



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
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


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
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IMPRESSION MANAGEMENT DURING THE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS
OF NIXON, CARTER, AND REAGAN: A QUANTITATIVE CONTENT
ANALYSIS AND THEMATIC ANALYSIS

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Karen Sue Johnson

August 1984

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my thanks to the members of my committee. My appreciation is extended to Dr. Alex Smith, Dr. Tom Unga, and Dr. Paul Ashdown for their words of encouragement and helpful suggestions.

This work would not have been completed if it had not been for several individuals at The University of Alabama who worked to provide me with an appropriate atmosphere in which I could pursue my research interests. My appreciation is extended to Dean Ed Mullins, Dr. Jim Brown, Dean Bill Melson, and Dr. Gary Copeland.

Two personal friends, Byron St. Dizier and Greg Horne provided me with the moral support and the laughter that kept me going. To both of them, many thanks and much love.

And at this point, it is most appropriate to repeat what I wrote in my acknowledgments for my thesis. It is perhaps even more true today than it was five years ago. "To Dr. Dan Nimmo, my mentor and friend, I would like to express my deepest gratitude for his guidance, for he is the person most responsible for my academic evolution." Without this caring man, I would not be a teacher or a writer. And above all, I would not have realized my potential as a human being or as a scholar. He cared enough to push me, when others dared not.

I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my parents, Mr. and Mrs. Edsel E. Johnson, whose years of love, understanding, and encouragement made this work possible.

ABSTRACT

Even though the traditional American Politics literature virtually ignores the presidential transition period and its relationship to the political future of the president-elect, this research suggests that the transition period must be examined, for it is here that the successful presidential candidate evolves into a governing politician. "This creation of political character or the political presentation of self is crucial for the career of the politician and for an understanding of electoral politics" (Hall, 1972, p. 61). The choices made during the transition will reverberate throughout the remainder of the president's political career.

This study revealed that Nixon was highly successful in the creation of his political persona. He avoided violations of type and remained consistent in his presentation of his persona. The Carter persona that emerged during the 1976-77 transition was one of complexity and incoherency. By attempting to combine two incompatible leadership roles, Carter violated his central role and proved inconsistent. Although Reagan avoided violations of type, he ran into trouble by pursuing a theory of silence and withdrawing from active participation in the Washington scene. However, once the trouble became apparent, the Reagan team devised an adaptive strategy and to a great extent corrected their earlier mistakes.

This study is based on a quantitative content analysis and a thematic analysis of the transition coverage provided by The Washington Post, The New York Times, Time, and Newsweek during three transition

periods: November 5, 1968-January 20, 1969; November 2, 1976-January 20, 1977; and November 4, 1980-January 20, 1981.

There were approximately 77 days of newspaper coverage and 11 issues of the newsmagazines. The observation unit for the coding process was a story unit.

Coding categories were developed from a thematic analysis of The Washington Post over the three time periods. Four coding categories were used: the source of the story unit; the president-elect discussed; the substance of the story unit; and the mode of the story unit. Inter-coder reliability checks were not applicable. The intra-coder reliability score did not fall below 93 percent for a story unit. The average reliability score for the coding process was 97 percent.

Future research should involve a variety of media as samples. Network news and regional and local newspapers should be examined. Studies should span additional time periods in order for a more comprehensive comparative analysis.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

"Only in recent times has the political community identified presidential transitions as a distinctive set of phenomena to be named, analyzed, and affected by purposeful effort" (Henry, 1969, p. 471). This study will be an examination of one such purposeful activity of the Nixon (1968-1969), Carter (1976-1977), and Reagan (1980-1981) transitions: impression management.

A transition may be viewed as the 11 weeks between the election and the inaugural, or it may be viewed more broadly as the time it takes for the president to become familiar with his new job (Neustadt, 1980, p. 217). For the purposes of this work, a presidential transition period will be discussed as the time between the election and the inaugural. During a transition period, an old administration is winding down, and a new one is being born. A winning campaign organization must be turned into a successful governing organization, and similarly, a winning presidential candidate must turn miraculously into an effective president. The drama of an election campaign is evolving into the drama of governing (Denton, 1982, p. 5). The president-elect must evolve from partisan contender to winner to public servant.

This political evolution has been described negatively in various ways: "the weakest hour of American democracy" (Benedict, 1961, p. 16); a "governing hiatus" (Blair & Savage, 1980, p. 1); or even more dramatically "the crisis of transition" (Benedict, 1961, p. 16). The

common denominator of these symbolic labels is the theme of uncertainty and anxiety (Long, 1972; Boeckel, 1960).

This uncertainty is not just the uncertainty brought from the transference of the reins of power from the hands of one group to another, but rather, it is also the uncertainty about the president-elect himself. Is the president-elect really of presidential cloth? Will the president-elect be able to meet the challenges of the presidential office?

Bryce addresses the root of this uncertainty in his classic work, The American Commonwealth (1896). In the famous chapter, "Why great men are not chosen presidents," Bryce suggests "that the merits of a President are one thing and those of a candidate another" (p. 60). The political parties of this time were more concerned with selecting a winning candidate than with selecting a potentially good president (Bryce, 1896, p. 60). Bryce describes the political realities of this period:

It will be a misfortune to the party, as well as to the country, if the candidate elected should prove a bad President. But it is a greater misfortune to the party that it should be beaten in the impending election, for the evil of losing national patronage will have come four years sooner. (1896, p. 60)

Recently, Krasner (1979) examined the "political realities" of modern America in his article, "Why great presidents will become more rare." Krasner suggests that with the advent of modern media technology and the primary system, the party nominee is known before the nominating convention is held (1979, p. 368). Krasner maintains that "the resources essential to capturing the nomination--a strong personal organization, an effective television image, and an appealing theme--are

not central to the conflict and bargaining that permeate national policy-making" (1979, p. 367). Thus, whether a candidate is selected by a party convention or by a media-primary-party convention process, there are no guarantees of a potentially good president. The president-elect remains an uncertainty, an unknown element in the American political arena.

Recently, Kissinger (1981) made a similar statement concerning a president-elect's organization: for, "their performance in the campaign offers no clues to their capabilities in the Executive Branch" (p. 403). An invaluable campaign aide is not necessarily an invaluable policymaker (see Kissinger, 1981, pp. 403-405). Thus, both the president-elect and his organization are worrisome uncertainties in the American political arena.

Regardless of the qualifications of both the president-elect and his organization, the task of transforming a campaign-oriented drama into a governing-policymaking-drama is a formidable one. Neustadt describes the task before the president-elect and his organization:

The eleven weeks are hazardous because they are so few. They leave but little time to turn a campaign into an Administration, which takes office three weeks after Congress does. There has to be a pattern for the presidential staff and initial appointments to suit. There have to be Cabinet and sub-Cabinet appointments, along with understandings on appointments down the line and on procedures to produce them (and to place campaigners). There has to be a legislative program or at least a holding-action with a start upon specifics. There has to be a point of view toward diplomatic and defense initiatives left dangling by the previous administration. The outgoing regime presents a budget just as it departs; there has to be a point of view on that. There has to be a "memorable" Inaugural Address. Furthermore, importantly, the new look of the President-elect--candidate no longer--has to be impressed upon a temporarily attentive public and insatiably curious Washington. (1980, p. 217)

And to make things more complicated, all of these things must be "carried out in a political atmosphere of uncertainty and tension, in which everything the President-elect does is scrutinized in relation to a leadership and factual situation that may have been thrown into flux by his victory" (Henry, 1960, p. 714). A president-elect then must attempt to define a situation in which the only certainty is uncertainty. Long (1972) has labeled this task of "defining the situation" as one of "uncertainty absorption" (p. 76). The president-elect must make himself and the political situation "understandable" (see Edelman, 1964, pp. 91-94). This task of "defining the situation" is the process of the president-elect defining himself and his relationships with other governmental actors and with the public at large. Thus the president-elect must "conduct himself with awareness of the image of the man-in-action he is creating in the public mind, and its portent for his post-inaugural success" (Henry, 1960, p. 714). The public image of the president-elect is the key to what he should do and can do as president (see Klapp, 1964, p. 123). The purposive process of "defining the situation" is the art of impression management.

In order to understand a president-elect's use of impression management, it is first necessary to examine the nature of presidential power and the nature of the symbiotic relationship existing between the president and the mass media.

"The constitutional convention of 1787 is supposed to have created a government of 'separated powers.' It did nothing of the sort. Rather it created a government of separated institutions sharing powers" (Neustadt, 1980, p. 26).

The President's role in relation to policy making is "hortatory" rather than "determinative." He has neither the legal-constitutional nor the party-political base to command action, or even attention, in the legislative process. He must persuade, bargain, exhort, and on occasion, bribe. Above all he must win and channel public support. (Cornwell, 1965, pp. 5-6)

Thus according to Neustadt, presidential power is persuasion, bargaining (1980).

How many persuasion advantages a president has, how much "power" a president has, is a function of professional reputation and public prestige (see Neustadt, 1980, pp. 44-79).

Professional reputation is the "dominant tone" (Neustadt, 1980, p. 47) of the "impressions of tenacity and skill accumulating in the minds of Washingtonians-at-large" (Neustadt, 1980, p. 48). A president's professional reputation is based then on "the most attentive members of his audience," the Washingtonians (Neustadt, 1980, p. 44).

Members of Congress and of his Administration, governors of states, military commanders in the field, leading politicians in both parties, representatives of private organizations, newsmen of assorted types and sizes, foreign diplomats (and principals abroad)--all these are "Washingtonians" no matter what their physical location. (Neustadt, 1980, p. 44).

Washingtonians scan their political environment to see "how the president is doing." They read

. . . everything reported in the press. . . . Whatever happens to their neighbors amplifies their view. They ask each other questions. They tell each other stories. They read with care the news reports, and newsletters, and syndicated columns circulating "inside dope" drawn from men like themselves. (Neustadt, 1980, p. 47)

The Washingtonians "anticipate" how "well the president is doing" and subsequently, gauge their reactions to the president's orders and requests on the basis of this political judgment. Thus, "his bargaining

advantages in seeking what he wants are heightened or diminished by what others think of him" (Neustadt, 1980, p. 48; see also p. 67).

Public prestige is a judgment made by the Washingtonians, anticipating "how well the president is doing with the public." "When men make judgments in the Washington community they are no less concerned with what he is liked for, than with how many like him" (Neustadt, 1980, p. 65).

Elected officials are greatly influenced by expressions of public support for the president and hesitance to contravene public wishes. One main reason for this is a selfish one: the desire to be reelected. The second is ideological: Congress and the judiciary have been nurtured in the democratic ideology, which places great weight on public opinion. (Graber, 1982a, p. 2)

Thus, by going through this "scanning process," Washingtonians anticipate the public's reaction to the president (see Entman, 1981, p. 94; Neustadt, 1980, p. 64). Consequently, Washingtonians react to the president on the basis of this judgment.

In recapitulation, Washingtonians arrive at impressions of presidential power by anticipating professional reputation and public prestige and politically act on the basis of these impressions. These impressions are dynamic, evolving in the political process (see Nimmo & Savage, 1976, p. 49).

Thus ultimately, presidential power is linked with public support. Cornwell expounds this concept of presidential power when he writes that: "the American presidency's power is essentially 'plebiscitary' in its basis" (Cornwell, 1976, pp. 55-56). Any "leverage the President has acquired in the law-making process has been indirect, based on use of the arts of persuasion, and ultimately grounded in the popular

support he can claim or mobilize. Hence his link with the public is his key relationship" (Cornwell, 1965, p. 4; see Edwards, 1976).

However, a president can not reach a citizen directly on a one-to-one, interpersonal basis. "In a large and complex world people do not observe most major events directly. . . . But most people, most of the time, receive information about events indirectly, through mass media--particularly television" (Brody & Page, 1975, p. 140).

The mass media create common reality by shaping the conceptual environment in which humans communicate. . . . Political reality is formed by mass communication reports which are talked about, altered, and interpreted by citizens in a society. The totality of this process constitutes reality. (Kraus & Davis, 1976, p. 211).

Thus, the president must attempt to stimulate public support through the mass media. Any presidential attempt to impression manage is filtered through the conceptual environment of the mass media. The media capitalize on the president as a ready source of good copy (see Cornwell, 1959; Balutis, 1977), and the president and his aides capitalizing on this serendipitous events, engage in impression management (see Cornwell, 1965, p. 302; Hall, 1977, p. 26; Boorstin, 1976, p. 183).

The result of this symbiotic relationship is that "the President is so close to us, he seems larger than life. . . . He is a living presence; the others are dim figures" (Greider, 1976, p. C1; see Miroff, 1982, p. 242). Around "25 percent of all domestic national news . . . concerns presidents or presidential candidates" (Entman, 1981, p. 81). The presidential domination of public attention has led Miroff (1978, p. 5; 1982, p. 219) to define American politics as a presidential drama. "Presidential drama is expected to fill up the

public space; presidential dominance over visible publication is now as much demanded by the media as it is sought by the President" (Miroff, 1978, p. 5; see Caesar, Thurow, Tulis & Bessette, 1982, p. 242).

According to Haight and Brody (1977), there is "repeated evidence of a relationship between the public's response to day-to-day news and approval of the President, which is in turn related to his ability to govern" (p. 58). Similarly, Graber stresses that "the correspondence of mass media images to images held by mass and elite publics makes constant themes in news stories important social indicators" (1976, p. 173). Thus the presidential dominance of news has ramifications not only for a president's attempts at impression management but for the American political system as well. Cornwell concludes:

A process of interaction between the developing media of communication and their generalized impact, on the one hand, and growing presidential use of them, on the other, has altered both the center of gravity of the national governmental system, and the frame of reference of the public in viewing government. Progressively, during this century (and episodically, during the last), the President has become the source of initiative and stimulus for action. He has done so by exploiting his unequalled platform for popular leadership. This fact, with a powerful assist from the burgeoning commercial news media, has virtually transformed the White House occupant into the personification of the national government. (1965, p. 5)

"Political Scientists, generally, have failed to examine the dynamic, internal processes of the political system, the impact of political outputs and 'symbols' upon society, and the creation of 'symbolic political reality' by 'symbols' upon society" (Denton, 1982, p. 9). This study attempts to do just that.

Grossman and Kumar (1981a) have typed the print media system into several categories. The New York Times and The Washington Post are in

the "inner circle" of what Grossman and Kumar (1981a) call the "majors." The "majors" are defined as those print publications that are important political indicators for the Washington political community and that also influence other media throughout the United States in how they portray the Washington political community (see Grossman & Kumar, 1981a, pp. 52-54). The middle group of the majors includes Time and Newsweek. The outer group contains the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Star, and U.S. News and World Reports. According to Grossman and Kumar:

Five qualities make the majors different from the rest of the media: 1) They reach the elite among policy influencers, including the President, who learn about the more important stories published about them immediately after they appear. 2) The information they provide about the Washington community becomes the common currency of the next highest level of influentials in the White House, Congress, the bureaucracy, the interest groups, research institutions, and the media. 3) Items that appear in them are accepted as authoritative by the rest of the media and are given national circulation by the wire services and the broadcast media. 4) They provide the most complete and continuing coverage of national affairs, and the only such coverage that consistently includes and insider's point of view. 5) They reach many citizens throughout the country directly, either because they have a national circulation or because local newspapers subscribe to their news services. Each major publication has at least four of these five qualities, and the first two are unique to them. (1981a, pp. 52-53)

Leon Sigal (1973) writes that:

In Washington, nearly everyone reads the Post and the Times; this applied to newsmen as well as to officials and the attentive public. . . . The two papers have considerable influence on the news that readers of other newspaper obtain . . . because they have an extensive audience in the journalistic community. . . . Because of the size and quality of their staffs, the Times and Post enjoy a distinguished reputation in the field of journalism for their energetic and thorough coverage. (p. 5; also see Grossman & Kumar, 1981a, p. 254; and Neustadt, 1980, p. 47)

Time is the leader in the newsweekly magazine field. Time was the first to use this type of format. The magazine has the largest

national circulation as well as "the broadest readership among Washington influentials" (Grossman & Kumar, 1981a, p. 254). Time and Newsweek present the news in a highly dramatic and highly personal manner.

Consequently, Washington officials regard the appearance each Monday of Time and Newsweek on newsstands and government desks as an important event. Leading figures in the administration or the opposition are frequently on their covers. The impression given by their stories weighs heavily upon the reputation of the administration and its opponents. (Grossman & Kumar, 1981a, p. 61).

All too often, political scientists and mass communicologists sell Time and Newsweek short in terms of their impact on the political community. The magazines are often regarded as a "quick and dirty" way of obtaining the news. There is perhaps an intellectual bias against the two magazines. Certainly a large distinction is made between The Washington Post/The New York Times and Time/Newsweek. This positioning of the newsweeklies as "inferior pieces of journalism" with little or no political impact is unfortunate, for it misses the political communication reality that exists in Washington.

They are still the only print publications that approximate television news's connection to the American public. Presidential assistants may call the Post and Times when their object is primarily to inform the Washington community, but when their objective is to resonate the message of the President's accomplishments throughout the land, they are more likely to go to the newsweeklies. (Grossman & Kumar, 1981a, p. 62)

Time and Newsweek distribute over 7 million copies in the United States each week. Their readers tend to be the well-off and the well-educated. In short, their readers are described by many as the "opinion-makers" in America (see Grossman & Kumar, 1981a, p. 62).

This study analyzes Time's, Newsweek's, The Washington Post's,

and The New York Times' political coverage of the 1968-1969, 1976-1977, and 1980-1981 presidential transitions through a quantitative content analysis and a thematic analysis.

This study provides an unusual opportunity for study in that it utilizes a comparative research design. First of all, the study provides for a comparison of transition coverage across media (newspapers v. magazines). This alleviates the dangers of attributing the content findings of the coverage analysis to the unique properties of a particular medium (see Adams, 1978, p. 23). Secondly, the study provides for a medium analysis (newspaper v. newspaper; magazine v. magazine) which exposes differences in coverage between the newspapers, and between the news magazines. Thirdly, the study provides an opportunity to examine the subject area longitudinally. Differences in media coverage of presidential transitions across time will be exposed as well as differences in transition coverage across time within the same publication concern. Few studies have employed a comparative design across time and across mediums (see Patterson, 1978, p. 182; Adams, 1978, p. 23).

The transition period itself provides a unique opportunity for study. "The routines involved in the transfer of power can to at least a degree be isolated from substantive political issues, and the action is controllable by a limited number of men--principally the President and President-elect" (Henry, 1969, p. 482). Thus, more easily than during the term of office, a researcher may discern a leadership role (which has been impression managed). This is a valuable descriptive device and to a lesser degree, a predictive and prescriptive device in that the "impression" developed and managed by a president-elect between

his "election and inauguration will reverberate, either positively or negatively, throughout . . . his terms" (Blair & Savage, 1980, p. 1).

An analysis of rhetoric used in mass media coverage lends itself well to the study of impression management during presidential transitions. Brummett succinctly defines rhetoric as the "advocacy of realities" (1976, p. 31). It is in the media that one finds a wealth of competing realities. A president-elect's advocacy of his political reality is essential, for a "president-elect can only speak, not act with any of the authority that remains in another's hands" (Lee, Johnson, & Beld, 1979, p. 477).

The language utilized by public opinion leaders, institutional representatives, legislators, and the media . . . may mirror key words and phrases employed in presidential discourse, and may depict how presidential themes are affirmed, reinforced, altered, rejected, and in general, expounded upon. (Cherwitz, 1980, p. 35)

Thus a study of the mass media's coverage of presidential transitions identifies not only the structure of attention and tone of the president-elect's rhetoric but also the structure of attention and tone of those people discussing the president-elect.

The Nixon Transition (1968-1969), the Carter Transition (1976-1977), and the Reagan Transition (1980-1981) were selected for study for a variety of reasons. Nixon, Carter, and Reagan are the only presidents in American history who have prepared before the election for the transition. In September, 1968, Nixon announced that he had set up 30 task forces under the direction of Paul W. McCracken of the University of Michigan to study and plan for the transition (Henry, 1969, p. 472). Carter spent \$200,000 on his transition planning team which was headed

by Jack Watson. The Reagan pre-election transition operation was a secretive operation separated from the campaign, and the press received little information concerning it (see Hess, 1980, F-5). Reagan made extensive use of his "California-Kitchen Cabinet" in his transition planning process.

All three transitions were of the "party overturn" type. A party overturn transition is one in which "the incoming President is of a different political party from his predecessor" (Henry, 1960, p. 8). A party overturn transition is unique in that it seems to "raise the sharpest problems of leadership, continuity, and institutional adjustments" (Henry, 1960, p. 9).

A choice of the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan transitions provides a ready comparison between Republican transitions and a Democratic transition. In addition, the choice provided an opportunity to study the "handling" of a transition by three men who had very different political experiences. Nixon had served as a Congressman, a Senator, and a Vice President. Carter came to the White House with the executive experience of being the governor of Georgia and with the aura of a populist movement around him. Reagan had served as governor of California, and he came to the White House as the "New Right's champion." Nixon was if not actively a part of the Washington scene, recognized by the political actors and was regarded as an "insider." Carter campaigned as an "outsider," and in truth, he was. "He had no previously existing base of power in Washington, lacking the acquaintanceships, respect, and obligations that have traditionally provided the essential cement of governing majorities" (Lee, Johnson, & Beld, 1979, p. 476). Reagan,

although regarded as an "insider," rode to the White House on a tide of reform promises.

And importantly enough, the Nixon, Carter, Reagan transitions occurred within vastly different environments. In 1968, there was an undeclared war abroad and civil unrest at home. But in 1976, there was the lull of the post-Watergate-Ford era and the red, white, and blue of the bicentennial. And in 1980, there was runaway inflation, high unemployment, civil tension, and the threat of Soviet power abroad.

In recapitulation, a study analyzing mass media coverage of the Nixon, Carter, and Reagan presidential transitions through a comparative research design utilizing a quantitative content analysis and a thematic analysis is a valuable descriptive study of the exercise of impression management.

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Dramatistic Theory

I hold the world but as the world,
gratiano--a stage, where every man
must play a part, and mine a sad one.

The Merchant of Venice
Act I, Sc. 1, 77-79

All the world's a stage,
and all the men and women merely players.
They have their exits and their entrances;
and one man in his time plays many parts.

As You Like It
Act II, Sc. 7, 139-142

"Dramatism is a method of analysis and a corresponding critique of terminology designed to show that the most direct route to the study of human relations and human motives is via a methodological inquiry into cycles or clusters of terms and their functions" (Burke, 1976, p. 7). Human life is drama and can be understood by analyzing social behavior much in the same way that a Broadway critic would review a play on opening night. Researchers observe actors each with a unique motive acting out their roles in a setting.

This perspective is associated with two fields of academic inquiry, literary criticism and symbolic interactionism. Kenneth Burke (1945; 1950; 1966) and Hugh Duncan (1962; 1968) are associated with the use of the dramatistic perspective in literary criticism. In sociology, George Herbert Mead (1934) and Herbert Blumer (1969) are associated with the use of the dramatistic perspective in the school of symbolic

interactionism (see Combs, 1980, p. 3). In order to understand the dramatistic perspective more fully, it is first necessary to review these foundations.

The dictum "Things move; people act" is at the heart of the dramatistic perspective. A motion "consists of mere physical movement" (Nimmo, 1974, p. 132). An act, on the other hand, "consists both of physical movement and of the subjective significance of the movement for the person committing it, or for some observer" (Nimmo, 1974, p. 132). An act is an intended, minded behavior. Mead (1934) believed that the social act is the basic datum of the study of social behavior. This implies that there is a fundamental social dimension in the development of human beings and the process by which they engage in living, i.e., their associations with other human beings.

Meaning is not a property intrinsic to an object which is being observed nor is it the psychological predispositions of the observer. Rather it is the meaning which is created through the process of social interaction. Thus, "fortunately or unfortunately meaning is not intrinsic in events, facts, people, or 'situations' nor are facts 'publicly observable'" (Vatz, 1973, p. 156). Meanings are social products, "creations that are formed in and through the defining activities of people as they interact" (Blumer, 1969, p. 5). In recapitulation, there are three basic aspects of meaning in this perspective. First, meaning is extrinsic. Secondly, meaning is behavioral, and thirdly, it is created through the communication process of social interaction (see Hall, 1972, pp. 37-39).

Man is born into a world of complex actions. "This life of any

human society consists necessarily of an ongoing process of fitting together the activities of its members" (Blumer, 1969, p. 7). Both culture and social structures are derived through activity and continuously evolve through human activity. Man is born then into a complex social environment as well as a physical environment. They are stimulated by both signals and symbols. A signal is part of the physical world, and its meaning is intrinsic (see Frank, 1966, p. 3; Meltzer, 1972, p. 13). A symbol has "a learned meaning and value for people, and man's response to a symbol is in terms of its meaning and value rather than in terms of its physical stimulation of his sense organs" (Rose, 1962, p.5). Man is viewed as a "symbol-using animal" (Burke, 1966, p. 16), for he has a distinctive capacity for symbolic communication. Man alone has the vocal ability to make a "large number and a wide range of different sounds," and man alone has the nervous system capable of storing the "meanings and values of millions of symbols" (Rose, 1966, p. 7). Language then is viewed as "symbolic action" which is acquired through social interaction (Burke, 1966, p. 16).

Burke suggests that the fact that man is a symbol-using animal is obvious enough but that the ramifications of such an idea are not fully understood. He writes:

The "symbol-using animal," yes obviously. But can we bring ourselves to realize just what that formula implies, just how overwhelmingly much of what we mean by "reality" has been built up for us through nothing but our symbol systems. What is our "reality" for today (beyond the paper-thin line of our particular lives) but all this clutter of symbols about the past combined with whatever things we know mainly through maps, magazines, newspapers, and the like about the present? The whole overall "picture" is but a construct of our symbol systems. To mediate on this fact until one sees its full implications is much like peering over the edge of

things into an ultimate abyss. And doubtless that's one reason why though man is typically the symbol-using animal, he clings to a naive verbal realism that refuses to realize the full extent of the role played by symbolicity in his notions of reality. (1966, p. 5)

The importance of language must be stressed, for it is through language (symbolic action) that man acquires the meanings necessary for functional social behavior. Thus, "we live as humans by and for symbole" (Frank, 1966, p. 14).

Thus socialization must be viewed as a process of symbolic social interaction. The self is the "organization of qualities (attributes and roles) that the individual attributes to himself" (Kinch, 1973, p. 224). The individual develops a self concurrently with his use of role-taking. Role-taking is defined as the "establishment for ego of the meaning of the other, i.e., the discovery of the line of action that gives the specific acts of the other a direction, coherence, and significance" (Hall, 1972, p. 39). By taking the role of others, the individual begins to see himself as an object. This enables the individual to get outside of oneself and analyze and define the situation in terms of "others." Man can not only take on the role of a single "other," but he can also take on the roles of a "generalized other" (see Rose, 1962, pp. 8-9). The self is a social process within the individual which involves the negotiation of two roles, the "I" and the "Me." The "I" is the impulsive tendency of an individual, while the "Me" is the "incorporated other within the individual" (see Meltzer, 1972, p. 10). The "I" is the source of creativity and propulsion, and it is governed by the goal-directed, conforming hand of the "Me" (Meltzer, 1972, p. 11).

According to Burke, social interaction is a dramatic expression: "an enactment of roles by individuals who seek to identify with each other in their search to create social order" (Duncan, 1962, xix).

Put in the language of the dramatistic view, human behavior consists of symbolic acts that make up theatrical performances, that is, people presenting themselves to each other to influence their mutual impressions of one another and their joint expectations of what must be done to sustain the performance. (Nimmo, 1974, p. 133).

"Role is the aspect of society in man; society provides the script, the man plays the role variously--with verve, mechanically or however" (Combs & Mansfield, 1976, pp. 19-20).

Duncan views Burke's drama of society as "a drama of hierarchy in which superiors, inferiors, and equals communicate by symbols which they believe will create and sustain social order" (1962, p. 436). Thus political processes are viewed as dramatic expressions. Consequently, they may be analyzed as drama.

In A Grammar of Motives, Burke developed a dramatistic approach to the study of human behavior (1945). He identified five key elements in any dramatic presentation: agents (actors); scene (setting); purpose (motives); agencies (means to achieve ends); and acts (symbolic actions). This is known as the Burkean pentad. In order to understand a political situation, dramatists would examine the interactions of these five elements. "Whatever emerges from a drama is a result of the reciprocal relationships of all the actors in a situation, the whole governs the parts" (Klapp, 1964, pp. 149-150).

The Drama of Political Leadership

"'Leadership' as a phenomenon and an art is highly dramatic"

(Combs, 1980, p. 77).

Leadership, then, is not to be understood as something an individual does or does not have, at all times and places. It is always defined by a specific situation and is recognized in the response of followers to individual acts and speeches. If they respond favorably and follow, there is leadership; if they do not, there is not. (Edelman, 1964, p. 75).

The nature of leadership "is always temporary and uneasy" (Edelman, 1964, p. 91). It is a relationship between the leaders and his followers that is constantly changing and evolving. It is constantly being renegotiated and redefined. The process of going about this is quite simply, talk (see Hall, 1972, p. 51). "Talk . . . involves a competitive exchange of symbols, referential, evocative, through which values are shared and assigned and coexistence attained" (Edelman, 1964, p. 114). "Talk is a largely irreplaceable means of defining situations, exigencies, and the way the world is" (Brummett, 1980, p. 293).

A leader uses rhetoric in his attempts to remain the leader. Burke has defined rhetoric as "the use of words by human agents to form attitudes or induce actions in other human agents" (1950, p. 41). A leader will attempt to "define the political situation" for his followers in his own best interests. He will advocate a particular reality of the political situation in the hopes of "managing" the situation.

Impression management is the processual advocacy of realities that has been purposefully designed to create a desired "definition of the situation." Hall writes:

Impression management means that control over the conduct of others for one's own interest is achieved by influencing

the definition of the situation in which all are involved. This is accomplished by acting in such a way that an image is created of the actor (and related objects) that lead others to voluntarily act as the actor wishes them to act. (1977, p. 2)

Impression management has two dimensions. First, the "impression manager" uses the power of information flow control (Hall, 1972, p. 2). The information presented to the audience (i.e., media personnel, crowd, staff, etc.) are choices of the "impression manager." Secondly, the "impression manager" uses a variety of symbolic devices to mobilize support for his definition of the situation. Persona is the term used for what the "impression manager" wishes to portray (see Lee, Johnson, & Beld, 1979, p. 479).

A presidential news conference is an exercise in impression management. Manheim writes:

The president whose behavior we observe at a news conference is by and large the president he wants us to see. He is an actor, a role player, who is trying with greater or lesser facility and effectiveness to set the public agenda and to enhance his bargaining position in the dealings he has with myriad groups and individuals. What the president reveals of himself in the process is thus more likely to reflect his perceptions of his role and standing, of the progress of the political game, and of his needs relating thereto, than it is some underlying personal essence. The news conference is by definition a media event, an opportunity for posturing. (1979b, pp. 487-488; see Manheim, 1979a)

Clearly, a president has a fundamental interest in impression management, in advocating his realities, in staging his own dramas, in getting his definition of the political situation out to the people in the form that he desires. Neustadt (1980) writes that "a President concerned for leeway inside government must try to shape the thoughts of men outside. If he would be effective as a guardian of public standing, he must be effective as a teacher to the public" (p. 73).

Neustadt's notion of the president-as-teacher is similar to Hall's notion of the president-as-impression-manager. One of the techniques used by the president-as-teacher is the manufacture of events and the assigning of meaning to these events (Neustadt, 1980, p. 75).

It is important to remember that neither the president-as-impression-manager nor the president-as-teacher are hypodermic needle concepts of persuasion. The ultimate "definition of the situation" is the joint action, intersubjective reality of the participants, i.e., the citizens, the mass media, other governmental actors, etc. The "definition of the situation" is a negotiated order. Impression management merely attempts to study and explain means used by political leaders to enter and engage in the negotiation process, the drama known as politics.

"The relationship between followers and leaders is a reciprocal one" (Combs, 1980, p. 78). The political drama is a morass of competing realities. The President must act to define the situation he chooses. "Such acting, which always requires subtle dramatic skills, is especially demanding when situations are given composite definitions that call for contrasting lines of action" (Orr, 1980, p. 17). The political process is a very complex, kinetic system. The people's "impression" of the president depends not only on his present rhetoric, but also on his past and his future rhetoric and their perceptions of it (Neustadt, 1980, p. 78). The people's impression of the president also depends on their present experiences, their past experiences, and their expectations for the future.

Clearly then,

The Presidency is a product of interaction. The institution is comprised of the public's historic, mythic perceptions and expectations of the office. It "grows" as individual occupants and situations mold, shape, create, and reinforce various public perceptions and expectations of the office. The Presidency is not what goes on behind closed doors. Its true significance and impact lies in its public domain. (Denton, 1982, p. 8).

A president must be aware not only of his role performance (his ability to act) but also his public's role expectations (how they want him to act).

How Americans view the president affects what he does, how he does it, and whether he is thought to have succeeded or failed. It affects the scope of his job, the extent of his power and his ability to lead or be led. It influences his appearance, his manner, even his behavior in office. Expectations shape evaluations, and evaluation, in turn, affect the capacity to get things done. (Wayne, 1982b, p. 185)

For example, some roles are acquired when a political leader takes office. The President and his First Lady are expected to be moral exemplars (Klapp, 1964, p. 131). If that expectation is not met, the President is subject to a great deal of criticism and may even suffer a disintegration of support (see Combs, 1980, p. 78). Other roles are developed by leaders as they take office. These roles are performed in an arena of role expectations. Lee, Johnson, and Beld (1979) found that Carter portrayed three persona during his transition period (pp. 482-486). These persona are very similar to "ideal types" or "ideal roles" which Nimmo and Savage (1976) found in people's preferences for presidential behavior (p. 68). Other researchers have found similar expectations of behavior or actual behavior on the part of leaders (see Greenstein, 1965; Sigel, 1966; Kjeldahl, Carmichael, & Mertz, 1971; Graber, 1971; 1972; 1974-75; 1976a; and Blair & Savage, 1980).

Robert Denton in The Symbolic Dimensions of the American Presidency (1982) develops a communication model of presidential power that builds upon these "types or roles" which Denton calls "orientations to power." In this model, Denton describes two continuum which operate in the presidential power matrix. The authority-influence continuum suggests the potential basis of presidential power (1982, pp. 69-70). The "authority" component refers to the legalistic or constitutional basis for presidential power. The "influence" component refers to the persuasive, bargaining skills of the president that also serve as a basis for presidential power. The openness-secrecy continuum refers to a president's policy on information control (Denton, 1982, pp. 70-71). Denton (1982) places the two continuum in an intersecting position, and he has, thus, established four quadrants which he says depict four orientations to power.




FIGURE 1

DENTON'S COMMUNICATION MODEL OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER

According to Denton (1982), the Institutional orientation to power is based on a conservative approach to presidential power. It is based on

the legalistic-constitutional definitions of the powers of the president. An institutional approach ignores the persuasive, interpersonal bargaining skills of a president. The world is viewed in terms of "right" and "wrong," and the president works in a "management mode" (Denton, 1982, pp. 72-73). The Bureaucratic orientation to power is based "on legitimate authority but generally surrounded by secrecy" (Denton, 1982, p. 73). Presidents use their bargaining skills to their best advantage. Both physical (hierarchical) force and psychological force are used to persuade (see Denton, 1982, p. 73). The Pragmatic orientation to power is an attempt to maximize power. The mode of operation is a cost-benefit analysis. The orientation is highly rational, but it does rely on persuasion and bargaining skills (see Denton, 1982, p. 74). The Charismatic orientation to power is linked closely with a president's personality. Information control is not used as a tool for power. The president's interpersonal skills

. . . create a sense of obligation and loyalty with individuals with whom the President interacts, foster unconscious identification with subordinates or ideas they profess, and create perceptions of dependence with those with whom he interacts. (Denton, 1982, p. 74)

Denton (1982) does not view a president's orientation to power as being "static," for he believes that a leader's orientation to power is specific to the situation. Denton describes J. R. Ewing as being both "bureaucratic" and "pragmatic," while his brother, Bobby is "charismatic" and "institutional" (p. 75). The collection of "orientations" that a president regularly uses is called a "political self" (Denton, 1982, pp. 75-83).

Denton's work is useful here, for it clearly summarizes a great

deal of the literature on presidential roles and it does so from the standpoint of a symbolic interactionist. After reviewing the literature, it is possible to discern four presidential roles: the Leader; the Decision-maker; the Manager; and the Partisan. These "roles" vary to some degree from Denton's four orientations to power, because many of the findings of other researchers do not cluster neatly around the openness-secrecy continuum. And in addition, historically presidential behaviors (or activities) would be difficult to explain solely by the interaction of the authority-influence and openness-secrecy continuums. For example, Denton maintains that the president who follows an institutional orientation to power does not take advantage of his interpersonal bargaining skills. However, a president with an institutional orientation to power just might not openly operate as a "wheeler-dealer." Rather, the president might choose to operate in a less overt manner. Part of being "regal" and "very presidential" is the ability to appear above politics but yet be a master of it.

Thus, the four roles that will be used here correspond roughly with Denton's: the Leader (Institutional); the Decision-maker (Bureaucratic); the Manager (Pragmatic); and the Partisan (Charismatic).

1. The Leader is very presidential in behavior. He is above politics, but yet he is also a master at the game, for he is deft politically. He is a moral exemplar. He is a man of conviction, and he articulates those convictions. He is assertive. He is a man of action. He is a creative, visionary.
2. The Decision-maker is issue-oriented. He is very practical

and will compromise to get the job done. He cares for people, and he is one of the common men. He is middle America. He is honest, open, fair, and he is not tied to partisan interests.

3. The Manager believes in rational behavior in governmental decision-making. He tries to reduce subjectivity in the processes. He is knowledgeable, efficient, thorough, and hardworking.
4. The Partisan is linked to various interests. He advocates party positions, and he is not willing to compromise these positions. He is often granting and paying back political favors. He avoids scandals, but he rejects the moral exemplar role.

A president may be perceived as having qualities associated with all four role types. And a president may attempt to portray qualities associated with each of the four role types (see Nimmo & Savage, 1976, p. 72).

When observers of the presidency try to "type" a particular president's leadership attributes, they observe his behavior. A president's "type" is

. . . shaped by signs of patterns in the things he says and does. These are the words and actions he has chosen, day by day. His choices are the means by which he does what he can do to build his reputation as he wants it. Decisions are his building-blocks. (Neustadt, 1980, p. 62)

A public's typing of a president is a highly kinetic, dynamic process (see Nimmo & Savage, 1976, p. 49). The "dramatic domain always throws roles into a crucible of crisis where anything is possible"

(Klapp, 1964, p. 122). A president's public character (dominant impression of him) is constantly evolving, in flux with the political drama being staged. His public character must be attended to and protected from other actors and events threatening his power and prestige. The president can not control the other forces playing in the drama, but in order to be effective, the president must attempt to control the persona he brings to the drama.

The literature suggests that the leader protect his public character by being aware of his persona and managing its depiction. He must try to avoid errors in depicting his persona, consciously and intelligently. By concentrating on "impression managing" his persona, the president may play more strategically in the political drama. As stated previously, the president must control information flow and utilize symbolic devices of persuasion (Hall, 1977, p. 2). The literature suggests eight other specific areas of concern the president must attend to in the protection of his public character.

The president must avoid violations of type. A violation of type is "almost any public conduct that contradicts an image important to people" (Klapp, 1964, p. 124). Goffman uses the phrase "communication out of character" to describe a social act that is in contradiction to the public expectations of one's behavior" (1959, pp. 167-207). The terms "public conduct" and "social acts" includes the ingredient of communication.

In order to avoid violations of type, a president must attend to his central role. A central role is the "thing for which people admire him or that they expect from him" (Klapp, 1964, p. 138). His

central role is his ace in the hole in that it is the most stable of his roles. It is something which he can build his persona around. A president must discover what his central role is and capitalize on it.

The president must also react to events consistently, for "every leadership role carries with it the burden of consistency and performance. For an audience to relate to an actor, the actor must foster an impression of authenticity" (Combs, 1980, p. 98). He must attempt "to alleviate conscious and subconscious anxieties as to whether . . . [his] posture and dramaturgical performance is a reliable indication of his ability and values: whether their public concerns are being managed with integrity" (Edelman, 1964, p. 92). The president's "dramaturgical jousts with public problems make the world understandable and convey the promise of collective accomplishment to masses who are bewildered, uncertain, and alone" (Edelman, 1964, p. 91). The president when faced with a decision must make the decision within the expectational boundaries of his central role. The decision must be consistent with past decisions and a foundation for future decisions. A president may identify events or issues that when confronted might put his public character into crisis. He must prepare his persona to manage these danger areas.

Consistent behavior in addition to aiding the president in his relationship with the public also aids him in his relationships with the mass media.

The President must understand that the way he communicates to his publics effects popular perception of him and his policies. Just as power tends to adhere to those presidents who sense what it is made of, favorable publicity comes to

those Presidents who have a sense for dramatizing and personalizing issues and policies. (Kumar & Grossman, 1981b, p. 105)

For if the president is consistent, then it is easier to "stereotype" him. Stereotyping is "basically a process of definition based upon past experiences" (O'Hara, 1961, p. 170). O'Hara explains that

. . . we first, define, and then we "see," that is we "see" things not as they are but as what our definition tells us they should be. And our definition reflects the sum total of our experiences with the thing being defined, which is brought to bear at the moment of perception. (1961, p. 170).

Stereotyping "enables the mass communicator to frame his message with the least amount of lost motion, and it enables the receiver to comprehend what is being communicated with equal speed and facility" (O'Hara, 1961, p. 194; also see Lippmann, 1965, pp. 53-102; and Gans, 1979).

If a president knows his central role and guards it against type violations by portraying his persona consistently and meeting demands placed on it consistently, he may map out danger areas to avoid in order to protect himself (see Klapp, 1964, pp. 138-139). Using the four presidential roles previously defined, a chart of behavior may be drawn

If the central role is that of a . . .	then it violates the type to play the part of a . . .
Leader	wheeler-dealer softie, frightened man powerless individual crook, man with little values "guy next door"
Decision-maker	Partisan Bureaucrat following the rational actor model Visionary Stubborn, close-minded individual

Manager	Wheeler-dealer Empathic person above all Visionary Statesman
Partisan	Visionary Flexible person Moral exemplar Maverick

In addition to appearing consistent and avoiding violations of type, the president must be sure to maintain an active, coping persona.

The chief executive may maintain his "symbolic leadership" through ascriptions of his ability to cope, through publicized action on noncontroversial policies or on trivia, and through a dramaturgical performance emphasizing the traits popularly associated with leadership: forcefulness, responsibility, courage, decency, and so on. (Edelman, 1964, p. 81).

Wayne (1982a; 1982b) suggests that these traits give us a "masculine view of leadership." In addition, this vision of leadership coincides with what has been termed the "liberal version" or "liberal bias" concerning presidential power. Cronin suggests this liberal perspective: "the great Presidents have been the strong Presidents, who stretched their legal authority, who occasionally relied on the convenience of secrecy, and who dominated the other branches of government" (Cronin, 1977, p. 75). But it is not only political scientists that often have the "liberal" or "masculine view" of leadership, but it is also the presidents themselves (Grossman & Kumar, 1981a, pp. 232-235) and their constituents (see Nimmo & Savage, 1976). It is thus very important for the president to appear active both in word and deed. "The public official who dramatizes his competence is eagerly accepted on his own terms" (Edelman, 1964, p. 78; see Brummett, 1980). The mass media and the public expect the president to be the "great national explainer"

(Kumar & Grossman, 1982, p. 109) or in more traditional terms, the national educator. "This means that their publics must receive a continuous stream of messages through the media explaining what the president wants to do or not do, with reasons for these actions and inactions" (Kumar & Grossman, 1982, p. 109). In summary, Willian Allen White should be quoted: "A democracy cannot follow a leader unless he is dramatized. A man to be a hero must not content himself with heroic virtues and anonymous actions. He must talk and explain as he acts--drama" (from Fenno, 1975, p. 320).

Some researchers have suggested that "much political power . . . appears to be derived and . . . maintained by the manner in which silence is used" (Bruneau, 1973, p. 39). A strategic silence may be defined as a "refusal of a public figure to communicate verbally when that refusal (1) violates expectations, (2) draws public attribution of fairly predictable meanings, and (3) seems intentional and directed at an audience" (Brummett, 1980, p. 289). However, by refusing to talk, the leader has left his actions open to interpretation. The "definition of those actions has been relinquished to the speculation of press and public, speculation that will find mystery, passivity, etc., in those situations" (Brummett, 1980, p. 293). Silences create uncertainty and tension (see Brummett, 1980, p. 292). According to Edelman, "the basic condition for the displacement of political leadership is the leader's inability or lack of opportunity to convey the impression of coping with an opposition . . ." (1964, pp. 81-82). Roper explains: "Americans are accustomed to admire men who get things done, men who radiate faith and confidence. Americans are not inclined toward doubt; they like to be all for or all against something, right away if possible" (1956, pp. 219-220),

for or all against something, right away if possible" (1956, pp. 219-220). Silence does not appear to be a very intelligent choice when a political leader is attempting to manage his persona.

The president has more to worry about than just himself. He must also keep watch over his presidential staff and his Cabinet. According to Entman (1981):

The media's attraction to presidential subordinates can pose management problems because of three strong media impacts--on the agendas of executive officials and agencies, on the relationships between those individuals and offices and the president, and on the president's control over information. (Entman, 1981, p. 88)

The mass media treats an administration badly that talks with many voices. It is important that the "administration" speak with a consistent voice also. For the media believe that "a fragmented sense of publicity and communications is a product of a fragmented Presidency" (Kumar & Grossman, 1981b, p. 114). "On the other hand, well-run political communications operations will make it more likely that the media will reflect rather than distort what the White House is doing" (Kumar & Grossman, 1981b, p. 122). The president must make sure that the presidential staff and the Cabinet represent his persona in the way in which he wishes. He must be concerned with their depiction of his policies, purposes, objectives, and character. In return for their services, he bestows upon them rewards. The relationship is a symbiotic one (see Kissinger, 1981, p. 405).

The president must be careful to avoid the public "power struggle" or the highly conflictual situation. Personality feuds and policy debates among his top administrators are best not aired. According to Entman (1981):

Clashes among Washington newsmakers over presidential policy and purpose stimulate news. The more conflict, the more the media will fill with criticisms of the president. These undermine the president's preferred image as a competent consensus-builder. (p. 82)

The more conflictual situations the president is involved in, the more likely the media coverage will be negative.

Sometimes the president is faced with a difficult decision regarding his persona. If a violation is unavoidable, if an inconsistency must be made, or if inactivity is a necessary behavior, then a leader must counteract this "threat" to his persona by deliberately seeking out behavior reinforcing his original persona.

If a celebrity contradicts his central role and throws his image into crisis, he should immediately reaffirm his status by an extreme, dramatic action along the lines of his central role, that is, he should go on doing what he had been doing, only more so. (Klapp, 1964, p. 139; see Neustadt, 1980, p. 48)

If a president successfully attends to these eight impression concerns, he may be more able to control his "persona" and thus safeguard to a degree his public character. However, it must be remembered that it is the drama that determines the outcome not any of the players. As stated earlier, "whatever emerges from a drama is a result of the reciprocal relationships of all the actors in a situation, the whole governs the parts" (Klapp, 1964, pp. 149-150).

In Summary

It is "suggested that more image analysis is needed to keep public men in touch with themselves, that the analysis might well be in terms of social types, and that the key to shaping images is drama" (Klapp, 1964, p. 120).

For the political scientist, studying the "patterning or consistency in the contexts in which specific groups of individuals use symbols is crucial, for only through such patterning do common political meanings and claims arise" (Edelman, 1964, p. 115).

The dramatistic perspective is particularly well suited to a study analyzing mass media coverage of the 1968-69, 1976-1977, and 1980-1981 presidential transitions through a quantitative content analysis and a thematic analysis. It is a valuable descriptive study of the presidential exercise of impression management.

During a transition, "the president-elect can only speak, not act with any of the authority that remains in another's hands" (Lee, Johnson, & Beld, 1979, p. 477). A study of "talk" is particularly relevant here.

The president-elect's presidential public character is just being born; it is here that it is most crucial to exercise impression management wisely. For,

. . . public images are more fluid in the early stages of their development. A bad part or a violation of type early in the game, when the public image is forming, and "on probation," is more crucial and potentially destructive of popularity than it would be later. (Klapp, 1964, p. 122)

The president-elect must "conduct himself with awareness of the image of the man-in-action he is creating in the public mind, and its portent for his post-inaugural success" (Henry, 1960, p. 714).

And in a sense, the transition period is the most crucial test of a political leader's strength in impression managing, for it is here that he evolves from a campaigner to the leader of the country.

In short, there is a logic for each dramatistic performance; the logic of campaigning for the presidency is not the logic

of being president. Yet the images a candidate commits himself to in one role carry over to influence his role performance in the presidential drama. (Nimmo, 1974, p. 134)

It is perhaps the supreme test; and the choices made there will reverberate throughout the remainder of his political career (see Blair & Savage, 1980, p. 1).

The Dramatic Construction of Political News

Robert Entman (1981) has suggested that journalists use four processes in their construction of political news: personalization; source standardization; dramatization; and, surrogate representation.

Personalization. In the "personalization process" news reporters neglect the "historical or structural explanations by concentrating on individuals whose deliberate choices cause events" (Entman, 1981, pp. 81-82). Individual politicians whether cast as heroes or villains are pictured as shaping the political realities of our time. Similarly, Barber (1978) has suggested that the most common developing news story is one of "action-reaction," i.e., political man interacting with political man.

Significantly, the "personalities" in the news are usually powerful political figures. Gans (1979) found that people in the news could be placed in two categories: the knowns and the unknowns. Around 70-85 percent of news stories deal with the knowns. The knowns are political leaders, heads of major corporations, political candidates, state and local officials, etc. (Gans, 1979, pp. 8-13). The unknowns comprised around 20 percent of all news stories (Gans, 1979, pp. 13-15). The unknowns were the victims of crimes, the perpetrators of crimes,

freaks (people who are engaged in bizarre activities), protesters, strikers, and survey respondents (Gans, 1979, pp. 8-13).

