



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
I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Mikiko Sakakura entitled "Sino-Japanese Normalization of Relations." I have examined the final copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in Political Science.


Joseph W. Dodd, Major Professor

We have read this thesis
and recommend its acceptance:



Accepted for the Council:



Vice Provost
and Dean of the Graduate School

SINO-JAPANESE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS

A Thesis

Presented for the

Master of Arts

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Mikiko Sakakura

June, 1988

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I owe a great deal of gratitude to a number of people for assisting me in the completion of my thesis. First among them is Joseph Dodd, my thesis advisor, who provided patient advice, encouragement, and criticism throughout this ordeal. I am also indebted to Young-Bae Kim, who enabled me to study at the University of Tennessee. Finally, I would like to thank my friend, Tony Simones, for commenting on earlier drafts.

ABSTRACT

The People's Republic of China and Japan established formal diplomatic relations in 1972. At the time, however, Japan had extensive and valuable economic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan. One of the issues that had to be worked out in the full normalization of relations between the P.R.C. and Japan involved the search for a diplomatic formula whereby the P.R.C. could be assured of its "sovereignty" over what was seen as the "province" of Taiwan while Japan could be assured of its retention of economic relations with what was in reality a separate and distinct Taiwan. The formula emerged during the difficult Sino-Japanese negotiation of a civil aviation agreement.

A second major issue in the normalization process arose when Japan and the P.R.C. later began negotiation what ultimately became the Peace and Friendship Treaty. The P.R.C. insisted on the inclusion in this treaty of an "antihegemony" clause that was rather clearly aimed at the Soviet Union. As a result,

Japan found herself trying to deal with the P.R.C. without offending the Soviet Union. Matters were further complicated because the government had to manage this issue as well others without jeopardizing its close ties with the United States.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

When the Japanese are asked which country they think is the most important to Japan, the majority of them cite the United States of America. This is understandable, considering the political, economic and military ties with the U.S.A. Under the Japan-U.S.A. Security Treaty, the U.S.A. is obliged to protect Japan from any military attack from other countries. The trade relationship with the U.S.A. is far more important to Japan than that with any other nation. Personnel exchanges in political and cultural fields are very active between the two countries. However, this close relationship between the two countries is a relatively recent phenomenon. It started with Japan's defeat in World War II, when the Americans came to Japan as rulers.

Compared with the U.S.A. as a country of importance to Japan, China seems to have been slighted. However, China has

been no less important and influential to Japan than the U.S.A. The association between China and Japan is centuries old and China has exerted a great cultural influence in Japan. The two countries initiated contact more than two thousand years ago. Since then Japan has learned many valuable things from the great Chinese civilization, such as rice growing, pottery techniques, writing systems, Buddhist and Confucianism. Although much of Chinese culture gradually lost its considerable influence in Japan, some of it took deep roots in Japanese society and has lasted until today.

Besides the cultural affinity, there is an additional tie which binds Japan and China. Japan was an aggressor and exploiter in China for about fifty years until the end of World War II. Particularly during World War II, the Japanese military committed dreadful atrocities in China, for which many Japanese continue to have a sense of deep guilt. When things do not go well between the two countries, the Chinese inevitably resurrect the specter of Japanese militarism and remind the Japanese of their past wrongdoings.

A few years ago ministers of the Japanese government visited a shrine in Japan for the war dead. The Japanese government received a strong protest from China, which accused Japan of trying to revive militarism. The Japanese government was thus put into the position of denying any militaristic intentions. When problems arise in trade, the pattern is the same. The Chinese attempt to link Japanese trade custom with Japanese imperialism during World War II. The matter was settled only after the Japanese government extended apologies and the Chinese government accepted them. In this sense the ghost of World War II still haunts today's Sino-Japanese relations.

For these reasons--cultural affinity and unhappy memory--China is a very important country to Japan. The study of Sino-Japanese relations is important since China is such a special country.

Additionally, the study of Sino-Japanese relations illustrates Japan's post-war relations with the two super powers, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union.

The main reason Japan did not recognize the People's

Republic of China for so long was the pressure from the U.S.A. The U.S.A. wanted Japan to conform its China policy to that of the United States. Unless the United States recognized the P.R.C., Japan was not able to go ahead with normalization of relations with China. Thus, the U.S.A. affected Sino-Japanese relation considerably before the P.R.C. and Japan established diplomatic relations.

The thaw in U.S.A.-China relations at the beginning of the 1970's led to Sino-Japanese normalization of relations in 1972. However, problems continued to exist between the two countries. This thesis will study the Taiwan problem and the Soviet hegemonism issue, which involve Japan's policies toward Taiwan and the Soviet Union as well as the P.R.C.

In 1972 Premier Zhou Enlai of the P.R.C. and Prime Minister Tanaka of Japan signed a joint communique which technically ended a state of war that had existed between the two countries since 1937. In the communique both the P.R.C. and Japan left Japan's future relationship with Taiwan ambiguous because they realized it would take time to solve the problem. The P.R.C. claimed that Taiwan was a part of China whereas Japan considered it an

independent nation. However, when the P.R.C. and Japan began negotiations for administrative agreements after the rapprochement had been established, the P.R.C. demanded that Japan terminate diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The negotiations for a civil aviation agreement between the P.R.C. and Japan elaborate on the subject.

The second problem between China and Japan involved the issue of Soviet "hegemonism." The P.R.C. maintained a considerable apprehension that the Soviet Union was expanding its power in Asia; and the P.R.C. had frequently criticized Soviet expansionism, condemning it as Soviet hegemonism.

The term hegemonism appeared in the Zhou-Tanaka Communique and at the time it did not cause any controversy. The problem of hegemonism later arose during the negotiation for the Peace and Friendship Treaty between the P.R.C. and Japan. The P.R.C. insisted that the treaty should include a provision which expressed the objection of both China and Japan to Soviet hegemonism. Consequently Japan was dragged into the rivalry between the P.R.C.

and the Soviet Union, each of which tried to keep Japan from tilting toward the other. The thesis will examine how the three countries dealt with the problem.

In dealing with the Taiwan and hegemonism issues the study will be organized as follows.

Chapter II presents a brief history of Sino-Japanese relations, with emphasis being placed on the China policy of each of the prime ministers of post-war Japan. The study then turns to the 1972 normalization of relations in Chapter III. Particular attention will be focused on the Taiwan problem, through an examination of the negotiations of the aviation agreement.

Chapter IV studies the Peace and Friendship Treaty with the focus being the controversy over hegemonism in the negotiations of the treaty. As related to it, Soviet-Japanese relations will also be discussed.

Chapter V concludes the thesis by exploring the lessons to be learned by this examination of two central issues in Sino-Japanese relations.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The history of Sino-Japanese relations before the normalization of relations in 1972 is divided into three main periods based on the nature of relations between the two states. The first period (the second century-the late nineteenth century) covered a large part of the whole period. Relations were peaceful in this period. The second period, which was the unhappiest chapter in the history of Sino-Japanese relations, lasted from the late nineteenth century to 1945. Relations were quite unfriendly as a result of Japanese aggression and exploitation in China. The period from 1945 to 1972 was a complex time in which the two governments were unfriendly to each other, while friendship revived between the two peoples.

Sino-Japanese Relations up to the Late 19th Century

Contacts between China and Japan started some 2000 years ago. The advanced Chinese civilization influenced Japan over the centuries. The Chinese civilization first came to Japan through Korean immigrants traveling across the Korean Peninsula, though later the Japanese learned Chinese culture directly from the Chinese. The first thing the Japanese learned from the Chinese civilization was rice growing technology. It came to Japan in about 100 B.C. and brought about a drastic change in Japanese eating habits, though the number of rice paddies was small and the technique was primitive. Approximately at the same time metalware was introduced in Japan by the Chinese, who had long utilized bronze and steelwares. In Japan stoneware was still the base for most tools but metalware soon replaced them. In addition to metalware, Chinese metalworking technicians also came to Japan, thereby contributing greatly to spreading the new technology.

In the 7th century the Japanese government started to send imperial missions to China in order to introduce the advanced

culture systematically into Japan. Despite dangerous sailing conditions, many missions were sent to China. In the eighth century Japan sent seven missions to the Tang Dynasty (Sakamoto, 1977, p.102). The missions' main purpose was to bring back advanced culture, new technology and Buddhism. Therefore many students and monks, as well as bureaucrats, were in these missions. The missions brought home advanced skills in bridge building, architecture, textiles, metalworking, pottery, and writing system, as well as Buddhism and Confucian philosophy. Based on the Chinese models, the Japanese formed their constitution, government, land ownership and taxation. The influence of Chinese culture was quite extensive and reached its peak in the ninth century.

The massive borrowing from Chinese culture subsequently declined as the indigenous Japanese culture flourished. The Japanese developed their own political, economic and social systems, more suitable to Japanese society. However, Chinese culture continued to influence the basic framework of Japanese culture.

After the systematic cultural borrowing ceased, trade came to play an important role. While trade with China was active through the ages, it was especially valuable during the Edo period (1603-1867). Japan adopted an isolationist policy in 1639 and contacts with foreign countries were strictly prohibited, with the exception of China and Portugal. But even here, the relations with these countries were limited to trade. However, as Japan became accustomed to a self-sufficient economy, trade with these nations, especially with China, lost its importance. By the end of the Edo period little contacts existed between China and Japan.

The Late 19th Century to The End of World War II

In the second half of the 19th century both China and Japan underwent drastic internal and external changes under the influence of Western nations. To these new waves of changes China and Japan responded in different ways.

With the arrival of the American naval fleet in 1853, Japan was forced to abandon its isolationist policy of the past two

hundred years. The Meiji Restoration of 1868 ended three hundred years of warriors' rule and formally reinstated the emperor. The new government was determined to modernize the nation as rapidly as possible in order to stand up to the Western military powers. Japan's leaders embarked upon massive importation of Western technology and political, economic and legal institutions, hoping to strengthen the nation and put Japan on a par with the Western countries.

China was also forced to open itself to Western nations. While China initially resisted change, it soon realized the necessity of modernization if it did not want to be colonized. China turned to Japan as a model for modernization and for aid. For that purpose a large number of Chinese students went to Japan to attend universities. In spite of its efforts, China was still a very backward country, which both Japan and Western powers were attempting to control.

Under these circumstances, China and Japan had a military confrontation over the control of the Korean Peninsula. China considered Korea to be its tributary state. Japan, on the other hand,

was keeping an eye on the Peninsula with territorial designs. When a rebellion broke out in Korea in 1894, both China and Japan sent their armies under the pretext of suppressing the rebellion. The result was the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, which put an end to centuries of peaceful relation between China and Japan. (Although relations between the two countries were peaceful for most of the first period, China and Japan had direct confrontations in 1271 and 1281. In those days China was ruled by the Mongols who failed in an attempt to invade Japan.)

Japan, well prepared with advanced technology, easily won the war. In the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895, China ceded to Japan the following territories: Taiwan, the Pescadores Islands, and the Liaotung Peninsula in southern Manchuria. In addition, China paid a huge indemnity. China also accepted the full independence of Korea, and accorded Japan the same unequal diplomatic and economic privileges in China enjoyed by Western nations (Reischauer, 1981, p.152).

The victory in the Sino-Japanese War spurred Japanese expansionism in the Korean Peninsula and China. Thereafter, Japan

exercised increased political influence in the Korean Peninsula. Ten years after the Sino-Japanese War, in 1904 and 1905, Japan fought and defeated Russia. Consequently Russia agreed to transfer to Japan its lease of the Liaotung Peninsula in China and the railways the Russians had built in Southern Manchuria (Ibid., p.154). The railways were renamed the Manchuria Railway Company. Japan expanded its business to other heavy industries as well. Thus Japan openly embarked upon a program of economic exploitation in China.

World War I gave Japan another chance to expand in China.

While Western powers were engaged in battles in Europe, Japan took advantage of the situation and continued to broaden its economic concerns.

