

India's Portrayal In The U.S. Press During And After The Cold War

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ABSTRACT

The dissertation sought to answer the overarching question --- Whether the U.S. media in their international reportage about India reflect policies of the U.S. government? The dissertation studied the portrayal of India in the U.S. media 24 years during and 24 years after the Cold War (1967-2015). Published literature laid out that India and the U.S. were not on good terms during the Cold War. However, after the Cold War the two nations became friends.

The study took into account news stories from *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* from the two era. The study comprised a quantitative section and a qualitative section. The theory used for the research was Indexing theory. Framing also was used as a theoretical construct. The quantitative study involved a content analysis of the news stories included in the research. The study focused on how the news stories framed India-U.S. relations on five parameters: trade and economics, defense, nuclear issue, combating terrorism and secessionist movements in India.

There was significant difference in the two time frames via chi-square tests on all five parameters under study. Therefore, the quantitative study found that the U.S. media portrayed India as anti-U.S. during the Cold War. The U.S. media portrayed India as a U.S. ally after the Cold War and the U.S. media were supportive of India's stand on terrorism after the Cold War. The qualitative study involved uncovering common themes about India in the U.S. media during and after the Cold War. The qualitative study found that the common themes about India in both *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* were a study in contrast for the two era. The common themes uncovered lent support to the quantitative findings of this research. The dissertation found that the U.S. media portrayed India in accordance with U.S. government policy stance on India during and after the Cold War.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The end of the Second World War marked the beginning of the Cold War between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.). Both nations tried to bring as many countries as possible in their respective spheres of influence. In its quest for dominance, the United States set up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, which was a military pact among several nations such as the United Kingdom and West Germany, in a bid to counter Soviet influence. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, brought together many communist countries such as Poland, Romania and Hungary to form the Warsaw Pact in 1955, in a bid to oppose the U.S. led alliance (Mohanty, 2013).

The end of the second world war also brought about independence for many countries, for instance, India, from their colonial masters. The South Asian subcontinent was partitioned into India and Pakistan in 1947, after the British left the region. From the very beginning, India followed a path of friendship and peace with both superpowers, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The reason for it was that India did not want to ally with either of the two superpowers and give away its independence in foreign policy (Latham, 2010).

India became a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), an organization that professed to maintaining equidistance from both power blocks in order to pursue an independent policy. During the first six years of its existence, India had a dispute with Pakistan over the possession of the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir. In order to counter India's influence with the superpowers and its perceived tilt toward the Soviet Union, Pakistan joined U.S. led alliances and became a U.S. ally in its quest to contain the spread of communism in Asia (Mohanty, 2013).

Despite the fact that India's foreign policy was built around non-alignment and solidarity among Third World countries, India tried to play an active role in events in many parts of the world. However, it was able to influence events only in its neighborhood (Schaffer, 2009). India got economic aid and engaged in scientific collaboration with the United States. It received U.S. military assistance during its war with China in 1962. However, most of the Cold War period was marked by both countries not having good relations with each other (Jain, 2008).

The Cold War years saw greater cooperation between India and the Soviet Union, with India and the U.S.S.R. signing a friendship treaty in 1971. The Soviets provided India with economic as well as military aid that brought about greater cooperation between the two nations. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 brought about a realignment of global powers (Jain, 2008).

India's economic growth due to its opening up of its economy triggered global interest in the country. This paved the way for India to increase its share in international business. While India grew economically, the country's foreign policy also underwent a drastic change. India viewed itself as a major global power and redefined its status with other international powers, including the United States. India cooperated with the U.S. to serve its two main interests: to emerge as a major economic power and to gain acceptance in the international community as one of the world's major powers. This partnership with the U.S. resulted in greater trade and military cooperation between the two nations, for instance, the countries in 2005 signed a 10-year defense agreement (Schaffer, 2009).

Successive Indian governments used foreign policy to increase economic success and attract foreign investment. Another change in India's foreign policy was with regard to South Asia, where it still continues to treat with caution relations between Pakistan and the United

States. However, India's bid to get U.S. support for a permanent seat in the Security Council of the United Nations is in stark contrast to India's policy at the U.N. during the Cold War when it would seek to be a moral arbiter of disputes. Despite its quest to have better relations with the U.S., the nation also seeks to have autonomy in its foreign policy. From the U.S. perspective, India has acquired importance due to security concerns in Asia and India's growth as a major economic power (Schaffer, 2009).

Good terms between the two nations were marked by successive U.S. presidents visiting India such as U.S. President Barack Obama's India visit in November 2010. Also, many Indian prime ministers visited the United States. For instance, India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the United States in 2015. A major change in the U.S. attitude toward India was demonstrated by the signing of the Civilian Nuclear Deal in 2005. The deal paved the way for India to obtain nuclear technology from countries, including the United States ("Timeline," 2015).

While scholarly research is available on relations between India and the United States, little if any literature is available on the portrayal of India in the U.S. press. This dissertation researched the portrayal of India in the U.S. press during and after the Cold War. The study assumes significance because India is the world's largest democracy with more than 1.25 billion people. The countries have shared values in democracy, and a political aim of containing China (Kissel, 2011). India's geographical position in South Asia with China, Pakistan and Afghanistan in close proximity makes India important from the geopolitical standpoint. Culturally, the nation has a 5,000-year-old history, and Indian Americans numbering more than three million in the U.S. have contributed to the country's economy and work force while practicing their religion and culture in the United States.

Politically, Indian Americans have played a noteworthy role in the country. Dalip Singh Saund, a U.S. citizen of Indian origin, became the first Indian American to be elected to the House of Representatives in 1957 (“Dalip Singh,” 2012). For the first time, an Indian American, Kamala Harris, was elected to the U.S. senate in 2016 (“Kamala Harris,” 2016). South Carolina governor Nimrata Haley was appointed by U.S. President Donald Trump as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations (“Senate confirms,” 2017). U.S. citizens of Indian origin have actively taken part in the political process of United States. For instance, businessman Shalabh Kumar founded the Republican Hindu Coalition in 2016 in support of Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump and campaigned for him among Indian Americans (Rajghatta, 2016).

The dissertation on India’s portrayal in the U.S. press uses the constructs of indexing and framing to guide the study’s research. Indexing theory, also referred to as indexing hypothesis, was developed by political scientist Lance Bennett and is among the theoretical concepts that have explored the links between news coverage and a nation’s foreign policy. This theory rests on the premise that news reporting of a story involving debate in the upper echelons of the government is influenced by the unity or disunity prevailing among policy makers in the government (Bennett, 1990). Indexing theory can be studied by researching the frames used in news stories. The term frame in news media refers to the presence or absence of words, text, common phrases, photographs, sources of information and the relation between them that highlight certain news themes in a news story (Entman, 1993, 2004). Frames are helpful in identifying ways in which an issue or an object has been portrayed in a news story.

Using Indexing theory as its basis and framing as a means of analysis, the primary thesis proposed for this dissertation was that India’s portrayal in the U.S. press will closely align with the U.S. government’s policy stances on India. The dissertation will further our knowledge about

Indexing theory by examining and comparing news content during Cold War and post-Cold War years.

This dissertation begins with an introduction to the issue being researched. It then presents an historical overview of India's relations with the U.S. and Pakistan during and after the Cold War in order to provide context to this present study. The overview of India's relations with the U.S. and Pakistan is followed by an explication of Indexing theory and framing. A review of pertinent past studies that have used indexing and framing is also provided, followed by a presentation of this study's overarching research question and specific hypotheses. The method section lays out how the quantitative and qualitative studies of India's portrayal in the U.S. press during and after the Cold War were undertaken. It is followed by the results section where the findings of the study are presented. The discussion section of the dissertation delves into the findings of the present research and whether the results confirmed our hypotheses and answered the research question.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Historical Background of India-U.S. Relations

The following sections delve into relations between India and the U.S. during and after the Cold War.

Indo-U.S. Relations During the Cold War

After India gained independence from British colonial powers in 1947, it began evolving its foreign policy in the backdrop of the Cold War between the U.S.-led block of countries and the nations in the Soviet sphere. India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited the U.S. on Oct 13, 1949, in a bid to strengthen India's position on the world stage ("Timeline," 2015). While the United States established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1954, in a bid to collectively counter the spread of communism across the world, countries in the sphere of the U.S.S.R. organized the Warsaw Pact in 1955 to oppose capitalism. The United States approached the Indian subcontinent in a bid to have good relations with both India and Pakistan. It particularly wanted to establish friendly ties with India, because India was different from all other newly founded nations on the basis of its size, population and democracy (Tahir-Kheli, 1997). This led to a state visit to India by then U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower on Dec. 9, 1959. He addressed the Indian Parliament and met with senior leaders of the Congress party ("Timeline," 2015).

However, the Indian government wanted more recognition on the world stage than simply being a regional ally of a western nation to contain the U.S.S.R. India was also aware that the ultimate goal of the United States was containing the spread of communism, therefore, it decided to exploit the rivalry of the Cold War powers to its own benefit (Tahir-Kheli, 1997). India had

attained its freedom after hundreds of years of foreign rule. The Indian government did not want to sign away its independence vis-à-vis foreign policy by aligning itself with either of the Cold War powers, the United States and the U.S.S.R. Therefore, in a bid to remain equidistant from both the sides during the Cold War, as mentioned earlier India became a founding member of the Non Aligned Movement (NAM). This organization was founded in 1961 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, under the leadership of India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, Egypt's President Col. A. Nasser and Yugoslavia's President Marshall Joseph B. Tito. The countries that were part of the Non Aligned Movement decided to not take sides during the Cold War and pursue their own independent policies without external influence (Latham, 2010). The Non Aligned Movement incorporated in its charter the Panchsheel principles that were agreed upon between India and China: 1) Mutual respect for territorial integrity. 2) Mutual non-aggression. 3) Non-interference in each other's internal affairs. 4) Equality among each other. 5) Respect for mutual co-existence (Rotter, 2013).

India's role in world affairs as a major non-aligned country was an irritant in its relations with the United States. Successive U.S. presidents viewed Indo-U.S. relations through the prism of India's non-alignment. For instance, the Eisenhower administration termed India's non-alignment immoral. However, President John F. Kennedy tried to have a South Asia policy outside the ambit of Cold War politics. His support for India hinged on several factors. First, he believed that the militaristic approach of previous U.S. governments had not gone down well with Third World nations and that imbalance could be corrected with good relations with India. Second, he looked upon India as a country that could usher in world peace. Third, he also wanted developing countries to have a good impression of the U.S. and for that he wanted better terms

with India. Fourth, Kennedy did not agree that India's non-alignment would be an impediment to having better relations with the United States (Jain, 2008).

For the most part, however, the Indian tilt toward non-alignment, instead of siding with the United States, led successive U.S. governments to believe that India was more favorably inclined toward the Soviet Union than the United States. During the early years after India attained freedom, it depended on the Soviet veto at the United Nations. For instance, between 1954 and 1964, the Soviets used their veto power more than 100 times at the U.N. to block resolutions calling upon India to carry out a plebiscite in the state of Jammu and Kashmir as envisaged in the 1948 U.N. resolution. The state of Jammu and Kashmir has been a bone of contention between India and Pakistan ever since both countries went to war over it in 1948. Similarly, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev declared that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India (Tahir-Kheli, 1997, p. 32).

India and China went to war in 1962 over the issue of a boundary dispute between the two nations. The war between India and China in 1962 brought India and the United States closer for a few years as the Indian government sought help from the John F. Kennedy-led government for assistance to counter Chinese aggression in the eastern sector of India. The United States was aware that India was militarily unprepared to face the Chinese threat and it was also aware that prospective Chinese gains against India would help strengthen communism. The Indians, on the other hand, had a balancing act to do between seeking military help from the United States and adhering to its foreign policy of non-alignment (Tahir-Kheli, 1997, p. 33). While military ties between India and the United States grew considerably after India's defeat in the border war with China, economic ties also grew between the two countries.

Economic and scientific relations

During the first 25 years of its existence India was a major recipient of international economic assistance. For instance, India received 50 percent of the loans granted by the World Bank. India also received the largest food aid from the U.S. under Public Law 480, which was colloquially called Food for Peace Program. India received about 12 percent of all foreign assistance that the U.S. gave in 1970 (Schaffer, 2009, p. 28).

Low agricultural yield due to drought led India to rely on United States assistance during the mid-1960s. Aid from the United States had a major role in India producing high-yield grains leading to self-sufficiency in food production in the country. This phenomenon was called the green revolution (Schaffer, 2009, p. 28). The United States also helped India in establishing scientific and research training facilities in the country such as the Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT). The United States also funded exchange visits of scientists and professors from both countries to gain knowledge about each other's areas of research. These scientific collaborations were funded by the United States using the surplus money gained from the sale of food. However, souring of relations between the two countries over the war between India and Pakistan in 1971 led to the United States cutting off economic aid to India. The United States restored economic aid to India in 1978 (Schaffer, 2009, p.29).

Scientific collaboration between India and the United States also extended to the realm of space technology. The Indian government began its space program in 1962. By 1969 the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) had been set up to help realize Indian goals in space research. The first launch from Indian territory was a U.S. made rocket in 1963. United States scientists from National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) helped the Indian

government set up a launch site at Thiruvananthapuram in the Indian state of Kerala, from where about 300 rockets eventually were launched.

During the 1960s and 1970s, United States scientists along with their Indian counterparts helped station a satellite over central India to provide information, education and entertainment to more than 2400 villages in India. By the mid-1970s the United States would not take part in Indian activities to launch rockets. However, it allowed India to launch its own rockets from U.S. bases. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) initiated by the U.S. government imposed stringent limitations on space cooperation between India and the United States. It treated anything dealing with launching a space shuttle or helping maintain its flight as a potential contribution toward missile technology, which the MTRC wanted to prevent. United States export of space technology to India was proscribed if it could bring about a delivery of 500 kg payload over a stretch of 300 km (Schaffer, 2009, p. 101).

The bonhomie between India and the United States in the aftermath of the war between India and China lasted for a short time as India and Pakistan fought another war over the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1965. The United States had a limited role to play in the negotiations to bring the war to an end. The reasons for a limited United States role were that the country was busy expanding its military efforts in Vietnam and growing United States interest in Arab-Israeli problems in the Middle East. The United States had, however, imposed arms embargo on both India and Pakistan, which was one of the factors that brought about a ceasefire between the two warring nations (Ganguly, 1994).

Relations between India and the United States reached their lowest point during the regime of India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi (1966-1977). Her foreign policies were viewed by the U.S. government as too radical and different from previous Indian governments. The U.S.

government viewed India's foreign policies to be tilted in favor of the Soviet Union and against the global interests of the United States. For instance, India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi condemned the U.S. war in Vietnam despite repeated U.S. advice to not oppose it. It led to the U.S. government delaying food aid to India at a time the country faced drought in many parts of the nation (Jain, 2006).

Mutual distrust

Jain (2006) contends that India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had misgivings about the U.S. administration due to many reasons. She believed that the U.S. policies were harmful to Indian interests. She considered that the U.S. failure to continue economic assistance to India proved that it was an unreliable partner. She also trusted the U.S.S.R. more than the United States. In addition, Indira Gandhi believed that the U.S. was trying to draw India's arch rival, Pakistan, away from non-alignment toward the U.S. sphere of influence. However, during her second stint from 1980 to 1984 as India's prime minister, Indira Gandhi, led efforts for better relations with the United States, for instance promoting scientific cooperation among the two countries (Jain, 2006).

The war between India and Pakistan in 1971 led to the creation of Bangladesh and also soured India's relations with the U.S. In the build up to the war, U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger in July 1971, visited India and assured the Indian government that warming of ties between the U.S. and China would not be at the cost of Indian interests vis-à-vis China. However, after visiting China soon after his India visit, Henry Kissinger told the Indian ambassador to the U.S., L.K. Jha, that China would attack India, if India dared to attack Pakistan and that in case of a Chinese attack India should not expect U.S. help like it did in 1962 (Ganguly, 2001).

With no U.S. assurance of help forthcoming, India soon signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the U.S.S.R. on August 9, 1971, giving the country a veto-wielding ally in the United Nations. India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi went on a tour of many western nations in order to generate support for India's position on the crisis unfolding in East Pakistan where West Pakistan soldiers were busy fighting an uprising by Bengali Muslims who were demanding a separate state based on cultural differences. Indira Gandhi managed to get the U.S. to cut off arms aid to Pakistan, however, in reality arms continued to trickle into Pakistani hands even during the 14-day war with India in 1971 (Ganguly, 1994).

Ganguly (1994) argues that U.S. President Richard Nixon's personal dislike of India was largely responsible for the anti-India policies followed by the U.S. during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. This led to the United States sending its ship USS Enterprise with 2,000 marines on board into the Bay of Bengal ostensibly to evacuate its citizens from Dhaka, which was then the capital of East Pakistan. However, India construed it to be a show of support for Pakistan. The primary U.S. objective of the naval action was to deter India from taking military action on its western border with Pakistan though scholarly research suggests India had no plans of attacking Pakistan along its western borders (Ganguly, 1994). Ganguly (1994) argues that the U.S. show of support gave false hope to Pakistan that the United States would help it win the war against India. For instance, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Joseph Farland, would regularly assure the Pakistan government that help from the U.S. would soon be forthcoming (Ganguly, 2001). The 1971 war led to the creation of Bangladesh and also brought the U.S.S.R. closer to India.

India's nuclear quest

As India's relations with the United States soured during and after its 1971 war with Pakistan, India conducted its first ever nuclear test in 1974 at Pokhran in the state of Rajasthan. The Indian government called the test a peaceful nuclear test that was not meant to disturb world peace. During the early years of the Cold War, the U.S. had helped India in the field of nuclear research and in training its scientists. For instance, the commercial light-water nuclear reactor at Tarapur in the state of Maharashtra was set up with U.S. assistance. A 30-year agreement on nuclear cooperation was signed between the U.S. and India in 1963 in which the U.S. was to provide with refueling of the Tarapur nuclear reactor. However, India's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty led to calls from U.S. officials for sanctions against and snapping of U.S. nuclear help to India (Kapur et al., 2002).

The nuclear test by India in 1974 brought about a significant shift in U.S. policies toward India regarding nuclear proliferation. The Carter administration made nonproliferation a cornerstone of its foreign policy, while the U.S. supply of heavy water to India's Tarapur nuclear plant ran into trouble. The Symington and Glenn amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1979, caused the Carter administration to suspend nuclear cooperation with India (Tahir-Kheli, 1997). The Symington Amendment stipulates that a country cannot receive military and economic aid from the United States until the U.S. President certifies that the country does not have nuclear weapon producing material. The Glenn Amendment lays out that if a non-nuclear weapon possessing state conducts a nuclear test, the country would face U.S. economic sanctions ("Pakistan's sanction," 2001)

An arms race had begun between India and Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons and in 1984, rumors of an impending Indian attack on Pakistani nuclear reactors led to U.S. officials

visiting both India and Pakistan to avert a war. India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi met U.S. President Ronald Reagan in the United States in October 1985, to discuss India's nuclear program. Reagan told the Indian prime minister that the United States would oppose Pakistan developing a nuclear bomb and that the Pakistani government had promised to restrain its nuclear program. The Indian government, however, publicly rejected the U.S. assertion that Pakistan had not constructed a nuclear bomb (Tahir-Kheli, 1997). During the Cold War, the U.S. government did not equate India's nuclear program with Pakistan's clandestine quest for nuclear weapons (Jain, 2006). A 1987-88 report of the Indian government's external affairs ministry said that India was disappointed that the U.S. had decided to not implement its non-proliferation laws and that such a move favored Pakistan's nuclear program. For instance, the Reagan administration had used a waiver to the Symington Amendment to vouch for the fact that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon. Despite repeated U.S. requests India made it clear that it would not sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty because it was discriminatory toward India (Jain, 2006).

