To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Carol Jean Tullos entitled "Personal Guilt and Social Responsibility in Six Plays by Max Frisch." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in German.

Robert L. Hiller, Major Professor

We have read this thesis
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:

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Graduate Studies and Research

PERSONAL GUILT AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN SIX PLAYS BY MAX FRISCH

A Thesis

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ABSTRACT

Between 1945 and 1962 Max Frisch wrote six plays investigating the problem of human responsibility and exploring the dramatic possibilities of responsibility and guilt. Guilt plays a major part in five of the six plays under consideration here. In Biedermann und die Brandstifter (1958) it is used consciously as a manipulative device and produces all the action. In Graf Öderland (1961) guilt is suspended, and society without guilt is represented. Andorra (1961) is a study of the process of scapegoating, showing the transferral of collective guilt to an individual. In Nun singen sie wieder (1945), Als der Krieg zu Ende war (1962), and Die chinesische Mauer (1955), as well as the previously mentioned plays, Frisch uses crime, real guilt, fear of guilt, guilt as a social function, and shame and pride as major devices to make his points concerning responsibility. The plays show a coherent attitude on Frisch's part toward man's responsibility to man. His decision at the end of these six plays is that man must be a responsible being; that although it is impossible to take on social responsibility, man must choose to believe that it is possible and act accordingly.

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INTRODUCTION

One of the common characteristics of post-World War II theater in Germany and in the rest of Europe is a preoccupation with guilt and responsibility. Of the German-speaking dramatists, Max Frisch, in a period running from 1945 to 1961, wrote six plays investigating the problem of human responsibility and exploring the dramatic possibilities of responsibility and guilt. Nun singen sie wieder, first played in 1945, treats the theme of war-crimes and responsibility. Als der Krieg zu Ende war was written during 1947 and 1948, first played in 1949, and revised in 1962 by the omission of the third act. It is concerned with the question of prejudice in language and indirectly with the problem of personal responsibility and guilt. Die chinesische Mauer, whose theme is social responsibility, was first played in 1946, was published in 1947, but was revised extensively in 1955. Andorra, whose subject matter is scapegoating, appeared first in Tagebuch 1946-1949, and was not played or published until 1961, after five rewritings. Biedermann und die Brandstifter, a prose sketch in the first Tagebuch, was first produced as a radio play in 1953, and then revised and played in 1958 as a one-act play with an

epilogue. Its point is concerned with personal and social responsibility. Graf Öderland first appeared as a sketch in Tagebuch 1946-1949, was played in 1951, and revised in 1956 and 1961.

Although vastly different in outward subject matter and particular theme, taken as a whole these plays show a coherent attitude on Frisch's part toward man's responsibility to man. His decision at the end of these six plays is that man must be a responsible being; that although it is futile, even impossible to take on social responsibility, man must choose to believe it is possible, and act in accordance with that belief. This idea is perhaps summed up best in Die chinesische Mauer, in which his conscience, coupled with society's urging, compels the Man of Today to take on social responsibility even though he knows it to be self-defeating. He accepts his responsibility only to find that his actions are completely futile and have no effect whatsoever on the society in which he acts.

In order to understand the concept of guilt and related ideas such as shame, existential guilt and responsibility, it is necessary to look somewhat abstractly at the ideas involved. Chapter I contains definitions of these phenomena and briefly discusses how they might apply to drama. In Chapter II the selected works by Frisch are analyzed for their use of guilt as a dramatic and thematic device.

CHAPTER I

GUILT AND RELATED CONCEPTS

It is hard to underestimate the ubiquity and influence of guilt on human life. Philosophers and psychologists alike emphasize the centrality of guilt to human experience. Roger W. Smith, in Guilt: Man and Society, states that "guilt is a basic category, like power, identity, death or love, without which it is difficult to explore seriously the human condition."[1] Friedrich Nietzsche, in an essay on guilt, very nearly defines man in terms of guilt, saying that man is the animal with "the right to make promises," and that making promises implies the acceptance of responsibility. "His proud awareness of the extraordinary privilege responsibility confers has penetrated deeply and become a dominant instinct."[2] This instinct is called conscience, and it is in the area of this responsibility that "the moral universe of guilt, conscience, and duty, took its inception."[3] Martin Buber goes one step further and defines

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[1]Roger W. Smith, "Preface," Guilt: Man and Society, ed. Roger W. Smith (Garden City, New York, 1971).

[2]Friedrich Nietzsche, "'Guilt,' 'Bad Conscience,' and Related Matters," in Smith, p. 28.

[3]Nietzsche, p. 34.

man outright as "the being who is capable of becoming guilty and is capable of illuminating his guilt."[4] Other authors speak, both psychologically and in religious terms, of the enormity of the guilt manifested in modern society and in the individual. In addition it is commonly recognized that guilt is one of the most essential problems faced by the Christian, the philosopher, and modern man in general. Stein points out that Freud calls it "the most important problem in the evolution of culture."[5] James A. Knight points out that "the fact of sin constitutes the central problem of the biblical record."[6] Hence it is central to Bible-based religion.

In spite of these widespread pronouncements on guilt, the problem of defining it is not as simple as it might at first seem, for the water is muddied by at least three different viewpoints--the religious, the psychological, and the sociological--each with a different set of basic precepts and terminology. In addition, the fact that guilt is so central to mankind makes it difficult to be

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[4]Martin Buber, "Guilt and Guilt Feelings," in Smith, p. 113.

[5]Edward V. Stein, Guilt: Theory and Therapy (Philadelphia, 1968), p. 13.

[6]James A. Knight, Conscience and Guilt (New York, 1969), p. 68.

perfectly objective. It appears offhand, however, that there are at least two kinds of guilt: that type which may be called existential, that every man has by definition, because he is not perfect, and the type of guilt which one earns as a result of breaking some law set down by oneself or by others. Original sin, in religious terms, or existential guilt, in philosophical, is just what its name implies. It is existential. That is, it exists because man exists or is born into society. It implies no action of any sort, nor any standard against which action or inaction can be measured.

The more tangible form of guilt, the one of which most people are aware, is what might, for lack of better words, be called moral or ethical guilt. What is this guilt? Edward Stein has an answer which merits observation if only because it illustrates the difficulties encountered in trying to arrive at an interdisciplinary definition of the term:

> Guilt, by any name, resembles a "law of gravity" of human existence. It is the dynamic principle operative in man which verifies the fictitiousness of his total autonomy and the validity of his dependence upon all the rest of life, essentially the human community, and supremely, the source and principle of all life, God--the ground of our being.
>
> Guilt begins in love, is impossible without love, and paradoxically is only cured by love. It is the most horrible and one of the most hopeful facts for man. It is the experience of anti-life, anticommunity, antilove, which, as limit, as void of being, turns man to seek its opposite. It is "hell." It is

> life that is anxious for love. It is loveless life fixed with "no exit." It is life experiencing hatred, and the worst of all hatreds, hatred of self . . . Guilt is the special form of anxiety experienced by humans-in-society, the warning tension of life principles violated, of conditions of human social existence transgressed, of socio-spiritual reality ignored or affronted, of God alienated, of self being destroyed . . .
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> . . . . . .
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> Guilt will be defined here as a state of tension or anxiety over internalized aggression (self-hatred) or loss of self-love. These are reflections of early experiences with significant emotional figures in the environment, usually the parents. Internally and phenomenologically guilt is anxiety, pain, displeasure, depression, remorse, because of the violation of some internalized values rooted in an emotional relationship. The threat of anticipated guilt anxiety normally cues off the control system, inhibiting impulse expression. The failure of this conscience warning, in the case of impulses which break through into action, results in normal guilt (remorse). However, as Freud says, the wish itself may activate the guilt system, resulting in neurotic self-condemnation and self-punishment at unconscious levels of function.
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> There is thus a warning system (feeling of conscience) and an after-the-fact punitive system.[7]

It will be shown later in the course of this discussion that this seemingly hopeless jumble of ideas and terminology is actually a rather complete summary of the various definitions of and attitudes toward ethical guilt. For now, however, only one significant idea need be extracted from the passage, that of the breaking of boundaries. It is not incidental that Stein mentions this not only in connection with the religious area of his definition, but also

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[7]Stein, pp. 14-16, 26.

in the social and psychological areas, for transgression of boundaries seems to be the root of every definition of ethical guilt. In religious terms, one transgresses a boundary when he breaks a commandment or other law of God and becomes guilty. In society man is guilty when he breaks a social law. Psychology accepts the requirement of transgression, but as Stein says, guilt is the feeling produced "because of the violation of some internalized values rooted in an emotional relationship."[8] In other words, it is produced by the transgression of a boundary. The major difference in these viewpoints lies not in the breaking of the law, but in the source of the law itself--i.e., one law comes from God, one from society (government), and one from one's personal internalized system of law, that is, one's moral or ethical system.

The psychiatrist James Knight gives perhaps the simplest definition of ethical guilt in his book Conscience and Guilt: "Guilt is generated whenever a boundary, set by the conscience, is touched or transgressed."[9] This definition gives us yet another criterion for the presence of guilt, a two-edged one, that of conscience. It is at the same time the setter of boundaries and the mechanism which polices the boundaries

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[8]Stein, p. 26.

[9]Knight, p. 95.

(the "warning system," as Stein calls it), so that there are now two further additions to the postulate "he who transgresses a moral, legal, or personal boundary is guilty."

First, if the boundary has not been set in the conscience, there is no possible crossing of it. Hence a person is not guilty who breaks a law that is not internalized. Evidence of this attitude in our legal system can be seen in the case of the person who murders, but who at the same time has no internalized concept that murder is wrong. This person is called insane, but he is not called guilty, nor is he punished. The second consideration is that a person must be conscious that he is transgressing a boundary. Consciousness of both the action or the consequences of the action and of the boundary itself is necessarily present before a man can be labeled guilty. The law recognizes the difference between transgression of set boundaries--this can be called simply crime--with intent and without. Religion, particularly Old Testament legalistic writing, recognizes that unconscious crime is far less serious than conscious. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1969) defines non-legal guilt as "remorseful awareness [italics mine] of having done wrong," and the standard Webster's Second International Dictionary lists under

"guilt" "the state of one who has committed an offense, esp. consciously." "Doing something wrong" and "committing an offense" both imply action crossing a boundary, just as earlier definitions. And in addition, these statements imply consciousness of guilt as a third criterion for the existence of guilt.

Yet another definition of guilt, from the Catholic Dictionary of Moral Theology states that "theological guilt presupposes two necessary elements: (a) a norm obliging in conscience before God; (b) a free human act in violation of this norm or moral law."[10] As with previous definitions, there must be a standard, or law, and an action transgressing this law. In addition, though, this definition touches on a new idea: that the action across the boundary must be a free one. This differentiates forced action across a boundary from actual guilt-producing transgression, just as in governmental law killing in self-defense is considered murder under mitigating circumstances, and is differentiated from premeditated or intentional murder.

At this point we might state an essential definition of the phenomenon guilt: Guilt is a feeling or a state of being produced whenever a boundary set by the

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[10]Francesco Roberti, Dictionary of Moral Theology, ed. Pietro Palazzini, trans. Henry J. Yannone (Westminster, Md., 1962).

conscience is touched or transgressed freely and knowingly.

It must be noted that guilt exists within individuals, but since individual men do not (in practicality) exist outside of society, guilt is a social phenomenon, and must be looked at as such. According to Roger Smith in Guilt: Man and Society, guilt as we have defined it is central to the concept of guilt, but the whole idea also includes "creation, maintenance and repair of boundaries, within society and within ourselves."[11] Smith speaks of a linear progression of guilt which involves the "notion of a boundary, the overstepping of the boundary, and the return to a boundary."[12] In terms of a person's relationship to society, he speaks of what he calls the structural sequence of guilt:

> a boundary is transgressed, the offender is separated from the rest of society (sometimes physically, sometimes through withdrawal of solidarity), various attempts are made (nemesis, guilt feelings, punishment, etc.) to reassert the boundary, and finally the boundary is either restored or a new one takes its place (reconciliation) and society finds itself at one with the offender (atonement).[13]

Thus the consequence of guilt is a ritual interaction between the guilty individual and society. The guilty one

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[11]Roger W. Smith, "Introduction," Guilt: Man and Society, p. 20.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid., p. 21.

has transgressed and must seek restoration of the boundary (reconciliation) and atonement, while society separates the offender and attempts to reassert the boundary, and then shares in the reconciliation and atonement of the offending individual. The description seems almost like a ritual dance. It might be noted that Smith's definition applies equally well no matter how large or small the society is. A society might consist of one other person as easily as a group.

There remain but a few small points in connection with this definition of guilt. First, in a phrase borrowed from James Knight, guilt is generated not only when a boundary is transgressed, but even when a boundary is only touched. That is, guilt may be produced by nearly breaking a law. We need only note two facts to prove this last point. In religious terms, the thought of breaking a law is often as wrong as actually breaking that law. In social law, the aiding in the commission of a crime, or the attempting of a crime, i.e., nearly breaking the law, just as certainly makes one guilty. As Stein says, even the wish to break over a boundary may activate the guilt system. The guilt thus produced is what, according to Stein, Freud calls "neurotic guilt."[14]

Second is the point that Stein mentions in the

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[14]Stein, Guilt: Theory and Therapy, p. 26.

first paragraph of his lengthy definition: that guilt verifies man's dependence on the human community. Psychologists and psychiatrists, beginning with Freud, propose that the boundaries in the conscience are not innately there, but are set there, whether, as Freud sees it, by the parent, or as some sociologists and psychiatrists maintain, by society as a whole. At any rate, without other beings, boundaries would not exist in the conscience. They would not be necessary, since their reason for existence is the protection of society. And a conscience without boundaries is a conscience without guilt. As Nietzsche would have it, guilt is the price man paid for becoming a social animal.[15]

Third, in the large body of words surrounding guilt, two of the more important ones are shame and responsibility. Both of these concepts are related to that of guilt, but neither falls completely within its realm. In one sense, shame is the feeling engendered when one's guilt is brought to one's attention or to the attention of others. Webster's Second International Dictionary defines shame as a "Painful feeling . . . excited by a consciousness of guilt, shortcoming or impropriety, or of having done something unworthy." The

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[15]Nietzsche, "'Guilt,' 'Bad Conscience,' and Related Matters," p. 50.

important idea here is that shame is brought on by consciousness of guilt or of unworthiness. Whereas guilt is brought on by consciousness of transgressing a boundary or by not living up to potentials, shame occurs when one becomes or is made aware that he is guilty or unworthy. Margaret Mead deals nicely with the concept:

> Shame . . . may be described as that sanction under which the individual's attention is focussed upon possible disapproval from a group, in which the whole quality of the behavior is negative and one acts in fear of a negatively valued response.[16]

That is to say, shame is the social counterpart of guilt. Whereas guilt is something engendered by parents (Mead subscribes to Freud's view of internalized boundaries), shame is something engendered by society. It is a negative response, or the fear of one, from a group of others, and the greater the value of the group to the guilty one, the greater the shame. In spite of Mead's requirements, the existence of a society, or group of others, is not entirely necessary to produce feelings of shame. The fear of a negatively responding society is sufficient, and it is entirely possible for an individual to gain enough intellectual distance from himself to act as his own society. Pride is opposite shame on a continuum, as Mead

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[16]Margaret Mead, "Some Anthropological Considerations Concerning Guilt," in Smith, p. 125.

defines it. It is a positive response, or the expectation of one, from a group of others.

