





To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by David Arnold Wesson entitled "Product Salience, Puffery and Perceived Deceptiveness: A Comparative Treatments Experiment." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Communications.



Alan D. Fletcher, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:



Accepted for the Council:



The Graduate School

PRODUCT SALIENCE, PUFFERY AND PERCEIVED DECEPTIVENESS:
A COMPARATIVE TREATMENTS EXPERIMENT

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

David Arnold Wesson

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ABSTRACT

This is a study of consumer perceptions of deceptiveness in advertisements employing social or psychological product benefits as their primary appeal. Preston (1975) generated interest in this type of advertising by claiming the practice is deceptive and should be regulated by the Federal Trade Commission.

The background of this issue, evidence from previous research, and expert opinion are presented. A theoretical structure compiled from theories of de facto selective exposure, perception and retention, and consistency and novelty theories is presented as the basis for formulation of study hypotheses.

A comparative treatments experiment is reported which attempted to test the hypothesis that forced exposure to an advertisement claiming social or psychological benefits for a product of low interest to subjects tends to result in evaluations by subjects of deceptiveness of the advertisement. Advertisements for fictitious brands of cigarettes, support hose and screwdrivers, specially prepared to be of low, high or negative interest to nursing and engineering students, were evaluated for deceptiveness by a panel of experts and by randomly assigned subjects from these student populations.

The panel of experts found the advertisements equivalently deceptive, but both student populations found the hose and cigarette advertisements more deceptive than the screwdriver advertisement. Experimental results neither supported nor disconfirmed the study hypotheses, due to the presence of a confound in the experiment. The speculative explanation of the confound was that varying appeals employed in the three ads were evaluated by subjects rather than interest in the advertised product.

The author recommends further research on the hypotheses that consumers may perceive a continuum of deceptiveness in social and psychological appeals, and that these perceptions may interact with product interest, product type, and circumstances of exposure.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM	4
Definition of Terms	5
Assumptions	7
Limitations	8
Theoretical Foundations for Hypotheses	9
Hypotheses	10
III. LITERATURE REVIEW	12
Who Is Being Protected?	18
Puffery in Advertising	20
Social-Psychological Representations in Advertising	22
Theories of Advertising Psychology	26
Theoretical Structure	31
Implications of the Theoretical Structure	41
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY	43
Research Design	43
Sample Selection	45
Study Hypotheses	46
Pretest	46
Pretest Results	47
Experimental Methodology	54
Treatments	55

CHAPTER	PAGE
V. EXPERIMENT RESULTS	57
Substantive Significance of Findings	63
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS	68
Recommendations for Future Research	72
LIST OF REFERENCES	75
APPENDIXES	83
APPENDIX A. PRETEST FORMS	84
APPENDIX B. EXPERIMENT TREATMENTS AND FORMS . . .	90
VITA	96

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
1. Hypothesised Results of Exposure to Advertisements at Various Levels of Salience in Unforced and Forced Situations	39
2. Research Experiment Design in Haskins' Precise Notational System (Haskins, 1981)	44
3. T-Test Differences Between Populations of Consumerist Attitude And Attitude Toward Advertising and Demographic Characteristics . .	49
4. Descriptive Statistics and Reliability (Alpha) Scores for Consumerist Scale and Attitude Toward Advertising Scale	50
5. T-Test Differences Between Populations of Product Saliences, Ranked by Level of Salience	51
6. T-Test Differences Between Populations on Wells Reaction Profile Items and Total Scores	58
7. Mean Scores for Wells Reaction Profile of Treatments by Population	61
8. Two-Way Analysis of Variance of Wells Reaction Profile Scores by Population and Treatment . .	61
9. Mean Scores for Deceptiveness Scale of Treatments by Population	62
10. Two-Way Analysis of Variance of Deceptiveness Scores by Population and Treatments	62

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1975, Ivan Preston urged the Federal Trade Commission to regulate a category of advertising practice known as "puffery," or exaggerated sales claims. The FTC does not bring actions against puffery in advertising because by its legal definition puffery is inherently not believable and therefore cannot be deceptive. Preston took issue with this assumption about the effects on consumers of puffed advertising.

In Preston's book, The Great American Blow-up, (1975) the author stated his belief that puffery burdens the truthseeking American consumer with false beliefs about the marketplace. Because one of the missions of the FTC is to protect the consumer from false and misleading advertising, Preston believed that the exemption that puffery holds from regulation is unwarranted as a residue of outdated economic policies.

Preston conceded, with the FTC, that the magnitude of deception occurring due to any specific advertisement is not easily ascertainable. Thus the mere capacity to deceive is considered by both to be adequate reason to restrict the use of an advertising claim. However, the question of whether a particular claim or class of claim contains the

capacity to deceive is not easily answered. Although the FTC maintains the right to decide such a point on the basis of its own expert opinion, critics and apologists for advertising alike (Brandt and Preston, 1977; Dillon, 1973; Lackniak, 1979; Preston, 1975) proposed that the answer should come directly from consumers through scientifically sound research.

In order to perform this research, however, a set of definitional and methodological issues must be resolved, since the outcome of such research will be determined by how the variables for study are operationalized (Pearce, 1971). Resolution of these issues will rest in part on theoretical assumptions about the psychology of advertising audiences. Ultimately, the search for truth in advertising is an issue that can be decided only by the coherence of psychological theories and verifiable laws established on their assumptions (Stewart, 1972).

This researcher believes that substantial consequences to the advertising industry rest on the outcome of the research on the deceptiveness of advertising puffery. Adverse findings resulting from definitional or methodological flaws based on inaccurate theories of advertising psychology may be used as evidence by consumerists to persuade the FTC to reverse its policy on

puffery, making the industry susceptible to greatly increased legal pressures.

Little evidence exists that a systematic, large scale research campaign has been mounted to resolve this issue of puffery's deceptiveness. Evidence, as it exists, tends to support the consumerist claim that deceptive effects of puffery is greater than assumed by the FTC (Vanden Bergh and Reid, 1980).

The problem of this study is to investigate a source of bias in the research to date, and to propose a qualification of subject sample procedure that will reduce bias in future studies. The anticipated result of this modification would be a reduction in support for the idea that puffery as a class of advertising practice is inherently deceptive. As the subcategory of puffery identified by Preston (1975) as social-psychological misrepresentation--claims of social or psychological benefits from product use--is likely to show greatest relief from this accusation of deceptiveness and represents a substantial portion of current practice, it will be the specific area of concern for this study. The theoretical propositions derived from this study may prove to be generalizable to the study of other sub-categories of puffery as well.

CHAPTER II

STATEMENT OF PROBLEM

The questions for this study are whether social-psychological appeal advertisements may be considered categorically deceptive, and if it is appropriate to test such advertisements employing study samples for whom the product is of little or no interest? For example, in a study to determine the deceptiveness of an advertisement for toothpaste where the stated or implied benefit portrayed is enhanced social confidence and approval, is it appropriate to conduct the study using a sample in which most or all of the subjects are not the kind of person to whom the advertisement is addressed, e.g. young women aged 12 to 24 seeking social acceptance?

The purpose of this study is to determine whether such sampling procedures using product non-users tends to bias findings on consumers' perceptions of deceptiveness, in effect finding perceived deceptiveness where actual deception is least likely to occur. Spurious research findings of deceptiveness of social or psychological benefit appeals might be used as evidence by consumerists to support demands for increased regulation of advertising by the FTC.

Definition of Terms

The following terms are defined for purposes of this study and are discussed at greater length in the literature review that follows.

Although the principles derived from this study may have universal applicability to all advertising media, the term "advertising" is restricted in this study to refer to paid commercial messages appearing in American consumer magazines. The term "deception" is used to refer to the condition where a receiver of a message, on the basis of that message, changes a belief or forms a new belief which subsequently can actually or potentially be discovered to be false.

"Deceptiveness," defined distinctly from deception (Preston, 1982), refers to characteristics of a message that have the capacity to cause deception in a receiver, regardless of whether such deception have taken place.

The terms "puffery," "puffs" and "puffing" are used to refer to statements made or implied in an advertisement that are exaggerated claims about the attributes or benefits of a product, service, idea or organization, but which contain no specific fact. A sub-category of puffery identified by Preston (1975) is the social-psychological representation, though Preston's original term is "misrepresentation" reflecting the bias of his theories.

In this study a social-psychological representation, henceforth called a S-P representation, refers to any aspect of an advertisement that states or implies a social or psychological benefit from the use of the advertised product that is not a material attribute of the product itself. For example, the social benefit of having one's body adequately concealed to meet prevailing social standards is a material attribute of swimming trunks worn on the beach. Increased attractiveness to others on the beach is not necessarily a material attribute, as it is not inextricably a characteristic of wearing the trunks.

The term "product salience" is used, following Chaffee's definition of salience (1967), to mean the importance of a product to an individual, or psychological closeness" Product salience is differentiated from "advertisement salience," the latter referring to some aspect of the advertisement itself, other than the product depicted, that may be of high importance to the message receiver. For example, an illustration of a nude female may make an advertisement highly salient to a male reader although the product in the advertisement, a female hygiene product, may be a low salient item. When not otherwise stated, salience refers to product salience. The unqualified term "salience" will be used, after Chaffee, to mean positive interest; low salience will refer to neutral

affect; and negative salience will refer to interest that derives from disapproval or distaste.

Assumptions

It is assumed in this study that since use of S-P representations is a pervasive technique in the advertising industry (Anderson, 1969; Andren, 1978; Shimp, 1979), it is a useful technique for meeting the goals of advertising, and that removal of this technique from the repertoire of advertisement practitioners would be a bane to the industry.

It is also assumed, following Levitt's opinion (1970), that "the consumer suffers from an old dilemma. He wants 'Truth' (in the marketplace), but also wants and needs the imagery and tantalizing promises of the advertiser and designer."

