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**The Shadow State and Refugees:
The Role of Nonprofit Organizations in Refugee Participation**

A Thesis Presented for
The Master of Science Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

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August 2011

DEDICATION

To Belén

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to acknowledge the generosity and helpfulness of those at the Refugee Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities in Miami. In particular, I am grateful to Raul Hernandez who has been a wealth of information and a great help to this thesis. Finally, I would like to acknowledge Hiram Ruiz, Raul Hernandez, and Luisa Lois for their willingness to contribute their stories.

ABSTRACT

The devolution of welfare services in the United States has increased the importance of the nonprofit sector. Geiger and Wolch argue that decentralization has left nonprofit organizations (NPOs) under the purview of the state. They refer to this as the “shadow state.” Trudeau argues for a more nuanced view of the shadow state in which governmental agencies and NPOs are highly interdependent. This research expands on the findings of Trudeau by extending the shadow state construct to the individual. I examine the role of refugees in the shadow state construct and their ability to affect government policy through participation in NPOs and find that refugees do indeed play a role in the shadow state. Through feedback, experience and, most importantly, by becoming part of the organization, refugees can have an impact on refugee services through participation in NPOs.

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INTRODUCTION

[Civil society organizations]¹ provide a means for governments to consult migrants and thus ensure a better match between programmes and migrants' actual requirements (Spencer 2005, p. 3).

Since the 1960s, the welfare system in the United States (US) has undergone a devolution of services to local levels. These changes have increased the importance of the nonprofit sector by increasing its role in the administration of services in the welfare state (Trudeau 2008). In 1986, Geiger and Wolch (G&W) coined the term "shadow state" to explain the increasingly important role of nonprofit organizations (NPOs) in the modern welfare state. The shadow state, as defined by Wolch, is:

[A] para-state apparatus comprised of multiple voluntary sector organizations, administered outside of traditional democratic politics and charged with major collective service responsibilities previously shouldered by the public sector, yet remaining within the purview of state control (Wolch 1990, p. xvi, in Trudeau 2008).

Trudeau (T) (2008) argues for a more nuanced view of the shadow state that emphasizes the role of NPOs through the development of interdependent relationships between official government agencies and the nonprofit sector. Government agencies depend on NPOs for the provision of information and the distribution of services. Conversely, the nonprofit sector relies on the government for funding. Trudeau argues that the

¹ Civil society entities are, "Non-governmental associations of citizens, charitable or otherwise, formed for the purpose of providing benefit to the members and to society. The term includes non-governmental organizations engaged in humanitarian work" (USDOS). These entities will be referred to as "nongovernmental organizations," "VOLAGs", "voluntary agencies" and the "third sector" throughout this thesis. These terms are used interchangeably.

government exerts control over NPOs, and that these organizations in turn have the power to influence policy, particularly as pertains to the provision of services.

Despite this important addition to our understanding of the shadow state, Trudeau's research stops short of exploring the role of refugees, or even considering if they have a role, in the shadow state construct. It is the aim of this research to examine the role of refugees in the shadow state and their ability to affect government programs through participation in NPOs. I will focus on the following three research questions:

1. How does devolution lead to the democratization of welfare services, thereby better enabling service providers to meet the needs of their clients?
2. How do refugees, through NPOs, influence services that are provided?
3. How do actors and institutions at the local, state and national scales operate within the shadow state construct?

The thesis is divided into four major sections. First, I will review literature pertaining to the devolution of welfare services in the US and Europe. Second, I will describe the methods used to complete this research. Third, I will present a case study of Cuban refugees in Miami. The case study will be divided into two stages, namely 1) secondary data analysis; and 2) participant observation through volunteer work at the Refugee Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami. Lastly, I discuss the broader impacts of this thesis and provide ideas for future research. Before beginning, it is important to understand the historical and legal context of the Cuban refugee flow to the US, and why I have chosen Miami-based Cubans and Catholic Charities for this study.

Historical and Legal Context of the Cuban Refugee Movement in the US

In 1959, Fidel Castro ascended to power in Cuba after successfully overthrowing the Batista regime. This event contributed to decades of exodus from the island nation. The exodus can be broken into roughly four waves. The first wave of Cubans arrived immediately after the fall of Batista in 1959. Within the first few years, over 200,000 Cubans fled their country and resettled in the US (Nackerud *et al.* 1999). This initial group of exiles was primarily upper-middle class, and they believed that Castro would be quickly removed from power (*ibid.*). In 1961, a US-backed group of Cuban exiles invaded Cuba in an attempt to overthrow Castro, known as the Bay of Pigs. This unsuccessful attempt was followed by several other failed coup attempts. It became increasingly clear that the Castro regime was not going to be immediately overthrown. In 1965, the second wave of Cuban exiles began arriving in the US. From 1965-1973, Cubans seeking asylum in the US could board Freedom Flights from Cuba to the US (Nackerud *et al.* 1999). These flights were organized by the US and Cuban governments as part of the Memorandum of Understanding (*ibid.*). During eight years of flights, over 250,000 Cubans entered the US (*ibid.*). Following a relatively calm period, the third wave of Cuban refugees arrived in 1980. This wave, perhaps the most controversial, occurred when a group of Cubans stormed the Peruvian embassy in Cuba, demanding asylum. The Peruvian government refused to hand the Cubans over to the Castro regime. Infuriated, Castro withdrew all protection from the Peruvian embassy, underestimating the exodus that would occur. Subsequently, thousands more

stormed the embassy. Castro, in a fit of anger, allowed 125,000 people to leave Cuba through the port of Mariel (ibid.). The Mariel Boatlift, as it came to be called, received great opposition in the US. The vast number of exiles tested the patience of people in the US. Matters were further exacerbated by stories of Castro using the boatlift to offload his prisoners and socially undesirable people onto the US (ibid.). As a result, the Marielitos, as those who arrived in the boatlift came to be known, were not immediately granted refugee status (ibid.). Eventually, in 1984, they were granted residency status under the Cuban Adjustment Act (ibid.). The final wave of exiles was comprised of *balseros* (rafters). The Balsero Crisis, beginning in 1994, consisted of the capture of over 28,000 Cuban rafters by US forces, and their subsequent transfer to a US Naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (ibid.). The *balseros* were detained at the base for eight months until the US and Cuba came to a mutual agreement that guaranteed 20,000 regular immigration visas per year for Cubans, but eliminating their automatic refugee status (ibid.). This was only one of many changes in US policy towards Cuban exiles in the past five decades.

Prior to the 1960s, refugee policy in the US focused primarily on defining who was or was not a refugee, but gave no consideration to resettlement (Zucker 1983). The first semblance of our modern refugee system appeared in the Corporate Affidavit Program of 1946 (ibid.). This program established a relationship between the government and VOLAGs that allowed VOLAGs to submit an affidavit of support (guaranteeing that the recipient would not become a public charge) on behalf of thousands of displaced persons who otherwise would not have qualified for

resettlement in the US (ibid.). This first step was important for two reasons. First, it created a legal relationship between the government and VOLAGs. Second, the program was so successful that it led to the establishment of the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. This act, the first significant refugee legislation in the US, assigned the responsibility of resettling refugees to VOLAGs (ibid.). The VOLAGs' first opportunity to exercise their new role occurred after the 1956 Hungarian uprising. Federal funding supported the VOLAGs efforts to resettle Hungarian refugees, setting an important precedent for the Cuban refugee flow that was to follow.

As the first Cuban exiles began to arrive, VOLAGs relied on their own resources to aid in their resettlement (ibid.). However, by 1960 the number of refugees exceeded the financial capacity of VOLAGs (ibid.). In December 1960, the *Cuban Refugee Emergency Center* was established by President Eisenhower and VOLAGs received federal funding to resettle Cuban exiles. Two years later, Congress passed the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, establishing the Cuban Refugee Program (the Program). The Program was responsible for organizing refugee benefits, such as health care, housing, education, professional licensure, etc. (ibid.). A few years later, Congress passed the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, which provided Cuban exiles a path to Legal Permanent Residency.

By 1980, Congress sought to replace the Cuban-specific refugee program with a universal refugee program, the Refugee Act of 1980 (ibid.). As part of this act, the US adopted the definition of "refugee" found in the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, " [any person] who can establish persecution or a

well-founded fear of persecution in their home country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion” (USDOS 2001). In addition, the Refugee Act of 1980 recognized the Office of the US Coordinator for Refugee Affairs. The coordinator was “instructed to ‘consult regularly with States, localities, and private nonprofit voluntary agencies concerning the sponsorship process and the intended distribution of refugees’” (Zucker 1983, p. 178). Finally, the 1980 law established the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), which is responsible for the provision of refugee assistance (ibid.). However, within weeks of its passage, the Act was met with strong opposition from Cubans (ibid.).² In response, a new status, “Cuban-Haitian Entrant” was created. This status allowed Cubans and Haitians who entered the US between the 21st of April and the 10th of October of 1980 to become legal permanent residents after one year in the US (ibid.). A further response to the Act of 1980 was the passage of the Fascell-Stone Amendment in 1982 that granted entrants equal benefits as refugees (ibid.). Today, according to the volunteer orientation provided by Catholic Charities, Cuban and Haitians may enter the United States under “parole” status. Parole is a conditional status granted to Cubans and Haitians upon arrival in the US. This status can be adjusted to legal permanent resident after one year, however until that time they are considered “entrants.” As a Cuban or Haitian entrant, the individual is eligible for the same benefits as a refugee. Their interaction with the

² Cubans opposed the legislation because it sought to strip many Cubans of refugee benefits. However, this law was amended by the creation of the “Cuban-Haitian Entrant” status and the Fascell-Stone Amendment that guaranteed entrants the same assistance as refugees.

Refugee Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities is the same, their orientation and services are the same, and therefore all will be referred to as “refugees” in this paper.

Why Miami Cubans?

This research focuses on the Cuban population of Miami. The Cuban exile community in Florida has been the focus of national attention for the past half century. Their public exodus from Cuba started in the 1950s and continues today, and it has been well documented and heavily publicized. I chose to study Cubans in Miami primarily because of the availability of data on this community. For example, The Cuban Heritage Collection, housed at the University of Miami and home to a large collection of records relating to the Cuban diaspora, was especially important for this thesis.

The location of this collection in Miami is fitting, as Florida is home to 68% of the Cuban population in the US (Pew 2006). Familial ties, cultural and climatic similarities, and the geographic proximity to Cuba all contribute to the dense settlement of Cubans in South Florida. However, modern Miami’s importance as a Latino center extends beyond the Cuban community. Jaime Roldos, past president of Ecuador, illustrated the importance of Miami to the Americas when he named Miami “the capital of Latin America.” Miami earned this title because of the large Latino population and the strong touristic and business ties between the city and Latin America (Levine 1985). According to 2008 statistics released by the Pew Hispanic Center (based on US Census statistics), 62% of the Miami-Dade county population identifies itself as Hispanic (Pew 2010).

Despite its domestic significance as one of the fastest growing Sunbelt cities, Miami has increasingly depended on Latin America for its economic growth (Levine 1985). It comes as no surprise, given its geographic location, that Miami has come to serve as the gateway between the Americas. Latin investors have turned to Miami not only as a tourist destination, but for its friendly business environment. Miami offers a stable economic and social environment where financial establishments have flourished and business can be conducted in a stable and secure environment (in stark contrast to the volatility of many Latin American markets) (Levine 1985). No single group has been more responsible for Miami's ascent than the Cubans (Levine 1985; McHugh *et al.* 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Portes and Stepick 1993).

One Cuban banker put it this way,

Miami was a typical southern city, with an important population of retirees and veterans [...]. No one thought of transforming Miami into what it is today. It is no exaggeration to say that the motor of this Great Change were the Cuban men and women [...]. These last decades have witnessed the foundation of a dynamic and multi-faceted Miami over the past of a Miami that was merely provincial and tourist-oriented. Today, the level of progress has reached unanticipated heights (Portes and Rumbaut 2006, p. 156).

Cubans have made Miami their own through tremendous political involvement. According to McHugh *et al.* (1997, p. 515) "Cubans are one of the most geographically concentrated immigrant ethnic groups in the United States. [...] Rather than assimilating in the classic sense, Miami Cubans have remade the city in their own image." Portes and Rumbaut (2006) recount an example how Cubans in Miami used their concentrated numbers and political will to vote out politicians who favored

unpopular policies, such as an anti-bilingual referendum, and replaced them with exile Cuban candidates. The political clout of Miami Cubans extends beyond the local and into state and federal levels as well (i.e. Hiram Ruiz, Director of Refugee Services for Florida Department of Children and Families, Senator Mel Martinez and the newly elected Senator Marco Rubio) (McHugh *et al.* 1997; Portes and Rumbaut 2006).

Civil society is helpful in understanding the success of Cubans in Miami. Civil society is a network of community associations that represent the needs of a group (Espinoza 1999; Foley *et al.* 1996). The roots of civil society can be traced to eighteenth-century “Scottish moralists,” such as Adam Smith (Foley *et al.* 1996, p. 39).

