable uniqueness. These last two words may constitute a contradiction in terms, which might be dealt with by refering to situations in which repetition is desirable or necessary in terms of the development of the special classes of intrinsic valuation as suggested by Davis.

Beardsley's example of the child swinging has already been seen. He said that the act of swinging was justified only after reasonable consideration had been given to such things as the strength of the ropes on the swing, whether the child's stomach was easily upset by swinging, whether there was homework to do, and even whether the child has asked politely. Beardsley concluded that "once we know these facts, we can adopt a vacation point of view."[68] However, it may very well be that the experience of swinging, the elation and bouyancy, should be considered as valuable in and of itself, without any precedence being taken by more factual considerations. In fact, it should be further said that such experiences should be cultivated and sought out.

The "vacation point of view" for Beardsley becomes segregated out from the rest of factual life. It is an "extra added attraction" to be permitted by other, more rationally compelling circumstances. Hartman's thought is diametrically opposed to such a conception. He calls for a "vacation spirit"[69] which will infect all of one's life as an integrating

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[68] Beardsley, op.cit., p. 16.

[69] Hartman, BHS, op.cit., p 76. Davis' article on uniqueness (p.

power capable of turning vocation into avocation, and infiltrating fact with fantasy; a creative, intrinsic valuing life-style which transforms work into a new creation, play. "Lifestyle" is a strong word which implies a fundamental orientation (Hartman's "centering") toward one's existence, or a movement out of the self-knowledge gained and enhanced in the intrinsic experience. It is the activity of the virtuosity of the artist at life who will be characterized as the genius at play — Homo Ludens. No less virtuoso than Bach himself suggested the relationship of the creative, intrinsic intellect to play by inscribing on a number of his scores: "For the greater glory of God, and a little pleasant recreation."[70]

Addendum

It may seem to those familiar with Hartman's work that a major section, the relationship of his system to transfinite mathematics, has been neglected. However, any such seeming "neglect" is purposely intended, so that one will be encouraged to see the value of Hartman's fundamental theses without having to become embroiled in the controversies surrounding the discussion of transfinite math. Hartman was attempting, as has been said, to be as scientific as possible in his demonstrations; to move beyond the often obscure range of analytic concepts to the more explicit synthetic. In doing so, he found that transfinite mathematics offered the most acceptable mathematico-logical model

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198) also picks up on this idea of the relation of intrinsic value to play: "where there is intrinsic valuation, or aesthetic appreciation, of an object, there must be, I think, considerable imaginative interplay between the object valued and the valuer."

[70]George Kimball Plochmann, "Discussion: Robert S. Hartman on the Structure of Creativity — A Critique," The Journal of Value Inquiry, VII (Summer, 1973), p. 134.

by which he could describe infinitely increasing levels of intrinsic experience. In a most significant statement, Hartman advances the following thesis:

> Some experiences often appear intolerable, for they seem to burst the limited human frame. One the other hand, knowing the hierarchy of intrinsic values and its transfinite symbolism of alephs, which does heap infinities in a rational pattern, $\aleph_0$, $\aleph_1$, $\aleph_2$, . . . $\aleph_N$ . . . $\aleph_\omega$, such experiences do not seem to be so overpowering nor so anomalous. Rather, they seem to confirm a natural disposition of the human spirit toward experiences of ever-heightened awareness and consciousness. Thus, we find in Cantor's work . . . the most rigidly exact in science applied to the shadow and spirituality of the most intangible in speculation.[71]

It therefore seems that Hartman had the basic systemic, extrinsic, intrinsic fulfillment of concept intension, and aesthetic creativity ideas fairly well formed in his mind previous to the emphases on transfinite math. In searching for a way to make his scheme more scientific, he came upon the heralded idea of the mathematical system. This became a perfect counterpart to his thought, as the transfinite model became a perfectly scientific, logical vehicle through which his system could be expressed. However, one must take care in not placing the proverbial cart before the horse in Hartman's work. The transfinite mathematics is best understood as a model, symbol, or "rational pattern" for his thought.

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[71]Hartman, SV, op.cit., p. 224. For a more thorough explanation of Hartman's work on transfinite mathematics, see SV, "The Arithmetical Pattern of the Value Terms," pp. 208ff. It can be noted that the formative work on transfinite mathematics, which acted as the primary influence on Hartman, was done by Georg Cantor (cp., James Thomson, "Infinity in Mathematics and Logic," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, IV, pp. 183-190; Abraham A. Fraenkel, "Georg Cantor," Ibid., II, pp. 20-22; and, Jean van Heijenoort, From Frege to Gödel, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971, pp. 113-117).

Obviously, Hartman felt that the mathematical scheme added a great deal of veracity to his ideas. It is at this point that an objection can be raised, for the extreme systemization of the math may have caused Hartman more trouble, as far as critical reaction is concerned, than it was worth. Such an extreme systemization cannot help but call attention to itself; it is a dramatic departure from typical axiological demonstrations. There would seem almost a natural tendency to have one's attention called, in this particular instance, more to the medium (i.e., the vehicle, model, or rational pattern) than to that which is being mediated. George Kimball Plochmann's constructive critique of The Structure of Value could not be any more pertinently succinct: ". . . its structure is unyielding . . . . I wonder if so much structural inflexibility is needed, especially when setting forth the terms for dealing with the creative life . . . . Hartman's work holds a wealth of ideas; I only wish they did not exhibit so shimmering a schematic perfection."[72] Davis objects to this sort of analysis, making the Dewey-like response that the system should be criticized in terms of its applicability, and not in terms of what would be traditionally expected to relate to that which was concerned with creativity and aesthetics.

However, many who have wrestled with the highly specialized mathematical of Hartman's work would agree with Plochmann, saying that it is inconsistent with the very nature of creativity to dress it in a garment of such rigid stricture. Others, however, have found so many inconsistencies in Hartman's own use of his schematic system, that they are quick to advance an opposite opinion. Edwards, for example, after demonstrating

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[72]Plochmann, op.cit., pp. 135-136.

the wide range of confused definitional usages related to "intrinsic value" and "intrinsic valuation" noted above, says: "As I see it, one of the most serious difficulties with the Hartman system as a formal axiology is that it is far too crude an instrument!"[73] However, both extremes of criticism, which are certainly valid in many respects, can be avoided in the demonstration provided in the present discussion that the content of Hartman's thought need not be irrevocably bound with the mathematical model, and that a justifiable avoidance or criticism of the latter need not reflect negatively upon the former.

In a further consideration, it has been shown that the set theory out of which transfinite mathematics has been constituted may have inherent weaknesses. P. A. Y. Gunter[74] has demonstrated that the "Continuum Hypothesis" (which basically states that no transfinite number exists between denumerably infinite $\aleph_0$ and non-denumerably infinite $\aleph_1$) can be denied without contradiction. This would allow such questions to be raised as to whether some type of value did not occur between extrinsic and intrinsic. Gunter asks:

> I wonder whether Hartman's belief in the existence of non-denumerably infinite sets does not depend upon an interpretation of Cantorian set theory rather than the theory simpliciter. If so, then his axiology really rests not on a simple scientific basis, but on a philosophical interpretation of science.[75]

If Gunter's criticism is justified, and it appears that it is, then it

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[73] Edwards, op.cit., p. 5.

[74] P. A. Y. Gunter, "Hartman: Three Criticisms," The Journal of Value Inquiry, VII (Summer, 1973), p. 137.

[75] Ibid., p. 138.

should be welcomed, for it allows the relation of medium and that which is mediated to be relaxed. By not emphasizing the transfinite mathematical aspect, this dissertation is attempting to advance the idea that Hartman's work can be "de-mathematized" to its advantage in such a way that it will not be a distraction to the entire range of Hartman's considerations.

There will be no attempt on the part of this dissertation to posit a deontological, normative axiology. In fact, it is strongly asserted that there is no way in which such a position could be legitimately justified or verified. This dissertation would rather emphasize a teleological situationalism which provides room for a major consideration involving human responsibility. However, it seems that there would be some "golden mean" between a pharisaic normative ethics, or a view of Hartman's thought which emphasizes the schematic aspects, and the extremes of a purely situational hedonism of the present moment. In regard to the latter position, it seems that some degree of "organization of the phenomenal field" would be a beneficially valid undertaking. However, the undertaking would have to be continually self-critical in such a way that the organizing aspects would not become absolutized; again, the medium (i.e., that which lends organization) would always stand under the judgement of that which was mediated.

In this dissertation, primary attention will be given to "that which is mediated," the possibilities of having and maintaining the experience of experiencing meaning-value (the two words in this case are synonymous, mutually inclusive) which constitutes the epitomizing experience of being human (or, human being). Even admittedly imperfect media, such as the scheme of transfinite mathematics, may be <u>helpful</u> in communicating

about the experience; this is quite distinct from saying that any such medium would guarantee the "Truth" of that which is mediated.

Finally, when the meaning-value experience does occur, one comes into a special relationship with one's own self, with the other "self" of the experience, and with one's entire "universe" at that particular moment. Some terminology is needed for describing the relation of the meaning-value experiencing individual to "that-which-is-now-self," that entity which now is claimed to be of intrinsic value because of the process of intrinsic valuation. There will, in addition, be degrees of meaning-value experiencing, and thus degrees of experiencing the oneness of the meaning-value experiencing subject and the "that-which-is- now (or, that-which-is becoming) - self." These degrees of the experiencing of intrinsic value in the intrinsic value event will be described in the dissertation as degrees of "the fulfillment of the intension of the concept." The intrinsic value terminology, herein strictly qualified, will be used, along with the emphasized aspects of Hartman's system, and as qualified are claimed to be justifiably descriptive of the dimension of authentic human existence that this dissertation is attempting to advance.

CHAPTER II

HOMO LUDENS: MAN THE PLAYER

Almost without exception, those philosophical investigations which are attracted to the problem of play give primary consideration to the formative influence in the area of play studies of the work of Johan Huizinga. Huizinga was a Dutch historian of culture who, in the early 1930s, was involved in a cultural study of the late Middle Ages. His The Waning of the Middle Ages was, in part, an investigation of why the Christian church continued to perpetuate such cultural artifacts as codes of honor, chivalric orders, and a variety of athletic tournaments. He concluded that these were forms of play which had a genealogy reaching back to the sacred "play" of ancient initiation rites. Huizinga, thus, arrived at the supposition that there was a direct relationship between play and man's existence as a cultural being; play was the primary constituent element in man's culturalization. This basic thesis is then developed in Homo Ludens. If the realm of intrinsic valuation could be understood as the locality of culture (paideia), or the "sacred," then play could be described as the ritual through which man is enabled to achieve his "place" in this locality; later, it will even be possible to speak of language, and especially poetry, as the liturgical aspect of this metaphorical comment on the importance of play.

Huizinga initiates his investigation by making two points of clarification. First, he understands man as being more than a rational creature; that is, human being is not necessarily epitomized only by rationality. Therefore, Homo Sapien is not an entirely accurate

designation for man when he exists in his full authenticity. Huizinga says that since the Industrial Revolution, of which he says "never has an age taken itself with more portentous seriousness,"[1] that "man the maker," Homo Faber, is more appropriate for describing the nature of man; man's capacity for rationally producing tools has become the primary manifestation of his existence. In a work entitled Apology For Wonder, which will be given further consideration below, Sam Keen adds the designation Homo Fabricatus,[2] "man the artifact," to describe the situation of Homo Faber who, in the midst of the extremes of the technological society, looses control over and becomes victimized by the tools which he has made. Huizinga insists that there is a function appropriate to man which is as notable as making and reasoning; this is playing, and one thus arrives at the designation Homo Ludens, "man the player." Other designations will appear which are generally synonymous with Homo Ludens: Keen's Homo Admirans, "man the dreamer," and Homo Tempestivus, "the timely man" or "the man for all seasons" (when the discussion mentions the work of Paul Tillich below, Homo Tempestivus will be described as that man who has a sensitivity for kaipos); and, a designation original to this discussion, Anthropaidian, which means "man the player" in what will be claimed to be a more distinctive sense than that which is conveyed by Huizinga's Homo Ludens.

In a second preliminary clarification, Huizinga firmly establishes that the central "play-element" which he calls the basis of culture is

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[1]Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (Boston, 1964), p. 192.

[2]Sam Keen, Apology For Wonder (New York, 1969), p. 124.

not merely an aspect "in" culture alongside of other constituent elements. Rather, he insists on the genitive "of," describing his protest to the use of "in" and its implications in the following manner: "it was not my object to define the place of play among all the other manifestations of culture, but to ascertain how far culture itself bears the character of play."[3]

It is necessary to be as specific about what is meant by the use of the word play as possible. Huizinga is not attaching his primary attention to play as it is manifested in any particular form of play; he would be aware of avoiding any sort of "naturalistic fallacy" as it relates to play. Play is more than "playing football," "playing bridge," or "playing house." David L. Miller, in a work entitled Gods and Games, aphoristically approaches the same distinction:

> Life is a game. If I had written, "Life is like a game," you would have asked, "Like which game?" Actually, it is like the game of life. That's why I wrote, "Life is a game."[4]

In order to avoid such questions as "like what kind of play?", Huizinga moves to a consideration of what he calls "the very essence, the primordial quality of play,"[5] which is for him the "fun" of playing. In terminology which is precisely reminiscent of Hartman, he speaks of the "intensity" and "power of absorption" which "fun" is in play. He further stresses that play is an "absolutely primary category of life,"[6] which,

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[3]Huizinga, op.cit., p. iv.

[4]David L. Miller, God and Games: Toward a Theology of Play (New York, 1970), p. 173.

[5]Huizinga, op.cit., pp. 2-3.

[6]Ibid., p. 3.

as with Moore's "ultimate simple," cannot be reduced to any other mental category, resists all analysis and logical interpretation, and has no foundation in any purely rational nexus. In fact, most attempts at investigating the phenomena of play are seen as having been scientifically quantitative (extrinsic), rather than aesthetically qualitative (intrinsic). He implies from these distinctions that "the very existence of play continually affirms the supra-logical nature of the human situation."[7] Play is understood as "a totality, in the modern sense of the word."[8] This idea of totality undoubtedly refers to the previously mentioned Gestalt-event or "happening" (recall Hartman's "continuum").

Etymology, as will be seen in greater detail below, is important to Huizinga, and he is concerned to give an etymological background to the English word fun. Its nearest equivalent is the Dutch aardigkeit which is derived from the German Art and Wesen. In a reference which will preclude the discussion's consideration of Heidegger in the next chapter, it can be noted that Heidegger makes a related etymological consideration[9] which extends Huizinga's understanding of fun. This particular consideration of the relation of Huizinga to Heidegger is of utmost significance for the dissertation as a whole. In the German language, "essence" is translated Wesen and reflects the Indo-Germanic root, vas, which carries the verbal force of "coming to reside, arriving, taking place." There is thus the movement from the earlier Heidegger's

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[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[9] James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (eds.), The Later Heidegger and Theology (New York, 1963), pp. 61ff.

use of the word Sein to the use of the word Anwesen; "the 'being of being' is formulated as 'the arriving of that which arrives' (das Anwesen des Anwesenden)."[10] Heidegger also distinguishes between two types of thinking: Vorstellen, which is theoretical-scientific, and Entsprechen, which can be described as the event of "letting be said that which shows itself."[11] In relationship to Huizinga, these distinctions would mean that fun has no substantive aspect which can be isolated by scientific reasoning, but that it is an event in which that which is human being un-veils (recall Heidegger's emphasis on the Greek word a-letheia) itself. Therefore, such designations of the "fun" of play as "primordial quality," "very essence," and "primary category" seem to be decidedly appropriate; culture, the active manifestation of human being, is convincingly shown to be sub specie ludi.

Huizinga attempts to describe play in terms of its not having properties, but qualities. A distinction can be made between properties and qualities by describing properties as those objectively demonstrative (mechanically calculable) parts of an entity or event, and qualities as those intrinsically valuable properties of properties. Non-seriousness is first considered, initially with the assumption that seriousness and play must be necessarily juxtaposed. Such an assumption is quickly rejected, for ordinary experience provides a myriad of examples of play that is undertaken with the utmost of seriousness; one need only consider the intent seriousness of the child stacking blocks, or stalking giants in an imagined land of adventure. It is, therefore, necessary

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[10] Ibid., p. 22.

[11] Stanley Romaine Hopper and David L. Miller (eds.), Interpretation: The Poetry of Meaning (New York, 1967), p. xiv.

to distinguish two types of seriousness. A positive type of seriousness receives the special designation "earnestness." When there is a spontaneous, concentrated activity of play which is being pursued on a heightened level of absorption between player and play-situation, it is appropriate to speak of the player as playing in earnest. This positive seriousness is a necessary implication of the degree of total self-commitment which is being given to the play. No juxtaposition is encountered in this situation between play and seriousness. Rather, there is a creativity perpetuating dialectic which has been established.

However, there is also a negative seriousness which is correctly conceived as standing in juxtaposition to play. This negative seriousness occurs when playing becomes too self-conscious; when play turns in upon itself, and becomes calculative. Negative seriousness is play taking itself too seriously, and in such a situation as this play looses its spontaneity and its character of being a happening. As will be seen, artistic creativity is the most intrinsic form of play, and in regard to art, Huizinga says: "when art becomes self-conscious, that is, conscious of its own grace, it is likely to loose something of its eternal child-like innocence."[12] As regards this sort of self-consciousness, there is a great deal of difference between a young child running in his backyard and falling down with the shout "I'm tackled," and man whose livelihood completely depends on whether or not he is able to make a particular number of tackles in a professional football contest. It is impossible to "make" play, in the same way that it is impossible to "make" love; if one's attention is completely engrossed in the calculative

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[12]Huizinga, op.cit., p. 202.

aspect, it never "happens." For Huizinga, play involves a certain "disinterestedness"[13] "Don't try. Just do it. And don't try to 'just do it,' either. Forget the whole thing."[14]

> Can man play? No, not intentionally, not volitionally or rationally . . . . Play cannot be accomplished, but it always happens. For those who have dancing eyes to see. We must learn not to do play, but to see the play in it all. But of course we cannot do that either; not by trying. Yet sometimes we do "do" it. Or rather, it happens to us. Like a love affair. It all comes from playing around.[15]

In almost every form of play, from athletics to chess, one can find instances of negative-play or serious-play, often termed "pressing," which is play trying too hard. "Play to order is no longer play; it could at best be a forcible imitation."[16] Play taken too seriously is the intrinsic lowering itself to the level of the extrinsic, especially when it insists upon meeting certain arbitrary standards before it can be considered play. At this point, the implications for discussing play and work are evident and abundant.

A second quality of play explored by Huizinga is that of freedom. By freedom, he means that play is an activity which is freely undertaken. It is voluntary in the sense that it is done only for its own enjoyment. One might say with Moore, that its intrinsic value rests entirely upon its intrinsic nature. When anything outside of itself becomes the compelling factor, it is no longer play. It cannot be a task, a physical necessity, or a moral duty; it must be, as regards all other extrinsic

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[13]Miller, op.cit., p. 125.

[14]Huizinga, op.cit., p. 9.

[15]Miller, op.cit., p. 175.

[16]Huizinga, op.cit., p. 7.

considerations, entirely "superfluous."[17] Ortega y Gasset speaks of such superfluity in the following manner:

> Utility creates nothing, invents nothing; it simply appears and registers what has been created independently. Life's original, primary activity is always spontaneous, playful, superflous in its intent. It is free expansion of a pre-existing energy. What is most necessary is most superflous.[18]

The third quality of play is that it is not "ordinary life." Huizinga makes a distinction between the "real" world, and the play world, and describes play as a "stepping out of 'real' life into a temporary sphere of activity all its own."[19] The play world is exemplified by the child playing "pretend." Such pretending may be an inferior activity as compared to the adult rationality of the "real" world which "really knows better," but for Huizinga "child-play possesses the play-form in its veriest essence, and most purely."[20] He further adds: "Really to play, a man must play like a child. Can we assert this is so in the case of such an ingenious game as bridge? If not, the virtue has gone out of the game."[21] At this point, one should recall the idea of virtue or "excellence" conveyed in Aristotle's understanding of arete, and also recall the ideas by Hartman on the possibilities of being a "virtuoso at living." The "real" world is ends-oriented, and involved

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[17] Ibid., p. 8.

[18] Jacques Ehrman, "Homo Ludens Revisited," in Ehrman, Game, Play, Literature (Boston, 1971), p. 48. Ehrman comments in a statement indicative of negative-seriousness: "Needless to say, we can hardly subscribe to this view, with its rather naive idealism."

[19] Huizinga, op.cit., p. 8.

[20] Ibid., p. 17. The chapter on Nietzsche will deal with the topic of child's play in detail as its major consideration.

[21] Ibid., p. 199.

in the satisfaction of wants and appetites, while that which stands outside of the ordinary is "activity satisfying in itself."[22] Like Plato, Hartman reverses this terminology by describing the "real" world as the world created in intrinsic valuation, and the extrinsic world as only a fragment of the real. John Fowles offers the following aphorism:

> Means-oriented societies, for whom the game is a game. Ends-oriented societies, for whom the game is winning. In the first, if one is happy, then one is successful; in the second, one cannot be happy unless one is successful.[23]

Some might argue that this is a distinction without a difference since happiness is the end of both. It might be objected, however, that winning and happiness are not necessarily coextensive, and it is quite possible to be involved in winning but not to be happy about the way that the outcome was achieved. Also, it may be questionable whether happiness is an end; it may be better described as a part of the experience of the satisfying movement of means toward an end. It is not unusual to have the experience of greater fulfillment accompanying achievement of some end rather than that end being completed.

Huizinga says that in relationship to the "ordinary," that play first presents itself as an interlude in "real life." He explains this by referring to social anthropologists who argue that the sacred feast or festival was such a playful interlude in the most primitive societies. However, there is idealized a movement of play from interlude status to the place where it is viewed as an integral complement to life in general. "It thus has its place in a sphere superior to the strictly

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[22] Ibid., p. 9.

[23] John Fowles, The Aristos: A Self-Portrait in Ideas (Boston, 1964), p. 196. Quoted in Miller, op.cit., p. 174.

biological processes of nutrition, reproduction, and self-preservation."[24] Hartman might say that the level of biological processes is the extrinsic level of man's existence, while the level of the play processes is the intrinsic level. Huizinga says that "play casts a spell over us; it is 'enchanting,' 'captivating',"[25] and it will be recalled that Hartman has already been shown to say that the event of intrinsic valuation "captivates . . . cast an 'unreal' spell over the valuer, yet, in this spell he feels more alive than in the 'real' world."[26] Therefore, there is no "real" world which is juxtaposed against a so-called play world. Any designation of "reality" will ultimately be arbitrary. "Reality" is not substantive, but experiential. It is not some sort of absolute substance, but is created continually through play. One is reminded of Sartre's thought, which will be closely considered below, in which Being is Nothingness, and essence is created through human activity. That which comes nearest to "reality" in the ordinary use of the word is the happening-event of the experience of play. Play, as with intrinsic value, is meaning-conferring/confirming activity. This activity is on a level "higher" than the more utilitarian, mechanistic meaning conferred on the level of "ordinary" or "extrinsically quotidian" life.

Huizinga's fourth quality of play is "limitedness." By this he means that play has a particular limitation imposed upon it by time and space, duration and locality. "Play begins, and then at a certain

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[24] Huizinga, op.cit., p. 9.

[25] Ibid., p. 10.

[26] See above p. 27.

moment it is 'over'. It plays itself to an end. While it is in progress all is movement, change, alternation, succession, association, separation."[27] Within this movement, Huizinga also describes the dialectical element of tension and resolution which could be manifested in such diverse activities as a quarterback calling a play ("checking off") at the line of scrimmage in a football game, or an artist choosing a particular brush or mixing a new color. The happening-event nature of play is being stressed, and once the event is over, the play experience is retained only as objective data which takes the form of memory, tradition, or some fixed cultural phenomena. There may be a general repetition of a play-experience, but each experience has an individuality all its own; each new play-experience has an element of novelty.

There are sections of the work of A. N. Whitehead, who will be given detailed consideration in a later chapter, which one might find particularly appropriate as a model for understanding this point in Huizinga's description of the qualities of play. The basic element of Whitehead's metaphysical scheme is an "actual entity" which occurs in, or is temporally expressed as, an "actual occasion." Actual entities can best be understood in terms of a pulsation of energy in quantum mechanics. The pulsations are discontinuous, each having a unique duration which Whitehead calls a "specious present." After this duration, the particular actual entity perishes, and can be described only in terms of its "objective immortality." During the actual occasion there occurs what Whitehead calls "concresence," or the "coming together" of the actual entity's "subjective aim." There is a sort of tension and

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[27]Huizinga, op.cit., p. 9.

resolution, a climax, and then the particular actual entity-duration "perishes." It may be possible to suggest that the duration of the happening-event of play is a concresence (recall Hartman's "interpenetration " and "conpenetration") of player and play-situation in a "oneness of satisfaction," which is tantamount to what Huizinga has termed the essential aspect of play, "fun." It does not seem absolutely necessary to make an equation of fun and pleasure, especially if that would lead to an identification of pleasure, intrinsic value experience, and happiness. While these are definitely related, "fun" seems to be more descriptive of the experiential happening-event itself, and "pleasure" would seem to relate to a philosophically reflective description of it. Play also has a limitedness of space which may relate to the field upon which a particular game is played, a game board, or a sacred spot where ritual is acted out.

A final quality of play is described as order; in fact, Huizinga says that play creates order. There is not a great deal of clarity given at this point in his discussion, and the additional explication that order is the "aesthetic factor"[28] in play makes the problem even more complicated. Order is associated with rules, and there is the added statement that any deviation from these rules spoils the game. However, it seems that Huizinga has something more basic in mind than the rules of a game of basketball or backgammon. For Huizinga, order is synonymous with meaning, and it is by the adherence to the rules which arise out of play that play is able to be perpetuated or have meaning. Yet, it must be clear that the meaning or order is not impressed on play from

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[28] Ibid., p. 19.

without, but that it arises out of the nature of play itself.

What then are these rules? It would seem that they are the very qualities that have been discussed: non-seriousness, freedom, non-ordinariness, disinterestedness, and limitedness. The manifestation of these qualities is the ideal order, meaning, or the "rules" of play. They arise out of true play, and continually act as a self-critical aspect which enables play to advance. Any further, specific rules must be consistent with these basic orders-of-play, and it is admittedly quite difficult to imagine how these qualities can be translated into the width of a playing field, the number of players on a team, or the length of a game. When rules do not arise out of play, the play is corrupted; only those rules are acceptable which enhance the self-perpetuation of play. It is as if one begins to play, and the rules or order comes about naturally as the play goes along, and so that the play might continue. Rules and order are made for play, not play for rules.

At this point, one is able to see the basic insights of Huizinga on play. The remainder of his book is an attempt to demonstrate particular manifestations of the play-element. He finds the play-element in art, philosophy, poetry, epistemology, law, and war. For example, in the section on philosophy, he described the role of the ancient sophist as being closely related to that of the athlete, and considered the medieval disputation as being tantamount to a sporting event. A number of his comments on these particular manifestations will be mentioned in later sections. Finally, the present status of Western Civilization is described in relationship to the play-element. Huizinga believes that the play-element, particularly in the political sphere, has been on the

wane since the eighteenth century. Modern warfare has also completely lost its contact with play (except for the generals), and has become deadly serious. Modern man has become engrossed in seriousness, especially an epistemological seriousness that insists on affirming itself in terms of what it considers the most precise use of reason, and in doing so has created a life replete with boredom, dullness, and unresolved tensions.

There is, however, another major section in Huizinga's work which will be of importance to this discussion, particularly as it turns its attention in the next chapter to the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Consideration will now be given to the section of Homo Ludens which deals with the relationship of play to language. Huizinga prefaces his language discussion with a statement which indicates the basic assumptions of his linguistic philosophy. He claims that "we must always bear in mind that the idea as we know it is defined and perhaps limited by the word we use for it."[29] Gadamer will describe this phenomena in terms of inescapable "prejudices" which are an inherent part of language. Huizinga is, therefore, attempting to look at the most primeval instances of the play-element as it is manifested in human culture through a study of man's language. He explains that it is not unusual in primitive cultures to find words for specific species, but not for a common genus; for example, a word may be found for eel or pike, but not for fish. In a similar sense, several modern languages have words which apply to the general notion of play, but the primitive language must be consulted in order to observe the emergence of the primary manifestations

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[29] Ibid., p. 28.

of the play-element itself.

He sees it, for instance, as being of the utmost importance that the Greek language has a special suffix which has no other purpose than to distinguish an activity as being "playful." The suffix, -ινδα, is indeclinable and underived. The best conjecture in regard to the source of the suffix is that it has close affinity with the words ἀλίνδω and κυλίνδω which carry the implication of some sort of spontaneous or non-teleological (as far as any utilitarian, instrumental purpose is concerned) motion; ἀλίνδω means "to roll around" or "to roam about." Huizinga says that in this suffix that there is conveyed the sense of a non-purposive "revolving,"[30] but he is unable to draw any implications from this. One might say, for example, that he should have noticed the relation of this spontaneous motion to dancing which was an extremely important part of primitive ritual. As will be seen in this and later sections, dancing may be seen as one of the most fundamental epitomizing forms of play in its purest state. It can be added, parenthetically, that the idea of "roaming about" mentioned earlier finds a linguistic parallel in the contemporary idiomatic expression "hanging out."

Returning to the above mentioned play suffix, Huizinga says that it connotes "playing at" or "having fun at." For example, the word σφαιρινδά means "playing at ball," and would be inappropriate for describing any kind of organized, purposive ballgame. Similarly, the word στρεπτίνδα means "playing at throwing," and would not be used

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[30] Ibid., p. 29n. In the introduction to Linge's translation of the shorter essays of Gadamer, he seems to be describing this same phenomena when he talks of the "bouyancy of the game." (Cp., David Linge, The Shorter Essays of Hans-Georg Gadamer, unpublished manuscript, p. 10.)

to describe throwing which was done in competetive, standard, or rule related situations. An example of this type of fundamental play activity, where the play-element manifests itself in an uncorrupted state can be seen in the recollection by Gadamer, from his own childhood, of sitting for long periods of time completely absorbed in bouncing a ball against a wall.

There are three words in the Greek language which are used for play: ἀδύρω, παιδιά (hereafter paidia), and ἀγών (hereafter agon). The first can be dismissed as being of relatively little importance. However, the question of the relationship of paidia and agon provides one of the most fundamental distinctions in Huizinga's work. In fact, it might be said that the central operating thesis of the entirety of Homo Ludens depends upon his position on the relationship of these two words. As will be seen, the position of this dissertation stands in contrast to the findings of Huizinga.

Paidia is the key term which can be discussed in regard to play studies. It can stand for child's play (its etymological meaning), or it can be used to denote the most sacred kind of ritualistic activity. In paidia there is a light-heartedness and carefree joyfulness. In a passage from his dialogue, Laws, Plato exalts this particular concept of play in the following manner:

> . . . man is made God's plaything, and that is the best part of him. Therefore, every man and woman should live life accordingly, and play the noblest games . . . . Life must be lived as play . . . .[31]

As a prelude to the chapter which will deal with the concept of play in Plato, it can be said that he relates the idea of the "noblest games,"

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[31]Plato, Laws (Chicago, 1952), vii, p. 796.

not to the olympian athletic events, but to aesthetic creativity; a person will be enabled through the embodiment of paidia, "to go through life in the spirit of the poet,"[32] to live his life aesthetically. It can also be recalled that in The Republic that precedence is given to training in music and the telling of legendary stories, instead of to training in gymnastics. It should be carefully noted that Huizinga does not include this statement, which is removed by one sentence and which is the concluding sentence of the paragraph of the original text of Plato, in the quotation as it is used in Homo Ludens. Rather, he makes as his concluding statement of this call to live one's life as play the following: "then a man will be able to propitiate the gods, and defend himself against his enemies, and win the contest."[33] However, more standard translations have "battle" instead of "contest," which stands in an obvious parallel to the preceeding phrase in the quotation.

The reason for Huizinga's insistence on the emphasis being placed upon "contest" is because of the third word for play, agon, which is usually given that meaning. Huizinga's contention is that paidia and agon form a synthesis which, in turn, constitutes the play-element. Thus, the competitiveness of the contest is seen as being one of the primary aspects of play. This contention then allows Huizinga to see the contests in philosophical disputation, jurisprudence, military combat, and the very process of man's culturalization as manifestations of this competition-oriented play-element.

Huizinga is correct in this contention at least to the extent that

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[32] Ibid., p. 721.

[33] Ibid. Quoted in Huizinga, op.cit., p. 19.

it is true that almost all manifestations of agon do involve the play-element. In fact, the play-element is most often found in some sort of contest. However, to say that paidia becomes necessarily bound to agon in some sort of cultural transition or evolution which irrevocably moves from the paidia of the child to the agon of the professional athlete or soldier cannot be justified on this basis. It seems possible to admit that paidia and agon are typically manifested in some synthetic relationship, and at the same time to affirm that atypical manifestations of paidia by itself can be observed which occur independently from agon. More importantly, by distinguishing between paidia and agon, it becomes possible to speak of a purer, or more intrinsic, form of the play-element, paidia, which adheres more closely to the ideals of spontaneity, freedom, and disinterestedness earlier suggested by Huizinga himself. By making this distinction, it also becomes possible to speak of an intrinsic form of play that does not necessarily involve competitiveness and its accompanying plethora of rules. In the agon play, the competitive and rule-oriented ideas are given greater attention. In fact, it is the rule-orientation that provides the impetus for the terminology Ludus. It may even be that Huizinga's Latinized terminology, Homo Ludens, which is fundamentally dependent upon Hellenistic ideas which may be corrupted in their transition to the Roman world, applies to the more extrinsic form of play, and that a more appropriate term, which would be in accord with the intrinsic, paidia element, might be the Greek Anthropaidian.

However, Huizinga would be quite intimidated by this suggestion, for he would quickly realize its implication for a major portion of his discussion. In his investigation of other ancient languages, he makes

the attempt to find examples which would confirm his paidia-agon synthesis. Yet, in sharp contrast to this thesis, it may be that these examples from other languages question rather than confirm Huizinga's thesis, and lead inescapably to the conclusion that there is an independently existing paidia type of play.

First, in the Sanskrit, he considers the primary word for play, kridati. Its most usual connotations are related to motion, and the motion is applicable to movement in nature as with waves or wind, animals, and humans. With humans, the primitive usage refers to the dance. It appears that there may be some understanding being expressed about a relation between the movement of nature and the play of man. The dancing human, absorbed in a spontaneous oneness with the movement of his environment, becomes the paradigm of the human in his "natural" state. As will be considered in detail, it is not likely that any better example of this can be found than the dancing Zorba in Nikos Kazantzakis' novel, Zorba the Greek. One might also consider the importance of dance in primitive religious, nature, and magical rites; the idea of "oneness" can be further advanced by recognizing that in the most primitive setting that these rites were not distinguished into separate types as the preceding delineation suggests. This close relationship to nature was also advanced by Sanskrit words which indicated that one of the earliest forms of play involved imitation of animals. Imitation is recognized by most social anthropologists and child psychiatrists as being the mode of culturalization, and it does not seem far from the ancient Sanskrit concepts to the young child dressing in its parent's clothing, or the teenager dressed in tuxedo going to the senior prom. However, in his investigation of this language, Huizinga admits: "to my

knowledge, the contest as such is not expressed by any of the play-words in Sanskrit."[34]

In the Chinese language, the word wan is the primitive play-word with similar connotations to paidia and kridati such as rapid movements and imitation. There is the added connotation of the physical experience of play which is conveyed in descriptions such as the fingering of ornaments or the enjoying of moonlight. There are obvious sensuous overtones to the ideas of "handling something with playful attention" and "being lightly engrossed."[35] As regards the contest, the Chinese language is found to have a distinct, special word, cheng, which means the "position" or "situation" of play, and which is said by Huizinga to be "the perfect equivalent of the Greek agon."[36] It may well be that this equivalence does exist, and agon may be found to relate to paidia in terms of it form, rules, position, or situation. However, there appears to be a respective relation between paidia and wan, and agon and cheng which in no manner advances Huizinga's argument that there is a transition from one Greek work to the other. Again, Huizinga seems to have demonstrated an argument against his fundamental position.

In the Blackfoot language, the distinction between play and contest is continued. Koani means "child's play," and the only time it can be used in relation to adults is in the erotic. Other "adult play" is, without exception, termed kachtsi which emphasizes skill, strength, winning, and competition. Huizinga states: "The relationship between koani and kachtsi, therefore, resembles that between paidia and agon in the

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[34] Huizinga, op.cit., p. 32.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

Greek."[37] He is completely correct in his assessment, but the rigid distinction in the Blackfoot between "child's play" and "adult play" does not advance his main thesis; in reality, it is diametrically opposed to it.

Huizinga admits at this point that he may be holding his own position in question, but that a consideration of three other languages, Japanese, Latin, and Hebrew, will justify his position. It might, however, seem that three against three would be less than adequate justification. In fact, the Japanese and Latin may not be any justification at all, for both of these languages are like those characterized in Huizinga's prefacing remards about linguistic philosophy which have only words for the more general genus. As he has already demonstrated in his initial attraction to the Greek, words referring to the more general genus for play are less valuable in making determinations about the play-element. Therefore, that asobi and ludus express a relatedness between "play" and "contest" does not mean a great deal when it is considered that the words are used for any activity that vaguely hints of play in the slightest fashion. It may be that Huizinga senses this difficulty, for in the midst of his treatment of the Japanese and Latin he looks forward to the Hebrew: "As we shall see, Hebrew affords striking evidence of the identity between the agonistic and the play principle."[38] He later adds emphasis to this position by further stating that "no illustration of the essential identity of play and battle (i.e., contest) in archaic culture could be more striking than the one offered

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[37] Ibid., p. 33.

[38] Ibid., p. 35.

in The Old Testament."[39]

The illustration that Huizinga is making reference to, and upon which he is placing the weight of his argument, comes from The Second Book of Samuel. In this historically oriented section of the biblical corpus, an incident is recalled which relates to the rise to power of David as king of Israel following the death of Saul, Israel's first king. Saul's son, Ishbosheth, became king over all of the tribes of Israel except Judah over which David rules at Hebron for seven and one-half years. Finally, military encounters began to take place between the two groups, and it is in the context of the first major encounter of this sort that Huizinga's "evidence" is found. The two armies camp on opposite sides of the pool of Gibeon, and the suggestion is made that twelve soldiers from each side "arise and play before us."[40] Huizinga sees in the Hebrew word that is used here, צחק, (sahaq), the perfect synthesis of the play-element and the idea of contest. Not only are the men seen as providing amusement, but they are also participating in one of the primary forms of contest, battle. As the two groups meet, the following event takes place: "And each caught his opponent by the head (perhaps the 'grip' position for the beginning of a wrestling match), and thrust his sword in his opponent's side; so they fell down (i.e., died) together."[41] From this beginning, a long war was fought between the house of David and that of Saul in which David ultimately gained superiority.

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[39] Ibid., p. 41.


[40] II Samuel 2:14. Revised Standard Version of The Holy Bible.

[41] II Samuel 2:16. Ibid.

Huizinga's interpretation can be questioned from two perspectives. First, it can be seen that what is proposed in the recorded account is, as Huizinga suggests, a contest. The men are more than likely wrestlers, and such contests were not unusual means of amusement in situations such as this. In should be noted that no war had been declared, and the wrestling match affords each side an opportunity to test the strength of the other, and to provide a time of deliberation while they decide exactly what they are going to do. In this particular usage of sahaq, the play-element is present with that of the contest. As has been admitted, the play-element can be often present in, or confined to, the contest. However, the wrestling match becomes a front for a clandestine attack on the opponents best fighters. But ironically both sides have devised the same scheme, concealed weapons are drawn at the same time, and all twenty-four men are killed. The presence of the weapons and the intent with which they are used convey a seriousness which wholly cancels out the play-element which might have been present. The contest is carried on under the guise of play, a situation quite familiar to the spectator of a great deal of contemporary athletic contests which often become the vehicle of commercialism or political subterfuge. It takes a great deal of imagination to find the play-element in this scenario. In fact, play is subjected to a utilitarianism which stands in the most radical opposition to Huizinga's own definitions of what activity must manifest in order to be considered play.

From a second perspective, a more fundamental objection to Huizinga's thesis can be raised. The basis of this second objection is that the usage in II Samuel which he relies upon is unique in The Old Testament. Every other instance of sahaq can be directly related to the Greek

paidia. In fact, it cannot even be said that the presently considered usage departs from the norm, as it is obviously used with deception. In II Samuel 6:5 and 6:21, the high point of the consolodation of the Davidic reign is described. David brings the most important artifact of the Hebrew faith, The Ark of the Covenant, into Jerusalem. The Ark had been recaptured by David from Israel's Philistine enemies, and David's bringing it back to Jerusalem would be equivalent to a returning hero's ticker-tape parade down Fifth Avenue in New York City. David is ecstatic, and the above mentioned references describe his ecstatic dance before the Ark at the head of the victory parade. Both references describe David's activity as "playing before God." References in the parallel historical account in I Chronicles 13:8 and 15:29 describe the same phenomena, and use the same word. Even if Huizinga had been correct about the first reference, the dancing-playing use of sahaq would be the standard usage, and the wrestling match the exception. It should also be noted that in the Septuagint (the third century Greek translation of the Hebrew Old Testament) that each usage of the idea of play is translated with a cognate of paidia; there is not the slightest hint of agon.

The position against Huizinga can be further substantiated by noting a cognate of sahaq, sahhek (). The word appears twice in the Book of Genesis, where it describes a specific instance of child's play (21:9), and an instance in which the character Issac is seen fondling his wife (26:8). The King James Version is quite close to the literal meaning of the word with a translation which reminds one how contact with genitals is often referred to in common expression in terms of play; it translates "fondling" as "sporting with." The literal

translation is "toying with,"[42] which recalls the relation of the paidia element to the erotic described throughout, and especially the Chinese, specifically paidia-related wan which meant "handling something with playful attention." A third usage in Exodus 32:6 describes ritualistic play (also translated with a cognate of paidia in the Septuagint), and the Old Testament scholar Johan Pedersen says that the words "began to play" should be translated "began to abandon themselves."[43] The idea of abandonment has also been seen as directly related to the intrinsic, paidia form of play.

In summary, one might say that on the basis of the internal, textual evidence, that the Hebrew use of the word sahaq cannot bear the weight of the burden of proof that Huizinga wishes to place upon it. In fact, it appears to the contrary that he has attached his argument to one obscure instance, and that the typical use of the term adds increased validity to the paidia-agon distinction.

It further appears that Huizinga has given insufficient consideration to the original force of the word agon. The earliest meaning of the word does not relate to a kind of play, but very specifically to the place of play; it originally means "place of assembly," "place of contest," or "stadium."[44] Huizinga thus should have distinguished between the play-element, paidia, and the place where paidia may occur, agon.

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[42]Fransic Brown, S. R. Driver, and Charles A. Briggs, A Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament (London, 1968), p. 850.

[43]Johan Pedersen, Israel: Its Life and Culture, II (London, 1964), pp. 643 and 468.

[44]Ethelbert Stauffer, "Agon," in Gerhard Kittel (ed.), Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, I (Grand Rapids, 1974), p. 135.

This would seem to relate back to what he had already said about play having both a temporal and spatial limitedness. Agon seems to have more to do with the limitedness that is imposed upon paidia by the situations in which it occurs. It would also seem that the rule element of play arises out of this limitedness; for example, the play is limited to one hour's duration of time, and a field one hundred yards long and sixty yards wide. Within the context of these limitations, play becomes a game, or paidia becomes manifested in agon. The Chinese language was correct in distinguishing between wan, the paidia element, and cheng, the "position" or "situation" of play.

The primary implication to be drawn from this discussion is that paidia and agon can be irrevocably distinguished. It becomes possible to speak of an extrinsic, agon form of play in which the play-element is encountered in kinds or classes of play, in games and contests. Here, there are recognized limitations which may even by described as corruptions of the play-element. Within the sphere of these limitations, it is also possible to talk about rules and competitiveness. However, there is also an intrinsic, paidia form of play which is not limited by rules, need not be competitive, and does not demand an organized game or context in which to be experienced. Rather than demanding organization, it lends organization to the entire phenomenal field of the moment of paidia.

It also becomes possible not to have to speak of life as play, as Plato did, and then necessarily to think of life in terms of some type of game. One can rather think of a play-attitude in which one achieves a certain spontaneity, equilibrium, and mediated non-seriousness with one's self, environment, and fellows. There follows a lessening of the

tensions brought on by the agonistic view of success as winning. In a society where rampant competitiveness is glorified (the greatest heroes are successful, agonistic competitors), there is an inbuilt high frustration factor, for not everyone can be a winner all of the time. To say that "character" is directly derived from participation in competitive sports, or that all forms of non-serious play are somehow inferior to the play of the professional, are grossly inadequate assumptions or conventional myths of a technological society that often uses play and athletics as an outlet for competitive passions which could otherwise be self-destructive.

Thomas Middleton, writing in Saturday Review about the great American athletic metaphor, which is particularly noticable in the present political vocabulary, says of minds that are "geared largely to the sports page":

> To think in terms of contests, of "won" and "lost" columns, is to lose one's perspective on normal give and take — the reasonable elastic accomodations that are really the basic of society, and, ultimately, of survival.[45]

Editor Norman Cousins, in a later edition of the same publication, says concerning the thesis of the so-called "lifeboat ethics" that it is justifiable not to send food to starving nations: "It is unscientific and unrealistic to believe that men who have solved the problem of leaping across space to inspect the face of Mars lack the wit to create vital balances on earth."[46] Within the context of this idea of "vital balance," one finds an extremely appropriate synonym for intrinsic

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[45]Thomas H. Middleton, "Light Refractions," Saturday Review (June 14, 1975), p. 59.

[46]Norman Cousins, "Harm Through Mercy?" Saturday Review (July 24, 1976), p. 4.

valuation. One might speak of a vital balance which could be derived from the relation of luxurgy and necessity, work and play, or that equilibrium or grace in which a "Self" emerges out of an individual's variety of "selves." Such a vital balance would be a distinctively axiological dimension in which there is equilibrium between ethics and aesthetics, the "good" and the "beautiful." Terms such as balance, grace, and equilibrium are synlytic terms (note that they are also play terms) in which the agonistic, the social, the aesthetic, and the "spiritual" are inclusively eclipsed by that which can be termed "human." Here, one is brought back to the primordial play dimension of movement, motion, dance, and loving attention; it is thus suggested that the primordial play dimension is the fundamental manifestation of the primordial dimension of human being.

It would seem, therefore, imperative in the present agonistic society, to be able to innovatively discuss the possibilities of play which is not rule inhibited, and to describe a kind of play which is not even subject to ideas of winning or loosing, success or failure. Such play would be both more aesthetically and more ethically pleasing, and could serve, especially in a nation where athletics is given central attention by the man in the local bar and the man in the oval office, as a creative paradigm for human activity in its entirety. The distinctions between paidia and agon, and its maintainence, is of utmost significance. In conclusion, the American novelist, Kurt Vonnegut, relates the following experience:

> A friend of mine was a superjock at Yale, but in his senior year he quit the varisity ice hockey team. He organized an ice hockey team where you had to have a beard to play. He challenged Rhode Island School of Design to a game, and the two teams skated to the

> center of the hockey rink carrying their jerseys. They made a big pile of them, and then chose up sides. That was beautiful. They were friendly, cheerful people, and they were doing amusing things. Their goal (note the contrast with the normal usage of the word goal in a hockey game) was to delight themselves, and not to defeat each other.[47]

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[47] Kurt Vonnegut, "On Being 'Good' Sports," Psychology Today (October, 1979), p. 59.

CHAPTER III

THE PLAY OF BEING

The dissertation to this point has been concerned with developing an understanding of the concepts of "intrinsic value" and "play." There has also been the attempt to present the dissertation in such a way that the relationship between the two concepts would be made evident. Intrinsic value is that status which is conferred upon an entity in the human process of intrinsic valuation. Intrinsic valuation occurs, in an experiential event, in a direct porportion to the degree of unity, absorption, interpenetration, or "oneness" which can be accomplished between the valuer and the entity being valued. Intrinsic valuation is an epistemological process, and the meaning derived from this valuation is not merely definitional or expositional, but the experiencing of special knowledge which is termed "unique." To the degree that one actively manifests the capacity to intrinsically value, to confer "selfhood" upon an entity, one is a human being.

Play is then understood as a form of intrinsic valuation. In play, an individual experiences the kind of special relationship described above to his environment, which becomes his "play-ground," and to the entities of his play, his "play-mates" or toys ("play-things"). These entities, and the total (Gestalt) environment, transcend any level of stereotype, extrinsic objectification, and become participating subjects (Selves) in the event of play. However, play is not simply a form of intrinsic valuation. It is, rather, the form of intrinsic valuation. The activity of artistic creativity, which is the paradigm

activity of intrinsic valuation, is fundamentally an activity of play. In a similar manner, when any activity can be characterized in terms of the idea of play developed in chapter two, that activity is tantamount to being an activity of intrinsic valuation in which there is the aforementioned realization and experience of human being.