In like manner, responsibility may be said to be the opposite of guilt. Whereas guilt is breaking the law, responsibility is upholding the law. Looked at in reverse, as Webster's does, guilt is the "responsibility for an offense," and responsibility is the urge to avoid transgressing. Under the entry "responsible" Webster's Second International Dictionary clarifies the definition of responsibility quite a bit. Being responsible means "having the character of a free moral agent; [being] capable of determining one's own acts; [being] capable of being deterred by consideration of sanctions or consequences." The last phrase of this definition, "capable of being deterred by consideration of sanctions," could be rephrased as "capable of avoiding transgressing boundaries": hence the opposite of being guilty. More accurately, though, being responsible is being able to make, and making, moral decisions, i.e., decisions not to cross boundaries. One is responsible and may feel pride as long as he remains within the boundaries set in his conscience. He becomes guilty when he crosses them, and experiences shame when he becomes or is made aware of his guilt.

As overriding and penetrating as this guilt as it has been defined is, there is, as was mentioned, another form of guilt that is even more pervasive--existential guilt. The concept of existential guilt is not easily understood, probably because it is most difficult to pin existential guilt down to concrete "wrong acts" or anything tangible. One of the best clarifications of the concept is Knight's, which is based on describing what existential guilt is not:

> Existential guilt has some specific characteristics which must be understood, or else one is almost certain to confuse it with normal and neurotic guilt. First, everyone participates in it, for it is innate and a part of the very structure of being human. It is related to our failure to live up to our potentialities, as well as our failure in interpersonal relationships. . . .
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> Second, existential guilt does not come from cultural prohibitions or the taking unto oneself the values of one's parents but is rooted in the fact of self-awareness. It accompanies that ability of man to stand off and look at himself at a distance, to reflect upon himself. It is guilt that does not consist of violations of parental prohibitions, but arises from the fact that one can see himself as the one who can choose or fail to choose. Although its content may vary a little from culture to culture, every developed human being is confronted by this existential guilt.
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> Third, existential guilt is distinctly different from pathological or neurotic guilt. If unaccepted or repressed it may grow into or feed neurotic guilt. . . .
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> Fourth, existential guilt usually does not lead to the formation of symptoms but has constructive effects in the personality.[17]

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[17]Knight, Conscience and Guilt, p. 92.

First, existential guilt results not from transgressing a boundary, but as Knight points out, from failure to meet a goal. Tillich describes what he calls "moral acts" and "antimoral acts" in this existential fashion:

> [Man's] moral imperative has this content: to become a person. Every moral act is an act in which an individual self establishes itself as a person. Therefore, a moral act is not an act in obedience to an external law, human or divine. It is the inner law of our true being, of our essential or created nature, which demands that we actualize what follows from it. And an antimoral act is not the transgression of one or several circumscribed commands but an act that contradicts the self-realization of the person as a person and drives toward disintegration.[18]

Hebraic thought contains the same concept of guilt resulting from man's failure to live up to his potentialities. Sin is defined as "separation from God," not as a result of transgressing God's law, but as a result of man's misusing or failing to use to the fullest his ability for oneness with God. In other words, he has failed to live up to his potentiality.

Second among Knight's criteria for existential guilt is the fact, significant for the artist, that existential guilt does not arise from social or Freudian ideas of internalized values. Instead it is a product of self-awareness, of man's being able to step out of himself and look at himself from a distance. It is a mild case of what

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[18]Quoted in Knight, p. 9.

might be called the "Tonio Kröger Syndrome," and everyone, not just the artist, suffers from it. Too, it is rooted in man's ability to choose or not to choose, in his responsibility, his potentiality to do certain things or not to do them.

In addition to these considerations, it might be repeated that existential guilt is not the same thing as neurotic guilt, that although they are both in a sense unreal, existential guilt is a product of a real situation. Neurotic guilt is transferred or manufactured or exaggerated out of proportion in some fashion and is not rooted in reality.

While it is all very well and good to define guilt explicitly, it is also necessary to apply this definition constructively to drama. What sort of use can one expect a playwright to make of the processes of guilt? Since any dramatist may be said to be making some sort of point, if not conveying a moral using human actions as example, it seems logical to expect that guilt and its related concepts would be used by the dramatist in one of two ways: either his moral might be concerned with guilt, responsibility, or some related idea; or his characters might act through guilt, guilt-fear, or responsibility--that is, they might be motivated by those feelings and facts.

In tragedy crime and guilt are necessary. By any definition of tragedy there is some crime, whether it be committed or only considered, and the guilt for that crime leads the hero ultimately to his punishment, whether it be through the action of others or through the actions of the hero himself. Since drama treats conflict, it will use crime and guilt to some extent, and Frisch's plays are no exception. Actions will either result in guilt or be produced by guilt in many cases. Actions which result in guilt will be transgressions of boundaries, as has been discussed above. Actions which are produced by guilt will be in some measure either designed to avoid the admission or recognition of that guilt, or will be attempts to correct the crime: punishment, revenge, re-acceptance into society, that is, any of the elements of Smith's social process of crime. An individual character's actions might be activated by his own crime, guilt, or fear of guilt, or by that of another, or they might be responses to feelings of existential guilt.

There are countless ways in which the dramatist may be concerned with guilt. Very often, in fact most often, the author is using the guilt feelings produced by a crime to warn the audience away from something the author feels is wrong. Or as is the case most often with Frisch, a drama may be designed to awaken the audience to

a responsibility or to make them aware of a crime they are committing or have committed. The list of permutations on the ideas of guilt in drama is too long to elucidate here. In the following chapter six plays by Frisch will be analyzed in terms of their use of guilt as a motivating factor and as a means of making a specific point concerning responsibility.

CHAPTER II

GUILT AND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE DRAMAS

In several ways Nun singen sie wieder is an unusual play for Max Frisch. It is one of the first he wrote and is the earliest one considered in this paper. Its subject matter is World War II, and in contrast to Frisch's usual powerful but restrained manner of presentation, Nun singen sie wieder appears dishevelled and overemotional in its portrayal of a society suddenly fully aware of the wrongness of what it is doing. The major characteristics of most of the play's figures are confusion and trauma and innocence defiled, or so it seems. Characters are preoccupied with their guilt and confused as to how to cope with it.

Nun singen sie wieder is the only Frisch play in which the horror of war is the end point of the author's meaning. That is to say, other plays by Frisch treat the war and the guilt of war, but in them he has gone beyond war to some more abstract idea. In Die chinesische Mauer, for example, the existence of the atomic bomb is the concrete fact, but the elimination of tyranny in general (not just of those who can build the bomb) is the larger

idea represented by the knowledge of the bomb. In Biedermann und die Brandstifter Babette mentions Gottlieb's social irresponsibility in terms of joining "the Party," but the main idea of the play is social irresponsibility in general. The World War II parallel in Andorra is quite obvious also, but the point of the parallel is not that the Germans were prejudiced, but that people in general are. In Nun singen sie wieder, however, there is no idea beyond the horror of war and the guilt of all involved. The play seems to be the author's first reaction to the war, written before Frisch had really been able to accept and assimilate the war into his experience in a constructive way. As he himself notes, "The play sprung not from a deliberate intention to lecture the German people, but simply from the need to get rid of my own distress."[19]

The play is divided into two parts, the first taking place in the real world, the second in what first appears to be heaven, but later turns out to be something like purgatory. The plot is in two levels, one comprising the actions taken by Karl and Herbert and the people of their village, the other covering the action of a squadron of fliers who are shot down near the village.

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[19]Quoted in Carol Petersen, Max Frisch (New York, 1972), p. 35.

The first group represents the German people, the second some unspecified opposing force, perhaps the English or Americans. The problem for both groups is one which will be the prime concern of this study: are they responsible for what they are doing? Karl and Herbert open the play by shooting twenty-one women, children and old people who are being held as hostages. Karl, who is also supposed to shoot the priest, their only witness, begins immediately to worry about the deed, and runs away without shooting him.

Karl is suddenly horrified at the deeds he has committed, horrified almost to the point of insanity--at least to the point that he is no longer able to think coherently. He returns to his own village when he runs away, and here he wanders about looking for his mother, who is buried in the rubble of bombed buildings. Then he goes to his father, who is frightened at his son's action. The father is more concerned with obeying authority and tries to make his son return to the army. Instead Karl tries to make his father understand that they are all responsible, all guilty:

> Karl: Hast du schon einmal auf Frauen und Kinder geschossen?
> Oberlehrer: Ich sage dir: du hast es auf Befehl getan!
> Karl: Und wer hat es befohlen?
> Oberlehrer: Es ist nicht deine Schuld, Karl, was

alles auch befohlen wird, es ist nicht unsere Schuld--

Karl: Das ist es ja!

Oberlehrer: Du lachst?. . .

Karl: Jedes Wort, das du sagst, es klagt uns an. --Es gibt das nicht, es gibt keine Ausflucht in den Gehorsam, auch wenn man den Gehorsam zu seiner letzten Tugend macht, er befreit uns nicht von der Verantwortung. Das ist es ja! Nichts befreit uns von der Verantwortung, nichts, sie ist uns gegeben, jedem von uns, jedem die seine; man kann nicht seine Verantwortung einem andern geben, damit er sie verwalte. Man kann die Last der persönlichen Freiheit nicht abtreten--und eben das haben wir versucht, und eben das ist unsere Schuld.[20]

A statement by Hannah Arendt gives a reasonably accurate picture of what happens to Karl:

> [The modern man of the masses] has driven the dichotomy of private and public functions, of family and occupation, so far that he can no longer find in his own person any connection between the two. When his occupation forces him to murder people he does not regard himself as a murderer because he has not done it out of inclination but in his professional capacity. Out of sheer passion he would never do harm to a fly.
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> If we tell a member of this new occupational class which our time has produced that he is being held to account for what he did, he will feel nothing except that he has been betrayed. But if in the shock of the catastrophe he really becomes conscious that in fact he was not only a functionary but a murderer, then his way out will not be that of rebellion, but of suicide.[21]

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[20]Max Frisch, "Nun singen sie wieder," in Frühe Stücke: Santa Cruz/Nun singen sie wieder (Frankfurt am Main, W. Germany, 1966), Bild iv, pp. 105-106. Future references to this work will be cited in the text by title, scene (Bild) and page number. Where reference to this work is obvious, scene and page number alone will be used.

[21]Hannah Arendt, "Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility," in Smith, pp. 265-266.

When Karl is forced into the senseless act of shooting the hostages he does suddenly become aware of his actions, perhaps through the fact of the singing. He runs away to escape this, but cannot, and finally, in his conversations with his father, he comes to a full realization of the responsibility he has failed to live up to. Then he does, as Arendt would have predicted, commit suicide.

Karl's father's actions remind one of a very strong statement by Hannah Arendt about the German "family man" of World War II and about mob man in general:

> . . . the devoted paterfamilias, worried about nothing so much as his security, was transformed under the pressure of the chaotic economic conditions of our time into an involuntary adventurer, who for all his industry and care could never be certain what the next day would bring. . . . It became clear that for the sake of his pension, his life insurance, the security of his wife and children, such a man was ready to sacrifice his beliefs, his honor, and his human dignity. . . . After such degradation he was entirely prepared to do literally anything when the ante was raised and the bare existence of his family was threatened. The only condition he put was that he should be fully exempted from responsibility for his acts.[22]

Karl's father has given up, little by little, his personal responsibility and his moral idealism for the sake of conformity and later for the sake of his family's existence (See Nun singen sie wieder, Bild iv, pp. 105-

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[22]Arendt, pp. 263-264.

106). And, as Arendt says, the only condition he has been allowed is the right to say he was not responsible. "Karl," he tells his son, "du hast es auf Befehl getan! Ich sage dir: wir haben keine Schuld daran" (Bild iv, p. 104). He only begins to admit to himself after his son's death that his guilt for what he did is inescapable.

It is an interesting point, in terms of Smith's process of guilt, that in these two cases (Karl and his father) the separation from society and the subsequent process do not begin until the guilty one sees himself as guilty. Then he is separated or begins to feel separated on his own, without any act on the part of any other member of society, so that it is not totally necessary for society in the form of a real person or group of people to exist. Boundaries can be so strongly instilled that their breaking produces guilt quite apart from society.

Although he fails to convince his father immediately, Karl's dialogue and suicide in turn become the deciding factor in the teacher's realization of his own guilt. Stäuble describes it well:

> Der freiwillige Tod seines Sohnes öffnet dem Oberlehrer die Augen für die eigene Schuld und für die Schuld des eigenen Volkes. Und als, während eines Bombenangriffes der Feinde, die Leute im Luftschutzkeller über die Angreifer fluchen: "Gott strafe den Feind!", da kann der Oberlehrer nicht mehr in diesen Fluch miteinstimmen. "Auch unsere

> machen das gleiche," sagt er, "auch unsere machen das gleiche. . . ."[23]

Karl's statement to his father in Bild iv (pp. 105-106) is perhaps the key to the whole play. With the exception of Herbert, who sees his ability to commit such atrocities as proof that God does not exist (Bild i, p. 85), the characters come together in the second part of the play precisely to be made aware of the reality of their guilt. Jurgensen agrees: "Im Reich der Toten werden schliesslich alle Unterschiede aufgehoben; Freund und Feind treffen aufeinander und erfahren gemeinsam die Schuld und Sinnlosigkeit ihres verbrachten Daseins."[24]

In Part II it is the priest who brings the point into focus. In a conversation with the captain, as he slowly becomes aware that his former life wasn't as free from guilt as he thought, the priest tells him that the point of their present situation is that they must remain in purgatory until each learns his own guilt:

> Pope: Es wird noch lange dauern, etlich auch von den Toten denken noch immer an Rache. Ich glaube, es wird noch lange dauern, bis nichts mehr zurückbleibt.

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[23]Eduard Stäuble, Max Frisch: Gesamtdarstellung seines Werkes (St. Gallen, 1967), p. 80.

