To the Graduate Council:

I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by J. Kristen Urban entitled "Theories of Conflict and the Palestinian Leadership During the First Two Years of the Intifada: An Explanatory Model." I have examined the final copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Political Science.

Robert L. Peterson, Major Professor

We have read this dissertation
and recommend its acceptance:

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and Dean of the Graduate School

THEORIES OF CONFLICT

AND THE

PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP

DURING THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE INTIFADA:

AN EXPLANATORY MODEL

A Dissertation
Presented for the
Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

J. Kristen Urban
December, 1993

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ABSTRACT

This study addresses the paradoxical nature of leadership as it promoted and directed the first two years of the Palestinian uprising, or *Intifada*. It attributes the success of these early years to the fact that the internal political leadership, officially the Unified Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) was willing to maintain a dialectic with the Palestinian social leadership, which operated at the grassroots level: a relationship which was new to the national movement.

Both social and political leaderships emerged throughout two decades of life under Israeli military rule in the territories occupied after the 1967 Six Day War. Following the uprising's initial "explosion," 9 December, 1987, the social leadership reconstituted itself immediately as the *popular committees*, which sprang up in all localities throughout the Territories to help communities address immediate problems brought on by Israeli reprisals. The UNLU, which contained a representative from each political faction, coalesced within a month of the outbreak of the *Intifada* to coordinate resistance activities and to promote policies of non-violence and civil disobedience by means of communiques which it issued every two weeks.

The present research examined the process of decision-making and of policy implementation by means of interviews with former UNLU members, representatives of political factions, and political activists within the OT (Summer, 1992). This process was

found to reflect democratic values throughout the first eighteen months, but became more narrowly circumscribed following an apparent take-over by Fatah in mid-1989.

Additionally, the research examined the communiques and undertook a frequency analysis of policy changes (across five categories) throughout the first two years. It found that policy changes, while influenced chiefly by Israeli policies of reprisal, also reflected the dynamics of a leadership partitioned into internal and external sectors.

Finally, the dynamics of the Palestinian uprising were examined within the context of theories addressing the rise of social conflict. An explanatory model is offered which suggests three theoretical approaches be integrated to explain the appearance and persistence of the *Intifada*: Skocpol's structuralist approach, the Gurr/Davies/Burton psychological-deprivation approach, and Tilly's approach highlighting mobilization.

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CHAPTER 1

THE DEFINITION OF THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT

Introduction

An historic Agreement was concluded on 13 September, 1993 between the leaders of a nation-state and the leadership of a people burning with national intentions. The Declaration of Principles, signed by Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel and by Yasir Arafat, Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, adversaries of long standing, caught the international community by surprise precisely because of the longevity and the seeming intractability of the conflict between their peoples.

Jewish national aspirations, arising from within the empires of Europe, first began pressing Palestinian claims in the closing days of the 19th century, with Theodor Herzl lobbying in Western capitals for a Jewish homeland,[1] and Arab nationalists actively

[1]For a historical discussion of this process, see Oscar Benjamin Frankl's *Theodor Herzl: The Jew and the Man* (New York: Storm Publishers, 1949) and Alan R. Taylor's *Prelude to Israel: An Analysis of Zionist Diplomacy, 1897-1947* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959).

seeking independence from Ottoman rule.[2] By 1948 and the birth of the state of Israel by international acclamation and upon Arab lands, a conflict which had been smoldering for over half a century, burst abruptly into flames. Twenty years later, Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank following the 1967 Six Day War, further shaped the conflict. The acquisition of lands through this offensive military conquest redefined the conflict in terms pertaining to: 1) the status of the Arab population (Palestinians) maintained under Occupation; 2) the illegal settlement of Israeli citizens on Arab lands; and 3) Palestinian claims to self-determination.[3]

In December, 1987, following a year of intermittent clashes between Palestinians and Israeli soldiers, the Intifada[4] erupted. Initially sparked in Gaza as response to a traffic accident, the incident inaugurated a resistance movement within the Occupied

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[2]George Antonius, in his *Arab Awakening* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1939), describes these early stages of this Arab nationalist movement, which originated in Syria and the Levant; see also, more recently, Walid Khalidi, Editor, *From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987), and Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S. Simon, Editors, *The Origins of Arab Nationalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

[3]For an introduction to the issues presented by the Occupation, see: Naseer H. Aruri, Editor, *Occupation: Israel Over Palestine* (Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1983); Geoffrey Aronson, *Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians, and the West Bank* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1987); Ibrahim Abu-Lughod, Editor, *Palestinian Rights: Affirmation and Denial* (Wilmette, IL: Medina Press, 1982); Don Peretz, *The West Bank: History, Politics, Society, and Economy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); and National Lawyers Guild 1977 Middle East Delegation, *Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West Bank and Gaza* (New York: National Lawyers Guild, 1978).

[4]*Intifada*, literally, "shaking off," the Israeli Occupation being the object of the activities.

Territories (OT) which has persisted at all levels of Palestinian society for more than five years.[5] Indeed, it has been the eight-year-olds organized for stone-throwing against the Israeli machinery of war, which has challenged the conscience of both the international community and the Israeli polity, a conscience further assaulted by the harsh policies of reprisal directed against Palestinian demonstrators. Calls for an international peace conference to address the resolution of this long-lived conflict were finally acceeded to, following the Gulf War. In November, 1991, Arabs and Israelis -- and significantly, Palestinians, themselves -- began a dialogue in Madrid at an historic peace initiative orchestrated by the Bush Administration and co-sponsored by the then-Soviet Union.[6]

The signing of the 13 September, 1993 Declaration has initiated a new phase in the evolution of Israeli/Palestinian (and Israeli/Arab and Palestinian/Arab) relations, as:

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[5]Numerous books have been written on the Intifada. Amongst these are: Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, Editors, *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (New York: Praeger, 1990); Zeev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising, Israel's Third Front* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990); Don Peretz, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990); F. Robert Hunter, *The Palestinian Uprising: A War by Other Means* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991); Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, Editors, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising against Israeli Occupation* (Boston: South End Press, 1989); and Joost Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

[6]See: Fouad Moughrabi, Elia Zureik, Manuel Hassassian, and Aziz Haidar, "Palestinians on the Peace Process," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Autumn, 1991), pp. 36-53; George T. Abed, "The Palestinians in the Peace Process," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 22 No. 1 (Autumn, 1992), pp. 5-17; Herbert C. Kelman, "Acknowledging the Other's Nationhood: How to Create a Momentum for the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 22 No. 1 (Autumn, 1992), pp. 18-38; "Reflections on the Peace Process: Interviews with Haydar 'Abd al-Shafi and Nabil Shaath,: *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 22 No. 1 (Autumn, 1992), pp. 57-77; Camille Mansour, "The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations: An Overview and Assessment," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Spring, 1993), pp. 5-31.

1) Israel accepts official PLO recognition of the state of Israel and Israelis begin redefining their conception of the Zionist state and, within this context, the meaning of "security;" 2) as Palestinians begin constructing the foundations for autonomous Palestinian rule, while anticipating the emergence of the state of Palestine; and significantly, 3) as neighboring Arab regimes seek to restructure their relations with these two political entities, now acknowledged, by virtue of treaties of peace, as members of the Middle East community of states.

While defined largely by policies of non-violence and civil disobedience, the Intifada as a social movement, must be seen as representing "societal violence," in that the movement sought to break with the existing system of authority, and by so doing, anticipated the violent response of that authority. Shaking off imposed Israeli rule, Palestinians acted to achieve national self-determination or, in Locke's terms, to establish a social contract of their own in light of their expressed identity as a Palestinian nation.

Characterization of the Intifada as a social movement would suggest that the role of leadership has been a crucial one: movements are not, by nature, serendipitous. The Occupation had been in place for twenty years and by means of its Military Administration, had imposed harsh rules upon Palestinians for daily life, via more than 1200 Military Orders.[7] Throughout this period there had been an internal political leadership (factions linked to the diasporan PLO leadership) and an emergent leadership

[7]Raja Shehadeh, *Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1985).

within Charitable Societies, trade unions, and student organizations.[8] But while there had been numerous small *intifadas*, particularly in the 1970's, such leadership had been unable to "lead" a sustained internal revolt: none of the uprisings had lasted beyond a few weeks, and none had penetrated throughout all levels of the social structure.

What gave the December, 1987 uprising its endurance, its success? It is my view that the success of this Intifada required the presence both of a competent (and legitimately conceived) leadership and of a genuine sense of Palestinian community (solidarity), particularly throughout the first two years of the uprising. This research therefore asks: What was the role of the Palestinian leadership in organizing and maintaining the Intifada throughout the first two years of the uprising?

The investigation focused on primary sources, such as the communiques issued by the Unified Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), which directed the actions of the Intifada, and interviews (Summer, 1992) with members of the Palestinian leadership, representing all four political factions, as well as grassroots activists, academics, and Palestinian journalists on the West Bank and in Gaza.[9] In addition, it employed

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[8]Emile Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics Since 1967* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1988); Ibrahim Dakkak, "Back to Square One," IN Alexander Scholch, Editor, *Palestinians Over the Green Line* (London: Ithaca Press, 1983); and Joost Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada*, op. cit.

[9]Conforming with guidelines laid out by the Office of Research Administration of the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, Tennessee, interviewees will be identified by dual initials, selected randomly, to represent specific individuals. It was my concern, as well as that of my committee and the Office of Research Administration, that nothing quoted within the study ever be used as "evidence" against any participants. For the record, it may be stated that a number of individuals waived their anonymity voluntarily, many claiming that they had already served a number of years (2 years to 17 years) in Israeli prisons, in any case.

secondary sources such as newspapers, newsletters, Palestinian news agency publications, journal articles, and other publications analyzing/reviewing events of the Intifada.

The study defines the Intifada in terms of the dynamics of the conflict, and seeks to explain both the onset and the maintenance of this episode of social violence by means of available theoretical literature. It then offers an explanatory conceptual model which integrates pertinent approaches. It is proposed that the assumptions underlying explanations of the conflict itself will affect both the definition of resolution and the process by which such resolution will be sought. Unfortunately, given the restraints of both time and resources, the study cannot apply these findings to the key test of predicting outcomes for a future Palestinian state. It is my view, that the dynamics operating within the Intifada will bear significantly upon the success of such a state, and will be reflected in the assumptions demonstrated in the present study.

Theoretical Foundations

Theories explaining conflict and addressing the resolution of conflict find this particular conflict perplexing. *On the one hand*, many theories, having their origins in the study of Western conflicts, assume the existence of liberal democratic norms, grounded in the tradition of contractual government. Hence "societal violence" represents a break with the normal processes of contract bargaining customary in democratic settings. In this view, conflict is an aberration, a distinct case wherein one or more

groups, feeling disenfranchised, find the doors to government closed, and respond affectively and irrationally against state authority. For the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, particularly as evidenced through the Intifada, these assumptions cannot be met: there is no social contract between the Palestinian people and the military administration. Furthermore, the concept of political venue does not exist in defining relations between an occupied people and a coercive military regime.

On the other hand, the Palestinian attempt at "shaking off" rule by an occupying regime does not fit traditional theories characterizing revolutionary movements, either, movements wherein violence is adopted as a legitimate *and primary* means to overthrow an exploitative dominant class. Given the coercive nature of the Israeli regime in its administration of the Occupied Territories, violence as a primary means of instituting change would be disastrous. Further, the subordinate status of the Palestinian population cannot be defined in economic terms: identity rests with national and ethnic claims. Hence, strictly class-based analyses of traditional revolutionary processes provide inadequate explanations.

Even before Ted Gurr asked, *Why Men Rebel*,[10] the question of what prompts societal violence had been seriously raised by others. In 1962 James C. Davies posited a theory which drew from both de Tocqueville and Marx and rested on what he called "unfulfilled expectations," a work which initiated the beginning of a systematic

[10]Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

exploration of political violence.[11] People rebel, he said, when there is an excessive gap between what is expected and what can be realized. Such expectations can be fueled by what people see around them -- a way of life available to others, perhaps, but not to themselves -- or, alternatively, by periods of economic stability and sustained growth which actually improve living conditions for the general population, followed by a sudden downturn in the economy.

This argument implicitly assumes that "expectations" somehow mirror "needs:" people need what they want or, stated differently, wants are needs-driven. However, all wants/needs must not be equal because many people do not rebel. Some needs must be more potent than others, the question being, how are we to make this determination? Maslow,[12] we know, has constructed such a hierarchy from behavioral observations of human development. While there has been scant empirical work to substantiate the hypothesis, his general ordering has been intuitively satisfying. For the present inquiry, the important aspect is the conclusion that physical/physiological needs stand at the base of this hierarchy. That is, that certain needs -- basic substantive needs -- must be met first. Such a conclusion supports the Davies hypothesis that men revolt when there is a

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[11]James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Socioogical Review*, Vol. 27 (February,1962), pp. 5-19. Also: "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion." IN Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, Editors, *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969).

[12]Abraham H. Maslow, "A Theory of Human Motivation," *Psychological Review*, Vol. 50 (1943), pp. 370-396. Also: *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper and Brown, 1954).

gap between expectations (of receiving material goods) and reality (goods actually available for consumption), expecially when the goods sought are primary goods.

Once basic needs are met, it would appear that the stimulus for rebellion is removed and, conversely, that rebellion should occur only in places where people are severely economically deprived, an assertion which has been questioned. J.L.P. Thompson,[13] in a time-series analysis spanning sixty years, found no link between violence and economic indicators in Northern Ireland, for example. Moreover, conflicts have been sustained in a wide range of economic landscapes and across several decades: consider Spain, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Northern India, Canada, and Israel/Palestine, to name a few such protracted conflicts. In more recent work,[14] Davies suggests a mechanism which could account for the general occurrence of such conflicts. First, is the acknowledgement that political development itself, while perhaps assuring physical survival, continues to create expectations. In so doing, it also fosters the acquisition of needs further "up" the hierarchy, needs which Davies calls "self-esteem" or "dignity" needs. How? Where basic needs are met, social groups begin to form. It is when the individual becomes identified with such groups that a process of "national identification" begins -- a notion of group solidarity. Thus empowered, the group sees itself as aggrieved and begins to enumerate grievances and interests.

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[13]J.L.P. Thompson, "Deprivation and Political Violence in Northern Ireland, 1922-1985: A Time-Series Analysis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 33 No. 4 (December, 1989), pp. 676-699.

[14]James C. Davies, "Maslow and Theory of Political Development: Getting to Fundamentals," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 12 No. 3 (September, 1991), pp. 389-420.

This is not unlike findings in organization theory addressing conflict in corporate hierarchies. Gibb[15] developed a ten-stage Environmental Quality scale by which to classify relationships within organizational settings. The independent variable in the scale is "level of trust" within the environment. What he explicitly observes is that new sets of "prepotent needs" emerge at each level depending upon the status of newly developed skills, capacities, and awareness levels of particular individuals. The hierarchical ordering of a needs/wants hierarchy reveals new needs becoming ascendent at each phase. Needs, in effect, seem to take on a life of their own. For Gibb, this is the whole point of focusing on "needs." Like an Indian firewalker crossing red coals, the individual can effect change by creating his/her own reality. "I create my own environment by making choices,"[16] however, assumes an environment characterized by choice, and would seem to ignore the realities of who is holding the guns, in the strictly political context. It is precisely because of the coercive powers of the state that individual choices are limited. Nevertheless, within the context of a social movement, the ability of a leadership to perceive -- and to communicate -- a new and distinct reality, is a powerful motivating force for initiating and sustaining the movement.

Some would argue that the state, itself, can restructure its priorities, therein addressing the needs of its constituents. For Burton,[17] this is paramount. If the state

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[15]J. Gibb, *Trust: A New View of Personal and Organizational Development* (Los Angeles: The Guild of Tutors Press, 1978).

[16]Ibid., p. 70.

[17]John W. Burton, *Deviance, Terrorism, and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Problems* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979).

were to focus on meeting the needs of its individual citizens in the *first* instance, its own security (stability) would be assured, in the *second.* Citizens who are content do not threaten political structures, is the underlying assumption. But the fulfillment of human "needs" is a competitive enterprise: resources are scarce. What this theory requires, in essence, turning Maslow "on his head," is the acceptance of psychosocial needs as being primary -- needs of identity, security, predictability, control. Psychosocial needs do not have to reflect limited resources. The state, by enabling the diversity of its citizenry to achieve fulfillment, will thereby protect and enable its own continued existence and, significantly, its singular hold on power.

There is an obvious paradox: can both Davies and Burton be correct? The Davies argument is that revolution occurs when expected "needs" are unfulfilled; more explicitly, that once primary (physical) needs are met, intergroup dynamics promote a sense of *identity* which itself becomes an empowering force enabling the group to undertake violent actions to bring about change if its members see themselves as "aggrieved." That is, *identity promotes revolution in the face of unmet needs*. Burton argues, however, that a state policy of *promoting identity over and beyond material goods would defuse violent activities*, and hence, "revolution."

This apparent paradox may reflect differences in level-of-analysis focus. Davies' "individuals" are individuals in the process of becoming groups which readily articulate grievances such as discriminatory treatment, as a matter of their "group-ness." Burton's

primary theoretical weakness[18] lies with his failure to adequately distinguish between individuals, groups, and the larger system. His emphasis, particularly in *Deviance, Terrorism, and War* is on individuals. But these are atomized "components" of his social system, for whom the term *identity* takes on a universal meaning. For Davies, the individual is seen as the group; for Burton, the individual is a kind of amorphous universality. Since eruptions of societal violence require actions from many individuals, it can be readily understood that the Davies' mechanism of group identity would offer explanations pertaining to *social movements*, as well as to ad hoc affective displays against state authority, the frequent demonstrations or intifadas throughout the 1970's and 1980's, for example. Burton's focus, in promoting identity for the (atomized) individual within society, would seem to address the randomness of violence within society, particularly as sparked at the individual level, and in the present case could account for the reports of knifings, shootings, and individual acts of violence against Israeli soldiers and civilians by Palestinians. In the Davies argument, *identity* would be crucial at the group level for formulating group protest against the status quo; in the Burtonian argument, promoting *identity needs* of the individual as a matter of state policy, would be seen as forestalling possible "deviant" acts by alienated individuals. For either argument, however, it is clear that the concept of *identity* plays a unique role for citizens within the state.

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[18]J. Kristen Urban, "The Alternative Paradigm of J.W. Burton: A Critique," October, 1990. Unpublished.

Spin-offs from this approach have propelled work on conflict resolution using psychotherapeutic techniques. Kelman's work[19] with problem-solving workshops to address the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, focuses on altering individual perceptions -- in effect, addressing Burton's identity needs -- by bringing adversaries together to problem-solve in a structured setting. Doob[20] has employed similar workshops to address conflict similarly characterized by deep ethnic/religious divisions such as those between Sudanese and Ethiopians, Turkish and Greek Cypriots, and Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. It must be emphasized here, that the psychotherapeutic approach to conflict resolution represents a 180-degree shift from state-centered approaches, in that the individuals it brings together must dialogue as individuals, and not as representatives of state interests or policies. In many cases the participants are students and/or academics, and while some may be civil servants within their domestic environment, they do not come to the workshops as policy-makers. Hence, there would seem to be a gap between the intentions of this approach and the possibilities for policy revision and subsequent implementation at the level of the state, unless massive workshops throughout the societies in conflict are envisioned. It must be admitted, however, that as a parallel

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[19]Herbert C. Kelman, "Creating Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 26 No. 1 (March, 1982), pp. 39-75; "Overcoming Barriers to Negotiationof the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 16 No. 3 (Autumn, 1986), pp. 13-28; and "Acknowledging the Other's Nationhood: How to Create a Momentum for the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 22 No. 1 (Autumn, 1992), pp. 18-38.

[20]Leonard W. Doob and William J. Foltz, *Resolving Conflict in Africa: The Fermeda Workshop* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970) and "The Belfast Workshop: An Application of Group Techniques to a Destructive Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 33 No. 4 (December, 1989), pp. 676-699.

track in the process of conflict resolution, the approach cannot be discounted. The "Norwegian Connection" which brought about the historic Agreement of Principles between the Israeli government and the PLO represents the fruits of such an approach.

Harry Eckstein,[21] in reviewing theoretical developments and research in the area of collective political violence, provides an "explanatory sketch"[22] which characterizes as a branch in the theoretical tree, all the various approaches reviewed above. He calls the Gurr/Davies/Burton "branching" discussed above, Contingency Theory, societal violence (in this view) being *contingent* upon some external trigger. While the initial spark of the Intifada would certainly be viewed as an affective response to a singular event -- a traffic accident in which a number of Palestinian workers were killed -- the maintainence of the popular uprising beyond the first weeks does not fit into the category of "affective violence." And, there are other problems. If deprivation accounts wholly for the eruption of public demonstrations, why did it occur when it did? The Occupation was already twenty years old, and deprivation had become a way of life. Davies' observations relating to *group identity* indeed provide insight, however. Palestinian solidarity seemed to coalesce overnight throughout the Territories and, while Palestinians have long held a strong sense of national identity, this new solidarity cut across political and social factions, perhaps for the first time. But again, to attribute this to deprivation would seem to offer reductionist explanations.

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[21]Harry Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence," IN Ted R. Gurr, Editor, *Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research* (New York: Free Press, 1980).

[22]Ibid., pp. 142-143.

The other major body of research addressing the question of societal violence, Eckstein calls Inherency Theory or the collective action approach. A coercive or oppressive environment, such as that of Palestinians under Occupation, would be one in which violence becomes an *inherent* feature of the sociopolitical landscape. Charles Tilly's work on mobilization and revolution[23] represents the most well-articulated theory of this state of affairs, one which is grounded in utilitarian notions of rational determination of self-interest. Relations between the government and the people become so strained that eventually a *revolutionary situation* comes to exist. Characterized by a state of multiple sovereignty, a revolutionary situation, in Tilly's view, includes: 1) the presence of a core group which, in effect, stakes its claim as a parallel government; 2) the acceptance of such a claim by the larger group, particularly when needs increasingly remain unmet by the regime; and 3) the inability of the authorities, for whatever reasons (solidarity of the group, for instance), to block the actions of the group (even) by extreme repression. The actualization of social violence in this revolutionary situation, rather than being spontaneous and wholly affective, is characterized by *rationality* -- by the careful calculations of costs and benefits related to the actions -- by *discipline*, and by *persistence*. But the demonstrations which overtook the Territories on 9 December, 1987 were anything but rational. In fact, throwing stones at the Israeli military would be called entirely irrational and devoid of calculation.

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[23]Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1978).

It is the intent of the present study to test the explanatory power of this approach by focusing the analysis upon the role of the "parallel authority" operating as decision-makers and as implementers of policies organizing the activities of the Intifada. Lustick, in a recent review of "Intifada studies,"[24] offers support for this undertaking in noting that the various studies emerging, while generally lacking a theoretical focus, provide evidence which would tend to support the collective action approach. In addition, Goodwin and Skocpol,[25] explaining the occurrence of revolutions in Third World settings through a "structuralist" framework, offer insights for the Intifada. Considering the Occupied Territories in the category of "Directly Ruled Colonies," Goodwin and Skocpol highlight sociopolitical conditions within which a leadership would be operating while orchestrating a "revolutionary" movement. Assertions that are made regarding the consequences of direct colonial rule will be shown in the present study to find application within the context of the Palestinian uprising against Israeli authority. Of particular concern will be those discussing the mobilization of society as a whole, as a prerequisite for revolution, and the observation that "brittle and unreformable"[26] regimes are most vulnerable to replacement by revolutionary means.

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[24]Ian S. Lustick, "Writing the Intifada: Collective Action in the Occupied Territories," *World Politics*, Vol. 45 (July, 1993), pp. 560-594.

[25]Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," *Politics and Society*, Vol. 17 No. 4 (December, 1989), pp. 489-510.

[26]Ibid., p. 505.

Outline of Research

To examine the Research Question, "What was the role of the Palestinian leadership in organizing and maintaining the Intifada from December, 1987 - December, 1989?" the socio-political environs must first be established. The initial two chapters will highlight the existing climate for the emergence of a Palestinian leadership. In this, Chapter 2 will discuss the Occupation, both as a legal construct (its definition under international law) and as a coercive authority employing the rule-of-law to shape daily life for the Palestinian inhabitants. In particular, specific categories of the Military Orders will be examined, Orders which have, over the course of twenty-five years, deliberately blunted the emergence of an indigenous national leadership.

Chapter 3 examines the year preceding the Intifada and the events of the Intifada's first two years, drawing largely from accounts documented by the West Bank English edition of *Al-Fajr*, a newspaper which, like all elements of the Palestinian press, was subject to Israeli censorship. The concern in Chapter 3 is to demonstrate the demands on leadership. Specifically, to highlight the dialectics of the uprising, in terms of Palestinian actions and Israeli counter-actions as well as Israeli actions and Palestinian counter-actions.

Chapter 4 examines the evidence of leadership: the communiques released by the United Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) throughout the first two years of the Intifada. The communiques are discussed in terms of both their communicative rhetoric and in terms of their substance. In particular, and with an eye to Tilly's discussion of a "parallel

authority," the communiques are also framed as an informal "Constitution," representing a codification of political values as the leadership -- and a Palestinian political community -- is seen to emerge. A key element noted through an analysis of the communiques is the degree to which the reality of a social leadership (forming within weeks in local communities) is recognized by the political (UNLU) leadership, and incorporated within the structure of implementation.

Chapter 5 follows Chapter 4 conceptually in that, beyond the process of establishing "leadership," the core group must act as a decision-making body in designing policies. UNLU policies, categorized under five headings, are examined with regard to frequency data, and an analysis of policy changes across time is undertaken. The findings are directly linked with the role of Palestinian leadership and the effects of Israeli policies targetting Palestinian leadership.

Finally, in Chapter 6 the Discussion reviews the research findings regarding the Intifada as a social movement, its leadership and group cohesion, in light of both Contingency Theory and Inherency Theory as categorized by Eckstein. In response to a query raised at a Round-Table discussion led by the author at the Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs (PASSIA) in Jerusalem, as to whether Contingency Theory and Inherency Theory might not be fungible, it will be argued that each perhaps applies to different aspects of the process of conflict resolution, that they are, perhaps, in an appropriate setting, complementary.

In environments characterized by repressive rule, Inherency Theory offers explanations as to the means by which a people seeks to establish their claim to a social

contract -- to gain political control over their lives and to shape decision-making in accord with existing social values. Once the right to self-determination has been recognized, then the values of contractual theory come into play. That is to say, the assumptions underlying Contingency Theory become relevant.

This transition has implications for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict along two dimensions. First, the assumptions of the Contingency Theory approach -- in essence, liberal democratic assumptions -- apply to the Peace Process, itself, with consequences to Palestinians, as non-state actors. Secondly, such assumptions will play into the configuration of the outcomes to be expected from the building of the future Palestinian state. At both these levels, the true "fungibility" of the approaches to addressing conflict will emerge. Defining the entire playing field of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, most recently re-written as the Intifada, however, is the unequal distribution of power and the structuring of authority. This is a fact which has too often been missing from Western assumptions about conflicts and conflict resolution. The model will seek to communicate the points at which this structural reality impinges upon the conflict, and operates to maintain it.

The concern at the outset of this study, is in finding that the repurcussions of twenty-five years of Occupation may have fostered a set of dynamics which pose too serious a challenge for legitimate processes of democracy. The hope would be that the Intifada, initially laying the groundwork for integration of both the political and the social leadership, would provide a new mechanism for national leadership. Whether the

diasporan (PLO) community can adapt to the political realities of the Intifada will remain an important question.

CHAPTER 2

THE OCCUPATION

Introduction

Political revolutions are in essence a recent phenomenon, argues Hannah Arendt,[27] and reflect an optimism that the historical narrative of a people can begin anew at a fresh moment in time. Arendt links the appearance of modern revolutions with the occurrence of the American and French Revolutions, that is, with the introduction of the political concept of "freedom."[28] While clearly not revolutionary, their thrusts being more correctly seeded from nineteenth century nationalism, both Arabs and Jews, at the close of the First World War, sought with just such optimism, the coincidence of these very possibilities. At the close of the Second World War over a quarter century later, these twin ideals were still in place for both peoples: the hope of new beginnings grounded in values of political freedom. But the intervening years had been years of

[27]Hannah Arendt, *On Revolution* (New York: Penguin Books), 1965.

[28]Ibid., pp. 28-35.

violence between Arabs and Jews, each seeking to establish claims under British mandatory rule in Palestine. More tragically, their parallel aspirations of nationhood were increasingly understood as being unable to accomodate each other.

The Balfour Declaration,[29] incorporated by Great Britain in its administration of the Palestine Mandate 30 years earlier, had called for the establishment of a national homeland for the Jewish people in Palestine, and in so doing, has been described as having given "priority to the national aspirations of a non-inhabitant people over those of an indigenous populace."[30] While the British government, as author of the Balfour Declaration, had stated officially that,

> His Majesty's Government have not contemplated . . . the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population . . . [nor] that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine,"[31]

this policy had, sadly, fixed the national aspirations of two peoples upon the same land. The UN Partition Plan of 1947,[32] which divided the Palestine Mandate into an Arab and a Jewish state was accepted joyously by Jewish inhabitants, but was angrily rejected by Arabs, who argued that lands they had inhabited for centuries had been given to outsiders.

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[29]"The Balfour Declaration, November 2, 1917," IN John Norton Moore, Editor, *The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Readings and Documents* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), 1977, pp. 884-885.

[30]Allan Gerson, *Israel, the West Bank, and International Law* (London: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd.), 1978, p. 43.

[31]Quoted by Henry Cattan, *Palestine and International Law* (Bristol, England: Longman Group, Ltd.), 1973, p. 15.

[32]"General Assembly Resolution 181 (II) Concerning the Future Government of Palestine November 29, 1947," IN Moore, pp. 907-933.

Violence broke out immediately and the vision of new beginnings and political freedom were awash with blood.[33] For the Jewish community it was a beginning, a Return, the promise of a safe haven and that the Holocaust would never again visit Jewry. For Palestinians, it was the beginning of the Diaspora, an exile in which young boys living in the squalor of Gaza refugee camps 45 years later would name villages of their great grandparents, which they had never seen and which were by then a part of Israel, as "home." Indeed, "in the Palestinian memory, 1948 is the great divide," writes Shipler, "the parting of the fates of those who left and those who stayed. It marks the genesis of anger and regret, hatred and longing."[34]

Having gained recognition as a nation-state, however, Israel has found its euphoria tempered by its geographic realities. Surrounded by hostile Arab states across whose borders Palestinian liberation forces (Fatah) launched frequent raids, Israel has been party to repeated wars, and security has become an essential national policy issue. While all wars have costs, the June, 1967 War has had special consequences for the Israeli state. Following months of inter-state tensions across the Middle East, Israel initiated a pre-emptive attack against Syria, Jordan, and Egypt in the summer of 1967,[35] and in the ensuing Six Day War, nearly tripled its holdings. The newly occupied territories

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[33]Don Peretz, *The Middle East Today* (New York: Praeger), 1988, pp. 297-303 recounts the emergence of the state of Israel as an historico-political event.

[34]David K. Shipler, *Arab and Jew: Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land* (New York: Penguin Books, Inc.), 1986, p. 53.

[35]Charles W. Yost, "The Arab-Israeli War: How it Began," IN Moore, pp. 293-309. See also Peretz for discussions of the roles of each of these states in the 1967 War, pp. 320-355.

comprised some 70,000 sq. km. as compared with 26,000 sq. km. designated in the 1949 armistice, and included the Golan Heights Region (north), the West Bank (center), the Gaza Strip and Northern Sinai (south), and other territories returned to Egypt as part of the Camp David Accords.[36]

It was the decision to continue to occupy the territories acquired in the war, however, that has led to two subsequent wars, and to intense political debate within Israel itself. Yehoshafat Harkabi, a former chief of Israeli military intelligence, represents the viewpoint within Israel that Israel's security must be re-defined and that both Arabs and Jews must come to terms of peace, a concern reiterated by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in interviews following the 13 September, 1993 signing of the Declarations of Principles between Israel and the PLO. At the heart of new security concerns, says Harkabi, lie the consequences of the 1967 War:

> The victory and occupation of territories in 1967 were taken to mean that the old policy that had put the grand design [of establishing a greater Eretz Yisrael which included most of Transjordan and parts of Lebanon and northern Sinai] to one side was erroneous in its minimalism, and detracted from the ability to achieve loftier goals. This revised outlook gradually led to a total revamping of the dominant ideology and a change in Israel's political culture and eventually (in 1977) brought Menachem Begin and the Likud to power.[37]

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[36]Esther Rosalind Cohen, *Human Rights in the Israeli-Occupied Territories 1967-1982* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press), 1985, p. 35.

[37]Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Israel's Fateful Hour* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers), 1988, p. 42.

A military occupation is maintained for the benefit of the occupier. Carlton[38] notes that one aspect of this involves the use of power to effect the regime's policies. borrowing from Almond and Powell,[39] he argues that successful military conquerors must have the following capabilities:[40]

> 1. Extractive Capacities: A system from which resources and manpower can be drawn, by force, if necessary. He notes that, "much here depends upon compliance of the subjects and the willingness of subordinates through whom the policies are mediated." [41]
>
> 2. Regulative Capacities: A system of formal (legal) or informal mechanisms to ensure political control and therefore maintain order.
>
> 3. Distributive Capacities: A system by which to distribute goods and services and, importantly, one which "defines the allocation of statuses and rewards within the state or system."[42]
>
> 4. Symbolic Capacities: "Every system has to explain itself to itself, especially the -- as yet -- unconvinced or those who are still free to doubt at the margins. Just as important, is its need to assure the world outside of its good intentions."[43]
>
> 5. Responsive Capacities: This involves the "capability of eliciting enthusiastic support for the current regime."[44]

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[38]Eric Carlton, *Occupation: The Policies and Practices of Military Conquerors* (Savage, MD: Barnes and Noble Books), 1992.

[39]Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (New York: Little Brown), 1966.

[40]Carlton, summarized from pp. 9-11.

[41]Ibid., p. 9.

[42]Ibid., p. 10.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Ibid.

As Israeli policies in administering the Occupied Territories (OT) moved ever more to policies of control, these various regime capabilities grew more extreme in their administrative demands. Israeli Ccitics such as Harkabi and others would observe that this more repressive policy orientation began to threaten the democratic underpinnings of Israel itself. An equally serious security threat, however lay in the fact that in effecting its rule by means of repressive, exclusivist policies, Israel was unwittingly nurturing the possibility of revolt from among the Palestinian population it sought to control.[45]

The Evolution of Military Rule

The evolution of military rule has greatly impacted the lives of the Palestinian population living under occupation. The intent of this section is to establish the environment in which Palestinians have had to organize their lives. It will also demonstrate the effect which this environment has had upon equipping Palestinians to realize their "revolutionary vision" of one day achieving a new historical beginning framed in the concepts of political freedom. In particular, it will emphasize those aspects of military rule which have been designed to limit the development of leadership potential within the Palestinian community, and will thus lay the groundwork for an analysis of the

[45]See Goodwin and Skocpol, pp. 501-503 for a discussion of the vulnerability of this type of regime to revolutionary overthrow.

role of this emergent leadership in the first two years of the Intifada, an analysis which is at the heart of this research.

The Operative Legal Framework

The occupation of the Territories has continued for over twenty-five years, and security has been repeatedly advanced as the justification for implementing harsh policies in the military's administration of the OT. The quality of life under the occupation depends upon whether one is an Israeli or a Palestinian. Civil administration in the OT, "like the military government before it, uses three sets of laws."[46] Primary among these are Military Orders, which adapt the legal code to day-to-day changes as reflected in Israel's policy towards the Territories. As of 1988, over 1200 such orders had been issued since the Occupation's beginnings in 1967.[47] Second in terms of frequency, are the British Mandatory Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, which are applied, "under the pretext that they are part of Jordanian law,"[48] although Jordan's government has denied that these regulations were ever adopted in the Hashemite Kingdom, and Great Britain, which set them in place originally, has confirmed that the Regulations were repealed as of 14 May, 1948 "by virtue of the Palestine (Revocation) Order in Council, 1948, repealing all Mandatory Orders in Council, including the Order in Council of 1937,

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[46]Lea Tsemel, "Personal Status and Rights," IN Naseer Aruri, Editor, *Occupation: Israel Over Palestine* (Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.), 1983, p. 58.

[47]Raja Shehadeh, *Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies), 1988, "Introduction."

[48]Tsemel, p. 58.

on which the 1945 Defence Regulations were based."[49] And finally, Jordanian law is invoked "whenever necessary."[50]

Two sets of courts operate in the OT: civil courts and military courts. When the military has no serious interests at stake, cases are remanded to the civil court, cases involving "security" questions or coinciding with interests of the military government, being reserved for military judgment. Lines are not always clear-cut, as Lea Tsemel, an Israeli attorney who has spent years defending Palestinian clients, explains by way of example:

> A straightforward case of murder involving two Jordanian civilians was brought before the military courts because the suspected murderer, a man named Janho, was a well-known collaborator with the Israelis, who did not want to risk his being found guilty by a civil court. He was acquitted by the military court in Ramallah.[51]

It is a system so convoluted as to prompt Felicia Langer, an institution in herself as an Israeli lawyer defending Palestinians from the abuses of the legal system, to acknowledge that "even Kafka would be lost there."[52]

Since 1967, approximately 65,000 Israeli citizens have taken up residence in the West Bank alone, the state having added 118 new settlements -- excluding the 120,000

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[49]As quoted in Shehadeh, "Introduction," p. xiv.

[50]Tsemel, p. 58.

[51]Ibid.

[52]Felicia Langer, "A Judicial System Where Even Kafka Would Be Lost," *Journal of Palestine Studies* XX (1) Autumn, 1990, p. 25. In this interview, Ms. Langer discusses her decision as of May, 1990 to close her practice and accept a position teaching in Germany, no longer willing to "legitimize" a system which only pretends to execute justice within the OT.

settlers residing near Jerusalem.[53] This has been interpreted as being a continuation of a Zionist policy, begun in 1948, which has sought "the dismantlement and dispersion of Palestinian society."[54] The effect has been to create:

> A dual system wherein Palestinians are subject to laws and regulations in effect before the 1967 War, as amended by Israeli military authorities, while Israeli residents are subject to laws and regulations applicable to Israeli nationals living in Israel.[55]

It is further complicated by the fact that, while Israel is a parliamentary democracy with free elections, an independent judiciary, and many democratic institutions, it has been, until late 1993, in a formal state of war with all its Arab neighbors, excepting Egypt, and continues to operate under emergency regulations established under the state of emergency.[56] Hence, no principles are fixed, and "whenever necessary, the 'rule of law' is recruited in all its flexibility to directly serve the purposes of the conqueror."[57]

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[53]Shehadeh, p. 212.

[54]Muhammad Hallaj, "Alternatives to the Occupation," IN Naseer Aruri, Editor, *Occupation: Israel Over Palestine* (Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.), 1983, p. 427.

[55]Country Report, p. 1189.

[56]This situation may change in the near future as a consequence of the 13 October, 1993 joint signing of the Declaration of Principles by Israel and the PLO in Washington, D.C., and the move by other Arab parties to agree to negotiate treaties of peace with Israel.

[57]Tsemel, p. 57.

The Four Legislative Stages

To understand Israel's interpretation of international standards in applying the "rule of law' to its administration of the OT, it is helpful to outline the "Four Legislative Stages" represented by the Military Orders, and discussed by Shehadeh in the 1988 revision of his book, *Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank.*[58] The author, a West Bank attorney,[59] states explicitly that his analysis applies to the West Bank, since Gaza, which was formerly under Egyptian administration, has been governed under a slightly different set of Military Orders, bearing a different numbering system. The contents of both systems are fundamentally the same, and the following outline is at least demonstrative of the development of the course of Israeli control throughout twenty years of occupying the Territories.

The *first legislative stage*, from 1967 to 1971 lay the groundwork by which Israel could assume full control of the Palestinians in the OT:

> The military government was given full control of all transactions in immovable property, the use of water and other natural resources, the power to expropriate land, and the authority to operate banks. In addition, the orders made illegal the import and export of agricultural products to and from the West Bank without military permission. Driver's licenses (Order 215), travel permits, and licenses to practise a variety of professions (Orders 260, 324, and 437) also came to require the approval of the military authorities. Moreover, during this period the system of control through identity cards was initiated . . . as was control over the municipal councils (Order 194) and over the village councils (Order 191).[60]

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[97]Munir Fasheh, "Impact on Education," IN Naseer H. Aruri, Editor, *Occupation: Israel Over Palestine* (Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.), 1983, p. 301.

[98]Dakkak, pp. 70-74 and Sahliyeh, pp. 22-24.

These orders, some 200 in number, "were not published, and were not available even to lawyers."[61]

Such orders as were related to "security" -- a valid concept under international law -- were generally applied in excessive ways. For example, Military Order 101, which limited freedom of expression, made the "'congregation of 10 people or more in a place where a speech is heard on a political subject . . . or who are gathered for the purpose of deliberating on such a subject,' punishable by 10 years in prison."[62] Significantly, in light of its use throughout the Occupation and especially in the course of the Intifada, "Order 378 authorised arrests without warrant and detention for as many as 18 days, renewable, without charge or trial."[63] Revisions during the Intifada permitted the state to hold "detainees" for up to six (later, twelve months) without charge or trial.

The *second legislative phase*, from 1971 to 1979, sought to facilitate Jewish settlement on the West Bank. For example,

> Order 418 ammended the Jordanian planning law to make possible the zoning of large areas in the West Bank for the benefit of the Jewish settlements. Order 419 allowed foreign juridical bodies to acquire land far more easily than had been possible under Jordanian law.[64]

Implicit in this phase is the practice of requisitioning land for military purposes, closing land for military purposes, the acquisition of land by declaring it to be "state" land,

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[61]Ibid.

[62]Ibid., "Introdution," p. ix.

[63]Ibid.

[64]Ibid.

expropriating land for public purposes, and restricting the use of lands by Palestinians.[65] Approximately 40% of the land has been registered "for the exclusive use of Jews, [however,] the land over which Israel has control approaches 60% (including military zones, parks, and land expropriated but not registered."[66]

The *third legislative stage*. following the signing of the Camp David Accords, 1979 to 1981, saw a great influx of Israeli citizens into the West Bank.[67] Reflecting this reality, Military Orders served to 1) tighten the links between Israeli citizens on both sides of the 'Green Line,' by "extending Israeli law to the Jewish settlers, and excluding them from jurisdiction of [and accountability to] the West Bank Courts;[68] 2) administering the settlements in accordance with practices of local government within Israel; and 3) creating the Civil Administration to administer aspects of Palestinian life.[69]

The *fourth legislative stage*, 1981 to 1988 has:

> Primarily involved planning regulations pertaining to the use of the extensive areas of land that were being acquired for Jewish settlement. In addition, a number of orders related to financial matters and specifically to controlling the flow of money into the West Bank. Tax laws were also amended and the value-added tax [VAT] introduced during this period; these changes increased the revenues collected from the Occupied Territories.[70]

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[65]Ibid.; see also Chapters 1 and 2, pp. 17-57.

[66]Ibid., p. 213.

[67]Ibid., "Introduction," p. ix.

[68]Ibid., "Introduction," p. x.

[69]Ibid.

[70]Ibid.

Shehadeh argues that the evolution of the Military Orders reflects changes in the way the state of Israel perceived its role as "Occupier" of the Territories it had acquired by force in June, 1967. While initially acknowledging its status as an occupying force -- having prepared its first three Military Orders prior to its Occupation, "as part of the army's contingency plans,"[71] and claiming land would be exchanged for peace, it subsequently cited the necessities of "defence," arguing the need for the expropriation of land for Israeli settlements to provide for security of the Israeli state. when the Likud government rose to power in 1977, "the Territories were held to belong to Israel by right, indeed by divine right: there could be no question of expropriating or occupying what was rightfully Israel's."[72] The only "public" recognized was the Jewish settlers; this orientation was reflected in the fact that the designation "West Bank" disappeared from all official references, with "Judea" and "Samaria" being the only appellations which were politically acceptable:

> The Territories were now 'adminstered,' as were the 1.5 million Palestinian inhabitants. With the rightful owners of the land now deemed to be Israeli, the Palestinians by implication, became mere squatters.[73]

[71]Ibid., "Introduction," p. xi.

[72]Ibid., "Introduction," p. x.

[73]Ibid., "Introduction," p. xi.

The Occupation and Human Rights

What can be said about the Israeli occupation of the Territories in light of this? In its investigation of the treatment of Palestinians by Israeli authorities within the OT, The U.S. Senate Country Report on Human Rights for 1987 catalogued extensive rights abuses (as defined within the various international codes), as occurring in all the following areas: violation of person (political killing, torture, arbitrary arrest, detention or exile, denial of fair public trial if accused of security offenses, arbitrary interference with privacy, family, home, or correspondence); violation of civil liberties (prohibitions against displaying the colors of the Palestinian flag, censorship of the press, closing of publishing houses, censorship and banning of periodicals and books which are anti-Semitic or which encourage Palestinian nationalism, limits on peaceful assembly, freedom of movement obstructed by security checks, requirement for identity documents); "Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government" (above the municipal level there is no self-government); "Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Language, or Social Status" (as discussed above, inhabitants of the Occupied Territories are subject to different legal codes as well as court systems, the application of which are based precisely upon these characteristics; in addition, economic regulations and land-use and transfer laws are discriminatory in nature).[74]

[74]Country Report, pp. 1191-1198.

The U.S. House Subcommittee Hearing on Developments in the Middle East, September 1987, contained a study (with testimonies) documenting a "pattern of arrest, imprisonment, and torture [which] shows that the Israeli authorities have a policy of abuse against Palestinian children."[75]

On August 4, 1985, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin "announced the 'iron fist' . . . and issued 62 administrative detention orders within the space of a month. The 'iron fist' policy reintroduced or intensified extrajudicial administrative measures against Palestinians and their institutions. The five main measures have been:

* Administrative detention . . .
* Deportation . . .
* Restriction orders (town arrest) . . .
* House demolitions and sealings . . .
* Closure of institutions. . . ."[76]

Further, the 1987 Report of the West Bank Database Project notes that "battlefield tactics" have been legalized in campus confrontations, permitting IDF forces "to open fire on demonstrators."[77]

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[75]Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, *Hearing: Developments in the Middle East, September, 1987* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), 1988, p. 99.

[76]Penny Johnson, "The Routine of Repression," *Middle East Report* (January-February), 1988, p. 5.

[77]Ibid., p. 7. The reference is to the multi-faceted research project headed by Meron Benvenisti, which included no less than fourteen individual undertakings by different scholars and focused on such issues as demographics, agriculture and water, administration, industry, taxation, settlements, and others as they related to conditions in the OT. The findings were published: Meron Benvenisti, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research), 1984. Further reports have been issued in subsequent years.

The Occupation and Palestinian Leadership

For Israel, the Occupation has sought, by legal means, to control lands designated as *Eretz Israel* and, with an eye toward future annexation, to create facts on the ground[78] which would make the return of lands occupied in 1967, exceedingly difficult. To ensure the continuation of this level of control, Israel has been careful to adopt policies restricting both the development of a viable Palestinian national leadership and the expression of such leadership within the OT, therein thwarting attempts at organizing the Palestinian national movement internally. The following discussion is by no means inclusive of all Israeli policies to retard the development of a genuine political Palestinian movement within the OT. For this, the reader is referred to other sources,[79] from which the present discussion has been drawn, and which document the evolution of such policies more fully. The intent at present is to outline the major features of this policy.

Development of Leadership. Policies which affect the development of Palestinian leadership within the OT -- especially the education, training, and

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[78]See Geoffrey Aronson, *Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians, and the West Bank* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies), 1987.

[79]The reader is referred to: Emile Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership: West Bank Politics Since 1967* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute), 1988; Raja Shehadeh, *Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank* (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Palestine Studies), 1988; Naseer H. Aruri, *Occupation: Israel Over Palestine* (Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.), 1983; *Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West Bank and Gaza: Report of the National Lawyers Guild 1977 Middle East Delegation* (New York: National Lawyers Guild), 1978; Ibrahim Dakkak, "Back to Square One, IN Alexander Scholch, Editor, *Palestinians Over the Green Line* (London: Ithaca Press), 1983.

opportunities for Palestinian youth -- constellate around three areas: 1) Military Orders relating to freedom of thought and expression; 2) policies affecting the operation of educational institutions; and 3) Military Orders concerning individual rights and liberties.

Freedom of Thought and Expression. Among the earliest Military Orders published are those requiring permits (from the military officer appointed by the Area Commander) for the publication or possession of any newspaper or document of "political significance."[80] Such orders, with their numerous amendments, soon included any material,[81] even if retained as a personal copy for one's own library. Violation of the order could net an individual 5 years imprisonment and a hefty fine. Nor could anyone send or receive such material through the mail -- meaning that mail entering or leaving the OT is subject to review by the state censor. To further restrict the flow of ideas, Orders have been enacted to prohibit the publication and/or receipt of books and textbooks.[82] The implications of this for schools and universities is obvious. Not only is acquiring textbooks a tedious and uncertain process, but permits even for periodicals are frequently refused. Newspapers -- as primary source material -- can be received (if at all) only in censored form. Shehadeh reports that, "around 30% of all . . . editorials"

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[80]Shehadeh, pp. 156-161: Military Order No. 50, Order Concerning Bringing in of Newspapers and their Distribution, 11 July, 1967; Military Order No. 101, Order Concerning the Prohibition of Incitement and Adverse Propaganda, 27 August, 1967.

