

August 12, 1968

To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Shun Yao entitled "Personnel Organization in the Republic of China--The Reorganization of 1967." I recommend that it be accepted for nine quarter hours of credit in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, with a major in Political Science.

Laurence L. Durisch
Major Professor

We have read this thesis and
recommend its acceptance:

Josh E. Holm
Charles E. Patterson, Jr.
Dewey H. Stollar

Accepted for the Council:

Linton A. Smith
Vice Chancellor for
Graduate Studies and Research

PERSONNEL ORGANIZATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA--

THE REORGANIZATION OF 1967

A Thesis

Presented to

the Graduate Council of
The University of Tennessee

In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by

Shun Yao

August 1969

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The writer gladly expresses his appreciation and gratitude to all whose kind consideration has made this study possible.

Special acknowledgement is due Dr. L. L. Durisch, Professor of Political Science, The University of Tennessee, who gave sympathetic counsel and encouragement.

Among those to whom the writer feels indebted are my wife who graciously helped me in supplying valuable materials.

ABSTRACT

I

At the end of 1967, the Chinese government promulgated an administrative decree on delegation of authority, and established the Personnel Bureau directly under the Executive Yuan. These two occurrences, from the administration point of view, are milestones in the renovation of the Chinese Republic in modern history.

The aim of these actions is to improve the conduct of government and inspire efficiency in government personnel--problems encountered in government. Progress involves the analysis of theories of public administration as well as the practical problems presently existing in the government. The scope of this thesis does not permit consideration of the problems of the government and government personnel in their entirety. The main descriptions are concentrated on the following:

- A. The problems encountered: the background and cause of the existing personnel administrative system in the government, and how to affect to the field of personnel problems.
- B. The concrete content of the major change in the personnel organization in 1967, and how these actions might dispel the difficulties in the Chinese bureaucracy.

II

The study is based on the assumption that Chinese governmental organization forms and practices could be compared with the practices of the Western nations and with the prescriptions and descriptions of leading textbooks and monographs. Certain differences in the Chinese system might then profitably be redressed to conform to the Western model. Consequently, the study first compares practices with the model. Certain of the descriptions of the Chinese practices and mode of organization are based upon my own translation of Chinese studies, reports, and documents. Extensive use was also made of data obtained in a 1963 sample survey of the Chinese bureaucracy conducted by Professor Chang for the Chinese Association of Personnel Administration.

III

The thesis is developed in five chapters of which the first is employed to set out a short description of the traditional examination system and the organization of the government. Chapter II describes the characteristics of the present bureaucracy and examines the administrative process and personnel machinery. The third chapter focuses on current problems in personnel management and the fourth describes the major changes occurring in 1967 as a result of an extended re-organization study. Chapter V sets out a brief conclusion and a set of recommendations. Findings made in the thesis include the following:

The fact that executives do not want to delegate authority to their workers is directly related to the centralized type of organization.

One of the purposes of adopting centralization is to maintain control over the machinery of administration. For this reason, executives have to depend primarily on a body of precise, complicated laws and rules. However, before long the laws and rules fail to act as a restraint upon worker behavior and the executives resort to the help of confidential appointments. This practice disrupts the personnel system, blocking out opportunities for other workers to get promotions, and in turn, deepening their sense of dissatisfaction with the organization. As a result, the situation is made worse with respect to efficiency and worker performance.

On the other hand, the independence and power of the personnel organization over administration causes a duplication of supervision over personnel workers and results in conflicts between the administrative organization and the examination system, thus breaking down the integration of administrative authority in an important aspect of personnel administration. The inadequate system and improper rules are left untouched and even good rules are only on paper and are not realistically practiced. As a result, examinations are divorced from employment and young and able people are prevented from entering government service. Efficiency evaluation is but a formality, and elimination of the inefficiency is impossible. Under such circumstances, it is useless to talk about the improvement of the quality of workers.

All these factors are something like a chain consisting of a series of rings which have bound the government agencies so tightly that there is no room for their movement. This chain of reactions

constitutes the very problems existing in the administrative machinery. This binding chain can be broken only through the reorganization and re-orientation of personnel management. That is why, in 1967, the Chinese government adopted two measurements designed to adjust the authority as it relates to the machinery of organization. One is the system of delegation of authority, based on the importance of position, which is being realized through division of responsibility. The other is the transference of authority in the field of personnel through the establishment of the Personnel Bureau. It is predictable that the two measures will produce promising effects, for both are not only directed toward the needs of government, but also are consistent with theoretical principles of administration.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. INTRODUCTION.	1
A Brief Statement on the Traditional Examination System . .	1
The Organization of the Republic.	4
General organization of the Central Government.	4
Organization of administration.	6
Organization of legislature.	10
Organization of judiciary	11
Organization of control	12
The Examination Yuan.	14
Organization and power.	14
II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE BUREAUCRACY.	19
The Administrative Process.	19
Theoretical background of the bureaucracy	19
Emphasis on rules and laws.	22
Adoption of centralization in organization.	23
Lack of participation on the part of workers.	25
Personnel Machinery and Procedures.	27
Personnel units in different levels	27
Traits of personnel management.	31
Drawbacks of the system	33

CHAPTER	PAGE
III. PROBLEMS IN THE PERSONNEL FIELD	35
Shortcomings of Staff	35
Confidential Appointments	39
Participation and Responsibility.	46
Examination System.	47
Retirement and Evaluation System.	54
Worker Quality.	60
IV. THE MAJOR CHANGE OF 1967.	67
Delegation of Authority	67
Establishment of the Personnel Bureau	77
V. CONCLUSIONS	82
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	88
VITA.	91

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
1. Worker's Views of Essential Requirements in New Appointments. .	42
2. Supervisors' Views of Essential Requirements for New Appoint- ments	43
3. Number of Promotions Since Employment.	45
4. Workers' Sense of Participation and Responsibility.	48
5. Average Age of Workers--Four Central Ministries	52
6. Attitude Toward Existing System of Evaluation	58
7. Educational Background of Workers in Central Government Agencies.	62
8. Acceptance of Workers' Suggestions.	63
9. Concerning Job Choices of Workers by Educational Level.	64

CHAPTER I

I. INTRODUCTION

A. A BRIEF STATEMENT ON THE TRADITIONAL EXAMINATION SYSTEM

The examination system for personnel selection in China has had a long history and has been highly valued. The system was first conceived by Emperor Kao Tsu of the Han dynasty when he came into power in 206 B. C. His son, Emperor Wien Ti (179 B. C.), advanced the concept by requesting his minister to recommend virtuous and qualified persons to become officials. However, it was not until 132 A. D., during the reign of Emperor Shun of the Han dynasty, that formal examinations were adopted as a system of selecting officials.

In the Wei period (220-264 A. D.), special officials known as Chung Chang were charged with discovering men of talent and holding them in reserve for possible service in the government. This reserve was graded into nine classes by periodical examinations.

During the Sui dynasty (581-618 A. D.), the system of examination was further improved. Under the new system, successful candidates were given the degree Chin Shih which opened the door to a government career. Successful candidates were either assigned to the Han Lin Yuan (Imperial Academy) for further study or appointed as apprentices to government functionaries. Not infrequently they were appointed district magistrates. The Han Lin Yuan, to which only a

handful of candidates was admitted, became a reservoir from which prime ministers and ministerial officials were drawn. Once the principle of open competitive examinations was established, candidates offered themselves freely. The government depended heavily on this system.

Along with the growth of the system of examinations, government schools came into being. Promising young men were admitted to these schools and participated in annual examinations. Those who did well were appointed to positions in the government.

During the Tang dynasty (618-935 A. D.), examinations covered many subjects, including classical learning, history, literature, law, calligraphy and mathematics. Candidates who presented themselves to the Ministry of Rites (sic) for examination were generally of two kinds: (1) those recommended by district magistrates, after they had passed preliminary examination, and (2) those graduated with honors from government schools. Candidates who passed were entitled to participate in another examination given by the Ministry of Civil Office prior to their assignment to official positions.

This system continued into the Sung dynasty (960-1279 A. D.) without any major change, but the examination process became more elaborate. Candidates recommended by magistrates were required to take a preliminary examination before they sat for their third scholastic degree in the examination held in the capital by the Ministry of Rites. Those who passed this nation-wide competitive examination were awarded the degree of Chin Shih and were admitted to a re-examination supervised

by the Emperor. The leaders in the final examination could be appointed to government posts.

The following changes took place in the examination system during the Sung dynasty: (1) Interpretation of the classics and essay writing began to be used in preference to the poetry composition of the Tang dynasty; (2) supervision became stricter; and (3) the quota of eligible candidates was much higher.

During the Ming dynasty (1368-1643 A. D.), the practice of recommending candidates was abolished and only students at government academies were admitted. This practice was continued in the Ching dynasty (1644-1911 A. D.). A national college (Kuo Tze Chien) was established in the capital, and an academy was set up in each district.

During the Ching dynasty, a limited number of scholars were admitted by annual entrance examination. Successful candidates were awarded the Hsin Tsai degree. Those who showed proficiency were awarded fellowships and given admission to the Kuo Tze Chien in the capital. Once every three years a provincial examination was held. Scholars in the local academies as well as in Kuo Tze Chien were eligible. Candidates who passed the examination were given the Chu Jen degree, which entitled them to compete in the examination held in the national capital once every three years for the highest degree of Chin Shih. Those who passed this examination were entitled to take a special examination, supervised by the Emperor, for admission to the Han Lin Yuan. Anyone who passed these examinations could expect an

appointment of superior rank. Those who received lower degrees were appointed to offices of lower rank.

In recent centuries, a serious defect became obvious in the examination system. Because the candidates were required to expound on themes limited to the Chinese classics, the examination did not necessarily produce able administrators. Toward the close of the Ching dynasty, the 2000-year-old system was scrapped and modern education introduced.¹

Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, founder of the Republic, believes that examinations, like another ancient system of control (impeachment), could be adapted to meet modern needs. He advocated that examination and control functions be written into the Chinese Constitution.

B. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE REPUBLIC

1. General Organization of the Central Government²

The Constitution of the Republic of China is based on the five-power system³ originated by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, founder of the Republic.

¹Chang Chin-Chien, The Chinese Personnel Administration (Taipei, Taiwan: Chengchi University, 1962), pp. 8-14.

²"The Constitutional Law of the Republic of China," China Year Book 1966-67 (Taipei, Taiwan: China Publishing Co.), pp. 717-721.

³The concept of the five-power system stems from Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's political theory. Dr. Sun, the founder of the Republic of China, argued that government has to hold five powers--executive, legislative, judicial, examination and control which are separated in the central government organs.

It combines the cabinet and presidential systems of government.

The government of the Republic of China was established in 1948 under the Constitution adopted in the winter of 1947. In general, the organization is patterned after that of its predecessor, the National Government ruled by the Kuomintang (Nationalist Party of China). The Chinese government system has certain characteristic features in the division of political and administrative powers. According to Dr. Sun, there are two sources of political power--the people and the government. The former--the power to control the government--may also be called popular power. The latter is the power of the government itself. There are four political powers--suffrage, recall, initiative, and referendum--and five governmental powers--executive, legislative, judicial, examination, and control. Only when the political powers are in the hands of the people, who have sovereignty, and administrative powers are placed in government organs with the power to manage the nation's business can truly democratic rule be established.

The 1947 Constitution vests political power in the National Assembly, composed of delegates elected on geographical and occupational bases, which exercises the four political powers on behalf of the people. The delegates are elected once every six years. The chief functions of the National Assembly are election and recall of the president and vice president, amendment of the Constitution, and approval of proposed constitutional amendments submitted by the Legislative Yuan or by referendum. The five governmental powers are given

to as many separate government branches: Executive, Legislature, Judicial, Examination, and Control Yuan.

Organization of administration.⁴ There are five categories of subordinate organizations under the Executive Yuan: (1) Policy-making organization--the Executive Yuan Council; (2) executive organizations--the ministries and commissions; (3) staff organization--the secretariat; (4) accounting organization--Directorate General of Budgets, Accounts and Statistics; and (5) an information organization--the Government Information Office.

Executive Yuan Council. The council is composed of the president and the vice president of the Executive Yuan, heads of the ministries and commissions, and ministers without portfolio, with the president of Executive Yuan as chairman. The council meets once a week. An extraordinary meeting may be convened when necessary. If the president of the Executive Yuan, or the heads of the ministries or commissions concerned, should disagree with a resolution, the president of the Executive Yuan will make the final decision.