Besides the nuclear issue, U.S. arms supply to Pakistan in the 1980s became a sore point between India and the U.S. From 1980, successive U.S. governments used Pakistan as a conduit to arm Muslim insurgents violently opposing the Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan in order to prop up a failing communist regime in the country. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan made Pakistan an indispensable ally of the United States. The Indian government believed that massive U.S. aid to Pakistan was meant to counterbalance India's position in South Asia and also to help Pakistan gain a strategic edge over the Indian military. India's relations with the U.S. were further strained when the U.S. government used a waiver to give Pakistan a \$4.2 billion aid package. India urged the United States to suspend all types of help to Pakistan to reduce tension

in the region, which the U.S. refused to accept (Jain, 2006). On the other hand, the U.S. was reluctant to give India defense equipment on account of its long standing treaty with the Soviet Union from whom they got military aid, for instance a nuclear-power submarine (Jain, 2006).

Through the 1980s relations between India and Pakistan deteriorated on account of the Sikh insurgency in the Indian state of Punjab and the Islamic insurgency in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Both insurgencies sought to establish a separate nation by breaking away from India. India accused Pakistan of aiding the insurgents, but the United States chose to ignore Indian allegations of Pakistani support to the insurgents due to the help Pakistan was rendering in Afghanistan. As tensions between India and Pakistan mounted U.S. deputy national security adviser Robert Gates visited both India and Pakistan in order to prevent a confrontation between the two nuclear weapons armed states. His intervention cooled tensions between India and Pakistan (Tahir-Kheli, 1997).

While the Cold War years were marked mostly by strained relations between India and the United States, significant improvement of ties took place between the two nations after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union ceased to exist.

Indo-U.S. Relations After the Cold War

The improvement of ties between India and the U.S. after the Cold War was reflected in all spheres of their relations: Kashmir, terrorism, nuclear issue, trade and defense ties. The opening up of the Indian economy by the Congress government in the early 1990s transformed the country's economy. India's policy makers also realized the need of having the U.S. as an ally after the U.S.S.R. ceased to exist. The U.S. government also realized that they had many shared interests with India that could be achieved with better relations between the two nations (Jain, 2006). In 1993, the U.S. for the first time placed Pakistan on its State Department's watch list of

countries sponsoring international terrorism (Press Trust of India, 2016). However, it later removed Pakistan's name from the watch list by July 1993 (Kapur et al., 2002, p. 522).

While the Clinton administration in the U.S. began its tenure with pronouncements construed as anti-India, especially on the Kashmir issue, relations between the two nations became cordial after India's Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao visited the U.S. in May 1994. India cancelled its decision to produce and deploy its medium-range Agni missiles in a bid to improve its relations with the U.S. and to obtain concessions from them. Indian efforts to carry out a nuclear test in 1995, were detected and thwarted by the U.S. Instead, India agreed to test its missiles (Kapur et al., 2002, p. 312). India in 1997, objected to the U.S. move of granting a one-time waiver of the embargo imposed on Pakistan in accordance with the Pressler Amendment thereby allowing the delivery of arms except F-16 aircraft to Pakistan. The Clinton administration during its second tenure at the White House decided to abandon an issue by issue policy for South Asia. Instead, the Clinton administration decided to have a more structured approach in dealing with India. However, India's nuclear tests in 1998 soon brought about a brief lull in bonhomie between the two nations (Kapur et al., 2002, p. 315).

By 1998, a Bharatiya Janata Party-led coalition government was in power in India. In May 1998, at Pokhran in the Indian state of Rajasthan, India tested a hydrogen bomb that triggered international condemnation and United States sanctions. The U.S. government imposed sanctions under the Glenn Amendment, suspended foreign aid to the country and blocked World Bank's one billion dollar aid to India. It also restricted India's access to advanced technology (Jain, 2006). The Glenn Amendment stipulates that if the president of the United States determines that a non-nuclear weapon possessing state has conducted a nuclear test, the president could impose a range of sanctions against the country ("Pakistan's sanction," 2001). The United States recalled

its ambassador to India in retaliation to India's nuclear test ("Timeline," 2015). Some of the sanctions were eased after the Indian government assured the Clinton administration that India would consider signing the CTBT and negotiate with the U.S. a treaty to cut off fissile material. However, India did not fulfill the promises it made to the United States. A sustained round of dialogues between Indian and U.S. officials helped ease the sanctions imposed on India (Jain, 2006). In 1999, India and Pakistan were involved in a military conflict in the Kargil region of Kashmir. While India claimed that Pakistan army regulars had intruded on Indian territory, Pakistan maintained that the intruders were not Pakistani soldiers but Kashmiri insurgents fighting the Indian rule in Kashmir. India took military action to evict the invaders from Kargil. During the Kargil conflict in Kashmir in 1999 between India and Pakistan, U.S. President Bill Clinton met with Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and asked him to withdraw Pakistani army regulars from the Kargil region of Indian-administered Kashmir. Clinton also told the Pakistan prime minister to not expect any United States help in case India attacked Pakistan. This was a marked departure in U.S. policy after the Cold War vis-a-vis Pakistan (Ganguly & Hagerty, 2005).

Relations between the two countries improved dramatically after U.S. President Bill Clinton visited India in 2000. Addressing India's parliament Clinton acknowledged India as a global power on the rise. India's Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee dubbed both the nations as natural allies having the will to work with each other on a global scale. At the end of Bill Clinton's India visit, the U.S. president and India's prime minister signed the Vision 2000 document. It called for both nations to work together for a prosperous global economy and opening more avenues of trade. It also urged for establishing a multilateral system of trade, meeting environmental challenges on a global scale, promoting contact between people of both

nations and promoting joint ventures to get rid of indigence, diseases and suffering in the world. Both countries also agreed to jointly combat international terrorism, host a joint forum on investment and increase commercial exchange to promote business between people of both nations.

The Clinton administration's policies regarding India marked a major shift from its predecessors. The U.S. ruled out its intervention in the Kashmir dispute and called for its resolution through dialogues between India and Pakistan. The Clinton administration also avoided talking about the 1948 U.N. resolution calling for a plebiscite to ascertain the fate of Kashmir (Jain, 2006). India's Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee visited the United States in September 2000, and the visit gave a significant boost to economic ties between the two nations with regard to privatization of power, insurance and banking in India. By the time the Clinton administration was replaced with George W. Bush as the president, the United States was dealing with the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks that killed thousands of people in the country (Jain, 2006).

Combating international terrorism

Cooperation between India and the United States on combating terrorism began in the 1990s when India started appealing to the United States to designate several Pakistan-based outfits as terrorist groups. A major change in the U.S. attitude came with the kidnapping and subsequent killing of five western hostages who were kidnapped in Kashmir by insurgents. In what was the U.S. State Department's first public acknowledgement of Pakistan's role in sponsoring terror in Kashmir, the State Department in a report titled "Patterns of Global Terrorism" highlighted Pakistan's support to Kashmiri insurgents fighting against India (Kapur et al., 2002, p. 526). At India's request the United States designated Harkat-ul-Ansar as a

terrorist group. India extended its support to the United States after it carried out missile attacks against terrorist bases in Afghanistan in retaliation to the bombing of its embassy in Nairobi, Kenya (Kapur et al., 2002, p. 526). Both India and the United States set up a Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism in 2000 in the aftermath of the hijacking of an Indian aircraft (Schaffer, 2009).

In the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, the Indian government offered assistance to the U.S. in dealing with terrorist groups in Afghanistan. However, it failed to persuade the United States that the insurgency in Kashmir was part of the same global terrorism that had caused attacks on U.S. soil. In the wake of the attack on India's parliament at New Delhi in December 2001, the United States launched diplomatic efforts that saw Pakistan taking action against insurgent groups India had blamed for the attack. However, the U.S. stopped short of designating Pakistan as a state sponsor of international terrorism, because that would have led to sanctions against Pakistan (Schaffer, 2009, p. 125). A June 2005, agreement between India and the U.S. called for both countries to work together to defeat terrorism, establish stability and security, stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction and protect economic interests of both nations (Schaffer, 2009, p. 75). The terror attacks on Mumbai by insurgents on November 26, 2008, resulting in the death of 183 people, including six U.S. citizens, set the stage for more cooperation between India and the United States. The United States acceded to India's request and declared Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) leader Hafiz Sayeed a terrorist and placed a bounty on him. The U.S. also blamed the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba for an attack on the Indian consulate at Herat in Afghanistan (Riedel, 2014). India and the U.S. signed a Counter Terrorism Initiative (CTI) in 2010 to enhance cooperation in intelligence sharing, cyber security and training for India's elite anti-terrorist special forces ("India," 2010). In the wake of

India's attack on terrorist camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir in September 2016, the U.S. government supported India's right to reply to cross border terrorism ("US backs," 2016).

Defense cooperation

The cooperation between the two countries to fight terrorism also saw an increase in defense cooperation between the armed forces of India and the United States. Two operational features of this cooperation are most visible --- the frequency of joint exercises by the defense forces of both nations and increase in trade, especially research and production of weapons. Joint military exercises between India and the U.S. grew after 2002. For instance, the navies of both nations carried out the largest ever joint exercises with aircraft carriers in strike formations off the coast of Malabar in India in October 2005 (Schaffer, 2009). Similarly, the air forces of both nations regularly conduct joint exercises. Indian soldiers were flown to Hawaii in the U.S. for joint exercises with their U.S. army counterparts in 2006. The Indian navy and the U.S. government have worked together to thwart piracy on the high seas. Increase in defense trade between the two nations took place slowly after the Cold war ended because of the international sanctions placed on India after the 1998 nuclear tests. The defense agreements signed between India and the U.S. in 1995 and 2005 had led to expectations of greater defense trade. Between 2002 and 2008 this trade was worth \$700 million. In 2007, India and the U.S. were involved in defense trade worth \$13 billion (Schaffer, 2009).

While the Cold war years were marked by U.S. opposition to India's nuclear program and India's refusal to sign the NPT and CTBT, the post-Cold War period saw cooperation and acceptance of India's nuclear program by the United States. In 2005, both countries signed the Civilian Nuclear Deal that paved the way for nuclear cooperation between the two nations and the lifting of a more than 30-year embargo on nuclear trade with India. Under the agreement

signed between India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and U.S. President George W. Bush, India agreed to have its civilian nuclear installations under the watch of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), while India's nuclear military nuclear installations were kept out of IAEA's purview ("Timeline," 2015). The U.S. government took the initiative of signing the Civilian Nuclear Deal with India keeping in mind that India is the world's largest democracy and that it would help bring India toward the nonproliferation side. India too agreed to keep its nuclear exports in line with non-proliferation guidelines and would make international non-proliferation of nuclear material stronger (Schaffer, 2009, p. 96).

Talks between the U.S. and India were held in Washington, D.C., on June 1, 2010, and they led to many more subsequent dialogues between senior officials of both countries. The strategic dialogues focused on strengthening of relations and trade between the two nations besides addressing nuclear non-proliferation ("Timeline," 2015). Both countries have increased cooperation in space research as India seeks to launch its first moon mission called Chandrayaan. The first satellite for this moon mission was launched in October 2008 with help from the United States. The Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and the premier U.S. space organization NASA signed an agreement in 2008 for helping India with its lunar mission (Schaffer, 2009, p. 102). U.S. President Barack Obama came to India in November 2010 and supported India's long-standing demand for a permanent place in the U.N. Security Council. He also announced trade deals worth \$15 billion between the two countries ("Timeline," 2015).

While the Cold war years were marked by hostilities and a lukewarm relationship between the two countries, the post-Cold War period has seen coming together of the U.S. and India with regard to defense, nuclear program, trade and commerce. Relations between India and the United States have often been affected by India's relations with Pakistan. For instance, during the 1971

war between India and Pakistan, the United States sent its ship USS Enterprise into Indian waters to deter India from escalating the conflict. Therefore, a review of relations between India and Pakistan should also be undertaken for this research.

Historical Background of India-Pakistan Relations

The following sections delve into relations between India and Pakistan during and after the Cold War.

Relations Between India and Pakistan During the Cold War

The Kashmir dispute

India and Pakistan came into being as two separate nations after the British left India in 1947. From the beginning of their independent existence, Hindu-majority India and Muslim-majority Pakistan contested each other's claim over the Muslim-majority region of Jammu and Kashmir. The discord lies at the heart of relations between India and Pakistan.

The Indian state came into being with the merger of 562 princely states lying within the boundaries of India. The state of Jammu and Kashmir, bordering India and Pakistan, had a Hindu king ruling over a Muslim-majority population. Initially, the king, Hari Singh, chose to remain independent of the two newly created nations (Bhattacharya, 2005). He feared that the socialist and peasant movements prevalent in India would gain ground in his state and erode his authority (Mohanty, 2013). Before Maharaja Hari Singh could decide whether to accede to either of the two countries or have the state as an independent nation, a portion of the Jammu and Kashmir population owing allegiance to the newly created state of Pakistan rebelled against him in September 1947, triggering violence in the state (Bhattacharya, 2005).

With the aim of capturing Jammu and Kashmir, about 5,000 tribesmen from North West Frontier Province of Pakistan aided by Pakistan army regulars attacked the state prompting the

king to accede to India and seek India's military and political help to beat back the invaders. The invaders captured the Poonch region of the state and established what they called Azad Kashmir (Bhattacharya, 2005). Maharaja Hari Singh acceded to India on Oct. 27, 1947. Subsequently, the Indian government airlifted troops and ammunition to Jammu and Kashmir to evict the invaders from the state (Mohanty, 2013). After managing to vacate a portion of Kashmir from the invaders, the Indian government took the issue of the invasion of Jammu and Kashmir to the United Nations and requested it to put an end to the Pakistani aggression in the contested state (Mohanty, 2013). On Aug. 13, 1948, the United Nations passed a resolution on the status of Jammu and Kashmir in which the future of the state was to be decided by a plebiscite after Pakistan withdrew its forces from the state (Ahmed, 2000). The plebiscite, however, never took place and Pakistan refused to withdraw its forces from the territory it had captured in the Kashmir region. India refused to allow a plebiscite to take place until Pakistan completely withdrew its armed forces from the portion of Kashmir in its control. Kashmir has since been a sore point between India and Pakistan ("Milestones," 2015).

While India became a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, a bid to stay away from the U.S.-led and U.S.S.R.-led groups of nations during the Cold War, Pakistan joined U.S.-led alliances, for instance, Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, in what became an apparent tilt toward the United States. While the publicized Pakistani objective to ally with the United States was to contain the spread of communism in Asia, the real objective was to strengthen its position against India and resolve the Kashmir dispute in its favor (Jain, 2006).

The 1965 & 1971 wars

In 1965, both countries again went to war over Kashmir. The 1965 war was brought to an inconclusive end by a U.N. mediated ceasefire (“Milestones,” 2015). Both sides met at Tashkent in the former U.S.S.R. and both sides gave each other some concessions; for instance, India returned Pakistan territories it had won in Azad Kashmir during the 1965 war. The war demonstrated that Pakistan coveted Jammu and Kashmir to make their nation complete, while India needed the state to demonstrate the success of its secularism. However, it also exposed the eastern half of Pakistan, which adhered to Bengali language and culture alongside their Muslim faith. Bengali Muslims of East Pakistan came to identify the Jammu and Kashmir issue with West Pakistan where Urdu was the official language (Ganguly, 1994).

The national elections in Pakistan, held on Dec. 7, 1970, resulted in the victory of East Pakistan’s Awami League. However, Pakistan’s rulers were not in a mood to relinquish power to Awami League’s leader Mujibur Rehman. General Yahya Khan, the military dictator of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the president of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan army postponed the convening of Pakistan’s National Assembly. The Awami League, led by Mujibur Rehman, organized protests across East Pakistan. The Pakistan government cracked down by revoking civil rights in East Pakistan, arresting Awami League leaders, including Mujibur Rehman, and brutally stamping out resistance to its rule. The brutal crackdown triggered an exodus of millions of refugees to India. The Indian government supported the cause of East Pakistan people. The Awami League set up a guerrilla organization called Mukti Bahini, which was to violently resist the Pakistan army’s presence in East Pakistan. A government in exile was set up by the Awami League on Indian territory and India covertly trained and armed Mukti Bahini guerrillas (Ganguly, 1994).

Pakistan declared a state of emergency in the nation. Hostilities between Indian and Pakistan began on Dec. 3, 1971, when Pakistan Air Force bombed Indian air bases. India retaliated militarily and soon a full-fledged war broke out between Indian and Pakistan both on the western and eastern front of India. The Indian forces along with Mukti Bahini guerrillas kept advancing on Dhaka, which fell to the advancing forces on Dec. 16, 1971. Gen. A.K. Niazi, the top Pakistan military commander in East Pakistan, surrendered to India along with over 90,000 Pakistani soldiers. East Pakistan became a new nation called Bangladesh (Ganguly, 1994).

The Indian and Pakistani governments, represented by prime ministers Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto respectively, met at Shimla in India for negotiations. The 1972 Shimla agreement between June 28 and July 2 resulted in India releasing the over 90,000 Pakistani prisoners of war, returning to Pakistan territory won in the 1971 war and restoring diplomatic ties with Pakistan. Both sides agreed to abjure violence and use only bilateral negotiations to settle their disputes with each other. The ceasefire line dividing Kashmir was from then onward called Line of Control (LoC). According to Indian officials present at the talks Bhutto agreed to divide Kashmir along the Line of Control when the atmosphere was conducive for it. However, no such step was later taken. Pakistani officials denied that any such informal decision was taken. The Shimla agreement was ratified by both governments. Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi won another term as prime minister. Bhutto claimed that he had not compromised on the Kashmir issue in the Shimla agreement and the National Assembly of Pakistan ratified it (Ganguly, 1994). According to Ganguly (2001) from the Indian standpoint, the emergence of Bangladesh supported the Indian view that religion cannot be the sole basis of nation building.

Nuclear race between India and Pakistan

India's nuclear test at Pokhran in Rajasthan in 1974 started a nuclear arms race between the two countries. India had lost a border war to China in 1962 that resulted in India losing 14,000 square miles of its territory along the Himalayan region to China. China's nuclear test in 1964 at Lop Nor, and India's 1971 victory against Pakistan were external factors for India's nuclear test. Also, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was facing socio-economic pressures in governing India with escalating oil prices in the country due to the Arab-Israel conflict of 1973. The Indian nuclear test triggered a Pakistani quest for a nuclear weapon. Pakistan Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was of the view that India's overwhelming advantage in conventional weapons would be a great disadvantage to Pakistan in future. He put A.Q. Khan in charge of Pakistan's nuclear program (Ganguly, 2001).

The Pakistani nuclear program continued despite the coup that overthrew Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the military takeover by Gen. Zia ul Haq. The U.S. initially tried to restrain the Pakistanis from building a nuclear device, but after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. did not exert much pressure on Pakistan to abandon its pursuit of a nuclear bomb because the U.S. needed Pakistani help to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan (Ganguly, 2001).

According to Ganguly and Hagerty (2005), Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had considered launching a pre-emptive strike against a Pakistani nuclear plant at Kahuta. However, the Indian government backed out at the last moment due to three factors: 1) It may have triggered a full scale war with Pakistan, 2) The Indian aircrafts were slower in the skies than the Pakistani F-16s and 3) A Pakistani attack on Indian nuclear reactors would have caused a catastrophe, because the Pakistani reactors used plutonium and were located near civilian areas. The specter of an Indian attack on Kahuta again created tensions in 1984, but the Indian government once again

decided to not attack the Pakistani nuclear plant. In 1985, both sides verbally agreed to not attack each other's nuclear installations and a treaty to that effect was ratified only in 1991.