This is to say that the American consumer is not rational in the sense that he or she makes decisions in the marketplace solely on the basis of material attributes of a product. An added, powerful, even overpowering motive is to sustain a frame of reference pertaining to non-material, perhaps even illusory, relationships with the self and others (Merton, 1968). It is further assumed that frames of reference pertaining to non-material relationships are more diversified among the American population than frames of reference pertaining to material attributes. For

example, members of the general population are more likely to agree that the price and lathering qualities of a shampoo brand are adequate than on the social and psychological advantages of use of the brand.

Also, it is assumed that no product is universally salient. Thus, for any product there is a segment of the market for which this product will be more salient than for another segment.

Limitations

Although in the strict sense the findings in this study are generalizable to only populations similar to the student samples used, the use of samples that are not statistically representative of the general population is justified by the research design and by the nature of advertising practice. In order to prepare advertisements of known salience to accessible study populations, it is necessary to define the populations narrowly, in this case nursing and engineering students. Since it is standard advertising practice to target advertisements toward narrowly defined audiences, preparation of valid, realistic advertisements requires this procedure in experimental circumstances as well. A further rationalization amending this problem of external validity is that the unnatural condition of forced exposure to treatments in this study replicates the methods by which much consumer research on

this question of advertising deceptiveness is carried out and is likely to be in future studies.

The sampling problem is ameliorated by the fact that the purpose of the study is to test the theory that homogeneous, non-representative sampling procedures are more appropriate for research in advertisement deceptiveness than heterogeneous samples from the general population. In effect, this study is using a sample selected on the basis of known bias (established by pretest) for the purpose of demonstrating the appropriateness of this procedure, as opposed to the procedure of sample selection from a heterogeneous population of unknown or widely variant bias.

Theoretical Foundations For Hypotheses

The hypotheses for this study derive from these environmental conditions discussed in the literature review:

1. There is a low level of credibility of advertising in the general population. This proposition is supported by evidence from survey research (Bauer and Greyser, 1968; Schutz and Lasey, 1981).
2. There is a low level of attention to advertising in general among the general population (Bauer and Greyser, 1968).
3. The readership of an individual advertisement,

with minor incidental exceptions, is restricted to a market segment with high product or advertisement salience. This proposition is supported by Cummings (1965) and by theories of de facto selective exposure, perception and retention.

4. The situation depicted or enunciated in an advertisement usually is designed to appeal to the market segment for which the product is likely to be salient. Hence, advertisement salience tends to coincide with product salience. This proposition is supported by conventional trade practice as presented in advertising texts and by evidence (Achenbaum, 1972).
5. In a natural advertisement exposure situation where opportunity exists, but is not forced as in a laboratory experiment, a low-salient reader is not as susceptible to deceptiveness in an advertisement by reason of non-exposure, non-perception or non-retention of the advertising message. This proposition builds on proposition 3.

Hypotheses

The following hypotheses are extrapolated from the theoretical base:

1. Readers with high product salience are less likely to perceive deceptiveness than readers with low product salience in a forced exposure situation.
2. Readers with high product salience are less likely to perceive deceptiveness than readers with negative product salience in a forced exposure situation.

CHAPTER III

LITERATURE REVIEW

Where deception is found in advertising depends on where it is looked for and what criteria are applied. Pollay (1969) pointed out that there are three places in the lifecycle of an advertisement where deception can be said to exist--in the source, or advertiser; in the message, or advertisement; or in the receiver, or reader.

Finding deception in the source means determining intent on the part of the advertiser to deceive advertisement readers. According to legal authorities (Bernacchi, 1976; Preston, 1975) the purpose of the Federal Trade Commission is not to punish advertisers, but to protect the public from misleading or false advertisements. Thus, finding civil violation on the part of the advertiser is not cogent to the FTC's purpose and "intent to deceive" does not have to be proven in a FTC action, nor is implied by such action.

The fact that deception has taken place, either in substantial segments of the public or in isolated instances is also not sufficient for a finding of deceptive practice by the FTC (Preston, 1975). Although Gardner (1976) argued that only the impact of an advertisement on the receiver is a viable means of determining deceptiveness, the FTC does

not consider this evidence except as incidental support for its own decisions (Brandt and Preston, 1977). An important consideration in the need to prove actual deception has occurred through exposure to an advertisement is that the advertisement must be published for such exposure to take place. However, the FTC may rule on an advertisement before publication, where actual deception cannot have taken place. Also, there is a problem in ascertaining that deception has occurred by nature of the ability of a deception to be so complete that the deceived person cannot acknowledge that deception has occurred.

A case in point of undiscovered deception was presented by Preston (1975):

Cosmetics promise much (in advertisements), deliver nothing, and sell like hot cakes for years on end with the same customers. The public couldn't have discovered the deception if it keeps on buying like that. (p. 262)

In this example Preston argued that the deception by cosmetics advertising is so thorough that the public is incapable of seeing the deception. It could be argued, on the other hand, that the public is already convinced of the efficacy of cosmetics by testimony of its use for thousands of years, and that advertising did not create nor change a belief. It also can be argued that the benefits of cosmetic use, being subtle and subjective, have merely been overlooked by Preston.

Since the fact of actual deception is not readily determinable, particularly for S-P appeals such as that just mentioned, the position of focusing investigations on sales misrepresentations that in the commission's opinion possess the capacity or tendency to deceive (Bernacchi, 1976; Gardner, 1975; Preston, 1975) seems expedient until readily applied measures for actual deception are found.

Gardner (1975) identified deception--currently held by the FTC in case-by-case decisions, lacking a comprehensive definition--as occurring "when an objectively ascertainable material fact is presented falsely, is ambiguous, or is misleading." The implication of "is presented" in this statement is that deceptiveness is a characteristic of the advertising message itself, not of the source or receiver. The criterion of "objectively ascertainable material fact" suggests that advertising claims about benefits from product use that exist in the subjective realm of the user, i.e. S-P representations, are exempt from FTC control (Isaacs, 1972; Preston, 1975).

This legal status of deception in advertising has been questioned by many writers in this field (Brandt and Preston, 1977; Dillon, 1973; Gardner, 1975; Preston, 1975). Dillon, speaking as a representative of the practitioners of advertising, aired this point of view on behalf of those who believe that regulation by the FTC is based on presumed

transgressions that do not actually exist, and that the result is unnecessary hardship to advertisers and overprotection of the public:

I would like to make what I believe to be a constructive suggestion that we find out directly from the consumer what the consumer's problems are with deception in advertising.

Similar calls for consumer research have been made on the part of consumerists convinced that such research would yield findings of more pervasive deception than presumed by the FTC (Preston, 1975).

Several writers (Gardner, 1975; Glassman, 1977; Pearce, 1971; Terhune, 1975) have suggested criteria that need to be considered in consumer research on advertisement deception. Pearce (1971) identified the variables of suitability of subjects, message content, subject personality, and social influences on subjects. He raised the questions of who should decide "capacity to deceive;" what standards for research design where appropriate in regard to subject intelligence, forced exposure of advertisements, naturalistic setting for testing; and whether a homogeneous market segment would make a more appropriate population for subject sampling than a heterogeneous segment.

Gardner (1975) reiterated some of these questions and suggests these criteria for evaluating advertisement deceptiveness:

1. Measurement focuses on consumer reaction
2. Allows advertiser room for creativity
3. Allows advertiser to use truthful product claims
4. Is flexible enough to be adaptable to special situations in the marketplace. (p. 45)

This last criterion suggests that contextual factors of the natural advertisement reception environment need consideration, which can be extrapolated to the idea that only natural readers for a particular advertisement should be candidates for research sampling. Gardner stated that consideration in sampling must be made for the possibility that any advertisement may be deceptive to some segment of the public because of idiosyncratic belief patterns of that segment. Thus, deceptiveness needs to be studied as a subtle psychological occurrence, rather than a broad social phenomenon. Practically, this means that research of deceptiveness of advertisements using samples from the general population are likely to include members of this idiosyncratic segment, thus generating spurious findings of at least some level of deceptiveness for almost any conceivable advertisement.

In 1975, Terhune discovered through an experimental study that several psychological variables correlate with the propensity to perceive deceptiveness in advertisements. Although causality in the relationships was not stated in

the findings, a reasonable implication worthy of further testing is that modulation in one or more of the variables can lead to bias in consumer deceptiveness research. The variables Terhune identified were:

1. Product salience
2. Attitude toward advertising in general
3. Consumerist views
4. Attitude toward the advertiser

Gardner (1976) found from a review of the literature in this matter that two evaluations were found to be present in consumers' perceptions of deceptiveness in advertisements, one about specific product appeals and the other about the general gestalt impression of the advertisement as a whole. He recommended that both of these factors need to be studied in further research. He also recommended that for an accurate test of reaction to the general impression of an ad, consumers not in the target market for the product not be used. The purpose of this current study is to test this proposition.

Further support for this need to refine methodology in consumer research in deceptiveness comes from Glassman (1977) who also proposed that salience, attitudes and norms are susceptible to variation by product, market segment and time, and that research findings are likely to be affected by modulations in any of these variables.

Who Is Being Protected?

Under the mandate bestowed on the FTC by Congress in its original chapter, its commissioners are free to act as a self-reliant panel of experts in determining practices that are misleading in advertising (Preston, 1975). However, the question has been raised whether the judgment of the FTC is representative of the general public it is supposed to protect (Bernacchi, 1978; Gardner, 1976; Preston, 1975).

An issue to be resolved in this question is who is the consumer that the FTC is protecting? Several legal standards have been applied in the history of FTC case findings ranging from the "ignorant man standard," which assumes that even the most gullible and credulous member of the public is entitled to protection from deception, to the "reasonable man standard," which assumes that the consumer enters the marketplace with a skeptical attitude toward salesmen's product claims (Preston, 1975). Support for the former standard comes from Preston (1975) in his opinion that a great deal more deception actually occurs in the marketplace than the FTC presumes, since consumers are not as astute as it expects.

