To the Graduate Council:

I am submittng herewith a thesis written by Richard Heath Greathouse entitled "The South Bypass, Maryville, Tennessee: A Case Study of the Effects of Citizen Participation on the Highway Location Decision-Making Process." I recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Planning.

Judith G. Stoloff, Major Professor

We have read this thesis and
recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:

Vice Chancellor
Graduate Studies and Research

THE SOUTH BYPASS, MARYVILLE, TENNESSEE: A CASE STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION ON THE HIGHWAY LOCATION DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

A Thesis

Presented for the

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to determine the effects of the citizen participation policy of the Tennessee Department of Transportation on the location decision-making process involved with the South Maryville Bypass, Maryville, Tennessee.

The study has been divided into four major sections. First, a theoretical discussion of citizen participation was presented, which was used to develop a framework of analysis concerning citizen participation. A second theoretical discussion was presented to formulate a framework for analyzing the decision-making process.

In order to assess how citizen participation affected the decision-making process, the interrelationship between actors, issues and organizations is established using the leverage system of analysis as prescribed by Kenneth J. Gergen. Through the establishment and subsequent analysis of the leverage systems involved in this study, it is found that the citizen participation approach had a serious effect on the decision-making process. The participatory approach utilized had the unintended result of transferring, though informally, enough influence to the citizens, who, by objecting to all feasible alternatives, were able to effectively obstruct any decision on the issue.

In conclusion, it is suggested that not all kinds of decision making should have the same mode of citizen participation. In highway location decision making, it is recommended that a method be chosen

that would enable the public to become involved so that the "exchange function" of participation could be achieved, but would still allow those responsible for making the final decisions to still be able to do so.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I. THE ISSUE OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Citizen participation in government affairs is a fundamental principle of the democratic system that is often defended but seldom fully achieved. Traditionally, participation in democratic government has been limited primarily to the ballot, in which the policy and law formulators are elected to represent the public in the affairs of government. In a large and complex society such as the one we now live, where full participation is impossible, the representative system often results in a situation where actual decision-making power or influence over the decision making process is concentrated in the hands of a relatively few number of people. All too often, citizen participation in public policy formulation has consisted mainly of pressure from those capable and willing to exert influence on the system.[1]

Increasing amounts of civic unrest and agitation by minority and low income groups have made clear the need for involving greater numbers in public decision making. In the turbulent years of the 1960s, there seemed to be an underlying belief that only through physical violence

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[1]Kenneth R. Padgett, Jr., "Techniques for Active Communities: A Critique of One Attempt at Citizen Participation" (Masters Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1973), p. 1.

could racially and economically disadvantaged people have any control over the institutions that affected their day-to-day lives.[2]

The belief that something could be done to achieve more citizen involvement, even through violence, is in itself a testimony that the principle of participation is an achievable goal, and out of the social unrest and disorder of this period emerged a number of social programs designed to give the disenfranchised a more active and equal voice in the public policymaking process. Efforts such as President John F. Kennedy's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, the Ford Foundation's Grey Area Project, the Community Action Programs, and the Model Cities Demonstration Projects are notable examples of attempts at the federal level of government to achieve more citizen involvement. Where open violence or political apathy existed, these and other similar programs have attempted to create mechanisms for constructively channeling frustration and giving a meaningful voice to the poor and minority citizen.[3]

By the early 1970s, however, there developed a growing awareness that these programs had not achieved the continuous constructive participation as originally intended. One author aptly stated:

> Every effort to reduce its protean-like substance to a definable, systematic, and comprehensive body of thought is resisted by inherent dilemmas—contradictions between myth and reality and even between different social

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[2]David E. Booher, "A Theory of Participatory Planning" (Masters Thesis, University of Tennesse, 1974), p. 1.

[3]Padgett, "Techniques for Active Communities," p. 1.

> phenomena. Citizen participation virtually defies generalization and delights in reducing abstraction to dust.[4]

It has become apparent that a solution which would allow for widespread participation, a method allowing people to have a say in government without endangering political stability—or at least, slowing government processes almost to a halt—has yet to be found. The realization of the need for a higher quality of citizen input in the public decision-making process, coupled with the fact that no methodology or institution exists that can adequately incorporate citizen involvement, has led to what has been labeled the "crisis of participation."[5]

In few professions did this crisis of participation attract more attention than in planning. For quite some time the planning professions, whether it be land use, social, transportation or other "speciality" planning fields, have recognized that "without some kind of involvement by the relevant clients of the plan, the plan stood in danger of ending up as a monument to the planner,"[6] with a decreased chance of being implemented.

This has been especially true in transportation planning. However, citizen participation and involvement in all phases of transportation,

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[4]Hans B. C. Speigel, ed., Citizen Participation in Urban Development (Washington: Center for Community Affairs, NTL Institute for Applied Behavioral Science, 1968), p. 3.

[5]Booher, "A Theory of Participatory Planning," pp. 1-9.

[6]Ibid., p. 4.

including facility location, has for the most part been neglected. This is largely due to the fact that individuals and citizen groups are not the decision makers in the planning for location of roads and highways. Instead the responsibility has largely been delegated to the respective state highway departments, who have established a complex bureaucracy charged with planning for a construction of new highways.[7]

In recent years, though, the disruption to neighborhoods, the disappearance of parklands and historic sites, and general disruption of specific urban corridors, have been sources of considerable friction between these delegated decision makers and citizen groups. An example of this friction is in the recent controversy over the location of I-40 in Nashville, Tennessee, where it was stated:

> Nothing has better dramatized the failures in the transportation planning process—and the failures to achieve meaningful citizen participation—than the way in which the public has rebelled against various urban segments of the Interstate Highway System.[8]

Mr. Douglas Fugate, president of the American Association of State Highway Officials, further addressed this problem now being faced in Highway Facility Planning, stating:

> I am persuaded that the engineering mind which failed to break out of its narrow confines when faced with the challenge of decision making has contributed to some of the widespread criticism of the highway program in the last few years.[9]

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[7]Richard Henry Ginn, "Interstate 40 Through North Nashville, Tennessee: A Case Study in Highway Location Decision Making" (Masters Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1974), p. 1.

[8]Ibid., p. 4. [9]Ibid., p. 2.

Traditionally, the state highway departments are in fact the major decision makers within the framework of federally assisted highway program guidelines. However, in recent years, increasing amounts of community pressure have had a tremendous effect on the whole highway planning and decision-making process.[10]

In the past several years, the importance of citizen participation has become apparent to transportation planners and has resulted in attempts to incorporate participation by those affected by the highways—the citizens—into the highway planning and decision-making process. During this period, transportation planners and decision makers began to reflect the thoughts similar to a Pittsburg urban renewal commissioner, who could have been speaking of the entire planning function, when he stated:

> The specific objectives to be served by Urban Renewal in any community cannot be set by government experts at any level of government. They must be formulated through broad participation by informed citizens. Only in this way can sound Urban Renewal plans be established. Only through full citizen support can they be realized.[11]

This paper will analyze one such attempt to incorporate citizen input into planning for a highway project. It is hoped that through analysis of an attempt made by the Tennessee Department of Transportation (hereafter referred to as the TDOT) to incorporate citizen participation

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[10]Ibid., p. 3.

[11]Aron Levine, "Citizen Participation," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXVI, No. 3 (August, 1960), p. 20.

in the highway location planning and decision-making process of the South Maryville bypass, lessons can be learned as to how to gain more citizen input into not only highway facility planning, but also any type of planning process. Thus, the major goal of this thesis will be to gain insight into the discovery of how to involve the public in planning and decision making.

II. BACKGROUND OF THE SOUTH MARYVILLE BYPASS

The location of the South Maryville Bypass has been a source of controversy in Maryville and Blount County, Tennessee, for over five years. The proposed segment of highway, a portion of a planned bypass around the cities of Maryville and Alcoa has been under consideration for almost a decade with an approximate corridor for the South Bypass being shown on the Blount County Major Road Plan. Until plans were announced to complete this section of roadway, there was little reaction to the proposed location by either local officials or the public. However, when in 1972 the Highway Department began driving preliminary survey stakes along the corridor shown on the County Major Road Plan, a public outcry arose in an almost instant controversy over the proposed location of the bypass.[12] This controversy resulted in the project being halted, and for a few months it looked as though the issue was dead.

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[12] Maryville Alcoa Daily Times, April 12, 1972, p. 1.

However, the issue was not dead, and in the Spring of 1973, the TDOT, under new planning policy set forth in the "Action Plan for Consideration of Economic, Social and Other Environmental Effects of Highways," announced intentions to proceed with the South Bypass.[13] The TDOT emphasized that under the action plan policy, more citizen input was going to be sought by the highway planners before a final location decision was made. This would differ from past policy on public involvement in location decision making. Instead of holding a required number of public hearings immediately prior to initiation of land acquisition—in effect, after the final decision had been made—citizens would be invited to participate earlier in the planning process in a series of public meetings.[14]

When the first public meeting was held, over two hundred citizens attended. The majority were against the two alternate routes, as prepared by the TDOT staff.

After the adverse reaction to the two alternatives presented at the first public meeting, the TDOT prepared four different alternative corridor locations and presented these at a second public meeting. This meeting was similar to the original forum in that public debate was heated and no movement toward resolving the controversy was

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[13]Tennessee Department of Transportation, Summary Report, Action Plan for Consideration of Econonic, Social and Other Environmental Effects of Highways (March 1974), p. 10.

[14]Telephone interview with C. S. Harmon, Project Engineer, Tennessee Department of Transportation, Knoxville Regional Office, May 16, 1975.

indicated. Both the citizens and local officials attending this meeting voiced puzzlement and confusion as to what was occurring.[15]

During this time, an atmosphere of conflict began to develop between the citizens and state highway officials, and in spite of the fact that almost everyone involved recognized the need for a bypass, the Maryville City Council found itself in a position between the public and the TDOT. On one side of the issue were the citizens who had used the public forum to oppose the alternatives, while on the other side were the TDOT planners and engineers who were quite perplexed at the amount of opposition facing all their proposed corridor locations. At this point, there seemed to be confusion as to who was responsible for handling public involvement and making a final recommendation for the location of the highway. The TDOT felt that the local officials should take charge in formulating a popular consensus of opinion concerning a favorable alternative.[16] However, the local officials were reticent to make a recommendation in the face of the public reaction encountered.

Largely as a result of threats by the TDOT to utilize state highway funds on a less controversial project elsewhere, the Maryville Regional Planning Commission attempted to resolve the issue by requesting their Planning Commission staff to study the effects of each of the alternatives on land use and transportation. When completed,

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[15]Author's personal observation made while attending this meeting.

[16]Interview with Walter Blackburn, City Planner for Maryville, Tennessee, April 9, 1975.

this study consisted of an analysis of the effects of four alternative corridor locations upon the land use and transportation in the Maryville Planning Region.[17]

At the same time this report was being prepared, the East Tennessee Development District was in the process of conducting a study evaluating each alternative. This study was a general analysis of the regional aspects of the bypass, and was intended to give guidance to local officials in their consideration of a suitable alternative.[18]

Both studies recommended the same alignment; consequently, the Maryville Planning Commission endorsed that alternative location and submitted its findings to the City Council. However, the Maryville City Council has not acted upon this recommendation and, as of June, 1977, the issue is still unresolved.

To date, the process of locating the bypass has come to a virtual standstill. According to the Maryville City Manager, Don Peterson, and the staff planner for the Maryville Regional Planning Commission, Walter Blackburn, the current situation is tantamount to a standoff between the local public officials and the TDOT as to whom is responsible for developing a vehicle for channeling the public input required under the Action Plan policy guidelines into a consensus favoring one alternative. Although the need for a bypass is recognized

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[17]Maryville Regional Planning Commission, "Review of the Proposed Alternatives, U.S. 411 Bypass, Maryville, Tennessee" (September, 1974).

[18]East Tennessee Development District, "Relocation of U.S. 411 at Maryville" (September, 1974).

by almost everyone, there is serious doubt as to whether the highway will be constructed in the near future.

III. OBJECTIVE OF THESIS

The objective of this paper will be to utilize the events uncovered in this case study to analyze the planning process in respect to the following questions: What has been the overall mode of decision making and the public participatory framework which has apparently constrained the process? What individuals and what groups participated? What issues were important to the process? By what means did they influence decisions that were made?

The insight gained from the investigation of these questions will be utilized to assess the implications for comprehensive planning; and specifically, to assess what lessons can be learned as to how citizen' participation can be better incorporated into planning for any type of program.

IV. METHODOLOGY

This thesis consists of a case study of the South Maryville bypass issue which involves three types of research: a historical review, a literature review, and an analytical methodology utilizing Kenneth Gergen's concept of leverage system analysis.

Historical Review

The historical review establishing the background for this study utilizes newspaper accounts, public records, minutes of both public

and private agencies and interviews. It traces the series of events leading up to the current status of the South Maryville bypass and, in effect, forms a "backbone" for the case study.

Literature Review

The literature search of articles and texts establishes theoretical frameworks in citizen participation and decision making. These literature reviews should be viewed as a general rule and are not to be viewed as a set theory to be proved or disproved.

A synthesis of current concepts regarding citizen participation was developed to serve as a guide in assessing the impact of public involvement in the planning process. This literature review drew upon concepts and research from the social sciences with major emphasis placed on two areas.

First, writings of political theorists were reviewed to develop insight into basic democratic philosophy and the reasons for the current dilemmas regarding citizen participation. Second, results of research efforts analyzing citizen participatory programs were reviewed. Through this review empirical insight was gained as to the results of programs which have tried to implement large scale public participation programs.

A discussion of current literature on decision making was written to gain insight on accepted decision-making theory. This literature review not only serves as a conceptual guide for the analysis of decision making, but also forms the theoretical basis of leverage system methodology employed in Gergen's policy analysis. This

literature aided in applying Gergen's methodology, and will facilitate in understanding the theoretical conceptualization of issues, actors, organizations, and their interrelationships.

Leverage Analysis

In the initial research into this case study, it became evident, due to the nature of highway location decision making, that a large number of actors, organizations, and issues were involved. In this particular case, three levels of government—state, county and municipal—participated in the process. Furthermore, a number of local business, citizen, and civic groups also became active in the project. As a result, there was no one source that could be utilized in identifying the actors and issues or who could answer questions concerning the planning and decision-making process. A technique had to be selected which would enable the interrelations of actors, organizations, and issues to be sorted out so that the events leading up to the current status of the South Maryville bypass could be evaluated. The technique selected was leverage or influence systems.

Leverage system policy analysis as described by Kenneth J. Gergen in The Study of Policy Formation[19] was utilized as the methodology in the process of identifying these issues and individuals having influence in the decision-making process. Stated simply, this method identifies those issues and actions that influence the decision-making process.

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[19]Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen, eds., The Study of Policy Formation (New York: The Free Press, 1971).

This form of analysis assumes that a thorough understanding of public policy hinges upon knowledge of individual actors participating in the process.

To gain this knowledge requires two steps or stages. First, issues and actors involved in formal leadership positions must be identified. This is accomplished through personal interviews which are conducted with several knowledgeable persons to gather more detailed information regarding policy issues and individuals and groups involved in the process. The second stage builds upon information gathered in the first stage. In this step, issues are specifically delineated, and a complete list of actors having influence is compiled and extensive reviews are conducted with them to gather the information necessary to complete the leverage analysis.

In order to expediently collect the desired information, the interviews were designed to allow flexibility with regard to the personality and position of the interviewee and the time allowed for the interview. The results of these interviews, utilizing both structured and open ended questions, formed a basis for analyzing the leverage system.

The structured questions allowed a leverage hierarchy of issues, organizations and actors to be formulated, while the open ended questions provided information which was utilized in conjunction with data gathered in the preliminary search of files, newspaper articles, and public records to subjectively analyze the leverage hierarchy established from the structured questions, and to help explain the interrelationships found within it.

In a case study which requires extensive personal interviews, the possibility of bias on the part of the respondent must be considered. The effect of time on the interviewees' memory or a number of other reasons may result in respondent bias. To reduce this element, the responses to the open ended questions were compared with the results of the search of newspaper accounts, files, etc., in a subjective effort by the author to account for respondent bias on the open ended questionnaire. A more detailed explanation of leverage analysis is included in Chapter III.

V. . ORGANIZATION

The thesis is arranged in the following manner:

Chapter I has presented a brief introduction to the case study, the objectives of this thesis, the methodology of preparing the study, and the organization of the remainder of this thesis.

Chapter II presents a discussion of citizen participation theory and practice and provides a framework for analyzing citizen participation in this study.

Chapter III presents a discussion of the decision-making theories pertinent to this study and explains Gergen's leverage system of analyzing the decision-making process.

Chapter IV presents the chronological events which constituted the location decision-making process of the South Maryville bypass.

Chapter V analyzes the issues, actors, and organizations involved in the location decision-making process of the bypass via Gergen's leverage system approach.

Chapter VI presents the evaluation of citizen participation and the decision-making process along with the summary and conclusions, that were drawn from this case study.

This thesis was organized in the manner presented above to be useful to two prospective types of readers. First, it is expected that the theoretical chapters in themselves may be utilized as a source of theoretical information on citizen participation and decision making. Therefore, the theoretical background and analytical frameworks are presented in "self-contained" chapters. Second, prospective readers may be interested in the more pragmatic aspects of the case study by itself. Should this be the case, the reader can use the case study and analysis chapters only. In short, it is hoped that this thesis will provide a useful and convenient source for both the "political" and "theoretical" reader.

CHAPTER II

A THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

I. INTRODUCTION

As explained in the introduction, this chapter will focus on a general discussion of citizen participation. It consists of a brief discussion of two major theories of participation in democratic government, the classical theory and elite participatory theory. The discussion of these theories will serve as part of the framework for analyzing participation in the case study which will be presented in subsequent chapters.

II. CLASSICAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY

Citizen participation has been defined as "the means by which members of the community are able to take part in the shaping of the policies and plans that will affect the environment in which they will live."[1] This participatory concept has two implications. First, that people have an inherent right in a democratic society to information to the choices and proposals open to decision makers. Second, citizens should be able to have an input into the planning and the decision-making

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[1]Arnold Whittick, ed., Encyclopedia of Urban Planning (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1974), p. 850.

process, from the initial identification of goals and objectives to the detailed implementation of plans and policies.[2]

The belief in the right of man to intervene in public decisions that will affect his environment is a democratic ideal that can be traced back to the origins of democracy in ancient Greece. There, in a few small city-states, democracy was practiced by the citizen who directly made many of the political decisions of the day. Classical democracy, as practiced by the Greeks, emphasized maximum participation of all of the citizens all of the time.[3]

Basic to this theory of classical democracy are three underlying assumptions about human nature in general and the individual in particular. First, it is assumed that the "citizen has a strong motivation for participation,"[4] that given the opportunity "significant numbers of people will engage in the active local participation necessary to make a program successful."[5] Second, all individuals within a community have the necessary talent or resources for effective participation regardless of their station in life.[6] And third, that

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[2]Ibid.

[3]Kenneth R. Padgett, "Techniques of Active Communities: A Critique of One Attempt at Citizen Participation" (Masters Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1973), pp. 12-13.

[4]Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarfield, and William N. Mephee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), p. 308.

[5]David E. Booher, "A Theory of Participatory Planning" (Masters Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1974), p. 22.

[6]Jewel Bellush and Murray Hausknecht, "Planning Participation and Urban Renewal," Urban Renewal: People, Politics, and Planning, ed. by

the overall results of complete participation will be desirable in the sense that feelings of political powerlessness will be eliminated, programs made more relevant, while at the same time, proving not to be dysfunctional to the system.[7]

As a political and social system, classical participatory democracy presupposed that the interest of all groups will be directly involved in governmental processes since "the democratic objective . . . toward which the activities of citizenship are aimed cannot be completely satisfied by exclusive rule by experts or by any other kind of elite."[8] Furthermore, under the classical concept of participation access to political decision making is guaranteed to every citizen; should he lack the necessary skills, he is to learn them through actual participation. As noted by Keynes and Ricci:

> The basic objective of classical democracy has always been to extend the opportunity for individuals to take an equal and effective part in the management of public affairs. Through this opportunity, it was believed, the horizons of the participatory individual could be widened, his knowledge extended, his sympathies made less parochial, his practical intelligence developed. . . . Participation in politics would provide men with opportunities to take part in making significant decisions and to transcend the narrow bounds of

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Bellush and Hausknecht (Garden City: Doubleday and Company, 1967), p. 279, quoted by Kenneth Padgett, "Techniques of Active Communities: A Critique of One Attempt at Citizen Participation" (Masters Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1975), p. 14.

[7]David E. Booher, "A Theory of Participatory Planning," p. 22.

[8]Kenneth P. Padgett, "Techniques of Active Communities," p. 14.

> their private lives. It would build and consolidate a sense of genuine community and would serve as a solid foundation for government.[9]

Dennis Thompson writes that this optimism in man's capability to govern himself did not end with the demise of the golden age of Greece, but is still alive and well in the twentieth century with only a few minor adjustments having been made necessary. Labeling classical democracy as citizenship theory, Thompson refers to "citizenship" as the capacity of the individual to influence politics, which implies the active involvement in political life. "This concept evokes the ideas of citizenship which can be traced back to the ideals of Athenian democracy."[10]

According to Thompson, democratic citizenship in the twentieth century suggests more than the Greek ideal in two respects. First, all individuals in the modern state are to engage in the activities of citizenship, there being no exceptions such as slaves. Second, modern citizenship suggests that citizens engage in political activities to express not only personal interest but group interests as well.

Yet, in some respects, Thompson asserts that a modern classical democratic system achieves less than the Greek ideal. In a large and complex industrialized state, it is impossible for all citizens to

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[9]Edward Keynes and David M. Ricci, eds., Political Power, Community and Democracy (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1970), pp. 245-246.

[10]Dennis F. Thompson, The Democratic Citizen (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1970), p. 2.

be consulted on most of the decisions which have to be made, and the citizenship (classical) theorists are dissatisfied with the low levels of citizen involvement in modern democracies. They emphasize the importance and the possibilities of expanding citizenship through more participation in governmental affairs.[11]

III. ELITE DEMOCRATIC THEORY

In contrast to classical theories stressing maximum participation, there has evolved another major trend in western political theory that questions the wisdom of widespread participation in the affairs of modern government. These theorists, labeled elite[12] by some, and contemporary or representative by others,[13] state their conviction that the theories of classical democracy are "in need of drastic revision, if not outright rejection."[14] They have been concerned with insuring stability in the political system, a belief founded in the turbulence of the early twentieth century, in which the rise of totalitarian states was accomplished in previously high participatory governments such as the Wiemer Republic.[15]

Elite theorists have been further influenced by findings revealed by the expansion of political science and sociology in the twentieth

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[11]Ibid. [12]Ibid.

[13]Carole Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

[14]Ibid., pp. 1-2. [15]Ibid., p. 3.

century, which pointed out empirical evidence that most citizens were not interested in or capable of effective participation in government. These findings led Joseph Schumpeter to write:

> Data from large-scale empirical investigations into political attitudes and behavior, undertaken in most western countries over the past twenty or thirty years, have revealed that the outstanding characteristics of most citizens . . . is a general lack of interest in politics and political activity. . . . The conclusion drawn . . . is that the "classical" picture of democratic man is hopelessly unrealistic, and moreover, that in view of the facts about political attitudes, an increase in political participation by present nonparticipants could upset the stability of the democratic system.[16]

Schumpeter has a vast influence on elite theory when he authored Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, in which his main criticism of classical democracy was that the central participatory role of the people rested on empirically unrealistic foundations, that more realisitically, the power of the ballot is enough power for the average citizen. In this scheme,

> . . . it is the competition for leadership that is the distinctive feature of democracy, and the one that allows us to distinguish the democratic from other political methods. By this method everyone is, in principle, free to compete for leadership in free elections.[17]

Participation, according to the elite theorists, is achieved through balloting for leaders, but other than that, has no special or central role. All that is entailed to insure democracy is that enough citizens participate through the ballot to keep the

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[16]Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (3rd ed; New York: Harper Brothers Publishers, 1960), p. 26.

[17]Ibid., p. 169.

institutional arrangements working satisfactorily. Participation is focused on a minority of leaders,[18] "for the electoral mass is incapable of action other than a stampede,"[19] and widespread participation would result in political instability.

In a similar attack on classical democracy, Berelson writes that limited participation and apathy have a positive function for the whole system by cushioning the shock of disagreement and change. Berelson argues that low amounts of political participation is functional to the system, that high levels of participation are required from a minority of citizens, and more importantly, political apathy plays a valuable role in maintaining the stability of the system. Thus, the amount of participation that actually is obtained is just about the amount that is required for a stable system of democracy."[20]

In A Preface to Democratic Theory, Robert Dahl reinforces this theme when he stresses that there is no use in advocating a theory that requires maximum participation, when it has been empirically shown that most people tend to be disinterested in politics.[21] Pateman builds even further on the theme, stating:

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[18]Carol Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, p. 12.

[19]Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 283.

[20]B. R. Berelson, P. F. Lazarfield, and W. N. McPhee, Voting (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 316-323.

[21]Robert A. Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 81-138.

> Voting studies have, in effect, brought out a very poor picture of the ordinary voter, so poor that one is forced to wonder whether the public in question is anything more than a merely passive audience. The average citizen is neither interested nor active in political discourse. His information is indeed thin and his perception of this issues is distorted and aprioristic. His choices correspond to patterns of identification connected with a prevailing allegiance or with overlapping affiliations to the family, the peer group, the class, the church group, etc.[22]

Both Pateman and Dahl, as well as Schumpeter, have been influenced in their beliefs by the host of empirical evidence that was increasing in volume as the twentieth century progressed.

These studies were interpreted to show that the low levels of participation and corresponding high levels of apathy "particularly among the lower classes are not bad, but highly desirable."[23] These findings imply that the increasing complexity of modern society, especially in government, has made it difficult for the ordinary citizen to make correct judgments and develop choices relevant for the exercise of governmental affairs. Study after study listed the deficiencies of the poor and the reputed correlation to participation. A person's childhood and adult experience,[24] the presence of an authoritan environment, level of income,[25] and even the degree of

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[22]Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, p. 47.

[23]Ibid., p. 49.

[24]Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 279.

[25]Thompson, Democratic Citizen, p. 73.

exposure to the media have been "woven into a noose—a circle of poverty that attempted to justify the exclusion of the poor for the sake of political stability."[26]

V. O. Key adequately summed up this elite philosophy concerning the poor and average citizen stating:

> The characteristics of the ruling elite are much more important to the public policy system than participation by citizens. . . . The critical element for the health of democratic order consists in the beliefs standards, and competence of those who constitute the influentials, the opinion-leaders, and the political activists.[27]

IV. REEMERGENCE OF CLASSICAL THEORY

Another noted twentieth century political theorist saw an inherent danger in the elite philosophy and warned that "in a domestic crisis, these unorganized interests may prevent the development of usable compromise and encourage resort to less orderly means of adjustment."[28]

This belief by David Trumans proved to be phophetically true when the lower classes, especially the blacks, began to demand, often by confrontation, their rights as individuals living within a democratic society. Treated as nonpersons for generations, when the blacks refused second-class citizenship and strove for advancement within society,

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[26]Padgett, "Techniques for Active Communities," pp. 19-20.

[27]V. O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 530.

[28]David B. Truman, The Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), pp. 516-524.

often having to resort to open physical violence and civil disobedience, they made measurable progress.

With each success, blacks did not just improve their own race, however, but also tended to discredit many of the findings of elite democratic theory.[29] For example, Dahl's New Haven study found, contrary to elite theory, that the number of blacks participating in political campaigns were proportionally higher among registered voters than the white "elites."[30]

Other studies have indicated negative environmental factors have been considered by elite theorists to impair the ability of lower status persons to participate effectively, it would appear instead that, even in "negative" environments, personal activation can be generated. For example, Ryan reveals that:

> In the early grades, when, presumably, the effect of the home background—the cultural deprivation or disadvantage—are greatest, there is little or no difference in reading performance between children in low income schools as compared to those in high income neighborhoods.[31]

Such evidence has led to a reemerging realization that more effective participation by the disadvantaged citizen is not an impossible or undesirable task. Instead, many have begun to view it

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[29]Padgett, "Techniques for Active Communities," pp. 22-23.

[30]Dahl, Who Governs, p. 294.

[31]William Ryan, Blaming the Victim (New York: Random House, 1971), p. 37 CF., "Techniques for Active Communities," pp. 21-22.

as a goal worth achieving rather than as an irrepairable condition, an indelible blot on society.[32]

Edgar and Jean Camper Cahn summed up this growing rebuttal of elite democratic theory, stating that we must realize "the poor are not monolithic; they are composite, capable of speaking and deliberating in a variety of modes.[33]

In other words, there is an increasing amount of evidence showing that, if given the opportunity, the lower socioeconomic groups can and will assume responsive and responsible places in society, that participation in the chassical sense does not necessarily result either in political instability, or, ultimately in the rise of an authoritaritan system.

V. STRATEGIES IN CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

With the renewed demands for equal participation and the resurgence of support for classical democratic theory, it is not surprising to find that recent participatory strategies have reflected a movement away from elite participatory theory toward an acceptance of greater involvement by all segments of society. This movement can be traced in many public programs of twentieth century government in the United States.