According to Ganguly (2001) the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 impacted Indo-Pakistan relations. Pakistan's importance for the U.S. increased after the Soviet invasion as the U.S. government used Pakistan to covertly aid Afghan insurgents against the Soviet-backed Afghanistan government. According to Ganguly and Hagerty (2005) the U.S. government in 1981 supplied Pakistan with a 3.2 billion dollar arms package, which included F-16 aircraft. In 1986, the U.S. government brushed aside Indian objections to supply Pakistan with 4 billion dollar worth of help (Ganguly & Hagerty, 2005).

According to Ganguly (2001) India received aircraft and tanks worth 1.6 billion dollar from the Soviet Union for supporting their Afghan plans in the United Nations. Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, the Pakistan military dictator, offered a no-war pact to India in 1981, which it immediately rejected. In turn, India asked for a more comprehensive peace treaty, which Pakistan ignored. While the U.S. was busy fighting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan using Pakistan as a means to support insurgents in Afghanistan, a Sikh separatist movement raised its head in the state of Punjab in India.

The Punjab insurgency

According to Ganguly and Hagerty (2005), in 1981, the main Sikh political party, the Akali Dal, started agitating for demands that included resolving the status of the city of Chandigarh, which was the capital of two states --- Punjab and Haryana. Also, the change in socio-economic conditions of Punjab due to the economic policies of the Indian government, a growing Sikh revivalist movement and the deficiencies in the federal structure of India contributed to this secessionist movement. Soon the secessionist movement assumed the form of

an armed insurgency challenging the Indian government's control of Punjab. Pakistan covertly provided arms, training and sanctuary to the Sikh combatants, though it officially denied supporting the secessionist movement (Ganguly & Hagerty, 2005). The insurgency culminated in about 2,000 Sikh combatants led by a fundamentalist Sikh preacher Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale massing in the Golden Temple at Amritsar, which is the holiest shrine for Sikhs. They demanded the establishment of an independent Sikh state --- Khalistan. Unable to bring the Sikh combatants to the negotiating table, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered the army to attack the temple to flush out the Sikh insurgents, which resulted in a heavy loss of lives on both sides. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her two Sikh bodyguards a few months later in October 1984, ostensibly in revenge for storming the temple. Pakistan, on the other hand, accused India of promoting violence and instability in the state of Sindh in Pakistan. The people of Sindh were demanding greater autonomy, equitable distribution of government funds, and more representation in the country's military and civil services. The Pakistan army was pressed into service to crush the rebellion in Sindh (Ganguly & Hagerty, 2005).

The icy heights of Siachen Glacier in Kashmir in 1984, became a bone of contention between the two nations. Both India and Pakistan claimed ownership of Siachen Glacier due to discrepancies in border demarcation between the two countries. The Indian armed forces launched operation Meghdoot on April 13, 1984, to capture the glacier and hold on to it. They captured the glacier a week before the Pakistan army could deploy on the glacier. In 1987, fighting once again broke out between Indian and Pakistani forces on the glacier, but the Pakistani forces were unable to dislodge the Indian soldiers from the glacier ("Siachen conflict," 2016).

The Indian action resulted in India capturing 1000 square miles of territory claimed by Pakistan. Pakistan tried to wrest control of Siachen Glacier in 1990, 1995, 1996 and early 1999 but could not dislodge the Indian army from there. A ceasefire came into being in 2003. On June 12, 2005 then prime minister of India, Manmohan Singh, visited the Siachen Glacier and became the first Indian prime minister to do so. India has since 2007 allowed trekking and mountaineering expeditions to the Siachen glacier in a bid to show its control over it. Pakistan, however, has protested such Indian expeditions (“Siachen conflict,” 2016).

According to Ganguly and Hagerty (2005), as the Sikh insurgency aided by Pakistan raged in Punjab, the Indian army began a huge military exercise codenamed Brasstacks in the state of Rajasthan in May 1986. Politically, the aim was to demonstrate India’s strong military capabilities to Pakistan despite the challenges India faced in countering terrorism in the country. The Indian government also wanted to send a clear message to Pakistan that it had the resolve to inflict damage on Pakistan if war broke out between the two countries. The military exercise held near the India-Pakistan border alarmed the Pakistan government and it moved its army units near the border with India. With both sides moving their army units to the border regions tensions escalated. The prime ministers of both the countries, Rajiv Gandhi and Muhammad Khan Junejo, spoke to each other and both countries decided to pull back their forces and hold high-level talks that resulted in the two nations resorting to confidence-building measures, for instance, they decided to not attack each other, to exercise restraint and not make provocative moves along the border. As the Sikh insurgency in Punjab was brought under control by India, the state of Jammu and Kashmir saw the beginning of an armed insurgency in the state from 1987 (Ganguly & Hagerty, 2005).

The Kashmir insurgency

According to Ganguly and Hagerty (2005) the seeds of the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir were sown a few years prior to 1987. In 1983, the National Conference, a political party led by Farooq Abdullah, refused an offer from the Congress party to fight the state elections as allies. The National Conference won the state elections. However, the Congress party tried to destabilize the National Conference government in the state and managed to get it out of power by engineering defections of elected representatives from the National Conference. New state elections were held in 1987 with the National Conference in alliance with the Congress party. Farooq Abdullah became the chief minister after an election that was perceived by the Kashmiri people as rigged. Allegations of a rigged 1987 state election, an inefficient and corrupt state government and unemployment fueled an agitation against the state government which soon assumed the form of an armed insurgency against India in Kashmir. By December 1989, India had a new government led by Prime Minister V.P Singh (Ganguly & Hagerty, 2005).

According to Joshi (2008), the kidnapping of Rubaiya Sayeed, a daughter of India's then home minister in the federal government Mufti Mohammad Sayeed in December 1989, led to the release of five Kashmiri insurgents languishing in Indian prisons. The aim of the kidnapping was to bring world attention to Kashmir and force the Indian government to listen to the insurgents (Joshi, 2008).

According to Ganguly and Hagerty (2005), the Indian government retaliated to the armed insurgency by dismissing the Farooq Abdullah led state government and imposing presidential rule in Jammu and Kashmir. Jagmohan was appointed as the governor of Jammu and Kashmir. In January 1990, as street protests intensified in Kashmir over 100 people were killed in police firings over a period of two weeks in the state. While Pakistan covertly supported the armed

insurgency with arms and training in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, it continued to officially profess only diplomatic and moral support for the Kashmir insurgency. While India feared Pakistan intervening militarily in the Kashmir conflict, Pakistan feared an Indian attack on training camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir for Kashmiri insurgents. Both countries massed their armies near the international border with each other. A visit by U.S. deputy national security adviser Robert Gates helped both countries demobilize. Gates impressed upon the Pakistani leadership that in no way can Pakistan win a war against India, that they should not expect any U.S. help in the event of a war with India, and that Pakistan should not support the Kashmir insurgency and provoke India into taking military action. He told the Indian leadership that a war with Pakistan had the potential of turning nuclear. Finally, both sides decided to pull back their forces (Ganguly & Hagerty, 2005).

The Cold War years saw bitter relations between India and Pakistan. Both countries went to war three times, and as a result of the 1971 war, East Pakistan broke away to form an independent nation called Bangladesh. However, the Kashmir dispute between the two nations remained unresolved and continued to be a point of discord after the end of the Cold War.

Relations Between India and Pakistan After the Cold War

The end of the Cold War saw a rise in Islamic militancy in Indian-administered Kashmir, where Indian security forces had to battle Kashmiri insurgents who were fighting for either independence of Jammu and Kashmir or its merger with Pakistan. The insurgency in Kashmir led to charges of human rights violations on both the Indian government and the Muslim insurgents. For instance, the Indian government attributed the massacre of 35 Sikh residents of Chattisinghpura village in Kashmir to Pakistan-backed insurgents (Swami, 2000). The Indian army has often been charged with excesses, including torture and killings. In Jammu and

Kashmir, for instance, seven soldiers were sentenced to life imprisonment for killing three men on charges of terrorism. The men were lured by the soldiers for jobs and shot dead along the India-Pakistan border. They were falsely described as insurgents (“Kashmir soldiers,” 2014).

According to Ganguly and Hagerty (2005), India-Pakistan relations have often been affected by missile tests by both the nations. On May 11, 1998, India conducted underground nuclear tests. Pakistan followed suit on May 28, 1998. Both countries faced international criticism and sanctions.

Kargil conflict impedes peace initiatives

In February 1999, then prime minister of India, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and many Indian officials travelled by bus to Lahore, Pakistan, in a bid to promote peace between the two nations. The two sides came up with the Lahore Declaration where both nations agreed to resolve their dispute through peaceful means. They also agreed upon a few confidence building measures regarding their nuclear program. However, the gains made at Lahore, Pakistan, proved short-lived, as India and Pakistan once again were militarily involved in a conflict in Kargil in Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistani army regulars in the garb of Kashmiri insurgents occupied the heights in Kargil, which is in Indian-administered Kashmir. The Indian government used the army and its air power to dislodge the Pakistan army regulars. Hundreds of soldiers died in the conflict that raged for months. It was the first time after 1971 that India used its air force in Kashmir. After the U.S. government refused Pakistan any help and also asked it to withdraw from Kargil, the Pakistan army withdrew. The Kargil conflict did not escalate into a full-fledged war between the two nations because of Indian restraint and the fact that both countries were nuclear states (Ganguly & Hagerty, 2005). On Indian invitation Pakistan President Gen. Pervez Musharraf, visited India for peace talks. The talks, known as Agra Summit, took place between him and

India's Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. However, both sides were unable to achieve consensus due to different perceptions on the Kashmir issue ("Agra summit," 2001).

Terrorist attacks and Indian mobilization

According to Ganguly and Hagerty (2005) relations between the countries hit a new low when on December 13, 2001, Kashmiri insurgents attacked India's parliament killing a few officials. The Indian government held Pakistan responsible for the attack and in retaliation severed diplomatic relations with Pakistan, recalled its ambassador, and mobilized its forces and deployed the Indian army along the India-Pakistan border. Pakistan denied its role in the attack and in response to the Indian deployment, Pakistan army was deployed along the border. United States Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and several senior government officials from the U.S. and the United Kingdom visited both the countries advising restraint and caution. India's Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee called for a conclusive battle against Pakistan (Ganguly & Hagerty, 2005). Faced with diplomatic pressure from the U.S. and the specter of an Indian attack, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf decided to lower the levels of infiltration of insurgents into Indian-administered Kashmir and arrest those whom India blamed for the Parliament attack. By October 2002, India pulled back its forces from the border (Ganguly & Hagerty, 2005). Both India and Pakistan in 2003, agreed to observe ceasefire along the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. In 2004, India's Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee travelled to Islamabad, Pakistan, to meet Pakistan President Musharraf. The meeting was the first in a series of talks between senior government officials from both the countries. Relations between the two countries often have been punctuated by violent incidents; for instance, the Samjhauta Express, a train service between India and Pakistan, was bombed in 2007 causing the death of 68 people, mostly Pakistani citizens (Mushtaq, 2015). In November 2008, 10 terrorists attacked multiple targets in Mumbai,

India, killing 166 people. India blamed Pakistan for the terrorist attacks and canceled peace talks with it. The Pakistan government accepted that the attacks were planned and launched from its soil and promised to investigate the case.

India has used soft diplomacy in its relations with Pakistan. For instance, India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in March 2011 invited Pakistan Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani to watch a game of cricket between the two countries in India. Pakistan in November 2011, gave India the "Most Favored Nation" status in trade. In April 2012, Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari visited India to initiate peace talks with the nation ("Flashpoints and," 2012).

After the Cold War, periods of relative calm between the two nations have alternated with periods of conflict and violence, especially in Jammu and Kashmir. For instance, India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Pakistan to attend the wedding of Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's granddaughter in December 2015 ("PM Modi," 2015). However, India in September 2016, attacked insurgent camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir after insurgents killed 20 Indian soldiers in Jammu and Kashmir (Negi, 2016).

Hostilities over the contested state of Jammu and Kashmir have marked relations between India and Pakistan from 1947 to date. The external factors fueling the conflict have been the role of superpowers in arming both nations that played out in the Cold War politics, for instance, U.S. support for Pakistan in a bid to counter Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Also, both India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons that has increased chances of a nuclear conflict in South Asia. Cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir has been a point of discord between India and Pakistan while the fight against international terrorism has brought India closer to the United States. Internal factors that have contributed to this conflict have been Pakistan's support to Kashmiri insurgents, unresolved disputes between India and Pakistan, for instance, the Siachen

Glacier issue, rise of nationalist forces in Indian politics and the rise of Islamist forces in Pakistan. Therefore, research about portrayal of India in the U.S. press should take into account relations between India and Pakistan.

This dissertation researched the portrayal of India in the U.S. press during and after the Cold War. The study assumes significance because India is the world's largest democracy with more than 1.25 billion people. Both India and the U.S. have shared values in democracy, and a political aim of containing China (Kissel, 2011). India's geographical position in South Asia with China, Pakistan and Afghanistan in close proximity makes India important from the geopolitical standpoint. Politically, Indian Americans have played a noteworthy role in the country. Dalip Singh Saund, a U.S. citizen of Indian origin, became the first Indian American to be elected to the House of Representatives in 1957 ("Dalip Singh," 2012). For the first time, an Indian American, Kamala Harris, was elected to the U.S. senate in 2016 ("Kamala Harris," 2016).

The dissertation uses the theoretical constructs of indexing and framing to answer proposed research hypotheses and research questions that will be following an overview of theories. Lance Bennett's Indexing theory (Bennett, 1990) is among theoretical concepts that have explored links between news coverage and a nation's foreign policy. This theory rests on the premise that news reporting of a story involving debate in upper echelons of the government is influenced by agreement or disagreement of views prevailing among elite policy makers in the government (Bennett, 1990). This dissertation researches whether the U.S. press portrayed India differently during the two era under study: Cold war and post-Cold War. The Indexing theory can be studied by researching the frames used in news stories. The term frame in news media refers to the presence or absence of words, text, common phrases, photographs, sources of

information and the relation between them that highlight certain news themes in a news story (Entman, 1993, 2004). This dissertation studies the frames used in the portrayal of India in the U.S. press during and after the Cold War. It researches whether there was significant difference between the frames used by the U.S. press during the two era.

Researching media news frames about India's portrayal in the U.S. press assumes importance, because it would help ascertain whether the U.S. media portrayed India in accordance with the policies of the U.S. government. By researching India's coverage in the U.S. press the researcher sought to determine whether Indexing theory can find support from the findings of this research. The overall significance of this research lies in understanding whether elite U.S. news media follows the policies of the U.S. government while reporting on international issues.

Theoretical Framework

This dissertation is based on two theoretical constructs --- indexing and framing. Both the theoretical constructs have been used to study the portrayal of India in the U.S. press during and after the Cold War.

Indexing Theory

Scholarly research has examined possible links between ways a nation's press reports on foreign policy issues and the foreign policy of the home country's government (e.g., Bagdikian, 2004; Herman & Chomsky, 2002; Hallin, 1986). Lance Bennett's Indexing theory is among the theoretical concepts that have explored the links between news coverage and a nation's foreign policy. This theory rests on the premise that news reporting of a story involving debate in upper echelons of the government is influenced by the agreement or disagreement of views prevailing among policy makers in the government (Bennett, 1990).

The theory states that news reports will include an entire gamut of opinions existing among elite government officials on a particular subject. It also surmises that on issues regarding foreign policy matters of the home country the range of opinions is narrow in scope (Bennett, 1990). Bennett (1990) studied how the U.S. media reported on the United States intervention in Nicaragua to destabilize the Sandinista government in the 1980s. He found that views included in media reports on the U.S. intervention were those of elite foreign policy makers in the U.S. Mermin (1999) argued that relying only on government sources for news on foreign policy would restrict the various points of view available for media to include in its news reports.

Indexing theory has found support from research (e.g., Bennett, Lawrence, Livingston, 2006; Harp, Loke, & Bachmann, 2010) dealing with foreign policy issues related to security and those directly involving the U.S. Althaus et al. (1996) used Indexing theory to study *The New York Times'* reliance on a range of debate in the upper echelons of the U.S. government during the 1985-86 Libyan crisis. They found that the press relied more on foreign sources than on sources from the U.S. They concluded that this was a sign of the U.S. media having autonomy of including elite officials that they chose to include as sources.

Ha (2013) researched *The New York Time's* coverage of the Guantanamo Bay between 2004 and 2009. Ha (2013) found that in a majority of stories during the reign of U.S. President George W. Bush the newspaper used frames (57%) that were against the use of the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. However, they found that during the regime of U.S. President Barack Obama the use of anti-Guantanamo Bay frame had fallen to about 40%. The researchers concluded that the newspaper used more anti-Guantanamo Bay frame during the tenure of U.S. President George W. Bush than President Barack Obama. The researchers attributed the significantly less anti-Guantanamo Bay frame during President Barack Obama era to the U.S.

government acknowledging its mistakes regarding the use of torture and injustices done to prisoners at Guantanamo Bay. Another factor that led to a decrease in the anti-Guantanamo Bay frame was that political elite and human rights organizations were less critical of President Barack Obama's policies regarding Guantanamo Bay.

Harp, Loke, and Bachmann (2010) used Indexing theory to study the coverage of the Iraq war in *Time* magazine between 2003 and 2009. They found that criticism of the U.S.-led war in Iraq in 2003 was present throughout the *Time* coverage and was aimed at the George W. Bush administration. They also found that official sources, U.S. civilians and Iraqi people's voices were also included in raising concerns about the war. They argue that journalists too became critics of the war in later years of news coverage in the magazine (Harp, Loke, & Bachmann, 2010).

Hayes and Guardino (2010) researched the inclusion of elite government officials in the ABC, CBS and NBC news coverage leading up to the 2003 Iraq war. The researchers analyzed a total of 1,434 stories in the eight months before the invasion. They found that news coverage leaned in favor of the war, and that President George W. Bush-led administration officials were quoted more often than Democratic Party leaders in the news stories.

The literature cited on the use of Indexing theory in research makes it evident that framing is used to determine whether press coverage of an issue falls within the realm of a home country's governmental debate. This study also adopts framing as a theoretical construct to explore whether the U.S. press coverage of India mirrored the policies of the U.S. government toward India.

Framing

Frames in news media refer to the presence or absence of words, text, common phrases, photographs, sources of information and relations between them that reinforce certain news themes highlighted in news stories (Entman, 1993, 2004). Frames shed light on the importance of select pieces of information in news stories through the inclusion of words, text, common phrases, photographs and sources of information, and by their placement or repetition in news stories (Entman, 1993, 2004). The theoretical construct of framing assumes that media are powerful and active because it decides the slant of news stories. It also assumes the audience to be passive because it has no role in shaping the news content. News flow is direct from media to the audience (Lowery & DeFleur, 1995).

Yang and Ishak (2012) studied how Malaysian media covered Hindraf, a non-governmental organization fighting for the rights of minorities in a predominantly Muslim Malaysia. They looked at the news sources used, news frames, news slants, and extent of coverage. They chose four newspapers: a Malaysian, a Chinese, an English-language daily and an alternative newspaper. Samples were drawn from November and December 2007. The frames in all the dailies were about conflict, consequences, responsibility, moral and human interest frames. The conflict frame described Hindraf as the main enemy of the government. The consequences frame related to police action against the Hindu rights group, Hindraf. The responsibility frame related to stories about responsibility of government to solve Indian problems in Malaysia. The moral frame was about cooperation and unity among all in Malaysia. Human interest frame was about the emotional angle given to stories by having a human face to the story. The Malaysian and English language dailies were critical of Hindraf, the Chinese-language one was neutral, and the alternative daily was supportive of Hindraf. The extent of news coverage included mostly news

articles in all four media outlets. Maximum number of news sources in the Malaysian, Chinese and English-language dailies were those from the ruling party, while the alternative news outlet had civilians comprising the majority of the news sources.

Hanson (1995) studied the front-page news coverage in *Times of India* between 1985 and 1993. The three time periods compared were Cold War (1985-1989), transition period (1990-91) and post-Cold War (1992-1994). A total of 329 front pages were included in the study. Every story was coded for news type (national or international), importance (columns, story leading or not), country focus and general subject area.

