




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
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
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THE DISAVOWED SELF:
PERCEPTION OF DIRTINESS IN STIGMATIZED PERSONS

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

W. Allen Burt
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ABSTRACT

Stigmatized persons are commonly shunned and avoided by others. It is proposed that the perception of dirtiness in stigmatized individuals may contribute to this avoidance. The aversion towards stigma is considered in relation to, and as a function of, social and individual identities. Eighty one undergraduate volunteers were led to believe that the experimenter was either normal or stigmatized through a family history of mental illness. Using ratings of subliminally presented words and pictures, subjects tended to view the examiner, in particular, and stigmatized people, in general, as being relatively more dirty than normals. In addition, a comparison of reaction times in which subjects defined themselves and university students using a list of words, showed subjects were least ambivalent about words referring to dirt. Dirtiness was quickly denied both in the self and in university students, a peer group. It is suggested that improvements in methodology may result in a more conclusive link between dirtiness and stigma.

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INTRODUCTION

Stigma debases those to whom it is applied. It indicates something unusual and bad about the person, making him or her less than fully human (Goffman, 1963). As such, stigma defines the margins of what is human and acceptable, and what is unknown, frightening and debasing. Stigma serves an important cultural and psychological function because it helps to define the self through establishing what the self is not. It stands for what normal people are not. "Normal" people are not avoided, discriminated against, or shunned. Because normal people are perceived as clean, I propose that people who are stigmatized are also seen as dirty.

Although the literature is replete with anecdotal material, no studies have been specifically designed to test the hypothesis that stigma is associated with dirt. What I attempt to accomplish in the literature review is to look at the function of stigma in terms of its usefulness to the in-group, such that the in-group may bolster its sense of acceptability through locating the unacceptable in the other. In this way, stigma acts something like a reversed mirror for normals. Normals can look into the mirror of stigma and feel reassured that their images are not contaminated, not dirty, and "not me".

I begin by considering the need to organize and give meaning to experience, first by focussing on stigma's function in social and group psychology and then showing the clear parallels which exist at the level of the individual. It will be apparent at each of these levels that the human need for boundaries and the desire to deny one's own "dirt" are directly connected with stigma.

CHAPTER 1

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Social Order, Stigma, and Dirt

We are born into "one great booming buzzing confusion" (James, 1890). No one can live in such a world, without boundaries or organization. Humans need some stability to function, and it is only because a baby has a mother to provide structure that it is able to survive at all (Winne-cott, 1965). The real world is too fleeting, complex, and varied to be fully apprehended. "We are not equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many variations and combinations. And although we have to act in that environment, we have to construct it on a simpler model before we can manage with it" (Lippman, 1922, p. 16).

Sheer survival is based upon the limitation of that which is unlimited. Part of human maturation is differentiation--self from nonself, good from bad, right from wrong, friend from foe, and clean from dirty. These notions order experience. They shape, limit, and define our view of the world and thus provide the structure which allows one to develop a sense of meaning. Who can know why one was born a certain race, with certain features, or in a certain

society? Such questions reveal the profound uncertainty which pervades life, for they betray, if one was to forsake cultural ideologies, the profound capriciousness of this world. Our system of "truths" is rooted in our culture, and can be taken for granted only because it is not challenged (Berger & Luckman, 1966). The sense of a solid order is illusory and may change with a small shift in perspective. For example, although everyone swallows saliva, few will take it from a cup.

Once categories of meaning have been established they must continue to be reestablished. In considering the "good" man or woman, one must also have an image of the "bad" man or woman to provide contrast. There is no good without bad, no high without low. That which is, is forever in contrast with and threatened by that which is not. The beauty of the day fades into night, stability is interrupted by change, a sense of contentment jeopardized by hunger. Life and death, good and bad, clean and dirty all evidence a tension between them which is both necessary and threatening.

Such polarities are also apparent in the structure of society. There are good and bad, moral and immoral, normal and stigmatized. Stigma's value lies in its ability to provide order and a way of understanding and coping with life's contingencies.

The meanings of dirt and stigma are closely associated as both refer to that which is bad, unwanted, and contaminated. "Reflection on dirt involves reflection on the relation of order to disorder, being to nonbeing, form to formlessness, life to death" (Douglas, 1966, p. 5). According to this widely influential view, dirt and that which is dirty, are labels to describe events, actions, people or things which confuse accepted classifications. Dirt is that which threatens a valued ordering of experience. "The underlying feeling is that a system of values which is habitually expressed in a given arrangement of things has been violated" (Douglas, 1975, p. 51). The link between dirt and systems of values is an important one because it means that, by definition, there is no absolute "dirt". Dirt is relative. Thus, what is dirty in one culture may be considered clean in another. Often, travelers are wary of the different foods they encounter, and are hesitant to eat them for fear that they are unclean. In such a manner, "pollution beliefs not only reinforce the cultural and social structure, but they can actively reduce ambiguity in the moral sphere" (Douglas, 1975, p. 54).

Dirt does not exist in isolation but in relation to the society in which it is defined. Thus, as values and culture change, so must what is held to be clean and what is held to be dirty. This relative definition of dirt assumes that

dirt is symbolic, not concrete. The specific symbolic forms which make up a culture are reflective of the underlying cultural themes which they express; thus, the cultural themes can not exist without their corresponding forms (Ortner, 1973). What is dirty must, therefore, for each culture, be symbolized through the concrete. Although given form, dirt is symbolic.

Like dirt, stigma is relative and reflects cultural norms. To be stigmatized is to be discredited as a human being; it is to be of a lesser, inferior status than those of the cultural majority. Stigma is not inherent in behavior or appearance, but is a property conferred upon a person by others (Erikson, 1962; Goffman, 1963). The actual personality of the marked individual has little bearing on his or her exclusion from acceptance. Simply being very different from others is not, in itself, justification for stigmatization. As Szasz (1970) has noted, both Nobel prize recipients and drug addicts are out of the ordinary, but only the drug addicts suffer the burden of stigma. The difference is not a question of statistics and numbers but one of morals and values. The stigmatized person is essentially "bad" (Goffman, 1963). Such a person is blemished, "ritually polluted, to be avoided, especially in public places" (p. 1). He or she is removed from the acceptable, tainted, and discounted as fully human.

Stigma varies with culture and with time. "By its very nature, stigma is ambiguous. What is perceived as stigma may be quite different from one social context to the next--so different that at times we strain to see any similarity" (Ainlay, Coleman, & Becker, 1986, pp. 3-4). Yet some forms of stigma are less resistant to change. For example, our notions about the morality of murder have not essentially changed, but our beliefs about what constitutes beauty have. In contrast to today's emphasis on looking physically fit, the nineteenth century glorified the appearance tuberculosis gave its victims. The disease was thought to affect those of a superior sensitivity, who felt life too passionately, and who had a refined sense of awareness. Tuberculosis was believed to make people more interesting and real, and the drawn, pale look became the fashionable one for women (Sontag, 1978).

As stigma defines and separates people, it removes them from each other emotionally as well. The feeling of being different hinders the process of mutual identification and empathy which might otherwise take place. To be stigmatized is to be set apart as different from what is valued. Thus removed, the stigmatized person is more easily hated and despised than if they were members of the group. In Java, small children, the insane, the flagrantly immoral are all

viewed as "not yet Javanese" and therefore not yet human (Geertz, 1973, p. 129).

Dirt too has a similar separating and organizing effect. The danger associated with dirt fuels its avoidance. Underlying the danger is disgust, which originates in the unpleasant experience of the self coming into contact with something dirty (Angyal, 1941; Rozin & Fallon, 1987). Disgust repels, it does not attract. "To call something disgusting becomes a powerful means of establishing its place or of demeaning it" (Miller, 1986, p. 299). Any one who has spent time with others who are prejudiced is not surprised to hear them refer to stigmatized persons as being "dirty" or having a bad "odor".

One of the best ways in which to determine caste ranking in India is to determine the relative "purity" of each caste (Marriott, 1968). In his study of 24 castes, Marriott found a great consensus between the relative degrees of caste purity or pollution and their social ranking, but he could not find any objective referents by which such discriminations were made. Instead, he found that the consumption of certain foods and certain types of work were considered unclean, not because they were physically dirty but because they were morally so. In the caste system, lower caste members are felt to be "a source of contamination, the

potency of which depends on the social distance between the castes" (Goffman, 1971, p. 44).

Society, in order to exist, needs a shared reality and limits which demarcate this reality. At this level, stigma has very important functions. In 1933 when Durkheim wrote "The Division of Labor in Society", he argued that although some deviant acts are harmful to society, such as murder and theft, many are not necessarily harmful to group life but perform a vital function by drawing people together in an essential social likeness. To be deviant or normal is simply to be on one side or the other of a socially prescribed limit. Deviance, he believed, was a symbol of social cohesion. "We must not say that an action shocks the common conscience because it is criminal, but rather that it is criminal because it shocks the common conscience" (p. 81). The same is true for stigma. It does not repel others because it is "bad", it is "bad" because others are repelled. By implication then, these others are "good". It was the validation of limits (laws, morals, etc.) which Durkheim (1933) felt served to maintain social cohesion. Likewise, Szasz (1970), basing his thesis on the social functions of the Inquisition and Institutional Psychiatry, offers that both provide "an intellectually meaningful, morally uplifting, and socially well-organized system for the ritualized

affirmation of the benevolence, glory, and power of society's dominant ethic" (p. 58).

In all societies, there exist provisions for "status degradation". Garfinkel (1956) defines this as "any communicative work between persons, whereby the public identity of an actor is transformed into something looked on as lower in the local scheme of social types" (p. 420). Such a universal element in social groups is not a simple coincidence. The universality of degradation ceremonies is a direct result of societies' recognition of limits. To be degraded is to be removed from one social sphere and placed in another. It is to be removed from the realm of clean and placed into the realm of dirty, as occurs when someone is publicly recognized as a prostitute.

