A Portfolio

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Samuel Webb

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Abstract

This master's thesis is a portfolio of essays that were submitted to the philosophy department of the University of Tennessee at Knoxville in order to complete the competency requirements of the PhD program. This portfolio contains three essays that fall under each of the three broad divisions that are typically used to categorize the disparate areas of discourse that philosophy encompasses: ELMS, value theory, and the history of philosophy. In "Defending Practical Attitude Intellectualism", I reconstruct an attempt by Yuri Cath to put forward an analysis of practical knowledge which synthesizes elements from two competing analyses of practical knowledge. Next, I offer a defense for this attempt against an objection that Cath had previously considered as well as a novel objection. In "Our Duties to the Disabled", I present a problem that often arises when we consider the question of who should accept moral responsibility for meeting the needs of a disabled person under non-ideal circumstances, which is identifying who should accept responsibility for meeting the needs of a disabled person when a party that was presumed to be responsible fails to meet those needs. I proceed to construct a schema that addresses this problem and demonstrate how this schema can be used to address the kind of real cases that I pointed out. In "Three Interpretations of Hume's Self", I explain why determining the best interpretation of Hume's theory of personal identity is a difficult problem, and then I offer a novel attempt to argue in favor of one interpretation. I present three competing interpretations of Hume's theory of personal identity from Ainslie and Ware, Ruth Boeker, and Lilli Alanen, and I compare each of these interpretations according to how compatible they are with Hume's theory of practical reason, which draws upon his theory of personal identity. I use this comparative analysis to argue in favor of the interpretation advanced by Alanen because is the most compatible with Hume's theory of personal identity.

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Part 1: Defending Practical Attitude Intellectualism

Introduction

In his essay, "Know How and Skill: The Puzzles of Priority and Equivalence" (2020), Yuri Cath outlines a heterodox intellectualist analysis of knowledge how which he names "Practical Attitude Intellectualism" (PA-Intellectualism). Cath directly compares this analysis to the standard orthodox intellectualist analysis, which he names "Practical Mode Intellectualism" (PM-Intellectualism) in order to demonstrate that a heterodox analysis offers a greater degree of flexibility to resolve dilemmas that Cath poses against the orthodox analysis. PA-Intellectualism accepts the central claim of Ryleanism, that knowing how is an ability or set of dispositions to Φ, while incorporating a dispositional conception of propositional belief that preserves a connection between know-how and propositional belief as well. Furthermore, Cath contrasts how PA-Intellectualism and PM-Intellectualism can address three important examples that he presented in an earlier essay. However, in his response to the challenge posed by the *Non-Dogmatic Hallucinator* case, Cath admittedly leaves an underdeveloped response that is only meant to hand wave at the greater degree of flexibility that the PA-intellectualist can afford that is impossible for the PM-intellectualist. In this essay, I will put forward a fully developed defense of PA-intellectualism against the objection that is driven by the *Non-Dogmatic Hallucinator* (NDH) case. I will then go on to put forward my example-driven objection against PA-Intellectualism that modifies Stanley and Williamson's *Pianist* objection against Ryleanism. Finally, I will demonstrate that PA-Intellectualism can also be defended against this modified objection.

Issues Facing Orthodox Intellectualism

Cath sets up two dilemmas for orthodox intellectualists by examining a pair of claims which are commonly affirmed by both intellectualists and Ryleans. These conditional propositions are "(KH→AB): If *S* knows how to Φ then *S* has the ability to Φ intentionally", and "(AB→KH): If *S* has the ability to Φ intentionally then *S* knows how to Φ". (Cath, 2020, pg. 1) Intellectualists and Ryleans are obliged to accept both of these claims because they are entailments of (KH=AB): "*S* knows how to Φ if and only if *S*

has the ability to Φ intentionally", which is a thesis that both analyses accept as true. (Cath, 2020, pg. 1) Assuming that (KH=AB) is correct, Cath then proceeds to explain how both of the entailed theses raise potential issues for the standard orthodox intellectualist analysis, which he attributes to Stanley and Williamson (2001) and labels as Practical Mode Intellectualism. Cath defines PM-intellectualism as: "S knows how to Φ iff for some way *w*, (i) *S* knows that *w* is a way for *S* to Φ, and (ii) in possessing this knowledge, *S* entertains *w* under a practical mode of presentation [which ought to entail the ability to Φ]." (Cath, 2020, pg. 2). (KH→AB) and (AB→KH) both lead the orthdox intellectualists into a dilemma that leaves them unable to reconcile their theoretical commitments with each of the respective theses.

Starting with the (KH→AB) thesis, Cath explains that orthodox intellectualists only allow for one legitimate disambiguation of the phrase that 'S knows how to Φ' that attributes to S the kind of practical knowledge that the know-how debates are centered around. They disambiguate 'S knows how to Φ' as 'for some way *w*, S knows that *w* is a way that S can Φ in circumstances C'. In an attempt to explain the truth of (KH→AB), Cath grants that the PM-intellectualist can reasonably stretch this disambiguated form of the 'S knows how to Φ' ascription to include intentionality on the part of S in Φ-ing. However, this explanation is in direct tension with the intellectualist stance because it equates knowing how to Φ with some kind of ability to Φ rather than a belief about how to Φ. Intellectualists will likely want to respond that it is S knowing of a way *w* to Φ that we should understand as being explanatorily prior, but this raises a further problem. It seems odd to say that a belief about one's ability to Φ precedes the ability to Φ itself. It seems obvious that the ability to Φ must already be present within a person before they can become aware of the ability and form reasonable beliefs about it. This places the PM-intellectualist in a dilemma, which Cath sums up as follows: "Either the relevant entailed 'S can Φ' ascription is one that itself entails 'S has the ability to Φ intentionally' or it does not. If the latter is true, then the entailment fact cannot explain (KH→AB). On the other hand, if the former is true then the entailment fact can explain (KH→AB) but this explanation seems to commit one to the claim that the ability to Φ

intentionally is explanatorily prior to knowing how to Φ, a claim which most intellectualists would reject." (Cath, 2020, pg. 3)

Moving on to the (AB→KH) thesis, Cath first makes a point to frame the role of knowledge how as being something which is concerned with actions being under one's control or guidance rather than being concerned with the initiation of actions. This is a framing that both intellectualists and Ryleans can accept, and at first blush it seems like the orthodox intellectualists might not have a problem trying to explain (AB→KH). Your possession of an A-relevant action plan is a commonly cited requirement for your intentionally A-ing, and the intellectualist can make a compelling case that possessing an action plan consists in having a belief that '*w* is a way for me to Φ', which seems like a very attractive explanation for (AB→KH). However, Cath points out that the PM-intellectualist analysis is not in total harmony with (AB→KH) because this proposition supports counterexamples to PM-intellectualism, which were laid out in "Knowing how without knowing that" (2011). In that article, Cath puts forward three cases in which the subject is presented as knowing how to Φ without knowing that *w* is a way for them to Φ because their belief about *w* fails to count as knowledge for different reasons. Here are the three cases:

> *The Lucky Light Bulb*: "Charlie wants to learn how to change a light bulb, but he knows almost nothing about light fixtures or bulbs (as he has only ever seen light bulbs already installed and so he has never seen the end of a light bulb, nor the inside of a light fixture). To remedy this situation Charlie consults The Idiot's Guide to Everyday Jobs. Inside, he finds an accurate set of instructions describing the shape of a light fixture and bulb, and the way to change a bulb. Charlie grasps these instructions perfectly. And so there is a way, call it 'w1', such that Charlie now believes that w1 is a way for him to change a light bulb, namely, the way described in the book. However, unbeknownst to Charlie, he is extremely lucky to have read these instructions, for the disgruntled author of The Idiot's Guide filled her book with misleading instructions. Under every entry she intentionally misdescribed the objects involved in that job, and described a series of actions that would not constitute a way to do the job at all. However, at the printers, a computer

error caused the text under the entry for ‘Changing a Light Bulb’, in just one copy of the book, to be randomly replaced by new text. By incredible coincidence, this new text provided the clear and accurate set of instructions that Charlie would later consult.” (Cath, 2011, pg. 3)

The Dogmatic Hallucinator: “Lucy occasionally suffers from a peculiar kind of hallucination. On occasion, it seems to her that she remembers events of learning how to Φ, when in fact no such event occurred. Furthermore, the way Lucy ‘remembers’ as being the way to Φ is not a way to Φ at all. On Saturday, a clown teaches Lucy how to juggle. By the end of the class, she knows how to juggle and is juggling confidently. And so there is a way, call it ‘w 2,’ such that Lucy now believes that w 2 is a way for her to juggle, namely, the way the clown taught her to juggle. On Sunday, Lucy is about to tell a friend the good news that she knows how to juggle. However, as she begins, the alarm goes off on her false (p.116) memory detector (or FMD), a remarkable device that is a superreliable detector of her false memories. This indicates to Lucy that her apparent memory of learning how to juggle is not only a false memory but also misleading with respect to the way to juggle. Normally, Lucy would revise her beliefs accordingly, and this is what she believes she ought to do now. However, on this occasion, she is unable to shake the beliefs she believes she ought to revise. So, Lucy continues to believe that she knows how to juggle and that w 2 is a way for her to juggle. Of course, Lucy did learn how to juggle yesterday, so her FMD has made an error, albeit one that was highly unlikely.” (Cath, 2011, pg. 3)

The Non-Dogmatic Hallucinator: “Jodie occasionally suffers from a peculiar kind of hallucination. On occasion, it seems to her that she remembers events of learning how to Φ, when in fact no such event occurred. Furthermore, the way Jodie ‘remembers’ as being the way to Φ is not a way to Φ at all. On Saturday, a clown teaches Jodie how to juggle. By the end of the class, she knows how to juggle and is juggling confidently. And so there is a way, call it ‘w 3,’ such that Jodie now believes that w 3 is a way for her to juggle, namely, the way the clown taught her

> to juggle. On Sunday, Jodie is about to tell a friend the good news that she knows how to juggle. However, as she begins, the alarm goes off on her false memory detector (or FMD), a remarkable device that is a superreliable detector of her false memories. This indicates to Jodie that her apparent memory of learning how to juggle is not only a false memory but also misleading with respect to the way to juggle. Normally, Jodie would revise her beliefs accordingly, and this is exactly what Jodie does. So, she no longer believes that she knows how to juggle or that w 3 is a way for her to juggle. Of course, Jodie did learn how to juggle yesterday, so her FMD has made an error, albeit one that was highly unlikely." (Cath, 2011, pg. 4)

The Lucky Lightbulb case presents a subject S that knows how to Φ despite the fact that S's belief that *w* is a way to Φ violates the anti-luck requirement for propositional knowledge, and Cath emphasizes a further entailment of the case that know-how might be compatible with Gettier-style luck. *The Dogmatic Hallucinator* case presents a subject S that knows how to Φ despite the fact that S's belief that *w* is a way to Φ violates the justified belief requirement for propositional knowledge. *The Non-Dogmatic Hallucinator* case presents a subject S that knows how to Φ despite the fact that S does not believe that S can Φ, which violates the belief requirement for propositional knowledge. Therefore, each of these cases presents a second dilemma for the PM-Intellectualist analysis which it does not have the capacity to resolve. These cases present a subject S who can Φ intentionally, which should lead an intellectualist to the conclusion that each S knows how to Φ because they accept the (AB→KH) thesis. However, because of the theoretical assumptions of PM-intellectualism, the analysis has to deny that S knows how to Φ in each of these cases because their ability to Φ cannot be equated with propositional knowledge. Hence, the orthodox intellectualist must either reject (AB→KH), and subsequently (KH=AB) as a result, or she must reject the theoretical assumptions of orthodox intellectualism.