The idea of play expands Hartman's discussion at one of its most essential points. In the key article, "The Value Structure of Creativity," he makes the explicit association of the actualized capacity of intrinsic valuation with artistic creativity. At this point, he gives emphasis to the statement "Valuation is a play with properties,"[1] which means that valuation is the ability to move from a situation in which properties are randomly encountered to the place where they are formed, along with the valuer, into a Gestalt. With the closure of the Gestalt, one encounters the experience ("fun") of intrinsic valuation, and a meaningful whole is created. It is appropriate to use the rather vague term "meaning" in this instance for, as Hartman stressed, meaning and value can be equated.

It is of further importance to note that it is the phenomena of play, which is made explicit in the article on creativity, which emerges at the crucial juncture in Hartman's axiology where there is a movement from the level of understanding "good" in terms of all of the properties of an object being present, to the understanding of fulfillment of concept intension and the systemic, extrinsic, and intrinsic levels of valuation. In fact, it can be said that without the "play of properties" that the hierarchy of values in Hartman's thought is not possible. In a

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[1]Robert S. Hartman, "The Value Structure of Creativity," The Journal of Value Inquiry, VI (Winter, 1972), p. 245.

section of The Structure of Value significantly entitled "Essence of Value," Hartman says that the very possibility of valuation is dependent on "the mobility of the descriptive properties."[2] He means by this that an entity's properties, while being fixed in number, are capable of being recognized, emphasized, or understood in a variety of ways; that is, they are "capable of combination."[3] At this point, one might recall the illustration by Ortega y Gasset of the dying man. The following example is provided:

> If the thing is good, if it has all its descriptive properties, and if the sum of its values includes the value Goodness, this sum must be more than all the thing's descriptive properties. How a thing can have more properties than it has is the secret of valuation.[4]

The "fluidity" or mobility," which is synonymous with "play," of the properties, which is the way that the combination of properties and properties of properties reaches denumerable and non-denumerable levels, is manifested in artistic creativity, and this is the experience that is understood as the essence of valuation. Hartman quotes Einstein's recognition that it is the creative thinker who has a highly developed capacity for "combinatory play."[5] There is conveyed a dual sense in

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[2]Robert S. Hartman, The Structure of Value: Foundations of Scientific Axiology (Carbondale, 1967), p. 215.

[3]Ibid., p. 213.

[4]Ibid., p. 214.

[5]Ibid., p. 351. Also see J. Hadamard, The Philosophy of Invention in the Mathematical Field (Princeton, 1945), pp. 142-143. Hartman also notes (SV, op.cit., pp. 216-217) that Galileo makes a similar discovery. This leads him to stress: "Creative science is valuation in a profound sense . . . . The much discussed analogy between natural and moral science now becomes precise, and the relation between fact and value is resolved."

which the properties of the entity itself are playing, and in which the valuer is playing with the entity; one might conceive of a potter turning a lump of clay, a poet turning a phrase, or a pioneer being "turned on" by a wilderness vista. The play relationship of properties of an entity or an environment, and the way in which man is able to become a part of that play by recognition of properties or alternatives thus becomes the guiding consideration of this chapter.

It should be clear at this point that the major focus of the discussion has been upon the activity of man in relation to the entities of his environment. An almost Cartesian subject-object relationship (Gabriel Marcel calls this "first reflection") has been developed in which the meaning and value of entities becomes completely dependent upon man's meaning and value conferring activities. In an attempt to steer away from the idea that entities have no property that can be termed "intrinsic value," the extreme statement has at least potentially appeared that entities have no meaning or value outside of man's powers of arbitrarily providing such status.

The discussion will now move through a shift in perspective which will question and mediate the potentially extreme implications of the first two chapters. The primary motivating factor in this shift of perspective is the phenomenological experience of "encounter" (Begegnung) that it is possible to have with other individuals or entities in one's environment. One might, for example, reflect upon the experience of meeting someone about whom it is said "they have a captivating personality." It is, of course, possible to have much more intense personal encounters; Hartman said that the first time that he saw the woman that would eventually become his wife, he knew that he would marry her. In

other words, there was a "meaning-value" of that other person that "addressed" that individual which was not dependent upon the individual's conferring of meaning or value. It is possible to experience a "between-ness" (Zwischenmenschliche) with persons in which the experience of conferring meaning-value is shared with the experience of being the receiving object (or, subject) of meaning-value conferance (Marcel refers to this as "second reflection").

A similar experience is possible with an object. For example, it is not unusual to say of an "encounter" with a work of art that "it speaks to me," "it grabs me," or "it moves me." However, objects do not speak, grab, or move; only subjects can do that. This is the key point: that which was previously considered object, at which human subjectivity could direct its attention and make special, is now seen as having a subjective status or power ("Self-hood") in and of itself. No longer is it only human being which has the power of "addressing" or "speaking," but all entities have a being, or participate in "Being" which has the ability to "address." It becomes possible to move beyond the "monologue" in which human being is monochromatically doing all of its meaning-value conferring activity into a "dialogue" (Zweisprache) in which one fulfills human being-ness to the extent that the other can be experienced as "Self." Any status of value, meaning, or uniqueness will now be understood as being conferred in response to the experienced "demand" (an axiological categorical imperative) that is presented by the entity of human experience. This is what Hartman meants by "inter-penetration" all along; however, to this point, emphasis has been almost exclusively on man's role.

Attention will now be given, not simply to human being, but the Being of all beings both human and otherwise. Play will now be seen in

terms of the "play of Being," or play as the mode of Being, and not simply as the form or mode of the intrinsic valuation of man. In relating the idea of play to the basic ontological nature of the world, one comes in contact with the work of Martin Heidegger, Eugen Fink, and Hans-Georg Gadamer. For example, in Gadamer's Wahrheit und Methode, a primary chapter is entitled "Play as the Leading Motif of the Ontological Explication." Gadamer places his emphasis on the "primacy of play," rather than the "activity of the player."[6] Play comes through, or makes its appearance through, the player, and is thus an activity which precludes the being of the player; it is a part of Being itself. It is, thus, in the work of art that one finds the explication of the nature of world and man's relation to it. For Fink, meaning (and value) are found in the context of this play-full interaction (interplay). The ideas of these two philosophers will be given greater attention below. However, to deal with them before dealing with Heidegger would be presumptory, for it is the thought of Heidegger which acts as the primary motivation for their own work. Therefore, the discussion will proceed to deal with Heidegger, Fink, and Gadamer, and then offer a conclusion that will seek to provide a synthesis of the first three chapter, which constitute the first section, of the discussion.

Heidegger[7]

In the early writings of Heidegger, the "ground" of metaphysics is within man. Dasein is first conceived in terms of man "being his own

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[6]David L. Miller, God and Games (New York, 1970), p. 75.

[7]At this point, the discussion is indebted to two major articles. The importance of these articles is heightened by the fact that there are only an extremely small number of published articles and books which discuss Heidegger, Fink, and Gadamer on play. The articles are:

there"[8] in the sense that his own being and the beings with which he had contact were manifested through his thinking activity. Heidegger does notice, however, in his early writings that this thinking does not conceive (begreift) being, but rather comprehends (versteht) it. There is thus implied an external status to Being, even though its manifestation is dependent upon man. The manifestation of Being takes place in what Heidegger calls "founding" (Begründen), which is tantamount to giving intelligibility; founding, intelligibility, and comprehension are synonymous activities accomplished by man.

This particular understanding was not satisfying to Heidegger for very long. Heidegger was not convinced that he was actually dealing with the ontological level of Dasein, for in spite of all that he had said about Dasein, it still seemed to exist on the ontic level; that is, it was still the essence of a being. The understanding of Being as the comprehension of Being which was possessed by a being did little justice to the experience of the power of Being itself transcending all beings. Even though Dasein may be individualistically self-sufficient as, for example, in the way that it stands before the reality of death, it is also finite. Implied from this ultimate finitude is the realization that any founding process carried on by it is also finite; any

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Martin Heidegger, "The Principle of Ground," Man and World, VII (Number Three, 1974), pp. 107-121, translated by Keith Huellen; and, John D. Caputo, "Being, Ground, and Play in Heidegger," Man and World, III (Number One, 1970), pp. 26-48. The Caputo article is deserving of the highest accolades. It is by far the most superior study encountered in the preparation for the present discussion. In the section on Heidegger which will follow, the Caputo article is being closely followed, and its findings firmly supported.

[8] Caputo, op.cit., p. 26.

transcendence of Being is necessarily "contracted."[9]

In 1929, Heidegger addressed this inadequacy in his conception in What Is Metaphysics? by relating Being to Nothingness. One begins to come in contact with the abyssal ground (abgründig) of Heidegger's thought in which the finite founding of Dasein is not the most original (ursprünglich) ground of Being.

> Nothingness is described as the finitude of Being. Being insofar as it is limited in the Nothing . . . . If Being is finite, then Nothingness signifies the "un-manifest," the "concealed." To say that Being and Nothingness belong together is to say that the intelligibility of Being gives out, that Being is not entirely luminous. Being may be aletheia but letheia belongs to its hard core. Being is always both concealment and unconcealment . . . . Founding provides the "reason for" and the "intelligibility" of the being, but it also leaves it to some extent "without reason" and "unintelligible."[10]

Thus, in the experience of Dasein, as was mentioned in several examples above, there is the experience of that which is beyond Dasein; to borrow a phrase from the Heideggerian influenced theology of John A. T. Robinson, there is an experience of a "beyond in the midst." In a quotation which will have utmost significance for Heidegger's understanding of play, Caputo says: "Finite founding will turn out to be not a dead end, but a stop along the path of the 'way back to the ground.' It is, we will see, a faithful reflection of a more primordial grounding activity."[11]

Finally, Heidegger comes to the formulation of the "ground-question"

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[9] Ibid., p. 29.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., p. 30. Italics added.

(grundfrage) of metaphysics of why there are beings rather than nothing; a question which cannot be answered by reference to any particular being. Being is not described in the following manner:

> . . . the inner power of the being by which it is . . . . the pre-during power which remains whatever fluctuations occur within beings . . . . the emergent power, stepping forth into the light of itself. Being as ground, therefore, is physis: the emergent, pre-during-power (aufgehendverweilend-Walten).[12]

The locus of "founding" has changed from Dasein to Being itself, and Dasein is now thought of as the "there" of Being, the place where Being as ground manifests itself; Dasein is a place of revelation. "Being needs (braucht) Dasein no less than Dasein needs Being because it needs a place of self-disclosure."[13]

The self-disclosure of Being is described by Heidegger in terms of the mission (Geschick) of Being to Dasein and the world. Within this context, the descriptive word play, which conveys the essential character of the activity of Being, is first used. Being is not to be understood as a static substance which causes an orderly process of history (historie). Rather, Being manifests itself in an advancing-withdrawing pattern which is highlighted by Being-events in which Being appropriates a subject as its place of self-disclosure. This movement of Being is thus described as the "play of Being." It should also be noted that inclusive with the idea of Being as mission is the idea of Being as world. The temporally oriented event of Being needs a spatial locality in which to occur. The world is thus understood as the location (Raum)

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[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid., p. 31.

of Being. "Time and space, mission and world, belong together. They are the same, but not alike. Together they constitute the 'space of play of time' (Zeit-Spiel-Raum). The world is the 'shape' that Being takes."[14] This elaboration reminds one of the paidia-agon discussion of chapter two, and provides further substantiation of the position of this dissertation taken up at that point.

However, traditional metaphysics has been incapable of seeing this distinction because of its engrossment with beings. In what Heidegger calls "the forgetfulness of Being," traditional metaphysics has accepted substitute, penultimate grounds for Being such as "God," "First Cause," Plato's "Good," Aristotle's "Logos," or Hegel's "Absolute Spirit." The word penultimate is used here to indicate that all of these attempts at ultimate-explanation are in the final analysis not ultimate. They are, rather, expressions of what is considered the organizing reality of the most plausible explanation, as it is personally understood by each individual thinker. While "as if" images of reality are important, they can never be unquestionably proven, and thus must always remain, in the most rigid consideration, penultimate. Modern science is guilty of a similar attraction to penultimates in its presupposition that Being can be rationally conceived and comprehended. Such instances of forgetfulness are "an epochal disguise, a derivative form of the origin-al ground."[15] One must move to that which is before rationality where, as the original Greeks knew, Being was experienced and not conceptualized; where the ground founds itself, and is not

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[14] Ibid., p. 36.

[15] Ibid., p. 33.

founded by man.

Heidegger emphasizes the distinction between calculative thinking, which is the basis of traditional metaphysics and modern technology, and what he calls, in an article entitled "The Principle of Ground," "meditative thinking."[16] He also says that there has never been an age in which meditative thinking, the thinking of poetry and play, has had more opposition than the present age. For, the present age is the only age in man's historical existence in which he has totally characterized himself in terms of material objectivity. In the "atomic age," a purely material sufficient reason, atomic energy, is offered as the ultimate explanation of man's existence. In a statement that will be important below, Heidegger says later in the above mentioned article that this materialistic age implies an understanding of language which understands it merely in terms of a vehicle of information. Such an understanding is on an opposite extreme from the Heideggerian understanding of the language of poetry as the vehicle of the speaking of Being. When a situation exists as that in the present technological society, it is proper to speak of the "withdrawal" of Being. In regard to this idea of "withdrawal," it can be noted that one of the major influences on Heidegger was the German poet, Hölderlin, who had responded to Nietzsche's ideas on the "Death of God" by describing a paradoxical position of God withholding his presence, yet still existing. The present age can be characterized not only, according to Heidegger, by the "withdrawal" of Being, but also by the "self-withdrawal" of God.

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[16] Heidegger, op.cit., p. 213.

Returning to the specific idea of play, these "missionary" activities of the advancing and withdrawing of Being are seen as "Being toying with man." The question is raised as to why Being does not simply illuminate itself in its fullness, and a response is made with a quote from Goethe: "How? When? Why? The Gods remain silent! Hold yourself in _because_ and do not ask _why_?"[17] It can be noted that a typical response in child's play to the question of "why" is "just because" which is never fully satisfying. There is always a "Because" element in Being, and while the principle of sufficient reason is true of beings, it is not true of Being. That one is always caught up in "because" inhibits the accepting of an absolute "why" about which an edifice or rationality can be constructed, and adhered to with utmost seriousness. According to "The Principle of Ground," to be caught up in "because" implies a certain attitude of repose toward one's existence. Because (_Weil_) etymologically implies the idea of a special kind of "resting" which is also an "enduring" or "lasting." Another verse is quoted from Goethe: "The fiddle stops, the dancer rests."[18] Then Heidegger points out that this enduring-resting-lasting is the old meaning of "to be" (_Sein_). It seems very likely that there is commonality between the idea of the experience of the repose of existing in "because," and the experience of Huizinga's "fun" in play; the experience of play is the experience of the self-renewing of the repose of "Because."

> The role of man is to 'play along with' (_mitspielen_) the play of Being. The idea of man's freedom is transformed from the power to take over the direction of

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[17] Caputo, _op.cit._, p. 34.

[18] Heidegger, _op.cit._, p. 220.

> one's being to the willingness to "work with" and "play with" Being as mission. Being plays "because it is play," and man is caught up in that play.[19]

In fact, it can be said that not only is man's play a reflection of the play of Being, but that play is a means of founding more origin-al than intelligibility. "Man is not so much a being as a relationship of openness towards Being. Being and man 'cor-respond'; they are a dialogue, an interchange."[20] It is helpful to recall at this point the role that dialogue (Zweisprache) played in Buber's Ich/Du philosophy.

Heidegger introduces the idea of Being as a "groundless play," to describe the continual existence in "Because." He explains carefully that play is always groundless for three reasons: there is no other world opposed to this world which exists as a "totality"; there is no other being, either divine or extra-mental, which can be set over against this totality; and, Being is of this totality, and is not to be placed in opposition to it in any subject/object dichotomy. There is no "Answer," only the "way" or "path" of "Answer-ing." This is opposed to the way of scientific research (Forschung)described by Goethe: "Yet research untiringly strives and struggles for the law, the ground, why and how."[21] It is significant to note the way in which the idea of "way" or "path" is emphasized in most of the important world religions: the Chinese Tao; the Shinto michi; the Buddhist "path of Buddha; the Muslim Islam which means "straight path"; and, the Old and New Testament idea of the "way of God." In Unterwegs zur Sprache, the

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[19]Caputo, op.cit., p. 34.

[20]Ibid., p. 40.

[21]Heidegger, op.cit., p. 215.

following statement is made regarding the movement from the earlier to the later stages in Heidegger's thought:

> I have forsaken an earlier position, not to exchange it for another, but because even the former position was only a pause on the way. What lasts in thinking is the way.[22]

In a section of Discourse on Thinking entitled "Conversations on a Country Path," man's nature as a thinking being is discussed. In opposition to the characterization of man's thinking as manifested in technical knowledge, a word from a fragment of Heraclitus, ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων, is discussed. It describes the kind of thinking which is never rationalistically absolutized, but is continually "going toward" and "letting-oneself-into-nearness."[23] A profound model for this "letting-oneself-into-nearness" is found in Hölderlin's elegy "Homecoming." This type of knowledge is described as being "for the naïve observer, although not for the exact scientist. Ever to the child in man . . . ."[24]

Thus, man is always a ground-seeker and searcher, a prober and explorer, but never a ground-finder. The Dasein of man is never complete; to say that it is complete is tantamount to Dasein's taking itself too seriously. "To exist is always to be on the way, so that one can never, as it were, pin down the existent at any precise moment and give an exhaustive description. Man is constituted by possibilities rather than properties."[25] In this context, "authentic existence"

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[22]Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen, 1959), p. 98.

[23]Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking (New York, 1969), pp. 88-89.

[24]Ibid., p. 89.

[25]John Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger (Richmond, 1968), pp. 12-13.

means the active realization of possibilities, or the "play with possibilities." The forfiture or suppression of possibilities or play is understood as "inauthentic existence." Commenting on the hermeneutical phenomenology of Dasein in Being and Time, Heidegger said:

> What is essential in it does not lie in its actuality as a philosophical 'movement.' Higher than actuality is possibility. We can understand (the phenomenology of Dasein) only by seizing upon it as a possibility.[26]

The model of play is carefully chosen because play stands in radical contra-distinction to the lofty rationalistic schemes of Western science and philosophy. Play both defies and exceeds rational interpretation. Any ideas of the perfect intelligibility of Being are flatly rejected, along with any conceptions of a rational, highest Being.

> . . . . while Being in intelligibly manifest, it is equiprimordially unintelligible. Being is no less the falsum (un-truth, letheia) than it is the verum (truth, aletheia). There is necessarily within Being a hard core of concealment, a reserve which has not yet stepped into manifestness. The concealment is due to Being itself and is not (against Kant) to be ascribed to a failure of the mind to comprehend it. Being obstinately holds itself back behind its manifestations like the hidden source of a river which conceals itself in the very process of emerging. The concealed "unessence" of Being is essential" to it.[27]

In Heidegger's attempt to more explicitly define exactly how he understands play, he makes a distinction between child's play, and the play of adults which is thought of in terms of games and rules. When he speaks of the play of Being, he is more concerned with the ruleless

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[26]Martin Heidegger, Being and Time (New York, 1962), p. 63. Also see Joseph I. Esposito, "Play and Possibility," Philosophy Today, XVIII (Summer, 1974), pp. 137-146.

[27]Caputo, op.cit., p. 37.

play of children; the paidia as contrasted to agon. "The play of Being is ant-agonistic!"[28]

> Being plays because it is play. "Because" sinks into play. The play is without "why." It plays while it plays. There remains only play: the highest and the deepest.[29]

Child's play is not an orderly process, and the play of Being is not a rational advance of some Absolute Being as in Hegel. Play is a "fluctuating (wandelnd), wavering dance."[30] In Being's play with man, it is clearly demonstrated that Being is superior to man. It is not a "revolution" of man, as thinkers in the Marxist tradition have suggested, that will change the world, but the unpredictable revolutions of Being. Otto Pöggeler emphasizes this point by recalling Heidegger's attraction for a section of Paul's First Letter to the Thessalonians in which the eschatalogical "Day of the Lord" is described as unpredictably coming: "like a thief in the night; it is when people are saying 'how quiet and peaceful it is,' that the worst suddenly happens."[31] This unpredictability is necessarily limited in the game/rule context, but freely expresses itself in the play of the child. "The wanton, inscrutable freedom of a child at play signifies and originates in the origin-al free play of Being."[32]

In conclusion, it can be said that Heidegger understood thinking

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[28] Ibid., p. 41.

[29] Heidegger, "The Principle of Ground," op.cit., p. 188.

[30] Caputo, op.cit., p. 38.

[31] Ibid., p. 39. See I Thessalonians 5:1-3, The New Jerusalem Bible.

[32] Caputo, op.cit., p. 41.

about Being to be a form of play; it must be so, for rational thinking is merely a penultimate "pause" along the way to Being. Therefore, there must be a form of thinking, and its expression, that is playful. For Heidegger, this is poetry, and it is in poetic capability, not logical capacity, that the true power of language is confronted. Scientific thinking would miserably fail in attempting to be the "Lord of Being," while the poet is seen as being particularly equipped to be the "Shepherd of Being." Again, there is a direct relationship which can be noticed between play, artistic creation, the potentiality of being fully human, and the power to value intrinsically. The poet's locus is the above mentioned "interchange" where "das Anwesen des Anwesenden" ("the arriving of that which arrives") occurs. The dissertation will now bring its consideration of Heidegger to a close, at least for the moment. Some attempt must now be made to reconcile the position of the first two chapters with that of Heidegger. However, before that attempt is undertaken, the work of Eugen Fink and Hans-Georg Gadamer will be given consideration.

Fink

The primary contribution of Eugen Fink to the study of play is found in a work entitled Oase des Glucks: Gedanken zu einer Ontologie des Spiels which appeared in Germany in 1957. Fink's work, in the tradition of Huizinga, is as much anthropological as it is philosophical, for he attempts to discuss the phenomena of play as it is present in a technologically oriented society. In a society such as this, play is primarily seen as a reward, a respite from the machine. Ironically, the machine not only creates an environment in which a re-creative distance is demanded, but it also provides man with more leisure or

play time than his predecessors could have ever imagined. Therefore, the phenomena of play has become increasingly predominant in the decisions and priorities by which men shape their lives, and Fink sees the need of understanding this dimension of existence as much as is possible. He doubts that even though the possibilities, occasions, and materials of play proliferate in the present age, that man has a very deep understanding of the nature of play.

The first task of his presentation is to attack what he calls the "pedestrian view" or "vulgar interpretation" of play. This view occurs when play is seen as being "nothing more than a phenomenon on the margin of human life, a peripheral fact, an occasional sort of thing.[33] Play is here juxtaposed to "important" pursuits, and is seen as a diversion, the sort of activity that can be taken up when there are no reasons not to; this view sees play as an ergänzung[34] (a supplementary thing). However, Fink believes that this understanding prohibits one from understanding the true ontological dimension of play by always construing it in some sort of limiting relationship: "play and work," "play and the realities of life," "play and seriousness." His position can be stated as follows:

> Play is a fundamentally existential phenomenon. It is not derived from any other manifestation of life. To oppose play to any other phenomenon is to risk misunderstanding it.[35]

In the midst of his introductory remarks on play, Fink deals with

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[33] Eugen Fink, "The Ontology of Play," Philosophy Today, XVIII (Summer, 1974), p. 149.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid., p. 150.

"child's play." He observes, as Heidegger did, that there is a distinction between the play of children and that of adults that is at the heart of a philosophically mature understanding of human existence. Adult play has the tendency to become more organized and structured. At this point, there is the first mention of the word game. Such structuring and organization tends to inhibit the natural spontaneity of play, and make it into a calculated "escape from boredom."[36] However, for the child, such spontaneous, innocent play is the very essence of his existence. Fink, in fact, sees education as the means of transition, not simply from child-likeness to adult maturity, but from a play-attitude to a work attitude. Maturity is usually seen as the ability to be serious, but Fink implies that true maturity is the continual, creative ability to be playful. The kind of cultural education which he sees as typical is far removed from the education/culturalization implied in the Greek understanding of paideia ("child rearing," "education," "culturalization") which is directly related to the paidia, play element.

However, he does not want to be misleading in regard to the epitomizing of child's play, which is an important point for the dissertation as a whole. In his opinion, the play of the child is not the ideal. While it is admittedly more ideal than the typical adult play, and as such may be an important model to observe as a starting point which moves away from typical adult play, the most ideal play is that of a creative, highly self-conscious adult. A fundamental aspect of that self-consciousness is the ability to understand that one is playing, and

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[36] Ibid., p. 149.

to have a similar understanding of the value of that play to human existence as a whole. The child is not, however, capable of making such a distinction. This is not, however, to say that ideal play is to be judged by some criterion of rationality, for play is fundamentally supra-rational and beyond ordinary reasoning and logic. What is being said is that it is in the adult play that the element of play is in an acknowledged, reciprocal relationship with the totality of the Self which includes such aspects as self-consciousness and creative intention.

One of the most important philosophical points which Fink makes relates to the Aristotelian conception of Eudaimonia, which generally means "a state of blessedness." Fink understands eudaimonia teleologically, and says that it characterizes the goal of almost all human activity. It does not matter if it is proletariate "praxis" or artistic "poiesis," almost every activity of man is future oriented. Eudaimonia is the end of a life which can be characterized as a path toward fullness, in which humans are "travelers" pursuing a "vital project." However, eudaimonia can never be perfectly attained, and man is thus continually on the way of answering which never attains the Answer; human life is a future-oriented "task." By implication, man never exists in the present. The present is understood as "a preparation, as a stage, as a passing phase."[37] When the discussion turns to a consideration of Sartre, it will be seen that when man can achieve a "present," that it will be proper to speak of Being as "Rather-Than-Nothingness." Fink also notes that there is a tragic element in man's compulsive

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[37] Ibid., p. 150.

passion for ends. In all of man's ordering of ends, which is the major domain of his reason and seriousness, there is no guarantee that the final end can be gained or even approximated; usually the search for alternatives and the making of revisions is necessitated. This consideration may relate to what some philosophers call the "absurdity" of life, or the fact that life is limited by death and other physical aspects over which man has no control. Given these realities of human life, Fink implies that it is not surprising that there is a synonymous relationship which is usually understood to exist between work, being adult, or seriousness, and anxiety, uncertainty, or unhappiness.

In other words, it is not unusual to find the attitude expressed that part of being an adult is to accept the fact that life is work, anxiety, uncertainty; to be adult is to be awakened to the rude reality that life is "no bed of roses." The acceptance of such an understanding leads to a rampant, de-humanizing competitiveness which is often violently manifested in the total commitment to future-oriented ends. It seems much more than coincidental that accompanying this competitiveness in the broad spectrum of human endeavors, that one observes an attraction to and emphasis upon similar, epitomizing competition in the special set of human endeavors termed "games." Often games are violent in a way that is only indicative of the competitive violence being done within the society as a whole, especially in relationship to its work. Also, the games are said to build "character," which is tantamount to saying that they foster and teach the kind of competitive, ends-oriented attitude being described. When it is said that "all that matters is winning," what is being implied is that all that matters is the end; in such a context, events such as Watergate emerge.

In now moving to Fink's conception of play, the rigid distinction between play and game, paidia and agon, is consciously being maintained. In contrast to all teleological activity, play is unique. Play is not concerned with final ends, and thus is not subject to the kind of calculative end-seeking found in other types of activity. Further, it is only in play that a real present can be achieved. Fink speaks of the present in terms of a "serene presence."[38] He undoubtedly is influenced by Buber at this point who epitomized the Ich/Du relationship in terms of the idea of a "special present" (Gegenwart) which actually becomes "presence" in an "event of making present." Play is such an event.

Fink admits that play, like eudaimonia which Aristotle said was valuable in and of itself, also has ends, but these ends are not like the teleological oriented ends described earlier. Play has "internal ends" and "immanent ends," and while play may not be gratuitous, it is autonomous. A child may get as much enjoyment out of objects scattered helter-skelter in a room as he does the same objects in orderly array. In fact, he may even get more enjoyment from the former; so may the artist. It is of further importance to note, with the mention of the word enjoyment, that there is a distinction which must be drawn between the enjoyment of paidia-play which is enjoyment of an end-in-itself, and the teleologically oriented "pleasure" which is found in typical, egoistic hedonism. Fink quotes Rilke:

> O childhood hours, behind whose make believe
> Was hid more than the past and before us lay
> No future to contend. Though we dreamed, 'tis true

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[38] Ibid., p. 152.

> Of growing up and were perhaps in haste to be well grown,
> More was it for the love of being those
> Who had no other merit than being grown.
> While yet not hid from life, we tasted joy
> Which gives repose and were suspended thence
> In an interval between the universe and play, a place,
> From all eternity, chosen for the pure event.[39]

At this point, Fink's treatment turns from the phenomenological study of play to a discussion of the structure of play. In observing his findings, one comes in contact with many reminders of the idea of intrinsic valuation. First, it will be recalled that Huizinga said that the fundamental aspect of the experience of Homo Ludens was not merely play, but the "fun" of play. However, Huizinga provided no further development or explanation of this "fun" element. Some have even suggested that his lack of explanation makes the basic element of his philosophy pleasure, and that it thus says little more than traditional hedonistic treatises.

Fink provides a valuable qualification of the "fun" element which can be applied to Huizinga's work. He also notes that the essential element of play is a "joyful passion of the soul."[40] However, he is more careful than Huizinga in that he strictly distinguishes the unique "joy" of play, and the experience typically associated with the common-sense understanding of "pleasure." In a key passage, he states:

> This delight is indispensible to the activity of play. We cannot compare it to any other known forms of functional pleasure . . . . The fulfillment of play is accompanied by a pleasure which we cannot compare with the joys experienced in any other action or physical urge.[41]

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[39] Ibid.

[40] Ibid., pp. 153f.

[41] Ibid., p. 154.

The "joy" of play is then characterized as the "ecstasy" that occurs when someone enters into a "universe." By this, it seems that Fink means the experience of the closure of a Gestalt in which one experiences a "wholeness in oneness." Play is thus the "rite of passage" into this Gestalt, and is reflected in the "aha experience" of creativity which is tantamount to the experience of intrinsic valuation. Play is thus a ritualistic form of knowing, and joy is the "well-being"[42] which comes when one gives oneself fully to a particular situation, person, or object. Significantly, it is at this precise point that Fink describes the bond which is established between the participants (both animant and in animant) in the play event as "the intrinsic meaning of play."

A similar distinction, perhaps with even more clarity, is made by John Dewey. In his Art As Experience, he describes man's need for an "inner harmony" which will be attained when man comes to terms with his environment. Pleasure is then understood as an objective manifestation of that harmony. Pleasure may come in coincidental, chance occurences which, for Dewey, are not to be despised in a world filled with pain. However, beyond this level of pleasure, there is the level of "delight" and "happiness," which involves a fulfillment of the total person. This is Dewey's "consummatory experience," and he describes it in terms which have an immediate affiliation with play. It is a situation in which "there is an attainment of a period of equilibrium,"[43] and instead

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[42] Ibid.

[43] John Dewey, Art As Experience (New York, 1934), p. 17. The relation to Dewey at this point was suggested by John Davis.

of the fulfilling event reaching a teleological end, it constantly renews itself as does *paidia* — "the time of consummation is also one of beginning again."[44] (Perhaps this quote defines play in terms of re-creation.) Later, Dewey says that such an experience is "art in germ."[45]

The further description of the consummatory experience is quite similar to the ideas of intrinsic value experiences already advanced. In the experience, Dewey says that there is a "unity" (*Gestalt*) which is "constituted by a single *quality* that pervades the entire experience in spite of the variation of its constituent parts."[46] He describes the "form" of the experience in precisely the same way that the relationship of *agon* to *paidia* was described; form must arise out of the experience, it is "inherent, not imposed from without."[47] Finally, the idea of movement which is associated with the primordial level of play is conveyed in Dewey's emphasis on the "rhymthic movement"[48] (note that this is also the definition of *dance*) of the experience of artistic experience (art for Dewey means the presence in an experience of the quality element).

In returning to Fink, it can be found that he takes up the discussion of the relation of play to rules and games. Realistically, he submits that one would be hard-pressed to find any play that does not

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[44] *Ibid*.

[45] *Ibid*., p. 19.

[46] *Ibid*., p. 37.

[47] *Ibid*., p. 137.

[48] *Ibid*., p. 326.

have rules. There is even the implication of rules in the solitary child tossing rocks; he is aiming at something, it would be unfair, "no contest," if he got too close in his throwing, he allows himself only so many throws, and he keeps track of the approximate percentage of hits to misses. However, there is a distinct contrast between a "rule" which may make the play more interesting and fun, and a "law" which demands irrevocable commitment. Fink adds veracity to the already advanced conclusions that ideal play must always view its organizing structures as tentative and open to enhancing change.

It is in the discussion of the equipment of play that the relation to intrinsic valuation seems most pronounced. This plaything or toy when seen by those that do not play is merely an object; this is extrinsic valuation, or what Fink calls "seeing from the exterior view."[49]

> The doll is a product of the toy industry, it is a mannequin made up of material and a piece of wire or of plastic. We can buy it at a certain price; it is merchandise. But seen with the eyes of a little girl who plays, the doll is a child and the small girl is its mother. Perhaps it is not as though the child thought the doll were actually living, for she is not under a false impression nor apt to confuse the nature of things. She possesses, on the contrary, a simultaneous knowledge of the doll as such and its meaning in play. The child who plays lives in two worlds. <u>What makes a thing a toy — gives the essence of toy — is something rather magical. It endows an everyday thing with a special kind of mysterious being</u>. It then infinitely is more than a simple means of amusement, more than a thing which one puts together and keeps in hand.[50]

This is intrinsic valuation, and the words "endow" and "infinitely" should stand out as being significantly appropriate for the dissertation to

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[49] Fink, op.cit., p. 154.

[50] Ibid., p. 155.

this point. Consider the following poem entitled "Toys" which is inspired by the painting by Giorgio De Chirico entitled "Toys of a Prince."

> The toys are laying in crooked disray
> Cripples and wrecks
> Disheveled, bedraggled, and bounceless.
> Waiting for his wakened sounds
> The sounds of the
> Creator
> Who breathes into them the
> Breath of Life.
> The Child
> The Player
> A king and a clown
> A prince and a partner
> Their god in pajamas and
> Sleep rustled hair
> Whose touch is like magic
> Whose attention is life.

Play is a particular type of "schizophrenia" for Fink which is, of course, not pathological. There is, on the one hand, a real man in a recognizably real world, and then there is, on the other hand, that same person in the "intrinsic context"[51] of play. In this context, the "real" self is lost as the man looses himself in the play context. Along with the "real" self, the "real" world is exchanged for a play world (Spielwelt). The play world is the intrinsic valuation of the real world, and in that valuation all criteria for determining "reality" are held in question; the play world may, in fact, have "more" reality than the so-called "real" world. Fink even insists that what were considered standard categories for experiencing and understanding the world, space and time, are mediated in the play world. The play world is not simply an "appearing-to-be," it is a "real 'appearing-to-be'," and to speak of the "unreality" of play is hasty and quite

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[51] Ibid.

superficial as far as Fink is concerned.

In conclusion, the idea of play for Fink is as important as far as ontological models or symbols are concerned as Thales' water, Plato's light, or Hegel's spirit. It needs to also be kept clearly in mind that Fink does not simply understand this ontological model as saying that existence is game-like. Rather, play is the fundamental model because of the way that it testifies to the creative power of the merger of an ethical/aesthetic interpretation of human being. For Fink, the primary result of play or intrinsic valuation is the achievement of the most fundamental form of self-knowledge:

> If the essence of the world were thought of as play, it would follow that man is the only being within the immensity of the universe who can understand the infinity of the whole and respond accordingly. This is nothing more than recovering for himself the sense of the infinite that eludes him, that he might be able to reach the source of his being.[52]

Gadamer

The transition to the discussion of Gadamer's philosophy will be provided by the development of the important distinction which can be made between "play with ideas" and "play of ideas." This distinction can be elicited by first returning to the section of Homo Ludens where Huizinga discussed "The Play Forms of Philosophy." Here he called attention to the early Greek sophist, whose craft was something between an art τέχνην παλαιάν — Protagoras,[53] and a game παίγνιον — Gorgias[54]; at its inception it would be proper to speak of both an

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[52] Ibid., p. 156.

[53] Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens (Boston, 1964), p. 147.

[54] Ibid.

aesthetic and athletic dimension. The philosopher's role was seen as a specialization of the role of the ancient seer, prophet, medicine-man, or vates. (It can be noted at this point that there may be a distinct etymological relation between vates and the Indo-Germanic root, vas, mentioned above in the Heidegger discussion.) Huizinga stressed, as has been noted, the way in which the sophists engaged in verbal contests, jousting with words, riddles, and ideas in the same manner that the athlete would in the olympian arena. Philosophy was a performance, an exhibition, in which the audiences laughed and applauded with each assault and retort. A lengthy "volley" between masters filled the audience with delight and excitement, and brought fame, honor, and acclaim to the victorious philosopher.

Philosophy was also seen to be born in an almost recreational environment. Such activities were associated with leisure (σχολή) time, and Huizinga etymologically demonstrated that even the word school originally meant "leisure." The association with play is unmistakable:

> Theaetetus in the Sophist has to admit to the Stranger from Elea that the sophist belongs to the sort of people "who give themselves up to play" (τῶς τῆς παιδιᾶς μετεχόντων. Parmenides, pressed to pronounce upon the problem of existence, calls his task "playing a difficult game" (πραγματειώδη παιδιὰν παίζειν.[55]

Philosophy was further associated with youth; an activity identified with youthful distractions and pleasant pastime. This attraction can be clearly seen in Plato's Republic, and the passion for young men cannot be simply summarily dismissed as an expression of homosexual

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[55] Ibid., p. 149.

tendencies.

That which began with the Sophists is indicative of the further history of philosophy. The dialogues of Socrates and Plato, and even the refutation of the Sophists by Aristotle, take a similar form. During the Middle Ages, such philosophical rivalry was also readily apparent. One might give consideration to the scholastic disputation, the debates of men such as Erasmus and Luther, and other intellectual rivalries which often gained wide-spread attention. It is not likely in the entire history of philosophy that a more perfect example of the type of figure that Huizinga described could be found than Giordano Bruno whose meanderings through Western Europe and Great Britian were both famous and infamous. An ideal environment for Huizinga's philosophical playfulness was the court of Elizabeth I of England, significantly called by Spenser "The Fairie Queen," where a man such as Bruno obtained the highest honors, and where even the Queen learned Latin and Greek so that the scholarly conversation could be carried on in the erudite languages of the ancients.

At this point, one can come to talk about "playing with ideas." The philosophers were the players, and the ideas their playthings. One should not think that the "play" of these philosophers was not serious. As has been earlier stressed, to necessarily juxtapose playfulness and seriousness is fundamentally fallacious. They are involved in the activity which fulfilled their unique individuality more than any other, and while it was often pursued in agonistic earnest, it was also their play giving them their fun and its correlate, freedom. It is only in an age influenced by the inhibitions of Puritanical piety and such perversions of thinking as the so-called "Protestant Work Ethic" that rigid distinctions are made between that which

involved play and that which should be taken seriously.

These thoughts on "playing with ideas" can be qualified to a certain extent by saying that there are degrees of this "playing with." This means that there are variations in the way that man sees himself as transcending the ideas. During the period from the Sophists until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, which is the advent of the modern age for Huizinga, there seems to be a fairly balanced status between ideas and thinkers. In fact, throughout much of this period, as was mentioned above, the ideas of the ancients were held in a particular awe. During this period, or in what might be called the pre-modern age, the understandings of "play with ideas" and "play of ideas" are very close.

However, with the coming of the modern age, this closeness is shattered. No longer is there a balanced reciprocity between idea and thinker, but increasingly man sees himself in the position of transcending the ideas and manipulating them; playing with ideas becomes self-conscious, calculated, and even belligerent. There is a great gulf which separates the fanciful colloquy of the court of Elizabeth I, for example, and the propagandized manipulation of the media in the 1968 and 1972 United States Presidential campaigns. For Huizinga, there has been a fatal shift from playfulness to over-seriousness. "The old play-factor has undergone almost complete atrophy . . . . The virtue (an old idea) has gone out of the game."[56]

Huizinga noticed that at the same time that the play element began to wane that other play-related activities began to show significant

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[56] Ibid., pp. 198-199.

changes. Athletics in general began to become more specialized and professionalized; until mid-1800, cricket players could still be photographed playing in top hats. He might also have noticed that what had begun calmly enough in the Enlightenment was at this same time becoming reason running rampant in the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution, and would finally be consummated in the excesses of the technological society. It will be recalled that Huizinga saw play as a mental phenomenon, but as going beyond what was merely rational; now, man was proclaiming that reason incarnated as science could solve any problem. It is of utmost significance that one see the correlation between professionalized athletics which Huizinga prophetically described as "sport sui generis," the technological society, and the unvirtuous status of contemporary politics; these elements become bound together in what economist John Kenneth Galbraith calls the "technostructure" where the euphemistic "name of the game," or to follow Huizinga, the essential element or quality, is not play or fun, but money and material resource (i.e., man's self-understanding in terms of a contemporary materialism as explained above). The technostructure can appropriately be described as a culture in which the only play is "false play,"[57] and a culture in which the greatest failures can be traced to man's taking himself too seriously.

Huizinga would have welcomed the disclaimers of the technological society, the so-called "counter-culture." Here is a movement which can best be understood as a reaction against the over-seriousness of the technostructure. It is youth oriented (Huizinga had found Callicles

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[57] Ibid., p. 206.

very early seeing the importance of this aspect[58]), and places significance on the aesthetic as it moves beyond the purely rational to the emotional which encompasses more adequately what Huizinga called the "totality" of man; its members are fundamentally players. The technostructure is old and established, and from its close-minded bastions of extrinsic power come such pronouncements as "youth no longer see the value of work," or "young people aren't serious-minded enough anymore — they're just fooling around." Significantly, professional football in the United States has become primarily an "over-30" affair.[59] Of further, ironic significance, one can recall that it was Richard Nixon, who was brought to power by the manipulative forces of the technostructure, who was also self-esteemed as the nation's "Number One Football Fan," and who celebrated one of his most ignoble moments sitting before a television watching a football game while the counter-culture marched in protest against the greatest travesty of the technological society, the War in Southeast Asia.

Huizinga would further have welcomed and could have profited greatly from a fuller awareness of the thought of Nietzsche, whose work is sometimes seen as "philosophy gone over the brink," but who recreated (as will be seen) the play-element in philosophy, and paved the way for Heidegger's "death of metaphysics" which sounded the death-knoll on the excesses of rationalism. In Nietzsche, philosophy's Cartesian-inspired over-seriousness is mediated; philosophy becomes a gay science or joyful wisdom. Once again it becomes possible to speak about "play-

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[58] Ibid., p. 150.

[59] 1974 Atlanta sports survey.

ing with ideas" without being prejorative. Huizinga evidently knew little about Nietzsche, but in his one mention of him in Homo Ludens[60] he takes a position against Nietzsche's more rationalistic critics, and sees the possibility of his thought leading philosophy back to its antique origins. However, it remained for Heidegger, and more specifically for Gadamer in the particular area of play, to move beyond Nietzsche. It not only becomes possible through their work to offer positive statements about "playing with ideas," but also to offer the more significant understanding of the "playing of ideas." The "play of ideas" will be described in such a way that it will not only be shown to be more fundamental than "playing with ideas," but also be shown to hold inherent correctives to those excesses already demonstrated as potentially within the range of "playing with ideas."

As has been noted in the Heidegger discussion, play is not simply an "element" in culture (in the same sense that Being is not simply a part or the sum total of beings), but the mode of Being for which culture is sub specie. Huizinga's initial idea of "culture sub specie ludi" has renewed appropriateness. In such a culture (paideia), one begins to glimpse the more essential reality of "the play of ideas." "The play of Being is not onesided . . . . Being needs man's attentive co-operation, although it retains the upper hand."[61] Being and man are involved in an inter-play; Gadamer will speak of a "conversation" with Being. In this conversation with Being (Heidegger sees man and

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[60]Huizinga, op.cit., p. 152.

[61]Caputo, op.cit., p. 40.

Being as existing in a "duet"[62]), man achieves his human being, is the place where Being plays itself, and man has fun. Philosophically, the conversation is characterized by a creative openness to the "new-not-yet" which continually arrives in perpetual novelty. More important than discursive, ontic answers to questions, is the non-absolutized questioning process itself; "anything like a final explanation is simply inappropriate."[63]

Thus, it is Heidegger who initially makes the distinction that the discussion has sought between "play _of_ ideas" and "play _with_ ideas," and has envisioned the ideal way in which the philosopher plays _with_ ideas. Heidegger's philosopher is involved in a never-ending process of inquiry, and the inquiry _itself_ is tantamount to the experience of Being. Heidegger's way is called "ideal" in contrast to the perverted, manipulative "playing _with_" described in relation to the egotistical excesses of technological rationalism. What now finally remains is for Gadamer to build upon the work of Heidegger, and to become even more explicit about the play _of_ ideas. It may also have come time in the dissertation to stop using, or at least explicitly qualify, the word _idea_ which has previously acknowledged, substantival overtones, and think more in terms of "play _with_ Being" and "play _of_ Being."

Gadamer's work will be understood as a "hermeneutic of Being." However, it is not a hermeneutics which merely seeks to understand Being, but quite the contrary, it is _an attempt to experience Being as understanding_, tradition, or thinking. Such a hermeneutic is not a

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[62] _Ibid_.

[63] _Ibid_., p. 42.

methodology, or an attempt to conceive understanding as the result of man's subject/object relationship with his world (as in the hermeneutics of Dilthey or Schliermacher). It is rather an attempt to see understanding as a process of eventful happenings, which is the way of Being itself, and "the way of being of man himself."[64] Therefore, for Gadamer, the process (and it must remain process) of understanding or thinking, the transmission of tradition, is the more specifically explained mode of Being and play; that is, understanding or thinking is the disclosure-happening of Being. "Understanding is not reconstruction but mediation."[65]

> Understanding itself is not to be thought of so much as an action of subjectivity, but as the entering into an event of transmission in which past and present are continually mediated. This is what must gain validity in hermeneutical theory which is much too dominated by the ideal of procedure, a method.[66]

Furthermore, Gadamer (in a way similar to both Heidegger and Huizinga) sees that the mode of understanding is language, and that language thus becomes the most fundamental form of play. Therefore, several items are being conjointly brought together into a synonymous context: Being, play, understanding, thinking, transmission of traditions, and language. A rationally analytic philosophy might attempt to act devisively with these items. On the other hand, the type of philosophy which Gadamer calls for would realize more their intrinsic inter-relatedness, and in

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[64] Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics (Evanston, 1969), p. 163.

[65] David Linge, The Shorter Essays of Hans-Georg Gadamer, unpublished manuscript, p. 6.

[66] Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (Tübingen, 1965), pp. 274-275. Quoted in Linge, op.cit., p. 7.

doing so become more immersed in an encounter (Buber's Begegnung) with aletheia-truth.

Within Being's playfulness, or within understanding, there are two interrelated elements; an episodic element which is related to the dimension of "playing with," and a trans-subjective element which is related to the dimension of "playing of." Episodic means that "every particular 'act' of understanding is a moment is the life of tradition itself."[67] Therefore, as each thinker plays with an idea, he is part of the life or truth of that idea, or of Being itself. The thinker or philosopher, with all of the prejudices and worldviews which constitute his uniqueness, does not stand subjectively above the tradition, but serves as a conveyor of the tradition from past to present to future; the tradition only lives, Being only is, the philosopher only authentically exists in this conveyance, which is thus described as a game. The philosopher is in an active reciprocity with understanding, language, and Being, and exists in an open questioning which does not seek absolute finality in either understanding's past (for example, a particular text) or in its present (the thinker's present set of prejudices). The tradition, understanding, Being, game lives in its presentations and re-presentations, its being played. In relation to this episodic element, it is justifiable to be involved in a playing with ideas or Being.

Trans-subjective means that "what takes place in understanding is a mediation and transformation of past and present that transcends the knower's manipulative control."[68] At this point, the game/play imagery

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[67] Linge, op.cit., p. 9.

[68] Ibid.

becomes of utmost significance for Gadamer, for involvement in true play or a real game brings the realization, not that one is playing, but that one is being played! Any single individual or single occasion of understanding is a subordinate part of the whole movement of understanding, the entire play of Being. The most essential understanding of man is thus gained, not in seeing him as transcending, manipulating, or autonomous, but as intrinsically related to the totality of Being as a player who is being played (or Being-played).