[81]"carving on stone, typing on a typewriter, copying, photographing . . . numbers, symbols, maps, paintings, decorations or any other similar material," including (later) casettes and videos; from Military Order No. 101 Article 6 (and Amendment No. 3 -- Order No. 1079). IN Shehadeh, p. 157.

[82]Shehadeh, pp. 57-58: Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, Palestine Gazette, 29 March 1937, p. 268; Military Order No. 107, Order Concerning the Use of Textbooks, 19 August, 1967.

written by Arab journalists in Jerusalem, "are refused publication by the censor,"[83] and the fact that editors can be placed under town arrest for years, thus preventing them from going to work at all,[84] signifies that the transfer of ideas within the society is a precarious undertaking. Indeed, "a large number of individuals in the West Bank have been charged and sentenced for possessing 'prohibited books.'"[85]

Policies Toward Educational Institutions. The closure of educational institutions -- frequently universities -- can be for a number of reasons, but is usually linked with punishments meted out by military authorities in response to student demonstrations.[86] Such closures by Military Order, can involve closure of the institution for days or for many months. In May, 1982, a policy of unofficial closings began when soldiers erected roadblocks across all entrances to An-Najah University in Nablus, thus preventing students and faculty from entering the campus.[87] Closures can also be initiated when authorities extend official vacations, when settlers close schools forcibly, and when students and faculty -- in protest over Israeli policies -- strike.[88]

In addition to closures, Israeli policy impacts the education of Palestinians in other ways. Neither schools nor universities can plan on extensive development of their

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[83]Shehadeh, p. 160.

[84]Ibid.

[85]Ibid.

[86]Ibid., pp. 161-162.

[87]Ibid., p. 162.

[88]Ibid., p. 163.

facilities, building permits generally being denied and requests for necessary equipment delayed.[89] Military Order No. 854,[90] issued 6 July, 1980 restricted education even further, and imposed Israeli authority over all university functions, including the hiring of faculty and the acceptance of students. Further, in the fall of 1982, all "non-resident" teachers at West Bank and Gaza universities were required to sign a "loyalty oath" to the state and denounce the PLO. If signed, the oath would then require the professor,

> To report on students' and colleagues' conversations inside and outside the classroom, as well as the presence of literature or cultural exhibits which could be deemed to be in support of a 'terrorist' organization.[91]

Those who refused to sign the affidavit found their visas revoked or were deported.

Policies Circumscribing Individual Rights. *Freedom to Congregate.* Military Order No. 101, in addition to suppressing the freedom of expression (above), also made illegal the "'congregation of 10 people or more in a place where a political speech is heard on a political subject . . . or who are gathered for the purpose of deliberating on such a subject' punishable by 10 years in prison."[92]

Arrest, Search, and Detention. All Palestinians in the OT are subject to arbitrary arrest anywhere and at any time, day or night. Military Order 378 (Articles 78 and 81) grant Israeli soldiers the power "to search premises and arrest upon suspicion without a warrant. It is estimated that 200,000 security prisoners [as of 1985 - pre-Intifada] have

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[89]Ibid., p. 168.

[90]Ibid., p. 171.

[91]Ibid.

[92]Ibid., "Introduction," p. ix.

passed through Israeli prisons."[93] The same Order authorized detention for as many as 18 days, renewable, without either charge or trial.[94] University students are frequent targets of night arrests, with soldiers entering houses at will, searching through papers, magazines, and books for "forbidden material," then -- even finding nothing incriminating -- soldiers transport them to the police station for "questioning," where they are generally beaten, held without charge, and eventually released.

Harrassment of students has also taken the form of arresting those preparing to sit for the government matriculation examinations, which are administered once a year. By holding masses of students in detention until the examinations are over, students are prevented from taking them, and must wait another year.[95] In addition, both students and teachers may be subject to town arrest -- as are many other Palestinians, including farmers as well as professionals. The restrictions of town arrest confine an individual to movement within his own town of residence and generally require that he report to the police station once or twice every day. Town arrest may be (and frequently is, according to Amnesty International) imposed without either charging or trying the accused, so he has no means of launching a defense. Such a "sentence" can be imposed for six months, but is renewable and, as with the editors of two Jerusalem papers (above), can curtail the activities of one's professional life for several years.[96]

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[93]Ibid., p. 141.

[94]Ibid., "Introduction," p. ix.

[95]Ibid., p. 167.

[96]Ibid., p. 146.

Expression of Leadership. In spite of Israeli policies to frustrate the training and education of Palestinian youth -- hence, retarding the development of a young, coherent base of leadership -- the policy seems to have backfired somewhat. Fasheh, discussing Israeli attempts at controlling curricula in Palestinian schools, a policy which blatantly censored sentences, pages, and whole chapters from textbooks, particularly in the subject areas of history, literature, geography, and cultural achievements, writes:

> It is amazing how completely he [Israeli officer of education] failed -- and probably still fails -- to perceive what was happening under Occupation and to see that, since the Israelis had taken control of the curriculum, opposition among Palestinian students to Israeli policies and practices had increased. For example, the number of students who were killed, wounded, arrested, or tortured in the spring of 1982 exceeded the corresponding number for the preceding ten years.[97]

In fact, throughout the Occupation, Palestinians continued to organize, first as the Islamic Council[98] and the Higher Committee for National Guidance;[99] next -- in response to the organization of external forces -- Fateh, the DFLP, and the PFLP, factions of the PLO.[100] (The Communist Party, which had come into being in 1927, was the only political party with an internal leadership.) Charitable societies were formed during

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[97]Munir Fasheh, "Impact on Education," IN Naseer H. Aruri, Editor, *Occupation: Israel Over Palestine* (Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.), 1983, p. 301.

[98]Dakkak, pp. 70-74 and Sahliyeh, pp. 22-24.

[99]Ibid.

[100]Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power, and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1984, pp. 36-57. Sahliyeh, pp. 59-66 and Dakkak, pp. 75-80 discuss the PLO's attempts to mobilize university students as part of the Palestine National Front (PNF), attempts which failed, in part, because of the students' allegiance to their external custodial parties, rather than to the "Front."

the 1970's and throughout the 70's and 80's the organization of trade unions and women's groups began.[101] For a brief time, the National Guidance Committee was organized to formulate policies of resistance to the Camp David Accords and Likud policies in general.[102]

Failure of these movements to succeed in bringing about a cohesive national Palestinian leadership within the OT can be attributed in part to the effects of several classes of policies adopted by Israel in its efforts to control life within the OT: 1) policies relating to the transfer of money into the Territories from without; 2) policies banning hostile groups and organizations; and 3) the policy of deportation.

Restrictions on Monetary Support. From 1967 to 1982 Israel's policies were designed to control the business sector in Palestinian communities, but did not seriously affect the flow of external support to cooperatives or charitable enterprises.[103] Beginning in January, 1982, however, a series of Military Orders were issued which not only limited economic development within the Palestinian sector, but restricted the development of political institutions, as well. Military Order 952[104] limited the operation of money changers in the exchange of foreign currency (all Arab banks had been closed immediately after the Occupation, hence, the necessity of money changers) and required all residents with external accounts to inform Israeli authorities of the status

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[101]Joost R. Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1992.

[102]Sahliyeh, p. 71-77 and Dakkak, pp. 83-88.

[103]Shehadeh, p. 119.

[104]Concerning the control of currency, 20 January, 1982; Ibid., p. 121.

of the account, including the amounts of deposits. In June, 1982, by way of Military Order 973,[105] public institutions were prohibited from receiving "any loan, contribution, gift, or annuity whether in the form of money or in other property except by permit from the 'person responsible.'"[106] If such money comes from the "enemy," and is in the form of cash, "the permit will only be granted for the purpose of depositing the currency in the ownership of the 'Fund for the Development of Judea and Samaria,' established by virtue of Order Number 974."[107]

Restrictions on Political Activity. Under the provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention outlining the responsibilities of an occupying government, the occupier is not required to allow "political expression directed against the occupation."[108] It is also true, however, that while security is viewed as a valid concern of the occupier, the occupying authority is obliged "to maintain as normal a situation as possible."[109] Ten years into its occupation, Israel was not living up to these standards, was the conclusion of a fact-finding visit from the National Lawyers Guild of the U.S.

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[105]Concerning the importation of money into the area, 6 September, 1982; Ibid.

[106]Ibid.

[107]Ibid., p. 122.

[108]*Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West Bank and Gaza: Report of the National Lawyers Guild 1977 Middle East Delegation* (NY: National Lawyers Guild), 1978, p. 53.

[109]Ibid.

The formation of any national organization is immediately targetted, and its membership prosecuted.[110] In fact, as Shehadeh reports, there was a meeting of the Civilian Administration on 29 October, 1982[111] at which official Israel policy toward perceived leaders within the Palestinian population was outlined. He describes three classifications:

> 1) "Radical heads" of the municipalities -- these reject the Israeli occupation and are the leading members of the "National Guidance Committee;"
>
> 2) The "Jordanian block" -- formerly supporters of Jordan, but after the 1974 Rabat Conference, lean toward the PLO and include mayors and moderate figures;
>
> 3) Those totally dependent upon the Civil Administration and include the heads of the village leagues, moderate mayors, and mayors appointed by the Administration -- these are independent of external influences.

Recommendations regarding this classification system were to exert pressure upon those in the first group and to maintain ongoing files on their activities; the pro-Jordanian group was to be wooed toward support of the Administration; and complete support would be extended to the third group, with salary increases, special privileges, and the granting of special identity cards being only a few of the carrots offered.[112]

In an attempt to achieve Palestinian support for its administration of the OT, the village leagues were established by Israel in 1978,[113] in the wake of the Camp David

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[110]Ibid., pp. 53-57. Dakkak, pp. 69-93 and Sahliyet, pp. 42-86, 115-136, and 163-175 also examine Palestinian attempts at internal political organization.

[111]Shehadeh, pp. 115-117.

[112]Ibid.

[113]See Salim Tamari, "In League with Zion: Israel's Search for a Native Pillar," *Journal of Palestinian Studies* Vol. 12 (Summer), 1983.

Accords and anticipating the necessity of implementing (eventually) the "autonomy plan,"[114] which required a local leadership with whom to interact. The leagues, which were given full Israeli military support and control over local administration in settling disputes, organizing cooperatives and charitable societies, planning and executing development and industrialization, and establishing public companies to serve a district's inhabitants, wielded significant power over everyday activities.[115] However, as Shehadeh further notes,

> In practice, the leagues go beyond the objectives laid out in their articles. Their centres of operation are not in the villages they were ostensibly formed to serve, but in the main cities.[116] The heads of the leagues are appointed, and it is not clear what constitutes membership or what the terms of affiliation exactly are. Many of the members of these leagues are armed with sub-machine guns provided by the Israeli army and are trained by the army in the use of these weapons. . . . Most of them are recruited from the lowest ranks of socity and from amongst society's outcasts. Evidence from affidavits collected by Law in the Service of Man [a human rights organization] indicates that the leagues go to greater excesses than even the members of the Israeli army.[117]

What Israel did point to with pride during its first 10 years as occupier, was the fact that it brought committee elections to the municipalities in the West Bank and Gaza. This initiative was viewed by most Palestinians, however, as an effort by the Israeli government to put a good face on an occupation it frequently described as "benevolent."

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[114]For a discussion of the Home Rule proposals offered by Begin and Sadat, see William B. Quandt, *Camp David: Peacemaking and Politics* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute), 1986, pp. 151-159 and 182-190.

[115]Shehadeh, pp. 174-175.

[116]Saliyeh (also referencing Tamari, p. 52), notes that the leagues were purposely headquartered in the towns to contain "the political influence of the urban elite," p. 85.

[117]Shehadeh, p. 175.

In 1972, this effort was rejected by the PLO on the grounds that elections orchestrated by the Occupier were illegal, and that Palestinian participation, in effect, legitimized the Occupation.[118] Elections did take place, and the resulting council seats were largely filled by conservatives, an indicator of the PLO's weakness at this point.

With the 1974 Rabat Conference, and the acceptance by the membership of the Arab League of the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," the PLO's influence within the OT grew. The military government allowed the 1976 municipal elections to go ahead as scheduled, perhaps, as Sahliyeh postulates, to draw a competing body of leaders to the fore, thus neutralizing the PLO's effectiveness.[119] With no other legitimate political institutions (permitted) inside the OT, seats on the councils "became the highest political post in the West Bank."[120] Since the actual administration of the districts remained under military control, the councils served as political fora from which mayors could articulate "the interests of their townsmen."[121] Hence, even though there remained few substantive powers associated with the councils, seats on the municipal councils did reflect power vis-a-vis the local constituents. Issues which demanded the councils' attention included the failure of districts to receive money for development; protesting threats to force linkage of utilities inside the OT with the

[118]Sahliyeh, pp. 37-39.

[119]Ibid., pp. 63-64.

[120]Ibid., p. 63.

[121]Ibid.

Israeli system; protesting the restrictions on local governments; protesting treatment of students by Israeli soldiers; and protesting military policies, in general.[122]

The urban elite within the OT supported holding the 1976 elections and the PLO therefore gave a green light. A victory for the "new nationalist elite," all professed supporters of the PLO, shocked Israel. The politically powerful in 1976 within the OT were young, well-educated, largely professional Palestinians, in contrast with the traditional elite who had taken seats four years earlier. They were also nationalists, with an avowed commitment to resist the Occupation. Following the Camp David Accords (1978), the National Guidance Committee came together to orchestrate opposition to the agreement. Comprised of elected mayors and representatives of professional associations, labor unions, women's organizations, and youth movements, the NGC operated for several years. The PLO, attempting to wrest control from this new elite, reactivated the Palestine National Front (PNF), a political coalition of factional representatives from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Baath Party, and the Palestine Communist Party (PCP).[123]

Israel's approach toward this new leadership was mixed. Due to the signing of the Camp David Accords, a local Palestinian leadership was necessary. Certain members of both the Labor and Likud parties felt this new leadership should be tolerated. Others within the Israeli government saw as imperative that Israel: 1) develop a rural-based leadership wholly dependent upon the Occupation, itself -- hence, the formation of the

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[122]*Treatment of Palestinians*, pp. 44-47.

[123]Sahliyeh, pp. 69-81.

village leagues (discussed above); and 2) concomitantly pare down the authority retained by the elected mayors.[124] Voices in the second camp won. In May, policies limiting the powers of the new elite were initiated, with the deportation of two mayors, restrictions being placed on members of the NGC (including town arrests) and two mayors being banned from "making political statements, attending political rallies, or leaving their towns without advance approval from the military government, and the telephone lines of all seven NGC members were disconnected."[125] In March, 1982, the NGC was outlawed and eight mayors ousted from their elected positions by the Israeli government. Those removed were leftists and, although they called -- with an appeal to solidarity -- for the outright resignation of all elected mayors, those remaining in office were politically more moderate and, thus divided by ideology, refused to join the deposed mayors and turn their towns over to Israeli military officers.[126]

Deportations. Deportation, like house demolitions and administrative detentions an extra-judicial punishment, is a policy in violation of international law, and specifically of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.[127] It is, in fact, categorized in Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention as a "grave breach" of the Convention, and was declared as a "war crime" and a "crime against humanity," in the 1945 Charter of the

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[124]Ibid., pp. 81-83.

[125]Ibid., pp. 83-84.

[126]Ibid., pp. 84-85.

[127]*Treatment of Palestinians*, p. 74.

Nuremburg Tribunal.[128] It is employed by Israel under the argument that it is permitted under the Defence (Emergency) Regulations of 1945.[129] Under this rationale, an Area Commander is vested with the power to sign a deportation order by virtue of Articles 108 and 112 of the Regulations.[130] The provisions of Article 108 allow such an order if,

> It is necessary or expedient to make the order for securing the public safety, the defence of Palestine, the maintenance of public order or the suppression of mutiny, rebellion, or riot.[131]

Article 112 allows deportation to be for an indefinite period of time.[132]

Prior to 1970 more than 1,000 Palestinians had been deported at the will of the Military Administration. After 1970, a form of due process was implemented requiring a person issued with a deportation order to be detained until the deportation is enacted. While in detention, the individual has the right to appeal the order to a military advisory committee and, if confirmed at that level, to further appeal the Israeli High Court of Justice.[133] The process of appeals safeguards the rights of no one, however:

> Both bodies are empowered only to determine if the order was implemented in a procedurally correct manner and whether the Area Commander acted in 'good faith.' No formal charges are made against the

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[128]*A Nation Under Siege: Annual Report on Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territories, 1989* (Ramallah, West Bank: Al-Haq), 1990, p. 312.

[129]Recall that Great Britain has confirmed that it repealed these Regulations at the time it surrendered its Mandate, in 1948. Nor had Jordan, the sovereign between 1950 and 1967, ever invoked them, which Israel claims -- and uses as additional justification.

[130]*A Nation Under Siege*, p. 310.

[131]As quoted in *A Nation Under Siege*, p. 310.

[132]Ibid.

[133]Ibid., pp. 310-311.

> deportee, and, as a rule, evidence is kept secret [by virtue of Article 44 of the Evidence Law of 1971, in cases where 'disclosure of the evidence may reveal intelligence sources'].[134]

A November, 1977 study by the American Friends Service Committee concluded that approximately 1500 West Bank and Gaza Palestinians had been expelled since the onset of the Occupation.[135] Their list included two tribes of Palestinians, plus 1136 individuals, many of whom were identified as being: "mayors, labor and religious leaders, school principals, teachers, heads of women's societies, tribal chiefs, student leaders, doctors, judges, lawyers, journalists, and writers."[136] The fact that an Israeli military official said -- that same year -- that no more than 200 individuals had been deported,[137] perhaps reflects the informal way the expulsions often occur. The delegation from the (American) National Lawyers Guild described the experience of one such deportee, interviewed in Jordan.[138]

Dr. Hanna Nasir, formerly President of Bir Zeit University, was telephoned around midnight (following a demonstration at the University that afternoon), 20 November, 1974, and ordered to appear at the Military Governor's headquarters in Ramallah. As a precaution (and for witnesses), he took two other faculty members with him, but was immediately separated from them. One hour later,

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[134]Ibid., p. 311.

[135]Reported in *Treatment of Palestinians*, p. 74.

[136]Ibid.

[137]Ibid., p. 78.

[138]Ibid.;this description is taken from pp. 74-75.

> He was surrounded by soldiers, his identification documents were taken, and he was blindfolded, handcuffed, and led to a car. In the car were three other Palestinians -- an engineer, a high school teacher, and a dentist who was a close friend of Dr. Nasir. The four were driven to the Lebanese border and forced to cross into Lebanon, through mountainous terrain and mine fields. None of the four was charged with any crime.[139]

The victims of deportation, as is evident from the American Friends' List and Dr. Nasir's experience, have frequently been community leaders and independent thinkers. Dr. Nasir's comments were direct: such policies reflect "'a systematic attempt to destroy local leadership. They [the Israeli authorities] want to deprive the people of a class that thinks even a little.'"[140] The delegation, itself, having interviewed many Palestinians in the course of its investigation, concluded that not only was the practice of deportation in clear violation of international standards, but that,

> Given the identity of many of those expelled . . . expulsion has been used by the Israeli Government to deprive the West Bank and Gaza Palestinians of their indigenous established leadership, around whom they could focus their discontent with the Israeli Occupation.[141]

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[139]Ibid., p. 75.

[140]Ibid., as quoted, on p. 78.

[141]Ibid.

Discussion Summary

Israel, born out of centuries of injustice to the Jewish people of the Diaspora and, more immediately, from the ashes of the Holocaust, took great care to ground its state in democratic principles wherein the free exchange of ideas would be safeguarded by the rule of law. With the occupation of lands attained by a pre-emptive war in June, 1967, in clear violation of international law -- indeed, a system of law to which Israel owed its very existence as a nation-state -- Israel began to call upon Law in order to justify policies it had underwritten vis-a-vis the Palestinians living on the occupied lands. But "justification" alone, is an impoverished child of the law. Palestinian appeals have made an issue of Israel's record of compliance with international standards, and while the arguments advanced have by-and-large felt the support of the larger world order the problems created by this occupation will involve more than the unravelling of a Kafkaesque system of laws.

There can be no disputing the fact that land has been expropriated, leaving thousands of Palestinians, and entire villages, disinherited from their past. Nor that hundreds of homes have been demolished and olive trees uprooted, nor that development has been held at a standstill due to regulations regarding investment capital and to the absence of a banking community. This, in addition to the fact that thousands of Palestinians have been detained (and tortured) in the absence of any formal charges and in the face of summary justice. Life has, for a generation of Palestinians, been incomparably difficult and marked by daily uncertainty.

While this is all true, perhaps the most far-reaching consequence of this occupation, administered through a legal system predicated upon *justification* rather than *justice*, is that it has deprived a people of the development of a legitimate central leadership by whose means they, as a national entity, might have constructed something larger than *survival*. Policies restricting the education of Palestinian youth, of harrassment in their studies, of limiting the free exchange of ideas and hence, of the opportunity to openly plan alternative -- and coherent -- responses to the hardships of daily life, all contributed to the opportunity costs of the Occupation. The banning of political organizations and the deportation of community leadership across all sectors of society meant that political enterprises became fractured, discussions polarized, and legitimacy regarding any sort of internal decision-making, seriously undercut. Palestinians living inside the Territories, unable to anticipate a future political society, have had to look to the external leadership of the PLO -- the diasporan Palestinians -- for the hope of liberation. After 1982 and Israel's sweep into Lebanon, which effectively shattered this hope, Palestinians inside began a slow process of mobilization, of defining a "leadership" based on community needs, and organized within the structures of the local community.

Meanwhile, the excesses of the Rule of Law, ruled Palestinian lives in all respects. Indeed, the Territories occupied by Israel in the Six Day War have been described as representing life in Goffman's "total institution,"[142] an environment in which all avenues

[142]Fouad Moughrabi, "Israeli Control and Palestinian Resistance." *Social Justice*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Fall), 1992, pp. 46-61. The reference is to Erving Goffman's *Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co.), 1962.

that would give meaning to the inmate's life are controlled absolutely. That the pressures would eventually lead to an outright explosion against the Occupier -- to a "prison riot" -- should not have surprised the "guards." In twenty years of Occupation, the one thing Palestinians had lost which they would not miss, was fear: fear of Israeli soldiers and fear of Israeli law.

CHAPTER 3

THE INTIFADA

Introduction

An Explosion in Gaza

Al Fajr[143] reported that three Palestinians were killed and more than 60 injured in four days of demonstrations in the Gaza Strip. The event was triggered by an accident in which an Israeli truck driver plowed into two vans carrying Palestinian day-laborers headed for work in Israel, at the Eretz checkpoint in the Gaza Strip. Four Palestinians were killed and nine others injured. The news story from Gaza reported:

> The accident was viewed by Gazans as a deliberate act of revenge for the killing of an Israeli salesman in Gaza December 6, and angry Palestinians

[143]"Demonstrations Sweep Occupied Territories, Many Killed and Wounded," *Al Fajr* English, December 13, 1987, p. 1. *Al Fajr* (AF) English is the English Weekly newspaper published in Jerusalem. It is subject to Israeli censorship, and therefore must conform to certain regulations. AF's coverage of the Intifada was indispensible to this study, and will be the source of information regarding the events of the uprising. The December 13 issue represents the first publication since the December 8th accident. In fact, AF Arabic was banned for 10 days beginning December 11 for its coverage of the event, even though photos and news releases had been taken from Israeli and French sources ("Israel Bans *Al Fajr* Arabic," AF 13 December, 1987, p. 1).

> took to the streets. Three of the people killed in the car crash were from Jabalya refugee camp and the fourth from Maghazi camp.
>
> Four thousand people from Jabalya attended the night-time funeral for those killed and the next day, December 9, hundreds demonstrated in the camp, hurling stones at soldiers. The soldiers fired at the demonstrators, killing Hatem al-Sis, 17.[144]

By 12 December, demonstrations had broken out in the West Bank, as well. The report from the West Bank highlights this development:

> The shooting by Israeli forces of Palestinians in the occupied West Bank during the last week left five people dead and at least 45 others injured . .
>
> A total commercial strike was called as a show of protest in many West Bank towns, including East Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Nablus, December 12.
>
> Available reports the same day stated that tension escalated in many places in the West Bank. Israeli soldiers were reported to have come under attack from demonstrators in Hebron, Nablus, al-Bireh, and Ramllah and in several refugee camps . . .
>
> According to press reports, an unprecedented military presence was witnessed in most areas of the West Bank.[145]

For most observers, December 9, 1987 marks the beginning of the Intifada or the concerted attempt by Palestinians at "shaking off" the Israeli Occupation of those territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 Six-Day War. The Intifada, generally translated as "the uprising," has moved through several stages, but was characterized initially by massive spontaneous public demonstrations. Literally overnight, people took to the streets by the thousands in towns, villages, and refugee camps initially throughout

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[144]Ibid.

[145]Ibid.

the Gaza Strip, then across the West Bank as well. Events in the Occupied Territories (OT) also triggered support from Israel's Arab citizens -- or the Palestinians inside the "Green Line," as news reports documented within the week.[146]

The suddenness of the Intifada took Israeli officials by surprise. Their initial response was to shrug off the events altogether. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir "was quoted by the Israeli press as saying that the demonstrations are no different from previous ones at this time of the year."[147] True, there had been numerous "uprisings" in the past, most notably in the 1970's following the October War (1973), preceding the Rabat Summit (1974), in recognition of Arab Land Day, 30 March, 1976, and following the imposition of the VAT taxes in 1976, but none had lasted more than a few weeks.[148] However, the extensiveness of this uprising shattered Israeli complacency about its administration of the Territories, challenged its ability to control the Palestinians, brought world opinion to bear upon its handling of the demonstrators, and shook its national confidence, as its own Arab citizens demonstrated in solidarity with their Palestinian "brothers."[149] Even within the first week a variety of responses were reported by the press:[150]

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[146]"Solidarity Comes From Inside the 'Green Line,'" AF, December 20, 1987, p. 1.

[147]"Demonstrations Create Controversy in Israel," AF 20 December, 1987, p. 4.

[148]*Middle East Report* (No.47), May, 1976; *Middle East Report* (No.50), August, 1976.

[149]For example, "Solidarity Comes from Inside 'Green Line,'" AF 20 December, 1987, p. 1, and "Arabs Inside 'Green Line' Are Part of Palestinian Nation," AF 3 January, 1988, p. 5.

[150]"Demonstrations Create Controversy in Israel," AF 20 December, 1987, p. 4.

a. Leaders of the right-wing Likud party . . . tried to play down the significance of the massive demonstrations which rocked the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

b. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir . . . blamed the PLO for the protests.

c. Israeli officials blamed the PLO for the protests. But the Israeli press and political experts dismissed the claim and said the real reason is the difficult conditions which Palestinians live under.

d. Israeli army officers . . . said their measures are short-term remedies . . . 'we are just dispensing aspirin instead of serious treatment.'

e. Labor Party officials charged that Likud's negative position regarding a political settlement created a state of desperation among Palestinians..

f. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, head of the Labor Party, proposed at the very beginning of the uprising[151]. . . to demilitarize the Gaza Strip 'because we cannot keep 650,000 hostile people under our control.'

g. In its editorial under the title of 'No Quiet Without Settlement,' *Ha'Aretz* (liberal-independent) said that the essence of the problem is 'the impossible attempt to impose foreign rule on a society with a national identity.'

As Part of the National Movement

The biggest mistake for analysts of the Intifada is to think of the Intifada as an event unto itself. To understand the meaning of the Intifada, one must recognize its place within the Palestinian national movement, a movement which had its inception before the

[151]Reported in AF on 13 December, 1987 ("Foreign Minister Peres Calls for Demilitarization of Gaza Strip," p.5). Peres made this appeal on 6 December at a meeting of the Knesset and Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, following the death of an Israeli salesman in Gaza.

turn of the century as part of the pan-Arab movement which sought to "shake off" domination by foreigners.

Prelude to the Intifada. In Response to Ottoman Rule. In 1875 five Arab Christians, all graduates of the Syrian Protestant College in Beirut, met to foment a revolution. The Beirut "secret society," as it became known, expanded cautiously to include twenty-two others, Muslims and Druze, as well as Christians, all representative of the elite of the Levant, and soon supported branches in Damascus, Tripoli, and Sidon.[152] Due to Turkish administrations under Sultan 'Abdul-Hamid's rule, the foundations of which "were laid on a basis of espionage and repression,"[153] the society was forced to communicate with the public by means of placards. Members would meet in long night vigils, first to agree to the text of an appeal, and then to draft many copies in carefully disguised handwriting. These appeals, according to Antonius, "contained violent denunciations of the evils of Turkish rule, and exhorted the Arab population to rise in rebellion and overthrow it."[154] With glue pots in their pockets, members would fan out across the city and stick the placards to the walls of the city under the cover of night. Although the identities of the members of the society were never revealed, the society felt it prudent to disband four years later, due to repressive governmental measures.

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[152]George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippencott Co.), 1939, describes this infant movement in Chapter 5, pp. 79-100.

[153]Ibid., p. 67.

[154]Ibid., p.80.

Forty years later, after the Young Turks had overthrown the despotism of Abdul-Hamid and begun to establish one of their own, secret Arab literary societies again began to agitate for Arab freedom. One of these, *al-Fatat*, was founded in Paris, 1911, in the manner of the Beirut secret society, except that its membership was predominately Muslim. As members moved from Paris back to the Levant, *al-Fatat*'s headquarters were re-located first to Beirut (1913) and then to Damascus the following year. This committee, along with several others, organized the Committee of Reform, drew up an agenda for the granting of home-rule to the Arab provinces, and began to publicly agitate for their demands.[155] When the Ottoman government forcibly closed the *al-Fatat* headquarters, "all the shops and business premises in Beirut . . . closed [in protest], and the newspapers appeared framed in borders of black, with the order of dissolution as their sole announcement."[156] Using this momentum of public sentiment, *al-Fatat* spearheaded the organiation of an Arab Conference, which convened on 4 April, 1913 in Paris.[157] Attended by 24 delegates, some 200 Arab observers also arrived to sit in on the meetings. A number of resolutions were discussed and passed which called for reforms by the Ottoman government vis-a-vis the administration of the Arab provinces. It was at this conference that Palestinian representatives made an unsuccessful attempt to alert other

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[155]Ibid., pp. 107-120.

[156]Ibid., p. 113.

[157]Ibid., pp. 114-117.

Arab delegates of the threat which Zionism posed for Palestine in particular, and the Arab world, at large.[158]

In Response to British Rule. Following World War I, the Mandate System of the League of Nations was imposed upon many of the former Ottoman holdings in violation of the Hussein-McMahon pledges (1915) which promised the Arabs control over their lands in exchange for military support during the War (initiating the Arab revolt against the Ottomans).[159] An all-Palestine Congress was convened in Jerusalem (27 January - 10 February, 1919), which advised Amir Faisal -- spokesman on behalf of the Arabs at the Peace Conference in Paris -- that Palestine wanted to be ruled by Faisal as part of an independent Syrian state (which would also include present-day Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan).[160] What should be emphasized is that the Palestinian national movement began to be fully defined within the context of Zionism. Unlike Arabs in the rest of the former Ottoman Empire, the Arabs of Palestine had two fronts to address following World War I: European intervention, as the mandate system was set in place and Palestine became subject (effectively) to rule as a crown-colony,[161] and increasing pressures of Zionist

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[158]Ibrahim Dakkak, "Back to Square One: A Study in the Re-emergence of the Palestinian Identity in the West Bank," IN Alexander Scholch, Editor, *Palestinians Over the Green Line* (London: Ithaca Press), 1983, p. 65.

[159]Antonius addresses the treachery of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration in Chapters 8-14, pp. 149-324, and includes the McMahon Correspondence, the Sykes-Picot Agreement, and other pertinent documents for review.

[160]Manuel S. Hassassian, *Palestine: Factionalism in the National Movement (1919-1939)* (Jerusalem: PASSIA), 1990, Chapter 3.

[161]Ibid., p. 22.

designs as the Balfour Declaration was implemented,[162] and European Jews began settling in Palestine.[163]

A Second and a Third all-Palestine Congress were held in Haifa (1919 and 1920), and it was at the latter that delegates passed resolutions demanding self-determination as a Palestinian geographic and political entity. By 1921 a Fourth Congress resolved to send a delegation to London to argue the Palestinian cause.[164] The Palestine nationalist movement continued its agitation through the 1920's and 1930's, culminating in the Arab Rebellion (1936-1939) which, according to Hassassian's research, was brought down by factionalism within the Palestinian leadership, a leadership representative of two of Jerusalem's rival elite families, the Husseinis and the Nahashibis.

In Response to Israeli Rule. With the defeat of Nazi Germany, the establishment of the state of Israel (1948), and the displacement of 90% of Palestinian Arabs from their homes in Palestine,[165] Palestinian Arabs, again working under the cover of "cultural

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[162]Both Dakkak and Hassassian address the paradoxical development of the Zionist and Palestinian identities.

[163]Taylor reports that Jewish immigration to Palestine following the Balfour Declaration reached a high in 1925 of 34,386, and that by 1929 99,806 Jews had immigrated to this new homeland. Alan R. Taylor, *Prelude to Israel: An Analysis of Zionist Diplomacy 1897-1947* (New York: Philosophical Library), 1959, pp. 48-49. See also, Chapters 2-4 for an account of pre-Balfour activity.

[164]Hassassian, pp. 32-33.

[165]See Naim Stifan Ateek's *Justice and Only Justice: A Palestinian Theology of Liberation* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books), 1990, for a personal account of the experiences of Christian and Muslim families driven from their villages, and witnesses to the seizure of their homes and belongings by Israeli occupiers.

societies" (overt political organizations being forbidden in Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt), began discussing tactics and a strategy for regaining their homeland.[166]

Fatah[167] emerged as an underground movement (dependent on the financial support of certain Arab states) following the Suez War of 1956 and in so doing, asserted the right of Palestinians to lead the struggle for the liberation of Palestine from Zionist control, a duty which had been assumed (without apparent success) by the Arab world at large in 1948,[168] and in the war- and inter-war years that followed. Fatah was a nationalistic movement, disdainful of ideology, which therein allowed it to skirt "the murky depths of intra-Arab rivalries among competing political parties and personalities . . .,"[169] and to grow. By the time of the Six Day War in June, 1967, Fatah found itself in a position able "to transform itself from a [state-]dependent underground organization into an independent and open revolutionary movement."[170]

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[166]Alan Hart, *Arafat: A Political Biography* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), 1988. See Chapters 1-4 for a discussion of these formative years of the modern Palestinian national movement.

[167]*Fatah* is a palindromic acronym for *Harakat al-Tahrir al-Filastiniyya*, "The Palestinian Liberation Movement."

[168]Sameer Y. Abraham, "The Development and Transformation of the Palestinian National Movement," IN Naseer H. Aruri, Editor, *Occupation: Israel Over Palestine* (Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc.), 1983, p. 392.

[169]Ibid., p. 393.

[170]Ibid., p. 397. For a thorough discussion of the development of the PLO during its "underground years,"a its "formative years," and its "period of quaisi-state development," see pp. 392-416. SEE ALSO, Helen Cobban's *The Palestine Liberation Organization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1984, AND Hart's *Arafat* (op cit.).

Its nationalistic thrust brought Fatah into conflict with other Palestinian liberation organizations, however. Those with strong ideological tenets, such as the Jordanian Communist Party (JCP -- later the Palestinian Communist Party, PCP -- and more recently renamed the Palestinian Peoples' Party, PPP) and post-1967 rivals such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) all included in their revolutionary agendas a social transformation of Palestinian society, an orientation which Fatah found not only distracting to the larger national objectives, but destructive to them as well, since it felt the national movement should involve the efforts of all classes within society. However, the effectiveness of Fatah's guerrilla units in undertaking the military struggle, and particularly after confronting the Israeli military at the Battle of Karameh in March, 1968 (no Arab forces had before been able to stand against Israel's superior forces) spoke for itself. Fatah's position of pre-eminence in leadership was ensured, and within a year, Fatah had captured control of the fledgling PLO through its control of the parliament, the Palestinian National Council (PNC).[171]

At the Seventh Arab Summit in Rabat in October, 1974, the PLO was officially recognized by the Arab States and, therefore by the Palestinians, themselves, as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people. This government-in-exile, already well-established by its tenth year, boasted a sophisticated national infrastructure, which included an executive committee, a parliament, a military apparatus, and various executive agencies ("departments") which linked leadership policies with the needs of the scattered

[171]Cobban, pp. 8-12 and 36-56.

Palestinian population.[172] The agencies included organizations responsible for: health needs, welfare, education, social research; mobilizing various groups such as women, workers, professionals, youth, economic opportunities; and establishing the political agenda for the Palestinian entity.[173]

But the PLO was of necessity, part of the Palestinian diaspora (Palestinians in the West, in Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, the Gulf States, many of whom had been living in refugee camps since 1948), and its organizations did not reflect the socio-political realities within the OT. Granted, as Quandt notes, by the early 1970's it was possible to track the "emergence of a new political class of young professionals."[174] This class, Hiltermann quickly points out, was in "full support" of the PLO,[175] a fact not lost on the PLO as it sought in the early 1970's to mobilize Palestinians within the OT through factional affiliations.[176] Such efforts were not universally seen within the OT, however, as strengthening the battle for liberation from within. Indeed, many living under Israeli Occupation had been taught to view the PLO as the external liberator which, in the main, had left Palestinians on the "inside" to cope with Israeli administration as they could:

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[172]Ibid., pp. 11-15.

[173]Ibid.

[174]William B. Quandt, "Political and Military Dimensions of Contemporary Palestinian Nationalism," IN William B. Quandt, Fuad Jabber, and Ann Mosely Lesch, *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism* (Berkeley: The University of California Press), 1973, p. 251.

[175]Joost R. Hiltermann, *Before the Uprising: The Organization and Mobilization of Palestinian Workers and Women in the Israeli-Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip* (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Dissertation Information Service), 1989, p. 223.

[176]Ibid.

> The social mindset, if you will, was that it was not the job of those living under Occupation to free themselves -- after all, they were staking claim to the homeland and bearing the primary costs. The Arabic media kept this alive as well, with boasts of, "We will liberate you!" to give their cause unity and to provide a political agenda. There was a certain feeling of helplessness inside the OT, and a sense that the time was near when the OT would be freed from Israeli control.[177]

This is not to say there had been no emergent leadership within the OT. The initial reactions to the withdrawal of the Jordanian army from the West Bank and the beginning of Israeli occupation were spontaneous and involved both political and institutional responses.[178] As discussed in Chapter 2, in Jerusalem the Islamic Committee had been formed to provide religious leadership and the administration of Islamic law, while at the same time a semi-secret political leadership, the National Guidance Committee, had also been organized. Coordination between the two was effected by As-Sayeh, who served as chairman of both committees, until he was subsequently deported. Departing with him was the unity he had achieved between the two leadership groups. For the next decade, factionalism among the internal leadership and amidst a myriad of political parties crippled any serious efforts at developing either a unified strategy or an immediate and jointly-supported political agenda.[179] Late in 1978 a group of mayors, representatives of trade unions, student organizations, women's groups, the Charitable Societies, and of Gaza met in Jerusalem to discuss the

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[177]Personal interview with A, a political activist and member of the Palestinian Peace Delegation, 8 August, 1992, in Jerusalem.

[178]Dakkak, pp. 70-74.

[179]Ibid., pp. 74-80.

consequences of the Camp David Accords.[180] At a follow-up meeting, the group named itself the National Guidance Committee (II). The rise of this new leadership caught the political factions by surprise, which added to the problems faced by NGC-II in acquiring legitimacy. In addition, tensions between the inside and an outside (PLO) leadership which, by 1979 evidenced "a clear swing . . . to the right,"[181] began to tell, as the NGC-II faced losing (monetary) "support" from the PLO unless it included more conservative members.[182] With the imposition of Israel's "iron fist" policy after May, 1980,[183] the internal leadership once again became factionalized, as the external leadership sought to exert more control.[184]

Decisions by the PLO[185] to establish a base (an approved base) of leadership within the OT had been attempted, but such efforts met with limitations: 1) indigenous

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[180]Ibid., pp. 84-86.

[181]Ibid., p. 86.

[182]Ibid., p. 87.

[183]Aronson discusses the onset of Israel's "iron fist" policy as growing out of the fruits of the Camp David Accords. Having achieved a diplomatic coup through its agreement with Egypt and the United States, the Begin government sought to control opposition to Camp David within the OT by the enforcement of even more repressive policies than had been the case prior to Camp David. Aronson quotes a United States diplomat as admitting soon after the signing, that, "Life for Palestinians is worse now than it was before Camp David." Geoffrey Aronson, *Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians, and the West Bank* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies), 1987, pp. 213-229.

[184]Ibid., p. 88.

[185]In January, 1973, the Eleventh PNC decided, secretly, to establish a new body within the OT to coordinate activities amongst various resistance groups. In August, 1973, the Palestine ational Front (PNF) issued its first communique from within the OT. See Cobban, pp. 168-174.

leaders within the OT faced Israeli reprisals,[186] hence making external leadership less risky; 2) such attempts by the PLO were chiefly political and focused on resistance activities; 3) Fatah, the major party within the PLO alliance, was often viewed by those "inside" as being pre-eminently concerned with securing its power vis-a-vis competing factions.[187] [188] When the PLO was forced to evacuate Beirut (and Lebanon, itself) in August, 1982, following Israel's invasion and its siege of the Lebanese capital in "Operation Peace for Galilee," the PLO had no choice but to re-examine its policy. A union activist and member of PFLP described this as:

> When the PLO was forced from Lebanon in 1982, it began to take steps to keep the resistance alive in the OT. It was at this time that the PLO leadership began to take notice that the policies for the previous 18 years had not particularly taken the needs/concerns of Palestinians living under Occupation into account: they had not been concerned with taking care of their people. From this time forward, they began to initiate actions which involved the people in the work. Hence, it is from this time that we find unions for workers established, for [university] students, for women, teachers, and even students in secondary school.[189]

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[186]For example, within four months of the inauguration of PNF activities, eight prominent PNF leaders were deported and, in less than one year, more than 450 PNF members had been arrested. See Emile Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leaders: West Bank Politics Since 1967* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution), 1988, pp. 51-63.

[187]One DFLP activist commented dryly, "Fatah sees itself as representing the true Palestinian interests and actually says that, 'Palestinians are born into Fatah,' that we are Fatah by birth! This is dogmatic and absolutist." Discussion, 10 August, 1992, in Jerusalem.

[188]For a discussion of political tensions, see Hiltermann, Dissertation, pp. 224 ff.

[189]Personal interview with Y, 2 August, 1992, Jerusalem.

Hiltermann documents[190] the mass mobilization of Palestinians within the OT which, while begun in the 1970's with workers' unions, student organizations, and volunteer committees, literally "took off" in the 1980's. During the year of 1985 through March 1986, when Abu Jihad (Arafat's second-in-command) was headquartered in Amman, he was responsible for building an infrastructure within the OT, which "related to every aspect of Palestinian life -- economic, political, and social,"[191] and was amply supported by PLO resources and a highly centralized office network through which to work. As one who assisted in this effort noted, however, "All these attempts to establish a cornerstone, were crushed by the Iron Fist policy of the Israeli government: there was nothing here when the Intifada began -- that is why it has taken us five [as of 1992] years!"[192] Indeed, as Dakkak recalls:

> By the late 1980's the Palestinians felt that no one was going to come to their aid -- if change was to occur, they must take steps on their own. The '87 Arab Summit was humiliating to the PLO. Hence, there were reasons [for the UNLU] to use the accumulated momentum to start the confrontation with the Israelis. There was a great amount of disbelief that external factors would liberate Palestinians. In this, they advanced a rationality: 1) demands for withdrawal by Israel and 2) the establishment of a state of Palestine.[193]

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[190]Hiltermann, Dissertation, especially Chapters 2, 3, and 4.

[191]Quoted from a PASSIA Roundtable Discussion in J. Kristen Urban, *Conflict Resolution: Assumptions Behind the Approach* (East Jerusalem: PASSIA), 1992, p. 22.

[192]Ibid.

[193]Dakkak, personal interview.

Events of the Intifada

Introduction

What happened once the demonstrations erupted in Gaza? To a large extent, the events of the Intifada reflect a dialectic in accordance with the relationship between Palestinian and Israeli responses to the actions of each other. Chapter 4 will address this dialectic with respect to the official leadership, the Unified Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), which took over the direction of the spontaneously derived grassroots activities of the streets within a month of the 9 December events in Gaza. UNLU Communique No.1 was issued 8 January, 1988. Chapter 5 will address this dialectic with respect to the policies of the UNLU, as seen in the Calls published within the communiques. The present chapter seeks to place the Intifada within the historical perspective of the Palestinian national movement (Introduction, above) and to define the events of the Intifada, with an eye to the question of "Why 9 December, 1987?" -- why did the Intifada erupt when it did, and why has it been able to maintain itself for the length of time that it has?[194] The discussion will point to a number of factors, but chiefly to the question of leadership.

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[194]For a more complete analysis of the Intifada, itself, the reader is referred to a review of 12 books by Don Peretz, *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol. 20, No. 4 (Summer, 1991), pp. 133-148. Four books discussed by Peretz are especially helpful in the breadth of scope they provide: **1**) Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, Editors, *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (NY: Praeger Publishing Co.), 1990; **2**) Zachary Lockman and Joel Beinin, Editors, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation* (Boston: South End Press), 1989; **3**)Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada: The Palestine Uprising -- Israel's Third Front* (NY: Simon and Schuster), 1990; **4**) Don Peretz, *Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press), 1990.

Most people interviewed by this author, in Gaza and the West Bank during the Summer of 1992, roughly identified four phases in the Intifada. *Phase One* included the first six months, and reflected massive grassroots activity in the public arena, genuine local leadership, and the widespread adherence to UNLU policies of non-violence and civil disobedience. *Phase Two* included the next twelve months (June, 1988 - June, 1989), which continued to see enormous popular support, especially in the villages and camps, but due to Israeli policies of force and of subjecting leadership figures to arrest and deportation, the level of territorial-wide demonstrations and coordinated activities was reduced. Phases One and Two, considered together, were generally seen as having been the most "successful" phases of the Intifada. *Phase Three* saw a decline in massive popular activities, as: 1) the public arena was further closed down; 2) a more inexperienced leadership found itself directing daily activities at the local level; 3) UNLU policy decision came to be determined by the outside leadership (PLO); and 4) Intifada actions moved away from coordinated activities of non-violence and civil disobedience to more individually directed and implemented activities which increasingly rejected the idea of non-violence. The latter part of this phase -- during the fourth year -- also corresponded to a period which several characterized as being one of "despair," which set in during the Gulf War.

The definition of the *Fourth Phase* depends to a certain extent upon one's political affiliation and one's vision of the future. For a number of people, the Fourth Phase -- coincident with the Peace Process which followed the Gulf War -- represented the culmination of the Intifada. Promising a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

which would embody Palestinian self-determination and the eventual birth of a state of Palestine, the Peace Process is viewed by many as a new stage in the Intifada. In this new stage, the international community is seen to recognize the efficacy of Palestinian claims, and both Israelis and Palestinians will each acknowledge the right of the other to a national existence. However, there are others who now see the Intifada as being "dead." Moving the dialogue out of Palestine and into the international arena has meant that the PLO has been forced -- as part of the process of international politics -- to make concessions. This has aggravated the relationship between diasporan Palestinians (in particular, the hierarchical, right-leaning organization of the PLO[195]) and the Palestinians living within the OT and "laying claim to the Homeland," once again signifying tensions between *outside* and *inside* leadership. These tensions have been further heightened by the rise of HAMAS and an Islamic fundamentalist leadership which seeks to impose an alternate vision of Palestinian self-determination within an independent state of Palestine, one with less resolve toward compromise with the Western world.

Review of the Intifada

The present review of the events of the Intifada will consider only the first two years of the Intifada -- those labelled the "most successful" by many interviewees -- and will be broken down into three-month time periods to highlight the evolution of the Intifada. The events of the first three months will be discussed the most fully, with

[195]That is, a PLO dominated by Fatah, which is characterized by a narrowly defined, elitist leadership.

changes and new or exceptional activities/policies being added to these for the subsequent time periods. This not only reflects the media coverage itself, but the development of the Intifada, which gradually became "routinized" in terms of the daily activities, confrontations, and reprisals. This review has been undertaken through an examination of the coverage presented by *Al Fajr* Jerusalem (AF), an English weekly newspaper which, though subjected to Israeli censorship, was allowed to publish throughout the first two years, although its Arabic daily, along with numerous other Arabic dailies, was periodically under order of closure.