Enlightenment thinkers considered the associations of civil society as necessary for civility and democratic vitality (*ibid.*). Civil society organizations are often the “byproduct of religion, tradition, [and] shared historical experience” (Fukuyama 2001, p. 7). All cultures are based on shared norms, and these norms serve to encourage cooperation within a community (*ibid.*). This has certainly been the case with Cubans in Miami. Historically, Cuban exiles have relied heavily on the Cuban community in Miami for support. In return, new members of the community have been expected to vote for Cuban-supported politicians – as illustrated by the anti-bilingual referendum discussed earlier in this chapter. A defining characteristic of civil society is unified action to solve problems, which relies on cooperation (Lehning 1997). The Cuban community in Miami uses its unified voice to pressure authorities and to engender bottom-up change. In this way, civil society can be seen as “a form of societal self-organization which allows for cooperation with the state” (Hall 1998, p. 32). Citizen

participation in voluntary associations and community organizations helps to sustain civil society by building trust within the community, potentially leading to greater political participation (Newton 2001). Furthermore, participation in community associations reinforces relationships and strengthens the social networks of members, thereby strengthening communities (Lehning 1997).

The Cuban community in Miami has used its social capital to build a strong civil society. The result has been a powerful ethnic community that has changed the face of Miami-Dade County through strong local and national political participation. However, it is important to note the uniqueness of Cuban exiles. Cubans, as a group, have been exceptional in their high political participation. This is due, in part, to the high levels of educational and professional attainment of many members of the Cuban exile community in Miami. The political strength of the Cuban community is also aided by its location in the most populous county of one of the most important swing states. Nevertheless, the Cuban community is a unique example how civil society organizations can instigate change from the bottom-up, while simultaneously using the shadow state to encourage change at the highest levels of government.

Civil society can help explain the success of the Cuban community from a bottom-up perspective. However, I am interested in the ways in which government-sanctioned voluntary agencies can use the federal refugee resettlement program to scale-up the needs of refugees to state and federal governmental organizations. It is due to the Cubans' propensity for political participation that I have decided to study how Cuban refugees may use voluntary agencies as a platform for political

participation. Specifically, I am interested in how refugees can voice their needs and concerns through local NPOs and how nonprofit organizations, such as the Refugee Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities, “scale up” their influence.

Why Catholic Charities?

Of the organizations available to Cuban refugees, Catholic Charities has proven to be one of the most influential because of its early and profound involvement with the Cuban Diaspora (Walsh 1971). The vast majority of Cubans are, at least nominally, Catholic. This has placed the Catholic Church in a unique position to aid arriving refugees, catering to both corporeal and spiritual needs. Tweed (1997) highlights the concern of the Catholic Church with respect to the Cuban situation and the importance of the creation of the Archdiocese of Miami. Shortly after the arrival of the first Cuban exiles in 1959, Archbishop Carroll encouraged the establishment of *la Ermita de la Virgen de la Caridad* (The Shrine of Our Lady of Charity) in Miami to, as Tweed recounts, “tend to the unchurched³ in the exile community” (Tweed 1997, p. 38). This shrine has become an important symbol of the Cuban diaspora in Miami, creating both a spiritual connection to the remembered Cuba of the past and a “physical” connection through radio broadcasted sermons from the shrine that reach the island nation (Tweed 1997).

³ The term “unchurched” refers to those who are not actively practicing their faith (Catholicism in this case), and in particular to those who practice some form of syncretistic religion (the combination of two or more religions to form a single hybrid religion), such as Santería.



Figure 1. La Ermita de la Virgen de la Caridad (The Shrine of Our Lady of Charity)
(Source: <http://www.ermitadelacaridad.org/ermita.html>)

Another account that further emphasizes the role of the Catholic Church in responding to the Cuban exodus comes from Monsignor Bryan O. Walsh, the Episcopal Vicar for Spanish-Speaking Peoples of the Catholic Archdiocese of Miami. In 1960, Walsh created a program for the resettlement of unaccompanied Cuban youth from communist Cuba to the US that came to be known as *Operation Pedro Pan*. While in the initial stage of logistical planning, Walsh's organization, the Catholic Welfare Bureau, worked in tandem with other organizations of Protestant and Jewish faiths to organize the resettlement of unaccompanied Cuban minors to the US. Walsh recognized that his Catholic Welfare Bureau bore a unique responsibility to the Cuban children, a sentiment made clear by the following statement, "Since most Cubans were at least

nominally Catholic, it was recognized that the main burden would fall on the Catholic Welfare Bureau" (Walsh 1971, p. 388).

In my consideration of nonprofit organizations it became clear that Catholic Charities offered the best opportunity to employ, as Kodras (1997, p. 80) has suggested, a "*flexible use of scale and scope*."⁴ The aforementioned responsiveness and sense of obligation of the Catholic Church to the Cuban diaspora made Catholic Charities a natural choice for this project. In addition, as will be seen, Catholic Charities has an impressive network of governmental and nongovernmental partnerships that offer a good example of how an organization can transcend scale. For instance, Catholic Charities has "scaled up" its power to the national scale. It becomes clear in Walsh's account that the Catholic Church actively organized local efforts on the ground, in both Cuba and the United States, while simultaneously cooperating with other religious and governmental organizations (within and outside of the Catholic Charities umbrella) to petition the federal government for financial aid. Their on-the-ground-expertise and experience was well received by government and business officials alike, who were needed for the financial backing of the operation. Ultimately, they secured funding for the program through an impressive network of nonprofit, commercial, and government agencies. Throughout the organization of *Operation Pedro Pan*, Walsh was in continuous contact with actors at various scales. At the local level, Cuban and Cuban-American

⁴ A *flexible use of scale and scope* refers to "institutions and groups operating in one place draw[ing] on the resources and abilities of institutions and groups elsewhere to enhance their own capacity to meet societal responsibilities" (Kodras 1997, p. 80).

Catholics approached Walsh and the Catholic Church for help. In response, Walsh used his local contacts to coordinate with leaders of other local nonprofit organizations who, together, applied for financial aid from the federal government to relocate Cuban youths to the US. In a 1971 journal article published in the Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Walsh writes about the experience of working with employees of the U.S. Department of State (USDOS), US presidential advisors, foreign governmental officials, child welfare agencies, and officials from Catholic, Protestant and Jewish faith based organizations to provide information regarding the resettlement of Cubans in Miami (Walsh 1971).

Catholic Charities' impressive network of aid organizations that span the local, state, national and international scale provide a unique opportunity to understand how a voluntary organization can *scale-up* the needs of its clientele. Additionally, the Cuban diaspora has been well documented. Information, such as that available in the Cuban Heritage Collection, provides strong contextual footing for this thesis. Using this information and a case study of Cuban refugees in the Refugee Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities of Miami, I will investigate the ways in which nonprofit organizations include refugees in the political process. Using qualitative research methods, I aim to provide empirical evidence to support Spencer's (2005, p. 3) claim that local NPOs "provide a means for governments to consult migrants and thus ensure a better match between programmes and migrants' actual requirements."

CHAPTER 1: LITERATURE REVIEW

Understanding the Shadow State

Beginning in the 1960s, the US and many other developed nations partly privatized welfare service delivery (Kramer 2000; Wolch 1990). The restructuring of the welfare sector intensified during the 1970s and 1980s due to economic pressures from a global recession (Wolch 1990). Governments increasingly used and funded nonprofit organizations (NPOs) for service provision, which resulted in a worldwide increase in the number of NPOs (Kramer 2000). The number of NPOs in the United States alone increased from 50,000 in the 1940s to 1,400,000 in 2000 (ibid.). Increased governmental funding of NPOs for the provision of welfare services has been the main impetus behind their increase in the US (Nightingale *et al.* 1997). Through grants and subsidies, the US government has “become a more important source of revenue in the nonprofit sector than all private giving combined” (Kramer 1989, in Wolch 1990, p. x). The increasing importance of government funding to NPOs is particularly important to refugee resettlement because almost all countries, including the US, that offer refugee resettlement services depend on some kind of public-private partnership (Wright 1981). The increased importance of the voluntary sector could, as suggested by Geiger and Wolch (1986), lead to the emergence of a shadow state. In a shadow state, voluntary agencies are largely responsible for shouldering the burden of the welfare sector, while remaining under the auspices of the state (Geiger and Wolch 1986). Wolch and Rocha (1993) argue that governmental responsibilities for welfare services are increasingly

moved to the voluntary sector. Geiger and Wolch (1986) are concerned that NPOs that operate as part of a shadow state are “I) less accountable to the public, II) outside key democratic controls, and III) remain circumscribed by government” (p. 364). However, despite these concerns, the offloading of governmental welfare responsibilities has enjoyed great public support for a variety of reasons. Kramer, in the introduction to Wolch (1990) explains that leaders on the both the Right and the Left have extolled the virtues of voluntarism. Those on the Right view voluntary organizations as a manner to keep government small through privatization, while those on the Left consider the sector as a means to strengthen communities. Despite the shadow state’s reputation as a tool of the political right, Wolch (1990) points out that the shadow state has been pursued by both liberal and conservative administrations in many countries. In the US, privatization of services during the 1960s and 1970s began under democratic leadership, and continued under republican rule (ibid.). Privatization accelerated under the Reagan administration, and was a major part of the welfare reform that President Clinton introduced in 1996 (Bartkowski 2003). The bipartisan push towards decentralization in the US was backed by a Republican-controlled Congress and its *Contract with America*. This program sought to reduce the size and scope of the federal government through the devolution of responsibilities to local and state governments. In 2001, President George W. Bush created the Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (OFBCI) to increase the funding of local and faith-based organizations. Under this initiative, federal funding would support the delivery of social services by these organizations.

The increasingly central role of the shadow state is a “contradictory phenomenon” (Wolch 1990, p. xvi). The shadow state serves to democratize the provision of welfare services, while increasing the role of the government in the daily activities of voluntary organizations (Wolch 1990). The implications of the shadow state are not, as of yet, fully understood. Supporters of privatization point to increased efficiency (Geiger and Wolch 1986).⁵ They argue that privatization supports the advantages of competition, such as greater responsiveness and innovation (Nightingale *et al.* 1997). Moreover, they argue that nongovernmental organizations can provide services that are two to four times cheaper than state services (Wright 1981). Wright (1981) continues that VOLAGs offer “significant advantages as the vehicle for [refugee] resettlement” because of their flexibility and responsiveness during crisis situations (p. 171). In addition to flexibility and responsiveness, NPOs offer services with a “more human face” (Neldner 1997, p. 2). Again, this is of particular importance to the refugee resettlement organizations that have longer-term responsibility for their clients. VOLAGs are required, by their government grant agreements, to follow-up with refugee-clients during the first year of resettlement (Wright 1981, pp. 172). Follow-up contact with refugees is highly advantageous because of the danger of losing track of refugees when they enter the welfare system (*ibid.*). Furthermore, VOLAGs have a great ability to elicit public support for refugee movements (*ibid.*). Wright notes that VOLAG constituents often show great interest in getting involved with refugee

⁵ Opposition to privatization will be discussed later in this Chapter.

resettlement, and that the constituents' interest increases public support for refugee admissions (ibid.). Support for refugee movements can come in a variety of forms, including donations, housing, cash and community acceptance of refugee populations (ibid.). Young (2000) argues that the voluntary sector can provide customized service to heterogeneous communities. Governments contract out to local service providers due to their (government's) inability to adequately differentiate welfare services to meet the needs of a heterogeneous citizenry (Young 2000). Another key advantage of nongovernmental organizations is that they can work in areas where the UN and governmental agencies cannot, for political reasons, be involved. One example of NGOs providing humanitarian support when governmental agencies were politically unwilling is shared by Neldner (1997). In the late 1980s, NGOs provided food to conflict-ravaged areas of Ethiopia because official aid channels were unwilling to work with the Mengistu regime (ibid.). Furthermore, NGOs can be used as a vehicle for service delivery when governmental agencies lack legitimacy. After the 1992 Los Angeles riots, city officials, including the mayor and city council, formed a nongovernmental organization, Rebuild LA (RLA), to aid in the revitalization of poor neighborhoods in Los Angeles.⁶ City officials felt that RLA would be more legitimate, and therefore more effective in rebuilding post-riot Los Angeles than the government (Ferris 1998). The RLA could legitimately serve community members who, because of the outcome of the Rodney King trial, felt disenfranchised by local government. The

⁶ Citywide riots resulted from the not-guilty verdicts for Los Angeles police officers who were accused of beating Rodney King, an African American.

city of Los Angeles used the RLA to reestablish legitimacy by providing community revitalization services to the neighborhoods most affected by the 1992 riots.

Not everybody is supportive of the dismantling and offloading of the centralized state welfare system to lower levels of governance. Wolch (1990) argues that heavy reliance on governmental funding will make the voluntary sector increasingly subject to state regulation:

The increasing importance of state funding for many voluntary organizations has been accompanied by deepening penetration by the state into voluntary group organization, management, and goals. [...] the transformation of the voluntary sector into a shadow state apparatus could ultimately shackle its potential to create progressive social change (ibid., p. 15).

As voluntary agencies become increasingly dependent on government grants, Wolch (1990) fears that they may become a “puppet or pawn in the service of goals that are antithetical to their organizational mission” (p. 217). In the introduction to Wolch (1990), Kramer states that:

The degree to which their advocacy seeks to promote controversial change—or challenge the prevailing distribution of power and other resources—seems to be a critical determinant of their fate and their ability to continue receiving governmental funding (p. xi).

Wolch (1999) argues that power relations between government and nonprofit organizations are not equal, and that NPOs are “often junior partners” to more powerful governmental organizations (p. 26). The increasing dependence of nonprofit organizations on government contracts decreases the ability of nonprofit organizations to be critical of government policy (Wolch 1990). Voluntary groups are likely to shy away from “excessive activism” that may result in loss of government funding (Geiger

and Wolch 1986, p. 359). Furthermore, dependence on state funding forces voluntary groups to plan “reactively” to government priorities, as opposed to exercising innovation and challenging the status quo (Wolch and Rocha 1993, p. 389). Those organizations that are best able to adapt to governmental funding are often larger organizations. Geiger and Wolch (1986) fear that “heightened competition among voluntary groups may work to the detriment of smaller less financially secure organizations” (p. 358).