An argument against the ignorant man standard (Cummings and Cummings, 1977) is that this legal standard is an exception to the general rule of the legal system

that all people are responsible for their own actions, and innocence by ignorance of law or innate poor judgment is not acceptable criterion for protection by the law. Oliver (1979) cites the Restatement of the Law of Torts, 1965, on this point:

- d) Thus, the purchaser of an ordinary commodity is not justified in relying on the vendor's opinion of its quality or worth.
- e) This is true particularly of loose general statements made by sellers in commending their wares, which is commonly known as "puffing," or sales talk." It is common knowledge, and may always be assumed, that any seller will express a favorable opinion concerning what he has to sell; and when he praises it in general terms without specific content or reference to facts, buyers are expected to and do understand that they are not entitled to rely literally upon the words.

The most recently formulated standard from recent FTC cases is called by Preston (1975) a "modified ignorant man standard," which is more protective than general law, but does not attempt to protect the "foolish or feeble-minded" consumer.

These legal standards do not directly address the question of how the average consumer perceives deception or is deceived by advertising, since the standards are not based on evidence. Such evidence would have to be defined by some understanding of proportions of the public that must be affected before action must be considered. The FTC and consumerists concur that deception in cases of isolated individuals is not sufficient to warrant action by the FTC,

rather that "substantial portions" must be affected (Preston, 1975). Advertisements that are "unreasonably misunderstood by an insignificant and unrepresentative segment of the class of persons to whom the representation is addressed," as Kirchner pointed out (1963, in Preston, 1975), are not the target for legal action.

Since 1975, research has addressed the question of what average consumers actually perceive in advertising, and theories are being formulated to support the consumerist claim of pervasive deception by puffery (Kuehl and Dyer, 1976; Pollay, 1980; Rotfeld, 1978; Vanden Bergh, 1978; Vanden Bergh and Reid, 1980).

Puffery in Advertising

Discussion and research on puffery is hindered by lack of a standard definition or clear set of criteria for delineation of the term. Preston (1975) summarized the predominant conception of puffery as follows:

The terms puffing and puffery are widely understood today . . . by legal authorities, advertising people and consumerists to refer to claims which are of opinion form and associated with facts only by implication. (p. 121)

There remains in the law today no statements identified as puffery which literally state false facts. (p. 129)

Although these statements appear to exonerate puffery from the capacity to deceive, being merely opinion and containing no literal false statements, it is Preston's

opinion (1975) that puffery effectively deceives the public in several ways. First, the public is deceived by the implication that facts exist that support puffed claims. Second, the public is deceived that puffed claims are facts, not opinions. Third, the public is deceived not only by what is stated in the puffed claims, but also by claims that are reasonably implied in the advertisements.

Support for the second opinion, that puffs are not discriminated from facts, is presented by Rotfeld (1978) who found that subjects "could not readily tell advertising opinion claims might not be literally true," and that puffery is more likely to be believed than facts. Support for the third opinion, that implications of puffs are a source of deception is found in research (Oliver, 1979; Preston, 1975; Preston and Scharback, 1971) in which it is found that people perceive implications from statements in advertisements that do not logically derive from the statements. It was also found that "illogical" reading of advertisements is greater than with other forms of communication, due to expectations of readers about what advertisers would like to say if they were permitted.

In order to facilitate discussion on various types of puffery, Preston (1975) created a set of categories which include:

1. Puffery--exaggerated opinions or superlatives containing no specific claim
2. Obvious Falsity--Claims that are not in any way believable
3. Social-Psychological Misrepresentation--
Associating product with social or psychological values which the product does not literally provide
4. Literally Misdescriptive Names--Brand names that exaggerate product benefits or attributes
5. Mock-Ups--demonstrations in advertisements or commercials which simulate real tests or depictions of the product or its performance

The focus of this study is the third category, renamed "social-psychological representation" to remove Preston's bias. This category is selected on the assumption that this practice is distinct from the others in that it serves a vital marketing function for the advertiser and a significant utilitarian function for the consumer as well.

Social-Psychological Representations in Advertising

Preston (1975) stated the opinion that "there's really no good defense for the assertion that false social-psychological misrepresentations are not deceptive." His basis for this strong opinion is that S-P benefits of a product exist only because its advertiser says they exist,

but are not objectively or literally present. Taking issue with the legal stand on this point, Preston claimed that non-literal product attributes, as well as legally controlled material attributes, are a source of deception.

The distinction between material and non-material attributes is critical to the deception issue. Material attributes are generally susceptible to verification by the consumer or by an investigator, and can be categorized in two groups of product characteristics (Nelson, in Pitofsky, 1978):

1. Search qualities, which can be inspected before purchase
2. Experience qualities, which can be authenticated during use

Non-material attributes are associated with the second category, though Pitofsky (1978) and Oliver (1979) pointed out that S-P claims actually form a third category for qualities that are difficult to verify even after considerable use.

Preston (1975) stated that advertisers in this century have increasingly employed the practice of making exaggerated S-P claims because they have discovered that this type of advertisement claim, though persuasive, is least likely to be disconfirmed by the consumer, and thus is the safest deception to employ. Anderson (1969)

confirmed that non-material appeals in advertisements have increased in each decade since 1890. However, the reason for the increase may not be that practitioners have found this technique useful in changing beliefs of consumers or in creating new beliefs, but in making existing beliefs more salient. This possibility is supported by Achenbaum (1972), who studied contemporary advertising techniques and found that:

Information about one or more attributes which are (already) salient to consumers is communicated in a persuasive context by national advertising. These attributes can be sensory, evaluative or emotional.

Achenbaum concluded that this advertisement practice is not manipulative, but rather caters to salient wants the consumer seeks to satisfy, whether of objective or subjective nature.

A central criticism of advertising by consumerists is this practice of appealing to "non-rational" wants of consumers. Bernacchi (1978) summarized the position of advertising critics:

It's been further posited that inducement of mood advertising, or advertising that suggests the benefits of fulfilling emotional needs as sexual attractiveness and social acceptance, and advertising that associates a product with strongly held social values such as affluence or sophistication is patently irrational. The mood and social-value advertisements are deemed irrational because they provide insufficient real attribute (price and inherent quality) information to enable the consumer to make a rational purchase.

Advertising rationalists believe that the consumer's response is rational if it is based on inherent product characteristics and irrational if it is based

on emotive characteristics presented by the advertiser.

Bernacchi argued that this employment of "rational" and "irrational" in this context is a hold-over from classical economic theory which posited the consumer as an "economic rational man" who uses objective product criteria in his selections in the marketplace. Bernacchi stated that this view of the average consumer, though still retained by the FTC and some consumerists, is not supported by study of actual consumer behavior, and thus has been dropped by modern economic theorists.

The criticism that advertising, in not providing material product information in favor of non-informative persuasive appeals, is misleading, wasteful or harmful (Andren, 1980) is addressed on several accounts. Pearce (1971) pointed out that the distinction between information and persuasion is a false one because information is used in advertisements only for its persuasive value, and persuasive statements, particularly of the S-P type, also contain information about subjective attributes associated with a product. Hunt (1976) supported this observation and adds that quantity of information is not synonymous with quality, since different people employ different amounts and kinds of information. Schutz and Lasey confirmed this in 1981, finding that consumers collect product information from friends and independent sources as well as from

advertising, and that advertising is the least relied on of the three.

The implication of this controversy over information and persuasion in advertising is that more detailed evidence and theory needs to be brought forth on the impact of advertisement messages on the advertising reader.

Theories of Advertising Psychology

In 1954 Ewen wrote of the "presentation of the world (by advertisers) that obfuscates the fundamental relations of that world," which he called a "phantom objectivity," a term borrowed from Lukacs (1921). This observation of the interaction between the world as portrayed in advertising and the psychological frame of reference of the consumer is a profound condemnation of large-scale deception of consumers through this "phantom objectivity." The discrepancy between the world as depicted in advertisements and that which consumers experience may be responsible for much skepticism and criticism confronting advertising.

This discrepancy is the foundation for research exploring the negative effects of puffery, called expectancy and disconfirmation theory research (Ryan and Bonfield, 1975), in which the description of a product in a puffed advertisement produces expectancies that are disconfirmed by use of the product, producing negative effects on attitudes toward the product, the message and the advertiser

(Vanden Bergh, 1978; Vanden Bergh and Reid, 1979).

These theories do not explain why puffery, particularly S-P representations, is increasingly employed in practice (Anderson, 1969). Whatever negative effects are theorized, there either must be some powerful overriding positive effects, or the evidence for negative effects must be exaggerations of a minor phenomenon or an artifact of research methodology (Noelle-Neumann, 1970).

The contention of the current study is that several operating psychological mechanisms nullify the potentiality of negative responses to advertisements, and that well designed advertising evokes positive responses in consumers through precisely these techniques of S-P representations that consumerists condemn as negative and deceptive.

In 1975, Horowitz and Kaye deduced from an experiment confirmation of a principle of current advertisement practice (Burton, 1978; Nelson, 1981) that an effective advertisement is designed to "reduce psychological distance between product and consumer by using themes that are descriptive of the self-image of the intended consumer." In effect, this means that effective advertisements are designed to coincide with the existing frame of reference of the intended audience. These findings confirm those of Cummings (1965) that identification with visual themes and

affective, or subjective values in an advertisement are the factors most responsible for recall of advertisements.

Significantly, both Horowitz and Kaye and Cummings found that the greatest impact of advertising is in response to subjective product attributes, and that beliefs about objective attributes are not as powerfully affected. The efficacy of subjective appeals was noted by Galbraith in The New Industrial State (In Achenbaum, 1972):

Management (of product demand) involves the creation of a compelling image of the product in the mind of the consumer. For building this image, palpable fantasy may be more valuable than circumstantial evidence.