December, 1987 - February, 1988. Swedish journalist Peter Lofgren, interviewed by AF during the second week of the Intifada was asked to comment upon the effect of the media regarding international public opinion and the uprising. "I am sad to say," he replied, "that it takes bloodshed of the kind we have seen last week to put the Palestinian issue back on the front page."[196] Indeed, confrontations with the military and forceful responses characterized the first weeks of the Intifada. In the December issues of AF, the press reported continual massive demonstrations,[197] as the Intifada broke into full swing. Inevitably, such stories were accompanied by lists of Palestinians killed by Israeli gunshot while engaged in the protests.[198] These early demonstrations themselves often involved

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[196]"It Takes Bloodshed to Get Press Coverage," AF, 20 December, 1987, p. 16.

[197]"Demonstrations Sweep Occupied Territories, Many Killed and Wounded," AF, 13 December, 1987, p. 1; "More Dead in 2nd Week of Protests," AF, 20 December, 1987, p. 1; "Third Week of Protests Opens with General Strike, Demonstrations," AF, 27 December, 1987, p. 1.

[198]"25 Palestinians Killed in Demonstrations," AF, 27 December, 1987, p. 4.

constructing roadblocks with tires, setting them ablaze to draw the soldiers to the smoke, then pelting the troops with stones by hand or sling-shot and tossing molotovs at the military vehicles with the intent of disabling them. Israeli civilian vehicles were also targetted, particularly Israeli Egged buses, which were used to transport Palestinian day laborers to work in Israel. Israeli-owned business, stores, and restaurants in East Jerusalem were also in danger of being ravaged or set afire. The crowds, often numbering in the hundreds or thousands, chanted slogans, waved the forbidden Palestinian flag, and marched against the Israeli troops.

In addition to the massive demonstrations, other actions early in the course of the Intifada included the commercial strike.[199] Beginning 14 December, for example, a general strike began in East Jerusalem, which ran well into January before shopkeepers began opening for three hours a day.

Israeli responses to Intifada activities included curfews, shooting with live ammunition, beatings with night-sticks, and the liberal use of teargas. Waves of arrests were undertaken, with hundreds of people detained after sweeps through villages, refugee camps, and university campuses.[200] At least three Arab newspapers, *Al Fajr* Arabic, *Al Sha'ab* Arabic, and *Al Quds* Daily were banned for various periods of time because of their coverage of the Intifada,[201] and the Israeli military tried to muzzle the foreign

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[199]"Long Strike in Major West Bank Cities," AF, 20 December, 1987, p. 1.

[200]"Wave of Arrests Sweeps Occupied Territories," AF, 13 December, 1987, p. 3; "Israel Arrests Hundreds of Palestinians," AF, 27 December, p. 1.

[201]"Israel Bans *Al Fajr* Arabic," AF, 13 December, 1987, p. 1; "Israel Bans Distribution of *Al Sha'ab* Arabic Daily," AF, 20 December, 1987, p. 3; "*Al Quds* Daily Banned from Distribution for 30 Days," AF, 27 December, 1987, p. 3.

press.[202] Classes were suspended at several universities,[203] and Israeli soldiers attempted to forcibly open shops in Gaza during the extended commercial strike.[204]

Reports in AF issues in **January** reflect a continuation of activities begun in December, but also more organized protests as well. The January 3 issue announced the boycott by Palestinian lawyers of Israeli military courts, "in protest over the summary trials . . ." of individuals rounded up during the December arrest campaigns.[205] The same edition also reported on a sit-in in which over 300 women from different camps in the Gaza Strip protested living conditions, UNRWA responses, and the Israeli-provoked difficulties of life under Occupation.[206]

The UNLU formally issued its first communique on 8 January and with its Calls to Action, began to organize activities in general. Hence, from AF's 17 January edition, the reports tell of demonstrations and strikes in calendar fashion. Other activities are discussed as responses to Israeli measures. For example, in both the West Bank and Gaza, residents "organized popular committees to distribute food,"[207] as lengthy curfews meant many households faced serious food shortages. In Gaza, coordinated activities involved body-snatching! When an injured demonstrator died in the hospital, Israeli

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[202]"Israel Attempts to Restrict Foreign Press," AF, 20 December, 1987, p. 3.

[203]"Education Institutes Close," AF, 27 December, 1987, p. 2.

[204]"Long Strike in Major West Bank Cities," AF, 20 December, 1987, p. 2.

[205]"Lawyers Boycott Summary Trials," AF, 3 January, 1988, p. 1.

[206]"Women Hold Sit-In Protest at UNRWA Gaza Office," AF, 3 January, 1988, p. 2.

[207]"Extended Curfews Create Food Shortages in Camps," AF, 17 January, 1988, p. 3.

soldiers would attempt to remove the body and supervise small night burials, to prevent a locus around which "martyrdom" could arise, sparking even larger demonstrations. To combat this, groups of Palestinians (body-snatching popular committees) would retrieve the body of a comrade first: "The new system [we devised] is that we snatch the body from the hospital and bury it, and turn this into a sort of spontaneous demonstration."[208] In one such event, over 35,000 people took part in the funeral.[209]

Israeli policies included economic restrictions such as banning West Bank Palestinians from working in Arab hotels in Jerusalem[210]and the implementation of policies to fire Palestinians working in Israeli factories.[211] And, as front-page photos for January 24 and January 31 very clearly show, Israeli policies of forced openings and closings of West Bank shops went into full swing, with soldiers using crowbars to break the locks, or employing welders to enforce shop closings by welding the metal shutters closed. Deportations also moved forward, with 9 Palestinians being slated for deportation in January.

The institution of Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin's new policy of "Force, Power, and Blows," was announced 19 January.[212] This policy, as implemented, meant that

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[208]"This is Not a Revolt -- This is a War," Makram Makhoul, *Ha'ir* (Tel Aviv) 18 December, 1987, IN AF, 17 January, 1988, p. 10.

[209]Ibid.

[210]"West Bankers Banned from Work in Jerusalem Hotels," AF, 17 January, 1988, p. 2.

[211]"Israeli Factories Fire Palestinian Workers," AF, 17 January, 1988, p. 13.

[212]"Demonstrators Subjected to Rabin's Force, Power, Blows," AF, 24 January, 1988, p. 3.

soldiers not only confronted demonstrators or people on the street, but broke into homes and beat residents inside. Within two weeks, "more than 427 Palestinians from various parts of the Occupied Territories [had been] hospitalized, many with broken bones and severe bruises, as the Israeli authorities intensified their beatings with clubs and gun butts."[213]

In **February**, many events continued as they had throughout the first two months[214] -- demonstrations, including one by over 30,000 Arabs and Jews in Israel, itself;[215] continued newspaper closings, including closings of Israeli papers critical of government policies;[216] beatings continued to be severe, with hospitals reporting acute blood shortages due to the number of surgeries,[217] with reports of the arrest of two

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[213]"Hundreds Hospitalized After Beatings," AF, 31 January, 1988, p. 1.

[214]The Israeli press itself became increasingly critical of Rabin's policy and in one report which was compiled from observations by citizens Rights Movement representatives, the following was documented: "The reports we have point to more than 200 people needing plaster casts in recent days, after having been brutally beaten by soldiers. . . There are a number of rooms in Shifa Hospital in Gaza populate entirely by people with broken hands and legs." A further comment pointed to the costs for Israel: "The damage to the army inherent in the policy of beatings -- beyond the diplomatic and political damage -- is likely to be horrifying. what kind of condition must a soldier be brought to so that he will believe that beatings planned in cold blood are justified? Are we not causing thousands of soldiers to dehumanize the Arab so tht he can beat him with a clear conscience?" Taken from: "Special Report: The Occupied Territories," *New Outlook Middle East Monthly* (March/April, 1988), pp. 16-17.

[215]"30,000 Arabs, Jews, Demonstrate in Haifa," AF, 21 February, 1988, p. 4.

[216]"Leftist Israeli Newspaper Closed," AF, 21 February, 1988, p. 4.

[217]"Hundreds Treated by Injuries Caused by Army Beatings," AF, 21 February, 1988, p. 3.

soldiers for beating and then burrying alive four Palestinians.[218] Finally, to prevent students from agitating, the Israeli Civil Administration in the West Bank ordered all schools to remained closed until further notification, elementary and secondary schools as well as universities.[219]

March, 1988 - May, 1988. Demonstrations and strikes continued throughout the next three months, especially in recognition of Land Day (30 March)[220] and in honor of and mourning for the death of Abu Jihad, Arafat's second-in-command, who (most believe) was assassinated at his home in Tunis on 16 April by Israeli intelligence.[221] The "War of the Shops" ended in the middle of May, when Israeli authorities abandoned

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[218]"Two Israeli Soldiers Arrested in Connection with Burial Alive Case," AF, 21 February, 1988, p. 4.

[219]"Israel Closes All Palestinian Academic Institutions," AF, 7 February, 1988, p. 1.

[220]"Land Day Marked," and "Pre-Land Day," AF, 3 April, 1988, p. 4.

[221]"Abu Jihad Assassinated; PLO Blames Israeli Mossad," AF, 17 April, 1988, p. 1; "Palestinians Mourn Abu Jihad," AF, 24 April, 1988, p. 3; "General Strike Observed on Abu Jihad's 40th Day Remembrance," AF, 29 May, 1988, p. 1. While Israeli sources have never admitted the killing, and it is therefore difficult to corroborate Mossad involvement, a recent *New York Times* article confirms this type of activity. The Mossad, *NYT* reports, "systematically killed Palestinian guerrilla leaders after Palestinians from the Black September group killed 11 Israeli Olympic athletes at Munich, Germany, in September 1972." The article quotes former Israeli intelligence chief, Aharon Yariv, as admitting that, "'Then there was a conscious campaign of liquidation, of killing the heads of Black September. . . The effect was very big because they were senior people in sensitive positions. Suddenly they felt they were not safe in their homes.'" "Ex-Official Admits Israel Assassinated Palestinian Killers," *The New York Tiimes* (23 November, 1993), p. A9.

forced openings and closings of Palestinian shops,[222] meaning that subsequent to this, strikes were determined solely by the UNLU and the popular committees.

The big story in this time frame, from the point of view of the Palestinian offensive, was the UNLU call in Communique No.10 for Arab police to resign from the Israeli Civil Administration.[223] This marked the beginning of the official UNLU policy of disengagement from the occupying regime. Within a single day of the call, hundreds of Palestinian police turned in their uniforms, in spite of Israeli inducements, including offers to double their salaries. Palestinians were also engaged in developing policies of self-sufficiency, especially in the areas of agricultural produce[224] and education.[225]

Other events in the Intifada involved Israeli policies of reprisals. Various reports in AF's 20 March edition tell of the severing of telephone lines connecting the OT with the outside world, with limitations being placed on travel within the OT (permits were required), with the destruction of farmland and the cutting of water, electricity, and fuel to certain towns and villages.

Mubarak Awad, Director of the Palestinian Center for the Study of Non-Violence was issued deportation orders, appealed, and subsequently tried for his role in shaping

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[222]*The Stone and the Olive Branch* (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Media and Communications Center), 1991, p. 13.

[223]"Arab Police Resign En Masse," AF, 20 March, 1988, p. 1.

[224]"Household Economy Taking Hold in Era of Intifada," AF, 22 May, 1988, p. 8, and "Development of Household Economy: A Case Study," AF, 22 May, 1988, pp. 9, 13.

[225]"Educators, Students Commenting on Closures of Schools," AF, 27 March, 1988, p. 8; "Coping with Closure of Schools," AF, 27 March, 1988, p. 9; and "Educators Discuss Impact of School Closures on Education," AF, 22 May, 1988, p. 11.

UNLU policy vis-a-vis the program of non-violence and civil disobedience.[226] This occurred on the heels of eight other expulsions,[227] and amidst a policy of arrests and harassment of Palestinian journalists.[228] Economic policies also tightened as Gazans were ordered to change their Israeli identity cards -- thus requiring them to settle all debts with the Israeli government (i.e., payment of back-taxes) and with any other authorities or (Israeli) citizens.[229] In other cases authorities forced the collection of taxes by appropriating material goods of those in arrears.[230] Hundreds of Palestinian farmers were forced to accept losses when export permits were denied for their crops.[231]

Lastly, in an attempt to close down the activities of the masses, the Palestinian *al-Shabiba* movement, a grassroots youth movement, was banned on 27 March.[232] The effects of this order were to empower Israeli soldiers to round-up all youth: "'The

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[226]Although the formal charges related to the fact of his visa expiration and the status of his "citizenship." "Israel to Deport Mubarak Awad," AF, 8 May, 1988, p. 3; "Mubarak Awad's Court Postponed Until May 23," AF, 15 May, 1988, p. 3; "Status of Palestinians was Subject of Discussion at Mubarak Awad's Court Hearing in Jerusalem," AF, 29 May, 1988, p. 3.

[227]"World Condemns Expulsions," AF, 17 April, 1988, p. 3.

[228]"List of Arrests and Harassment of Palestinian Journalists," AF, 29 May, 1988, p. 3. This report lists names of Palestinian journalists under Israeli scrutiny: 20 under administrative detention, 6 under arrest, 3 expelled, and 11 arrested on various occasions and later released. In addition, media centers remained closed and the ban on the distribution of 4 Arabic dailies within the OT remained in effect.

[229]"Gazans Ordered to Change ID Cards," AF, 15 May, 1988, p. 4.

[230]"Police Seize Taxis to Collect Taxes," AF, 15 May, 1988, p. 4.

[231]"Watermelon Export Restricted," AF, 22 May, 1988, p. 3.

[232]"Shabiba Movement Banned," AF, 27 March, 1988, p. 1.

Shabiba movement is comprised mainly of youths. For the Israeli authorities to make mass arrests, it needs a legal cover,' commented a Bir Zeit University student . . . Any Palestinian youth suspected of being a member of the Shabiba will be arrested and put on military trial."[233] Arrest campaigns in general were increased to the extent that by late March, nearly 3,000 Palestinians were in detention, with 700 being arrested in a single week, necessitating the use of educational institutions (closed by military order) as prison detention centers.[234]

June, 1988, - August, 1988. The second half of the year saw many activities continue. Confrontations and fierce clashes were the norm, and more Palestinians were being killed by gunshot wounds. As a symptom of the spirit of dehumanization of the conflict, an early June front-page photo showed a nine-month old girl hospitalized after an Israeli soldier had shot her in the eye with a rubber bullet (she later lost the eye) and had broken one of her arms in a raid on her home.[235] In the same issue, another story reported that a Rabbi (a settler) broke into an Arab home and assaulted a 5-year old girl. Increasingly, there are stories and reports in these three months of settler involvement in provoking violence, settlers often acting as paramilitary groups and raiding homes and

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[233]Ibid.

[234]"Hundreds Rounded Up," AF, 27 March, 1988, p. 1.

[235]AF, 5 June, 1988, p. 1.

villages. Such events were accompanied by international criticisms, with Amnesty International conducting a number of inquiries during the summer.[236]

The key issue for Israelis was economic: the tax boycotts had seriously affected the Israeli economy.[237] The response to this was an increase in house demolitions,[238] raids on homes, the imposition of new taxes, and the closing down of Palestinian institutions. One raid targetted the homes of 50 merchants,[239] during which individuals were beaten and their ID cards confiscated (to receive new ones, one must appear before the Israeli authorities, where one is then accountable for payment of fines, back taxes, etc.); in response to this, over 1300 residents of the town turned in their ID cards as well. New taxes were also imposed in efforts to regain economic control, and in Gaza, citizens were forced to buy new automobile license plates -- and then pay all back taxes.[240] Israel also began targetting the Palestinian infrastructure supporting the Intifada toward the end of the summer,[241] with an outright ban on the popular committees[242] and

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[236]"Amnesty Wants Death of 40 Palestinians Investigated," AF, 26 June, 1988, p. 3; "Amnesty International Reports on the Misuse of Tear-Gas by Israeli Army Personnel in the Occupied Territories," AF, 10 July, 1988, p. 8; "Amnesty International -- Excessive Force: Beatings to Maintain Law and Order," AF, 28 August, pp. 8-9, 13.

[237]AF, 5 June, 1988, p. 1.

[238]AF, 19 June, 1988, p. 1.

[239]"Palestinians Turn in Israeli ID Cards," AF, 10 July, 1988, p. 3.

[240]"Military Imposes New Tax on Gazans," AF, 24 July, 1988, p. 3.

[241]"Military Closes *Ia'ash al-Usra* for Two Years," AF, 26 June, 1988, p. 1, and "Israel Targets Palestinian Institutions and Unions," AF, 28 August, 1988, p. 1.

[242]"Israel Bans Popular Committees," AF, 10 July, 1988, p. 2.

attempts to squeeze the medical community (hospitals treating Palestinian Intifada patients) and charitable medical societies.[243] Such institutions were seen as providing the groundwork for a future Palestinian state.

Israeli intelligence was right to be concerned. Beginning in August, AF contained a number of articles reflecting the dialogue within the Palestinian community which had begun questioning the goals of the Intifada,[244] and had moved from peace proposals[245] to outright discussions of independence.[246] These had been accompanied throughout the summer by an emphasis on Palestinian historico-socio-cultural identity, with poems, short stories, critiques of theatre productions, and reports centering upon using culture as a means of teaching, scattered throughout AF's issues.

September, 1988 - November, 1988. The final quarter of the Intifada's first year saw no let-up in the popular activities, with Palestinians provoking daily confrontations, burning tires, stoning the soldiers and firebombing buses. But the Israeli regime was "on trial" before its constituents, and with the November elections Likud took actions designed to look as if it were taking a tough stand against the uprising and regaining

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[243]AF, 10 July, 1988, p. 1.

[244]"The Future of the Uprising," Ziad Abu Amr, AF, 19 June, 1988, p. 6.

[245]Ibid., p. 2.

[246]The following articles all appeared in AF, 14 August, 1988: "Palestinians Discuss Declaring Independence," p. 1; "PLO Edging Toward a Government-in-Exile," p. 4; "A Draft of the Declaration of Independence," p. 5; and "A Dialogue On the Issue of Government-in-Exile," p. 6.

control. Campaigns of mass arrests were undertaken throughout the OT,[247] villages were razed by bulldozers,[248] more charitable societies were shut down by military orders,[249] and measures to cripple the Palestinian economy were enforced.[250] Likud was overwhelmingly supported in its bid for re-election, its seats increased by half.[251] Following the election, and certain of political support, the military moved forward with its repressive measures, sealing the OT on several occasions,[252] demolishing the homes of families whose members were suspected of Intifada activities such as throwing stones,[253] and on 28 November, in the words of an army spokesman, soldiers in the Israeli army carried out "a personal act of revenge," when more than 30 soldiers rampaged through a refugee village.[254] The world was watching the Intifada, too,

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[247]"Army Campaign Believed to be an Election Stunt," AF, 11 September, 1988, p. 1.

[248]"Scores Injured in Clashes this Week," AF, 30 October, 1988, p. 1.

[249]"Israel Closes Charitable Societies," AF, 4 September, 1988, p. 1.

[250]"Ban on Grapes Export Hurts Hebron," AF, 18 September, 1988, p. 3; "Israeli Restrictions Hurt Olive Season," AF, 25 October, 1988, p. 1; "Olive Crop Suffers from Restrictions," AF, 30 October, 1988, p. 1; and "West Bank Arab Bank Offices Ordered Closed," AF, 30 October, 1988, p. 3.

[251]"Palestinians Express Dismay at Election Results," AF, 6 November, 1988, p. 1.

[252]"Occupied Areas Sealed Two Days, General Strike Observed on Balfour Anniversary," AF, 6 November, 1988, p. 1, and "Occupied Lands Sealed," AF, 21 November, 1988, p. 1.

[253]"Jeflik Evacuated, Homes Demolished," AF, 13 November, 1988, p. 3; "Tahrouri Family Member Found Innocent After Home was Demolished," AF, 13 November, 1988, p. 3; "Demolition of Taibeh Homes Causes Protests," AF, 13 November, 1988, p. 6.

[254]"Israeli Army Goes on a Rampage in Qalandia," AF, 28 November, 1988, p. 1.

however, and during this quarter, international groups published several studies of investigations into Israeli policies in the OT.[255]

On the Palestinian side, the discussions of a Palestinian state begun earlier in the year, bore fruit on 15 November, 1988, when in Algiers, the Palestinian National Council, meeting on the fourth day of the 19th PNC session announced the declaration of the independent state of Palestine.[256] The decision to make the announcement, while taken outside the OT (by the PLO), had been encouraged from within (as seen over the previous months) and was received with jubilation.[257] With the PLO acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, however, this signalled the beginning of a distinctly political dialogue between the Palestinian leadership, Israel and the rest of the world, a set of events which left Palestinians on the *inside* a little uncertain as to their role and the role of their Intifada as this dialogue unfolded. To address these questions, Hanna Siniora, Editor of AF, attempted to define the separate responsibilities of Palestinians inside the OT and those of the external leadership.[258] Those who had worked to maintain the Intifada inside the OT, he wrote, were "to pursue a [yet] more vigorous non-

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[255]"AI [Amnesty International] Report on Israel's Use of Live Ammunition," AF, 23 October, 1988, p. 10; "Database Project on Palestinian Human Rights Reports on Closures of Institutions," AF, 30 October, 1988, pp. 8-9; "*Al-Haq* Reports on Israel's War Against Education in the Occupied West Bank," AF, 28 November, 1988, pp. 8-9, 13. (*Al-Haq*, West Bank Affiliate, International Commission of Jurists, is a human rights organization.)

[256]"The Palestinian State is Born: Recognition of the New State Increases Every Day," AF, 21 November, 1988, p. 1.

[257]"Palestinians Hail National Council Peace Resolutions," AF, 21 November, 1988, p. 1.

[258]"Political Process Has Just Started," AF, 21 November, 1988, p. 16.

violent campaign of resistance against the occupation," while the external (PLO) leadership was "to dispel the fears of the new emergent state of Palestine by clarifying intentions, and leading a political diplomatic campaign internationally."[259] Viewed in this way, the efforts of both sides operate synergistically to realize the ultimate goals of the national struggle.

December, 1988 - February, 1989. With the beginning of the second year of the Intifada, solidarity became an issue reported in the press.[260] In part, this was due to hopes that the Palestinian declaration of statehood could become a reality,[261] but more accurately, it was because of increasingly rigid application of harsh Israeli measures, which included among others, an enhanced rate of land expropriations, curfews, killings, excessive beatings, and the collective punishment of demolishing the homes of families who harbored stone-throwers.[262] In this context, new reports are seen involving the

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[259]Ibid.

[260]"*Al-Khader* Residents Join Hands to Help Neighbors with Demolished Homes," AF, 19 December, 1988, p. 3; "Arab Journalists Association Appeals for Solidarity," AF, 19 December, 1988, p. 3; "Palestinian Intellectuals Appeal for Peace," AF, 19 December, 1988, p. 5.

[261]"Palestinians Feel Intifada Moved Political Process," AF, 19 December, 1988, p. 3.

[262]"Army Shoots Dead 5 in One Day in Nablus," AF, 19 December, 1988, p. 1; "Uprising Martyrs Toll Exceeds 400 to Date," AF, 19 December, 1988, p. 1; "A Year of Forced Closure," AF, 26 December, 1988, p. 5, which discusses the application of collective punishment, academic freedom, and the status of human rights; "Israeli Authorities Restrict Entry of Money into the Occupied Territories," AF, 26 December, 1988, p. 6; "The Pretext, Illegal Building, is the Same, But the Figure is Much Higher During the Intifada," AF, 26 December, 1988, pp. 8-9, 13; and "72 Left Homeless as Israel Demolishes Their Homes," AF, 30 January, 1989, p. 1.

arrest and sentencing of children to house arrest for throwing stones.[263] And in one case, the police broke into an Israeli (Palestinian) school to drag off an 11-year-old whom they had seen carrying a ruler with the colors of the Palestinian flag painted on it, thus violating the law.[264] Near the end of January, the army was given orders to use lethal plastic bullets rather than teargas or rubber bullets, and the open-fire restrictions were relaxed.[265]

While Palestinians continued to protest with stone-throwing, building barricades, throwing fire-bombs, instigating clashes with the military, and calling for commercial strikes,[266] and Palestinian lawyers continued their boycott of Israeli military courts,[267] voices outside Palestine began to be heard as well. The release of the 1989 U.S. State Department's Report on human rights in the OT put considerable pressure on Israel,[268]

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[263]"Banishment is What is Facing Jerusalemites," AF, 16 January, 1989, p. 1.

[264]"Police Break into Nazareth School and Arrest 11-Year-Old Student," AF, 13 February, 1989, p. 6.

[265]"Rabin Givew Army Wide Range of Power," AF, 23 January, 1989, p. 1.

[266]"Palestinians Mark First Anniversary of the Intifada," AF, 12 December, 1988, p. 1; "Protests Continue throughout West Bank, Gaza Strip," AF, 30 January, 1989, p. 1; "Eight Killed as Intifada Enters 15th Month," AF, 13 February, 1989, p. 1; and "Strike Declared in Protest of Israeli Measures," AF, 23 January, 1989, p. 1.

[267]"Palestinian Lawyers Extend Boycott of Israeli Military Courts," AF, 13 February, 1989, p. 6.

[268]"Palestinian Human Rights Group Welcomes U.S. Government Report," AF, 13 February, 1989, p. 1; "U.S. State Department Report Exposes Israeli Violations of Palestinian Human Rights in the Occupied Territories," AF, 13 February, 1989, pp. 8-9, 13; State Department Official Says US is Talking to Israel about its Violations," AF, 13 February, 1989, p. 7.

as did condemnations by Bishop Tutu, British members of Parliament, and members of the bar in Italy.[269]

March, 1989 - May, 1989. Confrontations continued throughout these months, with demonstrations, stone-throwing, firebombing, and tire burning being daily occurrences in camps, towns, villages, and neighborhoods not under direct curfew. The Palestinian death toll continued to rise as soldiers fired at demonstrators to quell the disturbances.[270] Demonstrating their commitment to the Intifada, 96% of eligible Arab voters ignored the Jerusalem municipal elections in March,[271] and women, championing the new role the Intifada has given them, organized sit-ins and demonstrations in recognition of International Women's Day.[272] Even political prisoners and those held in detention protested Israeli policies in the Intifada, especially those carried out at the notorious Ansar 3 overflow camp in the Naqab Desert.[273] Economic conditions

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[269]"South Africa Anti-Apartheid Leader, Bishop Tutu, Criticizes Israeli Policies," AF, 13 February, 1989, p. 7; "Parliamentarians from Britain Critical of Israeli Practices in Occupied Areas," AF, 13 February, 1989, p. 3; "Italian Lawyers Say Israel Holds Justice System in Contempt," AF, 13 February, 1989, p. 6.

[270]"Soldiers Kill Ten This Week," AF, 1 May, 1989, p. 1; "11 Killed, Hundreds Injured This Week Alone," AF, 27 March, 1989, p. 1; "Soldiers Kill 10 as Intifada Enters Its 18th Month," AF, 15 May, 1989, p. 1.

[271]"Palestinians Not Surprised by Boycott of Elections," AF, 6 March, 1989, p. 1.

[272]"Intifada Transforms Palestinian Society, Especially the Role of Women," AF, 13 March, 1989, pp. 8-9; "Women Mark Day With Demonstrations," AF, 13 March, 1989, p. 3.

[273]"Palestinian Political Prisoners at Ansar Begin Open Hunger Strike," AF, 6 March, 1989, p. 3; "Inside Ansar3: One of Israel's Most Shameful Accomplishments," AF, 10 April, 1989, pp. 8-9; "Human Rights Group Demands Closure of Ansar 3," AF, 10 April,

were still difficult, with farmers often caught in the middle of army restrictions and village curfews, with no place to market their produce,[274] but some businesses found niches in the local economy -- particularly cottage industries operated by women in villages and camps[275] -- but also in larger, more formal industries.[276]

In all of this, Palestinians in the OT received support from Palestinians living within Israel -- inside the "Green Line" -- a fact which Israeli authorities found increasingly disturbing,[277] as even Israeli Jews move to the "peace camp."[278] Significantly, Israeli Palestinians began to embrace Islam as a theology of liberation, and demonstrate this at the polls in local elections.[279]

1989, p. 9 (the group was an American fact-finding delegation of U.S. lawyers).

[274]"Palestinian Farmers Unable to Market Their Produce Anywhere," AF, 15 May, 1989, p. 3.

[275]"Intifada Transforms Palestinian society, Especially the Role of Women," AF, 13 March, 1989, pp. 8-9.

[276]"Tako Factory Owners Build Baby Diaper Machine that Will Prove Competitive," AF, 13 March, 1989, p. 2, and "Palestinian Industry is Flourishing, But a Lot More Work is Still Expected," AF, 1 May, 1989, pp. 8-9.

[277]"Thousands Mark 13th Land Day Anniversary [in Israel]," AF, 3 April, 1989, p. 1; "Israelis Say Intifada May Spill Across 'Green Line,'" AF, 1 May, 1989, p. 1; "Arab Workers Inside 'Green Line' March in May Day Celebrations," AF, 8 May, 1989, p. 3.

[278]"Israeli Peace Activists Arrested for Demonstrating," AF, 27 March, 1989, p. 6, and "Police Detain 14 'Women in Black,'" AF, 10 April, 1989, p. 13 (Women in Black is an Israeli group which protests the Occupation every Friday).

[279]"A Rise in Islamic Fundamentalism: Local [Israeli] Municipal Elections Bring Positive Changes but Results Shock Many," AF, 27 March, 1989, p. 8, and "Religion Wins in *Um Al-Fahm*," AF, 13 March, 1989, p. 6 (*Um Al-Fahm* is an Arab town in Israel).

Israeli policies to address this trend included the imposition of new restrictions on anyone carrying a "green card."[280] In the OT, a green ID signifies the bearer has served in administrative detention, been formally arrested, or imprisoned -- he is subject to being stopped, harassed, and beaten by Israeli soldiers at any time on the street. New restrictions prohibited travel into Israel as well. A striking feature of Intifada events during this period was the frequency of raids by gangs of settlers (sometimes numbering more than 100 individuals) of Arab towns and villages, killing, beating, and destroying property of residents.[281] During this time there was also the occurrence of "mysterious explosions," which came from small packages wrapped like candies and dropped into rural areas from helicopters or thrown from cars.[282] Numerous children were the victims, often receiving burns over 35% of their bodies and 3rd degree burns on face, hands, and legs when they attempted to retrieve the packages. One child reported, "It looked like a package of halva. The package exploded into flames that were higher than me and burned the entire area."[283] This was not official Israeli policy, and military officials undertook a broad investigation once reports had been verified.

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[280]"Green Identity Cards Mean Holders Can't Travel Into Israel," AF, 10 April, 1989, p. 13.

[281]"Settlers Go on a Rampage on Village," AF, 1 May, 1989, p. 15; "Settlers Attack Hebron Residents," AF, 8 May, 1989, p. 2; "Settlers Take Law into Own Hands," AF, 15 May, 1989, p. 6.

[282]"Mysterious Explosions in the Occupied Territories," AF, 3 April, 1989, pp. 8-9, 15.

[283]Ibid., p. 9.

Finally, a dominant trend during these three months, perhaps reflecting international concerns for the Palestinians and the involvement of the new (Bush) Administration from the US in seeking solutions was the interest in dialogue about peace. Even distinguished Israelis, such as Professor Moshe Maoz, of Hebrew University, were optimistic,[284] and Palestinians and Israelis alike voiced their hopefulness of finding a solution through dialogue rather than force.[285] Such pressures even meant that Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir ordered the release of 474 prisoners in a gesture of "good will" on the eve of his Washington visit -- though, it was noted, many of the prisoners had already served the bulk of their terms.[286]

June, 1989 - August, 1989. New actions of the summer, included an abortive attempt by an Israeli settlement to implement a policy within the Ariel Settlement which required "foreign workers" -- i.e., Palestinians -- to wear special identity badges.[287] Reminiscent of the yellow stars required in Nazi Europe, the policy provoked cries of outrage from Israeli Knesset members as well as from the international community, and

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[284]"I Am Encouraged by New Palestinian Pragmatism," AF, 13 March, p. 13.

[285]"PLO is Serious about Getting Peace Efforts Underway," AF, 6 March, 1989, p. 16 -- an interview with William Quandt of Brookings Institute; "On the Road to Peace: Learning to Talk Together," AF, 10 April, 1989, p. 4 -- a joint *Al Fajr/ New Outlook* conference in New York; "Mubarak, Bush vow to Move on for a Peace Settlement," AF, 10 April, 1989, p. 6; "Yesterday's Fighters are Today's Peaceseekers," AF, 8 May, 1989, p. 4.

[286]"Prisoners Say Their Release is More Political, Not Humanitarian," AF, 10 April, 1989, p. 3.

[287]"Ariel Badges Likened to Nazi Era," AF, 5 June, 1989, p. 1.

was withdrawn -- although official government policy does require ID cards of all Palestinians and distinguishing (color-coded) license plates for automobiles. In fact, later in the summer, Gazans were required to obtain magnetic ID cards from Israeli authorities.[288] Also near the end of summer, new orders allowed Palestinains to be held in administrative detention for up to twelve months without a trial.[289] Formerly it had been six months. The collaborator phenomenon, responsible for provoking Palestinian - Palestinian violence, had only infrequently been covered in this Palestinian weekly, but near the end of the summer, a feature appeared from the pen of an Israeli journalist.[290]

From the point of view of Palestinian leadership, the important event was the fifth Fatah Conference, begun in Tunis on 3 August.[291] Fatah, Arafat's organization and the largest contingent within the PLO, had not convened a full-fledged conference since 1980, and major events had occurred since then: 1982 Israeli war with Lebanon (PLO ousted from Beirut), the "Iron Fist" policy was implemented within the OT, the outbreak of the Intifada, and the assassination of Abu Jihad.

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[288]"Magnetic Cards Draw Palestinian Resistance," AF, 21 August, 1989, p. 1.

[289]"Israel Ups Detention without Trial from Six to Twelve Months," AF, 14 August, 1989, p. 1.

[290]"And This is Why They are Called Collaborators and Hated," AF, 14 August, 1989, p. 10, reprinted as excerpts from "Collaborators in the Territories," Zvi Gilat, *Hadashot*, 28 July, 1989.

[291]"Fatah Opens its Fifth Conference in Tunis: Arafat's Moderate Line is Expected to Win," AF, 7 August, 1989, p. 1; "Composition of the New Fatah Central Committee," AF, 14 August, 1989, p. 1.

Initiatives for promoting peace by Palestinians and Israelis were in evidence,[292] including one event during which over 2500 peace activists fanned out across the OT to personally visit Palestinian villages and to talk with Palestinians.[293] Finally, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, John Kelly, made his first visit to the region, meeting separately with Israeli leaders and with Palestinian notables inside the OT.[294]

September, 1989 - December, 1989. The final quarter of the second year was a time of hardship for Palestinians, with lengthy curfews, closed military zones, and tax raids being ordered throughout the OT.[295] Demonstrations and "fierce confrontations" ocurred at Nablus, which left 5 dead.[296] Tax raids became international news,[297] as one town, Beit Sahour, was sealed off, allowing soldiers to work their way through the town confiscating furniture, gas ovens, pictures on the walls, TV's -- any personal property was subject to being appropriated in lieu of the unpaid taxes.[298]

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[292]"Palestinians and Israelis Talk about Education in Occupied Lands," AF, 24 July, 1989, p. 7.

[293]"Peace Activists Visit Palestinian Villages," AF, 5 June, 1989, p. 3.

[294]"Palestinians to Kelly: Recognize Our Right to Self-Determination," AF, 7 August, 1989, p. 1; "Kelly's Meeting with Palestinians in Jerusalem is an Attempt to Create Alternative Leadership," AF, 21 August, 1989, p. 5.

[295]"Army Escalates Activities in the Occupied Territories," AF, 11 September, 1989, p. 1.

[296]Ibid.

[297]"Army Raids Towns, Arrests People, Seizes Property," AF, 2 October, 1989, p. 2.

[298]"Beit Sahour: Everything is Done According to Law; Is it?" AF, 2 October, 1989, p. 3.

Attempts at maintaining policies aimed at self-sufficiency and thereby facilitating economic disengagement from Israel were heavily tested.[299] Entire crops of plums, grapes, figs, and vegetables rotted in fields under prolonged curfews or sieges (there have to date been more than 2500 curfews since the beginning of the Intifada); olive-picking was banned, but the army raided olive presses anyway, demanding U.S.$ 2400 to 10,000 for tax payments, and over 2014 trees were uprooted in 4 villages alone; vineyards were sprayed with toxic chemicals under cover of night, by soldiers and by settlers, destroying the harvest of grapes.[300]

With such hardships, the phenomenon of Palestinians collaborating with the Israeli military -- whether for their own gain or under threat by the Authorities -- had led to the assassination of Palestinians by Palestinians. On the eve of the second anniversary of the Intifada, Fatah issued a call for unauthorized assassinations to cease. About 140 suspected collaborators had been killed by Palestinians since the beginning of the Intifada.[301]

With the close of 1989, the beginning of the Intifada's third year, and the mystique of the Christmas season settling over the Holy Land, the spirit of hope was

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[299]"Determination to Work the Land in Spite of All the Difficulties," AF, 11 September, 1989, p. 2; "High Losses Due to Tree Uprooting," AF, 2 October, 1989, p. 3 (this includes the results of a study by the Arab Studies Society); "Gaza Strip Fishermen Facing a Very Difficult Future," AF, 27 November, 1989, p. 8; "Long Curfews On Many Places in Territories," AF, 27 November, 1989, p. 1.

[300]Ibid.

[301]"Fatah Calls for End of Killings," AF, 4 December, 1989, p. 3.

mixed in with the reality of "steadfastness." The stalled Peace Process was a concern,[302] and in light of studies by *Al Haq*, Law in the Service of Man (the West Bank affiliate of the Geneva-based International Commission of Jurists),[303] *B'Tselem* (the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories, established in Jerusalem in 1989),[304] and other publications,[305] a series of fact-finding delegations from Europe visited the Territories during the holiday season,[306] and Bishop Tutu came to Jerusalem to demonstrate solidarity with the Palestinians.[307] Still, headlines the week before Christmas announced, "Confrontations Continue in Occupied Areas,"[308] and "Christmas Celebrations in Territories Cancelled."[309]

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[302]"Egypt Working on Reviving Stalled Peace Process with U.S. Help," AF, 11 September, 1989, p. 1; "Palestinians Have Reached an Advanced Stage in Winning World Opinion and they Should Keep It," AF, 2 October, 1989, p. 5; "As the Intifada Concludes its Second Year, Palestinians Evaluate Political Developments," AF, 4 December, 1989, p. 1.

[303]"*Al Haq*: Palestinians Are Without Effective Protection," AF, 18 December, 1989. p. 5.

[304]"Human Rights Groups in Israel Keeping Tab on Abuses in Occupied Areas," AF, 2 October, 1989,p. 8.

[305]"Publications Discuss Human Rights Issues in Occupied Areas," AF, 25 December, 1989, p. 11.

[306]An announcement of a delegation of European parliamentarians (photograph), AF, 11 December, 1989, p. 13; an announcement of a French delegation (photograph), AF, 11 December, 1989, p. 12; an announcement of a Spanish fact-finding delegation (photograph), AF, 18 December, 1989, p. 13.

[307]"Tutu Pays Jerusalem Solidarity Visit," AF, 25 December, 1989, p. 1.

[308]AF, 18 December, 1989, p. 1.

[309]AF, 18 December, 1989, p. 1.

Rationale Behind the Intifada

The question, "Why did the Intifada occur when it did?" can be addressed at three levels, depending upon the time frame being used and the level of complexity sought in the analysis. The *first* level would be the most straightforward and immediate, and would attempt to locate the actual outbreak within the context of other events throughout 1987. The *second* would focus not on the specific eruption of popular demonstrations and violence, but on the Intifada's "staying-power," and would examine those means which saw the Intifada move forward, take root, and blossom into an organized uprising. The *third*, which would take the longest view, would place the Intifada within the context of the national movement itself. It would explore the phenomenon of leadership at both the social and political levels, the occurrence of which enabled the Intifada to outlast Israeli reprisals and ultimately, to achieve success in moving the Palestinian Question to an International Peace Process, a process which for the first time, saw Palestinians speaking for themselves. The following brief discussion will highlight the outlines of each of these three explanatory orientations with the hope of providing a context for the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5.

Imminent Causes

A reading of *Al Fajr* throughout the year preceding the Intifada depicts life under the Occupation as becoming increasingly harsh, a harshness which itself precipitated

responses from sectors of Palestinian society. Every month or two a new spate of demonstrations broke out, each protesting different sets of Israeli policies.

Israeli military policies toward Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, and in particular, a lengthy siege of the camps, brought students in the OT into action early in the year in demonstrations which included marches, slogans, the carrying of placards and waving of Palestinian flags, sit-ins, hunger strikes, and the striking of university classes.[310] In addition, the recognition of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, 29 November, with its attendant emotional underpinnings, sparked widespread demonstrations across campuses.[311] These precipitated additional demonstrations, which spread across other sectors of the society, and Palestinians throughout the OT proclaimed solidarity with their "brothers" in the Lebanon.[312] Such activities drew an immediate response from the Israeli military, which stormed campuses, firing rounds of ammunition both into the air and at students, arresting students, and issuing military orders closing university campuses and other Palestinian institutions.[313]

Two months later, more than 4,000 Palestinian political prisoners launched a hunger strike to protest the denial of basic rights of prisoners, the authority's use of

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[310]"Soldiers Kill Two Bir Zeit Students," AF, 5 December, 1986, p. 1.

[311]"Army Wounds 1, Arrests 15 at Local College Demonstration," AF, 5 December, 1986, p. 1. This day of solidarity was designated by the UN in 1978 after the signing of the Camp David Accords.

[312]"Palestinians Protest Camps Siege," AF, 13 February, 1987, p. 1.

[313]"Soldiers Kill Two Bir Zeit Students," AF, 5 December, 1986, p. 1; "An Najah U. Closed, Scores Injured," AF, 13 February, 1987, p. 1; "Confrontation Characterizes Week of Protest," AF, 20 February, 1987, p. 1; "Police Close Alternative Information Center," AF, 20 February, 1987, p. 1.

torture, and the conditions of Israeli prisons in general.[314] Within weeks, other Palestinians had organized protests in solidarity with the Palestinian prisoners, and marches, stone-throwing, and commercial strikes broke out throughout the towns of Nablus, Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Ramallah, and Jenin, as well as the refugee camps of Askar, Jalazon, Al Am'an, Balatta, Dheisheh, and Tulkarm.[315] Again, such activities drew sharp responses from the Israeli military, as it closed other universities and began a siege of certain refugee camps.[316] Charges relating to the treatment of prisoners did not involve adults, only. In July, a report was released which documented that hundreds of children aged 10 - 14 and thousands aged 15 - 17 had been subjected to "systematic humiliation, beatings, and torture during the course of interrogation and imprisonment [and that all had been] denied full due process of law.[317]

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[314]"Strike Expands to 4000 Prisoners," AF, 3 April, 1987, p. 1.

[315]"Prisoners Hospitalized Following Beatings," AF, 20 September, p. 3; "Hunger Strike Continues; Territories Erupt in Support," AF, 12 April, 1987, p. 1.

[316]"Army Assaults Bir Zeit, Kills Student, Injures Others -- University Ordered Closed for 4 Months," AF, 19 April, 1987, p. 1; "Soldiers Declare War on Balatta," AF, 7 June, 1987.

[317]"Reverend Abu Al-Assal Reports on Children in Israeli Military Prisons," AF, 26 July, 1987, p. 1; "Minors Tell Stories of Torture While in Detention," AF, 13 September, 1987, p. 1. While they would in no way attempt to justify Israeli treatment of children within the OT, there are those who would suggest that Palestinian adults must also bear responsibility for placing their children at risk by promoting their involvement in stone-throwing and tire-burning within the context of the Intifada. The validity of this viewpoint would not be argued by me, but the involvement of children must also be understood within the context of a fractured society, from which many adults had been swept away, either through imprisonment or death. Children often took their roles, socially reinforced to be sure, upon themselves, as the Intifada became the immediate center of Palestinian life, and the hope for a better future.

In June, there were widespread strikes and demonstrations -- some referred to this later as an *intifada* -- on the anniversary of the 20th year of the Occupation.[318] Throughout the summer, tensions remained very high. Demonstrations raged on the West Bank,[319] and Gazans were increasingly targetted for severe Israeli policies.[320] The hostilities were further exacerbated by the actions of Israeli settlers, who, amongst other things, moved with the support of the Israeli military, to dispossess families living in the Old City (Arab Quarters) of Jerusalem and to take over their homes.[321] All Palestinians became suspect as Israeli military authorities sought to bring the Territories under control. Officials began harrassing American tourists of Palestinian descent, to the extent that the

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[318]"Demonstrations, Strikes, Mark 20th Anniversary of Occupation," AF, 7 June, 1987, p. 1.

[319]"The Cancer of Land Confiscation," AF, 6 September, 1987, p. 1; "Demonstrations, Strikes Mark Fifth Sabra and Shatila Anniversary," AF, 13 September, 1987, p. 1; "Protests Rage through Occupied Areas: Mother of Eight Killed in Ramallah; Thousands Confront Army at Al Aqsa," AF, 18 October, 1987, p. 1; "Soldiers Kill Bethlehem Student, University Closed Three Months," AF, 1 November, 1987, p. 1.

[320]"Gaza Fishermen Deprived of the Sea," AF, 12 July, 1987, p. 1 (per military order, Gazans were prohibited from fishing in the Mediterranean); "600,000 Gazans Under Siege for Four Days," AF 9 August, 1987, p. 1 (following the killing of an Israeli military officer); "Gaza Holding in Spite of Israel's 'Iron Fist' Policy," AF, 23 August, 1987, p. 1; "Israeli Soldier Put on Trial for Intentional Shooting of Gaza Youth," AF, 30 August, 1987, p. 1; "Gaza Protests Enter Second Week," AF, 25 October, 1987, p. 1; "Israel Adopts Harsher Policy Toward Gaza Strip," AF, 25 October, 1987s, p. 1; "Israeli Army Kills Three Palestinians in the Gaza Strip," AF, 4 October, 1987, p. 1; "Many Injured in Demonstrations Protesting Army Shooting in Gaza," AF, 11 October, 1987, p. 1.

[321]"Old City Residents Evicted," AF, 13 March, 1987, p. 1; "Settlers Take over Homes in Jerusalem's Old City," AF, 30 August, 1987, p. 1; "Settlers Occupy Eighteen Old City Rooms," AF, 27 September, 1987, p. 2; "Settlers Kill School Girl, Released Uncharged," AF, 15 November, 1987, p. 1; "Settlers Acquitted in Gaza Kidnap Case," AF, 29 November, 1987, p. 4.

U.S. State Department was forced to issue a warning to Israel,[322] and Mubarak Awad, an American citizen and Director of the Center for the Study of Nonviolence, was brought in for questioning and threatened with deportation.[323]

The month before the Intifada's explosion saw the release of a news story reporting a document drawn up by Minister Moshe Arens and his advisor on Arab affairs which investigated ways of tightening Israeli control over its own 700,000 Arab citizens.[324] Two Arab dailies were closed down by Israeli authorities and then struck on their own, to protest the ban on their distribution.[325] As the Occupation continued to pressure Palestinian society, fostering a sense of political frustration, a breakdown in family ties, loss of employment, and exacerbated social problems,[326] tensions continued to build throughout the population.[327] On 25 November, a Palestinian successfully crossed the Lebanese-Israeli border under cover of night, and landing his glider silently near an Israeli military post, walked into the camp through the front gate, killing six Israeli soldiers and wounding seven before being shot and killed, himself, when he finally

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[322]"US Asked to Issue Travel Advisory for Israel," AF, 5 July, 1987, p. 1; "Israel Warned About Treatment of Americans," AF, 19 July, 1987, p. 1.

[323]"Israeli Police Question Pacifist on his Writings," AF, 13 September, 1987, p. 4; "Mubarak Awad Evades Deportation," AF, 29 November, 1987, p. 3.

[324]"Racist Israeli Document Revealed," AF, 1 November, 1987, p. 1.

[325]"Two Dailies Close for One Week in Protest over Israeli Ban on Distribution," AF, 15 November, 1987, p. 1.

[326]"Increasing Drug Abuse Blights Society in Occupied Territories," AF, 29 November, 1987, p. 2.

[327]"Tension Prevails in Occupied Territories for Third Straight Week," AF, 29 November, 1987, p. 2.

ran out of ammunition.[328] Blame rained from all quarters within Israel, but as one Israeli journalist noted,

> In the old stereotypical pictures [of the Arab-Israeli conflict], the Israelis were few, possessed initiative, exploited the cover of darkness, and were resourceful: the Arabs were many, clumsy, and thrown into disarray by startling initiatives. At Gibor last Wednesday, it was exactly the opposite. And it wasn't simply a momentary lapse. . . . The failure of Gibor is not simply the failure of the Nahal or the Israeli army.[329]

What Palestinians saw, as the 21st year of Occupation advanced, was a military giant perhaps standing on clay feet. From this vantage, the precise date of the Intifada's first volley is immaterial -- it could have been the 10th of December, the 15th of December, perhaps the 8th of January. Uprisings had been the standard response to the harsh policies of the Occupation throughout the year. The conditions were right and it was only a matter of time until a new generation of Palestinians, a generation raised under the guns of the Occupation and without fear, would rise up in earnest.