> Man is not defined prior to or independent of the event of Being which thinking essentially serves. Not only is man not primary in his relation to Being: man is at all only insofar as he is addressed by Being, and in his thinking, participates in the event of Being . . . . The basic relation is not man's relation to himself (i.e., his "self-consciousness," his subjectivity), but his relation to and immersion in the event of Being . . . . Thinking is the place where Being clears itself and shines forth. The most accurate characterization of thinking, therefore, is not as the achievement or work of man, but as the achievement of Being. Thinking has an ontological status transcending human intentionality and purpose.[69]

Therefore, the philosopher is a participant in the "play of ideas" or more precisely "the play of Being." Being transcends him, and his thinking process is his being played by Being. In a sense, the philosopher is the servant of Being; to follow Heidegger's terminology, he is the "missionary" of the "mission" of Being. His effort, or his play, is part of an endless process;[70] it has no aim in which it terminates, and continually renews itself in repetition. Only when it claims a

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[69] Ibid., pp. 46-47.

[70] Theodore Kisiel, "The Happening of Tradition: The Hermeneutics of Gadamer and Heidegger," Man and World, II (Number Three, 1969), p. 371.

terminus by absolutizing a single repetition of the whole does it cease to be play, a game, and take itself too seriously in false play.

> The most original meaning of play is neither the object nor the subject of play, but the medial meaning, the play as such, i.e., the spontaneous to-and-fro movement accomplished by play . . . . The players are drawn into the play in such a way that they are unburdened, and "play takes over," as a pure self-display. But even though "the play's the thing," it still needs the players as those to whom it displays itself, who begin by playing only to become played in the process.[71]

The primary implication which can be drawn from Gadamer's statements on "the play _of_ ideas" or the "play _of_ Being" may be that, either for philosophy as a specific discipline or for thinking in general, a full appreciation of the dimension of "play _of_" and "played by" serves to protect philosophy from becoming too serious, or thinking in general from becoming absolutized or ideological. At the root of such absolutized ideology is that which stands diametrically opposed to _human_ being and freedom _per se_. When _human_ being and freedom are emasculated or threatened, such too-serious absolutizing is inevitably the essential villian. The dimension of "playing _with_" has a definite, pathological potential; the dimension of "playing _of_" or "played by" has an inherent iconoclastic element which manifests itself as a desire for, pursuit of, and expectation of "the new."

The greatest threat to philosophy, to thinking in general, and in turn to fun, humanity, freedom, and _Being itself_, is a narrow-minded, establishment enforced adherence to ideas that have been sanctified as absolutes. Such philosophical narrow-mindedness issues in such excesses as the technostructure or the "forgetfulness of Being." It is no

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[71] _Ibid_.

small thing to think of oneself, not as a subjective absolute, but as a part of an on-going process, a totality; as part of a game in which Being is "there" through one's play, and one's being played. In such a game absolutes become tentative absolutes, and principles become operative principles. There is a buoyancy, a carefreeness, a certain tensionless frivolity to understand or be oneself in the context of the "ripening" of Being; there is a certain freedom ("you shall know the aletheia-truth, and it shall set you free") in the speculative dialectic of the game, the world-play of Being. Philosophy is thus: a creative open-mindedness; an endless questioning-answering dialectic with Being; an iconoclastic waiting without idolatrous absolutes; and, an immersion into because without a final why; a being played by the play of Being.

Several elements of Gadamer's thought deserve more precise explication. First, his special understanding of hermeneutics is of utmost significance. Hermeneutics is not understood as a scientific methodology which is capable of "the amassing of ratified knowledge."[72] What Gadamer is here calling "ratified" knowledge would parallel what the discussion has been calling to this point "Absolute Truths." Gadamer rejects the veracity of this kind of knowledge, and opts for experiential truths. There are significant implications at this point for confirming what the discussion has already suggested about "intrinsic value" being experiential in character. In a key statement, he says that his hermeneutics "is concerned to seek that experience of truth

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[72]Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, tr. by Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York, 1975), p. xi.

that transcends the sphere of the control of scientific method . . . ."[73] There are modes of experience which lie outside science "in which a truth is communicated that cannot be verified by the methodological means proper to science."[74] Not only does Gadamer's procedure claim the transcendance of "scientific" truth, but it calls upon science to recognize the inherent limits of its own kind of knowledge. Gadamer also lends support to the essential claim of this dissertation that there is a common ground which lies at the foundation of ethics and aesthetics. The kind of truth that he acknowledges, and that which is the object of his hermeneutics, is ultimately an aesthetic truth. However, in understanding his relation to this type of truth, man confronts the most essential level of his existence. Thus, Gadamer associates the impetus of his work with "aesthetic humanism."[75]

It should be mentioned in this context that hermeneutics prior to Gadamer was greatly influenced by the promises of objective exactitude heralded in the "scientific method." Gadamer sees that hermeneutics and science become closely related in the work of Schleiermacher and Dilthey. Before these writers, hermeneutics merely sought to "understand" a text, and most of this so-called understanding usually amounted to little more than poorly-applied spiritualization. With Schleiermacher and Dilthey, the emphasis in interpretation is placed upon the ridding of any obstacles which stand between the present interpretation and the actual Sitz im Leben of the subjective intention of

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[73] Ibid., p. xii.

[74] Ibid.

[75] Ibid., p. xvii.

the original writer. Therefore, "the knower's own present can have only a negative value. As the source of prejudices and distortions that block valid understanding, it is precisely what the interpreter must transcend."[76]

However, Gadamer departs from this type of interpretation by seeing the "methodological alienation of the knower from his own historicity"[77] as being totally impossible. There is no such conscious state as that envisioned by scientific hermeneutics in which a totally "objective" attitude can be taken toward the past event or text. The interpreter cannot leave his present situation, and because of this, the event or text cannot mean one thing; nor, is it ever possible to know what the subjective intention of the writer or speaker was. In fact, even as that original writer looks back at what he has written, he may not be able to recall the exact motivation and intention behind what he had written. This may apply, in the strictest sense of the word, to something said a thousand years ago, and to something one may be presently hearing. By implication, a text has a "non-denumerable infinity" of possibilities; in all conversation, whether with speaker or text, there is always what Gadamer calls "the infinity of the unsaid."[78] For Gadamer, the primary role of the interpreter is to play with these possibilities, or more precisely to become involved in the play of these possibilities.

Thus, the acknowledgement and understanding of one's present

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[76]Linge, op.cit., p. 4.

[77]Ibid.

[78]Gadamer, Wahreit und Methode, op.cit., pp. 443-444.

prejudices, rather than being an obstacle to the past, becomes the process by which one comes most intimately in contact with one's traditions. It is important to note that the most fundamental form of these prejudices, and inexorably so, is language. One's personal tradition thus becomes the essence of one's existence, and to authentically exist means to come face-to-face with that tradition, converse in an inter-play with it, and be a contributing part in its being passed on. It is with this inter-play that the play model becomes of importance to Gadamer. No longer is Being left mysteriously undefined; now, one's encounter with Being is tantamount to one's encounter with one's traditions especially as that encounter takes place on its most intrinsic level through one's encounter with one's Self. Such an encounter is seen as "understanding," and in contrast to scientific knowledge is "intrinsic knowledge."

If this is true, then hermeneutics (and understanding itself) is not a methodological reconstruction which arrives at absolute fact or absolute truth, but the mediation of experiential, relative truth. This mediation is a dialectic process, a continual "back-and-forthness," which attains a high degree of metaphorical descriptiveness in being termed the "play of Being." As man is part of this, he is anthropaidian.

> We are conveyors of the past into the present. Even in the most careful attempts to grasp the past "in itself," understanding remains essentially a mediation or translation of past meaning into present situation. Thus, Gadamer's specific emphasis is not on the application of a method by a subject, but on the fundamental continuity of history as a medium encompassing every such subjective act and the objects it apprehends. Understanding is an event, a movement of history itself in which neither interpreter nor

text can be thought of as autonomous parts.[79]

Again, of foremost importance is the maintenance of non-autonomy in regard to text and interpreter. This implies that the "end" of every conversation is but a tentative end; it can be resumed in new situations which will demand new precision. The opposition to absolutes, even to such statements as those which claim enduring "intrinsic value" in-themselves, is heightened; continual novelty is present in direct relation to the creative perpetuation of questioning. In regard to the play model, Gadamer finds it important to stress that true play is unending.[80] "Every conversation (and the conversation of Being) has an inner infinity and no end. 'One breaks it off because it seems that enough has been said or that there is nothing more to say (for the moment). But every such break has an intrinsic relation to the resumption of the dialogue'."[81]

The "watchword" of the Enlightenment (and that which has followed from it) for Gadamer was "Freedom From Prejudice."[82] However, Gadamer gives a less than traditional understanding for what "reasonable" (the state of being free from prejudices) ought to mean; this understanding will become operative for this dissertation. He says that this understanding of what "reason" means is not necessarily to be considered radical, for modern society has, in his opinion, already done the same

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[79]Linge, op.cit., pp 6-7.

[80]Hans-Georg Gadamer, "The Power of Reason," Man and World, III (Number One, 1970), p. 6.

[81]Ibid., p. 24.

[82]Ibid., p. 11.

sort of thing. In the modern society, "the problem does not concern what an investigator finds as a result of his investigation, but rather the form in which the result enters into the public consciousness."[83] He then takes this "medium is the message (massage)" statement, and applies it in two ways. First, it applies to the sort of media manipulation noted above which is grossly apparent in politics and consumer product promotion. He also notes the increasing linguistic specialization which has become an adjunct of the technological society. Public policy is shaped by all sorts of enforcers of "scientific expertise," but in such a specialized, complicated manner that the ordinary public mind is deprived of all ability to make judgements; true participation in one's socio-political life becomes almost impossible. Much of this specialization is defensively intentional; "it is very much like a union, a way of guarding a trade — or, in other words, a way of keeping skills and knowledge and paychecks among those who have paid their dues (i.e., done that which is necessary to become experts in the particular language)."[84] Gadamer then makes the following statement about "reason."

> Whoever speaks in the name of reason contradicts himself. For what is reasonable is to know the limits of one's own understanding, and just through this fact to be capable of better understanding wherever it may come from . . . . Reason always consists in not blindly insisting upon what is held to be true but in critically occupying oneself with it. Its activity remains rational explanation, but not the dogmatic certainty of a new rationality absolutely laid down, which knows everything better — reason is conceived

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[83] Ibid., p 12.

[84] Thomas H. Middleton, "Light Refractions," Saturday Review (July 26, 1975), p. 61.

> as engaged in a continuous process of self-enlightenment concerning itself and its own conditions.[85]

One is reminded of the statement of Parmenides that "a wise man is he who knows truly what he is ignorant of." A major aspect of open-mindedness is the strenuous attempt not to become one's own follower. That which is "well-known" is not known at all well.

The applicability of Gadamer's thesis is myriad. At least two instructive examples can be cited in order to underline his main ideas. He talks about the "truth" of a work of art which is not found in either exterior standards which can be applied to the work, the subjective intention of a particular artist, or the subjective response of the particular viewer. He says in regard to the important work in aesthetics, expression, that it "is not to be understood primarily as an expression about one's own feeling, but as an expression which arouses feelings."[86] Play is akin to this, for the essential nature of play exists independently of the consciousness of the player. One thus returns to the event-full, experiential locus of "Truth" and "intrinsic value."

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[85] Gadamer, "The Power of Reason," op.cit., pp. 14-15.

[86] Palmer, op.cit., p. 176. It is important at this point to at least provide a reminder of the critical distinction which exists between geschichte and historie. The arena of historie is filled with the rehearsal of brute facts, while the arena of geschichte is filled with interpretation, confession, and myth-making. Historical positivism, especially as it has been inspired by pragmatic rationalism, sees the basic task of historical research as the discovery of historical facts (historie) behind the subjective interpretation. However, the adherents of the geschichte understanding of history insist that where experience of a factual event is communicated that historie becomes impossible. Language itself, and even the non-verbal communication which leads to language, are interpretive. Therefore, if an event is experienced (which seems to be the basic criterion for having an event), there is interpretation and confession. Therefore, there is no historie; all is geschichte. Even the very establishment of the fact that an object is an artifact is interpretive.

There is, to illustrate, a "truth" to the painting "Guernica" which transcends the fact that it depicts a scene from the Spanish Civil War, that it was painted by Picasso, or that Picasso may have used a great deal of artistic license in his depiction in order to call emotional attention to his cause. All of these may be extrinsic considerations, and have little to do with the intrinsic transformation which the painting is capable of eliciting; the painting probably does not even need to be titled. There may also be implications at this point for the discussed relation of expertise to the ability to make intrinsic valuations.

A similar sort of understanding is demonstrated in regard to historical criticism. Gadamer calls his position "intrinsic historicality" (Geschichtlichkeit),[87] and it follows closely upon Heidegger's understanding of the "prestructure of the understanding" in which all history is viewed through a consciousness which is standing in the present. "The past is not like a pile of facts which can be made an object of consciousness, but rather is a stream in which we move and participate ('in which we live and move and have our being' — Acts 17:28), in every act of understanding."[88] Here there is a radical divergence from the Cartesian position that the world belongs to the human subjectivity;

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[87]Gadamer, Truth and Method, op.cit., p. 458. Later (pp. 105-106), Gadamer will say: "It is to move out of the actual experience of a piece of literature if one investigates the origin of the plot on which it is based, and equally it is to move out of the actual experience of the drama if the spectator reflects about the conception behind a performance or about the proficiency of the actors." This is "aesthetic differentiation," and Gadamer hopes to move beyond this extrinsic level to a more intrinsic "aesthetic non-differentiation."

[88]Palmer, op.cit., pp. 176-177.

here the human subject is a part of the world. The recognition of this fact is, at one and the same time, the first movement of historical knowledge and self-knowledge. When these movements cannot be distinguished, one has Gadamer's "intrinsic historicality" or the intrinsic valuation of history. Here one also sees the continuance of the relation of value and meaning. "So basic is the process (of intrinsic historicality) that it is not so much one thing among others which one does, but that process in which and through which one exists as a human being."[89] Thus, it is appropriate to speak of play not simply as a mode of Being, but the mode of Being.

Gadamer's hermeneutical position calls for a kind of thinking which can deal with that which is non-objectifiable. His philosophy parallels that which in contemporary theology, much of which is influenced by the thought of the later- Heidegger, is termed "the renewal of God-language" and seeks to deal with divinity in a non-objectifying manner. There are no "right interpretations" as "right-in-itself is a thoughtless ideal and an impossibility."[90] It is also not enough to talk about how "tradition" can be judged by reason, for reason in Gadamer's interpretation always stands within tradition. The nearest that one can come to an absolute truth or an objective essence is in an assessment somewhat like the following:

> Since a great work lays open a truth of being, we may assume that its essential truth corresponds to that which originally brought it into being — without asserting the idea of a truth-in-itself or

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[89] Ibid., p. 180.

[90] Ibid., p. 183.

a perennially right interpretation.[91]

In concluding this part of the discussion on the more specific details of Gadamer's thought as it has applied to his understanding of hermeneutics, mention can be made of what he calls the "neglected factor" in interpretation, application. Application is extremely important for it is the point of closure in which past and present, self and tradition achieve a Gestalt of understanding; to use Heidegger's terminology, it is the point at which Being "clears" or "unveils" itself. Application is always present in interpretation for "to understand, in the sense of knowing and explaining, already involves within it something like an application to the present."[92] This is particularly apparent in judicial and homiletical interpretation, and Gadamer is suggesting that these examples should serve as models for what he would consider legitimate literary interpretation or academic philosophizing (i.e., that which acknowledges its historical present).

A common academic circumstance suggests itself at this point that would be helpful to and perhaps extend Gadamer's assessment. It is not unusual to come in contact with the thought of a particular thinker, and to feel that one possesses an understanding of what that thinker is saying, only to find that particular understanding quite inadequate in the moment of application, as for example, before a classroom of questioning students. Application is the optimum test of understanding, and it is usually the case that in repeated attempts at application, especially in the back-and-forth dialogue of debate, that the thought

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[91] Ibid., p. 184.

[92] Ibid., p. 187.

of that particular thinker finally becomes a part of one's own self. It is application that provides the ground for continual refining, and increased precision, perhaps even to a very close re-presentation of the experience had by the original speaker or artist. It can be said that Gadamer "is concerned not so much with understanding more correctly (and thus with providing norms for valid interpretation) as with understanding more deeply, more truly,"[93] or perhaps more intrinsically.

It is also important to note that this sort of understanding of application does not involve an ivory tower, hermeneutical subjectivism or intellectually elite isolationism, but a radical involvement with one's self, one's particular traditions, and other selves and their experiences of that tradition. One of the most legitimate philosophical pursuits would appear to be to attempt, not simply to know and to explain, but to experience through application. Here again, one is at the point of being a part of the "play of ideas," and interpretation becomes inter-pretation or what Hartman might have called "con-pretation."[94]

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[93] Ibid., p. 215.

[94] Perhaps some etymological speculation might be instructive at this point. The word interpretation is a combination of the Latin inter which means "between" or "among," and a root which corresponds to the Sanskrit prath which means "to spread abroad." Therefore, interpretation means the process of being the between-element in the spreading abroad (or, the "proclamation") of a text or record of an event. Thus, the true interpretation, in the sense suggested by Gadamer, always preserves this between-element, and never allows it to say that it has reached an end. The designation "inter-pretation" would then suggest the reciprocity involved in this "spreading abroad," and "con-pretation" might give a heightened sense to the "with" element which would suggest that interpretation is never an independent, autonomous process. Akin to these ideas in the Greek idea of kerygma which is primarily associated with the "proclamation" of the New Testament. In the New Testament understanding of proclamation, one does not simply find a descriptive account

As Heidegger spoke of one being the "Shepherd of Being," it is now possible to speak of one being the "Shepherd of Tradition"; "serving the text, being governed by its claim, and simultaneously interpreting it in the light of the present . . . ."[95] Thus, for Gadamer hermeneutics is dialectical, and he understands this dialectic as being exemplified by the playful exchanges of the Socratic method of questioning which are epitomized in the Platonic dialogues. One need only read the exchanges between Socrates and Thrasymachus in the first part of The

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of historical events. Rather, one encounters a re-presentation of the experience of the "revelation" of God in the so-called "historical" event in such a way that there is a crisis situation in which the hearer becomes involved in a struggle for self-understanding and self-identity in light of what the kerygma has said. This crisis situation can be described as a situation of application; one ultimately encounters the existential situation in which the most important question is "what does this say to me?" Finally, in the kerygma there is no "right" or "correct" interpretation of revelation, but rather the potentially infinite possibility of new self-understanding and new experience of that which is revealed. And, the revelation is always tantamount to a liquid continuum between that which is revealed from without the individual caught up within the experience, and that which is revealed of or within that individual; in fact, all distinctions of "within" and "without" are obliterated at least in a penultimate manner. By penultimate, an idea is being conveyed like that of Gabriel Marcel's understanding of "Participation" and "Communion." There is the ideal attempt to reciprocally participate with one's world as much as is possible, but not to the point of having the self totally absorbed into some sort of transcendental world process such as in Hegel or some of the Eastern religions. There is rather a "Communion" with one's world in which the self is preserved; the idea of a reciprocal continuum seems to best describe this situation which will be described in the section on Nietzsche below as "penultimate oneness." Finally, it can be stated that in the case of the kerygma which is being discussed that the series of "event-full appearings" or "happening-unveilings" is called in theology Heilsgeschichte. Here, the Heil refers to the experience of a divine, Otto-like "holy Other." However, it might also refer to the times (kairoi) in which what Heidegger would call "authentic existence" occurs. In fact, besides the sort of penultimate distinction which was made above, there may be little distinction between the divine Heil and the occurence of this authentic existence.

[95] Palmer, op.cit., p. 189.

Republic to see what he means by this statement. Hermeneutics becomes a "speculative hermeneutics"[96] in which imagination (i.e., "the capacity to see what is questionable in the subject matter and to formulate questions that question the subject matter further"[97]— the endless "play of possibilities"), and especially that of the poet who is conceived as the "speculative experiencer par excellence,"[98] is the key factor. "The keys to understanding are not manipulation and control but participation and openness, not knowledge but experience, not methodology but dialectic."[99]

A final, more detailed explication of the thought of Gadamer will be made by making a more specific return to the main theme of play. This will be done by closely analyzing the section of Truth and Method

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[96]Ibid., p. 214.

[97]Linge, op.cit., p. 12.

[98]Palmer, op.cit., p. 211.

[99]Ibid., p. 215. An excellent example of the sort of interpretation suggested by Gadamer can be found in the Heidegger-influenced Old Testament theology of Gerhard von Rad; cp. Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology (New York, 1967). Von Rad works from the presupposition that historie is essentially impossible, and that true theologizing occurs only within and as geschichte. G. E. Wright and the so-called "School of Biblical Archaeology" have been critical of von Rad at this point, saying that not only is historie possible, but that it is the ultimate authenticating element in biblical research. However, von Rad's retort is such as to reveal the importance of geschichte to his work. "Let us assume that the sources really give us a not too unclear historical glimpse into the time of the patriarchs — what would we have gained thereby? I cannot escape the impression that it is Wright's belief that with the establishment of a certain 'authenticity' of the stories of the patriarchs something would be gained in a theological respect . . . The remarkable thing is that Wright, in his discovery of the historical background, leaves the realm of the witness of history behind him, and pushes back to an area that is theologically speechless." The most that Wright and other interpreters like him seem to be able to do is to establish the "substantial historicity" of early biblical narratives in which nothing can be proven, but only broadly trusted

entitled "Play As The Clue To The Ontological Explanation" which has already been mentioned. In this section of his major writing, Gadamer makes his most explicit statement on play, and demonstrates the implications of play for a new understanding of the whole of ontology. In the examples noted in this section, he is particularly concerned with relating his ideas on play to art.

At the onset of this particular chapter, Gadamer wants to clearly establish that by play he does not mean the subjective attitude of the creator, or that of the observer, but the "mode of being of the work of art itself."[100] The attitudes of the creator (or player) in the activity of play are not different from other activities of the subjectivity. Gadamer also early in the discussion takes note of the relationship of play to seriousness which has been noted throughout. Play is serious, but it is not a teleological seriousness that is caught up in an ends-oriented purposiveness or instrumentalism; this is quite similar to Fink's position on seriousness which was discussed above. For Gadamer,

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where it appears that events are beyond reasonable doubt. However, not only does an event have to be explicitly proven to be historie, it has to be exactly reduplicated, and that is impossible.

The geschichte idea of history is determinative for self-understanding. With geschichte man dwells poetically on the earth; geschichte is kerygmatic autobiography. "An autobiography is the closest literary approximation to the most sublime act of which man is capable, the act by which he comes to know, and in knowing create himself. The self known and made may not have existed prior to the autobiographical act, but it surely exists after it." An example of this is the event of the Exodus, which has a central place in the biblical proclamation for von Rad. The Exodus as historie is not important, but as geschichte (autobiography) it is the self-identity of Israel as a people who have been created in their liberation by God from Egypt. "Not the event, but the telling of the event is what matters." To describe a "historie-cal" Israel is to describe a non-biblical Israel, one which exists behind the canonical texts, and behind their own autobiography."

[100]Gadamer, Truth and Method, op.cit., p. 91.

to be serious at play means to become so involved in the play that all ends-orientation is disregarded.

> In the attitude of play all those purposive relations which determine active and caring existence have not simply disappeared, but in a curious way acquire a different quality. The player himself knows that play is only play and exists in a world which is determined by the seriousness of purposes. But he does not know this in such a way that, as a player, he actually intends this relation to seriousness. Play fulfills its purpose only if the player loses himself in his play.[101]

Particular attention should be called to the idea in this quote of "acquiring a different quality"; this is tantamount to intrinsic valuation. The "purposive relations" noted here would relate to the extrinsic properties of an event or object. These are rearranged into a "new creation" by the attitude of play so that they "acquire a different quality." This quality is a part of the relations, but it is not; it is a property of the properties, which involves a different level of valuation which arises out of the event or object through the valuer.

The idea of the autonomy of play, which has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, cannot be overstated in Gadamer's discussion. There is no subject-object relationship which can adequately explain the phenomena of play. For example, in a ballgame, the ball can very legitimately often be spoken of as having an autonomy which transcends the controlling capacities of the players. "The ball is freely mobile in every direction, appearing to do surprising things of its own accord."[102] It is not unusual to hear said about games that they were

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[101] Ibid., pp. 91-92.

[102] Ibid., p. 95. At this point an aside can be noted that may help to explain what sort of rules are enhancing to play. Football was first played with a round, soccer-like ball. However, the bounces of such a

won or lost by the "bounce (perhaps, buoyancy) of the ball." This type of play activity is undoubtedly the direct descendant of the ancient practice of casting lots which was often understood as a way of being in communication with the will of the gods. The question has been raised throughout human history, especially by those who have no time (chronos) for play, why anyone would become involved with playing with some sort of ball or the other paraphernalia of recreation; perhaps, in the context of the discussion at this point the answer becomes more apparent, and instead of refering to play with a ball, it seems more accurate to speak of being involved with the play of a ball. With regard to the example of the work of art, Gadamer makes the following parallel statement:

> . . . it is not an object that stands over against a subject for itself. Instead the work of art has its true being in the fact that it becomes an experience changing the person experiencing it. The "subject" of the experience of art is the work itself . . . . Play has its own essence, independent of the consciousness of those who play. The players are not the subjects of play; instead play merely reaches presentation through the players.[103]

The idea of "experience" is obviously of utmost importance to the dissertation as a whole, as is the idea that play is presented through the player which is a variant of Heidegger's idea that authentic human being is the place (the "there") of Being's appearance. There is also the desire to associate these ideas with those taken from Hartman that

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ball were quite predictable. An oblong ball would bounce with less predictability, be more easily thrown, and therefore create more possibilities for play which in turn would make the game porportionately more interesting.

[103] Ibid., p. 92.

when artistic creation or intrinsic valuation occurs, that there is an event of human being.

The word play is examined, and Gadamer arrives at understandings that have already been encountered. He emphasizes the back-and-forth, to-and-fro movement which undoubtedly is at the etymological root. In Linge's discussion on Gadamer, the word bouyancy is used which seems to capture the essential nature of the primordial play movement, and will be employed by this dissertation. Gadamer notices, significantly, that the idea of dance and its relation to play is quite important. "The movement which is play has no goal which brings it to an end; rather, it renews itself in constant repetition."[104] This comment, especially as it applies to repetition, adds veracity to the statements of Edwards on intrinsic value in the first chapter. However, it would still seem that such an experience would have to possess a certain "infinity" and a perpetual element of novelty or uniqueness in order that it would not become boring. In other words, in play there is the possibility of not only one whole that is valued, but a series of wholes (i.e., not simply a class of intrinsic value experience as was discussed above, but the genus of intrinsic value experience).

The back-and-forth movement of Gadamer's play provides a perfect model for the dialectical element of his hermeneutics. Within this dialectic, there is a relativizing synthesis which occurs which obscures if not obliterates what had been antithetical extremes. Several of these have already been mentioned: fact and illusion; reality and non-reality; truth and un-truth; play and seriousness; play and work; and,

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[104] Ibid., p. 93.

reason and tradition. To these Gadamer adds the distinctions which might be drawn between belief and non-belief, literal and metaphorical, faith and pretense. One might also add that in this context such extremes as rationality and intuition, science and faith, or even idealism and pragmatism begin to move toward one another. The movement of play is a natural, effortless sort of experience which has its own initiative. Because of this there is an absence of strain, a resolution of tension, and it becomes appropriate to speak of "relaxation," even in the midst of what may be the expenditure of a great deal of physical energy.

Movement is also important in making distinctions between games or types of play manifestation. Gadamer says that games have a different quality or "spirit" in accordance with different types of movement. Some games such as basketball have a rapid movement, while that of golf is quite slow; the movement of chess is more mental, while that of ice hockey is fundamentally physical. The different sorts of movement constitute the structure and rules of the game. The game involves what Gadamer calls a "task," but that task is not seen in terms of achieving a particular goal (i.e., winning), but in how one relates oneself to the movements of the particular game. Play is manifested, occurs, or is "re-presented" in the game, and that "re-presentation" as it occurs through man's play activity also becomes "self-representation" for the player. When this occurs "human play finds its true perfection in being art."[105] At this point, one might recall Hartman's idea of virtuosity, or the ability to be an artist at living. Here play acquires

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[105] Ibid., p. 99.

a self-identity, or what Gadamer calls "ideality"[106] which enables it to be understood as play. What has been movement, activity, "energeia" takes on "the character of a work, of a ergon . . . ."[107] Here is an understanding of work that is not opposed to play, but that in fact is the manifestation of play in some sort of identifiable, structured form. Such a transformation into structure Gadamer calls a "total mediation," and the apparent relationship between ergon and agon could not be more deceptive; ergon is agon transformed by paidia.

The word ergon is from the Greek ἔργον, and it most commonly is confronted in English in the word erg which is a metrically calcuable unit of work. Kittel's Theological Wordbook of the New Testament[108] gives important etymological information about the word. Ergon is a term important in Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy where it is related to arete (ἀρετή) which was the decisive word for Hartman meaning "virtue". In the first part of the Nicomachean Ethics (I, 1, p. 1094a, 3ff) the relation is developed systematically: "ἔργα are by nature of more value and more worth seeking than ἐνέργειαι. The arete of every creature . . . consists in fulfilling properly its specific ergon . . . . The state of fulfillment implies true and viable activity." Therefore, the structure of play, or the "work" of art which is produced by true playful activity is not a static, teleologically completed sort of thing at all, but a fulfillment of

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[106] Ibid.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Georg Bertram, "Ergon," in Gerhard Kittel (ed.), Theological Wordbook of the New Testament, II (Grand Rapids, 1974), pp. 635-636.

virtuosity. It might even be possible to speak of the "structure" that one's life has attained as the "work of art" that has arisen out of the fulfillment of one's virtuosity or virtuous playfulness; such an understanding of "structure" would then lend meaning to a somewhat anomalous term like "lifestyle." A derivative form of the Greek ergon is the Latin ergo which means "therefore," and preceeds the conclusion of a syllogism. An ergon or "work of art" in the sense that Gadamer is using it has a "therefore" sort of force in the sense that it too has a conclusive-like element; something like the closure of a Gestalt. It should also be noted that ergon and agon have no etymological commonality, and any case for establishing a relationship between agon and paidia at this point would be completely unfounded.

That which is capable of attaining this structure can be thought of as "lasting," "permanent," or "true." However, these words are not being used to legitimatize some sort of absolutization. The whole idea of continuing along the way of questioning is still operative. At least when these moments of structuring, closure, fulfillment, or self-representation do occur, one is able to feel that one is on the right track (perhaps, "the track of Being"), participating in the type of movement of play which best lends continuity to one's own particular self, or, at least, asking the right question (which is infinitely more important than claiming that one has all the "right" answers).

However, Gadamer feels the need to say that a legitimately attained "structure," while not claiming to be "right" or "absolute," does demand a certain "justice," and has a certain "binding nature." He means by this that the particular "structure," if it is arrived at through the process which he has described is not to be taken lightly.

One is at least responsible to the structured ergon, the tradition at a particular stage, to the degree that it deserves being understood, and in this process of understanding one is again involved in the dialectic of interpretation and the "play of Being."

Gadamer also stresses the point that these fulfillments of virtuosity and structure are only momentary, even though an artifact may be left from the activity in this moment which will last for centuries. One is reminded at this point of the suggested relation of the discussion to Whitehead which has been mentioned, and which will be discussed further below. There are moments of fulfillment or structuring in which there is a "true present/presence" in the endless play of Being. Gadamer says that these fleeting moments or events have "the character of an epiphany."[109] In these moments which are described as "the fullness of time," chronological, extrinsic time ceases to exist in the occurence of an historical-existential "appearance time."[110] A similar distinction between καιρός, the time of "the fullness of time," and χρόνος, formal or clock time, is made by Paul Tillich, and will be considered in detail below. Heidegger would speak of those moments when light breaks through a clearing as one walks along a forest path; the life of an authentically existing individual is characterized by a Lichtungsgeschichte.

Finally, while these moments are fleeting, and are only corrupted if they are made static, it is important to note that they are repetitious. One of the most important aspects of play is that it is

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[109] Gadamer, Truth and Method, op.cit., p. 109.

[110] Ibid.

repetitious but not boring. It is repetitious for Gadamer in a sense similar to that of the celebration in a festival. The original essence of a festival is "always to be something different (even when celebrated in exactly the same way). It has its being only in becoming and return."[111] As a festival exists only in being celebrated, so authentic human existence occurs in the buoyancy of life filled with an infinite density of playing and played-with possibilities. In this "becoming and returning," one is at the point of Hölderlin's "Homecoming," Eliade's "Myth of the Eternal Return," and the back-and-forth movement which is at the etymological root of the word play.

To celebrate at a festival does not simply mean to watch as an outside observer what is happening; "to be present means to share."[112] In a sporting event, the spectator has a role that is as necessary to the totality of the event as that of the actual players. "Crowd reaction" and "home field advantage" are common terms in athletic competition which point to this reality. One is not a spectator at a festival, and the role of a spectator in true play is a role of involvement. One who is authentically existing is involved in the play of the possibilities of his existence. Again, the concept of "aesthetic non-differentiation" is important, for the objectifing status of "aesthetic differentiation" is tantamount to inauthentic existence. True "reality" always is on the horizon of this superfluity of possibilities. Therefore, the true being of a spectator, and a confrontation with true reality, can only occur to the degree that the spectator gives himself

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[111] Ibid., p. 110.

[112] Ibid., p. 111.

to the play of the possibilities of Being which is happening. It will be recalled that the final definition of intrinsic valuation also was directly related to the ability to loose oneself in interpenetration with that which one encountered as one's world at a particular moment. Authentic existence is thus a celebration of life in which one is a participant in the festival of the play of Being, the play of the possibilities of one's existence.

The discussion of Gadamer will end at this point having given consideration only to the most predominant ideas of Truth and Method which deal with the concept of play. While the discussion has sought to be detailed, it could only be exhaustive if the entirety of the book could be discussed. The magnitude of Gadamer's work has only been glimpsed. Truth and Method will undoubtedly come to be recognized as one of the most significant philosophical documents of the modern age. This dissertation has only played with a few of its possibilities, and an infinity of novelty and festive encounter remains.

A Philosophy of "As If"

At this point the discussion will attempt to develop a concluding statement for this first, major section which will bring together the thoughts of the first three chapters. In so doing, a phrase is being used which has already found for itself a place in the history of Western philosophy. The Kantian scholar Hans Vaihinger, in a work entitled Die Philosophie des Als-Ob which was written in 1911, introduced the terminology "as if." The general idea of Vaihinger's work was to give a more pragmatic interpretation of Kantian idealism; it could be quite helpful to act "as if" there was a God, moral imperatives, or categories of the mind. There would at least be some "explanation" for areas of

concern which had defied explanation. Such "as if activity" would lend some structure to one's life, and if the "as if" was continually self-critical, it would not necessarily be an exercise in self-imposed delusion. For example, in Vaihinger's own understanding of religion there was a rejection of any actual divinity, but a recognition of the potential aesthetic and ethical value of religion. However, this discussion has received no influence whatsoever from Vaihinger, and in no way should be considered a variant of his thought. The idea of "as if" to be presented here was conceived before any aspect of Vaihinger's thought was encountered. Yet, with the recognition of Vaihinger's previous use of the term, it seemed incumbent upon this discussion to make some statement defining the relation to his work.

Within the context of the epistemological presuppositions of the relativity of truth, all activity is "as if activity." That is, all activity is based upon the premise that the motivations and rationale for the activity are justifiable; one acts "as if" they are true. The lawyer defends a client "as if" it were true that he was innocent; a navigator charts a course "as if" his understanding of the universe is correct; a scientist makes a prediction "as if" his understanding of the "laws" of cause and effect which govern the universe are in some way binding; an artist says of his creative experience that it is "as if" he became "one" with his world at a particular moment; an individual says that an entity or experience has "intrinsic value," and acts "as if" it were so; an evangelical preacher calls upon people to be saved "as if" the dimension of eternal life, which is promised to accompany the salvation he is offering, is a reality. There is no thesis that can be absolutely proven either in the natural or human

sciences. All "facts" are ultimately faith statements; there finally comes a point when all the compilable information is gathered, and one must act "as if" that information is valid for the next moment of one's existence.

For example, people on the Earth act "as if" the "law of gravity" was an obvious axiom of their existence. Within the purview of recorded history, any time that an object has been tossed into the air or fallen from some height, it has gone down to the ground. However, there is no way of negatively demonstrating that once in every fifty billion years that the universe regularly, orderly arranges itself in such a manner that for ten minutes the law of gravity is reversed on the surface of the Earth, and objects tossed into the air continue to rise. It also cannot be established that this ten minute period will not commence in the next moment, although not many people would be sufficiently convinced by this presentation to begin to nail down all loose items which might be lying about; one acts "as if" the law of gravity is absolute, inviolable. The same sort of argument would apply to speculation about the sun rising in the morning. That it has always done so is no guarantee that it will tomorrow, although activity motivated by the belief (always belief, never fact) that it will is certainly the norm.

The type of "as if activity" described to this point, while being quite fundamental, is mundane when compared to a heightened sort of "as if activity" in which man also participates. The attempt to describe one's existence in terms of what might be called "ultimate characterizations," about which the understanding of one's existence is shaped, is the epitome of "as if activity." Therefore, to say, for example,

that some sort of other-concerned and at the same time self-fulfilling moral benevolence is the best way in which human existence can be pursued is a superior sort of "as if activity." As has been mentioned, Thales' water, Plato's light, and Hegel's Spirit are assumptions about relaity which directly relate to a particular type of "as if activity." To understand one's existence in terms of an ultimate divine God is a heightened form of "as if activity." The whole of existence is explained in relation to the assumption that the ideas or beliefs about God are true. While God may not be ultimately provable or disprovable, activity "as if" there is a God or visa versa is not unusual. It can also be said that the understanding of "ultimate reality" in terms of "Being" or "The Play of Being" is a similar sort of procedure. Perhaps Dewey's understanding of "coming to terms" with one's world could be interpreted to mean that one puts their world-experience into some kind of terms that allows them to live in that world; such terms would not have an absolute meaning, but as with play a mediating meaning.

"As if activity" is play activity, and every action, from that which accords with a "law" of gravity to that which derives a divinity or understanding of Being, is essentially play. Heidegger says that the ground-question of metaphysics is "why are there essents rather than nothing?" However, this question is precluded by a desire on the part of human being(s) to give some kind of structure, meaning, or self-identity, or Gadamer's "ideality" to their existence. The energeia of of human being finds its most basic "drive" in the movement toward "ergon-hood," and a question such as that of Heidegger is merely a particular stage of a particular pursuit which attempts to accomplish

that structure, organization, value, or meaning. In the sense that all activity is "as if," all meaning and value is conferred. However, it should only be fair to say that the most legitimate meaning would be that which is conferred, not in some differentiated status to that which is, but in conjunction (to "junction with" would be a more precise description that "oneness") and in response to the realization of that which is occuring in one's existence. Gadamer's realization that true play is conscious of itself as play is also important, for in the recognition that one's activity is "as if," there should be less of a tendency at absolutization and more of a motivation toward community.

It would also seem that some "as if activity" would be "better" than others. However, great care would have to be used in determining any criteria. As in the procuring of rules of play which arose out of play itself and were condusive to its own maintenance, enhancement, and furthering, the basic criterion of the best "as if activity" would be that which advanced and enhanced "as if activity" itself and the human community as a whole. Something like a creative, self-critical, open-mindedness would seem to emanate from the kind of "as if" attitude described.

Finally, it would seem that <u>if</u> the "as if" understanding is the understanding of existence which does come closest to approximating the "true nature of reality," that the philosophical model which is most closely aligned with an "as if" understanding would be the most valuable for human self-understanding. This is the great value of Gadamer's work, for his understanding of existence as the "play of Being" may come closer to describing the "true nature of reality" than any philosophical model that has been presented before in the history of philosophy.

To be fully human is thus understood as that activity in which one's existence as playing with possibilities is transformed by that play and synthesized into an experience of participating in the play of possibilities; this is the intrinsic valuation of one's own existence — the ultimate form of "as if activity" and play. In this situation, "Truth" or "Value" is not conferred in the sense of an activity of an independently existing subjectivity. Rather, that which exists is "brought together" (the original, etymological meaning of the word confer! — it can also be understood in terms of a "dialogue") into a meaningful whole, in an activity which is a synthesis, a "back-and-forthness," of conferring and responding. The arete paidia, the virtuous play or the play of the fulfillment of human virtue, is fulfilled in a meaningful, dynamic structure which is a work of art. In this bringing together, one is a part of the event, the happening, the unveiling, the conferring of "Truth" in the "play of Being."

CHAPTER IV

THE IDEA OF PLAY IN PLATO

Preface to the Second Section

The second section of the dissertation, which will comprise Chapters IV through IX, will seek to provide additional information on the idea of play as it can be found in several key presentations in the history of Western Philosophy. As will be seen, while concern with the idea of play appears to be contemporary, it is actually as old as the discipline of philosophy itself. The attempt of this section will be to continue and to augment the discussion of the first section. While the first section could stand by itself, with the development and supplementation of the second section, a broader range of possibility for the investigation of the idea of play is made available. In addition, a more well-developed context is provided for the fundamental, first section.

An attempt has been made to single out discussions in which major thinkers deal with play as a significant aspect of their thought. The dissertation will give primary consideration in this section to the work of Plato, Schiller, Nietzsche, Sartre, and Whitehead. Then, chapter nine will give attention to the work of the American poet Wallace Stevens. This particular chapter is the only one in the entire study which might be seen as standing outside the range of that which is traditionally philosophical. However, the dissertation has had as one of its mediating concerns the attempt to move into an area of expression that is more aesthetic than traditional philosophy sometimes is, although

that certainly seems to be the direction that any "philosophy as play" would have to move in; it is also the movement implied by the philosophy of Nietzsche and Heidegger. Stevens' poetry, which will also bring the section back to the framework of Hartman's philosophy, is a good example of an "aesthetic philosophy" or a "philosophical aesthetics." The rationale for choosing Stevens will be further developed in that particular chapter. In some cases, there will be a repetition of ideas already encountered, and when this occurs it will increase the veracity of those ideas. In others, entirely new perspectives on play will be noted. A generally applicable conclusion will be, however, that the concept of play provides a unifying focal point around which the entirety of these several philosophies individually coalesce. If the first section could be considered a painted canvas, this second section would be considered its frame; undoubtedly, the careful framing of an object of art can do much to enhance its total presentation.

There is some need to state why these particular philosophers were chosen rather than others. The choice was in no way arbitrary. The entirety of the history of Western philosophy was surveyed in an attempt to determine exactly to what extend the idea of play, while gaining current attention, might have already been present. The philosophers discussed here appeared to give the play ideas significant consideration, and their consideration thus becomes the concern of this section. The dissertation at this point needs to defend itself against what would appear to be a quite understandable criticism that these individual philosophers had their philosophies selectively considered from the point of view of the play concepts, and that in this selectivity that injustice was done to the philosophies in their entirety. That

is, with the play idea so predominant in one's mind, it would seem to be quite easy to see in a particular philosophy more than is actually there. In fact, this criticism has been stringently self-implied as a part of the methodology of the dissertation. Only that material which seemed to be thoroughly convincing was used, and part of the judgement on the dissertation as a whole will depend on how well one is convinced by the claims of this second section. The treatment of Plato and Schiller should already be fairly well-known, but the idea of play in relation to the other thinkers may not have been quite so evident. However, the dissertation will hope to convince any skeptics by specific internal evidence that the idea of play in each of these philosophies is of central significance. In the end, the content and veracity of the dissertation as a whole will be richly complemented by the thought of this section. Following the consideration of this section, the claim that the model of "the play of Being" is the most thoroughly convincing attempt which has been made to "come to terms" with "the true nature of reality" should be efficacious. It is one thing to find a doctoral dissertation making such a claim; it is quite another to have that claim substantiated by Plato, Sartre, and Nietzsche!

At least some indication of the material which was excluded from the dissertation seems important: a fuller elucidation of Aristotle's discussion of _eudaimonia_ and _makarios_ ("happiness" and "blessedness") which is mentioned; a discussion of Kierkegaard which would include his ideas on humor, the comical, and the balance of passion and necessity in the healthy personality; Kant's ideas on play which are a prelude to Schiller; Hegel's references to the concept at the end of his _Phenomenology of Spirit_; ideas gleaned from the educational philosophy of

Pestalozzi; and, the writings of Hermann Hesse (especially his novel entitled The Glass Bead Game — Magister Ludi). Finally, no mention is made of the rich contributions to play-related phenomena in the Eastern religions, especially in Zen Buddhism. Perhaps, every finished work is but a plateau; the more that one knows, the more that one realizes that there is an immanent "yet-to-be-known," which exists only a short distance ahead, that would give more completeness to what is known. One is reminded of a quote from Lessing recalled by Kierkegaard in his Concluding Unscientific Postscripts: "If God held all truth in his right hand, and his left hand held the lifelong pursuit of it, he would choose the left hand."

Play in Plato's Philosophy

A major portion of the sources consulted in preparing this dissertation made significant reference to the importance of play as it is stressed in the philosophy of Plato. Almost without exception, the following passage from Plato's The Laws is recognized as being of central importance.

> Though human affairs are not worthy of great seriousness, it is yet necessary to be serious . . . . I say that a man must be serious with the serious . . . God alone is worthy of supreme seriousness, but man is made God's plaything, and that is the best part of him. Therefore, every man and woman should live life accordingly, and play the noblest games, and be of another mind from what they are at present . . . . What, then, is the right way of living? Life must be lived as play, playing certain games, making sacrifices, singing, and dancing, and then a man will be able to propitiate the gods, and defend himself against his enemies, and win the contest.[1]

However, most play theorists only use the mention of this passage as a

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[1]Plato, Laws (Chicago, 1952), vii, p. 803. Noted in the following:

sort of proof-text that Plato was interested in play; such an interest seems to provide some sort of justification for their own concerns. Very little exegesis of the text is provided, and no single attempt has been found which seeks to place the important statement within the context of the particular Platonic work in which it appears. A preliminary attempt will be made to overcome this deficiency, and hopefully to provide a commentary which can parallel the actual importance that this particular passage does in fact deserve. In developing this context, Werner Jaeger's Paideia is being relied upon as the definitive source.

The Laws comes at the end of Plato's career, and may represent a final construction of his entire philosophy. It is his largest work, and contains more than one-fifth of the accumulated corpus of Platonic writings. The work may be best understood as a restatement of The Republic. The earlier writing is more of a concentration on pure forms of knowledge. Here, he is more concerned with describing culture (paideia) in its highest, most perfect manifestations; an ideal society, ruled over by a philosopher-king, and guided by the "Idea of the Good." In fact, in The Republic, "he did his best to cut the word (paideia) and the concept away from pais (child)."[2]

However, in The Laws a different standard is being used. Instead

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Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (Boston, 1964), pp. 211-212; David L. Miller, God and Games: Toward A Theology of Play (New York, 1970), p. 106; Hugo Rahner, Man At Play (New York, 1972), pp. 12-13; Gavin Ardley, "The Role of Play in the Philosophy of Plato," Philosophy, XLVII (1967), p. 235.

[2]Werner Jaeger, Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture, III (New York, 1969), p. 223.

of pure knowledge, there is an emphasis on experience as a superior epistemological entity. There is also the introduction of a myriad of legal regulations which govern every aspect of civic life, which is greatly removed from the attitude that the enlightened, ideal state of The Republic, needs no such rigid, specific restraints. "In The Republic he tried to make education so perfect that legislation was superflous."[3] Finally, instead of a concentration on the loftiest stages paideia, Plato is concerned to search for its roots, and find these roots in the play of children. Play thus becomes a central issue in The Laws, as it is seen as a fundamental constituent of man's culturalization. In this context, Plato is concerned to emphasize with the greatest care the relation between paideia and pais, which will of course necessitate a consideration of paidia.

The Laws is intended as a synthesizing work, and Plato is consciously attempting to make a final resolution of the Dorian and Athenian natures. He is concerned throughout his life with "the healing of systematic dualisms,"[4] and here the specific dualism is that which exists between the Dorian passion and the Athenian rationality. In fact, Jaeger's basic definition[5] of paideia (culture) is the establishment of harmony between desire and reason. It is in play that a higher unity, of which both desire, pleasure, passion, and reason are constituent elements, is epitomized. This harmony is thus the intrinsic valuation of both the desire, pleasure, passion extreme, and the reason extreme.

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[3] Ibid., p. 216.

[4] Ardley, op.cit., p. 226.

[5] Jaeger, op.cit., p. 234.