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[32]Padgett, "Techniques for Active Communities," p. 24.

[33]Edgar S. and Jean Camper Cahn, "Citizen Participation" in Citizen Participation in Urban Development, ed. by Hans B. C. Spiegel (Washington: Center for Community Affairs, NTL Institute for Applied Behavioral Science, 1968), p. 24.

In the early decades of the twentieth century, boards such as Community Welfare Councils, relying on business and social elites, and Citizen Planning Commissions, also made up of "elites" from the business and social communities, were established as vehicles for classical public involvement in government. However, these and other similar citizen boards reflected little if any representation of poor and minority citizens. The voice of the common person could only be heard through the ballot. The citizen boards were reserved for those citizens having social and economic status.[34] Thus, these efforts represented an attempt to incorporate classical philosophy into public affairs.

In the 1930s, classical citizen participatory theory was given a better test with the establishment of a new program within the Department of Agriculture, called the New Democracy of Agriculture. Operating in conjunction with the Agriculture Adjustment Administration (A.A.A.), this organization inc uded a series of citizen committees which had a voice in the decision making of various substantive programs within the Department of Agriculture.

The advisory program participants varied greatly in composition, background, and activities. Some were farmers, others blue collar workers, and others from "elite" segments of society. Overall, the

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[34]Principles and Practices of Urban Planning, James H. Pickford, "The Local Planning Agency Organization and Structure," edited by William J. Goodman and Eric C. Freund (Washington, D.C.: International City Managers Association, Fourth Ed., 1968), pp. 527-528.

system of citizen participation involving these people was worked out program by program with each local agency operating under broad departmental guidelines—giving much discretion to the local boards.

By 1940, the total national membership of all these committees was almost 900,000. Hence, the federal government in the 1930s had created a citizen participation mechanism of major proportion which was remarkably similar in many respects to the Community Action Program established some 25 years later. For a while at least, this program provided classical participatory theory a foothold in the "real world" of the twentieth century.[35]

However, with the coming of World War II, social experiments such as this were displaced by programs, both social and military, which were specifically aimed at aiding the war effort.

VI. URBAN RENEWAL

After the end of the war, another milestone in participation came about with the establishment of the workable program of the Urban Renewal legislation of 1954; a program requiring a limited amount of participation. Under the provisions of this act, citizens advisory committees would be required to assist in the development of urban renewal plans. Reflecting an "elite" philosophy regarding participation, these committees were made up of business and social

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[35]Booher, "A Theory of Participatory Planning," p. 33.

leaders of the community, with little if any representation of poor or minority groups.[36]

The Federal guidelines for this program recognized the need for citizen participation, but were limited to merely requiring appointments of a city-wide advisory committee by the mayor. This, in effect, excluded the poor from representation. In practice these committees contained civic leaders representing business groups and interests in the community. Representation of the poor, who were usually most directly affected by renewal activities, was neither mandatory or commonplace.[37]

Eventually, neighborhood opposition to this elite concept of participation in urban renewal grew. Critics charged that:

> . . . the renewal program was more concerned with bricks, mortar, and physical accomplishments than with people, hitting hardest at those least able to help themselves—the Negro, the small businessman, the elderly and the low-income large family. They claim that renewal more often intensifies than alleviates the difficulties faced by these groups.[38]

As a result of this criticism, in many neighborhoods, organizations were formed for the first time to combat decisions made by Urban Renewal Citizen Committees, and as a consequence, many urban renewal projects floundered in indecision caused by controversy.[39]

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[36] Goodman and Freund, eds., Principles and Practices of Urban Planning, p. 487.

[37] Ibid. [38] Ibid.

[39] Neil Gilbert, Clients or Constituents (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1970), pp. 11-12.

Gradually, the demands for more local representation, along with a growing inability to get projects implemented, resulted in a movement toward more representation of all interests in all phases of urban renewal project planning; a movement

> . . . towards greater integration with planning, more understanding of basic city processes and constraints to action, use of more powerful analytical tools, social planning, greater coordination of the parts of government vital to effective renewal action, developing techniques for making renewal decisions and solving some of the problems that have perennially beset past renewal efforts.[40]

Rossi and Dentler had no doubt as to the importance of a strong community organization in the total planning process of urban renewal.

> It seems likely that successful urban renewal in large cities—successful in the sense of widely accepted both within and without the neighborhoods under renewal—will come primarily either in neighborhoods that have an indigenous successful community organization or in neighborhoods in which some outside agency manages to create one.[41]

Thus, during the course of urban renewal in the 1950s and 1960s, the need for a move toward classical participation was gradually evidenced. Occurring mostly as a result of demands by poor and minority groups, participation in urban renewal programs shifted from one of upper class and business representation, to a more widespread base.

However, most of the renewal efforts still have been directed towards keeping middle class families, industries, hospitals,

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[40]Kaufman, "Urban Renewal," p. 487.

[41]Peter H. Rossi and Robert A. Dentler, The Politics of Urban Renewal (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1961), p. 292.

universities, and downtown business concerns in the city. The emphasis has been to preserve "important" institutions, not on developing certain "less important" resources such as provide housing for low income and elderly people, and aiding small business and the like.[42] However, by experiencing the reactions of the public to a large "physical" program which uncovered and made social problems more visible, urban renewal was an important forerunner of social programs instituted in the 1960s.

Following the trend of increased participation in decision making in urban renewal projects, a number of social programs were undertaken in the early 1960s that were to lay the groundwork for much larger programs instituted later in that decade.

Such projects as the Harlem Youth Opportunities, the Ford Foundation's Gray area projects, and President Kennedy's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency were all influential in the formation of later social programs emphasizing participation. Moreover, these projects differed from urban renewal in that they were social programs directly aimed at the poor, and were based on more of a classical concept regarding participation.[43]

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[42]Kaufman, "Urban Renewal," pp. 518-519.

[43]For a more detailed discussion of these programs see: Kenneth B. Clark, A Relevant War Against Poverty (New York: Metropolitan Applied Research Center, 1968): Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding (New York: The Free Press, 1969): Morris and Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform (New York: Atherton Press, 1969).

As socially enlightening as these programs were, according to the tenets of participatory democracy, they met with a limited amount of success. Blame for the failure of these programs has been placed on two factors. First, Morris and Rein wrote in The Dilemmas of Social Reform that the projects suffered from a compromise in proper planning. Due to stress from both communities and Congress, who wanted quick action, planners for such projects were forced to act prematurely; action was "phased in while plans were still developing. . . . The logic of scientific problem solving collapsed into piecemeal pragmatism."[44] Second, these programs were hampered by inadequate and intermittent funding. "Too often, community organizations were set up and people motivated into acting, only to learn that there was no money available to finance their effort."[45]

These "independent agencies" were almost totally dependent on federal funding for survival, and when the cities refused to pick up the burden after the initial "seed money" was depleted, the agencies became powerless to act.

VII. THE ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY ACT

During the late 1950s and early 1960s, growing civil unrest made the task of instituting viable social programs urgent. As a result of the increasing unrest and agitation by lower income groups, in 1964,

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[44]Morris and Rein, Dilemmas of Social Reform, p. 39.

[45]Padgett, "Techniques for Active Communities," p. 31.

according to Daniel Moynihan, "The President wanted action, not planning, not just specific target areas, but nationwide action, especially aimed at the blacks."[46] It was becoming apparent that a much larger commitment, in size, scope and funding of projects, would be needed if the social problems of the country were to be solved.

The 1964 Economic Opportunity Act was to offer the solution. Under the provisions of this act, the main vehicle of implementation was to be Community Action Programs, operated by public nonprofit agencies located in the neighborhoods being served. These agencies would provide services, assistance, and other activities aimed toward the elimination of poverty, and would operate under the mandate of "maximum feasible participation" of residents of the neighborhood. For the first time, on a nationwide scale, the poor were given both political and economic power to solve their own problems.

Ironically, this developed as a factor which proved to be their biggest hurdle. As the Community Action Programs began organizing, they also began to threaten to undermine existing political structure. Since the CAAs were autonomous agencies, many local governments began to consider them as instigators of social unrest and even open violence. Assuming a position of advocacy, the CAAs had proved to be very effective at defining conflicts but found that solving them would take a much longer period of time. Instead of providing community-wide

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[46]Daniel P. Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding (New York: The Free Press, 1969), p. 56.

planning and coordination of services for the poor, many of the agencies had defined their roles as one of advocacy and confrontation.[47]

Since the community action programs were founded upon the classical theory of maximum participation, a certain amount of social unrest was inevitable as a result of the ad ocate position, and by following an advocacy approach, CAAs were being assailed by local politicians and bureaucrats alike. Under pressure from mayors of many of the nation's larger cities, administrators in the O.E.O. began to revise the original meaning of maximum participation and to try to keep the local CAAs as quiet as possible. As a result of the contorversy, the President began to press the O.E.O. administrators to keep the community action program out of controversy, and to silence their spokesmen. This, in effect, would minimize the role of the citizens in policy-making.[48]

Yet, even this did not quell the fears of political instability. Thus, in 1967, the Green Amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act was passed, which, returned most of the power of the CAAs to the local governments if they wanted to assume it. In a move back toward "elite" participatory philosophy, the amendment reserved one third of the membership of CAA policy boards for public officials and allowed another one third to be assigned to business, education and other similar groups. The remaining one third would be left to the poor. Hence the

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[47]James L. Sundquist, Making Federalism Work (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1969), p. 80.

[48]Moynihan, Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding, pp. 144-146.

"traditional power structure" of the community was virtually assured control of the community action agencies that had originally been under the dominance of the poor.[49]

The shift in control of policy decision making presented a turning away from pure local control and the concepts of neighborhood mobilization, coordination, and planning from which community action had evolved. As a result, the Community Action Programs would never again enjoy the strategic position in the community it at one time held.[50]

Overall, the Community Action Program, while obtaining a high degree of participation, failed to achieve its objectives of providing a number of services for the poor. By taking a position of advocacy, the Community Action Programs proved very effective at defining conflicts, while at the same time raising a threat of political upheaval. This resulted in the traditional power base of the communities taking over control of the local programs, ultimately spelling the doom of the Community Action agencies as an effective tool for combating social problems through a program of community-controlled and operated boards. A need for coordination remained, but an impatient Congress had already turned to a different organization.[51]

VIII. MODEL CITIES

In 1966, Congress passed the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act calling for "widespread citizen participation" instead

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[49]Padgett, "Techniques for Active Communities," p. 35.

[50]Ibid. [51]Ibid., p. 37.

of "maximum participation." An important part of President Johnson's Great Society, the Model Cities Program under widespread citizen participation returned the emphasis on decision making from the neighborhood to City Hall. This reflected a move back to "elite" democratic theory.

The philosophy which originally guided the O.E.O. was one of decision making at the neighborhood level, while in the Model Cities concept, the community resident's function was one of advisory participation only. Although Model Cities Boards were elected within the Model Cities neighborhoods, they held only advisory influence. The real power lay in city hall. Under the Model Cities approach, it was reasoned that program success depended more upon support of the local political structure, than on neighborhood organizations. Strong political leadership was now accepted as the most effective means of coordinating both planning and action.[52]

Of crucial importance in distinguishing the basis of power between the O.E.O. and Model Cities program is the fact that where money under O.E.O. program funding was channeled directly to the local C.A.A.s, funding for Model Cities projects would first be channeled through the City Hall. This gave the local political structure the ever important "power of the purse."

With a hierarchial system of authority, a major problem with Model Cities projects lay in implementing the program's mandate for widespread

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[52]Murray S. Stedman, Jr., Urban Politics (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1972), pp. 249-252.

participation. Measures had been taken to insure a certain amount of citizen input into the programs, but no specific methodology was set forth as to how neighborhood participation would be carried out. The only direction that model cities administration had given concerning participation was to direct the city governments to insure that whatever organization is adopted, that it provide the means for citizens to participate and be fully involved in all phases of decision making.[53] No specific mechanism was suggested through which this mandate could be accomplished. There was even some disagreement between officials of the Department of Housing and Urban Development as to how citizen participation was to be incorporated into the decision-making process of the model cities project.[54]

After an initial period of confusion as to how citizen participation should be incorporated into model cities planning and decision making, HUD issued the "Minimum Performance Standards for Citizen Participation in Model Cities." These standards contained three program elements of crucial importance to citizen participation. First, model cities would be directed by a bicameral structure of local citizens and officials, which, if implemented successfully, would satisfy not only the political requirements for control but the social obligation for participation as well.

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[53]Roland L. Warren, "Model Cities First Round: Politics Planning and Participation," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXXV (July, 1969), pp. 247-249.

[54]Ibid.

The second element of significance is the explicit selection and acceptance of representatives by neighborhood residents. This element recognized the need for strong and direct citizen involvement in public policy decision making and bowed to pressure for minorities for at least some voice in administering the program. By experiences gained in earlier programs of the war on poverty, the residents were developing an understanding of the leverage they possessed, and were not satisfied until nothing less than an active, though shared, voice in the decision-making process was gained. The best way to insure such a voice was through elections of citizen representatives which would comprise the citizen board in the bicameral policymaking structure.[55]

Apathy and disorganization were still to be combated, but the danger of mounting citizen unrest and protest against a lack of neighborhood involvement was more than enough impetus to include their representation. In order to aid the local citizens who were to be involved in the process, the final program element called for technical assistance to provide training and education so that the poor would be able to intervene rationally early enough in the process to effect the eventual outcome. "It would allow poor people to present, in technically persuasive ways, their own hopes and desires for the future of their own neighborhoods."[56]

The resultant planning process, due to the nature of these three program elements, would by necessity be not only long range and general

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[55]Padgett, "Techniques for Active Communities," pp. 38-42.

[56]Ibid., p. 342.

in scope, but short range and problem oriented as well. Within this process, there would also be an awareness of the political as well as neighborhood forces involved in public policy formulation. Greater emphasis on decision making, however, was placed on the existing political structure rather than on community controlled agencies.[57]

However, the Model Cities program, as in the O.E.O. programs, was nipped in the bud before its effectiveness could be given fair assessment. In 1973, funding for new projects for Model Cities was stifled by the Nixon administration. It was argued that mayors, city councils and county executives should represent the people—not neighborhood groups—even when working at the discretion of local politics as in Model Cities projects. Acting in the name of local and state rights, many of the programs of the 1960s were abolished through official program termination or executive withholding of funds. In their place, a system of revenue sharing was established which contained virtually no participatory guidelines, giving much discretion to local officials as to how to spend these funds.

IX. THE HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 1974

Just a week after the resignation of President Nixon in 1974, Congress passed legislation providing for social and community

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[57]Graham S. Finney, "The Intergovernmental Context of Local Planning," Principles and Practices of Urban Planning, edited by William J. Goodman and Eric C. Freund (Washington, D.C.: International City Managers Association, Fourth Ed., 1968), pp. 38-40.

development programs: The Housing and Community Development Act of 1974. Under its provisions, many categorical grants were replaced by an $8.6 billion block-grant community development program that will give localities greater control over how the money is to be spent than was experienced under the categorical grant.[58] A federal categorical grant is essentially any allocation of funds to a state or local jurisdiction for specified purposes, usually with a degree of stipulations, supervision and review by the federal agency involved in the specific grant. These grants are normally made on a "matching" basis, where, according to a formula, the federal government "matches" an amount of money paid by the local grant recipient. Under the categorical grant, more control over how the money was to be spent was held at the federal level than in the block-grant procedure set forth in the 1974 Housing Act.[59]

Citizen participation is still required under the act of 1974, but the words hold a different connotation than before.

> Specifically, citizen participation must become a key means of achieving two new but crucial objectives. First citizens must help use the federal funds available under the act as leverage to attract large amounts of private capital and other nonfederal resources that are essential to making community development work. Second, they must assist in striking a proper balance between spending federal and other funds in low income neighborhoods or for the direct benefit of primarily low- and moderate-income households. . . .[60]

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[58]Daniel Lauber, "Some Tips on the New Housing Act," Planning, Vol. 41, No. 10 (November, 1974), pp. 21-23.

[59]Ibid., p. 21.

[60]Ibid., p. 22.

This reflects a definite shifting of the purpose and meaning of participation as it was viewed in the "Great Society" programs as described below.

Under this new concept, cities will still be required to file with HUD a "citizen participation plan" delineating how the applicants plan to: "(a) provide citizens with adequate information concerning the amounts of funds available . . . (b) specify the range of activities that may be undertaken . . . (c) delineate how and when public hearings will be held to obtain the views of citizens on community development and housing needs, to provide citizens an adequate opportunity to participate in the development of the proposals. . . ."[61] However, it remains uncertain whether these provisions will actually open up the Community Development Block Grant process to active citizen input since ". . . a city should fully comply with the citizen participation requirements, but could still ignore the citizen input." It remains to be seen whether a city can be forced to take this input into account. "Until that question is answered, these provisions may be just another exercise in rhetoric."[62]

X. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND HIGHWAY PLANNING

Attempts to incorporate citizen involvement in the 1950s were not limited just to social, housing and redevelopment programs. Throughout this period, efforts to involve the public in transportation and

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[61] Ibid., p. 23. [62] Ibid., p. 23.

highway planning were attempted also. One highway official placed the starting date of 1950 as the year when limited participating was required in highway planning.[63] The Federal Aid Highway Act of that year created public hearing requirements for highway projects, and these procedures remained substantially unchanged for 12 years. In 1962 Federal "legislation called for a greater participation by local officials in the planning of highway improvements and the coordination of urban transportation plans with an area comprehensive plan,"[64] through the "A-95" review process.

In 1969, Congress required more direct participation in transportation planning when it required, in Section 4(F) of the National Environmental Policy Act of that year, that a "multidisciplinary approach to be made in planning highway improvements, and alternate plans must be developed for consideration by the public and other agencies and groups concerned with social, economic and environmental impacts that a project would have on a community."[65] A year later, the U.S. Department of Transportation required in Section 156(b) of the Federal Aid Primary Act which requires full consideration of all impacts and involvement by the public "throughout the planning and development process."[66]

However, as in the housing and redevelopment programs instituted during this period, no clear and efficient mechanism for implementing

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[63]Letter of Jan. 24, 1974, from Robert Smith, Commissioner of the TDOT to Thomas W. Cate, concerning the South bypass.

[64]Ibid. [65]Ibid. [66]Ibid.

the required participation was set forth. The need for participation was widely recognized and lauded as a worthy concept, but the officials responsible for carrying out these requirements were often left with a seemingly impossible task. The Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Transportation aptly summarized this dilemma, stating:

> . . . I would have to admit that the intention of this legislation is highly commendable. . . . However as chief administrator of a state agency responsible for providing the highway facilities needed and demanded by the public, and at the same time, responsible for compliance with all of the bureaucratic requirements that have been proliferated by the various federal agencies, I find the job extremely difficult and at times exasperating.[67]

XI. CONFUSION IN PARTICIPATION

Participation of citizens in community planning and decision making is now a common practice. The demands of citizens and the resultant federal legislation have combined to make citizen participation a requirement in virtually every project. However, in program after program, citizen participation is a major source of confusion.

In urban renewal, many projects were virtually halted or, at the least, criticized for their lack of widespread participation. Even the O.E.O. and Model Cities programs, both of which consciously pursued participation, stumbled over the application of citizen participation and the confusion in highway planning has not been any less. This lack of a mechanism is a main reason for the "participation confusion" one finds in the programs discussed above.

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[67] Ibid.

In attempting to find a suitable participatory mechanism, there have been at least as many strategies as there have been programs. Some programs like urban renewal encompassed a more elite philosophy, while others such as the O.E.O. programs leaned toward a "classical" approach. The more recent attempts at participation in the Housing and Community Development programs through its policy of local discretion—discretion of the political structure—have evidenced a return to the "elitist" perspective.

By way of summary, it can be concluded that the lack of a clear-cut method of incorporating participation into these programs has led to confusion and frustration. As Edmund Burke stated, "Commonly advocated as serving fairly specific objectives, citizen participation is more often predicated upon value premises than upon practical considerations."[68] The myriad of programs that have attempted to include the public into the planning and decision-making processes have resulted in a myriad of complex participatory methodologies.

XII. PARTICIPATION CLASSIFICATION: TWO RECENT METHODS

Given the number and complexity of the diverse attempts at participation in planning and decision making, and given the relative degree of success and failure of these attempts, it appears that there is no one best approach to the problem and to imply that the term citizen participation is a single and undifferentiated strategy is

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[68] Edmund M. Burke, "Citizen Participation Strategies," Journal of the American Institution of Planners, XXXIV (September, 1968), pp. 287-295.

misleading. It is more accurate to speak of several strategies which can be defined in terms of given objectives. These objectives are limited by available resources as well as the organizational character of the community.

> . . . The relevancy and the success of a strategy depends both upon an organization's ability to fulfill the necessary role for a strategy's effectiveness and upon the adaptability of the strategy to its environment.[69]

Sherry Arnstein and Edmund Burke have addressed this problem and, after research of many participatory programs of recent years, have developed two typologies for classifying and categorizing participation strategies.

Five Classifications of Participatory Strategy

In an article which appeared in the September, 1968, issue of the Journal of the American Institute of Planners, Burke formulates a model which classifies five types of participatory strategies (Table I). These are: education-therapy, behavior-change, staff-supplement, co-optation, and community power.

Education-therapy. The education-therapy strategy is described as a frequently proclaimed but rarely viable strategy that focuses on the presumed need for improvement of the individual. Focus is on the means, not the accomplishment of goals and tasks. The education role of participation is the overriding factor in this strategy. Participation is used therapeutically, as a means of developing self-confidence,

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[69] Ibid., p. 287.

TABLE I

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION STRATEGIES

Power Strategy
Staff Supplement
Co-optation
Behavior Change
Education Therapy

Source: Edmund M. Burke, "Citizen Participation Strategies," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXXIV (September, 1968), pp. 287-295.

thereby solving many of the citizens' own problems without more direct aid involvement of the agency.

Behavioral change. Closely related to the education-therapy strategy in which, through group participation, it is felt that individual behavior can be changed. The objective of this strategy is to induce change in the individual through influence of groups in which the individual participates. Unlike the education-therapy strategy, whether or not an individual personally benefits is not relevant; the focus is on getting the individual to support the accomplishment of the group goals.

Staff supplement. Probably the widest used participatory technique, according to Burke, is the staff-supplement strategy which operates on the simple principle of voluntarism—the recruitment of citizen laymen to carry out a number of tasks of an organization. However, in this strategy, often the advice of the laymen is treated as opinion and does not carry much weight in the decisions of the organization.

Co-optation. There is the possibility, however, that the citizens' expertise can become merely a sanctioning element, a symbol through which, in actuality, the staff's voice becomes policy. When this is pursued, according to Burke, the strategy of staff supplement becomes another strategy—co-optation. This is primarily a technique in which citizens are involved to prevent anticipated obstructionism. It has been defined as the process of absorbing new elements into the

leadership or policy determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability and existence.

Community power strategy. The final strategy described by Burke is not a singular method but two strategies based on theories of power. The first is to "capture" influentials by involving them as participants in the organization in order to accomplish organizational objectives—a modified form of co-optation. The second and significantly different strategy is based on the premises of power theory but not its conclusions. Change, it is suggested, can be caused by power in numbers such as an organized mass of citizenry. Essentially, through conflict and pressure, the power base is given over to the group demanding it—meaning a change in political structure, and perhaps, in political stability. Therefore, the ultimate form of participation involves an actual change in power over the decision-making process.

The effectiveness of a particular strategy depends on certain conditions found within an agency and the citizens it serves. It is important to note that not all strategies are appropriate for all organizations, the principal difficulty being to adopt a strategy which will best serve the demands of that particular type of organization. This is predicted on the belief that there is no one strategy which can be generalized as being the one best strategy. A model of this is shown in Table I, page 46.

A Participatory Ladder

In "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," Sherry Arnstein proposes that "there is a critical difference between going through an empty

ritual of participation and having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the process."[70] Based on the concept that valid citizen participation is a categorical term for citizen power, Arnstein proposes a model containing eight levels of participation in which each "rung" corresponds to the extent of citizens' power on the decision-making process. This model is shown on Table II.

Manipulation. Lowest on the "ladder of participation" is manipulation, an illusionary form of "participation" in which people are placed upon rubber stamp advisory boards for the purpose of educating them in order to gain their support. Arnstein asserts that early citizen advisory committees under O.E.O. programs were operated for this purpose and did not constitute "true" participation.

Therapy. The second rung of the participatory ladder is therapy whereby citizens are involved in planning by group action; the focus of which is to change their behavior through manipulative application of clinical group therapy. It is argued that not only does this not constitute participation, but is also tinged with unethical overtones.

Information. A little higher up on Arnstein's model is the process of information; or the token participatory activity of informing citizens of their rights, responsibilities and options. Information dissemination can be an important first step to legitimate participation,

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[70] Sherry Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXXV (July, 1969), pp. 342-356.

TABLE II

A LADDER OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Type of Participation	Classification
Citizen Control	
Delegated Power	Citizen Power of Influence
Partnership	
Placation	
Consultation	Tokenism
Informing	
Therapy	
Manipulation	Therapy

Source: Sherry Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXXV (July, 1969), pp. 342-356.

but too frequently, the information flows from officials to citizen, with no mechanism for feedback or negotiation.

Consultation. Closer to legitimate power in Arnstein's conceptual model of participation is the method of consultation, in which citizens' opinions are invited during project planning. However, if no assurance that citizen concerns will be taken into account, then this "rung" of the ladder will not provide real citizen influence in the decision-making process. Together with the previous "information rung," consultation without such assurances will, in effect, amount to mere tokenism instead of active participation.

Placation. Another form of participation is found on the next step, the act of placation. An example of placation methodology is to place a few handpicked "worthy" poor on boards. But either due to a lack of majority representation on these boards or having the actual decision-making authority higher up in the structure of the organization or even in formal political bodies, these citizens lack real decision-making power. In other words, these representatives are "tokens," placed on the boards and committees to placate certain groups. In reality, they have little authority to influence the outcome of decisions.

Partnership. The next rung of the ladder is the first rung where power is actually redistributed through negotiated partnership between citizens and power holders. At this partnership level, the citizens and powerholders agree to share planning and decision-making responsibilities

through joint policy boards, planning committees or other mechanisms for solving impasses. Actual power in the decision-making process is shared.

Negotiation. Negotiations that result when citizens and power holders share power can further achieve definite, delegated power, the next rung on the ladder. At this level, citizens hold significant power and can assure accountability of the program to their interests. This step is differentiated from the partnership level in that power is negotiated by both groups, not delegated to the citizen by the powerholders.

Citizen control. The ultimate degree of citizen participation in Arnstein's model is citizen control, where local groups of neighborhoods actually have complete and autonomous control of the particular program affecting them. This is a step further than negotiated power since in community control, the basis of authority is completely switched. This means that the citizens group has complete control rather than even a sharing of authority.

These strategies form each rung on the ladder of citizen participation. The model is essentially an hierarchial participatory conceptualization, outlining a typology of relative degrees of citizen participation, ranging from token participation to actual participation and power holding. This model is similar in many repects to Burke's scheme. It differs from it in that Burke's model offers a method of classification where on the other hand, Arnstein offers a method of analyzing the actual power achieved in different schemes.

XIII. A COMBINED ANALYTICAL MODEL

By combining these two models, a third model, which synthesizes certain aspects of each of the original schemes, can be created to form a typological model and analytical framework in which the participatory program involved in the South Maryville bypass can be assessed. In this synthesis, Burke's five strategies are placed at appropriate and corresponding rungs along the ladder of participation. By combining the two models, the type of participation can be classified according to Burke's model and further analyzed in terms of power, according to Arnstein's concept. The model which combines Burke's and Arnstein's approaches is shown in Table III.

Briefly explained, the strategies of education-therapy and educational change are considered as the manipulation and therapeutic types of participation thus being classified in regards to power strategies of nonparticipation.

Burke's strategy of co-optation can be either a consultation or placation type of participation, depending on the exact method in which the co-optive strategy is applied in a particular situation. This is to say that co-optation can perform either a consultative or placative role.

The staff-supplement strategy described by Burke overlaps with co-optation as a placation strategy, but can also lead to partnership—the first level of actual participation. Merely having citizens participate as supplementary staff without a real voice in decision making approximates co-optation strategies and would be

TABLE III

A COMBINED PARTICIPATORY MODEL

Strategies	Types of Participation	Classification
	Citizen Control	
Power Strategies	Delegated Power	Citizen Power
	Partnership	
	Partnership	
Staff Supplement	Placation	Tokenism
	Consultation	
	Placation	
Co-optation	Consultation	
	Informing	
Behavior Change and Education Therapy	Therapy	Nonparticipation
	Manipulation	

considered a placating form of token participation. But on the other hand, should a staff supplement strategy involve a significant role in policymaking, where the citizen has the power to negotiate with the powerholders, a partnership level of participation has been reached.

Power may be defined as exercising one's will over the opposition of others. Should this occur either through a delegation of power, the next rung on the participatory ladder, or through complete citizen control, the ultimate form of citizen participation, then power strategies of participation will have come into play.

