





To the Graduate Council:


I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Sellers C. Lawrence entitled "The Demos Dethroned: A Study of the Support for the Four Hundred at Athens in 411 B.C." I have examined the final copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts with a major in History.


J. D. Bing, Major Professor

We have read this thesis
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:


Vice Provost
and Dean of The Graduate School

STATEMENT OF PERMISSION TO USE

In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Master's degree at The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, I agree that the Library shall make it available to borrowers under rules of the Library. Brief quotations from this thesis are allowable without special permission, provided that accurate acknowledgment of the source is made.

Permission for extensive quotation from or reproduction of this thesis may be granted by my major professor, or in his absence, by the Head of Interlibrary Services when, in the opinion of either, the proposed use of the material is for scholarly purposes. Any copying or use of the material in this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.

Signature William C. Lawrence

Date August 5, 1937

THE DEMOS DETHRONED: A STUDY OF THE SUPPORT FOR THE
FOUR HUNDRED AT ATHENS IN 411 B.C.

A Thesis
Presented for the
Master of Arts
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Sellers C. Lawrence
August 1987

ABSTRACT

In June 411 B.C. the democratic government of Athens was overthrown and replaced by the government of the Four Hundred. In September the latter was in turn replaced by a broader oligarchy of the Five Thousand. Sometime in May 410 this regime gave way to the restoration of full democracy. This thesis examines the individuals and groups of Athenians who supported the moves to limit or destroy democracy in this period. Who were the active members of the conspiracy to establish the Four Hundred? How widespread was the support for oligarchy within the citizen body of Athens? How were the conspirators able to overthrow the established democracy?

The major sources for the events of 411/10 are the eighth book of Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War and Aristotle's Athenaion Politeia. Though they disagree on some details, these two works provide a connected account of the oligarchic movements and shed light on the motives of the participants. These are supplemented by a variety of other ancient sources: contemporary orators (Antiphon, Andocides and Lysias), comic playwrights (Aristophanes, Plato, Eupolis and others), and later historians and scholars (Xenophon, Diodorus and Plutarch). Also, inscriptions from the period provide valuable details.

The oligarchic movement at Athens received support from a broad section of Athenians. Not just wealthy and aristocratic knights, but many hoplites of moderate means shared a desire to change the government. This sentiment was a result of earlier trends which had reduced the social prestige and political power of both the

upper classes and the hoplites. More important was the economic pressures on individual property owners created by renewed war with Sparta, the occupation of Decelea, and the loss of revenues from the empire. The absence of the poorer citizens, the thetes, and the support of many hoplites enabled the Four Hundred to seize power, but the members of the oligarchy and its most enthusiastic supporters were from the wealthy knights. The Four Hundred fell when the hoplites withdrew their support and the oligarchs quarreled among themselves. The government of the Five Thousand was not a return to full democracy, which shows the hoplites wanted to implement the idea of a government restricted to those of hoplite status. The revival of Athenian naval power brought about the restoration of full democracy and the recognition of the rights of the thetes.

PREFACE

Athenian politics of the fifth century B.C. has been the subject of centuries of historical scholarship, so it may seem that nothing new can be said on a major episode such as the oligarchy of the Four Hundred in 411.* However, the previous scholarship leaves much to be desired in its emphases and approaches to the oligarchy. The reign of the Four Hundred is not so attractive a topic for historians as Periclean Athens or the Sicilian Expedition. No monograph exists on the oligarchy or even the last decade of the Peloponnesian War. Studies on Thucydides' history of the war are numerous, but his narrative of the Four Hundred appears in his last book, which he left incomplete and unrevised, so the incident receives limited discussion in modern analyses. The events of 411/10 are covered in general histories of Athens or Greece, but description of the Four Hundred is usually reduced to a few pages. Significant scholarship appears in journal articles, but these are often narrowly focused on different aspects of the period and do not cover the oligarchic movement comprehensively.

The emphasis in much of the discussion of the Four Hundred is limited in scope and sometimes misplaced. Much of the scholarship on the oligarchy can be summarized by the subtitle of a Mabel Lang article, "Chronology and Constitutions." Both of these topics arise from Aristotle's Athenaion Politeia. This work and book eight of Thucydides are the two major sources for the events of 411, but they

*All dates will be B.C. unless otherwise stated.

do not always match on details of events. Chronology will not be a major issue in this study. In most cases the accounts are compatible and extensive discussion of chronological details would be distracting. The other topic which has dominated scholarship on the Four Hundred is the nature of the "constitutions" found in the Athenaion Politeia. These documents will be discussed in Chapter III, but they will not receive the attention they often do (with extensive study of minute details), since they are, in my view, only propaganda and were not implemented by the oligarchs.

The subjects often neglected in studies of the Four Hundred are the backgrounds of the men in the conspiracy and the motives of the groups which supported the movement to limit or destroy democracy in Athens. Many historians simply refer to the oligarchs, or they divide them into extreme and moderate oligarchs, without any discussion of their social and political backgrounds. Other historians stress groups formed around individuals such as "those around Antiphon" or "the men with Theramenes." This approach recognizes the importance of personal relations in Athenian politics, but it also downplays broader social and political groups in the oligarchic movement. In addition, most studies treat only the persons actively involved in the conspiracy of the Four Hundred, excluding the larger group of Athenians who gave some degree of support to restricting democracy.

This thesis will examine the individuals and groups of Athenians who supported, in varying degrees, the movement to limit or replace democracy in Athens. While there have been some attempts

along this line, no major study accurately and fully discusses the backgrounds and motivations of these groups. This study will cover both the active oligarchic conspirators and other Athenians, particularly those of hoplite status, who desired changes in the democracy. The government of the Five Thousand, which succeeded the Four Hundred will also be discussed as a continuation of oligarchic sentiments. An emphasis on the backgrounds of participants and the motives of individuals and groups should provide a better means of understanding the events of 411 and 410 than a stress on chronology or constitutions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTERS	PAGE
I. BACKGROUND TO A REVOLUTION	1
II. THE OVERTHROW OF THE DEMOCRACY IN ATHENS	28
III. THE SUPPORT FOR OLIGARCHY IN ATHENS	46
IV. THE REACTION AGAINST THE FOUR HUNDRED AT SAMOS AND ATHENS	71
V. THE INTERMEDIATE REGIME AND THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY	88
VI. CONCLUSIONS	108
BIBLIOGRAPHY	119
APPENDIX	128
VITA	131

ABBREVIATIONS

Ar.	Aristophanes
Arist.	Aristotle
<u>Ath. Pol.</u>	<u>Athenaion Politeia</u> ascribed to Aristotle
Dem.	Demosthenes
Plut.	Plutarch
Thuc.	Thucydides
Xen.	Xenophon
Ps.-Xen. <u>Ath. Pol.</u>	<u>Athenaion Politeia</u> found in manuscripts of Xenophon but believed to be the work of an anonymous late fifth century Athenian known as the Old Oligarch.

SECONDARY WORKS AND JOURNALS

<u>ABSA</u>	<u>Annual of the British School at Athens</u>
<u>AClass</u>	<u>Acta Classica</u>
<u>AJAH</u>	<u>American Journal of Ancient History</u>
<u>AJP</u>	<u>American Journal of Philology</u>
<u>ATL</u> 3	<u>The Athenian Tribute List</u> , vol. 3, B. D. Meritt, H. T. Wade-Gery, and M. F. McGregor.
<u>BRL</u>	<u>Bulletin of the John Rylands Library</u>
<u>CAH</u> 5	<u>The Cambridge Ancient History</u> , vol. 5
<u>CJ</u>	<u>Classical Journal</u>
<u>CP</u>	<u>Classical Philology</u>
<u>CQ</u>	<u>Classical Quarterly</u>
<u>CR</u>	<u>Classical Review</u>
<u>CSCA</u>	<u>California Studies in Classical Antiquity</u>

<u>FAC I</u>	<u>The Fragments of Attic Comedy</u> , vol. I. J. M. Edmonds.
<u>FGrH</u>	<u>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</u> . Felix Jacoby.
<u>GHI</u>	<u>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions</u> . Russell Meiggs and David Lewis.
<u>HCT</u>	<u>A Historical Commentary to Thucydides</u> . A. W. Gomme, (vols. 1-3); Gomme, A. Andrewes and K. J. Dover (vols. 4-5).
<u>IG I²</u>	<u>Inscriptiones Graecae</u> , vol. I, 2nd ed.
<u>JHS</u>	<u>Journal of Hellenic Studies</u>
<u>LCL</u>	Leob Classical Library
<u>PCPS</u>	<u>Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society</u>
<u>REA</u>	<u>Revue des Etudes Anciennes</u>
<u>REG</u>	<u>Revue des Etudes Grecques</u>
<u>TAPA</u>	<u>Transactions of the American Philological Association</u>

CHRONOLOGY

431	Beginning of the Peloponnesian War
429	Death of Pericles
421	Peace of Nicias between Athens and Sparta
415	Sicilian Expedition; Affair of the Herms; Alcibiades' exile
413 Spring	Peloponnesians fortify Decelea
Fall	Athenian defeat in Sicily
412 Summer	Revolt of Athenian allies in the Aegean
Fall	Alcibiades contacts leading men in the fleet
December	Peisander proposes oligarchy to assembly
411 February	Failure of Athenian embassy to Tissaphernes
Spring	Reign of terror in Athens initiated by conspirators
Early June	Peisander returns; Assembly at Colonus (see Map 2, Appendix); The Four Hundred seize power
Mid June	Reaction against oligarchs in fleet at Samos (see Map 1, Appendix)
July	Recall of Alcibiades by the fleet
September	Fall of the Four Hundred; Government of the Five Thousand established
Late Fall	Athenian victories at Cynossema and Abydos (see Map 1, Appendix)
411/10 Winter	Departure of Theramenes from Athens; Return of Thrasyllus
410 April	Athenian victory at Cyzicus; Spartan fleet destroyed
May-June	Restoration of full democracy at Athens
405	Athenian fleet destroyed at Aegospotami (see Map 1, Appendix); Siege of Athens
404/3	Tyranny of the Thirty; Restoration of Democracy

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND TO A REVOLUTION

Classical Athens' reputation as the birthplace of democracy is well deserved; almost every concept or institution associated with democracy was first conceived and practiced in ancient Athens. However, in the late fifth century the democracy of Athens was twice replaced by narrow oligarchies. In 411 the defeat of the Sicilian expedition and Athens' deteriorating position in the Aegean War gave the impetus to a movement to overthrow the democracy and establish the Four Hundred. The final defeat of Athens and Spartan occupation enabled the Thirty Tyrants to seize power in 404. In the latter incident the oligarchs benefitted from foreign military force in both establishing and maintaining their position. Thus 411 was the only example of a purely internal revolution at Athens which succeeded, at least temporarily, in replacing democracy with oligarchy. The goals of this paper are to determine the groups which supported the movement to restrict or destroy democracy in 411 and to examine the motives for their support.

The movement to alter democracy in Athens in 411 had a degree of support from large segments of the citizen population and was not exclusively the work of a small conspiracy. While much support came from aristocratic and wealthy Athenians, their anti-democratic sentiments were in part shared by citizens of moderate means among the hoplite group. Determining the motives of any individual or

group in history is difficult. The task is especially complicated for ancient history where the number of sources is limited and first person accounts almost non-existent. The motives of individual Athenians during the crisis of 411 certainly varied and included personal ambition, concern for the city's safety and ideological sympathies. While their motives varied many Athenians shared a belief that democracy had failed and needed to be drastically reformed. Participation should be restricted to the "better men" and political power taken from the poorer citizens, the thetes. Many well-to-do Athenians held longstanding resentments toward the democracy, and in 411 their feelings had become further radicalized by recent events and hardships. Throughout the previous century, aristocratic and wealthy Athenians had shown a remarkable ability to adapt to an increasingly democratic system and to maintain their dominant role in Athenian politics and society. In the 420s and 410s their control was seriously undermined by a new style of politics which encouraged the poorer classes to exercise their rights fully. The Athenian hoplites also underwent a reduction in status from this trend and from economic hardships caused by the Peloponnesian War. The war devastated the countryside of Attica and threatened the economic position of the wealthy and the men of moderate means. These hardships were increased after the Spartans occupied Decelea in 413, and they fueled discontent with the democracy.

While many Athenians gave some degree of support to the idea of limiting participation in government in 411, disagreement arose over how limited the government should be. Some hoped for a "broad oligarchy" based on property ownership, in effect a hoplite democracy. Those actively conspiring against the democracy hoped to keep power in their own hands. The refusal of the Four Hundred and their hardline supporters to share power with the hoplites caused their fall and brought about the establishment of a broader oligarchy, the Five Thousand. This soon gave way to a full restoration of democracy. As Athenian naval power and confidence revived, the thetes, whose service in the fleet had saved the city, demanded and got the return of their full franchise.

The issues and actions of 411 cannot be fully understood from examining contemporary events; they require an understanding of earlier political and social developments and the oligarchs' interpretation of these changes. Many upper-class Athenians of the late fifth century still claimed to adhere to the aristocratic value system of their ancestors. In the ninth and eighth centuries only a few men had the wealth for armor or the leisure time to train for warfare.¹ These men had arete and were the only ones deemed fit to compete in athletics, warfare or for leadership of the polis. Long after hoplite warfare necessitated the arming of large portions

¹Walter Donlan, The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece (Lawrence: Kansas: Coronado Press, 1980), pp. 3-5; Arthur W. H. Adkins, Moral Values and Political Behavior in Ancient Greece from Homer to the end of the Fifth Century (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 12-18, 36-37.

of the free citizens, the aristocrats preserved their power and prestige. Less emphasis was placed on physical prowess and bravery, which could be matched by non-aristocrats, and more on innate superiority and noble lineage, which often included mythical heroes and gods. Using the wealth from their large estates, they developed more luxuriant styles of dress and entertainment. The aristocracy might absorb a few newly rich men who adopted their values and customs, but they attempted to distance themselves from the rest of society.²

Throughout the sixth and fifth centuries, aristocrats competed with each other for political dominance in Athens. In the process they made many innovations and institutional changes which extended the opportunity of political participation. The importance of hoplite warfare meant the aristocracy no longer ruled with absolute authority, but with the co-operation and approval of the hoplites. The hoplites' involvement increased in the sixth century. Cleisthenes recognized and incorporated this support in his political reorganization of Athens in 510. However, it would be an exaggeration to say the hoplites fully realized their power or saw the aristocratic leaders as their "servants." Aristocrats continued to monopolize positions of power in Athens, although the hoplites had a voice in the assembly.³

²Donlan, pp. 74-75; Thuc. 1.6.3; Adkins, pp. 112-117; G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World (Cambridge: University Press, 1981), pp. 411-412.

³Herodotus 2.55-66, 69-73; Raphael Sealey, "Regionalism in

The expansion of Athenian naval power during the Persian Wars and the growth of the Delian League into an Athenian empire brought unprecedented wealth into Athens and precipitated a major change in Athenian society. The reforms initiated by Ephialtes and Pericles in the 460s, while the products of aristocratic rivalry, had the effect of making the assembly sovereign and of breaking the aristocrats' monopoly over the new wealth.⁴ While aristocrats retained the leading positions during Pericles' term of control, his building policies in Athens, the emphasis on naval power and the rewards of the empire meant the profits of prosperity reached a much larger segment of the population. The opportunity for public employment was greatly expanded and the institution of pay for jury duty made Athenian citizenship a desirable and profitable status for even the poorest Athenian. The empire also generated trade and commerce, allowing some Athenians to grow wealthy from sources other than landed estates.⁵ All Athenians benefitted from

Archaic Athens," Historia 9(1960) pp. 174-175; Charles Hignett, History of the Athenian Constitution to the end of the Fifth Century (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), pp. 156-157.

⁴Ath. Pol. 25-26; Plut. Cimon 13; Raphael Sealey, "Ephialtes," CP 59(1964), pp. 18-20; Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969), pp. 68-71.

⁵Empire and wealth: Ath. Pol. 24; M. I. Finley, "The Athenian Empire; A Balance Sheet," in Economy and Society in Ancient Greece (New York: Viking Press, 1982), pp. 57-60. Social changes in Athens: Frank J. Frost, "Tribal Politics and the Civic State," AJAH 1(1976), pp. 70-71; W. R. Connor, The New Politicians of Fifth Century Athens (Princeton: University Press, 1971), pp. 152-158.

the prosperity of Athens, but the poorest citizens, the thetes, derived the greatest gains. Most owned little or no land and were effectively excluded from politics by poverty. They now acquired secure income and many rose to hoplite status, some from receiving land in cleruchies in the empire.⁶

The citizens of Athens were divided into four groups, the thetes, hoplites, knights, and the pentakosiomedimnoi, based on their income. These will be important groups in this study (references to the knights will include the pentakosiomedimnoi), but they should not be seen as classes conscious of their identity. Each status level, particularly the hoplites, had a wide variety of wealth and mental outlooks among its members, and it is not possible to say an entire group was acting in a certain way. The closest to an economic class with some degree of awareness of its position is the group of Athenians owning substantial property who felt their position threatened by war and taxes. Even within this group no unity of outlook can be determined and the most that can be said of any group is that many or perhaps most of its members acted in a certain way. In terms of distribution in the population, the rise of many thetes made the hoplites a little over half the citizen body in 431. Out of a total of around 40,000 only 2000

⁶Thetes and cleruchies: Russell Meiggs, The Athenian Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 121, 260-262; Arnold W. Gomme, The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries (Oxford: Blackwell, 1933), pp. 25-26; idem HCT 2, p. 329.

were knights or higher. The thetes were only a slightly smaller group than the hoplites.⁷ The population of all groups dropped in the 420s, but these ratios remained.

⁷Status levels and qualifications: Ath. Pol. 7.3-4; Distribution: Gomme, Population, chart on p. 26; Julius Beloch, Griechische Geschichte, 2nd ed., vol. 3, pt. 2 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1923), pp. 386-418 with chart on p. 410; Barry Strauss, Athens After the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 70-86, examines population trends and battle losses throughout the war.

The nature of classes in ancient Greece is a subject avoided by most ancient historians, including many who use the term class in their work. Many traditional historians have an aversion to Marxist or any interpretation "tainted" with sociological theories or concepts. Some of this is justified reaction to historians who try to apply Marx's ideas to areas he did not. Marx said classes, as self-conscious, politically active groups did not exist in every era of history. See E. J. Hobsbawm, introduction to Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1964), pp. 11f. G. E. M. de Ste. Croix has attempted, most fully in Class Struggle, note 2 above, (see pp. 42-47 for definition of class), more succinctly in "Karl Marx's Conception of History, Ancient and Modern," Monthly Review 37 (March, 1985), pp. 20-31, 35-46, to get around the problem with a "better understanding of Marx." He says class is basically a relationship of exploitation of one group by another, and class-consciousness and political activity are not necessary for class struggle to be present. While slaves in antiquity are a class in his view, Ste. Croix also sees an exploitative relationship between the propertied class and the free peasants as a result of the taxes of the state which is controlled by the propertied class. This does not fit Athens in the late fifth century when the rich paid liturgies and eisphora and the poor paid nothing. Ste. Croix acknowledges that anyone using the idea of class is entitled to establish his own criteria as long as he is consistent. This subjective approach is close to M. I. Finley's use of class; see The Ancient Economy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), pp. 40-50, and Politics in the Ancient World (Cambridge: University Press, 1983), pp. 1-3, 9-14. After using "status group" in The Ancient Economy because he liked its vagueness, Finley returned to "class" in Politics because it was more "harmless." Finley uses it in the same sense as it is used in everyday discourse with no theoretical strings attached. A good example of Finley's view in practice is Barry Strauss' work cited in the first part of this footnote. His subtitle, Class, Faction, and Policy 403-386 B.C., shows the

Pericles was the dominant politician of Athens for almost two decades before the Peloponnesian War. He dictated the policy to go to war with Sparta in 431 and to withdraw inside the city's wall without offering battle, and most Athenians supported him. However, the forced consolidation of the Athenian citizen body behind the walls of Athens created a new political situation. Most Athenians, despite the growth of the urban center, still lived outside the city on their estates and farms. Most had neither the time nor the inclination to go to the city for regular meetings of the assembly. The day-to-day working of the government was thus left to those with the resources and leisure time to spend many days in the boule and assembly. During the invasions from 431 to 425, all citizens were in Athens for several weeks in the spring. Even after the Spartans withdrew many Athenians probably remained in the city (since there were no crops to go back to) and took a greater interest in politics.⁸

importance of class in his analysis, but Strauss gives no discussion on how he uses class. His lists of "classes," pp. 42-43, is roughly a series of income groups ranging from the "liturgical class" to the "poor." Yet there is nothing in his use of the term that is not immediately understandable from everyday usage. The terms upper-class, upper classes and lower classes will be used in this everyday sense in this study.

⁸Thuc. 2.13-16, 21-22, describes the disruption caused by moving the rural population into the city; David Whitehead, The Demes of Attica (Princeton: University Press, 1986), pp. 353-356; Ath. Pol. 27.2.

New men arose to exploit this situation and challenge Pericles. He was fined by the assembly in 430/29, but in the following year was re-elected as general not long before his death. Many of the new politicians were not from the old aristocratic families which had provided Athens' leaders in the past. Even those that were practiced a new style of leadership which marked a new era in Athenian politics. The traditional system of politics stressed family relationships. Pericles rarely addressed the assembly or boule, leaving mundane business to friends and associates. This was possible when only aristocrats and their supporters among the hoplites maintained close personal control of the government, even in the meetings of the assembly. In the unsettled years of the Peloponnesian War, this system broke down and even Pericles was forced to appear before the people and argue for his policies. After his death anyone attempting to lead the people had to personally attend each meeting of the assembly and persuade a majority of those present to follow his advice.⁹ Thus power was in the hands of men with oratorical ability who could judge the emotions of the demos.

The demos, or rather the assembly which now included a more representative portion of the people, for the first time exercised its full power. The assembly included a much greater percentage

⁹M. I. Finley, "Athenian Demagogues," Past and Present 21 (1962), pp. 15-16, 19; Connor, pp. 87-98; George Grote, History of Greece (London: J. Murray, 1872), 6, pp. 244-246.

of thetes and poorer hoplites than before. Many of these men no longer accepted the upper class' claim to rule in the best interest of all. While individual aristocrats continued to gain offices, the awe and respect for the aristocracy's heritage and prestige were gone. The shift is apparent in the plays of Aristophanes where the demos is not just spiteful but even suspicious of the aristocrats' lifestyle and behavior. The knights are frequently accused of being conspirators, synomotai, against the demos.¹⁰

In place of the aristocratic, paternalistic style of leadership, which even Pericles employed,¹¹ politicians portrayed themselves as friends of the demos. The terminology of the period reflected a shift from a personal emphasis in politics to a civic oriented approach. Philopolis, friendly to the city, and misopolis, hateful to the city, show the concern to cast actions in terms of benefit to the demos and the city. The term democracy itself only became a common expression at this time as the demos began to exert itself.¹²

¹⁰Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 2.19-20 is explicit about the demos' distrust of the chrestoi and the preference for poneroi, bad men; Knights as conspirators: Ar. Knights 236, 257, 452, 476-477, 628, 862; Wasps 345, 483, 488, 507, 957.