The knowns were pictured as if they were in mortal combat with evil. They were engaged in conflict often with other "knowns" or with "impersonal forces," i.e., inflation, unemployment (Gans, 1979, pp. 8-15). "News objectifies and reifies social and economic forces, presenting inflation as though it were a tornado, impossible to control, but necessary to mop up after" (Tuchman, 1981, p. 90).

And, the unknowns were pictured as depending on the "knowns" for survival. "Issues" could not be "dealt" with on an individual "unknown's" level; rather, the unknowns must wait for the "knowns" to do battle with the issues of the day. This presentation of the political issues of our times has an obvious impact on the system as a whole. Issues are so personalized that the every-day man or woman can not deal with them personally. Often the average citizen is pictured as helpless or ignorant of the proper course to take. In short, the public is presented as ineffectual (Dahlgreen, 1981, p. 105). This creates an extreme dependency on the "knowns," our political leaders (see Dahlgreen, 1981, p. 108).

Golding (1981) concludes that political news lacks the concepts of power and process (pp. 76-77). According to Golding, power is equated with legalistic or institutional definitions. A person has power because of the position he or she occupies. Golding suggests that the news media do not discuss informal power, the power based on the individual and his own personal political skills in interaction with others in the political arena. Similarly, the political "process" is

virtually ignored. News is for the living. It speaks only to the immediate present. For that reason, events are written about in a succession. Rarely are news stories linked together to form the patterns and processes of history. World events, then do not unfold (see Golding, 1981, pp. 76-77). Rather subjects are presented as separate, distinct occurrences. Political news then is often ahistorical (see Dahlgreen, 1981, p. 105). The audience does not see then "the interconnectedness" of events; it does not see the evolution, the process of political events. Thus, the individual politician is presented as the lone champion or villain who is separate from the political realities of power and process.

But, it is not only the politicians that are larger than life. The United States, "the nation" is described in anthropomorphic terms (Gans, 1979, pp. 19-21). The nation is viewed as an individual who is tested by fate to withstand great punishments and ill-luck. In many ways, America is viewed like Job of the Bible. The national will is expressed as one. The will is not divided; the American people speak as one. Similarly, Public Opinion is discussed as if it was just one opinion.

Thus, the personalization process creates an ahistorical, personalized view of the political issues of our day. The concepts of formal and informal power are trivialized. The natural give-and-take of a pluralist nation is depicted in a very negative light. The internal complexities and dynamics of the country are reduced to a misleading stereotype of "oneness."

Standardization. According to Entman (1981), "source standardization" is another journalistic process used in the construction of news. For Entman, the term means that journalists use the same group of informants over and over (see Entman, 1981, p. 81). However, for the purpose of this work, a concept of "standardization" will be used that will not only include Entman's source standardization, but it will also include all of the routinized procedures of a journalists' day-to-day pursuit of his trade.

Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann (1973) suggested that there existed a set of assumptions that all newspeople have concerning the criteria for the acceptance of their stories by the people. This set of assumptions or this set of criteria has long been taught in skills courses of journalism and broadcast journalism throughout the country. Golding (1981) lists the major news values: drama; visual attractiveness; importance; size, proximity; brevity; negativity; and recency (p. 75). To the extent that journalists share a similar news criteria then journalists are apt to create a similar news product by their efforts to meet these news values.

In addition, journalists share a common dependency on sources (see Noelle-Neumann, 1973, pp. 67-112; Entman, 1981, pp. 81-82; and Tuchman, 1981, pp. 88-89). Journalists must have information, and for that, they depend on the "centralization of information in bureaucracies and the generation of facts by bureaucrats" (Tuchman, 1981, p. 88). Journalists view these bureaucratic sources as legitimate because the "facts produced by centralized bureaucratic sources are assumed to be essentially correct and disinterested" (Tuchman, 1981, p. 89). Thus,

the working journalist is "enmeshed in . . . bureaucratized and routinized interactions between and among workers in legitimated institutions" (Tuchman, 1981, p. 88). For this reason, newspeople tend to rely on the same people or the same types of people for information. This practice produces a similarity in their reporting. And importantly, because of this reliance on formal-institutional-sources, the journalist often misses the less-formal-source or misrepresents the informal groups. For example in the 1960's, the leaders of the civil rights movement had difficulty gaining access to journalists, because this social movement was in its pre-bureaucratic stages and because they offered information that was contrary to the information supplied by the bureaucratized sources of the government (see Tuchman, 1981, pp. 89-90).

In addition to the constraints placed on journalists by their "news values" and "sources," the media organization itself and the media system places a degree of constraint on the individual journalist. The media organization--the newspaper, the magazine, the network--has a code of conduct or expectations of journalistic performance that individual journalists must follow. In a sense, a reporter writes for his immediate executive as well as for his public. The copy must meet the expectations of the "group" to which the journalist either belongs or aspires to belong. In addition to the norms and values of the group that influence the journalist when he or she writes the story, there are also group influences after the reporter turns in the story. For "the group" or "the news organization" then molds the story to fit the group's demands (structure, style, etc.). The term "group journalism" is used to suggest a style of news-making that involves a bureaucracy in the creative process (see p. 47). According to Gans:

Time and Newsweek have often been criticized for practicing "group journalism," but all news organizations do so. More correctly, they practice seriatim journalism, as every story passes through several hands before it reaches the audience. (1979, p. 84)

In addition to the internal influences of the media organization, the journalists (and the media organization for that matter) experience strong reciprocal influences among the various media in terms of developing their issue agenda for the day's or week's events (Noelle-Neumann, 1973; see pp. 67-112). The stories in The Washington Post and The New York Times are picked up by the newsweeklies, and the themes found in Time and Newsweek are picked up by the national newspaper (see pp. 9-10). Thus, news creation is an interactional process that may be characterized by its routinized patterns of interaction. The nature of the news-gathering process itself brings a certain degree of similarity to the political coverage offered by the various media.

Thus, the "standardization" process creates a pattern of homogeneity in the news (Noelle-Neumann, 1973, pp. 67-112). And as Tuchman has suggested, "all news has an essential unity" (1981, p. 90).

Dramatization. Entman (1981) maintains that "dramatization" is an important part of the journalist's creation of news. As stated previously, "drama" itself is a news value and so is its counterpart, conflict. Four types of dramatic conflict are used in news stories: man versus man, man versus himself, man versus fate, and man versus nature. Political leaders are pictured as "Davids" fighting the mighty Goliaths, inflation, unemployment, and nuclear war. However, the story often does not have a happy ending. Inflation isn't killed; and, unemployment doesn't fall to the ground. It often seems that there are

"no happy endings." The result is that in many instances, political leaders are portrayed as ineffectual. Common phrases such as: "he's not of presidential cloth"; "he doesn't have what it takes;" and "he can't get the job done" are typical of audience reactions to news stories concerning their political leaders and the issues of the day. A complex picture emerges: the common man can't help himself and must depend on the government, but the political leaders can't help either, so the common man is left in a state of hopelessness. A very negative image of American politics emerges. Wamsley and Pride (1972) and Robinson (1976) have warned that an emphasis on the negative aspects of politics and governmental processes may be denigrative of the political system.

In recapitulation, news is "drama." By concentrating on conflict and struggle, by emphasizing personalized issues, and by presenting a non-processual, ahistorical view of the political arena, the media often create a negative view of the operations of government and the role that the average man plays in it.

Surrogate representation. According to Entman (1981), the news is involved in surrogate representation: "the enforcement of government responsiveness to the public by pressing politicians to explain candidly their actions, motivations, and plans" (pp. 81-82). Surrogate representation takes the notion of "the fourth estate" or "the watchdog" theory of the press one step further, for the mass media have not sought to become the "arbiters of the political system" (Kumar & Grossman, 1981b, p. 107). Today, journalists attempt "to discover

truth, not merely facts" (Weaver, 1974, p. 67). Thus Kumar and Grossman (1981b) maintain that the mass media have become a new type of political actor. They write:

The central impact of permanent underlying forces on the media is that news organizations have become actors of considerable significance in the American political system. They play a number of important public roles including influencing the selection and removal of those who hold office, determining the public perception of the importance of many issues and interpreting the significance of a leader's activities. Nonetheless, news organizations are neither traditional political actors nor are they a fourth branch of government. They do not have clearly defined objectives, as do interest groups, and they do not seek power in the sense of winning and holding office, as do most of the politicians. With the exception of a relatively few matters about which their owners and managers care a lot, or about which a few columnists, editors, and elite reporters do have opinions, most media organizations do not seek to determine electoral or policy outcomes. What might be said of them is that they strive to become the arbiters of the political system. They legitimize and delegitimize individuals, points of view on issues, and even institutions such as the Presidency itself. Collectively and individually, news enterprises act as if they set the ethical norms for candidates and the criteria by which policies shall be evaluated. In sum, these organizations attempt to establish the criteria of rectitude for political operations in the United States. It is no wonder that the other actors, including the President, resent them. (Kumar & Grossman, 1981b, pp. 106-107)

This journalistic attitude is unfortunate, for it masks the symbiotic nature of the mass media-governmental relationship in this country as well as ignoring the very real and very powerful role the mass media plays in American politics (see p. 7).

A Mediated Political Reality

The importance of media themes in shaping the public's political reality has often been overlooked. Even when man does not receive his news directly from the mass media, he obtains his news from someone who has.

The mass media create common reality by shaping the conceptual environment in which humans communicate. . . . Political reality is formed by mass communication reports which are talked about, altered, and interpreted by citizens in a society. The totality of this process constitutes reality. (Kraus & Davis, 1976, p. 211)

Thus, the words, the symbols used by the mass media become very important in man's perception of his world. For, words are creators. "They create situations which are no longer there, or which have never existed, and people behave as if they were real" (Berelson & Steiner, 1964, pp. 664-665).

The perspective newspeople use in selecting and presenting their stories shape politics to a significant degree. For many people in and out of government, media images become the reality on which their judgments are based. They also become the menu from which politicians select the political fare to be served to legislative bodies and publics. (Graber, 1982, p. 11)

Media themes are often overlooked in terms of their importance to the political process. Keeter and Zukin (1982) found that the true test of presidential candidates rests in the media's coverage of the horse race nature of the campaign and the media's evaluation of how well the candidate is doing in the horse race. Character, looks, and ideology were not nearly as important in shaping an individual's perception of a given candidate (see Keeter & Zukin, 1982, pp. 39-82). Similarly, Patterson (1980) found that unlike earlier election studies that in 1979 voters chose to discuss the game-like aspects of the political competition rather than substantive issues. Patterson (1980) suggests that this response is a "perfectly natural reaction to the flow of information and events" from the mass media, for the coverage is contest oriented in nature (p. 105).

Thus, man's political knowledge comes to him not through participation and personal experience but from a conceptual environment created by the mass media. This has led Caesar and associates (1982) to suggest that the mass media actively create "the" political reality for most Americans.

"Real" expressions of mass opinion, which in the past were sporadic, are replaced by the news media's continuous "sophisticated" analyses that served as a surrogate audience speaking to the government and supposedly representing to it what the people are saying and thinking. Driven by its own inner dynamic to find and sustain exciting issues and to present them in dramatic terms, the news media create--or give the impression of creating--national moods and currents of opinion which appear to call for some form of action by the government and especially by the president. (Caesar, Thurow, Tulis, and Bassette, 1982, p. 242)

In conclusion,

What presidents must learn from all of this is that political communication as sent through and by the media play the central role in their struggle for control of political institutions. News organizations must recognize that as the refracting lens for the public, they are a vital ingredient in the political system. (Grossman & Kumar, 1981a, p. 253)

CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

This study is based on a quantitative content analysis and a thematic analysis of presidential transition coverage by The New York Times, The Washington Post, Newsweek, and Time. The three presidential transition periods under consideration are: November 5, 1968-January 20, 1969; November 2, 1976-January 20, 1977; and November 4, 1980-January 20, 1981. This study provides for a longitudinal comparative medium and comparative media analysis of presidential transition coverage.

The Journalistic Character

The New York Times and The Washington Post have long been regarded as being in a class by themselves. They are the two premier newspapers in the United States. The New York Times is considered to be "the newspaper of record" in the country (Grossman & Kumar, 1981a, p. 266). Because of this, The New York Times includes the texts of speeches, documents, and the transcripts of news conferences. The Washington Post is considered to be "the insider's" newspaper in Washington. This newspaper, also, will print the texts and transcripts of public occurrences. For most people, these two newspapers present the equivalent of "that's the way it was" in American politics. The New York Times and The Washington Post are considered to be the most accurate, most objective newspaper in the business.

On the other hand, Time and Newsweek are regarded as the lazy man's dream. For where else can you turn to find a quick analysis of a

week's events in a few short pages? Rarely do these magazines present texts or transcripts of the week's events, however. For, Time and Newsweek provide one with "interpretations" of the week's events (see Grossman & Kumar, 1981a, pp. 265-266). The writers of these magazines weave events into thematic stories that contain a definite perspective on those events.

This is known as "group journalism." Time is much more open and obvious about this approach. But, both magazines "see their role as weekly summarizers and explainers, putting the news of the week into historical, political, or scientific perspective, to express the meaning in the news" (Hiebert, Ungurait, & Bohn, 1982, p. 444). Time

especially has perfected the technique of "group journalism," where facts are sent to New York headquarters from many different persons and many different angles on a given story. These facts are chewed over and digested at the Olympian heights by editors and specialists, who then put together a final summary, synthesizing, interpreting, and analyzing the facts in some perspective. (Heibert, Ungurait, & Bohn, 1982, p. 444)

This "group" approach results in multiple authors. Many articles have five or more contributors.

The image of these two groups--national newspapers and national news magazines--are very different, yet both groups have tremendous influence within the journalism community. The themes found within their copy are echoed across the nation (see pp. 8-10). It is their picture of the political world that becomes the political reality for the Washington elites (see pp. 8-10).

In an examination of the transition coverage provided by these national publications, it is important to consider the operating style

or journalistic style exhibited by the writers. Doris Graber (1982) in her edited work, The President and the Public, suggests that the mass media serve as the link between the president and his public(s) in two ways. First, the mass media act as simple transmitters of messages. In this instance, the mass media simply relay information. Although it is true that the medium affects the message, for the most part, the message is sent unaltered. An example of this is the printed minutes from a presidential news conference in The Washington Post or The New York Times. But, the mass media do not always act as simple transmitters, rather they most often provide another means of linkage, that of the independent transmitters. Graber writes that: "When newspeople move from verbatim transmissions to selection of news and condensing and highlighting it to their own specifications they become essentially independent transmitters of messages" (1982, p. 10). This process of independently transmitting information has been called by Seymour-Ure (1974) as the independent participancy stage in media development. During this stage, the mass media attempt to present an individualistic journalistic perspective in their copy. Journalists bring up issues; they spark political debate; and in short, serve as political actors. In many ways, journalists seek to establish the nation's political agenda (see Kampelman, 1978, p. 13).

A layman might examine The Washington Post, The New York Times, Time, and Newsweek and suggest that the newspapers and magazines are quite different in their journalistic approach. However, this study found that there are striking similarities between the national newspapers and the national magazines. Both groups are clearly in the

independent participancy stage of media development. For that reason, particular attention is paid to political statements made by media personnel.

Research Questions

This survey answers a variety of questions such as: the nature of coverage in general, the policy concerns of the various transition periods, the leadership role traits emphasized by the presidents-elect and the mass media, the mode of the information supplied, and the personality and biographical information supplied about the presidents-elect.

These questions were developed under nine research areas.

Research question development. What type of transition information was supplied by each of the magazines and newspapers during the three transition periods under study? Did transition stories dwell on general policy topics of leadership role traits? Did the emphasis in transition coverage vary from transition period to transition period? Did emphasis in transition coverage vary between magazines or newspapers during the same transition period? Did emphasis in transition coverage by one newspaper or magazine vary from transition period to transition period?

What policy concerns were stressed by each newspaper or magazine during each transition period? What policy concerns were associated with each president-elect? Did policy concerns associated with a particular president-elect vary between newspaper or magazines? Were there any differences in policy concerns associated with a particular

president-elect by pro-president-elect sources, con-president-elect sources, and media personnel?

What leadership role traits were associated with which president-elect? Did leadership role traits vary from president-elect to president-elect? Did a president-elect's role traits as depicted in transition stories vary from magazine to magazine, or newspaper to newspaper? Did any print publication stress similar leadership role traits regardless of transition period and presidents-elect? Were there any differences in emphasis of a president-elect's leadership role traits between pro-president-elect sources, con-president-elect sources, and media personnel? Were there any differences in emphasis of leadership role traits associated with a particular president-elect by the various newspapers and magazines?

Did leadership role traits and policy concerns stressed by a president-elect and other pro-president-elect sources vary from political setting to political setting?

What was the tone of the information supplied by the newspapers and magazines? In what lights were the political, economical, and social environments depicted? Did newspapers and magazines stories stress the negative or positive aspects of the transition process? Were there any differences in the tone of transition information supplied by each magazine or newspaper? Were the presidents-elect depicted negatively or positively? Were there any differences in tone of the information supplied by pro-president-elect sources, con-president-elect sources, and newspaper and magazine personnel? Did newspapers and magazines vary in the tone of information supplied from transition period

to transition period? Was there evidence for a "transition-honeymoon" period?

Was there a correlation between consistency of leadership role traits supplied by pro-president-elect sources and a similar depiction made by personnel? Was there a correlation between consistency of leadership role traits supplied by pro-president-elect sources and a positive network coverage of the president-elect?

Did Cabinet Appointment stories as covered by each of the newspapers and magazines support the leadership role traits supplied by each of the newspapers and magazines?

How were each of the presidents-elect's background depicted?
How were each of the presidents-elect's personal manners depicted?

Were there any differences between communication patterns found in the magazine and newspaper coverage during the 1968-69, the 1976-77, and 1980-81 transition periods? Were there any differences between communication patterns found in similar media? Was there a correlation between consistency of leadership role traits supplied by pro-president-elect sources and a similar depiction by media personnel? Was there a correlation between consistency of leadership role traits supplied by pro-president-elect sources and a positive media coverage of the president-elect?

Sampling

The transition periods were approximately 11 weeks each in length. Election Tuesday was chosen as the starting point for coding.

News magazines. Both Time and Newsweek are published weekly.

Therefore, it was expected that 11 issues of each were to be examined. However, during some transitions, a magazine is released before the outcome of the election is known (that first week) or is released after the inauguration (the eleventh week). Under these circumstances, only one or the other occurs. Thus in some cases, only 10 issues were examined. All political stories were surveyed for transition material (this includes political columnists). All transition material was coded.

Newspapers. There are approximately 77 days of newspaper coverage for each of the three transition periods under examination. As previously stated, Election Tuesday was chosen as the starting point for each of the transition periods. The number three was chosen as the increment by which the remainder of the transition days to be analyzed were selected. This sample size is well within the sampling range of reliability (Liehty & Bailey, 1978, p. 115). Front-page political articles (including jumps), articles hyped on the front-page, and articles located in the political and editorial section(s) of the newspapers were coded.

The observation unit for the coding process is a story unit. A story unit is part of the larger article. An article may have many story units. A story unit represents a separate avenue of discussion. The president-elect, his transition chief, the newspaper reporter, and the leader of the opposition may all be discussing revenue sharing; however, four separate story units must be coded in order to capture the

different source-origins. In some instances, several story units are used when the setting of the discussion changes. For example, the president-elect addressing the AFL-CIO should be coded separately from the president-elect talking with his cabinet appointees. In some instances an article is separated into various policy topics. Usually sub-headings are used to distinguish these points in a newspaper. In this type of situation, separate story units would be coded for say the discussion of foreign policy, civil rights, and domestic life. See Table 1 for a breakdown of articles and story units coded for The Washington Post, The New York Times, Time, and Newsweek during the 1968-69, the 1976-77, and the 1980-81 transition periods.

Quantitative Content Analysis and Thematic Analysis Methods

The content analysis literature suggests two approaches to the study of media content: the hard approach and the soft approach (see Frank, 1973, pp. 23-25). The hard approach may be viewed as simply counting "discrete and concrete quantifiable bits of data" (Frank, 1973, p. 23). The soft approach allows the coder(s) "to evaluate the entire Gestalt package of the news story" or the news segment (Frank, 1973, p. 23).

The hard and soft approaches have both strenghts and weaknesses. The hard approach reduces possible subjective coding error, but it results in a loss of information. The soft form, a more wholistic approach, introduces a great deal of potential subjective error; however, it is quite possible that more of the coded information will be retained in its natural context (see Frank, 1973, pp. 24-25). According

TABLE 1

NUMBER OF ARTICLES AND STORY UNITS CODED DURING
THE 1968-69, 1976-77, AND 1980-81 TRANSITIONS

Transition Period	Story Units President- Elect	Story Units Incumbent	Story Units Presidency in General/ Other*	Total Story Units	Number of Articles
<u>The New York Times</u>					
1968-69	196	38	4	238	167
1976-77	181	58	7	246	154
1980-81	260	43	5	308	145
<u>The Washington Post</u>					
1968-69	240	39	7	286	138
1976-77	287	14	5	306	151
1980-81	261	44	5	310	176
<u>Time</u>					
1968-69	105	6	6	117	61
1976-77	159	6	3	168	82
1980-81	84	6	5	95	44
<u>Newsweek</u>					
1968-69	140	17	5	162	129
1976-77	182	15	2	199	104
1980-81	140	31	8	179	135

*Story units associated with "other" refers to those coded which discussed a third party leader, e.g., George Wallace.

to Frank (1973), the optimal technique is "the construction of a research design which utilizes both the hard and soft approaches to content analysis" (p. 25).

This study combines both the hard and soft approaches to content analysis. The study employs the soft approach in the thematic analysis technique adopted by Herbert Gans (1979) in his exploration of the mass media, Deciding What's News. This method of analysis "looked at news with very general categories, deliberately constructed to abstract specific stories from their immediate contexts" (Gans, 1979, p. 5). This method is designed to discover any possible significant factors found in the story units that were untouched by the quantitative content analysis (the hard approach). This analysis asks the question, "What is the theme or 'spine' of this story unit?" And, "How are these themes built upon each other?" This method is primarily qualitative.

The coding categories used in the quantitative content analysis were developed from an informal content analysis of The Washington Post during the 1968-69, 1976-77, and 1980-81 transition periods. This method is regarded as informal, because the coding categories are selected as the coder surveys the articles and columns. The Washington Post was chosen for study, because it is regarded as being finely attuned to the Washington political arena, and its reporters and columnists are regarded as "inside dopesters" (see Neustadt, 1980, p. 47). The coding scheme was designed and pre-tested by the author. One issue each of The New York Times, Time, and Newsweek for each transition period was chosen for the pre-test. Changes were made in the coding scheme, and it was enlarged. A single notation of "147" was used in the final

coding scheme to represent "miscellaneous" in order to cover topics that might not have been discovered during the development of the coding scheme. However, it was not used. Sources consulted in the development of the final content analysis code were: Greenstein (1965); Sigel (1966); Kjeldahl, Carmichael, and Mertz (1971); Graber (1971; 1972; 1974-75; 1976a); Nimmo and Savage (1976); Lee, Johnson, and Beld (1979); and Blair and Savage (1980).

The four coding categories used were: the source of the story unit; the president or president-elect discussed; the substance of the story unit; and the mode of the story unit.

1. Source of the story unit. The originator of the story unit, the audience to whom the originator addressed his messages, and the audience's response to the originator was coded.

2. The president or president-elect discussed. Story units were coded according to the president or president-elect under discussion. Often parties were personified in such a way that it was possible to code the remarks as if they were explicitly directed at the specific party leader (president or president-elect). However, qualities or issues which were used in a normative sense without reference to a personified party or to a specific party leader were coded in separate categories, most oftenly "the presidency-in-general." Qualities or issues associated with presidents prior to L. Johnson were treated as normative references.

3. The substance of the story unit. One hundred and eighty-three different elements were used to code the substance of the story units. One hundred and forty-seven of these dealt with general policy

topics. For purposes of analysis, policy topics were clustered into six categories: economic problems; general governmental problems and philosophy of government; foreign policy; social problems; relations with the general public and the mass media; and miscellaneous. Twenty-two elements were used under economic problems. Forty-one policy elements were used under general governmental problems and philosophy of government. Thirty-one policy elements were used under foreign policy. Thirty-two policy elements were used under social problems. Twenty policy elements were used under relations with the general public and the mass media. And one element was used under miscellaneous. Of the 183 elements used in the coding scheme, 20 dealt with presidential role traits. For the purposes of analysis, role traits were clustered into four categories: the leader role; the decision-maker role; the manager role; and, the partisan role. Each of the four roles had five role elements associated with it. The acceptability of cabinet appointees made up six of the total elements used to code the story units. The manner of man and biographical information section made up eight of the total number of elements used in coding the story units.

Statements concerning the role traits of the president or president-elect were coded as to whether these remarks were in negative, positive, or normative form. Negative statements suggested that a president or president-elect possessed either an undesirable quality or failed to possess a desirable one. Positive statements suggested that a president or president-elect possessed a certain desirable quality. Normative statements suggested that a president or president-elect ideally should possess certain qualities.

Remaining code qualities falling under the acceptability of cabinet appointees and the manner of man and biographical information were scaled individually.

4. Mode of story unit. The entire story unit was coded as to whether the content contained within the story unit concerning the president or president-elect was neutral, positive, or negative. Story units were coded neutral if the content concerned what the president or president-elect should do or if the content was in the form of a presidential itinerary of political activities. In addition, if the story unit did not contain any "apparent view" towards the presidential actions reported, the unit was coded neutral. Often the story units were a composite of many positive references as well as many negative references; these story units were also coded as neutral. Story units were coded as positive if statements were made that the president or president-elect should do something, and the unit suggested that he would. In addition, story units were coded as positive if "the apparent view" of the story unit was positive, or if the story unit was overwhelmingly positive in nature. Story units were coded as negative, if the story unit suggested that the president or president-elect should do something, and but that he wouldn't do it. In addition, story units were coded as negative if "the apparent view" of the story unit was negative, or if the story unit was overwhelmingly negative in nature.

Data Gathering

Each story unit was analyzed and coded on the basis of the themes expressed in the story unit. However, a theme was coded only once for

each story unit, unless a different aspect of the theme was being discussed.

Only one coder was used; therefore, inter-coder reliability tests were not applicable. However, an intra-coder reliability check was done. After each day's coding was completed, the coder drew three completed coding sheets haphazardly from the day's collection. The coder then attempted to re-code these story units. The following formula was used:

$$R = \frac{2 P_{ab}}{P_a + P_b}$$

where R is reliability, P_a is the number of observations of the first coding, P_b is the number of observations of the second coding, and P_{ab} is the number of agreed upon observations. The reliability score did not fall below 93 percent for a story unit. The trouble spots were identified early into the coding, and special care was given in considering these coding elements. Thus, many problems of coding reliability were avoided. The average reliability score for the coding process was 97 percent.

Data Analysis

The data was compiled through the use of single rankings and percentages. A Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient test was also used.

The Spreaman Rank Correlation Coefficient is defined by

$$r_s = 1 - \frac{6 \sum d_i^2}{n(n^2 - 1)}$$

where d_i is the difference in the two ranks of the i th observation and n is the number of paired observations.
(Matlack, 1980, p. 67)

However, because of the small sample size (4), the significance table for the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient was not used. Rather, the strength or weakness of an association was observed.

CHAPTER IV

THREE PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS

Political Science literature has traditionally pictured American presidential transitions in a rather negative fashion. As stated previously (see pp. 1-2), transitions have been described as "the weakest hour of American democracy," "a governing hiatus," or even more dramatically "the crisis of transition." It is interesting to note that the newspapers and magazines studied share these themes of uncertainty and anxiety.

R. W. Apple (The New York Times, November 17, 1968) writes that: "There isn't even a satisfactory name for these 75 days. It is not an interregnum, not a time between kings but a time of two kings, and therein lies the delicacy of the matter." Hedrick Smith of The New York Times shares this view:

The built-in conflict of interest between incumbents, with their desire for continuity and their urge for a strong finish, and incoming Presidents, with their emphasis on change and their preference for a period of drift that will set the stage for the image of bold, innovative leadership they hope to project on taking office has made Presidential transitions some of the most precarious periods in American history. Indeed, transition seems too tame a euphemism to capture the gradual loss of elan in an outgoing Administration, the slowdown of policy making, the growing sense of futility about new projects or the anomaly of a retiring President presenting his final budget and making a State of the Union address that is less a program of action than a valedictory for the sake of history. (November 14, 1976)

Yet, it is the transition that sets the tone for the future administration. The transition more than any other time is crucial to the success of the new administration. James Reston writes:

Much is made by the calendar worshipers of "The First Hundred Days" or "The First Thousand Days" of a new Administration in Washington, but probably most important are the 78 days between the election of a President and his inauguration. (The New York Times, November 5, 1976)

Reston explains:

For it is in these eleven weeks that the President-elect must pick the team, set the tone of the new Government, establish at least tentative relationships with the White House staff, the Cabinet and the leaders of Congress. And these threshold decisions--which must be made even before he takes the oath of office--are likely to determine what happens in his "First Thousand Days" more than anything else. (The New York Times, November 5, 1976)

The transition period is both the showcase for future successes as well as future disasters. Lawrence Lynn of The Washington Post suggests that the transition period provides "clues to later problems of performance" (December 19, 1980).

As sensitive and as crucial as the time period is, the president-elect is still under "unremitting and microscopic scrutiny" (Time, December 6, 1968, p. 30) by the press. And worse, one columnist writes that: "an important segment of the press . . . has come to feel that it has the God-given mission to frustrate, hamstring and finally destroy the men who have been chosen to lead the nation" (Newsweek, December 2, 1968). The beginning transformation of a winning politician to successful leader is a complex process. Under the watchful eye of the press, a man must change from the position of being leader of a party to being the leader of all the people. Reston maintains that the biggest change on inauguration day is not a policy change but rather a personal change. "They must now take on some of the majesty and responsibilities of their country. . . . It is challenged the character of our new officials

from the beginning of the Republic . . . (The New York Times, January 19, 1969). President-watchers may judge an individual's personal qualities before he or she enters the White House, but they "cannot confidently predict how these characteristics will finally interact within the presidential context" (Time, November 17, 1980).

The president-elect must guard not only his own personal transformation but also the transformation of the leaders of his administration. The reception of the Cabinet is very important. Individuals must cease to act as solitary figures, and instead they must become part of an administration. Time quotes Richard Fenno: "The Cabinet is the show window of the Administration, and a favorable reception for the group will be an asset the President can use to augment his own public image" (December 20, 1968, p. 10). Members of a new administration must watch their public comments, for they no longer speak just for themselves. They are the representatives of the President and his new administration. The New York Times quotes Eugene Wilson, Eisenhower's Secretary of Defense: "Every Cabinet member should learn the lesson of the whale. The only time you get harpooned is when you're up on the surface spouting" (December 20, 1968).

In addition to the internal problems of creating a new government, there exists an external problem that is often depicted in a highly sinister, dangerous manner. And that problem is the so-called "vacuum of power" that might be perceived to exist in foreign affairs. The "vacuum" creates a heightened sense of danger or the expectation of pending crisis. Murray Marder of The Washington Post writes that:

Diplomats estimate that it takes on the average about 18 months for the Soviet Union and a new government in

Washington to become familiar with each other's operating style. But that by no means represents a grace period, for often the required knowledge comes out of a crisis. The first months of a new administration are always a hazardous probing period between the two superpowers, especially if there are tensions on the international horizon. (January 3, 1981)

In 1980, Carter aides reported that: "There's a general feeling of anxiety around here that foreign adventurers might use this period to do something that they wouldn't otherwise do" (Newsweek, December 15, 1980, p. 28). Haynes Johnson saw a particular threat in the 1980-81 transition period. He writes:

In the present quietus that envelops the transfer of power in Washington, when the government hangs in limbo, decisions are deferred, and the new president waits in the wings a continent away, the Polish crisis has crept ominously upon us. (The Washington Post, December 17, 1980).

Johnson goes on to say that, "the threat posed in Poland is one of the gravest since World War II . . . (The Washington Post, December 17, 1980).

Newsweek summarizes the transitional experience in this way:

"Every Presidency is known by the total mix of the man and his character, the people he chooses, the problem he undertakes, and the political realities of his times" (November 11, 1968, p. 36).

In summary, The Washington Post, The New York Times, Newsweek, and Time share a common view of presidential transitions with political scientists. Transitions are pictured as a highly difficult and dangerous time for the nation. Power hangs in the balance--"Will much needed domestic and foreign policy decisions be made?" "Will foreign powers take advantage of our perceived vulnerability?" Thus, journalists and political scientists view the American presidential transition period as a time of crisis for both the nation and the world (see pp. 1-2).

CHAPTER V

THE NIXON TRANSITION

The Political Environment

Stephen Wayne (1982b) suggests that there are three types of environmental factors that influence a president's performance in office: the national (or economic) environment; the international environment; and the President himself (his background, his political history).

The Nixon transition coverage was at times overwhelmed by other events of the day. On the national front, the country thrilled to the successes of the Apollo 8 mission. But for the most part, the news was not so good. The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence released a study condemning the Chicago police for their activities at the Democratic Convention. Three Arab men were arrested in connection with a plot against the life of President-elect Nixon. Representative Adam Clayton Powell attempted to regain his lost position in the House of Representatives after being censured by that body. Mitchell Ginsberg, head of the Human Resources Agency, appeared before Congress in response to charges of widespread corruption within the agency. The press reported a national mood that sought a change in direction for the New Deal programs. Stewart Alsop suggested that "national unhappiness increases in direct proportion to increases in funds spent for social purposes" (Newsweek, January 13, 1969, p. 88). Newsweek reported that most Americans appeared "to favor shifting some

of the responsibility for national social goals from Washington to the states and to private enterprise" (January 13, 1969, p. 26).

The international arena contained rather exhaustive coverage of the Paris Peace talks. Discussions concerning "legitimate" participants and even table size filled the press copy. The Pueblo crew was freed, and the men came home to a wary nation concerned with the crew's behavior in captivity. Intelligence sources continued to report on the growing Soviet presence in Africa.

The third environmental factor to be considered was Nixon himself. Nixon had served as a Congressman, a Senator, and as Vice President. He was a partisan-in-fighter. He had survived political scandal during the Eisenhower years. His defeat in the 1960 presidential election sent Nixon back to California where he ran for the governorship. This second defeat after having served as vice president of the United States for eight years, might have ended another man's political career. But, Nixon's stubborn resiliency brought him back to the spotlight in 1968. His search for power under the most trying of circumstances is the key to the Nixon story.

The Transition: Preparation, Organization, and Management

Nixon was the first president in history to prepare before the election for the transition (see Henry, 1969). In September 1968, Nixon announced that he had set up 30 task forces under the direction of Paul W. McCracken of the University of Michigan to study and plan for the transition (Henry, 1969, p. 472). However, Dr. Glenn Olds, former president of Massachusetts' Springfield College, had been on the

job for seven months before the election. Olds was responsible for exploring over 1,500 possibilities for the top 300 jobs in the Nixon administration (see Time, November 29, 1968, p. 12). Jeremy Loomis had been placed in charge of the policy task force (Time, January 17, 1969, p. 14).

For the first time, the terms of the 1964 Presidential Transition Act were in force. The act authorizes up to \$900,000 for the expenses of the changeover and allows the President to make available extensive facilities, including office space, for his successor's advance party. (Time, November 22, 1968, p. 12).

However, the goings-on of the Nixon transition were centered in New York City and Key Biscayne, Florida--not in Washington. After Election day, Nixon named Franklin Benjamin Lincoln, Jr., as the Director of the Transition. However, Nixon himself maintained a powerful presence within the transition operations. Time reported that "he conducted almost continuous staff meetings, many of them devoted to the talent search for Cabinet members and the 2,200 or so other officials who will make up the core of his Administration" (November 22, 1968, p. 12). Similarly, Newsweek reports that Nixon "was very much on the job of effecting the transition from Lyndon Johnson's presidency to his own" (December 2, 1968, p. 29).

The transition was a "highly managed" affair. Newsweek reported that Nixon was "putting together his Administration as gingerly, as hopefully and as secretively as a poker player drawing to a four-card flush" (December 2, 1968). "So close to the vest was he playing the . . . game that most of the men who staffed his campaign directorate--and who will shortly occupy his White House--were themselves in the dark" (Newsweek, December 2, 1968, p. 29). The yellow legal pads that Nixon

was fond of using were treated like "state secrets" (Newsweek, December 2, 1968, p. 30). The only leaks were intentional leaks made by Nixon himself concerning the future of personal friend, William French Smith, in the new administration. Only The New York Times reported that there might be trouble within the Nixon ranks. The newspaper suggested that Nixon aides and supporters were "jockeying" for position within the new administration (The New York Times, November 11, 1968). One short-lived scandal broke when Drew Pearson reported that Nixon had been under psychiatric care. Both the named physician and transition aides denied the allegations (see The New York Times, November 14, 1968).

Nixon appointed J. Williard Marriott to the post of Inauguration Chairman. Newsweek reported that "the official theme of the occasion is 'Forward Together' (a reflection of Nixon's election-night call for unity)--and dignity, tradition and gaiety are to be the Inaugural's bywords . . ." (December 23, 1968, p. 22). A management-consultant firm, Booz Allen and Hamilton, was used to organize the gala event (see Newsweek, December 23, 1968, p. 22). The Inauguration speech was team effort. Nixon used his favorite speech-writers during this creative process (Ray Price, Pat Buchanan, James Keogh, and William Safire). The theme of the speech was "hope" (see Newsweek, January 20, 1969, p. 13).

The 1968-69 Transition In Perspective

The transition itself was of the party overturn type. A party overturn transition is one in which "the incoming President is of a

different political party from his predecessor" (Henry, 1960, p. 8). The party overturn transition is expected to "raise the sharpest problems of leadership, continuity, and institutional adjustments" (Henry, 1960, p. 9). The Nixon transition was expected to be particularly difficult in that this was the first time since the election of Zachary Taylor in 1848 that both houses of Congress were to be controlled by the party out of power. In the United States, the party that is "in" power is the party that controls the presidency (see Newsweek, January 13, 1969, p. 26). In addition, the election itself was a very divisive experience for the nation. The issues of the campaign--civil rights, law and order, and Vietnam--had divided the nation.

However, the transition was not as difficult as what is ordinarily is expected, for the transition was a non-incumbent transition. This means that the setting President had not sought re-election. This non-incumbent nature of the transition tempers the conflict traditionally found in the party-overturn transition.

Transition Coverage

The incumbent. Although the transition was of the non-incumbent type, the transition coverage of the incumbent, Lyndon Johnson was far from positive or even polite. Tom Wicker of The New York Times wrote:

Mr. Johnson took the nation almost secretly into a war he had pledged not to enter, and whose validity and goals were deeply questioned by many of those who elected him; that he therefore found himself unable, politically or economically, to pursue to the necessary degree the high domestic goals he had set for himself; and that primarily for these reasons he led the nation into the most corrosive internal disunity of modern times. (January 19, 1969)

Newsweek's Meg Elfin maintained that Johnson had not understood presidential power. She writes that "the power to inspire, not the power to command is the most potent tool of presidential leadership" (January 20, 1969). A member of his own Cabinet was reported to have said that Johnson forgot "that the Presidency is an instrument of education as well as of political power" (Newsweek, January 20, 1969). Instead, Johnson's operational style included "arm-twisting, horse trading, secrecy and 'the deal'" (Newsweek, January 20, 1969). The result, according to Elfin, was that Johnson had "eroded the broad trust between himself and the American people" (Newsweek, January 20, 1969).

Media evaluations of the transition. Although the coverage of Johnson was generally negative, the newspapers' and magazines' evaluations of the transition itself were generally favorable. The New York Times' Max Frankel reports that:

The President, by the testimony of his Administration's successors, has extended every courtesy and has set no booby traps in the files or partisan obstacles in the budgets and regulations that he leaves behind. And the President-elect, but the testimony of the predecessors of the new Administration, has treated their programs and leading personalities with all the respect and cautious deference that they had any right to expect, indeed with much more than they had expected. (The New York Times, January 13, 1969)

Time remarked:

The 36th President of the U.S. and the man who will be No. 37 are two of the most pugnacious politicians of their generation. Yet both Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon seemed determined last week to avoid the rancor that has so often accompanied the transfer of power. (November 22, 1968)

Newsweek concludes that the "interregnum between the Johnson Era and the Age of Nixon may be the smoothest in the modern history of the Presidency" (November 25, 1968, p. 31).

Transition trouble spots. Although, the transition was generally characterized as being a smooth transfer of power, there were a few incidents that created a good deal of speculation on the part of the media. Perhaps the greatest "snafu," as The New York Times termed it, occurred over foreign policy during the transition. Nixon said that, "the current Administration is setting forth policies that will be carried forward by the next Administration." Later Nixon said that he had made this statement based on an understanding between the two administrations that "prior consultation and prior agreement" between the old and new administrations must exist before any major foreign policy step could be taken (see Time, November 22, 1968, p. 12). This suggested an idea of "co-presidents" to the media, and Johnson was quick to respond to this description of the last days of his administration. At a news conference, he said, "I will make whatever decisions the President is called upon to make between now and January 20" (News-week, November 25, 1968, p. 31).

Another touchy area involved the United States Supreme Court. Johnson had accepted the resignation of Chief Justice Earl Warren, and he was in the process of nominating Arthur J. Goldberg to be Chief Justice of the United States (see The New York Times, December 5, 1968 and December 11, 1968). It was at this point that Nixon intervened. Nixon convinced Justice Earl Warren to postpone his retirement by several months, so when Warren retired, it would be the new president who would replace him.

Another controversial area was the "sheltering" of great society programs. The GOP Governors' Conference accused Johnson of trying to

lock the Nixon administration into the morass of the Great Society programs in such a way that the new administration would be hamstrung and embarrassed (see The New York Times, December 8, 1968). Johnson's Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Wilbur Cohen was supposedly in charge of the sheltering operation. Newsweek reported that Cohen ordered Administrative actions that would have the effect of "entrenching" programs in three areas: "(1) legal services for welfare clients, (2) liberalized welfare investigations and (3) a series of hearings on how Medicaid works" (December 23, 1968, p. 14). Newsweek reported that the idea was to "make it difficult for Cohen's successor, Robert Finch, to undo too many Great Society measures without a great deal of fuss" (Newsweek, December 23, 1968, p. 14). Time reports that:

While a number of the outgoing Administration's final actions may seriously limit Nixon's flexibility, there is nothing legally or ethically improper about them. And although some Nixon aides may feel that there is an organized effort to make Nixon a prisoner of established policies, there is no evidence of a grand plot to this end. (January 3, 1969, p. 20)

Another trouble-spot for the transition involved Lyndon Johnson himself. Many reporters and political scientists expressed their view that Johnson's strong-suit lay in his record on civil rights. Johnson began touring the United States delivering speeches criticizing the Republican party and its position on civil rights (see The New York Times, January 20, 1968). This created an added tension in Nixon's attempt to place blacks in Cabinet and sub-Cabinet positions.

Thus in summary, the picture painted of the transition itself was generally positive by both the newspapers and the magazines. The incumbent received negative evaluations of his time in office by both

the newspapers and magazines. There were four trouble spots during an otherwise smooth transition.

Election results. The coverage of the "election results" or the president-elect's "electoral mandate" is very important. For it is this coverage that sets the parameters of the possible. In other words, what can the president-elect realistically expect to accomplish? How far can he or she go? What are the political dimensions within which he or she has to operate? Again, it is the transition coverage that sets the expectations for Washington elites and the general public in terms of the "parameters of the possible." The overriding theme of the coverage of the 1968 election results was the "narrowness" of the victory. Not since Woodrow Wilson in 1912, had a president received so small a share of the popular vote (Time, November 15, 1968). Nixon received 43.6 percent of the popular vote (The New York Times, November 8, 1968) compared to Wilson's 41.9 percent of the popular vote (Time, November 15, 1968). Time reported that Nixon "might console himself that his 324,966 plurality amounted to nearly three times the 118,574-vote figure by which John Kennedy defeated him . . . (November 22, 1968, p. 14). Time asked the question "why was the margin of victory so small," and the writer answered it with this explanation:

In addition to his choice of Maryland's inept Governor Spiro Agnew as his running mate, it was probably his closed negative campaign. That, and a personality that has simply never come close to captivating the U.S. voter. Nixon was so far in front that his overriding concern was to avoid a serious error--hardly the sort of strategy designed to fire imaginations. (November 15, 1968)

Time reported that "whatever the vote totals, that attitude constitutes a mandate--or at any rate, something more than a mand" (November 22,

1968, p. 11). Newsweek reported that "although Richard Nixon had finally won the Presidency, there was no clear and ineluctable trend to the right sweeping across the American political landscape" (November 11, 1968, p. 36). Time seemed to disagree: "The trend was obviously conservative, away from the omniscient federalism of the Great Society, toward the decentralized approach espoused by the Republicans . . ." (November 15, 1968).

Another recurrent theme in the election coverage concerned the characteristics of the voters that supported Richard Nixon. During the campaign, Nixon had promised to hear the "voice of the great majority of Americans, the forgotten Americans, the non-shouters, the non-demonstrators, that are not racists or sick, that are not guilty of the crime that plagues the land" (Time, November 15, 1968). Newsweek reported that:

Middle America won the Presidential election. . . . It was the constituency Richard Nixon had looked for. . . . He found it principally in the small towns and suburbs of the Midwest, West, and border South. He described it himself as the best, hardworking, taxpaying, nondemonstrating hard core of U.S. society, the legion of forgotten men. (November 18, 1968, p. 52)

Time said simply that the Nixon victory rested on the votes of "the unpoor, the unblack, and the unyoung" (November 15, 1968). "The vote pattern underscored yet again the fragmented condition of American politics" (Time, November 15, 1968). "Far from submerging the divisions in America, the campaign had only thrust them to the surface" (Newsweek, November 18, 1968, p. 37).

In summary, the coverage of the election results presented two themes: the narrowness of the victory and the fragmented nature of the

victory coalition. The "expectations of the possible" were certainly narrowed because of this appraisal.

Coverage of Nixon-the-man. The image of Nixon-the-man contained interesting dimensions. There were contradictions in the presentation of Nixon's image by the media sources. This largely grew out of a blending of two images: the old Nixon and the new Nixon. The distinction between the two images is best illustrated by two quotes from the same man, John Freeman, London's Ambassador to Washington. Freeman said of Nixon in 1962: He "suggests a man of no principle whatever," one who has "done lasting damage to the conventions of American political life" (Time, December 22, 1968, p. 11). Yet when Freeman was questioned in 1968, he remarked that Nixon "has proved by his success, and the quite admirable struggle which he has made to achieve it, that he has the qualities of leadership that make him worthy of high office" (Time, December 22, 1968, p. 11). Clearly a distinction is drawn between the "old" and the "new." Newsweek explains the "so-called" change:

No man in his middle years could go through the fires of defeat that Nixon went through--a breath-takingly close loss of the Presidency, a humiliating rejection of his native state--and not be changed. He would either be consumed by it, or tempered by it. And Nixon was tempered. (November 11, 1968, p. 36)

Again the "change" is explored by Newsweek.

On the resurrection road, he has grown in confidence and become more detached in self-judgment. Always given to solitude, he has tended to brood less and reflect more. By sheer effort, he has learned to control the flash of his temper. (Newsweek, November 11, 1968, p. 36)

Yet, there were writers who could not find "an old Nixon" or "a new Nixon." Instead, these writers found a blurring of the two images.

The "blurring" image is what will be called "the unknown Nixon."

Robert Semple of The New York Times described Nixon in this manner:

Moody, detached, standing alone, without any plain inherited ideology or natural allies, offering only himself and his hopes that he could "do better;" a conditional figure, inscrutable and puzzling, a man without a political address, a lifetime politician whose true values and bedrock political philosophy would be known only when the nations asked him what his answers to the problems were--Nixon and his capacity for inspiration remain at this early stage unrevealed. (November 17, 1968)

Similarly, Newsweek reports that:

No American in public life has talked face-to-face with as many grass-roots American voters--and revealed less about himself. The window to the inner man has remained ever clouded. There persists the curiosity about the sineus of his character, the capacity for patience, judgment, understanding and conviction that successful tenancy of the White House demands. (November 11, 1968, p. 36)

One Time article went so far as to suggest that perhaps there was no

"new Nixon" but rather Nixon himself had become better at disguising the

"old" one. The article says that there:

Was not necessarily a "new Nixon," but he was certainly a shrewder, more mature Nixon. Much of it was, perhaps cosmetic. Physically he still lacked grace and coordination; psychologically, he still seemed often insecure, as if he did not quite trust the extraordinary combination of events that had set him on his way to the White House. But most of the time he now projected an image of calm control. (Time, November 15, 1968)

In summary, coverage of "Nixon-the-man" contained two strains of discussion: one, the old versus the new Nixon; and two, the blurring-unknown Nixon.

Impression Management During the Nixon Transition

The leader. "The assertion that the Nixon administration had an obsession with impression management should be no surprise" (Hall, 1977, p. 4). During the transition period, a carefully orchestrated drama unfolded to reveal Nixon as "The Leader" (see page 26; and Chapter VIII). When the pro-president-elect mentions concerning role traits are combined for The Washington Post, The New York Times, Newsweek, and Time, it was found that 57 percent of all mentions could be characterized as falling under "the Leader;" that 32 percent of all mentions could be characterized as falling under "the Decision-Maker;" and that 10 percent of all mentions could be characterized as falling under "the Manager." "The Leader" was used as the central role, and components of "the Decision-Maker" and "the Manager" were used to support this role.

Nixon portrayed "the Leader" through the careful use of his public pronouncements. He did this by using four types of rhetoric that suggest the leader role: activist rhetoric; bipartisan rhetoric; healing rhetoric; and visionary rhetoric.