[24]Manfred Jurgensen, Max Frisch: Die Dramen (Bern, 1968), p. 92.

Hauptmann: Wie meinst du das?
Pope: Bis nichts mehr zurückbleibt, meine ich, von allem Grässlichen, was geschehen ist.
Hauptmann: Du redest ja, als wäre es ihre Schuld, dass man sie schändete, und sie sollen es abtragen, was Grässliches geschehen ist?
Pope: Darum allein, dass wir als ihre Opfer starben, darum sind wir noch keine guten Menschen gewesen.
Hauptmann: Und jene, die es getan haben?
Pope: Kümmere sich jeder um seine eigene Schuld.
Hauptmann: Heisst das, dass du den Mördern vergeben willst?
Pope: Ich bin nicht Richter, mein Freund, nicht einmal vergeben kann ich. Ich hatte Angst wie die meisten. . . .
Hauptmann: Und alle dies: wozu?
Pope: Ich glaube, wir alle sind da, bis wir das Leben kennenlernen, das wir zusammen hätten führen können. So lange sind wir da. Das ist die Reue, unsere Verdammnis, unsere Erlösung.
(Bild v, p. 125)

One thing Frisch seems to be saying here is that everyone involved in World War II is guilty of the war, the reason being that each person has the responsibility to live up to his own standard, and nobody has done this. The teacher, who represents the adult generation, has sold himself out intellectually and has therefore sold out his students, the younger generation. Karl, who represents this young German generation, has likewise evaded his responsibility. Whether it be out of cowardice or ignorance does not matter. He has still sold himself out by participating in the war. The captain, who represents the "right" side, is even so guilty of participation in killing. As Hans Bänziger points out, "Die sieben Flieger der feindlichen Armee sind keine Rächer in einem

männlichen Kampfe. . . ."[25] Bänziger claims they are instead powerless victims of blind fate, but Frisch would seem to have it otherwise, for he has the priest accuse everyone involved, himself and the enemy fliers included: "Darum allein, dass wir als ihre Opfer starben, darum sind wir noch keine guten Menschen gewesen" (Bild v, p. 125). Perhaps, as Jurgensen maintains, the captain's problems stem not so much from his participation in the war as from another source, his failure to live up to his potential: "Der Hauptmann hat die Sinnlosigkeit seines einstigen Daseins eingesehen, und ihm eröffnet sich die Ahnung eines wirklicheren Lebens."[26] As shall be discussed later, the search for "das wirkliche Leben" is a theme dominant in Frisch's works, and is related to the problems of guilt and responsibility in the plays being considered here.

Of the major characters, only Herbert continues to deny his guilt, but it is nevertheless clear that he is guilty in the same way that Karl is, and it is assumed that he will eventually realize this. At the end of the play he is in the state described by Arendt; he has been informed that he is a murderer, feels betrayed, but is not

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[25]Hans Bänziger, Frisch und Dürrenmatt (Munich, 1971), p. 59.

[26]Jurgensen, p. 99.

yet conscious of his crime.

Like many of Frisch's other plays, Nun singen sie wieder contains a minimum of dramatic action, and even though the play is about guilt, not all of the action is guilt-motivated, as, for example, it is in Biedermann und die Brandstifter. To be sure, all of Karl's actions are guilt-motivated. His refusal to shoot the priest comes out of a dawning awareness that the priest is innocent of any crime deserving such punishment. His flight home is motivated by his desire to escape death for not having shot the priest, but it is also a flight from guilt, in Frisch's eyes, for he has the priest tell Karl: "Jeder Weg, den du auf Erden noch gehst,--er führt dich hierher" (Bild i, p. 87). Later the priest explains that everyone who has returned to this place had to do so in order to learn how to live as he should have lived, not as he had. Thus Karl had to return to face his crime and be reconciled, in Smith's sense, with society. Other characters in the play are not motivated at all by guilt, but by fear of authority. Herbert does not act out of guilt, but on orders from above. The teacher, Karl's father, has in the past compromised his own moral integrity by giving in in some unspecified way to the authority he fears:

Oberlehrer: Auch mir, Karl, auch mir hat man schon Dinge befohlen, die ich aus freien Stücken nie getan, die ich nie auf meine eigene Verantwortung genommen hätte; mit kleinen und nebensächlichen Dingen fing es an, du weisst es, und warum habe ich es getan?

. . . . . .

Euch zuliebe habe ich es getan, Mutter zuliebe, dir zuliebe! Ich hatte damals die Wahl, ich konnte Oberlehrer oder brotlos werden, brotlos, arbeitslos, mittellos. Du lachst!

. . . . . .

Damals war es ein Schrecken, der grösste, damals, und dann war auch viel Gutes an der Sache, und ich sagte ja, euch zuliebe, Mutter zuliebe.

. . . . . .

Ich sagte ja. Später ging es nicht mehr um Stelle und Brot, es ging darum, ob man auf dieser Erde noch eine Heimat hatte oder nicht, und ich sagte noch einmal ja, denn ich wollte dir nicht die Heimat rauben. Begreifst du mich?

. . . . . .

Später ging es nicht mehr um Heimat oder Fremde, verstehst du, nach und nach ging es um den Kopf, und ich sagte ja. Karl! auch das ist ein Gewissen: man tötet nicht seine Frau der eignen persönlichen Gesinnung zuliebe, seine Frau, seinen Sohn--

(Bild iv, pp. 104-105)

The teacher's actions are out of fear of authority, as is the janitor's, and Karl's initial murdering of the hostages. These non-guilt-produced actions are very important to the question of guilt in the play, however. Each of the characters in Nun singen sie wieder is there to exemplify a crime of importance, that of failing to live up to one's own moral ideals, of not accepting one's responsibility to society. Karl's crime is not shooting the hostages so much as it is not having refused to shoot them. The teacher, as was mentioned, is guilty of not

saying no to the authorities. Herbert's crimes are somewhat more complex. He is guilty, of course, of the war crimes he has instigated or perpetrated, and for his general war-like behavior. In a sense, too, he is guilty of abandoning his principles, of erasing boundaries from his conscience such as limitations against mass murder. The priest accuses himself of the same crime, saying he too was afraid, and includes himself among the guilty for not standing up for the truth. The captain himself is guilty of vanity:

> Hauptmann: Wir hatten ein Haus, verstehst du, es war uns viel zu gross. Ich habe es bauen lassen, damit die Leute uns beneiden. Um unser Glück, das dennoch nicht kam. Das Haus, es war so gross wie mein Ehrgeiz, verstehst du, und ebenso leer.
>
> (Bild v, p. 121)

But in a wider sense the captain is guilty as Tillich defines it (see p. 16). He has sinned against himself by not being responsible to himself, by not living "das wirkliche Leben."

There are a number of other characters in the play, people such as Benjamin, Maria, and the small boy with the priest, who seem on the one hand to be innocent of any crime or any responsibility. It seems that they must therefore be presented, like the hostages, as mere victims of others' failure to accept responsibility. On the other hand, the priest, who seems to be the spokesman

for good, gives these people a share of the guilt, for after all, they are present in purgatory. He says that they are guilty precisely because they are victims. Thus it seems that Frisch is giving this responsibility to be true to oneself to everybody, and it seems obvious also that everybody has failed to carry out this responsibility.

The theme of social responsibility in Frisch's works is present almost from the beginning. In Nun singen sie wieder, his second play, his point is that men do have social and personal responsibilities and they must live up to them. The primary responsibility is to oneself, but in a larger sense to others, for if one acts responsibly toward himself, he must act responsibly toward society, because he is part of society. This idea is similar to the point of Die chinesische Mauer, in which Frisch says that man is socially responsible, but that it is impossible to live up to this responsibility. In Nun singen sie wieder, though, he has not yet come to this negativistic conclusion.

The second play to be analyzed is Als der Krieg zu Ende war, a work of very controversial construction. It was written during 1947 and 1948, but revised in 1962 by the omission of the third act. It is this act which causes the trouble. Kindler's Literatur Lexikon maintains that

> der letzte Akt wird allzu unorganisch angehängt. Der Oberst, neben dem Ehepaar die Hauptfigur der beiden ersten Akte, verschwindet im dritten ganz. Dagegen tauchen völlig neue Figuren--ein englischer Major und seine Frau sowie ein junger Quäker--auf. Der Schluss widerum, der eigentlich erschüttern müsste--Agnes stürzt sich auf die Strasse--, erscheint übersteigert und wenig überzeugend.[27]

In the first English translation, too, the third act is omitted completely.[28] The problem of the third act is even more important here because it is in that act that most of the play's dealings with guilt come through. Although Agnes' adultery and Horst's war crimes occur in or before Acts I and II, their psychological reactions to the crimes are not obvious until Act III. Thus, although Kindler's criticism of the structure is essentially and literarily correct, the three acts do hang together in one respect: the third act is a psychologically logical next step after the first two.

There are two ways of looking at Als der Krieg zu Ende war and its relationship to guilt psychology. Starting from Frisch's introduction to the play, there is the fact that Agnes, whose name means innocence or purity, typifies innocence and purity because she has no sense of racial prejudice. One of Frisch's favorite ideas is

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[27]Kindlers Literatur Lexikon (Zürich, 1965), vol. I, col. 478.

[28]Max Frisch, Three Plays, trans. James L. Rosenberg (New York, 1967).

that men trap other men by making "graven images" of them; that is, that a person is forced into being what other people think he is. Frisch relates it to the second commandment: "Du sollst dir kein Bildnis machen, heisst es, von Gott. Es dürfte auch in diesem Sinne gelten: Gott als das Lebendige in jedem Menschen, das, was nicht erfassbar ist."[29] In one section of Tagebuch 1946-1949, Frisch discusses this idea, maintaining that when one loves another, he does not make an image to entrap him.[30] In Als der Krieg zu Ende war, Agnes does not make the "graven image" of Iwanow that anyone else would because she does not speak his language and is freed from the prejudice innate in language. Thus her relationship with him is a good one. Frisch's theory that language is a carrier of prejudice is a valid one and proves itself true in this play about language barriers, for the person with whom Agnes does share a common language, Horst, is the person with whom she is unable to communicate truthfully. So Frisch has balanced an example of the positive statement of his theory with an example of its negative statement to provide a doubly clear message to the playgoer.

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[29]Max Frisch, Tagebuch 1946-1949 (Munich, 1950), p. 30.

[30]Ibid., pp. 26-28.

One must assume, if one accepts Frisch's idea, that Agnes' suicide has something to do with this principle of prejudice based on language. However, this link is difficult to see. Does Agnes kill herself because she cannot communicate with Horst? Possibly, but that is not the reason she gives. Three times she says that she cannot live in the same house with a criminal, twice in the first scene of Act III, once in the last: "Denn es geht nicht, dass wir im gleichen Hause wohnen mit einem Verbrecher, und wir wenden uns nicht gegen ihn. Es geht nicht, oder wir teilen seine Schuld."[31] It is assumed that it is Horst she is talking about, and that she commits suicide because of her suspicion of him. However, this sudden changeover from the guilty person in Act II who urges Horst to shoot her to the innocent in Act III who cannot bear to live with a "criminal" in the same house is a bit too sharp. Even detailed reading fails to turn up a really close relation between the language problem and the suicide (hence Kindler's comment that the third act does not belong to the first two). Thus we are tempted to look

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[31]Max Frisch, Als der Krieg zu Ende war, ed. Stuart Friebert (New York, 1967), Act III, pp. 87, 119. Future references to this work will be cited in the text by title, act, scene (Bild) and page number. When reference to this work is obvious, act, scene and page number alone will be used.

elsewhere for reasons for the suicide if we are to see the play as a coherent three acts. The biggest problem in the third act is that the theme of language-prejudice is blurred and almost buried by the introduction of new characters, none of whom is important to the plot of Acts I and II. More important, Frisch shifts his thematic emphasis from the language-prejudice problem to two other areas. First, he moves from portraying two people communicating without language (and two not communicating with it) to portraying one person, Agnes, as she struggles with her guilt feelings. In addition he shifts attention to another idea, that of Horst's criminality, and tries to present this as the reason for Agnes' suicide.

Although the language-prejudice barrier is obviously the main theme of the play, it appears that Als der Krieg zu Ende war shows greater coherence if the characters are analyzed in terms of their psychological dealings with guilt, and if Agnes' suicide is considered to be the result of guilt feelings about adultery rather than the result of her husband's war crimes. Agnes' actions in particular become clearer if we apply a little psychological analysis. To do this we need to look at her actions from the very beginning of the play. She is struggling from the first scene to admit to Horst that

their relationship is no longer possible, and at the same time she is struggling with the guilt feelings this is causing her. When he asks if she still loves him, she tries to explain:

> Horst: Wir sind alle nur Menschen. Ich meine, was ich dich gestern schon fragte. . . . Ob du mich noch liebst wie früher--Du musst nicht sagen, was gewesen ist; nur Ja oder Nein.
> Agnes: Nichts ist gewesen, Horst.
> Horst: Nichts . . .
> Agnes: Ich weiss, du glaubst es nicht.
> Horst: Zwei Jahre sind eine lange Zeit.
> Agnes: O ja! Wenn man keinen Abend weiss, wer den andern Morgen erleben wird. . . . Warum glaubst du mir nicht? . . . Es wurde viel gelebt hier, das ist wahr, und über keiner Frau, die es anders hielt, würde ich jemals den Stab brechen. Ich wusste nicht einmal, ob du noch am Leben bist. Du musst das nicht Treue nennen oder so, es war grauenhaft--ich weiss nicht--im Grunde ist alles ganz anders, als man es sagen kann. Ich wollte einfach leben. Ich wollte nicht vor die Hunde gehn--.
>
> (Act I, Bild i, pp. 26-27)

But she feels guilty for this, and so, after Jehuda's discovery of her presence, she vows, in a sudden change of mind, not to desert Horst:

> Agnes: Ich werde sprechen mit ihm. Ich werd' es versuchen. Und wenn ich umsonst gegangen bin, wenn es nichts ist mit dem Sonntagskind--wir werden einander nicht im Stich lassen, Horst . . . Du? . . . Wollen wir nicht leben, solang es geht? Und wenn es nicht geht, wenn's nur noch auf allen Vieren geht: dann nicht!
>
> (Act I, Bild i, p. 33)

All through the second act there are hints that she has guilt feelings about her affair with Iwanow. In the first scene, she explodes guiltily when Horst worries

that she is not eating enough:

> Horst: Du wirst immer elender, Agnes, das geht doch nicht.
> Agnes: Mach dir keine Sorge, mein Lieber, wirklich--!
> Horst: Bekommst du droben was Besseres . . .
> (Agnes wendet sich scharf:)
> Agnes: Wofür hältst du mich eigentlich?
> Horst: Nun ja--der Mensch muss doch leben . . .
> Agnes: Ich frage dich, wofür du mich hältst.
> Horst: Herrgott--
> Agnes: Glaubst du eigentlich, ich bin eine Hure?
> (Act II, Bild iii, p. 54)

Later in Act II, her guilt reaches an intense level as she senses Horst is suspicious, and she begs him to punish her so that boundaries can be re-established and she can be taken back into "society"--i.e., into Horst's company:

> Horst: Warum schaust du mich so an?
> Agnes: Und du? Warum schaust du mich an?
> Horst: Du siehst herrlich aus, Agnes, wie auf unserm ersten Ball. Damals in der Ermitage.
> Agnes: Du wolltest was andres sagen.
> Horst: Weiss nicht.
> Agnes: Sag es doch.
> Horst: Du gehst gerne hinauf?
> Agnes: Horst--
> Horst: Ich frage ja nur.
> (Agnes wirft sich an seine Schulter.)
> Agnes: Lass mich nicht gehen! Nie wieder!
> Horst: Agnes?
> Agnes: Halte mich! Halte mich!
> Horst: Du. . . .
> (Horst streicht ihr Haar.)
> Agnes: Lass mich nie wieder gehen.
> Horst: Und wenn sie herunter kommen?
> Agnes: Erschiesse mich.
> Horst: Agnes--
> Agnes: Uns beide.
> (Act II, Bild iii, pp. 63-64)

As Robert Heilmann notes, however, Agnes backs away from

this decision and offers Horst the chance to remain ignorant with her plea a few sentences later: "Glaube an mich, oder erschiesse mich!"[32] Horst accepts this alternative and lets her guilt remain unatoned when he replies "Das ich dir glaube, Agnes, das ist doch klar--sonst sind wir verloren." This is Agnes' last personal dialogue with Horst in Act II.