Intermediate Causes

Nevertheless, even an earnest Territory-wide uprising could not have succeeded had it not been maintained beyond demonstrations and stone-throwing. The demonstrations in Gaza on 9 December became "The Beginning" because of successes

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[328]"Glider Slips through Israeli Defenses," AF, 29 November, 1987, p. 1.

[329]"Looking For a Scape Goat in Hang Glider Operation," AF, 13 December, 1987, p. 10, as quoted from Ari Shavit, "Placing the Blame," *Koteret Rashit*, 2 December, 1987.

achieved throughout the 1980's in mobilizing the masses.[330] One source noted that after being forced from the Lebanon in 1982, the PLO began to initiate actions within the OT in the cause of the national effort. It is after this time, he explained, that unions were established for workers, women, students, and teachers. In concert with this, all the groups sought to mobilize the people:

> This process of mobilization was fueled by the bad economic conditions which prevailed when oil prices dropped, bad social conditions, the break in relations with Jordan, etc., all of which spurred people to join these organizations and to work with them. They moved to the streets.[331]

According to a DFLP activist interviewed on the West Bank, political factions had been observing the spontaneous demonstrations within the OT for some time:

> In the 80's there were a number of uprisings, but none were sustainable. We were analyzing this from 1986 on, to see what the patterns were and how this might be facilitated. We saw that each time, the *intifadas* lasted longer and longer and realized that the situation could explode: the Occupation was simply intolerable.
>
> In June, 1987 there was an uprising, and things seemed to be at the boiling point. In fact, in September, 1987, I wrote to people outside saying that we were close to being able to sustain such activities.[332]

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[330]Personal interviews with numerous political activists in the OT, Summer, 1992. SEE ALSO, Joost R. Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1992, for documentation on this extensive process throughout the 1980's. ALSO, J. Kristen Urban, *Conflict Resolution: Assumptions Behind the Approach* (Jerusalem: PASSIA), 1992 and a roundtable discussion at which one participatn explained the PLO's attempts at political mobilization after 1985.

[331]Personal interview with Y, a PFLP activist, in August, 1992, in Jerusalem.

[332]Personal interview with H, a DFLP activist, in August, 1992, in Jerusalem.

One PFLP member attributed the fact that within days the Intifada had spread from Gaza throughout the West Bank, to the very fact of "organization" itself.[333] The 20th anniversary of the PFLP would actually have fallen on 11 December, 1987. Each year, this anniversary, he explained, was celebrated, but for security reasons, was set at different times of the year. This time,

> The day of the outbreak of the Intifada in Gaza occurred the day before the scheduled demonstration in Nablus [West Bank city, north of Jerusalem]. Hence, the first day of the continuation of the Intifada, there was a demonstration of 3,000 people which went to the streets -- they had already been mobilized by the PFLP leadership, actually for another purpose!
>
> Within the next day or two other mass demonstrations, already having been organized in other villages, took to the streets as well. You might say that the Intifada was organized from the very beginning, except for the event which sparked the initial day in Gaza![334]

Regardless of how the people all found their way into the streets at the same time, the fact remains that 9 December, 1987 represents the beginning of a unique and historic phase in the Palestinian struggle, unique and historical because, as another PFLP activist explained, it is here that one found,

> All the people together -- not just the elite -- but students, the refugee camps, workers, merchants, women. The merchants, for example, were very active: this was one of the most significant features. [Nor was it] the

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[333]Personal interview with T, a PFLP activist, in August, 1992, in Jerusalem.

[334]Ibid. It must be stated, that this was the only time this particular information was offered during an interview, which does not invalidate it, as each interviewee, depending upon his/her political affiliation, area of activism, and personal experience with other groups (grievances, perhaps), emphasized different aspects of the phenomenon of the "uprising, aspects which would tend to support their personal commitments to the means of realizing the national goal -- self-determination.

> cities which were leading on the 9th, but the villages and the refugee camps.[335]

But if *mobilization* meant keeping people in the streets, was *organization* throwing stones? To a degree, yes, particularly if one realizes that the stonethrowers "are the same people who were already organized and the same ones who were members of the unions."[336] *Organization* had to mean more than this, however, if the Intifada were to demonstrate "staying power." For example,

> The accident occurred on 8 December, and by the 10th we [DFLP] had leaflets out throughout the entire region of the OT -- from Gaza to Jenin: the organization and network-communication was that good![337]

Organization had to mean coordinating activities: this involved leadership. While the initiation of the Intifada was not orchestrated by the leadership, it was true, as noted earlier, that,

> There were different Palestinian groups which were looking to see whether this was another period of demonstrations as had occurred earlier, however. Within one month, then, the *leadership* took over.[338]

By 8 January, 1988, the Unified Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU) had issued its first official communique. In regard to this, one analyst commented,

> You must understand that the UNLU is a post-mortem occurrence. It arose to serve the function of administration of the Intifada and embodies

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[335]Personal interview with I, August, 1997, in the West Bank.

[336]Personal interview with Y.

[337]Personal interview with H.

[338]Personal interview with N, August, 1992, in Jerusalem.

> both positive and negative aspects. This [political] leadership was taken by surprise by the Intifada.[339]

This view was reiterated by Jarbawi as well, who, while acknowledging that, "through this period of flux, shifts occurred in the balance of power within and among the various elite blocs,"[340] emphasized that the Intifada -- contrary to the hopes of the Israeli and U.S. camps -- "did not spawn new political forces that did not previously exist."[341]

The whole notion of leadership in the Intifada must be understood within the context of paradox. While this will be explored more fully in Chapters 4 and 5, the idea will be briefly addressed here. The relationship between the *external* (PLO factions headquartered outside the OT, as part of the Palestinian diaspora) leadership and the *internal* (residing within the OT) Palestinian leadership can be called paradoxical in that, while the PLO is the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people, and while Arafat symbolizes that relationship, the PLO must take its cue from inside the OT, or it will represent no one. As Dakkak noted,

> The PLO and the UNLU have a paradoxical relationship. Most of the political initiatives were begun within the OT, from 1967 onwards. There is a rationale: whatever decision is taken, whether by Arafat or [King] Hussein, if it finds no response with the people in the OT, then it falls down.[342]

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[339]Personal interview with R, August, 1992, in Jerusalem.

[340]Ali Jarbawi, "Palestinian Elites in the Occupied Territories: Stability and Change through the Intifada," IN Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, Editors, *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (New York: Praeger), 1990, p. 296.

[341]Ibid.

[342]Personal interview with Ibrahim Dakkak, 25 July, 1992, at his home in Jerusalem.

The rapidity with which the UNLU, which contained representatives of each of the four main political factions, was able to organize -- putting aside their differences -- and to gain control of the events of the Intifada, enhanced the UNLU credibility and gave it a certain autonomy from the external leadership. While Jarbawi writes, during the Intifada's first year, that the factions abroad retained their position of preeminence in decision-making, and that "there is no possibility that the organizational leadership might become a local leadership as distinct from the PLO, or even parallel to it,"[343] his viewpoint changed with time. In an interview several years later (and after an apparent take-over of the UNLU decision-making by the external leadership -- as demonstrated in Chapters 4 and 5 from an analysis of the UNLU communiques), he was critical of the extent to which the local leadership had been relieved of its decision-making capacity.[344]

If one level of paradox involved the UNLU's relationship with authorities *above* (external leadership), another level involved the UNLU's relationship with those *below* -- the masses, themselves. One activist explained,

> But we must understand that the UNLU is not separated from the masses. The UNLU lives with the masses, it knows their circumstances, how they think, and any submission for the framework for those activities will be taking into account the mood of those masses.[345]

Echoing Dakkak's observation that the UNLU appeared after the fact, another analyst commented that,

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[343]Jarbawi, p. 297.

[344]Personal interview with Ali Jarbawi, 18 August, 1992, at Bir Zeit University.

[345]Personal interview with A, July, 1992, in Jerusalem.

> All the successful initiatives were grassroots initiatives which were picked up by the UNLU.[346]

Implementation was not a problem; in this view:

> As long as the UNLU followed the agenda of the masses -- the initiatives of the people in the streets -- and supported those, there was success in implementation. . . . The directives which reflected popular initiatives worked.[347]

The Intifada's "staying power," then, was dependent upon the ability of the UNLU, a political leadership representative of the 4 factions of the PLO, to read the concerns of the masses, to move forward -- but not too far -- to develop an overall strategy, and to coordinate activities challenging the Occupation, while at the same time, withstanding the brunt of Israeli policies designed to decapitate the political leadership and factionalize Palestinian solidarity.

Intrinsic Causes: The Development of a Social Leadership

The integral factor not yet addressed in this discussion of the success of the December 9, 1987 Intifada, concerns the development of a Palestinian social leadership. There had been political leadership in the OT since the Six Day War of 1967, a leadership which had even come together briefly in the late 1970's in common alliance as the National Guidance Committee II, and which saw some success in challenging the

[346]Personal interview with S, August, 1992, Jerusalem.

[347]Ibid.

Israeli Occupation.[348] There had also been a process of mobilization through the efforts of the political factions and other groups throughout the 1980's. While the pressures of the Occupation had sparked numerous small uprisings over the previous decade, neither the political nor the organizational realities in themselves, had led to a sustainable uprising. Dakkak asserts:

> The Intifada was an expression of dissatisfaction against Israel AND against the Palestinian leadership, a leadership which had been unable to address these issues successfully. The Intifada was a reactive action.[349]

When people took to the streets by the thousands in December, 1987, this reflected the frustration felt at having been abandoned. Throughout twenty years of Occupation, Palestinians living within the Territories and "laying claim to the homeland," had had to develop means of coping with harsh Israeli policies and administrative neglect at the socio-economic level, means which focused on self-reliance. A leading activist and organizer within the OT commented:

> In the early 70's I began to work with women and to develop volunteer committees. These addressed problems which the Israeli administration had failed to address: getting streets paved, furnishing schools, hospitals, general concerns of building infrastructure.[350]

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[348]Ibrahim Dakkak, "Back to Square One," IN Alexander Scholch, Editor, *Palestinians Over the Green Line* (London: Ithaca Press), 1983, pp. 64-101. For a discussion of the formation of the National Guidance Committee II (NGC-II), see pp. 84-88. This committee was successful for several years in spite of the fact that it was not "run" by the external leadership, although this success was limited, in the end, by demands from the "right wing" of the external leadership for a stronger voice, and the implementation of the "iron fist" policies by the Israeli regime in the early 1980's.

[349]Personal interview, July, 1992.

[350]Personal interview with H, August, 1992, in Jerusalem.

Such activities were linked with political activities, as another women's activist would acknowledge.[351] While joining the women's committees was not as dangerous as joining the political groups or the trade unions, such committees were generally linked with the political factions and, although their activities were not "politicized" as such, "it must be said," D offered, "that there is no justification for having four or five groups *except* for the factionalism."[352]

Organizational efforts moved forward in the 1980's to include the grassroots. A West Bank analyst notes, "In the main, this reflected the new mood, and was preparatory for what later became the "Intifada."[353] Kamal also recalls such activities. The organization of women, for instance, during this period revolved around,

> Issues which particularly concerned women, such as equal pay for equal work, problems in health care, etc. This was generally outside the political context . . . [and included] coordinating efforts of solidarity over particular issues, such as a women's day's observance on April 9th or June 4th, or something like that.[354]

This self-help orientation was already a fact of life. And although the Rabin "Iron Fist" policies had, by 1987 destroyed much of the organizational infrastructure on the ground, people knew how to help each other. A union organizer recently released from prison, explained,

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[351]Personal interview with D, August, 1992, in Jerusalem.

[352]Ibid. For discussions of women's activities, SEE Hilterman, ***Behind the Intifada*** (op cit.) AND Islah Tad, "From Salons to the Popular Committees: Palestinian Women, 1919-1989," IN Nassar and Heacock's *Intifada* (op cit.), pp. 125-142.

[353]Personal interview with Ghassan al-Khatib, August, 1992, at his office in Jerusalem.

[354]Personal interview with Zahira Kamal, August, 1992, in Jerusalem.

> During the years of the Occupation, 50% of the people had been to jail. This was like "high school" as far as training went: not only were networks formed, but also people were taught to read and write, and [were taught] ways to combat the Occupation systematically.[355]

Popular committees began to be formed in the refugee camps within days of the outbreak of the Intifada to cope with the problem of curfews. If children were sick and needed medicine, if families needed food, if youths were being chased for throwing stones and needed to hide or to escape, people naturally helped. Neighborhood committees formed spontaneously to address specific needs of each community.[356] As T put it, in discussing this,

> You do not need "leaders" to tell you to take care of your neighbors when family members are in jail, or killed, or houses demolished. The [political] leaders could take such things for granted.[357]

It was this link which gave the Intifada significance in terms of the long national movement. The paradox of leadership at the grassroots end of the equation with the UNLU involved a decision-making process rooted in dialectics. Throughout the months of the Intifada generally deemed as "successful" by a number of interviewees within the OT (and designated as the first 1 1/2 to 2 years), the political leadership, recognized as the UNLU, undertook a decision-making process which was richly informed from below. It was the emergence of the social leadership of the popular committees within local communities, which enabled the grassroots at the local level to participate in organizing their Intifada. The members of this leadership were elected democratically (at least in the

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[355]Personal interview with T, August, 1992, in Jerusalem.

[356]Personal interview with Dakkak.

[357]Personal interview with T.

were to focus on meeting the needs of its individual citizens in the *first* instance, its own security (stability) would be assured, in the *second.* Citizens who are content do not threaten political structures, is the underlying assumption. But the fulfillment of human "needs" is a competitive enterprise: resources are scarce. What this theory requires, in essence, turning Maslow "on his head," is the acceptance of psychosocial needs as being primary -- needs of identity, security, predictability, control. Psychosocial needs do not have to reflect limited resources. The state, by enabling the diversity of its citizenry to achieve fulfillment, will thereby protect and enable its own continued existence and, significantly, its singular hold on power.

There is an obvious paradox: can both Davies and Burton be correct? The Davies argument is that revolution occurs when expected "needs" are unfulfilled; more explicitly, that once primary (physical) needs are met, intergroup dynamics promote a sense of *identity* which itself becomes an empowering force enabling the group to undertake violent actions to bring about change if its members see themselves as "aggrieved." That is, *identity promotes revolution in the face of unmet needs.* Burton argues, however, that a state policy of *promoting identity over and beyond material goods would defuse violent activities*, and hence, "revolution."

This apparent paradox may reflect differences in level-of-analysis focus. Davies' "individuals" are individuals in the process of becoming groups which readily articulate grievances such as discriminatory treatment, as a matter of their "group-ness." Burton's

often find families of 10 living in a single room and dependent upon the income of a family member working as a day-laborer in Israel. And finally, the litany of Israeli policies from the summer of 1987 onwards, which targetted Gaza, fueled already over-heated tensions.

That once underway, the Intifada spread so quickly, was due to the degree of organization which existed on the ground. Such organization was a direct result of political initiatives undertaken since the Occupation, and particularly after 1982. This helped to ensure the initial staying-power of the uprising, and to promote its continuation.

What secured a place for the Intifada in terms of the long-range national struggle was the appearance of a social-leadership, a leadership which sprang from a history of self-help at the local level and through which individuals had learned to cope with daily life under a repressive regime. That the political leadership was willing to take its cue from these "popular committees" -- at least in the early, successful phases of the Intifada -- and to establish a dialectic within the process of decision-making, is what enabled the Intifada to endure.

This is no small accomplishment when it is recognized that over the past centuries, Palestinians have consistently been denied the opportunity of choosing their own leadership. Living successively under occupation by the Ottomans, the British, the Jordanians, and the Israelis, all of whom selected Palestinian representatives (generally from the traditional elite) who best represented the interests of the occupying regime, meant that Palestinians, themselves, had been unable to develop a process by which to legitimate leadership. Moreover, each of the occupying regimes rigorously implemented

laws restricting the development of an indigenous national leadership. Palestinian leadership since 1967, therefore has found itself severely factionalized, with political groups differing over ideologies and means, with internal and external voices often addressing separate realities, and with the necessities of daily life provoking the development of a social leadership. The Intifada succeeded when it did, because, in part by past experience, in part by rational design, and in part by serendipity, all the voices came together to speak on behalf of a single goal.

CHAPTER 4

OFFICIAL LEAFLETS OF THE UNLU

Introduction

The collision between an Israeli army tank transporter and a car packed with Palestinian day-laborers occurred Tuesday evening, December 8, 1987. Word spread quickly of the deaths of four Palestinians and the serious injury of seven others, and by the following day, the Intifada had exploded throughout the Gaza Strip. Schiff and Ya'ari, privy to Israeli Defense Force files, reported that by the evening of the 9th December, a leaflet was already circulating throughout Gaza.[359] Palestinian sources identify the first leaflet as being the "Gaza Communique, distributed on the 16th December and signed by the "National Forces in the Gaza Strip."[360] It was a short communique, a single page in length, which criticized the unwillingness of Israel's

[359]Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising -- Israel's Third Front (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989), p. 18.

[360]Towards a State of Independence: The Palestinian Uprising December 1987 - August 1988 (Jerusalem: FACTS Information Committee, September, 1988), pp. 90-91. These pages include the text of this communique.

government to "read" the meaning of the week's relentless public demonstrations; it emphasized the fact that Palestinians, far from being complacent victims, were aware of their "legitimate rights"; and finally, it called upon the entire Gaza Strip to participate as a unified people in a symbolic and peaceful funeral Friday, 18 December, and to commemorate the memory of the martyrs who had fallen during that first week of struggle.

That there should be confusion over the dates of the first communiques is not surprising: leaflets had long been a regular feature of Palestinian life. Since the birth of the Israeli state in 1948, it had been Israeli policy to restrict movement between the various Arab settlements, villages, and refugee camps in an effort to negate the possibility of coordinated Palestinian activities. Leaflets were a means both of informing an "atomized" population of events occurring throughout the Palestinian community and of promoting a sense of solidarity in the face of repression and isolation. A random sampling of activities throughout the month preceding the uprising -- November, 1987 -- includes the following:

> Reports in *Al-Nahar* (28 October, p. 1) of pamphlets signed by the Islamic bloc attacking . . . "revolutionary and nonrevolutionary leaders who run after false peace slogans and meetings with Israeli ministers and Knesset members."[361]
>
> Reports in *The Jerusalem Post* (2 November, 1987, p. 2) that Fatah leaflets entitled "Petrol Bomb Day" had been distributed in Janin, Tulkarm, and Ramallah, calling for attacks on Israeli cars; the PFLP had distributed leaflets in Hebron and

[361]"Islamic Pamphlets Attack Meetings With Israelis" (FBIS-NES-87-211, 2 November, 1987), p. 33.

Bethlehem calling for a commercial strike; leaflets were distributed in Nablus by the "Nationalist Forces" also calling for a commerical strike.[362]

Reports by *Sanaa Voice of Palestine* (1600 GMT, 21 November, 1987) detailing four military communiques issued by the "Palestinian Revolutionary Forces General Command." These communiques variously described an ambush of military patrols, successful penetration of an Israeli market and the planting of time bombs and military actions against Israeli military transport vehicles.[363]

Report by *Baghdad Voice of the PLO* (1815 GMT, 26 November, 1987) of a communique issued by a military spokesman for the "Palestinian Revolutionary Forces General Command," announcing success in two incendiary grenade attacks against "Zionist military vehicles."[364]

Throughout the Intifada, many different groups continued to distribute leaflets: HAMAS, as well as the UNLU, occasionally the independent factions themselves, and even town and village leaders calling for particular -- often restricted -- actions within certain communities. It must be remembered that this was a popular uprising -- a genuine grassroots movement, particularly in the first two years -- and that resistance to Israeli Occupation rose as a groundswell, maintaining itself by the steady infusion of energy which percolated up from below. In addition to miscellaneous leaflets, a plethora of "statements" was also released, in support of particular actions, in clarification of specific conditions and, not infrequently, to reiterate Palestinian goals both "inside" and "outside" the OT.

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[362]"Fatah calls for 'Petrol Bomb Day' in Territories" (FBIS-NES-87-212, 3 November, 1987), p. 37.

[363]"Communiques Detail Anti-Israeli Operations" (FBIS-NES-87-225, 23 November, 1987), pp. 6-7.

[364]"Communique Reports Attacks in Hebron, Gaza" (FBIS-NES-87-228, 27 November, 1987), p. 4.

This chapter will assess calls emanating from the UNLU, which issued its first communique on 8 January, 1988. The UNLU signed, numbered, and frequently dated its communiques, so tracking them amongst the myriad of other leaflets did not present extraordinary difficulties, although upon occasion, there were questions as to which of two leaflets -- bearing the same number -- was the "official" UNLU communique. Such occasions presented themselves for one of two reasons: confusion or disagreement regarding the version agreed upon; or the presence of forgeries authored by the Israeli military itself to promote dissent/confusion within the Palestinian camp.[365] The guidance of Palestinian researchers was
indispensible in such cases.

Role of the Leaflets

"In the beginning, things were different than they are now!" This lamentation was repeated by Gazan and West Bank Palestinians in conversations and interviews throughout the summer of 1992, as activists pointed not only to a redefinition of the Intifada since the Gulf War, but to the significance of the leaflets, as well.[366] Bundles of handbills,

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[365]See for example, Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, "The Revolutionary Transformation of the Palestinians Under Occupation," in Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 194-197.

[366]Interviews in Gaza, on the West Bank, and in East Jerusalem, June - August, 1992.

they explained, printed and delivered clandestinely, were left at drop sites in towns, villages, and the camps, to be further distributed locally. In the first years of the Intifada, people read them avidly from the first to the last paragraph. Conceived by a leadership still struggling with the dialectics of leading a popularly inspired uprising, the early leaflets sought to knit together all levels of the Palestinian community, to maintain the intensity of the resistance, and, importantly, to give the Intifada a direction.

The first four UNLU communiques were released in January, 1988, each being one to two pages in length. By June, communiques were being issued on a bi-monthly basis; these were longer, considerably more detailed, and in general reflected a more "entrenched" leadership as the Uprising was becoming more "routinized," to use the description of one Palestinian sociologist.[367] The appeal of the leaflets rested with a language of excess and a general structural formulation which both recognized and applauded the contributions of all to the Intifada, and sought to promote UNLU policy as well.

Language

Each communique was drawn up after considered debate and a decision-making process which mirrored the composition of the UNLU itself. That is, representatives from each of the four factions agreed upon the text and the specific calls, and the final version thus reflected UNLU "policy":

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[367]Salim Tamari, "The Revolt of the Petite Bourgeoisie: Urban Merchants and the Palestinian Uprising," in Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 167.

> The drafting and distribution of leaflets is a classical method of the Palestinian political forces in the Occupied Territories. To the Palestinians under occupation, the leaflets of the UNLU, issued as numbered communiques, were transformed into a sort of a biweekly legislative-executive-judicial document with the force of a constitution. Signed by the UNLU-PLO, the communiques raised the slogans of a given period. These were rooted in the macro-political setting of the ongoing issues and challenges of the *intifada*.[368]

While describing these, collectively, as having the force of a "constitution" is perhaps a little extreme, the communiques, as a tool of the leadership, do represent deliberation -- and a strong measure of consensus -- over policies constructed to bring about the birth of a national state. In this effort, language itself, became a critical element.

The language of the communiques reflects two commitments, both of which appeal to the necessity of taking action: it is the language of exhortation and it is the language of defining a political agenda. While a "literary critique" would be inappropriate -- particularly since this work is being undertaken in translation -- there are specific usages which are especially effective.

Language of Exhortation. Exhortation reflects a "call to arms" in a figurative sense, and an emboldening of all segments of the population. Appeals to the continuation of "the glorious uprising," recognition of sacrifices already borne which will but precede the "success of our people's heroic position," and the calling up of the "blood of our martyrs" as justification, all phrases from the first UNLU communique, set this tone. In the first month alone, passages recount the common heritage of Palestinians, their continuing efforts within the Intifada, and the goals toward which they all move:

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[368]Nassar and Heacock, p. 191.

> People of martyrs, grandchildren of Al Qassam, Brothers and comrades of Abu Sharar, Kanafani, and Khaled Nazzal, people of the uprising extending from the roots of the homeland from 1936 and increasing in strength in the face of the fascist occupation . . .[369]
>
> Oh great people of Palestine, [those of the] masses of the stones and molotov cocktails, soldiers of truth who participate in the valiant uprising of our people, long live your arms of steel . . .
> We salute this great people which has drawn the most marvelous picture of sacrifice and struggle, the people which shook the land under the feet of the occupation last week . . .[370]
>
> Our heroic people:
> The uprising is only beginning, and this year is the year for our liberation from the dungeons of the occupation and the year for the ending of all suffering. The chains of the conspiracy have been destroyed. The enemy has lost the battle.[371]

It is a language of excess -- which reflects the excessively difficult conditions under which Palestinians survive -- and which promotes the recognition that only excessive risk and excessive forbearance will carry the resistance forward, given those conditions. The UNLU was faced with difficult choices as to how it was to keep the Uprising on the "front burner" for a people increasingly subject to Israeli policies of reprisal. As one member of the Palestinian Peace Delegation explains:

> Since the situation arising from the difficulties of living under the Occupation -- being chased all the time, being sent to prison, having resources destroyed -- did not enable them [UNLU] to carry things out as they would have liked . . . let me talk about the minimum and maximum that were employed.

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[369]UNLU Communique No. 2, 10 January, 1988.

[370]UNLU Communique No. 3, 18 January, 1988.

[371]UNLU Communique No. 4, undated, but released between 18 January and 28 January, 1988.

> The minimum involved the four groups in the coalition discussing everything in the leaflets. The maximum was when they took into account the cares of life, and were able to integrate the organizations in all the districts.[372]

Language and Political Agenda. To "t[ake] into account the cares of life," meant for the writers of the leaflets, that they keep the enormity of the vision always on the horizon. But for the people to listen only and not to act, or to act only sporadically and without political intent, would have meant the end of their bold beginning. Thus, bound within the hyperbole, both of imagery and of diction, is a language rich in the use of verbs:

> Let the earth burn beneath the feet . . . you who throw burning stones . . . Let Palestinian rocks fall on the heads . . .[373]

> O you who soar high in the sky and trample tyranny under foot, O you who achieved victory over the machine of death and the batons of the criminal Rabin . . .[374]

It is this language of the early communiques which gave meaning and intention to the Calls to Action which sought both to reflect and to shape the enormous swells of activity in the "street." From the first communique, the intention of "shaking off" the Occupation was identified as the political goal of the Uprising. Language supporting this political agenda is evident throughout the first year:

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[372]Personal interview with Professor Sami Kilani, writer and member of the Palestinian Peace Delegation, in East Jerusalem on 24 July, 1992.

[373]UNLU Communique No. 2, 10 January, 1988.

[374]UNLU Communique No. 8, undated, but broadcast over *Sanaa Voice of Palestine*, 1600 GMT, 22 February, 1988.

> [O]ur rejection of the occupation and its repressive polic[ies] . . . (No. 1).
>
> [C]ontinue this struggle until the achievement of the national legitimate aims of our people . . . (No. 5).
>
> You, the heroes of the uprising are daily making the cost of the occupation more prohibitive . . . (No. 9).
>
> The UNLU wishes to make it clear that our people are fighting to preserve their existence and to regain their usurped national rights (No. 21).
>
> To the bearers of the flame of an independent Palestinian state: as you continue your uprising on the battlefront, our heroic leadership represented by the PLO, is doing its utmost to translate our daily victories into international victories for our cause (No. 27).

By contrast, a more institutionalized leadership, writing a year after the first communique, in January of 1989, makes a different use of language. In this, the language of dynamic exhortation has given way to a more sullen language of steadfastness:

> O masses of our heroic people, the UNLU proudly praises the heroic deeds of our struggler people in the heroic Gaza Strip and appreciates their steadfastness in the face of the forms of terrorist repressive measures.[375]
>
> O heroes of the war of national independence: Long live your steel arms which the Zionist military administration has failed to oppress. Blessed be your stones that defeated the unconquerable army. O masses of the heroic uprising: As you are recording daily epics of struggle, showing a momentous rise in your morale and revealing endless powers, capabilities, and potential to continue the struggle, the oppressive measures, regardless of the brutatlity of their exaggerated violence, will never make you stop the uprising until you achieve its national goals.[376]

This change in style must be understood within the context of Israeli policies designed to break the backbone of the Intifada. Within the first eight months alone,

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[375]UNLU Communique No. 32, 7 January, 1989.

[376]UNLU Communique No. 33, undated, but broadcast over *Sanaa Voice of Palestine*, 1610 GMT, 22 January, 1989.

> On your behalf, O masses of our people, we say the Zionist state continues and escalates its terrorism against our masses in all positions whenever their voices denouncing the terrorism are getting louder. Occupation authorities can practice deportation now and go to extremes in massacres and savage oppression. But we promise you that the day of victory and return is coming with further struggle and national unity. The escalation of the terrorist Zionist campaign set a record in the number of killed and wounded last month.[383]
>
> O heroes of the people of the uprising: the Zionist enemy deludes itself into thinking that its new measures and policy of free murder and its use of various types of fatal bullets[384]will succeed in confronting the uprising, lessen its ardor, and consequently stop the major change in the international stand of our Palestinian people and their leader, the PLO.[385]

Leaflet Format

Beginning with the second communique, the structural format of the leaflets included three main sections. The first two have been the subject of the previous discussion relating to the use of language by the UNLU in shaping the uprising: the "preamble" and the "appeals" sections.

Preamble. The preamble, which would at times be very short and at others quite extensive, extolled the resolve of the Palestinian people in their efforts to realize their goals of national self-determination. In Communique No. 32, for example (7 January, 1989), the first paragraph praises the revolutionary spirit of a people entering their 14th month of the uprising, and for the next five paragraphs, the communique addresses the

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[383]UNLU Communique No. 32, 7 January, 1989.

[384]On January 9, 1989, the IDF rules for opening fire were relaxed and a new variety of plastic bullet, containing a larger proportion of metal, were introduced.

[385]UNLU Communique No. 33, undated, but broadcast over *Sanaa Voice Voice of Palestine* at 1610 GMT on 22 January, 1989.

incomplete data cite 123 communities which had been placed under curfews comprising a total of 1560 curfew-days.[377] During this same period, 292 Palestinian deaths (attributed to bullet wounds, tear gas, and beatings) had occurred,[378] and there had been 1,112 reports of injuries due to beatings to youth between the ages of one year and fifteen years of age.[379] By the end of the first year of the Intifada, over 300 homes had been demolished,[380] 59 Palestinians had been ordered to leave the OT,[381]and in the West Bank town of Qalqilla, during a single mass arrest raid by the IDF on 6 September, 1988, over 1,000 men were arrested[382] to be held in Administrative Detention, a fate not unlike that of thousands of other Palestinians throughout the course of the Intifada. All of these measures were part of life under the Occupation in general (i.e., since 1967), but the use of such policies was intensified during the first year of the Uprising.

By the following year the two UNLU leaflets issued in January reflect not only "steadfastness," as in a time of trouble, but a steadfastness targetted against the Occupier. That is, the language of excess has become a strident voice against the Israeli regime:

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[377]FACTS, p. 191. Curfews are normally instituted for a period of 24 hours, during which time, people are forbidden to leave their homes, and may be shot if they appear at their windows.

[378]FACTS, p. 157.

[379]Ibid., p. 179.

[380]Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, *The Stone And The Olive Branch: Four Years of the Intifada From Jabalia to Madrid* (East Jerusalem: JMCC, December, 1991), p. 36.

[381]al-Haq, *Punishing a Nation: Human Rights Violations During the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987 - December 1988* (Ramallah, West Bank: al-Haq, 1989), p. 144.

[382]Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, pp. 32-33.

international response to the Palestinian agenda and stressses the necessity of the international community's recognition of the PLO as the "sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" before progress in resolving the conflict can be made.

Appeals. The second, or "appeals" section, recognizes the contributions of various groups within Palestinian society and appeals to them to take their roles in the uprising very seriously and to respond to Israeli tactics creatively and with determination. For example, Communique No. 32 continues with 16 paragraphs, each of which congradulates or praises a particular group and/or calls on each for certain tasks. Specific examples from this communique include:

> [T]he UNLU proudly praises the heroic deeds of our struggler people in the heroic Gaza Strip and appreciates their steadfastness in the face of the forms of terrorist repressive measures.
>
> The UNLU appreciates the Palestinian woman's role in bolstering steadfastness . . . It calls on them to escalate their struggle . . . and to resist submission . . .
>
> The UNLU calls on all strugglers in all positions to safeguard the unity of the popular leadership . . .
>
> The UNLU calls on the strike forces to firmly confront all those who try to retract their resignation from the departments of the Civil Administration . . .
>
> The UNLU calls on the owners of private and public cars to resist the handing over of their cars to the forces of the occupation which are then used by the enemy organs to storm the uprising areas . . .
>
> The UNLU calls on the owners of industries and national establishment not to deduct the days of comprehensive strike from the wages of workers . .
>
> The UNLU calls on all the detainees who are threatened with deportation to reject all forms of bargaining . . .

> The UNLU congratulates the Christian communities which adopt the Eastern calendar on the occasion of the New Year and, for limiting this occasion to the performance of religious rites.

Calls to Action. The third section of the communiques contains the "calls to action." This is in effect, a calendar of resistance activities covering approximately 14 days. For Communique No. 32, this "calendar" looks like:

> January 9: A day of comprehensive strike on the occasion of the uprising's entering its 14th month.
>
> January 10: The day of sacred Palestinian stone for escalating the uprising and for reaffirming its perpetuation until freedom and national independence are won.
>
> January 11: A day for deportees, martyrs, the wounded, and detainees. During this day visits will be made to the wounded and to the families of martyrs, detainees, and deportees to express solidarity with them.
>
> January 12, 13, 14 will be days for afforestation, agriculture, and land reclamation vis-a-vis the deliberate sabotage at the hands of the occupation authorities of our agricultural produce and the uprooting of our blesssed trees. We urge the popular committees to carry out afforestation and agriculture.[386]
>
> January 15 will be a general strike day on the occasion of Al-Aqsa Day as well as a day for confrontation and defiance of the Zionist settlements' hotbeds around the first of the two kiblahs and the third holy mosque.

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[386]Economic pressures were used by Israel early in the Intifada to break the spirit of rebellion amongst the Palestinians. Hussein Jameel Bargouti in "Jeep Versus Bare Feet: The Villages in the Intifada"in Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (New York: Praeger, 1990) recounts that in a single week in June, 1988, a total of 5600 Palestinian trees were destroyed and that, in all, more than 100,000 trees -- mostly olive trees -- were destroyed in the first year of the uprising (p. 117).

> January 16 and 17 will be days for intensifying popular education in all positions and for confronting the policy of stultification.[387]
>
> January 18 will be a day for staging marches and women's sit-ins in protest of the policy of repression against prisoners and detainees in Ansar 2 and 3, Al-Zahiriyah, and other detention camps.[388]
>
> January 19 will be a day of mobilization and national education. On that day lectures and seminars pertaining to the uprising's great march will be held.
>
> January 20 and 22, Friday and Sunday, will be days for performing special prayers for the souls of the martyrs and for the staging of popular marches.
>
> January 21 will be popular wrath day. Palestinian masses will take to the streets and Palestinian flags will be hoisted. And on that day there will be violation of the curfew and siege so the Palestinian voice will rise high to the sky.
>
> January 24 will be a general strike day in protest of the policy of demolishing Palestinian houses and in solidarity with the besieged positions and to show refusal of yielding to the occupation authorities' orders.

Policy Definitions. The calls issued during the first two years represent a variety of types of actions. Some, such as calls for chanting slogans, flying the Palestinian flag,

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[387]One of the first responses to the Intifada by the Israeli government was the closure of educational institutions in the OT. The first order for closure of all schools was given on 21 December, 1987; all West Bank schools were closed for periods longer than eight months during 1988 alone. See Jerusalem Media and Communications Center, *The Stone and the Olive Branch* (East Jerusalem: JMCC, 1991), pp. 35-37.

[388]Mass arrests have been a means of the Israeli government to control the uprising. In the first four years of the Intifada, at least 95,000 Palestinians have been arrested in this manner. To cope with such a large influx of prisoners, several new detention centers were opened, the most notorious of which, located in the desert region of the Negev, is called "Ansar Three." Under the Emergency Regulations of 1945 (set in place by the British), prisoners can be held without charge or trial for a period of six months; in August, 1989, this period was extended to one year. See Raja Shehadeh, *Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank* (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Palestine Studies, 1988)pp. 133-145. Also, JMCC, *The Stone and the Olive Branch*, pp. 32-33.

strikes, and throwing stones, represent actions brought forward from resistance activities of the past; others were developed within the context of the Intifada to effect the goals of the uprising -- specifically, separation from the Israeli Civil Administration -- and in response to Israeli policies of reprisal. In the present study, the many possible actions were divided into five primary categories. In (a moreorless) increasing order of militancy -- and therefore, level of risk to Palestinians -- these are:

A. Calls for actions related to unity or solidarity

B. Calls for actions related to economic resistance

C. Calls for actions related to strikes

D. Calls for public demonstrations

E. Calls for militant actions

Additionally, 5 - 10 subcategories were assigned to each of the primary categories listed above. Examples relating to each would include:

A. Unity/Solidarity: days of quiet prayer; visiting families of martyrs, prisoners, and detainees; providing financial/moral support to neighbors or beseiged villages; formation of popular committees

B. Economic: economize within the household; cultivate land and grow vegetables; "buy Palestinian;" maximize production in factories; boycott Israeli goods; boycott taxes, fines

C. Strikes: general, comprehensive; closures/openings at specific times; stop work at settlements or inside the Green Line; public transportation

D. Demonstrations: people flock to worship; sit-ins; hunger strikes; marches; mock funerals; chants/slogans; hoisting Palestinian flags; painting slogans on walls (graffiti)

E. Militant: "daily clashes;" construct roadblocks; burn tires; throw stones; Molotov cocktails; punish non-cooperative Palestinians/collaborators; "merciless war" against settlers

While, in general, it is true that "A" represents actions less militant than those of "E", the assignment of actions to categories only imperfectly reflects the reality "on the ground." For instance, while certain actions *in themselves* are less militant, the *consequences* of those actions as perceived by the Israeli military administration are such that the outcomes invite a militant response and therefore place Palestinians at considerable risk. That is to say that the actions of civil disobedience must be viewed separately from the outcomes of such policies.

Non-Violence and Civil Disobedience. The policy choice of the UNLU from the beginning was one of civil disobedience and non-violence. Schiff and Ya'ari recount the work of Mubarak Awad in Jerusalem in the mid-1980's.[389] A Ph.D. psychologist who returned from 15 years in the United States, Awad founded the Center for the Study of Non-Violence in Jerusalem, and in time, developed over 120 different sets of non-violent actions which could be used by Palestinians in a campaign of civil disobedience against the Occupation. When the UNLU began shaping the direction of the popular uprising, in January, 1988, Awad's pamphlets and leaflets were brought to the drawing board and incorporated as an early -- and hopeful -- strategy of the Intifada.

Such a policy in and of itself posed a direct threat to Israeli military control. Civil disobedience is not only a means of disengaging from an occupying power, it is also -- and perhaps, centrally -- a means of equalizing the assymetrical distribution of power inherent in the military occupation of a subject population. The might of a well-equipped and rigorously trained modern army cannot be brought to bear upon an unarmed civilian

[389]Schiff and Ya'ari, pp. 240-245.

population without incurring significant political costs at the international level. Civil disobedience -- non-violent actions in the public (or "popular") arena -- raises the cost of the Occupation for the Occupier, significantly. To "form popular committees," an action catalogued here under "A" (actions relating to "unity and solidarity"), is in itself, a non-violent activity relating to the organization of Palestinian society during the uprising. The formation of such committees, however, *particularly at the popular level,* suggested, properly, to the Israeli government, the formation of a parallel Palestinian administration. Indeed, an announcement on 1 July, 1988 by the Israeli O.C. Central Command, Amram Mitzna, mirrored such fears: "The establishment of popular committees is against the law. Any person who co-operates with these committees will be punished . . . The Civil Administration is the only authority in the occupied territories."[390] This was reiterated in an 18 August statement by Rabin which cited the popular committees as being the "moving force behind the uprising," and declared them illegal.[391] To participate in popular committees, even to attend meetings, whether labour committees, women's committees, health committees, agricultural committees, or whatever, was to court risk. To *lead* such committees was to invite arrest, detention, and/or deportation, if not collective punishment for one's entire family.

Likewise, "cultivating land and growing vegetables," categorized under "B" (economic activities), is a non-militant means of resistance. But land is precisely what

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[390]*FACTS Weekly Review*, 16, 27 June - 2 July, 1988 in *Towards a State of Independence* (Jerusalem: Facts Information Committee, September, 1988), p. 16.

[391]*FACTS Weekly Review*, 22, 14 - 20 August, 1988.

is at stake for Eretz Israel, and the cultivation of land implies ownership. Outright destruction of crops and/or town curfews during harvest season was one Israeli response to this. Moreover, self-sufficiency, the specific goal of these actions, denied Israel a captive market for its produce. "Painting slogans" on walls of compounds and buildings is a non-violent activity, here ascribed to "D" (public demonstrations). But graffiti, painted in the colors of the Palestinian flag, was a manifestly visible contribution to the "redrawing of the Green Line . . . psychologically,"[392] and hence was one of the most dangerous of all possible actions:

> Strike forces of hard-core activists were created, which operated as underground cells, and busied themselves with the more overtly dangerous tasks of the uprising such as dealing with collaborators, attacking IDF patrols, and writing graffiti.[393]

Risk existed, then, at all levels of activity within the Intifada. The formation of the leaflets, particularly in terms of the language utilized and the types of actions called for by the UNLU generally took this into account. While in the course of the first two years there is evidence of a change in UNLU policies (as viewed from an analysis of the leaflets themselves), such a change reflected the dialectics of the Intifada itself. The grasssroots uprising and the UNLU commitment to policies of civil disobedience as a means of "shaking off" the oppressor merged synergistically in the first months of the Uprising on a euphoric crest of success. But the very success of this challenge to the military command, itself, brought reprisals which swept those in the "street" into prison

[392]JMCC, *The Stone and the Olive Branch,* p. 12.

[393]Ibid., p. 11.

camps in the Negev, forced the infrastructure underground, effectively closing down the public arena, and systematically decapitated the "leadership." In all this, the communiques, still signed by the UNLU and the PLO, continued to be distributed and continued to advance a weekly agenda. That the Intifada itself was preserved, albeit in an ever-evolving formulation, at least suggests that one examine the role which the leaflets played in the process of maintaining Palestinian resistance.

UNLU Leaflets as a National Constitution

Introduction

The National Context. To maintain the Intifada, not merely as a vehicle of resistance, but as a means of bringing into reality a sovereign Palestinian state, the UNLU was faced with the problem of acting out that reality which was not yet officially on the ground: the reality of statehood. Granted, there was a history of national development on which to build which included the activities of various political factions, those of the PLO, and those of numerous organizations at the popular level, and while it was also true that there had been many "intifadas" in the 1970's which had taken advantage of these "national elements," the UNLU was acutely aware that none of these mini-uprisings had lasted beyond a few weeks. The paradoxical nature of leadership within the Palestinian national movement meant that the UNLU had to promote new possibilities, taking advantage of the inertia of "the street," while acknowledging and reaffirming what had

gone before. Among other things, this meant being able to accept the mantle of legitimacy as a leadership forged from the policies of the Israeli occupation,[394] while at the same time, affirming the validity of the PLO as the "sole representative of the Palestinian people."

It is within this context, that Nassar and Heacock's assertion that the UNLU communiques, "were transformed into a sort of biweekly [bi-monthly] legislative-executive-judicial document with the force of a constitution,"[395] takes on meaning. The UNLU leaflets served not only to organize the Intifada, but to express the reality of Nationhood emerging through political struggle. In this, the leaflets reflect the democratic aspirations of the grassroots initiative from whence the "shaking off" began, and they can further be viewed as the codification of socio-political values within the context of an evolving social and political reality.

The Process of Nation-Building. For Aristotle, the Constitution of a polis was not a written document, but an understanding: not so much a structuring of political interactions as a recognition that a legitimate government arises from the historico-cultural- politico milieu of a particular society. Almond[396] and later Almond and

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[394]For example, I., a factional representative of the UNLU acknowledged: "As a person, actually, I suffered directly from the Occupation. First of all, I spent a long term in prison -- 11 years -- and I know also what Occupation means in other respects: most of the lands of my village were confiscated, and a large part of my land, also was confiscated. . . . It is impossible for us, as Palestinians, to coexist with the Occupation." Personal interview, East Jerusalem, 21 July, 1992.

[395]Nassar and Heacock, "The Revolutionary," p. 191.

[396]Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics 18* (1956): 391-409.

Verba[397] brought this concept forward, subjected it to the refinements of modern systematic empiricism, and called it "Civic Culture." In this it is argued that the process of nation-building requires a "mix" of political orientations, particularly with respect to individual perceptions of their role as participants within the political culture.

A written constitution necessarily derives from the Aristotelian conception. In this, the written "contract" between a government and its people reflect a conscious awareness of the need to accomodate the dialectic of change across time. Collaborative work[398] undertaken on the systematic study of developing political systems in the 1950's and 1960's identified five crises of political development. These, admittedly reflect a rational Western political bias, but are useful in organizing discussion. These five crises are:

> *The Identity Crisis*:[399] This refers to the extent to which the people of a state see themselves as forming a distinct political entity, and derive their personal identities from their attachment to this national identity.

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[397]Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964).

[398]Under the direction of Gabriel Almond, the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) initiated "Studies in Political Development," published by Princeton University Press. The culminaation of the series was *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), and included among others, contributions by Joseph LaPalombara, Lucien Pye, and Myron Weiner, which are cited below.

[399]Lucien Pye, "Identity and the Political Culture," in SSRC Committee, Crises and Sequences, pp. 101-134.

The Legitimacy Crisis:[400] This refers to the extent to which the citizens acknowledge and accept the right of the governmental authorities to govern them and to make decisions in their name.

The Participation Crisis:[401] This refers to the extent to which new participants are allowed active roles within the political system.

The Penetration Crisis:[402] This refers to the level of development of a political infrastructure by which means governmental policies can be implemented throughout the nation, at all levels of society.

The Distribution Crisis:[403] This refers to the degree to which national resources are, and are seen to be, fairly distributed throughout the nation.

Such ideas are part of an ongoing "constitutional dialogue" today not only in nations traditionally labelled "developing," but also in the formulation of new states in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. While boundaries are still being redrawn in many new democracies, opposing forces are struggling to determine which version of "the state" will predominate: a state modelled after Western liberal democracies in which citizenship does not depend upon race, ethnicity, language, or religion, OR a state based on nationality and defined precisely by such characteristics. What people expect their

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[400]Pye, "The Legitimacy Crisis," in SSRC Committee, *Crises and Sequences*, pp. 135-158.

[401]Weiner, "Political Participation: Crisis of the Political Process," in SSRC Committee, *Crises and Sequences*, pp. 159-204.

[402]La Palombara, "Penetration: A Crisis of Governmental Capacity," in SSRC Committee, *Crises and Sequences*,pp. 205-232.

[403]La Palombara, "Distribution: A Crisis of Resource Management," in *Crises and Sequences*, pp. 233-282.

constitutions to do, then, resonates very differently depending upon not only the heritage of a people, but the conditions under which they find themselves.[404]

A Constitutional Dialogue

Compared with the Palestinian entity, many other peoples presently defining their national aspirations enjoy certain advantages: they control the land which they are attempting to govern, they control the resources from which they can fashion an economically strong union, they control the infrastructure through which they can begin to implement their policies, and importantly, they are able to establish the principle of the rule of law under which all citizens will be held equally responsible. Clearly these conditions cannot presently be met in the Occupied Territories, as the term, "Occupied" would suggest. In what sense then, have the Communiques released by the UNLU been able to serve as a *de facto* Constitution of a people in the process of nation-building, a process which lay at the heart of the Intifada? It will be argued that three areas crucial to maintaining the Intifada -- Identity, Legitimacy, and Participation -- and already identified as being essential to the process of nation-building, itself, were addressed by the UNLU through the issuance of the leaflets, and that the UNLU, in coordinating the events of the Intifada, was thereby laying groundwork within the OT for the development of a state of Palestine grounded in democratic principles.

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[404]A.E. Dick Howard, "The Hem of History: Constitution Making in Central and Eastern Europe." A presentation in conjunction with the Presentation of the 1993 James W. Livingood American Spirit Award to Professor Howard by the Chattanooga Regional History Museum on the campus of the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, 1 April, 1993.