Within this framework, the troublesome question of the relation of play to pleasure is dealt with, and that which relates to the "fun" of play or "cheerfulness"[6] of play is a manifestation of this higher, harmony level, extreme. Emphasis is shifted from the proper training of a philosopher-king to the proper pre-school training, of which the first six years is specifically reserved for free play (paidia); the child should not even "have games shown them, but make up their own when they play together."[7]

Plato is quite specific about the nature of this pre-school and school age training. It is play training, and not job training! Job training had become the norm of Plato's time with the effect that individuals appropriated certain banausic skills the use of which usually resulted in some sort of instrumentalism basically motivated by the desire to make money. This sort of culture is "devoid of a governing spiritual principle and right aim."[8]

> True paideia, which had always been the education of men for "the whole of arete," had collapsed into purely specialist skills with no dominating aim in view. He must have felt that his era, in spite of all its astonishing wealth of specialist knowledge and ability, was really marked by a decline in culture.[9]

Such a culture, which lacks the rhythm and harmony of the higher play synthesis, can be characterized as "intrinsically unmusical."[10] In the

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[6] Ibid., p. 247.

[7] Ibid., p. 249.

[8] Ibid., p. 224.

[9] Ibid., pp. 224-225.

[10] Ardley, op.cit., p. 239.

movement of the discussion from this point, it is hoped that the suggested relation between aesthetics and ethics can be given further substantiation. The early Plato had held to the Socratic idea that "more and deeper knowledge would improve the entire moral culture of the personality,"[11] but in these last writings he is giving his attention to the intrinsically superior level of human character; and, he is saying that the "play character" is contingent with the level of the passion-reason synthesis. Passion is rational in the sense that it does not become an end-in-itself, and reason is passionate in the sense that it is in a creative, imaginative (perhaps "imagination" can be defined as passionate reason) interplay with the whole of existence.

This new synthesis of passion and reason is exemplified in the training which follows the period of free play. Singing and dancing are a synthesis of expression and experience, form and feeling, reason and passion. They are dependent upon an inner harmony and a mutually inclusive harmony with one's world. This level of experience is definitive for understanding what is meant by "oneness" in the artistic experience. Plato decries the present situation of his day in regard to song and dance. His cultural setting had become too intellectualized, and survived only as highly elaborate forms of art. Athletics, which is related to dancing, had also in Plato's time been degraded into a "form for form's sake" type of activity. Therefore, it is again the play of the child that provides the paradigm for the higher synthesis, and the guiding of that play into harmonizing experiences such as dancing and singing which enhances that synthesis is at the basis of

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[11] Jaeger, op.cit., pp. 227-228.

Plato's most fundamental assumptions about culture. It is important to note that the word nomos (νόμος), which is usually translated "law," can also mean "song." As Plato attempts to combine these two senses, the ethical and aesthetic merge.

In a final clarification, Plato wanted to direct an attack against the attitude particularly evident at Sparta that victory in war was the ultimate end of the culturalization (training) process. All play was to be ultimately exhibited in the context of battle; the athletic, in particular, was a stage of development which aimed toward this end. However, Plato vehemently rejected this understanding. In his doing so, a further substantiation is provided for the criticism leveled at Huizinga in which a Spartan-type attitude is expounded in which the relationship between paidia, agon, and war is seen as being necessary. Plato insisted that "wherever men think victory is the only thing worth living for, courage inevitably becomes the only virtue."[12] This can apply to war or athletic contests. A more ideal level than this is that in which the "whole of virtue" (πᾶσα ἀρετή)[13] is produced. Plato's conclusion is radically different from the Spartan ideal, and the mentality that claims that "winning is all that counts."

> For it is culture (paideia) that produces victory, not victory culture; in fact, victory often produces un-culture (ἀπαιδευσία)! A victory that increases hybris in man is a Cadmean victory, where more is lost than was won; but there has never been a Cadmean paideia.[14]

Plato insisted that where the paideia element is given its appropriate

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[12]Plato, op.cit., p. 626. Quoted in Jaeger, op.cit., 221.

[13]Jaeger, op.cit., p. 221.

[14]Plato, op.cit., p. 641. Quoted in Jaeger, op.cit., p. 223.

consideration, that such actions as athletic prowess or success in war will follow.

At this point, the initial quotation of this chapter can be given its most fundamental interpretation. The idea of play is given its broadest application by Plato in a way quite similar to its alignment with "ultimate questions" as mentioned in the conclusion of the first section. Jaeger says that at first sight such an application "might be thought to be a colossal exaggeration of a good idea."[15] To say that man is god's plaything, and that his most human activity is play activity, is in no way construed as a degrading of man. In fact, man is raised to a level on which he has an active relationship with his ultimate essence (the "divine" in man), and with god; this relationship is especially significant in comparison to the ideas more prominent in Plato's time of a mutual exclusivity which existed between man and the divine. To play is to view the world from a god-like perspective in which absolute seriousness about such things as war and work is mediated by the attitude that as man is god's plaything, so the world is the plaything of man. Such an attitude lessens the intense seriousness with which one relates to life. Life is seen "as a tragi-comedy not worth taking with deadly gravity, not yet to be despised as mere sport, but something to be taken as the eutrapelos takes it, with playful serenity and lightness of heart."[16]

The term eutrapelos is not Platonic, but Aristotelian. However, it seems to be quite appropriate for describing the synthesis of passion

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[15] Jaeger, op.cit., p. 253.

[16] Ardley, op.cit., p. 236.

and reason, seriousness and frivolity which Plato is describing. Literally, the work means "happy turning," which may indicate its etymological relation to the basic ideas of movement involved in the dance or at the basic root of paidia itself as have been mentioned. The term also means "without awkwardness," and may correctly suggest the "natural moves" of a child at play or an athlete. The person who possesses eutrapelia is capable of "striking the right note of mingled seriousness and gaiety, of bringing a lightness and gracefulness (equilibrium) of touch to every situation."[17] For Aristotle, the eutrapelos is the "golden mean" between the agroikos who is a rustic boor and too serious, and the bomolochus who is too frivolous.[18] The eutrapelos is characterized by schole which means a "leisured mind," which is in contrast to the more objectively intellectual understanding of mind as nous. This distinction parallels the distinction drawn by Plato in The Laws between "character" and the acquiring of "more, deeper knowledge."

The eutrapelos in Aristotle also possessed theoria which is the activity of inner contemplation. This is directly related to the divine in man, and man's ability to play as god. In The Nicomachean Ethics, a distinction is drawn between eudaimonia which is understood as "happiness," and makarios which is understood as "blessedness." Previous to Aristotle these terms had been used almost interchangeably and with little precision. However, he developed the idea the "blessedness" was superior to "happiness," and that it was ultimately reserved for an afterlife and the gods. Makarios is finally understood as the

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[17] Ibid., p. 229.

[18] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (Chicago, 1952), IV, p. viii.

epitomized state of the previously described theoria of contemplation. However, while man may not achieve a state of divine blessedness, makarios can be at least a limited potential as he realizes his ability at inner contemplation. Such activity is a primary attribute of the play consciousness, and the special experience of the eutrapelos-player is closely akin to the "blessedness" type of happiness which is seen as being divine. "The divine life is the life of theoria at its highest, a timeless activity of thinking, at once supreme activity and supreme rest."[19] There may be a possible implication at this point for understanding play as an activity that may involve strenuous activity, but at the same time renew or recreate the energy of the whole person; play is a self-sustaining and self-rejuvenating activity.

Gadamer also gives attention to this idea of theoria. He refers to the idea in the context of describing the ideal play-spectator who has achieved the state of "aesthetic non-differentiation" in regard to the play-experience. "Theoros means someone who takes part in a mission to a festival. Such a person has no other qualification and function than to be there."[20] Thus, theoria connotes a pure presence in which one is involved in an inter-play with something to the extent that all personal purposes are transcended. Here one would achieve the closest contact with anything which could be called "Truth." Thus, the "blessed" state of the gods which serves as an exemplar for man is theoria, "a true sharing, not something passive, but something active, namely

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[19] Ardley, op.cit., p. 233.

[20] Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, tr. by Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York, 1975), p. 111.

being totally involved and carried away by what one sees."[21]

At this point a statement about the relationship of rational involvement as distinguished from paidia involvement with an entity or an event can be made. It is not that reason and paidia are to be juxtaposed, but there is a transcending synthesis that is idealized although it is not often encountered. In the context of the discussion as it is now being presented, mere reason would be in contrast to paidia, a more passive involvement, even to the point of subject/object fragmentation. Reason is understood, in the present context, in a sense similar to that conceived by Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard believed that what his age lacked was not rationalistic reflective power, but passion; the capacity to be oneself, and to live in a real world. He would have likely represented the active/passion extreme and the passive/rationalistic extreme by Don Juan or Nero and Hegel respectively. A transcending synthesis could be considered a "healthy personality." This true sharing is synonymous with play in its most ideal state, the achievement of the synthesis of passion and reason, which for Plato is also the realization of culture (paideia).

For Plato this synthesis is the basic pre-requisite for dialectic which is, as Gadamer pointed out, one of the most superior examples of play. If this synthesis is not present, then dialectics is reduced to sophistic eristics. "In eristic we learn nothing, for our game has ceased to be a game (i.e., play), and has degenerated into a sordid

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[21] Ibid., p. 229. Usually, to "theorize" is understood in terms of a mind which transcends a situation examining and analyzing that situation. Within this understanding, it means to become involved in the "play of ideas" or "the play of Being."

a sordid competition."[22] Again, the distinction between paidia and agon is significant. Basic to this dialectic is an imaginative or speculative element which is the antithesis of a dogmatism which is involved in an "unambiguous assigning of a determination to a subject, a property to a given thing."[23] Gadamer stresses this sort of understanding in the concluding statements of Truth and Method: "a speculative person is someone who does not abandon himself directly to the tangibility of appearances or to the fixed determinateness of the meant, but who is able to reflect or — to put it in Hegelian terms — who sees that the 'in-itself' is a 'for-me'."[24] Such an understanding seems to add veracity to the idea basic to the dissertation that all activity is "as if activity."

In Gavin Ardley's essay on the role of play in Plato, there is described a "grave-merry" man who represents the playful synthesis being described by Plato. The following passage, which is related to The Republic, becomes decisive for Ardley's characterization:

> The serious and the playful are sisters. Through their association in contrariety, through the aporiai engendered thereby, the intelligence is set in motion. The proper handling of this ascending counterpoint is the key to education. The maintenance of the fugue is no easy matter: we so readily run after one contrary to the exclusion of the other. The comic side of life, if we become absorbed in it, is stultifying, because we have begun to treat it seriously in a closed order; we forget that the discords which provoke laughter get their point from something which is not discord. Conversely, the tragic side of life, if we become absorbed in it, is stultifying, because

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[22] Ardley, op.cit., p. 234.

[23] Gadamer, op.cit., p. 423.

[24] Ibid.

> we are beginning to take the world with too much gravity, as if human affairs were worth taking seriously as ends in themselves in a closed order; we forget that the tragic impasse is not an ultimate impasse.[25]

Within the context of the idea of counterpoint it is possible to mention what might be called "contrapuntal play," and in doing so to establish a paradigm for authentic human existence. The ancient Greek cosmologist, Anaximander, believed that the cosmos was originally one huge mass which he called "The Infinite (Aperion)." In his "creation account," within this "Infinite" there existed all of the contraries of cosmological experience (hot and cold, dry and moist, thick and thin, light and dark, etc.). As the contraries began to act upon one another, there was motion, and the entire cause and effect scheme of development was initiated. It might be possible to relate this movement of contraries to the primordial movement of play, and then speak of "the play of Creation." Anaximander's myth beautifully describes the activity of artistic creativity and the activity of authentic existence. Human existence is filled with contraries which generally can be categorized in terms of the comic and tragic, the playful and the serious. The authentically existing individual is a "contrapuntist" who artistically arranges these contraries. Neither extreme is acceptable by itself, and the exclusion of either extreme would be inauthentic, for the whole idea of "counterpoint" becomes meaningless if there is not a "point." There is the movement from confusing contraries, through the difficulty (aporiai) of meaningful organization, to the resolution or closure of a self-fulfilling whole in which the "genius at counterpoint"

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[25]Ardley, op.cit., p. 240.

emerges through and is sustained in the context of the "play of Being."

The term counterpoint is a musical term which is associated with Bach.[26] In what came to be known as the "Fugue," Bach took one melody, or "plain song," and added an accompaniment to it. However, this was not an accompaniment in the ordinary musical sense of adding notes on to a given melody in order to provide harmony. Rather, Bach took variations of the stated theme, which were modified according to pitch and rhythm, and introduced them as different parts or voices in the piece. Several melodies were deployed simultaneously in counterpoint to one another, but each was treated individually and with equal importance. There is a polyphonic effect which takes diversity, contrariety, and counterpoint, and produces a beautifully complex (Hartman would say "infinite" or "dense") work of art. The Fugue starts out simply, becomes extremely complicated, and then is resolved into a resounding climax whose sound communicates satisfaction, completeness, and

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[26] At this point the discussion is relying upon my wife's expertise in the Bach Fugue, and Milton Cross, Encyclopedia of the Great Composers and Their Music, I (Garden City, 1962), pp. 15-31. In a note that is not directly related to the dissertation at this point, but which is related at the point of the overall attempt at making a synthesis of work and play, technical knowledge and intrinsic knowledge, Cross concludes (p. 31) his discussion on Bach: "In whatever organ form he wrote Bach blended science with poetry, technique with emotion, virtuosity with grandeur and nobility of thought, and in a way nobody before him had approached. Too often, in the hands of Bach's predecessors, these forms had been technical exercises. But with Bach they became the channel through which he transmitted great and moving art." This is an excellent example of the intrinsic valuation of technique, and some sort of education curriculum which would promote this type of ability is the most basic need of contemporary technological society. Such education could be properly called paideia.

[27] "Counterpoint," The Compact Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary (New York, 1971).

wholeness; it conveys the "feeling" of the final pain before giving birth, the ecstatic moment before climax in sexual intercourse, the concrescence of Whitehead's actual entity/occasion, or the closure of creative "oneness." The "play of Being," in whose context human existence is lived out, is the polyphonic "back-and-forthness" of counterpoint and resolution.

A concluding comment can be made concerning Plato's understanding of play which is directly related to the quotation which introduced this chapter. As was said, the quotation as it appears in this dissertation is included in almost every discussion of play which has been encountered. However, this section of The Laws from which the quote is taken, there is a concern for more than play being a divine-like activity, and the expression that if one's play attitudes are as they should be such things as war and personal defense will take care of themselves. The passage is abruptly cut off, and the conclusion of the Athenian stranger, which is one sentence removed from the usual quoted ending, is left out. This is unfortunate, for the concluding statement is of utmost significance. The speaker says that the man of play (anthropaidian or eutrapelos), in order to live the most authentic lifestyle, "will go forward in the spirit of the poet."[28] Here, Plato is stating the central thesis of this entire dissertation. The ultimate form of play, the model of all other forms of play, is that imaginative creativity of the artist. To live in the "spirit of the poet" is synonymous with the playful activity of intrinsic valuation that this dissertation is relating to the merger of ethics and aesthetics, and is

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[28] Plato, op.cit., vii, p. 803.

designating as the epitomizing lifestyle of human being.

CHAPTER V

SCHILLER'S AESTHETIC EDUCATION OF MAN

Schiller's ideas on play follow directly from the fundamental idea of Plato that play activity is the synthesis of man's rational and passionate natures. For Schiller, play is related to a proper harmonization of being and becoming as it expresses itself in man's "need"[1] to restrict and organize his energies, and to discharge those same energies. Play is an intermediary position "between a purely sensuous, animal nature, and a formal or purely rational nature."[2] Play serves two fundamental purposes. First, it allows men to be successful in what Schiller calls the "difficult art of living"[3] by enabling him to have a playful rather than ultimately frustrating, serious mimesis (imitation) of such phenomena as Ideals, Laws, God, Duty, Beauty, and Truth. Second, play for Schiller related more to the "whole man," which implied that there was something more to man than the rational being epitomized by the Enlightenment. As will be seen, he criticized the Enlightenment for "fragmenting" man. His critique of the excessive emphasis on reason is not unlike the criticisms directed in the contemporary world at the excesses of the technological society. According to Schiller: "man plays only when he is in the full sense of the word

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[1] David L. Miller, God and Games: Toward a Theology of Play (New York, 1970), p. 114.

[2] Hilde Hein, "Play as an Aesthetic Concept," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XXVII (1968-1969), p. 1.

[3] Miller, op.cit., p. 114.

man, and he is wholly man only when he is playing."[4]

The implication in this statement that there are degrees of humanity lends itself well to the discussion of intrinsic and extrinsic value. This understanding has been recognized by several commentators. As regards the critique by Schiller of the Enlightenment's emphasis on reason, the following quotation is decisive:

> The play impulse avoids the extremes of explaining the world exclusively in terms of sense or reason, not by addressing itself to an extrinsic reality by which we are wholly determined, but by taking as its object a semblance (Schein) of reality which we freely construct ourselves.[5]

In her Feeling and Form, Susanne K. Langer notes the importance of Schiller's concept of Schein. Schein is that which "liberates perception — from all practical purposes, and lets the mind dwell on the sheer appearance of things."[6] This liberation is the epitome of freedom, and the "sheer appearance" is that of the entity's being experienced in such a way that its truth unveils itself. Langer clearly emphasizes that Schein is in no way make-believe, but the experience of that which transcends any teleological connotations.

> It is a curious fact that people who spend their lives in closest contact with the arts — artists to whom the appreciation of beauty is certainly a continual and "immediate" experience — do not assume and cultivate the "aesthetic attitude." To them, the

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[4] Ibid., p. 118.

[5] Julius Elias, "Friedrich Schiller," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, VII (New York, 1967), p. 313. Herta Pauly in "Aesthetic Decadence Today Viewed in Terms of Schiller's Three Impulses," The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XXXI (Spring, 1973), p. 366, relates Schein to what she calls a "virtual" mode of existence which is the most authentic mode of existence for man.

[6] Susanne K. Langer, Feeling and Form (New York, 1961), p. 49.

> artistic value of a work is its most obvious property. They see it naturally and constantly; they do not have to make themselves, first, unaware of the rest of the world.[7]

Langer's point is closely related to the conclusions of Gadamer's hermeneutics; one does not first have to make a purging of present prejudices. There is rather an "aesthetic non-differentiation" which presupposes one's part in an ongoing tradition.

Therefore, Schiller opts for an "Aesthetic Education" which may be little different from the Greek paideia. Play is the primary constituent element of that education, and not only does it have an aesthetic dimension but also a very specifically moral implication,

> Play has both intrinsic and extrinsic value. The activity itself is pleasurable and enjoyed for its own sake. But in so far as it is conducive to the liberation of the human spirit . . ., it contributes to the moral enhancement of the individual and society.[8]

On the extrinsic level play is understood to be of pedagogical importance; the activity of play is the "apprenticeship"[9] level of aesthetical/ethical or human existence — the highest level is best understood as a more mature form of play. One might even anticipate that the paradigm for authentically human existence is not the exemplar of rationality, but the artist and poet.

The word aesthetic is clearly delineated by Schiller. An experience may be considered from four perspectives: a physical, which relates to its sensous condition; a logical, which relates to its rational,

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[7] Ibid., p. 45.

[8] Hein, op.cit., p. 1.

[9] Ibid.

knowledge-giving dimension; a moral, which has to do with the choices or volition which it motivates; and, an aesthetic, which is a relation "to the totality of our various powers, without being a specific object for any single one of them."[10] The following illustration precludes a description of the basic aim of "Aesthetic Education":

> A man may be pleasant to us through his readiness to oblige; he can cause us to think by means of his transactions; he can instill respect into us by his high moral standards; but finally, independently of all these and without our taking into consideration any law or any design in our own judgement of him, but simply contemplating him, simply by his manifesting himself — he can please us. In this last-named character we are judging him aesthetically. So there is an education for health, an education for understanding, an education for morality, and an education for taste and beauty. This last has as its aim the whole of our sensuous and intellectual powers in the fullest possible harmony.[11]

The movement to this point, which is a prelude to Nietzsche, Heidegger, and even Hartman, is the basic content of Schiller's Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man. The book begins with the motivation to attack the Enlightenment. Schiller believed that it had prompted a one-sided and thus fragmented development of humanity. While its leading figures did recognize the importance of happiness, their thought had a decided attraction for only that which exhibited as a primary criterion rationality. Schiller's "Aesthetic Education" would hopefully overcome this. In his initial critique, he was motivated by a concern which in retrospect was prophetic, "the alienation of the

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[10] Friedrich Schiller, Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man (New York, 1974), p. 99.

[11] Ibid.

individual in an age of specialization."[12]

In order to fully understand Schiller's Letters, one must note how it moves away from the Enlightenment idea that objective beauty in a work of art was a property of an object (recall the discussion on intrinsic value as a property), and that to possess universal significance a work of art must, by rational standards, imitate nature. In coming to his split with rationalism, Schiller is significantly influenced by Goethe. In 1794, Goethe explained his theory of plant morphology to Schiller, and in doing so caused Schiller to have the realization that he (Goethe) "far from being solely dependent upon what nature pleases to give, in fact transmuted the content of his experience, supplying the human element of freedom in the transformation of mere perception into a structured whole."[13] Such "transmutation" is directly related to Hartman's description of intrinsic valuation, and the new creation of a personal Gestalt or structured whole which is unveiled in it. This comparison is not merely speculative; Hartman very specifically states[14] that Schiller's Schein is his (Hartman's) intrinsic Gestalt. It is also, according to Hartman, Ortega y Gasset's "irreality" which is not to be understood as less than reality, but the epitome of reality.

For Schiller, the influence of Goethe's explanation moves his thought radically beyond any purely rationalistic understanding of the aesthetic experience. Man's role is now heightened, and as with

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[12] Elias, op.cit., p. 313.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Hartman, Structure of Value, op.cit., p. 353, n39.

Gadamer, it now becomes possible to understand transmutation in terms of the transition of all forms of "truth" through that "truth's" expression and interpretation in human being. Against Kant, Schiller can say that there is no strict uniformity of nature or the human mind. Schiller's concept is extended beyond aesthetics to involve all forms of explanation. With the extention of his thought to philosophical, scientific, and religious explanation, aesthetics not only can be seen to merge with ethics, but aesthetics becomes the mode of epistemology per se; this is parallel to Gadamer's understanding of play as the mode of Being and understanding itself. "Thus, Schiller's original effort to show that aesthetic judgement is as objective as cognitive and moral judgements results in his revolutionary conclusion that 'cognitive and moral judgements are, indeed, as objective (i.e., as subjective) as aesthetic judgements'."[15] One might even conclude that this shift in Schiller is similar to the conclusions drawn by this discussion about Hartman; in his work in The Structure of Value there is the attempt to rationalize and scientifically objectify moral judgements, but in his further efforts to clarify what he means by intrinsic valuation, there is a movement to a higher level of "rationality" which is the aesthetic experience of that intrinsic valuation. Schiller and Hartman would not say that they had reached a point at which objectivity and rationality reverted back to a lesser level of subjectivity, but that rationality had been raised to a level of "beyond the rational" which did more justice to the true nature of human being than the purely rational was capable of providing. Here again is the rationale for insisting in

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[15]Elias, op.cit., p. 314.

the Hartman discussion that his "science of value" was not tantamount to an Orwellian perversion of morality, truth, and ethics. Schiller's "Fifteenth Letter" is comparable to Hartman's "The Value Structure of Creativity"; each piece is quantitatively only a minority of the work of the men, but may be most significant for understanding the final positions of their thoughts.

The last writings of Schiller present a movement beyond philosophy itself, in much the same manner that Heidegger sees Nietzsche as the end of philosophy and his own work as moving beyond the death of metaphysics. Schiller's final statements seek to move to a more fundamental level of the unveiling of truth than that which can be found in the metaphysical formulations of the philosopher. The preeminent role, as in the later work of Hartman, is not that of the philosopher, but that of the poet. In an essay entitled "Uber das Erhabene" he claims that the fundamental epistemological principle is the "uncomprehensibility of nature."[16] The implication of proceeding from this premise is as follows:

> If we accept the notion that the external world is strictly unknowable ("natural necessity has entered into no compact with man"), then the status of our hypotheses about the world is that of fictions, inventions, and heuristic devices to answer the questions to which we need answers in order to live; but the validity of these hypotheses will depend upon human criteria of factualness, logic, and plausibility and not upon their agreement with an extrinsic nature.[17]

This is precisely Gadamer's involvement with the play of ideas, or the

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[16] Ibid.

[17] Ibid.

play of Being. To be involved in this play as a creative artist of "as if activity," which is perfectly described in the preceeding quote, is the highest expression of man's humanity, and within it man realizes the ultimate expression of his freedom.

> The philosopher, Schiller has told us, is a caricature compared with the poet, who is the true human being: the philosopher seeks only to make explicit and justify what he already believes, while the poet is not bound by his original endowment of temperment or the accident of environment. World views change, and they are changed by men able to liberate precisely because world views are made, not given, by the makers, the poets, and all men, when they exercise this function and are free.[18]

This quote is somewhat simplistic and rhetorical for not all poets or philosophers would fit into this characterization. However, the authentically existing individual must be capable of moving beyond the point of simply justifying his own belief system to the point of having an openness to existence. In this openness, both the individual and the situation which he encounters will be open to the kind of change which precludes "new creations." Again, the emphasis on the ability to create world views and to come to an "image" of reality with which one can live is of utmost significance.

From this overview of Schiller's philosophy of play, it will now be possible to make a more precise investigation of the Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man. This discussion will be primarily concerned with letters four, six, seven, nine, eleven through fifteen, and seventeen through twenty-seven. It should again be kept in mind that the Greek paideia meant education, especially an education in which aesthetics

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[18] Ibid.

was the key element for attaining arete or virtuosity at living. At the basis of Schiller's "Aesthetic Education" and the Greek paideia is the fundamental element of play, paidia.

Schiller's Letters are written to the Danish Prince, Friedrich Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sugustenburg, who had previously befriended him, and was a political figure very sympathetic to the aesthetic dimension. Schiller makes his discussion on education, with Prince Friedrich in mind, in the political context of the responsibility of the State to Man. Man is described as being mutually obligated by the imperatives of Reason, which demands unity, and Nature, which demands multiplicity, and the Ideal State must be responsible to both of these obligations. The usual political experience, which Schiller finds to be inadequate, is a rational suppression by moral law of variety in order to insure unity. Lewis H. Lapham, editor of Harper's Magazine, describes the epistemological prejudice of contemporary society in the United States:

> God forbid that anybody should make judgements that cannot be measured by statistics or by a summary of a man's votes on the standard political issues. Respectable opinion in the United States refuses to admit into evidence anything that borrows too heavily from art or psychology. The illuminations of history and literature count for nothing because they presuppose the seriousness (perhaps "playfulness" would be better) of the imagination. The rules of democracy tend to place the imagination in the category of special privilege. It cannot be accepted as valid currency because no one can know that it is not counterfeit.[19]

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[19] Lewis H. Lapham, "The King's Pleasure," Harper's Magazine (November, 1975), p. 17.

The Ideal State, in contrast, will "respect not merely the objective and the generic, but also the subjective and specific character of its individuals."[20] This "specific character" is Hartman's "uniqueness," and the major responsibility of government is to its preservation. Aesthetic education will promote both Reason and Nature, and be conducive to the enhancement of a "Whole Man" who is in harmony with himself. "If the inner man is at one with himself, he will preserve his idiosyncrasy; the triumphant form rests equidistant from uniformity and confusion."[21] Within the Ideal State, almost as in Plato's Republic, there is an ideal ruler, "the statesman-artist," who Schiller compares to a fine artist. The fine artist, in contrast to his mechanical counterpart, defers to and respects the material with which he is working, giving its "truth" an opportunity to contribute to the final object of art; the statesman-artist respects the idiosyncrasy and personality of the individual.

Ancient Greek society is seen as a paradigm of the type of government Schiller is idealizing. There is a mutual inclusiveness of Reason, now called "form," and Nature, now called "content." There is a uniting of "the manliness of reason and the youthfulness of fantasy in a splendid humanity."[22] Schiller sees his Cartesian-inspired age as standing in stark contrast to this ideal. Because of the self-detachment and self-imposed isolation of the mental and rational faculties, only one dimension of man is developed, "while the rest, like a stunted plant,

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[20] Schiller, op.cit., p. 32.

[21] Ibid., pp. 33-34.

[22] Ibid., p. 38.

shows only a feeble vestige of its nature; individual concrete life is extinguished, in order that the abstract life of the whole may prolong its sorry existence."[23] Man is understood only as a function, and is respected for either a good memory, a tabulating intellect (Heidegger's calculative thinking), or mechanical skill. The technological society (though Schiller only knows this reality prophetically) has its own definition of "spirit" and "character"; understood as correlates of Reason, these other-than-rational attributes are manifested as "a law-abiding demeanor,"[24] or a "patriotism" which is subservient to the presuppositions of Reason. The following, summary remark could have been written in the 1970s as easily as it was written in the 1790s:

> As soon as enlarged experience and more precise speculation make necessary a sharper division of the sciences on the one hand, and on the other, the more intricate machinery of States make necessary a more rigorous dissociation of ranks and occupations, the essential bond of human nature is torn apart, and a ruinous conflict sets its harmonious powers at variance.[25]

By the eleventh letter, the political element is less evident, and Schiller has become more philosophical. At the same time, he begins more closely to explicate his understanding of the dual nature of human being. His terminology slightly modifies again, and he introduces the eleventh letter by saying that at the limits of abstraction that the most definitive statement that can be made about Man is that he is "something that endures and something that perpetually changes."[26] The

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[23] Ibid., pp. 38 and 41.

[24] Ibid., p. 41.

[25] Ibid., p. 39.

[26] Ibid., p. 60.

enduring element is now called "person," and the changing element "condition." Freedom relates to person, and time to condition. Then, Schiller makes this striking statement: "Only as Man alters does he exist; only as he remains unalterable does he exist. Man conceived in his perfection would accordingly be the constant unity which amidst the tides of change remain eternally the same."[27] This key point precludes Nietzsche's understanding of how the Superman by play affirms his own being and creates his own world in the midst of the "eternal recurrence of the same."

> Hence flow two contrary demands upon Man, the two fundamental laws of his sensous-rational nature. The first insists upon absolute reality: he is to turn everything that is mere form into world, and realize all his potentialities; the second insists upon absolute formality: he is to eradicate in himself everything that is merely world, and produce harmony in all its mutations; in other words, he is to turn outward everything internal, and give form to everything external.[28]

Schiller thus discusses a "sensuous impulse" and a "formal impulse" which respectively correspond to his physical and rational natures. In order to move beyond self-contradictoriness of these elements to harmony and unity of the whole person, it appears that a third impulse is needed. However, in his first consideration Schiller denies the possible existence of any third impulse; with the sensuous and the rational, he has exhausted all possibilities. He can only say that within any governmental entity or political establishment that there is the intrinsic, qualitative dimension of culture. Culture is defined as that

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[27] Ibid., p. 62.

[28] Ibid., pp. 63-64.

which inclusively enhances both extremes, and maintains with security the boundaries of each. At this point, one returns to the ideal of "contrapuntal play" mentioned at the end of the chapter on Plato. The idea of culture as paideia informed by paidia was not known by Schiller, but his independent movement to an acceptable third impulse makes what the Greeks had done even more efficacious.

A third impulse is discovered which, at one and the same time, respects the extremes and unifies them as one type of harmonizing activity. Schiller posits a "play impulse" through which there is an extinction of time in time, the reconciliation of being and becoming, and the marriage of variation with identity. His fifteenth letter is the most important in regard to his understanding of play. The fundamental distinctions of the chapter take the following form: (1) the object of the sense impulse is life; (2) the object of the rational impulse is shape; (3) the object of the play impulse is living shape! "Living shape" is then seen as being tantamount to Beauty, "the union of reality with form, of contingency with necessity, of passivity with freedom."[29] He adds that this "play impulse" is that which "fulfills the conception of humanity."[30] "Living shape" occurs when, out of the interaction of the objective world and human rationality, there is a new relation which is experienced to one's self and one's world; when the properties of world and self are experienced in a new arrangement which has not been previously encountered. The entire experience becomes qualitative in the sense that there is realized a property of

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[29] Ibid., p. 77.

[30] Ibid.

the properties of the world/self event which cannot be entirely explained or enumerated in terms of that which has preceeded it. "Living shape" is a dynamic "forming" which constitutes the level of intrinsic value experience and the "play of Being." In what may be the key statement of the entire writing, Schiller makes the following analysis of Beauty:

> Beauty is neither extended to cover the whole realm of living things, nor merely confined within this realm. A block of marble, therefore, although it is and remains lifeless, can nevertheless become living shape through the architect and sculptor; a human being, although he lives and has shape, is far from from being on that account a living shape. That would require his shape to be life, and his life shape. So long as we only think about his shape, it is lifeless and a mere abstraction; so long as we only feel his life, it is shapeless, mere impression. Only as the form of something lives in our sensation, and its life takes form in our understanding, is it living shape, and this will everywhere be the case where we judge it to be beautiful.[31]

Schiller is at this point complementing the thesis of the dissertation as a whole by saying that human being is somehow more than the physical, bodily form, and that seemingly internal dimension of rationality. Not only is there an active reciprocity between the two elements, but in the movement of reciprocity there is a transition to another dimension of reality that is not simply body, mind, soul, or any other single or group of entities.

Schiller feels the need to make at least one clarification, and in doing so makes a statement quite consonant with this dissertation. He insists that the play impulse is not to be confused with "mere games."[32]

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[31] Ibid., p. 76.

[32] Ibid., p. 78f.

Most games are concerned with either some sort of material objectivity such as money, fame, or honor, or they are taken too seriously such as when rationality manifests intself in a desire for perfection or winning as an end-in-itself. Man is not serious with Beauty, as long as it is co-extensive with play; when it is not, it is not Beauty. For example, the beautiful realization of form and idea in the graceful movements (i.e., the play) of an olympic figure skater transcends any consideration of gold medals, nationalistic victories, or judges' marks: "the real prize is doing it, and knowing that you did it" according to one such skater. Schiller suggested that the ideal of the play impulse should be set before man in all of his games. Finally, in the fifteenth letter, he returns to the Greeks finding the play impulse embodied in their culture (finding paidia embodied in paideia). The only mistake that he sees that the Greeks made was in transfering the ideal of the play impulse and its realization to Olympus as an activity reserved for the gods, when it should have become actualized on Earth as the one activity which uniquely advanced human being. He even goes so far as to say that the realization of the play impulse could be equated with or described as the "Divine" in man. To be Divine, to be fully human, to be Man — is to play. This seems precisely to be the point of Plato when he said that man as the "plaything of God" is the highest perfection that a creature can attain.

The remainder of the Letters is a description of Beauty and its power. It cannot be understood by reason or by physical feeling, but can be experienced in its totality through play. Play is thus, as Gadamer said, seen as a mode of understanding. Schiller goes on to say that it is impossible to "see" Beauty, as it can only be "perceived."

This is the part of the discussion that involves the recognition of the above described "appearance" (Schein). This recognition occurs in a "leap"[33] which transcends the rational. Hartman uses the same terminology[34] to describe the movement from analytic to synthetic thinking, and the movement from one value dimension to another. Beauty is also seen as a language more fundamental than reason or feeling, and Beauty is the locus of "Truth"; "Truth" arises in and through Beauty. Finally, Schiller returns to the political dimension, claiming that the adherance to the implied guidelines of an "Aesthetic Education" will result in true happiness like that of the "finely tuned soul," "the pure Church," or "the pure Republic." Schiller's discussion can only be applauded, especially in light of his almost prophetic analysis of contemporary culture (the use of the word culture is a misnomer), and the way in which his philosophy probes the interface between philosophy and poetry, and reason as it relates to "the whole man" in human being.

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[33] Ibid., p. 126. Also see p. 134.

[34] Hartman, op.cit., pp. 82 and 223. An excellent discussion of this sort of "leap" is found in the idea of a "paradigm change" presented by Thomas S. Kuhn in his famous The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, 1962). Hartman would consider the previously described movement from Aristotle to Galileo on the understanding of motion to be such a "leap." This is an "aha experience" in which there is a "sudden recognition of the infinite unity of the whole phenomenal field" (Hartman, op.cit., p. 9). Schiller uses a similar understanding of infinity in his discussion of Beauty in Letters, op.cit., pp. 90, 101, and 103.

CHAPTER VI

NIETZSCHE'S CONCEPT OF PLAY

The major contribution of Nietzsche to the discussion of play is found in the first discourse of Thus Spake Zarathustra entitled "Of the Three Metamorphoses." The significance of the concept lies in the way in which it unites the major theses of "The Will to Power," and "the Eternal Recurrence of the Same." The concept of child's play, as the third and final stage of metamorphosis in Nietzsche's scheme, may be of such significance as to ascribe to it the stature of being the key idea for understanding the whole of Zarathustra.

Most Nietzsche scholarship has recognized the primary elements of Zarathustra, the superman and eternal recurrence. One of the most excellent examples is Heidegger's "Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" in which he notes a passage from "The Convalescent" which reads: "You (Zarathustra) are the teacher of the eternal recurrence . . . ." and another passage from the Preface in which Nietzsche writes: "I (Zarathustra) teach you the superman."[1] However, the relation of these elements has not been found to be made clear, if even suggested, in any work except that of Heidegger who readily admits that "it is not immediately apparent whether what he (Nietzsche-Zarathustra) teaches belongs together and in what manner."[2] For this reason, the concept of play is

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[1]Martin Heidegger, "Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?" Review of Metaphysics, XX (1967), p. 413.

[2]Ibid. Heidegger's understanding of this relationship is given

of paramount significance; it is in play that these two ideas come together, after the manner of the play of a child. It should be made clear that Nietzsche is using the literary vehicle of analogy; child's play refers to an attitude, not a stage of physical development. Admittedly, eternal recurrence is Nietzsche's "most abysmal thought," perhaps remaining an enigma even to Nietzsche. However, that does not mean that one necessarily has to say with Heidegger that "we are all the less free to think that we can solve the enigma,"[3] or to simply say that it is either a kind of mysticism "which has no place before thought," or the ancient, cyclical view of Heraclitus concerning which "the present age should teach us to know better."[4] The dissertation must now move to substantiate the claim about the concept of child's play, and the understanding that it brings to Nietzsche's work.

The substantiation can begin within the context of describing the situation in which this section of Zarathustra was written. In a letter to Georg Brandes, Nietzsche confesses that the ten day period

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later in his article. While his metaphysical language can definitely be directly related to the findings of this discussion, they tend to make Nietzsche's relationships even more vague than it is; the discussion of the relationship in terms of the concept of play gives much more clarity. Heidegger says: "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra? We can answer in a formula: Zarathustra is the teacher of the eternal recurrence of the same and the teacher of the superman. But now we see, perhaps we see even more clearly beyond the bare formula: Zarathustra is not a teacher who teaches two different things. Zarathustra teaches the superman because he is the teacher of the eternal recurrence. But conversely, as well, Zarathustra teaches of the eternal recurrence because he is the teacher of the superman. Both doctrines belong together in a circle. By its circling, the doctrine accords with what is, the circle which constitutes the Being of beings, that is, the permanent within Becoming." (Cp. p. 426.)

[3] Ibid., p. 430.

[4] Ibid., 431.

in which the first section of Zarathustra came forth, was a moment in which he was "absolutely inspired."[5] The first writing is like a birth which takes place after an eighteen month period of gestation; Nietzsche says that he is like a "female elephant"[6] who carries her young an equal period of time. What had begun in a visionary experience on a mountain path in Sils Maria in the Swiss Engadine in August, 1881, reaches its poetic climax in February, 1883, following the dissolution of his relationship with Lou Salome, when he is just recovering from a bout with his sister and his own ill health, and at a time which coincided with the death of his friend Richard Wagner. To think of Zarathustra, and especially of this first section with its leading discourse "Of the Three Metamorphoses," in terms of Heidegger's truth as aletheia and his concept of "das Anwesen des Anwesenden" which was noted in the first part of the dissertation is quite appropriate. Zarathustra was Nietzsche's "most emancipated offspring"[7]; his later writings are but an expansion of the "event of truth" which is communicated in these discourses. "For everyone," Nietzsche says of this particular writing, "there comes a time when he must pour out his heart."[8]

In the letters which are written in this specific period of creative activity, much more than any of Nietzsche's other letters, he makes mention of play in regard to his own personal activities. The following

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[5]Peter Fuss and Henry Shapiro (eds. and trs.), Nietzsche: A Self-Portrait from His Letters (Cambridge, 1971), p. 112.

[6]James Gutmann, "The 'Tremendous Moment' of Nietzsche's Vision," The Journal of Philosophy, LI (1954), p. 839.

[7]Fuss and Shapiro, op.cit., p. 71.

[8]Ibid., p. 74.

excerpts, written during this period of time, should make the point quite clear:

> (to Ruhde concerning Zarathustra in its entirety) ". . . I fancy that I've now brought the German language to perfection. After Luther and Goethe there was still a third step to be taken . . . . My style is a dance; it plays with all sorts of symmetries, only to leap over and scoff at them.[9]
>
> (to Brandes in a mood of exultation) "I feel so relaxed, so strong, so cheerful, I find myself pinning a donkey's tail on the most serious things.[10]

Finally, he refers to Zarathustra in a letter to Overbeck as "my latest folly"[11] (a word which will be given greater significance below), and summarizes his monumental effort to Carl Fuchs by saying that "the most unheard of tasks are child's play."[12] During this period, he mentions two thoughts that he is giving attention, which seem quite out of context for the usual, melancholy conception of Nietzsche; he may return to Naumberg and become a gardener, and he is setting aside money to enable him to set up an abode on a small island where he can "live, work, and play."[13]

In his sister's introduction to Zarathustra which accompanies some translations, there is a comment which seems appropriate to the discussion at this point. Elizabeth Nietzsche is specifically describing the Superman, but it would be difficult to argue that she does not also have her brother in mind.

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[9] Ibid., pp. 77-78.

[10] Ibid., p. 117.

[11] Ibid., p. 73.

[12] Ibid., p. 137.

[13] Ibid., p. 14.

> The Superman has a "great healthiness." He is stronger, tougher, bolder, merrier — a spirit who plays naïvely with everything that has hitherto been called holy, good, intangible, and divine.[14]

Ancient Greek society is of utmost significance to Nietzsche in regard to play. For him,[15] only the Greeks could have had an idea such as this because of the way that the contest or the game played such an important role in their culture. From the gymnasia to the palaestra, they were play centered. Heraclitus' ideas on becoming form a fundamental part of Nietzsche's play framework. Although Heraclitus never mentions the word play, Nietzsche reads that implication into his thought.[16] Heraclitus may have inspired Nietzsche's thoughts more in action than in word, as it is reported[17] as a typical example of his style of life that when called upon to draft a set of laws for a confused Ephesus, that he retired to the temple and played knuckle-ball with the children.

Before proceeding to the text of "The Three Metamorphoses," a comment can be made about the content of Nietzsche's visionary experience

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[14]Friedrich Nietzsche, The Philosophy of Nietzsche (New York, 1927), p. xxiii.

[15]Friedrich Nietzsche, Early Greek Philosophy, ed. by Oscar Levy, (New York, 1924), pp. 101-102.

[16]Nietzsche says of Heraclitus and of play in one of the most significant passages which can be related to this study: "A man among men, Heraclitus was incredible; and though he was seen paying attention to the play of noisy children, even then he was reflecting upon what never man thought of on such an occasion: the play of the great world child, Zeus. That which he beheld, the doctrine of the Law in the Becoming, and the play in the Necessity, must henceforth be beheld eternally, he has raised the curtain of this greatest stage-play" (Ibid., p. 114).

[17]Phillip Wheelwright (ed.), The Presocratics (New York, 1966), p. 81.

in the Alps near Sils Maria. The idea of eternal recurrence had been dealt with before Nietzsche, and therefore it is not a claim to conceptual originality that marks his experience as being decisive. It is the full realization of eternal recurrence "as a challenge"[18] which confronts him as decisive, and he does not submit in despair to it or simply intellectually accept and philosophize about it; he embraces it with the attitude of the Amor Fait. It is the joy-full, play-full "response of the heroic temperament (i.e., the Superman) to the ultimate challenge of reality."[19] Here, will to power "embraces" the eternal recurrence of the same in play, and by playing instead of despairing, the "embrace" is a positive action, a "Yes-saying" affirmation of existence.

With the preliminary remarks in mind, the text will now be considered. Nietzsche introduces the first discourse of Zarathustra by describing three stages of the spirit's development: "how the spirit shall become a camel, and the camel a lion, and the lion at last a child."[20] These levels can be variously characterized. The camel can be seen as an example of the "herd" morality which could be understood in terms of unconditional obedience to traditional rules, laws, and values. Bearing down upon the camel, to use the figurative language of Nietzsche, is the "great dragon" of "Thou shalt!" This level is most compelling as it offers the security of the herd and its average,

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[18] Gutmann, op.cit., p. 840.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra (New York, 1971), p. 54.

majority opinions.

The next level, "the lion," represents what might be called the "penultimate" superman. The lion stands over against the solitary "desert" of the "herd" morality, and becomes a master who says "I will!" There is a process of negation in which the old values are transcended, and a new freedom from value and normative repression is experienced. However, and here is a key element, simply because one has negated the old laws, and stands in the context of a newly secured freedom, does not mean that new values can be created. For Nietzshce, "even the lion is incapable of this."[21] To create new values is not the key to solving the riddles of existence; new values so easily become new dogmatisms, "I will" regressing to "Thou shalt!" Nietzsche is thus ready for the central question of the entire discourse:

> But, tell me, my brothers, what can the child do that even the lion cannot? Why must the preying lion still become a child?[22]

The answer to Nietzsche's own question is that the child possesses certain attributes which allow it to face the greatest challenge of all, eternal recurrence, a challenge by which, if met, the penultimate superman can be transcended. Nietzsche mentions some of these attributes: "innocence, forgetfulness, a new beginning, a sport, a self-propelling wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes."[23] These attributes of a child playing, and their significance for the ultimate superman, will be discussed more precisely below. In describing these attributes, he

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[21] Ibid., p. 55.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

is coming to the point of the analogy of child's play, a point which has applicability to the attitude of "childlikeness."

These attributes are both the material and the methodology by which the affirmative response of "playing" can be made to existence. By saying that it is needed "for the sport (or, play — das Spiel) of creation,"[24] Nietzsche is refering to the eternal recurrence of the same. Play is thus seen as applying to both the Becoming of existence, and the Being of the superman-self which takes the affirmative stand within that Becoming. As will be seen, this stance will also be opposed to that Becoming. It seems that Nietzsche is saying that if one is to make any kind of affirmative stand within the Becoming of eternal recurrence in such a way that his Being will be confirmed, that he must learn to play the same game as the eternal Becoming, and in some degree beat eternal Becoming at it own game!

In most treatments of the superman, it seems that all one has to do to be a superman is to negate the old values. However, eternal recurrence is completely neglected in such an understanding as this. Only in the three stage metamorphosis, which takes into account the concept of the child at play, are the two ideas of superman and recurrence brought together. After the affirmation is made, the spirit can be said to "will its own will,'[25] and "win its own world."[26] The word of this ultimate level is "I am," which Nietzsche identifies in The

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[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

Will to Power[27] with the gods of the Greeks to whom he was significantly indebted in regard to his ideas of play as seen above in the words about Heraclitus. At this point a number of attributes of a child's playing will be offered. The attributes that Nietzsche mentioned will be discussed. In addition, a number of other attributes will be considered which elucidate Nietzsche's distinction. It will be recalled that it is the possession and practice of these attributes that allow the affirmative embracing of the greatest threat to superman-hood, eternal recurrence.

Experimentation

The child at play has a purely experimental relationship to his existence. If one were to speak of a "method" in Zarathustra, this would be it. Opinions, concepts, values, and rationalizations are not required as presuppositions, nor are they a desired result. Especially, any syndrome of future progress is simply not operative. The primary concern is to make as many experiments in the present as is possible. This experimentation can be described as a game in which disclosure of the world takes place on a preconceptual level of apprehension. Experimentation is a non-derivative event in which a pure, aletheia experiencing stands in stark contrast to any calculative categorization. There is an emancipation within this experimentation which gives the child at play an experience of freedom from all old values and conceptual frameworks (there are no laws of necessity in the purest form of

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[27]Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power (New York, 1967), p. 495. Also note paragraph 797, p. 419 that a relationship is drawn between play and God. "Play, the useless — as the ideal of him who is overfull of strength, as 'childlike.' The 'childlikeness' of God, pais paizon (a child playing)."

child's play), and within this freedom he can play creating his own new values; and even more precisely, living beyond any value or level of valuation. The child pretends, or "makes believe"; the "as if activity " of play is tantamount to making beliefs, and this is what Nietzsche describes in regard to the Superman as "the transvaluation of values." When the play of the child can be seen beyond the analogy in a more self-conscious, adult form, as with the artist, there is the "impression with the lack of correspondence between his own (experimenting) and the customary interpretation, and a refusal to sacrifice his perception to the stereotyped idols of society."[28] The child, or the artist, as he experiments is not "confined by convention,"[29] and the child's playing becomes a manifestation of "unmitigated subjectivity"[30] in which the totality of the child's existence is involved.