In 1915 Japan presented China the Treaty of Twenty-One Demands to gain more concessions. The Demands, which produced harsh international denunciation, revealed Japan's insatiable expansionism. They required China to transfer the German interests in China to Japan, to extend the lease of South Manchuria Railways for ninety years, to lease to Japan all the mining privileges in

Manchuria and Inner Mongolia, to prohibit the lease of ports and islands to other countries, and to hire influential Japanese nationals as consultants in the Chinese government (Encyclopedia of Japan, 1983, pp.120-121). While even more humiliating demands followed, China succeeded in resisting many of these demands.

Nevertheless, Japanese capitalists and the Japanese military became more and more aggressive. International criticism and growing nationalism in China were unable to stop Japanese imperialism.

The driving force of Japanese expansionism was shifting from military security to economic concerns. Japan had achieved substantial industrialization before the turn of the century. After the Russo-Japanese War heavy industries were developing rapidly and Japan had come to depend on foreign sources of raw materials and markets. A rapidly increasing population further worsened the situation. Japan needed a cheap food supply from abroad and jobs for its people. Against this background, economic concerns combined with the attitudes of the Japanese government mandated further expansion in China.

The Japanese army stationed in China continued to provoke small incidents while the weak Japanese government was unable to check its army's reckless aggression. One of those incidents resulted in an undeclared war with China in 1937, a conflict which would only be resolved with Japan's defeat in World War II.

Sino-Japanese Relations from 1945 to 1972

Both China and Japan experienced great changes after World War II. Japan was defeated and lost its sovereignty. In China following the withdrawal of the Japanese army, the Communists and the Guomintang fought a civil war. In 1949 the Communists won the war and the Guomintang fled to Taiwan and established a separate government there. Both Communist China and Taiwan proclaimed that they were the sole representative of China, thereby complicating global politics.

Both China's policy toward Japan and Japan's policy toward China were to a great extent affected by their respective relations with the United States. In Japan, though the China policies of each

prime minister were slightly different, they were consistently anti-P.R.C. and pro-Taiwan under the conservative Liberal Democratic Party rule. On the other hand, the P.R.C. tried to normalize relations with Japan but did not succeed.

The Yoshida Cabinet (1946-1954)

The defeated Japan was under the rule of the Allied Forces, but in reality it was ruled by the U.S.A. until 1952. In 1951 the Japan-U.S.A. Security Treaty was signed in preparation for Japan's independence. The treaty allowed the U.S. forces to remain in Japan to maintain peace and security in the Far East, to prepare for disturbances in Japan, and to prevent attacks from the Soviet Union and the P.R.C. Consequently Japan's China policy was in accordance with the China policy of the U.S.A., which was to contain and isolate the P.R.C., and to support Taiwan.

The Allied Occupation ruled Japan through the use of a Japanese administration throughout the Occupation days. Prior to Yoshida there were a few prime ministers but they were weak and their cabinets were short-lived. Yoshida was the first powerful

prime minister in post-war Japan.

Prime Minister Yoshida established a framework for Japan's China policy. He had wished to establish relations with the P.R.C. (Kapur, 1981, p.111). However, the U.S.A. would not allow this and forced Yoshida to pledge that Japan would never recognize the P.R.C. (Lee, 1976, p.27). In addition, the U.S.A. pressured Japan to recognize Taiwan. Reluctantly, Yoshida finally signed a peace treaty with Taiwan. Thus, Japan was forced to recognize only Taiwan and ignore the P.R.C. Yoshida's successors basically observed the Yoshida line in terms of China policy.

China's Japan view was not friendly. The P.R.C. viewed Japan as a potential danger to its security due to the U.S. military stationed in Japan. Even after the withdrawal of the Occupation forces from Japan, the U.S. military remained under provisions of the Japan-U.S.A. Security Treaty and there were a number of U.S. bases throughout Japan to counter the threat posed by the P.R.C. and the Soviet Union. Against this background, the P.R.C. tried to manipulate Japanese politics in their favor.

During the Occupation period, the P.R.C. instructed the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) to lead a revolution in Japan and thereby free Japan from the U.S. rule (Jain, 1977, p.5). The JCP became violently anti-American and initiated nation-wide terrorist acts. The Japanese government took harsh counter-measures against the JCP's terrorism and China's attempt resulted in catastrophic failure. Many of the leaders of the JCP fled to China and the party was in total disarray.

After Japan's independence, the P.R.C. changed its line toward Japan, voicing a desire for a normalization of relations. However, China's real intention was to free Japan of U.S. influence, to nullify both the Japan-U.S.A. Security Treaty and the peace treaty with Taiwan, as well as to gain recognition of the P.R.C. from the Japanese government. The Chinese call, much to their chagrin, did not bring about any change in Japan's China policy.

The Hatoyama Cabinet (1954-1956)

Prime Minister Hatoyama adopted a more friendly China policy and icy relations between the two countries began to thaw.

The Japanese government lifted restrictions on Japanese travelers to China and permitted Chinese delegations to visit Japan (Ibid., p.23). The P.R.C. responded positively to these changes by offering concrete and flexible suggestions concerning the establishment of relations between the two countries. In order to obtain normalization of relations China even promised that it would not object to Japan's maintaining relations with Taiwan (Kapur, 1981, p.114). However, strong opposition from the U.S.A. and constraints within the LDP prevented Hatoyama from normalizing relations with the P.R.C.

Nonetheless, friendly non-political relations, such as unofficial trade agreements, fisheries' agreements, and cultural exchange programs, were established. Japanese accused of war crimes being detained in the P.R.C. began to return home gradually. The number of Japanese people visiting China was growing and by 1957 it amounted to 1,600 (Kapur, 1981, p.116). Considering the fact that no Japanese visited China prior to 1955, the increase was significant. It seemed that friendly Sino-Japanese relations would continue. However, the burgeoning friendship came to an end when

Kishi became Prime Minister.

The Kishi Cabinet (1956-1960)

The next prime minister, Ishibashi, was in office only a few months and resigned due to poor health. Kishi, the Foreign Minister and acting Prime Minister in the Ishibashi cabinet, succeeded Ishibashi. Kishi was a competent bureaucrat in the war-time cabinet and contributed greatly to the Manchurian development program. After the war he was purged, but rapidly gained political power once he was de-purged. Based on his past, many Japanese were greatly concerned about his rightist ideology and the possibility that he would abandon the improving Chinese policies of the Hatoyama and Ishibashi governments, thereby making Japan's China policy totally subservient to the U.S.A. again.

Upon his inauguration, as predicted, Kishi voiced a strong anti-China view and stressed the necessity for a closer relationship with the U.S.A. In a news conference he stated: "It is not the right time to consider establishment of diplomatic relations with or recognition of the P.R.C." (Furukawa, 1981, p.134). In addition, in his

conversation with Prime Minister Nehru of India, he said: "To cultivate trade with China and recognize it formally are two different things" (Ibid, p.137). Thus, he made clear a separation of politics and economy (*seikei bunri*, in Japanese) and reiterated it occasionally. He also noted that "We (Japan) are scared of the Communist...and therefore we allow the U.S. forces to stay in Japan," and that "China is an aggressor...and therefore we (Japan) cannot recognize the P.R.C." (Ibid., p.138). With statements like these, he made his position very clear on relations with China.

At the same time, he emphasized a closer relationship with the U.S.A. and advocated vehemently the renewal of the Japan-U.S.A. Security Treaty, which was to expire in 1960. However, the renewal of the treaty was strongly opposed in Japan. The opposition parties, labor unions, and students were waging anti-treaty/anti-Kishi struggles. Unhappy with Kishi, the Chinese actively supported the struggles in moral and material ways, denouncing Kishi as a reactionary prime minister and "a chief culprit in obstructing normalization of Sino-Japanese relations" (Jain, 1977, p.41).

Sino-Japanese relations became even worse in the wake of an incident involving a Chinese flag. In May 1958, a Japanese youth tore down a Chinese flag at the Chinese stamp exhibit show in Kyushu, Japan, but was charged with only a light misdemeanor (Lee, 1976, p.37). The Chinese reaction was swift and unexpected. China issued a strong protest and suspended all economic transactions and cultural relations. According to Lee, China had two reasons for this overreaction: first, by suspending trade, the Chinese intended to mobilize Japanese business to change the Japanese government's China policy, and to help the progressive forces in the coming election. The second reason was that China's ambitious Great Leap Forward movement was in progress and Chinese leaders were overly confident of their economic capabilities (Ibid.).

As a result of "the flag incident," relations reverted to the no-relationship days prior to 1955, and from 1958 to 1960 no interaction existed between the two countries.

The Ikeda Cabinet (1960-1964)

China experienced great economic difficulties after the failure of the Great Leap Forward. In order to restore its shattered economy, China needed foreign aid and turned toward Japan. The Ikeda government had previously stated that Japan could not normalize relations with the P.R.C., "unless there was a 'fundamental change' in the U.S. policy towards China or unless the Mao regime became a legitimate member of the U.N." (Jain, 1977, p.49).

However, his *seikei bunri* policy was quite pragmatic. Responding to the call from China, the Japanese government decided to resume trade with the P.R.C.. In 1962 Ikeda endorsed a private trade mission to China, and China and Japan exchanged trade liaison offices. Their status was unofficial, but the offices were staffed with government officials who assumed a wide range of diplomatic functions (Lee, 1976, p.48).

In 1963 Ikeda took another step to increase trade. He permitted a Japanese textile company to use Export-Import Bank funds to establish a plant in China. It was quite unusual for the government bank to loan to a country with which Japan had no

diplomatic relations.

As these two cases indicated, Ikeda was very positive about trade with China. He had a reason, just as the P.R.C. had one, to seek better relations with China. Ikeda was carrying out his major economic plan, "the double income program." Both government and business had wanted to resume trade with China to boost the domestic economy. That was why Ikeda was quick to resume Chinese trade. Sino-Japanese trade grew rapidly and by 1965 Japan had become China's number one trade partner (Kapur, 1981, p. 122).

The Sato Cabinet (1964-1972)

Relations between China and Japan went sour again after Ikeda was replaced with Eisaku Sato. The new Prime Minister's China policy was hostile, much like that of his brother, former Prime Minister Kishi. Sato maintained close relationship with the U.S.A., South Korea and Taiwan, and the P.R.C. responded accordingly.

Sato also adopted a series of hostile policies toward the P.R.C. First, he denied entry visa to the Chinese Communist Party delegations to the Japanese Communist Party Congress. Both the

Chinese and the Japanese who were concerned with Sino-Japanese relations deeply resented him. Next, he canceled the financial aid of the Japan Export-Import Bank for the exportation of the plant to China previously endorsed by the former Prime Minister.

As if this were not enough to jeopardize relations with the Chinese, the Sato government in 1965 recognized the Seoul regime as the sole legitimate government of Korea. The P.R.C. had previously recognized North Korea and had been quite hostile to South Korea. In addition, the Sato government was getting closer to the Soviet Union. This was ironic considering that Sato was a strong anti-Communist, but he put national interests before his ideology. The natural resources in the Soviet Union were too attractive to Japan, which had to import most of its natural resources.

There were no active relations between the Soviet Union and Japan throughout the 1950s and the first half of the 1960s. (Post-war Russian-Japanese relations will be discussed in detail in Chapter V.) In the late 1960s, the Soviet Union approached Japan, hoping to obtain financial and technological help for Siberian

development. The Soviet Union and Japan came to an agreement to hold annual consultations. Afterward, government officials frequently visited each country and economic transactions were signed, too.

Meanwhile, the Chinese government launched a new series of attacks against Sato. China criticized the Sato government for its maintenance of close relations with Taiwan, its subservience to U.S. imperialism, and its collusion with the Soviet Union against China. Action taken by China against the Sato government was not only verbal. In 1967 when an unofficial long-term trade agreement came up for renewal, the Chinese refused to conclude a long-term agreement and instead signed a one-year accord. The accord was concluded after concessions on the part of Japanese businessmen that they would denounce Sato's *seikei bunri* policy in the accord.

In 1969 Sino-Japanese relations were aggravated further by the controversy resulting from the return of the Okinawa Islands. The islands, south of Japan, had been under U.S. administration even after the Occupation withdrew from Japan. Since then Japan had requested the return of the islands. In 1969 when Prime Minister

Sato visited the U.S.A., President Nixon agreed to return the administrative rights over the islands by 1972. Sato promised to assume responsibility for the defense of Okinawa, emphasizing the geopolitical importance of the area. This action received widespread national support.