In Act III, one would expect that her continued feelings of guilt would be reflected in her speech and actions, but on the surface, just the opposite seems to be the case. In the first speech of the act Agnes delivers the judgment of Horst that was mentioned earlier, that he is a criminal and cannot be tolerated: "Denn es geht nicht, dass wir im gleichen Hause wohnen mit einem Verbrecher, und wir wenden uns nicht gegen ihn. Es geht nicht, oder wir teilen seine Schuld" (Act III, Bild v, p. 87). Again she repeats this statement, word for word, and in so doing re-emphasizes her new position. Thus Frisch seems to indicate that Agnes commits suicide because she must atone for the sin of harboring a criminal. However, later in the third act the conversation returns to her affair with Stepan Iwanow and the certainty that she did wrong returns to her in the form of a wish for punishment:

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[32]Robert B. Heilmann, The Iceman, the Arsonist, and the Troubled Agent (Seattle, 1973), p. 194.

Horst: Nur ich mag nicht, dass jeder es weiss:
Die hat es mit einem Russen gehabt, während ihr
Mann drunten im Keller hockte, drei Wochen lang!
. . . . . .
(Agnes starrt ihn mit offenem Mund an.)
Agnes: Du hast es gewusst--
Horst: Warum entsetzt dich das so?
Agnes: Und hast mich nicht erschossen. Du hast es
gewusst und hast mich gehen lassen?
(Agnes verbirgt ihr Gesicht.)
(Act III, Bild v, p. 121)

But she wishes for punishment not because she has given shelter to Horst, but because she slept with Iwanow. This contradicts the theory that she dies because she has become a party to Horst's crimes.

After this dialogue she says nothing. She ignores what Horst is saying to her, finally covering her ears to keep him out and jumps to her death. As she jumps it is not "Horst" she calls, but "Stepan Iwanow." Even though what Horst is trying to tell her is what she suspects of him, that he was partly responsible for the actions at Warsaw, the cause of her suicide still seems to be her affair with Iwanow. It should be emphasized that in Agnes' eyes the sin of adultery is a double one. On the one hand, she is sinning against Horst because she is married to him, even though she no longer loves him. On the other hand, she does love Stepan, and when Horst comes upstairs at the end of Act II, Stepan of course knows that she is an adulteress and she becomes guilty in his eyes.

Additionally, Agnes' sin against Stepan is greater in her eyes than her sin against Horst, simply because Stepan is much more significant to her. She loves him, whereas she is no longer in love with Horst.

Agnes appears to have become deranged by the confrontation between Horst and Stepan at the end of Act II. It is as if she does not consciously consider herself guilty during her affair with Stepan, but at the moment she is discovered by Stepan to be an adulteress, she realizes her guilt. Just at this point Jehuda accuses Horst, and Agnes picks this accusation as a defense against having to admit to herself that she is guilty. Throughout Act III she appears preoccupied with the idea that Horst's crimes are making her guilty, when it is really her own actions, and it is for this, her own crime against Stepan, that she commits suicide. After a fashion, she admits this herself. Speaking of Stepan in the first scene of Act III, she says: "Er sah den Mann, der eine Waffe zog und sich verriet, und er sah die Frau, die er liebte, als Hure, die einen Verbrecher verbarg. Wie sollte er es anders sehen können?" (Act III, Bild v, p. 87). And immediately following this she repeats her belief that one becomes guilty if one tolerates a guilty person. Thus her sin against Stepan is not only adultery, but also giving shelter to Horst, and this

is why she must die. It is interesting that here Agnes does not feel guilty until some form of society sees her as guilty. This is in sharp contrast to Karl, who sees himself as guilty when no one else does.

If Agnes' actions are seen in terms of Smith's definition of the social process of guilt (see p. 10), it becomes clear that the third act of Als der Krieg zu Ende war is socially, if not dramatically, necessary. The social law against adultery is broken. Agnes crosses a boundary of sexual behavior and is found out by Stepan Iwanow, who then walks out, thus separating her from himself and beginning the social process of guilt. Between the second act and the end of the third, Agnes suffers guilt feelings which reflect her wish to reassert the boundary which was overstepped. Horst also provides a means of reasserting the boundary by himself making her feel guilty. The crux of the problem in the third act is that reconciliation and atonement are not possible, because the person Agnes has sinned against, Stepan, is not there to effect a reconciliation. Agnes' suicide may be seen as the only alternative solution. Her problem is that she is in limbo; she is neither accepted nor rejected by society in the form of Iwanow, and she must choose between death and living outside of society, i.e., away from Iwanow. Her decision in Act III is a necessary consequence

of her actions in Acts I and II and of Iwanow's at the end of Act II. In this sense, then, Act III is necessary after Acts I and II, and follows it logically.

Another set of emotional transactions is important in Acts II and III. Besides the criminal-versus-society relationship between Agnes and Stepan Iwanow, there is a criminal-versus-society relationship between Agnes and Horst which causes some of the mixed feelings Agnes exhibits. In this relationship also the crime is adultery. All of Agnes' guilt speeches in Act II are made in the presence of Horst. When she is with him she considers herself an adulteress. When she is with Iwanow, she does not. It is only when Horst comes into the picture in the last scene of Act II that she sees herself as an adulteress in Iwanow's eyes. Then she feels guilt towards Horst and shame (here the fear of a negative response followed by an actual negative response from Iwanow) before Stepan.

Contrapuntally, in Act III it is Horst's pride (pride being the opposite of shame) which prevents Agnes' reconciliation with him and contributes to her suicide. Just before her suicide Horst confesses to her that he knew of her adultery even as it was occurring, but kept quiet about it out of pride: "Nur ich mag nicht, dass jeder es weiss: Die hat es mit einem Russen gehabt,

während ihr Mann drunten im Keller hockte, drei Wochen lang!" (Act III, Bild v, p. 121). This also suggests that the whole situation could have had quite a different turn had Horst's prideful silence in Act II been broken. As a result of pride, Horst appears guilty of another more subtle crime, one that can be found in much of Frisch's work. If he can be accused of anything, he can be accused of lying to himself, of violating his own personal integrity for his safety's sake. By not admitting Agnes' affair with Stepan and by not admitting the lack of love between himself and Agnes, Horst allowed the whole situation to develop. Had they communicated properly (and this ties in with Frisch's stated theme about language), Agnes and Horst would not have perpetrated the crime they committed against Iwanow. Had Horst been honest with himself, and consequently with Agnes, the whole affair would have been known and possibly avoided. Thus Horst's crime is the violation of his own integrity.

Here, then, is another example of an important Frisch theme: "das wirkliche Leben." As Tillich would put it, Horst has committed an anti-moral act, one which contradicts his realization of himself, or one which hinders his progress toward "das wirkliche Leben."

Horst, who is not really a central figure in the play, nevertheless shows an interesting variation on the

war-crime guilt syndrome. In an unusual turnabout, Frisch has him say: "Natürlich haben wir die Leute umgelegt, Hunderte und Tausende--das heisst: nicht ich! Ich habe es nur befehlen müssen. . ." (Act III, Bild v, p. 123). Horst seems to have found his justification in just the reverse of most people's thinking. Where other characters (the teacher in Nun singen sie wieder, for example) were protesting "I had to do it, I was ordered to!" Horst defends himself by saying, "I didn't to it, I only had to order it done!"

Of the other characters in Als der Krieg zu Ende war, none was concerned with the action, and none committed crimes or had guilt which influenced the play's progress in any way. Stepan himself is just a stage prop, more or less, for the action between Agnes and Horst and between Agnes and her conscience. His "actions" consist of his affair with Agnes, conducted offstage, and not really part of the play, and of his walking out at the end of the second act. He has perpetrated no crime, but has, at the end of Act II, acted in accordance with what Frisch might call his own moral ideals. As Agnes admits, he has seen sin and chooses to eschew it:

> Agnes: Stepan Iwanow: gekommen als Krieger, gehasst und gefürchtet als Feind, langsam erkannt als einzelner Mensch, vertraut und für immer geliebt, für immer gegangen aus diesem Zimmer, ohne Rache, ohne Sprache, wie ein

> verwundetes Tier: wie hätte er glauben können, dass Agnes ihn liebte? Er sah den Mann, der eine Waffe zog und sich verriet, und er sah die Frau, die er liebte, als Hure, die einen Verbrecher verbarg. Wie sollte er es anders sehen können?
>
> (Act III, Bild v, p. 87)

Stepan stands in contrast to Agnes, who has lied and cheated, and to Horst, who has put off the inevitable confrontation with them too long.

Als der Krieg zu Ende war is a play about the inherent prejudice of language and the effect of this on communication. But however strongly this point is made in the ideas of the play, the actions of the characters of the play show another point, one not at all foreign to Frisch's works and not mutually exclusive of the language problem. The question of responsibility to oneself, of personal integrity, has been in the Frisch dramas since Nun singen sie wieder, and it will be seen in other plays. It is Horst's problem in Acts I and II, and Agnes' in Act III. If we look at Als der Krieg zu Ende war as a play of personal responsibility as well as one of language prejudice, the third act follows more closely after the first and second, and the play appears more coherent than it at first seems.

Another play by Max Frisch that treats guilt is Die chinesische Mauer. There are two major considerations in discussing this work in terms of guilt. First, on the

positive side, it is in one sense totally concerned with guilt, for its theme is the social responsibility of man. On the other hand, the other major facet of the play is that literally all but two of the characters are total masks without personality, without guilt or innocence, and thus of almost no importance to this study.

The point of the play, as Manfred Jurgensen sees it, is to warn mankind and to awaken people to their responsibility.[33] Frisch mentions that the setting for the play is "diese Bühne (Oder man könnte auch sagen: unser Bewusstsein)."[34] If, as most critics agree, the play is to be considered a drama in the conscience, then this play should provide a good opportunity to investigate the workings of guilt, for, as has been noted, guilt originates and must be dealt with in the conscience. Die chinesische Mauer might be seen as the enactment of a single person's process of accepting and coping with guilt. Under this interpretation the characters, particularly the Man of Today, Mee Lan, and Olan, might be seen as different thoughts recurring in the conscience of the person whose mind is the play's scene. We shall carry

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[33]Jurgensen, Max Frisch, p. 62.

[34]Max Frisch, Die chinesische Mauer (Frankfurt am Main, 1955), p. 12. Future references to this work will be cited in the text by title, scene and page number. When reference to this work is obvious, scene and page number alone will be used.

this discussion further after the actions and thoughts of these characters have been discussed individually.

A second way Die chinesische Mauer might be viewed is as any play usually would be considered; that is, not as a theoretical discussion set in the conscience, but as a staged representation of reality, where the characters appearing are individuals in society, albeit here a very confused society, with respect to time. It may seem that this omission of an actual fact of the play (that it occurs in Everyman's conscience) is not valid for criticism of the play. However, ignoring the theoretical setting does open the way for interpreting the actions of the characters, and these actions are important in themselves. When the play is staged, the fact that it is set in the conscience may be known, but it will not be emphasized. What will be seen are actions of individual characters, and these actions thus merit separate treatment. In the final analysis, setting the author's stated locale for the play completely aside cannot be done, but ignoring it for a time may finally allow a clearer interpretation of the play.

If we accept the stage as the setting for the play, the characters of main concern, as was previously mentioned, in order of importance are the Man of Today,

Mee Lan, and Olan. These people are the only characters really involved in the action of the play. The executioner and Wang (der Stumme), although part of the action, both act without their willing it and are thus incapable of becoming guilty according to the definitions set forth in Chapter I. Brutus, although very active at the end of the play (in murdering Cut and Frack), still has no action involving the Chinese scene per se. That is, he is not directly involved with the above-mentioned characters. His action is in relation to the other masks and as such is without importance to the main drama.