Although many groups considered deviant do not directly destroy or engage in overt aggression against society, they are nonetheless stigmatized. To make criminal some forms of human interaction which do not have a tangible effect on other members of a society is to legislate morality (Schur, 1965). Morals legislation indicates a system of values and a way of life that is felt to be threatened. Through the persecution of those who are stigmatized, competing ways of life are degraded. "They are labeled as being deviant because their appearance, behavior, or beliefs offend a dominant group who are intolerant to and threatened by human

differences" (Szasz, 1970, p. 209). Stigma represents that which society considers unwanted and dirty. The differences between those who are normal and those who are stigmatized are typically magnified, and information about relatively harmless aspects of the deviants do not receive much attention (Schur, 1965). Thus, the dominant social ethic is reaffirmed as morally pure.

What is most important is not the actual activities and beliefs of the stigmatized, but the image that is held of them. In his study of Jewish persecution, Sartre (1948, p. 143) stated that "it is not the Jewish character that provokes anti-Semitism but, rather it is the anti-Semite who creates the Jew". In a closely allied vein, Schur (1980) argues that the deviant is not some objective, immutable entity that people respond to; the deviant is first created through social definitions and then reacted to as if the created social image were the reality. The assertion that stigmatized people "smell bad" is likewise a constructed characteristic.

Odor is a curious psychological shibboleth. It is made to bear the brunt of intimate subjective feelings (and prejudices), but its role seems primarily to be that of an "objective" excuse or rationalizer for affective states that are too personal and private to be understood or analyzed in their own right. (Allport, 1954, p. 138)

In our society, deviance has become highly political and dependent on the media (Schur, 1980). These "deviance

contests" consist of the manipulation of symbolic threats, symbolic interests, and public image all for the purpose of garnering political support and furthering one set of interests usually at the expense of another. The attention Schur has given to the politics of deviance does not trivialize stigma. On the contrary, by calling it political, he highlights the very essence of stigma--its symbolic threat. As I will discuss later, this threat, which is felt to emanate from outside groups, is in reality, an internal threat which has been displaced and finds its expression in the creation of stigma. More specifically, this internal threat is linked to the denial of one's own dirtiness and is reflected in the fear of being contaminated by the other.

In most instances, there are far more commonalities than differences between normal and stigmatized people. These intergroup differences may be, on the surface, rather minor but hold deep psychological meaning for those whose worlds it affects (Volkan, 1988). Freud (1917/1957) coined the term "narcissism of minor differences" to describe feelings of hostility which are based on small dissimilarities between people who are otherwise alike. Stigma, although based upon minor differences, establishes the separation between "those who are like us" and "those who are not like us". This gap is essentially a constructed disparity whose

function is to strengthen social identities through dividing the pure from the corrupt.

The very power of a label lies in its ability to obscure commonality. Yet, even between superficially very different groups, there may be an equivalency at the meta-level. Thief and victim share the value of property, heretic and inquisitor interact in terms of religion, and deviant and conformist mirror each other's values (Erikson, 1966). What is held in common is the understanding that there is an agreed-upon limit, a boundary which segregates and defines people.

Deviance is not an alien, destructive element, but "a normal product of stable institutions, a vital resource which is guarded and preserved by the forces found in all human organizations" (Erikson, 1962, p. 307). "The norm retains its validity only if it is regularly used as a basis for judgment" (p. 310). "Thus deviance cannot be dismissed as behavior which disrupts stability in society, but is itself, in controlled quantities, an important condition for preserving stability" (p. 310). "A given society then, is likely to have the kinds of deviance it fears and perhaps even the amounts of deviance that it seeks out" (Schur, 1980). Deviance is needed to symbolize what a society is not and thus strengthen its sense of what it is. As such,

in any given society, the in-group is likely to view themselves as clean, while considering others as dirty.

Social identities evolve out of the conflict both surrounding and defining the boundaries between the acceptable and the unacceptable (Breakwell, 1983). Hampshire (1983) likewise believes that morality is deeply intertwined with conflict. Morality needs transgressors to give it meaning. Of what value is a moral code if it has no purpose? Stigmatized persons breathe life into morality for it is they who represent the consequences of transgression. Discrimination is "a phenomenon of social pluralism" (Sartre, 1948, p. 149), and rejection of the other may be viewed as the supreme proof of loyalty to the group (Szasz, 1970).

The degree of community solidarity may be reflected in the amount of repressive justice employed by the community in its dealings with those who transgress community standards. Inverarity (1976) found that such a relationship held for the deep south in the late 19th century. During the election years, when white solidarity was disrupted, the number of lynchings increased. In other years, when the white community was cohesive, racist hostility could be very high but the number of lynchings low. Thus, racial violence could be predicted according, not to the amount of prejudice expressed, but by the amount of solidarity or disruption experienced within the white community. Erikson (1966)

found a similar cohesion maintaining function in the hunting and killing of witches in Puritan towns. Because deviance functions to maintain systems of value, the specific forms of deviance will vary depending on the context. For example, behaviors which are considered quite sane in one situation, may be seen as being symptomatic of mental illness when viewed from the perspective of a mental hospital (Rosenhan, 1973).

In his classic experiment, Rosenhan sent eight participants to various mental hospitals with the complaint that they heard voices which said "empty", "hollow", and "thud". After they were admitted, they acted as they would normally, yet none were quickly discharged, and seven out of the eight were given the diagnosis of schizophrenia, in remission. (An interesting finding was that whereas none of the staff detected the pseudo-patients, many of the actual patients did!) The intense pressure to accept a role and take on a new identity in order to confirm the label of mentally ill is what Goffman (1959/1981) has described as "the moral career of the mental patient".

What may matter most in stigma is that a boundary is crossed, not how it is crossed. People may cross boundaries and be labeled as stigmatized, but it is also possible that the boundaries may cross the people to the same effect. Lauderdale (1976) has shown empirically that deviance can

result from the movement of moral boundaries independent of individual actions within the system. A quick look at history confirms this finding. When the United States entered WWII, thousands of Japanese citizens, who days before were law-abiding people, suddenly became potential spies and were herded off to detention camps. Likewise, standards of cleanliness have changed. Today we are, as a society, very concerned with eliminating bodily odor and other signs of personal dirt which would have been largely ignored in the previous century. A "clean" person of the 1800's would likely no longer be considered clean by today's standards.

Not all deviants are created equal, and there are some which trouble society much more than others. During the Puritan witch hunts, it was hoped that the accused witch would repent of her sins before being burned or drowned and thus exonerate the very standards responsible for her death (Erikson, 1966). Those who break social norms with no remorse are considered dangerous because they threaten a reality which is built upon nothing more than social consensus. One way to neutralize this threat is to label a person as sick, and thereby absolve him or her of any moral responsibility in the community's eyes. Thus, the success of the insanity plea, whose basic premise is that the criminal was not him or herself at the time of the crime, is therefore

"sick" and excused of both responsibility and criminal intention.

Gusfield (1967) has well captured the different symbolic significance stigma may hold depending upon the way it is understood. He defined three types of alcoholics, each exerting a different social pressure: repentant, sick, and deviant. The repentant alcoholic is welcomed into society, for the act of repentance confirms the social norms, allowing the alcoholic to return to the moral fold. The alcoholic who is perceived as sick is viewed as irrelevant to the norm, as his or her actions are not seen as being representative of the person but of the "disease". The alcoholic who enjoys and accepts drinking to the consternation of others is considered "the enemy". He or she is the enemy precisely because of the threat posed to the dominant social belief that "excessive" drinking is immoral.

In the 1850's the issue of drinking was clearly a clash over social values (Gusfield, 1967). The great influx of the heavy drinking Irish Catholic and German Lutherans was very disturbing to the typical American middle class Protestant. The issue of drinking was solidly divided between the "natives" and the newly arrived immigrants. What was at stake was not liquor but whose cultural values would take ascendancy.

The Individual, Stigma, Dirt, and Disgust

Stigma not only serves to bolster social morality and strengthen group loyalty by serving as an example of what normal people are not, but it provides similar functions at the individual level. There is a great psychological identification between a country's borders and the borders of the self (Falk, 1975). This same relationship exists between the boundaries of the community or social class and the boundaries of the self. To damage, blur, or otherwise disturb the community's boundaries is felt by its members to be an attack and disruption of the self. What is outside the boundaries is felt to be "not me", which may be infused with the "bad me" and "dirty me", thus increasing the importance of separating the in and out groups.

Volkan (1988) has explored in depth the interlocking functions of self and society. From a developmental perspective, he argues that the good and bad aspects of self and other are never fully integrated, and that

it is inevitable that each individual will collect persons (or things) specific to him that are contaminated by his unwanted aspects. These will include elements of the precursors of individualized enemies and will be perceived as existing in the environment. . . .Also, some objects in the environment will be contaminated by the concept of individual allies because the child views them as being helping and protecting him as he adopts to the external world. (pp. 22-23)

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Although the child would have his own psychological make-up, he would be allied to other children in his group through the common suitable target of externalization which is the reservoir of the unmended self- and object representations of all that affirms their ethnic, cultural, and national identity. . . . When kept inside, unintegrated bad units threaten the self's cohesive-ness; when put out there at a safe distance and used for comparison with good self- and object representations, they can enhance the sense of self. I suggest that shared, durable bad suitable targets contain the beginning of the concept of an enemy in a social and political sense and that the reservoir of the good is the precursor of the shared ally. (p. 33)

People need enemies in which to see their own badness, their own personal dirt. Through seeing what is unacceptable in the self as being in the other, one can maintain a sense that the self is good and pure. There is then no need to deal with ambiguity and conflict within the self. If the other is defined as evil, then one can attain good simply by ostracizing, by removing the evil (Sartre, 1948). The individual who is considered normal can then blame his or her difficulties on those who are stigmatized, assuming that "if it weren't for them", life would be very good. Goodness thus becomes a given, the person "has no need to seek it in anguish, to invent it, to scrutinize it patently when he has found it, to prove it in action" (p. 4). To stigmatize is the lazy human's road to glory. "Contempt is the weapon of the weak and a defense against one's own despised and unwanted feelings" (Miller, 1981, p. 69).

