




To the Graduate Council:


I am submitting herewith a thesis written by Timoklia Ioannidis-Dougalis entitled "Planning for 'Athens 2000': A Study of the Institutional Background within Which Planning Takes Place in Greece, Focusing on the Process of the Preparation of a Comprehensive Plan for the Greek Capital." I have examined the final copy of this thesis for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Planning.


James A. Spencer, Major Professor

We have read this thesis
and recommend its acceptance:

Accepted for the Council:


Vice Chancellor
Graduate Studies and Research

PLANNING FOR "ATHENS 2000": A STUDY OF THE INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND
WITHIN WHICH PLANNING TAKES PLACE IN GREECE, FOCUSING ON THE
PROCESS OF PREPARATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
FOR THE GREEK CAPITAL

A Thesis
Presented for the
Master of Science in Planning
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Timoklia Ioannidis-Dougalis

March 1983

3066077

Ἡ πόλις θὰ σὲ ἀκολουθεῖ.

Κ. Καβάφης

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis could have never been completed without the assistance and support of many people. First of all I wish to express my deep-felt gratitude to professor James A. Spencer, not only for his role as my thesis advisor but also for his consistent support during the numerous "hard times" encountered in the course of the preparation of this thesis. I would also like to thank Jim Spencer for showing towards me the same warmth and understanding as director of the Graduate School of Planning, in the earlier years of my stay there.

Professors Ken Kenney and Joe Prochaska are gratefully acknowledged for giving a considerable amount of their time to study this thesis and for the much appreciated comments that they have contributed as my Committee members. I wish also to thank these, as well as my other teachers in G.S.P., namely Judy Stolloff, my former advisor, George Bowen, Walter Shouse, and Bob Wilson for helping make the years I spent in G.S.P. a clearly positive experience.

I would like to thank my classmate and friend Susana Antognoli for encouraging me to work on a subject involving my country. I am also indebted to Dr. Ann Hardmam for a discussion that inspired me the topic of this thesis, and for providing me with my first stock of bibliographic material.

My dear friend Haroula Andrakakou is gratefully acknowledged for a literature review that she conducted for me in Greece and for locating and collecting a good amount of referances for this thesis. I am also thankful to friends Maro Onoufriou, Anna Anagnostopoulou, and Haris Polytopoulos for helping me obtain valuable unpublished documents from

the agencies where they work, and also for bringing me in touch with persons who could offer direct insight to my subject of interest.

I am profoundly grateful to all the planners and administrators who made time to assist me in my research, by responding to my questionnaire. Space does not permit to acknowledge everybody by name. However I would like to extend special thanks to Mr. V. Harissis and Mr. M. Vles-sas for two most informative interviews. I am also truly indebted to Mr. N. Hadgitheodorou, whose master thesis has been a valuable information source for Part I of this thesis.

To Mr. James L. Russell and his assistants who have succeeded in turning my hand-writing into this typed text, and who have shown toward me unusual compassion in a time of strain, I am deeply grateful.

My family in Greece, and especially my parents, have always been a great source of support, and have strongly encouraged my academic endeavors. My deepest gratitude goes to my mother Mrs. Anna Ioannidis who has literally been my "agent" in Greece, efficiently collecting missing references, double-checking information, and always being there to help with my various other duties, making it possible for me to give more time to my work.

I am thankful to my daughter Anastasia for adjusting to day-care and for keeping reasonably healthy during the last several months. I also appreciated her gracefully putting up with a mommy who seemed never to have enough time for play. However if I could only thank one person for this thesis and for this degree, this would be my husband, Vassilios. He was the one who suggested to me to pursue an advanced degree and the one who financed my particularly expensive studies. Nevertheless nothing could have been accomplished without his constant support and encourage-

ment. His being there tended to make me lazy, at times, but also gave me strength and drive to continue. Thank you all.

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the institutional framework within which planning is done in Greece, using the process of preparation of plan Athens 2000, the latest comprehensive plan for the Greek Capital, as a case study. The information in this report is based on a literature review and on material collected during interviews with persons who had participated in the process of planning for Athens 2000 in various capacities.

Athens dominates Greek socioeconomic life because of size and because of political and economic power. Therefore the serious problems faced by the city today threaten the country's future also.

Planning, as other aspects of government in Greece, is highly centralized. Local governments are not adequately developed or organized to carry out planning functions. On the other hand planning is not yet recognized as a necessity of life in Greece. Although urban development controls date back to 1923, true planning legislation started appearing in Greece only during the seventies, and reached a comprehensive form with law 947/1979, concerning Urban Development Areas.

The Athens 2000 plan is important primarily because it had the potential to be implemented. The process of its preparation evolved in four stages. Stage one started in August 1978 and ended in April 1979 with a draft plan, Proposition 1979, as its outcome. The second stage involving a public discussion of Proposition 1979, ended in September 1979 with a widely accepted agreement concerning planning principles, goals and objectives for the development of Athens. During the third stage, which lasted from September 1979 to October 1980, the objective was to revise the draft plan through a process involving planners

representing a wide spectrum of philosophies, and the local governments of the metropolitan area of Athens. Finally in the fourth stage this process was practically interrupted by the national administration, and a final Athens 2000 plan, bearing a striking resemblance to Proposition 1979, was officially adopted in May 1981.

Although the process of planning for Athens 2000 produced an unusual co-operation between private planners of diverse philosophies on the one hand, and central government agencies on the other, in the end the administration failed to adjust its thinking and procedures to reflect the findings of this co-operation. Instead, the central government imposed its own authoritative "solution" which was very unlikely ever to be implemented.

Despite its disappointing end, the process of preparation of plan Athens 2000, especially during its third stage, constitutes a valuable experience for Greek planners. In a country as pluralistic as Greece an incremental approach to planning, an approach involving a representative array of philosophies, seems the only one that could result in an implementable plan. The process of preparation of the Athens 2000 plan showed that such an approach can be feasible. This allows some hope for the future.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	1
A. A Statement of the Problem	1
B. Need/Purpose of the Study.	5
C. Thesis Organization.	8
D. Methodology.	10
PART I. THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PLANNING	
I. GREECE: A SOCIOPOLITICAL ORGANISM	15
A. Socioeconomic Characteristics.	15
B. The Government in Greece	25
II. THE EVOLUTION OF PLANNING LEGISLATION	33
A. An Essay on Planning in Greece	33
B. The Traditional Legislation.	37
C. Innovations in Planning Legislation.	51
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING.	81
A. State Planning	81
B. Other Actors in the Planning Process	89
PART II: THE "ATHENS 2000" PLAN	
IV. HISTORY OF PLANNING FOR ATHENS.	104
A. A Profile of the City.	104
B. The Problems of Athens and Their Major Causes.	121
C. An Historical Review of Planning for Athens.	144

TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

CHAPTER	PAGE
V. THE DRAFT PLAN ATHENS 2000; PROPOSITION 1979.	160
A. The Initial Approach.	160
B. Proposition 1979: The Content of the Draft Plan	176
C. Evaluation of Proposition 1979.	211
VI. THE NINE SECTOR PLANS OF ATHENS 2000	248
A. From Proposition 1979 to the Eighteen Point Agreement	248
B. The Preparation of the Nine Sector Plans.	258
C. Phase II: The Process of Synthesis.	282
D. Epilogue. . . . ,	294
CONCLUSION	
ATHENS 2000: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EXPERIENCE	298
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	305
APPENDICES	
A. Interview Questionnaire	316
B. List of Persons Interviewed	319
C. Basic Statistics of Greece.	321
D. Glossary.	322
VITA.	325

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
I. Population Growth in Greece	21
II. Greek Population Distribution According to Age and Sex (1971)	22
III. Some Indices of the Social Conditions of the Greeks	23
IV. Summary of the Planning Legislation in Greece	80
V. Population Increase of Greater Athens	121
VI. Housing Conditions in Greater Athens.	141
VII. Household Facilities Available in Greater Athens.	141
VIII. Proposition 1979: Distribution of the Athenian Population .	179
IX. The Nine Sectors of the Athenian Metropolis (Proposition 1979)	187
X. Work Force Distribution According to Industry in 1979 and 2000.	196
XI. The Metropolitan Population of Athens by Year 2000 as Dis- tributed to the Nine Sectors.	293

LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE		PAGE
1.	Administrative Organization for Planning	90
2.	Athens: Geographic Location within Greece and Attica . . .	105
3.	Athens Population: Gross Density Distribution (1978) . . .	107
4.	The Center of Athens	110
5.	Topography and Basic Urban Structure of the Athenian Basin	113
6.	Basic Land Uses in the Metropolitan Area of Athens	115
7.	The Kleathis' Plan for Athens (1833)	117
8.	Athens Urban Area Growth (1833-1976)	119
9.	Differences Between Areas Developed . Spontaneously and Areas Developed According to a Plan	125
10.	Unauthorized Housing in Athens	130
11.	Interrelations Among the Present Problems of Athens . . .	132
12.	Perceptions of Athens by Popular Cartoonists	145
13.	The Process of Planning for Athens 2000 as Seen by Car- toonist I. Iannou.	174
14.	Proposition 1979: Land Use Plan for Athens 2000.	180
15.	The Nine Sectors of Athens, According to Proposition 1979	185
16.	Changes in the Nine Sector Boundaries within the Athenian Basin.	263
17.	The Nine Sectors of Athens, as Studied During Phase I. . .	284
18.	Alterantive Sector Division, as Proposed by the Nine Teams.	285
19.	The Final Land Use Plan Athens 2000, as It Appeared on a Leaflet, Issued by the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment, Along with Other Projects Accomplished in 1981	296

INTRODUCTION

A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The subject of this thesis is the detailed study of the process of preparation of the latest comprehensive plan for Athens, with special attention to the changing institutional background, against which this process has taken place. The focus of the study is the planning process rather than the product of planning (although, of course, the two are dialectically related), not only because a soundly structured planning process is a prerequisite for the production of any "good plan", but also because the general ineffectiveness of planning in Greece, up to date, strongly suggest that it is exactly in the process of planning, as it has been institutionalized over the years, that one must try to locate the defects that account for the more than sixty unadopted and unimplemented plans.

Athens is the Capital of Greece, home of more than three and a half million people. In an urbanized area of thirty one thousand hectares (or seventy seven thousand acres) it contains not only forty percent of the total Greek population, but also the most vital part of the nation's economic, social and cultural life as well as almost every single one of the central government administrative units [68, pp. 4, 7, 10]. During the past thirty years Athens has been transformed from a modest urban center of a vast rural hinterland into a metropolis which came to dominate all aspects of the socioeconomic life in the country [68, p. 4].

This imbalance between the city of Athens and the rest of Greece (rural and urban) is today thought to be detrimental to both the country

and its Capital [79, p. 78]. The nation's overall economic, social, cultural and demographic development is threatened by the disproportionate growth of only one city which absorbs the lion's share of public as well as private investment [68, p. 4]. Meanwhile the congestion of people and activities in Athens, in an urban organism which has not been prepared to absorb it, is generally acknowledged today as the primary cause of an array of problems of curcial significance for the survival and further development of the city [68, p. 6].

Among these problems one should include those related to the progressive destruction of the natural environment (air, water, and sea-coast pollution, scarcity of green space, disturbance of the ecological equilibrium, etc.); those indicating a rapid deterioration of the quality of life of the Athenian population (problems in housing, transportation, public health, education or recreation) etc. Many of these problems have reached such threatening dimensions that one could certainly speak of a crisis situation facing Athens during the last few years [30, p. 480b].

The feeling that something must be done "to save" the Capital before it is too late is today shared by government officials and opposition parties' representatives alike, by planners and other urban professionals, as well as by lay people. In fact, at this moment there is a consensus in the country (and this is a rarity, indeed, for Greece) about the urgent need to plan for the further development of Athens [39, p. 25]. As it was put into words in April 1979, by the man who as Deputy Minister of Public Works initiated the process of preparation of the latest master plan for the Greek Capital, "the constantly worsening urban problems faced by the city make the immediate

implementation of a development plan imperative"¹ [11, p. 3]. This development plan, known by the name Athens 2000, was ordered by the Ministry of Public Works in the Winter of 1979 [25, p. 8].

To someone not quite familiar with the conditions in Greece it would certainly look strange that it was only in 1979 that the Greeks came to realize that the preparation and implementation of a plan for a city of more than three million people was "imperative." The fact is, however, that Athens 2000 is not the only plan that has ever been prepared for Athens. On the contrary, during the post-World War II years a great number of urban studies, including several comprehensive development plans (two of which were finished in the seventies) had been commissioned by governmental agencies and paid for with public money [73, pp. 5, 8-11]. However, none of these plans has ever been officially implemented for reasons not really related to their professional merits. Although it is true that some of these urban studies may have indirectly influenced official decision making, or even private investment policies, all this has happened in such a random way that its cumulative effect on the urban structure of Athens has really been negligible [57, p. 133].

Most planners would agree that implementation is often a most problematic step of planning, at least in the western societies. In the case of Greece, however, it has been even more than that.

Official implementation of even a single plan, from the more than sixty which have been prepared in Greece for various cities and regions

1. Mr. Stefanos Manos.

over the last twenty years, has yet to be seen [57, p. 138]. It is clear that planning has dramatically failed to play a positive role in guiding the development of cities and regions in Greece. Whether the reason for this failure should be sought in a severely defective institutional mechanism or in the very sociopolitical structure of the power system in Greece is hard to answer, although both these possibilities have been suggested [57, pp. 145]. What is clear, nevertheless, is that the situation to this day does not permit much optimism about the fate of any new plan, however ambitious or necessary it might be.

In this context one could not be overly optimistic about the fate of the Athens 2000 plan. Nevertheless this plan presented a very interesting subject of study, primarily because of some characteristics that differentiated it clearly from any other plan previously produced in Greece. The general consensus about its necessity was a new and very positive element. The fact that the announcement of the plan's preparation came in a time when the government of Greece was in the process of introducing important administrative and legislative innovations related with planning, could also prove to be significant. However, perhaps even more significant was a third element that distinguished that plan from any other previously produced in Greece. This was the different process (pioneering for some people, yet unorthodox, even irrational, for others), that was followed for the first time in planning for Athens 2000, a process which involved, at least up to a point, a plurality of voices representing a wide range of planning and political philosophies as well as interests. Taking also into consideration the scale of the endeavor, these new elements,

along with the fact that any planning in Greece is, essentially, a function of the central government, could mean that the process of planning for Athens 2000 could be a test of the effectiveness of planning, as practiced within the present political socio-economic and institutional context of Greece, allowing for general observations concerning the future.

In fact, the central problem of this thesis is exactly to provide an answer to the question of how planning can be done in Greece within the given institutional framework, by studying in depth the planning process followed in the test case of the comprehensive plan Athens 2000.

B. NEED/PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

Working on this thesis has fulfilled a personal educational need of its author: that of relating what she had learned in the course of her studies in the United States to the planning situation in Greece, where she plans to work after graduation. Planning, as any social science, has some basic principles and methods. However the practicalities of being a planner can be clearly defined within a specific societal context. The form of government in a country, its administrative organization, its legislation, its institutions and also a number of economic, social, political and cultural characteristics, compose a framework that determines what a planner working in a country can do and also how he can do it. It is evident, therefore, that for a person who wishes to function as a planner in a given society, knowing as many dimensions of this framework as possible is crucially important.

In the case of Greece, demystifying this framework is not a

trivial task. One reason for this is the sparcity of indigenous planning bibliography, and, more specifically, the absence of comprehensive studies concerning the Greek planning experience. A second equally important reason is the complexity and at the same time the fluidity of the institutional context within which planning takes place.

In view of these two real problems--which, most probably, are faced by all young planners who want to work in Greece--the author hopes that despite the basically individualistic reasons behind her decision to undertake this study, its usefullness will not be limited to satisfying a personal need. This author also hopes that this study will have some value for non Greek planning scholars too, since understanding how special societal particularities can affect planning can be conducive to advancing planning thought in general.

From what has been said so far, the reader must have realized that the primary interest of the author in this study was to understand how planning works in Greece. In order, however, to arrive at this understanding it would certainly not suffice to study the legal framework within which planning takes place, the administrative organization in regard with planning, or even the roles that its various participants play during the planning process. This would be necessary, of course, but particularly illuminating for one would be to see how all these elements are interplayed during the process of preparing an actual plan.

Since in Greece physical planning is done centrally, by state government agencies and not by localities, studying the process of planning for any city or region of the country would provide an adequate illustration of how planning would work, generally. Nevertheless, the

planning process selected as the focus of this thesis is an interesting subject by itself.

Planning for Athens would be worth studying in any case. Because of the existing polarity between Greece and its Capital (a polarity that can roughly be expressed in terms of rural versus urban), the way in which Athens will develop--according to a plan or not, and according to what plan--can be expected to have a strong impact on the growth and prosperity of Greece as a whole. However the special attributes of the Athens 2000 plan make it a tempting subject to be studied in its own right.

Following the thoughts summarized above, this thesis has a dual purpose. On the one hand a central goal of its author has been to study how planning is done in Greece, assessing the effectiveness of the system within which planning is produced--a system consisting of the planning legislation and of the institutionalized planning practice, within the overall political and socio-economic situation of the country. On the other hand there was also the objective to study the process of preparation of the Athens 2000 plan, not only because this plan is urgently needed for the city and the country, but also because the process of its preparation--being unique in involving a plurality of planning approaches and coinciding with legal innovations that could pave the way for its implementation--could have a decisive impact on how planning will be done in Greece, in the future.

These two parallel objectives of this thesis, these two parallel studies, are structurally related in a dialectic manner and are, in effect, complementary of each other. A certain degree of understanding

the institutional framework within which planning can be done in Greece is essential for seeing the specific process of planning for Athens 2000 in its proper perspective. By the same token, focusing on the concrete example of the process of planning for Athens 2000 provides a real life case, against which this institutional framework can be examined in action.

C. THESIS ORGANIZATION

In accordance with the two-fold scope of this thesis the material is organized into two parts. Part I, under the title "The Institutional Framework for Planning" comprises the three first chapters of the report, while Part II, entitled "The Athens 2000 Plan" comprises chapters IV, V and VI. The conclusions at the end of the report refer to both parts.

The first chapter includes general background information about Greece and is intended to familiarize the American reader with the country. The extent of the information given is limited to what is essential for the adequate comprehension of the other parts of the thesis. A description of Greece, its place in the international picture, some important socio-economic characteristics as well as the form and the functions of the country's government are all discussed in this chapter.

The purpose of Chapter II is to present the legal framework within which the function of planning is carried out in Greece today. Included in this chapter is an extensive discussion of the country's planning legislation in a historic perspective, with special attention

paid to the recent legal innovations and reforms.

Chapter III includes a description of the special institutionalized functions of the various central government agencies to which the responsibility for planning is vested. The secondary roles played by the non-central government actors who are participants in parts of the planning process (professional associations, local governments, planning consulting firms, etc.) are explored in this chapter as well.

The fourth chapter focuses on the city of Athens. After a brief discussion of the historic evolution of the Greek Capital, its present situation, and its importance for the country today, there is a detailed description of the problems that it is facing. A review of the numerous and unsuccessful attempts to plan for the development of Athens at the end of this chapter, serves as an introduction to the detailed study of the process of planning for Athens 2000, which is the subject of the last two chapters.

Chapter V focuses on the first period of the process of planning for Athens 2000, a process that was concluded by the production of a draft plan which came to be known as Proposition 1979. Included in this chapter is a critical review of the process of preparation of this plan, a description of its content and an evaluation.

Chapter VI deals with the events that followed the public reaction to Proposition 1979, events that lead to a process of revising the plan Athens 2000 through a pluralistic planning approach.

Finally, the conclusion of this thesis consists of an assessment of the experience of planning for Athens 2000, as set against its institutional background.

D. METHODOLOGY

In order to complete the research for this paper, the author has used, in addition to general bibliographic material consisting of books and scientific articles, two kinds of information sources: written documents and oral interviews.

The written documents used in this study can be divided into three categories:

1. Legal documents (i.e. pieces of legislation, memoranda issued by government agencies, agreements and contracts between state agencies and planning consultants, official administrative decisions etc);
2. Planning studies prepared either by governmental agencies or by planning consultants to these agencies; and
3. Reports issued with reference to the above planning studies, concerning their content or the process of their preparation, by professional associations, local governments, other public interest groups, by individual planners, etc.

The oral material collected for this thesis has been obtained through formal interviews with persons who, because of their professional positions, their scientific² knowledge and their degree of involvement in the preparation of the plan Athens 2000 could offer factual information about the planning process followed, as well as insight for

2. Planning is not a science in the strict sense of the word. The term is used throughout this report to suggest that there is a body of well recognized procedure and methodology in professional practice that distinguishes planning from a purely ad hoc or individualized activity.

a deeper and more complete understanding of this information. These interviews were based on an open-ended questionnaire (an English translation of which can be found in Appendix A) given to the prospective interviewees in advance, along with an introductory letter. The intention of the author in preparing the specific open-ended questionnaire was to include questions that invited discussion and comments, rather than the selection of one among several prearranged answers. An open-ended questionnaire was preferred because what was needed most was as much information from knowledgeable people as possible and not "data" that could be utilized in a statistical way. In the actual interviews the questionnaire served as a general guide and focus of the discussion rather than as a strict structure for recording responses.

The persons interviewed for this thesis were selected from among those who had participated in the process of planning for Athens 2000, from various positions, and who also happened to have generally different planning and political philosophies. The objective of the author in selecting the men and women with whom she discussed the process of planning for Athens 2000 was to include in her "sample" persons representing a wide spectrum of positions, interests, and philosophies so that she would be able to synthesize an as complete as possible picture of what had actually happened. Interviews were conducted with a high ranking administrator, members of the professional staff of the public agency that had the principal role in the process of planning for Athens 2000, members of the planning teams who also participated in it as private consultants, members of the planning staff of the association of the local governments of the metropolitan area of Athens, and also planning

activists who had closely followed the development of the process. A name-list of the persons interviewed, indicating also their professional position, can be found in Appendix B.

A problem that the author had to resolve was that the on site data collection for her thesis had to be concluded in the fall of 1980, at a time when there was not yet a final planning product of the plan Athens 2000. However the author felt that this would not be terribly detrimental for her study since by the time she left Greece in 1980, the process of planning had advanced enough for its outcome to be more or less predictable. As was proven by follow-up research, during a brief visit in Athens in Summer, 1981 (plan Athens 2000 was finalized in Spring, 1981), this feeling was not unfounded.

A considerable part of this thesis deals with evaluating. There is evaluation of legislation, administrative organization and mostly there is evaluation of planning. Although people are not personally evaluated, there is judgement expressed regarding actions and products of people. Of course, any judgement requires a set of "objective" criteria, although there is no universal agreement for what is objective, and even as to whether objectivity actually exists. This author, still a student, who had to evaluate the work of planners and officials far more experienced than she, is very aware concerning her limitations in this aspect. Whenever possible, in order to enhance her objectivity, she had tried to rely on criteria established and accepted by accomplished planners. However she knows that her own value system has also affected her judgement, even if only by influencing her selection of these "objective" criteria. After all, an evaluation is somehow destined to be relative to one's own

values, and it is with the knowledge of this reality that the author of this thesis accepts personal responsibility for what follows.

P A R T I

THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR PLANNING

CHAPTER I

GREECE: A SOCIOPOLITICAL ORGANISM

A. SOCIOECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS

A1. The Economy

Greece is a Western parliamentary republic. A small country in size as well as population, it exhibits a mixture of both "developed" and less developed characteristics rendering any classification a difficult task [63, p. 7].

The Greek economy, based on the primary sector before 1950, shifted its emphasis dramatically towards industrialization, in the post World War II years. Thus the percentage of the active population employed in agriculture and the other primary activities, which was as high as 48.2% in 1951, dropped to 40.5% in 1971 and to 27.3% in 1978 [9, p. 98], while the contribution of the primary sector to the Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.)¹ declined from 28% in 1950 to 18% in 1971 and 13% in 1979 [63, p. 9; 21, p. 57]. The opposite trends can be observed in the secondary sector in which the percentage of the employed active population increased from 19.3% in 1951 to 25.6% in 1971 and to 30.7% in 1978 [9, p. 98; 21, p. 71], while its contribution to the G.D.P. went up from 20% in 1950 to 26% in 1970 and to 32% in 1979 [63, p. 9; 21, p. 57].

All these figures demonstrate a radical change in the economy of the country. However the fact remains that Greece, although not an

1. For definitions of unfamiliar economic terms used in this chapter see: Glossary, in Appendix D.

agricultural economy anymore, is by no means an industrial one yet. In comparison to the countries of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.), of which Greece became the tenth member in 1980, the contribution of the primary sector to its G.D.P. is still too high (in E.E.C. countries the primary sector was contributing between 3% and 8% of the G.D.P. in 1975) [63, p. 9], while that of the secondary is still relatively low.

The fact that the annual growth rate of the industrial sector is slightly higher than the annual growth rate of the G.D.P. as a whole (the respective figures for the period 1958-1975 were about 6% for the G.D.P. and 9% for the industrial sector) gives some Greek economists grounds to hope that the national economy will be coming closer to the European standards in the near future [63, p. 9]. This optimism, however, is by no means universal. As a matter of fact there are studies which suggest that the structure of the Greek economy makes it more distant from the developed economies of Western Europe than other European economies, which from the point of view of the per capita Gross National Product (G.N.P.) are more or less poorer than Greece, namely Portugal (G.N.P. per capita of \$640 in 1970), Spain (G.N.P. per capita of \$960 in 1970), and Yugoslavia (G.N.P. per capita of \$561 in 1970)²[9, p. 25].

It is an undeniable fact that in the twenty years that followed the end of the Civil War,³ that is from 1950 to 1970, the Greek economy went through a spectacular development. Not only was its emphasis shifted

2. The per capital G.N.P. of Greece in 1970 was \$1,060 [9, p. 24].

3. A Civil War between left and right wing forces broke out in Greece, at the end of the German occupation (1944) and lasted up to 1949.

from agriculture to industry but also its sectors, agriculture included, exhibited a rapid and steady increase in total output. For the whole period the G.N.P. had an annual rate of growth of 6% [9, p. 20], to which all sectors of the economy contributed in varying degrees. With both inflation and unemployment kept at really low levels at the same time, the standard of living of the Greeks improved dramatically.

However, not everything was idyllic in these two decades. It is equally true that in the same period the Greek economy, which has always relied upon the international market for credit, imports and investment [9, p. 192], grew even more dependent on it and, as a result, became dangerously vulnerable to its fluctuations. This vulnerability became clear after the 1973 energy crisis, when inflation rose to sky high levels, unemployment became for the first time considerable and even the growth rate of the G.D.P. slowed down drastically. The dependency of the Greek economy, and especially its industrial sector, upon the international market has had many dimensions. The following three are among the most important:

i) Dependency on foreign credit: For both fueling and maintaining its development the Greek economy had to drastically increase its imports of capital and consumer goods, while its exports could not rise at an equal pace [9, p. 192]. This brought about a large and evergrowing payments deficit which became a chronic problem of the Greek economy, despite the remittances from the emigrants and the earnings of the large Greek merchant fleet.

ii) Dependency on imports: The Greek industrial development had been too sharply oriented towards consumer goods rather than capital

goods [9, p. 194]. The result was that after the 1973 energy crisis, when Greece had no other choice but to import the capital goods necessary for its survival at inflated prices, while realizing that its costly industrial (consumer) products were not a bargain for the shrinking export market, both skyrocketing of inflation (which exceeded 30% in 1973, was brought down during 1974 but remained high since then) [63, p. 11] and payments deficits were unavoidable.

iii) Dependency on the international labor market: During the fifties and especially during the sixties, Greece (that had always been a labor exporting country) actively sought relief both from employment pressures and from its payments deficit by exporting a considerable portion of its labor force to the developed countries of Western, especially Germany and Belgium. While this policy provided some short-term benefits, it backfired after 1973, when increases in domestic employment and worsening of the overall economic situation in the host countries, led to severe restrictions of further immigration and even massive lay-offs of foreign workers. The Greek emigrants, coming from a country that was not a member of the E.E.C. at the time, were not protected by special agreement and, as a result, were negatively affected by these measures. Having no other choice but to return home to seek jobs, a large part of them were added to the internal labor force triggering this way a sudden rise in the unemployment figures [19, p. 5].

The fact that the Greek economic development of the fifties and sixties was too tightly dependent upon the international market (a shortcoming which, admittedly, is rather too difficult for a small country to avoid in today's world) was by no means the only, and perhaps not even

the primary factor accounting for its troubles in the last ten years. To go to the heart of the matter, the central question that one could address would be this: "To what degree this at first glance impressive economic development had been really significant, in absolute terms, indicating that the economy of Greece, as compared on the one hand with those of the developing Mediterranean countries (which are more or less at the same economic level with Greece), and on the other hand with the industrialized economies of Europe, has completed a decisive stage in its development process" [9, p. 21]. Since industrialization has become in the modern times more or less the measure of development, one could paraphrase the question and ask instead whether the 1950-1970 Greek economic development has been oriented towards industrialization as fullheartedly as it had been professed to be.

In researching this question one can see that although aggregate investment and specifically investment in the secondary sector was considerably high during the twenty year period, industry's share as a percentage of the total investment declined from 54.5% in 1950 to 45.3% in 1970, to the benefit of the tertiary sector of the economy, the investment in which rose from 33.7% in 1950 to 43.7% in 1970 [9, p. 192]. As a matter of fact the tourism industry (especially vulnerable to international socioeconomic changes) had been given an indisputable priority as a revenue producing activity.

The situation is seen to be even less satisfactory when one considers the manner in which investment was distributed within the industrial sector [9, p. 192]. The findings here are that 55-60% of the total investment in industry was consistently absorbed by construction

(housing in particular) losing this way its multiplying effect [9, p. 193]. The investment in manufacturing as a percentage of the total investment within the sector decreased in the twenty years, while the investment in construction not only was too high but even increased its share between 1950 and 1960 [9, p. 192]. Finally, foreign investment which had accounted for a large part of the total industrial investment was not as much integrated into the broad industrial structure of Greece as it was absorbed in large scale individual projects [9, p. 193].

With such an ambivalent investment policy, especially considering, in addition, the overprotectiveness that the Greek state has always shown towards industry, it is not surprising to find out that the structure of Greek manufacturing had not got rid of some of its backward characteristics, at the end of the period [9, p. 193]. This half-finished modernization can account for a moderate productivity, for costly products and for a resulting low competitiveness of the Greek industry, especially in the export market; in short for the fact that industry, despite its development in the twenty year reference period, had not become the basic sector of the Greek economy.

With agriculture neglected and to a considerable degree unmodernized, and with tourism experiencing problems after its booming during the sixties and the seventies, with decreasing remittances from the emigrants abroad [19, p. 5], with a dangerously increasing payments deficit [21, p. 5], with the rate of growth of the G.D.P. dropping, with unemployment rising and the annual inflation rate up to 25%, the overall picture of the Greek economy in the eighties looks gloomy. For a summary view of it, the reader can refer to Appendix C.

A2. Population: Demographic and Spatial Distribution

The National Statistical Service (N.S.S.) of Greece in regard to the change in the Greek population since 1861 gives the data in Table I.

TABLE I
POPULATION GROWTH IN GREECE

YEAR	NUMBER OF INHABITANTS	PERCENT INCREASE	YEAR	NUMBER OF INHABITANTS	PERCENT INCREASE
1861	1,096,810		1920	5,016,889	90.6%
1870	1,457,894	32.9%	1928	6,204,684	23.6%
1879	1,679,470	15.2%	1940	7,344,860	18.3%
1889	2,187,208	30.2%	1951	7,632,801	3.9%
1896	2,433,806	11.2%	1961	8,388,553	9.9%
1907	2,631,952	8.2%	1971	8,868,641	4.5%

Source: N.S.S. of Greece: Yearbook of 1971 Census

There are two main factors that have contributed to the rapid growth of the Greek population up to 1940: territorial expansion and inflow of Greek refugees from other countries. In the period between 1864 and 1920 Greece annexed, as a result of military victories and international treaties, the Ionian Islands, Tessaly, Epirus, Macedonia, Western Thrace, Crete and the Aegean Islands, thus more than doubling its original size [63, p. 14]. In the same period there had been a relatively steady inflow of Greek refugees, coming to the homeland from Turkey, the

Balkans and Russia, because of either international political instability or the national wars between Greece and Turkey and the ethnic frictions between Greece and its northern neighboring nations [63, p. 14].

The largest single wave of immigrants, consisting of 1,069,957 Greek refugees from Asia Minor, arrived in Greece in 1922, following the disastrous end of the Greek expedition there [63, p. 14].

The dramatically low population increase between the years 1940 and 1951 graphically depicts how the Greek population was decimated during World War II, the famine that accompanied the German occupation, and the 1946-1949 Civil War. The population increase figure between the years 1951-1961 represents mainly the natural growth of the population (baby boom period), while in the decade 1961-1971 the relatively low population increase reflects the massive outmigration of Greek workers to Western European countries of the Common Market (During the same decade the natural increase of the population was 0.8% per annum) [3, p. 706].

According to the 1971 national census data the Greek population breaks down to age groups and according to sex as shown in Table II.

TABLE II
GREEK POPULATION DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO AGE AND SEX (1971)

Ages:	0-14	15-29	30-44	45-59	60-74	75+
	24.9%	20.4%	21.9%	16.5%	12%	3.8%
Sex:	Males: 48.81%		Females: 51.19%			

Source: Encyclopedia Britannica III; vol. IV.

The population of Greece is highly homogenous, as far as ethnic composition and religious affiliation are concerned. Thus 94.9% of it consists of persons of Greek ethnicity, while Eastern Orthodox (Greek Orthodox) Christians make up 96.8% of the total population [3, p. 706]. In the Table III the reader can find a selection of statistical data that are descriptive of the overall social conditions of the Greek population.

TABLE III
SOME INDICES OF THE SOCIAL CONDITIONS OF THE GREEKS

<u>1. Education</u>	<u>Literacy</u> : 82.2% of the total population (1961) (92.4% males, 72.7% females) <u>University Graduates</u> : 14 persons per 100,000 (1971)
<u>2. Health</u>	<u>Life Expectancy at Birth</u> : 70.2 years (1969) <u>Medical Doctors Per Population</u> : 1 per 638 (1969) <u>Daily Per Capital Caloric Intake</u> : 2900 calories (minimum recommended: 2,590 calories (1969))
<u>3. Employment</u>	<u>Population Economically Active (%)</u> : 43.8% (1969) <u>Unemployed (%)</u> : 1.8% (1969)

Source: Encyclopædia Britannica III; vol. IV.

Greece, along with Austria, Italy, Spain and Switzerland, has a relatively low urbanization level for a European country [63, p. 7].

According to the 1971 census only 52.4% of its inhabitants were urban.⁴ However Greece is special to the extent that it exhibits one of the highest concentrations of urban population in one single city, its capital Athens (The metropolitan area of Athens had, according to the 1971 census, a population of 2,540,000 people [20, p. 1], which added up to the 55.5% of the total urban population of Greece and to 29% of the Greek population).

Greece up to 1920 was a rural country, since its economy was based on the primary sector and also since the large majority of its inhabitants were residing in rural communities (with populations less than 10,000 people). What became a major impetus for the starting of a rapid urbanization process was the inflow of more than a million Greek refugees from Asia Minor in 1922. Although there had been official plans for a resettlement policy, distinguishing between refugees of urban and rural origin, most of them were in fact absorbed in the two major urban centers, Athens and Thessaloniki, thus producing an abrupt increase in the populations of these two cities, of 349,000 and 77,000 inhabitants respectively [63, p. 14]. This amount of concentration of cheap labor force, especially in Athens, triggered a rapid urban development of the city, both in economic and in social terms. This way, in the time period immediately following the Asia Minor disaster (1922), the Capital of Greece evolved into an urban center of national magnitude which had already started attracting population from all over the rest of the country.

4. This means that they were living in cities with population exceeding 10,000 people, regardless of their occupation [3, p. 706].

After the end of World War II and the Greek Civil War that followed, the emphasis of the Greek economy shifted, as has been mentioned earlier, from the primary sector to the sectors of industry and service, whose development is closely related to the urbanization process. As a result, after 1950, two internal migration movements of the Greek population were observed: one from the countryside towards all larger urban centers and one from all over the country toward Athens [63, p. 15].

Athens has been growing at a fairly fast rate since 1951, especially if one considers its large base. This growth has had many positive effects but also has generated many problems, which in the absence of any effective planning or control measures, have presently reached threatening dimensions. Thus, while in the beginning concentrated growth had led to the creation of the necessary conditions for a large scale economy, today the point of diminishing returns appears to have been reached [63, p. 15]. As a result the economic and social consequences of overgrowing are evident in all aspects of urban life in Athens, while this overdevelopment of one single city is widely believed to be detrimental to the country's overall economic and social welfare.

B. THE GOVERNMENT IN GREECE

B1. Central Government

According to the latest amendment to its constitution (1975), Greece is a Parliamentary, Presidential Republic. Three hundred Representatives, elected every four years from the country's fifty-two

Departments⁵ (NOMOS), by popular vote,⁶ form the National Assembly (Parliament). The National Assembly is the legislative body of the Greek state and it also elects, every five years, the President of the Republic (the head of the Greek state), who has also the power of vetoing legislation [62, p. 2].

Almost always, the representatives to the Parliament are not politically or philosophically independent but affiliated with one of the numerous political parties that share the Greek political stage. The two larger political parties, in the post-Dictatorship Greece (after 1974), are the "New Democracy," a conservative party which governed Greece from November 1974 up to October 18th, 1981 (that is during the entire time during which the planning process examined in this thesis has taken place), and the main opposition party, the "Panhellenic Socialist Movement," which was swept into power in the latest elections.

The responsibility for forming and running the central government lies with the political party which has the support of the absolute majority of the Representatives in the National Assembly (that is at least one hundred and fifty one votes). The central government administration is based on a system of Ministries (roughly corresponding to

5. For administrative purposes, Greece is subdivided into fifty-two regions which are called Departments or Prefectures (according to the French tradition to which these administrative subdivisions are modeled). A Department (NOMOS) may be a geographical or cultural unit, or part of a larger unit. It usually consists of a rural area surrounding a relatively important urban center, the Departmental Capital. Departments do not have elected governments of their own.

6. All Greek citizens (male and, since 1952, female), residing in Greece at the time of a national election, have voting rights. Voting is considered to be a citizen's duty and it is compulsory.

the administrative departments of the U.S. Federal Government) each headed by a Minister who may be assisted by one or more Deputy Ministers. The Council of Ministers is headed by the Prime Minister who represents the apex of the administrative decision making power [62, p. 3].

Decision making is highly centralized in Greece. All the powers, with the exception of those delegated by the constitution or by law to local authorities or some public agencies, lie with the central government [62, p. 2]. As a consequence, the central government controls nearly every sector of public interest and, among numerous others, city and regional planning too. The role of central government in planning is paramount, as it concentrates both planning and control functions, largely determining policies and expenditure [63, p. 23]. The Ministry of Co-ordination and Planning deals with matters of overall policy and planning on a strategic level (and also prepares the Five-Year Development Plans of Greece), while the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment (Y.H.O.P), and also the Ministries of Public Works (Y.D.E.) and of Interior, in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance produce further detailing and implementation measures to the plans or urban development studies [63, p. 23].

Decentralization of the central government executive functions is routed through the fifty-two Prefectures on the one hand and through the seven Regional Administrations, on the other [63, p. 23]. The first (and much older) represents an administrative division of Greece under the Ministry of Interior, while the second, relatively newly introduced, is under the Ministry of Co-ordination and Planning. The Regional

Administrations are not executive bodies while the Prefectures are responsible for carrying out executive functions of the central government [63, p. 24]. The Prefect (heading each one of the fifty-two prefectures) is appointed by the Minister of the Interior and is responsible for coordinating the functions of the representatives from the other Ministries (i.e. Education, Public Works, etc.) to the Prefecture [62, p. 4]. It should be emphasized that Prefectures are only executive organs [63, p. 24] of guidelines passed through the Ministry of Interior, thus not having any power to make decisions of their own. In other words "decentralization" in Greece is merely a tool for the uniform application of centrally made decisions. It does not imply any participation of the administrative units in the decision making process.

B2. Local Government

The population of Greece is distributed in more than eleven thousand communities, the large majority of which are small villages with populations ranging from a few dozen to a few hundred inhabitants. There are two hundred and sixty four towns with populations exceeding ten thousand people [62, p. 4]. These are defined as municipalities⁷ and their local affairs are administered by a popularly elected⁸ municipal council, headed by a mayor. The authority and jurisdiction of local government is under the direct surveillance of the Ministry of

7. Smaller towns or villages are defined as Communities and have a slightly different form of local government. Their popularly elected Communal Council is headed by the Community President.

8. Local government elections take place every four years, and at the same time for all elections in the country.

Interior (through the respective Prefecture) and depends, to a large extent, upon delegation by the central government [62, p. 3].

Local government responsibilities, at all levels, are very limited. Although according to the provisions of Legislative Decree no. 2888 of 1954, which concerns the functions of local authorities, it appears that their jurisdictions could be quite extensive, most of these, especially in the larger cities, are curtailed by special laws which delegate them either to central government agencies or to public corporations [62, p. 4]. In this way, a large number of functions which, in many other countries fall within the responsibility of the local government (for instance primary education, police and fire protection water supply, town planning and development etc.) are most often retained by the central government directly (e.g. education and planning) or delegated to public corporations (e.g. water supply in Athens) [62, p. 4].

Most commonly the functions that remain as the responsibilities of the local government are:

- Keeping records and issuing certificates of births, weddings and deaths of their citizenry.
- Construction and maintenance of municipal roads and other municipal public facilities (i.e. parks, playgrounds, athletic installations, theatres, etc.).
- Street cleaning, garbage collection and sewage disposal.
- Administration of municipal property.
- Administration of cemeteries.

Local government revenue comes from municipal fees, paid by every household in the community, which are supposed to cover the expenses for most of the municipal functions that are benefitting the community as a whole. Additional income is produced from fees for special services (for instance, the issuance of birth certificates), building permit fees and some local taxes, the most important among which is a single levy on property at the time it is included in the City Plan⁹ area [62, p. 5]. In Greece there are no annual property taxes paid either to the local or the central government.

Municipal revenue at any rate, is far too low to balance the expenditures for the functions of the local governments, even though these functions are limited. For this reason local government activities are to a high percentage (at times reaching 95%) subsidized by central government grants via the Ministry of Interior, through the prefecture, on the basis of budgets drawn up by the municipal council and subjected to the approval of the Ministry [62, p. 5]. Thus, the state, providing the means for their financial survival, has a really powerful control over what local governments can and cannot do.

Nevertheless the form of government in Greece is far too centralized for the State to rely only on this indirect financial control for the supervision of the activities of local governments. There are also some more direct and effective tools that may be used, if necessary. As a matter of fact, according to the "local authorities" law (Legislative Degree no. 2888 of 1954) the Minister of Interior can "reprimand",

9. See Chapter II, pp. 36-39.

"suspend" and even "dismiss" local officials, including elected ones, if they are found to be engaged in activities beyond strictly local matters as these are defined by the central government [62, p. 5].

Part of this obvious mistrust that the central governments of Greece have historically shown towards local governments can be explained in political terms. Indeed it is very well known to any voter in Greece that, despite occasional "declarations of independence" during pre-election times, candidates running for local offices are almost always tied with the major political parties. It is a very interesting fact which appears to be a paradox of the Greek political life that more often than not local governments turn out to be not to the political liking of the central administration, being usually affiliated with liberal to socialistic parties when most of the Greek governments since the thirties have been of a conservative political philosophy. This persistent philosophical disparity between State government, on the one hand, and most local governments, on the other, has obviously influenced the spirit of the legislation regulating the "self-government" of towns and cities in Greece.

It must be emphasized that this centralization of power in Greece and the minimizing of the jurisdiction of local governments may have at a certain historical moment facilitated strict central government control over the country and a somehow homogenous development, but it clearly has contributed to the creation of a monstrous central bureaucracy, as well as to the decline of most other cities and towns of Greece, to the dubious "benefit" of Athens, where the central government resides.

A change in the present situation of the local governments (perhaps even a radical one) is, however, to be expected after the October 1981 parliamentary elections that brought to power the party of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK). As a matter of fact the new government of Greece has included in its program general measures, of both financial and institutional character, which aim at eventually giving local governments a much larger role in the decision making process. It is still too early to assess the possible effectiveness of these measures, especially since they are for the moment expressed only in general terms. However the fact that presently most local governments in the country happen to share the political philosophy of the governing party--something that has scarcely occurred before--makes the fulfillment of this promise of decentralization more feasible than it has ever been.

CHAPTER II

THE EVOLUTION OF PLANNING LEGISLATION

A. AN ESSAY ON PLANNING IN GREECE

If, in a broad sense, planning consists of "foresight in formulating and implementing programs and policies" [29, p. 387], then some degree of planning is present in any activity of the civilized man or society. However for the purpose of this study a somehow stricter definition of "planning," one which takes into account the scale of the endeavor (in terms of people involved, space and time), its scope and also the degree of effectiveness that one can expect from it, would seem more appropriate. According to this, planning can be defined as an ongoing process, which involves the community, working with a competent technical staff, to determine its needs, wants and values, to translate these into goals and objectives, to formulate alternative social, physical and economic policies and programs, attempting to meet these goals, and objectives, and finally to select from these policies and programs and implement the outcome.

The need for planning, thus defined, has not been acknowledged in Greece until the very recent years [63, p. 27; 28, p. 59]. Although the first piece of legislation concerning urban development did appear as early in 1923, its emphasis was placed on regulating development as it was occurring rather than on planning for it beforehand. The very word that stands for city planning in the Greek language (POLEODOMIA = City structuring) has a definite slant towards the physical act of building

rather than the intellectual process of programming ahead for a desirable future.

The relatively low value attached to planning in the Greek society is better indicated by the absence, to date, of a School of Planning in a University (either at the graduate or undergraduate level), anywhere in the whole country. The fact that most Greek planners started their professional careers as architects¹ has undoubtedly left an impact on the sort of planning traditionally done in Greece, with its strong inclination towards physical planning and design and its relative disregard for legal and political considerations which are nevertheless, key factors if any implementation of planning is to be contemplated [70, p. 10].

However, if one should ask why, from the more than sixty plans and urban studies prepared in Greece since the early sixties, not even one has ever been implemented [57, p. 138], it would be really unfair to place the blame on the presumable educational handicaps of the Greek planners.²

Some clues suggesting the real reason of the ineffectiveness of planning in Greece can come to the surface if one stops to reflect on

1. The School of Architecture of the National Technical University in Athens was the first university department to add a planning course in its curriculum. Consequently, most Greek planners are architects specialized in planning in Universities of Europe and to a lesser degree of North America. Most Greek architect-planners are educated in France.

2. To the contrary, the absence of adequate planning education within the higher educational system of Greece, should be viewed as yet another effect and not the cause of the prevailing attitude towards planning in the Greek society.

the philosophical question of what planning really is, what it can accomplish and why (and by whom) it is sought [29, p. 387], while at the same time keeping in mind the specific socio-political situation of modern Greece. Indeed, according to a number of theorists, the complex action of planning always represents a compromise, expressed in time and space, between several generally contradictory objectives and by the same token between conflicting interests of different social groups, normally coexisting in any society [29, p. 392; 57, pp. 137, 144]. If this is true, the argument goes, planning may not be needed at all in a society that aspires, for any number of reasons, to the materialization of only one objective, or more realistically, in a society where one single objective is given absolute priority over all others. In the same way planning can be easily discarded in a situation when one social group holds the political power to seek the fulfillment of its own class interests without having to cope with considerable opposition on the part of the rest of society [57, pp. 129, 136].

Well, what many scholars of planning in Greece believe has been the cause of its failure is the conjuncture of both the above situations. First, during the period that followed the end of the Greek Civil War (and which coincided with the period of a remarkably accelerated urbanization), one social class, that of the economically privileged, held enough political power to pursue its own special interests without having to take into account what would prove in the long run to be to the benefit of the nation as a whole [57, pp. 138, 145]. Since the pursuit of short term capitalistic interests can best take place within a free market system, planning was not only thought unnecessary but

clearly undesirable. The Greek state on the other hand was obsessed, in the same period, with just one aspect of development and progress, namely with the rapid, at all costs increase of the total national output through industrialization, an objective that could also be optimized through the free operation of the market [57, pp. 129, 145]. Indeed, it was not until the late sixties that the state came to understand that the unplanned growth had accumulated a host of problems which started assuming threatening dimensions (of a varying degree, of course) for most segments of the Greek population and for the country's overall socio economic development as well, and that the time for some planning had come. However even then (and even now) planning has been viewed as a magical medicine which would somehow help with the solution of the problems without demanding any sacrifices. This view of planning may be the reason why so many plans have been commissioned and why as many have failed to satisfy the whims of those who ordered them, with the result that none was ever adopted and implemented [57, p. 130].