Ministers and Commissions. The Executive Yuan has eight ministries and two commissions. They are the ministries of (1) the interior, (2) foreign affairs, (3) national defense, (4) finance,

⁴"The Organizational Law of Executive Yuan," Article 5-15. The Six Categories of Law Book, edited by Dr. Yu Shu-Pin (Taipei, Taiwan: Far-east Co. Press, 1953), pp. 895-897. This code is available only in Chinese. The translation here and in the text are my own.

(5) education, (6) justice, (7) economic affairs, and (8) communications; and commissions of (1) Mongolian and Tibetan affairs, and (2) overseas Chinese affairs.

The temporary agencies subordinate to the Executive Yuan include: (1) The Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development; (2) the Vocational Assistance Commission for Retired Servicemen; (3) the Foreign Exchange and Trade Commission; and (4) the Commission for Youth Assistance and Guidance.

Each ministry is headed by a minister, and each commission by a chairman, all of whom are members of the Executive Yuan, nominated by the premier and appointed by the president. The functions and organization of these ministries and commissions are:

The Ministry of the Interior handles home administration, including territories, etiquette and customs, land administration, etc. Under this ministry are departments of civil affairs, census administration, conscription, police administration, social affairs, labor, public health, land administration and general affairs. In each department is a director, under whom are section chiefs, specialists, and staff members.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs handles international negotiations and all matters pertaining to Chinese nationals residing abroad, foreign residents in China, and commercial affairs relating to foreigners. It comprises twelve departments: East Asian and Pacific affairs, West Asian affairs, African affairs, European affairs,

treaties, international organization, information, protocol, consular affairs, and general affairs.

The Ministry of National Defense deals with every phase of the nation's military defense. Its organization is similar to that of the American system, but does not have a separate department for each service. The chief of the general staff, while answerable to the commander-in-chief (president), is also subordinate to the minister of national defense in all administrative matters. He is assisted by the deputy chief of the general staff and assistant chiefs.

The Ministry of Finance is the fiscal organ of the nation. The ministry consists of the departments of the national treasury, customs, taxation, currency, national bonds and general affairs.

The Ministry of Education is charged with the responsibility of promoting and supervising the nation's educational programs. It is composed of the departments of higher education, secondary education, elementary education, social education, culture bureau, and general affairs. There is also a bureau of international culture and educational relations.

The Ministry of Justice, which administers the nation's judicial affairs, contains four departments: department of civil courts, criminal courts, prison administration, and general affairs. There is also an investigation bureau to help protect national security and interests.

The Ministry of Economic Affairs handles the nation's economic administration and economic development. It has departments of

industry, mining, commerce, agriculture and forestry, water conservancy, public enterprises, and general affairs.

The Ministry of Communications controls railroads, highways, telecommunications, post office, navigation, and aviation. The Ministry supervises both state-owned and private communications enterprises, and has departments of navigation and aviation, railways and highways, posts and telecommunications and general affairs.

The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission handles all matters concerning Tibet and Mongolia. In addition to the chairman and vice chairman, a number of members serve as advisors on policy matters. Under the commission are a Mongolia affairs department, a Tibetan affairs department, and a general affairs department.

The Oversea Chinese Affairs Commission devotes itself to the interests of Chinese nationals in foreign countries and areas. It is interested in protecting their rights as well as in promoting better relationships between them and their host countries. The commission gives scholarships to young overseas Chinese for study in Taiwan. Under the commission are departments of administration, education, research, and general affairs.

The secretariat serves the president and the vice president of the Executive Yuan and Executive Yuan Council. A secretary general, a deputy secretary general, and secretaries constitute the administrative organization of the office. Counselors prepare bills and orders, screen administrative rules and plans, and handle the work

involved in survey design, compilation, and translation. Editors assist the counselors. The Executive Yuan has a petition committee to study and act on petitions concerning administrative affairs.

The Government Information Office explains national policy, publicizes laws and regulations, and disseminates information at home and abroad. The office is headed by a director, assisted by a deputy director. On the working level, the office has three departments.

The Directorate General of Budgets, Accounts and Statistics handles budget, accounting, and statistics. It is composed of a budget bureau, an accounting bureau, and statistics bureau.

Organization of legislature.⁵ The legislative Yuan exercises legislative power on behalf of the people. The first election of members of the legislative Yuan was held in 1948. A total of 760 legislators were elected, of whom approximately one-tenth were women. Because of the impracticability of holding an election on the mainland now, the council of Grand Justices ruled that the present members of both the Legislative Yuan and Control Yuan should continue to function until new members could be elected. At present the Yuan has 457 members.

The Legislative Yuan operates through (1) the legislative Yuan session, (2) the committees which screen and examine bills, and (3) the

⁵Ibid., Articles 4-23, pp. 903-905.

secretariat. The Yuan session meets twice a year, with the first session lasting from February to May, and the second from September to December. Meetings may be extended. The secretariat office has a secretary general and deputy secretary general, and the usual responsibilities of such an office.

There are twelve committees: home affairs, foreign affairs, national defense, economic affairs, finance, budget, education, communications, frontier affairs, oversea Chinese affairs, judicial affairs, and organic laws. Each committee is limited to ninety members. A member may serve on only one committee. Special committees have been set up to handle specific matters. They are: (1) Credentials Committee--responsible for examining credentials of members elect; (2) Committee on Maintenance of Order--responsible for the decorum of members and for recommending disciplinary action; (3) Committee on Rules--responsible for preparing the agenda; and (4) Committee on Accounts--responsible for checking the accounts and estimates of the Legislative Yuan.

Organization of judiciary.⁶ Impartial justice is the spirit and aim of the judicial system of China. The Constitution stipulates that "Judges shall be above partisanship and shall, in accordance with the law, hold trials independently, free from any interference." The Organic Law of the court prescribes qualifications for judges and insures that they be properly selected. Protection of the office is

⁶Ibid., Articles 2-7, pp. 917-918.

written into the Constitution.

Civil and criminal cases are handled through a system of three trials on three levels of courts: the district court, the high court, and the supreme court.

The Judicial Yuan directly controls the following organizations: (1) The Ministry of Justice; (2) the Supreme Court; (3) the Administrative Court; and (4) the Committee on the Discipline of Public Functionaries.

The Ministry of Justice, which has jurisdiction over district and high courts, was shifted to the Executive Yuan in 1932, and back to the Judicial Yuan in 1934. Since January, 1943, it has been under the Executive Yuan. In August, 1960, the Council of Grand Justice ruled that all courts and their branches should be under the jurisdiction of the Judicial Yuan. Since then, the Executive Yuan and the Judicial Yuan have established a special panel to study measures for readjustment of the judicial supervisory system.

Organization of control.⁷ The Control Yuan is the highest supervisory organ of the nation. It is composed of members elected by provincial and municipal councils and Mongolian and oversea Chinese groups. The allocation of seats is as follows: Five for each province, two for each municipality under the direct jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan, eight for the Mongolian leagues and banners, eight for

⁷Ibid., Articles 3-9, pp. 925-926.

Tibet, and eight for Chinese residing abroad. All the members of the Control Yuan form the Control Yuan Council. The president and the vice president are elected from and by the members of the council.

The President of the Control Yuan is responsible for calling the monthly meeting of the Yuan. The general meeting, held in May to review the year's work, must be attended by at least one-third of the members.

The Control Yuan may exercise powers of impeachment and censure against functionaries of the National and local governments, and propose corrective measures for executive action. The Executive Yuan and its ministries and commission must submit original orders and all other relevant documents to the Control Yuan upon request. The Control Yuan may also exercise power of impeachment and censure against the personnel of the Judicial Yuan and Examination Yuan and their subordinate organs, and may propose measures for correction and improvement.

Committees. The Control Yuan has ten committees: Civil affairs, foreign affairs, national defense, finance, economic affairs, education, judiciary, communications, frontier affairs, and oversea Chinese affairs. It is the duty of the committees to check on the work of government organs. A chairman or co-chairman are elected by each committee. Meetings are called by the chairman or at the request of at least three members.

Secretariat. The Secretariat is headed by a Secretary General, selected by the Control Yuan and responsible to the Yuan president. He administers the affairs of the Yuan and supervises subordinate

officials. Each committee has one secretary and one specialist who are responsible for research and routine work under the direction of the Secretary General and the chairman.

Ministry of Audit. The Minister of Audit administers the affairs of his office, under the direction of the president of the Control Yuan, and assisted by a Vice Minister or Assistant Auditor General. The organic law of the Ministry of Audit provides that a department of audit shall be established in each province and municipality under the direct jurisdiction of the Central Government, and an audit division shall be formed in each of the major governmental, financial and economic agencies. Due to the extraordinary circumstances of recent years, all the departments and divisions have been closed except the department in Taiwan province.

2. The Examination Yuan⁸

The Examination Yuan is the supreme national organ in charge of examination for recruiting and promoting government employees. The Yuan has a president, vice president and a number of members who are appointed by the President of the Republic with the concurrence of the Control Yuan. Members of the Examination Yuan are above politics and exercise their duties in accordance with the law.

Organization and power. The Council of the Examination Yuan, the policymaking organ, is composed of the president and vice president

⁸Ibid., Articles 3-19, pp. 923-924.

of the Examination Yuan and a number of commissioners. The members are appointed by the President of the Republic, with the consent of the Control Yuan, for a term of six years.

A special Examination Board, established for each national examination, supervises preparation and conduct of the examination and announces the results. Its duties end with completion of the examination.

The Yuan has two ministries--the Ministry of Examination, and the Ministry of Personnel. The Ministry of Examination attends to matters pertaining to recruitment of public functionaries and professional and technical personnel through competitive examinations. It appoints the members of the special Examination Board and compiles the list of successful candidates.

The Ministry of Personnel is in charge of the registration of public functionaries, checking their service records, determining their qualifications for proper ranking and promotion, fixing salary scales, and handling placement, transfer, demotion, discharge, service security, awards, commendation, pensions, and retirement.

The Yuan has the following committees: Legal Codification, Improvement of Examination Methodology, Personnel Research, and Department of Planning and Function.

The Examination Yuan regards competitive examinations as the basic method of recruiting qualified persons for government positions. It could be called the personnel branch of the government, because its

functions deal primarily with personnel administration. The main function of the Yuan is to ensure the selection of the best qualified persons, and to provide fair and equal opportunity for all to enter government service. The major functions may be detailed as follows.

Examinations:

1. Higher and ordinary examination. Examinations are conducted annually on higher and ordinary levels to qualify candidates for the civil service and professional and technical posts. The civil service examination covers civil administration, personnel management, education, social welfare, public finance economics, cooperative managements, land administration, public health, accounting and auditing, statistics, tax administration, international trade, business management, judiciary, probation penitentiary work, medical jurisprudence, public information, border administration, library service, diplomatic and consular service and public works. Professional and technical examinations are given to lawyers, accountants, medical personnel (physicians, pharmacists, dentists, nurses), agricultural technicians (general agriculture, agriculture chemistry, forestry, pest control, marine products, animal husbandry, veterinary medicine, etc.), industrial personnel (civil, electrical, mechanical, aeronautical, chemical engineering, architecture, hydraulics, environmental situation, machinery, ship building, etc.), mining technicians, and many others.

2. Qualification examinations. The qualification examination is given for persons who lack formation education sufficient to participate in ordinary and higher examinations. Candidates who pass the

qualification examination on the ordinary and higher levels are required to participate in other examinations on corresponding levels.

3. Examinations for promotion. These examinations are usually conducted at the request of government offices for employees seeking promotion.

4. Screening according to the examination law. Certain professionals and technicians may be qualified for practice by submission of personal data to the Ministry of Examination for screening. The process is noncompetitive. Also subject to screening are candidates for elective offices in local government. The candidates qualified in the special examinations are employed because these examinations are held to meet specific needs of government agencies.

Personnel administration:

The administration of civil servants, public school teachers and employees of public enterprise is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Personnel. Most government offices, schools, and public enterprises have personnel offices integrated into the government personnel system. The main activities of the Ministry are as follows:

1. Civil service position classification. The civil service position classification program has the dual objective of getting the right men for the right positions and providing equal pay for equal work. The Ministry of Personnel publishes a "Handbook for Position Classification and Grading Operations," and promulgates "Measures Governing Position Classifications and Payment for Taiwan Provincial Government Enterprises."