Of all the characters, the Man of Today is of course the most important. It is within him that the greatest change occurs during the play, and it is through him that most of the author's attitude seems to come out. The Man of Today goes through four definite stages in the twenty-four scenes of Die chinesische Mauer. In his first stage he feels an overriding responsibility to warn the men of the past of what is in store for them if they continue as history predicts they will. More than once he is at pains to describe what will happen, as in this passage when he tries to convince Napoleon that he cannot return to rule Europe in the twentieth century:

> der Heutige: Wir können uns das Abenteuer der Alleinherrschaft nicht mehr leisten, Exzellenz, und zwar nirgends auf dieser Erde; das Risiko ist zu gross. Wer heutzutag auf einem Thron sitzt, hat die Menschheit in der Hand ihre ganze Geschichte, angefangen bei Moses oder Buddha, inbegriffen die Akropolis, die Tempel der Maya, die Dome der Gotik, inbegriffen die ganze abendländische Philosophie, die Malerei der Spanier und Franzosen, die Musik der Deutschen, Shakespeare, inbegriffen dieses jugendliche Paar: Romeo und Julia. Und inbegriffen uns alle, unsere Kinder, unsere Kindeskinder. Eine einzige Laune von Ihm, der heutzutag auf einem Thron sitzt, ein Nervenzusammenbruch, eine Neurose, eine Stichflamme seines Grössenwahns, eine Ungeduld wegen schlechter Verdauung: Und alles ist hin. Alles! Eine Wolke von gelber oder brauner Asche, die sich zum Himmel türmt, anzuschauen wie ein Pilz, wie ein schmutziger Blumenkohl, und der Rest ist Schweigen--radioaktives Schweigen.
>
> (Scene i, pp. 17-18)

And he is doggedly determined, with the optimism of an inexperienced intellectual, that even though people do not want to hear, he will make them. He addresses the audience:

> der Heutige: Sie sehen schon, meine Damen und Herren, wie heikel es ist, mit diesen Herrschaften zu sprechen, die unser Hirn bevölkern und nicht begreifen wollen, was ihnen ein Heutiger meldet, mit diesen Lemuren einer Geschichte, die nicht zu wiederholen ist. Ich werde es aber nicht aufgeben. . . .
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> (Scene i, p. 18)

In this vein he tries to convince Napoleon, Mee Lan, Hwang Ti, Philipp of Spain, and Da Hing Yen, but nobody seems to listen except Mee Lan. And she listens because, for reasons of her own, she is dissatisfied with the status

quo and wants to use the Man of Today to get out of the situation she is in. She believes him, and is consequently quite verbally disappointed after scene xiv, when the Man of Today fails to change history by martyring himself in defense of the mute. At this stage the Man of Today is only existentially guilty. There is really no concrete act or omission on his part that has caused the discovery of the bomb; he is guilty only because he is a member of society. Like Beckmann in Draussen vor der Tür,[35] he is trying to assume a guilt which he cannot possibly carry himself. He is trying to make existential guilt into ethical guilt, and it is not surprising that he is unsuccessful.

Scene xiv, in which the mute is condemned to torture, is the first turning point in the Man of Today's attitude. In the second stage of his development he realizes that what he has been seeing and hearing is true, that people, even intellectuals (the Man of Today himself) who know what the situation really is, will not accept their social responsibilities, whether they are responsible for total destruction (the cobalt bomb) or for the loss of one life (the torturing of the mute).

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[35]Wolfgang Borchert, Draussen vor der Tür (Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1956).

Not only will people not accept, they cannot accept:

> der Heutige: Was kann ich denn tun?! Er wird gefoltert. Ich weiss. Wie schon einige Tausend gefoltert worden sind . . . das alles, ich weiss, gibt es bis zum heutigen Tag. Und ob wir weinen oder lachen, ob wir tanzen, schlafen, lesen: Es gibt (vermutlich) keine einzige Stunde, da nicht ein Mensch gefoltert, geschunden, gemartert, geschändet, gemordet wird zu unsrer Zeit. Hat denn unsereiner, ein Intellektueller, jemals das Verhängnis abzuwenden vermocht, nur weil er es voraussieht? Wir können Bücher schreiben und Reden halten, sogar mutige Reden: Warum es so nicht weitergehen kann! Und es geht weiter. Genau so! Gelehrte höchsten Ranges erheben sich und rufen der Menschheit zu: Die Kobalt-Bombe, die wir herstellen sollen, wird euer Ende sein!--und die Kobalt-Bombe wird hergestellt. Du hast recht Mee Lan: die Achsel zucken und eine nächste Zigarette anzünden, das ist alles, was unsereiner zuzeiten vermag. . . .
>
> (Scene xix, pp. 79-80)

This declaration follows upon his own refusal in scene xiv to accept the responsibility for the defense of the mute. And it is his guilt feelings over this, combined with Mee Lan's accusations, which bring him to the third stage, that of action. Defending his inaction to Mee Lan he stumbles upon the only solution to be found:

> der Heutige: Kann man das Martyrium wählen, wie man einen Beruf wählt? Und doch hast du recht. Ich weiss! Es bleibt dem Geist, wenn er Geschichte will, nichts als das Opfer seiner selbst--
>
> (Scene xix, p. 86)

Even though it is a negativistic decision, he makes it in the belief that at least he will die a man of principle,

a man who has accepted his moral responsibility. It is to Frisch's credit that he did not allow the matter to end here on even a slightly optimistic note. There is further degradation for the man of ideas when he stands up for the mute and becomes so eloquent in his defense that instead of being beheaded as Min Ko, the Voice of the People, he is awarded the Kung Fu Tse prize for poetry and made a hero. The ghastly conclusion of the fourth stage in the Man of Today's intellectual development is that nothing matters. Not even the sacrifice of oneself is significant. Whatever one does, it simply does not matter. As Petersen points out,

> [In Die chinesische Mauer,] freedom is only in the realm of the spirit; for in the real world, the possessors of power end up by doing the same things over and over again. . . . The intellect as decoration but not as an agent that controls power--this appears to be its position now and forever.[36]

At the end of the play the Man of Today is completely mute.

Ultimately the Man of Today is guilty of nothing. His two major actions, refusing to help the mute and later trying to help him, are both useless and neither responsible nor guilty actions. He is left quite innocent at the end, except for his existential guilt, which has not changed, but he has illustrated a major point

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[36]Petersen, Max Frisch, p. 39.

about social responsibility, a point which will be discussed later.

If the Man of Today is the Intellectual of Die chinesische Mauer, Mee Lan can be called the Romantic. Her ideas until the end of the play seem based more upon boredom and infatuation than anything else. She is in her first scene a spoiled teenager who wants an Emotional Prince Charming, not a great general, for a husband. She is infatuated with the Man of Today simply because he is different from the series of lookalike heroes suing for her hand. As she steps out of character and addresses the audience, she reveals her emotionality, and at the same time the moral idealism which eventually becomes significant in her interactions with the Man of Today; but even this, one of her most forceful statements, is filled with childish overtones:

> Mee Lan: Ihr meint, ihr könnt mir etwas vormachen? Ihr meint, ich merke nicht, dass ich verkleidet bin? Und ihr, die ihr erwachsen seid und alles wisst, glaubt ihr denn selbst daran, zum Beispiel: dass Papa immer im Recht ist? Ich bin nicht blöd. Ihr meint, ich merke nicht, dass alles hier. . . . Theater ist? . . . Ihr aber sitzt und seht's euch an, ihr die ihr erwachsen seid und alles wisst, ihr sitzt, die Arme vor der Brust verschränkt, und schweigt--und keiner kommt und sagt's wie's ist, und keiner wagt's und ist ein Mann?
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> (Scene vi, p. 32)

Mee Lan's major importance is not, as with the Man

of Today, in her ideas of moral responsibility and her learning to cope with them. She is more important for her interaction with the Man of Today. As far as individual guilt goes, she is probably the least guilty of all characters in the play. Because she is not yet a full member of society, she does not have the social responsibility that the Man of Today feels. In fact, she is only beginning to see that such a thing exists. Her vision has not yet developed to the point that she knows what social responsibility is; thus by definition, she cannot be held socially guilty because social guilt is not yet an internalized concept to her. By the end of the play, though, she has grown quite a bit. She seems to understand what has happened to the Man of Today and to be in complete accord with him.

Mee Lan's greatest significance, as was mentioned above, is in her interaction with the Man of Today. She plays roughly the part of society in general to the offender, the Man of Today. Although in an absolute sense Frisch seems to conclude at the end of the play that the Man of Today is not guilty, within the action of the play his decision not to defend the mute is seen by Mee Lan as wrong. Looking at this situation with Smith's social definition of guilt in mind, it can be said that the Man of Today transgresses a boundary in scene xiv

when he fails to defend the mute. As happened to Agnes in Als der Krieg zu Ende war, society separates itself from the Man of Today. As Iwanow rejects Agnes, Mee Lan rejects the Man of Today in scene xix:

> Mee Lan: Du weisst, dass er stumm ist.
> der Heutige: Ja.
> Mee Lan: Und du hast es zugelassen, dass ein Stummer gefoltert wird, du, der alles weiss?
> der Heutige: Zugelassen--?
> Mee Lan: Du zuckst die Achsel. Das ist alles! Die Achsel zucken und eine nächste Zigarette anzünden, während sie einen Stummen foltern und zum Schreien bringen, weil du, der Sprache hat, daneben stehst und schweigst--das ist alles!
> (Scene xix, p. 79)

At the end of the scene she re-emphasizes this rejection of him by dancing off the stage with Don Juan. At the same time she reasserts the boundary, as Smith puts it, by letting him know what she expects of him--that he defend the mute. Later he restores the boundary he has transgressed by doing the thing he was guilty of not doing. He announces himself as the Voice of the People to save the child's life. This eventually leads in scene xxiv to his reconciliation with society as Mee Lan accepts him again. Thus Mee Lan's function in the guilt-responsibility theme of the play is supportive rather than central. She herself is neither responsible nor guilty, but she acts as a foil against which the Man of Today's development can take place.

Of the other characters in Die chinesische Mauer,

all except Olan (die Mutter) are masks, and although some have some importance to the general question of guilt, none other is guilty in terms of the play itself. By its very definition, a mask cannot be guilty, for the mask has no individual personality and no will, hence no conscience. Olan, of course, is guilty of betraying her son in scene xxi, although it is such a mindless, stupid action that it is hard to believe she knows what she is doing. She is used more as a means of pointing out that people do not learn from others' experiences than as an example of a guilty person.

Although the remaining characters and masks have little importance in the context of the foregoing discussion, some of them are significant when the play is considered as it really must be considered, in the context of its ultimate scene of action: the conscience.

If, as was suggested at the beginning of this discussion, Die chinesische Mauer is seen as a single person's process of accepting and coping with guilt, the reader is faced, as Frisch apparently wanted him to be, with a bewildering selection of ideas, some of them completely unrelated to the question of moral responsibility. The philosophy and changes in position of the Man of Today seem to represent the dominant and eventually triumphant attitude taken by the conscience in question. Petersen

calls him "the character through whom Frisch speaks."[37] The Man of Today is the dominant figure in the play. He is the most vocal and the best developed as a character. He is the character who changes most during the course of the play. In fact he is the only character to change except for Mee Lan. The action of the play is so centered on him that it appears that the moral point of the play must be the moral point that he sees for himself. Another slightly less than logical hint that his ideas are the conclusive ones is that he is, after all, the only twentieth-century person in a play which does take place in the twentieth century.

Mee Lan, as was suggested earlier, might be taken to represent society as this conscience sees it, as the vehicle for the expiation of sin. Most of the masks (but especially Brutus and Pilate) serve as examples of the results of inaction: Pilate is forced to repeat again and again that it was not his fault that Jesus was killed. He tries to mitigate his guilt by intellectual argument, avoiding the question by asking another, "Was ist Wahrheit?" and by self-effacement: "Wie soll ich entscheiden, was Wahrheit ist? Ich bin unschuldig am Blut dieses Gerechten" (scene xxiii, p. 102). Brutus, who on the other hand did act against tyranny (and hence

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[37]Petersen, p. 38.

for social responsibility, although he did commit an immoral act in the process) represents the realization that it really doesn't matter, because the whole situation is hopeless anyway. He at least suspects this himself: "Heisst dies Geschichte, dass der Unverstand/ Unsterblich wiederkehrt und triumphiert?" (scene viii, p. 44; scene xxiii, p. 102). He thus foreshadows the end of the play quite early in the action, in scene viii.

The other characters and masks in the play are there primarily for reasons other than to present ideas about social responsibility. Some are merely necessary pieces of furniture, as the Master of Ceremonies, while others have importance to other considerations in the play, as Hwang Ti and Wu Tsiang, who represent the machinations of the tyrant and future tyrant in the problem of the cobalt bomb.

We might sum up by repeating that Die chinesische Mauer is a play about social responsibility in which a man's conscience is obliged to consider and draw conclusions on the question of whether he actually does have a responsibility to society. The conclusion seems to be that man does have social responsibility, or else Pilate would not still be guilty; but that man has no real way of acting socially responsibly. No matter what he does, he cannot change the course of history. The main

action of the play is a clear demonstration of what Smith calls "the structural sequence of guilt," and the clear implication of scene xxiv is that although man cannot change the course of history, he is obliged by society to try to do so.

Guilt as a motivating factor for the action of the play is not obvious, yet it is pervasive. The fear of becoming guilty is what produces in the Man of Today the urge to be responsible socially. Thus fear of guilt is in essence the major motivating force for all the actions of the Man of Today in the play. As was discussed earlier, Mee Lan becomes the society which reacts to the Man of Today's guilty actions and is thus also prompted to act by guilt. Minor characters such as Brutus and Pilate, who have committed actual crimes, also serve as warnings against ignoring social responsibility. Even though their actions were themselves not important to the play, they were still guilt-produced.

In the foregoing discussion there has been almost no mention of what is generally regarded as the most important theme of Die chinesische Mauer: the matter of political tyranny and the cobalt bomb. The bomb and the political tyrant are obviously of importance to the play, but their importance is, like many other concrete facts in Frisch's dramas, not actually in the facts but in their

power as metaphors. As Hwang Ti and his wall are symbols of tyranny, the responsibility for the cobalt bomb is a metaphor for the discussion of the question of political and social responsibility in general. Enough of Frisch's work is concerned with responsibility for it to be possible to maintain that the bomb-plus-tyranny situation simply forms a metaphor through which Frisch is putting forth his views on responsibility.

There are several extraneous matters to be reckoned with in discussing Andorra. The World War II Jewish question, the question of political dominance, the similarity between Andorra and Switzerland, between the Andorra of the play and the real Andorra all serve to obfuscate the meatier questions of the play. The major theme of the play is, of course, "Du sollst dir kein Bildnis machen," and the effects of breaking that commandment. It might be noted that the second commandment as Frisch interprets it (that is, that it is wrong to make a set image in one's mind of an individual, because that stifles him by making him into what one thinks he is) is a commandment which deals with man in society, and the responsibility not to break this commandment is therefore a social or collective responsibility. Thus in talking about what the main theme of the play is we are really talking also about the secondary theme: social responsibility.

Another prevalent theme is, as Jurgensen calls it, "der Mensch auf der Suche nach seiner Identität."[38] Andri's major problem is having no identity. In all innocence, he has been lied to and subjected to false images of himself, and literally does not know who he is. Other characters in the play are self-deceptive. They have refused to be truthful and therefore responsible to themselves and to Andri. Thus there is a second argument for responsibility as a theme in Andorra.

In Andorra, social responsibility is handled not in terms of the intellectual, as in Die chinesische Mauer, but in terms of the emotional, one might even say the primitive or animalistic aspect of man the social animal, for the action of the play is the creation and execution of a scapegoat. Here it is not a matter of causing the physical destruction of mankind, but of the lapse of a whole society into primitive behavior.