Geographic disparities in services are another concern. Kodras (1997) states,

The current reductions in the scale and scope of the American state will increase geographic disparities in the role and effect of government in accordance with the capacity of institutions and groups in particular places to take on functions previously coordinated by the national government. The capacity to assume these responsibilities is defined by the extent to which fiscal resources, expertise, infrastructure, and political will exist, or can be developed, within specific locales. In this sense, capacity for governance is geographically and historically produced (Kodras 1997, p. 80).

Kodras argues that devolution will lead to a geographically uneven distribution of welfare services. Moreover, those geographic regions most in need of services, such as inner cities, will have least access to welfare services.

Another potential consequence of devolution is the reduction of political autonomy at the local level. Peck argues that government should be close to the people, but that action must take place at higher scales where rules are made:

Local action can be only part of the solution and, uncoordinated, it may remain part of the problem...political action must confront the level at which the rules of regime competition are set (the

supranational/global) not that at which the rules are carried out (the local) (Peck 1995, p. 257).

Peck sees the devolution of responsibility to the local scale as “the prerequisite to the competitive downgrading of regulatory norms” (Peck 1995, p.255). It is, according to Peck, the institutions at national and international scales that set the rules. The local scale is then left to carry out these rules, but does not necessarily have the ability to influence them. If Peck is correct, then local organizations need to transcend these scales to exert influence on the rules that locally bind them. They must “scale up” their influence to the scales at which decisions are made. Kodras (1997) argues for,

the flexible use of scale and scope, whereby institutions and groups operating in one place draw on the resources and abilities of institutions and groups elsewhere to enhance their own capacity to meet societal responsibilities (p. 80).

According to Kodras, scale becomes a key factor for understanding the role of the nonprofit sector in the shadow state.

The Role of Scale and the Nonprofit Sector in the Shadow State Construct

“Within the USA, the impetus of the federal welfare state since the 1970s has been to devolve responsibilities to lower levels” (DeVerteuil *et al.* 2002, p. 230). The devolution of services has increased the importance of the voluntary sector, further incorporating it into the local welfare system and local politics (*ibid.*). DeVerteuil *et al.* (2002) go on to state that the hallmarks of the voluntary sector are “accessibility, uneven constraints, and local uniqueness” (p. 231). Many at the local level see the devolution of services as an opportunity to locate them “closer to the ground” (Taylor and Bassi 1998,

p. 120). The initiative of local authorities to locate services “closer to the ground” illustrates two important points. First, forces for devolution can come from below as well as from above. Here we see *local* authorities taking the initiative to set up *local* organizations meant to influence *local* policy. Secondly, a power conflict between the federal government and the local third sector becomes apparent, as illustrated in the following quote:

At the same time that central government sought to employ the third sector as an agent for service delivery, it saw the sector deployed to some effect by politically antagonistic [local] authorities (Taylor and Bassi 1998, p. 120).

The significance and role of the third sector varies at different scales. While the central government saw the third sector as a potential apolitical agent that could cheaply provide services as part of a shadow state, local authorities regarded the third sector as a tool for organizing grass-roots participation in local politics. Another instance of the dual vision of the third sector comes from the Greater London Council (GLC), as documented by Geiger and Wolch (1986). GLC provided funding for innovative voluntary agencies in order to garner grass roots support against unpopular policies of the Thatcher administration. Recognizing this, the central government attacked the GLC, eventually leading to its closure. The case of GLC highlights the ideological clash that can exist between organizations at different scales. GLC, at the local scale, aimed to mobilize grass roots support for anti-Thatcher policies. The central government, at the national scale, used its power to shut down the GLC.

A primary objective for many organizations in the nonprofit sector is the scaling-up of issues to raise awareness (Henderson 2002). Henderson (2002) explains: “‘scaling-up’ occurs when organizations extend their scope and power through [...] linkages with other organizations” (p. 109). One example from Neldner (1997) is the ability of NGOs to scale-up the concerns of those affected by forced migration to the national and international arena. Neldner (1997) points out that building awareness of refugee needs has been a primary role of NGOs, and that these NGOs have successfully brought refugee issues to the attention of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

In another example of scaling-up, Cullen (2009) explains how pro-migrant NGOs in Ireland have sought to influence government policy through associations with governmental officials. Through these associations, NGOs aided migrants by influencing officials to reconsider individual migrant cases (Cullen 2009). Furthermore, these NGOs (the Migrants Rights Center of Ireland and the Immigrant Council of Ireland) have used international organizations, such as the European Commission (EC) and the United Nations (UN), as venues to fight for the rights of migrants in Ireland (ibid.). For example, Cullen states that

The UN has proved a more useful context for employing ‘shaming’ tactics regarding the Irish state’s record of non-compliance with international accords. [...] pro-migrant NGOs have supported cases including a July 2008 European Court of Justice ruling which overturned Irish restrictions on the residency rights of non-EU citizen spouses (Cullen 2009, p. 105).

Irish pro-migrant NGOs have also used local media to exert power at the national scale. The NGOs used stories of individual migrants in local media to counter the

predominant image of immigrants as “suspect, untrustworthy free loaders who displace Irish workers” (Cullen 2009, p. 106). In one instance, a local NGO produced a documentary that was aired on national television that highlighted the injustice and hypocrisy of the Irish government. It argued that the government pushed for the legalization of undocumented Irish immigrants abroad while denying the same benefits to undocumented immigrants in Ireland (Cullen 2009). This documentary provides another example how local NGOs can advance their interests at national and international scales. By highlighting the commonalities of migration issues throughout the world, local NGOs can ostensibly reach the national and international scales where regime rules are established.⁷

Understanding how organizations in the nonprofit sector work at different scales is helpful for understanding their position in the shadow state:

If we are to understand the impact that changes [of decentralization] in the state have on the third sector, we must understand the dynamics of the relationship between national and local government as well as those between the state as a whole and the third sector (Taylor and Bassi 1998, pp. 134-135).

How these organizations work at different scales, and how they bridge the gap between these scales, is necessary to understanding how NPOs can facilitate refugee inclusion in the shadow state. I will discuss how these scalar politics operate for Cuban refugees in Miami in Chapter 3.

⁷ An international regime is defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given issue area” (Krasner 1983, p. 2)

CHAPTER 2: METHODS

I used qualitative research methods to engage with my research questions. Qualitative methods are best suited for my study because they allow me to analyze the meanings behind people's actions. Discrepancies between words and actions can be deciphered through qualitative research (Herbert 2000). "Ethnography [...] examines what people *do* as well as what they *say*. It thus enables an insightful examination of any discrepancies between thoughts and deeds" (Herbert 2000, p. 552, emphasis in original). Qualitative methods allow a researcher to understand an observation not simply as a solitary point in time, but as an event within a greater context. Clifford Geertz referred to this method as "thick description." The contextualization of observations within a larger framework provides deeper understandings of meaning. Herbert states that

[T]he tissue of social life is not always observable. The meanings of objects and events are often revealed through practices, reactions, cursory comments and facial expressions. [...] These meanings are discerned through inferences, as daily practice is interpreted against the ethnographer's developing understanding of the larger cultural system of which it is apart (Herbert 2000, p. 553).

The use of qualitative research methods will allow me to better understand how refugees have been brought into the shadow state and the operation of scale in the shadow state. A discussion of my methods follows.

Initially my research was divided into four stages, namely: 1) secondary data analysis; 2) participant observation through volunteer work at the Refugee Resettlement

Program, Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami; 3) administration of a questionnaire to refugees; and 4) in-depth, semi-structured and unstructured interviews. However, as is often the case in the field, my methods changed during my fieldwork research with the Refugee Resettlement Program. Due to privacy concerns, the organization did not allow the use of interviews or questionnaires. Instead, I attended weekly job seminars, and I conducted extensive archival research at the Cuban Heritage Collection.

The first research stage consisted of the compilation of contextual data on the shadow state and the Cuban refugee community in Miami. I read academic journals and books, and conducted extensive research at the University of Miami's Cuban Heritage Collection. This collection documents more than 400 years of Cuban history in books, periodicals, archived materials and an extensive digital collection. The archived materials and digital collection consist of photographs, manuscripts, maps, and other materials from individuals and organizations – from Cuba and the Cuban diaspora. The collection of Cuban materials increased dramatically in the 1960s, with the arrival of thousands of Cubans to the Miami area (Cuban Heritage Collection). Since that time it has grown to be recognized as the “premier collection of materials documenting the Cuban exile and Cuban-American experience as well as the largest repository of historical and cultural Cuban materials outside of Cuba” (Cuban Heritage Collection, p. 1). Of greatest significance to this research, the collection became home to thousands of

documents from the *Cuban Refugee Center* (the Center) when it closed in 1994.⁸ These 107 boxes of documents are found in the “Cuban Refugee Center Records.” This section contained seven sub-series, namely 1) Cuban Refugee Center Documents and Programs, 2) Government Agencies, 3) Non Governmental Agencies and Organizations, 4) Publications, 5) Other Documents, 6) Photographs, and 7) Clippings. I focused primarily on sub-series 1-3 because I was particularly interested in documents that illustrated the role of the nonprofit sector and scalar relationships between organizations, such as local nonprofit agencies that explain their local situation to federal agencies.

The second stage consisted of participant observation with the Refugee Resettlement Program of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) in Miami, Florida. USCCB is one of nine voluntary resettlement agencies (VOLAGS) that are contracted by the United States Department of State (USDOS) to administer federal services to refugees. I obtained permission from the Volunteer Coordinator of the Refugee Resettlement Program, Raul Hernandez, to volunteer with the Refugee Resettlement Program from May 15th, 2010 to June 25th, 2010. After his refusal to conduct interviews due to privacy concerns, participant observation became an important part of the data collection. In participant observation, “the observer participates in the daily life of the people under study [...] observing things that happen, listening to what is said, and questioning people” (Becker and Geer 1957, p.

⁸ The *Cuban Refugee Center*, also known as the *Cuban Refugee Emergency Center*, will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. It is also commonly referred to as the Center, a name that I will use in this thesis.

28). After each session of participant observation I conducted informal discussions with employees of Catholic Charity. These discussions allowed me to further investigate the meaning of observations in a timely manner, thereby gaining deeper insights into the operation of the organization. As a volunteer I observed two types of events. First, I observed the intake of two new refugees, which consists of an orientation that explains the program, welfare benefits and expectations for new arrivals. Secondly, I observed and participated in three weekly employment meetings that were organized by job counselors.⁹ They informed newly arrived refugees about the employment system in the US. This participant observation allowed me to gain deeper insights into the operation of the Refugee Resettlement Program and its role in enabling refugee participation. Moreover, these weekly meetings led to an unanticipated insight regarding how to answer my research questions. Such insights are an important merit of participant observation. Bouchard (1976), explaining the benefits of participant observation, highlights what Merton refers to as the serendipity pattern. "The serendipity pattern refers to the fairly common experience of observing an unanticipated, anomalous strategic datum which becomes the occasion for developing a new theory or extending an existing theory" (Merton 1949, p. 98, in Bouchard 1976). Through participant observation I began to see that refugees helped shape the program, and ultimately the system of services that they administered, by becoming part of the organization. A large percentage of governmental and non-governmental resettlement

⁹ My participation was generally as the token American, confirming what the job counselor taught. For example, the job counselor would use me as an example of how Americans dress for a job interview.

programs were staffed by refugees, many from Cuba. This observation formed an unexpected yet exciting new direction for my research. Refugees are not simply being brought into the resettlement system through infrequent token involvement, but rather through employment in the organizations that manage refugee resettlement. This phenomenon will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.

My preliminary research design was comprised of four research stages, but this design was hindered by privacy concerns. I have included the third and fourth step in this proposal to illustrate my original intentions.

In the third stage, I planned to administer a questionnaire to twenty-five refugees who currently receive aid from the Refugee Resettlement Program. The purpose of the questionnaire was to collect information about the refugees' ability to voice their needs within the organization, and the extent to which they felt that the organization responded to those needs. The questionnaire would address the following topics: i) channels of communication within the organization; ii) responsiveness of the organization; iii) perception of the organization as a platform that can be used to voice opinions and needs; iv) instances when participant has voiced an opinion. The data from the questionnaire would inform questions for subsequent interviews.

The fourth and final phase of my fieldwork research would consist of twenty in-depth, unstructured and semi-structured interviews. The first ten interviews would be semi-structured and would be conducted with refugees who were selected from the third stage. Interview questions would be similar to those addressed in the questionnaire and would provide more detailed answers. The next ten interviews

would be selected from representatives of the Refugee Resettlement Program and would be selected based on their ability to address questions related to the involvement of refugees in organizational decision making. These interviews of representatives would be unstructured. Mr. Hernandez, the volunteer coordinator, had enthusiastically agreed to teach me about the organization, its missions, programs, and funding sources before I arrived in Miami. Unstructured interviews would allow for a flexible and responsive interview format that would fit into interviewee schedules and that would build upon the information from previous interviews, particularly with Mr. Hernandez. In this way, each successive interview would inform subsequent interviews. Beardsworth and Keil note that, “the open-ended, discursive nature of the interview [permits] an iterative process of refinement, whereby lines of thought identified by earlier interviewees could be taken up and presented to later interviewees” (Beardsworth and Keil, 1992, pp. 261-262).