2. Civil servants insurance. Civil servants insurance initiated in September, 1958, has been expanded to cover more public functionaries. It covers sickness, injury, disability, old age, death, funeral expense, and childbirth. As of March, 1966, a total of 240,953 employees of 3,925 government agencies were insured. The insurance program is administered by the Central Trust of China, a governmental financial organ, under supervision of the Ministry of Personnel.

3. Filing of personnel data. The Ministry of Personnel has established a centralized system for filing government personnel data.

CHAPTER II

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CHINESE BUREAUCRACY

To understand the importance of the delegation of authority and of agencies for personnel administration, the situation relative to organization of the Republic at the present time must be considered. Such consideration reveals problems and the consequences that result from inefficiency based on the factors just noted.

A. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS

1. Theoretical Background of the Bureaucracy

The bureaucracy of a nation is always subject to the influence of its history and culture--the longer the history is, the deeper the effects are. China has the longest history and living culture of all the nations of the world. As a result, it has inherited deep influences of traditional culture. Pfiffner and Presthus state the point:

Bureaucracy differs from nation to nation, reflecting the values and institutions of the society, moreover, bureaucracy is ambivalent, exhibiting both a will to power and growth and a resistance to change. One of the most helpful theoretical models for studying large-scale organization is the ideal type concept of bureaucracy set down by Max Weber, a German economist who wrote around the turn of the twentieth century. However, his generalization must be applied with caution.⁹

⁹John M. Pfiffner and Robert Presthus, Public Administration (Fifth edition; New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1967), p. 41.

When China was in the process of becoming a democracy under rule of law, its concept of law came from Europe. Thus its concept of administrative organization was likewise affected by continental law. Therefore, the characteristics of Chinese bureaucracy can be explained if we apply Max Weber's concept of organization. Pfiffner and Presthus summarized Weber's concept of administrative organization as follows:¹⁰

1. Bureaucracy is a term which applies to both public and private effort.
2. Rationalized job structure. There is a rational division of labor, and each position is accompanied by the legal authority necessary to accomplish the goals set.
3. Formalization. Acts, decisions and rules are formulated and recorded in writing (red tape).
4. Management separated from ownership; there is a hired professional administrative class.
5. There is no property right to office.
6. Special competence and training are required of the administrative class.
7. Members are selected competitively on the basis of competence.
8. Legal flavor. Weber's construct reflects the legalistic flavor attaching to administration in continental Europe. "Each office has a clearly defined sphere of competence in the legal sense."

Judging from the points stated above, "Weber's concept of administrative organization" merely aims to seek and identify the machinery of control.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp. 41-42. The Pfiffner and Presthus sources include Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (Fair Lawn, N. J.: Oxford University Press, 1946), and The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. and trans. Talcott Parsons (Fair Lawn, N. J.: Oxford University Press, 1947).

However, in a modern large-scale organization, an executive is unable to exert personal control over everything. Therefore, one must rely on regulations or rules, whereby the behavior of a worker is expected to be made to conform to certain desirable standards. Limiting the worker's behavior with regulations is intended to achieve two things--reliable and predictable behavior. If a worker's behavior is found to be both reliable and predictable, goals once established may be attained in most cases. At the same time, the administrator may effectively control his organization. Max Weber believed that this theory not only applies to the general situation of administrative organization, but also suits the particular needs of army, church, political party, and civic organizations.

We may compare the main points of Max Weber's theory with the present administrative organization of the Chinese government. The pathological characteristic of the Chinese administration are easy to find, such as an over-emphasis placed on rules and laws, too much centralization of power focused on the person in charge, and a lack of self reliance on the part of the workers. The following chapters offer statistical evidence obtained from workers in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Communications by the Chinese Association of Personnel Administration (C. A. P. A.).

2. Emphasis on Rules and Laws

The present administrative organization of the Chinese government gives great emphasis to the importance of rules and laws. For example, "The Existing Administrative Laws of the Republic of China," compiled in 1950, contains more than 1300 pages. The primary aim of all the "rules" and "regulations" and "principles" and "important points" and "outlines" of this huge book is to prove that behavior can be bound within certain limits. Consider the Department of Population of the Ministry of the Interior as a specific example: Not including the general rules that every worker must abide by, there are fourteen series of rules compiled especially for these workers. On June 15, 1967, the Executive Yuan promulgated a set of "Rules for General Affairs Management," including 616 articles dealing with paper work, filing, cashier's work, and property keeping. The rules even specify the way a desk and a chair should be placed, the pattern of putting stationary on a desk, and the place in a room where a hat and coat should be placed. This example of over-emphasis is extreme but by no means unique.

Theoretically, stressing the importance of regulations should result in working procedures that are uniform and by strict following of the rules and fixed procedures, the reliability and predictability of the worker's behavior should be insured. Since the administrative machinery is designed to enforce dependability and predictability, it makes countless rules and laws which seek to restrain and restrict worker's behavior. To assure the success of the restraints, the

administration stresses the relationship between the superior and inferior as one of order giving and order taking.

3. Adoption of Centralization in Organization

All the administrative agencies stress control from top to bottom. As the scale of organization gets larger and larger, administrators increasingly depend on many rules and laws. For tightening the organization and for the exercise of control, they adopt centralization. Centralization, in the mind of an executive, gives him responsibility for his workers' behavior and the right to interfere in handling any assignment. As a result, no assignment can be carried out without asking for advice first and at every important stage in the work. However, since technical know-how may change from day to day, the division of responsibility must be very precise, and specialization is looked upon as of great importance. Thus the size of the organization has to be enlarged as principles of specialization and division of responsibility are followed. The expanding organization must go in one of two directions: the vertical or horizontal. The former tends to entail too much scalar process; in the latter, the span of control may be too wide. Sometimes, an organization will be enlarged in both directions. In this instance, both the scalar process and the span of control are too great for an executive to accommodate. An adequate span of control is often said to cover five to seven units under one person¹¹--a figure

¹¹For a useful analysis of the span of control concept, see William H. Starbuck, "Organizational Growth and Development," in J. March, Handbook of Organizations (Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1965), pp. 496-498.

not necessarily accurate now for modern administrative machinery. However, for the purpose of having effective and positive control, the fewer the units are, the better the supervision becomes. The Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Economic Affairs, and Ministry of Communications may be taken for examples: Twenty-one units are directly under the Minister of the Interior; in Economic Affairs, twenty-four; in Education, sixteen; and in Communications, eleven. These figures indicate that the span of control that a top Chinese administrative executive has to contend is by no means small. Where the span is too wide the executive may intend to care and be responsible for everything; but neither his time nor his energy will allow him to do so. If the minister tries to directly supervise too many individuals, he will surely not have time to consider and make proper policy decisions for his ministry. As a consequence, some ministers are terribly overburdened but feel that they personally, should check all papers and make decisions because they do not want to see errors made. Without adequate personal supervision mistakes are common occurrences and laws on which the administrator depends for control cease to be in themselves an effective restraining force.

If, in order to narrow the span of control, the ever enlarging machinery has to expand vertically, the scalar process under the executive is lengthened. As a result, it lengthens the upward and downward communication channels, and, for convenience, more communication steps have to be established. In other words, in communicating

from bottom to top, one has to go through a multitude of subordinates at different organizational levels. The so-called paper-travel is mainly due to the multiplicity of steps existing in the channel of communication. During the course of getting a plan of action up to the top administrator, much of the thought and work of the originator may be deleted or amended at any level, for each individual in the chain of communication may leave only what he thinks will please his immediate supervisor. Consequently, by the time the plan is submitted to the top executive, it may be completely different from the original. Such being the case, the plan cannot be understood or reviewed thoroughly and many worthwhile suggestions and comments of the workers are prevented from reaching the top executives. Thus the executive, although theoretically in control of the machinery, is not serving in his full capacity when his organization is being expanded in such a way as to increase the problems of centralization.

4. Lack of Participation on the Part of Workers

The pattern of the organization and of its leadership determines whether or not the general workers obtain the right of participation in agency affairs. In an agency that adopts an organizational form which emphasizes centralization, the executive is apt to demand that he be in control of all policy making for fear that his authority may be weakened. The fact that the workers usually are not able to participate in decision-making, because of extreme centralization is characteristic of Chinese bureaucracy.

Participation involves the right of workers to participate in making decisions concerning the work which they are to undertake. Decisions in most agencies are made by the executive alone and the workers are expected only to obey. Participation can, however, serve as a stimulus to raise the workers' interest and to help them channel their abilities to best accomplish agency purposes and goals. It can also help them in the sense that they feel themselves to be of some importance in the machinery, thereby giving them the psychological and emotional satisfaction of being part of an organization and essential to its efficiency. Imagination and creativity of the workers also are improved by participation.¹² The workers who have participated in decision-making are able to draw up guidelines for their own work. They are the ones who should be most interested in discovering effective ways of dealing with problems and the kinds of work situations that must be faced. In other words, employees do not have to rely on their executive for direction on each minor detail in carrying out plans with which they are familiar and for which they feel some sense of responsibility. In this way they are compelled to use their own minds all the time, and must plan and motivate themselves toward the goal set by a joint decision. On the other hand, the machinery can often receive suggestions of great value from the workers, which may contribute to job efficiency. O. Glen Stahl said that

¹²Pfiffner and Fels, The Supervision of Personnel Human Relations in Management of Men (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1958), p. 9.

In any fair-sized establishment it has been found advisable to adopt systematic methods whereby the workers are encouraged to express their ideas and gain recognition. Their experience goes to prove that a reservoir of ideas may be tapped by this method, ideas that are often of real value for improving both work processes and working conditions. Such contributions, when adopted and given due recognition, obviously add to the workers sense of partnership and personal worth.¹³

On the contrary, if workers are not permitted to participate, they are ignorant of the principles established for their work, and are obliged to depend constantly on directions or decrees. Thus, they simply become machine tools, without any initiative, exercising only their physical capabilities. Keith Davis points out that "Participation means mental and emotional movement rather than mere muscular activity. A person's self is a product of his mind and his emotions. It is psychological rather than physical."¹⁴ Participation by the workers, it may be pointed out, does not mean that in the final analysis the executive is not responsible for the decision. The final choice must be his even where workers share in decision making.

B. PERSONNEL MACHINERY AND PROCEDURES

1. Personnel Units in Different Levels

The political system of the Republic of China is based on the thought of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, the father of the Republic. Its "five-

¹³ O. Glen Stahl, Public Personnel Administration (Fifth edition; New York: Harper and Row Press, 1962), pp. 211-212.

¹⁴ Keith Davis, Human Relations at Work (2nd ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962), p. 427.

power system" covers executive, legislative, judicial, control, and examination. The present personnel machinery began after the government enacted a law for personnel management of government agencies. This law stipulates not only the functions of the personnel affairs agency and the ranks of the officials working in it, but also that the five Yuans and their different ministries, provincial governments, and the municipal government should set up personnel affairs departments. Since 1947, when the Constitution was promulgated, all the laws have been renewed or amended in accordance with the Constitution, and the organization law of the Examination Yuan, still valid, was promulgated by the Central Government. Based on the laws and acts, a brief explanation of the personnel affairs agencies both in the central government and the local government can be set out:

Central government.

Article 83 of the Constitution stipulates that "the Examination Yuan is the highest authority on the personnel management of the Chinese Government. Its functions are: holding examinations, taking care of appointments, ascertaining efficiency evaluation, arranging salary ranges, providing protection, making compensation schedules, and planning retirement and pension." Article 85 stipulates that "the selection of government workers must be done through open examinations by limiting the number of names. The examination can be held in different provinces. No one failing to pass the examination can be appointed to take up any job in the government." The existing organization law of the personnel agency was enacted in accordance with

Article 89 of the Constitution. It covers mainly the following points:

a. The establishment of the examination committee: Article 84 of the Constitution stipulates that "In addition to the President and vice president of the Examination Yuan, there should be 19 committee members nominated by the President and approved by the Control Yuan." In regard to the qualifications of each member, Item 3 of the organization law of the Examination Yuan has very strict stipulations, and Article 88 of the Constitution holds that "the member should not be related to any political party so that by himself basing on the law, he may act independently."

b. The establishment of the Ministry of Examination and the Ministry of Personnel: According to item 6 of the organization law of the Examination Yuan, as in the preceding statement, the Yuan establishes the Ministry of Examinations and the Ministry of Personnel. The latter administers the personnel affairs of the government and has the executive charge of the personnel departments. Both are responsible for carrying out the decisions made by the Examination Yuan.

c. In order to carry out personnel policy independently, personnel units should be established in different levels of government. The Presidential Hall (including each department of it), the five Yuans, and each ministry (including each affiliated body of different ministries), have each established a personnel department of a personnel section.

d. The appointment and dismissal and evaluation of personnel workers in Central government agencies are done by the Ministry of Personnel.