Unity

Within the context of the play of the child, it is possible to speak of two types of unity: a unity of experience in which everything is interconnected in a "superfluity"[31] of relations; and, a unity with experience in which the child achieves a penultimate oneness with his

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[28]Walter Kaufmann, "Art, Tradition, and Truth," Partisan Review, XX (1955), p. 11.

[29]Ibid., p. 26. In another writing entitled Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist (Princeton, 1950), pp. 64ff, Kaufman says that in taking a stand against convention that Nietzsche is opposing a Hegel-like system building. Instead of a systematic science, he calls for a "gay science" of fearless experimentation. Regardless of the common claim in Germany during his lifetime, a system as such held no special claim to truth for Nietzsche.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Sam Keen, Apology For Wonder (New York, 1969), p. 48.

world. Piaget describes the first type of unity:

> . . . the spontaneous tendency on the part of the child to take things in by means of a comprehensive (i.e., synthetic, preconceptual) act of perception instead of by detection of details, to find immediately and without analysis . . . and in a word, it is the tendency to connect everything with everything else.[32]

The "world syncretism" described here is joined by the child becoming, to a degree, one with the experience; the child (the player) and the world (as game) become one in play-fulness. At this level of preconceptual apprehension, it is not possible to speak of a dissociation of thought and emotion; the experience of unity is far removed from the asking of questions such as "what happened?"[33]

At this point one may be correctly reminded of Plato's understanding of culture or paideia as the harmony which is established, or the synthesis which is attained, by the harmonization of passion and reason. At the very basis of Greek culture, at the "birth" of its tragic outlook on the interplay of the Apollonian and Dionysian tendencies which constituted a significant part of Nietzsche's own philosophy, there is the attempt at this sort of synthesis. Nikos Kazantzakis, whose Zorba is created out of the same sources as Nietzsche's Zarathustra, describes the primeval Greek condition in the following manner:

> New forces are rising from the East, new forces are rising from the West, and Greece, caught as always the two colliding impulses, once more becomes a whirlpool. Following the tradition of reason and impirical inquiry, the West bounds forward to conquer the world; the East, prodded by frightening subconscious forces, likewise darts forward to conquer the world. Greece is placed in the middle; it is the

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[32] Ibid.

[33] Kaufmann, op.cit., p. 11.

> world's geographical and spiritual crossroad. Once again its duty is to reconcile these two monstrous impulses by finding a synthesis.[34]

There is not separation of the possible and the impossible, but rather an "incarnation of dissonance,"[35] but it is dissonance which is made beautiful by its playful arrangement in counterpoint.

Within this paradoxical "synthesis in dissonance" there is the radical playfulness of the Superman who confirms and expresses his own truth and the truth of his world. An order or meaning is given/experienced which is consonant with the kind of "structure" which arises out of true paidia in Gadamer's discussion. According to Kazantzakis, man is involved in a quixotic attempt to "create a new world according to the laws of his own heart, which are contrary to the inhuman laws of nature — to create a new world which is better and more real than the one that exists."[36] According to Zarathustra:

> Man is a rope, fastened between animal and Superman — a rope over an abyss.
>
> A dangerous going-across, a dangerous wayfaring, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous shuddering and staying-still.
>
> What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal; what can be loved in man is that he is a going-across (Übergang) and a down-going (Untergang).[37]

Caution needs to be observed in regard to this concept of unity, and that is why the qualification, penultimate, is being used. For

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[34]Peter Bien, "Zorba the Greek, Nietzsche, and the Perennial Greek Predicament," The Antioch Review, XXV (1962), p. 148.

[35]Ibid., p. 157. Quoted from Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, tr. Francois Gulffing (New York, 1956), p. 145.

[36]Nikos Kazantzakis, Zorba the Greek (New York, 1953), p. 271.

[37]Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, op.cit., pp. 43-44.

Nietzsche, an absolute unity or oneness is not ultimately achieved, nor is it desired. In this sense, he is different from the ancient Greeks and their Oriental parallels. One must rather speak of a dialectic between unity and experimentation, and since experimentation implies a certain distance or "outsidedness," the unity will always be penultimate; Becoming, in Heidegger's words, or the "superfluity of relations" mentioned above, never arrives at Being. Without this dialectic, play is impossible; in any ultimate oneness, play would cease.

Immediacy

This oneness of everything in a superfluity of relations, which is joined by the child's penultimate oneness with that which is, is joined by a penultimate oneness of time in which there is no past or future, only the here and now. Within this immediacy, eternity (the temporal expression of the recurrence of the same) is captured in a moment. To use Nietzsche's terminology, there is a recurrent succession of "new beginnings" much like a "self-propelling wheel"; every motion is the first motion. An important elucidation of this immediacy-eternality can be seen in the idea of "everlastingness" presented by the American artist, Jackson Pollock. In this everlastingness, there is a flux of becoming, which never arrives at being, the static position at which experience falls victim to conceptualization if becoming is eradicated. Sam Keen also speaks of this immediacy, and describes it as the time of "pure happiness"[38] (or, "wonder" which is understood as sustained and continued delight) in which the child is not burdened by the tainting knowledge that the event will not last.

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[38]Keen, op.cit., p. 31.

Innocence

Such a childlike naïvete as would be required in order that the progression of time (and the repetitions of time) could be assimilated in immediacy can be spoken of in terms of innocence and its correlary forgetfulness; the relation between the two lies in the fact that innocence cannot be maintained unless a certain amount of forgetfulness is present. Forgetfulness obviously heightens the possibility of encountering things and events which are new, and prohibits the construction of an historical or conceptual consciousness. It takes two events at two separate times to provide the necessary elements of a concept; if one is always forgetting the first event, no concept can be made. Forgetfulness eradicates the past, and relieves the burden mentioned above of knowing that the present experience will not continue indefinitely. This type of innocence is an openness to the new which may arrive, and to the future in which this arrival will take place.

It may be possible to think of this innocence in terms of trust. Buber distinguishes between the Hebraic understanding of trust, which he characterizes as an intimate relatedness that requires a person's whole being, and a Greek understanding of trust which is characterized as an intellectual assent to propositional truths. The innocence of the child playing, and his intimate relatedness to the object of play, his playmates, and the total environment of playing seems greatly akin to the first type of trusting.

Folly

A final attribute of the play of the child, and one which may conflate the others into one, is that of folly. The best discussion of this idea of folly is in the Bien paper noted above which has as its

central point the discussion of the relationship between Nietzsche and Kazantzakis' Zorba the Greek. In a key passage, which describes the relationships of "The Three Metamorphoses" succinctly, Bien says:

> Zorba's folly is treated by Kazantzakis in a distinctly Nietzschean way, for it is pitted not only against reason, but also against individuation. Passion leads Zorba into irrational folly which pierces through individuation to the Oneness that lies at the core of things.[39]

The reason that is mentioned here is the "Thou Shalt" of the camel, and the individuation is the "I will" of the lion. Yet, beyond this is the unity that is affirmatively achieved with that which is, the eternal recurrence of the same, in which man is the "incarnation of dissonance,"[40] the "I am" of the child playing. Bien needs to be reminded of the idea of penultimate oneness. One could hardly argue that Zorba is absorbed in a total Oneness of Becoming; he rather impresses his Being upon that Becoming by playing (especially dancing).

Dancing is metaphorical expression which involves one's entire being. "Dance, for Kazantzakis, does what Nietzsche says is accomplished by myth; it makes even the immediate present appear sub specie aeternitatis, gives to quotidian experience the stamp of the eternal."[41] Again, dance is seen as a model of intrinsic valuation, and the play of an infinity of possibilities; "there is only one dancer, but he has a thousand faces — faces change, crumble, return to earch, but others rise to take their place."[42] Zorba's boss says of his guide (a significant

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[39] Bien, op.cit., p. 156.

[40] Ibid., p. 157.

[41] Ibid., p. 160.

[42] Kazantzakis, op.cit., p. 243.

vocational role which Kazantzakis has chosen for Zorba) that he has plumbed the depths (Nietzsche's Untergang) of the illogically contradictory core of existence through his dance; he has "simply cracked life's shell — logic, morality, honesty — and went straight to its very substance."[43] According to Zorba, "every man has his folly, but the greatest folly of all is not to have one!"[44]

To summarize: play is the positive way of relating oneself to the reality of the eternal recurrence of the same. To play is, at one and the same time, a paradoxical way of becoming a part of and standing in contrast to the "play of creation" (i.e., "the play of Being") which is eternally manifesting itself. Within the context of this paradoxical stance, one realizes the highest form of the will to power, "the impressing of the character of Being upon Becoming."[45] Thus, will to power and eternal recurrence no longer have to be seen as separate elements in Nietzsche's thought; the concept of child's play reveals their intrinsic relatedness.

The paradigm for this child's play is, in a general sense, the poet

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[43] Ibid., p. 151.

[44] Ibid., p. 146.

[45] Heidegger, op.cit., p. 426. It should be noted carefully that this impression of the character of Being upon Becoming does not mean a mastery of Becoming by Being. In fact, such a mastery would imply a negation of Becoming into a static existence void of all wonder and possibility of play. Jackson Pollock says of his painting: "I never finish a painting . . . when something is finished, that means that it is dead . . . ." "Impression," as has been said, is better understood in terms of an affirmation-dialectic of Being with Becoming. Henry James said in reference to the French novelist, Guy de Maupassant: "The way we see the world is our own particular illusion about it, and the great artists are those that make the world accept their illusion." Cp. Wallace Stegner, "Guy de Maupassant," Brief Lives, ed. by Louis Kronenberger (New York, 1974), p. 511.

and the artist. In a most important, specific sense, it is Nietzsche himself. Throughout the Zarathustra experience, which is the event around which the rest of his writing takes shape, and through which there may have been substantial mourning and labor, Nietzsche is playing. Especially in the moments of conception and birth, he is experiencing the Superman's affirmation (Ja-sagen) of impressing his character on the eternal recurrence of the same. He has taken on and is playing eternal recurrence at its own game, and he is winning his own world.

CHAPTER VII

THE IMPORTANCE OF PLAY IN SARTRE'S PHILOSOPHY

The ideas on play which are found in the philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre offer a significant expansion of the ideas being presented in this dissertation. At first sight, if a quantitative criterion of judgement were used, it would probably appear that the idea of play is a minor concept in Sartre's writing; Catalano says, in fact, in his commentary on Being and Nothingness, that the mention of play is merely a "digression."[1] However, there are at least hints in Being and Nothingness that the idea of play may deserve much greater status than its being understood as a digression, and that it at least deserves the attention of a discussion such as the one undertaken in this dissertation; the dissertation would be strikingly incomplete without it.

In the section of "Doing and Having" which comes toward the end of Being and Nothingness, and which comprises part of the conclusion to which the entire book builds, one encounters the primary discussion of play that is presented by Sartre. In Sartre's explanation of his reference to play, he makes this leading statement: "There remains one type of activity which we willingly admit is entirely gratuitous — the activity of play . . . ."[2] Earlier, in the second section of chapter one of part two on "Being-for-Itself" entitled "Immediate Structures of

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[1]Joseph S. Catalano, A Commentary on Jean-Paul Sartre's Being and Nothingness (New York, 1974), p. 219.

[2]Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York, 1973), p. 740.

the For-Itself," he offers this poignant remark: "we can be nothing without playing at being."[3] As these comments are analyzed, the importance of the idea of play for the entirety of Sartre's philosophy may be given substantiation. The dissertation will even presume to move in the direction of saying that it is in play that human being finds at least one area in which the seemingly impossible ideal of "being-in-itself-for-itself" may be experienced. If this can be seen to be the case, then the idea of play will achieve a signal status in Sartrian study.

As can be seen from the preceeding paragraph, the study of Sartre's philosophy requires some degree of specification in regard to vocabulary. Even when the communication is between those already familiar with the major concepts of his writings, it is helpful to know just exactly which concepts are seen to be of greatest significance for a particular discussion, and to have a definitive understanding of the specific manner in which the person making the presentation is using them. Therefore, before proceeding to the idea of play per se, an attempt to define terms seems appropriate.

The ideas of "being-in-itself" ("etre-en-soi") and "being-for-itself" ("etre-pour-soi") are fundamental for Sartre's philosophy. Generally speaking, "being-in-itself" applies to things, and "being-for-itself" applies to human being. Things are complete in themselves, and can be conceptualized and generalized as scientific data; things have "essence," and are "solid, massif, entirely actual."[4] On the

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[3] Ibid., p. 131.

[4] Mary Warnock, Existentialism (New York, 1970), p. 94.

otherhand, human being is never complete. It continually exists in a state of unrealized potential which is governed by conscious choice, and which is primarily motivated by an "existential choice" which guides other conscious choices in an existential "project" destined at securing uniqueness in unique settings-in-life. Thus, "being-for-itself" is radically non-essential; it is "nothingness," a kind of "hole in being"[5] which always manifests a certain "lacking." Man is thus completely undetermined, and human being is understood as a freely conscious, active movement toward understanding and the filling of that "hole in being," rather than as an objective substance.

The idea of man's being completely undetermined in Sartre cannot be overstated. He vehemently rejects any sort of subconscious or unconscious level which prefaces man's conscious choices in a determinative manner. He thus is led to eschew ideas of "immutable principles of human nature," "complexes" such as an Oedipus complex, "basic urges" such as Nietzsche's "Will to Power," or such deterministic explanations as Freud's libido. Even such human manifestations as fetichisms, emotions, or extreme forms of psychosis are the result of some sort of choice. He found it important to quote from the work of the Viennese psychiatrist, Stekel, entitled Frigidity in Women in which the following statement was stressed: "Every time that I have been able to carry my investigations far enough, I have established that crux of the psychosis was conscious."[6]

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[5]Roland N. Stromberg, An Intellectual History of Modern Europe (New York, 1966), p. 403.

[6]Sartre, op.cit., p. 95. Also see Thody, "Existential Psycho-Analysis," The British Journal of the Society for Phenomenology (May,

He further states that adjunct to this idea of man's being being totally undetermined, is the idea that man's being defies mechanistic analysis. That is, man's being is a Gestalt with the whole always being greater than the sum of the parts. One of the more memorable quotes often cited from Being and Nothingness is that "man is a totality and not a collection." Therefore, man, and "being-for-itself" is being thought of as synonymous with man, must be approached synthetically and not analytically; to use Hartman's terminology, man on the level of "being-for-itself" is intrinsic being, and not an extrinsic being.

Sartre comes closest to talking about a "thing" which can be analyzed in the human Gestalt, and which approximately determines "being-for-itself," when he makes reference to the "existential choice" mentioned above. In fact, this "existential choice" is the object of that discipline which is termed "existential psycho-analysis." However, instead of this "choice" being an uncontrolled, deterministic facet of the human personality which can be treated mechanistically, it is a chosen attitude which is intended to act as a dynamic principle in ordering the various aspects of one's existence. It is itself incomplete in that it is always future oriented, and in a sense the future is presently active (proleptically present) to the degree that the choice intends a certain future. To again make reference to Hartman,[7] the

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1970), pp. 84ff; and, Mackey, "Sartre and the Problem of Madness," Ibid., pp. 80-82.

[7]Robert S. Hartman, The Structure of Value: Foundations of a Scientific Axiology (Carbondale, 1967). Be sure to note the difference between intentionality and intensionality. The words are easily confused when used in the same general context.

chosen attitude is the intentional "axiom" of one's life which provides, at least provisionally and temporarily, an intension/extensional core for the phenomenal field of one's existence (i.e., the entirety of one's experience at any given time).

To return to the wholly undetermined nature of "being-for-itself," Sartre outlines the implications of this idea for man's freedom; if man is wholly undetermined, then he is "condemned to be free." But, how can this radical freedom be understood in terms of condemnation? Sartre would answer that it is not easy to realize the full burden of personal responsibility that is contingent with this freedom; all of one's involvements, actions, and attitudes are completely dependent upon personal, conscious choice. The realization that one is exactly as one has chosen to be can, in fact, be quite nauseating. It is not unusual at all to see man opting for some deterministic, mechanistic understanding of himself; as Sartre sees in his first novel, Nausea, it is typically bourgeois to understand oneself as filling a pre-existent role or deterministic essence. It also lessens the burdens of personal responsibility to understand one's being in terms of some uncontrolable, substantial urge, complex, emotion, or libido. To thus say that one is bound by some sort of necessity, is to imply that one's choices are unavoidable, and that in a given situation that one has no alternative choices.

Such an existence is understood as "Bad Faith" in Sartre's philosophy. That is, "being-for-itself" is not being fully honest with itself about its nature as radically free, and it is not being responsively responsible for that freedom. When the freedom is denied or made relative by adherence to some other "power," man ceases to be human being

(intrinsically) and becomes a human being (extrinsically), filling a particular role, societal expectation, or deterministic mold. It might even be appropriate to question whether or not the term human in "human being" is fitting any longer. One can say, at least, that "being-for-itself" is reduced in "bad faith" to "being-in-itself"; man becomes a thing. This "thing-hood" of man is then tantamount to Heidegger's "inauthentic existence." However, it is likely that most men exist in this deterministic state, and for most — Sartre would say for all — this deterministic state, when it is evident, is consciously self-imposed.

It is not easy to be human, to possess and to do one's human being-ness. Most people's lives are safe and secure in their self-imposed prisons of determination; in their determination there is a dull dishonesty to their true nature, rather than a daring, dangerous openness to uncertainty and the being-which-is-always-appearing in authentic existence. It will later become possible to see Sartre juxtaposing this "bad faith" with play, and speaking of "bad faith" as a "spirit of seriousness." It will also become important to distinguish some forms of play as "bad faith."

The whole idea of "bad faith" is the negative characterization of the relation of "being-for-itself" to "being-in-itself." There is, however, posited a positive characterization of this relation in Sartre's philosophy. In this positive characterization, a relation of "being-for-itself" to "being-in-itself" can be made which does not compromise the freedom of "being-for-itself." That is, there is posited a way in which "being-for-itself" can have "being" rather than "nothingness" in "being-in-itself"; the "hole in being" can be filled.

This positive relationship is what Sartre terms "being-in-itself-for-itself."

The idea of being which is "being-in-itself-for-itself" is tantamount to an idea of God. "As one who makes choices and decisions, God must exist 'for-himself'; as one who is complete and self-sufficient, God must exist 'in-himself'."[8] Because there is seemingly an impossible contradiction in these two notions of being, Sartre rejects the idea of God. However, he does say that this impossible ideal is always before man. This impossible ideal would fill man's "lacking" or "hole in being," and therefore it manifests itself in man as desire. One might speak of a desire for being rather than nothingness. Thus, there is the continual movement of "being-for-itself" toward the future, and the movement is expedited by an ultimately hopeless desire to be God; that is, to achieve "being-in-itself-for-itself."

While Sartre seems fairly rigid in the belief that "being-in-itself-for-itself" is absolutely, hopelessly impossible, it may be that there are other areas in his writings that imply that the achieving of this state of being may be plausible at least to the degree not seen in the major corpus of his work. When he wrote Being and Nothingness, he had not yet met Jean Genet. Yet, he comes to call this derelict thief a "saint." At least one interpreter has convincingly suggested[9] that he does so because he saw in Genet the embodiment of "being-in-itself-for-

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[8]Alasdair MacIntyre, "Existentialism," in A Critical History of Western Philosophy, edited by D. J. O'Connor (New York, 1964), p. 519.

[9]Marjorie Grene, "The Aesthetic Dialogue of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty," The British Journal of the Society for Phenomenology (May, 1970), pp. 60-61.

itself."

In Being and Nothingness the most useless passion of man was the attempt at achieving "being-in-itself-for-itself," or becoming God. However, writing several years later about Genet, he says that "in the realm of the imaginary, absolute impotence is transfigured, changes signs, and becomes omnipotence. Genet plays at inventing the world in order to stand before it in a state of supreme indifference."[10] The process of imagination must be taken quite seriously, for Sartre believed that imaginative consciousness and freedom existed in direct relationship to one another. This is an extension, if not a modification, of the idea that man is condemned to be free; freedom is not merely passive, it is also active. In child's play and in the imaginative, creative activity of the artist, impotence becomes omnipotence, and to be able to stand before the creation in the state of indifference is to relate to it radically on the level of the non-serious; it is also a relation which enables the creation to unveil its truth.

> The existentialist approach to literature (or, artistic creativity) involves trying to see a writer's (or artist's) work as expressive of his "project," his fundamental way of being human. Every one of us, in his life, is engaged in making of his given situation a composition (which is intrinsically musical in contrast to Plato's view of the majority of society as "intrinsically unmusical"), an organic whole, that is uniquely his; an artist does this in and through his work, which therefore speaks to us of his particular style of being-in-the-world.[11]

Here again is the idea of man being a totality and not a collection which Sartre has stressed throughout.

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[10]Jean-Paul Sartre in Jean Genet, Our Lady of the Flowers (London, 1964), p. 53.

[11]Grene, op.cit., pp. 59-60.

However, while it would be admitted that the major thrust of Being and Nothingness is that "being-in-itself-for-itself" cannot be absolutely achieved, there may at least be the indication that it can be experienced, and that in that experience one gets a glimpse of the depth of one's being. He seems to have toyed with this idea before. In Nausea the main idea seems to be that human life cannot endure the often meaninglessness and incoherency of the radical freedom of "being-for-itself," and almost necessarily retreats into some form of falsification or "bad faith." He does seem to hint, however, that perhaps in the production of a work of art that an "acte gratuit" (free act or gratuitous act) may occur which is entirely one's own, and not otherwise determined. That which would be involved in such an act would not be an ultimate, absolute achievement of "being-in-itself-for-itself," yet it might be characterized as an experience of it. A character named Mathieu in the series of novels entitled L'Age de Raison seeks for the same kind of experience, and dies in a crucial stand against Nazis invaders. It is ambiguous as to whether Sartre feels he also had this experience, although it appears that he is suggesting that he did.

Therefore, when he comes to the idea of play in the latter part of Being and Nothingness, and says that here is an act which is definitely gratuitous, it may be that he is suggesting that in play that one achieves the experience of "being-in-itself-for-itself." If Genet did achieve this level, he could then be characterized as the paradigm player. To "be at play" would thus be the mode of being of the epitomized state of "being-for-itself."

There is another way in which "being-for-itself" is reduced to "being-in-itself." This particular reduction is not, however, approached

with the same prejorative attitude which is appropriate to the preceeding reduction. In fact, the second reduction is a necessary part of human existence, and all human beings experience it. "Being-for-itself" becomes "Being-in-itself" as it becomes a part of human being's past. Such a past comprises a significant form of what Sartre calls human being's "facticity." However, this facticity applies not only to the past but to the present. That being which is immediately present to consciousness is also past because human being is always a being beyond this immediately conscious, present being in a being-toward-the-future. Sartre suggests that the Cartesian cogito should be reformulated accordingly: "I think, therefore I was."[12] The idea of nothingness reappears; for, if there is no real present being, or an "instantaneous present"[13] in which there is no specious duration of time, then all that can remain is a nothingness bracketed in by past facticity and future intentionality.

However, if there was an occurence of "being-in-itself-for-itself," then perhaps the duration of that event would be a real present. As "being-in-itself-for-itself" seems to be the only way to fill the "hole in being," it might also be the only way to fill the "hole" in time (i.e., that which is neither past nor future). Most of the time in Sartre it seems appropriate to think of a present which is eradicated by the past and the future. However, if a real present could be construed in terms of the temporality of the occurence of "being-in-itself-for-itself," then it would be the future and the past which would be

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[12] Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op.cit., p. 173.

[13] Ibid., p. 159.

eradicated. Perhaps, it would be possible to speak of the occurence of the real, instantaneous present as being achieved or experienced in an act of play. One might think in this context of lines from William Blake's "Auguries of Innocence" in which all time is captured in a moment of pure immediacy:

> To see a World in a Grain of Sand
> And Heaven in a Wild Flower,
> Hold infinity in the palm of your hand
> And eternity in an hour.[14]

The discussion will now move to a more explicit attempt to understand what Sartre means by play. It will first do this by characterizing a form of play which is not the form of play in which "being-in-itself-for-itself" is experienced. Only play which is an "acte gratuit," a completely free act which is entirely one's own, can qualify for that which may present "being-in-itself-for-itself." Any other sort of play is play in "bad faith." The most common form of this play as bad faith is that which is commonly called "role playing," or the limitation of an invididual by societal expectations to a particular function. Gratuitous activity must be beyond the realm of the anticipated, and even enforced, function. Sartre describes a man who is a waiter in a cafe, and who is "playing a game" at being a waiter. However, in this play-acting, the man's primary concern is to fulfill the obligations to the cafe patrons who expect him to act in a particularly "waiterly" fashion.

> This obligation is not different from that which is imposed on all tradesmen. Their condition is wholly

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[14] Russell Noyes, English Romantic Poetry and Prose (New York, 1956), p. 222.

> one of ceremony. The public demands of them that they realize it as a ceremony; there is the dance of the grocer, of the tailor, of the auctioneer, by which they endeavor to persuade their clientele that they are nothing but a grocer, an auctioneer, a tailor. A grocer is not wholly a grocer. Society demands that he limit himself to his function as a grocer, just as the soldier at attention makes himself into a soldier-thing with a direct regard that does not see at all, which is no longer meant to see, since it is the rule and not the interest of the moment which determines the point he must fix his eyes on.[15]

The role or function is thus a facticity, and "bad faith" exists in the attempt to mold oneself into a limiting facticity.

> The waiter wishes to make his condition real, so that he shall have no choices left, but shall be completely and wholly absorbed in being a waiter. Not only does he want this himself, but there is pressure upon him from outside to do this. For the general public wishes to be able to think of him simply and solely as a waiter. They do not want to have to think of him as a free human agent, but prefer that he should be nothing but the character demanded by his job.[16]

Sartre does, however, acknowledge the possibility of a redeeming feature in the waiter's play. If the waiter realizes that he is only playing a role, and that his consciousness is not identified with the role, nor desires to be so identified, then he is not in the state of "bad faith" with himself (although he may be with the audience, if they are convinced that he is one in conscious identity with the role). However, in much of contemporary society, the role or function dictates one's self-conscious identity, and is not a role to be played with. When this is the case, the play is in "bad faith," and there is no prospect

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[15] Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op.cit., p. 102.

[16] Warnock, op.cit., p. 103.

of "being-in-itself-for-itself" emerging.

Sartre introduces his discussion of play in Being and Nothingness by drawing a contrast between the human as player, who will be referred to following Huizinga[17] as Homo Ludens, and the serious man who is exemplified by the materialist and the revolutionary. Both the revolutionary and materialist take themselves as objects, and in doing so attribute more reality to the world than to their own selves. The materialist is entirely governed by causal laws, yet there are those who are endowed with an imaginative consciousness which enables them to exist "For-themselves" as well as "In-themselves." Illustrating these too-serious revolutionaries, Sartre says that they:

> . . . come to know themselves first in terms of the world which oppresses them, and they wish to change this world. In this one respect they are in agreement with their ancient adversaries, the possessors, who also come to know themselves and appreciate themselves in terms of their position in the world. Thus all serious thought is thickened by the world; it coagulates; it is a dismissal of human reality in favor of the world. The serious man is "of the world" and has no resource in himself. He does not even imagine any longer the possibility of getting out of the world, for he has given to himself the type of existence of the rock, the consistency, the inertia, the opacity of being-in-the-midst-of-the-world. It is obvious that the serious man at bottom is hiding from himself the consciousness of his freedom; he is in bad faith and his bad faith aims at presenting himself to his own eyes as a consequence; everything is a consequence for him, and there is never any beginning.[18]

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[17]Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens: A Study of the Play Element in Culture (Boston, 1964).

[18]Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op.cit., p. 741. In regard to Sartre's idea of revolutionaries, one should see Genet's "The Balcony" in which the contrast between the serious, revolutionary consciousness and the playful consciousness is beautifully portrayed. See Jean Genet, The Balcony, tr. by Bernard Frechtman (New York, 1966).

On the other hand Homo Ludens relates himself to reality or the world, not as an object among other objects, or as having an objectivity of his own delegated from that world. Rather, in play the subjectivity is "released,"[19] and Homo Ludens possesses his world in a possession which is paradoxically a non-possession; he strips the real of its own objectivity, and makes it over in his own image, by the power of his playful imagination which impresses his image upon the world. The importance of imagination to play cannot be overestimated. Such imagination is Hartman's ability to "play with possibilities," and can be expanded upon in the following manner:

> Imaginative consciousness consists in a separation of the subject from the world. It consists, which is the same thing, in the possibility of considering and describing objects, of wonder in what they are and what they might be, and how they might be otherwise. That this is possible is then shown to have certain consequences in the case of individual conscious beings, in respect of the choices they are able to make and the deceptions which they are able to practice. For imaginative consciousness simply consists in the possibility of seeing that there are choices to be made, and in seeing that things need not be, or need not be described, as they actually are.[20]

There is an "area of free play" which surrounds an entity of consciousness whether it be an object, some fellow, or an experience, "so that the conscious being can approach it, contemplate it, question it, and describe it."[22] This questioning appropriately might remind one of the

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[19] Ibid., p. 741.

[20] Warnock, "The Concrete Imagination," op.cit., p. 6.

[21] Ibid., p. 7.

[22] Ibid.

play of the Platonic dialogues in which the "area of free play" is extended to ideas.

Imagination can thus be described in terms consonant with the model of transfinite mathematics as it is applied to intrinsic valuation. It is that consciousness "which transports us from one way of looking at the world to another, in which the objects before us have meaning beyond themselves."[23] This is described by Sartre as "seeing as,"[24] an idea which he gets from Aristotle through Heidegger, and which may have implications for the ideas of "as if activity" and creating the world in accordance with one's own illusions or images. If the waiter in the earlier illustration can preserve his imagination in the setting of having the role of waiter enforced upon him by the outside world of the cafe's patronage, and if he can still imagine that he is not a waiter in the midst of performing the waiterly function, then his play at being a waiter is genuine, self-affirming, conscious activity and not "bad faith." There is in play, therefore, a seminal distinction to be drawn between being possessed by the world and being possessing the world. In this play one moves toward the "impossible synthesis"[25] of assimilation (man's activity as Homo Ludens) and an assimilated (the world) which would be "being-in-itself-for-itself," and which in its occurence would constitute a real present; an authentic existence in the world without compromise to that world.

Attention should also be given to the idea in the previous quotation

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[23] Ibid., p. 11.

[24] Ibid., p. 10.

[25] Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op.cit., p. 743.

on revolutionaries that the revolutionary's self is neglected or denied in his concentration on consequences. It is a common experience to see individuals living completely toward some future goal or consequence, and having their present existence inauthentically eradicated; the attitude embodied in such statements as: "when I get my degree . . . ."; "when I get away from home, and out on my own . . . ."; "when I get out of the service . . . ." It should be obvious that a great deal of sport or play suffers under the indictment of being consequent oriented; such professionalized play, not play merely for the "fun" of it, is certainly not a part of the ideal which Sartre is establishing. Here it is the gratuitous act of the present moment, and not the role played toward some particular consequence, that is most important. There may even be a serious implication here for Sartre's idea that the being that one is conscious of in the present moment is already past facticity because of the way that consciousness is always future oriented. In genuine play, he may be suggesting, there is a consciousness of a present being which is not past facticity; a being which is not a nothingness. It would then appear that this would be "being-in-itself-for-itself."

> What is play indeed if not an activity of which man is the first origin, for which man himself sets the rules, and which has no consequences except according to the rules posited? As soon as a man apprehends himself as free and wishes to use his freedom, a freedom, by the way, which could just as well be his anguish, then his activity is play. The first principle of play is man himself; through it he escapes his natural nature; he himself sets the values and rules for his acts and consents to play only according to the rules which he himself has established and defined. As a result, there is in a sense "little reality" in the world. It might appear then that when a man is playing, bent on discovering himself as free in his very action, he

> certainly could not be concerned with possessing a being in the world. His goal, which he aims at through sports or pantomine or games, is to attain himself as a certain being, precisely the being which is in question in his being.[26]

Sartre now comes to what is the key point for the suppositions in this present discussion, and to what this dissertation would claim to be one of the most significant points for understanding the human manifestation of his philosophical investigation. He describes play not simply as a desire to do, but as a desire to be. It will be recalled that this "desire" is the nearest approximation of a basic urge in man; this "desire" is that which finds particular manifestation in Sartrian psycho-analysis as the "existential choice." It is that which fills the "hole in being"; it is that which he has sometimes called the hopelessly impossible desire to be God, to achieve "being-in-itself-for-itself." Now, he is saying that "the desire to play is fundamentally the desire to be."[27] Thus, this discussion wants to make the interpretation that in imaginative, free play, that one comes closer to achieving, and perhaps does experience, a present being which is not nothingness. Obviously, as has been said before, such an occurence is extremely exceptional. Sartre even suggests in the preceeding quotation, that if one is too conscious of the intended consequence of play to provide the kind of being-fulfilled, exalted experience herein described, that it is probable that no genuine experience will likely be attained. Therefore, a genuine action, or play, is self-transcending of ordinary consciousness, and in the self-transcendence there is the achievement

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[26] Ibid., pp. 741-742.

[27] Ibid., p. 742.

of a certain "Oneness" with one's total environment; this "Oneness" is synonymous with a form of "Being-in-itself-for-itself." Sartre uses the example of a boxer, a player:

> By genuine acts we must understand the whole synthetic activity of a person; that is, every disposition of means as related to ends, not as the for-itself is its own possibilities but as the act represents a transcendent psychic synthesis which the for-itself must live. For example, the boxer's training is a genuine act because it transcends and supports the For-itself, which moreover realizes itself in and through this training. The same goes for the research scientist, for the work of the artist, for the election campaign of the politician. In all these cases, the act as a psychic being represents a transcendent existence and the objective aspect of the relation of the For-itself with the world.[28]

For the exceptional event of genuine play, or the freely self-creative activity of Homo Ludens, the following passage is decisive:

> The genuine act of play is not its own goal for itself; neither does its explicit end represent its goal and its profound meaning; but the function of the act is to make manifest and to present to itself the absolute freedom which is the very being of the person. This particular type of project, which has freedom for its foundation and its goal, deserves a special study. It is radically different from all others in that it aims at a radically different type of being. It would be necessary to explain in full detail its relations with the project of being-God, which has appeared to us as the deep-seated structure of human reality.[29]

It is from this statement that the dissertation receives its primary motivation. Surprisingly, at this point, Sartre says that the further discussion of this point will be reserved for a later study. Perhaps, he senses that the activity of true play defies analysis in a

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[28] Ibid., p. 227.

[29] Ibid., p. 742.

sense similar to the event of "Being-in-itself-for-itself." He says that such a study will come in an Ethics. However, he then proceeds to give an aesthetic description of play: "in reality sport is a free transformation of the worldly environment into the supportive element of the action. This fact makes it creative like art."[30] It may, in fact, be that for the Homo Ludens that there is an intrinsic merger of of ethics and aesthetics; to live life playfully and to be an artist at living constitute a mutually inclusive, authentic being-in-the-world. Such an existence would epitomize what could be called "Good Faith."

> In good faith we start with the realization that we are freedom; we recognize, however, that we can exist only by tending in the direction of being, only by trying to become what we freely choose to be. We also recognize that our very flight toward being will never be achieved as an identity. In good faith we do not flee our freedom, and in particular, we do not flee the very fact that our good faith is always in question.[31]

This authentic being-in-the-world ("being-in-itself-for-itself" — a being which is not a nothingness, but which is also not a self-effacing "somethingness") is then illustratively characterized by Sartre by a particular form of play, skiing. One encounters an Alpine slope, a field of snow. There is an intuitive enjoyment of the brute facticity of the pure "being-in-itself," the pure being of the phenomena. Beyond this intuitive response there is a "fascination"[32] (Otto's mysterium tremendum is an appropriate synonym) with that which is

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[30] Ibid.

[31] Catalano, op.cit., p. 88.

[32] Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op.cit., p. 743.

absolutely not-me. Sartre often speaks of the fascination of "being-for-itself" with "being-in-itself." "What I wish precisely is that this in-itself might be a sort of emanation of myself while still remaining in-itself."[33] That is, what is desired is that an intrinsic reciprocity can be accomplished with one's environment in which the environment becomes "being-in-itself-for-itself," and the Homo Ludens, the skier, becomes "being-for-itself-in-itself." However, to play in this environment is not simply to play with the snow, creating out of it an object, and at the same time objectifing oneself as part of an objectivity-involving relationship.

> If I pick up the snow with my hands, it turns into liquid in my fingers; it runs off; there is nothing left of it. The in-itself is transformed into nothingness. My dream of appropriating the snow vanishes at the same moment. Moreover I do not know what to do with this snow which I have just come to see close at hand. I can not get hold of the field; I can not even reconstitute it as that substantial total which offered itself to my eyes and which has abruptly, doubly collapsed.[34]

Therefore, in genuine play, there is established a reciprocal, existential oneness with, in this particular case, a whole environment; the environment and the Homo Ludens mutually constitute one another without objectifing one another. Piaget speaks thusly of the play of children:

> . . . the spontaneous tendency on the part of the child to take things in by means of a comprehensive (i.e., synthetic, preconceptual) act of perception instead of by detection of details, to find immediately and without analysis . . . in a word, it is the tendency to connect everything with everything else.[35]

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[33] Ibid.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Sam Keen, Apology For Wonder (New York, 1969), p. 48.

Thus, play becomes the actualized manifestation in a real environment of one's "existential choice," which acts as a dynamic principle in ordering that environment as it is the Homo Ludens' environment. One is living out and out of one's "existential choice" in and as play.

Again, as regards the poignant example of skiing, the play is a "synthetic activity of organization and connection"[36]; that is, there is a meaning conferring organization of the phenomenal field — the imagination, active consciousness, and choice of the Homo Ludens does this to the field in its "possession" of the field; and, the experience of connection with the phenomenal field — this is what the field does to the Homo Ludens in its "possession" of him. In this reciprocal, mutually inclusive possession, both Homo Ludens and environment (both "being-for-itself" and "being-in-itself" respectively) are constituted as being-as-play in which an "event of being-in-itself-for-itself" occurs, and in which neither the field nor the Homo Ludens is objectified! Instead of playing with the snow as described above (i.e., holding the snow manipulatively in one's hands), Sartre succinctly calls one's attention to sliding over the snow. Here the sliding may be understood, not as an objective playing-with the snow, but as an existential "being-with" (Mitsein) the snow, or the play of the phenomenal field.

> We think of sliding as remaining on the surface. This is inexact; to be sure, I only skim the surface, and this skimming in itself is worth a whole study. Nevertheless, I realize a synthesis which has depth. I realize that the bed of snow organizes itself in its lowest depths in order to hold me up; the sliding is

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[36] Sartre, Being and Nothingness, op.cit., p. 744.

> action at a distance; it assures my mastery over the material without my needing to plunge into that material and engulf myself in order to overcome it. To slide is the opposite of taking root. The root is already half assimilated into the earth which nourishes it; it is a living concretion of the earth; it can utilize the earth only by making itself earth; that is, by submitting itself, in a sense, to the matter which it wishes to utilize. Sliding, on the contrary, realizes a material unity in depth without penetrating farther than the surface; it is like the dreaded master who does not need to insist nor to raise his voice in order to be obeyed. An admirable picture of power. From this comes down that famous advice: "Slide mortal, don't bear down!" This does not mean "Stay on the surface, don't go deeply into things," but on the contrary, "Realize syntheses in depth without compromising yourself."[37]

The end result of play is the realization of one's uniqueness, especially in an environment, or in a relation to the world, that renders that environment unique for me. There is a direct relationship between realizing one's own uniqueness, and being able to discover the uniqueness that arises from objects (or other selves). This is the point which is central to Hartman: the ability to discover uniqueness is thought of as the ability to intrinsically value, and it follows in Hartman's axiology that the development (perhaps, the "exercise" of playful freedom) of this ability is that which enables an individual to discover his own uniqueness. For Hartman, as with Plato and others, the artist was the paradigm example of this ability. Sartre would concur, describing the development and expression of this ability as "continuous creativity," the play of the imagination and consciousness with the infinite possibilities of one's world.

Thus, the realization of uniqueness is the highest possible

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[37] Ibid., p. 745.

expression of human being. While it is certainly not the absolute realization of the God-ideal, "being-in-itself-for-itself," there is the experience of this ideal in a penultimate way, and simply because the perfect level is absolutely unattainable in a way that can be continuously maintained, the importance of the experience which can be realized should in no way be lessened.

That man never ultimately achieves this ideal level has more positive implications than it has negative, for once man confers divinity upon himself, he participates not in ultimate freedom, but ultimate objecitfication. Man freely plays only in "continuous creativity." Genuine play does not find an "Answer," but continually plays along the way (or, Way) toward that "Answer," being prodded by a desire which is also a lacking at the center of one's being; an unanswered question that always holds the entirety of being in question, and that continually asserts itself in the midst of all penultimate answers (or, that which by its very nature makes all answers penultimate). Dewey refers to this intrinsic process as "growth," and says of it:

> The process of growth, of improvement and progress, rather than the static outcome and result, becomes the significant thing . . . . The end is no longer a terminus or limit to be reached. It is the active process of transforming the existent situation. Not perfection as a final goal, but the ever-enduring process of perfecting . . . . Growth itself is the only "end."[38]

Thus, the experience of uniqueness must be sought and discovered again and again; genuine human being is always the, or advent, of new beginnings. Such an intrinsic, playful relatedness to life is not fully

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[38]John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (New York, 1939), p. 44.

satisfied (actually it is never fully satisfied in the strictest sense of the word) in only random "peak experiences" of play, but in an attitude, lifestyle, or "Way of Life" which is playful in the Sartrian sense. To experience and live on the level of this Sartrian playfulness as much as is possible is to affirm, constitute, and possess one's being in the face of all temptations to "bad faith" and the continual presence of nothingness.

CHAPTER VIII

PLAY AND AESTHETIC EVENT IN WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY

The philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead is not usually understood as an aesthetics. It is more readily recognized as a rigorously philosophical investigation of science, cosmology, and epistemology. This understanding is implicit in serveral of Whitehead's major works: Process and Reality; Science and the Modern World; and, Modes of Thought. It will, however, be claimed in this chapter of the dissertation that Whitehead intrinsically valuates these traditional concerns of philosophy, and that his final treatment is thoroughly aesthetic. His major writing could just as easily have been entitled The Process of Reality or The Mode of Thought. There will be the further attempt to demonstrate that an intrinsic part of this "process" of reality and "mode" of thought is play. This understanding will not be demonstrated by implication, but by Whitehead's own use of play terminology at critical junctures in the development of his theses.

A preliminary investigation of Whitehead's philosophy reveals that he has concerns related to aesthetic value which are quite distinctly parallel to the areas of concern stated in the dissertation to this point. Whitehead makes extensive use of the ideas of extrinsic and intrinsic value. In a key passage from Science and the Modern World, he states: "There is thus an intrinsic and an extrinsic reality of an event, namely, the event as it is in its own prehension, and the event as it is in the prehension of other events."[1] While the idea of

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[1]Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York,

"prehension" will be more fully discussed below, one can speak basically of an intrinsic reality which is experienced "for its own sake," and an extrinsic reality which is the intrinsic reality objectified by an observer from without, or by the one to whom the event was intrinsic at a later (one-tenth of a second for Whitehead) moment. Earlier, Whitehead had made the relation of intrinsic reality and intrinsic value more specific: "'value' is the word I use for the intrinsic reality of an event."[2] This distinction can also be seen in Modes of Thought where it is clearly stated that everything that in any sense exists has two siaes, namely, its individual self (intrinsic value) and its significance in the universe (extrinsic value).[3] It is not unusual for scholarly criticism[4] to view this distinction as a fundamental element in Whitehead's thought.

An excellent example of this sort of treatment of Whitehead's thought, which includes an emphasis on ethics which is directly related to this dissertation, can be found in an article entitled "Whitehead's Moral Philosophy" by Richard S. Davis. Davis first examines a distinction which exists between morality and the event of intrinsic valuation. Morality is extrinsic, involving reflective and objective deliberation, while the intrinsic valuing event is more spontaneous and immediate. There is, however, an intrinsic dimension to the moral event

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1967), p. 103.

[2] Ibid., p. 93.

[3] A. N. Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York, 1968), p. 111.

[4] Richard S. Davis, "Whitehead's Moral Philosophy," Process Studies (Summer, 1973), pp. 75-90.

which is realized for its own sake, the nature of which could not be fully explained in terms of extrinsic manifestations. Davis explains that the intrinsic and the extrinsic are closely related;[5] that which becomes extrinsically established as valuable is the result of that which has been intrinsically satisfying in the individual, and part of the intrinsically satisfying has been the experience derived from contributing positively to others. Davis also shows[6] that the intrinsic experience can have an extrinsic extreme in regard to morality if it becomes a "cosmic egotism" bent only on its own satisfaction. While Davis sees forms of religion which defend prejudice and provincial interests as readily available examples of this type of extrinsic extreme, it is also possible, as will be seen, to apply this description to the type of mysticism and aesthetic experience which is not the goal of Whitehead's thought. Finally, in regard to the Davis article, in an ideal moral system, the intrinsic experiences of one individual enhance the intrinsic experiences of other individuals, and vice versa. However, as with G. E. Moore in his "naturalistic fallacy" mentioned above, the extrinsic level of deeds never fully defines and explains the intrinsic level of experience.

Whitehead would continue from these emphases by describing the evolution of sensory specialization which moves along increasingly clear and distinct levels of sensory experience to the ability to abstract from the vagueness of primary feelings, and concentrate on qualitative details. Within the context of this qualitative concentration

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[5] Ibid., pp. 86-87.

[6] Ibid., p. 89.

of human consciousness, there is the "triumph of specialization"[7] which is tantamount to the realization of uniqueness. Note in the following quotation the relation between the "intrinsic experience" and that which is distinctively human.

> For example, take the subtle beauty of a flower in some isolated glade of a primeval forest. No animal has ever had the subtlety of experience to enjoy its full beauty. And yet this beauty is a grand fact in the universe. When we survey nature and think how flitting and superficial has been the animal enjoyment of its wonder, and when we realize how incapable the separate cells and pulsations of each flower are of enjoying the total effect — then our sense of the value of the details for the totality dawns upon our consciousness . . . . In every advancing civilization, this sense of sacredness has found vigorous expression. It tends to retire into a recessive factor in experience, as each phase of civilization enters upon its decay.[8]

As will be seen, these words seem to be more the words of a poet than a mathematician-logician. They also seem to be the words of a thinker well aware of the threat to the intrinsic experience which is caused by the scientific materialism of the technological society. Whitehead's theory of organism stands in opposition to the Cartesian body-mind dualism which he considers to be at the heart of scientific materialism. "Science can find no individual enjoyment (a synonym for the intrinsic experience) in nature: science can find no aim in nature: science can find no creativity in nature; it finds mere rules of succession."[9] He later returns to a statement which is obviously suggestive of the intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy: "The reason for the blindness of

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[7]Whitehead, Modes of Thought, op.cit., p. 121.

[8]Ibid., pp. 119-120.

[9]Ibid., p. 154.

physical science lies in the fact that such science only deals with half of the evidence provided by human experience."[10]

As has been noted throughout this discussion, it is the poetic use of language that is the vehicle of expression on the intrinsic level, and Whitehead is strikingly aware of the poetic dimension. In the lecture entitled "The Romantic Reaction" in Science and the Modern World, he goes so far as to say that cognitive, rational mentality it not the total, necessary substratum for experiencing an event. In fact, an event may be experienced without rational cognition. This is especially true in regard to the comments that have been made on value.

> Remembering the poetic rendering of our concrete experience, we see at once that the element of value, of being valuable, of having value, of being an end-in-itself, or being something which is for its own sake, must not be omitted in any account of an event as the most concrete actual something."[11]

He later summarized: "the romantic revival was a protest on behalf of the organic view of nature, and also a protest against the exclusion of value from the essence of matter of fact."[12]

One of the best sources for Whitehead's comments on poetry is a book of personal dialogues recorded by Lucien Price. In one section, Whitehead, his wife, and Price are discussing a speech by Dr. McFee Campbell, a professor of psychiatry at Harvard Medical School, in which Campbell had discussed the inadequacy of words to express certain experiences and emotions. Whitehead concurred by saying that a large part

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[10] Ibid. Also see Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, op.cit., p. 155: "In particular for physics, there is no intrinsic reality."

[11] Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, op.cit., p. 93.

[12] Ibid., p. 94.

of human experience could not be conveyed meaningfully in ordinary language.