Individuals are capable of exerting power and influence, and, centers of power are capable of existing outside formal political structures. This power can be effectively utilized to negotiate delegation of authority away from formal powerholders or, usually through conflict, i.e., picketing, boycott, or even violence. Complete authority can be taken away from the existing power structure. Should this occur, community power, which constitutes the highest rung on Arnstein's participatory ladder, will have been achieved.

The combined participatory model will be utilized as a basis for analyzing the citizen participation strategy applied in the location decision-making process of the South Maryville bypass. It will be utilized to classify and analyze, in terms of power or influence, the particular participatory strategy involved in this case study. It will be utilized further as a basis for recommending changes for the future in cases similar to this one. It should be reiterated, however, that there is no preconceived value placing any single strategy above or

below any other in an attempt to formulate a general strategy of participation. What may be successful for one type of program and a given area may result in a dismal failure for another type of program in another location.

In summary, the typological model is useful for two reasons. First, it offers a basis of categorizing participatory programs for purposes of analysis in a type of "classifying" scheme; and serves as a basis or framework for discussing the program. Second, given the consideration of both the mechanism utilized, and the degree of power achieved, the model can serve as an analytical tool which can be utilized in determining the most appropriate participatory mechanism under a given set of circumstances. In other words, given particular needs, values, and policy orientation of a particular program, a method fitting any one of the model typological concepts may be appropriate in that instance. Thus, it is hoped that the participatory model will aid in the development of a mechanism which, in a given situation, will recognize the needs, goals, values, etc., of that particular instance to aid in the identification of an appropriate strategy for a particular situation. To reiterate, such a strategy may differ drastically from other programs operating under different circumstances.

XIV. SUMMARY

The debate between "elite" and "classical" political and social theorists as to the most appropriate form of participation still continues today. Although recent evidence has inferred that the

assessments of "elite" participatory theorists have not been entirely correct, political applications of programs based on both theories have come full circle in the last thirty years. Starting largely with an "elite" concept in early planning structure of urban renewal, a gradual shifting to more "classical" forms of participation as greater participation by the poor was demonstrated as not only possible, but highly effective.

However, more recent participatory efforts have reflected a turning back to "elitist" concepts. But even though the theoretical basis for participation has returned to a more "elite" concept, the programs in the last six or seven years reflecting "elitist" philosophy require a greater degree of participation than previous "elite" programs, and generally speaking, citizens have more voice in decision making than the citizens of twenty years ago. Thus, the discussion between "elite" and "classical" participatory theory and philosophy goes on.

The continuing debate has served to foster a confusing array of participatory strategies. Although most of the major participatory programs have been at the federal level, there has been no overriding federal policy serving to guide participation efforts within these programs. This has resulted in at least as many strategies of participation as there have been programs. Even within programs espousing a certain philosophy toward participation, confusion was often the rule, with shifting of participatory policy resulting in a general failure of citizen participation efforts.

The typological model presented in this chapter has been fo in an attempt to classify, in a general conceptual scheme, the many methods and strategies that have been tried in recent participatory efforts in planning and decision making. The typology will serve as a framework for analyzing the participatory efforts involved in the location process of the South Maryville bypass. It does not recommend, however, that any one strategy is, generally speaking, better than any other strategy. Instead the "best" strategy is contingent on circumstances surrounding any given situation. The model, however, serves as a useful analytical tool for recommending which strategy could best be utilized in situations requiring participation.

CHAPTER III

PUBLIC POLICY DECISION MAKING

I. INTRODUCTION

Through the years there has been a large amount of attention focused on decision-making theory and what is the most appropriate method of reaching a decision. As J. W. Dykeman wrote:

> Many kinds of decision processes are available to the individual or to society. Decisions may be made by reference to traditional norms; they may be made intuitively, both routinely without reference to conscious processes, or creatively without an understanding of how the decision is achieved; or they may be made by reference to rational analysis, whether on a technical or judgement basis. The mechanisms for achieving these kinds of decisions are also numerous.[1]

It is beyond the scope of this study to present a complete discussion of decision-making theory, for a large number of theories have been espoused which explain various modes of decision making. Instead, three decision theories, pertinent to this case study will be discussed; "Rational social action,"[2] "Incrementalism,"[3] and "Mixed

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[1]John Dyckman, "Planning and Decision Theory," Journal of the American Institute of Planners (November, 1961), p. 336.

[2]Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindbloom, Political Economics and Welfare (New York, 1963), Harper and Row.

[3]Charles E. Lindbloom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review (Spring, 1959), pp. 79-88.

scanning."[4] These decision-making theories will serve as a basis for analysis of the decision-making methodologies used by the major actors involved in the location issue of the South Maryville bypass.

In order to understand the type of decision making that has occurred in this case study, it is necessary to understand the complex web of interrelationships involved in the formation of public policy. In other words, to gain a better awareness of the decision-making process, important issues and members of society having input into the process must be identified and analyzed. By understanding the interaction of the actors and issues affecting public policy formation, the decision-making process that occurred can be more accurately understood.

Kenneth Gergen presents a methodology for accomplishing this task in his book, The Study of Policy Formation.[5] The use of the methodology proposed by Gergen will allow the issues and actors involved in the decision-making process of the South bypass to be identified and their interrelationships analyzed. By understanding these interrelationships, the mode of decision making can be more accurately identified.

II. RATIONAL SOCIAL ACTION

Ideally, decisions would be made by an actor who, after becoming aware of the problem, carefully posits a goal, weighs alternative means,

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[4]Amitai Etzioni: "Mixed Scanning: A Third Approach to Decision Making," Public Administration Review (December, 1967), pp. 385-392.

[5]Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen, eds., The Study of Policy Formation (New York: The Free Press, 1971).

and chooses from among them according to his estimates of their respective merit with reference to the state of affairs he prefers. An approach such as this is basically a scientific method of problem solving whereby a best solution to a problem would become apparent after a process of rational analysis has been performed.[6]

Robert Dahl and charles Lindbloom have labeled this type of decision making as rational social action. In Politics, Economics, and Welfare, Dahl and Lindbloom assert that there are two basic prerequisites necessary to achieve rational action.

> The actor must make rational calculations about the ways in which the attainment of his goals can be maximized in the real world. And the actor must be able to control others whose responses are needed to bring about the desired state of affairs.[7]

Furthermore, in achieving rational social action, four major problems must be overcome. First, information must be available. Second, information to the actors involved in the decision making must be communicated. Third, the number of variables involved in the decision-making process must be manageable. Finally, the complexities of the relations among the variables must be perceived.[8] The solving of these problems is made difficult by man's limitations. Dahl and Lindbloom note:

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[6]Dyckman, "Planning and Decision Theory," p. 339.

[7]Dahl and Lindbloom, Politics, Economics and Welfare, p. 57.

[8]Ibid., p. 58.

> As everyone knows, there are severe limits to man's capacity for overcoming these difficulties. One important limit is set by man's capacities as a thinking animal, for his abilities are meager in comparison with the problems he can create. Another is set by the level of knowledge that exists in a given field at a given time.[9]

However, they remain optimistic about the ability of man to overcome his inherent limits as well as the problems encountered in achieving calcultion, stating ". . . a number of social techniques, the heritage of civilized man, have proved to be of enormous utility as aids to rational action."[10] In the space of six thousand years, according to Dahl and Lindbloom, man has raised the level of knowledge in one sphere of life after another and has created the ability to keep civilization going by using an extensive variety of social processes that facilitate rational action.[11]

A few of the more significant processes that man has learned to utilize in overcoming the problems of rational calculations are listed by Dahl and Lindbloom as: Discussion and codification, processes for information and communication; quantification, sampling and delegation processes; and, the use of scientific methodology to aid in the reduction of the number and complexity of variables.[12]

In order to make rational calculations utilizing these techniques, it is essential that the actor reduce the number of variables to be considered. This in turn makes the key to rational action dependent

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[9] Ibid., p. 65.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid., p. 64.

[12] Ibid., pp. 60-88.

upon the number of variables. There is an inherent danger in the process of reducing the numbers of variables to a workable size which can lead to unforeseen consequences. Decision making, which is rational in respect to these specialized goals, may be irrational in respect to other long-range goals. Thus, the process of accurate rational action is contingent upon the relevancy and accuracy of the techniques utilized in overcoming the problems and limitations encountered in performing rational calculations.[13]

Calculation is but one of two major prerequisites for rational social action in decision making; the other is the process of control. In order to control people, the actor must produce responses in others, appropriate responses that are a consequence of the decisions made by the actor.

To produce these responses in others, one must act on their "field" of awareness,

> . . . that is, each individual's own special conscious and unconscious awareness of the universe made up of the self and its relation with other objects, resources and capacities, feelings of reward, deprivation, symbols and expectations.[14]

An actor can influence and control another person's field by influencing his expectation of rewards and deprivations by "acting on his information signals, communications, cues or symbols or, one can act on the rewards and deprivations that actually operate on the subordinate,

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[13]Richard Henry Ginn, "Interstate 40 Through Overton Park: A Case Study of Location Decision Making" (Masters Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1970).

[14]Dahl and Lindbloom, p. 97.

thereby affecting his expectations."[15] Four basic techniques that can be utilized to achieve control are identified by Dahl and Lindbloom.

Spontaneous Field Control. The first control technique is called spontaneous field control, which results without the actor actually trying to control another person's field. Often, when an action is performed, signals are produced about rewards and deprivations which may influence another person. That person then responds in an attempt to avoid the threatened deprivation or secure the expected gratifications; yet, the actor does not deliberately seek to produce this response.[16] Spontaneous field control is of vast importance to planners and decision makers in that their actions attempting to produce one type of response often produces an unanticipated, different response. This type of control is hard to escape since "wherever one goes, a network of spontaneous field control envelopes the actor" and those in position of authority should be constantly aware of the existence of often unwanted and unanticipated response to it.[17]

Manipulative Field Control. The second control technique, called manipulative field control, is the deliberate attempt to control, where a desired response is sought without the use of a command. In the words of Dahl and Lindbloom, it is a:

> . . . deliberate action on another person's field in order to secure a definite response, by manipulating signals about

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[15] Ibid., pp. 93-99.

[16] Ibid., pp. 99-101.

[17] Ibid.

> rewards and deprivations or by manipulating rewards and deprivations or both.[18]

Thus, the person's field responses are effected by his or her expectations about rewards or deprivations and that person responds to secure rewards or to thwart deprivations. A good example of this type of control in highway location decision making occurs when the Highway Department threatens to utilize the funding for a project elsewhere unless those people with whom they are negotiating agree to specific demands.

Command. Both manipulated and spontaneous field controls are appliedin almost all control relationships in the real world. The third technique, command, although an important controlling device, is but marginally utilized in most human organizations. To utilize a common control technique is:

> . . . to control the response of a subordinate exclusively by virtue of a penalty prescribed by the controller for nonperformance of an implied or stiuplated directive, so that the subordinate expects that his failure to respond as directed will result in the initiation of penalties by his supervisor.[19]

Control by command in tantamount to directly threatening someone with deprivation if that command is not obeyed.

Paradoxically, this form of control plays an important role in democratic systems where freedom of choice is a fundamental ideal. If taken at face value, command control, through the large number of laws and regulations in our society, would appear to be a predominant

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[18] Ibid., p. 104. [19] Ibid., p. 106.

rather than a marginal form of control. "Uet, as modern students of the sociology of law point out, the form of the law does not explain why most people disobey it."[20] To explain why laws are obeyed voluntarily by the majority of people, one would need to investigate the predominate body of rewards and deprivations through spontaneous and field control that are not invoked by the courts but by family, friends, teachers, neighbors, churches, and so on.[21]

In the real world, control is seldom a unilateral process. In many situations, within both hierarchical and horizontal organizations, actors can employ command and manipulated field controls against one another. Such a relationship, in which two or more people are attempting to control one another through either command or manipulation of fields is labeled reciprocity. In such situations, reciprocity is often utilized where special advantages are granted by one side in exchange of special consideration by the other.[22]

In a democracy where freedom and equality are idealized social goals, reciprocity is a control technique of vital importance. "If control of human beings by human beings cannot be eliminated, reciprocity is an alternative to anarchy. If great inequalities in control are undesirable, reciprocity is an alternative to tyranny."[23]

To summarize, rational decision making, as explained by Dahl and Lindbloom, is essentially a scientific method of defining goals and

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[20] Ibid., p. 107. [21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., p. 109. [23] Ibid.

analyzing a comprehensive set of alternatives, ultimately choosing the alternative that will result in maximum goal attainment. In order for rational comprehensive decision making to occur, two prerequisites—rational calculation and social control—must be met. The actor must make rational calculations about the ways in which goals can be achieved, and must be able to control others where responses are needed to bring about the desired state of affairs.[24]

III. INCREMENTALISM

Pure rational decision making has been questioned on the basis that despite modern technology, man cannot adequately deal with real world complexities; that true rational calculations cannot be performed and that field control is impossible to achieve in our complex system.

The critics of rational social action charge that man's limitations, the "boundaries of rationalities," as Herbert Simon has called it,[25] prohibits rational calculation from being a feasible decision tool. Simon and other opponents of rational decision theories assert that man does not have the mental or technological capability to successfully implement full rational-comprehensive decision-making processes in complex real world situations. Furthermore, this scientific approach to problem-solving assumes that agreement on goals

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[24]Ginn, "Interstate 40 Through Nashville," p. 8.

[25]Herbert A. Simon, Organizations (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968), p. 171.

can be reached, an assumption that those critics feel is not valid when placed in the context of public policy issues.[26]

Charles Lindbloom has suggested an incremental method of decision making, "successive limited comparisons," as an alternative to rational analysis. Ideally, Lindbloom asserts, in pure rational decision making, nothing is left out. However, it is impossible to take everything important into consideration "unless important is so narrowly defined that analysis is in fact quite limited."[27] The information that can be compiled about consequence is at best fractional. Moreover, decision makers do not have the assets nor the time to collect the vast amount of information required for rational choice. A decision maker attempting a comprehensive-rationalistic analysis would soon become frustrated and would exhaust his resources without coming to a decision.[28] Consequently, "every administrator faced with a sufficiently complex problem must find ways to simplify.[29] Thus simplification becomes a key problem, Lindbloom writes that simplification is achieved through a series of successive limited comparisons.

> First, it is achieved through limitations of policy comparisons to those policies that differ in relatively small degrees from policies presently in effect. . . . The second

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[26]Etzioni, "Mixed Scanning," p. 386.

[27]Lindbloom, "Muddling Through," p. 84.

[28]Etzioni, "Mixed Scanning," p. 387.

[29]Ibid.

> method of simplification of analysis is the practice of ignoring important possible consequences of possible policies as well as the values attached to the neglected consequences. If this appears to disclose a shocking shortcoming of successive limited comparison, it can be replied that even if the exclusions are random, policies may nevertheless be more intelligently formulated than through futile attempts to achieve a comprehensiveness beyond human capacity.[30]

Incrementalism, then, is an attempt to simplify and adapt decision-making strategies to the limited capacities of man and to reduce the costs of data collection and computation to a manageable level. Lindbloom summarized six primary requirements of incrementalism in this way:

1. Rather than attempting a comprehensive survey and evaluation of all alternatives, the decision maker focuses only on those policies which differ incrementally from existing policies.
2. Only a relatively small number of policy alternatives are considered.
3. For each policy alternative, only a restricted number of "important" consequences are evaluated.
4. The problem confronting the decision maker is continually redefined. Incrementalism allows for countless ends-means and means-ends adjustments which, in effect, make the problem more manageable.
5. Thus, there is no one decision or "right" solution but a "never-ending series of attacks" on the issues at hand through serial analysis and evaluation.
6. As such, incremental decision making is described as remedial, geared more to the alleviation of present, concrete social imperfections than to the promotion of future social goals.[31]

In the incremental method of decision making, the test of a correct or good decision is the agreement by the decision makers on the policy itself.

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[30]Lindbloom, "Muddling Through," p. 86.

[31]Charles Lindbloom, The Intelligence of Democracy (New York: Free Press, 1960), p. 139.

> If agreement on policy as a test for "best" policy seems a poor substitute for testing policy against its objectives, it ought to be remembered that objectives themselves have no ultimate validity other than they are agreed upon.[32]

Policies then are the outcome of negotiation between "numerous societal partisans" through a method of partisan mutual adjustment which provides for a measure of coordination between decision makers.

Incremental decision making is claimed to be a realistic account of how decision making in a democratic system is actually carried out. Given our system of multiplicity and dispersion of decision makers, incrementalism is held to compensate for the inadequacies of the individual decision maker and for the system's inability to make decisions from one center.

IV. MIXED SCANNING—A "MIDDLE OF THE ROAD" APPROACH

A third approach, which is a hybrid of the rational and incremental decision-making theories, is offered by Amitai Etzioni. He criticizes incremental decision making, by stating that decisions reached by agreement among partisans

> . . . would of necessity reflect the interests of the most powerful since partisans invariably differ in their respective power positions: demands of the underprivileged and politically unorganized would be underrepresented.
>
> Second, incrementalism would tend to neglect basic societal innovations, as it focuses on the short run and seeks no more than limited variations from past policies.[33]

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[32]Lindbloom, "Muddling Through," p. 83.

[33]Etzioni, "Mixed Scanning," p. 388.

While over time the large number of incremental steps could lead to a gradual change of some significance, there is nothing in this approach to guide the accumulated effect of many small decisions. These incremental decisions may be circular, leading back to where they started; or they may be dispersed, leading in no one particular direction.[34]

To rectify this predicament, continues Etzioni, incremental strategists need to recognize "one subset of situations to which it (incrementalism) does not apply"[35]—namely, large or fundamental decisions such as a declaration of the war on poverty by the Johnson administration. While incremental decisions far outnumber fundamental decisions, it is often fundamental decisions which set the context for the more numerous incremental ones.[36]

Thus, while the incrementalists hold that decision-making involves a mutually exclusive choice lying between the incremental and rational models, it should be noted that:

> . . . (a) most incremental decisions specify or anticipate fundamental decisions, and (b) the cumulative value of the incremental decisions is greatly affected by the related fundamental decisions.[37]

While decision makers participate in both fundamental and incremental decisions, the number and role of fundamental decisions are more significant than incrementalists state. Furthermore, when the fundamental decisions are missing, policy based upon incremental decisions face an inherent danger of drifting, taking action with no direction.

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[34]Ibid. [35]Ibid. [36]Ibid., p. 389. [37]Ibid.

To alleviate this danger, Etzioni proposes that societal decision making should have two sets of mechanisms:

> (A) High order fundamental policy-making processes which set basic directions and (B) incremental processes which prepare for fundamental decisions and work them out after they have been reached.[38]

This approach is called mixed-scanning. It provides, according to Etzioni, "both a realistic description of the strategy used by actors in a large variety of fields and the strategy for effective actors to follow." In mixed-scanning, fundamental decisions are made in an altered rationalistic approach where the main actor explores alternatives in view of his conception of his goals; but, unlike comprehensive rational mode of decision making, details are omitted so that an overview is feasible. With the context of these limited fundamental decisions, incremental decisions are made.

> Thus, each of the two elements in mixed-scanning helps to reduce the effects of the particular shortcomings of the other. Incrementalism reduces the unrealistic aspects of rationalism by limiting the details required in fundamental decisions, and contextuating rationalism helps to overcome the conservative slant of incrementalism by exploring longer run alternatives.[39]

While full detailed rationalism in decision making may well be impossible, mixed scanning is more feasible and, according to Etzioni, may be more effective in terms of achieving the actors' goals than the incremental approaches of "muddling through" the decision-making process.

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[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid., p. 391.

V. A COMPOSITE OF STRATEGIES

In studying location decision-making theories, such as that just discussed, it should be noted that any one theory may not apply to all highway location decisions.

The decision-making process associated with the location of highways is often a composite of various decision theories and strategies employed by the actors involved. This is to say that in a decision-making process, various decision theories will be applied by different actors at different stages in the process. For example, in the location of Interstate 40 in Memphis, Tennessee, it was found that the major actor groups utilized different approaches. The State Highway Department, which was the delegated leader in determining the location of the highway attempted rational calculation to create in the eyes of the public the concept of expertise. On the other hand, the local governmental officials adopted a policy of incrementalism because it allowed flexibility in weighing the issues and providing compromise.[40] Thus, the central problem faced in a case study of decision making becomes one of identifying the various actors and their actions, along with the issues, involved in the overall problem, so that the various modes of decision making applicable to the process under study can be identified and analyzed. The leverage system policy analysis as described by Kenneth J. Gergen in The Study of Policy Formation[41] offers a method of accomplishing this task.

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[40]Ginn, "Interstate 40 Through Nashville."

[41]Bauer and Gergen, Policy Formation, pp. 181-203.

VI. LEVERAGE SYSTEM OF ANALYSIS

Before discussing the leverage system of analysis, leverage, power and influence must be defined. For the purposes of this study, power is the ability to directly control the decision-making process. On the other hand, influence is the ability to have an effect on, but not control over the process.

However, through manipulation, enough influence can be gained to assume power. By doing this, the actor uses leverage to enhance his ability to gain power in the process. That is, through leverage manipulation, influence can be enhanced to a point where it can exert enough force to assume power over the process.

The term leverage can be understood by considering any social system as consisting of interacting subunits. In Gergen's form of analysis, it is assumed that a thorough understanding of public policy hinges upon knowledge of individual actors participating in the decision-making process, and how the exert leverage in the attempt to control the process. The Leverage System of analysis makes a further assumption that a major source of change in a social system is caused by the input of new information into the system. The modification of the system caused by this input will, to a large extent, depend upon the existing configuration of the subunits of a system. Thus a major problem of analysis becomes one of isolating individuals (i.e., subunits) and the amount of influence they possess.

One important point needs to be made. The amount of leverage exerted by an actor in an attempt to attain more influence in a process

(or to gain power) is largely dependent on how much interest that person (or group) has in the issues involved in the study. That is, a person might held a vast amount of potential leverage, but if uninterested in the issues, may choose not to utilize that leverage.

Thus,the key to the success of this system of analysis depends on one's capacity to identify the core group of issues as well as persons whose roles in the process are central. Through interviews and observations, this core group as well as the issues involved and influence patterns, can be identified.

There are a number of approaches for identifying the most influential issues and members of a social system. Gergen identifies them as: the reputational approach, the positional approach, the pooled leadership approach (a combination of the previous two approaches), the social participation approach, the opinion leadership approach and the demographic approach. All of these methods are appropriate for a case study and require extensive interviewing and analysis to determine the actors, and their influence in the planning process.

The Reputational Approach

The reputational approach of identifying influential persons in a decision system normally entails asking knowledgeable persons in the community to nominate actors whom they feel are the most influential. The list may vary in size, but generally includes a sizeable portion of formal or institutional leaders. The results of this procedure may be applied directly to an analysis of leverage or, further interviews of

the top influentials may be conducted to obtain additional information and insight into the decision-making process.[42]

This approach, however, has received some criticisms. For example, it can be argued that the validity of the approach is dependent upon the researcher's ability to identify those of influence. Also, it offers no guarantee that the researcher occupies a privileged vantage point. Furthermore, critics of this approach argue that this method does not adequately investigate perceived and actual influence in decision making. Several other criticisms have been aimed at this technique claiming that this method fails to distinguish among issues, fails to distinguish the various stages of the policy formation process, and does not take into account the position of the various nominees to be interviewed.[43]

In spite of these shortcomings, the reputational approach does have a number of attributes. First, it is easy to administer, having no complex scoring systems. Second, if utilized properly, it can identify influential persons not holding formal leadership positions. Third, the reputational approach allows the researcher to become familiar with the actors engaged in public decision making. Although it would seem unwise to adopt the method as a direct operational representation of the decision-making process, some of its characteristics are useful in developing a useful methodology of decision making.[44]

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[42] Ibid., p. 195.

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ibid.

The Positional Approach

Another way of identifying influentials in a decision-making system is to simply select for study those who occupy formal leadership positions in the community. This approach has been used in a number of studies, the majority of which have been involved with analyzing the characteristics of actors in these various positions rather than in the configuration of influence patterns.[45]

In studies of influence, a major difficulty of this approach is in deciding what positions are central. "There are certainly two or three crucial leverage positions in any decision-making process, the being that there might be widespread disagreement in adding further positions to the list."[46] There appears to be no appropriate answer to this dilemma except by judgement of the analyst.

The positional approach does have a perceptible flaw due to the fact that many influential positions may not hold formal leadership positions in the community. Ex-officeholders, distinguished citizens, the wealthy, or informal citizen group leaders may all hold a considerable amount of leverage and yet may not be discovered by strict adherence to the positional approach.[47]

Leadership Pool Approach

A combination of the reputational and the positional approaches was utilized by Dahl in Who Governs, a 1961 study of power in

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[45] Ibid., p. 201.

[46] Ibid. [47] Ibid.

New Haven.[48] This method requires that the researcher specify the issue area of interest, for example, urban renewal or transportation. Then, all persons holding formal positions of authority with respect to that issue are listed as knowledgeable people in that specific area. Intensive interviews are then conducted with each of these knowledgeables to identify key issues as well as additional persons which might have had influence in the decisions concerning the specific issue.

The leadership pool technique essentially utilizes the best parts of the positional and reputational methods. This approach is sensitive to the specific issue under study and avoids premature closure on the identification of influential actors in the decision-making process.[49]

The Social Participation Approach

A fourth method of analyzing influence has centered on the degree in which citizens have been involved in public life. Supposedly, a person who is active in public affairs has more influence in public decision making. Therefore, in analyzing power or influence, the study using this approach would scrutinize those individuals involved in the issue. It would appear, however, that such an approach, while identifying influential individuals at the grass roots level, would be rather insensitive to the upper level influence patterns.[50]

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[48]Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale Univeristy Press, 1961), p. 76.

[49]Gergen, Policy Formation, p. 196.

[50]Ibid., p. 201.

The Opinion Leadership Approach

An additional approach to assessing leverage has concentrated on persons who seem to influence the opinions of others. The 1944 study by Lazaffield, Berelson, and Gaudet, The People's Choice, found that the most significant factor of influencing change in one individual by another was through discussion. Persons who had a great deal of influence on the opinions of their peers were termed opinion leaders.[51]

Many other studies have been performed in this area.[52] Most of these studies used members of the general population to identify opinion leaders, with the result that designated leaders have not been major officeholders; generally not having the "status" of influentials identified through the reputational or positional methods.[53]

The Demographic Approach

Another approach often used to assess influence patterns involves the analysis of the demographic characteristics of the actors involved in public policy formation. A host of studies have concluded that the vast majority of influential people in the United States are male, white, between forty and sixty years old, belong to a Protestant church, and are either businessmen or professionals and have concentrated on these individuals.[54]

If the findings of these studies are correct, one could assume that, regardless of the specific issue, most of those possessing leverage would

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[51]Ibid., p. 197. [52]Ibid., p. 198. [53]Ibid.

[54]Gergen, Policy Formation, p. 199.

fall into this group. Thus, if research efforts were funneled into analyzing these groups, the likelihood would be great of reaching the desired recipients and the costs of that effort could foreseeably be reduced.

VII. A METHOD OF ASSESSING LEVERAGE

The technique recommended by Gergen is the leadership pool approach, a combination of the reputational and positional methodologies. The reason that this approach was chosen is due to the fact that by employing both of these approaches within the circumstances for which each is best suited, limitations of one would be countered by strengths of the other. In addition, the concept of leverage as described by Kenneth Gergen will be used in this study. Gergen described this concept as follows:

> The implication of the term leverage point can be understood by considering any social system constituted by a set of interacting subunits. If the social system is taken to be an entire society, the subunits at one level might be the institutions or organizations within the society. At a more microlevel, the individual members of the society might be the focal subunits. . . . In any case, it is assumed that the subunits of greatest importance are individual persons rather than organizations or institutions and that a thorough understanding of public policy will ultimately depend on knowledge of individual participants.[55]

The leverage concept further assumes that one major source of change in a social system is the entry of new information into the system. When new information becomes available, it can further be assumed that

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[55] Ibid.

modification of the system will, to a large extent, depend on the existing configuration of the subunit and how they are functionally related to other subunits. This is to say that, since modification of the system depends more upon the state of some subunits than on others, some subunits vary in their degree of leverage in the system. Thus, individuals can be considered as leverage points for the system as a whole, and the problem of analyzing leverage becomes one of isolating influential individuals for analysis.[56] Specifically, Leverage System Analysis offers a methodology in which a public policymaking process (specific happenings) can be analyzed through the examination of the involved actors' relationships to issues, other actors, and to their own personal resources.

It is upon this concept of leverage that the aforementioned methods can be utilized in identifying those issues and members of society that have influence in the decision-making process.

The technique employed in this case study was the leadership pool approach, a combination of the reputational and positional methodologies.

The utilization of this approach in analyzing leverage in the South Maryville bypass location issue required a two-stage process. The first step was the identification of individuals involved through formal leadership positions. Initial interviews were conducted with these persons to obtain information concerning key issues and a rating of nominees involved in key issues. The second stage was built upon information gathered in the first stage, to sharpen the focus on a set

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[56] Ibid.

of more specifically delineated subissues and actors. Based on the information obtained in stage one, a complete list of individuals said to possess leverage in the system was compiled and interviews were conducted with those individuals. During these interviews, the following information was obtained.