Although needed for self enhancement, the stigmatized other may also be feared. Mental illness can be used for such a purpose. The distrust and fear of the mentally ill runs very deep in our culture and have been shown to be present by the age children enter preschool (Weiss, 1986). It has been suggested that the application of a psychiatric diagnosis is not geared towards helping the identified patient, but to help those who are not identified as patients (Szasz, 1970).

One of the earliest aspects of the self that is seen as undesirable is the body's own waste products. Children are routinely toilet trained and taught not to play with or touch their feces because they are "bad" and "dirty". Yet, children do not have an innate aversion to their feces. In fact, they find them very interesting and spend much time exploring and playing with their bodily wastes. The child's success with toilet training is a great victory, for no longer do the parents react with aversion to the child's smell. The child is no longer "dirty". The parents, proud and no doubt relieved, congratulate their child on its growing sense of mastery. The control of one's own bowel movements is indeed an accomplishment, yet, this control involves a loss and a distancing. The child becomes separated from and disidentified with bodily dirt. No longer is the child clean and dirty, just clean. Dirt becomes a property

of other living things or objects. This, now unwanted aspect of self, is split off and mastered. The infant's comfort with bodily wastes is transformed, in adulthood, into discomfort.

"Often disgust will be called into play as a reaction-formation against positive interest in the feces" (Miller, 1986). Disgust is associated with the close presence of dirt and "has its origin in the negative parental reactions to touching everything with the tongue, mouth, and hand . . . disgust is primarily the early conditioned fear of intimate contact with certain objects" (Schachtel, 1959, pp. 187-188).

Disgust serves to organize one's experience along the dimensions of good and bad, and inside and outside the self (Miller, 1986). What is considered disgusting varies according to time, nationality, sex, age, and social class (Straus, 1966). However, disgust with the feces may very well be universal (Angyal, 1941).

Because of disgust's powerful ability to shape and organize experience, it provides a ready mechanism for transmitting cultural values (Rozin, 1987). Labeling certain experiences, people, activities, or places as disgusting helps to assure that the accepted members of society will not involve themselves with what is off-limits.

In a study of food rejection by young children and their mothers, Fallon, Rozin, and Pliner (1984) found that there was a very close correspondence between the foods that the children rejected and the foods that their mothers rejected. The reasons given, however, differed between the mothers and their children. Mothers were much more likely to use disgust as a rationale than were their children.

The idea that contact with a disgusting substance renders an otherwise acceptable food inedible, does not occur before age seven (Rozin, Fallon, & Augustoni-Ziskind, 1985). The fear of contamination serves to further strengthen the boundary separating the acceptable from the unacceptable. Thus, the notion of what should and should not be consumed is learned early, and, with age, this understanding slowly changes as the boundaries become strengthened by disgust.

There is no clear notion present of a damage or harm which the disgusting object would inflict upon one's person. Disgust is directed rather against close contact with certain objects, implying mainly the fear of becoming soiled. The more intimate the contact, the stronger the reaction. (Angyal, 1941, p. 394)

The range of what is considered disturbing varies greatly and includes the interpersonal. The common imagery or feeling is that of one's having come into close contact with something felt to be disturbing. One may not necessarily be physically close to what arouses disgust. A

psychological closeness between the self and what is considered "not self" may be threatening. "Our language is full of expressions which reflect the psychosomatic identity of disgust produced by physical food and by what is indigestible only in the psychological sense" (Perls, Hefferline, & Goodman, 1951, p. 237). As Miller (1986) notes, a three year old may be disgusted with the poor bowel control of a younger sibling, the adolescent with public display of emotion, and the adult with moral failure.

There is a ubiquitous assumption in the literature that a central aspect of disgust involves the fear of incorporating the object into the self. To approach the boundary separating self and disavowed self, is to increase the danger that what was once projected out of the self onto another, may be reincorporated into the self image. Uninvited contact with the other can violate one's personal territory. Such a violation represents "an incursion, intrusion, encroachment, presumption, defilement, besmearing, contamination . . ." (Goffman, 1971, p. 45).

An important aspect of disgust is the fear of contamination. This fear is essentially what Frazer (1890/1959) referred to as the second fundamental principle of magic, which he stated as "things which have once been in contact continue ever afterwards to act on each other" (p. 7). He called this the law of contagion. His first principle, the

law of similarity is also relevant. This law, he stated simply as "like produces like (p. 7). Thus, the aversion to looking like, acting like, or thinking like others who are despised, can be viewed as an attempt to deny even a superficial likeness to such groups, thereby protecting the self-concept.

Both the law of contagion and the law of similarity underlie many "primitive" people's fears of becoming like something or someone whose qualities are seen as disagreeable. For these reasons, a man may not wish to be close to women before a hunt as he fears he may assume a feminine weakness. Likewise, this is why there is a close association between a person and a person's clothes. In primitive society, rights of purification are often used with strangers to cleanse and make them safe.

Hence before strangers are . . . permitted to mingle freely with the inhabitants, certain ceremonies are often performed by the natives of the country for the purpose of disarming them of their magical powers, of counteracting the baneful influence which is believed to emanate from them, or of disinfecting, so to speak, the tainted, atmosphere by which they are supposed to be surrounded. (Frazer, 1890/1959, p. 161)

Levi-Strauss (1966) has also commented on the danger that outsiders may represent. To marry someone, even from the next village, may be a dangerous undertaking. It can put "a man at the mercy of assassins and sorcerers . . ." (p. 111). Feelings of danger when faced with the unknown

other are not unique to primitive peoples. In their extensive review of the stigma literature, Jones et al. (1984) found that one often cited dimension of stigma is the real or symbolic threat which stigma poses to normals. An aspect of this threat may be a conscious manifestation of the fear of contamination.

The desire to remain separate from the other is bolstered by disgust feelings. "Disgust is the defense against invasion by decay. . . . a hidden characteristic and, thus, one that can express itself in many different ways" (Straus, 1966, p. 305). It is important to understand disgust and decay symbolically rather than literally. Probably the most extreme form of self-violation in our culture is smearing oneself with and eating one's excrement (Goffman, 1971). Even here, dirt should not be taken as an absolute. Infants do not believe their feces are dirty until the parents define them as dirt (Rozin & Fallon, 1987). On the other hand, is the businessman who dumps toxic wastes into people's backyards any less "dirty"? The phrase "morally corrupt" strongly implies the notion of dirt. At whatever level, dirt is that which is unwanted.

Because dirt and disgust are intimately linked with the fear of reincorporation, the imagery that accompanies that fear is often based on the bodily function of eating and taking into the self what was once placed outside. Oral

imagery is the prototype of the border between self and world. Any means of entry into the self, such as the eyes, ears, skin, or nose can represent the same dynamics (Miller, 1986). Eyes may be covered to keep out an unwanted sight, the nose held to keep out a smell, and the ears plugged to keep out disturbing sound. Nevertheless, oral imagery predominates.

In our society, eating certain foods is considered reflective of the type of person incorporating them. For instance, tripe is considered a low and base food. Caviar is considered a food of the elite. The sharing of cake at a wedding is symbolic of the sharing and incorporation of two "I"'s into a "We".

The link between oral consumption and personal relationship or characteristics is more pronounced in "primitive" cultures. In Thailand, villagers do not consume non-domesticated animals because of their great difference from humans. They will not eat monkey because, to them, this animal represents the human descent into savagery, and the eating of monkey endangers the person into a likewise descent (Tambiah, 1969). In Ceylon, to say that a woman cooks for a man is equivalent to a public affirmation of a conjugal relationship (Tambiah, 1969). Levi-Strauss (1966) has noted that often there is a close correspondence governing with whom food may be exchanged and whom one is permitted to

marry. In all these examples, the symbolic separation of self from nonself is reflected in graphic and concrete actions which gain meaning only through their symbolism.

Disgust experiences "can serve the individual's wishes to rid himself of psychologically noxious substances in the same way vomiting of sickening food rids the body of noxious foodstuffs" (Miller, 1986, p. 300). To human beings, what is most psychologically noxious is our own base limitations. There is a stark contrast between the lofty aspirations of the spirit and the fact that we all have bodies like animals --bodies that pollute, are limited, will eventually cease to function, die, and decompose into a stinking mess. It is this animal aspect of our nature that Becker (1973) believes all humans attempt to deny. He links this denial with animality. At some level, each culture is anal in the sense that each cosmology attempts to link humans with a beyond, with a higher power or meaning.

To say that someone is "anal" means that someone is trying extra-hard to protect himself against the accidents of life, the danger of death, trying to use the symbols of culture as a sure means of triumph over natural mystery, trying to pass himself off as anything but an animal.
(p. 32)

Disgust has been linked exclusively to animals, parts of animals, things that have been in contact or associated with animals, and animal and human waste products (Angyal, 1941; Rozin & Fallon, 1987). "A major animal source is

interpersonal: The prospect of consuming things contacted by people who are disliked or viewed as unsavory often elicits disgust" (Rozin & Fallon, 1987, p. 27). To be stigmatized is to be linked to animals, and being linked to animals, linked to dirt.

The one bodily product that is not considered disgusting once it leaves the body is tears. The reason for this may be that tears are uniquely human and do not serve to remind us of our animal nature (Ortner, 1973). Tears do not blur the boundary separating humans from animals. They affirm us as "higher".

To be like an animal is to be dirty and contaminated. The most painful aspect of being labeled dirty may be that the label separates one from the rest of humankind (Miller, 1985). This separation though, is illusory, for everyone is dirty.

One could ask whether decay is anything but an excrement or corpse? If that were so, then decaying would of course be limited to particular things with particular manifest characteristics. . . . Actually, however, decay is in the midst of life, inextricably involved with life. We can not escape it; it is everywhere life is. . . .

.
The skin, even as it rejuvenates and renews itself, exudes wastes. It is the same with all other organs. (Straus, 1966, pp. 308-309).

People prefer to forget this. They prefer to think of themselves as clean and the other as dirty, as if they, somehow were above contradiction, meanness, and death.

Stigma is threatening because it serves as a reminder that life is uncertain and doomed to end in death and decay.