Local government.

The principles followed in establishing local personnel units have three characteristics. First, the Ministry of Personnel serves as a hand holding a whip. Second, the Personnel Departments or committees work independently but stand merely as a staff to the chief of the government agencies. Thirdly, the ministry of personnel can exercise its right of making appointments and dismissals by law. The following main points serve to clarify these principles:

a. The examination and personnel department in the provinces consists of various units. Due to the large size of the Chinese provinces, it is impossible for the two ministries under the Examination Yuan to take direct charge of the examinations and personnel of all local government. It is, therefore, stipulated in item 16 of the organization law of the Examination Yuan that in the provinces and special municipal cities, the Yuan should establish departments of examination and personnel responsible for examination and personnel management. These departments are, of course, under the jurisdiction of both ministries--Examination and Personnel. Prior to the establishment of such a department, the province must at least set up an examination personnel committee responsible for appointment, salary range, and evaluation and registration of personnel records.

b. Each province, and each special municipal, city, or county government has established a personnel department, a personnel section, or a personnel administrator.

c. Each public university, college, school, public enterprise company, in proportion to its number of teaching staff or its business, has established a personnel department, a section, or an administrator.

d. In a local government, in addition to the chiefs of the personnel department of the provincial and special municipal government under the Ministry of Personnel, the Ministry of Personnel appoints, dismisses, and evaluates personnel through the recommendation of the government chief of whom their section is a staff unit.

2. Traits of Personnel Management

In accordance with the above-listed principles for establishing personnel agencies and rules or laws for its management, the Chinese machinery of personnel management has the following characteristics: states that the Ministry of Examinations administers the examinations in accordance with national policy, while the Ministry of Personnel manages the personnel affairs of the government and has the executive charge of the personnel departments. Therefore, personnel from the Presidential Hall (five Yuans) and all ministries, down to the county and city governments and public schools, are under the supervision and direction of the Ministry of Personnel. The personnel service simply adopts a whip-hand policy and the local units must conform to central direction.

b. Restraint of different personnel laws: A personnel department stands as a staff unit to the chief of each government agency, and should not take away his rights in personnel affairs. However, except for examinations set for new appointees, given by the Ministry of Examinations, other authorized activities such as checking requirements, ascertaining efficiency evaluation, arranging salary ranges, as well as protection and pension are strictly governed by the rules established by the Ministry of Personnel. As a result, it is impossible to avoid infringing upon the right of personnel affairs of the agency chief, though in theory the personnel department is but a staff unit to him.

c. The independence of personnel machinery: According to its organizational law, the Examination Yuan has very strict stipulations for the qualification of each of its members. Article 88 of the Constitution, states that "the member should not be related to any political party so that by himself basing on the law, he may act independently." All the regulations on personnel are enacted by these members, and put into force by the Ministry of Examination and Ministry of Personnel. Furthermore, the Ministry of Personnel has the authority to appoint all personnel chiefs of all organizations in the Central Government. It also appoints the personnel chiefs who work in local government, even those in public schools. Although the chiefs of local government and the principals of public schools have the right to recommend someone for positions, their acceptance or rejection still remains with the

Ministry of Personnel. In other words, if the nominee cannot get the support of the Ministry of Personnel, he cannot obtain a position in the personnel service. The personnel machinery is really an independent unit in the total bureaucracy.

3. Drawbacks of the System

Analysis of the characteristics of the present personnel system leads to the conclusion that it has difficulties that will be hard to overcome.

a. The personnel workers, on one hand, serve as working staff to the government body in which they are placed; on the other hand, they are subject to the authority of the personnel ministry. In other words, they are under two different supervisors. Should the two supervisors hold different ideas, the personnel worker will immediately find himself in a dilemma, not knowing whose order to follow. For no matter which choice he makes, he will surely offend one of the two.

b. Superficially the personnel service that adopts a firm policy seems good, for it can thus escape interference from any administrative body, and can objectively and fairly fulfill its functions. However, it may damage the integrity of the organization, and thus cause difficulty. For instance, according to law, neither promotion and dismissal of a personnel worker are not in the hands of the chief of the organization in which he works but in the hands of the chief of the personnel department, which ranks higher than his own unit.

Thus, the personnel department is spared the interference of the administrative department--yet the administrative department is often thwarted and blocked by the personnel units. Therefore trouble makers can use differences of opinion to create contradictions and controversies in personnel service, resulting in damage to the leadership of an administrator. The teamwork of the organization can be reduced and its efficiency diminished by the dualism that exists between administrative responsibility and personnel authority.

c. The present system, possessing an independence that enables it to carry out its work free from outside disturbance, is always alien to the practical situation of the organization of which it is part. Therefore the measures it takes do not always suit the needs of the organization. On the other hand, an administrator may consider the very existence of the unit in the organization to be an intrusion, and refuse to cooperate with the personnel policy it maintains. The administrator sometimes uses this relationship with the personnel unit as an excuse for his own failure in that field. Without effective administrative support the best planned personnel service cannot succeed in its mission. In the last analysis the statement that "personnel is a function of management" is as true in the Republic of China as it is elsewhere.

CHAPTER III

PROBLEMS IN THE PERSONNEL FIELD

Having stated the characteristics of the organization of both bureaucracy and personnel machinery, one is in a position to consider problems in the personnel field.

A. SHORTCOMINGS OF STAFF

From the practical point of view, administrators ignore the fact that stressing the importance of rules and laws can stifle a worker's ability to use his own knowledge and creativity. Consequently, many administrators become men with cautious, conservative, and negative attitudes. This is true particularly in China where the present laws and regulations for a worker are not only numerous and complicated but often are overlapping, conflicting and frustrating. Thus when confronted with a problem which is not specifically discussed in a manual, a worker may not know what to do or where to go for instructions. As a result, he becomes timid, indifferent, and passive. In the present administrative machinery, during the process of handling a problem, a section or a worker for his own safety always adheres to his own understanding of the application of the rules, with no concessions or yielding to innovation or the search for a "better way." Not only does the problem remain unsolved, but new conflict and new tension arises between the

workers or the sections and the top management. This situation is caused by the overemphasis of rules and procedures.

In the present administrative machinery, with rules overemphasized and workers obliged to follow them explicitly, there is no flexibility for the worker to apply when handling any given problem. He is not allowed to make any adaptation or adjustment of the rules. They are written and unchangeable, even though circumstances are every changing. It is difficulty, if not impossible, to handle all problems according to rules which are never to be amended. Obviously then, it is possible that some problems may never be solved if the rules are strictly observed. In order to arrive at an effective solution, at least sometimes the rules must be put aside. The rules may work today, but may not work tomorrow. In considering "The Existing Administrative Laws of the Republic of China," an observation and analysis of the real situation of the administrative machineries in the Republic of China may lead us to another conclusion. Since rules or laws may fail to restrain the workers, a worker's on-the-job behavior may not possess the supposed dependability and predictability. Through the simple stressing of rules, problems often cannot be effectively solved on time or by the best methods. Some of the existing laws have ceased to regulate a worker's on-the-job behavior, a situation which stems from the fact that a worker, for his selfish interest of benefit, will try to apply to the case the rules that are advantageous to him and interpret the others to support what he in fact does in a given situation.

Confining a worker's on-the-job behavior to a fixed norm by force of law while solving a problem destroys the worker's will to retain his autonomy and self respect. If the right and obligation of each and every office are already set by written law, a worker must at least in theory conduct his work within these defined limits. This can be done only after a successful classification of the duties of each office. The Chinese government has for years worked on detailed regulations for each office. The Examination Yuan, at one point, set up a committee for this purpose. A set of rules covering all offices was recently enacted and formally promulgated by the President. Yet how can these rules be enforced? Under such general instructions, some classification, autonomy, and hindrances in the process of carrying out work are inevitable. Consequently, workers often compete for the jobs that are easily done and where the procedures and rules are adequate and try to avoid those that are hard. In the present situation, only by decree or direction can a hard or non-routine job be expected to be done successfully. Decrees and directions may be given incorrectly and are not a solution to problem solving. Before the old problems are solved, new ones have appeared and new decrees and directions are needed. The process is endless.

Without a certain amount of autonomy in solving a problem, a worker must depend totally upon his supervisor's decree or direction, or he must constantly ask his superior for advice. As a result, each worker becomes a robot, and fails to participate at all. Furthermore,

obstacles may appear in the lines of communication between superior and inferior. Stahl states that "any group of people associated to get work done automatically constitutes a kind of social organism that devises its own way of keeping alive through exchange of intelligence as to what is going on," and Stahl added, "communication is found, for example, in the stimulation of employee ideas for work improvement and in the formal analysis of employee feelings through attitude surveys."¹⁵ Communication is an important factor that leads workers to concentrate on their work, and helps to promote team work. Without effective communication a certain emotional barrier will be created between the executive and his subordinates. There is little hope for functional team work,¹⁶ which is necessary to obtain success, in an organization hopelessly enmeshed in detailed rules and regulations.

Being limited by complicated rules and laws, the working behavior of government workers can be entirely different from their social and off-the-job behavior, which may be congenial and creative. Models of behavior set by the government may run counter to the natural behavior of the worker. In the present administrative organizations, workers often wonder and worry about the rules, and as a consequence, get little work done. Yet workers of an informal organization, based mainly on friendship, may be very efficient in their activities. Suppose one

¹⁵Stahl, op. cit., pp. 210-211.

¹⁶Gerald G. Fisch, "Line-Staff is Obsolete," Public Administration: Reading in Institutions, Processes, Behavior. Edited by Frank Gibson and Geoffrey Y. Cornog (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966), pp. 162-163.

goes to a government agency for help on a certain matter. He may encounter much difficulty because he has to go through all the channels that the law demands, even though this may not actually be necessary. Very often a request is delayed or turned down on the ground that the situation is not covered by the rules. On the other hand, if an individual knows someone in the agency, and makes use of this contact by asking an individual for help, his request may be fulfilled immediately on the basis of friendship or persons recommendation. Some say that it is a part of Chinese nature, to value friendship highly, and that the Chinese are easily persuaded on a personal basis. In fact, these are traits which are fostered by too much emphasis being placed on rules and laws, and by the fact that these rules are rarely amended or abolished. Those involved are forced to rely on informal channels, personal contacts and friendships as ways to meet the needs of an existing situation.

B. CONFIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS

Since the employees of a growing governmental agency increase in number, by what measures can an executive keep sufficient and efficient control over the organization? Some executives resort to confidential appointments as a means of control. When an executive is appointed, he often staffs his office with his relatives and friends, who are expected to help him control the organization. But this practice affects and upsets the other workers' feelings, and in effect defeats the executive's purpose of control. Workers who feel that they

are eligible and will be considered for promotion will try to please their superior in order to win his trust and favor. On the other hand, those who do not think that they can get a promotion--or who believe that their opportunities have been taken away by the followers--and relatives of the executive--will become discouraged and resort to negative action, some directed to undermining the position and authority of the chief. Although the workers may seem to get along well with the executive's followers, in reality they resent them, hold themselves aloof from them, and have no desire to cooperate with them. This kind of attitude will, of course, harm the organization and its efficiency. According to Weber's theory, which was cited before, the appointment of personnel for effective administrative machinery must be done through a fair and open examination system. Selection must be based on the need of the organization; promotion must be based on the worker's record of performance and his working experience. The existing Chinese system of examination is not adequate in many instances (as is pointed out later), but it is comparatively fair and far superior to appointment by favoritism of the executive. Appointing those who did not pass the examination given by the ministry and failing to appoint those who did certainly affects the morale of the workers and the regard of the people for the civil service.