Hanson (1995) found the international and domestic coverage was stable over the 9 years of study. The peak year of international coverage was 1987 when India sent troops to Sri Lanka to battle the terrorist outfit Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE). This suggested importance of regional events than international events on the front pages of *Times of India*. Among all the stories on the front pages of *Times of India*, the United States (16%) received most attention, followed by Pakistan (12%), Sri Lanka (11%) and Soviet Union/Russia (8%). Among the lead stories on the front pages, 22% were about Sri Lanka, and 13% about the United States. Overall by way of regions, 30% of stories were from South Asia, followed by 16% from North America. Overall by story types, political stories dominated the front page (28%) followed by stories on violence (18%), and the military (18%).

D'Angelo, Calderone and Territola (2005) studied strategy and issue framing in the 2004 presidential election coverage in *The New York Times*. They conducted a content analysis of 267 stories from Campaign 2004 articles, from Labor Day to election day. They established three categories: Policy issues, politics and process, and personality. They found that stories with policy had an issue frame, stories with politics and process had a strategy frame, and stories with

personality had an issue frame. Also, they found that metacoverage stories were also issue framed. Meta-coverage stories were those having details about behavior and activities of media organizations and journalists.

Dimitrova and Ahren (2007) studied the online sources, tones and frames used in 2003 Iraq war coverage in *The New York Times*, *The Guardian* (U.S. coalition partner nations), *Al Ahram* and *Al Jazeera*. They downloaded 112 homepages for the war duration from all four media outlets. The Arab media comprising *Al Ahram* and *Al Jazeera* focused heavily on “military conflict” (100% and 100%) and “violence of war” (100% and 100%) frames. The “responsibility” frame was present in 33% of Arab stories. Arab media also had “media self-referential,” which was about the role of media (72%) in the stories. The Western media had “rebuilding of Iraq” frame, which the Arab media ignored. They found that all media outlets used government and military sources. The tones of *The New York Times* and *The Guardian* were neutral, while *Al Ahram* and *Al Jazeera* were critical of the war and their online coverage was negative in tone.

Ross, Fountain and Comrie (2015) studied how members of parliament in New Zealand used Facebook in the run up to national elections in 2011. They sampled Facebook wall posts of 26 MPs for 4 weeks up to election eve. They recorded a total of 1148 posts. They found that the members of parliament spoke of their own campaign event, own party policies and criticized the policies of other political parties. About 85% of posts had some kind of comment. As many as 43% of posts with comments had weblinks, too. The most observed tones of comments were supportive (52%), mixed (30%), neutral (15%) and hostile (3%) comments. The researchers also found that opposition Labor Party members of parliament posted more than National Party

members, talked more about their own and party campaign events and criticized the ruling National Party more.

Scharrer (2002) studied newspaper coverage of Hillary Clinton as she went from First Lady to Senate candidate in the United States. He compared her coverage with that of New York mayor Rudy Giuliani. As many as 342 stories about Hillary Clinton and 96 stories about Rudy Giuliani were taken into account. Study samples were drawn from all U.S. newspapers over a period of 4 months from 1999 to 2000. They found that when Clinton was framed as politically active, the tone of stories was more negative. Scharrer (2002) also found that stories about Clinton's senate race were more negative than other stories related to Hillary Clinton. However, Scharrer also found that overall there was no significant difference between Clinton and Giuliani's coverage.

Holt (2012) researched the press coverage of Democratic Party leaders Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton during the 2008 Democratic primaries in the U.S. He wanted to see if the press focused on a black candidate's skin color and a female candidate's gender and appearance. For the study, 302 articles from *The New York Times*, *Los Angeles Times* and *Chicago Sun Times* were chosen. Holt (2012) found that atypical candidates lead to atypical coverage. He found that the press made Barack Obama's race more salient than Hillary Clinton's. He also found that Hillary Clinton received more coverage for her gender than Barack Obama.

Zelenkauskaitė, Gao and Powell (2012) analyzed five newspapers and two wire services for the use of the terms Red State (Republican supporters) and Blue State (Democratic supporters) during five federal election cycles between 2000 and 2008. In all 310 stories were analyzed. They found that the terms started to be used around 2002. Both *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* were early users of the terms. They also found that when the two terms

were used together in a single sentence, the number of their occurrence together was higher than each term being used separately within the story. They found that “Red State” was used more in headlines across most frames, except candidate frame. The term “Blue State” was used more in headlines than “Red State” in only horserace frame. The term “Red State” was used in strategically more visible positions in the story.

Benoit, Stein and Hansen (2005) investigated *The New York Times*’ coverage of Democratic and Republican presidential campaigns from 1952-2000. The most frequent topics of newspaper coverage of the presidential elections were horse race, followed by character and policy frames. In the horse race frame, they found maximum stories were about strategy, events, poll, predictions and endorsements. They found that the character frame was significantly more prominent than policy frame. The overall tone of newspaper coverage was more negative than positive. The most commonly used sources in the stories were reporters, candidates and supporters.

Hickerson, Moy and Dunsmore (2011) researched journalists’ sourcing and framing patterns of Abu Gharib prison and invocation of events during Alberto Gonzales’ nomination as U.S. attorney general. They did a content analysis of 760 stories from *The New York Times* from the years 2004 and 2005. They found that overall the sources quoted most frequently were military leaders, academics, military personnel, U.S. President George W. Bush, defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. They found that over time congressional sources figured more prominently, especially during pre-nomination and nomination periods for attorney general Alberto Gonzales. Overall, the two words most frequently used in the stories were abuse (75%) and torture (31%). They concluded that the change from military and academic sources to

Congressional sources reflected power indexing. In power indexing those perceived as in a position to change policy are quoted.

Using the theoretical construct of framing, a researcher can find out if Indexing theory holds up well in the samples being studied. The frames used in the literature cited can be helpful in finding out the tilt of news stories; for instance, Hickerson, Moy and Dunsmore (2011) found that journalists quoted significantly more sources that were in a position to bring about changes in policy, which they termed power indexing. Therefore, the present study uses the Indexing theory and the theoretical construct of framing to research India's portrayal in the U.S. press during and after the Cold War.

Based on the literature review of India's relations with the U.S. and Pakistan, and the theories used to guide this research, the following research questions and hypotheses were proposed for the study.

Research question 1: Did the U.S. news media portray India in accordance with the U.S. government policy stances during and after the Cold War?

Research question 2: What were the themes related to India's coverage in the U.S. press during and after the Cold War?

Hypothesis 1: The U.S. news media portrayed India as anti-U.S. during the Cold War.

The aforementioned hypothesis is based on India's relations with the U.S. during the Cold War era. While India did not have any military alliance with the U.S., it demonstrated a tilt toward the U.S.S.R. with which it signed a friendship treaty in 1971.

Hypothesis 2: The U.S. news media portrayed India as a U.S. ally after the Cold War.

The above-mentioned hypothesis is based on India's growing friendship with the U.S. after the Cold War that resulted in increased defense, trade and nuclear cooperation.

Hypothesis 3: The U.S. news media were supportive of India within the context of terrorism after the Cold War.

The aforementioned hypothesis is based on the fact that cooperation increased between India and the U.S. in combating terrorism in South Asia after the Cold War.

CHAPTER THREE

METHOD

Sample for Quantitative and Qualitative Studies

For the present study, two elite newspapers *The Washington Post* and *The New York Times* were chosen because the two newspapers are said to represent mainstream U.S. news media. The duration of the study was 24 years during the Cold War (Dec. 27, 1967 to Dec 26, 1991) and 24 years after the Cold War (Dec. 27, 1991 to Dec. 26, 2015). A ProQuest search was undertaken of *The New York Times* for the Cold War duration with the search terms “India” in the title AND “relations” in the body of the text. The search returned a total 697 articles without duplicates. From this total, every 5th story was selected for analysis. Taking every 5th story into account ensured that all the stories returned by the search had an equal chance of being selected for the study. This process yielded a total of 139 stories from *The New York Times* belonging to the Cold War era and was included in the study.

A similar ProQuest search of *The Washington Post* for the same timeframe resulted in 385 articles. From the 385 stories, every 4th story was selected, leaving a total of 96 stories belonging to the Cold War era from *The Washington Post* for analysis. Taking every 4th story into account ensured that all the stories returned by the search had an equal chance of being selected for the study. For the research, 235 stories were included from both newspapers for the Cold War era.

For the post-Cold War time frame a LexisNexis Academic search with the search terms “India” in the headline and “relations” in the body of the text was carried out for *The New York Times*. In all 1,004 articles were returned by the search. From the 1,004 articles, every seventh article was included in the study, leaving a total of 143 stories for analysis. Taking every 7th story into account ensured that all the stories returned by the search had an equal chance of being

selected for the study. A LexisNexis Academic search was carried out for the post-Cold War duration with the same search terms for *The Washington Post*. The search resulted in 702 articles. From the 702 articles, every seventh article was selected for analysis, resulting in a total of 100 articles belonging to post-Cold War era from *The Washington Post*. Taking every 7th story into account ensured that all the stories returned by the search had an equal chance of being selected for the study. Therefore, 243 articles from both newspapers were included in the study sample for the post-Cold War years. A combined total of 478 stories from the Cold War and post-Cold war era were included in the study.

Data Analysis for Quantitative Study

A quantitative content analysis of the articles was carried out at the story level. The unit of analysis was the story. A coding sheet, drawn up at the story level, is presented in Appendix A. The coding sheet was used to code the stories included in the study sample for the presence or absence of issues related to India's nuclear program, economic and defense relations with the U.S., separatist movements, and terrorism in India. It was used to also code the coverage tone --- supportive, critical or neutral --- of the aforementioned issues in the stories in order to test this study's proposed hypotheses and answer its overarching research question.

The content analysis revealed how the news stories defined and interpreted India during and after the Cold War. Two coders were involved in the content analysis. To establish intercoder reliability, approximately 10% of the articles were independently coded by two coders. The coders underwent several rounds of training and the instrument was tested using articles not included in the final sample before attaining acceptable reliability coefficient in terms of Krippendorff's alpha (Hayes & Krippendorff, 2007), which ranged from .75 to 1.00, with all the items attaining alpha levels beyond 0.90.

The coded data were entered into an SPSS file and statistical analysis was carried out to answer this study's hypotheses and the overarching research question.

Data Analysis for Qualitative Study

A qualitative analysis of the 478 news articles selected through systematic random sampling was carried out at the story level. The duration of the study was 24 years during the Cold War (Dec. 27, 1967 to Dec 26, 1991) and 24 years after the Cold War (Dec. 27, 1991 to Dec. 26, 2015). The unit of analysis was the story. The qualitative study was done manually to uncover themes about India's portrayal in the U.S. press during and after the Cold War. Each story was studied for the themes emerging from them. The study used the four stages identified by Boyatzis (1998): 1) "sensing themes" that recognized the codable portions of each story; 2) coding the news stories in a consistent way; 3) setting up codes from the codable portions of each story; 4) interpreting the themes obtained from the news stories in relation to a theoretical framework.

The researcher manually highlighted the codes in each era about India in the stories from the two newspapers. All the news stories were thoroughly read several times before themes were sensed from portions of news stories included in the sample. This led to identification of codes related to India in the news stories. The codes were treated as issues or frames related to the research questions about India's portrayal in the U.S. press that the present study investigated. At this stage, the researcher once again read the stories in the sample. To study the codes in the news stories included in the sample, the researcher focused on words and topics related to India that were used in the news stories. The researcher studied the codes once again to find common themes about India in the news stories.

After the themes were identified, similar themes about India were merged under a common theme. This led to several common themes about India being uncovered from the news stories from the two eras included in the sample. After the news stories were coded and common themes about India uncovered, the researcher once again read the news stories included in the present study to ensure that no code had been left out or overlooked in determining the common themes about India's portrayal in the U.S. press.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS

Quantitative Findings

The study included news stories from *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* from two time frames: Cold War (Dec. 27, 1967 to Dec 26, 1991) and post-Cold War (Dec. 27, 1991 to Dec. 26, 2015). The dateline for a majority of news stories from both the time frames were India (55.2%) followed by U.S. (6.3%), Pakistan (4.6%). The other datelines were unidentified (27.4%) or in other locations (6.5%).

For the Cold War time frame, the dateline for a majority of news stories was India (57.9%) followed by the U.S. (8.1%) and Pakistan (1.7%). The other datelines were unidentified (25.5%) or in other locations (6.8%). For the post-Cold War time frame the dateline for a majority of news stories was India (52.7%) followed by Pakistan (7.4%) and the U.S. (4.5%). The other datelines were unidentified (29.2%) or in other locations (6.2%).

Pearson's chi square tests were done to test whether there was significant difference between the portrayal of India in the U.S. press during and after the Cold War with regard to nuclear issues, trade and defense ties with the U.S., separatist movements and terrorism. The study found significant difference in all the aforementioned five parameters used to answer the research questions and the overarching hypothesis.

The first hypothesis of the present study was that the U.S. news media portrayed India as anti-U.S. during the Cold War. The study found that 9.4% of the total number of news stories were about defense ties between India and the United States during the two timeframes (Timeframe 1: Dec. 27, 1967 to Dec 26, 1991; Timeframe2: Dec. 27, 1991 to Dec. 26, 2015).

Of the stories regarding defense ties between India and the U.S. during the Cold War era, 12% of the stories were supportive in their tone, 76% were critical and 12% of the stories were neutral vis-à-vis India's stand. Of the stories regarding defense ties between India and the U.S. during the post-Cold War era, 80% of news stories were supportive in their tone, 10% were critical and 10% were neutral.

A Pearson's chi square test found significant difference in the tone of news stories about defense ties between India and the United States between the two timeframes (Timeframe 1: Dec. 27, 1967 to Dec 26, 1991; Timeframe2: Dec. 27, 1991 to Dec. 26, 2015). Therefore, the first hypothesis was confirmed from the results ($N = 45$ $df = 2$ $\chi^2 = 22.58$ $p < 0.0001$).

The second hypothesis was that the U.S. news media portrayed India as a U.S. ally after the Cold War. To test this hypothesis, the researcher studied news stories regarding India's relations with the U.S. vis-à-vis trade and the nuclear issue.

The study found that 20.7% of the total number of news stories were about trade ties between India and the United States during the two timeframes (Timeframe 1: Dec. 27, 1967 to Dec 26, 1991; Timeframe2: Dec. 27, 1991 to Dec. 26, 2015). Of the news stories about trade ties between India and the United States during the Cold War, 24% of the stories were supportive in their tone, 58% were critical and 18% of the stories were neutral vis-à-vis India's stand. Of the news stories about trade ties between India and the U.S. during the post-Cold War era, 79.6% of the news stories were supportive in their tone, 6.1% were critical and 14.3% were neutral vis-à-vis India's stand. A Pearson's chi square test found significant difference in the tone of the news stories about trade ties between India and the United States between the two timeframes ($N = 99$ $df = 2$ $\chi^2 = 35.66$ $p < 0.0001$).

Tied to the notion of India being a U.S. ally is India's nuclear program. This study considered news stories about India's nuclear program in the U.S. press during the two timeframes. The study found that 23.8% of the total number of news stories were about India's nuclear issue during the two timeframes (Timeframe 1: Dec. 27, 1967 to Dec 26, 1991; Timeframe2: Dec. 27, 1991 to Dec. 26, 2015). Of the news stories about India's nuclear program during the Cold War, 19.4% of the stories were supportive in their tone, 64.5% were critical and 16.1% of the stories were neutral vis-à-vis India's stand. Of the news stories about India's nuclear program during the post-Cold War era, 37.3% of the news stories were supportive in their tone, 18.1% of the news stories were critical and 44.6% were neutral vis-à-vis India's stand.

A Pearson's chi square test found significant difference in the tone of the news stories about India's nuclear program between the two timeframes ($N = 114$ $df = 2$ $\chi^2 = 23.06$ $p < 0.0001$). Therefore, the second hypothesis was also confirmed from the study results.

The third hypothesis of the present study postulated that the U.S. news media were supportive of India within the context of terrorism after the Cold War.

The study found that 18.8% of the total number of news stories were about terrorism during the two timeframes (Timeframe 1: Dec. 27, 1967 to Dec 26, 1991; Timeframe2: Dec. 27, 1991 to Dec. 26, 2015). Of the news stories about terrorism during the Cold War, 35.7% of the stories were supportive in their tone, 7.1% were critical and 57.1% of the stories were neutral vis-à-vis India's stand. Of the news stories about terrorism during the post-Cold War era, 68.4% of the news stories were supportive in their tone, 1.3% of the news stories were critical and 30.3% were neutral vis-à-vis India's stand. A Pearson's chi square test found significant difference in the tone of the news stories about terrorism between the two timeframes ($N = 90$ $df = 2$ $\chi^2 = 6.28$ $p < 0.05$).

Tied to the notion of terrorism are the separatist movements in India. The study found that 21.8% of the total number of news stories were about separatist movements in India during the two timeframes (Timeframe 1: Dec. 27, 1967 to Dec 26, 1991; Timeframe2: Dec. 27, 1991 to Dec. 26, 2015). Of the news stories about separatist movements in India during the Cold War, 18.5% of the stories were supportive in their tone, 22.2% were critical and 59.3% of the stories were neutral vis-à-vis India's stand. Of the news stories about separatist movements in India during the post-Cold War era, 32.5% of the news stories were supportive in their tone, 6.5% of the news stories were critical and 61% were neutral vis-à-vis India's stand. A Pearson's chi square test found significant difference in the tone of the news stories about separatist movements in India between the two timeframes ($N = 104$ $df = 2$ $\chi^2 = 6.03$ $p < 0.05$). Therefore, the third hypothesis was also confirmed from the results of the present study. Table 1 depicts the results of the chi square tests.

Table 1. Chi square test results of five parameters between Cold War and post-Cold War timeframes.

Parameters	N	Df	χ^2	P
Defense	45	2	22.58	0.0001
Trade	99	2	35.66	0.0001
Nuclear program	114	2	23.06	0.0001
Terrorism	90	2	6.28	0.05
Separatist Movements	104	2	6.03	0.05

CHAPTER FIVE

QUALITATIVE FINDINGS FROM COLD WAR PERIOD

The quantitative study about India's portrayal in elite U.S. news media during and after the Cold War brought to the fore significant findings on all the five parameters included in the study: Nuclear ties, trade ties, defense ties, portrayal of secessionist movements in India and terrorism. The research involving news stories from *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* revealed that the U.S. news media portrayed ties between India and the U.S. in a manner that showed India as a friend and ally of the United States.

However, findings of the quantitative research necessitated that a qualitative study be also undertaken to uncover themes about India in the U.S. news media during and after the Cold War. This would answer the research question about common themes related to India in elite U.S. news media during and after the Cold War. Following are the common themes about India uncovered from news stories from *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post*.

Common Themes in *The New York Times* During the Cold War

Sour Defense Relations Between India and the U.S.

The New York Times coverage of India focused on India's sour defense relations with the United States. An article in *The New York Times* quoted an unnamed member of India's parliament as saying that India should destroy the ship USS Enterprise if it interfered in the 1971 war between India and Pakistan (Butterfield, 1971). The article (Butterfield, 1971) noted the Indian suspicion that the U.S. ship was near Indian waters to help Pakistani troops evacuate from newly founded Bangladesh.

Another article ("U.S. military," 1972) quoted U.S. embassy officials in India as saying that the Indian government had banned U.S. military aircrafts from flying in its airspace, except

those aircrafts that will be given special permission to fly in Indian airspace. The article attributed the Indian move to ban U.S. military flights over India to sour relations between the two nations in the aftermath of India's war with Pakistan in 1971 ("U.S. military," 1972). *The New York Times* quoted unnamed U.S. officials in an article (Gwertzman, 1971) as saying that all U.S. military assistance to India had been cut off by the U.S. government following the war between India and Pakistan in 1971.