Because the orthodox intellectualists find themselves struggling to reconcile their analysis with (KH→AB) and (AB→KH), Cath recommends that intellectualists should seek out new and heterodox intellectualist analyses in order to address these challenges he has put forward. Cath has previously

argued that heterodox intellectualists can release their commitment to the anti-luck condition for know-how, if only for cases of upstream luck seen in cases like *Lucky Lightbulb*, but the *Dogmatic Hallucinator* and *Non-Dogmatic Hallucinator* cases pose a more persistent challenge for any intellectualist analysis.

PA-Intellectualism and Dispositional Attitudes

After examining these two dilemmas facing the PM-intellectualist position and being unable to find a satisfying mode of response on their behalf, Cath puts forward a heterodox intellectualist analysis of know-how to serve as a provisional starting point for stepping away from orthodox intellectualism. The readily available alternative to Intellectualism is Ryleanism, which is a family of analyses about know-how that are characterized by the positive claim that "we can identify knowing how to Φ with some kind of ability to Φ or set of dispositions involving Φ-ing." (Cath, 2019, pg. 5) Rather than fully abandoning Intellectualism, Cath outlines an analysis that synthesizes elements of intellectualism and Ryleanism in order to offer his provisional analysis a greater amount of freedom in responding to the challenges that Cath has levelled against orthodox Intellectualism. Cath names this position "Practical Attitude (PA) Intellectualism", and he defines it as follows: "S knows how to Φ iff for some way *w*, (i) S knows that *w* is a way for S to Φ, and (ii) in possessing this knowledge, S believes, in a practical way, that *w* is a way for S to Φ." (Cath, 2020, pg. 6) At first appearances, this definition of PA-intellectualism does not appear to be making much of a departure from PM-intellectualism. However, Cath goes on to explain that what distinguishes PA-intellectualism is how it conceptualizes believing in a practical way. The PA-intellectualist identifies the complex of dispositional states which enables S to carry out *w* as a way to Φ as what constitutes believing in a practical way rather than the vague notion of a Practical Mode of Presentation (PMP).

Drawing upon the work of Schwitzgebel (2001, 2002, 2013), Cath outlines the concept of a dispositional profile, which is a collection of dispositions to act in certain ways that match the stereotype of a person who possesses a belief with a particular propositional content. Schwitzgebel explains that there are dispositional profiles which can be stereotyped to a property, X, if the dispositions "would be

regarded as characteristic of something that possesses property X." (Schwitzgebel, 2013, pg. 8) One kind of property that dispositional profiles can be stereotyped to are beliefs, and so the characteristic dispositions of someone who holds the belief P are dispositions to act and react as if P is the case. Belief-characteristic dispositions can either be intellectual dispositions, i.e., they concern states and processes which are internal to our minds, or they can be practical dispositions, i.e., they concern our externally observable behavior. The kind of propositional beliefs that are relevant for analyzing know-how will be beliefs held by a person, S, of the form "there is some way, w, for S to Φ," which will henceforth be referred to as "action-focused beliefs." This means that when S comes to hold an action-focused belief about Φ-ing in a way that counts as knowledge, according to the PA-intellectualist, S must possess the dispositional profile that is stereotyped to the same propositional belief about Φ-ing. Therefore, it is in virtue of possessing a dispositional profile for Φ-ing that a person can be accurately described as knowing how to Φ according to the PA-Intellectualist analysis.

This dispositional account of know-how that Cath outlines carefully synthesizes the two key elements of knowledge how: the dispositions and ability to manifest Φ-ing, which is emphasized by the Rylean analysis, and propositional beliefs about ways to Φ, which is emphasized by the orthodox intellectualist analysis. As a result, the PA-intellectualist analysis of know-how manages to retain the strengths of a Rylean analysis and an intellectualist analysis while avoiding the commonly cited shortcomings of both positions. This does not leave PA-intellectualism completely beyond the reach of any possible objections, but it does grant a much greater degree of flexibility in how one might resolve the dilemmas which Cath has pointed out.

Resolving Ability-Belief Priority

The principal advantage of the PA-intellectualist analysis over PM-intellectualism is that it provides the PA-intellectualist with a ready solution to the belief-ability priority issue that is unavailable to the orthodox intellectualist. With respect to the concerns that (KH→AB) and (AB→KH) raise over whether beliefs about one's ability to Φ are prior to the ability to Φ, the PA-intellectualist's notion of a

dispositional profile offers an explanation that gives no priority to either the belief that *w* is a way to Φ or the ability to Φ intentionally. Rather than one being explanatorily or necessarily prior to the other, the PA-intellectualist analysis conceives of S's ability to Φ intentionally and S's belief that S can Φ as being simultaneous products of the dispositional profile that is stereotyped to an action-focused belief about Φ-ing. This means that the PA-intellectualist neither has to concede to the priority of the ability to Φ, nor does she have to struggle to give a complex psychological account of how the belief that one can Φ precedes the ability to Φ. This effectively resolves the dilemma which the PM-Intellectualist analysis falls into when attempting to reconcile itself with (KH→AB).

Objections to PA-Intellectualism Addressed by Cath

Cath returns to the counterexample cases he presented against PM-intellectualism that arise in connection to (AB→KH) to demonstrate that the PA-Intellectualist analysis is not susceptible to these same objections.

The *Lucky Lightbulb* case does not present a challenge for PA-Intellectualism because the analysis focuses on the dispositional profile of the subject S, which means that PA-Intellectualism can account for know-how in a way that is compatible with upstream, Gettier-style luck. PA-Intellectualism can explain why the subject of *Lucky Lightbulb* knows how to Φ: S has acquired a dispositional profile that makes S apt to change a lightbulb, even though the reason for S acquiring this dispositional profile was a case of upstream luck.

The *Dogmatic Hallucinator* does not present a challenge to the PA-intellectualist because the analysis can explain why the subject knows how to Φ: Even though Jodie's belief that she can juggle is undercut by her misleading evidence, she nonetheless possesses the right kind of dispositional profile to juggle.

Next, turning to the *Non-Dogmatic Hallucinator*, Cath explains that this case poses some challenge for the PA-intellectualist because it presents Jodie as retaining the ability to juggle even though

she loses the belief that she knows how to juggle altogether, which raises the concern that the ability to juggle is the more basic component of Jodie knowing how to juggle than her beliefs about her ability to juggle. Cath suggests that the PA-intellectualist can respond by claiming that even though Jodie does not believe in an intellectual way that she can juggle, she does however believe in a practical way that she can juggle. He explains that believing a proposition in an intellectual way requires an acknowledgement of certain intellectual dispositions, e.g., being disposed to endorse the proposition in words and thoughts. Jodie is aware that she lacks such dispositions, and so she does not believe that she can juggle in an intellectual way. However, believing a proposition in a practical way only requires one to possess the relevant success and guidance dispositions which make up the dispositional profile of a person who can Φ intentionally and successfully. This is because a person who is disposed to Φ intentionally and successfully can act upon the proposition that *w* is a way to Φ by virtue of their dispositional profile even if they do not intellectually believe that the proposition is true. Cath wraps up this rather brief rebuttal by admitting that this response is not fully developed, but it demonstrates that PA-intellectualism is flexible enough to offer some kind of a response to the counterexample.

A Fully Developed Response to The Non-Dogmatic Hallucinator

Cath claims that Jodie qualifies as knowing how to juggle because she meets all of the requirements posed by the PA-intellectualist analysis. However, this seems like the incorrect conclusion because Jodie does not believe that she knows how to juggle. Cath's response to the pushback on his conclusion is that while she does not intellectually believe that she knows a way to juggle, she does practically believe that she can juggle. Her action-focused belief that she can juggle is explained by the fact that she is aware of a prospective way to juggle – the one revealed to her in what she believes was a hallucination – which she can put into practice by attempting to juggle, and it was stipulated that she would succeed if she attempted to use what she learned. Cath explains that this means that while she might lack the intellectual dispositions to affirm to herself that she can juggle due to her undermining evidence, she nonetheless still has access to the success and guidance dispositions that constitute the relevant dispositional profile for

juggling. Here, Cath makes it clear that the dispositional profile itself is sufficient to constitute know-how according to the PA-intellectualist position. Even though the dispositional profile is something which gives rise to the ability to Φ intentionally and justified beliefs about one's ability to Φ, these associated products of the dispositional profile are not a necessary component of know-how according to the PA-Intellectualist.

However, there is a further lingering concern here that Cath's response does not appear to resolve, which isn't surprising as Cath acknowledges that more needs to be said about diagnosing the NDH case. The lingering concern is that this response from Cath seems to undermine the PA-Intellectualist solution to the (KH→AB) dilemma. According to Cath, PA-intellectualism avoids the dilemma because it claims that S's belief that they can Φ and S's ability to intentionally Φ are independent products of S's dispositional profile that have no priority relation to one another. However, Cath diagnoses the NDH case by claiming that Jodie does possess know-how despite her failing to believe that she can Φ because she still retains the ability to intentionally Φ. Cath's diagnosis seems to reveal that the ability to intentionally Φ is more basic and essential for know-how than S possessing a belief that they can Φ, and it might even eliminate the need for a belief about Φ-ing from the analysis entirely, which would be an ironic conclusion for an intellectualist analysis to reach.

I think that this concern can be addressed in a way that preserves the PA-Intellectualist "no-priority" response to the (KH→AB) dilemma and avoids having PA-intellectualism potentially collapse into a purely Rylean analysis. A necessary distinction needs to be made here between S holding a belief that 'S can Φ' and S holding a belief that 'w is a way for S to Φ'. The former is what Cath refers to as an intellectual belief and the latter is an action-focused belief, and an action-focused belief is all that is necessary for knowing how to Φ according to the PA-intellectualist analysis.

In the case of Jodie, it is true that she does not believe that she can juggle, but she is still aware of the way to juggle that she learned from the clown which constitutes her action-focused belief that doing what she learned is a way to juggle. We can see that this is the case if we imagine what Jodie would do if

she were convinced to make an attempt to juggle by using what she learned from the clown. In order to make the attempt, she would have to be able to present what she learned to herself as a way to juggle, even though she also currently has an undercutting intellectual belief that this attempt might not be successful. In exercising this action-focused belief, which ought to be successful according to the stipulations about the case, it seems clear that Jodie would intentionally juggle by attempting to manifest what she learned. However, this would be impossible for someone who lacked this kind of action-focused belief, i.e., a perfect novice with respect to juggling. Such a person, even if they could be convinced to make an attempt at juggling, lacks an action-focused belief about how to juggle in the first place which leaves them in a position where an attempt would either be impossible or it would require them to invent an action-focused belief about how to juggle on the spot. Either way, these considerations illuminate the fact that an action-focused belief of the kind 'w is a way for S to Φ' is a necessary component of the explanation about whether S knows how to Φ, but an intellectual belief of the kind 'S can Φ' is not.

By comparing Jodie with a perfect novice with respect to juggling, we can also see that this response does not collapse knowing how to Φ back into the mere ability to Φ intentionally. If Jodie successfully juggles, this fact is best explained by her holding an action-focused belief about how to juggle which disposes her to juggle when she intends to. However, if the perfect novice successfully juggles, this fact is best explained by some kind of lucky circumstance in which the novice's actions constituted a successful attempt to juggle when he intended to. Even though we can say that Jodie and the novice juggled intentionally, it is clear that Jodie knows how to juggle and the novice does not know how to juggle. What best explains the difference between Jodie and the novice is Jodie's action-focused belief which is constituted by her dispositional profile.