Within this context it is not surprising that in Greece, a country notable for its overregulation and for its abundance of legislation, controlling almost any human activity, real planning legislation (with the literal meaning of the word Planning) did not appear before the late sixties. Of course, as it has already been mentioned, there has existed since 1923, the Legislative Decree of June 17, 1923 (L.D. of 1923), concerning City Plans, which along with some later supplements has served as the basic legal tool that guided the urbanization process in Greece [63, p. 28]. To understand this urbanization process and the

problems that it has brought to the Greek cities and regions, it is necessary to study the legal framework within which it has occurred.

B. THE TRADITIONAL LEGISLATION

The L.D. of 1923 constitutes an early attempt to insure an orderly urban development in Greece [63, p. 30]. Its basic provision was that every community should have a statutory City Plan indicating the street network along with any open space, and determining a set of development variables for each sector of the city [63, p. 29]. In other words, according to the L.D. of 1923, each city should be divided into sectors or zones, and any authorized development within such a sector should be found to comply with the development variables set in the zoning ordinance [63, p. 28] before a building permit could be issued.

It must be emphasized here that the "zoning ordinance" as introduced in Greece with the L.D. of 1923 did not regulate the use of land or buildings [63, p. 31]. In fact, up to date, there is no land use zoning in the Greek cities. There are virtually no restrictions as to the uses of the structures for which a building permit is issued.³ Instead, the development variables included in the zoning ordinance have a definite structural character, specifying, for instance, maxima for building heights and floor-area ratios, minima for plot sizes and street frontage for each kind of development (i.e. multi- or single- storey) and other dimensional controls regulating the bulk of the structure in

3. The only requirement is an additional approval by the respective ministry in cases of industrial, educational, health or tourist uses. Such an approval concerns merely the appropriateness of the building for such a use rather than its location in a sector of the city.

relation with the plot on which it is to be erected [63, p. 29]. This sort of zoning, preoccupied with structural considerations and entirely missing those related with the use of land, did not help to counter the degradation (social, physical and economic) of the urban environment, which unavoidably results from the mixing of incompatible land uses.⁴

The L.D. of 1923 also regulated the kind of development which could legally occur outside the City Plan, either (a) within the city "zone", which was defined as the area surrounding the City Plan within a radius of 500 meters, or (b) outside the city and the "zone" but along the national, provincial or local roads, or (c) anywhere else outside the city and the zone [1, pp. 30-31]. The "building uses" permitted in each of these three cases were specific⁵ and the development variables applied (and concerning minimum plot size and building bulk and height) were meant to insure the least dense development in the third case, with the density increasing as one goes to cases (b) and (a), and the most dense development intended to occur, of course, within the city limits [63, p. 30].

The Legislative Decree of 1923, influenced in its conception by the German experience (which is considered to be the oldest in the field of

4. This way, the intrusion of industrial uses has in many cases completely destroyed formerly attractive residential areas, the intensification of commercial uses along larger streets and in many central sectors of the cities has created heavy traffic, etc. etc.

5. Thus the notion of "building use" (and not "land use") is introduced by the L.D. of 1923, but only in cases when building itself constitutes an exception rather than the rule. Permitted uses outside the cities (and provided that minimum plot sizes and structural guidelines are met) include hotels, hospitals, educational and religious buildings and auxiliary agricultural structures.

zoning, originating in 1880) proved to be largely inappropriate for Greece [63, p. 24]. Despite its stated positive intentions and although it has certainly been, at a period of rapid urbanization, more beneficial than no development controls at all,⁶ the heart of the matter is that it really did not help, one way or the other, the planned development of urban Greece.

Apart from its more or less important omissions (such as omitting land use zoning) and some crucial errors in terminology (such as regulating "buildings" instead of "land" its major weakness was, ironically, what in a different institutional context than the one prevailing in Greece (in 1923 as well as today) would be most positive. It is, indeed acknowledged today that the "Achilles' heel" of the Legislative Decree of 1923 has been the fact that it placed the final responsibility for any planning and implementation directly on the cities [63, p. 29]. This would have been, of course, the only right thing to do in the case of Germany, with its strong civic tradition. However, as it was transplanted in Greece, a country with a remarkably centralized form of government, with cities stripped of any sizeable financial, organizational or technical capabilities, it was bound not to work. In fact most of the towns in the country failed even to have a City Plan drafted in the first place [28, p. 59], while the cities which did have City Plans had really nothing more than statutory maps that were picturing the respective communities as they were at that time, with "zoning ordinances"

6. In this legislation the general provisions for an institutional framework and the respective procedures towards implementation were fairly advanced, considering the knowledge and needs of the period [63, p. 28].

superimposed on them. In no case has a statutory City Plan been based on a previously adopted "master plan" (development plan), or been amended to comply with, and serve as an implementation tool to a plan prepared after the original City Plan had been adopted.

This way the City Plan, as introduced in the Greek legislation by the L.D. of 1923, has practically been nothing more than an empirical and more or less arbitrary zoning ordinance (regarding, of course, only structural and not land use variables). Since it had been arbitrary in the first place, it could also be (and it invariably has been) readily susceptible to a series of amendments and changes, in response to either organized pressures or reality itself that was evolving despite the City Plan [28, p. 59].

In addition, most cities, for lack of technical and financial means, could not even work out an original zoning ordinance with individually defined sets of variables to be applied in each of their sectors. This local inability (however justified) led relatively early to the "solution" of a centrally drafted General Building Regulation Code (G.B.R.C.), the first version of which was introduced in 1929 [63, p. 32]. In its two later amendments (1935, 1973) the G.B.R.C. was extended so much as to regulate even minor building details. Its nationwide use (either along with or even without a special zoning ordinance in effect), contributed to the gradual depersonalization of the building character, traditionally particular to different parts of Greece, and to the uniform repetition of the same indifferent architecture, unimaginative and bureaucratic as much as it has been "modern" and sanitary [28, p. 59].

The traditional Greek legislation concerning city planning and

regulating construction in general (which, based on the L.D. of 1923, also includes a long series of later legislative additions and amendments) did recognize that the implementation of a plan constitutes a "public interest". Nevertheless it did not equip the local authorities responsible for this implementation with the legal and/or financial tools that are essential if this "public interest" is to be seriously pursued [28, p. 58]. In this way the traditional legislation did not include provisions aiming at substantially enhancing the municipal incomes on which the financing of any City Plan implementation depended almost entirely. Indeed, according to this same body of legislation, even the acquisition of enough land for the accommodation of such elementary urban facilities as a satisfactory street network, squares, parks, etc., had to be based on compulsory expropriation by the city [28, p. 59], which, however, was usually in no position to pay land owners the "just compensation" required by the Constitution.⁷ In only one case did the traditional legislation concerning City Plans accept that land expropriation by the city was "self compensatory" because of "value added" and consequently needed not to be paid for in money. This was considered to happen in the case when a strip of land, not wider than ten meters, was acquired with the purpose of accommodating

7. The Greek Constitution protects the right of private property. In its latest revision in 1975, and in Article 17, it states that although private property is protected by the state, the respective rights cannot be used against the public interest. Accordingly, compulsory expropriation can take place only in cases when: i) the public interest is adequately demonstrated by law; ii) complete and just compensation is paid; and iii) the due process of the law is followed. Payment of the compensation should take place not later than one year and a half after the decision for expropriation is taken, otherwise this decision ceases to exist. Before the payment of the complete amount of compensation all property rights remain with the original owner [63, p. 39].

the right of way for a street. The value added to the properties through which the street was cut (because of the street access and the right to build on a City Plan approved "building line") was then considered to be an adequate compensation for the land expropriated, provided however that the properties were not divided by the street in a way that inhibited the full development of the remaining land, according to the provisions of the G.B.R.C. and the zoning ordinance in effect [28, p. 59].

Property re-arrangement of any kind was not permitted under the traditional legislation [28, p. 58]. Consequently, if a city needed to avoid court suits and costly settlements (and this has been of course invariably the case), special care had to be taken in designing the city streets so that existing properties were not adversely affected. This concern soon became the primary preoccupation of the city engineers [28, p. 58] with the result that today most urban street systems in Greece, while efficiently providing access to almost every individual property in the city, are clearly less efficient in serving the other equally fundamental function of a street network, namely that of carrying traffic and accomodating transportation needs.⁸

The traditional City Plan legislation in conjunction with the chronically ill finances of the Greek municipalities have, to a large extent, been responsible for the presently prevailing condition of the

8. There are two primary purposes of a street network: That of carrying traffic in, out and through a community and that of providing access to all parts of it [14, pp. 146-149].

urban street systems in Greece. These street systems, largely lacking auxillary facilities (such as off-street parking for instance) and consisting of a very dense⁹ network of narrow, poorly differentiated¹⁰ and awkwardly designed streets, are serving in a less and less satisfactory way the growing transportation needs of most Greek cities. This has become more evident in the recent years, especially in the larger metropolitan areas, where increased population densities, intensified use of urban land and a dramatic rise in private car ownership have caused a sharp increase in traffic and have greatly aggravated the transportation related problems faced by most larger cities in the country.

If such is the situation concerning the street network of the Greek cities one can imagine what has happened with urban facilities considered to be of less importance, such as squares, green space, playgrounds, other recreation facilities, parking space, even arterials with rights-of-way wider than ten meters. Although nothing in the traditional legislation inhibited such features in a City Plan, the securing of enough land for them was left to depend entirely upon compulsory expropriation on the part of the cities. Understandably enough, however, Greek municipalities were seldom able to pay the legally required compensations

9. Property size and building blocks in Greek cities usually are considerably smaller than those in a typical North American city. Consequently streets are much more densely packed.

10. In a well-functioning urban circulation system the streets are clearly differentiated according to their primary purpose. This way "local streets" are mainly providing access to the properties abutting the public right of way, "collectors" are guiding local traffic to or off the main arterials, while "arterials" and especially "freeways" (if the latter exist) are supposed to primarily carry high speed traffic in long distances, in, out or within the community [14, pp. 146-149].

for most of the necessary expropriations. The fact that the law provided that the time between the commencement of a compulsory expropriation and the payment of the complete compensation for it to its original owner could not be more than one year and a half [63, p. 39] was an additional hardship for the cities, which in most cases could simply not follow through with consistency a program of acquisition of the pieces of land designated as "public" or "open" in the City Plan.

An explanator statement (Law 5269/1931), added to the traditional legislation in 1931, officially and positively permitted private land owners to build on their properties, even in case when these properties were located on a City Plan designated "open space," if the city had failed to pay off in time the entire sum for their compensations and if the constructions conformed with the guidelines included in the Building Regulation Code and the zoning ordinance in effect for these sectors of the city [28, p. 59]. This explains why multi-story buildings were erected right in the middle of City Plan designated "squares," even parks (with existing old trees), or occupying the unpaid for part of a designated "right of way" for an arterial wider than ten meters. The only designated "open sapces" that were relatively safe from being built on, were those planned on the scarce pieces of municipally owned land. These public properties however, were often located in the outskirts rather than the central sectors of cities, where public open space was needed the most [28, p. 59]. On the whole, the effect of the traditional legislation in equipping the Greek cities with adequate public open space has been minimal. Today, towns and large metropolitan areas

alike are, as a rule, short of green space and parks,¹¹ severely deficient in public facilities such as playgrounds, squares, recreation areas or off-street parking lots, and sorely in need of more and safer high speed arterials [28, p. 59].

One could argue that the traditional planning legislation in co-existence with the weak finances of the Greek municipalities on the one hand, and the constitutionally and legally well-protected right of private property on the other, could not possibly bring about any better results. In fact the legislative framework of planning in Greece has often been accused of being too protective of private interests and, as a result, detrimental to those of the public [28, p. 58]. It is true that in the Greek Constitution, the citizens' right to private property is protected but not as strongly as in the Constitution of the United States.¹² However, the fact that the right to private property is adequately protected in Greece, by the Constitution as well as through a body of special legislation while, at the same time, land owners do not have the duty of paying annual property taxes, either directly to cities (as in the case of the U.S.A.) or to the state [63, p. 22], demonstrates that private ownership in Greece enjoys more privileges than it bears

11. The city of Athens is otherwise known as the metropolis with only 2% of its area "green". The scarcity of green open space and air-cleaning trees is a fact partly blamed for the acute air pollution problem that the city faces today [68, p. 18].

12. In the constitutional revision of 1968, made during the rule of the military dictatorship in Greece, the statement regarding the protection of private property was similar, almost identical, with that of the American constitution. The latest revision of the Constitution (1975) returned to the analogous clause of the 1952 Constitution.

duties, and gives a certain degree of validity to the criticism expressed above.

In any case, the actual (an heavily problematic) situation of most Greek cities today dramatically depicts the effect that the traditional City Plan legislation has had on urban Greece, through the over forty years of its absolute reign (from 1923 until the late sixties).

Considering the legislation from the point of view of its final result rather than its original intention one could say that the weakest point of L.D. of 1923 was that it tragically failed to have any major effect in directing the growth of the Greek cities. Indeed, even more serious than the deficient street network, the lack of adequate open space and parks or the unsatisfactory infra-structure in the central cities, has been the problem of the anarchic, unplanned and totally out of control urban expansion, which in the larger metropolitan areas and especially in Athens overshadows and at the same time forcefully aggravates all other problems.

As has been mentioned, the L.D. of 1923 intended to insure a lower density development outside city limits, mainly by regulating (1) the size of the "buildable" plots, and (2) the use of the authorized constructions. However, since the legislation was referring to "buildings" and not "land," it was giving a green light (even if unintentionally) to agricultural land subdivision, which has always been handsomely profitable in times of high pressure for urban expansion [28, p. 59]. In other words, according to the traditional City-Plan legislation, it was perfectly legal and risk-free for any owner of agricultural land in the periphery of a city to subdivide it into tiny plots, unbuildable under

the law, and sell it off to individual buyers [62, p. 13]. During the rapid urbanization process in Greece (which practically coincided with the development of the traditional City-Plan legislation), and in the absence of any comprehensive, government-originating housing program, there were always more than enough rural immigrants eager to buy a piece of land that they could afford, even if it was not larger than a hundred square meters and even if, as they well knew, it was illegal to build on. This way, while the extra profits from the land transactions were absorbed by individual "suddenly rich" ex-owners of agricultural properties, and while the risk for "breaking the law" was being transferred onto the poor--who, in any case, did not have much to lose and a home to gain--Greek cities were rapidly deteriorating [28, p. 60].

This is how densely populated, low income, unauthorized neighborhoods, lacking everything but an elementary network of three-meter-wide streets (designed by the original agricultural land-owner), sprouted up all around Athens after World War II [62, p. 13]. Each one of these workers' cities was created literally in one night. Houses were usually built by the families that were to live in them, without any infrastructure, water lines, electricity, sewage, without any provision for garbage collection or fire and police protection and, certainly, without any open space or other public facility [79, p. 43].

The disposition of the state towards these unauthorized mushrooming subdivisions has been ambivalent, ranging anywhere from acceptance and legalization to demolition orders [28, p. 60]. On the one hand the State could not help but realize that the unauthorized housing provided, at least, some short-term relief to the acute housing problem faced by

large numbers of rural origin immigrants who were sorely needed in the city since abundant and cheap labor was a prerequisite for the planned rapid industrialization of the country. On the other hand the State knew well that the miserable living conditions prevailing in these unauthorized "workers' cities" were not only creating social problems and a pending risk for dreaded political unrest, but also had the tendency to "expand" outside the unauthorized settlements "contaminating" entire urban organisms. However when faced with the dilemma of whether to legalize or to demolish unauthorized housing, most governments in modern Greece have been ultimately inclined to choose the former.

After all as long as the State was not disposed towards positively intervening in the housing market with a comprehensive, government originating, low income housing program¹³ (for which there was no interest on the part of the private sector), unauthorized housing did represent a certain solution--less than perfect, of course, but a much needed solution, at any rate--to an immediately pending problem [28, p. 60]. In this way, little by little, and usually during an election year, most unauthorized subdivisions acquired legal status and were incorporated in city-plan extensions, worked out by the respective offices of the Ministry of Public Works [63, p. 24]. After that, the municipalities

13. It is true that in the period started after the end of World War II there has been some limited government intervention in the low income housing market, oriented towards either refugee resettlements (by the Ministry of Social Welfare, L. 1667/1931) or workers' housing (by the Workers' Housing Association established in 1954). Nevertheless the quantity of housing produced as a result of these programs could only take care of a negligibly small part of the existing need for low income housing [63, p. 34].

were responsible for connecting the newly annexed areas to the most essential utility networks (usually water and electricity) and for accommodating them into the cities' school or fire and police protection systems. This "a posteriori" intervention (often assisted by the central government) while alleviating some of the most urgent problems of the unauthorized neighborhood people, could not really promote the integration of the new subdivisions into the urban organism, especially as it was done on a basis of the minimum possible cost [63, p. 76].

Finally, the traditional legislation has proved largely insufficient as far as regional planning and the protection of the environment and the natural resources of Greece are concerned. While there were provisions aimed at protecting the coastal line and every site of archeological interest, the traditional legislation did not include any measures for the protection of forests, agricultural land, areas of scenic beauty, etc. (neither, of course, for the protection of the ecological balance of the natural environment), and did not promote in any way a balanced and equitable development (economic, social or cultural) of the whole country and its regions [28, p. 60].

Today the shortcomings of the traditional legislation, as they have been discussed in this section, are acknowledged in Greece by almost everybody. However it was not before the mid-sixties, when the urbanization process had reached a point at which some of its structural problems had become evident that planning professionals, and some officials too, started realizing the magnitude of these problems and began to look with a critical eye at the body of legislation that for the past forty years was guiding the urban development of the country. The soul-

searching that followed was bound to crystallize, sooner or later, into both legislative and organizational innovations, which, in a very hesitant, fragmented and somewhat experimental way, were to gradually replace some aspects of the traditional legislation. It must be emphasized here that this process of critical reviewing and reform is by no means over yet, nor is it accepted with a universal enthusiasm. The traditional City Plan legislation continues to constitute the spinal chord of the body of legislation that concerns planning in Greece [63, pp. 29-30].

Nevertheless, a "new spirit" is obvious among planners, other professionals and scholars concerned with the urban and regional development of the country, and administrators alike. This "new spirit" manifests itself with a near-consensus in acknowledging the inadequacy of the traditional legislation and with an equally widespread eagerness to try to introduce ways for alleviating its shortcoming, although the consensus stops short of any concrete measures to be taken. The legislative innovations which started appearing as early as in 1968 and took a more or less comprehensive form with the Law 947 of 1979, reflect this new spirit and can also be seen as constituting an attempt on the part of the government to politically "balance" (up to a point) the widely diverging interests (and philosophies) regarding the urban and regional development of the country.

C. INNOVATIONS IN THE PLANNING LEGISLATION

C1. The Post World War II Years

The sector of the economy that displayed the most dramatic development in Greece during the first twenty-five post-World War II years was construction. Although the spectacular blooming of the construction-related industries in this sector has also been significant. As far as the planning-related legislation is concerned this period is characterized by the relaxing of building regulation and restrictions. Among the specific regulations altered for facilitating the expanding construction activity were that of limiting the height of buildings, that relating building height to the width of the adjacent street, that of maximum floor area ratios, etc. [73 , p. 6].

In a more or less laissez faire climate, with public intervention kept to a bare minimum [63, p. 32], construction industries did produce, the "modern" housing needed for the ever-increasing numbers of the new middle-class city dwellers in record time, but by the same token, they have been instrumental in altering in a destructive way "the shape into which Greek cities have evolved during their long lives" [73, p. 6].

Nevertheless, the very limited public intervention in the domain of construction has been just one facet of the prevailing general absence of planning, an absence that could be detrimental at any time but which at this period of accelerated urban growth has had a particularly negative impact. Specifically in Athens the deterioration of the urban environment as expressed by a host of accumulating problems started becoming clearly apparent during the early sixties, if not yet to the

general public, certainly to most professionals as well as to some enlightened administrators [73, p. 6].

Still, however, the administration (even its most "enlightened" part) was viewing these problems as isolated and separate, failing to understand that they all were structurally related to one another and to the (unplanned) way in which the urbanization of Greece was proceeding. The time for planning had not come yet. Instead the administration was hoping to alleviate the urban problems with technical solutions, custom-fit for taking care of one problem at a time. In this spirit a number of expensive urban studies (such as the notorious "Transportation Study for Greater Athens" by W. Smith and Associates [73, p. 6], were commissioned and prepared by private planning firms. Regardless of the scientific merit of this "problem-oriented" approach to planning and apart from the fact that the Greek government was really unable to undertake financing the recommendations of these studies, planning did not have any chance for implementation at that time in Greece. The necessary institutional and legal framework within which implementation could be possible, at least in theory, was still lacking.

In January 1966, during the Fifth Panhellenic Conference of Architects which was held in the Capital and had as its subject "The ever worsening problems of Greater Athens",¹⁴ the acceptance of the fact that planning, as opposed to just controlling development after

14. The term Greater Athens is used in Greece in reference to the metropolitan area around the Greek Capital. Greater Athens comprises the cities of Athens and Piraeus as well as other municipalities and communities.

it had occurred, was indeed a definite necessity of life in modern Greece was evident in the presentations made by professional participants as well as by some government officials [73, pp. 7-8]. However, a study concerning housing and prepared by the Center of Planning and Economic Research (KEPE), a public agency, just before the military coup d' etat of April 21, 1967, constituted the first serious official attempt to introduce the necessary public policy lines concerning urban development in general, as well as housing [63, p. 34]. Among the propositions of this study were the following [63, pp. 34-38].

1. Amendment of social housing programs.
2. Coordination of public units responsible for planning administration and financing.
3. Updating the urban development and land use legislation framework.
4. Formation of development corporations for launching "active development" programs in relation to regional policies for industrial zones.
5. Creating incentives for the orientation of private investment towards housing for low income groups [63, pp. 34, 35].

C2. The Seven Years of the Military Dictatorship

The coming to power of a military dictatorship in April, 1967, with the political instability that followed, led to a plethora of legislation which was introduced primarily to refuel construction activity as well as in order to "mitigate grievances, reconcile opposing interests and keep social groups in a balance state" [63, p. 35]. With stated intentions similar to those included in the above-mentioned study of KEPE, the planning legislation produced during the seven years of military rule was primarily aiming at direct economic and

political gains [63, p. 35]. This is one of the reasons why, despite the undeniable fact that it constitutes the first attempt on the part of the administration to institutionalize planning in Greece, this legislation had by no means the desirable effects which were its stated objectives.

The first piece of planning legislation issued in this period was the Legislative Decree 625 of 1968 introducing the concept of Mass Plan [28, p. 61]. This decree provided a new legal tool for the expansion of the cities. It permitted development outside city limits on sites with a minimum size of 6,000 sq. meters, provided that these sites were situated in an area which could be connected with an already existing town or city, even if this area was not a self sustaining settlement [63, p. 36].

What really made L.D. 625/1968 a piece of planning legislation is its provision that, in order for construction on such sites to be legal, a plan of the proposed development of the area had to be submitted for approval to the Ministry of Public Works [63, p. 36]. In the L.D. it was also stated that land owners interested in developing their neighboring properties might form a team, accept co-ownership of the area, and submit to the Ministry a joint development plan [63, p. 36]. Unfortunately this last provision was only wishful and not statutory in any way. Indeed under the L.D. 625/1968 even one single piece of property as small as 6,000 square meters (1.5 acres) could be given permission to be built upon. It was exactly the exploitation of this option that has brought about a lot of "piece-meal" development--basically unplanned in its entirety--resulting in a

spectacular mushrooming of "second homes" along the coast lines of Attica,¹⁵ between 1968 and 1974 [63, p. 36].

After the restoration of the parliamentary regime in 1974, the decree was amended to conform to its stated original objectives.¹⁶ In this way the minimum size of the area to be considered for development, under L.D. 625/1968, was increased to 20 hectares (49.4 acres) [63, p. 37]. Also, in order that the "public interest" of the community be better served, a condition was added providing that a considerably large percentage (up to 50%) of the total acreage of the site to be developed should be allowed for public use (streets, pedestrian ways, open space, etc.) [63, p. 37].

Another very important piece of legislation issued during the military dictatorship was L.D. 1003 of 1971, concerning Active Urban Development. This decree constitutes the first attempt by the government to introduce in Greece the concept of urban revitalization (or urban renewal) while also providing a new tool for controlling the expansion of the cities. The general objective of the L.D. 1003/1971 was to provide the possibility for organized large-scale construction in Zones of Urban Development (Z.U.D.), in order to improve the overall function of the cities [63, p. 40]. As Z.U.D.'s could be declared problem areas inside the cit (in which case Active Development would take the form of Urban revitalization or renewal), or outside city limits (City Expansions) [63, p. 40].

15. The peninsula of Attica is the geographical area in which metropolitan Athens is situated.

16. The amendment is Memorandum no. 22/1977, issued by the Ministry of Public Works [28, p. 6].

The responsibility for the accumulation of the land necessary for Active Development lied with the public sector (as represented jointly by the Ministries of Finance and Public Works), which by exercising its power of Eminent Domain, could, in the "public interest," proceed to the acquisition of the estates lying within the Z.U.D. [63, p. 40]. Traditionally such transactions have been handled solely by means of compulsory expropriation. However the L.D. 1003/1971 introduced in addition a flexible set of more advanced types of public land acquisition, including pre-emption rights for the public in cases of free sale, and exchange of land with built property within the Active Development area [63, p. 40].

Once the land was acquired, the L.D. 1003/1971 conceded the right for the development of the Z.U.D. to a qualified¹⁷ development corporation, private or semipublic [63, p. 40]. The responsibility of the undertaking corporation was to ensure that the development on the area be consistent with generally stated urban planning standards but not with the specific development variables set for the respective city sector in the City Plan (according to the traditional legislation). In other words, variables such as the location of streets, pedestrian walks, building blocks, etc. were not predecided for the Z.U.D., and neither were the heights and forms of the buildings, while variables such as the overall floor area ratio in the site or the ratio of built versus

17. In order to encourage the implementation of active development programs the decree provided for the establishment of private or semi-public development corporations and offered incentives in the form of loans and partial exemptions from taxes [63, p. 40].

open space had to follow the City Plan, and building standards have to conform with the building code.

The L.D. 1003/1971, has undeniably been a piece of planning legislation. This, however, is not supposed to mean that it was positive or even acceptable in most of its aspects. The decree has been strongly criticized by socially concerned planners for delegating the responsibility for the protection of the "public interest" (after all it is only because of this that the land necessary for Active Development could be constitutionally expropriated) to private developers who were given a free hand to reshape blighted areas of the Greek cities according to their own (monetary) aspirations, and, at any rate, without considerable regard of the overall social cost of their interventions.¹⁸

It has been argued, for instance, that a simple physical upgrading of a blighted area would not necessarily serve the "public interest," although something to that effect was implied in the text of the legislation [76, p. 33]. In order that a privately initiated development be reasonably profitable it would have to be made attractive to incomes generally higher than those of the original inhabitants of the area (tenants as well as small property owners). Consequently the living conditions of these people (which, according to this view, are what most needs improvement, in the first place) would not be positively affected. On the contrary they could deteriorate even further, as the original neighborhoods along with any sense of community that might have existed in them would be destroyed, and as the dislocated people would be faced

18. This criticism of Active Development roughly corresponds to the criticisms raised against urban renewal in the U.S. during the last few decades.

with the necessity to seek their homes in other parts of the city, transferring and spreading their blight along the way.

At any rate, one can assess the validity of this criticism at a theoretical level, only. Indeed the question whether Active Development could constitute a viable solution to some of the problems faced by Greek cities or whether it could only initiate a vicious circle of Urban Renewals on the one hand, and new urban blight on the other, at the expense of the public and to the benefit of some privileged private developers, has not been answered in real-life situations, because the L.D. 1003/1971 was simply never implemented [73, p. 18].

This can be partially blamed on the non-existence in Greece, to this day, of development corporations "big" enough to undertake large scale construction, in other words of corporations to which the provisions of 1003/1971 would have been particularly appealing. The fact that there has been professional (and political) criticism against the decree along with the fact that the dictatorship never felt secure enough to put its shaky stability to the test, by initiating action with the potential of generating dreaded social unrest, must also have played a significant role, accounting for the official reluctance towards encouraging the activation of this decree. It may be pointed out that the freeze of 1003/1971 was not lifted until 1979 when a new piece of comprehensive planning legislation (Law 947/1979) officially replaced it¹⁹ [28, p. 61].

19. The revision of the Genral Building Code (with L.D. 8/1973) is not presented here, although it is certainly a very important piece of legislation, because it is peripheral to the primary scope of this analysis of planning legislation innovations. The same holds for L.D. 1138/1972 and L.D. 9020/1972, legislation concerning housing financing programs.

The last important piece of planning legislation issued during this period is L.D. 1262/1972, concerning Regulatory Plans²⁰ [49, pp. 1715-1718]. By this decree the importance of comprehensive planning for the development of the cities of Greece has, at last, been acknowledged officially. Indeed the objective of L.D. 1262/1972 was to institutionalize the legal procedure according to which master plans (Regulatory plans) can be ordered, prepared, adopted, implemented, amended and revised [63, p. 43].

Of course the concept of development plan has by no means been introduced in Greece by the L.D. 2162/1972. As has already been explained since 1960 several dozens of master plans had been commissioned by central or local government units for an equal number of cities and regions of the country and were prepared by various public agencies or their private consultants. Some of these plans may have played an indirect role in guiding development in a few instances, but none was ever implemented to a substantial degree [62, p. 9]. What was thought to be missing before 1972 was the institutional framework within which a development plan could have a chance for implementation. Exactly this framework and this process is what L.D. 1262/1972 attempted to provide.

First of all the L.D. 1262/1972 required that plans be ordered by the Ministry of Public Works according to a priority list issued annually by the Ministry of Planning and Government Policies.²¹ The Ministry

20. "Regulatory" is a literal English translation of the Greek term RHTHMISTIKON. A Regulatory Plan corresponds to what is known in the U.S. as a Master or Comprehensive plan.

21. This was the new name that was given to the "Ministry of Coordination" during the dictatorship. After 1974 it resumed its original name.

of Public Works could then commission the master plans to private planning firms, or to take over the plan preparation itself, through one of its technical offices. The Ministry of Public Works was also to provide the planning unit with general guidelines along with some desirable development standards, and was ultimately responsible for the content of the plans which were to be prepared under the direct supervision of a specially assigned public agency. After the completion of its preparation, the Regulator Plan was to be sent to the Ministry of Planning and Governmental Policies (Coordination) for comments, and then back to the Ministry of Public Works for revisions and preliminary approval.

The next step was exposing the product to the public for feedback. According to the procedure described in the L.D. 1262/1972, the plan had to be posted, care of the respective local government, in the city hall for thirty days. During this time interested public authorities (such as local governments, "organizations of public interest," public corporations, etc.) might present their dissenting views or any other relevant comments.²² After this the plan could be revised, as necessary, care of the Ministry of Public Works and then, after joint submission by the Ministries of Coordination, Public Works, and Interior, given the status of a legislative decree of the Greek state.

In order to make the implementation of a Regulatory plan financially feasible, L.D. 1262/1972 provided for the creation of the National Fund

22. One should note here that the right to comment or to express grievances is not granted to private citizens. Indeed, this is a piece of legislation drafted during a period of suspended civil rights and this is clearly reflected in the mockery that 1262/1972 makes out of the traditional city planning requirement of citizens' participation.

for the Implementation of Urban Development Plans and Programs (ETERPS). The decree also gave guidelines for the preparation of special studies and small area plans aimed at facilitating the implementation of a comprehensive plan. Finally, a procedure was established for insuring that any new construction or land subdivision within the area of an adopted regulatory plan conformed with the guidelines given for the respective sector of the city in the plan. To this end the decree required that before any such action took place a permit had to be issued by the Ministry of Public Works. To complete the planning process, L.D. 1262/1972 required the regular (every five years) revision and updating of adopted plans by the Ministry of Public Works which could issue amendments to the original product.

The legislative decree 1262/1972 undoubtedly was a step in the right direction in attempting to modernize the traditional City Plan legislation. Indeed, the transferring of the responsibility for planning and implementation from local to central government was just the right thing to do if the power structure of government in Greece, which accounts for the inability of the local authorities to carry out either of these functions, had to remain intact. In other words the fact that the responsibility for planning was conceded to the only unit that could possibly carry it out, to this author's opinion, was a positive point of this decree, demonstrating realism on the part of the lawmaker. Among the positive aspects of the legislation one can also count the fact that it introduced, at last, the notion of "land use" as opposed to the traditional legislation's "building use"

[63, p. 43] and that it included, for the first time, some tools and

steps aiming at making planning implementation possible. Of course, in L.D. 1262/1972 as in the traditional City Plan law, planning was still acknowledged to be conducive to the "public interest", a fact that made interfering with private property (through eminent domain) possible.

On the other hand L.D. 1262/1972 had also some prominent defects. The remarkably bureaucratic process of plan preparation and approval (adoption) that it established is one among the most obvious. Indeed, presumably in an attempt to overcome the well known mutual mistrust and antagonism between different public agencies in Greece, the decree vested the responsibility for planning jointly to three Ministries, which had to arrive at a consensus before any Regulatory plan could be adopted. However, precisely because of this mutual antagonism and mistrust, arriving anywhere near a commonly acceptable proposal could be a next-to-impossible task, with the result that the chances that a prepared plan might have for being legally adopted could be greatly endangered. Aside from this, a weakness relevant to the way the legislative decree has been drafted is the fact that 1262/1972 went into fine detail in describing a most inflexible planning process, at a time when many of these details had not yet been tested against any real-life situation.

Going deeper into the substance of the matter one can locate what might be considered as the single most severe problem of this legislation, namely the fact that it attempted to institutionalize a planning process from which private citizens and citizen groups were kept as far away from as possible. The exclusion of the people from the process

of planning for their communities is dangerous, not only because it makes planning implementation more difficult (for lack of local co-operation), but more important because, as most planners would agree, without feedback from the local people and their participation in planning at every step, there is simply not any guarantee that the plan to be produced will indeed serve the interests of these people [76, p. 6].

At any rate, be it for better or for worse, the L.D. 1262/1972 was, once again, never implemented in a comprehensive manner. It is true that a number of Regulatory plans have been commissioned and prepared according to its provisions but almost always the planning process was cut short before these plans were legally adopted and, of course, implemented.

This can be blamed, in part, on the defects of the legislation, especially on that related with the fact that a consensus among three Ministries was required before a Regulatory plan could be adopted. However the larger part of the responsibility for the non-implementation of the decree lies directly with the governments of Greece, during the period of the military dictatorship and also during the years that followed it, for their clearly demonstrated hesitation to follow through on their own stated policy of supporting planning.

This hesitation, deriving from these governments' conservative political philosophy, accounts for their reluctance to impose the implementation of administrative decisions which would interfere with the "sacred" freedom of the market. In fact the sad fate of L.D. 1262/1972 has provided one more strong argument in favor of those who have always believed that the ineffectiveness of planning in Greece cannot

be conveniently attributed to the lack of the appropriate legislation but that its deeper causes are intricately interwoven with the characteristics of the socio-political situation of the country [57, p. 148].

C3. The Years after the Restoration of Democracy (1974-1980).

The first piece of planning legislation voted upon by the National Assembly after the restoration of the parliamentary regime in Greece, in July 24, 1974 was Law 360 of 1976 on Physical Planning and the Environment.²³ With this legislation an attempt was made to officially acknowledge the need for Regional Planning as a means for promoting both a balanced and orderly economic and social development in Greece as well as for protecting the country's natural resources [44, pp. 1041-1044].

According to Law 360/1976 the responsibility for preparing and coordinating the implementation of regional plans, including the National Development Plan (this is a regional plan encompassing the entire country) is exclusively vested in the Ministry of Coordination and Planning. The legislation also establishes the National Council of Physical Planning and Environment (E.S.H.P.), which is responsible for making general policy decisions concerning regional development, as well as for legally adopting regional plans prepared under the supervision of the Ministry of Coordination and Planning [38, p. 104]. The Council is composed of Ministers, appointed to it ex officio, and it is presided

23. Physical Planning is the closest English translation of the Greek term CHOROTAXIA which literally means Spatial Ordering. The term is typically used with the meaning of Regional Planning, as opposed to Urban or City Planning, and it is used this way here, too. However sometimes CHOROTAXIA is expanded to include any physical planning, Urban as well as Regional.

over by the Minister of Coordination. Its members include the Ministers of Finance and Interior and the Minister and Deputy Minister of Public Works. The Law 360/1976 stated that although the National Development Plan could not acquire legal status before being voted upon by the National Assembly, all other regional plans of a smaller than national scale, could become legal if just approved by the National Council of Physical Planning and Environment.

The legislation has been widely criticized for excluding from the process of planning the people who are affected by it. According to Law 360/1976, not only does the entire process of preparation of a regional plan take place in an administrative vacuum, without even permitting token citizen participation, but it also excludes citizen participation through their representatives, from the process of legalization -adoption of the final document, since the vote of the National Assembly is not required except in the case of the National Development Plan [38, p. 15].

Apart from this valid criticism, what Law 360/1976 did accomplish, essentially, was to establish an administrative framework within which regional planning could be, theoretically, possible [15, p. 19]. However the law itself by no means insured that regional planning will be seriously pursued. The fact is that the effect of this legislation up to date has been minimal [73, p. 18], and one can say without being far from the truth that for all practical purposes regional planning in Greece today is in no better shape than it was before Law 360/1976 [28, p.62]. Indeed, the negligible effectiveness of 360/1976 provides one more illustration of how much the technocratic view according to

which the only factor responsible for the absence of planning in Greece is the lack of the appropriate mechanism for its promotion, is really superficial and naive [26, p. 19].

As presented so far, the planning legislation enacted in Greece from 1968 well into the mid-seventies can be generally characterized as "basic" legislation, legislation of intentions rather than action, in short as legislation with very little practical effect.²⁴

Nevertheless, during the last few years of the past decade the situation started changing sharply. An overheated, highly inflationary economy made it urgent that drastic measures be taken to effectively slow down construction [28, p. 61]. Its overdevelopment at the expense of other more productive industrial activity was acknowledged to be a major cause for the deterioration of the state of the economy [63, p. 12].

That the overall volume of construction should be limited was, on the other hand, also desirable from other, not strictly economic, points of view. First, the rapid worsening of a host of acute urban problems made it crucial that a ceiling be placed on the population densities in the city-centers, while the progressive destruction of the natural environment made imperative the protection of what agricultural and forested land still remained in and around the cities.

24. One may include in the same category of "too general" pieces of legislation Law 446/1976, about the creation of a Public Corporation for Urban Development and Housing (DEPOS, is its Greek acronym) with the principle objective to make suitable and affordable housing available to low- and moderate-income families, by acting as a (public) developer in "Active Development" projects. Although L. 446/1976, concerned with a vital problem of the Greek society namely low-income housing, is certainly important, it is only indirectly related to planning (through L.D. 1003/1971) and thus not presented in detail in this analysis.

It is precisely as a result of this conjuncture of economic, social and environmental goals that a series of single-target laws were introduced between 1977 and 1980 aiming principally at: a) limiting construction in the centers as well as in the periphery of the cities; b) protecting forests and agricultural land; and c) providing incentives for the "competitive" (to Athens) development of rural regions and their urban centers, with the direct objective of deterring further population influx to the Capital [25, p. 29].

Among these pieces of legislation, targeted directly at limiting the total construction output while also insuring more satisfactory urban densities, is Law no. 880/1979 [45, pp. 497-499] by which the upper ceiling placed on permitted floor/area ratios for urban development was lowered. Law no. 960/1979, according to which adequate parking space had to be provided within the building lot before any type of construction could be authorized,²⁵ made investment in building considerably less profitable, and in this indirect way also intended to limit construction while its primary goal was, of course, to insure adequate private parking space and a better functioning transportation system for the Greek cities [28, p. 61].

25. If adequate parking space (for each type of construction) cannot for any reason be provided within the building lot, the developer has the option to pay the money value of the required parking space to the public, "buying" in this way for the future residents of the building the right to lawfully use municipal parking space. The law-maker intended that the money thus collected be used for the financing and maintaining of municipal off-street parking lots which are so much needed and so scarce in the Greek cities. However the measure, extended to include any construction activity, even small additions or improvements to existing buildings, has been justly criticized as unfair [28, p. 61].

Law no. 998 of 1979 [47, pp 2843-2873] had as its subject the protection of forests and forested areas of Greece, either privately or publicly owned. The law introduced a comprehensive set of measures for the preservation of the forested areas of Greece, which were declared to constitute a national resource. The Presidential Decree (PD) of December 13, 1979 [54, pp. 8133-8134], concerning the protection of the unbuilt land of Attica, provides concrete guidelines for limiting the development on the agricultural land situated in the larger area of the Greek Capital, the peninsula of Attica. The protection of forested land all over Greece and the preservation of the open-space character of the unbuilt land of Attica constitute, in addition to their obvious environmental value, measures for controlling the city-expansion, especially in the Athenian Metropolis.

A third set of legislative acts issued in the same period is primarily targeted at preventing more population from gravitating towards Athens, by establishing a general policy for promoting the development of growing secondary cities. Such development was desirable in the hope that it would make these cities and non-urban regions better able to compete with Athens for attracting new population and secondary and tertiary economic activities. In this spirit, Law 849/1978 provided new economic incentives for locating new industrial units (and relocating old ones) in areas outside the metropolitan area of Athens²⁶ [28, p. 62].

On the other hand, Law 674/1977 attempted to solve a problem that

26. One should note here, however, that the Technical Chamber of Greece has criticized Law 849/1978 for encouraging industrial concentration in Attica and Beotea, which lies at twenty miles to the North of the Capital. This would certainly not lead to industrial decentralization, as it was implied in the text of the Law [73, p. 14]

has for long been thought of as a major obstacle to the development of the agricultural sector in Greece. The fact that the typical family property (which in Greece is very small, averaging a total of ten acres for a rural family) [56, p. 78] is dispersed in numerous tiny pieces of land, located often far away from one another, makes the rational and profitable cultivation of the rural land a goal too difficult to attain. Law 674/1977 introduced the legal possibility of re-arrangement of the agricultural properties in a way that farmers could have their acreage all in one piece [28, p. 62]. Aside from the benefits to the total agricultural production obviously expected as a result of this legislation it was also hoped that the improvement in the living and working conditions of the Greek farmer family would make the alternative of paid employment in a big city less attractive.

Finally the Administrative decree of November 6th, 1979 concerning "Policy Lines for the Decentralization of Greece" [42, pp. 8823-8826] constituted an official attempt to formulate in very general terms a national policy aimed at keeping further population and activities from gravitating towards Athens and, to a lesser degree, Salonika, while at the same time encouraging the balanced development of the rest of urban and rural Greece. A set of measures targeted at guiding new urban development primarily in the six Centers of Intensive Development (KEPA) which, presumably, had the potential to grow into cities capable of successfully competing with Athens and Salonika in attracting population and socio-economic activity, included the transfer of a number of administrative units from Athens, intensive public investment in infrastructure works, the creation of major hospitals, universities and other

cultural centers and the creation of incentives for attracting to these cities new private businesses. According to the decree, the rest of the cities of Greece were characterized as Urban Centers (ASTOK) and their respective development would be based on Regional Development Plans. Finally the rural communities of the country will be organized into "systems of Rural Centers," (AGROK) with the most vital community of the "system" playing the role of its socio-economic center. This organization will also be based on Regional Development plans.

It is still too early to assess the effectiveness of all the legislation which was briefly presented above and which was almost all produced within one year.²⁷ However one can safely say that, the more "modest" in its objectives the legislation, the more effective it has been. Legislation restrictive in character and directly targeted at one single objective has generally been successful. For instance, Laws 880/1979 and 960/1979, helped along their way by the imposition at that time of heavy taxation on imported building materials, helped to reduce total construction activity significantly. On the other hand too ambitious legislation, aiming at bringing about too radical a change, was largely ineffective. The best illustration is provided by the A.D. of Nov. 6, 1979, concerning "Policy for the Decentralization of Greece," which merely represents wishful thinking rather than a concrete program of action for the accomplishment of its broad objectives.

Nevertheless, 1979 has been really important for planning in Greece for it was on July 26 of that year that the single most significant

27. 1979, the year of a record production of planning legislation.

of modern planning legislation was introduced in the country. Law no. 947 of 1979, concerning "Urban Development Areas,"²⁸ spelled out a comprehensive body of legal provisions for the orderly and planned expansion or revitalization of the Greek cities, establishing also the necessary tools and procedures for the planning implementation. Law 947/1979 [46, pp. 1731-1751] was meant to gradually replace the L.D. of July 17th, 1923, aspiring to give the public sector a much broader and more active role in planning than the one provided by the traditional City Plan legislation [28, p. 60]. It also replaced, in practice, the frozen L.D. no. 1262/1972, concerning Regulatory Plans, and Law no. 1003/1971 which introduced in Greece the concept of Active Urban Development [28, p. 60]. However the most impressive and innovative change brought about by 947/1979 lies not merely in the fact that it constituted a comprehensive planning law, but in its establishing a realistic procedure for the implementation of planning [28, p. 60].

The central idea behind 947/1979's provisions for making the implementation of planning in Greece feasible is a simple one. First of all this law finally acknowledged that before any development plan could be implemented it was essential that adequate land be available for the accommodation of public uses [28, p. 60]. Considering the limited financial capabilities of the public sector in Greece and also the negative past experience, the law-makers rightfully concluded that this land could not possibly be secured just by compulsory expropriation. Following this, the viable alternative introduced by 947/1979 was that the largest

28. The literal translation of the Greek term is "Ekistic Areas", meaning areas of urban character or areas to be developed as city expansions.

part of the public land necessary for an acceptable urban development be acquired by means of compulsory contributions in land on the part of the proprietors of estates located within the Urban Development Area (U.D.A.). These contributions would be compensated for by the expected substantial increase in value of the remaining pieces of property, after they were included in the U.D.A. Furthermore, this rise in property value expected to occur after inclusion in the U.D.A. justified--at least in the eyes of the lawmakers--the imposition upon the land owners, in addition to the "land contribution" of a "development fee" which was calculated as a percentage of the total value of each individual property prior to development, and which was to be used for financing the actual development of the U.D.A. Law 947/1979, by broadening the concept of public intervention to private property, made planning in Greece financially self-relying, in other words financially possible [28, p. 60].

Law no. 947/1979 also employed other means in order to insure the accumulation of all the necessary land for public use as well as to have this land appropriately located according to a plan. First of all, compulsory expropriation, the traditional method for public land acquisition, was not abandoned by 974/1979; it was only made less necessary .. [28, p. 61]. On the other hand the legislation introduced, for the first time in Greece, the concept of the compulsory re-allotment of urban property, a concept which afforded to public the possibility to transfer and rearrange estates within a given area, in a way that all the "land contributions" could be "collected" in an orderly manner, forming street networks, squares, parks, etc., in the appropriate locations according to a plan [28, p. 61]. Finally 947/1979 also utilized the concept of

of the "transfer of the permitted floor-area ratios" which was introduced by Law 880/1979 and which permitted the right to build on a given property to be used on another piece of land, in addition to the floor-area ratio already permitted there [28, p. 61].

All these means of acquisition and spatial arrangement of public land were of course to be used just to make planning feasible. And planning is what 947/1979 is all about, since U.D.A.'s were to be given authorization for development only after a development plan for them had been approved and only in accordance with this plan. First, an area located inside a city or in its periphery, already built upon or undeveloped, had to be declared as an U.D.A. This could be accomplished by three different procedures:

1. By decision of the Minister of Public Works (a decision which could be used as a tool for implementing a comprehensive plan);
2. After a proposal by a local government;
3. After a proposal by the majority of the proprietors in the prospective U.D.A., who had also to own at least two-thirds of the total land.

However an area could be declared to be a U.D.A. only after a development plan for it, prepared under the responsibility of either one of the above three agents and indicating land use, major open space, etc., was officially approved.

Law 947/1979 established three levels of intervention for achieving this plan's implementation: Active Urban Development (A.U.D.), Property Reallotment (P.R.A.), and Regulatory Terms for Development (R.T.D.). An Active Urban Development Zone could be a part (or all) of the U.D.A.

which would be developed as a unit by one corporation (public, semipublic or private) according to a specific construction plan. The landowners in the A.U.D. zone could exchange their horizontal properties with floor-area after development had taken place, transfer their right to build upon their property to another piece of land (according to Law no. 880/1973), or sell their property to the development corporation or the public (compulsory expropriation). Basically the concept of A.U.D. in Law 947/1979 was similar to the one introduced by L.D. 1003/1971, the big difference being that according to 947/1979, A.U.D. was a tool for implementation of planning and not just for organized construction of an area.

A zone of Property Reallotment could be a part (or all) of a U.D.A. in which the exact location and design of streets, open spaces, utility easements and building blocks would be mapped in detail, and within which the property parcels were to be accordingly arranged (diminished, of course, by the percentage of the compulsory land contribution). The owner of such property, which might have to be relocated within the P.R.A., had after that the right to build on it, provided that the construction was to be done in accordance with a preset body of standards and regulations concerning floor-area ratio, bulk, position of building within the lot, etc.

Finally a Zone of Regulatory Terms for Development would be a part (or all) of the U.D.A. in which the only organized intervention aimed at making possible the implementation of the general development plan, would be the imposition of a zoning ordinance (as it is known in the U.S.), indicating street networks, permitted land uses per sector and

terms regulating the height and bulk of the buildings to be constructed.