In order to establish what I presumed and inferred above, I can cite the answers the Chinese Association of Personnel Administration

received in a poll of the workers of four ministries.¹⁷ Among the questions in the questionnaire was the following: "As far as you know in addition to the general requirements, what is the essential criterion for new appointments in your ministry"? The answers were as shown in Table 1. At the same time, the C. A. P. A. distributed more than 100 questionnaires to department chiefs. Answers to the same question were shown in Table 2. These statistics reveal a difference in the response of the department chiefs and those of the general workers to the same question. For example, in answer, 69 per cent of the workers in the survey said that personal relations are essential, but only 31 per cent of the department chiefs held the same opinion. Perhaps the following explanations apply:

1. Many of the friends or relatives appointed by the ministry executives usually occupy positions as department chiefs. They would never, therefore, admit that nepotism exists in the ministry. And they would also deny that nepotism is involved in appointment in lower ranks, for if any exists, they might be the very ones who established it.

¹⁷The Survey Statistics of Personnel Problems in the Central Governmental Agencies (Taipei, Taiwan: Chinese Association of Personnel Administration, 1963), directed under Professor Chang Chin-Chien, conducted a 24-question survey of 600 workers in four central governmental agencies, including Ministry of the Interior, Education, Communication, and Economic Affairs. About 100-330 responses were received. This report is available only in Chinese. The translation here in the text are my own.

TABLE 1
WORKER'S VIEWS OF ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS
IN NEW APPOINTMENTS

	Number	Per Cent
Ability	41	14
Education and Experience	50	17
Personal Relations	200	69

Source: The Survey Statistics of Personnel Problems in the Central Government Agencies (Taipei, Taiwan: Chinese Association of Personnel Administration, 1963), p. 11.

TABLE 2
SUPERVISORS' VIEWS OF ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS
FOR NEW APPOINTMENTS

	Number	Per Cent
Ability	15	21
Education and Experience	34	48
Personal Relations	22	31

Source: The Survey Statistics of Personnel Problems in the Central Government Agencies (Taipei, Taiwan: Chinese Association of Personnel Administration, 1963), p. 11.

2. Some of the department chiefs had been in that position before the ministry executive came. They were not relatives nor friends of the executives. Yet by working with the executives all the time, a close relationship is built, which does not allow him to say otherwise.

3. Most general workers, including some of the section chiefs, believed that personal relations are essential for new appoints in their ministry.

The main reason they say this is that an executive often prefers promotion from without rather than from within whenever there is a vacancy in his ministry. This assumption is also based on statistics drawn by the same Association. The workers of the above mentioned ministries were given the following question: "How many promotions have you had since you came to work in the present machinery"? The answers were as shown in Table 3. These statistics indicate that an absolute majority of the workers in the survey have had no promotion or only one. Naturally, they are not satisfied with the situation. The channel of promotion is simply blocked by the practice of promotion from without. As a result, the workers are led to believe that the executive is fond of nepotism, even though what he does may be based on the need of the machinery and through fair selection. The workers' feelings, however, are fundamental to the efficiency of the machinery; without their cooperation efficiency is impossible.

TABLE 3
NUMBER OF PROMOTIONS SINCE EMPLOYMENT

	Persons Responding
None	105
One	76
Two	39
More than two	33

Source: The Survey Statistics of Personnel Problems in the Central Government Agencies (Taipei, Taiwan: Chinese Association of Personnel Administration, 1963), p. 12.

C. PARTICIPATION AND RESPONSIBILITY

Participation means that the worker within the sphere of his rights and responsibilities is given sufficient authority for planning and carrying out his work. On the other hand, the executive should be willing and always ready to bear the responsibility of the results of their work. It is presumed that a worker who is given authority for performing his duty will assume that his executive will be responsible for the result of his work. He will feel free to talk with the executive about problems at any time. The following response from a poll provides a valuable basis and support for this assumption.

These answers provide two conclusions: One is that workers who have authority in dealing with their work feel that their executives are responsible for the results of their work; another is that the amount of authority a worker has is in direct proportion to how free he feels to talk with his executives. Only 14 per cent of the workers asked said they had sufficient authority; but 36 per cent of them stated that they had no authority at all. From these data we may draw three inferences:

1. The executive not only should give his workers proper authority for his work but also should be willing to bear the responsibility for the results of their work.

2. Delegation of authority will not hurt the leadership of the executives. On the contrary, it will help his prestige and facilitate communication, both upward and downward.

3. From Table 4 we notice that only 14 per cent have sufficient authority, and 51 per cent, comparatively sufficient. Yet 36 per cent have no authority. It indicates that as far as participation is concerned the situation of the administrative machinery in the Republic of China is still far from satisfactory, and it would be worthwhile for executives to give it more thought.

As a matter of fact, those who are given full authority in their work are also given opportunities to show their ability and talents. Likewise, in order to show their ability and talents, they must have sufficient authority for their work. The opportunity to employ their talents and ability stimulates the workers' interest in their work, keeps them satisfied with their situation, and leads them to feel that they are going to get promoted. And from Table 4 we can also assume that the opportunity to use their talents can affect the workers' interest, sense of satisfaction, initiative for work, and hope for the future. The data reveals that the personnel administration of the administrative machinery in the Republic of China has much room for improvement. More will be given about this later.

D. EXAMINATION SYSTEM

As previously described, civil service examinations in China have a long history and have been highly valued. But now, because of the lack of cooperation between the examination and the administration of personnel management, selection by examination without the power of

TABLE 4

WORKERS' SENSE OF PARTICIPATION AND RESPONSIBILITY

Response		Number	Per Cent	
Do you in the sphere of your right and responsibility have sufficient authority to carry out your work?	Sufficient	36	14	
	Comparatively Sufficient	134	51	
	Not at all	95	36	
Do you think your executive can be held responsible for the result of your work?	Sufficient	Can	29	80
		Sometimes	7	20
		Cannot	0	0
	Comparatively Sufficient	Can	61	47
		Sometimes	53	43
		Cannot	11	10
	Not at all	Can	26	28
		Sometimes	36	38
		Cannot	32	34

TABLE 4 (CONTINUED)

		Response	Number	Per Cent
In the course of carrying out your work, do you feel free to talk with your executive?	Sufficient	Very Free	27	75
		Comp. Free	9	25
		Not at all	0	0
	Comparatively Sufficient	Very Free	51	41
		Comp. Free	71	57
		Not at all	3	2
	Not at all	Very Free	14	15
		Comp. Free	63	67
		Not at all	17	18

TABLE 4 (CONTINUED)

	Response	Number	Per Cent
Do you have opportunity for your talents and ability?	Yes, I do	75	29
	Not much	124	48
	Not at all	60	23
How interested are you in your work?	Very much	27	11
	Not much	159	59
	Not at all	64	30
Do you have authority in your work?	Yes, I have full authority	43	16
	Yes, I have some	133	50
	Not at all	91	34
Do you feel that you can get promoted?	Yes, I do	29	15
	Yes, perhaps	89	34
	No, I cannot	60	24
	I do not know	75	27

Source: The Survey Statistics of Personnel Problems in the Central Government Agencies (Taipei, Taiwan: Chinese Association of Personnel Administration, 1963), pp. 39-40; 72-75.

appointment hurts the effectiveness of the examination system. Presently, the organization with the power to hold examinations does not have the authority to make appointments, and the organization with authority to make appointments does not have the power to hold examinations. As a result, those who have passed the various examinations conducted by the Examination Yuan acquire merely the qualification for some appointment--but not a definite position. Consequently, this situation has two effects: (1) Most of the ambitious young people gradually lose interest in the examination; and (2) the government machinery loses its vigor as it ceases to take in new blood possessing the proper qualifications. Indeed, the age level of personnel has a definite effect on the improvement of efficiency. The government can be very active and dynamic if it is filled with young people. Conversely, it is inclined to be passive-minded and resistant to change if its personnel age-level is higher. The age levels of government workers in the Republic of China are demonstrated in Table 5.

Table 5 shows the average ages of workers in the four ministries, not including the personnel in their affiliated bodies, as 48 for Home Ministry, 49 for Education, 49 for Communications, and 47 for Economics. The average age in each of the four ministries is slightly over 48 years. This is higher than it should be, for the average span of life of the Chinese people is 61 years--making only 13 years difference between the two averages. Of course, most civil servants are intellectuals and know more about the preservation of health; their average age

TABLE 5
AVERAGE AGE OF WORKERS--FOUR CENTRAL MINISTRIES

Ministry	Persons	Mean Age	Age Distribution (in Percentage)				
			20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69
Home	24	48	2	17	40	31	9
Education	183	49	1	10	44	32	13
Communica- tions	129	49	6	18	34	28	14
Economic	149	47	10	23	33	28	6

Source: The Survey Statistics of Personnel Problems in the Central Government Agencies (Taipei, Taiwan: Chinese Association of Personnel Administration, 1963), p. 88.

is likely to be a little higher than that of the nation as a whole. However, in China, where living conditions change rapidly due to swift economic development, government workers must be active, vigorous, and full of new ideas. These are qualities found in young people, but usually lacking in aged ones.

Generally speaking, both the thought and behavior of a Chinese person would have taken shape by the time he reaches the age of 45. It would be difficult for a Chinese over 45 to accept new ideas. In other words, persons over 45 are the conservatives in the government organization. However, new ideas are indispensable when the government is endeavoring to improve and increase its efficiency. New ideas are the basis of reformation, yet they are the things that older people resist. Therefore, young people with dynamic ideas and imagination must be given more responsibility if the government is to experience new developments.

The high average age of workers also indicates the unhealthy situation of personnel management, in which, because there is no attrition of the old, there can be no absorption of the new. According to the records of personnel mobility in the Ministry of the Interior, from January, 1960 to December, 1964, only 28 vacancies resulted from retirement, transference, and death--only 5.6 per cent of the total personnel. Among this number, 17 asked for retirement, three transferred, five resigned, and three died. Furthermore, of the 17 who asked for retirement, 13 were under the age of 35; and those who transferred were still in the government. And the fact that the three who transferred

were still in the government agencies actually reduced the 28 vacancies to 25. Therefore, on the average, only five vacancies came up in a year, only a little more than 2 per cent of its total of 24 (not including the personnel of the affiliated body of the Ministry).

The Chinese government is fully aware of the situation, and has continually asked its agencies to employ more young people in order to improve its efficiency. The various government machineries have absorbed some young people, yet many ambitious youths are prevented from entering government service because of its narrow door. This is due to the fact that the retirement system has not been put into effective force. There are two main reasons why the system has not been effective. One concerns pensions and the other concerns the efficiency evaluation system. Both of these shall be discussed in the following chapter.

E. RETIREMENT AND EVALUATION SYSTEM

In the concept of modern personnel administration, pension does not solely mean remuneration for service. The retirement system is also for the purpose of eliminating the superannuated workers so as to keep the machinery active and dynamic. Stahl observes:

A proper retirement plan not only results in the elimination of many inefficient employees but tends also to improve the morale of the whole force and to facilitate the process of retirement. From the standpoint of the employee the advantages of a retirement plan are obvious. It supplements an income which is ordinarily not adequate to permit the accumulation of any large amount of savings.¹⁸

¹⁸Stahl, op. cit., pp. 397-398.

But most government workers do not appreciate the system. According to the retirement law for government workers promulgated in November, 1959, a commissioned officer 60 years of age with 25 years of service in the government, and having three dependents--his wife, a son, and a daughter--asks for retirement but wants to keep his name under the government umbrella of insurance purposes; all he can get, even if his rank is in first class, is about NT \$46740. Under the method of computing pensions, he is given 51 units. One unit is about NT \$760, his salary NT \$610, and another NT \$800 which is equal to the amount of money given for his dependents' living expenses for a two-year period. If he put this amount of money into a bank, with the most favorable monthly interest of 1.3 per cent, he can probably get NT \$607.88 a month. It is very close to the monthly pay he received before his retirement, but no longer can be get support for his family. Therefore, without another job, he cannot live on the bank interest. This is the main reason why many workers linger in the government though they have reached retirement age. This problem also relates to the evaluation system.

Efficiency evaluation is designed to check both the quality and the quantity of work a person has done. It is the basis used for promotion, demotion, commendation, and punishment. This is a very important element in personnel administration, and no organization hoping to increase its efficiency can ignore it. According to Stahl:

One of the basic problems in any large of far-flung organization is to determine and record the performance value of staff members. This is fundamental not only as a guide to the

administration of promotion, demotion, and transfer, but also as a means of checking the efficiency of original selection method.¹⁹

Evaluation, if carried out properly, can produce two effects: (1) It can obtain dependable materials to support the administration of commendation and punishment. With evaluation, on the one hand, the inefficient can be improved or eliminated and hard workers can be motivated to work even harder. Evaluation can eliminate much of the jealousies or complaints against measures taken for commendation and punishment. This in turn will promote cooperation among the workers and heighten morale and the desire to achieve. (2) Evaluation can give the superior executive increased knowledge of the attitude, ability, superiorities, and limitations of his workers. Therefore, he may help the good workers to develop their potential and give them more opportunities to use their talents. And he can counsel and advise those with difficulties so as to help them correct or improve their attitude or ability. Efficiency evaluation in personnel administration at least can help get rid of prejudices, wrong impressions, and individual feelings against promotion and demotion. Unfortunately, the efficiency evaluation system adopted by the Chinese government has not only failed to function correctly, but has become merely a meaningless procedure or a joke. The following data supports the previous statement.