1. A rating of the degree of influence of others involved in each issue area.
2. A rating of the degree each issue was relevant to the respondent and the degree of importance of any decisions made in that area.
3. A rating of how each participant views his own position on the issues involved.
4. A rating of how each respondent views his own amount of influence on the decision-making process.

Throughout the interviewing process, additional information about each actor and issue area was gathered from newspaper accounts, public records and open-ended interview questions in order to fill voids left by structured interview questions, and to assist in recognizing elements of bias on the part of respondents.

The leverage approach to the problem reflected each of the actors, issues and influence patterns involved in the planning process of the South Maryville bypass. Once identified and rated, these dimensions were ranked by order of importance and significance. The resultant hierarchies were then analyzed through utilization of the subjective information gained from the research of files, newspapers, public documents, etc., and the responses to the open-ended questions. In

other words, the ranking hierarchy of actors, organizations, and issues serves as a basis for analysis, and the information gathered from the open-ended questions and from the background research provided detailed information necessary to perform a more complete analysis of the leverage hierarchy so that influential actors and issues associated with the location decision-making process of the South Maryville bypass could be ascertained and described.

Once these interrelationships had been identified, an accurate analysis of the type of decision making was conducted. When the type of decision making had been ascertained, a further analysis as to the effects of the type of participatory strategies involved in the process was performed. Finally, the effects of the participatory strategies on the decision-making process was analyzed. This is the ultimate goal of this thesis. The results of these analyses and a more detailed description of the methodology involved in leverage analysis are presented in Chapters V and VI. However, before they are discussed, the thesis will turn from theoretical discussion to the actual case study. The following chapter will present the chronology of events in the somewhat controversial history of the South Maryville bypass.

CHAPTER IV

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

I. LOCATION AND HISTORY

The cities of Maryville-Alcoa are located in Blount County, a part of the Knoxville Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. Geographically, Blount County, of which Maryville is the county seat, is located in the Great Valley of East Tennessee, with about one third of the county lying within the Great Smokey Mountains National Park. Blount County is bordered on the north by Knox County, on the east by Sevier County, on the South by Swain County, North Carolina, and on the west by Monroe and Loudon Counties.[1] The physical setting of the area is shown on Figure 1.

Historically, the area was originally settled in the 1780s by former residents of North Carolina and Virginia who were attracted by the fertile lands, available water, and abundant natural resources which could be found in Tennessee. Early economic activity was based on lumber and agriculture, with many small industries gradually following. These included cotton and woolen mills, quarrying, furniture making, and canning. By 1912, there were nine small industries in Blount County, with the bulk of the economy based on

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[1]Maryville Regional Planning Commission, "Summary Plan, Maryville, Tennessee," June, 1974, p. 4.



Fig. 1. Regional Setting.

agriculture and forestry production. However, in 1913, there occurred a development in the industrial picture, which still has a major impact on the economy of the area. In that year, the Aluminum Company of America, constructed a major plant in the area and began to manufacture aluminum. This created a major single source manufacturing base which is still in effect today.[2]

The City of Maryville grew from an early development around Craigs Fort which was constructed in 1785. In 1850, the City of Maryville had grown enough to be incorporated by the General Assembly. In its early history, Maryville experienced slow steady growth, increasing from a population of 259 in 1825, to more than 600 in 1833, to over 1000 in 1900.[3] In 1907, Maryville was rechartered to operate under a mayor-council form of government. In 1967, the city's voters elected to change the governmental structure to a council-manager form.[4]

The City of Alcoa has a somewhat different history. The area of what is currently within the Alcoa city limits was initially sparsely settled and developed as farmland adjacent to Maryville until the early twentieth century.

In 1910, the Aluminum Company of America decided to locate a major factility in the Maryville area due to its proximity to the Little Tennessee River on which the company was building several hydroelectric dams to provide power for the production of aluminum. However, due to

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[2]University of Tennessee Civil Engineering Department, "Maryville-Alcoa, Tennessee, Urban Area Transportation Study: 1964-1984," Vol. I, p. 1.

[3]Ibid., p. 12. [4]Ibid.

a fear that Maryville town fathers might burden the plant with excessive taxes, the Aluminum Company decided to construct and incorporate a new town which they named Alcoa.[5]

Construction on the first plant north of Maryville began in 1914, and at the same time, Alcoa engineers began planning the city of Alcoa, which would contain the aluminum plant's facilities and provide complete services for its employees, approximately 10,000 people. These early planners provided for water, sewer, and lighting, established development controls, and designed community facilities, including one acre of parkland for every 100 persons. In 1919, the city became chartered and was incorporated in July of that same year. It has since operated under a commission form of government. Alcoa grew rapidly until the end of World War II, but during the 1950s its population was virtually static, as a result of a lack of expansion of the Aluminum Company facilities.[6]

Both Alcoa and Maryville have grown both in size and population since 1960, due to annexations by both cities, and continuous growth that has occurred on their fringe areas surrounding each town. In the past ten years, the Maryville-Alcoa area has developed an increasingly diverse economy with retail and service activities increasing markedly while the manufacturing base centering around the aluminum plant in Alcoa has remained relatively strong.

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[5]Alcoa Regional Planning Commission, "Comprehensive Plan, 1970-1990, Alcoa, Tennessee," p. 22.

[6]"Maryville-Alcoa, Tennessee Transportation Study," p. 1.

These factors, plus its status as a regional employment center, tie the Maryville-Alcoa area to the growth of the region, making it an important part of the growth of metropolitan Knoxville and Knox County.[7]

Today, most of the development in Blount County is associated with the cities of Maryville and Alcoa. Commercial activity centers around the Midland Shopping Center in Alcoa which does not have a central business district as such. Maryville, with a much older central business district, contains most of the established financial and professional offices serving the county. It is also the center for major institutional activities including the Blount County courthouse, Blount Memorial Hospital, Maryville and Maryville College. In addition, most residential uses are located in Maryville due to a shortage of available land in the incorporated area of Alcoa.[8] Although they are separate and distinct political entities, the two cities are in r ality a contiguous urban development with no physical barrier separating them. If they are "twin" cities, then they are surely Siamese twins and in an analysis cannot be treated separately, but, instead, as a single urban area.[9]

II. GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE

The quarterly court is the legislative and chief administrative body of Blount County. The court consists of 21 squires, with the

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[7]East Tennessee Development District," Comprehensive Plan, 1970-1990, Alcoa, Tennessee," p. 22.

[8]Ibid., p. 24. [9]Ibid.

county judge as the chief presiding officer and administrator. It has the power to levy taxes, make appropriations, authorize bonds, and appoint many boards, as well as the responsibility of preparing the annual county budget and setting the tax rate. The Blount County government also provides services for education and highways.[10]

The City of Maryville, since 1967, has been operating under a council-manager form of government. Under this system, the city council consists of five members: four councilmen, and a mayor, all with equal voting power. The mayor and the manager are both appointed by and serve at the will of the council. The mayor has largely a ceremonial power with administrative authority under the jurisdiction of the city manager who is responsible for budget preparation, appointments, and program administration. The city of Maryville provides the following services: local planning, police and fire protection, schools, water, sewer and electricity, solid waste collection, street and road maintenance, and development and housing assistance.[11]

Alcoa has operated under the commission-manager form of government since its incorporation in 1919. In 1968, the last amendment to the city charter provided for the election of five commissioners. One of these commissioners is elected mayor by the commision. The city manager, under the supervision of the Board of Commissioners, is the administrative head of the municipal government. The manager enforces municipal laws, supervises city employees, recommends measures for

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[10]Ibid., p. 32. [11]Ibid., p. 33.

adoption by the Board of Commissioners, serves as purchasing agent and acts as the city's budget commissioner. Services provided by the City of Alcoa include police and fire protection, schools, water and sewer, solid waste collection, street maintenance, and electricity.[12]

III. PLANNING ORGANIZATION AND JURISDICTION

All three governments have planning commissions. Alcoa and Blount County utilize the local assistance planning services offered by the Tennessee State Planning Office.[13] These two planning bodies share a staff of two planners and a planning aide which are partly funded by the State of Tennessee. The planning staff works out of a branch office of the East Tennessee section of the TSPO. This office was the first local assistance planning office in Tennessee to be located in the community being served, rather than in a regional office. The increasing amount of growth and development occurring in the Maryville-Alcoa area made this arrangement more efficient than having the planning staff work out of the Knoxville office. Maryville utilized this same staff until July of 1975 when it hired its own city planner and moved all its planning functions under the supervision of the Maryville Community Development Corporation.

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[12]Ibid., p. 34.

[13]During final writing of this study, Alcoa withdrew from its contract with the State of Tennessee to provide local assistance planning for its Planning Commission.

Both the Maryville and Alcoa planning commissions have been given regional planning authority for the fringe areas adjacent to their corporate limits. Additional planning assistance is obtained by all three governments from the East Tennessee Development District and the Tennessee Valley Authority, but most of the planning is accomplished by the Tennessee State Planning office staff working for Blount County and Alcoa, and the staff planners for Maryville.

The Maryville-Alcoa urban area is served by several major traffic arteries. U.S. Highway 411 runs north to south providing a linkage between the small Tennessee cities along the North Carolina border from Bristol to Chattanooga. This highway bisects Maryville serving as the major in-town artery, Broadway Street, in Maryville's central business district. Maryville is also served by U.S. 129, which connects Knoxville and Interstates 40 and 75 to the Townsend entrance of the Great Smokey Mountains National Park by way of State Highway 73 south of Maryville. Traffic density in the peak tourist season has been estimated to exceed 5000 vehicles per day along this route.[14] This traffic is funneled through the downtown area of Maryville resulting in heavily congested streets and intersections. Currently Route 129 is bypassed to the north of Maryville, on a limited access four-lane highway that was completed in 1960. The current terminus of the 129 bypass at the intersection of U.S. 411 and Business 129 has been proposed for the starting point of the 411 (South) or South bypass. The area transportation network is shown in Figure 2.

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[14] Maryville-Alcoa, Tennessee Transportation Study," p. 24.



Fig. 2. Major Transportation Network.

IV. THE 1964 TRANSPORTATION STUDY

In 1964, the cities of Maryville and Alcoa, the County of Blount, the Tennessee Department of Highways, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the Bureau of Public Roads reached an agreement on the funding of a comprehensive transportation study for the Blount County urban area. In June of that year, the Department of Civil Engineering at the University of Tennessee was employed to prepare the document and technical coordinating committee was formed to give support and to counsel and advise in the preparation of the study. The Tennessee State Planning Commission was contracted with to provide land use and socioeconomic data and to provide general assistance.[15]

The scope of this study included inventories of parking, land use, socioeconomic parameters, accidents, traffice columns, and origin destination studies, concluding with recommendations for traffic and parking improvements and took more than two years to complete. When made public in 1967, the study provided the Maryville-Alcoa urban area a complete detailed analysis of the area's transportation along with recommendations for improvement.

For the first time, the need for the south Maryville bypass, a major recommendation of this study, became apparent. If implemented as recommended, this segment of highway would become a major transportation artery, a primary key to the solution of the transportation problems in and around Blount County's urban areas. The bypass would channel the heavy tourist traffice as well as large amount of local vehicles away from existing in-town traffic arteries,

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[15]"Maryville-Alcoa, Tennessee Transportation Study."

enabling these facilities to adequately handle expected future demands with little new construction.[16]

V. A LEGACY OF DELAY

From this beginning, implementation of the recommended bypass suffered delay. The only action taken between 1967 and 1970 concerning the south bypass was the adoption in October of 1967 of the Blount County Major Road Plan based on the recommendations of the transportation study. A general proposed location of the bypass was indicated on this plan. Until 1970, there was no widespread discussion of the south bypass either by local or state officials, or by the private sector of the community. The bypass was a part of a planning document shared the fate of many other plans—it sat on the shelves of community officials and collected dust.

In 1970, the bypass received its first serious attention at a December 14, 1970, meeting of the executive committee of the Blount County Chamber of Commerce, when the Executive Vice President, Ken Faulkner, raised the issue of the need for the facility as shown on the transportation map. Due to development that was occurring along the corridor indicated on the major road plan, Mr. Faulkner felt that something should be done to protect this corridor from encroachment. The Board moved that the transportation committee study the problem and make specific recommendations to the Chamber.[17]

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[16] Ibid., Vol. III, p. 84.

[17] Minutes of Blount County Chamber of Commerce Executive Committee Meeting, Dec. 14, 1970.

Until this time, the efforts of the Blount County Chamber of Commerce to secure better roads for the area had been concentrated on the construction of State Route 95. By late 1970, the right-of-way for this facility had been acquired and construction was underway, for half of the route. With the completion of the rest of TN. 95 assured, the need for a south bypass, as reported in the 1964 transportation study, became obvious to the members of the transportation committee. When completed, Route 95 would provide direct access to the Townsend entrance of the Park from Interstate 75, thus increasing the amount of tourist traffic through Maryville.[18]

Two months after Faulkner raised the question of the need to preserve land for the bypass, the chairman of the Transportation Committee, Pete Lobetti, reported to the Executive Board that the south bypass should be the next transportation project for the Chamber. The Executive Board agreed and the Blount County Chamber of Commerce then became an instrumental force initiating planning for the South Maryville bypass.[19]

Also at this time, a number of other community businessmen began to see the need for the bypass. Both these businessmen, many of whom were Chamber members, and the Chamber of Commerce agreed that for the

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[18]Personal Interview with Jeff Fletcher, April 22, 1975, Mr. Fletcher was the principle planner in the Maryville office of the Tennessee State Planning Commission during the Spring of 1970.

[19]Minutes of Blount County Chamber of Commerce Executive Committee meeting on Jan. 18, 1971.

time being, it was best to quietly push for the road, attracting as little attention as possible.[20] These quiet and low-keyed discussions by Chamber of Commerce and associated businessmen initiated the local push for the bypass which was recommended in the Maryville-Alcoa Transportation Plan.

VI. A POLITICAL MEETING

The momentum for the facility picked up when, in an unpublicized meeting late in 1970, a group of Blount County businessmen met with Governor-elect Winfield Dunn and prospective Highway Commissioner Robert Smith. The group included Fred Lawson, president of the Blount National Bank, Harold Lambert of Vulcan Materials Company, County Judge Asher Howard, State Senator Houston Goddard, and Bill Felknor, the chairman of Blount County's good governmetn committee, which was a patronage board. The meeting centered around the completion of State Route 95 and the South bypass. In regard to the bypass, a gentlemen's agreement was reached at this meeting whereby Mr. Smith promised to place the bypass on a high priority status in return for support of his appointment as State Highway Commissioner. This agreement was kept private.

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[20]Interview with Mr. Fred Lawson on May 19, 1975. Mr. Lawson is the senior vice president of Blount National Bank in Maryville and has actively participated in the Blount County Chamber of Commerce.

The Chamber of Commerce Board of Directors were not made aware of the meeting. They therefore continued to push in other directions for action on the bypass.[21]

During the spring of 1971, representatives of the Chamber met with local and state officials to see what could be done to place the project on a higher priority status for funding by the legislature. Meetings were also held with Tennessee highway officials to inquire about the possibility of obtaining, at least for the time being, the right-of-way before development within the corridor made it impossible.[22]

Ken Faulkner had also been in contact with the staff of the Tennessee State Planning Office concerning the status of the bypass. Mr. Faulkner expressed concern about several developments that had been previously approved by the Maryville Planning Commission which were located in or near the proposed bypass corridor.

The Planning staff agreed with Mr. Faulkner that efforts should be made to gain clarification of the status and location of the bypass. However, subsequent telephone conversations with state highway planners yielded information that more specific location details for the route were not available and, that the highway had a very low priority status within the Tennessee Department of Transportation.[23] Funding for location studies had not even been approved.

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[21] Ibid.

[22] Interview with Jeff Fletcher.

[23] Ibid.

An attempt was then made by the local planning staff and Ken Faulkner to push for clarification by trying to reach an agreement with the State Highway Department that if a more definite route could be ascertained by the state highway planners, the planning commission would do everything within its power to prohibit development from occurring within that corridor. This agreement would mutually benefit both the Planning Commission and the Chamber of Commerce. The Planning Commission would have a more firm basis upon which to evaluate planning proposals near the proposed corridor while the Chamber would be aided in its attempts to accelerate planning for the route. However, these efforts were to prove futile until after the Dunn administration took office.[24]

The first official planning for the project began on April 19, 1971, after Governor Dunn took office, and Bob Smith had been appointed and confirmed Highway Commissioner. On this date, the Highway Department took the first positive action on the bypass when C. S. Harmon, Director of Research and Planning, requested that preparation be initiated to survey a preliminary center line (p-line) and to stake it out on the ground. This was to be called the p-line. This would, according to a memo of April 19, aid the Maryville Planning Commission in protecting the right-of-way from infringement by new developments.[25]

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[24] Ibid.

[25] Tennessee Department of Transportation Memo from C. S. Harmon, April 19, 1971.

On May 19, 1971, the foregoing events, which thus far had occurred without publicity, were made public in an article by the Maryville-Alcoa Daily Times which stated that state action on getting the south bypass constructed was being pushed by the Blount County Chamber of Commerce. Little public reaction was generated by this proposal, although a map of the proposed corridor was shown in the article.[26]

Between May, 1971, and March, 1972, little activity occurred in Blount County concerning the route. During this period, the highway department was routinely compiling data in preparation for the surveying and subsequent staking of the p-line. This route is shown on Figure 3.

VII. BEGINNING OF THE CONTROVERSY

On March 31, 1972, a land survey team from the TDOT began staking out the preliminary center line. This action, in Blount County, created a public outcry and initiated controversy surrounding this highway project that has continued to the present.

There were two reasons for the controversy. First, none of the residents along the right-of-way were notified that the survey was going to take place, and as a consequence, woke up that morning to find survey crews placing markers at regular intervals across their property. As one resident put it, "I came home from work and saw a line of red and

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[26]Maryville-Alcoa Daily Times, May 19, 1971, p. 1.



Fig. 3. P-Line Route.

white markers staked across my yard."[27] Second, this survey for the first time, put the location of the highway in a definite and visible location where the property owners along the route could see exactly how their own land would be affected by the highway.

Throughout that day, the planning office, the local newspaper, and the Maryville City Engineers' office were deluged with telephone calls inquiring about what was occurring. This action by the Highway Department was such a complete surprise to the community that the editor of the Maryville-Alcoa Daily Times had to question one of the field crews to find out the purpose of the survey. The article in that afternoon's edition explained the reason for the survey, as explained by the field crew, and further stated that the efforts by the Chamber of Commerce and State Senator Houston Goddard, Senate minority leader, had both been instrumental in getting action started on the bypass.[28]

The p-line survey and subsequent staking of markers along the proposed route prompted a heavy influx of protest letters to the TDOT. Some of the letters complained of property damage but most were from residents living in or near the right-of-way who were writing to voice their opposition to the proposed route. More than 80 letters of protest were received within a short time after the initiation of the p-line survey.[29]

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[27] Interview with Dr. Bryan Smalley, May 11, 1975.

[28] Maryville-Alcoa Daily Times, March 31, 1972, p. 1.

[29] Interview with Ben Smith, Tennessee Department of Transportation, April 3, 1975.

The heavy amount of opposition to the alignment did not go without notice in the TDOT. After receving telephone calls as well as letters protesting the route, Commissioner Smith contacted Senator Houston Goddard to discuss the local situation. Commissioner Smith asked Goddard if he had a preference as to the exact location of the route. Goddard replied that he did not care where the bypass was located and added that he was not necessarily "for" a bypass which would create controversy in the community. This was an apparent shift from his full support of the project.[30] As a result of the amount of protest against the p-line route, and the subsequent withdrawal of support of Senator Goddard, the TDOT curtailed its surveying and planning operations for the bypass, returning the priority of the project to a lower status.[31]

The TDOT announced publicly that planning operations were being curtailed as a result of the public reaction to the p-line survey. A public hearing, which had been tentatively set for late that year, was postponed until further studies could be complete for alternative routes.[32] However, between the spring of 1972 and the winter of 1973, virtually no action was taken by the TDOT on the bypass. As one official explained, the TDOT originally curtailed planning operations for the bypass in order to give its planners more time to evaluate alternate locations.[33]

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[30]Interview with Houston Goddard, April 19, 1975.

[31]Interview, Ben Smith, May 6, 1975.

[32]Ibid

[33]Ibid.

Action on the bypass was delayed even further when the Highway Department received new federal guidelines under the Highway Act of 1970 concerning the planning of federally aided highway projects. Under the provisions of the Act, the TDOT had to drastically change the method of planning for highway projects. To comply with the new guidelines, the highway department had to develop a new policy concerning citizen participation in highway planning at an earlier stage in the planning process. In addition, environmental impact statements for each federally aided project had to be filed before federal funds would be approved.[34] Thus, while methods for complying were being formulated within the TDOT, the process of planning the bypass was brought to a virtual standstill and no action on the route was taken by the Highway Department between the spring of 1972 and late Fall of 1973.

VIII. THE ATTITUDE OPINION SURVEY

By early 1973, officials in Blount County were becoming impatient with the lack of action within the TDOT. As a result of further discussions between the Chamber of Commerce Executive Vice President and the Tennessee State Office Planning staff, concerning the need for quick action on the bypass, the Maryville Planning Commission passed a a resolution expressing the need for a south bypass and conveyed it to the TDOT in the anticipation that it would aid in accelerating planning for the highway.[35] However, another action taken by students and

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[34]Ibid.

[35]Minutes of Maryville Regional Planning Commission, Jan. 5, 1973.

professors from the University of Tennessee resulted in a public outcry that forced the TDOT to initiate further planning for the highway sooner than it had scheduled.[36]

In February, 1973, an attitude-opinion survey concerning the proposed bypass was undertaken by Dr. Michael E. Gordon, an associate professor of Industrial and Personnel Management at the University of Tennessee through fundings by the socioeconomic studies of the Federal Highway Administration.[37] Dr. Gordon enlisted the aid of the Chamber of Commerce which felt that the study might help in their effort to get the highway constructed at the earliest possible date.

The attitude survey collected opinions from residents living in the vicinity of the proposed corridors and from members of the Downtown and Midland Merchants Association and the Maryville Real Estate Board as to which of two alternative bypass routes were preferred. These routes, according to Dr. Gordon, "had already been identified tentatively,"[38] and were labeled alternate "B," beginning at the intersection of State Route 33 and U.S. 129, following Montgomery Lane and intersecting at Montvale Road, and alternate "A," a loop further away from the city between U.S. 129 and Montvale Road. Both routes would converge at the same point on Montvale Road, with only one

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[36]Interview with Ben Smith.

[37]Michael E. Gordon, "Results of a Consumer Reaction Study to the Proposed Maryville Bypass," Unpublished report, University of Tennessee, 1975.

[38]Ibid., p. 2.

alternative from that point to State Route 23. Figure 4 shows the locations of these alternatives.

These two alternatives were under consideration by the TDOT at the time the opinion survey was undertaken. Alternative "B" was essentially the p-line route while alternate "A" was, at that time, under "very tentative" consideration by the highway planners. The alternative route suggestions were given to Dr. Gordon by the Federal Highway Administration, not by the TDOT, which was not ready to publicize the fact that alternate "A" was being considered until further research had been completed.

The study undertaken by Dr. Gordon, based on the alternatives given to him by the Federal Highway Administration, alerted the citizens to the existence of both alternatives and, according to Mr. Smith, created additional controversy within the community as to where the route should be located. As a result of the public attention focused on the bypass route, more letters opposing both of these routes were received by the TDOT.[39]

The results of the attitude survey were consistent with the majority of the letters received by the Highway Department. The survey recommended that a more southerly route, one further away from the city, be constructed in lieu of either alternate "A" or "B" stating,

> To many of the residents of Maryville, the selection of one of the proposed alternates for the bypass represented a hobson's choice. Although a consistent preference was expressed for route A, it appeared as though many of the respondents considered this location the least undesirable of

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[39]Interview with Ben Smith.



Fig. 4. Routes "A," "B," "C," "D," "E Modified."

> two relatively unattractive alternatives. Very little positive sentiment was expressed in favor of either alternative . . . whereas little objection to the idea of the south bypass itself was observed, many residents wanted the plans altered in such a way as to begin construction of the project further south and west of Maryville. . . . Therefore, it is recommended that further study be undertaken to identify a more suitable location for the bypass.[40]

Although the study was not binding in any way, the results of the survey did have the effect of serving notice to the TDOT that the letters opposing both alternatives were consistent with the majority of public opinion concerning the route location. Also, as previously mentioned, the publicity and resultant controversy created by the attitude survey forced the Highway Department to initiate planning activities earlier than was originally scheduled in an effort to curb the amount of opposition against both alternatives, "A" and "B."

In response to this opposition to both corridors, two other alternatives, "C" and "D," were added by the TDOT for study. These routes were located further away from the city than were alternates "A" and "B," in an effort to placate public opinion demonstrated in the attitude opinion survey against alternative "A" and "B." Alternates "A," "B," "C" and "D" are shown in Figure 4.[41]

IX. PUBLIC PRESSURE INTENSIFIES

While the TDOT gathered data on the four alternates, local officials and businessmen in Maryville stepped up their efforts for

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[40]Gordon, Result of a Consumer Reaction Study, p. 9.

[41]Interview with Ben Smith.

quicker action on the highway. Representatives of the Blount County Chamber of Commerce met with TDOT officials in Knoxville on Nov. 7, 1973, to discuss the status of the bypass.[42] On November 13, the Maryville Regional Planning Commission passed another resolution, this time stating their support of completing the bypass as soon as possible.[43]

Local efforts pushing for faster action on the bypass continued when on January 17, 1974, the Transportation Committee of the Blount County Chamber of Commerce recommended that a delegation be sent to Nashville to push for construction of the bypass.[44] On February 18, the Maryville Regional Planning Commission passed another resolution supporting quick land acquisition and construction of the south bypass.[45]

On February 13, an additional alternative was added when a resident of one of the neighborhoods affected by alternate "B," Mr. Charles Hultquist, met with TDOT officials to propose another alternative, "E." This alternative would be the furtherest proposed route away from the city, and would intersect with TN95, outside the Maryville City limits. The State Highway Planners took this proposal under consideration and within a few weeks, requested that planning data be gathered for essentially the same alternate as proposed by

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[42]Interview with Jeff Fletcher.

[43]Minutes of Maryville Regional Planning Commission, Nov. 13, 1975.

[44]Minutes of Blount County Chamber of Commerce, Jan. 17, 1974.

[45]Minutes of Maryville Regional Planning Commission, Feb. 18, 1974.

Hultquist. This alternative was labeled "E" modified. Route "E Modified" is shown in Figure 4, page 106.

X. NEW FEDERAL GUIDELINES

By February, 1974, the TDOT had developed its new planning and location decision-making policy in accordance with "guidelines set forth by the Federal Highway Administration to comply with the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1970."[46] This policy was explained in a pamphlet printed by the highway department entitled "The Action Plan," which was written with the purpose of incorporating economic, social, and other environmental considerations into Tennessee's highway transportation planning process. This new approach would require much more citizen involvement, earlier in the planning process, as well as requiring environmental impact statements to be filed. The Action Plan was printed in March of 1974 and has since guided the location planning and decision making of the south bypass.

Even before being printed, the policy set forth in the "Action Plan" was utilized in the planning process for the bypass when, on February 21, 1971, a public meeting was scheduled. The alternatives—"A," "B," "C," and "D"—would be presented in a meeting at the Blount County Courthouse.

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[46]Interview with Ben Smith.

XI. THE PUBLIC MEETING OF FEBRUARY 21, 1974

The public meeting held in the Blount County Courthouse was not a public hearing and no official action would be taken. As a vital part of the Action Plan's purpose of incorporating citizen input into the planning process, information gathered at the meeting would be used in future decision making as to the recommended alternate.

The meeting was conducted by TDOT representative Ben Smith, who started the forum by explaining the need for the facility as determined by the 1964 Transportation Survey, and summarized the events that had occurred to date. The audience at first was in a beligerent mood but after Mr. Smith explained the need of the bypass and the different locations that were already suggested, and the fact that he and the other officials were there to find out what the citizens wanted, the attitude of the attending citizens seemed to change. More people began to speak in favor of a bypass. The mood seemed to be that the people wanted the bypass located as far south of the city as it could go. Discussions were also held concerning safety of the roadway, needs of the people, and reasons for the bypass, along with the pros and cons of different alternatives. The last questions were answered at 10:30 p.m. after a three-hour session.[47]

After the March 5 meeting, the history of the bypass was summarized by the TDOT as follows. Prior to the fall of 1973, the alternative alignments which had been considered were designated "A" and "B"

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[47] Ibid.

(shown in Figure 4, page 106). However, alternate "B" was temporarily dropped from consideration by the project review committee because of heavy commercial activity in the corridor location area and the p-line survey was then initiated for route "A."

