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I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Milburne Edward Owens, Jr., entitled "Estes Kefauver and the Atlantic Union Resolution: A Study in Congressional Foreign Policy Initiative." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in History.

Jonathan G. Utley, Major Professor

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ESTES KEFAUVER AND THE ATLANTIC UNION RESOLUTION: A STUDY IN CONGRESSIONAL FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVE

A Thesis

Presented for the

Master of Arts

Degree

The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

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June 1976

1286928

ABSTRACT

On July 26, 1949, Estes Kefauver of Tennessee took the floor of the United States Senate to introduce the first Atlantic Union Resolution. The resolution, inspired by the ideas of Clarence Streit as presented in *Union Now* (first published in 1939), provided that the President of the United States should call an Atlantic Exploratory Convention, to be attended by delegates representing the original NATO sponsor nations. The purpose of the convention would be to explore the possibility of creating an economic, defense, and political union of the Atlantic democracies, after the example of the United States Government.

The State Department of the United States, fearful lest an Atlantic Convention upset its own programs, and jealous of its own prerogatives in foreign policy formulation, opposed the Atlantic Union Resolution. In 1950, 1951, and again in 1955, the State Department thwarted Kefauver's efforts to obtain Congressional consideration of the resolution. Upper echelon State Department officials, and especially Secretaries Dean Acheson and John Foster Dulles, were instrumental in assuring that the Atlantic Union Resolution was never reported out of committee.

Despite the persistent efforts of Kefauver and other advocates of Union, Senators on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee proved all too willing to heed the advice of the State Department, while rejecting the entreaties of a colleague. Thus, a positive legislative

initiative in American foreign policy formulation was defeated. The Senate, though often extremely critical of State Department policies, was itself unable or unwilling to take the lead.

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INTRODUCTION

As envisioned by the framers of the Constitution, the United States Senate traditionally has been limited to the role of "advise and consent" in American foreign affairs. For better or worse, foreign policy planning has been left to the specialists at the State Department, or to their superiors in the White House. This is not to deny the Senate's influence; rejection of the League of Nations and wholehearted acceptance of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution are but two examples of how the Senate has changed the course of American foreign policy. Yet both cases, albeit to opposite extremes, were merely reactions to policy planned and initiated by the Executive branch. Historically, the Senate has not taken the lead.

The cold war, however, was a period without precedent in American history. Beset by an ever-heightening tension that could find no sudden and satisfying relief, Americans became afraid; and their fear was only reinforced by the apparent impotence of American foreign policy in the face of a seemingly monolithic worldwide threat. Not surprisingly, this fear was echoed by the people's elected representatives. Forgetting historical precedent, the Senate for once attempted to take the initiative. By the summer of 1949, more than forty Senators were sponsoring various resolutions calling for such measures as international control of atomic weapons, revision of the United Nations charter, or even world government.

Of all these resolutions, however, only one was backed by an organized and persistent group of advocates, possessed of a coherent

ideology and a well-defined plan of action. This was the Atlantic Union Resolution, introduced in July, 1949, by Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee. For over ten years, Kefauver and other supporters of Union relentlessly pursued a legislative initiative in American foreign policy formulation. Kefauver's efforts, the opposition he encountered, and the ultimate fate of the Atlantic Union Resolution form the story of a rare Senatorial attempt to take the lead in American foreign affairs.

CHAPTER I

IDEA AND INITIATIVE

On March 20, 1919, a young American soldier assigned to the Paris Peace Conference penned the following in the course of a letter to a young French woman:

> A man owes a state nothing because of the fact that he happened to be born in it. It was through no choice of mine that I am an American. I could be naturalized now as citizen of some other country? True, but the state, in educating me, was fitting me for a life within that state, its object was to train me into being a good citizen of it. And the very accident of birth gave me dear associations, friends, memories in America . . . . With all her faults, I prefer America to any other country . . . .
>
> And yet, this simple accident of birth under one flag instead of another colors the mental attitude and disturbs the intellectual processes of most men . . . .
>
> For my part, I love America . . . because of the ideals on which the Republic was founded (not all of them, however) . . . . But that isn't going to keep me from trying to see things as they really are. I am an intelligent man first, an American afterwards. The United States is now undoubtedly the most powerful single nation on the globe. All the more need then for men in America whose allegiance is to the human race.[1]

Though only twenty-three years old, Clarence K. Streit was already groping toward an idea that would one day become the single consuming passion of his life: world peace through renunciation of national sovereignty.

Assigned to the Army Intelligence Service, Streit was attached in a confidential position to the American Peace Commission in Paris, where, aside from sniffing bouquets to check for bombs, his duties

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[1]Cited in Clarence K. Streit, *Union Now* (New York, 1939), 297-98.

necessitated access to the secret records of the daily meetings between Wilson, Lloyd George, and Clemenceau, as well as all dispatches to and from the American President.[2] Not surprisingly, young Streit was soon disillusioned by the attitudes of the victorious Europeans at Paris. Like many Americans, Streit had entered the war in "unthinking acceptance" of its supposedly democratic goals. Inevitably, he shared the disappointment of his countrymen. Streit left Paris convinced that "the next last war" would not be long in arriving.[3]

After a brief stint at home, Streit returned to Europe as a Rhodes Scholar and sometime reporter for the *Philadelphia Public Ledger*. By autumn of 1921, he was the *Ledger*'s full time correspondent in Rome. Throughout the 1920's Streit reported events all over the European continent. The ineffectual League of Nations, however, he deemed unworthy of coverage; although stationed in Switzerland for many months, he did not see the League in action until 1929, when he was assigned to Geneva by the New York *Times*.

Thus, having witnessed first hand the creation of the troubled peace of Versailles, Clarence Streit found himself in attendance at its final disintegration. As Europe moved once more toward war, Streit, dismayed by the breakdown of international law and order, set about to formulate an alternative plan for international organization. The task took six years. In 1939, the first public edition of *Union Now*

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[2] *Ibid.*, 290. [3] *Ibid.*, 296-98. [4] *Ibid.*, 299.

appeared. The proposal put forth in Streit's work was startling: a Federal Union of the world's democracies, after the example of the United States of America.[5]

Such a union, as envisioned by Streit, would have three basic goals. First, it would "provide effective common government in . . . those fields where such common government will clearly serve man's freedom better than separate government." This would involve a united defense force, a customs-free economy, a single currency, and a united postal and communications system, all based on common citizenship in the federal Union government. Next, the Union would maintain national independence in all other areas: the particular brand of democracy practiced by individual states would matter little. Finally, the Union's constitution would provide for unlimited growth by allowing entrance to any democracy, existing or to come, that would guarantee to its citizens the Union's minimum Rill of Rights.[6]

The similarity between this proposed union and that adopted by the thirteen states of the North American Confederation is not difficult to discern. Indeed, Streit made much of the parallel. Twentieth century national sovereignty, with its League of Nations, he compared to the pretensions of the thirteen former British colonies, with their "League of Friendship" under the Articles of Confederation.[7] Both Leagues Streit found to be equally helpless in the face of interstate conflict; but fortunately for American democracy, America's leaders devised a plan to discard a League based on the sovereignty

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[5] *Ibid.*, ix. [6] *Ibid.*, 2-3. [7] *Ibid.*, 9-10.

of the individual states, in favor of a Union whose basic unit of sovereignty was the individual citizen.[8]

To facilitate the process of union, Streit's federation would have to be restricted, initially, to fifteen "Founder Democracies," all experienced in the ways of democracy, and among which there had been no war for over one hundred years. The fifteen: the United States, the British Commonwealth (specifically the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, and Ireland), France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Language barriers would pose little problem; for all practical political purposes English and French would suffice.[9]

As for more materialistic concerns, Streit extolled the obvious advantages of Union might on a world-wide scale. Union economic power would be overwhelming, the financial benefit to Union citizens unprecedented. Militarily, the Union would be undefeatable; while individual nations could reduce their defense expenditures, the overall strength of the Union military would be twice that of any potential aggressor.[10]

Although generally positive in tone, *Union Now* was quite obviously written as a response to the aggressive intentions of Germany, Italy, and Japan. It was, after all, the renewed threat of war that had inspired Clarence Streit to put his ideas in writing. This basic rationalization for Union, a united front against aggression, was

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[8]*Ibid.*, 4, 31-33. [9]*Ibid.*, 6-7. [10]*Ibid.*, 7.

essentially timeless. Not even war could erase the appeal of the Union idea; to Streit, as indeed to most Americans, there seemed little difference between the old threat of Hitler and the new threat of Stalin. Hence, the Postwar Edition of *Union Now* differed from its predecessor only in an appendix, tacked on by Streit to provide for Union participation in the United Nations.[11] In a world grown only more frightening, the idea of Union grew ever more attractive.

Union of the world's democracies did indeed seem an effective answer to what most Americans believed to be a monolithic communist threat. Furthermore, though Streit himself seems to have been most concerned with the spread of individual liberty, there was plenty in the idea of Union to appeal to those concerned with maintaining America's dominance in world affairs. To begin with, there was the idea of a customs-free system of intra-Union trade. If effected, such a system would virtually insure that America would remain the world's unchallenged industrial leader; developing nations joining the Union would lose all tariff protection, on both imported manufactures and exported raw materials. Even relatively developed nations, like Britain and France, could soon become economic vassals to America's industrial might. Moreover, the Union's proposed apportionment of political representation would be based on population, a measure that could well mean American dominance of the Union's federal superstructure. In short, though Streit himself was concerned with the

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[11]Clarence Streit, *Union Now, Postwar Edition* (New York, 1949), 251-324.

spread of democracy, the probable result of his federal union plan would be the economic entrenchment of those capitalist states which had heretofore maintained their own democratic systems through commercial dominance of the rest of the world. That dominance would only be enhanced by the obvious ability of the Union defense force to defeat any conceivable threat to the newly established status quo.

But Clarence Streit, like most Americans before and since, saw the issues of his time in terms of human liberty. In that context, *Union Now* became a hope, a bright dream that would attract influential champions. As the 1940's drew to a close, the tensions of the cold war assured Streit an audience. At no other time had American democracy seemed so threatened; at no time had Union seemed so urgent.[12]

Among those Americans whose imaginations were captured by the dream of *Union Now* were a small group of influential citizens in Memphis, Tennessee. Edmund Orgill, Lucius Burch, Edward Meeman, and John Apperson were convinced that Streit's ideas could work. But it was not until 1947 that this shared conviction found an effective outlet. Shortly before Thanksgiving, the Memphians received word that Clarence Streit himself was upriver in St. Louis, lecturing and promoting Freedom Union, an organization devoted to furthering the Atlantic Union idea. A hasty telegram brought Streit to Tennessee. Soon Memphis had its own chapter of Freedom Union.[13]

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[12]Istvan Szent-Miklosy, *The Atlantic Union Movement* (New York, 1965) deals extensively with Clarence Streit's ideas and the history of the Atlantic Union Committee.

[13]*Memphis Press Scimitar*, January 2, 1962, 1 ff.

The story thus far is unremarkable; but 1948 was an election year, and Boss Crump of Memphis still ruled Tennessee politics. This time a Senate seat awaited the winner. And so, in the manner of ambitious Tennessee politicians, Congressman Estes Kefauver came to Shelby County--not, however, to praise Crump, but to bury him. To make a respectable showing against the Crump machine, Kefauver needed the support of men like Burch and Apperson, respected attorneys, Orgill, an influential businessman (and future Mayor of Memphis), and Meeman, Editor of the *Memphis Press Scimitar*. From these men, Kefauver first learned of *Union Now*. By one account, in April, 1948, the Congressman was presenting his case to Orgill, Burch, and Meeman at the Peabody Hotel in Memphis. Suddenly, politics was interrupted by personal tragedy; word came from Madisonville that Kefauver's mother had suffered a cerebral hemmorhage. Rushing to her side, Kefauver carried with him a copy of *Union Now*, presented to him by Lucius Burch. Long hours passed as his mother lay dying; waiting helplessly, Kefauver immersed himself in reading. He emerged from his ordeal, or so the story goes, a convert to the ideas of Clarence Streit.[14]

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[14] *Ibid.*; Harvey Swados, *Standing Up for the People* (New York, 1972), 42-43; Lucius Burch to Bob Snowden, March 21, 1955, folder 19, Atlantic Union General Correspondence, Box 7, File Series I, Estes Kefauver Papers, Kefauver Collection, University of Tennessee Library, Knoxville, Tennessee. (Since all pertinent items in this collection are contained in File Series I, and since all pertinent folders are headed Atlantic Union, future references to items from the Kefauver Collection will supply only partial folder headings and Box numbers.)

By the following month Streit and Kefauver were correspondents, and by August a lifelong friendship had begun.[15] When Streit requested that Kefauver write a new introduction to the Postwar Edition of *Union Now*, the Congressman hastened to accept the honor.[16] By November, 1948, Kefauver seemed convinced that Clarence Streit had developed "the one idea and plan around which we can build a peaceful world for the generations to come."[17] That same month, the new Senator-elect from Tennessee began his campaign for the ideas of Clarence Streit with an inspiring speech before the New York City chapter of Freedom Union.[18] Nor was his commitment limited to high-sounding words. On December 14, Kefauver called on President Truman and talked with him at length about Freedom Union. Though the President refused to commit himself to the cause, he did promise to read the issue of *Freedom & Union* presented him by the Senator-elect, and to pass it on to Secretary Marshall.[19]

As 1948 drew to a close, there arose the question of how Kefauver might best use his newly won office to advance the cause of Union. Accordingly, one Sunday in December, Burch and Orgill, who

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[15]Clarence Streit to Estes Kefauver, May 20, 1948, folder "Streit, Clarence," Box 8; Kefauver to Streit, August 24, 1948, *ibid.*

[16]Don Dennis to Kefauver, August 16, 1948, *ibid.*; Kefauver to Streit, undated, *ibid.*; Kefauver to Streit, August 24, 1948, *ibid.*

[17]Streit, *Union Now, Postwar Edition*, xi.