The emphasis in advertising toward representation of specific images or themes that potential customers can identify with suggests two propositions. First, members of the general public who are not potential customers will not identify with images in advertisements for a product they are not interested in, i.e. that are of low salience; and second, when forced to perceive a low salient ad, the unintended audience will find the experience of that exposure either unrewarding or negative.

These propositions are supported by the American Association of Advertising Agencies study of 1965 on consumer attitudes (Kanter, 1965). In this survey it was found that advertisements for products or brands that are not salient to a test subject are likely to be classified

neutrally or negatively as annoying or offensive.

Conversely, advertisements for products or brands that a test subject uses or likes are likely to be classified as enjoyable or informative.

The theories of de facto selective exposure, perception and retention (Sears and Freedman, 1967; Katz, 1968) provide support for a third proposition that in the natural circumstance of opportunity for exposure to an advertisement, low salient advertisements tend not to be read, so the negative effects of annoyance are seldom natural occurrences. The theory of de facto selective exposure states that readers tend not to read media in which low salience material is found. The theory of selective perception states that if the opportunity to read low salient material does occur during media use, readers tend not to see the material. The theory of selective retention states that if a reader sees low salient material, he tends to forget it quickly.

These are the principle mechanisms by which negative effects or responses to low salient advertisements are avoided in natural, opportunity-for-exposure situations. When these mechanisms are thwarted, the result is unwanted exposure to an advertisement that proves uninteresting, annoying or offensive. This is possibly the reason that TV advertising is cited as more offensive than print

advertising (Kanter, 1965)--the obtrusive aspect of TV commercials results in forced exposure to low salience messages.

The relevance to the current study of the tendency to find offense in forced exposure to low salient advertisements is in the correlation uncovered by Haefner (In Gardner, 1975) in 1972 between "advertisements seen as deceptive and those described as annoying, offensive or insulting to intelligence."

Since the independent and dependent variables are not identified in this study, three explanations can be ventured for this correlation. First, people tend to be annoyed at the discovery of perceived deceptiveness in advertisements. Second, advertisements that are annoying tend also to be deceptive. Third, advertisements that are annoying tend to be condemned as deceptive to reconcile the incongruity in frames of reference between the advertisement and the reader. Theories of congruity proposed by Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955) and Chaffee (1967) posit that incongruity between a message and a receiver's frame of reference results in an attempt by the receiver to reconcile the message with the frame of reference.

Festinger (1957) and Festinger and Maccoby (1964) supported this theory and proposed that cognitive dissonance resulting from this type of incongruity is

reduced through various means. One such reaction would be to denounce the incongruous message as false or deceptive.

Despite its appeal and longevity of use, dissonance theory is not sufficiently sound to serve as the operant mechanism in this study. First, the evidential support for the theory has been seriously compromised during reanalysis (Chapanis and Chapanis, 1964), which found it "overenthusiastic." Second, the theory does not explain counter evidence and examples of inconsistency or novelty-seeking behaviors that need reconciliation with the group of consistency-oriented theories on which dissonance theory is based (Zajonc, 1960).

Theoretical Structure

Because of the frailty of selectivity and consistency theories, a broadened conceptual basis needs to be constructed for this study, following the suggestions of Zajonc (1960) and McGuire (1969) of analysis of the "tactics of perceptual selectivity." The theory of Perceptual Selectivity to be presented here is an exploration of the relationship of an individual's mental set and exposure to new stimuli, or in terms of Preston's Association Model (1982), the link between advertisement exposure and advertisement evaluation.

The theoretical structure is developed through a set of propositions:

1. The perceptual and cognitive field in its natural state is organized and meaningful (Krech and Crutchfield, 1961). The organization of the mental set need not be logical by any preconceived standards; what is suggested is a pattern of relationships within the mental set that remains relatively stable over time. Likewise, meaning in the mental set does not necessarily imply that meaning will be apparent to a second person, or that only a single meaning is present, or that meaning can be fully verbalized (Lynch and Srull, 1981), since organization and meaning in the mental set are complex and developmental (McQuail and Gurevitch, 1974). The qualification about "natural state" means that organization of the mental set can be temporarily or permanently disrupted by stimuli such as alcohol, severe shock, etc., which we consider abnormal situations.
2. Perception has physical and psychological components (Hyman and Sheatsley, 1947). Krech and Crutchfield (1961) refer to these as structural and functional elements. Structural elements derive from physical stimuli and neural effects; functional elements derive from needs, moods, past

experience and memory. The sum of these functional elements is called a mental set or frame of reference, meaning the "functionally related factors (present and past) which operate at the moment to determine the particular properties of a psychological phenomenon, such as perception, judgment, affectivity."

3. Perception is functionally selective (Krech and Crutchfield, 1961). A choice is made, consciously or not, to pay attention to only part of the total available sensory stimuli in a given situation. Selection is made on the basis of utility, or anticipated reward, to the individual (Katz, 1968). Judgment of stimulus utility is called interest, or salience. The judgment of low salience results in "tuning out" selectively, and judgment of high salience results in attention. Utility can be practical or ludenic (pleasurable), but some "payoff" must result to compensate for paying attention.
4. These three propositions are the basis of the theory named here Perceptual Economy, which is that paying attention to a stimulus, or set of stimuli such as a communicative message, must result in a compensating payoff. If the payoff is

not adequate to ameliorate the debt, the mind will seek some means to "balance the budget" through some satisfaction it creates for itself. The satisfaction can be positive or negative. A positive satisfaction might be an excuse, or synthetic rationale. A negative satisfaction might be a revenge reaction.

5. The mind strives for a balance of two tendencies, one toward consistency in its mental set and congruity of input stimuli, and one toward novelty of input stimuli (Maddi, 1968). The tendency toward consistent or novel selection of input is situationally determined, based on expectancy of end benefit (payoff). Activation theory posits a nonmonotonic (inverted U shape) relation between comfort and the thresholds where too much consistency or novelty becomes unacceptable. A mixture or balance of consistency and novelty produces the most satisfying experience aesthetically and functionally.
6. The mind attempts to preserve its sense of organization and meaning by seeking consistency in its input stimuli. This is the gist of consistency theories as summarized by Zajonc (1960), attributed to Heider, Newcomb, and Osgood

and Tannenbaum. Walker (1973) amends these theories to point out that consistency does not mean that stimuli are sought or accepted on the basis of sameness, but rather by similarity. Absolute redundancy is therefore not supported as a satisfactory stimulus pattern, rather the pattern called habit is the crux of this concept.

7. The mind seeks sufficient arousal to avoid boredom (Berlyne, 1960). Stimulation comes from "situations in which uncertainty is of psychological importance." Attention mediates contact with uncertainty stimuli, either to avoid or seek it. Seeking uncertainty is called curiosity. Three aspects of uncertainty are novelty, complexity and conflict.
8. The mind avoids overstimulation to avoid confusion, serious disruption of the mental set equilibrium, or information overload. Exposure to stimuli that are too novel, too complex or containing strong conflict is uncomfortable. An example of too much novelty might be initial exposure to Chinese opera; of too much complexity, exposure to a Calculus text; of strong conflict, exposure to stimuli depicting values antithetical to significant aspects of one's frame of

reference, such as homosexual pornography.

Individual thresholds of stimulation differ between individuals and within individuals over time.

9. These last four propositions are the basis of the theory named here Perceptual Risk Management, which is that before selecting to perceive a stimulus, the degree of novelty is pre-evaluated to safeguard against exposure to seriously disruptive situations, and the degree of redundancy is pre-evaluated to safeguard against exposure to boring situations. When the evaluation is incorrect and exposure to disagreeable stimuli occurs, means of physically or psychologically terminating the experience are employed, such as disrupting the stimuli flow, leaving, fainting or misperceiving.
10. An important portion of an individual's frame of reference is his social reference groups, both membership and non-membership types (Merton, 1968). Stimuli which present values antithetical to those believed by an individual to be held by a reference group create conflict, and stimuli perceived as jeopardizing his relationship to such a group will be avoided, terminated in progress,

or will result in an "attention debt." Since gratification does not result from overly conflict-laden exposure, a compensating satisfaction, negative or positive, will be sought.

These propositions and theories apply to advertising stimuli as follows:

1. An audience is exposed to advertisements under two situations, opportunity for exposure and forced exposure, the first typified by print advertisements and the second by broadcast advertisements. The audience exercises the power of selectivity before the fact in the first case, but can only exercise disconnecting acts or budget-balancing acts in the latter.
2. In the circumstance of opportunity for exposure, the audience selects to perceive an advertisement anticipating a payoff for paying attention.
3. advertisements that are prejudged as containing boring, threatening or discomforting stimuli are avoided.
4. In forced exposure situations, if the audience does not find an advertisement satisfying, i.e. is not paid off for paying attention, the audience accrues an attention debt. The debt may be paid off by

positive means, such as generating a positive rationale for the experience, or by negative means, such as making fun of the advertisement, denouncing advertising in general, or exercising some mode of revenge for being threatened or bored. Since positive rationale may require inordinant creative effort, denouncing acts may be the predominant mode of satisfaction. For example, there may be some satisfaction in hating Mr. Whipple. A tendency has been noted (Kanouse, 1972) toward negativity in evaluation of mixed or ambivalent stimuli, thus negative satisfaction seems to be the preferred mode of debt balancing act. Kanouse refers to this tendency as "cost-oriented" evaluation, where risk is considered more heavily than reward from stimuli.

5. Attention debts that are not sufficiently amortized at the time of exposure may accumulate, awaiting an opportunity to pay a summative debt in one occasion. For example, meeting an advertising practitioner at a cocktail party may serve as an occasion to cash in an accumulated debt through negative, satisfying revenge--complaining and harrassment.