CHAPTER 3: CASE STUDY

Cuban Heritage Collection (CHC)

Introduction

In the literature chapter I explored explanations and examples of the evolution of the shadow state. These examples came from varying countries, organizations, and welfare sectors; but all shared a common thread of welfare state devolution. In this section, I will explore documents that pertain specifically to the devolution of services for the Cuban diaspora. This section will ground the Cuban refugee experience into existing literature about the devolution of welfare services while laying the foundation for my conceptual extension of the shadow state construct. Following is a discussion of documents from the *Cuban Refugee Center* that illustrate the existence of a shadow state among the voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) involved in the Cuban diaspora.

Figure 2 illustrates the case study presented in this chapter. Documents from the Cuban Heritage Collection illustrate the need for an extended understanding of the shadow state, as argued in this thesis, while participant observation at the Refugee Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities illustrates the three methods by which refugees have come to be included in the shadow state.




Figure 2. Diagram of Case Study: Overlap of Cuban Heritage Collection (CHC) and Catholic Charities (CC) research.

Cuban Refugee Center: Voluntary Agencies

In an address to “The United States Conference of Mayors,” Abraham Ribicoff, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, recognized that voluntary agencies and the State of Florida had assumed a heavy financial burden to assist refugees (Ribicoff 1962). As the number of refugees in Miami increased, President John F. Kennedy recognized that volunteer agencies and the State of Florida would be unable to cope with the refugee situation without federal assistance and the *Cuban Refugee Center* was opened in February of 1961 (Ezquerro 2007). The Center would function under the umbrella of the Social Security Administration of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare,

and the services provided were legislatively defined in the “Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962” (Ball 1962). These services included, “reception and registration, classification of skills, cash assistance and welfare services to those in need, resettlement and employment opportunities, and provision for education and health services” (Ball 1962, p. 2). By 1962, between 1,500 and 2,000 Cubans were arriving in Miami every week (Ezquerro 2007). The Center’s role, besides managing federal assistance, was to coordinate the complex web of governmental and independent organizations’ programs (ibid.). The center became a hub for refugees and the organizations involved in their resettlement. By studying the interaction between the federally controlled Center and the VOLAGs with whom they worked, a clear picture of the three different understandings of the shadow state evolve. The following discussion focuses largely on the resettlement of Cuban refugees. This, as will be seen, was one of the most important roles of the Center (representing the federal government), and, consequently, of the VOLAGs. The communication and relationship between governmental and nongovernmental organizations will also be explored through this lens. Analysis of the Centers’ documents makes it clear that Geiger and Wolch’s understanding of the shadow state is insufficient. Trudeau’s extended understanding and the conceptual extension suggested in this thesis are necessary to truly understand the complex relationship between the federal government (the Center), the VOLAGs, and the refugees themselves. An analysis of these documents provides an ideal format through which to see the three different approaches to the shadow state construct; Geiger and Wolch, Trudeau, and that presented in this thesis.

On March 28th 1961, William L. Mitchell, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, sent a letter to Marshall Wise, Director of the *Cuban Refugee Center*. In the letter, he stated that the resettlement of refugees was a top priority of the Center (Wise 1961). However, he goes on to outline a few of the major obstacles to large-scale resettlement, such as the refugees' desire for a quick return to Cuba, the cold climate in the northern United States, and the possible lack of jobs for them in other cities (Wise 1961). A country as large as the United States was easily capable of handling the 1,500 – 2,000 refugees arriving per week; however Miami-Dade County alone was not. Unsurprisingly, resettlement played a significant role in the federal government's plan to deal with the vast number of arriving refugees, but these efforts were plagued with difficulties. In order to address these obstacles there were many who felt that action needed to start at the *top* (Lyford 1962; vanden Heuvel 1963). Calls, such as the one below, emphasize the top-down notion of the relationship between federal power and local organizations.

For some Cubans active in politics, resettlement has become a dirty word. Some of this, in the highly emotional Miami climate, was bound to rub off on the mass of refugees. [...] We have been handicapped by our inability to get the resettlement message through to the people who speak for the many service organizations in the United States. [...] We have reached the conclusion that a voice stronger than ours is needed to combat this organizational lethargy. [...] Without leadership from the White House, we feel, it would be difficult to elicit a real grass-roots response (vanden Heuvel 1963, p. 2).

Interestingly, this letter was written by William J. vanden Heuvel, President of the International Rescue Committee, a national VOLAG, to John F. Thomas, Director of the federal Cuban Refugee Program in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. This seems to contradict the fear of *unwanted* government involvement in the nonprofit sector that Geiger and Wolch expected; however, it still represents a top-down power structure consistent with Geiger and Wolch's conceptualization of the shadow state. Such observations are also evident in government memorandums, including one written by government official Harry B. Lyford. He states, "[the President's] personal action should be the key to spark action at all levels" (Lyford 1962, p. 2). He went on to say that the "President-Governor-Mayor" approach would, in his opinion, be the only effective means to produce positive resettlement results across the US (Lyford 1962, p. 3). Lyford recognized the importance of grassroots action. However, he assumes that such action can only start from the highest level – the White House. While such views fit well into the G&W conceptualization of the shadow state, further reading shows that an extended understanding of the shadow state is needed to understand the interaction of governmental and nongovernmental organizations. As will become clear in the following section, the relationship between these entities truly is interdependent.

One area of resettlement where the interdependent nature of the relationship between the government and VOLAGs is particularly clear is the utilization of VOLAG networks by the federal government.¹⁰ Abraham Ribicoff, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, emphasizes the extent to which the government relies on the complex national web of networks established by VOLAGs.

These agencies, with their local affiliates across the Nation, handle the actual resettlement of Cuban refugees by methods worked out through long experience. These include careful selection of a destination for the refugee family – the location of sponsors to give them personal help in getting settled – a great deal of careful planning with the refugees and their sponsors – and much counseling – and perhaps a long period of working with a refugee family as it develops roots in its new home (Ribicoff 1962, p. 3).

These intra-agency networks influence future resettlement decisions. For example, the Center agreed to pay transportation costs for refugee resettlement from Miami to any city where the Refugee Center had affiliated agencies (Wise 1961). Later in this section we will see how VOLAGs were instrumental in securing funding for resettlement costs; however, here it is important to note that the pre-existence of networks guides the financial decisions of the federal government. Where networks are previously established, the government is willing to cover transportation costs. Robert M. Ball, Commissioner of Social Security, reinforces the government's dependence on VOLAGs. "For the all-important resettlement activity, we have depended primarily on the skill

¹⁰ A national network of service providers is a prerequisite to be contracted as an official VOLAG.

and dedication of the voluntary agencies and their constituents around the country” (Ball 1962, p. 21). Such constituents are found wherever Catholics, Protestants, Jewish, or affiliates of the International Rescue Committee are found (Ribicoff 1962).

The national networks of voluntary agencies were a primary, but not a singular strength of these organizations. Their experience in helping vulnerable populations, such as unaccompanied children, granted them a privileged position of experience. Such experiences made these organizations specially qualified to handle delicate assignments, such as the support of unaccompanied children. Regarding the support and protection of unaccompanied children, Secretary Abraham A. Ribicoff states that, “[t]his program should make use of experienced national voluntary agencies in this field” (Mitchell 1961a, p. 6). However, more than simply being entrusted with greater responsibility, voluntary organizations were valued for their unparalleled knowledge and expertise.

The importance of the voluntary agencies was not lost on Robert M. Ball, Commissioner of Social Security, who, soon after assuming his position, called a meeting with voluntary agency executives. In this meeting, Ball and the executives revised resettlement policy and instituted a transition allowance to fund refugee resettlement outside Miami (Ball 1962). This emphasizes the important role of the voluntary agencies, that the new Secretary would call a meeting with them “soon” after assuming his position (Ball 1962, p. 14). Furthermore, it illustrates the role of the VOLAGs in the instituting of the transition allowance – money given to a refugee upon being relocated to make the initial arrival easier for the refugee and the host-family.

The Secretary goes on to say that, “We took [this] step following consultations with the voluntary agencies associated with us in resettlement work, and we believe the transition allowance has contributed significantly to the increase in resettlement” (Ball 1962, p. 7). The transition allowance was a recommendation made by VOLAGs, based on feedback that they had received from refugees and potential host-families. Refugees were uncomfortable resettling with no money to speak of, and the arrival of a refugee put a burden on host-families who faced up-front expenses when the refugee arrived (Ball 1962). Using their expertise, and their extensive contact with refugees and host-families, the voluntary agencies recommended the implementation of a transition allowance. The effect of this allowance was two-fold; it eased the concerns of refugees, removing a stumbling block to resettlement, while simultaneously increasing the number of potential host-families by addressing their immediate financial concerns. Such expertise can come only from on-the-ground organizations, such as VOLAGs, and was clearly appreciated by government agents, such as those at the Center.

As a result of their important role in the administration of services, their central role in the resettlement process, and their close contact with refugees, VOLAGs became an important source of information for Center staff. Weekly staff meetings were held at the *Cuban Refugee Center* in Miami and included the heads of voluntary agencies and the executive staff of the Center (Wise 1961). Such meetings were instituted, “for the exchange of ideas, and the tightening and smoothing of procedures” (Wise 1961, p. 4). One document lists as a Basic Objective, “[c]loser coordination among the voluntary agencies at the Center to provide an opportunity for interagency discussion of mutual

problems” (Lazell 1962b, p. 2). The document recommends the involvement of representatives of resettlement agencies (VOLAGs) and government officials at all panels that were convened to review the cases of refugees who refused to accept resettlement opportunities outside of the Miami area (Lazell 1962b). These panels convene when a refugee who is invited to resettle refuses the offer, preferring to stay in Miami. Implicit in such objectives is recognition of VOLAGs as sources of experience and knowledge.

Such experience was appreciated in Washington D.C. as well, where voluntary organization leaders were called to testify before Congress about the refugee program. In one such event, Gaynor I. Jacobson, the Executive Director of United HIAS service, testified before a Senate Subcommittee headed by Senator Edward M. Kennedy (Rosen 1966). In his testimony, the Director commended the subcommittee for revising labor regulations that negatively impacted refugees, while simultaneously urging them to go further (Rosen 1966). This was not a singular testimony, and in fact Jacobson testified before the same subcommittee at a later date (Rosen 1966). Information from the voluntary sector reached government officials through other means than official testimony as well. In one instance, Senator Robert Kennedy mentioned that, “various social agencies specializing in work with refugees *tell us* of case after case where companies report their special delight with their new Cuban employees” (Kennedy, R.F. 1966, p. 2, emphasis added). Such a statement is indicative of social agencies’ ability to communicate with policymakers, and those policymakers’ willingness to use such information to inform policy decisions.

Committees were another method by which the voluntary sector was involved with policymakers at a federal level. In 1961, Tracy S. Voorhees, President Eisenhower's Personal Representative for Cuban Refugees, recommended the establishment of an advisory committee on Cuban refugees (Mitchell 1961b). Speaking of this committee, Voorhees recommended that representatives of all connected voluntary agencies, usually the heads, be involved. Their involvement, in Voorhees' words, would "give them all the feeling [...] that they were part of it and were being actively consulted. Also this would tend to minimize friction between these organizations, keep them working together as a team, and diminish labor opposition" (Mitchell 1961b, p. 5). This quote emphasizes a dual importance of voluntary organization involvement at the federal level; it instills feelings of involvement, while aiding in the efficient use of resources.

Involvement with federal agencies, whether in Washington D.C. or at the *Cuban Refugee Center* in Miami, put voluntary agencies squarely in the middle of discussions on refugee policies. Their expertise in the on-the-ground-execution of federal refugee programs also put them in a position of advocacy for refugees when programs were not considered to meet their real needs. One program involved with the *Cuban Refugee Center*, the Christian Community Service Agency of Dade County (CCSA), sent a letter to Harry B. Lyford of the Center stating that, "[w]e will attempt [...], in our casework service, to *put pressure* on the Cuban Refugee Center to *meet the refugees' needs*" (Smith 1969, p. 2, emphasis added). The letter goes on to state, "[w]e will continue as an agency to voice to the community our concern about the refugees' plight and the staff

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will attempt to play an *advocacy role* with the Refugee Center and with the various community agencies” (Smith 1969, p. 2, emphasis added). The sentiments of “pressure” and “advocacy” expressed in these statements suggest that CCSA sees itself not as an unwitting pawn, but rather as a partner – critical if need be - working together to improve the services offered to refugees.

Trudeau recognized the interdependent nature of the relationship between governmental and nongovernmental organizations. His understanding of the shadow state goes further in explaining the complex relationships that exist in the welfare sector. However, as I will show in the following section, a further extension of the shadow state construct is in order.

Including Refugees in the Shadow State

Conceptual understandings of the shadow state that omit the role of refugees leave out an important aspect of the devolution of welfare services. The conception of the shadow state construct by Geiger and Wolch added greatly to our understanding of the devolution of welfare services. Trudeau correctly establishes the fact that relationships between governmental and nongovernmental organizations are indeed multi-directional and that governmental agencies rely on voluntary organizations for on-the-ground information and expertise. However, Trudeau does not consider the ability of refugees to influence this construct. It is the aim of this research to illustrate how, through participation with voluntary organizations, refugees should be included in an extended understanding of the shadow state. In this section, information from

Cuban Refugee Center documents will be used to establish a historical context of refugee involvement within the Cuban diaspora.