In a sense Law no. 947/1979 constitutes the first operational (as opposed to wishful) comprehensive planning legislation ever introduced in Greece. With 947/1979 planning was not just a desirable step before construction but an absolute requirement for city expansion, development outside a city or urban revitalization. The law of course did not guarantee that planning would be done in a scientifically sound manner nor that it would really serve the interests of the community. On the other hand, planning remained a centralized state function since any U.D.A. plan, before becoming legally binding, had to obtain the official approval of the Ministry of Public Works. However 947/1979 permitted a variety of procedures of plan preparation some of which could be open to citizens' participation at any stage of the planning process (This could happen, for instance, when the initiative for having an area declared as a U.D.A. was taken by a local government or even by private citizens). Law 947/1979, while far from being a panacea, and far from removing all political, social and financial obstacles out of the way of effective and worthwhile planning has, nevertheless, been a bold step in the right direction, opening a door of hope for the future of planning in Greece.

Law 974/1979 legitimized the right of the public sector to intervene in the domain of private property in a set of novel ways. Although there really is no question about the constitutionality²⁹ of such

29. The Greek Constitution of 1975 positively acknowledges the right of the public to intervene in the domain of private property in order to protect the public interest stating that: "Although private ownership is protected by the state the respective rights cannot be used against the public interest" (Article 17) [63, p. 39].

intervention one could raise an issue concerning the fairness of the concept of compulsory contribution in land and money imposed upon all property owners within a U.D.A., in exchange for the right to develop their estates. Nevertheless many planners would agree that in principle the concept is sound and democratic [28, p. 61]: Since someone has to pay the cost of development, it is only fair that most of the burden fall on the shoulders of the people who will directly reap the benefits from it and not be shared equally among taxpayers. Ultimately however, the fairness of the concept really would depend upon the exact way in which the burden of development would be distributed among the beneficiaries, in other words on whether the ones who benefit the most pay the most and the ones who benefit the least pay the least.

In this respect law 947/1979 has been heavily criticized and justly, in the opinion of this author. By establishing that compulsory contributions in land and money are calculated respectively as a flat percentage of the acreage and the market value of the property, without any discrimination between large rural estate proprietors and small lot owners, Law 947/1979 clearly favors the former against the latter [28, p. 61].

Since the conversion of large estates into urban building blocks would in any case require that a street network and other open space be provided within the property, the imposition of the duty to contribute for public use the 30%,³⁰ or 40% of the total land and the 10%³¹ or

30. 30% for properties within A.U.D. zones and P.R.A. zones; 40% for properties within R.T.D. zones.

31. 10% for properties within A.U.D. or P.R.A. zones; 15% for properties within R.T.D. zones.

15% of the total value of the land, does not constitute an unbearable hardship for the owner.

However, in the case of the small "homesteader" who at one time bought a piece of "urban" land barely large enough to accomodate a home for his family, having to contribute 30% or 40% of it to the public would result in depriving him completely of the right to use his property, if the remaining piece of it happens not to be large enough for authorized development. Of course, Law 947/1979 allowed in such cases the possibility for the small landowners to make instead of the land contribution an additional money contribution, equal to the value of the land that was owed to the public. In practice, however, even this measure was not adequate to insure that most of the small lot owners would be able to hold on to their properties, and not be obliged to ask for their expropriation (a procedure which was also included among the provisions of L. 947/1979).

A system of "bracketing" land size and values and determining the percentages of required land and money contributions accordingly, would be more just and would also indicate social concern on the part of the public sector. However there is a long distance between fighting for the correction of such details and fighting for the total removal of the entire legislation, using this particular detail as a convenient pretext [28, p. 60]. Unfortunately this is exactly what happened in Greece immediately after Law 947/1979 was voted into effect. The maximalistic attitude of a number of planners and politicians of the left led them to actively oppose the implementation of the law, in advocacy of the interests of the numerous small lot owners who would be unfavorably

affected by it.³² At the same time a much more powerful and influential group of people, representing the interests of the medium size and larger property owners and also those of the developers, added their passionate protests without even acknowledging the real reasons for their disapproval of the legislation,³³ so that an alliance of the Left and Right, against 947/1979, became possible [28, p. 62].

This alliance "without principles" was helped along the way by internal contradictions within the governing party, fueled by a fear of heavy electoral losses,³⁴ as well as by a wave of personal antagonism against Stefanos Manos, the man who as Deputy Minister of Public Works had been the architect of Law 947/1979 as well as of most of the down-to-earth planning legislation of that year [28, p. 63]. For a brief period it looked like all this opposition was bound to lose the battle. In March of 1980, Mr. Manos was promoted to head the newly founded Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment (YHOP), to which the General

32. In Greece the phenomenon of the Urban Slum as it is known in the U.S.A., that of a blighted urban area of rental housing for the very poor, is not widespread. Much more prominent is the problem of "unauthorized" urban expansion areas that were generated after the subdivision of rural property into very small plots of land, on which low-income homesteaders erected their substandard but in any case self-owned houses. For this reason radical planners in Greece are not concerned so much with the problem of relocating the displaced Urban Renewal tenants as they are with the protection of the interests of these small property owners.

33. These reasons are of course related to the fact that with any compulsory land and money contributions as a pre-requisite for urban development, the public sector keeps part of the profit generated by it, whereas, if 947/1979 did not exist, this profit would be shared only by the property owner and developer.

34. This fear was justified because both big property owners and construction entrepreneurs have traditionally been among the most powerful supporters of the conservative party in Greece.

Directorate of Housing of the Ministry of Public Works was upgraded. However in May of the same year, Mr. Manos was transferred to another Ministry and the new Minister of YHOP, Mr. G. Plytas, did not take any time before imposing a moratorium over Law 947/1974, "in response to the public opposition" and as an interim measure, "in view of a future amendment" [28, p. 63].

Unfortunately neither that government, nor the one which came to power after the parliamentary election of October 1981 have removed this moratorium or at least presented an amendment to the legislation.. As a matter of fact, in the Summer of 1982 Greece was still expecting a new comprehensive planning law to solve the problems which have accumulated over the years as by-products of unplanned development and which are rapidly reaching dimensions threatening the very basis of this development.

For a summary of the planning legislation in Greece, as described in this chapter the reader can refer to Table IV, on page 80.

TABLE IV

SUMMARY OF THE PLANNING LEGISLATION IN GREECE

A. TRADITIONAL CITY PLAN LEGISLATION

L.D. ¹	of Jul. 17/1923	about.....	City Plans
L.D.	of Oct. 23/1928	about.....	Development outside City Plan areas
Law ²	no. 5269/1931	about.....	Construction on City Plan designated Public Space
-- General Building Regulations Code (G.B.R.C.), of April 3/1929.			
- Amendment of General Building Regulations Code of 1935.			

B. URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING LEGISLATION

L.D.	no. 625/1968	about.....	"Mass Plan"
L.D.	no. 1003/1971	about.....	Active Urban Development
L.D.	no. 1262/1972	about.....	Regulatory Plans
L.D.	no. 8/1973	about.....	Amendment of G.B.R.C. of 1935
Law	no. 360/1976	about.....	Regional Planning and Development
Law	no. 446/1976	about.....	"Public Corporation of Urban Development and Housing" (D.E.P.O.S.)
Law	no. 647/1977	about.....	Rearrangement of Rural Properties.
Law	no. 880/1979	about.....	Maximum Floor/Area Ratios
A.D. ³	of Nov. 6/1979	about.....	General Policy Lines for Decentralization
Law	no. 947/1979	about.....	"Urban Development Areas."
Law	no. 960/1979	about.....	Required Parking by Type of Construction
P.D. ⁴	of Dec. 13/1979	about.....	Protection of the Unbuilt Land of Attica
Law	no. 998/1979	about.....	Protection of Forests
Law	no. 1032/1980	about.....	Creation of the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment

1. Legislative Decree: A piece of legislation passed at a time of suspension of the Parliamentary Democracy and, thus, not voted by the National Assembly.

2. Law: A piece of Legislation voted by the National Assembly.

3. Administrative Decree: A policy decision with legal status, made by a Minister.

4. Presidential Decree: A policy decision made by the government and signed by the President of the Republic, with legal status.

CHAPTER III

THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION FOR PLANNING

Andreas Faludi [10, p. 1] defines planning as "the application of scientific method--however crude--to policy making." This definition implies that planning is an interactive process involving two parts: planners, who as advisers provide the scientific intelligence, and administrators, who make the decisions. This relationship between planners and administrators is not one in which both parties are equal. To the contrary it is clear that the adviser can "come into the game only at the pleasure of the decision maker" [10, p. 2]. Although there is nothing inherently wrong with this, the question for the planner is "whether the process by which he and his decision-making master arrive at decisions is valid, or whether their relationship distorts this process" [10, p. 2].

Before one may attempt to answer this "big" question one must of course understand the "rules of the game" that govern the interaction between these two parts, in other words the exact content of the roles ascribed for each one of them by the particular circumstances within which planning is attempted. Therefore a study of these roles, "decision-maker and "planning adviser," as they have been elaborated over the years by legislation as well as practice, within the context of the power structure of Greece, is essential.

A. STATE PLANNING

In Greece, as it has been already mentioned, the role of the decision-maker in matters concerning urban development and planning is held by

the state. Indeed the central government is responsible: i) for implementing the City Plan legislation; ii) for preparing, adopting and implementing comprehensive urban plans; and iii) for regional planning.

i) Implementing the City Plan legislation: City Plans¹ prepared under the provisions of the L.D. of July 17th, 1923 must be approved by the Ministry of Public Works, and are given legal status by Presidential Decree [62, p. 12]. Local governments may be consulted before City Plans are adopted and private citizens are also given the right to object to certain provisions of a City Plan which is under consideration for approval. However, the Minister of Public Works is the only authority with the power to adopt, amend or reject City Plans, at his absolute discretion [62, p. 12; 70, p. 11].

City Plans were meant to be implemented through the respective local authorities [70, p. 11]. Nevertheless, since very few municipal authorities can really afford to employ the necessary technical staff, City Plan implementation is typically taken over by the Technical Service of the respective Prefecture² [70, p. 11]. This service is staffed by employees of the Ministry of Public works and belongs to the Prefecture which, in its turn, is a regional administrative subdivision of the Ministry of Interior. In other words implementation of City Plans is supervised through the respective Prefectures jointly by these two Ministries [70, p. 11].

1. For an extensive discussion of the City Plan legislation, see Chapter II, pp. 37-42.

2. An alternative term for Prefecture is Department (NOMOS, in Greek). See Chapter I; pages 28-29.

The Technical Service of the Prefecture, which is usually staffed by Engineers and not by planners, manages City Plan implementation by undertaking construction and maintenance of public facilities (streets, squares, etc.) for the localities within the jurisdiction of the Prefecture, and by controlling building activity in and out of City Plan limits [70, p. 11]. Building permits certifying that construction plans submitted to the Technical Service of the Prefecture have been reviewed and found to conform with building regulations and other provisions of the City Plan, are necessary before any authorized construction activity can take place. Inspection during construction is also a responsibility of the Technical Service of the Prefecture [70, p. 11].

After the creation of the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment, on March 14th, 1980 (by Law 1032 of 1980), the Technical Services of the Prefectures came under the jurisdiction of this newly founded Ministry [48, p. 718].

ii) Urban planning: As it has already been mentioned several times in this report, urban planning in Greece is a responsibility of the central government which is the only authority with the formal power to adopt and implement urban plans and programs of any scale, and also the only unit capable of financial planning.

Since 1963 and before 1972 several urban and regional development plans and special studies were prepared in Greece, commissioned to private planning consultants by various central government agencies, or local authorities [62, p. 9; 25, p. 9; 57, p. 28]. However, for several reasons--not the least important among which has been the lack, at the time, of the institutional framework, within which plans could become legally binding--none of these studies were ever implemented. It is

true that some may have influenced, in an inconsistent and "selective" way, the annual allocation of public investment within urban areas. Nevertheless it remains an undisputable fact that their overall impact on the development of the cities and regions for which they were prepared, has been really negligible [62, p. 9].

One, of course, would be justified to wonder why these plans and studies were prepared at all, when it was obvious, a priori, that no chance for their implementation really existed. Other legitimate questions that could also be asked would concern the criteria according to which the cities and regions in need of development plans were selected, or even the reasons for commissioning these studies from the particular planning consulting firms and not from others.

Certainly all these are "big" questions and attempting to answer them in a satisfactory way would be really beside the point here. Suffice to say that according to some Greek planning scholars, all this plan production of the sixties and early seventies was meant not as an expression of a genuine interest for planning on the part of the government, but as a response to a few "powerful" planning firms, pressing for public contracts, as a concession to lobbying efforts in favor of planning by the technical staff of government agencies, sometimes even as a means to refuel economic activity--at least on the limited scale of the planning firms--and almost always as a "show" of modernization [57, pp. 130, 138, 140, 149].

However the situation appeared to drastically change in 1972 when, by L.D. 1262 of that year, "the concept of comprehensive urban development control, including the regulation of land uses, through legally binding

Master Plans" [62, p. 10], was introduced for the first time in Greece. As discussed earlier the L.D. 1262/1972 did establish a formal procedure for plan preparation and implementation. According to this, the central responsibility for urban planning in Greece went to the Ministry of Public Works, which through its General Directorate of Housing was solely responsible for supervising plan preparation and implementation [70, p. 10]. The Ministry of Coordination and Planning entered the planning process by working out an annual priority list according to which master plans had to be prepared, and also later when the planning product had to be approved for adoption [62, p. 10]. At that step, in addition to this Ministry and to the Ministry of Public Works, the Ministry of Interior was also involved.³

After L.D. 1262/1972, the lack of the institutional framework within which planning could--at least in theory--proceed beyond the point of plan preparation, could no longer be blamed as the only factor responsible for the failure of implementation. Nevertheless, although a priority list indicating the order in which plans were to be prepared for the respective cities was maintained by the Ministry of Coordination and Planning, although a number of them were even formally adopted, the fact remains that no measures for the systematic implementation of these plans were ever taken, up to date.

iii) Regional planning: One can say that, for all practical purposes, regional planning in Greece is even further behind than city

3. Since the National Council for Regional Planning and the Environment has been established, by Law 360/1976, Master Plans must be also approved by it before acquiring legal status (see Chapter II, pp. 63-64).

planning. Although between 1963 and 1972 a number of plans for the development of various regions of Greece (and even one for the entire country, the "National Development Plan for Greece" ordered in 1972 from the Doxiadis planning firm) were commissioned by the Ministers of Coordination, Interior and Public Works, none of them has ever had significant impact on the respective regions [78, pp. 5-8]. In 1976, by Law 360 of that year, the need for regional planning was officially acknowledged but this did not really change the situation as far as implementation was concerned, up to date [28, p. 61].

This persistent failure of any attempt to have planning (urban or regional) implemented in Greece indicates that there are obstacles between plan preparation and implementation which simply cannot be removed "technically," either by legislative or organizational reforms. Indeed, the disappointing results of pieces of legislation like L.D. 1262/1972 and Law 360/1976 cannot be explained satisfactorily if one does not realize that the ineffectiveness of planning in Greece, its inability to progress beyond plan preparation, has been really a direct result of the unwillingness of the decision-makers in the government to accept it wholeheartedly [57, p. 130].

This unwillingness can be easily understood. After all most of the conservative politicians who had administered the Greek government for the best part of fifty years, have always been strong believers in the free economy system and, consequently, set against any serious attempt on the part of the state to introduce regulations, restrictions or to otherwise intervene in the market. On the other hand these politicians have also actively opposed planning simply for fear of electoral losses.

Imposing any planning implementation measures could have a sizeable political cost, especially in those cases when the people who would be most upset by such state intervention are the primary supporters of the politicians taking action.

However, among the decision-makers there have also been the "enlightened" few, who professed that a degree of government intervention in the market was necessary if the conflicts which are always bound to arise within it were to be resolved in a non-destructive way. This second group of administrators has obviously been much weaker than the first but, nevertheless, has managed to exercise a considerable pressure in favor of planning, within the government [28, p. 62].

These "enlightened" administrators have been assisted in their pro-planning lobbying by the professional staff employed in the Ministries or in the National Research Centers. These planning administrators believed in the necessity of planning, not only as a means for smoothing out the differences within the market but also as the only way to ensure that the overall (not only economic but social, cultural and physical too) development of Greece will be "orderly and balanced".⁴ Indeed, these professional civil servants have shown that they could, up to a certain degree, influence administrative decision-making and their efforts are credited for most of the progress in the domain of legislative and organizational

4. Of course this view of conventional planning as a panacea for all the very complex problems in a society does not take into account the real chances that such planning has to be implemented, in a given political and socio-economic reality. Such a technocratic view of planning, however, is prominent among senior planners employed in the public sector in Greece [57, p. 139].

reforms for planning, made through the most enlightened among the elected government officials [57, p. 146].

The number of planners employed by the government, either in the Ministries or in the National Research Centers, especially in senior positions, is very small [29, p. 10]. Most are concentrated in the General Directorate of Housing, formerly belonging to the Ministry of Public Works and upgraded, in March 1980, to form the core of the then created Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment (YHOP).

Planning personnel are also employed by the Ministry of Coordination and Planning, in its Directorate of Regional Planning and Environment [38, p. 10], and by the semi-independent National Research Centers, the Center of Planning and Economic Research (KEPE)⁵ and the Greek Center of Social Research (EKKE),⁶ which are affiliated with the Ministry of Coordination and Planning. However, while the planners employed by the Ministry of Coordination (and by KEPE and EKKE) are mostly concerned with economic and social, large-scale regional planning, the planning personnel of YHOP are oriented towards physical planning and urban development.

Nevertheless in all cases planners are a minority among the professional and scientific staff of central government Agencies. Even in the Ministry of Regional and Urban Planning, where planners are employed in relative large numbers, they are still outnumbered by architects and engineers who are the ones who impress their own professional style on the work done there [70, p. 10].

5. KEPE prepares the Five Year National Development Plans and other studies of socio-economic character for the Ministry of Coordination and Planning.

6. EKKE prepares social studies.

Certainly the number of planners employed by YHOP is not adequate for staffing plan preparation agencies. This is one reason why comprehensive plans are usually commissioned from private consultants whose work is supervised by the Ministry [70, p. 14]. Of course the fact that most senior positions in the Ministry are held by non-planners does not facilitate the cooperation between consultants and supervisors.

Nevertheless as more and more younger planners are being hired by the Ministry and as older ones are being promoted to higher, more responsible positions, there is hope that the situation will somehow improve in the next few years. In this respect it is certainly a good sign that following the latest election which in October 18, 1981 brought to power a socialistic party (PASOK), a professional planner, Dr. A. Tritsis, was appointed as the Minister of Physical Planning and Environment.

The existing interrelations among principal planning agencies in Greece are illustrated on figure 1, page 90.

B. OTHER ACTORS IN THE PLANNING PROCESS

Although the institutional framework, in both its legislative and administrative dimensions, certainly reflects the cumulative disposition of society--as a dynamic, therefore changing organism--towards planning, it is nevertheless not the only factor that shapes the actuality of whether how and why planning is done [28, p. 62].

A series of other "actors" also participate, in the planning process, directly or indirectly, and hold the power--at least potentially--to influence its outcome. A "starring" role is of course played by




Figure 1: Administrative organization for planning.

the planners who most usually take over in Greece, as professional consultants, the process of plan preparation, while the more indirect involvement of professional associations and the interested local governments has a modifying effect on both the process and the product of planning. Finally the citizens, the people of the cities and regions of Greece certainly form a very alert audience, whose reactions to the planning process must be taken into account. One should also not overlook a political dimension in all this (with the very narrow meaning of the word "political"). In a society as deeply involved in politics as the Greek one, ideology and even party affiliation has a tremendous impact in influencing all the actors, not only the direct participants but also those who are indirectly involved in the process of planning.

i) Planning Firms: Planning firms can enter the planning process only after being invited by the government. The exact procedure according to which the government agencies select the firm from whom a planning study will be commissioned is directed by the "Regulations for Commissioning Studies for Programs (involving) Public Investment", which have the status of a law⁷ [36, p. 38]. (The Greek acronym by which the body of these regulations is known is KAMPDE). One important provision of the KAMPDE procedure is that all planning and other related firms are assigned a number of quality points, calculated according to how many professionals each of them employs, what degrees these professionals hold, how many years of experience they have etc. Following this, a roster is prepared by the "Advisory Committee of the Directory of Planning Firms"

7. This is law 716/1977.

(YEMMKA is this committee's Greek acronym), in which planning firms are ordered according to their accumulated total quality points [36, p. 38]. When a planning study is to be commissioned by the government from a private agency all firms which have a minimum of quality points (set by the government for each particular case) are eligible to apply to be granted a public contract. Of course the more complex (and expensive) the study, the more "quality points" are needed before a firm can be eligible, with the result that only very few larger private planning agencies can be awarded "big" comprehensive plans.⁸

The oldest and by all accounts largest Greek private planning agency is the one founded by Konstantinos Doxiadis, in Athens. Since 1949 this firm has had a record of contracts with the Greek government for preparing urban studies, master plans and regional plans (including a "National Development Plan and Program for Greece" [36, pp. 4-72] and a "Comprehensive Development Plan for Athens" [78, pp. 58-105], both commissioned in 1972) as well as numerous architectural studies.

"Doxiadis and Associates" employs a large group of planners, architects, economists and several related professionals and scientists, along with an army of technical and auxiliary staff. The death of K. Doxiadis in 1975 did not disturb the normal function of the firm whose planning philosophy still represents the mainstream "orthodoxy", and has greatly influenced the way in which comprehensive planning is understood

8. The procedure regulated by KAMPDE is, nevertheless, not followed in every case by the government, although it is, in theory, statutory, with the result that sometimes studies are commissioned directly from pre-selected firms [36, p. 39].

in Greece. On the other hand Doxiadis' agency is the only Greek planning firm with an international reputation.⁹

In addition to "Doxiadis and Associates" there are in Athens¹⁰ about thirty other smaller firms which, although primarily concerned with architecture and construction, can also double as planning agencies. These businesses, usually owned and operated by one senior architect-planner, employ also a number of younger architects who may or may not hold graduate degrees in planning. Most of these firms, although concentrating primarily in architecture and, consequently, having a limited planning experience, are generally adequate in preparing planning studies.

Of course the absence of a strong planning tradition and, even worse, the absence of an indigeneous planning education, does create some problems. Indeed in some cases there have been attempts made hastily by planners to have radical innovations imported from abroad applied to Greek situations basically dissimilar to the ones that these innovations were originally aimed at resolving. In any case there is certainly a need today in Greece for the development of an indigenous theory in and of planning¹¹ and, even more urgently, of a planning education based on the

9. During the recent years several large technical corporations have been founded in Greece that prepare construction plans and even development plans for foreign countries (mostly in the Middle East). These corporations employ a large number of Greek architects, technicians and some planners also but, since they have their business outside Greece, are not directly involved with planning for the cities and regions of the country.

10. To the best of the author's knowledge, there are not any planning firms in Greece with their offices outside Athens.

11. Andreas Faludi defines theory in planning as the scientific background that assists a planner in preparing a study while theory of planning is defined as a systematic study of the complex and subtle in-teraction between planners as advisers and administrators as decision-makers which can lead to planning implementation [10, pp. 1-4].

Greek experience and independent from other disciplines (i.e. architecture) [35, p. 38]. This is really a must if the Greek planning firm (and even Greek planning, in general) is to get rid of a certain amateurish attitude and if it is to firmly establish a professional credibility, essential if planning implementation is to be honestly contemplated.¹²

ii) Professional associations: The total number of planners working in Greece is relatively small. An overwhelming majority among them are educated primarily in architecture which they continue to practice in parallel with any planning project they may be working on. Few are the planners who do not have an undergraduate background in architecture or do not consider themselves to be architects at least as much as they are planners. On the contrary there is a large number of architects who, although lacking any formal planning education, are deeply involved with planning and practice it, after having accumulated a considerable amount of experience while working with planners on planning projects commissioned to the firms where they have been employed.

All these architect-planners (with or without planning degrees) belong to the "Association of Architects" (SADAS is the Greek acronym) a politically influential association of professionals, within which they form a large, well organized, active and articulate group. SADAS belongs to the Technical Chamber of Greece, an organization that officially represents the interests of the Greek engineering professionals and the

12. In fact, it has been suggested by administrative officials interviewed for this report, that one basic reason behind the fact that plans are not being implemented in Greece, is that planners have seldom been able to persuade the decision-makers about the scientific validity of their studies and the soundness of their proposals.

official mission of which is to serve as an advisory body to the government in matters regarding the development of the man-made environment and the protection of the natural resources of Greece. A purely "Planning Association" does not exist in Greece although Greeks holding planning degrees may participate in the Greek chapter of the International Association of City and Regional Planners [38, p. 99]. However this professional association is not as vocal, active or influential as the two mentioned earlier.

The majority of architect-planners belonging to SADAS--that is the majority of all Greek planners--are politically radical or, at any rate, not conservative.¹³ Although there are certainly philosophical disparities among them, reflecting differences in their planning education and also particular political party affiliations, the fact is that the leadership of SADAS after 1974 has consistently questioned the basic willingness as well as the ability of the conservative governments of Greece in the period 1974-1981 to promote effective and worthwhile planning. On the other hand, the Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE), dominated by the engineering establishment [28, p. 62] and having, in the same period, a leadership affiliated with political parties of the parliamentary opposition, has lobbied against programs and reforms introduced by the government without, however, challenging their effectiveness from a radical point of view.

In any case, both SADAS, representing the Greek planners and TEE,

13. As a rule (with numerous exceptions, of course) Greek planners educated in Continental Europe, and France in particular, are more radical in their philosophies while planners educated in Britain or the U.S. are considered more "mainstream" and technocratic.

representing all specialties of engineers as well, have been very influential in affecting decision-making by the government as well as by the opposition. This is undoubtedly reflected in the fact that when the socialist government came to power after the elections of October 1981 both the chairman of TEE, Mr. E. Koulouris and a prominent member of SADAS, Dr. A. Tritsis, were given Ministerial posts.

iii) Local governments: As it has been discussed earlier, the form of government in Greece is an extremely centralized one and, as a result, local governments do not have the legal authority nor the financial and technical capability to effectively participate in planning for their communities or to otherwise actively promote the special interests of their citizenry [38, p. 3]. This fact deprives Greeks of an accessible channel of communication with and participation in their government, which becomes in this way a distant, totally depersonalized entity, appearing almost impossible to be successfully confronted and changed by the ordinary citizens. The vast majority of local elected officials do not differ substantially from the average Greek in perceiving the role of local governments as limited to insuring city cleanliness or, at most, sponsoring cultural and recreational events. It is noteworthy that this does not change even in cases when these officials are affiliated with political parties which actually support governmental decentralization at the local level.

Nevertheless, during the last years a movement aiming at restoring the powers of the local government, especially in the domain of city planning, is rapidly gaining momentum [62, p. 16]. In contrast to many countries where fragmentation of authority for urban planning has

created coordination problems leading to proposals for the centralization of the required urban management functions, in Greece there is a disposition by the electorate towards greater local autonomy [62, p. 16].

An active group operating within SADAS and TEE fiercely advocates that local authorities gradually acquire a much larger role in supervising the preparation of development plans for their communities, in having the power to decide whether to have these plans adopted or not, and in programming and enforcing plan implementation. This group of planners argues that strengthening the role of the local government (TOPIKI AFTODIOIKISI) would help to "reduce the distance between citizens and the decisions made by government, which directly affect them" [62, p. 16].

This way planning could be done with more attention to the real needs and desires of the citizens and also have a better chance of implementation because of the cooperation of the people in the community [30, p. 484]. In fact the issue of restoring the powers of local government in Greece is closely related to that of bringing the people closer to the decision-making process, and to the issue of citizens' participation in government and, of course, in planning as well.

The planners who form the "Group for Promoting Local Self-Government in Greece" believe, of course, that the primary responsibility for the present inability of localities to participate in the planning process lies with the central government which has gradually stripped municipalities of most of their decision-making powers as well as from financial means. However the group also recognizes that in the present situation, before the local authorities can take over the process of planning, they need not only to be given back these powers but, even more

important, to have their priorities and resources reorganized, to get educated in how to promote the planned development of their towns and also to restore communication with their citizenry, getting it actively involved in municipal activities.

Between 1974 and 1981 most political parties of the Opposition (including of course the Panhellenic Socialist Movement which came into power after the last general elections, in October 1981) have added to their programs reforms aimed at strengthening the role of local authorities. Even the conservative party of "New Democracy" (that governed before 1981) has felt at times compelled to seek the active cooperation of local governments in implementing its policies. It is in this way that an old and forgotten piece of legislation (L.D. 183/1952) concerning secondary and tertiary levels of local government was reactivated by the Presidential Decree no. 197 of 1978 [55, pp. 345-350]. According to this legislation all local governments within an administrative Department (Prefecture) of Greece might form a "Regional Association of Municipalities and Communities" which would have as its scope the study of local matters and the coordination of local activities. The P.D. 197/1978 also provided for the formation of a tertiary unit, the "Association of Municipalities and Communities of Greece," which would represent all the Regional Associations and also have a coordinating function.

During the process of preparation of the plan Athens 2000 the then Ministry of Public Works, realizing that some form of cooperation with all the 118 separate localities¹⁴ within the metropolitan area of the

14. The municipality of Athens covers only a part of the Athens metropolitan area. The rest is under the jurisdiction of 118 separate municipalities and communities varying greatly in size.

Greek Capital was essential, offered technical and financial assistance to the Regional Association of Municipalities and Communities of the Department of Attica (TEDKNA is the Greek acronym) so that the local governments become able to participate, through TEDKNA, in the process of planning. More details will be given in Chapter VI of this thesis.

After the Socialistic party of PASOK came into power in October 1981, it announced its plans to gradually delegate most of the responsibilities for urban planning and development control directly to the local governments which would be assisted by planning offices, transferred from the respective prefectures to the direct supervision of the municipalities.

iv) The citizens: In theory Greek citizens, as voters, can exercise their influence concerning urban development decisions through their elected representatives. However since these decisions are made on a day to day basis and elections, both national and local, take place only once every four years, in practice this influence is not significant [62, p. 6]. The Greek Constitution, on the other hand gives to the citizens the right to object, in writing, to decisions made by the government--provided of course that these decisions are known--requiring also that the authorities respond to these objections as quickly as possible [62, p. 7]. In case that citizens have more severe grievances against governmental decisions they may also contest them in the High Court (AREIOS PAGOS) or the Constitutional Court (SYMVOULION EPIKPATEIAS) [62, p. 7]. Of course it is easy to see that such "citizen participation", permitted only after decisions are already made, cannot be terribly effective.

The situation becomes a little better for the citizens in the case of municipal affairs. Indeed, "opportunities for public participation in local government activities are provided in the meetings of the communal

and municipal councils, which are open to the public" [62, p. 7]. Citizens may even "draw up petitions calling for the communal and municipal councils to meet in order to consider any particular local issue" [62, p. 7]. In practice, however, this possibility for citizen participation is not worth much because the municipal government can only make decisions over a very small number of issues of limited importance, and in this way involvement on the part of the citizens in what is considered to be "local matters" cannot bring about any significant change in their lives. This explains, up to a certain point, why citizens actually get so seldom involved in the municipal decision-making process and why a population so vocal and highly political as that of Greece displays such a marked apathy regarding the issues that affect the quality of everyday life, planning included [38, p. 9]. These issues, in the present situation, cannot possibly be confronted by local action while anything that local decision-making can accomplish is too little to motivate the citizens to contribute time and effort.

The fact that decisions on all really important issues are made centrally, in an administrative vacuum where citizens do not have access, is very frustrating to the Greeks. Their spontaneous response is to ignore, when at all possible, such decisions, made without them and in spite of them. In fact Greeks feel so alienated from the government decision-making process that disrespect for the law is rarely considered morally wrong. The motto: "rules are made to be broken" is a *modus vivendi* in Greece with the result that it is not infrequent at all to see legislation ended up being an empty formality, massively overruled in real life. In the domain of planning and development control there are numerous

examples of such action, undertaken by unorganized people but having a damaging cumulative impact [62, p. 13]. It has already been discussed how, despite the City Plan legislation cities have expanded through unauthorized development which had to be eventually legalized [62, p. 13]. It is also a widespread practice to have buildings erected in gross disregard of the building regulations, which are tolerated, because it would simply be too expensive for the public sector to take action against the developers of every one of them.

Organized citizen pressure intended to influence a government decision related with planning and affecting an entire community or neighborhood is much less frequent. However, in the last twenty years there have been instances when citizens' mobilizations have succeeded in overturning government decisions. The effectiveness of such mobilization was usually enhanced in cases when they had the active support of public interest organizations, political parties and the mass media (newspapers) [62, p. 14].

Certainly both these types of citizen participation, the "passive", though bypassing the law, and the "active", through raising organized opposition to already made decisions, are neither terribly effective in insuring the people's participation in the decision-making process nor, in any sense, conducive to a planned development.

Most planners would agree that participation of citizens in the planning process is desirable and also most effective and productive when invited from the earliest steps of goals setting. In Greece, with the specific institutional context prevailing, such citizen participation could happen most easily if planning were done by local governments.

Local governments are less distant and impersonal than central government agencies and, furthermore, the process by which they make their decisions is, even now, open to the public. In fact citizen participation in planning can be expected to be greatly enhanced, as more planning responsibilities are being transferred to municipalities and as the latter take a more active role in the system of government of Greece.

PART II

THE "ATHENS 2000" PLAN

CHAPTER IV

HISTORY OF PLANNING FOR ATHENS

A. A PROFILE OF THE CITY

A. General Description

Athens is the Capital and by far the largest city of Greece. Lying on the peninsula of Attica, with its center five miles to the north of Phaleron Bay (an inlet of the Aegean Sea) it covers an urbanized area of one hundred and twenty square miles, spreading over four administrative Provinces¹ of the Department (Prefecture) of Attica [68, p. 10; 2, p. 262]. Its location within Attica and Greece can be seen in figure 2, page 105.

The metropolitan area of Athens consists of 57 municipalities and 61 communities. In other words it comprises 118 separate local administrative units which vary greatly in size.² The largest municipality is that of the city of Athens, which in 1971 had a population of 867,023 people, while the smallest community, Oinoi, had in the same year barely 188 inhabitants. [50, pp. 10-11].

1. A Province is a geographical subdivision of a Department, roughly the size of a county in the U.S.A.

2. There is no official consensus as to what are the exact boundaries of Metropolitan Athens. This is the reason why in different sources, one can find discrepancies in reports concerning the total area and population of the city, at a given time. In this study, the term Metropolitan Athens describes a geographical area covering in their entirety the administrative Provinces of Aigina, Attica, Megaris, and Piraeus with the exception of the island of Spetses. This area exactly coincides with the Metropolitan Athens dealt with in plan Athens 2000.



Figure 2: Athens: Geographic location within Greece and Attica.

The population of Metropolitan Athens was estimated in 1979 to be 3,680,000 people [36, p. 10]. This means that its annual increase since the 1971 national census³ has been as high as 4%, while, in the same period, the yearly natural increase of the total Greek population was less than 0.8% [3, p. 706].

The average density of Metro Athens is 119 people per hectare, or 49 per acre. This is not considered to be excessively high; however, the situation is worse than it may look at first glance because densities in Athens are very unequally distributed. For instance, in the Municipality of Zographou the average density is 182 persons per acre --and in some neighborhoods of Athens much higher still-- while in the community of Stamata the average density is less than a person per acre. As it is shown on Figure 3, p. 107, most of the city's population is located inside the arid basin of Athens, which, surrounded by mountains on the East, North, and West, is open to the sea at its South end. The basin of Athens is roughly bisected by a north to south hilly formation, Tourkovounia, which along with the city's center and Leophoros Sygrou, a major arterial that connects the center with the Phaleron coast, forms a spinal cord which separates two city-sectors of distinct character, the Western and the Eastern [2, p. 262].

The city center forms a triangle bounded by the streets: Metro-poleos-Athenas, Vassilissis Sophias and Alexandras. Inside or in the immediate periphery of this triangle are concentrated most buildings housing central government functions (the House of Parliament, the

3. The population of Metropolitan Athens in 1971 was 2,778,911 persons (118 localities).




Figure 3: Athens population: Gross density distribution (1978).

Source: Athens 2000: For better living conditions. Ministry of Public Works.

Presidential Palace, most Ministries, etc.), the Higher Courts, most foreign embassies, the Athens City Hall and the Municipal Cultural Center, the Greek-Orthodox Metropolis, the Catholic Cathedral and the chairs of other major churches, the headquarters of most banks, the central Post Office, a business district of regional and national magnitude, three major public parks, two large stadiums, the most important museums, three Universities and numerous private evening schools, many sites and monuments of archeological interest, including the Acropolis and the Greek and Roman Agoras, numerous squares with open-air cafes and taverns, theaters, concert halls, etc., the largest hotels in the country, several big hospitals and many private medical clinics and also a few high density residential middle and upper-middle class districts, also accomodating professional offices [75, p. 3].

To this city center, which barely has a diameter of two miles, converge the few major arterials which connect the residential districts of Metropolitan Athens through the city's center, and which also carry most public transit routes.⁴ Among these arterials Leophoros Kifissias leads to the north-eastern affluent suburbs, Odos Patission and Odos Acharnon lead to the north-western residential districts and the Athens-Solonica highway, Leophoros Kavallas connects the center to the western industrial zones and worker's residential subdivisions, Odos Pireos leads to the Phaleron Bay and Leophoros Vouliagmenis gives access to the southeastern residential subdivisions

4. Most of the public transit needs of Metropolitan Athens are carried out by busses and trolley-busses. One subway line, connecting the northern suburb of Kiffissia to Pireus, also goes through the center.

of the Athenian basin, serving also as the main route to the south-eastern beaches of Attica [75, p. 3].

Through these and other less important arterials, millions of people, Athenians as well as visitors (Greeks or foreigners) enter everyday the center "triangle", in order to work, go to school, shop, take care of business, get entertained, visit Museums and archeological sites, etc. Traffic jams occuring day and night, scarce parking space, delayed public transportation, conjested sidewalks, dirty streets, and alarmingly high levels of air and noise pollution are today characteristics of the urban landscape of downtown Athens [79, p. 53]. Yet it still keeps some of the charms of a very lively, very colorful center of a historic city. (See figure 4, p. 110).

The eastern sector of the city, separated from the western by the hilly formation of Tourkovounia, contains most middle and upper-middle class residential subdivisions and the few affluent suburbs of Athens, most prestigious private schools, the new campuses of two major national universities, some public agencies' headquarters, quality retail commercial centers, the major private hospitals, the headquarters of international corporations, etc. The residential districts in this area are equipped with more green and open space than the average neighborhood in Athens, streets and sidewalks are generally well kept and densities are not extremely high. A few older working-class neighborhoods, dating since the 1920's when they were created as refugee settlements, tend to "modernize" and assimilate to the predominant character of the eastern sector [75, p. 4].

To the west of the central axis of the Athenian basin there are




Figure 4: The center of Athens.

Source: The background map is taken from La Grande Encyclopedie, Librairie Larousse. Vol. 2 .

located some older middle and lower middle-class neighborhoods, the basic transportation corridors connecting Athens with Northern Greece and Peloponese, the wholesale market, industrial zones and large working class residential districts, the newest among which have emerged after the World War II as unauthorized settlements. The residential districts in the western sector, especially of course the unauthorized ones, are characterized by very high densities, scarcity of open space and parks and by the lack of adequate urban infrastructure and amenities. However, it is exactly these districts and especially the poorer and most blighted among them, which receive most of the immigrating working population, and which tend to expand and further deteriorate [75, p. 5].

It is important to note here that the Eastern and Western sectors of the Athenian basin are basically connected only through the city center. According to a study made by the Technical Chamber of Greece (T.E.E.) in 1979 [75, p. 5], the fact that direct access from one sector to the other is generally lacking is not as much a result of the adverse topography (as mentioned before, the two sectors are separated by the steep hills of Tourkovounia) as it is related to the fact that the two sectors have historically developed such distinct socioeconomic characters that there was seldom need for direct communications between them [75, p. 5].

Today, as the steep and rocky slopes of Tourkovounia are being urbanized, from both the eastern and the western side, and also as the traffic through the city center becomes ever more frustrating, the need for direct access between the two sectors is urgent. During the

last few years, two Peripheral Ways, crossing Tourkovounia at the north of the center, have been built and although they are too steep and curvy to be considered highspeed arterials, they are already carrying a good amount of traffic. However, since all routes of the heavily used urban public transit system go through the center and since most movements in the Athenian basin start or end there, most traffic in both the Eastern and the Western sectors, still converges to the center "triangle", which by all means remains the heart of the Metropolis [75, p. 52]. The topography and urban structure of the Athenian Basin is shown on figure 5, page 113.

The Metropolitan area of Athens has expanded outside the boundaries of the Athenian basin during the last twenty years. On the western coast of the Saronikos Gulf, past the Aigaleo mountain, a large industrial park extends between the coast line and the Athens-Peloponessus highway, including steel manufactures, oil refineries, ship yards, and related highly pollutant industries. In the vicinity of this strip, new low-income residential subdivisions have emerged during the post World War II years, while the formerly rural towns of Elefsis and Megara have grown in the same period dramatically, evolving into predominantly working class residential districts.

The coast of Saronikos Gulf on the east of the large port of Piraeus, has, on the other hand, remained generally free from industrial installations. Most of it has in fact developed into a tourist and recreation attraction. Hotels, restaurants, taverns, commercial beaches, and second home subdivisions cover most of the coast line lowland strip, up to the Sounion Cape. Second home areas have also emerged, during the last few years, along the east Attica coast of




Figure 5: Topography and basic urban structure of the Athenian Basin.

Source: Encyclopedia Universalis, Vol. 2.

Evoikos Gulf.

Finally, as a result of the urban expansion outside the Athenian basin, the villages and rural areas in the hinterland of Attica are gradually losing their rural character transforming into marginal urban satellites, which provide labor to the industrial zones developed along the Athens-Salonica highway, and in various other locations within Attica (Lavriion, Mesoghia, Oinofyta, etc.) [75, p. 6]. The last census of 1981 showed in fact a movement of the Athenian population away from the city center (the old municipality) and even the Athenian basin, towards the rest of the Metropolitan area. This way, while the population of Greater Athens in April 1981 was 3,027,331, having increased only by 19.2% since 1971, the population of the rest of the department of Attica had grown by 32.8% being measured in 1981 to be 342,093 persons. [43, p. 3171-3176]. This population increase is by far the highest observed in any area in Greece, since 1971. The basic land uses in the Metropolitan area of Athens are shown in figure 6, page 115.

A2. Historical Evolution

One rocky peak of the North-to-South hill formation which serves as the central axis of Athens, is Acropolis, the citadel around which the city was born in the prehistoric times. Athens has had an uninterrupted historic life of more than three millenia, while archeological evidence suggests that it has been inhabited since the Neolithic period (before 3000 B.C.) with the earliest discovered buildings dating from the late Bronze Age (1200 B.C.) [2, p. 265].

Ancient Athens reached its zenith during the fifth and fourth




Figure 6: Basic land uses in the metropolitan area of Athens (Adapted from: Planning in Greece. University of Strathclyde).

centuries B.C., when it came to dominate, politically, financially, and culturally over most of the coastal lands surrounding the Mediterranean Sea. Classic Athens is considered, in fact, to be the nursery of the Western civilization and it certainly is the birthplace of democracy as a form of government [2, p. 262, 266].

In the Hellenistic times (third and second centuries, B.C.), the city continued to be prosperous and a cultural center with a relative political independence. Athens was invaded by the Romans in 86 B.C. but still managed to survive as an important city, enjoying special imperial favor [2, p. 267].

Christianity was introduced early in Athens, with the visit of the Apostle Paul in 51 A.D., but the city remained a stronghold of the "older ways" until the fifth century A.D. when pagan worship was officially abolished in the Byzantine Empire. Athens fell to the crusaders in 1204 and remained under Latin occupation until it was captured by the Turks in 1456, at the fall of Byzantium [2, p. 268].

In 1833, the year in which Athens was made the Capital of the newly liberated modern Greece, its past glory was only vaguely suggested by the remnants of the grandiose architectural monuments of the antiquity. Indeed, Athens at the time was no more than a little town, with an estimated population of 4000 people, living in modest houses congested on the northern slope below Acropolis [2, p. 268]. The newly imported king of the Hellenes, Otto, son of Ludwig I of Bavaria, ordered that same year a plan for his palace and "a new Athens far out in the fields" [2, p. 268]. This first plan, made by the Greek architect Kleanthis (see figure 7, page 117) was however, considered to be too "big" and ambitious, with the result that the development of the




Figure 7: The Kleanthis' plan for Athens (1833)

Source: Athens 2000: For better living conditions. Ministry of Public Works.

modern city was based, instead, on a modified, smaller version worked out by the king's German architects.

Once the new capital was established, it started growing at a fairly fast rate reaching, in 1860, 50,000 inhabitants, "a figure not much exceeded in the day of Athens' greatest power and glory" [2, p. 268]. Since then the city has grown seventy times in population while in the same period, the total Greek population has increased only eight times its original size. On Figure 8, page 119 shows the growth of the Athens Urbanized area, between years 1833 and 1976.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the population of the city grew at a steady rate of 7% per annum, growth that it could comfortably accommodate orderly expanding according to its original plan. In the first century of its modern life, Athens was a calm, easy-going small city with a distinctive Greek-Neoclassical architectural character. By 1907, the municipality had a population of 167,479 [2, p. 268].

However, this orderly growth process was interrupted in 1922 when, as it has already been discussed, large masses of Greek refugees came from Asia Minor, after an exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, following the "Asia Minor disaster" [2, p. 268]. "Despite government efforts to resettle them elsewhere, many swarmed into shanty towns around the fringes of Athens and Piraeus, and the area's population soared from 473,000 to 718,000" [2, p. 269]. By 1940, the basin of Athens had a population of 1,224,000 persons. During the German occupation (1941-1944) the population of Athens was decimated because of famine and outmigration of many families who sought refuge




Figure 8: Athens urban area growth (1833-1976)

Source: Planning for Greece. University of Strathclyde.

from starvation in the rural hinterland [2, p. 269]. This trend was reversed after the liberation since the terrors of a lengthy civil war drove much of the rural population to the relative safety of the larger urban centers.

After the end of World War II and the Greek Civil War, the emphasis of the Greek economy moved, as observed in Chapter II, from the agricultural sector to the sectors of light industry and services. Government policies have been indeed, oriented "towards creating industries which would provide goods for public consumption in order to substitute the imported ones" [63, p. 8]. As a result most newly formed factories were established near the bigger consumer centers and of course near the biggest, Athens. The decline of the rural areas in this period, brought large numbers of rural immigrants to Athens, and to a lesser degree, to other major cities too, in search of employment in the newly founded factories. Later the importance of Athens as the major metropolitan area of the country became paramount and "the population shifts during the last fifteen years can be described with two movements: one from the countryside towards the cities (and Athens, among them) and another from all geographical areas (rural as well as urban) towards Athens" [63, p. 15].

This uncontrolled population influx and the resulting congestion of all aspects of social and economic life in a city that was ill prepared to absorb it is considered to be the primary cause of the problems that today threaten Athens. In table V one can see the rate of growth of the Greek capital during the post War years.

TABLE V
POPULATION INCREASE OF GREATER ATHENS¹

Year				
Number of Inhabitants	1,279,000	1,775,815	2,424,600	3,027,331
Percent Increase from 1951	100%	138,8%	189.6%	236.6%

1. It must be brought to the reader's attention that Greater Athens does not coincide with Metropolitan Athens as defined on page 102. Greater Athens is the most urbanized part of the Metropolitan area, the Athenian basin.

Source: Censuses of 1951, 1961, 1971, 1981
National Statistical Service

B. THE PROBLEMS OF ATHENS AND THEIR MAJOR CAUSES

B1. Centralization at the National and the Urban Level

One could summarize the present situation of the Greek Capital with one phrase quoted from a pamphlet about the draft-plan Athens 2000, which was issued by the Ministry of Public Works in Summer 1979. According to this: "Athens generally presents the phenomenon of a single-centered, radially expanding matropolis, with urban activities congested in the center and sub-developed in the periphery" [68, p. 7]. Most Greeks, lay people as well as administrators and planners, would agree today that the number one problem that plagues Athens, the problem that, in a sense, has caused or seriously aggravated almost every other, is centralization. Centralization first on a national scale and second on the scale of the metropolis [25, p. 22].

It is a fact that Athens today is not just the largest city in

Greece. By and large it is the center of Greece, directly serving not only the needs of its own population and the people of the surrounding region but in countless instances the needs of Greeks all over the country too [75, p. 2]. This, up to a point, may not be unusual for a national Capital. However, the degree of centralization of urban activities of national magnitude in a single city, as observed in the case of Athens, is remarkably high. The city not only concentrates most central government administration functions but also half the industrial employment of the nation, sixty percent of the international commerce, half the employment in the tertiary sector, almost all large, modern hospitals in the country⁵, four universities with 64% of the total number of university students in Greece [79, p. 207], in short the lion's share of urban activities with national importance [68, p. 7].