Identity. For Palestinians, the question of national identity brooks no argument: Palestinians are the people of the land of Palestine. Ruled by the Ottomans, the British, and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, they include predominately Islamic and Christian Arabs. They occupied these lands before the European Jewish immigration in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and before the creation of the state of Israel in 1948.

Admittedly there are factions within the Palestinian camp, both political and religious, but such divisions generally reflect a commitment to the *means* of achieving a "legitimate" national identity -- an internationally recognized sovereign nation-state -- rather than the *fact* of such an identity. The challenge for the UNLU, then, was not so much in structuring the relationship between itself and "the people" to reflect a commitment to such an identity, but in effecting solidarity. For the Intifada to be successful in shaking off the Occupation, it had to succeed in 1) keeping people in the streets and maintaining a commitment to visible resistance, in 2) mobilizing all groups at all levels of society, and in 3) establishing an agenda for the duration of the Intifada.

Maintaining the Confrontation. That people were in the streets on 9 December, 1987 had little to do with the UNLU, which was not yet formally organized: this Uprising, like many in the 1970's was a spontaneous response to the burdens of Occupation. That people were still in the streets on 9 January, 9 February, and 9 March, 1988 was largely due to the efforts of the UNLU in managing the resistance and their use of the communiques in coordinating such efforts.

While it can be said that a legitimate constitution would either establish or reflect the relationship between a people and their leadership, in the present instance, this

"constitution" does both. This is so because of the inherently paradoxical nature of leadership within a populist "revolutionary" movement, wherein the impetus for action arises at the grasssroots level. Leadership, in such a context, must both respect the source of such energy and build with it. "All the successful initiatives," explained one activist, "were grassroots initiatives which were picked up by the UNLU." This served to shape new ideas of "leadership" within the Territories, and the relationship between the people and the "government."

> In the beginning, the strikes actually confused the UNLU. These strikes lasted sometimes for thirty-six continuous days -- for example, in Jerusalem. The UNLU argued that this policy will actually break the Intifada, and resisted such policy. It was a dilemma for them, because they could not call it off (the Jerusalem strike) without losing all credibility: the strikes were being sustained by the masses! Finally, the popular committees in Nablus -- on their own -- decided to open shops for two hours a day and to strike the rest of the day. The UNLU could accept this, and from then on, supported these efforts.[405]

In fact, initiatives which did not arise from the masses were often ignored. If people were called upon to do "silly things" merely to demonstrate solidarity, such calls were ineffective. For instance, when people were urged to whistle at a certain time of day or to turn off their lights at a certain time, such "trivial games" met with little appeal in pragmatic audiences.[406]

In its efforts to promote solidarity, the UNLU had to reflect this understanding of its role as "leader," both in its exhortations and in the calls it selected for each

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[405]Personal interview with Dr. Ghassan Khatib, Palestinian delegate to the Peace Conference, in East Jerusalem, on 8 August, 1992.

[406]Ibid.

communique, discarding ideas which would not be picked up by the public and reinforcing actions that already had support. This not infrequently involved evaluating what the people could in fact be called upon to do in light of Israeli policies of reprisals. For example, on 17 May, 1989, then-Defence Minister Yitzhak Rabin issued an order that all Gazan males over age 16 would be required to carry a magnetized plastic card in order to enter Israel to work. Such cards were to be issued only to people with clean security records and those who had paid all outstanding taxes and fines. The Gazan leadership called on Gazans to refuse their compliance.

> 'Operation plastic card' was launched in August 1989 and severe punishments were extended to those who failed to register. the UNLU responded by calling for a protracted general strike;[407] only 800 of the 40,000 Gazans who worked as wage labourers in Israel failed to join this strike. After a 40 day protest which included much hardship, Gazans returned to work.[408]

On 15 August, Communique No. 44 called for strikes in solidarity with the Gaza Strip, calling upon Palestinians (in Gaza as well as the West Bank) to challenge the "policy of divide and conquer," in order to prevent its success in "devour[ing] the people little by little." It labelled any work in Israel as "treasonous." Communique No. 46 (28 September, 1989) directed over half its initial calls to the situation in Gaza, requesting supplies and medical relief, solidarity in strikes and sit-ins, seeking support from international labor unions, etc. Communique No. 47 (16 October, 1989) greeted the "revolutionary masses in the heroic Gaza Strip," and affirmed the support they expressed

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[407]UNLU Communique No. 44, 16 August, 1989.

[408]JMCC, "The Stone," p. 41.

from within the entire Palestinian body -- a one-day strike was dedicated to the hardships in Gaza. Communique No. 49 (4 December, 1989) mentions "Gaza" not at all, but urges West Bank Palestinians to be "prepared to wage the battle of the magnetic cards," as soon as the policy is transferred to the West Bank. Communique No. 50 (26 December 1989) makes no mention of the magnetic cards, but calls on Gazans to be alert to nefarious Israeli marketing attempts (Israel changed labels on Israeli goods to promote their products as being "Arab"). What caused this sudden policy-change? Was the UNLU no longer concerned about resisting Israel's "operation plastic card?" A young Gazan journalist explained:

> The UNLU had leaders which would watch the places where you had to collect the identity cards and at night, people would come to your house and confiscate them. This created too much of a hardship on the people, however, who must work in Israel in order to buy food, pay rent, etc. After two months or so, one day they [UNLU] announced that they would place all of the collected cards in the mosque and whoever had had a card which had been confiscated, could go and collect it. They realized they were asking too much of the people. You see, the Israelis control everything by means of the Civil Administration, which is highly centralized. Your water, electricity, car license, travel permits, identity cards: everything is centralized through these offices. You must cooperate at least in this, or your life becomes very difficult.[409]

In being responsive to the realities of the people -- not merely to idealistic policies -- the UNLU, through the leaflets, acknowledged the realities of a living Intifada.

"You might want to ask whether the leadership was leading the Intifada or the Intifada was leading the leadership," was one observation made regarding this question

[409]Personal communication with AR, in Gaza, 4 August, 1992.

of leadership.[410] Hence, even though -- and perhaps because of the fact that everyone visited families of martyrs as a matter of course, one of the calls to action cited over 30 times in the communiques of the first two years, involved asking the people to visit families of martyrs, detainees, and deportees.[411] Assigning particular dates to such activities did lend a structure to the movement, but perhaps more than that, by including such calls, the UNLU was also recognizing in a public way, the hardships and the costs to all, of participation in the struggle. The extended curfews imposed by the Israeli military meant that all Palestinians living in the OT had to depend upon one another for medical help, for food, for hiding/escaping from soldiers, and the families of martyrs, detainees, and deportees were especially vulnerable to hardship, having lost the heads of their families.

Effecting Mobilization. Besides keeping people in the streets and visibly engaged in resistance, the UNLU had to promote mobilization at all levels of Palestinian society. Admittedly, many Palestinians were already organized. In numerous interviews, political activists from all factions explained that trade unions, women's groups, agricultural, educational, medical, and relief committees had all been formed in the 70's and 80's, particularly after 1982, due to local initiatives. Two groups had traditionally remained aloof from all of this: the Jordanian sympathizers -- those traditional elites who (especially on the West Bank) had enhanced both social and economic interests through

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[410]Personal interview with Ibrahim Dakkak, in East Jerusalem, 25 July, 1992.

[411]For example, see Communiques numbered: 8, 10, 13, 16, 17, 19, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 46, 48.

cooperation with Amman; and the merchants and shopkeepers, who cooperated with Israeli directives to facilitate their business interests. The Intifada effectively undercut the position of pro-Jordanian sympathizers, first, through the nationalistic impetus of the movement (to be allied with interests of other nations was therefore to be un-Palestinian) and secondly, through King Hussein's 29 July, 1988 announcement severing official administrative ties with the West Bank.[412] The Intifada also sparked the involvement of merchants and shopkeepers who, since 1976, had borne the brunt of the VAT taxes imposed by the Israeli government.[413] The task of the UNLU then, was to maintain a high level of commitment from all Palestinians.

The preamble to the first UNLU communique, issued 8 January, 1988, recognized this:

> In continuation of the glorious uprising of our people, for the continuity of the spirit of struggle and solidarity with our people everywhere, in expression of our rejection of the Occupation and its repressive policy of deportation, mass arrests, curfews, and house demolitions, and for more solidarity with our revolution and our valiant masses . . . we issue the following: all sectors of our heroic people everywhere must conform with the call for a general comprehensive strike starting January 11, 1988 until the evening of Wednesday, January 13, 1988. The strike includes all public and private commercial institutions, workers, and transportation. The strike will be conducted under the slogan of 'Down with the Occupation. Long live Palestine, Arab and free.'

The preamble is followed by four paragraphs, each of which appeals to a specific group: "Brother Workers," "Brother Shopkeepers," "Brother Bus Company and Taxi Owners," and "Brother Doctors and Pharmacists."

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[412]Jarbawi, pp. 300-301.

[413]Tamari, pp. 161-163.

Communique No.3 (18 January, 1988) calls upon "Our people of all classes and sectors," to boycott Israeli goods and in the following paragraphs exhorts "the Palestinian working class masses," "our valiant students," and "our valiant taxi drivers, bus drivers, and owners of taxi and bus companies," then calls upon other groups to be prepared for service: doctors and the health services, pharmaceuticals, and owners of pharmacies, "all able and well people" who can donate resources, and "all academics and professionals."

Within a week or two, Communique No.43 addressed itself to merchants, students, the besieged (refugee) camps, and laborers, and asked that the "popular means" become a daily weapon in the hands of every "brother, sister, student, youth, woman, and girl" in the course of the uprising.

By the beginning of the second month, Communique No.5 was issued, which enlarged the audience through even greater differentiation. The appeal in the preamble was directed toward: merchants, workers, farmers, students, children, women, old men. The communique further called on the audience to respect the work boycott against Israel, and specifically requested that "our mothers, sisters, and daughters" work alongside their menfolk in the struggle. "Valiant students," who had just completed high school exams were called upon to be soldiers of the uprising, and "our merchants . . . citadels of the uprising," were extolled for their leadership role.[414]

Once it was apparent that all Palestinians were committed to the demands of the Intifada, new concerns arose for the UNLU -- those of creating specific tasks for specific

[414]Tamari, p. 166 cites this as being, "The only national communique that is almost entirely devoted to merchants and businessmen."

groups and thus ensuring the engagement of all. For example, in Communique No.9 (2 May, 1988) several calls were given: merchants, artisans, and professionals were to refrain from paying Israeli taxes; factories were to work at full capacity to provide necessary goods to sustain the boycott of Israeli products; pharmacies, clinics, and health services were to remain open all the time; students and teachers were to break closure orders, and forceably enter their institutions; women were to undertake large marches in the streets.

Half a year later, the public arena having been effectively shut down by Israeli policies,[415] the communiques reflect a shift from people to tasks: there are jobs to be done, and each individual is to serve where he/she can. Whereas in early communiques, the activities were linked with "Brother Shopkeepers," "Brother Students," "Brother Workers," etc., by Communique No.27 (9 October, 1988) the significant categories identified are functional: "Education," "Agriculture," "Merchants," "Attorneys," and "Resisting the Policy of Raids." Further, life had by now become more complex: it is no longer of use to the national cause merely to "demonstrate." With regard to "Education," for instance, international and human rights organizations are requested to appeal to UNESCO, the UN itself, and diplomatic missions to pressure Israel into opening schools and universities. Students are urged to organize sit-in campaigns on campuses and at diplomatic missions, and academics and development workers are asked to oversee

[415]For example, in the two-week period, 2 October - 15 October, 1988, 122 demonstrations were reported as occurring in 64 West Bank towns, villages, and camps -- an average of 1/week/locale. *FACTS Weekly Review* No.27 (2 October - 15 October), 1988, p. 15.

the organization of popular education in neighborhoods, villages, towns, and refugee camps. Where "people" form the category (eg., physicians, attorneys), the emphasis is still upon service: being available, maintaining low fee structures, and coordinating efforts with others.

By June, 1989, the situation as reflected in the communiques, had changed again. Israeli policies had become very harsh, much of the grassroots leadership had been deported, arrested, or driven underground. Open communication was difficult, precluding organized public activities. Communique No.41 (14 June, 1989) is more terse in its tone, and the key concerns are concerns regarding compliance. In place of the hopeful, enthusiastic focus of the earlier communiques are calls such as the following:

> The UNL calls on the owners of artesian wells to reduce the price of water . . .
>
> The UNL calls on bakery owners not to turn their bakeries into groceries . . .
>
> The UNL warns merchants who tamper with prices . .
>
> The UNL urges the accountants association in Gaza to expel members who still submit tax statements.

The specific calls (the two-week calendar) include general strikes, days of escalating the struggle, days for militant activities, and sit-ins.

If the argument can be made that the communiques serve as the living, breathing Constitution for the uprising, then keeping people on task is what remained when superior forces have subjected the movement to fierce oppression. Here the lives are sparse -- as are the directives -- precisely because each community and each sector of society is

operatively on its own. Compliance becomes a crucial issue in such a time, and the leaflets served as the general link in communicating the need for this throughout the OT.

Structuring an Agenda. Besides drawing upon shared experiences for the communiques in order to strengthen "solidarity," the UNLU also sought to structure the resistance, particularly by setting out an agenda, and to move activities beyond the throwing of stones. Concerns were twofold: to maintain a highly visible level of resistance for as long as possible and to effect a disengagement from the Israeli Civil Administration. In this,

> A concensus emerged early on in the uprising that the protesters should eschew weapons, using predominately non-violent methods of protest. The use of stones and Molotov cocktails was sanctioned, however, [and] stones were swiftly to take on a symbolic role. . . . The UNLU took to addressing its communiques to the 'children of the stone' [who stood] like David, facing the Goliath of the Israeli Defence Force (IDF).[416]

Mass demonstrations were the ideal actions, and within the first 33 weeks (3 January - 20 August) there were 3305 demonstrations reported in the OT, an average of 115 demonstrations per week.[417] Communiques throughout this period encouraged mass public actions with high visibility, calling for responses such as the following:[418]

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[416]JMCC, "The Stone," p. 8.

[417]FACTS, "Towards," pp. 147-148. There is no complete or exact record of the number of demonstrations, but these were compiled by the FACTS office from local press reports. This is an underestimate, as many demonstrations go unreported, but it does provide an index as to the high level of popular involvement.

[418]Specific communiques are listed only as examples: such calls were made repeatedly in numerous communiques.

Commercial strikes[419] (all communiques)

Sit-ins in Red Cross and Red Crescent Headquarters (No.8)

Breaking imposed curfews by going into the streets at noon (No.8)

Hoisting Palestinian flags (No.9)

Painting Hebrew signs black (No.9)

Marching to worship en masse on Fridays and Sundays (No.9)

Unity in opening and closing shops - in defiance of Israeli orders (No.10)

Visiting tombs of martyrs after prayers at the mosque (No.16)

Mammoth demonstrations (No.16)

Children's parades to present gifts to children of martyrs, prisoners, and deportees (No.17)

Marches and demonstrations (No.20)

Seminars, exhibitions, and other activities celebrating the Palestinian national heritage (No.20)

Olive-picking campaigns (No.27)

Demonstrations after prayers on Fridays and Sundays (No.27)

Such calls were in addition to calls which organized other kinds of activities. An official statement was read over *Al-Quds* radio on 28 May, 1988 which outlined the strategy of Civil Disobedience, or measures to be used to disengage from Occupation

[419]Strikes were "highly visible" in terms of their effects: the streets were empty, the shops closed. Indeed, as Tamari notes, "the commercial strike became the most visible daily feature of the uprising" (p. 164).

Authorities.[420] Again, measures of civil disobedience were introduced much earlier than this. For example, in three early communiques, one finds:

> Communique No.3 (18 January): people were called upon to boycott Israeli chocolates, dairy products, cigarettes, and other products having Palestinian equivalents;
>
> Communique No.5 (around 28 January): workers were called upon to continue their work boycott of Israeli projects; merchants were called upon to prepare for battling the VAT tax;
>
> Communique No.9 (2 March): merchants, artisans, and professionals were advised to pay no more taxes to Israel and all workers in the Civil Administration and police were asked to resign forthwith.

The official statement on 28 May, however, gave what had gone before significance in terms of UNLU policy. Further, it lay out the hardships which would be borne through Israeli retaliation and outlined the responsibilities of the Palestinian people in meeting such retaliation. The "constitutional" impact of such communiques was, therefore, to provide a definition of national identity within a context of visible resistance oriented towards achieving national independence.

Legitimacy. In existing constitutions, legitimacy is assured by means of process: the document spells out how its political leadership, both executive and legislative, is to be selected from among the people, and how change in such leadership is to be engineered. For the UNLU, the notion of process was, likewise a crucial issue, although the communiques mirrored this understanding rather than served as a blueprint for it. The

[420]"Uprising Issues 'Civil Disobedience' Statement." FBIS-NES-88-105, 1 June, 1988, pp. 2-3.

UNLU itself reflected the political, rather than the social, elements of Palestinian leadership:

> When you speak of the UNLU, you are only talking about four people: one from each party. I know, I was one of these. There would have been more credibility to the 'leadership,' perhaps, if 'parties' would have been set aside, and the representatives come from different 'regions,' taking advantage of the leadership which society itself had produced. This formula of four was a reflection of the outside Palestinians: the PLO.[421]

It was necessary, as far as national leadership was concerned, that legitimacy be tied with the grassroots organizations. The crucial linkage for this -- in terms of decision-making -- was the phenomenon of the "popular committees," which embodied the "social leadership," discussed in Chapter 3.

Legitimacy as Process: Decision-Making. Popular committees arose as a means to meet the everyday demands of the Intifada. For example, when the Israeli government closed schools and universities, popular committees sprang up in the refugee camps, the towns, and the villages to organize "popular education" for the children. The political factions did not operate at this social level. "In fact," as an activist from a West Bank refugee camp testifies, "I come from Dheisheh Camp. It is not necessary that any members of the popular committees from my camp are even members of factional political groups."[422] The popular committees, each focused on different tasks, were

[421]Personal interview with a former UNLU member, in East Jerusalem, 8 August, 1992.

[422]Personal interview with L, an organizer and member of the PFLP, at the National Palace Hotel in East Jerusalem, 14 August, 1992.

elected democratically in the refugee camps, and would change membership as the activities changed.[423]

The decision-making process involved in selecting the Calls to Action, or the two-week agenda published in each communique, involved direct communication between leaders of the popular committees throughout the OT with regional factional representatives which then communicated with the UNLU, itself. In essence, the decisions both arose from and were received by, the people, themselves. This paradoxical element of 'leadership' is explained as follows by one who was directly involved, and was substantiated in other contexts by others:

> First of all, who decides those activities is the UNLU and its branches in all the districts. But we must understand that this UNLU is not separated from the masses. The UNLU lives with the masses, it knows their circumstances, how they think, and any submission for a framework for those activities, will be taking into account the mood of those masses. Of course, we are talking here about the UNLU and its branches, which is embodied in the popular committees that have been developed during the Intifada. So, the masses must not only receive the instructions, but they must be the basic source for those instructions.[424]

The knowledge of this by the people, extended legitimacy to UNLU decisions. In publishing the bi-monthly calendar of actions in the communiques, the UNLU was acknowledging this relationship publicly, and the communiques came to be the written evidence of a legitimately conceived governing body, albeit restricted in the range of its actions by the policies of the Israeli military command.

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[423]Personal interview with AB, in East Jerusalem, 8 August, 1992.

[424]Personal interview with N, DFLP activist and member of UNLU network, in East Jerusalem, 21 July, 1992.

This is not to say that the lines of authority were always clear within the UNLU, a fact which might be expected in a popularly-mandated process and in an environment wherein open "leadership" carried with it great risk. There are two Communique No.10's, for example. In both language and substance, they are similar, but one was published 10 March, 1988 and the other, a day later, 11 March, 1988. According to sources, Fatah leaders claimed the first version was published by the Communist Party and PFLP delegates, prematurely, while the leaflet was still under discussion. Two points in the first version were changed with the release of the second version. In the preamble of the first, the following statement occurs: "We acclaim those freedom-loving people and those progressive forces in Israel, who have supported us. ." The second version deletes "Israel" by name: "the United National Command also extends its appreciation to all the free of the world and the peace and freedom-loving forces and the position of democratic and progressive Jewish forces which stood . . beside our struggle . . ." And, to mitigate the effects of recognizing support from Jewish quarters, notes along the margins acknowledge that Fatah and the DFLP added the following: "the total solidarity of our people in Nazareth, Galilee, the Triangle, the Negev, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip and in all its diaspora is an obvious clue as to the unity of destiny, future, and struggle. . . ."

A more substantive point of difference, however, occurred within the actual "Calls." Regarding the seventh item in the list of Communique No.10, one notes the following differences between the versions:

> *Version 1:* The struggle against the army, settlers, collaborators, and Jordanian supporters must be continued. We applaud the efforts of our

people against those who collaborate with Israel and Jordan, which has forced some to renounce their collaboration. We call upon those members of the Jordanian parliament who were appointed by King Hussein to resign. If they do not, they will forfeit the right to remain in our country.

Version 2: The people are to strengthen their hold against the Occupation army, its settlers, collaborators, and men of the Jordanian regime.

According to one source, Fatah asked why the UNLU should start a fight with Jordan before the time was ready -- thus, the second version pared this call down. From further notes pencilled in on the communique, is the suggestion that there were also disagreements between *inside* and *outside* elements of several factions in the process of drafting Communique No. 10.

That such confusion was held to a minimun, testifies to the importance which the UNLU placed on the necessity for achieving concensus in the release of its official statements. This awareness is particularly striking in light of past efforts of an *inside* leadership at working together.[425] This history was in fact, exploited by the Israelis, who published false leaflets or "forgeries" under the name of the UNLU. Such attempts at fracturing the unity of Palestinians within the OT operated at several levels. One obvious one was to provide a competing calendar of events, which would destroy the sense of solidarity in the Calls to Action. Another, more subtle, played upon genuine differences in allegiances or agendas of the various factions. *FACTS Weekly Review* published a warning ("Spot the Difference") in one of its newsletters:[426]

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[425]Ibrahim Dakkak, "Back to Square One," pp. 64-101. See especially, pp. 85-86, in which he describes the functioning of the National Guidance Committee II.

[426]*FACTS Weekly Review*, October 16-29, 1988, p. 4.

> Regularly over the past year, fake communiques have also been distributed which impersonate the UNLU. These are assumed to be produced and distributed by the Israeli secret service in an attempt to mislead and confuse the population.
>
> Below is an excerpt from the latest communique from the Israeli secret service. Soldiers were seen throwing bundles of the communiques into the streets.

In the fake Communique 20, the leadership salutes Hosni Mubarak, "the President of the biggest arab country," Sadam Hussein of Iraq, "the eastern gate of the arab world," and King Hussein of Jordan, "the door to hope in the battle for victory." While Palestinians in the OT have long viewed Saddam Hussein as a liberator, they sting at the mention of Egypt, which betrayed their interests at Camp David, and resent Hussein's attempts as spokesperson for Palestinian aspirations. Additionally, the fake communique declares that the UNLU will act on its own if the PNC (legislature of the PLO) refuses to act on resolutions which support *inside* interests -- a clear attempt to exacerbate tensions between the internal and external leadership.

Clearly the legitimacy of the UNLU -- as a symbolic institution -- is demonstrated by the continued release of communiques which reflect/promote interests of Palestinians engaged in the Intifada. Further, the very fact that the leadership (while frequently undergoing change due to imprisonment, deportations, etc.) is able to continue publishing coherent statements and leaflets which reflect a measure of consensus, attests to the legitimacy -- or the perception of such legitimacy -- held by the "governing body" in the eyes of its constituents.

Legitimacy as Outcome: Policy-Making. In addition to making decisions and outlining actions which people listened to and followed, the leadership was also required

to shape such policy as events dictated. The fluid nature of this process did create problems for "legitimacy." One reflection of this is the fact that two months after the Communique No.10's were released, two Communique No.17's were issued, one on 21 May, 1988 and one a day or two later, and broadcast over *Al-Quds* 24 May, 1988. The first bore the signature of, "the PLO, the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising in the Occupied Territories," while the second, addressed to the "Children of the Stones," carried no signature. In this instance, the communiques are very different from one another, not only in language and tone, but in the calendar of Calls as well. The first carries the sensibilities of Palestinians living through the Intifada, not unlike other communiques released through this point in time, while the second is more terse and decidedly linear in its formulation. Importantly, its focus is directed not toward managing life inside the OT, but toward the outside -- the international arena. Notes in the margins of the second -- and "suspect" --- communique, question whether its authorship was in fact located within the UNLU. One West Bank political analyst cited the two Communique 17's as evidence of a "coup d'etat," or a takeover of the policy-making machinery from without. Is this the only evidence, or does an analysis of other communiques of this period support such a claim?

An assessment of other communiques, particularly beginning with Communique No.15 (30 April, 1988) would indeed tend to support this. In addition to tone and content, a more simple "index" might be used, that being the number of references to the "PLO," "PNC," "Mr. 'Arafat," etc. The early communiques, developed from within the OT acknowledged the role of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of all

Palestinians, usually through a single reference in the preamble. Israel was, after all, attempting to factionalize the Palestinians, and to separate Palestinian voices inside from those outside the OT -- for this reason alone, the local UNLU was careful to open no cracks for Israeli manipulation. In Communiques No.1-14, the average number of references to the PLO is *one*. With Communique No.15 there is a subtle change in tone and perspective and in the number of references to the PLO itself. Five or six paragraphs focus on external, international issues and speak of "thwarting the U.S.-reactionary conspiratorial schemes;" of the "joint Soviet-Palestinian agreement to render successful the convening of an international conference;" of the "UN Security Council Resolution No. 605;" of the "Palestinian, Algerian, Libyan, and Soviet efforts;" of using "Syria to embody a relationship of militant alliance with the PLO;" and of "the sons of our steadfast people in the Lebanese arena."[427] By contrast, in Communique No.13 (10 April, 1988) there is a single paragraph, which states in fairly indefinite terms, "Now we can feel the increase in the international support of our cause and of our legitimate rights." Moreover, Communique No. 15 makes reference to the "PLO" a total of seven times and mentions "Brother Abu 'Ammar" (Yasir Arafat) by name; Communique No.13 refers to the "PLO" twice, and makes no mention of "Arafat."[428] Communique No.16

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[427]"'Uprising' Call No. 15 Outlines Protest Days," FBIS-NES-88-085, 3 May, 1988, pp. 5-6.

[428]It must be noted that Communique No. 12 does cite the PLO at least five times, but in conjunction with the condemnation of Schultz's Middle East tour, during which Schultz attempted to find "more moderate" spokespeople (than the PLO) for the Palestinians. It is entirely in character that Palestinians within the OT should show vocal support for the PLO in this regard.

(11 May, 1988) refers to the "PLO" no less than ten times, in conjunction with phrases such as: "The originator of our struggle, the PLO;" "the presence of the PLO and the continuation of the Palestinian struggle within its framework;" "declaring the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people everywhere" (stated twice in the communique); "through a commitment to the PLO;" "toward developing the unity of the PLO;" and "to realize a national consensus within the PLO." There seems to be a clear attempt at bolstering the position of the PLO vis-a-vis the events -- the Intifada -- within the OT, perhaps with the intention of wresting the internal policy-making function from the UNLU, by factional representatives on the outside. This trend of more frequent references to both the "PLO" and "Mr. Arafat" continues as does the change in tone, which has been discussed earlier in this chapter.

If the Intifada was already being effectively managed from "within," why would the leadership in Tunis intervene directly? In the past -- prior to the Intifada -- the PLO had spoken for all Palestinians, but had often taken its policy cues from "inside." Dakkak explains:

> Whatever decision is taken outside, whether by Arafat or [King] Hussein, if it finds no response with the people in the OT, then it falls down. Conversely, anything which arises with high consensus cannot be refused from the outside [PLO]. For example, with regard to Camp David, the PLO response to the Autonomy Plan was ambivalent; there was a conference [of the "inside" leadership] in Jerusalem which said, 'No!' The next day the PLO adopted that: it could not do otherwise.[429]

[429]Personal interview with Ibrahim Dakkak, 25 July, 1992 at his home in East Jerusalem.

And, while Tunis was concerned, in the early months of the Intifada, that the initiative had been taken from within the (hierarchical) PLO organization, the external leadership was also aware that the masses, under the guidance of the UNLU, had been able to sustain something their leadership alone, had been unable to manage from outside the OT. Neither the Patriotic Front nor the National Guidance Committee, for example, both of which had been spawned from within and both of which had been linked through the leadership of the political factions to the PLO, had been able to ignite an effective Intifada a decade earlier. Hence, the first priority was to support what was obviously working. Moreover, the PLO had not been altogether excluded from the decision-making process. If the duality embodied in the release of the two Communique No.17's, then, could be seen as an attempt of policy take-over from abroad, why would it have occurred at this time?

By the summer of 1988, the following had occurred within the Palestinian camp in response to the Intifada:[430]

> 50 Palestinians had been deported or had been issued deportation orders
>
> International phone lines from the OT had been cut (and were not reconnected until 9 January, 1989)
>
> Gaza had been declared "closed" to the press; in East Jerusalem four newspaper editors had been placed under house arrest
>
> All educational facilities had been closed
>
> Abu Jihad, Arafat's second-in-command, had been assassinated in Tunis (16 April)

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[430]For a more complete chronology, see "Appendix B: Chronology of Key Dates of the Uprising," in JMCC's *The Stone*, pp. 63-65.

> By August, the popular committees had been declared "illegal" and hundreds of people had been arrested

This was a stark reality for the Intifada to face. The OT was effectively isolated from the rest of the world, the internal communications network was forced underground, and the deportations and arrests represented a masssive decapitation of the legitimate leadership. As one individual acknowledged, under such conditions, "if someone would write a leaflet . . . it would be accepted, but no one was sure of the credentials of the author. The leadership was perceived as being weaker."[431]

While UNLU legitimacy was thus being threatened by Israeli policies, and the arena for discourse within the OT was being effectively shut down, the Intifada itself had sparked activities abroad. The Moscow Summit between Reagan and Gorbachev was scheduled for May, 1988; then-U.S. Secretary of State George Schultz was on tour of Israel and the Middle

East to rally support for the U.S. peace plan; at the Arab Summit in Algiers (3 June, 1988), PLO spokesperson, Bassam Abu Sharif presented a document entitled *Prospects of a Palestine-Israeli Settlement* which endorsed a two-state solution; and on 31 July, 1988 King Hussein abrogated "all legal and administrative ties" with the West Bank, and stated his "willingness to step aside for the PLO."

Hence, precisely at the moment when the continuation of a legitimate leadership was most in question within the OT, the need for such leadership -- not only for maintaining the struggle during very difficult times, but also for enabling the political

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[431]Personal interview with R.S. in East Jerusalem, 17 August, 1992.

gains of the Intifada to be realized on the international stage -- was absolutely paramount. If the Communique No.17 puzzle does represent a coup d'etat by the external PLO, it would seem a concern both to continue the resistance and to press for international support would be grounds for such intervention.

Moreover, the killing of Abu-Jihad at his home in Tunis by an alleged Israeli military unit (16 April) was seen by all Palestinians as a direct assault upon the Palestinian national enterprise. The Intifada had begun internally, in response to harsh Israeli policies of occupation -- it had not been engineered by the PLO from without. That Israel showed such disregard for the legitimacy of Palestinian grievances as to locate the initiative for the Intifada outside (in the personage of Abu Jihad) and to attempt to quell the entire Palestinian national movement by assassinating its top leadership, only served to reinforce the legitimacy of the PLO leadership in the eyes of the masses within the OT.

It was via the mechanism of the leaflets, however, that this UNLU/PLO legitimacy was maintained within the OT. Policy may have come to be formulated from without (and faxed in), albeit with input from within. Such policy changes acquired credibility with the masses because UNLU legitimacy had already been established, and retained legitimacy as long as PLO-dominated policy took into account the needs of the people inside, people who were daily suffering the costs of the the resistance.

Activists interviewed by this author noted one of two periods which marked significant shifts in the "success" of the Intifada: one such point lay between 12 and 18 months; the other point was identified as being post-Gulf War. The fact that no one

pointed to changes in the success of the communiques within the first year, would seem to attest to the strength of the legitimacy which the UNLU enjoyed via the policies embodied within the communiques. For all sectors, it was most important that the national agenda be advanced. Since the Israelis themselves had deprived the OT of an indigenous Palestinian leadership through their policies of deportation and imprisonment, the massses within were quite willing to allow a leadership from outside, already acknowledged as being the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people in the international arena, to step in during the summer of 1988 and direct policy.

Participation. It is necessary that a democratic formulation of government, grounded in participatory democracy, outline the fundamentals of *participation.* Whether premised upon legislative sovereignty or limited through socially engineered mechanisms of checks and balances, the role of "the people" must be constitutionally defined or the result may be chaos.

The concept of *participation* itself is not easy to define. Popular participation in the Intifada, for instance (a "popular" resistance movement) denotes the involvement of all sectors of Palestinian society in the strikes, the demonstrations, the flying of Palestinian flags, the refusal to pay taxes, etc. The present study would refer to participation of this sort as *mobilization.* It would define *participation* in terms of specifying those people (or categories of people) who share in the process of decision-making. This definition can, itself, be further dichotomized to two operations which can be difficult to separate, but which are technically distinct: "participation" in policy-making -- outlining the agenda for the resistance; and "participation in the implementation

of the national agenda. The difficulty comes in the present study because implementation must often be undertaken in communities isolated from the rest of Palestinian society (a town/village as a declared closed military zone, under curfew, under military siege, etc.) and facing Israeli policies of reprisal unique to a particular time and place. Under such circumstances, implementation often becomes policy-making, itself. This dilemma is not, however, altogether unlike the dilemma faced by other democracies in defining the boundaries between responsibilities resting with local/regional participation and those retained by the central authority. For the Intifada to maintain itself successsfully, an apparent duality in leadership had to be defined in terms of such participation.

Participation as Implementation of UNLU Policies. *The Rise of the Popular Committees.* In the context of the Occupation, under which formal institutions are forbidden, the definition of participation has evolved informally. After the initial shock of the Six Day War of 1967, Palestinians began to act on their own. Women's charities/committees, labor unions, student organizations, professional unions for teachers, lawyers, and doctors, and legal services and human rights groups all grew out of a need for self-help organizations.[432] Denied access to services which the nation-state is expected to provide, Palestinians "participated" as a matter of necessity. Such organizations were largely independent of the political factions and operated at the "social level," which thus made involvement for participants easier:

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[432]See Joost Hiltermann, *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, for an analysis of this process of mobilization.

> The women's committees were more open than the political groups, for instance -- you did not have to worry about your political beliefs. It is not as dangerous as joining the trade unions or the political groups. We have 4 or 5 women's groups which affiliate with each of the factions, but they are not *politicized* as such. But it must be said that there is no justification for having 4 or 5 *except* for factionalism.[433]

By 1985, and after eighteen years of life under occupation, Palestinians were linked in networks of self-help organizations which criss-crossed the Territories, and which boasted lists and telephone numbers of their membership.[434]

Such organization is what, in fact, made the Intifada possible. The activating sociopolitical principle of the uprising from the outset was that of popular sovereignty. The Intifada had erupted in *the street*the and was maintained by *the street.* The Israeli military, caught by surprise at the level of mass resistance to its policies,[435] attempted to develop new policy to crush the uprising, but relied initially upon its superior level of force. Such policies included the use of live ammunition,[436] and were structured around

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[433]Personal interview with R.S., a women's rights activist, 17 August, 1992, at the Jerusalem Hotel, in East Jerusalem.

[434]Zahira Kamal discussed her role in many of these activities which, beginning in the 1970's were largely elitist. A conscious effort was made from the early 1980's, however, to enlarge the scope of such activities to include grassroots participants. Kamal is also a political activist, but stressed that her role in committees and organizations was "outside" the political arena, although "linkage" is inevitable in this setting: "Of course, people know who I am and what my [political] concerns are." Personal interview, 7 August, 1992 at her home, near Jerusalem.

[435]Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's initial comment: "[There is] no cause for concern . . . There is nothing new in this . . ." *The Guardian*, 22 December, 1987 (quoted in JMCC's *The Stone*, p. 26); and the IDF Assistant Chief of Operations Brig. Gen. Giora Rom declared in *Ha'aretz*, 9 May, 1988 that, "the IDF was taken by surprise by the uprising in the territories," (quoted in JMCC's *The Stone*, p. 85).

[436]By 31 July, 1999, nearly 300 Palestinians had been killed, 77% by bullet wounds. *FACTS, Towards a State*, p. 157.

(then-Defense Minister) Yitzhak Rabin's "merciless policy,"[437] which involved "the deployment of a massive military presence of crack troops in particularly sensitive areas, and of 'going after organizers' through the use of extensive arrests and administrative detention, accompanied by the threat of mass deportations."[438] Additionally, the "policy of might, power, and beatings,"[439] was introduced, and the curfew -- an IDF measure utilized throughout the Occupation -- was imposed as a collective punishment in response to a variety of Palestinian actions.[440] Once the euphoria of the initial successes of the Intifada -- as reflected by the severity of the Israeli response -- began to wear off, a test of reality began for Palestinians living in the OT.

Under increasingly harsh conditions there were two priorities for individual Palestinians: 1) survival, both for oneself and for one's family and neighbors, and 2) maintaining a struggle which increasingly carried great risk both for participants and for their families. The latter, of course (survival of the Intifada) depended upon the former (survival of individual Palestinians). Many communities in the small towns, villages, and refugee camps found themselves facing Israeli reprisals in isolation and responded by forming popular committees, patterned after the self-help groups that had held communities together throughout the 20-year occupation.

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[437]*Jerusalem Post*, 23 December, 1987, as quoted in JMCC's *The Stone*, p. 28.

[438]JMCC, *The Stone*, p. 28.

[439]Yitzhak Rabin, *Jerusalem Post*, 20 January, 1988, as quoted in JMCC's *The Stone*, p. 28.

[440]One source has estimated that every Palestinian living under Occupation "has spent an averate of ten weeks under in-house curfew." JMCC, *The Stone*, p. 35.

Case-Study of Idna.[441] Idna is a village of approximately 15,000 inhabitants, located southwest of Jerusalem, and situated close to the border with Israel. It is a poor community, many villagers working as day-wage laborers in Israel, and others involved in small-scale agriculture. When the Intifada broke out, there were branches of two trade unions in the village and a volunteer work committee. Following are excerpts from entries for the first days and weeks of the Intifada:

> From the first days of the uprising the people of Idna followed with great interest the confrontations in Gaza and Balata [refugee] camp, and the attacks by settlers in Beitillo and Deir Ammar. Heated discussions were held in the village over the significance of the events, and villagers waited for workers to return in the evening so they could read about new developments in the newspapers.
>
> The uprising began in Idna on 20th December when a large group of young people erected stone barricades at the northern and southern approaches to the village, just before an Israeli army patrol was due to arrive on its daily rounds. . . soldiers immediately called for reinforcements and a clash with the villagers began. . . Live ammunition and teargas were fired into the crowd.[442]

This initial period of struggle between the villagers and the military continued for weeks, the village laborers maintaining a strike against working in Israel -- despite the fact that several Israeli employers returned with buses and the army and tried to force the workers to return to their jobs in Israel. Israeli military helicopters were called to the scene and fired barrages of teargas grenades into the village. Fierce clashes with the soldiers continued almost daily, and soldiers chased stone-throwing youths into their homes,

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[441]Excerpts from "The Idna Diary," a diary kept by the villagers, chronicling the first months of the Intifada, and included in FACTS, *Towards a State*, pp. 22-30.

[442]Ibid., p. 23.

smashing doors and windows to gain entry, then destroying furniture, dishes, and other property when they failed to apprehend the boys, many of whom had already escaped. Villagers were beaten inside their homes, and soldiers emptied foodstuffs such as flour, salt, and sugar onto the floor and scuffled the mixture together with their boots.

By mid-January, the village had established a number of popular committees which devised tactics for confronting the army, minimizing injuries to the villagers, and defending the village through an open, but contentious, process:

> Popular committee formation was not easy -- there was a wide range of opinion about how they should function and what they should do. Some saw their function as being restricted to organizing confrontations with the army. Others proposed a broader function including the provision of various community services.
>
> Discussions were carried out in a democratic spirit, with the participation of a large proportion of the village. Following these debates, the following committees were formed:
>
> * defense committees (for guarding the village)
> * a food supply committee
> * a strike committee
> * neighborhood committees
> * mobilization committees
> * a publicity committee
>
> The various committees were coordinated by a central committee called, "The Committee for the Leadership of the Struggle." This committee keeps the people informed about the latest news of the uprising and political developments . . . committee members also make regular nightly visits to the defense committees.[443]

The concern of the Palestinian leadership both within and from abroad, was that the popular movement itself would lapse into anarchy and burn itself out if based only

[443]Ibid., pp. 24-25.

loosely upon popular participation. Hundreds of Palestinian towns, villages, and camps, scattered throughout Gaza and the West Bank, structured their daily lives -- as did Idna -- by means of their popular committees. Such committees were organized democratically, were specialized, and were responsive to the demands peculiar to life around them. Their very flexibility enabled them to counter Israeli policies as they arose. From a tactical standpoint, however, this meant that while a thousand separate loci of resistance could stretch the capacity of the Israeli Military Administration -- to the advantage of the Palestinians -- it also meant that the Palestinian national enterprise could itself face dismemberment when these small organizational centers were placed under orders of military closure and thus isolated from one another. The necessity for the national leadership was to coordinate not only certain universally observed actions/measures to promote genuine public solidarity (strikes which would be observed throughout the OT on specific days, for example), but also to develop a strategy of resistance which would knit the resistance together, moving it beyond street demonstrations. Obviously, this required a measure of centralized planning. At the same time, the UNLU had to show genuine support for the decision-making capacity of the popular committees at the local community level, a local leadership which was forced to improvise in unpredictable circumstances and not infrequently, was isolated totally even from the neighboring villages.[444]

[444]For example, in Idna one night at 11:00 P.M. on 15 February, 2000 soldiers "shot their way into the village, backed up by helicopters and flares." Again, on 24 March, 2500 soldiers invaded the village and set up camp in a local school. On 7 March, Idna was declared a 'closed military area.' No one was allowed to enter or leave the village for 21 days, electricity to the village was cut off, and no food supplies were allowed into

It was through its publication of the communiques that the UNLU was able to effect this task. First, through recognition of the popular committees as part of the leadership structure, and secondly, through specific calls which directed the popular comittees to assume responsibility for developing and implementing new policies.

Recognition of the Role of the Popular Committees. Recognition of the role of the popular committees in sustaining the resistance was not given grudgingly. When the UNLU stepped in to shape the Intifada a month after it had begun, it was more concerned with mobilizing all sectors of Palestinian society than with challenging the already effective grassroots leadership. As described earlier, the decision-making process operated loosely from bottom-to-top in the initial stages of the Intifada, the UNLU reaching concensus regarding the language and calls of the communiques after receiving suggestions from the popular committees. The popular leadership was therefore established as an integral part of the process from the beginning.

Reflecting this, reference to the popular committees in the communiques of the first six months is sparing and is utilitarian in tone: the popular committees implemented, at the local level, the policies published by the UNLU (policies which they had already helped establish). While discrete groups within the population were being mobilized through the rhetorical use of language ("Brother Workers," "Brother Shopkeepers," etc.), Communique No.1 merely appends a "General Statement" for the popular organizations as the closing paragraph:

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the community. Ibid., pp. 27-29.

> All members of popular committees and uprising committees in various worksites must work at giving people a hand in anything they need, especially to needy families.

In Communique No.3, the UNLU defers to the local leadership for policy implementation:

> We call on all the committees of national work and popular committees to declare a general strike starting on Tuesday January 19, 1988 until Friday evening January 22, 1988.

The popular committees are recognized as a fact of the peoples' lives and are called on with respect to implementation. When, in Communique No.9 (2 March) the UNLU asks the people to establish "centers for donations," this is to be done under the supervision of the popular committees. As life becomes more complex with the resignations of many Palestinians (police, tax officials, etc.) employed by the Civil Administration, the people are urged in Communique No.11 (19 March) to "continue forming popular committees in every site, city, village, camp, or street to be the arm of the united command across the homeland." And when Days of General Steps of Struggle are ordered in Communique No.12 (2 April), the popular committees and the striking forces are asked to take the lead.

Recognition of the role of the popular committees by the national leadership, at least as evidenced in the communiques, is thus never a problem with regard to their role in the implementation of UNLU policies, at the local level. What one sees clearly with regard to "policy-making," through the communiques, however, is UNLU dominance in this area of national leadership. In all official UNLU communiques, it is the UNLU (by name) which lays out the policy of resistance, and whatever the informal decision-making process, officially it is the popular committees which implement what the national leadership outlines.

Participation as Policy-Making

Control of Policy-Making. a) Under Grassroots Leadership. To parry any concern among the people that the UNLU is wresting control from the popular committees (remember, the Intifada was sparked from *the street*), Communique No. 5 meets the question head-on in the first month of UNLU leadership:

> The general commercial strike will continue until the gains of the uprising are achieved. In this context we point to the fact that the command of the uprising is coordinating with popular committees and merchants' committees to specify certain hours (three hours a day) when shops are allowed to open their doors.

The UNLU thus sidesteps the problem of "legitimacy" by allowing the popular committees themselves to organize actions within the local or neighborhood setting, where the local leadership is respected. Further, in respecting the autonomy of the popular committees, the UNLU found that the national policies could be adapted for the local setting and thus observed universally, promoting Palestinian solidarity, UNLU legitimacy, and the effectiveness of the continued Intifada resistance against the Occupation. The local leadership could decide, for instance, which three hours in the day the shops would be open: what was important was that the commercial strike itself was observed. The popular committees of individual communities even published their own communiques occasionally to organize other actions locally, and published, sometimes jointly as the "Popular Committees of the Uprising," communiques which bore the number of the UNLU communique and which either comment upon that communique or emphasize the key points to be observed. In these communiques (eg., Communique No.41, 22 August, 1988), in contrast with those issued by the UNLU, paragraphs initiating an appeal all

begin with the phrase: "The leadership of the popular and national committees of the uprising . . . calls/lauds/stresses/urges . . .," and refrain from mentioning the UNLU by name -- which safeguards them from accusations of trying to compete with the national leadership. Instructions for day-to-day activities emanating from such local directives are more specific and focus on local concerns, such as the inclusion of a paragraph (in No.24) on "Winter crops," which asks people to plant cereals, chickpeas, broadbeans, garlic, and other crops which could be easily stored (and thus utilized when the village was under curfew or military siege).

As recounted in an earlier section, several changes occurred in April and May of the first year: Abu Jihad's death (17 April, 1988), the publication of the official strategy of Civil Disobedience, and an apparent shake-up in leadership, or a take-over from *outside* the OT. Life was becoming more difficult for Palestinians *inside* -- many workers had quit jobs within Israel, strikes were an ongoing feature of life, mass arrests and detentions left families fragmented, and curfews, house sealings or demolitions, and other kinds of collective punishment left people without shelter, food, water, and electricity. The actions of the popular committees began to be crucial for survival. Further, as the tactics of civil disobedience became more formalized (the "official agenda"), more and more specialized committees were required to implement the policies. In essence, the second stage of the Intifada was dawning, and *mobilization*, within the context of the popular struggle was being redefined. Going into the streets was often not possible due to the increased presence of the Israeli military, but it also was not enough. Communiques released during the remainder of the year reflect a more open reliance upon

the role of the popular committees, especially with regard to developing new policies at the local level to effect the broader goals of the national agenda. It must also be remarked, however, that if the communiques were being written from *outside* the OT, the reliance of this "new" UNLU/PLO leadership formulation upon the popular committees was one of necessity. The new leadership voice, as discussed earlier, reflected a more broadly conceived national policy, one which placed the Intifada in an international context, and was compelled by both the scope of its agenda and its distance from the theater of events, to rely upon the actions of the popular committees to maintain the Intifada on the front lines.

Communique No.19[445] (6 June, 1988) outlines the many achievements of the Intifada's first six months in effecting disengagement from occupation rule. Such successes, due to "the militant program and resolutions of the uprising's popular and national committees," have led the Palestinians to the "threshold of a new phase of the struggle -- the phase of full-scale disobedience." Within this new agenda, the communique cites the uprising's popular and national committees as urging immediate resignation of ALL people employed by the Civil Administration (including employees in the departments concerning police, taxes, housing, ID registration, birth registration, etc.), the boycott of Israeli goods, the withholding of tax payments, supporting industrial development, and so forth. In the specific Calls to Action, 13 June is set aside for

[445]UNLU Communique No. 19, in "Al-Quds Radio Carries 'Uprising' Call No. 19," FBIS-NES-88-110, 8 June, 1988, pp. 9-11.

"strengthening the building of the power of the people," which involves, "the formation and the spread of popular and specialized committees in all areas."