¹¹Thuc. 2.65.5-10; The famous statement describing Athens as a democracy in word only, in reality the rule of one man--Pericles.

¹²Connor, pp. 99-107; See Aristophanes' Acharnians where his main character is named Dicaeopolis, honest citizen; Democracy: Connor, pp. 63, n. 54; While the concept of equality was old, the term "democracy" as a form of government seems to have only become common in the second half of the fifth century.

The political power and prestige of wealthy and aristocratic Athenians, as well as better-off hoplites, were reduced once they had to compete in a more egalitarian system. Obviously many resented the change. The best example of upper-class reaction is the treatise by the Old Oligarch. The author did not hide his contempt for the demos of Athens which gave power to vulgar men, poneroi, instead of the good men, chrestoi. The better classes, though morally superior, were forced to tolerate political equality. They also had to pay for public choral performances, athletic competitions and the outfitting of triremes.¹³ The author conceded that the poor earned their position because of their importance to the fleet from which Athens derived her power and empire, but he lamented the decline in the quality of the hoplite force and their loss of political prestige. He did recognize that some upper-class Athenians were successful at this type of politics and certain offices such as generals, strategoi, and cavalry commanders, hipparchoi, were reserved for the chrestoi and dynatotatoi.¹⁴

Aristophanes echoed many of the same criticisms in his plays. He also blamed the politicians for the Peloponnesian War which was harming the aristocrats and hoplites, both of whom depended upon their farms for their status. He portrayed the politicians as greedy vulgar cowards pandering to an equally vulgar demos or mob.

¹³Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.1; 1.5; 1.13.

¹⁴Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.2; 2.1; 1.3.

His insults--low birth, practicing a trade, corruption, lack of education--were interchangeable and applied to almost every politician of the day. In contrast, the aristocratic knights and the hoplite farmers who had always deferred to their betters were the perfect heroes for Aristophanes. For him, they were symbols of an earlier, better time.¹⁵

The change in politics after the death of Pericles was also recognized by Thucydides. He accuses later politicians of playing to the whims of the demos and ruining the city through their competition.¹⁶ This negative image of men such as Cleon and Hyperbolus is still prevalent today though it is based on a few, clearly biased sources. The career of Cleon shows considerable talent, especially in financial matters, and Thucydides' negative judgement of Cleon's military skills can be contradicted by evidence from his own work. Similar rehabilitations are possible for other politicians derided by Aristophanes and other writers, but who led Athens through the difficult years of the Peloponnesian War.¹⁷

¹⁵Ar. Knights passim, see 128-145; Clouds 551-554; Acharnians 595-618; Victor Ehrenberg, The People of Aristophanes 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1951), pp. 90-96.

¹⁶Thuc. 2.65.7-13, blames demagogues for defeat in Sicily; 3.36.6 calls Cleon biaiotatos, the most violent, of citizens; 8.73.3 calls Hyperbolus mochtheros, worthless.

¹⁷Grote 6, pp. 481-487; A. G. Woodhead, "Thucydides' Portrait of Cleon," Mnemosyne 13(1960), pp. 289-317; Barry Baldwin, "Cleon's Strategy at Amphipolis," AClass 11(1968), pp. 211-214; idem, "Notes on Hyperbolus," AClass 14(1971), pp. 151-156; idem, "Notes on Cleophon," AClass 17(1974), pp. 38-39.

The distorted image of the new politicians is a reflection of the upper-class resentment of the encroachment of these men on their traditional privileges. The aristocracy might absorb a few men such as Nicias from newly rich families as long as they accepted and participated in the aristocratic lifestyle. They hated men such as Cleon who rejected this route to power and even attacked the wealthy Athenians' privileges such as pay for cavalry duty.¹⁸ As the Peloponnesian War dragged on and Athens' financial resources were strained, the new politicians imposed an eisphora, a property tax, on the wealthy classes. The empire had long provided the resources necessary for pay for political offices without the need for taxing the wealthy. In the middle 420s the aristocrats and wealthy Athenians were forced to pay to preserve the empire and a democracy over which they had increasingly less control.¹⁹

In response to the more equalitarian democracy of the 420s, upper-class Athenians emphasized their distinct lifestyle in the hetaireiai, or social clubs, symposia and gymnasia. They affected physical differences, wearing their hair long (a Spartan habit) and dressing in expensive clothes. Only the rich could afford to keep

¹⁸Connor, pp. 161-162; Cleon vs. the knights: Scholia in Knights 225-226=Theopompus FGrH 115 F93; Charles W. Fornara, "Cleon's Attack on the Cavalry," CQ 23(1973), p. 24.

¹⁹Rudi Thomsen, Eisphora. A Study in Direct Taxation in Ancient Athens (Kbenhavn: Gyldenhal, 1964), pp. 169-173; M. I. Finley, The Ancient Economy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 173.

horses for racing or serving in the cavalry, or to pay the fees demanded by sophists. Also, homosexual activity was distinctive to wealthy and aristocratic Athenians by the end of the fifth century.²⁰ While the social and material aspects of life were stressed in the 420s and 410s, it would be a mistake to say the Athenian upper classes withdrew from politics or public service in this period. Their prestige and power were weakened, but they never conceded the field. Many of the generals and other officials during these years were from the old families. These men continued to compete, with some success, in the new style politics.²¹

With the peace of Nicias in 421, Athens came out of the first phase of the war with its empire intact. The Spartan invasions had already ceased (the last one was in 425), and Athenians enjoyed the use of their countryside year-round. The damage from the invasions was not extensive and Attica quickly recovered. The author of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia says that in 413 Attica was the most lavishly and expensively furnished countryside in Greece.²² Peace and

²⁰Donlan, pp. 155-171; Ar. Knights 579-580: "do not begrudge us our long hair and well grooming;" Homosexuality: K. J. Dover, Greek Homosexuality (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 151, 198, 201-202; Jeffery Henderson, The Maculate Muse (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), pp. 216-218; Ehrenberg, People, pp. 99-107.

²¹Connor, pp. 175-193, argues many aristocrats withdrew from politics; C. W. Fornara, The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404 (Historia Einzelschriften, no. 16; Wiesbaden, 1971), pp. 55-65.

²²Hellenica Oxyrhynchia 12.4-5; W. G. Hardy, "The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia and the Devastation of Attica," CP 21(1926), pp. 346-355.

stability benefitted individual Athenians, especially those with large estates. Also eisphora taxation was suspended with the end of hostilities. Athens benefitted from the trade within the empire and city finances were soon restored after the severe depletions of ten years of war.²³

This era of recovery and peace was shortlived. Emboldened by Alcibiades' promises of easy victory, in 415 the Athenians voted to send a large expedition to Sicily. Despite the arguments of Nicias in Thucydides' account, no major group opposed the venture.²⁴ There were splits over foreign policy between 420 and 415, especially concerning Alcibiades' actions in the Peloponnese, and there was personal political sparring as seen in the ostracism of Hyperbolus, but all of Athens was consumed with dreams of conquest and glory in Sicily. This unity was shattered by the mutilation of the herms in Athens and the ensuing hysteria: when the expedition was ready to sail in the spring of 415, almost all of the herms were mutilated in a single night. The herms were important for the good fortune of individuals and the city, so their simultaneous defacing appeared to be the work of a large group of individuals intent on overthrowing the democracy.²⁵ Despite several confessions, including

²³Thuc. 6.8.2, 12.1; Thomsen, pp. 169-173.

²⁴Enthusiasm: Thuc. 6.24.3-4; Nicias' speech was more what one should have said: M. I. Finley, "Thucydides the Moralizer," in Aspects of Antiquity (New York: Viking Press, 1969), pp. 52-55; Thuc. 1.22.1.

²⁵Thuc. 6.27; Nepos Alcibiades 3.3-4; Plut. Alcibiades 18.2-4.

Andocides' officially accepted one, the actual motivation for the mutilation remains unclear. More definite is the way politicians exploited the fear of conspiracy the incident aroused. The most prominent victim was Alcibiades, who was first accused not of the herms' mutilation, but of mocking the Eleusinian Mysteries. The slave who offered the evidence later recanted and was executed, but the truth was not the major concern of those Athenians who resented Alcibiades' power and prestige and feared he might achieve more if he won victories in Sicily. Although Alcibiades pressed for an immediate trial, his opponents, fearing the men of the expedition, to strateuma, were well-minded to him and the demos would be lenient on him, forced him to sail with the fleet. Later, after more confessions, the assembly voted to recall Alcibiades and his friends for trial. Fearing his personal enemies and the resentment his political ambitions and aristocratic excesses in lifestyle had engendered, Alcibiades fled. He was condemned to death in absentia.²⁶

The recall of Alcibiades has been called the work of either the radical democrats or the oligarchic party.²⁷ Party labels and ideological terms are not appropriate nor necessary to explain the desire of leading Athenians of all backgrounds to remove the most powerful man in the city and thus their most powerful rival. The

²⁶Thuc. 6.28-29, 60-61; Plut. Alcibiades 19-22; Resentment: Adkins, p. 144.

²⁷Radicals: Hignett, pp. 266-277; Oligarchs: Ruth E. Allen,

incident of the herms was an opportunity for individuals to settle personal scores and to remove political enemies. Most of the persons executed or exiled in the scandal were from upper-class families, in particular relatives of Alcibiades or Andocides.²⁸ The prosecutors were a more mixed group, some were aristocrats and others demagogues of the new style of politics. A few, such as Peisander and Androcles were active before this time, while others appear to have used the trials as a springboard to political power. The trials and the exit to Sicily of not only Alcibiades, Nicias and Demosthenes, but also of many other Athenians, provided an opportunity for lesser politicians to advance themselves.²⁹

The immediate result from the political infighting at home was a lack of support for the expedition in Sicily. An almost inevitable division existed between the commanders in the field and the leaders at home. The politicians in Athens stood to lose prestige and power if the commanders returned home victorious. The generals in Sicily were in a position where they could not admit defeat and return to Athens. When the first expedition proved

"The Mutilation of the Herms," Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Cincinnati, 1947, pp. 146-149.

²⁸Andocides 1.11-69 provides the fullest account of the trials and he lists those accused. For family connections, see J. K. Davies Athenian Propertied Families (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), especially for Andocides and Alcibiades; Allen, pp. 80-84.

²⁹Douglas MacDowell, Andokides; "On the Mysteries" (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 193; Hignett, pp. 267-268; Thuc. 6.28.

unsuccessful, both groups refused to accept responsibility and another armada was sent out. After the combined forces were defeated, the commanders fatally hesitated to withdraw, fearing the review of their actions once back in Athens.³⁰ As a result, the entire armament was lost in the fall of 413, a victim as much of internal rivalry among the Athenians as of Sicilian resistance.

The Sicilian expedition was a major setback to Athenian power, over 40,000 fighting men and 220 triremes, warships, being lost. However, the number of Athenian citizens lost was only a fraction of the total. Only 2500 hoplites were sent with 750 thetes equipped to be marines, and only 250 Athenian cavalry.³¹ A number of thetes certainly served as rowers in the fleet, but the crews appear to have a large proportion of mercenaries from the empire and resident aliens, metics.³² Also, some Athenians did escape the disaster and returned to Athens, though it is difficult to determine how many.³³ Beyond the losses among citizens, the loss

³⁰Wesley Thompson, "Thucydides 2.65.11," *Historia* 20(1971), pp. 142-144, 148-150; cf. H. D. Westlake, "Thucydides 2.65.11," *CQ* 8(1958), pp. 102-110.

³¹First expedition: Thuc. 6.43.1; Cavalry: 6.94.6; Second: 7.20.2; Arrian, 1.9.1-2, lists the great disasters in Greek history, but plays down the Sicilian defeat since the expedition was composed mainly of allies and the defeat happened far from home.

³²Mercenaries and allies: Thuc. 7.13.2; Metics: Thuc. 7.63.3 with scholia; See Ps.-Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.12 for importance of metics to Athens. Meiggs, pp. 347-348.

³³Thuc. 7.85.4, says many escaped during the final battle or later and made their way to Catana; The speaker of Ps.-Lysias 20 escaped and returned to Athens; For the fate of the prisoners

of over two hundred ships and 40,000 allies greatly reduced Athens' military power, and all of Greece must have sensed that a new phase of the war was about to begin.

Even before the disaster Athens' situation had deteriorated. In early 413 the Peloponnesians had reopened hostilities in Greece, claiming Athenian breaches of the peace. They marched into Attica in the spring and for the first time built a permanent post, at Decelea. In the earlier invasions the Spartans and their allies had stayed in Attica only a few weeks and had never ventured into all areas of the country. Now they left a strong garrison which could ravage and loot at will. The rich country estates of the aristocrats and the farms of the hoplites and poorer Athenians were systematically plundered. The effects of the garrison were immediate and lasted for the duration of the war. The countryside of Attica was completely lost to the city as a source of food and other materials. Everything needed by the city had to be imported by sea. Thucydides says 20,000 slaves escaped to Decelea, many of them skilled workers.³⁴ Many of these are assumed to be workers from the silver mines at Laurion, and the mines were probably closed by the presence of the Spartans since there were no

see D. H. Kelley, "What Happened to the Athenians captured in Sicily," *CR* 20(1970), pp. 127-131 and the sources he cited. In addition, see Iseaus 6; Andocides 3.30; Dem. 20.41-42; On the negative side, Plut., *Nicias* 29.1, and Diodorus, 13.33.1, say most of the prisoners died.

³⁴ *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 12.3-5; Hardy, pp. 346-348; Slaves: Thuc. 7. 27.

fortifications protecting them. Thus the state and individual Athenians lost a valuable source of income at a time when demands on their resources were increasing.³⁵

When news of the defeat in Sicily reached Athens in the fall of 413, the population had begun to feel the economic impact of renewed war and also the psychological effects of prolonged crowding within the walls of the city. According to Thucydides, the Athenians were angry with the orators who had promoted the expedition as well as the oracle-mongers who had promised easy victory, but no source mentions any action taken against individuals or groups for supporting the venture. Instead of indulging in personal revenge and political trials, the Athenians moved to ensure the defense of the city and empire. The fear was that the allies in the Aegean, believing Athens had lost her best ships, sailors, and hoplites in the disaster in Sicily, would revolt.³⁶ Without control of the Aegean and the lifeline of the sea Athens could be strangled into submission and suffer total destruction. Every effort was made to equip a new fleet and keep the allies in hand.

The defeat in Sicily and Athens' precarious position in the renewed war in Greece aroused general concern over the democratic government's ability to function effectively and wage war. For some Athenians, already critical of democracy, the incident of the herms, the exile of Alcibiades, and the failure of the expedition

³⁵Thuc. 7.27.3-28; Alcibiades' advice re mines: 6.97.7.

³⁶Thuc. 8.11-12.

showed that the demos was unfit to control the state. At the least a more effective means of running the war was needed. For the moment the only change was the election of a board of ten elderly men to serve as probouloi.³⁷ The exact powers and aim of this board are unclear. The question is whether it constituted a first step to change the city's constitution or was a temporary measure to facilitate the war effort.

In the Politics, Aristotle says the probouloi were representative of oligarchical governments since they were always few in number and assumed some of the duties of the boule and the assembly. Aristotle's discussion and the few references to actual bodies of probouloi in Greece suggest these boards usually held supreme powers in a state where they existed.³⁸ However, our sources give no indication that the probouloi at Athens held extensive powers or limited the existing democratic institutions. The only known members, Hagnon and the playwright Sophocles, were both very elderly respected men with experience in high office. Hagnon was a fellow general of Pericles on a number of occasions and founder of the colony at Amphipolis. Some historians doubt the identification of the proboulos Sophocles with the famous poet, but Michael

³⁷Thuc. 8.1.3; Ath. Pol. 29.2.

³⁸Arist. Politics 1299a31-37; Probouloi at Megara: Ar. Acharnians 755; at Cnidus: Plut. Moralia 2.292a; Leonard Whibley, Greek Oligarchies (New York: Haskell Press, 1971, orig. 1896), pp. 163-164.

Jameson shows that the tragedian, experienced as a general and treasurer, was a logical choice for an advisory board in 413.³⁹ The view of the board as an advisory one with limited powers is supported by Arictophanes' Lysistrata which was produced in early 411. In the play, a proboulos confronts the women who have seized the acropolis and thus control the treasury. Their actions prevent the official from securing money to buy oars for the fleet.⁴⁰ Beyond this mundane chore, the sources say nothing on the powers of the board. Although the probouloi probably assumed some supervisory functions, the boule and assembly continued to meet. One must conclude that the board of probouloi was not an attack on the democracy, but only one of a number of measures the Athenians enacted to better wage the war and economize in the city.⁴¹

During the winter of 413/12 many allies in the Aegean requested the Spartans to aid them in their revolt against Athens. The Spartans decided to send a fleet to the island of Chios. The Chians were supported by representatives of Tissaphernes, the

³⁹Hagnon: Lysias 12.65; Generalships: Thuc. 1.117.2; 1.102.3; 5.11.1; Sophocles: Arist. Rhetoric 1419a25-31; Michael H. Jameson, "Sophocles and the Four Hundred," Historia 20(1971), pp. 543-546; cf. H. C. Avery, "Sophocles' Political Career," Historia 22(1973), pp. 509-514.

⁴⁰Ar. Lysistrata 421f.; The proboulos is presetned as a pompous man very arrogant about his position. Later, 609, after the women have humiliated him, he rushes off to tell his fellow probouloi of the crime.

⁴¹Thuc. 8.1.2-4; P. J. Rhodes, The Athenian Boule (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 216; Jameson, pp. 545, 560. Anecdota Graeca I.298 s.v. probouloi says one came from each tribe.

Persian satrap of Ionia, who wished to break Athenian naval power and reassert control over the Greeks in Asia Minor. Also, Alcibiades had fled to Sparta and was advocating an aggressive policy against Athens. In the spring of 412, five ships with Alcibiades and the Spartan Chalcideus eluded Athenian patrols and reached Chios, ensuring the revolt. The Chians quickly brought other Ionian cities into rebellion against Athens.⁴²

The Athenians reacted swiftly to the news of Chios' revolt, for the island was the most powerful of Athens' allies and others would follow her lead. The assembly revoked the penalties against the use of the thousand talent reserve set aside in the first year of the war for the defense of the city itself. They rushed as many ships as possible into service.⁴³ Thucydides, in his dry chronological style, records the arrival of various Athenian squadrons in the Aegean throughout 412. Their small size and the rapidity of their appearance betray a frantic rush in Athens to send out ships as soon as they could be manned and equipped. A squadron of eight ships left for Chios as soon as news of the revolt came. Another twelve were close on their heels, then a group of sixteen and later ten more. Late in the summer Phrynichus brought a large force of forty-eight ships and a thousand Athenian hoplites

⁴²Thuc. 8.5-8, 14.

⁴³Thuc. 8.15.1; Philochorus FGrH 328 F138=Scholia in *Lysistrata* 173, says the fund was first used in archonship of Callias, so in mid summer 412; For establishment of fund in 431: Thuc. 2.24.1.

along with 2500 from the allies and Argos. Early in the winter thirty-five more ships arrived at the Athenian base on Samos (see Map 1, Appendix).⁴⁴ Collectively these efforts reveal a rapid mobilization and dispatchment of a force larger than either of the Sicilian armadas.

Such a force included a large number of Athenian citizens and their departure from Athens altered the political situation in the city. The great majority were thetes serving as sailors and rowers but their exact number is uncertain. The 129 triremes sent to Samos each needed 170 rowers, or 22,000 men in all. In order to man its ships fully, Athens employed its own citizens, resident aliens and mercenaries (mostly from cities within its empire) as rowers. (Slaves were very rare on Athenian warships, but this may not have been true for other Greek states.)⁴⁵ The Sicilian expeditions had drawn heavily on the metics and foreign mercenaries and the losses there may have reduced the pool of foreign rowers available. Also the Athenians imprisoned the Chians in the fleet when they heard of the revolt and they may have done the same with the men from other cities in revolt.⁴⁶ The crews of the ships

⁴⁴Thuc. 8.15.1; 17.3; 19.2; 23.1; 25.1; 30.1.

⁴⁵J. S. Morrison and R. T. Williams, Greek Oared Ships 900-332 B.C. (Cambridge: University Press, 1968), pp. 254-258; Lionel Casson, The Ancient Mariners (New York: Macmillan, 1959), pp. 95-96; M. Amit, Athens and the Sea (Collection Latomus, vol. 74, Bruxelles, 1965), pp. 48-49.

⁴⁶Crews in Sicily: see note 32 above; Chians: Thuc. 8.15.2; Strauss, pp. 71-73, suggests citizens made up around thirty-six

sent out in 412 were assembled quickly from men present in Athens. They likely had a high proportion of Athenian thetes and metics aboard. Given the numbers needed and the losses among the thetes in Sicily and earlier, the overwhelming majority of thetes of military age were probably forced into service in 412. Thus the thetes as an active political force were physically removed from Athens and transplanted to Samos.

Though the majority of the citizens leaving Athens were thetes, a good number of hoplites and even wealthy Athenians also were with the fleet. Thucydides does not refer to hoplites serving as rowers as they did in other emergencies.⁴⁷ However, each trireme carried ten hoplites as marines, so there were 1290 serving with the fleet in this role. In addition a thousand hoplites came out with Phrynichus. These 2300 hoplites were almost as many as were sent to Sicily.⁴⁸ While no cavalry was sent, some of the richest men of Athens would serve in the fleet with the ships they outfitted. The state owned the triremes and provided the base pay for the crews, but wealthy men selected as trierarchs were responsible for

percent of the crews. This would mean between 8000 and 9000 thetes out of Athens.

⁴⁷Thuc. 3.16.1; In 428, with the main fleet at Lesbos, the Athenians manned seventy ships with all the citizens except the knights to ward off a Peloponnesian attack. Normally thetes only: Amit, p. 63.

⁴⁸Marines: Amit, p. 30; Morrison and Williams, pp. 263-265.

hiring the crews (often having to give higher pay), and for keeping the ships in fighting condition throughout the year.⁴⁹ This was an expensive duty and was even more difficult for men who were deprived of their main source of income, their estates, by the Spartan occupation of Decelea.

The economic situation worsened in 412 with the second year of occupation. With the countryside deserted and the silver mines probably closed, both the city and individual Athenians were dependent on their resources in the empire and now these were being lost because of the revolts in the Aegean. The tribute Athens extracted from her allies had been replaced in 414/13 by a five percent tax on trade in the sea ports of the empire, but the Athenians could only collect this in the cities they controlled. Also the war in the Aegean discouraged trade in general and further cut revenues.⁵⁰

The loss of revenues from the empire further aggravated the economic strain on individual Athenians. The luxury of tribute payments and related income from the empire made the system of pay for governmental duty possible in the democracy of Athens, as many historians have observed. The revenues allowed Athens to pay

⁴⁹Trierarchs' duties: Amit, pp. 111-115; Morrison and Williams, pp. 263-265.