1. Activist rhetoric. Nixon discussed his future role as an activist president several times during the transition period. Activist rhetoric combines the leader concept of assertiveness and action with the manager concept of a hardworking individual (see p. 26). These dimensions of the two roles are compatible. Nixon's activist rhetoric may be illustrated by the following quotes:

The days of a passive presidency belong to a simpler past.
The next President must take an activist view of his office.

He must articulate the nation's values, define its goals and marshal its will. (quoted in Time, November 15, 1968)

I am basically an activist. I don't intend to stand by and have a dip in the economy occur if I can use the credit of the United States or the tax powers to get the economy moving. (quoted in Newsweek, November 11, 1968, p. 39)

In The Washington Post, The New York Times, Newsweek and Time, Nixon was associated with action verbs. The Washington Post reported that "he would give the lead to a Nationwide crackdown on crime. . . ." He would "endeavor to put the economy on an even keel," and he would "initiate new types of programs for improving the conditions of the cities" (November 10, 1968).

2. Bipartisan rhetoric. Nixon transformed himself from the leader of the Republican Party to the leader of the nation. His rhetoric of bipartisanship played well in Washington. The New York Times reported that Nixon was "convinced that the appointment of "real" Democrats-- that is, men visibly identified ideologically and politically with the opposition--would be a necessary component of his efforts to re-unite the country and establish a firm bi-partisan approach to pressing international problems . . ." (November 26, 1968). The New York Times reported that Nixon was trying to fill at least one of three significant cabinet posts with a Democrat: State, Treasury, or Defense (see November 26, 1968). Newsweek reported that Nixon planned "to assemble the first full fledged coalition government since World War II" (November 11, 1968, p. 37). The appointment of men to the Cabinet with divergent viewpoints (Kissinger, Moynihan, etc.) suggested that Richard Nixon was above party politics. He favored open and exciting dialogue, debate. In short, he was pictured as being above politics but at the

same time, being a master of it. Newsweek said Nixon was the "quintessential politician of these troubled and confusing times" (November 11, 1968, p. 36), and similarly, "the nation's consummate politician" (November 18, 1968, p. 38).

3. Healing rhetoric. Nixon's call for unity on election night and the theme of "Bring Us Together" for the Inaugural illustrated his healing rhetoric. On election night, Nixon said, "This is a time when we must unite the country" (Newsweek, November 18, 1968, p. 43). "That will be the great objective of this Administration at the outset--to bring the American people together" (Newsweek, November 18, 1968, p. 38). Newsweek's Kenneth Crawford reported that Nixon had "strewn olive branches in enemy and neutral territory" in an attempt to unite the country (December 23, 1968, p. 30). In this way, Nixon became a leader of "all" the people. He had the welfare of all the people in mind--not just the welfare of his Republican cronies. He demonstrated the decision-maker role traits of compassion and compromise by pursuing the unity theme. Nixon revealed such a theme when he said: "the . . . President must unite America. He must calm its angers, ease its terrible frictions, and bring its people together again in peace and mutual respect" (The Washington Post, December 22, 1968).

4. Visionary rhetoric. Nixon's public statements also presented him as a creative, visionary. It was Nixon that understood the destiny of the American people, and it was Nixon that would lead the American people to their destiny. He perceived his job to be "to rally the people, to define those moral imperatives which are the cement of a civilized society, to point the ways in which the energies of the people can be

enlisted to serve the ideals of the people" (Time, November 15, 1968). Nixon described religion as: "the true fountainhead of America's strength," and he went on to say that he had "a profound conviction that the whole national experience of our people, the extent to which the American idea has worked, is evidence of the interdependence of a widely shared religious faith and the vigorous health of a free American society" (Time, December 6, 1968, p. 104). The destiny of the United States knew no bounds. Nixon maintained that "our cause today is not a nation, but a planet--for never have the fates of all the people of the earth been so bound up together" (The New York Times, November 11, 1968). Nixon viewed the United States as the peacemaker. He said:

The judgments of history can bestow no honor greater than the title of peacemaker. It is this honor--this destiny--that beckons America. . . . This is our summons to greatness. If we answer the call, generations yet unborn will say of his generation of Americans that we truly mastered our moment, that we at last made the world safe for mankind. (The New York Times, November 11, 1968)

Nixon portrayed himself as a man of convictions who would articulate those convictions to the nation. The Washington Post said that Nixon was "bolder," a "broader-visioned" man than the newspaper had expected him to be. He was said to be willing to make "tough decisions whatever the political consequences" (The Washington Post, December 4, 1968). Nixon was portrayed as a strong, determined leader. The Washington Post reported that "when he's convinced that is the way to get the job done. . . . Then he will do it, and no one will stop him" (November 10, 1968). Newsweek said that Nixon was an "astonishingly perservering and determined man" (November 18, 1968, p. 40).

In summary, the Nixon transition team portrayed Nixon as "The

Leader" by carefully combining compatible leader, decision-maker, and manager role traits. Nixon used four rhetorical themes to forge his leadership style: activism; bipartisanship; unity; and, the American vision or destiny.

The Nixon Transition's Operational Mode

Caution. Nixon's operational mode during the transition assured the news media that he and his new administration would follow a cautious path. There would be no sweeping changes. This caution portrayed is part of the "decision-maker" role (see p. 26).

Time magazine reports that: "After a cautious campaign and a transition period relatively free of friction Nixon apparently intends to ease through his first months of incumbency in much the same manner" (December 27, 1968, p. 12). "Thus far, the progress of his transition suggests very much the qualities of the Nixon style that will come to prevail in Washington: steadiness, caution, efficiency and the utmost discretion" (Time, December 6, 1968, p. 30). The New York Times reports that:

All along, the Nixon men have been saying they have no intention, after five years of costly and innovative social legislation, of burdening the country's tax resources with still more. Mr. Nixon's apparent ambition is not to dazzle the nation with new initiatives, but to impress it with careful reorganization and a sorting out of what already exists. The watchword is efficiency, not boldness. (January 19, 1969)

Newsweek suggested that: "Caution comes naturally to Nixon any way, and he will fill his table of organization with care" (November 18, 1968, p. 41), and that the cautious mood of Nixon team is "right in step with the cautious mood of the nation as expressed in the elections" (December 23, 1968, p. 16).

The Director of the Policy Task Force for the Nixon Transition, Jeremy Loomis, warned the press:

Don't expect dramatic shifts or changes. Maybe Nixon will be able to slow down or alter the direction of 3% or 5% of existing programs in his first year, maybe 8% to 10% in his second and third years. Add it up: that's change of enormous impact and significance. But it's gradual. (Time, January 17, 1969, p. 14)

Similarly, The New York Times reports: "The Nixon Administration which takes office tomorrow has neither a radical vision nor a reactionary dream. . . ." and "Because Mr. Nixon and his colleagues recognize what they cannot do, they are stronger than their predecessors of 1963" (January 19, 1969).

"Presidential" behavior. A key element of "The Leader" personae is the mystique of "presidential behavior." Comments concerning Nixon's personality often referred to his "presidential manner," his "presidential stature," or his "presidential bearing." Part of this mystique is the conscious separating of "The Leader" from the rest of the world. "The Leader" is necessarily perceived to be "a loner," for no man is his equal; he is at the top. He alone bears the burden of leadership. One columnist reported that "veteran Nixon watchers could see a cycle of decision and action giving way to a cycle of solitary contemplation. His door is closed frequently now, and Nixon is often alone with the yellow legal pads he prefers for ordering his thoughts" (The Washington Post, January 9, 1969). An element of the mystique of "The Leader" is the use of majestic, formal, statesmanlike speech patterns. Dan Oberdorfer, a columnist for The Washington Post, quotes from Nixon's Six Crises in order to illustrate Nixon's sense of leadership and destiny:

Sometimes a nation is ready and a man is not; sometimes a man is ready and a nation is not; sometimes a nation decides that a man is ready for leadership and his is the right kind of leadership for the time. Only time will tell what course destiny will take in this watershed year of 1968. (January 9, 1969)

Government and media relations. According to The Washington Post, Nixon accepted his role as "public persuader." During the transition, "gestures of goodwill to all and tokens of greater things to come will abound" (The Washington Post, November 10, 1968). Newsweek reported that Nixon was very aware of the role of the mass media in politics:

The Nixon staff monitors the nation's major newspapers, magazines and radio and television broadcasts and twice a day prepares for him brief typewritten summaries of what is being reported. (December 9, 1968, p. 89)

Nixon named Herbert Klein, "a California newsman, as his director of communications for the executive branch of government, with what appeared to be unusual supervisory powers over all Government information sources" (The New York Times, November 26, 1968). Klein told representatives of the media:

Truth will become the hallmark of the Nixon Administration. I'm charged directly by the President to emphasize (to) every department of Government, that more facts should be made available. With this kind of emphasis, we feel that we will be able to eliminate any possibility of a credibility gap in the Administration. (The New York Times, November 26, 1968)

Klein said that he would be in charge of "news management" for the White House. However, he made a distinction between those who "manage" the news to "suppress" it and those who "manage" the news "to insure its widest possible distribution" (The New York Times, November 26, 1968). This process of open communication was stressed again and again. The

Washington Post reported that Nixon was "fully aware that the regular White House press conference is an instrument of communication between the President and the country essential to effective presidential leadership and vital to presidential credibility" (November 16, 1968). And the newspaper predicted that "televised bustle will be the order of the first 100 days, to demonstrate the new President has grasped the reins firmly" (November 10, 1968). However, Newsweek took a dim view of such predictions. The magazine reported that:

Richard Nixon plans to use radio and television perhaps more than any previous President because, in his view, this will enable him to shortcircuit the Washington news corps and reach the public directly. Nixon is known to feel that the media distill and paraphrase too often. (December 9, 1968, p. 23)

Newsweek continued this theme by reporting that the newsmen that covered Nixon predicted that Nixon would "become the most insulated and aloof President of modern times" (December 9, 1968, p. 89). And one reporter was quoted as saying that "Perhaps the most relevant thing to say about Nixon's relations with the press is that they don't exist" (December 9, 1968, p. 89). Newsweek also suggested that while Klein would be operating the strategic planning of the Nixon communication team, Ron Ziegler would be in charge of the day-to-day affairs. However, according to Newsweek, Ziegler did not have "top clearance," so he would not be privy to the internal goings-on of the Nixon administration (December 9, 1968, p. 90).

In summary, the Nixon-media relationship received rather positive coverage in light of Nixon's past reputation with the press. Moreover, Newsweek provided the only truly negative evaluations of the Nixon-media relationship.

Organizational Style

In addition to his acceptance of the fatherly, "public persuader" role, Nixon's image of "The Leader" was buoyed by the discussions of his organizational style. As stated previously, Nixon was portrayed as "a consummate politician," a leader that while above politics was also a master of it (see pp. 78-79). The Washington Post reported that he had "shown himself to be a politician of high mettle, smart, experienced" and possessing "singlemindedness of purpose" (December 10, 1968).

The Executive Branch

Nixon's political judgment may be seen in his anticipated relations with the other governmental actors. Pro-president-elect sources quoted in both newspapers and magazines stressed the executive branch of government: his relations with the Cabinet; his perception of the "presidency"; his relations with the presidential staff; his relations with the federal bureaucracy; and, his relations with the vice president.

During most transitions much of the political coverage concentrates on the Cabinet and the presidential staff. And perhaps more importantly, the relationship existing between the Cabinet and the staff. The New York Times reported:

Sensitive to the possibility of empire building within his own small acre of assistants, he plans instead to organize his White House Staff in a way that will encourage and not inhibit communication between his Cabinet officers and the President. (November 14, 1968)

Around Nixon would be a small group of "special assistants" concerned with only administrative duties (The New York Times, November 14, 1968).

Similarly, Time magazine reported that: "it became clear that he would not allow his immediate aides to exert the kind of authority that presidential assistants have enjoyed in recent Administrations" (November 22, 1968, p. 12). Time reports that:

Nixon's men insist that there will be no Sherman Adams, Harry Hopkins, McGeorge Bundy or Bill Moyers standing between Nixon and his statutory policymakers in the Cabinet. The White House staff, they add, will concern itself far more with running the headquarters than fighting the main governmental battles. (November 22, 1968, p. 13)

And The Washington Post appeared to agree with this view when it reported that "there will be no Jim Hagerty, no Sherman Adams, no Tom Stephens" (November 22, 1968). This view, that there would be no drain on presidential power by White House aides, is a very important one. For, it emphasizes that the leader stands alone, and the reins of power are clearly in Nixon's hands alone (see Neustadt's discussion, 1980, p. 32). Yet although, The Washington Post, The New York Times, and Time have a similar depiction of Nixon's political staff, Newsweek provides an alternative view. Newsweek suggests that a triumverate of power exists among the presidential aides. Newsweek names Bob Haldeman (Chief of Staff), Bryce Harlow (Assistant to the President for Congressional liaison), and John Ehrlichman (Counsel to the President) as the men who compose the triumverate (see Newsweek, November 25, 1968, p. 32). And among these three men, Haldeman is considered to be the key. Newsweek reports that "he is, quite simply the man to see if you want to capture the attention of the 37th President of the United States" (December 16, 1968, p. 29). Newsweek concludes that:

Nixon's insulation, in fact, has begun stirring memories of Eisenhower in the heyday of his protective "assistant president,"

Sherman Adams. Despite all the disclaimers, Nixon has already installed West Coast adman H. R. (Bob) Haldeman, who likes to call himself just a technician, as the man who screens his visitors, phone calls and memos--precisely the powers Adams enjoyed. (December 9, 1968, p. 29)

In summary, Newsweek once again provided the only discordant view of Nixon's presidential staff.

The Washington Post, The New York Times, and Time continue their view of the presidential staff with their evaluations of Nixon's relationship with his Cabinet. Nixon was said to believe that he should never yield his decision-making powers to his Cabinet; however, he was said to firmly believe that the "engines of power" should not rest with his White House staff (Time, December 20, 1968, p. 17). Thus the solution was to develop a close-working relationship with the Cabinet. The New York Times reports that his Cabinet officers would "have the major responsibility for policymaking under the President" and would "be guaranteed regular access to the White House" (November 14, 1968). For the first time since Woodrow Wilson's mass announcement in 1913, Nixon announced his Cabinet all together, significantly on a live television show. Time reported that this act indicated "Nixon's intention to invest the Cabinet with more prestige and responsibility than most of its recent predecessors, the show was a good beginning" (December 20, 1968, p. 10). The television presentation of the Cabinet conveyed to the audience "a sense of esprit and solidity at the top . . . " (Time, December 20, 1968, p. 10).

And in addition, a presidential assistant reported that Nixon wanted "to elevate both the Cabinet and the National Security Council. He also intends to maintain an active relationship with his top people

(The New York Times, November 14, 1968). Nixon maintained that the National Security Council was "the controlling element in our success in keeping the peace," and he attributed "most of our serious reverses abroad since 1960 to the inability or disinclination of President Eisenhower's successors to make effective use of the council" (Time, December 13, 1968, p. 16). The New York Times concluded that the National Security Council would serve as the "fulcrum" of Nixon's efforts to devise what "he hopes will be a more efficient and orderly method of approaching and defusing world crises" (January 1, 1969). Nixon appointed Henry Kissinger as chairman of the National Security Council. Kissinger was viewed as a "coordinator" and as a "strategic planner." The New York Times said that Kissinger had "a strong reputation with a demonstrated interest in synthesizing the military and diplomatic policies" (December 8, 1968). Kissinger was said to have gathered about himself "a high-powered staff." The newspaper reported that:

The high professional caliber and experience of Mr. Kissinger's staff has strengthened earlier assumptions that, especially in the early weeks of the Nixon Administration, this staff will serve as the Administration's "intellectual bank" on foreign policy while Secretary of State-designate William P. Rogers is getting control of the vast machinery of the State Department. (The New York Times, January 19, 1969)

Rogers was viewed by the mass media as having very little experience in foreign affairs (see Newsweek, December 23, 1968, p. 20; Time, December 20, 1968). However, surprisingly, Roger's lack of experience was not a negative for the new administration. Time reports:

Roger's very lack of previous involvement in diplomacy--several German papers referred to him as an unbeschriebenes Blatt (blank page)--is not a drawback as far as Nixon is concerned. He intends to be his own policymaker in foreign affairs. . . . (December 20, 1968, p. 11)

Nixon was to be the "policymaker" with Kissinger operating as his close adviser. Rogers would be the administrator in the group.

One area of the executive branch of government received rather negative press, the vice presidency or more specifically, the vice president. During the campaign, Nixon described Agnew as "a man with brains. He's a man of very great courage. He doesn't wilt under fire" (Time, November 15, 1968). Time reported that by the end of the campaign, "many Republican strategists wished that Agnew had remained What's His Name. The Vice President-elect had become not only a figure of comedy and controversy but also a decided liability" (Time, November 15, 1968). "In three months, 'Agnewism' became virtually a synonym of 'malpropism' . . ." (Time, November 15, 1968). Newsweek reported that "Agnew's stock appears to have slipped in the Nixon camp--younger staffers refer to him as 'Wengas' (S. Agnew backwards) . . ." (Newsweek, December 23, 1968, p. 17). Newsweek concluded that Agnew had the "positive gift for saying the wrong thing in the wrong words at the wrong time (November 11, 1968, p. 38). Nixon had promised during the campaign that Agnew would operate as a "domestic czar" concentrating on urban problems (see Newsweek November 11, 1968, p. 38; December 23, 1968, p. 17). However, after the election, Nixon had little contact with his vice president (The New York Times, November 8, 1968). "Nixon did not mention him in his victory speech" (The New York Times, November 8, 1968), and Agnew was "conspicuously absent" during the early days of the transition (Newsweek, November 18, 1968, p. 40). Newsweek reported that Nixon had informed Agnew that "he would be ensconced right under the boss's eye in the West Wing of the White House, where Nixon's

secretaries will type his correspondence and Nixon's press officers will handle his relations with newsmen" (November 11, 1968, p. 40). Newsweek and Time both doubted that Agnew would play the domestic policy role that he had been promised (Newsweek, November 11, 1968, p. 38; Time, December 23, 1968, p. 17). One aide remarked, "the governor's stock has clearly fallen with the boss" and predicted that Agnew would be one of the most "inconspicuous" of vice presidents (Newsweek, November 11, 1968, p. 38). The negative coverage of Agnew worked in an unusual manner. Agnew was regarded as an "unfortunate choice," but Nixon still did not suffer as much as he might have. Nixon was still the leader, the loner; he shared his power with no one. He might have made a poor choice for the vice presidency, but he was still the leader, and he more importantly, was going about taking measures to curtail Agnew's operations (or in other words, solve the problem he had created).

The Cabinet Selection Process

Nixon's political judgment was illunimated by his process of making political appointments. Nixon made his cabinet decisions himself. He was aided by three of his closest advisers: Robert Finch ("the man who stands the best chance of becoming the Bobby Kennedy of the Nixon Years"), H. R. Haldeman ("chief executive officer," and a member of the "California mafia"), and John Mitchell ("chairman of the board") (Newsweek, November 18, 1968, p. 43; also see Time, November 29, 1968, p. 12). But Newsweek concluded that: "the task of picking the people at the top belonged to Nixon himself" (December 2, 1968, p. 29).

Nixon was seen as operating alone; a solitary figure in history making his own decisions, i.e., "The Leader."

Nixon seemed to have a very definite idea of what he was looking for in terms of Cabinet officers. At one point, he said that his transition team was looking for "brains, judgment, creativity, and youth" (Time, November 29, 1968, p. 12), and he committed himself to an "unprecedented search for talent" "regardless of party, race, or section" (Newsweek, December 2, 1968, p. 29). And for the most part, the mass media seemed to suggest that Nixon found what he wanted. "Nixon surrounded himself with men very much in his own mold: relentlessly unflamboyant lawyers and energetic, highly disciplined rags-to-riches businessmen" (Newsweek, December 23, 1968, p. 16).

In fact, the Nixon high command--like the President-elect himself--has a sure feel for the American middle-class majority, the kinds of people who elected him last month. Nixon's Middle America still reveres the Alger hero who has overcome poverty, lack of education and other handicaps to make it big. (Newsweek, December 23, 1968, p. 17)

"It represents the middle class, the mid-continental academic community and middle-of-the-road politics" (Newsweek, December 23, 1968, p. 30). The new Cabinet was comprised of a "cadre of versatile generalists"-- "men whose background and judgment made them good choices for any number of jobs and would enable them to contribute ideas on a wide array of government problems" (Newsweek, December 23, 1968, p. 16).

Although Nixon chose a group of "middle-of-the-road generalists," he chose a group that had built-in internal dynamics. Nixon wanted a thinking-debating group of Cabinet officers. Nixon said that he hadn't "found any one of them who agrees with me completely on everything that

ought to be done. But that's all to the good. I don't want a Cabinet of yes-men," and he went on to say that such built-in conflict in many ways guaranteed an "open administration" (Time, December 20, 1968, p. 17). Nixon appointed Daniel Moynihan as chairman of the cabinet-level Council on Urban Affairs. He was to serve the same functions of planning and coordinating domestic policies as Kissinger was for foreign policies. Yet he disagreed

. . . with the predominant sentiment of the new Administration on some issues, particularly in his support of a role for the Federal Government as the "employer of the last resort" on the hard-core unemployed and for a war on poverty with a comprehensive family allowance plan. (Time, December 20, 1968, p. 16)

Henry Kissinger was at odds with Nixon on several points of foreign policy, particularly the concept of nuclear parity. Kissinger did not agree with Nixon that the United States should seek overwhelming military superiority over the U.S.S.R. (see Time, December 13, 1968, p. 18).

Nixon strengthened the image of an "open administration" by seeking a bipartisan Cabinet (see pp. 78-79). Newsweek reports that "Nixon has strewn olive branches in enemy and neutral territory by offering top-level appointments to influential politicians who turned him down (not unexpectedly in most cases) and by tapping respected specialists for sub-Cabinet positions" (December 23, 1968, p. 30). Nixon's efforts for a bipartisan approach to the Cabinet delayed the transition's timetable. "It appears that one major reason for the delay is Mr. Nixon's anxiety to find and place prominent Democrats in high posts as an early gesture of national unity" (The New York Times, November 26, 1968).

The political coverage of the Nixon-Cabinet-Making-Process was very positive. Nixon's attempts at creating an open administration through placing men with a variety of opinions on his team played well with the media. However, there were a few rough spots in appointment process.

Cabinet controversies. Because Nixon had tried to appoint cabinet officers with a diverse background, the process was slow and often awkward. Prominent democrats such as Hubert Humphrey, Sargent Shriver, and Eugene McCarthy turned him down. Within the more liberal wing of the Republican party, Nelson Rockefeller turned down Nixon's overture. Nixon had given orders that qualified black men and women be found for his cabinet. But three of those who were asked turned him down: Whitney Young, Jr., Senator Edward Brooke, and Ersa Poston (see Time, December 20, 1968, p. 13).

The appointment of Walter Hickel as Interior Secretary created a great deal of controversy. The New York Times summarized the controversy surrounding the Hickel appointment by writing:

There have been allegations that Mr. Hickel is not a strong advocate of conservation and that his business orientation makes him unfit to govern the diversified department. (January 16, 1969)

The newspaper ran an editorial that said that Hickel had "confirmed the worst fears of those who regard the restoration and conservation of a ravished continent and purification of its polluted air and waters as priority business for this generation . . ." (The New York Times, December 20, 1968).

In addition to the controversy surrounding the Hickel appointment,

a similar problem arose around the appointment of David Packard as Deputy Secretary of Defense. Packard was co-founder of the Hewlett-Packard Company, and his stock in the company was well over 300 million dollars in value. The Senate was concerned over a possible conflict of interest in that the Hewlett-Packard Company is a large defense firm. In addition, there was controversy over how Packard could fairly separate himself from his stock without losing it (see The New York Times, January 13, 1969).

The nominated Under-Secretary of Agriculture Phil Campbell also received some negative coverage. Representative Neal Smith, an Iowa Democrat, told reporters that: "the consumers of America will be made easier prey for the chiselers, the mislabelers, and the purveyors of unfit and unsanitary products" if Phil Campbell became Under-Secretary of Agriculture (The New York Times, January 1, 1969). Campbell was not the only Under-Secretary receiving negative coverage. Nixon nominated Elliot Richardson as Under-Secretary of State. However, media reports suggested that Richardson suffered from alcoholism and had committed numerous traffic violations while under the influence (The New York Times, January 16, 1969).

In summary, the coverage of the Nixon-cabinet-making-process was generally positive except for the appointments of Packard, Hickel, Campbell, and Richardson. Time correspondent Simmons Fentress seems to represent the overwhelming verdict on the new cabinet when he wrote:

There is a pattern to the people named to the Nixon administration to date. Those who have come front and center tend to be bland. That doesn't worry the people at all. This is not an exciting crowd. Its campaign was not exciting, and its government is not apt to be. It recruits by the yardsticks of

competence and loyalty and public acceptance. It is not trying to stir up or to amuse. Competence may be the goal, but that doesn't mean politics is overlooked. (Time, January 17, 1969, p. 15)

The Nixon Transition's Policy Priorities

Foreign policy. Nixon defined his policy priorities in such a way that it buoyed his "Leader" image. He concentrated on foreign policy and the Presidential image is explained by Leonard Garment in his comments to White:

In foreign policy you get drama, triumph, resolution-- crisis and resolution so that in foreign policy Nixon can give the sense of leadership. But in domestic policy, there you have to deal with the whole jungle of human problems. (1973, p. 52).

C. L. Sulzberger in The New York Times wrote that "no American President at the moment of taking office has known the world so extensively as Richard Nixon" (January 19, 1969). A member of the new administration explained how Nixon felt about foreign policy: "He has a pride in his feel for it, and he may work at it almost to the exclusion of everything else" (Newsweek, November 11, 1968, p. 36). "Having persistently accumulated firsthand knowledge abroad, Nixon clearly indicates he will personally make policy" (The New York Times, January 19, 1969). And in Sulzberger's words, Nixon intended "to be his own Secretary of State" (The New York Times, January 19, 1969).

By emphasizing his foreign policy concerns, Nixon took the reins of command in both hands. His very language suggested it. America would "negotiate from strength" and maintain "overall military superiority" (The Washington Post, November 10, 1968). His preeminent role in foreign affairs is illustrated by this comment on the Vietnam War

operations: there will be "systematic work by a central staff with bureaucratic lines running not to the armed services or the State Department, but to the President himself" (The Washington Post, December 22, 1968). Newsweek explained Nixon's Vietnam War policy:

Nixon favors de-escalation through negotiation. He opposes bombing non-military targets and would not blockade North Vietnam or use nuclear weapons. His plan for ending the war is to step up training of the South Vietnamese forces, put a new emphasis on pacification and negotiate--not just with the North Vietnamese in Paris but with the Russians who, in his judgment, make continuation of the war possible. (Newsweek, November 11, 1968, p. 37).

Senator Jacob Javitz succinctly stated the country's mood, "Nixon will end the war" (The Washington Post, November 10, 1968). The following quote suggests Nixon's firm views on foreign policy concerns:

Any future war is either going to be a nuclear war where we are going to need a mass army, or it's going to be a guerilla war where we will need a highly trained professional military force. (Newsweek, November 11, 1968, p. 37).

The Soviet Union will understand strength and firmness, not belligerence; but strength and firmness will lead to negotiation. (Newsweek, November 11, 1968, p. 37)

His language was the rhetoric of strength and power, the language of the leader.

Domestic policy. Although Nixon emphasized foreign affairs, he did not take a passive view of domestic policy. Rather, he immediately set himself off as an activist. Nixon said:

I am basically an activist. I don't intend to stand by and have a dip in the economy occur if I can use the credit of the United States or the tax powers to get the economy moving. (Newsweek, November 11, 1968, p. 39).

Newsweek concluded that Nixon was not alone in this activist view--that he was bringing the Republican party right along behind him (see

November 11, 1968, p. 39). The new administration would not destroy the Great Society programs. Rather according to Finch, it was their job "to rationalize and implement the legislation now on the books" (Time, December 27, 1968, p. 12). Newsweek concludes that: "the new administration seems designed to refine and consolidate the eclectic--and often erratic--advances of the last eight Democratic years and to take a reasoned, non-ideological approach to America's unfinished business" (Newsweek, December 23, 1968, p. 16). Nixon's economic appointments were liberal Republicans. Felix Belair of The New York Times wrote that Nixon's reliance on Harlow for Congressional relations symbolized a "'progressive Republican' political philosophy" (November 14, 1968). Eileen Shanahan of The New York Times saw Paul W. McCracken's appointment as chairman of the Council on Economic Advisers in a similar vein. She writes that:

In naming Paul W. McCracken . . . , President-elect Nixon appears to have set his Administration on a course of liberal Republicanism in the economic policy area. For Mr. McCracken is far from a devotee of the conservative philosophy that government should simply keep its hands off the economy. . . . (December 5, 1968)

Shanahan continued to maintain that "the appointment assured the continuation of activist economic policy and also of the tradition of naming to the council men of the highest standing within the economics profession" (The New York Times, December 5, 1968). With David Kennedy at Treasury, Nixon would work towards planned social change. Newsweek reports that: "Kennedy's role will be central to Nixon's scheme to bring private enterprise into full partnership with the Federal government as a force of social change" (December 23, 1968, p. 17).

This interventionist philosophy attached to power of the private sector developed into a domestic policy that Nixon called "black capitalism." Time defines "black capitalism" as "private investment, tax credits and Government loans to rebuild the ghettos" (November 15, 1968). Nixon told reporters that: "what we need is to get private enterprise into the ghetto, and get the people of the ghetto into private enterprise--not only as workers, but as managers and owners" (The New York Times, December 11, 1968). Newsweek predicted that to the 91st Congress, Nixon would propose "a system of tax credits designed to persuade private enterprise to create ghetto jobs and build housing for the poor, and to train the unskilled worker" (November 11, 1968, p. 38).

Although Nixon was taking a liberal stance on economics, he was taking a firm, conservative stance on law and order. Nixon told the nation that: "In a system of government that provides a method of peaceful change, there is no cause that justifies breaking the law or engaging in violence" (Newsweek, November 11, 1968, p. 37). The Nixon Administration planned "to be tough on acts of civil disobedience, agitators and rioters who damage property or interfere with the rights of others" (Newsweek, November 11, 1968, p. 38). Nixon's conservative approach is illustrated by this quote: "if the conviction rate were doubled in this country, it would do more to eliminate crime than quadrupling of the funds for any governmental war on poverty" (Time, November 15, 1968, p. 3).

Newsweek summed up the Nixon issue agenda by this statement:

It all seems to add up to a hard line abroad, a tough line at home with dissenters and demonstrators and an effort to enlist

the private sector in the task of solving the nation's outstanding domestic problems. (November 11, 1968, p. 39)

In recapitulation, Nixon orchestrated a presidential drama emphasizing his role as "The Leader" of the American people. This was done through a careful integration of a number of key components: his personal mannerisms, his manner of public speaking, his portrayal of presidential power, his "leadership rhetoric," his decision-making style, his organizational style, his emphasis on the executive branch of government, his emphasis on foreign policy, and his activist domestic policy.

Conclusions

The findings of this study suggest that Nixon was highly successful in "defining the situation" for the reporters of The Washington Post, The New York Times, and Time. With Newsweek, he was not so successful, for in several areas of transition coverage, the magazine provided a negative view of the process. Nixon avoided violations of type and remained consistent in his presentation of his persona (see pp. 77-81). This allows the mass media to easily "stereotype" his behavior and avoid the "fishing around," "arm-chair guessing" that is often present during transition periods. Nixon presented a clear "Leader" persona; therefore, there was nothing to clear up or to question. He was a known entity, a certainty. His careful exercise of impression management led Henry to write:

President Nixon tried to set a tone of competent, moderate, responsible, leadership that would establish public confidence, heal partisan wounds, and enlarge his base of support at the political center. In his personal conduct, Nixon appeared as a well-informed, self-possessed executive and

generally succeeded in raising himself in public esteem as measured both by the opinion polls and the journalists' periodic appraisals. (1969, p. 478)

The pro-president-elect sources and media sources (see Chapter VIII, Role Traits) are very similar in their presentation of Nixon's leadership persona. The similarity may be seen when a Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient test is done to the pro-president-elect mentions and the media-mentions for The Washington Post, The New York Times, Newsweek, and Time (see Appendix G).

Nixon knew his central role, the leader, and he worked to protect its depiction during the transition. Nixon's careful management of his persona gave him an unusual advantage during the first days of a new presidency.

CHAPTER VI

THE CARTER TRANSITION

The Political Environment

As stated previously, Stephen Wayne (1982b) has identified three types of environmental factors that influence a president's performance in office: the national (or economic) environment; the international environment; and the President himself (his background, his political history).

In 1976, there was the lull of the post-Watergate-Ford era. International and national concerns were muted by the aftermath of the Watergate-Nixon-Pardon period. The nation and the news media appeared to be "dazed" by recent events. A period of national boredom replaced the patriotism of the bicentennial.

Carter had never held national office. His political history included four years as a Georgia Senator and four years as Governor of that same state. He had waged a campaign from the standpoint of an external-party candidate. He had few political friends, and he came to the White House on a wave of populism. He was the "ultimate" outsider.

The Transition: Preparation, Organization, and Management

The Carter transition was a concern of the Carter campaign for the presidency. Before the election, Carter appointed Atlanta lawyer, Jack Watson as the Director of the Transition. Watson was given \$150,000 to spend on the transition before the election. Watson organized 18 coordinators to aid him in formulating the future activities of the

transition (see Time, November 15, 1976, p. 25; Newsweek, November 15, 1976, p. 35). Newsweek described Watson's team as: "long on academic talent . . . and, despite its liberal leanings, generally nonideological" (November 15, 1976, p. 35). Carter gave Watson four areas of responsibility. Watson and his team were to create a calendar for the transition and to create a schedule for the executive branch's reorganization. Watson was to develop a guideline for the selection of Cabinet personnel, and the Watson team was to investigate several fiscal alternatives (see Newsweek, November 15, 1976, p. 33). This advance planning impressed one Newsweek reporter, Alpern Clift. He wrote that the early planning put Carter "a giant step ahead of most Presidents-elect in shaping a new Administration" (November 15, 1976, p. 33).

Transition Controversies

Although the Carter transition had an extensive planning stage, the transition period itself was not a peaceful one. Robert Ajemian of Time reported that: "The transition had been delayed for a couple of weeks by the power struggle between Jordan and . . . Jack Watson. A lot of people had been complaining about the holdup, and Carter was getting impatient" (December 20, 1976, p. 10). Newsweek reported that the: "friction between transition planner Jack Watson and campaign manager Hamilton Jordan settled down to a running joke around Washington" (November 29, 1976, p. 23). The Carter aides went public with their own personal dissatisfaction with the transition. One aide described Watson's position papers as "just fluff," and he remarked to a Time reporter that "they're about what you'd expect from a group of graduate

students with several months and \$150,000 to spend" (November 29, 1976, p. 12). Time reported that "much of the criticism centered on Watson's personnel lists, which one aide described as unfocused and deficient in political judgment. The lists were apparently computerized to the point of being almost useless" (Time, November 29, 1976, p. 12).

In the middle of the transition, Carter moved in to the controversy. Carter chose a 100-member transition team that appeared to be a compromise for the rival factions. Time reported that "in choosing the team, Carter apparently was trying to bridge a split between the transition planners, headed by the ambitious, efficient Jack Watson, and the campaign staff, directed by the more volatile Hamilton Jordan" (November 27, 1976, p. 13). Carter placed Jordan in charge of the personnel hunt, but he allowed Watson to continue with the development of Carter's fiscal budget (see Time, November 29, 1976, p. 12). Time concluded that: "Campaign Director Hamilton Jordan and his predominately Georgia-oriented campaign team seem to have won a significant round in the fight for influence with Watson and the Ivy League, Northeastern Establishment types who dominate his transition staff" (November 29, 1976, p. 11). Time viewed Carter's intervention into his transition staff's problems in a positive light. The magazine concluded that:

The outcome of the muted struggle may also say something important about the President-elect. He obviously liked and trusted Watson. Yet, the moment Carter concluded that Watson's performance in a particular area was not up to his lofty expectations, he did not hesitate to move him out of that area. There may be as much steel in the new President of the United States as his detractors had suspected and his admirers had approvingly anticipated. (Time, November 29, 1976, p. 12)

But, the conflict continued even after the shake-up. The New York Times called the tense situation "a bloodless dual," and The Washington Post commented that Jordan's intra-staff battles had left quite a few "walking dead." And the controversy between Watson and Jordan wasn't the only one raging. Environmental adviser, Joseph Browder, quit the transition team, saying that he had been "frozen out of high councils" by senior aides (Newsweek, November 29, 1976, p. 25). In January a Carter aide told Newsweek that: "The level of anxiety got so high no one could do anything. The New Spirit is cover your ass" (January 24, 1977, p. 19).

The allusion to "The New Spirit" is to the Carter inauguration. And the plans for the inauguration had its own problems. Carter appointed Bardyl Tirans as one of the co-chairmen of the Inauguration. Tirans told the news media that he was "trying to give Mr. Carter what he wants--a simple, modest, inexpensive inauguration that will involve all the 215 million people of this country? (The New York Times, January 16, 1977). "We will open up this city, which belongs to the people in every way" (Newsweek, December 13, 1976, p. 24). "The aim is to set the tone for the administration, to signal to the American people that we have a new Government, a Government responsive to the people's needs" (The New York Times, January 16, 1977). The three million dollar inaugural would be a "people's inaugural" (Newsweek, December 13, 1976, p. 24). However, the drama of the common man achieving the presidency ran into problems in Washington, D. C., a city used to "imperial trappings" and "regal affairs." "The People's Insugural" was said to be

the first test "on how well he handles the first big operation of his administration" (The Washington Post, January 12, 1977). In a similar vein, one columnist observed that "what is shaping up as the great fiasco of the people's inaugural is helping to shape Mr. Carter's reputation and image in a way that cannot help and could return to haunt him" (The Washington Post, January 12, 1977). A member of his own party predicted, "It's so bad . . . that only a blizzard can save Carter's inaugural from hurting him politically during the first few months and maybe longer" (The Washington Post, January 12, 1977).

The United States Congress had appropriated two million dollars for the 1976-77 transition. The Carter forces divided their time between Washington , D. C. and Plains, Georgia. During the 11 weeks of the transition, Democratic leaders of Congress made frequent trips to Plains. On one occasion, Carter invited all the Democratic leaders. The president-elect and his democratic comrades discussed a stimulative budget and plans for governmental reorganization. House Majority Leader Tip O'Neill was pleased by Carter's initiative to bring the White House and Congress together. During a press statement, O'Neill said:

I've been in Congress for 24 years, and I don't ever recall anything of this nature--the leadership coming and having a dialogue with the President in regard to his pending messages and plans. (Time, January 17, 1977, p. 11)

However, the meetings weren't as cordial as one might expect. Newsweek reports that "early meetings with the elders of the Hill have been infected with a certain stiff formality--and, participants report, occasional flashes of irritation" (January 17, 1977, p. 18). "Some of the leaders suffered in testy silence through Carter's discourses on government reorganization when they were itching to talk about unemployment

and jobs" (Newsweek, January 17, 1977, p. 18). Carter threatened the Democratic Congressional Leaders that he would go over their heads to the people, if they did not support his governmental reorganization plan (see Newsweek, January 17, 1977, p. 18). O'Neill warned Carter "that would be the worst thing you could ever do" (Newsweek, January 17, 1977, p. 18). In addition, Carter told the Democratic Leaders that the next time they all journeyed to Plains that the Republican Leaders would be coming with them. O'Neill was upset by this prospect. He told Carter directly:

I'm bitterly opposed to that. I think that's a terrible mistake. All the Republicans have done is obstruct. They are our opposition. It's the worst thing you can do. (Time, November 29, 1976, p. 12).

The mass media coverage of the transition dwelled on the problems of the transition. The notices were not good ones. The intra-staff battles, the "people's inaugural," and Carter's Congressional confrontations played poorly in the Press. Newsweek concluded:

It was advertised at birth as the best organized ever; it is ending in a litter of unread option papers, untapped personnel print-outs and unfulfilled ambitions among the young over-achievers who did all the work. The predominant feelings among them were irrelevance to the real decision--Carter and two or three intimates made them in his study in Plains. . . . (Newsweek, January 24, 1977, p. 20)

The 1976-77 Transition in Perspective

The Carter Transition was expected to be a rather difficult one. The transition was a party-overturn type which usually proves to be a rather difficult time for all those concerned. In addition, Carter had ousted a setting-incumbent, and this too usually forecasts a difficult transition. And Carter was unique; he was a member of the democratic

party, but he was not a "party-president," rather, he was an "outsider."

Time magazine reports:

In most respects, the transition of Government in the United States is an enviably smooth process. But although there are no tanks and armies on the scene, the capital city nonetheless always undergoes convulsions. These are particularly acute at present because Jimmy Carter is an "outsider" who has never lived in Washington and, worse made a point of campaigning against it. (November 22, 1976, p. 25)

The only expected bright spot was "the return of single-party control of the White House and Congress for the first time since LBJ" (Newsweek, January 17, 1977, p. 17). Yet, as we have seen, the Democratic Congressional Leaders and Carter had had more than a few run-ins during the transition. The Carter transition had been expected to be a rather awkward time, and the expectations were coming true.

Transition Coverage

The incumbent. It is interesting to note the diversified coverage of Gerald Ford during the transition period. Newsweek concentrated its coverage on the relationship that existed between Ford and Carter. It was said that Ford was "thrown off balance by defeat" (Newsweek, December 6, 1976, p. 23). Ford was having a hard time accepting his new place in history. One Ford aide explained that, "He still sees himself as the embodiment of the hopes and aspirations of half the American people" (Newsweek, November 22, 1976, p. 30). Newsweek reported that

. . . it is a somber, saddened, even grim President who is transferring power to his successor. Partly, Ford's mood results from lingering animosity toward Carter--a feeling uncharacteristic of a man who unusually does not harbor a grudge. (December 6, 1976, p. 23).

Another aide told Newsweek that Ford "has no respect for Carter and he keeps kicking himself in the ass for losing to him" (November 29, 1976, p. 24). "He's just unbelievably disgusted with himself for losing, and every day, as he hands over more power, it drives the point home deeper" (Newsweek, December 6, 1976, p. 23).

Time did not share Newsweek's enthusiasm for the "Ford-as-a-bad-port" theme. Rather, Time pictured Ford as a new type of American hero--not quite a great man, but a good man. Time reports that:

In one sense Carter had won in a year in which nearly any respectable Democrat should have triumphed. While Gerald Ford, could hardly be held accountable, the Republicans had presided over a lingering end to the Viet Nam War, had both produced and been victimized by the nation's worst political scandal, had been their party's President and Vice President resign in disgrace, and had held office during the deepest postwar recession. Ford had pardoned the man who appointed him. (November 15, 1976, p. 14)

And thus, the magazine concludes that:

It was a tribute to Ford's astonishing persistence, his own achievements in helping to pull his party out of the quagmire he had inherited, and his own basic decency that he ran as close a race as he did. It was also a measure of the nation's doubts about Carter that the race was so close. (November 15, 1976, p. 14).

In a similar vein, Time states that:

Jerry Ford could hardly have done better. He will turn over to Carter the leadership of a nation that is far far stronger politically and economically than when Ford inherited a discredited presidency from Nixon. (November 15, 1976, p. 15).

"Gerald Ford, without flair or ambition had furnished what the nation needed--solidity, courage, common sense, and honor" (Time, November 15, 1976, p. 28). "The decent, solid and forthright Gerald Ford--to his everlasting credit--did much to restore faith and confidence in Government and to curb inflation" (Time, January 3, 1977, p. 12). Time

compared Ford to Martin Van Buren and Herbert Hoover, "not men of greatness, but men who did their best" (Time, November 15, 1976, p. 28).

Ford aide, David Gergen told Time that: "The President has gained in stature through this defeat and through the graceful considerate way he's handled the whole matter of passing on the mantle" (Time, November 22, 1976, p. 15). And Time seemed to agree.

The New York Times seemed to agree with Time that Ford was a decent man. James Naughton wrote that: "there was a sense that Mr. Ford had--through fortune more than design--been the right man at the right time in the White House and that the nation was the better for it" (The New York Times, November 14, 1976). Naughton went on to say that Ford was responsible for "the resuscitation of the Presidency itself" (November 14, 1976). One Ford aide told The New York Times that it was "the President's misfortune that stability has never been perceived as important to the nation" (November 14, 1976). But The New York Times did not view Ford through rose-colored glasses. The newspaper reported that Ford "never proved he was in charge or that he could lead" (January 13, 1977). The newspaper said that Ford was too slow on civil rights and health care. The paper accused Ford of allowing welfare laws to take their course and of ignoring the plight of the large cities. The article concluded that Ford was too conservative and was too in favor of limited government (The New York Times, January 13, 1977). But, The New York Times mainly depicted Ford as a lameduck. Philip Shabecoff writes that:

Mr. Ford and his aides have repeatedly declared that he intends to exercise the full power of the presidency right up to inauguration day. The fact is, however, that most

of those powers have evaporated since Mr. Ford lost the election, leaving behind the form and trappings but little of the substance of Presidential authority. . . . In sum, President Ford has discovered that lame ducks truly do not fly very well. (January 7, 1977)

In another article, Shabecoff suggests that:

The White House, from the President down, is now feeling the full symptoms of withdrawal from the high of running the nation and the excitement of a close election campaign. The workload for most members of the staff is down. . . . The sense of mission has vanished. (December 8, 1976)

And The New York Times concludes that: "the Ford White House and Cabinet have almost vanished in the shadows" (December 17, 1976).

The Washington Post was very similar to The New York Times in its depiction of Ford. Ford was a decent man, but the country needed to go on and to go on without him. He was depicted as a lameduck.

Media Evaluations of the Transition

In general, the coverage of the "change of command" stated that both Ford and Carter were trying to cooperate. However, there was an underlying theme of conflict. The New York Times reports that:

There are already signs that the 1976 transition is about to repeat the familiar pattern. It is only natural that President Ford should want to reach out to his elected successor to shore up his waning power on such pressing matters as world oil prices, the shaky economy or the effort to promote a settlement in Rhodesia. But given the philosophical differences between Mr. Ford and Governor Carter during the campaign on defense spending, taxes, unemployment, or aid to the cities, the two are understandably at odds now on how to deal with the practical problems of the next ten weeks. (November 14, 1976)

Transition trouble spots. Ford sought to maintain his authority, and when he did so, the trouble began. During the last days of his administration, Ford decided to go ahead with the development of the

B-1 bomber. But, the mass media had mixed reactions. John Finney of The New York Times puts the situation in its best light when he wrote:

The Defense Department in a move to ease the transition of power, is seeking to work out an arrangement that would relieve Jimmy Carter of the necessity of making a major decision on the B-1 bomber program shortly after he becomes President. (November 14, 1976)

Yet an editorial in The New York Times called Ford's decision on the B-1 bomber "irresponsible" (November 8, 1976).

In another foreign policy squabble, Ford suddenly announced that he wanted Puerto Rico to become the fifty-first state. Time magazine suggested that:

The statehood surprise surely reflected the familiar predicament of a lame-duck Chief Executive whose desire to deepen his mark in history is matched only by his loss of real power. (January 17, 1977, p. 21)

On the domestic side, Ford gave the go-ahead for the "air-bags." The Carter administration expressed its disapproval through Stuart Eizenstat:

Just as with the decision to proceed with the B-1 bomber, the air bag decision was not one that had to be made before the change in administration. (The New York Times, December 8, 1976)

Eizenstat said that "simple courtesy" should have led the Ford administration to consult with the new Carter administration (see The New York Times, December 8, 1976).

Eileen Shennan of The New York Times reported that Ford was being accused of submitting a "low budget" to Congress so that Carter would look like a "Big Spender" (December 26, 1976). A member of the Carter transition team called the proposed budget "a public relations document" designed to make the new president look badly (The New York Times, December 26, 1976).

Probably one incident that occurred between the Ford and Carter camps best illustrates the tension underlying the transition. With the permission of Ford's Press Secretary Ron Nessen, Jody Powell (Carter's Press Secretary) attended a press briefing at the White House in order to see how these affairs were handled. However, the reporters began to ignore Nessen for he was an officer of the past, and Powell was the officer of the future. Nessen became so angry that he threatened to call for the White House Security Police to oust the fickle newsmen. However, Powell sounded a retreat before the situation turned too ugly (see The New York Times, November 17, 1976).

In summary, the transition was depicted by both the newspapers and the magazines as a rather tense affair. The Ford and Carter camps were at odds with each other, and the Carter transition team was troubled by internal struggles for power.

The Election Results

The coverage of the electoral victory is very important for the new president-elect, for it sets the parameters of his new administration. What can he realistically accomplish in his first term? Again, it is the transition coverage that sets the expectations for Washington elites and the general public in terms of the "parameters of the possible." The overwhelming theme of the election coverage was the unexpected "narrowness" of the victory. Time magazine declared Carter "a winner by a whisker" (November 15, 1976, p. 16). Carter had won 51 percent of the popular vote. His plurality was 1,681,417 in the popular vote (Time, January 3, 1977, p. 11).

Carter seemed to accept the "narrow margin" as his own fault. He told reporters that: "The only reason it was close was that I as a candidate was not good enough as a campaigner. But I'll make up for that as President" (Time, November 15, 1976, p. 13). However, Carter did maintain that narrow though it was, it was a "sufficient mandate" to pursue a wide variety of Governmental programs and policies (see The New York Times, November 5, 1976). However, Time magazine did not agree. Yes, he had won, but . . .

Yet he had done so in such a sometimes brilliant, often halting, and finally narrow manner as to convey no commanding mandate for his campaign promises or any demonstrated confidence in his still disquieting personality. (November 15, 1976, p. 13)

The importance of Carter's personality in the election outcome was debated in the magazines. For Time's Stanley Cloud, "the race was decided on personality and character, plus a desire for new leadership, even if it meant electing a relative unknown like Jimmy Carter" (November 15, 1976, p. 34). Time tempered this view somewhat when it reported that:

Carter remained a mystery to many voters, and they opted for him less because of the "intimate relationship" that he claimed to have with them than because he offered the promise of a fresh start. (November 15, 1976, p. 31)

Newsweek did not think much of the "Carter personality" theory of the election's outcome. Newsweek reported that "for all the attention paid to the personality issue between Carter and Ford, most voters did not seem to perceive it as a major factor" (November 15, 1976, p. 28).