With this success under his belt, Sato turned his attention to the defense of Taiwan. He said that "the maintenance of peace and stability in the Taiwan area is also a most important factor for the security of Japan, and Tokyo would do all it could to assist the U.S.A. fulfill its obligation in regard to the peace and security of the Far East" (Jain, 1977, p. 59). This statement made the P.R.C. furious and thereafter China intensified its criticism of Sato.

People's Diplomacy

The China policy of the LDP government was not free from domestic criticism. There was always a wide gap between government policy and public opinion. "People's diplomacy," a means by which the P.R.C. actively cultivated ties with the Japanese

people, exploited this gap to increase pro-Beijing sentiment and to change the Japanese government's China policy. The P.R.C. approached many groups, including opposition parties, intellectuals, businessmen, citizens, and dissidents in the LDP.

Each group had its own reasons to respond positively to "people's diplomacy." The Japanese intellectuals were traditionally under the influence of Marxism and sympathetic to Communist countries. Businessmen were attracted by the vast market in China. The opposition parties were not only against the LDP's anti-Beijing policy but also Japan's subordination to the U.S.A. The majority of the Japanese people, while apolitical, had a sense of cultural affinity toward China and a sense of guilt about their past wrongdoing.

"People's diplomacy" was initiated in the early 1950s after the Chinese Communist Party failed to bring about a revolution in Japan. The emphasis was placed on non-governmental agreements on trade, fishing, exchange of cultural missions, and reparation of Japanese nationals.

The opposition parties, such as the Japanese Communist

Party and Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) functioned as what the Chinese called "an institutional device to penetrate into Japan's political process and to influence the Japanese government's China policy" (Lee, 1976, p.36). When members of these parties were in China at the invitation of the P.R.C., they not only met with Chinese leaders but also issued a joint statement in which they harshly criticized the LDP's China and American policies.

Japanese citizens also worked in China's favor, and the Chinese formed many friendship associations with them. One of those associations, the Japan-China Friendship Association, was set up in 1950 by the JCP, JSP, labor unions, trade organizations and cultural groups. It promoted friendship and cooperation between the two countries on a citizen's level and exerted popular pressure on the Japanese government to void the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty, to establish diplomatic relations with the P.R.C., and to admit the P.R.C. to the United Nations.

"People's diplomacy" penetrated the LDP as well and was a considerable success. The "anti-mainstreamers" eventually began to

pressure the Japanese government to change its policy toward the P.R.C. Influential dissidents, such as Miki and Ohira, occasionally voiced their opposition to the mainstream's China policy. Ohira, who later contributed greatly to normalization of relations in 1972 as Foreign Minister, challenged Prime Minister Sato in 1964 saying that "once China is welcomed as a bona fide member of the U.N., Japan will naturally have to normalize relations with China" (Coox, 1978, p. 360). His statement was in sharp contrast to Sato's policy. China made the most of these dissidents and factional rivalries in the party, broadening a pro-Beijing group and weakening the mainstream's leadership. Mao Zsedong identified the active pro-Beijing members of the LDP as his "indirect allies" in Japan (Lee, 1976, P. 45. As for the opposition parties, Mao identified them as "direct allies."). Mao's "indirect allies" continued to urge the LDP mainstreamers to establish an early normalization of relations with the P.R.C.

Trade with China played an important role under the *seikei bunri* policy. Japanese businessmen did not want to jeopardize their good relations with the U.S.A. and Taiwan by trading with

China, and therefore created small dummy firms which specialized in trade with China. Though they were very attracted to the market in China, the business sector did not take any direct actions to force the LDP government to change the China policy until the late 1960s, when it became concerned that Japan might lose a market to Western countries, as many NATO nations recognized the P.R.C. and expanded trade with China (Eto, 1972, p.6). Japanese businessmen started to pressure their government for an early normalization of relations.

In the face of mounting opposition to his China policy, Sato at long last compromised. Instead of referring to the P.R.C. as Communist China, Sato began to refer to China as "the Beijing government." He stated that he planned "to promote contacts and exchange of personnel with China [while] maintaining friendly relations with South Korea and Taiwan" (Jain, 1977, p. 96).

However, his conciliatory posture was not enough to satisfy the Chinese. They placed no trust in Sato and refused to talk with his government, contending that "he was too hostile to China, too friendly to Taiwan, and too tied up with the U.S.A. to pursue an

independent line" (Kapur 1981, p.134). The P.R.C. was waiting to deal with the next prime minister, but there was no sign of Sato's leaving office. However, in 1971, two major events occurred which would have a tremendous impact on Japan's China policy, as well as causing Sato's resignation.

Global Changes

The United States had supported the Taiwan government and refused to recognize the Beijing government since 1949. During the Nixon administration, however, the U.S.A. abruptly changed its China policy.

On July 16, 1971, (Japan time) President Nixon announced that Dr. Kissinger was currently visiting China to meet Premier Zhou and that Nixon himself would visit Beijing before long. President Nixon's announcement of the Sino-U.S.A. accommodation came to be known in Japan as the "Nixon Shock." The impact of the "Nixon Shock" was extraordinary. Japan had shaped its China policy to conform to that of the U.S.A. for twenty years. The Japanese felt

betrayed because the U.S.A. did not observe its pledge to inform Japan in advance of any change in policy .

The pro-Beijing LDP Dietmen had predicted the Sino-U.S.A. detente and warned of "the possibility that Tokyo might fall behind Washington in arranging for diplomatic ties with Beijing" (Park, 1975, p. 564). However, Sato paid no attention to them because of his absolute trust in Nixon.

In October 1970, Nixon and Sato had held a summit meeting and agreed to maintain close mutual consultation on China. This agreement was later confirmed between U.S. Secretary of State Rogers and Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi in June 1971 (Lee, 1976, p.99). Three weeks before Nixon's announcement of the China breakthrough Sato was once again reassured by the U.S. Ambassador to Japan that "the U.S.A. would make no move toward recognition of China without prior consultation" (Ibid.). Sato, relying on this series of American assurances, was caught off guard and his leadership was seriously undermined. (According to Lee, the Americans tried to give prior notice. Rogers tried to inform the Japanese Ambassador

to Washington, Ushiba, but Ushiba could not be reached. It was shortly after the Nixon announcement on television that the Japanese government finally learned of it through Ushiba. (See Lee, 1976, p.99.)

The pro-Beijing groups became more vocal and were rapidly increasing their support. The opposition, the anti-mainstreamers of the LDP, businessmen, mass media and even bureaucrats urged the government to recognize the P.R.C. soon. Remarkably, big business suddenly changed its position, withdrawing support from Sato. It began to view him as an obstacle to an early normalization of relations.

In response to these new developments, Sato made additional concessions. For the first time he acknowledged that the Beijing regime was legitimate. He also expressed the desire to establish diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. and started behind-the-scene overtures.

The Chinese had previously presented the "five principles" for normalization of relations to several Japanese groups visiting China.

They were:

- (1) There is only one China and the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legitimate government representing the Chinese people;
- (2) Taiwan is a Province of China and an inalienable part of Chinese territory;
- (3) The Japan-Chiang Peace Treaty is illegal and must be abrogated;
- (4) The United States must withdraw all its armed forces from Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits area;
- (5) The legitimate rights of the People's Republic must be restored in all the organizations of the United Nations and the representatives of Taiwan expelled (Jain, 1977, p.95).

In October Sato sent a message to Premier Zhou in the name of the LDP Secretary General Hori. In the letter Sato accepted the first and second preconditions and agreed to fulfill the third one in the course of negotiations. (After the Nixon announcement the Chinese dropped the fourth precondition.)

The Hori letter also conveyed his intention to visit China to negotiate normalization of relations. However, Zhou dismissed the

letter as deceptive (Lee, 1976, p.106). At the same time the Chinese publicly stated that they would not negotiate with Sato. As a consequence Sato's overtures produced no concrete results.

Three months after the "Nixon Shock," a second blow hit the Sato government. Taiwan was expelled from the United Nations and the P.R.C. was admitted as a representative of China.

Ever since Japan was admitted to the U.N. in 1956, it consistently had supported Taiwan. When the U.S.A. shifted from all-out support for Taiwan to a two-China resolution, Prime Minister Sato agreed to cosponsor the resolution despite strong domestic opposition. The U.S. plan allowed the P.R.C. admission to the U.N. with a permanent seat in the Security Council and Taiwan a seat in the General Assembly (Lee, 1976, p.101). Sato's decision to support this plan was quite unpopular even among his supporters.

Despite the efforts of the U.S.A. and its allies, on October 25, 1971, the General Assembly voted by a majority of 76 to 35 to seat the P.R.C. and to oust Taiwan (Eto, 1972, p.6). The U.N. decision increased the demand for an early rapprochement with the P.R.C., and consequently Sato suffered "irreparable damage to his domestic

political leadership" (Lee, 1976, p.103).

China, on the other hand, dropped the fifth precondition after its entry to the U.N. The Chinese were waiting for the LDP's presidential election scheduled for the summer of 1972, which would most likely bring about a drastic change in the Japanese leadership.

As we have seen, the history of Sino-Japanese relations can be divided into three periods based on the nature of the relations. In the first period, the relations were peaceful and friendly. Japan extensively borrowed from Chinese culture and absorbed it. The influence of Chinese culture was massive. These peaceful relations changed in the second period. Japan changed from a student of the Chinese culture to an aggressor on the Chinese continent. Japan was expanding its territory through exploitation of the Chinese. Naturally the relations were unfriendly. As nationalism rose among the Chinese, their anti-Japanese sentiment became stronger. In the third period, inter-governmental relations were unfriendly. The

P.R.C. tried to gain recognition from the Japanese government but did not succeed until 1972. However, the P.R.C. succeeded in developing a friendship with the Japanese people by means of the "people's diplomacy," designed to influence the official policy of the Japanese government. "People's diplomacy" helped to produce recognition of the Beijing government. However, the change in the international environment concerning the P.R.C., the impending American recognition of the Beijing government, and the admission of the P.R.C. to the U.N., finally changed the China policy of the Japanese government.

CHAPTER III

NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS

By the fall of 1971, the P.R.C. was internationally recognized as a sole representative of China. With a change in policy toward the P.R.C. on the international stage, domestic policy in Japan was quickly changing in China's favor. Prime Minister Sato, who enjoyed powerful leadership for seven years and eight months--the longest premiership in Japan--and resisted recognition of the P.R.C., was rapidly losing his political power. He resigned and the LDP elected as its new leader, Kakuei Tanaka, a man who was eager to normalize relations with the P.R.C.

The P.R.C., on the other hand, saw the end of the Cultural Revolution, the results of which had been catastrophic. In particular, economic activities were severely damaged. On the political stage, pragmatists, led by Zhou Enlai, were gaining power, and embarking on a reconstruction of the nation. Thus, in both countries the time was ripe for rapprochement. In the fall of 1972,

the P.R.C. and Japan established long-delayed diplomatic relations.

The Tanaka Cabinet

The 1972 LDP presidential election is said to be the most heated and expensive election in the party's 25-year-old history. Five contenders, Tanaka, Fukuda, Nakasone, Ohira, and Miki, all of whom were leaders of various factions, vied vehemently for the presidential seat. The China question was one of the important campaign issues. Four contenders, with the exception being Fukuda, were quite critical of Sato's China policy and supported an early normalization of relations with the P.R.C.

From the beginning, the race was fought primarily between Fukuda and Tanaka. Fukuda, Foreign Minister in the final Sato cabinet, was viewed as Sato's preference and a front runner. Fukuda stated on several occasions that he accepted Beijing as the legitimate government of China but refused to endorse the abrogation of the Tokyo-Taibei treaty (Coox, 1978, p.387). His position was identical to that of Sato, and Chinese leaders had

declared that they would not deal with him. His stand on China eventually cost him the support of business. Business circles desired to establish formal relations with the P.R.C. and reiterated that they preferred a pro-Beijing prime minister.