After the public reaction to the p-line, alternate "B" was reinstated and in early 1974, alternates "C" and "D" were added to give a selection of alignments a more southerly direction, further away from developed portions of the city.[48]

In March of 1974, the TDOT project review committee, now operating under the new planning policy found in the action plan, decided to consider the additional route suggested by Mr. Charles Hultquist of Maryville. This route, labeled "E-modified" was further south than any of the existing alternatives previously studied. This route is shown in Figure 4, page 106. Other alternatives—alternatives "E," "F," "G," "H," and "I"—were considered by the committee to be unfeasible and dropped from consideration.

During the course of these studies, the Project Review Committee decided to eliminate alternate "C," due to its proximity to Westwood Hills (a relatively large residential subdivision) and its similar location to alternate "D."

Thus, the final set of alternative alignments selected for further study after the community meeting of February 21, 1974, were "A," "B," "D," and "E-Modified." The results of the study of these alternatives would be presented in a second public meeting.

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[48] Ibid.

By July 9, these studies were nearing completion. On that day, representatives of the TDOT met with officials in Blount County to set up another public meeting in which the results of the studies would be presented for review and comment by local citizens.[49]

XII. THE SECOND PUBLIC MEETING

On Sept. 6, 1974, the second public meeting was held in Maryville to consider the four alternatives. The meeting was crowded and vocal, with the majority of citizens attending voicing opposition to alternatives "A" and "D." There was organized opposition to these alignments, led by Mr. Charles Hultquist and Hugh Griffin, originators of the "E-modified" alternative. Most of the citizens that appeared at the meeting were living along either route "A" or "D." No one living near the "E modified" route was present at the meeting.

Due to the nature of the public meeting, no decisions were made and the discussion that took place only intensified the controversy. Within a few days after the meeting, the Highway Department received another flurry of letters, some opposing "A" and supporting "D," others opposing "D" but supporting "A," and still other opposing both routes. It appeared that opposition was organized, as a number of letters followed similar form and wording.[50] However, no letters were received opposing alternate "E-Modified."

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[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

XIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ALTERNATE "A"

Two weeks following the second public meeting, a report was filed by the East Tennessee Development District (ETDD) favoring alternate "A." The purpose of the report was to

> . . . give public officials in Blount County and Maryville an analysis of the regional aspects of the U.S. 411 relocation (bypass) as they relate to Maryville and Blount County. This report is intended to give guidance to the local public officials including the planning agencies in their consideration of the best location for this route.[51]

The report continued, by discussing what should be considered in highway location decision making. It concluded by recommending alternate "A," stating "route 'A' comes nearer to fulfilling the best combination of needs for both the region and the locality than either route 'D' or route 'E'."[52]

Another report, this one by the Blount County Office of the Tennessee State Planning Office, also recommended alternative "A." This report was a "planning-oriented review of the impact of the three proposed alternatives of the U.S. 411 bypass."[53] It reviews the impacts of the alternatives on land use, future land use, and transportation, concluding that:

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[51]East Tennessee Development District, "Report to Public Officials in Blount County, Relocation of U.S. 411 at Maryville," September, 1974.

[52]Ibid.

[53]Tennessee State Planning Office, Blount County Office, "Review of the Proposed Alternatives, U.S. 411 Bypass, Maryville, Tenn.," September, 1974.

> Alternate "A" appears to be the most efficient bypass route. Alternate "A" will provide the greatest number of residents with improved access and circulation. Alternate "E" will require the most improvements to existing streets which intersect the bypass.[54]

On October 21, 1974, the staff report was presented to the Maryville Regional Planning Commission. The Commission then voted to send a resolution supporting alternate "A" to the Maryville City Council.[55]

IX. THE CONTROVERSY CONTINUES

The publication of the planning reports and subsequent action by the Planning Commission served to further polarize the community. More letters were received by TDOT and petitions and counter petitions were filed opposing or supporting the various alignments with signatures of hundreds of citizens on them.[56]

As the controversy continued in the community, representatives from the TDOT met in a work session with the Maryville City Council on November 5, 1974, to discuss the bypass situation. In that meeting, the City Council requested that the proceedings on the highways be temporarily curtailed for two reasons. First the council felt that the controversy surrounding the bypass location was becoming overly heated

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[54] Ibid., p. 3.

[55] Minutes of the Maryville Regional Planning Commission, Oct. 21, 1974.

[56] Interview with Ben Smith.

and a cooling-off period would help to ease the situation. Second, city elections were scheduled for the near future and the members of the city council did not want the bypass location to become a political issue. TDOT officials agreed to this request as it would give them more time to study the alignments as well as give the public a chance to cool off.[57]

These issues were not all that was discussed at this workshop. The TDOT officials also had a request. They asked the City Council to take a stand supporting one of the alternatives. They explained to the Council that under the new planning policy in the Action Plan, decisions of this nature should be made at the local level rather than by the TDOT—a departure from previous planning and decision-making policy.[58]

The City Council reacted negatively to this request by the TDOT. Several members expressed the feeling that the highway department was balking at making a controversial decision, choosing instead to force the City Council to make the decision. One councilman stated that since the TDOT were the experts, they should study the alternatives and make a decision. The City Council should not do this.[59]

Thus, the Maryville City Council hesitated at being burdened with the task of making a route selection. This created an impasse with the

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[57]Interview with Don Peterson, Maryville City Manager, April 25, 1975.

[58]Minutes of Maryville City Council, Nov. 4, 1974.

[59]Interview with Don Peterson.

TDOT concerning the final decision. However, the highway department officials agreed to let the issue cool as it would not only give more time for study of each alternative, but would give the Maryville City Council a chance to reconsider its position, after the city elections were over.[60]

In the regular meeting held after the workshop, the City Council received the Planning Commission report favoring alternate "A." Several citizens, led by Mr. Charles Hultquist, appeared before the Council to voice their opposition to alternate "A," asking the Council not to give their support to the route. Consistent with sentiment expressed in the workshop, the Council did not act on the resolution submitted by the Planning Commission, indicating that no action would be taken until further studies were completed by the TDOT.

X. CURRENT STATUS OF THE BYPASS

The Highway Department made only one other major move of the south bypass in 1974. On November 25, representatives from the TDOT conducted a field review of two additional routes, with Mr. Charles Hultquist, Mr. Ed Taylor, and Dr. J. B. Smalley, leaders of an unofficial group organized to oppose alterntive route proposals cutting through their neighborhood. The two additional alignments (unnamed), were presented to these citizens so that the TDOT could receive their reactions.

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[60]Interview with Buddy Blackburn.

It was hoped that by including these citizen leaders in early consultations, their support of one of these alternatives could be gained and opposition in such heavy amounts would be prevented.

After this meeting, no further public action was made by the TDOT on the south bypass for several months in response to the slowdown made by the Maryville City Council. After a delay of several months, the TDOT initiated action on the two new routes that had been discussed with the citizen group leaders in the November 25 field check. It was noted in a memo from the current planning section requesting information of the new alternatives, that "this office has determined that, for the best overall interest, the new modifications should be further studied." However, this study was never initiated.

Another public meeting was tentatively scheduled by the TDOT in the fall of 1975. This meeting was to discuss these routes, one an inner route, the other an outside alignment. TDOT officials hoped that by combining the "better" aspects of several previous alignments into two alternatives, more of a consensus of opinion favoring one of these alternatives can be reached in this meeting than was obtained in the previous two forums.

This meeting never materialized. The TDOT stated that due to the budget pressure faced in the economic slowdown of 1975, the project was taken off a planning status.[61]

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[61] Interview with Ben Smith.

However, Maryville officials feel that the lack of ability to handle controversy was a major reason for this last delay, noting that the matter of which agency should make the final decision has never been resolved. In an August 25, 1975, interview with the Maryville City Manager, it was stated that the City Council would not support an alternative without a recommendation by the TDOT. Furthermore, Mr. Peterson stressed that the Council was fearful of withdrawal of backing from the TDOT should controversy arise over the decision.

Mr. Peterson felt that, on the other hand, the TDOT, in order to comply with its "Action Plan" policy, would not make a decision without support of the local government.[62] Thus, an impasse has been reached which has resulted in the further delaying of the South bypass, a facility for which need was demonstrated eleven years prior in the 1964 transportation study.

XI. SUMMARY

In summarizing the chronology of events, it is important to distinguish two separate phases.

The first phase, which will be called the p-line phase, consisted of the series of events that occurred up to and including the p-line survey and the immediate resulting controversy. During this phase, the planning and decision-making process was carried out under "traditional" policy where almost all planning and decision-making authority lay in the hands of the Highway Department.

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[62] Interview with Don Peterson.

However, in this phase, policy and decisions made by the TDOT were influenced politically. For example, although the TDOT ultimately had final location decision-making power, decisions concerning the priority status of highway projects were made by politicians. In this case study, the south bypass project was placed on a high priority status through political maneuvering r ther than by utilizing a planning methodology.

Had the project been brought to completion under the "traditional" policy, it is feasible that the p-line route would have been surveyed, acquired, and constructed after the mandatory public hearings with no serious consideration of other alternatives. (The west bypass of U.S. 129 was planned, acquired and constructed in 1960 with no public hearings and no public review of alternatives.) Or, as a matter of speculation, public opposition might have caused the route to be abandoned entirely, with no bypass constructed. This seems likely since the highway project was placed on a lower status when the oppostion to the p-line survey caused key political backers to take a more neutral stand.

However, since planning policy was changed a few months after the p-line survey, the second phase of the South bypass was initiated, under the "Action Plan" phase.

In this second phase, the priority of the bypass was placed on a higher status within the TDOT through pressure mounted by local government officials and the Blount County Chamber of Commerce. There is little evidence of "behind the scenes" political maneuvering in this

second phase of the South bypass history. Instead, constant and intense pressure by government officials working closely with the Chamber of Commerce convinced the TDOT that the highway is needed to aid in solving the Maryville-Alcoa automobile transportation problem.

This Action Plan phase differs from previous "traditional" highway projects in two important respects. Under Action Plan policy, serious consideration has been given to alternative corridor locations, and public input was invited early in the planning process. The public participatory policy has, in the case of the South bypass, apparently resulted in nonaction. Instead of dampening criticism, participation led to controversy and delay.

The remainder of this study will focus on analysis of the effects of the citizen participation policy upon the process of locating a corridor for the South bypass. This will be accomplished through the leverage system of analysis, through which the actual importance of actors, issues and their interrelationships can be identified. Once this has been accomplished, and the leverage system has been identified, the effects of the system on the decision-making process can be assessed.

CHAPTER V

THE LEVERAGE SYSTEM ANALYSIS

I. INTRODUCTION

As previously stated, the central objective of this thesis is to analyze the effects of citizen participation on the location decision-making process. This analysis will be presented in the final chapter which is divided into four sections. Before it can be done, the leverage of individuals, groups, and issues must be identified. This chapter will be concerned with this task.

II. IDENTIFYING LEVERAGE VIA GERGEN'S LEVERAGE ANALYSIS

Gergen's method of analyzing leverage consists of two stages. These were briefly discussed in Chapter II, but now will be discussed in more detail.

Determination of Issues—Stage One

The first step in the leverage analysis was to identify specific issue areas of interest. Through a search of newspaper articles, minutes of the Blount County Chamber of Commerce, the Blount County Quarterly, Maryville City Council, as well as all three Regional Planning Commissions, certain issues were identified as important to location of the bypass. Additional research was conducted through review of the files kept on the South bypass in both the Knoxville and Nashville

offices of the TDOT. Also, interviews to obtain additional background information were held with TDOT officials. The list of issues is shown on Table IV.

Identifying Key Actors

After determining the issue area, persons holding formal positions of authority with respect to the issues were identified via the positional approach. Twenty individuals holding formal positions of authority with respect to the issues were compiled via the positional approach. The list of actors can be found in Table IV.

Identifying Key Groups

By use of the background research, a list of groups that appeared to be important in the bypass issue was also compiled. This list is shown in Table IV.

Interview of Informed Persons

An interview was then conducted with eight of the most knowledgeable individuals on this list. The city managers of Maryville and Alcoa, the previous County Judge, the Maryville City Planner, the President of the Blount County Chamber of Commerce, and three citizen leaders were asked to fill out a questionnaire (Appendix A) designed to obtain the following information.

1. Rating of each individual listed by the positional approach. The eight knowledgeables were asked to rate the amount of influence each individual had on the bypass issue.

TABLE IV

ACTORS, ISSUES AND ORGANIZATIONS IDENTIFIED
AS INFLUENTIAL FOR STAGE ONE INTERVIEWS

Actors	Organizations	Issues
David Black	Blount County Chamber of Commerce	Environment Issues:
Buddy Blackburn	Blount County Quarterly Court	Amount of noise
Wilson Borden	Downtown Merchants Association	Effect on air quality
Tut Bradford	Maryville City Council	Aesthetic effects on community
Ken Faulkner	Maryville Real Estate Board	Disruption of neighborhoods
Bill Felknor	Maryville Regional Planning Commission	Property Issues:
Jeff Fletcher	Midland Merchants Association	Removal of homes
Houston Goddard	Tennessee State Planning Office	Removal of businesses
Gary Head		Enhancement of business
Asher Howard		Enhancement of property values
Charles Hultquist		Traffic Issues:
Harold Lambert		High speed design
Fred Lawson		Ease of local traffic
Joe Montgomery Jr.		Ease of through traffic
Don Peterson		Easy access to downtown
Dr. J. Bryan Smalley		Elimination of intown through traffic
Dean Stone		
Ed Taylor		
Wilson Taylor		

2. List of additional influential individuals. By use of the reputational approach, each respondent was asked to list additional individuals having influence in the location process that had not been identified through the positional approach.

3. Rating of groups. To aid in the final determination of influential individuals, a rating of key groups involved in the issue was also obtained.

4. Listing of additional groups. The respondents were also asked to list and rate additional groups not listed that were influential in the process of locating the South bypass.

5. Rating of issue areas. As a validity check of the determination of issues, each respondent was asked to rate the importance of each issue concerning the location of the South bypass.

6. Listing of additional issue areas. Finally, the respondents were asked to list and rate any additional issue that was of importance in the location of the highway.

II. RESULTS OF STAGE ONE INTERVIEWS

The results of the interview questionnaire were tabulated and ranked in the following manner. The responses for each actor, group, and issue were rated by giving three points for a "very influential" response, two points for a "moderately influential" response, one point for a "little or no influence" response, and no points for a "don't know" or "no opinion" response. The same point system was established for additional actors, groups, and issues listed by the respondents, which were not on the original questionnaire.

The points for all responses were then totaled for each actor, group, and issue and ranked according to total score. From this ranking, four individuals identified on the list were found not to have been influential on the bypass issue. In addition, three individuals not previously listed were identified as having influence. Likewise, several groups were found not to have exerted significant influence on the South bypass location, but no additional groups were listed by the respondents. The most important issues concerned with removal of homes, ease of through traffic, and ease of local traffic. Of some significance is that real estate issues, as well as most of the real estate connected individuals listed on the questionnaire, were ranked as having little influence on the bypass location.

The results of the Stage One questionnaire utilizing the leadership pool approach identified nineteen individuals as having a degree of influence on the location decision-making process of the South bypass. Likewise, five groups were pointed out as having significant input into the process. The ratings of these responses are shown in Table V.

III. LEVERAGE SYSTEM ANALYSIS—STAGE TWO

Based upon the information gathered from the results of the questionnaire in Stage One, a list was compiled of the most important actors, formal organizations, and issues involved in the bypass location process. The list is shown on the Second Round Questionnaire, which can be found in Appendix B. Interviews were held with all of the individuals named on the list. The interview consisted of two sections.

TABLE V

RATING OF STAGE ONE QUESTIONNAIRE

Points	Actors	Points	Organizations	Points	Issues
21	Don Peterson	18	Blount County Chamber of Commerce	19	Removal of homes
18	David Black			18	Disruption of neighborhoods
18	Ken Faulkner	16	Maryville City Council	16	Ease of through traffic
18	Bill Felknor	12	Maryville Regional Planning Commission	16	Amount of noise
16	Walter Blackburn			12	Ease of local traffic
16	Charles Hultquist	12	Tennessee State Planning Office	10	Easy access to downtown
14	Asher Howard			8	High speed design
12	Houston Goddard	10	Blount County Quarterly Court	4	Removal of business
10	Wilson Borden			4	Aesthetic effects on community
10	Tut Bradford	0	Alcoa City Commission	3	Effects on air quality
8	Gary Head	0	Alcoa Planning Commission	3	Enhancement of business
8	Ed Taylor			2	Enhancement of property values
6	Jeff Fletcher	0	Downtown Merchants Association		
6	Dr. J. Bryan Smalley				
6	Dean Stone	0	Maryville Real Estate Board		
6	Wilson Taylor				
0	Pete Lobetti	0	Midland Merchants Association		
0	Kyle Middleton				
0	Jim Proffitt	0	Townsend Chamber of Commerce		
0	Elmer Reno				

First, each respondent was asked to rate all the actors and issues listed on the questionnaire. The questionnaire followed the same format as the Stage One questionnaire.

The results of this questionnaire allowed this writer to gauge the importance of each actor and organization as the respondents perceived them. A ranking system utilizing the same technique employed by the Stage One interviews was established from these responses, in which the importance of all individuals, organizations and issues were ranked.

In addition, each actor was asked to list the three most influential actors and two most important groups and issues. This provided a cross-check of the validity of the rating responses. Coupled with the information gathered in the chronology, research, and interviews, the additional information gained from the open-ended question provided a more complete base from which the leverage hierarchy of the location decision-making process of the South bypass could be analyzed.

In addition to the structured questions, Stage Two interviews also involved open-ended questions upon which further analysis of the rankings was based. In this phase of the interviews, each respondent was asked a number of questions designed to obtain more subjective data that could not be obtained in the rating questionnaire.

In order to facilitate in-depth responses to the open-ended questions, the personal interview technique was employed. All interviews were conducted during July and August of 1975.

The Rating Scheme

Two methods were employed in evaluating the questionnaire and interview responses. First, the responses to the questionnaire ratings of the list of individuals, groups and issues were coded and totaled. The second method of scoring utilized the responses to the open ended question, asking the respondent to list the three most important actors and two most important groups and issues.

The responses to the rating questions were "indexed" before being tabulated. Under the indexing rating scheme, a response giving an individual, issue or group a "highly influential" rating was given an indexed score of 3, a moderately influential response was given two points. Responses indicating little influence were given one point while the responses indicating that the respondent did not know or had no opinion about the actor, issue or organization was given no points. After all the interviews were complete, the results were totaled according to this rating scheme, and a rating hierarchy was established.

The responses to the open-ended questions in which the respondent was asked to list the most influential actor, group and issue were ranked according to how many times each was listed. No indexing of scores was attempted in the ranking procedure. The results of the rating and ranking scoring procedure are shown in Table VI.

V. IDENTIFYING ISSUES

Of fundamental importance to the understanding of leverage within a public policy decision making framework is the influence of issues

TABLE VI

RESULTS OF STAGE TWO QUESTIONNAIRE

Actors	Rating	Ranking	Issues	Rating	Ranking	Organizations	Rating	Ranking
Houston Goddard	50	10	Removal of homes	47	13	Blount County Chamber of Commerce	48	16
Ken Faulkner	44	7	Disruption of neighborhoods	44	11	Maryville City Council	30	11
Bill Felknor	44	9	Ease of through traffic	40	8	Maryville Regional Planning Commission	30	3
Charles Hultquist	36	4	Ease of local traffic	30	5	Tennessee State Planning Office	26	7
Harold Lambert	35	3	High speed design	24	0	Blount County Quarterly Court	11	0
Don Peterson	33	2	Removal of business	22	0			
Asher Howard	31	1	Amount of noise					
Ed Taylor	31	1	Aesthetic effects on community	16	0			
Wilson Borden	30	1	Effects on air quality	12	0			
Tut Bradford	27		Enhancement of property values	11	0			
Dr. J. Bryan Smalley	26		Easy access to downtown	8	0			
Joe Montgomery Jr.	22		Enhancement of business	0	0			
Dean Stone	20							
Fred Lawson	18							
David Black	16							
Walter Blackburn	14							
Jeff Fletcher	10							
Wilson Taylor	9							
Gary Head	6							

upon that process. Policy issues are those sometimes hard to describe concepts that influence the decision-making process. Moreover, individuals vary greatly in their relationships to a public issue and different issues may influence a person in varying degrees. With respect to leverage, the greater the relevance of an inssue to a person, the stronger will be his attempt to exert leverage upon the policymaking process. Thus, the degree of relevance to an individual should bear a direct relationship with the actual amount of leverage.[1]

In the first method of analysis, based on the rating of the degree of influence of each issue listed on the questionnaire, the removal of homes was rated as the most influential issue with 47 points. This issue was followed closely by the issues of neighborhood disruption and ease of through traffic, each receiving 44 and 40 points respectively. The easing of local traffic issue was rated with 30 points followed by the high speed design issue which received 24 points. The last six issues, listed in order of importance, were: removal of business—22 points; noise—16 points; aesthetic effects—16 points; air quality—12 points; enhancement of property values—11 points; and finally, easy access to downtown—8 points. These results are shown in Table VI.

The findings of the rank ordering of the total responses to the question, asking the interviewee to list the two most important issues, indicated that disruption of homes was the most important issue in the process. This issue was followed very closely by neighborhood disruption. The through traffic issue was ranked third, followed closely by the

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[1]Raymond A. Bauer and Kenneth J. Gergen, eds., The Study of Policy Formation (New York: The Free Press, 1971), p. 292.

local traffic. The remaining issues were not listed by any respondent as being one of the two most influential issues.

Thus, the findings of both the questionnaire rating and the open-ended ranking question indicate that the related issues of removal of homes and disruption of neighborhoods are the two most important policy issues in the location decision-making process of the South Maryville bypass. It is significant to note that three traffic issues—ease of local traffic, ease of through traffic, and high speed design—very closely followed the top two issues in both the ranking and rating procedure.

This indicates the potential for controversy and conflict concerning issues. If one of these two issue areas not ranked high on the leverage hierarchy, then the potential for conflict would have been lessened. For example, if the issues of removal of homes and the disruption of neighborhoods were not of high importance, then the construction of a bypass maximizing the facilitation of through traffic as well as easing local traffic could be completed with much less public outcry. Likewise, if the easing of local traffic problems and the facilitation of traffic were not of high importance, then a route could be designed with a minimum of neighborhood disruption and home removal. However, in this case, all of these issue areas were important, thus providing a potential source of conflict within the community.

VI. INFLUENCE OF ORGANIZATIONS

In analyzing influence systems, an important element to be considered is the leverage of organizations. By understanding the

power of certain groups, a broader understanding of the leverage of individuals within these groups can be obtained.

The leverage approach utilized in this study allows the identification of groups and actors that have input in the decision-making process. This approach ultimately narrows down to analyzing leverage of individuals. To do this, however, requires an understanding of the roles of the organization that the individuals may belong to. At a minimum, the awareness of the leverage of groups will aid in developing a better understanding of the actors within those groups.

In the first method of analysis, based on the rating of the amount of influence of each group listed on the questionnaire, the Blount County Chamber of Commerce was rated the highest with 48 points. The Maryville Regional Planning Commission was rated second with 30 points, followed closely by the Maryville City Council with 30 points. This was followed by the Tennessee State Planning Office with 26 points. The Blount County Quarterly Court was rated the lowest with 11 points.

When evaluating these groups by the ranking method, the Blount County Chamber of Commerce again was ranked the highest. It was ranked all 16 times. The Maryville City Council was listed 11 times, while the Maryville Regional Planning Commission was ranked third with 8 responses. The Tennessee State Planning Office ranked fourth with 8, and the Blount County Quarterly Court was ranked last with 0 responses. The Tennessee State Planning Office ranked fourth with 8, and the Blount County Quarterly Court was ranked last with 0 responses. Analysis of these results follows.

The Role of the Blount County Chamber of Commerce

The results of the survey identifies the Chamber of Commerce as the most important organization having input into the South bypass project. Acting through the advice of its transportation committee, the Chamber has a long history of pushing for better roads in Blount County. It was instrumental in getting the Alcoa Highway, the West bypass, and the foothills parkway constructed. In addition, for the last ten years, the Chamber has organized local efforts aimed toward completing State Route 95 to I-75 in Loudon County.

Working closely with the staff on the Tennessee State Planning Office, the Chamber initiated the first efforts to get the South bypass priority status pushed up within the TDOT. Through these early efforts, local businessmen, public officials, and politicians became aware of the need for the project.

However, most of the influence of the Chamber was not accomplished by direct action of the Chamber but by its members acting on their own. In the "p-line phase" of the projects, group efforts by the Chamber to get the TDOT to act faster on the bypass were futile. However, the discussion within the Chamber about the project revealed that several members had political connections within the administration of Governor Dunn and used them, not as representatives of the Chamber of Commerce. In this manner, the meeting of Governor-elect Dunn and Robert Smith, with a group of businessmen and politicians from Blount County, the influence of the Chamber of Commerce was achieved indirectly.

During the action plan phase, influence by the Chamber was achieved largely by direct group action. For example the attitude opinion survey conducted by Professor Michael E. Gordon was a Chamber sponsored project.[2] Also, throughout the action plan phase of the project, representatives of the Chamber kept meeting with TDOT officials, pressuring for action on the highway. It is important to note that the Chamber exercised leverage through influence rather than power. In the p-line phase, the Chamber indirectly affected the decision to place the highway on a higher priority status by influence several politically powerful members to use their power. Similarly, in the "action plan" phase of the project, the Chamber had no real power to wield as a leverage tool. Instead, through constant pressure by its representatives upon those in a position to effect decisions, the Chamber influenced the decision-making process.

Serving as a catalyst, the Chamber influenced many of its power-holding members to press for action on the highway and kept the project "before the public eye" in times when the issue seemed dead. In short, the Chamber of Commerce used most, if not all of its potential leverage in its efforts to get the highway constructed. Influenced initially by the issues of facilitating local and through traffic, the Chamber took a more "neutral" approach after the issues of home removal and neighborhood disruption were raised by residents. The latest stance

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[2]Professor Michael E. Gordon, "Results of a Consumer Reaction Study to the Proposed Maryville Bypass," unpublished report, University of Tennessee, 1975.

by the Chamber has been one of strong support of a bypass. However, the Chamber has not publically supported any one alternative, and in the spring of 1975, the Chamber decided to wait for further studies to be accomplished before supporting a route.[3]

Leverage of the Maryville Regional Planning Commission

Although ranked second by responses to both the questionnaire and open-ended ranking questions, the Maryville Regional Planning Commission was evaluated far below the Chamber of Commerce in the amount of influence it exerted upon the process. It is of significance to note that only two members of the Planning Commission were rated as influential, whereas six individuals on the list were members of the Chambers of Commerce. Even this may be misleading since one of the planning commissioners is Don Peterson, the Maryville City Manager who, by virtue of his position, possesses more potential leverage other than through membership on the Planning Commission.

The Maryville Planning Commission did take a stand relatively early in the process by passing a resolution urging the TDOT to act on the highway. As the project developed, the Planning Commission strongly supported the highway in general, passing a number of resolutions supporting the bypass. In the spring of 1974 the Planning Commission passed a resolution supporting alternate A. However, as previously mentioned, the commission did not take a stand in favor of any alternate and urged the City Council to follow suit. As with the

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[3]Interview with Harold Lambert, president of Vulcan Materials Company, May 21, 1975.

Chamber of Commerce, the leverage of the Planning Commission was achieved primarily through influence rather than power. However, the amount of potential leverage of the Planning Commission is less than the Chamber by virtue of the fact that no one on the Planning Commission had the political power to influence decisions within the TDOT. The Planning Commission did attempt to influence the decision-making process through the passing of various resolutions and by initiating the land use analysis of the effects of four alternatives. However, as the questionnaire and interview results indicate, the amount of actual influence by the Planning Commission upon the decision-making process was negligible.

Leverage of the Tennessee State Planning Office

The Blount County Office of the Tennessee State Planning Office became involved in the South bypass issue almost from the beginning of the project, when Ken Faulkner approached the planning staff to see what support and information they could gather concerning the status of the bypass.

As with the Chamber of Commerce and the Maryville Regional Planning Commission, the State Planning Office staff had no real power within highway location decision making. Instead, any leverage that the TSPO staff held was through influence.

Nonetheless, the planning staff of the Blount County TSPO made several attempts to influence the process. During the "p-line" phase, the staff met with officials from the TDOT to see if the highway department would and/or could cooperate to at least preserve right-of-way

for the bypass corridor as shown on the Blount County Major Road Plan. Also, the TSPO staff tried to get the TDOT to commit itself to place the highway project on a higher priority and to assure construction within five years. The planners pushed for this not only to get the highway started, but also so that they could recommend that the Planning Commission not approve subdivision and rezoning applications within that corridor. Without this commitment by the highway deparmment, the planners felt that the Planning Commission would not have a strong enough justification for denying development proposals in the corridor.

These efforts proved futile when the TDOT informed the planning office that, at that time, the highway could only be placed on a twenty-year schedule. After failure of these negotiations with TDOT the only efforts by the TSPO staff to influence the process was to recommend that the Planning Commissions in Blount County, Maryville and Alcoa, adopt resolutions urging the local legislative bodies and the TDOT to act swiftly in completion of the bypass. Even after the planning policy shift in the "action plan" phase of the project, the TSPO staff could only influence the process. Due to its capacity as a technical assistance planning staff, it held only an advisory position to the three Planning Commissions in the county, whose leverage has already been demonstrated as negligible.