Time reported that:

Jimmy Carter won with a combination of grit, driving ambition, daring if flawed political planning and a generous measure of

good luck. As a campaigner, he struck many voters as more enigmatic than charismatic, as more of a trimmer than a visionary--and perhaps not really likeable enough. In the end, he did not so much win the presidency as avoid losing it. (November 15, 1976, p. 31)

Newsweek concluded that: "Jimmy Carter's victory was not a personal triumph; he won because of the revival of the old coalition that first sent FDR to the White House in 1932 . . . " (November 15, 1976, p. 29). "The result was a reconstitution of the old democratic coalition on the basis of party loyalty, pocketbook concerns and the simple feeling that it was time for a change in Washington" (Newsweek, November 15, 1976, p. 27). Time reported that:

Carter hardly had a mandate for sweeping change. His victory was very regional and based largely on social and economic class. He was supported by the blacks, by low-income earners, by the poorly educated, and others who felt that they were hurting. (November 15, 1976, p. 14)

"The midwives of his victory in the end were old-style delivery pros like the AFL-CIO's George Meany and national party chairman Robert Strauss; Carter in the end required rescue by the men he had once run against" (Newsweek, November 15, 1976, p. 25; see also, Time, November 15, 1976, p. 34). But the help from the party leaders might prove to hurt Carter. James Reston of The New York Times reported that:

Mr. Carter has another problem. He captured his party against the will of many of its political, union, and intellectual leaders, and owes his narrow victory to their exertions in the North. But he doesn't want to be captured by them in the end, or even unduly influenced or controlled by the Democratic Old Boy network in the selection of his principal aides and advisers. (November 5, 1976)

Newsweek summarized Carter's situation in this manner:

He enters upon it with a slender mandate, untried skills of state craft, and eleven weeks to prepare himself for his day in the sun. (November 15, 1976, p. 26)

In summary, Carter's victory was depicted as a very narrow one. He was pictured as being in a rather awkward political position. Carter had campaigned as an external-party candidate, and he had even campaigned against the old time party leaders. Yet, in the end, it was the Old Boys that delivered the election to him. According to the mass media, Carter owed them, and he was going to find it very difficult to "pay" them and still fulfill his campaign promises.

Coverage of Carter-the-man. The image of Carter-the-man found in The Washington Post, The New York Times, Newsweek, and Time is a rather unsettling one. He was pictured as an unknown quantity in American politics. Carter was viewed as a mass of contradictions. And the few qualities that the reporters could agree that he did possess were not viewed as positive characteristics for the next president of the United States. Time chose Jimmy Carter as their "Man of the Year." The magazine explained their choice:

Because of his impressive rise to power, because of the new phase he marks in American life, and because of the great anticipations that surround him, James Earl Carter, Jr. is Time's Man of the Year. (January 3, 1977, p. 12)

The New York Times said that Carter remained "largely unpredictable as a national leader" (January 16, 1977). The political party that eventually supported him and the public that eventually elected him were also uncertain about Jimmy "the unknown." Newsweek reported that: Carter was "an incompletely acquired taste for the party and trade-union organization men who helped elect him, and their joylessness in his election was manifest" (November 15, 1976, p. 24). "Carter is further burdened by a kind of lingering public unease over who he really is and

what he really stands for" (Newsweek, November 15, 1976, p. 24). Carter was "an unknown quantity" because he had been reported as a "mass of contradictions." Time summarizes this problem:

He has been described with a catalogue of contradictions: liberal, moderate, conservative, compassionate, ruthless, soft, tough, a charlatan, a true believer, a defender of the status quo, a populist Hamlet. (January 3, 1977, p. 13)

Time depicted Carter as being stubborn and over-confident. The magazine characterized his relationship with Georgia legislature as being "the worst in the history of the state" (January 3, 1977, p. 14). This might spell disaster for future White House-Congressional relations.

Time reports that: "The obvious danger of such self-confidence is that President Carter may be unwilling to listen to advice or compromise when thwarted, as he will inevitably be" (January 3, 1977, p. 14).

Carter did not alter Time's view when he told a Time reporter:

I am pretty rigid. It's been very difficult for me to compromise when I believe in something deeply. I generally prefer to take it to the public, to fight it out to the last vote, and if I go down, I go down in flames. (January 3, 1977, p. 18)

Carter--the unknown--the man of contradictions--the stubborn--the over-confident--all of these played havoc with his image. The news media were not certain what to expect. Stanley Cloud of Time magazine summarizes the undertainty surrounding Catter:

My own view is that he will either be one the the greatest Presidents of the modern era, or that he will be a complete failure. I see no middle ground for him, no mediocrity. He often describe his vision of America as a "beautiful mosaic" of almost infinite colors and facets. Presidents don't normally talk that way. They don't normally cry in front of reporters. They don't normally blast some political opponent one day and apologize publicly the next. Presidents don't normally do a lot of things Jimmy Carter does. Therein lies his mystery. Therein lies his potential for greatness--or the possibility of disaster. (January 3, 1977, p. 22)

Carter recognized that as the president-elect he faced an image problem. He told a reporter that many people viewed him as "the agent of undefined, threatening change" (The Washington Post, November 7, 1976). In the words of one writer, Carter "still looked like the outsider--challenger than the ultimate insider: the President-to-be" (The Washington Post, November 7, 1976). This crucial time period in which Carter had to change from a winning candidate to a governing President had observers worried. The situation led one reporter to write, that "the next 11 weeks--before inauguration day--may be crucial to the entire success or failure of Jimmy Carter's presidency and the nation's course for years to come" (The Washington Post, November 7, 1976).

Impression Management During the Carter Transition

The man who came to the White House from a Georgia peanut farm by way of the Georgia State Capitol was no stranger to the art of impression management. The new administration was concerned with its relationship with the mass media, its ability to use the media, and its ability to make both of these work to prepare the "damaged image." On November 5, 1976, Carter promised that his administration would be open and that each month two "full-scale" news conferences would be held (The New York Times, November 5, 1976). Jody Powell, a close Carter associate, would serve as Press Secretary.

The common man drama. During the campaign, Carter attempted to appeal to those people outraged with "the goings-on" of the government. One reporter of The Washington Post wrote, "Carter's agenda . . . is

aimed at conservative values: making government work properly, making it fair and honest, restoring the traditional respect which has been eroded by recent history" (November 7, 1986). This agenda continued through the transition. Carter asked of his listeners to "trust" him, and he promised to give them "a Government as good and as competent and as compassionate as are the American people" (Time, January 3, 1977, p. 12). Carter was concerned with the quality of life in America and with the American family (The New York Times, December 29, 1976).

Carter's dream of government was shared by lower-middle America. He was their president. During the transition, he talked of returning the presidency to the people. Newsweek reported that Carter was "expected to carry on with that President-of-all-the-people manner" (November 22, 1976, p. 26). Carter asked people to mail in ideas on how to return the presidency back to the people. The transition team considered asking citizens to come and "share a meal" or just "visit with him" at the White House (The Washington Post, December 31, 1976). Carter said he might hold "town-hall type forums," and he suggested that he might open Cabinet meetings up to the mass media (Time, January 3, 1977, p. 23). Carter said that he might open up a toll-free phone line to the White House so that the American people might talk to their president (Time, January 17, 1977, p. 12). Newsweek concluded that Carter's drama of the common man might bring "a folksy informality to the Presidency, entertaining rarely seen in Washington since Andrew Jackson invited the public into the White House for his own Inaugural" (November 22, 1976, p. 26). Rosalynn Carter wanted to hold square dances in the East Room, and she said that the Carter family would not

serve any beverage stronger than wine to White House guests (Newsweek, November 22, 1976, p. 26). President "Jimmy" liked blue jeans, softball, beer busts and stock-car races (Newsweek, November 22, 1976, p. 26).

However, not all of the Carters' folksy ways met with the approval of the Washington community. According to Newsweek, the Washington social circle had "visions of 'Southern-fried Kennedy'" (November 22, 1976, p. 26). One Washington socialite Page Lee Huffy remarked that, "Blue grass music in the White House is one thing. But stock-car racing? I'm not so sure about that" (Time, November 22, 1976, p. 25). Even the White House staff was concerned about the Carter presidency. Newsweek reported that:

Some of the Carter's household liaison people came back from the White House kitchen in popeyed merriment at having been told by an incumbent staffer: "We can prepare any kind of Southern food you like. In fact, we serve it to the help every day." (December 6, 1976, p. 22)

This populist drama of the common man was met with mixed reviews by the national press. Newsweek reported that:

The first glimpses of populism Carter-style will thus be largely theatrical--a process of de-Caesarizing that will only begin with his much-ballyhooed "People's Inaugural" this week. In the Age of Jimmy, the President will relax in Levis, lug his own suit bag and dispense with such luxuries as hauling his bed of state along on trips--a perk enjoyed by Richard Nixon. (January 24, 1977, p. 17)

A caption of a cartoon in Newsweek read:

Jackson's Inaugural, 1829: For Carter, a people's party--but no mud on the floor. (November 22, 1976, p. 26)

Time magazine ran a satirical letter on November 29, 1976 from "Ol'

Hickory to Y'ng Peanut." The letter warned Carter of the excesses of

the common people. In the letter Jackson describes Carter's inaugural as "Jacksonian democracy with vengeance" (Time, November 29, 1976, p. 10). Carter had said that he was planning to have a "democratic with a small 'd' inauguration . . . to strip the White House of some of its more imperial trappings" (The Washington Post, November 7, 1976). But this didn't set well with the Washington social set or with the news media (see pp. 104-105).

1. Populist rhetoric. The drama of the common man ran into problems in the Capital. News reporters questioned Carter's dyed-in-the-wood populism. Time magazine reprinted a passage from Carter's Madison Square Garden's acceptance speech:

Too many have had to suffer at the hands of a political and economic elite who have shaped decisions and never had to account for mistakes nor to suffer from injustice. When unemployment prevails, they never stand in line looking for a job. When deprivation results from a confused and bewildering welfare system, they never do without food or clothing or a place to sleep. When the public schools are inferior or torn by strife, their children go to exclusive private schools. And when the bureaucracy is bloated and confused, the powerful always manage to discover and occupy niches of special influence and privilege. An unfair tax structure serves their needs. And tight secrecy always seems to prevent reform. (January 3, 1977, p. 18)

Yet, in an interview with Time, Carter played the other side of the fence. He said:

I have no inclination to want a homogeneous society in which someone who is strong or able or brilliant or even fortunate, is punished, and his substance--speaking about his financial substance now--is taken away from him and distributed among those who are less highly motivated. (November 15, 1976, p. 22)

Time concluded that:

After all that has been said and written about him during a long campaign, he is still an enigma to millions of Americans,

including many who voted for him. He is complex and sometimes contradictory. His creed combines traditionally antithetical elements of help-the-deprived populism and deny-thyself fiscal conservatism. (January 3, 1977, p. 11)

2. Religious rhetoric. In addition, Carter's rhetoric included a vigorous religious message. Carter told Time magazine that:

The presence of my belief in Christ is the most important thing in my life. I'm not ashamed of it.

I don't pray to God to let me win an election. I pray to ask God to let me do the right thing.

I'll never tell a lie. (January 3, 1977, p. 12)

In an interview with Time, Carter extended his religious theme into the foreign policy frontier:

I hope to establish, as best I can, a position where our country is the leader of the world, based not on military might or economic pressure or political persuasion but on the fact that we are right and decent, that we take a position with every nation as best we can according to what is best for the people who live there. (November 15, 1976, p. 24)

However, this religious tone to Carter's rhetoric did not play well in educated, urban America. Time quoted a Jewish democratic leader in Miami, Florida:

When a guy keeps telling you he's more religious than you are and keeps wearing his badge on his sleeve, you begin to wonder. Jews have always been concerned about the separation of church and state. (Time, November 15, 1976, p. 19)

There was a general distrust of his populist and religious rhetoric.

Time reported that:

Some opponents charged that he was trying to be all things to all people, tailoring his positions to suit his audiences. There was mistrust, some ridicule of his strong religious note and his self-righteousness. (November 15 1976, p. 31)

3. "Double-talk." Carter's attempts "at being all things to all people" became a theme in the transition coverage. Time described

one speaking engagement in that it was a "vintage Carter performance-- He left some listeners convinced he would do one thing, others convinced he would do exactly the opposite" (December 6, 1976, p. 20). Time suggested that Carter stated "positions in a manner intended to give the least possible offense to his audience" (January 3, 1977, p. 17). Carter "hedged" on anti-abortion amendment with his opposition but then he switched again (see Time, January 3, 1977, p. 17). Time reported that:

He staked out three slightly differing positions on grain embargoes, he spoke of ambitious new programs and of balancing the budget, he painted an almost Depression-like picture of the U.S. economy that many people perceived as unreal. In a year of skepticism about politicians, he was beginning to sound like any other exaggerating overpromising old pol. (Time, November 15, 1976, p. 31)

The New York Times preferred to view all of this in a more positive light. Charles Mohn wrote that all of this is just "one of the questions of fine semantic distinctions that sometimes characterized his political campaign and surrounded it with controversy" (December 29, 1976). Newsweek said that Carter was guilty of making "overlapping promises" (November 15, 1976, p. 33). Time too saw it as a problem of promising too much during the campaign. Time quotes Henry Graff, a professor of American History at Columbia University:

He comes to the White House with more commitments publicly uttered than any recent president. He's going to be attacked for not doing the things he promised. (January 3, 1977, p. 22)

Time concluded that: "Clearly the President-elect faces a difficult problem in reconciling his expansive campaign pledges with the hard facts of political reality" (Time, January 10, 1977, p. 11).

4. Inflated promises. But, it was not just Carter's overlapping

promises and his double-talk that troubled the Time writers. Time's reporters believed that "one of the more serious problems of Carter's presidency may be a tendency to raise expectations too high, to promise more than he can deliver" (January 3, 1977, p. 17). Hugh Sidey concludes that Carter "cannot possibly live up to this country's soaring expectations" (Time, November 15, 1976, p. 28).

Newsweek reported that "The temptation among skeptics was to charge him with having already begun to default on the commitments of autumn" (January 3, 1977, p. 15). Time noted that Carter himself was using qualifiers. His campaign's "you can depend on it," had switched to "I think you can depend on it" of the transition (Time, January 10, 1977, p. 11).

In summary, it is clear that Time magazine scrutinized Carter's rhetoric closely. The magazine appeared suspicious of the "common man image," and the populist rhetoric that accompanied it. In Time's view, Carter had overextended himself politically by promising groups what they wanted to hear and by trying to be all things to all people.

The Operational Mode of the Carter Transition

Carter's common man drama colored his operational mode to a marked degree. The rhetoric of the common man is the rhetoric of the decision-maker. For, the decision-maker cares for people. He is one of the people, and thus, the decision-maker behaves as the common man.

Decision-maker rhetoric. The Washington Post said that Carter was "to the grits born," and his speech patterns were often colored with such colloquialisms. His words were not those of "The Leader" but

rather they were those of the "Decision-maker." In one of his personal disclosures, Carter said:

I feel very dedicated, very sober, very deeply aware of the responsibilities that will be on my shoulders. . . . But I honestly can't say, even searching for some expression of modesty, that I feel afraid of the job. (The Washington Post, November 7, 1976)

Carter's rhetoric is sincere but not stuffy; educated but not overly so; and better yet, it is smack full of human qualities, i.e., dedication, soberness, devotion to duty, honesty, modesty, and bravery.

The Political Style of the Manager

One very important element of the organizational style is the operational style or political mode of the president. Carter set himself up as being above politics. The "Decision-maker" is not tied to partisan interests, but he negotiates and compromises according to what he can realistically achieve for the good of the people. Compromise and negotiation is the heart of politics. But Carter treated these activities as if they were "unclean" or "dirty." Rather than use the political game to achieve his goals, Carter wanted to leave the game. This is the manner of the "Manager" role. The Manager believes in the rational actor concept of decision-making. The optimal solution is sought. There are no compromises, no partial solutions. The Manager does not negotiate, but rather he attempts to reduce subjectivity in the decision-making process. Carter's personality was viewed as being "stubborn and over-confident," and this stereotype is merely the negative description of the "Manager" orientation.

Carter's political history and style dictated a new dependency on

the vice president. For, Carter ran for the presidency as an external-party candidate; he did not have a political network supporting him. Time reported that "His lack of ties to Washington and the party establishment--qualities that helped raise him to the White House--carry potential dangers" (January 3, 1977, p. 22). "He does not really know the politicians whom he will need to run the country . . . " (Time, January 3, 1977, p. 22). For this reason, Vice President Mondale would enjoy an unprecedented political position in the new administration. Mondale was an old-time politician with contacts with the democratic machine. One Carter aide remarked that Mondale would be highly visible, for "After all, he's the only one who knows anything about the place" (Newsweek, November 29, 1976, p. 24).

A violation of type. Carter's "good ol' boy rehtoric" associated with the "Decision-maker" role was deceiving, for he operated as a "Manager." Carter gave the democratic leaders of Congress his personal bedside phone number and invited them to call and "chat" when they wanted to talk over their concerns with him (Newsweek, November 29, 1976, p. 23). Carter called Tip O'Neill on election night and told him:

I'm going to be President, you're going to be Speaker, and we're going to get along fine. (Newsweek, November 15, 1976, p. 23)

However, these folksy ways didn't explain the whole story. The collision of the good ol' boy rhetoric with managerial tactics often brought sparks to the transition process. These episodes placed unusual tensions between a president-elect and his own party. During his session with

the Democratic Leaders in Plains, Georgia, Carter threatened to go over their heads to the American people if the leaders didn't give him what he wanted (see p. 106). Carter also said he wanted Republican counsel as well as Democratic counsel, and the Democratic Leaders were insulted by the suggestion. Tip O'Neill was quick to respond when Carter began throwing his weight around. Tip O'Neill told the press:

I intend to see Congress remain a co-equal partner with the branch at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue. (Newsweek, December 20, 1976, p. 25)

Common sense and the Constitution demand that Pennsylvania Avenue remain a two-way street. (Time, January 17, 1977, p. 9)

News reporters and Washington politicians began talking about Carter's history with the Georgia Legislature (see p. 116). His stubborn, over-confident personality became the subject of news stories as well as political discussions. Carter sought the authority from Congress to reorganize the executive agencies through executive orders. Carter said that he was worried that the details would die in committee. The reaction of Jack Brooks, chairman of the House Government Operations Committee, was typical. Brooks warned Carter that: "Your proposals are not going to die in committee. This is not the Georgia Legislature" (Newsweek, January 24, 1977, p. 31).

Carter combined the rhetoric of the "Decision-maker" role with the rhetoric and actual behavior associated with the "Manager" role. This created some confusion among the Washington politicians and the news media. His "political savvy" received rather negative reviews from both these groups. A president can not be viewed on the one hand as a compassionate, negotiator and on the other hand as an objective, rational manager. Carter had made a violation of type (see pp. 27-30).

The Carter Transition's Organizational Style

A violation of type. Carter's political judgment may be seen in his anticipated relations with the other governmental actors. Pro-president-elect sources quoted in both newspapers and magazines stressed both the executive branch and the legislative branch. Forty-one percent of mentions discussed the president-elect's relationship with his Cabinet. Twenty-three percent of all the pro-president-elect mentions discussed Carter's concept of the Presidency. Sixteen percent of all mentions discussed Presidential-Congressional relations. Seven percent of all mentions discussed the vice president's role in the new administration, and 5 percent of all mentions discussed Carter's relationship with his staff. This emphasis on both the executive and legislative branch is typical of a president assuming the "Decision-maker" role, for the president works with all branches. He is not above any political actor, rather Carter assumed a prima inter pares approach associated with the Decision-maker role.

Carter's prima inter pares approach is obvious in both his anticipated relations with the Vice President as well as the Cabinet. Carter's relationship with Mondale was a rather unusual one. For, Carter "owed" Mondale and his ties to the old political pros that delivered the election to Carter. For that reason, observers maintained that Mondale would "win" a larger role for his vice presidency than had been expected in the past. Time magazine reported that: "After the results were in, some political analysts went so far as to speculate that Fritz Mondale

had been the difference between victory and defeat for the Carter ticket" (November 15, 1976, p. 35). Newsweek reports that:

Whatever Presidents may say to the contrary, Vice Presidents usually become silent partners shortly after Election Day. Against that tradition, Walter Mondale has some strong cards to play. Mondale's across-the-board popularity with Democratic voters was a distinct help to the ticket. . . . (November 15, 1976, p. 30)

Time concluded that: "Mondale, on the basis of his campaign showing, is in a strong position to hold Carter to a promise to give his Vice President consequential assignments" (November 15, 1976, p. 35).

This expectation on the part of the news media was heightened by Carter's public statements:

I expect him to play a larger role in the next Administration than any other previous Vice President has ever played. (The New York Times, November 5, 1976)

There's not doubt in my mind that Fritz Mondale will play a major role in governing. He'll be my chief staff person, and his office will be near mine in the White House. He ought to get the same CIA briefings, the same foreign affairs dispatches that I look at and he'll be a constant adviser to me and constant partner with me in making decisions. (Time, January 3, 1977, p. 23)

Mondale was expected to act as Carter's liaison man on Capitol Hill. Carter talked of making Mondale the ombudsman for state and local governments. Mondale, himself, was very interested in heading up a task force on organized crime. And he wanted to play an important role in Carter's plans for governmental reorganization, and health care and tax reform (see Newsweek, November 15, 1976, p. 30).

Carter's promises concerning Mondale's position in the White House were given heavy play by the newspapers and magazines. Carter said that Mondale would be working as an "equal partner" with him

(Newsweek, November 29, 1976, p. 24), and Carter promised to make Mondale "assistant President of the new Carter Administration" (Newsweek, January 3, 1977, p. 16). Carter told the media:

I look on Senator Mondale, who will be the next Vice President, as my top staff person.

He's my chief staff person. He'll be in the White House with me. . . . I've informed all the White House staff personally that he is their boss. (Newsweek, January 3, 1977, p. 16)

Although Carter made such public statements, Jody Powell rushed to assure the mass media that indeed "Mondale will not be chief of staff" (Newsweek, January 3, 1977, pp. 16-17). Powell suggested that Carter really hadn't meant what the press thought he had said. Insiders suggested that Mondale wouldn't be enjoying as much power as Carter had led the news media and public to believe. Newsweek suggested that a clue to all this might be found in the new administration's room assignments:

A point for President watchers: Vice President-elect Mondale, who had his choice of space, ceded the prestigious corner office once held by Spiro Agnew and Presidential Chiefs of Staff. It has gone to Hamilton Jordan. (January 17, 1977, p. 12)

Although Carter had "pledged to eliminate the powerful Chief of Staff position developed under Nixon and Ford, and to avoid the growth of a palace guard that can insulate a President from reality," the news media didn't seem to buy that story. Newsweek writes that:

After much jostling and bloodletting, he finally named his White House staff. The faces were mostly Georgian and wholly familiar from the campaign, and the pecking order was transparently plain through the office rhetoric about fifteen "coexisting" responsibility centers. (January 24, 1977, p. 21)

Newsweek maintained that Hamilton Jordan was operating as "de facto chief of staff," and for that reason, Jordan was "one of the most powerful men in America" (January 24, 1977, p. 23).

Carter received criticism because the press perceived Hamilton Jordan as the de facto Chief of Staff (The Washington Post, December 1, 1976). Jordan had led some intra-staff battles and had left quite a few "walking dead" (The Washington Post, December 1, 1976; see pp. 102-103). Political observers believe that when one staff member achieves dominance over the others, he develops his own power base, apart from the president. This is viewed as a constraint on presidential power (see Neustadt, 1980, p. 32). The question seemed to be asked, "If Carter can't manage his own staff, how can he manage the country?"

Carter's promise to cut back on the presidential staff positions was echoed by the new director of OMB, Bert Lance. Lance explained:

He doesn't believe its necessary to have large staffs. His ability to know things, to retain things, to study and do things, makes a difference in his ability to rely on fewer people and be able to make those decisions that have to be made himself. (Newsweek, December 20, 1976, p. 23)

However, the news media looked upon the small, closed circle from Georgia, and they saw "a Georgia mafia," and they saw an isolated president. The Carter camp was quick to protect their own. Greg Schneiders was accused of illegally taking unemployment compensation while he operated a private business. It was some time before Schneiders resigned, but after the investigation was over, Schneiders was cleared by the government in January, and he rejoined the Cater camp.

Carter's prima inter pares approach is also illustrated by his relations with his Cabinet. Carter told Time:

I'll use the Cabinet very aggressively. I don't intend to run the departments from the White House. I'm going to have a relatively small staff, and I'll trust my Cabinet members to manage their own departments. (January 3, 1977, p. 21)

Jody Powell explained the planned cabinet-system:

It looks more like a wheel, with Carter at the hub, the various departments as spokes and his personal staff around the rim, making contact with the entire circle and keeping people informed. (Time, January 3, 1977, p. 18)

The Carter Cabinet would work as a team. One aide said that, "Jimmy wants them to function as a cluster, and they will" (Time, January 17, 1977, p. 17).

Carter's stated "openness" to congressional power and decision-making illustrates his prima inter pares mode in the decision-maker role Carter told the news media that he thought it was "a bipartisan oversight that the Presidents have not been as deeply involved with the key leaders in Congress" (The New York Times, December 2, 1976). Carter considered opening up an office on Capitol Hill so that he could stay in touch with Congressional leaders (see Times, January 3, 1977, p. 22). Carter was particularly interested in involving the Congressional leaders in the foreign policy decision-making arena (see Newsweek, November 15, 1976, p. 33).

However, the relationship between Carter and his Democratic Congress was not all wine and roses. Carter's confrontations with the Democratic Leaders during the transition spelled trouble for the new administration (see pp. 106 and 127). The confrontations were the result of Carter's violation of type that concerns his political mode or operational style. Carter talked like a good ol' boy, but he most often acted as an uncompromising "Manager."

Carter's organizational style was a mix of the "Decision-maker" traits and the "Manager" traits. Carter used the common man's rhetoric associated with the "Decision-maker," and he emphasized both the executive and legislative branches in operational discussions. His rhetoric

suggested an "openness" to other political actors such as his vice president and the leaders of Congress. Yet, Carter again and again, placed himself "above politics" in his actions and some times in personal discussions with others. Carter seemed to discount the worth of compromise and negotiation (see p. 117). If you don't like what someone says, you don't work with them. You go around them. This is the key to Carter's troubles in political situations. Time and again, he angered Congressional leaders by his insensitivity to politics (see pp. 106 and 127). Carter seemed to seek only the optimal solution even when the optimal solution wasn't the possible solution. Although saying otherwise, Carter attempted to reduce the political role of others in the decision-making process. For this reason, Carter approximates the "Manager" in reality.

The cabinet selection process. Carter's political judgment was illuminated by his process of making political appointments. Carter made the final choices himself. This fact and his distance from much of the staff during the selection process gave him the aura of "The Leader" role. Time reported that:

He shared his thoughts with only a tight circle of advisers, notably Hamilton Jordan and Vice President-elect Walter Mondale. Not even his closest aides could be certain which way Carter would go in the end. (December 20, 1976, p. 8)

Newsweek included Carter's closes friend, Charles Kirbo, in that mystic inner-circle (December 20, 1976, p. 22).

Carter's coupling of "The Manager" role and "The Decision-maker" role is reflected in his own criteria for the selection of Cabinet Appointees. For, he said that they must show "management expertise and

compassion" (The Washington Post, November 7, 1976). Carter said that he was seeking a group of individuals who possessed "a common understanding of the nation's problems and possible solutions" (Newsweek, January 1, 1977, p. 57). Carter said he wanted "tough, competent managers" (Time, January 3, 1977, p. 40). The "accent was on experience" (Time, January 3, 1977, p. 40). Time correspondent Stanley Cloud did not think much of Carter's emphasis on experience. Cloud wrote:

It is ironic that Carter should have put such store in resumes, in records of past positions. His own résumé hardly qualifies him for President; indeed, it might not even qualify him for a job in his own Cabinet. Had he been less methodical and more instinctive in his appointments, his Cabinet might have seemed a little less safe--and a lot more exciting. (January 3, 1977, p. 40).

In short although Carter had promised new faces in his Cabinet, the faces were very familiar (see Newsweek, November 15, 1976, p. 34; Newsweek, November 29, 1976, pp. 23-25). Time magazine quipped that "the biggest of the 'surprises' so often forecast by the President-elect's aides was that there were so few surprises" (January 3, 1977, p. 40).

Time described Carter's Cabinet Appointments as being "recycled" politicians. The magazine quoted a Pentagon General who claimed that the new Carter Administration had "dusted off a lot of guys from the JFK-LBJ era and put them back in power, trying to pretend they had flawless performance records. They didn't" (Time, January 3, 1977, p. 40). Hugh Sidey of Time said that the new Cabinet gave him flashes of déjà vu. According to Sidey, the names of men like Sorensen, Vance, Brezinski, Brown, Harris, Califano, and Blumenthal were names that were from the past. Sidey asked this question of the nation:

Can the brain of Carter change the condition and function of the middle-aged limbs and trunk of this Government, so conventional and familiar. (Time, January 17, 1977, p. 13)

Carter had a difficult time forming his Cabinet for a number of reasons. First, he had difficulty following his own Code of Ethics for Cabinet Selection. Secondly, Carter received a great deal of pressure from interest groups which often had contradicting interests. Thirdly, a lot of the "fresh faces" that Carter desired for his Cabinet simply did not want the job.

Carter established three rules for his Cabinet appointees to meet:

1. Disclose all assets, liabilities and income sources in 1975, plus those of their spouses and minor children.
2. Sell or place in blind trusts all investments that might involve them in conflicts of interest.
3. Promise that for two years after they leave office, they will not take private jobs that involve contacts with federal agencies or officials on matters that were part of their Government responsibilities. . . . (Time, January 17, 1977, p. 13)

It was difficult to find men and women that could meet these requirements. Thus, Carter was experiencing "a bit of embarrassment, difficulty and delay in fashioning a Cabinet" (Newsweek, December 27, 1976, p. 12). In addition, Carter was "caught in a growing tangle of public controversy and private pressure from key elements within the Democratic Party" (Newsweek, December 27, 1976, p. 12). According to Newsweek, Carter owed "a whole packet of I.O.U.'s to labor, the party regulars, the big cities, and the blacks" (November 22, 1976, p. 24), and these groups were beginning to call in the I.O.U.'s. William Safire said that interest groups were the key to the Carter-cabinet-making. In a column in The New York Times, Safire described the Carter-cabinet-making-process:

Never before have we had the tie-salesman approach to Cabinet-making. Balancing a Cabinet ideologically, geographically, ethnically, racially, and sexually is traditional and makes political sense, but the decisions have heretofore been presented as a fait accompli. For the first time a President is publicly negotiating with special-interests beforehand to work out a Cabinet acceptable to all. (December 20, 1976)

Time concluded that: "The final lineup was the result of tough infighting among competing interests, and fancy--even tricky--manuvering on Carter's part" (January 3, 1977, p. 40).

The new faces were hard to find for the Carter transition team. Three prominent black leaders and one woman turned down invitations to join the Cabinet. If experience is one's main concern, it is difficult if not next to impossible to find experienced people who also have new faces.

The coverage of the selection process gave the impression of a frenetic if not frantic process. Time reports that Carter was aware that his cabinet-selection process was getting the reputation of being expedient. The magazine reports:

Aware that the talent hunt is beginning to resemble David O'Selznick's search for a Scarlett O'Hara, Carter said, "I'll be a little slow and a little more methodical about the selection of Cabinet members than has been the case in the past." (Time, December 6, 1976, pp. 19-20)

Cabinet controversies. The Carter appointment process had at least five rather messy episodes that need to be addressed here. The first and perhaps the most obvious incident had to do with Harold Brown and James Schlesinger and the role of interest groups in the selection process. Both Brown and Schlesinger were being considered for Secretary of Defense. Harold Brown supported detente, and for that reason, Brown

was labeled a "dove." On the other hand, James Schlesinger distrusted detente, and for that reason, he was labeled a "hawk." Brown was skeptical of high-priced weapon systems, and he favored the concept of rough equivalence. Schlesinger favored more expensive nuclear systems, and he argued for the use of strategic limited nuclear war (see Newsweek, December 27, 1976, p. 22). For many politicians and news personnel, Schlesinger was the "symbol of the hard liners in the United States who were opposed to detente and a strategic arms agreement" (The New York Times, December 14, 1976). The liberal wing of the Democratic party was very much against Schlesinger being appointed as Secretary of Defense (The New York Times, December 14, 1976). "The possible appointment of Mr. Schlesinger has provided Mr. Carter with a lesson in the back-biting political ways of Washington and the symbolism of international diplomacy" (The New York Times, December 14, 1976). However, Harold Brown was not without his enemies also. Organized Labor lobbied long and hard against the appointment of "dovish Dr. Harold Brown as Secretary of Defense" (The New York Times, December 20, 1976). The pressures that organized labor was placing on the Carter personnel selection team were a steady topic for journalists during December. However, Carter chose to deny that labor was pressuring him to appoint Schlesinger rather than Brown. Carter remarked to the press:

It's been a little bit disconcerting to notice that some of the reports in the press have been absolutely and totally inaccurate. (The New York Times, December 20, 1976)

I have never had a single person either with me or on the telephone ask me not to appoint Dr. Harold Brown for Secretary of Defense. (Time, December 27, 1976, p. 7)

William Safire of The New York Times was indignant over the Carter denial of pressure from organized labor. Safire wrote:

As it turned out, it was Mr. Carter, and not the press coverage, that was misleading. Lobbying by organized labor . . . has been widespread and aboveboard.

Mr. Carter, however, chooses to define "pressure" in the most narrow terms; in his mind, he has not been pressured by organized labor unless George Meany has personally threatened to grind out his glowing cigar in the President-elect's palm. (The New York Times, December 20, 1976)

In the long run, Carter arrived at a solution to please all concerned.

Brown became Secretary of Defense, and Schlesinger was made the head of the new Department of Energy.

The new department would combine the Federal Energy Administration, the nuclear-oriented Energy Research and Development Administration and the Energy Resources Council, along with elements of the Interior Department. (Newsweek, January 24, 1977, p. 30).

Schlesinger's expertise in nuclear science would not be wasted.

In another area, once the appointments were made for Ambassador to the United Nations, Secretary of State, and National Security Adviser, speculation began concerning the personalities of the three men and their potential working relationships with each other. The New York Times was of the opinion that National Security Adviser Abigniew Brezezinski would "overshadow both Defense Secretary Brown and Secretary of State Vance" (January 16, 1977). The newspaper predicted that Cyrus Vance (Secretary of State) and Abigniew Brezezinski (National Security Adviser) would not get along and that there would be trouble on the foreign policy team (The New York Times, January 16, 1977). Newsweek reported that Brezezinski and Andrew Young, the United Nations Ambassador, had already had a falling out over the United States' South African

policy (January 24, 1977, p. 14). The speculation over possible conflicts continued.

Perhaps the most controversial nomination was that of Griffin Bell for Attorney General (The New York Times, December 20, 1976). "Carter said repeatedly during his campaign that the Attorney General should not be appointed for political reasons. Bell is a lifelong friend of Carter's and is a law partner of one of Carter's closest advisers, Charles Kirbo . . . " (Newsweek, December 27, 1976, p. 22). The Wall Street Journal called the appointment "all too reminiscent of the Kennedy-Nixon tradition of choosing an Attorney General" (quoted in Time, January 3, 1977, p. 41). Time reported that "Carter has reverted to the more traditional practice of choosing as Attorney General a man who may be counted upon not to take policy stands in opposition to his boss" (December 27, 1976, p. 15). But, it was not only Bell's close friendship with Carter that brought national attention. Bell's record on the court was moderate in terms of civil rights. Bell himself belonged to three exclusive clubs (literally), the Ogelthrope Club, the Capital City Club, and Piedmont Driving Club. At first Bell, refused to withdraw from the memberships of these clubs. The objections to Bell's record and his behavior were loud and angry. Newsweek reports that "Objections to Bell were predictable and profuse, from organized blacks, liberals, and feminists" (January 24, 1977, p. 20). James Reston of The New York Times said that Bell was "insensitive, willful, stubborn, and even selfish" (quoted in Time, January 3, 1977, p. 41). And, part of the story was Jimmy Carter himself. Carter's defense of Bell seemed insensitive to many politicians and news personnel. Carter said:

Almost every person in the past has belonged to some kind of Club that doesn't have both women and blacks or Christians or Catholics or Protestants. (The New York Times, December 23, 1976)

The media's conclusion that Carter had shown a stubborn streak of insensitivity over the Bell nomination was only strengthened by a series of controversies concerning Black Americans. Carter had promised that he would recruit several blacks for Cabinet positions. However, he ran into difficulty persuading them to come aboard. Three blacks and one woman turned his offers down. Carter told the news media that it was difficult to find qualified blacks and women for the Cabinet. This started quite an uproar among black and feminist groups (see Newsweek, January 3, 1977, p. 57). However, David Rosenbaum of The New York Times appreciated the efforts that Carter had made.

Rosenbaum writes:

It is difficult to compare Mr. Carter's problems with those of his predecessors because no other President-elect has ever made such a concerted effort to place blacks in his Cabinet. Nor did any of his predecessors have such an open selection process. (The New York Times, December 17, 1976)

However, another problem occurred that touched Carter personally. His Southern Baptist Church in Plains, Georgia, would not allow blacks to worship there. Carter "had fought segregation within the congregation, but he was reluctant to quit the church in which he had worshiped all his life" (Time, November 22, 1976, p. 22). The news media attended closed conferences of the church's elders, and the language was colorful and reminiscent of an older time in American history. One particular statement by a female in the meetings gave way to another mini-controversy. A lady asked the elders, "I'm only a woman, but can I

speak?" (The New York Times, November 5, 1976). This statement brought it to the nation's attention that women were not allowed to speak in Carter's church. Carter's response to the uproar over the church's practices left many in the media unsatisfied:

I can't resign from the human race because there's discrimination, and I don't intend to resign from my own church because there's discrimination. (Time, November 22, 1976, p. 22)

In another area, Carter created a long-lasting controversy by nominating Theodore Sorensen as Director of the C.I.A. Sorensen had no experience in this area, but Time reported that the Sorensen appointment was a way in which Carter was paying his respects to "the still important Kennedy wing of the Democratic Party" (January 3, 1977, p. 45). The appointment caused "cries of anguish in the intelligence community," for Sorensen supported the concept of a "moral" C.I.A. (see Time, January 3, 1977, p. 45; The New York Times, January 19, 1977). In addition to these general problems with the appointment, Sorensen faced some very specific charges of improper conduct. After leaving office after the Kennedy years, Sorensen "packed off classified documents and used them in writing a book" (Newsweek, January 24, 1977, p. 20). The New York Times was led to ask, "Why did they pick him in the first place--stupid choice" (January 19, 1977). Eventually, Theodore Sorensen withdrew his name from nomination to the Directorship of the C.I.A. This was done, because the Senate would have failed to confirm. This incident was used by reporters to suggest that Carter was lacking in political acumen. One reporter wrote, that "Perhaps the most revealing aspect of the entire tale was Carter's inability to

convince at least four Senators of his own party to give him and Sorenson the benefit of the doubt" (The Washington Post, January 18, 1977). The same reporter predicted, "This could be an omen of the political realities in the first months of the Carter administration" (The Washington Post, January 18, 1977).

Media Evaluations of the Cabinet-Selection Process

In general, the Cabinet nomination process received rather negative reviews. The selection of Cabinet members by the criteria of "management expertise and compassion" did not impress the writers of The Washington Post. Stories began to center on their dismay of Carter's lack of political acumen. Reporters were concerned that many Cabinet appointees did not have an independent power base separate from Carter's belief in them. The New York Times regarded the Cabinet as a "team" Cabinet; there would be no stars on the Carter team. James Reston wrote that:

Mr. Carter's Cabinet is an important symbol. Not a Kissinger or a Simon--no lone rangers like Kissinger at State or economic theologians like Simon at Treasury--not a boat-rocker in the crowd. Mr. Carter had been very insistent on this point; he hasn't told the country yet where he's going, but he has decided very carefully who is going with him, and has insisted that they all go together. (The New York Times, January 16, 1977)

Time for the most part, pictured the Cabinet as "has-beens," "recycled" politicians, and "retreads" (see p. 135). But, the magazine concluded that:

On balance, despite liberal carping Carter has picked a clearly competent Cabinet, with some appointments smacking of cronyism (Bell, Budget-Director-designate Bert Lance), others showing imagination and bringing in some fascinating personalities (Brown, Schlesinger, Blumenthal). As usual,

much will depend on the kind of leadership the President provides, the tone he sets, the policies he establishes. (January 3, 1977, p. 40)

Newsweek depicted the new Carter Cabinet as "comfortable." The magazine reports that in the end:

Carter had done what most Presidents do--settled on the people whom he felt comfortable with, who satisfied the party's major political constituencies, and who had the managerial or political experience required of Cabinet officers. In the end, the most important "fresh face" in the crowd was still that of Jimmy Carter himself. (January 3, 1977, p. 57)

The Carter Transition's Policy Priorities

Domestic policy. Carter's issue agenda emphasized domestic or economic policy. When Carter was elected, the business community was greatly concerned for they feared his populist rhetoric. This "lingering uncertainty about the new Administration's attitudes toward business and economic policy added to pressures on Carter to move swiftly in lining up his full economic team" (Time, December 13, 1976, p. 13). The future Director of OMB, Bert Lance, said that: "It's awfully important that (Carter) show people early on that he can deal with the economy in a positive manner. The confidence factor is the biggest thing" (Time, December 6, 1976, p. 20).

Carter attempted to reassure the business community by making moderate appointments to his economic team. One of his economic advisers, Lawrence Klein, wrote that "Carter is not going to be a bull in the economic china shop. He is a moderate and he knows basic economic values" (Newsweek, November 22, 1976, p. 29). "I know the financial markets will be reassured once they see Carter's appointees" (Newsweek,

November 22, 1976, p. 29). With the appointment of Bert Lance as the OMB Director, Newsweek concluded that:

Carter planned to take a moderate approach to the nation's economic problems. Lance is a fiscal conservative who believes in a balanced budget and is wary of large government spending programs. (December 6, 1976, p. 22)

Similarly the new Secretary of the Treasury Michael Blumenthal said of himself:

I am conservative and realistic when it comes to economic management. . . . I understand the free-market economy. . . . I am dedicated to free enterprise and acutely aware of the role of profits. But I also know and understand the importance of finding ways for labor and management, blacks and whites, women and men to work together. (Newsweek, December 27, 1976, pp. 15-16)

As stated previously, Carter portrayed himself as a combination of the "Manager" and "Decision-maker" roles (see pp. 124-126). He attempted to present a persona of himself as the efficient, rational "Manager" tempered by the qualities of "The Decision-maker" (see p. 26). When the pro-president-elect mentions concerning role traits are combined for The Washington Post, The New York Times, Newsweek, and Time, it was found that 38 percent of all pro-mentions were related to the "Decision-maker" role; that 29 percent of all pro-mentions were related to the "Manager" role; that 27 percent of all pro-mentions were related to the "Leader" role. Carter's good ol' boy rhetoric established a strong showing for the Decision-maker traits. And his discussions of morality and America's place in the world showed up as the visionary trait under the leadership role. Carter's attempt to combine several aspects of the leader, the decision-maker, and the manager proved dangerous to his presidency. Carter by combining The Manager role with

The Decision-Maker role in order to create his unique leadership style, created a type violation that proved to be characteristic of his presidency (see pp. 126-128). Carter's central role as "The Manager" is violated by "The Decision-Maker's" human qualities of compassion, empathy, and flexibility. A president can not be a "rational decision-maker" and yet be the guy next door, soft-hearted, and kind. The president can not say that politics is a dirty business, but yet be placed in a position that he is involved in politics in a very open manner. The president can not show decision-maker traits but yet refuse to compromise and negotiate. Newsweek concluded that Carter had:

Signaled, by his choices and his manner of making, the kind of government he proposed to lead northward from Georgia to Washington next Jan. 20--a safe-and-sane technocracy with button-downs under its denims and moderation on its mind. (December 13, 1976, p. 20)

According to economic adviser Klein, "There will be no majestic 100 days of dynamite because the nation's finances and economic condition simply cannot provide for it" (Newsweek, November 22, 1976, pp. 27-29). The presidential pollster Pat Caddell explained: "This is a fragile process we're in, rather than some bold undertaking. Things have to be done in steps because the country is not going to give much credence to any large-scale sweeping changes" (Newsweek, January 24, 1977, p. 19). Carter told the press: "I don't intend to get in trouble, and certainly not by trying to do too much too soon" (Newsweek, January 3, 1977, p. 15).

The result of Carter's show of moderation was a good one. Newsweek reported that: "The show of caution has brought Carter time and favor with corporate America, which had hitherto looked on his coming

with something like the fondness Rome felt for the Visigoths" (Newsweek, January 24, 1977, p. 19).

Although, the news media and Washington politicians seemed relieved over Carter's new found moderation, there was still a concern that Carter didn't have a handle on "economic" policy or foreign policy. Carter's zero-base budgeting scheme brought cries of dismay from the media and fellow Democrats (The Washington Post, December 1, 1976). Carter's stand on human rights--his desire to promote "fundamental human values abroad"--brought cries of anguish from the international arena (The Washington Post, January 12, 1977). Carter was accused by some of not "grasping" the realities of foreign affairs (The Washington Post, November 25, 1976). Thus in both the domestic and international fronts, his management-decision-making skills were called into question.

During the first days of the transition, Carter's staff presented him with an "official promises book"--110 pages--containing every Carter promise during the campaign (Newsweek, January 24, 1977, p. 19). Carter promised that the goals of his administration would be achieved by combining the efforts of the American people, the Congress and the Executive Administration (The New York Times, November 5, 1976).

The chief issues adviser during the campaign, Stu Eizenstate, said that:

The economy is far and away the No. 1 priority. Unless the economic house can be put back in order, many of the programs we have announced we favor will be deferred--or at best, cut back. (Newsweek, November 22, 1976, p. 27)

According to Newsweek, the two top issues were inflation and unemployment (November 15, 1976, p. 2). Carter said that would tackle the jobs

problem first (The New York Times, December 11, 1976). But the Carter economic team was not certain where to begin. The Congress was pushing for more spending programs, and Carter was unsure of the course of pursue. The New York Times said that the Carter team vacillated "from advocacy of spending programs to advocacy of tax reduction and back again" (December 29, 1976). Finally, the Democratic Leaders and Carter agreed on a \$30 billion, "two-year 'stimulative package' of tax cuts and rebates and government spending to create work for the unemployed" (Newsweek, January 17, 1977, p. 12&. Newsweek reported that:

At first glance, it seemed to contain something for everyone--a multibillion dollar public-jobs program to slash unemployment, hefty tax cuts to pump money back into a sputtering economy, even a preliminary pass at tax reform designed to make filing easier for most Americans. (January 17, 1977, p. 59)

"To pay for all this, the fiscal 1977 Federal deficit would be the biggest in history--between \$72 billion and \$76 billion" (Newsweek, January 17, 1977, p. 59).

Carter stressed his plans for government reorganization, national health insurance, and a national energy policy. He also stressed that the federal government would be playing an increasing role in the American welfare system. Carter wished to eliminate local and state contributions to the system (see Newsweek, January 24, 1977, p. 34). Carter also stressed the need for conservation in the United States. In one speech, Carter said that if there came a time when the conservation needs of the country came against the energy independence goal that he had set for the country, that he would "go for beauty, clean air, water and landscape" (Time, January 3, 1977, p. 21).

Foreign policy. In the area of foreign policy, Carter wished to move swiftly. One aide said that Carter wished "to signal to the world there's been a changing of the guard" (Newsweek, November 15, 1976, p. 26). Carter said that he wanted to open up the foreign-policy-making decision process "to the Congress and to the American people and then to deal with these problems in an open fashion so the American people would understand them" (The New York Times, November 5, 1976). Just as there had been concern about Carter's economic policy by the business community, there had also been concern over Carter's human rights policy by the international community. In this area too, Carter moved towards moderation. Time reported that the new Secretary of State Cyrus Vance had a more moderate view of human rights. According to the magazine, Vance showed:

A deep concern for human rights in his conduct of foreign policy, but he pointed out that "one has to deal also with the practicalities of the situation"---a reassuring note to many U.S. allies who feared that the Carter Administration might be too concerned with morality in the world where raw power is still the main arbiter in international affairs. (Time, December 13, 1976, p. 13)

In summary, Carter emphasized domestic policy over foreign policy. In both areas, he attempted to pursue a course of moderation.

Conclusions

As stated previously, Carter portrayed himself as a combination of the "Manager" and "Decision-maker" roles (see pp. 124-126; 145). He attempted to present a persona of himself as the efficient, rational "Manager" tempered by the qualities of "The Decision-maker" (see p. 26). When the pro-president-elect mentions concerning role traits are

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Carter's attempt to combine several aspects of the leader, the decision-maker, and the manager proved dangerous to his presidency. Carter by combining The Manager role with The Decision-maker role in order to create his unique leadership style, created a type violation that proved to be characteristic of his presidency (see pp. 126-128). Carter's central role as "The Manager" is violated by "The Decision-maker's" human qualities of compassion, empathy, and flexibility. A president can not be a "rational decision-maker" and yet be the guy next door, soft-hearted, and kind. The president can not say that politics is a dirty business, but yet be placed in a position that he is involved in politics in a very open manner. The president can not show decision-maker traits but yet refuse to compromise and negotiate.