Tanaka was head of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. He repeatedly stated the necessity of an early normalization with the P.R.C. As early as April he started cultivating contacts with Chinese leaders. He and Ohira met Furui, an influential pro-Beijing LDP member who was about to leave for China. According to Park, the meeting was held in complete secrecy. There Tanaka pledged to Furui that "if chosen as premier he would appoint Ohira, whose China views were well known to Peking, as his foreign minister, and work to establish acceptable relations" (Park, 1975, p.583).

Tanaka, who had little experience in foreign affairs, tried to win Chinese approval by teaming with Ohira. Ohira was not in the cabinet at that time, but was very experienced in foreign matters. In addition, his pro-Beijing opinions were well-known in both China

and Japan. Park writes that "Furui reportedly told his Chinese hosts that the Tanaka-Ohira team was most zealous to bring about normalization" (Ibid.).

Zhou reportedly replied: "If, upon assuming the premiership, you are determined to wrestle with the normalization task, we shall refrain from doing anything that might embarrass you" (Ibid.). Thus Tanaka acquired Chinese implicit approval, though it was kept in secret.

On July 5, the presidential election took place. Tanaka, who was quite skillful in intra-party maneuvering, formed a coalition with Ohira, Nakasone, and Miki in order to prevent a Fukuda victory. It was reported that a tremendous amount of money was exchanged among the candidates and their followers. As a result Tanaka won the presidential election. However, bitterness resulting from the fierce election remained long in the party.

Tanaka swiftly formed a cabinet. As he had promised to the Chinese, his cabinet included Ohira as Foreign Minister. The government quickly moved toward rapprochement. Ohira was consulting with the U.S.A. and negotiating with the Taiwan

government, while Tanaka was trying to achieve consensus in the party.

At the same time Tanaka sent a series of intermediaries to China to lay the groundwork for rapprochement. His intermediaries included Furui and leaders of opposition parties. These intermediaries played a crucial role in preparation for Tanaka's visit to China.

On July 25, Zhou handed Komeito chairman Takeiri the first draft of the joint statement which was, according to Lee, very "flexible and practicable" (Lee, 1976, p.116). Zhou even told Takeiri that China would forego its claim for war reparation. (Ibid.)

In response to the positive Chinese reaction, Tanaka set up a 312-member Council for the Normalization of Japan-China Relations in late July in order to achieve a consensus within the party (Jain, 1977, p.101). The Council sent a delegation, the first official delegation of the LDP to China, which paved the way for Tanaka's visit to China. On August 11, the Chinese formally extended an invitation to Tanaka.

On September 9, Furui departed for China to deliver in

person Ohira's proposals for the joint statement. Lee says that Japan and China reached a comprehensive agreement on all major issues at this point (Lee, 1976, p.116).

Normalization of Relations

After consolidating groundwork for normalization of relations, Tanaka went to China to conclude the joint statement which would bring about a new era between the two countries. Prime Minister Tanaka arrived at the Beijing Airport on September 25, 1972, with a large entourage including Foreign Minister Ohira and Chief Cabinet Secretary Nikaido. Zhou and Tanaka held four summit sessions and agreed to establish diplomatic relations. On September 29, Zhou and Tanaka signed a nine-article joint statement and Japan became the 77th nation to establish diplomatic ties with the P.R.C. (Japan Report, October 16, 1972).

The nine articles were as follows: (See the Appendix A.)

Article one: The article concerned itself with the termination of the state of war. (The language in the article raised

a question as to the legality of the statement, which will be discussed later.)

Article two: Japan recognized the P.R.C. as the sole legal government of China.

Article three: China reaffirmed that Taiwan was "an inalienable part of its territory" and Japan fully understood and respected the Chinese position. Despite article three, Japan later maintained that it did not accept the Chinese claim on Taiwan but merely understood and respected it. However, Japan obliquely acknowledged that it regarded Taiwan as a part of China by mentioning the Potsdam Proclamation in the joint statement.

Article four: Both countries agreed to establish diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors.

Article five: China renounced its demand for war indemnities from Japan for the sake of friendship between the two peoples.

Article six: Both countries agreed to establish a peaceful and friendly relationship in accordance with the U.N. charter.

Article seven: Both countries would not seek hegemony in Asia and the Pacific areas. There was considerable apprehension among Asian countries that China and Japan would conspire and seek hegemony in the region. Article seven was designed to dispel such misgivings, declaring that both countries opposed attempts by any country to seek hegemony in the area.

Article eight: Both countries agreed to conclude a peace and friendship treaty. China insisted on the illegality of the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty and the need for a new peace treaty. However, Japan had not annulled the peace treaty with Taiwan, which China mysteriously condoned.

Article nine: In order to maintain friendly relations, the two countries agreed to hold negotiations concerning trade, navigation, aviation, fishery, etc.

The statement contained several ambiguous terms and expressions. In addition, according to Lee, it had "a major legal defect" (Lee, 1976, p.128). He explains that "given the nature of the joint statement," it was virtually a peace treaty (Ibid.). However, the statement was not named so. A treaty requires Diet

ratification, which, under the circumstances, was certain to cause a political disturbance over the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty.

Tanaka, winner of the LDP presidential election and the leader of the largest faction in the party, had yet to consolidate his power. He was concerned about the possible political uproar and therefore strongly refused to acknowledge the statement as a peace treaty. Therefore the language in the statement was carefully selected so that it would not be considered to be a peace treaty. Lee notes that if the term "state of war" had been used in Article one, the statement would be regarded as a peace treaty. Instead, the P.R.C. and Japan compromised to use the phrase of "abnormal state of affairs" (Ibid.).

In addition, Japan asserted that the "state of war" between Japan and China had been ended with the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty in 1952 (Eto, 1972, P12). Therefore Japan did not need another peace treaty to establish diplomatic relations with the P.R.C. This argument goes back to the problem of Taiwan status. If the Japanese government stood by the argument, Japan acknowledged Chinese claim that Taiwan was a part of China. However, Japan

insisted that it did not acknowledge Chinese claim on Taiwan, merely that it understood that the Chinese had such a claim. Japan insisted that a clear distinction existed between "understood" and "did not acknowledge." However, Japan was only playing with words to avoid the Taiwan problem.

Another issue was the relationship between Taiwan and Japan. Soon after his appointment as Foreign Minister, Ohira talked with the Taiwanese Ambassador to Japan and made it clear that the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty would be abrogated after the P.R.C. and Japan established diplomatic relations (Jain, 1977, p.98). After the signing of the Zhou-Tanaka Communique, Ohira unilaterally declared the annulment of the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty. Eto describes Japan's view as follows:

"There had merely been a shift of central governmental powers from the Nationalist regime in Taiwan to the P.R.C. government in Peking;...the 1952 treaty, though concluded with the Nationalist regime only, was nonetheless a pact between Japan and China;...therefore the transfer of Japanese recognition from Taipei to Peking would not require the negotiation of a new peace treaty with the P.R.C. As to when legality on the government of China would pass from the Nationalist regime to the government in Peking, Tokyo took the position that the shift would occur--so far as Sino-Japanese relations were

concerned--from the moment of Japan's recognition of the P.R.C. as the lawful government of China" (Eto, 1972, p.10).

Japan's assertion was quite one-sided and arbitrary. Nonetheless, the P.R.C. raised no objections to it at the time. And the ambiguity over Japan-Taiwan relations remained.

Reasons for Rapprochement

Normalization between China and Japan was finally realized twenty years after the birth of the P.R.C. Both countries had reasons for wanting normalization of relations in 1972.

The Japanese government, which had continually given a cold shoulder to China's call, finally recognized the legitimacy of the Beijing regime. There were three reasons for Japan's decision to establish rapprochement.

First, Japan came to realize that the international environment was rapidly changing in favor of the P.R.C. By 1970, approximately seventy nations had recognized the P.R.C. (Ibid. p.7).

In November 1970, Italy, the last large NATO country in Europe

except for West Germany, recognized the Beijing regime (Ibid., p.6). Then the P.R.C. was admitted to the UN and the Sino-U.S.A. detente occurred. The Sino-U.S.A. detente gave Japan leeway for rapprochement with the P.R.C. At the same time the Sino-U.S.A. detente alarmed Japan. If Japan did not quickly proceed with normalization, it would find itself left behind.

Secondly, China's huge market and raw materials were quite attractive to Japanese business circles, which were anxiously watching other Western countries' developing trade with the P.R.C. Big corporations such as Mitsui and Mitsubishi, which were traditionally conservative and had a considerable influence in the business and political world, had resisted jumping on the China bandwagon. However, even they finally came to realize the importance of China, dropped their objection and urged the Sato government to speed up normalization. When business interests realized that Sato was not able to do so, they withdrew their support from him. Their desertion largely contributed to Sato's "premature retirement" (Park, 1975, p.584).

Third, after the humiliation of the "Nixon Shock," Japan

"adopted an independent posture in world affairs" (Jain, 1977, p.96. See also Bedeski, 1979, p.681). With regard to the normalization with the P.R.C., Japan wanted to move ahead of the U.S.A. (President Nixon and Zhou Enlai signed the Shanghai Communique in February 1972. However, normalization of relations was delayed until January 1979.)

In addition to these reasons, the Japanese government could not ignore the pressure from public opinion and mass media any longer.

The P.R.C.'s initial reason for seeking normalization of relations was the U.S. threat. The P.R.C. wanted to see Japan independent of U.S. influence. However, once the Sino-U.S.A. normalization of relation was in the offering, China no longer had to be afraid of Japan-U.S.A. close ties. As a consequence of the Sino-U.S.A. detente, the P.R.C. deleted the fourth provision from the five principles for normalization of relations with Japan.

Were there other reasons? Japan's economic power and China's fear of the Soviet Union were China's motives.

The Cultural Revolution unofficially had ended in 1969. With revolutionary fervor on the wane, pragmatists were gaining power among the leadership. Japan could supply advanced industrial technology and financial credits, both of which were vital to Chinese economy.

Secondly the P.R.C. was concerned about growing cordial relations between the Soviet Union and Japan. Accommodation had been growing between the two countries since the late 1960s. This included personnel exchanges among statesmen, bureaucrats, and businessmen and an overflight agreement with the Soviet Union. Japan had agreed to cooperate with the Soviets in Siberian development.

China was particularly apprehensive about joint Soviet-Japanese projects in Siberia. Japan and the Soviet Union were planning to construct a crude oil pipeline and highway. When completed, they would link a port on the Sea of Japan and industrial regions in western Siberia.

Ever since a direct military confrontation in 1969 with the P.R.C., the Soviet Union had continued a military buildup along the

Soviet-Chinese border. The pipeline and highway were certain to be used for expansion of the military stationed along the border. The Siberian development, buttressed by Japan's finance and technology, would become a threat to Chinese national security. Therefore the P.R.C tried to keep Japan from drifting too far toward the Soviet Union by offering Japan formal diplomatic relations.

In addition, the P.R.C. tried to strengthen its position vis-a-vis Taiwan (Jain, 1977, p.89). Under the Sato government, Japan was further involved in Taiwan's economy and "developing a predominant influence" over Taiwan (Barnett, 1977, p.143).

The Civil Aviation Agreement

After the rapprochement there was a significant increase in cultural and economic exchanges between the two countries. In particular, progress was made in economic and trade relations. In 1973, twenty-eight Japanese economic and trade missions visited China and thirty Chinese economic delegations visited Japan (Kim, 1975, p.560). As economic exchanges increased, Sino-Japanese

trade grew rapidly, with an increase in 1973 of 83 % over that of 1972 (Ibid.).

However, in contrast to the impressive development of cultural and economic relations, little progress was made in the political field, with the exception of an exchange of ambassadors in 1973. None of the administrative agreements promised in the Zhou-Tanaka Communique had been worked out.

Following Ohira's announcement regarding the abrogation of the Japan-Taiwan peace treaty, Japan severed formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. On December 1, 1972, the Japanese embassy in Taiwan was replaced by the Japan-China Exchange Association. The following day Taiwan organized the East Asia Relations Association. Both associations performed diplomatic functions including issuing visas and trade licenses. The two associations were staffed by diplomats and government officials who were "on temporary leave." These associations functioned as virtual embassies. Under this arrangement, Japan continued to enjoy considerable economic gain from trade with Taiwan.