A *New York Times* article (Taubman, 1983) referred to misunderstanding between India and the United States about the sale of weapons to India. It quoted U.S. Secretary of State George P. Schultz as saying that the U.S. government would like to clear any misunderstanding with India about sale of U.S. weapons (Taubman, 1983). Another article (Schanberg, 1971a, p. 5) with the headline "A harder line for India," stated that the Indian government was under "military pressure" to adopt strong measures against the United States government (Schanberg, 1971a, p. 5). The use of the term "military pressure" is significant because it lays bare conflict of interest between India and the U.S. over Pakistan's role in fighting Bengali guerrillas in East Pakistan. While terming India "unreasonable," the article noted that the U.S. government was unhappy with India not accepting U.N. observers and not pulling back its troops from its international borders with Pakistan.

Recent remarks by administration officials indicate that the White House has grown increasingly irritated over India's latest position. This includes a refusal to accept United Nations observers, a refusal to withdraw Indian troops from the borders ... (Schanberg, 1971a, p. 5).

The New York Times in an article (Borders, 1976) observed that India was amassing troops more in number than even the United States. The article noted that India was manufacturing its own weapons and its dependence for weapons on the superpowers, including the United States, had considerably decreased.

Frayed Economic Ties Between India and the U.S.

The New York Times noted in its articles that economic ties between India and the United States were often strained due to U.S. foreign policies during the Cold War, India's war against Pakistan in 1971 and India's reluctance to accept U.S. aid on the ground that it would establish U.S. dominance over India.

A *New York Times* article ("Détente with," 1974, p. 35) with the headline "Détente with India," noted the pro-Pakistan policies of the U.S. government in 1971 that resulted in suspension of all kinds of aid to India. The article further noted that U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wanted assurances that India would not trade technology received from the United States for Arab oil ("Détente with," 1974, p. 35). Another article (Schanberg, 1971b, p. E2) in *The New York Times* stated that Indians viewed U.S. aid for East Pakistan refugees in India in 1971 as "conscience money" to tide over U.S. overlooking Pakistan army's crackdown against Bengali guerrillas in East Pakistan (Schanberg, 1971b, p. E2).

A *New York Times* article (Hazarika, 1989) noted that it took 30 years for India and the U.S. to sign a pact to avoid double taxation. The article further quoted U.S. embassy economic counselor Louis Warren as saying that there were many strained moments between India and the U.S. in the past (Hazarika, 1989). Another *New York Times* article's (Kaufman, 1980b, p. D11) headline was "U.S.-India trade talks fail on tariff issue." It termed the failure of talks a "serious setback" (Kaufman, 1980b, p. D11) for economic relations between the two nations. The article (Kaufman, 1980b, p. D11) noted that trade between India and the U.S. were worth two billion dollars. Another news report (Weinraub, 1974a, p. 9) noted India's discomfiture with asking for U.S. aid:

To some Indian officials, the resumption of American food aid would be a blow to this country's pride and a touchy political problem (Weinraub, 1974a, p. 9).

The article quoted unnamed Indian officials as saying that U.S. aid to India was meant to help the United States maintain its political hold over the country (Weinraub, 1974a). Similarly, another *New York Times* article said:

American friends of India have noted that criticism of United States policies to the extent of denigrating great amounts of American economic aid, has become distressingly fashionable in official and intellectual circles (Trumbull, 1972, p. 3).

The same article (Trumbull, 1972, p. 3) quoted an unnamed professor in India as saying that Indians would have “starved without U.S. wheat.” By quoting him the newspaper gave the impression that U.S. economic aid helped India survive famine. Another *New York Times* report (Rangan, 1972) stated that India, in the aftermath of its war with Pakistan in 1971 and record production of wheat, decided to stop buying wheat from the United States. The article used the term “dependence on U.S. wheat,” (Rangan, 1972, p. 8) in relation to India’s purchases in a bid to signify the importance of U.S. sale of wheat to India.

U.S. Opposition to India’s Nuclear Program

The New York Times portrayed U.S. government’s opposition to India’s nuclear program in its articles during the Cold War. In an article (Cowan, 1974, p. 2) with the headline “Blast by India prompts high-level review of aid,” the newspaper noted that India’s nuclear test carried out in 1971 had triggered fears of nuclear proliferation and that the U.S. government was reviewing all types of aid to India. It quoted an unnamed U.S. official as saying:

If there isn’t some cost to India for doing this, other countries will go ahead (Cowan, 1974, p. 2).

Another article (“India did,” 1980), however, also put forth India’s stand of undertaking a nuclear test for peaceful purposes. It quoted Gopalaswami Parthasarthy, an official of the Indian embassy in the U.S., as saying:

We are committed to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and have no intention of contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons being undertaken by the nuclear weapons state (“India did,” 1980, p. A18).

The New York Times in a report (Hazarika, 1985) noted that the U.S. government had turned down an Indian governmental request to buy a super computer due to its possible use in nuclear research by India and the fear of India leaking the technology to the Soviet Union. A newspaper report (Taubman, 1984) compared India’s nuclear strategy with that of Pakistan by observing that both nations had not allowed international inspection of its nuclear facilities.

A newspaper report (Taubman, 1983, p. 3) brought to the fore U.S. opposition to India’s nuclear plan. It noted that India continued to extract plutonium “against American wishes.” The use of the term “against American wishes” (Taubman, 1983, p. 3) is significant because it portrayed the Indian action running counter to the stated U.S. policy of nuclear non-proliferation. *The New York Times* in an article (Miller, 1980, p. A1) quoted Senator John Glenn as saying that India had the “worst history” (Miller, 1980, p. A1) of testing nuclear devices among all the countries with trade ties to the United States. The article observed that India had refused international inspection of its nuclear facilities and had refused to agree to not produce nuclear weapons. In an article (Lewis, 1987, p. A22) the newspaper headline read: “Bill on atom arms would punish India.” The use of the term “punish” (Lewis, 1987, p. A22) is significant because it portrayed U.S. opposition to India’s nuclear program. The article noted that the U.S. Senate had approved a bill that would make India roll back its nuclear weapons program in order to purchase high-technology equipment from the United States. A *New York Times* article (Tolchin, 1980) mentioned that the U.S. House of Representatives had voted to block shipment of uranium to India. The article justified the move on the grounds of nuclear proliferation. The article quoted

Representative William S. Broomfield as saying that the U.S. government would have helped in spreading of nuclear weapons had the uranium shipment to India not been stopped.

A *New York Times* report (“U.S. and,” 1981, p. 2) quoted unnamed Indian journalists using the term “divorce proceedings” (“U.S. and,” 1981, p. 2) in describing India’s bid to end an agreement it had signed with the United States in 1963. The article noted India’s reasons for not agreeing to stop manufacturing nuclear weapons:

India has steadfastly held that it could not accept a standard that applied to one set of nations and not to others (“U.S. and,” 1981, p. 2).

By using the term “maverick state” (“U.S. and,” 1981, p. 2) in describing India’s nuclear policy, the newspaper gave the impression that India was not in agreement with the U.S. government over its nuclear test:

... the United States government came to regard India as a maverick state for having refused to sign the treaty barring the spread of nuclear weapons ... (“U.S. and,” 1981, p. 2).

U.S. Support to Pakistan Against India

The New York Times noted the United States government’s support to Pakistan against India. An article (Szulcs, 1972, p. 10) used the term “chilled relations,” in the headline while describing India’s relations with the United States: “Rogers quickly reciprocates India’s calls for improving chilled relations.” The article further noted:

... after relations between India and the United States plummeted to a low during the India-Pakistan war of last December. In the conflict fought over the independence of Bangladesh, the United States and China supported Pakistan, while the Soviet Union backed India (Szulcs, 1972, p. 10).

Another article (Taubman, 1984) in *The New York Times* carried Indian allegations of Pakistan threatening India with a military buildup along its borders after receiving U.S. aid. The article noted the concern expressed by members of the United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence regarding the threat of an imminent Indian attack on a Pakistani nuclear plant. The

newspaper quoted two unnamed sources from the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as saying that the U.S. secret service had learnt that India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was considering an air raid on a Pakistani nuclear plant.

A *New York Times* report (Taubman, 1983) ascribed strains between India and the United States to U.S. arms sale to Pakistan. Another *New York Times* article ("Détente with," 1974) noted that the policies of U.S. President Nixon favoring Pakistan had alienated India after the U.S. government suspended all forms of aid to India. A report (Kaufman, 1981) in the newspaper quoted a U.S. representative to the United Nations, J. J. Kirkpatrick, as saying that the sale of U.S. arms to Pakistan did not pose a threat to India. The article, however, also noted that India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi disagreed with Kirkpatrick's view. Regarding U.S. sale of weapons to Pakistan, the article mentions:

... a scheduled debate in the United States Congress next month on ways to augment deliveries of advanced weapons to Pakistan (Kaufman, 1981, p. A2).

A newspaper report (Lewis, 1987) observed that the U.S. government had supported a waiver of a law to ensure Pakistan received military aid because it was cooperating with the U.S. in fighting the Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan. The article stated that the Indian government was extremely upset at the U.S. move. Another report (Mydans, 1985) carried allegations by India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi that the U.S. government did little to rein in Pakistan's nuclear program.

Soviet Union's Support for India

The New York Times portrayed India being in the Soviet sphere of influence. An article (Taubman, 1983) in the newspaper noted India's dependence on the Soviet Union for arms for its military. The report also portrayed the widespread impression outside India that the country was inching closer to the Soviet Union. Another article (Mydans, 1985, p. A1) with the headline

“Gandhi stresses India-Soviet link,” quoted India’s Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi as saying that the Soviet Union was a friend of India for over 30 years and that his visit to the Soviet Union had strengthened peace and amity between the two large nations. A news report (Rangan, 1977, p. 12) noted that a friendship treaty that India signed with the Soviet Union was aimed at getting Soviet support against Pakistan. It also stated that India’s policy of non-alignment in international politics was suspected by western nations as a ploy to ally with the Soviet Union on major international issues. The article noted:

... India’s friendship with Moscow had been promoted to the extent of acquiring a tilt toward Moscow (Rangan, 1977, p. 12).

A *New York Times* report (Schanberg, 1971b) noted that India’s relations with the Soviet Union had become better at the expense of its ties with the United States after the Soviets assured India of help against Pakistan. Another report (Weinraub, 1974a, p. 9) noted that the Indian government had requested the Soviet Union for food aid after facing severe shortage of wheat and rice. The report quoted an unnamed Indian diplomat as saying:

They (USSR) see India as a very significant country and they value India far more than most Western countries now (Weinraub, 1974a, p. 9).

India as a South Asian Adversary to the United States

The New York Times portrayed India as a South Asian adversary to the United States during the Cold War. A news report (Welles, 1972) referred to charges levelled against India by U.S. officials that India wanted to destroy west Pakistan in the 1971 war between the two nations. The newspaper report also published a denial by India’s ambassador to the United States, L.K. Jha, to allegations that the Soviet Union had requested for military bases in India. The issue of purported Soviet requests for bases in India is important, because it shows Cold War politics playing out in South Asia. In a news report (Schanberg, 1969, p. 7), unnamed U.S. officials were quoted as

saying that the Indian government's ties with communist North Vietnam would call into question India's neutral stand as a member of international organizations. The article talked of India's foreign minister Dinesh Singh negotiating with the North Vietnamese government. It quoted press reports as saying:

Mr. Singh also met in Hanoi with Viet Cong officials to discuss the possibility of establishment of an office in New Delhi by the provincial revolutionary government (Schanberg, 1969, p. 7).

Another article (Schanberg, 1971a, p. 5) noted that the Indian government was hardening its stand against the Nixon administration with regard to its South Asia policies. However, the article also noted that India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi may not get the U.S. government to agree to her views. A *New York Times* report (Kaufman, 1980a, p. A9) stated that the Indian government had taken a "conciliatory" (Kaufman, 1980a, p. A9) stand to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Significantly, the newspaper noted that India had treated the Soviet invasion on a par with U.S. supplying weapons to Pakistan. It quoted India's Foreign Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao as saying:

American arms supplies convert the South Asian region into a theatre of great-power confrontation and conflict (Kaufman, 1980a, p. A9).

A *New York Times* article (Butterfield, 1971, p. 1) portrayed United States' deteriorating relations with India. The headline of the article (Butterfield, 1971, p. 1) was "Indian animosity grows." The article noted the arrival of the U.S. ship USS Enterprise in Indian waters during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan. Another article (Weinraub, 1973, p. 165) noted India's opposition to U.S. policies at international venues:

And India's antagonism in the United Nations and at international conferences to American positions on Vietnam, the Middle East and arms control has left a bitter taste in Washington (Weinraub, 1973, p. 165).

India Beset with Religious Insurgencies

The New York Times portrayed India as a country that was fighting insurgencies led by its religious minorities in several states of the country. The newspaper identified such insurgencies with the religion of those who were fighting against the Indian state. In an article (Stevens, 1982, p. A8) with the headline “Sikh campaign for autonomy nearing a showdown in India,” the newspaper used the word “Sikh” (Stevens, 1982, p. A8) both in the headline and the rest of the story to identify the insurgents with the Sikh religion. The introductory paragraph of the story read:

Nearly a month after Sikhs wielding swords and spears attacked India’s Parliament House, the increasingly violent campaign on behalf of greater autonomy for the Sikhs’ home state, Punjab, appears about to reach a showdown with the central government (Stevens, 1982, p. A8).

In another report (Crossette, 1990b, p. 14), insurgencies in the Indian states of Punjab and Kashmir were identified with India’s religious minorities: Sikhs and Muslims. The headline referred to India’s Prime Minister V.P. Singh as an “embattled leader,” (Crossette, 1990b, p. 14) and noted the rising levels of violence in the nation: “India’s embattled leader struggles with rising violence and party rivals” (Crossette, 1990b, p. 14). The report (Crossette, 1990b, p. 14) charged India’s prime minister with having unleashed violence on “non-Hindu populations” (Crossette, 1990b, p. 14) and depriving them of their right to vote for a government in Kashmir and Punjab. By using the term “non-Hindu,” (Crossette, 1990b, p. 14) the article portrayed the impression that the Indian government was biased against its religious minorities.

A *New York Times* report (Taubman, 1984, p. 2) noted Indian allegation of Pakistani support to Sikh insurgency in the Indian state of Punjab. The report also describes the hijacking of an Indian aircraft by “Sikh students” (Taubman, 1984, p. 2). It is significant that the newspaper chose to describe the hijackers by their religion and occupation, but it did not call

them insurgents or terrorists. A news report (Mydans, 1985) referred to an allegation by India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi about U.S. support to Sikh insurgency in India. In another article (Crossette, 1990a) the newspaper alleged, without mentioning its source, that the Indian army was using more force than what was needed to tackle a secessionist movement in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. The report (Crossette, 1990a, p. 3) said that the "secessionist movements" (Crossette, 1990a, p. 3) in the Indian states of Kashmir and Punjab had brought into question the loyalties of even local officials serving in the state. Significant is the fact that *The New York Times* chose to describe armed insurgencies as "secessionist movements," (Crossette, 1990a, p. 3) which were viewed by the Indian government as terrorism.

India's Aggressive Foreign Policy

The New York Times noted India's aggressive foreign policy, both in word and deed, with regard to its neighboring nations and beyond. An article (Weinraub, 1974b, p. 10) quoted India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi condemning Israeli occupation of Arab lands. She dubbed Israel an "aggressor nation" (Weinraub, 1974b, p. 10). Similarly, another news report (Schanberg, 1969) noted that the Indian government was moving closer to the North Vietnam government despite the fear of losing U.S. aid and trade ties to it (Schanberg, 1969). An article ("India and," 1975) noted how India used its military to capture the state of Goa from Portugal in 1961. The article also said that the Portuguese government had renounced its claim over Goa and recognized India's suzerainty over the island.

The New York Times noted India's aggressive policies in Sri Lanka in aiding Tamil separatist rebels in the country. An article (Weisman, 1987, p. A1) with the headline "India airlifts aid to Tamil rebels," noted that the Indian Air Force air-dropped 25 tons of food and medicine to Tamil rebels trapped in Northern Sri Lanka much to the discomfort of the Sri Lanka

government. It also carried the reaction of Sri Lanka's government that described the Indian help to the Tamil rebels as "a naked violation of our independence" (Weisman, 1987, p. A1), thereby portraying India's attempt at undermining the sovereignty of another nation. While describing the helplessness of the Sri Lankan government in countering Indian efforts, the newspaper quoted a Sri Lankan government official, Lalith Athulathmudali, describe India as a "giant military power" (Weisman, 1987, p. A1). Another newspaper article (Weisman, 1985, p. A1) elaborated on Indian role in mediating the civil war in Sri Lanka:

Meanwhile, India has startled many experts by playing a constructive role in mediating the dispute between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil insurgents who are seeking an independent state in the north and east (Weisman, 1985, p. A1).

Common Themes in *The Washington Post* During the Cold War

U.S. Opposition to India's Nuclear Program

The Washington Post portrayed the U.S. government's opposition to India's nuclear program. It also noted India's refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In an article (O'Toole, 1978) India's Prime Minister M. Desai was quoted as saying that India would not sign the non-proliferation treaty because it considered it as a discriminatory pact that would allow only superpowers to possess nuclear weapons. The article also quoted him as saying that India would sign the treaty only after superpower countries took steps to stop making nuclear weapons and also reducing their existing stockpile. The article quoted presidential press secretary Jody Powell as saying that U.S. reluctance to supply uranium to India had hampered relations between the two nations (O'Toole, 1978).

A newspaper report (Unna, 1968) referred to India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's suspicion that the U.S. was offering aid to India to make India sign the non-proliferation treaty and abide by U.S. requests about its nuclear program. Another *Washington Post* article

(Benjamin, 1982, p. A1) noted India's plans about using spent fuel from its nuclear reactor.

Significantly, the article used the word "threatened" to describe India's plan:

India has threatened several times to put spent fuel from Tarapur (nuclear reactor) through an unsafeguarded reprocessing plant that it has built down the road (Benjamin, 1982, p. A1).

The article also quoted an unnamed Indian scientist as saying that with the spent fuel India could manufacture many nuclear weapons. Another article (Oberdorfer, 1977) noted anti-India measures that the U.S. government adopted after India conducted a nuclear test in 1974. The U.S. government had not given any substantial aid to India after 1971, the article said. A *Washington Post* article (O'Toole, 1980, p. A10) used the word "conflict" in its headline to describe India's relations with the U.S. about its nuclear program: "U.S.-India A-treaty conflict comes to head today" (O'Toole, 1980, p. A10). It noted:

A conflict that could strain relations for months between the United States and India comes to a head today when the key provision of a law Congress passed in 1978 goes into effect (O'Toole, 1980, p. A10).

The article (O'Toole, 1980) quoted an unnamed U.S. State Department official as saying that the U.S. government did not get assurances from India that it would not use spent fuel from its nuclear reactor in manufacturing nuclear weapons. While noting India's atomic test in 1974, *The Washington Post* (Simons, 1974, p. A1) quoted an unnamed U.S. State Department official as saying that the Indian government's promise to not manufacture nuclear weapons was only a "goobledygook" (Simons, 1974, p. A1) thereby portraying their disbelief of India's promise.

Frayed Defense Ties Between India and the U.S.

The Washington Post in its articles during the Cold War years depicted the frayed defense ties between India and the United States. An article (Simons, 1973, p. A17) quoted an unnamed Indian government official as saying that India cannot rely on the U.S. as a defense partner for supplying military aid to the country. The article substantiated the Indian official's allegation by

observing that the U.S. had often stopped supply of military hardware to India. Regarding the United States not having defense ties with India, the article quoted an unnamed Indian defense source as saying:

... it would be nice to have Phantoms and Mirages and not to be tied to MIGs alone. But it would be pointless (Simons, 1973, p. A17).