In support of this, Communique No.20 (22 June) designated 4 July as a day to "strengthen the formation of popular committees . . .," and Communique No.22 (21 July) broadens this commitment even further:

> The UNLU . . . emphasizes . . . [t]he importance of continuing to set up popular committees and support them by rallying around them, seeking their help in solving all problems, and backing their implementation of their programs, *considering them the people's alternative authority to the occupation authority's organs and appointed committees.*[446] [Italics mine.]

b) Effects of Israeli Reprisals. Within a month, Israel had reacted to the threat which the popular committees posed to Israeli authority. On 18 August, 1988, in an attempt to destroy the Intifada's infrastructure, the Israeli military command had declared the popular committees illegal. A new policy of mass arrests was undertaken by the military, with the accusation of membership in a popular committee being enough to send a person to six months in the Negev prison camp. Other institutions were also closed down, including the Union of Charitable Societies, and the Professional Association Complex.[447] By the end of August,

> [A]t least twenty-four unions had been closed by military order, as well as the three labor federations in Nablus, which itself housed six local unions. Most of the remaining unions closed their own doors, fearing army reprisals.[448]

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[446]UNLU Communique No. 22, FBIS-NES-88-142, 25 July, 1988, p.4.

[447]"Chronology of the Uprising," in Nassar and Heacock's *Intifada*, p. 321.

[448]Joost Hiltermann, "The Role of the Working Class," in Nassar and Heacock's *Intifada*, p. 149.

Such organizations had always operated informally, however, so the ban had little effect on the role of the popular committees. The assumption of Israeli authorities was that the popular committees were being funded by the PLO, and with the Jordanian announcement on 31 July that it was severing all its administrative ties with the West Bank, Israel wanted to prevent the PLO from stepping in to take Jordan's place. The PLO was not, however, funding these organizations -- they were entirely of grassroots origin.[449] Moreover, most Palestinians were loyal to the PLO, and would not have had to be "bought" with PLO resources.[450] A *FACTS* Editorial, responding to the Military Order banning the popular committees and other institutions, points to the shortcomings of the new policy:

> In all probability Rabin would like to take some well-publicized steps to close down the popular committees, but of course he cannot: they [committees] do not have convenient offices to seal, filing cabinets to raid, *and almost everybody belongs to them.* So he has apparently settled for any independent Palestinian institutions which he can lay his hands on. [Italics mine.]
>
> The real irony is that if Israel continues to systematically close all community service institutions, while the government has all but collapsed . . . then the people will be left with no option but to organize things for themselves . . . [and] in the end, *only* the popular committees will be left.[451]

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[449]A member of the UNLU explained: "The PLO wasn't very comfortable with this [internal leadership]. They refused to spend money in the popular committees, for instance, saying, 'We don't know who these people are.'" Personal interview in East Jerusalem, 8 August, 1992.

[450]*FACTS Weekly Review*, No. 23, August 21-27, 1988, Editorial, p. 1.

[451]Ibid.

That these committees continued to play a crucial role both in organizing and implementing policy throughout half of the second year, is evident by the kinds of references made to them in the communiques. In Communique No.32 (7 January, 1989) three entire paragraphs are devoted to the popular committees, calling on "all strugglers . . . to safeguard the unity of the local leadership and the popular committees;" to plan a "mammoth popular demonstration" during the period of each call; to supervise, by means of the specialized committees, the boycott of Israeli goods "to which there are alternatives from our national products," such as: foodstuffs, detergents, furniture, cigarettes, agricultural products, etc.; to form popular courts to try "thieves, agents, and brokers who encroach on people's rights;" and finally, of the need for carrying our cooperative projects at the local level to expand land investment, the independent local economy, and supervision of the supply and storage of goods to protect people during curfews, strikes, and times of siege.[452]

References to the "popular committees" in subsequent communiques, are more sparing, but actions of specific groups (factory owners, workers, "our brave merchants," education committees, youth committees, lawyers, etc.) are acknowledged and encouraged, so it can be assumed that such local organization was ongoing, but not "over-administered" from *outside*. Specific references to the popular committees, themselves, include:

> Communique No.34 (12 February) in which the UNLU "praises the positive initiative of the popular committees and strike groups in the

[452]UNLU Communique No. 32, FBIS-NES-89-005, 9 January, 1989, p. 10.

> Nablus areas," and calls on the masses "to further form popular committees for guards, education, supply, and relief in all areas . . ."[453]
>
> Communique No.39 (1 May) in which the UNLU "values the steps taken to create unified sectoral councils, and urges the formation of more such councils so that increasing numbers of our people may be organized and enlisted in the battle for independence."[454]
>
> Communique No.41 (12 June) in which the Unified National Leadership "stresses . . . working very eagerly toward uniting the popular committees . . . and expanding these committees . . . [which] should be considered as basic and indispensible for promoting the Intifada. . ."[455]

c) Under External Leadership. The latter communique (No.41), hints at a reorganization in the center of policy-making. The designation "UNLU" (the name selected at the beginning of the uprising by the internal Palestinian leadership) is abruptly discarded at this point and is not reinstated. Call No.41 was issued by "the Unified National Leadership in the Occupied Homeland." Three weeks later, Call No.42 is issued by "the Unified National Leadership of the Intifada, the PLO's militant arm." Call No.43 (25 July, 1989) is issued by "the PLO-Unified National Leadership of the Intifada in the State of Palestine." From this point on, the official name becomes the UNLI: the Unified National Leadership of the Intifada.

As with the change noted in June, 1988 regarding the competing Communique No.17's, when the UNLU appeared to be taken over by leadership *outside* the OT (the PLO) and new trends in both the focus and language could be noted, the adoption of a

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[453]UNLU Communique No. 34, FBIS-NES-89-028, 13 February, 1989, p. 14.

[454]UNLU Communique No. 39, *FACTS Weekly Review*, No. 41 (April 23-29), pp. 4-8.

[455]UNL Communique No. 41, FBIS-NES-89-113, 14 June, 1989, p. 2.

new name by the national leadership in July, 1989 (without explanation) is also accompanied by other changes. The most outstanding is an apparent shift to the political "right," a movement away from "participation" as it has been employed here, and towards a more centralized an hierarchical system of authority. Emphasis is placed upon "solidarity," "standardizing slogans," "smoothing over factional differences," "discipline" regarding one's actions, acting only with the backing of a "national concensus," and undertaking no initiatives "without a central decision by the higher command." Examples are:

> Communique No.44 (15 August)[456] - the UNLI:
>
> ...sees radicalization and intensification of the intifadah as the only route for its continuation ...calls for increased social solidarity and launching solidarity funds
>
> ...calls for external differences to be smoothed over
>
> ...calls for standardizing national slogans
>
> ...calls for the need to maintain cohesion and to work to resolve any problems through the established channels and the higher eschelons
>
> Communique No.45 (5 September)[457] - the UNLI:
>
> ...let the September call be a call for unity
>
> ...we reiterate the need for all the cadres of the strike forces and the popular committees to abide by discipline for fear of confusion
>
> ...[to] the *popular and unity-seeking committees*: the UNLI calls for working as soon as possible out of a unity-oriented perspective [italics mine]
>
> Communique No.47 (15 October)[458] - the UNLI:
>
> ...emphasizes to the masses of our people the critical nature of the current political phase and the enemies' attempts ... to divide the ranks

[456]UNLI Communique No. 44, FBIS-NES-89-159, 18 August, 1989, pp. 2-3.

[457]UNLI Communique No. 45, FBIS-NES-89-171, 6 September, 1989, pp. 1-4.

[458]UNLI Communique No. 47, FBIS-NES-89-199, 17 October, 1989, pp. 9-11.

Communique No.48 (9 November)[459] the UNLI:

> ...calls for ... consolidation of national unity and enhancement of the state of the popular, national, and sectoral committees
> ...urges everybody to renounce factional, sectarian, and family differences and exert every effort to reinforce national unity among the ranks of our people

In December the third year of the outbreak of the Intifada began. No one -- neither Israelis nor members of the Palestinian national leadership -- had expected this uprising to endure for more than a month or two. It outlasted the Reagan Administration, which viewed the uprising as a part of the terrorist agenda inspired by the PLO. Further, its successes enabled Yassir Arafat to address the United Nations, in spite of U. S. objections, at which time he reiterated Palestinian acceptance of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 (which call for a two-state solution), and renounced terrorism as a weapon by which Palestinians would seek national statehood, legitimizing Palestinian claims in the eyes of much of the world.

But it also thrust the "Palestinian Question" into a broader arena with many contradictions which any Palestinian leadership would be forced to address. The Bush Administration was willing to talk with the PLO and spurred a renewed Middle East Peace Process, the term "process" implying adherence to the *rational* means of achieving one's ends -- and, significantly, compromise. U. S. Secretary of State James Baker encouraged reduced levels of violence if such a process was to move forward and the external PLO leadership was pressured to call upon Palestinians within the OT to limit

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[459]UNLI Communique No. 48, FBIS-NES-89-218, 14 November, 1989, pp. 9-11. This communique heralds the 1st anniversary of the declaration of Palestinian statehood, which took place on 15 November, 1988.

violence. However, the external leadership was well aware that Palestinians inside the OT realized that the very motivation for a Peace Process was the threat of violence.

Further, the Israelis demanded that alternative spokespeople (alternative to the PLO) be empowered to speak for the Palestinians and Baker attempted to find individuals on the West Bank who would act as Palestinian representatives. This was viewed universally within the OT as an attempt by the "West" to fracture Palestinian solidarity which maintained the Intifada.

The Shamir "Peace Initiative," advanced in May, 1989, confirmed Israeli opposition to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, refused negotiations with the PLO, allowed no change in "status" of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and sought to implement Autonomy under the rubric of the Camp David Accords. "Autonomy," a notion which has appealed to U. S. negotiators through three different administrations, is rejected by Palestinians as a policy of window-dressing designed to maintain the status quo. It is a policy under which Palestinians would still be compelled to deal with: the Shin Bet (as Israel retains control over "national security"); a system of justice under which Israeli law is applied unequally to Palestinians; the fact that land would still be subject to confiscation for state purposes, and that economic development would be curtailed by Israeli banking and commerce laws; the fact that administrative detention would remain a reality as would the exile of thousands of Palestinians living in the diaspora.

Finally, as 1989 drew to a close, it was apparent that Gorbachev's Soviet Union -- long a supporter of the Palestinian "revolution" -- was beginning to crack, the policies

of *glasnost* and *perestroika* having fueled popular Soviet expectations to levels not realizable by a decaying political and economic system.

The Intifada as a Stage in the National Struggle.

a) Contention for Leadership. The sum of all these events was unsettling for the Palestinian leadership, long divided by differences as to the means by which to achieve the common ends. The Intifada had become part of a national agenda begun with the Fatah/PLO in 1964, and now included Palestinians within the Diaspora as well as those living within the Homeland. Who was to define Intifada policy?

The first "*coup d'etat,*"[460] a transfer of decision-making power from *inside* to *outside*, seems to have taken place in June, 1988, when the successes of the Intifada thrust the Palestinian issue onto the world stage and (it could be argued), a broader policy-making perspective was necessary. For the following year, however, it appears from the communiques, that decision-making was still encouraged at the local level via the popular committees, in spite of the fact that they were officially banned by Israeli military order.

The second change in command appears to have occurred a year later and reflects an apparent take-over by Fatah. Communique No.43 (25 July, 1989)[461] cites "Fatah" by name in its first paragraph, the first such attribution to occur in the communiques, and continues with such references through two more paragraphs:[462]

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[460]The term used by a political analyst interviewed at Bir Zeit University on 18 August, 1992.

[461]UNLI Communique No. 43, FBIS-NES-89-142, 26 July, 1989, pp. 2-4.

[462]Ibid., p. 2.

> O masses of our heroic people; O masses of the valiant intifadah; O builders of the independent state of Palestine ... while you are about to begin the days of the 21st month of the great intifadah, the Palestine National Liberation Movement -- Fatah -- is making preparations for its fifth congress ...
>
> Fatah had the honor of launching our contemporary revolution through its initiation of armed clashes, as the revolution of our people exploded like a volcano under the feet of the invading occupiers, affirming the permanence of the national struggle ...
>
> On this occasion, the Unified National Leadership, along with the raging masses of our people in the occupied state of Palestine, congratulates all the brothers, strugglers, cadres, and leaders in the Fatah Movement ...

While it is not uncommon for the communiques to acknowledge the independent factions -- and even HAMAS -- from time to time, it would appear that this is a pitch for UNLI legitimacy. Its location at the very beginning of the communique (the section generally reserved for exhortations), its considerable length, and its content all reflect the supremacy of Fatah as the originator of the national liberation struggle. Left unstated, but implied, is the understanding that the Intifada and its popular leadership, while crucial to realizing the national goal of independence, *represent but a stage* in what has been a very long struggle and which was, in fact, inaugurated more than a quarter of a century earlier by Fatah, itself. It is no surprise to read several months later, in Communique No.50 (25 December),[463] that:

> 1 January will be a day of distinguished escalation on the occasion of the anniversary of the Fatah Movement and the Palestinian revolution. On that day, massive demonstrations will be staged. Palestinian flags, slogans, and banners will be raised ...

[463]UNLI Communique No. 50, FBIS-NES-89-247, 27 December, 1989, p. 4.

The anniversary of the PFLP also occurred in December, and was coincident with the beginning of the Intifada. Indeed, a PFLP member explained in a personal interview that it was PFLP organization (in preparation for its 20th anniversary celebration in December, 1987) which facilitated the rapid spread of the Intifada throughout the West Bank.[464] Yet the PFLP drew only a paragraph of support on the second page of Communique No. 49 (4 December),[465] and was not acknowledged as part of the 1 January, 1990 anniversary celebration in Communique No. 50.

b) A Move To The Right. The take-over by Fatah represents efforts to restrict popular involvement -- participation -- at the decision-making level. *Participation* is here defined as "implementation," the duty of Palestinians in the Homeland being to continue the Intifada in unity. But the sound of this "unity" is not the same as in calls stressing mobilization and unity in the first months of the Intifada. Such calls sought to involve all sectors of society *without regard to political belief*, and in whatever capacity each could contribute to the national goal: the creation of an independent state of Palestine. "Unity" implied unity of commitment and of purpose. Two years later, in the context of the OT, "unity" signifies unity of political beliefs, unity to central authority, unity to standardized slogans.

The two final communiques of 1989[466],[467] demonstrate the move towards

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[464]"The first day of the continuation of the Intifada, there was a demonstration of 3000 people which went to the streets -- originally for another purpose! The celebration of our 20th anniversary as a separate faction." Interview with TAT, in East Jerusalem, 2 August, 1992.

[465]UNLI Communique No. 49, FBIS-NES-89-232, 5 December, 1989, p. 9.

[466]Ibid.

politicization of the process of decision-making. Communique No.50 (25 December) reviews at length the gains of the Intifada and calls upon the masses to continue the uprising, "intensifying its popular character," but proposes no new initiatives. The Calls to Action include calls for boycotts, strikes, continued shop closings, and support for popular education, all tactics developed within the first six months of the Intifada. How new, creative policies are to be generated is unclear. While the UNLI "applauds and greets the *nongovernmental organizations*," the notion of the popular committees seems remote from the concept of "NGO's" [Italics mine]. The entire Call reads:

> The UNLI applauds and greets the nongovernmental organizations and appeals to our masses to support their activities and demonstrations of solidarity with out people's struggle for their legitimate rights.

Clearly, something has changed. Formerly, the people and the popular committees were one and the same, and the people themselves determined democratically the content of those actions. The UNLI now feels it must *appeal* to the people to support such groups. Why? Are they constituted differently at this point? Is the leadership "out of touch"? Communique No.49 (4 December) perhaps speaks to these questions. Tucked in with the calendar of events and assigned as the activity for 17 December *is* something new, at least in terms of the Intifada:

> The 17th of December: A day of completing the formation and construction of *political committees and their specialized committees* in the neighborhoods, villages, and camps to reinforce their role among the masses. [Italics mine]

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[467]UNLI Communique No. 50.

For the sake of "unity," for the sake of controlling a national Palestinian strategy made increasingly complex as it is swept (finally) into the international arena -- an arena itself also being transformed by the dissolution of the East/West tensions -- the UNLI has reverted back to the earlier PLO strategy of imposing political definitions upon activities within the Territories.

Chapter Summary

In retrospect, what did this mean to the popular thrust of the Intifada? Did policies initiated by means of these communiques reflect an arrogant usurpation of power -- or were they part of the dialectic of coping with realities on the ground? Leaders inside the OT identified few clear-cut answers. Almost all offered that the first phase of the Intifada -- which many identified as lasting the first eighteen months -- was the most successful. What made it successful was harmony in decision-making and solidarity at the popular level.

In the beginning the leaflets spoke to the hearts of the people through a language of possibility, calling upon Palestinians from all sectors of society to become involved in shaking off the Occupation in the streets of their own towns, villages, or refugee camps. They were inspired to meet the task of resistance with creativity, forming popular committees by which to organize a broad front of activities at the local level.

Through the use of the leaflets, members of the UNLU also laid the groundwork for democratic processes by creating a "constitutional dialogue" with the people. "We The People" was effected through calls appealing to solidarity of action and the structuring of an agenda by which such action could be realized. Legitimacy of the governing body was achieved through the process by which such calls were derived and by the necessity of turning to the popular committees for leadership at the local level to see policy implemented and, not infrequently, to see policy-making itself, realized. The people followed the "calls" without question and the result was a strong popular movement.

However, there was general agreement among leaders inside that the politicization of the popular committees by the leadership did play a substantial role in changing the nature of the Intifada. As to when this process began, there were a variety of opinions represented by the following:

> The popular committees were formed by the various factions to address certain activities -- they were politicized from the beginning.[468]
>
> All the popular committees were elected democratically ... many of the activities which are affiliated with the various factions began to lobby the UNLU. That is, the UNLU would agree to recognize the popular committees if they would include such and such a person ... In general, this reflected the relationship with the leadership 'outside,' and I would say that the way the leadership outside treated the leadership inside was negative.[469]
>
> After the [Gulf] war, this picture changed: members of the UNLU had no free hand in making decisions. Everything had to go back to the factions.

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[468]Personal interview with ST on 30 July, 1992 in the OT.

[469]Personal interview with GAK, 5 August, 1992, in East Jerusalem.

> It was a cumbersome process of political decision-making: this is what I would call 'politicization,' and it was a negative, not a positive for the Intifada.[470]

There was another set of reasons as to why the role of the popular leadership declined in decision-making, and it relates directly to the new agenda advanced by Fatah. Arafat's UN adddress in December, 1988 accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the idea of a two-state solution. The repercussions of this resonated in the Territories, as these comments illustrate:

> People began to believe that dialogue might be possible with the Israelis ... yes, some [people] were angry; but more at the way the decision was made [without consultation] than with the decision, itself.[471]

> In 1988 there was a split in the leadership -- those who wanted to work out a peace with Israel through negotiations and those who did not: a shift in the *means* of the Intifada, perhaps.[472]

> We started listening to some voices of the Israeli leadership calling for a solution. For example, Rabin, who admitted that it's impossible to conquer the Intifada militarily -- Israel must go to politics to achieve a solution to this issue.[473]

It is clear that "participation" in the sense of decision-making has narrowed considerably since the inception of the Intifada. But what was also clear from interviews with members of the local leadership was that, while this leadership did not surrender its influence voluntarily, blame itself could not be shouldered by the Palestinians, themselves. What truly corrupted the movement as a popular movement, in Palestinian eyes, was the

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[470]Interview with AJ, 14 August, 1992, at the National Hotel in East Jerusalem.

[471]Interview, TAT, 2 August, 1992, at the Jerusalem Hotel, East Jerusalem.

[472]Interview, ST, 30 July, 1992, OT.

[473]Interview, HI, 21 July, 1992, East Jerusalem.

Israeli response. Israel reacted with brutal policies designed to break the leadership, disrupt organizational communications, and force the masses out of the streets:

> Israel began to fill populated areas with soldiers and observation towers to watch for the first sign of a gathering, after which they would begin shooting randomly, into the crowds. Such popular demonstrations became impossible under these conditions.[474]

Additionally, they targetted UNLU policies of civil disobedience by issuing ID cards, "new" ID cards, and then magnetic cards. With each new ID requirement, Palestinians had to interact with the authorities, reinforcing linkage with the Civil Administration:

> If you want to make any routine application, you may have to go to 7 different offices to complete the application. Everything is interconnected. For example, if I want to export citrus to Jordan, I must go to several different offices in the Central Bureaucracy: if I haven't paid my electricity bill, if I have a police ticket, if I am behind in my taxes [I cannot receive my permit]. If, if, if. Even if you do not have any records missing, it compels you to work with the system -- you simply cannot disengage. Even to get a birth certificate for my daughter.[475]

Eventually such policies fractured the ability of Palestinians to coordinate actions of resistance and challenged their commitment to non-violence.

Participation in the course of the Intifada has set the stage for democratic processes once the state of Palestine is realized. While the notion of shared decision-making first emerged in the trade unions, student unions, and the women's movement, these had all operated at the level of social leadership prior to the Intifada. It was the ability of the UNLU to incorporate this local social leadership -- redrawn as the network of popular committees -- and to retain a popularly conceived process of decision-making -

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[474]Personal interview with GAK, on 8 August, 1992, in East Jerusalem.

[475]Ibid.

- which brought the Intifada to the heighths of its success in the first two years. Subject significantly to Israeli policies of retaliation, which curtailed political participation, and subject also to the advancement of the Palestinian Question to the international arena, which necessitated a broader policy approach, local political participation was redefined in terms of its ability to implement policies defined from abroad. The UNLU/PLO leadership therefore reverted to a hierarchical decision-making process, which excluded an internal, popularly based leadership, generally unknown to the skeptics in Tunis. As evidence of this, one has only to examine UNLU policies, themselves.

CHAPTER 5

UNLU POLICIES

Introduction

The Paradox of Occupation

The Intifada began as a popular response to a twenty-year occupation which had, on more than one occasion billed itself as the most enlightened occupation in history. If the comparison rests with the legacy of the Assyrians in Mesopotamia, for example, then such a descriptor holds. Israel is, in contrast to past occupiers, a nation grounded in principles of democratic rule.

The paradox inherent in a concept such as *enlightened occupation*, however, is that regardless of intentions to provide beneficient administration of a subject people, the decision to continue to occupy lands gained by force, argues Carlton, is driven chiefly by ideological motivation.[476] It is axiomatic that the process of implementing an

[476]"Ideology" is here defined by Carlton as: 'a set of beliefs in a preferred social order which enables adherents to interpret their past, explain their present, and develop a vision of the future.' Eric Carlton, *Occupation: The Policies and Practices of Military Conquerors* (Savage, MD: Barnes and Noble Books), 1992, p. 1.

ideological vision within hostile territory will require more than persuasion. Indeed, the exercise of power in the realization of ideologically defined ends becomes a preeminent concern of the occupier:

> Control is almost the primary objective of the conqueror . . . [and] it is rarely achieved without some measure of physical or cultural repression. In these circumstances, ideology can work either for or against a successful occupation. Most conquerors are not in the game of proselytization -- they are aiming for higher and more lucrative stakes.[477]

The "stakes" in the present case (the continued Israeli occupation of the Territories) involve a return of the Jews to the Biblically-defined kingdom of Israel, a "kingdom" to which an Arab people has staked its claim since the dawn of Islam over a thousand years ago. The vision[478] thus requires a denial of many values primary to Israelis, values which themselves prompted the establishment of the twentieth century Israeli state.

The consequences of this paradox have not escaped some Israelis. Even before the Intifada, Leibowitz expressed concerns about policy driven by belief:

> The most fateful day in Israel's history was the seventh day, by which I mean the day after the Six Day War. On that day, we had to decide if the war was a war of defense or of conquest. What started on the seventh day eventually brought about the Yom Kippur War and the war with Lebanon. Ultimately, Israel may find itself locked into a war to the finish with the entire Arab world, from Morocco to Kuwait. Internally, these same interests lead to fascism.[479]

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[477]Ibid., p. 5

[478]This vision, as Harkabi argues, is the vision of the Israeli right and finds opposition within Israel, itself. Policies which have sought to implement this vision are chiefly those of the Likud. See Yehoshafat Harkabi, *Israel's Fateful Hour* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers), 1988 for a discussion of "hawks" and "doves" in Israel.

[479]Yeshayahu Leibowitz, "Liberating Israel from the Occupied Territories" (An Interview), *Journal of Palestine Studies* 15 (Winter, 1986), p. 105.

And even today, the Women in Black[480] hold weekly meetings, Peace Now[481] continues to lobby the Knesset, and organizations like B'Tselem[482] compile statistics which attest to the costs of the occupation for Israel. Ari Shavit, in his book, *On Gaza Beach*, wrote after the outbreak of the Intifada:

> For this is what the Palestinians have brought upon us by means of the intifada: they have deprived us, in the most unambiguous way, of the possibility of an 'enlightened occupation.' They have forced us to choose: territories or decency. Occupation or fairness. And, yes, that is indeed the question of the hour. An acute and urgent question, demanding an answer at once. It is not, at this hour, a matter of territories in exchange for peace. It is a matter of territories in exchange for our humanity.[483]

Israeli Policies of Control: A Review

The activating vision for this occupation has been the restoration of *Eretz Israel*. For this reason, a formal peace was never concluded following the 1967 Six Day War[484] -- acquisition of land by force is a clear violation of international law, and the provisions of any treaty would have required Israel to give back land. Hence, the decision to occupy

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[480]Israeli women, so named for their dress, who meet to protest the occupation and violence associated with the occupation.

[481]An Israeli activist group protesting the violence engendered by the occupation, lobbying for a just resolution to the conflict.

[482]An Israeli human rights organization founded in February, 1989, which monitors human rights abuses against the Palestinians.

[483]Quoted in *The Stone and the Olive Branch: Four Years of the Intifada From Jabalia to Madrid* (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Media and Communications Center), 1991, p. 27.

[484]At the Camp David Accords, signed by Israel and Egypt in 1978, Israel did restore the Sinai to Egypt, but retained the Gaza Strip, the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the Golan Heights.

and to create facts of ownership on the ground,[485] meant that, in redrawing its national boundaries to incorporate the historic (Biblical) land of Israel into the modern state, the leaders of this modern state had to decide what role the "conquered people" (since 1950, under Syrian, Egyptian, or Jordanian rule) would play in the promotion of this vision. As Carlton underscores, the occupier does not have to treat a conquered state as a subject state. A conquered state may be assigned the status of client state or more simply, be directed toward a favored status relationship vis-a-vis economic enterprises, access to resources, etc., with the dominant state.[486] Occupation, itself, thus involves a policy decision.

In the case of Israel, the vision defines national identity in terms of a belief system and in terms of a geographical space, making control of the land paramount. Policies designed to "encourage" Palestinians to leave,[487] included policies of building universities. Juxtaposed against other policies which restrict growth and development in the Occupied Territories (OT), increasingly well-educated Palestinians have been forced to emigrate to find jobs comensurate with their training, level of education, and expectations. Policies of land confiscation, rationalized through a complicated legal system were also directed toward this end, as is the ongoing construction of settlements

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[485]See Geoffrey Aronson, *Creating Facts: Israel, Palestinians, and the West Bank* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies), 1987.

[486]Carlton, p. 1.

[487]For a thorough analysis of Israeli policies driving the occupation, see Raja Shehadeh, *Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank* (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Palestine Studies), 1988. For an alternate interpretation of Israeli policies, see E.R. Cohen's *Human Rights in the Israeli-Occupied Territories 1967-1982* (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press), 1985.

for Israelis on the occupied land (in violation of international standards), and the strategy of shaping development (construction of roads, allocation of resources, the provision of services, etc.) to serve the Jewish settlements, while bypassing Arab towns and villages. Palestinians who chose to remain in the "homeland" came to realize that economic and labor policies were designed to maintain the OT as second-class colonial possessions, which supplied labor and primary goods to Israel while remaining, themselves, a captive market for Israeli goods.[488]

Such a strategy contributed to the growth and development of the Jewish nation-state of Israel at the expense of the Palestinians. It is no surprise, then, that Israeli policies adopted at the beginning of the Intifada were harsh and unrelenting: the contest over who retains control of the occupied lands is perceived in zero-sum terms. But these policies were not new to the Palestinians. As Hart recounts, from the beginning of the Occupation,

> There were: curfews, cordons and house-to-house searches; restrictions on travel and movement; long prison sentences for Fatah activists and sympathizers; detention without trial; deportations; neighborhood or collective punishment, including the closure of schools, shops, and offices, and the blowing up of houses belonging to those who gave, or were suspected of giving, shelter for Fatah activists. In December 1969, Moshe

[488]See the Immigration and Naturalization Subcommittee Hearings of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary (Ninety-Fifth Congress), entitled, *The Colonization of the West Bank Territories by Israel* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office), 1978; also: Raja Shehadeh's *Occupier's Law*, which outlines the legal basis for the maintenance of a colonial economy; also George Abed's, *The Economic Viability of a Palestinian State* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies), 1990; and, a joint research endeavor by Palestinian, Israeli, and Jordanian economists, Leonard J. Hausman, Director, *Securing Peace in the Middle East: Project on Economic Transition* (Cambridge, MA: The Institute for Social and Economic Policy in the Middle East, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1993.

> Dayan claimed that a total of 516 houses had been destroyed. Two months previously a special report in *The Times of London* had said the real figure was 7,000.[489]

Table 5.1 briefly outlines Israeli policies adopted to control the Intifada for the first two years (December, 1987 - December, 1989). Such policies are difficult to attach to specific points in time, because nearly all have been utilized for over 20 years, and many, such as curfews, arrests/administrative detention, house demolitions, and deportations, continued to be used throughout the Intifada. Further, the policies were interrelated. For example, the imposition of an extended curfew as a collective punishment also reinforced a) the agricultural siege, as farmers were not allowed out of their homes and had to watch crops and animals die; b) the policy of mass arrests and beatings, as soldiers would conduct house-to-house searches for "wanted people," unchallenged; and c) the policy of maintaining a massive military presence, as villages and towns were surrounded by large military forces, subjected to helicopter teargas barrages and to intermittent sniper fire.

What <u>can</u> be said in reference to Table 5.1, and in general terms, however, is that the initial Israeli response involved a massive use of force in an attempt to control the mass public demonstrations and to clear people from the streets. For three months there were forced shop openings and closings, a policy which Rabin later admitted was a "major blunder" for Israel, a blunder, however, from which "we have learned proper

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[489]Alan Hart, *Arafat: A Political Biography* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press), 1989, p. 247.

Table 5.1 Evolution of Israeli Policies Dec 1987 - Dec 1989

Date/Policy	POLICY AREAS				
	Use of force	Economics	Civil Society	Bureaucratic	Intelligence
Dec 87-Feb 88 "Merciless Policy" "Policy of Might, Power & Beatings"	massive military presence; live ammunition; extensive arrests; breaking of limbs; live burials	Forced shop openings/closings; limitation on Jordanian Dinars	curfews school closed universities closed deportations	ID's required in Gaza	
Mar - May 88	Open-fire restrictions relaxed	Olive tree uprootings; Pal banking assets frozen	house demolitions and sealings; all services to OT cut; intl phone lines cut		
Sept-Nov 88	Plastic bullets; open fire restrictions further relaxed		Popular committees outlawed; extended curfews		Specially trained undercover squads; use of collaborators
Dec 88-Feb 89	Mass arrests; new "rubber" bullets	Agricultural siege; Ag export permits denied		color-coded ID's required	
Mar - May 89		increased house demolitions and sealings			
Jun - Aug 89 "Operation Plastic Card"	Open fire restrictions further relaxed; shoot masked men	forced tax collections		New, plastic ID's required	
Sept - Nov 89					
Dec 89 Low Profile	Reduced military presence; avoid deaths; rooftop observations				Monitor activities; increased reliance on intelligence; assasinations; use of collaborators

lessons."[490] By the close of the first year, thousands of people had been arrested and held in administrative detention, the open-fire restrictions had been relaxed several times, permitting soldiers to fire in non-life-threatening situations and in response to even the threat of molotov cocktail attack, the schools and universities had been closed, numerous towns and villages had been maintained under extended curfew, and the popular committees, which implemented policies of the Palestinian national leadership, had been outlawed.

While not abandoning reliance on force, Israeli policy-makers sought to reinforce the linkages between Palestinians and the Civil Administration, eventually requiring everyone to obtain Identity cards from the Israeli authorities. These identity cards were re-issued several times, thereby ensuring continued linkage: Palestinains were not permitted to disengage from the Israeli bureaucracy. Since they could not obtain a new ID if they were in arrears in their taxes or in payment of fines, they were compelled to "support" the occupying regime economically. By the end of 1989, the IDF began to re-think its strategy and to implement policies which required a lower military profile, at least in terms of a visible military presence in the streets and population centers. Relinquishing the goal of "total control," the IDF strove to secure the main roads and to monitor Palestinian activities from roof-top observation posts. Soldiers were ordered to avoid causing deaths, to take care when firing plastic bullets, and to adopt a less confrontational approach while serving in the OT. Implementation began in November,

[490]Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin, in *Ha'aretz*, 22 April, 1989, as quoted in JMCC's *The Stone*, p. 13.

1989, and within the month, the number of Palestinian fatalities had dropped by 50%.[491] In abandoning policies of the direct use of force, the IDF relied increasingly upon intelligence sources to pinpoint key activists in order to pursue them directly. While collaborators have been used by Israeli intelligence since the beginning of the Occupation, often blackmailed to enlist their cooperation,[492] their increased use after the second year not only served Israeli interests vis-a-vis the gathering of intelligence, but also in terms of engineering cracks in the levels of trust and solidarity which had come to characterize the Palestinian community up to that time.

The Palestinian Challenge to Occupation

The Palestinian challenge to the Occupation directly confronted the vision retained by the occupier and, not insignificantly, the economic system in which it was secured. When, within the first month of the Intifada, a leadership coalesced, and as the "UNLU," began to officially shape the Intifada, this leadership approached policy-making in rational terms. As has been earlier discussed (Chapter 4), the process itself was rational, drawing upon both grassroots and factional (political) inputs, but it was also rational in terms of the specific policies it chose to adopt. Two goals drove such policy. The first goal was to escalate the cost of occupation for Israel. The Occupation depended upon cheap Palestinian labor, upon a ready market for Israeli goods, and upon a low-cost program for

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[491]JMCC's *The Stone*, p. 31.

[492]See Hart, *Arafat*, pp. 235 - 254, "The Popular War of Liberation," for a discussion of these methods in the 1960's.

maintaining control in the Territories. If Palestinian labor was withdrawn, the demand for Israeli goods negated, and the cost of maintaining order doubled or tripled, then (the rationale dictated), Israel would at some point be forced to re-calculate the advantages of Occupation, and to withdraw.

The second goal was to unlink from the Israeli governing authority -- the Civil Administration -- and to create a parallel (and competing) Palestinian authority. Obviously the Military Administration bore no legitimacy in the eyes of the inhabitants it administered, but neither had it been seriously challenged in its ability to structure the daily lives of people living in the Territories. If it could be shown that Israeli authority could *never* take the place of Palestinian authority -- and could "govern" only through increasingly extreme policies of repression -- then (it was hoped) the Israeli populace, as well as the Western democratic powers, would pressure the Israeli government for withdrawal. In this, an ancillary achievement was that, through the process of disengagement from Israeli authority, Palestinians would create an infrastructure with which to address the new UNLU policies of self-sufficiency. For Palestinians, this possibility represented a blueprint for the future nation-state, which would be grounded in principles of democracy, a feat -- if successful -- of singular accomplishment in the largely authoritarian theatre of the Middle East.[493]

These two goals, to raise the cost of occupation for Israel and to disengage from the Civil Administration, were pursued by the UNLU through a variety of measures

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[493]The entire issue of the *Middle East Report* (MERIP), Number 183 Vol. 23 No. 4 (July-August), 1993, is devoted to "Political Islam," and examines the possibilities of democracy in various political and sociocultural settings within the Middle East.

outlined as "Calls to Action" in the communiques. As Israeli tactics to thwart the Intifada changed, drastically altering the lives of Palestinians, the UNLU was forced to assess its policies and to alter them in accordance with a continually evolving reality.

Policy Analysis of UNLU Communiques

In the following analysis, five categories of "calls" were identified from the UNLU communiques issued throughout the first two years of the Intifada, December, 1987 - December, 1989. Categories included calls for:

A: Unity/Solidarity

B: Economic Responses

C: Strikes

D: Mass Public Demonstrations/Activities

E: Militant Actions

Before undertaking an analysis, this paper must briefly address the question of what constitutes a "call." The easy answer is: any of the dated activities listed at the end of a communique and comprising the two-week calendar of Intifada activities. These can be tabulated with little difficulty and subjected to coding procedures. What complicates matters is that, not infrequently, within the body of a communique itself, entire paragraphs are devoted to calling upon specific sectors of society to engage in a set of activities, or to continue activities called for throughout the previous month. It seemed a

misrepresentation of UNLU policy demands to include only individual activities listed in the bi-monthly calendar when the substance of a communique centered upon categories of actions as well. Hence, reference to a category of actions within the body of the communique was tabulated as a "call" in the same manner as a specific activity assigned to a specific day for the populace at large. This is admittedly imprecise, as an explicit measure of UNLU "calls to action," but since the approach was used throughout the analysis, it does provide a *relative measure* of variation for UNLU policies.

General Frequency Data

Review of Data. 1988. Figure 5.1 shows the frequency data for types of calls issued, as compiled by month, for the first two years of the Intifada. The UNLU issued its first communique on 8 January, 1988. An argument has been advanced in Chapter 4 that in June the internal leadership began receiving its directives from "outside" the OT, and that by April and May of 1988, the Intifada had become part of the global agenda. Visual inspection shows the first six months as representing the most active period of the uprising's first year, with April reflecting a peak number of more than 100 calls. The fewest number of calls were issued in the summer months and, by the end of 1988, the numbers were similar to those at the beginning of the year.

1989. In the second year, the first four months again reflect renewed numbers of calls which drop, abruptly, in May, to increase somewhat erratically by the end of the year, to levels on par with those at the beginning of the year.




Figure 5.1 Frequency Data for Calls Issued (by month) for 1988 and 1989

Analysis and Discussion. Palestinian Factors. Two sets of reasons can be reviewed for explanation of these patterns. The first relates to changes within the Palestinian leadership and decision-making process. Such an explanation would argue that in the first four months, the internal leadership was heavily involved in the mobilization of all levels of society and the coordination of resistance activities. An average of four communiques were issued each month, resulting in a large number of calls. People were in the streets, and levels of popular activity were high. In June, 1988, there was a play for power and, in the face of this transition within the national decision-making body, the number of commuiques issued per month -- and hence, the number of calls -- dropped.

An alternative explanation, also focusing on the Palestinian side of the equation, would highlight the gradual *routinization* of the Intifada, hence the need for fewer communiques by which to direct the activities, and a reduction in the number of calls. This explanation would also argue that the external leadership was in control from the beginning, via the political factions, and that as the Intifada fell into a routine, the local leadership of the popular committees planned and coordinated many of the local activities; official UNLU calls were necessary only to maintain unified action at the national level, and to preserve the legitimacy of the UNLU as a decision-making body.

It was also argued in Chapter 4 that June, 1989 represents another bid for power within the external leadership, a take-over by Fatah. Again, this observation is based on a review of the communiques themselves, and discussion with political activists within

the OT. This would account for the abrupt drop in the number of calls in May (again, a transitional period) in the publication of the communiques. If this is true, the recovery in the number of calls through the rest of 1989 reflects a leadership solidly in control of decision-making, operating outside the reaches of Israeli interference, and working to maintain solidarity within the OT and among a people sceptical of a new "international" agenda and, not insignificantly, experiencing exhaustion from months of coping with the reprisals undertaken by the Israeli military regime.

Israeli Factors. The second set of explanations for the patterns of frequency data seen in Figure 5.1 revolves around Israeli tactics to thwart the Intifada. Initial policies of confronting the uprising with force made organizational efforts increasingly difficult for the UNLU. Rabin's "merciless policy," which included the round-up of organizers -- or possible organizers -- eventually hampered publication efforts. Schiff and Ya'ari detail the persistent efforts of the IDF in these attempts.[494] By August, 1988, 50 Palestinians had either been deported or had received deportation orders.[495] Decapitation of the leadership itself thus contributed to a decrease in the numbers of leaflets published (and therefore, the number of calls). Additionally, the high-profile military presence, designed to close down the massive public demonstrations, made communications among the leadership difficult, and incidentally, hampered the distribution of leaflets once they were printed. These problems were further augmented

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[494]Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *Intifada* (New York: Simon and Schuster), 1989, especially Chapter 7.

[495]See JMCC's *The Stone*, "Appendix B: Chronology of Key Dates of the Uprising," pp. 62-77.

when the popular committees were outlawed in August, 1988. A rebound in the number of calls in the final quarter of the second year (September - December, 1989), could likewise be explained by the gradual implementation of the new, less confrontational IDF policies, which would permit the Palestinian masses a greater freedom of movement and thus justify greater numbers of calls to action. This focus on Israeli actions does not explain the high levels of calls at the beginning of 1989, however.

Summary Notes. Given the dialectics inherent in the relationship between the Palestinians and the Israeli military throughout the Intifada, explanations of frequency data patterns probably rest with both sides. Without doubt, the direction taken by the Palestinian leadership in formulating and distributing the communiques reflected the necessity of its policies and the patterns of succession within the UNLU membership as different "layers" of respected leaders were arrested and/or deported. As always, struggles over definition of policy and policy goals were a source of dissention. However, at least through the first 18 months, the leadership was committed to the broad goal of civil disobedience (to be discussed in the Chapter summary), and this served to sketch the boundaries.

The forceful response by the Israeli military -- in arresting and deporting the Palestinian leadership, in requiring ID cards, in outlawing the popular committees, and in laying siege to towns and villages -- necessarily affected the ability of a coherent and legitimate leadership to direct the Intifada activities, and hence, in the issuance of the calls to action.

And, for both sides, developments in the world-at-large played increasingly into the calculations, raising the stakes for both the Palestinians and the state of Israel.

Frequency Data Defined by Policy

Review of Data

Tables 5.2 - 5.6 break the frequency data down by month and by policy type:

A : *Solidarity Calls*

Includes calls for activities such as: days of prayer; visiting families of martyrs/prisoners/deportees; days of solidarity with particualr groups; helping each other; collecting donations; expanding healthcare; forming popular committees; repenting non-cooperative behavior.

B : *Economic Calls*

Includes calls for activities such as: moderating consumption; cultivating land/ growing vegetables; "buying Palestinian;" maximizing production by industry/factories; keeping prices down; boycotting Israeli goods; boycotting fines; boycotting the payment of taxes.

C : *Strikes*

Includes calls for activities such as: closing shops at specific times; thwarting Israeli shop opening/closing orders; general commercial strikes; workers strikes in Israeli settlements and in Israel; transportation strikes; self-imposed curfews when people stay off the streets.

D : *Popular Demonstrations*

Includes calls for activities such as: people flocking to worship; sit-ins; hunger strikes; marches; mock funerals; placing flowers on the tombs of martyrs; chants/slogans; violation of closure laws at universities/schools; hoisting flags (black), or the Palestinian national flag; painting slogans (graffiti); painting over Hebrew slogans/signs.

E : *Militant Activities*

Includes calls for activities such as: daily clashes; constructing roadblocks; throwing stones; using iron bars; throwing molotov cocktails; "all combative means;" forcibly toppling [Israeli-]appointed councils/committees; punishing non-cooperative Palestinians and

collaborators; "days of rage;" conducting a "merciless war" against settlements and settlers.

Each table, therefore, represents one of five different policy categories, and presents the frequency data (number of UNLU calls) for a single policy orientation as a percentage of the total number of calls recorded for a single month. A review of these data by year and by policy types with discussions of their significance, follows. It should be noted that the paradoxical nature of the Palestinian/Israeli conflict itself, means that "truth" is reflected through multiple facets and is never, in its essence, monolithic. Hence, the data will often compel competing sets of explanations.

1. **Solidarity Calls**

Review of Data. *1988.* From Table 5.2 it is apparent that calls for solidarity increased after the first four months of 1988, having comprised 17% of the calls in the early part of the year, and making up 25% - 35% of all UNLU calls during the second half of the year. The month of November is exceptional for the high number of solidarity calls (63%) issued by the UNLU.

1989. Table 5.2 would lead one to believe that things had changed by the second year of the Intifada. In this second year, there was little consistency in the proportion of calls devoted to "solidarity," the numbers vascillating, with 24%, 7%, 21%, 28%, and 7% being recorded throughout the first five months of the year. An exceptional month in 1989 was September, during which 53% of the calls were dedicated to "unity."

Table 5.2 Solidarity Calls ("A") as Frequency Data and % of Total Calls for 1988 and 1989 by Month

Month	1988		1989	
	Raw Data (Calls)	% Data	Raw Data (Calls)	% Data
January	7	17%	16	24%
February	10	17%	4	7%
March	8	13%	10	21%
April	18	17%	18	28%
May	15	25%	1	7%
June	15	28%	3	13%
July	6	30%	8	22%
August	4	25%	2	11%
September	6	35%	23	53%
October	6	20%	5	17%
November	20	63%	7	11%
December	8	21%	11	15%

Comparison. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 show the proportional frequency data for 1988 and 1989 graphically. From Fig. 5.2 it is apparent that, with the exception of the two peaks noted above (November, 1988 and September, 1989), calls for solidarity made up between 10% and 30% of the UNLU calls and that no real pattern is evident for either year. Fig. 5.3, which plots the differences (between 1988 and 1989) in the percentage of solidarity calls by month, would suggest that there were generally fewer calls for solidarity during 1989.

Analysis and Discussion It is apparent that, four months into 1988, the calls for solidarity rose, and were maintained at the higher levels throughout the Intifada's first year. Does this reflect the fact that Israeli policies designed to break the uprising were, in fact, "breaking" the Palestinians, requiring the UNLU to promote solidarity to sustain commitment to the revolt? This may represent part of the truth. For instance, it is true there had been numerous "intifadas" in the 1970's, none of which had ever lasted beyond a few weeks; and it is true that the Palestinians did not fully expect the level of brutality with which the Israeli military responded, a level which was designed to bring the uprising under control quickly. The UNLU may indeed, have wanted to underscore the need for solidarity and commitment.

The data may reflect a different truth as well. The Intifada was a spontaneous grassroots movement and was underway for nearly a month before the UNLU circulated its first communique. As discussed in Chapter 4, legitimacy was an initial concern for this leadership. The UNLU was promoting, in the early months, activities already in





Figure 5.2 Type "A" Data as % of Total Calls for 1988 and 1989



	1988	1989	CHANGE
JAN	17	24	7
FEB	17	7	-10
MAR	13	21	8
APR	17	28	11
MAY	27	7	-20
JUN	28	13	-15
JUL	30	22	-8
AUG	25	11	-14
SEP	35	53	18
OCT	20	17	-3
NOV	63	11	-52
DEC	21	15	-6

TYPE A DATA

Figure 5.3 Difference Between the Percentage of Calls for Solidarity Actions ("A") by Month for 1988 and 1989

progress on the ground, its emphasis being the coordination of such activities, both to maintain the strength of the Intifada and to maximize its effectiveness. Calls to solidarity, while important in the initial stages (17% is a moderate percentage), became even more important when the policy of civil disobedience was officially introduced. Nonpayment of taxes, boycotts of Israeli goods, noncompliance with ID requirements, and the resignation of civil servants and police required the participation of all sectors of society. Hence, the increase in the percentage of calls directed toward the formation of popular committees and the promotion of days of solidarity with particular groups of the society. As growing numbers of Palestinians were killed, arrested, imprisoned, and deported, such calls were increasingly relevant. People did not need to be told their "duty" to one another -- the history of self-help spanned twenty years -- but such calls did reflect understanding of the people's suffering on the part of the UNLU, thereby reinforcing the leadership's legitimacy at a time when successive layers of "leaders" were being removed through a variety of means by Israel.

A further explanation regarding the increased calls for actions of solidarity as 1988 progressed, would point to external events, particularly the April 16 assasination of Abu Jihad by Israeli agents and the visit of United States Secretary of State Geroge Shultz to Israel to meet with (look for) "moderate Palestinians" and to push for acceptance of the U.S. Autonomy Plan. Regarding the former, Palestinians realized that Israel, misunderstanding the grassroots nature of the uprising, blamed the external PLO leadership for orchestrating events in the OT. The Israeli solution: to liquidate Arafat's No. 2 in command. Solidarity calls not only reflected a national sorrow and the loss of

a respected leader, but also were meant to demonstrate to both Israel and the U.S. that the Intifada was a reality with or without an external leadership -- that Palestinians living within the OT would not back down until Israel withdrew from the Territories and accepted Palestinians' right to self-determination. Further, regardless of U.S. and Israeli attempts to ignore, discredit, or cripple the PLO and to fragment Palestinian unity by focusing peacemaking talks on a new leadership inside the OT ("untainted" by PLO affiliation), the Palestinians were not to be fooled: regardless of Israeli or American tactics, the PLO remained the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."[496] To make the point clear, no Palestinians were to meet with Shultz when he came in search of an alternative leadership. Indeed, a FACTS editorial notes, "The national unanimity over boycotting Shultz was crucial in thwarting any US political maneuvres with 'Palestinian moderates...' The US autonomy plans looks farther away than ever."[497] Palestinians (at this stage -- and in light of the early successes of the Intifada) believed they would prevail over U.S./Israeli attempts to impose an "autonomy" which Palestinians had clearly rejected after Camp David, and which, while granting them limited self-rule, would empower the Israeli military to step in whenever it felt Israeli "security" was threatened, a situation not unlike the realities of the Occupation, itself.