All culture, all man's creative life-ways, are some basic part of them a fabricated protest against natural reality, a denial of the truth of the human condition, and an attempt to forget the pathetic creature that man is. (Becker, 1973, pp. 32-33)

"Our reactions to marginal situations of all kinds are powerfully conditioned by the experience of death" (Jones et al., 1984, p. 86). Speaking broadly, death is a metaphor for all that is dirty, despicable, and tragic about the human condition. Through stigma, this tragedy is denied. It becomes the tragedy of a specific group, not that with which everyone must come to terms. To stigmatize is an attempt to control and localize that which can not be contained; it is to locate what is dirty and base in human nature in the other, leaving the self pure and exempt from life's realities.

In a study of some of the difficulties faced by those people working with AIDS victims, Dunkel and Hatfield (1986) found the fear of the unknown, fear of death, fear of helplessness, and fear of contagion were prominent factors interfering with empathic contact between helping professionals and AIDS sufferers. AIDS is mysterious, menacing, and unknown. It represents a slap in the face to all of our medical technology and skill. It is no wonder that AIDS is

so threatening on so many levels. However, even within the scientifically well understood area of the physically handicapped, there may be fears of contagion that lead normals to shun and segregate that group (Gellman, 1959).

Yet every human body, at some level is disgusting, for every body produces wastes (Angyal, 1941). This fact is denied, repressed, and projected onto the stigmatized who then carry the burden for others. Being dirtied is not a threat as long as one can maintain a distance from others felt to be contaminated. To touch or be touched is to be threatened with contamination. Consequently, the same object may or may not be disgusting depending on who has handled it (Rozin & Fallon, 1987).

Dirt is symbolic. It has little to do with germs or danger and much to do with the maintenance of boundaries between the self and other. Rozin, Millma, and Nimeroff (1986) have studied the relationship between Frazer's (1890/1959) laws of contagion and similarity to avoidance reactions. Illustrating the law of contagion, they found that people preferred wearing the laundered, used shirt of an unknown person to the laundered, used shirt of a disliked person. The shirt was viewed as being contaminated by the unwanted aspects of the disliked person which were seen as potentially transferable through the shirt. That people preferred fudge shaped like muffins to fudge shaped like dog

feces illustrates the law of similarity that like produces like. This dramatic example is not far fetched in that it illustrates the strong tendency to focus on superficial similarities and differences, magnifying them so that the end result is the assurance that "we are not like them; we are better".

When the neighbor . . . is tinged with our unwanted parts, we do not want to acknowledge any likeness to us. Therefore, we focus on minor differences --or create them--in order to stress dissimilarity and the existence of a gap between us. (Volkan, 1988)

The focus remains on the other. "The other person is mean, the other person is cowardly, the other person is false. One's own being is still obscured" (Straus, 1966, p. 311). And one's being remains obscured as long as the disowned parts of the self are kept at a distance. The self is then free of contradiction, free of contamination. What threatens people is life as it truly is (Becker, 1973). Contact with the stigmatized is fraught with the possibility of contamination. "We have a horror of touching a murderer no matter how clean he may have washed" (Straus, 1966, p. 306).

"It is as if men could not accept, and still can not accept, that good men may be sick and evil men healthy or that healthy men may be evil, or sick men good" (Szasz, 1970, p. 274). Instead our experience is split up, some of

it owned and the rest rejected. It is our rejected aspects which are reflected in our reactions towards the stigmatized.

This study seeks to demonstrate that the perception of dirtiness in the other will be reflected in the behavior of the observer without its influence being discussed or even necessarily conscious. Thus, the hypothesis that, at an unreflected level, normals perceive stigmatized people as dirty is tested using subliminal stimulation and reaction times. It is expected that, while stigmatized people will be viewed as dirty, normals will strongly deny dirtiness in themselves and their social group. Furthermore, normals will feel a contamination threat in the presence of stigma, and attempt to gain distance from this threat by more rapidly denying personal dirtiness than when under non-threatening conditions.

Subliminal Perception

An important problem confronting this study was the issue of response bias. For example, how does one obtain truthful data about subjects' opinions concerning whether or not they experience stigmatized people as dirty? The topic is emotionally loaded, calling into play not only rules of social etiquette, but also images of self both public and

private. To ask a person such potentially threatening questions would be to invite distortions, and misrepresentations. If the subjects could answer the questions free from the above constraints, then one might, with greater certainty, consider their responses representative.

The use of subliminal stimuli enables the experimenter to bypass conscious, structured thought processes. It is for this reason that it was employed in two of the four experimental procedures.

Current research in subliminal perception is not concerned with whether or not such a phenomenon exists, but rather its use in terms of testing and exploring psychodynamic principles. Silverman and his colleagues (e.g., 1978, 1985) have been the most prolific investigators in this field for the last two decades, with other investigators either agreeing or disagreeing with his methodology or conclusions.

A great variety of applications of subliminal perception have been used in investigating such areas as the effects of subliminal symbiosis-related gratifications (e.g., "Mommy and I are one.") upon schizophrenics (Kaplan, Thornton, & Silverman, 1985), the effects of subliminal oedipal stimuli on performance (Silverman, Ross, Adler, & Lusig, 1978; Vitiello, Carlin, Becker, Barris et al., 1989; Heilbrun, 1980), subliminal symbiotic activation as a means of

alleviating depression (Thorton, 1987), subliminal influences upon anxiety states (Robles, Smith, Carver, & Weelens, 1987; Tyrer, Lewis, & Lee, 1978), the effect of mere subliminal exposure on personal preferences (Bornstein, Leone, & Galley, 1987; Zajonc, 1968), and the uses of subliminal perception in advertising (Cuperfain & Clarke, 1985). What is most striking about this body of work is that, although there exists a general consensus that subliminal perception does, in fact, occur, there is some disagreement as to its strength, its measurement, and its use in testing psychoanalytic constructs. Balay and Shevrin (1988) have recently reviewed much of the current popular work which uses subliminal stimulation to measure and test psychoanalytic theory. They found much inconsistency, few attempts at exact replication, and ill-defined parameters under which results could be reliably demonstrated.

There are several studies of more direct relevance to the procedures employed in this study. Miller (1939) was able to demonstrate that verbal responses, which subjects subjectively experienced as guesses, could be influenced by subliminal visual material. It has also been shown that the affective tone of words can be discriminated before they are consciously recognized (Eriksen, Azuma, & Hicks, 1959). About half of the words these investigators used to demonstrate that unpleasant words could be discriminated

antecedent to recognition, were closely related to the idea of dirtiness. Worthington and Dixon (1964) had subjects guess at subliminally presented numbers and found that there was a significant likelihood that the responses would either be to the number or an associate of the number. However in another, differently designed experiment, Banreti-Fuchs (1967), found no effect of subliminal stimulation upon the accuracy of subject's "guesses".

In a now classic experiment, Smith, Spence, and Klein (1959), demonstrated that the meaning of subliminally presented words can affect conscious thoughts. By flashing the words "happy" or "angry" before the exposure of a neutral male face, they found that the descriptions of the face were modified in the direction of the word flashed. Somekh and Wilding (1973) obtained similar results. In an expanded investigation of the effects of subliminal hostile stimuli on the perception of a neutral face, Bargh and Pietromonaco (1982) found that the ratings of the face were positively and consistently related to the proportion of hostile words flashed. Thus, not only did they confirm the previously established relationship, but they were able to show that the relationship holds and is proportional to the amount of subliminal exposure.

Neisser (1967) is often cited as a proponent of the view that subliminal effects are due to the bias of the

experimenter and the demand characteristics of the experiment. Such a view, while plausible in the face of the replication problems that have been encountered in this area, has not received wide support. In an effort to discriminate between experimenter bias and subliminal perception, Barber and Rushton (1975) attempted a controlled replication of two classic experiments by Smith, Spence, and Klein (1959), and Spence and Holland (1962). They found no evidence for experimenter bias, yet only a trend in favor of subliminal effects. They hypothesized that differences in subject pools may have been, in part, responsible for the discrepancy. For an exhaustive review of the literature and controversies surrounding the history of the experimental use of subliminal stimulation, please see Dixon (1981). The consensus remains, however, that there are subliminal effects but they are not robust.

The use of subliminal stimulation in investigating unconscious attitudes towards stigmatized persons appears both valid and appropriate. The method seems especially useful in view of the potential response bias problems which would be encountered in investigating people's attitudes towards stigmatized individuals at the public and conscious levels. Although, by definition, stigma is that which is rejected, there is also a strong moral code of altruism, of helping those who are less fortunate, which would inhibit

the direct expression of negative feelings. The methods employed in this research bypass conscious constraints by relying on unconscious ratings and reaction times, in an attempt to reveal basic, unreflected attitudes.

CHAPTER 2

METHODOLOGY

Apparatus

The equipment used, a Scientific Prototype Mfg. Corp. two channel tachistoscope, model 800-F, allowed for the stimuli to be presented through either closely spaced flashes or constant, low intensity projection. The most common method used today employs flashes of 4 msec, therefore this was considered. However, due to the fact that at the 4 msec speed, some of the experimenter's colleagues and the experimenter himself were able to catch faint "glimpses of something", it was decided to use an exposure time of 1 msec, a rate so rapid no one detected more than a flicker of light, making the stimulation inarguably subliminal.

Subjects

Subjects were 89 undergraduate volunteers enrolled in psychology classes at the University of Tennessee at Knoxville. They were offered extra credit for the 30 to 40 minutes it took to complete the procedures. The credit they earned could be used towards their final course grades.

Out of these 89 subjects, 8 had to be dropped from the experimental condition due to their failure to believe the experimenter's stigmatized self-description. These eight subjects told the experimenter either in writing, verbally, or both that they did not believe the reported history of mental illness in his family. Eight randomly selected subjects served as experimental replacements and were given the identical procedural orderings as the subjects who had been dropped. This group of eight believed the experimenter's reported history. Of the resulting group of 81, 32 were men and 49 were women. The majority of subjects were Caucasian, several were black, and a very few were foreign. None had any visible limitations, although a number wore glasses.