The process of scapegoating arises in primitive cultures from a fear of evil spirits or gods and the need of primitive peoples to rid themselves of these evil spirits. James Frazer, in The Golden Bough,[39] attests the

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[38]Jurgensen, Max Frisch, p. 82.

[39]Quoted in John B. Vickery and J'nan M. Sellery, eds., The Scapegoat: Ritual and Literature (New York, 1972), pp. 3-51.

existence of scapegoatism in widely varied types and stages of society, and describes scapegoatism in many forms. He sees it as a collective process arising from fear of evil and knowledge (perhaps subconscious) in each individual that he has evil within him. The use of a scapegoat to carry away all the evil spirits from the individual and the society relieves people individually and collectively of their guilt, and in many cases is thought to assure prosperity and good in the future.

Frazer notes some characteristics in his descriptions of various scapegoating rituals which apply quite nicely to the scapegoating in Andorra. In several ceremonies the scapegoat was chosen because he had some mark or defect that was recognizeable to the gods as a sign that he was to be the scapegoat.[40] In Andorra, the mark chosen to indicate the scapegoat was Jewishness, for after all, that is what the "evil gods" in the form of the Blacks found acceptable as a sacrifice. In some societies the human sacrifice's face was painted or covered to hide his identity.[41] In Andorra the victim's face was covered until he was accepted. The incident of the stoning of the Señora, the rape of Barblin, and other

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[40]Frazer, The Golden Bough, pp. 6, 15.

[41]Frazer, p. 10.

more minor sins committed in the play seem to reflect Frazer's comment that the expulsion of devils or evil spirits is "commonly preceded or followed by a period of general license, during which the ordinary restraints of society are thrown aside, and all offenses, short of the gravest, are allowed to pass unpunished."[42]

Erich Neumann, in Depth Psychology and a New Ethic, outlines the scapegoat phenomenon in more detailed psychological terms and thereby explains the action of Andorra to a great extent. He maintains that every man has a "shadow," which consists of the evil in himself, or more precisely the opposite of a man's or Man's ideal self. It is "that part of our personality which is 'alien' to the ego, or own unconscious counterposition. . . ."[43] Man, individually and collectively, cannot accept this shadow as part of himself, so he projects it onto an outside object. Then "it is combated, punished and exterminated as 'the alien out there.'"[44] This is, in terms of psychological processes, what happens when a society institutes and executes a scapegoat. People begin to be consciously aware of evil

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[42]Frazer, p. 21.

[43]Quoted in Erich Neumann, "The Scapegoat Psychology," in Vickery and Sellery, p. 45.

[44]Neumann, p. 43.

within themselves and rid themselves of these unacceptable feelings by projecting them onto a member of their society who is weak and vulnerable by reason of his deviation from the social norm. This scapegoat is then made to leave the society in question, either through exile or death, and takes with him the evil feelings which had been felt within the society's members. In Andorra bigotry and greed, among other things, exist in great quantity, although Andorra prides itself on its tolerance and the fact that it is an innocent, sinless nation. Thus the bigotry and greed, which are part of the collective shadow, are projected on Andri as a means of liberating the people of Andorra from sin. But why should Andri, a youth innocent of any crime, be chosen as scapegoat?

It appears that there are two reasons for Andorra's creation of the scapegoat Andri. According to Neumann, he is the only choice:

> For primitive man--and the mass man in every nation reacts, as we know, like a primitive man--evil cannot be acknowledged as "his own evil" at all, since consciousness is still too weakly developed to be able to deal with the resulting conflict. It is for this reason that evil is invariably experienced by mass man as something alien, and the victim of shadow projection are therefore, always and everywhere, the aliens.[45]

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[45]Neumann, p. 45.

First, the people of Andorra have need of a scapegoat to rid them of their realization that they are bigoted and greedy. That they are aware of these sins is reflected symbolically in the emphasis in scene i on whitewashing the whole village to make it appear clean even though it is not. Second, Andri is a foreigner. He is not a native Andorran, but has been smuggled over the border into the country. Thus Andri, who is thought to be a Jew and treated as one, becomes the only logical choice, in snow-white Andorra, for scapegoat. Hegele indicates that in pursuit of his moral concerning prejudice Frisch has, consciously or unconsciously, attributed "Jewish" characteristics to each of the Andorrans:

> Die Andorraner selbst besitzen jene Eigenschaften, die sie als typisch jüdisch Andri vorzuwerfen bereit sind: der Tischler verlangt ein überhöhtes Lehrgeld, geil ist der Soldat, ehrgeizig der Doktor, unehrlich der Wirt und feig sind sie alle miteinander als die Schwarzen kommen.[46]

Thus when all these "sins" are projected onto one person who is to be used as scapegoat, that person symbolically or in reality takes on these characteristics, and is, to all practical purposes, a Jew. Thus again the choice of Andri and the making of Andri into a Jew can be

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[46]Wolfgang Hegele, "Max Frisch, 'Andorra,'" in Über Max Frisch, ed. Thomas Beckermann (Frankfurt am Main, 1971), p. 188.

explained in terms of the society's guilt feelings.

Another reason for Andri's choice as scapegoat rests on the same principles. Neumann says that when a society is consciously identified with certain ethical values and at the same time has repressed its shadow, the society will feel a sense of insecurity as well as guilt. In Andorra the citizens identify with values such as tolerance and lack of bigotry and think themselves innocent of any collective sin. At the same time they have repressed the reality that they do not live up to these ideals. They actually are prejudiced, greedy and guilty, and as a result they feel insecure and guilty. When a society ultimately becomes aware of the shadow, as Neumann says it will, "the feeling of inferiority will be over-compensated by a tendency to exaggerated self-vindication."[47] This is what happens as each Andorran in turn climbs into the witness box and proclaims that he was innocent, that it was not his fault. The sole exception to this is the pastor, who admits his guilt.

Curiously enough, Neumann says that the process has not ended here:

> The projection of the shadow will now become systematised, and the final result will be the paranoid reactions of individuals and whole nations, whose

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[47]Neumann, p. 49.

> own repressed aggressive tendencies reappear in the shape of fear of persecution at the hands of other people and of the world at large.[48]

Thus ultimately it is not only distress at the existence of evil in themselves, but also the fear of persecution from other peoples which prompts the Andorrans to create a scapegoat. In the absence of a real "marked person" the Andorrans have created one to use as a sacrifice to the superior power they fear: the neighboring nation, the Blacks. It is known that the Blacks accept Jews as sacrifice and are appeased, so Andri, who is thought to be a Jew, is made to look and act like one against the possibility that someday Andorra may be overrun by the Blacks. When Andri is accepted as sacrifice, they are freed of their fears (Kein Andorraner hat etwas zu fürchten!) and are no longer guilty in the eyes of these black "gods." We find that Neumann is right in his interpretation of scapegoatism, at least in terms of the play Andorra. Heilmann sums up the whole purpose of the scapegoating when he talks about the Señora's murder:

> Frisch thereby permits the inference that the Andorrans, while incidentally indulging xenophobia by killing the Señora, are instinctively performing a crime that they can blame on Andri, and thus getting ready a victim to hand over to the Blacks when the Blacks come. In one great emotional and political coup the Andorrans can indulge in anti-Semitism, placate the Blacks and save themselves.[49]

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[48]Neumann, p. 49.

[49]Heilmann, The Iceman, p. 201.

The interpretation of Andorra that the recognition of scapegoating points toward has so far gone unnoticed. Aside from the obvious theme of racial prejudice, Andorra points up the peculiar position of the small state whose existence, no matter how long-term and secure, can be threatened by large neighboring states. Andorra, by virtue of its scapegoating, shows up the precarious position of Andorra in the world and portrays the national and individual reaction to this existential fact.

So far we have discussed the creation of the scapegoat in very general terms. Looking at Andorra more closely it is possible to discern some of the specific acts which lead to the institution of Andri in the role of scapegoat. It is not difficult, as has been noted, to see why he becomes the victim. He has been looked upon as a Jew his entire life, and as an alien he is the perfect target for the machinations of the Andorrans. But in order to convince the people of Andorra completely his Jewishness must be exaggerated. He must be made into a criminal, for "when a nation becomes civilized, if it does not drop human sacrifice altogether, it at least selects as victims only such wretches as would be put to death at any rate."[50]

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[50] Frazer, The Golden Bough, p. 22.

Thus the carpenter overcharges for Andri's apprenticeship because Jews are not suited to be carpenters--they are salesmen or moneylenders. So intent is he on making a Jew out of Andri that he intentionally "mistakes" the wrong chair for Andri's work in scene iii, and another apprentice, in the same spirit, lets the carpenter get away with it. Later the priest tries to talk Andri into accepting the fact that he is a Jew and succeeds fairly well, with the help of all the adverse happenings Andri experiences. The doctor, who uses anti-Semitism as an excuse for his own shortcomings, provides more antagonism for Andri's already brainwashed mind, but the final act towards making a perfect scapegoat of Andri is the stoning to death of the Señora, presumably by the Tavernkeeper, who loudly declares that he saw Andri do it. At this point Andri is not only an alien, he is also a criminal, and therefore a perfectly acceptable scapegoat. Finally, it must be noted that Andri's father was himself the one most responsible for Andri's being victimized, because he initiated and perpetrated the lie that Andri was a Jew.

All during this process anything which might be construed as Jewish is exaggerated by the Andorrans. If Andri rubs his hands together, it is because he is Jewish. If he saves his money, it is because Jews save money, although the Andorrans themselves have the reputation of

being lovers of money. When he is identified by the Judenschauer, the ring he is wearing is taken as a sign of his race because Jews have things of value. Andorra has turned Andri so completely into a Jew that when he is finally told that he is not one he cannot believe it, and is led offstage thinking that he is a Jew.

The other characters in Andorra are guilty, as has been shown, of existential as well as moral sins, guilty of breaking Frisch's favorite commandment, "Du sollst dir kein Bildnis machen," and guilty of the whole scapegoating process. It is impossible to say who is most or least guilty. As in Nun singen sie wieder, Frisch does not assign degrees of guilt. Either one is guilty or one is not, and here, as in the other play, everyone is guilty. Bänziger recognizes this in his analysis of the play:

> Der erste Teil des Dramas entlässt uns mit dem Eindruck, der Lehrer sei der Hauptschuldige; durch die Lüge, die er in die Welt gesetzt habe, sei ein Menschenleben zerstört worden. Der zweite Teil aber beweist, dass die Schwäche eines einzelnen nur das Sinnbild für die Schwäche des Gemeinwesens ist.[51]

Furthermore, the guilt is not assignable by degrees for the simple reason that the countrymen of Andorra are not individuals. As Jurgensen points out, they cannot be

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[51]Bänziger, Frisch und Dürrenmatt, p. 108.

seen as individuals, but only as representatives of the society to which they belong. "Sie müssen, wie schon Frisch hervorgehoben hat, grundsätzlich als Typen betrachtet werden."[52] And as mere representatives of society, if they are to be assigned social guilt, it must be collective guilt assigned equally to all.

Wolfgang Hegele, in an exhaustive article on Andorra, more than once asserts that the play is more centrally about the Andorran society than about the individual. He reminds the reader: "Das Stück heisst weder 'Andri und Barblin', noch 'Can'. Das Stück heisst Andorra."[53] This idea is significant to the investigation of Frisch's use of guilt in Andorra, for it is the Andorrans, not Andri, whose guilt is paramount, and it is the Andorrans who collectively commit the social crime of creating a scapegoat.

It might be noted here that the majority of the action takes place as a direct result of the fear and guilt of the people of Andorra. The action arises out of guilt and results in guilt, for the scapegoating does not quite work. The people of Andorra instinctively sense that they are guilty of Andri's murder, else they

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[52]Jurgensen, Max Frisch, p. 85.

[53]Hegele, "Max Frisch, 'Andorra,'" p. 176.

would not be so totally concerned (in the numerous Zwischenspiele) with declaring that they are not guilty. They are not quite able to sink to the level of primitivism required for the success of the psychological process of scapegoating. What Frisch seems to be saying by this is that one person cannot take on the responsibility for the whole community. Even a scapegoat cannot take the responsibility for the whole society. In Die chinesische Mauer Frisch points this out by showing that the Man of Today, no matter what he does to try to be responsible, ultimately cannot take on himself the social responsibility of the whole society. Conversely, in Andorra, he is saying that this responsibility cannot be forced by society onto one individual member of that society.

Thus far plays have been considered which concern themselves to a great degree with social responsibility. Biedermann und die Brandstifter is generally taken to be a "morality play" about the dangers of political apathy. Its moral is seen as the need to prevent totalitarianism at its inception.[54] Like Nun singen sie wieder, Biedermann und die Brandstifter lays the responsibility for

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[54]Max Bach, "The Moral Problem of Political Responsibility," Books Abroad, No. 37 (Fall 1963), p. 381.

political tyranny squarely at the feet of the individual; but here Frisch's conclusions about this responsibility are somewhat different. This question will be discussed further in connection with the Nachspiel. There is another aspect of Biedermann und die Brandstifter which is seldom noticed; that is, the problem of guilt as motivation for the action of the play. It is my contention that all of the action of Biedermann und die Brandstifter is motivated by guilt, in the case of Biedermann and Babette, or by the knowledge of guilt psychology, in the case of Schmitz and Eisenring.

Of all the critics to treat Biedermann und die Brandstifter, only Robert Heilmann, in his outstanding book on tragedy and melodrama (The Iceman, the Arsonist and the Troubled Agent, 1973), has seen guilt as a major theme and the dramatic device that it is. He mentions the gradual expansion of Biedermann's guilt from his "middle-class" guilt feelings at the beginning of the play through the Knechtling suicide episode to the finale in which, in Macbethian style, Schmitz becomes the ghost of Knechtling. In addition he recognizes that Schmitz and Eisenring hold Biedermann in line by working on his guilt.[55] There is no question that the action of the play consists

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[55]Heilmann, The Iceman, p. 198.

of the subtle manipulation of Biedermann and Babette by Schmitz and Eisenring. This is attestable throughout the play, and in addition, Eisenring himself freely admits that Mr. and Mrs. Biedermann's guilt is the basis of his actions:

> Schmitz: Und wenn er auf die Idee kommt und die Polizei ruft? . . . Was dann?
> Eisenring: Wieso soll er die Polizei rufen?
> Schmitz: Wieso nicht?
> Eisenring: Weil er selber strafbar ist . . . Jeder Bürger ist strafbar, genaugenommen, von einem gewissen Einkommen an. Mach dir keine Sorge![56]

To show that the manipulation succeeds because of the guilt feelings of the Biedermanns, it is necessary to look at the dialogue in Biedermann und die Brandstifter. Here one can see not only the guilt of Biedermann and Babette, but also their crime.