By creating the violation of type, Carter created a type of role confusion. When this happens, the definition of the situation is in a sense given over to the mass media, for it is their job "to name" the political realities of our time. However, the job of labeling or stereotyping Carter was not an easy one. When all the media mentions concerning role traits for The Washington Post, The New York Times,

Newsweek, and Time are combined, it was found that 37 percent of the media-mentions were related to the Manager role; that 32 percent of the media-mentions were related to the Decision-maker role; that 18 percent of the media-mentions were related to the Leader role; and, that 12 percent of the media-mentions were related to the Partisan role. The news media saw Carter as primarily a Manager and then a Decision-maker. In addition, the media saw Carter as being much more partisan than did the pro-president-elect sources.

Carter's decision-maker rhetoric is in sharp contrast to the media's portrayal of Carter's operational mode and organizational style. The Washington Post described Carter as "a strong manager, a planner and an administrator" (November 7, 1976). Time reported that Carter was using a "management-science approach" to the presidency (January 3, 1977, p. 18). Newsweek said that "the Carter Administration had more the aura of a corporate board than of a government bursting to be born. Its tone was cautious, its vision was hedged around by balance sheets" (January 3, 1977, p. 14). Time reported that Carter was "an efficiency expert who values long-range planing and prides himself on his managerial ability" (January 3, 1977, p. 17). Carter's personal habits were also judged as "managerial" in nature. One aide joked: "Carter's doing just about everything. Maybe we should give back the \$2 million transition money to the Government" (Time, December 20, 1976, p. 8). Carter was said to have "relentlessly meticulous habit of work" (Newsweek, December 13, 1976, p. 21). A reporter from The Washington Post wrote that Carter was "the most persistent and formidable man in terms of his commitment to goals and in the achievement

of those goals that" he had ever known (November 7, 1976). Another reporter wrote, "Jimmy Carter's outstanding attribute is as a tough, plan-oriented and goal oriented executive, personally fascinated by detailed questions of governmental management" (The Washington Post, January 18, 1977). Although many of Carter's managerial skills were given heavy play by the newspapers and magazines, his image problem persisted and even intensified. Carter's violation of type that occurred because of an improper mixing of the Decision-maker and Manager role traits continued to be a problem. Even members of Carter's team shared this violation of type. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown said of himself:

I have tried to retain a rational and analytical approach to things. That does not preclude full consideration of the nonquantifiable--the human, individual and political aspects of any problem. (Time, January 3, 1977, p. 42)

Thus, the national print media found it very difficult to "type" Carter. In order to understand the difficulty the news media experienced in "typing" Carter, it is useful to look at what "pro-president-elect mentions" that the newspapers and magazines decided to quote. There was very little consistency in the choices of quotes from pro-president-elect sources. Therefore, there was a great deal of diversity in the portrayal of Jimmy Carter--the presidential figure. However, the newspapers and magazines were somewhat consistent between what they chose to quote from pro-president-elect sources and what they themselves report (see Appendix 6, page). However, this similarity is less than the similarities that existed during the Nixon or Reagan transitions. Looking across all four media samples, it is clear that there was a confusion of role traits being discussed.

In recapitulation, Carter's persona during the transition period suffered from a violation of type. He tried to wed two incompatible leadership traits together. The Manager can not exhibit the "milk of human kindness" present in the Decision-maker role. His central role, The Manager, was weakened by repeated Management mistakes (Jordan's intra-staff battles, Cabinet Appointees, etc.), so that by the end of the transition period, the very skills central to his persona were under heavy clouds.

During the 1976-77 transition, the Carter persona that emerged was one of complexity and incoherency. He presented a persona of contradictions. By attempting to combine the common man, good ol' boy Decision-maker with the Rational Manager, Carter created a nebulous persona. The reporters could not stereotype the administration according to leadership style, because he presented contradictory ones (see pp. 126-133). Although the press, wrote of the various leadership roles Carter played, no clear picture was presented. The Manager role was emphasized more than the Decision-maker role; however, the reporters created stereotypes based not on positive leadership traits but rather on negative traits of Carter, the politician. His lack of political acumen, his country ways, his overlapping promises, his double-talk, and his conflicting personalities became the dominant themes of the transition coverage. The press seemed to ask "if he is a manager, why can't he seem to manage?" Thus Carter had failed to "define the situation" and had lost control over his own political persona. Similarly, Neustadt gives the Carter transition a rather poor rating; he writes,

that "Too many transitions like Carter's, too often, might indeed make the Presidency impossible" (1980, p. 216).

In short, the president-elect must protect his public character by being aware of his persona and managing its depiction. He must try to avoid errors in depicting his persona, consciously and intelligently. For on this, depends his success in the drama called politics.

CHAPTER VII

THE REAGAN TRANSITION

The Political Environment

As stated previously, Stephen Wayne (1982b) has identified three types of environmental factors that influence a president's performance in office: the national (or economic) environment; the international environment; and the President himself (his background, his political history).

The transition of 1980-81 was faced with a rather grim state of affairs on the domestic side. The new president was faced with runaway inflation, his unemployment, a huge federal deficit, and increasing civil tension in the urban centers. John Lennon's death brought home to America the increasingly violent nature of her people. The future was viewed with uncertainty.

And if the economic picture was bleak, the foreign picture was worse. The United States was still struggling with the "hostage crisis" in Iran. The American people felt that the U.S. had "lost face," and middle America became more vocal about America's foreign policy moves. El Salvador beckoned from the South, and the civil war there caused anxious moments on the part of American leaders. The Polish situation had reached a critical point, and it looked as if the U.S.S.R. might invade Poland to crush the trade unions there. Many reporters believed that the United States had reached a critical point in her history of involvement with other countries around the world.

In short, in many ways the United States was surrounded by mini-crises of one nature or another. The tone of national and international coverage was negative. The United States was often pictured as a "powerless giant," and sometimes a "hopeless giant."

Ronald Reagan came to the White House with the executive experience of being the Governor of California. He came to the White House on the shoulders of the New Right. It had taken several presidential elections before Reagan had found "his time." Reagan was an old political pro; and, he had strong affiliations with the conservative wing of the Republican Party. He was regarded as an "insider" even though he had campaigned against the status quo. He rode to the White House on a tide of reform promises.

The Transition: Preparation, Organization, and Management

Like Nixon and Carter before him, Reagan too had planned for the transition before election day. But the Reagan pre-election transition planning was a rather secretive affair (Hess, 1980, F-5). Edwin Meese III was the transition director. Meese hired E. Pendleton James as the "Cabinet Headhunter" more than one year before the election (see Newsweek, December 24, 1980, p. 41). According to The Washington Post, James "fits corporate managers into proper niches, is non-political and non-ideological" (December 31, 1980). James turned over his lists to Reagan's personal attorney, William French Smith, who headed an "18-member-Los Angeles-Appointments-Committee" (Newsweek, December 24, 1980, p. 41). Meese also hired Deputy Transition Director William J. Timmons who divided the government in five issue clusters for study. Timmons

would oversee the actual transfer of power (Newsweek, December 24, 1980, p. 42). After election day, William Casey (the campaign director) became the chairman of the transition team, and Anne Armstrong became the vice chairman of the transition team. They headed 50 separate task forces and hired over 400 specialists to aid them in their job.

The Reagan transition team set up some interesting innovations in the transfer of power process. The team developed a bipartisan interim foreign policy board to study foreign policy problems and to advise the new president on such matters. The members of the interim foreign policy board included: Henry Jackson, Richard Stone, Edward Williams, Gerald Ford, John Tower, Henry Kissinger, Alexander Haig, William Clements, Casper Weinberger, Eugene Rostow, Donald Rumsfeld, George Shultz, Jeane Kirkpatrick, John McCloy, Anne Armstrong, and Richard Allen (The New York Times, November 7, 1980). In addition to the interim foreign policy board, the Reagan team started a "policy executive seminar" that would train the future leaders in government. One Reagan aide said it was "a kind of introduction to government, but things have changed so much that even those who served in previous administrations need to be brought up to date" (The Washington Post, December 28, 1980).

Congress had appropriated two million dollars for the use of the new president-elect for his transition period. However, the transition team had over spent that sum by at least one-half million dollars, so the transition team had to scrape up the money from left over campaign funds. One Reagan aide joked: "It's like a minister going to Las Vegas. To fight sin, you've got to know it" (Newsweek, December 22, 1980, p. 14).

Negative Transition Images

The "bloated" transition. But the newspapers and magazines didn't find the situation humorous. The Washington Post called the transition a "big bloated transition" (December 19, 1980) and "a bloated bureaucracy" (December 16, 1980). Newsweek said that the Reagan transition represented an "'overcooked' approach to public management" (December 29, 1980, p. 19). And that it "seems dangerously vulnerable to the disease it hopes most to cure: bureaucratic bloat" (December 29, 1980, p. 18). Even the Republicans were embarrassed by the "bloat." One Republican Congressman said: "This government is supposed to be lean and trim, but this transition looks like something created by HEW" (Newsweek, December 29, 1980, p. 18). Newsweek reported that "The Reagan transition, in fact, is both behind schedule and over its budget--the hallmark shortcomings of the government it aims to reform" (December 29, 1980, p. 18). The magazine concluded that "The message for Ronald Reagan was that his overture had gone flat and the question for the nation was whether that discordant beginning would sour his Administration-to-be" (December 29, 1980, p. 19).

The slow pace of Reagan's Cabinet-Making was only part of the trouble his transition faced. Overstaffed and over its budget, the transition team has become a parody of Reagan's promise of efficient government, and Washington veterans are wondering whether the chaotic operation may foreshadow the Administration to come. (Newsweek, December 29, 1980, p. 10)

The "rich" administration. The Inauguration of Ronald Reagan was significant in its departure from its immediate past, the Carter "people's inaugural." It is said that "The Inauguration of a new

President is the central sacrament of American democracy--a time of rekindled hope and rising expectations" (Newsweek, January 26, 1981, p. 35). And it was in this light, that the Reagan team approached their Inaugural--"A New Beginning." In a time of great economic difficulty, over eight million dollars was spent on the inaugural celebration. A lavish inaugural was used in the hopes that it would restore confidence to America.

The "wealthy" image of the new Reagan administration received particularly severe criticism from Newsweek. Newsweek said that Reagan came from "well-heeled California" (November 17, 1980, p. 30). For the Inaugural Celebration, Washington could expect "a crush of Reagan's wealthy California friends" (Newsweek, January 26, 1981, p. 30). George Will threw a dinner party for the Reagans at a "tony F Street Club" (Newsweek, December 1, 1980, p. 32). The transition tempo was just one big "glittering cocktail party" (Newsweek, December 16, 1980, p. 26). The Cabinet was announced in a "gilded Washington hotel ballroom" (Newsweek, December 22, 1980, p. 12). The Reagan's attended "beautifully peopled dinner parties" (Newsweek, December 22, 1980, p. 14). The inaugural was described as a "Hollywood-comes-to-Washington-gala" (Newsweek, January 12, 1981, p. 29). Inaugural co-chairman Charles Zwick said the festivities were a return to "this country's basic values," but Newsweek was quick to remind him that the price tag was well over twice the Carter Inaugural (see Newsweek, January 12, 1981, p. 29). One Reaganite remarked that "Class has returned to Washington," but Newsweek responded with "If class is coming to Washington, the postmark is unmistakably Hollywood" (January 12, 1981, p. 29). Obviously

for Newsweek, the Reagan administration and the inaugural celebration itself would be a rather gaudy affair. The New York Times was much more subtle. The newspaper interviewed a friend of Reagan's in California, and this passage was the result:

"This sure ain't Plains, Georgia," he said, sipping a Courvoisier on the rocks. (The New York Times, December 26, 1980)

In addition to being offended by the money of the new administration, Newsweek was offended by the entertainment-guest list for the inaugural. The magazine rehashed old rumors of Frank Sinatra's ties to the Mafia. The magazine presented no new evidence but came up with this judgment:

No laws are being violated, except the ambiguous ones of taste and propriety. (Newsweek, January 19, 1981, p. 20)

The magazine interviewed William French Smith concerning these allegations, and the result is this passage. Smith was

"totally unaware" of Sinatra's reputation for befriending criminals--a striking admission from a man about to become Attorney General. (Newsweek, January 19, 1981, p. 20)

But, Sinatra wasn't the only Reagan link with organized crime according to Newsweek. An Ohio Teamster, Jackie Presser, had been appointed as a senior adviser in economic affairs for the transition group. Presser had been the subject of several government investigations for allegedly mismanaging union benefit funds; however, he had never been indicted. Newsweek termed Presser a "political embarrassment" for the new administration. And the magazine concluded that this was "further indication that the transition process, intended to smooth the passage of government from one administration to another, has become yet another source of political patronage" (Newsweek, December 29, 1980, p. 19).

On the whole, the Reagan transition was pictured as a rather bloated operation. However, it was Newsweek that provided the darkest picture.

The 1980-81 Transition in Perspective

The 1980-81 transition was a party-overtake transition. For this reason, it was expected by most political watchers to be a rather conflictual period. In addition, Reagan had unseated a sitting president, and this added to the tension. However, the Republicans did capture the majority position in the Senate, and this was thought to help the Reagan team in making the transition. Reagan would not, unlike Richard Nixon, be facing two houses of Congress both controlled by the opposition. Rather, his party would have control over the upper house of the U.S. legislature.

However, in many ways, veteran political observers were wrong. The Senate was controlled by the Republican party, but a large number of those Senators felt that the time had come for them also, and they were ready to make their move. The Republican leaders of the Senate told Reagan that they expected to be consulted on Cabinet appointments (The New York Times, November 20, 1980). Senator Bob Dole and Senator Strom Thurmond were said to be "striking out on positions on their own," and in some instances, the two were taking the initiative or even in some cases, opposing the promises of the Reagan campaign (see The New York Times, November 7, 1980). The far right in the Senate were "setting their priorities and carrying out the conservative mandate they feel they have received from the American electorate" (The New York Times, November 7, 1980). And, it was not just the Senate leaders

that Reagan had to worry about. In the House of Representatives, the Reagan camp feared Illinois Republican Representative Philip Crane. Newsweek reported that the Reagan camp now regarded "Crane as a hostile outsider and expect him to battle the Administration as a point man for the radical right" (January 5, 1981, p. 11). Thus, Reagan--the right-wing campaigner--soon-to-be-moderate-president--had to worry about his right flank. Time concludes that "a Republican 97th Senate could prove to be just as balky as its predecessor" (Time, November 17, 1980, p. 55).

Transition Coverage

The incumbent. The transition coverage of Jimmy Carter was very negative. Although The Washington Post did suggest that Carter should be commended for his work on human rights, nuclear disarmament, and conservation (January 15, 1981), the newspaper in general had a very dim view of the Carter presidency. In discussing Carter's foreign policies, The Washington Post quoted a democratic professor and soon-to-be U.N. Ambassador Jean Kirkpatrick:

The Carter administration has given us a brand of McGovernism without McGovern that is, at best, only slightly less objectionable than the authentic, original product. (November 7, 1980)

The newspaper quoted one Republican as saying: "The presidency of Jimmy Carter has been one enormous mistake" (November 7, 1980). David Broder suggested that Carter was in some ways a horrible mistake that couldn't possible happen again. Broder writes:

It is impossible to imagine a man like Jimmy Carter being nominated and elected president in any other year of our

history. Had the civil rights revolution not enfranchised southern blacks, he would not have won. Had the old leaders and leadership-recruitment systems of the Democratic Party not been shattered by the bitter internal conflicts over Vietnam, he could not have won. Had the Republican Party not been disgraced by Watergate, he could not have won. (January 18, 1981)

Edward Walsh suggested that Carter was "not, after all, ready to be president," and that the Carter years would be remembered as the "deeply flawed presidency of good intentions" (The Washington Post, January 18, 1981). Walsh reported that Carter had "severely limited political skills," and "if he had a coherent vision and sense of direction for the country, he never learned to articulate it" (The Washington Post, January 18, 1981). Perhaps the most negative comment came from the Post's J. Draft, for he hit both Carter and Reagan. Kraft wrote:

At the center of the Carter legacy is an institution in trouble. A supreme office was trivialized to the point where it became thinkable for an actor to be elected president. (The Washington Post, January 18, 1981)

The New York Times probably depicted Carter more positively than did the Post, or the magazines. For the newspaper, Carter was a lame-duck and a generally poor president. The paper did not go into details.

The harsh fact is that, although he is still President, his voice lost its authority on November 4. (December 11, 1980)

Today's budget is also . . . symbolic of Mr. Carter's performance in the fiscal front. The 1981 budget, which Mr. Carter promised to balance, is now expected to show the third largest deficit in history. (January 16, 1981)

Time magazine suggested that Carter in word and deed had wounded the American spirit. Roger Rosenblatt wrote that Carter:

Was perhaps most bitterly resented for shrinking these hopes down to the size of a presidency characterized by small people, small talk and small matters. He made Americans feel two

things they are not used to feeling, and will not abide.
He made them feel puny and he made them feel insecure.
(Time, January 5, 1981, p. 13)

One reporter quoted the late social theorist Ernest Becker in relation to the Carter years:

A protest without a program is little more than sentimentalism--this is the epitaph of many of the great idealisms.
(Time, November 17, 1980, p. 44)

Hugh Sidey seemed to suggest that in the end Carter and his administration was just a lot of talk, signifying nothing:

Carter may have done considerable damage by his incessant flow of words. . . . Language ultimately was cheapened and meaning diminished. The Carter White House echoed with so much talk that it finally became a bore. Presidential restraint of tongue might restore some credibility to talk and heighten the impact when the right moments come for the Chief Executive of the nation to sound off to the people.
(Time, January 5, 1981, p. 37)

Newsweek called the Carter Administration a "collapsing Presidency" (November 17, 1980, p. 27). And the magazine said that the election was a "personal rejection of Jimmy Carter" (November 17, 1980, p. 29). Although the magazine listed the accomplishments of the Carter administration (civil service reform, industrial deregulation, the Panama Canal treaties, the new energy programs, better China relations, and the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement), the verdict was the same--a poor president. Newsweek explains:

But in large measure the President had brought his defeat on himself. His contempt for the political establishment was as thick as Georgia accent--and just as resistant to change. The result was an un-against-them mentality that isolated the White House. His relation with a Congress controlled by his own party were the worst of any President in modern history. His refusal to compromise, consult or curry favor on Capitol Hill first baffled, then outraged legislators, who retaliated by bottling up his programs. (November 17, 1980, p. 29)

The transition period was not a pleasant time for Carter:

Carter's final days were filled with far more pain than pleasure. What seemed to hurt most was the evident delight with which Washington was preparing to greet his successor. The enthusiasm generated by Reagan's recent tour of Capitol Hill so rankled Carter that he ordered up a lengthy report on his transition activities four years ago

Carter was also infuriated by a spate of newspaper and magazine articles suggesting that the Reagans would restore to the White House a cultural and social grace that had been absent for the past four years. (Newsweek, December 16, 1980, p. 29)

In summary, the coverage of Jimmy Carter's presidency in its last days was generally negative. One got the impression that the news media at least were glad to see him go.

The transition tone. In general, the 1980-81 transition seems to have been a rather orderly process. The Carter administration emphasized that it would not try to limit the next administration. Carter's transition director Jack Watson announced that:

The president is interested in seeing that major matters, major policy questions and issues that will need to be addressed in the next four years, both legislative and otherwise, be deferred for their action post Jan. 20.
(The Washington Post, November 13, 1980)

Newsweek said that the transition process showed "surprising smoothness" (December 24, 1980, p. 41). "And increasingly, it began to look as if Reagan would enter the White House with a freer hand than any new President in recent memory" (Newsweek, December 24, 1980, p. 41).

Transition trouble spots. However, although the transition was depicted as being generally smooth, there were several rough spots that generated a great deal of media attention. One of these areas was the Iranian Hostage situation. Reagan took a firm stand on Iran. He said:

I think all of us down deep inside have an anger also at the idea that their captors today are still making demands on us for their return, when their captors are nothing better than criminals and kidnapers who have violated international law totally in taking these innocent people and holding them this long. (The Washington Post, December 25, 1980)

Reagan's right-hand man, Ed Meese, told the news media that:

The Iranians ought to think over very carefully the fact that it will certainly be to their advantage in every way to get our hostages back now. (The New York Times, December 29, 1980)

Reagan warned that he would not endorse "a blank check" for the Iranians

(The Washington Post, January 8, 1981). The Washington Post was not pleased with the Reagan comment. The newspaper said that:

The comment may have added a new obstacle to the already complicated task of negotiating release of the 52 Americans by Inauguration Day, Jan. 20. (The Washington Post, January 9, 1981)

The Post quoted a Carter administration source that Reagan's comment:

Was expected to add to the doubts in Tehran about concluding an agreement now which would have to be carried out in part, by the successor administration. (The Washington Post, January 9, 1981)

Reagan's comments continued to bother the Carter Administration.

From the beginning, Reagan had promised:

We want to make it perfectly plain that we're not going to intrude. We're going to recognize the fact that this Administration is still in office, and foreign leaders must be aware that the President is still the President. (The New York Times, November 7, 1980)

Yet Reagan continued to make foreign policy statements that were often contradictory to the Carter administration's position.

I don't think that you can turn away from some country because here and there they do not totally agree with our concept of human rights and then at the same time maintain relations with other countries, or try to develop them where human rights are virtually nonexistent. (The New York Times, November 7, 1980)

And then Reagan advisers "assured visitors from El Salvador that the new administration will increase military aid, including combat equipment, to security forces fighting leftist guerillas" (The New York Times, November 29, 1980). The Carter Administration was outraged by this move. Reagan aides insisted "that no one in a position of authority had taken any positions on Latin America, or on other foreign policy issues" (The New York Times, December 14, 1980), but the transition head of the State Department Robert Neumann insisted that his associates "curtail their comments on international affairs" (The New York Times, December 11, 1980). The Carter administration chose a diplomatic position when State Department spokesman Jack Cannon announced that:

Statements by persons who do not represent the incoming administration but who claim to do so have complicated an already difficult crisis situation in El Salvador. (The New York Times, December 11, 1980)

In addition to the problems with Iran and El Salvador, Reagan ran into problems by breaking an announced transition policy of not meeting with foreign leaders (see The Washington Post, January 6, 1981). Reagan met with both West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Mexican President José Lopez Portillo.

On the lighter side, the Reagans themselves became the subject of controversy, when Mrs. Reagan visited the White House. Nancy Reagan had shown concern over the amount of redecorating that the living quarters needed, and she commented that when she and Ronnie left the White House, they would probably leave a few days earlier so that the new presidential couple could fix things up as they liked. The Carters and the media did not take kindly to Nancy's remarks. A Reagan spokesman tried to clear the air with a press statement. The New York Times reports:

A Reagan spokesman said that Mrs. Reagan had simply wished idly that "by magic" she could have an early chance to redecorate the living quarters, and that this had been misinterpreted as resentment that the Carters had not moved out. (December 14, 1980)

This episode strengthened the image of the "idle rich" associated with the Reagans by elements of the media, i.e., Newsweek.

On the Carter side of the transition, there were some controversies also. The future OMB Director David Stockman called the new Carter budget--"a very political document" (The New York Times, January 16, 1981). Newsweek reported that:

The Carter White House is leaving behind a prickly January surprise: a "low ball" budget that will quickly force the Reagan team either to increase the Federal deficit or forgo, at least for the moment, some of its announced goals. (January 12, 1981, p. 21)

In another area, the Carter team was scared of the new deregulation spirit of the Reagan administration, so the agencies began pouring out regulations. Philip Hilts of The Washington Post explains:

The reason for the outpouring is not hard to divine. Before the change of administration on Tuesday, agency officials want to see in place as many rules and programs as they can, to finish projects they have started and leave their mark on government after they depart. (January 18, 1981)

And in other areas, the Carter bureaucracy was playing hardball. Assistant Secretary of Education F. James Rutherford is an example of someone playing to win. He wrote a memo to his staff, and The Washington Post obtained the memo and decided to print it. It reads as follows:

It is the intention of the president and the secretary, and mine as well, that the transition proceed as efficiently as possible. It is important, therefore, that we provide full and appropriate cooperation. (December 16, 1980)

But the memo continues with three "ground rules" of cooperation:

- Nobody, but nobody in OERI is to discuss business in person or by phone with anybody on the transition team without clearance from Rutherford.
- No documents are to be provided to the transition team without clearance from his office.
- At no time is information concerning the 1982 budget submission to be shared with a transition team. (The Washington Post, December 16, 1980)

In one other area, the transition had a few problems. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee had asked National Security Adviser Brezinski for papers, documents concerning the role of Alexander Haig in the Nixon-Ford era. Brezinski refused to turn over the information unless the committee could tell him exactly what they were looking for, because in Brezinski's words, he would not be "partners to some indiscriminate witch hunt" (The New York Times, January 4, 1981). However, it was known that Jimmy Carter himself favored the release of the information. It was a sticky situation.

In conclusion, the transition appeared to be a rather smooth transition according to the mass media, but there were some episodes on both sides of the transition that proved embarrassing.

Coverage of election results. As mentioned previously, the coverage of the election results and the perception of the "electoral mandate" are very important to the future of a new administration. In many ways, it sets the environment of expectations of what is possible to accomplish by the new administration. The coverage of the "Reagan Mandate" had three themes. The election was viewed as: a "repudiation" of Carter; a conservative mandate or revolution; and a return to the past. Reagan's lawyer told Newsweek that: "The election is a clear

mandate that the programs of the immediate past have not worked and that the people want to try something different" (November 24, 1980, p. 38). Reagan had won a 44-state, 8-million-votes-victory (Newsweek, November 24, 1980, p. 38). Newsweek called it a "landslide" (November 24, 1980) and an "avalanche" (November 17, 1980).

Repudiation of Carter. Some discounted the size of the Reagan victory. Newsweek said that it wasn't that so many were for Reagan, it was that so many were against Carter. The magazine reported that the Reagan mandate "was clouded by the suspicion that the difference most wanted was to be rid of Jimmy Carter" (Newsweek, November 24, 1980, p. 38). Newsweek quoted Historian Richard Wade as saying that: "this is no big cosmic thing. Carter was a lousy President" (November 17, 1980, p. 32).

Conservative revolution. Yet at other times, the Newsweek articles saw the election as "the most seismic power shift in a generation" (November 24, 1980, p. 3). It was a "tide of time-for-a-change-conservatism" (Newsweek, November 17, 1980, p. 27). It was a "counter-revolution" that "shredded the old Democratic coalition" (Newsweek, November 17, 1980, p. 27). Newsweek compared the election to Ike in 1952 and FDR in 1932. The election would make "the Republicans custodians of the American future for the rest of this century" (Newsweek, November 24, 1980, p. 38). David Broder of The Washington Post viewed the election as an ideological revolution. Broder wrote:

You had to be dense to miss the message of Reagan's campaign: a flat-out repudiation of basic economic, diplomatic and social policies of the reigning Democratic liberalism.

They were reacting to the decline of living standards, the squeeze of inflation and interest rates. And the frustration

of American power abroad, as symbolized by the Iranian hostage ordeal. In some instances they were also protesting the changes in social customs, life styles and community standards condoned or encouraged by literal legislatures and judges--the issues of the Moral Majority. (The Washington Post, November 19, 1980)

Haynes Johnson of The Washington Post reported that:

The sense of a new beginning--a new president to lead the nation into a new decade--appears strong. (December 7, 1980)

Roger Rosenblatt of Time agreed that the mandate was specific--there would be a new beginning, a conservative beginning. However, Rosenblatt said that the presidency would not become "a national pulpit for Jerry Falwell's lethal sweet talk" (January 5, 1981). Rosenblatt writes:

That mandate is specific: to control inflation, to reduce unnecessary governmental interference in private lives and in business, to reassert America's prominence in the world. That is all there is to it, and that is plenty. The mandate does not necessarily include far-right hit lists, Censorship, the absence of gun control, prayer in schools and a constitutional amendment banning abortion. These Things are significant if problematical, but they do not represent majority wishes. (Time, January 5, 1981, p. 13)

Return to the past. In some ways, the election of Ronald Reagan was viewed as a return to the past. Newsweek maintained that the election was a "rousing vote of confidence in him and his politics of nostalgia for that America of limitless plenty and power he grew up in" (November 17, 1980, p. 27).

Coverage of Reagan-the-man.

Cowboy and actor. The image of "Reagan-the-man proved to be an interesting one. The Washington Post and Newsweek emphasized Ronald Reagan-theactor and Ronald Reagan-the-cowboy. Both of these images proved to be rather negative in orientation. The actor image

suggests that Reagan is in some ways fake or false. The cowboy image calls to mind a jingoistic crusader who rises around on horseback spreading "his limited view of the world."

Newsweek describes Reagan's career:

Once he was the most underestimated man in American politics--a washed-up movie star, it was said, who was too old, too simple, and too far right to be president. (November 17, 1980, p. 27)

According to Newsweek, Ronald Reagan is "the ultimate media-age politician--a man who apprentices for his calling in a quarter century as a movie and television performer" (November 17, 1980, p. 31). When Reagan arrived in Washington, the headlines in Newsweek said: "Mr. Reagan goes to Washington" (November 24, 1980, p. 38). The take off on the old movie "Mr. Smith goes to Washington" is obvious, but the play off the Jimmy Stewart-Ronald Reagan image is more subtle. Both men share the homespun, gosh-golly, good ol' boy Americana that made them successful in the early movies. After Reagan's trip to Washington, Newsweek wrote that:

For the first time since America cast him as its 40th President, Ronald Wilson Reagan played Washington last week--and won. (December 1, 1980, p. 30)

Similarly, Lou Cannon of The Washington Post reports on the victory press conference:

It was appropriately enough, like opening night at the theater, an opening night when a new show is in town featuring an experienced actor in an unfamiliar role.

The show was "President Reagan." It opened here under bright lights in the ballroom of the Century Plaza Hotel to good notices and the whispered undercurrent of excitement that attends first nights.

Reagan is, above all, a performer, and he was playing a role today he had auditioned for 12 years. He knew what to do. (The Washington Post, November 7, 1980)

Cannon also suggests that Reagan had a particular role to play:

What Reagan wanted to do, he and his advisers agreed, was to play the part of Reagan the Reassurer to foreign allies and foreign foes, demonstrating that he was not the warmonger his opponent had said he was. He wanted, also, to reassure those Americans who didn't vote for him that he would be a reasonable president. (The Washington Post, November 7, 1980)

Haynes Johnson of The Washington Post wrote that America would now have "the Presidency performed in the Stanislavsky Method" (January 18, 1981). Johnson explains:

He's more than a competent performer, and comes over as likable, engaging and exuding a disarming charm. He was also, by all accounts, a serious, hardworking dedicated craftsman.

It's Reagan himself, the roles he plays and the values those movies embody that are illuminating.

America is always right; no task remains beyond its capacity. Its people are brave, bold, good, generous. Its wars are just . . . its progress assured. No matter how difficult the going for the moment, nor how terrible the ordeal to be faced, they will endure, persevere and triumph. . . . Optimism is their hallmark, simplicity their virtue. . . . Bad guys lost. (January 18, 1981)

He is the quintessential American (The Washington Post, January 18, 1981). Johnson concludes the piece by stating that "the films are remarkably naive" (The Washington Post, January 18, 1981). Late in January, the theme of Reagan-the-actor is still going strong. E. Emmett Tyrrell wrote:

This week, full of brag and bounce, Ronald Reagan & Associates are donning their makeup and their costumes, going through final rehearsals and flying into town for their first four-year stand. (The Washington Post, January 12, 1981)

Time also used the actor-theme, but it was not quite so negatively used. Time's depiction of Reagan, the man, is best illustrated by this Rosenblatt quote:

If one were to take all of Reagan's qualities--the detachment, the self-knowledge, the great voice and good looks--and project

them into the White House, he would have a first-class B-movie presidency. That is no insult. The best B movies, while not artistically, are often the ones that move us most because they move us directly, through straightforward characters, simple moral conflicts and idealized talk. (Time, January 5, 1981, p. 23)

Reagan is described as having a modest, patient disposition. He is pictured as a self-reliant loner who enjoys solitude, but on the other hand, he has good humour and enjoys the company of his friends. He is honorable and trustworthy. He embodies, according to Time, "the attributes of fatherhood at its best" (January 5, 1981, p. 15). He is not in short, the man for an A-movie presidency, but Time suggests that this may be for the best (January 5, 1981, p. 23). He is neither the most qualified man for the job that the country has ever had nor is he the least. Time reports on "the American experience" that is Ronald Reagan's life:

The journey that Ronald Reagan has taken from his prairie hamlet of Dixon, Illinois, to the White House, via Hollywood and the Governor's mansion in Sacramento, is an astonishing American pilgrimage. Reagan is not brilliant in any sense, but his mind had to be practical and persistent in a special way to bring him this distance. Those instincts nurtured in simpler times and places seem to have served him well. Football, swimming, campus politics, sportscasting and acting are the strata in his evolution. He mimicked real life until he became Governor of California, and then he amazed people by performing credibly. (Time, November 17, 1980, p. 26)

Certainly, Time was not positive in its depiction of Reagan, but yet the coverage was not as condescending as The Washington Post's and News-week's. An example of this attitude is found in this passage from The Washington Post:

Ronald Reagan, California's Cowboy Capitalist, is galloping toward Washington, promising to reign in America's bucking economy, coral inflation, and put a cattle prod to sagging productivity. (November 10, 1980)

William Safire wrote of an irony that had escaped many reporters in their concentration on the Ronald Reagan-the-actor theme. In order to do what he proposed, Ronald Reagan would have to become a de-activist-activist. For in order to "de-activate" the government, the new president would have to take an active role in pursuing that goal. Safire writes that: "To return power to the states and cities, he must first snatch it away from the Federal bureaucracy and the Congress--which requires an exercise of Presidential power" (The Washington Post, November 20, 1980).

In summary, The Washington Post and Newsweek emphasized the image of Ronald Reagan-the-actor and Ronald Reagan-the-cowboy. This was done in a belittling fashion. Time also used "the actor theme," however, it was not used as negatively as the Post's and Newsweek's version. The New York Times did not appear to concentrate on Ronald Reagan-the-man. Instead, the newspaper concentrated on the transition activities, particularly the problems of the transition.

The Reagan Transition's Policy Priorities

Front and center. The issue agenda differs considerably from that a casual observer might expect from the Reagan campaign rhetoric. When the pro-president-elect mentions concerning issues are combined, it was found that: 48 percent of all pro-mentions pertained to Governmental Problems and Philosophy Positions; 19 percent to Economic Problems; 16 percent to Foreign Policy; 13 percent to General Public and Mass Media Relations; and 3 percent to Social Problems. Surprisingly,

social problems such as busing, equal rights, abortion, gay rights, etc., are virtually ignored (Table 5; Appendix D).

Reagan was moving toward front and center. The rhetoric of the "new morality" was changing to the rhetoric of "governing." Newsweek predicted that Reagan would work to "broaden his one-fourth electoral based into an authentic national consensus, muting ideology, exuding sweet reason and discouraging impossible expectations" (November 24, 1980, p. 39). Reagan had "let it be known that some of his assaults on Big Government might take time--dismantling the departments of Energy and Education, for example, or repealing the wind-fall-profits tax on oil" (Newsweek, November 24, 1980, p. 39). Realism had settled in on the Reagan camp, and The New York Times suggested that realism had replaced the election euphoria for good (December 2, 1980). The transition itself was staffed not by "right-wingers," but with "old Nixon-Ford Republicans, and even a few token Democrats" (Newsweek, November 24, 1980, p. 39). There was a "Nixon-Ford-Kissinger flavor" to the transition team (Newsweek, November 24, 1980, p. 39). And the transition team was looking towards the Heritage Foundation, a middle-of-the-road conservative research group, for advice during the transition. The Washington Post reported that the Heritage Foundation had delivered a thorough report to the transition team. The Post described the report:

It is clearly a hope chest of the mainstream right wing, predictably coming down hardest on environmentalists and on minority programs, restrictions on the military, the intelligence communities and free enterprise. As a step-by-step road map to realization of most of Reagan's campaign promises, much of it could serve as a handy guide for a later check on his performance. (November 16, 1980)

The Cabinet selections were viewed as a deliberate attempt by Reagan and his transition team to move towards the center of the political spectrum. Newsweek reports that:

The selections taken together were precisely what Reagan wanted in his passage from fundamentalist politician to centrist president: a company of good, gray, solid citizens with eight team players and no known prima donnas. (December 22, 1980, p. 13)

Newsweek concluded that "Reagan's bent in office is as pragmatic as his rhetoric getting there is ideological" (November 17, 1980, p. 28).

Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut said that he wasn't worried about Reagan's far right rhetoric; however, Weicker wasn't so sure about the new Republican Senate:

I think the Presidency moderates anybody, including Ronald Reagan. I am not really all that perturbed about a Ronald Reagan Presidency, but I think the United States Senate has the potential of being really out of it, really off-stage to the right. (The New York Times, December 29, 1980; see pp. for similar discussions)

Thus, during the transition period, Ronald Reagan was moving toward the center, attempting to create a national consensus based not on far-right social reforms but rather on a conservative economic policy and a strong American foreign policy.

Coverage of the Issue Agenda

The pro-president-elect issue mentions and the media-issue-mentions are remarkably similar in nature. When the media-issue-mentions are combined for The Washington Post, The New York Times, Newsweek and Time, it was found that: 46 percent of all issue-mentions pertained to General Governmental Problems and Philosophy Positions; 17 percent of all issue-mentions pertained to Foreign Policy; 16 percent

to Economic Problems; 12 percent to Public and Mass Media Relations; and, 8 percent to Social Problems. It is interesting to note that The Washington Post, The New York Times, and Time emphasized foreign policy matters slightly more than the economic problems of the day. The reverse was true for the pro-president-elect-sources (see Appendix E). This slight difference may be explained in that foreign policy concerns were Reagan's Achilles' heel during the campaign (see Newsweek, November 17, 1980, p. 27).

It is also interesting to note the similarity between what the newspapers and magazines chose to quote of what the pro-president-elect-sources mentioned concerning issues, and the similarity between what the media-sources of the newspapers and magazines reported concerning issues (see Appendix E).

Domestic policy. The economy was clearly Reagan's number one concern. Reagan told the press that he thought that "for the first few months, anyone in our position ought to concentrate on the economic problems and getting started on that" (The Washington Post, December 1, 1980). But the economy was worse than what the Reagan campaign team had suggested. Chief of Staff James Baker warned that there had "been a drastic deterioration in the economy over the course of the last six months . . . " (The New York Times, January 16, 1981). The transition team found the situation grim, and David Stockman, the OMB-Director-Designate, recommended that an economic state of emergency be called as soon as Reagan took office. However, that idea was eventually dismissed because of the fear that the American public might panic (The New York

Times, January 7, 1981). Donald Regan, Treasury Secretary Designate, remarked that "We must have a sense of urgency--not a sense of emergency" (The New York Times, January 7, 1981).

The Reagan campaign had emphasized five courses of action for the new administration: (1) a budget cut greater than 2 percent; (2) a 12-month freeze on new government regulations; (3) a three-year, 30 percent income-tax reduction; (4) a federal hiring freeze; and (5) an increase in military spending. The transition team began working on these courses of action.

Newsweek took a rather dim view of the Reagan economic plan. The magazine wrote that the Reagan team promised "the most sweeping economic agenda since the New Deal" (Newsweek, November 17, 1980, p. 77), the Reagan package was "one of the most iconoclastic economic philosophies ever to be articulated from the Oval Office" (Newsweek, November 17, 1980, p. 77).

Reagan had promised during the campaign that the budget would be cut by reducing "waste, fraud, abuse and mismanagement," but the transition had found that further cuts must be made to meet the Reagan objectives (The Washington Post, January 6, 1981). OMB-Director Designate David Stockman "targeted a sweeping set of reductions in government spending. The OMB task force plans to deliver its recommendations to Republican Congressional leaders . . . before the Inauguration, hoping to line up support before the bills are presented" (Newsweek, December 29, 1980, p. 9). The magazine reported that the Reagan team was

Considering ideas as politically explosive as reducing educational and school-lunch subsidies, changing the way that social security and other income-support payments are

adjusted for inflation, and even recommending a constitutional amendment to limit the level of Federal spending. (Newsweek, November 17, 1980, p. 78)

Stockman said that the principal objective was to "cut off the undeserving" (Newsweek, December 29, 1980, p. 9). Food stamps would be taken away from middle class college students and the seasonally unemployed. The administration would try to curb hospital costs by capping medicare and medicaid payments. The government would begin to reduce low-interest federal loans to both farmers, businessmen, and students. Federal construction would be considerably curtailed. And the government would begin to charge for such services as coastguard-rescue operations (see Newsweek, December 19, 1980, p. 9). The Reagan team intended to pursue the Kemp-Roth tax bill that they had supported during the campaign. This bill would cut personal tax rates by nearly 30 percent over three years (Newsweek, November 17, 1980, pp. 77-78). Newsweek said that they hoped that Reagan's advisers would restrain "his wilder economic impulses" (November 17, 1980, pp. 77-78). And the magazine didn't seem to appreciate Reagan's tax proposals or his budget cuts:

His tax proposals are more stimulative and consumer-oriented than any recent predecessor has contemplated, and his plans for reducing the growth in Federal Spending are reminiscent of Lizzie Borden and her ax. (November 17, 1980, p. 77)

According to Treasury Secretary Designate Donald Regan "one of the key elements of the economic package" was "getting a handle on Federal regulation and beginning to deregulate" (The New York Times, January 7, 1981). Reagan was expected to try to make major amendments to the Clean Air Act of 1970. And, Reagan was expected to step up deregulation in transportation, banking, communications, and other

industries (see Newsweek, December 8, 1980, p. 69; Newsweek, November 17, 1980, pp. 77-78). And it appeared that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency would be curtailed in their operations (Newsweek, December 8, 1980, p. 69). However, Newsweek predicted that: "Reagan will be pragmatic: committed to curtailing bureaucratic excesses, while supporting the principles of the law" (Newsweek, December 8, 1980, p. 69).

Reagan had promised to institute a federal hiring freeze and to abolish the departments of Energy and Education during the campaigns. However, the Reagan team had decided that the hiring freeze would be unwise, and they instead tried to review all positions, looking for those that might be cut. And the dismantling of the Energy and Education Departments would not take place immediately. The process would be a slow and graduate one (see Newsweek, November 24, 1980, p. 39).

A renovated foreign policy apparatus. During the campaign, Reagan had promised increased military spending and a stronger America. The Reagan team believed that the route to a stronger America was to create a more efficient foreign policy apparatus. According to Meese, Reagan would reduce the power of the national security adviser, and in this way, perhaps the new administration might avoid the bickering between the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser that existed in the Carter administration. The adviser "would coordinate and expedite matters for the president, but not compete with the Secretary of State in policy making" (The Washington Post, November 10, 1980). In addition, the new foreign policy team would pay more attention "to

advice from experts outside the administration" (Newsweek, December 1, 1980, p. 32). And, the Reagan administration would revive the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Newsweek, December 1, 1980, p. 32). The transition team had recommended that "several sweeping changes in the organization and operations of the nation's intelligence programs including increased emphasis on covert action abroad" (The Washington Post, December 8, 1980).

The new team would pursue a hard-line towards the Soviet Union. The team players would be "more hawk than superhawk" (Newsweek, December 22, 1980, p. 12). Reagan had said that "the policies of aggression of the Soviet Union" must be considered in any discussion with the Soviet Union. In other words, Reagan believed in linkage (see The Washington Post, November 7, 1980; Newsweek, December 1, 1980, p. 32). Newsweek predicted that the "progress in arms control or expanded trade may depend on whether the Soviet Union curbs its expansionist tendencies" (Newsweek, December 1, 1980, p. 32). On the concept of "human rights," the Reagan team would pursue a different line. Reagan said:

I don't think that you can turn away from some country because here and there they do not totally agree with our concept of human rights and then at the same time maintain relations with other countries, or try to develop them where human rights are virtually nonexistent. (The Washington Post, November 7, 1980)

Again, this translated into "a stronger, tougher America." The Washington Post concluded that: "The election of Ronald Reagan promises renewed American efforts to reassert pre-eminence in military, political, and economic affairs" (November 26, 1980). Time concluded that:

In foreign affairs, the U.S. must build up its military power and face down the Soviets. At home, Reagan's watchword will

be less: less federal spending, less taxation, less regulation, less federal activism in directing the economy and curing social ills--in fact, less Government, period. (Time, November 17, 1980, p. 24)

The Reagan Transition's Operational Mode

Political style. Reagan's operational manner and his organizational style during the transition reveal a great deal about the future Reagan presidency. Reagan was no political-newcomer, and after the election he immediately began healing wounds and building fences.

Newsweek reported that Reagan:

Shook hands and made up with Jimmy Carter, massaged the barons of both parties in both houses of Congress, supped white wine with the Justices of the Supreme Court, and swept the city's civic and cultural glitterati off their feet simply by paying attention to them. (December 1, 1980, p.30)

And the Reagan team planned to stay in touch with their underlings in government. A computer would be used to track down those who hadn't "been in the Presidential presence for a given period," and these people would then be invited to staff briefings, bill signings, or even to dinner with the president (see Newsweek, December 15, 1980, p. 25). Newsweek predicted that it would be used to "build morale and bolster loyalty to the President among the several hundred middle-management members of the Administration" (December 15, 1980, p. 25). Reagan wanted to touch all bases if possible, for he was aware "of the need for comity and confidence between the branches of Government and between the parties" (The Washington Post, November 20, 1980).

The Reagan Transition's Organizational Style

The organization of power. Reagan's political sensitivity influenced his approach to the organization of government. Time reported that "in a sense, Reagan is trying to bridge the constitutional gulf between the White House and the Congress" (November 24, 1980, p. 15).

Reagan told the news media:

What we would like to do is to resume a relationship based on regular and rather frequent meetings in a bipartisan manner with the leadership of the House and Senate with regard to the programs we think must be done.

In other words, we're not going to just throw surprises up here at the hill. (The Washington Post, November 19, 1980)

Reagan gave Senator Paul Laxalt the job of Congressional Liaison. Time reported that Laxalt:

Has suddenly become one of the most powerful men in Washington, with privileges and responsibilities that are without precedent between a President and a legislator. He is scheduled to be the connecting link between the White House and Congress. (Time, November 24, 1980, p. 15)

Laxalt explained Reagan's plan:

What we are seeking to do is to make Congress as much as possible a full partner with the President.

He wants me to be his eyes and ears on the Hill. (Time, November 24, 1980, p. 15)

The new administration's emphasis on Congressional Relations was only exceeded by its concern for selecting the Cabinet and the development of Ronald Reagan-the-president (i.e., his organizational-political style). Only around 2 percent of the mentions concerning governmental relations discussed the Vice President-Elect George Bush. More concern was shown for Reagan's relationship with his own staff (15 percent of

government-relations mentions) and the Republican Party (4 percent of government-relations mentions).

Reagan wanted to avoid creating a powerful presidential staff like the ones that existed during the Nixon and Carter years. William Casey, the chairman of the transition team, explained the Reagan plan:

It will be very much like Eisenhower's. You'll see people of experience, people of heavier weight than have been around since then. More authority will be delegated to the Cabinet, and the White House staff won't have such a heavy hand. (Time, November 17, 1980, p. 41)

Hedrick Smith of The New York Times wrote that Reagan was:

Moving to curtail the importance of the White House staff in policy formulation and preparing to build his policy-making machinery around a small 6 to 10 member inner Cabinet, or Executive Committee of the Cabinet. (November 13, 1980)

However, Newsweek said that Transition Director Edwin Meese was "emerging as the linchpin of the new Administration--administrator, coordinator, spokesman, almost the kind of Deputy President that Reagan once considered making Gerald Ford" (Newsweek, December 29, 1980, p. 10).

The Reagan transition team focused on how power was to be organized. What was the most effective and efficient means of governing? For the Reagan transition team, the answer was cabinet government or a modified form of it known as executive committee government.

Cabinet government. Reagan was to rule as a "chairman of the board" with the cabinet being the board of directors. Warner writes:

The President-elect, who is famed for keeping reasonable hours and not getting bogged down in details, is expected to act pretty much like a chairman of the board who makes the big decisions but delegates the day-to-day operations to others. Thus the people Reagan brings into office are likely to have larger-than-usual roles in running the Government. (Time, November 17, 1980, p. 41)

Reagan's operating style had always been to delegate authority (Newsweek, December 24, 1980, p. 41), and he planned to do so now. Reagan wanted to rehabilitate "the Cabinet both as his interdisciplinary council of state and as his corps of emissaries to the departments--not theirs to him" (Newsweek, January 26, 1981, p. 50; see also The Washington Post, December 1, 1980). Secretary of Defense-Designate Caspar Weinberger said that:

The Reagan Presidency will be more like the British Cabinet System. Reagan likes discussion, he likes to hear different viewpoints. The atmosphere will be collegial, with all the Cabinet officers participating in all policy discussions. (Newsweek, November 17, 1980, p. 35)

Similarly, Press Secretary James Brady said that:

What he is sketching is a working mechanism where it's a board of directors concept in which everyone is encouraged to speak out in areas that don't necessarily happen to be their own. (The Washington Post, January 9, 1981)

Reagan himself said that:

We want to have lively debate and discussion. It's my belief that we do share a basic philosophy of government. . . . We may differ at how we arrive at the end result, but I want free and open discussion. (The Washington Post, January 9, 1981)

Reagan appointed Edwin Meese as White House Counsel and gave him Cabinet Rank. It would be Meese's job to "serve as a bridge between the Cabinet and the President" (The Washington Post, December 1, 1980).

The concept of "cabinet government" eventually evolved into the concept of "executive committee government." Edwin Meese said "the executive committee" would consist of "about six officials including Vice President Bush, the White House Chief of Staff, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury" (Newsweek, November 17, 1980, p. 33). According to Meese, "All other Cabinet Departments

and major agencies would be clustered by function and report operating details to one or another executive Cabinet Secretary" (Newsweek, November 17, 1980, p. 33). Time has a similar view:

Reagan intends to govern largely through an executive committee, an "inner circle" of six or so senior Cabinet officers, plus, on appropriate occasions, the directors of the CIA and Office of Management and Budget. The inner circle will meet with Reagan regularly to review the whole range of governmental problems and will be charged with making sure that his orders are carried out. Thus the people filling these posts--basically the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury and the Attorney General--must be capable of giving advice on a broad variety of subjects. (Time, November 24, 1980, p. 12; Time, December 15, 1980)

Time suggested that Cabinet government usually doesn't work because the president is unwilling to share his power with the Cabinet. Time suggested that the success of Reagan's "cabinet government" depended on "whether Reagan and his people have enough confidence and humility to shift the great media spotlight from the front lawn of the White House to the offices of the Cabinet Secretaries" (Time, December 15, 1980, p. 19). Time went on to predict that "maybe a lifetime on the stage has taught Reagan that in a good act all the important players get some of the spotlight" (Time, December 15, 1980, p. 19).