Table 1 contains a list of the probable consequences of exposure to positive, neutral and negative salient advertisements, analysed in terms of Risk Management and Perceptual Economy, or Risk and Payoff, in forced and unforced exposure situations, where neutral salience represents the case of low risk and low payoff, high salience represents low risk and high payoff, and negative salience represents high risk and low payoff.

TABLE 1

HYPOTHESISED RESULTS OF EXPOSURE TO ADVERTISEMENTS AT
VARIOUS LEVELS OF SALIENCE IN UNFORCED AND
UNFORCED SITUATIONS

SITUATION	SALIENCE	SELECTION	RESULT
<u>Unforced</u>	Positive	Attention	No debt
	Neutral	Ignore	No debt
	Negative	Ignore	No debt
<u>Forced</u>	Positive	Attention	No debt
	Neutral	Attention	Debt
	Negative	Attention	Debt

The tables show only two possible situations where advertisement exposure is likely to result in attention debt accrual, both forced exposure situations where low payoff is present. In the first situation, low payoff and risk combine for a boring event; in the second, low payoff

combines with high risk for a threatening event. This category may explain the strong negative reactions reported by Aaker and Bruzzone (1981) from exposure to feminine hygiene commercials.

The fourth possible permutation of risk and payoff--a high risk, high payoff advertisement--is not represented because of the unlikelihood of such an occurrence. If it were to actualize, it can be anticipated that selectivity would rest on a judgment of payoff versus risk, probably with substantial ambivalence.

Much of the preceding discussion reflects an assumption of at least a moderate degree of cognitive involvement by the audience (Carlile, 1982). Typically, advertisement exposure situations are also recognized as significant where cognitive involvement is marginally low. This represents the situation where the audience may prejudge low payoff in an advertisement, but may not completely ignore or disengage from the stimuli, rather paying just enough attention to monitor the advertisement. In this situation, the resulting debt should be proportionately small, requiring little debt balancing. It may be that advertisements are used as minimal arousal threshold preservers, providing just enough "noise" stimuli to keep the mind channel open. A question for further study would be what sort and degree of learning takes place

under these low involvement circumstances.

Implications of the Theoretical Structure

In this research project, the effects of forced exposure to different levels of salient stimuli are being evaluated. The hypothesised effects of exposure to three levels of treatment are varying degrees of attention debt--none or low for the salient advertisement, medium for the neutral advertisement, and high for the negative advertisement. The opportunity to balance the debt after exposure is offered by the post-treatment questionnaire containing the Wells Reaction Profile. Since Wells (1964) reports high correlation between Profile scores and independently collected recall scores, it is deduced that a low Profile score signifies that the audience would have preferred to have ignored the ad, is likely not to remember it for long, and is in an unbalanced budget situation.

One of the evaluative items on the Wells Profile is dishonesty in the advertisement. Since the advertisements are prejudged by experts as being equivalent on this variable, audience responses that show differing responses to the levels of treatment may be attributed to differences in interaction with the audience's frame of reference. The conclusion is thus reached that evaluations of dishonesty, i.e. of deceptiveness, will differ between homogeneously-selected salient subjects for research and the heterogenous

general public or unselective research sample. Thus, deceptiveness research using unselective samples are likely to find at least some portion who will report deceptiveness in an S-P ad, no matter what product is depicted or what level of deceptiveness actually exists, because the frame of reference depicted in the S-P advertisement is in conflict with the frame of reference of at least some portion of the sample.

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Research Design

The design for datagathering to test the hypotheses of this study is a comparative treatments experiment. The significant features of this design are forced exposure to treatments and random assignment to treatment groups (Haskins, 1981). Table 2 on page 44 shows the research design. This experiment has several threats to validity which are common to experimental research designs. First, the treatment advertisements were specifically contrived for this use, thus are not completely realistic, though the attempt was made to have them as realistic as possible. Second, the treatments were presented pasted into a magazine, rather than being published in the magazine. Third, the magazines were distributed in an unnatural setting--in a classroom--with instructions to read the enclosed advertisement, which constitutes forced exposure to the treatment rather than the more natural circumstance of opportunity for exposure. Further, the advertisements were read in the presence of the experiment administrators; and sample sizes were smaller than audiences for actual advertisements.

TABLE 2

RESEARCH EXPERIMENT DESIGN IN HASKINS' PRECISE
NOTATIONAL SYSTEM (Haskins, 1981)

	t1	t2	t3
P1a	--	T1a(fx)	M1-17
P1b	--	T1b(fx)	M1-17
P1c	--	T1c(fx)	M1-17
P2a	--	T1a(fx)	M1-17
P2b	--	T1b(fx)	M1-17
P2c	--	T1c(fx)	M1-17

- t1 = Before experiment
 t2 = Administration period during class
 t3 = Immediately following exposure to treatments
 P1 = Female students in nursing class
 P2 = Male students in engineering class
 P1a = Random assignment from P1, n=26
 P1b = Random assignment from P1, n=27
 P1c = Random assignment from P1, n=24
 P2a = Random assignment from P2, n=31
 P2b = Random assignment from P2, n=30
 P2c = Random assignment from P2, n=29
 T1a(fx) = Forced exposure to low salience treatment
 T1b(fx) = Forced exposure to neutral salience treatment
 T1c(fx) = Forced exposure to high salience treatment
 M1-12 = 10 Wells Profile Items with 2 supplemental items
 M13-17 = Demographic items

Attempts to ameliorate the effects of these biasing factors were to administer treatment advertisements inserted in a neutral magazine format medium--a corporate public relations journal, and to have treatment advertisements professionally prepared and critiqued. The problems of forced exposure to stimuli and sample size are likely to parallel conditions in consumer reaction research in general, thus not significantly misrepresenting the procedures it is the purpose of this study to qualify.

Sample Selection

The samples for this study were drawn from the population of female students enrolled in the junior and senior years in the College of Nursing at the University of Tennessee during the Fall quarter of the 1982-83 academic year, and from male students enrolled in the sophomore year in the Electrical Engineering Department of the College of Engineering in the same university at the same time. Foreign students were excluded from the sample frames on the assumption of divergent mores and perceptions of the American marketing process.

The reason for selecting these populations for study are that the study required homogeneous samples for which product saliences were predictable. Samples were drawn from these two professional colleges because they presented access to high concentrations segregated by sex and by

professional interests, thus presumably by product saliences for at least some categories of product. Heterogeneous samples, generally desirable in research because of representativeness of the general public (Deming, 1950), do not permit designing treatments that have predictable product salience.

Study Hypotheses

The following are the specific hypothesized findings of this research:

1. Nursing students will evaluate an advertisement for support stockings as less deceptive than an advertisement for a screwdriver kit.
2. Nursing students will evaluate an advertisement for support stockings as less deceptive than an advertisement for cigarettes.
3. Engineering students will evaluate an advertisement for a screwdriver kit as less deceptive than an advertisement for support stockings.
4. Engineering students will evaluate an advertisement for a screwdriver kit as less deceptive than an advertisement for cigarettes.

Pretest

It was necessary for this experiment to have treatment advertisements designed which were of predictable salience to the samples. To ascertain product saliences for the

populations, a pretest survey was conducted on 50 members from each population, selected by interval sampling from sampling frames taken from enrollment records for each college. The survey questionnaire contained a list of 20 products to be rated for salience on a +10 to -10 scale. A copy of the questionnaire and pre- and post- survey letters are contained in Appendix A.

The questionnaire also contained Likert scaled items soliciting data on subjects' attitudes toward advertising and the American marketing system in general. Two scales were formed, a Consumerism Scale with four items and an Attitude Toward Advertising Scale with three items. The results from these scales were compared to test for differences between the two populations on these measures.

Pretest Results

The pretest survey was designed to evaluate three population characteristics--product saliences, consumerist attitudes, and attitude toward advertising. Terhune recommended (1975) that these variables, and attitude toward brand or advertiser be controlled in studies of advertisement deceptiveness. The attitude toward advertiser variable was controlled in this study by using fictitious, but similar, brand names for treatment products.

The pretest found the two populations equivalent on the variables of consumerist attitude and attitude toward advertising in general. T-tests by item between groups show no significant differences on these variables, and the summative scales of four items for Consumerist Attitudes and three items for Attitude Toward Advertising, therefore show no differences as well (Table 3, page 49). A reliability check on these two scales showed suitable reliability for each, with Alpha scores over .7000 (Table 4, page 50), indicating sufficiently predictable measurement of a single factor.

T-tests for differences between groups on the product saliences measures show differences for some products and, predictably, none for others (Table 5, page 51). Support pantyhose, screwdrivers and cigarettes were selected from the list of products, having the desired salience characteristics and being from a similar price bracket, which protects against that variable biasing the appeal of advertisement treatments.

Demographic findings show no significant differences between the two populations except that males report greater magazine use than females. Since the finding is unexplained and not crucial to interpretation of the study results, it was not considered justification for determining non-equivalence of the populations.