Procedures

Subjects were randomly assigned to control and experimental groups. The order of tasks was varied for both groups to preclude order effects significantly influencing the results. All subjects met the experimenter in the waiting room of the Psychological Clinic at the University of Tennessee and were led to a room containing the tachistoscope. After the subjects were seated and the equipment prepared, they were told the following:

This experiment involves perception and the meanings of words. You will be required to make different kinds of ratings of both words and pictures. About half of the tasks are subliminal, and for these tasks you will have to use your intuition to make an educated guess about what is being flashed on the screen. The rest of the exercises will involve ratings concerning words that will be clearly visible to you. I will explain it as we go along.

The purpose of this research is to describe some of the differences between the way in which normal and stigmatized people are perceived.

At this point, in addition to the above, the experimental group was given false information concerning the experimenter so that he would be seen as stigmatized. They were told:

This is a very interesting question, at least for me, because I always had to deal with stigma while I was growing up. I have a mother who is schizophrenic. She was hospitalized several times when I was a kid, and so the people in the neighborhood started calling us the crazy family. And that sort of thing can be hard to live with.

Both groups were treated equally throughout the remainder of the experiment. After this brief introduction, all subjects were asked to read and sign a consent form (see Appendix A).

The essential difference between the control and experimental groups was that the experimental group believed that the experimenter was stigmatized, whereas the control group was not given this discrediting "information". Thus, the experimenter served both as the independent variable and as the control.

Experiment 1

This procedure involved presenting a list of words, one at a time, at two subliminal exposures of 1 msec each. The list of 20 words had randomly embedded in it six words referring to dirt: dirty, filthy, polluted, contaminated, contagious, and infected. The list of six adjectives was selected because of the similarities of their denotative meanings. A variety of other words were included in the list to obscure the repeated occurrence of the words referring to dirt. One half of the words were positively toned and the other half negatively toned (see Appendix B).

All subjects were told:

In this part of the experiment, I am going to show you a list of words. I will show them to you one at a time, and for each one you are to decide how much like or how much unlike me you feel the word is. For example, tall is like me but short is not; thin is like me but fat is not. The words are in random order. I will flash the word twice and then I want you to make a rating to show whether you feel the word is like or unlike me.

The subjects were then given a six-point rating scale ranging from "extremely unlike" (1) to "extremely like" (6) and were told to circle the number corresponding to their choice (see Appendix C). Before the subjects continued, they were told that the words would be flashed so quickly that they would not be able to see more than a glimmer of

light, and that they would have to rely on their intuition and "gut reaction" to make their decisions.

They were then instructed to look into the tachistoscope while the experimenter flashed a blank screen to demonstrate what they would be seeing when the experiment was begun. The experimenter pointed out to them that they would probably feel like they were guessing, but that this feeling was natural and to be expected. In addition, subjects were instructed "not to think too much", but rather to decide on the basis of "what felt right".

Experiment 2

This procedure involved ten pictures which were selected on the basis of a pilot test group's subjective ratings of how physically "clean" or "dirty" they experienced each picture. Nineteen graduate and undergraduate volunteers were given a set of 19 pictures spanning flowers to dirty oil drums. They were then asked to rate their subjective reactions to the pictures along a seven-point scale ranging from "extremely clean" (1) to "extremely dirty" (7) (see Appendix D). Out of the 19 pictures, a group of 10 was selected both on the basis of the consistency of the ratings and to provide a variety of stimulus cues. Thus, the pictures selected were experienced very consistently as either

clean or dirty. Duplication of content was avoided to help insure that several different examples of each category would be represented. For example, plants and flowering trees were both experienced as very clean, but only one example of plant life was selected for the final group of pictures. The resulting five "dirty" pictures and five "clean" pictures were then randomly ordered.

Each subject was told the following:

Now I am going to show you pictures of people ranging from very stigmatized individuals to those who are well accepted. I will flash each picture twice, but it will be so quick that you will not be able to see more than a slight flicker of light. What you will have to do is use your intuition and gut reaction to decide which kind of person you feel is in the picture. This may feel like you are guessing, but that is not unusual. Its best not to try and think too much about the ratings, but go with your intuition. After I flash a picture twice, you are to make a rating as to how stigmatized or how accepted you feel the person you are seeing is, then I will go to the next one.

Subjects were then given a six-point rating scale ranging from "extremely stigmatized" (1) to "extremely accepted" (6) (see Appendix E). They were instructed, for each picture, to circle the number corresponding to their rating. If the subjects had not yet been exposed to the tachistoscope, the experimenter would invite them to look into the machine while a blank screen was flashed. They were then told that what they were seeing was very much what they would see when the pictures were presented and not to expect

more. The subjects were then given two 1 msec exposures to the stimulus picture and allowed time to make a rating.

Experiment 3

For this procedure, all subjects were presented with the same list of words that was used in the first experiment. They were shown each word separately through the tachistoscope. Each word remained clearly visible for about 10 seconds before the blank screen returned.

All subjects were instructed to decide whether or not the word they were seeing applied to them or not. They were further instructed to indicate their answers by pressing either one of two buttons on a specially constructed box. One button was labeled "me" and the other "not me".

The tachistoscope was connected to an analog timer which was started the moment the word was exposed. By pressing the "me" or the "not me" buttons, the subject stopped the clock. In this way, reaction times for each word were recorded to an accuracy of 1/100th of a second.

Experiment 4

This procedure was very similar to experiment 3. Subjects were shown the list of words one by one on the tachis-

toscope so that each word remained clearly visible for about ten seconds. They were instructed to decide whether or not they felt the word applied to U.T. students who had at least a C+ average.

Subjects were told to rate "students with at least a C+ average" to help ensure that they were responding to a similar population and not to widely discrepant student groups.

Subjects indicated their answers by pressing either one of two buttons on a specially constructed box. One button was labeled "yes" and the other one "no". As before, the timer was begun when the word first appeared and was stopped by the subject's pressing either button, thus providing reaction times.

The order of presentation was partially randomized to minimize order effects. In no case was experiment 1 given after either experiments 3 or 4. This was considered prudent because once the subjects had been consciously exposed to the word list, the subliminal presentation of the words would be contaminated by conscious recall of the previously seen list. The effect of having seen the list of words subliminally was considered to pose less of a contamination threat to the supraliminal stimuli.

After all procedures had been completed, the subjects were asked to respond in writing to several questions concerning their perceptions of what the purpose of the experi-

ment was and whether they felt they had been in any way deceived (see Appendix F). This served as a manipulation check.

None of the 41 subjects employed in the experimental condition suspected that the experimenter's stated background was false or manipulative. The vast majority of subjects reported that they believed the experiment was designed to investigate the differences in how people are perceived or judged depending upon the social group to which they belong. Often, subjects felt that their self perception in relation to their perception of others was an important part of the experiment. Many subjects believed that one purpose of the study was the exploration of the effects of subliminal stimulation. If any suspicion was expressed, it was not directed at the manipulation but at the methodology. Numerous subjects questioned the validity and usefulness of subliminal stimulation itself.

Before the subjects left the room, they were debriefed. They were told of the experimenter's role and of all deception which was employed in the procedures. Further, it was explained to them the reasons that the research was approached in this way. After the experimenter had finished the debriefing, questions were encouraged and answered. Subjects were also told how they could contact the

experimenter if any questions should occur to them after having left the building.

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

Summary of Hypotheses

To reiterate, the following hypotheses were developed to investigate the relationship between dirt and stigma:

1. The experimenter would be seen as dirtier in the experimental group than in the control group.
2. The pictures of dirty objects would be interpreted as being more stigmatized than the pictures of clean objects.
3. Dirt would be quickly denied in the self and in other university students.
4. Subjects in the experimental condition would experience a contamination threat from the experimenter and would react, more quickly than the control group, to deny dirtiness in themselves and other students.

Statistical Analysis

See Table 1 and Table 2 for intercorrelations of the experimental variables, and Table 3 for the descriptive statistics.

TABLE 1
INTERCORRELATIONS OF STUDY VARIABLES
FOR THE EXPERIMENTAL GROUP

VARIABLE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Rating of Experimenter using Dirt Words	1.00	.19	.02	-.21	-.31*	-.12	-.06	-.03
2. Rating of Experimenter using Other Words		1.00	.09	.23	-.22	-.03	-.17	-.10
3. Rating of Clean Pictures			1.00	-.18	-.00	-.05	-.07	-.01
4. Rating of Dirty Pictures				1.00	-.05	-.11	.08	.10
5. Me/Not Me Reaction Time for Dirt Words					1.00	.66***	.66***	.65***
6. Me/Not Me Reaction Time for Other Words						1.00	.46**	.67***
7. UT Students Reaction Time for Dirt Words							1.00	.87***
8. UT Students Reaction Time for Other Words								1.00

*Significance defined as $p \leq .05$, two-tailed

**Significance defined as $p \leq .01$, two-tailed

***Significance defined as $p \leq .001$, two-tailed

TABLE 2
INTERCORRELATIONS OF STUDY VARIABLES
FOR THE CONTROL GROUP

VARIABLE	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
1. Rating of Experimenter using Dirt Words	1.00	.36*	.31	.35*	-.20	-.26	.10	-.01
2. Rating of Experimenter using Other Words		1.00	.07	.44**	-.05	-.17	-.00	-.08
3. Rating of Clean Pictures			1.00	.02	-.04	-.16	.10	-.20
4. Rating of Dirty Pictures				1.00	.02	-.26	.08	-.08
5. Me/Not Me Reaction Time for Dirt Words					1.00	.68***	.52***	.44**
6. Me/Not Me Reaction Time for Other Words						1.00	.55***	.66***
7. UT Students Reaction Time for Dirt Words							1.00	.80***
8. UT Students Reaction Time for Other Words								1.00

*Significance defined as $p \leq .05$, two-tailed

**Significance defined as $p \leq .01$, two-tailed

***Significance defined as $p \leq .001$, two-tailed

TABLE 3
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

VARIABLE	MEAN	STANDARD DEVIATION
Rating of Experimenter using Dirt Words	3.41	.620
Experimental	3.51	.631
Control	3.31	.600
Rating of Experimenter using Other Words	3.40	.434
Experimental	3.40	.377
Control	3.39	.492
Rating of Clean Pictures	3.62	.731
Experimental	3.65	.700
Control	3.59	.769
Rating of Dirty Pictures	3.47	.673
Experimental	3.58	.600
Control	3.35	.730
Me/Not Me Reaction Time for Dirt Words	1.98	.862
Experimental	2.02	1.017
Control	1.95	.678
Me/Not Me Reaction Time for Other Words	2.29	.799
Experimental	2.26	.917
Control	2.32	.668
UT Student Reaction Time for Dirt Words	2.45	1.124
Experimental	2.43	1.241
Control	2.46	1.004
UT Student Reaction Time for Other Words	2.68	1.001
Experimental	2.62	1.052
Control	2.74	.955

The first hypothesis that the experimenter would be rated as relatively more dirty by the experimental group than the control group was not supported, yet approached statistical significance. The experimental group mean for the dirt words was 3.51 (S.D. = .631) and the mean of the control group was 3.31 (S.D. = .600). The t test of the difference between the experimental and control means revealed only a trend towards significance ($t = 1.46$, $df = 78.95$, $p = .07$, one-tailed). This trend linking stigma and dirt was not strong enough to be considered statistically significant.