[18]Walden Moore to Kefauver, August 12, 1949, folder 4, Committee, Box 6; *New York Herald Tribune*, November 24, 1948.

[19]Kefauver to Streit, December 20, 1948, folder "Streit, Clarence," Box 8.

were in Washington, were picked up at their hotel by Kefauver. The three then proceeded to the Phoenixville, Pennsylvania, farm of Owen J. Roberts, a former Supreme Court Justice who had resigned to devote full time to working for Atlantic Union. There, at Roberts' farm, the decision was made to form the Atlantic Union Committee. The purpose of the committee was to achieve passage by Congress of a resolution calling for an Atlantic Convention, where delegates of the democracies could explore possible methods of federation. Roberts would head the committee, and other Unionists with political experience would be invited to join in the organization's lobbying efforts. Streit himself would work out the details of the resolution: which countries to invite, suggestions as to delegate selection, and who exactly would call the convention.[20] Having laid their plans, the founders of the AUC went quickly to work. Soon such influential figures as Will Clayton, veteran of the State and Commerce Departments, and Robert Patterson, former Secretary of War, had joined the AUC's Executive Committee. At a news conference on March 15, 1949, the AUC was formally christened.[21]

By early June, Streit was ready with the resolution, and preparations for its introduction proceeded forthwith. Then came an unexpected delay. The State Department, ostensibly fearful that an Atlantic

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[20]Edward Meeman to Kefauver, August 16, 1949, folder 4, Committee, Box 6; Livingston Hartley, *Atlantic Challenge* (Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1965), 56; Szent-Miklosy, 109-110.

[21]Press Release of Tuesday, March 15, 1949, folder 4, Committee, Box 6; New York *Times*, March 16, 1949, 14.

Union Resolution would cause more Senatorial foot-dragging on ratification of the North Atlantic Pact, requested that Kefauver delay introduction of his resolution until after the Pact had been dealt with. Although this request was granted, Streit was anxious that the delay be a short one. Even though approaching Congressional adjournment made immediate hearings impossible, Streit deemed it essential that the resolution be introduced that summer. The sooner the proposal was made public, the better the effect on AUC fund raising.[22]

Thus Senator Kefauver set about soliciting his colleagues' support for the Atlantic Union Resolution. His task was no doubt eased by the ever-heightening tension of that cold war summer. The end of the Berlin blockade brought little relief to divided Europe; in China, the communists appeared invincible. America's leaders, meanwhile, cast about for some way to unify the free world in the face of a seemingly monolithic worldwide threat. This urge was certainly manifest in the United States Senate. Indeed, before summer's end more than forty Senators would be sponsoring one or more resolutions calling for such measures as strengthening the United Nations, Atlantic Union, or even world government.[23] On July 21, the day the North Atlantic Pact was ratified, Kefauver's request for support went out to every member of the Senate.[24] Soon came the replies. Some were noncommittal;

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[22]Streit to Owen Roberts, June 7, 1949, folder 4, Committee, Box 6; Szent-Miklosy, 110.

[23]Ely Culberson to Kefauver, August 12, 1949, folder 1, Resolution, Box 6.

[24]Kefauver to Walter F. George, July 21, 1949, folder 12, Correspondence, Box 7.

some favored other resolutions; a few promised support; and in the end nineteen agreed to co-sponsor the Atlantic Union Resolution.[25] Thus it was that a "highly elated" Estes Kefauver took the floor of the Senate on July 26, 1949, to introduce Senate Concurrent Resolution 57, the call for an Atlantic Exploratory Convention.[26]

Kefauver began his remarks with a summation of the problems facing the Atlantic democracies in the political, military, economic, and monetary fields, problems which were being approached inefficiently, in "piecemeal" fashion, by various and sundry aid programs. Calling an Atlantic convention, maintained the Senator, would permit the continuation of present efforts at unification, while at the same time committing America to nothing more than an exploration of the possibility of Atlantic Union. This claim was borne out by the operative clause of SCR 57, which read as follows:

> Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That the President is requested to invite the democracies which sponsored the North Atlantic Treaty to name delegates, representing their principal political parties, to meet this year with delegates of the United States in a Federal Convention to explore how far their peoples, and the peoples of such other democracies as the convention may invite to send delegates, can apply among them, within the framework of the United Nations, the principles of free federal union.[27]

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[25] See replies from various Senators in folder 3, Correspondence, and in folder 2, Statements and Speeches, Box 6.

[26] Kefauver to Edmund Orgill, July 27, 1949, folder 1, Correspondence, Box 6; *Congressional Record*, Eighty-first Congress, First Session (Washington, D.C., 1949), 10144. See Appendix for complete list of sponsors.

[27] *Ibid.*

The introduction of the resolution, and an attendant press conference, received good publicity, including front page coverage in the New York *Times* and the *Washington Post*, as well as in the *Memphis Press Scimitar*, and the *Commercial Appeal*.[28] Letters expressing approval arrived from all over America. But Secretary of State Dean Acheson, when questioned by the press, had no comment.[29]

Less than a year had passed since the election of Estes Kefauver to the United States Senate, and already an Atlantic Union Resolution was pending before Congress. Next would come hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Thus far, there had been but one delay, the month-long postponement of the introduction; now the way seemed clear for consideration of Atlantic Union.

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[28]John Apperson to Kefauver, July 26, 1949, folder 1, Correspondence, Box 6; Kefauver to Robert McCormack, July 27, 1949, *ibid.*; Kefauver to George Fort Milton, July 30, 1949, *ibid*; Sabra Holbrook to Kefauver, July 28, 1949, *ibid.*

[29]New York *Times*, July 28, 1949, 3.

CHAPTER II

FIRST OPPOSITION

When the Senate adjourned on October 19, optimism was in order for Atlantic Unionists. On the twenty-seventh, Kefauver went publicly on record as confident that an Atlantic Exploratory Convention would be called sometime in 1950.[1] New pledges of support included those of Senator John Foster Dulles and New York Governor Herbert Lehman, Dulles' opponent in the upcoming Senatorial election. Both men promised, if elected, to vote for SCR 57.[2]

The new session of Congress was barely one week old when, on January 10, 1950, Kefauver once again sought support from his colleagues. Senator Elbert Thomas of Utah was organizing a Foreign Relations subcommittee to hear proposals for revision of the United Nations charter, and at Kefauver's request, the Atlantic Union Resolution would be on the agenda. What Kefauver wanted this time was statements from sympathetic Senators, or even personal appearances at the hearings, set to begin in early February.[3]

As is customary in matters pertaining to foreign affairs, the Thomas subcommittee was desirous of the State Department's opinion on

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[1]New York *Times*, October 27, 1949, 28.

[2]*Ibid.*, October 28, 1949; Herbert Lehman to Moore, October 14, 1949, folder 4, Committee, Box 6; John Foster Dulles to Moore, October 22, 1949, *ibid.*

[3]Kefauver to various Senators, January 10, 1950, folder 12, Correspondence, Box 7.

the various resolutions to be dealt with at the hearings. Accordingly, the subcommittee asked the Department of State to "give careful consideration to the proposals and to be prepared to express its opinion on the resolutions during the hearings."[4] Nor was the importance of State Department views lost on the Atlantic Union Committee, which had for some time been holding strategy sessions in preparation for the hearings. Conversations between Union lobbyists and State Department officials, though admittedly informal, indicated that most State Department planners favored European, but not Atlantic, Union. This attitude, however, would seem understandable in light of the fact that no one at State had really given any thought to Atlantic Union. Thus, despite this initially unfavorable response, by late January there had arisen in the AUC the hope that State Department opinion was somewhat divided as to SCR 57.[5]

Given the uncertainty of State Department cooperation, it is not surprising that Kefauver and his allies should seek a more sympathetic executive ear. Soon the Senator had arranged for a delegation of Unionists to meet with President Truman. This group, thirty-six strong and headed by Kefauver, Representative Hale Boggs, and Owen Roberts, met with the President on January 20. The meeting, however, did not

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[4]*Revision of the United Nations Charter: Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate* (Washington, D.C., 1950), 3.

[5]Minutes, Nineteenth Meeting, Executive Council, Atlantic Union Committee, December 22, 1949, folder 4, Committee, Box 6; Minutes, Eighteenth Meeting, Executive Council, AUC, December 8, 1949, *ibid.*; Minutes, Twentieth Meeting, Executive Council, AUC, January 12, 1950, *ibid.*; Minutes, Twenty-first Meeting, Executive Council, AUC, January 26, 1950, *ibid.*

prove productive. Although Truman saw "nothing but good" to come from the AUC's work, he would not endorse the cause of Union; the delegation, for their part, did not disturb the pleasant get-together by pressing the issue. Thus it appeared that the Unionists would have to make their case in the uncertain forum of the Thomas subcommittee hearings.[6]

The hearings, scheduled to begin February 2, would be divided into three phases. First, proponents of the various resolutions being examined would present their cases. Next, representatives of the State Department would state the Department's position on each proposal in particular. Finally, the subcommittee would hear testimony from members of the general public who wished to make known their views on any of the resolutions in question.[7] As the opening date approached, the AUC, in concert with Senator Kefauver, carefully outlined and planned each part of their presentation. By February 8, when SCR 57 came up for consideration, the Unionists were ready with exhaustive arguments for their Atlantic federal plan.[8]

On the morning of the eighth, a Wednesday, Senator Kefauver appeared before the subcommittee to deliver a few opening remarks and

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[6]Kefauver to Harry S. Truman, January 19, 1950, folder 5, Correspondence, Box 5; New York *Times*, January 21, 1950, 3; List of delegates to meet with Truman, folder 4, Committee, Box 6; Excerpts from Presidential press conference of January 27, 1950, folder 1, Resolution Correspondence, Box 6.

[7]*Revision of the United Nations Charter: Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate* (Washington, D.C., 1950), 2.

[8]Streit to Roberts, January 25, 1950, folder 3, Resolution Statements and Speeches, Box 6; Streit to Roberts, February 1, 1950, *ibid.*

to introduce the witnesses for SCR 57. From the start, the Senator, emphasized the superiority of a comprehensive Union solution to free world problems. Passage of the Atlantic Union Resolution would not interfere with present economic and military aid programs; rather would it give hope of replacing the "piecemeal" program with something stronger and far more efficient. Nor would SCR 57 deter efforts for disarmament or world peace, since the very purpose of the resolution was peaceful, not aggressive. To Kefauver, the greatest single gain of America's postwar foreign policy was the time bought by the North Atlantic Treaty. Time, however, seemed to be rapidly running out. China had already "fallen," and soon the Russians would have atom bombs enough to destroy the urban centers of western Europe. East-West tension, furthermore, showed no signs of abating in the near future. How long could America stand the strain of ever-increasing defense expenditures? More importantly, how long could Americans stand the psychological stress of an apparently winless ideological conflict? Kefauver was not optimistic: "The people are apt to tire of our cold war efforts unless we present an idea and a definite plan which arouses the imagination of our own country, as well as that of the free peoples all over the world." Such a plan was offered by SCR 57. The Senator then introduced Owen J. Roberts, who would deal with the "political and jurisdictional" aspects of Atlantic Union.[9]

Justice Roberts, after a warm welcome from the subcommittee, began his testimony by citing the danger posed to democracy by

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[9]*UN Charter: Hearings*, 228-30.

ever-expanding Soviet communism. The Russians, observed Roberts, had obtained control of a third of the world through a policy that was "a mixture of old-fashioned imperialism and modern fifth-column tactics." That control, moreover, was iron-fisted. Controlled Soviet industrial capacity, which need not worry with consumer goods, could quite conceivably give the communist world a decisive edge in the production of nuclear weapons. The communist world was the only united world, and in that unity lay potentially insurmountable strength. The democracies, on the other hand, were divided, not only on tariff and currency questions, but on basic policy, such as the recognition of communist China or the reintegration of Germany into European affairs. Given the ever-increasing influence and power of world communism, it was clear to Justice Roberts that quick action was imperative. Union was needed now. Unless an exploration of closer Atlantic unity were soon begun, the democracies might well run out of time. SCR 57 would provide that exploration.[10]

Turning to specifics, Roberts described how the proposed convention might be set up with regard to representation, voting, and composition of the American delegation. Under Roberts' illustrative scheme, the United States would have thirty-eight votes, Canada eight, and Europe's total would be forty-six. Thus would the vote of North America and Europe be balanced. The members of the American delegation would be acting solely in their capacity as private citizens; thus would the appearance of official endorsement be eliminated. For this

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[10]*Ibid.*, 232-34.

convention would be merely an exploration of possibilities. The American government would be in no way obligated to accept any plan arrived at by the convention. Roberts, furthermore, made it plain that any illustration of possible convention organization was sheer speculation on his part. After all, it would be up to the Executive branch of the American government to arrange the details of the convention. And although Justice Roberts was also willing to speculate on the kind of federal plan that might issue from the convention, he again made it clear that the convention delegates would be bound to no detailed blueprint of federation. Certain measures, however, seemed certain to emerge from the convention in one form or another. Chief among these should be a Union bill of rights, division of powers between federal and national governments, and provision for ratification and amendment of the Union constitution. Also dealt with should be admission of new members, the language problem and transition measures to facilitate the construction of the Union.[11]

To Justice Roberts, however, specifics were not as important as the fact of the convention itself. Besides showing that America took its Atlantic Pact obligations seriously, the convention would give the Pact added moral support. By demonstrating a willingness to go beyond the Pact and the Marshall Plan, America could quiet European fears of an American return to isolation. Passage of the Atlantic Union Resolution would also attest to the continuance of bipartisan foreign policy in the United States, since the resolution

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[11] *Ibid.*, 234-36.

was supported by citizens and Congressmen of both major American political parties. Finally, Roberts compared Atlantic Union favorably with proposals for world government. Since all communist nations would refuse to join a world government, the result of such a proposal might well be the permanent division of the world into two armed camps. Atlantic Union, however, would involve a restricted number of nations, leaving a large neutral bloc that need not choose sides.[12]

After reminding the subcommittee that Union government could save much money through elimination of duplicated government functions, such as defense and diplomatic expense, Roberts turned his attention to the effect of Union on regional pacts. Once Union had been achieved, the North Atlantic Pact and the Marshall Plan would cease to exist as such; the present poisonous "rich uncle-poor nephew" relationship would be replaced be a healthier bond based on common citizenship. Although Roberts did not explain just how such a new relationship would be any "healthier," he was not challenged on this point by the subcommittee, which remained remarkably friendly and uncritical of the Justice. And, though maintaining that the Union would simply inherit America's place in inter-American organization, Roberts failed to take into account any possible unfavorable reaction by Latin American nations.[13]

As for nations not invited to the convention, Roberts did not fear their resentment. Had the North Atlantic Pact engendered any such ill will? Furthermore, the convention would have the option of

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[12] *Ibid.*, 236-37.