Athens is also the area where all important national transportation routes of land, sea and air, converge. Its geographical location in the geometric center of Greece, at the crossroads of the natural land-transportation corridors which connect north and south, and with its center at five miles to the north of Piraeus, the largest and most important port of the country, strengthens the role of the Capital as the heart of the nation [75, p. 51].

5. Athens concentrates 54% of the hospital beds and doctors in Greece [79, p. 30]. While the ratio of both hospital beds and physicians to the Athenian population is satisfactory, according to international standards, the situation is not truly as idyllic as it appears at first glance. Indeed, the health system of Athens is really serving a population up to 50% larger than that of the Metropolitan area, because the high deficiencies in the rest of the country as far as health protection is concerned force people all over Greece to seek specialized care in the Capital's hospital facilities [75, p. 39].

At the scale of the Metropolitan area, on the other hand, there is still another level of centralization. Indeed, as described earlier, most land uses⁶ which are not directly associated with residential uses, tend to be contained within the two square kilometers (0.76 square miles) area of the city center, towards which the residential districts of the Metropolis also gravitate [39, p. 28].

One should note that during the last ten years there has been observed a start of a reverse movement, of "central" activities relocating away from the center "triangle" and along the main arterials which radiate from it, and of population spreading to the periphery of the Athenian basin and all over Attica too [63, p. 8]. This centrifugal tendency, however, is by no means strong enough yet to affect the overall character of the urban structure of Athens, which remains highly centralized.

Excessive centralization at the national as well as the metropolitan level has gradually created for the city a series of multidimensional problems each one of which has a seriously negative impact on the urban structure. These problems are not isolated but intricately interrelated in such a way that they cannot be effectively confronted individually. These problems are related with the urban land, housing, employment, social and technical urban infrastructure, the natural environment, health, recreation, demographic synthesis, administrative organization, social integration, transportation and public transit systems, in general with the quality of life in the Greek capital [75, p. 1].

6. Except from industry, of course.

B2. The Unplanned Urbanization of Athens after World War II

Congestion of people and activities in and around the center of Athens has been and still is one of the basic problems of the city. A problem which causes the most urbanized residential districts of the Athenian Basin to be characterized by too high densities (up to 400 persons per acre, net, or 125 persons per acre, gross, in the most densely populated subdivisions [75, p. 21], severe traffic related problems, overcrowding of the existing infrastructure networks, deficiencies in public facilities and scarcity of green space, soil air and noise pollution etc. On the other hand the urban expansion areas which, as a rule, have been initially urbanized as unauthorized settlements and which encroach on the hills surrounding the Athenian Basin, face even more acute problems and much more severe deficiencies in both social and technical infrastructure [63, p. 20]. An illustration of the striking differences between neighborhoods in the first and second categories is provided in Figure 9, page 125 showing the present layout of the affluent suburb of Psichiko, which was developed according to a plan, in contrast with the layout of the municipality of Kaissariani which was created as a refugee settlement in 1922.

According to a study prepared in 1978 by the Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE) in collaboration with the National Center of Social Research (EKKE), the present problems which afflict in different ways and to different extents both types of residential districts of the Athenian Basin, the ones surrounding the city-center as well as those on the periphery, have resulted directly from the commercial way in which both have been developed--with little intervention on the part of the public




Figure 9: Differences between areas developed spontaneously and areas developed according to a plan.

on the part of the public sector--during the peirod of rapid urbanization that followed the end of World War II [30, p. 480].

Because the state being unable--or unwilling--to launch a comprehensive housing program⁷ taking care of the soaring needs of the rapidly growing working population that in this period has been immigrating to the Capital, the initiative for residential development was taken by the private market [75, p. 14; 63, p. 17].

In the absence of planning or even adequate control legislation which could also be enforced [75, p. 5], authorized housing in Athens was produced according, primarily, to one rule: that of the maximum profit for developers as well as land owners [75, p. 13]. This way, in areas where the City Plan ordinance permitted maximum land exploitation (in the form of high floor-area ratio, for example), building activity has been extremely intense, resulting in a period of a few years in the transformation of the original townhouse neighborhoods into the densely packed high rise apartment districts that today are so typical throughout the Atheninan metropolis [63, p. 19]. On the other hand, in sectors of the city which, according to the City Plan provisions were supposed to develop less density, construction was limited to a minimum, as both land owners and developers were withholding activity while pressuring the government for more profitable development conditions [63, p. 19].

The saturation of the central districts, the constant demand for more housing as well as the organized pressure from land speculators and

7. At present there is a weak public housing program in Greece. However, the total number of subsidized housing units represents every year no more than 3% of the total housing constructed [79, p. 43].

developers⁸ have encouraged the governments of this period to amend the City Plan ordinance of Athens several times, gradually granting higher development variables to more and more peripheral neighborhoods, without however taking care to insure for these areas the urban infrastructure necessary for the more intense development allowed [75, p. 19]. It is in this way that the city of Athens grew vertically before expanding in surface, to the contrary to what was intended by the original City Plan which envisioned a radial urban expansion to less and less intensively developed suburbs [75, p. 5].

The dense, high rise apartment buildings of the central residential districts of the metropolis satisfied the housing needs of the increasing numbers of Athenian middle class families who could afford them [63, p. 19]. However, for the large masses of the working population that immigrated to the Capital in this period, such housing was out of reach [79, p. 43]. However, for the large masses of the working population that immigrated to the Capital in this period, such housing was out of reach [79, p. 43]. In the absence of legal alternatives (such as public low-income housing or subsidy programs) as seen earlier in this report, many among these people were turned to unauthorized settlements, investing their meager savings in small lots which had resulted from the semi-legal subdivision of formerly rural properties located near the urban fringe. Although building was prohibited in such outside the City Plan areas, a part of these small owners, the ones who

8. One should be reminded here that keeping construction going strong was in this period a government policy of crucial importance.

could afford it and who also were prepared to take the risk, built unauthorized houses on their lots, while the rest continued to stay in rental housing inside the city, hoping that a City Plan expansion would soon allow them to develop their properties legally [63, p. 19]. Between 1945 and 1966, 320 to 360 thousand persons--representing 45% of the total population increase of Athens in this period--were housed in unauthorized settlements [79, p. 43].

This situation resulted in the emergence of clustered unauthorized neighborhoods, at first almost randomly distributed within the Athenian Basin. As it has been discussed earlier in this report most of these neighborhoods were granted legal status a posteriori, despite the fact that they were lacking public facilities (with the exception of an elementary access-giving street network), despite the fact that most individual properties within them were too small (200 sq. meters on the average) [63, p. 20], and although in many cases these areas were lacking even the most basic technical infrastructure (such as electricity and water supply).

When such an "unauthorized" neighborhood was included in the City Plan, the public sector was supposed to intervene and have the new city district connected, if possible, to the existing urban infrastructure systems. However in numerous instances this task has been proven prohibitively costly, with the result that residential areas originally urbanized as unauthorized settlements are still much more deficient in essential urban public facilities than the older neighborhoods of the city [63, p. 20]. For instance sewage networks and flood protection

systems are generally lacking in those areas while the are as a rule provided in areas which were included in the original City Plan.

In any case, as soon as each previously unauthorized neighborhood was included in the City Plan it was automatically becoming a prime target for commercial development, in quite the same way as any other residential district within the Athens City Plan. Since housing demand for the lower middle class was always on the rise, a typical "unauthorized" neighborhood was gradually being transformed into a high-rise residential district in the few years following its "legalization", with apartment buildings rapidly replacing the original humble unauthorized structures, and with densities soaring high almost as much as land values were.

After that the neighborhood, no more affordable to newcoming immigrants, was bound to be taken over by the expanding Athenian lower middle class, while the large numbers of poorer working families who went on migrating to Athens had to seek housing in more remote areas, still outside the City Plan. This way, second and third generations of unauthorized settlements were being developed, settlements that were also destined to be granted legal status, sooner or later. Figure 10, page 130, shows the expansion of unauthorized housing in Athens between the years 1962 and 1976.

The urbanization of the Athenian Basin was completed by the start of the decade of the seventies, as a result of the operation of a vicious circle which created unauthorized homesteading areas outside the City Plan on the one hand, and dense commercial housing development in the areas within the City Plan on the other.




Figure 10: Unauthorized housing in Athens.

Source: Planning in Greece. University of Strathclyde.

To summarize: The present problems of Athens result directly from the interaction of primarily two factors of central importance. First of the fact that during the last thirty years the city has experienced a highly accelerated urbanization process, dramatically growing in population and activity as a strongly centralized urban organism which is today the urban center of the entire Greece. Second, of the fact that the residential development which followed this population growth, a development which was carried over mainly by the private sector and which was not preceded, not even accompanied, with the provision of the necessary urban infrastructure, was not only unplanned but, to a large extent, de facto unregulated too. The interrelations of the most prominent present problems that afflict the Athenian Metropolis and their relation to these two "original sins" of the post World War II urbanization process of the city, are shown in summary form on Figure 11, on page 132.

B3. Mixture of Land Uses

Today land uses in Athens are generally mixed and non-rationally located, in relation to each other and to the infrastructure networks, most notably the transportation system [75, p. 19]. Indeed, it is not unusual at all to see in the same district residential land uses literally side-by-side with industrial ones. The municipality of Nea Ionia, to the north-west of central Athens, is a classic example of such a peculiar symbiosis, in which typical middle-class multistory apartment buildings (POLYKATOIKIA) are found next door to factories, or in which small factories are operating in the ground floor of such residential buildings [75, p. 20].




Figure 11: Interrelations Among the Present Problems of Athens

As for commercial land uses, these in Athens are almost always integrated with residential ones [30, p. 482]. It is a fact quite typical for central districts of the basin (and, to a lesser extent, for an densely built district) to be filled with multi-story apartment buildings, the ground floors of which are occupied by retail stores⁹ [79, p. 48]. On the other hand, most residential areas are not satisfactorily equipped with uses that usually are closely related with housing, namely playgrounds, elementary schools, day-care centers, health clinics etc. [30, p. 482].

As a rule the mixture of land uses¹⁰ within the same district, as observed in Athens, does not help the particular district to be self-sufficient or self-contained to any significant degree. Despite the fact that employment providing land uses exists within most larger residential areas it remains a fact that most of the working population residing in a district is typically employed outside of it, while people residing in other parts of the metropolitan areas come there to work every day.¹¹

9. Retail commerce in Greece is, to a large extent, still in the hands of small family stores, while larger super-market type commercial establishments have also appeared during the last ten or fifteen years. For the moment both types survive side by side with each other.

10. As discussed earlier, the city plan legislation did not provide for land use zoning. See pages 37-38.

11. This fact is mainly due to the gradual but spectacular transformation of the residential character of most districts in the metropolitan area, during the post World War II years. For instance, Nea Ionia used to be an industrial center in the middle of a working class refugee settlement (dating since 1922) which provided most of the work force employed in its factories. However the rapid expansion of the city after the War changed things, with the result that the present residents of the municipality of Nea Ionia are mostly white collar employees while the workers employed in its industry come from new working class neighborhoods in the Athenian metropolis [39, p. 34].

B4. Transportation

The unmorganized spatial distribution of land uses in Athens make the functioning of the city remarkably inefficient, affecting in a negative way both the productivity of the economic sectors [63, p. 8] and the quality of life in the residential districts [63, p. 6]. The provision of technical infrastructure is obviously complicated by the mixture of land uses while one of the most prominent and acute problems of Athens today, transportation, is also directly related as much to the fact that the various land uses are so poorly organized within the metropolitan area, as it is also due to the extremely high level of centralization of activities in the small city-center area [75, p. 52].

It has been suggested that the number of movements which cause the transportation network of Athens to be overloaded every day could be significantly reduced, if only the use of land in the Athenian Basin was regulated in a sensibly way [75, p. 52]. However it is beyond any doubt that the transportation network itself could also stand a significant amount of purely technical improvement [79, p. 50]. Indeed, the dense network of narrow streets that characterizes Athens is presently too poorly differentiated according to function and generally lacking auxiliary facilities (such as off-street parking etc.) [30, p. 480]. On the other hand the absence of north-to-south and east-to-west arterials bypassing the city center decisively contributes to the overloading of traffic that presently afflicts the metropolitan core. As a matter of fact the 42% of the movements on the central streets of Athens represent through-traffic, not destined to the center of the city but using it only because alternative access to the areas of its destination is not available [75, p. 52].

The growing inefficiency of the metropolitan transit system which is slow, crowded, unreliable and in many cases not rationally organized, is another factor contributing to the worsening of the transportation problems in Athens. In the recent years the Athenian population has shown a rapidly increasing preference towards private car transportation;¹² with the result that, despite the fact that driving conditions in Greece are enormously frustrating, fuel too expensive, and automobiles too heavily taxed, large numbers of cars (much larger than the annual population growth would justify) are added to the streets of Athens every year.¹³

The present overloading of the transportation system of Athens is also due, in part, to the extremely bureaucratic system of administration as well as to the counter-productive structure of the working day in Greece, which both generate a big number of essentially unnecessary movements [75, p. 53]. For instance, movements related to the fact that Greek citizens must have frequent personal contact with the various governmental agencies in order to take care of daily personal or business affairs, make up the 24.3% of the total movements on the Athenian streets every day [75, p. 53]. On the other hand, despite some recent reforms, a high percentage of working people in Athens have still an non-continuous working day (with a four hour break in the afternoon) with the result that these people have to make the trip from home to

12. In 1979 there was one private care registered in Athens per nine city residents. The figure is rising sharply [75, p. 54].

13. The number of movements on the street work of the Athenian Basin increase at an annual rate of 17% [68, p. 14].

work and back not just once but twice daily. The same holds true for shopping, since all stores must, by law, follow this interrupted schedule too.

Finally, the role of Athens as the center of Greece, because of both the structural relation between the nation and its Capital and the "technical" fact that there are no national roads connecting Northern and Southern Greece and bypassing Athens (see map on figure 2, p. 105), is still another factor that further aggravates the transportation problems of the metropolitan area [75, p. 52].

B5. Air Pollution

Closely related to the problems of transportation as well as to the mixture of land uses and to the absence of environmental legislation controlling industrial discharges in Greece, is the problem of air pollution, a problem that during the last few years has reached in Athens a critical significance [79, p. 53]. The "nefos", a cloud of smog made out of dust and chemicals produced by industrial fumes and car exhaust gases, hangs over Athens most of the year, clearing out only on highly windy days or holiday weekends, when most Athenians leave the city [33, p. 11]. The geographical and climatological conditions of the Athenian Basin do not help at all the smog dispersal, making Athens extremely vulnerable to air pollution [79, p. 53]. The "nefos" represents today a serious public health hazard and the sulphur dioxide that it contains, turning when it rains to sulphuric acid, (that dissolves marble), threatens the city's ancient monuments, most notably the Acropolis [33, p. 11].

The acuteness of the problem of air pollution during the recent years has provoked public demonstrations and considerable protest, in

response to which the previous government (of the "New Democracy" party, which stayed in power until October 1981) had introduced a set of regulations targeted at putting the problem under control. For instance, there were introduced restrictions to the use of heavy oil (which has a higher sulphur content) in central heating. Controls over polluting industries within Athens were also announced but not enforced, while emergency measures, to be taken in days of extreme concentration of pollutants, included banning private cars with even or odd-plate numbers off the streets on alternate days, halting the heating of public buildings, cutting down on the working hours of industries etc. [33, p. 11].

The present government of PASOK plans to introduce a stricter set of rules regulating the use of industrial fuels and filters, backed up by a team of inspectors to supervise enforcement. It is also considering banning private cars from certain sectors of the city-center completely and permanently [36, p. 12]. However a scientific study intending to identify the chemical synthesis of the nefos and to determine the extent to which each one of the known responsible factors (geography, climate, industry, private cars, residential heating etc.) contribute to its formation--so that the policies taken against air pollution can be selected rationally and not intuitively--is yet to be done [27, p. 24].

B6. Residential Land Use and Housing

As it has been seen earlier in this chapter, the residential districts of Athens are generally characterized by too high densities, neighboring incompatible land uses, noise and air pollution, deficiencies in technical urban infrastructure and in public facilities such as parks, play grounds, recreational land uses etc. Generally the quality

of life in Athens is deteriorating, even though there are huge qualitative disparities between individual neighborhoods, not only concerning housing but also in regard to the public amenities provided in connection to it [25, p. 22].

In fact, while there are a few high income residential districts (mostly located in the north-eastern part of the Athenian Basin) which do not suffer from almost any of the evils mentioned above, there are much more highly populated areas (generally concentrated in the western and southwestern parts of the basin) which bear an excessive share of urban blight [63, p. 17].

As a rule, the distribution of public amenities in Athens does not follow the population density distribution [30, p. 482]. Indeed, most of the densely built underprivileged neighborhoods severely lack green space, play grounds, day care centers, private education, athletic installations, medical clinics etc., while at the same time suffer high levels of air pollution (mainly because of neighboring incompatible land uses) and, in general, all the inconveniences, sometimes even hazards, of a deficient technical urban infrastructure. On the other hand, the high-income areas in the northeast, developed as roomy, single family residential neighborhoods) are not only equipped with adequate technical infrastructure networks but also concentrate most of the social infrastructure available in the Athenian Basin and not absorbed in the city-center [75, pp. 28-31]. For instance in these areas are located most of the private education units for preschoolers, elementary and high school students of Athens, a large share of neighborhood parks, most "decentralized" hospitals, almost all nursing and convalescent homes, most

recreation facilities, etc. [75, pp. 38, 39, 42]. On Figure 9, p. 125 one can see, just by looking on a map, the sharp difference between two typical neighborhoods of these two extreme categories, in layout, open space, street network, building densities, etc. [63, p. 79].

A study prepared in 1979 by the Technical Chamber of Greece [75, p. 32] attributes the uneven distribution of social services within the Athenian residential districts to the fact that the provision of such services is considered by the state as a luxury and is largely left to the initiative of the private sector which, however, cannot be concerned with the well-being of the society as a whole.

The fact that some high income areas have been developed according to a plan prepared in advance, whereas low-income districts resulted from unauthorized settlements successively annexed to the city, can explain, in part, the better provision of both infra-structure and community facilities in the affluent neighborhoods [63, p. 79]. However another reason may be the fact that well-to-dos have always a much stronger influence on the public decision-makers than the poor. In any case the market disparities in the present conditions of the various residential districts of Athens and the "de facto" segregation of people according to social class (in a way similar to the racial and ethnic segregation in the U.S.A.), "leads to inequality of access to services and community facilities and subsequently determines the quality of life in different areas" [63, p. 79]. Problems of social justice are accentuated by the fact that the Athenian population, both because of lower car ownership and because of the condition of the transportation

network in Athens, is by no means as mobile within the metropolitan area as American urban people typically are.

If the deficiencies in social and technical infra-structure and the lack of harmony in the interrelation of residential land-uses with the rest of the urban functions represent one level of degradation for the residential districts of Athens, the condition of housing itself represents still another [30, p. 482]. Although there have been spectacular improvements in the housing condition in Athens during the last thirty years (see Tables VI and VII on p. 141) and despite the fact that on the average these conditions appear satisfactory according to international standards, there are still today in the Capital [75, p. 23]:

- 760,000 persons who live with housing densities of more than 1.33 persons per room.
- 2,700 persons who live in structures which are not considered regular housing units.
- 4,340 persons who live in houses without an indoor toilet.
- 89,320 persons who live in houses without water-taps.
- 720,880 persons who live in houses without bathing facilities.
- 585,740 persons who live in houses without separate kitchens.

All these figures correspond to the census of 1971 and must have since increased following the population growth, given the fact that no special measures aimed at improving housing conditions have been taken in the interim period, and the real average income of the Greek and Athenian population has not risen significantly [75, p. 23].

The present supply of housing units in Athens varies in both quality and value. However, while the units which are addressed to the

TABLE VI
HOUSING CONDITIONS IN GREATER ATHENS

	1951	1961	1971
Population	1,279,000	1,775,815	2,424,660
Number of Households	340,000	522,600	781,140
Inhabited House Units	321,000	480,000	769,000
Rooms	732,500	1,236,500	2,569,900
Rooms/House Unit	2.28	2.57	3.34
Persons/House Unit	3.98	3.69	3.30
Units with Co-habitation	N/A	69,833	22,920
Inappropriate Units	N/A	14,951	1,420

Source: Regulatory Plan of Greater Athens, 1975

TABLE VII
HOUSEHOLD FACILITIES AVAILABLE IN GREATER ATHENS

	1961	1971
Kitchen	70.9%	73.1%
Bathroom or Shower	30.0%	69.6%
Indoor Toilet (+ Water Installed)	38.0%	81.0%
Electricity	95.3%	99.2%
Sewerage (Network)	--	48.1%

Source: Regulatory Plan of Greater Athens, 1975.

higher incomes do correspond to the needs and financial capabilities of this part of the market, when it comes to the units which are supposed to satisfy the housing needs of the lower middle class and the working people, this is simply not the case. What accounts, for instance, for the fact that in the national census of 1971, the 10.1% of the total "standard" housing stock in the Athenian Basin was found empty and unused, is not the lack of real need for such housing. The figures on this and on the previous page show just the opposite. What must be blamed is the fact that this housing "surplus" was unaffordable by the people who needed it the most [75, p. 28].

It is an undeniable fact that presently housing in Athens is much too expensive, especially if one considers also the levels of income of the population. The absence in Greece of programs encouraging housing ownership (like mortgages in the U.S.), the fact that the housing markets is private, not interfered with by the public sector and therefore profit-oriented, and the sky-rocketing of land values in and around Athens, make owning a house just a dream for the average family [75, p. 26].

B7. The Urban Land

In Athens land value usually follows the pattern of population densities but is also affected by the layout characteristics of each plot, the City Plan provisions for it, and its proximity to desirable or incompatible non-residential land uses [63, p. 20]. According to official surveys land values between 1960 and 1964 increased by 100 to 300 percent, especially in urban expansion areas [63, p. 21]. Rapid increases continued also during the next eight year period 1964-1972 when prices rose by four to six times [63, p. 21].

High land values are not just contributing to the housing problem of the less affluent urban populations. They also constitute a sizable obstacle to efforts on the part of the public sector to intervene and regulate the urban organism. Two other factors that further inhibit public intervention for planning implementation are: a) the over-subdivision of private land and b) the lack of cadastral maps [30, p. 480; 63, p. 21].

Land ownership in Athens is almost entirely in private hands. The fact that land is inherited by the children of the dead proprietor, accounts for the frequent land subdivisions [63, p. 21], while economic factors such as the small savings of the average Greek family, the tendency to invest in land rather than in other commodities, and the demand for low-cost housing of whatever quality, are also responsible for the fact that as a rule urban land in Athens is overly subdivided into too small individual plots [30, p. 48]. On the other hand the lack of cadastral maps covering Athens is the major reason for the continuous infringement of public land by land speculators. "There are various cases regularly published in the daily newspapers, of people who purchased plots which were never privately owned" [63, p. 22]. In fact, land ownership titles and cadastral mapping is considered an immediate need by public agencies, a prerequisite before any planning implementation can take place [63, p. 22].

Certainly the review of the problems of Athens, as described in the previous pages, is by no means a complete summary analysis of the present situation of the Greek Capital. It is merely a "technical" enumeration of the most prominent concrete issues that, by general



consensus, planning for Athens must take into account. However the overall complex picture of Athens today almost eludes rational analysis and, sometimes, it is better captured not by words but by pictures. Some "perception of Athens" by popular Athenian cartoonists could be eloquent in this respect. The reader can find a small collection in figure 12, page 145.

C. AN HISTORICAL REVIEW OF PLANNING FOR ATHENS

C1. The Early Years: 1945-1960

The first official attempts to have existing problems of the Metropolis of Athens corrected and future ones prevented through planning can be traced back to the early post-World War II years. In a climate of euphoria celebrating the anti-Nazi victory and the end of the war (despite the fact that a destructive civil war between Greek left-and right-wing forces was just starting) and with money available in larger than usual amounts, thanks to the American aid (Marshall Plan), this was a period of decision and policy making. At that time of reconstruction--with the literal meaning of the word--the orderly development of Athens was an issue, though, understandably, not of primary importance.

In 1945 the then director of the Technical Service of the Municipality of Athens, architect K. Biris, submitted a plan for the "Reconstruction of the Capital", proposing, among other things, the decongestion of the city-center, a satellite city in Megara (30 miles to the West of Athens), improvements of the primary transportation network in the city, expansion of the subway system etc. This plan, however, was



In the beginning there was chaos.



Figure 12: Perceptions of Athens by popular cartoonists.

not adopted or in any way used by the central government administration [75, p. 5].

In 1947 the Office of Master Plans of the then Ministry of Reconstruction, directed by Konstantinos Doxiadis, prepared the first "Master Plan for Athens" which, also, never acquired legal status. A second plan for the Capital was developed in 1954 by the Directorate of Master Plans of the Ministry of Public Works, but this too, no more lucky than the previous plans, was never adopted and much less implemented¹⁴ [75, p. 5]. To quote from a study by the Technical Chamber of Greece, published in 1979 and referring to that period: "Different things were being proposed by the Directorate of Master Plans, different things were 'implemented' by the Office of Plan Implementation of the same Ministry and still different things were being constructed on site, by landowners and developers of Athens" [75, p. 5].

Nevertheless, while in those very early post-War years plans were definitely not implemented, the fact that they were prepared at all shows that planning was at least considered to be something more or less desirable. In contrast to this, during the period between 1954 and the start of the decade of the sixties planning was practically rejected altogether. A dramatically growing economy and a spectacular improvement of the living conditions of the population had gradually erased any doubts that the conservative governments of Greece might have had that the free market is almighty and, as a rule, should not be interfered with.

14. K. Doxiadis had, by then, left the public sector and founded the "Athenian Institute of Technology" and the "Center of Ekistics".

In this context, planning--which is by definition a form of public intervention in the market, as it sets for its operation rules externally generated--was even theoretically abandoned, for Athens as for any other city in Greece. Furthermore, as if this was not enough, already existing controls and regulations were eased also, so that soon almost all obstacles were removed allowing an anarchic and extremely intensive development. It has already been described in this chapter how in this period the state, bowing to various pressures, had in time conceded to the demands for more profitable development variables, granting always higher floor-area ratios and also deregulating the height of buildings from based on the width of the streets [75, p. 6].

In these few years the neoclassic architectural character of Athens was destroyed and the POLYKATOIKIA, the typical high-rise residential building of modern urban Greece, gradually replaced all other types of construction, in some cases even buildings that had been considered as landmarks of the Athenian landscape [75, p. 6]. The present problems of Athens show catastrophic results of the "laissez faire" official attitude of these years, an attitude that unfortunately has prevailed for much longer than the early sixties (even though after that it had lost any theoretical backing).

C2. The Decade of the Sixties

By the onset of the decade of the sixties the fruits of the unplanned and uncontrolled growth became clearly apparent on the urban structure of the Capital. However, although government officials on the one hand and professionals on the other generally agreed upon the existence of the problems, they perceived their causes and their solutions

in markedly different ways. While most of the latter had started realizing that those problems were generally interrelated--as products of the same unplanned overgrowth of the Capital--and that consequently comprehensive planning was the only hope for their alleviation, the former, considering the growth of Athens as a natural (and basically positive) result of the industrialization of Greece, still believed that "isolated" problems would best be resolved by technical means [73, p. 6].

In this spirit the responsibility for the solution of the worsening transportation problems of Athens was turned over to Wilbur Smith in 1962. The propositions of his study based on the construction of a network of new highways crisscrossing Athens,¹⁵ stressed the role of the private car while undervaluing the importance of public transit systems (such as a metropolitan subway, for instance) [75, p. 7]. As it has been mentioned earlier this transportation study was never implemented officially.¹⁶ Its general message, however, its heavy reliance on construction and public works rather than on organizational reforms and planning, created an illusion of attainable solutions and left a strong imprint on the way in which the problem of transportation of Athens has been perceived by the administration ever since [73, p. 7].

Nevertheless, as the decade proceeded and problems were rapidly worsening, the idea that in the long run planning was indeed a necessity

15. In these propositions the financial capabilities of the Greek public sector were overestimated by far. [31, p. 21].

16. However the study has guided public investment (in a selective way). The construction of Leophoros Vouliagmenis, a new arterial connecting the center of Athens with the eastern coast of the Saronic Gulf and the international airport of Ellinikoy, is a result of the Smith study [73, p. 21].

for the development of the Capital was increasingly gaining support. During the Fifth Panhellenic Conference of Architects in January 1966, the situation of Athens was the central focus of both presentations and discussion. At least three different general schemes for a comprehensive plan for the city were submitted by people representing all the principal planning philosophies prevailing in Greece at that time.

Representing the Administration,¹⁷ P. Vassiliadis, the senior planner of the Ministry of Public Works, proposed, after an analysis of the existing situation, a general plan for the decentralization of Athens at the metropolitan level. Decentralization would be achieved through the creation of fifteen sectoral centers at the periphery of the city, the development of which was supposed to relieve pressure off the congested single center of the metropolis. This proposal was complemented by plans presented by the Center of Planning and Economic Research (KEPE), which were targeted at promoting decentralization at the National level [73, p. 7].

K. Doxiadis, for his part, estimated in his presentation that within the prevailing socio-economic system of Greece the centralization to the Capital and further growth of Athens could not be halted. However he argued that the efficient organization of the spatial structure of Athens was feasible. Among the proposals he made to this end was the creation of a new administrative center in Tatoi, a site at the extreme northern angle of the Athenian basin [73, p. 7].

17. Greece has had a series of liberal governments at that time, for a brief period (1964-1966) which was later characterized as the "Kennedy Era of Greece".

Finally, a number of architects and planners belonging to the "Society for Economic Development" (EMOKA), a radical group associated with the Left, agreed with Vassiliadis on the immediate need for decentralization, both at the metropolitan and the national level. However they also stressed that decentralization should be accompanied by socially oriented programs of urban revitalization, targeted at socially "dese-gregating" the residential districts of the city through balancing the distribution of public services and amenities in them [73, p. 8].

These planning ideas, however, were destined not to materialize because of the military dictatorship that followed the coup d'etat, April 21, 1967. P. Vassiliadis, still heading the planning staff of the Ministry of Public Works, completed in 1969 his "Regulatory Plan of Greater Athens", which was based on the general scheme he presented in the Fifth Panhellenic Conference of Architects. Although this has been the first plan for Athens to be officially adopted (by the Council of Ministers of the dictatorship government), it was not only never implemented but, in addition, the administrative policies for Athens taken after its adoption were actually in clear opposition to the very principles of Vassiliadis' plan [73, p. 8]. Indeed, in an effort to keep the economy going by refueling construction activity, the dictatorship further increased the permitted maximum floor-area ratios and also deregulated the height of buildings in the central sectors of the city. The first skyscrapers appeared in Athens in these years, while densities in the center increased further and centralization on the metropolitan level was accentuated more than ever before [73, p. 9].

C3. Planning for Athens in the Seventies

By the onset of the decade of the seventies the accumulated urban problems of Athens had reached obviously threatening dimensions. At the same time the results of the National Census of 1971 were emphatically pointing out the catastrophic effects that the overgrowth of the Capital was having for the rest of the country [73, p. 9]. In fact the figures of the Census showed that since 1961 the population of rural Greece, especially the regions along the northern and eastern borders, had dramatically decreased, to such an extent that this created problems related to the National Defense, at a time of increased friction with neighboring Turkey [73, p. 9].

There was indeed little doubt, by then, that the continuous growth of Athens was not only negatively affecting the quality of life in the city itself, but that it was also inhibiting the balanced development of the country as a whole, creating problems of national significance [59, p. 34; 79, pp. 30-31]. However, the dictatorship government, while admitting the existence of these problems, was not inclined, because of short run economic and political reasons, to take measures that could risk slowing down construction in the Athenian basin. Neither were they disposed towards displeasing the industrialists by imposing counter-incentives for the operation of new units around the Capital [63, p. 35]. Instead they chose to turn again to planning, unfortunately not because they honestly believed it was needed but because postponing painful decisions until after the plans were ready, could gain them some time [73, p. 10].

This way, in 1972, the Doxiadis planning firm was commissioned by the Ministry of Coordination (then named Ministry of Planning and Govern-

ment Policies) for two major comprehensive plans, one for the Metropolitan area of Athens and the other for the regional development of Greece as a whole [73, p. 10]. At around the same time, on the other hand, P. Vasiliadis, still head of the professional staff of the Office of Athens Master Plan of the then Ministry of Public Works, was ordering sixteen special studies, each referring to a prominent urban problem of Athens, to an equal number of private or public agencies, having in mind to use the results in synthesizing an updated version of his Regulatory Plan of 1969 [73, p. 9].

However in 1975 both P. Vassiliadis and K. Doxiadis died, the first without having completed his new Regulatory Plan for Athens¹⁸ while the associates of the second did submit to the Ministry of Coordination for approval both a National Physical Plan and Program of Greece and a Physical Plan and Program of the Region of the Capital, in 1976 [73, p. 10].

i) The Doxiadis Physical Plan and Program for the Region of Athens:

By 1976 the dictatorship in Greece had fallen and the democratic regime was restored. The new conservative government (of the party of "New Democracy") respected K. Doxiadis and also realized that some planning for the Capital was urgently needed. However it was reluctant to sanctify a master plan ordered and prepared under the military rule. For this reason, mainly, it invited the local governments of the Athens area, and public interest groups and scientific organizations, including the Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE), to study the plan and submit a review

18. This plan, an updated version of the 1969 Regulatory Plan of P. Vassiliadis, was completed by the Office of Athens Master Plan later in 1975.

of it [24, p. 7].

Almost all of these units, with the Technical Chamber of Greece as the most authoritative among them, strongly criticized the Doxiadis plan [77], in unison with the planners of the "Association of Architects" (SADAS), for being utterly technocratic in its approach [25, p. 17], arbitrary in its propositions [31, p. 22], for being prepared in isolation from the public, literally as a classified document [31, p. 22] and, most important, for cynically expressing the political selections of the dictatorial government who had ordered it--selections which existed even before the study was initiated [25, p. 21]--and which needed to have the seal of "scientific" approval in order to become palatable [31, p. 18].

The central points of the Doxiadis' Physical Plan and Program of the region of Athens were as follows:

1. Athens would keep on being the headquarters of the Government Administration, but the lower administrative agencies would decentralize at the National Level [59, p. 34]. A new administrative center of the Metropolitan area would be created in Tatoi [73, p. 11].
2. Athens would remain the center of the economic activity of the country, the focus of the transportation routes and a center of culture and tourism. [31, p. 18].
3. Industry would be decentralized all over Greece [73, p. 10] while industrial units within the Athenian Basin would relocate outside from it, along the western coast of the Saronic Gulf (Thriassion Pedion) or the hinterland of Attica to the east of

the Athenian Basin (Messoghia) [73, p. 11]. Around these two industrial zones would also converge the workers' industrial districts.¹⁹

4. The development of Athens would rely increasingly on the tertiary sector which would assume a paramount role [73, p. 10].
5. The urban land of the Capital would expand to cover most of the non-mountainous area of the peninsula of Attica [31, p. 20; 73, p. 11].

In other words according to Doxiadis' study the basic fact of the overgrowth of Athens in relation with the rest of the country was not inherently negative [59, p. 34].²⁰ What the Metropolis of the seventies needed was to be better, more efficiently organized in space. For this reason any measures which could help reverse existing trends (such as the accelerated internal migration to Athens, for instance) were not considered necessary [31, p. 18]. In fact the primary tools proposed for the implementation of the plan, for moving from the situation of Athens in 1976 to the Doxiadis vision of Athens 2000 were in the form of:

1. Public investment. (For expropriation of land for public uses, for conservation of landmarks, and for financing an imposing

19. It is striking how this plan envisions Athens as an urban organism clearly segregated according to social class [73, p. 11].

20. This is, of course, in striking contrast with how the situation is interpreted in the Regulatory Plan of Athens, by Vassiliadis and the Office of Athens Master Plan of the Ministry of Public Works. Indeed in all three updated revisions of this plan (1965, 1969, 1975) centralization, on both the National and the Metropolitan level, and the overgrowth of the Metropolitan area are blamed as the basic problem of the city [25, p. 15].

amount of public works such as a new transportation network) [31, p. 21].

2. Legal expansion of the city-limits to include most of the developable land of Attica. (So that the availability of a large supply helps urban land values to decrease and also so that the problem of the unauthorized settlements is very simply resolved) [31, p. 20].
3. New incentives for the relocation of industrial units outside the Athens basin and all over the rest of Greece [31, p. 21].

The third of these measures had already been used for many years before Doxiadis proposed it, however with negligible results [31, p. 21]. On the other hand one would be justified to wonder how removing almost all restrictions for urban construction in Attica would insure that new development would be acceptably provided with urban infrastructure and social services [31, p. 20]. However the most severe doubts for the effectiveness of the proposed "implementation tools" would be raised in regard to the public investment policy, since the study of Doxiadis did not concern itself at all with questions such as how would the public find the sizable monetary means to finance the proposed public investment program.²¹

In the light of all this, one would be inclined to agree with the opinion of the Technical Chamber of Greece which characterized the

21. Indeed, as it has been estimated in a study by the Center of Planning Studies of the National Technical University of Athens, the annual public investment for the implementation of the Doxiadis Plan, during the twenty-four years following its adoption, would be more than twice as high as the total public investment for the entire country in 1972 (and this in stable 1972 prices!) [31, p. 21]

propositions of the Physical Plan and Program of the Region of the Capital as "belonging to a large extent, to the mythology of planning with minimally implementable parts" [73, p. 11]

Be it for better or worse, although the plan had been given wide publicity and although, as mentioned before, a public dialogue involving all the interested parts was attempted soon after the study was submitted to the Ministry of Coordination in 1976, the Physical Plan and Program of the Region of Athens was silently put aside and filed by the administration, without the reason for this ever becoming public [73, p. 10].

ii) Planning attempts after 1976: With the restoration of the parliamentary regime in 1974, the public sector displayed a definite inclination towards increasing its role in controlling and regulating urban development [25, p. 13]. Some prospects of a positive change favoring planning started appearing. It has been already discussed how in that period the Administration launched a program of innovative planning legislation. In parallel to this activity there were also some first attempts on the part of the public sector to have, at last, taxation policies related with policies of urban development.²² Indeed the existing direct levy on construction activity was increased (as another means of discouraging construction), while new taxes in the form of fees destined to finance public urban facilities (such as pedestrian ways, parks, playgrounds, etc.), were also imposed [25, p. 13]. It should be pointed out, however, that the taxation innovations of this period have

22. Before that, taxation policies in Greece have been completely unrelated to urban development [63, p. 23].

by no means been bold enough to affect urban development in a more affirmative manner, for instance as a tool of decreasing land values or for discouraging (or encouraging) particular kinds of development [63, p.23].

During the same period the activity of the General Directorate of Housing²³ of the Ministry of Public Works has significantly increased, especially after Deputy Minister S. Manos took responsibility for this agency. In fact a long term study for the spatial distribution of second home areas in the coastal peripheries of both Athens and Salonica was initiated in 1978 [25, p. 12], while a study aiming at increasing pedestrian access in the center of Athens was also undertaken [73, p. 29]. However both these studies have been criticized as arbitrary, as they were basically unrelated to comprehensive planning for either Athens or Salonica [73, p. 20].

A more comprehensive planning effort of the General Directorate of Housing²⁴ is Policy 1977, a study which attempted to define the general development pattern that the metropolitan area of Athens should follow [73, p. 13]. This study was not a master plan for Athens. It rather represented a planning philosophy for the Capital, a philosophy which had been shaped during the successive attempts of the agency to prepare a master plan for Athens. (These are the Regulatory Plans of 1965, 1969, and 1975 and the various special studies

23. Later this agency was upgraded, as it was previously discussed, to become the core of the new Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment (YHOP).

24. More specifically, Policy 1977 was the work of the Directorate of Master Plans and its Director, planner S. Kokkoliadis.

which have been ordered in different times, during the previous fifteen years by the Ministry of Public Works) [25, p. 15].

The principal points of Policy 1977 can be highlighted as follows:

1. Measures for decentralization on the national level should be taken so that the growth rate of Athens slows down significantly. The population of the Metropolitan area should not exceed four million people by the year 2000, being by then 40% of the predicted total population of Greece in 2000 [73, p. 14].
2. Athens should stop expanding in surface except in those cases when urban expansion is absolutely necessary for the accomodation of socially needed land uses or for areas of planned development [73, p. 14].
3. The floor-area ratios inside the city should not be decreased. However, for each new development a part of it should be given to the municipal authorities. Managing the properties accumulated this way should enable municipalities to expropriate land necessary for accomodation of public uses and also to finance rehabilitation and renewal programs, while a part of the municipal housing units would be used as residences for low income families (municipal public housing) [73, p. 14].

According to a study prepared in 1979 by the Technical Chamber of Greece [73, p. 15]:

While some of the basic principles of Policy 1977 were indeed giving solutions, the problem of their feasibility remained. Neither the organization of the Office of Master

Plans nor its available planning personnel were adequate for the task of implementation, while the organization and personnel of the local governments were of course in still worse shape. On the other hand the analysis of the existing situation of Athens at the time was incomplete, while some basic analytic work (such as cadastral mapping, for instance) was still missing completely.

Following this, the next logical steps for the Administration to take after Policy 1977 would have been: a) to proceed to the re-organization and expansion of the Office of Master Plans, b) to introduce propositions for the much needed reform of the system of local government administration in Athens, and c) to conduct further research and analytic work and to elaborate the "principles into concrete policies" [73, p. 15]. However, the Deputy Minister Mr. Manos chose, instead, to halt the further development of Policy 1977, and to initiate in the Summer of 1978, the preparation of an entirely new Master Plan for Athens, the one that later came to be known as Plan "Athens 2000" [73, p. 16].

The process of preparation of this latest plan for the Athenian Metropolis will be studied in detail in the next two chapters of this report.

CHAPTER V

THE DRAFT PLAN ATHENS 2000: PROPOSITION 1979

A. THE INITIAL APPROACH

A1. Original Objectives

The process of preparation of the latest development plan for the Greek Capital, plan Athens 2000, began in August, 1978 [76, p. 1]. At that time Mr. S. Manos, then Deputy Minister of Public Works, was personally selecting five Athenian professional planners, Messrs. Tritsis, Kalogeras, Papayiannis Symeon and Psomopoulos (of the "Doxiadis" firm), to whom he commissioned the task of preparing "general scheme" plans for the Capital, each working independently from the others [25, p. 12]. These plans, which had to be submitted by October 15, 1978 [76, p. 3]-- this is within just forty-five days after the date the contracts between the Ministry of Public Works and the planning consultants were signed-- were supposed to express the ideas of the latter about how they envisioned the development of the Capital in year 2000 [76, p. 2].

The work for these Idea Plans was to be based on analytic data included in: a) the Regulatory Plan of Athens (Vassiliadis, 1975); b) the Physical Plan and Program of the Region of the Capital (Doxiadis, 1975); and c) Policy 1977 (Kokkoliadis, 1977). The propositions of all three of these studies were to be taken into account also. Two guidelines given to the five consultants by the Ministry were: a) that the population of Athens in year 2000 would not exceed 4,300,000 people and b) that the international airport of the Metropolitan area would be transferred from Ellinikon to Spata, a site in Western Attica, according to

plans which were already made [76, p. 2].¹

At the same time that the Deputy Minister of Public Works ordered these five Idea Plans to the private consultants, he also invited six public units to prepare similar studies [25, p. 12]. These units were:

1. The Office of Athens Master Plan of the Ministry of Public Works.
2. The Center of Planning and Economic Research (KEPE).
3. The Greek Center of Social Research (EKKE).
4. The Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE).
5. The Chair of Urban Planning of the School of Architecture of the National Technical University of Athens.
6. The Planning Office of the Municipality of Athens.

However, in contrast to the five Idea Plans ordered from the private consultants, these studies were supposed to focus on the analysis of the existing urban spacial structure of Athens as well as on evaluating the plans which had been prepared for the Capital previously during the seventies, rather than on presenting development ideas of their own [76, p. 2].

1. The new airport of Spata was planned to be much larger than the existing one in Ellinikon and with a capability to carry significantly higher volumes of daily air traffic.

There has been strong criticism against both the idea of expanding the airport and of transferring it to the particular location of Spata, on the part of the Technical Chamber of Greece and numerous other public interest groups. One reason for this was that a much larger airport for Athens would accentuate the role of the Capital as the center of transportation (This, of course, would be contrary to the stated intentions of the administration to promote decentralization on the national level). On the other hand transferring the airport to Spata, a location presently poorly connected with the Athenian Basin, would require a spectacular public investment, absorbing too much money which would be better used for other purposes (such as improvements of the urban infrastructure in Athens [25, p. 14]).

It must be emphasized here that as far as one can understand by studying the literature concerning plan Athens 2000 at this very early stage (August 1978 - April 1979), the intentions of the Ministry at that point were not to initiate a lengthy and adventurous planning process, a process which would actively involve a plurality of voices and even some indirect citizens' participation, as turned out to be the case. The initial objectives of Mr. Manos were probably much less ambitious than that. Apparently in the summer of 1978, and even later, the Deputy Minister just planned to use the five Idea Plans, as well as the six studies of the public agencies, in order for the Office of Athens Master plan to synthesize, under his own supervision, a new comprehensive development plan for the Capital, which would be promptly implemented. This way the time frame set for the entire operation was four months and the final product was expected to be completed in December 1978 [25, p. 19; 76, p. 5].

According to a study of the Technical Chamber of Greece² (TEE) [76, p. 1], this haste and even the announcement of the preparation of a new master plan for Athens in the Summer of 1979, were connected to the upcoming National Local Government elections which were to be held in October of that year [76, p. 1]. What the Technical Chamber of Greece implied was that the governing party of "New Democracy" needed to exhibit some planning activity for Athens just because of narrow electoral purposes. However, as his later action showed, whatever the specific reasons for initiating the process of planning for Athens 2000

2. The reader should be reminded here that in this period the TEE has been dominated by PASOK, the political party which--as the primary parliamentary opposition--was actively challenging governmental action.

in August, 1978 might have been, Mr. Manos was honest in his desire (or his ambition) to have a comprehensive development plan for the Capital prepared, adopted and implemented, during his stay in the Ministry of Public Works.

Moreover the turn of events demonstrated that the Deputy Minister, in order to be successful in this primary aim, was willing to accept criticism and even to change his original views when adequately persuaded for doing so, in sharp contrast to most of his predecessors in the Administration. In fact, what makes plan Athens 2000 interesting and the process followed in its preparation worth studying is precisely the fact that, primarily because of the flexibility of Mr. Manos, what actually happened with this plan was very different from what it was originally intended.

One difference has been that the product of the synthesis of the five Idea Plans and the six public agencies' studies was not ready until April 1979 instead of December, 1978 [76, p. 5], the four additional months allowing for a more sensible treatment of the subject than it would have been possible within the original time frame. The most important difference was, however, that the product of this phase ended up being not the final, immediately implementable master plan for Athens, but rather a first draft plan, proposing a generally agreed upon scheme of development for the Capital. A draft plan that was to be worked out in detail and amended, as needed, during an unorthodox yet interesting planning process which was not preplanned but shaped as the work progressed to fit the action.

That the situation was destined to proceed in this way was, of course, unknown on October 15, 1978 when the five Idea Plans were

submitted to the Ministry of Public Works [76, p. 3]. The evolution of the process of planning from that time up to the point when the draft plan Athens 2000 was accepted as a general scheme proposal for the development of the Greek Capital will be examined in the following pages of this chapter.

A2. The Five Idea Plans

Both the five Idea Plans and the studies the six public agencies had prepared for Athens were completed and submitted to the Ministry of Public Works on October 15, 1978 [76, p. 3]. However, according to statements of protest issued by the Technical Chamber of Greece [76, p. 3] and the Association of Architects (SADAS) [25, p. 9], there had been a marked difference in the way that the Ministry had treated during the process of plan preparation the private consultants on the one hand, and the public agencies on the other. For instance, while the former were invited to participate in all the administrative meetings which had as their subject the plan for Athens under preparation, the latter were largely ignored, to the extent that they were not even provided with the analytic data necessary for their work, data which they had to ask for on their own initiatives [76, p. 3].

Judging from this qualitatively differentiated treatment it was clear, for both the Technical Chamber and SADAS, that while the contribution of the five professionals were considered essential by the Ministry the participation of the public agencies was invited more for reasons of public relations than because it had been honestly thought necessary [76, p. 3].

In any case a presentation and discussion of all the studies

sponsored by the Ministry of Public Works was scheduled for the 16th, the 17th and the 23rd of November 1978 [76, p. 3]. Although these meetings had been initially announced to be open to the public, insuring the active participation of all the parties interested in planning for Athens, this did not actually happen [26, p. 12]. For unclear reasons and in contrast to what had been advertised earlier, the three day presentation and discussion sessions were held as essentially intra-administrative meetings to which there were invited to participate only the five private planners, and representatives from the six public agencies which were involved in the process from its start [76, p. 4].