Biedermann and Babette are guilty of pride, for keeping up appearances is their major goal, and being thought humanitarian is Biedermann's personal obsession. Schmitz manages to insinuate himself into the Biedermann household by playing upon the guilt associated with prideful "keeping up with the Joneses." He knows their weaknesses because, as has already been mentioned, he knows

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[56]Max Frisch, Biedermann und die Brandstifter (Frankfurt am Main, 1958), scene iii, p. 34. All future references to this work will be cited in the text by title, scene and page number. Where reference to this work is obvious, scene and page number alone will be used.

that every Bürger is punishable, i.e., every Bürger is guilty. In addition he has watched Herr Biedermann in action at the local tavern (scene i, p. 14) to determine his weaknesses.

Schmitz and Eisenring use their knowledge in several ways to control both Biedermann and Babette, and their techniques are not particularly subtle to any but Biedermann and his wife. Their most frequently used technique takes advantage of the Biedermanns' pride. Since they think themselves better than other people, it is only necessary for Schmitz to say "Everybody does so-and-so." This forces Biedermann to do exactly the opposite. When on his arrival Schmitz senses fear in Biedermann, he has only to say "Alle Leute haben Angst vor mir" (scene i, p. 13), and Biedermann bends over backward to appear as though he were not afraid. To keep Biedermann from realizing that he is an arsonist, Schmitz uses a combination of reverse psychology and flattery, both of which operate on Biedermann's pride:

> Schmitz: Wo führt das noch hin, wenn keiner mehr dem andern glaubt? Ich sag immer: Wo führt das noch hin, Kinder! Jeder hält den andern für einen Brandstifter, nichts als Misstrauen in der Welt. Oder hab ich nicht recht: Das spürte die ganze Wirtschaft, Herr Biedermann: Sie glauben noch an das Gute in den Menschen und in sich selbst. Oder hab ich nicht recht? Sie sind der erste Mensch in dieser Stadt, der unsereinen nicht einfach wie einen Brandstifter behandelt--
> (Scene i, p. 16)

To keep Biedermann from calling the police Schmitz again says "Everybody else does it," and thus prevents Biedermann from it:

> Schmitz: Nicht überall, Herr Biedermann, wird man so empfangen. Das kann ich Ihnen sagen! Ich habe schon Dinge erlebt--Kaum tritt unsereiner über die Schwelle, Mann ohne Krawatte, obdachlos, hungrig: Nehmen Sie Platz! heisst es, und hintenherum rufen sie die Polizei . . .
>
> (Scene i, p. 16)

He uses the technique in scene ii with Babette also: "Wie das Fräulein mich ansieht! Verdammtnochmal! Wenn's auf die ankäme, ich glaub, ich stünde draussen im strömenden Regen" (p. 27). The implication of this speech is of course that a lowly servant girl would throw him out, but Babette, who is much better than Anna, would not. This increases her already well-developed guilt over throwing him out, and his accusation a few lines later, "Sie möchten mich los sein?" tips the balance and she denies hotly that she wants to be rid of him: "Missverstehen Sie mich nicht! Was hab ich denn gesagt? Nichts liegt mir ferner, Herr Schmitz, als Sie zu kränken. Ehrenwort!" (scene ii, pp. 27-28).

In addition to using the technique of reverse psychology, Schmitz and Eisenring manipulate their captives by playing up to their pride. This works especially well with Biedermann. In scene i Schmitz spends some time flattering Biedermann as a means of gaining access to the attic room:

Biedermann: Sie kennen mich, haben Sie dem Mädchen gesagt.
Schmitz: Freilich, Herr Biedermann, Freilich.
Biedermann: Woher?
Schmitz: Nur von Ihrer besten Seite, Herr Biedermann, nur von Ihrer besten Seite. Gestern Abend am Stammtisch, ich weiss, Herr Biedermann haben mich gar nicht bemerkt in der Ecke, die ganze Wirtschaft hat sich gefreut, Herr Biedermann, jedes Mal, wenn sie mit der Faust auf den Tisch geschlagen haben. . . . Männer wie Sie, Herr Biedermann, das ist's was wir brauchen!
Biedermann: Ja, Ja, gewiss, aber--
Schmitz: Kein Aber, Herr Biedermann, kein Aber! Sie sind noch vom alten Schrot und Korn, Sie haben noch eine positive Einstellung. Das kommt davon.
Biedermann: Gewiss--
Schmitz: Sie haben noch Zivilcourage.
Biedermann: Sicher.
Schmitz: Das kommt eben davon.
Biedermann: Wovon?
Schmitz: Sie haben noch ein Gewissen, das spürte die ganze Wirtschaft, ein regelrechtes Gewissen.
Biedermann: Ja, Ja, natürlich--
Schmitz: Herr Biedermann, das ist gar nicht natürlich . . .

(Scene i, p. 14)

Schmitz does the same thing indirectly with Babette. He says to her, after he has bullied her out of making him leave:

Schmitz: Der Willi, der sagt immer, das gibt's gar nicht mehr: die private Barmherzigkeit. Es gibt heutzutage keine feinen Leute mehr. . . . Der wird Augen machen!--wenn er ein solches Frühstück bekommt, der wird Augen machen!

(Scene ii, p. 30)

This statement simultaneously makes it impossible for Babette to throw him out, rewards Babette for doing what Schmitz wants, and thus serves to keep her happy and willing to subvert her conscience further in the future.

Tactic number three is trading on the dishonesty of Biedermann and Babette. This technique is utilized quite the same way as the first, although it is more specific and more easily recognized. A good example is in scene i, where Schmitz knows very well there is an extra bed in the house. The maid has told him there is not, and he uses the knowledge that Biedermann has lied to force the concession he wants out of him:

> Schmitz: Leider kein freies Bett!--das sagen alle--aber Ihnen, Herr Biedermann, glaub ich aufs Wort. . . . Wo führt das noch hin wenn keiner mehr dem andern glaubt?
>
> (Scene i, p. 16)

This puts Biedermann in moral debt to Schmitz, for Biedermann is aware of having lied to him. Thus he owes him a night's shelter. Again a few lines later Schmitz uses the same technique to the same purpose. When Biedermann acts inhumanely toward Knechtling, Schmitz praises him for his humanity. This too puts Biedermann in debt to Schmitz and forces him to act humanely by sheltering him. After prattling about Biedermann's Menschlichkeit for a few lines, Schmitz slips in for the kill, and succeeds quite well:

> Biedermann: Sie müssen jetzt nicht denken, Herr Schmitz, dass ich ein Unmensch sei--
> Schmitz: Herr Biedermann!
> Biedermann: Frau Knechtling nämlich behauptet das!
> Schmitz: Wenn Sie ein Unmensch wären, Herr Biedermann, dann würden Sie mir heute nacht kein Obdach geben, das ist mal klar.
>
> (Scene i, p. 20)

Thus Biedermann is trapped, and Schmitz has the attic room.

The same tried and true tactic works equally well in scene vi, as Schmitz and Eisenring use Biedermann's own suspicions to trap him into giving them matches:

> Schmitz: Herr Biedermann! Wenn Sie uns schon für Brandstifter halten, warum nicht offen darüber reden?
> (Biedermann blickt wie ein geschlagener Hund.)
> Biedermann: Ich halte Sie ja nicht für Brandstifter, meine Herren, das ist nicht wahr, Sie tun mir Unrecht, ich halte Sie nicht für--Brandstifter . . . . . Was soll ich tun, dass sie mir glauben?
> Eisenring: Geben Sie uns Streichhölzchen.
> Biedermann: Streichhölzchen?
> Schmitz: Als Zeichen des Vertrauens, meint er.
> (Scene vi, pp. 80-81)

And, of course, they get their matches.

Another technique is the "pity me" tactic, which plays on guilt arising from social position and degree of wealth. When Schmitz casually mentions the death of his mother and his life in the orphanage, he is forcing Babette into his debt because she was never a poor orphan. It is, it might be added, very unfair of the devil to be using existential guilt against an individual. To some extent scenes iv and v are the result of "pity me" tactics. Biedermann's attempt to be "one of the boys," although partly out of fear, is also partly out of guilty knowledge that he is of a higher class than they.

It should be noted that all of these techniques are based on the manipulation of Biedermann and Babette

through their overriding pride. Reverse psychology (claiming that everybody else does it to keep Biedermann from doing it) depends on the Biedermann's proud conviction that they are better than everyone else. Flattery, with the implication "if you are so good, you will do what I want" is of course a direct appeal to their pride. Trading on their dishonesty (or inhumanity, class consciousness, etc.) is a form of blackmail against their pride. If they are too proud to be caught lying (being cruel, being snobbish), they will pay the ransom rather than admit the crime. The "pity me" tactic which, as was noted earlier, is an unfair play upon existential guilt, is also aimed at pride, for Biedermann and his wife are proud of their high social standing and very much aware of the lower position of Schmitz and Eisenring.

The whole scheme of manipulation of guilt feelings turns on a delicate balance of crime and punishment. Each of Schmitz and Eisenring's techniques works through such a balance. Where each accusation implies a crime, each resulting action implies a punishment. In abbreviated form, the techniques, implications, and results are as follows:

Technique:	Crime:	Punishment:
Reverse psychology	You think you are better than others,	therefore you must give me . . .
Pity me	You think you are better than me,	therefore you must give me . . .
Trade on dishonesty (or any failing)	You have committed crime of _____	I won't report you if you give me . . .
Flattery	You think you are so good;	surely you won't refuse me . . .

Since the action of the play consists mainly of Schmitz and Eisenring's insinuating themselves into Biedermann's house for the purpose of burning it down, it is not incorrect to maintain, as was said earlier, that the action of Biedermann und die Brandstifter is motivated by guilt, in the case of Biedermann and Babette, or by the knowledge of guilt psychology, in the case of Schmitz and Eisenring. This is not to say that this is the point of the play or a major theme of it. It is only the means by which the action is accomplished.

The conclusion to be drawn from all this manipulation and the ease with which it is done is that it all could have been prevented had Biedermann accepted his real self. Had he not been guilty of deceiving himself, he would not have been so easily deceived: had he been responsible to himself, he would have been responsible to others. Stäuble draws the same conclusion. He describes the action in terms of opposites:

> Biedermann und seine Frau verstellen sich; sie geben sich den Anschein der Schlichtheit; sie machen auf einfach; sie setzen sich vor den Brandstiftern eine proletarische Maske auf. Biedermann, der millionenreiche Haarwasserfabrikant, gibt sich bescheiden und ärmlich.
>
> Die Brandstifter dagegen stellen den wahren Biedermannschen Sachverhalt wieder her. Sie reissen den Biedermanns die Maske wieder weg, damit ihr wahres bourgeoises Gesicht wieder zum Vorschein kommt.
>
> Die Biedermanns lügen. Die Brandstifter dagegen sind verrucht genug, immer platt heraus die Wahrheit zu sagen. Die Biedermanns arbeiten mit Verstellung und Verlogenheit, die Brandstifter dagegen mit nackter Wahrheit. Die Biedermanns sagen nicht, was sie meinen, und meinen nicht, was sie sagen. Sie sind nicht wirklich, sie scheinen bloss. Im Gegensatz zu den Brandstiftern, die wirklich sind, wie sie sind--und damit sind sie den Biedermanns gegenüber auf jeden Fall im Vorteil.[57]

Stäuble concludes:

> Die Wahrheit ist letzten Endes immer stärker als die Lüge, das Sein ist letzten Endes immer stärker als der Schein.
>
> Diese Überzeugung des Dichters ist uns aus vielen andern seiner Werke wohlbekannt. Immer wieder geht es bei ihm um das wahrhafte, das wirkliche Leben. . . .[58]

The corollary of this abdication of responsibility to self is the abdication of responsibility to society. The whole city burns because Biedermann has refused to act upon his knowledge of the two culprits. Is not Frisch saying, as he has in other plays, that the individual is responsible for the collective? Manfred Jurgensen thinks this is so:

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[57]Stäuble, Max Frisch, pp. 113-114.

[58]Ibid., p. 114.

> Frisch stellt einen unmittelbaren Zusammenhang zwischen dem sozialen Bankrott der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft und der akuten Gefahr einer Zerstörung der gesamten Welt durch die Atombombe her. Die "Fässer voll Brennstoff" befinden sich ja auf weltweitem Radius unter dem Dach fast aller bürgerlichen Häuser--allein durch die Tatsache nämlich, dass die Existenz der Atombombe von ihnen geduldet wird.[59]

Jurgensen is quite right in his analysis of the "bankrupt bourgeoisie," but that the danger mankind is up against is the atom bomb seems an oversimplification. Fire could just as easily represent anything that threatens men or mankind through man's lack of caring for himself or other men. Political tyranny, unbridled political corruption, careless use of energy--any of these could just as easily be the gasoline in the attic.

Throughout the preceding discussion the last scene of the play, the Nachspiel, has been pointedly ignored. There are several reasons for this. Like most of Frisch's plays, Biedermann und die Brandstifter has been rewritten at least twice. It was originally written as a prose sketch in the first Tagebuch in 1948. Then it was rewritten and performed as a radio play in one act in 1953. In 1958 it was again rewritten as a stage play, the Nachspiel was written and the whole was performed on stage for the first time in Frankfurt. The Nachspiel was written mainly in order to give more length to the one-act

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[59]Jurgensen, Max Frisch, p. 67.

play so that it could be performed alone, and it adds so little to the play that it is usually stricken from the performance.[60] Stäuble states: "Biedermann und die Brandstifter ist ein völlig in sich abgeschlossenes, selbständiges Stück, das nicht dringend nach einem Nachspiel ruft."[61]

There is no action in the Nachspiel to speak of. It consists mostly of the discovery by Biedermann and his wife that they are in hell, not heaven, and of some expository material from Beelzebub and the Devil about the closing of hell to spite heaven. The point of this episode seems to be similar to the point Frisch made in the last part of Die chinesische Mauer. There he said, in effect, "No matter how good you are, you'll never get to heaven." Here, by closing hell just as Biedermann arrives, he implies the parallel statement: "No matter how bad you are, you'll never get to hell."

Although Biedermann, it is true, spends a lot of time in the Nachspiel talking about guilt and innocence, the Nachspiel has little to do with the guilt-manipulation of the main play. Biedermann's talk is just a continuation of his prideful prattling in earlier scenes. Of course he is innocent. There is no question in his mind at all

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[60] Kindlers, vol. I, col. 1613.

[61] Stäuble, p. 120.