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[496]For a discussion of this position, see Ali Jarbawi, "Palestinian Elites in the Occupied Territories: Stability and Change through the Intifada." IN Eds. Jamal Nassar and Roger Heacock, *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (New York: Praeger), 1990, pp. 287-305.

[497]*FACTS Weekly Review*, April 3 - April 9, 1988 (Jerusalem: FACTS Information Committee), p. 1.

Finally, November, 1988 reflects a very high level of solidarity calls (63%) and this can be attributed to a single event. On Tuesday, November 15, 1988 in Algiers, the Palestine National Congress (PNC) declared the existence of the independent Palestinian national state. The historic event had been announced for several weeks and the Israeli government had braced itself for the repurcussions:

> On Tuesday November 15, 1988, with the whole of the Gaza Strip and several West Bank towns under curfew, the independent state of Palestine was declared. All telephone lines had been disconnected for two days and electricity supplies were cut, so that television coverage of the declaration could not reach the people. There had been a big pre-declaration arrest campaign, and there was a massive army presence in all towns and camps. Journalists were prevented from entering either the West Bank or Gaza to cover the events (except with an army escort).[498]

All this notwithstanding, the UNLU had issued numerous calls for solidarity. Why? Would not all Palestinians rally behind a Palestinian state? Yes, but statehood was not the only announcement. The PNC also defined the political interests of this new state. It advanced a new agenda which accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for the convening of an international peace conference. This new state of Palestine was thereby offering implicit recognition of Israel's right to exist, and endorsing a two-state solution. Calls for solidarity were issued to promote unity: more radical elements of the PLO and of Palestinians as a whole wanted to see a single, secular democratic state in the whole of Palestine (which would permit the return of Palestinians to the land and the homes they were forced to abandon in 1948), and one in which all citizens would live in freedom and with equal rights. The fact that solidarity was

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[498]*FACTS Weekly Review*, November 6 - November 19, 1988, Editorial, p. 1.

maintained even in light of the new national political agenda, was itself cause for celebration:

> Splits and in-fighting have long plagued the National Movement, but the present political program has been adopted without the withdrawal of any significant political group from the PLO. Not all elements agree to the position adopted, but the decision has been made to abide by the will of the majority. The PLO appears to have found the strength to take the initiative.[499]

Inconsistencies in the proportions of calls devoted to solidarity throughout the second year of the Intifada, 1989, can be attributed to changes in leadership, to a reduced need for solidarity calls, as most sectors of society were already active in the Intifada and were supporting one another, and, significantly, to a rise in the proportion of calls targetting other kinds of actions.

Qualitatively, solidarity calls differed from 1988 to 1989 as well. Whereas calls during the first year reflected efforts at mobilizing all sectors of society and implementing policies at local levels, "solidarity" moved in a different direction in the second year. While there were still calls for solidarity with merchants and with workers, and calls to affirm the Palestinian national enterprise (see Communiques No.33, No.35, No.38, No.45, etc.) and to protest US/Israeli policies (No.37), most calls were centered on support for the victims of Israeli reprisals. Included in this are calls for: solidarity with detainees and with families of detainees and martyrs (most communiques); with the formation of funds for family solidarity (No.35); with "days of joint social responsibility" (No.46); with the owners of demolished homes (No.39, calling for the formation of popular

[499]Ibid., p. 2.

reconstruction committees to help re-build); and for campaigns to send cables to NGO's demanding closure of the prison camps. Additionally, most strikes were called "in solidarity" with workers, detainees, deportees, or workers in Gaza.

2. Economic Calls

Review of Data. *1988.* Table 5.3 shows an increase in the number of economic calls between February and June of the first year and a sharp drop after June, with calls being infrequently directed toward economic policies after this.

1989. Table 5.3 reveals a similar pattern for the second year of the Intifada. In five months of 1989, no economic calls were issued and in seven months there were less than 10 calls in total. Economic policies were advocated most prominently during the first four months of 1989, and were returned to near the end of the year.

Comparisons. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show the proportional frequency data for 1988 and 1989 graphically. From Fig. 5.4 it is evident that for both years the summer months reflect the lowest percentage of economic calls, with peaks being evident at either ends of 1988 and 1989. From Fig. 5.5 it would seem that there are no distinct patterns in the proportion of calls devoted to economic activities when 1988 is compared to 1989.

Analysis and Discussion. The emphasis on economic calls came as part of the general policy orientation of civil disobedience, and had two goals: 1) to separate Palestinian economic activities from control by the Israeli Civil Administration, and 2) to make the continued occupation of the OT an economic liability for Israel. Calls were therefore issued from February through June, 1988 which emphasized activities which

Table 5.3 Economic Calls ("B") as Frequency Data and % of Total Calls for 1988 and 1989 by Month

Month	1988		1989	
	Raw Data (Calls)	% Data	Raw Data (Calls)	% Data
January	2	5%	16	24%
February	6	10%	11	19%
March	11	18%	7	15%
April	12	12%	8	12%
May	6	10%	0	0%
June	4	8%	0	0%
July	0	0%	2	6%
August	0	0%	0	0%
September	1	6%	1	2%
October	2	7%	6	20%
November	0	0%	0	0%
December	1	3%	9	12%





Figure 5.4 Type "B" Data as % of Total Calls for 1988 and 1989



	1988	1989	CHANGE
JAN	5	24	19
FEB	10	19	9
MA	18	15	-3
APR	12	12	0
MA	15	0	-15
JUN	8	0	-8
JUL	0	6	6
AU	0	0	0
SEP	6	2	-4
OCT	7	20	13
NO	0	0	0
DEC	3	12	9

TYPE B DATA

Figure 5.5 Difference Between the Percentage of Calls for Economic Actions ("B") by Month for 1988 and 1989

would impact the Israeli economy and support a parallel Palestinian authority. The fact that such calls dropped off after June and were issued only sporadically the remainder of the year, would likely be explained as a pragmatic response to Israeli tactics.

The "shopkeeper's war"[500] began early in the year, with merchants closing their shops at 11 AM and soldiers moving in to force the shutters and barred doors open,[501] frequently breaking the locks and damaging merchandise in the store. Conversely, if Israeli orders demanded shop closings, merchants would open their shops and the soldiers would forcibly close them. It was a battle for control. Throughout this "shopkeeper's war," solidarity was critical for the Palestinian effort, not only to ensure compliance of the merchants, who came to be called the "pillars of the Intifada," (UNLU communique No.5), but also the support of locksmiths, blacksmiths, and metalworkers, who made the rounds at night to repair damage done by the soldiers during the day. By May this war had been won by the Palestinians, and shops remained opened or closed according to decisions of the local popular committees. Hence, the necessity for such calls was reduced.

Palestinians were also encouraged, as part of the policy of civil disobedience, to strive for Palestinian self-sufficiency. One aspect of this was developing a "home economy:"

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[500]Salim Tamari, "The Revolt of the Petit Bourgeoisie," In Nassan and Heacock's, *Intifada*, pp. 158-174. Tamari identifies this term as the term adopted by the Israeli press to characterize military policy and cites several articles by Joel Greenberg in the **The Jerusalem Post** in the first months of 1988, as support.

[501]Ibid., pp. 163-164.

> The 'home economy' movement has mobilised communities throughout the West Bank. Almost every patch of available land has been cultivated this year, in an attempt to maximise the self-reliance of communities in food and to minimise the purchase of Israeli imported produce which confers economic benefit to Israel. Agricultural committees for this purpose have been formed in most villages and camps in the West Bank.[502]

The Israeli response to this was an economic siege against agriculture. Implementation began as a collective punishment against families whose members were accused of involvement in stone-throwing incidents, and was undertaken in earnest in October, 1988, when farmers were warned that their continued participation in and/or support of the Intifada would result in their inability to harvest or market their crops.[503] While measures included witholding export licenses and bans on selling produce, it also included measures undertaken throughout the Occupation and employed early in the Intifada as well: the destruction of Palestinian fruit and olive trees and damage to the land itself.

These tactics were used most widely in the first two years of the Intifada, declining in use by the end of 1989, although a marked increase has been noted since the end of the Gulf War. (Through the end of 1991, the JMCC has recorded, "a total of 454 incidents, sometimes involving as many as 7,000 trees in one go."[504]) When it is recognized that olive trees live and produce for hundreds of years, the extent of the loss which this level of destruction poses to the Palestinian economy is apparent.

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[502]*FACTS Weekly Review*, April 24 - April 30, 1988, p. 2.

[503]JMCC's *The Stone and the Olive Branch* (Jerusalem: The Jerusalem Media and Communication Center), 1991, p. 38. See also Schiff and Ya'ari, *Intifada*, pp. 250-251, which cite Israeli tactics to bring UNLU agricultural policies to heel.

[504]Ibid., p. 39.

Typically, to implement an order to lay siege to village land, the military surrounds or enters a village, and supported by one or more army bulldozers, destroys the stone walls surrounding the targetted land, "lifting large tracts of soil, rendering the land [itself] useless."[505] In the village of Hussan (near Bethlehem) on Friday, 22 April, 1988, such a siege began at 3AM. Initial actions were met with resistance from the villagers, who lay down in front of the bulldozer and refused to move. They were subsequently beaten and dragged from the site, watching helplessly the destruction of their sole source of income.[506] It is understandable, therefore, that Israeli policies such as these blunted calls by the UNLU for eocnomic acts of resistance: the costs to the people were too high.

Although the Palestinian editor of FACTS states that, "Non-payment of taxes is one of the non-violent forms of protest which has been adopted during the uprising,"[507] clearly the response it drew from Israeli authorities was far from non-violent, ranging from forced entry into villages and homes in order to collect identity cards, to tax raids during which mass arrests were carried out, "and private and commercial property (to the value of an estimated $5 million) ... siezed, along with the identity cards."[508] The policy of collecting ID cards was introduced early in May in the Gaza Strip. This "new tactic" is described as follows:

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[505]*FACTS Weekly Review*, April 24 - April 30, 1988, p. 8.

[506]Ibid., pp. 8-9.

[507]*FACTS Weekly Review*, May 1 - May 7, 1988, p. 1.

[508]JMCC's *The Stone*, p. 15.

> Refugee camps are surrounded, and the army goes from house to house, collecting the identity cards of the whole population. The people are given slips of paper and are ordered to report to the military headquarters to collect their ID's.
> When they arrive at the military HQ, they are told that they will not be given new ID's until they have paid all their taxes.[509]

Those receiving ID's would then be given a new ID which forbade travel outside the Gaza Strip. Since many Gazans depend upon working in Israel as day laborers, this presents a critical hardship. Permits are required of many in both Gaza and the West Bank for a variety of reasons: opening a new business, obtaining a car license, visiting a relative in prison, etc. -- none of which can be obtained from the Civil Administration unless taxes have been paid. Authorities have also threatened to cut services to entire villages, if the village is in arrears in the payment of taxes or fines.[510]

In light of such hardships, the UNLU scaled down demands for eocnomic resistance to the Occupation, eventually ceasing altogether to call for non-compliance with Israeli policies demanding new ID's.[511] The kinds of calls still issued related to continuing to cultivate land, to boycott Israeli goods, to buy "Palestinian," for merchants to keep prices low, for industries to maximize production, and for plant owners to pay

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[509]*FACTS Weekly Review*, May 1 - May 7, 1988, p. 1.

[510]Ibid., Editorial, pp. 1-2.

[511]A young journalist from Gaza explained the leadership response as follows: "The UNLU had leaders which would watch the places where you had to collect the ID's and at night, people would come to your house and confiscate them. This created too much of a hardship on the people, however, who must work in Israel in order to buy food, pay rent, etc. After two months or so, one day they announced that they would place all the collected cards in the mosque and whoever had had a card which had been confiscated [by the UNLU]l, could go and collect it. They realized they were asking too much of the people." Personal interview, Gaza, 8 August, 1992.

wages even for strike days. Many Palestinians were already supporting such policies, so the need for specific calls became less necessary.

Additionally, with a take-over by the external PLO leadership early in the summer of 1988, an agenda (as announced 15 November, 1988) was being formulated which would place the Palestinian issue on the table of the international community. A concern for such a leadership was to keep the Intifada alive and visible before the world. It strove to confront the Israeli regime in ways which would elicit responses from Israel which would reveal the extent of its repressive character to a global audience. In such a configuration, economic measures -- while significant in denying Israel revenue from the Territories -- did not result in allowing Palestinians to extricate themselves from Israeli Administrative control (in fact, with the new ID's it intensified their connectedness), and the costs to Palestinians themselves, were too high for the ends achieved. While economic policies, therefore were not utterly abandoned, other types of policies -- more visible and less "costly," were promoted.

3. **Strikes**

An integral part of the strategy of non-violence, and the most visible tactic in the campaign of civil disobedience, was the ability of the Palestinians to determine their own levels of economic activity. This has taken the form of the strike, which has been experienced in one of two ways. The first is the general strike, during which all activities in the OT come to a halt: laborers and factory workers do not go to work; taxis, buses, and cars do not run; and all shops are closed. Also included in this category

are calls for resignations of Palestinians working for the Israeli Civil Administration: policemen, tax officials, individuals connected with licensing bureaus, etc. Mass resignations from these departments began in March, 1988.[512] Workers in Israel were asked to leave their jobs, and laborers in the Jewish settlements were encouraged to find work elsewhere. General strikes are visible, they are unifying in that they demonstrate the strength of Palestinian solidarity. Further, they send the clear signal that Israel is not "in charge" of organizing lives in the OT, despite the resultant hardships.

The second form of strike, the commercial strike, begun in Jerusalem on 14 December, 1987[513] was highlighted in the previous section as the "war of the shops." The contest of wills between Israeli and Palestinian authorities continued throughout the first six months of the Intifada, and was finally "won" by Palestinians, as Israeli officials were forced to abandon their strategy of forced shop openings and closings in early May, 1988.

Review of Data. *1988.* Table 5.4 shows that, in 1988, strikes made up about one-fifth of the total number of calls issued by the UNLU. While the range spans 9% to 29%, at least 20% of all calls were for strikes in six of the twelve months and over 12% in all but two months. That strikes were an effective means of protest and, once the war of the shops was won, a tactic which carried predictable costs (generally, reduced income), meant that the UNLU turned to this action on a regular basis.

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[512]Ibid., pp. 16-17. See also Husain Jameel Bargouti, "Jeep Versus Bare Feet," IN Nassar and Heacock's *Intifada*, pp. 113 - 115 for a discussion of the resignations.

[513]JMCC's, *The Stone*, p. 13.

Table 5.4 Strike Calls ("C") as Frequency Data and % of Total Calls for 1988 and 1989 by Month

Month	1988		1989	
	Raw Data (Calls)	% Data	Raw Data (Calls)	% Data
January	10	24%	7	10%
February	13	22%	9	16%
March	8	13%	6	13%
April	17	16%	8	12%
May	12	20%	4	29%
June	7	13%	3	13%
July	2	10%	7	19%
August	4	25%	12	63%
September	5	29%	5	12%
October	6	20%	5	17%
November	3	9%	4	7%
December	5	13%	13	18%

1989. Table 5.4 shows the case for 1989 as well. On average, there were 3% fewer calls for strikes (proportionally) in 1989 as compared with 1988, if the August, 1989 calls are excluded. The high proportion of calls for strikes in August (63%) results in part from the decline in the absolute number of total calls in August. Hence, while the total number of monthly calls for strikes remained between 5 and 10 throughout 1989, that number reflected a much higher proportion of the calls issued in August, due to the small number of calls in total (the reader is referred back to Fig. 5.1, which reflects this visually). The case in August demonstrates the significance of the strike as a tool of the Intifada: it persists as a mechanism of protest even when other actions cannot be undertaken.

Comparisons. Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show the proportional frequency data for 1988 and 1989 graphically. From Fig. 5.6 it does not appear that patterns were significantly different between the first and second years of the Intifada. If the exceptional peak in August, 1989 is excluded -- for reasons cited above -- it is apparent that strikes were an ongoing policy-choice for the UNLU. Several points could be made regarding Fig. 5.7. First, the fact that there were fewer calls, proportionally, the second January, would reflect greater use of strikes in the war of the shops in 1988. Second, August, as noted, can be discounted. Finally, the proportionally lower number of calls in September of 1989 probably reflects the greater use of calls in September, 1989 (53%) for "unity," after the Fatah take-over.





Figure 5.6 Type "C" Data as % of Total Calls for 1988 and 1989



	1988	1989	CHANGE
JAN	24	10	-14
FEB	22	16	-6
MA	13	13	0
APR	16	12	-4
MA	17	29	12
JUN	13	13	0
JUL	10	19	9
AU	25	63	38
SEP	29	12	-17
OCT	20	17	-3
NO	9	7	-2
DEC	13	18	5

TYPE C DATA

Figure 5.7 Difference Between the Percentage of Calls for Strikes ("C") by Month for 1988 and 1989

Figure 5.8 represents a comparison between the percentage of calls for *Solidarity* data and *Strike* data, by month, for 1988 and 1989. The two policies appear to mirror each other: In 1989, when calls for solidarity drop (April through September), this is accompanied by a proportionally higher number of calls for strikes. It would seem that, perhaps when calls for solidarity alone might have little effect -- the public arena is closed, the popular committees are operating clandestinely, the legitimate leaders have been successively removed -- that solidarity can be best promoted through the policy of strikes, which visually demonstrates the notion of "solidarity."

Analysis and Discussion. According to Israeli figures, over one-tenth of the population in the OT is employed continuously in Israel, most of these individuals (due to Israeli laws restricting employment), as day-laborers.[514] In the initial months of the Intifada, worker absenteeism in Israel -- due both to the general strikes and the curfews -- is reported by Hiltermann to have played havoc with the Israeli economy, particularly in the building industry and during the citrus harvest. As he records from a March edition of the *Jerusalem Post*, "only about 58 percent of the Palestinian labor force normally employed across the Green Line was coming to work to jobs in Israel, including Israeli settlements in the Territories."[515] By December of the first year, official Israeli

[514]Joost Hiltermann, "The Role of the Working Class," IN Nassar and Heacock's *Intifada*, p. 144.

[515]Hiltermann, "The Role of the Working Class," p. 144.




Figure 5.8 Comparison Between the Percentage of Calls for Type "A" Data and Type "C" Data by Month for 1988 and 1989

figures cited a 20% drop in the number of workers employed across the Green Line.[516] Israeli threats to replace Palestinian workers with laborers from Lebanon and southern Europe pressured many Palestinian workers to "circumvent strike calls by staying overnight [illegally] in Israel."[517] The UNLU was compelled to take a pragmatic approach to the situation of workers in its calls for strikes. As a trade unionist, quoted by Hiltermann, says, "The uprising equals life. This means that it is the task of workers to bring in money for others who are active in resistance to the Occupation."[518] While many strike days were called for, most were listed as strike days with a specific focus, such as: "to commemorate martyrs," "to mark the 16th month of the Intifada," "in solidarity with the Gazan workers," or "in solidarity with the detainees." Specific demands were not identified beyond this, nor were exceptional demands made on workers. An exception, as in Communique No.44 (17 August, 1989), would be the warning, that anyone who took the post of workers on strike would be accused of "treason."

4. **Popular Demonstrations**

Review of Data. *1988.* Table 5.5 reflects a very high proportion of calls for activities involving mass demonstrations in 1988. Indeed, with the exception of September and November, the average proportion of calls for popular demonstrations was 41%.

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[516]Ibid., p. 148, taken from the *Jerusalem Post International Edition*, March 26, 1988.

[517]Ibid., p. 151, taken from the *Jerusalem Post*, December 21, 1988.

[518]Ibid., p. 155.

Table 5.5 Popular Demonstration Calls ("D") as Frequency Data and % of Total Calls for 1988 and 1989 by Month

Month	1988		1989	
	Raw Data (Calls)	% Data	Raw Data (Calls)	% Data
January	16	38%	16	24%
February	19	33%	12	21%
March	26	33%	10	21%
April	41	39%	18	28%
May	19	32%	5	36%
June	22	42%	4	17%
July	10	50%	6	17%
August	5	31%	1	5%
September	2	12%	6	14%
October	14	47%	6	20%
November	3	9%	40	66%
December	22	8%	30	41%

1989. Table 5.5 shows an overall decline in the proportion of calls devoted to mass demonstrations, with one-quarter of the 1989 calls (on average) being targetted to popular demonstrations, while more than one-third (36%) of the calls the previous year had been so-targetted.

Comparisons. Figures 5.9 and 5.10 support these findings, graphically. From these figures, it is readily apparent that percentage of calls for popular demonstrations were lower throughout most of 1989 as compared with the percentage of calls devoted to demonstrations the previous year. This is not to say that there were significantly fewer demonstrations in 1989 as compared with 1988. Indeed, it was reported[519] that between March 13 and April 23, 1988 there were a total of 603 demonstrations which had been reported by the local press, an average of 100 demonstrations/week. For the same six-week period in 1989, this figure was reported to be 531, an average of 89 demonstrations/week.[520] Since many demonstrations go unreported as they occur in hundreds of towns, villages, and camps, these are underestimates, but they do serve as indicators that popular demonstrations continued throughout the OT in 1989, even though official UNLU calls targetted them less frequently. Many such demonstrations were

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[519]*Towards a State of Independence* (E. Jerusalem: FACTS Information Committee), September, 1988, pp. 147-148.

[520]*FACTS Weekly Review*, March 12 - 30, 1989, p. 9, and March 31 - April 22, 1989, p. 6.





Figure 5.9 Type "D" Data as % of Calls for 1988 and 1989



	1988	1989	CHANGE
JAN	38	24	-14
FEB	33	21	-12
MA	43	21	-22
APR	39	28	-11
MA	27	36	9
JUN	42	17	-25
JUL	50	17	-33
AU	31	5	-26
SEP	12	14	2
OCT	47	20	-27
NO	9	66	57
DEC	58	41	-17

TYPE D DATA

Figure 5.10 Difference Between the Percentage of Calls for Popular Demonstrations ("D") by Month for 1988 and 1989

organized independently by local popular committees. Between March 12 - 30, 1989, for instance, a total of 252 demonstrations were reported across 72 different locations.[521]

Analysis and Discussion. It must be emphasized that in the beginning, the Intifada was an ongoing spontaneous popular demonstration which erupted throughout the Territories. In the week of January 10 - 16 alone, 217 demonstrations were reported in the local press.[522] The concern of the local leadership as well as of the PLO on the outside, was how to maintain such demonstrations -- at least until strategies for a prolonged and effective uprising could be developed. Throughout the first months,

> Literally thousands of men, women, and children took to the streets in almost every town, village, and refugee camp of the occupied territories to protest against the occupation. Roadblocks and barricades were hastily erected, walls daubed with defiant graffiti and tyres set alight as an entire population made manifest their protest.[523]

Such activities had been used since 1967 to protest the Occupation, but they had not before been maintained over time. Diaries from villages kept throughout the first six months of the Intifada[524] are replete with entries which cite "organized massive demonstrations," "enormous demonstrations," "large demonstrations," "huge demonstrations," and occurrences of whole towns being "in celebration." UNLU calls throughout the first seven months of the year reflect this euphoria and encourage a wide

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[521]Ibid., March 12 - 30, p. 9.

[522]*Towards a State*, FACTS, p. 147

[523]JMCC, *The Stone*, p. 7.

[524]Compiled in *Towards a State*, FACTS Information Committee, pp. 22 - 89.

range of popular activities , from asking people to "flock to worship" on Fridays and Sundays, to staging sit-ins, hunger-strikes, and mock funerals, to chorusing chants, hoisting flags, and painting slogans. Specific dates were not always assigned to such activities, since the towns, villages, and camps often organized their own, but the calls were made to perpetuate this class of actions. It was precisely the public activities which demonstrated that Israel's control over the Territories was an illusion. And it was the Israeli response-by-force in such arenas which was captured by the international press and which openly challenged the myth of the "enlightened occupation."

The drop in calls to 12% during September of the first year is significant, particularly since the total number of calls issued in September is very low, and may reflect the banning of the popular activities late in August, a ban which would restrict the planning and coordination of popular demonstrations, although Hiltermann observes that the effect of the ban was merely to formalize harrassment that had already been the norm,[525] and FACTS highlights stories regarding the importance of the popular committees months after the ban was put into effect.[526] The November low (9%) can be attributed to the very high *number* of calls for solidarity in November. 15 November was the date of the PNC Declaration of the Palestinian National State. One would expect a *proportional drop* in other categories of calls. Additionally, however, is the fact that calls for "public demonstrations" were made within the context of celebrating unity and solidarity, both in anticipation of and following the Algiers declaration of 15 November,

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[525]Hiltermann, "The Role of the Working Class," p. 151.

[526]*FACTS Weekly Review*, April 23 - 29, 1989, p. 9.

and such calls were therefore coded (in the present study) as "solidarity" calls rather than as calls for "popular demonstrations."

The data show that calls by the UNLU for popular demonstrations were less frequent the second year of the Intifada. Supporting data also reveal that the drop in the proportion of calls devoted to mass demonstrations did not mirror a significant drop in the number of actual demonstrations reported in the local press: mass demonstrations did continue in spite of a decrease in the number of UNLU calls issued to promote this activity. One explanation would be that many of these actions were being organized by popular committees (operating clandestinely) in local settings. Knowing this, the UNLU did not have to issue calls for demonstrations as frequently. Furthermore, because towns, villages, and camps remained curfew, such calls at the "national" level made little sense: local leadership had to decide when it was possible to demonstrate openly. Other explanations likewise would point to Israeli policies of reprisal as a factor in shaping UNLU policies. By 1989, successive layers of UNLU leadership had been arrested, the grassroots leadership active in the popular committees, had been subjected to arrest and administrative detention, and the public arena essentially closed down. The remaining leadership within the OT, having become politicized by "outside" forces, could not act with the same degree of legitimacy -- as far as the *street* was concerned. The movement, to some extent, turned "inward" as individuals and families began to cope with the fallout of Israeli policies. The UNLU began to focus a greater proportion of its calls in new directions.

5. **Militant Calls**

Review of Data. *1988.* Table 5.6 details a generally constant level of calls advocating "militant activities' throughout 1988, a level which represents (on average) between 14% and 15% of the total number of calls issued. Militant calls include activities such as: calls for "daily clashes;" for using iron bars, knives, and "all combative means;" for toppling [Israeli-] appointed municipal councils/officials; for punishing non-cooperative Palestinians; for advocating "days of rage;" for issuing confrontation and ambush commands for the "strike forces;" and for conducting the "merciless war against settlers/settlements."

1989. Table 5.6 also shows that the number of calls for militant activity increased considerably during the second year, the average indicating that somewhat more than one-fourth (27%) of all calls issued in 1989 were calls for militant activities.

Comparisons. Figures 5.11 and 5.12 compare the percentage of calls for militant activities issued in 1988, with the percentage issued in 1989, as graphic representations. From Fig. 5.11 it is obvious that the percentage of calls targetting militant activities was consistently higher in 1989 than in 1988, with the exception of the month of November. Both November, 1988 and November, 1989 can be explained in terms of policy changes: 1988, changes in Palestinian policy; 1989, changes in Israeli policy. Fig. 5.12 computes the same data as differences in percentages of calls between 1988 and 1989. This depicition is striking in its portrayal of the UNLU's move in 1989 toward advocating militant activities.

Table 5.6 Militant Calls ("E") as Frequency Data and % of Total Calls for 1988 and 1989 by Month

Month	1988		1989	
	Raw Data (Calls)	% Data	Raw Data (Calls)	% Data
January	7	17%	13	19%
February	10	17%	22	38%
March	8	13%	14	30%
April	16	15%	13	20%
May	7	12%	4	29%
June	5	9%	13	57%
July	2	10%	13	36%
August	3	19%	4	21%
September	3	18%	8	19%
October	2	7%	8	27%
November	6	19%	10	16%
December	6	16%	11	15%





Figure 5.11 Type "E" Data as % of Total Calls for 1988 and 1989



	1988	1989	CHANGE
JAN	17	19	2
FEB	17	38	21
MA	13	30	17
APR	15	20	5
MA	15	20	5
JUN	9	57	48
JUL	10	36	26
AU	19	21	2
SEP	18	19	1
OCT	7	27	20
NO	19	16	-3
DEC	16	15	-1

TYPE E DATA

Figure 5.12 Difference Between the Percentage of Calls for Militant Actions ("E") by Month for 1988 and 1989

Analysis and Discussion. Two questions must be addressed here: 1) What would account for the fact that, in a movement committed to non-violence and civil disobedience, 15% of the calls issued the first year centered around militant activities? 2) What explanations can be offered to account for a near-doubling (proportionally) of these calls in the second year? Explanations of the first will center upon the character of the national movement itself, while explanations of the second will focus upon Israeli responses to the Intifada and the effects upon Palestinian society in the wake of that response. Finally, in the Chapter Summary, the question of non-violence and civil disobedience within the context of the Palestinian setting, will be addressed.

Violence as a Rational Means. The Intifada is not an event isolated in time, but exists within the context of a national movement (originally part of the broader Arab national movement) which has been building since the early part of the century, gaining momentum after the 1967 Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights. All tactics identified here as "militant activities" are tactics (as are the general strike and certain economic measures) which have been used throughout the struggle for a national state. What IS missing, is a reliance upon weapons of war and military hardware, such as were employed by the military wing of the PLO in its guerrilla strikes against Israel, launched from the frontline states of Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon in the

1970's.[527] Hence, from the perspective of the national movement, the initial years of the Intifada have been predicated upon "non-violence."

The role of violence as a pragmatic tool in the national movement has been long-debated among the PLO factions, with Arafat initially advocating it to gain the attention of the Western powers, that they might pressure Israel into accomodation with the Palestinians. The limitations of violence to bring about real change, however, were apparent to Arafat, who later often stood alone in efforts to bring consensus among the PLO factions, for joining a political process once the use of violence had achieved its goal of identifying the issue of Palestinian claims.

This pragmatic use of violence -- to move issues onto the table -- has been recognized by the leadership of the Intifada, as well. Early in 1989, when Secretary of State Jim Baker was engaged in dialogue to bring about a "peace process," he suggested reduced levels of "Israeli and Palestinian violence" in order to improve the atmosphere for talks. Questions were raised among Palestinians[528] -- did this mean throwing fewer stones? smaller stones? halving the number of demonstrations in the streets? The Israeli Peace Now movement suggested the UNLU declare a "ceasefire day" when Palestinians would join solidly to back peace initiatives by refraining from violent activities. A local Palestinian editorial commented:

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[527]For a discussion of this portion of the struggle, see Hart's *Arafat, A Political Biography*, and Helena Cobban's *The Palestine Liberation Organization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 1984.

[528]*FACTS Weekly Review*, March 12 - April 1, 1989, p. 1.

> Ideas of this kind may sound quite attractive to the outsider, but for the Palestinians they contain an obvious contradiction: it is the mass popular protests which continue to move the peace process forward. Stop the protest and the pressures for peace will be reduced. Pacification cannot lead to peace.[529]

In this uderstanding, violence is a means to an end.[530] This is not a new notion, Marx and Fanon being only two who have integrated violence as a means in their theoretical explanations of change. Others have likewise evaluated the potential of collective action as a means of effecting change. In the introduction to his study on mass mobilization and collective action,[531] Tilly cites numerous instances of eighteenth century "riots" resisting the extension of the workhouse system within certain communities in Great Britain, noting that such "disorders" were a means through which people harboring a set of shared interests, sought to initiate change. Similarly, Eckstein, in reviewing explanations of collective political violence, identifies violent political

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[529]Ibid.

[530]See Ian Lustick, "Changing Rationales for Political Violence," *Journal of Palestine Studies* (Vol 20), 1990, pp. 54-79. Lustick compares the histories of Jewish-sponsored violence in the pre-state era and the Palestinian-sponsored violence prior to the Intifada and sees solipsistic rationales on both sides in the early stages of these national movements. He notes a fundamental shift since the Intifada toward "other-directed," violence. While acknowledging the solipsistic rationale behind stone-throwing by young Palestinians, he argues that, "The discipline exhibited by the entire population in limiting the scale and nature of attacks against Israelis is indicative of a decisive shift in the balance of motivation toward other-directed violence. The immediate subjects of the violence are settlers and soldiers, but the target audience is the Israeli government and Israeli public opinion. The objective, very clearly and explicitly, is to intimidate, scare, "persuade," Israelis into ending the occupation by raising the felt costs of continuing it" (p. 75). The importance of this shift cannot be underestimated, in his estimation: if Jews and Palestinians are seeking something from each other, then at least they can move toward accomodation.

[531]Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Collective Action* (MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co.), 1978, Chapter 1.

actions as a category -- among others -- from which groups wishing to bring about change, can choose.[532] This distinctly rational orientation to the use of violence is significant in situations wherein violence is an *inherent* feature of the political landscape, due to structural or cultural anomalies. In such circumstances, Eckstein notes, the choices available to a people seeking change are between methods involving *more* or *less* violence -- not over the efficacy of using violence, per se.

For Palestinians living more than two decades under Israeli military occupation, violence has been a presence at all levels of daily life. Indeed, the spontaneous eruption of mass protest which became the Intifada was a blatant manifestation of the dissonance created for Palestinians by the daily process of coming to terms with violence to property, to person, and to the psychological self. In calling for specific categories of militant activities on a regular basis, the UNLU recognized the latent potential of this violence, and sought to shape and to control it, to ensure that violence remained a means and did not become an end unto itself.

Violence Within the Intifada. What happened the second year? Figure 5.13, taken from Israeli Army sources,[533] clearly illustrates the increased use of weapons after the

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[532]Harry Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence," IN Ted R. Gurr, Editor, *Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research* (NY: The Free Press), 1980, pp. 135-166.

[533]Published in JMCC's *The Stone*, p. 18.




Figure 5.13 Use of Weapons by Palestinians
December 1987 - November 1991

Source: *The Stone and the Olive Branch*
The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre
Jerusalem, 1991

first year, and points to a new UNLU policy of supporting militant activities. Voices from the West Bank and Gaza answered this question variously, as follows:[534]

(1) The occupation was trying by every means to shape the Intifada, and to remove it from the phenomenon of public action into the realm of more violent, individual actions.

(2) Soldiers can stop you at any time and ask to see your ID. You are assumed to be a 'terrorist' if you carry one of these [green card, signifying time spent in jail]. You are subject to random interrogations and beatings should the soldiers stop you anywhere.

(3) What corrupted the movement was the Israeli response. They misread the intentions and saw it as a security issue ... In the first year 14 leaders were deported -- when you lose that percentage of your leadership, the struggle changes: the people moving in to fill the vacancies are not as experienced, do not have the same skills or followings, and may not have the same agendas.

(4) When one of her daughters was three, she saw her father shot and killed [by the soldiers]. She ran after the soldiers screaming, 'You killed my father! You killed my father!' One of the soldiers chased after her and beat her so hard she had to crawl home.

(5) There was also a change in the collaborator phenomenon. The collaborators began to be given violent tasks to perform [by the Israeli military]: to throw molotovs into the house of a Fatah person one night, another, a PCP, another a PFLP, etc. to factionalize the movement.

(6) But then [after the first year], most of the respected leaders of the struggle were imprisoned and, after many of these people were tortured and had very bad experiences, they came out advocating different means: they dropped the idea of non-violence.

(7) The movement became more violent as people began to feel they had nothing to lose, and as their anger and frustration grew. Also, without leadership -- and normal family life or even the concept of 'family' -- young men began to organize themselves ... These men had only thrown

[534]Quotes taken from a series of interviews held in the OT during the summer of 1992.

> stones the first year and a half -- now they began to use guns and molotovs.

What were people living with in their daily lives? Harsh Israeli responses included extended curfews, during which villagers could not go to work, could not obtain food or water (especially when utilities were cut), could not harvest crops, and were forced to watch livestock die. Between March 12 and March 31, 1989, for example, some 50 towns and villages had been held under curfew for a total of 243 days, most for at least 4 days, and many for over half the entire period of time.[535] It has been estimated that each Palestinian living in the OT has spent "an average of ten weeks under in-house curfew."[536]

The use of force, including live ammunition, rubber bullets, teargas, and beatings, have taken many Palestinain lives. Figure 5.14 reflects data taken from the local press,[537] and shows the number of deaths which have resulted from the use of force by Israeli soldiers or settlers, or as a result of orders from Israeli soldiers. Many of these deaths occurred during military sieges against towns or villages, military operations often begun in the early morning hours and involving several hundred border police and soldiers. One account includes descriptions of an "organized, indiscriminate shooting spree" at the village of Nahleen (near Bethlehem) on 13 April, 1989 during which at least 50 residents suffered serious gunshot wounds and at least 4 were confirmed dead when soldiers fanned out among houses and trees and began shooting at anything moving.

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[535]*FACTS Weekly Review*, March 12 - April 1, 1989, p. 8.

[536]JMCC's *The Stone*, p. 35.

[537]JMCC's *The Stone*, p. 29.




Figure 5.14 Intifada Deaths
December 1987 - November 1991

Source: *The Stone and the Olive Branch*
The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre
Jerusalem, 1991

Troops then entered homes, beat residents, broke furniture and windows, destroyed food supplies, and punctured water tanks.[538] A similar siege recorded at Idna village lasted from 16 March - 21 March, 1989 and resulted in beatings, killings, the demolition of three homes, the destruction of personal property, and the dynamiting of water storage tanks before the soldiers finally withdraw -- and after which a military helicopter arrived and sprayed the village with teargas.[539] In addition to policies being maintained by the military, vigilante settlers were also allowed to lay siege to villages, impose curfews, and use live ammunition against village residents. If the military intervened at all, it was not to restore order. "Rather, troops arriving on the scene continue the harrassment, declaring curfews, searching homes, carrying out mass arrests, and firing live ammunition at Palestinian residents who resist them."[540]

Additional tactics included the demolition or sealing of homes (Fig. 5.15)[541] and the uprooting of olive trees and destruction of agricultural land (Fig., 5.16).[542]

Quantitative Response. All of these policies led to anger and frustration and served to promote a climate of violence, but for the UNLU, the challenge to the implementation of policies of non-violence and civil disobedience came when:

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
[538]*FACTS Weekly Review*, April 2 - April 22, 1989, pp. 7 - 10.

[539]*FACTS Weekly Review*, March 12 - April 1, 1989, pp. 14 - 15.

[540]*FACTS Weekly Review*, April 30 - May 20, 1989, pp. 4 - 6.

[541]JMCC's *The Stone*, p. 36.


[542]Ibid., p. 40.



Source: JMCC records from local press

Figure 5.15 House Demolitions and Sealings
December 1987 - November 1991

Source: *The Stone and the Olive Branch*
The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre
Jerusalem, 1991



Source: JMCC records from local press

Total = 467 Incidents

Figure 5.16 Tree Uprooting and Burning Incidents
December 1987 - November 1989
Source: *The Stone and the Olive Branch*
The Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre
Jerusalem, 1991

> Israel began to adopt policies which made it impossible for the Palestinians to express themselves in a politically non-violent way. Israel began to fill populated areas with soldiers and observation towers to watch for the first signs of a gathering, after which they would begin shooting randomly, into the crowds. Such popular demonstrations became impossible under these conditions.[543]

Figure 5.17 depicts graphically, the UNLU response to this. Reflecting both necessity and the mood of the people, calls for popular demonstrations are clearly lower in 1989 than they were in 1988, while calls for militant actions are much higher the second year. The exception is the month of November. Two things can be said about the peak (near 60%) for the percentage of calls for demonstrations in November, 1989 as compared with November, 1988. The first is that Israeli policy changed in November, 1989 from high-profile use of force to one less confrontational and one in which Israeli soldiers were "encouraged to avoid engaging in clashes with Palestinians in their population centres."[544] JMCC reports that Palestinian fatalities dropped by nearly 50% in November, indicating that the effects of the new policy were demonstrated immediately.[545] Hence, the one-month increase in calls for demonstrations may reflect this sudden change in the "climate." A second point to be made is that 15 November, 1989 was the first anniversary celebration of the Declaration of Independence for the Palestinian state, and the week preceding the 15th was observed with great festivity. Calls for demonstrations of celebration the previous year had been masked (in the coding

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[543]Interview with Ghassan al-Khatib, in East Jerusalem, 8 August, 1992.

[544]JMCC's *The Stone*, p. 31. The new tactics also included an increasing reliance upon clandestine surveillance, utilizing the Shin Bet and collaborators, and placing Israeli sharp shooters on rooftops, turrets, etc., to monitor events.

[545]Ibid.




Figure 5.17 Comparison Between the Percentage of Calls for Type "D" Data and Type "E" Data by Month for 1988 and 1989

of these data) by calls for unity and solidarity due to the announcement of the new (controversial) political agenda of the PLO leadership, which accepted UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338: hence, the apparent increase in the proportion of calls for demonstrations in November, 1989. Figure 5.17, then, explicitly reflects the change in UNLU policy orientation, as a pragmatic move away from mass popular demonstrations and toward more singular activity, activity frequently involving militant actions.

Qualitative Response. Qualitatively, what types of militant activities are targetted? Communiques the first year call for activities such as throwing stones and molotovs, using sticks and slingshots, building roadblocks, burning tires, confronting soldiers and settlers, organizing days of rage, and intensifying the struggle. They call for resignations of those employed by the Civil Administration, warning those who do not comply and asking others to confront delinquents -- often, to "strike with an iron fist" those in non-compliance (UNLU Communique #16), and they call on enhanced roles for the strike forces.

In contrast, communiques for 1989, while including many of the activities cited above, highlight more specific foci. The problem of collaborators is one of these. Communique No.37 (31 March, 1989) calls on strike forces to avoid violence, reserving violence for use,

> only against enemies, collaborators, and losers who must be eliminated from our ranks by exposing them, proscribing them socially, and beating them until they announce their repentance. We warn against ... statements

> ... containing names of decent citizens ... [which serve] to undermine and create confusion.[546]

Communique No.44 (17 August, 1989) warns people, "Do not liquidate any agent without a central decision from the higher command . . . no agent should be executed without a national consensus and a chance to repent."[547] This particular call, late in 1989, reflects the divisive impact of Israeli policies of using collaborators -- often through blackmail and/or bribery -- as the Israeli command was moving away from high-profile, high-confrontational policies which characterized the response throughout the first two years. Actions taken by strike forces against suspected collaborators were swift and extreme, and pronounced enough to provoke Faisal Husayni to issue a call in mid-August, 1989, not to assassinate people suspected of collaborating. In his opinion, "Palestinians have been killing innocent people whom they suspect of collaborating with authorities."[548]

Besides collaborators, another focus of militant actions was the Israeli regime -- the military as well as the settlers, which had often been acting as a paramilitary force. Communique No.38 (11 April, 1989) calls for confrontation "with all means" to avenge the souls of the martyrs, calls for strike forces to attack "herds of settlers, border guards, and the army with molotovs," and calls for "activities of all methods to confuse the enemy and paralyze its movement."[549] Communique No.39 (30 April, 1989) calls for confrontation and escalation to commemorate martyrs of the Palestinian working class,

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[546]FBIS-NES-89-062, 3 April, 1989, p. 7.

[547]FBIS-NES-89-159, 18 August, 1989, p. 2.

[548]FBIS-NES-89-156, 15 August, 1989, p. 22.

[549]FBIS-NES-89-069, 12 April, 1989, pp. 3 - 6.

and sets aside a day of "unique popular wrath" on which there will be confrontations and clashes with "molotov cocktails and knives to avenge martyrs."[550] Late in June, days for escalating the struggle are identified and the "war of molotov cocktails against soldiers and settlers" called for.[551]

In short, Israeli policies of harsh reprisals led the UNLU to move away from initial policies of non-violence and civil disobedience, which featured demonstrations of mass protest -- policies which were adhered to by masses of Palestinians at the outset[552] -- and to move to individual kinds of activities, activities which often included more militant actions. This re-orientation was facilitated both by a people increasingly disposed to violence, having themselves experienced extraordinary violence daily from the Israeli regime, and by the fear of betrayal from those members of their own families and communities who had been blackmailed into service for the Israelis. What this did for Israel, was to provide it with the rationale it needed for meeting the uprising with unmitigated force. If Palestinians could be provoked to violence, the cameras would no longer present the image of a lonely David hurling his stones at a massively armed Goliath for a sympathetic world review.

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[550]FBIS-NES-89-082, 1 May, 1989, pp. 1 - 4.

[551]UNLU Communique #41, 12 June, 1989, in FBIS-NES-89-113, 14 June, 1989, pp. 3 - 5.

[552]One West Bank Palestinian described an incident in which a lone Israeli soldier found himself swallowed up by the crowd in the streets during a demonstration in the early months of the Intifada. the crowd took his helmet, broke his gun, and let him go, untouched.

Summary Discussion

With the inception of the UNLU a month after the Intifada's beginnings, the tasks of this new, internal leadership were no less than daunting. Against the backdrop of change precipitated by Israel's response to the UNLU's policies, the UNLU made its bid for leadership in order to direct events of the uprising both to *prolong* it and to *shape* it. In so doing, the policy outline which this leadership elected to develop was that of non-violence and civil disobedience. That their implementation of this policy orientation differed significantly from the Gandhian example must be admitted. Gandhi's methods of *satyagraha*, themselves required extensive training, training which would have been difficult to administer within the tightly controlled Territories. Further, it must be admitted that this orientation was foreign to the Palestinian national cause, the armed *fedayeen* having been the image of the liberator since the Occupation. The fact that violence was contained to the extent that it was (consider conditions in South Africa, for instance), is a testament to the success of the UNLU overall policy. Strikes and economic boycotts and the symbolic violence of the young stone-throwers, remained the *primary* means of protesting the Occupation throughout the Intifada.

Summary of UNLU Goals

Prolonging the Intifada. Prolonging the Intifada involved promoting policies which drew in all sectors of society and which recognized the strengths -- and the limitations -- of each. Importantly, it established a routine of organizing activities via the regular publication of calendars in the communiques, while leaving details to the localized

leadership of the popular committees. In this, as described in Chapter 4, democratic principles became the norm, and suggestions for calls to action bubbled up from the grassroots leadership below, to reach the decision-making political leadership (factions) above, of which the UNLU itself was comprised. Not insignificantly, the UNLU evaluated what was possible for the people to bear, in terms of hardships linked with specific policies. While winning the "war of the shops," for example, Palestinians lost ground in other areas -- non-compliance with identity card requirements, the withholding of taxes, the ability to achieve self-sufficiency in agriculture, etc. -- and the UNLU was compelled to re-evaluate the direction of its policies in accordance with the dialectics implicit within the Israeli response.

Shaping the Intifada. Shaping the Intifada involved developing a strategy which would give the Intifada meaning in terms of both 1) the national movement and 2) the national experience. The national movement had long postulated the demise of Israel as a Zionist enterprise, and the national experience, particularly since the beginning of the Occupation, had included universal suffering, documented by widespread violations of human rights as well as recognized violations of international law pertaining to the rights retained by an occupied people.

The Palestine National Movement. The UNLU approached the former from a "realist" stance, and formulated calls which moved to dissociate Palestinians from "integration" with Israel. For this new, pragmatic leadership of the Intifada, the legitimacy of Israel as a nation-state was accepted, and the national goal for Palestinians was to achieve an independent nation-state of Palestine beside the state of Israel. The

means for de-linking with the Israeli Civil Administration involved raising the price of Occupation for Israel, and centered largely upon mass public demonstrations (which openly challenged Israeli control) and upon economic strategies, which included: withdrawing labor from Israel, withholding taxes, boycotting Israeli goods, developing a self-sufficient agricultural sector, and manufacturing Palestinian goods. These were maximum goals, and had to be readjusted in accordance with the dialectics of Israeli policy-making, which made full compliance -- especially regarding economic policies -- very difficult, particularly after more than twenty years of intensive Israeli-promoted integration between Israel and the Territories.

The Palestine National Experience. The UNLU drew directly upon the national experience under Occupation in its policies to shape the Intifada. While garnering a reputation for factionalization at the political level, Palestinians had developed -- throughout the history of Israeli Military Administration -- a concomitant history of working together at the *social* level. A variety of charities and committees had been organized during the 1970's to address the problems of daily life -- the need for roads, clinics, schools, hospitals -- met only inadequately by the administrative authorities. Likewise, labor unions, student unions, and professional organizations had come together to meet challenges faced in their respective arenas by life under Military Administration. Before the Intifada had passed through its first month, popular committees began forming spontaneously throughout the hundreds of towns, camps, and villages in the OT, to meet crises resulting from curfews, deaths, physical injury, school closures, arrests, and military sieges of towns and villages. The UNLU drew upon and encouraged this movement to

facilitate the implementation of its policies and, not incidentally, to bolster the development of parallel institutions of governing, a crucial step in Palestinian disengagement from Israel. The popular committees played their role so successfully, that Israel outlawed them within a year as posing a "security threat," and the activities of both the popular committees and their leaders were thereafter driven underground.