TABLE 3

T-TEST DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POPULATIONS OF CONSUMERIST
ATTITUDE AND ATTITUDE TOWARD ADVERTISING
AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS

VARIABLE	SEX	MEAN	SD	DF	T-VALUE	2-TAIL P
<u>Consumerist Attitude</u>						
	M	-0.0167	0.907	54.16	0.30	0.762
	F	-0.1000	1.192			
<u>Attitude Toward Advertising</u>						
	M	1.1444	0.653	55.12	-0.58	0.565
	F	1.2556	0.824			
<u>Age</u>						
	M	21.1000	3.033	46.53	-1.63	0.110
	F	22.9000	5.228			
<u>Magazine Use</u>						
	M	26.7333	26.616	51.69	2.57	0.013
	F	11.5000	18.483			

TABLE 4

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND RELIABILITY (ALPHA) SCORES
FOR CONSUMERIST SCALE AND ATTITUDE
TOWARD ADVERTISING SCALE

SCALE	ITEMS	MEAN	VARIANCE	STD DEV	ALPHA
<u>Consumerism</u>					
	4	-0.23333	17.67345	4.20398	0.75055
<u>Attitude Toward Advertising</u>					
	2	2.60000	4.92202	2.21857	0.76715

TABLE 5

T-TEST DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POPULATIONS
OF PRODUCT SALIENCES, RANKED BY
LEVEL OF SALIENCE

SALIENCE	PRODUCT	SEX	MEAN	2-TAIL P	COMMENT
<u>Negative</u>					
	Chewing Tobacco				
		M	-3.1000		
		F	-5.3000	0.160	
	Cigarettes				
		M	-4.5000		
		F	-5.3667	0.614	Treatment
<u>Low</u>					
	Drafting Pen				
		M	2.3000		
		F	0.2000	0.047	
	Briefcase				
		M	2.5000		
		F	0.9333	0.156	
	Kitchen Knife				
		M	2.5667		
		F	4.8667	0.039	
	Portable TV				
		M	4.3667		
		F	4.1000	0.753	
	35mm Camera				
		M	3.8000		
		F	3.4333	0.722	
	Shaving Cream				
		M	3.1333		
		F	1.1000	0.048	

TABLE 5 (Continued)

SALIENCE	PRODUCT	SEX	MEAN	2-TAIL P	COMMENT	
<u>High</u>	Glass Cleaner	M	0.7667	0.009	Treatment	
		F	3.4667			
	Shoe Brush	M	1.4333	0.838		
		F	1.2333			
	Luggage Set	M	2.6000	0.020		
		F	4.9667			
	Tennis Ball	M	2.4333	0.437		
		F	3.2333			
	Moped	M	-1.3000	0.437		
		F	-1.7000			
	Work Shoes	M	3.9000	0.004		
		F	7.2667			
	Support Stockings	M	-2.2000	0.000		
		F	7.1333			
	Motor Oil	M	6.7333	0.667		
		F	6.3667			
	Stethoscope	M	-1.3333	0.000		
		F	8.9000			
	Shampoo	M	7.2667	0.087		
		F	8.4000			

TABLE 5 (Continued)

SALIENCE	PRODUCT	SEX	MEAN	2-TAIL P	COMMENT
	Socks	M	6.3333		
		F	6.4667	0.880	
	Automobile Tires	M	6.9333		
		F	6.6000	0.709	
	Screwdriver	M	6.1000		
		F	2.6000	0.001	Treatment
	Notebook	M	6.0667		
		F	7.4333	0.148	
	Stereo Amp	M	6.0667		
		F	1.7333	0.000	
	Work Wardrobe	M	4.4000		
		F	8.7667	0.000	

Experimental Methodology

The datagathering method for this experiment was in the form of a questionnaire administered immediately following exposure to treatment advertisements in a classroom setting. Treatments were distributed alternately to provide randomness of assignment to treatments. Copies of the treatments and questionnaire are contained in Appendix B.

The questionnaire was composed of the Wells Reaction Profile (Wells, 1964). The Reaction Profile was developed and validated in 1964 for Ogilvy and Mather, and continues to be used by applied researchers for pretesting advertisements.

The portion of the ten item semantic differential scale dealing with deception, of primary interest in this study, was augmented with two synonym sets to establish the reliability of response on this measure. Thus, a Deceptiveness Scale was formed as a subset of the Reaction Profile using the items Realistic/Unrealistic, Honest/Dishonest, and Truthful/Deceptive.

Demographic items were also included on the questionnaire to purge the file of stray non-population members, such as female engineers and non-nationals.

Treatments

Three treatment advertisements were designed and produced for the experiment representing the three levels of product salience found to exist in the pretest evaluation. An advertisement was designed for support pantyhose, representing high salience for nursing students and low salience for engineering students. An advertisement was designed for a screwdriver set, representing high salience for engineering students and low salience for nursing students. A third advertisement was designed for cigarettes, representing negative salience for both populations.

The three advertisements were designed to be as closely equivalent graphically and in copy as the three diverse products would permit. Each advertisement contains one explicit, but innocuous product claim: dependability for pantyhose, precision-made for screwdrivers, and more tobacco flavor for cigarettes. The rest of the appeals in the advertisements are all of a social or psychological nature.

To establish the equivalence of the advertisements in presentation of claims, and particularly on the variable of deceptiveness, the advertisements were presented to a panel of advertising experts. The panel consisted of an agency chief copywriter, an agency art director, and a professor

of advertising. Each member found the advertisements to be equivalent on the value of deceptiveness, regardless of the degree of deceptiveness that was present. They concurred that if subjects report more deceptiveness in one or more of the advertisements than another, the finding is a function of the subjects' psychology rather than of the advertisements.

The treatments were reproduced after evaluation and inserted into copies of Fairfield, the public relations publication for Fairfield Development Corporation. The purpose of this insertion was to have the advertisement appear in a magazine-type setting as close to a real situation for exposure as possible. A regularly issued consumer magazine was not used so that the editorial and advertising environment around the inserted advertisement would not bias expectations of the subjects. Fairfield magazine has no other advertising.

CHAPTER V

EXPERIMENT RESULTS

After elimination of 13 unusable responses (8 percent of total), the administration of treatments yielded 53 in the sample of males and 86 in the sample of females. The discrepancy in sample sizes, though planned from similar sized classes, may be accounted for by differences in attendance between Engineering classes at 7:50 a.m. and Nursing classes at 11:00 a.m.

Alpha tests of the reliability of the original items in the Wells Reaction Profile and of the Deceptiveness Scale subset showed suitable Alpha scores of 0.90397 and 0.83991, respectively. The reliability tests indicate that each scale measures a single factor for the study with sufficient predictability.

An analysis of the use of individual scale items by the two groups show that in almost every case females rated across all advertisements with lower scores than males, demonstrating greater disapproval overall (Table 6, page 58). This may be accounted for by impatience with the exposure situation, which was at the end of a class, as opposed to the beginning of class which was the case with administration to males. It is also possible that the attitudes toward advertising differ between groups, though

TABLE 6

T-TEST DIFFERENCES BETWEEN POPULATIONS ON
WELLS REACTION PROFILE ITEMS
AND TOTAL SCORES

ITEM	SEX	MEAN	2-TAIL P	COMMENT
<u>Beautiful/Ugly</u>	M	-0.6604	0.001	
	F	-1.6977		
<u>Meaningful/Meaningless</u>	M	-0.8302	0.012	
	F	-1.9070		
<u>Fresh/Stale</u>	M	-1.3019	0.007	
	F	-2.3140		
<u>Realistic/Unrealistic</u>	M	-1.3019	0.470	Item added
	F	-1.6047		
<u>Attractive/Unattractive</u>	M	-0.7358	0.002	
	F	-1.9302		
<u>Convincing/Unconvincing</u>	M	-1.7736	0.041	
	F	-2.5465		
<u>Lively/Lifeless</u>	M	-1.3774	0.044	
	F	-2.2209		

TABLE 6 (Continued)

ITEM	SEX	MEAN	2-TAIL P	COMMENT
<u>Interesting/Uninteresting</u>				
	M	-1.5283		
	F	-2.4419	0.022	
<u>Honest/Dishonest</u>				
	M	-0.7358		
	F	-1.7326	0.014	
<u>Different/Ordinary</u>				
	M	-1.0000		
	F	-1.7093	0.109	
<u>Appealing/Unappealing</u>				
	M	-1.3208		
	F	-2.6047	0.000	
<u>Truthful/Deceptive</u>				
	M	-0.9623		
	F	-1.8023	0.038	Item added
<u>Total Original Items</u>				
	M	-0.9557		
	F	-1.7953	0.000	
<u>Total Items</u>				
	M	-0.9599		
	F	-1.7422	0.001	

the pretest did not reveal this. The two items which did not test as significantly different, realism and originality, do not shed light on this overall difference in the responses.

Analysis by ANOVA (SPSS, 1981) of differences in summative ratings of advertisements (see Tables 7 through 10) using the Wells Profile showed that statistically different responses for each advertisement separately were found for the Screwdriver and Cigarette advertisements, but not for the Pantyhose advertisement ($P > .05$). Analysis by the Scheffe test (SPSS, 1981) of differences in summative ratings of advertisements using the Wells Profile shows no significant differences in responses for each advertisement within groups (Table 7, page 61). This indicates that each sample found the advertisements to be equivalent overall, though females responded more negatively to the treatments.

Analysis by ANOVA of differences in Deceptiveness Scale ratings shows no statistically significance on this variable between samples for each advertisement. Analysis by Scheffe test of differences in Deceptiveness Scale ratings of advertisements within each sample shows that both groups rated the Screwdriver advertisement more positively than the other two ($p < .05$) (Table 9, page 62).

Analysis by Two-Way ANOVA of the interaction effect of sample membership and advertisement treatment on Wells

TABLE 7
MEAN SCORES FOR WELLS REACTION PROFILE
OF TREATMENTS BY POPULATION

	Screwdriver (n=49)	Support Hose (n=47)	Cigarettes (n=43)
Males (n=53)	-0.60 (n=19)	-1.41 (n=18)	-0.87 (n=16)
Females (n=86)	-1.61 (n=30)	-1.78 (n=29)	-2.02 (n=27)

TABLE 8
TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF WELLS
REACTION PROFILE SCORES BY
POPULATION AND TREATMENT

Source of Variance	DF	Mean Square	F	Sig F
Main Effects	3	9.322	5.707	0.001
Group	1	22.932	14.039	0.000
Ad	2	2.424	1.484	0.231
2-Way Interaction				
Group Ad	2	1.926	1.179	0.311
Explained	5	6.364	3.896	0.003

TABLE 9
MEAN SCORES FOR DECEPTIVENESS SCALE OF
TREATMENTS BY POPULATION

	Screwdriver (n=49)	Support Hose (n=47)	Cigarettes (n=43)
Males (n=53)	0.12 (n=19)	-1.24 (n=18)	-1.58 (n=16)
Females (n=86)	-0.46 (n=30)	-1.71 (n=29)	-2.35 (n=27)

TABLE 10
TWO-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF
DECEPTIVENESS SCALE SCORES BY
POPULATION AND TREATMENTS

Source of Variance	DF	Mean Square	F	Sig F
Main Effects	3	31.529	13.518	0.000
Group	1	11.826	5.070	0.026
Ad	2	41.001	17.579	0.000
2-Way Interaction				
Group Ad	2	0.244	0.104	0.901
Explained	5	19.015	8.152	0.000

Profile Scores shows no statistical significance (Table 8, page 61). Analysis by Two-Way ANOVA of the interaction effect of sample membership and advertisement treatments on Deceptiveness scores also shows no statistical significance (Table 10, page 62).