Another newspaper report (Simons, 1972, p. A16) observed that the U.S. government had suspended arms sales to India after the nation went to war against Pakistan in 1971. The arms embargo also included non-lethal military equipment, the article noted. It stated that the Indian government was talking to the U.S. administration to resume a surveillance project along India's borders with China. It quoted an unnamed Indian governmental source denying that the Indian government was threatening the U.S. with terminating the surveillance project if the U.S. administration did not resume arms sale to India. The source said:

We are not in a position to twist the arm of Mr. Nixon on this matter. By terminating the contract we would be cutting off our nose to spite our face (Simons, 1972, p. A16).

A newspaper report (Harrison, 1971) noted that the U.S. government suspended sale of arms to India during the 1965 war between India and Pakistan. It also noted the Indian government's position during the 1971 conflict between India and Pakistan, that the U.S. should also cut off military aid to Pakistan until Pakistan brought about a political settlement to the uprising in East Pakistan. *The Washington Post* in a report (Oberdorfer, 1985, p. A16) quoted India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi as saying that during his talks with U.S. President Ronald Reagan he did not discuss India buying arms from the United States. India could only hope to build up defense ties with the U.S. administration slowly and over the years, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was quoted in the article. The article (Oberdorfer, 1985, p. A16) stated that Prime Minister Gandhi refused to give his assent to the Strategic Defense Initiative, commonly known

as Star Wars, on the ground that it was not suitable for the international community. He termed the initiative “very dangerous,” the article noted. The use of the term “very dangerous,” (Oberdorfer, 1985, p. A16) by India’s Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi portrays the distrust the Indian government had about U.S. defense plans.

Rift in Economic Ties Between India and the U.S.

The Washington Post portrayed a rift in economic ties between India and the United States. A newspaper report (“India and,” 1973) noted that India was getting economic aid from western nations, including the United States, only on loans that it had to repay in hard currency that was not readily available in India. An important aspect that came out of the articles was the Indian allegation that the United States was using its economic power to leverage political support from India. In an article (Unna, 1968, p. A9) the Indian state was termed “ungrateful,” that accepted U.S. economic aid and yet tilted toward the Soviet Union in military affairs. The article further stated:

... it (U.S.) is using U.S. foreign aid to influence Indian politics, gain economic concession for U.S.

businessmen, and hold out as a reward for signing a nuclear nonproliferation treaty that fails to meet India’s security problems (Unna, 1968, p. A9).

Another article (“India won’t,” 1972, p. A33) noted that the U.S. government suspended 85 million dollars of economic aid to India when it went to war against Pakistan in 1971. It quoted India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi as saying that she would not ask the U.S. government for any economic help to India; however, it was up to the U.S. government to begin discussions about offering economic aid to India. Regarding India’s stand about economic aid, she said:

We are interested in help from any country if that help is without strings and if it is going to assist us in economic development. We are not interested in any help which is going to assist us in economics, but try to influence our judgments or our affairs ("India won't," 1972, p. A33).

The Washington Post also laid bare how troubles in economic ties between India and the U.S. were influenced by India's foreign policies. An article noted how the U.S. cut off all economic ties with India during its war with Pakistan in 1965 (Harrison, 1971). Another article (Kraft, 1977) stated that India was not getting any aid from the United States, because it had turned toward to Soviet Union for help. Despite Soviet help, the article noted, India was still in need for aid in the field of agriculture (Kraft, 1977). A news report (Malhotra, 1969, p. 168) used the headline "India's trend toward Hanoi disturbs U.S.," to describe India's growing friendship with North Vietnam and the resulting U.S. discomfiture. The use of the term "disturbs" (Malhotra, 1969, p. 168) is telling of U.S. anger at India's relations with North Vietnam. The report further stated that India's friendship with North Vietnam had caused the U.S. government to let India know that it would suspend economic aid to India. The article noted how the U.S. had in 1966 made its economic aid to India contingent on the fact that India cut off its trade links with Cuba and North Vietnam.

India's Protests Against U.S. Support to Pakistan

The Washington Post brought to the fore India's protests against U.S. support to Pakistan during the Cold War. An article (United Press International, 1972) noted that the Indian government and the Indian public were strongly against the United States primarily for its policies that supported Pakistan. The article also noted that India's relations with the United States took a turn for the worse after civil war broke out in Pakistan in 1971. A news report ("Gromyko in," 1971, p. A1) quoted India's Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul as saying that the

Indian government had informed the United States about its concerns regarding sale of U.S. arms to Pakistan. The article stated:

... Indian-American relations are very strained because of continued U.S. arms shipments to Pakistan and what is officially described here (New Delhi) as “the prestige being used at the highest levels of the State Department and White House to shore up and back up the Pakistan regime” (“Gromyko in,” 1971, p. A1).

Another news report (Simons, 1973, p. A17) quoted an unnamed defense analyst from India saying that in view of U.S. supplying 14 million dollars worth of arms to Pakistan, India cannot rely on the United states government. Significantly, while describing Pakistan as “India’s enemy,” (Simons, 1973, p. A17) the article also stated that the U.S. government cannot be a “reliable friend” (Simons, 1973, p. A17) of India after U.S. arms supply to Pakistan. The article noted:

This judgment is based on previous years of U.S. arms supply to Pakistan, long India’s enemy on the subcontinent, as well as periodic shutoffs in the flow of military equipment to India (Simons, 1973, p. A17).

Another *Washington Post* article (Nossiter, 1968) talked of India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi inform the Soviet Union that the U.S. could do nothing to stop Pakistan from using U.S.-supplied arms against India in the 1965 war. A news report (Auerbach, 1982) stated that the Indian government had conveyed to diplomats of Western nations that U.S. military aid to Pakistan was forcing India to seek help from Soviet Union.

India’s Portrayal as a Soviet Ally

The Washington Post depicted India’s close ties with the Soviet Union during the Cold War. An article (Southerland, 1984) brought to the fore the quid-pro-quo approach of the two nations. The report asserted that while the Soviet Union supported India’s stand against Pakistan regarding the Kashmir dispute, successive Indian governments did not condemn Soviet invasion

of Hungary, Afghanistan, among other nations. Another report (“India and,” 1973, p. A26) highlighted India’s importance for the Soviet Union. It asserted that the Soviet Union wanted to treat India as a showcase for its own set of ideas and policies. The article outlined Soviet strategy in South Asia:

The chief Soviet interest in India is no doubt to outflank China and to enhance the Soviet position in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf (“India and,” 1973, p. A26).

A newspaper article cited India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi reminding members of India’s parliament that the Soviet Union was the biggest supplier of weapons and economic aid to India as an example of India’s friendship with the Soviet Union (Nossiter, 1968). An article (Auerbach, 1982, p. A15) with the headline “Military leaders from Moscow visiting India,” noted that Soviet officials were about to offer latest weapons, including tanks and attack aircraft, to India. The article (Auerbach, 1982, p. A15) stated that a 1980 arms deal of 1.6 billion dollars between the two nations was the biggest defense deal signed between the two nations until then. Significantly, the real monetary value of the arms deal was several times more because the Soviet Union had offered concessional rates to India, the article noted. Another news article (“Soviets, India,” 1977, p. B10) cited a joint statement by Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who was visiting India, and India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi about good ties between the two nations:

A joint communique said both sides were satisfied at the development of their “time-tested relations” and were determined to strengthen cooperation in the spirit of the 1971 Indian-Soviet treaty of peace and friendship (“Soviets, India,” 1977, p. B10).

India’s Aggressive Foreign Policy

The Washington Post portrayed India as a major South Asian nation asserting itself on the international stage with an aggressive foreign policy. An article (Simons, 1973) asserted that

India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and most educated people of the country saw India as a major world power. The article further stated that Indians viewed their country as a strong nation even among non-aligned countries. A letter to the editor ((Sri Lanka, 1987) published in the newspaper argues that India was not bullying Sri Lanka in the 1980s, but acting against Tamil rebels who had established bases in southern parts of India as well as Sri Lanka. An article (Leslie, 1975) noted that India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi resented India's comparison with Pakistan in any way, because it was demeaning to the Indian state. While portraying India as a major south Asian power, another article ("Sikkim king," 1974, p. A23) noted the protests of the king of Sikkim, C.P.T. Namgyal, to India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of attempts to force Sikkim to merge with the Indian state. The article quoted the king as saying:

In messages to Mrs Gandhi, he claimed his 200,000 subjects were "bewildered and greatly upset" by her moves to absorb the mountain protectorate into the Indian political system ("Sikkim king," 1974, p. A23).

The article further noted that India had turned the king from an "absolute monarch to a figurehead" ("Sikkim king," 1974, p. A23). Another report ("India to," 1990) noted that the presence of thousands of Indian troops in Sri Lanka was a sore point in relations between the two nations. The article noted that the Indian army's withdrawal from Sri Lanka was taking place at a slow pace decided upon by the Indian government. The article put the number of Indian troops in Sri Lanka at 100,000. Attesting to India's position on the international stage, a *Washington Post* article (Lewis, 1972, p. A22) read:

... whether Washington agrees or not, India has established itself as an undisputed major power in South Asia and may well become quite as influential as China and Japan in the overall Asian future (Lewis, 1972, p. A22).

CHAPTER SIX

QUALITATIVE FINDINGS FROM POST-COLD WAR PERIOD

Common Themes in *The New York Times* After the Cold War

U.S. Efforts at Agreement with India on the Nuclear Issue

The New York Times brought to the fore efforts by the U.S. government at arriving at an agreement with India on the nuclear issue. A newspaper report stated that the U.S. government wanted India to overcome domestic political opposition and reach an agreement with the U.S. about its nuclear program before President George W. Bush left office (Sengupta, 2008). An article (Shanker, 2006, p. 10) with the headline “nuclear deal with India wins backing of U.S. senate,” detailed how the U.S. Senate gave its approval to a nuclear deal between the U.S. and the Indian governments. It quoted Senator Richard G. Lugar, the chairman of Foreign Relations Committee in the U.S. Senate, praising the deal as:

... one more important step toward a vibrant and exciting relationship between our two great democracies (Shanker, 2006, p. 10).

The article also quoted a statement from U.S. President George W. Bush praising the agreement between the two nations. Noteworthy is the fact that the U.S. president described India’s nuclear program as “civilian” (Shanker, 2006, p. 10) and not military:

The United States and India enjoy a strategic partnership based upon common values. The U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation agreement will bring India into the international nuclear nonproliferation mainstream and will increase the transparency of India’s entire civilian nuclear program (Shanker, 2006, p. 10).

Another article (Brinkley, 2005) noted the anger among Republican members of the Congress at the efforts of the U.S. government to help build nuclear reactors without consulting the U.S. Congress on the use of the reactors. The article stated that some members of the U.S. Congress, despite their misgivings about India’s nuclear program, would support the U.S.

government's nuclear deal with India, which was viewed as part of strategic relations between the two countries (Brinkley, 2005). It quoted R. Nicholas Burns, the U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs, as saying that the U.S. was in the process of getting India to abide by nonproliferation norms and have its civilian nuclear facilities inspected (Brinkley, 2005).

A *New York Times* article (Weisman, 2005) quoted an unnamed U.S. government official as saying that the United States had received approval from many European countries as well as the U.S. Congress to arrive at an agreement with India that would allow India to retain its nuclear weapons and receive U.S. assistance to build its civilian nuclear program (Weisman, 2005). In a news report (Stolberg, 2006, p. 10), *The New York Times* noted that U.S. President George W. Bush signed a legislation that would allow the U.S. government to sell nuclear technology and fuel to India. The article stated that the signing of the legislation, in fact, reversed a ban on U.S. nuclear assistance to India that had been in place for many decades. It quoted President George W. Bush as saying:

This is an important achievement for the whole world. After 30 years outside the system, India will now operate its civilian nuclear program under internationally accepted guidelines, and the whole world is going to be safer as a result (Stolberg, 2006, p. 10).

Increased Defense Cooperation Between the U.S. and India

The New York Times stories about India portrayed greater defense cooperation with the United States. A news story (Burns, 1995, p. 12) with the headline "U.S.-India pact on military cooperation," noted that the two countries overcame frosty relations that existed during the Cold War to sign a military treaty that would eventually bring stability to South Asia. The news report observed that ties between the two nations were not friendly until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The article (Burns, 1995, p. 12) described the Soviet Union as a "close ally" of India during the Cold War era. The article quoted William J. Perry, the United States Secretary

of Defense, as saying that the signing of the treaty would usher in a “new era in security relations” (Burns, 1995, p. 12) between the two countries. The news report also quoted India’s Home Minister S.B. Chavan as saying that both countries wanted to move ahead together after forgetting the animosity of the past.

Another article (Dugger, 2001a, p. 9) with the headline “U.S. nurtures growing bond with India on defense,” highlighted increased defense cooperation between the two nations.

Unlike most of the world, India has reacted positively, if somewhat ambiguously, to President Bush’s proposal for missile defense, and in response the Bush administration is continuing the warming trend in American-Indian relations that began under Bill Clinton (Dugger, 2001a, p. 9).

A news report (Shanker & Brinkley, 2005) quoted U.S. President George W. Bush as saying that the U.S. government was discussing with India a proposal that would enable India buy attack aircraft from them. The article also noted how U.S. arms manufacturing companies were competing to sell arms to India. A newspaper article (Bagri, 2013) cited United States’ difficult relations with Pakistan and the need to contain China as primary reasons for greater defense cooperation with India. The article quoted U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden as saying that defense cooperation was a key area in relations with India. Another newspaper article (Gordon & Harris, 2014, p. 8) stated of India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi:

Mr. Modi is also hoping for a sharp increase in American investment in India’s defense manufacturing sector (Gordon & Harris, 2014, p. 8).

Increased Trade Between India and the U.S.

The New York Times highlighted better trade ties between India and the United States. A news story (Sengupta, 2006) had U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard A. Boucher refer to a delegation of about 400 U.S. businessmen who would visit India in November 2006 as a measure of U.S. economic interests in India. The article quoted U.S. embassy officials in New

Delhi as saying that trade between the two nations stood at 26 billion dollars in 2006. A newspaper article (Rai, 2006, p. 5) noted how American exports to India had doubled in the previous four years. The article noted the importance of trade ties between the two nations:

India with a population of 1.1 billion has been a major draw for foreign investors, especially American.

Companies in the United States have led the trend in outsourcing jobs, much of it to India, accounting for more than a million positions in the country (Rai, 2006, p. 5).

A news report (Bagri, 2013, p. 11) quoted U.S. Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. as saying that both countries could together achieve a lot in terms of economic stability of South Asia. The report (Bagri, 2013) also quoted him as saying that bilateral trade between India and the U.S. had increased five times between 2000 and 2013 and was nearly 100 billion dollars.

Vice President Joseph Biden was quoted as saying:

India is no longer an economic island and will continue to rise as an economic power (Bagri, 2013, p. 11).

In an editorial (“India and,” 2001), the newspaper noted that U.S. investment in and economic ties with India had increased due to economic reforms instituted by the Indian government, thereby making the situation more conducive for the U.S. to do business with India. Another article (Gordon & Harris, 2014) asserted that the U.S. government under President Barack Obama was seeking to enhance economic ties with India. It quoted U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry as saying:

Our private sector is very eager to be a catalyst for India’s development. American companies lead in key sectors that India wants to grow in: in high-end manufacturing, in infrastructure, in health care, and in information technology (Gordon & Harris, 2014, p. 8).

India Fighting Pakistan-Backed Insurgency in Kashmir

The New York Times portrayed India fighting a Pakistan-backed insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir. In an article (Waldman, 2002), the newspaper asserted that Pakistan’s support to the Kashmir insurgency had led to India massing troops along its borders with

Pakistan. In another article (Bearak & Dugger, 2001, p. 11), the newspaper asserted that Pakistan had since 1989 instigated the insurgency against the Indian state in Kashmir. The newspaper noted:

And while it is an open secret that the Pakistanis supply these militants with money and training and guns, this is something never to be spoken of in public (Bearak & Dugger, 2001, p. 11).

A *New York Times* news report (Malhotra, 2014), held the Pakistan Army responsible for the Kargil conflict in 1999, asserting that the Pakistani soldiers had entered Indian-administered Kashmir that had triggered a military clash between India and Pakistan. The article also mentioned unattributed accusations of Pakistani support to Kashmiri separatist leaders who have opposed Indian rule in Kashmir. A news report (Eckholm, 2002) blamed insurgents of having carried out two suicide bombings in India in their quest to end India's rule in Kashmir. The article noted that Western diplomats agreed to India's charges that Pakistan was supporting such insurgent groups in their fight against Indian forces in Kashmir.

A *New York Times* article (Dugger, 1999) quoted unnamed U.S. diplomats in India agreeing that Pakistan had backed incursion of Kashmiri insurgents into Indian-administered Kashmir, which triggered the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999. Another article (Bonner, 2002, p. 10) quoted unnamed Indian officials as saying that three insurgency groups operating in Indian-administered Kashmir had transmission towers in Pakistan-administered Kashmir from where their commanders would communicate with them. The article asserted:

In the past several years, hundreds of Pakistanis and other other foreigners, who have trained at Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and at camps in Pakistan under the supervision of the Pakistani intelligence agency, have crossed into Indian-controlled Kashmir to carry out attacks (Bonner, 2002, p. 10).

U.S. Efforts at Establishing Peace Between India and Pakistan

The New York Times portrayed U.S. efforts at establishing peace between India and Pakistan. An article (Purdum, 2002) noted that U.S. President George W. Bush spoke on phone with India's Prime Minister Atal B. Vajpayee and Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf and urged both leaders to peacefully resolve the Kashmir dispute. Another article (Rhode, 2002, p. 5) stated:

The State Department spokesperson, Richard A. Boucher, said Secretary of State Colin L. Powell had telephoned Gen. Musharraf and India's foreign minister, Yashwant Sinha, to praise the troop withdrawals. American and European diplomats have been shuttling in and out of the region for months pushing for a reduction of tensions (Rhode, 2002, p. 5).

An article (Malhotra, 2014) narrated how during the Kargil crisis between India and Pakistan, the Pakistan Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, was summoned to the U.S. by President Bill Clinton and asked to withdraw Pakistani forces from Indian territory in Kargil, which he did. Significantly, the newspaper article used the term "humiliated" (Malhotra, 2014, p.1) while referring to Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. A *New York Times* article (Bonner, 2002, p. 10) noted:

American officials at the highest level, including President Bush and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell, have since put intense pressure on Gen. Musharraf to stop the infiltrations (Bonner, 2002, p. 10).

A news report (Dugger, 2002a) laid out how sustained diplomatic pressure from the United States government had made Pakistan accept the fact that those battling the Indian army in Kargil region of Indian-administered Kashmir were not Kashmiri militants from India, but foreign fighters. *The New York Times* (Burns, 1998) noted that the United States government had used diplomatic efforts to ensure that India and Pakistan did not deploy nuclear weapons, opened

negotiations with each other and minimize the risk of war. *The New York Times*, in an article (Burns, 2001, p. 1), noted:

Mr. Bush implied that the United States, after a week of intense diplomacy aimed at heading off a war between the two nuclear armed neighbors, hoped that the arrests would be enough to cause India to pull back from the brink of conflict (Burns, 2001, p. 1).

India a Victim of Terrorism

The New York Times depicted India as a victim of terrorism. A news report (Malhotra, 2014) alleged that the Pakistan-based outfit Lashkar-e-Taiba was responsible for carrying out the 2008 Mumbai attacks in India that left 163 people dead. The article noted that the attack slowed down peace talks between India and Pakistan. Another news report (Eckholm, 2002) observed that the militant movement in Kashmir had the capacity to adversely impact the international campaign against terror and trigger a major crisis in India, too. A newspaper report (Dugger, 2002b, p. 10) stated:

The police in eastern India said today that they had shot a Pakistani man in a gun battle early this morning and that he had confessed before he died that he had fired an AK-47 at officers guarding an American cultural center in Calcutta on Tuesday. The attack there killed four officers (Dugger, 2002b, p. 10).