The next hypothesis predicted that all subjects would identify the dirty pictures as being relatively more "stigmatized" than the clean pictures. This relationship was not significant, however, the paired samples t test revealed a trend in this direction ($t = -1.33$, $df = 80$, $p = .09$, one-tailed). The mean for the clean pictures was 3.62 (S.D. = .731) and the mean for the dirt pictures was 3.47 (S.D. = .673). The higher the numbers, the higher the level of acceptability. The strong trend in the expected direction notwithstanding, these results suggest that stigma and unacceptability are not linked with dirt.

The hypothesis that subjects would respond more quickly to the dirt than other words, in order to establish themselves as clean, was confirmed. The mean reaction time for

the dirt words was 1.98 seconds (S.D. = .862) as compared with 2.29 seconds (S.D. = .799) for the other words. The paired samples t test determined that these results were significant ($t = -4.03$, $df = 80$, $p < .01$, one-tailed). This result supports the notion that the placing of dirt outside of the self is a very profound and ingrained method of self organization.

Subjects overwhelmingly indicated that the dirt words did not describe them or university students, revealing an absence of ambivalence in relation to dirt. It is quickly and efficiently located outside of the self and the peer group.

It was also predicted that due to the importance of denying dirt in one's own social group, subjects' reaction times to the dirt words would be quicker than their reaction times to the other words when they were rating university students. The paired samples t test showed that the discrepancy between the mean reaction time for the dirt words (2.45 seconds, S.D. = 1.124) was significantly faster ($t = -3.42$, $df = 80$, $p < .01$, one-tailed) than the mean reaction time for the other words (2.68 seconds, S.D. = 1.001). Thus, the relative importance of denying the dirtiness of one's own social group received strong support.

In addition, it was predicted that the experimental group, feeling threatened with contamination by the stigma-

tized experimenter, would attempt to achieve distance from the dirtiness by responding more quickly to the dirt words as "not me" as compared with the control group. The control group, by contrast, would have a less pressing need to establish that they are clean and thus would not respond as quickly to the dirt words as the experimental group. This was disconfirmed. The mean reaction time for the experimental group was 2.02 seconds (S.D. = 1.017). The mean reaction time for the control group was 1.95 seconds (S.D. = .678). The t test of this difference indicates that these results are a chance phenomenon and not the result of experimental differences ($t = .35$, $df = 69.91$, $p = .37$, one-tailed). Apparently the presence of a stigmatized experimenter was not a threat which resulted in increased reaction times when these subjects defined themselves via the dirt words.

Likewise, the hypothesized contamination threat was predicted to shorten the reaction times of the experimental subjects describing university students using the dirt words. It was anticipated that the experimental subjects would attempt to defend themselves through quickly establishing that the peer group, and therefore the self, is not dirty. The results did not confirm this. The mean reaction time of the experimental group was 2.43 seconds (S.D. = 1.241), while the mean reaction time of the control group

was 2.46 seconds (S.D. = 1.004). This difference is not significant ($t = -.12$, $df = 76.41$, $p = .45$, one-tailed t test). The experimental manipulation did not affect the reaction times either when subjects rated themselves or when they rated others. The hypothesis that the stigmatized experimenter would be a threat was therefore given no support.

In summary, the subliminal sections of the experiment indicated that stigmatized individuals are not experienced as dirty. However, the observed trends in the expected directions must be considered as suggestive. In addition, subjects' reaction times did not reveal the threat which the experimenter was expected to pose to the experimental group. However, the quickness of reaction times to the dirt words revealed a lack of ambivalence in the subjects' responses. Almost without exception, subjects rapidly rejected dirt words as part of the self and as part of the peer group.

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

The results of this study were mixed and, while not conclusive, are both interesting and suggestive. The reaction times to the self descriptions and the descriptions of a peer group established that the dirt words were more quickly responded to than the nondirt words. The shorter reaction times revealed little ambivalence about dirt. Dirt was not seen as part of the self, nor as part of the peer group. The quickness of the subjects' reactions reflects how well rehearsed and ingrained the denial of our own filth is. Subjects did not hesitate to consider the pros and cons; instead they knew, without hesitation, that the self and peer group were clean. The experimental results confirm the importance of locating dirt outside of the self.

Because one does not exist except in relation to others, as part of a social group, it is likewise important to see one's peers as clean. This experiment has shown that that is indeed the case. Not only did most subjects rate U.T. students as being not dirty, but their reaction times to the dirt words were significantly shorter than the reaction times to the other words. This makes sense in light of the fact that humans desire to view themselves as clean. To

believe that one's social group is dirty would be to feel continually threatened by contamination. In addition, because of one's cultural identifications, belonging to a dirty social group identifies the self as contaminated. The self exists only as part of a social and cultural context. As the self reflects the culture, so the culture reflects the self. Both must be kept clean to retain some illusion of mastery and control of fate, avoiding disconcerting ambivalence and contradiction through compartmentalizing and disowning what is dirty.

While subjects tended to rate the stigmatized experimenter as dirty and the dirty pictures as being those of stigmatized people, neither result, in itself attained significance. That both procedures showed trends towards significance in the expected directions, indicates that this is an area worthy of further exploration.

But why, in this section of the experiment, were there only trends and not significant results? Before considering that the hypothesis is mistaken, several procedural aspects of the experiment which have direct relevance to the results, should be considered.

Smith, Spence, and Klein (1959) noted that the subjects who were most sensitive to subliminal information showed both a tolerance of passivity and an ability to be flexible. Those who were insensitive to minimal stimuli were somewhat

suspicious of the experiment and were either rigid or preoccupied with personal fantasies. If cognition is organized and structured, the influence of subliminal stimuli is minimal. However, as cognitive structure loosens, and the individual becomes more open to subtle feelings and tangential thoughts, subliminal stimuli have a greater impact upon the individual (Allison, 1963). This notion is very similar to what Schachtel (1959) referred to as the effects of focal attention. In directing attention towards one aspect of the world, what is not attended to fades into the background. The perspective must be allowed to shift if these other aspects are to be noticed. More recently, Dixon (1981) has reiterated that for subliminal stimulation to be effective, subjects must be in a state of low arousal, relaxed, passive, and nonselectively attentive.

The subjects of the present study could not uniformly be described as relaxed, passive, and receptive. Many subjects reported during the debriefing that they experienced some mild discomfort in the subliminal sections of the experiment. Their discomfort was associated with acting on the basis of little knowledge. Rating the experimenter and "people" without having any visual clues, was frustrating for numerous subjects as they felt they did not have enough information to make a "real" decision. A very few wondered if there were any pictures at all!

It may be that the subjects needed more extensive exposure to the ideas behind subliminal stimulation. Perhaps a few actual demonstrations of the phenomenon and some discussion of its principles would have satisfied subjects' curiosity about the method itself, freeing them up to focus more on the experimental process.

Much of the subjects' discomfort seemed to revolve around an uncertainty about labeling the experimenter and others without being consciously aware of the label or what was labeled. Several factors could be at work in such a situation. Subjects could have feared offending the experimenter or inadvertently giving a "poor" impression of themselves. Possibly they feared that their ratings, which were done unconsciously, would not be an accurate reflection of their conscious beliefs and might confirm their own fears about being prejudiced. Any attempt to second guess themselves or the experimenter would disrupt their receptivity to the subliminal stimulation. If the impact of their ratings were made less significant and therefore less threatening, the experimental results may have been more definitive.

One way of lessening subjects' anxiety would be to explain just how delicate this type of work is. If subjects knew beforehand, that subliminal effects were strongly influenced by factors such as cognitive set and information processing styles, and that any one individual's results

were inconclusive, they may feel less threatened and more willing to passively attend to their own intuitions. By making subliminal perception less of an "unknown", subjects may feel more safety and security in exploring their own subtle feeling states. Once free of these interfering factors, their responses would more accurately reflect their actual feelings. With less threat and more relaxed subjects, the results may well have attained significance. It would be worthwhile for this study to be replicated, while controlling for these factors because of the difficulty in sorting out the relative influence of subject's attitudes and unintended methodological effects.

One hypothesis of this study was that the presence of the experimenter would be threatening to the subjects in the experimental condition. The very proximity of the experimenter was expected to induce in the subjects a fear of being dirtied. This fear was predicted to have effects on the reaction times of the subjects self ratings and ratings of U.T. students. The test results showed no significant trend in this direction. The hypothesis that subjects would react more quickly to define themselves and their peers as not dirty in the experimental condition was not borne out. It seems safe to conclude that the experimenter was not experienced as a threat.

Although positive results would have served to support this study's major hypothesis, negative results do not detract from it. All that can be said is that it does not appear that the subjects were threatened with being contaminated by the experimenter as measured by the reaction times to the dirt words. Thus, these results do not mean that the experimenter was not seen as dirty, but that, perhaps, this dirtiness was not felt to be threatening. The experimenter could have been perceived as dirty, however, if the subjects were not threatened with contamination, the reaction times, which were hypothesized to be influenced by this threat, would be unaffected.