During the "action plan" the planning staff attempted to utilize what influence it held by preparing the planning oriented review of the bypass in which it reviewed the impacts of alternatives "A," "B," "C,"

"D" on land use—concluding by recommending alternatige "A." The report was adopted by the Planning Commission but not by the City Council and appears to have had a minimal amount of influence upon the overall process.

Significantly, of the eighteen individuals interviewed, six responded that they felt that TSPO could have exerted more influence than it did. These respondents mentioned that, since the TSPO staff was working with all three governments, the planning office could have organized local support for the bypass. However, the planners only attempts to exert leverage were through influence by negotiating with the TDOT and by recommending that the Planning Commission pass resolutions supporting the project.

Regarding the amount of potential leverage held by the Planning staff, the lack of direct power in the highway decision-making process must be considered. Even if TSPO had organized local government efforts, it still would have held leverage only through influence. It is likely, however, that a coordinated effort of all three governments would have had more influence in the process than piecemeal efforts.

Leverage of the Maryville City Council

The Maryville City Council was rated and ranked fourth of the five groups listed on the interview questionnaire. Generally, the City Council did not take an active role in the bypass issue. During the p-line phase of the project, the City Council had no direct involvement even though the Planning Commission referred to them a number of

resolutions urging quick completion of the bypass. However, the council took no official action on these resolutions.

It was not until late in the "action plan" phase that the City Council took definitive steps on the issue when the City Council, in the workshop with TDOT officials, asked that no action be taken until after City Council elections—a move that would also serve to give time for all parties to cool off, for at that time, the controversy was becoming quite heated. It should be stressed that the City Council refused to take a position favoring one alternative.

As was the case with all other groups involved in the bypass issue, the City Council did not have any leverage by power, but could only influence the decision-making process. In the action plan phase, when the TDOT adopted a policy of incorporating citizen input the location planning and decision-making process, the amount of potential influence of the City Council increased.

Under the action plan policy guidelines, the TDOT had to take local sentiment into consideration. The City Council could have used this policy to increase its leverage in the process by taking two steps. First, the Council could have taken a firm stand supporting one of the alternatives. If they had done this, according to City Manager Don Peterson, the TDOT could have in turn taken a stronger position on one of the alternatives. For, in the council workshop, TDOT officials implied that if the City Council would go on record in support of one of the alternatives, the entire process would be speeded up. However, the Council balked at taking this course of action because they felt

that the TDOT was forcing them to make a controversial decision shortly before city elections. Then the City Council took no action, it was the consensus of the Council that the TDOT should use its planning and engineering expertise to make a recommendation of one alternative. Then the City Council would back this recommendation since it would be based on rational planning considerations. The Council felt that it did not have the ability to make recommendations itself. However, TDOT officials said that they would not make such a recommendation without someone in the community favoring an alternative. Thus, an impasse was reached, with the Council giving up a source of influence.

Even under these circumstances, the Council could have used the Action Plan policy to increase its leverage. Short of making its own recommendation of an alternative, it could have taken the lead by attempting to form a consensus of opinion on a location of the bypass. This could have been accomplished by organizing a citizen's advisory committee or other similar mechanism which would work under the auspices of the City Council. The findings of this committee could then be used as a basis for an official recommendation of an alternative, thus relieving the Council of the burden of making a controversial decision. This would also give the TDOT a definite assessment of local opinion upon which to base their decision.

However, the actual leverage exerted by the Council was not very significant. The City Council had a relatively large amount of potential leverage through which it could have influenced the TDOT. But, due mostly to the desire by its members not to "politicize" the highway

controversy at the local level, the City Council elected not to use this potential leverage, preferring to try to stay out of the controversy as much as possible.

Leverage of the Blount County Quarterly Court

Of all the groups listed on the questionnaire, the Quarterly Court of Blount County had the least amount of leverage. The Court was only marginally involved in the bypass issue. In 1967 the Court adopted the Blount Major Road Plan with the proposed corridor for the bypass shown on the plan. With this exception, the County Court took no further definitive action on the highway project.

Five respondents indicated that the Quarterly Court did have more potential leverage than it exerted. One respondent stated that the County Court probably held more potential leverage than the Maryville City Council because it was politically more closely allied with the administration of Governor Winfield Dunn.[4] This person felt that at least three members of the Court "had an in" with the Dunn administration could have used this influence to "get things done on the bypass."[5]

However, as an organizational entity, the County Court, like the other groups reviewed above, had no authority or power over state highway corridor locations, but only had influence through political means. It chose not to use this influence. As a consequence, the

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[4]Interview with Dr. Bryan Smalley, May 17, 1975.

[5]Ibid.

Blount County Quarterly Court exerted the least amount of leverage of all the organizations involved in the process of locating an alignment for the South Maryville Bypass.

VII. SUMMARY OF ORGANIZATION LEVERAGE

In summarizing organization leverage as a whole, it must be stressed that no organization held leverage through direct power in the decision-making process. This power remained within the TDOT. Thus, no single organization exerted a singularly high degree of leverage—most groups only nominally influenced the overall process.

If any one organization is to be pointed out as most influential, it would be the Blount County Chamber of Commerce. Their efforts to get the project initiated, started the entire process and kept it going when it appeared that opposition would kill it. However, as a group, their efforts did not have a direct impact on the decision-making process. Instead, the power of certain chamber members resulted in the bypass being placed on a high priority. Moreover, as the project progressed, efforts by the Chamber and the other groups involved continued to only marginally influence the decision-making process as they chose to remain neutral once the issue became controversial.

VIII. EVALUATION OF ACTOR LEVERAGE

An individual having leverage will possess certain characteristics which enable him to have influence or power within a decision-making process. The ability to initiate or influence general policy

formulation, the ability to organize individuals and ideas to produce the desired results, the ability to effectively communicate as well as to have access to channels of communication, and the ability of an actor to gain acceptance of his ideas from institutions are just a few of the qualities that give an actor leverage. By identifying these characteristics, the actor's leverage can be evaluated. Not every actor will possess these qualities, but those who possess more of the characteristics will generally have more leverage.[6]

In this section of the chapter, the analysis of the leverage of the nineteen individuals listed on the questionnaire will be presented. As in the evaluation of the influence of groups and issues, the evaluation of actor leverage was accomplished by both rating and ranking procedures upon which a hierarchy was established for each method.

As shown in Table VI, page 129, Houston Goddard, Ken Faulkner, and Bill Felknor received 50, 44, and 44 rating points respectively. Six individuals rated closely behind the top three actors, being rated with thirty or more points. There are Charles Hultquist, Harold Lambert, Don Peterson, Ed Taylor, Tut Bradford, and finally, Asher Howard and Wilson Borden. The lowest nine actors, in order, were Dr. J. Bryan Smalley, Joe Montgomery, Dean Stone, Fred Lawson, David Black, Buddy Blackburn, Jeff Fletcher, Wilson Taylor and Gary Head.

When evaluating actor leverage by the ranking procedure, similar, though not exact, results were obtained. The nine most influential

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[6]Gergen, The Study of Policy Formation, p. 24.

actors were the same in both evaluative methods, though the hierarchial ranking of the individuals within this grouping differed to a minor degree. The results are shown in Table VI, page 129.

In summary, the results of both the ranking and rating questions generally reinforce each other. An analysis of these evaluative procedures reveal hierarchies in which the nine most important actors are clearly identified. Within this group, the analysis of both hierarchies further reveals the four most influential individuals. These are Houston Goddard, who was rated first by both procedures, Ken Faulkner, Bill Felknor, and Charles Hultquist.

IX. ANALYSIS OF ACTOR LEVERAGE

The focus of this study will now turn from the establishment of actor leverage to one of analyzing the leverage of individuals. In analyzing actor leverage, it is important to identify the key issue that played a major role in the decision-making process, because, as mentioned previously, actors are influenced by issues, and conversely, issues can be influenced by actors.

There were four key issues which were stated as being important in the bypass controversy. One issue was the desire for the facility to ease through traffic, which has caused the Maryville-Alcoa area to be a traffic bottleneck for over a decade. The second major issue was the desire for the bypass to facilitate the movement of local traffic. Maryville does not have major artery going in an east-west direction and, as the results of the issue evaluation indicated, many actors felt

that the highway should serve this function. Finally, the issues of home removal and neighborhood disruption were rated as the two most important factors that influenced the process. To many, the issue of whether the highway will serve local as well as through-traffic was secondary to the destruction of homes and the subsequent disruption of neighborhoods.

These four issues influenced the actors and set the scene for the controversy and often heated debated that occurred as to the proper location of the highway. The issues form the center of the controversy. Not a single actor doubted the need for the bypass. Instead, the debate has been over the best location of the highway which would best serve the issue that the actor happens to support.

X. LEVERAGE OF THE NINE MOST INFLUENTIAL ACTORS

As shown in Table VI, page 129, both evaluative procedures identified the same nine actors as being most influential. For purposes of clarity, the leverage analysis of these actors will proceed on the order that each actor was evaluated by the rating procedure.

Analysis of Houston Goddard's Leverage

Houston Goddard has been a successful attorney in Maryville for a number of years. During the beginning of the bypass project, Mr. Goddard was a member of the Tennessee State Senate and was the Senate Minority Leader, the same party of the Dunn administration. In the spring of 1975, he was appointed a Federal Judge in Knoxville.

Judge Goddard was ranked as the most important individual by both procedures. This was due to his input in the project early in the process. By virtue of his position as Senate Minority Leader, Judge Goddard was in a position to directly effect the decision-making processes of the TDOT. The Judge used this leverage during the "p-line" phase by placing a single phone call to the governor-elect "informing him of the need for the bypass in Blount County."[7] Thus, in the early stages of the project, Judge Goddard, although not directly involved in the decision-making process, had a large degree of influence in this process. As stated previously, no one outside of the TDOT was directly involved in the decisions made by the agency. However, by virtue of his large amount of political influence and power as Senate Minority Leader, Judge Goddard had the more direct leverage than any other individual involved in the issue.

However, after the public outcry following the p-line survey, Judge Goddard backed away from using his leverage. After letters and calls of protest had been received by the TDOT, Commissioner Smith placed a phone call to ask Judge Goddard if he cared where the highway was located. The Judge replied that he had no preference where the highway was finally placed, which, in essence, indicated the withdrawal of support for the p-line route.

Four of the actors interviewed felt that this action by Goddard resulted in the p-line phase being stopped along with the consequent

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[7]Interview with Houston Goddard, April 19, 1975.

lowering of the priority status of the project. These respondents claimed that Judge Goddard was influenced by many letters from his constituents; and especially by Charles Hultquist and Ed Taylor.

By not directly acting to produce a desired action, the influence of Judge Goddard was so powerful that, by assuming a neutral position, he influenced the decision to delay the project.

Judge Goddard was initially influenced by the issue of getting a bypass around Maryville to facilitate area traffic. He felt this would not only relieve Maryville of traffic congestion, but also would help the county's tourist trade by making the Townsend entrance to the national park more accessible. Thus he pushed hard for the best through route, the p-line corridor.[8] However, when the issue of home removal and neighborhood disruption came to the forefront, and citizens started reacting against the p-line route, Judge Goddard became more concerned by these issues than by the need for a direct bypass, and thus switched his position on the highway.

During the p-line phase, Judge Goddard was definitely the most important actor. His actions started the project and his inaction resulted in the early halting of the bypass. However, when the project was regenerated in the action plan phase, Judge Goddard did not have major input into the decision-making process. In 1974, Goddard did not run for reelection and, since his appointment as a Federal Judge, he has been completely uninvolved in the issue.

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[8] Ibid.

Analysis of Ken Faulkner's Leverage

Mr. Faulkner was the Executive Director of the Blount County Chamber of Commerce from 1970 until 1974. His involvement with the project began in 1970 when he recommended to the Executive Council of the Chamber that the South bypass become a project. From that time, until his resignation as Executive Director in the spring of 1974, Mr. Faulkner was very active in the various Chamber sponsored activities pushing for action on the highway. As Executive Director, Mr. Faulkner organized meetings between TDOT and local businessmen, coordinate with Dr. Gordon and his student who conducted the attitude opinion survey. He worked closely with the local planning staffs and governments to get the bypass underway. In short, Mr. Faulkner used a number of means to influence the process of getting a bypass constructed.

Mr. Faulkner had many close contacts with businessmen, politicians, citizens and local government officials. As a result, his leverage through influence was significant. Working on behalf of the Chamber, Mr. Faulkner met informally with local officials including the City Managers of both Maryville and Alcoa, the County Judge, the TSPO staff, officials from the TDOT as well as local politicians, to point out the need for the highway and to promote interest in getting the project underway.

It is significant to note that the Chamber was initially concerned with the issue of facilitating through-traffic around town. As businessmen, the Chamber officials felt that tourism would be greatly

benefited in the County if the traffic bottleneck in Maryville was eliminated. Furthermore, a bypass route would ease local traffic problems, making driving in the Maryville area easier and would enhance the area's attractiveness as a subregional shopping area.

Emphasizing these issues, Mr. Faulkner was successful in convincing many local people that quick action was needed to get the highway constructed before development in the proposed corridor made it unfeasible. Through his pressure, efforts to gain clarification of the issue by the planning office were initiated. Meetings were also set up between local officials and the TDOT.

Thus, in the p-line stage of the project, Ken Faulkner's leverage was exerted through indirect "coffee cup" influence of his working relationships with many elements in the Maryville-Alcoa area. These conversations resulted in politically powerful individuals act ng on their own to directly influence the decision within the TDOT. In this regard, Mr. Faulkner's leverage, though indirect, was considerable.

During the "action plan" phase of the project, the influence of Mr. Faulkner in getting the project regenerated also was very important. After the p-line phase was terminated, Faulkner again followed the same tactics to influence the project. However, due to the controversy over the p-line, many politicians who had initiated that phase of the project did not want to become infolved again. Though his leverage was somewhat diminished by the fact that the Chamber could not influence those having a direct authority over the TDOT, the efforts by Mr. Faulkner ultimately resulted in the priority

of the bypass being pushed back into a higher status position. Thus, the leverage applied by Ken Faulkner was instrumental in getting the South Maryville bypass project moving in both the "p-line" phase as well as the "action plan" phase. By use of this position of Executive Director of the Chamber of Commerce in which he had access to those actors having more direct access to those involved in the TDOT decision-making process, he served as catalyst in the process. For example, his contact with Judge Goddard and others resulted in their influence during the p-line phase. Also, at his urging, the Chamber was largely responsible for getting the project reprioritized during the action plan phase.[9]

Analysis of Bill Felknor's Leverage

Mr. Bill Felknor, listed third on both the rating and ranking hierarchies, had a significant though relatively small role in the South bypass issue. A lawyer in Maryville for over thirty years, Mr. Felknor was chairman of Blount County's Better Government Committee—a patronage board for the Dunn administration which gave him a degree of influence in political affairs.

He was first approached by Ken Faulkner in early 1971, when Mr. Faulkner discussed with Mr. Felknor the need for the bypass. Mr. Faulkner asked if he would support the project with Mr. Felknor

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[9]During the course of research for this case study, Mr. Faulkner, who left employment with the Chamber of Commerce in 1974, could not be located. The analysis of his activities was taken from information gathered in the background research of the case, and from comments obtained in other personal interviews.

replying in the affirmative. When asked why he gave this support, Mr. Felknor stated that he had always felt that East Tennessee had been "robbed" of new highway construction by previous democratic governors. Since a Republican had just been elected, he wanted to see if the Republicans in Blount County could get "a bunch of new projects for the area."[10]

Consequently, Mr. Felknor utilized his leverage by asking the Governor and Robert Smith to meet with him and other members of the Blount County Committee for Better Government. In this meeting, the bargain was made between the Governor and these committee members that they would support Smith for Highway Commissioner in return for the promise that the bypass project would be initiated as soon as possible.

This meeting was held within two weeks after Houston Goddard placed the phone call to Governor-elect Dunn about the bypass.[11] In analyzing the series of events it would appear that, although the meeting and the phone call occurred independently, both of these events were mutually supportive in the sense that two influential persons were supporting the same cause. However, the actual leverage of Mr. Felknor was limited. When the opposition arose to the p-line, Mr. Felknor said he "fought like crazy" to keep the project going. Yet, he was unsuccessful because, as Mr. Felknor stated, "Houston Goddard listened to his neighbors and friends whose houses were going to be displaced and withdrew his support from the project."[12] Without the backing of the

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[10]Interview with Bill Felknor, April 19, 1975.

[11]Ibid. [12]Ibid.

then State Senator, Commissioner Smith was not willing to continue the project in the face of the unusually large amount of opposition.

In summation, Mr. Felknor exercised leverage through his political position of Chairman of the Blount County Better Government Committee. However, this leverage, though very important in initiating the p-line phase, was negated by the more powerful leverage of Houston Goddard when the latter chose to change his position concerning the project. Through the process, Mr. Felknor pushed for a direct bypass around Maryville, and was not influenced by the controversy over home removal and neighborhood disruption.

Analysis of Mr. Charles Hultquist's Leverage

Mr. Charles Hultquist, a native of Blount County, resides in the path of alternative "A." He is an employee of the Aluminum Company of America and occupies no official position in any of the governments in Blount County.

Charles Hultquist's leverage in the process was achieved by two factors. First, Mr. Hultquist has the ability to organize and to make himself heard. Second, in the absence of a formally designated citizen group, the TDOT sought him out as a community spokesman after he utilized his communication ability to organize the neighborhood protests of the in-town route alignments.

Mr. Hultquist first became involved in the issue when the p-line was surveyed. This alignment cut across his property, and necessitated the removal of his home. Immediately after this survey, Mr. Hultquist

wrote letters of protest to the TDOT, the governor, the City Council, and the newspaper. However, he did not stop his efforts at that point. Mr. Hultquist continued talking with most of the other residents of the neighborhood, organizing them into an unofficial group that attended both public meetings in large numbers. In addition, Mr. Hultquist passed around a petition favoring alternative E, an alternate created by him, which ultimately received over 100 signatures.[13]

Just prior to the first public meeting, Mr. Hultquist met with TDOT representatives to propose alternative E which is the route furtherest away from the center of town.[14] At that first public meeting, Mr. Hultquist was the spokesman for his neighborhood and led the opposition against all of the routes discussed at that meeting.

After the meeting, Hultquist organized a letter campaign in which over 100 letters were mailed to the governor and highway commissioner protesting any route that would disrupt existing neighborhoods in the city. Also, during that time, Mr. Hultquist organized a telephone campaign to try to enlist widespread opposition to the in-town alternatives.

At the second public meeting, Mr. Hultquist continued in his role as spokesman for the neighborhood group and vocally opposed every alternative except "E." At the meeting, he presented a lengthy and detailed argument of the advantages of alternative "E."

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[13]Interview with Charles Hultquist, May 19, 1975.

[14]Interview with Ben Smith, May 12, 1975.

[15]Hultquist interview.

By this time, his position as a neighborhood spokesman was established. Through the efforts described above, Mr. Hultquist became the citizen leader, if only an unofficial one, and it is significant that the TDOT officials met with Mr. Hultquist and Ed Taylor to get their reactions to the latest alternatives under consideration while informing local officials of these alternatives by mail over six months later.

Of all the actors involved in the process, Charles Hultquist had the least amount of resources for wielding leverage. However, Mr. Hultquist's ability to organize and make himself heard overcame his lack of personal resources. By using his abilities, Mr. Hultquist was able to influence Judge Goddard to withdraw his support for the project during the p-line phase. The large number of letters as well as the pressure placed upon him by friends who were working with Judge Goddard were instrumental in getting the Senator to change his support.

Mr. Hultquist's influence was definitely enhanced by the action plan policy adopted by the TDOT in which public input into the process became mandatory. By virtue of the fact that there was no preexisting formal mechanism for acquiring citizen input, the situation was right for an aggressive individual to step into the limelight. Moreover, the fact that the City Council did not move to create such a mechanism, added more strength to Mr. Hultquist's influence. In other words, Mr. Hultquist acquired leverage when the City Council gave up a source of potential leverage. In order to get some sort of public input, the

TDOT had no other source to turn to except Mr. Hultquist and his loosely organized neighborhood coalition which attended the public meetings in large numbers.

Analysis of Mr. Harold Lambert's Leverage

Mr. Harold Lambert was rated fifth by both evaluative methods. A native of Maryville and Blount County, Mr. Lambert is the President of Vulcan Materials Company which operates a rock quarry immediately south of the proposed corridor location between Montvale Road and Wilkinson Pike. Mr. Lambert is a member of the Blount County Chamber of Commerce and has served on its executive committee and was also on the Maryville Regional Planning Commission from 1968 to the spring of 1972.[16]

Although playing a relatively small role in the bypass issue, he has had a significant amount of influence. His most important single action occurred when he was one of the individuals who met with Governor-elect Dunn and commissioner Smith in the meeting in which the political deal on the status of the bypass was agreed upon. Mr. Lambert also participated in several subsequent meetings with TDOT officials as a Chamber representative. Aside from the meeting with the Governor-elect and the meetings as Chamber representative, Mr. Lambert has taken no direct action on the highway project.[17]

Mr. Lambert has indirectly held another source of influence that has been of substantial importance in the bypass issue. The Vulcan

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[16]Interview with Harold Lambert, May 16, 1975.

[17]Ibid.

Materials Company of which he is president owns a rock quarry which is located on the south side of town. Currently, the company's trucks must haul rocks through the center of town to get to the northern part of the county and to Knoxville. As a result, the streets that these trucks use are subject to heavy wear caused by the heavy loads. When the subject of the bypass first came up, many local officials felt that the route should be located so as to also serve the rock quarry trucks, relieving the city streets of their extra wear.[18]

Four respondents listing Mr. Lambert as very influential felt that the rock quarry "problem" gave him a large amount of potential leverage. They felt that Mr. Lambert utilized his political and Chamber resources to push for the bypass because it would reduce travel time for the trucks across town.[19]

When queried about this during the interview, Mr. Lambert denied these allegations, stating that he pushed for the bypass because "Maryville needed it," that as far as Vulcan Materials Company was concerned, it did not matter if the bypass was located next door or not. However, Mr. Lambert felt that the route should serve in-town as well as through-traffic.[20]

Nevertheless, Mr. Lambert's leverage within the process was considerable. This leverage was achieved through a combination of

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[18] Ibid.

[19] The four respondents making these statements requested that their identities remain private.

[20] Interview with Harold Lambert.

his position within the Chamber of Commerce, his political connections, and the fact that his company's trucks were tearing up certain streets in Maryville.

Analysis of the Leverage of Mr. Don Peterson

Don Peterson has been the City Manager of Maryville since the spring of 1974. Prior to his appointment as Manager, he served as Assistant City Manager for four years. As City Manager, Mr. Peterson also serves on the Maryville Planning Commission.

Mr. Peterson's involvement in the bypass issue has been mostly through his capacity as City Manager. Acting in this capacity, Mr. Peterson met on a number of occasions with TDOT officials to try to clarify the status of the bypass. Largely influenced by the traffic congestion in Maryville, Mr. Peterson has been primarily concerned with getting a facility constructed as quickly as possible.[21]

Mr. Peterson's influence was considerably lessened by the City Council's neutral position on the project. Under the Council-manager form of government, the City Manager operates under the approval by the Council. Since the Council did not take a strong position in the controversy surrounding the issue, Mr. Peterson had to follow suit. As a result, he found himself in the position of spokesman for the Council in which he negotiated with the TDOT, pressing them to make a decision as quickly as possible. However, as previous discussion of this pointed

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[21]Interview with Don Peterson, April 25, 1975.

out, the TDOT would not make such a decision without getting local input first. If the City Council had elected to take a position or at least organize a mechanism for gathering public opinion or forming public consensus, the leverage of Don Peterson, as the administrator of Council policy, would have increased substantially. Thus, Mr. Peterson's appearance in the top nine individuals considered important or having leverage may largely be a result of his position as City Manager and the resultant public visibility of the position.

An Analysis of the Leverage of Ed Taylor

Ed Taylor, a native of Blount County currently works as a pharmacist for Blount Memorial Hospital in Maryville. He is a squire on the Blount County Quarterly Court. Mr. Taylor, however, played an important role in the process but not through his capacity as a County Court squire. Mr. Taylor tried unsuccessfully to bring the bypass issue before the court on a number of occasions, but the court, according to Mr. Taylor, did not want to become involved in what was considered to be "a controversy exclusive to the city of Maryville."[22] Thus, much of Mr. Taylor's potential leverage as a county squire was negated by the court's lack of participation in the matter.

Instead, the importance of Mr. Taylor's role in the process was achieved through his efforts as a citizen—a resident of a neighborhood threatened with disruption by alternatives "A" and "B." His participation in the project was similar to that of Charles Hultquist.

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[22]Interview with Ed Taylor, May 17, 1975.

He and Mr. Hultquist worked together on organizing public opposition to the in-town routes.

The fact that Mr. Taylor was a County Court squire gave him a source of potential leverage that Mr. Hultquist did not have. Even though the County Court did not participate actively in the process, Mr. Taylor had political connections that he utilized to influence those having a more direct access to the decision-making process. In particular, Mr. Taylor was one of the the most influential individuals in getting Houston Goddard to withdraw his support for the p-line route.

Although much potential leverage as a County Court squire was neutralized by the County Court, Mr. Taylor still wielded a substantial amount of influence. Working closely with Charles Hultquist, Mr. Taylor was able to assist in organizing public opposition with the resulting increase in leverage as they made themselves heard, thereby gaining the attention of the TDOT. This leverage was enhanced by his political relationships with other individuals who held more influence in the process.

An Analysis of the Leverage of Mr. Tut Bradford

Tut Bradford is the publisher of the Maryville Alcoa Daily Times, the only daily newspaper in Maryville and Alcoa. Mr. Bradford also is a member of the Blount County Chamber of Commerce, serving on the Executive Committee. Both of these positions give him a source of leverage.

Mr. Bradford first became directly involved in the bypass project through the Chamber of Commerce. As a representative of the Chamber,

he attended several meeting with state highway officials concerning the bypass.[23]

His ownership of the local newspaper gives him a substantial amount of potential leverage. As previously discussed, a major source of leverage is the ability to communicate, to be heard by those in authority and his newspaper coverage of the issue contributed to the leverage.of the citizens involved in the process. As mentioned above, Mr. Hultquist, as a citizen leader, had little resources to exert leverage in the process. He had to depend on his ability to organize and communicate and several large articles in the newspaper contributed vastly to these efforts. Mr. Bradford attributed the large public attendance at the first public meeting to the front page articles publicizing the reason for the meeting.[24] Had Mr. Bradford chosen to, the issue and Mr. Hultquist's efforts could have been played down by the newspaper. However, he did not choose this course of action. By publicizing the issue, his influential paper enhanced the leverage of the neighborhood leaders.

An Analysis of the Leverage of Mr. Asher Howard

Mr. Asher Howard was the County Judge in Blount County for 16 years. He did not run for reelection in 1974 but retired to his residence in Townsend, a small Blount County community bordering on the National Park. As County Judge, Asher Howard held a vast amount of

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[23]Interview with Tut Bradford, April 21, 1975.

[24]Ibid.

potential leverage. Through this position, he was closer than any other actor in the process with the exception of Houston Goddard to the decision-making process of the TDOT. However, Judge Howard used this leverage to a limited degree, and perhaps a more important analysis of Asher Howard's leverage is one of his potential influence that he did not exert. Unlike the administrative head of Maryville, as County Judge, Mr. Asher Howard was elected by popular vote and, therefore, was not subject to dismissal by the County Court. Thus, Judge Howard could have actively pushed for court involvement in the bypass issue. Judge Howard did not, however, take this course of action. Outside of the political meetings he participated in, Judge Howard did little to influence the project, and thus gave up a considerable amount of potential leverage. He was one of the individuals attending the meeting with the Governor-elect and Robert Smith. He also attended meetings with TDOT officials concerning highway projects in Blount County.

XI. LEVERAGE OF THE REMAINING ACTORS

In a leverage system analysis, it is important to understand the interrelationships of all the actors, issues and groups having input into the process. Therefore, the analysis of the leverage of the remaining actors on the leverage hierarchy will be presented, but not in as much detail as the top nine actors.

Mr. Wilson Borden. Wilson Borden was a Senior Vice President of the Bank of Maryville during the period of this case study. Mr. Borden also was the President of the Blount County Chamber of Commerce during this time.

It was through his position of Chamber president that Mr. Borden became involved in the south bypass project. Acting in this capacity, Mr. Borden attended most of the meetings between local and TDOT officials. However, most of the contacts and legwork necessary to set up these meetings were left up to Ken Faulkner. As long as Mr. Borden agreed with Faulkner's actions, the executive director was left with a free hand in the process.[25] Since this was mostly the case on the south bypass issue, Mr. Faulkner's role was more important.