As mentioned previously, resettlement was a major priority of the Center. In a 1962 letter from A.A. Micocci, Staff Adviser at the Cuban Refugee Program, to Brevard Carihfield, Secretary of the Governor's Conference, Micocci emphasizes the need for, "all the help we can get from all quarters" to aid in the resettlement process (Micocci 1962a, p. 2). The resettled Cuban refugees were an important group to aid Micocci's effort (Barrera 1971; Cuban Refugee Center 1962; IRC 1966; Kendall 1962; Micocci 1962b; Ribicoff 1962). In a letter sent from Marshall Wise, Director of the *Cuban Refugee Center*, to resettled Cuban refugees he states,

[Y]our continued successful resettlement will pave the way to helping us aid other Cubans to find jobs and resettlement. [...] Would you, therefore, write me of your experience in your job, of the cooperation you received, of the assistance given you during the first days, your impressions of your new home, surroundings, your new life? [...] If you know of other possibilities in your new environment for resettling Cubans, please let me know (Micocci 1962b, p. 2).

In an effort to resettle other refugees, the Center turned to those who had already been resettled for help. This was also an opportunity for resettled refugees to contact those in charge of the Cuban Refugee Program directly. In another letter, prepared for those ready to be resettled, J. Arthur Lazell, Deputy Director for Resettlement at the Center, writes, "It is most important that when any problem arises, you immediately contact your local sponsoring organization for its members will guide and counsel you" (Micocci 1962b, p. 4). Again, refugees are provided with channels of communication; in

this case, those channels are through their voluntary agency. Such feedback, as seen in the preceding section, is passed on to the Center through the VOLAGs.

While much of the feedback solicited from resettled refugees was to be used in encouraging other refugees to resettle, it was also seen as an opportunity for Cubans to help other Cubans (Barrera 1971; Cuban Refugee Center 1962; IRC 1966; Kendall 1962; Micocci 1962b; Ribicoff 1962). Feedback on resettled refugees reached all levels. In one instance, Abraham Ribicoff, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, stated that, “[r]eports about the 25,000 refugees already resettled outside Miami are good. From the Cubans we hear about their new jobs, their new friends, and their new employers” (Ribicoff 1962, p. 3). Information collected by the *Cuban Refugee Center* included questionnaires that inquired about the refugees’ experiences in their new cities (Cuban Refugee Center 1962). The center used this information to inform newly arriving refugees about resettlement options. In one instance, Cuban personnel from the Center organized an exhibit at the 1962 Conference of Mayors in Miami Beach (Cuban Refugee Center 1962). These staff members were available to answer questions from attendees, specifically about the initiation of resettlement opportunities in their communities (Cuban Refugee Center 1962). This is a more direct form of Cubans helping Cubans, the employment of Cubans in refugee organizations. Cuban volunteers made up an important part of the *Cuban Refugee Center*. In a 1966 statement released by the International Rescue Committee, one of four major VOLAGs associated with the Center, the centrality of Cuban volunteers is made clear, “[w]e did not know that what started as an operation *staffed by Cuban volunteers* [referring to the *Cuban Refugee Center*] would

grow into a permanent set-up” (IRC 1966, p. 1, emphasis added). Further evidence of the centrality of Cubans’ role in the resettlement of newly arrived Cuban refugees come from a letter sent from Howard H. Palmatier, Deputy Director of the Cuban Refugee Program, to Raul Lastra, President of the Organization of Cuban Educators in Exile, in 1969. In this letter Palmatier states,

I do want to underline, however, that we rely greatly on the goodwill and cooperation of Cubans in the United States – be they refugees, or long-time residents of this country. They have provided valuable assistance to newcomers and we earnestly seek their continued assistance (Palmatier 1969, p. 1).

The role of Cubans in assisting refugees is further emphasized in a statement made by Lazell, Deputy Director of the *Cuban Refugee Center*, in a letter to Commissioner William Mitchell, of the Social Security Administration, in which he states,

The greatest need at the Center and within the agencies is sufficient personnel for objective counseling of refugees prior to their departure from Miami, persons who know the United States and refugee psychology. *Cuban personnel cannot do this work adequately* (Lazell 1962a, p. 2, emphasis added).

From this quote we learn two important details. First, that Cubans are already beginning to make up part of the personnel in these organizations. Second, we learn that they are considered adequate for some work, i.e. manning an exhibit and answering questions from the public, and inadequate for other work, i.e. counseling refugees preparing for resettlement. This phenomenon will be explored in greater detail later in this thesis. However, it is of great significance that Cubans came to occupy positions within these organizations – both governmental and nongovernmental. The role of refugees in refugee organizations is, as will be argued

later, the primary manner by which refugees can exert the greatest influence on the refugee program.

As seen in the previous section, refugees make up a significant portion of the staff of refugee organizations. Nevertheless, non-refugees make up part of the personnel and, through daily contact with refugees, can provide important insights into refugee concerns. Lasa, a staff member at the Center and Liaison for the Miami Cuban Community, took advantage of the daily contact between non-refugee personnel at the *Cuban Refugee Center* and refugees, to survey non-refugee employees regarding the refugees' main objections to resettlement outside of Miami. Lasa then addressed these main objections in a letter campaign to refugees in the Miami area (Cuban Refugee Center 1962). Lasa used information gleaned by Center personnel from refugees to better address refugee concerns. He also received, "Cuban refugee groups and individuals that come to the Director's office with complaints, problems, etc." (Cuban Refugee Center 1962, p. 5).

What is clear from the *Cuban Refugee Center* documents is that, whether through voluntary organizations or the Center itself, channels of communication are open to refugees. Furthermore, as illustrated by the following quote, such channels are used. "Many Cubans say that they want to stay in Miami so that they can get back to Cuba quickly when the time comes [...] the United States will get them back there promptly, as soon as it is possible for them to return to Cuba" (Ribicoff 1962, p. 6). This quote, from the person in charge of all refugee operations in the United States, shows a knowledge and understanding of refugee concerns – namely the concern of straying too

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far from Miami. In response to this sentiment, the refugee program instituted a return clause in all resettlement agreements to alleviate this concern.¹¹ Other instances of refugee involvement are abundant in the documents. For example, in a Congressional Subcommittee meeting, the New York Association for New Americans, which served Cuban-Jewish refugees who settled in metropolitan New York, suggested the provision of grants or loans to aid exile professionals in re-validating their credentials, allowing them to practice their profession in the US (Soskis 1966). Philip Soskis, Executive Director of the program, continued:

For some of the professionally trained men and women such as pharmacists or dentists, there has been a great deal of discouragement because they have been unable to resume practice in their own specialty in the United States. [...] I am pleased that the Committee will be able to hear direct testimony from one of our former clients, Mrs. Regina Perez, who [...] will describe how she and her husband have been able to use their former skills (Soskis 1966, p. 9).

Mrs. Perez, as well as other Cuban refugees, was able to voice her experiences and concerns directly to a Congressional Subcommittee through the voluntary agency that aided her upon arriving to the United States. Personal testimony, such as that given by Mrs. Perez, was welcomed by the subcommittee. In his opening statement the Chairman of the subcommittee, Edward Kennedy, stated that,

“[w]e are happy to have with us today several witnesses, including a number of resettled Cuban refugees, who will relate their experiences with the resettlement program. [...] We hope that the on-location hearings [...] will [...] put the Subcommittee and the entire Congress in a better position to make recommendations and

¹¹ The clause guaranteed return passage to Miami if and when the Castro regime fell.

pass legislation for the benefit of all concerned” (Kennedy, E.M. 1966, p. 2).

Cuban professionals also took the initiative to form their own organizations. In one instance, a group of exiled Cuban lawyers organized as the “National Association of Cuban Lawyers” (Quifiones 1969). They used this organization to request a meeting with the Director of the *Cuban Refugee Center*, Ballafonte, to discuss their needs and concerns (i.e. revalidation of credentials) (Quifiones 1969). Other organizations, such as the Cuban Hebrew Circle in Miami – a “self-help organization of Cuban refugees” -, were formed by Cubans for the mutual strengthening of Cuban refugees (United HIAS Service 1967, p. 5). This self-motivation attracted the attention of public servants and welfare organizations alike who considered Cubans to be invaluable employees. In one example, Senator Robert Kennedy relates the experience of James Dumpson, a former New York City Welfare Commissioner, who “went to Miami and recruited a number of Cuban refugees to serve as case workers and investigators for the Welfare Department” (Kennedy, R.F. 1966, p. 4). Senator Robert Kennedy recommends that other departments in New York City consider following Dumpson’s example, stating that, “[o]ur city government should be as responsive as it can be to the needs of our Spanish-speaking citizens” (Kennedy, R.F. 1966, p. 4).

The feedback to the federal level, where legislation concerning refugees is made, is a key component of the ways in which refugees influence refugee-related policy. Voluntary organizations often serve as the platform through which such communication occurs, as illustrated in the following example. In April of 1966, the

New York Association for New Americans testified before a Congressional Subcommittee (Soskis 1966). In this testimony, they stated that Cuban refugees were putting down deep roots in the United States, but that in order to fully adjust they would have to be offered a path to permanent residency and citizenship (Soskis 1966).

The testimony states,

We do, therefore, hope that your Committee will find ways and means of recommending the necessary measures to Congress so that the status of the individuals can be regularized and they can attain the responsibilities and privileges of citizenship in the United States for which they have a deep longing (Soskis 1966, p. 10).

One member of that subcommittee was Senator Robert Kennedy, who stated that same day,

[W]e must take legislative action to clear up an unfortunate anomaly regarding the legal status of our Cuban friends who are in this country. Under the law, they are admitted as “parolees.” This means that because they have not come into this country under the usual immigration procedures, they cannot become permanent resident aliens – and therefore eligible for citizenship – unless they first leave the country, go elsewhere, and reapply for admission through the normal channels and under the normal priorities. I believe this is unfortunate (Kennedy, R.F. 1966, p. 4).

Later that year, on November 2, 1966, Congress passed the “Cuban Adjustment Act,” which allowed thousands of Cubans to adjust their status from “parolee” (temporary permission to be in the US) to Lawful Permanent Resident (permanent permission to reside in the US) (USCIS). This is one example that indicates that voluntary organizations are familiar with the needs of Cuban refugees. They presented the needs of their clients before Congress, contributing to a new law that was passed just months afterwards.

Fundamental to an understanding of the shadow state construct is the notion that voluntary organizations provide communication channels for refugees. I have already discussed channels, such as letter campaigns and government-administered questionnaires (through the federal *Cuban Refugee Center*). Questionnaires administered by VOLAGs to their former clients is another example. Earlier I discussed the New York Association for New Americans testimony before Congress. In the testimony, the organization stated that Cubans were putting down roots in the United States and that their legal status had to be regularized before full adjustment could take place (Soskis 1966). This information was gleaned from a survey administered to 100 families by the organization (ibid.). The association stated that the survey gave them the opportunity to renew contacts with past clients, determining how they had adjusted to life in the US (ibid.). This survey, conducted through interviews and home visits, provided the organization with information directly from refugees (ibid.).

Surveys administered by voluntary organizations provide invaluable feedback to the federal government. Such surveys are also of great use to voluntary organizations. One such survey, conducted by the United States Catholic Conference (USCC), requested that individual Diocesan Resettlement Directors and Directors of Special Cuban Refugee Committees, send a "Family Survey" questionnaire (see Appendix 1) to Cuban refugee families (McCarthy 1967). This survey was designed to obtain, "personal observations of our program" to "improve and reevaluate our Cuban Refugee Program" (McCarthy 1967, p.1). In a letter sent to questionnaire participants in 1967 (see Appendix 2), the USCC states that, "In our constant endeavor to give better

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service [...] we prepare many studies and seek a great deal of expert advice. In order to help us help your fellow countrymen more efficiently and effectively, please fill out the enclosed 'Family Survey'" (McCarthy 1967, p.2). The "Family Survey" included questions about the family's adjustment and about the service that they received from the organization. For example, the survey asked participants, "What problems did you find to be the most difficult in resettling in this country?", "Please tell us frankly how the services you received from our organization [...] were helpful to you and your family. If not helpful, please Explain.", "What other services would have been of additional help in your beginning here?", and finally, "We hope you will add any other information you believe will be helpful to our understanding of your life in this country" (McCarthy 1967, pp. 5-6). Such questions provide refugees with a direct channel of communication to organizations. As we have seen, voluntary organizations can and do use feedback from refugees to address concerns on both an organizational and federal level.

Finally, federal agencies such as the Cuban Refugee Program, utilized questionnaires as well. In a letter sent to Wise, Director of the *Cuban Refugee Center*, on the 14th of February 1963, John F. Thomas, Director of the Cuban Refugee Program, states that, "A questionnaire is being circulated tomorrow by the Cuban Revolutionary Council to the members of Brigade 2506 [Brigade involved in the Bay of Pigs] to *determine their needs and desires*" (Thomas 1963, p. 12, emphasis added). Channels of communication, while mostly easily accessed through voluntary organizations, were even available between the federal government and refugees. The existence of such

channels strongly supports, as argued here, the extension of the shadow state to include refugees.

Resettlement documents provide a clear lens through which to understand the relationship between governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Resettlement was the primary objective of the federally instituted Center, and voluntary organizations were the tools by which that objective was executed. Such a relationship is in line with the shadow state construct as understood by Geiger and Wolch. However, further investigation reveals an interdependent relationship between these organizations, just as Trudeau would expect. Clear channels of communication between refugees and organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental, support an extended understanding of the shadow state construct, as argued in this thesis.