Modifying the Pianist Case

While I believe that the reasonably expanded form of Cath's response to the *Non-Dogmatic Hallucinator* objection is successful, I think there is further room left to challenge the PA-intellectualist analysis. While Cath thoroughly re-examines the objections which the PM-intellectualist analysis was insufficient to

defend against, these objections focus their attack entirely on whether belief comes apart from the dispositional profile that constitutes know-how. So, I will now examine another possible avenue of objection which focuses on whether the ability to Φ intentionally comes apart from the dispositional profile instead. While this type of objection is usually levelled against Rylean analyses of knowledge how, it is an appropriate concern for the PA-intellectualist as well because of the Rylean elements that Cath incorporated into PA-intellectualism. The standard type of case that is put forward to make this objection is the *Pianist* case, which is attributed to Stanley and Williamson (2001), and other cases that possess a similar form to the *Pianist*. However, Cath has previously acknowledged Hawley's (2003) notion that invoking the thesis that knowing how to Φ entails reliable success in action provides an effective strategy for rebuttal against the *Pianist* and other similar cases. (Cath, 2019, pg. 15) By disambiguating 'S knows how to Φ' to be understood narrowly as 'S knows how to Φ in circumstances C', a Rylean can effectively resolve the central issue that the *Pianist* advances, and it seems clear that a PA-Intellectualist is free to offer the same rebuttal as well. So, I have constructed a case which attempts to illustrate how a person S might possess the proper dispositional profile to Φ but would somehow be incapable of intentionally Φ-ing that circumvents this readily available response to the *Pianist* case.

> *Fictional Game* – One day, in a flight of fancy, Garrett makes up a game which would require the use of a fictional device which has never existed and will never exist. Later that day, Garrett explains the rules of his imaginary game to Yvette, and she considers how one would play such a game if it were possible to play it. Let us assume that if the fictional device necessary to play Garrett's imaginary game actually existed, Yvette already possesses all of the dispositions that one would need to play the game, and she would be able to play the game successfully when she intends to play it. Does Yvette know how to play Garrett's game?

This case reasserts the possibility that the dispositional profile of S and S's ability to Φ intentionally can come apart in a manner that Hawley's rebuttal does not account for. According to the PA-Intellectualist analysis of know-how, Yvette would know how to play Garrett's game because she

possesses the dispositional profile of someone who can play the game. However, claiming that Yvette can play a game that has never been played and will never be played seems absurd. If we attempt to apply the Hawley rebuttal to the *Fictional Game* case, we can see that appealing to the notion of "S knows how to Φ in circumstance C" seems odd if we are describing a circumstance which has never and will never come to pass. The intuitive appeal of the Hawley response in the *Pianist* comes from the fact that the circumstance for the master pianist to play the piano was actually available to her in the recent past of the actual world prior to her accident. However, the circumstance for playing Garrett's game has never existed in the actual world and won't exist at any point in the future, which makes the Hawley response less appealing. Even if it is conceded that Yvette knows how to play Garrett's game in the counterfactual world where the fictional device exists, using this to support the assertion that the Yvette in the actual world knows how to play the game seems like a non-sequitur. This reveals a limitation for the applicability of the Hawley response, namely that it offers an effective rebuttal to *Pianist* cases in which the circumstances for Φ-ing are, were, or could be available in the actual world. Therefore, my modified objection case sidesteps the Hawley response and threatens the PA-Intellectualist analysis by showing that it must accept an absurd conclusion.

My Defense Against the Modified Objection

However, I will now demonstrate that there is a response available to the PA-Intellectualist which can release the analysis from accepting this absurd conclusion from the *Fictional Game* case. While the PA-Intellectualist asserts that the dispositional profile of S is what determines whether S knows how to Φ, Cath also explains that S can only know how to Φ if S has an action-focused belief that *w* is a way to Φ that counts as knowledge. While heterodox intellectualism is characterized by rejecting the claim that knowing how must meet all of the same requirements that propositional knowledge has, it does not dispense with the truth condition on knowledge. This means that even if S has a dispositional profile that is stereotyped to an action-focused belief about Φ-ing, that action-focused belief must also be true in order to count as knowledge. In order for an action-focused belief to be true, S must be able to

successfully Φ by means of w, which means the truth of that belief will be dependent upon a set of facts about the actual world. We can understand this set of facts as a complex proposition that is a conjunction of all propositions which must be true about the actual world in order for Φ-ing to be possible in the actual world, and henceforth I refer to this complex conjunction as "WHAT-IT-IS-TO- Φ". We know that in order for WHAT-IT-IS-TO-Φ to be true every proposition it conjoins must also be true, and action-focused beliefs about ways to Φ can only be true if WHAT-IT-IS-TO-Φ obtains in the actual world.

With these points established, this opens up a response that the PA-Intellectualist can offer to the objection put forward by the *Fictional Game* case. In order for Yvette's action-focused beliefs about how she could play Garrett's game to be true, at least one fact must obtain in the actual world: the fictional device necessary to play the game must actually come into being. This means that the existence of the device is one of the propositions within WHAT-IT-IS-TO-Φ with respect to Garrett's game. Because the device doesn't exist in the actual world, WHAT-IT-IS-TO-Φ with respect to playing Garrett's game doesn't obtain. This means that even if we stipulate that Yvette possesses the dispositional profile which would allow her to play the game in a counterfactual sense, the PA-Intellectualist can still conclude that Yvette does not know how to play the game because an action-focused belief about how to play the game cannot be true. Hence, the PA-Intellectualist is not committed to accepting a counterintuitive conclusion about the *Fictional Game* case.

Conclusion

Cath presents a compelling case for intellectualists to move past the orthodox PM-Intellectualist analysis of knowledge how in order to address the challenges he has posed. While his demonstration of the defensibility of PA-Intellectualism is strong, he admittedly leaves his response to the *Non-Dogmatic Hallucinator* case underdeveloped. As I have shown, there is a fully developed response available to defend the PA-Intellectualist analysis from this objection which is consistent with Cath's project. To offer a further objection that places pressure on the Rylean elements in the PA-Intellectualist analysis, I have also put forward my *Fictional Game* case as a counterexample, and I demonstrated that there is a decisive

response available to address this objection as well. This result further supports Cath's conclusion that heterodox intellectualist analyses should be sought out and tested, and the PA-intellectualist position is a promising start for that effort. It is clear that the PA-intellectualist analysis is advantageous and highly defensible because it is flexible enough to address a variety of different challenges that are raised against it.

Part 2: Our Duties to the Disabled

Introduction

While it is clear that duties of care are owed to the disabled, it can be difficult to determine who is responsible for a specific type of care and when a party ought to take responsibility to care for someone else. While some disabled individuals might be able to function independently in their environment, others might need to rely on their families, their governments, or their local communities to provide the things that they need. Even if we know that someone could meet the needs of a disabled individual, the fact that the needs of the disabled, their circumstances, and their available resources can vary so much raises questions about where responsibility should fall. For example, when a person in a wheelchair needs to enter a building that lacks a handicap-accessible entrance, it might not be immediately obvious who is obligated to help them enter the building. Even if it is clear that one party – perhaps the people who work in the building – ought to help the disabled person, does this burden shift to another party if they refuse to help? If so, to whom does this obligation shift? These questions arise when there are at least two parties who could fulfill a need, and we need a way to decide which party ought to take responsibility for meeting that need. In this essay, I will describe a schema that is intended to offer one approach to answering these kinds of questions in a way that captures our moral intuitions about beneficence as they apply to our duties to the disabled.

The schema is based on the habilitative health framework described in the work of Laurence Becker, which serves to describe what a disability is and how disabilities are connected to habilitative needs. Using this conceptual framework, I will explain how moral duties of care arise in response to the habilitative needs of others and how the schema is structured according to our intuitions about beneficence. This schema is not meant to be a comprehensive account of our moral duties of care, and it does not serve as a complete practical guide to how one ought to meet their duties of care. However, what this schema offers is an account of our moral intuitions about who is responsible for meeting duties of care to the disabled across a range of normal circumstances by examining our intuitions about when a

party should accept responsibility for a duty of beneficence more generally. According to this schema, in order to determine who is responsible for meeting a disabled person's habilitative need, one begins by determining whether the disabled person can fulfill the need on their own. If he or she cannot meet the need, the next step is to determine whether the disabled person's family can fulfill the need. If they cannot meet the need, we then determine whether the government that the disabled person lives under can fulfill the need. Finally, if none of the prior parties has fulfilled the need, then it will fall upon the disabled person's local community to fulfill the need in question. This schema arranges these four parties in a lexical priority that corresponds to the kind of relation they have with the disabled person and the strength of that relation. When a party is identified as responsible for meeting the habilitative need of a disabled person according to this schema, this is a strong prima facie reason for that party to accept responsibility for meeting the need. This schema may also have applications for addressing questions about our duties of care owed to everyone more generally, but I will limit my discussion here for the sake of keeping the focus on this issue as it pertains to the disabled.

Habilitative Health

Laurence Becker, across two essays titled "Habilitation, Health, and Agency: a Framework for Basic Justice" (2012) and "Habilitative Health and Disability" (2020), critiques the standard accounts of health that are commonly found in philosophical discourse and the medical profession. He calls these accounts "negative health," which conceptualize good health as the mere lack of ill health and are usually accompanied by an emphasis on treatment plans that seek to remove the ailment from the patient and restore the patient's body to a sufficient degree of functioning. In contrast to negative health, Becker advances a conception of positive health, which emphasizes not only the absence of ill health but also the presence of factors that ward off ill health and support the characteristic activity of a human person. Becker points out that a positive health conception supports treatment plans that seek to not only remove ailments but also guard against future illnesses and promote functioning well in the long term.

Becker names the positive health conception that he puts forward “habilitative health,” which places characteristic human functioning as the central concern for determining whether a patient is in good or ill health. Elaborating on the habilitative health conceptual framework, Becker explains that every human person has habilitative needs that must be met in order for each human to survive and function effectively. According to this framework, any actions which can be taken to improve a person’s health are ones that meet one or more of that person’s habilitative needs immediately or remotely. Becker draws upon this notion of habilitative needs in order to explain that disabilities are a special instance of habilitative needs according to the habilitative health framework. A disability either adds to the number of habilitative needs that a person has or modifies the habilitative needs they would already have. For example, all humans have a habilitative need to effectively communicate with other humans, which means that each human must learn a mode of communication that is effective within his or her social environment. If a person is hard of hearing or mute, then this need is modified because their disability excludes certain modes of communication. According to Becker’s habilitative health framework, we can make sense of these additional or modified habilitative needs as a distinct kind – disabilities – which are accounted for in an overall assessment of someone’s health without assuming that a disability is inherently harmful. If a person’s habilitative needs are met in a sufficiently robust fashion, then we can say that they are healthy according to this conceptual framework whether they have a disability or not. Conversely, if a person's habilitative needs are not met or only minimally satisfied, then we can say that they are unhealthy according to this conceptual framework whether they have a disability or not.

The evaluative standard of Becker’s habilitative health framework depends on whether three habilitative health tasks have been accomplished by or for an individual in order to determine whether that person has achieved good habilitative health. The three tasks are: (1) “accepting habilitation from others as necessary," (2) "habilitating themselves as necessary," and (3) "[habilitating relative to] the physical and social environments they inhabit." (Becker 2012, pg. 70) It is necessary for all humans to meet each of these three tasks in some way, and failure to meet any of them can be debilitating or fatal for

anyone. This is clear when we examine the ways that humans mature and develop over the course of their lives. Beginning as infants, we must be able to accept habilitation from others in order to survive at all. As we grow into adults, we need to acquire the ability to habilitate ourselves in many ways in order to survive and function without the constant intervention of others. As we age and become elderly, we gradually become more reliant on others to habilitate us in ways that we were once capable of providing for ourselves. Finally, at all stages of life, there are special habilitative needs that are imposed upon us by our physical and social environments, such as the types of clothing we need to wear, the availability of food and water, the language(s) we need to learn, etc.