⁵⁰Thuc. 7.28.4; With their revenues falling they replaced the tribute system, "believing more money would come in to them." ATL 3, p. 90; Meiggs, pp. 349, 369, says they were soon disillusioned with the port tax.

for public duties and maintain a large permanent fleet without taxing the wealthy citizens. The revenues did not preserve democracy, but the good will and support of the wealthy and aristocratic Athenians who not only did not have to pay for the system but benefitted from the democracy. As long as the wealthy supported the democracy, the system was safe from revolution.⁵¹ Indeed, Aristotle's Politics records only two ways a democracy is overthrown: 1) when a demagogue sets himself up as tyrant, or 2) when the wealthy classes revolt because of overtaxation.⁵² Discontent with the democracy first appeared in the 420s when the eisphora was levied. They were discontinued after the Peace of Nicias, but were begun again in 414 and continued.⁵³ In 412/11 Athens was requiring service as trierarchs and eisphora payments from the upper classes in order to carry on the war. With their own resources reduced, many aristocratic and wealthy Athenians resented giving their revenues to a government in which they had a limited voice. Some were ready to take drastic actions to return to government to the "better men," but they needed the right circumstances to provide them the opportunity to overthrow democracy without unduly risking their necks. They would soon get that opportunity from an unexpected source.

⁵¹Finley, Ancient Economy, p. 173.

⁵²Arist. Politics 1304b20-1305a7; Aristotle, of course, blames the high taxes on greedy demagogues.

⁵³Thomsen, pp. 174-175.

CHAPTER II

THE OVERTHROW OF THE DEMOCRACY IN ATHENS

By the late summer of 412, the cities and islands of Ionia were fairly evenly divided between Athens and Sparta. Chios and Miletus provided the Peloponnesian fleet the greatest material and military support, while the large island of Samos served as Athens' main naval base and its most loyal ally. The Peloponnesians concluded a treaty with Tissaphernes to secure pay for their fleet. The prospect of unlimited Persian aid gave the Spartans a definite psychological as well as material edge. Everyone realized Athens could not match the combined resources of the Peloponnesians and the Persian Empire indefinitely. The Spartans also decided Alcibiades was now a threat to their aims in the Aegean. His skills of persuasion were invaluable in securing the revolt of Chios, Meletus and other cities, but now that the diplomatic phase of their offensive was completed, the Spartans were suspicious of Alcibiades' personal ambitions and skills. He learned of orders for his execution and withdrew to the court of Tissaphernes where he quickly became a trusted advisor to the satrap. He told Tissaphernes not to be so enthusiastic in his support of the Spartans, but to weaken both sides. The Persian took Alcibiades' advice to heart, paying the Peloponnesians irregularly and never fulfilling his promise to use the Phoenician fleet against the Athenians.⁵⁴

⁵⁴Thuc. 8.45-46; Plut. Alcibiades 24-25; Plutarch, who often

Alcibiades also began to work for his recall to Athens. During the winter of 412/411 he contacted the most powerful, dynatotatoi, and best, beltistoi, men in the Athenian fleet at Samos. Telling them he enjoyed the confidence of Tissaphernes, he promised to secure Persian aid for Athens. The conditions for such support were Alcibiades' recall and the establishment of an oligarchy in place of the democracy which had exiled him. Thucydides reports these proposals were welcomed by the dynatotatoi and the trierarchs, for they were "already plotting for the overthrow of democracy on their own." He makes no comment on this first appearance of organized opposition and sedition against the democracy. These influential men were bearing the heaviest burdens of the war and Thucydides says they wanted to get control of the affairs of the state and also defeat the enemy. Their sentiments recall the Old Oligarch's statements that the lower classes benefitted from the expenditures of the rich, even in war.⁵⁵

After some of Alcibiades' friends in the fleet visited him, they began to organize those persons considered suitable, epitedeioi, into a conspiracy, xynomosia. They also said openly to the majority of the men, hoi polloi, that the King would provide them with money if Alcibiades was recalled and they were not ruled by a democracy. Thucydides says the ochlos, the crowd or mob, though not happy with

uses sources now lost, seems totally dependent on Thucydides for his knowledge of the Four Hundred.

⁵⁵Thuc. 8.47.1-2, 48.1; Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.13, 2.14.

the talk, kept quiet because of the hope of pay from the Persians. This should not be taken as an endorsement, even a reluctant one, of oligarchy by the fleet. No formal proposal was put forward nor any official assembly called to discuss the matter, only opinions circulated by some of the conspirators. The overwhelming emphasis in their public statement was on the acquisition of Persian aid. Political changes were intentionally downplayed to avoid arousing the ire of the many thetes and poorer hoplites among the sailors and soldiers.⁵⁶

The conspirators met among themselves and while they generally approved of Alcibiades' scheme, one of the generals, Phrynichus, doubted Alcibiades' ability to obtain Persian aid for Athens. He also questioned Alcibiades' desire for oligarchy and whether the allies would remain loyal once the democracy was put down. These objections are similar to Nicias' speech before the Sicilian expedition and may represent Thucydides' idea of what a sensible person should have said at the time.⁵⁷ In any event, the conspirators were not deterred and decided to send Peisander and several others to Athens in order to initiate the change.

Included in these discussions were the majority of the hetaireiai among the fleet. The hetaireiai were social/political associations of upper-class Athenians. They have been variously

⁵⁶Thuc. 8.48.1-2; HCT 5, p. 108; Frank Marsh, "Alcibiades and the Persian Alliance," CJ 28(1932), pp. 12-21.

⁵⁷Thuc. 8.48.4-7; Earlier praise of Phrynichus' wisdom: 8.27.1-5.

described as drinking clubs, social organizations and political associations aimed at helping members in law courts and politics. As George Calhoun showed in his study of these groups, they were all these things and more. The hetaireiai were the basic friendship-family group in which every aristocratic and wealthy Athenian operated. His strongest bonds of loyalty were always to fellow members of his hetaireiai, stronger even than those to his city.⁵⁸

The existence of hetaireiai in the fleet confirms the presence of a number of aristocratic and wealthy Athenians in Samos at this time. Their role also shows the upper-class nature of the original conspiracy. Thucydides' usage of group terms is as explicit as any political discussion in his work. The term beltistoi, dynatoi, and dynatotatoi were all used by the Old Oligarch to designate aristocratic and wealthy Athenians, and Thucydides' usage is the same. Even the term epitedeioi, suitable, had an oligarchic connotation.⁵⁹ The hetaireiai were limited to wealthy and aristocratic Athenians and those better-off hoplites who sought to imitate the upper classes. The trierarchy was

⁵⁸Thuc. 8.58.4; George M. Calhoun, Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1913); Connor, pp. 25-29; HCT 5, pp. 128-131; Robert J. Bonner and Gertrude Smith, The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968, orig. 1930), 2, pp. 19-21.

⁵⁹Thuc. 8.47-48; HCT 5, pp. 5, 106; Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.2, 5; Donlan, pp. 127-128; epitedeioi: Thuc. 8.48.2, 63.4; see W. R. Connor, Thucydides (Princeton: University Press, 1984), p. 223, n. 25.

restricted to the most wealthy families in Athens. Phrynichus makes the upper-class nature of the movement clear when he calls the conspirators kaloi kagathoi, the time-honored description of the aristocracy.⁶⁰

Thucydides is equally clear in the terms which he uses to describe the men at Samos who were not in the conspiracy. The conspirators are contrasted with the majority, to plethos, the many, hoi polloi, and the mob, ochlos. All these had political meanings in the Old Oligarch, Aristophanes, and elsewhere in Thucydides. Phrynichus is again more straightforward, contrasting the kaloi kagathoi with the demos.⁶¹ The contrast in terms is less explicit when the scene of action later shifts to Athens, but for the original plot in Samos Thucydides seems intent on emphasizing that the leadership of the conspiracy was from the upper class and that the majority of the men of the fleet were excluded from the plot. The expressed aim of the conspirators also supports this view--they were carrying the heaviest financial burdens and should control the government themselves.

For some historians, Peisander was an unlikely choice as spokesman for a group of aristocratic and wealthy Athenians or even

⁶⁰Thuc. 8.48.6; Phrynichus accuses the kaloi kagathoi of being the poristai, providers, and esegetai, proposers, of schemes to the demos from which they reap the most benefit and which harm the allies.

⁶¹Thuc. 8.48.2: polloi; 48.3: plethos; 48.3: ochlos; Phrynichus: 48.6; Amit, pp. 43-46; Olivier Reverdin, "Remarques sur la vie politique d'Athènes au Ve siècle," Museum Helveticum 2(1945), pp. 208-209.

for inclusion in the conspiracy. He is often described as a radical demagogue and his actions in 411 seen as a volte-face. Yet, nothing in the sources preclude the possibility of his being an aristocrat.⁶² The insults aimed at him in comedy do not include low birth or poverty, commonly applied to politicians. Instead he is called a coward and a glutton. Gluttony was an insult frequently directed towards the wealthy who could enjoy the feasts of the symposia. The charge of cowardice was also used against the aristocrats who secured offices or embassies to avoid combat duty or performed relatively safer duty in the cavalry.⁶³ Peisander was definitely a landowner; his farm was confiscated after the fall of the Four Hundred. A. G. Woodhead identifies the oligarch Peisander (not a common name in Athens) with a Peisander, son of Glaucetes, appearing in an inscription from 421/20, as supervisor of a cult statue, a position requiring considerable property. A Glaucetes whom Demosthenes criticizes in the middle of the fourth century for going to Decelea and aiding the enemy is perhaps Peisander's son. This Glaucetes was a Treasurer of the Gods,

⁶²A. G. Woodhead, "Peisander," AJP 75(1954), pp. 138-139; W. J. McCoy, "The 'Non-speeches' of Pisander in Thucydides, Book Eight," in The Speeches in Thucydides (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973), pp. 79-80; Hignett, p. 270.

⁶³Gluttony: Eupolis FAC I F110A; Plato FAC I F97: "stuffed like cushions;" Athenaeus 10.415d: Peisander one of the great gluttons of history; Donlan, pp. 163-164; Cowardice: Eupolis FAC I F31; Phrynichos FAC I F20; Suda s.v. Peisander deiloteris; Ar. Acharnians 595-604; Lysias 14 and 15.

another position requiring a high property qualification.⁶⁴

During the affair of the herms Peisander was an enthusiastic member of the board of inquiry. He proposed the immediate arrest and torture of the men implicated. His actions are often seen as a radical democrat's persecution of aristocrats, but his victims were limited to the family and friends of Andocides, with whom he seems to have had a personal feud.⁶⁵ While Peisander was a leader of the people, in the same sense as Pericles or Alcibiades was, there is no reason to doubt that Peisander was a well-born Athenian, as Aristotle calls him in the Athenaion Politeia.⁶⁶

Thucydides states the aim of those in the conspiracy was the overthrow of democracy in Athens, but Peisander and his colleagues were understandably less direct in their public statements when they reached the city. Addressing the assembly soon after their arrival, they emphasized the possibility of Persian aid if Alcibiades was recalled and if they were not governed by "the same form of democracy." The phrase implied only minor changes in the government, but it brought an immediate uproar from the demos. Objections were also raised by Alcibiades' personal enemies

⁶⁴Woodhead, pp. 133, 145-146; Estate: Lysias 7.4; Father: IG I² 370.1-3; Son: Dem. 24.127-128.

⁶⁵Andocides 1.27, 36; 2.14; Peisander had Andocides arrested when he tried to return to Athens during the Four Hundred; Woodhead, pp. 136-137.

⁶⁶Ath. Pol. 32.2; Nepos, Alcibiades 5.3, says Peisander was no friend of the people, and favored the aristocracy.

and by the families which looked after the Mysteries.⁶⁷ Peisander then came forward and asked each of those objecting to the plan if they had any alternative means of saving Athens. He argued they should be more concerned with the salvation, soteria, of the city than its constitution, politeia. The King would trust Athens only if it had a wiser government and gave more power to the few. This allusion to oligarchy brought another outburst from the assembly. Eventually, Peisander's insistence that this was the only alternative to total defeat and the promise that they could change the constitution again if something was not pleasing silenced many of the critics.⁶⁸

Peisander and ten other envoys were selected to go to Alcibiades and negotiate in whatever way they saw fit. This was a major step for the conspirators, but it was not an endorsement of their full policy by the assembly. Mabel Lang's and M. Caspari's view that this assembly approved the proposal for oligarchy and appointed a board of syngrapheis to draw up proposals is contradicted by Thucydides' later narrative and by the strong opposition in the assembly. As Anthony Andrewes and C. Hignett point out, the demos only reluctantly consented to the sending of an embassy to Alcibiades. The issue of modifying the government, though

⁶⁷Thuc. 8.49.1, 53.1-2.

⁶⁸Thuc. 8.53.2-3, 54.1; HCT 5, pp. 124-125; See L. Bieler, "A Political Slogan in Ancient Athens," AJP 72(1951), pp. 181-184 for soteria as an oligarchic slogan in the late fifth and early fourth centuries.

part of the conspirators' plan, was not pressed at this time.⁶⁹

Peisander also brought false (according to Thucydides) charges against Phrynichus and had him and his colleague Scironides removed from their generalships since he feared Phrynichus would harm the negotiations with Alcibiades.⁷⁰ Before he left, Peisander visited the various hetaireiai in Athens. These were the kinsmen and friends of the original conspirators on Samos. Peisander's acceptability as an envoy to these groups is further evidence of his social standing. Among these aristocratic and wealthy Athenians Peisander was more blunt about the aims of the conspiracy. He urged these groups to put aside their normal rivalry and factionalism and work together to overthrow the democracy. The success of the venture was largely a result of the relish and enthusiasm with which these groups went about their work in the next few months before Peisander returned to Athens. After

⁶⁹Thuc. 8.54.1-3; M. O. B. Caspari, "On the Revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens," *JHS* 33(1913), p. 2; Mabel Lang, "The Revolution of the 400," *AJP* 69(1948), pp. 275-277; idem, "Revolution of the 400: Chronology and Constitutions," *AJP* 88(1967), pp. 176, 183; McCoy, "Non-speeches," pp. 86-88; These all argue that the work to restructure the constitution began with Peisander's first trip; the following say that the commissions were not formed until he returned. Hignett, p. 270; *HCT* 5, pp. 125-126; P. J. Rhodes, *Commentary to the Aristotelian "Athenaion Politeia"* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 363-365.

⁷⁰Thuc. 8.54.3, 73.4; *HCT* 5, p. 126; The assembly replaced the generals with Leon and Diomedon who were not part of the plot, showing that the conspirators did not dominate the assembly.

arranging these matters Peisander left for Asia and the meeting with Alcibiades around the beginning of 411.⁷¹

The negotiations between the Athenians and Tissaphernes were fruitless. Though the satrap valued Alcibiades' advice, he probably never seriously considered changing his policy towards Athens. Whether Alcibiades ever thought he could achieve this aim, he knew it was impossible by the time Peisander and the others arrived from Athens. In the negotiations, Alcibiades acted as Tissaphernes' spokesman and was anxious for the blame for the failure to rest on the Athenians. The envoys repeatedly agreed to new demands from the satrap until they finally realized Alcibiades was unable or perhaps unwilling to deliver what he had promised.⁷² They returned to Samos in late February.

The conspirators had lost the main pretext for changing the government of Athens, the promise of Persian aid, but they were determined not to abandon the project. Some believed the loss of Alcibiades was not a serious blow since he was not a suitable person to lead an oligarchy. This sentiment was probably not shared by the friends of Alcibiades who had helped initiate the

⁷¹Thuc. 8.54.4-5, uses xynomoshia as a synonym for hetaireiai. For equivalence of the terms, see Calhoun, p. 5 and sources he cites in n. 5; Suda s.v. synomoshia; Plato, Republic 365d, equates the two terms as secret conspiracies in which the same way Aristophanes uses xynomoshia. See note 10 above for xynomoshia in the Knights and the Wasps. Ar. Lysistrata 577, condemns those "banding and knotting together for offices." HCT 5, pp. 128-131.

⁷²Thuc. 8.56.2-5; HCT 5, p. 136.

scheme, but no mention is made in our sources of persons backing of the plot as a result of the break with Alcibiades. Instead, others like Phrynichus were its enthusiastic supporters. The conspirators on Samos agreed to follow through with their plan and to contribute as much of their own resources as necessary since they would now be bearing the burdens for themselves and not for others. The emphasis in their private statements was on their personal wealth and securing control of the government for those who like themselves were paying for the war.⁷³

The removal of Alcibiades would naturally affect many individuals' attitude towards the plot, both at Samos and at Athens. Thucydides makes no comment on the change except for Phrynichus' new enthusiasm. Certainly other political opponents of Alcibiades who opposed the proposal of Peisander would now be more receptive towards the movement. The momentum of the conspiracy does shift from the fleet at Samos where Alcibiades' friends initiated the scheme to Athens where the government eventually established was distinctly hostile towards Alcibiades.⁷⁴ Alcibiades appears to have been able to cast the blame for the failure of the Athenian embassy onto the oligarchs. His reputation and the myth of his influence over Tissaphernes remained intact.

⁷³Thuc. 8.63.3-4.

⁷⁴Raphael Sealey, "The Revolution of 411," in Essays in Greek Politics (New York: Manyland Books, 1967), pp. 119-120, overemphasizes the loss of Alcibiades on the aims of the plot.

After spending the early part of spring securing their position on Samos, the conspirators sent Peisander and the other envoys to Athens. They proceeded across the Aegean, abolishing democracies in the cities and taking aboard hoplites from Andros, Tenos and Carystos.⁷⁵ When Peisander's group arrived in Athens in early June, they found most of the work of preparation already done by their friends. Thucydides describes the state into which Athens had fallen during the months since Peisander's departure. A steady progression of intimidation and violence by the members of the hetaireiai had culminated in the assassination of Androcles, the most powerful leader of the demos, by some of the "younger men." Androcles was an enemy of Alcibiades, but more importantly he could have mobilized opposition to the conspirators.⁷⁶ The boule and the assembly continued to meet, but they discussed only what was approved by the oligarchs and only they could address these bodies. If anyone did oppose them, he was immediately killed. No one investigated their deaths or brought charges even when the suspects were known. Thus the demagogues such as Androcles were removed and the demos thoroughly intimidated. Nor could anyone plan opposition to the oligarchs since no one could be certain who was a member of the conspiracy or how large the group was.

⁷⁵Thuc. 8.64.1, 65.1; HCT 5, p. 161.

⁷⁶Thuc. 8.65.1-2; Androcles: Andocides 1.27; Plut. Alcibiades 19.1.2, calls him an enemy, echthros, of Alcibiades; Ar. Wasps (420) 1187 says Androcles was in a state delegation; Cratinus FAC I F209A (428) is a proverb: in times of civil strife even Androcles is polemarch.

Some men in the plot would never have been thought to favor oligarchy. These inspired the greatest distrust among the demos by confirming their suspicions.⁷⁷

The oligarchs circulated the proposal that no one should get pay from the state except those serving in the war. The government, they said, should be limited to those men who could serve the state both in property and body. This number should not exceed five thousand. The proposal was not equivalent to restricting the franchise to the hoplites and higher classes. By limiting the citizen body to five thousand, the oligarchs would strip many poorer hoplites of their status. Thucydides believed this program of no pay for offices and limited participation was put forth merely to appease the citizens. In his view, the aims of those in the conspiracy were to gain control of the state for themselves alone.⁷⁸

Thus the demos was cowed and the propaganda groundwork laid for constitutional change when Peisander returned. An assembly was called and a board of commissioners, syngrapheis, was appointed with full powers to draft proposals for the best interests of the state. The board consisted of the ten probouloi along with twenty others appointed by the assembly. The conspirators were using the probouloi to legitimize their actions while the

⁷⁷Thuc. 8.66.2-5: HCT 5, pp. 163-164.

⁷⁸Thuc. 8.65.3-66.1.

twenty new members probably included the leaders of the plot in order to ensure their control of the proposals.⁷⁹

On the appointed day, the assembly met in the precinct of Poseidon at Colonus, a spot over a mile outside the city's walls (see Maps 2 and 3, Appendix). Though there was no threat from the enemy, the move would have discouraged some persons not involved in the plot from attending, either from inconvenience or out of fear of the conspirators.⁸⁰ The syngrapheis declared that anyone could make any proposal he felt was in the best interest of the state without fear of being indicted for making an unconstitutional proposal.⁸¹ Thucydides' description of the assembly is brief and concerned only with how the Four Hundred took power. Peisander, perhaps as one of the syngrapheis, proposed that the current office holders be removed and that no one should receive a salary from the state. Five men were then selected as presiding officers.

⁷⁹Thucydides, 8.67.1, says there were only ten syngrapheis, but a fragment of Androtion, FGrH 324 F43=Philochorus FGrH 328 F136, preserved in Harpocration, s.v. syngrapheis, says thirty were chosen. The Ath. Pol., 29.2-3, says twenty men were added to the ten probouloi. Many solutions have been advanced to clear up the conflict, but the best is to remember that Thucydides was less concerned with constitutional details than with personal motives and the actual exercise of power. Androtion and the Ath. Pol. used details from decrees and records to exaggerate the legal manner in which the oligarchs proceeded. Thucydides' desire to summarize details led to a mistake. Also the references to Sophocles' and Hagnon's membership on the board of probouloi (note 39 above) imply a role for this group in bringing the Four Hundred to power. Also see HCT 5, pp. 165-166; Hignett, p. 274.

⁸⁰HCT 5, pp. 166-167; Hignett, p. 275, implies Spartans were a threat.

⁸¹Ath. Pol. 29.4; Thuc. 8.67.2; Bonner and Smith 1, pp. 264, 304.

These named a hundred men who each chose three others. These four hundred men were to enter the council chamber and govern with full powers. They supposedly would convene the Five Thousand citizens in an assembly whenever they thought best.⁸²

The Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia gives a very different version. No one was to receive pay except the prytanies and archons, and the government was to be entrusted to those men with property, amounting to not less than five thousand. Ten men from each tribe were selected to enroll the Five Thousand. The assembly at Colonus then ratified these proposals. The Five Thousand then elected a hundred men to draw up a constitution. These men drew up two documents, one for the future, Ath. Pol. 30, and one for the present, Ath. Pol. 31. These were approved by the Five Thousand.⁸³

The problems with Aristotle's view of events are legion. The Five Thousand acts as a body on the same day a commission is set up to enroll it. The board of syngrapheis delivers finished constitutions on the same day it was formed. The attempts to incorporate the two versions are numberless, but they run up against Aristotle's own statement that the Five Thousand was drawn up in word only. Here Aristotle fell victim to his sources or his own desire to present the actions of the oligarchs in a more

⁸²Thuc. 8.67.3; McCoy, "Non-speeches," p. 84.

⁸³Ath. Pol. 29.5-30.1.

positive and legal light. The constitutions were certainly not proposed at Colonus. Theories on their origin vary, but the most commonly accepted one is that they were both documents circulated by the Four Hundred soon after they seized power in order to appease the citizens and legitimize their position.⁸⁴

Thucydides' account of the assembly at Colonus is accurate and reliable as far as it goes, but there are details in the Athenaion Politeia which Thucydides omits. Certainly some provision was at least put forth for enrolling the Five Thousand. The promise of a limited hoplite democracy was the oligarchs' main propaganda tool and they could not yet afford to cast it aside. Lysias indicates the Four Hundred did appoint a board of registrars although the board made no real attempt to compile the list for most of the Four Hundred's term.⁸⁵ A related item of political propaganda is seen in an amendment by Cleitophon calling on the board of syngrapheis to seek out the ancestral laws, patrioi nomoi, laid down by Cleisthenes. This raises the complicated question of the Athenians' concept of the constitution and their views on when democracy was actually established at Athens. No unified

⁸⁴HCT 5, pp. 242-246, gives a summary of the different theories; Hignett, pp. 360, 373; M. Cary, "Notes on the Revolution of the Four Hundred," JHS 72(1952), pp. 58-61, believes both documents were the products of the fall of the Four Hundred.