Clearly Reagan's operational mode and organizational style during the transition suggests the role traits of the "Decision-maker" (see pp. 184-188). The decision-maker is practical, and he is willing to compromise. He is open, fair, willing to listen to alternative views. He operates from a prima inter pares approach like the British Cabinet System. He is the final decision-maker, but he shares his power with others.

Cabinet selection process. The nature of a "cabinet government" makes the selection process for arriving at such a cabinet and the criteria used to arrive at such a cabinet very important indeed. The qualifications of those who are chosen as well as of those who did the choosing are very important. Time writes that:

The process by which Reagan is choosing his Cabinet is revealing of the man and his methods. He has entrusted the talent hunt to old friends with whom he feels comfortable and has given them a great deal of leeway.
(Time, December 8, 1980, p. 22)

Newsweek and The New York Times called this small 18-20-member group headed by Reagan's attorney, William French Smith, the "Kitchen Cabinet" (Newsweek, November 24, 1980, p. 43; The New York Times, November 23, 1980). According to Newsweek, however:

The inner circle that made most of the initial choices included Bush, chief of staff James Baker, CIA director-designate William J. Casey, appointments secretary Michael Deaver, head-hunter E. Pendleton James, Senator Paul Laxalt, Attorney General-designate William French Smith and most important--Chief Counselor Edwin Meese. (Newsweek, January 12, 1981, p. 27)

Reagan said that he had one basic rule to follow in his Cabinet selections: "My basic rule is that I want people who don't want a job in Government. I want people who are already so successful that they would regard a Government job as a step down, not a step up" (Time, November 17, 1980, p. 36). Time reported that the Reagan transition appointments committee had certain characteristics in mind for possible appointees: "In general, the group looked for the same qualities that might be found in the chief executive officer of a major corporation: proven competence, team work, experience, and toughness" (December 8, 1980, p. 22). Similarly, Newsweek said the Reagan team was looking for

"proven managers" (December 24, 1980). According to the magazine, Reagan was looking for team players--"men and women loyal to him personally and to his philosophy generally, willing to argue over policy but not fundamental ideology" (Newsweek, November 17, 1980, p. 33). Experience was what the Reagan people were after. The Washington Post reported that a plea by a veteran Republican that "character and ideology" and "past service for Ronald Reagan" be placed "above experience went unheeded" (December 31, 1980).

The selection and recruitment process ran into problems early during the transition. The Reagan transition is the first to comply with the 1978 Ethics in Government Act. This act "tightens financial reporting for top Government officers and sets up elaborate rules to guard against a clash between their federal and private lives" (Time, December 15, 1980, p. 16). Fred Fielding was the Conflict of Interest Counsel for the transition appointments committee (The New York Times, December 8, 1980), and he spent long hours working out potential conflict-of-interest problems for possible nominees (The New York Times, December 8, 1980). Newsweek reported that "Fred Fielding's Washington office is a legacy of Watergate--a mountain of conflict-of-interest-regulations, consent forms and disclosure requirements" (December 15, 1980, p. 28). As a result, the whole selection and announcement process was behind schedule (see Newsweek, December 15, 1980, p. 28; The New York Times, December 8, 1980). Thus the Reagan team found the recruitment process slow and frustrating. White House Counsel Edwin Meese explains:

A president-elect used to call up a prospective Cabinet member. He would consult with his wife, call back in 24

hours and the deed was done. Now he has to sit down with a lawyer from the transition team, his own lawyer, his accountant and a number of others. (Time, December 15, 1980, p. 16)

Cabinet controversies. In addition to the slow timetable of the transition due to the Ethics in Government Act, there were additional problems that the Reagan team encountered relative to the Cabinet. Even after some of the secretaries were named, attention was given to possible conflicts-of-interest in relation to Secretary of Labor-Designate Ray Donovan, Secretary of Interior-Designate James Watt, Secretary of the Treasury-Designate Donald Regan, and National Security Adviser-Designate Richard Allen.

Ray Donovan had trouble on two fronts. Before he was even nominated, his name was the center of controversy. Reagan had received information that Donovan was the International Brotherhood of Teamsters' candidate for Secretary of Labor. When Reagan learned that this wasn't true, he put the Donovan nomination on hold (The New York Times, December 14, 1980). Eventually Reagan overlooked the political skullduggery and nominated Donovan to the post. But then lightning struck again. The FBI was investigating Donovan for "questionable labor practices and possible racketeering associations" (The New York Times, January 13, 1981).

Similarly James Watt had two problems. Environmentalists were outraged by the Watt appointment. The Executive Director of the Wilderness Society, William Turnage, said that Watt was not the man for the job. The Washington Post quoted Turnage when he claimed that Watt "not only alienated the environmental movement but also Indians, women and the handicapped, just about everyone you can imagine" (December 23,

1980). Newsweek said that Watt had "spent much of the last years attempting to thwart the agency he has been named to head . . . "

(January 5, 1981, p. 17). The Washington Post maintained:

The job of Secretary of the Interior calls for shrewd, sensitive balancing of the conservation and protection of public lands with the exploitation of their natural resources. To nominate Mr. Watt is to ignore balance and push the pendulum heavily toward exploitation. (December 23, 1980)

In addition to his track record on environmental issues, Watt was involved in several business ventures that would place him in a "conflict-of-interest" position once he was Secretary of the Interior.

Similarly Donald Regan faced a conflict-of-interest problem. Regan had been an executive with Merrill Lynch. The company had been recommending to their customers that they use "tax straddles," an illegal tax dodge. There was a likelihood that Regan would have to oversee the prosecution of these "tax dodgers" if he was Secretary of the Treasury (The New York Times, December 17, 1980).

Richard Allen was under investigation by the FBI for his relationship with Robert Vesco and his personal business dealings (The Washington Post, November 7, 1980).

The selection of a Secretary of State was a battle in its self. And the battle was waged publicly between the various factions of the Republican Party. George Shultz was the betting man's favorite. But Shultz had his enemies, particularly Richard Nixon. Shultz also increased the anxious atmosphere surrounding the selection process by repeatedly saying that he wanted to stay with his company, Bechtel and not return to public life. William Simon was the favorite of the conservative wing of the party, but he too had his enemies in the way of Gerald Ford and his followers. Newsweek reported that:

Ford had always looked on Simon as a bit of a prima donna with a brilliant mind, an abrasive manner and a private agenda to pursue--an agenda some people now think includes the Presidency for himself. (December 8, 1980, p. 30)

While Simon and Shultz supporters battled it out, Alexander Haig quietly gained ground particularly with Reagan himself. And Haig was eventually nominated.

Newsweek describes Haig as "a sometime Nixon-Kissinger protégé whose world view is a more subtly woven version of Reagan's own: rearm America, watch the Russians and keep your powder dry" (December 22, 1980, p. 12). But Haig carried "the heavy baggage of having served--and, some say, shielded--Nixon through the worst of the Watergate crisis, for all his well--publicized heroics at easing the President toward resignation in the final days" (Newsweek, December 15, 1980, p. 27). Hedrick Smith of The Washington Post said that the Haig nomination was a "signal of Mr. Reagan's determination to restore American strength and standing in the world and to revitalize the Atlantic Alliance" (December 17, 1980). The Democrats, particularly Robert Byrd (the new minority leader), were determined to fight the Haig nomination (see pp. 169-170). With the Haig nomination, Ronald Reagan had "signaled his determination to stand firm in the face of a Congressional challenge" and had "set the stage for a partisan test of strength over his choice for Secretary of State" (The Washington Post, December 17, 1980).

Secretary of Defense-Designate started a controversy when he wanted to nominate Carter's Deputy Director of the CIA to be his Deputy Director of Defense. The new right was outraged by Reagan's permission on the matter. In addition to this problem, Weinberger's confirmation

hearings became an embarrassment for the new administration. The Washington Post wrote that "no defense secretary has been less familiar with defense problems since Charley Wilson in 1953 . . . " (December 19, 1980). "Weinberger's nearly total ignorance on defense questions . . . was revealed in his Senate confirmation hearing" (The Washington Post, January 9, 1981).

Reagan considered removing the Joint Chief of Staff whom many believed to be "a rubber stamp for Carter" (The New York Times, December 12, 1980). However in two columns, The New York Times did not support the idea. James Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense under Nixon and Ford, summarizes the viewpoint expressed by the paper: "One should not hold military subordinates responsible for the policies of their civilian superiors" (The New York Times, December 12, 1980; see also The New York Times, January 7, 1981).

Reagan nominated William Brock as the Special Trade Representative, and this created an uproar among the new right. Brock had served as the Republican National Committee Chairman during the Carter years, and he had refused to release party funds for an opposition campaign against the Panama Canal Treaties (The Washington Post, January 6, 1981).

In summary, the Reagan Cabinet-making process received rather controversial notices. Stories concerning potential conflicts-of-interest and struggles within the party for favored positions were the typical cabinet stories. Cabinet members were usually described as "qualified" even if controversial. Future Cabinet members were pictured as "gifted intellectuals" (Time, November 17, 1980, p. 41) who were

educated primarily at Ivy League schools (Time, December 22, 1980, p. 8). The Cabinet was said to have a "corporate character," for Reagan had sought out those with a "make-a-buck-fire" (Time, December 22, 1980, p. 23).

Reagan appointments and the new right. The Reagan transition appointments committee had done quite a balancing act in filling Cabinet posts. It was a "balance between traditional Republican pragmatists and more ideological Reagan loyalists" (Time, January 19, 1981, p. 13). And that "delicate balance" was what angered the new right. "The leaders of the ideological conservative movement perhaps the most loyal and longstanding supporters of President-elect Ronald Reagan in the country" were "seeing an awful specter floating around their former hero . . . : moderate Republicanism" (The Washington Post, November 19, 1980). One new right leader told The New York Times:

It's the names that keep popping up that bother us--Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Alan Greenspan, Anne Armstrong. These people are symbolic. If one or two are in the Cabinet all right. But not all four. (November 20, 1980)

Jesse Helms called the future cabinet members "retreads" (Time, December 15, 1980, p. 16), and Richard Viguerie complained that "it's the kind of Cabinet Jerry Ford or George Bush would have assembled. I'm sick to my stomach. Reagan gave all the winks and signals that he was going to be a true conservative, and turns his back on us" (Time, December 22, 1980, p. 8). Newsweek reported that Viguerie told their reporters that the Reverend Jerry Falwell, leader of the Moral Majority, hadn't "been able to get a phone call returned by the Reagan camp since the election" (Newsweek, December 22, 1980, p. 10). John Lofton of the Conservative Digest remarked:

When I look, I don't see the hard-core Reaganites around Reagan. There are even moments when I wonder how much of a hardcore Reaganite Reagan is. (The Washington Post, November 19, 1980)

Some said that it was only "a minor setback" for the new right, but "the new right counted it more than that: the betrayal by Reagan of the cause for which people had soldiered in his crusades since 1966" (Newsweek, December 22, 1980, pp. 13-14). There were two bright spots, however, on the Reagan Cabinet for the new right. Newsweek reports that:

Some of the new righteous did take heart at having Stockman at Reagan's court, preaching the gospel of the redemptive tax cut, and, some were pacified by Schweiker's opposition to abortion and school busing. (December 22, 1980, p. 14; also see The New York Times, December 2, 1980)

Yet, Reagan continued to make overtures to the new right. This statement was made at the post-election press conference, and it is typical of the Reagan rhetoric concerning this area:

Well, I have told the people who have supported us in this campaign that I am going to do as I did when I was Governor of California, that I am going to be open to these people. I--you are President of all people--and I am going to want to seek advice where I think that I can get advice from those who are familiar with a particular problem, ask their help--and I don't know any other way to say it than that. In other words, I'm not going to separate myself from the people who elected us and set us there. (The New York Times, November 7, 1980)

Reagan also appointed Richard Williamson under Chief of Staff Baker to become the "unofficial ambassador to the New Right" (The Washington Post, December 6, 1980). But these overtures aside, it was clear that Reagan was moving to the center on social issues.

According to The Washington Post, Reagan's maneuvering on the social issues should have been expected. For Reagan owed his victory

"more to concerns about the economy and defense than to New Right issues like abortions" (The Washington Post, November 19, 1980). The newspaper continued to explain why:

Moreover, the passion that truly motivates the New Right is a moral one that is magic with segments of the electorate but doesn't translate well into government policy. New Right leaders talk most animatedly about restoring "values" to American life in the form of required school prayer, a constitutional ban on abortions and getting sex out of the movies and television--not reforms likely to be at the top of any president's list of things to do. (The Washington Post, November 19, 1980)

Similarly, Newsweek suggests that Reagan's moderate Cabinet selections were very intentional:

The choices were in fact fresh evidence of Reagan's determination to let his New Right admirers howl (as some did) and to look instead to moderate-right men of affairs for answers to the hard realities he is about to inherit. (December 22, 1980, p. 12)

Reagan's actions might have brought "howls" from the New Right, but many Democrats were pleased at Reagan's moderation. A California Democrat, Jesse Unruh, complimented Reagan when he remarked that:

You rarely get into trouble in the political field because of your enemies. It is the most difficult part of leadership to be able to say no to your friends. (Time, January 26, 1981, p. 25)

Time concluded that "Collectively, Reagan's choices announce louder than anything he has said that he intends to run a pragmatic Administration, one not bound by ideology, and the right wing is vocally dismayed" (December 22, 1980, p. 8).

Impression Management During The Reagan Transition

The decision-maker. As mentioned earlier, Reagan emphasized the "Decision-maker" role traits. And it is this role, that is his "central

role." Reagan's emphasis on "cabinet" or "executive committee" government portrays the Decision-maker persona. Reagan's humble, good 'ol boy political personality and his fatherly attitude places his operational style under the Decision-maker persona. Reagan used "a collegial group" of friends to select his Cabinet and through compromise and negotiation, the group reached united decisions. This too illustrates the Decision-maker persona. Reagan's moving towards the center also is a trait of the Decision-maker role type. For, the Decision-maker is the president of all people, so he can not allow himself to represent any one particular group to the exclusion of all others. Even though Reagan presented his central role, the Decision-maker, clearly, without violations of type, he ran into difficulty. For, Reagan chose to withdraw from actively "defining the situation" after the election and returned to California. This was intended to nurture his power and to avoid committing himself to policy strategies. Hugh Sidey writes that:

Ronald Reagan really is behaving like a chairman of the board. He is remarkably removed from the daily hubbub of the transition. He is plainly not aware of many of the details about the process and just as plainly uninterested in knowing about them. But it is he who decides--from instinct, from experience and from his trust in his advisers who make the recommendations. (Time, December 22, 1980, p. 14)

Sidey continues:

While Reagan made two forays out of his Pacific redoubt to remind the world of his smile and desire to work with Congress and other powerful people, he has talked very little. The flow of commentary on appointees, world events and national issues that Presidents-elect in other times have been lured into has been avoided. His image is compressed and contained, drawn deliberately and somewhat vaguely as the power that is felt behind the stage, emerging only for the big bows. That protected position also helps reduce wear and tear on a President who truly intends to change directions. (Time, December 22, 1980, p. 14)

Losing control over the persona. However, even though Reagan was successfully portraying himself as "the Decision-maker," problems arose. For Reagan to be "chairman of the board" was fine, but for Reagan to be the "continually vacationing chairman of the board" was quite another story. Reagan was described as "remote" (Time, December 29, 1980, p. 8) and "detached" from the Washington scene (Time, December 22, 1980, p. 23). Reagan was described as "aloof" (Newsweek, January 19, 1981, p. 18) and living in "near-isolation" (The Washington Post, December 16, 1980). Newsweek wrote that Reagan was "remarkably detached from the process" (December 29, 1980, p. 10), and Reagan continued to enjoy a "leisurely schedule" (The New York Times, December 8, 1980).

The Washington Post reported that:

No one suggests that Reagan isn't making decisions, but he has chosen to let the preliminary decision-making process be conducted in Washington and by conference telephone calls rather than in his presence. (December 4, 1980)

"To others, Reagan's detachment was a harbinger of his Presidency, a willingness to delegate nearly everything and a reluctance to wrestle with the details of governing" (Newsweek, January 19, 1981, p. 18).

Sidey reports the tension of the situation: "Reagan has just met for the first time some of the people he named to his Cabinet. Those who believed that a President-elect should eat, talk and pray with his Cabinet nominees were stunned" (Time, January 19, 1981, p. 20). Newsweek reports that:

The unexpectedly hard work of Cabinet-making tinged Reagan's honeymoon with its first sour notices, less for the quality of his choices than for the slowness and bumpiness of the process and for Reagan's air of long-distance disengagement from it. (Newsweek, January 5, 1981, p. 16)

Tongue in cheek, Rosenblatt of Time wrote that "On January 20, Reagan and the idea he embodies will both emerge from their respective seclusions with a real opportunity to change the direct and tone of the nation" (Time, January 5, 1981, p. 12).

Sidey pinpoints the dangerous game that Reagan and his transition team were playing:

In reality a detached presidency puts decisions in the hands of everyone else. No harm is done when the issues are trivial, but as the piecemeal nature of the Cabinet appointments have demonstrated, relying so totally on advisers is a dangerous game. (Time, December 22, 1980, p. 23)

An adaptation strategy. The Reagan transition team began responding to such criticism: first, by aides rushing to his defense, and secondly, by Reagan himself entering the arena. Aides described Reagan as being "very much in command even if not on the spot" (Time, December 29, 1980, p. 8). Counselor Edwin Meese told reporters: "He is taking a very active role. He is totally cognizant of all the things that are happening . . . on the phone with us . . . reading the memoranda. . . . Obviously, he's making all the decisions" (Newsweek, December 29, 1980, p. 10). Lyn Nofziger assured reporters that Reagan was "in constant contact with Meese and others" (The Washington Post, December 4, 1980). Transition aide Holmes told reporters: "He is making decisions and he has made the decisions" (The Washington Post, December 4, 1980). Nofziger assured reporters: "Make no mistake, the Cabinet will be Ronald Reagan's Cabinet and they will be there because he wants them there" (The Washington Post, December 4, 1980). Reagan himself decided to give Newsweek an interview for the December 29, 1980 issue. And he spoke to this question of "detachment":

The whole business of Cabinet selection and so forth goes on with me here. . . . Most of it is phone work or personal visits and staff meetings that are held here. Then there is an awful lot of reading to be done. (Newsweek, December 29, 1980, p. 12)

Reagan's venturing out for the Newsweek interview and all of his aides' protests that he was "the Leader" mark clearly an adaptation stage of the Reagan transition team. Around December 4, 1980, the media began questioning Reagan's absence, and by the end of December, the press was stepping up their criticism of his absence. The Reagan team responded intermittently to this charge; however, by the end of December, it was clear that they were on the warpath against such an image of "the detached Reagan." The team began an adaptation strategy. The "Decision-maker" unfortunately labeled as the "continually vacationing chairman of the board" had to be complemented with an active, assertive, leadership role, i.e., The Leader. In those last weeks of December, Reagan became no longer the passive overseer but rather a dynamic gladiator. He was often quoted, and his very language changed. "By God, if that's what it takes, we'll do it" is a statement that best typifies the new Reagan (Time, January 19, 1981, p. 10). "Reagan spoke of his determination not only to provide better management, but also to change the direction of Government" (Time, January 19, 1981, p. 13). Reagan became the visionary, the leader. He said: "We do have a rendezvous with destiny. . . . There is a divine plan that created this nation and put us here for the service of mankind" (Newsweek, January 26, 1981, p. 30). Trips to Washington became more frequent, more visible, and more vocal.

Although the Spearman Rank Coefficient test is useful in comparing

over-all mentions during the transitions, it is not very useful in zeroing in on Reagan's "image" problem and his team's adaptation strategy. For, the test examines the final scores. Thus, both a Spearman Rank Coefficient test was performed and an examination of the raw scores was conducted (see Appendix F, Tables 56-59; Appendix G, Tables 60 and 61). A greater similarity existed between pro-sources and media-sources in terms of issues mentioned than for role traits mentioned. This illustrates the problem that the new administration had in maintaining control over the Reagan persona.

When the distribution of raw scores were examined over the 11-week period, the adaptive strategy of the Reagan transition team and the media's response to it can be examined. In The Washington Post, 79 percent of all pro-source mentions of "The Leader" occur after December 1, 1980, in response to the media's criticism of Reagan's detachment from the transition. In The New York Times, 76 percent of all "The Leader" mentions occur after December 1, 1980. In Time, 89 percent of all "The Leader" mentions occur after December 1, 1980. But, in Newsweek only 14 percent of all "The Leader" mentions occur after December 1, 1980. Clearly, Newsweek did not accept the transition team's adaptation image (see Newsweek discussion, pp. 159-161; 172-173).

Conclusions

The findings of this study suggest that Reagan was generally successful in "defining the situation" for the news media. For Reagan avoided violations of type and remained consistent in his presentation of his persona. This allows the mass media to easily "stereotype" his

behavior and avoid the "fishing around," "armchair guessing" that is often present during transition periods. Reagan presented a clear "decision-maker" persona; however, the persona became somewhat of a caricature when it evolved from "the chairman of the board" to "the continually vacationing chairman of the board." Reporters began to react negative "stereotypes" based on this vacationing chairman persona; Reagan was beginning to lose control over his own political persona. However, once the criticism became pronounced, the Reagan transition team regrouped and began to complement the central role of "decision-maker" with the active "leader" role. This adaptation proved successful in fending off the unwanted vacationing chairman persona (except for Newsweek). Clearly, the Reagan team made a mistake in following the theory of silence and withdrawing from active participation in the Washington scene; however, the team was able to counteract the resulting caricature successfully by attending to the media, devising an adaptive strategy, and pursuing the complementary leader role. Thus, Reagan was successful in protecting his public character by being aware of his persona and by managing its depiction. On this ultimately, depends his success in the drama known as politics.

CHAPTER VIII

THE QUANTITATIVE STUDY

Reporters, Columnists, and Editorialists

After examining the transition articles for the 1968-69, 1976-77, and 1980-81 presidential transitions, it became increasingly obvious that the reporters themselves and their by-lines have become increasingly important. The increased use of by-lines, columns, and editorials suggests a greater personal influence on the part of the writer. The writer is now viewed as an important element of the story.

The Washington Post has both increased the number of stories that are assigned by-lines and increased the number of column and editorial writers. In 1968-69, Joseph Kraft, Robert Donovan, Rowland Evans, Robert Novak, and David Broder were the main columnists and editorialists for the newspaper. But by 1980-81, the newspaper was hiring writers for only one piece. James Schlesinger, Caspar Weinberger, Meg Greenfield, and George Will all wrote pieces for the Post. In addition, the newspaper increased its regular editorial/columnist staff. Hobart Rown, Haynes Johnson, Philip Geyelin were regulars in The Washington Post. In 1968-69 usually only the front page articles had by-lines, but by 1980-81, it was difficult to find a story without one, no matter how short the column space. In 1968-69, nine different by-lines for articles were coded, but by 1980-81, the number of different by-lines had increased to 45.

The New York Times had always made use of by-lines more so than

the Post. However, there was a slight increase over the three periods of study. It was the editorial/columnist staff that saw tremendous growth over the years. In 1968-69, 6 editorialists/columnists were coded, but by 1980-81, the number of editorialists/columnists coded had risen to 22. With the old faithful--R. W. Apple, Robert Semple, and James Reston--came James M. Naughton, Hedrick Smith, Anthony Lewis, and Tom Wicker. And, The New York Times also began using one-time articles from such people as Anthony Barnett, William Safire, and Robert Byrd.

Newsweek did not use by-lines at all in 1968-69. And there were only four "essayists": Walter Lippmann, Kenneth Crawford, Stewart Alsop, and Mel Elfin. By 1976-77, the by-lines were there, and the names of: Peter Goldman, Tom Matthews, Eleanor Clift, Thomas DeFrank, David Alpern, Elaine Shannon, Richard Steele, and Vern Smith began to appear weekly. Although by-lines were used, they were not present for all stories during this transition. By 1980-81, the number of different by-lines had more than doubled. And the names of Tom Morganthau, Howard Fineman, John Lindsay, Allan Mayer, Gerald Lubenow, Martin Kaisindorf and Dennis Williams began to appear weekly. Interestingly enough, the magazine did not increase the numbers of "essays" over the three transitions. But, the magazine did start publishing outside essayists. Meg Greenfield and George Will were the regulars, but Michael Korde, Jane Quinn, and Vernon Jordan, Jr., also made an appearance.

In 1968-69, Time did not use essays or by-lines. By 1976-77, there was one essayist, Hugh Sidey, who wrote on the presidency. By-lines were used, but they were used only for interviews. Stanley

Cloud, Robert Afemian, Bonnie Angelo, Thomas Griffith, John Berry, and Murray Gart were the interviewers for the magazine. And in 1980-81, there was still only one essayist, Sidey. Now by-lines are used for most news stories. George Church, Lawrence Barrett, Ed Magnuson, Roger Rosenblatt, Walter Isaacson, and Edwin Warner were the "big" writers during the 1980-81 transition.

Both Time and Newsweek practice a type of "group journalism." However, Time is much more open and obvious about this approach. Both magazines "see their role as weekly summarizers and explainers, putting the news of the week into historical, political, or scientific perspective, to express the meaning in the news" (Hiebert, Ungurait, & Bohn, 1982, p. 444).

Time especially has perfected the technique of "group journalism," where facts are sent to New York headquarters from many different persons and many different angles on a given story. These facts are chewed over and digested at the Olympian heights by editors and specialists, who then put together a final summary, synthesizing, interpreting, and analyzing the facts in some perspective. (Hiebert, Ungurait, & Bohn, 1982, p. 444).

This "group" approach results in multiple authors. Many articles have five or more contributors.

Both The Washington Post and The New York Times are using more and more news analysis techniques. The Washington Post provided a short interpretive piece called "Transition Notes" during 1980-81. In addition, the Post interrupts the story-line to insert a sub-heading, News Analysis. However, the copy is interpretive in some instances without that insert. The amount of leeway or interpretive elements used still depends on the individual reporter. Some reporters naturally write more

freely than others. In some instances, news analysis is used in mundane stories. While in some pieces, news analysis would be very appropriate, but the writer doesn't choose to comment. In the end, it is the writer's own individual decision.

All four publications, increased the variety of stories printed. Stories about the presidential staff became much more common. And detailed portraits of the presidential family and circle of friends became more common. The process of selecting the Cabinet received increasingly detailed examination by the media. There was an increased attention to informal power structures rather than just formal ones. The question of ethics in government was a popular theme in all three transitions, and individual financial records were given close scrutiny.

The magazines updated their layout and graphics techniques. The 1980-81 transition stories had much more white space, less black than the early transitions. The magazines also increased the use of photographs to illustrate their stories. And the photographs were more likely to catch the politician off guard. Fewer staged shots were used by 1980-81. The newspapers also updated their layout and graphics techniques. More white space was used by 1976-77 and 1980-81. The newspapers used more photographs to illustrate their stories. The photographs, however, appeared to be more flattering to the political leaders that they captured. The photographs were more "traditional" in nature than the magazine in photographs.

All in all, the four publications under examination went through a series of changes between 1968 and 1981. What became increasingly apparent, was the importance of the individual reporter, columnist, or

editorialist to the article itself. There was an increasing emphasis on the individual political actor--the journalist. Writers became less constrained by the dictates of their field. Writers chose a greater variety of topics to write about, and they had the option of writing in a news-analytical style. And many chose to do so.

Mode

Story units were coded according to whether their content concerning the president-elect or president was neutral, positive, or negative. Neutral stories contained content that was concerned with what the president-elect should do or if the content was simply a listing of the day's events. Sometimes, story units were coded as neutral if there was no "apparent view" or the president-elect, or if the story units contained both positive and negative references concerning the president-elect. Positive story units suggested that the president-elect should do something and that he would do it. In addition, story units were coded as positive if "the apparent view" was positive, or if the story unit was overwhelmingly positive. A story unit was coded as negative if the unit suggested that the president ought to do something but that he wouldn't. In addition, story units were coded as negative if "the apparent view" of the story unit was negative, or if the story unit was overwhelmingly negative in nature.

The coverage of the 1968-69, 1976-77, 1980-81 presidential transitions was overwhelmingly neutral in tone. The transition period is considered to be a time of "healing," of making up and going on with the business of government. The partisan bickering characteristic of a

campaign or of a legislative session has abated to a great degree. And during the presidential transition, the opposition is unusually quiet, for it is not quite kosher to attack the man before he is actually in the job. Criticism, if there is any at all, usually comes from the media or unidentified sources quoted within the media articles (see Appendix B). The exceptions to this was when the president-elect was involved in an internal struggle among his own party members. This happened during the 1976-77 transition, when Carter angered black and labor leaders over his Cabinet choices. And Reagan faced the same type of situation when he ran up against the New Right during his Cabinet selections.

The 1968-69, 1976-77, 1980-81 transition coverage was for the most part neutral or positive in tone (Table 2). Few negative mentions were made. Nixon received less negative mentions than Carter or Reagan. And except for The New York Times, Reagan received less negative mentions than Carter.

A cautionary note on mode analysis. It is important to note that most story units were a composite of neutral, positive, and negative mentions; however, in these instances, one "single evaluation as to the mode" could not be made, so it was coded neutral. Therefore, the results must be regarded as suspect, for much of the richness of the story units was lost due to the quantitative method of coding.

Newsweek: A case study of negativity. However, that "richness" is picked up by the qualitative analysis (see pp. 53-54). An example of such a loss is the evaluation of the story units found in

TABLE 2
MODE OF STORY UNITS: PRO, MEDIA SOURCES

Mode	Number of			Percent			Number of			Percent			Number of		
	Mentions	Pro-Nixon	Nixon	Media Sources	Nixon	Pro-Carter	Media Sources	Carter	Pro-Carter	Media Sources	Carter	Pro-Reagan	Media Sources	Reagan	
<u>The Washington Post</u>															
Neutral	36	36.4	73	57.5	60	38.5	79	66.9	7	8.8	115	76.2			
Positive	57	57.6	46	36.2	80	51.3	18	15.3	66	82.5	14	9.3			
Negative	6	6.1	8	6.3	16	10.3	21	17.8	7	8.8	22	14.6			
TOTAL	99	100.1	127	100.0	156	100.1	118	100.0	80	100.1	151	100.1			
<u>The New York Times</u>															
Neutral	3	9.4	118	81.4	5	10.6	83	72.8	9	11.1	113	75.0			
Positive	26	81.3	23	15.9	39	83.0	23	20.2	64	79.0	14	9.0			
Negative	3	9.4	4	2.8	3	6.4	8	7.0	8	9.9	22	14.0			
TOTAL	32	100.1	145	100.1	47	100.0	114	100.0	81	100.0	149	100.0			
<u>Newsweek</u>															
Neutral	4	12.9	82	83.7	13	21.3	90	86.5	2	10	112	96.0			
Positive	27	87.1	14	14.3	42	68.9	6	5.8	17	85	3	3.0			
Negative	--	--	2	2.0	6	9.8	8	7.7	1	5	1	1.0			
TOTAL	31	100.0	98	100.0	61	100.0	104	100.0	20	100.0	116	100.0			
<u>Time</u>															
Neutral	10	27.8	45	76.3	11	21.2	47	60.3	15	62.5	44	66.0			
Positive	26	72.2	12	20.3	39	75.0	18	23.1	8	33.3	18	27.0			
Negative	--	--	2	3.4	2	3.8	13	16.7	1	4.2	4	6.0			
TOTAL	36	100.0	59	100.0	52	100.0	78	100.1	24	100.0	66	100.1			

NOTE: Media Sources is a summary category including media-reporter sources and media-editorial sources.

Newsweek during the three transition periods under study. While few story units could conclusively be coded as negative (especially during the 1980-81 transition), Newsweek consistently provided more negative coverage than the other three publications (Table 2). Newsweek often went on negative "sprees" that the other publications did not write about. Newsweek provided the only negative depiction of Nixon's relationship with the media and the only negative depiction of Nixon's presidential staff (see pp. 84-85; 87). Newsweek provided a negative view of the Ford defeat that was quite unlike those in the other publications (see pp. 107-108). Newsweek provided a rather severe look at Reagan's friends at Reagan's friends' money (see pp. 159-160). The magazine suggested that the mafia was associated with several of Reagan's friends, and the magazine openly attacked Reagan's supply-side economics and his budget plans (see pp. 160-161; 181). Thus, obviously, the soft approach of thematic analysis is needed to bring out this type of rich detail in the magazine's coverage of the presidential transitions.

Negativity. Although, the quantitative analysis showed that the dominant tone of transition coverage during the three periods under study was neutral, it would be very difficult to generalize from this type of mode analysis. Unfortunately, the quantitative analysis often "missed" the essential nature of the story units. Through a careful thematic analysis, it is possible to suggest that there was an increasing trend towards negative remarks on the part of the press. The copy grew more interpretive and that interpretation was often negative.

Stories on the whole were coded neutral in the quantitative analysis because they were not overwhelmingly positive or negative. However, it is the "build-up" of negative images, themes, etc., that occur in the story units of the national print publications that should be considered when making a judgment concerning the "tone" of the transition coverage.

The Honeymoon Period: Fact or Fiction?

It is not unusual to find that presidential coverage is generally positive and neutral in nature (see Grossman & Kumar, 1981a, pp. 259-261; Kumar & Grossman, 1982, p. 87) during the first months of a new administration. This has typically been called "the Honeymoon Period." The phrase suggests that the mass media give up their aggressive, combative techniques and allow the new guy on the block a chance "at making it." In the literature, it is considered to be a relatively "safe" period, a breathing stretch for the new president. Grossman and Kumar suggest that this term is inappropriate because:

It implies the suspension of self-interest, thus conveying the impression that the President is being given a chance by reporters to get to know his job and relish the fruits of his newly won office for a few weeks before reporters and White House officials resume their traditional role as adversaries. (Grossman & Kumar, 1981a, p. 275).

According to Grossman and Kumar, the mass media and the president are actually in an alliance phase of mutual cooperation (1981a, pp. 275-276). "During the alliance phase cooperation is the rule. News organizations communicate the White House line and channel the ideas and images of the President to their audience" (Grossman & Kumar, 1981a, p. 274). Grossman and Kumar suggests that "a silent partnership" exists between the mass media and the president. "The partnership is based on

two elements: the common definition by both parties of newsworthy items; and the willingness of reporters to provide an unfiltered conduit on which the White House can convey messages to the public" (Grossman & Kumar, 1981a, p. 275). Their study found three types of stories during the alliance period: (1) human interest; (2) president as policy-maker, personal conduct; and (3) the president's goals and plans.

The findings of this study would suggest that this is an oversimplified view of the early days of a presidency. Traditionally, the literature has suggested that because the president-elect isn't actively involved in carrying out policy, the press wouldn't criticize his performance. For this reason, it has been suggested that there is "a period of grace" that exists for the new president. This traditional view has been supported by studies that have suggested that the relatively positive-neutral tone of the transition coverage illustrated this phenomenon (see Grossman & Kumar, 1981a). While it is true, that the president-elect and his fledgling administration have no constitutional power, this does not mean that the press ignores their political preparation for their "stab" at the presidency.

Transition stories do evolve around the three areas that Grossman and Kumar have suggested (1981a, p. 275). In the beginning, stories are concerned with personalities. Human interest, personal conduct, and personal goals are areas of "show and tell" for the working journalist. Stories concern themselves with the "new faces" in the "new" administration. However, there was not evidence to suggest that the press "provide an unfiltered conduit" for the presidency. It is the contention of this study that the neutral-positive tone found during

the beginning months of a presidency, is a product of two separate operating variables. First, the positive-neutral tone is a function of the type of stories written. And, these types of stories are deceptively neutral in nature. In that, the stories generated would not fall under the policy-analytical-hard-hitting-stories associated with "critical" or "negative" coverage. In addition, the stories are written in such a way that they are not totally negative or totally positive. And this brings us to the second factor, the nature of the quantitative mode analysis. As stated previously, negative mentions within a given story unit are often ignored when there are also positive mentions within the story unit. For this reason, a quantitative mode analysis often results in a deceiving picture of news coverage. The story unit, even though it is smaller than the article itself, is still too large to collapse into a given label. Thus, the richness of the content is often lost in analysis. It is only through the "soft" thematic analysis that the true tone of the story unit can be reconstructed (see Frank, 1973, p. 24). Articles may appear neutral in the quantitative analysis, but if the same negative themes are used again and again throughout the other "neutral" story units, then there begins to be a cumulative effect. Simply stated, a series of four neutral stories that contain negative elements may "set the tone . . . , may develop a news theme, which will affect the presentation and the reception of a fifth news story" (Frank, 1973, p. 24). And that is how stereotypes are born. For instance, the discussions concerning Ronald Reagan's acting career and his wealthy friends (see pp. 159-161; 172-176) appear trivial at first until the entire "context" or Gestalt package of the passages are

considered. What came before it; what came with it; and, what came after it? Two powerful political images might have gone ignored if only the "hard" quantitative content analysis had been used. The "soft" thematic analysis aided the author in the careful reconstruction of media themes.

Issues

For purposes of analysis, issues were clustered into six categories: economic problems; general governmental problems and philosophy of government; foreign policy; social problems; relations with the general public and the mass media; and miscellaneous (see Appendix A). One hundred-forty-seven issues were examined.

Personality and Issue Images

In recent years, researchers have suggested that the number of personality images in the press far outweigh the number of issues presented (see Greenstein, 1965; Edelman, 1964; & McGinnis, 1969). Graber somewhat tempered this in 1971, when she found that while images were mentioned more frequently than issues, it was not in "landslide proportions." The ratio which she found was 44 percent issues to 56 percent images (Graber, 1971, p. 77). This study revealed that issues far outnumbered personality images in the coverage of the transitions. In 1968-69, the ratio of personality images to issues was: 31 percent to 69 percent for The Washington Post; 14 percent to 86 percent for The New York Times; 19 percent to 81 percent for Newsweek; and 15 percent to 85 percent for Time. In 1976-77, the ratio of personality images to issues was: 24 percent to 76 percent for The Washington Post; 16

percent to 84 percent for The New York Times; 14 percent to 86 percent for Newsweek; and 15 percent to 85 percent for Time. And in 1980-81, the ratio of personality images to issues was: 12 percent to 88 percent for The Washington Post; 7 percent to 93 percent for The New York Times; 17 percent to 83 percent for Newsweek; and, 22 percent to 78 percent for Time.

Personalistic Encapsulations

However, this too may be misleading. For, the issues were couched in "personalistic encapsulations" (Pool, 1965, p. 177). Issues were associated with leaders, and in many ways, the issues and the personality merged as one. Individual politicians were pictured as active creatures. Issues were shaped and defined by the individual. "Law and Order" was Richard M. Nixon. "Human Rights" was Jimmy Carter, and "A Strong Defense" was Ronald Reagan. Issues were viewed most oftenly as conflicts between individuals. During the transition, these "conflicts" were often between the president and president-elect, between members of the president-elect's staff, and between members of the campaign organization and the transition organization. Like the Gans study (1979) and Tuchman study (1981), it was found that political leaders were often pictured as being in combat with reified social and economic forces (see p. 36).

According to Dahlgreen (1981), whether the political leaders are pitted in battles against other political figures or impersonal forces, the results are the same. Issues are depicted as personal conflicts, and for that reason, the public is "dependent" on the political

leaders to solve these "personal conflicts" that affect all the people. Certainly, this study would support such a concept. For, not only are issues presented in personalistic encapsulations but also that which is presented is a very shallow representation of the political realities of the day.

Traditionally, the political leaders themselves have been blamed for the "shallowness" of issue discussion. Patterson (1980) maintains that political leaders like to use "diffuse issues" that are roughly just very, very broad policy proposals (pp. 31-33). A call for a healthy economy and peace at home and abroad are two examples of diffuse issues. On the other hand, Patterson (1980) suggests that journalists prefer "clear-cut issues" that "rest on principle rather than complex detail or relationships" (pp. 31-23). Although, this description alludes to the shallow nature of the media coverage, Patterson's writing seems to suggest that the journalists' pursuit of these "clear-cut issues" (such as abortion, nuclear disarmament, etc.) in some way better educates the voter than does the politicians' "diffuse issues" (see Patterson, 1980, pp. 156-165). Media exposure is highly correlated with issue awareness.

However, the findings of this study would suggest that there is very little real difference between "diffuse" and "clear-cut" issues in terms of issue treatment. Just because a discussion of an issue is divisive in the case of the "clear-cut" issues and people remember the "names" of these issues does not necessarily mean that issue coverage has been in-depth.

Knowledge About and Acquaintance With Political Activities

An important distinction must be made between issue awareness and actual knowledge about issues. Issue awareness in most political studies is in reality the ability of the respondent to "name" or "label" an issue. Researchers have associated the ability to "name" issues with the respondent's media exposure (see Patterson, 1980). However, there is a very real difference between being "acquainted with" an issue and being able to "name" it than really knowing about an issue and being able to discuss the complexities of the issue in an analytical fashion. This distinction was first made by Robert Park in 1940 when he suggested that news provides man with "acquaintance with" events not "knowledge about" events. According to Park, the news serves to orient man in his political work by naming political issues and events. Often this naming is presented because of the controversial nature of particular subjects (1940, pp. 669-686). For this reason, an individual is more likely to remember a controversial "naming" such as abortion than the more nebulous issue of peace. This issue awareness should not necessarily be linked with the concept of "knowledge about." News provides very little opportunity for "formal knowledge" to be acquired from its content (see Park, 1940, p. 669).

All in all, issues presented in both the newspapers and magazines were little more than buzz-words. Nixon's plan for "black capitalism," Carter's plan for "zero-base budgeting," and Reagan's plan for a "strong America" were all themes in the transition coverage. But readers knew very little more than the "naming" of these issues. The "how," "when," and "why" of these issues were not discussed. The coverage of the

issues could not be considered to be an "in-depth" treatment. In rare instances, newspaper stories would contain some definitions of concepts and some discussion on the merits or disadvantages of these concepts. But in general, little was presented that would provide the individual with the opportunity to acquire "formal knowledge."

Informal Power and Political Process in News Coverage

Golding (1981) has suggested that political news lacks the concepts of informal power and political process (pp. 76-77). Golding suggests that institutional power is stressed while informal power is ignored (see this text for discussion, pp. 37-38). However, this study did not suggest this. On the contrary, there has been a marked increase in the attention paid to informal power. This has probably been brought about for a number of reasons: the president's increased reliance on a personal staff; the growing fragmented nature of American politics; and, the growing consciousness of political intrigue and wrongdoings since the mid-1960s. Although the news media under study did discuss informal power, the accounts did little to explain the processes of government. Rather, it often served to distort the nature of politics in America. For a rather peculiar distinction is made: (1) the job description is a legitimate power source (institutional power, formal power), and (2) an individual's personal power (informal power) is an illegitimate power source. The word "politics" has been defined as informal power; and, for that reason, many journalists picture political persuasion, negotiations, and compromise as a corrupt process. In many ways, to suggest that someone is political has come to suggest that someone is evil, corrupt (see Crick, 1972, pp. 15-34). Thus, even

though the mass media is not paying attention to "informal power," the media reporters as a whole do not understand the role of power or politics in a democratic society. Like a young child observing adults playing bridge, journalists watch the shuffling maneuvers, the feinting, the mind-reading gambits, but they do not know the rules of the game.

For the most part, political news is without process. Issues and events are written about in succession, but they are often depicted as unrelated, separate entities. Thus, political news is often ahistorical in nature. Only the very rare news analysis piece attempts to grapple with the processual nature of political events.

Issue Agendas for Three Presidential Transitions

During the 1968-69 transition, the issue agendas for The Washington Post, The New York Times, Newsweek and Time varied to some degree (see Appendixes C, D, E). The Washington Post concentrated on foreign policy and domestic policy. The New York Times concentrated on general governmental problems and philosophy and foreign policy (see Table 3). Newsweek emphasized the governmental problems and philosophy and relations with the public and the mass media. Time emphasized general governmental problems and philosophy and foreign policy (see Table 3; for more detail concerning specific issues see Appendix D).

However, during the 1968-69 transition, there was a good deal of similarity between what the newspapers and magazines chose to quote from the pro-president-elect-sources and what the reporters themselves chose to write about (see Appendix G). Issue agendas appeared to be

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the creation of individual reporters during the 1968-69 transition, but the publications were internally consistent in their presentation of issues to the public.

During the 1976-77 transition, the issue agenda of the four publications were very similar in content (see Appendixes C, D, E; see Table 4). However, when the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient test is computed between what the newspapers and magazines chose to quote from the pro-president-elect sources and what the reporters themselves chose to write about, some differences emerge for Newsweek and The Washington Post (see Appendix G). Neither The Washington Post nor Newsweek followed the pro-president-sources' lead and emphasized domestic policy; rather, the two publications emphasized foreign policy.

During the 1980-81 transition, the issue agendas of The Washington Post, The New York Times, Newsweek, and Time were very similar (see Table 5; Appendixes C, D, E). When the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient test is computed between what the newspapers and magazines chose to quote from the pre-president-elect sources and what the reporters themselves chose to write about, some differences emerge (see Appendix G). The Washington Post, The New York Times, and Time were very consistent in what was quoted and what was presented as issues of the day. However, Newsweek's coverage presented a rather discordant view in terms of what the pro-sources said were "the issues of the day" and what the reporters said were "the issues of the day."

It is useful to examine the four publications over the three transition periods (see Appendix G). Newsweek consistently provided the public with the most discordant view of the world. Newsweek

ISSUE CATEGORIES
PRESIDENTIAL

Issue Categories	<u>The</u> <u>Washington</u>	Number of Mentions	nt	<u>Time</u>	Number of Mentions	Percent
	<u>Post</u> <u>Rank</u>			<u>Rank</u>		
Economic Problems	1	65		2	35	20.0
General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government	3	51		1	80	45.7
Foreign Policy	2	60		3	29	16.6
Social Problems	5	39		5	15	8.6
Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media	4	<u>43</u>		4	<u>16</u>	<u>9.1</u>
TOTAL		258			175	100.0

Mentions

Economic Problems	2	61		3	38	12.1
General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government	1	153		1	176	55.9
Foreign Policy	3	46		2	40	12.7
Social Problems	4	35		5	27	8.6
Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media	5	<u>24</u>		4	<u>34</u>	<u>10.8</u>
TOTAL		319			315	100.1

NOTE: Other Sources is a summary category of all sources.

ISSUE CATEGORIES
PRESIDENTIAL

Issue Categories	<u>The</u> <u>Washington</u>	Number of Mentions	Rank	Time Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
	<u>Post</u> Rank					
Economic Problems	1	65	1	2	35	20.0
General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government	3	51	2	1	80	45.7
Foreign Policy	2	60	1	3	29	16.6
Social Problems	5	39	1	5	15	8.6
Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media	4	<u>43</u>	2	4	<u>16</u>	<u>9.1</u>
TOTAL		258	1		175	100.0

Men						
Economic Problems	2	61	1	3	38	12.1
General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government	1	153	1	1	176	55.9
Foreign Policy	3	46	1	2	40	12.7
Social Problems	4	35	1	5	27	8.6
Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media	5	<u>24</u>	1	4	<u>34</u>	<u>10.8</u>
TOTAL		319	1		315	100.1

NOTE: Other Sources is a summary of all sources.

exhibits the greatest disparity between the pro-sources and the media-sources generally. The Washington Post, The New York Times, and Time generally have a fairly high degree of association between the pro-sources and media sources. This was true except for the Carter transition when both national newspapers dropped somewhat.

Role Traits

The role traits expressed by the pro-president-elect sources and the media sources served a very important function. For, it is through the roles that are developed around the president-elect that all the issues are understood. As it was mentioned earlier, issues are couched in personalistic encapsulations. All points of interest are viewed with the president-elect's leadership role in mind. It is the key to his performance in office.

The activist president. All four publications seemed to favor "the activist" image of the president. For, when reporters made normative statements about the presidency in general, the comments were related to the powerful "Leader" role. This emphasis suggests a form of liberal bias that is also common in political science academia (see p. 30). The newspapers and magazines wanted a president who would take hold of a situation. In short, the publications wanted a president who had power and knew how to use it and keep it. A great deal of attention was placed on informal power over formal power. The news media were interested in a president who had both.

Presidential paradoxes. Thomas Cronin (1977) introduced the phenomena of presidential paradoxes that often place a president in a true political dilemma. The operation of these paradoxes were very clear in terms of media coverage and partisan comment. Interestingly enough, the reporters often contradicted themselves when evaluating the presidents-elect in terms of leadership traits. For instance, Jimmy Carter was pictured as having little political savvy, so these remarks were coded that he did not have partisan traits. And, the story unit could be potentially coded as negative. However, the same reporter would say in another article that Carter was "cutting too many deals" in his Cabinet selection. This time it was coded that Carter was partisan. And, the story unit was potentially coded as negative. This mix-mash of reporters' comments provide an interesting insight into their news value system. And it provides, for a rather startling look at the tight-rope that politicians walk. Similarly, political influentials themselves exhibited contradictory perscriptions for presidential leadership traits. Jimmy Carter was regarded as "too religious" by many when he entered the White House, but the Moral Majority was soon telling him that he "wasn't religious enough." Nixon was praised for being a leader of all the people, but at the same time, his own party criticized him for not being more of a partisan.

Presidential leadership traits in three presidential transitions.