Substantive Significance of Findings

The finding of no differences between advertisements in overall evaluation by both groups was desirable, demonstrating success in the creation of generally equivalent treatments. The fact that females rated two of the three advertisements lower overall than males appears to reflect a pervasive attitude not reflecting on the treatments themselves. Since equivalence on this variable between populations was established in the pretest, the assumption can be made that some other confounding variable manifested this difference. Two candidates for this confound may be the situational effect of the timing of administration, which was out of the researcher's control, or some divergent aesthetic sensibility.

The finding of no differences between samples in the responses on the Deceptive Scale, confirmed by the finding of no interactive effect between samples and treatments, indicates that the samples did not react to the treatments as expected. The study hypotheses predicted that males and females would respond differently to the Screwdriver and

Support Hose advertisements because of differing salience, but similarly to the Cigarette ad, being similarly negatively salient to both samples.

Study hypothesis One predicted that nursing students would perceive less deceptiveness in the support hose advertisement than in the screwdriver advertisement. The reverse was found. Study hypothesis Two predicted that nursing students would perceive less deceptiveness in the support hose advertisement than in the cigarette advertisement. This was found to be the case. Study hypothesis Three predicted that engineering students would perceive less deceptiveness in the screwdriver set advertisement than in the pantyhose advertisement. This was found to be the case. Study hypothesis Four predicted that engineering students would perceive less deceptiveness in the screwdriver advertisement than in the cigarette advertisement. This was also found to be the case.

The hypotheses pertaining to the negatively salient Cigarette advertisement were supported by these findings, as both groups rated the Cigarette advertisement as being significantly more deceptive than the neutral and high salient advertisements. However, the uniform direction of subject evaluation of the other two advertisements which contradicts the expected finding--both groups evaluated the screwdriver advertisement as less deceptive than the

panty hose advertisement--suggests that the support of the Cigarette hypothesis may be spurious. It is not possible to tell from the data whether the high deceptiveness rating by both samples is due to the hypothesized Attention Debt response of rejecting a non-salient frame of reference based on negative product salience, or is due to perceived unbelievability of the S-P appeal of social success used in the advertisement.

The experiment was originally based on the estimation that all variables in the treatment advertisements could be considered equivalent, with only product salience of the advertisements being varied. The assumption was thus made that any S-P appeals present in the advertisements were equivalently deceptive, regardless of degree. The researcher designed the treatments under this assumption, and the advertisements were subsequently evaluated as such by the panel of experts. The findings in this study suggest that advertisement readers do not consider different S-P appeals to be equivalently deceptive, but this evaluation is not based on product salience, rather on some other aspect of their psychological frame of reference. More precisely, if product salience is a significant contributor to variance in perceived deceptiveness, this effect was overridden or overshadowed by another variable.

Although statistical analysis does not reveal interactive effects between advertisements and group membership, it is substantively apparent that the nursing sample reacted to the Pantyhose advertisement from an unanticipated, though quite potent, reference set. Conversation with the instructor of the sample class revealed an inculcated reference set which may be labelled as Professional Ethics and Self-Image, which responded negatively to suggestions of levity or sexual ulteriority in the nursing role. Apparently, the advertisement was based on an appeal that was strongly incongruous with perceived referent group norms. The model employed in the pantyhose advertisement may have been interpreted as overtly frivolous. The presence of two males in the ad, employed to suggest increased attractiveness, may have been viewed as sexist and significantly more objectionable than an S-P appeal of non-sexual nature. The subjects' defense against uncritical acceptance of such an appeal coincides with evidence by Carlile (1982) that advertising audiences employ greater critical judgment in perceiving advertising messages than consumerists give them credit for.

Preston's theory (1975) that all S-P appeals are categorically deceptive, which was the impetus for this study, does not address the possibility that all S-P appeals may not be equally deceptive. If this is the case,

then the assumption of equivalence in the preparation of treatments was a mistaken one. Because it is impossible to extricate the effects of the two variables of product salience and acceptance of appeals in this experiment, no conclusive support nor disconfirmation is possible for the original hypotheses. Though this was not the objective of the study, the demonstration of this confounding consideration in the study of S-P appeals is in itself useful.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Advertising professionals, consumerists and consumer protection agencies share concerns about deceptive practices in advertising. Each group has its reasons for wanting greater insight into deceptiveness. The most valid source about what practices are deceptive is the consumer. Therefore, these professional groups will continue to seek empirically grounded insights into the interaction of advertisement appeals and consumers' psychological perspectives. The most direct, though not necessarily most incisive, means of evaluating deceptive advertising is to simply ask consumers to evaluate advertisements on this variable. Directly or indirectly, this is the gist of consumer self-reported research--consumers are asked to respond to questions about advertisements, real or contrived.

Consumer research techniques have been developed for advertisements where appeals are primarily factually based. Models for such research have been produced (Barbour and Gardner, 1982) that should yield accurate indicators of deceptive factual claims or appeals. Although little research to date has dealt specifically with deceptiveness of social or psychological representations, we may

anticipate increasing interest in collecting consumers' perceptions on what advertisements they find deceptive and why. Likewise, research on belief change and implication perception, which are the current trends in S-P research, may eventually recognize the need to validate the theoretical structures which they assume against the self-reported perceptions of consumers. That is, eventually any model of consumer psychology has to be validated by consumers it purports to represent. This is because only the consumer knows what psychological expectations are actually disconfirmed through experience. An outside observer or objective researcher may feel competent to judge increased sex appeal from the use of a toothpaste, but a far more valid judgment can be expected from the user, who sees or feels the subtle cues of social acceptance or confidence, which is more to the point of such advertisement claims.

It must be acknowledged that self-reportage is not an unassailable source of data. But for data on subtle, internalized psychological events it is still the primary source. The consumer's inability to accurately evaluate his subjective states is probably less of an error source than the expertise of social researchers in eliciting data incisively and without bias.

A premise of this study is that although the consumer knows his own mind sufficiently to be a useful data source for deceptiveness research, the circumstances of research itself are likely to evoke spurious responses unless many factors in the research technique are carefully considered and controlled. One such source of bias in technique can occur in sample selection. In many research designs it is desirable to employ samples selected to represent the general public as accurately as possible. Advertisements that employ factual appeals may be successfully evaluated with such heterogeneous samples, since a phenomenological fact is a fact for anyone, at least legally. Advertisements that employ S-P appeals must be considered separately, on the basis that a psychological "fact" is not equally a fact for everyone, and should be recognized as such legally.

This study attempted to demonstrate that different populations with different product saliences as part of their frames of reference would perceive differing levels of deceptiveness in S-P advertisements. The experiment data appeared to partially support this hypothesis. However, a more frank analysis of the data suggests that another psychological phenomenon accounts for the discrepant findings and the apparently supportive findings as well. The interpretation of data that supports the

research hypotheses indicates that populations will perceive substantial deceptiveness in advertisements with S-P appeals for products that are negatively salient. Both study samples showed the tendency to rate negatively salient advertisements lower than neutral or positive salient advertisements. However, the fact that one sample, females, rated what was calculated as a positively salient advertisement in the same negative direction, and statistically similarly, as the negative advertisement indicates that another explanation needs to be proposed.

This alternate explanation covering both these findings is that both samples objected to not the fact of exposure to differing levels of advertisement salience, but to the nature of the S-P appeals employed. This suggests that there may be a perceived deceptiveness hierarchy of S-P appeals, and a confounding variable in the research design. In this instance, the appeal of peer approval may be less objectionable to both study populations than one for increased attractiveness. The direction of data suggests that when attractiveness claims are made in association with a negatively salient product the attractiveness appeal is perceived as even more objectionable or at least more deceptive.

Recommendations for Future Research

Preston's claim (1975) that S-P representations are categorically deceptive can be interpreted in two ways. Deceptiveness can be defined as a binary state--yes or no--or as a continuum or hierarchical state. The indication in this study is that the second interpretation may be the more accurate. This possibility needs to be explored and verified in future research. If a hierarchy of deceptiveness exists, then the possibility also exists that the low deceptiveness end of the scale merges indistinctly into non-deceptiveness. If the distinction between deceptive and non-deceptive is found to be empirically indistinct, this poses new problems, legally and ethically, for those making the claim of deceptiveness of advertisement appeals. It is far easier to judge issues in black and white than when grey areas exist for interpretation.

If a grey area is found in deceptiveness research, another complexity may also present itself for further study, which is that the appeal hierarchy may be perceived differently by sub-populations within the "modified ignorant man" standard. That is, within the population protected by law and/or ethics, there may be disagreement about what is decidedly deceptive in S-P appeals and what is indecisively so.