⁸⁵Ath. Pol. 29.5; Thuc. 8.89.2, implies an early promise to publish a list of the Five Thousand; Ps.-Lysias 20.13-14; Photius s.v. syngrapheis: "ten men chosen to register who would be in the Four Hundred."

constitution existed in Athens at this time, only the accumulated mass of decrees passed by the boule and assembly over the decades. Whether a certain group of these could be singled out in 411 as the laws of Cleisthenes (or of Solon) is unclear. More important for the oligarchs was the propaganda value of invoking Cleisthenes and the patrioi nomoi. By using the legacy of Cleisthenes, they showed they were trying to undo the changes enacted in the last fifty years which had allowed greater political participation to the thetes and poorer hoplites. They were attempting to recall the hoplite democracy of Cleisthenes which had defeated the Persians under aristocratic leadership. This image would appeal to many hoplites, who disliked the current democracy which put the thetes on equal terms with them. They would not support a narrow oligarchy but they might support a government based on a hoplite property qualification.⁸⁶

Thucydides' and Aristotle's language does not make it clear whether the changes enacted at Colonus were to be implemented at once or later. Since it was early June, the regular officials and boule members had about two months to serve and the Four Hundred possibly were to replace them at the end of their term. The conspirators had other ideas. Towards the end of each afternoon the Athenians guarding the city's walls routinely stacked their

⁸⁶ Ath. Pol. 29.3; Alexander Fuks, The Ancestral Constitution (London: Routledge and Kegan, 1953), pp. 1-25; M. I. Finley, "The Ancestral Constitution," in The Use and Abuse of History (New York: Viking Press, 1975), p. 38.

arms in the agora and went home. On this particular day (Thucydides' phrase is again vague whether on the same day or soon after) those involved in the plot waited near their arms. The hoplites Peisander had brought from the islands did the same.⁸⁷ The Four Hundred, armed with daggers and escorted by a hundred and twenty youths burst into the council chamber and dismissed the elected boule. The Four Hundred paid out of their own pockets the boule members for the remainder of their term as they filed out of the chamber. The paying off of the democratic officials with their private funds was symbolic of the oligarchs assuming direct control of the government of Athens.⁸⁸

The Four Hundred selected presiding officers and performed the normal sacrifices for assuming office. Thucydides says these were done in the normal democratic manner, but they soon abandoned democratic procedures and ruled in a high-handed fashion.⁸⁹ No immediate opposition to the change came from the demos and democracy was replaced by a narrow oligarchy. Who were the men in the scheme and what were their motives? What degree of support did they have in the city? Why was there no popular reaction? These questions are discussed in Chapter III.

⁸⁷Thuc. 8.69.1-2; Hignett, p. 360, says on the same day; HCT 5, pp. 179-180 is unsure; A later day very soon after the Colonus assembly seems likely. See Grote 8, p. 38.

⁸⁸Thuc. 8.69.2-4.

⁸⁹Thuc. 8.70.1; HCT 5, p. 182.

CHAPTER III

THE SUPPORT FOR OLIGARCHY IN ATHENS

The overthrow of democracy was supported by various groups in Athens, but those actually involved in the planning and execution of the deed were few in number. Despite his distaste for the plot and its motivations, Thucydides calls the leaders of the conspiracy xynetoi, wise or able.⁹⁰ Little is known of these men individually; most references are to the oligarchs or, later, the Four Hundred. No list of the Four Hundred survives. Only twenty-two can be identified with certainty, and at best another twenty men who were probable or possible members. The main instigators are fairly well known. Thucydides cites Peisander, Antiphon, Phrynichus and Theramenes. In the Athenaion Politeia, Aristotle agrees with all except Phrynichus, though in the Politics he acknowledges Phrynichus as a major player in the plot.⁹¹

Peisander was the public spokesman and most visible of the oligarchs, but the man Thucydides considered the most responsible

⁹⁰Thuc. 8.68.4; Criticisms of the oligarchs: 8.66.1, 89.3, 91.3; See H. D. Westlake, "The Subjectivity of Thucydides: His Treatment of the Four Hundred at Athens," BRL 56(1973), pp. 197, 199-201.

⁹¹H. C. Avery, "Prosopographical Studies in the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1959), DA 21(1961), pp. 3070-3071; For the ancient references to each member, see Iohannes Kirchner, Prosopographia Attica, 2 vos. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1901). Thuc. 8.68; Ath. Pol. 32.2; Rhodes, Commentary, p. 363 suggests a copyist's error caused Phrynichus to drop from the Ath. Pol. list.

for the planning and execution of the plot was Antiphon, the son of Sophilus from the deme of Rhamnous. In an unusually strong personal statement, Thucydides praises Antiphon as second to no Athenian of his time in character and ability.⁹² Antiphon was the first of the ten great Attic orators, and though there may have been another Antiphon, a sophist, living at the same time, at the very least Antiphon of Rhamnous taught rhetoric, wrote books on the subject and was a professional speech writer.⁹³ The Athenaion Politeia calls him well-born, but his claim to aristocratic standing is uncertain. In comedies he was ridiculed for his love of money which may indicate he was a nouveau riche. His pupils were young aristocrats and he moved in the same circles as Socrates. His clients showed a tendency for anti-democratic sympathies. Thucydides says Antiphon had been considering the overthrow of democracy longer than any of the conspirators. He was hated by the demos so he rarely spoke in the assembly or the courts.⁹⁴ In Antiphon one sees the backstage mastermind of the plot.

Thucydides calls Theramenes, the son of Hagnon from Steiria, one of the foremost figures in the plot but says nothing about his actions during the establishment of the oligarchy, only that Theramenes was skilled in speech and judgement. Aristotle includes him among the well-born leaders of the plot and his social status

⁹²Thuc. 8.68.1-2; HCT 5, pp. 170-172.

⁹³H. C. Avery, "One Antiphon or Two?" Hermes 110(1982), pp. 145-158, argues for one; HCT 5, pp. 108-109, opts for two.

⁹⁴Ath. Pol. 32.2; Ps.-Plut. Moralia 832b says his father

is confirmed by his own trierarchy and Hagnon's liturgies.⁹⁵

Theramenes' career before 411 is almost a complete blank. He was significant enough to be mentioned in a comedy in the 420s. In 403 Critias accused Theramenes of betraying the demos in 411 after he had been honored by it. This may indicate previous political office. The Four Hundred elected him general, which implies a degree of military experience, although Hagnon may have used his prestige to secure an ambitious position for his son.⁹⁶

The career of Phrynichus is as uncertain as Theramenes' and his background more so. His enthusiasm for the conspiracy resulted from his fear and hatred of Alcibiades and his belief that the oligarchs would not recall him. The only possible reference before 411 to Phrynichus (a common name) is a passage in the Wasps where a Phrynichus and also an Antiphon are part of a drunken revelry at a symposium.⁹⁷ The speech For Polystratus, (preserved mistakenly in the manuscripts of Lysias) delivered in 410 in defense of a former oligarch, says Phrynichus spent his youth in

was a sophist; Philostratus Lives of the Sophists 15.449; Socrates: Xen. Memorabilia 1.6.1-15; Plato Menexenus 236a; Antiphon 6, On the Choretus; Thuc. 8.68.1-2.

⁹⁵Theramenes: Thuc. 8.68.4; Ath. Pol. 32.2; Davies, pp. 227-228; Hagnon: see note 39 above.

⁹⁶Eupolis FAC I F327 (Cities c.422) accuses Theramenes of being adopted; Critias' attack: Xen. Hellenica 2.3.30; Gabriel Adeleye, "Theramenes and the Overthrow of the Four Hundred," Museum Africum 2(1973), p. 81; Generalship: H. C. Avery, "Lysias XII, 65," CP 61(1966), pp. 257-258.

⁹⁷Ar. Wasps 1302; Alan H. Sommerstein, ed., Aristophanes, Wasps (Warminster, Eng.: Aris and Phillips, 1983), pp. 235-236; HCT 5, p. 59.

poverty in his deme of Deirades, and came to Athens as a sycophant. The speaker is trying to disassociate Phrynichus from Polystratus, whose wealth and social standing could not be denied. Therefore his degrading of Phrynichus' background is suspect, especially since by the time of the speech Phrynichus had been posthumously convicted of treason and his bones thrown out of Attica. Nothing is known of his father, Stratonides.⁹⁸ The only favorable evidence for the earlier activities of Phrynichus is that in 412 when he was already in his sixties and Athens was facing a battle for her very survival, he was elected general and sent to Ionia as supreme commander of the fleet. The importance of the command indicates a high level of confidence and trust in Phrynichus based on his earlier career, which to us is a blank.

Of the remaining eighteen identified members of the oligarchy, some are known only from their actions in the oligarchy. Generalizations made from the other seven or eight and the leaders of the plot are obviously flimsy and tentative. Nothing can be said of the ages of these men or their demes of origin. One trend however, does seem certain. Despite the dearth of evidence, eight of the twenty-two men are included in J. K. Davies' Athenian Propertied Families.⁹⁹ Davies' criteria are sometimes arbitrary. He refuses

⁹⁸Lysias 20.11-12; HCT 5, p. 59; Bones: Lycurgus 1.113; Father: Scholia in Lysistrata 313.

⁹⁹Davies includes Andron, pp. 33-34; Aristarchus, p. 48; Aristocrates, pp. 56-59; Thymochares, pp. 524-528; Callaeschrus, pp. 322-335; Melesias, pp. 230-237; Polystratus, pp. 467-468; Theramenes, pp. 227-228.

to include the treasurers of Athena or the Hellenotamiai as members of the propertied class despite the statement in the Athenaion Politeia that they came only from the highest property class.¹⁰⁰ This excludes Peisander, son of Glaucetes. Davies also refuses to speculate on the basis of inclusion in the Platonic dialogues. This eliminates Antiphon. Davies' standard of wealth is clear evidence of a man performing state liturgies--trierarchies, choral performances, athletic games and other expensive duties. The evidence for these is in inscriptions and chance references in texts. The survival of inscriptions is also largely a matter of random chance, seeing that very few of the thousands of dedicatory inscriptions have in fact survived. With a better group of evidence more of the Four Hundred would be included in the propertied class as Davies defines it. Though it is no sure indication of aristocratic status, it is interesting that seven of the oligarchs appear in the dialogues of Plato.¹⁰¹

The evidence from Davies' work and the references in Plato confirm the direct statements of Thucydides and Aristotle that the leaders and active members of the plot were mostly well-born Athenians, the knights. As discussed earlier, Thucydides' terminology is explicit. The emphasis is on the dynatotatoi and beltistoi as the natural supporters of such a project. Both in

¹⁰⁰ Davies, p. xxvi; Ath. Pol. 8.1, 47.1.

¹⁰¹ Andron: Gorgias 487c, Protagoras 315c; Antiphon: Menexenus 36a; Aristocrates: Grg. 472a; Aristoteles: Parmenides 127d; Callaeschrus: Charmides 153c, Prt. 316a; Cleitophon: Republic

Athens and among the fleet at Samos, the members of the aristocratic and wealthy hetaireiai were the most active and dedicated oligarchs. Their self-justification--putting control of affairs in the hands of those paying for the war--emphasized their wealth and position.¹⁰² While the most active supporters came from the knights, not every aristocratic or well-to-do Athenian took part in the plot. Some may not have shared the beliefs of the conspirators or may have been excluded because of personal rivalry. However the Four Hundred, drawn from the hetaireiai and families which had enthusiastically supported the change in government, could include a broad section of the wealthy knights. The younger knights were particularly zealous in their support of the movement. Thucydides says they often provided the violence and bullying for the oligarchs including the assassination of Androcles and the storming of the council chamber. The young knights reappear in 404/3 as the henchmen of the Thirty.¹⁰³

In addition to the knights, the hoplites Peisander brought with him from the islands played an armed role in the seizure of power. These men were recruited from Andros, Tenos and Carystos

328b, Cleitophon 406a; Melesias: Theages 103a, Meno 94c, Laches 179a.

¹⁰²Thuc. 8.47-48, 54.4; Ath. Pol. 32.2.

¹⁰³Androcles: Thuc. 8.65.2; Council chamber: 8.69.4; Loyal to end: 8.92.6, 9; Thuc. 8.92.6 identifies the youths with Aristarchus as knights and it is reasonable to assume earlier references to youths were to the same group. See T. R. Glover, From Pericles to Philip, 4th ed. (London: Methuen, 1926), pp. 187-188; Xen. Hellenica 2.3.23: youths present at the boule of the Thirty which was restricted to the knights; Glover, p. 188.

in Euboea at the same time Peisander was establishing oligarchies in these cities. Thucydides clearly states these men came to Athens solely to aid the oligarchs in seizing power. Their involvement, as non-Athenians in internal Athenian politics, was likely a result of their inclusion in the oligarchies Peisander established in their home cities.¹⁰⁴ Along with the islanders Thucydides mentions some Athenians colonists from Aegina. Whether Peisander had brought them with him or they were already in Athens is unclear. As cleruchs they were still Athenian citizens, and as large land owners were perhaps in sympathy with the aims of the plot.¹⁰⁵

The deployment of armed supporters on the day the Four Hundred took power shows they feared the reaction of some elements of the population. Most likely they were worried about the thetes and poorer hoplites who stood to lose their rights and who never accepted even the limited reforms suggested in the public propaganda of the conspirators. The oligarchs underestimated the effects of

¹⁰⁴Thuc. 8.65.1: Peisander and his friends "overthrew the demos in the cities and at the same time from some places took hoplites as allies for they themselves;" 8.69.1: These men had come "for this very purpose with their arms;" The men from Andron, Tenos, and Carystos were not Athenian cleruchs. Thuc. 7.57.2, lists the Athenian forces in Sicily. The Athenians themselves are listed with their colonists on Aegina and elsewhere. The Carystians and the islanders are listed as tribute paying allies. Thuc. 4.42.1 treats the Carystians as a separate ally, while in 5.74.2 the Aeginetans are joined with (syn) the Athenians. See Meiggs, pp. 569-570.

¹⁰⁵Meiggs, p. 121; Kagan, p. 119; A. J. Graham, Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece (Manchester: University Press, 1964), pp. 171-172.

the reign of terror they had unleashed. The activities of the clubs and youths had eliminated the popular leaders and intimidated a demos already greatly depleted by the departure of the fleet to Samos. While some men may have wanted to resist the change, they had little chance without strong leadership and without a clear understanding of the power of the oligarchs.¹⁰⁶ Obviously, the thetes and poor hoplites were the least able to oppose an armed plot, having few arms to compete with the armor and weapons of the better classes.

The change in government also had support among the hoplites. The exact extent of this feeling was likely unclear and a source of concern for the oligarchs on the day they seized power. The plot surely had some active supporters among the hoplites, especially among the better-off hoplites who had to pay the eisphora and identified more with the aristocracy than others of their status. The conspirators realized they needed support or at least neutrality from the majority of the hoplites and they went to considerable lengths in their propaganda to appease this group. The success of their efforts is obvious in the oligarchs' ability to pass their program at Colonus without opposition and in the lack of popular reaction when the Four Hundred seized power. The passive support or acquiescence of the hoplites was the ultimate cause of the plot's realization.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰⁶Thuc. 8.66 discusses the terror and the weakness of the demos.

¹⁰⁷Thuc. 8.65.3-66.1; G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, "The Character

Individual Athenians and groups had a variety of reasons to give the movement to overthrow democracy their active or passive support. The city was suffering extreme hardships and facing an uncertain future. The conditions were commonly shared, but individual reactions varied greatly. Depending on their backgrounds and predispositions Athenians were motivated by combinations of personal ambition, concern for the city's safety, greed, and political ideology. The most common and simplest explanation given by ancient sources for the success of the Four Hundred was discontent with the democracy after the defeat in Sicily.¹⁰⁸ While this minimizes Athens' recovery in 412, the Sicilian disaster was a major factor in the background for 411. Many families had lost members in the expedition, or were still unsure whether they had died or were in slavery somewhere. Although some Athenians did manage to escape and return to Athens, the vast majority never came back.¹⁰⁹ The families of these men and Athenians as a whole questioned the reasons for the expedition and whether it was handled properly by the government. In a similar way, the trials and executions over the mutilation of the herms and the profanation of the Mysteries left some Athenians

of the Athenian Empire," Historia 3(1954), pp. 26-27.

¹⁰⁸ Ath. Pol. 29.1, mentions Sicily and Sparta's alliance with Persia; Diodorus has two brief references to the Four Hundred, first saying the demos was disheartened by the revolt of the allies, 13.34.1, then adding the Athenians were distressed over the defeat in Sicily, 13.36.1.

¹⁰⁹ For the losses in Sicily and the Athenians who returned, see notes 31 and 33 above.

bitter. Some families had members killed or exiled. These were few in number, but in some cases they were powerful and wealthy families.¹¹⁰ Again, even persons not directly affected by the trials were troubled by the conduct of the government and politicians.

More serious than past misfortunes were the city's current woes and its cloudy future. The Peloponnesians had a permanent garrison at Decelea, depriving the city of its countryside and leaving Athens an island, dependent on its fleet for survival. The Spartans had finally succeeded in breaking up Athens' empire and putting a large fleet into the Aegean. With Persian aid, the Peloponnesians were assured of continuing resources while Athens slowly drained her treasuries. The breakup of the empire, itself a serious psychological blow, gave the Spartans a strong fleet in the Aegean and meant one Spartan victory could destroy Athens' fleet and cut her life line from the sea. Thus for the first time Athens was faced seriously with the same type of complete destruction she had bestowed on other cities.

The higher stakes of the later phases of the Peloponnesian War are evident in Thucydides' usage of the term soteria, salvation. This rarely means simply safety or protection from danger but has a connotation of escape from total destruction or death. The term is rare in the early books of Thucydides, but it becomes a common

¹¹⁰In particular the families of Alcibiades and Andocides were two of the oldest and wealthiest in Athens.

theme of the later part of his narrative starting in the Melian dialogue and then in discussions of the Athenians' fate in Sicily.¹¹¹ The theme of soteria appears several times in the oligarchs' propaganda, most strikingly in Peisander's rejoinder to the assembly to be more concerned with the city's soteria than her politeia.¹¹² The prospect of complete destruction was very much in the minds of Athenians in 412 and 411. It was an effective tool for the oligarchs as they exploited the promise of Persian aid and Alcibiades' return as the only means of soteria for the city.

The war was also draining the city's and individuals' finances. Besides its losses in men and ships, the Sicilian expedition had been a serious drain on the treasury. The empire had long provided Athens with an easy means to recoup losses, but

¹¹¹Thucydides uses forms of soteria only ten times in the first four books and many of these occur in speeches which were possibly written later than the narrative of these books. In the second half of the work, he uses the word eight times in book five, seven times in both books six and seven, and nine times in book eight. Not surprisingly the concept is a major part of the Melian dialogue (all eight uses in book five are between chapters 87 and 111); indeed the Athenians argue that soteria should be the Melians' only concern. In the account of the Sicilian expedition, the term is first used in discussing all sides, but in book seven, as the Athenians' situation worsens, it refers only to them and their allies (8.1, 12.3, 61.1, 64.2, 70.7, 71.3, 81.3).

¹¹²Peisander made much of the idea at the first assembly: Thuc. 8.53.2, 53.3, 54.1; Later part of the promises of the Four Hundred to the men at Samos: 8.72.1, 86.3; Major concern of men on Samos: 75.3, 81.1, 82.1; See Bieler, note 68 above, for soteria as an oligarchic slogan.

even before the revolts of 412, tribute collections were down and Athens had switched to a port tax in the empire. With the revolts, particularly of the large trading centers of Chios, Miletus and later Rhodes, imperial revenues plunged even more. Most revenues collected from the allies probably never actually came to Athens, but were used by the commanders in the field to support the fleet.¹¹³

The city's domestic revenues were also strained. Eisphora were collected, but the Spartan occupation reduced the amount collected. Even if the silver mines at Laurion were not completely closed, they produced at a much lower rate than before. Expenditures were increasing while revenues declined, as the city scrambled to increase its fleet in order to keep up with the Persian-backed Peloponnesians. The use of the thousand talent reserve in 412 shows that the regular treasury was empty. Thucydides says efforts were made to economize after news of the defeat in Sicily, but he gives no specifics.¹¹⁴ Judging from later events, pay for public duties was not halted. Athens did answer the challenge in 412 and mobilized a large fleet to meet the Peloponnesian threat in the Aegean. The city's ability to

¹¹³Thuc. 7.28.4, mentions port tax; W. S. Ferguson, The Treasurers of Athena (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932), pp. 35-36; Charles W. Fornara, Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1977), #154, pp. 176-179; GHI, #84, pp. 255-260; ATL 3, p. 366.

¹¹⁴Eisphora: Thomsen, p. 175; Mines: see note 35 above and Strauss, p. 46; Thuc. 8.1.2-3, 15.1.

accomplish this feat was largely a result of drawing heavily on the resources of private Athenians, particularly the upper classes.

These public demands were made on individuals already smarting from the hardships of war. The occupation of Decelea deprived most Athenians of any advantage from their land. The degree of deprivation varied; those with farms close to Athens had some degree of protection, while others lost everything to the garrison at Decelea and looters from Boeotia. Some non-agricultural production, such as arms or naval supplies probably increased, but this was a limited area and did not reduce the strain on those whose wealth came from traditional sources.¹¹⁵ The revolt of the allies also cost individuals income from the empire. Beyond official cleruchies, private citizens had also bought land in the allied states. These holdings were lost after the revolts.¹¹⁶ The state was demanding heavier contributions. The trierarchy, always an expensive duty, was now a constant burden on the rich. The rich and some men of the hoplite class were repeatedly required to make eisphora payments. The combination of lowered income and greater burdens sapped the economic position of the upper classes. In a sense, they were also paying for the democracy for the first time, since pay for jurors and officials continued without revenues from the empire. In these

¹¹⁵ Strauss, pp. 47-50.

¹¹⁶ Finley, "Athenian Empire," p. 52; Meiggs, p. 262.

circumstances, the oligarchic movement was a reaction by the propertied class to protect their position from slipping further.¹¹⁷

For some Athenians the solution to the city's and their own problems was to replace democracy with a more restrictive form of government composed of those who were actually paying for the war. How the initiators of this movement were depicted in ancient accounts depended on the attitude of the particular historian. In Thucydides' view, the conspirators were purely self-serving opportunists seeking total political domination in Athens. Their public pronouncements for the city's safety were only propaganda to deceive the rest of society.¹¹⁸ On the other hand, in the Athenaion Politeia Aristotle emphasizes the failure of the democracy and the concern for soteria. A reduction of public expenditures was needed and a more efficient government in order to prosecute the war.¹¹⁹

This division of opinion is often carried over into modern histories of the Four Hundred where a distinction is made between "moderate" and "extreme" oligarchs.¹²⁰ The extremists are said

¹¹⁷Thomsen, pp. 166, 175; Ste. Croix, "Character," pp. 27-28.