> Poetry at its best comes somewhere near capturing in a net of words one of those powerful, evanescent moments of happiness and pain. After all, a word is only a sound, and the relationship between a sound and an experience is very artificial and arbitrary. Look up the poet's words in the dictionary, and you will find that the meanings there given do not total the poet's; he had added to their meaning by emotional overtones, so that in some cases you follow the accretions of meaning which successive poets have added to words. But always in the poetry itself is a fragrance of experience which the poet alone has been able to capture, though we recognize it as also our own.[13]

Two and one-half years later, in a similar conversation with Price, the same theme asserts itself:

> Words do not express our deepest intuitions. In the very act of being verbalized they escape us. The trouble is that we are in the habit of thinking of words as fixed things with specific meanings. Actually the meanings of language are in violent fluctuation, and a large part of what we try to express in words lies outside the range of language. Music often seems to come nearer expressing our deepest feelings. Another profound form of expression is sculpture.[14]

Finally, in a conversation which was the last that Price had with Whitehead, six weeks before his death, he made his most succinct expression on words, poetry, and philosophy.

> I am impressed by the inadequacy of language to express our conscious thought, and by the inadequacy of

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[13]Lucien Price, Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead (Boston, 1954), p. 195. Especially note Price's reply, and then that of Mrs. Whitehead in which the duration of the actual occasion is implicated. "Don't we all have moments of intense being," I asked, "when we are peculiary and uniquely alive? And there they remain, eternal springs, into which we can lower our buckets time after time, and years later, without exhausting them." "Yes. But it is not the experience," corrected Mrs. Whitehead, "it is a memory of the moment we lived so intensely."

[14]Ibid., pp. 295-296.

> our conscious thought to express our subsconscious. The curse of philosophy has been the supposition that language is an exact medium. Philosophers verbalize and then suppose the idea is stated for all time. Even if it were stated, it would need to be restated for every century, perhaps every generation. Plato is the only one who knew better and did not fall into this trap. When ordinary methods failed him, he gave us a myth, which does not challenge exactitude but excites revery. Most of what we think and say with our conscious minds and speech is shallow and superficial. Only at rare moments does that deeper and vaster world come through into the conscious thought or expression; they are the memorable moments of our lives, when we feel — when we know — we are being used as instruments of a greater force than ourselves for purposes higher and wider than our own. Men of genius have moments more often, but nearly everyone has had a few moments of such illumination. The poets are important here, because they express these vast intuitions in words, often better than most philosophers, and in words, however inadequate, that do nevertheless somehow stir in the reader or listener some corresponding sense of the infinitude of thought or feeling or experience which is being talked about.[15]

It may very well be that enough attention has not been given to the relation of Whitehead's philosophy to poetry. This is especially true in regard to the poetry of William Wordsworth; "admirers of Whitehead who know him best have suggested that Wordsworth had possibly a greater influence of him than anyone except Plato."[16] His daughter, Jessie, said that during the period that Whitehead was intensively involved with mathematics, his philosophical ideas only existing in the earliest forms of germination, that he was reading Wordsworth intently. "He

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[15] Ibid., pp. 368-369.

[16] Mary A. Wyman, The Lure of Feeling (New York, 1960), p. 129. Also see V. Lowe, "The Philosophy of Whitehead," The Antioch Review (Summer, 1948); and, "Whitehead's Philosophical Development," in P. A. Schilpp, The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (New York, 1951), pp. 118ff.

would read The Prelude as if it were the Bible, pouring over the meaning of the various passages."[17] The Prelude, subtitled "The Growth of the Poet's Mind,"[18] is one of Wordsworth's major works, and is tantamount to an autobiographical statement of the creative experience as it occurs in and through the poet.

Wordsworth describes a situation in which a process is taking place, a process which is prompted by "creativity" and which is an immanent manifestation of "creativity" as it finds unity within and gives unity to the poet's experience. It seems quite accurate to say that "creativity" as used here and "the play of Being" used earlier are synonymous. This two-fold movement of "unification" is what Whitehead calls "concrescence," and the "prompting" and direction of the immanent manifestation provided by "creativity" is what Whitehead will formally call "subjective aim." Concrescence moves toward its final cause, which is its subjective aim. The fulfillment of this concrescence, the aesthetic event, is what is referred to as "satisfaction." The intrinsic, poetic experience is the experience or event of this satisfaction as it has become objectively immortalized; the poem relates to the "Subject" of the poet, while the experience itself relates to the "Superject" of the poet.

For both Whitehead and Wordsworth, this initial "creativity" is identified with God. Whitehead sees a movement from the primordial nature of God to the consequent nature of God in which there would be

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[17] Wyman, op.cit., p. 129.

[18] William Wordsworth, "The Prelude: or, Growth of a Poet's Mind," in Russell Noyes, English Romantic Poetry and Prose (New York, 1956), pp. 269-302.

a final satisfaction (it is questionable, however, how one would be able to speak of a "last divine event"), and each individual satisfaction is indicative of and apart of the movement toward that final satisfaction. Of the many levels of satisfaction that can be described, it is that of the poetic experience which is the height of human satisfaction, and which most adequately epitomizes the satisfaction of creativity (Being) itself, or of God. (This "identification" may be somewhat problematic in Whitehead; he at least sees God as the "primordial instance" of creativity.)

Whitehead and Wordsworth are both troubled with giving a name to this event or special capacity which is within the poet; they are not sure that it is even proper to speak of its being within the poet's mind. In some manner it is a heightened sense of "mind," which for Whitehead extends to the whole organism, and most likely is best left unnamed considering the limitations inherent in even the poet's words. Wordsworth finally ends up referring to Imagination, "which, in truth,/ Is but another name for absolute power/ And clearest insight, amplitude of mind,/ And Reason in her most exalted mood."[19] In the section of Process and Reality entitled "The Higher Phases of Experience," Whitehead makes much the same statement by speaking of a heightened consciousness, which cannot be adequately defined by simple inference from ordinary consciousness, which is the "crown of experience."[20]

While it would be a major undertaking to deal with the whole of The Prelude, a task which Mary A. Wyman embarks upon in a work

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[19] Ibid., p. 302.

[20] A. N. Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York, 1969), p. 312.

entitled The Lure of Feeling,[21] a title that describes the manner in which "Creativity" first manifests itself, Wordsworth's poem "The Green Linnet"[22] lends itself quite well to a Whiteheadian parallel. The poem describes an almost play-experience that the poet had in early Spring in the midst of a blossoming orchard. At first the poet was only an observer of a small bird who had attained a perfect oneness with the setting, and was having an experience of pure enjoyment. As the poem continues, there is a unification process which is evidenced in which the poet achieves what seems to be the same kind of experience as the bird. There is a concrescence which leads to a satisfaction that is also best described as pure enjoyment (not necessarily unlike the bird is experiencing). The poem then exists as a chronicle of an intensification of feeling. The poem itself is actually post-satisfaction, the "actual occasion" of the aesthetic event having perished; as the poem is being written, the event has already lowered itself to the level of rational, discursive consciousness. It is, as regards degree of intensification, somewhat surprising that sexual imagery is not used to describe this movement toward satisfaction, which could then be described as a climatic orgasm of creative organism. Again, the key idea that the poem illustrates is the playful concrescent movement from observer to pure enjoyment in the aesthetic event to post-event writing of the poem.

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[21] Wyman, op.cit., p. 129.

[22] Noyes, op.cit., pp. 319-320. A Linnet is a common song-bird. Wordsworth's complete poem is as follows:

THE GREEN LINNET

Beneath these fruit-tree boughs that shed
Their snow-white blossoms on my head,

In an unpublished doctoral dissertation entitled "Wordsworth and Hartshorne: A Comparative Study,"[23] Keith A. Gould presents several

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With brightest sunshine round me spread
  Of spring's unclouded weather,
In this sequestered nook how sweet
To sit upon my orchard-seat!
And birds and flowers once more to greet,
  My last year's friends together.

One have I marked, the happiest guest
In all this covert of the blest:
Hail to Thee, far above the rest
  In joy of voice and pinion!
Thou, Linnet! in thy green array,
Presiding Spirit here to-day,
Dost lead the revels of the May;
  And this is thy dominion.

While birds, and butterflies, and flowers,
Make all one band of paramours,
Thou, ranging up and down the bowers,
  Art sole in thy employment;
A Life, a Presence like the Air,
Scattering thy gladness without care,
Too blest with any one to pair;
  Thyself thy own enjoyment.

Amid yon tuft of hazel trees,
That twinkle to the gusty breeze,
Beyond him perched in ecstacies,
  Yet seeming still to hover;
There! Where the flutter of his wings
Upon his back and body flings
Shadows and sunny glimmerings,
  That cover him all over.

My dazzled sight he oft deceives,
A Brother of the dancing leaves;
Then flits, and from the cottage eaves
  Puts forth his song in gushes;
As if by that exulting strain
He mocked and treated with disdain
The voiceless Form he chose to feign,
  While fluttering in the bushes.

[23]Keith A. Gould, "Wordsworth and Hartshorne: A Comparative Study," Unpublished doctoral dissertation of The Pennsylvania State University (June, 1973). Thanks must be expressed to Dr. Lewis S. Ford, editor of Process Studies, for suggesting the relation of this work to my own, and for making a copy of Gould's manuscript available. Ford also made valuable comments on the content of this particular chapter of my discussion.

points which are applicable to the present discussion. The relation of Whitehead to Hartshorne is well-known, and Gould's discussion makes reference to Whitehead throughout. Gould's basic intention is to show that for Wordsworth and Hartshorne following Whitehead that aesthetics is at the crucial foundation of the development of the "whole man" or "world soul"; "the way to truth and peace begins in the sensorium, not in the cerebrum."[24] While the aesthetic dimension is given precedence, a balance with the analytic power of reason is idealized in what Wordsworth calls the "height of feeling intellect" and the "philosophic mind."

In a consideration which directly relates to the paidia form of play, Wordsworth asserts that the first stage of awareness which moves toward the "philosophic mind" is through the senses, especially as one is able to open one's self to all that is around him. One should hold

> . . . unconscious intercourse
> With the eternal Beauty, drinking in
> A pure organic pleasure from the lines
> Of curling mist, or from the level plain
> Of waters color'd by the steady clouds.[25]

According to Gould, Wordsworth calls this "idleness," and there is no active participation on the part of the person involved in the experience; he simply lets the experience happen to him as it will. A second stage then blends "idleness" into what is referred to as "wise passiveness." "If in idleness a person is a leaf drifting aimlessly in the current of sensory impulses, in wise passiveness a person is a speckled trout holding in the current, receiving the impulses in the sensorium

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[24] Ibid., p. 40.

[25] Wordsworth, Prelude, op.cit., II, 376-379.

and reacting emotionally to them. Sensation and feeling blend."[26] Hartshorne would call this blending the "affective continuum." One significant element which seems to appear as characteristic of "wise passiveness" is the synthetic reconciling of opposites, which is also a primary element in play as has been seen.

Following this second stage there is a merger with an "intellectual continuum"[27] in which an "affective-intellectual continuum" functions as an "interchange" (Gould's word) or "interplay" between the mind and the objects which act upon it. Here the mind's creativity is seen as being "capable of somehow recreating and enhancing the beauty and significance of the thing perceived."[28] This seems precisely the same sort of phenomena as Heidegger and Gadamer's "re-presentation," and on its most fundamental level is directly related to the imitative or mimisis element of play. It is also sigificant that this interchange is initiated, not by the active mind of man, but by some truth which stands without man which unveils itself. For example, Whitehead notes according to Gould that there are times in Wordsworth's poetry when nature exhibits "entwined prehensive unites, each suffused with modal presences of others."[29]

> This is not to say that Wordsworth "becomes" the tree or the dancing daffodils, although through his remarkable recreative memory the poet does seem to melt into the experience and to dance with the flowers. Rather, we could say that he "feels their feelings," that

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[26] Gould, op.cit., p. 43.

[27] Wordsworth, Prelude, op.cit., XII, II, 376-379.

[28] Gould, op.cit., p. 48.

[29] Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, op.cit., p. 84.

> somehow, through sympathetic union, he "embodies" them as they"embody" him. (As Whitehead would say, objects and modes of feeling embody each other insofar as they are influenced by one another.[30]) And the imaginative process leads to this merging, or partial merging, of subject and object. The merging would be partial because Wordsworth seems to agree with Hartshorne that the feelings of the flower would be on a much more rudimentary level than would the feelings of the man. That is, the flower or the tree would not prehend the man as fully as the man prehends them, because he would be more "sympathetically dependent" on them than they on him.[31]

At this point, one is approaching the next level which is that of imagination, or more precisely, imaginative reason. This level is tantamount to the Platonic synthesis of passion and reason. Here one arrives at active internal processes of the mind, albeit ones which are informed by the preceeding levels. Imagination is seen as a higher power or ability to re-create or re-present, and to unify and reconcile opposites. One can clearly see how this understanding closely approximates Hartman's ideas about playing with possibilities, and the "centering in concreteness" which is achieved in doing so. Wordsworth compared this imaginative reason to mystical experience, a type of intrinsic experience in Hartman's thought.

The aesthetic blends with ethics in Wordsworth, also. When a person is fully aware in the sense described above, their conscious will awaken. "When a person has developed a reverence for life and discovered the unity permeating all things, he will begin to act morally. Nature not only becomes a source of joy, she becomes a teacher of ethical conduct."[32] Here, the ideas emphasized by Gould in his study reflect quite

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[30] Ibid., p. 81.

[31] Gould, op.cit., p. 50.

[32] Ibid., p. 57.

favorably upon the thesis of this dissertation that the ability to see synthetic unity is directly related to a lessening of devisive competitiveness, and the ability to be human. Thus, conscious and moral activity may be considered a stage beyond the "philosophical mind."

In returning to Whitehead, the intrinsic, aesthetic event of the poem can be justifiably assigned the status of paradigm in elucidating his metaphysics in much the same way that play is Gadamer's paradigm. This aesthetic parallel should not be underestimated. Whitehead was compelled by the idea that "beauty, moral and aesthetic, is the aim of existence."[33] There was for Whitehead as "aesthetic order for the universe";[34] "the actual world is the outcome of the aesthetic order and the aesthetic order is derived from the immanence of God."[35]

Hopefully, the point of the relation of Whitehead's metaphysics to poetry and the intrinsic aesthetic event, which was understood as an extension of one of the major theses of the entire discussion, is convincingly made. Aesthetic order and play should by now be seen as models which are closely parallel, and manifest a similar perspective on that which is. Whereas, it has been seen that a study of the aesthetic event can elucidate Whitehead's metaphysical understanding of existence, it now needs to be seen how the formal elements of his philosophy can be used to describe this event. At this point, the discussion will be primarily concerned with coming to an understanding of what Whitehead

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[33]Norman Pittenger, Alfred North Whitehead (Richmond, 1969), p. 4.

[34]Bertram Morris, "The Art Process and the Aesthetic Fact in Whitehead's Philosophy," in Schilpp, op.cit., pp. 463-486.

[35]A. N. Whitehead, Religion in the Making (New York, 1963), pp. 104-105.

means by the term "satisfaction." This is the key term in Whitehead's thought: that which "happens" to the artist; that which takes place in intrinsic valuation and play; that which makes something valuable "for its own sake"; the subjective aim of creativity; the fulfillment of the primordial nature of God; the unified end of that which is called concrescence; the highest intensification of feeling. The key term and the ancilliary terms which accompany it must now be defined within the context of the formal structures of Whitehead's system.

The basic element of Whitehead's metaphysical scheme is an "actual entity" which occurs in, or is temporally expressed as, an "actual occasion"; the two terms cannot be fundamentally separated except on the level of God where Whitehead does not think that the designation "occasion" with its implication of temporality, duration, and change is fully appropriate. These actual entities can best be understood in terms of a pulsation of energy in quantum mechanics (almost a primordial "leap" of movement, as in the etymological root of paidia). The pulsations are discontinuous, each having a unique duration which Whitehead calls a "specious present." After this duration the particular actual entity perishes, and can be described only in terms of its "objective immortality." This means that the particular entity or occasion can become the object of ordinary consciousness or knowledge; it also means that the original occasion can have some influence upon or make some contribution to succeeding actual entities. There is, however, an absolute, causal independence of each event. The only idea that approximates causation is what Whitehead calls "the causal immanence of the past in the present," in which future events "inherit" form the past. Whitehead is developing a scheme which will stand in opposition to such

ideas of "substance" as those held by Aristotle (the enduring thing in the midst of permanence and change) and Descartes (that which needs nothing but itself in order to exist, and which can be characterized in terms of thinking or extension), ideas of any "order of nature," and ideas of continuous matter in general.

The actual occasion has a teleological nature in Whitehead's thought. By this he means that there is some sort of aim which he calls "subjective" which creatively prompts the direction of the satisfaction or concrescence of the entity. The entity also contributes to the concrescence by its own power of choice, which will be more fully explained, and this supplementation of "subjective form," which may be understood as synonymous with Gadamer's "structure." It should also be noted that the "form" is not implied from without, but arises from within. Each individual entity has such an aim, and the organism as a whole does, also. The aim can be understood in terms of final cause, and it is initiated for Whitehead in the primordial nature of God (or, "Creativity").

Therefore, each individual, infinitesimal occasion has a subjective aim, a subjective form, a duration, a moment of satisfaction, and a perishing. Within the duration there is a <u>continual movement</u> (the "back-and-forthness," and perpetual repetition and renewal of play) toward satisfaction. This movement is characterized by increased unification and concrescence. By concrescence Whitehead means that there is a purposive, self-determined "coming together" in which the range of alternatives that the occasion could become is increasingly limited until one alternative is available which unifies any diversity within the entity, and which makes it uniquely different from any other actual

entity of occasion. In the realization of this uniqueness, satisfaction is attained. This is the goal of the "actual occasion" in Whitehead's thought as it was the goal of the process of "Aesthetic Education" in Schiller. The occasion is the locus for, and the entity experiences, the greatest intensification of feeling or richness of intension; this is the "immediacy of self-enjoyment," and it is this unique element which cannot be inherited. It perishes as experience, and therefore to rationalize it is to shift to a lower order of conscious perspective.

W. A. Christian provides a succinct discussion of the concept of satisfaction in his Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics.[36] He emphasizes several ideas that are brought out in the preceeding paragraph. The diversity mentioned above is explained in terms of component feelings which inhibit one another because of attraction to various ends. Whitehead is also seen as describing the concrescant unification in terms of "harmony." Christian points out that the satisfaction is, in at least one sense, present in the occasion at the onset of the process of duration in the occasion's "specious present"; it is present as the ideal of the process, which again provides another synonym for "subjective aim." In a point of lesser importance, one can see the entire universe being "implicated" in the satisfaction of the actual occasion. One could speak of positive and negative prehension within this "implication," but the main idea that needs to be understood is that in the moment of satisfaction that uniqueness of the actual entity is posited against every other actual entity; there is nothing else in

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[36] W. A. Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead's Metaphysics (New Haven, 1959), pp. 17-38 passim.

the universe exactly like it. The actual occasion now has a "determinative attitude toward every element in the universe."[37]

At this point the discussion can be brought back to the primary question of value, for it is in an understanding of this "determinative attitude" that the most specific statement about value in general and intrinsic value in particular can be made. The following quotes are decisive:

> This satisfaction is the attainment of something, individual to the entity in question. "Satisfaction" provides the individual element in the composition of the actual entity.[38]
>
> In the conception of the actual entity in its phase of satisfaction, the entity has attained its individual separation from other entities . . . .[39]
>
> . . . the attainment of a particular definiteness is the final cause which animates a particular process . . . .[40]
>
> The final phase in the process of concrescence, constituting an actual entity, is one complex, fully determinative feeling.[41]

Preceeding these quotation from Process and Reality is one summarizing quote from Science and the Modern World: "Value is the outcome of limitation."[42]

Therefore, the organic process within the duration of the actual

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[37] Ibid., p. 26. Quoted from Whitehead, Process and Reality, op. cit., pp. 71-72.

[38] Whitehead, Process and Reality, op.cit., p. 129.

[39] Ibid., p. 233.

[40] Ibid., p. 340.

[41] Ibid., p. 38.

[42] Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, op.cit., p. 74.

occasion is a process of seeking value or uniqueness, and a process of valuation. Valuation takes place in the movement toward unification as various potential alternatives are selected out (i.e., played out). One might speak at this point of "The One" emerging from "The Many." Finally, by this process of "finitude-ing" or self-limitation, the uniqueness of the occasion is realized and the experience of satisfaction occurs. Thus, one can think of the value of the occasion in terms of form, or the structure of the actual occasion which is different from any other structure. One can similarly think of value in terms of feeling, or the "immediacy of self-enjoyment" which is experienced when the uniqueness occurs. However, the key word is uniqueness; that which is of intrinsic value is that which makes the occasion different from anything else, and the experience of the realization of that difference or determinativeness. The form and feeling cannot be ultimately separated in the event or occasion in a perfect synthesis of event as in the synthesis of the sensual and the rational in play; such division could occur only after the occasion had perished, and attained the status of objective immortality.

What has been heretofore said about any actual occasion can be complexified in a movement to the highly complex society of actual occasions which reachesits apex in man. It should be carefully noted that Whitehead felt that the greater complexification of societies of actual occasions that was involved, the greater resultant level of intensification of feeling in satisfaction that could be attained! The society of actual occasions that go into making up an electron experience satisfaction. However, when one comes to the level of Wordsworth's linnet, there is a complexification which has taken place, and the

song-bird's experience of satisfaction is much more intense than that of the electron. Man, then, has the optimum range of intrinsic intensification of satisfaction that is available. It might even be said that different men have different levels of complexification, and it is then possible to return to the artist as being representative of the highest level of human intrinsic experience that is possible.

One can again speak of the play of artistic creativity in which there is a concrescence of the artist and the particular environment that he may be inhabiting; for example, Wordsworth in the orchard, or Michelangelo before the block of granite that would become "David." The artist is able to realize the uniqueness of the particular event when the concrescence attains satisfaction; the uniqueness is thus the intrinsic value of the event. The artist is also able to realize his own uniqueness or intrinsic value in that occasion of satisfaction. Man is special in the sense that he can realize or affirm his uniqueness time and again. It may even be possible to speak of man in terms of a continuing concrescent entity, or as possessing the potential for a continuing immediacy of self-enjoyment; i.e., man is human only as long as he plays. While, in the strictest sense of the Whiteheadian system, man may actually be a different actual entity with each passing duration, Whitehead also describes a philosophical or aesthetic attitude which can be developed by man, which certainly encompasses more than one "specious present." The need to realize uniqueness is greatly demanded, for it brings continuity and coherence to the changes which are occuring. It then becomes possible to speak of a self-identity or an overall uniqueness or intrinsic value which might be synonymous with such terms as "Personhood," "Self," or "Being."

What has been said about the actual entity in particular can be said about human life in general. It is proper to think of "aims of satisfaction" in terms of "desires for happiness."[43] In Modes of Thought, he describes the end of satisfaction as the "way of enjoyment."[44] This "way" is accomplished in a contemplative, artistic lifestyle that Whitehead characterizes in terms of play. In this attitude of play, the individual is constantly being provided with new alternatives, "the infinite variety of vivid values,"[45] which must be evaluated to the point of realizing their uniqueness. In doing so, the uniqueness of the individual is affirmed, and there is an escape from boredom. There is an essential juxtaposition which is generated between the individual who is bored with life, and that individual who plays with (or, more precisely, who is caught up in the play of) life; the latter is the intrinsic valuer, the player, the participant in and product of the aesthetic lifestyle. A statement by Whitehead toward the end of Science and the Modern World is of fundamental importance.

> A static value, however serious and important, becomes unendurable by its appalling monotony of endurance. The soul cries loudly for release into change. It suffers the agonies of claustrophobia. The transitions of humor, wit, irreverence, play, sleep, and — above all — art are necessary for it. Great art is the arrangement of the environment so as to provide for the soul vivid, but transient, values . . . great art is more than transient refreshment. It is something which adds to the permanent richness of the soul's self-attainment. It justifies itself both by its immediate enjoyment, and also by its discipline of the inmost being.

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[43] Davis, op.cit., p. 77.

[44] Whitehead, Modes of Thought, op.cit., p. 152.

[45] Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, op.cit., p. 199.

> Its discipline is not distinct from enjoyment, but by reason of it. It transforms the soul into the permanent realization of values extending beyond its former self.[46]

In a work entitled Experience and Conceptual Activity, J. M. Burgers suggests that this idea of play is at the very heart of Whitehead's metaphysical scheme.

> Conceptual activity is not a physical measuring and calculating appratus of which we can postulate that it works with certainty. It can waver, and it can make errors. We must ascribe a certain amount of freedom of the activity of the subjective form, and the best description that we can give of its activity involves the notion of play with all its elusiveness. It "experiments," and this is influenced by some conception of purpose in view of which possible courses are evaluated.[47]

In an important qualification of these statements, Whitehead says that this playful aestheticism is more than simply staring at beautiful sunsets. Even those objects which seem at the opposite extreme of anything aesthetically pleasing can be seen from a variety of perspectives. For Whitehead, unless that variety of perspectives is observed, the object has not been seen in its completeness, nor is there any possibility for making it any more intrinsically valuable. Take, for example, what would seem to be an absurd illustration in regard to the typically considered realm of aesthetics, a factory:

> A factory, with its machinery, its community of operatives, its social service to the general population, its dependence upon organizing and designing genius, its potentialities as a source of wealth to the holders of its stock is an organism exhibiting a variety

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[46] Ibid., p. 202.

[47] Ibid., p. 200.

> of vivid values. What we want to train is the habit of apprehending such an organism in its completeness.[48]

Therefore, this poetic playfulness is not simply a mysticism, but an involvement in the "play of possibilities" related to an event or a person. It is a philosophical attitude ("philosophical mind") in which philosophy is seen as "an attitude of mind toward doctrines ignorantly entertained,"[49] and in which the word philosophical is explicitly defined.

> The use of philosophy is to maintain an active novelty of fundamental ideas . . . . It reserves the slow descent of accepted thought towards the inactive common place. If you like to phrase it so, philosophy is mystical. For mysticism is direct insight into depths as yet unspoken. But the purpose of philosophy is to rationalize mysticism; not by explaining it away, but by the introduction of novel verbal characterization, rationally coordinated. Philosophy is akin to poetry . . . . In both cases there is a reference to form beyond the direct meaning of words.[50]

Truth, value, intrinsic worth, selfhood, Being, and any other essential "Urstoff" which man attempts to locate or explain in order to confirm his human uniqueness is not found within the confines of an absolute, scientific, rationalistic, substantival, propositional description, but in the play of alternatives or play of possibilities, the lair of the lure of feeling. Whitehead's final word in regard to this particular assessment may not be a word at all, but a laugh.

> Is it that nothing, no experience good or bad, no belief, no cause, is, in effect, momentous enough to monopolize the whole of life to the exclusion of laughter (or play)? Laughter is our reminder

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[48] Whitehead, Modes of Thought, op.cit., p. 171.

[49] Ibid., p. 174.

[50] Ibid.

that our theories are an attempt to make existence intelligible, but necessarily only an attempt, and does not the irrational, the instinctive burst in to keep the balance true by laughter?[51]

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[51]Price, op.cit., p. 62. Whitehead is reading to Price from chapter XIII of Science and the Modern World.

CHAPTER IX

IMAGINATION AND PLAY IN THE POETRY OF WALLACE STEVENS

Attention will be given in the final chapter of this section to the work of the Pulitzer Prize winning American poet, Wallace Stevens. It might seem that the writings of a poet, and an attempt at a literary criticism of a selection of his work, would be somewhat misplaced in a study such as the one that is presently being made. However, Stevens' work is of particular significance for a number of reasons. First, he produces a modern equivalent to Wordsworth's The Prelude or a work such as Joyce's Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man in the disscussion which he provides about the artistic imagination. It has already become quite evident that the imagination is one of, it not the, major manifestations of intrinsic playfulness. Stevens' poetry is highly introspective, and as will be seen, may be an attempt of imagination seeking to express and understand itself through a poet and his work. While there is certainly no claim being made that the present work attains a parallel stature to that of Heidegger, the consideration of Stevens is prompted by the prominent place given by Heidegger to his consideration of the poetry of Hölderlin. Stevens is also concerned with intrinsic value, and this consideration is a central element in his writings; in his essays on poetry, The Necessary Angel, one of the major chapters is entitled "Imagination and Value." In one of his best-known poems, his emphasis on a fictive, play attitude will be examined, and he will even be found making almost Platonic statements about the epitomized position of children in regard to play. There has been a

good deal of discussion in the dissertation concerning a philosophical expression which somehow moves beyond traditional philosophical expression, and which comes in contact with the "play of Being" more experientially, rather than by analytical rationalization. This area of expression appears to be a philosophy which merges with poetry. The work with Stevens will be an attempt to investigate what may be more of that sort of expression. The dissertation will also attempt to move through this chapter to a less analytical re-presentation of its major conclusions.

Some mention should perhaps be made in regard to why Wallace Stevens' work originally became of importance to a discussion such as the one here undertaken. In one of those events of serendipity that education (when it is paideia) sometimes provides, a seminar with Hartman on intrinsic value and artistic creativity and a seminar on Stevens' poetry were being taken concurrently. Time and again, the response was evoked from the classes that "these men are saying the same things!" Finally, discoveries were made in the work of the previously unknown Stevens that made the suggested parallel definite. In the previously mentioned The Necessary Angel, Stevens is found giving consideration to the difficult problem of attempting to manage the ambiguous ranges of notions implied by the word value. He recalls a statement that had been made with regard to this problem that he considered "provocative"[1]: "someone said the other day, that 'an objective theory of value is needed in philosophy not dependent upon unanalysable intuitions . . .'."[2] This

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[1]Wallace Stevens, The Necessary Angel (New York, 1951), p. 149.

[2]Ibid.

was exactly the thesis being formulated and first expressed by Hartman at the same time that Stevens' was making the statement quoted above. There is, of course, no way of substantiating that Stevens was referring to Hartman specifically, because numerous individuals have made similar statements about managing the plethora of notions related to value, but the possibility is nonetheless quite plausible. Stevens kept himself abreast of the latest movements in philosophy; he also was an executive with Hartford Insurance during the time that Hartman was providing seminars for The Nationwide Insurance Company. Eventually, a discovery was made in Stevens' work which, in light of the relationship between intrinsic value and poetry already encountered in Hartman, veritably "leaped off the page." In his discussion of poetic value, Stevens remarked: "poetic value is an intrinsic value. It is not the value of knowledge. It is not the value of faith. It is the value of imagination."[3] One might say with Plato and Schiller in particular, that it is not reason or passion, but a higher, synthesizing unity of the two; that which occurs in play. As attention was increasingly related to imagination and play, especially that manifested in the artistic creativity of the poet, the work of Stevens became of more pronounced importance; it seemed quite necessary to include a treatment of his work at this point in the dissertation.

A basic introduction to the main concerns of Stevens' poetry can be seen by taking examples from a few of his best known, and most often anthologized works. Though these poems, almost without exception, appear in the earlier published volume of his work, Harmonium, and do

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[3] Ibid., p. 149.

not attain the philosophical intricacy of some of his later poems such as "The Man with the Blue Guitar," which will be given consideration, they nonetheless demonstrate the principle issues with which he was attempting to come to grips. One of his best-known poems is entitled "Anecdote of the Jar."

> I placed a jar in Tennessee,
> And round it was, upon a hill.
> It made the slovenly wilderness
> Surround that hill.
>
> The wilderness rose up to it,
> And sprawled around, no longer wild.
> The jar was round upon the ground.
> And tall and of a port in air.
>
> It took dominion everywhere.
> The jar was gray and bare.
> It did not give of bird or bush,
> Like nothing else in Tennessee.[4]

Here, Stevens reveals a basic concern with order and meaning in the midst of chaos, chaos being suggested by "sloverly wilderness" and the reference to Tennessee which Stevens thought of as being a backward, uncultured area. One might also think of the basic desire for "structure" described in the Gadamer discussion. The poet then places all of the attention of his imagination on the jar, and it is the jar that gives order to all that surrounds it; the rest of the creation seems to radiate out from the center which is the jar, but more precisely the place the jar holds in the poet's imagination. This is parallel to the important concept of "centering in concreteness" in the Hartman discussion. The "Anecdote" may be an anecdote describing the function of poetry itself as that which can create a world in itself by the way

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[4] Wallace Stevens, The Collected Poems of Wallace Stevens (New York, 1972), p. 76.

that the poetic imagination is able to shape what is called "reality." The ability of the poetic imagination, which is the epitome of playfulness, to see the jar in the way that it does is tantamount to being able to find meaning in the midst of chaos, which is the process of intrinsic valuation. In a sense the poem is a creation in a creation, and in a further, perhaps more importance sense, it is an anecdote of the way that the poetic imagination realizes the dimension of "new creation." The poem would be didactic in the sense that it implies that perhaps other instances of such imaginative seeing could dispell other manifestations of chaos.

In a later work, "Of Modern Poetry," which comes from a volume entitled Part of the World, Stevens extends these reflections:

> The poem of the mind in the act of finding
> What will suffice. It has not always had
> to find: the scene was set; it repeated what
> Was in the script.
> Then the theatre was changed
> To something else. Its past was a souvenir . . . .[5]

Here is another form of chaos: the ever-changing world in which man often attempts to live by an outdated script. The poet must become involved in the "play of ideas," and must advance the traditions by looking in new ways, visualizing new perspectives. Stevens would see the outdated script in "Of Modern Poetry" which no longer suffices as a kind of thinking which finds security in classifying and systemitizing existence into lifeless myths that have lost any uniqueness that they might once have had. The outdated script would be like the paidia which has become paralized in the rule orientation of agon, and which

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[5] Ibid., p. 239.

has lost its vitality and openness to change.

Stevens continually emphasizes the power of the imagination to intrinsically value a particular reality. In "The Glass of Water" he refutes the position of the logical positivists that one could only talk about that which could be objectively verified. Making an explicit reference to Husserl, he felt that that which could be verified as fact was only one dimension of reality. There was a meta-physical in addition to the physical. Hartman had said that "it is no exaggeration that the most important phenomena today are intangibles,"[6] and Stevens that it is "only through ideas (poetic imagination) that one is able to arrive at the important things of life"[7]; perhaps that level of truth which supra-rationally transcends the "rational" is that which has been termed aletheia.

> That the glass would melt in heat,
> That the water would freeze in cold,
> Shows that this object is merely a state,
> One of many, between two poles . . .
>
> Here in the centre stands the glass. Light
> Is the lion that comes down to drink. There
> And in that state, the glass is a pool.
> Ruddy are his eyes and ruddy are his claws
> When light comes down to wet his frothy jaws.[8]

A logical positive might not agree with this experience, but the child would quickly identify with it.

In a poem entitled "Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Blackbird," Stevens

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[6]Robert S. Hartman, "The Value Structure of Creativity," The Journal of Value Inquiry (Winter, 1972), p. 246.

[7]Holly Stevens (ed.), The Letters of Wallace Stevens (New York, 1966), p. 345.

[8]Stevens, Collected Poems, op.cit., p. 197.

shows thirteen different responses of the imagination to a single experience. In each instance the blackbird is not simply all of the definable properties that fulfill the definition of "blackbird" (Hartman's systemic value), nor is it merely a member of the class of all blackbirds (extrinsic value). In each of the thirteen instances, there is demonstrated the infinite range of the intrinsically valuing imagination; the blackbird is unique in each instance, and in each instance, not only the blackbird, but the entire world, takes on a different appearance (or, takes on a new "reality"). This particular poem represents an excellent example of what Hartman called the "play of possibilities." Stevens is doing with a blackbird what Whitehead did in the previous chapter with a factory.

I
Among twenty snowy mountains,
The only moving thing
Was the eye of the blackbird.

III
The blackbird whirled in the autumn winds.
It was a small part of the pantomine.

IV
A man and a woman
Are one.
A man and a woman and a blackbird
Are one.

XII
The river is moving.
The blackbird must be flying.

XIII
It was evening all afternoon.
It was snowing
And it was going to snow.
The blackbird sat
In the cedar limbs.[9]

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[9] Ibid., pp. 92-94.

The final way of looking at the blackbird is of special importance because of the way that the blackbird in the poet's picture has a particular relation to time. Micheline Sauvage describes four potential levels of time in a work of art: T1, the historical date of the work of art; T2, the time element in the work of art, or the time it takes to read it or meditate upon it; T3, the evoked time, or the "prerogative moment"[10] from which the events which the moment captures radiate; and T4, "a time represented over and above the time of what is represented (i.e., the life events of the poem)."[11] Sauvage uses Poe's "The Raven" as an example. "Once upon a midnight dreary," or "Ah, distinctly I remember it was in the bleak December" are examples of T3 as is "it was evening all afternoon" in Stevens' poem. Yet, above T3 is the greater intrinsic experience of the represented time, T4. In "The Raven" it is a feared, hated, malevolent time; perhaps, it is a similar time in Stevens' poem. T4 time is intrinsic time, or play time, and when Sartre's "hole in time" is filled and Being does have a real specious present, the time experienced is intrinsically T4. Stevens says that the "world around us would be desolate except for the world within us . . . ."[12] The "world within us" is the imagination, and the ability to value intrinsically is also an ability to respond to this intrinsic world.

One of the best-known poems by Stevens is entitled "A High-Toned

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[10]Etienne Souriau, "Time in the Plastic Arts," in Susanne K. Langer (ed.), Reflections on Art (Baltimore, 1968), pp. 122-141.

[11]Micheline Sauvage, "Notes on the Superposition of Temporal Modes in Works of Art," in Langer, Ibid., pp. 161-173.

[12]James Baird, "Transvaluation in Stevens' Poetics," in Peter L. McNamara (ed.), Critics on Wallace Stevens (Coral Gables, 1972), p. 16.

Old Christian Woman." In the poem, one encounters one of the most explicit statements about the paidia relation to existence.

> Poetry is the supreme fiction, madame.
> Take the moral law and make a nave of it
> And from the nave build haunted heaven. Thus,
> The conscience is converted into palms,
> Like windy cithern hankering for hymns.
> We agree in principle. That's clear. But take
> The opposing law and make a peristyle,
> And from the peristyle project a masque
> Beyond the planets. Thus, our bawdiness,
> Unpurged by epitaph, indulged at last,
> Is equally converted into palms,
> Squiggling like saxophones. And palm for palm,
> Madame, we are where we began. Allow,
> Therefore, that in the planetary scene
> Your disaffected flagellants, well-stuffed,
> Proud of such novelties of the sublime,
> May, merely may, madame, whip from themselves
> A jovial hullabaloo among the spheres.
> That will make widows wince. But fictive things,
> Wink as they will. Wink most when widows wince.[13]

It may be that Stevens is attempting to substantiate the claim of the first sentence of the poem by all that follows it. Addressing the sterotypic figure of a pious, Christian widow, he discusses the juxtaposed extremes of a moral and egotistical hedonistic lifestyle. His conclusion, which makes the widow wince (as if she is reminded of something she already knows) when it is manifested, is that both are but particular, fictive constructions having an equal efficacy. Here again is the affirmation that all activity is "as if," and the supreme player is the person who recognized the fictive nature of reality. The child is also seen as the paradigm of this type of activity: " . . . one stops to think how much of the poetry of the whole world is the poetry of children, both as they are and as they have been written of and

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[13] Stevens, Collected Poems, op.cit., p. 59.

painted, as if they were the creatures of a dimension in which life and poetry are one."[14]

A further, helpful elucidation of intrinsic value and imagination can be found in a book by Sam Keen entitled To A Dancing God. In a section which deals with "Education for Serendipity," Keen speaks of the art of becoming a lover. There is a parallel relationship which exists between the capacity to love and the capacity to value intrinsically. Hartman said: "love is a species of which intrinsic value is the genus."[15] Keen uses the illustration of a Carson McCullers short story[16] in which a young paperboy encounters a drunk in an all-night diner. The drunk begins to show the boy pictures of his wife who deserted him fifteen years earlier, and his plan for winning her back. The drunk posits a science of love in which there is a hierarchy for loving. "First love a rock, then a cloud, then a tree, and gradually your powers will grow until it will be possible to love a woman."[17] The drunk complains that the mistake which he originally made was in trying to love the hardest object of love, a woman, first. Keen is reminded of Buber's "I-Thou" relationship, and then analyzes the McCullers story:

> There is a wisdom in this story which the Greek philosophers would have understood. Plato also insisted that love had a ladder of ascent whose rung was a simple object. Eros is first directed toward modest objects, and only afterwards may it reach the good,

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[14] Stevens, The Necessary Angel, op.cit., pp. 159-160.

[15] Hartman, orally, in seminar discussion.

[16] Sam Keen, To A Dancing God (New York, 1970), p. 58.

[17] Ibid.

the beautiful, and the true.[18]

Intrinsic valuation and poetic imagination are now seen as an erotic relatedness to life, and "human survival"[19] depends upon recovering that erotic relatedness that Keen explained as being obscured in an "eclipse of wonder" in the present, technological society. Keen stated: "the basic skill necessary is the ability to indwell with sympathetic imagination,"[20] the ability characterized by the poetic man of imagination.

Returning to Stevens, in The Necessary Angel he sees the imagination as "the power of the mind over the possibility of things."[21] Recalling "Of Modern Poetry," the poem is "the mind in its act of finding what will suffice,"[22] the playful creation of a "Supreme Fiction."[23] He says that he has in mind such artistic expressions as the sculptures of Michelangelo. In the sculptures there is expressed "their wonderful strength verging, as in the things of the imagination great strength always does, on what is singular or strange."[24] It is important to recall that for Hartman intrinsic valuation was concerned primarily with singular concepts. Stevens reveals that his main impetus is to let the poetic imagination deal with the present world in which old myths and romantic imaginings are no longer meaningful. In "Loneliness

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[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., p. 59.

[20] Ibid., p. 61.

[21] Stevens, The Necessary Angel, op.cit., p. 136.

[22] Stevens, Collected Poems, op.cit., p. 239.

[23] Ibid., p. 380.

[24] Stevens, The Necessary Angel, op.cit., p. 137.

in Jersey City" he says: "The steeples are empty and so are the people."[25] "The great poems of heaven and hell have been written and the great poem of the earth remains to be written."[26] Paidia is no longer the possession of Olympus, but of Earth. He concludes that the poet is the "orator of the imagination,"[27] and it is the exercise of this particular imagination and others like it that "enables us to live our own lives"[28]; that is, to be free.

> We have it because we do not have enough without it. This may not be true as to each one of us, for certainly there are those for whom reality and the reason are enough. It is true of us as a race. A single, strong imagination is like a single, strong reason in this, that the extreme of each is a spiritual good. It is not possible to say, as between the two, which is paramount. For that matter, it is not always possible to say that they are two.
>
> The truth seems to be that we live in concepts of the imagination before the reason has established them. If this is true, then reason is simply the methodizer of the imagination. It may be that the imagination is a miracle of logic and its exquisite divinations are calculations beyond analysis, as the conclusions of the reason are calculations wholly within analysis.[29]

Consideration can now be given to one of the most important of Stevens' poems, "The Man with the Blue Guitar," which is his major attempt at poetically dealing with the imagination; significantly, the main figure in the poem is a guitar player. "The Man with the Blue

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[25] Stevens, Collected Poems, op.cit., p. 210.

[26] Stevens, The Necessary Angel, op.cit., p. 142.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid., p. 150.

[29] Ibid., pp. 150 and 154.

Guitar" can be described as representing the mid-point in Stevens' career as a poet. Although many of the same themes occur with consistency throughout his poetry, there is a basic difference in style for which this poem can serve as a dividing line. The pre-Blue Guitar poems are more lush and elegant, filled with color, tropical atmosphere, and what some might call more traditionally poetical language. The poems following Blue Guitar are more direct, perhaps even stark at times, and it seems that Stevens' is very consciously concerned with an economy of words. The post-Blue Guitar poems become very philosophical in an attempt to come to grips with the problem of the relationship of the poetic imagination to what can only ambiguously be described as reality. The poems are not simply an extrinsic description of this struggle, but an intrinsic articulation and evocation of the struggle itself. In the end the struggle may not be completely resolved, but it certainly is not prematurely systematized; perhaps the poems leave the reader, in a situation as that described by Gadamer, to participate in the struggle for himself. Stevens' poetry can be described as "metapoetry,"[30] or as a grammatical "drama,"[31] as it introspectively attempts to deal with the medium of poetry itself, and the power of the poetic imagination.

The writing of Blue Guitar comes at a crisis period in Stevens' career as a poet. In the middle of the 1930s, he came under a seething attack by literary critic Sidney Burnshaw. Burnshaw was very much aware of the social milieu of the thirties (the threatening economic crisis,

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[30] Roy H. Pearce and J. Hillis Miller, The Act of the Mind (Baltimore, 1965), p. 184.

[31] Ibid.

the rise to power of Adolph Hitler, the Spanish Civil War), and he was convinced that the only valid poetry was poetry that commented on these social conditions. He severely criticized Stevens for writing a type of poetry which was completely detached from life.

What Burnshaw did not understand was that Stevens was writing his poetry on a more essential level of consideration than that content level for which the critic was calling. What Stevens was attempting to do was "not to forego but to subsume politics, the socio-economic, even the ordinary run of experience; in the end intending no less than to show how man, by the exercise of his strictly human imagination, could resolve the proximate into the ultimate."[32] What Stevens was doing is admittedly more subtle, but he creates a universal, timeless world in itself which could have applicability to all of existence, not just particular parts of it. There may be further implications at this point for the statements which have been made about the relationship of the ethical to the aesthetic, and the idea that aesthetics may be, not only a more fundamental level of knowledge, but a more fundamental level of morality. With regard to Hartman's designations, Stevens was writing an intrinsic poetry, while that which Burnshaw was demanding was an extrinsic poetry which would be tantamount to a dis-value of the intrinsic level.

However, Stevens was sensitive to Burnshaw's criticisms, and seems to have been appalled by the way that he had been misunderstood. He retorts with a lengthy poem entitled "Owl's Clover," but then is almost immediately totally displeased with the emotional response that he allows

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[32] Ibid., p. 255.

himself to make; he felt as if he had allowed his standards to be lowered. "Owl's Clover" was looked upon as "argument and not art. It became for Stevens the paradigm of ideological error, the reduction of poetry to partisan rhetoric, and the doctrinaire assertion of one idea."[33] In the final edition of Stevens' collected poems, he did not allow "Owl's Clover" to be published.

"The Man with the Blue Guitar" can be seen as an attempt to repair the "error" made by "Owl's Clover." Stevens said that he deliberated more over the poems that made up Blue Guitar than any group of poems he had ever written. The poem is a suite of thirty-three parts in which there is no coherent pattern or systematized use of symbols or metaphors. The poem seeks to be true to life that is seen as a constant flux of images undisturbed by a logical mind obsessed with an eagerness for order. Stevens considered each poem to be complete in itself, and admitted that in retrospect some "bored him." However, most of his critics agreed that one of the main glories of the work was that Stevens retained interest through thirty-three poems that had so much in common. Blue Guitar can be summarized as "the rationale (reason finding its ultimate expression in poetry) for the imagination, in contrast to any ideology, as the unique power binding together and defining man."[34] He concludes in The Necessary Angel: "The imagination is the power that enables us to perceive . . . the opposite of chaos in chaos."[35] In a similar statement, Hartman says:

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[33] Ibid., p. 253.

[34] Ibid., p. 255.

[35] Stevens, The Necessary Angel, op. cit., p. 153.

> Man is in a continuous process of creating himself and his environment, a dynamic process which is potential far more than actual. It means that everything is possible for man, that he has no fixed place but makes his place continually. The moment he stops this creative endeavor he becomes a constant, insists on his place, and thus stops being man intrinsically, becoming one extrinsically, a member of a class, a manager, an organization man, one in whom creation has stopped — and who, therefore, abdicates responsibility (and human self-hood).[36]

In the first poem of the suite,[37] the player of the blue guitar is introduced. The man is the poet, and throughout the blue guitar is the symbol of the imagination.

> The man bent over his guitar,
> A shearsman of sorts. The day was green.
>
> They said, "You have a blue guitar,
> Do you not play things as they are."
>
> The man replied, "Things as they are
> Are changed upon the blue guitar."
>
> And they said then, "But play, you must,
> A tune beyond us, yet ourselves,
>
> A tune upon the blue guitar
> Of things exactly as they are."

The poem points up the relationship between the poetic player or intrinsic valuer, and the typical man who Stevens calls "quotidian." Quotidian men are, at one and the same time, intrigued by the prospects of a higher consciousness beyond their own, and are insecure about anything that seems to be different, especially if it is not within the realm of fact, "things as they are." The last stanza of this introductory poem suggests that the paradox is most often resolved in favor of the

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[36] Hartman, "The Value Structure of Creativity," op.cit., p. 278.

[37] Stevens, Collected Poems, op.cit., pp. 165-184. No further notation will be made in regard to selections from this particular poem.

established, factual truth.