[13] *Ibid.*, 237-38.

inviting other democracies to join in its deliberations; at any rate, there would be no onus on America. The Union, moreover, would keep its doors open for future increases in membership. Such increases would seem inevitable. The Union, with its great free market of 400,000,000 people, would become the only important market for all other nations. It would be the world's best buyer of raw materials, and the sole source of supply for many manufactured goods. Economics alone would make other nations desire Union membership. Here Roberts contradicted his earlier testimony; though Atlantic Union would start out small, its eventual growth would indeed result in the division of the world into two armed camps. Clearly, no communist government would be willing to accept the Union's minimum Bill of Rights.[14]

Although Justice Roberts continually stressed the purely exploratory nature of the proposed Atlantic convention, the subcommittee seemed more interested in possible effects of Union itself. After some discussion of such particulars, Roberts took his leave, to be replaced at the witness table by Dr. Harold C. Urey, "Atomic Scientist."[15]

Dr. Urey, professor of chemistry in the University of Chicago's Institute for Nuclear Studies, was well known to subcommittee members as a Nobel prize winner and a key figure in the Manhattan Project. The professor began by warning that the ever-increasing power of nuclear weapons made world peace more urgent than ever. The answer to this problem was Atlantic Union. Historically, Urey claimed, peace

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[14] *Ibid.*, 238-40.

[15] *Ibid.*, 240-55.

had been effected by one of two methods: either the warring factions had eventually united, or one side had achieved a "preponderance of power." In 1950, world government was clearly impossible; but Atlantic Union could create a preponderance of power. To Urey, Union was as necessary as it was possible. What would happen, he asked, if by infiltration, sabotage, or outright nuclear coercion, the Soviet Union tried to separate western Europe from its alliance to the United States? To be sure, there was NATO, but how could Europeans be really sure we would honor our commitments? What was one treaty when weighed against America's long tradition of non-involvement in European affairs? Only the cement of Union could effectively bind Europe to America.[16]

Questions immediately arose, and were put to the professor by the Senators. Obviously, the United States would be the military powerhouse of any proposed Union. What would prevent the Russians, once strong enough, from launching a surprise attack on America? Would Union help us then? To Dr. Urey, this little affected the matter of federation. With or without Union, world destruction remained a possibility. Atlantic federation, however, would at least solve the problem of saving Europe from possible communization, and America from an undesired isolation. As to the sharing of atomic secrets, a question much on everyone's mind, the professor pointed out that such secrets are impossible to keep for more than a few years. At any rate, nuclear stockpiles on both sides of the Atlantic seemed sure to

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[16]*Ibid.*, 255-57.

keep growing for the foreseeable future. Dr. Urey's testimony ended with witness and inquisitors alike pondering the possible outcome of a future nuclear standoff. Clearly, the importance of peace could only increase with time.[17]

At this point in the hearings the statement of Robert P. Patterson, who was unable to appear, was inserted into the record. This rather brief message stressed the overwhelming military might of an Atlantic Union, as well as the purely exploratory nature of the proposed convention.[18]

Next came Clarence Streit, who used the time remaining before the afternoon recess to deliver an elegantly worded, idealistic plea for Union. Later that day, after further expert testimony, Streit would return for further questioning.[19]

The first witness to appear that afternoon was J. Parker Van Zandt, President of the Aviation Research Institute, a nonprofit organization engaged in transportation research. The purpose of Mr. Van Zandt's appearance was to bring home to the committee the central position of Europe in the age of air travel. Pointing out that "the map that lies flat, lies," Van Zandt set about to change the Senators' possible misconceptions about relative distances on the surface of the globe. Constructing a new, "principal" hemisphere with Europe at the center, the aviation expert pointed out that within that hemisphere lay 90% of the earth's ice-free land area, 94% of its population, and major portions of the world's natural

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[17] *Ibid.*, 257-64. [18] *Ibid.*, 279-80. [19] *Ibid.*, 280-93.

resources, technical skill, and financial strength. The airways of the future would undoubtedly focus on Europe. All the more advantage to America in Atlantic Union; otherwise, there was the risk of being someday isolated from the center of world commerce. Thus concluded Van Zandt's testimony.[20]

Returning to wrap up the presentation, Clarence Streit once again stressed the purely exploratory nature of the proposed convention. Considerable time, however, was spent explaining probable effects of Union in all possible areas: political, economic, military, and social. In response to questioning by Senator Kefauver, who was present throughout that day of hearings, Streit affirmed his own belief that Americans would welcome some sort of Atlantic federation, a belief engendered by ten years of meeting the people while promoting the Union idea.[21].

So ended a long day of pleading the Atlantic Union case. Although Will Clayton could not appear until February 13, a "delighted" Estes Kefauver telegraphed his Memphian friends that, thanks to "most impressive" testimony by Roberts, Urey, and Streit, the hearings had been "very successful."[22] The Senator's satisfaction, however, was premature. The Department of State had not yet been heard.

Will Clayton's testimony on the thirteenth brought nothing startling, since Clayton was slated to deal with economic aspects of

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[20] *Ibid.*, 293-98.

[21] *Ibid.*, 298-312.

[22] Kefauver to Orgill, Meeman, and Burch, February 8, 1950, folder 5, Correspondence, Box 5.

Union. Predictably, Clayton extolled the potential benefit of Union to businessman and consumer alike. The destruction of tariff walls would force businesses throughout the Union to become more efficient. Not only would consumers enjoy lower prices; nations outside the Union would also be attracted to Union products. Thus the economic power of the Atlantic Union would only increase with time.[23]

On Wednesday, February 15, Dean Rusk and John Hickerson arrived at the hearings to present the State Department's views. Rusk, Deputy Under Secretary for policy matters, would first present a general statement; Hickerson, Assistant Secretary in charge of the Bureau of United Nations Affairs, would then deal separately and specifically with each of the resolutions before the subcommittee.

Rusk's rather lengthy opening remarks expressed strong State Department support for the United Nations, as well as approval of the UN's numerous past achievements.[24] It then fell to Hickerson to proceed with the real business at hand. First, however, the Assistant Secretary summed up the State Department's "philosophy" on international organization. "Reduced to its simplest terms," declared Hickerson, "that philosophy says that we believe, in the Department of State, that the United Nations is and should remain the cornerstone of our foreign policy." When considering alternative or additional forms of international organization, Americans should proceed with great caution, "lest action be taken which might weaken or jeapordize

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[23] *UN Charter: Hearings*, 265-279.

[24] *Ibid.*, 377-414.

a going concern in the illusory hope of getting something better." The Assistant Secretary then turned his attention to the individual resolutions before the committee.[25]

The rest of the morning was spent in consideration of various proposals for world government or revision of the United Nations charter, all of which the State Department either recommended against or could not support. Finally, after a luncheon recess, Hickerson began the evaluation of SCR 57, the Atlantic Union Resolution. Like the subcommittee members, and like the proponents of the resolution, the Assistant Secretary chose to dwell mainly on the implications of Union, rather than on the resolution as such. Pointing out that Atlantic Union "would involve not only basic economic and social changes but also changes in the structure of the United States Government," Hickerson questioned the readiness of America to accept such changes. Clearly, American participation in Atlantic Union would involve cession of U.S. Government power in many fields, such as diplomacy, defense, taxation, imports, currency, exploitation of natural resources, and immigration. Would Americans be prepared to cede such powers? If so, to what extent? To what kind of authority? By what process? What would be the effect on labor standards, or business, or agriculture? Other countries proposed for Union membership had forms of government different from that of the United States. How far would Americans be willing to go in altering their own form of government? Were Americans prepared to be in the minority in the

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[25] *Ibid.*, 414-15.

Union parliament? For that matter, would other nations be willing to make the abovementioned concessions? What other nations would be invited to participate in the Union, and on what basis would they be selected? The more homogenous the group, the better for progress, but then one was faced with a great number of nations which might resent their exclusion from the Union. In the State Department's opinion, its own programs were far superior in this respect: "For the present, the approach of separate arrangements for dealing with different problems, and with different membership, is valuable in preventing any sharp distinction between the 'ins' and the 'outs.'"[26]

Hickerson did not deny the divisive effect of differing national interests among the world's free nations. Yet even national sovereignty could be an effective aid to cooperation: "In a number of countries in the Atlantic community, progress in both the national and international fields has resulted from the willingness of certain groups to accept sacrifices primarily on the basis of national interest. It will take a very long time before similar strong loyalty to a new political unit emerges." The Assistant Secretary went on to laud current State Department programs, such as the Economic Cooperation Administration, the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the North Atlantic Treaty and the inter-American system, cooperation with the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, ratification of the International Trade Organization, and encouragement of such European developments as Benelux and the Council of Europe.[27]

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[26] *Ibid.*, 435-36.

[27] *Ibid.*, 437-38.

Turning at last to the resolution itself, Hickerson warned that calling an Atlantic convention could "lead to reactions unfavorable to the cause of collective security." If the convention should fail, as the State Department thought likely, it would almost certainly "bring to light and emphasize the divisions among the proposed members of the Atlantic Union." The convention, therefore, should be called only if it were clearly evident that: it would advance American interests; all peoples concerned approved and had full knowledge; there was a "reasonable" chance of agreement; it would strengthen rather than weaken both the North Atlantic community and support for the purposes and principles of the United Nations. Meanwhile, closer Atlantic unity should be pursued through NATO, the UN, and existing diplomatic channels.[28]

During the questioning that followed, Hickerson admitted that the State Department in fact had no way of knowing whether an Atlantic convention would indeed fail. The Department was certain, however, that much more study of Atlantic Union was necessary; all nations involved should be aware of the implications of Union before a convention was "precipitately" called. Other problems were brought to light as well. If, as set forth in SCR 57, the President of the United States were to call the convention, it would be impossible to avoid the implication that America favored Atlantic Union itself, rather than a mere exploration. Nor could racial issues be ignored: only predominantly white nations would be invited to the proposed convention.

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[28] *Ibid.*, 438.

In this context America's minority problems, already a sore spot in relations with "developing nations," would only exacerbate the resentment felt by those countries not invited to the convention. At any rate, western Europe was growing ever stronger, and soon drastic measures like Atlantic Union would no longer seem so urgent. In the State Department's view, current programs would suffice to forestall the advance of communism in the meantime.[29]

At this point Senator Kefauver, who had been present throughout the State Department testimony, asked to be recognized. Professing to be "terrifically disappointed with the attitude and the lack of imagination of the State Department," the Senator accused the Department of "assuming the prerogative of speaking for the American people and for the Congress." The American people, continued Kefuaver, were "getting awfully tired of paying the expense of a cold war when they don't see any great something that we are seeking or trying to arrive at." For this purpose, the State Department's "piecemeal" program was obviously unsatisfactory. Noting that Owen Roberts and others had already answered almost all of the questions raised by Hickerson, Kefauver wondered aloud whether the Assistant Secretary had indeed read the testimony of the Unionists. When Hickerson replied that he had, Kefauver retorted that it was evident that the State Department had prepared its position far in advance of Roberts' appearance before the subcommittee. Clearly, the Senator was angry. How, he demanded to know, could the State Department say that the American people were

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[29] *Ibid.*, 438-446.

or were not ready for Union? To this Hickerson replied that the Department was only raising questions that needed consideration. Kefauver, however, was implacable. The duty of the State Department, maintained the Senator, was not just to raise questions, but to provide answers, to "get us off this plateau that we now find ourselves on."[30]

Thus began a lengthy and sometimes heated exchange between Senator Kefauver and the State Department representatives. Rusk and Hickerson, for their part, maintained that much more study and thought were needed on both sides of the Atlantic before a convention could be called. Such a convention should be entered into only if America had worked out a detailed opening position, as in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty. A Presidential call to a convention would strongly imply American desire for Union; thus, Americans should have clearly demonstrated their wish for Union before the convention, lest the effort fail and lead to division among the democracies. In the State Department's opinion, the best way to ascertain the feelings of the American people would be extensive and unofficial debate over Atlantic Union. An officially sanctioned convention, on the other hand, would certainly be premature.