¹¹⁸Thuc. 8.66.1, 89.3, 91.3; Westlake, "Subjectivity," p. 199.

¹¹⁹Ath. Pol. 29-32; Westlake, "Subjectivity," pp. 196-197.

¹²⁰Leonard Whibley, Political Parties in Athens During the Peloponnesian War (Cambridge: University Press, 1889), pp. 95-96; G. H. Stevenson, "The Constitution of Theramenes," JHS 56(1936), pp. 48-57; Fuks, pp. 3-5, 11-13, 86-89; Hignett, pp. 272-279; G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, "The Constitution of the Five Thousand," Historia 5(1956), pp. 10-11; Victor Ehrenberg, From Solon to Socrates, 2nd ed. (London: Methuen, 1968), pp. 318-320.

to have had no real goal except personal power, while the moderates were motivated by civic concern to push for "necessary" constitutional and economic reforms.¹²¹ While the division is obviously simplistic, it may have some usefulness, but not between factions within the oligarchs, but between the active supporters of the conspiracy and those Athenians who responded to the public propaganda emphasizing constitutional reforms. Since the Four Hundred later split over these reform promises, historians have tried to make this an issue of division from the beginning of the conspiracy. The ancient accounts make no such distinction between moderate and extreme oligarchs among the Four Hundred when they were first established. Thucydides says none of the oligarchs intended to enact the measures they were promising and they were all originally content with the Four Hundred.¹²²

The actual conspirators, while conscious of Athens' precarious position, saw an opportunity to benefit themselves politically and economically. Many were knights and better-off hoplites who were paying the most to the state and exerting little influence on the government. They saw an opportunity to immediately reduce the drain on their resources and to have control over what they paid. Some aristocrats held long standing grudges against

¹²¹Ste. Croix, "Character," p. 26; Sealey, "Revolution," pp. 127-130, rejects the moderates as a real group, but instead makes their program of economic reform the true aim of the entire incident, pp. 122-127.

¹²²Thuc. 8.66.1, 89.3 says personal ambitions led to the split.

the democracy for depriving them of their ordained position of leadership in the state.¹²³

The motivations of the hoplites of modest means who were not privy to the inner circles of the conspiracy were perhaps more civic oriented. The public propaganda of the conspirators found a receptive audience among Athenians concerned with the city's chance of survival and who wanted a more efficient government. Most of these men had no dreams of personal power. However, the civic-mindedness of these hoplites and others who shared their views can only partially explain their support for the overthrowing of democracy. The propaganda of the plot was carefully focused to appeal to property owning hoplites who felt they had become forgotten men under the democracy. The allusions to Cleisthenes and the patrioi nomoi conjured up the hoplite democracy of their grandfathers which had saved Greece and made Athens an imperial power. Many now believed the empire and the reforms of the fifth century had reduced the hoplites to second-class citizens beneath the thetes. The restriction of the citizen body to five thousand men would restore those with substantial property to their rightful place in society. The move would clearly have disenfranchised the poorer hoplites along with the thetes, since there were around 10,000 hoplites citizens in 411.¹²⁴

¹²³Thucydides says Antiphon, 8.68.1, and Aristarchus, 8.90.1, had long despised democracy and their feelings were likely shared.

¹²⁴Gomme, Population, p. 26 hoplites and thetes around 10,000 each; Strauss, p. 79, uses the figure of 9,000 hoplites

The better-off hoplites would then constitute the assembly and boule, and hold real power in Athens. Beyond the political reassertion of the wealthier hoplites, the promised economic reforms would benefit those hoplites paying eisphora. The ending of public pay for officials and jurors did not extend to persons in military service, and since most were on duty full-time, the hoplites would continue to receive their pay.

The common ground for both the conspirators and the "civic minded" hoplites was the disenfranchisement and removal from politics of the thetes and poorer hoplites. The act of ending public pay was both an economic relief for the rich and a political move to eliminate their opponents. However, the impact of ending public pay should not be exaggerated. Its importance was more as a symbolic gesture and a propaganda slogan than as a political or economic reform. Contrary to Aristophanes and the Old Oligarch, there were not thousands of idle Athenians living off the public payroll. Thetes were excluded from most offices already, and poor citizens were probably the exception among the five hundred members of the boule. Pay for jury duty was three obols a day, below the average wage for a manual laborer. Moves were probably taken in 412 to limit the size and frequency of juries in order to cut costs. The state would receive some modest savings by ending pay, but constitutionally the move did not bar anyone from

from Lysias 20.13; Beloch, p. 410, also uses this figure, but avoids any total number for citizens in 411.

government.¹²⁵ More important was the restriction on participation in the assembly and other areas of government to five thousand persons. Most of the citizen body would be disenfranchised. Democracy as the rule of the demos would cease in either the plans of the oligarchs or the hoplites, though the hoplites would claim their government was still a democracy.¹²⁶ The oligarchs of course were determined to go much further in restricting the government and they did not plan to share power with any group. Both groups' ultimate goal was to re-establish their prestige and power. The oligarchs saw themselves as the heirs of the aristocratic tradition of political leadership, and the hoplites invoked the democracy of Cleisthenes and the heroes of Marathon. Neither group had any qualms over stripping the thetes, on whose shoulders the fate of Athens rested, of their political rights.¹²⁷ Men were certainly concerned with the city's safety, but both the hoplites and the oligarchs hoped to lead Athens out of its crisis and also establish a new political order in which they were dominant.

¹²⁵Ath. Pol. 7.4; Whibley, Political Parties, pp. 42-45; Ste. Croix, Class Struggle, p. 289; Ehrenberg, From Solon, p. 241; HCT p. 288; Hignett, p. 279.

¹²⁶Ste. Croix, "Character," pp. 27-28; Strauss, pp. 79-81; Gomme, Population, p. 16; Gregory Vlastos, "The Constitution of the Five Thousand," AJP 73(1952), p. 190, n. 6.

¹²⁷For thetes in fleet see notes 45 and 46 above.

Exactly how the different groups hoped to restructure Athenian politics and society is a complicated matter. The constitutions preserved in the Athenaion Politeia are less help than many historians claim in reconstructing the views of Athenians in 411. They were circulated by the Four Hundred to appease the population after public opinion began to shift against them. The constitution for the present, Ath. Pol. 31, was an attempt to legitimize the Four Hundred's seizure of power. The boule was to number four hundred in accordance with ancestral tradition. The oligarchs claimed the existence of a pre-Cleisthenes boule of four hundred; it is questionable whether there had been such an institution or whether the oligarchs believed in it themselves in 411.¹²⁸ As in actual practice, the constitution invested the boule with absolute power. The generals were to be elected from the Five Thousand (in reality they were elected from the Four Hundred, who of course were also members of the Five Thousand) and would have autocratic powers. The boule was to elect the other officials of the state. Only the generals and boule members could hold office more than one year. No indication is made as to when this constitution would be replaced, and the provision that the boule members and generals could serve

¹²⁸Ath. Pol. 30-31; P. J. Rhodes, Commentary, p. 368; Antony Andrewes, "Androton and the Four Hundred," PCPS 22(1976), pp. 20-21; Ath. Pol. 31.1; 8.4; HCT 5, p. 227; Hignett, p. 93.

more than one year implies the Four Hundred planned to keep it in effect for some time.¹²⁹

In the constitution for the future, Ath. Pol. 30, the Five Thousand were to be divided into four equal groups. These would take turns yearly to form the boule. The boule was to be all-powerful and the generals and other major officials had to be members of the boule that year. This plan's impractical points, such as restricting generals to one year terms even during the war, suggest it was never a serious proposal, but it did promise equal participation to those citizens who could provide their own arms and to no one else.¹³⁰ The Four Hundred hoped to engender support for their regime among the hoplites by promising eventual participation.

The propaganda of the conspiracy was aimed at the hoplites and gives some indication of how they hoped to reform the government of Athens. Limiting the franchise to five thousand men would reduce the size of the assembly, but it would retain its ultimate authority under the hoplite democracy.¹³¹ The boule would have more power to control the proceedings of the assembly than in the old democracy. The abolishment of pay for the boule would restrict its membership to the better-off hoplites.

¹²⁹Ath. Pol. 31.2-3; HCT 5, pp. 230-231; Hignett, pp. 367-375.

¹³⁰Ath. Pol. 30.2-6; Ste. Croix, "Constitution," pp. 14-20, Hignett, pp. 377-378; Andrewes, "Androtion," p. 20.

¹³¹Thuc. 8.65.3.

In effect, the government would return to the time when aristocratic and wealthy Athenians dominated the decision-making process in the boule and in private discussions and then used the hoplite-dominated assembly to approve the decisions made in the boule. How those supporting such reforms hoped to preserve this arrangement after the mass of thetes returned with the fleet is uncertain.

The oligarchs, the actual conspirators, are often said to have had no real constitutional program beyond absolute power for themselves. While they clearly cared more for gaining and holding power, the oligarchs certainly had some vision of a future Athens under their control. They were obviously not going to give up their absolute control of the government. The constitution circulated to legitimize the oligarchy gave the Four Hundred an open-ended term of office. The government in it is only a temporary arrangement; how the oligarchs planned to restructure Athens permanently can only be speculated upon. Some of them, like Antiphon and Aristarchus, had been considering the overthrow of democracy and establishment of an oligarchy for some time.¹³² Many aristocratic Athenians looked toward Sparta for inspiration and the ideal government, but nothing in the actions of the Four Hundred indicates a desire to copy Spartan customs as perhaps was the case during the oligarchy of the Thirty in 404/3.¹³³ Also

¹³²Antiphon: Thuc. 8.68.1; Aristarchus; 8.90.1; One of the Four Hundred, Archeptolemus, was the son of Hippodames, a political theorist discussed by Aristotle in the Politics 1267b22-1269a28.

¹³³David Whitehead, "Sparta and the Thirty Tyrants,"

many of the conspirators were educated by sophists and were convinced they knew how to best understand and organize society.¹³⁴ Their long-term plans to reshape Athens' government and society according to their theories were never fulfilled.

Theories on the nature of society or government had little to do with the Four Hundred's immediate problems in securing their position and controlling the rest of the Athenians. Their day-to-day administration was based solely on the absolute power of the Four Hundred. At first they may have tried to conceal this fact and played on the propaganda of the Five Thousand and promises of reforms, but in reality the Four Hundred sitting as the boule was the only institution of government and the oligarchs planned to keep it that way. They promised to call the Five Thousand when they saw fit, but they delayed even registering those in this group. With the assembly no longer existing, the decisions of the boule became law. The few surviving decrees of the Four Hundred's reign have the preamble "passed by the boule" instead of the normal "by the boule and demos."¹³⁵ The use of

Ancient Society 13/14(1982/83), pp. 117-118; Donlan, p. 168; E. N. Tigerstedt, The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity, vol. 1 (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1965), pp. 154-158.

¹³⁴W. G. Forrest, "Democracy and Oligarchy in Sparta and Athens," Echos. Classical Views 27(1983), pp. 288-299; Donlan, pp. 158-159; Whibley, Political Parties, pp. 79-80.

¹³⁵IG II² 12+, translated in Fornara, Archaic Times, #149, pp. 172-173; Grote 8, p. 37.

of prytany as presiding officers in their first meeting suggests the Four Hundred used regular procedures within the boule, at least in the beginning. No new offices were created and most of the old ones were retained with the Four Hundred appointing themselves and their supporters to them. The oligarchy broke with democratic practice by dating their decrees by the days of the month instead of the tribal prytany and by using the Ionic alphabet instead of the Attic.¹³⁶ Their motives for these changes are not clear, but both of these oligarchic innovations became regular democratic practices after 403.

The abolition of the assembly had the effect of wiping out the democratic court system, long the bane of aristocratic and wealthy Athenians.¹³⁷ The Four Hundred itself was the only court in Athens with the exception of the Areopagus. This vestige of aristocratic heritage and power seems to have retained its ancestral jurisdiction over homicide cases though no record of an actual case survives. The Four Hundred decided the fates of their opponents. These received some type of hearing before the boule, as Andocides did when Peisander accused him of aiding

¹³⁶Whibley, Greek Oligarchies, p. 145; IG I² 298, tr. Fornara, Archaic Times #150, p. 173; HCT 5, p. 182; GHI #81, pp. 250-251, says Ionic letters were used for the first time here, "perhaps on principle."

¹³⁷Bonner and Smith 1, pp. 323-325; Robert J. Bonner, "Justice Under Athenian Oligarchies," CP 21(1926), pp. 210-212; Ps.-Xen. Ath. Pol. 1.13-14, 16; 3.1-7; Ar. Wasps passim; Plato Gorgias 515e.

the men on Samos.¹³⁸ In legal matters, as in administrative, the Four Hundred replaced what they saw as a chaotic democratic system with their own autocratic authority.

In financial matters, the oligarchs surely implemented their pledge to end pay for public officials and reduce the expenses of the government. They also most likely did not exact eisphora during their term in office. The account of the treasurers of the Four Hundred exists in fragments. The preamble shows no deviation from the usual democratic procedures, but the actual accounts are too fragmentary to give any idea of the Four Hundred's expenditures or revenues. Despite their promises of putting Athens back on sound financial ground, the Four Hundred appear to have left an empty treasury at their downfall.¹³⁹

The oligarchic movement had succeeded in subverting democracy in Athens through a combination of propaganda, violence and legal maneuvers. The movement to reform the government had received broad support from the entire propertied class--the knights and hoplites of both comfortable and modest means, but those within the oligarchic conspiracy were drawn almost exclusively from the upper classes. These men alone now held

¹³⁸Dem. 23.66, says the Areopagus had never been stripped of its jurisdiction over homicides either by democracies or oligarchies; Bonner and Smith, p. 326; Thuc. 8.70.2; Andocides 2.13-16.

¹³⁹Eisphora: Thomsen, p. 175; Empty treasury: GHI #84, p. 258; Ferguson, Treasurers, pp. 33-34; Accounts: IG I² 298, GHI #81; Fornara, Archaic Times, #150, p. 173.

power, and they set about to consolidate their control over the rest of the population and to ensure the continued success of their government. In this aim they were spectacularly unsuccessful.

CHAPTER IV

THE REACTION AGAINST THE FOUR HUNDRED AT SAMOS AND ATHENS

Upon their installation the Four Hundred took several steps to strengthen their position and ensure their power in Athens. They first eliminated a number of personal enemies and potential opponents. Neither the names of these men nor the charges against them are known, only that a few were executed, some were imprisoned and others banished from the city. This minor purge was initiated or carried out by Theramenes, perhaps in his role as general. The "three choices" were associated with him in comedy and became proverbial.¹⁴⁰ The oligarchs did not enact a recall of exiles, as was common after revolutions, because of their fear and hatred of Alcibiades.¹⁴¹

The Four Hundred sent envoys to the Spartan king Agis at Decelea, offering to negotiate a peace. Agis, believing the situation in Athens was unsettled, received new troops from the Peloponnesus and advanced on the city. Anxious to show their control, the oligarchs led Athens' forces out and drew up for battle. Some Spartans were killed in skirmishing and Agis withdrew

¹⁴⁰Thuc. 8.70.2; Photius Lexicon s.v. ton trion kakon en includes Polyzelus F3 and Aristophanes F149, "I am fearful of choices of three after Theramenes;" Scholia Frogs 541, "It seems Theramenes decreed the three penalties, either to be fettered in the stocks, to drink hemlock, or to be banished."

¹⁴¹Thuc. 8.70.1; Grote 8, p. 49; HCT 5, p. 182.

his forces. This was the first time in the war that the Athenians had offered battle to the invading Peloponnesians. Their readiness to fight with their hoplites probably earned the Four Hundred considerable support among this group. Agis was more receptive when new envoys came from the oligarchs, and he encouraged them to send an embassy to Sparta. They did so immediately for they were anxious to have peace as to secure their government.¹⁴²

Ten men were also dispatched to the fleet at Samos in order to convince the men there that the revolution was in the best interest of the city. The oligarchs feared a reaction among the thetic rowers and sailors in the fleet so the envoys were instructed to claim the Five Thousand held power and not just the Four Hundred.¹⁴³ This group did not reach Samos in time. The conspirators there had met with defeat about the same time the plot in Athens was succeeding. Before Peisander had left for Athens the oligarchs in the fleet seemed in total control and had invited three hundred of the Samian dynatotoi to join the conspiracy. With the support of the Athenian oligarchs, the three hundred Samians planned to attack the Samian demos and establish an oligarchy. As a sign of good faith the Samians killed the exiled Athenian demagogue Hyperbolus.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴²Thuc. 8.70.2-71.3.

¹⁴³Thuc. 8.72.1-2; Envoys claimed 5000 had never attended a meeting of the assembly (possibly meant only during the war). HCT 5, pp. 183-184 says this was a claim of envoys, not supported by Thucydides.

¹⁴⁴Thuc. 8.73.1-3; This is the only mention of Hyperbolus

The demos of Samos, learning of the plot, approached the Athenian generals Leon and Diomedon, who had been appointed by the demos of Athens and had shown only reluctant support of the oligarchs. They also sought the aid of Thrasybulus, a trierarch, and Thrasyllus, a hoplite, who were openly vocal in their opposition of the plans of the oligarchs.¹⁴⁵ These men went to individual Athenians and encouraged them to help the Samians. In particular, the crew of the state ship Paralus, who were all Athenian citizens and opposed the oligarchy even before it was a threat, showed great enthusiasm. So when the Samian oligarchs attacked, the Athenian sailors defended the demos and the oligarchs were soundly defeated.¹⁴⁶

No actions were taken against those in the fleet known to be oligarchs, but the Paralus was sent to Athens with news of the events. When they arrived the Four Hundred arrested the crew, but one man, Chaereas, escaped and returned to Samos. He gave an exaggerated (in Thucydides' opinion) account of conditions in the

in Thucydides; Death: Theopompus FGrH 115 F96=Scholia in Lucian Timon 30; Ostracism: Plut. Nicias 11, Alcibiades 13, see HCT for overview of modern theories on the date and implications of the ostracism, v. 5, pp. 258-64; Career: Barry Baldwin, "Notes on Hyperbolus," AClass 14(1971), pp. 151-6. Baldwin says there is no reason to believe his murder was purely symbolic. Hyperbolus was probably still active and a threat to the oligarchs' plans in Samos and Athens.

¹⁴⁵Thuc. 8.73.4; Thrasybulus: Davies, pp. 240-1; Thrasyllus: W. J. McCoy, "Thrasyllus," AJP 98(1977), pp. 265-6; Ferguson, CAH 5, pp. 299-300, says all four were out of sympathy with the revolutionaries.

¹⁴⁶Thuc. 8.73.4-6; Paralus: HCT 5, p. 265; Harpocration s.v. Paralus.

city, saying people were being punished, no one could criticize the government, and the relatives of men serving at Samos were being held to ensure their support. The men of the fleet immediately rushed on those known to be oligarchs in order to stone them. They were restrained with difficulty and then all the Athenians, particularly those suspected of oligarchic sympathies, swore oaths to preserve the democracy, fight the Peloponnesians, and be enemies of the Four Hundred.¹⁴⁷

The situation on Samos differed from that in Athens as there was a large group of lower class Athenians who, although they tolerated the oligarchs' early proposals, were ready to oppose any attempt to put these into action. In Athens, few thetes of military age remained to oppose the oligarchs effectively. Many of the persons disenfranchised by the Four Hundred were serving with the fleet. Those that did remain were leaderless and intimidated by the violence of the conspirators. On Samos the thetes and poorer hoplites formed a majority of the Athenians. Far from weak or leaderless, they were armed and active with leaders such as Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The example of these men along with Leon and Diomedon show that others besides the thetes opposed the oligarchs on Samos. These upper-class "democrats" had a number of possible motives for opposing the plot: personal rivalries with men in the plot, their own ambitions,

¹⁴⁷Thuc. 8.74-75; Ath. Pol. completely ignores events on Samos. False report: HCT 5, pp. 266-7.

concern over civil war in the fleet with the Spartans so close, or even a genuinely held fondness for democracy and respect for the rights of their fellow Athenians. Which of these was foremost for each man can not be said, but certainly Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus made the most of the situation to rise from obscurity to positions of power.

The Athenians on Samos immediately called an assembly and removed the generals and any of the trierarchs who were suspected. The new board of generals included Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. The men encouraged themselves, saying that they as the citizens of Athens were the real polis, not the walls or houses back in Attica. The city had revolted from them and was powerless without men. Those in the city were destroying the ancestral laws, patrioi nomoi, while they were preserving them. For the men in the fleet the patrioi nomoi did not have to be searched for in the distant past, they were the laws of the democracy they had left in Athens which were also the same as those established by Solon.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸Thuc. 8.76; Patrioi nomoi as different for men on Samos: Fuks, pp. 33-4, 40; Claude Mosse, "Le Rôle de l'armée dans la révolution de 411 à Athènes," Revue Historique 231(1964), pp. 5-6; Finley, "Ancestral," pp. 37-8; K. R. Walters, "The Ancestral Constitution and Fourth Century Historiography at Athens," AJAH 1(1977), pp. 129-44, argues this was the view of all Athenians in the fifth century and the idea of an ancestral constitution was not possible until after 403. Walters completely ignores the political and social changes of the second half of the fifth century, particularly the political changes after the death of Pericles which made many upper class Athenians feel the government had undergone a great change. He makes no use of the Old Oligarch or Aristophanes, and largely ignores modern scholarship such as Connor's New Politicians and Finley's "Athenian Demagogues."

While the oligarchs believed the last century had seen a corruption of the patrioi nomoi, the democrats on Samos saw no change, only the fulfillment of Solon's and Cleisthenes' laws.

Sometime after the reaction by the fleet, Thrasybulus convinced the men to recall Alcibiades. Thucydides implies Thrasybulus had some difficulty persuading the men, but he does not explain the opposition.¹⁴⁹ Alcibiades had always been popular with the army and the failure of the oligarchs' mission to Tissaphernes does not seem to have destroyed the myth of his influence at the satrap's court. Though his original scheme to return had failed miserably, Alcibiades had begun a chain of events which secured his recall. When he arrived on Samos, he addressed the men and promised to acquire Persian aid for Athens or at least to deny it to the Spartans. The men were overcome with enthusiasm and elected him commander of their forces.¹⁵⁰ Later, the envoys of the Four Hundred arrived from Delos where they had delayed for some time after hearing of the reaction at Samos. The men of the fleet at first refused to hear them, threatening death for the "subverters of democracy." When the men calmed down, the envoys announced the changes in Athens were for the good of all, that all the Five Thousand would participate in the government,

¹⁴⁹Thuc. 8.81.1; HCT 5, p. 275; Grote, 8, p. 50, suggests the democratic fleet was reluctant to overturn the sentence for sacrilege and treason passed by a democratic court.