At this point neither the Association of Architects, which officially represents Greek planners, nor the local governments of the metropolitan area of the Capital were asked to participate in the planning process [26, p. 12]. As a matter of fact the preparation of a new plan for Athens up to that point and even for much longer was basically an internal affair of the General Directorate of Housing of the Ministry of Public Works, a pet-project of Deputy Minister S. Manos [76, p. 3]. Indeed, from the process of planning there were initially excluded not only public interest groups like SADAS and the local governments, but also central government agencies the active and coordinated support of which would be absolutely necessary for the implementation of any comprehensive plan for the Capital. One would particularly note, for instance, the non-inclusion in the process, even from that early stage, of representatives of Ministries such as those of Coordination, Transport, Industrial Development or Agriculture, and of Public Corporations such as DEH (Power Company), OTE (Telecommunications), OSE (Railways) etc. [76, p. 3].

At any rate the three day presentations took place as planned, in the Ministry of Public Works (November 16th) and the Ministry of Social Welfare (November 17th and 23rd) [25, p. 12]. Early in the course of these sessions it became clear that there was a fundamental difference between the five Idea Plans, on the one hand, and the studies of the six public agencies,³ on the other. While most of the studies of the public agencies⁴ focused on critically reviewing the development plans for Athens which had been prepared during the seventies without proceeding to any new proposals of their own--this, they argued, could not be possible in the given time frame of the forty-five days [176, p. 4] --the private consultants, almost without referring to the previous plans at all, concentrated on exposing their own development ideas for the Capital [76, p. 5]. As a matter of fact, the discussion during the three-day meetings was focused on comparing six different Idea Plans: Policy 1977 (reintroduced by the Office of Athens Master Plan), four new Idea Plans presented by Messers. Tritsis, Kalogeras, Papayiannis and Symeon, and the Doxiadis's "Physical Plan and Program for the Region of the Capital" which was resubmitted by Mr. Psomopoulos, a senior associate of the Doxiadis firm, after some modification and updating [76, p. 5].

All six plans recognized as the basic problems of Athens the dramatic rate of population increase, the convergence of activities to the

3. Because TEE and EKKE had collaborated in preparing a common study, the number of studies prepared by public agency were five.

4. The Office of Athens Master Plan reintroduced its Policy 1977 plan as one idea to be considered along with the five Idea Plans of the private consultants.

metropolitan center, the radially ordered street network, the unequal distribution of urban amenities between the eastern and western sectors of the city, the generally deteriorating quality of life, the shortage of public land and urban land in general, and the absence of the public sector as a planning and regulating entity [25, p. 18]. In addition all plans agreed with one another as well as with the Ministry of Public Works that adequate measures ought to be taken targeted at drastically slowing down the rate of growth of the Athenian population, in order for the inhabitants of the Capital not to exceed 4,300,000 persons in the year 2000 [25, p. 18]. As for the second assumption given by the Ministry, this concerning the location and dimensions of the new metropolitan airport of Spata, the planning consultants were generally less willing to go along with the desires of their client. Indeed Messrs. Tritris, Papayiannis, and Psomopoulos presented arguments against the proposed plans to transfer the airport to the site selected by the government [25, p. 18].

On the other hand the six plans did differ markedly in their answer to the "most pressing" development question of how to accomodate "the increase in population (...) and improve on the present methods of doing so." [79, p. 78]. Indeed, with respect to the problem of the form that the urban expansion should take in Athens, there had been a full spectrum of proposed solutions, ranging from totally restricting new development beyond the present legal boundaries of the metropolitan area (Policy 1977, and Idea Plans of Messrs. Tritsis and Kalogeras) to permitting almost unlimited urban sprawl all over Attica (Psomopoulos'-Doxiadis' plan) [25, p. 18; 101, p. 6]. The propositions

of Messrs. Symeon and Papayiannis in regard to this matter were somehow less dogmatic, accepting both the need for some expansion and the necessity for large scale urban rehabilitation programs of various kinds, targeted at improving the urban function of the Athenian basin [25, p. 18]. On his part Mr. Psomopoulos did not propose such extensive rehabilitation programs, leaving it to the free market to take care of the situation through the availability of large amounts of new urban land [25, p. 18]. To the contrary Messers. Tritsis and Kalogeras, basically agreeing with Policy 1977 (by the Office of Athens Master Plan), combined their propositions of restricting urban sprawl with a program of renewal-rehabilitation of entire sectors of the city, program targeted at redistributing population and urban amenities throughout the Athenian basin, in a way that both the future densities are acceptable (in most cases slightly higher than in 1979), and that all sectors of the metropolis are equitably equipped with basic technical and social infrastructure [25, p. 18; 101, p. 6].

However the propositions of all plans generally remained schematic, stopping short before going into any details. Furthermore, as it has been pointed out by the Committee of Urban and Regional Planning of the Association of Architects (SADAS), in a study prepared in December 1978 [25, p. 15]:

The differences of the Idea Plans in particular points were overshadowed by a basic similarity. All plans were preoccupied with distributing in space the same elements. All could be adequately described in maps. (...)

All the studies were presented as graphic illustrations of ideas which had been based on data and assumptions given by the Ministry of Public Works. The spatial distribution of each land use was this way proposed by all planners AD HOC, this is without a concrete analysis of the actually existing situation.

In fact the five idea plans were flatly accused, in the above mentioned study but also in previously issued protests by SADAS and by TEE, of being not only technocratic (in the sense that they were prepared by experts working in a vacuum) but also for being essentially "unscientific" since they were produced without any previous analytic work and in a time frame that could not possibly permit anything more than intuitive planning [25, pp. 20-21].

However, despite the validity of such criticism, at the end of the three day presentation and discussion meetings the Deputy Minister of Public Works was still explicit in his intentions to proceed with "synthesizing" a new comprehensive development plan for the Capital, on the basis of the six Idea Plans: A Comprehensive Plan which was supposed to be completed by December 1978 [25, p. 19].

A3. Synthesizing the Idea Plans.

The intentions of Mr. Manos concerning using the Idea Plans were eloquently presented in a November 25, 1978 memorandum which was addressed to the planning staff of the Office of Athens Master Plan [83]. This document was supposedly put together by the then director of Master Plans, Mr. Kokkoliadis, who, however, failed to sign it and who was because of this transferred from his position. By this memorandum the professional staff of the Office of Athens Master Plan was asked to proceed in preparing a final Comprehensive Development Plan for Athens, a first draft of which ought to be ready by 2:30 p.m. on November 29, 1978--this is in just four days. The plan was supposed to be prepared according to guidelines, personally worked out by the Deputy Minister Mr. Manos, the most important among which were the follow-

ing. [83, pp. 1, 2]:

- The plans for relocating the airport in Spata should remain as
- The metropolitan transportation network should be designed according to the propositions of Mr. Symeon's Idea Plan;
- The port of Piraeus should develop according to the proposition of Policy 1977;
- The residential districts should be rehabilitated so that each is adequately equipped with essential urban amenities;
- The city expansion should follow the Doxiadis-Psomopoulos proposals;
- A new metropolitan Central Business Districts should in Kalogreza according to Mr. Symeon's proposition;
- School districts will be located according to Policy 1977;
- Agricultural land uses would be conserved if they are not converted to residential by urban expansion;
- Industrial zones would be located according to the propositions of Mr. Tritsis;
- Heavy industrial development would be located according to the propositions of Mr. Symeon.

According to this memorandum the objectives of all planning action would be [83, p. 2]:

1. To minimize the necessary intra-metropolitan movement of the population;
2. To minimize air pollution; and

3. To organize the individual neighborhoods as units capable of efficiently serving the needs of their populations.

This document is a monument of unacceptable planning for a series of reasons. The most obvious among them is the fact that it ordered a comprehensive development plan for a metropolitan area of 4,300,000 people to be prepared basically in four days (even if in draft form). Even more outrageous, however, is the way this document makes a mockery out of a scientific planning procedure, namely this of selecting one out of several prepared alternative propositions.

Indeed, even if one accepted, for the sake of the argument that the six Idea Plans from which proposition elements were borrowed had been prepared in a truly rigorous way, one would in all probability agree with the Committee of Urban and Regional Planning of SADAS which in December 1978 was decreeing that "'Synthesizing' six basically different propositions (in the way that Mr. Manos' Memorandum indicated) would completely destroy whatever internal consistency each of the plans might have had" [25, p. 20].

On the other hand the act of selecting from the available alternatives, carried out by one man (Mr. Manos, a non-planner administrator), disregarded the professionally sanctified "rules of the game" as it was based on personal intuition and obscure "objectives" rather than on hard, scientifically formulated criteria. Last, but not least, since the Idea Plans were unscientifically prepared⁵ in the first place, any process of selecting alternative propositions would be essentially meaningless.

5. With the partial exception of the one based on the Office of Athens Master Plan's Policy 1977.

After all this one could accept as valid a statement made by SADAS in a December 1978 study, in which the process of preparing the new comprehensive plan for Athens was characterized as constituting a step backward when compared with previous attempts to plan for Athens [25, p. 21]. Indeed, while the Vassiliadis's successive Regulatory Plans for Athens could be criticized as techocratic, they were certainly prepared in a professionally rigorous way.

Despite this, however, there was another key-difference between the past planning attempts for Athens and the new plan, a difference that decisively weighted in favor of the latter, and which was--understandably--overlooked in SADAS's statement. This difference is that while the initiative for preparing the previous plans for Athens had been taken by the professional staff of the Ministry (Vassiliadis or, later, Kokkoliadis), the initiative for preparing the Plan Athens 2000 was taken by Stefanos Manos, an administrator with decision making power who --and this was most important-- honestly intended to have a development plan for Athens implemented. A man who, as it later became evident, really believed that some form of planning was essential for the development of both Greece and its Capital.

However, in December 1978, when the study by SADAS was decreeing against the process being followed in planning for Athens 2000, the fact that Mr. Manos had such ambitious intentions could have been guessed. Only later, during the first half of the next year, particularly after the Deputy Minister introduced the innovative law 947/1979 and even more when, during the period of public exposure of his proposed Athens 2000 plan, he proved that in order to insure maximum acceptance for a development plan for Athens he was willing to accept

criticism and alter his original ideas about the planning process, did it start becoming obvious that Mr. Manos was sincere in his desire to proceed in planning implementation.

At any rate the memorandum of November 1978 raised not only reactions from within the General Directorate of Housing (which resulted in transferring Mr. Kokkoliadis, Chief of the Directorate of Master Plans, from his position), not only loud protest from the Association of Architects (SADAS) and the Technical Chamber of Greece, but even some public outcry to which the caricatures on Figure 13, p. 174 bear witness.

The Association of Architects (SADAS), in response to the fact that it had been officially kept away from the process of planning for Athens, organized in its offices a two session presentation and discussion of the Idea Plans which were prepared by the five private planners and of the studies of the six public agencies, on November 20th and December 1st, 1978 [25, p. 9]. In these two public meetings, apart from the planners and architects-members of SADAS, there had been invited representatives from all the local government units of the Athens Metropolitan area, as well as officials from professional associations belonging to the Technical Chamber of Greece, but not Mr. Manos or any official representatives from the Ministry of Public Works [25, p. 9].

Based on these presentations and the discussions that followed, the Committee of Urban and Regional Planning of SADAS prepared afterwards a report in which it critically reviewed the process according to which the preparation of the new plan for Athens was proceeding. In



The Cook (Manos): Fry a few industrial parks by Tritsis, in a cup of intensive industries by Symeon. Add a pound finely diced administrative units by Doxiadis ...

The taxpayers: O.K., O.K. we understand. How much must we pay again?

THE HOLIDAY EXODUS

Manos: And when they come back they will find the gates locked.

The Prime Minister: Manos, you are satanic!



Figure 13: The process of planning for Athens 2000 as seen by cartoonist I. Ioannou.

the past few pages of this section there have been numerous references to that report, which was presented during a public meeting which took place on December 18, 1978 [25, p. 9]. However the above mentioned report [25, pp. 21-24] not only included factual information and criticism but also proceeded in proposing an alternate process for the preparation of a new comprehensive development plan for Athens. A process which could still be followed if the Administration chose to do so. In stating its proposition the Committee of Urban and Regional Planning of SADAS noted [25, p. 21]:

What is about to be proposed here will not be heard for the first time. In his speech during the Fifth Panhellenic Conference of Architects, P. Vassiliadis declared that he considered the Regulatory Plan which he was proposing as the product of the first phase of a planning process that would include two more phases. Indeed during the second one the prepared Regulatory Plan for Athens would be reviewed in collaboration with all the interested public agencies and professional associations and amended as necessary. In this phase there would be worked out also more detailed sector plans for large sectors of the city, in cooperation with the respective local authorities. Finally in the third phase--in which private planners could participate as consultants--small area plans, corresponding to individual neighborhoods, would be elaborated with the participation of the citizens of the areas.

SADAS was not more specific about exactly what process its committee actually proposed to be followed for the new plan for Athens. However, judging from the context out of which the quotation was taken, one can assume that a planning process similar to what Vassiliadis had proposed in 1965 would be acceptable to SADAS who, as the study clearly indicated, was basically supporting the idea of central government planning for Athens, provided that certain conditions, insuring scientific plan preparation and public participation in the process, were met [25, p. 21].

In any event, despite the strong criticism coming from various directions against the process being followed in the preparation of plan Athens 2000, in December, 1978 the General Directorate of Housing issued a leaflet which advertised the new comprehensive plan for Athens, implying that its preparation was completed and that the plan would soon be implemented [25, pp. 8-10]. Nevertheless, it was not before April 11, 1979 [76, p. 18] that the final product was presented to the public in the form of a twenty page popularized edition under the title: "Athens 2000: For Better Living Conditions" [68]. A scientific report (consisting of forty-three double spaced typed pages plus tables and maps), addressed to the interested public agencies and the professional community, was also made available by the Ministry of Public Works, under the more modest title "Proposition 1979" [69]. Deputy Minister Mr. Manos went on National Television presenting the new plan and an open discussion which was to involve all interested parties (including central government agencies, local governments, professional associations and various public interest groups) was announced for Summer 1979.

B. PROPOSITION 1979 : THE CONTENT OF THE DRAFT PLAN

B1. Goals and Objectives

Derived from the ultimate planning goal of "improving the living conditions of the Athenians and increasing their productivity" [68, p. 8], the objectives of Proposition 1979 were stated as follows [69, p. 4]:

- Balanced development of the city will be achieved through the transformation of its structure from a single-centered into a multi-centered one. Urban functions not necessary

for Athens itself should be gradually taken away.

- Population and basic urban functions will be redistributed throughout the city. Problematic areas will be rehabilitated.
- Urban space will be reorganized into self-contained units.
- The natural environment will be protected and the cultural resources conserved.
- The transportation needs of the population will decrease through redistribution of urban functions.
- Reorganization of the urban circulation system will decrease travel time and energy consumption.

All these objectives would be achieved "without compromising the philosophical principles of the free economic system and democracy and within a realistic financial framework" [68, p. 8; 69, p. 4]. Finally, Proposition 1979 considered as the basic development principle for the Capital: "decentralization at all levels, national, regional and metropolitan" [69, p. 4].

B2. Urban Land Expansion

As has been discussed earlier, plan Athens 2000 was initiated under the basic assumption that the population of the region of the Greek Capital would not exceed 4,300,000 people in the year 2000. Of course Proposition 1979 was based on this very fundamental assumption also [69, p. 6]. Consequently the 670,000 persons expected to be added to the Athenian population by the year 2000 had to be accommodated within the urban structure. In accordance with two basic planning objectives set for Proposition 1979, namely those of: a) balancing development within the metropolitan area of Athens; and b) redistributing the population so that densities in 2000 are acceptable everywhere in the city and the urban organism can function efficiently [69, pp. 4-7], the policy lines developed by Proposition 1979 in regard to the vital issue of urban expansion were of two key types.

First and foremost the existing urbanized area was to be rehabilitated (through varying degrees of public intervention) so that its population would be evenly distributed and well equipped with technical infrastructure and social services [69, p. 5]. Second, limited urban expansion would generate new residential land, where the bulk of the new incoming population would be absorbed [69, p. 7].

Proposition 1979 gave the following data concerning the existing (1979) situation in the metropolitan area of Athens [69, p. 6]:

Total land of Attica	300,000 ha ⁶
Total population of the metropolitan area of Athens	3,800,000
Total legal urban land	31,000
Total population residing on legal urban land	3,580,000
Gross population density on legal urban land	$\left(\frac{3,580,000}{31,000}\right) = 116$ persons/ha

Assuming as an acceptable gross overall density for the year 2000 the figure of 117 persons per ha, it was calculated that an additional 7,500 hectares of urban land would be needed in the form of urban expansion, so that the total urban land in the year 2000 would be 38,500 ha [69, p. 6].

The draft plan Athens 2000 proposed that 28,500 ha of this land be located inside the Athenian basin. Since the existing urban land within the basin was 26,000 ha in 1979, a total of 2,500 ha were proposed as urban expansion areas inside the Athenian basin. The total Athenian basin population for the year 2000 was proposed to be 3,630,000 persons while densities would range from 60 to 300 persons per ha [69, p. 7] (Overall gross density inside the Athenian basin would be 127 per

6. One hectare (ha) equals 10,000 square metres or 2.47 acres.

hectare [69, p. 7]).

On the other hand 10,000 hectares of urban land would be distributed outside the Athenian basin, in areas providing residence to 670,000 persons [69, p. 7]. Half of this area would result from urban expansion, since in 1979 only 5,000 hectares of urbanized land were located outside the Athenian basin [69, p. 7]. The population residing out from the Athenian basin by the year 2000 would be distributed, according to "Proposition 1979" as it is shown on Table VIII, on this page.

TABLE VIII

PROPOSITION 1979: DISTRIBUTION OF THE ATHENIAN POPULATION

2000 Population	Location	1979 Population
220,000	Western Attica (Thriassion Pedion/Megara)	80,000
360,000	Eastern Attica (Messoghia/Lavrion)	120,000
90,000	Northern Attica (Avlona/Schimatari)	--

Source: Proposition 1979, Ministry of Public Works

In figure 14, page 180, which constitutes an adaptation of the land use plan Athens 2000. as it was presented in Proposition 1979, the reader can see that the new urban areas which would absorb the additional population of the year 2000 are located to the north and northwest of the Athenian basin and secondarily in the western part of Attica, away from the basin and inside the plains of Thriassion Pedion and

Megara.

The authors of Proposition 1979 concluded the chapter about "Urban land expansion" by noting that the proposed urban expansion areas, as they are shown in figure 14, would be filled by the proposed population only up to 66% by the year 2000, so that "there will be a surplus of urban land in every districts as it has been judged necessary for purposes of controlling urban land values" [69, p. 8].

B3. Administrative Division into Nine Sectors

In agreement with the initial planning objectives of: a) transforming Athens into a multicentric urban organism and b) reorganizing urban space into self contained entities, a most basic proposition of the draft plan Athens 2000 concerned the administrative division of the metropolitan area of the Greek Capital into nine Sectors. Each of these Sectors would have the official status of a prefecture and be organized around a Sector-Center. By the year 2000 the Athenian population was to be harmoniously distributed among these nine Sectors, every one of which would have the size and magnitude of a city of a population of 500,000 [69, p. 36].

The nine Sectors would not only be self reliant in terms of internal administration but also in regard to economic and social functions. The population of each Sector would ideally be employed within it, while the Sector-Center would cover its needs for shopping, recreation, cultural and educational activities etc. [69, p. 37]. This way, the need for inter-Sector movements would be limited, with obvious benefits in economizing both time and fuel.

Defending this fundamental selection of plan Athens 2000, the

authors of Proposition 1979 noted [69, p. 36]:

The single-centered structure of Athens has generated a series of grave problems related with the overall functioning of the city. Today, while in the center of the metropolis activities are congested, in the periphery--where the economically weaker classes have created their own unauthorized city--urban activities are sub-developed.

On the other hand the transferring of decision making authority to the Sectors themselves was intended to take care of the problems of administrative coordination and planning faced by each one of them. The present administrative division of Attica (and Athens) into four prefectures (those of "Athens", "Piraeus", "Eastern Attica" and "Western Attica" [63, p. 24]) was not satisfactory because, according to Proposition 1979, it did not really "correspond to any existing urban entities" [69, p. 37]. On the other hand Proposition 1979 was not considering the local governments of the Athens Metropolitan area as capable of carrying out administrative responsibilities of a metropolitan scale, since these units exhibited "an enormous diversity in size and population" [69, p. 36].

Nevertheless, some administrative role was given to local governments at a subsectoral level. Indeed, Proposition 1979 did not envision decentralization of the urbanized space of Athens to materialize only through the division into nine Sectors. To the contrary its target was to extend the decentralization concept into organizing each individual Sector into sub-Sectors, averaging populations of 70,000 people and structured around secondary "centers". The urban affairs at the sub-Sector level would be administered by coordinative bodies composed of representatives from the governments of the municipalities (or communities) which would form the sub-Sector [69, p. 37], while

these localities, on their part, would constitute the smallest decentralized urban entity [69, p. 38].

In parallel with its intentions to reorganize Athens as a decentralized urban organism Proposition 1979, nevertheless, accepted that the Capital would remain the headquarters of the national government,⁷ to which implicitly it conceded the role of ultimate decision maker and planner of the Athenian Metropolitan area.

In other words it was a strategic target of Proposition 1979 to organize the administration of the urbanized area of the Greek Capital in the following way:

1. One Metropolis of 4,300,000 people, administered as one entity by the central government of Greece.
2. Nine Sectors of a population of 500,000 persons each, the internal affairs of which would be administered by special units corresponding to prefectures.
3. Subsectors of 70,000 people into which Sectors would be divided and which would be administered by coordinated local governments.
4. Localities (of 10,000 people) administered by local governments.

This strategic target of Proposition 1979 was, however only partly translated into maps and applied onto the specific situation of the Athenian Metropolis. Indeed, Proposition 1979 proceeded in defining the boundaries of the nine Sectors and in locating their centers but stopped short before entering into any detail concerning the organiza-

7. One should note here that no provisions for the decentralization of national government functions were included in Proposition 1979.

tion of each Sector into sub-Sectors, in relation to the existing or proposed new localities. This job was left for a later stage when, according to a provision of Proposition 1979, special comprehensive plans were to be developed, separately for every one of the nine Sectors [69, p. 40].

The assumptions according to which the authors of Proposition 1979 proceeded into defining the boundaries of the nine Sectors, were the following:

1. The legal limits of existing Municipalities and Communities and the location of major transportation corridors were to remain unchanged.
2. The geographic and physical characteristics of the area were to be considered as "constant" [69, p. 37].

In accordance to these, the nine Sectors were defined on the map as it is shown on figure 15, page 185 .

Following this task the authors of Proposition 1979 proceeded in locating "centers" within the urban space of each Sector. The selection of areas to be developed as Sector centers was based on the following three principles:

1. Policies of betterment of existing centers, through urban rehabilitation programs, would be extensively used.
2. New centers should have good access to the primary transportation network of the metropolitan area and be readily connected with each other.
3. All Sector centers should be related with presently existing small (mostly commercial) community centers, so that their functions are intensified and their role, as centers, boosted




Figure 15: The Nine Sectors of Athens, According to Proposition 1979.

[69, p. 37].

On the other hand Sector centers were to be organized in such a way that:

1. They serve their populations' administrative, social, financial, educational, cultural and shopping needs; and
2. They create viable poles, able to attract urban functions away from the present single center of the Athenian Metropolis, promoting, in this way, decentralization [69, p. 37].

In accordance with all this, each Sector-center was located in space as it is shown in figure 15 (page 185). The total area covered by each center was calculated under the assumption that for every person residing in a Sector there would correspond two square meters of Sector-center surface. In Table IX the reader can see how the present (1979) and the projected (for 2000) population of the Athens metropolitan area was distributed by Proposition 1979 among the nine Sectors. In the same table the location as well as the total area of each Sector-center in hectares can also be found (1 hectare [ha] equals 10,000 square meters or, approximately, 2.47 acres).

B4. Social Services

Proposition 1979 concerned itself with four categories of social urban services. Namely: "Education", "Open space and athletics", "Cultural activity" and "Public health and Social Welfare".

i) Education: Concerning education, after a brief discussion of the existing situation, the basic policy lines adopted by Proposition 1979 were as following:

1. Day care, kindergarten and primary schools would be "distributed

TABLE IX

THE NINE SECTORS OF THE ATHENIAN METROPOLIS (PROPOSITION 1979)

Sector	Urbanized area		Sector Center (area)	1979		2000
	in 1979 (ha)	in 2000 (ha)		Population	Population	
1 (Northwestern)	950	2,350	Menidi (78 ha)	79,000		390,000
2 (Northeastern)	4,450	5,350	Kiffissia (92 ha)	168,000		460,000
3 (Out-western)	1,350	2,250	Mandra (44 ha)	80,000		220,000
4 (Western)	2,950	3,100	Peristeri (84 ha)	365,000		420,000
5 (Eastern)	3,950	4,250	Kalogreza (118 ha)	409,000		590,000
6 (Central Athens)	4,700	4,700	Athens (existing)	1,189,000		600,000
7 (Central Preaus)	3,800	3,800	Piraeus (existing)	700,000		540,000
8 (Southeastern)	5,850	5,850	Ellinikon (114 ha)	570,000		720,000
9 (Out-eastern)	3,000	6,850	Stavros (72 ha)	120,000		360,000
Total	31,000	38,500		3,680,000		4,300,000

Source: Proposition 1979. Ministry of Public Works.

within residential areas at walking distance from the homes of the children they served" [69, p. 10]. Access to these schools would be provided by "networks of pedestrian ways" [69, p. 10].

2. Secondary schools would be located in "Public Service Zones",⁸ where students would be transported by buses [69, p. 10].
3. Higher education would be decentralized. According to Proposition 1979 by the year 2000 only 30% of the university students in Greece would go to school in Athens,⁹ while new universities founded in provincial cities or transferred there from the Capital would absorb the balance [69, p. 10]. Within the metropolitan area, universities would also decentralize to the periphery of the Athenian basin [69, p. 11].

The authors of Proposition 1979 proposed multiple use of the school grounds (especially of athletic installations) during after school hours and concluded their study concerning education by noting that "a comprehensive public education policy had yet to be defined by the Greek state (Ministry of Education)" [69, p. 11].

ii) Open space and athletics: In regard with Open space and athletics Proposition 1979 described the existing situation in Athens by the following remarks:

The City Plan approved urban green space for the entire Attica region totals 792 Ha, of which 295 Ha are not yet secured because the legally required expropriation compensation is not yet paid to their private proprietors [69, p. 12].

8. These would be organized at the sub-Sector level.

9. In 1979 this percentage was 64% [79, p. 30].

on the other hand:

The fact that land uses are not regulated or organized, has resulted in an inefficiently dense network of streets, covering space which could have been turned to the public for recreation. It is therefore a must that studies, targeted at converting such space into playgrounds, pedestrian walkways etc., are undertaken at the level of Sectors, sub-Sectors, localities and neighborhoods [69, p. 12].

Proposition 1979, based on the assumption that for each city-resident there are needed six square meters (about 54 sq. feet) of urban open space, calculated the open space needs for Athens in the year 2000 to be 2,580 Ha, which meant that 1,780 ha of open public land had yet to be found [69, p. 12]. The draft plan proposed that this land be made by utilizing existing creeks and flood plains, existing municipal or church lands, the "green zones" around the mountains flanking the Athenian basin (see figure 14, page 180), and also by securing open space within urbanized areas, through expropriations, transfers of permitted floor-area ratios (with law 880/1979), or urban renewal (with law 947/1979).

More specifically:

1. At the neighborhood level, open space covering everyday needs for street play and social interaction. as well as providing the benefits of trees and vegetation would be secured from: "existing public land, through expropriation and through the conversion of surplus streets into pedestrian walkways and playgrounds" [69, p. 12].
2. At the level of "locality", open space covering needs in organized recreation, would be secured through urban renewal (according to law 947/1979) and through transferring land uses

incompatible with the residential character (for instance old factories, military installations etc.).

3. At the level of the metropolitan area, open space for athletic and other recreational activities of metropolitan magnitude would be secured through urban renewal programs, and through the appropriate organization of lands which belong to the state or the Greek church (especially those located within the green zones around the mountains).

In an area is rich in archeological treasures as Attica the issue of protecting and preserving monuments of archeological interest was bound to be of paramount importance. Not unpredictably, therefore, Proposition 1979 urged for the amendment of the already existing legislation, concerning the "Conservation of visible archeological monuments " so that larger archeological sites can be preserved and put to use, as an integral part of the livable open space network of the Athenian metropolis [69, p. 15].

Concerning athletic activities specifically, Proposition 1979 noted the absence of an organized metropolitan athletic center, an unequal distribution of Sector-level athletic installations within the metropolis, a surplus of soccer fields, and severe deficiencies in gymnasias, swimming pools and other athletic facilities.

In its propositions the draft plan accepted the following grouping and distribution of athletic facilities for the year horizon of 2000 [69, pp. 13-14]:

1. Neighborhood Athletic Centers. Integrated within the residential land uses, these will include outdoors game courts and one indoors gymnasium with swimming pool. For every urban resident will correspond 1.77 square meters of neighborhood athletic

- center. The total city area covered by all neighborhood centers will be 761 Ha.
2. Sub-Sector Athletic Centers. Each of these will serve about 100,000 residents, covering an area of 5 to 7 hectares. Such centers will include complete open track field and sitting accommodations for 3,000 people, along with all the facilities provided in a neighborhood athletic center. The total city area covered by sub-Sector centers would be 185 Ha.
 3. Sector Athletic Centers. There are proposed nine such centers, one corresponding to each Sector. They will be located on public land inside the urbanized part of sector or in the green zones surrounding the city. Each will include, apart from facilities of neighborhood and sub-Sector level, one indoors track, sitting accommodations for 30,000 people, adequate parking space and other auxiliary facilities. Each will cover a surface of 30 to 35 ha and altogether will take up 301 Ha of the urban land of Athens.
 4. National Athletic Center. Proposed to be located on the grounds of the military airpor of Tatoi and will cover 250 Ha.

iii) Cultural Activity: In regard with organizing in space cultural activity land uses, the draft plan Athens 2000 proposed the following [69, p. 16]:

1. Primary pole of cultural activity at the metropolitan level will be the "Cultural Center of Athens"¹⁰ located, as it had been planned, on the public property opposing the National Gallery. This center should incorporate the National Gallery as well as the nearby National Odeon (Music Hall),

10. It should be noted here that the decision to locate a metropolitan magnitude culutral center on the site mentioned in Proposition 1979, one of the last remaining tree-covered open spaces in the center of Athens, was made by the government long before it was "proposed" by the draft plan Athens 2000. Since it was announced, this decision had raised a chorus of loud protests by public interest groups--among which the Technical Chamber of Greece--strongly opposed to the whole idea. These groups, covering a wide spectrum of political and philosophical ideologies, argued that not only the convservation of the present character of the site as a tree covered green space was vital for the survival of the area from an einvironmentalist's point of view, but also that going through with this decision would be, in addition, disastrous from the point of view of the overall urban functioning of the city, contradicting the target of decentralization at the metropolitan level, and further aggravating the already problematic traffic conditions in the central districts of Athens.

and also include auditoria, a public library and open-air space.

2. At the level of the Sector, cultural events will have as a focus the Cultural centers located in the Sector-centers. These Cultural centers could be housed in rehabilitated landmark buildings. Such buildings located outside of Sector centers could also be used for cultural activities of sub-Sector or neighborhood magnitude.

iv) Public health and social welfare: Regarding medical care, the authors of Proposition 1979 remarked that although the overall number hospital beds available for every 1000 residents of Athens (11 beds per 1000 people) was close enough to internationally accepted standards, there were such severe functional deficiencies in the health care system that this apparent adequacy in hospital beds was misleading [69, p. 17]. The weaknesses in the medical care system were codified as following [69, p. 17]:

1. Hospital units are very unequal in the number of beds (capacity), personnel, technical equipment and even functional design.
2. Hospital beds are non-rationally distributed by medical specialty.
3. A generally observed inefficient hospital organization results in a longer average hospital stay for the patients.
4. The health care system of the Athenian metropolis is not used only by the population of the region but to a great extent by the population of the rest of Greece also.

The propositions of the draft plan concerning the spatial distribution of new Athens hospitals were the following [69, p. 17]:

1. One general hospital should be located in each of the nine Sector centers.
2. New hospitals should be located in the "green zones" surrounding the mountains of Attica.
3. New hospitals should be founded in Lavrion (Southeastern Attica) and Megara (Western Attica).

Finally concerning social welfare facilities, such as day care centers, nursing homes, homes for the handicapped and convalescence homes, the authors of Proposition 1979 noted that while presently the

needs in that area were partly covered by the private market, publicly supported facilities were very inadequate [69, p. 18].

The draft plan proposed that for the year 2000 seventy and one-half (70.5) "positions" in such a social welfare facility should correspond for every 1000 residents of Athens [69, p. 19]. The total urban area needed for accomodating social welfare facilities in the year 2000 was estimated to be 584 ha [69, p. 19], while it was proposed that most of these facilities be integrated with residential districts. The larger Social Welfare Centers would, on the other hand, be located within the "green zones" around the mountains which flank the Athenian basin [69, p. 18].

B5. Commercial Land Uses

The authors of Proposition 1979 did not devote a special section presenting findings and proposals concerning commercial land uses. As a matter of fact, the way in which the draft plan envisioned the distribution of retail commercial activity within the Athenian urban organism was not made clear anywhere. It is true that in the section concerning the administrative division of the metropolitan area of Athens into nine Sectors it was mentioned that the Sector-centers would be organized in such a way as "to serve as poles of attraction to retail commercial units" [69, p. 37]. Nevertheless nowhere in Proposition 1979 was it implied that retail commerce would be somehow confined to Sector or sub-Sector centers. To the contrary, the vague way in which commercial activity was generally mentioned suggests that the authors of the draft plan probably accepted that retail commerce would continue to be

integrated within the residential land uses in the year 2000 as it had been in 1979.

Finally, in regard to wholesale commerce, while it was also not mentioned anywhere in the text of Proposition 1979, the location and area of a wholesale market did appear on the graphic illustration of the draft plan Athens 2000, an adaption of which can be found on Figure 14, page 180. According to this, the wholesale commerce of the the Athenian metropolis organized into one unit was proposed to be transferred from its present location in the center of Athens to a site on the Northwestern corner of the intersection of the National Road connecting Athens with Salonica and the proposed East-to-West freeway, going from Stavros to Elefsina.

B6. Industry

After acknowledging that "The nonexistence of state planning concerning the secondary sector of the Greek economy has had a definite impact on the urban development of the Capital ..." [69, p. 21], Proposition 1979 proceeded in describing the existing situation of industrial activity in Athens as follows [47, p. 21].

- Athens concentrates a little more than 50% of the total number of persons employed in the secondary sector of Greece (Employed in the secondary sector in 1971: In Greece: 615,938 persons; in Athens: 324,590 persons).
- Industrial units are dispersed inside residential districts, along primary transportation corridors, near second home areas, even in the vicinity of archeological sites.
- The problem of the unorganized distribution of industries within Attica is complicated by the fact that there is a mixture of units of diverse branches of production, size or degree of pollutant waste emission, and by the fact that there is not adequate industrial infrastructure nor adequate control of industrial activity on the part of the public sector.

With the objective of "limiting the uncontrolled installation of industrial units within Attica as well as the social and economic repercussions of it" [69, p. 21], the draft plan Athens 2000 proposed the organization of industrial zones in areas where existing as well as new units could be integrated away from incompatible land uses and in connection with infrastructure networks. Another general proposal was that the public sector should exercise "real controls" over industrial activity, targeted at limiting the emission of pollutant waste [69, p. 22]. As an implementation tool concerning this latter proposal the draft plan introduced new legislation aimed at "the protection of the environment from industrial activity", while it was stressed that whatever legal measures were to be taken it was extremely important that they were to be strictly enforced [69, p. 22].

On the other hand, as a tool for implementing the proposal concerning the organization of "industrial zones", the draft plan urged using law 947/1979. According to this law, the 40% to 45% of the total area to be developed as an industrial zone had to be contributed for public uses [69, p. 22]. The state would not need to expropriate any land in order to accommodate there the necessary infrastructure networks and also buffer zones, separating the industrial park from adjacent land uses. Finally, industrial units operating outside from these parks were to be encouraged to transfer there "by appropriate incentives" [69, p. 22].

The proposals concerning the spacial distribution of industrial land uses made by the authors of the draft plan Athens 2000 were based on the following assumptions [69, pp. 22-23]:

1. The employment in industry in the year 2000 will approximate the figure of 500,000 persons¹¹ (According to data provided by the National Statistical Service, this figure was in 1973 320,000).
2. The industrial units operating in Attica will be classified into three categories according to the degree of pollution they cause¹²: a) highly pollutant; b) moderately pollutant; c) lightly pollutant.
3. The gross density of the labor force in industrial units classified as highly and moderately pollutant has been assumed to equal 100 workers per Ha. For lightly pollutant units this density is assumed to be, on the average, equal to 130 workers per Ha. Finally, by the year 2000, all industrial zones will be filled up to 66% of their capacity.
4. The distribution of work force into the three kinds of industrial units will change, in favor of more workers being employed in less polluting industries.

The distribution of industrial workers according to industry is shown on Table X, below.

TABLE X

WORK FORCE DISTRIBUTION ACCORDING TO INDUSTRY IN 1979 and 2000

Units	Percentage of Industrial Workers Employed	
	1979	2000
Highly Pollutant	15%	10%
Moderately Pollutant	50%	50%
Lightly Pollutant	35%	40%

Source: Proposition 1979. Ministry of Public Works.

11. This number was calculated on the basis of estimates given "in study by KEPE" [69, p. 22].

12. This classification was not worked out in any detail in Proposition 1979. To the contrary it was proposed that a special study be scheduled with the objective to define criteria according to which each industrial unit could be classified under any of the three categories and also the specific terms according to which the classification of a particular industry could change [69, p. 22].

Based on these assumptions the authors of the draft plan Athens 2000 proposed that the total area of the metropolis to be covered by industrial land uses, by the year 2000, would equal 6,470 ha [69, p. 23]. Of these, 4,870 ha would be organized into ten Industrial Parks, located for the most part, outside the urbanized area of the Athenian basin. Another 900 ha would form smaller "Light Industry Parks" which, although buffered from residential land uses, would be integrated inside the urban grid. Finally the remaining 700 ha would be covered by lightly pollutant industries, a percentage of which would still remain dispersed within the residential districts [69, p. 25].

Concerning the installation of different categories of industries in each of the industrial land uses defined above, Proposition 1979 noted that "highly pollutant industries should be given permits to operate in Attica only following a special impact analysis study, and then be located accordingly, inside an Industrial Park" [69, p. 23]. On the other hand, moderately pollutant industries were to be located mainly inside Industrial Parks, and to a lesser extent within Light Industry Parks, while lightly pollutant units would preferably locate inside Light Industry Parks [69, p. 24].

The location and size of the ten industrial parks which were proposed by the draft plan Athens 2000 can be found in figure 14, page 80. The reader can observe that two such parks are located inside the Athenian Basin, by the North-to-South freeway, between the centers of Athens and Piraeus. Three Industrial Parks are located in eastern and southeastern Attica, one of which near the town of Lavrion and two others in the vicinity of the proposed airport of Spata, in the plain of Messoghia. In Western Attica there are located three more Industrial

Parks, the largest in the plain of Thriassion, another near the town of Elefsina and a third further to the west, by the town of Megara, while the remaining two parks are located in North Attica, along the National Road. As it can be seen in Figure 14, page 180, most of the Light Industry Parks are contained within the Athenian Basin.

Proposition 1979 devoted the closing paragraph of the section concerning "Industry" to the problem of sewage and solid waste disposal. After noting that "presently only 50% of the urbanized area of the Athenian Basin is served by a sewage network"¹³ it proposed that this be "immediately" extended to cover the needs of the remaining areas in the Basin as well as those of the industrial zones located elsewhere in Attica [69, p. 26]. It was also proposed that apart from the existing sewage treatment plant in Schiston two more would be established at the sites of Metamorphosis and Vari, while for the concentration of solid waste there was proposed a new landfill in Vari, in addition to the two presently operating in Schiston and Ano Liossia [69, p. 26].

B7. Recreation and Second Homes

Proposition 1979, after some remarks stressing the value of recreation¹⁴ for the residents of a densely urbanized metropolitan area which is characterized by its scarcity of urban open space, noted that

13. The needs of the remaining area of the basin and the rest of Attica are served by septic tanks [69, p. 26].

14. The term "recreation" here, it is not meant athletic recreation. This was covered by Proposition 1979 in the section concerning urban open space. Recreation as used in this section, should be understood as related to vacation and amusement activity.

day-long or week-end recreation was extremely important for the Athenian population [69, p. 27]. In accordance with these remarks it was proposed that recreation areas be organized at a time distance of 45 minutes from the urban core of Athens (along the beaches of Saronikos and Evoikos Gulf, as well as by the mountains of Attica), equipped with overnight stay accommodations and other types of recreational facilities. It was proposed also that these areas be connected with "monorail or tramway transit lines", so that access to them would be easily provided to all income levels of the population [69, p. 27].

Proposition 1979, noting an increasing demand for vacation homes-- "a necessary amenity for large numbers of Athenian families because of bad every-day living conditions in the desely urbanized districts of the city"--estimated the needs in "second home " units by the year 2000 to total 120,000 units (The number of such units existing in 1979 was calculated at at 50,000).

The "second home" areas were proposed to be organized on sites "not appropriate for other productive development", by the beaches of Attica (in a depth of two to three kilometers), as well as in mountainous areas (near existing communities), in three concentric zones at respective time distances from the Athens urban core of:

- 45 minutes (20% of the units);
- 60 minutes (30% of the units);
- 120 minutes (50% of the units);

For reasons of "land value control" these vacation areas were proposed to be much larger than it would be necessary in order to accomodate the needs in the year 2000 [69, p. 28]. The floor-area ratios permitted in

such second home areas were proposed to be regulated between 0.1 and 0.3, so that the "country" character of the districts was preserved [69, p. 28]. On Figure 14, page 180, the reader can see the areas proposed by the draft plan to be covered by the second home zones in Attica.

B8. Agricultural and Forested Land of Attica

The authors of Proposition 1979 introduced the section with this title with the following remarks [69, p. 20]:

Although the legislation concerning the protection of forests is generally strict in Greece,¹⁵ there are no legal provisions for the conservation of agricultural land which, because of the uncontrolled urban expansion development, is gradually converting to residential or industrial. Especially in areas where land values are particularly high, like in Attica, agricultural land is being subdivided and while building on it is not permitted it cannot be used for agricultural purposes any more.

Accepting that the results of this situation are disastrous for both economic, social and environmental reasons, Proposition 1979 urged the conservation of agricultural land of Attica (estimated at 77,080 Ha) which should be used for cultivation of high yield crops (vegetables, flowers) as well as for the traditional Attican cultivations of olive and vine orchards. It was stressed, in particular, that incentives should be offered for the preservation of the rural character of the fertile plain of Mossoghia so that "the harmonic symbiosis of the proposed airport of Spata with agricultural land uses is secured"¹⁶

15. Law 998/1979, which was voted into effect a few months after "Proposition 1979" was drafted, introduced even stricter provision for the protection of forested land.

16. It should be noted here that a few months after Proposition 1979 was made public the Ministry of Public Works was introducing a piece of legislation which intended to implement exactly this policy. This legislation is P.D. of Dec. 13, 1979 concerning the "Protection of the unbuilt land of Attica."

[69, p. 20]. In Figure 14, page 180 the reader can see which areas were proposed by the draft plan Athens 2000 to remain open for agricultural use as well as the ones labeled at Forested Lands.

B9. Transportation

The authors of Proposition 1979 placed a special importance on the problem of transportation within the Athenian Metropolis, and this can be witnessed by the fact that the respective section is by far the largest one in the document, covering seven pages out of a total of forty-three.

The section is divided into five parts each focusing on the following subjects:

- 1: Airports
- 2: Sea Ports
- 3: Railways
- 4: Metropolitan Subway (Metro)
- 5: Automotive Transportation Network

i) Airports: In regard with the first subject Proposition 1979 was brief accepting a previous plan according to which the metropolitan airport was to be transferred near the community of Spata, in the plain of Messoghia (see Figure 14, page 180). The existing airport of Ellinikon was proposed to continue operating for "ten more years, until the construction of the new facility was completed." Additionally, the airport of Elefsina was proposed to remain in use for military purposes (see Figure 14, page 180 [69, p. 29]).

ii) Sea-ports: Concerning the organization of sea ports, Proposition 1979 noted [69, p. 29]:

The port of Pireaus is today the largest port of Greece. However, lack of both marine and coastal space and also of a satisfactory land transportation connection, have created unfavorable operating conditions, detrimental to both the function of the metropolitan area of Athens and to the Greek economy as a whole. It is therefore necessary that the role of the Port of Pireaus be limited to serving the region of the Capital, while a port of national importance must be looked for outside of Attica.

Despite this, the draft plan accepted that the port of Pireaus would not be adequate for serving the Athenian Metropolis in the year 2000, even if it was to be expanded towards Perama (to its west). It was therefore proposed that two additional commercial ports be developed by the year 2000, one by the community of Lavrion (East Attica) and one near Megara (West Attica), "despite the sizeable capital investment needed in order for both of them to become able to operate" [69, p. 29]. The port of Elefsina was proposed to remain as a military naval base, while the port of Pireaus would not be adequate for serving the Athenian Metropolis in the year 2000, even if it was to be expanded towards Perama (to its west). It was therefore proposed that two additional commercial ports be developed by the year 2000, one by the community Lavrion (East Attica) and one near Megara (West Attica), "despite the sizeable operate" [69, p. 29]. The port of Elefsina was proposed to remain as a military naval base, while the port by Rafina and Porto-Rafti, by Evoikos Gulf, would continue to carry limited amounts of passenger traffic, basically serving the nearby islands [65, p. 30]. The location-scheme of the sea ports, as proposed by the draft plan Athens 2000 can be seen on Figure 14, page 180.

iii) Railways: As an important means of land transportation, Proposition 1979 stressed the future role of railways in handling both

commercial and passenger traffic throughout Attica. The proposed railroad network, as it can be observed Figure 14, pag 180. is basically bypassing the Athenian basin with only one line, originating from Northern Greece and Europe, going through the urban part of the basin, by the center of Athens to the port of Pireaus. The port was also proposed to be connected with western Attica and Peloponese (Southwestern Greece) by a line following the coast to the west of the port and connecting with the basic east-to-west railroad axis, near the Industrial Park of Thriassion Pedion [69, p. 30].

The proposed new east-to-west railroad line, following the corridor of the freeway of Savros-Elefsina, and bypassing the Athenian basin, would connect the airport of Spata and east Attica with Western Attica and with the railroad lines going to Northern Greece and Peloponese. The remaining railway network, composed of a North-to-South axis, and of a line going along the western coast of Attica and connecting it with Peloponese would remain basically unchanged with only minor improvements [69, pp. 30-31].

iv) Metropolitan Subway System: The draft plan, recognizing the importance of urban railways for rapid passenger transportation within the highly urbanized area of the Athenian basin, proposed two new lines to be added to the existing north-to-south subway line, which presently connects the suburb of Kiffissia with Piraeus. These new lines, crisscrossing the center of Athens from east to west, would connect:

1. The western workers' community of Peristeri with the north-eastern part of the Athenian basin, ending to the community of Gerakas, where there would be a connection with the railway system (as well as with the freeway of Stavros-Elefsina).

2. The community of Sepolia, in the western part of the basin, to the southeastern urbanized area, ending at Ellinikon [69, p. 31].

The proposition of draft plan Athens 2000 concerning the metropolitan subway system can be found on Figure 14, page 17 .

v) Automotive Transportation: The automotive transportation network for the year 2000, as proposed by the draft plan, can also be seen in Figure 14, page 180. As the authors of Proposition 1979 noted: "The structure of the city, with its high building densities and land values, imposed a transportation solution based on improving the existing network rather than on constructing entirely new corridors" [69, p. 31]. However one such new corridor, crossing Attica from east-to-west, was proposed to be developed as a freeway, connecting the airport of Spata and western Attica to the industrial town of Elefsina in western Attica, after passing by the Northeastern suburb of Athens, Stavros. "Leophoros Stavros-Elefsina" as the proposed freeway was appropriately enough, referred to in Proposition 1979, would intersect with the National Road of Athens-Salonica (to Northern Greece), while its western extreme would merge with the National Road to Peloponese [69, p. 33]. In this way the transportation of Attica destined outside the region could bypass the center of Athens were today it converges. The Athenian basin could also be bypassed in its entirety by inter-region traffic passing through Attica, thanks to another proposed new freeway, which would connect the intersection of "Leophoros Stavros-Elefsina" with the National Road to

Peloponese to the National Road of Athens-Salonica, at the north of the town Thivai, in Beotea [69, p. 32] (See Figure 14, page 180).

Both the National roads (one leading to Salonica, Northern Greece and Yugoslavia as well as one leading to Peloponese and the important port city of Patra), were proposed to be upgraded into freeways. (Although their present width is adequate, both have still a number of one level intersections with other arterials). The extension of the National Road of Athens-Salonica inside the Athenian basin, going through the Western part of the urbanized area from north-to-south, would also be developed as a freeway carrying fast metropolitan traffic [69, p. 32]. This freeway, the northern half of which was already developed in 1979 under the name of "Leophoros Kiffissou" would be created by upgrading of already existing minor streets [69, p. 32].