One may be affected very differently depending on the context. For example, a shark is very threatening if one is swimming in the ocean but merely interesting in an aquarium. In both cases, the shark is considered dangerous, but in only one is it considered a threat. Likewise, that the experimenter was not threatening, does not mean that he was not seen as dirty.

One can look at but not feel threatened by dirt as long as one does not fear contamination. One unsolicited comment by a subject that the experimenter's history "calmed" her is relevant here. Several of the female subjects mentioned that they felt sorry for the experimenter. Instead of the expected threat, could sympathy with the "plight" of

the experimenter have been a mitigating factor? The telling of the experimenter's history may have functioned in unanticipated ways, evoking more compassion than threat.

Ambivalence towards the experimenter may have been a factor mitigating the hypothesized threat. How conscious ambivalence may have effected the subjects' "unconscious" responses is an important unanswered question and one which future researchers may wish to examine in terms of the relationship of ambivalence to subliminal susceptibility and response bias. On a conscious level, if subjects felt some degree of pity for the experimenter, the experienced threat would be reduced.

Although most investigators presently believe that mental patients, as in the past, are held in very low regard, not all patients are treated badly because of competing feelings of sympathy for those who are less fortunate (Farina, 1982). And although empirical research is scant, Weyand's study (cited in Jones et al., 1984) indicates that the courtesy stigma associated with mental illness is as damaging as the stigma of mental illness itself. Presumably, such a courtesy stigma would arouse similar ambivalence in the other.

Perhaps if the experimenter had presented himself as bitter and rejecting of help instead of describing the "difficulty" of living in stigmatized family, he would have

elicited less concern and less ambivalence. Another modification which might lessen the interfering effects of ambivalence is the use of a stigma for which there is no social call for tolerance. Mosher, Farina, and Gliha's study (cited in Farina, 1982) showed that the conscious restraint illustrated by normals attempting to treat mentally ill people as equals, was not apparent when the confederate admitted to having been a prostitute. The study, a variation of Farina, Holland, and Ring's (1966) work, indicated that subjects would freely give a higher intensity "shock" to the "prostitutes" than to the confederates who presented themselves as normal. It may be that, for those stigmas considered the most abhorrent, little or no attempt is made at concealing unpleasant feelings as there is much less ambivalence. Such stigmas as pedophilia, prostitution, and criminal violence are hardly likely to call forth much sympathy, and might be of value in further investigations.

Whatever stigma is employed, it should be selected according to the population who will serve as subjects. The present study's population was very homogeneous, although there were a few blacks and foreign students in the sample. These black and foreign students may have felt stigmatized themselves and, as a result, may have been more tolerant of the experimenter (Galanis & Jones, 1986). Because their numbers were so small, any effects, if present, were proba-

bly minor. Nevertheless, future researchers would be advised to consider possible interactions between the stigma investigated and the subject population utilized.

Another factor which may have had a mitigating effect on the experimenter's threat value was the degree of interpersonal distance between the subject and the experimenter. Both were in the same room, but how "close" were they? This is a crucial question because the element of threat is often proportional to proximity.

The social purpose of stigma is to make the rest of society feel better about themselves by serving as a container or reservoir for normal's unwanted aspects. As such, stigma provides a socially sanctioned and agreed upon definition of who has the positive social attributes and who the negative ones. As long as stigmatized and normal people remain within their prospective roles, no threat exists to the moral order. The threat comes from the violation of roles and boundaries. That is, threat results when normal and stigmatized people engage in contact that is without a set of rules or clear roles to define it. It is the immanence of forbidden contact, of boundaries which no longer hold, which is threatening.

The possible influence of interpersonal distance was not taken into account in the design of this study, and the reciprocal roles of subject and experimenter may have served

to bind the risk of contagion. The boundaries between experimenter and subject are ethically considered firm and unbreachable. Each knows and understands his or her role. The experimenter is there to test a hypothesis and the subject is there to be of service. Once the information has been gathered, the relationship is finished. There are no grounds for its continuation. Without the implicit experimental boundaries, would the results have been different? Would contagion then be a significant factor?

In a very concrete sense, subject and experimenter were separated from each other. Given the equipment and facilities available, this was an unavoidable occurrence. During the introduction to the equipment, the subject was always on the opposite side of a table, and during the experiment itself, the experimenter had to stand behind the equipment in order to operate it. This effectively hid the experimenter from view. At most, the curious subject would have been able to catch a glimpse of an arm or the top of the experimenter's head. It may be that such physical barriers between the people served to minimize the danger of contamination.

If physical and emotional distance was a factor influencing this study's results, future researchers may desire to confirm or disconfirm this factor. How would the results have been different if the experimenter had been seated next

to the subjects? This might have intensified the threat of exposure to dirt. The emotional boundaries between subject and experimenter could also be made less firm and protective. For example, the experimenter might imply the possibility of the continuation of the relationship once the study was completed by asking the subject out for a snack or coffee. Perhaps unobtrusive research and field studies would provide data that the experimental situation masks.

Pollution and purity exist in a system of relation to each other, with context being an important mediating variable in that relationship. In one's home, one sees plants, not pots of dirt with plants in them. If a plant is toppled and dirt spills across the carpet, there occurs something of a mild revelation, "there is dirt in my house!". But it was there all along, only ignored. Perhaps, it would be more accurate to say that the home had no dirt in it until the pot was overturned. The difference is crucial because it reveals dirt to be a relative phenomenon. Dirt becomes dirt only in relation to a self whose illusory cleanness has been threatened. To extend the analogy further, once the potted plant has been overturned, the dirt is no longer contained and isolated from the self. It is spread out on the floor threatening to soil the whole room and its inhabitants!

Some of the aversion to dirt may stem from its disavowal, effectively distancing and mystifying what was, at one

time, very close to the self. Thus, dirt takes on a "differentness" felt to be threatening and unknown. The limits of the unknown can only be guessed at, while the known is bounded by the mind. Dirt, evil and stigma are mysteries to most people; they are unknown and different. Because they are unknown, the extent of their power and threat is likewise a mystery. Mystery seems to loom so large in comparison to certainty. So it is that dirt is felt to be stronger, more potent than clean, that evil threatens good, and stigmatized people threaten others who are "normal". A drop of urine in a glass of tea contaminates it, but a drop of tea in a glass of urine has no effect upon its dirtiness. For one who denies these aspects of self, closeness with them is anxiety arousing, not only because of the sense of sinister mystery, but fundamentally, because closeness threatens the self with the acknowledgment of personal dirt.

Because dirt is veiled and denied, it becomes more threatening. Like the child whose night light burns out and suddenly becomes alarmed at the hitherto unnoticed house noises, so one's own dirtiness and badness take on threatening dimensions when removed from the seen world of the self concept. The sense of danger helps to ensure that the separation of the self from the disavowed self remains intact. If the boundary is maintained then the self is not threatened with defilement. Once the separation is weakened, what

was once safely separate from the self becomes uncomfortably close.

Possibilities for the modification and development of methods to test for a relationship between dirt and stigma are as varied as the imagination of the researcher. One measure which the author was forced to forego because of equipment difficulties was the correlation of electrodermal activity with the subject's ratings of the experimenter. Because emotional arousal and electrodermal response have been shown to be related, it would have been informative to explore this realm. This measure could provide additional and valuable data for investigating the relationship between dirt and stigma through determining the difference in the emotional impact of dirt on subjects in the two conditions.

Within the list of dirt words, "contagious" appeared to evoke an ambivalence which the other words did not. The ambivalence was related to an uncertainty about how the word was intended. Contagious laughter and contagious disease are both appropriate uses but reflect widely different affective tones. One refers to the transfer of positive feeling and the other to the transfer of germs. Because an aspect of the word contagious involves the notion of "transfer", sometimes without regard to what is transferred, it is more prone to misunderstanding than the other words. Future

researchers may wish to take this ambiguity into account when considering the use of this word.

Relation to Current Stigma Research

The field of stigma is presently concerned with the process by which people stigmatize others and the process of interaction between normal and stigmatized individuals in terms of self-concept, stereotypes, and discrimination. Primarily, research in this area focuses on the cognitive and behavioral components of the stigmatizing process. This involves determining what are the expectancies, assumptions, and context that influence and shape these interactions. Although the range of what is considered to be stigmatizing is very broad, most research has focused on stigmas which are physical and visible, such as appearance, sex, or race. Increasingly, there appears to be an appreciation of the complexities involved in the stigmatizing process. Individual and cultural factors are important but not the only ones. The media, political climate, history, and economics may also strongly influence and shape what is considered to be stigmatizing as well as how people in a given situation react to those with stigma. Recently, both Jones et al. (1984), and Ainlay, Becker, and Coleman (1986) have provided

comprehensive overviews of the current directions of stigma research.

The present research, while appearing very different from current work, in that it is neither cognitive or behavioral, nevertheless is concerned with the process of interaction which has gained so much recent attention. However, this research explores a different domain of interaction--the unconscious, affective components of mixed encounters. The hypothesis that all stigmatized individuals pose some degree of physical contamination threat is new and has not been discussed in the literature.

There has been scant research investigating the threat that stigmatized individuals pose to others. When the element of threat is discussed, it is usually in terms of the fear of physical harm that many normals experience in the presence of mental patients or ex-convicts. It is interesting that, in spite of the numerous discussions on the symbolic threat which deviance poses to the social order, no empirical research has attempted to investigate this particular aspect of peril. "In fact, marked persons always seem to pose some form of threat, and it may be that danger, in its many forms, is the fundamental characteristic of stigmatizing interactions" (Jones et al., 1984, p. 66). Symbolic danger has been discussed but not investigated.