There was, however, one chamber policy that was influenced directly by Mr. Borden. It was his belief that the Chamber should remain neutral in the controversy surrounding the exact alignment of the bypass. As president, his wishes bore more weight than others in the Chamber who wanted to publically back a single alternative.[26] An important aspect of Mr. Borden's influence in the process was his insistence that the Chamber remain neutral concerning the exact location. Mr. Borden felt that the TDOT should be the agency to make such a decision, since no one in the local community had the training or experience to make an adequate choice.[27] As a result, during the p-line phase of the project, the Chamber continued as a strong advocate for a bypass but remained neutral on the alternative controversy.

Thus, the leverage of Mr. Wilson Borden was directly related to his role as President of the Chamber of Commerce. The fact that his rating

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[25]Interview with Wilson Borden, April 20, 1975.

[26]Ibid. [27]Ibid.

in the leverage hierarchy was tenth can be attributed to his deferring most of the personal work on the project to Ken Faulkner.

Dr. J. Bryan Smalley. Dr. J. Bryan Smalley is an orthopedic surgeon on the staff of Blount Memorial Hospital. His involvement in the south bypass issue has been entirely as a citizen, working closely with Ed Taylor and Charles Hultquist.

Dr. Smalley first became active in the issue when he woke up one morning and saw a stake in his property. Subsequently, he met with local citizens to discuss what could be done to stop the highway from cutting through his yard. He was a participant along with Ed Taylor and Mr. Hultquist in the fall meeting with TDOT officials to discuss routes J and K. His position on the matter was simple and straightforward: "I feel that it (the bypass) should not come through anybody's neighborhood."[28]

Of the citizen leaders, Dr. Smalley was ranked lowest on the leverage hierarchy. Although vocal at public meetings, Dr. Smalley did not contribute as much time to the issue as Mr. Hultquist or Ed Taylor and, thus, did not cultivate the same degree of leverage. As a respected physician, though, Dr. Smalley's leverage was enhanced. Two respondents felt that Dr. Smalley's position in the community, particularly his social relationships with Houston Goddard and other politicians, contributed to the halting of the project after the p-line survey.[29]

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[28]Interview with Dr. J. Bryan Smalley, May 11, 1975.

[29]Interview with Asher Howard and Bill Felknor, May 18, 1975.

Joe Montgomery, Jr. Joe Montgomery, Jr. is a native of Blount County. He is a developer, having built some of Maryville's largest and most expensive residential subdivisions. Mr. Montgomery was also served on the Maryville City Council for over 12 years.

Mr. Montgomery's influence in the bypass issue did not come through his position as a Council member. He did try to get the Council to take a stronger stand to clarify the alignment issue. However, any potential leverage that he may have exerted through the Council was canceled by that organization's decision to not take a position favoring one alternative.

Mr. Montgomery did have an influence, although indirect, on the bypass issue. In 1971, he approached the planning staff to discuss preliminary plans for a Planned Unit Development. As it so happened, the proposed corridor for the South bypass, shown on the Blount County Major Road Plan, transversed the tract of land in the proposed development. Mr. Montgomery wanted to know how this would effect the Staff's recommendation concerning his development.[30] It was this proposal, along with the subsequent additional smaller development projects, that provided the impetus for the Planning Staff to join the Chamber in its attempt to push for a higher priority and clarification of the proposed bypass.

Hence, Joe Montgomery, Jr. had more indirect than direct influence in the project. His rating as the twelfth most influential actor in the

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[30]Interview with Joe Montgomery, Jr., May 16, 1975.

process was due to a combination of his role as a developer, a project that was directly affected by the p-line route, and to his public role as a city councilman. However, as discussed above, his leverage as a council member was negated by that organization's neutral position. Three respondents felt that Mr. Montgomery vastly influenced the decision to initiate the p-line survey.[31] But, it is this author's opinion that these allegations are based more on rumor than fact, that the actual influence of Mr. Montgomery was more indirect, as discussed above, rather than through direct attempts to influence the location decision-making process.

Mr. Dean Stone. The actor rated as the thirteenth most important individual in the process under study was Dean Stone, the editor of the Maryville Alcoa Daily Times. In the capacity as editor, Mr. Stone has written a number of editorials and feature articles on the south bypass.

These articles and editorials were neutral, with the paper not endorsing any route alignment. Instead, the editorials pushed for completion of the bypass, repeatedly pointing out the need for the facility. Thus, as with the leverage of Tut Bradford, the publisher of the newspaper, the influence of Dean Stone can best be characterized as more potential than actual. The paper could have adopted an editorial policy favoring one of the alignments, and attempted through its circulation to influence public opinion concerning that alignment.

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[31] Interview with Charles Hultquist, J. Bryan Smalley, and Ed Taylor, May 21, 1975.

Since this was not the case, the leverage of the editor of the newspaper was minimal. Furthermore, as editor, working for Mr. Bradford, the owner, Mr. Stone was working under a form of constraint in that it can be expected that the editorial tone of the paper closely reflects the opinion of the owner-publisher. Thus, the leverage of Mr. Stone would be subordinate to that of Tutt Bradford. As with Mr. Bradford, Mr. Stone's listing as an influential person in the bypass issue can be attributed to his name being associated with numerous articles in the newspaper.

David Black. The actor rated fourteenth on the leverage hierarchy is David Black, a successful lawyer, and a native of Blount County. Mr. Black is the Chairman of the Blount County Planning Commission.

All of Mr. Black's involvement in the highway project has been through the Planning Commission. This activity, however, has been very limited. The only direct activity has been to initiate the resolutions supporting the highway in general. Even this action was on the recommendation of the TSPO staff. Outside of this, Mr. Black took no other action on the highway project.[32]

Thus, the amount of actual leverage of David Black was limited. As chairman of the Blount County Planning Commission, Mr. Black did possess additional potential leverage, but, since the Planning Commission did not take an interest in becoming actively involved, this source of potential leverage was negated. Furthermore, as previously stated, the

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[32]Interview with David Black, April 21, 1975.

leverage of the Planning Commission itself was limited by the fact that most of the alternative locations were within the jurisdiction of the Maryville Regional Planning Commission, thereby restricting Mr. Black as Chairman of the Blount County Planning Commission if he had opted to utilize his potential leverage.

Walter Blackburn. Mr. Walter Blackburn is currently the staff planner for the Maryville Regional Planning Commission. Prior to assuming this position, he was the principal planner of the Blount County Planning Office of TSPO. He worked in this capacity from April, 1972, until March, 1975.

Although ranked relatively low, fourteenth, on the leverage hierarchy, Mr. Blackburn has been fairly active in the highway issue. As staff planner for the Maryville Planning Commission, Mr. Blackburn was concerned with continuing development proposals and, consequently, kept pushing for a clarification of the status of the bypass within the TDOT. However, even as late as spring, 1973, the TDOT would not release details of plans for the highway and the staff could not reasonably recommend against any development proposal on the grounds that it lay in the path of a future highway. During this time, Mr. Blackburn's policy on this issue was to point out to the Planning Commission that such development lay within a proposed but indefinite corridor location without formulating a staff recommendation on this issue alone.[33]

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[33]Interview with Buddy Blackburn, April 25, 1975.

When the action plan phase became controversial after the first public meeting, Mr. Blackburn was directed by the Planning Commission to carry out a planning oriented study of the effects of alternatives, A, B, C, and D on land use and transportation. This would give the planning commission a basis upon which to make a decision on an alternative.[34]

Moreover, according to Mr. Blackburn, it was hoped that the planning study and subsequent recommendation by the Planning Commission would provide the City Council with an impetus to back one of the alternatives. Mr. Blackburn felt that if progress was to be made on the project by the TDOT, the City Council would have to push for it. Although not aware of the workshop with the City Council and the TDOT, with the resultant impasse concerning the responsibility of who should make a recommendation, Mr. Blackburn was aware of a "decision-making power vacuum." He felt that if any action was to be initiated, it would have to come from the City Council which first would have to make a decision on an alternative.[35] Mr. Blackburn hoped that the planning study would aid in this decision.

However, as previously mentioned, although the planning commission accepted the staff report, the City Council refused to act on it, deferring the issue altogether. Thus, since the planning commission did not have a large amount of authority in highway decision making, the amount of potential leverage of the staff planner was limited.

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[34]Ibid. [35]Ibid.

Furthermore, when Mr. Blackburn attempted to utilize his potential leverage through staff reports and recommendations urging action, he was thwarted by the unwillingness of the City Council, whom the Planning Commission advises in certain matters, to act on the issue. Thus, the total amount of actual influence exhibited by Mr. Blackburn on the process was nominal.

Jeff Fletcher. Jeff Fletcher was the principal planner of the Blount County Planning office from spring, 1971, until March, 1972, when he resigned to go into the Real Estate profession.

Mr. Fletcher was the planner with whom Ken Faulkner first discussed the Chamber's concern over the need for a bypass in early 1972. Mr. Fletcher's input into the process from then on though brief was important in the p-line phase on the project.[36]

Mr. Fletcher agreed to assist the Chamber in their efforts to initiate action on the bypass, as it would aid the planning staff in their review of development proposals near the proposed corridors. Subsequently, it was Mr. Fletcher who first contacted the TDOT and uncovered the fact that the highway at that time placed on a low twenty-year construction schedule.[37] Further meetings with TDOT officials and Mr. Fletcher and Mr. Faulkner disclosed the realization that TSPO had no authority in highway location decision making. These meetings that were set up through the TSPO office yielded information

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[36]Interview with Jeff Fletcher, April 22, 1975.

[37]Ibid.

to the Chamber of Commerce members that no agency in the county had any real direct influence in highway planning. This in turn led to the "political" meetings of various Chamber members with state officials which resulted in the initiation of the p-line phase.[38]

The actual leverage in the decision-making process that Mr. Fletcher held was negligible. As principal planner for the Blount County TSPO Office Mr. Fletcher did have important input in the process, as explained above, but no direct voice in decision making. Mr. Fletcher was indirectly influential since it was through his action that the situation was clarified and much information as to who was in positions of authority within the TDOT was gathered by Jeff Fletcher.

Wilson Taylor. Mr. Wilson Taylor was the Chairman of the Regional Planning Commission from 1968, until Spring, 1974. Thus, during most of the activity on the bypass, Mr. Taylor was the chairman.

However, with the exception of voting for the resolutions and planning reports on the highway issue, Mr. Taylor has not been involved in any way in the process.[39] As Planning Commission chairman, Mr. Taylor held a potential source of leverage but did not utilize it. The publicity of his position on the Planning Commission in all probability resulted in his being listed on the leverage hierarchy.

Fred Lawson. Rated eighteenth on the leverage hierarchy is Fred Lawson, the President of the Blount National Bank. Mr. Lawson is

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[38] Ibid.

[39] Interview with Wilson Taylor, May 16, 1975.

also a member of the Blount County Chamber of Commerce, serving on the executive committee.

Mr. Lawson, however, only participated in one activity directly related to the highway. He was one of those present in the meeting with Governor-elect Dunn and Mr. Robert Smith. Mr. Lawson did not take any other action on the highway.[40] Mr. Lawson did hold a small amount of leverage in the process due to his position as President of the second largest bank in Blount County. However, he chose to stay neutral because of his business and did not participate any further.

Gary Head. The lowest ranked person on the leverage hierarchy is Mr. Gary Head, the City Manager of Alcoa. Mr. Head came to Alcoa in the fall of 1972, thus not participating in any events prior to that time.

As City Manager, Mr. Head could have participated in the subsequent activity on the project but chose not to. When the controversy arose over the exact location of the facility, Mr. Head decided that it would be in the best interest of the City of Alcoa if he stayed out of the debate.[41] Thus, Mr. Head exerted none of his potential leverage on the issue. His appearance on the leverage hierarchy is in a likelihood a result of his position as City Manager.

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[40]Interview with Fred Lawson, May 19, 1975.

[41]Interview with Gary Head, April 27, 1975.

XII. ANALYSIS OF LEVERAGE SYSTEMS BY GROUP RESPONSE

In the preceding discussion, influence and leverage systems were established and analyzed by asking actors who were involved in the process what issues, formal organizations and actors were important to the project. However, it becomes obvious that this method by itself is not satisfactory because the interrelationship between these components of the leverage system are not fully explained.

To alleviate this problem, a second method of analysis was performed by separating the actors into five groups. These groups consisted of the politicians, Chamber of Commerce officials, government officials, citizens and all others not falling into one of the above groups.

An actor was listed in a group if his primary activities on the project was within that group but if an actor was equally important within two groups, he was listed in both. For example, Harold Lambert was a member of the Chamber of Commerce, but a major portion of his activities were concerning the highway in political meetings, therefore, he was listed in both political groups and Chamber of Commerce. These groupings of actors should not be confused with the list of formal organizations on the questionnaire for three of the groups analyzed in this section are not part of formal organizations. The political, citizen and "other" groups were separated into separate classes for purposes of gaining a more clear understanding of the leverage

system under study.[42] The grouping of these actors is shown in Table VII.

The Politicians

Of the five groups that have been classified for this further analysis, the political actors were rated highest as a group. Four actors, Houston Goddard, Bill Felknor, Harold Lambert, Asher Howard, in these groups were rated in the top ten most influential actors on the hierarchy. One political actor, Fred Lawson, was rated in the last nine.

In analyzing the responses of the political actors as a group to the rating questionnaire, they listed the most important issues as the need for an in-town route as well as the need for the facility to serve through traffic. The most influential actors were listed as Houston Goddard, Bill Felknor, Ken Faulkner, Charles Hultquist, and Ed Taylor, which is generally consistent with the overall results of the actor hierarchy.

One important aspect of the analysis of the political groups is the fact that their political involvement in the process stopped at the end of the p-line stage. Most explained that once the issue became controversial, they preferred to stay out of it. Thus, during the action plan phase, the influence of the political actors, including Houston Goddard and Bill Felknor, two of the most influential actors, were not an important factor in the decision-making process.

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[42]The implications of the formal organizations not represented in the group analysis should be explained. The Blount County Quarterly

TABLE VII

INFORMAL ACTOR GROUPS

Politicians	Chamber of Commerce Members	Public Officials	Citizen Leaders
Houston Goddard	Wilson Borden	David Black	Charles Hultquist
Bill Felknor	Tut Bradford	Walter Blackburn	Ed Taylor
Harold Lambert	Ken Faulkner	Jeff Fletcher	Dr. J. Bryan Smalley
Asher Howard	Harold Lambert	Gary Head	
	Fred Lawson	Don Peterson	
		Wilson Taylor	

The Chamber of Commerce

Individuals involved in the process through action of the Chamber of Commerce were, as a group rated the second most important. Four actors were rated within the top ten on the actor hierarchy.

In analyzing the responses to the rating questionnaire, the Chamber of Commerce group listed itself as most influential. Concerning issues, this group did not rate a single issue very far above other issues listed as important. Instead, the issues of ease of local and through traffic were rated very close to the issues of home removal and neighborhood disruption. The issue of high speed design followed very close to the first four issues. The almost equal rating of these issues can explain the neutral position that the Chamber assumed concerning exact route alignment after the contoversy arose.

The Chamber as a group rated Houston Goddard and Bill Felknor as most important actors. Following these individuals, Charles Hultquist and Ed Taylor were rated as very influential. Interestingly, Ken Faulkner was rated a relatively low tenth by Chamber officials. Based on responses to open-ended questions during the interviews, these two individuals were given a high rating by all but two respondents in this group due to their political connections.

These ratings can be explained by the Chamber's involvement throughout the process, in which it can be assumed that the actors had

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Court, the two merchants associations, Maryville City Council, Maryville Real Estate Board are not included. This is consistent with their low ratings in the leverage hierarchy, further reinforcing the previous analysis of the lack of influence these organizations had on the process.

an awareness of what was occurring. Thus, the rating of Houston Goddard and Mr. Felknor, consistent with the overall results, can be attributed to the member awareness of what political maneuverings were being accomplished by the other political members. Moreover, the Chamber group's high ratings of Mr. Hultquist and Taylor can be contributed to the Chamber's continued involvement during the "action plan" phase and the subsequent awareness of developments during that phase. This awareness of the influence of citizens on the process can further explain the "split rating" of traffic vs. neighborhood issues at the chamber.

In summary, the Chamber's group influence was rated the second most influential of the five groupings classified for this analysis. Unlike the political group, the Chamber has remained active through the process under study. However, when the controversy over the exact route alignment began to heat up, the Chamber assumed a neutral position, while continuing to support the bypass in general.

Citizen Leaders

The citizen actors involved in the bypass issue constituted the third most important group in the average hierarchy of individuals. The three citizen actors, Mr. Charles Hultquist, Mr. Ed Taylor and Dr. J. Bryan Smalley were rated within the top eleven actors. Mr. Hultquist was rated the highest, placing fourth on the hierarchy.

As a group, the citizen actors rated the removal of homes as the most important issue, with disruption of neighborhoods closely following. Congruent with these findings, the issue of through traffic was rated a third while ease of local traffic was rated close to the bottom. This was the only group that rated aesthetic and noise pollution very high.

Concerning the importance of formal organizations, the citizens, consistent with the overall ratings, evaluated the Chamber of Commerce as the most important formal organization.

However, they were the only group which rated TSPO almost as high. The reason that this organization was rated so high was that it took the strongest stand in favor of alternative "A," a posture that directly threatened the position of the citizens against an in-town route. The citizen group rated Houston Goddard and Ken Faulkner highest in the leverage rating scheme. Second highest were other Chamber of Commerce members and the citizens themselves.

In summation, the citizen group was the third most important group as rated on the overall hierarchy. This group was very much influenced by the threat that the bypass offered to their homes and neighborhoods; a factor which provided the motivation to overcome their initial lack of resources for acquiring leverage.

In addition, the citizens assisted in gaining leverage by the relinquishing of potential leverage by the politicians, the City Council, and by the Chamber of Commerce. As a result, after the controversy intensified during the action plan phase, the leverage of the citizen groups was enhanced, especially when the TDOT had no other source to turn to gather public input. Through a combination of their persistent efforts to block the in-town routes, and through the defaulting of these other organizations, the citizens found themselves wielding a significant amount of leverage and, at this writing, can be considered the most influential group in the highway issue.

Public Officials

The public officials constituted one of the largest actor groups in this case study. The individuals in this group are Don Peterson, David Black, Buddy Blackburn, Jeff Fletcher, Wilson Taylor and Gary Head. All of these actors were rated near the bottom of the actor hierarchy with the exception of Don Peterson, the Maryville City Manager, who was rated sixth.

As a group, the public officials rated the traffic issues ease of both local and through traffic as most important. The issues of disruption of neighborhoods and home removal were rated as having moderate influence.

This group also broke from conforming with the overall results in the organization hierarchy by rating TSPO as the most influential organization. The Chamber of Commerce closely followed.

In rating the actors, the public officials differed radically from the overall ratings. According to this group, the most important actors were Don Peterson, Ken Faulkner, Walter Blackburn and Jeff Fletcher. Various Chamber of Commerce members were ranked as moderately influential while the politicians and the citizens were rated lowest.

This indicates two things: First, as a group, the public officials were not aware of the political meetings that were so important in the initiation of the p-line phase. Second, as a group, the public officials did not have much contact with the public. During the course of interviewing, three public officials asked the interviewer who the citizens listed on the questionnaire were.

This lack of communication between the public officials and the citizens can be attributed to the fact that the citizens felt that they could get their objectives accomplished better by working with the politicians, the news media, and by direct contact with the TDOT.

In addition, one other factor contributed to the lack of communication between the public officials and the public in general. This was the policy of the TDOT of having the public meetings without direct involvement by local public officials. Therefore, while a direct channel of communication was opened between the TDOT and the public, communication between public officials and citizens was somewhat stifled.

Overall, the public official group was rated lowest of the actor hierarchy. As a group, they rated the actors, issues, and organizations somewhat differently than the actors as a whole, indicating that their understanding of an involvement in the process was somewhat different than other groups. The results of the open-ended responses indicated that the public officials generally did not have as clear perception of the entire process regarding citizen participation and, in this aspect, were on the periphery of the procedure.

This can be explained by the fact that the action plan policy regarding participation was new, and the local officials were not generally aware of the attempts by the TDOT to acquire the required public input. The interview responses indicated that there was very little communication between the local officials and the citizens in involved in this issue.

XIII. LEVERAGE SYSTEM SUMMARY

In summarizing the analysis of the leverage of the location decision-making process of the South Maryville Bypass, the distinction between the p-line phase of the project and the action plan phase must be stressed because, in each phase, different actor groups are the most important. The leverage system approach identified which actors, issues, and organizations were important. By analyzing the resultant leverage hierarchies, in light of additional information obtained from the background research and from the open-ended interview questions, the leverage system of the process during both phases of the project was ascertained. The major points of this analysis follow.

1. The most important actors are clearly established by the lverage hierarchy. These fall into three main actor groups that are somewhat different from the formal organizations: the Chamber of Commerce, the politicians, and the citizens.

2. During the p-line phase, the most important groups of actors were the politicians. However, mostly due to an unwillingness to enter into a controversy, the political actors were not involved in the actin plan phase.

3. The public officials as well as the two planning commissions involved and the City Council generally were not active in the process, thereby not utilizing potential sources of leverage. With the exception of the Planning Board resolutions and staff reports, these groups did not become heavily involved in the process. They maintained little

contact with each other throughout the process; and in the latter stages had relatively little contact with the TDOT.

4. The Chamber of Commerce actor group was ranked highest in importance throughout the process. Unlike the politicians, the Chamber was involved in both phases. However, in later events in the action plan phase, the Chamber took a neutral position, preferring not to take a stand supporting one alternative. This enhanced the citizen group's position.

In analyzing the entire process, the reason that the Chamber rated highest in the leverage system of analysis is twofold. First, they were very active in the initial stage of the process and received a great deal of publicity for their efforts. This seemed to be well remembered when the respondents were recalling certain events during the interview sessions. Second, a respectable portion of the Chamber Board of Directors also had other sources of influence, most political. When the Chamber is viewed as an active group whose individual members held personal influence, the amount of potential leverage is considerable, and as the results of the ratings and rankings show, most of the actors felt that the Chamber used this potential.

However, one very important finding must be stressed. After the p-line phase, the Chamber backed off from aggressively pushing a single route, and took a neutral position. Thus, like the public officials, they have up much of their potential leverage when the TDOT began to look for someone at the local level to take a leading role in the process. In effect, the TDOT had no one but the citizen group to turn to.

The combined inaction of these officials and agencies, especially the City Council, gave to the citizen leaders much of the leverage that they ultimately acquired in the process. For when TDOT adopted their new policies concerning public input in the highway planning process, they had no place to turn except to the citizen leaders who were more than willing to fill in the vacuum left by the lack of a willingness on the part of public and semipublic officials to organize an appropriate method to gather public opinion and make a local recommendation to the TDOT.

5. This ultimately resulted in the citizen group wielding the most leverage, at the local level, on the process. Because of the unwillingness of the other groups to utilize their potential leverage, the citizens became the most influential group in this process in the action plan phase. This is evidenced by the fact that during the latter stages of the process, the TDOT consulted first with citizen leaders when additional routes were being considered, and not local public and elected officials or even the Chamber of Commerce.

Starting with virtually no personal resources, motivated strongly by the threat to their homes and neighborhoods, the citizen leverage was enhanced to the point that they were able to block the entire process.

In conclusion, it can be said that the analysis presented above indicates that the citizen participation policy adopted by the TDOT in the Action Plan has definitely affected the decision-making process. Without the insistence by the TDOT of incorporating public input into

the process, in all probability the leverage of the citizen actors would not have been enhanced in such a manner or amount. The Action Plan resulted in a shift of influence from political actors which were important in the p-line phase, to the citizen actors during the second phase. This shift appears to be a result of the hesitancy of local elected and appointed public officials to take charge when the TDOT asked for local input into the decision-making process. The effect of this series of events on the decision-making process will be discussed in the concluding chapter.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION ON THE LOCATION DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

I. INTRODUCTION

The central purpose of this thesis has been to determine the effects of the Tennessee Department of Transportation citizen participation policy on the location decision-making process involving the South Maryville Bypass. The analysis which will be presented in this chapter has been organized into three sections. First, the method of citizen participation will be analyzed and compared to the participation models presented in Chapter III. Second, the effects of the citizen participation policy on the location decision-making process will be presented in light of the findings resulting from the leverage analysis. The chapter will conclude with a summary of the entire thesis and a brief discussion of lessons learned from this study, and suggestions for further study.

II. THE METHOD OF PARTICIPATION

The place of citizens in highway location has been traditionally one of reaction to, rather than participation in, the decision-making process. However, in the last few years, the concept of highway planning has been undergoing change; change which has been emphasizing participation by the public in location decision making. The institutional setting of the 1950s placed a high priority on the

automobile, with its ease of personal mobility. However, in view of the changing values of the 1960s and 70s, with a turn toward a more "classical" approach in democratic government, the traditional institutions which guided highway decision making began to recognize that highway locations involve a very complex interaction between issues and needs in areas other than transportation. For example, the effects of a highway on livability and aesthetic aspects of a neighborhood gradually grew in importance in evaluating transportation alternatives.

Likewise, physical environmental issues became a more important consideration in highway planning during this period. Two good examples of this are the controversies that surrounded the location of Interstate 40 in both Nashville and Memphis, Tennessee.[1]

This realization resulted in changing legislation concerning citizen input in the decision-making process. In 1961, the Highway Act of that year required, for the first time, that all federally aided projects have at least one public hearing prior to final project approval. The 1968 Highway Act added to this. It required two public hearings instead of one.[2]

The Highway Act of 1970 went even further in attempting to insure that the many ramifications of highway locations be taken into

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[1]For analysis of these controversies, see: James Ford, Jr., "Interstate 40 Through North Nashville, Tennessee, A Case Study in Highway Location Decision Making" (Masters Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1974); and, Richard Ginn, "Interstate 40 Through Overton Park: A Case Study of Location Decision Making" (Masters Thesis, University of Tennessee, 1970).

[2]Letter of Jan. 24, 1974, from Robert Smith, Commissioner of the TDOT, to Thomas W. Cate, concerning the South bypass, May 15, 1973.

consideration before a final decision is made. It was the requirements of this Highway Act that forced the TDOT to reformulate its decision-making policy concerning citizen participation in highway location.[3]

To set forth the new policy that would conform to the Highway Act of 1970, the TDOT wrote the Action Plan.[4] Concerning citizen participation, the Action Plan required involvement of the public throughout all stages of highway transportation planning and development. Under policy set forth in the plan, the public is required to be given a chance to provide relevant information and advice in the highway location decision-making process.[5]

The Action Plan calls for two methods of incorporating public involvement in the planning process. First, it states that interested citizens are encouraged to meet informally with DOT personnel to discuss matters of concern. Second, the opportunity for public meetings is available during both the route planning and design location stages of a project.

In this case study, both of these mechanisms were utilized. There have been two public meetings held on the bypass issue in which the TDOT presented information on the project and received comments and suggestions from the public. Also, TDOT personnel met on several

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[3] Ibid.

[4] Tennessee Department of Transportation, Summary Report, Action Plan for Consideration of Economic, Social and Other Environmental Effects of Highways (March, 1974).

[5] Ibid.

occasions with various citizens leaders as well as with Chamber of Commerce and local public officials.

As pointed out previously in the process under study, the TDOT still held the final decision-making authority. This is to say that actual power in location decision making still likes completely within the TDOT. In taking this into consideration, it would be logical to expect that the power would remain with the decision makers (TDOT), and those outside that organization could not obtain enough influence to exert power over the decision-making process. This is what the highway planners and engineers expected. According to one TDOT official interviewed in the process of the study,

> We thought that all we had to do to meet the Action Plan policy concerning public input was to hold a couple of hearings, explain the pros and cons of each alternative, hear a few comments from some people, and an instant consensus would be formed favoring one alternative.[6]

With this expectation, the TDOT implemented the participation policy by holding the two public meetings, and having a series of private consultations with citizen leaders. By utilizing this approach, it was hoped that through informing the public and consulting with them, that most, if not all, of the opposition to a favored alternative would be eliminated, and the TDOT would be free to make a noncontroversial decision.

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[6] Interviewee requested that this comment remain anonymous.

Consultant/Co-optation

In analyzing the decision-making process that occurred in this series of events, it becomes evident that the process involved several different participatory mechanisms, with the end result being totally unintended and unanticipated. That is, the TDOT attempted to utilize a consultant/co-optative approach (a token form of participation), which through the unexpected series of events that occurred, resulted in the citizens taking over effective power in the process (thus gaining citizen control). This series of events is analyzed as follows.

The initial approach used by the TDOT, along with the intended results, can best be classified, according to the participatory analytical model (presented in Chapter III) as one of Consultant/Co-optation. The consultant classification is based on the fact that the TDOT method of incorporating participation into the process was one of merely consulting with the public. The method gave the citizens a chance to hear and to be heard. Both the formal and informal meetings performed the function of allowing them to be consulted on the issues, but it was never the intention of the highway officials to use this approach for anything more than a consultative role. Actual power in the decision-making process was never to be given up by the TDOT, nor was it to be shared. All final authority in the project was to remain with the TDOT. Thus, "higher power classifications" on the participation model are eliminated, and consultation level on the participatory model becomes the highest level of participation that can be applied to the method attempted by the TDOT in this case study.