The P.R.C. did not raise any objections to this convenient

arrangement. The Japanese government interpreted the P.R.C.'s silence as acquiescence toward Japanese involvement in the Taiwan economy as long as no formal relations existed between Taiwan and Japan.

In November 1972, the Japanese government dispatched a delegation to Beijing to negotiate a civil aviation pact. However, contrary to the optimism of the Japanese government, the P.R.C. demonstrated their displeasure about Japanese-Taiwanese relations. The P.R.C. opposed the "co-existence" of the two Chinas, i.e. the two flag carriers of the P.R.C. and Taiwan, using the same airport in Japan. In spite of several preliminary discussions, the countries were unable to find a mutually acceptable solution and by March 1973 the negotiations went into deadlock.

The P.R.C. demanded that Japan adhere to the Zhou-Tanaka Communique to the letter, insisting that since Japan abrogated the peace treaty with Taiwan, all relations between Japanese and Taiwanese governments should cease to exist, which meant the civil aviation pact between Taiwan and Japan should be nullified.

The P.R.C. specifically demanded the following:

1. Japan cancel the Japan-Taiwan route operated by Taiwan's China Airlines (CAL) and Japan Airlines (JAL), or re-route CAL flights to other Japanese airports;
2. CAL remove the national flag from its planes;
3. CAL change its official designation to something like "Taiwan Airlines";
4. CAL transfer its branch office in Japan to a local agent (Hsiao, 1974 a, P.722). The P.R.C. argued that two flag carriers from the P.R.C. and Taiwan sitting side by side at the same airport would certainly create the two-China impression, though Taiwan was only a province of the P.R.C.

However, the Japanese government did not meet the Chinese demands partly because of Taiwan's stern refusal and partly because of domestic concerns.

The Taiwanese government warned that if the Japanese government accepted the Chinese demands, Taipei "would stop allowing any Japanese airplanes to land in or fly over Taiwan and any flying object entering over [Tiawan's] Air Defense Identification

Zone without permission shall be regarded as an unidentified flying object and treated as such" (Hsiao, 1974 a, p.273).

Hsiao states that "although this threat was most likely a political maneuver to enhance Taipei's bargaining position, the potential financial losses and physical risks involved for the many JAL flights to Taipei and Southeast Asia could be very great" (Ibid.).

The strong stance of the Taiwanese government was supported by the pro-Taiwan LDP Dietmen. They objected vehemently to the Tanaka government yielding to Chinese demands at the expense of Taiwan. In the LDP, there were two groups who were sympathetic to Taiwan.

One of them was a conservative group, which included party elders such as former Prime Ministers Kishi and Sato, and former Foreign Minister Fukuda. They had long committed themselves to supporting Taiwan and had earlier blocked Sino-Japanese normalization.

Immediately after the Sino-Japanese normalization, the group sent a seventy-member delegation to Taiwan in order to "reassure Taiwan of Japan's continued good-will and cooperation"

(Hsiao, 1974 (a) p.723).

In October, Kishi, who enjoyed a personal friendship with Chiang Kaishek, visited Taiwan to celebrate the latter's birthday and promised continued support of the group.

Both the delegation and Kishi stressed that "Japan should maintain the present air and other transportation means which are the basis for economic, cultural and other exchanges with Taiwan" (Ibid.).

Another group, *Seirankai*, (which means "blue stormy group" in Japanese) was formed in the summer of 1973 by thirty-one militant, anti-Communist members of the LDP Diet members. Their objective was to constrain Tanaka's moves toward Beijing (Mendell, 1975, p.215).

By 1972, the power of the first group had declined drastically. However, the Prime Minister could not afford to slight the party elders. In addition, the *Seirankai* was quite militant. Thus the Japanese government was put in a tight corner by three parties--the P.R.C., Taiwan and the Taiwan lobby in its own party.

Additionally, the Japanese government was concerned about

the potential economic loss incurred by terminating aviation relations with Taiwan. The air traffic between these two countries was the second most lucrative route for JAL (Hsiao, 1974 b, p.121). CAL flew 21 weekly 2-way flights from Taipei to Tokyo and Osaka; JAL flew 37 weekly 2-way flights from Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka and Fukuoka to Taipei, and 20 weekly 2-way flights to Southeast Asia via Taipei. In 1973, as many as 448,000 Japanese tourists visited Taiwan and a large majority of them flew by JAL (Ibid.).

In addition to this direct economic loss, the termination of air relations was likely to lead to a tremendous disruption in the booming business between Taiwan and Japan. Taiwan was the third largest purchaser of Japanese products (Hsiao, 1974 b, p.113). From an economic point of view, Taiwan was too important to Japan.

Finally, a concession to the P.R.C. on the aviation pact would be an unwelcome precedent for the other administrative agreements which also involved the Taiwan problem.

For these reasons the Tanaka government was not ready for a compromise. Neither was China. To China national prestige was at

stake. The negotiations remained deadlocked throughout 1973.

In 1974, the Tanaka government resumed the negotiations. The Upper House election was scheduled that year and Tanaka needed a dramatic event to boost the LDP's waning image (Far Eastern Economic Review, January 12, 1974, p.12). China, "equally concerned about the political consequence of a prolonged deadlock," responded positively to the resumption of the negotiations (Kapur, 1981, p.139).

In January, Foreign Minister Ohira visited Beijing. The main objective of his visit was said to be signing a Japan-China Trade Agreement but his real intention was to negotiate a compromise to conclude the aviation pact. After Ohira returned to Tokyo, the Japanese government prepared a six-point guideline based on the talks between Ohira and Chinese leaders:

1. The Japanese Government will promptly conclude a civil aviation agreement with China on the basis of the Japan-China joint statement of September 1972 but at the same time present Japan-Taiwan air services will be maintained under a non-governmental agency;
2. The Government will see to it that the Japanese flag carrier, JAL,

will not serve the Japan-Taiwan route;

3. The Government will not seek changes in the name and emblem of CAL against CAL's will but will make clear its own view concerning the nature of CAL's name and emblem on another occasion. The Japanese authorities henceforth will refer to CAL as "China Airlines (Taiwan)";

4. The [Japanese] Government will see to it that the Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) aircraft will use the New Tokyo International Airport at Narita and those of CAL will use the Tokyo International Airport at Haneda. Before the new international airport is opened, the Government will temporarily permit both CAL and CAAC to use Haneda airport by allowing them different operational hours;

5. The Government will redesignate an alternative airport to CAL which will be agreed upon between Japan and Taiwan;

6. The Government will see to it that ground services for CAL will be entrusted with its agents or a separate company (Hsiao, 1974 (a), p.724).

While the P.R.C. unexpectedly accepted all of the Japanese

proposal, *Seirankai* reacted violently and Taiwan rejected much of it. *Seirankai* "organized a mass rally of 25,000 people to protest Japan's abandonment of Taiwan" (Ibid.). Taiwan accepted only the provisions calling for replacement of JAL with a newly organized airline and the use of separate airports in Japan. They opposed the rest of the guideline.

In spite of these objections, Ohira vigorously proceeded with the negotiations with the Chinese. On April 20, 1974, after seventeen months of negotiations Japan and China concluded the aviation agreement.

After signing the pact, Ohira announced the official view of the Japanese government: "Japan would henceforth consider Taiwanese flights to Japan to be 'private,' would no longer regard China Airlines as a carrier representing a 'state' and, finally, would cease to recognize the emblem on Taiwan aircraft as a 'so-called national flag'" (Recognizing the P.R.C..., p.12).

Under the agreement, JAL secured the right to fly to Beijing and Shanghai. CAAC secured the right to fly to Tokyo and Osaka. Each country also gave the other the right of through-flights, with

China securing the right to fly to Japan and on to Canada, the U.S.A., and Latin America, and Japan securing transit rights through China to the Middle East and Western Europe (Kapur, 1981, p.139).

An enraged Taiwan government canceled CAL flights to Tokyo. (The Tokyo-Taibei route was resumed a year later by a new private Japanese airline and CAL.) Nevertheless, on May 7, the Japanese government easily secured ratification of the agreement in the Diet with warm support from the opposition, while many pro-Taiwan LDP members boycotted the session.

The civil aviation agreement was thus concluded after nearly two years of negotiations. The agreement, in which Japan made heavy concessions, created an international precedent for civil aviation pacts between other countries and the P.R.C. (Hsiao, 1974, p.727).

The agreement also became a precedent for other administrative agreements between the P.R.C. and Japan. In January 1974, a trade agreement was signed to replace an existing unofficial one. With a shipping agreement concluded in November of the same

year, major administrative agreements were settled between the two countries.

In the fall of 1972, Premier Zhou Enlai of the P.R.C. and Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan signed a joint communique, thereby normalizing relations which had been long delayed. In the communique, Japan and China pledged to promote friendship and cooperation. Thus a new era dawned between the two nations.

However, the rapprochement was established on precarious terms, largely due to the relations among the P.R.C., Japan and Taiwan. Upon signing the communique, Japan unilaterally terminated diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Nevertheless, Japan continued to maintain cordial relations, including lucrative trade with Taiwan. Strangely the P.R.C. raised no objection to this situation, and friendship followed between the P.R.C. and Japan until they started negotiations on a civil aviation agreement. The P.R.C. made an issue of Japanese-Taiwanese relations, demanding that Japan sever the Japanese-Taiwanese aviation treaty. Originally the Japanese government rejected the Chinese demand because of Taiwanese

strong reaction and objection from the Taiwan lobby. However, ultimately the Japanese government made considerable concessions. In 1974, the two governments signed the aviation pact.

The significance of the pact was its creation of a precedent for other administrative agreements between China and Japan, and other countries who wished to maintain air routes with Taiwan and the P.R.C. However the pact did not solve the Taiwan problem.

CHAPTER IV

PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY (PFT)

Sino-Japanese relations experienced major progress in 1974. The P.R.C. and Japan concluded three important administrative agreements in trade, civil aviation and shipping. The two nations were thus steadily realizing the promise of the Zhou-Tanaka Communique. The two governments, therefore, were optimistic about achieving the last task, the signing of the Peace and Friendship Treaty (PFT).

However, the PFT turned out to be the most difficult task in the whole process of the normalization of relations between the P.R.C. and Japan. Negotiations were complicated by the "antihegemony" clause and domestic political problems in both countries. In addition, the negotiations not only dragged Japan into the Sino-Soviet dispute but also brought attention to a territorial issue between the P.R.C. and Japan.

The PFT Negotiations Initiated

In January 1974, Japan's Foreign Minister Ohira visited Beijing to sign a trade agreement. There the two nations initiated the PFT. While Japan was optimistic about completing an agreement on this pending issue from the Zhou-Tanaka Communique, the Chinese response was not positive.

However, by the fall the Chinese policy had changed. In November the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister expressed in Japan the desire to move ahead with the treaty negotiations. The two nations agreed that the treaty should be based on the Zhou-Tanaka Communique and that the territorial issues should be "shelved to facilitate the treaty-making progress" (Kim. 1979, P.297). The territorial issues referred to the Senkaku Islands, which were located south of the Okinawa Islands. The P.R.C., Taiwan and Japan all claimed sovereignty over the islands.

Kim attributed the change in the Chinese position to anxiety about the future of the Tanaka cabinet (Ibid.). Tanaka, who once enjoyed great popularity among the Japanese public, was being

criticized for financial abuses and losing popularity rapidly. The P.R.C. decided to hurry the treaty negotiations while he was still in power.

Tanaka's future was short, as the Chinese had feared. He was forced to resign in December on charges of improper dealings in political funds and personal assets. As his successor the LDP leaders chose Takeo Miki, which came as a great surprise to the Japanese nation, since he was regarded as belonging to a fringe of the party and being a "dove." The Tanaka scandal tarnished the party. The party leaders hoped that Miki would overcome the crisis with his reputed integrity.

In any case, the negotiating process continued. In April 1975 the two nations exchanged drafts of the treaty (Scott, 1983, p.55). The Chinese draft included the "antihegemony" clause exactly as it had appeared in the Zhou-Tanaka Communique. On the other hand, the Japanese draft made no mention of the clause (Ibid.).