> The world today, as it always has been, is run by managers, the uncreative, who usually make miserable the life of the creative. These latter are called crackpots, visionaries, dreamers, utopians, idealists. They are not taken seriously because the world of intrinsic value in which they live is unknown.[38]

Stevens says that most people, like the audience of the poet, live within the "imprisioned imagination of a quotidian existence," dwelling in a "granite monotony." Poem Ten of Blue Guitar describes this quotidian man in terms of the poet's "adversary."

Stevens' poetry has been described as "sustained metaphor," and one should expect more than one level of meaning in the same poem. In the first poem, beyond what has been discussed above, Stevens is introducing the basic theme of the entire poem: the relationship between things as they are ("reality," the "green" in contrast to the "blue" in the first couplet), and things as they are in the imagination. While he wants to give the imagination full reign in order that its total powers might be exercised, he is also conscious of the fact that to radically distort just for the sake of distorting is to alienate, and to create a detachment that jeopardizes credibility. The imagination is "Pure Poetry,"[39] and the purpose of writing poetry is to articulate reality on the level of its most intrinsic truth. He offers a resolution of the problem in his own comments on Blue Guitar:

> The validity of the poet is that he adds to life that without which life cannot be lived, or is not worth living, or is without savor. Poetry is a passion, not

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[38]Hartman, "The Value Structure of Creativity," op.cit., pp. 278-279.

[39]Holly Stevens, op.cit., p. 363.

> a habit. This passion nourishes itself on reality. Imagination has at its source reality, and ceases to be of any value when it departs from reality. Here is the fundamental principle about the imagination: it does not create except as it transforms. There is nothing that does not exist exlcusively by reason of the imagination, or that does not exist in some form in reality. Thus, reality equals the imagination equals reality.[40]

Poem Three gives consideration to the importance that Stevens places on man. One is reminded of the statement made in an earlier chapter that the main error of the Greeks was in transferring what could have been a human emphasis to the gods. Also, the ideas on the intrinsic value of man in Hartman's thought are recalled: "Anything may be intrinsically valued, but only persons are of intrinsic value in themselves. Persons are the source and fountain of intrinsic value."[41]

> Ah, but to play man number one,
> To drive the dagger in his heart,
>
> To lay his brain upon a board
> And pick the acrid colors out,
> To nail his thought across the door,
> Its wings spread wide to rain and snow,
>
> To strike his living — hi and ho,
> To tick it, tock it, turn it true,
>
> To bang it from a savage blue,
> Jangling the metal of the strings . . . .

Stevens says that in this poem that he is recalling his New England childhood, when it was the custom of farmers who might kill an eagle to nail the bird up on a barn door for people to see. This was such an unusual event that people would come from many miles away to see this

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[40] Ibid.

[41] Robert S. Hartman, "Four Axiological Proofs for the Infinite Value of Man," unpublished manuscript, p. 11.

extraordinary object. He is, therefore, emphasizing that man is the most extraordinary object of creation, and that the poet's imagination can picture man in terms of the highest potentiality of his greatness.

The fifth poem brings the audience back upon the scene, but now they have become almost militant detractors. On should pay particular attention to the first four couplets.

> Do not speak to us of the greatness of poetry,
> Of the torches wisping in the underground,
>
> Of the structure of vaults upon a point of light,
> There are no shadows in our sun,
>
> Day is desire and night is sleep.
> There are no shadows anywhere.
>
> The earth, for us, is flat and bare.
> There are no shadows. Poetry
>
> Exceeding music must take the place
> Of empty heaven and its hymns,
>
> Ourselves in poetry must take the place,
> Even in the chattering of your guitar.

The "torches wisping in the underground" are the deep, poetic brooding of the imagination, and the detractors picture this almost as if it were despicable catacombs of human existence. They do not need the power of poetry which is pictured as light streaming into the cold, heavy darkness of a Gothic cathedral, because their lives are seen in terms of explicitly definable blacks and whites; there is no ambiguous, muddled gray. "There are no shadows anywhere." In the final three couplets of the poem, poetry is described in contrast to the detractor's assessment. The ideas of its taking the place of "empty heaven" are reminiscent of the lines from the above mentioned "Loneliness in New Jersey." The further idea of hymns being replaced points up an interesting stylistic consideration. The words of the detractors in

the first part of the poem are written in the meter of old church hymns. Then, the comments on poetry return to the four beat, deliberate meter that is most common in Blue Guitar. It is ironic that the detractors themselves are using this last style, having rejected the hymnic, in the latter part of their comments. The line "ourselves in poetry must take their place" is of seminal importance as it calls for a poetic, playful lifestyle which carries the implication that others in addition to the poet could be intrinsic valuers.

In the tenth poem, which may be the key poem in the work, Stevens says that it is the poetic imagination that is

> The heraldic center of the world
> Of blue, blue sleek with a hundred chins,
> The amorist adjective aflame . . .

As the adjective modifies a noun, so the poetic imagination modifies man's existence. An adjective is not an entity, but a quality, and the imagination is the qualitative dimension of man. The word amorist reminds reminds one of the ideas on love expressed above, and aflame refers to the intensity of the imagination's power. The word sleek is also important, for the reference to "blue, blue" means that the imagination is sleek. The Oxford English Dictionary quotes Hazlitt's use of the term to mean "dexterous" of "skillful." Therefore, the imagination is a skillful power, that is capable of acting as a metaphor in providing a wide variation of meaning ("a hundred chins"). It is possible to make a distinction between "technique" and "skill" by saying that skill is the intrinsic valuation of technique. As has been stressed, the capacity for variation and playing with possibilities is in direct proportion to human being.

Poem Eight gives Stevens the opportunity to qualify what he has

said about the power of the imagination. There will be some occasions when reality is so overpowering that the imagination is powerless to transform it, and the imagination need only be observer. Here, the poet becomes the place where Being unveils itself; for example, one might recall Sartre's confrontation with the "that-ness" of the entire field of snow in the skiing illustration. The player of the blue guitar says: "I twang it out and leave it there." This overpowering potential in reality is expressed formally in the way that this poem is more musical and poetic than any of the other poems of the entire piece.

> The vivid, florid, turgid sky,
> The drenching thunder rolling by,
>
> The morning deluged still by night,
> The clouds tumultously bright
>
> And the feeling heavy in cold chords
> Struggling toward impassioned choirs,
>
> Crying among the clouds, enraged
> By gold antagonists in air —
>
> I know my lazy, leaden twang
> Is like the reason in a storm;
>
> And yet it brings the storm to bear.
> I twang it out and leave it there.

In a poem that comes somewhat later in his career, "Bouquet of Roses in Sunlight,"[42] he expresses some of the same sentiments:

> Say that it is a crude effect, black reds,
> Pink yellows, orange whites, too much as they are
> To be anything else in the sunlight of the room.
> Too much as they are to be changed by metaphor,
> Too actual, things that in being real
> Make any imaginings of them lesser things.

The poet must always be the point of interplay between the imagination

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[42] Stevens, Collected Poems, op.cit., p. 430.

as it acts and the imagination as it is acted upon. In fact, this may not be an either/or situation, but imagination may be the word which is used to describe the personal locus (rather than a spatial locus) of the activity of interplay. At times, it may only seem more the conscious effort of the imagination, at other times the effort of that which impinges upon it.

In Poem Twelve, one comes in contact with that poetic experience which has been described as "self-identification" and "penultimate oneness," the emphatic and empathic dimension of intrinsic value in which the valuer, the process of valuation, and that which is valued reach their ultimate synthesis becoming a world in itself. "One not only creates something, one becomes something as well . . . creators live their problem, and in its solution is their own becoming themselves, their own self-realization."[43] Stevens expresses in Poem Thirty-Two that such identification leads to self-realization. In a condensed form the poem reads: "Throw away the lights, the definitions . . . do not use the rotted names. Nothing must stand/ Between you and the shapes you take/ When the crust of the shape has been destroyed./ You as you are? You are yourself./ The blue guitar surprises you." This is serendipity, and is indicative of the novelty and out-of-the-ordinary which arises in the play of the intrinsic valuer.

> Tom-tom c'est moi. The blue guitar
> And I are one. The orchestra
>
> Fills the high hall with shuffling men
> High as the hall. The whirling noise
>
> Of a multitude dwindles, all said,

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[43]Hartman, "The Value Structure of Creativity," op.cit., p. 244.

To his breath that lies awake at night.

I know the timid breathing. Where
Do I begin and end? And where,

As I strum the thing, do I pick up
That which momentously declares

Itself not to be I and yet
Must be. It could be nothing else.

These lines offer a succinctly lucid description of the height of intrinsic, poetic experience. The noises of the theatrical hall are blotted out, and the intrinsically valued so "momentously declares" itself that the space between imaginative creation and revelation to the imagination is blurred; Stevens seems to be saying that paradoxically that which declares itself is autonomous, but that the momentous declaration is clearly the heightened consciousness of the poet himself. This is not exactly the point of Gadamer and Heidegger; it is more the point of Hartman, but distinction at this point with the poetic, artistic experience becomes increasingly hard to make. Some synthesis of "both/and" seems more plausible than a juxtaposing "either/or." In a later poem, "The House Was Quiet and the World Was Calm,"[44] Stevens further reflects on this kind of intrinsic experience; one should particularly notice the use of the word truth in the next to last couplet.

The house was quiet and the world was calm.
The reader became the book; and summer night

Was like the conscious being of the book,
The house was quiet and the world was calm.

The words were spoken as if there was no book,
Except that the reader leaned above the page,

Wanted to lean, wanted much most to be

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[44]Stevens, Collected Poems, op.cit., pp. 358-359.

The scholar to whom his book is true, to whom

The summer night is like a perfection of thought.
The house was quiet because it had to be.

The quiet was part of the meaning, part of the mind;
The access of perfection to the page.

And the world was calm. The truth in a calm world,
In which there is no other meaning, itself

Is calm itself is summer and night, itself
Is the reader leaning late and reading there.

Poem Nineteen is another key poem in Blue Guitar. Here Stevens is dealing with another aspect of the poet's relationship to reality; the "monster" in the poem is the symbol for this reality. It seems that the expression at this point is precisely parallel to the statements of Nietzsche concerning the Superman's ability to playfully assert and manifest himself in the midst of the "eternal recurrence of the same."

That I may reduce the monster to
Myself, and then may be myself

In face of the monster, be more than part
Of it, more than the monstrous player of

One of its monstrous lutes, not be
Alone, but reduce the monster and be,

Two things, the two together as one,
And play of the monster and myself,

Or better not of myself at all,
But of that as its intelligence,

Being the lion in the lute
Before the lion locked in stone.

This poem is decisive for Stevens, especially the words of the last couplet; he comments on them extensively:

The monster is what one faces: the lion locked in stone which one wished to match in intelligence and force, speaking (as a poet) with a voice matching

> its own . . . .[45] I want to face nature the way two lions face each other — the lion in the lute (imagination) facing the lion locked in stone (reality). I want, as a man of imagination, to write poetry with all the power of a monster equal in strength to that of the monster about whom I write. I want man's imagination to be completely adequate in the face of reality.[46]

The conclusion of Blue Guitar consists of an attempt to make application of the thoughts on the imagination to quotidian man. It is imagination, as the primary manifestation of a paidia lifestyle, which will give man his ultimate freedom. He says that out of the monotonous incarceration of quotidian man in what he terms "granite monotony," that he will "evolve a man,"[47] by showing him the power of the imagination. Here is Stevens ultimate answer to Burnshaw's criticisms noted above. His paradigm quotidian man, which the ability to intrinsically value can save, is a telephone repairman (tangled in wires, on a pole not unlike a cross of crucifixion) in the technologized polluted suburb of a city called Oxidia.

> A-cock on the cross-piece on a pole
> Supporting heavy cables, slung
>
> Through Oxidia, banal suburb,
> One-half of its installments paid.
>
> Dew-dapper clapper-traps, blazing
> From crusty stacks above machines.
>
> Ecce, Oxidia is the seed
> Dropped out of this amber-ember pod.
>
> Oxidia is the soot of fire
> Oxidia is Olympia.

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[45] Holly Stevens, op.cit., p. 360.

[46] Ibid., p. 790.

[47] Stevens, Collected Poems, op.cit., p. 181.

Oxidia is brought forth from an amber-ember pod, which symbolizes the equal potentiality for existence of either change and exultation, or permanence and gritty reality. However, Oxidia is "the soot of fire . . . Olympia. Fire symbolizes intensity for Stevens, such as the intensity of the imagination, but Oxidia is no more than a drab residue of that intensity. Oxidia is Olympia, not Olympus. The people of the "banal suburb" are not dreamers, players, Homo Ludens. Their futures and dreams are largely caught up in finishing off the remainder of their installment loan payments.

> That generation's dream, aviled
> In the mud, in Monday's dirty light,
>
> That's it, the only dream they knew.

However, this is the man that the ability to value intrinsically, to have imagination, will save by leading him to the discovery of the richest truth of his environment, and the self-discovery of himself. His dream may be "aviled," de-based, now, but with the ability to intrinsically value will come "the rhapsody of things as they are."[48] The metaphorical use of the word rhapsody implies not only its use as a noun, which makes it a part of the musical symbolism of the whole poem, but also its verbal sense which conveys the idea of a musical or poetic, an intrinsic, transforming or transvaluation. To be rhapsodic is to playfully atune oneself to the play of Being. The poem concludes with a reference to play which makes the study of Stevens' work even more appropriate to the dissertation as a whole:

> Here is the actual stone. The bread
> Will be our bread, the stone will be

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[48] Ibid., p. 183.

Our bed and we shall sleep by night.
We shall forget by day, except

The moments when we choose to play
The imagined pine, the imagined jay.

CHAPTER X

IMPLICATIONS: WORK AND PLAY

Preface to Section Three

This dissertation has reached a number of conclusions. Some of these would be labeled "preliminary" in the sense that they arose as a part of the framework which was built for the study as a whole. For example: the definition of "intrinsic value" which came out of the discussion on Hartman and his critics; the idea that the mathematical aspect of Hartman's work does not have to be given extensive attention in order to come to the central issues of his thought; the understanding of an area of experience where aesthetics and ethics merge; and, the criticism of Huizinga's understanding of the relationship between *paidia* and *agon*. It can also be said that the claims presented concerning the importance of the idea of play in the several thinkers of the second section constitute additional, "preliminary" conclusions. Each of these conclusions preclude and substantiate the fundamental conclusion of the dissertation, specifically dealt with in chapter three, that Heidegger and Gadamer have provided the most efficacious model for understanding human existence in the history of philosophy in their understanding of the "play *of* Being."

However, even this formidable conclusion is preliminary to the idea that philosophy must issue in and relate to the situations and concerns of the man and woman whose "Being-there" is the street, the local barber shop, and the corner market; Stevens' telephone repairman climbing into the wire-shrouded, polluted skies of Oxidia. For this reason,

the need presents itself to take the conclusions which have been made to this point, and attempt to re-present them in what can never be described as a "more mundane" context. Such an exercise could be exhaustive, and therefore will be limited to three areas. First, there will be an attempt to consider the implications of the conclusions of the dissertation as they relate to man and his work. Then, there will be the further attempt to develop a positive relationship between the ideal sort of play which this study has posited and the contemporary expressions of play found in the popular, agonistic mode of emphasizing athletics in present-day society. Finally, the dissertation will be concluded by giving attention to the work of Sam Keen whose ideas on play and wonder provide a poignant forum for the dissertation's closure.

Work and Play

In a short story by Harlan Ellison entitled "'Repent, Harlequin!' Said the Ticktockman" an extremely lucid and poignant description of the distinction between Homo Faber and Homo Ludens/Anthropaidian is provided. Ellison attempts to emulate the 1984 style of Orwell in succinctly portraying what might be likened to the banal suburb of Wallace Stevens' Oxidia. Homo Faber is represented in Ellison's fiction by the Ticktockman, a character completely ruled by and executing the role of the time clock in an industrial state; the Ticktockman is the epitome of Jacque Ellul's "technocrat." Homo Ludens is represented by a Harlequin, a clown and a superman, whose activities of play, which are considered by the establishment as being extremely counter-cultural, are feared and hated as the most radical kind of revolutionary activity that could attack a society totally consummed by its work. Ellison

prefaces his work[1] with the statement that in the human race "There are those who ask, what is it all about?," and responds to this most basic of all questions by quoting form Thoreau's "Civil Disobedience":

> The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies . . . . In most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the judgement or of the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones; and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve the purposes as well. Such command no more respect than men of straw or a lump of dirt. They have the same sort of worth only as horses and dogs . . . . A very few, as heroes, patriots, martyrs, reformers in the great sense, and men, serve the state with their consciences also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part; and they are commonly treated as enemies by it.[2]

In the opening scene of his story, Ellison depicts a problem which has arisen which is causing a great deal of consternation for the executives of a prophetically fictionalized culture who are called "The Ones Who Keep the Machine Functioning Smoothly." The problem is that one of the members of the society (parts of a machine would be more appropriate) is gaining notoriety, becoming a celebrity, or even a hero. The grevious evil that has been perpetrated upon the State is that one of its members has become a personality, and while they might call the occurence a manifestation of "emotional disturbance,"[3] there it was, "something they had filtered out of the system many decades ago."[4] The

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[1]Harlan Ellison, "'Repent Harlequin!' Said the Ticktockman," Literature: The Human Experience, ed. by Richard Abcarian and Marvin Klotz (New York, 1973), p. 310.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid., p. 311.

problem of revocating this difficulty was given to the Ticktockman.

The Ticktockman was really the Master Timekeeper, a "time-wise" man who was ruled by chronos, the exact opposite of what Sam Keen calls Homo Tempestivus, "the timely man." He was known, as was every other member of the society, by his function; he was called Ticktockman behind his back, "no one called him that to his mask."[5] In making the longest speech he had ever been heard to make, he asked "Who is the Harlequin?" In this language-obliterated society, words do not mean anything (at one point the Harlequin amazed a friend by using a "great deal of inflection" in his conversation, for which he felt the need to apologize), and the question "who" is seldom asked; usually it is "what." The Ticktockman carries in his hands a time card and a cardioplate, instruments which lock every member of the society into a master computer timeclock. Death is the prerogative of the Ticktockman, and is usually necessitated by someone getting "out of time" (i.e., out of chronos); it comes by the pulling of one's time card. The Ticktockman becomes almost frantic in his pursuit of the Harlequin's name. If he can find the name, he can blank the deviate's cardioplate.

The Harlequin commits three crimes. First, he flies his air-boat over a Timkin roller-bearing plant at the time for its shift change, and proceeds to dump on the factory and its surroundings one hundred and fifty thousand dollars worth of jelly beans. Ellison's description of the "bombing" is as playful as the events it portrays:

> Jelly beans! Millions and billions of purples and yellows and greens and licorice and grape and raspberry and mint and round and smooth and crunchy out-

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[5] Ibid.

> side and soft-mealy inside and sugary and bouncing jouncing tumbling clittering clattering skittering fell on the heads and shoulders and hard-hats and carapaces of the Timkin workers, tinkling on the slidewalks and bouncing away and rolling about underfoot and filling the sky on their way down with all the colors of joy and childhood and holidays, coming down in a steady rain, a solid wash, a torrent of color and sweetness out of the sky from above, and entering a universe of sanity and metronomic order with quite-mad coocoo newness. Jelly beans![6]

Yet, while the play of the clown delighted the shift workers like manna from heaven for a starving man, the system was precariously disrupted.

> The shift was delayed seven minutes.
> They did not gethome for seven minutes.
> The master schedule was thrown off by seven minutes.
> Quotas were delayed by inoperative slidewalks for seven minutes.
> The Harlequin had tapped the first domino in the line, and one after another, like chik chik chik, the others had fallen.
> The System had been seven minutes worth of disrupted. It was a tiny matter, one hardly worthy of note, but in a society where the single driving force was order and unity and promptness and clocklike precision and attention to the clock, reverence of the gods of the passage of time, it was a disaster of major importance.[7]

To make matters worse, no one could account for the availability of jelly beans; no one had manufactured jelly beans for over a hundred years.

A second crime involved the Harlequin announcing by firecracher rockets that he would attend a certain meeting "at 8:00 P. M. precisly." The authorities were waiting for him, and since he had no understanding of chronos, they assumed he would be late. His play involved arriving twenty minutes early, and the timing of his would-be capture

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[6] Ibid., p. 312.

[7] Ibid., p. 313.

was so disrupted that his captors became hopelessly entangled in their own trapping devices. Finally, he climbed to the top of a new Efficiency Shopping Center and delivered the following speech:

> Why let them order you about? Why let them tell you to hurry and scurry like ants and maggots? Take your time! Saunter a while! Enjoy the sunshine, enjoy the breeze, let life carry you at your own pace! Do not be slaves of time, it's a helluva way to die, slowly, by degrees . . . . Down with the Ticktock-man!"[8]

It is not likely that the truth of Gadamer's idea of the "play of Being," or Linge's idea of "bouyancy" could be better stated than in Ellison's admonition to "let life carry you at your own pace!" Yet, the speech of the Harlequin fell on deafened ears, and the typical response was "Who's the nut? . . . Who's the nut oh wow I'm gonna be late I gotta run . . . ."[9] The search for the Harlequin was intensified, finally with success.

> They used dogs. They used probes. They used cardioplate crossoffs. They used feepers. They used bribery. They used stiktytes. They used intimidation. They used torment. They used torture. They used finks. They used cops. They used search&seizure. They used fallaron. They used betterment incentive. They used fingerprints. They used Bertillon. They used cunning. They used guile. They used treachery. They used Raoul Mitgong, but he didn't help much. They used applied physics. They used techniques of criminology.
>
> And what the hell: they caught him.
>
> After all, his name was Everett C. Marm, and he wasn't much to begin with, except a man who had no sense of time.[10]

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[8] Ibid., pp. 316-317.

[9] Ibid., p. 317.

[10] Ibid.

This "sense of time" is a sense of chronos, but the Harlequin knew the non-sense of kairos as well.

Everett C. Marm was called upon to repent, and the obvious implications which relate to a "religious" mentality which sees the System and the Machine as divine are consciously intended. He is eventually brainwashed, even to the point of becoming a spokesman (perhaps "mouthpiece" would be better) for the System. But, in Ellison's conclusion, it seems as if the play of the Harlequin may have had an unexpected effect. The last lines of the story read as follows:

> So Everett C. Marm was destroyed, which was a loss, but you can't make an omelet without breaking a few eggs, and in every revolution, a few die who should not, but they have to, because that's the way it happens, and if you make only a little change, then it seems worth while. Or, to make the point lucidly:
>
> "Uh, excuse me, sire, I, uh, don't know how to uh, to uh, tell you this, but you were three minutes late. The schedule is a little, uh, bit off."
>
> He grinned sheepishly.
>
> "That's ridiculous!" murmured the Ticktockman behind his mask, "Check your watch." And then he went into his office, going mrmee, mrmee, mrmee, mrmee, mrmee.[11]

It is but a short distance, intellectually, from the fiction of Ellison to the more philosophical treatistes on the state of contemporary technological society which have been written by Lewis Mumford. Mumford's The Myth of the Machine traces the devolution of Homo Faber, "man the worker," who becomes in his reliance on the machine and its accompanying mechanistic interpretation of existence Homo Fabricatus, "man the artifact." Mumford agrees with this dissertation's claim that

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[11] Ibid., p. 319.

the mechanistic explanation of organic behavior originates with the Cartesian emphasis on the subject-object distinction. Then, in the Industrial Revolution, "as machines became more lifelike, Western man taught himself to become in his daily behavior more machine-like."[12] In order to insure that his job is not lost to a machine, man attempts to become more like the machine; he becomes an automaton. Mumford notes that in the English language of 1611 that automaton conveyed the idea of an autonomous being who could move with self-control and self-determination. However, the term has come to mean something completely different; in The New Oxford English Dictionary there is the description of an entity with a power of motion "fixed for it, not by it."[13] The freedom of Homo Fabricatus is deterministically eradicated; "he" becomes "it," "who" becomes "what," and personality becomes a function.

Mumford pictures the astronaut as the paradigm Homo Fabricatus. Next to a picture of Alan Shepherd crammed into the Mercury capsule that sent the first American into space, and under the caption "Encapsulated Man," Mumford offers the following assessment:

> Behold the astronaut, fully equipped for duty: a scaly creature, more like an oversized ant than a primate — certainly not a naked god. To survive on the moon he must be encased in an even more heavily insulated garment, and become a kind of

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[12]Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine (New York, 1964), p. 95. This point is illustrated by a reference to the novelist Frank O'Connor who describes his mother's explanation of where babies come from. She explained that "mommies had an engine in their tummies and daddies had a starting handle which made it work, and once it started it went on until it made a baby." Mumford comments: "But, of course! What could be more 'natural,' that is, more 'objective'?" (Ibid., p. 72.)

[13]Ibid.

> faceless ambulatory mummy. . . . Here is the archetypal proto-model of Post-Historic Man, who existence from birth to death would be conditioned by the mega-machine, and made to conform, as in a space capsule, to the minimal environment — all under remote control. Increasingly, the astronaut's space suit will be the only garment that machine-processed and machine-conditioned man will wear in comfort; for only in that suit will he feel alive. This is a return to the womb, without the embryo's prospect of a natal delivery. As if to emphasize this point, the actual working position of the astronaut under normal working conditions is on his back, the normal position of the fetus.[14]

This characterization seems far removed from the "becoming as a child" epitomized by the primordial stage of the child's paidia, or the mature paidia of the artist. However, even Shepherd was infected by the spirit of paidia. He examined the gravitational effect of the moon's atmosphere (or lack of it) by driving a golf ball with a club which he had stowed away on his lunar landing craft; undoubtedly this was in lieu of some rule, hardly as accurate as other measuring devices, but certainly a boon for paidia.

Perhaps Shepherd is little more than a surrogate tourist, experiencing for humanity as a whole the first-fruits of a tomorrowland that may someday be more readily within their grasp. The use of the idea of tourism is not impromptu, for several philosopher's who are concerned with the play-like manifestations of contemporary Homo Faber understand tourism as a basic expression of technology encroaching upon man's play activities. Primary among these thinkers is Theodore Roszak. In his Where The Wasteland Ends, he explains that technology is turning nature into little more than a crassly commercialized, poor imitation of the real thing. It is almost impossible in the resort city of Gatlinburg,

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[14] Ibid., Graphic Section I, Numbers 14-15, between pages 180-181.

which advertises the lore and legend of the Southern Appalachians, to find a "real" Indian headdress or a "genuine" Smokey Mountain Black Bear which does not bear the label "Made in Japan." My wife's grandfather was an "original" as far as products of East Tennessee mountain culture might be concerned. His independence, humor, and wisdom was a direct descendant of the pioneer variety idealized in American folklore; quite the opposite extreme of some "commercialized ethnic hokum"[15] described by Roszak. When he reached retirement age, he was contacted by a tourist attraction near his home called "The Village of 1800" concerning the possibility of his acting as a guide. If the management of the attraction could have simply let him be himself, tell his stories, and share his humor, any tourist would have found their money well spent on this particular attraction. However, if the job had been taken, he would have had to have worn a "buckskin" outfit; actually, it was some synthetic combination of polyester and vinyl, a standard model from a national costume rental service. He would also have had to have worn a "Davy Crockett coonskin cap" which was really made out of a dyed rabbit fur, and which any self-respecting coon would rapidly shun. Needless to say, no job was worth that kind of "tomfoolery"; it was a much more productive use of his time to go fishing, take rides up into the mountains to talk with old acquaintances, and enjoy the world hurrying by from the timeless (chronos-less) vantage point of an old front porch swing.

Roszak explains that technology and its adjunct compatriot, the

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[15]Theodore Roszak, Where The Wasteland Ends (Garden City, 1972), p. 17.

commercializing media, have created a totally artificial environment in which authentic existence and true play become increasingly difficult. Roszak recalls a visit by his family to Yellowstone National Park in the height of the Summer season. With forty miles of bumper-to-bumper traffic leading to the park, waiting in lines to eat or get water, and the impossibility of rest in the midst of transistor radios, automobiles, and crowds, the amazing spectacle of the eruption of the geyser "Old Faithful" appeared as a potential relief. Such anticipations were wholly mistaken and greatly short-lived. A father and his three children were seated beside Roszak in what was described as a small football field equipped with food vendors and souvenir hawkers; the remainder of the description must be Roszak's:

> . . . . no sooner did the geyser begin to blow than their eyes vanished behind their cameras. The children, eager to catch Old Faithful at its very zenith, kept asking their father, "Now, Dad? How?" But the father, apparently expecting the geyser to split the heavens, restrained them. "No, not yet . . . wait till she really gets up there."
>
> But Old Faithful only rises so high, and then the show is over. Before this family of photographers had snapped their pictures, the veritable wonder of nature had bubbled back beneath the earth. The father's face emerged from behind his camera, frowing with disbelief. "Is that all?" he asked, with the belligerent voice of a man who knows when he is not getting his money's worth. "I thought it was supposed to go higher," his wife said. The children were no less crushed with disappointment. As they got up to leave, one of the boys sourly remarded, "Disneyland is better." And the whole family agreed.[16]

In spite of the objections of thinkers such as Mumford or Roszak, Homo Faber still wants his son to be an astronaut; these men are not simply the playboys of the Western world, but of this particular part

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[16] Ibid., p. 27.

of the solar system. Homo Faber also spends a tremendous amount of energy, money, and time in anticipation of those two or three weeks of freedom, reprieve, rest and recuperation, which he calls vacation, his play time, his time in the sun. But like the Mayfly whose life is conceived, lived out, and ended in a few hours of a warm Southern afternoon, the play ends and it is back to work. The basic character of modern man is his work, and it is only very rarely that play is seen as any more than an exceptional luxurgy.

Of even greater significance than the writings of the thinkers mentioned to this point for understanding the nature of Homo Faber and the working conditions which frame the perimeters of his existence is a volume of interviews compiled by Studs Terkel entitled Working. In this volume, it is not the philosopher who is speaking, but the working individual. Every conclusion formed by men such as Mumford and Roszak, and the critical view taken of the excesses of technology as outlined in this dissertation, will ultimately stand under the judgement of the working man or woman whose lot in life the contemporary philosopher often views as his major "cause." It will be impossible to recount all the stories of the more than one hundred and twenty-five individuals that Terkel interviewed. However, there are some stories that must be seen as determinative to the conclusions of this dissertation. Terkel prefaces his work with a quotation from William Faulkner:

> You can't eat for eight hours a day nor drink for eight hours a day nor make love for eight hours a day — all you can do for eight hours a day is work. Which is the reason why man makes himself and everybody else so miserable and unhappy.[17]

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[17]Studs Terkel, Working (New York, 1974), p. ix.

If there is any sort of "average" worker or any experience which moves toward being called normative, Terkel's introductory remarks would probably come close to expressing the basic nature of that particular Homo Faber's existence. He says that since his book is about work that it is about violence, for most of his subject's work is ulcers, nervous breakdowns, insult, humiliation — it is war. "To survive the day is triumph enough for the walking wounded among the great many of us."[18] The book is also described as being about a search which is for "daily meaning as well as daily bread, for recognition as well as cash, for astonishment rather than torpor; for a sort of life, in short, rather than a Monday through Friday sort of dying."[19] Terkel is giving expression at this point to what Dewey called the basic human task, trying to "come to terms" with one's environment. Ultimately, the search is for something that challenges the imagination; something which the ticktock machinery seems incapable of doing. The imagination is the key element in human being, as has been seen throughout, and if the work does not serve as a challenge to that manifestation of man's intrinsic character, then the work is dehumanizing. Nora Watson, a staff writer for a health publications institution, describing her own work situation, makes a statement representative of the Homo Fabers of humanity: "I think most of us are looking for a calling, not a job. Most of us have jobs which are too small for our spirits. Jobs are not big enough for people."[20]

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[18] Ibid., p. xi.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid., p. xxiv.

The auto assembly line worker is probably the paradigm Homo Faber for conventional thinking. The conversation with such a worker reveals that the common understanding of this worker's experience is quite accurate. Phil Stallings is a spot-welder in a Chicago Ford assembly plant. During an eight hour shift he stands on a two foot square area making thirty-two welds per car, forty-eight cars per hour. For Stallings, the most dehumanizing part of the job is the line itself; it is endless, never stops, and there is total repetition. Here is probably a perfect manifestation of Nietzsche's "eternal recurrence of the same." Ellison's fiction is no more grotesque than Stalling's reflections on his own experience:

> How would you like to go up to someone and say, "I would like to go to the bathroom?" If the foreman doesn't like you, he'll make you hold it, just ignore you. Should I leave this job to go to the bathroom, I risk being fired. The line moves all the time.
>
> I don't understand how come more guys don't flip. Because you're nothing more than a machine when you hit this type of thing. They give better care to that machine than they will to you. They'll have more respect, give more attention to that machine. And you know this. Somehow you get the feeling that the machine is better than you are. You really begin to wonder. What price do they put on me? Look at the price they put on the machine. If that machine breaks down, there's somebody out there to fix it right away. If I break down, I'm just pushed over to the other side till another man takes my place. The only thing they have on their mind is to keep that line running.[21]

One of Terkel's most unusual subjects is a man by the name of Ken Brown. While Brown is only twenty-six, the "greening of America" in the counter-culture movements somehow missed him. He is president of four corporations, could be the exemplar of the Protestant Work Ethic, and

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[21] Ibid., pp. 160-161.

his hero, with whom he has a business partnership, is a player-of-sorts, Evel Knievel. When Brown was still a teenager, he made $125,000 in one Summer leasing motorbikes; when he was eighteen he had ulcers. His motto perhaps gives the rationale for both his success and his health: "once you get something, it's not as important as it was. You need something else to keep you going."[22] For many workers, nine to five is bad enough, but for Brown a person is despised if that is the extent of their commitment to work. He says of his own work day:

> I usually get out of here at one o'clock in the morning. I go home and eat dinner at two. I do my best thinking at night. I can't fall asleep until seven in the morning. I turn the TV on. I don't even pay any attention to it. They got the all-night movies. You actually feel like an idiot. I just sit there in the living room, making notes, trying to put down things for the next day to remember. I plan ahead for a month. Maybe I'll lay down in bed about four in the morning. If something comes in my head, I'll get up and start writing it. . . .[23]

Brown sees his wife or friends half a day on Sunday, after he has worked the first half. For the assembly line worker who bitterly complains, there may be hope; Ken Brown is Homo Fabricatus, a machine sustained by a steady diet of Maalox and Mylanta.

There are a few notable exceptions to the Homo Faber/ Homo Fabricatus pattern which Terkel usually encountered. He interviewed a piano tuner who found as a motivation for his work the desire to hear a good sound, and whose child had attained a kind of status in his neighborhood because he knew what his father did, which was unlike the child's young friends who only knew that their fathers left on a train every morning

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[22] Ibid., p. 463.

[23] Ibid., pp. 463-464.

at nine o'clock. The tuner's work was his play and the distinctions between vocation and avocation had been obliterated in his life. He recalled an incident in which he was tuning a piano in a ballroom where a symposium for computer manufacturers was being held. He was informed by one of the men that they would soon have his job. He responded: "By the time you isolate an infinite number of harmonies, you're going to use up a couple of billion dollars woth of equipment to get down to the basic fundamental that I work with my ear."[24] The computer may replace man as a thinker, but man only as a thinker is already fragmented; the computer cannot replace the whole man as an artist; a computer could never paint a "Starry Night."

Finally, Terkel's most unlikely revelations, especially from the perspective of this study, come from a waitress. The attitude which she takes toward her work is one of paidia; the epitome of the waiter who acts in "good faith" in Sartre's comment seen above. The job is described as an opportunity to learn about people, to have the world come to you, and not only serve but cajole and nurse; "maybe with coffee, I give them a little philosophy."[25] In this instance of a vocation which has become an art, there may well be an instance of the accomplishment of a being which is not a nothingness, or a real present:

> It becomes theatrical and I feel like Mata Hari, and it intoxicates me . . . . I feel like Carmen. It's like a gypsy holding out a tamborine and they throw the coins . . . . To be a waitress, it's an art. I feel like a ballerina, too. I have to go between the

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[24] Ibid., p. 323.

[25] Ibid., p. 294.

> tables, between thoses chairs . . . . Maybe that's the reason I always stayed slim. It is a certain way I can go through a chair no one else can do. I do it with an air. If I drop a fork, there is a certain way I pick it up. I know they can see how delicately I do it. I'm on stage.[26]

Terkel quotes from D. H. Lawrence:

> Even if it is a woman making an apple
> dumpling, or a man a stool,
> If life goes into the pudding, good
> is the pudding,
> good is the stool.[27]

There are those thinkers within the technostructure who take exception to the ideas of what they call the "antitechnologists." Representative of this opposing position is an engineer by the name of Samuel C. Florman. Among Florman's writings are books entitled The Existential Pleasures of Engineering, and Engineering and the Liberal Arts. He summarizes the critical findings of the antitechnologists in the following manner:

> (1) Technology is a "thing" or a force that has escaped from human control and is spoiling our lives.
> (2) Technology forces man to do work that is tedious and degrading.
> (3) Technology forces man to consume things that he does not really desire.
> (4) Technology creates an elite class of technocrats, and so disenfranchises the masses.
> (5) Technology cripples man by cutting him off from the natural world in which he evolved.
> (6) Technology provides man with technical diversions which destroy his existential sense of his own being.[28]

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[26] Ibid., pp. 294-297, passim.

[27] Ibid., p. 299.

[28] Samuel C. Florman, "In Praise of Technology," Harper's Magazine (October, 1975), p. 56.

Florman goes on to say that much of his own writing is the result of a search for self-identity which had been motivated by the antitechnologist's insistence that engineers and scientists were half-men incapable of emotional expression and the experience of any intrinsically good life. The fact that most antitechnologists are masters at words, and proprietors of aesthetic and moral concerns, tends to make the technician seem philistine.

Objections are lodged, in Florman's praise of technology, against the six main themes outlined above. First, technology is not seen as being autonomous, but as another activity of man which is ultimately an activity of choice. Man's choices may be unlearned, or the result of habit or peer group pressure, but Florman insists that that is still quite removed from technology itself victimizing human existence. As regards degrading work, Florman writes off this position as merely the typical expression of a humanity which has always had ambivalent feelings toward work. And, the idea of the consummer being duped into having products forced upon them by technology that are luxurgies rather than necessities is actually a manifestation of an elitism on the part of the antitechnologists who are actually disturbed because people are buying elaborate new cars and electric can openers instead of oboes, oil paints, chess sets, and Mozart records. In reaction to the fourth point of the outline, Florman insists that few technical intellectuals ever arrive at places of political power for any reasons that are directly related to their technological competence. With an event no less than Watergate to provide substantiation, he notes that the non-technical elite have always been more than ready to advance schemes which are not traceable to any motivation from someone with a

purely technical orientation. History, he claims, demonstrates that instead of technology disenfranchizing the masses, that it has given man more power and freedom, especially the average man; perhaps, he reasons, because of the loss of power on the part of the intellectual elite, there is a predilection on the part of this elite for defensively striking out at those who advance technology.

As regards the transcendental emphasis on nature, while Florman admits an enjoyment of the natural environment, he feels that the fuller case is overstated. Too many individuals have lived lives in a totally urban environment and not appeared inherently inferior in any way because of it. In Florman's opinion, the idyllic antitechnologists are taking themselves and their problems too seriously; he has his own master of words, Saul Bellows, from which to quote:

> A million years passed before my soul was let out into the technological world. That world was filled with ultraintelligent machines, but the soul after all was a soul, and it had waited a million years for its turn and did not intend to be cheated of its birthright by a lot of mere gimmicks. It had come from the far reaches of the universe, and it was interested but not overawed by these inventions.[29]

With final regard to the idea of being cut off from the true self by such technological diversions as television, pinball machines, and the juxbox, Florman says that technology may have fooled man into thinking he is happy, but what criterion of judgement can be involved in making this kind of an assessment. Quoting from a Gide novel, he says that God cannot tell the difference between feeling and imagining that one feels, and that the antitechnologists are certainly not gods. He

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[29] Ibid., p. 66.

concludes his critique of the main themes of the antitechnologists by reflecting upon Edward Steichen's photographic exhibition The Family of Man. Here Florman finds revealed in societies from the primitive to the industrial the eternal needs of man: "Alike and ever alike, we are on all continents in the need of love, food, clothing, work, speech, worship, sleep, games, dancing, fun."[30]

Florman admits that there are devastating physical and existential problems in the world, but that these are the results of men's competitiveness and desire; admittedly, advanced technology is the most useful tool of this competitive desire that the world has ever known, but technology is malignant only when it is malignantly used. "Our contemporary problem is distressingly obvious. We have too many people wanting too many things."[31] He finds Schopenhauer's concept of Will (which precludes Nietzsche's "Will to Power") as being philosophically descriptive of what he means, and technology is but a manifestation of this Will. The cause of the problems of modern man, he reasserts, "is not technology, which can be restrained, but the pressure of human desire, which cannot be restricted."[32] He finally concludes that there is a tendency for excess on both extremes of the question of technology, and in a synthesizing conclusion states that an overriding concern must be "to make sure that matters of taste do not become matters of dogma."[33] Elsewhere, he advances the idea that ironically it is intellectuals that

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[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid., p. 68.

[32] Ibid., p. 72.

[33] Ibid.

are speaking out against that which is intellectual in the name of morality, and in doing so are proposing what would be, for him, an intellectual disaster; he asks: "Can an intellectual disaster be a moral triumph?"[34] Perhaps, Florman should be as ready to ask whether an intellectual triumph could be a moral disaster, and if he did, he might be able to understand that the question of intrinsic value (which may simply be manifested in the question of how paidia can emerge above the obstacles presented by a thoroughly agonistic world) involves a dimension which extends beyond his extrinsic considerations.

Some middle way between the conclusions of Florman and the so-called antitechnologists would seem more appealing than either extreme. While the latter group may be guilty of convincingly using language to make their point, it is not clear in Florman's discussion just exactly what use of language has to do with the basic issues and needs which are considered. He attempts to do the same sort of thing, and is also quilty of being too simplistic; his argument which was based on the quote from Gide violates almost every fallacy of inference known to logic, which is something one might think that he would be quite sensitive about. On two essential points he seems quite weak, and both of these involve man's role. He says that man's choice essentially controls technology, and that man is not dubiously maneuvered into wanting more than he needs. However, in a society in which the overwhelming majority of the masses have an almost wholly passive involvement in the political processes which most directly influence their lives, it is

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[34]Samuel C. Florman, "Another Utopia Gone," Harper's Magazine (August, 1976), p. 29.

not likely that they are even aware of the subtle potentialities of the effect of technology. Florman does not even seem to be aware that this whole villanous emphasis on things, the motivation of which is at the root of men's problems in his understanding, is basically a technological orientation that goes all the way back to Descartes, and the subject/object split which occurs there is the ground force of the technological. It is, in turn, the healing of that split which is man's greatest need, and love, clothing, shelter, dancing, and fun only are given passing mention in his commentary although they may represent stations along the way toward healing that split.

He further says that there are no criteria for making judgements between the two positions. At this point, the Terkel work becomes of even greater importance. The conclusion of this dissertation is that while Terkel's subjects might not understand much of the highly intellectual presentation of the antitechnologists, they would not "buy" the conclusions of Florman. It is not enough to say that technology provides a lifestyle with more conveniences, because the average working man <u>does</u> feel that he is the victim of a monumental flim-flam, he <u>does</u> feel enslaved, and he does not feel happy; not even in those all-to-short times of escape which involve play. Florman would not get very far reading to Phil Stallings, the Ford assembly line welder, from Saul Bellows that he has not been cheated of his birthright by "mere gimmicks." Too many who left the mines and those "good ole' cotton fields back home" for the lure of "big money" in the factories and the "fast" life of the cities beat a hasty retreat; many who stayed did so out of the greatest desperation. Florman writes from the mind, while Roszak, Mumford, Ellul and others write from the heart; Terkel's subjects speak

from the "gut," and there is revealed an entrenched misery and yearning for a freedom which things cannot provide. This misery and yearing is directly causative of the devastating competitive tensions of the contemporary world; tensions which have grossly affected man's ability to love, worship, dance, and have fun — the needs noted by Florman. He may be correct in saying that technology is only malignant when it is malignantly used, but the presence of technology is alot like the large number of weapons which proliferate American society; when opportunity is so abundant, and the gun or computer cannot say "stop and think it over," the malignant use is more likely.

Nothing which Florman says adversely affects the ideas which have been presented on play. In fact, his discussion reinforces several ideas. Most of his list of needs are specifically paidia related. More importantly, the competitive desire or Will which he claims is at the root of man's problems can, in direct opposition to his claims, be restrained. It can be restrained by an emphasis on the kind of paidia motivation or play lifestyle that this dissertation has suggested as being normative to human being in its essential nature. Paidia makes personal desire secondary to the primary joy of participating in a whole. Florman makes no mention of imagination and creativity, and here may well be the fundamental rudiments of a criterion which would make oboes, chess sets, and Mozart records better than pinball, new cars, and electric can openers. Finally, his statement on the overriding concern about the obliteration of dogmas has been seen throughout as the primary philosophical implication of the whole area of play studies.

If any single conclusion can be drawn in this chapter on Homo

Faber and his work, it is that there is a compelling need to re-introduce the concept of "calling." First, the concept must be purged of some of its purely religious overtones; it means something more than a conservative, ecclesiastical "vision" from God. If the concept is given a play interpretation it will come to mean the search for a vocational involvement which is play and not work. Authentic existence will be manifested in playful "authentic work," and authentic work will always be directly related to wonder. It requires what Hartman called "genius" and Aristotle "virtue" for authentic work; it requires, in terminology perhaps acceptable to Florman, that one become an intellectual.

> To be an intellectual is, first of all, to be a person who has a fascination, at bottom as unfathomable as any other fascination, with making sense of the confused mosaic of life and of human institutions. Intellectuals are people with a way of life who then go in search of a way to make a living.[35]

This does not mean that the work will be frivolous, although it may well be a kind of expression of frivolity. Nor does it mean that all ambivalence toward work in general will be eradicated; no matter what the job, there are bound to be times when an individual does not want to do that particular thing at that particular time — Michelangelo did not like to paint all the time. Basically, the primary criterion for work is that it must be an enhancing extension of whatever the particular person is. It will be a vocation which has as its primary end the fulfillment of the person; as Aristotle said: "activity of soul in accordance with virtue." There is a wide gap between a Ken Brown saying that money is the way of tabulating and scoring degrees of

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[35]Steven Kelman, "The Limits of Abstraction," Saturday Review (September 21, 1974), p. 22.

success, and a piano tuner motivated by a desire to hear good sounds. The whole idea of "calling" may be directly related to the concept of authentic human being as the locus where Being speaks; to be involved in an experience of avocational paidia may be one way in which the word of Being (Truth) becomes incarnated in and as a real existence. The old Protestant Work Ethic may whiplash one's conscience for considering it, but work should be thought of in terms of fun and fulfillment; ergon, which seems close to agon, can be paidia.

CHAPTER XI

IMPLICATIONS: PAIDIA AND CONTEMPORARY ATHLETICS

"Blanket generalities" are usually of little importance to a philosophical discussion. However, it can perhaps be said with some degree of accuracy that beyond his concern with the work which provides the money for the "necessities" of his life, that contemporary Homo Faber is primarily concerned with play. Lewis Mumford characterized the astronaut, in the last chapter, as the paradigm "hero" of the technological age, but it must be recalled that when the last American astronaut stepped on the moon's surface, it was with a golf club in his hands. If Homo Faber is asked to talk of heroes, he will undoubtedly begin to speak of those who come from the world of sport, the new Olympus. New may not, however, be appropriate, as his earliest games were called "olympics," and their participants were seen as being god-like. Homo Faber lives in a world conditioned by a "sport's page mentality," in which major political metaphors are athletic in nature, and where a man can receive a million dollars a year for throwing a baseball; in the world of Homo Faber, the most famous man in the world, and the most highly paid, is a boxer.

Homo Faber is a spectator, and if Gadamer's criterion of involvement is used to judge the efficacy of his effort, Homo Faber passes with flying colors. The following comment is indicative of the degree of this involvement: "The perfect way to die would be to live to be ninety and to have a heart attack as the final gun is sounded of a University of Tennessee — Alabama football game . . . immediately after

UT had scored the winning touchdown." The men on the playing field are surrogates for those in the grandstands; the Washington Redskins or the New York Yankees are "his" team, and he can talk about "good ole" Joe Namath or Mickey Mantle as if they were friends from childhood — which perhaps, in an infiltration of paidia, they are. But Homo Faber is much more than a spectator. If one were to examine his garage, storage room, or the trunk of his car, it is quite likely that a plethora of softball uniforms, little league bats, jogging togs, and balls and shoes for every type of athletic endeavor could be found. Homo Faber is on the softball team from his factory or church, bowls with his friends one night each week, and plays golf on the weekend. His major problem is often how to crowd these concerns into a schedule which must leave room for athletic events that take place near his home and on his television screen. He dreams, not of the future, but of that time when he played quarterback on the high school team; his letter jacket is his most prized possession. In addition, the activities of his wife and children, including their dreams and aspirations, are not very different from his own.