This strategy can be classified, according to the model in Chapter III, as a form of "token participation." In other words, the formal method of public and private meetings with those concerned with the bypass was not designed to result in a real sharing of power. All that was intended to be accomplished was that the public be involved in some way in a participation program. What the power holders would achieve is ample, well-documented evidence that they have gone through the required motions of involving people. Since those participants outside the TDOT were not to hold any actual authority in the process, then the approach used by the TDOT in this instance would have to be considered as a token form of participation.

This approach to participation corresponds closely to the strategy of co-optation in which citizen participation is included to try to prevent obstructionism of projects. Co-optation can have several forms, and one method is to ". . . tap into existing groups—neighborhood organizations or block clubs for instance."[7] This was used by the TDOT in the subsequent meetings with local neighborhood leaders to gain their support of new alternatives before they were made public. In this way, the local citizens could identify with the program and hopefully become committed to one alternative, thus thwarting adverse reaction.

The method employed was a form of formal co-optation. Informal co-optation implies a sharing of power in response to specific or potential pressures. Formal co-optation, on the other hand, merely

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[7]Sherry Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," Journal of the American Institute of Planners, XXXV (July, 1969), pp. 342-356.

seeks public acknowledgement of the agency-constituency relationship, which is exactly what the TDOT intended to do.[8]

The co-optive strategy had the following advantage, as seen by the TDOT. The responsibility of the decision could be shared with the citizen and/or other groups. Should adverse public reaction occur, the decision maker (TDOT) had a partner in the decision, even though power in the decision-making process itself is not shared. This would take the burden of any resulting controversy off the agency. In essence, what is shared, is the responsibility for power, but not power itself.

An example of this strategy is illustrated by the fact that the TDOT put pressure on the Maryville City Council to support one alternative. The TDOT felt that should controversy result, in light of the proposed alternatives, the Council would, and should, bear most of the public pressure, not the TDOT.

However, the City Council recognized the plight that a public position on one alternative would put them in, and refused to take a stand on the issue.[9] This refusal to take a stance, even at the insistence of the Maryville Regional Planning Commission and the East Tennessee Development District, is seen as a crucial event and proved to be an important catalyst in a series of events that resulted in the product of the participatory strategy being totally different from that anticipated by the TDOT.

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[8]Ibid.

[9]Interview with Don Peterson, April 25, 1975.

From Tokenism to Citizen Control

The Consultant/Co-optation approach used by the TDOT depended in a large part on the willingness of a respected local group to play an important role in forming a local consensus for a preferred route and to smooth the way for a decision. In this case, the Maryville City Council was approached to assume this role, but refused. This left only two other organizations which could possibly perform the task, the Maryville Regional Planning Commission and the Blount County Chamber of Commerce.

The Planning Commission, however, is largely an advisory board and does not carry the authority of the elected City Council, and therefore could not assume the responsibility even though it did publicly recommend one alternative. On the other hand, the Chamber of Commerce, which comprised a cross section of respected business leaders, could probably have assumed this responsibility. However, this organization in light of the controversy surrounding the project, chose to remain neutral and did not take a position advocating one alternative.

The refusal by the City Council and Chamber of Commerce to assume a leadership position, and the inability of the Planning Board to do so, in effect left the TDOT with a local "power vacuum," as there was no local organization willing to take a stand on the issue.

There was, however, one group that was more than willing to fill this vacuum—the citizens led by Mr. Hultquist and Dr. Smalley. Having nowhere else to go, the TDOT turned to this group to implement its strategy.

If a major goal of the participation effort was to prevent obstructionism of the process, the consultations with this citizen group could be considered a serious error because, according to Mr. Hultquist, they were opposed to any alternative that would "destroy or harm any neighborhood in Maryville."[10] Without actively acknowledging it, this group supported stopping the project, since any economically feasible route would come close to, or inside a neighborhood. In view of this position, it is no surprise that all of the proposed alternatives presented to the citizens were not accepted. Instead of reaching a consensus favoring an alternative, every time the TDOT made public a new proposal, the controversy became more intense and a consensus was moved even further from reality.

Thus, the citizens informally but effectively achieved a large amount of influence in the decision-making process. In an ironic informal process, the formal participation method, intended to overcome obstructionism through a sharing of the responsibility, but not a transfer, of influence resulted in an actual transfer of leverage where, by default of the City Council, the citizens gained enough influence to drastically alter the entire decision-making process.

III. THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

In shifting from participation to an analysis of the decision-making process of the South Maryville Bypass, further analysis points out that

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[10]Interview with Charles Hultquist, April 19, 1975.

the decisions were not based on any rational quantitative analysis. The event that most closely approximated rational calculation was the planning study of 1964 which attempted, through a comprehensive analysis of the transportation planning program for the area which would be "the initial step in what should be a continuing transportation planning process."[11] However, such a transportation planning process in Blount County was not established after the study was completed; and the plan, although initiating for the first time the idea of the South bypass, became a static "shelf document."

No mechanism was established through which a comprehensive planning process could be implemented. Without such a mechanism, the four basic problems involved in implementing a comprehensive rational planning process in making decisions based on rational calculations could not feasibly be overcome. This is to say, that without an institution charged with the implementation of such a program, the problems of communication, availability of information, the large number of variables involved, and the complexity of the interrelationships among the variables, could not be met. Furthermore, without such a program, there is no way to control field response, a necessary prerequisite to achieving rational decision making. Had there been an ongoing planning program, which implies the presence of a professional advisory staff, it is feasible that some of the adverse reaction to the proposed routes could have been averted through "staff manipulation" and attempts to control "field response."

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[11]Maryville Regional Planning Commission, "Summary Plan, Maryville, Tennessee," June, 1974, p. 4.

More specifically, the participatory mechanism of public and private meetings between the TDOT, local officials, interest groups and citizens did not incorporate a mechanism for controlling the adverse reaction (field response) to the alternatives. Had there been an ongoing planning process based on a rational method of developing alternatives, in all probability, the "rationality" of each alternative could be presented. Through an unbiased presentation of the pros and cons of each alternative, the amount of controversy could probably have been lessened. At the least, this method would lessen rumors and misinformation about the effects of each alternative. But such a mechanism was lacking and the process of locating a corridor for the South bypass resulted in a mode of decision making that can be classified as incremental rather than comprehensive.

Although the Transportation Study of 1964 was based on rational planning principles and was adopted by the three planning commissions in Blount County, the final decision making on State and Federal highway projects in the county remained in the jurisdiction of the TDOT, which traditionally has been the delegated leader in determining where highways would be located. Under such a system, where the TDOT remained the decision maker, they were not bound to any of the recommendations of the planning study undertaken by the local community. The subsequent decision-making process for the South bypass was not based on any of the findings of the Maryville area transportation study and instead became an incremental process.

For example, the decision to initiate the "p-line" phase was made politically, not on any type of rational analysis of the need for the

project. Likewise, the decision to stop the "p-line" project was another incremental political decision where the political actors involved decided that it would be in their own short run interests to withdraw support of the project. Thus, the p-line phase of the project was temporarily initiated and curtailed by disjointed incremental decisions based on political considerations rather than a method of rational analysis.

Similarly, the action plan phase of the project was marked by incremental decisions. The decision to proceed with the action plan phase was prompted by the adverse public reaction to the bypass. This reaction resulted from the publicity of the attitude opinion survey, which in turn resulted in intense pressure from the Chamber of Commerce to continue with the project. The decision was not based on any type of comprehensive analysis of the need for the facility, or a planning process outlining an efficient method for meeting such needs.

Similarly, later decisions to proceed with consideration of additional alternatives can also be classified as disjointed, incremental process. For example, alternatives "C" and "D" were added by the Knoxville office of the TDOT without going through a formal planning process. These alternatives were created in direct response to the public reaction to alternatives "A" and "B," not as a result of rational analysis. Also, other alternatives were added in reaction to public opinion rather than through an analytical process showing the need for the study of additional alternatives. The result was a confused tangle of alternative alignment proposals that even highway

department personnel could not clearly explain during the interviews with this author.

In short, decision making throughout the process was incremental. During the "p-line" phase, decisions were based on political considerations rather than through a process of rational calculation. In the "action plan" phase, the decisions again were incremental but less politically influenced. They instead were influenced by the public controversy surrounding each alternative.

The decision strategy can also be classified as nonrational because of the lack of comprehensive assessment of needs and alternative methods of meeting those needs throughout the decision-making process. According to interviews with State personnel, the decisions that were made were brought about either through political or public reaction, not through a logical form of rational thought.

IV. THE EFFECTS OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION ON THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS

As demonstrated above, the formal mode of citizen participation was classified as consultant/co-optative, with unexpected results of achieving a measure of citizen power, while the decision-making process in both the "p-line" and "action plan" phases can best be classified as incremental. The problem now turns to one of analyzing how this citizen participation process affected the mode of decision making.

Under the "traditional" decision-making process, the chief actors have been the highway department, local government officials, and

businessmen and the citizens. The decision-making process was generally dominated by the highway department personnel who created in the eyes of the public a conception of expertness, i.e. through a form of technical rationality. The politicians were usually the only group that exerted direct control in the decision-making process, by exercising the political leverage over the highway decision makers. However, the "expertness" of the highway officials more often than not reinforced the politicians' support of a project. When confronted by an angry public, the politician could turn to the highway engineer for support, an expert who could argue with facts supposedly based on a statistical analysis of the issue, a form of technical rationality. By maintaining that their decisions were technical and rational, engineers have often been able to persuade the public that a proposal was in accordance with the best interests of the majority of the people.

The impact of local government officials on highway location has been generally minimal under "traditional" highway planning policy. Historically, the local officials have not held the necessary influence to significantly affect the decision-making process within highway departments. Furthermore, when local officials oppose decisions made by highway personnel, the latter group can threaten to utilize funding on another project.[12]

Local citizens traditionally have had even less leverage in highway decision making. As previously mentioned, citizens have more often

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[12]Interview with Don Peterson.

reacted to location decisions rather than participating in the process. Thus, participation has often become a conflict oriented strategy in which the neighborhoods confront existing power holders with the of numbers. This can, and often has, resulted in intervention by the courts o settle the dispute. These conflict oriented strategies are naturally inappropriate in government programs which function best through coordination and cooperation. Such conflict, among other things, pointed out the lack of an adequate mechanism for citizen input.

When the project was first initiated under the policy guidelines prior to the action plan policy, the process generally fitted the pattern stated above. That is, during the "p-line" phase, the most important actors were the highway officials and the politicians. The politicians influenced the decision to initiate the project. Once this was decided, the Highway Department became virtually the only actor in the process and began to gather data upon which a technical explanation for the final route selection could be based. Had the TDOT not received new policy guidelines from the Federal Highway Administration, the process would probably have continued to fit the traditional patterns, where after the "p-line" was completed, a public hearing would be held in which the technical justification of the decision could be presented. Generally, the technical findings were enough to overcome arguments made by local citizens unless an unusually large number of citizens became opposed to it.

A good example of this type of process occurred earlier in Blount County when the planning, acquisition, and construction of the U.S. 129

bypass in 1969 was completed in such a manner. On that project, a proposed route was formulated completely within the State Highway Department. A public hearing was held in which the technical justification of the route was presented and the public was given a chance to react. Almost immediately afterward, the acquistion of the right of way began.

However, this was not to be the case in the South bypass project. After the "p-line" phase was implemented in order to conform to the requirements of the Highway Act of 1970, the TDOT had to switch policy concerning location decision making. This had the immediate result of slowing down the project. The delay was due to two reasons. First, the highway department needed time to formulate new decision-making policy. Second, and more importantly, since the project was halted before the engineers could complete their technical studies, the technical justification for the bypass could not be presented. When the public outcry arose over the project, the politicians could not turn to the engineers for "technical justification" and, eventually, withdrew their support of the project. Acting under the new action plan policy, the politicians had no one source to turn to to justify their support of a project, and therefore withdrew support for an alternative. Thus, an important influence group became a neutral factor.

The Action Plan policy concerning citizen participation had its primary effects upon the decision-making process when the project was reinitiated in the Action Line phase. During this phase, there was,

as mentioned above, little action taken to initiate any type of comprehensive rational decision making into the process. Instead, a series of incremental decisions were made as over eight alternatives were considered within the TDOT; each in response to public criticism of previous ones. Rather than compile data necessary for attempting even a limited statistical analysis, as in the old policy, the TDOT kept adding new alternatives and presenting them to the public in the hopes that a consensus could be found in favor of one alternative so that the project could progress. The continued addition of new alternatives, however, made the formation of any kind of consensus favoring one alternative even more difficult. Thus, the action plan policy in general and the participatory strategy (Consultative/ Co-optative) had the effect of making formation of consensus a difficult taks and made the entire process even more controversial.

Perhaps the greatest effect of the Action Plan policy has been to delay the final location decision. This project has involved many private meetings, two public meetings, and over two years to reach the current status. Still, the final location decision has not been reached. Ironically, one of the justifications for the participatory policy in the Action Plan was to avoid costly delays in the process. However, in the South bypass project, the decision-making process ground to a halt. The series of disjointed, incremental proposals failed to bring about the coordination and cooperation necessary for the swift implementation of the South Maryville bypass and, as discussed in the previous section, transferred effective power in the decision making process to the citizens who were able to achieve their goal of

preventing their neighborhoods from being disrupted. Thus, the largest impact of the citizen participation policy concerning the South bypass has been to dealy the process to a point that no apparent progress was made on the project during the 15 months this study was undertaken.

V. A LESSON LEARNED

In assuming that meaningful participation is an attainable and worthy goal in decision making involving complex technical issues such as the location of major highways, the results of this study point out that a participatory method must be chosen and implemented in such a manner as to not totally disrupt the decision-making process, should controversy arise. Furthermore, participation should be viewed and utilized as a tool which enhances the process. That is, if properly used, citizen participation can lead to better and more informed decisions, since adequate citizen input can given those persons responsible for the final decision a different perspective. Also, participation has the potential of providing the decision maker with information not attainable by any other source. Thus, if utilized properly, public input has the potential of providing a valuable resource of information upon which better and more informed decisions can be made.

The major question then becomes one of how to properly handle citizen input, for as this case study illustrates, the road toward meaningful participation is full of hazards. Participation can very easily create controversy and prove to be a hindrance to, rather than

an aid in, the decision-making process. In this case study, the TDOT chose an approach that could not cope with the negative response, and thus, participation had a disastrous effect on the decision-making process. Instead of preventing obstructionism and enhancing the overall process, the method chosen achieved the opposite.

If any lesson is to be learned from this, it is to point out that the approach to participation should be well thought out and a method applicable to the type of project involved be selected. There is no one method to achieve this. However, if participation is going to be successful, a means to handle both the positive and negative results must be devised.

It is the opinion of this author that specific technical decision-making processes such as highway location, will have to ultimately be made by the technicians. In such cases, the role of public participation is two-fold. First, public input can provide the technician with additional information. Second, the input mechanism can provide a means of informing the public about how and on what basis a decision is being reached. This process is labeled by this author as the "information exchange" function of participation. However, once public input is obtained and the information assimilated into the process, i.e. highway location decision making, there must remain one body responsible for making the final decision.

This final decision-making authority was a major lacking element in the South bypass issue. The approach used in this instance resulted in the body charged with making a decision (TDOT), in effect giving up its

authority. Instead, they should have utilized an approach that would have allowed for the exchange function, while recognizing the continuing authority of the TDOT to make the final decision. Even if a decision, based on public input as well as technical data, was made not to proceed, no one could criticize that the process broke down. At least, a decision would have been made.

In conclusion, the major lesson to be learned from this study is that a method of incorporating citizen input into the decision-making process should be well thought out, and a particular approach applied to a particular type of decision-making process. There is no one method applicable to all processes; instead, a method should be devised and applied that is suitable to the needs of each particular project. In this study, a method should have been chosen that recognized the need for a continued central decision-making authority (TDOT) while at the same time achieving the "information exchange" function applicable to a highway location decision-making process.

VI. SUMMARY

The objective of this thesis has been to investigate the decision-making process of the South Maryville bypass and, in particular, the effects of citizen participation upon that process. Before delving into the actual case study, theoretical discussions on citizen participation and decision-making theory were presented. These presentations explained the theoretical framework of analyzing and classifying both citizen participation and decision-making methods.

The participatory framework was based on a combination of Arnstein's "ladder of citizen participation"[13] and Burke's "Citizen Participation Strategies" in which a combined topological model was formed. The discussion on decision making centered around Dahl and Lindbloom's theory of rational calculation.[14] Lindbloom's presentation of incrementatism[15] and Etzioni's thoughts on a "mixed-scanning"[16] approach to decision making.

In order to identify the actors and issues involved in this project and to assess their interrelationships to form a picture of the leverage system, Gergens' leverage system of analysis was utilized.[17] Through this approach, the actors, issues and both formal organizations as well as informal actor groups were identified and the interrelationships between each element was discussed. The research using Gergen's methodology showed that the most important issues were traffic and disruption. The research showed that the citizen groups were influenced by the threat to their homes and neighborhoods while the public officials and, to a certain extent, the Chamber of Commerce and civic groups were influenced by the traffic issues. These findings pointed out the central source of controversy and conflict over this project.

The leverage system approach also allowed an actor leverage hierarchy to be established. Through analysis of this hierarchy

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[13]Sherry Arnstein, "A Ladder of Citizen Participation," p. 345.

[14]Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindbloom, Political Economics and Welfare (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

[15]Charles E. Lindbloom, "The Science of Muddling Through," Public Administration Review (Spring, 1959).

[16]Amitai Etzioni, "Mixed Scanning: A Third Approach to Decision Making," Public Administration Review (December, 1967).

in relation to the events, groups and organizations, and issues, it was ascertained that the most influential actors did not remain the same throughout the process. It was determined that in the "p-line" phase the most influential actors were the politicians, while during the action plan stage, the most important actors were the citizens. This was an unintended result of the participatory aproach used by the TDOT. Instead of power staying with the Highway Agency, through a formal co-optative and consultative program, leverage in the process was transferred ultimately to the group least capable of formulating a consensus of opinion on a feasible alternative, and the entire decision-making process ground to a halt and did not progress at all during the 15-month period that this study was undertaken.

In the actual case study presented in Chapter IV, major events were identified and discussed. Two stages of the project were identified which formed an essential concept for analyzing the case study. The first stage involved a more traditional process in which politicians played a key influential role. The second stage was characterized by a policy shift toward emphasizing more citizen participation in planning for the highway. By shifting from the traditional planning process to a more publically oriented one, it was found that the citizens achieved more influence in the decision-making process than in previous similar highway projects. This was due mainly to the type of participatory approach where the hesitancy of both the local and state officials in taking the responsibility in channeling public input into the process resulted in the citizens obtaining enough influence to stop the project.

This pointed out a singular lesson that can be learned from the study. If participation is a goal deemed worthy to pursue, then a method particular to each kind of decision-making process must be designed. There is no one answer to this challenge. In the case of highway location decision making, the results of this study indicate that participation must achieve the "information exchange" function, but must not result in losing a single authority responsible for making the final decision.

VII. CONCLUSIONS

The new policy guidelines set forth in the action plan had a definite effect on the decision-making process of the South Maryville bypass, and the resultant approach utilized by the TDOT had the following results.

1. The leverage of the "traditional" decision-making process was changed so that citizens were able to obtain more influence than any other group. Though the formal mode of citizen participation was classified as consultant/co-optative, the method resulted in the citizens obtaining enough influence to halt the project. What was initially designed as a token from of participation actually resulted in "citizen control" of the decision-making process.

2. The unanticipated change in leverage resulted in the decision-making process being disjointed and incremental. Very little attempt was made to include rational analysis into the project during the Action Plan phase.

3. The decision-making process, if not completely broken down, has been seriously disrupted. A major rationale for including citizen participation in planning and decision making is to facilitate the process. However, in this case study, it was found that the lack of an appropriate partic patory program has resulted in the disintegration of planning and decision-making and has caused a delay in a project which from the outset was recognized by everyone involved as a needed facility.

4. Perhaps the most important lesson that can be learned from this study is that this type of decision-making process (Highway Location Selection) where the final authority to make a decision lies with the "expert" (in this case the TDOT), a participatory method should have been used that allowed the "information exchange function of participation to occur while continuing to recognize the need for the TDOT to make the final decision. It can be expected that decisions involving many technical and engineering aspects would involve, at the least a limited comprehensive rational process which could include an effective mechanism for incorporating meaningful citizen participation. This, however, did not occur.

The consultive/co-optative approach that was utilized resulted instead in the TDOT giving up its ability to make the final decision and thus render it incapable of making a decision on one alternative. By unintended informal means, enough influence was transferred to the citizens groups to stop the project. By default, the citizen group became the group having the most leverage in the process, and achieved citizen control over the project.

5. One final lesson can also be learned from this study. This, however, is based on a point of conjecture by the author. That is, the hypothesis that there would not have been as much intense public reaction to the project, and in particular the p-line if a public awareness program had been implemented prior to initiating the original p-line survey. The TDOT almost certainly invited public opposition by sending out survey crews to stake out the p-line with a series of red markers, some of which were placed in the front yards of dwellings. As a matter of conjecture, this author feels that if the TDOT had explained what was happening and why the state survey crews were working on privately owned property, the "shock" of the sudden appearance of these crews and their survey markers would have been considerably lessened. This turn could have lessened the amount of negative public response to the entire project.

VIII. POSTSCRIPT

As a concluding note, the author wishes to briefly discuss two items which are not a formal part of this study.

Suggestion for Further Study

It is suggested that a good topic for further research would be to perform another case study on citizen participation in highway location decision making to see and compare new approaches used by the TDOT in later projects. In making this suggestion, it is assumed that the lessons learned in this and subsequent cases have been applied, and it would be interesting to perform a comparable study to delineate exactly

what changes have occurred in TDOT policy since this project was undertaken, and how the result differentiates from the findings made in this study.

Leverage Analysis

Finally, a few brief comments about the applications of Kenneth Gergen's leverage analysis are in order.

This methodology provided first and foremost a method of structuring a study which involved complex interaction between actors, issues, and groups. The leverage system provided a convenient system of first identifying these components, and then to analyze them.

There are, however, two potential problems with this approach. First, much of the leverage system of analysis depends on the accurate identification of the three components during Stage I. It was a recurring fear during the course of this study that the listing of actors, issues and groups, by use of the positional approach and reputation, were not entirely accurate and by concentrating on these during the remainder of the study, that an element of bias was inadvertently introduced into the study. However, the open-ended questions, careful analysis of the responses, and a thorough familiarization of the project during the background research has hopefully resulted in the final results as being valid. Nonetheless, the element of bias as a product of the study methodology in its initial stage, was always a worry during this study.

The second major problem with Gergen's methodology involved the actual establishment of the leverage hierarchy, i.e., how to score the

responses. No approach to this problem was offered by Gergen, and thus, the author was left to devise a method for this study. Therefore, to provide a cross-check of the method chosen (the rating procedure), a second method was also utilized (the ranking procedure). It was not without some trepidation that these procedures were used. Fortunately, the results of both methods were generally consistent and reinforced each other.

Even with these two potential problem areas, the use of Gergen's leverage system of analysis provided a useful framework upon which the analysis of the issues and actors in this case study was organized. It would, however, be interesting to compare the results of this study with a second study of the bypass, utilizing a different approach. A convenient time to do this would be after completion of the bypass, which everyone contacted during the course of this study (including the author) feel will eventually be completed.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

SOUTH BY-PASS QUESTIONNAIRE

1. From the following list of individuals, please place a check in the blank which best indicates how much influence each person has had in the events leading up to the current stttus of the South Maryville bypass. There is no right or wrong answer, only your opinion counts.

	Highly influential	Moderately influential	Little or no influence	No opinion or not familiar with person
David Black				
Buddy Blackburn				
Wilson Borden				
Tut Bradford				
Ken Faulkner				
Bill Felknor				
Houston Goddard				
Gary Head				
Asher Howard				
Charles Hultquist				
Pete Lobetti				
Kyle Middleton				
Don Peterson				
Jim Proffitt				
Elmer Reno				
Dr. J. Bryan Smalley				
Dean Stone				
Ed Taylor				
Wilson Taylor				

2. Please indicate any other individuals that you feel have been influential in the process of locating the bypass. Rate these in the same manner as above.

Name	Highly influential	Moderately influential

3. From the following list of organizations, please place a check in the blank which best indicates how much influence each group has had in the events leading up to the current status of the bypass.

	Highly influential	Moderately influential	Little or no influence	No opinion or not familiar with organization
Alcoa City Commission				
Alcoa Planning Commission				
Blount County Chamber of Commerce				
Blount County Quarterly Court				
Downtown Merchants Association				
Maryville City Council				
Maryville Real Estate Board				
Maryville Regional Planning Commission				
Midland Merchants Association				
Townsend Chamber of Commerce				
Tennessee State Planning Office				

4. Please list any additional organizations that you perceive as having had influence in the process of locating a route for the south bypass. Rate them in the same manner as the previous questions.

Organization	Highly influential	Moderately influential
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

5. From the following list, please indicate which issues have been important in the consideration of a location for the south bypass. Place a check in the blank beside each issue that best describes the importance of that issue.

	Very important	Moderately important	Little or no importance
Traffic Issues:			
High speed design	_____	_____	_____
Ease of local traffic	_____	_____	_____
Ease of through traffic	_____	_____	_____
Easy access to downtown	_____	_____	_____
Property Issues:			
Removal of homes	_____	_____	_____
Removal of businesses	_____	_____	_____
Enhancement of business	_____	_____	_____
Enhancement of property values	_____	_____	_____
Environment issues:			
Amount of noise	_____	_____	_____
Effects on air quality	_____	_____	_____
Aesthetic effects on community	_____	_____	_____
Disruption of neighborhoods	_____	_____	_____

6. Please list any other issues that you feel have had an influence in the process of locating a route for the bypass. Rate these in the same manner.

Issue	Very important	Moderately important
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

APPENDIX B

SOUTH BYPASS QUESTIONNAIRE

1. From the following list of individuals, please place a check in the blank which best indicates how much influence each person has had in the events leading up to the current status of the South Maryville Bypass. There is no right or wrong answer, only your opinion counts.

	Highly influential	Moderately influential	Little or no influence	No opinion or not familiar with person
David Black				
Walter Blackburn				
Wilson Borden				
Tut Bradford				
Ken Faulkner				
Bill Felknor				
Jeff Fletcher				
Houston Goddard				
Gary Head				
Asher Howard				
Charles Hultquist				
Harold Lambert				
Fred Lawson				
Joe Montgomery Jr.				
Don Peterson				
Dr. J. Bryan Smalley				
Dean Stone				
Ed Taylor				
Wilson Taylor				

2. Please indicate any other individuals that you feel have been influential in the process of locating the bypass. Rate these in the same manner as above.

Name	Highly influential	Moderately influential
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

3. From the following list of organizations, please place a check in the blank which best indicates how much influence each group has had in the events leading up to the current status of the bypass.

	Highly influential	Moderately influential	Little or no influence	No opinion or not familiar with organization
Blount County Chamber of Commerce	_____	_____	_____	_____
Blount County Quarterly Court	_____	_____	_____	_____
Maryville City Council	_____	_____	_____	_____
Maryville Regional Planning Commission	_____	_____	_____	_____
Tennessee State Planning Office	_____	_____	_____	_____

4. Please list any additional organizations that you perceive as having had influence in the process of locating a route for the south bypass. Rate them in the same manner as the previous questions.

Organization	Highly influential	Moderately influential
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

5. From the following list, please indicate which issues have been important in the consideration of a location for the south bypass. Place a check in the blank beside each issue that best describes the importance of that issue.

	Very important	Moderately important	Little or no importance
Environment Issues:			
Amount of Noise	_____	_____	_____
Effects on air quality	_____	_____	_____
Aesthetic effects on community	_____	_____	_____
Disruption of neighborhoods	_____	_____	_____
Property Issues:			
Removal of homes	_____	_____	_____
Removal of businesses	_____	_____	_____
Enhancement of business	_____	_____	_____
Enhancement of property values	_____	_____	_____
Traffic Issues:			
High speed design	_____	_____	_____
Ease of local traffic	_____	_____	_____
Ease of through traffic	_____	_____	_____
Easy access to downtown	_____	_____	_____

6. Please list any other issues that you feel have had an influence in the process of locating a route for the bypass. Rate these in the same manner.

_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____

VITA

Richard Heath Greathouse was born in Goldsboro, N.C., on March 5, 1947. He attended elementary schools in that city, and also in Raleigh, N.C., before graduating from Durham High School in Durham, N.C., in 1965.

The following September, he entered the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, and in June 1969, received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Education. Prior to entering the United States Army in January 1970, he worked in Nashville, Tennessee, in Real Estate.

Upon discharge from active duty in 1972, he was employed by the Tennessee State Planning Commission, where he worked as a local assistance planner in the Blount County Office.

Mr. Greathouse entered the Graduate School of Planning at the University of Tennessee in September 1974, and received the Master of Science degree in Planning in August 1977.

He is a member of the ASPO and is an associate member of AIP.

Since October 1975, he has been employed as a Planning Director for Catawba County, N.C.