In order to discover the actual response of government workers toward the existing system of evaluation, P. A. C. A. submitted the following questions to 260 persons:

¹⁹Ibid., p. 257.

- a. Are you satisfied with the existing system of evaluation?
- b. What are the causes that make you dissatisfied with the existing systems of evaluation?

The answers were as shown in Table 6. Table 6 shows that more than 70 per cent of the workers were not satisfied with the existing system of evaluation while only 4 per cent indicated satisfaction with the system. The causes of their dissatisfaction are twofold: One is due to the system itself, the other is largely man-made. Of the man-made faults--i.e., "not serious enough to put it into force," and "the chiefs play favoritism"--the latter is more serious than the former.

How could such a situation exist? Prof. K. C. Chang once said:

Most of the machinery chiefs, neglect its consequences, with a sort of playful attitude, never try to carry it out seriously. In fact, they do not have courage and determination enough for this task. Therefore, under their evaluation, workers are almost the same in working efficiency. All the grades a chief gives are but B. and C.²⁰

According to Item 4 and Item 5 of the evaluation law, evaluations can be classified into five grades. Grade A gets promotion and a half month's extra pay. Grade B gets promotion only. Grade C gets neither promotion nor extra pay. Grade D gets demotion or transfer and grade E gets dismissal. However, efficiency evaluation at present is but a kind of formality, for the chiefs would not give a grade below C, even to the worst worker. At the same time, many workers, with their meager monthly pay, are already unhappy and grumbling about their situation. They are

²⁰Chang, op. cit., pp. 85-86.

TABLE 6
ATTITUDE TOWARD EXISTING SYSTEM OF EVALUATION

Answer to Question a	Number	Per Cent
Satisfactory	11	4
Unsatisfactory	190	73
No Idea	59	23
Answer to Question b	Number	Per Cent
The System Itself Unreasonable	94	25
Not Serious Enough to Put it Into Force	152	42
The Chiefs Play Favoritism	118	33

Source: The Survey Statistics of Personnel Problems in the Central Government Agencies (Taipei, Taiwan: Chinese Association of Personnel Administration, 1963), p. 64.

easily irritated and may go to extremes if and when something frustrates them. The fact that the system has not been put into effective force, is not due to difficulties that the machinery chiefs cannot overcome, but to the workers whom the chiefs dare not offend. The chiefs do not want to court trouble with the inefficient workers by giving them low marks. This situation exists because some agencies and some schools encounter a great deal of difficulty when their chiefs try to dismiss some of their workers or students.

The system itself has defects too. First, according to law, the number of workers given grade A should never be more than one-third of the total workers in a unit. As a result, some workers who are really efficient cannot be given a grade of A. This is unfair, and naturally they will be disappointed and may react against their chiefs. Some chiefs, trying to be fair and seeking to avoid hurting the feelings of the workers, adopt a system of rotation. It means that an A grade will be given to all workers in yearly turn.

Secondly, the form of evaluation provides only for grades but not for records of work which are supposed to be the basis for grades. Therefore, the grades given are merely a chief's impression of his workers. It is common for a hard worker whose turn to receive a grade of A is still far away but who has laboured all year long to get a B grade. On the other hand, someone who merely idled his time away gets grade A, because his turn has come. This situation encourages the aged workers to stay in offices and wait for their turn to receive an A.

They do not retire from work because they still have a chance for a good evaluation, even though they may be inefficient in reality. Thus, the inadequacy of evaluation also hinders the effective operation of the retirement system.

F. WORKER QUALITY

One of the tendencies of modern government administration is specialization of government affairs, which has, of course, resulted from industrialization. Using statistics given by college graduates in high federal offices, Pfiffner and Presthus point out that "almost four-fifths of all high officials in the United States have had technical professional education. Although many higher civil servants are indeed generalists, the vast majority of them, perhaps four out of five, are specialists engaged in program and scientific technical activities."²¹ However, examinations are not necessarily the most effective way to attract specialists. There must be other methods in order to meet the needs of young people. The problem is that the government is given authority to appoint only those who have passed the proper examinations, and it would be against the law if it were done otherwise. As a result, this becomes another obstacle in improving the quality of workers.

The quality of a worker is closely associated with his education, which in turn has a bearing on the quality of work that he can

Pfiffner and Presthus, op. cit., pp. 128-129.

contribute to the government. The chances are that those who are well educated can always hold higher positions, and their ideas on problems are more readily accepted. At the same time, they are more ambitious and eager for advancement. On the other hand, the well educated are also the ones who may easily get excited or upset. They will quit their jobs when they find themselves in a hopeless situation. As a result, the government will find it not only difficult to eliminate inefficient workers, but also to keep the efficient ones from leaving the field. In this regard, 260 persons responded to the following questions:

- a. Would you machinery chief accept your suggestions, if any?
- b. If there are two job opportunities before you, one inside your own machinery and the other outside, both of which are satisfactory to you, which one would you like to take?

The answers were as shown in Tables 7, 8, and 9. From the answers listed in Tables 7, 8, and 9, we can infer the following:

1. In Table 7, a majority of the respondents were college graduates. The fact that college graduates are the main force in the government is a good sign. Yet there are two points underlying that do not warrant it. Firstly, of the total workers giving answers, 137 are college graduates. Yet, among the 137, 90 persons are already over the age of 40. According to what I stated in the previous chapter, Chinese people over the age of 40 are physiologically far from being young, and mentally tend to be conservative. Therefore, they are not the workers that the government needs at the present. Secondly, the

TABLE 7

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND OF WORKERS IN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

Age Bracket	20-29		30-39		40-49		50-59		Over 60	
Number of Persons	19		68		107		54		11	
Education	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Senior High School	5	26	12	18	29	27	9	17	0	0
Junior College	2	11	10	15	20	19	15	28	2	18
Full College	8	42	39	57	55	51	27	50	8	73
Post-Graduate	4	22	5	7	3	3	3	6	1	9
Others	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: The Survey Statistics of Personnel Problems in the Central Government Agencies (Taipei, Taiwan: Chinese Association of Personnel Administration, 1963), p. 103.

TABLE 8
ACCEPTANCE OF WORKERS' SUGGESTIONS

Response	Senior High School		Junior College		Full College		Post-Graduate	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Yes, he would	4	8	0	0	4	3	0	0
Yes, probably	17	35	25	56	84	64	14	78
No, never	7	15	1	2	7	5	0	0
No idea	2	42	19	42	37	28	4	22
Total	30		45		132		18	

Source: The Survey Statistics of Personnel Problems in the Central Government Agencies (Taipei, Taiwan: Chinese Association of Personnel Administration, 1963), p. 109.

*Respondents were asked: "Would your 'machinery' chief accept your suggestions, if any?"

TABLE 9
CONCERNING JOB CHOICES OF WORKERS BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL

Education	Number	Answer to Question b	Number	Percentage
Senior High School	57	(1) The one inside	43	77
		(2) The one outside	14	23
Junior College	47	(1) The one inside	34	69
		(2) The one outside	13	31
Full College	132	(1) The one inside	76	58
		(2) The one outside	56	42
Post- Graduate	19	(1) The one inside	13	68
		(2) The one outside	6	32
Others	2	(1) The one inside	1	50
		(2) The one outside	1	50

Source: The Survey Statistics of Personnel Problems in the Central Government Agencies (Taipei, Taiwan: Chinese Association of Personnel Administration, 1963), p. 113.

number of workers who have received post-graduate education, all having Master's degrees, is the smallest of all educational levels--16 persons altogether. This shows that in an age of specialization, there is still a long way to go in raising the quality of workers.

2. Table 8 shows that the percentage of workers answering "Yes, probably," gets larger in moving from the high school bracket to that of post-graduate: high school, 35 per cent; junior college, 56 per cent; full college, 64 per cent; and graduate school, 78 per cent. The percentage of workers answering "No, never," gets progressively smaller. In the post-graduate bracket, none believe that their suggestions would be rejected. This is another fact indicating that those who are more educated are given more opportunities to make suggestions, and that the possibilities of acceptance of their suggestions are greater. This is due to the fact that higher positions are often held by those who are more educated. And those who are in higher positions can have more opportunities to express their ideas and to participate in decision-making.

3. Table 9 reveals that most of the workers, no matter what bracket of education, chose to take the job inside. However, in comparing percentages of workers in different brackets, the smallest percentage, 58, is those who finished their college education. The reason is that the qualification of those with high school and junior college education is comparatively poor. They know that they can seldom get better jobs after leaving the present ones. Therefore, 77 per cent of them

chose to stay and would not take jobs outside. Those with post-graduate education either have the advantage of seniority, or already hold higher positions, and are not willing to quit unless another job is really promising. Therefore, only those who were from universities (full college), mostly being young and junior in rank, like to get out of the present job and have a change. There are often many experienced hands standing in their way for promotion, and their salaries may be so low that any other job will seem attractive. But they are the ones that the government needs for renovation or reformation. How to keep them from leaving is therefore another task before the personnel administration.

CHAPTER IV

THE MAJOR CHANGE OF 1967

On September 8, 1967, the Chinese government promulgated an administrative order on the delegation of authority; and in the same year, on September 16, the Personnel Bureau, directly under the Executive Yuan, was formally established. These two occurrences, coming in the same month, constituted a very important move toward reforming public personnel organization. These two changes have transferred authority--decentralizing authority in machinery from top to bottom--and moving the power of personnel administration from the Examination Yuan to the Executive Yuan. The former is a vertical authority change, and the latter is a horizontal change.

A. DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY

The strongest tendency in the organization of the present administration is that it has to keep expanding as the work becomes more specialized. The more specialized it becomes, the more its processes are divided. Centralization may take either a vertical or horizontal course. The organization of administration will invariably become entangled in this maze of growth. The concept of delegation of authority and the new rules promulgated by the government can now be considered in some detail.

Delegation of authority also can be called division of authority. It means that the subordinates of the machinery are given or entrusted with more responsibility. By dividing authority on routine work and giving it to the chiefs of the lower units, all the units in a sphere of authority can work with a greater degree of independence. The executive does not have to concern himself with matters that are not, according to the division of duty, his primary business. One traditional conception has kept the executive, being the chief of machinery, is responsible for each and every function. One also has to delegate responsibility to his workers. The meaning of delegation of authority covers that of delegation of responsibility. However, this does not mean that the executive who delegates authority is free from responsibility. He still has the responsibility of supervision. The goal of the system of hierarchy is to help one other among the units at the different levels of operation. The authority and responsibility of both the executive and his subordinates are closely related.²²

As the work of administrative machinery becomes more specialized, a worker in a specialized position must receive specialized training and acquire specialized knowledge. But the executives of the administrative organization are mostly generalists. They do not fully understand the expertise with which a specialist conducts his work. In such

²²Victor A. Thompson, "Hierarchy, Specialization and Organizational Conflict;" edited by Maurice E. O'Donnell, Readings in Public Administration (New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966), p: 54.

circumstances, the high ranking executives simply cannot direct, advise, or command them efficiently. To try would simply result in emotional tension or conflict between the generalists and specialists. This sort of tension and conflict leads to emotional uneasiness on the part of the specialists, affecting their working behavior and bringing about many unnecessary personnel conflicts. Consequently, in self-defense, the specialists have to adopt a sort of conservative attitude which will not allow them to make full use of their talents. If as a result, all they do is what they are told; their specialization goes to waste. Otherwise, the centralized system of organization is changed. The result could be as Thompson stated:

There are the social process of specialization and cultural institution of hierarchy. A great deal of insight into these organizations can be gained by tracing out the relations between specialization and hierarchy, particularly, any underlying tensions or conflicts can be eliminated in this fashion.²³

What makes delegation of authority superior? What are its effects on the behavior of the workers? An explanation of the superiority of the delegation of authority contains the following points.