As the other part of the city, giving access to the eastern districts of the Athenian basin, there was proposed another north-to-south freeway, to be developed by utilizing existing corridors of local streets.

"Leophoros Pendelis", as this eastern counterpart of Leophoros Kiffissou was referred to in Proposition 1979, would start at Stavros, where it would intersect with Leophoros Stavros-Elefsina, ending at the Phaleron coastline. There it would merge with a coastal freeway connecting the southern extremes of both the North-to-South primary transportation corridors, closing the "external freeway ring", which would surround the urbanized core of the Metropolis [69, pp. 32-33]. The proposed freeway system as described above can be seen mapped on figure 14, page 180.

Concerning transportation within the basin, the draft Plan Athens 2000

proposed the following east-to-west network of major arterials, between the parallel freeways of Stavros-Elefsina, at the Northern tip of the basin, and Phaleron, by the coast of Saronikos:

- Leophoros Kapodistria-Vysantiou (crossing the Tourkovounia hills, which separate the basin into two parts)
- Leophoros Mousson-Galatziou (crossing the hills Tourkovounia, also);
- Leophoros Alexandras (defining the center of Athens to the north);
- Leophoros Hamosternas (defining the center of Athens from the south); and
- Leophoros Sofouli-Spartis¹⁷.

All these would have intersections with both the freeways, Pendelis at their eastern end, and Kiffissou at their western [69, p. 33].

Concerning North-to-South transportation inside the basin, the plan proposed the construction of two new major arterials. The first would follow the railway line to Piraeus up to the port of Piraeus. The second, Leophoros Konstantinoupoleos, would adjunct to the center of Athens, bounding it to the west and would extend to the north to intersect with the Stavros-Elefsina freeway, and to the south to end at the freeway of Phaleron [69, p. 32].

17. From these east-to-west arterials the ones with a double naming (this is all except the two that bound the center of Athens) are composed today by two different streets, the first serving the western part of the basin while the second serves the eastern. "Proposition 1979" did not make it clear whether it proposed improvements aimed at functionally unifying the two parts of these arterials, promoting, in this way, the integration of the distinct eastern and western parts of the Athenian basin.

The rest of the north-to-south arterial network was to be formed by existing streets which, converging to the center of Athens, needed "little improvements". Of these:

- Leophoros Kiffissias (needing upgrading);
- Leophoros Kymis; and
- Leophoros Thivon

would continue to serve the northern part of the basin, while

- Leophoros Syngrou and
- Leophoros Thisseos

would serve the part of the basin lying to the south of the center of Athens [69, p. 32].

An "internal ring" proposed to surround the center of Athens, would consist of a part of Leophoros Pendelis (freeway), on the east, and from the major arterials of Leophoros Alexandras (north), Konstantinoupoleos (west) and Hamosternas (south) [69, p. 34]. Finally, Leophoros Voul-iagmenis, originating from the center of Athens, would continue to provide major arterial access to the Southeastern urban areas of the basin, mergin, near Ellinikon, with the coastal highway of Attica [69, p. 33].

Access to the second home areas and also the residential and industrial districts of eastern Attica (Messoghia) would be provided by a coastal highway and by a network of arterials intersecting with the freeway of Savros-Elefsina [69, p. 34]. On the other hand a new arterial, proposed to cross the mountains of Hymettus, through an underground tunnel, would provide another connection to the airport of Spata [69, p. 33]. The major arterial transportation network for the year 2000, as proposed by the draft plan for Attica, can be seen on figure 14, page 180.

vi) Public Transit: Proposition 1979 devoted a special paragraph to the issue of public transit. As it was noted: "Because the numbers of cars using the streets of the metropolitan area of the Capital are constantly increasing, the proposed physical improvements of the transportation network will not be effective in drastically improving the presently discouraging situation, unless the public transit system is reorganized radically, in a rational way" [69, p. 34].

To this end, the draft plan proposed the following general policies [69, pp. 34-35]:

1. That perimetric bus lines be organized with the possibility for passengers to transfer to bus lines radiating from the center of Athens, which would be preserved.
2. That the bus line network be organized in connection with the metropolitan subway system.
3. That special bus lanes be assigned on the transportation corridors for the exclusive use of public transit vehicles.
4. That parking areas be created by the bus terminals in the periphery of the basin.
5. That one unified fare be applied throughout the public transit network.

All these measures would be targeted at "increasing the relative attractiveness of the public transit system so that the use of the private car inside congested areas can be voluntarily limited" [69, p. 35].

vii) Parking: Proposition 1979 concluded its lengthy chapter concerning transportation with a paragraph on the issue of parking. Noting that "a basic prerequisite for the smooth operation of the proposed automotive transportation network is the balance between the street system and the availability of adequate parking space" [69, p. 35], the draft plan proposed the introduction of legal provisions targeted at making it compulsory for any new construction to be equipped with

adequate parking space for its future users.¹⁸

Finally Proposition 1979 noted that the location of proposed municipal (or otherwise publicly operated) multistory parking facilities should be designed in connection with the public transit system which "should become the primary means of transportation within the highly urbanized districts". Street parking in congested areas would be gradually prohibited so that more street space is used for traffic movement and also so that the use of private cars in such areas is discouraged [69, p. 35].

B10. Implementation Mechanisms, Resources and Programs

Proposition 1979 was concluded with a brief section concerning the implementation of the proposed master plan for Athens 2000. The measures proposed to be taken so that "the objectives of the plan be realized within the set time-frame" were distinguished into: a) legal; b) financial and c) administrative [69, p. 43].

Regarding the legal tools necessary for the implementation of plan Athens 2000, four categories of legislation were proposed [47, p. 43]:

1. Legislation regulating land use (this is land-use zoning legislation);
2. Legislation aimed at limiting urban densities.
3. Legislation imposing minimum standards for public land use space; and
4. Legislation aimed at securing adequate public urban land.

The law concerning "Urban Development Areas", which was being drafted by the Ministry of Public Works simultaneously with Proposition 1979 (and which was voted into effect in July of the same year, in the

18. Such a legislation was, indeed voted into effect in December 1979, in the form of Law 960/1979 which has been discussed earlier in this report.

form discussed earlier in this thesis, as law 947/1979) was expected to serve as the framework, on which future pièces of legislation, referring to all four of the categories mentioned above, would be based [69, p. 41].

Another draft legislation mentioned by Proposition 1975 and concerning "The Protection of the Environment from Industrial Activity" failed, however, to be brought before the National Assembly, probably because of pressures exercised by lobbying groups which could be adversely affected by such a law [69, p. 41].

Concerning the financial aspects of the implementation of the plan Athens 2000, Proposition 1979 noted that "a detailed public investment program had to be elaborated, comparing the resources available with the necessary capital investment programs, and setting priorities" [69, p. 43]. The financial means for the implementation of the plan should, according to Proposition 1979, be managed by ETERPS (the National Fund for the Implementation of Urban Development Plans and Programs, established by the L.D. 1262/1972), whose resources "had to be strengthened by the state" [69, p. 42]. On the other hand Proposition 1979 stressed the role that DEPOS (the Public Corporation for Urban Development and Housing, established by Law 446/1976), could play in the production of affordable standard housing by actively getting involved in the low-income housing market, under the provisions of the "Urban Development Areas" law (Later, 947/1979) [69, p. 47].

Finally, in regard to the administration of the implementation of the proposed plan for Athens at a strategic level, the authors of Proposition 1979 suggested the creation of a new administrative unit,

under the name of Administration of Master Plans, which would prepare implementation programs and also direct public investment policies [69, p. 43].

C. EVALUATION OF PROPOSITION 1979

Planning of any kind, and urban planning in particular, can be seen in two ways: First as the job of planning professionals who put into use scientific intelligence in order to "provide a factual context for the consideration of policy questions" [8, p. 4] and, second, as an endeavor of the organized society which, in a more or less democratic way, more or less implicitly, sets goals for its future and attempts to formulate policies in order to meet them. In an ideal situation planning in the first sense would be just a part of planning in the second, with the scientific methods of planners being used to rationally and effectively serve the aspiration of a community of people to control their future.

The term "planning process" as used throughout this thesis, encompasses both these dimensions of planning which one might well term, respectively, "political" and "professional" or "scientific."

The purpose of this section is to evaluate Proposition 1979 as the product of a planning process. The political aspects of this process have already been discussed in section A of this chapter and will also be reviewed at the conclusions of the thesis.

The critique of Proposition 1979 in this section focuses on studying:

1. The degree to which the planning goals and objectives set by Proposition 1979, address the problems of Athens in an operational way;
2. The relation between these goals and objectives and the means proposed for meeting them;
3. The extent to which these propositions have been grounded on a thorough analysis of the existing situation of the metropolitan area of Athens;
4. The compatibility of the propositions concerning particular urban activities, to each other and to the general proposition scheme;
5. The implementability of the propositions.

Although the responsibility for the evaluation which follows lies with the author of this thesis, references to a critique of Proposition 1979 presented by the Technical Chamber of Greece, as a contribution to the process of public discussion of the draft plan, in June, 1979 [76] will be cited also in support of some of the author's views.

C1. Goals, Objectives and Preliminary Assumptions

If planning was to be viewed as "a series of related actions and decisions that are organized around and moving towards the accomplishment of objectives" [14, p. 327], then establishing goals and objectives that are operational, that in other words can lead to concrete plan propositions, should be no less than "the cornerstone of the planning process" [14, p. 327].

In regard with the ultimate planning goal set by Proposition 1979, there would not be many who would find anything objectionable

in striving for "improving the living conditions of the Athenians and increasing their productivity" [68, p. 8]. What one could note, however, is that such a generally stated clause might indicate that for the authors of the draft plan "the Athenians" form one group, with one, distinct, common interest. However, to such a notion, a number of professionals who believe that planning should be a tool for allocating resources and developing the environment in order to eliminate the great inequalities of wealth and power in society",¹⁹ in other words, who declare that there is not one "public interest" but a multitude of competing interests of different social groups, would disagree profoundly. Indeed, concerning the goal of "improving the living conditions of the Athenians", the forementioned critique by the Technical Chamber of Greece noted [76, p, 27]:

There is no doubt that the present living conditions of all the residents of the metropolitan area of Athens are degraded. However the generality of the goal as expressed in Proposition 1979 conceals the present economic, social, functional or local disparities between different groups of the Athenian population, disparities which would dictate a clearer definition of Proposition 1979's 'living conditions in the Capital' and, consequently, a goal statement more emphathetic to the needs of the disadvantaged.

On the other hand most Greeks would probably support the idea that "decentralization at the national level" would be the best way to change the present problematic situation of Athens antagonizing the rest of Greece for attracting population, economic activity and social amenities, a situation thought of as detrimental to both the country

19. This quotation is taken out of the Statement of Principles as adopted by the founding conference of the Planners Network, held on May 8-10, 1981, in Washington, D.C.

and its Capital. However, before national scale decentralization" could be used as the principle, on which the proposition of the comprehensive plan of a metropolitan area is to be based, there would be a need for a detailed analysis of the present spatial distribution of economic resources and activities within Greece, measuring, in some way, the impact this particular distribution has on the development of the country. This analysis could serve as the basis for a national development plan, within which attempts to promote decentralization of national magnitude activities away from Athens would have some practical meaning [76, p. 10].

For instance, because "population distribution is the direct result of a particular socio-economic and administrative structure" [76, p. 23], the basic assumption of Proposition 1979 that the population of Athens "would not exceed 4,3000,000 persons in the year 2000" (in other words that it would grow only at an annual rate equaling its natural increase) "could only be made if a program of intensive economic development was actively pursued in provincial Greece, in addition to any policies aiming at relieving Athens from some of its present administrative and economic functions" [76, p. 23]. However such a program (and much less, of course, a national development plan on which it could be based) did not exist at the time Proposition 1979 was being drafted. It is true that a decision concerning "Policy lines for the Decentralization of Greece"²⁰ was arrived at by the National Council of Regional Planning and Environment a little after the draft

20. Later this decision was given the legal status of an Administrative Decree (Nov. 6th, 1979). For more details the reader may refer to pages 67 and 68 of this thesis.

plan was presented to the public. However this decision, justly criticized for being arbitrary as well as unimplementable, could not replace the missing development plan of Greece, which had to be comprehensive in nature as well as based on a detailed analysis of the existing spatial distribution of soci-economic activity in the country [76, pp. 10, 11].

In regard to the issue of "Decentralization at the Metropolitan Level", another of the basic objectives of Proposition 1979, one could expect a consensus among Athenians in accepting as a fact that presently the metropolis of Athens is too poorly organized around its single center while the prephery of the metropolis suffers various deficiencies in both social and technical urban infra-structure. In this context it is difficult to disagree, in principle, with the intentions of Proposition 1979 to balance urban development "through the transformation of the city's structure from a single-centered to a multi-centered one" [69, p. 4]. However one should be allowed to keep some reservations concerning the feasibility of such an ambitious scheme, especially if it is to be attempted "without compromising the philosophical principles of the free economic system" [69, p. 4], within which even the most competent planning is bound to represent only one in the multitude of forces that interact to shape the urban environment [76, p. 32].

The objective of "redistributing the population and urban functions throughout the city and rehabilitating problematic areas" appears certainly humane and well meaning, provided that one interprets it as primarily intending--in agreement with the goal of "improving

the living conditions of the Athenians"--the betterment of the situation of people who today live with too high densities, in districts ill-equipped with both technical and social infrastructure. However such an intention is not clear in the way the objective is stated. For instance the work "redistributing" does not give a clue as to whether what is considered worst are too high or too low densities. As a matter of fact, one can "read" the objective as having its emphasis rather on encouraging an increase of densities in presently sparingly built areas, so that their equipment with infrastructure networks becomes less costly, per capita [69, p. 30]. By the same token the word "rehabilitation" may be interpreted as meaning, merely, the physical upgrading of blighted areas, through a program of urban renewal which could dislocate the original inhabitants.

If one were to interpret this objective in the first way, it is clear that its materialization would require not only a sizeable public investment but also a decisive public intervention in the domain of private property. However the emphasis with which the authors of Proposition 1979 declared that their objectives would be accomplished "without compromising the principles of the free enterprise system" and within a "realistic" (sic) financial framework, indicates rather that the second interpretation would be closer to their minds [76, p. 33]. Unfortunately, the propositions of the draft plan, stressing the use of rehabilitation programs in the less densely populated districts of the northern and north-eastern areas of the Athenian basin [76, p. 44], while not mentioning in equally specific terms any rehabilitation of the much more problematic areas in the western parts of the city, also point to

such an interpretation of the objective, interpretation which shows it greatly limited in its scope [76, p. 32].

Concerning the objective of "protecting the environment", as it is pointed out in the critique by the Technical Chamber of Greece, "no one could disagree" [76, p. 30]. In fact the problems of air and coastal pollution have reached such threatening dimensions in Athens during the recent years, that the issue of environmental protection has become an extremely popular one. However for the objective to become "operational" it should have been more completely defined. For instance it would be perhaps helpful for Proposition 1979 to have specified the existing major sources of pollution as well as to state which, and to what extent, they can be controlled [76, p. 32].

Finally, in regard to the objectives of "decreasing travel time and energy consumption" through "reorganizing the urban circulation system", and of "decreasing the transportation needs of the population" through "redistributing functions" one can say that they are addressing in a sensible way a clearly existing problem. Indeed, the present condition of the transportation system is one among the most obvious--if not among the most serious--evils that plague the Athenian Metropolis today. It must be stressed also that a number of factors dictate a solution to this problem based on eliminating the need for extensive movements through the metropolis, rather than one based on capital improvements. Among these factors one can include the poor finances of the Greek state,²¹ the present relatively low private car ownership and the

21. Because of limited public capital investment possibilities and also because of scarcity of unbuilt urban space and too high land values, a highway system as sophisticated as that of an American city of comparable size would not be feasible in Athens.

very high cost of gasoline [76, p. 30]. In this context the principles on which the two objectives of Proposition 1979 dealing with the issue of transportation are based, can be characterized as basically sound. However the degree to which the proposed transportation plan helps to meet these objectives will have to be examined later.

Overall, concerning the goals and objectives of Proposition 1979 one could say that while they have certainly been well within the "public sentiment", they remained too generally stated--almost to the point of being ambiguous--to be practically usable in facilitating the formulation of a well defined proposition scheme. The relations between some of the weaknesses of the actual proposition scheme of the draft plan Athens 2000 and the fact that the goals and objectives, formulated at its onset, were not elaborated to the degree that they should have, will be pointed out further in the following pages.

C2. The Missing Analysis

In a traditional planning process the step of goal setting is usually followed by research and analysis [14, p. 1]. A rigorous analysis is basic for planning, not only because it points out exactly where the generally perceived problems, needs, and deficiencies lie but also because it brings to view existing change trends, trends that it is the planner's job to alter, modify or even sometimes reverse [76, p. 27]. Furthermore, as T.J. Kent asserts [16, p. 134] "the existing major development issues and the problems that the plan attempts to deal with (. . .) including information trends, forecasts and assumptions (. . .) must be described and presented in their full context" in the "introductory sections" of the planning document itself. Because, Kent

goes on [16, p. 134]:

(. . .) the way in which the introductory sections of the official general-plan document are handled (. . .) can greatly affect the degree of interest and respect with which the ideas and policies presented in the document are subsequently studied and used.

The above introductory paragraph would be rather common place if it was not for the fact that analytic studies of any kind were entirely left out of the planning document of Proposition 1979. In fact, the statement of proposals concerning each one of the urban issues dealt with in the draft plan was preceded by only a brief paragraph of summary findings which were not supported by citing references to original base-studies or even to already existing analytic data. The additional fact that the methodology followed for arriving at the proposition scheme of the plan was nowhere described [76, p. 38], leaves the reader wondering about the origin and even the credibility of the information on which the findings and, consequently, the Proposition itself has been based.

The issue here, of course, is not whether the proposals of the draft plan have been based on some analytic data or not, for they obviously have. The issue rather is that the omission of presenting these data in the planning report along with the synthetic work is unacceptable. It is well known that in social studies the decision about which data to collect, how to collect them and also how to process them can greatly affect both the quality of the findings as well as the degree to which these findings can be convincing. The age of the data collection is also an important factor, especially in situations where change is rapidly taking place. In the planning document under evaluation the absence of information concerning the analytic data on which findings

and propositions have been based creates a series of questions.

First, if one was to judge from the fact that Proposition 1979 was prepared in a very short time, especially considering the limited planning man-power available in the Directorate of Master Plans at the time, it would be safe to deduce that probably there have not been major original analytic studies for plan Athens 2000, the findings and proposals of which much have been based on data from already available sources. Among these sources one would include the analytic studies which accompanied the two master-plans for Athens, which were prepared in the early seventies (respectively by Doxiadis' firm and by the Office of Athens Master Plan, under the direction of Vassiliadis) while the "Fifteen Years Development Plan of Greece" which was prepared by KEPE during the dictatorship period, must also have provided some forecast data.²² Apart from the fact that in some cases analytic information coming from such sources could be considered outdated (if one takes into account the high growth rate of Athens) a much bigger problem is posed by the question of whether it is possible for information derived from various analytic studies, based on data which have been probably collected in different ways and for different purposes, to be put meaningfully together. This question becomes even more pressing if one considers the fact that Proposition 1979 did not include any references

22. Proposition 1979 based, for instance, its estimates concerning industrial employment in Athens, by the year 2000, on a "forecast by KEPE" [69, p. 22]. Although the reference is no more complete than that, the study implied is apparently the Fifteen Year Development Plan. It must be noted here that this "plan" has been widely criticized, even during the military rule, and officially denounced after the restoration of the democratic regime, for representing an attempt to justify the status quo, rather than to promote any national development goals.

to previous studies, evaluating in some way their frequently contradictory findings and propositions [76, p. 38].

Second, the absence of any description of analytic studies leaves the reader of the draft plan in the dark concerning whether any of its propositions have been based on existing trends or whether they just represent "desired ends". This, however, would be significant because, while propositions based on existing trends can generally be implemented without problems, propositions which would require altering these trends in order to materialize should be accompanied by some statement indicating in broad terms how their implementation is envisioned. In relation to this T.J. Kent asserts: "The general plan is not a program. It states the desired ends, but does not specify the measures for achieving them" [16, p. 21]. However, not many planners would contest that these "desired ends" of a plan must be rooted on the existing situation and the ways it is changing. This does not mean of course that the recommendations of a plan should be projections of existing trends to the future (such planning would be useless), but merely that an attempt to reverse existing trends should be based on a knowledge of these, and made with thoughtfulness and deliberate action.

This has not always been the case with the proposals of the draft plan Athens 2000. A good illustration showing how the failure to include in the planning document complete analytic data as the basis for a proposal can impair the degree to which this proposal can be accepted is provided by the urban expansion recommendation of the draft plan. The reader may remember that the metropolitan area of Athens was proposed to expand primarily to its north and northeast. However, this urban expan-

sion scheme, apparently based primarily on topographic considerations has been strongly criticized for being in sharp contrast with "existing urban expansion trends" which, according to a statement by the Technical Chamber of Greece, indicated "that the western districts of the Athenian basin" were the ones "exhibiting a high rate of growth" while the northern and northeastern ones were growing at much more modest rates [76, p. 45].

Whether this statement is true or false (and to someone who has lived in Athens for a while it would appear rather logical) could be decided only after a special study of the existing urban expansion trends in Athens. The finding of such a study--even if in agreement with the hypothesis of the Technical Chamber of Greece--would by no means force the abandonment of the proposal as it was. Certainly, though, they would have made necessary a strong argument defending the planning choice against other possible alternatives, in an effort to persuade decision makers and the public alike, that it had been selected for very good reasons. Otherwise--as happened with the urban expansion scheme of the draft plan--the proposition could be vulnerable to justified criticism and its credibility as well as its implementability could be endangered.

According to T.J. Kent, the introductory chapter of a general-plan should comprise besides the presentation and analysis of the existing situation, also a description of the planning process followed for arriving at the propositions [16, p. 139]. Concerning this matter it is rather surprising--especially if one remembers the publicity that was given to the first phase of plan preparation--that nowhere in the planning document of Proposition 1979 can the reader find references to the

Idea Plans, on which the draft plan has been based, nor to the way the findings and suggestions of these studies have been utilized [76, p. 38]. Furthermore it is unfortunate that references to the previous comprehensive plans prepared for Athens with the active involvement of the agency responsible for the production of Proposition 1979 during the period from 1963 to 1979, were also missing [76, p. 38]. On this particular issue the critique by the Technical Chamber of Greece noted [76, p. 38]:

For reasons of scientific and methodological "propriety" there should have been not only bibliographical references to the previous attempts of planning for Athens, but a complete documentation of (. . .) what was kept as constructive from the past experience as well as of what was regarded as negative (. . .). This would have also offered a measure for estimating the degree of elaboration of the propositions of the draft plan .

Indeed, by omitting any references to previous plans and urban studies for Athens the authors of Proposition 1979 may have succeeded in avoiding to comment on the past planning performance of the public agency to which they belong, but certainly failed to present their own work in its proper perspective.

C3. The Land Use Proposition

The final goal of Proposition 1979 was to transform Athens into a functional city, so that its people are happy ("improving the living conditions of the Athenians") and prosperous ("increasing their productivity"). As one can deduce from the stated planning objectives this goal was supposed to materialize primarily through the following three strategies:

1. Decentralization at the national level, which would result in the gradual reduction of the role of Athens in relation to the rest of Greece;

2. Decentralization at the metropolitan level, which would result in the decongestion of the center of Athens and the more efficient function of the city as a whole;
3. Improvement of the transportation system, so that moving within the metropolis becomes more efficient in terms of time and cost.

The issue of decentralization at the national level was not directly dealt with in Proposition 1979 and rightfully so, since the plan was focused on the city of Athens rather than the country. However it has presumably been a primary consideration which has guided the propositions of the draft plan. Other considerations such as the efficient functioning of the residential areas, their being equipped with public facilities and open spaces, as well as the issue of the environment, were clearly among the objectives of the plan but one can say that they were subordinated to the primary three, and especially this of metropolitan decentralization.

In fact it appears that the issue of decentralization at the level of the metropolis is the central theme of the plan [76, p. 37], since it is on this concept that the spatial distribution of most urban functions (such as education, retain commerce, recreation, health-care etc.) are based. Yet such urban functions are dealt with in Proposition 1979 only in general terms, under the stated assumption that their specifics are to be examined during the preparation of the proposed Sector Plans.

i) Nine sectors: The issue of metropolitan decentralization: In evaluating the degree to which the proposed reorganization of Athens into nine more or less self-contained Sectors is conducive to the goal

of metropolitan decentralization, one should examine whether or not this corresponds to a real redistribution of urban activities and functions so that each Sector represents a somewhat distinct entity and can function as a unit.

Of course, that a Sector should be able to function as a unit in order to help promote metropolitan decentralization should not be interpreted as meaning that each Sector had to be completely homogenous or, for that matter, absolutely self-contained. Self-contained it could not possibly be, since it had to remain an integral part of one metropolitan area. Homogenous, on the other hand, perhaps it should not be, since no city, functioning as such, ever is.

A memorandum [92], issued in Fall, 1979 by the Directorate of Master Plans of the Ministry of Public Works, was intended to clarify the concept of Sectors, as meant in Proposition 1979, for the purpose of facilitating the preparation of the nine Sector plans (at that time ordered to an equal number of planning firms), remarked the following [92, p. 1]:

Certainly the Sector cannot be considered as having an absolute autonomy in relation with the rest of the metropolitan area. The goal is to have it organized as an area with relative autonomy in regard with its function and its possibility to be studied as a separate planning unit.

In the same document the two primary conceptual elements of the notion "Sector" were defined as being [92, p. 1]:

1. The relation between Sector and its center: Through this the Sector appears as space "polarized" around one center. The "creation" of this center is, consequently, a crucial factor for shaping the Sector as a metropolitan subdivision with relative functional autonomy.
2. The relation between residential-non residential land uses: The target is to reorganize residential land uses and employment related ones, so that movements through the metropolis be minimized and so that congested areas are relieved.

It is clear that according to the above, an organization of the Athenian metropolis into Sectors would radically differ from the present situation, in which one center of metropolitan magnitude (with another by the port of Piraeus as its appendix) coexists with a multitude of minor lineal or polar concentrations of non-residential function; in which, in addition, large numbers of people have to move daily to distant places in order to work, or seek the satisfaction of various other needs [76, p. 40].

Nevertheless, if it was only to be judged by a look at the Athens 2000 land use plan (figure 14, page 180), one would certainly not observe such an obvious change. Indeed, the division into nine Sectors is in no way evident in the plan, except of course through the Sector-boundary markings (see figure 15, page 185). Certainly, appearances might well be deceptive if the Sectors were internally organized in a way that enforced their functioning as entities. However this would require the provision within each Sector of an adequate range of employment opportunities as well as opportunities for education, daily and weekly shopping, health care, recreation, etc. Furthermore, this would require that all these non-residential land uses be organized in such a way that, while they are readily accessible to people residing in the Sector, they are not as easy to reach for the population of the rest of the metropolis. This would have a discouraging effect on inter-Sector movement within the metropolis, in accordance to the objectives of the plan.

Nevertheless, such as internal organization of the nine Sectors again cannot be guessed on the Athens 2000 land use plan, although one would expect it to be somehow indicated, even in the very broad scale of Proposition 1979. For one thing, employment--in particular industrial

employment since this is the only one which was dealt with in some detail by the draft plan--does not follow the distribution of population in the Sectors. For instance, while most new population is proposed to be received by the northern part of the Athenian basin (Sectors 1 and 2), no new industrial employment opportunities are provided there [76, p. 50]. On the other hand the two already existing industrial zones in the area--both located along the National Road to Salonica--are equally accessible to residents of these two Sectors, since they lie on their common boundary, but are also within access to people residing in other parts of the metropolis, provided they can use the freeway system.

Concerning the proposed Sector-centers, questions could be raised both in regard with their location and their internal organization. Indeed, while it would be expected that the Sector-centers, presumably the focus of non-residential activity in each Sector, would be located so that they are well connected with populated areas in the Sector to which they belong but not as well with areas in other Sectors, often this does not happen. For instance, among the seven proposed new Sector-centers, five (these of Sectors 9, 5, 1, 2 and 3), are located on (or in the immediate vicinity of) the free-way Stavros-Elefsina. While such a location improves choice among various centers (not an objective of the draft plan) it also encourages private car use (definitely not an objective), and inter-Sector movement (something that the draft plan intended to avoid). Certainly such a location does not promote the desired "self-contained" function of each Sector.

On the other hand, this is not promoted by the organization of the transportation system inside the Sector, either. As a matter of fact it seems like the transportation network--which, incidentally, was studied

in much greater detail than any other aspect of the plan [76, p. 51]-- was designed before (or despite) the decision to divide Athens into nine Sectors was made, and certainly, before the location of the Sector-centers was assigned on the map. In this way it looks like the centers were located in relation to the proposed transportation network rather than the opposite [76, p. 52], with the result that in many cases they are awkwardly related to areas in the Sector. For instance one cannot see why people of Sector 9, residing along the coast of Saronikos Gulf, would prefer using the center of Stavros to that of Ellinikon, to which their access is obviously better (See Figures 14, on pages 180 and 185 respectively).

Concerning the organization of activities within the Sector-centers, the draft plan indicated that each would include administrative buildings, public facilities--such as a cultural center and a general hospital--and also tertiary sector activity, in other words, retail commerce and services. One would question, here, the appropriateness of locating major hospitals inside active business districts. However this would be a minor issue. The major issue is the question of how the draft plan dealt with the Sector-centers attracting the crucial for their functioning tertiary sector activity [76, p. 51]. Because, although locating public facilities of any kind on a site which was chosen to be developed as a center is something relatively easy to accomplish (as it depends solely on administrative decision), it is not quite as simple to insure that private businesses are attracted to the same site, especially if this is left to rely just on obscurely defined "incentives". Concerning this matter, although introducing land use zoning was among the stated objectives of Proposition 1979, nowhere in the planning document was mentioned

any intention to promote the separation of commercial land uses from residential ones by any means, and particularly by commercial land use zoning.

However, perhaps the most objectionable part in the way Proposition 1979 approached the issue of the internal organization of the Sectors is the fact that it disregarded completely the task of defining sub-Sectors and of locating sub-Sector centers. However, as noted in the Critique by the Technical Chamber of Greece [76, p. 42]:

Even in the very board scale of the draft plan, a sub-Sector of an average population of 70,000 is an urban unit large enough to require that at least its center is defined in size and location. It is, in fact, very probable that had the authors of the plan proceeded in doing so, many of their particular propositions, for instance this concerning the limits of urban expansion, this concerning the role and location of the Sector-Centers and also this concerning the transportation system would have to be revised.

On a different scale, this of the metropolis rather than that of the Sector, the logic on which the authors of Proposition 1979 based their division of the metropolitan area into Sectors can also be questioned. Indeed one can legitimately wonder whether defining the boundaries of each Sector just by following "the legal limits of existing municipalities (...) the location of major transportation corridors (...) and the geographical and physical characteristics of the area" [69, p. 37], while, of course, taking also into account the goal of "balancing population through the Sectors", would suffice to guarantee that these, city-sized metropolitan subdivisions, could function as "relatively independent" [92, p. 1] units.

Unfortunately this does not appear to be the case concerning, for instance, Sector number 9, which comprises almost the entire western

Attica (see Figure 15, p. 185). Indeed the highly developed touristic southern part of Saronikos Gulf does not have much in common with the rural area of Messoghia--from which it is separated by mountains--nor to the calmer middle class second home areas, along the coast of Evoikos Gulf. By the same token the completely urbanized Sector 5, physically and functionally bisected by the steep hills of Tourkovounia, is made out of two very distinct parts, a Western part, composed of refugee and working class communities, and an Eastern part, comprising upper middle class subdivisions along with the two most affluent suburbs of Psy-chiko and Filothei.

Of course, that a Sector should consist of parts that can compose unit does not mean that it should be socially or functionally homogenous. This could be detrimental also, and Sector 3 furnishes a good example to that effect. This Sector, as proposed, concentrates the largest (and probably the most pollutant²³) industrial zones in the entire metropolis, and, as a consequence, a big share of the total industrial employment. Given this fact, and in consistency with the development goal according to which people employed in one Sector must also reside in it, one can conclude that the new population expected in Sector 3 by the year 2000 would be primarily composed of industrial workers' families. In addition to the one could expect also a number of farmers and agricultural workers, since the rural character of the plain of Megara is planned to be preserved (see Figure 14, page 180).

This however would mean that the social structure of the population

23. According to a statement in Proposition 1979, the highly pollutant industries will be located in industrial zones, away from the Athenian Basin [69, p. 24].

in Sector 3 would be one-sided, with lower income people²⁴ overrepresented. And since the poor have usually little power to influence administrative decision-making--especially in the case that this is centralized--as in the proposed Sector administration scheme--one would not be sure about how it can become possible for "the living conditions" in the Sector "to improve", without its residents being able to pressure for it. Especially if one takes also into account the fact that the area is already among the most degraded in Attica, with extremely severe of air pollution (the most pollutant factories in Greece among which a steel industry and numerous oil refineries are presently concentrated in the area) and sea-coast pollution which is caused both because of discharges of industrial waste and of the fact that the entire Elefsina Bay is used as a tanker anchorage [39, p. 38]. Taking all this into account one could be inclined to at least partly accept the somehow exaggerated criticism by the Technical Chamber of Greece, according to which the Sector division scheme of Proposition 1979 emphasizes the social class segregation observed in the metropolitan area of Athens [76, p. 30; 39, p. 27].

This, on the other hand, brings to the surface another serious issue in regard to which the proposal of the draft plan concerning the Sectors appears unsatisfactory. This is the issue of restructuring the system of metropolitan administration of Athens on the basis of the nine Sectors. In the Critique by the Technical Chamber of Greece one reads in relation to this matter [76, p. 48]:

24. Both industrial workers and farmers (and especially the latter), are considered to be among the poor social groups in Greece.

It is considered a basic weakness of Proposition 1979, that the restructuring of the metropolitan administration system which it proposes appears to ignore the issue of the administrative decentralization and the role that local governments can play in promoting it. It seems as if older propositions of the Directorate of Master Plans, concerning the organization of a unified metropolitan government²⁵ consisting of a form of coalition of the individual municipalities and communities of the Athenian metropolis have been abandoned by the draft plan.

Indeed, the propositions of plan Athens 2000 in regard to the administration of the Sectors--according to which each would be governed by a Prefecture, a rigid bureaucratic unit controlled by the central government--does not promote decentralization at the metropolitan level. First of all, Prefectures do not possess any decision making power of their own, their actions being directed from the Ministry of Interior. Second, they are not bodies representative of the Sector's population because they are not elected. As a result if the administrative units of the Sectors were to have the status of Prefectures the Sector residents would not have any direct access to them and, consequently, their chances to influence decisions that would affect their every day lives would be extremely limited.

On the other hand the planning power of such an administrative unit would be questionable, since any "decisions" it could make would have been subject to approval by the Central Government, this latter being thus the supreme--and supremely centralized--planning authority in the metropolis [76, p. 10]. In light of this, the alternative prescribed by

25. Here the authors of the critique by the Technical Chamber of Greece imply a proposition of Policy 1977 (see page 157).

by the Technical Chamber of Greece²⁶ appears to be much more attractive.

It is as follows [39, p. 27]:

The administrative organization of Athens must be based on local self-government. First-level government units--the present municipalities and communities--should administer the affairs of localities with populations ranging between 50,000-100,000 people. The Sectors should be also self-governed, form-in a unit of second-level local government. Finally the metropolitan area should be administered by a third level local government, consisting of representatives from the second-level ones.

ii) The transportation plan: The proposition concerning transportation is, by far, the most elaborate one in the draft plan. One cannot question the importance of the transportation system in a metropolitan area of the size of Athens, especially since its present condition poses grave functional and economic problems. However one could agree with the criticism expressed by the Technical Chamber according to which "the extremely unequal degree of elaboration between the proposed transportation plan and the propositions concerning other urban functions does not do justice to the importance of transportation, itself", since "a well-functioning transportation system", rather than being "an absolute planning goal", must be oriented "towards serving a particular relation of urban functions, needs and objectives, in other words, a particular organization of land uses" [76, p. 52].

Apart from this, the proposed perimetric freeway system which

26. The following quotation is an excerpt from a document concerning the principles on which, according to the Technical Chamber of Greece, planning for Athens must be based. This document, often referred to as "The Plus Eight Points", was drafted in Fall, 1979 and subsequently endorsed by several public interest groups. More information about it can be found in the next chapter of this thesis.

bypasses the center of Athens seems satisfactory, although, as the Critique by the Technical Chamber of Greece notes: "it emphasizes the present organization of the Athenian metropolis in a western, an eastern, a northern, and a central part, with all the problems that this organization represents" [76, p. 53]. (Incidentally the author of this thesis does not agree with the criticism, for practical reasons,²⁷ as the construction of a radically differently organized freeway system would not be feasible). Especially commendable is the creation of the east-to-west freeway, Stavros-Elefsina, which makes possible for long distance Attica traffic to bypass the heavily urbanized core of the Athenian Basin. Even more worthy of positive reaction is the proposition of the freeway connecting Thivai with Elefsina, which makes possible for inter-city traffic to bypass Athens entirely.

One could not raise substantial objections concerning also the proposed railway system, although the Critique by the Technical Chamber of Greece remarks that "the abolishment of the Peloponese railroad line" (presently starting at the western edge of the center of Athens and going west) "is positive in regard with the objective of removing loading of goods out of the urban core of Athens, but contrary to the objective of improving the comfort of the public transportation system, since the passengers to Peloponese will be inconvenienced" [76, p. 53]. (To this criticism, however, one could respond that a better organization of the

27. The geographical relief of the area almost dictates the location of the perimetric freeways as they have been proposed in the draft plan. Another solution would have been prohibitively costly, especially if one considers the finances of the Greek public sector.

railway routes could solve this problem, since passenger trains destined to Peloponense could still use the north-to-south line which passes through the basin).

However a major objection to the proposed transportation plan could be raised in regard with the network of arterials, collectors, and secondary streets which all appear to be finally defined, in both their function and location.²⁸ This happens at a moment when the boundaries or the centers of the 70,000 people sub-Sectors are not yet determined, when the nine Sectors themselves have not yet been dealt with but in the broadest manner, without any elaboration concerning their internal land use organization, indicating, for instance, the location of public service zones, open space, major athletic installations, etc. As it is noted in the Critique of the Technical Chamber of Greece [76, p. 52]:

In this way the impression is conveyed that what is proposed is a transportation plan capable of receiving and accomodating whatever land uses, movements, needs, potential change etc.

Disregarding the problem of the "overelaboration of the transportation plan", there is another important fault that one can observe in it. Indeed, while one would expect that the proposed arterial and secondary street network would in some way correspond to the organization of the urban space of metropolitan Athens into nine Sectors--after all this organization is of strategic importance to the draft plan--this cannot be seen on the map. To the contrary, the grid pattern of the major arterials as it appears on Figure 14, page 180--a pattern typically

28. Because of the necessary substantial reduction of the land use plan presented in Figure 19, page 180, streets of lesser importance than major arterials do not appear there, despite the fact that they were indicated in the 1:50,000 scaled original.

followed also by collectors and secondary streets--suggests an integrated urban organism rather than a polycentric one. This is also the case in regard with the proposed subway system--except that this stresses, in addition, the paramount role of the present center of Athens [76, p. 40]. Here it should be noted that the subway system as appearing in Proposition 1979, was planned and also officially adopted by the central government administration, several years before plan Athens 2000 was initiated. However since construction was not yet started at that time, it could have been revised by Proposition 1979 in order to conform with the spirit of the rest of the plan.

Another relatively minor observation concerning the proposed automotive transportation scheme is that in some cases it appears to be grossly overestimating the financial capabilities of the public sector in Greece, although one objective of the draft plan was exactly to avoid this. For instance, even if one was to accept the financial feasibility of the proposed metropolitan freeway system (one could have doubts about this, too) it seems almost certain that a tunnel could never be cut through the mountains of Hymetus, as it was proposed, just for the purpose of giving secondary access to the new airport in Spata.

Concerning this latter, there has been much opposition dating since the time its construction was proposed in a special study, a few years before planning for Athens 2000 started. The major points of the critique against the airport of Spata as it was articulated in an study ordered by the Technical Chamber of Greece, can be summarized as follows:

1. The creation of an airport facility as large as the one proposed, would further emphasize the role of Athens as the center of Greece.

2. The construction of the new airport and its related facilities would require a major public capital investment, which would be taken away from projects of higher priority.
3. The proposed airport would take up a quite large parcel of prime agricultural land on the plan of Messoghia and would also pose a serious threat to the conservation of its rural character [25, p. 14].

In its critique of Proposition 1979, the Technical Chamber of Greece insisted on its arguments against the proposed airport, pointing out that its creation would contradict two explicitly stated objectives of Plan Athens 2000, namely that of promoting national decentralization and of conserving agricultural land. It should be pointed out, however, that all parts agreed that the present metropolitan airport of Ellinikon is already inadequate for taking care of the daily airborne traffic and that its expansion is highly problematic because of the urbanization level of the surrounding land.

In regard with the proposition concerning sea-port development, the Technical Chamber of Greece strongly approved the objective of Proposition 1979 "not to further development of the port of Piraeus" [76, p. 53]. However it pointed out that the proposition, of two new major ports in Attica (near Megara and Lavrion respectively), contradicted the objective of promoting national-level decentralization. The author of this thesis, while believing that a special study focused on determining the needs of the metropolitan area of Athens concerning sea transportation, and on analyzing the impact of the proposed ports on the rest of the urban organism is in order before the issue can be decided, feels that the

creation of a major port in Lavrion would require a better land transportation connection with the metropolis than the one proposed in the draft plan.

Finally concerning public transit and parking one would approve of the general suggestions, broadly sketching the reorganization of the metropolitan bus system, although--because of the scale of the plan--those remain too abstract to be properly evaluated. Very positive, on the other hand, is the proposition to develop the metropolitan subway system, at least in principle, since the author's objections on the proposed organization of the lines have already expressed. However one should also address the question, as the critique of the Technical Chamber does, of whether the proposed sophisticated (for Greece, at least) freeway system will not encourage further use of the private car, despite Proposition 1979 emphasizing the advantages of mass transportation [76, p. 55].

iii) The role of Athens: A dilemma: In an article entitled "The Economics of Urban size" William Alonso notes [11, p. 434]:

At least since Aristotle, men have wondered about the best size for cities. In the last decades developed and developing nations, capitalist and socialist, have increasingly adopted more or less explicit policies of urbanization with special reference to city size. Most typically, these policies assume that the big cities of the nation are too big, and therefore try to disperse growth. Complementarily, in recent years such dispersal policies and policies addressed to distressed or backward regions, have recognized that these alternative centers must be of a certain minimum size, however ill-defined, in order to be viable. In its simplest sense, the question of urban size consists of symmetric parts: how big is too big? and, how big is big enough?

Concerning this question it seems that there is a near consensus in Greece in accepting that Athens is, indeed, too big, in the sense that its relative size and socio-economic impact dominates the rest of the

country. The author of this thesis is certainly aware of the fact that there is currently a debate going on among planners, in which the traditional notion that "overurbanization" is to be condemned because it inhibits balanced growth in developing countries, is challenged. Greece is an overurbanized country [11, p. 423], if one defines as such, countries in which "the degree of urbanization is much more than would be expected from the level of industrialization they have achieved"²⁹ [11, p. 423]. However, according to N.V. Sovani it is not clear whether what is perceived as "overurbanization" is really detrimental for a nation [11, p. 430] while William Alonso suggests that it may even be beneficial [11, pp. 434-449]. The question is, of course, whether people in developing countries which are characterized as overurbanized would be better off in an alternative situation or not. The answer to this question would have to depend on how one defines "better off". However an answer based on facts, rather than on a theoretical model, would be difficult to be given since, after all, overurbanized countries have developed in that way and not in another.

Nevertheless, that this question is answered in a more or less categorical way is crucial, before planning for the largest city of such a country can be undertaken. Realizing this, the Directorate of Master Plans of the Ministry of Public Works chose to start planning for Athens 2000 by selecting its answer in agreement with the public sentiment,

29. "This overurbanization is supposed to have come about because rural migrants have been "pushed" rather than "pulled" into the urban areas in these countries, as a result of great and mounting population pressure in the rural areas. In overurbanized countries urban misery and rural poverty exist side by side with the result that the city can hardly be called "dynamic" as social historians of developed countries generally described the process of urbanization" [11, p. 421].

rather than not, stating as the development principle on which its Proposition 1979 has been based: "Decentralization at the national level."

In accordance with this principle, the importance of Athens to national development had to be diminished by the year 2000. However the degree to which this should happen was not defined, with the result that in the propositions of the draft plan one can detect an ambiguity, a co-existence of contradictory objectives. As it is pointed out in the critique by the Technical Chamber of Greece [76, p. 23]:

Proposition 1979 does not convey a definite idea in regard to what scale of national decentralization it considers desirable, and, consequently, with what mode of development it proposes for Athens.

In this way, while the draft plan introduces measures aimed at decentralizing university education and health care, its proposals regarding industry, for instance, do not appear to be conducive to the decentralization of such a basic economic activity [76, p. 25]. For one thing, the draft plan based its assumption concerning the size of the industrial employment of Athens in the year 2000 on projections of the existing trends (which of course show Athens to grow at a much faster rate than the rest of Greece) rather than on a policy of gradual reduction of the present attraction that Athens has for people "pulled out" of rural regions because of poverty. One would expect an element of such a policy to be discouraging the creation of more industries in the metropolitan area of the Capital while encouraging the industrial development in other parts of the country.

Instead, the draft plan Athens 2000, after adopting the industrial employment figure forecasted on the basis of the present trend, proposed the creation of a record number of industrial zones throughout the

metropolis [76, p. 48]. In fact it proposed more such zones than had been proposed in any single one of the five Idea Plans which, in the case of the proposition concerning industry, were "summed rather than synthesized" [25, p. 20]. Needless to say that such an extensive industrial development contradicted also the objective of protecting the environment [76, p. 49], especially in the cases of industrial zones which were proposed inside the Athenian Basin (Sectors 6 and 7).

It has been mentioned already that, at least according to an expressed criticism, the creation of a "super airport" in Spata as well as the development in Attica of two major ports (in Megara and Labrion), in addition to Piraeus contradicts the objective of decentralization, because it emphasizes the present role of Athens as the national transportation center [76, p. 25].

However one could raise much more serious objections in regard to the fact that Proposition 1979 did not concern itself at all with the issue of administrative decentralization as one way--nevertheless a crucial "one"--for bringing about decentralization of urban functions on a national scale [76, p. 42]. Indeed, in the draft plan not only the present role of Athens as the headquarters of the national government is preserved--this would be justifiable--but, more important, no attention whatever is given to the need for restructuring central government units in a way conducive to administrative decentralization at the national level.

Although someone could observe that this would be beyond the issues typically dealt with in a comprehensive plan of a city, the author of this thesis, in agreement with the opinion of the Technical Chamber of

Greece on this matter [76, p. 42], believes that a plan as ambitious in its goals as Proposition 1979, dealing with a metropolis as important for a nation as Athens is, cannot possibly limit itself in considering only issues with clearly physical dimensions. Because, as Andreas Faludi notes [10, p. 2]:

(...) even the most staunchly "physical" planners have found no way to isolate the effects of their work from the murky cross-currents of economic and social conflict. (...) Planners aspire, as their theory says they must, to determine the overall framework in which urban physical development takes place. To do less, they say, is not planning but tinkering.

In this context, the dispersion of the headquarters of central government agencies throughout the Athenian Basin, as proposed in the draft plan, is obviously unrelated to the objective of decentralization on the national level [76, p. 42]. Incidentally it is also unrelated--even contrary--to the objective of decentralization on the metropolitan level. Because of the fact that the public sector in Greece employs a very significant part of the total white collar work force and, also, because the bureaucratic structure of government obliges citizens to have frequent personal contacts with the administration, the dispersion of Ministries and other public agencies into different Sectors would encourage movement throughout the metropolis and of course would greatly inconvenience the public, while its impact on the transportation networks and the overall function of the metropolis has not been assessed [76, p. 42].

iv) Planning and implementation: The inclusion in the planning document of Proposition 1979 of a section concerning implementation is commendable. However it seems like both the size and the degree of

elaboration of this section is not what one would hope, considering the fact that implementation has typically been an unsurpassable problem for Greek planning.

Concerning the legislative measures proposed in broad terms as implementation tools for plan Athens 2000, strong approval has been already expressed for the law of "Urban Development Areas", despite some minor objections on details which could be corrected. Another positive element has been that of urging DEPOS, the Public Corporation for Urban Development and Housing, to intervene in the low-income housing market. The provision of an adequate number of housing units for the lower income brackets seemingly is the best way to radically resolve the problem of unauthorized housing, one of the most grave structural problems of Athens. Still, it is felt that the issue is not stressed strongly enough in Proposition 1979, mentioned as it is in a very casual manner.