According to Becker: "Basic good health is the presence, in a given environment, of functionally significant levels of stability and strength in vital functions, together with resistance, immunity, resilience, and regenerative powers with respect to ill health, developmental momentum away from ill health in the generative and regenerative processes characteristic of the human life cycle, and in the energy and activity characteristic of competent functioning humans of a given age, in a given environment." (Becker 2020, pg. 70) This conception of health can be applied on a continuum between instances of humans that are completely deprived of any habilitation and instances where humans are ideally habilitated to fully achieve basic good health. Becker goes on to clarify that basic good health should be understood as reliably competent functioning within a given environment, which must be actively maintained and fortified against harmful factors. The habilitative tasks, if performed well, should improve the habilitative health of the beneficiary and help to stave off the processes that gradually degrade our health. Because the habilitative tasks are a matter of basic survival, they are specifications of what we are required to do when we fulfill our duties of care for ourselves and others. According to this conception, our duties of care require us to not only ensure mere survival for ourselves and others but also to promote reliable functioning for ourselves and others.

Duties of Care

There are many duties of care that we observe and carry out in our daily lives. Many of these duties are directed towards our own wellbeing, e.g., grooming, feeding, and exercising ourselves, but of course, self-care does not exhaust our duties of care. We owe many general duties of care to others that we encounter, even if they are strangers to us. For example, as philosophers such as Peter Singer have pointed out, it seems obvious that we have a duty to prevent the deaths of others if doing so is not overly burdensome. We also owe many duties of care which are only applicable to others if we have a certain kind of relationship with them. For example, we have a duty to console our friends and close family members in moments of serious emotional distress. What all of these duties of care have in common is that they aim to promote or restore a person's overall wellbeing. This means that the duties of care have a teleological aim that is partially captured by Becker's conception of habilitative health, and so I will use the habilitative health framework to draw some preliminary conclusions about what it means to fulfill our duties of care to the disabled. The preliminary conclusions I draw out here are guided by what I understand to be commonplace moral intuitions about the duties of care, and I will rely on the habilitative health framework to explain why these intuitions seem correct. These preliminary conclusions make up the schema that I am putting forward in this essay. The conclusions I reach here are not intended to serve as definitive axioms but rather as general rules of thumb that can be consulted when attempting to resolve questions about which party should accept responsibility for a duty of care to a disabled person. The conclusions reached when applying the schema can serve as a strong prima facie reason for a party to accept responsibility for meeting one or more of a disabled person's habilitative needs.

The Schema

Philosophers have tended to focus on why we have duties of care, on the stringency of those duties, and on what beneficence demands we do for one another as such or in general. However, we need a way to operationalize our duties of care to answer questions about who ought to help and when. One approach we could take to operationalize our duties of care would be to simply rely on our intuitions about

beneficence to guide us in particular cases. Another approach would be to try to establish a set of specific moral principles that direct us toward what we ought to do in particular cases. Rather than taking either of these approaches, I am instead putting forward this schema as part of an operationalized model of beneficence that can be deployed in real-world cases for determining which party is morally obligated to fulfill a particular habilitative need for a disabled person within the circumstances that the disabled person and other relevant parties find themselves in. There are four parties which the schema refers to: the disabled person himself or herself, their family, their government, and their local community.

To demonstrate how to deploy the schema, let us consider the example question of "who is responsible for obtaining groceries for a disabled person?" In order to use this schema to answer this kind of question, one begins by examining whether this disabled person is capable of meeting this need for himself or herself and if it would be reasonable to expect him or her to fulfill the need. If not, then we must examine whether the disabled person's family is capable of meeting this need for him or her and if it would be reasonable to expect them to fulfill the need. If not, then we must examine whether the disabled person's government is capable of meeting this need for him or her. Finally, if none of the previous parties have met the habilitative need in question, then it falls upon the members of the local community that the disabled person lives within to fulfill the need as best as they can.

These four parties are arranged in a lexical priority that is based on the kind of relation they bear to the disabled person and the strength of that relation. The disabled person is a moral agent that is expected to fulfill duties of self-care to the best of their ability, and so an examination about who would be responsible for meeting their habilitative needs should start with that person. The family of a disabled person is the party with the closest and strongest relation to that person, and so it is the next party that should be considered if there is a need that the disabled person cannot meet for themselves. A government has a less immediate relation to that person, but it has a clear mandate to provide for citizens that are unable to care for themselves. Therefore, their government is the third party we should consider if a disabled person's family does not meet one or more of their habilitative needs. Finally, a disabled

person's local community is the last party we should consider because it has the weakest relation to that person, but it should accept the responsibility of meeting that person's needs if all previous parties have failed to do so.

Before moving on, I should address some potential issues that might be raised about the schema from this overview alone. First, we can obviously think of other parties which have duties of care for disabled people, such as friends or caretakers. While it is true that other parties can have duties to the disabled, they are not named in the schema because the duties of care they are responsible for are duties they have assumed or had delegated to them. I will say more about assumed and delegated responsibilities later in this essay but to address this concern in a preliminary way, I will just point out that there are some parties that are responsible because they have entered into a voluntary agreement and other parties are involuntarily responsible. In cases where the responsibility for meeting a disabled person's need is disputed or unclear, a voluntary agreement would either settle the dispute on its own, or the dispute falls outside the scope of the agreement. If the dispute can be settled by an existing voluntary agreement, then this schema is not needed to resolve that issue. If the dispute cannot be settled by an existing agreement, then one must look for a party that is involuntarily responsible for meeting the need. Therefore, the schema I present here only identifies the parties that ought to accept responsibility for meeting the needs of the disabled for involuntary reasons.

A second concern is that narrowing the focus down to just these four parties, ordering these parties in lexical priority, and treating them as completely separate and distinct from one another overlooks much of the actual complexity that takes place in the real world. To this, I must confess that the schema does leave aside much of the complexity of real life. For example, one form of complexity this schema does not account for is the interdependence and cooperation that takes place between individuals, families, governments, and local communities. In fact, families and community organizations often depend on resources from their governments to help care for disabled individuals, and disabled individuals often have to cooperate with their families, governments, or local communities in order to

receive the habilitative care they need. A more comprehensive examination of our duties of care to the disabled would account for the interconnected relationships between these four parties. I have set aside these complexities for the sake of developing the schema in such a way that it can offer clear answers to a narrow set of cases, namely cases where there is little or no interdependence or cooperation involved. These would be cases where a need has not been met, the party that should take responsibility for meeting this need is disputed or unclear, and the need in question can be met through direct intervention by one party alone. Consider my earlier example of acquiring groceries for a disabled person and add onto it that the disabled person is unable to acquire their own groceries. There are other parties who could meet this need for this person, it isn't immediately obvious which party should accept responsibility for meeting this need, and any single party could buy the groceries and deliver them to this person. This schema, as I have constructed it here, is intended to reach clear conclusions about these kinds of cases. In future work I plan to expand this schema to account for the complexity that cooperation and interdependence present in real world cases.

The Individual

According to the habilitative health model, everyone has an individual responsibility to meet a threshold of self-sufficiency within their environment to the best of their ability. While total self-sufficiency is not attainable for human beings, we are the kind of beings that develop in a way that requires us to reach a threshold of self-sufficiency that enables us to live without regular interventions from others. Even though many human beings do not reach this threshold, we are a kind of being that moves towards reaching this threshold as we reach maturity. We approach this threshold by becoming well habilitated in our environment, which Becker defines as being fully functional with regard to human characteristic activity. There are many readily available examples of how someone meets their own habilitative needs, such as a person who picks up their own prescription medication, prepares their own meals, or exercises regularly to maintain their bodily health. For disability-related habilitative needs, we can imagine similar examples, such as a person who uses a wheelchair and opens doors for herself or a person of short stature who uses

an assistive device to reach items on high shelves. While such examples represent an ideal state of self-sufficiency, there are many individuals who cannot meet a basic threshold of self-sufficiency according to the habilitative health model because they require the regular intervention of other people to meet some or all of their habilitative needs throughout their entire lives. The habilitative needs of the disabled clearly represent this aspect of the human condition.

To be clear, the claim that humans have an individual responsibility to meet their own habilitative needs to a sufficient degree does not impugn the character of anyone who cannot meet their own habilitative needs. The responsibility is placed on the individuals first because, over the normal course of a human's development, a human should reach a stage where they are largely self-sufficient regarding their own habilitation. Obviously, this course of development might be disrupted by various things, and such disruptions might result in the individual being largely or entirely absolved of the responsibility to meet their own habilitative needs because they are simply unable to do so. My latter discussion about the responsibilities of others will carry the same caveat that a failure to fulfill the responsibility does not necessarily entail that the failing party is blameworthy. Any of the responsibilities I am describing here might be violated in ways that are blameworthy and ways that are not blameworthy. When individuals cannot meet their own habilitative needs, we must next look to the party which has the closest and strongest relation to that person: their family.

The Family

Because humans need to be habilitated in order to survive but are incapable of habilitating themselves at certain stages of their life, they must rely on others to help them reach at least a minimum level of habilitation necessary for survival. Habilitating those who cannot habilitate themselves is normally fulfilled by the dependent person’s family, as long as they are present and capable of meeting that person’s needs. This arrangement is fitting because a person's family is likely to remain in close proximity to them, and their affection for that person can serve as a motivation to promote his or her habilitative health. A clear example of this is the case of infants, who are entirely incapable of habilitating themselves

and rely on their parents and other family members to provide the necessary habilitation that allows them to survive. Ideally, the family continues to provide for the needs of the child while they develop and mature until the child becomes a largely self-sufficient adult. However, in the event that the child cannot become independent, or an adult enters a state where they cannot care for themselves, it is expected that the person's family will step in to meet that person's needs if they are able to. For these same reasons, the family of a disabled person should accept responsibility for meeting the disability-related habilitative needs that the disabled person is not capable of meeting on their own.

The duty of the family to care for a person who cannot meet their habilitative needs is a central aspect of the personal relationships that exist within a family. The roles that family members occupy in relation to one another are deeply connected to the dependencies that each member has upon the other. It is foundational to parenthood that parents meet the needs of their children to the best of their ability, and someday this care may need to be reciprocated by their children. This responsibility is not entirely exclusive to parents and children; there is also a broader expectation that the other members of a family will care for one another if the need arises. We expect some level of care from our siblings, cousins, grandparents, aunts, uncles, etc. Even if we don't have to rely on relatives outside of our immediate family to meet many of the most basic needs that we usually think of, e.g., food, water, clothing, or shelter, we can still rely on them to habilitate us in other ways as well, e.g., helping us to develop necessary social skills and learning how to succeed within an economic system. Any of these examples I have given here can also be received from other people that we are not related to, but we expect it to first come from our families. We can sense that someone has been deprived of something important if they do not receive this kind of help from their family because the expectation for a family to meet the physical, emotional, and social needs of its individual members is an essential element of familial relationships.

There are some concerns about making one's family the first party to bear responsibility after the individual, which I will address here. First, the most obvious concern would be to consider what this would mean for someone who does not have a family, or their family is too remote from them to offer

help. In such cases where a person does not have a family or there is no practical way for the family to aid them, this entails the same result as a family failing to meet the needs of this person for any other reason, i.e., the examination has to look elsewhere to identify a party who should accept responsibility for meeting the need. Another concern that one could raise is that relying on families to meet the habilitative needs of the disabled leaves them in a position where they are vulnerable to abuse or neglect. Even if we can point to specific instances in which someone's family turns out to be extremely poor at meeting their habilitative needs, this is not a defeater for the claim that family members should be expected to meet the habilitative needs of their relatives if they can. In fact, our implicit assumption that family members have a special responsibility to care for their family members explains our moral sensitivity to the wrongness of abuse and neglect that comes from family members. Family abuse or neglect seems especially heinous because both are deviations from our normative expectations of how a family should operate. However, there are reasonable limits to the kind of habilitative needs that a family can fulfill for a family member. A family is not responsible for meeting a habilitative need of a disabled relative if it would not be abusive or neglectful for the family to not fulfill the need. There are habilitative needs that fit this description, and so the habilitative needs that fall outside the purview of the family are addressed in the latter parts of this schema.