Kefauver, however, was convinced that only good could come of an Atlantic convention. Surely some progress toward greater unity could be made. Of course, more discussion and debate were needed; on this the Senator and the State Department agreed. But to Kefauver,

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[30]*Ibid.*, 446-47.

there could be no greater stimulus to debate than the calling of the convention itself. A convention, furthermore, would provide the American people with a goal, a tangible result of their nation's foreign policy, a bright hope in contrast to the fear and confusion engendered by the State Department's undramatic "piecemeal" program. When Hickerson continued to insist that more study and preparation were necessary, Kefauver at last lost all patience:

> SENATOR KEFAUVER. Why can't you do this preparatory work now if you set your head to do it?
> MR. HICKERSON. Senator, that is precisely what we are suggesting be done.
> SENATOR KEFAUVER. Well, then, why didn't you do it, instead of saying here we are against anything, and although you know the Congress and the people want something, that you are just going to sit on the perch and that you are against every resolution that is presented and you think more study ought to be made? Why don't you say, instead of being against them, that we want to study this thing, we would like for Congress to debate it? I don't know of any better place to generate study than to have a full-dress debate on the floor of the Senate, do you?
> MR. HICKERSON. No sir. I think that is an excellent place.
> SENATOR KEFAUVER. Don't you think that would be a good idea?
> MR HICKERSON. I think it would be an excellent idea.
> SENATOR KEFAUVER. That is all I wanted, Mr. Chairman.

Kefauver's legal training had stood him in good stead. Though Hickerson later explained that he had been speaking of debating the issues in general, and not SCR 57 in particular, the distinction was not so clear as he would have wished.[31]

As far as the Atlantic Union Resolution was concerned, the hearings were ended. But Estes Kefauver was angry; the State Department had not

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[31] *Ibid.*, 447-57.

yet won. More than forty Senators had signed one or more of the resolutions rejected by State at the hearings. Thus, the Atlantic Union Committee could feel confident that growing Senate support would offset the State Department's adamant opposition. In the meantime, Kefauver was preparing to take the State Department to task.[32]

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[32]Minutes, Ninth Meeting, Board of Directors, AUC, February 23, 1950, folder 3, Committee, Box 6.

CHAPTER III

SETBACK

From the very beginning, 1950 had not been an auspicious year for State Department public relations. On January 25, Alger Hiss had been convicted of perjury; scarcely two weeks later, Senator Joseph McCarthy had opened his attack on State Department "communists" with a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia. Then, on March 13, Estes Kefauver took the floor of the Senate to add his voice to the mounting chorus of dismay at the conduct of America's foreign affairs.

While certainly no McCarthyite, Kefauver echoed his countrymen's lack of faith in the wisdom and foresight of the Department of State. Citing America's urgent need for "creative leadership," Kefauver expressed his shock and alarm at the State Department's "lack of vision" in no uncertain terms. Despite vast expenditures of money and effort, the United States seemed to be losing the cold war. While barely holding its own in Europe, America had lost much of Asia to the communists. Now was the time to seek an alternative to the obviously inadequate leadership of the State Department. This alternative, declared Kefauver, was readily available if only Congress would shoulder its constitutional responsibilities. Praising the closeness of Congress to the American people, as opposed to the aloofness of State Department officials, Kefauver ar the same time chided his colleagues for being "back seat drivers" in the conduct of foreign affairs. As a case in point, the Senator turned to the matter of the

recent Thomas subcommittee hearings. Despite the fact that the Senate had steadfastly supported State Department policies, the Department had chosen to ignore the advice of the Senate by rejecting almost all of the resolutions to come before the subcommittee. Why this lack of vision? Senator Paul Douglas of Illinois arose to provide an answer. "Is it not true," inquired Senator Douglas, "that the members of the State Department all too often succumb to the occupational disease which sometimes characterizes executive officials, namely, that any suggestion made by a member of the legislative body is to be automatically turned down?" To this Senator Kefauver replied that, at least in this instance, the State Department seemed to value only its own opinions. Agreeing with Douglas that State seemed to think "it is theirs to speak and ours merely to listen and mutely acquiesce," Kefauver went on to accuse the Department of attempting to usurp the Congressional prerogative of speaking for the American people. This self-assurance on the part of the State Department was all the more galling for the fact that it was not justified by policy success. Lacking an effective program of its own, the Department of State was nevertheless unwilling to heed the suggestions of others:

> The answer of the State Department to every proposal for peace, Mr. President, is that it needs time to consider the proposal. My heaven, Mr. President, the one thing we do not need is time to consider. We need to utilize the brief time we have . . . to quit drifting and start moving. The State Department evidently does not realize that we cannot kill time; it is time which kills us . . . . I am afraid that the hydrogen bomb wears no wrist watch.

Finally, after a lengthy and rousing defense of the Atlantic Union Resolution, Kefauver came to the practical heart of the matter:

a call to the Foreign Relations Committee to issue a favorable report on SCR 57. Once released to the Senate, the resolution would receive the study and discussion that the State Department thought so necessary.[1]

Kefauver's attack on the State Department struck a responsive chord in the public at large, and especially in the Senator's home state of Tennessee. University of Tennessee President C. E. Brehm was only one of many Tennesseans who agreed that Congress had been slighted by the State Department.[2] Better yet from Kefauver's point of view, a mass meeting of citizens in Memphis vociferously denounced the State Department's position on Atlantic Union as "consistent with the timorous and uninspired character" of general State Department policy. In Memphis at least, Kefauver was the man of the hour.[3]

Meanwhile, at the Department of State the realization apparently was growing that whatever had been gained before the Thomas subcommittee could be lost on the field of public relations. By March 17, Theodore Achilles, Director of the Office of Western European Affairs, had written both Kefauver and Clarence Streit in an attempt at reconciliation. The Department's position, claimed Achilles, was "not nearly so negative as it was taken to be." Included in the letters were copies of Rusk's statement before the Thomas subcommittee, with certain

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[1] *Congressional Record*, Eighty-first Congress, Second Session (Washington, D.C., 1950), 3204-3213.

[2] C. E. Brehm to Kefauver, March 14, 1950, folder 4, Resolution Correspondence, Box 6.

[3] *Memphis Press Scimitar*, March 16, 1950, 1.

innocuous passages marked.[4] Kefauver, however, could not forget the overall thrust of the State Department testimony. His response was to mail Dean Rusk a *Memphis Press Scimitar* clipping about the mass meeting in that city, with the suggestion that Rusk show the clipping to Hickerson. A similar, but more gentle message went to Dean Acheson. After pledging to defend the State Department against "the insidious attack by Senator McCarthy," Kefauver directed the Secretary's attention to public support for the Atlantic Union Resolution. The Senator's language was somewhat softer than in his public pronouncements: "I do hope so much that you and my good friends in the State Department will reconsider your position on the Atlantic Union Resolution."[5] The reply to Kefauver's prodding came from Rusk. Although still not convinced that an Atlantic convention was the best way to obtain closer ties with Europe, the Deputy Under Secretary expressed confidence that he and the Senator could "go a long way down the same road before we come to a fork."[6] Both Kefauver and the State Department seemed to be moving toward positions more amenable to compromise.

Kefauver, meanwhile, still believed that the Thomas subcommittee would report out some sort of resolution. In that event, it was

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[4]Theodore Achilles to Streit, March 17, 1950, folder 2, Resolution Statements and Speeches, Box 6; Achilles to Kefauver, March 17, 1950, folder 3, Resolution Statements and Speeches, Box 6.

[5]Kefauver to Dean Rusk, March 21, 1950, folder 4, Resolution Statements and Speeches, Box 6; Kefauver to Dean Acheson, March 21, 1950, *ibid.*

[6]Rusk to Kefauver, March 23, 1950, folder 15, Correspondence, Box 7.

Kefauver's plan to move, on the floor of the Senate to amend the resolution in favor of Atlantic Union. The resultant full scale debate would effectively circumvent the State Department's opposition to the Atlantic Union Resolution. But until such time as the subcommittee issued its report, Kefauver would have to do his best to deal with State. Accordingly, the Senator arranged a meeting with Secretary Acheson himself.[7]

On April 4, Kefauver met with Acheson and two underlings, Theodore Achilles and Jack MacFarland. The meeting, in Kefauver's words, was "fruitful": "I put the matter right up to him." Acheson, speaking first, spent half an hour outlining his Department's programs. Kefauver, however, was convinced that this "piecemeal" program did not go nearly far enough; nor was it dramatic enough to calm the fears of the American people. Bluntly, the Senator informed the Secretary that "unless he could adopt a policy with some high principle showing what we were aiming for, I thought his whole foreign policy was going to collapse." In Kefauver's opinion, Acheson exhibited "great interest" in the Senator's observations, and appeared to take a "definite turn" toward a more cooperative attitude. The Secretary's subordinates seemed likewise sympathetic, and later informed Kefauver that the talk had done "a lot of good."[8]

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[7]Minutes, Twenty-fourth Meeting, Executive Committee, AUC, March 23, 1950, folder 3, Correspondence, Box 6.

[8]Kefauver to Orgill, April 5, 1950, folder 15, Correspondence, Box 7; Kefauver to Orgill, April 8, 1950, *ibid.*

This apparent softening of the State Department's resistance was also noticed by members of the Atlantic Union Committee, who cited a new attitude that seemed to be emerging in talks with State Department officials. These officials, it seemed, were stressing the fact that at no time had the Department actually used the word "oppose" with regard to SCR 57; rather, the State Department's position involved merely "lack of support" for the resolution.[9] In early May, further talks with Acheson were made impossible when the Secretary left for Europe. Meanwhile, the AUC renewed lobbying efforts among Congressional leadership, and especially among members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.[10] In June, Unionists' hopes were given yet another boost by the publication of *The New Federalist*, a collection of articles from *Freedom & Union*, Clarence Streit's Union-oriented magazine. In the introduction, John Foster Dulles again lent the weight of his prestige to the push for Atlantic Union. While praising State Department programs as "important steps in a good direction," Dulles nevertheless maintained that such measures "do not provide the reality of dependable common defense." Atlantic unity was a contingency, not a fact. *The New Federalist*, like *The Federalist Papers*, pointed out the unreliability of mere promises by sovereign states to stand together when peril strikes: "Such promises . . . are rarely kept unless, when the event occurs, national self interest coincides

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[9]Minutes Twenty-sixth Meeting, Executive Committee, AUC, April 20, 1950, folder 3, Committee, Box 6

[10]Minutes, Twenty-ninth Meeting, Executive Committee, AUC, June 22, 1950, folder 2, Committee, Box 6.

with the promise." Citing the "political vision, wisdom, and courage" of the authors of *The New Federalist* (among them Owen Roberts and Clarence Streit), Dulles concluded with the hope that Congress would give the Atlantic Union Resolution the careful consideration it deserved. Things were looking up for SCR 57.[11]

Then, on June 25, 1950, the cold war became a shooting war as North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel into South Korea. To AUC members, this sudden communist aggression was proof positive that State Department plans for free world unity were really not much of a deterrent. To be sure, America, followed by the United Nations, reacted quickly; but the absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council, the key factor in UN intervention, could only be regarded as a lucky accident. Now the time seemed ripe to press again for Union. Soon the Congressional sponsors of the Atlantic Union Resolution were planning their strategy sessions. At one key meeting on July 27, it was agreed to arrange further conferences with Dean Acheson and high-echelon State Department officers.[12]

After careful preparation, a committee of Unionists and Congressional supporters arranged to meet with a State Department delegation on the morning of August 10.[13] Present at the meeting were a

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[11]"Publius II," *The New Federalist* (New York, 1950), xv-xvii.

[12]Minutes, Thirty-first Meeting, Executive Committee, AUC, July 20, 1950, folder 2, Committee, Box 6; Robert Bishop to Kefauver, August 2, 1950, *ibid.*; Robert C. Hendrickson to Kefauver, August 3, 1950, folder 2, Resolution Statements and Speeches, Box 6.

[13]Bishop to Kefauver, August 2, 1950, folder 2, Committee, Box 6.

balanced bipartisan group of seven Congressmen and five Senators, headed by Kefauver. The State Department entourage consisted of Acheson, W. Averill Harriman, and John Foster Dulles. The presence of these last two had been requested by the AUC. Harriman, a close associate of President Truman, had supported Atlantic Union in 1947, as Secretary of Commerce. The inclusion of Dulles, recently returned from Japan, was a result not only of his support for the Atlantic Union Resolution, but also of the Unionists' desire to emphasize the bipartisan character of the crusade for Union. Also present, as a last minute addition, was John Sherman Cooper, who had accompanied Acheson to Europe as a GOP advisor.

From the meeting's outset, support of the Atlantic Union Resolution was urged upon Acheson by each of the legislators present, as well as by Dulles and Cooper. Although accounts conflict, Harriman seems to have wavered, taking no position conclusively. But Acheson, though seeming to take a more friendly attitude, was basically unmoved. In the end, however, the Secretary agreed to appoint delegates to a later, smaller conference for the purpose of ironing out a compromise resolution, with wording acceptable to both sides. By the end of the month, both State and the Congressmen had chosen their representatives.[14]

In the interim, however, the cause of Union was dealt a body blow by the issuance, on September 1, of the report of the Thomas

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[14]Kefauver to Orgill, August 14, 1950, folder 1, Resolution Statements and Speeches, Box 6; Streit to Dwight D. Eisenhower, August 29, 1950, folder 2, Committee, Box 6.

subcommittee. Seemingly accepting State Department objections as valid, the subcommittee refused to report out any resolution at all. One by one, the State Department's arguments were echoed; this was especially true in the case of the Atlantic Union Resolution. To begin with, more research was needed to determine if the nations invited to the proposed convention were indeed amenable to Union. This research might well be carried out through the regular diplomatic channels of the State Department (not very likely in view of the Department's position). Other such objections were likewise repeated; and then the subcommittee turned to its own more original observations. The Atlantic Union Resolution, the report continued, was not the positive initiative for peace that its supporters claimed it to be; rather was it an anti-Soviet strategem, based on the fear that Russia would never voluntarily abandon her aggressive course in world affairs. Atlantic Union was, in short, a counsel of despair, despair now made less defensible by growing strength in western Europe and United Nations determination in Korea. Indeed, in the subcommittee's opinion, there would be no real support for Union were it not for the behavior of the Soviets. Who could say that tensions would not eventually ease?