Firstly, only through delegation of authority can the workers have autonomy, and carry out their work independently. With autonomy, workers have opportunities to develop their potential and use their knowledge--which in turn, helps to raise working efficiency. Many sociological scholars, conducting experiments on these points, have

²³Ibid., p. 53.

found such evidence. Cock and French indicated that a worker's efficiency will become stagnant at a certain level if he constantly works under strict supervision. On the contrary, if given sufficient autonomy, his working efficiency will improve. The following is a result they obtained after three months of experimentation in a factory. Under strict supervision, a worker's hourly production was about 40 pieces. Without any supervision, beginning with the fifth day, his hourly production began to increase, rising to 60 pieces an hour after the 30th day.²⁴ With autonomy, the worker determines how to do his work, and has only himself to blame if he fails. Hence it helps a worker to be responsible and positive. Furthermore, it keeps him from depending too much on his superiors, and from avoiding any difficulties that may arise. Thus, we find a clear relationship between autonomy and efficiency.

Secondly, after having obtained full autonomy, a worker can develop not only his potential and wisdom, but also can develop an interest in his work, thus obtaining personal satisfaction. Bursk unexpectedly discovered a pertinent fact in 1950, using two working units in one machinery with the same nature of work and the same pay, but having different levels of efficiency. The fact that prompted his study of the situation was that the workers of lower efficiency often broke up and destroyed public property. After close observation, he found

²⁴ Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, Group Dynamics (New York: Peterson and Company, 1962), pp. 334-335.

that there was too much interference in their work. It affected their interest and gave them no personal satisfaction. This indicates an important relationship between a worker's autonomy and his interest.²⁵

Thirdly, according to the modern sociologist's view, people living together will naturally produce a kind of interaction and mutual influence among themselves. As a result, friendly groups are formed. They are informal groups, in the terms of administration, which exercises considerable restraint upon the workers' behavior. If an administrative organization adopts a strict type of centralization, nothing can be done without approval. And in order to restrict its workers' behavior within a fixed sphere, it must enact laws and rules. Then the informal group, with strong restraint being exerted upon its members, will naturally adopt a negative, uncooperative attitude toward its work. However, if the workers have enough autonomy in their work, the informal group, instead of being indifferent about their work, will help serve as a motivating force. The reason for this is that so long as the workers have sufficient liberty in their work and are not obliged to ask for approval constantly, they have flexibility of behavior. They are better prepared in case of emergency, for if they must go by rules, and ask for approval before acting, a problem seldom can be solved on time. Therefore, delegation of authority gives workers


²⁵Edward C. Bursk, Human Relation for Management (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), pp. 250-255.

flexibility and helps them to solve urgent administrative problems.

Dublin claims:

I submit that this paradox is real only to those who insist that an organization is what the organization charts and job descriptions say it is. Informal relations in the organization serve to preserve the organization from the self destruction that would result from literal obedience to the formal policies, rules, regulations, and procedures.²⁶

Fourthly, delegation of authority can also simplify the procedure of administrative work and render less complex the communication system. Centralization in an administrative organization confuses administrative procedures and delays work. Under centralization, the executives are unwilling to entrust authority to subordinates. If a project needs the cooperation of two units to get started, according to its procedure, one of them, unit A for example, has to ask for approval first. To be approved, the plan of unit A must go through many levels before reaching the top executive. Then the executive will hand down approval in the same way to unit B. The following figure may serve as an illustration:²⁷



²⁶Robert Dubin, Human Relations in Administration (New York: Prentice Hall, 1951), p. 68.

²⁷Chin-Chien Chang, Public Administration (Taipei, Taiwan: In Chinese Sixth Edition: National Chengchi University Press, 1961), p. 131.

This figure means that unit F faces a problem of which the solution is possible if unit F can work together with unit P. Without delegation of authority, unit F has to ask unit P for cooperation through executive A; and unit P cannot lend its hand without approval notification from executive A. To complete the procedure, unit A's request has to go through ten steps before it gets an answer. With the delegation of authority, unit F can go directly and ask unit P's cooperation, and the problem can be easily solved. No time is wasted by going through so many steps--an obvious contribution to efficiency. Simplification of working procedure and a minimum of communication stops are essential to administrative efficiency. Confronted by communication stops the originator of a plan has no way of personally controlling the success or failure of his work. With a minimum of communication stops, the success or failure of his plan is felt by him personally. This kind of feeling definitely helps a worker to become better motivated, involved, and responsible for his work.

Through analyses made from the viewpoints of both theory and reality, we find that broad delegation of authority is the most effective way for solving the problems stemming from the traits of administrative organization. This is the basis upon which I have placed so much emphasis on the delegation of authority. After long study and experimentation, the Chinese government has finally found the key to the door of efficiency, and the Executive Yuan had promulgated its "rules for implementation of the delegation of authority in the administrative machineries." The new rule comprises 13 articles, including

purposes, limits, principles for the delegation and the contents of authority and responsibility. The following is a brief summary and evaluation of the new rules:

Aims and limits. Article 1 states: "In order to raise the efficiency of administrative machineries, it is requires that duties must be carried out through delegation of authority. All the executives, vice executives, and chiefs of all scales of which the delegation of authority and the division of responsibility must be based on these rules: Its application is limited to the following government agencies: (machineries):

a. The Executive Yuan and its affiliated ministries, commissions, departments, and bureaus.

b. Provincial and special municipal governments and all their affiliated machineries.

c. County and city governments and their affiliated machineries.

Classification of scales. The classification of scales must be based first on organizational law. The scalar process covers no more than four steps. The executives are on the top step, and section chiefs on the bottom. The whole work first must be specifically classified according to the nature and importance of positions, and then grouped and printed in a list. This can be put into force after approval.

The contents of authority and responsibility. (This is the most important part of the new rule.)

a. The executive of machinery has authority to make decisions on the following matters:

1. He is authorized to make decisions on policies, work plans and projects, and evaluations of his machinery and of all his affiliated bodies.

2. To check, adjust or increase the budget of his machinery and that of all his affiliated bodies. To spend the reserved fund if necessary.

3. To approve, amend, or abolish the rules or regulations of his machinery and that of all its affiliated bodies. To explain the rules about his machinery and all of its affiliated bodies.

4. To carry out the important orders given by his superior.

5. To make suggestions, appeals and reports and to ask for advice.

6. To direct and supervise the important measures adopted by his affiliated bodies.

7. To appoint, transfer, cut or raise salaries, evaluate, and praise or punish the workers of his machinery.

8. To appoint, fire, transfer, and praise or punish the workers in the middle class of his affiliated machinery.

9. To approve or reject any treaty or contract that his machinery or his affiliated bodies have made with outside organizations.

10. To classify and adjust the responsibilities for the units of his machinery and to pass judgement on mistakes.

11. To handle any conflicts of his affiliated bodies.

12. To answer important inquiries from the machineries at the same level.

13.. To preside over and participate in important meetings.

14. To take care of other important matters.

b. Matters over which authorized chiefs on second or third level have authority:

1. According to policies and work plan, to direct, supervise and check the work under their care.

2. To spend funds in the budget or funds with special approval.

3. To carry out work according to his chief's direction or the approved principles.

4. To grant or reject requests according to rules or laws.

5. To explain rules established for his work.

6. To pass on or carry out the orders from above and to coordinate with machineries on the same level.

7. To direct, supervise or adjust the personnel in his own unit.

8. To appoint, dismiss, evaluate, praise or punish temporary workers.

9. To grant leaves within one month for his subordinates.

10. To collect and supply common materials.

11. To preside over or participate in meetings related to his duties.

12. To care for other matters authorized.

c. In addition to the chief of machinery, who has the authority to approve of out-bound papers, chiefs in lower levels can also approve

out-bound papers if they are within the limits of their responsibilities.

1. An out-bound paper that is approved by a department chief still can be sent out in the name of the machinery chief and in that of the machinery to which his department belongs. However, his name should also be given as the substitute under the signature of his chief.

2. In an emergency, an out-bound paper can be approved by a chief on the third or fourth level. However, it has to be sent out in his own name and with the seal of his own section.

Chiefs, in urgent cases, have approved out-bound papers, but they also have to bear all resulting responsibilities. And, by the end of the month, they must submit to their chief a list of papers they have approved in his place.

Chief of a machinery bears the responsibility of supervising and evaluating work carried out through the delegation of his authority. He must assign a particular person to investigate jobs done by department chiefs in his place, and by chiefs on the third or fourth levels. The department chief, in turn, must examine jobs done by the chiefs below. In case of transgression, irresponsibility or dereliction, reports must be made immediately.

B. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PERSONNEL BUREAU

Against the above background, the government of the Republic of China decided the Personnel Bureau should be established directly under

the Executive Yuan. Except for the examination, all of the authority of personnel management was moved from the Examination Yuan to the Executive Yuan, a transference of authority from one machinery to another. The following paragraphs explain:

How was the bureau established? There is no provision for the organization of the Personnel Bureau in the organizational law of the Executive Yuan. The Constitution stipulates that no new organization can be established without the approval of the Legislative Yuan. However, the Executive Yuan cannot ask the legislature to approve the establishment of the Personnel Bureau, for the functions of the bureau have connection both with the Executive Yuan and Examination Yuan; and by the Constitution, the standing of the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, and the Examination Yuan are equal. Whereas the Executive Yuan is responsible to the legislative, the Examination Yuan is not. Therefore, the Personnel Bureau was not established through ordinary legislative process, but by Article 5 of provisional law attached to the Constitution. It stipulates that "The President is authorized to readjust the administrative machineries and the personnel machineries when he sees the need." So the bureau was established by a presidential decree.

The purpose for reorganizing the personnel management is that the Examination Yuan is concerned only with holding examinations. The rest of the work of personnel management, such as appointment, dismissal, promotion, demotion, transference, evaluation, and retirement,

are immediately under the direction and supervision of the administrative machineries. This is intended to improve the public personnel administration, and contribute to the administration reform which is now under way in China.

The bureau has four departments and five administrative sections. The number of its working staff is 105, not including supernumeraries. The greatest difference in personnel administration after the bureau came into existence is that the bureau directly administers all personnel affairs of the different administrative machineries and public enterprises that are under the jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan. These affairs were previously under the direction and supervision of the Examination Yuan. In other words, the superior officials of the personnel department in the Executive Yuan formerly were the Examination Yuan, but now they are in the Executive Yuan. As far as personnel is concerned, the Examination Yuan hereafter will occupy a secondary place.

The first item of organizational law says that "In the time of mobilization for suppressing the communist rebellion, the Executive Yuan especially establishes the personnel bureau with a purpose to strengthen the personnel management on the different levels of its administrative machineries and its public enterprises; at the same time to prepare and store different talents for the future." This general statement indicates that all government personnel are under its care. It does have a supplementary rule saying that "In connection with

examination and appointment the Personnel Bureau is also subject to the direction and supervision of the Examination Yuan." It is, however, a matter of procedure without any force of restriction. The ensuing explanation of its functions may help one to understand it better.

a. The first department has the following duties: (1) planning and managing personnel affairs on all levels of administrative machineries and public enterprises; (2) studying and suggesting policies and actions on personnel; (3) suggesting and evaluating the establishment or reformation of the personnel machineries in Executive Yuan and in its affiliated bodies; (4) managing appointment, dismissal, transferring, evaluation, praise and punishment of the civil servants in the administrative machineries and public enterprises under the jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan; (5) studying the drafting of personnel acts for the areas that are not yet recovered and put under the jurisdiction of the government; (6) training and preparing capable workers for the future.

b. The second department has four duties: (1) planning and evaluating appointment, dismissal, and transfer of the persons of selected ranks; (2) planning and evaluating the organizational law and categories of different levels of the administrative machineries; (3) evaluating the appointment, dismissal, and transfer of the heads and boards of directors of public enterprises; (4) planning the preparation and distribution of personnel for all levels of the administrative machineries.

c. The third department covers these items: (1) planning the system and rules of efficiency evaluation, and methods of increasing administrative efficiency of all levels of administrative machineries; (2) understanding, evaluating, preparing statistics, and analyzing the persons now employed; (3) evaluating and checking the efficiency evaluations, and taking actions necessary either to praise or punish workers on all levels of the administrative machineries; (4) arranging and keeping the records of evaluation of the administrative machineries and public enterprises; (5) planning and arranging for the civil servants pre-appointment training, training in service, seminar, further-study after work and study tours; (6) arranging for administrative medal awards, ceremonies, and citations.

d. The duties of the fourth department are six-fold: (1) planning and regulating the workers' salaries, bounties, and general welfare projects; (2) making suggestions on improvement of civil servants' insurance policy; (3) working for and regulating civil servants' retirement and pensions; (4) doing investigations, statistics, and analyses of personnel data; (5) studying developments in personnel management, and publishing related books and translations.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The problems of personnel organization described above are due in no small measure to the fact that the administrative executives, for one reason or another, do not entrust authority to their subordinates, or if they do, it is always with some degree of reservation. Because of reluctance to delegate, workers do not have authority for independent action nor initiative to do their work well. Hence workers lose interest and find little satisfaction in their positions, and little concern for efficiency. Poor efficiency results in negative evaluation by superiors, and poor evaluation in turn damages opportunity for promotion. The fact that executives do not want to delegate authority to their workers is directly related to the centralized type of organization. As was stated, one of the purposes of adopting centralization is to maintain control over the machinery of administration. For this purpose executives have to depend primarily on a body of precise, complicated laws and rules. However, long before the laws and rules fail to act as a restraint upon worker behavior, for they lack flexibility and cannot be adapted to changing environments and circumstances. The executives also resort to the help of their friends and relatives. Yet these so-called confidential appointments disrupt the personnel system, blocking out opportunities for other workers to get promotions, and, in turn, deepening their sense of dissatisfaction

with the organization. As a result, the situation is made worse with respect to efficiency and worker performance.