The Government

Governments are responsible for meeting the needs of the disabled that are left unmet by the disabled individual and their family, which the government fulfills by funding and operating assistance programs. Some of these programs are in place as a means to meet the habilitative needs of all citizens more generally, such as unemployment protection and food voucher programs. While these universal programs contribute to fulfilling the government's responsibilities to the disabled, it will also need to fund and operate additional programs which are needed to specifically address the habilitative needs of the disabled through financial assistance and support services. This responsibility also extends to meeting habilitative needs, which we cannot reasonably expect individuals or families to address themselves. These are some

of the habilitative needs related to the third habilitative task, which is habilitation relative to our social and physical environments.

There are many ways for someone to habilitate themselves or someone else to the environment around them, such as dressing appropriately for the weather or conversing in a common language in order to navigate the social landscape effectively. However, there are measures that are needed to make our physical and social environment hospitable for the people within them that require the use of government intervention, at least in modern societies. Clear examples of these interventions are environmental policies that are enforced to protect clean air and water from pollution, anti-discrimination policies that are enforced to ensure that everyone has a fair chance to succeed within our institutions, paying for expensive equipment, or making expensive adjustments to the physical environment and so on. These kinds of interventions are also needed to meet certain kinds of disability-related habilitative needs. Because they are beyond the scope of what a disabled individual or their family could reasonably be expected to accomplish themselves, the responsibility for carrying out these environmental interventions must fall upon the governments that disabled people live under. In order to make our social environments hospitable for the disabled, there are many different forms of intervention that governments must impose, such as the requirement for disability accessible entrances for public buildings, braille letters on important signage, and anti-discrimination practices in employment and education. All of these measures are intended to create a social environment that is hospitable for the disabled, and without these interventions, it would be incredibly difficult, if not impossible, for a disabled person to be habilitated to such an environment.

The Community

Finally, we have to acknowledge that there will always be individual cases of people with unmet needs who fall through the cracks of the standard measures to address their needs. Assuming that families and government assistance are well-situated to help those with disability-related habilitative needs, such individuals ought to be rare, but this number will increase if families consistently lack the resources to

provide for their disabled relatives and if the government assistance programs are underfunded or poorly managed. When a person is left with habilitative needs that are not met by their families and the government assistance programs in place, then the expectation for these needs to be addressed falls upon their local community to meet them. To offer a simple illustrative example: when someone in a wheelchair realizes that they cannot enter a building because of a failure related to the disability access, such as the disability entrance being locked when it should be open or the ramp is unsafe to ascend, this person might simply ask any bystanders around them to assist them by carrying them and the wheelchair up the stairs so they can enter the building or notify someone inside that their disability access is out of order. In this example, the disabled person's family cannot be held responsible for ensuring reliable disability entrances on buildings, and the government's enforcement mechanism was unable to prevent periphery failures that leave disabled people in a position where one of their habilitative needs have to be met in some other way.

Of the parties listed within this schema, the relationship between the individual in need and their local community is the weakest. This kind of relationship is not often well-defined, and the notion of a relationship with a local community is likely to evoke many different ideas depending on the person who considers the notion. To narrow this discussion to what I think is the most relevant for understanding duties to the disabled, I conceive of the relationship between the individual and their local community as one of solidarity. A relationship of solidarity is held between members of a local community who offer mutual aid to one another in the event that anyone finds themselves in serious need. Thus, solidarity requires that if a disabled person has habilitative needs which have not been met by themselves, their family, or their government, then the members of their local community hold a shared duty of care to meet the needs of this disabled person if they can.

Restoring Responsibility

Another potential concern for the way this schema is organized is that it seems to leave the door open for us to offload all of our duties of care to the disabled onto our local communities. Over time, individuals,

families, and governments will often fail in their responsibilities, and this means that all duties of care will eventually fall down the line until none remain for individuals, families, or governments to accept responsibility for. In order to avoid this outcome, there must be some way that responsibilities are restored to individuals, families, or governments where they once failed. This is not merely possible, but it is usually the preferred option when addressing a failure to uphold a particular responsibility in the actual practice of moderating responsibilities.

A common example of this restoration taking place is a patient that has checked out of the hospital after they have recovered from their injuries or illness. While they were in the hospital, the responsibility for their habilitation fell upon the hospital staff until they could recover, and once they recovered, they are released to resume their responsibilities of self-care. Another clear example is that parents may have custody of their children taken from them by the state and transferred to other guardians or to the state itself if the parents failed to provide a hospitable environment for their children. However, the state can extend the opportunity to the parents to reclaim custody of their children if they demonstrate at a later time that they are now capable of meeting their parental responsibilities. While this may not come to pass, this is the preferred option if the parents are capable of reassuming their responsibilities and sincere in reaffirming their commitments to their children. In a similar way, a reasonable response to discovering some kind of periphery failure or disfunction in the application of a government assistance program or legal enforcement is for advocacy groups to make the relevant authority aware of the issue and perhaps even advocate for correction or reform, even though the local community will have to address the unmet needs in the meantime. The reason for taking these efforts to inform and advocate is that, if possible, it would be better for the government to reassume its responsibility to meet the needs in question rather than to allow a permanent abdication to take place because of the prior failure. The same is true in my prior examples about patients and parents as well.

Assuming and Delegating Duties

So far, I have only discussed the duties of care for the disabled which map directly onto parties I have named in each section of the schema. However, there are many other examples where duties of care would obviously apply but which seem to fall outside of these categories. For example, I mentioned earlier that hospital staff need to care for an individual until she is able to care for herself again. It is clear that the hospital staff have a duty of care to each of their patients, but this kind of duty seems to fall outside of the duties of a family, government, or community. Rather than assigning these duties to a separate category, I contend that these kinds of duties are best understood as being instances of a duty that is assumed by or delegated to another party on the basis that we normatively evaluate these delegated duties as if they belonged to the original duty-holder. This does not mean that assuming or delegating a duty requires a formal agreement, but a formal agreement is sometimes involved. This means that in order to evaluate whether a delegated or assumed duty has been fulfilled or if it was fulfilled in the right way, we apply the normative standards that we would apply to the original duty-holder.

When an individual delegates a duty of self-care or that duty is assumed by another, then the normative standards for self-care are carried over when we evaluate how the assumed or delegated duty was performed. For example, I can make an appointment with my doctor when I am physically ill because I lack the expertise to fulfill some of my habilitative needs on my own behalf and need to procure the services of a relevant expert if I have the resources to do so. Because we delegate our duties of self-care to doctors, we expect them to apply their expertise to care for others in the same way they would care for themselves, and we consider it a violation of their duty to offer advice or treatments that they would not be willing to subject themselves to if they were in a similar circumstance. This same expectation would apply even if I did not seek out the doctor on my own and I was brought to her because I was incapacitated instead. In this case, the doctor would assume the duty to care for me while I am incapable of caring for myself, and she would be expected to apply her expertise according to the same normative standard of self-care. What I have said here about doctors would also apply to other experts who occupy a

similar role, and we also hold this expectation for instances of caring for others in much more mundane circumstances, such as offering advice about taking a class or recommending a movie to someone else.

The duties of a family might also be assumed or delegated as well. A common example of this is a caretaker who takes on the responsibility to meet someone else's daily habilitative needs. Our normative expectations for caretakers are the same as the normative expectations we hold for family members, which is why the notion of an ideal caretaker is often characterized as being a stand-in for the family of their patients. Conversely, we find caretakers who abuse or neglect their patients especially blameworthy for the same reasons that we find abusive or neglectful families to be especially blameworthy, and the abuse or neglect of caretakers is often attributed to their inability to inhabit the mindset of someone who is caring for a patient as if they were a relative.

Delegation of a government's responsibilities to other entities is not unheard of, but they do not seem to happen regarding the government's responsibilities to intervene in the social environment. I am also uncertain that it would be a good idea for a government to attempt something like this. However, I will present here what I think would be necessary for such an attempt to be successful and avoid violating the normative expectations that we would hold for a government. Any outside body that would take on the government's responsibility to intervene in the social environment in order to ensure it is hospitable for disabled people would have to have comparable resources to the government in order to operate at least as effectively as a government body would. They would also have to offer at least the same degree of transparency in their operations and be held to a comparable level of oversight from elected officials. If all of these conditions are met, then I do not think a government delegating this responsibility to such an entity would be immediately objectionable, but there could still be reasons to object to this transfer of responsibility that I have not considered here.

Finally, the responsibility of a community can also be assumed or delegated as well. Because this category of responsibility is intended to compensate for so many different kinds of failures in the prior categories, community responsibility can require a wide variety of fulfillments from the people it applies

to, and there are a wide variety of ways to satisfy these responsibilities. This can be left as an entirely individual responsibility for everyone in the community to meet the needs of others that they see around them, or members of a community might form private associations that assume this responsibility on behalf of the community by pooling their time and resources together to meet the needs of the disabled within the community. Being actively involved in an NGO or a political organization that is committed to helping people who have been left without necessary care can also be a way for people to meet their obligations to the disabled members of their community. However, I would contend that as the scope of an organization's mission becomes sufficiently broad, it makes their efforts too far removed from the kind of immediate help that the disabled might need from their communities. This is not to downplay the importance of organizations that strive to help the disabled at the national or international level. I am merely claiming that offering immediate aid to the disabled that live within your community and offering support and resources to large advocacy organizations should be understood as two distinct categories of behavior.

Conclusion

In this essay, I have described a schema for answering questions about who bears a responsibility to meet the habilitative needs of the disabled that is organized around Becker's habilitative health framework. While this schema is not intended to be comprehensive with respect to our duties of care, it offers answers for practical questions concerning duties of care for the disabled in real cases. Even though this schema sets aside some of the complexity that is present in the lives of the disabled and those around them, it offers answers for a narrow set of cases that align with our intuitive understanding of who should take responsibility for meeting the needs of the disabled in different circumstances. Rather than placing a narrow focus on the obligations of a single person or a set of people, this schema elaborates the obligations of different sets of people according to the organizing principle of habilitative health. An advantage of the approach I have put forward here is that it respects the moral agency of disabled individuals by avoiding the presumption that they must need the intervention of others in all

circumstances. Another advantage is that this approach does not entail problematic conceptions of independence which idealize a notion of absolute self-sufficiency, because the habilitative health framework emphasizes how dependent we are upon the social structures we are all deeply imbedded into.

While this schema accomplishes my stated goals for this essay, this leaves plenty of room for further discussion about beneficence, our duties of care to the disabled, the four parties that the schema focuses attention on, and the further complexities which I have touched upon but did not incorporate into the schema. The interconnectedness of the four parties, as well as other parties who are drawn in by voluntary agreements and the delegation of responsibilities, is an important aspect of how the needs of the disabled are actually met. I set aside these complexities for this essay in order to ensure that the schema could address the narrow set of cases I intended to address here, but this complexity will need to be added into the schema if it is going to be able to offer practical answers about a greater number of real-world cases. One way that this might be accomplished would be to elaborate and sort out different types of responsibilities. For example, a first party might be responsible for assisting a disabled person in an immediate way, and a second party might be responsible for supplying the first party with the resources that are necessary to facilitate their assistance. I think this is a promising start for developing this schema in future work.

Part 3: Three Interpretations of Hume's Self

Introduction

In this essay, I will demonstrate that a composite-self interpretation of Hume, which Lilli Alanen advances, is a stronger interpretation than competing interpretations offered by Donald Ainslie, Owen Ware, and Ruth Boeker because it is the most compatible with Hume's theory of practical reason. David Hume, at the end of Book 1 in *A Treatise on Human Nature*, argues against the standard rationalist notions of personal identity. "It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions [that the rationalists appeal to], or from any other, that the idea of self is derived; and consequently there is no such idea." (Hume, *Treatise*, Book I, Part IV, Section VI) Then, he puts forward his own view about what the self must be by starting with the observation that "I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement," and eventually concluding that "identity is nothing really belonging to these different perceptions, and uniting them together; but is merely a quality, which we attribute to them, because of the union of their ideas in the imagination, when we reflect upon them." (Hume, Ibid.)