During the 1968-69 presidential transition, the national newspapers presented a similar depiction of presidential role traits (see Table 6; Appendixes F, G). However, this was not true for the magazines. Time

Role Categories	<u>The</u> <u>Washington</u>		<u>Time</u>		<u>Number</u>	
	Post Number of Mentions Pro	Percent Pro	Number of Mentions Pro	Percent Pro	of Mentions Media Sources	Percent Media Sources
The Leader	1	100.0	1	100.0	--	--
The Decision-Maker	--	4	--	--	--	--
The Manager	--	--	--	--	--	--
The Partisan	1	--	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	1	100.0	1	100.0	--	--
The Leader	32	57.9	13	61.9	13	39.4
The Decision-Maker	16	28.6	7	33.3	6	18.2
The Manager	8	14.8	1	4.8	13	39.4
The Partisan	--	9	--	--	1	3.0
TOTAL	56	100.0	21	100.0	33	100.0
The Leader	--	5	--	--	--	--
The Decision-Maker	--	5	--	--	--	--
The Manager	--	--	--	--	--	--
The Partisan	3	100.0	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	3	100.0	--	--	--	--

portrayed Nixon as a combination of the "Leader" and the "Manager," rather than as a Leader/Decision-maker like the other three publications (see Table 6; Appendix F). In addition, Time presented a discordant view in its discussion of presidential leadership in that the magazine quoted pro-sources that depicted Nixon as a Leader/Decision-maker but the journalists discussed Nixon as a Leader/Manager (see Table 6; Appendix F). The other three publications followed the pro-sources that they quoted in presenting Nixon as a Leader/Decision-maker (see Table 6; Appendix F).

During the 1976-77 transition, the newspapers and magazines were different in their approach to the Carter persona. The newspapers were very similar in their portrayal of Carter (see Table 7; Appendixes F, G). However, the magazines presented two distinct pictures. Newsweek viewed Carter as a combination of the Decision-maker and the Leader. But, Time saw Carter as primarily a Manager with supporting Partisan and Leader traits (see Table 7; Appendix F). Both The Washington Post and Newsweek presented similar pro-source quotes and media comments concerning the Carter persona (see Table 7; Appendix G). But The New York Times and Time did not follow the pro-sources lead and depict Carter as being primarily a Decision-maker with supporting traits of the Leader. Rather, both publications described Carter as having Manager role traits (see Table 7; Appendix G).

During the 1980-81 presidential transition, both the newspapers and magazines provided a highly similar view of Reagan's political persona (see Table 8; Appendixes F, G). The Washington Post and The New York Times presented Reagan as a combination of the Decision-maker and

Role Categories	<u>The Washington Post</u>		<u>Time</u>		<u>Number of Mentions</u>	
	Number of Mentions Pro	Percent Pro	Number of Mentions Pro	Percent Pro	Media Sources	Percent Media Sources
The Leader	--	--3	--	--	5	100.0
The Decision-Maker	--	--3	--	--	--	--
The Manager	--	--	--	--	--	--
The Partisan	--	--3	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	--	--9	--	--	5	100.0

The Leader	36	62.7	12	46.2	5	23.8
The Decision-Maker	18	31.7	11	42.3	15	71.4
The Manager	--	--6	1	3.8	1	4.8
The Partisan	4	6.7	2	7.7	--	--
TOTAL	58	100.0	26	100.0	21	100.0

The Leader	1	16.7	--	--	--	--
The Decision-Maker	3	50.0	--	--	1	20.0
The Manager	1	16.7	--	--	--	--
The Partisan	1	16.7	--	--	3	60.0
TOTAL	6	100.0	--	--	5	100.0

the Leader. However, Time and Newsweek ignored much of the late Reagan rhetoric concerning his "leader" traits, and the two magazines continued to picture him as the Decision-maker (see Table 8; Appendixes F, G).

Looking at an overview of the four publications during the three transitions, Time showed the lowest similarity between its pro-source mentions and its media-source mentions (see Appendix G). The Washington Post and The New York Times generally show a high degree of association (see Appendix G). And although Newsweek consistently provided the most negative coverage of the presidents-elect, the magazine's positive mentions followed the pro-sources fairly closely.

Conclusions

The national newsweeklies are the least likely to follow the president-elect's lead in terms of issue and role trait discussion. Time and Newsweek seem much more independent of the influence from the "new" White House. Newsweek consistently presents more negative coverage of the president-elect and his transition operations than does Time. And, Time and Newsweek are more likely to differ in terms of themes generated in their transition coverage than the national newspapers.

The Washington Post and The New York Times are more likely to follow the president-elect's lead in terms of issue and role trait discussion of transition news than do the national newsweeklies.

The transition coverage although varying from newspaper to newspaper and from magazine to magazine is remarkably similar in nature. The same issues and people are discussed. Obviously, this stems from

a common definition of news. And interestingly, the same people are quoted again and again. Often the same quotes occurred word-for-word in two or more publications. Obviously, when the president or the president-elect makes a public address this can be expected. However, in general, other comments made by aides, friends, associates, and unidentified individuals were often remarkably the same. This suggests source standardization. The reporters have routinized procedures they follow in writing a story, and obviously these procedures must be similar for the various publications, because they are running across the same individuals.

In some instances, the same person is being quoted on the same thing at the same time in different publications. But, something happens that all journalism professors fear, the reader finds several versions of the same interview, speech, statement, etc. And all of the material is placed within quotation marks. Someone has misquoted, but who? Was it deliberate? And why?

All in all, The Washington Post, The New York Times, Time and Newsweek provide a rather homogenized view of presidential transitions.

CHAPTER IX

A PRESIDENT'S PUBLIC CHARACTER IN RETROSPECT

Most Presidents have preferred to cite poor management or media hostility as the explanation for their poor reception by the public rather than any problems with their performance or with the content of their messages. (Kumar & Grossman, 1981b, p. 105)

Presidents and presidents-elect must come to realize the importance of their public character, for how these leaders behave and the language they use often determines the success or failure of their administrations. During a transition period, the president-elect's public character is just being born; it is here that it is most crucial to exercise impression management wisely. The president-elect must "conduct himself with awareness of the image of the man-in-action he is creating in the public mind, and its portent for his post-inaugural success" (Henry, 1960, p. 714).

A president or president-elect must come to know his central role and guard against possible type violations by portraying his persona consistently and meeting the demands placed on him consistently. A president or president-elect must work to achieve an "active, coping" persona, for it is that type of leader that is preferred in the American political culture. The president or president-elect should be skillful in dramatizing his actions. The temptation to retreat and pursue "a rose garden" strategy should be avoided at all costs, for this course of action gives up the president's right "to define the situation." And suddenly, the president would find that his "persona" is in the

manipulative hands of others. The president and president-elect must keep a close watch over his aides and Cabinet. Those around him must speak with one clear voice. Conflicts between staff or Cabinet members should be given a high priority, for public conflict only hurts the presidential image. And, if all else fails, and a violation-of-type occurs or if the president has allowed his persona to get away from him, then the president and his aides and Cabinet should pursue an adaptation strategy.

Of the three transitions studied, Nixon came closest to following this advice. He received a far "better press" than did Carter or Reagan. Reagan was pursuing a disastrous course at one point, but he and his aides and Cabinet-in-waiting, suddenly struck an adaptation strategy that in the end saved him from a disabling transition. Carter was not so fortunate. In a very real way, the entire Carter transition was a violation of type, and it set the stages for his enfeebled presidency.

CHAPTER X

IMPLICATIONS

Limitations of Study

Content analysis implies the standard procedures of scientific investigation: the formulation of explicit propositions, the development of categories of analysis, and the collection of standardized bits of information needed to assess the adequacy of the initial formulations. (Janowitz, 1969, pp. 161-162)

However, content analysis also implies a researcher's personal decision of what to focus his data-gathering around. It is always possible that some other path of study might have proved more fruitful. By deciding what to measure, the researcher limits to some extent what he or she will find.

The Washington Post, The New York Times, Newsweek, and Time are all "majors" in the print publication field (see pp. 8-10). These newspapers and magazines serve as important political indicators for the Washington community and also serve as "a journalistic model" for the rest of the media throughout the United States. For this reason, the study allows generalizations to the American press coverage as a whole.

Strengths of the Study

This study involved a comparative analysis over three time periods. In addition, the study involved a medium analysis (newspaper v. newspaper; magazine v. magazine) which exposes differences in coverage between the newspapers, and between the news magazines. And, the study involved an opportunity to examine the subject area longitudinally.

Differences in media coverage of presidential transitions across time were exposed as well as differences in transition coverage across time within the same publication. Few studies have employed a comparative design across time and across mediums (see Patterson, 1978, p. 182; Adams, 1978, p. 23).

The study of the 1968-69, 1976-77, 1980-81 presidential transitions allowed for an analysis of the party overturn transition. It also allowed for the study of an incumbent-transition and a non-incumbent transition.

Recommendations for Future Research

Future research should involve a variety of media as samples. The next stage of this research should involve an examination of the ABC, NBC, CBS network television news programs. This author is already involved in this research project and has received a grant from The University of Alabama's School of Communication's Research and Service Committee. In addition, future research should look at regional and local newspapers to see how the information supplied from the "majors" is picked up and altered. Studies should span additional time periods in order for a more comprehensive comparative analysis.

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APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

CODING CATEGORIES

CODING CATEGORIES

1968-1969, 1976-1977, 1980-1981National Newspapers and National News Magazines

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Columns</u>	<u>Code</u>
001	1	Media Vehicle 1 <u>The New York Times</u> 2 <u>The Washington Post</u> 3 <u>Newsweek</u> 4 <u>Time</u>
002	2,3,4,5, 6,7	Month (2,3); Day (4,5); Year (6,7). Month 01--12 Day 01--31 Year 68, 69, 76, 77, 80, 81
003	8--11	Story Number
004	12--15	Position (If newspaper, Note Section 12-13, for example A=01, B=02, . . . Z=24. Page number 14-15; if magazine, give page number, 0001-9999.) 0001-9999
005	16--19	Miscellaneous

Columns 1 through 19. Information for these columns is recorded for each story unit within each article. Therefore, the same article number may appear several times. This indicates that the article contains separate story units, each recording a separate event, e.g., at a large rally; or, the story may contain several avenues of discussion, e.g., a discussion of the president-elect's policy preferences, his family life, and a discussion of his Cabinet appointees by several sources. For each discussion, codable information beyond the mere mentioning must be available.

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Columns</u>	<u>Code</u>
006	20-21	To Whom Addressed (primarily)
		01 Newspaper Audience (i.e., source interviewed by reporter)
		02 Magazine Audience
		03 Press Conference (formal; diverse media representation)
		04 TV Audience
		05 Radio Audience
		06 Large Open Meeting (more than 10,000)
		07 Small Open Meeting
		08 Small Group, Advisers
		09 Ethnic Audience
		10 Economic or Professional Groups (Groups organized to pursue specific economic and occupational interests)
		11 Status Groups (Diverse economic and professional backgrounds, but share a common political outlook; primary activity is political; ex., party gatherings, local political organizations, veterans, students, groups of Congressmen)
		12 Service or Church Group (organized for social or religious purposes, ex., B'nai Brith, Moral Majority)
		13 Other (should be used if primary addressee is mentioned but is not one of the first 12 responses or the thirteenth; ex., a press release not directed to any specific group)
		14 Not obvious (should be coded if there appears to be a primary addressee who cannot be readily identified as part of the first 13 categories or the 15th.)
		15 Broadcast Audience (Should be coded when the distinction of radio or television is not made.)
007	22-23	Who Said It (Source)
		01 Anchor of Broadcast
		02 Reporter(s) (broadcast or print)
		03 Commentary (editorial, opinion sections, columnists)
		04 Other news organization's copy presented (other than wire services)
		05 Wire Services
		06 Polls (network, wire, independent sponsor, private political, news organization)

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Columns</u>	<u>Code</u>
		07 Cartoon
		08 Caption of Cartoon
		09 President-elect
		10 President-elect's family, party members (including legislators), and staff
		11 New Appointees
		12 Out-going President
		13 Out-going President's family, party members (including legislators), and staff
		14 Out-going President's Cabinet
		15 Identified news source without known political affiliation
		16 Unidentified new source
		17 Several
		18 Other
008	24	Audience Response (at speech occasion)
		1 Strong Applause
		2 Mild Applause
		3 Not Mentioned
		4 Mild Opposition (neutral)
		5 Strong Opposition
		6 Not Applicable
		7 Large Emotional Response; Direction Unknown
009	25	Press Critique of President-elect, President, or Source (direct expressions of opinions in Categories 01, 02, 05).
		1 Strong Approval
		2 Mild Approval
		3 Not Mentioned
		4 Mild Opposition
		5 Strong Opposition
		6 Not Applicable
		Does not apply to editorials, opinion polls, and reports of expressed opposition or support by others.
010	26	President or President-elect Discussed by Source
		1 L. B. Johnson
		2 R. M. Nixon
		3 G. Ford
		4 J. Carter
		5 R. Reagan

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Columns</u>	<u>Code</u>
		6 Previous past presidents (before LBJ)
		7 Presidency in General
		8 President-elects in General
		9 Not Applicable
011	27	Political Party Discussed by Source
		1 Democratic
		2 Republican
		3 Third Party (recognized)
		4 Other
		5 Parties in General (Several)
		6 Not Applicable

General Topics

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Columns</u>	<u>Code</u>
012	28-30	<u>General Topic of Story Unit</u>
013	31-33	
014	34-36	
015	37-39	
016	40-42	
017	43-45	
018	46-48	
019	49-51	
020	52-54	
021	55-57	

All topics are to be coded, using the order of appearance in the story unit. First topic coded in Cols. 28, 29, & 30, the second topic coded in Cols. 31, 32, & 33, the third in 34, 35, & 36, the fourth in 37, 38, & 39, the fifth in 40, 41, & 42, the sixth in 43, 44, & 45, the seventh in 46, 47, & 48, the eighth in 49, 50, & 51, the ninth in 52, 53, & 54, and the tenth in 55, 56, & 57. If more than ten topics are discussed, code Cols. 55, 56, & 57 129 (Miscellaneous). Mark Coding Sheet of others. Rarely if ever will this be used. If fewer than ten topics are mentioned, the remaining columns are coded 000. Once a topic is coded, it may not be re-coded for that story unit.

Codes for topics are listed under subject groupings with each topic appearing in one group only. The following groupings have been used:

Economic Problems: Includes topics which stress economic aspects primarily.

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Columns</u>	<u>Code</u>
		<u>General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government</u>
		<u>Foreign Policy:</u> Includes U.S. Policy and International Politics
		<u>Social Problems:</u> Includes Topics which stress social policy aspects primarily: quality of life; social interactions
		<u>Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media</u>
		<u>Miscellaneous:</u> Rarely mentioned topics which do not fit under any general category. Col. reserved for those story units with more than ten topics.

*Note there are general categories, e.g., economic policy, and specific categories, e.g., inflation. Specific categories should be used whenever available. They identify major foci of transition discussion or foci of special interest to the investigator. General categories are reserved for items for which no specific category is available.

Economic Problems

- 001 General Economic Policy and Fiscal Policy
- 002 Interest Rates
- 003 Monetary Policy (Valuation)
- 004 Relationship with the Federal Reserve
- 005 Labor Policy (general attitudes about, relationship with)
- 006 Business Policy (relationship with, suggestions for private sector)
- 007 Business Subsidies (Chrysler, Amtrak)
- 008 Farm Policy (including subsidies)
- 009 Energy Policy (factors affecting energy policy, e.g., OPEC)
- 010 Unemployment, Jobs
- 011 Inflation
- 012 Taxes, Tax Incentives, Tax Cuts and Increases
- 013 Wage and Price Controls, voluntary and involuntary
- 014 Government Borrowing and Spending (a balanced budget)
- 015 Balance of Trade, Trade Deficit
- 016 Stock Market, Investments
- 017 Economic Growth or Decline, State of Economy
- 018 Economic Aspects of Welfare State and Social Democracy

- 019 Guaranteed Income
- 020 Revenue Sharing
- 021 City Bail-outs (New York)
- 022 Campaign Financing and Federal Matching Funds

General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government

- 023 Presidential Relations with the Vice President
- 024 Presidential Relations with the Congress
- 025 Presidential Relations with the Supreme Court
- 026 Presidential Relations with the Federal Bureaucracy
- 027 Presidential Relations with the Cabinet, and Senate Confirmation of
- 028 Presidential Relations with the Presidential Staff
- 029 Presidential Relations with the State and Local Governments
- 030 Presidential Relations with his own Political Party
- 031 Regular Functions of Political Parties (including the nominating process, policy process, appeals to constituents, party officers in Congress)
- 032 Bipartisanship
- 033 Interest Groups (traditional)
- 034 The Presidency (nominations, style, "leadership of the country," "representative of the people," advantages of incumbency, philosophy of the presidency, "role" of the presidency. Use "Presidential Role Traits" list, but also use this code in "topic" section if the Presidency in general, is one of the first ten topics discussed.
- 035 Ideology in General
- 036 Conservatism (the fight for the middle or the right of the road)
- 037 Populist Philosophy (the little guy)
- 038 Big Guy Philosophy (Big Business)
- 039 Middle America Philosophy ("American Dream," capitalism, individualism, "work ethic.")
- 040 Social Democracy (Equality Emphasis; Planned or Managed Economy), Federal Activism
- 041 Market Economy (Protestant work ethic, profits; differing from 034 in its orientations. 034 is a more popularized concept used in appealing to voters. 037 is a more concrete discussion of capitalism vs. socialism.)
- 042 Basic Value Structure (rule of law, constitutionality, democratic institutions, upholding democratic process)
- 043 Ethical Conduct of Government in General
- 044 Electoral College Reform, Election Reform in General
- 045 Reorganization of Bureaucracy
- 046 Reduce size of Government; Federal hiring cuts; Hiring freeze
- 047 Federalism
- 048 Immigration Quotas, Illegal Aliens, Cuban Refugees, Vietnamese Quotas
- 049 Nuclear Energy Debate
- 050 Federal Bureau of Investigation, the activities of, the organization of, the leaders of, relationship with

- 051 Regulations, Deregulations
- 052 Republican Policies in General
- 053 Democratic Policies in General
- 054 Third Party Policies in General
- 055 Opinion Polls (Discussion of use of)
- 056 Nixon's Policies in General
- 057 Carter's Policies in General
- 058 Reagan's Policies in General
- 059 Nixon's Transition Period Procedures
- 060 Carter's Transition Period Procedures
- 061 Reagan's Transition Period Procedures
- 062 Transition Periods in General (Discussion of incumbent's transition procedures)
- 063 Inauguration

Foreign Policy

- 064 Foreign Policy (in general, or to a specific situation stating what the United States should do)
- 065 International Politics (general discussion of international situation, to diplomatic relations, ex., discussion of what NATO should do. Not directly specific to United States.)
- 066 Defense (General U.S. Defense Policies and Problems, Military Spending in General)
- 067 Traditional Defense (fighting men, rifles, tanks)
- 068 Hardware Defense (Nuclear arms)
- 069 Arms Control
- 070 Amnesty for Vietnam deserters and dodgers
- 071 Volunteer Army
- 072 War Crime Trials
- 073 Central Intelligence Agency (activities of, investigation of, organization of, leaders of, relationship with)
- 074 U.S. Relations with Communist China (includes sale of goods, trade)
- 075 U.W. Relations with U.S.S.R. (includes sale of goods, trade)
- 076 Approach to Communism in General
- 077 Eastern Europe, Europe
- 078 Latin America
- 079 Middle East
- 080 Far East
- 081 Africa
- 082 Puerto Rico (Discussion of Statehood)
- 083 United Nations
- 084 NATO, Western Alliances
- 085 Detente (Discussions, except for arms control)
- 086 Hostage Crisis(es), Terrorism
- 087 Human Rights
- 088 Foreign Aid (military, economic, food)
- 089 Using Food as a Foreign Policy Tool (more directly stated than 088)
- 090 An "Oil" dictated Foreign Policy
- 091 Olympics as a Foreign Policy Tool

- 092 Interventionism, Willingness to Engage Military Forces Overseas
(in general, policemen of the world, helping hand, etc.)
- 093 Linkage in Foreign Policy
- 094 NASA

Social Problems

- 095 Poverty
- 096 The Affluent, The Rich as a Social Problem
- 077 Conservation, Environmental Protection (excluding nuclear energy
debate)
- 098 Housing
- 099 Urban Affairs (problems with inner city living)
- 100 Urban Transportation
- 101 Health Care, Health Insurance, National Health Insurance
- 102 Elderly
- 103 Education
- 104 Law and Order, Crime, Gun Control, Assassination Attempts
- 105 Drugs
- 106 Death Penalty, Criminal Sentencings
- 107 Prison Correctional System, Philosophy of
- 108 Race Relations (Blacks)
- 109 Race Relations (Other ethnics; also related issue groups, e.g.,
Ku Klux Klan, Neo-Natzis, ethnics in general; 097 is specific
to blacks only)
- 110 Integration, Desegregation
- 111 Affirmative Action
- 112 Women's Rights
- 113 Abortion
- 114 Gay Rights, Sexual Freedom
- 115 Religious Toleration, Religious Issues, e.g., Prayer in Schools
- 116 Individual Rights, Privacy, Social Tolerance (more general than
114 or 115)
- 117 Quality of Life, Family Life
- 118 National Unity
- 119 Apathy
- 120 Despair, Negativism
- 121 Censorship
- 122 Social Security, Federal Pensions
- 123 White Collar Crime
- 124 Civil Rights (in general mention)
- 125 Student Aid
- 126 Youth, Problems of, Unrest

Relations With The General Public and The Media

- 127 Creation of Positive Feelings in the Public
- 128 Involvement of or Role of Public in the Decision-making Process
- 129 Perception of Electoral Mandate and Public Support, Election Outcome

- 130 Concern for Building a National Constituency
- 131 Perception of Media Coverage
- 132 Campaign Debates
- 133 Campaign Promises
- 134 Campaign Techniques
- 135 Primaries, Delegates, Caucuses
- 136 Campaign Spending During Election
- 137 The Mass Media Role in the Political Process
- 138 Watergate and its impact on the public and the mass media;
connections with Watergate
- 139 Nixon Pardon
- 140 President-elect's Relationship with the Mass Media
- 141 The President-elect's Press Secretary or an individual performing
these functions
- 142 Freedom of Information Act
- 143 Media Covering Media
- 144 New Right, Relationship with, also coded as 033
- 145 PACS, Relationship with, may also be coded as 033
- 146 Leaks, Secrecy

Miscellaneous

- 147 Used for an article with more than ten topics, and topics which do not fit into any of the general topics. Rarely used.

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Columns</u>	<u>Code</u>
022	58-61	Byline of Media Source
		0001-9999
		0000 No Byline

Presidential Role Traits

Columns 62 through 81, listed on the following pages are coded either 1, 2, 3, 4,

- 1) If Normative. Stated that a President ought to have such a quality or ought to take a certain action.
- 2) If Positive. Stated that a President has the quality under such consideration or would take the action mentioned.
- 3) If Negative. Stated that a President lacks the quality in question or possesses the negative.
- 4) Not Applicable.

If both positive and negative references are made to a category within a coding unit, code as normative. Also, code normative if no specific President is discussed as in 034 in the General Topic Section. Code as if directly addressing a specific president or president-elect, if the comment used a party personified. If the comment refers to past presidents (before L. B. Johnson), Code as a normative statement. If the mode of comment is mixed, code as follows:

a. Positive + Normative = Positive (2)

b. Negative + Normative = Negative (3)

c. Positive + Negative = Normative (1)

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Columns</u>	<u>Code</u>
023-027	62-66	<u>The Leader Role</u>
023	62	Assertive, a man of reason who articulates his convictions, presidential behavior, a man of action
024	63	Cooperative, above politics, deft politically, masterful
025	64	Optimistic, confident
026	65	Integrity, moral exemplar
027	66	Visionary, statesman-like, creative
028-032	67-71	<u>The Decision-Maker Role</u>
028	67	Issue-oriented, practical, aware of limitations, compromises
029	68	Empathic person, cares for people, humane, one of the common man, Middle America
030	69	Cautious
031	70	Honest
032	71	Open, fair, accessible, flexible, not tied to partisan interests
033-037	72-76	<u>The Manager Role</u>
033	72	Believes in the Rational-Actor; attempts to objectify decision, reduce subjectivity

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Columns</u>	<u>Code</u>
034	73	Knowledgeable
035	74	Efficient
036	75	Thorough
037	76	Hardworking
038-042	77-81	<u>The Partisan Role</u>
038	77	Linked to various interests, champion of virious interests
039	78	Advocacy of party platform, spokesman
040	79	Not willing to compromise, stubborn
041	80	Rejects moral exemplar role, but avoids scandals
042	81	Model for future party leaders

Acceptability of Cabinet Appointees

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Columns</u>	<u>Code</u>
043	82	<u>Controversial</u>
		1 Controversial
		2 Non-controversial
		3 Not Obvious
044	83	<u>Qualifications</u>
		1 Qualified
		2 Unqualified
		3 Not Obvious
045	84	<u>Partisanship</u>
		1 Partisan
		2 Non-partisan
		3 Not Obvious
046	85	<u>Interest Group Linkage</u>
		1 Linked with Interest Groups
		2 Independent from Interest Groups
		3 Not Obvious

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Columns</u>	<u>Code</u>
067	86	<u>Similarity of Appointees' Viewpoints and President-Elect's Viewpoints</u>
		1 Similar
		2 Dissimilar
		3 Not Obvious
066	87	<u>The Mode of Mention of Choice</u>
		1 Pro
		2 Con
		3 Neutral
		4 Not Obvious

Manner of Man

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Columns</u>	<u>Code</u>
067	88	<u>Personal Activity</u>
		1 Active
		2 Passive
		3 Not Obvious
068	89	<u>Personal Enjoyment</u>
		1 Does Enjoy
		2 Does Not Enjoy
		3 Not Obvious

Biographical Information

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Columns</u>	<u>Code</u>
069	90	<u>Experience/Record</u>
		1 Good
		2 Bad
		3 Indifferent
070	91	<u>The Man</u>
		1 Good
		2 Bad
		3 Indifferent

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Columns</u>	<u>Code</u>
071	92	<u>Age</u>
		1 Good
		2 Bad
		3 Indifferent
072	93	<u>Education</u>
		1 Good
		2 Bad
		3 Indifferent
073	94	<u>Religion</u>
		1 Good
		2 Bad
		3 Indifferent
074	95	<u>Family</u>
		1 Good
		2 Bad
		3 Indifferent
075	96	<u>Commentary Critique of President-elect,</u> <u>President</u> (expressions of opinions in <u>Source Categories 03, 06, 07, 08)</u>
		1 Strong Approval
		2 Mild Approval
		3 Not Mentioned
		4 Mild Opposition
		5 Strong Opposition
067	97	<u>Mode of Story Unit</u>
		1 Pro
		2 Con
		3 Neutral
		4 Not Obvious

Informal Thematic Analysis

1. List words or phrases illustrating the "theme" or "spine" of the story unit.
2. Are there any possible significant factors found in this article which were untouched by the quantitative content analysis?

APPENDIX B

MODE OF STORY UNITS

TABLE 9

1968-69 TRANSITION: MODE OF STORY UNITS, PRO, CON, AND UNIDENTIFIED SOURCES,
MEDIA-REPORTER, AND MEDIA-EDITORIAL SOURCES

Mode	Number of Mentions		Percent Pro	Number of Mentions Con		Percent Con	Number of Mentions Unidentified		Percent Unidentified	Number of Mentions Media-Reporter		Percent Media-Reporter	Number of Mentions Media-Editorial		Percent Media-Editorial	PERCENT SUMMARY
	Pro			Con						Reporter			Editorial			
<u>The Washington Post</u>																
Neutral	36		36.4	7		58.3	1		50.0	63		56.8	10		62.5	48.8
Positive	57		57.6	3		25.0	--		--	42		37.8	4		25.0	44.2
Negative	6		6.1	2		16.7	1		50.0	6		5.4	2		12.5	7.1
TOTAL	99		100.1	12		100.0	2		100.0	111		100.0	16		100.1	100.1
<u>The New York Times</u>																
Neutral	3		9.4	2		16.7	4		57.1	97		85.8	21		65.6	64.8
Positive	26		81.3	6		50.0	3		42.9	16		14.2	7		21.9	29.6
Negative	3		9.4	4		33.3	--		--	--		--	4		12.5	5.6
TOTAL	32		100.1	12		100.0	7		100.0	113		100.0	32		100.0	100.0
<u>Newsweek</u>																
Neutral	4		12.9	1		20.0	2		33.3	69		87.3	13		68.4	63.6
Positive	27		87.1	2		40.0	2		33.3	8		10.1	6		31.6	32.1
Negative	--		--	2		40.0	2		33.3	2		2.5	--		--	4.3
TOTAL	31		100.0	5		100.0	6		99.9	79		99.9	19		100.0	100.0
<u>Time</u>																
Neutral	10		27.8	1		100.0	5		55.6	45		76.3	--		--	58.1
Positive	26		72.2	--		--	1		11.1	12		20.3	--		--	37.1
Negative	--		--	--		--	3		33.3	2		3.4	--		--	4.8
TOTAL	36		100.0	1		100.0	9		100.0	59		100.0	--		--	100.0

NOTE: Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 10
1976-77 TRANSITION: MODE OF STORY UNITS, PRO, CON, AND UNIDENTIFIED SOURCES,
MEDIA-REPORTER, AND MEDIA-EDITORIAL SOURCES

Mode	Number of Mentions		Percent Pro	Number of Mentions		Percent Con	Number of Mentions		Percent Unidentified	Number of Mentions		Percent Media-Reporter	Number of Mentions		Percent Media-Editorial	PERCENT SUMMARY
	Pro			Con			Unidentified			Unidentified			Reporter			
<u>The Washington Post</u>																
Neutral	60		38.5	4		50.0	2		40.0	72		66.7	7		70.0	50.5
Positive	80		51.3	2		25.0	--		-	16		14.8	2		20.0	34.8
Negative	16		10.3	2		25.0	3		60.0	20		18.5	1		10.0	14.6
TOTAL	156		100.1	8		100.0	5		100.0	108		100.0	10		100.0	99.9
<u>The New York Times</u>																
Neutral	5		10.6	--		--	6		37.5	65		86.7	18		46.2	51.9
Positive	39		83.0	1		25.0	3		18.8	7		9.3	16		41.0	36.5
Negative	3		6.4	3		75.0	7		43.8	3		4.0	5		12.8	11.6
TOTAL	47		100.0	4		100.0	16		100.1	75		100.0	39		100.0	100.0
<u>Newsweek</u>																
Neutral	13		21.3	2		66.7	6		42.9	86		89.6	4		50.0	61.0
Positive	42		68.9	1		33.3	3		21.4	5		5.2	1		12.5	28.6
Negative	6		9.8	-		--	5		35.7	5		5.2	3		37.5	10.2
TOTAL	61		100.0	3		100.0	14		100.0	96		100.0	8		100.0	100.0
<u>Time</u>																
Neutral	11		21.2	-		--	7		25.0	44		62.0	3		42.9	40.9
Positive	39		75.0	1		100.0	10		35.7	15		21.1	3		42.9	42.8
Negative	2		3.8	-		--	11		39.3	12		16.9	1		14.3	16.4
TOTAL	52		100.0	1		100.0	28		100.0	71		100.0	7		100.1	100.1

NOTE: Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 11

1980-81 TRANSITION: MODE OF STORY UNITS, PRO, CON, AND UNIDENTIFIED SOURCES,
MEDIA-REPORTER, AND MEDIA-EDITORIAL SOURCES

Mode	Number of Mentions		Percent Pro	Number of Mentions		Percent Con	Number of Mentions		Percent Unidentified	Number of Mentions		Percent Media-Reporter	Number of Mentions		Percent Media-Editorial	PERCENT SUMMARY
	Pro	Con		Pro	Con		Unidentified	Unidentified		Media-Reporter	Media-Reporter		Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial		
<u>The Washington Post</u>																
Neutral	7	8	8.8	44.4	3	25.0	82.6	25	59.5	51.0						
Positive	66	2	82.5	11.1	2	16.7	8.3	5	11.9	32.2						
Negative	7	8	8.8	44.4	7	58.3	9.2	12	28.6	16.9						
TOTAL	80	18	100.1	99.9	12	100.0	100.1	42	100.0	100.1						
<u>The New York Times</u>																
Neutral	9	6	11.1	33.3	3	25.0	81.7	24	60.0	50.4						
Positive	64	4	79.0	22.2	2	16.7	8.3	5	12.5	32.3						
Negative	8	8	9.9	44.4	7	58.3	10.1	11	27.5	17.3						
TOTAL	81	18	100.0	99.9	12	100.0	100.1	40	100.0	100.0						
<u>Newsweek</u>																
Neutral	2	3	10.0	100.0	1	100.0	87.3	2	66.7	84.3						
Positive	17	-	85.0	--	-	--	1.8	1	33.3	14.3						
Negative	1	-	5.0	--	-	--	.9	-	--	1.4						
TOTAL	20	3	100.0	100.0	1	100.0	100.0	3	100.0	100.0						
<u>Time</u>																
Neutral	15	1	62.5	100.0	-	--	69.5	3	42.9	65.9						
Positive	8	-	33.3	--	-	--	23.7	4	57.1	28.6						
Negative	1	-	4.2	--	-	--	6.8	-	--	5.5						
TOTAL	24	1	100.0	100.0	-	--	100.0	7	100.0	100.0						

NOTE: Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

APPENDIX C

FREQUENCY OF ISSUE CATEGORIES MENTIONED

TABLE 12

1968-69: FREQUENCY OF ISSUE CATEGORIES MENTIONED BY
THE WASHINGTON POST

Issue Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
<u>Specific Issue Categories</u>			
Economic Problems	2	123	25.3
General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government	3	81	16.7
Foreign Policy	1	146	30.0
Social Problems	4	46	9.5
Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media	5	<u>39</u>	<u>8.0</u>
TOTAL		435	89.5
<u>Summary</u>			
Subtotal		435	89.5
Unranked Mentions		<u>51</u>	<u>10.5</u>
TOTAL		486	100.0

NOTE: Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 13

1968-69: FREQUENCY OF ISSUE CATEGORIES MENTIONED
BY THE NEW YORK TIMES

Issue Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
<u>Specific Issue Categories</u>			
Economic Problems	3	51	10.0
General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government	1	247	48.4
Foreign Policy	2	91	17.8
Social Problems	4	46	9.0
Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media	5	<u>23</u>	<u>4.5</u>
TOTAL		458	89.7
<u>Summary</u>			
Subtotal		458	89.7
Unranked Mentions		<u>52</u>	<u>10.2</u>
TOTAL		510	99.9

NOTE: Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 14
1968-69; FREQUENCY OF ISSUE CATEGORIES MENTIONED
BY NEWSWEEK

Issue Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
<u>Specific Issue Categories</u>			
Economic Problems	5	10	3.2
General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government	3	81	16.7
Foreign Policy	1	146	30.0
Social Problems	4	46	9.5
Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media	5	<u>39</u>	<u>8.0</u>
TOTAL		435	89.5
<u>Summary</u>			
Subtotal		435	89.5
Unranked Mentions		<u>51</u>	<u>10.5</u>
TOTAL		486	100.0

NOTE: Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 15
1968-69: FREQUENCY OF ISSUE CATEGORIES MENTIONED
BY TIME

Issue Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
<u>Specific Issue Categories</u>			
Economic Problems	4	22	6.8
General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government	1	139	42.9
Foreign Policy	2	52	16.0
Social Problems	3	29	9.0
Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media	5	<u>20</u>	<u>6.2</u>
TOTAL		262	80.9
<u>Summary</u>			
Subtotal		262	80.9
Unranked Mentions		<u>62</u>	<u>19.1</u>
TOTAL		324	100.0

NOTE: Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 16

1976-77: FREQUENCY OF ISSUE CATEGORIES MENTIONED
BY THE WASHINGTON POST

Issue Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
<u>Specific Issue Categories</u>			
Economic Problems	2	121	21.0
General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government	1	188	32.6
Foreign Policy	3	99	17.2
Social Problems	4	67	11.6
Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media	5	<u>62</u>	<u>10.7</u>
TOTAL		537	93.1
<u>Summary</u>			
Subtotal		537	93.1
Unranked Mentions		<u>40</u>	<u>6.9</u>
TOTAL		577	100.0

NOTE: Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 17

1976-77: FREQUENCY OF ISSUE CATEGORIES MENTIONED
BY THE NEW YORK TIMES

Issue Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
<u>Specific Issue Categories</u>			
Economic Problems	2	158	19.6
General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government	1	297	36.8
Foreign Policy	3	136	16.9
Social Problems	5	86	10.7
Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media	4	<u>89</u>	<u>11.0</u>
TOTAL		767	95.0
<u>Summary</u>			
Subtotal		767	95.0
Unranked Mentions		<u>40</u>	<u>5.0</u>
TOTAL		807	100.0

NOTE: Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 18

1976-77: FREQUENCY OF ISSUE CATEGORIES MENTIONED
BY NEWSWEEK

Issue Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
<u>Specific Issue Categories</u>			
Economic Problems	2	87	16.9
General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government	1	246	47.9
Foreign Policy	3	59	11.5
Social Problems	5	31	6.0
Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media	4	<u>37</u>	<u>8.0</u>
TOTAL		460	90.3
<u>Summary</u>			
Subtotal		460	89.5
Unranked Mentions		<u>54</u>	<u>10.5</u>
TOTAL		514	100.0

NOTE: Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 19
1976-77: FREQUENCY OF ISSUE CATEGORIES MENTIONED
BY TIME

Issue Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
<u>Specific Issue Categories</u>			
Economic Problems	2	79	16.1
General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government	1	241	49.2
Foreign Policy	3	63	14.1
Social Problems	4	39	8.0
Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media	5	<u>24</u>	<u>4.9</u>
TOTAL		446	92.3
<u>Summary</u>			
Subtotal		446	92.3
Unranked Mentions		<u>44</u>	<u>9.0</u>
TOTAL		490	101.3

NOTE: Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 20

1980-81: FREQUENCY OF ISSUE CATEGORIES MENTIONED
BY THE WASHINGTON POST

Issue Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
<u>Specific Issue Categories</u>			
Economic Problems	3	136	15.6
General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government	1	367	43.4
Foreign Policy	2	138	16.3
Social Problems	5	52	6.1
Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media	4	<u>99</u>	<u>11.7</u>
TOTAL		792	93.1
<u>Summary</u>			
Subtotal		792	93.6
Unranked Mentions		<u>54</u>	<u>6.4</u>
TOTAL		846	100.0

NOTE: Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 21

1980-81: FREQUENCY OF ISSUE CATEGORIES MENTIONED
BY THE NEW YORK TIMES

Issue Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
<u>Specific Issue Categories</u>			
Economic Problems	2	94	10.9
General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government	1	311	36.2
Foreign Policy	3	93	10.8
Social Problems	4	20	2.3
Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media	2	<u>94</u>	<u>10.9</u>
TOTAL		612	71.1
<u>Summary</u>			
Subtotal		612	71.1
Unranked Mentions		<u>247</u>	<u>28.8</u>
TOTAL		859	99.9

NOTE: Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 22

1980-81: FREQUENCY OF ISSUE CATEGORIES MENTIONED
BY NEWSWEEK

Issue Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
<u>Specific Issue Categories</u>			
Economic Problems	2	76	16.0
General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government	1	215	45.3
Foreign Policy	3	55	11.6
Social Problems	5	19	4.0
Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media	4	<u>42</u>	<u>8.8</u>
TOTAL		407	85.7
<u>Summary</u>			
Subtotal		407	85.7
Unranked Mentions		<u>68</u>	<u>14.3</u>
TOTAL		475	100.0

NOTE: Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 23

1980-81: FREQUENCY OF ISSUE CATEGORIES MENTIONED
BY TIME

Issue Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
<u>Specific Issue Categories</u>			
Economic Problems	3	24	11.7
General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government	1	101	49.0
Foreign Policy	2	29	14.1
Social Problems	-	--	--
Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media		--	--
TOTAL		154	74.8
<u>Summary</u>			
Subtotal		154	74.8
Unranked Mentions		<u>52</u>	<u>25.2</u>
TOTAL		206	100.0

NOTE: Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

APPENDIX D

FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC ISSUES MENTIONED

TABLE 24

1968-69: FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC ISSUES MENTIONED
BY THE WASHINGTON POST

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Foreign Policy	C	1	41	8.4
Cabinet/Relationship	B	2	30	6.2
Inflation	A	3	22	4.5
Welfare State/Economics of	A	4	17	3.5
Unemployment, Jobs	A	5	15	3.1
Hardward Defense	C	6	14	2.9
Government Borrowing and Spending/Balanced Budget	A	6	14	2.9
General Economic Policy	A	6	14	2.9
Traditional Defense	C	7	13	2.7
Law and Order, Crime	D	8	12	2.5
General Defense	C	9	11	2.3
Arms Control	C	9	11	2.3
National Unity	D	9	11	2.3
Taxes	A	9	11	2.3
State of Economy	A	10	10	2.1
Threat of Communism	C	10	10	2.1
Race Relations (Black)	D	10	10	2.1
Detente (Discussions)	C	11	9	1.9
Presidential Staff/Relations	B	12	8	1.6
Electoral Mandate	E	12	8	1.6
President-elect's Relationship with Media	E	12	8	1.6
Congress/Relationship	B	14	6	1.2
Vice President/Relationship	B	14	6	1.2
Urban Affairs	D	14	6	1.2
Inauguration	B	14	6	1.2
Relations with Communist China	C	15	5	1.0
The Presidency	B	15	5	1.0
Middle America Philosophy	B	15	5	1.0
Building National Constituency	E	15	5	1.0
Interventionism	C	16	4	.8
Interest Rates	A	16	4	.8
Bipartisanship	B	16	4	.8
Nixon's Transiton Procedures	B	16	4	.8
Electoral College Reform	B	16	4	.8
Linkage	C	16	4	.8
Volunteer Army	C	16	4	.8
Conservation	D	16	4	.8
Old Images	E	16	4	.8
Foreign Aid	C	17	3	.6

TABLE 24 (continued)

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Federal Reserve/Relationship	A	17	3	.6
F.B.I.	B	17	3	.6
Youth	D	17	3	.6
Campaign Techniques	E	17	3	.6
Labor Policy	A	17	3	.6
Farm Policy	A	17	3	.6
Press Secretary	E	17	<u>3</u>	<u>.6</u>
TOTAL			435	92.0
Subtotal			435	92.0
Unranked			<u>51</u>	<u>10.5</u>
TOTAL			486	102.5

NOTE: Categories: A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy; Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media, respectively.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 25

1968-69: FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC ISSUES MENTIONED
BY THE NEW YORK TIMES

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Cabinet/Relationship	B	1	72	14.1
Foreign Policy	C	2	27	5.3
The Presidency	B	3	25	4.9
Ethics in Government	B	4	20	3.9
Congress/Relationship	B	5	19	3.7
General Defense	C	6	18	3.5
Presidential Staff/ Relationship	B	7	15	2.9
Relations with U.S.S.R.	C	8	12	2.3
Race Relations (Blacks)	D	9	11	2.1
Federal Bureaucracy/ Relationship	B	10	10	2.0
Law and Order, Crime	D	10	10	2.0
Inauguration	B	10	10	2.0
Unemployment, Jobs	A	11	9	1.8
Nixon's Transition Procedures	B	11	9	1.8
Threat of Communism	C	12	8	1.6
Taxes	A	13	7	1.4
Arms Control	C	13	7	1.4
Urban Affairs	D	13	7	1.4
Electoral Mandate	E	13	7	1.4
NATO, Western Alliances	C	13	7	1.4
Middle East	C	14	6	1.2
President-elect's Relationship with the Media	E	14	6	1.2
Government Borrowing and Spending/Balanced Budget	A	15	5	1.0
Functions of Political Parties	B	15	5	1.0
Social Democracy	B	15	5	1.0
Republican Policies in General	B	15	5	1.0
Education	D	15	5	1.0
National Unity	D	15	5	1.0
State of Economy	A	16	4	.8
Vice President/Relationship	B	16	4	.8
Reorganization of Bureaucracy	B	16	4	.8
Democratic Policies in General	B	16	4	.8
Conservation	D	16	4	.8

TABLE 25 (continued)

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Civil Rights	D	16	4	.8
Interest Groups	B	16	4	.8
Welfare State/Economics of	A	17	3	.8
Supreme Court/Relationship	B	17	3	.6
Basic Value Structure	B	17	3	.6
Federalism	B	17	3	.6
Opinion Polls	B	17	3	.6
Relations with Communist				
China	C	17	3	.6
Foreign Aid	C	17	3	.6
Press Secretary	E	17	<u>3</u>	<u>.6</u>
TOTAL			458	88.5
Subtotal			458	88.5
Unranked			<u>52</u>	<u>10.2</u>
TOTAL			510	98.7

NOTE: Categories: A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy; Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media, respectively.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 26

1968-69: FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC ISSUES MENTIONED
BY NEWSWEEK

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Cabinet/Relationship	B	1	41	13.1
Presidential Staff/ Relationship	B	2	17	5.4
The Presidency	B	2	17	5.4
National Unity	D	3	14	4.5
President-elect's Relationship with Media	E	4	13	4.1
Federal Bureaucracy/ Relationship	B	5	12	3.8
Defense	C	5	12	3.8
Race Relations (Black)	D	7	10	3.2
Law and Order, Crime	D	8	9	2.9
Electoral Mandate	E	8	9	2.9
Transition Periods	B	9	8	2.5
Creation of Positive Feelings in Public	E	9	8	2.5
Taxes	A	10	7	2.2
Relations with U.S.S.R.	C	10	7	2.2
Inauguration	B	10	7	2.2
Nixon's Transition Procedures	B	11	6	1.9
Campaign Promises	E	11	6	1.9
Bipartisanship	B	11	6	1.9
Media Coverage	E	12	5	1.6
Campaign Techniques	E	12	5	1.6
Vice President/Relationship	B	13	4	1.3
Volunteer Army	C	13	4	1.3
Government Borrowing and Spending/Balanced Budget	A	14	3	1.0
Middle America Philosophy	B	14	3	1.0
Electoral College Reform	B	14	3	1.0
F.B.I.	B	14	3	1.0
International Politics	C	14	3	1.0
Urban Affairs	D	14	3	1.0
Relations with own Party	B	14	3	1.0
Leaks, Secrecy	E	14	3	1.0
Building a National Constituency	E	14	3	1.0
TOTAL			272	86.9

TABLE 26 (continued)

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Subtotal			272	86.9
Unranked			<u>42</u>	<u>13.4</u>
TOTAL			314	100.3

NOTE: Categories: A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy; Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media, respectively.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 27

1968-69: FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC ISSUES MENTIONED
BY TIME

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Cabinet/Relationship	B	1	59	18.2
Foreign Policy	C	2	19	5.9
The Presidency	B	3	17	5.2
General Defense	C	4	15	4.6
Federal Bureaucracy/ Relationship	B	5	13	4.0
Race Relations (Black)	D	6	11	3.4
Bipartisanship	B	7	8	2.5
Nixon's Transition Procedures	B	7	8	1.2
Welfare State/Economics of Persidential Staff/ Relationship	A	8	7	2.2
General Economic Policy	B	8	7	2.2
Law and Order, Crime	A	9	6	1.9
Vice President/Relationship	D	9	6	1.9
Congress/Relationship	B	10	5	1.5
Arms Control	B	10	5	1.5
Electoral Mandate	C	10	5	1.5
President-elect's Relationship With the Media	E	10	5	1.5
Ethical Conduct in Government	E	10	5	1.5
Transition Procedures	B	11	4	1.2
Campaign Promises	B	11	4	1.2
NATO, Western Alliances	E	11	4	1.2
Business Policy	C	11	4	1.2
Taxes	A	12	3	.9
Functions of Political Parties	A	12	3	.9
Market Economy	B	12	3	.9
Reorganization of Bureaucracy	B	12	3	.9
Relations with Communist China	B	12	3	.9
Relations with U.S.S.R.	C	12	3	.9
United Nations	C	12	3	.9
Poverty	D	12	3	.9
Conservation	D	12	3	.9
Urban Affairs	D	12	3	.9
National Unity	D	12	3	.9

TABLE 27 (continued)

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Creation of Positive Feelings in Public Media Coverage	E E	12 12	3 <u>3</u>	.9 <u>.9</u>
TOTAL			262	80.3
Subtotal			262	80.9
Unranked			<u>62</u>	<u>19.1</u>
TOTAL			324	100.0

NOTE: Categories: A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy; Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media, respectively.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 28

1976-77: FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC ISSUES MENTIONED
BY THE WASHINGTON POST

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Cabinet/Relationship	B	1	48	8.3
State of Economy	A	2	23	4.0
Unemployment, Jobs	A	3	18	3.1
Presidential Staff/ Relationship	B	4	16	2.8
President-elect's Relationship with Media	E	5	13	2.3
Taxes	A	5	13	2.3
The Presidency	B	5	13	2.3
Energy Policy	A	6	12	2.1
Congress/Relationship	B	6	12	2.1
Government Borrowing and Spending/Balanced Budget	A	7	11	1.9
Carter's Transition Procedures	B	7	11	1.9
Foreign Policy	C	7	11	1.9
Campaign Promises	E	7	11	1.9
Public's Role in Government	E	8	10	1.7
Welfare State/Economics of	A	9	9	1.6
Vice President/Relationship	B	9	9	1.6
General Defense	C	9	9	1.6
Detente (Discussions)	C	9	9	1.6
Electoral Mandate	C	9	9	1.6
Business Policy	A	10	8	1.4
Ethical Conduct of Government	B	10	8	1.4
Inauguration	B	10	8	1.4
Arms Control	C	10	8	1.4
International Politics	C	10	8	1.4
Relations with U.S.S.R.	C	10	8	1.4
Urban Affairs	D	10	8	1.4
Elderly	D	10	8	1.4
Education	D	10	8	1.4
Race Relations (Black)	D	10	8	1.4
General Economic Policy	A	11	7	1.2
Inflation	A	11	7	1.2
Populist Philosophy	B	11	7	1.2
Reduce size of Government	B	11	7	1.2
Threat of Communism	C	11	7	1.2
Linkage	C	11	7	1.2
Conservation	D	11	7	1.2
Creation of Positive Feelings in Public	E	11	7	1.2

TABLE 28 (continued)