Another report (Dugger, 2000) noted a meeting between U.S. President Bill Clinton and Rachna Katyal, an Indian citizen, whose husband was killed by the hijackers of an Indian aircraft in 1999. The article described the killing as an “act of cruelty” (Dugger, 2000, p. 6). Citing an Afghan link to militant attacks in India, a newspaper report (Gordon & Harris, 2014) cited unnamed Indian secret service sources as saying that the exit of the U.S. army from Afghanistan had set in motion militants moving from Afghanistan into attacking India.

Another report (Agence France-Presse, 2004) highlighted a bomb attack in India’s eastern city of Guwahati that killed seven persons. The report attributed the attack to the United

Liberation Front of Assam, which is a banned outfit in India. Another *New York Times* article (Kumar & Yardley, 2010) reported a bomb attack in the Indian city of Varanasi, which the report stated was holy for the Hindus. The report quoted India's Home Secretary G.K. Pillai as saying that the banned terror outfit Indian Mujahideen was responsible for the attack. The article also noted that serial blasts had taken place in the city in 2006.

India as a U.S. Ally

The New York Times portrayed India as a U.S. ally during the post-Cold War years. An article (Bagri, 2013) quoted U.S. Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. as saying that the U.S. government would support India's efforts at getting a permanent seat in the U.N. Security Council as well as emerging as a South Asian power. He said:

Imagine what our two countries can achieve together, not only for one another but for the economic and political stability of the region (Bagri, 2013, p. 11).

Another news report (Gordon & Harris, 2014) stated that sharing intelligence with the U.S. against terrorist organizations was a major goal of India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi. *The New York Times* (Dugger, 2001b) quoted U.S. secretary of State Colin Powell as saying that the U.S. government would act against terrorist groups that were responsible for carrying out attacks in India. In the aftermath of the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008, a newspaper article (Sengupta & Bradsher, 2008) quoted U.S. President George W. Bush as saying that the U.S. government would help India recover from the attack as well as help India investigate the attacks. He was quoted as saying:

The killers who struck were brutal and violent, but terror will not have the final word. People of India are resilient. People of India are strong. They have built a vibrant, multi-ethnic democracy that can withstand this trial (Sengupta & Bradsher, 2008, p. 1).

The New York Times (Dugger, 2001a) reported that the U.S. government had consulted the Indian government about U.S. nuclear policies. The article stated that the Indian government was happy to have been consulted on nuclear matters, which was in contrast to decades of opposition to India's nuclear program. Another article (Kapur, 2009) noted that the U.S. government had two shared interests with India: fighting Islamic terrorism and taking part in international trade.

Common Themes in *The Washington Post* After the Cold War

U.S. Support to India's Nuclear Program

The Washington Post in its articles portrayed U.S. government's support for India's nuclear program. An article (Weymouth, 2009) quoted India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as saying that India and the U.S. had signed a significant nuclear deal and that India had never indulged in nuclear proliferation. Another article (Lakshmi & Wax, 2008, p. A12) described the nuclear agreement signed between the U.S. and India.

Under the historic deal, India would open 14 of its civilian atomic reactors to international inspection. In return, it would be able to develop its civilian nuclear program without having to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty (Laxmi & Wax, 2008, p. A12).

The article (Lakshmi & Wax, 2008) quoted Sharon Squassoni, an official at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, as saying that India had reaped rich benefits from the nuclear deal with the U.S., though India did not have to shoulder any additional responsibility for nuclear disarmament in South Asia. A news report (Eilperin, 1998) in *The Washington Post* stated that former House member Stephen J. Solarz had urged the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to not punish India for conducting nuclear tests, but welcome India as a major nuclear power in the world.

Another article (Kessler, 2008) noted that the U.S. government had won support from other nations on its nuclear deal with India by arguing that the nuclear deal will help bring down

global warming by giving India access to more nuclear technology. The article quoted U.S. State Department spokesperson Robert Wood as saying:

A lot of people have raised questions, and many people think (the civil nuclear deal) does not fit into the non-proliferation framework. That is not our view (Kessler, 2008, pp. A07).

An article (Kessler, 2007) in *The Washington Post* stated that U.S. President George W. Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice had supported a nuclear deal with India on the ground that nuclear cooperation with the country will greatly improve U.S. relations with India.

Strong Economic Ties Between India and the U.S.

The Washington Post portrayed strong economic ties between India and the United States after the Cold War. An article (Zezima, 2015a) noted how U.S. President Barack Obama, on a visit to India, announced several economic measures to boost trade ties with India. It quoted Obama as saying:

We do about \$100 billion a year in trade with India, which is a great improvement since I took office. But we do about \$650 billion a year with China. That gives you some sense of the potential both for the kind of growth that India might unleash, and the potential for greater trade between our two countries ((Zezima, 2015a, p. 1).

Another *Washington Post* (Weymouth, 2009) news story quoted India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as saying that India and the United States had strategic ties in every field. He said that India and the U.S. were working together in the fields of agriculture, science and technology, and healthcare. A news story (Wilson & Wax, 2010) in the *Washington Post* quoted U.S. President Barack Obama, who was on a visit to India, as saying that India was one of the nations with whom the U.S. would double its trade in a time span of five years. The news story also stated that the Indian government had given its approval to a U.S. move to promote

economic growth between the two nations. *The Washington Post* in an article (Zezima, 2015b, A10) noted:

The United States will set in place a series of plan to generate more than \$4 billion in investment between the two countries, including supporting U.S. exports to India and renewable energy investments, Obama announced during the U.S.-India Business Council Summit here (Zezima, 2015b, A10).

Another article (De Young & Londono, 2013) had U.S. Secretary of State John F. Kerry laud growing economic ties between India and the United States. He said that India and the U.S. had managed to overcome hurdles that affected trade ties in the past. A newspaper report (Lakshmi, 2009) noted how a joint venture between India and a U.S. based company, BP Solar, was providing villagers in India small loans of up to \$300. *The Washington Post* noted (Moore, 1995) the signing of \$7 billion worth of trade contracts between India and the United States. It quoted U.S. Commerce Secretary Ronald H. Brown as saying that the U.S. trade team in India had gone beyond what they hoped to achieve in terms of bilateral trade ties with India. He said:

It's the greatest success in dollar value in any mission we have taken anywhere in the world (Moore, 1995, pp. A24).

India Fighting Pakistan-Backed Insurgency in Kashmir

The Washington Post portrayed India fighting a Pakistan-backed insurgency in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. An article (Lancaster, 2004) asserted that Pakistan had backed an Islamic militant movement against India in Jammu and Kashmir since 1989. A news report (Goshko & Oberdorfer, 1993) asserted that the U.S. government had warned Pakistan that it would blacklist the country as a state sponsor of terrorism in view of Pakistani activities in Indian-administered Kashmir.

Another news story (Cooper, 1997a, p. A15) asserted:

The two-thirds of Kashmir controlled by India, it's only predominantly Muslim state, has been heavily militarized to combat a separatist insurgency to which Pakistan has lent moral and diplomatic support, and apparently material aid as well (Cooper, 1997a, p. A15).

The Washington Post noted in an article (Cooper, 1997b, A35):

Despite official denials, there is evidence that Pakistan has armed, trained and financed Islamic militants who have waged a separatist insurgency in Kashmir for seven years (Cooper, 1997b, A35).

A newspaper report (Loeb, 2001) quoted U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as saying that the U.S. would help India in fighting Pakistan-supported militants in Kashmir. Another report (Constable, 2000) noted that though Pakistan had officially condemned the hijacking of an Indian aircraft in 1999, it would not antagonize militant groups in Indian-administered Kashmir that were supported by the Pakistan army.

An article (Cooper, 1998) cited the Associated Press quoting an Indian defense ministry official as saying that Pakistan army had begun firing along the India-Pakistan border in Kashmir to help militants infiltrate into the India side.

U.S. Mediation Between India and Pakistan

The Washington Post portrayed U.S. efforts to bring about peace between India and Pakistan. An article (Vick, 2002, p. A22) quoted U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage as saying that the Indian government would soon announce military measures aimed at helping resolve a stand-off with Pakistan. He was also quoted in the article as saying that he had conveyed a peace proposal from Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf to the Indian government. Armitage said:

President Musharraf was quite categorical about the fact that the activities across the Line of Control (which divides Kashmir) would be stopped permanently. And he's quite keen ... on entering into a dialogue on the whole question of Kashmir (Vick, 2002, p. A22).

Another article (Goshko & Oberdorfer, p. A22) with the headline “U.S. moves quickly to calm Pakistan and India after Bombay bombings” brought to the fore U.S. moves at calming India after a bomb blast killed hundreds in the Indian city of Bombay. The article noted that U.S. diplomats feared that the Indian government may act militarily against Pakistan in order to punish them for the bombing. The article quoted unnamed officials as saying:

In the ensuing weeks, the situation has calmed considerably, partly as the result of U.S. efforts and it no longer is considered an imminent danger to the peace of the Indian subcontinent (Goshko & Oberdorfer, p. A22).

A news story (Lakshmi, 2008) noted how U.S. intervention in 2001 between India and Pakistan helped end an armed stand-off between the two nations after both nations had massed troops along their border, triggering fears of a nuclear breaking out in South Asia. A news story (Ignatius, 2011) observed how the U.S. government had encouraged talks between India and Pakistan to resolve their disputes on various issues. The article stated that the U.S. government had friendly ties with both nations and was in a position to mediate between the two countries. *The Washington Post* in an article (Rondeaux, 2008) quoted U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as saying that the U.S. government had urged Pakistan to transparently help probe the terror attacks in the Indian city of Mumbai in November of 2008. The article further noted that U.S. diplomats were encouraging India to not attack terror camps in Pakistan in retaliation to the Mumbai attacks. A news story (Vick & Lancaster, 2002) quoted U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as saying that the U.S. government would continue mediating between India and Pakistan. He said that talks were the only way ahead to restore peace in the region.

India a Victim of Terrorism

The Washington Post portrayed India as a victim of terrorism. A newspaper article (Lakshmi, 2008) noted that 174 people were killed in terror attacks in the Indian city of Mumbai

in November of 2008. The article stated that the attacks were linked to Pakistan and that there was outrage in India against the attacks. The article noted that several bomb attacks in India had claimed 260 lives and injured hundreds of people since May of 2008. Another article (Weymouth, 2009) quoted India's Prime Minister Manmohan Singh as saying that India was facing terrorism backed by Pakistan. Singh also said:

Now if Taliban and Al Qaeda type of terror, which in the past was located in the FATA area (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) of Pakistan, gets transferred to the mainland of Pakistan, I think it has very serious consequences for Pakistan. I think it has very serious consequences for our own security (Weymouth, 2009, p. B01).

A news story (Wilson, 2010) quoted U.S. President Barack Obama as saying that he would urge Pakistani political leadership to help bring perpetrators of 2008 terror attacks in the Indian city of Mumbai to justice. Obama also criticized Pakistan for not doing enough to stop terror attacks in India. A news report (Constable, 2000) carried Indian allegations of Pakistan government's complicity in the hijacking of an Indian aircraft in 1999. The article quoted Indian officials as saying:

Indian authorities said Sunday that they had "clear evidence" that Pakistan was involved in the hijacking and that the hijackers who were allowed to go free after releasing the hostages, had escaped into Pakistan (Constable, 2000, p. A09).

A news article (Naqvi, 2007) reported an explosion on a train traveling from India to Pakistan that killed 65 people. It also carried Indian allegations that the attack was aimed at stopping peace dialogues between India and Pakistan. Another news story (Rondeaux, 2008) reported that the terror attacks in the Indian city of Mumbai in November of 2008 had six U.S. citizens among the casualties, thereby increasing U.S. interests in the outcome of Indian investigation into the attacks. The story quoted an unnamed U.S. anti-terrorist official as saying that the U.S. government had intelligence that the Mumbai attacks were planned from Pakistani

territory. The story further noted that Inter-Services Intelligence, the Pakistani spy service, was responsible for arming terror groups in the 1990s operating in India.

India a U.S. Ally

The Washington Post depicted India as a U.S. ally. While reporting on U.S. President Barack Obama's India visit, a news story (Zezima, 2015a) quoted India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi as saying:

Our two nations are ready to step forward firmly to accept the responsibility of this global partnership for our two countries and toward shaping the character of this century (Zezima, 2015a, p.1).

Another report (Lakshmi, 2014) laid out how the U.S. government was eager to work with India's newly elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It quoted U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry as saying that it was about time for India and the United States governments to make good on the opportunities provided by friendly ties between the two nations. A news report (Lakshmi, 2008) stated a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was in India to assist the Indian government in probing the Mumbai terror attacks that took place in November of 2008. It further noted that U.S. President George W. Bush had promised assistance to India in their fight against terrorism. A news report (Zezima, 2015c) laid out that U.S. President Barack Obama was a special guest at India's annual Republic Day parade in a bid for the two nations to strengthen their existing bonds.

Another news story (Wilson & Wax, 2010 p. A01) with the headline "Obama endorses India for U.N. council seat," quoted U.S. President Barack Obama as saying:

The United States not only welcomes India as a rising global power, we fervently support it and we have worked to help make it a reality (Wilson & Wax, 2010, p. A01).

The Washington Post in a news story (Loeb, 2001, p. A14) had the headline: "U.S. pursues closer ties to India; Rumsfeld stresses similarities in coalition-building visit." The story quoted

U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld as saying that the U.S. government would help India fight Pakistan-backed militants in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Rumsfeld said that both the countries shared common values, including democracy and a common language with each other. He described India as a valued nation in a technology-driven world.

Another news report (Wan & Lakshmi, 2011, p. A12) observed:

The U.S.-India relationship has warmed over the past decade, with India transforming from a target of U.S. sanctions after its nuclear test in 1998 to one of America's closest regional allies (Wan & Lakshmi, 2011, p. A12).

CHAPTER SEVEN

DISCUSSION

This research was undertaken to answer an overarching question: Did the U.S. media portray India in accordance with U.S. government policies during and after the Cold War? Indexing theory (Bennett, 1990) was the basis for researching the overarching question to ascertain how the U.S. media reported on India. This theory rests on the premise that news reporting of an issue involving debate in the upper levels of the government is influenced by different kinds of views prevailing among government officials involved in decision making (Bennett, 1990). The theory surmises that news stories will include a range of opinions existing among top government officials on a particular subject. It also surmises that on issues regarding foreign policy matters of the home country, the range of opinions is narrow in scope (Bennett, 1990). Therefore, this theory relates international reportage to the policies of the home country's government.

Another issue that needs to be elucidated upon is the choice of India as a subject of the present research. India was chosen for this research because relations between India and the U.S. during and after the Cold War were a study in contrast. Published literature laid out that India's relations with the United States were inimical during the Cold War. For instance, the U.S. government supported Pakistan during the 1971 war between India and Pakistan that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh (Ganguly, 1994). Meanwhile, India tilted toward the U.S.S.R. by signing a friendship treaty with it in 1971 (Ganguly, 1994). The Cold War-era animosity between India and the U.S. were further worsened by the Kashmir insurgency and Indian accusations of Pakistani support to the insurgency.

However, with the end of the Cold War a realignment of political forces took place on the international stage. The United States started banking on India to counter China's influence in Asia (Kissel, 2011). India and the U.S. cooperated on many fronts, including sharing nuclear technology and countering terrorism after the Cold War. For instance, India and the U.S. signed a nuclear deal in 2005 that paved the way for international recognition for India's nuclear program and helped India buy nuclear technology from other nations ("Timeline," 2015).

At the beginning of the quantitative study, the author perused published literature to search for issues that would be included in the coding sheet and serve as parameters to study India's portrayal in U.S. media during the two eras. Published literature laid bare that India and the U.S. had strained relations due to India's foreign policy that was not in congruence with U.S. interests. Published literature also pointed to India's perceived tilt toward the U.S.S.R. and its dependence on the Soviet veto at the U.N. as reasons, among other reasons, for strained relations between India and the United States. However, after the Cold War ended, published literature showed that India and the U.S. cooperated on five fronts: nuclear technology, defense, trade, helping India counter secessionist movements in the country, and combating international terrorism. Therefore, these five parameters were used to draw up a coding sheet for a quantitative study for this research. The research spanned a 48-year period to study the press portrayal of India over a long duration of time.

This research also undertook a qualitative study to uncover common themes about India's portrayal in the United States press. The qualitative study was important because the quantitative study took into account only five parameters: nuclear technology, defense, trade, helping India counter secessionist movements in the country, and combating international terrorism. The quantitative study also broke down the observations into numbers. An advantage of the

quantitative results is that it could be extrapolated to the entire duration of the study. However, a qualitative study was needed to focus on the themes related to India and the choice of words and sentences used in the news stories to describe India's relations with the United States. Therefore, to strengthen the findings of this study, both quantitative as well as qualitative studies were undertaken using the same story samples.

Overall, results of the quantitative study assume importance, because there was significant difference on all five parameters under study regarding press portrayals of India in the two eras. The quantitative results provided support to the hypotheses about India's portrayal as anti-United States during the Cold War and as a U.S. ally after the Cold War. The results also provided support to the hypothesis that the U.S. was supportive of India's stand on terrorism after the Cold War.

On the nuclear front, published literature laid out consistent U.S. opposition to India's nuclear plan. The U.S. government's insistence that India sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and India's consistent refusal to do so strained relations between the two nations on the issue of nuclear cooperation. U.S. government officials even called for imposing sanctions against India for not signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Kapur, et al., 2002). India maintained that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was discriminatory toward it (Jain, 2006). India's first nuclear test at Pokhran in the state of Rajasthan soured relations between the two countries with the U.S. condemning the test, while India describing it as a peaceful nuclear test (Kapur et al., 2002). This set the stage for continued discord on the nuclear issue between the two countries during the Cold War era.

The nuclear issue assumed greater significance in South Asia that elicited more U.S. attention due to Pakistan's clandestine quest for nuclear weapons (Jain, 2006). The U.S. government, however, failed to act against Pakistan's nuclear program (Jain, 2006).

Published literature highlighted that the end of the Cold War resulted in the U.S. drawing closer to India on the nuclear issue. India tested a hydrogen bomb in 1998 that led to U.S. condemnation and sanctions (Kapur et al., 2002). However, after several rounds of negotiations, the U.S. removed sanctions it had imposed on India (Jain, 2006). The post-Cold war era had the U.S. government and India sign a Civilian Nuclear Deal in 2005 that paved the way for India to buy nuclear technology from developed nations and gain recognition as an international nuclear power (Schaffer, 2009).

The results of this research on the nuclear issue are significant against the backdrop of strained nuclear ties between the U.S. and India during the Cold War and nuclear cooperation between the two nations after the Cold War. The quantitative results found significant difference in India's portrayal with regard to the nuclear issue during the two era. While only 19.4% of the stories on the nuclear issue from the Cold War era were supportive in their tone about India's nuclear stand, as many as 37.3% of the stories on the nuclear issue from the post-Cold War era were supportive of India's stand.

The qualitative findings of the research lent support to the quantitative findings on the nuclear issue. Both newspaper --- *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* --- portrayed U.S. opposition to India's nuclear program during the Cold War. However, after the Cold War, *The New York Times* depicted U.S. efforts at arriving at an agreement with India on the nuclear issue, while *The Washington Post* laid out how the U.S. government lent its support to India's nuclear program. Both newspapers extensively quoted senior U.S. government officials to

support India's position regarding its nuclear policy after the Cold War. Therefore, with regard to the nuclear issue, it can be said that the U.S. media portrayed India in accordance with the U.S. government's nuclear policy stance.