Most of this activity seems harmless enough. In fact Homo Faber, as a parent, firmly believes that at least the athletic involvement helps to keep his children, and perhaps himself, "out of trouble." He is also confident that it "builds character" and that learning "how to win" is the major rite of passage into the adult world which he inhabits. In his assumptions about "character," he is, in fact, being quite Platonic. Plato firmly believed that the end result of paidia (playing) was paideia (culturalization or "character"). However, and this is the point where Homo Faber's assumptions begin to run aground, Plato made

no inclusive identification between "character" and winning; true paidia would more than likely lead to success in contests, but that consideration was pointedly secondary. In spite of Huizinga's demonstrations to the contrary, paidia which can result in "character" is rigidly distinguished from the agon of winning. In agon, Homo Faber is fragmented, and becomes a body, a throwing arm, or a kicking foot; a recent edition[1] of Esquire Magazine's annual "Sports in America" issue gave a full-color spread to life-size pictures of Pele's thigh, Rod Laver's wrist, Mohammed Ali's fist, and "Mean" Joe Green's neck. It cannot be said that Plato, in contrast, was advancing a philosophical elitism which emphasized the mind; that would also be fragmentary. His paidia was for the "whole man," and here is signaled the primary level of objection to the play of contemporary Homo Faber. His competitive drive to win, which is an adjunct of the technological culture of which he is a part, makes it almost impossible for the paidia event, which does build "character," to be experienced.

This emphasis on competitiveness, which is the negative dimension of Homo Faber's play is much more than the "pipe dream" of a scholar compacted away in a philosophic isolation from the world "as it is." It is primarily a realization which has come from within the athletic establishment itself. Its proponents may have been branded as dissidents who hold "bad blood" for that which has so suitably nourished them with money, honors, and fame, but the words from Thoreau's "Civil Disobedience" quoted above have a way of stilling those remarks. At this

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[1] Esquire Magazine (October, 1974), pp. 144-147 and Esquire Magazine (October, 1975), pp. 140-147.

point, the dissertation will give fuller consideration to this negative dimension of contemporary play forms, and then move to a discussion of the possibilities of *paidia* and a positive dimension for *Homo Faber's* play which may contribute to his transformation into *Anthropaidian*.

If there is any event in American experience which connotes images of virtue, character, and fun, it is the "All-American Soap Box Derby" which has been run for almost forty years at Akron, Ohio. This race is supposed to be the pinnacle of success for young boys who, with a large amount of youthful ingenuity and luck, have built a racer capable of traversing the 954-foot racetrack quickly enough to win a gold ring and (perhaps to Plato's approval) a $7500 college scholarship. However, in 1973 the Soap Box Derby publicly "lost its virginity"[2] when an electromagnet was discovered in the nose of the winning racer; the magnet, which was attracted to the race's metal starting gate, gave the racer an initial thrust and advantage when that gate was pulled down to start the race.

The villain in this "scandal" was a fourteen year old boy whose uncle had originally gotten him involved in soap box racing so that he could enjoy the excitement, "the thrill of building cars and running them down the hill."[3] However, it became immediately apparent that the event was filled with fraud, and from what began with the purchase of a $20 set of illegal axles, the winning racer cost nearly $3000 to build and was even tested by engineers in a wind tunnel. The winner's

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[2]Richard Woodley, "How to Win the Soap Box Derby," *Harper's Magazine* (August, 1974), p. 62.

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 65.

uncle justified his actions by saying, factually at least, that "cheating had been so rife that all he did was to even his nephew's odds in a dirty system."[4] For those that participated in the contest, levity with the rules did not seem out of place: "They don't feel it's cheating; it's so common it's just a part of the game."[5] When it is kept in mind the kind of effect that such action and attitude must have on a fourteen year old boy, the whole incident becomes a paradigm for paidia and "character" being corrupted in agonistic competition. The Derby "fell prey to what seems to be a national malaise: winning, being everything, is worth doing anything to achieve."[6] The following summer it would not be a Soap Box Derby, but Watergate, which would come to the forefront of public attention.

Except for the number of participants involved, there is not much difference in the 138 boys and girls involved in the Akron Derby and the 600,000 young people between the ages of eight and twelve who participate each summer in what may be wrongly termed "Little" League. In this massive organization which involves more than fifteen countries, paidia again seems to be greatly victimized. Robin Roberts was a highly successful major-league baseball player from 1948 until 1966. His "Hall of Fame" credentials makes his assessment of the phenomena of Little League baseball competition quite instructive.

Roberts emphasizes the pressure that is placed upon children by their parents and coaches to train and discipline themselves into

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[4] Ibid., p. 62.

[5] Ibid., p. 65.

[6] Ibid., p. 62.

acquiring the kind of techniques necessary to win. He notes, however, that during this age that the child's "concentration" is at a minimum. One might say that the child is caught up in a natural, paidia "back-and-forthness" which does not permit concertrated attention on anything, even fielding ground balls and hitting stances, for very long. According to Roberts, "as a result there is a lot of pressure on these young people to do something that is unnatural for their age."[7] He goes on to explain that the technical key to Little League success is good pitching, which few teams have; most young boys have trouble consistently throwing three strikes out of seven pitches. Therefore, "smart coaching" tells the boys not to swing, to hold the bat on their shoulders and take "walks." Roberts notes:

> The fun (i.e., the paidia) is in hitting the ball; the coach says don't swing. That may be sound baseball, but it does nothing to help a young player to develop his hitting (much less enjoy his sport). What would seem like a basic training ground for baseball often turns out to be a program of negative thoughts that only retards a young player.[8]

Roberts concludes his critique by offering several alternative suggestions: organization would be limited to summer playground programs under the guidance of college students; different teams would be chosen for each game, without individualizing uniforms and numbers; boys and girls would play together; and, play would be with a softball rather than a baseball — it is easier to hit and does not hurt as much to be hit with. As an ultimate goal, instead of winning, "the kids would have a

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[7]Robin Roberts, "Strike Out Little League," Newsweek (July 21, 1975), p. 11.

[8]Ibid.

good time playing ball in a program in which hitting the ball and running the bases are the big things."[9] There is obviously a great deal more levity and freedom in Roberts' proposals in which "fun" and "good times" take precedence.

These illustrations quite capably speak for themselves, and thus there is an avoidance on the part of the dissertation of charges which have been leveled against those who would criticize any aspect of contemporary athletics. For example,[10] former (ironically) California State Superintendent of Public Instruction, Max Rafferty, describes such critics as "cap-and-gowned buffoons" who possess a "college syndrome" which disguises the fact that they are actually "kooks, crum-bums, and Commies . . . ready to die at a moment's notice for a smile from Kosygin or even the slightest relaxation on the built-in scowl of the face of Mao-Tse Tung." There is a plethora of material which the discussion could have drawn upon at this point.[11] However, the critique of the negative dimension of contemporary athletics has been given more than sufficient attention in other studies. The task envisioned as a part of the implications of this dissertation is the attempt to relate paidia to contemporary athletics in a positive manner; that is, to consider the

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[9] Ibid.

[10] These comments by Rafferty are from a speech given to the California State Conference of Athletic Director. The entirety of the speech is recorded in Jack Scott, The Athletic Revolution (New York, 1971), pp. 13-22.

[11] In addition to the Scott text noted above, see: Robert M. Williams, "Away With Big-Time Athletics," Satruday Review (March 6, 1976), pp. 10 and 46; Paul Weiss, Sport: A Philosophic Inquiry (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1969); Ellen W. Gerber, Sport and the Body: A Philosophical Symposium (Philadelphia: Lea and Ferbiger, 1972).

possibility that paidia can be experienced in the context of contemporary athletics, and that ultimately these athletics become the context of paidia.

The search for paidia in contemporary athletics will be initiated in a quite unlikely place, an interview with a professional football player. This is unlikely because professional football in America is probably the most agonistic, competitive example of athletic competition ever to exist in human history (with the exception of the Roman gladiators who fought to a literal death). However, it is a phenomena that Homo Faber already knows a great deal about, and there is thus a point of relation between this study and Homo Faber which cannot be dismissed. The interview is between John Brodie, who for sixteen years was a highly successful quarterback for the San Francisco 49ers of the National Football League, and Michael Murphy, the president of California's famous Esalen Institute. Murphy is concerned with finding out about the "hidden side of sport"[12] which this study would relate to as the intrinsic transformation of agon into paidia. His primary questions to Brodie are involved with giving expression to the "extraordinary states of mind" that athletes sometimes speak of experiencing during a ballgame.

Brodie has had such experiences, reflects often upon their value, and provides the following example:

> Often, in the heat and excitement of a game, a player's perception and coordination will improve dramatically. At times, and with increasing frequency now, I experience a kind of clarity that I've never seen

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[12]Michael Murphy and John Brodie, "I Experience a Kind of Clarity," Intellectual Digest (January, 1973), p. 19.

> adequately described in a football story. Sometimes, for example, time seems to slow way down, in an uncanny way, as if everyone were moving in slow motion. It seems as if I have all the time in the world to watch the receivers run their patterns, and yet I know the defensive line is coming at me just as fast as ever. I know perfectly well how hard and fast those guys are coming and yet the whole thing seems like a movie or a dance in slow motion. It's beautiful.[13]

Murphy is curious as to whether this supra-rational experience simply happens by coincidence, or if it is something that can be developed. In other words, he is asking if intrinsic valuation or the artistic creativity is something that can be taught or learned. Brodie answers that it is not possible to develop this trait in any physical manner, such as with the development of particular muscles. However, he feels that it is possible to develop an ability to give complete attention to the "here and now," and to the degree that such attention is accomplished, the intrinsic event is possible. It would seem that what he is almost mystically describing is the aesthetic event of Sartre which allows the individual to have a real present. It also seems quite similar to what the creative artist does in relation to the environment and material of his creation. As regards the relation of the dissertation to child's play, Brodie's extension of these remarks in quite significant:

> He must be able to respond in the here and now. This is an ability we all have potentially. I believe it is our natural state. But because most of us loose it as we grow up, we have to regain it.[14]

This part of the interview is followed by a number of comments that relate directly to the dissertation's idea that technology often

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[13] Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[14] Ibid., p. 20.

often stands in juxtaposition to *paidia* and its expression. For Brodie this means the way in which computers have been programmed in recent years to provide game plans, which he says that most coaches follow religiously.

> Some teams worship the computer in the selection of their players and the creation of their game plans in such a way that you would think it was God. But computer-made game plans often lead a team away from the game itself. A team with a fixed game plan can be a brittle team, if it can't relate to the here and now of the game.[15]

Brodie's description of the game is not of something that can be played *with*, especially with computers, it is rather something that the player enters into the play *of*, and the better that the player is able to accomplish this, the better he will do in the game; that is, the more intense intrinsic and aesthetic experience he will have. In such an experience there is a "winning" which has nothing to do with score boards, which are also computer operated.

Finally, Brodie proposes an emphasis on athletics in America that would see athletic endeavors as a way of teaching what he considers a new "insight" into human existence. This insight allows the individual to "get into another order of reality . . . a reality that doesn't fit into the grids and coordinates that most people lay across life."[16] In words which echo Plato and Schiller, he says: "Sport is so important in creating values in America, it would be great if it could open up these inner dimensions for people."[17] In order for this to occur, there

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 21.

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

[17] *Ibid.*

must be a shift in sports away from a total compulsion for winning, to a desire for this "experience of clarity," and Brodie's suggestions for a totally non-teleological orientation seem to be the best clue given to this point about how that can be accomplished. To let athletics continue in its agonistic orientation is, for Brodie, "a conspiracy to belittle (dis-value) sports and human nature"[18]; instead, it must be raised to the level of "art" and "poetry" where grace, equilibrium, and skill characterize its participants.

American novelist John Updike describes a similar sort of experience with play. He says that the Western world has a yearning for "a peaceable creed that would flatter the flesh instead of mortifying it, that would blur away the painful mind-body split and ease the agonies of egoism."[19] Attempts at resolving this difficulty by the use of Oriental mysticism have not been satisfying enough according to Updike; they have rather been "physical therapy — of a harmless, deep-breathing, sweet-swinging sort — and trivial spookiness."[20] It is in play that the rationalistic, technological dilemma of Western man can be assuaged. Play creates a pitha, "a place where something breaks into our workaday world and bothers us forevermore with the hints it gives."[21] That "something" is the "arrival" of authentic human being, the intrinsic Self. Play has the same effect as authentic religion in its ability to "codify

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[18] Ibid.

[19] John Updike, Picked-Up Pieces (New York, 1976), p. 101. See also pp. 92-103 passim.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid., p. 102.

and lighten life."[22] Updike's game is golf, and he, like Brodie, is able to describe the intrinsic experience of being caught up in the play of the game:

> Once in a while a 7-iron rips off the club face with that pleasant tearing sound, as if pulling a zipper in space, and falls toward the hole like a raindrop down a well; or a drive draws sweetly with the bend of the fairway and disappears, still rolling, far beyond the applauding sprinkler, these things happen in spite of me, and not because of me. On the golf course as nowhere else, the tyranny of causality is suspended, and men are free.[23]

While these Western play experiences may not have any intention of aiming at an Oriental mysticism, the comments of Brodie and Updike could have been quite easily made in the context of Zen Buddhism. In fact, Zen's emphasis on play allows it to escape much of the criticism such as that suggested by Updike. Eugen Herrigel's Zen In the Art of Archery is an attempt by a Western philosopher, not only to experience the higher consciousness of Zen through sport, but to find a medium of explaining Zen that Western man could identify with. All of the elements of intrinsic experience are present in Herrigel's chronicle, and it is in most instances parallel to this discussion. With the exception of the idea of self-forgetfulness which the dissertation rejects in line with Gadamer, the following statement could act as an ideal for what all play experience could accomplish:

> The practice of archery is not intended for utilitarian purposes but only for pure aesthetic enjoyments, to train the mind; indeed, to bring it into contact with ultimate reality. Archery is, therefore, not

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[22] Ibid., p. 98.

[23] Ibid., pp. 97-98.

> practiced solely for hitting the target; the swordsman does not wield the sword just for the sake of outdoing his opponent; the dancer does not dance just to perform certain rhythmical movements of the body. If one really wishes to be master of an art, technical knowledge of it is not enough. One has to transcend technique so that the art becomes an "artless art." As soon as we reflect, deliberate, and conceptualize, the original unconsciousness is lost and a thought interferes. Calculation which is miscalculation sets in. Man is a thinking reed but his great works are done when he is not thinking and calculating. "Childlikeness" has to be restored with long years of training in the art of self-forgetfulness.[24]

In a conclusion, which will be extended by the final chapter of the dissertation, it appears at this point that a fairly substantial either/or situation begins to assert itself in regard to Homo Faber and his play. He is either teleologically oriented, or his basic world-view is non-teleological; the former is bound up with agon and the latter with paidia. It is the teleological nature that is at the basis of Western culture with its competitiveness, desire to win at all costs, and attraction for clear and accomplished ends. This orientation is manifested in an industrial production, and an athletic coach's injunction that there is nothing worse than coming in second. In order that this teleological orientation might be mediated, and at the same time that man might be enabled to experience the "wholeness" of his being, it is necessary that there be an infusion of the non-teleological.

This chapter of the dissertation has attempted to demonstrate, in a way that Homo Faber might find interesting, that the non-teleological is capable of being experienced in play; that paidia is potentially present in the play forms of contemporary athletics. If it were possible

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[24] D. T. Suzuki in Eugen Herrigel, Zen In the Art of Archery (New York, 1971), pp. v-ix passim.

for Homo Faber to begin to have and to search for non-teleological experiences, the effect on his total world-view could be untold. While there has been no call for a self-forgetfulness, there is the need for experiences in which there is an ends-forgetfulness in which Homo Faber can escape his role as fragmented function, and begin to achieve the meaning-full, real "here and now" which is possible in his now truncated infinitude. The most important intrinsic value experience is that which occurs when a person realizes his own intrinsic value, and paidia play may represent one of the most plausible ways for Homo Faber to experience this realization. When the non-teleological orientation triumphs, Homo Faber realizes, in the words of Wallace Stevens:

> A new text for the world,
> A scribble of fret and fear and fate,
> From a bravura of the mind,
> A courage of the eye . . .
> A text of intelligent men
> At the center of the unintelligible . . .

CHAPTER XII

ANTHROPAIDIAN: THE AFFIRMATION OF HUMAN BEING

One of the most fundamental concerns of the history of philosophy has been the investigation of the question "what is man?" At times in that history the idea has been advanced that there is some sort of an essential "some-thing-ness" that is a constituent element of man which makes him a human being. This essential element has been conceived in terms of a variety of forms and manifestations such as the Platonic rational nature, the Judeo-Christian soul, or Schopenhauer's Will. However, the compelling objection which has been raised to this particular kind of speculation by existentialism (recall the Sartre discussion) insists that no special "essence" preceeds man in any deterministic manner; man rather makes his own existence by his choices. Therefore, to be a "human being," and the degree to which that is accomplished is dependent upon a chosen and intended lifestyle, world-view, and synthesizing attitude.

There is an extrinsic answer to the question of what man is which relates to the first level mentioned above. On this level, man can be distinguished as a Homo Sapien, an upright creation with an opposite, workable thumb, or to use Plato's famous distinction, a two-legged animal without feathers. On this extrinsic level, it can be correctly asserted and proven by testing that man is man, and not a horse, a tree, or any other extended object of the universe. However, this study has attempted to claim that there is a fundamental distinction between extrinsic Homo Sapien and intrinsic human being. Of all the ideas which

this study has advanced, it should be predominantly clear that the question of what it means to be human transcends the problem of distinguishing man's uniqueness from other entities. To be human involves the introspective and reflective, continual process of arriving at, and being the palce for the arrival of, the above noted lifestyle, world-view, or synthesizing (play) attitude.

The purpose of this study has been to demonstrate and investigate the veracity of the idea that this human being can be experienced, attained, and maintained through the ability to intrinsically value. Furthermore, when that ability matures into a consciously intended lifestyle, it is tantamount to a play attitude which is taken toward life in general; or, a world-view primarily characterized by paidia. It will be recalled that the reliance on the idea of paidia did not arise haphazardly, but was firmly grounded in what was claimed to be two of the most fundamental insights into existence as such; that all truth is relative, and, in turn, that all activity is "as if activity." Both of these insights are uniquely manifested in a kind of play activity which attempts to see human being in terms of its wholeness rather than some part such as the mind, the body, chemical reaction, or social contracts. Thus, the answer which this study has attempted to advance concerning the compelling question of the nature of man is that man's fundamental uniqueness is related to his ability to intrinsically value (his own self, other selves, and his total environment). Then, man unveils human being to the degree that the potentiality for intrinsic valuation is realized, finally being epitomized in what this study has called "virtuosity at living," or the aesthetically imaginative, artistically creative life of Anthropaidian.

In the realization of human being as it is manifested by Anthropaidian, two key points merit a concluding assessment. First, there is the important recognition which is made by Anthropaidian that he is a part of what Gadamer called the "play of Being," "the play of ideas," or tradition. The realization of this potentiality can only be attained in a radical involvement with one's world; this involvement is fundamentally axiological in the sense that it can be characterized by the synthesis of ehtics and aesthetics, the good and the beautiful. In an article by Joyce Carol Oates (who knows about that area of experience where philosophy merges with poetry) entitled "The Myth of the Isolated Artist," precise expression is given to this Gadamer-inspired theme. Oates objects initially to the idea that there is some sort of unique, isolated entity that can be termed "self." She suggests that instead of being a rigid, fixed entity that man is always in the process of creating and being created. Most men are extrinsic in the sense that they are being created by unexamined traditions, passive habituations, and aquiescent absorption into the unconscious movement which for them lacks such definiton that it cannot even be determined what kind of movement it is. Others, however, have an active capacity for reflection and introspection, and thus are able to create themselves. Their life is, in a sense, a work of art.

Oates then describes a more advanced level of humanity where there are those who are capable of giving a formal expression of their introspection and reflection. These are the creative artists, and their formal expression is in the form of a painting, a poem, or some other type of literary or artistic creativity. She thus insists, in the major thrust of her article, that it is impossible for the artist to be

isolated because of the way that everything which he does is to some degree autobiographical, a formal expression of his own created self. Thus, every work of art is defined as "a hypothetical statement about reality — a kind of massive, joyful experiment submitted to one's peers for judgement."[1] What Oates says about a work of art is exactly descriptive of the kind of activity displayed by Anthropaidian. To be involved in the intrinsic valuation of the play lifestyle is to be making, through the form of one's own self, various hypothetical statements about one's own understanding of reality. Every statement which one makes is hypothetical because it is "as if," and it is always open to the responsive interplay of the judgements of others (which is the actual manifestation of tradition or Being). To live as Anthropaidian could be perfectly described as "a massive joyful experiment." Oates finally redefines the concept "self" in a way that is fully expressive of the thought of Gadamer. The "self" of Anthropaidian, in Oates' words, is a "part of a larger reservoir of energy, call it any name you like"[2]; here it has been called "tradition," "Being," and "understanding." In concluding her article, Oates gives expressions which are directly related to play, and to the idea that human being is the locus of the "speaking of Being":

> As long as the myth of separate and competitive "selves" endures, we will have a society obsessed with adolescent ideas of being superior, of conquering, of destroying. The pronoun "I" is as much a metaphor as "schizophrenia," and it has undergone the same "metaphor-into-myth" process. Creative work should be

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[1]Joyce Carol Oates, "The Myth of the Isolated Artist," Psychology Today (May, 1973), p. 74.

[2]Ibid., p. 75.

> greeted as a communal effort — an attempt by an individual to give voice to many voices, an attempt to synthesize and explore and analyze.[3]

A second key point that has been emphasized throughout is the basic implication which can be drawn from the play-orientation that one must be radically open-minded, especially to the point of lessening the degree of seriousness with which one takes oneself. Again, with reference to Gadamer, a fundamental aspect of the idea of the "play of Being" is its iconoclasm toward absolutized ideology whether it is found in an individual or corporate manifestation. Anthropaidian has as a correlate of his play a sense of humor which always allows him to laugh at himself. In an article entitled "The Sense in Humor," Harvey Mindness describes a sense of humor which goes for beyond the ability to merely "look on the bright side of things." Mindness' description perfectly characterizes essential features of the orientation of Anthropaidian:

> (1) flexibility — a willingness to examine every side of every issue;
> (2) spontaneity — the ability to leap from one mood or mode of thought to another;
> (3) unconventionality — freedom from the values of one's time, place, and profession;
> (4) shrewdness — the refusal to believe that anyone, least of all oneself, is what he seems to be;
> (5) playfulness — the grasp of life as a game, a tragicomic game that nobody wins, but that does not have to be won to be enjoyed; and,
> (6) humility — the elusive quality of being able to shrug off the insufficiency of one's ultimate wisdom.[4]

Beyond these characteristics is the fundamental ability to actively enjoy the ironies which permeate human existence:

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[3] Ibid.

[4] Harvey Mindness, "The Sense in Humor," Saturday Review (August 21, 1971), p. 10.

> We must become acutely aware of the anomalies that run through all human affairs. We must come to know, not theoretically but practically, that the happiest relationships are larded with suffering, that the greatest accomplishments are anticlimactic, that rational acts are motivated by irrational drives, that psychotic thinking makes excellent sense. We must know that assertiveness is the mask of fearfulness, that humility is a kind of pride, that love is a euphemism for lust, that truth is the pawn of fashion, that we cherish our misery, and that we are more irrational than we acknowledge.[5]

Anthropaidian lives in recognition of these realities and affirms his existence in their context. In this affirmation, Anthropaidian achieves authentic existence. In fact, the understanding of an authentic existence which is achieved through a playful, humorous dialogue with the ironies of one's life is at least a complement to, if not a supplementation of, Heidegger's formidable conception of authentic existence which is affirmed in the context of death.

At this point, a major part of this conclusion will find a focal point in the work of the American philosopher Sam Keen. In two works entitled To A Dancing God and Apology For Wonder, Keen attempts to make a synthesis of what has traditionally been described as the Apollonian and Dionysian lifestyles. The synthetic figure ultimately envisioned by Keen is the figure of Anthropaidian developed in this study. A discussion of Keen's ideas, which acted as a major part of the original impetus for this study, seemed to represent an appropriate consideration for the study's conclusion.

In one of Keen's earliest statements in Apology, he says that the present world can be characterized as suffering from an "eclipse of

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[5] Ibid.

wonder."[6] The influence of Buber is clear at this point, as it is in much of Keen's work. Buber had described, in his response to the "Death of God Theology," what he called the "eclipse of God," in which God had not ceased to exist, but man's ability to relate to a level of consciousness in which God might be confronted had been obscured. The technological society had corrupted man's understanding of his knowing processes, and made him epistemologically one dimensional; only calculative, rational thinking had any efficacy. To understand awareness, for example, as having epistemological truth value, or to consider aesthetic truth as being as formidable as logical demonstration was considered absurd. Man not only lost his ability to relate to an idea such as God, but his capacity for wonder or to wonder was emasculated. As Keen will show, it is only is exceptional instances such as the poet or the child that the capacity for wonder is maintained.

> Unlike some varieties of bees who come into the world to find that the previous generation has disappeared and left them a store of food, human infants are raised by parents. And parents have very often ceased to wonder. Parents who are anxious about novelty communicate this attitude to their children: the world is to be suspected as being guilty and hostile until it proves itself otherwise. Needless to say, when a child adopts this attitude, the world seldom has a chance to prove its innocence.[7]

His book is thus an "apology" for wonder in the sense that theologies which defended the Christian faith were once known as "apologetics." Keen says that "while this book was born out of a self-understanding, it seeks to demonstrate that the attitude of wonder is a prerequisite

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[6]Sam Keen, To A Dancing God (New York, 1970), pp. 6-21.

[7]Sam Keen, Visions and Visionaries (New York, 1974), p. 6.

of authentic humanness."[8]

The word wonder seems like a perfect word for describing the nature of the paidia experience that was elucidated in the third chapter of the first section. It will be recalled that a synthesis was postulated in which man reciprocally related to his environment rather than actively impressing his image upon it, or passively having its image impressed upon him; a synthesis of the involvement in the play of ideas (Being) rather than an extreme of playing with ideas (Being), or a deterministically being played by ideas (Being). Wonder denotes such a reciprocal, mutually inclusive relation. On the one hand, "to wonder" means for the mind to be active toward one's environment; it also means that the mind is being affected by (and perhaps effected by) that environment in a singular manner. For example, a child may wonder "where he came from." In doing so, he will be proposing certain questions, examining certain alternatives — activity which he initiates. At the same time, he will be caught up in the mystery of his own existence, the fact that he is rather than that he is not — a reality which is impinged upon him from without which causes him to exist in a state of wonder. Here, the discussion again comes very close to Gadamer, for it seems that the wonder is attempting to unveil itself, and that a part of that unveiling is the prompting of the question of one's existence. The old "which came first, the chicken or the egg" argument may be involved at this point in an attempt to determine which is more original, the questioning from within or the impinging reality from without. It would seem that an interface of the two would present a

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[8] Ibid., p. 7.

more plausible "ground of being" or "locus of truth" than either extreme, and the word which incorporates and manifests the polyphonic, polymorphic nature of that interface is wonder.

Keen gives a great deal of credit to the influence of Norman O. Brown as a significant motivating force behind his movement out of the Apollonian. He was intrigued by the "poetic precision"[9] of Brown's writings which raised logic to a new level, his advocacy of an adult level "polymorphous perversity of childhood,"[10] and an emphasis on the ir-rational which transcended the rational ("we should lose our minds and come to our senses"[11]).

> When he spoke of the obsession to labor and produce, and of the body which was drained of eros and controlled by the head, I recognized himself . . . . Being a Western man, I knew I had inherited a cultural tradition which drove a wedge between mind and body, self and world. And when Brown spoke about a reunion which involved the resurrection of the body and the creation of a Dionysian consciousness, I saw a vision of wholeness. The Gordian knot was cut, and I saw a way beyond the alienating dualisms that had held me fast. If there is no separation between mind/body, meaning/fact, imagination/action, vision/revolution, I could not experience more sensuality and warmth by merely emptying my mind of ideas. If eros was to warm my flesh, I would have to let it soften the concepts I used to think about the world. My driving mind would have to learn tenderness. Instead of making ideas march goose-step, I would have to allow them to tumble over each other like kittens. But how could I learn to be a player in a society of workers?[12]

Brown placed the kind of emphasis on imagination and a poetic,

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[9] Ibid., pp. 6-8.

[10] Ibid., p. 35.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid., p. 39.

intrinsically valuing lifestyle that is central to this discussion; he also understood this lifestyle in terms of play. In Love's Body, a quotation from William Blake is echoed as a mediating refrain: "The Eternal Body of Man is the imagination . . . ."[13]

> Polymorphous perversity (the paradigm of which is the activity of the child) turns out to be poetical rather than a literal thing. It is a form of mental playfulness as in Finnegan's Wake, something I do with my mind, a changed way of seeing that I would like to carry into everything I see.[14]

There could be no better description of intrinsic valuation. This is the polyphonic rhapsody of counterpoint that makes the intrinsically unmusical "incarnation of dissonance" intrinsically musical. The poetic lifestyle is characterized by a synthesis of word and deed, word and flesh, which for Brown provides ultimate personal freedom. Poetry itself is not seen as being opposed to concrete, particular prose, but a transcending of it. Poetry is a more fundamental epistemological tool; it is more particular and concrete than prose. His comment that "poetry I think is made with particulars, not with abstractions"[15] reminds one of Hartman's arrival at "singular concepts" by intrinsic valuation. Finally, he describes his own work, epitomizing the play attitude, with lines from Shelley's "The Clouds": "I silently laugh at my own cenotaph and arise and unbuild it again."[16]

Keen's "anatomy" of wonder begins with the Heideggerian realization

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[13] Ibid., p. 33.

[14] Sam Keen, Apology For Wonder (New York, 1969), p. 26.

[15] Ibid., p. 58.

[16] Ibid., p. 17.

of the fact that something exists rather than nothing; this is the "primal source of all wonder."[17] He drawn upon quotations from Wittgenstein, "it is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists,"[18] and Pascal, "I am terrified and astounded to find myself here and not there."[19] Even from the beginning of his investigation, there is the experience of all "certainties" giving way to questions which are finally not answerable; "wonder" is a particular type of perception which is intrinsically penultimate. It is not merely inspection, but rather a radical introspection which moves within (with and in) the usual to the accompaniment of the serendipitous unveiling of truth. Typically, wonder is understood in terms of the exceptional, the new and different, and Kierkegaard's Don Juan becomes the paradigm Wunderkind of a society enchanted by the fantacies of a "playboy" society. However, Keen's wonder is related more to the familiar than to the sensational.

> A mature sense of wonder does not need the constant titillation of the sensational to keep it alive. It is most often called forth by a confrontation with the mysterious depth of meaning at the heart of the familiar and quotidian. Rare birds — the scarlet tanger and indigo buntings of experience — do upon occasion delight us, but a mature sense of wonder may be evoked by starlings and English sparrows.[20]

Intrinsic valuation and Keen's "mature sense of wonder" are synonymous, and to talk about wonder with the qualification of maturity is to describe the way in which the poet grows out of, yet moves beyond, the

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[17] Ibid., p. 22.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid., p. 92.

[20] Ibid., pp. 23-24.

paidia of the child. Such involvement with and intrinsic valuation of the quotidian is exemplified by the creativity of the artist; Van Gogh's "Peasant Shoes," Mondrian's blocks of color, or Andy Warhol's soup cans.

A major consideration of this discussion has been the manner in which play, intrinsic valuation, and now wonder have a way in which they break down or transcend commonly conceived juxtapositions such as subject-object, rational-irrational, real-imaginary, or fact-myth. Keen comes quickly to this area of consideration in his own discussion, de

> the interface of such distinctions as these as the primal locus of truth which manifests itself as mystery. The distinct influence of the philosophy of Gabriel Marcel is evident at this point.

> > The province of the mysterious is where the distinction between subject and object break down. A mystery is something in which I am myself involved, and it can therefore be thought of as a sphere where the distinction between what is in me and what is before me loses its meaning and its initial validity.[21]

Making a point that is at the heart of Gadamer's discussion, Keen notes Marcel's approval of a statement by B. P. Jouve: "Mysteries are not truths that lie beyond us; they are truths which comprehend us."[22] Keen also stresses that wonder and mystery have little to do with quantitative knowledge, a typical assumption of technological and scientific rationalism. Wonder, mystery, and play have to do with qualitative knowledge, or that which metaphorically may be said to be on a different level of infinity as compared with the quantitative. For example, a good deal is quantitatively known about the phenomena of

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[21] Ibid., p. 125.

[22] Ibid.

the birth of a child. However, the wonder and mystery of that birth is in no way lessened by that quantitative information. (It can be noted that a baby was comparable to artistic creation at the highest point, I^I — intrinsic valuation of an intrinsic object — in the examples offered by Hartman which paralleled his value scale.[23])

The paradigm experience of wonder becomes that which is possible with other persons. Thus, following Buber again, a "relational mysticism" is the most qualitative experience that is possible. It transcends any sort of panpsychic mysticism, and the source of ethics is again found to exist in an aesthetic consciousness as this discussion has claimed. "It is important to insist upon the priority of wonder, because otherwise we lose the basic of ethics."[24] This is possible because "every wonder-event involves a cognitive crucifixion; it disrupts the system of meaning that secures the identity of the ego. To wonder is to die to the self, to cease imposing categories . . . ."[25] ("To die to the self" may be somewhat strong, but when it is qualified by "to cease imposing categories," the discussion of Keen remains within the framework suggested by Gadamer where "death" of the self would not be desirable; a prohibition against "imposing" categories in such a way that truth cannot speak is, however, emphasized.) As has been said, the Cartesian orientation of Western technological society has ultimately resulted in a de-personalization of the human, and a movement away

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[23]Robert S. Hartman, The Structure of Value: Foundations of Scientific Axiology (Carbondale, 1967), p. 272.

[24]Keen, Apology, op.cit., p. 30.

[25]Ibid., pp. 30-31.

from a systemic objectification of the world to the ability to aesthetically appreciate could have untold positive implications for human relations. This was the point of Schiller's "Aesthetic Education," and the "hierarchy of love" noted in the above mentioned Carson McCuller's story.

Keen makes a contrast between the scientific quest for knowledge, and the immediacy of the wonder-producing encounter. Scientific reason deals with reality as a problem to be solved, and in order to solve that problem certain elements must be abstracted from the whole. It is impossible to confront the whole as whole in the manner that Sartre, for example, spoke of contronting the whole givenness of the field of snow. In science there is an attempt to understand parts, while the aesthetic consciousness enjoys the whole; in the latter encounter there is a "movement from admiration to contemplation to celebration."[26] A basic presupposition of the aesthetic lifestyle is that life is a gift.

Wonder is associated with childhood, but Keen believes that this association is usually expressed in little more than cliché, often suggesting little more than an obscure return to the infantile. In an attempt to be more specific about the relation of wonder and the child, he says:

> Wonder, in the child, is the capacity for sustained and continued delight, marvel, amazement, and enjoyment. It is the capacity of the child to approach the world as if it were a smorgasbord of potential delights, waiting to be tasted. It is the sense of anticipation, freshness, and openness that rules the life of the healthy child. The world is a surprise party, planned just for me, and my one vocation in life is to enjoy it to the fullest — such is the

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[26] Ibid., p. 34.

> implicit creed of the wondering child. Reality is a gift, a delight, a surprise — in fact, a toy . . . . To wonder is to live in the world of novelty rather than law, of delight rather than obligation, and of the present rather than the future.[27]

The child's life can be radically present tense. Here, there may be the triumph of a real specious present which Sartre idealized. The child is not haunted by necessity, the idea that events and sensations will not last, or the concern with implications.

In this context, Keen gives attention to play, which he understands as a manifestation of pure freedom and pure happiness. It is immediately apparent that, while Keen makes no discussion of the distinction, there is a distinct difference between paidia play and agon play which is present in his writings. True play is not law governed; "the only laws governing play are those that are made up and adhered to as long as the game gives delight."[28] This is precisely the conclusion claimed in the first section. As with Gadamer, any "structure" arises out of play, and is a representative expression of that which enhances and provides for the maintenance of delight. Keen emphasizes that the child does not need the sensational, but is able to find delight in that which is repeated; the child can have intercourse with the familiar without being bored. A child reads the same book, wants the same bedtime story, and keeps company with the same select group of stuffed animals and toys. He may have a fixed, daily routine that would challenge that of his most encarcerated, adult contemporary, but the child is in no way quotidian. Keen quotes Chesterton:

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[27] Ibid., pp. 43-44.

[28] Ibid., p. 52.

> A child kicks his legs rhythmically through excess, not absence of life. Because children have abounding vitality, because they are in spirit fierce and free, therefore they want things repeated and unchanged. They always say, "Do it again"; and the grown-up people are not strong enough to exult in monotony.[29]

This ability to interpenetrate into the infinite singular is clearly what has been called intrinsic valuation throughout. The child is the Superman living authentically with eternal recurrence, and the world bears the child's image. His world is zuhanden more than vorhanden, and it is a world in which he is not afraid because it is more like him than unlike him. Intrinsic valuation is a natural manifestation of this relationship.

> Landscapes may be happy or sad, and animals good or bad. Milk that spills may be scolded for its malevolent intent, and chairs kicked for their propensity to trip innocent toddlers.[30]

This may be the child, but, especially as it regards the illustration of landscapes, it may also be the artist; Van Gogh is a child as he stands in awe before the French countryside near Arles. Myth comes naturally to the child; it is an adult that ascribes events of life to impersonal fate — a child would never do that. For Keen, "the child is a natural existentialist."[31]

Philosophy has at its motivating core the type of wonder that has been herein described. In the Platonic dialogue Theaetetus, Socrates says that "wonder (thaumazein) is the feeling of a philosopher, and

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[29] Ibid., p. 54.

[30] Ibid.

[31] Ibid., p. 55.

philosophy begins in wonder."[32] Thaumazine often means "vision," such as the prophet or seer might have of the gods or of some magical reality. Thaumazein is very close to the word theoria which was discussed in relation to play by Gadamer. Gadamer related theoria to the spectator's role in play, and Hannah Arendt extends that role to encompass the human the human relation to truth itself. Thaumazein and theoria mean "the contemplation of truth at which the philosopher ultimately arrives in the philosophically purified speechless wonder with which he began."[33] This is also the movement from philosophy to poetry which has been described, which here is being described as culminating in the speechless. Aristotle adds to these expressions: "It is owing to their wonder that men now begin and at first began to philosophize."[34]

Finally, Keen provides several definitions of man which are quite helpful to the overall discussion of play. First, there is Homo Faber, "man the maker" or "man the technician." Man is characterized in this definition as a compulsive, rather than a creative worker for whom there is an extreme chasm between vocation and avocation. Homo Faber has impotence as the primary symbol of his character; Keen recalls the view of Dostoevsky and Kafka that man is an insect, or Marx that man is an economic commodity, or Lawrence and Koestler that he is sexually impotent, and of Camus that he is an alienated stranger. Then, Homo Faber de-volves into Homo Fabricatus, "man the artifact." He has moved from the inventor of the machine to the position of being little

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[32]Plato, Theatetus (Chicago, 1952), p. 155.

[33]Hannah Andrent, The Human Condition (New York, 1958), p. 267.

[34]Aristotle, Metaphysics (Chicago, 1952), p. 982.

more than a cog in that machine; he is victimized by his own technological Frankenstein. Keen says that ultimately Homo Fabricatus will be seen as "man the waste maker," and that the very existence of man's world may be ended by man's garbage; the ultimate disvaluation of the intrinsically valuable. "It is as if our culture were plugged into the mechanical tit of a machine which force-feeds it until it begins to produce waste."[35] In its relationship to its technological creation, Homo Fabricatus has become the "anus of the machine rather than its brain."[36]

> Wonder is still experienced in relation to the holy, only now the manifestations of holiness are the power and products of technological intelligence, not the divine logos which the ancients saw operative in nature and history. Homo Faber still makes his religious pilgrimages to the sacred precincts in which his hopes are incarnate — in which his vision of his future is celebrated. The World's Fair and Expo 67 are both examples of meccas which Homo Faber periodically consecrates and visits in order to wonder before the most advanced technology and renew his vision of the Jerusalem he will create in the very near future.[37]

Homo Faber also has a relation to play, but in it the paidia outlook is perverted. The only way that he can play is in contests which exemplify the virtuous status which he has granted to competitiveness. "The game is the only way Homo Faber can play; it is a sublimination of the fun instinct."[38] Play is conceived in terms of discipline and structure. As an example of this, one need only view the three world

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[35] Keen, Apology, op.cit., p. 125.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid., pp. 137-138.

[38] Ibid., p. 144.

championship professional football teams fielded by the Miami Dolphins in the early 1970s. Never was a team more devastating, precise, professional; never was a team more predictable, more boring. Yet, that did not matter — they always won! Play is acceptable only as a means of socializing children with skills and attitudes that will make them a contributing part of a competitive society. This is paideia without paidia, the ultimate perversion of the ideas of Plato or Schiller. "Such a constipated view of play rests upon a deep suspicion which considers delight, pleasure, and fun acceptable only if they are means to some other end."[39]

Opposed to man defined as Homo Faber, Keen describes a Homo Ludens type figure which he calls Homo Admirans, "man the dreamer." Examples of Homo Admirans may be found in figures such as Prometheus, Zorba the Greek, Holden Caulfield, Huck Finn, and even Adam. As has been said, the paradigm activity of Homo Admirans is the dance. If Homo Faber is primarily Apollonian, Homo Admirans is fundamentally Dionysian. While Homo Admirans is without doubt the better choice of the two modes of existence, Keen sees the potentiality of a pathological extreme in both. Therefore, he posits a final definition which will constitute a transcending synthesis of the two extremes. He defines authentic man in terms of Homo Tempestivus, "the timely man" or "the man for all seasons." Homo Tempestivus is guided in his synthesizing efforts by a "creative process of oscillation."[40] Conveyed in the idea of oscillation are figures previously emphasized: the primal root of play as

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[39] Ibid., p. 145.

[40] Ibid., p. 195.

movement; the dance; the emphasis on the idea of "bouyancy"; and, Sartre's image of sliding over the field of snow. "Pathology involves an effort to deny wonder-openness-novelty-possibility or action-decision-regularity-necessity. Health lies in the both/and, not the either/or."[41]

Keen also emphasizes the time element by which Homo Tempestivus is governed. He explains that the ideas of limits and boundaries (agonistic ideas) of the Apollonian and the Dionysian both give a spatial orientation; one is either observing limits or breaking down barriers. With Homo Tempestivus, time becomes the organizing principle; "the wise man knows what time it is in his own life and in the life of the community."[42] A popular song of the late 1960s asked the question: "does anybody really know what time it is, does anybody really care?" This is kairos time as contrasted with chronos time, and Keen is relying at this point on one of the more important distinctions provided in the thought of Paul Tillich.

Tillich makes a distinction between chronos, formal or clock time, and kairos, the right, appropriate, "ripe," or fitting time. He directly relates the idea of kairos to artistic creativity and a sensitivity to the intrinsic: "to him who is conscious of an ongoing creative life, time is laden with tensions, with possibilities and impossibilities, it is qualitative and full of significance."[43] Tillich then describes the way in which man's capacity for a kairos-experience of his own historicality is eroded in the rampant rationality of the technological society.

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[41] Ibid. Also see p. 197.

[42] Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era (Chicago, 1966), p. 34.

[43] Ibid.

In words reminiscent of Keen's idea of Homo Fabricatus, he says:

> — the technical-mathematical explanation of the world by man's natural science, the rational conception of reality as a machine with eternally constant laws of movement manifest in an infinitely recurring and predictable, chronological, natural process. The mentality that has produced this conceptual framework as its creation has, in turn, come so much under its spell that it has made itself into a part of this machine, into a piece of this eternally identical process. It has so surrendered itself to its own creation that it has considered itself as a mechanism and has forgotten that the machine was created by it.[44]

For Tillich, the "new creation" is thus that which appears in kairo, in the midst of the chronologically oriented "old creation." He then does a sketch of human history in which the element of kairos as manifested in the creative processes is the primary criterion of judgement. These periods of history which manifest kairos, and which receive the most positive evaluation by Tillich, are those in which there is an openness to the Unconditional. Unconditional in this context can be seen as synonymous with the radically unconditioned "play of Being." By Unconditional, Tillich means that dimension of experience which cannot be ultimately subject to the manipulations of technological reason. In such a period of history, one encounters phenomena generally associated with aesthetics: a lack of separation between subject and object; an immediate spiritual "communion" with things, with no attempt to analyze or control them; and, an emphasis on the mystical, inner meaning of phenomena. Tillich says: "Obviously, in such a situation, the arts play a much greater role than in a scientific or technical age."[45]

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[44] Ibid.

[45] Ibid., p. 44.

Therefore, that individual who is "creative" is in possession of, or is grasped by, kairos; he is Homo Tempestivus. Such a characterization is not only appropriate to the artist and the aesthetic dimension in general, but it is also appropriate to ethics. That which makes an action ethical may in fact be its timing, or how it is fittingly appropriate to a situation. The opposite of such timing would be an ethical absolutism which would amount to little more than a mechanistic legalism. Tillich speaks in the following manner: "Not everything is possible at every time, not everything is true at every time, nor is everything demanded at every moment."[46] One would thus possess what Confucius called "Li," propriety, the ability to make a synthetic, harmonic whole out of each particular situation.

The whole idea of timing is directly related to play, and an experience that involves a sensitivity to the kairos is a paidia-experience. Creative activity is performed within the locus of a limiting, situational environment, and the artist-player must be cognizant of the activity's "fittingness" in relation to that environment: a photographer may follow a subject for days waiting for the "perfect moment" in which a photograph can be made which captures the essential being of the subject's character and personality; an artist may wait all day for sunlight to fall on a setting in a particular manner unveiling the setting's "truth"; a distance runner acquires a special sensitivity for the time in the race when he will make his "kick." One can easily call attention to the timing involved in other types of creative endeavors: the actor on the stage; the preacher and politician in their speeches; the grand

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[46] Ibid., p. 33.

ballerina; the mime or the stand-up comedian; or, the clown, magician, and trapeze artist in the circus.

Perhaps, the paradigm of timing in the creative arts is the concert musician or conductor. In the musical setting, as much attention must be given to the timing of the piece of music as to the notes themselves. It is one thing to play all of the right notes, and quite another to play with an expression which is described as having a "feel for the music," or as "capturing the soul of the composer which is in the music." In a conversation on this topic with a master piano teacher, the following comment was made: "Almost any student with discipline and commitment can learn to play the right notes; but, that is mechanics. Only an exceedingly small minority have a sense of time — something which cannot ultimately be taught — like the natural moves of a great athlete." These ideas on timing, which constitutes the basic character of Anthropaidian, can now be concluded by calling attention to the end statement of Heidegger's Introduction to Metaphysics which gives a heightened efficacy to the preceeding extension of Keen's discussion. Heidegger's quote applies not only to timing in general, but to the most important level of the timing of play, especially the participation of one's own being in the "play of Being."

> To know how to question means to know how to wait, even a whole lifetime. But an age which regards as real only what goes fast and can be clutched with both hands looks on questioning as "remote from reality" and as something that does not pay, whose benefits cannot be numbered. But the essential is not number; the essential is the right time, i.e., the right moment, and the right perseverance. "For," as Hölderlin said, "the mindful God abhors untimely growth."[47]

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[47]Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics (New York,

Keen concludes Apology For Wonder by talking in play terms. Homo Tempestivus has balance, equilibrium, grace; "he makes it look so easy, even I could do it."[48] Personal identity and authenticity are achieved in such a way that man has enough self-confidence to express himself which is his freedom. Man's life can thus be consummated in the epitome of play, celebration. Keen ends his book with a quotation from Dag Hammerskjöld:

> God does not die on the day when we cease to believe in a personal diety, but we die on the day when our lives cease to be illumined by the steady radiance, renewed daily, of a wonder, the source of which is beyond all reason.[49]

The most dramatic question of human experience is whether man, as he approaches the twenty-first century, will be a Ticktockman or a Harlequin, Homo Faber or Anthropaidian. It would seem that the prevailing forces of the present world are enamored by a ticktock "mentality," and that it becomes increasingly courageous to attempt to be a Harlequin, to create one's own self in the face of that which is self-less. Perhaps, this study will have been successful if, in its consideration, some Ticktockman is thrown three minutes off of his systemic schedule. It would be more successful if it has called attention to the wonder of intrinsic valuation, the vast potential of aesthetic education, the true freedom of paidia, and the adventure involved in assuming a posture of radical openness to the arrival of that which arrives in the continual newness of the mutually inclusive unveiling of Truth, Being, World, and Self.

1961), p. 172.

[48] Keen, Apology, op.cit., p. 201.

[49] Ibid., p. 212.

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