From the above information we may deduce that the independence and power of the personnel organization over administration causes a duplication of supervision over personnel workers and results in conflicts between the administrative organization and the examination system, thus breaking down the integration of administrative authority in an important aspect of personnel administration. The inadequate system and improper rules are left untouched and even the good rules are only on paper, and are not realistically practiced. As a result, examinations are divorced from employment, and young and able people are prevented from entering government service. Efficiency evaluation is but a formality, and elimination of the inefficient is impossible. Under such circumstances, it is useless to talk about the improvement of the quality of workers, even though quality is a vital necessity to specialized work.

All these factors are something like a chain consisting of a series of rings which have bound the government agencies so tightly that there is no room left for their movement. This chain of reactions constitutes the very problems existing in the administrative machinery. How can this binding chain be broken? It can be done only through the reorganization and re-orientation of personnel management. That is why, in 1967, the Chinese government adopted two measurements designed to adjust the authority as it relates to the machinery of organization.

One is the system of delegation of authority, based on the importance of positions, which is being realized through division of responsibility. The other is the transference of authority in the field of personnel through the establishment of the Personnel Bureau. It is predictable that the two measures will produce promising effects, for both are not only directed toward the needs of government, but also are consistent with theoretical principles of administration.

Since its establishment in September, 1967, the Personnel Bureau has adopted a system called "triple-check," involving three cards for each worker. One card is used to check his diligence and attendance. Another is to check the accuracy and efficiency of his work. And the third is to check his working habits and general conduct. There have been two evident responses from the workers. First, the worker is no longer late to the office. He is marked with a late check (V) on his attendance card if he comes to his office five minutes after the office hour begins. He is marked with an absent without leave (X) if he comes twenty minutes late. These marks are irremediable, for the cards are under the care of the personnel workers. The method is used for leaving the office; he will be given a mark of leaving ahead of time (V) in the attendance card if he leaves his office fifteen minutes early.

As a result, many more people have asked for early retirement. These who have already reached retirement age find that there is no way to change the card regarding efficiency. If a worker is to be dismissed, and his year-end evaluation, which is based on his records of

efficiency, is unsatisfactory for a succession of years, the dismissal deprives him of his right of pension. Therefore he is afraid to stay idle. According to statistics compiled by the Personnel Bureau, 500 workers have been compelled to retire, and another 1000 workers are now applying for retirement. This fact alone reveals that the government agencies are undergoing a definite change in the motivation of their workers. The evaluation of the "triple-check" is producing results if only through fear. There is still need for more positive motivation and morale.

The above effect is therefore only a beginning in the successes of the new system. Based on its authority, the Bureau must endeavor to encourage the workers by building up more reasonable systems of salary and evaluation that encourages improvement and if possible, providing workers with better treatment and job security so as to enable them to live more decently. At the same time, the system will also provide a way for young people to enter government service, and encourage the aged to retire by raising the amount of pensions, and paying more attention to welfare projects for employees.

As to the realization of the delegation of authority, although the government has approved and promulgated "the rules for implementing the delegation of authority," the effects still leave much to be desired. The realization of authority delegation must be based on the success achieved in position classification, with positions classified in a way that is consistent with the work and responsibility attached.

The responsibilities of a position must be clearly indicated and understood and accepted both by the supervisor and the employee. Several points in the rules call for further consideration. First, the definition of authority given to the machinery chief states, "He is authorized to direct and supervise the important measures undertaken by his affiliated machineries." Interpretations of this statement can be very flexible. Without more detailed explanation, it can be so applied as to justify interference by the chiefs. In order to avoid such ambiguity of the rule, a set of more detailed principles for its implementation should be worked out, so that each supervisor knows exactly what affairs are really under his authority. Secondly, the rule states that "the authority given to the chiefs on second and third levels" must be respected. For example, the chiefs, according to their given authority, may approve or reject a plan about some affairs. Their superior then must respect their authority and not try to interfere, and must avoid giving decrees or directions, so that the chiefs can feel free to devise their own way of performing their duties. At the same time, the central authority to say yes or no on certain matters, unless it goes beyond the limit given in the rule, is not subject to any administrative decrees or directions. Thirdly, the workers on the lowest level are simply to work for implementation of the operation. However, in China, as elsewhere, the workers at the lowest level often originate and work out operating plans. Therefore, in the rules, there should be a clear-cut classification of responsibility which strictly stipulates that the workers

on the fourth level are only to carry out the plans given by their chief. They are not supposed to do any planning work but their suggestions should be made to and received by their immediate supervisors.

It is good to know that the series of acts on "examination given to classified positions," "on appointments," "on salary ranges," and "on evaluation" were enacted by the legislature and signed by the President of the Republic of China in January, 1968. They will be in effect from July 1, 1968. They apply primarily to the fifteen categories of the machinery under the Taiwan Provincial Government, and, secondarily to the other agencies and public enterprises. The legislature has considered these acts since 1954. The fact that they were finally enacted and promulgated, immediately after the establishment of the Personnel Bureau, and the promulgation of the "rules for delegation of authority" indicates the desire of the government for administration reform and the determination to achieve needed change. By implementing these rules, it is expected that the two above measures for reorganization affecting personnel management will bring success in improving the administrative efficiency of the government of the Republic of China. The great tasks of welfare and economic development faced by the Republic makes it essential that its employees contribute in full measure to the success of all governmental programs.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bursk, Edward C. Human Relations for Management. New York: Harper and Brothers Press, 1956.
- Cartwright, Dorwin and Slim Zander. Group Dynamics. New York: Row Peterson and Company, 1962.
- Chang, Chin-Chien. Public Administration. Taipei, Taiwan: National Chengchi University Press, 1961.
- Davis, Keith. Human Relations at Work. 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962.
- Dubin, Robert. Human Relation in Administration: The Sociology of Organization, With Reading and Cases. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951.
- Golembiewski, Robert T. Editors Frank Gibson and Geoffrey Y. Cornog, Public Administration: Reading in Institutions, Processes, Behavior. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1966.
- Marx-Weber. Essays in Sociology. Ed. and trans. H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills. Fair Lawn, N. J.: Oxford University Press, 1946, and The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Ed. and trans. Talcott Parsons. Fair Lawn, N. J.: Oxford University Press, 1947.
- O'Donnell, Maurice. Readings in Public Administration. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966.
- Pfiffner, John M., and Robert Presthus. Public Administration. 5th ed. New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1967.
- Pfiffner, John M. The Supervision of Personnel; Human Relation in Management of Men. 2nd ed. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1958.
- Stahl, O. Glen. Public Personnel Administration. 5th ed. New York: Harper and Row Press, 1962.

DOCUMENTS

- "The Constitutional Law of the Republic of China," adopted by the National Assembly on December 25, 1946, promulgated by the National Government on January 1, 1957 and effective from December 25, 1947. China Year Book (1966-67). Taipei, Taiwan: China Publishing Co., pp. 713-730.

- "The Organizational Law of the Executive Yuan," promulgated by the National Government on March 31, 1947. Article 3, 5, 15 was amended by Legislative Yuan in 1948 and 1949. The Six Categories of Law Book, Edited by Dr. Yu Shu-Pin. Taipei, Taiwan: Far-East Company Press, 1953, pp. 955-958.
- "The Acts for the Appointment of Civil Servants," promulgated by the National Government on March 13, 1933, amended in 1935, 1937, and re-promulgated by the President of Republic of China on January 1, 1949. The Six Categories of Law Book. Edited by Dr. Yu Shu-Pin. Taipei, Taiwan: Far-East Company Press, 1953, pp. 981-983.
- "The Law on Retired Civil Servants," promulgated by the National Government on November 6, 1943, and amended on June 26, 1947. The Six Categories of Law Book. Edited by Dr. Yu Shu-Pin. Taipei, Taiwan: Far-East Company Press, 1953, pp. 995-998.
- "The Rules on the Personnel Management of Different Administrative Machineries," promulgated by National Government on September 2, 1942. Prof. Chang Chin-Chien, The Chinese Public Personnel Administration. Taipei, Taiwan: National Chengchi University Press, 1963, pp. 15-20.
- "The Rules for Establishing Personnel Machineries," promulgated by the Examination Yuan on October 17, 1942. Prof. Chang Chin-Chien, The Chinese Public Personnel Administration. Taipei, Taiwan: National Chengchi University Press, 1963, pp. 21-25.
- "The Rules of Efficiency Evaluation for Personnel Workers," promulgated by the Ministry of Personnel on December 1, 1951. Prof. Chang Chin-Chien, The Chinese Public Personnel Administration. Taipei, Taiwan: National Chengchi University Press, 1963, pp. 26-28.
- "The Rules for Efficiency Evaluation on Civil Servants," promulgated by the National Government in 1929, amended on April 9, 1962. Prof. Chang Chin-Chien, The Chinese Public Personnel Administration. Taipei, Taiwan: National Chengchi University Press, 1963, pp. 75-84.
- "The Organizational Law of the Personnel Bureau," promulgated by the President of the Republic of China on September 1, 1967, published in the "Central Daily News," September 2, 1967.
- "The Rules for Implementing the Delegation of Authority," promulgated by the Executive Yuan on September 8, 1967, published in the "Central Daily News," September 9, 1967.

VITA

Shun Yao was born on September 14, 1920 in Yuyao County, Chekiang, China. He is the eldest of four sons, his three brothers now being on the mainland of China with their present whereabouts and welfare unknown. Mr. Yao completed his elementary and secondary education in 1936. During this period of time, he also underwent a year's military training in the Resistance War period. He was awarded a Bachelor of Laws degree from National Wuhan University in 1946 and he has passed the Barrister Examination and is licensed to practice law.

As a graduate with honor, Mr. Yao was recommended by Wuhan University to the Ministry of Judicial Administration and was appointed judge at the local court of law of Chingchow, Liaoning for one year. He resigned due to the fact that the Communist forces agitated for rebellion. He was then appointed by the Ministry of Education as a section chief of the Educational and Vocational Guidance Committee for youth where he remained until 1949. When the National Government moved to Taiwan, he also moved to Taiwan. Here he first worked with the Kuomintang where he was responsible for the planning of the youth movement. Later he was transferred to the China Youth Corps. His present work consists of:

1. Secretary General, China Youth Corps, responsible for coordination and synthesis of the overall work of the Corps;
2. Professor, Tamkiang College and Taiwan Provincial Chunghsing University.

3. Member of the Committee for Cooperation between National Reconstruction and Education, doing research in national economic development and planning for the strengthening of the cooperation.

In addition, he shares a part of his time with the honorary works that are related with his duties as follows:

1. Member of the Board of Directors, China National Association of Scouting;
2. Supervisor, Chinese Guidance Association;
3. Deputy Secretary General, Association of Youth Organizations.

Mr. Yao was married in 1957 and has two children. After receiving the Master of Science degree, with a major in History, Mr. Yao has returned to Taipei, Taiwan.