Catholic Charities – Miami, FL

Introduction

Catholic Charities USA (CCUSA) was founded in 1910 to advocate for social justice (Catholic Charities 2011a). They have “served as a national advocate for the most vulnerable in our nation, including children, the elderly, the disabled, [and] immigrants” (Catholic Charities 2011b). According to the 2009 *Catholic Charities at a Glance* report, CCUSA received 67% of their revenue from the government (Catholic Charities 2009). With this funding, CCUSA supports local agencies through advocacy, networking, training, financial support and leadership (Catholic Charities 2011a). The

Refugee Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities in Miami is one of many local organizations that CCUSA supports.

The following section will be broken into three subsections. They explore three ways in which refugees can and do participate in the Refugee Resettlement Program, and ultimately in the refugee process as a whole. The three sections will be *Feedback*, *Experience*, and *Becoming Part of the Organization*.

Feedback

Volunteer organizations allow, even encourage, participation from refugees in many ways. Feedback is a primary method through which refugees influence the provision of services, and even what services are available. I observed feedback from refugees, sometimes solicited and sometimes simply received, in a variety of settings. I will discuss several methods of feedback in this section.

In October 2008, voluntary organizations involved in the resettlement of Cuban refugees in Miami produced a film for the United States Interest Section in Havana entitled, *Tu Nueva Vida en Estados Unidos: Consejos de cubanos en Miami* (Your New Life in the United States: Advice from Cubans in Miami). This film is intended to provide Cuban refugees who prepare to come to the United States advice regarding their new life. The almost two hour long video is comprised of interviews with VOLAG employees and refugees (we will see later that these two groups are hardly mutually exclusive). The video explains the refugee process and the programs that will be at their disposal. However, a significant portion of the video is devoted to refugees who

already are in Miami. Early on in the video the narrator, a member of the Miami VOLAG community, says, “Les preguntamos a muchos de los refugiados [Cubanos] que consejos les hubiera gustado escuchar antes de venir a los Estados Unidos” (We asked many of the [Cuban] refugees what counsel they would have liked to hear before coming to the United States) (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 35:55). The subsequent section of the video is devoted to Cuban refugees in Miami who offer their advice, based on their experience, to those who are preparing for life in the United States. Beyond the obvious influence of already resettled refugees on new refugees, they were also influencing voluntary organizations. This was an opportunity for those who are served by VOLAGs to provide direct feedback to the agencies at their disposal. Furthermore, the agencies listened to this feedback, because they included advice of Cuban refugees in the video. By allowing current refugees to express what they wished they had known before arriving in the US (something that apparently was not addressed adequately by their VOLAG), the VOLAG is addressing that issue more clearly with future refugees.

The use of resettled refugees is a significant part of the video. However, the refugees also serve the needs of the organization. In one part of the video, recently resettled refugees talk about the advantages of resettlement outside of Miami. The refugees share stories of acquaintances that have relocated outside of Miami, and the benefits that they have received as a result of their relocation.¹² Interestingly though,

¹² Refugees who resettle outside Miami receive more generous resettlement aid because they do not generally have family to support them.

the video only portrays Cuban refugees in Miami. This is of great concern to Miami-Dade County. The County is closed to refugee resettlement outside of family reunification – a response to the enormous number of refugees who already resettled in the County. That these refugees would even be speaking about relocation emphasizes the importance of *their* recommendation and speaks to the influence that past refugees can have on future refugees. This, however, is not a controlling top-down use of power by VOLAGs over refugees. There is a strong interdependence between voluntary organizations and the families of Cuban refugees in Miami. One cannot fully succeed without the other – a point addressed throughout the video by VOLAG employees. One such employee, speaking of the family and the Cuban community in Miami, put it this way, “[La familia es] una mano de ayuda muy importante para nosotros. [...]. La comunidad [Cubana] ha sido muy util en el proceso de reasentamiento Cubano” ([The family is] a very important helping hand for us. [...] The [Cuban] community has been very useful in the Cuban resettlement process) (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 13:00). The agencies in Miami depend on help from families to support newly arrived refugees. The financial assistance received by the refugee helps to offset the costs incurred by the family, but the family provides the foundation for successful resettlement. This does not preclude the role of the VOLAG, and in fact refugees are counseled by past-refugees to stay in close contact with their agency (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 12:12). VOLAGs are an important part of a newly arrived refugees’ life. One VOLAG employee put it this way, “Esta oficina [Catholic Charities] y todo los de mas que trabajan con refugiados [VOLAGs] son sus aliados, son sus amigos” (This organization

[Catholic Charities] and all who work with refugees [VOLAGs] are your allies, your friends) (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 7:55). The video goes on to implore refugees to stay in contact, to use their case worker's wisdom. "Es muy importante que antes de hacer nada [...] que le pregunten a la persona que lo entrevistó porque la persona lleva tiempo aquí [y] le va a decir lo mejor para usted" (It is very important that before you do anything that you ask the person who interviewed you, because that person has experience and will know what is best for you) (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 8:40). The "interview" referred to is the "intake interview." This is a refugee's first contact with their local agency, and the beginning of their relationship with *their* case worker.¹³

The relationship between a refugee, or client, and the case worker is the first contact a refugee will have in the US. The case worker's role often extends beyond the ninety days of government funded resettlement services as a friend and a counselor. The "intake interview" is the first meeting and an important opportunity for refugees to be prepared to provide feedback. The interview serves two important functions for the establishment of future feedback. The first is the establishment of channels of communications and a relationship of trust. The second is the provision of insightful case management to provide services tailored to the need of the individual refugee.

The establishment of communication channels with the organization is perhaps the most important step that refugees can take towards influencing the services that are provided to them. These channels are opened during the intake interview when

¹³ Each refugee is assigned a designated case worker.

refugees are informed of their rights, including the right to complain, by their case worker. During one such interview that I observed in Catholic Charities, the case worker asked a new client to read the contract between herself and the organization out loud, ensuring complete understanding of her rights and obligations. The refugees' right to complain is one channel of communication between themselves and their case workers. However, the right to complain would be of little use without a relationship of trust. This is another integral part of the intake interview. Such trust is built by an organization through the careful and insightful management of cases. Each refugee arrives with different needs and it is the case worker's responsibility to recognize those needs, even if they are not expressed by the refugee, and to address them. During one intake interview that I observed at Catholic Charities, the refugees, a young mother and daughter, were being resettled with a local family member. This family member did not have any form of transportation, nor the ability to arrange transportation. The case worker, through observation, began to arrange a bus pass that is not generally provided at this early stage. After this particular interview, I asked the Volunteer Coordinator if such flexibility was common place in the organization. He informed me that this case worker's action was quite common and encouraged. He went on to explain that no two cases were alike and that each case worker is encouraged to tailor services to meet the needs of each client. Such special arrangements, he continued, had to be approved by the bosses, but that this was hardly ever an issue. Any help that contributes to employment and/or independence, the two primary goals of the program, is always

considered – help with rent, down payments, additional education, etc.¹⁴ Such insight depends on perceptive case workers, and as will be explored later in this thesis, is greatly aided by the refugee experiences of most workers.

This flexibility and perceptiveness aids in the establishment of relationships of trust, and therefore encourages the use of established channels of communication. As individual refugees use those channels to voice concerns, or to ask for assistance, the organization becomes aware of the issues that refugees face. In one particularly important instance, it came to the attention of the Program that local employers were not hiring certain refugees because of a misunderstanding of employment documentation. In this particular instance it is important to highlight the difference between political prisoners and parolees. Political prisoners enter the US as “refugees,” while parolees are considered “entrants.” The majority of Cubans entering the US are “entrants,” and therefore require an Employment Authorization Document (EAD) in order to work. Refugees, on the other hand, do not require an EAD, because their status automatically confers work authorization. However, local employers had become accustomed to the EAD, and were wary of employing anyone who did not possess one. Refugees, who do not require an EAD, were turned away by employers afraid of hiring anyone without an EAD. The Program became aware of this when refugees contacted their case workers about this problem. Local VOLAGs brought this issue to the attention of government authorities and a statement was issued, explaining the

¹⁴ The two main goals of Catholic Charities are employment and independence. Independence refers to economic and social independence (i.e. moving around the city alone).

situation to local employers. This example highlights the important role of organizations to advocate for refugees, but more importantly, it highlights the role of refugee feedback in addressing the needs and concerns of the refugee community.

Voluntary organizations work together to address issues, such as the aforementioned EAD problem. Feedback from refugees is received by case workers, who in turn bring it to the attention of their organization. The organization, in turn, can share it with the VOLAG community through monthly meetings of the VOLAG Consortium (Consortium). These monthly meetings are an important opportunity for members of the VOLAG community to address issues that were brought to their attention by refugees. Likewise, it is an opportunity to meet with leaders from governmental departments, such as the Department of Health and the Department of Children and Families. A review of minutes from five months of meetings (January-May, 2010) reveals multiple instances of refugee feedback that informed VOLAG and governmental action.

In the February 2010 meeting minutes, a member of one of the VOLAGs expressed a concern regarding elderly refugees. The Department of Social Security no longer sends a letter to refugees who qualify for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). Elderly refugees will not receive SSI without submitting an application, and the letter served as a reminder to refugees that they had to apply for SSI (South Florida VOLAG Consortium). The VOLAG member had been made aware of a concern, the discontinuation of a SSI reminder letter, and brought that concern to the Consortium. In order to rectify this situation the Consortium agreed on the “importance of re-

installing a relationship with Social Security Office [...] [because] with all the new regulations we should have someone to *raise our concerns*” (South Florida VOLAG Consortium, p. 3, emphasis added). In order to reinstall this relationship, the members of the Consortium suggest a liaison person within Social Security who can advocate for the needs of the VOLAG community and their clients.

One of the interesting elements of the Consortium is that it serves as a platform by which the VOLAG community can interact with governmental agencies. On one level, it involves the direct participation of governmental agencies, i.e. the Department of Health and the Department of Children and Families. On another level, it involves the scaling up of refugee concerns to the federal level of the Social Security office and, as I will show below, the Department of Motor Vehicles.

Refugees are vulnerable due to their limited resources and relative lack of experience in a new country. Unfortunately, there are people who take advantage of this. In the April 2010 minutes we learn of such an incidence. A worker from Episcopal Migration Ministries (EMM) recounted an incident involving one of her clients at a local Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). Due to discrepancies in the name of the refugee on several legal documents, the DMV worker refused to grant her a driver license. However, the refugee was able to obtain a driver license by paying someone at the DMV \$100 (South Florida VOLAG Consortium). Another worker, from the International Rescue Committee (IRC) voiced a similar concern from one of her clients. All in attendance agreed that, “Issues like these are happening every day” (ibid., p. 2). To address these issues, the VOLAGs agreed to bring these issues to the attention of the

DMV Liaison at the next Refugee Task Force Meeting (ibid.). This case reinforces the chain of communication, extending from the refugee, through their VOLAG, and ultimately to the respective governmental agency. However, the case also makes reference to yet another tool through which VOLAGs can voice the concerns of their clients – the Refugee Task Force Meeting. These are regional bi-monthly meetings hosted by the State of Florida Department of Children and Families. These meetings, as referenced above, provide the VOLAG community access to the governmental departments necessary to address the concerns of refugees.

The VOLAG Consortium and the Refugee Task Force Meetings allow the VOLAGs to voice the concerns of their clients to other VOLAGs and governmental officials. Neither of these meetings directly involves refugees. Miami-Dade County is addressing this through the creation of the Miami-Dade County Refugee Advisors Panel (MDRAP). The MDRAP serves under the direction of the Florida Department of Children and Families' Director of Refugee Services Program. The panel's role is to provide feedback to the Director regarding refugee services and issues and concerns that refugees face. Beyond the Director, the panel serves as a resource for voluntary agencies and local government as well (MDRAP 2009). The MDRAP's mission is to serve as an advisory panel to the Refugee Services program, facilitating a smoother resettlement process for newly arriving refugees (ibid.). The role of the Refugee Advisors (panel members) is six fold:

1. Help identify and prioritize refugee concerns and issues;
2. Provide feedback on the suitability and helpfulness of services provided to refugees by RS funded providers;

3. Recommend policies, plans and procedures to promote effective delivery of services;
4. Identify the particular needs of older refugees, children, and other refugees with special needs;
5. Share materials and information relating to refugee matters among panel members;
6. Be prepared to participate in the local Refugee Task Force to inform service providers of the needs or concerns of the refugee communities and to share information learned at the Task Force with other refugees.

According to the panel guidelines, the thirteen members of the panel should include newly arrived refugees and those who have benefited from the refugee program within the past three years (ibid.).

The MDRAP is the newest channel of communication between refugees and their governmental and nongovernmental service providers. As we have seen in this section, there are a plethora of channels for refugees to provide feedback and to participate in the resettlement process. While these channels generally exist through resettlement agencies, the MDRAP provides an example of how refugees can provide direct feedback.

Experience

In each of the aforementioned cases, it is beneficial for prospective refugees to learn from the experiences of refugees in the US. For example, the orientation video provided newly arrived refugees an opportunity to share their experience with those who have yet to arrive. Case workers who were previous refugees also capitalize on

their personal experiences to help others. I will explore the role of experience in the shadow state in this section.