However, elements of his view seem to contradict the way he uses the idea of a self in Book 2 in his discussion of the passions. He states that, "It is evident in the first place, that these passions [pride and humility] are determined to have self for their object, not only by a natural but also by an original property," which seems to assume that the self is something unified that our indirect passions are all directed towards. (Hume, *Treatise*, Book II, Part 1, Section III) As a result, there are different interpretations of Hume's view about personal identity that try to make sense of what Hume must have meant. In this essay, I will present how Hume explains his theory of personal identity and his theory of practical reason. Then, I will lay out three different interpretations of his theory of personal identity that are given by Donald Aisnlie, Owen Ware, Ruth Boeker, and Lilli Alanen and explain the implications that each of these interpretations present for Hume's theory of practical reason. While the competing

interpretations share some of the explanatory advantages with Alanen's interpretation, they are also more difficult to reconcile with Hume's theory of practical reason. Long-term practical reasoning, experiences of changing desires, and experiences of weakness of will are elements of Hume's theory of practical reason that present issues for Aisnlie, Ware, and Boeker's interpretations. However, Alanen's composite-self interpretation presents a conception of the self that is sufficiently stable to make long-term practical reasoning possible and is sufficiently malleable to account for experiences of changing desires and weakness of will. Therefore, I endorse Alanen's composite-self interpretation because it is the most compatible with Hume's theory of practical reason.

Hume and the Self

In Book 1 of the *Treatise*, Hume sets out to use the tools of the rationalists against their own ideas. By explaining what introspection and reflection are within his own theory of mind, Hume attempts to demonstrate that various concepts that rationalists thought they could assert or prove could not be justified or supported by these intellectual capacities that they appeal to. This attack on the rationalists includes the idea of a unified personal identity or "self" that is sustained across all of the internal and external changes that we endure. Hume begins this late section of Book 1 by arguing that if the rationalist conception of the self is going to be "clear and intelligible," then it must be a single, unchanging impression. (Hume, *Treatise*, Book I, Part IV, Section VI) In trying to explain how we know about this unified self by introspection, rationalists assert that, "we feel [the self's] existence and continuance in existence; and are certain… both [of] its perfect identity and simplicity." (Hume, Ibid.) Hume takes this claim to mean that if we can observe what the self is, then it would require that we can pull our awareness away from our perceptions. He argues against this claim by appealing to his own introspection. He states, "when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade…. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception." (Hume, Ibid.) Here, Hume is denying the claim that we can introspect in such a way that pulls our awareness away from any perceptions, and then right after he describes that doing so would remove our

awareness entirely. “When my perceptions are removed for any time, as by sound sleep; so long as am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist.” (Hume, Ibid.) I don’t take Hume here to mean that we are annihilated in our sleep, but rather that when we introspect and identify some perception as our “self,” that object of our awareness is, at least temporarily, no longer there while we are in a state of being unaware of our perceptions. By using the phrase, “not to exist,” Hume might also be employing a *reductio* against the rationalists since he might take it to be an absurd conclusion of their view that our personal identities cease to exist while we sleep.

At this point, Hume asserts that what he has said thus far should be sufficient for anyone to see the falsehood of the claim that we can perceive a unified self. However, in case some remain unconvinced, he puts this issue for the rationalist conception of personal identity slightly differently. He states, “the identity, which we attribute to the human mind, however perfect we may imagine it to be, is not able to run the several different perceptions into one.…” (Hume, *Treatise*, Book I, Part IV, Section VI) Hume is arguing here that when we introspect about what we think our self is, what we find is a series of distinct perceptions, and we cannot conceive of an impression that could possibly smooth away the differences between them. Because our introspection does not avail us of an impression that unifies the variety of disparate perceptions that fulfills the concept of a self that Hume attributes to the rationalists, then it seems like we do not have a self - or at least not the kind of self that the rationalists claim we have. However, a rationalist might say, there must be something that we are referring to when we refer to a “self.” In common experience, we at least think we have a self and it is a prominent aspect of our use of language, so the rationalist might use these experiences to argue that there must be something like a single, unified self. Hume then attempts to give an error theory for these kinds of experiences or references to a self.

Hume begins his error theory by first establishing that the human mind sometimes confuses specific and numeric identity. He gives an example of an oak tree “that grows from a small plant to a large tree, is still the same oak; though there be not one particle of matter, or figure of its parts the same.”

(Hume, *Treatise*, Book I, Part IV, Section VI) Despite the substantial changes that happen to the tree, we still identify the acorn, the sapling, and the fully grown tree as having the same identity over time because they happen to be numerically the same object, but it has different specific identities across the different stages of its life. He also points out that we sometimes mistake an object having the same identity over time even though, in reality, the object has undergone a change that was imperceptible to us. The change might be sufficiently minor or sufficiently gradual so that it escapes our notice, and so we make the mistake of confusing the identity of an object at one time for what that object is at another time. Hume uses these kinds of phenomena to argue that, one way or another, we are making a similar kind of mistake between numeric and specific identity when we introspect about our own minds and declare that we find a single, unified self and when we rely upon the idea of such a self in our use of language. We observe that our own numerical identity has remained the same over time, and we experience perceptions and impressions of ourselves at different times that seem similar to us, so we reach the faulty conclusion that each of us must have the same specific identity over time, i.e., our personal identity. However, Hume claims that this cannot be the case because we cannot perceive of any one thing that can be identified as the self in our introspection.

Once he has finished his argument against the kind of self that the rationalists conceive of, Hume lays out what he thinks the "true idea of the human mind" is. (Hume, *Treatise*, Book I, Part IV, Section VI) He gives three different analogies that attempt to capture what this Humean concept of the self is. First, he claims that the self is "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement." (Hume, Ibid.) This analogy seems to suggest that the self might be nothing or something empty, but the other analogies pull away from this implication. The second analogy is that "[t]he mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations." (Hume, Ibid.) This analogy seems to suggest there is at least some kind of unity, which would be the theatre that the perceptions appear within, but it is also ambiguous

about what exactly the self would be. Either the self is the collection of all of the perceptions that pass through the theatre, which aligns closer with the bundle analogy, or the self is an implied audience member within the theatre that is observing the perceptions that come and go, which is structurally similar to how he describes our experience of introspection. Finally, Hume's third analogy is when he compares the soul "to a republic or commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of government and subordination… in like manner the same person may vary his character, disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing his identity." (Hume, Ibid.) This last analogy places a stronger emphasis on a kind of unity that contains the changing perceptions like the theater, but it seems to run against the first analogy when he pronounces that the self is "nothing but a bundle of perceptions," since the republic would not be reducible to the bundle of perceptions. Because these analogies are all roughly similar while also subtly pulling away from each other, interpreters of Hume either attempt to reconcile them or emphasize the importance of one while diminishing the other two.

Complications for Interpreting Hume's Self

The difficulties for laying out an interpretation of Hume's theory of personal identity are added onto by the fact that in the appendix to the *Treatise*, Hume admits that, "upon a more strict review of the section concerning personal identity, I find myself involved in such a labyrinth, that, I must confess, I neither know how to correct my former opinions, nor how to render them consistent." (Hume, *Treatise*, Appendix) Hume not only acknowledges that what he has written in Book 1 is confused and insufficient to resolve the question of what personal identity is, but he also weakens the confidence that can be placed on any of the analogies and how Hume attempts to explain each of them. Both of these implications of his admission in the appendix present further difficulties for making sense of Hume's theory of personal identity. To add even further difficulty and complexity upon attempts to interpret Hume, there are several instances in Book 2 of the *Treatise* in which Hume implicitly or explicitly appeals to the idea of a self in a way that contradicts what he wrote in Book 1, and so interpreters have also attempted to reconcile these apparent contradictions in their theories as well.

I have found three distinct interpretations put forward by different authors who have written about Hume's theory of the self. The first interpretation, which I will explain through a paper written by Donald Ainslie and Owen Ware, argues that despite Hume's rejection of a metaphysically real self as the rationalists conceived of it, he remained committed to a conception of personal identity in which the self is metaphysically real and unified, and his disagreement with the rationalists was about how to properly describe it. The second kind of interpretation, which I will explain through a paper written by Ruth Boeker, argues that Hume abandons the idea that a single, unified self can be metaphysically real, and instead posits that the unified self is a fictional entity that we posit for the sake of linguistic and social convenience. Finally, I'm going to explain an interpretation through a paper written by Lilli Alanen that argues Hume not only discards the metaphysically real and unified self, but he also discards the possibility that we can construct a fictional unified self either. Instead, her interpretation asserts that Hume's conception of the self is composite, i.e. it is made up of distinct parts. In what follows I explain how these authors present their interpretations, and then consider the explanatory advantages and disadvantages of each interpretation in relation to Hume's theory of practical reason, which is closely connected with Hume's discussion of the self. Finally, I will endorse Lilli Alanen's composite-self interpretation on the basis that it is the most compatible with Hume's theory of practical reason.

Hume's Theory of Practical Reason

Hume explains the most about his theory of practical reason in Book II of the *Treatise*, and what he offers is primarily meant to identify and explain what it is that moves a person's will, so he attempts to answer the following questions: how does a person choose the ends they desire and how do they choose the actions to pursue those ends? Hume sums up his answer in his famous quote: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them." (Hume, *Treatise,* Book II, Part III, Section III) Following this statement, Hume explains that it is the passions which lead us to select our ends, and it is reason which serves by identifying the effective means

we can take to pursue our ends and to calculate relevant information that we might need to consider in pursuit of those ends.

Starting from this point, Hume goes on to lay out the different implications of this view and how it differs from the Aristotelian conception of practical reason which prevailed during his time. A prominent element of Aristotle's theory of practical reason which Hume argues against is the notion that what a person wills, such as the ends they choose to pursue, can be evaluated according to norms of rationality. To demonstrate that this is false, Hume points out that if our wills and ends can be evaluated according to the norms of reason, then it must be possible for reason to contradict the passions which move the will and select our ends. However, according to Hume, this does not seem to be the case: "[w]hen I am angry, I am actually possest with the passion, and in that emotion have no more a reference to any other object, than when I am thirsty, or sick, or more than five foot high. It is impossible, therefore, that this passion can be opposed by, or be contradictory to truth and reason; since this contradiction consists in the disagreement of ideas, considered as copies, with those objects, which they represent." (Hume, Ibid.) Hume argues that because our rational faculties are only capable of making comparisons of observable phenomena, it is impossible for these faculties to contradict our passions. If the rational capacities cannot oppose the passions, then they can neither affect our will nor influence which ends we choose to pursue. The objects that our rational capacities have domain over might give rise to impressions which can counteract the effect of other passions we are experiencing under the right circumstances, but this means that it is our impressions of these objects and not the objects themselves which can affect our will. Hume concludes from this that because reason does not have the capacity to affect our wills or how we select the ends that we pursue, then the ends which a person pursues cannot be evaluated as rational or irrational.