(providing, of course, that Anna did not see him give them the matches) that he is in the wrong place and unjustly accused. Biedermann has obviously learned nothing. His reactions here are the same as those of the first six scenes.

Biedermann und die Brandstifter is a play whose action is based solely on guilt and manipulation. Like many of Frisch's other works, it is concerned with social responsibility and personal integrity. Were Biedermann honest with himself he could be honest with society, that is, with Babette and Schmitz and Eisenring. He could and would have forestalled the whole action of the play and in so doing would have fulfilled his social responsibility to prevent destruction of the city. A final point of the play, brought out by the precipitous closing of hell in the Nachspiel, is that abdication of responsibility gets one nowhere, not even into hell. This is similar to Frisch's conclusions in other plays, notably Andorra.

There is one last play by Frisch that is concerned with the operation of guilt in society: Graf Öderland. This drama is perhaps the most unusual of the lot, for the curious thing about Graf Öderland is that the society it portrays exists in a suspended state. It is either in a dream (the Prosecutor's) or a nightmare reality. In this

dreamlike society guilt is simply suspended for those actions which are usually considered crimes. No sins are punished except the sins of conformity and orderliness.

Let us consider for example the murderer who inspires the Prosecutor to his crimes. There is no doubt that the man has murdered the night watchman, and yet eventually, even though he has admitted the killing, society releases him without punishment, thereby admitting that he is not guilty. The question that arises is: "Why is he not guilty?" Guilt is produced whenever a boundary set by the conscience is touched or transgressed knowingly and freely. There are two possible reasons for the murderer's absolution. First, it appears in this case that the murderer, strange though it seems, did not cross a boundary, at least not in his own eyes nor in the eyes of society, because the boundary (against murder) was suspended in the case of the watchman. According to the murderer, there was no reason not to kill him, because he was nobody:

> Auch ein Hauswart sei ein Mensch. Wer zweifelt daran! Manchmal im Gericht, wenn ich die vielen Leute sehe, vor allem die Geschworenen, die ihr Geschäft und ihre Werkstatt verlassen haben, damit Recht geschehe, dann empfinde ich es wie Trost: dass ihnen der Mensch so viel wert ist. Es war nicht vorauszusehen, solang er die Türe bediente, und niemand hat ihn bemerkt, bevor ich ihn erschlagen habe--[62]

62Max Frisch, Graf Öderland, ed. George Salamon (New York, 1966), Bild vi, pp. 44-45.

Second, it might be supposed that since modern scientific man seems to believe that there must be a reason for everything, then any action performed without a reason must be an insane action. Thus the murderer is crazy and cannot be held accountable. At any rate, he is not. He is granted amnesty, or amnesia, as he puts it, and is released.

Much like the murderer's case is that of the Prosecutor, who murders on a wholesale level and is even rewarded for it by being made head of the government. On the other side of the fence are the watchman, the Köhler, and other victims of Graf Öderland, and society in general, all of whom are punished at the hands of the murderer or the Graf. Their only sins seem to be the two things that Graf Öderland hates worst, orderliness and its consequence, conformity:

> Staatsanwalt: In dieser Welt der Papiere, in diesem Dschungel von Grenzen und Gesetzen, in diesem Irrenhause der Ordnung . . . ich kenne eure Ordnung. Ich bin in Öderland geboren. Wo der Mensch nicht hingehört, wo er nie gedeiht. Wo man aus Trotz lebt Tag für Tag, nicht aus Freude. Aus Trotz, aus Tugend. . . . Alles ist Pflicht. Und Überwindung ist das Höchste, was man sich denken kann, dort wo ich geboren bin. Überwindung und Verzicht. Man macht sich ein Gewissen daraus, dass man lebt, und jeder sucht nach einem Sinn, nach Ersatz für die Freude, die im Nebel nicht gedeiht. Denn unser Sommer ist kurz, und wehe dem Menschen, der sich der Lust ergibt, wo sie nicht ausreicht, weil die Sonne nicht ausreicht. Wehe! wenn wieder die Dämmerung kommt, wenn alles vergraut, und der Nebel, wenn alles ohne Mass ist, unwirklich, und es kommen die

> Gespenster der Verantwortung, es wuchert das Gewissen, bis man erstickt,--oder ausbricht.[63]

Although this is certainly not the major point of the play, Graf Öderland may be said to be an example of what happens to society when a boundary such as "Thou shalt not kill" is removed. The fact that crimes are not punished, that criminal acts are considered normal and healthy, contributes much to the dreamlike atmosphere of the play, and thus, although guilt is not actively present, its influence can still be seen.

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[63]Frisch, Graf Öderland, Bild vii, p. 57.

CHAPTER III

CONCLUSION

In Chapter I it was noted that guilt and the related concepts of responsibility, shame, criminality, and so forth would show up in drama basically in two areas: first in the area of individual actions and their motivations, second in the area of theme and subject matter of the plays. In Chapter II it was shown that in at least half of his dramas--he has published ten--Max Frisch has used guilt as a major means of putting across his dramatic point and motivating his characters. Most of the actions in the five plays discussed at length resulted in the guilt of the characters who performed the actions or were motivated either by guilt, fear of guilt, feelings of responsibility, or shame. In Nun singen sie wieder Karl's actions are motivated by his crime--the murdering of the hostages. Herbert shares the responsibility for these murders, but never becomes fully aware of it in the timespan of the play; hence his actions, contrary to the actions of most characters are not caused by guilt. Karl's father, who is guilty of abdication of his responsibility to society, is awakened to his guilt by the death of his son,

and thereafter his actions are guilt-produced. He acts to reassert the boundary he has broken by speaking the truth--"Auch unsere machen das gleiche"--and this prompts his execution. In the second part of the play, which takes part in Frisch's specially designed purgatory, all of the characters are brought together to be made aware of another crime they have all committed, the failure to search, as Frisch puts it, for "das wirkliche Leben." That Frisch considers this a sin will be shown later. At this point it is only necessary to show that most of the action of Nun singen sie wieder is guilt-producing or guilt-produced.

Als der Krieg zu Ende war is again a play in which almost every action is connected with guilt. After the first act the situation is established which produces Agnes' guilt feelings, and the play itself from this point on is the chronicle of how she copes with this guilt and how Horst approaches the situation. As was discussed earlier, Agnes' guilt toward Iwanow, which occurs in the third act, originates in the fact of her adultery and the fact that Horst is considered, by her at least, to be a war criminal. Her guilt in relation to Horst arises out of the fact of her adultery and the fact that she had apparently lost her love for him even before he returned from the war. Her anxiety over the

knowledge of his war crimes is in part due to her need to find Horst guilty of something, since she is guilty too. Her dialogue with Horst, and to some extent her monologues before Iwanow, are all based on, if not motivated by, her guilty feelings. Iwanow's action at the end of Act II is prompted by Horst's appearance and not therefore directly by guilt or fear of guilt or the like. Horst's action comes when it does because of the arrival of the suit he has been waiting for, but it must be prompted by some urge to confront Agnes and Iwanow, else Horst would not have hidden the suit from Agnes when it arrived. Thus this action too is in part caused by Agnes' adultery.

Andorra, in sharp contrast to the weakly structured Als der Krieg zu Ende war, is a very meticulously constructed play. It could be a casebook on the process of creating and executing a scapegoat. In it, most of the action is directly concerned in one way or another with making Andri into a scapegoat. Andri's actions, and those of his mother and Barblin, are not directed toward scapegoating, but Frisch still does not let Andri escape, for he has Andri break the commandment "Du sollst dir kein Bildnis machen" by making an image of himself and getting caught in it. In this play Frisch has taken a fresh approach to the problem of

guilt and how it is handled by the guilty. Earlier his main stress was on the guilt of the individual. In Andorra he has looked at it from a social point of view and attempted to portray how guilt works in a society.

The point of Die chinesische Mauer is concerned not so much with guilt as with responsibility. The only important actions concerned actually with guilt are the Man of Today's refusal to defend the mute and his subsequent defense of him. His refusal is looked upon by Mee Lan, who functions as society opposite the Man of Today, as a criminal action, and she fulfills society's part in guilt by separating him from herself. This awakens his guilt feelings and prompts him to reassert the boundary he has broken by coming to the defense of the mute. They are then reconciled and the guilt problem is solved. The question of responsibility in Die chinesische Mauer is a much more important one, and will be discussed further.

Biedermann und die Brandstifter is the play in which Frisch most thoroughly, and incidentally, comically, makes use of guilt as a device. The action is all prompted by Schmitz and Eisenring, who do everything on the basis of their one self-made maxim: "Every Bürger is guilty of something." In the pursuance of their main goal, the overpopulation of hell, they use guilt to control

every action of Gottlieb Biedermann and his wife. Biedermann's crimes are pride and narcissism and apathy, and he pays for them by being used mercilessly. Schmitz and Eisenring feed his pride to increase his shame and then use his shame to get what they want.

In Graf Öderland guilt is not the major force it is in Biedermann und die Brandstifter and some of the other plays. Its treatment of guilt is rather bizarre. In the play guilt is merely suspended, and what would ordinarily be crime, murder particularly, becomes virtue. Orderliness becomes the only crime in this world, and murder its only punishment. There is no real concept of moral boundaries, and society, which would ordinarily police these boundaries, is nonexistent.

Of the six plays discussed here, guilt plays a major part in five. In one, it is used consciously as a manipulative device, in another it is suspended completely, and in one play guilt and expiation are analyzed in a casebook-like view of scapegoating. Frisch uses crime, real guilt felt for these crimes, fear of guilt, guilt as a social function, shame, and pride as major devices to make his points. In addition, the purpose of most of the plays is, to a large degree, to indicate some conclusion about man's personal or social responsibility. Each of the six plays under discussion here makes some

point about responsibility, and although often these points are contradictory, in the final analysis they seem compatible enough with one another.

The first, Nun singen sie wieder, makes the point that men have personal and social responsibilities and that they must live up to them. Frisch expects men to stand up against false things in themselves (as he has Karl and the captain do, for example) and against false things in the world in which they live (the teacher). Although the outcome of the play is pessimistic--all the significant characters die--their existence in purgatory and the tolerant remonstrances of the priest both serve to indicate that Frisch thinks that there is hope that men will learn to accept their responsibilities and succeed in upholding them.

Consistent with the moral of Nun singen sie wieder is the conclusion of Als der Krieg zu Ende war, that one becomes guilty if he does not accept his responsibility. Horst is guilty of not being responsible to himself because he lies to himself about Agnes' adultery and because he allowed or even helped with the perpetration of war crimes. Agnes is guilty of the same lack of responsibility. Her affair with Iwanow and her lying to Horst are "anti-moral acts" as Tillich defines them, and, as Frisch would put it, they are antithetic to

the concept of "das wirkliche Leben."

Die chinesische Mauer and Andorra represent another phase in Frisch's thinking. In Die chinesische Mauer, the Man of Today at first refuses to accept what he and Mee Lan see as his responsibility to defend the mute. He does finally accept this responsibility, only to find his actions completely ineffective. By this Frisch is saying that one man cannot take on the responsibility for society. He cannot, in the end, do anything just because he knows about it. In Andorra, the opposite side of this argument is shown. By making a scapegoat who is supposed to take on all the sins of the society and absolve them, Frisch shows responsibility being forced onto one member of society against his will. However, through the use of the Zwischenspiele, in which he shows the Andorrans to be guilty still, Frisch points out that social responsibility cannot be forced on one man by society, just as in Die chinesische Mauer he said that responsibility cannot be taken on by one man.

In Graf Öderland and Biedermann und die Brandstifter the theme is the abdication of responsibility. In Biedermann und die Brandstifter Biedermann and Babette are so concerned with keeping up their image (the exact opposite of living "das wirkliche Leben") that they give up their responsibility to themselves primarily, and

indirectly to society, for after all, it is the whole city that suffers for their apathy. However, in the Nachspiel Frisch refuses to punish the Biedermanns for their sins. Hell closes, and they are sent back to earth to do the same thing over again. Frisch implies that the abdication of responsibility results in nothing except repetition. It is rather as the priest in Nun singen sie wieder claims: people must be held in limbo until they realize what they should have done. Graf Öderland shows a slight variation on this theme. Öderland, by leaving his post as prosecutor, abdicates his responsibility. Unfortunately, by the end of the play it has returned to him two-fold. He is the leader of the revolution. He takes over the new government, and winds up in a position of higher responsibility than that he held before. When one abdicates his responsibility, it comes back to him many times over.

It would be convenient to be able to take the plays chronologically, analyze them with respect to their ideas of responsibility, and come up with a coherent, developing Frischian theory of responsibility. Unfortunately this is nearly impossible for the simple reason that Frisch's plays cannot be ordered chronologically. Of these six plays, four appear as sketches in the first Tagebuch: Andorra, May, 1946; Graf Öderland, between

May and October, 1946; Als der Krieg zu Ende war, November, 1947; and Biedermann und die Brandstifter, January, 1948.[64] One, Nun singen sie wieder, was performed in 1945 before the diaries were begun, and the last, Die chinesische Mauer, was performed in 1946 for the first time. Unfortunately these dates cannot be used to order the plays because Frisch habitually rewrites his works. Andorra, for example, was rewritten five times before its world premiere in 1961. In the process of rewriting, Frisch sometimes alters the point of a play. A good example of this is Biedermann und die Brandstifter, which appeared originally as a prose sketch, was produced as a radio play in 1953, and then was rewritten and played in 1958 as a stage play. The 1958 edition included the Nachspiel for the first time, and, as was noted earlier, the Nachspiel does affect the outcome of the play with respect to responsibility.

Because of all the rewritings it is therefore impossible to show Frisch's ideas of responsibility as they developed, and in reality very hard to see which conclusion he favors today of those he has created.

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[64]Max Frisch, Tagebuch 1946-1949. The sketches appear as follows: "Die andorranische Jude" (Andorra), p. 28; "Der Graf von Öderland," p. 57; "Berlin, November 1947" (Als der Krieg zu Ende war), p. 160; "Burleske" (Biedermann und die Brandstifter), p. 180.

It seems, however, that the sum of his various conclusions in the plays provides a rather coherent and probably accurate concept of man's responsibility to man. Frisch implies in Nun singen sie wieder, Die chinesische Mauer, and Biedermann und die Brandstifter that man must be a responsible being. In Biedermann und die Brandstifter, Graf Öderland, Nun singen sie wieder, and Als der Krieg zu Ende war he maintains that man cannot evade his responsibility, and in Andorra, paradoxically, that he cannot carry his responsibility. In Die chinesische Mauer he states that one must take on one's responsibility, even though he knows it cannot be borne. Thus, although it is futile to take on social responsibility, man must choose to believe it is possible and act in accordance with that belief.

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