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Labor Policy	A	12	6	1.0
Federal Bureaucracy/ Relations	B	12	6	1.0
Relations with own Party	B	12	6	1.0
Traditional Defense	C	12	6	1.0
Hardware Defense	C	12	6	1.0
NATO, Western Alliances	C	12	6	1.0
Urban Transportation	D	12	6	1.0
Building a National Constituency	E	12	6	1.0
Press Secretary	E	12	6	1.0
Social Democracy	B	13	5	.9
Electoral College Reform	B	13	5	.9
Opinion Polls	B	13	5	.9
United Nations	C	13	5	.9
Foreign Aid	C	13	5	.9
Wage and Price Controls	A	14	4	.7
Democratic Policies in General	B	14	4	.7
Carter's Policies in General	B	14	4	.7
Housing	D	14	4	.7
Women's Rights	D	14	4	.7
Relations with Communist China	C	14	4	.7
Interest Rates	A	15	3	.5
Functions of Political Parties	B	15	3	.5
Civil Rights	D	15	3	.5
TOTAL			537	93.2
Subtotal			537	93.2
Unranked			40	6.9
TOTAL			577	100.1

NOTE: Categories: A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy; Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media, respectively.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 29

1976-77: FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC ISSUES MENTIONED
BY THE NEW YORK TIMES

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Cabinet/Relationship	B	1	48	5.9
Foreign Policy	C	2	30	3.7
Congress/Relationship	B	3	28	3.5
General Economic Policy	A	4	26	3.2
Taxes	A	5	25	3.1
Interest Groups	B	5	25	3.1
Campaign Promises	E	6	24	3.0
Federal Bureaucracy/ Relationship	B	7	19	2.4
Electoral Mandate	E	8	18	2.2
Presidential Staff/ Relationship	B	9	17	2.1
Carter's Transition Procedures	B	9	17	2.1
Transition Periods	B	9	17	2.1
Unemployment, Jobs	A	10	16	2.0
Race Relations (Blacks)	D	10	16	2.0
City Bail-outs	A	10	16	2.0
State and Local Governments/ Relationship	B	11	14	1.7
The Presidency	B	11	14	1.7
Urban Affairs	D	11	14	1.7
Civil Rights	D	11	14	1.7
Campaign Techniques	E	12	13	1.6
Welfare State/Economics of	A	13	12	1.5
Ethical Conduct in Government	B	13	12	1.5
Middle East	C	13	12	1.5
Energy Policy	A	14	11	1.4
Affirmative Action	D	14	11	1.4
Government Borrowing and Spending/Balanced Budget	A	15	10	1.2
State of Economy	A	15	10	1.2
Reorganization of Bureaucracy	B	15	10	1.2
Relations with U.S.S.R.	C	15	10	1.2
Relations with own Party	B	15	10	1.2
Vice President/Relationship	B	16	9	1.1
Traditional Defense	C	16	9	1.1
Federalism	B	17	8	1.0
Democratic Policies in General	B	17	8	1.0
Eastern Europe	C	17	8	1.0
Arms Control	C	18	7	.8
Conservation	D	18	7	.8

TABLE 29 (continued)

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Health Care	D	18	7	.8
President-elect's Relationship with the Mass Media	E	18	7	.8
Press Secretary	E	18	7	.8
Inauguration	B	18	7	.8
Labor Policy	A	19	6	.7
Business Policy	A	19	6	.7
C.I.A.	C	19	6	.7
Africa	C	19	6	.7
Role of Public in Government	E	19	6	.7
Perception of Media Coverage	E	19	6	.7
Inflation	A	20	5	.6
Stock Market, Investments	A	20	5	.6
Regular Functions of Political Parties	A	20	5	.6
Hardware Defense	C	20	5	.6
Latin America	C	20	5	.6
United Nations	C	20	5	.6
Law and Order, Crime	D	20	5	.6
Women's Rights	D	20	5	.6
Campaign Debates	E	20	5	.6
Bipartisanship	B	20	5	.6
Farm Policy	A	21	4	.5
Social Democracy	B	21	4	.5
Far East	C	21	4	.5
Human Rights	C	21	4	.5
Interventionism	C	21	4	.5
Foreign Aid	C	21	4	.5
Detente	C	21	4	.5
Integration, Desegregation	D	21	4	.5
NATO	C	21	4	.5
Campaign Financing and Federal Matching Funds	A	22	3	.4
Supreme Court	B	22	3	.4
Republican Policies in General	B	22	3	.4
Opinion Polls	B	22	3	.4
Carter's Policies in General	B	22	3	.4
Reduce Size of Government	B	22	3	.4
Amnesty for Vietnam Deserters and Dodgers	C	22	3	.4
Puerto Rico	C	22	3	.4
National Unity	D	22	3	.4
Creation of Positive Feelings in Public	E	22	3	.4

TABLE 29 (continued)

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Federal Reserve/Relationship	A	22	3	.4
Ideology in General	B	22	3	.4
Linkage	C	22	<u>3</u>	<u>.4</u>
TOTAL			767	94.4
Subtotal			767	95.0
Unranked			<u>40</u>	<u>5.0</u>
TOTAL			807	100.0

NOTE: Categories: A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy; Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media, respectively.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 30

1976-77: FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC ISSUES MENTIONED
BY NEWSWEEK

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Cabinet/Relationship	B	1	51	9.9
The Presidency	B	2	50	9.7
Foreign Policy	C	3	27	5.3
Congress/Relationship	B	4	25	4.9
General Economic Policy	A	5	21	4.1
Electoral Mandate	E	6	16	3.1
Functions of Political Parties	B	7	14	2.7
Reorganization of Bureaucracy	B	8	13	2.5
Inauguration	B	8	13	2.5
Taxes	A	10	11	2.1
Vice President/Relationship	B	10	11	2.1
Carter's Transition Procedures	B	10	11	2.1
Race Relations (Blacks)	D	10	11	2.1
Opinion Polls	B	11	9	1.8
Interest Groups	B	11	9	1.8
Transition Periods	B	12	8	1.6
Energy Policy	A	13	7	1.4
Arms Control	C	13	7	1.4
Campaign Promises	E	13	7	1.4
Government Borrowing and Spending/Balanced Budget	A	14	6	1.2
Federal Bureaucracy/ Relationship	B	14	6	1.2
Presidential Staff	B	14	6	1.2
Ethical Conduct of Government	B	14	6	1.2
Relations with U.S.S.R.	C	14	6	1.2
Conservation	D	14	6	1.2
Health Care	D	14	6	1.2
Inflation	A	15	5	1.0
Welfare State/Economics of	A	15	5	1.0
Reduce Size of Government	B	15	5	1.0
Populist Philosophy		15	5	1.0
Democratic Policies in General	B	15	5	1.0
Detente (Discussions)	C	15	5	1.0
Law and Order, Crime	D	15	5	1.0
Monetary Policy	A	16	4	.8
State of Economy	A	16	4	.8
Reduce Size of Government	B	16	4	.8
International Politics	C	16	4	.8

TABLE 30 (continued)

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Hardward Defense	C	16	4	.8
Role of Public in Government	E	16	4	.8
President-elect's Relationship with Media	E	16	4	.8
General Defense	C	17	3	.6
Relations with Communist China	C	17	3	.6
Labor Policy	A	17	3	.6
Creation of Positive Feelings in Public	E	17	3	.6
Media Coverage	E	17	<u>3</u>	<u>.6</u>
TOTAL			460	90.2
Subtotal			460	90.2
Unranked			<u>54</u>	<u>10.5</u>
TOTAL			514	100.7

NOTE: Categories: A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy; Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media, respectively.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 31

1976-77: FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC ISSUES MENTIONED
BY TIME

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Cabinet/Relationship	B	1	94	19.2
The Presidency	B	2	38	7.8
Congress/Relationship	B	3	23	4.7
State of Economy	A	4	13	2.7
Unemployment, Jobs	A	5	12	2.4
Interest Groups	B	5	12	2.4
Campaign Promises	E	6	11	2.2
General Economic Policy	A	6	11	2.2
Reorganization of Bureaucracy	B	7	10	2.0
International Politics	C	7	10	2.0
Energy Policy	A	8	9	1.8
Taxes	A	8	9	1.8
Carter's Transition Procedures	B	8	9	1.8
Presidential Staff/Relationship	B	9	8	1.6
Race Relations (Blacks)	D	9	8	1.6
Business Policy	A	10	7	1.4
Welfare State/Economics of	A	10	7	1.4
Ethical Conduct of Government	B	10	7	1.4
General Defense	C	10	7	1.4
Health Care	D	10	7	1.4
Role of Public in Government	D	10	7	1.4
Market Economy	B	11	6	1.2
Arms Control	C	11	6	1.2
Creation of Positive Feelings in Public	E	11	6	1.2
Hardware Defense	C	12	5	1.0
United Nations	C	12	5	1.0
Housing	D	12	5	1.0
Relations with own Party	B	12	5	1.0
Labor Policy	A	13	4	.8
Government Borrowing and Spending/Balanced Budget	A	13	4	.8
Vice President/Relationship	B	13	4	.8
Federal Bureaucracy/ Relationship	B	13	4	.8
Conservatism	B	13	4	.8
Populist Philosophy	B	13	4	.8
Relations with the U.S.S.R.	C	13	4	.8
Carter's Policies in General	B	13	4	.8
Foreign Policy	C	13	4	.8
Detente (Discussions)	C	13	4	.8

TABLE 31 (Continued)

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
President-elect's Relationship with the Media	E	13	4	.8
Wage and Price Controls	A	14	3	.6
Social Democracy	B	14	3	.6
Opinion Polls	B	14	3	.6
Traditional Defense	C	14	3	.6
C.I.A.	C	14	3	.6
Relations with Communist China	C	14	3	.6
Threat of Communism	C	14	3	.6
Food as a Foreign Policy Tool	C	14	3	.6
Conservation	D	14	3	.6
Urban Affairs	D	14	3	.6
Elderly	D	14	3	.6
Women's Rights	D	14	3	.6
NATO, Western Alliances	C	14	3	.6
Bipartisanship	B	14	3	.6
Civil Rights	D	14	3	.6
TOTAL			446	90.0
Subtotal			446	90.0
Unranked			44	9.0
TOTAL			490	99.0

NOTE: Categories: A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy; Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media, respectively.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 32

1980-81: FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC ISSUES MENTIONED
BY THE WASHINGTON POST

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Cabinet/Relationship	B	1	81	9.6
Congress/Relationship	B	2	40	4.7
The Presidency	B	2	40	4.7
Presidential Staff/Relationship	B	3	37	4.4
Foreign Policy	C	4	32	3.8
Taxes	A	5	24	2.8
General Economic Policy	A	6	22	2.6
Watergate and Related Measures	E	6	22	2.6
Government Borrowing and Spending/Balanced Budget	A	7	21	2.5
Reagan's Transition Procedures	B	8	18	2.1
Farm Policy	A	9	16	1.9
Republican Policies in General	B	10	14	1.7
General Defense	C	10	14	1.7
Hostage Crisis, Terrorism	C	10	14	1.7
Bipartisanship	B	10	14	1.7
New Right	E	10	14	1.7
Relations with U.S.S.R.	C	11	13	1.5
Electoral Mandate	E	11	13	1.5
Campaign Promises	E	11	13	1.5
Federal Bureaucracy/ Relationship	B	12	12	1.4
Ethical Conduct in Government	B	12	12	1.4
Media Coverage	E	12	12	1.4
Press Secretary	E	12	12	1.4
Relations with own Party	B	12	12	1.4
State of Economy	A	13	11	1.3
Inauguration	B	13	11	1.3
Inflation	A	14	10	1.2
Arms Control	C	14	10	1.2
Role of Public in Government	E	14	10	1.2
Democratic Policies in General	B	15	9	1.1
Latin America	C	15	9	1.1
Interest Groups	B	15	9	1.1
Conservation	D	16	8	.9
Affirmative Action	D	16	8	.9
Conservatism	B	17	7	.8
Interest Rates	A	18	6	.7
Vice President/Relationship	B	18	6	.7
Reorganization of Bureaucracy	B	18	6	.7
Middle East	C	18	6	.7
Race Relations (Blacks)	D	18	6	.7

TABLE 32 (Continued)

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Business Subsidies	A	19	5	.6
Nuclear Energy Debate	B	19	5	.6
Transition Periods	B	19	5	.6
Regulation/Deregulation	B	19	5	.6
Hardward Defense	C	19	5	.6
Threat of Communism	C	19	5	.6
Integration/Desegregation	D	19	5	.6
Women's Rights	D	19	5	.6
President-elect's Relationship with the Medi	E	19	5	.6
C.I.A.	C	19	5	.6
Energy Policy	A	20	4	.5
Unemployment/Jobs	A	20	4	.5
Welfare State/Economics of	A	20	4	.5
F.B.I.	B	20	4	.5
United Nations	C	20	4	.5
Detente (Discussions)	C	20	4	.5
Education	D	20	4	.5
Abortion	D	20	4	.5
National Unity	D	20	4	.5
NATO, Western Alliances	C	20	4	.5
Ideology in General	B	20	4	.5
Linkage	C	20	4	.5
City Bail Outs	A	20	4	.5
Labor Policy	A	21	3	.4
Business Policy	A	21	3	.4
Stock Market, Investments	A	21	3	.4
Big Guy Philosophy	B	21	3	.4
Market Economy	B	21	3	.4
Reagan's Policies in General	B	21	3	.4
Reduce Size of Government	B	21	3	.4
Human Rights	C	21	3	.4
Food as Foreign Policy Tool	C	21	3	.4
Interventionism	C	21	3	.4
Campaign Techniques	E	21	3	.4
TOTAL			792	94.6

TABLE 32 (Continued)

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Subtotal			792	94.6
Unranked			<u>54</u>	<u>6.4</u>
TOTAL			846	100.0

NOTE: Categories: A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy; Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media, respectively.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 33

1980-81: FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC ISSUES MENTIONED
BY THE NEW YORK TIMES

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Cabinet/Relationship	B	1	80	9.3
Presidential Staff/Relationship	B	2	41	4.8
The Presidency	B	2	41	4.8
Congress/Relationship	B	3	38	4.4
Foreign Policy	C	4	30	3.5
Taxes	A	5	23	2.7
General Economic Policy	A	6	21	2.4
Watergate	E	6	21	2.4
Reagan's Transition Procedures	B	7	17	2.0
Hostage Crisis	C	7	17	2.0
Government Borrowing and Spending/Balanced Budget	A	8	16	1.9
Electoral Mandate	E	9	15	1.7
Farm Policy	A	10	14	1.6
Republican Policies in General	B	10	14	1.6
General Defense	C	11	13	1.5
Campaign Promises	E	11	13	1.5
Press Secretary	E	12	12	1.4
New Right	E	12	12	1.4
Ethical Conduct in Government	B	13	11	1.3
Role of Public in the Government	E	13	11	1.3
State of Economy	A	14	10	1.2
Welfare State/Economics of	A	14	10	1.2
Relations with the U.S.S.R.	C	15	8	.9
Inauguration	B	15	8	.9
Relations with own Party	B	15	8	.9
Inflation	A	16	7	.8
State and Local Governments/ Relationship	B	16	7	.8
Democratic Policies in General	B	16	7	.8
Arms Control	C	16	7	.8
Reorganization of Bureaucracy	B	17	6	.7
Affirmative Action	D	17	6	.7
Women's Rights	D	17	6	.7
Bipartisanship	B	17	6	.7
Interest Groups	B	17	6	.7
Linkage	C	17	6	.7
Conservatism	B	18	5	.6
Conservation	D	18	5	.6
Federal Bureaucracy/Relationship	B	19	4	.5

TABLE 33 (Continued)

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Business Subsidies	A	20	3	.3
Vice President/Relationship	B	20	3	.3
Nuclear Energy Debate	B	20	3	.3
Transition Periods	B	20	3	.3
C.I.A.	C	20	3	.3
Middle East	C	20	3	.3
Food as a Foreign Policy Tool	C	20	3	.3
Interventionism	C	20	3	.3
Abortion	D	20	3	.3
Ideology in General	B	20	<u>3</u>	<u>.3</u>
TOTAL			612	70.7
Subtotal			612	70.7
Unranked			<u>247</u>	<u>28.8</u>
TOTAL			859	99.5

NOTE: Categories: A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy; Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media, respectively.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 34

1980-81: FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC ISSUES MENTIONED
BY NEWSWEEK

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Cabinet/Relationship	B	1	44	9.3
The Presidency	A	2	25	5.3
Foreign Policy	C	3	22	4.6
Congress/Relationship	B	4	19	4.0
Government Borrowing and Spending/Balanced Budget	A	5	17	3.6
Taxes	A	6	15	3.1
Reagan's Transition Procedures	B	6	15	3.1
Regulation	B	7	14	2.9
Presidential Staff/Relationship	B	8	12	2.5
Reagan's Policies in General	B	9	10	2.1
President-elect's Relationship with the Media	E	9	10	2.1
Market Economy	B	10	9	1.9
General Defense	C	10	9	1.9
New Right	E	10	9	1.9
Interest Rates	A	11	8	1.7
Conservatism	B	11	8	1.7
Energy Policy	A	12	7	1.5
Inflation	A	12	7	1.5
Ethical Conduct in Government	B	12	7	1.5
Reorganization of Bureaucracy	B	12	7	1.5
Inauguration	B	13	6	1.3
Relations with own Party	B	13	6	1.3
Labor Policy	A	14	5	1.0
Federalism	B	14	5	1.0
Opinion Polls	B	14	5	1.0
Human Rights	C	14	5	1.0
Electoral Mandate	E	14	5	1.0
General Economic Policy	A	15	4	.8
ice President/Relationship	B	15	4	.8
Arms Control	C	15	4	.8
Conservation	D	15	4	.8
Housing	D	15	4	.8
Urban Affairs	D	15	4	.8
Social Security	D	15	4	.8
Creation of Positive Feelings in Public	E	15	4	.8
Campaign Promises	E	15	4	.8
Watergate	E	15	4	.8
Relations with Federal Reserve	A	15	4	.8

TABLE 34 (Continued)

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Ideology in General	B	15	4	.8
Wage and Price Controls	A	16	3	.6
State of Economy	A	16	3	.6
Functions of Political Parties	B	16	3	.6
International Politics	C	16	3	.6
Traditional Defense	C	16	3	.6
Threat of Communism	C	16	3	.6
Hostage Crisis	C	16	3	.6
Interventionism	C	16	3	.6
Abortion	D	16	3	.6
Bipartisanship	B	16	3	.6
PACS	E	16	3	.6
Leaks, Secrecy	E	16	<u>3</u>	<u>.6</u>
TOTAL			407	84.6
Subtotal			407	84.6
Unranked			<u>68</u>	<u>14.3</u>
TOTAL			475	98.9

NOTE: Categories: A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy; Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media, respectively.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 35

1980-81: FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC ISSUES MENTIONED
BY TIME

Issues	Categories	Rank	Number of Mentions	Percent
Cabinet/Relationship	B	1	59	28.6
Taxes	A	2	9	4.4
Congress/Relationship	B	3	8	3.9
General Economic Policy	A	4	7	3.4
Regulation/Deregulation	B	4	7	3.4
Reduce Size of Government	B	4	7	3.4
Defense	C	5	6	2.9
Government Borrowing and Spending/Balanced Budget	A	6	5	2.4
Reagan's Policies in General	B	6	5	2.4
Relations with U.S.S.R.	C	6	5	2.4
Latin America	C	6	5	2.4
Eastern Europe	C	7	4	2.0
Welfare State/Economics of	A	8	3	1.5
The Presidency	B	8	3	1.5
Reagan's Transition Procedures	B	8	3	1.5
Transition Periods	B	8	3	1.5
Foreign Policy	C	8	3	1.5
Arms Control	C	8	3	1.5
Middle East	C	8	3	1.5
Human Rights	C	8	3	1.5
Inauguration	B	8	<u>3</u>	<u>1.5</u>
TOTAL			154	74.8
Subtotal			154	74.8
Unranked			<u>52</u>	<u>25.2</u>
TOTAL			206	100.0

NOTE: Categories: A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy; Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media, respectively.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

APPENDIX E

FREQUENCY OF ISSUES MENTIONED

TABLE 36
1968-69 TRANSITION: FREQUENCY OF ISSUES MENTIONED, PRO, CON, UNIDENTIFIED, MEDIA-REPORTER AND MEDIA-EDITORIAL
SOURCES FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

Issue Category	Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent	
	Pro	Con	Pro	Con	Unidentified	Unidentified	Unidentified	Unidentified	Media-Reporter	Media-Reporter	Media-Reporter	Media-Reporter	Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial
A	69	5	32.9	42.0	-	-	--	--	47	20.8	9	29.0				
B	41	5	19.5	42.0	7	100.0			38	16.8	4	12.9				
C	60	--	28.6	--	-	--	--	--	84	37.2	13	41.9				
D	23	2	11.0	16.7	-	--	--	--	26	11.5	4	12.9				
E	17	-	8.1	--	-	--	--	--	31	13.7	1	3.2				
TOTAL	210	12	100.1	100.7	7	100.0			226	100.0	31	99.9				

NOTE: Categories, A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy, Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media respectively.

The category unidentified refers to all mentions made by a person of unknown party affiliation or by an anonymous individual.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 37

1968-69 TRANSITION: FREQUENCY OF ISSUES MENTIONED, PRO, CON, UNIDENTIFIED, MEDIA-REPORTER AND MEDIA-EDITORIAL SOURCES FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES

Issue Category	Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent	
	Pro	Con	Pro	Con	Unidentified	Unidentified	Unidentified	Media-Reporter	Media-Reporter	Media-Reporter	Media-Reporter	Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial
A	9	8	12.0	22.9	--	--	--	38	13.9	8	7.3					
B	40	19	53.3	54.3	2	12.5	149	54.4	47	42.7						
C	15	3	20.3	8.6	8	50.0	48	17.5	31	28.2						
D	8	5	10.7	14.3	6	37.5	24	8.8	10	9.1						
E	3	--	4.0	--	--	--	15	5.5	14	12.7						
TOTAL	75	35	100.0	100.0	16	100.0	274	100.1	110	100.0						

NOTE: Categories, A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy, Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media respectively.

The category unidentified refers to all mentions made by a person of unknown party affiliation or by an anonymous individual.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 38
1968-69 TRANSITION: FREQUENCY OF ISSUES MENTIONED, PRO, CON, UNIDENTIFIED, MEDIA-REPORTER AND MEDIA-EDITORIAL
SOURCES FOR NEWSWEEK

Issue Category	Number of Mentions		Percent Pro	Number of Mentions		Percent Con	Number of Unidentified Mentions		Percent Unidentified	Number of Media-Reporter Mentions		Percent Media-Reporter	Number of Media-Editorial Mentions		Percent Media-Editorial
	Pro	Con		Pro	Con		Unidentified	Unidentified		Media-Reporter	Media-Reporter		Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial	
A	1	1.5	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	12	7.1	7.1	5	7.1	7.1
B	39	60.0	5	62.5	2	100.0	--	--	--	75	44.4	44.4	26	37.1	37.1
C	8	12.3	1	12.5	--	--	--	--	--	31	18.3	18.3	8	11.4	11.4
D	9	13.8	2	25.0	--	--	--	--	--	20	11.8	11.8	14	20.0	20.0
E	8	12.3	0	--	--	--	--	--	--	31	18.3	18.3	17	24.3	24.3
TOTAL	65	99.9	8	100.0	2	100.0	2	100.0	100.0	169	99.9	99.9	70	99.9	99.9

NOTE: Categories, A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy, Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media respectively.

The category unidentified refers to all mentions made by a person of unknown party affiliation or by an anonymous individual. Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 39
1968-69 TRANSITION: FREQUENCY OF ISSUES MENTIONED, PRO, CON, UNIDENTIFIED, MEDIA-REPORTER AND MEDIA-EDITORIAL
SOURCES FOR TIME

Issue Category	Number of Mentions		Percent Pro	Number of Mentions		Percent Con	Number of Mentions		Percent Unidentified	Number of Mentions		Percent Media-Reporter	Number of Mentions		Percent Media-Editorial
	Pro	Con		Pro	Con		Pro	Con		Pro	Con		Pro	Con	
A	8	--	8.7	--	--	--	--	--	--	23	--	10.6	--	--	--
B	51	1	55.4	1	4	50.0	28.6	102	47.2	42	--	19.4	--	--	--
C	15	1	16.3	1	5	50.0	35.7	30	13.9	19	--	8.8	--	--	--
D	9	--	9.8	--	4	28.6	100.0	216	99.9	--	--	--	--	--	--
E	9	--	9.8	--	4	28.6	100.0	216	99.9	--	--	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	92	2	100.0	2	14	100.0	100.0	216	99.9	--	--	--	--	--	--

NOTE: Categories, A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy, Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media respectively.

The category unidentified refers to all mentions made by a person of unknown party affiliation or by an anonymous individual.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 40

1976-77 TRANSITION: FREQUENCY OF ISSUES MENTIONED, PRO, CON, UNIDENTIFIED, MEDIA-REPORTER AND MEDIA-EDITORIAL SOURCES FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

Issue Category	Number of Mentions Pro		Percent Pro		Number of Mentions Con		Percent Con		Number of Mentions Unidentified		Percent Unidentified		Number of Mentions Media-Reporter		Percent Media-Reporter		Number of Mentions Media-Editorial		Percent Media-Editorial	
	Pro	Con	Pro	Con	Pro	Con	Pro	Con	Unidentified	Media-Reporter	Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial	Media-Reporter	Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial	Media-Reporter	Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial
A	65		25.2	4	21.1	2	22.2	47	17.5	8	36.4									
B	51		19.8	10	52.6	5	55.6	131	48.7	7	31.8									
C	60		23.3	2	10.5	2	22.2	38	14.1	4	18.2									
D	39		15.1	--	--	--	--	33	12.3	2	9.1									
E	43		16.7	3	15.8	--	--	20	7.4	1	4.5									
TOTAL	258		100.1	19	100.0	9	100.0	269	100.0	22	100.0									

NOTE: Categories, A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy, Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media respectively.

The category unidentified refers to all mentions made by a person of unknown party affiliation or by an anonymous individual.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 41
1976-77 TRANSITION: FREQUENCY OF ISSUES MENTIONED, PRO, CON, UNIDENTIFIED, MEDIA-REPORTER AND MEDIA-EDITORIAL
SOURCES FOR THE NEW YORK TIMES

Issue Category	Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent	
	Pro	Con	Pro	Con	Unidentified	Con	Unidentified	Con	Media-Reporter	Con	Media-Reporter	Con	Media-Editorial	Con	Media-Editorial	Con
A	41	7	23.4	53.8	5	9.4	57	16.0	40	19.1						
B	72	4	41.1	30.8	21	39.6	139	38.9	82	39.2						
C	28	1	16.0	7.7	10	18.9	74	20.7	33	15.8						
D	13	--	7.4	--	13	24.5	44	12.3	27	12.9						
E	21	1	12.0	7.7	4	7.5	43	12.0	27	12.9						
TOTAL	175	13	99.9	100.0	53	99.9	357	99.9	209	99.9						

NOTE: Categories, A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy, Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media respectively.

The category unidentified refers to all mentions made by a person of unknown party affiliation or by an anonymous individual.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 42

1976-77 TRANSITION: FREQUENCY OF ISSUES MENTIONED, PRO, CON, UNIDENTIFIED, MEDIA-REPORTER AND MEDIA-EDITORIAL SOURCES FOR NEWSWEEK

Issue Category	Number of Mentions Pro	Percent Pro	Number of Mentions Con	Percent Con	Number of Mentions Unidentified	Percent Unidentified	Number of Mentions Media-Reporter	Percent Media-Reporter	Number of Mentions Media-Editorial	Percent Media-Editorial
A	15	13.4	--	--	5	20.8	59	17.3	14	46.7
B	73	65.2	4	66.7	14	58.3	166	48.5	4	13.3
C	6	5.4	1	16.7	3	12.5	56	16.4	3	10.0
D	8	7.1	--	--	2	8.3	33	9.6	8	26.7
E	10	8.9	6	16.7	--	--	28	8.2	1	3.3
TOTAL	112	100.0	6	100.1	24	99.9	342	100.0	30	100.0

NOTE: Categories, A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy, Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media respectively.

The category unidentified refers to all mentions made by a person of unknown party affiliation or by an anonymous individual.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 43
1976-77 TRANSITION: FREQUENCY OF ISSUES MENTIONED, PRO, CON, UNIDENTIFIED, MEDIA-REPORTER AND MEDIA-EDITORIAL
SOURCES FOR TIME

Issue Category	Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent	
	Pro	Con	Pro	Con	Unidentified	Con	Unidentified	Con	Media-Reporter	Con	Media-Reporter	Con	Media-Editorial	Con	Media-Reporter	Con
A	35	--	20.0	--	--	3	8.6	--	35	12.9	--	--	--	--	--	--
B	80	--	45.7	--	25	71.4	--	--	144	53.1	7	87.5	--	--	--	--
C	29	--	16.6	--	3	8.6	--	--	37	13.7	--	--	--	--	--	--
D	15	--	8.6	--	--	--	--	--	26	19.6	1	12.5	--	--	--	--
E	16	1	9.1	100.0	4	11.4	100.0	--	29	10.7	--	--	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	175	1	100.0	100.0	35	100.0	100.0	--	271	100.0	8	100.0	--	--	--	--

NOTE: Categories, A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy, Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media respectively.

The category unidentified refers to all mentions made by a person of unknown party affiliation or by an anonymous individual.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 44
1980-81 TRANSITION: FREQUENCY OF ISSUES MENTIONED, PRO, CON, UNIDENTIFIED, MEDIA-REPORTER AND MEDIA-EDITORIAL
SOURCES FOR THE WASHINGTON POST

Issue Category	Number of Mentions		Percent Pro	Number of Mentions		Percent Con	Number of Mentions		Percent Unidentified	Number of Mentions		Percent Media-Reporter	Number of Mentions		Percent Media-Editorial
	Pro	Con		Pro	Con		Pro	Con		Pro	Con		Pro	Con	
A	42		20.9	9		21.4	6		17.1	42		10.6	45		26.2
B	88		43.8	19		45.2	7		20.0	191		48.2	73		42.4
C	34		16.9	7		16.7	4		11.4	74		18.7	27		15.7
D	7		3.5	1		2.4	15		42.9	36		9.1	4		2.3
E	30		14.9	6		14.3	3		8.6	53		13.4	23		13.4
TOTAL	201		100.0	42		100.0	35		100.0	396		100.0	172		100.0

NOTE: Categories, A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy, Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media respectively.

The category unidentified refers to all mentions made by a person of unknown party affiliation or by an anonymous individual.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 45
1980-81 TRANSITION: FREQUENCY OF ISSUES MENTIONED, PRO, CON, UNIDENTIFIED, MEDIA-REPORTER AND MEDIA-EDITORIAL
SOURCES FOR THE NEW YORK TIME

Issue Category	Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent	
	Pro	Con	Pro	Con	Unidentified	Media-Reporter	Unidentified	Media-Reporter	Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial	Media-Reporter	Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial	Media-Editorial	Media-Reporter	Media-Editorial
A	40	8	19.7	19.5	6	42	17.1	10.5	45	25.0						
B	91	19	44.8	46.3	8	195	22.9	48.8	72	40.0						
C	33	7	16.3	17.1	4	75	11.4	18.8	27	15.0						
D	8	1	3.9	2.4	14	34	40.0	8.5	4	2.2						
E	31	6	15.3	14.6	3	54	8.6	13.5	32	17.8						
TOTAL	203	41	100.0	99.9	35	400	100.0	100.1	180	100.0						

NOTE: Categories, A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy, Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media respectively.

The category unidentified refers to all mentions made by a person of unknown party affiliation or by an anonymous individual.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 46
1980-81 TRANSITION: FREQUENCY OF ISSUES MENTIONED, PRO, CON, UNIDENTIFIED, MEDIA-REPORTER AND MEDIA-EDITORIAL
SOURCES FOR NEWSWEEK

Issue Category	Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent		Number of Mentions		Percent	
	Pro	Con	Pro	Con	Unidentified	Con	Unidentified	Con	Media-Reporter	Con	Media-Reporter	Con	Media-Editorial	Con	Media-Reporter	Con
A	4		11.8	--	--	--	--	--	78		18.4		3		37.5	
B	24		70.1	6	100.0	1	50.0		199		46.8		2		25.5	
C	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	66		15.5		2		25.5	
D	1		2.9	--	--	--	--	--	35		8.2		1		12.5	
E	5		14.7	--	--	1	50.0		47		11.1		--		--	
TOTAL	34		99.5	6	100.0	2	100.0		425		100.0		8		100.0	

NOTE: Categories, A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy, Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media respectively.

The category unidentified refers to all mentions made by a person of unknown party affiliation or by an anonymous individual. Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

TABLE 47
1980-81 TRANSITION: FREQUENCY OF ISSUES MENTIONED, PRO, CON, UNIDENTIFIED, MEDIA-REPORTER AND MEDIA-EDITORIAL
SOURCES FOR TIME

Issue Category	Number of Mentions Pro	Percent Pro	Number of Mentions Con	Percent Con	Number of Mentions Unidentified	Percent Unidentified	Number of Mentions Media-Reporter	Percent Media-Reporter	Number of Mentions Media-Editorial	Percent Media-Editorial
A	17	17.9	--	--	--	--	13	15.9	4	14.3
B	53	55.8	1	50.0	--	--	42	51.2	17	60.7
C	19	20.0	0	--	--	--	20	24.4	5	17.9
D	2	2.1	1	50.0	--	--	7	8.5	2	7.1
E	4	4.2	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	95	100.0	2	100.0	--	--	82	100.0	28	100.0

NOTE: Categories, A, B, C, D, and E refer to Economic Problems; General Governmental Problems and Philosophy of Government; Foreign Policy, Social Problems; and, Relations with the General Public and the Mass Media respectively.

The category unidentified refers to all mentions made by a person of unknown party affiliation or by an anonymous individual.

Percentages rounded to the nearest tenth.

APPENDIX F

FREQUENCY OF LEADERSHIP ROLES MENTIONED

TABLE 48

1968-79: FREQUENCY OF LEADERSHIP ROLES MENTIONED BY THE WASHINGTON POST

Role Categories	Number of Mentions		Number of Mentions Unidentified	Number of Mentions		Total	Rank	Percent
	Pro	Con		Media-Reporter	Editorial			
Normative								
The Leader	1	-	-	6	-	7	1	58.3
The Decision-Maker	-	2	-	-	3	5	2	41.7
The Manager	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
The Partisan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
TOTAL	1	2	-	6	3	12		100.0
Positive								
The Leader	32	-	-	76	4	112	1	55.4
The Decision-Maker	16	4	-	28	3	51	2	25.2
The Manager	8	-	-	20	-	28	3	13.7
The Partisan	--	-	-	11	-	11	4	5.4
TOTAL	56	4	-	135	7	202		99.7
Negative								
The Leader	-	1	2	3	1	7	1	58.3
The Decision-Maker	-	1	-	1	-	2	3	16.7
The Manager	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
The Partisan	3	-	-	-	-	3	2	25.0
TOTAL	3	2	2	4	1	12		100.0

TABLE 49

1968-69: FREQUENCY OF LEADERSHIP ROLES MENTIONED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES

Role Categories	Number of Mentions		Number of Mentions Unidentified	Number of Mentions		Total	Rank	Percent
	Pro	Con		Media-Reporter	Editorial			
Normative								
The Leader	3	-	2	1	10	16	1	51.6
The Decision-Maker	3	1	3	-	7	14	2	45.2
The Manager	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	3.2
The Partisan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
TOTAL	6	1	5	1	18	31		100.0
Positive								
The Leader	6	-	1	9	5	21	2	40.4
The Decision-Maker	11	-	2	11	3	27	1	51.9
The Manager	-	-	-	1	3	4	3	7.7
The Partisan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
TOTAL	17	-	3	21	11	52		100.0
Negative								
The Leader	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
The Decision-Maker	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	100.0
The Manager	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
The Partisan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	1	1		100.0

TABLE 50
1968-69: FREQUENCY OF LEADERSHIP ROLES MENTIONED BY NEWSWEEK

Role Categories	Number of Mentions Pro	Number of Mentions Con	Number of Mentions Unidentified	Number of Mentions Reporter	Number of Mentions Editorial	Total	Rank	Percent
Normative								
The Leader	-	-	-	2	-	2	2	28.6
The Decision-Maker	-	-	-	-	5	5	1	71.4
The Manager	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
The Partisan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
TOTAL	-	-	-	2	5	7		100.0
Positive								
The Leader	15	-	1	14	4	34	1	61.8
The Decision-Maker	3	-	-	9	2	14	2	25.5
The Manager	2	-	-	4	-	6	3	10.9
The Partisan	-	-	-	1	-	1	4	1.8
TOTAL	20	1	1	28	6	55		100.0
Negative								
The Leader	-	-	-	5	-	5	1	38.5
The Decision-Maker	-	-	2	3	-	5	1	38.5
The Manager	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
The Partisan	3	-	-	-	-	3	2	23.1
TOTAL	3	-	2	8	-	13		100.0

TABLE 51
1968-69: FREQUENCY OF LEADERSHIP ROLES MENTIONED BY TIMES

Role Categories	Number of Mentions Pro	Number of Mentions Con	Number of Mentions Unidentified	Number of Mentions Reporter	Number of Mentions Editorial	Total	Rank	Percent
Normative								
The Leader	1	-	2	-	-	3	1	75.0
The Decision-Maker	-	-	1	-	-	1	2	25.0
The Manager	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
The Partisan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
TOTAL	1	-	3	-	-	4	-	100.0
Positive								
The Leader	13	-	-	13	-	26	1	48.1
The Decision-Maker	7	-	-	6	-	13	3	24.1
The Manager	1	-	-	13	-	14	2	25.9
The Partisan	-	-	-	1	-	1	4	1.9
TOTAL	21	-	-	33	-	54	-	100.0
Negative								
The Leader	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
The Decision-Maker	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
The Manager	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
The Partisan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

TABLE 52

1976-77: FREQUENCY OF LEADERSHIP ROLES MENTIONED BY THE WASHINGTON POST

Role Categories	Number of Mentions		Unidentified Mentions	Number of Mentions		Total	Rank	Percent
	Pro	Con		Media-Reporter	Editorial			
Normative								
The Leader	4	1	-	3	5	13	1	56.5
The Decision-Maker	1	-	-	1	3	5	2	21.7
The Manager	-	-	-	2	-	2	4	8.7
The Partisan	3	-	-	-	-	3	3	13.0
TOTAL	8	1	-	6	8	23		99.9
Positive								
The Leader	18	1	1	9	2	31	3	22.1
The Decision-Maker	23	1	-	18	1	43	2	30.7
The Manager	26	-	-	30	-	56	1	40.0
The Partisan	3	-	-	7	-	10	4	7.1
TOTAL	70	2	1	64	3	140		99.9
Negative								
The Leader	1	1	2	7	1	12	1	44.4
The Decision-Maker	3	-	1	4	0	8	2	29.6
The Manager	-	-	-	1	-	1	4	3.7
The Partisan	6	0	0	0	0	6	3	22.2
TOTAL	10	1	3	12	1	27		99.9

TABLE 53

1976-77: FREQUENCY OF LEADERSHIP ROLES MENTIONED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES

Role Categories	Number of Mentions		Number of Mentions Unidentified	Number of Mentions		Total	Rank	Percent
	Pro	Con		Media-Reporter	Editorial			
Normative								
The Leader	-	-	4	-	7	11	1	61.1
The Decision-Maker	-	-	2	-	4	6	2	33.3
The Manager	-	-	-	-	-	--	-	--
The Partisan	-	-	-	-	1	1	3	5.6
TOTAL	-	-	6	-	12	18	-	100.0
Positive								
The Leader	10	-	1	3	5	19	3	16.2
The Decision-Maker	25	-	3	16	9	53	1	45.3
The Manager	8	-	-	13	12	33	2	28.2
The Partisan	5	-	1	2	4	12	4	10.3
TOTAL	48	-	5	34	30	117	-	100.0
Negative								
The Leader	-	1	1	2	1	5	2	22.7
The Decision-Maker	2	1	4	5	3	15	1	68.2
The Manager	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
The Partisan	1	-	-	-	1	2	3	9.1
TOTAL	3	2	5	7	5	22	-	100.0

TABLE 54

1976-77: FREQUENCY OF LEADERSHIP ROLES MENTIONED BY NEWSWEEK

Role Categories	Number of Mentions		Number of Unidentified Mentions	Number of Mentions		Number of Editorial Mentions	Total	Rank	Percent
	Pro	Con		Reporter	Media-				
Normative									
The Leader	-	-	-	2	-	1	3	1	50.0
The Decision-Maker	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	50.0
The Manager	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
The Partisan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	3	-	-	2	-	1	6	-	100.0
Positive									
The Leader	11	-	-	9	-	-	20	2	29.9
The Decision-Maker	14	-	-	13	-	1	28	1	41.8
The Manager	8	-	2	5	-	-	15	3	22.4
The Partisan	-	-	-	4	-	-	4	4	6.0
TOTAL	33	-	2	31	-	1	67	-	100.1
Negative									
The Leader	3	-	-	1	-	-	4	2	36.4
The Decision-Maker	-	-	1	6	-	-	7	1	63.6
The Manager	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
The Partisan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	3	-	1	7	-	-	11	-	100.0

TABLE 55
1976-77: FREQUENCY OF LEADERSHIP ROLES MENTIONED BY TIME

Role Categories	Number of Mentions		Number of Unidentified Mentions	Number of Mentions		Number of Editorial Mentions	Total	Rank	Percent
	Pro	Con		Media-Reporter	Editorial				
Normative									
The Leader	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	25.0
The Decision-Maker	1	-	-	2	-	-	3	1	75.0
The Manager	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
The Partisan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
TOTAL	2	-	-	2	-	-	4		100.0
Positive									
The Leader	10	-	-	6	-	-	16	2	24.6
The Decision-Maker	8	-	2	3	-	-	13	3	20.0
The Manager	12	-	3	10	-	-	25	1	38.5
The Partisan	3	-	2	6	-	-	64	4	16.9
TOTAL	33	-	7	25	-	-	65		100.0
Negative									
The Leader	-	-	-	4	-	-	4	2	20.0
The Decision-Maker	1	-	5	9	-	-	15	1	75.0
The Manager	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	3	5.0
The Partisan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
TOTAL	1	-	5	14	-	-	20		100.0

TABLE 56

1980-81: FREQUENCY OF LEADERSHIP ROLES MENTIONED BY THE WASHINGTON POST

Role Categories	Number of Mentions		Number of Unidentified Mentions	Number of Mentions		Total	Rank	Percent
	Pro	Con		Reporter	Editorial			
Normative								
The Leader	-	-	6	4	12	20	1	100.0
The Decision-Maker	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
The Manager	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
The Partisan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
TOTAL	-	-	6	4	12	20		100.0
Positive								
The Leader	36	-	-	10	2	38	1	47.5
The Decision-Maker	18	-	2	10	-	30	2	37.5
The Manager	--	-	-	--	4	4	4	5.0
The Partisan	4	-	-	4	-	8	3	10.0
TOTAL	58	-	2	24	6	80		100.0
Negative								
The Leader	1	-	-	-	-	1	3	8.3
The Decision-Maker	3	2	-	2	-	7	1	58.3
The Manager	1	-	-	-	-	1	3	8.3
The Partisan	1	-	-	1	1	3	2	25.0
TOTAL	6	2	-	3	1	12		99.9

TABLE 57

1980-81: FREQUENCY OF LEADERSHIP ROLES MENTIONED BY THE NEW YORK TIMES

Role Categories	Number of Mentions		Number of Unidentified Mentions	Number of Mentions		Number of Editorial Mentions	Total	Rank	Percent
	Pro	Con		Media-Reporter					
Normative									
The Leader	-	-	3	1	-	-	4	1	66.7
The Decision-Maker	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	2	33.3
The Manager	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
The Partisan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
TOTAL	-	-	5	1	-	-	6	-	100.0
Positive									
The Leader	18	-	-	4	5	-	27	1	58.7
The Decision-Maker	10	-	-	4	1	-	15	2	32.6
The Manager	-	-	-	-	1	-	1	4	2.2
The Partisan	2	-	-	1	-	-	3	-	6.5
TOTAL	30	-	-	9	7	-	46	-	100.0
Negative									
The Leader	1	-	-	-	1	-	2	3	15.4
The Decision-Maker	2	2	-	2	-	-	6	1	46.2
The Manager	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	4	7.7
The Partisan	1	-	1	2	-	-	4	2	30.8
TOTAL	5	2	1	4	1	-	13	-	100.0

TABLE 58

1980-81: FREQUENCY OF LEADERSHIP ROLES MENTIONED BY NEWSWEEK

Role Categories	Number of Mentions		Number of Mentions Unidentified	Number of Mentions		Number of Mentions Editorial	Total	Rank	Percent
	Pro	Con		Media-Reporter	Editorial				
Normative									
The Leader	-	-	1	1	-	-	2	1	50.0
The Decision-Maker	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	2	25.0
The Manager	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
The Partisan	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	--
TOTAL	-	-	1	3	-	-	4	-	100.0
Positive									
The Leader	7	-	-	23	-	-	30	2	42.3
The Decision-Maker	3	-	-	30	-	-	33	1	46.5
The Manager	2	-	-	5	-	-	7	3	9.9
The Partisan	1	-	-	--	-	-	1	-	1.4
TOTAL	13	-	-	58	-	-	71	-	100.0
Negative									
The Leader	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	4	9.1
The Decision-Maker	-	-	-	5	-	-	5	3	22.7
The Manager	-	-	-	9	-	-	9	1	40.9
The Partisan	-	-	-	6	-	-	6	2	27.3
TOTAL	-	-	-	22	-	-	22	-	100.0

TABLE 59
1980-81: FREQUENCY OF LEADERSHIP ROLES MENTIONED BY TIME

Role Categories	Number of Mentions		Number of Mentions Unidentified	Number of Mentions		Total	Rank	Percent
	Pro	Con		Media-Reporter	Editorial			
Normative								
The Leader	-	-	-	3	2	5	1	100.0
The Decision-Maker	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
The Manager	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
The Partisan	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
TOTAL	-	-	-	3	2	5		100.0
Positive								
The Leader	12	2	-	4	1	19	2	38.8
The Decision-Maker	11	-	-	11	4	26	1	53.1
The Manager	1	-	-	1	-	2	3	4.1
The Partisan	2	-	-	-	-	2	3	4.1
TOTAL	26	2	-	16	5	49		100.1
Negative								
The Leader	-	-	-	1	-	1	2	20.0
The Decision-Maker	-	-	-	1	-	1	2	20.0
The Manager	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--
The Partisan	-	-	-	3	-	3	1	60.0
TOTAL	-	-	-	5	-	5		100.0

APPENDIX G

SUMMARY TABLES FOR SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

TABLE 60

SUMMARY TABLE FOR SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
FOR ISSUE CATEGORIES MENTIONED BY
PRO-SOURCES AND MEDIA-SOURCES

Media Vehicle	1968-69 Transition	1976-77 Transition	1980-81 Transition
<u>The Washington Post</u>	.9	.6	.9
<u>The New York Times</u>	1.0	.8	.9
<u>Newsweek</u>	.7	.6	.5
<u>Time</u>	.9	.9	.9

NOTE: The sample size of four prevents the use of the significance table for the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient. Rather, the strength of weakness of an association is observed.

TABLE 61

SUMMARY TABLE FOR SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
FOR ISSUE CATEGORIES MENTIONED BY MEDIA SOURCES
IN LIKE MEDIA VEHICLES

Media Combinations	1968-69 Transition	1976-77 Transition	1980-81 Transition
<u>The Washington Post/</u> <u>The New York Times</u>	.7	.9	1.0
<u>Newsweek/</u> <u>Time</u>	.6	.8	.9

NOTE: The sample size of four prevents the use of the significance table for the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient. Rather, the strength of weakness of an association is observed.

TABLE 62

SUMMARY TABLE FOR SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
FOR ROLE TRAITS MENTIONED BY PRO-SOURCES
AND MEDIA-SOURCES

Media Vehicle	1968-69 Transition	1976-77 Transition	1980-81 Transition
<u>The Washington Post</u>	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>The New York Times</u>	.9	.7	1.0
<u>Newsweek</u>	1.0	1.0	.8
<u>Time</u>	.7	.7	.6

NOTE: The sample size of four prevents the use of the significance table for the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient. Rather, the strength of weakness of an association is observed.

TABLE 63

SUMMARY TABLE FOR SPEARMAN RANK CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
FOR ROLE TRAITS MENTIONED BY MEDIA SOURCES
IN LIKE MEDIA VEHICLES

Media Combinations	1968-69 Transition	1976-77 Transition	1980-81 Transition
<u>The Washington Post/</u> <u>The New York Times</u>	1.0	1.0	1.0
<u>Newsweek/</u> <u>Time</u>	.7	.6	1.0

NOTE: The sample size of four prevents the use of the significance table for the Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient. Rather, the strength of weakness of an association is observed.

VITA

Karen Sue Johnson was born in Bluefield, West Virginia, on July 31, 1956. She is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Edsel E. Johnson. She was graduated from Northside High School of Roanoke, Virginia. In May 1976, she received a B.A. in Government from the College of William and Mary in Virginia. During her undergraduate years, she was awarded an American Electric Power Merit Scholarship and the Carl Hibbard Memorial Scholarship. She was inducted into Pi Sigma Alpha, the Political Science honorary society. In December 1979, she received a Master of Science Degree in Mass Communications from The University of Tennessee, Knoxville.

In September 1979, she received a graduate assistantship from The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and she entered the Political Science doctoral program. In September 1980, she received a graduate teaching assistantship from The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, and she taught introductory political science courses for two years. In March 1982, she received Political Communication Doctoral Honors from the Speech Communication Association, and at the same time, she received a Bickel Scholarship from the College of Communications at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville.

In August 1982, Karen accepted a position as Broadcasting Director at The University of Alabama-Birmingham. And in August 1983, she moved to The University of Alabama where she is an Assistant Professor of Broadcast and Film Communication. In August 1984, she received a Doctorate of Philosophy Degree in Political Science from The University of Tennessee, Knoxville.