Summary of Data

Throughout the first two years of the Intifada, the UNLU followed policies which reflected the dialectics of what was possible, given Israeli military control over the Territories. During both years, Calls to Action were issued by the UNLU in all policy areas: solidarity, economic activities, strikes, popular demonstrations, and militant acts. *The first six months* reflect a concern with keeping the Intifada in "the street," and fully 38%[553] of the calls were devoted to popular demonstrations. Strikes and other economic activities comprised 28% of the calls during this period, revealing the importance attached to disengagement from the colonial economic relationship imposed by Israel.

The *second half* of the year saw the national public arena effectively closed by Israeli policies (though local communities were able to organize independently), with mass arrests, the imposition of curfews, the arrest and deportation of leaders, and the popular committees outlawed. In response to this, calls for popular demonstrations declined slightly, to 35%, and calls for solidarity were escalated from 26% the first six

[553]The percentages cited in this section reflect six month averages: January - June, 1988; July - December, 1988; January - June, 1989; and July - December, 1989.

months to 32% the second half of 1988. Calls for economic actions dropped abruptly, from 10% the first half of the year, to 3% in the second half.

The big change in the second year, 1989, was the drop in calls for popular demonstrations, from 38% in the first half of 1988 to 25% during the same period in 1989, and the doubling of calls for militant activities, which went from 14% during the first six months of 1989.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY DISCUSSION: THE MEANING OF THE INTIFADA

Research Findings: A Review

Introduction

The central question of this study has been to define the role of the Palestinian leadership throughout the first two years of the Palestinian uprising, or, *Intifada.* As the latest -- and perhaps, last? -- chapter in the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, the Intifada has itself become a case study.[554] The movement began as a spontaneous public response to a collision between an Israeli military transport and a vehicle carrying Palestinian day laborers. The accident occurred in Jabaliya, Gaza on 8 December, 1987, and by the following day, demonstrations had spread throughout the Gaza Strip and had ignited centers of protest within the West Bank.

As a popularly initiated movement, the Intifada evolved, virtually overnight, into an organized resistance effort with a political leadership which issued communiques that

[554]See Ian Lustick, "Writing the Intifada: Collective Action in the Occupied Territories," *World Politics* 45 (July, 1993), 560-594 for a review of key literature spawned by the Intifada.

served to mobilize all sectors of Palestinian society. These communiques also provided a two-week calendar of activities, thereby enabling coordination of events throughout the course of the movement. This leadership, the Unified Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), very quickly developed a policy orientation which reflected a commitment to achieving the movement's goal of "shaking off" Israeli domination, through non-violence, and by means of actions of civil disobedience. Significantly, the UNLU adopted a decision-making style which was not only democratic within its own circle, seeking agreement from the four political factions, but was constantly informed by the grassroots, below. It was the grassroots "social leadership" which was responsible for implementation of UNLU policy decisions at the local level, and the degree to which the Intifada was successful -- many argue that the first two years reflect its greatest success -- correlates roughly with the period during which this dialectic was maintained.

The Intifada was undertaken in a political atmosphere of control. Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip, and the West Bank, lands formerly held by Syria, Egypt, and Jordan, respectively, had evolved from administrative policies designed to ensure Israeli security (the Occupied Territories providing a land buffer between Israel and the front-line Arab states) to policies specifically designed to create facts-on-the-ground. Policies of acquiring Palestinian lands to establish Israeli settlements tormented Israeli commitments to "rule of law" through nefarious "legal" means of appropriation (or more typically, expropriation) of Palestinian lands. The policy also required separate codes for adjudicating violations of the rule of law. While Israelis were subject to Israeli civil courts, Palestinians were frequently tried before military tribunals.

Israel's vision of one day re-establishing *Eretz Israel* through the annexation of the Territories, thus carried with it high costs for both sides.

Most sources have agreed that the uprising caught everyone by surprise, including Israel and the PLO. Palestinians living under Occupation (or Palestinians *inside*) were believed to be docile, overwhelmed by Israeli military superiority, and thoroughly engaged in their struggle to survive the labyrinth of Military Orders (in excess of 1200) which governed their lives.[555] Indeed, Israel had occupied Arab lands since June of 1967. During this time there had been random acts of violence from time to time, targetting Israeli soldiers, Israeli settlers, and occasionally Israeli citizens themselves, but throughout twenty years of harsh military rule, there had been only a few small uprisings and these had been short-lived. It was also believed that Palestinians inside had left their liberation (permanently) up to diasporan Palestinian initiatives, particularly those emanating from the PLO, and to the efforts of the Arab states, especially the front-line states, and to linkages with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

This study finds answers to why the Intifada occurred as it did and to why it occurred when it did, to be complicated by the history not only of Arab/Zionist aspirations, but by the factional schisms which have defined the Palestinian national

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[555]Raja Shehadeh, *Occupier's Law: Israel and the West Bank* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1988) details the effects of the Military Orders upon the lives of Palestinians under occupation. See also: National Lawyers Guild, *Treatment of Palestinians in Israeli-Occupied West Bank and Gaza* (New York: National Lawyers Guild, 1978); Naseer H. Aruri, Editor, *Occupation: Israel Over Palestine* (Belmont, MA: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1983); Don Peretz, *The West Bank: History, Society, and Economy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); and Meron Benvenisti, *The West Bank Data Project: A Survey of Israel's Policies* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984).

movement, by the interactions between both diasporan and occupied Palestinian populations, and by definitions of the democratic Israeli state and the convolutions which the rule of law have undergone at the hands of Israel-the-Conqueror.

The Review

Until January, 1988 the history of political leadership acting within the Occupied Territories (OT) was checkered.[556] Not only were most initiatives taken from *outside* (PLO), but such initiatives, though sensitive to the mood *inside*, reflected an external agenda. The external "national" agenda, while acknowledging social concerns,[557] both with respect to Palestinian refugees and for the national movement itself, lacked a social dimension within the OT: means of coping with the realities of Occupation had been addressed primarily by Palestinians living within the Occupation setting.[558] After 1982 and the PLO's ouster from Lebanon, the PLO did (out of necessity) begin to look inside the OT, and the year prior to the Intifada saw Abu Jihad working to build socio-political

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[556]Ibrahim Dakkak, "Back to Square One: A Study in the Re-emergence of the Palestinian Identity in the West Bank 1967-1980," IN Alexander Scholch, Editor, *Palestinians over the Green Line* (London: Ithaca Press, 1983), and Emile Sahliyeh, *In Search of Leadership* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institute, 1988).

[557]Helena Cobban, *The Palestinian Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). Cobban discusses the organization of the PLO, with a diagram of the hierarchical beaureaucracy. The Social Affairs Department, "manages a network of social welfare schemes, which at one stage in the early 80's aimed to reproduce in the Palestinian *diaspora* the services provided to disadvantaged members of society by the most modern form of welfare state." (Emphasis, mine)

[558]This view was expressed countless times during interviews with activists and others within the OT.

structures from his office in Amman.[559] That the efforts were unsuccessful in promoting rebellion would (in general terms) be accounted for by the fact that the hierarchical PLO leadership linked its aid and resources to the support of Fatah's programs,[560] alienating an emerging leadership which was well-educated, pragmatic, and linked with factions whose agendas included the restructuring of Palestinian society itself, and which therefore, emphasized the social needs of the Palestinian community. PLO efforts were also unsuccessful, however, because of the tough Israeli policies which destroyed these efforts (perhaps) before they would have come to fruition:

> All these attempts to establish a cornerstone were crushed by the Iron Fist policy of the Israeli government: there was nothing here when the Intifada began. That is why it has taken us five years![561]

Throughout the 1970's and 1980's, self-help initiatives via Charitable Societies, labor unions, student and professional unions, and women's organizations had evolved,[562] spawning a social leadership generally independent from the PLO-sponsored political structures, although there were points of overlap. These efforts focused on enabling Palestinians to cope with the demands of the Occupation.

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[559]J. Kristen Urban, *Conflict Resolution: Assumptions Behind the Approach* (Jerusalem: Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs, 1992). This subject was raised during a Roundtable Discussion conducted at PASSIA on 15 August, 1992.

[560]Ibid.

[561]Ibid., p. 22.

[562]Joost Hiltermann documents the process of mobilization in *Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

It must be recognized here, that the Palestinian case, like other movements of self-determination, finds a subordinate population pitted against a dominant regime.[563] However, unlike most other such movements, the relationship between the two is defined by the efforts of the dominant, regime to control the lives of Palestinians under Occupation and by Israeli fears that such control would be wrested from them, compromising the security of the nation-state of Israel. Hence, Palestinian attempts at building structures by which to organize national initiatives were always met with forceful Israeli resistance. The development of social organizations was generally exempt from Israeli reprisals, although the emergence of any leadership figures always made such figures targets, if not immediately of deportation or imprisonment, at the least, of house arrest or the banning of their participation in any dialogues, verbal or written. Further, policies restricting freedom of speech in the press, in assembly, or within the classroom were generally enforced.

That the Intifada caught the PLO by surprise reflects in the main, the degree to which the PLO had developed an agenda separate from that of its "constituents" within the OT. Several such constituents asserted:

> The Intifada was an expression of dissatisfaction against Israel AND against the Palestinian leadership, a leadership which had been unable to address these issues successfully. The Intifada was a REACTIVE action.[564]

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[563]For a review of Third World revolutions, see Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," *Politics and Society* 17 (December, 1989), pp. 489-510.

[564]Personal interview in East Jerusalem, 25 July, 1992.

> If you read the Intifada not as a war against Israel, but as a mutiny against the old values, you will be closer to the truth.[565]
>
> The main cause of the Intifada is because the old people did not deliver the goods.[566]

But if the "old people" -- the external leadership -- were caught by surprise, members of the internal leadership were not:

> In the 80's there were a number of uprisings, but none were sustainable -- they did not last for long periods of time. We [a political faction] were analyzing this from 1986 on, to see what the patterns were and how this might be facilitated. We saw that each time the *intifadas* lasted longer and longer and realized that the situation could explode: the Occupation was simply intolerable.[567]

Within weeks, the internal political leadership came together as the UNLU, and recognizing both the necesssity of coordinated activities, strategies, and goals, and the power of the social leadership which had reconstituted itself (within days of the uprising) as *popular committees* in every locality, coopted these grassroots initiatives, acceeding to this social leadership both the flexibility and the authority to implement UNLU's broadly defined policies. The social leadership also retained the responsibility for organizing the localized popular response to the calendar of resistance activities, designated as the Calls to Action. Through this dialectic, established between the UNLU and the grassroots leadership, the UNLU maintained its legitimacy, a legitimacy which was reinforced by Territory-wide adherence to the Calls. The UNLU Calls to action, it is argued in this

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[565]Roundtable discussion, in East Jerusalem, 15 August, 1992. See Urban, pp. 20-25.

[566]Ibid.

[567]Personal interview, in East Jerusalem, August, 1992.

study, themselves came to reflect the evolution of a Palestinian "Constitution."[568] Incorporating both political and social values of a Palestinian people seeking self-determination, the communiques in effect codified such values as they arose on the ground.

UNLU policies, especially those orchestrated around non-violence and civil disobedience, were highly successful the first six months. Harsh policies of reprisal by the Israeli military government were instrumental in deflecting their success. Policies targetting the leadership through arrests and deportation, requiring new ID documents (thereby compelling Palestinian cooperation with the Civil Administration), outlawing the popular committees (forcing their activities underground), and preventing popular demonstrations and peaceful mass activities by flooding public areas with hundreds of troops and well-positioned sharpshooters, coupled with policies of mass arrests, began to change the character of the movement. Palestinians began to drop their commitment to non-violence. By the end of the first two years, a primary concern within the Palestinian community had also become the question of Palestinian/Palestinian violence, as the issue of Israeli-backed collaborators and the "swift justice" meted out to them by Palestinian strike forces took on a life of its own.

Perhaps in an effort to contain the response to externally targetted violence, thereby preserving the essential commitment to nonviolence while recognizing the mood

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[568]Nassar and Heacock referred to the communiques as having been, "transformed into a sort of a biweekly legislative-executive-judicial document with the force of a constitution," in Jamal R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, "The Revolutionary Transformation of the Palestinians Under Occupation," IN Nassar and Heacock, Editors, *Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads* (New York: Praeger, 1990), p. 191.

of the people, UNLU communiques themselves began to include a significantly greater number of "militant calls" the second year. Policy formulation was complicated, however, by the fact that the authorship of the UNLU communiques appears to have undergone a change as well. A leadership "coup" is evident within the first six months, after which, it has been suggested, activities began to be directed from the *outside*. The takeover would roughly correspond to the announcement by Jordan that it was severing its administrative ties to the West Bank, and to subsequent PLO initiatives in the international arena, initiatives which culminated in the 15 November, 1988 Declaration of Statehood. This appears to have been followed, the next summer, by a Fatah takeover, reasserting a narrowly conceived hierarchical decision-making process which circumvented the established social leadership entirely. After this time, the Intifada itself became routinized and grassroots leaders were asked, in effect to maintain status-quo Intifada activities, such as strikes and demonstrations. The communiques, formerly serving to inspire Palestinians living out the Intifada, from this point on, lost their inspirational quality, were characterized by a linear construction, and reflected expedience and a commitment to activities undertaken in the global, rather than the immediate Palestinian, arena. "People used to read the communiques from beginning to end," a Palestinian journalist commented. "Now they immediately turn to the last page to find the Calls to Action, so they know when to observe the next strike."

From this time forward, the local leadership, representing cooperation between the (grassroots) social and the (factional) political leadership, lost its essential decision-making role in organizing the Intifada. While this reflects the PLO's assertion of power,

it also reflects a level of necessity imposed by Israeli policies. The Intifada was part of the long-standing national movement, and had brought global attention to the Palestinian Question in a way that the PLO's politically driven agenda had never been able to. The Intifada compelled Israel to reasses the costs of its Occupation, not only in economic and political, but in moral terms as well. The PLO leadership recognized the importance of the Intifada and it could not afford to be sidelined when Israeli policies of decapitating the leadership and driving the popular committees underground threatened to squelch the movement. Hence, the PLO/Fatah takeover -- while operating explicitly at the level of power politics -- was necessary (it could be argued) to effect a continued resistance on the ground. Further, once external players, namely the United States and the Soviet Union, began to enter the dialogue, it fell to the PLO leadership (which had, since 1974, served as the "sole legitimate representative" of the Palestinian people) to step in as the Chief Negotiator of Palestinian claims.

The charge levelled at the PLO by Palestinians *inside*, who had served as members of the UNLU, as part of the social leadership, and/or as union and political activists, reflected anger not at the FACT of PLO domination, but at the MANNER of its decision-making. It was, after all, the process of a democratically organized Intifada which had been responsible for the heighths of the Intifada's success. This represented an ideal upon which Palestinians living under Occupation, expected to build a Palestinian national state.

Challenge to Theory

Theories attempting to explain conflict are abundant. Eckstein[569] has examined a number of these and decided upon two broad classifications in an effort to categorize them. One group he labels, "Contingency Theory" (CT) and the other, "Inherency Theory" or the "Collective Action" (CA) approach. Explanations falling within the CT camp,[570] including those offered by Gurr, Davies, Burton, and others, are characterized by their view that social violence requires an external trigger to be realized. An outbreak of violence, therefore, is *contingent* upon a spark, which then ignites a sector of the population in an affective wave of response to the events on the ground. The Los Angeles riots following the Rodney King verdict in May, 1992, would serve as an example. Explanations falling into the CA camp,[571] whose chief exponent has been

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[569]Harry Eckstein, "Theoretical Approaches to Explaining Collective Political Violence," IN Ted R. Gurr, Editor, *Handbook of Political Conflict: Theory and Research* (New York: Free Press, 1980).

[570]Included prominently in this camp: Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970); James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (February, 1962), pp. 5-19, ALSO "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great REvolutions and a Contained Rebellion," IN Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, Editors, *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives* (Washington, D.C.: National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, 1969); John W. Burton, *Deviance, Terrorism, and War: The Process of Solving Unsolved Problems* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979).

[571]Representative work includes: Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1978); Harvey Waterman, "Reasons and Reason: Collective Political Activity in Comparative and Historical Perspective," *World Politics* 33 (July, 1981), pp. 558-560; Samuel Popkin, "Political Entrepreneurs and Peasant Movements in Vietnam," IN Michael Taylor, Editor, *Rationality and Revolution*

Tilly, see violence as a rational choice and collective action as the means by which violence becomes rational -- it being irrational for individual members of society to resort to violence on their own. This branch of conflict theory is generally grounded in classical Marxist assumptions concerning the social order and the means of seeking change.[572]

Contingency Theory

In Theory. CT explanations appeared during the 1960's and 1970's as attempts by Western analysts to explain post World War II national movements and the trauma of "modernization"[573] in terms with which such analysts were most comfortable. Such terms reflected their own understandings -- and concerns -- about liberal democratic systems and about their concerns with disequilibrium. System-directed challenges represented a threat to the status quo, and if undertaken by violent means (what Lustick[574] refers to as "illegal" violence) such challenges threatened not simply the

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(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Michael Taylor, "Rationality and Revolutionary Collective Action," IN Michael Taylor, Editor, *Rationality and Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

[572]Hence the alternate title, "Inherency Theory," which would suggest the fact that societies characterized by particular social structures are *inherently* violent, although Eckstein also speaks of *cultures* as being characterized by violence, which would seem to bear "racist" overtones.

[573]Pioneering works in a non-Western setting include: Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967); and, among others examining the "problems" of development, Dankwart Rostow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967.

[574]Lustick, p. 561.

authorities in power, but the democratic system of securing change and hence (importantly), the system of governance, itself.

Besides its connection with systems theory, however, this approach was developed within a rational bureaucratic framework, and CT explanations reinforced values derivative of this. Chief among these is the value of *prescription.* Systems analysts mobilize their diagnostic skills to identify systemic weaknesses, the directive being: if the system is broken, isolate the locus harboring the defect, and repair it. By assigning a specific "trigger" or "spark" to an outbreak of violence, a managerial advantage is gained by the state: prescriptive policy can be ordered and the threat of violence -- and future(?) violence (if learning can be assumed) -- is negated.[575]

A less cynical logic is more commonly advanced, however, to explain the rationale of the CT approach regarding the "volcano theories" of social violence, and such logic reflects Lockean assumptions which are both cherished by and central to the proponents of Western liberal democratic theory. These explanations call up the social contract and argue that for people whose actions suddenly explode into violence, the contract has been (or is perceived as having been) broken: the state is not protecting their interests. Further, that political venue has been denied. Democratic theory, which is linked with liberal economic theory, assumes competition in the political marketplace. It is taken for granted that certain interests will win out over others, but, importantly, that all interests

[575]Interestingly, violence is almost never seen, in this view, as a safety-valve for the system -- an indicator of systemic imperfection or faulty design -- but as a defect to be patched. This bias is peculiar to social scientists, and not to true design engineers, whose imperative is to develop competitive improvements.

will somehow be represented. When certain interests continually languish "at the gate," needs can be said to remain unmet by the state. This approach, with elaboration, leads to deprivation theory, such as Davies' J-curve,[576] which links economic deprivation and rising expectations to outbreaks of violence; to human needs theory which, after the arguments of Burton,[577] asserts the necessity of meeting psychosocial needs to avert societal violence, and thence to social control theorists such as Sites,[578] who would seek to implement policies of control to address such needs; and to psychotherapeutic approaches which, in the work of Kelman and of Doob,[579] assume conflict to arise from the misperception of other contenders within the democratic field, in effect denying or threatening the individual identity of the "other." In all but the last of these, the role of the state is central, as it is the state's imperative to address unmet needs or blatant inequities as part of the obligations of the contract. It is unclear in the latter (distinctly individualistic) approach, exactly what the state's relationship to ameliorating the conflict would be.

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[576]See Footnote 18.

[577]Ibid.

[578]Paul Sites, *Control, the Basis of Social Order* (Dunellen Publishers, 1973).

[579]Herbert C. Kelman, "Creating Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26 (March, 1982), pp. 39-75; "Overcoming Barriers to Negotiation of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 16 (Autumn, 1986), pp. 13-28; and "Acknowledging the Other's Nationhood: How to Create a Momentum for the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22 (Autumn, 1992), pp. 18-38. ALSO Leonard W. Doob and William J. Foltz, *Resolving Conflict in Africa: The Fermeda Workshop* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970) and, "The Belfash Workshop: An Application of Group Techniques to a Destructive Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 33 (December, 1989), pp. 676-699.

Theory Applied. Given this set of assumptions, what can be said about the relevance of CT explanations as applied to the Palestinian uprising? Lustick, in his review of "Intifada literature," observes "the strong attacks [levelled] by most of these authors on 'volcano' accounts of the intifada,"[580] and moves away from any discussion of their relevance. In defense of this response, it must be stated that liberal democratic theory cannot, of itself, be applied to the Occupied Territories: there is no social contract between an occupied people and the controlling military regime. Further, in signing on to CT explanations of the Intifada uncritically, one runs the risk of reducing explanations to their simplest terms. There *was* a bureaucratic imperative, from the perspective of Israel's administration of the Territories, and the fact that the authorities focused upon events in Jabaliya (upon the affective response alone), assuming the initial flames would burn themselves out if "managed" properly (i.e., with sufficient force), reflects reductionist thinking.

It is my belief that CT theory does offer explanatory power for the category of violence it is designed, *as theory*, to explain: the initial outburst, which occurred on 9 December, 1987 and which continued for several days beyond that. While such an explosion does NOT reflect a broken social contract, for reasons cited above, it DOES represent a breach in the system of Israeli administration within the OT. Moreover, this was a breach which represented a threat both to the status quo and to the system of "governance" which had been established on the occupied lands.

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[580]Lustick, p. 584.

An Explanation. The history of the Occupation has been, for Palestinians, a history of unfulfilled needs. Deprivation was fostered by the Military Administration through Military Orders which regulated monetary exchange and Palestinian economic undertakings, restricted employment in hi-tech and professional jobs (designated as "security risks"), closed educational facilities at will, held towns, villages, and camps under extended curfews, and confiscated Palestinian land. Violations of person included harrassment, arbitrary arrest, beatings, torture, and the Military's practice of violating homes at will, beating inhabitants and destroying property. While certain social needs could be met through self-help measures, creating a coping network within families and neighborhoods, there was no government entity which could address these needs. Hiltermann[581] documents extensively, measures undertaken through PLO channels to organize the grassroots through unions to improve conditions, particularly after 1982, but the general perception (as noted earlier) was that Palestinians *inside* were on their own.

By the mid-80's there was also a gap in expectations. When oil prices dropped, less money came into the OT from family members working in the Gulf, the Gulf States themselves cut back on their support for the OT, there was a break in relations with Jordan, and social conditions in general were tense. To make the gap even more stark, thousands of Palestinian day-laborers travelled into Israel daily to work at low-paying menial jobs and brushed shoulders with the disparity between life in Israel and life in the Territories.

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[581]Hiltermann, especially pages 50-90 and 160-170.

While basic needs of food and shelter were met, needs which Maslow would argue are primary needs (although olive groves could be destroyed, vineyards sprayed with defoliants, under curfew crops would rot in the fields, and homes could be sealed or bulldozed at the discretion of the Military), Burton's psychosocial needs were in short supply. Security needs and control needs, in particular, remained unaddressed. Identity needs such as outlined by Davies[582] as dignity needs and self-esteem needs were, however, met through affiliation with the *group*, as he suggested they would be. The largest group affiliation, of course was with the "group" called *Palestinians*, although as Hiltermann documents, by the eve of the Intifada, there were many sub-groups, both social and political, through which individuals could find such needs met.

Gibb,[583] addressing the resolution of conflicts in an organizational setting, writes that new needs become ascendant at each level of social development. This would suggest that as the degree of organization became more complex throughout the 1980's, a new social and political leadership began to emerge, a well-educated, pragmatic leadership which, having been raised at the end of Israeli guns, had lost its fear of them. Empowered, and feeling (after 1982) that their liberation could only come from within -- the external forces could no longer be counted on to effect change -- and having acquired greater needs for control over their own lives, for autonomy, and for self-

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[582]James C. Davies, "Maslow and Theory of Political Development: Getting to Fundamentals," *Political Psychology* 12 (September, 1991), pp. 389-420.

[583]J. Gibb, *Trust: A New View of Personal and Organizational Development* (Los Angeles: The Guild of Tutors Press, 1978).

determination as a people, the Palestinians of Gaza and the West Bank were only awaiting a "spark" to set them aflame.

Recall the words of one activist: "We saw that each time the *intifadas* lasted longer and longer and realized that the situation could explode." This spark was insignificant in and of itself -- it was only a trigger, a unifying event which constellated the response. It could have occurred a month earlier or three weeks later, perhaps, but the collision in the streets of Jabaliya occurred on 8 December, 1987, and on the 9th everyone was in the streets. The rationality came with what followed. And what followed, was constructed upon what had been set in place before.

Collective Action Theory

In Theory. While CT theory adequately explains short-term bouts of societal violence, especially those occurring within Western democratic systems, its theoretical machinery is not sufficiently complex to address the dynamics of *movements* which challenge the efficacy of a political system. Theories of collective action directly address such phenomena, and can be used to explain the Intifada. Theories of collective action trace their roots to Marx's understandings that revolution is the only means by which a subordinate people/class can effect genuine change in a superstructure controlled by the interests of a dominant people/class. Hence, violence is a rational choice for engineering dramatic social change. What such theory requires is a cohesive class or "group" of people, which choose to act collectively in pursuit of their goals. In short, it requires "identity." Assumptions underlying this orientation include the assumption of

mobilization -- that the entire population will focus its efforts around the actions and goals of the group; that organizations exist by which to coordinate a campaign of resistance and/or violence; and that there exists a leadership which in effect, constitutes a parallel government and which is seen to have legitimacy to define policy. In this, there is the additional assumption that policies are rationally defined, with clear understandings of costs and benefits to the movement itself. And finally, it is an implied assumption that a revolutionary movement will need time to see its ends realized. Movements, therefore, unlike the "sparks" of CT theory, are neither spontaneous nor affectively constellated.

The Intifada became such a movement within a month, during which time the social leadership crystallized as *popular committees* to meet immediate needs resulting from harsh Israaeli policies of reprisal. Concomitantly, a political leadership, the UNLU, emerged to provide a coherent decision-making mechanism by which to coordinate and direct the resistance movement. The concern of the political leadership was to maintain popular involvement in challenging the Occupation for as long as possible, forcing Israel to recalculate the costs of occupying a recalcitrant population.

Theory Applied. It is difficult to delineate specific stages in the development of the Intifada as a movement of collective action, however. Like other aspects of the Intifada addressed in this study, overlapping relationships were the rule, both in terms of time and in terms of mechanisms by which entities interacted. A linear logic would suggest an ordering approximating the following, an ordering which takes in elements required by CA theory: *Needs* give rise to *Demands*, which result in the constellation of

Groups seeking to address the *Demands*. *Groups* foster an *Identity* (a group-identity being safer than a strong individually-centered identity in a coercive or controlling environment), which in turn builds *Organizations* and promotes *Leadership* in order to develop *Policies/Actions* by which to effect *Change*.

The role of *Needs* and *Demands* has been reviewed in the earlier application of CT theory. Questions arise, at present, however, as to the linkages between *Groups, Identity, Organizations, and Leadership*. It is true that leadership did not flower of its own. It would be difficult to decide whether leaders built the organizations or whether the organizations provided an arena for leadership. Davies, not intending to speak on behalf of CA theories (which Ilustrates the strain on this dichotomy), would assert that group identity comes first. Such an identity, based on shared deprivation -- i.e., shared suffering and shared cooperation -- empowers members of the group. One can only assume that perhaps at this locus in time, two events happen simultaneously. For some members of society, an individual identity crystallizes, promoting leadership tendencies (at risk to the individual, but framed within the context of the group-identity). For others, this self-identity finds its realization in participating in collective actions.[584] That

[584]It would be difficult to assess to what degree such identity, group-defined, would actually constitute "autonomy" in the sense identified by Joel Feinberg, "Autonomy" (pp. 27-53) and Gerald Dworkin, "The Concept of Autonomy" (pp. 54-105), BOTH IN John Christman, Editor, *The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). It would seem, however, that while there is coercion in solidarity, the costs of not participating being unacceptably high, there is still room for individually calculated costs and benefits -- there were collaborators, after all! It must also be emphasized, that individuals acting in solidarity were acting not only with great risk (vis-a-vis Israeli reactions), but with great creativity, as well. The fact of the existence of thousands of popular committees, each serving different needs in different ways, depending upon the local community, would attest to this. I would argue that this

political leaders, union leaders, students, and organizers of women's movements had been so successful in organizing the grassroots throughout the 1980's would seem to support this logic. In the initial weeks of the Intifada, this pattern already established, leaders of popular committees sprang to the fore at the same time as such committees splintered into tens of directions to address community needs.

Lustick recognizes the importance of these diffuse linkages when he cites Aya's work, a Tillian, who himself emphasized the importance of:

> The political, organizational, and mobilizational tasks that need to be accomplished to translate diffuse anger into collective political action and that, once accomplished, provide strategic explanations for its occurrence.[585]

Sustained rational action, actions which invite a violent response -- and Tilly (as well as Gandhi,[586] who developed *satyagraha* as a political tool) makes the distinction between violent actions and non-violent actions which (by design) draw a violent response -- require not only discipline and persistence, but a high degree of organization. Organization in the Intifada included not only political communication networks which were on the ground prior to the Intifada ("we had lists with phone numbers throughout the OT," one activist explained), but task-oriented groups ready to carry out -- and to develop -- specific assignments. Thousands of popular committees spawned education committees, food acquisition committees (for towns, camps, and communities under

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reflects, on the part of the participants, a strong sense of individual autonomy.

[585]Lustick, p. 587.

[586]See Joan V. Bondurant, *Conquest of Violence: The Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).

curfew), strike forces, watch committees, medical care committees, stone-throwing brigades, tree-planting committees, all to deal with the repurcussions of UNLU policies and the Israeli response. In addition, a plethora of cottage industries (one-and two-room shops making baby food, bridal wear, children's clothing, toys, men's clothing) sprang up to reinforce the efforts of the Intifada and to meet demands for primary goods, goods formerly provided by the Israeli market.

While there is overlap between Groups and Identity and between Identity, Organizations, and Leadership, there is also overlap between Organizations, Leadership, and Rationality, the implicit factor in CA theory. In short, the promotion of a social revolution is not a linear undertaking.

An Explanation. Collective Action theories, as noted, assume that social violence, rather than being spontaneous and affective, is characterized by rationality, which includes a calculation of costs and benefits related to its actions, and which involves both discipline and persistence on the part of all who join in collectively. Tilly[587] outlines what he calls a "revolutionary situation," which occurs when -- in a coercive environment, for instance -- a condition of multiple sovereignty comes to exist. Such a condition, Tilly asserts, involves: 1) the appearance of a core group which lays out claims in the name of the primary group; 2) the acceptance of the claims advanced by this group; and 3) the inability of the regime to block the activities of the group (even) by extreme repression. In the case of the Intifada, a condition of multiple sovereignty was very explicit. The UNLU appeared as the core group, issuing its first

[587]See Tilly, Chapter 7: "Revolution and Rebellion," pp. 189-220.

communique one month after the uprising began.[588] While acknowledged as the parallel authority, however, such legitimacy was conditional, depending as it did upon the UNLU's recognition of the grassroots initiatives. Inotherwords, sovereignty here, rested with "the people." It could be argued that the appearance of the UNLU created a case of multiple-multiple sovereignty, in that the UNLU slipped into a gap left vacant by the PLO, itself.[589] That the PLO appears to have been unwilling to share the political space with the grassroots leadership as the Intifada progressed, also raises questions of its legitimacy as a sovereign within the OT, particularly if/when the Israeli authority finally withdraws from the political space and Palestinian "autonomy" becomes a reality.

The rationality of the Intifada has also been noted within the study both in terms of process and in terms of policies. *Rational processes* regarding decision-making were in effect from the beginning, with policies being openly discussed among the UNLU leadership and input being received from grassroots linkages "below." The cares and concerns of the people, who would receive the brunt of Israeli reprisals, were taken into

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[588]Of course, the initial "core group" for the Palestinian national movement was the PLO, the existence of which so threatened the Israeli government that not even Israelis were permitted to meet with perceived PLO-members. For years, Israel had attempted to promote an "alternate leadership" and a stream of U. S. diplomats came searching for "moderate leaders" inside the OT. Under normal circumstances, it would have been considered "treasonous" for Palestinians *inside* to set themselves as an alternate leadership (which would split the national cause, as Israel was attempting to do). Events moved so quickly, that the UNLU was faced with a new reality -- and, infact, began acknowledging very quickly that the communiques were authored by the UNLU and the PLO, to prevent such division.

[589]Others also slipped into this lacuna, and throughout the course of the Intifada, democratic institution-building was an ongoing process, particularly in East Jerusalem, which is governed by Israeli laws, not by the Military Administration.

account whenever possible. It was, in fact, this *process* which structured the UNLU's legitimacy as the parallel government.

Evidence of *rational policies* is straightforward. Non-violence was adopted as the over-arching policy to neutralize Israel's strength, its military might. In opening fire upon unarmed demonstrations, Israel was forced to confront its weakness. This in fact also accounts for the harsh policies of reprisal: if Israel could provoke Palestinians to violence, Israel could also justify (to an increasingly critical world audience) the necessity of using its "strengths," by fighting violence with violence. Civil disobedience was a policy choice to effect disengagement from the Israeli Civil Administration. Such policies so threatened Israel that stiff Identity requirements were enacted to compel Palestinian linkage with the Israeli authorities. Economic policies such as commercial strikes, boycotts of Israeli goods, and attempts to build a self-sufficient economy were likewise rationally conceived, both to harm Israel economically (the OT having been forced into a neocolonial linkage with Israel) and to initiate an economic base from which to establish a future Palestinian state.

All of the elements discussed in this section were vital to the success of a movement based on collective action. The crucial factor, in my view, however, was that an explicitly rational political leadership was willing to acknowledge the significance of the grassroots social leadership and, in effect, to coordinate its agenda with leadership from below. This in itself was possible because of the degree to which Palestinians had previously been organized (an organization which had arisen out of necessity, as a means of coping with the Occupation) and because of the universal experience of suffering for

all Palestinians living under Occupation, an experience which served as a bond of solidarity. Such solidarity could promote the national movement and the harsh demands of collective action above concerns for power.

A Summation. What can be said about the Eckstein dichotomy of the theoretical approaches to explaining such conflict? First, it must be noted that he is not alone in making such distinctions, a fact which (it could be argued) in itself would suggest that the dichotomy reflects a level of truth. Waterman[590] structured his review of studies involving rebellions and revolutions so as to assess the validity of the CT approach in light of alternative theory centering on collective action. Also Skocpol[591] creates four theoretical divisions by splitting approaches by Marx, Johnson,[592] and Tilly each into separate categories and allowing Gurr to represent psychological/deprivation approaches.

From the foregoing application of CT and CA orientations to the Intifada, it would seem the distinctions reflect temporal displacement along a continuum characterized by the degree of violence across time. Social violence, itself, may generally be sparked affectively. Depending upon the extent of the "grievances" and the flexibility of the

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[590]Harvey Waterman, "Reasons and Reason: Collective Political Activity in Comparative and Historical Perspective," *World Politics* 33 (July, 1981), pp. 558-560.

[591]Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 6-14.

[592]See especially, Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little Brown, 1966). For Johnson, asserts Skocpol (p. 11), "political authority in society must be legitimized in terms of societal values." In this, she explains, he draws from the Parsonians and from Marx in that he views societal change as taking place within a macro-sociological system.

political system, it will then either be "resolved" (or "managed") according to the assumptions of CT theory, or it may escalate into a more persistent level of violence which, under "optimal" conditions, becomes subject to the rationality of a movement of resistance maintained by actions of the collective.

Structuralist Theory

In Theory. Eckstein's dichotomy does not itself reflect the universe of theory relating to the phenomenon of social violence. Structural analysis, such as that developed by Skocpol,[593] rejects the focus on explaining violence itself, and downplays the voluntarist role frequently ascribed to leadership. Instead, in analyzing the occurrence of specific revolutions, she emphasizes three elements linked with the structural integration of society. First, the historical setting of the state must be taken into account, and particularly the international setting in which a given state finds itself, since international pressures can augment situations of internal crisis for the state. Second, the multiple loci of power within the sociopolitical system must be described and the relationships which exist among them, defined, especially as those relations themselves create conditions which accelerate internal crises. And third, a structural analysis must examine the role of the state. That is, it must take into account the way in which the machinery of the state relates (by means of its own organizaitons) with other states, with the institutions of economic power within the society, and with the social class structure of that society.

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[593]Skocpol, *States*.

Theory Applied. Structuralist factors are a part of the Palestinian/Israeli equation. Israelis are in control and Palestinians under Occupation have been a subject people. Moreover, the superstructure -- inclusive of the Military Orders, which define the boundaries of activity, the Civil Administration, which translates the Orders into the daily life experience for each Palestinian, the Military Courts to which Palestinians are remanded for justice, and the military machinery which safeguards the superior position of the state -- are wholly a product of the dominant regime. For Palestinians to realize genuine change in their lives, the regime controlling this superstructure must be replaced, and a new ordering of values set in motion. Classical Marxist prescriptions would advocate violence. Goodwin and Skocpol[594] link the probability of bringing such change about through violent (revolutionary) means with several factors.

In an analysis of Third World revolutions, Goodwin and Skocpol developed a number of categories by which to discuss the variety of social movements/revolutions which have taken place, roughly since the 1950's. Regimes subject to successful revolutionary overthrow are those characterized by exclusionary political processes and by repressive governmental policies. Israeli administration of the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip is characterized by these factors, and this particular case, along with several others, is listed under the heading, "Directly Ruled Colonies." The authors do not explicitly discuss the Palestinian/Israeli situation, but their observations about this category of governance can readily be applied.

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[594]Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," *Politics and Society* 17 (December, 1989), pp. 489-510.

As is true for other regimes ruling their colonies directly, Israel's administration of the Occupied Territories has deliberately sought to restrict political access for Palestinians. Exclusionary policies targetted to deny the development of a legitimate leadership within the Territories, policies which included for example, a plethora of Military Orders restricting travel, free speech, the freedom to assemble, the free-flow of ideas, the movement of capital from the diasporan community, all left little space for revolutionaries to mobilize within the OT. However, in so doing, the regime's policies also served to radicalize Palestinians against the regime, leaving little legitimate room within the Palestinian community for moderation. When Israel attempted to bridge this gap by establishing the village leagues, such efforts were villified as disingenuous (naive?) attempts to coopt Palestinian support for the regime and in effect to paper over the illegalities (and moral weaknesses) of the Occupation, itself. That Israel selected the most illegitimate members of Palestinian society to effect this bureaucratic linkage is a measure of the regime's insensitivity to the demands of a people for political space. It is noteworthy that among the most significant UNLU policies in the first months were those calling for the resignation of Palestinians employed by the Civil Administration, whether as policemen or as bureaucrats in tax offices, centers regulating the implementation of identity requirements, or other "official" capacities. Palestinian non-cooperation with the Civil authorities was a direct acknowledgment of the exclusivity of Israel's administrative policies, and of the narrowness of its regime.

That policies of rule were repressive, has been well-documented in this study. Appropriation of Palestinian lands, control of water and resources, limitations placed on

economic development and free trade were harsh policies, relentlessly pursued. Particularly repressive, however, were policies of coercion designed to control political development and the emergence of a national leadership. Individuals were harrassed, arrested arbitrarily, held without charge, tortured, subjected to house arrest, or deported outright. Collectively, families and communities were subjected to land expropriation ("re-location" of villages), to the demolition of homes, destruction of agricultural land, olive and citrus groves, and vineyards, and to lengthy periods of curfew.

An Explanation. What do these observations contribute to explanations regarding the outbreak and the success of the Intifada? A structural analysis, emphasizing the relationship between the regime and the subject population would suggest that the development of organizations, coupled with the emergence of a legitimate alternative leadership, while necessary, does not explain everything. Structural factors, defined by the practice of "force-fitting" bureaucratic policies into a political space distorted by the effects of those very policies, themselves predisposed the regime to revolutionary challenge. Movements of revolution (or rebellion), in this view, are not voluntarist but are subject to deterministic forces. In the present case, then, the tensions along the interface defining the interactions between Palestinians and the Israeli Administration, and more specifically, those tensions resulting from both the narrow exclusivist character of the regime (which denied political space to all Palestinians and, moreover, which radicalized Palestinian opposition itself), coupled with the imposition of harsh, repressive administrative policies (which violated both person and property), meant that the Intifada's occurrence was a certainty.

It must also be added that, from a broader perspective, the dissonance inherent in the logic of a democratically conceived nation-state adopting ideologically driven policies to justify the occupation of another people, itself, was self-destructive. As the shape of the Occupation evolved, Israel was driven toward ever harsher, ever more exclusivist policies, policies predicated on values which had been rejected from the inception of the Jewish national state as lying beyond the pale for legitimate political systems.

An Explanatory Model

It appears then, that the development of theory in assessing the meaning of conflict and the occurrence of social revolutions (or revolutionary movements or movements of rebellion) must be brought together to offer a satisfying explanation for the occurrence of the Intifada. It is my intention, here, to propose such a model, a model which integrates the structural realities with the contentions of CT and CA approaches. This includes the existence of factors emphasizing the following. (1) The significance of a twenty-year Occupation characterized by unmet needs, and (2) the development of social groups which enabled communities to cope, and which, not incidentally, fostered a sense of Palestinian identity which became the basis for the cohesive solidarity which drove the Intifada. (3) On a parallel level was the development of a factional political network throughout the OT, funded and directed from the various factional headquarters located abroad. (4) With the outbreak of the uprising, this internal leadership coalesced as the

UNLU and, conceding the necessity of the localized popular committees (outgrowths of the social leadership), began to develop policies and (5) to issue the Calls to Action via numerous UNLU communiques. Such Actions, directed against the Israeli regime, generated (6) excessively violent responses from the Military Administration as it sought to bring the Territories "under control." Before considering a depiction of a model of the Intifada, however, it will be helpful to examine a model which reflects the pre-Intifada dynamics.

Dynamics Preceding the Intifada

In Figure 6.1 two interfaces define the political environment. The horizontal interface reflects th plane along which Palestinians and the Israeli leadership interact. The vertical interface represents the boundaries across which Palestinians under Occupation (Palestinians *inside*) and Palestinians of the diaspora (Palestinians *outside*) interact. Note that as the two planes intersect, diasporan Palestinians are confronted by Israeli state officials and policies (i.e., policies targetting the PLO, for instance), while Palestinians *inside* face the Military Administration, whose commanders, while under broad direction from the prime minister and the Knesset, have considerable autonomy within the OT.

The structure itself thus defines two cells with respect to the Palestinians. Prior to the Intifada, the dynamics can be described as follows. Throughout twenty years of Occupation, Israeli Actions (K), via the Military Administration, impacted Palestinian lives, creating abundant Unmet Needs (A'). The effects of these Needs were felt in two ways. At one level such needs spurred the development of a social leadership (H) to




Figure 6.1 Pre-Intifada: Internal and External Factors Driving Palestinian Leadership Before the Intifada

address the needs and the creation of an organizational network (D') to implement such programs. This, in effect, constituted a "coping loop" within Palestinian communities. At another level, Unmet Needs (A') created overt Demands (B') which served to foster an Identity (C'). Such an identity provoked Actions (I) directly -- actions as diverse as "terrorist" acts against soldiers/settlers/civilians, as well as clandestine negotiations between individual Palestinians and Israeli notables, and artistically creative efforts by Palestinian painters, sculptors, playwrights, and poets which challenged the Occupation obliquely. A perceived Identity also facilitated the development of organizations (D') and a commitment on the part of workers, students, women, and professionals (especially during the 1980's) to become mobilized in "resistance" efforts. These organizations were both promoted by, and themselves spawned, the development of a political leadership (G), which (except for the Communist Party members) received its agenda from abroad. While there was some overlap between the loop created by the political leadership and that of the social leadership, this was not extensive: the two agendas were, in the main, distinct.

A similar set of interactions was set up within the diasporan community. Israeli state policies -- the decision to evict Palestinians from their land and homes after 1948 and the decision to occupy the Territories in 1967, for example -- led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians, the "refugee problem," and claims for Palestinian self-determination. These reflected Unmet Needs (A), political as well as social. Such Needs gave rise to Demands (B) which fostered a distinct Palestinian Identity (C). The development of an Organization (D) to address the Needs of the

Palestinian people is abbreviated in this model, but was eventually formulated as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and included social and military bureaucracies as well as the parliament-in-exile, the Palestine National Congress (PNC). Decisions were made hierarchically with the PLO Executive Committee determining policy, although the open discussion of factional differences was part of this process. The PLO leadership and the factional leadership abroad promoted activities within the OT via connections to their factions *inside*. The PLO also developed Policies/Actions (F) which were implemented abroad -- "terrorist" hijackings, armed struggle across Israel's borders, as well as diplomatic ventures among Arab states and with the United Nations.

Dynamics of the Intifada

Figure 6.2 depicts several changes. Chief among these is the fact that the agendas of the political leadership and the social leadership covered the same ground, resulting in a dialectic between the two which resulted in a genuine, internal Legitimate Leadership (E'). Politically this was called the UNLU, but in fact, it represented the UNLU *plus* the cooperation of the grassroots leadership. This leadership (E'), formally the UNLU, working through Organizations (D') issued communiques which defined the Actions (I) of the collective.

A second major change with the development of the Intifada was the addition of Israeli violence (J) which, through specific Actions/Policies of the Military Administration (K), impacted the Palestinians in multiple ways, one of which was to provoke internal violence (L), which both targetted the regime through UNLU policies (I) and (dotted line)




Figure 6.2 Maintaining the Intifada: Internal and External Factors
Driving Palestinian Leadership During the First Two Years

swept down to challenge Identity (C') as collaborators (or suspected collaborators) were meted out "justice" directly. Israeli violence (J), which was far in excess of the levels of such violence during the Occupation, itself, was deliberately provoked by UNLU policies of Nonviolence and Civil Disobedience to demonstrate to the Israeli public that the benign Occupation of the Territories was a myth, to "announce" that the costs of Occupation would escalate for Israel, and to reveal to the global audience the repressive character of the Israeli regime. Israel's violent response provoked Actions by the Military (K) -- a flurry of new Military Orders, mass arrests, deportations, policies of beatings, etc. -- which targetted Palestinians at a number of loci. Specifically, the legitimate leadership (E') was targetted as well as the popular committees bound up with them. Palestinian Identity (C') was targetted via attempts to force Palestinians to integrate with the Civil Administration and to break the back of the resistance.

Throughout these developments, the PLO was initially sidelined. Its connections were with the factional leadership and it did not know the leadership spearheading the popular committees. (Several activists remarked on the fact that no external funds, for instance, were sent in to support the work of the popular committees because the PLO leadership -- Fatah? -- "did not know who these people were."[595])

Eventually, as Israeli tactics became more harsh and the layers of leadership were successively removed, the external leadership (E) replaced the legitimate internal leadership (E') entirely and Actions were directly initiated from abroad through the

[595]Interviews on the West Bank and in Gaza, Summer, 1992.

factional leaders *inside*. The communiques, however, were still signed by both the "UNLU" and the "PLO."

Review

In summation, this model accomodates not only the dynamics of the Intifada, but also the explanatory theoretical components, themselves. *Firstly*, the theater of action is defined by structural realities, an Israeli/Palestinian interface and a Palestinian/Palestinian interface.

Secondly, the initial spark which ignited the Intifada can be seen conceptually as arising from the history of Israeli Military Actions (K) as they shaped life in the Territories, creating a host of Unmet Needs (A'). The affective component of this was fed by the realization by many Palestinians living under Occupation that the PLO had not addressed such needs, and by feelings of empowerment which had crystallized through the emergence of an Identity (C') which had been strengthened through participation in an array of groups and Organizations (D') and (H). This outburst of energy constellated Actions through the arc C'-I (dotted line), which symbolizes the Demonstrations of 9 December, 1987.[596]

Thirdly, the rational, organized efforts by which the Intifada was managed and maintained involved the D-G-H-E' loops through which policies were developed,

[596]This arc also represents the Actions of individuals taken independently, some violent, others involving attempts at negotiations with Israelis. These actions occurred outside the organized Policies/Actions defined by the UNLU.

explicated, and implemented, resulting in specific collective Actions (I). These efforts were made possible by a history of self-help and by an extensive process of mobilization, elements of which were spearheaded by the PLO, particularly in the 1980's, and by a sense of solidarity which defined Identity through participation in the national cause.

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