Miki wanted to strengthen his internal power position by achieving the treaty and expressed his intention to conclude the treaty during the current Diet session (Still, 1976, p.248). In order

to narrow the gap, he offered to include the clause in the preamble to the treaty. China rejected the offer and insisted on including the clause in the body (Jain, 1977, p.113). Miki then made another concession. He said "he would have no objection to including the clause in the main body along with the general principles of peace as in the U.N. Charter or in the Bandung Declaration" (Ibid). However, the P.R.C. did not accept this compromise either.

Two questions come to mind. Why did the Japanese government, which raised no objection to the "antihegemony" clause in the Zhou-Tanaka Communique, reject an incorporation of the same clause in the PFT? The second question was why the P.R.C. was so intransigent?

At the time of the Zhou-Tanaka Communique the Japanese government did not realize that the "antihegemony" clause was directed against the Soviet Union. As Eto said, "the anti-Soviet undertone was not manifested until [the PFT] negotiations began in 1974" (Eto. 1980, p.80). After realizing the dubious intention of the P.R.C., the Japanese government maintained that Japan would not accept an incorporation of the "antihegemony" clause in the body of

the treaty, "since it could be construed by Moscow as directed at the Soviet Union" (Kim, 1979, p.298).

The Soviet Union and Japan have not concluded a peace treaty due to a territorial problem. By utilizing the China card, the Japanese government was trying to obtain concessions in its demand for the return of the northern islands which had been occupied by the the Soviet Union. The Japanese government feared that inclusion of the clause would jeopardize the Japanese position in negotiating with the Soviet Union.

In addition, the acceptance of the Chinese demand would harden the pro-Taiwan lobby. Miki, who was a compromise as a prime minister, had to accept pro-Taiwan LDP members in his cabinet. They could obstruct the treaty negotiations.

From the Chinese side "antihegemony" was an essential component of Chinese foreign policy. China started to use the term in 1971, with the Sino-U.S.A. Communique of 1972 being the first bilateral statement containing a hegemony clause (Glaubitz, 1976, p.205). The P.R.C. obviously was trying to make it appear that Japan

had tilted toward the P.R.C. by incorporating the clause in the treaty. On the other hand, as Kapur states, the absence of the clause in the PFT would constitute a step backward for China (Kapur, 1981, p.140).

The negotiations became deadlocked. In May 1975, Miki decided to suspend the talks. In the ensuing years, internal political crises prevented both nations from paying much attention to the treaty and no important progress was made.

Soviet-Japanese Historical Background

Ever since Russia and Japan established formal relations in the mid-nineteenth century, the two nations have only infrequently enjoyed a cordial relationship. Relations have been impaired by both military confrontations and disputes concerning sovereignty over "northern islands."

In the mid-nineteenth century the Tokugawa government was forced to open the country by the Western powers, and Russia also demanded that Japan open itself. In 1855 the two governments signed the Treaty of Shimoda. It was the first of a series of arrangements between the two nations regarding sovereignty over the "northern islands." The treaty recognized all of the Kurile Islands north of Etorofu as Russian and those from Etorofu south as Japanese. With regard to Sakhalin Island, a large island for whose sovereignty the two nations were competing, they agreed to occupy jointly (Holdsworth, 1976, p.48).

However, the arrangement on Sakhalin proved unworkable

and in 1875 they signed a new treaty. Under the Treaty of St. Petersburg Japan ceded her Sakhalin rights to Russia in return for the northern Kuriles (Ibid.).

Following the Sino-Japanese War, Russia, along with France and Germany, forced Japan to return the Liaotung Peninsula, which Japan had obtained from China. Russia had its eye on ice-free ports in the peninsula. Swallowing its pride, Japan returned it. However, Japan held a grudge against Russia, which was extending its influence into Korea from Manchuria.

A clash between Russia and Japan occurred in 1904 over their competing interests in Korea. Japan defeated Russia, which at the time was impeded by revolutionary movements at home.

Under the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905, Russia acknowledged Japan's paramount interests in Korea, transferred to Japan its lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, as well as the railways in southern Manchuria, and ceded the southern half of Sakhalin in lieu of an indemnity (Reischauer, 1981, p.155).

Now the whole Kurile Islands and southern Sakhalin belonged to Japan. The Japanese people started to move to these

islands, which contained very rich fisheries.

During World War II the Soviet Union and Japan effected a neutrality pact in 1941 which enabled the Soviet Union to concentrate on European battles. Japan did not have to fear Soviet troops coming down to Manchuria either.

However, Stalin realized the strategic importance of the islands and tried to recover them. At the Yalta Conference in 1945 he demanded that all the Kuriles and Sakhalin be surrendered to the Soviet Union in return for declaring war on Japan. U.S. President Roosevelt agreed since he was desperate to get the Soviet Union to join in the battle against the Japanese in China. It was said that Roosevelt was "under the impression that both the Kuriles and southern Sakhalin had been taken by Japan in 1905, hence that Stalin was making a legitimate claim" (Farrel, 1976, p.306). In the postwar era, the Soviet Union expelled 16,500 Japanese inhabitants and incorporated the islands as Soviet territories (Ibid.).

At the San Francisco peace conference Japan claimed the islands as integral parts of Japan. Prime Minister Yoshida asserted Japanese sovereignty over Etorofu, Kunashiri, the Habomai group, and

Shikotan. However, because of Japan's weak position as a defeated nation, he was forced to renounce Japan's claim to them as well as to southern Sakhalin. The San Francisco Treaty did not specify to whom those islands belonged and the Soviet Union did not sign the treaty for various reasons (Sase, 1976, p. 57). However, they have been occupied by the Soviet Union ever since.

During the Hatoyama cabinet the Soviet Union and Japan reestablished diplomatic relations, but they did not conclude a peace treaty. The governments met at London in 1955 to sign a peace treaty. Japan requested the return of the Habomai group and Shikotan and the Soviet Union agreed to the Japanese request. However, in the middle of the meeting the Japanese government abruptly escalated the demands by demanding Kunashiri and Etorofu as well (Ibid.). Sase presents an explanation for Japan's sudden change. Pursuant to America's containment policy, U.S. Secretary of State Dulles did not want Japan to improve relations with the Soviet Union and applied pressure on the Japanese government. He claimed that Etorofu and Kunashiri were not the Kuriles and if "Japan were to cede these islands permanently to the Soviet Union," the U.S.A. would

annex Okinawa (Ibid). The Japanese were not ready to abandon Okinawa and yielded to Dulles' pressure. Since then the Japanese government has insisted on the return of the four islands as a group. The Soviet Union feared that if it agreed to the Japanese demand, Japan might claim other islands.

Consequently the two governments agreed to shelve the territorial problem and issued a Joint Declaration in 1956. The Soviet Union promised to return the Habomai group and Shikotan upon concluding a peace treaty in the future (Holdsworth, 1976, p.45).

Since then the official Japanese position has consistently maintained that the Kurile Islands included only those islands acquired by the Russians in 1855. Etorofu and Kunashiri were not part of the Kurile Islands and therefore not subject to disposition under the San Francisco Treaty. Shikotan and the Habomais were extensions of Hokkaido and were part of Japan's inherent territory (Farrel, 1976, p.309).

The Soviet Union became more intransigent in the ensuing years, particularly around 1960 when the Japanese government was

trying to renew the Japan-U.S.A. Security Treaty. The Soviet Union demanded that the Japanese government abrogate the treaty, or it would not return Shikotan and the Habomais. Later the Soviet Union claimed that the territorial issue had been settled (Dixon, 1974, p.39). The Soviet Union continued that posture and in the early 1960s stationed 20,000 troops on those islands (Cooper, 1981, p.51).

After President Nixon agreed to return Okinawa to Japan the Japanese government intensified their pressure for a territorial settlement with the Soviet Union, but it failed to improve the situation. The Soviet Union, which had acquired territories from eight nations after World War II, tried to maintain the existing boundaries, believing any concessions to Japan would have serious repercussions on its control of other territories (Sase, 1976, p.59).

While the two nations were disputing the territorial issue the Soviet Union enforced a twelve nautical-mile territorial limit and deprived the Japanese of rich traditional fishing grounds around the islands (Farrel, 1976, p.310). Since then the two governments have held annual fisheries negotiations. However, the Soviet Union tied fishing privileges to the normalization of relations. In addition,

the Soviet Union arbitrarily changed the amount of catches for reasons of conservation. The Soviet Union also engaged in occasional harassment and seizure of Japanese boats and their crews in the vicinity of the islands. Those who were arrested were often detained in the Soviet Union for long periods of time and had to pay heavy fines to be released.

Despite the lack of political progress, economic cooperation developed gradually. From the mid-1960s the Soviet Union sought Japanese economic cooperation in Siberia. In 1965 a semiofficial Soviet-Japanese Economic Committee was established (Dixon, 1974, p.40). There were active discussions concerning development of natural gas, petroleum and lumber resources. However, many of these joint programs were of only limited success for a number of reasons. The Japanese felt that progress toward normalization of political relations should accompany economic cooperation. The Soviets, however, kept changing contractual agreements and evading technical questions. After the Soviet Union improved relations with Western European nations, Japanese technology and finance were not as attractive as before.

In the early 1970s Japan was improving relations with the P.R.C. and simultaneously searching for an "equidistant" policy toward the Soviet Union. In September 1971 the Japanese government extended an invitation to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to resume the Bilateral Ministerial Conference, which had been suspended since 1957.

The Soviet Union, which disapproved of the Japanese government tilt toward the P.R.C., accepted the invitation and in January 1972 Gromyko visited Japan. He offered "a compromise on the issue of the 'northern islands'; an expanding Siberian market; verbal support against the P.R.C." In return for these, he asked for a pledge that Japan would not develop a relationship with the P.R.C. (Ha, 1977, p.62).

However, his stay in Tokyo did not yield important results. Soon the Soviet conciliatory attitude changed. According to Ha, the Soviets were reassured after the Shanghai Communique that they had little reason to fear close cooperation between the U.S.A. and the P.R.C. (Ibid.). In addition, the Soviet Union could not find effective means to prevent the Japanese government from its rapprochement

with the P.R.C. and merely sat back and watched.

In October 1973 Prime Minister Tanaka visited the Soviet Union. The two governments agreed to resume negotiations on a peace treaty which would deal with the "disposition of problems left over from World War II" (Dixon, 1974, p.40). When pressed, General Secretary Brezhnev acknowledged that "problems" included the territorial issue (Takayama, 1986, p.130). The Japanese government felt that the Soviet Union was prepared to settle the territorial problem and was jubilant that they made big progress. The Soviet government also promised that "a supreme Soviet leader will visit Japan in the near future" (Dixon, 1974, p.40). However, before such a visit occurred the P.R.C. and Japan started negotiations on the PFT. Soon controversy over the "antihegemony" clause entangled Japan in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Political Turmoil and Other Problems

Political Turmoil in the P.R.C. and Japan

After their PFT negotiations were suspended in May 1975, both the P.R.C. and Japan experienced political turmoil at home. In 1976 China lost two great leaders, Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong, whose deaths triggered fierce power struggles among leaders. In January Premier Zhou died of cancer. Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping had been expected to succeed Zhou but he was purged. Radical Hua Guofeng succeeded with Mao's endorsement. After Mao's death in September, radicals took power for a brief period. However, Hua changed his political position and protected his premiership by arresting other radicals including Mao's widow Jiang Qing. By the summer of 1977 Deng was reinstated and led the nation with Hua.

While China was experiencing political turmoil, Japan was also in political confusion. Miki was determined to get to the bottom of the Tanaka scandal. Tanaka and two other influential LDP politicians were arrested on the charge of having accepted bribes from the Lockheed Corporation in the summer of 1976. This

unprecedented arrest of a former Prime Minister shook the nation. The LDP mainstream was growing uneasy about Miki's pursuit of the case. As a result of the Lockheed scandal, the LDP barely won a general election at the end of the year. The debacle gave the mainstream an excuse to blame Miki, and he was forced to take responsibility and ousted from office.