In the end, the Thomas subcommittee had refused to report out a resolution of any sort. This decision was accompanied by the curious justification that reconciliation of all opposing viewpoints was

impossible unless the committee resorted to a statement general to a ridiculous extreme.[15]

Given this unexpected setback, the talks with the State Department became all the more important to Kefauver and his Unionist allies. On the evening of September 6, the new, smaller delegations from both sides met at the Statler Hilton Hotel in Washington. Senators Kefauver, Fulbright, Sparkman, and Thye joined Representatives Judd, Mansfield, and Cliff Davis in presenting the case for Union. John Foster Dulles, John Sherman Cooper, and Assistant Secretaries Perkins and Hickerson represented the State Department. As might have been expected, no real progress was made. The action of the Thomas subcommittee had effectively disarmed the Unionists. The Congressmen made much of the State Department's low prestige among the American public; but the Department's representatives did not believe the need for bold, aggressive action to be so urgent. Although John Cooper urged Atlantic Union strongly and without strings, Hickerson remained friendly but noncommittal. Dulles, though inclined to limit the Atlantic convention initially to political and military union, agreed that this would inevitable lead to economic and financial union as well. Hickerson tried without success to get Dulles to endorse the State Department's "functional approach." Perkins, labeling Union premature, maintained that the NATO military alliance was sufficient for the present. At

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[15]*UN Charter: Report*, 44-46, 53-54, 4.

length, all agreed to adjourn and work on the wording of a possible compromise resolution.[16]

Despite an amicable parting, there was suspicion on the part of AUC members. The timing of the Thomas subcommittee report had played right into State Department hands; the Unionists had been deprived of their only concrete accomplishment, the resolution, just when it was needed most as a bargaining tool. Some supporters of Union believed that the subcommittee had tailored and timed its report to meet State Department specifications.[17] The report itself clearly echoed State Department arguments. The Unionists' suspicions would be borne out when, at other meetings later that autumn, no further progress was made toward a compromise resolution.[18] The State Department seemed insincere, to say the least. In the meantime Senator Kefauver, growing impatient with the lack of action, set forth to reintroduce his resolution in the Eighty-second Congress. As early as September 13, he was sounding out his colleagues about further support for Atlantic Union. Though the Senate would soon begin a series of three-day recesses, Kefauver hoped to reintroduce the

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[16]Kefauver to Gerald B. Henry, September 6, 1950, folder 7, Correspondence, Box 5; Memorandum, Bishop to Board of Governors, AUC, September 8, 1950, folder 2, Committee, Box 6; Streit to Lester Pearson, September 9, 1950, folder 7, Correspondence, Box 5.

[17]Memorandum, Bishop to Board of Governors, AUC, September 8, 1950, folder 2, Committee, Box 6.

[18]Streit to Roberts, November 16, 1950, folder 15, Correspondence, Box 7.

Atlantic Union Resolution as soon as possible after the November elections.[19]

Thus had the attempted reconciliation ground to a halt. For the greater part of a year, the State Department had blocked action on SCR 57, first with "non-support" and then with that seemed to be delaying tactics. The reasoning behind this opposition was by no means as simple as it seemed. To be sure, the Department's stated objections to both Atlantic Union and the resolution itself, objections so cogently presented before the Thomas subcommittee, were quite logical and defensible. Likewise obvious was the State Department's belief in its own plans for European rehabilitation and resistance to communist aggression, the "piecemeal" program derided by Senator Kefauver. But could the objections to SCR 57, and indeed, to almost all the resolutions before the Thomas subcommittee, have been mere rationalizations, covering a more subtle conflict? Was Senator Kefauver in fact correct in his March 13 assessment of State Department self-assurance and resentment at legislative interference in the conduct of American foreign policy? The key to the matter would appear to be the attitude of Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

Although at times throughout 1950 there seemed to be division of opinion, or even outright sympathy for Union among upper echelon State Department officials and advisors, the Secretary himself steadfastly refused to support the Atlantic Union Resolution. Time and

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[19]Kefauver to Meeman, September 27, 1950, folder 6, Correspondence, Box 6; Kefauver to Matthew M. Neeley, September 13, 1950, folder 12, Correspondence, Box 7.

time again, Kefauver, Streit, and other Unionists singled out Acheson as their greatest stumbling block; in later years, they would look back and reaffirm that judgment.[20] Perkins might sympathize; Cooper, Dulles, and Achilles might openly support Atlantic Union; but Acheson would not be moved. What motivated the Secretary? One could perhaps make a case for simple jealousy of executive prerogative, as argued by Kefauver. After all, Acheson's attitude toward the Senate is well known. If not quite contemptuous of that august legislative body, the Secretary at the very least seems to have harbored feelings of suspicious condescension toward any Senator not directly supportive of State Department policy. Indeed, given the acrimonious breakdown of "bipartisan" foreign policy that occurred in 1950, Acheson would seem to have been justified in viewing the Senate as an irresponsible and somewhat dangerous adversary.[21] As for the Secretary's opposition to SCR 57 in particular, Theodore Achilles provided a somewhat paradoxical explanation. "Several times," wrote Achilles, "when I discussed federation with Dean Acheson he would say, 'Fine, if we can start with Canada and the U.K.'"[22] Apparently, then, Acheson was

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[20]See, for example, Minutes, Twenty-third Meeting, Executive Committee, AUC, March 9, 1950, folder 3, Committee, Box 6; Streit to Roberts, December 10, 1954, folder 19, Correspondence, Box 7; New York *Times*, November 22, 1952, 12.

[21]For an analysis of some of Acheson's problems with Congress, see Norman Graebner, "Dean G. Acheson," in Norman Graebner, ed., *An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries of State in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1961), 267-88; for Acheson's own views on Congress, see his *Present at the Creation* (New York, 1969).

[22]Theodore Achilles to Streit, August 4, 1955, folder 9, Correspondence, Box 7.

not opposed to an extremely exclusive North Atlantic Union. It must be remembered, furthermore, that the State Department had never intentionally used the work "oppose" with regard to the Atlantic Union Resolution. Rather, the Department had taken the position that it "could not support" SCR 57. To Unionists, this distinction bordered on hypocrisy, since lack of support was construed by the public as opposition, and indeed, produced the same effect.[23] Yet the subtle difference between non-support and opposition, and Acheson's endorsement of the former position, help to support Achilles' explanation of the Secretary's refusal to aid the Unionists. According to Achilles, one of the principal arguments used by Acheson against approval of SCR 57 was that the resolution went far beyond the conduct of foreign affairs; the results of an Atlantic convention could require Constitutional amendment for acceptance, and the State Department, therefore, was not competent to deal with the matter in any way.[24]

Whatever the reason for Acheson's position, a hands-off stance by the State Department was just as effective as active opposition. This refusal to recommend had played a large part in the Thomas subcommittee's rejection of SCR 57. The State Department, moreover, possessed the only channels for sounding out other governments on the idea of an Atlantic convention; and such approaches would never be initiated if State really feared negative results that might jeapordize

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[23]Streit to Kefauver, February 3, 1951, folder 6, Correspondence, Box 5.

[24]Achilles to Streit, August 4, 1955, folder 9, Correspondence, Box 7.

existing Atlantic unity. Thus, whether the Department's opposition stemmed from jealousy of prerogative, fear of doing damage to existing Atlantic unity, fear of infringing upon Congressional prerogative, or, as seems most likely, a combination of all these factors, the result was the same for Atlantic Union, as well as for State Department policy.

Senator Kefauver, however, had not yet abandoned hope. Having failed in a plea to President Truman and British Prime Minister Clement Attlee, who were meeting in Washington, the Senator began marshalling support for reintroduction of the Atlantic Union Resolution.[25] On January 15, 1951, the proposal was again presented to the Senate, this time as Senate Concurrent Resolution 4, with twenty-seven Senators as sponsors. Once again the resolution was submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee.[26]

In anticipation of again being asked for an opinion on the Atlantic Union Resolution, State Department officials began working on advice to Secretary Acheson. Although the Secretary himself was absorbed in other foreign policy matters, both John Hickerson and George Perkins had assembled teams to construct positions for their

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[25]Kefuaver to Truman, December 6, 1950, folder 19, Correspondence, Box 7; Kefauver to Clement Attlee, December 6, 1950, *ibid.*; Attlee to Kefauver, December 7, 1950, folder 5, Correspondence, Box 5; John J. Williams to Kefauver, January 8, 1951, folder 2, Resolution Statements and Speeches, Box 6.

[26]*Congressional Record*, Eighty-second Congress, First Session (Washington, D.C., 1951), 261-64. For complete list of sponsors, see Appendix.

sections (United Nations Affairs and European Affairs, respectively).[27] The customary letter from Senator Tom Connally, Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, arrived early in February. What was the State Department's attitude toward SCR 4? By early March, an answer had been drafted; not a position paper, merely a reply to Senator Connally's letter. According to State Department sources, the reply "tried to avoid outright opposition to the Resolution, taking rather the attitude that it was outside the scope of the Department and primarily a matter for Congress."[28] Congress, however, could not consider a resolution that was never reported out of committee. Kefauver's pleas for legislative initiative in American foreign policy fell on deaf ears. The Foreign Relations Committee would not release the resolution without State Department approval; the Senate, for all its criticism of the State Department, would not lead. The Atlantic Union Resolution apparently had reached a dead end.[29]

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[27]Streit to Kefauver, February 3, 1951, folder 6, Correspondence, Box 5.

[28]Hartley to Moore, March 8, 1951, folder 6, Correspondence, Box 5.

[29]Kefauver to David O. Carlson, March 5, 1951, folder 6, Correspondence, Box 5.

CHAPTER IV

INTERREGNUM

As the summer of 1951 drew to a close, Atlantic Unionists were faced with the necessity of changing their approach in the area of Congressional action. Despite intensive lobbying and careful preparation, Kefauver and the Atlantic Union Committee had been unable to prod the Senate into movement. Now little hope remained for passage of an Atlantic Union Resolution in the immediate future. Perhaps a favorable surge of public opinion would force the Senate to reconsider; but such a massive popular campaign would take time and money to organize. Perhaps future administrations would prove more susceptible to the logic of Union; but for the time being, Kefauver's plans for the resolution had become "long range."[1] Meanwhile, the Senator's internationalist urge found a more immediate outlet in his attendance at the November meeting of the Consultative Assembly of Europe, a NATO-sponsored civilian gathering in Strasbourg, France.[2]

Notwithstanding Congressional setbacks, Atlantic Unionists had good reason to greet 1952 with optimism. If Executive opposition could not be surmounted, then perhaps it could be replaced: Estes Kefauver was beginning his drive for the Democratic Presidential

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[1]Kefauver to Mrs. Chase S. Osborne, October 31, 1951, folder 1, Committee, Box 6; Hartley to Moore, March 8, 1951, *ibid.*

[2]*Congressional Record*, Eighty-second Congress, Second Session (Washington, D.C., 1951), A3091; Kefauver to Alben Barkley, November 7, 1951, folder 20, Correspondence, Box 7.

nomination. The details of Kefauver's impressive early victories, and final defeat, need not be recounted here. However, the part played by the Atlantic Union issue in the Senator's election bid is worthy of attention. As early as December, 1951, Senator Richard Russell of Georgia was attacking Kefauver's "premature" plan for "world government." Attacks by Russell, and others such as Senator Robert Kerr of Oklahoma, continued well into the primary campaigns of 1952.[3] On radio and television, Kefauver explicitly espoused the cause of Atlantic Union, and promised that, if elected, he would call a conference of NATO nations to seek means to establish greater cooperation among them.[4] Only when the nomination was lost, and his advocacy of Union might have harmed the candidacies of others, did Kefauver temporarily still his voice.[5] With Kefauver out of the race, Atlantic Unionists resigned themselves to waiting out an election year that gave their resolution no chance to be considered.

The following year likewise brought hope, this time brighter than ever before. The inauguration of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President meant the appointment of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State. Clarence Streit traced his own friendship with Dulles back to 1939, when the latter had first read *Union Now*. Subsequently, as has been

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[3]Osborne to Kefuaver, December 16, 1951, folder 1, Committee, Box 6; New York *Times*, March 20, 1952, 22; *ibid.*, March 23, 1952, 41; *ibid.*, April 27, 1952, 1; *ibid.*, April 29, 1952, 18.

[4]*The American Forum of the Air*, XIV, Number 51, December 22, 1951, 3-11; New York *Times*, May 6, 1952, 23; *ibid.*, May 19, 1952, 11.