On the other side of the coin, one could observe that although a plethora of public works are proposed in the draft plan, such as schools, hospitals, athletic installations, streets, and infrastructure networks of various kinds, there is not much to be said about how, when and in which order these should materialize. In any case, but particularly in view of the meager financial means of the Greek public sector, it would seem appropriate for a plan to include some indications of which capital investments were considered to be of an absolute priority, as well as which "can wait", somehow. One could not expect, of course, from a broad scale general plan to include a complete investment program--and much less a budget. However, there should have been given a sense as to whether, for instance, improving the

sewage system was thought of as a more important priority than constructing neighborhood athletic facilities, or whether the construction of streets giving east-to-west access in the Athenian Basin was considered as more urgent than the creation of the new Stavros-Elefsina freeway, or the airport of Spata [76, p. 34].

Finally, the proposition about the creation of a new independent administrative agency, assigned to carry out the implementation of the proposed plan, is not easy to understand. If at the same time propositions were made for the abolishment of the Directorate of Master Plans of the Ministry of Public Work and of the planning offices in other Ministries one could see some justification for an Administration of Master Plan, since its being independent from existing government units could help smooth out some problems of planning implementation originating from the "mutual distrust" among the ministries.³⁰ However an Administration of Master Plans in addition to the existing planning units could only impose another bureaucratic obstacle to plan implementing.

C4. Summary

To summarize the evaluation of Proposition 1979 one can say that despite its many individual positive elements which have been pointed out in the respective sections of this critical review of the draft plan, there have also been a number of serious defects.

The first is related to the form in which the draft plan was

30. Despite this statement the author of this thesis still supports, as mentioned earlier, an organization of planning administration according to which the primary responsibility for any aspect of planning--implementation included, of course--would be held by an appropriate local body, for instance a tertiary level local government covering a metropolitan area, as it was proposed by the Technical Chamber of Greece [27, p. 27].

presented. Although one must keep in mind that this was indeed a "draft" plan and not a final one, it appears quite contrary to proper scientific procedure to expose to the public a planning document missing the presentation of analytic data on which its propositions are based, missing even references to data sources. Furthermore it is definitely not a credit to the quality of the planning document the fact that in it are found minor faults such as repetitions, omissions, statements of lesser importance which contradict each other, or typographic errors on important figures. And it is certainly an indication of unexcusable sloppiness that some details on the proposition maps have been changed between the time the first and last map was drawn, without however these minor changes having been recorded on the previously drawn maps.³¹ In general one can say without being unfair that the way in which Proposition 1979 was communicated to the public did not convey the impression of professionalism.

Concerning its substance, Proposition 1979 failed to demonstrate that it really was consistent with its set primary objectives of promoting decentralization of the urban activities of Athens, both at the national and the metropolitan level. On the other hand its disproportionate elaboration of the proposal concerning transportation was detrimental to the plan since it showed that this important urban function was viewed as an absolute end, rather than as a means for improving the function of the urban organism.

31. Indeed, among the maps presenting the land use plan, the transportation plan and this indicating the location of the Sector boundaries and the Sector centers, there are minor differences and incompatibilities.

However, the most serious defect of the draft plan Athens 2000 is that it is basically technocratic in the way it approaches urban problems. It is technocratic in the sense that it emphasizes physical interventions (such as regulations concerning urban expansion and land use zoning), public investment (such as for street and for street and infrastructure networks), such as application of high technology (as in the case of the industrial filters proposed in order to "eliminate" air pollution, without at the same time showing due consideration to interventions of structural character.

A good illustration of this point can be provided by the proposition of the draft plan concerning urban expansion. According to this, new urban areas were proposed to the north and northeast of the Athenian basin, in order, primarily, to accommodate the expected by year 2000 additional population of the metropolis. This population could not be housed within the existing urbanized area, because the gross density there (117 persons per hectare) is already slightly higher than this considered as desirable average gross density in Proposition 1979 (116 persons per hectare).

What is technocratic in this proposal is that no thought was given either to the socio-economic structure of this expected new population, nor to the way the proposed urban expansion area was to be developed. In other words it would not be beyond any probability that a part of the additional population would again not be able to afford housing within the approved urban expansion areas, having to turn, as a result, to unauthorized settlements, in the same way this has typically happened throughout the last three decades, when it was not the shortage of land within urban areas but rather the high price of residential development

which pushed the poor to create their unauthorized communities. If this should happen again--as it seems entirely possible--all the arithmetic of the authors of Proposition 1979, all the careful calculations concerning the acreage of the expansion areas, etc. would not have the effect of controlling the quality and quantity of urban expansion, an end for which planning was undertaken in the first place.

In general, the author of this thesis tends to agree with the opinion implicitly expressed in the Critique by the Technical Chamber of Greece and according to which the major weakness of the draft plan Athens 2000 lies in the fact that its goals and objectives are overly ambitious in comparison with what its propositions can bring about; in comparison, perhaps, with what planning can accomplish "without compromising the principles of the free economy." Despite this, however, the author, in opposition to what is implicitly communicated by the polemic tone of this Critique, believes that even less ambitious planning--planning which can be implemented within the presently existing socioeconomic and political system of Greece--is definitely preferable to no planning at all. Also, that administrative initiatives towards encouraging planning which aims at the amelioration of the living conditions in a city--even if "unequally" distributed with respect to the various social groups--should be supported, in principle, and constructively criticized in the details.

CHAPTER VI

THE NINE SECTORS OF ATHENS 2000

A. FROM PROPOSITION 1979 TO THE "EIGHTEEN POINT AGREEMENT"

A1. The Public Exposure of Proposition 1979

When Deputy Minister Mr. Manos introduced Proposition 1979 to the public it was the first time¹ that a plan for Athens was published and made available for evaluation to both professionals and lay people. However, despite the fact that an "unprecedented" public discussion of the plan was announced to take place during August, 1979, a discussion which, involving a wide spectrum of official participants, could presumably lead to re-evaluation and revision of the proposed draft plan, it was obvious that this was basically intended as a public relations event rather than as a debate on the substance [86, p. 1]. It is clear that at that point the administration did not expect any major changes to its plan as a result of its exposure to the public, and an indication of this was that as early as a month before the advertised discussion was scheduled to take place, law 947/1979, concerning "Urban Development Areas" was voted into effect.

As the reader may remember this piece of legislation was primarily intended as a major implementation tool for Plan Athens 2000. Another similarly intended law, 880/1979 concerning "Maximum Floor Area Ratios" was voted by the National Assembly even before Proposition 1979 was

1. This information was given to the author of this thesis during a May 1980 interview with Mr. V. Harissis, then Director of Master Plans in the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment.

presented to the public, in March, 1979.² It must be emphasized that this was indeed the first time that legislation related to the implementation of a physical plan was ever passed in Greece. This was a good omen and it certainly caused a significant increase in the interest with which professionals and their associations looked forward to debating the issues dealt with in the plan (and those which were not, of course!).

In August, 1979, an exhibit was organized by the Ministry of Public Works in a major Athens exposition hall having as its subject: "Planning for Athens." In it, after a review of the historic evolution of Athens and a brief overview of the previous unsuccessful attempts to plan for it, followed a presentation of the latest draft plan, in a form accessible to laymen. During the closing days of this exposition, a public discussion was held, hosted by Mr. Manos and the Director of Master Plans of the Ministry of Public Works. Invited to participate in this discussion were representatives from the Technical Chamber of Greece, from various associations of professionals involved with the urban environment (such as planners, architects, civil engineers, surveyors, chemical engineers, etc.), from the national research centers EKKE and KEPE, from the local authorities of municipalities within the metropolitan area of Athens as well as from various other public interest groups.

The discussion, which according to Mr. Harissis (the Director of

2. The fact that these laws were adopted before the plan was exposed to the public could not, however, be seen as "compromising" the value of such exposure, since because of their broad scope, the legislation pieces could not inhibit any physical revisions of the plan.

Master Plans and one of the hosts) lasted for 32 hours was very high spirited. The opposition to the draft plan was headed by the Technical Chamber of Greece which as early as in December, 1979, had put together a special committee (composed of planner-members of SADAS)³ which was assigned to analyze and evaluate the draft plan as soon as it was released to the public [76. p. 6]. This committee had produced the Critique which was extensively quoted in the previous chapter (section C) and which provided the framework for the arguments presented against Proposition 1979 by the Technical Chamber of Greece.

Contrary to the professional associations and individual planners, the local government representatives who showed up during the discussion sessions were not particularly vocal, for understandable reasons, while, for equally understandable reasons, they generally supported the views of the Technical Chamber of Greece.⁴

At the end of this marathon of a discussion it was evident that a consensus regarding the proposed plan would not possibly be reached and that Proposition 1979 could not gain a public acceptance as wide as Mr.

3. SADAS, along with other association of Professionals, form the Technical Chamber of Greece.

4. As the reader may remember, because of the power structure in Greece, local governments are, as a rule, not involved in planning decisions, nor equipped with planning staff which could enable them to formulate an independent view in regard with the issues presented by Proposition 1979. Since, however, the Technical Chamber of Greece strongly supported a substantial increase of the role of municipalities in decision making and--perhaps even more important--because of the existing political affinities--both the Technical Chamber and most of the largest municipalities of Attica were dominated by a socialist coalition of parties of the parliamentary opposition, with PASOK the dominant among them--the unreserved acceptance of the Chamber's views on the part of the municipalities of Attica was no surprise to anyone.

Manos would have hoped, just with minor revisions. The threatened dead end was avoided by the diplomacy of Mr. Manos who--perhaps encouraged by the Prime Minister Mr. Karamanlis--in a sharp turn from his past rigidity invited to the Ministry of Public Works most of the officials directly interested in planning for Athens (including representatives from other Ministries--members of the National Council of Physical Planning and Environment, the Technical Chamber of Greece, the national research centers and the local governments of the metropolitan area) with the purpose of arriving at an agreement concerning the principles on which planning for the Capital should be based. This meeting, held on September 3, 1979, and presided over by Mr. Karamanlis [53, p. 2] had a fruitful outcome, since a consensus of eighteen points were reached. The Technical Chamber of Greece had presented in the meeting an additional eight point statement--later casually referred to as the "Plus Eight Points"--which, however, failed to be approved by all the participating parties, while it was adopted, also, by the Athens' municipalities.

The Eighteen Point Agreement was given official status by a Decision of the National Council of Physical Planning and Environment, which met for this purpose on September 6, 1979. The text of this agreement and the related articles of the Decision of National Council, as well as the text of the "Plus Eight Points" will be presented in the following section.

A2. The Eighteen Point Agreement

In the Decision made by the National Council of Physical Planning and Environment, on September 6, 1979, concerning the "Framework-plan for the Development of the Metropolitan area of the Capital" [53], the

eighteen agreed upon points on which comprehensive planning for Athens was to be based were phrased in the following way [53, pp. 3-4],

1. Measures must be taken for the effective reduction of the rate of increase of the population of Athens. The target of 4,300,000 for year 2000, while desirable, appears optimistic.
2. Measures must be taken for the drastic reduction to the increase of functions which attract population to Athens.
3. No agency controlled by the public sector must be allowed to establish its headquarters in Athens if this is not absolutely necessary for the function of the city itself. Existing central government units which are not needed in Athens will have to be transferred elsewhere.
4. The creation of new industrial units inside Athens will be prohibited. It will be possible however for existing industries to merge or modernize, provided that in doing this they do not produce an increase in the employment nor furthermore burden the environment.
5. Measures must be taken for the protection of the mountains and the forests of Attica.
6. Measures must be taken for the effective protection of the remaining agricultural land of Attica.
7. Measures must be taken for securing and protecting urban openspace and for the development of green zones.
8. The expansion of the city plans in the metropolitan area of Athens must be limited. First priority for urban annexation will be given to areas already densely built, in order for these to be rehabilitated and provided with the necessary infra-structure.
9. The structure of the metropolis will be gradually changed from single-centered to multi-centered.
10. The corridors of the basic transportation network must be secured as soon as possible.
11. Public transit must be strengthened.
12. Areas of heavy industrial activity will be re-organized and rehabilitated in order for the environment to be protected.
13. Measures must be taken for the protection of the sea-coasts. The development of second home areas must not limit the accessibility of the coasts by the general public nor reduce its recreational possibilities. It also must have a form promoting and not disturbing the quality of the environment.
14. The port of Piraeus will remain as the principal port of Athens. No other ports of major importance will be created in Attica.
15. The programs and policies of all public agencies concerning the metropolitan areas must be adapted to the general plan of Athens.
16. Because planning for Athens is a continuous process the public agencies must regularly inform the citizens about the progress of the implementation of the plan.

17. The local governments must be given a ~~much~~ more substantial role in planning for Athens. In particular, their active participation in the next phases of plan preparation must be made possible.
18. Public works of primary importance such as sewerage networks, flood protection networks, improvements of the transportation system and the removal of sources of pollution, must be given first priority.

As stated in the Decision of the National Council of Physical Planning and Environment the eighteen points were adopted⁵ and "recognized as forming, along with land use plan Athens 2000, as this had been revised by the Deputy Minister of Public Works, (...) the Framework Plan for the development of the Capital" [53, p. 6]. Accordingly, the Ministry of Public Works was instructed to "immediately start the implementation of the Framework Plan (...) by working out the necessary programs" [53, p. 6].

These programs had, furthermore, to be "specialized by administrative agency (...) in order for all the government units to be able to adjust their policies according to the provisions of the plan" [53, p. 6]. Concerning the implementation of the urban expansion scheme proposed in the plan as well as the provisions related to the control of land use, the Decision of September 6, 1979, gave to the Directorate of Master Plans the power to propose the issuing of Presidential Decrees⁶ which would "impose rules and regulations (...) in regard to the permitted in each instance mode of development and land use, within defined

5. As the reader may remember, the National Council of Physical Planning and Environment was, according to Law 360/1979, the administrative agency vested with the responsibility of legally adopting physical plans and overseeing their implementation.

6. For a definition of the term, the reader can refer to page 80.

zones of the metropolitan area"⁷ [53, p. 7].

Near its ending the text of the Decision included a paragraph urging the Ministry of Public Works to "immediately proceed in the preparation of the special studies which were necessary for the implementation of the framework plan" [53, p. 7]. More specifically [53, p. 7]:

- Land use plans for each of the nine Sectors;
- Programs of immediate action for particularly problematic areas;
- Studies for defining incentives, for the development of the urban centers of the Sectors; and
- A comprehensive study of the points of the proposed plan Athens 2000 to which there have been expressed objections, in order for the general plan of the Capital to take its final form and for the successive preparation of a widely accepted plan implementation program.

It must be emphasized here, that the revision of the plan Athens 2000, which was "adopted" by the Decision of September 6, was really nothing more than a second draft of Proposition 1979, with some minor changes, related primarily with matters of presentation of the document rather than its substance. In any case the adopted "Framework Plan" had by no means been revised in light of the Eighteen Point Agreement, and this fact resulted in an angry protest on the part of the Technical Chamber of Greece [53, p. 1]. In this protest it was suggested that the Chamber's members, who had accepted the invitation to participate in the process of arriving at an agreement concerning the principles on which the plan for Athens--that had yet to be prepared--should be based, were trapped into legitimizing a plan to which they profoundly disagreed.

7. It must be emphasized here that by this short and casually stated phrase land use zoning was for the first time introduced in Greece. Although the statement explicitly referred to Athens only, the precedent established would open the way for land use zoning to be used in other Greek cities also.

Deputy Minister Mr. Manos, managed to avoid a new threatened dead-end, by informally assuring the Technical Chamber of Greece that the adopted Framework Plan was meant just as a starting point and that, as it was made clear in the Decision of September 6, 1979, itself, a comprehensive revision study was a definite prerequisite before plan Athens 2000 could become final [53, p. 7]. As one can deduce by studying the text of the "Guidelines" [91] which later accompanied the contracts for the preparation of the nine Sector plans, the attempt to revise the plan was postponed until after the first phase of preparation of these plans would have been completed. It was realized that the accumulated analytic information as well as the preliminary propositions of the planning consultants would make possible then a much more complete and meaningful revision.

According to the Decision of the National Council of Physical Planning and Environment, the next step in the process would have been to get the local authorities of the metropolitan area of Athens involved "in the next phases of plan preparation" (point 17) [53, p. 4]). There was a problem, however, in regard with how this could be done, in view of the fact that the Athenian Metropolis is composed of no less than 118 separate localities, greatly varying in size and technical and financial capabilities. The agreed upon solution to this problem was that the already legally existing--but thus far inactive--Regional Association of Municipalities and Communities of the Department of Attica (TEDKNA) be acknowledged as the official representative of the local governments of the metropolitan area of Athens, in the process of planning for the capital. It is remarkable as well as unprecedented that

TEDKNA was also offered a grant (by the Ministry of Public Works) for the purpose of hiring an advisory planning staff,⁸ so that its participation could be substantial as well as official.

This accomplished, the Ministry of Public Works formally invited all interested and qualified planning firms of Greece to apply for a contract of a Sector plan, in October 1978. On the other hand, shortly before the year was over the Ministry of Public Works introduced to the National Assembly and had voted into effect two pieces of legislation which were directly related to the respective propositions of the draft plan Athens 2000 that had been approved in the Eighteen Point Agreement (Points 5 and 6). These were laws 998/1979 concerning the "Protection of the Unbuilt land of Attica" (see pages 67-68 of this thesis). Earlier, on November 6, 1979 the National Council of Physical Planning and Environment had decided on approving the proposed "General Policy Lines for Decentralization", by the Ministry of Public Works in the form of A.D. of November 6, 1979 (see page 69), acting in accordance with the points of the Decision of September 6, concerning promoting decentralization at the national level.⁹

At around the same time, the Technical Chamber of Greece published the text of eight additional points which it had introduced to the Ministry of Public Works, in the meeting of September 3, 1979, hoping

8. The information concerning the financing of the planning advisory staff of TEDKNA by the Ministry of Public Works was given to the author by Mr. Harissis.

9. Thus statement refers to the A.D. of November 6th, 1979 concerning "General Policy Lines for Decentralization". More about this legislation can be found on pages 69, 70 of this thesis.

that they could be generally agreed upon. As explained earlier these "plus eight" points failed to gain unanimous support, however they were later endorsed by TEDKNA as well as by a number of the private planners who were commissioned with the preparation of the nine Sector plans.

These "plus eight" points were the following [39, p. 27]:

1. The development of the periphery of Greece, which is necessary before Athens can stop growing entirely out of proportion, cannot be solely based on the policy of the "competitive cities" It is crucial that a complete national development program be prepared and legally adopted by the government. Of even higher priority is that a definite answer is given to the question of what is desirable development, both for the country and its Capital.
2. It is necessary that the sharp disparities and oppositions, presently existing in the city, be smoothed out, so that tolerable living conditions can be insured for all the people of Athens. Generous investments are needed for improving the living conditions in problematic areas inside the urban grid so that citizens throughout the city have equal access to urban services. To this end planning standards must be adopted and a well rounded study concerning the possibilities for urban rehabilitation must be undertaken.
3. Housing must stop being seen as a consumers' good, and must be defined as a basic duty that the state has towards each citizen. Only in this way it is possible that the undesirable urban expansion through unauthorized low-income housing development will be prevented (...) The comprehensive plan for Athens cannot ignore the serious economic and social differences among various citizen groups, nor should it attempt to solve the problem just by introducing police-power measures for controlling "densities" and "land use".
4. The provision of the city with adequate social infrastructures (education, cultural activities, open space athletic facilities, health care, etc.) must be done with the responsibility of the State and not left to the sole care of the law of maximum profit. The respective public services needed, must be defined in detail both quantitatively and qualitatively, so that planning can be based on these.
5. The conservation of a tolerably clean urban environment for all requires effectively controlling industrial pollution. The sources of pollution must be officially defined and their output measured. Standards concerning absolute maxima of tolerable pollution must be adopted officially and enforced strictly.

6. The institutional framework concerning the powers and the responsibilities of local self-government in regard to planning for the development of the city must change. Local governments must be financially strengthened and given a much broader role in making decisions. Every municipality must be equipped with a Technical and planning service and must be re-organized in a way facilitating citizens' participation.
The administrative organization of Athens must be based on local self-government. First-level government units--the present municipalities and communities--should administer the affairs of localities with populations ranging between 50,000-100,000 people. The "Sectors" should be also self-governed, forming a unit of second-level local government. Finally the metropolitan area should be administered by a third level government, consisting of representatives from the second-level ones (...)
7. A priority list, based on the social benefit of the public works necessary for the metropolitan area, should be worked out in relation with estimates concerning the required investments and their possible sources. Our position is that public works serving all the people must not be subjected to business speculations but be viewed as a basic service of the State towards its citizens.
8. In the legal and institutional framework concerning planning implementation there must be provided room for adequate citizens' participation while the way people are to be represented must also be defined.

B. THE PREPARATION OF NINE SECTOR PLANS

B1. Ordering the Nine Studies

The subject of the nine Sector plans, as it was stated in the text of the Guidelines, which were appended to the contracts for the preparation of these plans, was [91, p. 1]:

(...) to produce planning studies for the spatial organization of the urban functions within areas which have been defined as Sectors in the Framework-plan of the metropolitan area of the Capital, and which were assigned with numbers from 1 to 9. (...)

These studies are to be viewed as integral parts of the process for the completion and implementation of the Master Plan for the Capital. The general guidelines which must be followed by the studies for each Sector are: The principles and directions given in the Decision of September 6th, 1979, by the National Council of Physical Planning and

Environment concerning the "Framework Plan for the Development of the Metropolitan Area of the Capital" and the respective propositions in the draft plan of the General Directorate of Housing.

Contrary to what had happened the previous year at the occasion of ordering the five Idea Plans, the selection of the private consultants who were to prepare the nine Sector plans was strictly based on the procedure ascribed by Law 716/1977, concerning the "Regulations for Commissioning Studies for Programs (involving) Public Investment",¹⁰ [90, p. 1; 86, p. 1]. Accordingly, the interested planning firms were invited to declare their desire for participating in the selection process and to submit their qualifications.

At this point the Technical Chamber of Greece avoided taking a definite position for or against its members participating in the process, because its leadership and also the leadership of SADAS (the Association of Architects) were profoundly divided on the issue. Indeed, for the leftist groups dominating both SADAS and the Technical Chamber of Greece, there were two radically different ways to estimate what was happening at that moment in regard with the process of preparation of plan Athens 2000.

One group, influenced by the Communist Part of Greece (KKE) and the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) estimated the situation as follows: Despite the latest developments and the apparent change in the earlier negative attitude of Mr. Manos--a change attributed to "public relation" needs--progressive planners should not be manipulated to legitimize by their participation a planning process which was to be

10. This procedure is known as KAMPDE. More information about it can be found on page 88 of this thesis.

ultimately controlled by the right wing central government administration [86, p. 1].

On the other hand, professionals influenced by the small Euro-Communist Party of the Greek Parliament (KKE (esoterikou)), along with leftist independents--who formed together a group which dominated SADAS and had considerable power in the leadership of the Technical Chamber also--estimated the developments of September 1979 quite differently. Accordingly, the recent indications were strong enough to suggest that this time there was genuine interest on the part of the government to proceed into planning for the Capital and on implementing it also. Whether this was so because the problems of Athens themselves had reached dimensions that could not be ignored even by the "ruling class", or whether this was so just because of the personal ambitions of Mr. Manos, a unique opportunity was presenting itself for planning for Athens. This opportunity should not be left to pass by progressive planners who could utilize it by trying to influence planning for the Capital as much as they could, even if it was certain that the process would be ultimately controlled by the right wing central government administration [86, pp. 2-3]. As it was pointed out in a newsletter issued on March 10, 1980, by AKPA, a group operating within SADAS and representing this second line of thought [86, pp.2-3]:

Substituting slogans for Critique, practically equals to indifference for the accumulating problems of our city, problems which fall particularly heavy on the popular masses. To come out of the vicious circle is certainly difficult. It requires research and hard work for formulating an alternative image for the development of the city (...) On our part we see that today there is a clear possibility, in terms of time, money and flexibility of guidelines, for co-operation of the planners with local governments and for serious research. Therefore, without comforting ourselves with exaggerated

hopes, we believe that the opportunity given today for research, thought and mobilization is, perhaps, among the most important ever presented in the history of Greek planning.

In accordance with these arguments, prominent planners belonging to this group, among which Messers. Diamantopoulos and Gartsos, who had respectively served as officials of SADAS and the Technical Chamber of Greece representing AKPA, declared their interest to participate in the process of preparation of the nine Sector plans, accepting the challenge--according to radical opponents of this attitude "and the money, also"--to try to influence planning for Athens. At the same time SADAS, whose leadership was then dominated by AKPA, concentrated its negotiating efforts for obtaining more favorable terms having the compensation of these private planning consultants for each sector plan, increased to six million drachmas¹¹ and the time frame within which the comprehensive plan for Athens was to be completed with their collaboration, to twelve months.

On the other hand, both SADAS and the Technical Chamber of Greece also insisted on assurances by the Ministry of Public Works, that the guidelines given to private planners, concerning assumptions and preliminary propositions appearing in the Framework plan, be flexible so that they could be adjusted if the analysis was to prove that they were faulty. These assurances were given by Mr. Manos and in the text of Guidelines attached to the Sector plan contracts it was indeed stressed

11. In 1979 prices six million drachmas equalled 150,000 dollars. According to the contract between each planning firm and the Ministry of Public Works, this money had to cover all expenses and salaries of the planning team for one year of full-time work [90, pp. 3-4].

that all assumptions and propositions would have to be tested in light of the findings of the analytic study for each Sector [91, p. 5; 92, p. 1].

On its part TEDKNA, in its debut as a planning entity, send a formal letter to the Ministry of Public Works [95] on November 29, 1979, protesting against the fact that in the process of dividing the metropolitan area of Athens into nine Sectors, according to Proposition 1979, existing municipalities and communities were often bisected by Sector boundaries [95, p. 1]. This had indeed happened in several cases, despite the fact that one of the criteria used for this division by Proposition 1979 was to follow the legal boundaries of localities [69, p. 37]. As a matter of fact in most cases when this criterion was in conflict with that of following the corridors of the primary transportation network Proposition 1979 had chosen to respect the latter, with the result that many local units, among which the municipality of Athens and those of Maroussi, Kifissia and Kaissariani, were cut into pieces by the Sector boundaries, as the reader may see on Figure 16, page 263 [95, p. 1].

The letter by TEDKNA was furthermore stressing that such an arbitrary division of the city [95, p. 1]:

(...) did not take into account presently existing economic, social, and even physical¹² criteria for a meaningful organization into sectors, criteria which we (TEDKNA) consider

12. By this TEDKNA probably meant that each local unit, being the evolution of an initial urban core which gradually grew by successive expansions of its original "city plan", presents an integral physical entity with a continuity in its street network, building blocks, etc. while along the boundaries between such entities there often exist obvious discontinuities and problematic situations [35, p. 36].




Figure 16: Changes in the Nine Sector Boundaries within the Athenian basin.

essential. Indeed, on the basis of these criteria larger or smaller groups of localities do present common characteristics, problems, and needs. This means that there is a structure in the metropolis of Athens which must be taken seriously into account in any attempt for successful decentralization.

Continuing, TEDKNA pointed out cases in which municipalities "structurally" belonging to one sector were "given" to another. As a striking example of such a situation there was listed, among other, this of the municipalities of Zographou, Kaissariani and Vyonas (respectively marked with the small numerals 1,2,3 of Figure 16, page 265) which, located immediately to the east of the center of Athens and almost within walking distance from it, were included, instead, in Sector 8 and were, supposedly, to be served by the Sector center of Ellinikon, several miles away.

In short, TEDKNA believed that the specific division into Sectors as attempted by Proposition 1979, was not adequately thought of, and that "it did not correspond to the existing groupings of areas, nor to the characteristics and needs of their populations" [95, p. 2]. With this reasoning TEDKNA indicated that it did not consider it constructive, at that time, for the Ministry of Public Works to proceed into having prepared Sector plans, proposing, as a preferable alternative, commissioning "analytic studies for every larger municipality and group of smaller communities in the metropolitan area of Athens" [95, p. 3]. The objective of this would be to collect the needed analytic data for the areas within the Athenian metropolis, the evaluation of which could possibly lead, at a later stage, to a new and more meaningful division of the metropolitan area.

Sure enough this proposition of TEDKNA was not accepted by Mr.

Manos, especially since the process of ordering the nine Sector plans had already been started. However the Office of Athens Master Plan did readjust the boundaries of the nine Sectors, in a way that in most cases municipalities were no longer divided. These new Sector boundaries can be compared with those previously proposed in Figure 16, page 265.

During January 1980, the process of selecting the planning consulting firms which would be commissioned with preparing the nine Sector plans was completed. Accordingly:

- The plan for Sector 1 was ordered to Mr. Xenakis and his associates;
- The plan for Sector 2 to the "Doxiadis" planning firm (Project Manager: Mr. Psomopoulos);
- The plan for Sector 3 to Messrs. Legakis, Kalogeras and their associates;
- The plan for Sector 4 to Mr. Skiadaressis and his associates;
- The plan for Sector 5 to Messrs. Gartsos, Gounaropoulos and Kostikas;
- The plan for Sector 6 to Mr. Papayiannis and his associates;
- The plan for Sector 7 to Messrs. Kontarghiris, Lambakis and associates;
- The plan for Sector 8 to Mr. Diamantopoulos and his associates; and;
- The plan for Sector 9 to Mr. Kontaratos and his associates.

According to the Guidelines attached to the contracts which were signed by the representatives of the nine planning firms, the subject of each study was the Sector, which was to be viewed [91, p. 1]:

1. In relation with the metropolis of Athens: As an integral member of the urban organism, bearing its particular economic, social and physical characteristics, but qualitatively equal to other Sector-members;
2. In its own space: As a self sustaining urban entity which offers to its residents all the necessary social services, and which will cover, to a significant degree, also their employment needs, without, however, bearing the characteristics of one particular income group.

The specific tasks which had to be included in each of the nine studies were enumerated in the text of Guidelines as following [91, p. 2].

1. Defining the center of each Sector, which must relieve the present center of the metropolis to a significant degree from functions related with administration, education, services, etc. More specifically, defining the physical boundaries of the center, its qualitative and quantitative characteristics and the way in which it will be developed.
2. Defining the general land uses within the area of each Sector, and in specific cases, when necessary, defining also special land uses.
3. Designing the secondary transportation network; also checking the impact on the Sector of the already agreed upon primary transportation network and, if necessary, proposing alternative solutions.
4. Locating the possibly existing organic entities within each Sector and, consequently, dividing it into smaller urban units (Sub-sectors) with their own centers. In parallel to this, checking the given Sector boundaries and proposing, if necessary, alternatives to the decided Sector division.
5. Defining Urban Development Areas for the needs of the Capital in the next 30 years. Working out an implementation program for the next five years.
6. Proposing planning and other measures aiming at:
 - a. The creation of choice in regard with the form of residence available in each sector for every income group.
 - b. The overall improvement of the quality of life in the Sector.
7. The correct integration within each sector of special land uses, such as industry, wholesale commerce, the airport, sea-ports, etc., with the objective of them co-existing harmoniously with residential areas.

According to the text of the Guidelines, while the Sector plan studies were to be worked out separately by different planning team, they had to be compatible with each other so that they could be ultimately synthesized to form the final comprehensive plan of Athens. In order to achieve this it was crucial for cooperation between the nine planning teams and coordination of their activities to be firmly established from the start. To this end, the Ministry of Public Works held for itself the role of the supervising planning co-ordinator and determined that the process of preparing the nine Sector plans would be

divided into the following four phases [91, pp. 3-4]:

1. Phase I

Duration: Four Months

Subject: Field reconnaissance of the area of study. Establishing contact with the local authorities. Collection of research data necessary for the scientific grounding of preliminary findings and propositions. Defining problems and possibilities.

Outcome: A planning report, including preliminary findings and propositions, with emphasis on interventions and public works immediately implementable, either because they are urgently needed or because their necessity is judged as obvious. At the end of phase I, the contractors must also submit a detailed program and a time-frame for the tasks to be undertaken during the later phases of plan preparation. This should include, among other things, a list of analytic data that the planning team proposes to collect during phase III, the way in which it plans to analyze and present them.

2. Phase II:

Duration: Two months

Subject: Common analysis of findings and propositions by the nine planning teams under the coordination of the Office of Athens Master Plan. Formulating final conclusions for the Metropolitan area of Athens and separately for each Sector, which will be supplied to the planning teams in the form of final directions for phase III, by the Ministry of Public Works.

3. Phase III

Duration: Four months

Subject: Detailed planning study for each Sector carried out according to the program and time-frame worked out by the planning team during phase I, as this may have been altered by the Office of Athens Master Plan, in order to insure the co-ordinated collecting and analyzing of data by the nine planning teams.

At the end of phase III the contractors must submit their final propositions for their respective sector-plan.

4. Phase IV

Duration: Two months

Subject: Each contractor will organize a one month exposition of its plan in a public hall within the area of the Sector, in order for the citizens of the Sector to have the opportunity to get familiar with its propositions. The contractor will also organize discussion-presentations of its plan, addressed to the interested citizen groups or their representatives. The objections or other observations presented during this public exposure process of the Sector plans, must be collected by the contractor in a special volume which will have to be submitted to the Office of Athens Master Plan by the end of this phase.

On the basis of these objections and observations the Office of Athens Master Plans will make the necessary alterations to the Sector plans which will be later submitted in their final form for adoption by the National Council of Physical Planning and Environment.

With all nine contracts signed by the respective planning firms by the middle of January, 1980, the deadline for submitting the planning reports of Phase I, was determined at the end of the coming April.

B2: Phase I: The Preparation of Draft Plans for the Nine Sectors of Athens

During the first months of 1980, while the nine planning firms were busy putting together draft plans for each Sector of Athens, a change was taking place in planning administration. This change took an official form on March 14, when Law 1032/1980, founding the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment, was voted into effect [48].

This new administrative unit was created from upgrading the General Directorate of Housing (belonging, up to then, to the Ministry of Public Works) into the status of a Ministry, following its spectacular growth in both personnel and range of activities, during the few previous years. Sure enough, Mr. Manos, who in the course of the several months of his tenure as Deputy Minister of Public Works had managed to gain unusual power, and who since the beginning of 1979 was officially substituting his Minister in matters related with the General Directorate of Housing (after a decision by the Prime Minister Mr. Karamanlis [59, p. 1]), was promoted to head the new unit.

This latest development had not thrilled the Technical Chamber of Greece who criticized it for not promoting the needed decentralization of planning to the localities and also because it was not the result of a rational restructuring of central government planning functions, which

remained still fragmented into several public agencies. However it certainly constituted a strong indication that planning was, at last, being acknowledged in Greece as a necessity of life. It furthermore had a definite euphoria-creating effect on the officials and the planning staff of the new Ministry, as the author of this thesis was clearly impressed, during her visit in Athens, in April and May, 1980.

Indeed, although the new Ministry, still bearing the unmistakable characteristics of a rigidly bureaucratic central government administration, was far from a haven of liberty, a marked change in attitude, particularly towards liberalizing work relations within the agency, could be clearly felt. The almost massive hiring of new--and for the most part very young and politically non-conservative--planners who were to staff the expanding functions of the Ministry, was probably a catalyst to this change. In any case, during the few months following the foundation of the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment the productivity of the Directorate of Master Plans had increased markedly. Indeed, while the planners employed by the agency were busy drafting legislation [52], which intended at clarifying certain aspects concerning the implementation of law 947/1979 (about "Urban Development Areas") they were also closely supervising the progress of the nine Sector plans.

It certainly was in an atmosphere of optimism that, following the completion of Phase I of the nine studies, the respective planning reports were submitted to the Ministry on time, something that had rarely happened in the past. Indeed, sessions of presentation and discussion for each study were scheduled to take place in the headquarters of the Technical Chamber of Greece for the first week of May. In these

sessions, which were open to the public, the official participants were:

1. Representatives from all nine planning firms;
2. Representatives from the Ministry of Physical Planning and planners from the Office of Athens Master Plan;
3. Representatives from the Regional Association of Municipalities and Communities of the Department of Attica (TEDKNA);
4. Representatives from the Technical Chamber of Greece, SADAS, the National research centers (EKKE and KEPE) and from the chair of planning of the School of Architecture of the National Technical University, in Athens.

As it had been hinted earlier in this report, the political and planning philosophies of the nine consultants who had been commissioned the preparation of the Sector plans--with only criteria their availability and professional credentials--were varied greatly. With the planners of the Doxiadis firm--which represented the conservative planning mainstream--at one extreme, and the planning team put together by Mr. Diamantopoulos--a French educated radical Planner¹³--at the other, and with the remaining seven planning teams covering the political spectrum in between, what one could definitely not expect from these presentation-discussion sessions was easy agreement and unanimity. As a matter of fact one could legitimately question the very possibility of these nine planning teams ever arriving at a consensus which, never-

13. Mr. Diamantopoulos believed that "any meaningful planning cannot be implemented in a capitalistic society." He considered, however, planning essential because: "it can help the disadvantaged to become conscious of their problems and therefore gives them some concrete goals to fight for" [13, p. 176].

theless, was crucially important before their studies could be synthesized to form the new comprehensive plan for Athens.

The impression that the author of this thesis got when discussing this issue with the persons whom she interviewed in Greece was that Mr. Manos had selected these planning firms, knowingly disregarding these philosophical disparities, because he believed that if professionally competent planners were to be confronted with concrete problems-- instead of just principles--they should be able to reach an agreement on specific solutions acceptable to anyone. And Mr. Manos, in order to achieve an acceptance as wide as possible for "his" plan, was willing to go through a possibly long and painful process before this agreement could be reached. The fact that a consensus had been reached before, under similar circumstances, (this leading to the Eighteen Point Agreement) was certainly a good omen.

On their part the most radical among the nine planning teams were also positively disposed towards the fact that planning for Athens was involving a plurality of philosophical view-points and planning approaches, believing that the juxtaposition of these during a democratic process could produce some original and appropriate planning solutions that could not have been thought of by a planning team sharing a common point of view. After all, they reasoned, society is pluralistic itself, as it is composed of groups of people with conflicting views and interests. Therefore, a planning team, in which some of society's conflicted powers are reflected, would be better able to assimilate society and, as a result, to solve its problems by compromise, in a way creating the least possible friction among the various groups.

Of course, the more "radicalized" among the nine planning teams, without being overly optimistic in regard with the possible effects of their own involvement, nevertheless hoped that they would have a chance to influence their more conservative colleagues--and perhaps even the Ministry--towards adopting a planning approach sensitive to issues of "social justice" as they perceived them.

Overall, the attitude of all the participants to the sessions of presentation-discussion, by which phase I of preparing the nine Sector plans was concluded, was positive. The author of this thesis who attended the sessions was, indeed, impressed by the fact that although during the discussion there were disagreements and debating, any polemic overtones--so typical in similar public discussions in the past--were avoided, and the prevailing climate was of a work meeting.

The nine Sector draft plans as one can judge from studying the respective planning documents, can all be characterized as professionally immaculate planning studies, the preparation of which had, without doubt, required a considerable amount of work by competent planners. In this respect each one of the nine reports was sharply distinguishable from the sloppily prepared and presented Proposition 1979.

Regarding their content, all Sector plans included a chapter describing the methodology followed in their preparation. Also all nine of them included detailed presentations of the analytic work on which their findings were based. The way data had been collected and processed was also exposed in a more or less detailed way in each one of the studies. Another common characteristic was that in all nine planning reports it was stressed that the base studies carried out during Phase I were by no means adequate for a complete analysis of the

existing situation and that a more systematic and coordinated--for all nine sector plans--data collection and processing had to be undertaken during phase III. Finally all Sector plans included a chapter concerning the historical evolution of their area of study, with special emphasis on their urbanization process during the post World War II years.

On the other hand, among the nine studies there were also marked differences. Most of these can be attributed to the fact that the Guidelines which had been given to the firms by the Ministry at the start of the process of Sector plan preparation [91], did not specify the way according to which the existing situation in each area was to be analyzed, nor did they include any directions concerning particular methods of data collection and analysis that were to be used. Although this was not conducive to uniformity--which could, of course, have facilitated the synthesis of the nine studies later--it was, however, welcome as a positive element of the planning process, by most planning teams, because it gave them the freedom to use professional judgment in selecting the best way to explore their subjects. This professional judgment could certainly not be substituted by administrative decision without a detrimental effect on the potential of the studies. As it was put into words by the planning team who, under the direction of Mr. Papayiannis prepared the draft plan for Sector 6 [71, p. 189]:

The Guidelines (given by the Ministry) define the goals of the studies and the objectives that have to be achieved. And they leave the planners free to employ, at their discretion, all the scientifically sound methods at their disposition, in order to analyze the existing situation, to pinpoint problems, to determine needs, to base their propositions. These are Guidelines given by an Agency that knows what it wants, to responsible planners whom it respects.

As a result, the way in which each planning team comprehended the subject of its work, and the special emphasis that it gave to particular planning issues was dissimilar in each of the nine studies. Some of these dissimilarities were related to existing differences in the nature of the particular areas under study. For instance, in the draft plan for Sector 3, an area which is facing an enormous pollution problem, the issue of the protection and improvement of the environment was given a particular emphasis [66, pp. 33-52]. By the same token in the plans for Sectors 7, and 9 the respective impacts of the port of Piraeus and the airport of Spata were considered central issues, around which both the analysis and the propositions of the plans were focused [65, p. 7].

However the nine studies had also dissimilarities directly reflecting the greatly varying political and philosophical concerns of the planning teams. For instance, it is a common trait of the nine studies that they all include some comments concerning the role of Athens, as perceived by the respective planning team, in relation with the objectives set for its development and with the means selected to achieve these objectives, by the draft plan Athens 2000. However, the way in which this issue was dealt with in each study is a characteristic according to which the sector plans can be divided into two distinct groups. In the first group the respective planning teams dedicated only a few pages to the issue of the role of Athens, as defined in Proposition 1979, expressing some comments on points that they found somehow questionable, but the bulk of their studies focused on the area which they were contracted to study, basically accepting that the assumptions and principles given to them were indeed "given".

In the second group, the issues related to Athens, its role within Greece and the objectives for its development, were dealt with in much greater detail and length, given almost as much consideration as were given issues directly related to the particular sector under study. By balancing their work in this way, the planning teams for Sector 6 (Papayiannis), 5 (Gartsos), and 7 (Diamantopoulos) seemed to emphasize their basic belief--which was explicitly stated too--that the area which they were assigned to study is, and will continue to be, an integral part of the city of Athens and cannot be technically isolated from it, even if only for the purpose of analysis.

The same dichotomy can be observed in the way in which the nine studies dealt with the process of planning for Athens 2000. Indeed, while all planning reports included some observations in regard to the issue, in the three "different" studies comments on the process followed thus far and proposals for future alternatives--with their emphasis on insuring a more substantial participation on the part of the local government of Athens--covered a significant portion of the respective planning documents.

Concerning the analysis of the existing situation of the particular area under study, the six "orthodox" studies (these for Sectors 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7) went as a rule into more detail than the studies prepared by the Diamantopoulos and the Papayiannis firms, while the Sector plan worked out by the team under Mr. Gartsos comprised both a deep and detailed analysis of the area covered by Sector 5, and a thoughtful essay concerning the role of Athens and the process that ought to be followed in planning for it. In any case it must be pointed out that the analysis of all nine studies were deep enough to assure the

"scientific grounding of preliminary findings and propositions" as was required for Phase I, in the Guidelines given to the planning teams by the Ministry [91, p. 3].

In all planning reports there were estimates of the present population of the area under study, as well as population forecasts for the year 2000. Also there were studies examining how the present population of each Sector was breaking down according to age, sex, occupation, etc., studies of the employment available in the Sector, land use studies and studies of the present development tendencies, transportation studies, base studies focusing on other infrastructure networks (such as water lines, electricity, flood protection, waste disposal, and sewage) and also studies examining the availability within each area of social infrastructure facilities (such as open space, recreation centers, schools, health care facilities, etc.).

The data used for these analytic studies originated from a variety of sources, generally different for each kind of study and also for each particular Sector. In a few cases--most often in land use studies--original data collected by the respective planning teams during specially conducted field surveys was used. Usually, however, for reasons of time limitations most analytic studies prepared for the nine Sector draft plans have relied heavily on already existing data, which were modified as needed, in order to fit the particular situation.

The National Census of 1971 had served as one major data source for all nine studies. Of course, because of the years that had elapsed between the date of this census and the preparation of the Sector plans each planning team thought it necessary to re-estimate the present population of its area of study. (In most cases by using as a basis

the customer inventories of the Electric Company). However, the way this population was distributed according to age, sex, occupation, education level, etc. was estimated on the basis of the census data. Other minor data sources for the nine sector plans included surveys held in the past by various governmental agencies, files maintained by some municipalities, etc.

There have also been a variety of approaches concerning the planning objectives set by each team for the respective Sector plan. In this way, while most studies adopted as their objectives those included in the Eighteen Point Agreement as it was approved by the Decision of the National Council of Physical Planning and Environment on September 6, 1979, the authors of the draft plans for Sectors 5, 6 and 8 (respectively the teams put together by Messrs Gartsos, Papayiannis, and Diamantopoulos) had also taken into account for their propositions the objectives and principles included in the "Plus Eight Points" document as it was drafted by the Technical Chamber of Greece (See pages 258-259).

The political philosophies of each planning team have also affected the order of importance according to which objectives were considered. For instance in the plan prepared for Sector 2 by the Doxiadis team, first priority was given to "protecting the character of high quality residential neighborhoods existing with the Sector" [60, p. 106], while policies intended to improve the situation of more problematic areas were somehow less emphasized. The contrary was true concerning Sector 5, which also comprised both high income residential suburbs and problematic refugee communities. In this case the planners working

under Mr. Gartsos put a high emphasis on propositions aimed at ameliorating the living conditions in the disadvantaged areas of the Sector, while it seems that they did not perceive any real threat for a sharp decline in the living conditions of the affluent areas.

The degree of elaboration of the propositions of each draft plan also varied significantly. In most case propositions for the development of the Sector were sketchy and general without being specifically expressed in space. However the Doxiadis team proposed three alternative land use plans for Sector 2 in year 2000, indicating residential areas, industrial zones, open space, the transportation network, the location and dimensions of the Sector center and the approximate location of sub-Sector centers also. In most other Sector plans, for instance the plan for Sector 4 prepared by Mr. Skiadaressis and his associates, there was only one preliminary land use proposition plan, on which there appeared generally the same elements as on the plan of Doxiolis. Finally the planning team under Mr. Diamantopoulos did not produce any land use plan at all at the end of phase I, limiting its propositions to public works of immediate need, and to amendments of existing legislation (especially Law 947/1979), concluding its study with some general thoughts for the organization of the area covered by the Sector the year 2000.

Concerning the crucial task of checking out the given boundaries of each Sector, the nine studies also varied in their approach. Indeed, from the planning team of Messrs. Kalorgeras and Legakis who rightly asserted that for Sector 3, which "represents an autonomous geographical entity, separated from the rest of Attica by the mountains of Parnis

and Aigaleo (...) there is no problem with the given boundaries" [58, p. 7], to Mr. Gartsos and his associates who also had good reasons to believe that Sector 5 could not possibly function as one entity, and proposed the creation of two distinct east and west Sectors covering its area and possibly extending to the north [64, p. 355], there was a full range of varying positions. For instance, Messrs. Kontarghiris, Lambakis and their associates would like to see "their" Sector 7 expanding to the south-east to include the municipality of Moschaton (given by Proposition 1979 to Sector 6, while its functional connections with the center of Piraeus are much stronger than with that of Athens) while Mr. Diamontopoulos and the other planners of the team studying Sector 8 correctly noted that the refugee municipalities covering the north part of their area of study did not belong with these along the coast of Saronikos and should either be attached to Sector 6 (Central) or form a separate Sector by themselves.

On the other hand, the way in which each planning team decided where and how to locate the center of the Sector under study, reflects again the existing political disparities among the teams. In fact, the grounds on which the planners of the Doxiadis plan, for instance, chose to transfer the center of Sector 2 from its location assigned by Proposition 1979 to a new site, when compared with the reasons given by the planning team of Mr. Gartsos for transferring their given Sector center provide a very characteristic illustration of how differently the role of a Sector-center could be perceived from different philosophical view-points.

Indeed, the Doxiadis firm argued that because the site preselected

as the Sector center was already built up to a high extent, and also was located within a larger area of high-quality residential character, "any intervention aiming at changing this character should be considered nonfeasible, in view of its social impact and of the high cost of site-expropriation" [60, p. 134]. Consequently, the firm proposed two alternative new locations for the center of Sector 2 on sites selected according to geographical criteria (near the geographical center of the Sector), criteria of land capability (flat terrain), economic criteria (unbuilt area, low expropriation cost) and accessibility through the transportation network. Questions of how this center would "attract" non-public activities or what its impact would be on existing municipal centers in the area were not given much consideration.