Fukuda, who had competed with Tanaka in the party election four years earlier, obtained party consensus and became Prime Minister. Upon assuming office, he faced a number of problems. The nation was mired in political confusion. In the Lower House, the LDP had achieved only a simple majority, which was also unprecedented. In addition, Fukuda had to deal with the pro-Taiwan lobby in his own faction and he was unable to simply brush aside their pressure, particularly from former Prime Minister Kishi and his followers.

Given these circumstances, both nations were unable to pay any attention to the PFT. The suspension of the treaty negotiations continued.

Soviet Reaction to the PFT

Until the end of 1974 the PFT negotiations were conducted secretly. In June 1975, one of Japan's newspapers reported the "antihegemony" dispute. As soon as it was made public, the Soviet Union launched an "antihegemony" campaign. The Soviets took a number of measures, including dispatching Gromyko to Japan, delivering verbal attacks, and offering a Soviet-Japanese Friendship Treaty. In January 1976, Gromyko offered to return two islands in return for a Japanese pledge that Japan would not sign the PFT. However, he only offended the Japanese government, which regarded his offer as intervention into Sino-Japanese relationship (Ha, 1977, p.64).

After the Soviet Union witnessed the failure of its conciliatory measures, it resorted to verbal threat and high-handed measures. The Soviet government alleged that Japanese militarists wanted the treaty to form an alliance with China to subjugate Asia (Bedeski, 1979, p.122). Pravda warned that Japan would face "retaliatory measures from Moscow" if the Japanese government signed the PFT (Kim, 1980, p.165).

In May the Soviet Union suddenly changed existing procedures concerning visits to Japanese ancestors' graves in the Soviet controlled "northern islands." Earlier the Soviet Union had permitted former Japanese inhabitants of the islands to visit their ancestors' graves as a sign of friendship. The Soviet Union had not attached strict requirements. However, this abrupt change in policy forced the Japanese government to cancel cemetery visits.

The following year, the Soviet Union declared a 200-nautical mile fishing limit and seized a number of Japanese fishing boats that violated the newly imposed limit. Then the Soviet Union canceled the existing fishing agreement (Bedeski, 1979, p.693).

In 1978 the Soviet Union once again adopted pacific measures. In January the Soviet Union presented a draft of the Soviet-Japanese Friendship Treaty. However, the draft did not impress the Japanese government at all since it did not mention the reversal of the four islands (Eto, 1980, p.729).

Thus none of the Soviet measures succeeded in changing Japan's China policy.

The Senkaku Incident

In Japan political commotion was gradually subsiding after Fukuda took office in 1976. Nevertheless, he was concerned about the Soviet Union and the Taiwan lobby and therefore was indecisive about resumption of negotiations with China.

In May 1977 Fukuda indicated that he would send a letter to Beijing offering to resume negotiations and conclude the treaty (Kim, 1979, p.300). But soon the Taiwan lobby put pressure on him. The Taiwan lobby insisted as their last resistance to normalizing relations with the P.R.C. that the Fukuda government demand an immediate cancellation of the anti-Japanese clause in the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950. The pressure from the Taiwan lobby forced Fukuda to back down. He had to obtain LDP consensus in favor of the treaty.

Early the following year Fukuda once again tried to

resume negotiations. In February 1978 Japanese Ambassador Sato and Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Han Nienlung met in Beijing (Kim, 1979, p.303). There the Chinese unexpectedly took a flexible position on the "antihegemony" clause. Kim notes that though the details of the talks were not revealed, the softened attitude of the Chinese government clearly reflected the new policy under Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng (Ibid). Sato and Han held another round of preliminary talks in March. However, Fukuda had not made up his mind to resume full-fledged negotiations before the Senkaku incident occurred.

On April 12, 1978, armed Chinese fishing boats were spotted in the waters off the Senkaku Islands brandishing placards which said "the Senkakus is Chinese territory" (Eto, 1980, p.730). The Japanese government interpreted the Chinese flotilla as an invasion of the Japanese territory by the Chinese government .

The Senkaku Islands are a group of small uninhabited islands off Taiwan. The P.R.C., Taiwan and Japan all claimed sovereignty over the islands. The Japanese government claimed that

the Senkakus were not included in the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, which China ceded to Japan in May 1895 in the treaty ending Sino-Japanese War. Thus when this territory was returned to China after World War II, it did not include the Senkaku Islands. The record showed that the Senkakus had been incorporated into Japanese territory in January 1895 (Japan Report, May 16, p.4). Since then the Japanese government regarded them as a part of the Okinawa Islands. After World War II, the Senkakus were under U.S. rule until 1972 when the U.S.A. returned the Okinawa Islands to Japan.

Under normal circumstances the Senkakus would not have raised much in the way of conflict, but in 1968 the U.N.'s Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East published a report of natural resources in the East China Sea that indicated the existence of a vast amount of mineral resources, including oil, in the continental shelf in the region (Eto, 1980, p.730). The report aroused keen interest in the Senkakus among the three nations which had for so long neglected them.

The P.R.C. and Japan had agreed earlier to shelve the

Senkaku issue in order to expedite rapprochement in the Zhou-Tanaka Communique of 1972. Later the two governments reconfirmed the agreement on the Senkakus when they started the PFT negotiations.

But now a conflict had been created. The Chinese ships remained in the waters around the Senkakus for almost a week (Kim, 1979, p.305). The Japanese reacted in two ways. The opposition parties interpreted the incident as a "demonstration prompted by the delay in signing the treaty," and urged the Japanese government to resume negotiations and conclude the treaty as soon as possible. On the other hand, the Taiwan lobby insisted that the dispute should be settled before the treaty was signed. The pro-Taiwan members in the Fukuda faction were particularly high-handed, criticizing the Chinese government severely, and concluding that the invasion of Japanese territory destroyed the possibility of the treaty. They contended that Fukuda should not make concessions on the territorial issue but rather should "take countermeasures and translate them into action" (Ibid).

The Japanese government soon filed a protest to the Chinese

Ambassador in Tokyo. The Chinese dismissed the incident as purely accidental (Ibid.). The Japanese strongly suspected that the Chinese adopted shock tactics to pressure Fukuda into expediting the PFT negotiations. Kim says that "Fukuda had disappointed Beijing repeatedly by his indecision on the treaty issue" (Ibid). Nevertheless, the Japanese government accepted the Chinese explanation and on May 10 the Senkaku incident was formally settled between the Japanese Ambassador and the Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister.

Resumption of the Negotiations

Immediately after the Senkaku incident, Fukuda again announced his intention of resuming negotiations. By then his government was "convinced that there was little likelihood of securing concessions from Moscow on the thorny territorial issue, regardless of whether Japan went ahead with signing the peace treaty with Communist China" (Kim, 1980, p.167).

In addition, business interests pressed the Fukuda

government to speed up the PFT negotiations. The Japanese business community was encountering difficulty in exporting to Western Europe and the U.S.A. Business leaders believed that the PFT would provide more stable Sino-Japanese relations and thereby expand Japan's export opportunities in China.

On July 21, 1978, negotiations were resumed. The major subjects were the "antihegemony" clause, the 1950 Sino-Soviet Treaty, which designated Japan as a common enemy of Beijing and Moscow and the territorial issue. The Japanese government proposed to add a "third country" clause in return for including the "antihegemony" clause in the main text of the treaty. The "third country" clause stipulated that the antihegemony clause was a general principle not "directed against any particular country" (Kim, 1979, p.308). The Chinese government strongly approved the incorporation of the "antihegemony" clause, but they dismissed the addition of the "third country" clause in the treaty. (Ibid)

The Fukuda government dispatched Foreign Minister Sonoda to Beijing to resolve the disagreement. On August 8 he presented a revised "third country" clause which read "the treaty shall not

impair the position of either signatory in its relations with any third country" (Ibid. p.309). The next day the Chinese government accepted the revised draft. In addition to his success in persuading the Chinese government, Sonoda obtained Deng's assurance that another Senkaku incident would never recur. The Chinese leaders also indicated that they would take necessary measures to abolish the Sino-Soviet Treaty (Ibid.).

On August 12, Foreign Ministers of the P.R.C. and Japan signed the PFT. The treaty was ratified in the P.R.C. and in Japan on August 17 and October 18 respectively (Kim, 1979, p.310). The treaty contains a preamble and five articles.

In Article I, the two nations pledged to develop peaceful and friendly relations based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence and to settle all disputes peacefully (Kim, 1979, p.309). Article II (the "antihegemony" clause) and Article IV (the "third nation" clause) were separated by Article III. Article II stipulates: "The contracting parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or groups of

countries to establish such hegemony" (Ibid). Article III refers to further development of economic and cultural relations between the two nations. With regard to Article IV, the Japanese Foreign Ministry made the following statement. "Article 4 stipulates that the treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries" (Japan Report, September 16, 1978, p.8). Article V refers to technical matters, including the provision that the treaty would remain effective for ten years.

The P.R.C., which had insisted on the inclusion of the "antihegemony" clause, and rejected incorporation of the "third country" clause, made a concession at the last moment. According to Kapur it was because Deng was consolidating his power. Deng favored an open foreign policy and rapid modernization and was convinced that the PFT was necessary in order to get Japan involved as a partner in China's modernization program (Kapur, 1981, p. 143).

The second reason for the Chinese concession was Chinese fear that Japan might yield to Soviet pressure. The Soviets in

various ways were intensifying pressure to prevent the Japanese government from concluding the PFT. The Chinese were afraid that Soviet pressure might affect "hesitant and conservative Fukuda" while the P.R.C. was rejecting the "third country" clause (Ibid.)

The third factor was the question of U.S. military forces in the Far East. In 1975 U.S. forces had withdrawn from Saigon. President Carter was now expressing the hope that U.S. forces would be withdrawn from South Korea in the near future as well (Bedeski, 1983, p.6). Bedeski explains that "while the P.R.C. would hardly be expected to embrace the presence of U.S. forces with enthusiasm," the withdrawal would create a power vacuum which would alter the balance of power in the region. Therefore the P.R.C. needed an ally (Ibid). These were the major reasons for China's concession.

The Japanese government had reasons for concession, in addition to Fukuda's realization that the China card would not help to recover the four islands from the Soviet Union. When the Japanese Foreign Minister visited Moscow in January 1978, the Soviets refused to discuss the territorial issue. The Japanese government regarded this refusal as a "clear violation of the Tanaka-Brezhnev

agreement of 1973" (Kim, 1980, p.167). The Soviet refusal angered the Japanese government and prompted Fukuda decide to conclude the treaty.

The second factor was President Carter's influence. Fukuda visited Washington in May and met with Carter. Carter said that he saw no problems with including the hegemony clause in the treaty (Bedeski, 1983, p.121). Carter further advised him to hasten the conclusion of the PFT (Japan Echo, 4, 1978, p.62).

The third factor behind Japanese concessions involved Fukuda's need for some dramatic development in foreign policy to strengthen his position at home, since he was eyeing the LDP presidential election at the end of the year.

Regarding the treaty, some scholars were critical, dismissing it as a second class treaty. Irie says that it was only symbolic since its intention was not to terminate the state of war but to strengthen and develop peaceful and friendly relations. He notes that the treaty did not contain many new ideas and was largely a repetition of the Zhou-Tanaka Communique (Irie, 1978, p.69). However, in Japan the treaty was generally assessed favorably.

Major newspapers and political parties welcomed it, with the exception of the Japan Communist Party.

Conclusion of the PFT proved to be the most difficult task in the entire process of the normalization of relations between the P.R.C. and Japan. The negotiations for the treaty were initiated in 1975 but soon were deadlocked. They remained suspended for three years. Numerous reasons existed for the delay, but it was due mainly to China's insistence on including the "antihegemony" clause. Antihegemony was China's principal foreign policy directed against Soviet expansionism.

The Japanese government first rejected the inclusion of the clause in the treaty because it was afraid of worsening relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union and Japan have a territorial problem dating back to World War II. Because of this problem they have not concluded a peace treaty, though they reestablished diplomatic relations in the 1950s.