¹⁵⁰Thuc. 8.81-82; HCT 5, p. 270; Grote, 8, p. 42; Ehrenberg, From Solon, pp. 319-320.

and that their relatives were not being insulted or deprived of their property. The men were not convinced and violently called on the commanders to sail against Athens and the Four Hundred. It took all of Alcibiades' persuasive powers (Thucydides says no one else could have prevented the action) to calm the men and avoid civil war.¹⁵¹ Instead he sent a personal message with the envoys that he had no objection to the Five Thousand ruling, but the Four Hundred should be abolished and replaced with the old boule of five hundred. Alcibiades also approved of any measures to economize expenditures and encouraged the city not to come to terms with the enemy.¹⁵²

Meanwhile in Athens the Four Hundred held full power and ruled with open force, kata kratos.¹⁵³ Early in their reign, after their actions against Agis, opposition or criticism of the oligarchs was not present. As time went on and the oligarchs showed no sign of fulfilling the promise of sharing power with the Five Thousand or even forming this body, the patience and restraint of the hoplites broke down. The news of the fleet's actions and Alcibiades' message caused much discussion among the citizens and discomfort for the Four Hundred. In response to the people's

¹⁵¹Thuc. 8.86.1-5; C. Nepos Alc. 1.2: the power of Alcibiades' oratory; HCT 5, pp. 285-7.

¹⁵²Thuc. 8.86.6-7; Personal message: HCT 5, p. 288; Hignett, p. 278.

¹⁵³Thuc. 8.70.1; Ath. Pol. 32.3; HCT 5, p. 239.

grumblings the government issued the documents in the Athenaion Politeia in order to appease the public.

The unity and confidence of the Four Hundred itself were already badly shaken. Thucydides says many of those in the oligarchy were distressed and anxious to be rid of the entire affair. Some men, including members of the Four Hundred such as Theramenes and Aristocrates, son of Scelias, were forming groups and criticizing the government. They claimed to be acting out of fear of the fleet and the Spartans, and out of loyalty to the city, but Thucydides believed these public professions were mere smoke screens. The real cause of their change of heart was the personal rivalry of each oligarch trying to make himself foremost in power. Aristotle in the Politics also cites the Four Hundred as an example of an oligarchy which fell as a result of internal strife among its members.¹⁵⁴ Elsewhere Aristotle praises Theramenes for his opposition to the Four Hundred when he realized they were not going to share power with the Five Thousand. Lysias, a contemporary of the events, gives a much different view, saying Theramenes was an eager member of the Four Hundred until he saw that others such as Peisander held more power than he did. Then he tried to attach himself to Aristocrates and the opposition. The motives of Theramenes and the other vacillating oligarchs

¹⁵⁴Thuc. 8.89; Arist. Politics 1305b22; HCT 5, p. 294, those in distress were "rank and file" supporters, not the leaders; For Aristocrates see HCT 5, 294-6; Davies, pp. 56-59.

were undoubtedly a mixture of personal ambition and concern for the city. There was a real threat from the fleet, especially to those in the conspiracy. Once the men in Samos recalled Alcibiades and refused to negotiate with the city, some members of the Four Hundred realized the oligarchy's days were numbered. They began to position themselves as leaders of the people, calling for the enrollment and publication of the Five Thousand and criticizing the Four Hundred's abuses.¹⁵⁵

Thucydides describes this split among the oligarchs. On the one side were those firmly and irrevocably committed to the oligarchy and opposed to any extension of political participation. These were the majority of the Four Hundred and they controlled the official acts of the government. Thucydides' use of the term dynatotatoi for this group may imply an identification with the interest of the aristocratic and wealthy classes. Among this group were Phrynichus, Aristarchus, Peisander and Antiphon.¹⁵⁶ These hardliners were also determined to reach a peace with Sparta to secure their position in Athens. Antiphon, Phrynichus and ten others were hastily dispatched to Sparta to reach an agreement. Their commitment to the oligarchy was a true aristocratic sentiment; they would submit to a foreign power rather than put themselves at the mercy of their domestic foes. Towards this end

¹⁵⁵ Ath. Pol. 33.2; Lysias 12.66; Thuc. 8.89.3; Grote, 8, pp. 58-62; Adeleye, "Theramenes," pp. 79-80; Ferguson, CAH, 5, p. 336; HCT 5, pp. 298-300.

¹⁵⁶ Thuc. 8.90.1; HCT 5, p. 302.

a wall was ordered constructed on the mole of Eetionea in the harbor of Piraeus (see Map 3, Appendix) so that the oligarchs could control the harbor with a few men and let in the Spartans. They also took measures to control the grain supply of the city in anticipation of trouble from the population. Opponents immediately claimed the wall was not for the defense of the harbor, as the oligarchs said publicly, but indeed to let in the enemy. Thucydides is very emphatic that the charge was true and that this was the only purpose of the wall.¹⁵⁷

The preparations at Eetionea show that the Four Hundred had come to fear the majority of the people, particularly the hoplites who had earlier supported them. A few disgruntled colleagues would be no real threat by themselves, but a reaction by the mass of the hoplites would put the government in serious jeopardy. The accounts of Thucydides and Lysias suggest the turncoat oligarchs such as Theramenes and Aristocrates were not so much leading the public unrest as exploiting it.¹⁵⁸ The reasons for the shift in public opinion are not difficult to determine. Many Athenians of hoplite status joined the wealthy and aristocrats in welcoming the Four Hundred as a more orderly and effective government compared with the old democracy. They believed the propaganda that promised Persian aid and Athenian victory in the

¹⁵⁷Thuc. 8.90-91; Thuc. agrees with claims of Theramenes in 93.1; HCT 5, pp. 303-6; Grote, 8, pp. 63-4.

¹⁵⁸Lysias 12.66; Thuc. 8.89.2.

war. The promised program of the Five Thousand appealed to many hoplites who as property owners resented the prominence of the thetes in politics and their own decline in prestige since Athens had become a naval power. The hopes for a hoplite democracy were quickly dashed as the Five Thousand were not enrolled and the Four Hundred ruled autocratically. This political disenfranchisement was a shock to the hoplites, but it might have been tolerated for a period of time if the Four Hundred had met its promises in prosecuting the war. The deception about Alcibiades and Persian aid would have been obvious when the oligarchs refused to recall Alcibiades upon taking power. The split with the fleet meant the Four Hundred had no means of carrying on the war or raising contributions from Athens' allies. Any Athenian concerned with prosecuting the war could see that an immediate reconciliation with the army and fleet at Samos was vital to Athens' survival, but the oligarchs refused. Instead they seemed bent on making peace with Sparta at any cost. Thus a mixture of political resentment and concern for the city's safety led many Athenian hoplites to work for the overthrow of the oligarchy.

Theramenes attacked the hardline oligarchs on both themes; he accused them of plotting to let in the enemy and called for the publication of the list of the Five Thousand. The inability of the Four Hundred to control its own members or silence critics shows its control in the city was slipping. After he and the other oligarchs had returned from their unsuccessful mission to Sparta,

Phrynichus was struck down in the agora. One of the assassins was caught and tortured. He gave no names but revealed that many persons were plotting against the oligarchy. However, the Four Hundred did nothing about the murder and the opposition grew bolder.¹⁵⁹

At this time a Peloponnesian fleet was operating out of Megara, very near Athens. The opponents claimed the enemy was waiting in the area to be let in by the oligarchs. The moment was right for action. Incited by speeches against the Four Hundred, the hoplites constructing the wall at Eetionea arrested and imprisoned Alexicles, one of the generals of the Four Hundred. They were encouraged to do so by Aristocrates and others. More importantly, says Thucydides, the mass of the hoplites in Athens approved of these actions. Thucydides' usage of "hoplites" here and in the following events is striking. He could have used a number of terms to refer to the men constructing the wall, but his use of hoplites here and later is clearly in terms of a social group. The counterrevolution in Athens was a reaction by the men promised power in the first revolution but denied it under the Four Hundred. Support did come from others, especially while the action was in the Piraeus, but Thucydides' emphasis is squarely on the hoplites as a group vigorously reacting against the wealthy

¹⁵⁹Thuc. 8.89.2; The murder of Phrynichus was later seen as a democratic blow against tyranny and disputes arose over the credit for the deed. IG I² 110, tr. in Fornara, *Archaic Times*, #155, pp. 179-180; GHI #85, pp. 260-265; Lysias 13.70-72; Lycurgus 1.112-115.

and aristocratic members of the Four Hundred. The conflict with the aristocrats is strengthened by Thucydides' assertion that Alexicles was supportive of the hetaireiai.¹⁶⁰

When the Four Hundred heard of the hoplites' actions most were ready to take arms against the men. They threatened Theramenes and others who were openly critical of the regime. Assuring them he would secure Alexicles' release, Theramenes and another of the generals in sympathy with him left for Piraeus. Aristarchus and some of the younger knights went down also. In the meantime there was near chaos and panic in both Athens and Piraeus as rumors flew that one side was about to attack the other. The stasis and armed conflict the oligarchs feared when they seized power now seemed imminent. Only with much difficulty was order restored in the city.¹⁶¹

Theramenes, on arriving at Eetionea feigned anger at the hoplites. Aristarchus and those with him were more sincere in their abuse. The hoplites, however, were not intimidated and showed they were willing to fight. They asked Theramenes if he thought the wall served any good and whether it should be demolished. He replied that if it seemed good to them to demolish the wall, it seemed so to him also. Immediately the hoplites and many of the people from Piraeus began to tear down the wall. The

¹⁶⁰Thuc. 8.92.3-5; HCT 5, pp. 311-2.

¹⁶¹Thuc. 8.92.6-8.

cry was raised for "whoever wanted the Five Thousand to rule instead of the Four Hundred to set to work."¹⁶² Aristarchus appears to have left and the wall was demolished without violence.

The next day, after completing the destruction of the wall and releasing Alexicles, the hoplites convened a meeting of the assembly in the theatre of Dionysus in Munychia. A motion was proposed and passed that they proceed to the city. They marched the four miles to the city without incident and assembled on the north slope of the acropolis. Thucydides clearly states they were armed, but he records neither opposition to their march nor whether they expected an attack from the Four Hundred. This is surprising considering the oligarchs' attitude the day before when they were ready to march against the hoplites. The demonstration at Eetionea had shown the hoplites' determination and the weakness of the Four Hundred, but the oligarchs had armed forces available and even if they were outnumbered they still could have prevented the entrance of the hoplites through the Long Walls or at the very least at the gates of the city.¹⁶³

The Four Hundred had decided not to fight but to negotiate. They sent selected delegates to talk "man to man" with the hoplites, urging them to be calm and to restrain the others, the alloi (perhaps a reference to the thetes and other segments of

¹⁶²Thuc. 8.92.9-11; HCT 5, pp. 313-4; Ste. Croix, "Constitution," p. 9.

¹⁶³Thuc. 8.93.1; HCT 5, p. 314; Grote, 8, pp. 68, 70.

the population which were supporting the hoplites). The Four Hundred promised (again) to publish the names of the Five Thousand. The Five Thousand would then decide how to select a new boule of four hundred. After many speeches the hoplites were persuaded, and they agreed to hold an assembly on a specified day to carry out the changes. The threat of civil war, with the Spartans close by, led to a compromise which kept the Four Hundred in power for the moment.¹⁶⁴

As the assembly was about to convene, news came that the enemy fleet had left Megara and was sailing along the coast towards Athens. The hoplites believed this was the culmination of the plot Theramenes had warned about. All men rushed to Piraeus and manned the walls and ships in order to defend the harbor. The Peloponnesians sailed past Piraeus, around Attica and anchored off Euboea. The Athenians hastily manned thirty ships, many with inexperienced crews and sent them in pursuit. They were badly beaten off Euboea, losing twenty-two ships, some with all their crews. As a result almost all the island of Euboea revolted. This was a tremendous loss for the Athenians since the island was their best source of grain and contained much of their personal property transferred from Attica. There was a great fear the Peloponnesians now would attack the harbor or blockade the city,

¹⁶⁴Thuc. 8.93.2-3.

but the Spartans, always over-cautious, did not follow up their success.¹⁶⁵

After reading Piraeus' defenses, the Athenians held an assembly. They met in the Pnyx for the first time since the Four Hundred had been formed. The Four Hundred was deposed and control of affairs given to the Five Thousand, which was defined as all those who could provide a hoplite's armor.¹⁶⁶ Full democracy could have been restored at this time, but from the beginning of the opposition to the Four Hundred, the leadership of the movement had been with the hoplites who sought only the enrollment of the Five Thousand. The hoplites endorsed the oligarchs' idea of limited participation and saw it as a means of restoring their prominence in Athenian politics.

The Four Hundred controlled the affairs of Athens for less than four months. Their attempt to reassert upper-class political leadership in Athens was a complete failure. The ensuing government of the Five Thousand, which Thucydides admired for its blending of the few and the many, retained some of the oligarchs' ideas such as the limiting of political participation and a strong boule, but power passed into the hands of the hoplites.¹⁶⁷ Many

¹⁶⁵Thuc. 8.94-96; Diodorus 13.34.3; HCT 5, pp. 317-318; Meiggs, p. 565.

¹⁶⁶Mossé, "Le Rôle d'armée," pp. 7-10; Thuc. 8.97.1-2.

¹⁶⁷Thuc. 8.97.2-3; The precise nature of Thucydides' praise is not clear. See HCT 5, pp. 331-9 for various theories; G. M. Kirkwood, "Thucydides' Judgement of the Constitution of the Five Thousand (VIII, 97, 2), AJP 93(1972), pp. 92-103.

of the upper-class supporters of the Four Hundred were made to pay for their support with fines and penalties. The oligarchs failed because they forgot that the periods of aristocratic power they were trying to imitate had been based on hoplite support. The Four Hundred was too intent on retaining absolute power to allow even a modest role for the Five Thousand. If they had given the hoplites some token power or duties, the oligarchs' support would not have eroded so quickly and their dream of renewed aristocratic leadership may have succeeded.

CHAPTER V

THE INTERMEDIATE REGIME AND THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY

The Four Hundred fell as a result of the loss of support from the hoplites, particularly those of moderate means, and because of factionalism within the oligarchs' ranks. Except for those associated with Theramenes and Aristocrates, most of the active supporters of the oligarchy were excluded from positions of power under the new regime. The questionable loyalty of these mostly upper-class Athenians led to a broad franchise among the hoplites. The original proposal for a hoplite democracy, when it was only a propaganda slogan of the conspirators, used five thousand as a maximum number of active citizens. The government would be in the hands of a limited group which excluded most hoplites. As a practical matter, it would be difficult to draw an arbitrary line at five thousand active citizens. Many of those eligible for this exclusive group were enthusiastic supporters of the oligarchy while many poorer hoplites supported the movement to overthrow the Four Hundred. Thus, when the Five Thousand was formed, membership was open to anyone who could provide a hoplite's arms. The term, the Five Thousand, though still used, lost any precise meaning. Polystratus, who served as a registrar of the Five Thousand, claimed he enrolled over 9,000 men for membership.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁸Thuc. 8.65.3 says no more than 5000; Lysias 20.13, 16 and Thuc. 8.67.3 represent the oligarchs' propaganda of forming the Five Thousand; Thuc. 8.97.1 and Ath. Pol. 33.2 stress the

The absence of pay discouraged poorer hoplites from being active though no legal barrier existed.

The replacement of the Four Hundred by the Five Thousand was an orderly and peaceful transition. No immediate actions were taken against the hardline oligarchs. The exact nature of the new regime and who would hold power was at first unclear. Thucydides says some of the hardliners, including Peisander, Alexicles and Aristarchus fled the city, but they did not leave until after several assemblies were held to organize the government. Precisely who was in danger from the new state of affairs took some time to become apparent. Those men who had openly advocated the shift of power to the Five Thousand had no reason to fear. Men such as Theramenes and Aristocrates were leaders of the new government. Once firmly in control of affairs they set about to settle scores with their former colleagues.¹⁶⁹

One of the first moves was the posthumous indictment of Phrynichus by Critias.¹⁷⁰ Prosecutions for subverting the democracy or acts of the Four Hundred per se would implicate Theramenes and other leaders of the new regime. Thus, Phrynichus was charged

handing over of affairs to those providing hopla, arms; Hignett, p. 279, says all hoplites in government; Ste. Croix, "Constitution," p. 1, n. 3; Ehrenberg, From Solon, pp. 320-321; Whibley, Greek Oligarchies, p. 133.

¹⁶⁹Thuc. 8.88.2, 89.1-4; Jameson, p. 553; Leaders of 5000: Ath. Pol. 33.2; Diodorus 13.38.2.

¹⁷⁰Lycurgus 1.113; Historians disagree over Critias' actions during the Four Hundred. H. C. Avery, "Critias and the Four Hundred," CP 58(1963), pp. 165-7, argues Critias was a friend of

with treason for his part in the oligarchs' negotiations with Sparta. Two of his former colleagues, Alexicles and Aristarchus, defended Phrynichus in court though doing so put them under sentence of death if they lost the case. Their presence shows that the hardliners did not immediately abandon Athens when the Four Hundred fell. Once Phrynichus' (and their own) conviction seemed certain, Alexicles and Aristarchus fled to Decelea. Phrynichus' bones were exhumed and cast out of Attica.¹⁷¹ Michael Jameson proposes a similar move against Peisander. Using references in Aristotle's Rhetoric, he suggests a trial of Peisander before the new boule or the assembly in which Sophocles aided the prosecution. This provides a good setting for the exchange between Peisander and Sophocles over the poet's role as a proboulos in establishing the Four Hundred. Peisander was a likely target of an early prosecution of leading hardliners. He did not wait for the decision and fled Athens.¹⁷²

Alcibiades and thus excluded from the oligarchy. Gabriel Adeleye, "Critias: Member of the Four Hundred?" TAPA 104(1974), pp. 1-9, Ferguson, CAH 5, pp. 326, 338, 365, Whitehead, "Sparta and The Thirty Tyrants," pp. 114-5, all agree Critias was a minor member of the Four Hundred and an associate of Theramenes who survived the fall of the oligarchy. This is more likely given Critias' later actions.

¹⁷¹Lycurgus 1.113-115; Ps.-Plut. Moralia 834b; Jameson, pp. 552-3.

¹⁷²Jameson, pp. 555-9; Arist. Rhetoric 1419a25-30: exchange between Peisander and Sophocles; 1416a14-17: Sophocles denies he is pretending to be old to influence the jury; 1374b35-1375d2: Sophocles arguing for justice in case of Euctemon.

Once the new order became clear many other hardliners followed Peisander, Alexicles and Aristarchus to Decelea to join the Spartans. From there they ravaged the Athenian countryside, hoping to return to power in Athens with Spartan help. Aristarchus took a contingent of Iberian mercenaries with him when he fled Athens and went to the Athenian frontier post of Oenoe on the Boeotian border. He told the garrison, which was besieged and knew nothing of recent events in Athens, that a peace had been agreed to and they were to give Oenoe to the Boeotians. The Athenians evacuated the post under a truce. The incident illustrates the aristocrat's idea of patriotism--his city mattered only so long as he was in power.¹⁷³

Some of the hardliners remained in Athens, believing that no illegal act could be directly tied to them without also implicating men still in power. Antiphon, Archeptolemus and Onomacles were charged with treason for their embassy to Sparta, the same charge Phrynichus had been convicted on. It is difficult to understand why they remained; indeed Onomacles appears to have fled between the time of the indictment and the final trial.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷³Thuc. 8.98.14; Aristarchus: Aristophanes FAC F550-1 (Triphales c. 410), "we've evaded the Iberians of Aristarchus up to now;" Eupolis FAC F43; Calhoun, p. 141; Ravaging of oligarchs at Decelea: Dem. 24. 127-128; Andocides 1.101; Lycurgus 1.120-121.

¹⁷⁴Ps.-Plut. Moralia 833e-834b records the indictment and conviction decrees. Onomacles present in indictment, 833f, but not in conviction, 834a; Date of trial: W. S. Ferguson, "The Condemnation of Antiphon," in Melanges Gustave Glotz, v. 1 (Paris: University of France Press, 1932), pp. 349-366.

Thucydides calls Antiphon's speech in his own defense the best oration of his time. Unfortunately only a few fragments survive. In one of these, Antiphon argues he had no motives for supporting an oligarchy, especially since he made his living as a speech writer for the courts and this practice was abolished under the Four Hundred.¹⁷⁵ No matter how admirable or well-written Antiphon's speech was, his reputation for cleverness and the people's distrust made the outcome of the trial beyond doubt. Another fragment of his speech and a reference by Lysias present Theramenes as the main force behind the prosecution. The indictment was proposed and prosecuted by Andron and Apolexis, both former members of the Four Hundred. Antiphon and Archeptolemus were convicted and executed. Their property, like Peisander's and the others who fled, was confiscated.¹⁷⁶ The persons around Theramenes are often called the moderates, but they showed little moderation in their vengeance against their former colleagues.

The prosecutions did not fall on only the leadership of the oligarchy. Polystratus does not appear to have been a prominent member of the Four Hundred, though he held an official position. He was heavily fined during the reign of the Five Thousand despite his attempts to portray himself as a reluctant

¹⁷⁵Thuc. 8.68.2; Antiphon frg. 1a Col. I, in Loeb edition.

¹⁷⁶Antiphon frg. 1b Col IV; Lysias 12.67 claims Theramenes and Antiphon were best friends; Andron: Ps.-Plut. Moralia 833e; Harpocraton s.v. Andron; Apolexis: Harpocraton s.v. stasiotes; idem, s.v. Apolexis; Property: Ps.-Plut. 834a; Lysias 7.4.

oligarch who benefitted the people. Other oligarchs who had been slow to support the change in government met with similar fines as Theramenes and his associates consolidated their power. Polystratus' defender refers to many trials of former oligarchs. His claims that real oligarchs got off through bribery or the intervention of prominent persons implies the major issue behind the trials was not individuals' actions during the Four Hundred, but where they stood in relation to the leadership of the Five Thousand.¹⁷⁷

The actual government established on the downfall of the Four Hundred is often called the "constitution of the Five Thousand" or the "constitution of Theramenes," but perhaps the best term for it is P. J. Rhodes' "the intermediate regime." Very little concrete information on the government's institutions and practices exists. Despite his high praise of the regime, Thucydides' description is very general and his narrative breaks off soon after the Five Thousand assumes power in Athens. The Athenaion Politeia echoes Thucydides' praise, but gives no new details about the nature of the intermediate regime. Xenophon's Hellenica and other sources pick up Thucydides' military narrative, but they say little about Athenian politics for the next few years.¹⁷⁸ The sources do show that full democracy did not immediately return when the Four

¹⁷⁷Ps.-Lysias 20, HCT 5, pp. 201-205. Other trials: Ps.-Lysias 20.14-15.

¹⁷⁸Thuc. 8.97.2-3; Ath. Pol. 33.2; Rhodes, Commentary, p. 368.