What has been investigated is the fear of contamination by those who are sick and dying. This fear is based exclusively, at least on a conscious level, on the known presence of potentially dangerous germs, cells, or viruses. Current work has dealt primarily with the fear surrounding AIDS (Dunkel & Hatfield, 1986; Meisenhelder & LaCharite, 1980; Richardson, Lochner, & McGuigan, 1987), and, to a lesser extent, cancer (Sontag, 1978; Barbarin, 1986). Commonly, given the scientific understanding of these illnesses, fears of contamination are viewed as being extraordinary. Even the doctors and nurses who work with AIDS patients have been criticized as being unrealistically afraid (Meisenhelder & LaCharite, 1980; Richardson, Lockner, & McGuigan, 1987).

That fears of contagion may remain even after all medically relevant procedures have been exercised, shows that there may be other aspects to this danger than science would have us believe. As Gellman (1959) suggested, even where contagion is known to be impossible, as in the case of physical disability, there may be unconscious fears that disability is contagious which can lead to the segregation of this group.

It is interesting that before children understand contagion in terms of microorganisms, they frequently overgeneralize the concept to include ailments like a toothache (Kister & Patterson, 1980). At a young age, the idea of

"catching something" has little to do with germs. Could it be that the adult's fear of becoming infected by medical patients, is fueled by fears other than that of germs? The "unreasonable" fright with which many persons respond to AIDS and cancer victims becomes more understandable if we assume that the fear of becoming soiled is misinterpreted as a fear of contagion. Thus, even though the germs may be contained, the fear of dirt may not.

"Any disease that is treated as a mystery and acutely enough feared will be felt to be morally, if not literally, contagious" (Sontag, 1978, p. 6). This statement mentions two key notions, that of fear and mystery. Fear leads to distancing in an attempt to contain mystery, to take away some of its terrifying expanse. The same may be true for any stigma, for stigma obscures the paradox and enigma of our humanness. Yet, what is set apart, always threatens to return. It is this contact with the self which is feared.

No matter how free of germs a stigmatized person is, he or she is still "dirty" and may continue to pose a contagion threat to normals. If further study reveals the trends in this analysis to be significant, researchers will have uncovered a strong emotional component associated with stigma --disgust. Disgust brings with it the threat of contamination. The specifics of the kinds of threat posed by stigma are just now beginning to be empirically studied. That

disgust is one aspect of this threat is certainly worthy of further consideration.

The research on affect and stigma has demonstrated that there always exists a degree of ambivalence towards those who are stigmatized. Gergen and Jones (1963) discussed the tension that the mentally ill evoke in others in terms of the conflict between aversion and altruism. Katz (1981) has demonstrated that this ambivalence can, on occasion, lead to an increase in helping behaviors. In an interesting experiment involving teaching a confederate through electric "shocks", Farina, Holland, and Ring (1966) found evidence that the conscious and unconscious responses to the confederate differed when he or she was believed to be a former mental patient. They found that although the intensity of the shocks given to the normal and the "mentally ill" subjects were equal, the subjects believed to be suffering from a mental disorder were given shocks of significantly longer duration. The intensity of the shock was under conscious control, but the duration of the shock was not. Attitudes and actions are often incongruent when normals interact with the mentally ill (Farina, 1982). At this time, the research on ambivalence has gone no further than examining context's influence on the response to stigma.

Conclusions

The ideas investigated in the present research merit further exploration for several reasons. Exploring the link between dirt and stigma could prove very helpful in gaining a deeper understanding of the ambivalence often noted in reference to stigma. Certainly, it would help expand the field's current emphasis on cognition and behavior so as to include more of the affective correlates involved in the interaction between normals and marked people. Perhaps most interestingly, this research could help clarify the nature of people's irrational fear of the stigmatized, especially as it relates to attitudes towards the physically ill, particularly AIDS and cancer victims.

In summary, this research has created more questions than it has answered. However, this work has revealed some interesting and noteworthy trends: the stigmatized experimenter tended to be seen as relatively dirty, and the dirty pictures tended to be interpreted as those of stigmatized individuals, even as neither result was significant. On the other hand, the importance and immediacy with which dirt is located outside of the self and one's social group was confirmed by this study. Examination of the results and a re-evaluation of the procedures and comments made by subjects has lead to a consideration of factors which may have

affected the results, such as the degree of threat posed by the experimenter and subjects' common complaint of discomfort with the subliminal sections. Before more conclusive statements on the association between dirt and stigma are made, further investigation of this relationship is warranted.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

CONSENT FORM

Participation in this research experiment is completely voluntary. No penalty or loss of benefits to which you are entitled will result from refusal to participate. You may withdraw at any point. This experiment, which involves approximately 30 minutes, will earn you extra credit points for your psychology course.

These procedures involve the use of a tachistoscope which can flash words or pictures very quickly, so that they can not be seen, or very slowly, so that they are easily visible. You will be required to make judgments of both words and pictures, some of which you will be able to see and others that you will not be able to see and must, therefore, rely on your intuition. The purpose of this research is to describe some of the differences between the way normal and stigmatized people are perceived. This experiment involves minimal risk and is not expected to be any more stressful than routine psychological tests. The answers you provide will be confidential and your name, although appearing on the consent form, will not be linked to the data you provide. The raw data will be kept in a file in the Student Director's (W. Allen Burt's) apartment. No other person will have access to the data.

By signing this form, you will indicate your understanding and acceptance of the above. You will be provided with a copy of this form.

If you should have any questions, you may contact Allen Burt at 974-2161, Psychology Department, Austin Peay Bldg., University of Tennessee, Knoxville.

Signature

APPENDIX B

LIST OF STIMULUS WORDS

RICH

DIRTY

SEXY

EDUCATED

CONTAGIOUS

SPLENDID

CRUEL

PRODUCTIVE

CONTAMINATED

BEAUTIFUL

FILTHY

INTELLIGENT

MASOCHISTIC

HELPLESS

POLLUTED

AFRAID

SUCCESSFUL

APPRECIATED

INFECTED

ACCEPTED

APPENDIX C

RATING SCALE FOR EXAMINER

Please rate each of these words according to your feeling as to whether they are like or unlike the experimenter by circling the appropriate number.

	1 extremely unlike	2 quite unlike	3 slightly unlike	4 slightly like	5 quite like	6 extremely like
A	1	2	3	4	5	6
B	1	2	3	4	5	6
C	1	2	3	4	5	6
D	1	2	3	4	5	6
E	1	2	3	4	5	6
F	1	2	3	4	5	6
G	1	2	3	4	5	6
H	1	2	3	4	5	6
I	1	2	3	4	5	6
J	1	2	3	4	5	6
K	1	2	3	4	5	6
L	1	2	3	4	5	6
M	1	2	3	4	5	6
N	1	2	3	4	5	6
O	1	2	3	4	5	6
P	1	2	3	4	5	6
Q	1	2	3	4	5	6
R	1	2	3	4	5	6
S	1	2	3	4	5	6
T	1	2	3	4	5	6

APPENDIX D

PRELIMINARY RATING SCALE FOR PICTURES

I would like your help in providing ratings for 19 pictures along the dimension of clean--dirty. The pictures that you are about to rate were selected on the basis of their representing either dirtiness or cleanness. I want your help in achieving some sort of consensus as to which pictures are dirty or clean and to what degree each picture fits into its particular category. There has been no attempt to evenly distribute the pictures over the categories which you see below, so there is no need to worry about achieving some sort of balanced spread of scores. Also, it is not necessary to rate the pictures relative to each other, but rather relative to what you personally feel is dirty or clean. In other words, use your gut reaction in rating these items.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
extremely	quite	slightly	neither	slightly	quite	extremely
clean	clean	clean	clean	dirty	dirty	dirty
			nor			
			dirty			

Circle the number corresponding to the above scale for each picture:

#1	1--2--3--4--5--6--7	#13	1--2--3--4--5--6--7
#2	1--2--3--4--5--6--7	#14	1--2--3--4--5--6--7
#3	1--2--3--4--5--6--7	#15	1--2--3--4--5--6--7
#4	1--2--3--4--5--6--7	#16	1--2--3--4--5--6--7
#5	1--2--3--4--5--6--7	#17	1--2--3--4--5--6--7
#6	1--2--3--4--5--6--7	#18	1--2--3--4--5--6--7
#7	1--2--3--4--5--6--7	#19	1--2--3--4--5--6--7
#8	1--2--3--4--5--6--7		
#9	1--2--3--4--5--6--7		
#10	1--2--3--4--5--6--7		
#11	1--2--3--4--5--6--7		
#12	1--2--3--4--5--6--7		

APPENDIX E

RATING SCALE FOR PICTURES

Please rate these pictures according to your feeling of whether or not and to what degree the people you are seeing are stigmatized or accepted.

	1 extremely stigmatized	2 quite stigmatized	3 slightly stigmatized		4 slightly accepted	5 quite accepted	6 extremely accepted
A	1	2	3		4	5	6
B	1	2	3		4	5	6
C	1	2	3		4	5	6
D	1	2	3		4	5	6
E	1	2	3		4	5	6
F	1	2	3		4	5	6
G	1	2	3		4	5	6
H	1	2	3		4	5	6
I	1	2	3		4	5	6
J	1	2	3		4	5	6

APPENDIX F

MANIPULATION CHECK

Please briefly answer the following questions:

In your own words, what did you think the experimenter was trying to investigate or prove?

Subjects sometimes feel that they are being deceived when participating in psychological studies, whether or not they are actually being deceived about the true intent of the study. Do you feel that you have been deceived in any way in this study? If so, how?

Any further comments?

VITA

W. Allen Burt was born on August 16, 1960, in Hartford, Connecticut. He attended schools in Florida, North Carolina, and Tehran, Iran. In June 1979, he graduated from Deland High School in Deland, Florida, and, the following September, entered Duke University receiving a Bachelor of Arts in Psychology and Spanish in June of 1983. His junior year at Duke University was spent studying and working with the inner city poor in Bogota, Colombia. After graduating, Mr. Burt worked as a counselor for a runaway shelter in Daytona Beach, Florida.

In September 1984, the author began his graduate study in Clinical Psychology at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. During his graduate training, Mr. Burt was employed at several area mental health agencies including Lakeshore Mental Health Institute and Overlook Center.