As previously mentioned, refugees are encouraged to stay in close contact with their case worker. The video, discussed in the last section, emphasized the importance of experience. For example, at one point in the video VOLAG employees encouraged new refugees to consult with their case workers because they have already been through the resettlement experience (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 9:00). Most case workers were refugees themselves and have, personally, passed through the same program that current clients are navigating. Moreover, through their work with refugees, VOLAG employees are aware of issues that most refugees will encounter. The video encourages refugees to ask their case worker for advice regarding everything, from continuing education programs to employment options, because their case worker often knows others who have participated in the same programs (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 7:55). Refugees come to rely on the organization as they would on family for advice and support. One refugee interviewed in the video, in reference to his voluntary agency, states that, “No he extrañado mis relaciones in Cuba porque me siento en casa” (I have not missed my relations in Cuba because I feel at home [in the US]) (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 11:57). One VOLAG employee provides encouragement to new refugees by emphasizing the fact that, “Todos hemos comenzado igual” (We all started the same [as refugees]) (Programa de Refugiados 2008, 52:58). Past experiences have come to define the approach that many case

workers take in helping current refugees. This was particularly obvious in the weekly job seminars that were held at the Refugee Resettlement Program of Catholic Charities.

Every Monday, the Program holds a job seminar that is hosted by one of the agency's employment specialists. Each new refugee is required to attend this seminar once, generally the first Monday that it is offered after their arrival. This seminar is meant to provide the refugees with a brief orientation to employment in the United States. During my time with the organization I participated in three job seminars. Two of these seminars were held by a Cuban employment specialist, while the other was given by a non-Cuban specialist. An analysis of how these specialists approached the job seminar provides insight into how having been a refugee oneself influences how services are rendered.

The influence of the refugee experience on Valeria, the Cuban employment specialist, was immediately clear.¹⁵ "Yo, [como soy Cubana] lo veo desde el punto de vista de mi experiencia" (Me, [as I am Cuban] I see things from the point of view of my experience). Valeria's point of view is that of a Cuban refugee who has sat in the same chairs as those who attend her seminars. She uses her experience to bond with the refugees over their shared experiences, life in Cuba and life as an exile. These shared experiences allow Valeria to use her personal knowledge of Cuba to tailor her seminar to those in attendance. To Valeria, her experience as a refugee is an integral part of how she teaches her seminars. In her seminars, Valeria relates her personal experiences and

¹⁵ Names have been changed to protect the privacy of participants in this study.

discusses issues that she knows will be most relevant. One such issue was job interviews. Valeria asked if anybody had ever applied for a job or participated in a job interview, but none had. Valeria already knew the answer to this question, but by asking she affirmed her knowledge of Cuba, and thereby affirmed her qualification to teach the seminar. Valeria knows that, coming from a communist country where job interviews do not exist, none in attendance have ever participated in a job interview. This, as we will see later, is a point that escaped Valeria's non-Cuban colleague Santiago. She took the attendees step by step through the job application process. This involved many steps that non-Cubans would take for granted. For example, she taught them how to ask for and fill out a job application. She went on to explain, primarily to the women in attendance, that daily household skills (i.e. childcare, cleaning, cooking, etc.) are valuable job skills. As a Cuban, Valeria understood that the women in attendance did not feel that they were qualified to work. However, because of her Cuban background, she knew that this was a concern and addressed it. She also stressed that self-employment was legal in the US, and that they did not need to fear legal repercussions for entrepreneurship. This issue could only be understood by someone who is familiar with Cuba, and it emphasizes the importance of the teacher's understanding of the background of her clients. In one instance, Valeria told the attendees that they needed to get out and explore the city. She mentioned that she knows that their families have told them that they cannot go out alone, but that is not true. This struck the refugees, who had indeed been told by their families that the streets were too dangerous to go out alone. She encouraged them to start driving, but

to avoid the interstate, which would be too complicated to use right away. This is another example of how Valeria used her experience as a refugee to tailor her message. Leaving the house alone, driving on the interstate, and the job application process were all issues that affected her resettlement, and therefore these issues have become part of her job seminar. Valeria used her own experience to alter the standard mandatory job seminar to address issues that Cuban refugees are most likely to encounter.

The job seminar with Valeria's colleague, Santiago, was an entirely different experience. It was immediately clear that Santiago was not from Cuba (he was from Central America) and that he was not a refugee. He did not make reference to his own experience. This was a great difference from the majority of employees in the Program who were Cuban, and who referenced their own experiences frequently. Santiago started his seminar by addressing the expectations of those present. He told them that things will not be easy, but that it will not do anyone any good to "paint things rosy." Instead of focusing on feelings and experiences, his seminar focused largely on the legal aspects of working in the US. Santiago explained, clearly and concisely, the benefits afforded to legal workers in the US, such as social security, workers compensation, overtime, and unemployment. In order to receive these benefits, he explained, an employee has to be legal. He continued to explain the tax system and the importance of taxes in funding social programs, such as the ones aiding them. Santiago also explained the employment system in the US so that those in attendance could understand. After the seminar, Santiago explained to me that he felt that not being Cuban was an advantage. He felt that Cuban employees were too concerned about the refugees,

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painting a rosy picture of a harsh reality. Not having been a refugee, Cuban or otherwise, hindered his ability to connect with participants. A cultural disconnect was apparent on a few occasions. In one instance, Santiago asked how far people had to walk to go to a job interview in Cuba. This question was met with confused looks and silence. Cubans, coming from a communist country, do not interview for jobs. By assuming that the refugees had participated in job interviews, Santiago did not address this issue to a great extent in his seminar. In another instance, Santiago discredited housework, and work in Cuba in general, as valid work experience. He emphasized that work experience is experience in the US, not Cuba. This was a direct contradiction of Valeria's view. Santiago was more susceptible to cultural missteps. One time he randomly assigned the name "Hotel Fidel" to a fictitious place of employment. This was met with looks of shock and surprise from the newly arrived refugees. While Santiago presented important information in a clear and effective manner, his cultural disconnectedness and non-refugee status made the seminar less personable and harder to digest for the attendees. While Valeria's seminar was engaging and personable, Santiago's was met with silence. At one point Santiago even pressed for questions, warning that silence was only prejudicial to the participants themselves. Ultimately, Valeria was able to use her own refugee experience and knowledge of Cuba to build a relationship of trust with the participants. Furthermore, she possesses a keen insight into what refugees are most concerned about and understands how to address those concerns. Overall, Santiago presented important information, as the program requires, but the experience and knowledge of Valeria contributed to a lively seminar and a

comfortable environment. Many who were involved with resettlement organizations in Miami were refugees. The following section will explore the influence of refugees on the resettlement agencies by becoming part of the organizations.

Becoming Part of the Organization

Many past refugees are employed by resettlement programs in Miami. They use their refugee experience to help new arrivals and to tailor available services to best meet the needs of their clients. I will now describe biographies of Hiram Ruiz, Raul Hernandez, and Luisa Lois, who are involved in the refugee resettlement program at different levels. Their stories differ, but they are all Cuban exiles, and they use their refugee experience in their current work. The vignettes are based on autobiographical excerpts.

Hiram Ruiz

Hiram Ruiz is the Director of Refugee Services in the Florida Department of Children and Families.

Born in Cuba and raised in Miami, Ruiz holds a Master of Social Work degree from Florida State University. He spent 8 years as a social worker in predominantly immigrant neighborhoods in London, England and was later a social worker in Vietnamese refugee resettlement centers in Scotland and England. Ruiz then spent three years with [...] the UN High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], first in [the] UNHCR's Social Service Office in Mogadishu, Somalia assisting urban Ethiopian refugees and then in Darfur, Sudan, as a field officer in refugee camps. After returning to the United States, Ruiz joined the D.C. Government's Refugee Program.

Ruiz subsequently spent 16 years as a senior policy analyst with the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR), a private, Washington, D.C.-

based refugee advocacy and public information group. In that capacity, Ruiz traveled to more than 40 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America to assess the needs of refugees and internally displaced persons and advocate for adequate U.S. and international responses. Ruiz authored more than 20 publications on refugees and was a staff writer for USCR's *World Refugee Survey* and *Refugee Reports*. He spoke at numerous national and international conferences and testified before Congressional Committees. Ruiz later served as Director of Communications for USCR and its parent organization, Immigration and Refugee Services of America, now USCRI.

In 2004, Ruiz returned to Miami as a political director for the Service Employees International Union. In October 2008, Ruiz was appointed director of DCF's Refugee Services Program, the largest refugee program in the United States (Ruiz 2010).

This biography provides a brief introduction to Hiram Ruiz and his accomplishments since he arrived in the US as a refugee. Hiram, a Cuban, has been a refugee twice in his life, once under the Batista regime, and the second time under Castro (Spangler 2008). Regarding his experience as a refugee, Hiram stated "There wasn't very much by way of services. Basically we got here, were given entry to the U.S., papers to be able to be here [...] but it was definitely tough, and it wasn't tough for months, it was tough for years" (Spangler 2008, p. 2). He has since worked with refugees around the world. As Director of Refugee Services for the Florida Department of Children and Families, a major goal of Hiram has been to bring refugee services closer to the refugees (Crucet 2008; Spangler 2008). He realized this goal, in part, by physically moving the office of Refugee Services from Tallahassee to Miami, Florida (where approximately 80% of refugees in Florida reside) (Crucet 2008; Spangler 2008). Hiram emphasized that the move was indicative of the Department's commitment to

respond to the needs of refugees and to be more directly involved in the refugee community (Cruet 2008). He also instituted the Miami-Dade County Refugee Advisors Panel (MDRAP), discussed earlier in this paper. Hiram has used his own experience as a refugee, and his years of experience working with refugees around the world, to emphasize the shared experiences of refugees across the globe. The shared experience of exile is a strong uniting force, and one that has drawn many refugees into careers with VOLAGs, such as Catholic Charities.

Dr. Raul E. Hernandez

Raul E. Hernandez came to the U.S. from Cuba in 1980 as part of the Mariel boat lift. He received a medical doctor degree from the University of Havana. Since his arrival in the country [US] he has worked in refugee resettlement. In 1980, he was hired by the University of Miami as camp manager of the Unaccompanied Minors Program serving Mariel Cuban children in Indiantown Gap, Pennsylvania. During 1980 and 1981, he worked for HHS [the Department of Health and Human Services], the Cuban Haitian Task force, and a number of voluntary agencies processing Cuban Mariel arrivals at the refugee camp created in Fort Chaffee, Arkansas.

From 1981 through 2007, Dr. Hernandez worked for Migration and Refugee Services of the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (MRS/USCCB) [holding] numerous responsibilities at the Arkansas Regional Office; New York City; and the Washington, DC national headquarters. He headed a number of national programs, including the Resettlement of Cuban entrants; Match Grant and Wilson Fish employment programs; Unaccompanied Refugee Minors; building refugee processing capacity in Haiti; moving Cuban/Haitian minors out the Guantanamo's U.S. Naval Base; resettling Kurdish-Iraqi asylees; and developing Refugee Mental Health Programs. During his tenure he represented USCCB at numerous national and international events. In 1996, he consulted with the Center for Applied Linguistics for the publication of "Cubans, their History and Culture".

Before his retirement from MRS/USCCB in 2007, he led the Cuban/Haitian Program in Miami for 15 years. He is currently the Volunteer and Resource Manager of the Refugee Program of Catholic Charities of the Archdiocese of Miami (Hernandez 2009).

Raul Hernandez has worked with refugees across the United States since his arrival in 1980. Describing this moment he writes:

It was a breezy glorious day and the shore line was visible in the distance. [...] After the years of repression, persecution, discrimination and fear, the feeling of actually being in the US was simply beyond description. It was May 21, 1980. We had arrived, and we were free! (Hernandez 2010).

As the Volunteer and Resource Manager of the Refugee Program of Catholic Charities of the Archdioceses of Miami, Raul was my primary contact. His refugee experience has instilled in him a great empathy for other refugees, making him a strong advocate for them. He confirmed that many former refugees work in the Program and similar organizations. One example is Luisa.

Luisa Lois

[My] family decided [...] to apply to the Program of Visas for Political Prisoners because my father was being persecuted for not supporting the Revolution and spent many years in prison. In 2005 after two years of waiting, we traveled to the United States as Refugees. [...] We were assigned to Catholic Charities as new arrivals. When the case manager that worked with me during this process saw my university and language degrees he informed me that there was an opening for a Case Manager position in the office. Needless to say that like every immigrant, I did not understand much the first days...but with the English that I brought with me and the help from my Job Developer, we completed the [resume] that opened the doors to a new life of work and life in Catholic Charities. The process of interviews took three months. [...] I was chosen and started immediately as Case Manager for the Cuban-Haitian Entrant-Program. It was very instructive to work with people who had just arrived like me! What could I tell them? Well

that itself...I arrived three months ago as well! They couldn't believe it! I progressively learned the work and was promoted to a position of Case Manager of the Match Grant Program only three months after starting in the company. This was the test of fire. It wasn't just about carrying a file for only one month, it was six months of direct work with the client and attending to people that had arrived just as I had arrived a few months ago...looking for their first job! For a Case Manager helping those who have just arrived is a hard task but when they finish the program after six months and you already see them working, adapted to the new life, living independently! That is the biggest satisfaction that we have. In October 2008 I changed positions again. Now [I am] working as a Job Developer [...] I always loved helping the clients look for a job (Lois 2010).