[5]David McCalmont to Kefauver, December 19, 1952, folder 3, Correspondence, Box 5; Kefauver to McCalmont, January 2, 1953, *ibid.*

seen, Dulles had consistently supported the movement for Atlantic Union. Unionists, therefore, were understandably happy to see the stubborn and intractable Dean Acheson replaced by an old friend and supporter. Nor was the Secretary of State the only potentially friendly member of the new administration. Vice President Richard Nixon had himself been a Senate sponsor of the Atlantic Union Resolution.[6]

In the Senate, too, the outlook was brighter. A newly expanded Foreign Relations Committee included two new Democrats, Hubert Humphrey and Mike Mansfield, both of whom were supporters of the Atlantic Union Resolution. What slight disappointment there was among Unionists resulted from the failure of Kefauver himself to gain a Foreign Relations Committee post, a circumstance dictated by Senate rules and Kefauver's previous committee appointments. In the main, however, proponents of Atlantic Union could find ample cause for optimism.[7]

Such optimism, however, soon proved to be unjustified. Despite persistent Unionist lobbying, the new administration was not yet ready to support the Atlantic Union Resolution. Instead, the Atlantic Union Committee was asked to delay further action on its resolution until the outlook for the European Defense Community became clear. The EDC, a proposed plan for an integrated European defense system including Germany, had been developed from talks between former Secretary of State Acheson and the Foreign Ministers of NATO member nations. Although

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[6]Clarence Streit, "What Eisenhower's Victory Means to Atlantic Union," folder 16, Correspondence, Box 7.

[7]Streit to Roberts, January 14, 1953, folder 3, Correspondence, Box 5.

by spring of 1953 an EDC treaty had been signed, ratification appeared endangered by a new French government which proposed certain amendments to the agreement. The Eisenhower administration, and especially John Foster Dulles, had adopted the idea of a European Army as part of the "new look" for defense of the free world; EDC would not only provide more efficient European defense, but would provide it at a lower cost. Secretary Dulles therefore opposed any major Atlantic move that might upset the already touchy EDC negotiations. Faced with this opposition, Atlantic Unionists had little choice but to wait. Without the endorsement of the administration, Republican Senators would not support the Atlantic Union Resolution. Congress, moreover, would be busy for some time with a post-election backlog of legislation. Clearly, an attempt at reintroduction in 1953 would meet with failure.[8]

Thus was the AUC frustrated; and thus did the situation remain. Unable to obtain action on their resolution, Unionists watched helplessly as events passed them by. In early March, the apparent solidarity of Soviet leadership ended with the death of Stalin. On July 27, the guns in Korea fell silent; the long-sought armistice had been achieved. In the meantime, implementation of the Schuman Plan, integrating European coal and steel output, brought Europe closer than ever to real economic unity. The EDC controversy, however, stretched on well into

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[8]Kefauver to Streit, February 9, 1951, *ibid*; Streit to Roberts, March 23, 1953, *ibid.*; Kefauver to Eisenhower, March 31, 1951, *ibid.*; Minutes, Twenty-second Meeting, Board of Governors AUC, May 14, 1953, *ibid.*; "Memorandum to All Chapters, Atlantic Union Committee," May 29, 1953, *ibid.*

the summer of 1954. In vain did John Foster Dulles threaten an "agonizing reappraisal" of American policy toward Europe; by summer's end, French fear of Germany had killed the EDC. Thus, at long last, Atlantic Unionists thought they saw their chance. With EDC dead, perhaps now Secretary Dulles could see his way clear to reiterate his long-standing support of the Atlantic Union Resolution.[9] This hope, however, proved illusory; further European developments soon led Dulles again to raise objections to Unionist plans. In September, at the initiative of the British Foreign Office, a compromise German reintegration plan was worked out at a nine-power meeting in London. The following month, in Paris, all nations concerned agreed that the Federal Republic of Germany should be admitted to NATO. Secretary Dulles, ostensibly fearful that introduction of an Atlantic Union Resolution would interfere with this unprecedented progress, asked once again that the Unionists delay. In a December meeting with Clarence Streit, the Secretary of State expressed his desire that reintroduction of the resolution be postponed until the London and Paris accords were ratified, probably sometime in February. When this was accomplished, Dulles promised, in Streit's words, "to view action on our resolution with sympathy."[10]

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[9]Streit to L. H. Schultz, October 13, 1954, folder 15, Correspondence, Box 7; *Freedom & Union*, December, 1954, 1, folder 9, Correspondence, Box 7.

[10]Streit to Roberts, December 10, 1954, folder 19, Correspondence, Box 7.

But Estes Kefauver and his Unionist allies apparently were weary of any further delay. Throughout the summer of 1954, the Senator had waged a bitter primary election battle against a mudslinging opponent who had made Kefauver's "internationalism" an issue in the campaign.[11] Kefauver's victory in the August primary, and in the general election in November, left the way clear for reintroduction of the Atlantic Union Resolution.[12]

As might have been expected, such plans were not well received at the State Department. Clarence Streit, in the course of his indefatigable efforts in behalf of Union, had talked with several young State Department officers deemed most likely to draft any Department statement on the Atlantic Union Resolution. William Nunley, Livingston Merchant, C. Burke Elbrick, and Douglas MacArthur II were among those interviewed. To Streit, the arguments voiced by these young officials sounded distressingly similar to objections put forth by their predecessors in the Truman administration: nations not invited to the Atlantic convention would be offended; European Union was the first order of business; NATO could be developed on its non-military side; only a severe breakdown of NATO would lead to any reconsideration of the State Department position on the Atlantic Union

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[11] *Freedom & Union*, September, 1954, 7, folder "Atlantic Union: Senator Kefauver's Role," Box 8; Swados, 54; Memphis *Commercial Appeal*, July 16, 1954, 4; *ibid.*, August 1, 1954, 2.

[12] *Atlantic Union Committee Newsletter*, November 23, 1954, folder 18, Correspondence, Box 7; Kefauver to Atlantic Union Committee Members, January 3, 1955, folder 4, Correspondence, Box 5.

Resolution.[13] As the date set for reintroduction approached, other State Department officials joined in the chorus of opposition. Assistant Secretary Thurston B. Morton, echoing the arguments of earlier years, declared his support of NATO, OEEC, and the goal of European Union; likewise timeworn was the Assistant Secretary's contention that a call by the President for an Atlantic convention would imply American support for Atlantic Union.[14] And yet, for all their opposition, upper echelon State Department officials readily admitted that Dulles' opinion would be decisive. At least two Deputy Assistant Secretaries, upon learning of Dulles' earlier support of the Atlantic Union Resolution, expressed their surprise and asserted that no one could foresee the Secretary's attitude toward Union. Dulles, they maintained, was "the X in the equation."[15]

The Secretary's subordinates were undoubtedly correct; no one, of course, could predict whether Dulles' future attitude toward the Atlantic Union Resolution would be as sympathetic as Streit had been led to believe. For the time being, however, Dulles still seemed afraid that a January introduction of the resolution would interfere with ratification of the London and Paris accords. Accordingly, the Secretary had Thurston Morton call Estes Kefauver and ask the Senator

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[13]Streit to Roberts, December 10, 1954, folder 3, Correspondence, Box 5.

[14]Morton to Peter Frelinghuysen, January 13, 1955, folder 19, Correspondence, Box 7.

[15]Hartley to Dick Wallace, January 25, 1955 (see attached memo), folder 19, Correspondence, Box 7.

personally whether the introduction could be delayed. Kefauver's written reply went out on January 22. Requesting that Morton relay his answer to Dulles, the Senator quite clearly expressed his determination to push for Union now. To Kefauver, it seemed strange that the State Department, an organization not recently noted for spectacular policy success, should oppose a dramatic initiative like the Atlantic Union Resolution: "[A]ll progress that has been made in State Department affairs in Europe was during the pendancy of our resolution. We held it up for two years because according to the State Department's views the time was inopportune. No progress was made and several diplomatic defeats were suffered."[16] Kefauver would not be dissuaded. The Atlantic Union Resolution would be given another chance.

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[16]Kefauver to Morton, January 22, 1955, folder 18, Correspondence, Box 7.

CHAPTER V

DEFEAT

Despite Senator Kefauver's determination to reintroduce the Atlantic Union Resolution in the new Eighty-fourth Congress, his plans were unexpectedly delayed. On January 24, 1955, President Eisenhower sent to Congress his Formosa Resolution, authorizing use of American armed forces for protection of Chiang Kai-shek's Taiwan regime. The resolution was briefly debated, passed by both Houses of Congress, and signed by the President on January 29. Kefauver, fearful that the Atlantic Union Resolution would be overshadowed, delayed for a fortnight his reintroduction of the measure. Thus it was not until February 9 that Kefauver took the floor of the Senate to introduce Senate Concurrent Resolution 12, the latest Atlantic Union Resolution. The wording of SCR 12 differed from that of its predecessors in only two respects: the preamble was amended to take into account the impending rearmament of Germany; and the operative clause was broadened to allow an exploration of a defense, economic, and political union constituted "federally or otherwise."[1] Nor had Kefauver's eloquent arguments for Union changed substantially in the past four years; this time around, however, the resolution's chances were not nearly as good. Only thirteen Senators joined with Kefauver in sponsoring

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[1]Kefauver to Elmo Roper, January 28, 1955, folder 19, Correspondence, Box 7; *Congressional Record*, Eighty-fourth Congress, First Session (Washington, D.C., 1955), 1366-1370. See Appendix for complete list of sponsors.

SCR 12; of these, only two were Republicans. Lack of GOP support, a result of the administration's opposition to the timing of the reintroduction, made the difference. Thus the Atlantic Union Resolution took on the trappings, and acquired the vulnerability, of a partisan measure.

Nonetheless, Kefauver would not relinquish hope. Approaching Senator Walter George, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Commitee, Kefauver requested that a hearing on SCR 12 be held as soon as possible. Senator George, though formerly a sponsor of the resolution, desired nevertheless to cooperate with the administration; hearings would be granted, but only after ratification of the London-Paris accords.[2] Atlantic Unionists could do nothing but wait. Finally, on April 7, the Senate ratified the London-Paris agreements, conferring sovereignty and NATO membership upon the Federal Republic of Germany. Now the way seemed clear for the hearings. The agenda of the Foreign Relations Committee was full, and would remain so for a few weeks, but Senator George assured Kefauver that the Atlantic Union Resolution would be considered as soon as possible.[3] In May, however, the hearings were once again delayed when Senator George fell suddenly ill. June passed, and a week of July, while George convalesced; Atlantic Unionists, who needed George's influence behind their resolution, were forced to wait. Kefauver, meanwhile, found time to

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[2]Streit to Roberts, January 18, 1955, folder 19, Correspondence, Box 7.

[3]Kefauver to George, April 20, 1955, folder 17, Correspondence, Box 7; George to Kefauver, May 2, 1955, *ibid.*

sponsor Senate Concurrent Resolution 29, providing for American participation in a NATO Parliamentarians Conference proposed by Norway. Finally, Senator George recovered, and hearings on SCR 12 were set for July 25.[4]

Unionists, in the meantime, turned to the business of securing State Department support for their resolution. Predictably, upper echelon State Department officials continued to voice their previous objections, declaring, among other things, that the basic constitutional changes involved in Atlantic Union fell beyond the purview of their Department.[5] The Unionists, however, were depending on their old friend John Foster Dulles. Now that the London-Paris accords had been disposed of, the Secretary of State surely could pose no further objection to the resolution he had once so heartily endorsed. Thus, in late June, Clarence Streit met with Dulles at the State Department to discuss the impending hearings before the Foreign Relations Committee. Streit opened the rather friendly meeting by reminding the Secretary of the latter's previous promise of "sympathetic support" once Germany had been admitted to NATO. Clearly, what Streit expected from Dulles was a forthright endorsement of the

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[4]*Congressional Record*, Eighty-fourth Congress, First Session (Washington, D.C., 1955), 4960; Streit to Kefauver, June 29, 1955, folder 17, Correspondence, Box 7; "Note on the Situation in Congress as Regards the Atlantic Convention Resolution," July 6, 1955, folder 19, Correspondence, Box 7; Kefauver to Hubert Humphrey, July 20, 1955, folder 17, Correspondence, Box 7.

[5]Herbert Hoover, Jr., to Justin Blackwelder, February 17, 1955, folder 19, Correspondence, Box 7; C. Bruce Elbrick, to Osborne, June 29, 1955, folder 17, Correspondence, Box 7.

Atlantic Union Resolution. What Streit got, however, was an unpleasant surprise: the Secretary of State immediately began raising objections to SCR 12. To begin with, Dulles maintained, the resolution as it stood placed entirely too much responsibility upon the Executive. Obviously, Atlantic Union would require changes in the Constitution of the United States; were not such changes within the province of Congress? The President, furthermore, would not want to be solely responsible for the selection of uninstructed delegates to an Atlantic convention. Perhaps it would be better if, for example, the Vice President (as President of the Senate) and the Speaker of the House each appointed half the delegates. To these changes Streit readily agreed, but pointed out that Congress had no machinery for approaching foreign governments. Could Congress perhaps use State Department channels, if it were made plain that the Department bore no responsibility for the convention itself? To this Dulles seemed amenable; but the Secretary was quick to raise other objections. First, there was the old State Department fear of offending those nations not invited to the convention; new additions to NATO, especially Germany and Italy, made this problem more sensitive than ever before. Streit, however, had no objection to inviting all NATO members to the convention. Dulles next objected to the partisan nature of the resolution's sponsorship, to which Streit replied that it was, after all, the Secretary's own opposition that discouraged Republican support. To this Dulles readily admitted; Streit, however, could not wring from the Secretary a promise of State Department support. Instead, Dulles desired to defer his decision until he had conferred with some of his

advisors. Soon the time allotted to the meeting ran out, and the two parted amicably.[6]

Such unexpected opposition on the part of a supposed friend might well have discouraged Atlantic Unionists. But Streit, always the optimist, saw in Dulles' attitude a "very substantial improvement" in the State Department's position. To Streit, it seemed that Dulles had cleared the way for an Atlantic convention called by Congress.[7] Surely the State Department would not object once the onus of responsibility was lifted from the Executive. Such optimism, however, soon proved unfounded. On July 10, in a letter to Clarence Streit, Dulles stated his objections in a manner that seemed to preclude approval of an Atlantic Union Resolution in any form:

> I would not underestimate the difficulty which there is in getting your Resolution into such shape that the Executive would not feel that he had to indicate objection to it either on the ground that it placed on the Executive the responsibility to make choices as between allies, or on the ground that it involves the Congress in the current conduct of foreign affairs. I have the impression that any convention would have to be more unofficial if it is to clear these twin difficulties.[8]

Thus, no matter which branch of the American government assumed responsibility for an Atlantic convention, the result would be unacceptable to the Eisenhower administration. Nor was it clear just what the Secretary of State meant by a "more unofficial" convention.