To the contrary Mr. Gartsos and the planning team he put together, rejected the Proposition 1979's decision to locate the center of Sector 5 in the area of Aghios Thomas, despite the fact that the proposed site was easily accessible from all points of the Sector, and on a flat piece of land which, furthermore, was still unbuilt and consequently economical to expropriate. Instead, Gartsos and his associates proposed that the central functions that were to go to the center of Aghios Thomas, be accommodated within the existing lively commercial municipal centers of Nea Ionia, in the western part of the Sector, and of Hallandri, in the eastern. This should be done, of course, without destroying the present character and functions of these centers but by expanding them through rehabilitation [61, p. 360]. In the same spirit the planning team that studied Sector 4 under Mr. Skiadaressis also proposed that this Sector's center be transferred to a new location

to include the existing municipal center of Peristeri, thus strengthening the functional role of a living and developing urban center in the area [73, p. 138]. Finally, Mr. Diamantopoulos and his associates also stressed the need to rehabilitate and strengthen existing centers in Sector 8 rather than creating a new one "from scratch" in Ellinikon, as had been proposed in the draft plan Athens 2000 [58, pp. 45-53].

In other words, the crucial question for these planning teams was not how the Sector center will be built or how much it would cost (which are necessary but nevertheless too "logistic" considerations), but rather how it would help provide the area with a functional focus of urban activities. The difference in perceptions is, indeed, striking. While Doxiadis' planners perceived the sector center as a large scale physical development which, by its dynamism, would impose its central role in the Sector (a deterministic approach), the three planning teams mentioned in the previous paragraph, believed that the existing livelihood of a center, a livelihood based on human relations which had been built up gradually during the historical evolution of the urban organism, constitutes a valuable asset, that should not only be protected but positively re-inforced also.

Finally concerning the population assumption of Proposition 1979 all nine planning teams expressed some reservation for accepting both the overall number of 4,300,000 metropolitan population for year 2000, and the particular population target assigned for each Sector for the year horizon of the studies. Generally speaking, while the planners studying the heavily urbanized central Sectors of Athens (4, 5, 6, 7, 8) believed that their given 2000 population estimates were far too low, if

measured against the present rate of population growth in the respective areas, the planning teams who studied the peripheral sectors (1, 2, 3, 9) questioned whether the high annual population increase rate which would be necessary for their areas to reach their population targets in year 2000, was feasible and realistic. Overall, if one tabulated the populations forecasted for each of the nine Sectors by the year 2000 the total metropolitan population of Athens by the horizon year, would rise considerably higher than the desirable 4,300,000 estimated between 5,350,000 to 6,000,000 people [85, p. 1].

C. PHASE II: THE PROCESS OF SYNTHESIS

Officially, phase I of the preparation of each of the nine Sector plans was to be carried out as an individual project, involving only the respective planning team and its appointed supervisor from the Office of Athens Master Plan. However, from January to April, 1980 there had been numerous informal contacts among the nine planning firms intended to exchange views on issues of common interest. The initiative to organize more structured meetings, involving all planning teams, TEDKNA, as well as representatives from the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment --who formally endorsed them--was taken by Mr. Papayiannis, whose team, studying the Central Part of Athens (Sector 6) was much more urgently needing to assess what was happening in the other Sectors, in terms of both findings and propositions. As one can read in the planning report for Sector 6 [71, p. 3]:

There have been about ten meetings which have covered a wide spectrum of issues including:

- The concept of the Sector;
- The Sector-centers;
- The cooperation with the local government;

- The transportation network;
- The law 947/1979 about "Urban Development Areas" etc.

More specifically, there has been discussed the problem of Sector boundaries and it was decided that:

- The Sector boundaries must always follow existing municipal borders; and that
- The presentation of data, problems and propositions in each Sector plan should be organized, if at all possible, by respective local government unit.¹⁴

In regard to the issue of the division of the metropolis of Athens into nine Sectors, Papayiannis and Associates, based on the information gathered during these meetings, proposed a new Sector division, which was generally more acceptable to all nine teams. As the reader can see by comparing figure 17 (page 284) to figure 18 (page 285) this new division was different from that according to which the Sectors had been studied during Phase I, in the following points:

- Sector 5 coincided completely with the municipality of Athens. Kalithea, a municipality occupying the southeastern extreme of the Sector as studied during Phase I, was given to Sector 8, while Moschaton, at its southwestern extreme, to Sector 7.
- Sector 4 had expanded to its south, covering the municipalities of Aigaleo, Aghia Barbara and Korydallos, which, during Phase I, had been studied as part of Sector 7. Sector 4 was also expanded to the north to include the municipality of Ano Liossia, formerly belonging to Sector 1.
- The most radical change in this new division concerned Sector 5 which was dichotomized along the north-to-south hill row of Tourkovounia. Its western part was given to Sector 1 while its

14. In order for the analytic work of each Sector Plan to be usable even if it was later decided to amend the predecided Sector division.




Figure 17: The nine Sectors of Athens, as studied during Phase I.




Figure 18: Alternative Sector division as proposed by the nine planning teams.

eastern was covered by expanding Sector 2.

- Finally, the northern municipalities of Sector 8 were separated from it to form a new Sector which, of course, was assigned the leftover Sector number 5.

In this new division, as the reader can realize by comparing figures 17 and 18 (respectively on pages 284 and 285), Mr. Papayiannis and his associates indicated as the major urban activity centers of the metropolis sites generally different from those proposed in the draft plan Athens 2000. Indeed, adopting the philosophy of the authors of the plans for Sectors 4, 5, and 6 (as far as the location of Sector-centers is concerned) Papayiannis stressed that rather than creating Sector centers from scratch, the existing and rapidly expanding municipal centers of the metropolis had to be strengthened and equipped with the necessary public facilities.

The cooperation of the nine firms established during phase I not only continued but intensified during phase II of the study. Following the formal presentation of the Sector draft plans in the Offices of the Technical Chamber of Greece during the first week of May, 1980, and the successive presentations which, organized by TEDKNA and the respective local authorities took place in the town halls of the larger municipalities of all nine firms. The task of this body was to study the nine preliminary Sector plans with the goal of arriving at some common propositions, which, after being officially endorsed by the Ministry of Regional Planning and Environment, would serve as the formal Directions for the preparation of the final Sector Plans in phase III. This would be exactly as it had been ascribed in the Guidelines which were appended.

to the contracts signed by the nine firms at the start of Phase I.

On its part, the planning staff of TEDKNA was keeping busy at the same time, studying the nine planning reports and preparing its own position concerning the proposals of the plans and also concerning the planning process to be followed during phase III [98, pp. 1-3].

However, an unexpected political development which took place at the end of May 1980 was destined to have a terribly negative impact on the process of planning for Athens that was under way. As a result of a growing bitter opposition against Mr. Manos, an opposition created within his own party primarily as a reaction to "his" law 947/1979,¹⁵ the man who must be credited with founding a Ministry of Physical Planning for the first time in Greece, was transferred to head another Ministry. Mr. Plytas, a conservative politician who had run several times for the office of the mayor of Athens, and who had held this office for a brief time during the mid-sixties, was appointed as the new Chief of the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment.

The political change created a definite uneasiness to the nine planning teams who, after a long and painful process, has finally succeeded in finding a common language with Mr. Manos. However, since the process of planning for Athens was well on its way and since the planners of the Office of Athens Master Plan, with whom they had direct, every day rapport had not changed, the nine teams still hoped¹⁶ that

15. For more information about this conflict the reader can refer to pages 77, 78 of this thesis.

16. This impression was given to the author of this thesis during interviews with representatives of the nine firms taken by her during May and June, 1980.

the process of preparation of the comprehensive plan for Athens could follow its predecided course.

However it soon started becoming clear that this was not going to happen. The first hint was given by the new Minister in a press conference, immediately following his taking office. During this press conference, Mr. Plytas announced a moratorium on law 947/1979 which was to be "reconsidered". Since this law was to be the primary implementation tool for the nine plans under preparation the development created a great uncertainty among the planners, who at that moment were trying to coordinate their proposals for Phase III. On the other hand, the change of chief executive and the resulting reexamination of the priorities set by the various agencies administration, had a delaying effect on the progress of Phase II, since at that particular stage the active involvement in the process of the Office of Athens Master Plan was a must.

Despite these developments, the coordinative body of the nine firms kept on debating the issues on which there was disagreement, managing to produce by the end of July, 1980, a document pointing out issues on which there was a consensus and including the different opinions regarding issues on which there remained differences. The basic points of agreement in this document [67, appendix 1] were the following:

1. The set population target of 4,300,000 people by the year 2000, appeared to the nine planning teams as unrealistically low. An alternative target--which could be reached only if very drastic measures for limiting the annual population growth of Athens

were to be taken immediately--would be 5,405,000 people. This population would be distributed to the nine Sectors as shown on Table XI, page 293.

2. A national decentralization policy, including measures for administrative decentralization and the decentralization of employment, especially industry, was urgently needed for the population goal to be reached.
3. In order for the city to function properly a balanced distribution of densities, employment opportunities, and urban amenities was necessary. Public housing programs and programs of public investment intending at improving infrastructure networks were of first priority.
4. In order to minimize movements through the metropolis there was a need for distributing employment opportunities throughout the metropolis in relation with the spacial distribution of the population.

An analogous document expressing the position of the local government of Athens in response to the nine Sector draft plans, was prepared also by TEDKNA and formally submitted to the Ministry [67, Appendix 2]. In this it was stressed again that the division of the metropolitan area of Athens into Sectors should be revised according to the findings of the analysis of the nine planning teams, in order to be based on existing local entities. Furthermore it was emphasized that the respective Sector centers should not antagonize but rather re-inforce existing developing municipal centers.

Nevertheless, following the change in Ministers the role of TEDKNA

as a participant to the process of planning for Athens--which, of course, had never been formally established--was drastically undermined. In a letter dated May 29, 1980, TEDKNA, addressing to the new Minister its constant demand to be officially acknowledged as a rightful participant in the process of planning for Athens, was proposing a time-diagram for carrying out the specific tasks necessary for completing Phase II, in which the role of TEDKNA, as well as that of the Technical Chamber of Greece and other non-administrative units were well defined [98, pp. 1-3]. However, in a later communique (dated June 20, 1970) TEDKNA expressed its strong protest over the Ministry hindering even its participation in the discussion of the nine plans by expressing its views over the debated issues [99]. A new and more elaborate task diagram submitted at the time was, again, silently rejected by the Ministry.

It was near the end of October, 1980, when the Department of Physical Planning and Environment, running almost three months behind schedule, gave the nine planning firms its final Directions [67] for Phase III of preparation of the Sector plans. The content of these Directions caused a terrible disappointment to the nine planning teams. As the author of this thesis understood in the course of follow-up meetings that she had with representatives of the nine firms during a brief visit to Greece in Summer, 1981, the Directions document ended the planners' months of uncertainty with complete disillusionment, in regard to the possible fate of their plans. Indeed, despite what had been accomplished during the previous year in terms of analytic studies, despite the progress made towards arriving at generally acceptable solutions to some crucial problems that had been identified, in short,

despite the hopes that were created when--for the first time in the history of Greek planning--professionals of different political views had managed to cooperate working together with local governments and central administration agencies, the Directions for Phase III, given by the Ministry merely finalized proposals dating from the draft plan Athens 2000. In some cases these propositions were amended but generally not in the way it had been indicated in the respective Sector plan studies.

Concerning the problem of the population target for year 2000 the authors of the Directions insisted that this had already been "set to 4,300,000 people" [67, p. 1]. However there was no indication in the text in regard to how this goal--which had been proved grossly unrealistic--was to be reached. To the contrary it was stressed that "no measures involving police power would be taken (...) for discouraging the creation in Athens of new employment intensive units (...) because this would be both undesirable and ineffective" (towards reducing the rate of population growth) [67, p. 2].

The Directions also "finalized" the nine Sector boundaries [67, pp. 9-11]. As the reader can see by comparing this latest division to the one that had been established at the start of Phase I (both appear on figure 17, page 284) there have been only minor changes to the Sector boundaries, while the respective propositions of the nine teams were generally ignored. (See figure 18, page 285). The only significant change regarded Sector 5, which was expanded to the North, to include eight new localities. Such a thing was by no means proposed in the respective Sector plan while the planners of Sector 2 had just remarked

that whether these municipalities would continue to remain in their Sector was a matter to be decided between the planning teams of Sectors 2 and 5, during Phase II. It is very characteristic of the overall quality of the Directions document, that the same population target which was assigned for Sector 5 by Proposition 1979--and which was rejected by the respective planning term as unrealistically low--was assigned again to the expanded Sector! On Table XI, page 293, the reader can compare the populations which were proposed for each Sector by the coordinative body of the nine teams, during Phase II, to the "final" Sector population target given by the Directions, as well as to the population target of Proposition 1979.

In regard to the Sector centers, the Directions introduced a new concept, this of the "metropolitan" Sector center as opposed to the "regional" one. Accordingly "metropolitan" Sector centers should be accessible from all points of the metropolitan area because "in them there would be organized activities of metropolitan magnitude."¹⁷ In regard to the location of each center the Directions generally insisted on the scheme proposed in the draft plan, accepting minor changes related to the specific site of the Sector center, in two cases. (Sectors 2 and 4) [67, pp. 11-12].

Similarly, concerning the transportation network, the location of industrial zones, and the location of administrative buildings and major public facilities, the Directions stuck with the respective propositions of the draft plan, with very minor changes, sometimes related

17. This, of course, would be in conflict with the objective of minimizing inter-Sector movements and dependancies.

TABLE XI

THE METROPOLITAN POPULATION OF ATHENS BY YEAR 2000
AS DISTRIBUTED TO THE NINE SECTORS

Sector	2000 Population According to the Draft Plan Athens 2000 (Proposition 1979)	2000 Population According to the Forecast of the Coordinative Body of the Nine Planning Teams	2000 Population According to the Directions for Phase III Given by the Ministry
1	390,000	300,000	200,000
2	460,000	340,000	200,000
3	220,000	175,000	150,000
4	420,000	500,000	400,000
5	390,000	700,000	600,000
6	600,000	1,100,000	1,000,000
7	540,000	1,000,000	750,000
8	720,000	1,000,000	700,000
9	360,000	280,000	300,000
Total	4,300,000	5,405,000	4,300,000

Source: Proposition 1979 and Directions for Phase III. Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment.

to the findings of the Sector plans but generally not.

Finally, concerning the planning methodology to be followed in Phase III, nothing was mentioned in the Directions although it was explicitly stated in the text of Guidelines that had accompanied the contracts signed by all firms in January, 1980, that Phase III of planning was to be carried out according to a specific program adopted by the Ministry "in order to insure the co-ordinated collecting and analyzing of data by the nine planning teams" [91, p. 4].

The reaction of all nine planning teams to these Directions was unanimous and angry. With letters to the Ministry [109; 94; 88; 100; 84; 93; 83; 82; 87] each firm formally protested that the analytic study which it had prepared, its conclusions and the related propositions, were not given due consideration in drafting the Directions document. In every letter there were pointed out instances in which the final Directions given to the planning team were arbitrary, unfounded in relation with the existing situation as it was analyzed during Phase I or in conflict with the goals set for plan Athens 2000 in the Eighteen Point Agreement.

Nevertheless, the Ministry did not amend its final Directions for Phase III in any way, and the nine firms were forced by the contracts which they had signed, to carry out Phase III, abiding by these Directions.

D. EPILOGUE

The author of this thesis had to conclude her research by Fall 1980. However, during a brief visit to Greece in Summer 1981, she had the opportunity to follow up on what had happened since.


According to the information she gathered in meetings with members of the nine planning teams and of the professional staff at the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment, the nine Sector plans had been submitted to the Ministry in their final form in May, 1981. Following this, the Office of Athens Master Plan had synthesized a "final" land use plan for Athens 2000, a land use plan that bears a striking resemblance to the one which had accompanied Proposition 1979. This land use plan was exhibited along with other projects completed by the Ministry of Physical Planning, on a leaflet, reporting to the public the accomplishments of the Ministry in 1981 (See figure 19, page 296).

Nevertheless, with law 947/1979 frozen and with no program of plan implementation under consideration, it was very clear to this author and to the persons whom she interviewed that no intention of ever implementing this plan existed, realistically. Even the fact that the plan was allowed to go past Phase II was probably due only to the contract that Mr. Manos had co-signed with the nine firms as the Minister of Physical Planning.

In any case a national election was approaching and it was increasingly obvious that another political party, the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), was going to take over the national government. This, indeed, happened on October 17, 1981. Following the change in administration the new Minister of Physical Planning, Dr. Tritsis, announced his intention to have a new comprehensive planning legislation drafted, in order to replace law 947/1979. He has also made clear that a series of programs aiming at taking care some of the most acute problems of Athens, for instance those of air pollution and transportation,



Προγραμματισμός Έργου 1981.



✓ Οργάνωση ευρύτερης περιοχής.



Ρυθμιστικό Σχέδιο 'Αθηνών.



✓ 'Αστικά και περιαστικά πράσινο 'Αθηνών στά πλαίσιο του Ρυθμιστικού Σχεδίου.

Figure 19: The final land use plan Athens 2000 as it appeared on a leaflet, issued by the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment along with other projects accomplished in 1981.

were being worked out. However, to this author's best knowledge, there have not been any references to the existing "comprehensive" plan Athens 2000 which, presumably, has been abandoned, nor any intention for working out a new one has yet been announced.

CONCLUSION

ATHENS 2000: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EXPERIENCE

In the course of the last two chapters there has been expressed judgement in regard with specific aspects of the process of planning for Athens 2000. For this concluding chapter there remains the task of assessing the planning experience as a whole.

The process of planning for the latest comprehensive plan for Athens can be divided into four characteristically distinct periods:

Period I began in August, 1978, when the planning process was initiated by Stefanos Manos, then Deputy Minister of Public Works, and ended in April, 1979 with Proposition 1979 as its outcome.

Period II started in April, 1979 with the presentation of Proposition 1979 to the public and ended in September of the same year with the Eighteen Point Agreement officially adopted by the National Council of Physical Planning and Environment.

Period III began in September, 1979 with the initiation of the process of commissioning nine Sector plans to an equal number of private planning firms and ended in October 1980 when the Ministry of Physical Planning issued its disillusionary Directions for phase III of the Sector plan preparation.

Finally, Period IV covered the preparation of the nine final Sector plans and the "finalizing" of the official Athens 2000 land use plan by the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment.

From its beginnings, in Summer 1978, it was clear that Plan Athens 2000 was going to be different from any plan previously prepared for the

Greek Capital. What made this particular plan special was the fact that, contrary to all previous plans, this was initiated by an administrator holding decision making power, rather than by a high ranking professional member of the staff of a public agency. This event by itself constituted a powerful indication that this plan, whatever form it took, would have a good chance to be implemented.

This possibility became almost certainty when, during 1979, a record of planning legislation pieces was brought before the Greek parliament and particularly when law 947/1979, undoubtedly the most comprehensive planning legislation that has appeared in Greece since 1923, was voted into effect.

On the other hand the fact that this time the process of planning was initiated and --more importantly-- directly supervised by a non-planner had its effect also. Indeed, as was proved by the fiasco of the five Idea Plans and their hasty "synthesis" into Proposition 1979, Mr. Manos was at that time very naive in regard with how a comprehensive plan for a metropolis can be prepared, with the result that the outcome of the first period of planning was an obviously bad plan.

However, during the process of public exposure of Proposition 1979 Mr. Manos was apparently educated in this respect. Furthermore, he had the undeniable sensitivity of realizing that without a wide public acceptance "his" plan could not possibly be implemented, as he obviously wished. It was probably to insure this public acceptance that he conceded to getting involved into a transactive process which resulted in the consensus on the Eighteen Points Agreement and which he hoped to let continue during the process of preparation of the nine Sector plans so

that these could be synthesized in a commonly agreed upon master plan for the metropolis of Athens.

To the author of this thesis, this third period of planning, involving a plurality of voices, and planning philosophies, has undoubtedly been the most interesting. It is clear that the process followed in the preparation of the nine Sector studies which, put together, would hopefully form one single plan for the Greek Capital, had little similarity to a traditional "synoptic" planning approach. An obvious question against the planning approach followed in period III of Athens 2000 plan preparation, would have to focus on the feasibility of a cooperation of planners with such contradictory planning theories, on the possible fruitfulness of this cooperation. However if "contradictions among (planning theories) are not seen as deficiencies in the theories themselves but as reflections of homologous tensions and contradictions in society at large", then "parallel applications of more than one theory" would be necessary "for arriving at a valid, three dimensional perspective of social issues and appropriate action implications." [29, p.1].

The above quotation is an excerpt from Barclay M. Hudson's thoughtful 1979 essay entitled: "Comparison of Current Planning Theories: Counterparts and Contradictions" [29]. In this article Hudson distinguishes five schools of planning thought: these of Synoptic, Incremental, Transactive, Advocacy and Radical Planning. To this author's opinion all five of these planning philosophies were interplayed in the process of planning for Athens 2000, especially during its third period.

"Synoptic planning, or the rational comprehensive approach" is described by Hudson as "the dominant (planning) tradition, and the point of departure for most other planning approaches." The basic elements of

synoptic planning are: (1) goal-setting, (2) identification of policy alternatives, (3) evaluation of means against ends, and (4) implementation of decisions. Synoptic planning, Hudson goes on, "typically looks at problems from a systems view point, using conceptual or mathematical models (...) with heavy reliance on numbers and quantitative analysis." [29, p. 388-389]. According to this definition of "synoptic" planning Proposition 1979 has been a bad example, while the plan the Doxiadis firm proposed for Sector 2 was a successful as well as a clear-cut one. On the other hand, elements of synoptic planning existed in all nine Sectors studies, while in some of these other approaches were evident also.

A transactive approach towards understanding urban problems through interpersonal communications, towards involving the persons who are to live in an area in the process of planning for this area, towards helping "people take increasing control over the social processes that govern their welfare" [29, p. 390], an approach towards "decentralizing planning institutions" is evident in the laborious efforts of many planning teams to involve in the process of planning for their Sector the citizens of the respective areas through the local government representatives as well as individually, by means of questionnaires, for instance.

In the three studies for Sectors 5, 6, and 8 there are distinct elements of advocacy planning also. The respective planning teams have indeed presented the cause of the disadvantaged people who lived within the areas they studied, and proposed policies aiming primarily at "defending the interests of weak against strong", as Hudson would have put it, [29, p. 390]. In the role that the Technical Chamber of Greece and the Association of Architects had played in the planning process since

its start, there have also been clear elements of advocacy planning. However, to paraphrase Hudson [29, p. 30], while their advocacy approach helped them to be successful in essentially "blocking an insensitive plan", Proposition 1979, it did not lead them to "mobilize equally effective support" for the constructive alternative process, proposed by Manos.

Elements of radical planning, in its "version associated with spontaneous activism, guided by a (...) pragmatic vision of self reliance and mutual aid" [29, p. 390] are found in the planning approach of Mr. Diamantopoulos who, as noted earlier, considered planning essential because it could lead to specific propositions to be used as a focus for social struggle [57, p. 176]. On the other hand elements of radical planning, in the sense of planning with its focus "less on ad hoc problem solving through resurrected community, and more on the theory of the state which is seen to permeate the character of social and economic life at all levels, and in turn determine the structure and evolution of social problems" [29, p. 390], can be found in the plans for Sectors 5, 6, and 8 (for more elaboration on this the reader can refer to page 277) as well as in the approach to the process of planning for Athens 2000, by the Technical Chamber of Greece and SADAS.

However if the author of this thesis was asked to fit the process followed in planning for Athens 2000--especially in its third period--into just one of Hudson's five categories, this would be "incremental" planning. Hudson defines incremental planning as "getting things done through a decentralized bargaining process, best-suited to a free market and a democratic economy" [29, p. 389]. "The case for incremental planning," Hudson goes on, "derives from a series of criticisms leveled at

synoptic rationality: its insensitivity to existing institutional performance capabilities (...), its presumption of a general public interest rather than pluralistic interests, (and also for) its bias towards central control" [29, p. 389].

Few would argue that in the modern Greek state there has always been a strong bias for central control of administrative decision making, either related or unrelated with planning. It is, therefore, a distinct characteristic of the process of planning for Athens 2000 that this bias was less emphasized than ever before. It seems safe to assume that Stefanos Manos had realized that in a society as pluralistic as Greece, a society composed of groups of people with as highly diversified interests and aspirations, planning could not be effective or implementable unless it had the consent of much more than one of these groups. Manos also realized that conflicting planning philosophies and approaches reflect, more or less directly, these conflicting social interests and that it would therefore be unwise not to take them into account in preparing a plan that he wanted implemented. Thus, as soon as he understood the futility of trying to have the plan prepared by his agency implemented, the process that he designed for essentially working out a new plan for Athens was one involving all parts who were willing to participate in it. One that had to be based on mutual trade-offs and compromise.

Because of the more conservative--and narrow-minded--people in his own party, the experiment of Stefanos Manos was not allowed to be completed. Today Athens still does not have a comprehensive development plan, while its problems get more serious every day. However planning for Athens 2000 has given to planners of various philosophies, to local

officials and also to members of government agencies the opportunity to realize that despite their differences they could and must cooperate. The experience accumulated by all these people during one year of learning how to work out a language for communication can be a valuable, indeed, contribution to planning in Greece.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. General References

1. Amner, Christine and Amner, Dean S. 1977. Dictionary of Business and Economics. New York: The Free Press.
2. Ehrlich, Blake and Vanderpool, Eugene. 1974. "Athens". Encyclopedia Britannica III. Vol. 2: 262-269.
3. "Greece". 1976. Encyclopedia Britannica III. Vol. IV: 706.
4. Hanson, J.L. 1974. A Dictionary of Economics and Commerce. London: Macdonald and Evans, Ltd.
5. Kayser, B. 1963. "Athenes, Ville Moderne" (in French). Encyclopedia Universalis. Vol. 2: 721-723.
6. Moffat, Donald W. 1925. Economic Dictionary. New York: Elsevier.
7. Perchoux, Pierre-Yves. 1971. "Athenes" (in French). La Grand Encyclopedie, Library Larousse. Vol. 2: 1160-1163.

B. Books

8. Altshuler, Alan A. 1965. The City Planning Process: A Political Analysis. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
9. Coutsoumaris, G. et al. 1965. Analysis and Assessment of the U.S. PL 480 Program in Greece. Athens: Center of Planning and Economic Research. Special Studies Series.
10. Falludi, Andreas, ed. 1973. A Reader in Planning Theory. New York: Pergamon Press.
11. Friedman, John and Allonso, William. 1975. Regional Policy: Readings in Theory and Applications. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
12. Germidis, Dimitrios and Negreponi-Delivanis, Maria. 1975. Industrialization, Employment and Income Distribution in Greece: A Case Study. Paris: Development Center of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Development Centre Studies. Employment Series no. 12.
13. Haar, Charles M. 1976. Land-Use Planning: A Casebook of the Use, Misuse and Resuse of Urban Land. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
14. Goodman, William I., ed. and Freud, Eric C., assistant ed. 1968. Principles and Practice of Urban Planning. Washington, D.C.: The International City Managers' Association.

15. Joint Center for Urban Studies of M.I.T. and Harvard University. 1964. The Effectiveness of Metropolitan Planning. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
16. Kent, T.J. 1964. The Urban General Plan. San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company.
17. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 1960. Economic Surveys: Greece. Paris: The Organization for European Economic Co-operation.
18. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1975. Economic Surveys: Greece. Paris: OECD Publications.
19. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1976. Economic Surveys: Greece. Paris: OECD Publications.
20. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1979. Economic Surveys: Greece. Paris: OECD Publications.
21. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1980. Economic Surveys: Greece. Paris: OECD Publications.
22. Price-Waterhouse. 1978. Doing Business in Greece. Information Guide. Athens: Price-Waterhouse Co.
23. Zolotas, Xenophon. 1965. Monetary Equilibrium and Economic Development. With Special Emphasis to the Experience of Greece 1930-1963. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

C. Journals

24. Association of Architects (SADAS). 1976. "The Physical Plan of the Capital" (in Greek). Deltion Syllogkou Architektonon. July-August:
25. Association of Architects (SADAS). 1979. "Special Issue: The Master Plan of Athens" (in Greek). Deltion Syllogkou Architektonon. January-February: 5-44.
26. Committee of Environment. Association of Architects (SADAS). 1976. "Law 360/1976 about 'Physical Planning and Environment'" (in Greek). Deltion Syllogkou Architektonon. July-August: 19-21.
27. Efthimiopoulos, Elias. 1982. "The Cloud Over the City" (in Greek). Anti: Bimonthly Political Review. April: 24-26.
28. Gartsos, Costis. 1981. "Recent Changes in the Legal and Administrative Planning System in Greece" (in Greek). Architecture in Greece. Vol. 15: 58-65.

29. Hudson, Barclay M. 1979. "Comparison of Current Planning Theories: Counterparts and Contradictions." Journal of the American Planning Association. October: 387-403.
30. Joint Study Group of the Technical Chamber of Greece and the National Center of Social Research. 1978. "A Critique of the Present Structure and Function of the Metropolitan Area of Athens" (in Greek). Review of Social Research. First and Second Quarter of 1978: 479-487.
31. Mandouvalou, M.; Martha. "Physical Plan and Program of the Region of the Capital: A Critique of Doxiadis' Plan" (in Greek). Del-tion Syllogkou Architektonon. November-December: 15-22.
32. Martinos, Harry. 1977. "Physical Planning and the Process of Formulating Public Policies" (in Greek). Technika Chronika. December 41-46.
33. Milligan, Stephen. 1982. "Socialism in One Country: A Survey of Papandreou's Greece." The Economist. July 3: 1-20.
34. Permanent Committee of Issues of Physical Planning. Technical Chamber of Greece. 1978. "The Process of Physical Planning and Implementation of Plans in Greece" (in Greek). Technika Chronika. August: 5-7.
35. Prevelakis, George. 1979. "For the Development of the Science of Space" (in Greek). Synchrone Themata. May: 55-62.
36. Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE). 1976. "Special Issue: The Commission of the National Plan and Program of Greece to the Doxiadis' Firm" (in Greek). Technika Chronika. February: 5-72.
37. Technical Chamber of Greece. 1977. "Special Issue: KEPOS DEPOS" (in Greek). Technika Chronika: May-June: 61-82.
38. Technical Chamber of Greece. 1978. "Special Issue: Law 360/1976" (in Greek). Technika Chronika. January: 4-113.
39. "The Problem Athens" (in Greek). 1980. Anti: Bimonthly Political Review. July: 25-39.
40. Tritsis, Antonis. 1977. "Planning--Greece--Development" (in Greek). Technika Chronika. June-July: 15-16.
41. Zacharakis, Stefanos. 1976. "Planning and Implementation of Development Programs in Britain and Greece" (in Greek). Technika Chronika. June-July: 15-26.

D. Legal (in Greek)

42. Administrative Decree no 9610. "About General Policy Lines for De-Centralization." The Government Gazette. Vol. B, issue no. 1021. Athens, November 6, 1979: 8823-8826.
43. Administrative Decree no 7908/D354. "The Official Results of the National Census of April 5, 1981." The Government Gazette. Vol. B, issue no. 370. Athens, June 14, 1982: 3153-3312.
44. Law no 360. "About Physical Planning and Environment." The Government Gazette. Vol. A, issue no. 151. Athens, June 22: 1041-1044.
45. Law no 880. "About Maximum Floor/Area Ratios." The Government Gazette. Vol. A, issue no. 58. Athens, March 22, 1979: 497-499.
46. Law no 947. "About Urban Development Areas." The Government Gazette. Vol. A, issue no. 169. Athens, July 26, 1979: 1731-1751.
47. Law no 998. "About the Protection of Forests." The Government Gazette. Vol. A, issue no. 289. Athens, December 29, 1979: 2843-2873.
48. Law no 1032. "About the Foundation of the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment." The Government Gazette, Vol. A, issue no. 57. Athens, March 14, 1980: 717-722.
49. Legislative Decree no 1262: "About Regulatory Plans." The Government Gazette. Vol. A, issue no 104. Athens, November 3, 1972: 1715-1718.
50. Ministry of Interior. 1976. Administrative Division of Greece. Athens: National Press.
51. Ministry of Interior. 1976. Municipal and Communal Code: Presidential Decree 933/1975. Athens: National Press.
52. Ministry of Public Works. 1979. Draft Presidential Decree about Particular Points Concerning Studies of "urban Development Areas." Athens.
53. National Council of Physical Planning and Environment. 1979. Decision: Framework Plan for the Metropolitan Area of Athens. Athens: September 6.
54. Presidential Decree. "About the Protection of the Unbuilt Land of Attica." The Government Gazette. Vol. D, issue no 707. Athens, December 13, 1979: 8133-8424.
55. Presidential Decree no 197. "About Regional Associations of Municipalities and Communities." The Government Gazette. Vol. A, issue no 43, Athens, March 29, 1979: 345-350.

E. Reports

56. Andrakakou, Ioannidis, Onoufriou and Foskolakis. 1975. Development Plan of a Rural Area around Kalavryta (in Greek, unpublished). A senior Thesis, School of Architecture, National Technical University. Athens. September.
57. Association of Architects (SADAS), Committee of Local Self-Government. 1975. Local Self-Government and Regulatory Plans (In Greek, unpublished). Athens.
58. Diamantopoulos, G., et al. 1980. Athens: Sector 8. Phase I, Preliminary Report (in Greek, unpublished). Athens. May.
59. Doxiadis, Konstantinos and Associates. 1975. Physical Plan and Program for the Region of the Capital (in Greek, unpublished) Athens. August.
60. "Doxiadis Firm," Psomopoulos, P., project manager. 1980. A Plan Organization and Regulation of Sector 2 (in Greek, unpublished). Athens. May.
61. Gartsos, Costis et al. 1980. A Planning Study of "Sector 5" of Athens (in Greek, unpublished). Athens. May.
62. Georgoulas, Nikos. 1975. Citizen Participation in Urban Planning: The Greek Example (Draft). Prepared for the Joint Urban Management Project of the OECD Technical Co-operation Service. Athens.
63. Hadjitheodorou, Nikolas M. 1978. Public Intervention and the Implementation of Urban Land Use Policies: An Assessment of the Respective Innovations Introduced During the Last Decade in Greece (Master's Thesis, unpublished). Oxford Polytechnical Department of Urban Planning Studies, Oxford.
64. Kondaratos, Savas, et al. 1980. Athens 2000. Sector 9: Draft Plan for Organization and Regulation (in Greek, unpublished). Athens.
65. Kontarghiris, D., Lambakis, A., and Associates. 1980. Athens 2000: Sector 7: Draft Plan for Organization and Regulation. Preliminary Report (in Greek, unpublished). Athens.
66. Legakis, Kalogheras. 1980. A Study for the Organization and Regulation of the Metropolitan Area of the Capital. Athens 2000: Sector 3 (in Greek, unpublished). Athens.
67. Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment, General Directorate of Housing; Office of Athens Master Plan. 1980. Directions for Phase III of the Planning Studies for the Nine Sectors of Athens (In Greek, unpublished). Athens, October.

68. Ministry of Public Works; General Directorate of Housing. 1979. Athens 2000: For Better Living Conditions (in Greek). Athens, April.
69. Ministry of Public Works; General Directorate of Housing; Office of Athens Master Plan. 1979. Proposition 1979 (in Greek). Athens, April.
70. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. 1976. Joint activity on Urban Management: Training for Managers of Urban Plans: The Greek example (preprint). Athens.
71. Papayiannis, Thimios, and Associates. 1980. Athens: Central Area. Space Organization and Regulation. Sector 6 (in Greek, unpublished). Athens.
72. Skiadaressis, G.A. 1980. Sector 4: A Study for the Organization and Regulation of the Metropolitan Area of Athens. Phase I (in Greek, unpublished). Athens, June.
73. Technical Chamber of Greece. 1979. Athens, the Problem: 1. History of Planning for Athens (in Greek, unpublished). Athens, June.
74. Technical Chamber of Greece. 1979. Athens, the Problem: 2. Comprehensive Planning; What it Must Be; What it Can Accomplish (in Greek, unpublished). Athens, June.
75. Technical Chamber of Greece. 1979. Athens, the Problem: 3. The Problems of Athens and their Causes (in Greek, unpublished). Athens, June.
76. Technical Chamber of Greece. 1979. Athens, the Problem: 4. A Critique of the General Plan Athens 2000 (in Greek, unpublished). Athens, June.
77. Technical Chamber of Greece. 1976. A Critical Analysis of the Physical Plan and Program of the Region of the Capital, by the Doxiadis Firm (in Greek, unpublished). Athens, October.
78. Technical Chamber of Greece. 1976. A Report of the Study Group of the Issue: Planning Studies in Greece (in Greek, unpublished). Athens.
79. University of Strathclyde; Dept. of Urban and Regional Planning. 1978. Planning in Greece. 1977 (unpublished). Glasgow, Scotland. January.
80. Xenakis, Kosmas and Associates. 1980. Organization and Regulation of Sector 1: Existing Condition and Draft Plan (in Greek, unpublished). Athens, May.

F. Miscellaneous (in Greek)

81. Avghi, Daily Newspaper. 1979. "Athens, the Monstrous City". Athens, September 23:2.
82. Diamantopoulos et al. 1980. Observations on the "Directions for Phase III" (Unpublished). A letter addressed to the Ministries of Physical Planning and Environment. Athens, November 11.
83. General Directorate of Housing; Ministry of Public Works. 1978. The Deputy Minister's Orders Concerning the Preparation of a Regulatory Plan for Athens (Unpublished). A Memorandum. Athens, November 25.
84. Gartsos et al. 1980. Observations on the "Directions for Phase III" (Unpublished). A letter addressed to the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment. Athens, November 28.
85. Gartsos, Costis. 1980. Assessment of Phase I of the Preparation of the Nine Sector Plans (Unpublished). A presentation to the coordinative body of the nine planning teams of the Sectors of Athens. Athens, August.
86. Innovative Movement of Progressive Architects (AKPA). 1980. A Newsletter Concerning the Preparation of the Comprehensive Plan for Athens. Athens, March 10.
87. Kondaratos, et al. 1980. Notes on the "Directions for Phase III" by YHOP (Unpublished). A letter addressed to the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment. Athens, November 28.
88. Legakis, Kalogheras. 1980. Sector 3: Summary Critique of the "Directions for Phase III" (Unpublished). A letter addressed to the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment. Athens, November.
89. Loukakis, P. 1980. Comments on the "Directions for Phase III" (Unpublished). A letter addressed to the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment. Athens, November 25.
90. Ministry of Public Works. 1979. Contract: for Commissioning a Study for the Organization and Regulation of Sector . . . of the Metropolitan area of Athens. Athens, December.
91. Ministry of Public Works. 1979. Guidelines; Subject of the Studies and General Directions and Principles. Text attached to the contract for commissioning a study for the Organization and Regulation of Sector . . . of the Metropolitan Area of Athens. Athens, December.

92. Office of Athens Master Plan. 1979. General Directions Concerning the Policy of Sectors and Sector-Centers in Plan Athens 2000 (Unpublished). Athens, December.
93. Papayiannis et al. 1980. Comments on the text of "Directions for Phase III" of YHOP (Unpublished). A letter addressed to the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment. Athens, November.
94. Psomopoulos, et al. 1980. Necessary Clarifications on the "Directions for Phase III" (Unpublished). A letter addressed to the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment. Athens, November.
95. Regional Association of Municipalities and Communities of the Department of Attica (TEDKNA). 1979. The Positions of TEDKNA on the Studies of the Second Stage of Preparation of Plan Athens 2000 (Unpublished). A memorandum issued by TEDKNA. A memorandum issued by TEDKNA. Athens, November 29.
96. Regional Association of Municipalities and Communities of the Department of Attica (TEDKNA). 1980. The Nine Studies of Athens 2000 (unpublished). A memorandum addressed to the local governments of Attica. Athens, February 25.
97. Regional Association of Municipalities and Communities of the Department of Attica (TEDKNA). 1980. Activities Planned by TEDKNA for the Second Stage of Preparation of Plan Athens 2000 (Unpublished). A memorandum addressed to the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment; the planning teams of the nine Sectors of Athens; and the local authorities of Attica. Athens, March 22.
98. Regional Association of Municipalities and Communities of Attica (TEDKNA). 1980. The Process of Phase II of the Studies for the Nine Sectors of Athens (unpublished). A memorandum issued by TEDKNA. Athens, May 29.
99. Regional Association of Municipalities and Communities of Attica (TEDKNA). 1980. Protest (Unpublished). A letter addressed to the Minister of Physical Planning and Environment, Mr. Plytas. Athens, July 20.
100. Skiadaressis, G.A. 1980. Comments Concerning the Directions for Phase III of the Studies of the Metropolitan Area of Athens (Unpublished). A letter addressed to the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment. Athens, December 1.
101. Vima, Daily Newspaper. 1978. With programs of Public Investment and Urgent Measures the Capital Can be Saved. Athens, November 21:6.

102. Xenakis, Kosmas. 1980. Comments on the "Directions for Phase II" of Preparation of the Nine Sector Plans, by YHOP (unpublished).
A letter addressed to the Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment. Athens, November 28.

APPENDICES

INTERVIEW QUESTIONNAIRE¹

1. It is well known that in the post World War II years, a number of plans and urban studies have been commissioned for the city of Athens, by statal Agencies. It is also known that these plans/studies have never been officially implemented. The situation being like this, it seems like one would have reasons to worry about the fate of the plan for Athens, presently under preparation (Athens 2000). What are the reasons that, according to your opinion, have led to the abandonment of all the previous planning studies before their implementation could start?

2. What are your comments about the process of preparation of plan Athens 2000? More specifically

- Was this process "rational", according to your definition of the word?
- To what extent was the participation to the planning process of citizens and interested official bodies (local governments, professional associations, etc.) insured? Was this participation enough to at least guarantee acceptance of the plan when time comes for it to be implemented?
- Do you think that it is possible that the final plan Athens 2000, composed out of nine separate Sector plans, will be sufficiently integrated, consistent in its objectives and the means prescribed to achieve them?

1. Translated from Greek.

3. According to law 360/1976 whether or not a master plan is adopted must be decided by the National Council of Physical Planning and Environment (ESHP)

- What does such an adoption mean?
- To what extent, do you think, the official adoption of a master plan will be binding to the members of ESHP, so that the future action of the government agencies which belong to the Council, help to bring about the implementation of the plan?
- Generally how do you feel about the process of adoption of a master plan, as this process is described in the current legislation?

4. Typically, there are three kinds of tools that are used for the implementation of physical planning in a western society: Regulation; taxation; and capital investment.

- How do you think that each of these tools will be used to bring about the implementation of Plan Athens 2000?
- Do you feel confident about the effectiveness of these tools in the present case?
- If not, what do you think are the "weak points" that might render the use of these tools insufficient or even inappropriate in the present case?

5. It is widely accepted today that planning does not end in the preparation, nor in the adoption of a document, however elaborate it may be, but that it rather is a continuous process.

- To your knowledge, are there to be taken any measures that will insure the continuous updating of the plan "Athens 2000" during the twenty years of its gradual implementation?

- If there are such measures considered, do you believe that they will be sufficient?

6. To end the discussion about "Athens 2000", I would like to have some of your comments on the draft plan. More specifically I am interested in your commenting on the objectives of the plan as well as on the propositions made to achieve these objectives.

7. As a conclusion, what would you have to say about the organization of planning in Greece, in general and, specifically in regard with the process of preparation of "Athens 2000".

APPENDIX B

LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED

1. WITHOUT THE STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Mr. I. Sariyannis (Doctor in City Planning).
Chair of City and Regional Planning,
Athens National Technical University
2. Mr. I Haidopoulos (Architect, planner)
"Diamantopoulos and Associates" Planning Consulting Firm
3. Mr. N. Hadjitheodorou (M.Sc. in Urban Planning Studies)
"Doxiadis and Associates" Planning Consulting Firm
4. Mr. K. Gartsos (Architect, Planner)
"Gartsos and Associates" Planning Consulting firm
5. Ms. F. Bazou (Architect, Planner)
"Papayiannis and Associates." Planning Consulting Firm
6. Ms. E. Bassoukea (Architect, Planner)
"Ministry of Planning and Environment"
Office of Athens Master Plan
7. Mr. G. Prevelakis (Architect, Planner)
"Ministry of Planning and Environment"
Office of Athens Master Plan
8. Mr. M. Vlessas (Architect, Planner)
"Gartsos and Associates" Planning Consulting Firm

2. WITH THE STRUCTURED QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Mr. V. Harissis (Architect, Planner)

"Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment,"

Director of Master Plans.

2. Mr. I. Pyriotis (M.Sc. in City Planning)

"Ministry of Coordination" Secretariat of the

"National Council of Physical Planning and Environment"

3. Mr. P. Psomopoulos (Planner, Project Manager) "Doxiadis

Associates" Planning Consulting firm.

4. Mr. A. Papadakis (Architect, Planner)

"Diamantopoulos and Associates" Planning Consulting

firm.

5. Ms. Roula Lambropoulou (Architect, Planning Consultant)

"Regional Association of Municipalities and Communities

of the Department of Attica" (TEDKNA)

BASIC STATISTICS OF GREECE¹

1. The Land

Area (1,000 sq. km.)	132.0	Main urban areas	
Cultivated area		14.3.1971 census (1,000)	
(1,000 sq. km.)		Greater Athens	2,540
1976	39.2	Salonika	577

2. The People

Population, 1978 mid-year (1,000)	9,360	Total employment	
No. of inhabitants per sq. km.	71	1976 (1,000)	(2,230)
Net natural population increase, 1977 (1000).	6	Agriculture (%)	(34.4)
		Industry and construction	(28.9)
		Other activities (mainly services) (%)	(36.7)

3. Production

GNP, 1978 (billion drachame)	1,182.3	Origin of GDP at factor	
GNP per head (\$), 1978	3,440	1978 (billion drs.)	1,005.4
Gross fixed investment (excl. ships) percent of GNP, 1978 per head (\$), 1978	785	Agriculture (%)	17.1
		Mining and Manufacturing (%)	20.4
		Construction (%)	9.0
		Services (%)	53.3

4. The Government

General government expenditure, 1978 (% of GNP)	29.4	Composition of Parliament (No. of seats):	
General government current revenue, 1978 (% of GNP)	294.4	New Democracy	172
		Panhellenic Socialist Movement	93
		Communist Party	11
		Other	24
			<u>300</u>

Last general election: 20.11.1977

1. Source: OECD: "Economic Surveys, Greece" 1979.

APPENDIX D

GLOSSARY

1. Economic Terms

Active Population: See Labor force

Capital Goods: One of the factors of production, specifically referring to all goods that are used to produce other goods and services, including factories, machinery and equipment [1, p. 57].

Consumer Goods: Products used directly to satisfy human needs or desires, such as food or clothing, as opposed to capital goods, used to produce some other product or service [1, p. 90].

Deficit: In describing a government budget, means an excess of expenditures over revenues [6, p. 75].

Eminent Domain: The right of government to take private property for public purposes. Usually some legal or constitutional provision requires that the owner be paid fair compensation for such property [1, p. 133].

European Economic Community (also Common Market): Originally a customs union of six European Countries (...) formed in 1958, which has since become a more inclusive economic union in terms of both membership and functions [1, p. 81].

Expropriation: The right of a government to take over private property, usually but not always with compensation for the owner (see also Eminent Domain) [1, p. 146].

Gross Domestic Product (G.D.P.): The money value of all the goods and services produced within a country but excluding net income from abroad [4, p. 240].

Gross National Product (G.N.P.): The total monetary value of a nation's output of goods and services during a given period, usually a year [1, p. 184].

Labor Force: The total number of men, women and children of working age in a country [4, p. 293].

Primary Sector of Production: This comprises all extractive occupations farming, lumbering, fishing, mining and grazing, the products of which are foodstuffs and raw materials [4, p. 387].

Secondary Sector of Production: This comprises all occupations concerned with manufacturing in which the raw materials produced in primary production are turned into finished goods [4, pp. 423, 357].

Tertiary Sector of Production: This includes all services: Commercial services, which are concerned with the movement, storage and distribution of goods; and direct and personal services of all kinds other than those related with commercial services [4, pp. 450, 357].

2. Greek Acronyms

EKKE: Greek Center of Social Research.

ESHPH: National Council of Physical Planning and Environment.

ETERPS: National Fund for the Implementation of Urban Development Plans and Programs.

KAMPDE: Regulations for Commissioning Studies and Programs of Public Investment.

KEPE: Center of Planning and Economic Research.

SADAS: Association of Architects.

TEDKNA: Regional Association of Municipalities and Communities of the Department of Attica.

TEE: Technical Chamber of Greece.

YEMKA: Advisory Committee of the Directory of Planning Firms.

YHOP: Ministry of Physical Planning and Environment.

Timoklia Ioannidis-Dougalis was born in Athens, Greece on April 7, 1950. She has lived most of her life in Athens, where, in September, 1971 she entered the School of Architecture of the National Technical University. She graduated in September 1975, with a degree in Architecture.

In 1976 Timoklia Ioannidis-Dougalis came with her husband to the United States, where in January, 1977 she entered the Graduate School of Planning at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville. She received her Master of Science in Planning in March, 1983, and she plans to return to Greece and work as a planner in the public sector.

Timoklia Ioannidis-Dougalis is married to Vassilios Dougalis. They have one child, Anastasia.