Because Hume concludes that there can be no rationality involved in how we select the ends we choose to pursue, all that is left of practical reason is the selection of the means we use to achieve our ends. The explanations that Hume offers about how a person makes choices and comes to will one action over another are descriptive rather than prescriptive. Hume does not put forward any explicit principles of

action which one should follow in order to be practically rational. Instead, he describes different phenomena that are commonly experienced by people when they exercise their practical rationality and then attempts to explain these phenomena within his psychological framework. Two phenomena that are of interest here are changes in desires and weakness of will. Hume explains that in order for a person to experience a change in their desire, that person must become aware that their desire for some particular good is founded on a false supposition, an object of aversion for that person must become desirable to them, or an object of desire for that person must become averse to them. He writes about the first type of change in desire when he explains how a passion can only be considered unreasonable if, "a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is founded on the supposition or the existence of objects, which really do not exist," and so it is only unreasonable in the sense that once a person discovers that the passion they feel is based on something false, the feeling should immediately pass. (Hume, *Treatise*, Book II, Part III, Section III)

Hume writes about the latter two types of changes in desire as he explains different factors which tend to influence the will towards or away from certain actions, and with these two factors we can start to piece together Hume's explanation of how a person exercises their practical reason in their pursuit of short-term and long-term ends that they desire. These two factors are repetition, which Hume refers to as "custom", and distance in time, which Hume either refers to as "contiguity" or "remoteness." Hume says that custom, i.e. repeated practice of a certain kind of action, " produces a facility of the human mind, and an infallible source of pleasure, where the facility goes not beyond a certain degree…. The pleasure of facility… will sometimes be so powerful as even to convert pain into pleasure, and give us a relish in time what at first was most harsh and disagreeable." (Hume, *Treatise*, Book II, Part III, Section V) This means that through the repetition of an activity that was once painful for them, a person can begin to desire that activity as the faculty they develop from repeating the activity provides them with great pleasure. Hume explains that the converse is also true: "But again, as facility converts pain into pleasure, so it often converts pleasure into pain, when it is too great, and renders the actions of the mind so faint and languid,

that they are no longer able to interest and support it." (Hume, Ibid.) Hence, it is clear that the effect of custom can change our desires as it makes things that we once thought were painful into things that are pleasant for us, and vice versa.

Hume goes on to say that distance in time increases or diminishes our attraction to something good depending on how close or distant it is from us in time, and this affects our aversion to something evil in the same way. Hume writes: "There is an easy reason, why every thing contiguous to us… should be conceived with a peculiar force and vivacity, and excel every other object, in its influence on the imagination. Ourself is intimately present to us, and whatever is related to self must partake of that quality. But where an object is so far removed as to have lost the advantage of this relation, why, as it is farther removed, its idea becomes still fainter and more obscure, would, perhaps, require a more particular examination." (Hume, *Treatise*, Book II, Part III, Section VII) This means that because our notion of a self is situated in the present, the closer that any harm or benefit that could be brought upon us is to the present, the greater effect that harm or benefit will have on our thoughts and our decision making. Therefore, temporally close evils or goods produce an elevated sense of aversion or attraction respectively, and remote evils or goods produce a diminished sense of aversion or attraction respectively. This does not mean that a person will always prefer to receive a more immediate benefit or a more delayed harm, but – all else being equal – this is a general tendency that people exhibit when exercising their practical reason.

The second phenomenon of practical reason that Hume sets out to explain is weakness of will, which are instances where someone recognizes that they have a desire they wish to pursue, and that they have the opportunity to effectively pursue the desire, but they choose not to take the opportunity to pursue the desire. Given what I have already explained about Hume's theory of practical reason, it is clear that one cause of weakness of will is a passion opposing their desire, which would halt their will if the opposing passion is felt at least a strongly as the initial desire. A person's desire for something, e.g. a desire to improve their physical health, can be opposed by another desire which is contrary to the desire they

intended to act upon, e.g. a desire to eat unhealthy food. Another potential cause of weakness of will that Hume writes about is uncertainty, which is capable of affecting the passions because "[u]ncertainty has the same influence [on the passions] as opposition." (Hume, *Treatise*, Book II, Part III, Section IV) If a person is uncertain about whether the action they are considering will achieve the desired outcome, or if pursuing the desire puts them at risk for harms that outweigh the benefit they desire, this uncertainty can produce the same halting effect on their will as a strong opposing passion would. Drawing upon what I have explained here about how Hume's theory of practical reason accounts for changes in desire and weakness of will, we can flesh out more about how Hume thinks about short-term and long-term practical reason in ways that connect up with his discussion about the self in Books I and II of the *Treatise*, which I will explore further as I examine the three interpretations put forward by Ainslie, Ware, Boeker, and Alanen.

Ainslie & Ware's View

In a co-authored paper "Consciousness and Personal Identity," Ainslie and Ware give a comparative analysis of Locke, Hume, Rousseau, and Kant's views of personal identity. When they reach their discussion of Hume's theory of personal identity, they primarily make comparisons between Hume and Locke's theory. Their analysis focuses on the bundle of perceptions analogy, which leads them to conclude that Hume differs from Locke because he thinks that we are "blind to our mental states, so that we are aware of their content without simultaneously being aware of our having them." (Ware and Ainslie, pg. 251) They derive this idea from Hume's claim that, "in common life 'tis evident these ideas of self and person are never very fix'd nor determinate," which they take to be Hume distinguishing between how we view the self as a matter of introspection and the self as it regards the tangible effects that our passions produce. (Hume, *Treatise*, Book I, Part IV, Section II) The idea we have of the self is only revealed when we introspect, and what we find is ever-changing and uncertain, but there is an underlying, real entity that, at all times, is being affected and moved by our perception and passions. This latter entity is what Ainslie and Ware identify as the "self" according to Hume, which he references in

Book 2 when he says that our "impression of ourselves is always intimately present with us." (Hume, *Treatise*, Book II, Part I, Section XI) Ainslie and Ware rely on the distinction between these two "selves" to demonstrate that Hume's treatment of personal identity in Book 1 is only concerned with the self as an idea held in our imagination and introspection, which the bundle analogy is meant to describe, but the self that Hume references in Book 2 is the entity that is affected and manipulated by the passions.

Furthermore, they diagnose the difficulty that Hume encounters with his own theory "as arising from the relation between the reflecting mind that is observing its perceptions and the perceptions that are themselves observed." (Ware and Ainslie, pg. 253) They assert that Hume remains committed to something like a Cartesian ego when he makes his bundle analogy because, in order to observe the perceptions of the bundle, there has to be an internal point of view to introspect with which is our consciousness. Despite this, Hume has difficulty acknowledging this because he is committed to his claim that "consciousness is nothing but a reflected thought and perception." (Hume, *Treatise*, Appendix) Having pointed out the underlying self that they claim Hume is implicitly committed to, Ainslie and Ware read the theatre analogy as Hume locating the self as the implied audience member of the theatre. This makes the theatre analogy a bridge from the bundle analogy to the republic analogy because the bundle analogy would be describing the events on the stage of the theatre, but the republic analogy more directly describes the underlying self, i.e. the audience member. They understand the republic analogy to be stating that the self is a distinct entity - the republic - that is defined by the associations between its members, which would be the perceptions and passions that affect it, but is not merely the collection of them all. Finally, Ainslie and Ware conclude that this all means that Hume's theory of personal identity is that there is a metaphysically real and unified self that is affected and manipulated by our passions and perceptions. Despite being unified, introspection only reveals an ever-changing procession of impressions. This means that we cannot form an idea of the self that is unified or consistent by relying on introspection alone, which was the rationalist method for describing the self. Hence, Hume describes the

self in relation to the passions and perceptions rather than our ideas of the self, according to Ainslie and Ware.

Issues for Ainslie & Ware's View

According to Ainslie and Ware's interpretation, the self is a metaphysically real entity that is affected and manipulated by the passions, and we cannot form a consistent impression of what it is. This means that the self is something that is carried around by the whims of the passions and desires, which prima facie sounds like a plausibly Humean idea of the relationship between the self and the passions. When this conception is situated within a Humean theory of practical reason, it seems clear how it could make sense of the changes in desire that we experience across our live and the experience of weakness of will. However, this interpretation presents an issue for Hume's theory of practical reason. In order to reason practically, according to Hume, one must pursue their desires. This means that our actions must be directly informed by a desire we possess, which is presented to us by our passions, then we determine the most efficient means we can for satisfying that desire, and then finally we act upon the desire by taking the most efficient plan of action we can come up with. However, if the self is pulled around at the whim of every desire and passion that is presented to it, then it seems like practical reasoning is highly constrained to short windows of action. Reasoning about any kind of long-term planning for oneself is impossible on this conception because the nature of one's desires is subject to constant changes, and therefore one cannot form a coherent idea about what kind of a person they are. One way of addressing this type of concern for Ainslie and Ware's interpretation might be to claim that because the self is metaphysically real, then the desires it has will be recurring and consistent enough to make long-term practical reasoning possible. However, this response seems like it would require us to turn their model of the self on its head. Ainslie and Ware claim that the passions and desires affect the character of the real, underlying self, but this response claims that the character of the real, underlying self affects the passions and desires that it experiences, so this doesn't seem like a plausible solution for Ainslie and Ware to offer.

Boeker's View

In a paper titled "Locke and Hume on Personal Identity: Moral and Religious Differences," Boeker proposes an alternative interpretation of Hume's theory of personal identity that is also based upon a comparative analysis of Locke and Hume. She entertains an interpretation similar to the one put forward by Ainslie and Ware, which she attributes to Lorenzo Greco. According to Greco, "Hume's discussion of personal identity in Book 1 concerns the reidentification question," which means that Hume's criticism of the rationalist conception of self in Book 1 concerns their claims about using introspection as a means to identify the self. (Boeker, pg. 117) Greco goes on to explain that "in Book 2 he turns to the characterization question," which means that Hume is proposing his own method for describing the self, which is primarily in relation to the passions. (Boeker, pg. 117) Boeker points out that, according to Greco's interpretation, Hume isn't questioning the metaphysical existence of the self. It is clear from Boeker's description that Greco's interpretation bears a great deal of similarities with Ainslie and Ware's interpretation of Hume's theory of personal identity, and so her rebuttal to Greco will also apply to Ainslie and Ware's interpretation.

Boeker disputes Greco's interpretation because "[she does not think] that there is strong enough textual support for interpreting Hume's Book 1 account as metaphysical; at best, this is controversial." (Boeker, pg. 117) Boeker also argues that positing a metaphysically real self, given all of the issues that Hume raises about our ability to observe the self via introspection, is inconsistent with Hume's strictly empiricist methodology. This contention is supported by Hume raising this rhetorical question in Book 1: "[w]hat then gives us so great a propension to ascribe identity to these successive perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence thro' the whole course of our lives?" (Hume, Treatise, Book 1, Part IV, Section VI) Boeker claims that Hume asks this question because he cannot find sufficient evidence on the basis of introspection to posit the existence of a metaphysically real self. Hume clearly states that our introspection does not yield a perception of a single, unified thing. Instead, it yields many distinct impressions, and none of these impressions fulfill the

description of a unified self. Being an empiricist, Hume cannot posit the existence of entities that he cannot perceive, and he denies that we can perceive a metaphysically real entity that we rightly call a self. Therefore, he cannot take the position that a self is a metaphysically real entity.

In order to make sense of the shift from Book 1 into Book 2 of the *Treatise*, Boeker argues that Hume is not only arguing against the rationalist characterization of personal identity, but he is also discarding the notion that the self is metaphysically real. However, Hume recognizes that we still have this idea of a self that is commonplace in our language and our social conventions. Boeker takes this to mean that, when he moves into Book 2, Hume is attempting to describe how we construct the self as a fictional entity which is unified in order to make sense of the procession of various impressions and perceptions that we experience. She points out that Hume explains this construction process through the indirect passions, which "are immediately directed toward an object, which is self in the case of pride and humility…" (Boeker, pg. 118) These self-oriented indirect passions arise in response to "mental qualities such as wit, good humor, courage, justice, and their opposites, bodily qualities such as beauty or strength…." (Boeker, pg. 118) Because our indirect passions respond to our own mental and physical characteristics, and because we can hold all of these in our mind using our memory, we can form associations between the responses, our own characteristics, and the circumstances surrounding the responses. Once we form these associations in our memory, they are strengthened when we experience sympathetic responses from other people when they react to our characteristics. This means that when others express positive or negative reactions to our characteristics, this can reinforce the pride, humility, shame, etc. that we have previously experienced.