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[6]Streit to Kefauver, June 29, 1955, *ibid.*

[7]Streit to Truman, July 11, 1955, folder 1, Correspondence, Box 5; Streit to George, July 18, 1955, folder 17, Correspondence, Box 7.

[8]Dulles to Streit, July 10, 1955, folder 9, Correspondence, Box 7.

At any rate, this unexpectedly hostile stance boded ill for the chances of the Atlantic Union Resolution.

On Monday, July 25, 1955, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began its hearings on SCR 12. The first witness to appear in favor of the resolution was Seantor Estes Kefauver. While not reading his prepared statement in its entirety, the Seantor did ask that it be inserted into the record. He then proceeded to deliver a set of abbreviated remarks containing what he felt were the most important points to be presented to the committee. To begin with, Kefauver made it plain that he and his Unionist allies would accept any change in the wording of their resolution that would "better define and make more plain its purposes." If, for example, "the executive departments" desired that the President issue the convention invitation on behalf of Congress, then such a change would certainly be acceptable, as well as "in keeping with our constitutional history." Here Kefauver was offering a compromise: perhaps Congress could accept responsibility for the convention, while utilizing the Executive apparatus to contact foreign governments.

The Senator then went on to quote various world leaders in support of the Atlantic Union Resolution. First there was George C. Marshall, a recent addition to the National Council of the Atlantic Union Committee. Eulogizing Owen Roberts, who had died in May, Marshall declared that Roberts' decision to resign from the Supreme Court to work for Atlantic Union was "perhaps the finest thing he did." Marshall went on to label the Atlantic Union Resolution a "prudent proposal" that "deserves support." Next came the statement of Robert

Schuman, French Minister of Justice, former Foreign Minister and architect of the European Coal and Steel Community (the Schuman Plan). To Schuman, the calling of an Atlantic Exploratory Convention was "of the highest importance to all nations belonging to NATO." As an ardent advocate of European federation, Schuman was concerned that "certain European nations have hesitated to advance far in this direction so long as the United States, Canada, and Great Britain were not disposed to explore in common with them an eventual political, economic, and military union." In conclusion, Schuman expressed confidence that an American call for an Atlantic convention would evoke an enthusiastic response from the European democracies, all of whom would be happy to send delegates to study Atlantic Union. And should a workable plan be reported out, "we would certainly have made a great step toward world peace and general prosperity." The third foreign authority cited by Kefauver was Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister of Belgium, who called the Atlantic Union Resolution "a most praiseworthy effort," and expressed hope that such discussion of closer Atlantic unity would take place "very soon." Finally, Kefauver quoted Paul Van Zeeland, former Belgian Foreign Minister, and Gaetano Martino, Foreign Minister of Italy, both of whom agreed with the Senator that any discussion of greater Atlantic unity could result only in good.[9]

Senator Kefauver then went on to discuss and defend both the Atlantic Union Resolution and the principles of Atlantic Union itself.

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[9]*Relating to the Calling of an Atlantic Exploratory Convention: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate* (Washington, D.C., 1955), 5, 2-4.

When asked if SCR 12 had been discussed with the State Department, Kefauver first outlined how, in deference to the State Department's wishes, he had repeatedly delayed action on the resolution. Secretary Dulles, opined Kefauver, had been wrong; passage of an Atlantic Union Resolution would have aided, not hindered, ratification of the London-Paris accords. Nevertheless, in view of Secretary Dulles' past strong support, the State Department should now be ready to endorse SCR 12. Given Kefauver's certain knowledge of Dulles' real attitude on the resolution, it is obvious that the Senator was not sincere in this assessment. Rather, it would seem more likely that Kefauver was trying to put the Secretary of State into a difficult position. With the committee freshly reminded of Dulles' previous views on the resolution, opposition on the Secretary's part would certainly seem to border on hypocrisy.[10]

Others testified for Atlantic Union that day, including Elmo Roper, AUC Treasurer, and, in a return appearance, Dr. Harold C. Urey. Although Roper added nothing really new, he did insert into the record a brief message from Will Clayton, who was unable to appear. Dr. Urey, for his part, expressed his own conviction that any lull in the cold war could only be temporary. Comparing the 1950's to the period between World Wars One and Two, the scientist predicted that World War Three would arrive in ten or twenty years. As in his 1950 appearance, Urey called for creation of a preponderance of democratic power through Atlantic Union. Next came Clarence Streit, who emphasized the willingness

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[10] *Ibid.*, 13-15.

of the Atlantic Union Committee to compromise on the text of their resolution. To Streit, as well as to most other AUC leaders, it mattered little whether Congress or the President called the Atlantic convention. Nor would the Unionists object to having the convention delegates appointed by the Vice President and the Speaker of the House. In fact, asserted Streit, such amendments to the resolution would probably be wise in view of the potential constitutional changes involved. Finally, there appeared before the committee Mrs. Chase S. Osborne, AUC member, and Garrison Norton, former Assistant Secretary of State, both of whom submitted short statements in favor of SCR 12. In addition, the pro-resolution statements of Senator James Murray, Seantor Herbert Lehman, and Maryland Governor Theodore McKeldin were inserted into the record. The hearings then adjourned until the following Friday.[11]

When the hearings resumed on July 29, Unionists and their opponents appeared to plead their cases before the committee. Predictable arguments met with predictable objections; "one-worlders" and chauvinists clashed. The really significant testimony, however, came from Deputy Under Secretary of State Robert F. Murphy, who presented the committee with a letter from John Foster Dulles. The message, of course, was unfavorable to the Atlantic Union Resolution. Most of the Secretary's objections were old ones: the convention would be too exclusive; if the President called the convention, official American support for Atlantic Union would be implied; to avoid State

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[11] *Ibid.*, 15-63.

Department opposition, the convention would have to be "less official." The only new objection was to the language of the resolution itself: Dulles suggested that it would be "inappropriate for the President or Congress to stipulate to other countries how their delegates should be named, and particularly that their delegates should 'include members of their principal political parties.'" After all, the largest single political party in France was the Communist Party. Thus concluded the Secretary's statement.[12] After testimony by two more witnesses opposed to SCR 12, the hearings were again adjourned.[13]

Secretary of State Dulles, as has been seen, opposed the Atlantic Union Resolution as presented to the Foreign Relations Committee. Yet the Secretary's letter of July 28 did not rule out the possibility of an Atlantic convention called by Congress, without the participation of the Executive. The significance of this omission was not lost on Estes Kefauver, who by now was surely grasping at any straw to save the Atlantic Union Resolution. Therefore, on August 5, 1955, the Senator wrote the Secretary to inquire as to the latter's attitude toward a convention called by Congress. To Kefauver, the only practical method of convening a "less official" convention would be to have Congress issue the invitations. To be sure, Congressional action would be "official" to a degree; since, however, the Executive would not participate, such a convention would indeed be "less official" than the one contemplated by SCR 12 in its present form. Kefauver went on to stress the willingness of Atlantic Unionists to yield to

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[12] *Ibid.*, 84-85.

[13] *Ibid.*, 85-101.

other of the Secretary's objections: all NATO members could be invited, with no stipulation as to the makeup of the various national delegations. Moreover, Kefauver noted with regret that the Secretary's letter of July 28 seemed to have been written without any knowledge of the testimony by supporters of SCR 12, who had answered the Secretary's objections in advance. In conclusion, the Senator asked for a reply, that he might know if his own interpretation of the Secretary's position were a correct one.[14]

By August 22, when the reply to his letter arrived, Kefauver was in Helsinki at a meeting of the Interparliamentary Union. Besides being tardy, Dulles' answer was not entirely satisfying. While admitting that his objections were based on the text of the resolution as presented to the committee, and not on "some hypothetical alternative," the Secretary of State nevertheless maintained that any Congressional action in the field of foreign affairs should "be designed to supplement, rather than to conflict or interfere with, existing efforts toward increased unity now being made by political organizations which are already in existence and going affairs." Besides implying that the Atlantic Union Resolution could hinder efforts toward European unity, Dulles was echoing John Hickerson's old warning about "jeapordizing a going concern in the illusory hope of getting something better." Of course, the Secretary continued, if Congress desired to take the initiative and explore Atlantic unity from "another

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[14]Kefauver to Dulles, August 5, 1955, folder "State Department Position on Atlantic Union," Box 8.

viewpoint, " then it was conceivable that a resolution could be fashioned in such a way as to avoid previous objections. However, Dulles concluded, "the executive does not itself feel that it would be wise for it to take an initiative in this matter at this time.' Clearly, if it was not wise for "the executive" to act, then Congress as well should proceed with caution.[15]

Thus, although leaving open the possibility of a convention called by Congress, Dulles made plain his continuing reservations. And, as we have seen, the Secretary of State had previously objected to a Congressional initiative for the Atlantic Union Resolution, on the grounds that it would "involve Congress in the current conduct of foreign affairs." There was, therefore, little chance that the Foreign Relations Committee would release SCR 12 to the floor of the Senate. To be sure, four Democrats on the committee were sponsors of the resolution, and Chairman George himself looked upon it with favor; but George wished to cooperate with the administration, and the committe's Republican majority would listen only to Dulles.[16] The first session of the Eighty-fourth Congress would see no further action on SCR 12.

And so the opposition of John Foster Dulles, erstwhile friend of the Atlantic Union Committee, killed the third Atlantic Union Resolution. In 1949, Dulles had strongly supported the resolution;

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[15]Dulles to Kefauver, August 22, 1955, *ibid.*

[16]Streit to Thomas E. Dewey, July 14, 1956, folder 1, Committee, Box 6.

by 1953, his first year as Secretary of State, Dulles was only "inclined" to be sympathetic, and then only upon certain conditions; by 1955, Dulles was unyielding in his opposition to the measure. What brought about this reversal of opinion on the part of the man whom Atlantic Unionists had counted among their most powerful friends? Although the answer is by no means clear, certain general conclusions may perhaps be drawn. First, it must be remembered that Dulles, although serving as an advisor to the State Department during Truman's second term, was, after all, a prominent Republican. Thus, in the end, Dulles bore no responsibility for the foreign policy of a Democratic administration. He could, therefore, freely exercise any personal idealistic urge without worry as to the effect upon State Department policy. By 1953, however, Dulles was in a position of responsibility. As Secretary of State, he endorsed the movement toward European unity begun under his predecessor Dean Acheson. Thus, the policies that Atlantic Unionists sought to supersede had become Dulles' policies; any risk to the progress of European unity would now involve Dulles' own prestige. Responsibility breeds caution; the shoe, so to speak, was now on the other foot. Nor can one discount the possibility that Dulles felt a certain amount of jealousy for his own prerogatives in the field of foreign policy formulation. Whether this jealousy was somehow personal in nature, or stemmed from concern for the separation of constitutional powers, is open to speculation. At any rate, it is obvious that Dulles did indeed disapprove of the involvement of Congress in the current conduct of foreign affairs. Another factor that perhaps affected Dulles' attitude toward the Atlantic

Union Resolution was President Eisenhower's own commitment to seeking greater European unity through existing channels such as NATO. When objecting to various provisions of the Atlantic Union Resolution, Dulles repeatedly referred to such objections as being those of "the Executive." Senator George, furthermore, was himself of the opinion that the administration's opposition to the resolution came from the President, and not from Dulles.[17] Despite Dulles' deserved reputation as a dynamic Secretary of State, Eisenhower's influence should not be ignored.

Whatever the real motivation for Dulles' desertion of the Unionist cause, the Atlantic Union Resolution as such was going down for the third and final time. There remained but one last gasp. On July 11, 1956, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held an additional hearing on SCR 12, to accommodate those on both sides of the issue who had failed to learn of the previous year's hearing in time to appear. Senator Kefauver, again in the thick of a fight for the Presidential nomination, could not attend. Only four committee members were present; the session lasted but a few hours. There arose but one new development, an amended draft of SCR 12 submitted by Senator Hubert Humphrey. Humphrey's resolution provided not only that Congress should call the Atlantic convention, but also that the American delegation should be appointed by the Speaker of the House and the Vice

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[17]Eisenhower to Streit, July 26, 1956, folder 8, Correspondence, Box 7; Clarence Streit, "What Eisenhower's Victory Means to Atlantic Union," folder 16, Correspondence, Box 7; Streit to Roberts, Jaunary 18, 1955, folder 19, Correspondence, Box 7.