Tied to the notion of the nuclear issue are defense relations between India and the United States. Published literature has shown that India and the U.S. had strained defense relations during the Cold War era. Instead of joining any U.S.-led military alliance, India chose to pursue an independent foreign policy and became a founder member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961 (Latham, 2010). On the other hand, India's rival Pakistan joined U.S.-led alliances, for instance, Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954, in what was a tilt toward the United States. While the stated Pakistani objective to join hands with the United States government was to stop the spread of communism in Asia, the real aim was to fortify its position against India and resolve the Kashmir dispute on favorable terms (Jain, 2006).

The Cold War years were marked by a perceived U.S. tilt toward Pakistan. India and Pakistan fought wars in 1947, 1965 and 1971 and in each of those wars the U.S. government provided defense and political support to Pakistan. For instance, during the 1971 war between the two countries over the creation of Bangladesh, the U.S. government sent the battleship *USS Enterprise* into Indian waters ostensibly to evacuate its citizens from East Pakistan. However, India viewed it as intimidation to stop the war against Pakistan (Ganguly, 1994).

After the Cold War ended, defense relations between India and the U.S. improved with several joint exercises by the defense forces of both nations and increase in research collaboration and production of weapons. (Schaffer, 2009). Joint military exercises between India and the U.S. were more frequent after the Cold War ended. For instance, both nations collaborated to undertake major joint naval exercises with aircraft carriers off the coast of

Malabar in India in October 2005 (Schaffer, 2009). The air force of both nations regularly undertake joint exercises in the U.S. as well as India. Indian soldiers were taken to Hawaii in the U.S. in 2006 for joint exercises with members of the United States army. The Indian navy and the U.S. government cooperated with each other to thwart piracy on the high seas. Many defense agreements were signed between India and the U.S. in 1995 and 2005. Between 2002 and 2008 this trade was worth \$700 million. In 2007, India and the U.S. were involved in defense trade worth \$13 billion (Schaffer, 2009).

This research found significant difference in portrayal of India's defense relations with the U.S. in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* for the two eras. The depiction in the two newspapers of India's defense relations with the U.S. was more favorable and supportive of India during the post-Cold War era. Of the news stories about defense ties between India and the U.S. during the Cold War, only 12% of news stories were supportive of India's stand. However, of the news stories about defense ties between India and the U.S. during the post-Cold War years, as many as 80% were supportive of India's stand. Therefore, there was a significant change in the way India's defense relations with the U.S. were portrayed in the U.S. press after the Cold War ended.

The qualitative study uncovered themes that were supportive of India's defense policy stance with regard to the United States. *The New York Times* portrayed sour defense relations between the two nations during the Cold War years. However, the same newspaper during the post-Cold War era portrayed better defense relations between the two nations. *The Washington Post* laid out how defense relations between the two nations were not well during the Cold War era. It also played out another related theme: that of India using its military might to pursue an aggressive foreign policy in its neighborhood in South Asia. Therefore, it can be said that the

U.S. media portrayed India's defense policy in line with the stance of the U.S. government, because the United States was opposed to India's procurement of military hardware and technology during the Cold War years, but after the Cold War ended the U.S. government readily offered military help to India.

Portrayal of trade ties between India and the United States was in accordance with U.S. government's trade policy stance on India. The Cold War years initially saw U.S. and India having good trade relations. However, India's nuclear quest and its relations with Pakistan had an impact on its trade ties with the United States. Souring of ties between the two nations over the war between India and Pakistan in 1971 led to the United States government cutting off economic aid to India. The United States government restored economic help to India in 1978 (Schaffer, 2009, p.29).

After India's nuclear test in 1974, the United States would not take part in Indian activities to launch rockets. However, it allowed India to launch its own rockets from U.S. bases. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) imposed a lot of restrictions on space cooperation between India and the United States. The MTCR also curtailed the export of space technology from the U.S. government to India (Schaffer, 2009, p. 101).

After the Cold War ended, India's economic strides due to its opening up of its economy brought about foreign investors. This helped India increase its share in international trade and business. India allied with the United States to achieve two targets: to emerge as a major economic giant in Asia, and to gain acceptance as an international power in the world. This strategic alliance with the U.S. government brought about more synergy in trade between the two nations (Schaffer, 2009).

Of the news stories about trade ties between India and the U.S. during the Cold War, only 24% of the news stories were supportive of India's stand. However, as many as 79.6% of news stories about India's trade ties with the U.S. after the Cold War were supportive of India's stand. Therefore, results show that there was a significant change in portrayal of India's trade relations in the U.S. press.

The qualitative themes uncovered in the research provided support to the quantitative findings. *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* portrayed frayed economic ties between the two nations during the Cold War years. However, both newspapers depicted changed economic policies of the U.S. government when they laid bare good economic ties between India and the U.S. after the Cold War. In doing so, the newspapers used quotes from senior government officials of both countries, and highlighted economic treaties between India and the United States. Therefore, the portrayal of India's economic ties with the U.S. in the United States press was in consonance with U.S. government's policies on India during and after the Cold War.

The portrayal in the U.S. press of secessionist movements in India mirrored the difference in U.S. government policies for the two era. India had to militarily and politically fight secessionist movements in various parts of the country like Kashmir since it got independence from colonial rule in 1947. The Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan has been a key issue in India's relations with the U.S. government. During the Cold War years, India had to depend on the Soviet veto in the United Nations to block any resolution on the Kashmir issue (Tahir-Kheli, 1997). Through the 1980s, India accused Pakistan of helping secessionist forces in the Indian states of Punjab and Kashmir, but the U.S. did not pay attention to Indian concerns (Tahir-Kheli, 1997).

However, U.S. government policy stance on Kashmir changed after the Cold War ended. A change in the U.S. policy on Kashmir came into being after the kidnapping and subsequent killing of five western hostages by insurgents in Jammu and Kashmir. The U.S. State Department publicly accepted Pakistan's involvement in sponsoring the insurgency in Kashmir and their support to Kashmiri insurgents belonging to different organizations (Kapur et al., 2002). The U.S. government acted on India's request by designating Harkat-ul-Ansar as a terrorist group in Jammu and Kashmir (Kapur et al., 2002). After India's cross-border surgical strikes on insurgent camps in Pakistan-administered Kashmir in September 2016, the U.S. government came out in support of India's right to reply ("US backs," 2016).

The Cold War years saw the U.S. government viewing the Kashmir insurgency more as a human rights issue, whereas the United States after the Cold War viewed it as part of a larger fight against international terrorism. Against this backdrop this research found significant difference in the portrayal in the U.S. press of secessionist movements in India. Of the stories related to secessionist movements in India during the Cold War, only 18.5% were supportive of India's stand. However, of the stories related to secessionist movements in India after the Cold War, 32.5% of them were supportive in their tone about India's stand.

The qualitative themes uncovered from the two newspapers included in the research also point to the U.S. media mirroring U.S. governmental policies regarding secessionist movements in India. *The New York Times* during the Cold War years portrayed India as a nation beset with religious insurgencies. The implication was that India was a Hindu-majority nation that was oppressing its religious minorities in Kashmir and Punjab. However, *The New York Times* in the post-Cold War era portrayed India as a nation fighting Pakistan-supported insurgency in Kashmir. Similarly, *The Washington Post* after the Cold War also portrayed India fighting

Pakistan-backed insurgency in Kashmir. Therefore, it can be said that U.S. press portrayals of secessionist movements in India mirrored the policies of the U.S. government during and after the Cold War.

Tied to the notion of secessionist movements in India is terrorism. This research found that the U.S. press was more supportive of India's stand regarding terrorism after the Cold War. During the Cold War era, India faced Sikh insurgency in the state of Punjab and an Islamic insurgency in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. India's attempt to describe these insurgencies as terrorism and Indian allegations of Pakistani support to the insurgents were ignored by the U.S. because they needed Pakistan's help in fighting the Soviets in Afghanistan (Tahir-Kheli, 1997).

However, the end of the Cold War brought about a change in U.S. policy toward India's stand on terrorism. The kidnapping and killings of five persons from Europe and the U.S. by Kashmiri insurgents led to a change in U.S. attitude toward India's allegations of Pakistani support to terrorism. In the aftermath of the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, India offered military and intelligence aid to the U.S. government in fighting terrorist groups in Afghanistan. After Kashmiri insurgents attacked India's parliament at New Delhi in December 2001, the U.S. government brought to bear pressure on Pakistan to act against insurgent groups that were operating from its soil. (Schaffer, 2009, p. 125).

A June 2005, agreement between India and the U.S. called for both countries to work together to, among other things, defeat terrorism. (Schaffer, 2009, p. 75). The terror attacks on Mumbai by insurgents on November 26, 2008, brought about the death of 183 people, including six citizens of the United States, setting in motion active cooperation between India and the U.S. government. Acting on India's plea, the United States declared Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) leader Hafiz Sayeed an international terrorist. The U.S. also blamed the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba for a terror

attack on the Indian consulate at Herat in Afghanistan (Riedel, 2014). Both countries signed a Counter Terrorism Initiative (CTI) in 2010 to help each other to fight terrorism and train India's special forces to fight insurgents ("India," 2010).

Of the stories related to terrorism during the Cold War, only 35.7% were supportive of India's stand. However, of the stories related to terrorism after the Cold War, 68.4% of them were supportive in their tone about India's stand. The qualitative themes uncovered during the research also supported the quantitative findings. The themes mirrored official U.S. policy toward supporting India's stand on terrorism after the Cold War ended. *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* portrayed India as a victim of terrorism after the Cold War. Both newspapers used quotes from senior government officials of both nations to depict India as a victim of terrorism. Therefore, with regard to terrorism it can be said that the U.S. media portrayed India's stand on terrorism significantly more after the Cold War ended.

The qualitative themes uncovered in the research also shed light on U.S. government's attitude toward India's relations with Pakistan during and after the Cold War. *The New York Times* portrayed U.S. support to Pakistan, which was the official U.S. policy during the Cold War. However, the newspaper portrayed U.S. efforts at establishing peace between India and Pakistan after the Cold War ended. The U.S. government has promoted peace efforts between the two nations after the Cold War. For instance, the U.S. government was instrumental in getting Pakistan to withdraw from the Kargil region of Jammu and Kashmir in 1999 (Ganguly & Hagerty, 2005). *The Washington Post* during the Cold War era depicted India's protests against U.S. help to Pakistan. The U.S. government had supplied Pakistan with weapons during the Cold War to contain communism in south Asia (Mohanty, 2013). However, after the Cold War ended, *The Washington Post* portrayed U.S. efforts at bringing about peace between India and Pakistan.

This was in consonance with the U.S. government policy to have nuclear-armed India and Pakistan to the negotiating table.

The New York Times during the Cold War portrayed India as a south Asian adversary to the U.S. mirroring the official U.S. government policy that saw both nations have competing interests in the region. *The Washington Post* during the Cold War portrayed India as Soviet ally, which was how the U.S. government viewed India due to its perceived tilt with the Soviet Union with which it had signed a friendship treaty in 1970 thereby paving the way to receive Soviet military assistance. However, after the Cold War came to an end, both newspapers portrayed India as a U.S. ally. The U.S. government started viewing India as an ally after the Cold War due to shared interests in south Asia (Jain, 2006). Therefore, the qualitative themes uncovered in the research mirror U.S. government policies toward India during and after the Cold War.

On the whole, based on the quantitative and qualitative findings of this research it can be said that the portrayal of India in the U.S. press mirrored the official policies of the U.S. government on India during and after the Cold War. This brings the spotlight back on the overarching question of this research: Did the U.S. media portray India in accordance with U.S. government policies during and after the Cold War? On the basis of the findings of this research, we can conclude that the U.S. media portrayed India in accordance with U.S. government policies on India during and after the Cold War. Therefore, Indexing theory (Bennett, 1990) finds support from portrayal of India in the United States media during and after the Cold War.

The findings of this research also raise the question: Why did the U.S. media follow its own government's policies in international reportage. The answer to this question was beyond the scope of this research and would require another in-depth study involving interviews with journalists.

This research brings into question how journalists use news sources in their stories to portray their government's policies. Using official sources in news stories has been in practice for the past several decades, because government sources have been considered reliable and accessible (Power & Fico, 1994). Sigal (1973) researched news stories on front pages of *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* and found that a majority of sources were government officials. Similarly, other researchers (Brown, Bybee, Wearden, & Straughan, 1987) also found preponderance of governmental sources in U.S. newspapers. This brings into question the journalistic routine of reporters approaching government officials for news sourcing. Cook (1994) argued that the journalistic routine of approaching governmental sources had helped indexing of news to prevail over the years. Lewis and Reese (2009) argued that self-censorship and editor's routine can also bring about indexing. They said that if a journalist quoted a government official, his editor may approve of it. However, the same editor may not like an alternative source being quoted instead of a governmental source (Lewis & Reese, 2009). The impact of the journalistic routine of using government sources on indexing theory needs to be researched using qualitative interviews with journalists. It was, however, beyond the scope of the present research.

This research used framing and indexing as theoretical constructs. Framing has often been criticized by researchers for being synonymous with agenda setting theory. McCombs, Llamas, López-Escobar and Rey (1997) argued that both the theories were similar to each other. Similarly, McCombs (2004) argued that framing was like second-level agenda setting that took into account the attributes of news stories. McCombs (2004) also argued that many researchers defined framing in different ways that ultimately impacted overall results of research studies. However, Reese (2007) argued that framing helped bridge the gap between qualitative and

quantitative research. Lance Bennett's (1990) Indexing theory was used in this research. While indexing lays out the entire range of debate among the elite in the upper echelons of a nation's government, it has faced criticism from researchers. Bennett (1990) argued that indexing did not take into account people's views on important issues. Another criticism of Indexing theory has been that media did not portray opinions that exist beyond the realm of a country's government (Bennett, Lawrence, & Livingston, 2007).

This research had a few limitations. The author was not able to include other newspapers in the research because many news stories in other newspapers for the two eras were not available. This research took into account only newspapers and not television newscast because television newscasts were beyond the scope of the present research. Another limitation was that published literature elaborated on relations between India and the U.S. in terms of nuclear weapons, defense and trade ties, secessionist movements in India and terrorism. Those issues were included in the coding sheet. However, published literature did not elaborate on other issues like agricultural and cultural ties between the two nations.

Nevertheless, a broader implication of this research is whether in a democratic country like the U.S. media should mirror policies of its own government in its international reportage and what that would tell about issues of press freedom and ethics. This research also raises the question of what has more importance for a journalist: impartial reportage or toeing the national line in international reporting.

The present research also throws open areas for future research. While Indexing theory finds support in India's portrayal in the U.S. press, there are other issues like press portrayals of immigration and refugee crises across the world that need to be researched to ascertain if the policies of the U.S. government are mirrored in U.S. media reports. In terms of portrayal of other

countries in the U.S. press, it would be interesting to see how Latin American and Caribbean nations were portrayed in the U.S. press after political conditions changed in those countries. Researching U.S. press portrayals of such issues and regions from across the world would help researchers understand the extent to which U.S. media mirrors the policies of its own government. In recent times, Russia has been seeking to emerge as a key player in the international arena. It has helped shore up the Syrian regime by helping it fight the terrorist group ISIS (“Syria’s War,” 2016). A major area of research using Indexing theory would be to study U.S. media portrayal of Russia during and before the presidency of Vladimir Putin. Such research would help shed light on whether the U.S. press portrayed Russia according to the policies of the U.S. government before and during Vladimir Putin’s presidency.

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APPENDIX

Coding Sheet

1. Article ID#

2. Coder:

1. Abhijit Mazumdar
2. Bhavna Wal

3. Newspaper:

1. New York Times
2. Washington Post

4. Location of story dateline:

1. India
2. U.S.
3. Pakistan
4. Other
5. Unable to determine

5. If other is selected in question no. 4, write the location of dateline:

6. Date of the story: mm/dd/yyyy

7. Does the story have anything about India's nuclear program?

1. Yes
2. No

8. If the answer to question 7 is "yes" then go to question 9 or else go to question 10.

9. What is the overall tone of the story with regard to India's nuclear program?

1. Supportive
2. Critical
3. Neutral

10. Does the story have anything about economic relations between India and the U.S.?

1. Yes
2. No

11. If the answer to question 10 is "yes" then go to question 12 or else go to question 13?

12. What is the overall tone of the story with regard to India's economic relations with the U.S.?

1. Supportive
2. Critical
3. Neutral

13. Does the story have anything about defense relations between India and the U.S. (e.g., joint military exercises, India buying U.S. arms, etc.)?

1. Yes
2. No

14. If the answer to question 13 is “yes,” then go to question 15 or else go to question 16.

15. What is the overall tone of the story with regard to India’s defense relations with the U.S.?

1. Supportive
2. Critical
3. Neutral

16. Does the story have anything on separatist movements in India (e.g., the Kashmir insurgency, Punjab insurgency, Nagaland insurgency, etc.)?

1. Yes
2. No

17. If the answer in question 16 is “yes” then go to question 18 or else go to question 19?

18. What is the overall tone of the newspaper with regard to India’s position on separatist movements?

1. Supportive
2. Critical
3. Neutral

19. Does the story mention anything about terrorism in India?

1. Yes
2. No

20. If the answer to question 19 is “yes,” then go to question 21?

21. What is the overall tone of the story with regard to India’s policy stance or actions against terrorism?

1. Supportive
2. Critical
3. Neutral

Timeline of India-U.S. Relations

- 1949: India's Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visits the U.S.
- 1959: U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower visits India
- 1963: India launches U.S. made rocket into space
- 1971: U.S. sends its vessel USS Enterprise into Indian waters during India-Pakistan war
- 1974: India tests its first nuclear device at Pokhran in Rajasthan
- 1978: U.S. President Jimmy Carter visits India
- 1978: India refuses to sign Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
- 1990: Deputy NSA Robert Gates visits India and Pakistan to defuse tension in South Asia.
- 1998: U.S. imposes sanctions after India tests nuclear devices.
- 1999: U.S. intervenes to end a military clash between India and Pakistan.
- 2000: U.S. President Bill Clinton visits India.
- 2001: U.S. lifts sanctions against India.
- 2005: India and the U.S. sign a Civil Nuclear Deal.
- 2006: U.S. President George W. Bush visits India.
- 2008: Terrorists kill 166 people in attacks at multiple targets in the Indian city of Mumbai.
- 2010: U.S. and India convene the first Strategic Dialogue between the two nations.
- 2010: U.S. President Barack Obama backs India for a permanent seat at U.N. Security Council.
- 2014: India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits U.S.

Timeline of India-Pakistan Relations

- 1947: India and Pakistan become independent nations.
- 1947: India and Pakistan fight their first war over Kashmir.
- 1948: U.N. passes a resolution calling for a ceasefire and a plebiscite in Kashmir.
- 1965: India and Pakistan fight a war over Kashmir.
- 1965: U.N. mediated ceasefire brings war to an end.
- 1971: India and Pakistan go to war over East Pakistan's quest for independence.
- 1971: East Pakistan becomes an independent nation called Bangladesh.
- 1984: India takes control of the Siachin region in Kashmir.
- 1986: India conducts military exercises along its border with Pakistan.
- 1991: Both countries decide to not attack each other's nuclear facilities.
- 1998: India's Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee visits Pakistan for peace talks.
- 1999: India and Pakistan clash over control of Kargil region in Kashmir.
- 2001: Pakistan's leader Gen. Pervez Musharraf visits India for peace talks.
- 2002: Kashmiri insurgents attack India's Parliament.
- 2002: India deploys its army along its border with Pakistan.
- 2008: India accuses Pakistan of supporting terrorist attacks in Mumbai.
- 2012: Pakistan President Asif Zardari visits India for peace talks.
- 2016: India conducts cross-border raids against terrorists in Pakistan.

VITA

The author is a journalist from India. He has worked with several prominent media organizations in India. He has M.S. in journalism from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.