Throughout the PFT negotiations the Japanese government made three concessions to the Chinese. First, the Miki government

agreed to include the "antihegemony" clause in the preamble to the treaty. After Chinese rejection, Miki made another compromise, proposing to include the clause in the text of the treaty while attaching some conditions. The third concession, made by the Fukuda government, in 1978 involved including the "antihegemony" clause but also including a "third country" clause in the text. The Chinese had rejected all of the Japanese concessions. However, the new Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, was more pragmatic and accepted a revised third concession. Soon after that, the treaty was concluded and ratified in each country.

The Soviet Union, always in competition with the P.R.C., attempted to draw the Japanese government toward Moscow using a variety of carrot and stick measures. The Japanese government, on the other hand, was trying to utilize the China card, and thereby, recover the lost territory. However, the Japanese government realized that the Soviet Union would never concede on the territorial issue and chose to solidify the relationship with the P.R.C.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION: COMPLEXITY OF JAPAN'S CHINA POLICY

After the Communists took power in China, the P.R.C. called for normalization of relations with Japan. Nevertheless, it took more than 20 years before a rapprochement occurred. Before this rapprochement, Japan's policy toward the P.R.C. remained strongly anti-P.R.C. Following normalization of relations the policy was pro-P.R.C., yet indecisive.

There were a number of factors contributing to the complexity of Japan's China policy. Opposition parties, public opinion, the business sector, and the Taiwan lobby at home, and Japan's relations with the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union--each of these affected Japan's China policy in tangled ways.

Among domestic factors, the business sector and the Taiwan lobby were significant in shaping the China policy. Until around 1970, the business sector was consistently pro-Taiwan because trade with Taiwan was quite profitable to Japanese

business interests. In addition, they were afraid of supporting a policy which might damage their relations with the U.S.A., another profitable business partner, and therefore they objected to rapprochement with the P.R.C.

However, business interests switched their position from pro-Taiwan to pro-P.R.C. when they witnessed a turnaround of U.S. China policy in the early 1970s. They urged the Sato government to seek an early normalization of relations. When they realized that Sato was not working for their cause, they abandoned their support for him and helped Kakuei Tanaka get elected as Prime Minister. In addition, the business sector occasionally influenced the government's China policy as have been seen in the cases of negotiations for the Sino-Japanese civil aviation agreement and the Peace and Friendship Treaty.

As for the Taiwan lobby, it played a significant role in shaping the China policy in a negative way. The Taiwan lobby, led by Prime Ministers Kishi and Sato, contributed considerably to delaying recognition of the P.R.C. and preventing the Japanese government from leaning too closely to the P.R.C.

One of the reasons why the Japanese government did not recognize the P.R.C. in the late 1960s, in spite of the international trend, was that the Japanese government was headed by Prime Minister Sato. He was quite close and sympathetic to the Taipei regime. Under his leadership, the Japanese government delayed recognition of the P.R.C. despite a call for an early normalization of relations from the opposition and from much of the Japanese general public.

The Taiwan lobby continued to affect Japan's China policy after the Sino-Japanese rapprochement. In negotiations for the Sino-Japanese civil aviation agreement, the P.R.C. presented a number of demands which were completely unacceptable to the Taiwan lobby. Among the demands, the P.R.C. insisted that the Japanese government abrogate the Japanese-Taiwanese aviation pact or reroute the Taiwanese Airlines. The Taiwan lobby, which had failed to prevent the establishment of formal Sino-Japanese relations, was now determined to prevent the Japanese government from leaning too closely toward the P.R.C. at the expense of Taiwan. Despite its strong pressure, the Taiwan lobby failed again and the

Sino-Japanese civil aviation agreement was signed to Taiwan's detriment. However, Prime Minister Tanaka, whose position in the LDP was somewhat precarious, was concerned about the reaction of the Taiwan lobby. As a result negotiations for the pact did not proceed as easily as the Japanese government had anticipated.

In comparison to the business sector and the Taiwan lobby, the impact of the opposition parties and public opinion was less significant. Through "people's diplomacy" the opposition enjoyed some success in making the general public pro-Beijing. Additionally, during the normalization of relations, they worked as a link between the P.R.C. and the various Japanese governments. However, in Japan's party system, which is often called a one-and-a-half party system--the LDP has consistently been in power for the last 25 years--the opposition parties' ability to affect the government's foreign policy is limited.

It has been said that public opinion seldom affects foreign policy in Japan. In the 1960s public opinion was gradually shifting in favor of the P.R.C. However it was not influential enough to

change the government's policy by itself.

The U.S.A. and the Soviet Union were no less significant than domestic factors in determining Japan's China policy. From the Occupation period until 1971, the Japanese government was consistently pro-Taiwan and anti-P.R.C. in compliance with the U.S. China policy. In the early 1950s the Japanese government tried to establish relations with the P.R.C., but under strong pressure from the U.S.A., the Japanese government chose to establish relations only with Taiwan. Henceforth the Japanese government adopted a policy of separation of economics and politics, thereby maintaining only economic and cultural relations with the P.R.C., while ignoring it politically. Since 1972 Japan's China policy has been ahead of that of the U.S.A. However, in order to change Japan's China policy, U.S. constraints had to be lifted. In this sense the U.S.A. was the most significant factor affecting Japan's China policy.

Another superpower, the Soviet Union, was also involved in Japan's China policy. However, this was not because of the Soviet Union's status as a superpower, but rather because of the delicate state of Japanese relations with the Soviet Union. After the

establishing formal relations with the P.R.C., the Japanese government tried to maintain an "equidistant" policy with the Soviet Union. The Japanese government feared antagonizing the Soviets and thereby killing an opportunity to recover the "northern territory" from the Soviet Union. When the "antihegemony" question arose, the Japanese government, aware of the possible repercussions on its relationship with the Soviet Union, strongly rejected the incorporation of the "antihegemony" clause in the treaty. The treaty negotiations were suspended for three years, largely due to China's insistence on inclusion of the clause into the treaty and Japan's objection to it. The Japanese government continued its objection until it concluded that the Soviet Union would never return the territory to Japan. The scope of Soviet influence on Japan's China policy was not as significant as that of the U.S.A. However, the impact of the Soviet Union can not be ignored.

These various internal and external elements contributed to the complexity of Japan's China policy.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

ZHOU-TANAKA JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Joint Statement of the Government of Japan and the Government of
the People's Republic of China. September 29, 1972

(Lee, p.210-212,1976)

At the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei of Japan visited the People's Republic of China from September 25 to 30, 1972. Accompanying Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei were Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi, Chief Cabinet Secretary Kikaido Susumu and other government officials.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung met Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei on September 27. The two sides had an earnest and friendly conversation.

Premier Chou En-lai and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei had an earnest and frank exchange of views with Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei and Foreign Minister Ohira Masayoshi, all along in a friendly atmosphere, on various matters between the two countries and other matters of interest to both sides, with the normalization of relations between China and Japan as the focal point, and the two

sides agreed to issue the following joint statement of the two Governments:

China and Japan are neighboring countries separated only by a strip of water, and there was a long history of traditional friendship between them. The two peoples ardently wish to end the abnormal state of affairs that has hitherto existed between the two countries. The termination of the state of war and the normalization of relations between China and Japan - the realization of such wishes of the two peoples will open a new page in the annals of relations between the two countries.

The Japanese side is keenly aware of Japan's responsibility for causing enormous damage in the part to the Chinese people through war and deeply reproaches itself. The Japanese side reaffirms its position that in seeking to realize the normalization of relations between Japan and China, it proceeds from the stand of fully understanding the three principles for the restoration of diplomatic relations put forward by the Government of the People's Republic of China. The Chinese side expresses its welcome for this.

Although the social systems of China and Japan are different, the two countries should and can establish peaceful and friendly

relations. The normalization of relations and the development of good neighborly and friendly relations between the two countries are in the interest of the two peoples, and will also contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the safeguard of world peace.

(1) The abnormal state of affairs which has hitherto existed between the People's Republic of China and Japan is declared terminated on the date of publication of this statement.

(2) The Government of Japan recognizes the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.

(3) The Government of the People's Republic of China reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of China and adheres to its stand of complying with Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.

(4) The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan have decided upon the establishment of diplomatic relations as from September 29, 1972. The two Governments have decided to adopt all necessary measures for the establishment and the performance of functions of embassies in

each other's capitals in accordance with international law and practice and exchange ambassadors as speedily as possible.

(5) The Government of the People's Republic of China declares that in the interest of the friendship between the peoples of China and Japan, it renounces its demand for war indemnities from Japan.

(6) The Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan agree to establish durable relations of peace and friendship between the two countries on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence.

In keeping with the foregoing principles and the principles of the United Nations Charter, the Governments of the two countries affirm that in their mutual relations, all disputes shall be settled by peaceful means without resorting to the use or threat of force.

(7) The normalization of relations between China and Japan is not directed against third countries. Neither of the two countries should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each country is

opposed to efforts by any country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

(8) To consolidate and develop the peaceful and friendly relations between the two countries, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan agree to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a treaty of peace and friendship.

(9) In order to further develop the relations between the two countries and broaden the exchange of visits, the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Japan agree to hold negotiations aimed at the conclusion of agreements on trade, navigation, aviation, fishery, etc., in accordance with the needs and taking into consideration the existing nongovernmental agreements.

(Signed) Chou En-lai
Premier of the State Council of
the People's Republic of China

(Signed) Tanaka Kakuei
Prime Minister of Japan

(Signed) Chi Peng-fei
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
People's Republic of China

(Signed) Ohira Masayoshi
Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Japan

APPENDIX B

PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP TREATY

Treaty of Peace and Friendship Between China and Japan

(Wang, 1985)

The People's Republic of China and Japan,

Recalling with satisfaction that since the government of the People's Republic of China and the government of Japan issued a joint statement in Peking on September 29, 1972, the friendly relations between the two governments and the peoples of the two countries have developed greatly on a new basis.

Confirming that the abovementioned joint statement constitutes the basis of the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries and that the preinciples enunciated in the joint statement should be strictly observed.

Confirming that the principles of the charter of the United Nations should be fully respected,

Hoping to contribute to peace and stability in Asia and in the world,

For the purpose of solidifying and developing the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries.

Have resolved to conclude a treaty of peace and friendship

and for that purpose have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

The People's Republic of China: Huang Hua, Minister of Foreign
Affairs

Japan: Sunao Sonoda, Minister for Foreign Affairs

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found to
be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

Article I 1. The contracting parties shall develop durable
relations of peace and friendship between the two countries on the
basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and
territorial integrity, mutual nonaggression, noninterference in each
other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful
co-existence.

2. In keeping with the foregoing principles and the principles
of the United Nations Charter, the contracting parties affirm that in
their mutual relations, all disputes shall be settled by peaceful
means without resorting to the use or threat of force.

Article II The contracting parties declare that neither of them should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or in any other region and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.

Article III The contracting parties shall, in a good-neighborly and friendly spirit and in conformity with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and noninterference in each other's internal affairs, endeavor to further develop economic and cultural relations between the two countries and to promote exchanges between the peoples of the two countries.

Article IV The present treaty shall not affect the position of either contracting party regarding its relations with third countries.

Article V 1. The present treaty shall be ratified and shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification which shall take place at Tokyo. The present treaty shall remain in force for ten years and thereafter shall continue to be in force until terminated in accordance with the provisions of

Paragraph 2 of this Article.

2. Either contracting party may, by giving one year's written notice to the other contracting party, terminate the present treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time thereafter.

In witness whereof the respective plenipotentiaries have signed the present treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate in the Chinese and Japanese languages, both texts being equally authentic, at Peking, this twelfth day of August 1978.

For the People's Republic
of China:

Huang Hua
(Signed)


For Japan:

Sunao Sonoda
(Signed)


APPENDIX C

MAPS

Northern Islands



Senkaku Islands



VITA

Mikiko Sakakura was born in Hokkaido, Japan on September 26, 1948. She attended elementary and high school in her home town of Sapporo, Japan. She received a B.A. degree from Fuji Women's College in 1971. From 1984 to 1985 she attended Maryville College, Tennessee. In 1988, she received a M.A. degree from the University of Tennessee, Knoxville.