Boeker provides an example to demonstrate this process: "While I may be proud about my achievements as a piano player my pride can vanish quickly and self-doubts take its place…. When other people take pleasure in my piano performances, I receive reassurance and my pride becomes more stable." (Boeker, pg. 118-119) According to Boeker's interpretation, Hume's conception of the self is constructed in response to something real, which are the characteristics of the entity that is observing itself. Therefore,

the self we construct through the associations we form is unified by our own persistent characteristics. Those characteristics will continuously be perceived by the entity observing itself and the responses of others, and hence the associations formed around those characteristics will be reinforced consistently. Her model uses and makes sense of the philosophical and psychological tools Hume provides in the *Treatise*, like the indirect passions and sympathy, which lends greater credence to interpretations of Hume's conception of personal identity as a constructed, fictional self.

Issues for Boeker's View

Boeker's interpretation of Hume's theory of personal identity presents an idea of the self that is constructed and grounded in permanent and consistent features of the entity that the self is meant to describe. Hence, Boeker presents a conception of the self that has a high degree of stability due to being rooted in the consistently observed features of a person. This means that, in the Humean framework of practical reason, the desires of this kind of self are consistent and highly predictable, if you have enough information about them. However, this raises a potential concern about the conception of personal identity being too inflexible. If the self is too stable, then when it is situated in Hume's theory of practical reasoning, then it will be difficult to make sense of why a person would experience weakness of will. The reason that weakness of will is hard to explain on Boeker's interpretation is due to it being an instance where the person acknowledges that they are aligned toward a particular desire, but they fail to act on it due to the interference of another stronger desire or uncertainty. Weakness of will due to uncertainty does not raise an issue for Boeker's conception of the self, but this is not the only kind of weakness of will that people experience. It is weakness of will due to the interference of a stronger passion that raises an issue, because the fact that people experience this phenomenon indicates that a person has constructed a self-concept around one set of passions and desires while also acknowledging that there are other passions and desires that they experience which they do not identify with. This raises an issue about how Boeker can explain why some desires and passions are taken up into the self-conception and others aren't. There are two potential responses that Boeker might give to smooth over this concern.

First, Boeker might appeal to second-order desires to make sense of how someone can identify with one set of desires over others, even if the disfavored desires are ultimately more efficacious. However, this response raises further issues. Here is an example case to illustrate:

> *One day, while earning community service hours for a scholarship, Ben feels proud of himself for volunteering his time with his local homeless shelter and soup kitchen. His peers express similar feelings of admiration for him, and this culminates in Ben identifying with the quality of being beneficent. He enjoys the idea of his helping the less fortunate, and so he forms the second order desire, "I want to desire to help others in need." However, the next weekend, Ben is about to settle in to watch his favorite football team play their rivals when he gets a text message from the director of the homeless shelter that reads: "Hey, you were a lot of help last week, and we're kind of short-staffed today in the soup kitchen. Would you be willing to come serve lunch?" Ben is immediately conflicted. He would have to leave right now to get to the shelter in time to serve lunch, but that would mean he will miss the game he's been waiting to watch all season. He has the second-order desire to desire to help, but he really wants to watch this game, and so he pretends not to notice the text and goes back to watching the game. Ben feels ashamed of himself for failing to live up to his new ideal, but he continues to identify with being beneficent and his desire to help the less fortunate.*

This example case portrays what weakness of will looks like on Boeker's model of personal identity, and it reveals the problem with using second-order desires to respond to the initial problem. The issue is that second order desires have to be preceded by the formation of a self-concept, which means they cannot explain why one kind of desire is taken up into the self-conception while another is not. We cannot explain why Ben constructed his self-concept around his desire to help the homeless by appealing to his second-order desire to want to help the homeless, because the event we're attempting to explain happened before the second-order desire was formed. Hence, second-order desires cannot resolve the explanatory issue that Boeker's interpretation faces.

The second response that Boeker might give to this problem is to claim that weakness of will scenarios are instances where further self-discovery is to be made. The weakness of will is a potential indicator to the person experiencing it that their self-concept is misrepresenting their own characteristics, and therefore they should reconsider their self-concept to incorporate the desire that won out. While this response seems effective at addressing the concern raised, I think it requires us to rewrite an important part of the model that Boeker proposed. In the original model, Boeker states that the self-conception is formed around the responses of the indirect passions to our own characteristics, e.g., pride, shame, etc. However, this response is adding into that model by claiming that direct passions, such as Ben's desire to watch his favorite football team, can also contribute to the construction of our self-conception. This response also revises Boeker's emphasis on the self-concept being constructed around the physical and mental traits of the entity because it adds desires that happen to be efficacious in our behavior as something we can use to form our self-concept. While this response might address my concerns about Boeker's interpretation being too inflexible, it has to revise important elements of her interpretation to work around the problem and ultimately brings her interpretation much closer to Alanen's.

Alanen's View

In a paper titled "Personal Identity, Passions, and 'The True Idea of the Human Mind,'" Lilli Alanen gives an extended analysis of what Hume says about personal identity, and she centers much of the analysis and her interpretation on his description of the republic analogy. She begins her interpretation by claiming that Hume does not ground the self in consciousness and memory in the same way that other figures, like Locke, have done. However, Hume still describes memory as a faculty that plays an important role in constructing our personal identity because it "contributes to the discovery of the causal relations constituting the self, which go beyond memory." (Alanen, pg. 8) Alanen claims that Hume is arguing against the notion of a metaphysically real self in Book 1 on the basis that "it fails to stand up to the empiricist tools of analysis he brings to bear on the experience that its defenders appeal to," and she

agrees with Boeker that Hume is referring to a fictional entity that humans construct using the indirect passions and sympathy. (Alanen, pg. 5)

However, unlike Boeker, Alanen argues that the Humean concept of a self cannot be unified because it is imperfect and continuously adjusted by new experiences. Rather than describing a unified, fictional self, Alanen argues that Hume describes the self as a composite that is made up of distinct parts that make up a recognizable whole. The whole of this composite self can be identified and remains over time, but any of the parts within the whole can change, fall away, or get replaced by new parts. Alanen describes the construction of this composite self in a way that is very similar to Boeker's model. She begins with explaining how the indirect passions respond to one's own physical and mental characteristics, and we form associations using these perceptions and impressions to construct our concept of the self. One difference between Alanen and Boeker's models of self-construction is that Alanen places greater emphasis on the role that memory plays in the construction process as the faculty that allows us to string together the disparate self-regarding perceptions and impressions we experience. For Boeker, memory is mainly just a vehicle for association to take place. However, Alanen describes memory as, "continuing to affect us or our present train of thoughts, giving our idea of who we are its structure and history," which gives memory a much more prominent role in Alanen's model than in Boeker's. (Alanen, pg. 8) This means that our memory not only facilitates the associations that are formed via the indirect passions, but it also provides a framework for the way we interpret the self-regarding impressions and perceptions – a framework that is constantly being developed and altered over time.

Alanen supports her interpretation by giving a thorough examination of Hume's republic analogy about the self, which she contends comes the closest to capturing Hume's "true idea of the human mind." (Hume, *Treatise*, Book I, Part IV, Section VI) She points out that there is "more of unity and continuity than a heap, bundle, or theatre of passing ideas and impressions," but this unity is not a "perfect simplicity or unproblematic unity." (Alanen, pg. 10) This composite self is constantly changing because, as Hume claims, the true idea of the human mind is, "a system of different perception or different existences, which

are link'd together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other." (Hume, Ibid.) This means that whatever conception of the self we attribute to Hume, it needs to be unified but constantly changing. Alanen argues that this kind of conception is best expressed by the republic analogy because there are members or citizens of a republic, representing the impressions and perceptions of the self, that are "united by ties of government and subordination." (Alanen, pg. 17) However, the number of members and the identity of members within a republic are not the same at all times, but even across these changes the citizens are still "propagating (that is, continuing or upholding) the same republic in the incessant changes…." (Alanen, pg. 17) Alanen is pointing out here that the changing character of the citizenry of a republic captures the sense in which the conception of our identity changes, while also remaining unified and identifiable as the same thing over time. By arguing from a variety of textual evidence from the *Treatise*, Alanen makes a compelling case for her interpretation of Hume's theory of the self.

Endorsing Alanen

Alanen's interpretation of Hume's theory of personal identity puts forward a conception of the self that is loosely unified within one entity but is a composite of the different aspects of that entity's desires, self-regarding perceptions, and impressions. This means that there is a self-concept that a conscious entity can identify and this self-concept can still be considered the same at different times despite the changes it undergoes. The implication of this interpretation of the self, when it is situated in a Humean theory of practical reason, stands somewhere between Ainslie and Ware's interpretation and Boeker's interpretation.

Alanen's theory possesses the theoretical advantages of the competing interpretations, but it does not entail the difficulties that Ainslie, Ware, and Boeker are presented with when attempting to reconcile their interpretations with Hume's theory of practical reason. Alanen's description of the self-concept is not so prone to change in a way that it cannot allow for long-term practical reasoning. It claims that there is a persisting idea of the self across these changes that can be reliably used to gauge one's own long-term

goals and the desires they are likely to have at most points in the future. However, this composite self is not so rigid that it precludes the possibility of encountering a new desire or passion that interferes with a person's intended actions. The composite-self interpretation can explain experiences of changing desires and weakness of will by appealing to the role that memory plays in framing how we interpret current and future events. When a person experiences a change in their desires or weakness of will that is caused by the interference of a stronger desire, the composite-self interpretation can point to the fact that the impressions that make up the self are constantly changing. These changes do not completely overwrite our self-concept, but over time they can lead to gradual changes in our personal identity.

Therefore, Alanen's interpretation of Hume's theory of personal identity, when it is situated within a Humean framework of practical reason, is less restrictive than either of the interpretations offered by Ainslie and Ware or Boeker. Hence, because Alanen's composite-self is the most compatible with Hume's theory of practical reason, I find that her interpretation is the strongest of the three interpretations discussed here. While the competing interpretations might offer some exclusive explanatory advantages when we consider the subject of the self in isolation, I contend that it is a greater advantage for an interpretation to be able to fit well within other relevant parts of Hume's work, which is why I endorse Alanen's view here.

Final Comments and Conclusion

Having considered and compared these three interpretations of Hume's theory of the self, there are clear theoretical advantages presented by the composite-self interpretation advanced by Alanen over the interpretations offered by Ainslie, Ware, and Boeker. The unified, real self that Ainslie and Ware put forward initially seems useful for explaining the difficulty that Hume reports in the appendix when he attempts to make sense of his own thoughts about the self, but it presents a concept of the self that is so susceptible to changes of whim that long-term practical reasoning would be nearly impossible. Here, Boeker's interpretation seems to be stronger than Ainslie and Ware's because it presents a more stable conception of the self that is rooted in a person's consistently observed characteristics, but this threatens

to portray Hume's concept of the self as being too stable to account for instances where a person experiences weakness of will due to conflicting desires. While the unified, fictional self that Boeker describes shares a lot of the same textual support that Alanen's interpretation relies on, attempting to amend her interpretation to address its disadvantages would bring it much closer to the interpretation that Alanen is advancing. Hume's theory of practical reason is better suited by a conception of the self that is sufficiently stable while also being sufficiently malleable. Both of these qualities are captured by Alanen's composite-self interpretation, which means it does not suffer from the restrictions presented by a unified self, whether real or fictional. In light of the advantages that Alanen's composite-self interpretation offers, I conclude that it is the strongest interpretation out of the three.

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Vita

Samuel Webb is a graduate student at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville who is pursuing his PhD in Philosophy. He is currently teaching and doing research on issues related to practical knowledge and other topics in epistemology as he prepares to write his dissertation.