Hundred fell. The thetes were excluded from some aspects of government. The traditional view, recently reaffirmed by Rhodes and Andrewes, holds that only hoplites and upper-class Athenians could participate in the government. Ste. Croix and Sealey have argued the thetes were barred from holding office and from membership in the boule, but were allowed to attend the assembly and serve on the courts.¹⁷⁹ This debate has replaced discussion over whether the constitution for the future in Athenaion Politeia 30 represents the actual form of the government which replaced the Four Hundred. The arguments for this view, most forcefully argued by W. S. Ferguson, have been countered by Ste. Croix and Hignett, and are generally rejected today. Despite the similarities in aims, no evidence exists for the use of the constitution's major innovations, such as dividing the citizens into four boulai.¹⁸⁰

Among other points, Ste. Croix and Sealey emphasize the almost total absence of references to the end of the intermediate regime and the restoration of full democracy in 410. They suggest this is more understandable if the change was limited to simply

¹⁷⁹G. E. M. de Ste. Croix, "The Constitution of the Five Thousand," Historia 5(1956), pp. 1-23; Sealey, "Revolutions," pp. 123-125; P. J. Rhodes, "The Five Thousand in the Athenian Revolutions of 411 B.C.," JHS 92(1972), pp. 115-127; HCT 5, pp. 323-328.

¹⁸⁰Ferguson, "Constitution," pp. 72-75; idem, CAH 5, pp. 312, 338-340; Fuks, pp. 86-89; Gregory Vlastos, "The Constitution of the Five Thousand," AJP 73(1952), pp. 189-198; The preceding all believe Ath. Pol. 30 is the government of the intermediate regime; those following do not: Ste. Croix, "Constitution," pp. 14-20; Hignett, pp. 376-378; HCT 5, p. 328.

restoring the right of holding office to the thetes. Sealey argues the changes in 410 were few and unimportant.¹⁸¹ Rhodes points out that Ste. Croix's and Sealey's view of the intermediate regime amounts to a return to full democracy since the thetes were always legally barred from major offices and were rarely members of the boule.¹⁸² The inadequate nature of the sources prevents a definite solution of the argument. The distinction is almost meaningless; whether the thetes retained any rights in the assembly or not, real power was consciously restricted to the hoplites.¹⁸³ In my opinion, the emphasis in the sources on the importance of hoplite status and the act of "handing over affairs to the Five Thousand" is persuasive evidence that the thetes were excluded from participating at any level of government.

The hoplites who forced out the Four Hundred were intent on enacting the reforms promised by the oligarchs in their propaganda. No effort was made to re-enfranchise the thetes. Poorer hoplites benefited from the abandonment of 5000 as a maximum number of citizens, but the lack of pay discouraged their participation in the boule or holding public office. Theramenes and those around him may have taken other steps to control who

¹⁸¹ Ste. Croix, "Constitution," pp. 11-13; Sealey, "Revolutions," pp. 123-125; R. Sealey, "Constitutional Changes in Athens in 410 B.C.," CSCA 8(1975), pp. 271-295.

¹⁸² Rhodes, "Five Thousand," pp. 126-127; Ath. Pol. 7.4.

¹⁸³ Best discussion of issues: Ste. Croix, "Constitution," pp. 6-13; Rhodes, "Five Thousand," pp. 122-126.

did serve in the government. Some evidence suggests the boule of the intermediate regime was elected by vote rather than lot, thus enabling Theramenes to pack the body with his supporters. The boule may also have had greater powers in relation to the assembly than under the old democracy.¹⁸⁴ The charges against Antiphon were resolved by the boule without the assembly's ratification. Also, the secretary and president of the boule were allowed to come from the same tribe, contrary to democratic procedures. Rhodes argues that the hoplites would not invest the boule with extraordinary powers after having just put down the autocratic boule of the Four Hundred.¹⁸⁵ The boule does appear to have operated differently from that under the democracy, and the election of its members allowed men such as Theramenes and Aristocrates, who risked their necks in opposing the Four Hundred, to retain control over the government.

The boule and other officials were probably elected in the assemblies held immediately after the Four Hundred's downfall. The charge against Antiphon was moved on the twenty-first day of the first prytany of the new regime and both the boule and the generals were already established in office. The officers of

¹⁸⁴Andocides 1.96 refers to the restored boule as the one of 500 chosen by lot; implies earlier boule was not chosen by lot; See Ste. Corix, "Constitution," p. 22; Rhodes, "Five Thousand," p. 117 and n. 24; Hignett, p. 372.

¹⁸⁵Ps.-Plut. Moralia 833d; Ferguson, "Condemnation," p. 354; Rhodes, "Five Thousand," p. 127.

the Four Hundred were all removed, though some, including the generals Theramenes and Thymochares, were re-elected under the Five Thousand. The archon Mnasilochus was replaced by Theopompus, making 411/10 the only year in Athenian history with two archons. The treasurers of the Four Hundred were replaced, but they were allowed to publish their accounts, which implies they passed a review of their conduct in office. The experience of the Four Hundred's autocratic power and perhaps the discussion of the patrioi nomoi led to a desire to codify the laws of Athens. A board of nomothetai was established to review and publish the laws.¹⁸⁶

The government took steps to reconcile the city with the fleet. Alcibiades and others with him were officially recalled from exile. The city sent envoys to him and the fleet urging them to "take a hand in the city's affairs." The city also recognized the authority of the generals of the fleet who had been elected by the men on Samos. Nothing is heard of Alcibiades' or the fleet's reaction, but the changes in Athens amounted to the fulfilling of Alcibiades' demands in his message to the Four Hundred, and his recall shows he was popular with the new regime. Within a few months naval squadrons from the city were co-operating with the fleet in the Aegean with no hint of dissension or distrust.

¹⁸⁶Ps.-Plut. Moralia 833e; Generals: Fornara, Athenian Board, pp. 67-68; Archon: Ath. Pol. 33.1; Treasurers: IG 1² 298; GHI #81, pp. 250-251; Fornara, Archaic Times, #150, p. 173; HCT 5, p. 195; Nomothetai: Thuc. 8.97.

In late 411 Thrasyllus returned to Athens from the Hellespont, marking the complete reunification of the Athenian war effort.¹⁸⁷

As with every other aspect of the intermediate regime, when and how it gave way to full democracy is uncertain. The only ancient reference to the change is the vague statement in the Athenaion Politeia that the "demos soon deprived these men of the politeia."¹⁸⁸ Full democracy was clearly back by the beginning of the new archon year in mid summer of 410, but most historians believe the change preceded the new year by a month or so. The most common explanation for the restoration is the different atmosphere resulting from the Athenian victories in the Hellespont. Thucydides says a minor victory by Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus at Cynossema in late 411 caused elation at Athens because it was the first Athenian triumph since the expedition to Sicily. A short time later a fleet under Alcibiades, Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus captured thirty ships at Abydos. Thrasyllus returned to Athens with news of the victory. In April of 410 the Athenians completely destroyed the Peloponnesian fleet in the Aegean,

¹⁸⁷Thuc. 8.97.3; Plut. Alcibiades 33.1, credits Critias with the motion to recall Alcibiades. Diodorus, 13.82.2, 42.1-2, gives Theramenes responsibility; Fornara, Athenian Board, p. 68; For co-operation between city and fleet see A. Andrewes, "The Generals in the Hellespont, 410-407 B.C.," JHS 73(1953), pp. 2-5.

¹⁸⁸Ath. Pol. 34.1; Date: GHI, p. 258; Hignett, p. 280; Ste. Croix, "Constitution," p. 1, n. 4; Andrewes, "Generals," p. 2. All these argue for a date in June. Jean Hatzfeld's arguments, "La fin du Régime de Théramène," Revue Des Etudes Anciennes 40(1938), pp. 113-124, for an earlier date have convinced no one.

sinking or capturing sixty ships at Cyzicus. Athens' control of the seas was re-established, and her lifeline was secured for the immediate future.¹⁸⁹

These victories revived the confidence of the Athenians as a whole and the thetes in particular. Athens had been saved not by its aristocrats or its hoplites, but by the thetic rowers and sailors of its fleet. The life or death circumstances which had supposedly necessitated their disenfranchisement first under the Four Hundred and then under the Five Thousand were gone. Thrasyllus and the men with him brought back some of the democratic enthusiasm of the fleet and there was the likelihood that the fleet itself would return to Athens now that the immediate threat was past.¹⁹⁰ This psychological change, though a major element, does not explain how the change in government was initiated or carried out in Athens.

An important factor was the change of leadership in Athens brought about by the exit of many of the leaders of the intermediate regime. Thymochares, a general of the regime, left Athens soon after its creation, and was in the Hellespont before the end of 411. Aristocrates' actions in this period are unknown, but he next appears in the sources as a general in Samos in 410/9

¹⁸⁹Cynossema: Thuc. 8.104-106; Abydos: Xen. Hellenica 1.1.4-7; Cyzicus: Xen. Hell. 1.1.14-18.

¹⁹⁰Hignett, pp. 279-280; Ferguson, "Condemnation," pp. 364-365; Vlastos, p. 198.

and he may have left Athens much sooner. Most important was the departure of Theramenes with a squadron of thirty ships around the beginning of 410. Theramenes obviously used his influence within the government to secure such a major command for himself. He took part in a number of actions in the northern Aegean and participated in the battle of Cyzicus.¹⁹¹ Many of his associates likely went with him, and their departure removed the driving force behind the government of the Five Thousand.

About the same time these men were leaving Athens, Thrasyllus returned. He was one of the most enthusiastic supporters of democracy in the fleet and his crew included thetes involved in the democratic reaction on Samos. As news of successive Athenian victories reached Athens, men dedicated to full victory in the war and re-enfranchising the thetes became more vocal. The most prominent of these was Cleophon. Shortly after the battle of Cyzicus the Spartans sent an embassy to sue for peace on the basis of the status quo, but Cleophon persuaded the assembly to reject the offer. The incident took place in the archonship of Theopompus and while the intermediate regime was still in power.¹⁹²

¹⁹¹Thymochares: Xen. Hell. 1.1.1; Aristocrates: IG I² 304A+ line 36; GHI #84, p. 257; Fornara, Archaic Times, #154, p. 178; Theramenes: Diodorus 13.47.6-8, 49.1; Xen. Hell. 1.1.12.

¹⁹²Diodorus 13.52.2-53.3; Philochorus FGrH 328 F139ab=Scholia in Euripides Orestes 371, 772 dates the embassy in the archon of Theopompus; Aeschines, 2.76, says Cleophon threatened to cut the throat of anyone who suggested peace; Baldwin, "Notes on Cleophon," pp. 43-45.

As the son of a general, Cleippides, Cleophon was at the very least of hoplite status. A brief reference in a play of 411 suggests Cleophon was already a public figure at that time, but he somehow survived the Four Hundred's purge of democratic leaders. He became a frequent target of abuse from the comic poets after 410, often described in the same terms as earlier demagogues such as Cleon and Hyperbolus. Cleophon was the likely leader of the move to restore full democracy. The actual process may have been gradual rather than sudden as more thetes attended meetings of the assembly and no one attempted to stop them. The remaining supporters of Theramenes and the other leaders of the Five Thousand were gradually overshadowed by Cleophon and his associates within the assembly and the boule.¹⁹³

The restoration of full democracy was completed by the mid summer when a new boule elected by lot took office. One of its first acts was the decree of Demophantus. The decree includes an oath to kill with one's own hands any person subverting the democracy or anyone who holds office after the democracy is overthrown. All Athenians were required to swear the oath before the next Dionysia (March 409). While not retroactive, the decree does abolish all oaths sworn in Athens or in the army for the overthrow of democracy.¹⁹⁴ The oath and decree display an

¹⁹³Career and father: Baldwin, "Notes on Cleophon," pp. 35-47; Ar. Thesmophoriazusae 805; HCT 5, p. 328.

¹⁹⁴Andocides 1.96-98; Dated by Cleigenes, the boule's secretary, who was secretary in IG I² 304A+ for the first prytary of 410/9; MacDowell, pp. 134-136.

enthusiasm for democracy absent from Athens (though not from the fleet) since the Sicilian disaster. The demos had returned to power with a passion not only for punishing those responsible for the oligarchy but also for ensuring that the government did not slip out of their control again. Laws were passed to restrict or at least to spell out the powers of the boule. Boule members swore oaths not to exceed these powers. The boule members were also required for the first time to sit alphabetically during their sessions, a move aimed at preventing a clique within the boule from controlling its proceedings as the oligarchs had done before they seized power. These laws were published as part of the general revision of laws carried over from the intermediate regime. Whether the boards of syngrapheis and anagrapheis were reconstituted or continued with the same personnel is not clear, but they spent the next seven years at their task and were not finished when Athens fell in 404.¹⁹⁵

The former oligarchs and their supporters received no mercy at the hands of the restored democracy. The juries of the demos made no distinction between moderate and extreme oligarchs. Simple membership in the Four Hundred was cause for prosecution. Lysias says that if all those accused by slanderous prosecutors of being

¹⁹⁵Boule: IG I² 114; H. T. Wade-Gery, "The Charter of Democracy, 410 B.C.--IG I² 114," ABSA 33(1932-33), pp. 113-122; Bonner and Smith, v. 1, p. 340; Philochorus FGrH 328 F14=Scholia in Ar. Plutus 972; Jacoby, FGrH, IIIb1, p. 510; Laws: Lysias 30.2-5; GHI #86, pp. 264-266; Hignett, p. 282.

in the Four Hundred were guilty, that body numbered over a thousand. Even men like Polystratus, already convicted and fined under the Five Thousand, were tried again. Those who could not pay their fines lost their citizen's rights. Others had their rights curtailed. In the Frogs, produced in early 405, Aristophanes has his chorus give a lengthy and impassioned plea for the men who lost their franchise on account of the "wrestlings" of Phrynichus. He calls these men kaloi kagathoi and the best men in the city.¹⁹⁶ Later in 405 the Athenian fleet was completely destroyed at Aegospotami. Facing blockade and siege, the Athenians declared an amnesty. The decree of Patrocleides restored the rights of public debtors and those soldiers (hoi stratiotai) who remained in the city during the time of the Four Hundred. Most likely these are the men who did not support the destruction of Eetionaea and remained loyal to the oligarchy to the end. The soldiers had remained citizens but were not allowed to speak in the assembly or serve in the boule. The amnesty covered members of the Four Hundred providing they were not fugitives in exile under a sentence of death for murder or attempted tyranny. The intent seems to be to exclude only those former oligarchs who had fled to Decelea and were aiding the enemy.¹⁹⁷

The decree of Patrocleides and the passage in Aristophanes' Frogs show that a large number of Athenians had lost some or all

¹⁹⁶ Lysias 20; 25.25-26; 30.7-8; Ar. Frogs 675-737.

¹⁹⁷ Andocides 1.73-79; MacDowell, pp. 106-119; Hignett, pp. 280-281.

of their political and civic rights at the hands of the restored democracy. Aristophanes' evidence indicates many of these men were aristocratic Athenians. Lysias accuses the prosecutors of being selective in their accusations and falsely charging wealthy men in order to receive a bribe or a part of the fine. The demos carried their vengeance against former oligarchs into their selection of political leaders. Even Alcibiades' second exile in 407 may have been influenced by his association with former oligarchs such as Theramenes and Critias. Theramenes himself, though not prosecuted for actions in 411, did not hold an elected position after 410. Lysias claims he was elected general in 405, but then rejected at his scrutiny for not being "well-minded towards the plethos, the majority." The men who prospered in Athenian politics, especially after the exile of Alcibiades, were those who had been steadfastly loyal to democracy in 411.¹⁹⁸

The prosecutions of former oligarchs was obviously carried to extremes by the restored democracy, but the full record of Athens in the later years of the Peloponnesian War is often overlooked by those who wish to point out the weaknesses and abuses of democracy at Athens. Despite increasing Persian aid for the Peloponnesians, Athens held her own in the war and even

¹⁹⁸Andrewes, "The Generals," pp. 2-9, proposes a serious split in the years 410-407 among Athenian leaders; Cleophon appears to have led attacks on former oligarchs including Critias. Arist. Rhetoric 1375b: Cleophon's attack on Critias; Xen. Hell. 2.3.15, 36: exile of Critias; Lysias 13.10: Theramenes' rejection for the generalship.

seemed on the verge of victory a number of times during the next seven years. The city's finances improved in 410 despite the war effort and several new moves by the new leaders of the demos to ensure the livelihood and political participation of the poor. Pay was restored for public duty and Cleophon instituted the diobelia, the two-obol payment. Its exact purpose is unclear, but historians believe the payment was a form of relief for those not already on the public payroll.¹⁹⁹ The government further relieved the poor by restarting construction on the Erechtheum which had been suspended after the Sicilian disaster.²⁰⁰ These expenditures were possible because of a revival in Athenian finances which was largely the work of Cleophon. Eisphora payments and traditional liturgies were begun again. The large fines and confiscations of property from former oligarchs provided the state with a windfall. The tribute system for the allies was re-instituted in 410, and Athens' new naval power ensured prompt and generous compliance. After inheriting an empty treasury from the intermediate regime the restored democracy built up a surplus in 410/9 and even began to repay money borrowed from the treasury of Athena in earlier years.²⁰¹ The events of the next few years

¹⁹⁹ Ath. Pol. 28.3; IG I² 304A+; GHI #84, p. 259; Fornara, #154, pp. 177-178; Ferguson, CAH 5, p. 344; Baldwin, "Notes on Cleophon," p. 43.

²⁰⁰ Erechtheum: IG I² 372; Ferguson, Treasurers, p. 38.

²⁰¹ Eisphora: Thomsen, p. 176; Lysias 21.2-3; Tribute: ATL 3, pp. 91, 363-364; Meiggs, p. 369; Treasury: Ferguson, Treasurers, pp. 34-38, 53.

are outside the scope of this study, but the revival of Athens, both militarily and financially, serves as a rebuff to critics, both ancient and modern, who said the democracy could not wage a successful war effort.

The prosecution of former oligarchs was largely a result of this revival of Athenian power and confidence. The leaders of the restored demos believed they could afford to persecute their political enemies and sacrifice the unity of Athens. The thetes and poorer hoplites were encouraged to vent their anger on those who had disenfranchised them without any concern for future consequences. In 404, when defeated Athens surrendered to the Spartans, there was fertile ground for the Spartans and the returning exiles to plant a new oligarchy. Many upper-class Athenians had had their dislike and distrust of democracy reinforced by the actions of the restored democracy. The oligarchy of the Thirty is a much more complicated and certainly more violent episode than the Four Hundred, but its general development was similar. A narrow oligarchy, the Thirty held absolute power then lost its support and was replaced by a broader oligarchy, the Three Thousand, and finally full democracy was restored. Despite the violence of the Thirty and the open civil war against them, the Athenians had learned their lesson against reprisals. An amnesty was declared for all but the most implicated of the oligarchs, and though not perfectly followed, it prevented the widespread prosecutions of the post 411 period. The violent

record of the Four Hundred and the Thirty disgraced oligarchy permanently. The democratic government of Athens was never again threatened by internal subversion.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The incident of the Four Hundred at Athens in 411 was made possible by an extraordinary combination of social and political trends, military defeat, and economic hardships. All of these factors contributed to the context within which individual Athenians made their decisions and acted upon them. Some historians, particularly Sealey, have tried to downplay the social and political aspects of the movement to limit democracy, portraying it as a move for economic reforms.²⁰² Sealey gives the public promises and claims of the conspirators too much credence. Economizing state expenditures was a major concern to all Athenians in 411, but from the beginning of the plot on Samos, the conspirators were not so much concerned with the state's finances, but with the strain on their own resources and how to control what they gave to the government.²⁰³ The plays of Aristophanes and particularly the pamphlet by the Old Oligarch show there were ideological discussions and differences in this period. Ultimately Athenians made decisions on the basis of personal benefits and losses. The civic-minded economic reformers of Sealey's arguments are hard to reconcile with the individualized self-interest dominant in Athenian politics. It is not wise or

²⁰²Sealey, "Revolution of 411," pp. 111-132.

²⁰³Thuc. 8.47.2-48.1.

possible to separate motives into categories of ideology, economic concerns or personal ambition. For an Athenian, these were all one thing.

This paper has sought to trace the development of the movement to restrict democracy and to study the motives of those Athenians who supported the changes. Chapter I set the background for the events of 411. The Athenian empire had brought wealth to all levels of Athenian society, but had especially raised the status of the thetes. In the 420s a new style of politician challenged the traditional dominance of aristocratic and wealthy Athenians, partly by encouraging the thetes and poorer hoplites to participate in government. The changes produced resentment among upper-class Athenians who lost their monopoly on political leadership, and also among the hoplites who lost prestige as the thetes diluted their power in the assembly. The disaster in Sicily and the renewed war in Greece put large economic burdens on men of property. The garrison at Decelea deprived many of their estates while the state demanded greater contributions and sacrifices. The conditions constituted a threat to propertied Athenians' economic position and social status.

Chapter II described the maneuverings and the machinations of the conspiracy. The wealthy and powerful among the Athenians at Samos, who were already plotting against the democracy, welcomed Alcibiades' proposal for an oligarchy in Athens. Their enthusiasm was conveyed by Peisander to the hetaireiai in Athens. These groups deserve the credit for the success of the plot since the conspirators on Samos seem less active after the break with Alcibiades. Those in

Athens were undeterred and pushed their program through with a combination of violence, intimidation, propaganda, and domination of the political process.

The next chapter discussed what little is known of the men in the conspiracy and government of the Four Hundred. The evidence supports the statements of Thucydides and the Athenaion Politeia that the leaders of the plot were well-born wealthy Athenians. The motives of active supporters of the oligarchy differed from the many Athenians who believed the propaganda of a broad oligarchy of hoplites. Those in the conspiracy were more concerned with their own power and position. The hoplites were somewhat more concerned with the safety of the city, but they too wanted a restoration of their earlier status and political power. The actual practice and institutions of the Four Hundred show that only the first group had any power, and they were determined not to share power even with the groups which had supported their coup.

The reaction against the Four Hundred, described in Chapter IV, began in the fleet at Samos. The absence of most of the thetes of military age aided the oligarchs in Athens, but their presence on Samos prevented the oligarchic plot from succeeding there. In Athens the Four Hundred's autocratic power soon alienated most of the hoplites and the fleet's reaction gave them encouragement to oppose the regime. Factionalism within the oligarchy provided the opposition with influential leaders. The oligarchy could not stand against the combined pressures, and the Five Thousand took control of the city's affairs. As discussed in Chapter V, the intermediate

regime of the Five Thousand raises many questions for which few definite answers can be given. The franchise was given to all hoplites and excluded the thetes. In the early months of this regime Theramenes and his supporters appear to have dominated the government. Their departure to the Aegean and the revival of Athenian naval power and confidence led to the restoration of full democracy and years of prosecutions of former oligarchs.

The most enthusiastic support for oligarchy came from the knights, the aristocratic and wealthy Athenians. Thucydides' terminology emphasizes the upper-class nature of the original conspiracy on Samos. The members of the hetaireiai were the driving force behind the actual implementation of the plot to intimidate the demos and establish the Four Hundred. Even when the hoplites at Eetionea were in open revolt against the oligarchy, the hetaireiai and the young knights were still enthusiastic supporters of Alexicles and the other hardliners. Despite their normal rivalry and factionalism many upper-class Athenians recognized a common threat to their position and united in opposition to the democracy.