As a Job Developer in the Program, Luisa is in constant contact with newly arrived refugees. Her own refugee experience has had a profound influence on her work. Luisa often turns to her own experiences to guide newly arrived refugees through the employment process. She uses her personal knowledge of life in Cuba and in Miami to tailor standardized messages to her primarily Cuban clientele. Luisa understands that "the hardest thing for every immigrant is adapting to a new life and to [a] new language [and a new] country in which they are starting from 'zero'" (Lois 2010). Luisa, Raul and Hiram have all used their experience as refugees to ease this period of transition and to tailor generic Federal services to the needs of their clientele.

In this section I have shown how three Cuban refugees have turned their personal refugee experience into a career of service to new refugees. These individuals, and many like them, use their experiences to better address the needs of Cuban refugees in Miami. Hiram, Raul and Luisa have *become part of the organization*, using their experiences to mold their respective organizations to better fit the needs of new

refugees. The employment of past refugees by governmental and nongovernmental organizations is the ultimate means by which refugees are involved in the shadow state.

CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have argued that current understandings of the shadow state are inadequate. Geiger and Wolch (1986) only consider a top-down hierarchical relationship between the government and voluntary organizations. Trudeau (2008) correctly argues that the relationship between governmental and nongovernmental organizations is interdependent – governments depend on voluntary organizations for their on-the-ground expertise while voluntary organizations depend on the government for funding. I argue that refugees play an integral part in the shadow state through their participation in voluntary organizations.

In the previous section, I presented three ways in which refugees can participate in voluntary organizations, and ultimately in the refugee process as a whole. By becoming part of their organizations, Hiram, Raul and Lucia used their personal refugee experiences to help other refugees. Their stories are not unique. Governmental and nongovernmental refugee resettlement organizations in Miami are staffed largely by Cuban refugees. They each use their personal experience to improve the provision of services for new arrivals.

The refugee *experience* shared by so many VOLAG employees aided greatly in the establishment of relationships of trust. The shared refugee experience validates the VOLAG employee's position in the eyes of a client. Trust contributes to open channels of communication, bringing attention to issues that individual refugees could not solve alone. The VOLAGs used a "*flexible use of scale and scope*" and were able to *scale-up*

issues of communal concern to state and federal governmental agencies (Kodras 1997, p. 80).

Feedback from refugees depends on established channels of communication. Such channels are multidirectional, as in the resettlement video that local Miami VOLAGs created in 2008. They invited newly resettled refugees to share their experience and advice with those preparing for departure from Cuba. The concerns and advice of the exiles often reflected perceived shortcomings of the resettlement process, such as the lack of reliable information about resettlement benefits. The inclusion of these interviews in the video show that voluntary organizations implicitly acknowledged the shortcomings while addressing these issues through their inclusion in the video.

As revealed in the Cuban Heritage Collection documents, the government relied greatly on on-the-ground expertise of voluntary agencies in Miami. Moreover, the government relied on pre-established national networks of the VOLAGs to guide their national resettlement planning, funding resettlement only in locations where organizations had an on-the-ground presence. Conversely, some VOLAG organizations felt that strong top-down support was necessary to further the resettlement of refugees throughout the US. In a letter to the Director of the Cuban Refugee Program in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, William J. vanden Heuvel, President of the International Rescue Committee (a VOLAG), asked the President of the United States to lend his strong support to the resettlement cause (vanden Heuvel 1963).

An examination of the current literature reveals that instances of welfare devolution are common throughout the US and Western Europe (Cullen 2009;

DeVerteuil *et al.* 2002; Ferris 1998; Geiger and Wolch 1986; Henderson 2002; Kodras 1997; Kramer 2000; Nevile 2009; Nightingale *et al.* 1997; Salamon 1999; Taylor and Bassi 1998; Trudeau 2008; Wolch 1990, Wolch 1999, Wolch and Rocha 1993; Wright 1981; Young 2000). Of particular interest to this thesis is the state of affairs in the US. Budget difficulties have contributed to a call for reduction in welfare spending and increased privatization. Despite the immediate sense of urgency that current politicians try to apply to each year's budget, the reality is that such discussions are not new. Salamon (1999) states that:

[N]onprofit organizations have had to adjust to what appears to be a *permanent situation of budgetary stringency*. This stringency [has] its origins in the conservative fiscal policies of the Reagan era of the early 1980s (p.8, emphasis added).

Devolution of services continued beyond the Reagan administration. During the 1990s, Republican Congressional leadership offered the US their *Contract with America*, promising a new era of fiscal responsibility. Central to their plan was the bipartisan welfare reform legislation passed under the Clinton administration in 1996. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA), as the 1996 bill was known, emphasized employment for those who receive welfare. PRWORA shifted the responsibility of service provision to the state and local levels "[opening] the floodgates of devolution" (DeVerteuil *et al.* 2002).

"Budgetary stringency" has, as predicted by Salamon (1999), continued into the 21st century (p. 8). Financial constraints have resulted in increased collaboration between government and the nonprofit sector. "The numbers and variety of

arrangements thru which government and non profits collaborate are increasing as government seeks ways of squeezing more out of its limited resource base” (Young 2000, p. 158). In 2010, the Republican leadership, once again, reiterated its commitment to financial responsibility in its *Pledge to America*. The near-shutdown of the federal government in early 2011 was only averted by deep spending cuts. Strong bipartisan support for the privatization of welfare services suggests that the devolution of services will continue. Accordingly, a deeper understanding of the effects of devolution on the provision of welfare services is necessary.

This thesis has focused specifically on refugee benefits that Cuban exiles in Miami received. The findings suggest that local voluntary organizations provide an opportunity for refugees to directly and indirectly influence the provision of services. Voluntary organizations have the ability to successfully *scale-up* refugee concerns and problems to state and federal governmental organizations that have the ability to implement policy changes. I discussed the passage of the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966 as one example how VOLAGs can *scale-up* the concerns of individual refugees. In this case, VOLAGs served as a platform for refugees to address their needs, achieving legal permanent resident status.

The findings in this thesis suggest that devolution can contribute to the democratization of welfare services, better enabling service providers to meet the needs of their clients. To better understand the role of devolution in the democratization of welfare services, I recommend more case studies of geographically and culturally diverse populations. Also, I suggest that studies should investigate if *feedback*,

experience, and *becoming part of the organization* exist as a means of influencing service provision among other types of welfare service providers (i.e. housing assistance, child care assistance, etc.). If they do not exist, it would be beneficial to know if the incorporation of *feedback*, *experience*, and *becoming part of the organization* into diverse welfare organizations would improve the organizations' ability to address the needs of their clientele. I have argued that resettlement agencies have benefited from the employment of past-refugees. Future research should investigate if past-clientele of other welfare organizations could similarly benefit their respective voluntary agencies. Finally, further research on civil society could provide insight into how civil society organizations democratize welfare services from the bottom-up. Particularly, how groups less politically active and unified than Cubans utilize civil society organizations.

Through the evidence provided in this thesis, it is clear that voluntary agencies are exercising a *flexible use of scale and scope* to *scale-up* the needs and concerns of their clientele. Refugees have become part of organizations at many levels, and have used their own experiences to shape how resettlement organizations can better meet the needs of refugees. The refugee resettlement program of Catholic Charities, the Archdiocese of Miami, has indeed led to the democratization of welfare services by providing "a means for governments to consult migrants and thus ensure a better match between programmes and migrants' actual requirements" (Spencer 2005, p. 3).

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APPENDIX

Appendix 1: USCC "Family Survey"

UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE
DEPARTMENT OF IMMIGRATION
Research and Information Division
Family Survey

- I. Are you single _____ married _____ widow _____ widower _____
separated _____ divorced _____?
- II. a) Please check the members living in your household:
Husband _____
Wife _____
Number of unmarried sons _____ Ages _____
Number of unmarried daughters _____ Ages _____
- b) How many married children do you have? _____
How many are in the United States? _____
How many are elsewhere? _____
If somewhere else other than the U.S., what country and
city? _____
- III. If you are living in an apartment, state number of rooms?

Monthly rent? _____
If you are renting a house or part of a house, state the
number of rooms _____
Rent? _____
If you own a house, is it one family _____
Two family _____
Three family _____
Four or more family _____?
Original Mortgage _____ Down payment _____?
- IV. a) What work did you do in Cuba? _____

Are you doing the same kind of work in this country?
Yes _____ No _____
If not, would you prefer it if you were doing the same
kind of work? Yes _____ No _____
If not what is your present occupation? _____

Did you learn this skill in school _____ On the job _____?
Did you get this job through your own effort _____
Relatives or friends _____ U.S.C.C. _____ Employment
agency _____?
Do you belong to a union? Yes _____ No _____

How many different jobs have you held since you came to this country? One _____

Two _____

Three _____

Four _____

More _____

- b) If you are working for yourself, please state the kind of business you are in _____

How long have you been in business for yourself? _____

Who helped establish you in business? _____

Do you have a partner? Yes _____ No _____

How many members of your family are working in your business? _____

How many additional people are working for you? _____

- c) If you practiced a profession in Cuba, what special problems did you have in establishing yourself in the same profession? In a new profession? Did an English deficiency confront you? _____

- d) What work did your wife do in Cuba? _____

Is she doing the same kind of work in this country?

Yes _____ No _____

If not, what is her present occupation? _____

Did she learn it in school _____ On the job _____?

Did she get this job through her own effort _____

Relatives or friends _____ U.S.C.C. _____ Employment agency _____?

Does she belong to a union? Yes _____ No _____

- e) How many children living at home are employed? _____

Full time? _____

Part time? _____

What are their occupations? _____

Do they contribute to the family income? Yes _____

No _____

Do your married children contribute to the family income?

Yes _____ No _____

	<u>Graduate</u>	<u>Technical</u>
	<u>Training</u>	<u>Training</u>
Husband	_____	_____
Wife	_____	_____

Was learning English difficult for you? Yes _____ No _____
 For your wife? Yes _____ No _____

c) Did your children graduate from: (in the United States)

	<u>Public</u>	<u>Parochial</u>
Elementary school	_____	_____
High School	_____	_____
Other type of school	_____	_____
College	_____	_____

If college, please give name of college _____

Did any child receive scholarships for college? Yes _____
 No _____ Through Whom _____

Loans? Yes _____ No _____ Through Whom _____

Did any child study for a higher degree after college?
 Yes _____ No _____

Please list your children's present occupations or professions: _____

VII. a) Where are you living now? City _____ State _____

b) Have you changed your city of residence since your initial resettlement? Yes _____ No _____

If so, indicate the city and state of origin _____

And the city and state to which you have relocated _____

c) Was any assistance given to either by a private agency or a government agency in your relocation to another city or state? Yes _____ No _____

VIII. Are you a citizen of the United States? Yes _____ No _____

Since what year? _____

Have you found the kind of religious affiliation that gives you the kind of satisfaction you want? Yes _____ No _____

Is it Catholic _____ Protestant _____ Jewish _____ Other _____?

Have you kept up close ties with relatives and friends from Cuba who are living here? Yes _____ No _____

Do you belong to:

Fraternal societies: Yes _____ No _____ Are most of the other

members Cuban? Yes _____ No _____
Religious societies: Yes _____ No _____ Are most of the members
Cuban? Yes _____ No _____
Other groups or societies: Yes _____ No _____ Are most of the
members Cuban? Yes _____ No _____

IX. What were your main reasons for leaving Cuba? Were they
political, economic, etc.,? _____

Was it a sudden decision? Yes _____ No _____
How long after the revolution had you been waiting to leave
Cuba? _____
Did you have any relatives in this country when you left
Cuba? Yes _____ No _____
Do you have any other relatives who are still living in Cuba?
Yes _____ No _____
If so, are you helping them to come to this country? Yes _____
No _____
Do they seek your assistance? Yes _____ No _____
How did the relatives in this country help in your beginning
here? _____

If you arrived without your family, how long was it before
they joined you? _____
If your family arrived before you, how long after their
arrival did you come? _____
How many close relatives have arrived from Cuba since you
did? _____
What did you hope in coming to the United States? _____

Have your expectations been fulfilled? Yes _____ No _____
Which ones have remained unfulfilled? _____

How long did it take you to feel really settled in this
country? _____
What problems did you find to be the most difficult in
resettling in this country? _____

If you came to the United States as a single person without any relatives here, what special problems did you face in this country? _____

- X. Please tell us frankly how the services you received from our organization (financial, employment, health, conseling or any other services) were helpful to you and your family. If not helpful, please explain. _____

What organization provided you with the most assistance? _____

What other services would have been of additional help in your beginning here? _____

Did you ever receive help from the Department of Health, Education and Welfare? Yes _____ No _____ For how Long? _____

- XI. We hope you will add any other information you believe will be helpful to our understanding of your life in this country. You may add this on the back of this sheet or on a seperate sheet of paper.

Appendix 2: USCC "Family Survey" Letter



Department of **IMMIGRATION**

1312 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20005, Tel. 737-7474 Cable Address: CATHWELL

Dear Friend:

In our constant endeavor to give better service to the thousands of your fellow countrymen in their search for freedom, we prepare many studies and seek a great deal of expert advice. In order to help us help your fellow countrymen more efficiently and effectively, please fill out the enclosed "Family Survey" and forward it to us in the attached envelope.

Thank you,

UNITED STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE

VITA

I graduated summa cum laude from the State University of New York, Geneseo with a B.A. in Geography in 2007. While at Geneseo, I minored in Philosophy and Environmental Studies as well. My last semester was spent in Buenos Aires, Argentina, where I found work with a satellite imagery and remote sensing company. I lived in Buenos Aires for two and a half years before applying for graduate school.