Future research to verify that product salience is an influential factor in how subjects evaluate advertisements will also have to contend with the hierarchy--selecting a definite or indefinitely deceptive appeal, and the possibility of variance in subject's perception of the hierarchy. That is, subjects who agree on product salience may not agree on deceptiveness of appeals. It is also possible that classes or types of product are viewed by consumers as more prone to deceptive appeals, acceptably or not. For example, consumers may accept stronger S-P appeals for cosmetics than for tires, since the products may be considered as parts of differing personal reference sets. Furthermore, S-P appeals for one product type may be considered inappropriate for products of another type, which may thwart the attempt to hold appeals constant over several product variations, or to test various appeals for one product.

Thus, a major question for further research is whether it is possible to extricate the interactive effects of variation in subjects' product saliences, acceptance of social-psychological representations, and acceptance of appeals for different products. The possibility that they cannot be studied categorically would tend to reinforce the FTC's current practice of determining deceptiveness on a situational basis. Until the deceptiveness of S-P appeals,

or evidence of strong consumer perceptions of advertising deceptiveness, can be demonstrated for the category of S-P representations, the summary judgment of consumerists should not guide changes in regulatory policy by the FTC.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A
PRETEST FORMS

SURVEY FORM, PAGE 1

College of Communications

THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE 37916

TO: The Student Chosen For This Survey

Here's the opinion survey questionnaire I wrote to you about a few days ago. I hope you can take 10 minutes right now to give us your thoughts.

I am conducting this survey as part of a study of how consumers perceive advertising messages. Your response is being solicited to aid in preparing this study, and will be kept completely anonymous. You are one of only a small number of people randomly selected to represent several hundred. Therefore, your responses are extremely important.

I might just mention that:

- (1) The questionnaire takes only a few minutes;
- (2) Your name is not required;
- (3) There are no right or wrong answers -- we just want your personal opinion.

Many thanks for your help in this survey.

David A. Wesson
David A. Wesson
Survey Director

P.S. The quarter attached here is to encourage you to return the completed questionnaire within one week - and is a small token of our appreciation for your help with this survey.

SURVEY FORM, PAGE 2

Page 1

1 2

4 5

This
Column
For
Office
Use Only.

INTRODUCTION: In the study of the American economic system, the term "marketing system" refers to the business activities required to distribute, promote and sell you products and services. This questionnaire is designed to explore your attitudes on aspects of the American marketing system as you have experienced it. This is not a test. Your answers are just an expression of your personal feelings and thoughts. For your participation to be most useful, please answer each question on the form. Your answers are anonymous.

For each statement below, circle the appropriate number which represents the degree to which you agree or disagree with the statement. For example:

A large breakfast is the best way to start the day.

Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree	Neutral	Slightly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In general, the American marketing system is a good one.

Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree	Neutral	Slightly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In general, the American marketing system is dishonest.

Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree	Neutral	Slightly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In general, the American marketing system needs to be changed.

Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree	Neutral	Slightly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In general, the American marketing system exploits consumers.

Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree	Neutral	Slightly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Advertising is one of the ways products and services are promoted in the American marketing system. In the course of your life you have been exposed to many kinds of advertisements or commercial messages. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following statements about advertising.

In general, advertising is a necessary part of the marketing system.

Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree	Neutral	Slightly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In general, advertising is a good thing.

Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree	Neutral	Slightly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

In general, advertising is deceptive.

Strongly Agree	Moderately Agree	Slightly Agree	Neutral	Slightly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Strongly Disagree
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

SURVEY FORM, PAGE 3

Page 2

The following is a list of products you may find generally available for purchase in stores. Beside each item, evaluate the importance of that item to you by giving the item a score from +10 to -10. +10 means +10 means Very Important to you; 0 means No Importance at all; -10 means Strongly Dislike or Disapprove.

ITEM	SCORE	ITEM	SCORE
Work shoes	<u>14</u>	Notebook	<u>28</u>
Support stockings	<u>16</u>	Portable TV	<u>40</u>
Drafting pen set	<u>18</u>	Cigarettes	<u>42</u>
Motor oil	<u>20</u>	35mm Camera	<u>44</u>
Stethoscope	<u>22</u>	Shaving cream	<u>46</u>
Shampoo	<u>24</u>	Stereo amplifier	<u>48</u>
Briefcase	<u>26</u>	Glass cleaner	<u>50</u>
Socks	<u>28</u>	Work wardrobe	<u>52</u>
Automobile tires	<u>30</u>	Shoe brush	<u>54</u>
Kitchen knife	<u>32</u>	Luggage set	<u>56</u>
Chewing tobacco	<u>34</u>	Tennis ball	<u>58</u>
Screwdriver	<u>36</u>	Moped	<u>60</u>

Sex 1 2 Class 1 2 3 4 5 6

M F 61 F S J Sr Grad Other

Major 1 2 3 Age

Nursing Engineering Other

Using this last week as a standard, please indicate the amount of time you generally spend each day with:

Newspaper	Magazine	TV	Radio	Non-text Book	Stereo
<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

POST-SURVEY FORM (70% Reduction)

College of Communications

THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE 37916

TO: Selected Participants of Opinion Survey

This is just a brief report of the survey for which you received a questionnaire a few days ago.

The completed questionnaires are starting to come in, and the results look very interesting and useful. They will help make this study a meaningful contribution in the marketing field.

Many thanks for taking part and sending us your opinion.

With great appreciation,

David A. Wesson

David A. Wesson
Survey Director

P.S. If you haven't returned your questionnaire yet, please do so in the next three days. If you've misplaced it and need another, call me right away at 974-3048 - I'll be glad to send you another.

PRE- AND POST-SURVEY FORMS

MEMO TO: Members of Opinion Survey Sample

In a few days you'll receive an opinion survey questionnaire from our survey study team. Since you are one of only a small number randomly selected to represent a large population, your views are extremely important.

The questionnaire will be short; your response will be completely anonymous; and will not be used for any commercial purposes. So please be on the lookout for it.

Many thanks for your help.



David A. Wesson
Survey Director

TO: Member of Opinion Survey Sample

Just a reminder: If you haven't returned the market survey questionnaire already, please fill it out RIGHT AWAY and mail it in.

Most of the responses are in and we are about to begin tabulating the results.


If you already have sent in the questionnaire, as most of the sample has, please disregard this reminder. And thanks for your participation.

David A. Wesson
Survey Director


APPENDIX B
EXPERIMENT TREATMENTS AND FORMS

SUPPORT PANTYHOSE ADVERTISEMENT

Get More Out Of Life.



You work hard. So you deserve more from life. More satisfaction on the job, more fun off the job. VICTORIA Support Pantyhose help you get the most from your life, at work and after work. Because you have more energy for work and play. VICTORIA... Strong, dependable support. So you get more from your life.



VICTORIA
SUPPORT PANTYHOSE

CIGARETTE ADVERTISEMENT

Get More Out Of Life.



You deserve more from life.
More flavor, more satisfaction.
VICTORY...A cigarette with
all the tobacco flavor you want.
Next time you reach for satisfaction,

reach for VICTORY.
With no compromise.
So you get more of
what you want
out of life.

Warning: The Surgeon General Has Determined
That Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.


VICTORY

SCREWDRIVER ADVERTISEMENT

Get More Out Of Your Work.



You work hard. So you deserve more from your work. More satisfaction and pride. A lot of satisfaction comes from using good tools. You can expect good results, and the rewards that come from good performance. VICTOR Precision Tools are precision-crafted to exacting specifications. When you order tools, specify VICTOR. So you'll get more from your work.



VICTOR

PRECISION TOOLS

EXPERIMENT FORM, PAGE 1

College of Communications

THE UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE, KNOXVILLE, TENNESSEE 37996-0313

Graduate Studies and
Communications Research Center
(615) 974-6631

Dear Fellow Student,

I am collecting opinions on advertisements as a part of my graduate research program. Your class instructor has kindly permitted me to ask your assistance with my research.

All you have to do is read the ad on page 13 of this magazine and give me your personal opinion of the ad on the reverse side of this sheet.

It will only take a minute or two to fill out the form; and your responses are completely anonymous. My assistant will pick up these materials in about 5 minutes.

Thank you very much for your help.

David Wesson

Remember: First read the ad on page 13,
then give me your personal opinion
on the other side of this sheet.

EXPERIMENT FORM, PAGE 2

RESPONSE FORM

Check the space between each set of words that best represents your opinion of the ad.

Beautiful	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Ugly
Meaningful	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Meaningless
Fresh	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Stale
Realistic	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Unrealistic
Attractive	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Unattractive
Convincing	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Unconvincing
Lively	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Lifeless
Interesting	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Uninteresting
Honest	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Dishonest
Different	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Ordinary
Appealing	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Unappealing
Truthful	___	___	___	___	___	___	___	Deceptive

RESPONDENT DATA

Please check the appropriate spaces:

Female ___ Male ___

Year: Fresh ___ Soph ___ Junior ___ Senior ___ Other ___

College: Engineering ___ Nursing ___ Other ___

U.S. Citizen: Yes ___ No ___

Thanks again; this will be a great help to me.

VITA

David Arnold Wesson was born in Rockville Center, New York on March 20, 1950. Two years later he moved with his family to Yokohama, Japan where he attended the Yokohama International School. In 1962 the family returned to the United States to the community of Glen Ridge, New Jersey where he graduated from high school in 1967. The following September he entered Syracuse University, where he received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Philosophy, with a major in Graphic Arts from Newhouse Communication Center.

In 1973 he joined the faculty of the School of Journalism at West Virginia University teaching communication graphics, leaving two years later to pursue a Master of Arts in Advertising at Ball State University. He obtained the degree in 1976, after which he worked as a graphic artist and returned to Ball State to teach Advertising in 1978. In 1980 he was accepted into the doctoral program in the College of Communications at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, completing the degree in 1983 with a concentration in Advertising.

The author is a member of Kappa Tau Alpha, Phi Kappa Phi, the American Academy of Advertising, and

the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communications. Upon graduation Mr. Wesson will join the faculty of the College of Journalism at Marquette University.