This co-operation among upper-class hetaireiai and their members admits a shared awareness of their situation. Throughout this paper the term "class" has been avoided, except for the vague, descriptive term upper-class. Class carries too much baggage and means such different things to different persons as to make it useless without extensive discussion of how one is using it. Also, it is never possible to determine the extent to which members of a group, say the knights, shared a view or supported an action. The

best that can be said is that many knights supported the Four Hundred or that the oligarchy received much support from the knights. The concerns of the knights were shared by others including the better-off hoplites. Those Athenians holding substantial property and subject to the exactions of the state came the closest to a class in the sense of being self-conscious of their position and the threat from other groups. Even within this group it can only be said that many of the propertied class saw a threat to their status and were determined to replace democracy. The extent to which this was shared by all members of this economic group is uncertain.

One of the hardest temptations to resist is to speak of a hoplite class and to treat it as a middle class. The hoplites did theoretically represent those citizens of moderate levels of property between the poor thetes and the wealthy knights, but among the group there was a considerable variety of wealth and outlooks. This was especially true in 411 when economic hardships had impoverished many hoplites to the point of being no better off than most thetes. These poor hoplites stood to gain little from the oligarchic movement, at least as long as the figure of 5000 was used as a maximum number of citizens. They likely showed little support for the movement and were a possible source of concern for the conspirators on the day they seized power.

On the other hand, many better-off hoplites who were subject to eisphora payments and other duties identified more with the knights than with other hoplites. Some better-off hoplites were ardent supporters of the oligarchy. Those soldiers later

disenfranchised by the restored democracy for standing by the Four Hundred likely came from the better-off hoplites. The majority of hoplites fell between the extremes. They were suffering from the war, and resented their loss of status under the new politics of the post-Periclean period. The propaganda of the conspirators was aimed at the hoplites' desire for renewed prestige and power. Many gave support to the new government of the Four Hundred believing it would restore a hoplite democracy. They were soon disillusioned as the oligarchs exercised full powers. The hoplites' willingness to oppose the Four Hundred with arms caused the oligarchy's fall. The hoplites comprised the assembly in the government of the intermediate regime, but Theramenes and his associates dominated the government. Perhaps the power of these former oligarchs again disillusioned many hoplites and their lack of enthusiasm for the regime helps explain the gradual restoration of full democracy in 410. The change did not have a dramatic impact on the hoplites since many thetes were still overseas.

The thetes were, along with the poorer hoplites, the group most opposed to any change in the democracy at Athens. The thetes of military age were mostly on Samos and kept the fleet loyal to democracy. Their relatives at home, intimidated by the conspirators and without strong leaders, could do nothing to prevent the Four Hundred from seizing power. Some thetes aided the reaction at Eetionea, but the group was denied the franchise under the intermediate regime. As Athens' fortunes revived, enforcement of any

limitations against the thetes lapsed until Cleophon and those with him brought about the full restoration of democracy.

The restored democracy could not restrain its vengeance against former oligarchs or their supporters. As a result Athens suffered tremendously when the oligarchy of the Thirty Tyrants ruled the city in 404/3. After the second restoration the demos showed more restraint and democracy was unchallenged throughout the fourth century. A shrine to Demokratia and Athena was established in the agora and celebrations held on the date of the return of democracy.²⁰⁴ The cause of oligarchy and the upper-class Athenians who supported it were permanently disgraced, and the demos and democracy triumphant. The anti-democrats, however, had the last word. A generation of aristocratic and wealthy Athenians had matured during a period of open hostility between the democracy and much of the Athenian upper class. Now frustrated in politics, many Athenian aristocrats turned to philosophy and literature. Isocrates, Xenophon, and Plato were all young men in Athens in 411 and the decade afterwards. The latter two were connected with the oligarchy of the Thirty,²⁰⁵ and the writings of all three reflect a distaste for democracy, both in theory and in practice at Athens. Criticism of Athenian democracy was a favorite topic of Socrates, and his death at the hands of the demos provided his followers and centuries of

²⁰⁴ A. E. Raubitschek, "Demokratia," Hesperia 31(1962), pp. 239-241.

²⁰⁵ Plato Epistle 7.324c325b; W. E. Higgins, Xenophon the Athenian (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), pp. 24, 150 n.18, 152 n.52; Xen. Hell. 2.4.2-7.

critics with proof positive of the evils of government by the rabble. Aristotle, though writing a half century later, was also of this oligarchic mind-set.

The literature of these and other anti-democratic Athenians who came of age during the incidents of the Four Hundred and the Thirty gave the rest of antiquity and intellectuals of the next 2000 years a negative view of democracy in Athens. Polybius dismisses Athens in the fifth and fourth century as an example of mob rule and not worthy of study in his analysis of constitutions.²⁰⁶ His view was shared not only by other ancients, but by most "well-bred" men in every period. Democracy remained a pejorative term well into modern times. Only in the 1800s did the image of Athens as the birthplace of democracy merit praise from historians and scholars. Much of the credit is due to George Grote's History of Greece, which challenged the biases of the sources and modern historians' prejudices against democracy. Grote was a member of the English parliament, a leader of the Radical Whigs who fought for election reform in the early 1800s. The glorification and overemphasis of Athens' institutions prevalent among ancient historians today make it easy to forget that before Grote, Sparta was the ideal city-state for any well-bred scholar.²⁰⁷ In a sense the ideals of the oligarchic Athenians, passed on by Plato and Aristotle to political theorists of the 1700s and from them to

²⁰⁶Tigerstedt, vol. 1, p. 158; A. H. M. Jones, "The Athenian Democracy and its Critics," in Athenian Democracy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957); Polybius 6.43-44.

²⁰⁷M. L. Clarke, George Grote; A Biography (London: Athlone Press, 1962), pp. 103-128 for the History, pp. 37-74 for Grote's

the present, still dominate conservative thinking. Like oligarchs in fourth century Athens, they do not challenge democracy directly, but they long for a government limited to those best qualified to serve in the best interests of all. Such a group would always include themselves and exclude most of the poor and undereducated. Like the oligarchs of 411, conservatives oppose any efforts by the government to expand the electorate by removing economic, legal or educational barriers facing the lower classes.

The oligarchic movement in 411 at Athens may be seen as the first manifestation of an all too common development in the modern world: an attempt by the propertied and privileged classes to roll back decades of gradual democratization of a society and its political system. In 411 aristocratic and wealthy Athenians hoped to re-establish their political and social dominance over Athens. They sought to regain control over a government they felt no longer served their interests, but instead benefited the poor at their own expense. The oligarchs in Athens were able to secure support from broad segments of the population by appealing to other groups' sense of lost prestige and influence. The oligarchs played on the universal theme of a return to a time of better government; a government in which only the hoplites and knights were active. The thetes had citizens' rights, but they did not exercise them, so the "better men" ruled in the interests of all. The corruption of this government "of our grandfathers" had supposedly been the work of politicians aiming

political career. He was also a friend of James and John Stuart Mill.

at personal power who attacked the upper classes and played to the greed of the poor. The way to remove the corruption was to end pay for public service. The pay from the government was all that allowed the poor to participate, so, the oligarchs thought, if pay is ended and the government does not encourage the poor then the "better men" would again control the affairs of the state. And if the state did not waste money on policies that benefited the poor, there would be less need for taxation of the propertied class.

The oligarchs in Athens were successful in putting their plan into effect and seizing power because the trying times had weakened many Athenians' support for democratic principles. Also, the majority of the hoplites believed the propaganda promising a return to a government in which they, as property owners, would form the dominant group and control actions for their interests and not those of the thetes. The Four Hundred failed to consolidate and extend their reign because they refused to share power with the hoplites, even those which supported the oligarchs' call for limitations on democracy. The oligarchs, consumed with the desire for absolute power, were unable to prevent the alienation of their early support and were unable to avoid internal disputes for power. The Athenian people finally recognized their deception and regained their rights.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ANCIENT SOURCES

- Aeschines. The Speeches of Aeschines. Translated by Charles D. Adams. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1919.
- Andocides. Minor Attic Orators, vol. 1. Translated by K. J. Maidment. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1941.
- Androtion. Fragments edited by Felix Jacoby. FGrH III B 324.
- Anecdota Graeca, 3 vols. Edited by Immanuel Bekker. 1814-21. Reprint Graz: Druck und Verlagsanstalt, 1965.
- Antiphon. Minor Attic Orators, vol. 1. Translated by K. J. Maidment. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1941.
- Aristophanes. The Plays of Aristophanes, 3 vols. Translated by Benjamin Rogers. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1924.
- _____. Fragments edited and translated by J. M. Edmonds. FAC vol. I.
- Aristotle. The Athenaion Politeia. Translated by Henry Rackman. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1935.
- _____. The Politics. Translated by Henry Rackman. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1944.
- _____. The Art of Rhetoric. Translated by John Henry Freese. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1926.
- Athenaeus. The Deipnosophists, 7 vols. Translated by Charles B. Gulick. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1927.
- Demosthenes. Orations, 6 vols. Translated by A. T. Murray. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1939.
- Diodorus Siculus. The History of Diodorus Siculus, 12 vols. Translated by C. H. Oldfather et al. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1933-67.
- Eupolis. Fragments edited and translated by J. M. Edmonds. FAC, vol. I.
- Harpocration. Lexicon in Decem Oratores Atticos, 2 vols. Edited by G. Dindorf. Groningen: Bouma, 1853. Reprint. 1969.
- Hellenica Oxyrhynchia. Edited by Vittorio Bartoletti. Lipsiae: Teubner, 1959.

- _____. Oxyrhynchus Papyri, vol. V. Edited by Bernard P. Grenfall and Arthur S. Hunt. London: Oxford University Press, 1908.
- Lycurgus. Minor Attic Orators, vol. 2. Translated by J. O. Burt. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1954.
- Lysias. Orations. Translated by W. R. Lamb. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1957.
- Cornelius Nepos. The Lives of Illustrious Men. Translated by J. C. Rolfe. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1929.
- Philochorus. Fragments edited by Felix Jacoby. FGrH III B 328.
- Photius. Lexicon, 2 vols. Edited by S. A. Naber. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1864-65.
- Plato Comicus. Fragments edited and translated by J. M. Edmonds. FAC, vol. I.
- Plato. Works of Plato, 10 vols. Translated by H. N. Fowler, W. R. Lamb, R. G. Bury and Paul Shorey. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1921-43.
- Plutarch. Parallel Lives, 11 vols. Translated by Bernadotte Perrin. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1914-26.
- _____. Moralia, 16 vols. Translated by Frank C. Babbitt, Harold N. Fowler et al. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1927-67.
- Scholia to Aristophanes. Scholia graeca in Aristophanem. Edited by Friedrich Duebner. Paris: Heinemann, 1927-67.
- Scholia to Thucydides. Scholia in Thucydidem ad optimos codices collata. Edited by Karl Hude. Lipsiae: Teubner, 1927. Reprint. 1973.
- Suda Lexicon, 2 vols. Edited by Thomam Gaisfordum and Godofredus Bernhardy. Halis and Brunsvigae, 1853.
- Theopompus. Fragments edited by Felix Jacoby. FGrH II B 115.
- Thucydides. History of the Peloponnesian War, 4 vols. Translated by Charles F. Smith. LCL. London: Heinemann, 1951-53.
- Xenophon. Hellenica, 2 vols. LCL. Translated by Carleton L. Brownson, LCL. London: Heinemann, 1918.
- _____. Memorabilia. Translated by E. C. Marchant, LCL. London: Heinemann, 1923.

Ps.-Xenophon Ath. Pol. The Constitution of the Athenians. Translated by Hartvig Frisch. 1942. Reprint. New York: Arno Press, 1976.

SECONDARY WORKS

Adeleye, Gabriel. "Critias: Member of the Four Hundred?" TAPA 104 (1974), pp. 1-9.

_____. "Theramenes and the Overthrow of the Four Hundred." Museum Africum 2(1973), pp. 77-80.

Adkins, Arthur W. H. Moral Values and Political Behavior in Ancient Greece from Homer to the end of the Fifth Century. New York: Norton, 1972.

Allen, Ruth. "The Mutilation of the Herms; A Study in Athenian Politics." Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Cincinnati, 1951.

Amit, A. Athens and the Sea; A Study in Athenian Seapower. Collection Latomus, vol. 74. Bruxelles: Latomus, 1965.

Andrewes, Antony. "Androtion and the Four Hundred." PCPS N.S. 22(1976), pp. 14-25.

_____. "The Generals in the Hellespont, 410-407 B.C." JHS 73(1953), pp. 2-9.

Avery, Harry C. "Critias and the Four Hundred." CP 58(1963), pp. 165-167.

_____. "Lysias XII, 65." CP 61(1966), pp. 257-258.

_____. "One Antiphon or Two?" Hermes 110(1982), pp. 145-158.

_____. "Prosopographical Studies in the Oligarchy of the Four Hundred." Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1959. Dissertation Abstracts 21(1961), pp. 3070-3071.

_____. "Sophocles' Political Career." Historia 22(1973), pp. 509-514.

Baldwin, Barry. "Cleon's Strategy at Amphipolis." AClass 11(1968), pp. 211-214.

_____. "Notes on Cleophon." AClass 17(1974), pp. 35-47.

_____. "Notes on Hyperbolus." AClass 14(1971), pp. 151-156.

- Bieler, L. "A Political Slogan in Ancient Athens" AJP 72(1951), pp. 181-184.
- Bonner, Robert J. "Administration of Justice Under Athenian Oligarchies." CP 21(1926), pp. 209-217.
- Bonner, Robert J. and Smith, Gertrude. The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle, 2 vols. 1930-38. Reprint. New York: Greenwood Press, 1968.
- Calhoun, George Miller. Athenian Clubs in Politics and Litigation. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1913.
- Cary, M. "Notes on the Revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens." JHS 72(1952), pp. 56-61.
- Caspari, M. O. B. "The Revolution of the Four Hundred at Athens." JHS 33(1913), pp. 1-18.
- Casson, Lionel. The Ancient Mariners. New York: Macmillan, 1959.
- _____. Ships and Seamanship in the Ancient World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- Conner, W. Robert. The New Politicians of Fifth Century Athens. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.
- _____. Thucydides. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Davies, John K. Athenian Propertied Families. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
- Donlan, Walter. The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece; Attitudes of Superiority from Homer to the end of the Fifth Century B.C. Lawrence, Kansas: Coronado Press, 1980.
- Dover, K. J. Greek Homosexuality. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978.
- Edmonds, J. M. The Fragments of Attic Comedy, vol. I. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1957.
- Ehrenberg, Victor. From Solon to Socrates, 2nd ed. London: Methuen, 1973.
- _____. The People of Aristophanes, 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell, 1951.
- Ferguson, William Scott. "The Constitution of Theramenes." CP 21(1926), pp. 72-75.

- _____. "The Oligarchical Movement in Athens." Chapter XI of CAH vol. 5. J. B. Bury, S. A. Cook and F. E. Adcock eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927.
- _____. The Treasurers of Athena. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1932.
- Finley, Moses I. "The Ancestral Constitution." The Use and Abuse of History. New York: Viking Press, 1975.
- _____. The Ancient Economy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.
- _____. "The Athenian Demagogues." Past and Present, 21(1962), pp. 3-24.
- _____. "The Athenian Empire; A Balance Sheet." Economy and Society in Ancient Greece. New York: Viking Press, 1982.
- _____. "Thucydides the Moralizer." Aspects of Antiquity. New York: Viking Press, 1969.
- Fornara, Charles W. Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1977.
- _____. The Athenian Board of Generals from 501 to 404 B.C. Historia Einzelschriften, no. 16. Wiesbaden, 1971.
- _____. "Cleon's Attack Against the Cavalry." CQ 23(1973), p. 24.
- Forrest, W. G. "Democracy and Oligarchy in Sparta and Athens." Echos. Classical Views 27(1983), pp. 285-296.
- Frost, Frank J. "Tribal Politics and the Civic State." AJAH 1(1976), pp. 66-75.
- Fuks, Alexander. The Ancestral Constitution. Four Studies in Athenian Party Politics at the End of the Fifth Century B.C. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1953.
- Glover, T. R. From Pericles to Philip 4th ed. London: Methuen, 1926.
- Gomme, Arnold Wycombe. A historical Commentary on Thucydides, vols. 1-3. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1945-1956.
- _____. The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries. Oxford: Blackwell, 1933.
- Gomme, A. W., Andrewes, A. and Dover, K. J. A Historical Commentary on Thucydides, vols. 4-5. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970-81.

- Graham, A. J. Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964.
- Grote, George. A History of Greece, 12 vols. London: Murray, 1872.
- Harding, Phillip. "The Theramenes Myth." Phoenix 28(1974), pp. 101-111.
- Hardy, W. G. "The Hellenica Oxyrhynchia and the Devastation of Attica." CP 21(1926), pp. 346-355.
- Hatzfeld, Jean. "La fin du régime de Théràmène." REA 40(1938), pp. 113-124.
- Henderson, Jeffery. The Maculate Muse; Obscene Language in Attic Comedy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975.
- Hignett, Charles A. A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952.
- Inscriptiones Graecae, vol. I, 2nd ed. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1924.
- Jacoby, Felix. Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, 3 vols. Berlin and Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1923-58.
- Jameson, M. H. "Sophocles and the Four Hundred." Historia 20(1971), pp. 541-568.
- Jones, A. H. M. Athenian Democracy. Oxford: Blackwell, 1957.
- Kagan, Donald. The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969.
- Kelly, D. H. "What Happened to the Athenians Captured in Sicily." CR 20(1970), pp. 127-131.
- Kirchner, Iohannes, ed. Prosopographia Attica, 2 vols. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1901.
- Kirkwood, G. M. "Thucydides' Judgement of the Constitution of the Five Thousand (VIII,97,2)." AJP 93(1972), pp. 92-103.
- Lang, Mabel. "The Revolution of the 400." AJP 69(1948), pp. 272-289.
- _____. "Revolution of the 400; Chronology and Constitutions." AJP 88(1967), pp. 176-187.
- McCoy, W. James. "The 'Non-speeches' of Pisander in Thucydides Book Eight." The Speeches in Thucydides. Philip A. Stadter, ed. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1973, pp. 78-89.


- _____. "Thrasyllus." AJP 98(1977), pp. 264-289.
- MacDowell, Douglas. Andokides on the Mysteries. London: Clarendon Press, 1962.
- Marsh, Frank Burr. "Alcibiades and the Persian Alliance." CJ 28(1932), pp. 12-21.
- Meiggs, Russell. The Athenian Empire. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
- Meiggs, Russell and Lewis, David. A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
- Meritt, B. D., Wade-Gery, H. T., and McGregor, M. F. The Athenian Tribute Lists, vol 3. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950.
- Morrison, J. S. and Williams, R. T. Greek Oared Ships 900-332 B.C. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
- Mossé, Claude. "Le Rôle de l'armée dans la Révolution de 411 à Athènes." Revue Historique 231(1964), pp. 1-10.
- Reverdin, O. "Remarques sur la vie politique del Athènes au Ve siècle," Museum Helveticum 2(1945), pp. 201-212.
- Rhodes, P. J. The Athenian Boule. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972.
- _____. Commentary on the Aristotelian 'Athenaion Politeia'. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.
- _____. "The Five Thousand in the Athenian Revolutions of 411 B.C." JHS 92(1972), pp. 115-127.
- Ste. Croix, G. E. M. de. "The Character of the Athenian Empire." Historia 3(1954), pp. 1-41.
- _____. The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- _____. "The Constitution of the Five Thousand." Historia 5(1956), pp. 1-23.
- Sealey, Raphael. "Constitutional Changes in Athens in 410 B.C." CSCA 8(1975), pp. 271-295.
- _____. "Ephialtes," CP 59(1964), pp. 11-22.
- _____. "Regionalism in Archaic Athens." Historia 9(1960), pp. 155-180.

- _____. "The Revolution of 411," in Essays in Greek Politics. New York: Manyland Books, 1967.
- Sommerstein, Alan H. Aristophanes' "Wasps". Edited and translated with notes. Warminster, Eng.: Aries and Phillips, 1983.
- Stevenson, G. H. "The Constitution of Theramenes." JHS 56(1936), pp. 48-57.
- Strauss, Barry. Athens After the Peloponnesian War; Class, Faction, and Policy 403-386 B.C. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1986.
- Thompson, Wesley E. "Thucydides 2.65.11." Historia 20(1971), pp. 141-151.
- Thomsen, Rudi. Eisphora; A Study of Direct Taxation in Ancient Athens. Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1964.
- Tigerstedt, E. N. The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity, 2 vols. Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1965.
- Vlastos, Gregory. "The Constitution of the Five Thousand," AJP 73(1952), pp. 189-198.
- Walters, Kenneth R. "The Ancestral Constitution and Fourth-Century Historiography in Athens." AJAH 1(1976), pp. 129-144.
- Westlake, H. D. "The Subjectivity of Thucydides. His Treatment of the Four Hundred at Athens," BRL 56(1973), pp. 193-218.
- _____. "Thucydides 2.65.11." CQ 8(1958), pp. 102-110.
- Whibley, Leonard. Greek Oligarchies; Their Character and Organization. New York: Haskell, 1971; orig. 1896.
- _____. Political Parties in Athens During the Peloponnesian War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1889.
- Whitehead, David. The Demes of Attica 508/7-ca. 250 B.C. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
- _____. "Sparta and the Thirty Tyrants." Ancient Society 13/14 (1982/83), pp. 106-130.
- Woodhead, A. G. "Peisander." AJP 75(1954), pp. 131-146.
- _____. "Thucydides' Portrait of Cleon." Mnemosyne 13(1960), pp. 289-317.


ADDITIONAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Beloch, Julius. Griechische Geschichte 2nd ed., vol. 3, pt. 2. Berlin: de Gruyter, 1923.
- Clarke, M. L. George Grote. A Biography. London: Athlone Press, 1962.
- Ferguson, W. S. "The Condemnation of Antiphon." Melanges Gustave Glotz, vol. 1. Paris: University of France Press, 1932.
- Finley, M. I. Politics in the Ancient World. Cambridge: University Press, 1983.
- Higgins, W. E. Xenophon the Athenian. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. Introduction to Karl Marx, Pre-Capitalist Formations. London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1964.
- Raubitschek, A. E. "Demokratia." Hesperia 31(1962), pp. 238-243.
- Ste. Croix, G. E. M. de. "Karl Marx's Conception of History, Ancient and Modern." Monthly Review 37(March, 1985), pp. 20-31, 35-46.


APPENDIX



Map 1. The Aegean Basin. Adapted from *A History of Greece to 322 B.C.* by N. G. L. Hammond, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959), facing p. 206.



Map 2. Attica. From *Athens Ascendent* by George Wilcoxon, (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1979), p. 19.



Map 3. Athens, Piraeus and the Long Walls. From *The Thirty at Athens* by Peter Krentz, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 29.

VITA

Sellers C. Lawrence was born in Falkland, North Carolina on August 1, 1959. He attended elementary schools there and was graduated from Farmville Central High School in June 1977. In May 1981, he was graduated with a Bachelor of Arts degree in History from East Carolina University, Greenville, North Carolina. Mr. Lawrence received a Master of Arts degree in History from The University of Tennessee, Knoxville in August 1987. He will pursue a doctoral degree in Ancient History at The University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.