President. Nowhere, however, was the principle, or the goal, of federal union mentioned. Instead, the convention would merely investigate how the Atlantic democracies might "achieve more effective and democratic unity in advancing their common economic, and political affairs, their joint defense and the aims of world peace and individual freedom."[18] Thus, although many of Secretary Dulles' objections were met, Humphrey's version of SCR 12 was not truly an Atlantic Union Resolution. But even this modified, diluted draft was unacceptable to the Eisenhower administration. The Republican Senators on the Foreign Relations Committee resisted the approval of any kind of resolution. All of Humphrey's efforts went unrewarded, including the unprecedented step of submitting the amended resolution directly to Secretary Dulles.[19] Estes Kefauver, Clarence Streit, and other Unionists petitioned in vain; neither the President nor the Secretary of State would yield.[20]

What, then, of Unionist hopes? In June, 1957, the NATO Parliamentarians Association endorsed the idea of a citizens convention to explore greater Atlantic unity.[21] This recommendation was promptly

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[18]*Relating to the Calling of an Atlantic Exploratory Convention, Part Two: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate* (Washington, D.C., 1956), 154-55.

[19]Streit to Eisenhower, July 24, 1956, folder 8, Correspondence, Box 7; Atlantic Union Committee Press Release of August 1, 1956, *ibid.*

[20]Eisenhower to Streit, July 26, 1956, *ibid.*; Kefauver et al. to Dulles, April 4, 1957, folder "State Department Position on Atlantic Union," Box 8; Dulles to Kefauver, April 8, 1957, *ibid.*

[21]The Parliamentarians Association resolution originated in the Association's Political Committee, of which Estes Kefauver was chairman during the 1957 session. See Hartley, 62; see also Swados, 43-44.

incorporated into the Humphrey resolution, which was reintroduced in February, 1958; the measure was further modified by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The final text, as amended, provided merely that if an Atlantic citizens convention were called by the Parliamentarians Association, then the United States should send delegates. But even this measure remained stalled until after the death of John Foster Dulles in the spring of 1959. Then, at long last, Secretary Christian Herter withdrew State Department opposition; in the summer of 1960, the resolution passed both Houses of Congress, and was signed by President Eisenhower. Shortly thereafter, the Atlantic Union Committee dissolved itself, declaring its mission accomplished. The Atlantic Citizens convention was held in Paris in 1962; Estes Kefauver, who had worked hard for Humphrey's resolution, was a member of the American delegation. Predictably, the meeting produced only a high-sounding statement on the general principle of closer cooperation among the NATO nations.[22]

This, then, was the product of thirteen years' labor by the Atlantic Union Committee. A resolution had indeed been passed, but only at the expense of the federal union principle. In the end, not even the Congressional initiative remained; the call for the convention came from without America. Technically, the AUC had achieved its goal; but the dream of Clarence Streit had been long since abandoned.

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[22]*Congressional Record*, Eighty-fifth Congress, Second Session, 2020; *ibid.*, Eighty-sixth Congress, First Session, 4567; *ibid.*, Eighty-sixth Congress, Second Session, 18069, 19112; *Convention of Leading Representative Citizens of NATO Countries: Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate* (Washington, D.C., 1958); Swados, 54; Szent-Miklosy, 234-39.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The Atlantic Union Resolution was unusual in that it was a positive legislative initiative in the field of American foreign policy formulation. To be sure, other Congressional resolutions were put forth in the late 1940's calling for world government, control of atomic weapons, or various modifications of the U.N. charter. But only the Atlantic Union Resolution was backed by a determined and organized group of citizens possessed of a fully formulated ideology and plan of action. The ideas of Clarence Streit, as set forth in *Union Now*, were essentially timeless in their appeal. In 1949, as in 1939, fear of aggression combined with love of individual liberty proved a potent motivating force.

Yet the Atlantic Union Committee was doomed to fail from the very beginning. Despite Streit's belief in the "sovereignty of the individual," it was the other, darker aspect of his Union idea that remained the most attractive. For *Union Now* had itself been born of fear; it was the rearmament of Germany and Italy that had caused Streit's ideas to crystallize. Likewise, a survey of Unionist literature reveals the large role played by fear of communism in attracting Americans to the idea of Union. Thus, as emotions stabilized after those first few frightened postwar years, it was perhaps inevitable that support for the Unionist cause should dwindle. Indeed, we are forced to conclude, with the Thomas subcommittee, that were it not for

fear of communist aggression, there would have been no significant support for the Atlantic Union Resolution.

Aside from this basic motivational flaw, the AUC further failed to put its message before the people in a coherent and convincing manner. Whether expounding in print or before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Atlantic Unionists often displayed serious lapses in logic. Although Streit himself seemed to have an answer for every question, he was the exception that proved the rule. Others were not nearly so clear-headed; most Unionists focused on ends rather than means. When asked how Union would be implemented, or what transitional measures would be necessary, Owen Roberts could only reply that it would be up to the Atlantic Convention to produce such plans. Unionists claimed that their plan was superior to World Government proposals in that Atlantic Union, by allowing for a large bloc of neutral nations, would not divide the world into two armed camps; yet other Unionists lauded the Union's potential for unlimited growth. Union, it was claimed, would replace the Marshall plan and other aid programs with a "healthier" relationship; but just how Union would make these programs better was never properly explained. This lack of clarity, with regard to results as well as to the means of actually achieving Union, was also reflected in Unionist literature.

But by far the most fateful error committed by Unionists was the formation of the Atlantic Union Committee itself. By relying on passage of a Congressional resolution, the AUC committed itself to a plan with only the slimmest chance of success. Traditionally, the Senate has not taken the initiative in American foreign policy formulation;

the Senate does not move swiftly enough, nor is it constitutionally constructed to do so. Rather, the Senate's role has been one of advise and consent, which in practice has meant reaction to Executive proposals or policies. To be sure, in times of crisis the Senate will raise its voice; the rash of resolutions in the late 1940's, of which SCR 57 was one, are ample evidence of the Senate's concern. Yet when passing judgment on all of these resolutions, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee deferred to the opinion of the State Department. Despite the fact that Senator Thomas himself was chief sponsor of one of the measures, his subcommittee acquiesced in the State Department's rejection of almost every single resolution put forth by concerned members of the Senate. Although unceasingly critical of State Department policy, and willing in the end almost to destroy the Department itself, the Senate would not take the initiative. To do so would have been to fly in the face of tradition, and perhaps of the Constitution itself. And yet, were the Senate's own voice to be believed, the time was ripe for bold new departures in foreign policy. But throughout the 1950's, the Senate continued to acquiesce in the State Department's rejection of the Atlantic Union Resolution. Nor could the Senate put forth any other constructive suggestions. Unwilling or unable to take the initiative, America's legislative leaders could only criticize those who really tried to lead.

In the end, then, the opposition of the State Department played a large part in killing the Atlantic Union Resolution in its original form. In light of the Senate's hesitancy, the reasoning behind the State Department's objections is not as important as the fact that such

opposition existed. However, a few conclusions may and should be drawn. To begin with, one's attention is attracted by a curious contradiction inherent in State Department objections to the Atlantic Union Resolution. Why, if the State Department favored European Union, did the Department fear the failure of an Atlantic Convention? If European Union was indeed a worthy and workable objective, then how would the addition of America, Canada and Great Britain render the plan untenable? Perhaps John Hickerson was sincere when, in testimony before the Thomas subcommittee, he expressed his Department's fear that Americans would reject Atlantic Union; yet Hickerson also raised the possibility of European rejection of an Atlantic federal plan. Clearly, then, the testimony of the Assistant Secretary of State seems to conflict with his Department's avowed aims. And, given Robert Schuman's later claim that it was precisely the absence of America and Great Britain that made European Union unworkable, the State Department's stated objection to the Atlantic Union Resolution becomes suspect indeed. Such suspicion, moreover, is only heightened by the continuity of State Department opposition to the resolution. For over eight years, be the administration Republican or Democratic, upper echelon State Department officials repeatedly voiced remarkably similar, if not identical, objections to the Unionist position. For over eight years, various and sundry officials maintained that those nations not invited to an Atlantic Convention would be offended, or that passage of the Atlantic Union Resolution would somehow interfere with current State Department policy, or that, in the State Department's opinion, the American people were not ready for Atlantic Union. Atlantic Unionists,

having repeatedly answered the same arguments year after year, could not but doubt the sincerity of State Department opinion. To be sure, one cannot doubt the sincerity of State Department support for State Department policy; what remains open to question is the role played by executive jealousy of prerogative, or the desire to resist legislative usurpation of foreign policy planning. In order more clearly to understand the workings of this element, it is necessary to examine the attitudes of Secretaries Acheson and Dulles themselves.

If Ted Achilles be believed, Dean Acheson was receptive to the idea of an exclusive form of Atlantic Union. Hence Acheson's "lack of support" for the Atlantic Union Resolution seemingly stemmed from constitutional scruple: Atlantic Union, maintained the Secretary, was beyond the purview of the State Department. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that such "nonsupport" was construed by the public and the Senate as opposition, and indeed had the same effect. Whatever Acheson's motivation, the result was no interference with the relatively cauticus course of American foreign policy; thus, one is tempted to speculate that at least some jealousy of executive prerogative was involved in Acheson's attitude. In the case of John Foster Dulles, however, there seems less room for doubt. Dulles' reversal of opinion on Atlantic Union clearly coincided with his assumption of the duties of Secretary of State. Although echoing occasionally the arguments of the preceding administration, Dulles quite forthrightly objected to the Atlantic Union Resolution on the grounds that it would involve Congress in the current conduct of foreign affairs. Here was executive prerogative openly claimed and defended. Although escalating somewhat the rhetoric of the

cold war, Dulles had adopted Acheson's policies as his own. And Dulles, like his predecessor, resented Congressional interference in the realm of executive action.

On one level, then, we may view the fight for the Atlantic Union Resolution as a conflict between a legislature that could better criticize than lead and an executive department jealous of its own prerogatives and cautious policy. But moving to a higher plain, let us not forget the dream of Clarence Streit. Atlantic Union was a plan based simultaneously on hope and fear, with the latter, sad to say, playing the larger role. And, like most internationalists, Streit underestimated the deep roots and real remaining strength of nationalism. Yet the plans of the State Department fared no better. European Union would not succeed in the 1950's; indeed, the two decades that followed would reveal dangerous splits in NATO itself. Not until the late 1970's would the first uncertain glimmering of real European unity appear. Nonetheless, both Streit and his State Department adversaries were moving in the right direction. Conflict of nations is tragic, inefficient, costly, and, in the end, detrimental to weak and strong alike. For as long as the earth's resources are inequitably distributed, as long as a relative few live well at the ultimate expense of the rest, the conflict will continue. In the three decades since the end of the last world war, the conflict has continually intensified; the proliferation of atomic weaponry has lent new urgency to the struggle. Sooner than one would care to imagine, the choice may be: unify or die. If indeed this choice arises, let us hope the dream of *Union Now* is

remembered. Let us hope that men worldwide can rule themselves for the common benefit while preserving that "sovereignty of the individual" so dear to Clarence Streit. To those born into a free society, the alternatives might well prove too awful to bear.

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

SPONSORS OF SCR 57, JULY 26, 1949

Democrats	*State*	*Republicans*	*State*
Chapman	Kentucky	Baldwin	Connecticut
Frear	Delaware	Cain	Washington
Fulbright	Arkansas	Ecton	Montana
George	Georgia	Hendrickson	New Jersey
Graham	North Carolina	McCarthy	Wisconsin
Gillette	Iowa	Thye	Minnesota
Hill	Alabama	Young	North Dakota
Kefauver	Tennessee		
Kilgore	West Virginia		
Maybank	South Carolina		
Miller	Idaho		
Sparkman	Alabama		
Withers	Kentucky		

SPONSORS OF SCR 4, JANUARY 15, 1951

Democrats	*State*	*Republicans*	*State*
Fulbright	Arkansas	Aiken	Vermont
George	Georgia	Cain	Washington
Gillette	Iowa	Carlson	Kansas
Hennings	Missouri	Ecton	Montana
Hill	Alabama	Flanders	Vermont
Humphrey	Minnesota	Hendrickson	New Jersey

SPONSORS OF SCR 4, JANUARY 15, 1951 (cont.)

Democrats	*State*	*Republicans*	*State*
Hunt	Wyoming	Nixon	California
Johnson	Colorado	Thye	Minnesota
Kefauver	Tennessee	Young	North Dakota
Kilgore	West Virginia		
Lehman	New York		
Long	Louisiana		
Maybank	South Carolina		
McClellan	Arkansas		
Murray	Montana		
Neely	West Virginia		
O'Mahoney	Wyoming		
Sparkman	Alabama		

SPONSORS OF SCR 12, FEBRUARY 9, 1955

Democrats	*State*	*Republicans*	*State*
Humphrey	Minnesota	Flanders	Vermont
Jackson	Washington	Payne	Maine
Kefauver	Tennessee		
Lehman	New York		
Mansfield	Montana		
McNamara	Michigan		
Murray	Montana		
Neely	West Virginia		
Neuberger	Oregon		

SPONSORS OF SCR 12, FEBRUARY 9, 1955 (cont.)

Democrats	*State*	*Republicans*	*State*
O'Mahoney	Wyoming		
Scott	North Carolina		
Sparkman	Alabama		

VITA

Milburne Edward Owens, Jr., was born on August 16, 1951, in Memphis, Tennessee. He attended elementary schools in that city and graduated from Messick High School in June, 1969. In September of that year he entered the University of Tennessee at Knoxville, and in June, 1974, he received a Bachelor of Arts degree, with a major in History. In the fall of 1974, Mr. Owens began study toward a Master's degree, which was awarded in June, 1976. After graduation, he will take up the study of law.